{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1744/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1744","id":"gutenberg_1744","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1744","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Classical literature","Pleasure -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"Produced by Sue Asscher\n\n\n\n\n\nPHILEBUS\n\nBy Plato\n\n\nTranslated by Benjamin Jowett\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.\n\nThe Philebus appears to be one of the later writings of Plato, in which\nthe style has begun to alter, and the dramatic and poetical element\nhas become subordinate to the speculative and philosophical. In the\ndevelopment of abstract thought great advances have been made on the\nProtagoras or the Phaedrus, and even on the Republic. But there is a\ncorresponding diminution of artistic skill, a want of character in the\npersons, a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and\nincompleteness in the general design. As in the speeches of Thucydides,\nthe multiplication of ideas seems to interfere with the power of\nexpression. Instead of the equally diffused grace and ease of the\nearlier dialogues there occur two or three highly-wrought passages;\ninstead of the ever-flowing play of humour, now appearing, now\nconcealed, but always present, are inserted a good many bad jests, as\nwe may venture to term them. We may observe an attempt at artificial\nornament, and far-fetched modes of expression; also clamorous demands\non the part of his companions, that Socrates shall answer his own\nquestions, as well as other defects of style, which remind us of the\nLaws. The connection is often abrupt and inharmonious, and far from\nclear. Many points require further explanation; e.g. the reference of\npleasure to the indefinite class, compared with the assertion which\nalmost immediately follows, that pleasure and pain naturally have their\nseat in the third or mixed class: these two statements are unreconciled.\nIn like manner, the table of goods does not distinguish between the\ntwo heads of measure and symmetry; and though a hint is given that the\ndivine mind has the first place, nothing is said of this in the final\nsumming up. The relation of the goods to the sciences does not appear;\nthough dialectic may be thought to correspond to the highest good, the\nsciences and arts and true opinions are enumerated in the fourth class.\nWe seem to have an intimation of a further discussion, in which some\ntopics lightly passed over were to receive a fuller consideration. The\nvarious uses of the word 'mixed,' for the mixed life, the mixed class\nof elements, the mixture of pleasures, or of pleasure and pain, are a\nfurther source of perplexity. Our ignorance of the opinions which\nPlato is attacking is also an element of obscurity. Many things in a\ncontroversy might seem relevant, if we knew to what they were intended\nto refer. But no conjecture will enable us to supply what Plato has\nnot told us; or to explain, from our fragmentary knowledge of them,\nthe relation in which his doctrine stood to the Eleatic Being or\nthe Megarian good, or to the theories of Aristippus or Antisthenes\nrespecting pleasure. Nor are we able to say how far Plato in the\nPhilebus conceives the finite and infinite (which occur both in the\nfragments of Philolaus and in the Pythagorean table of opposites) in the\nsame manner as contemporary Pythagoreans.\n\nThere is little in the characters which is worthy of remark. The\nSocrates of the Philebus is devoid of any touch of Socratic irony,\nthough here, as in the Phaedrus, he twice attributes the flow of his\nideas to a sudden inspiration. The interlocutor Protarchus, the son of\nCallias, who has been a hearer of Gorgias, is supposed to begin as a\ndisciple of the partisans of pleasure, but is drawn over to the opposite\nside by the arguments of Socrates. The instincts of ingenuous youth are\neasily induced to take the better part. Philebus, who has withdrawn from\nthe argument, is several times brought back again, that he may support\npleasure, of which he remains to the end the uncompromising advocate.\nOn the other hand, the youthful group of listeners by whom he is\nsurrounded, 'Philebus' boys' as they are termed, whose presence is\nseveral times intimated, are described as all of them at last convinced\nby the arguments of Socrates. They bear a very faded resemblance to the\ninterested audiences of the Charmides, Lysis, or Protagoras. Other\nsigns of relation to external life in the dialogue, or references\nto contemporary things and persons, with the single exception of the\nallusions to the anonymous enemies of pleasure, and the teachers of the\nflux, there are none.\n\nThe omission of the doctrine of recollection, derived from a previous\nstate of existence, is a note of progress in the philosophy of Plato.\nThe transcendental theory of pre-existent ideas, which is chiefly\ndiscussed by him in the Meno, the Phaedo, and the Phaedrus, has given\nway to a psychological one. The omission is rendered more significant\nby his having occasion to speak of memory as the basis of desire. Of\nthe ideas he treats in the same sceptical spirit which appears in his\ncriticism of them in the Parmenides. He touches on the same difficulties\nand he gives no answer to them. His mode of speaking of the analytical\nand synthetical processes may be compared with his discussion of the\nsame subject in the Phaedrus; here he dwells on the importance of\ndividing the genera into all the species, while in the Phaedrus he\nconveys the same truth in a figure, when he speaks of carving the whole,\nwhich is described under the image of a victim, into parts or members,\n'according to their natural articulation, without breaking any of\nthem.' There is also a difference, which may be noted, between the two\ndialogues. For whereas in the Phaedrus, and also in the Symposium,\nthe dialectician is described as a sort of enthusiast or lover, in the\nPhilebus, as in all the later writings of Plato, the element of love\nis wanting; the topic is only introduced, as in the Republic, by way of\nillustration. On other subjects of which they treat in common, such as\nthe nature and kinds of pleasure, true and false opinion, the nature of\nthe good, the order and relation of the sciences, the Republic is less\nadvanced than the Philebus, which contains, perhaps, more metaphysical\ntruth more obscurely expressed than any other Platonic dialogue. Here,\nas Plato expressly tells us, he is 'forging weapons of another make,'\ni.e. new categories and modes of conception, though 'some of the old\nones might do again.'\n\nBut if superior in thought and dialectical power, the Philebus falls\nvery far short of the Republic in fancy and feeling. The development of\nthe reason undisturbed by the emotions seems to be the ideal at which\nPlato aims in his later dialogues. There is no mystic enthusiasm or\nrapturous contemplation of ideas. Whether we attribute this change to\nthe greater feebleness of age, or to the development of the quarrel\nbetween philosophy and poetry in Plato's own mind, or perhaps, in some\ndegree, to a carelessness about artistic effect, when he was absorbed in\nabstract ideas, we can hardly be wrong in assuming, amid such a variety\nof indications, derived from style as well as subject, that the Philebus\nbelongs to the later period of his life and authorship. But in this, as\nin all the later writings of Plato, there are not wanting thoughts and\nexpressions in which he rises to his highest level.\n\nThe plan is complicated, or rather, perhaps, the want of plan renders\nthe progress of the dialogue difficult to follow. A few leading ideas\nseem to emerge: the relation of the one and many, the four original\nelements, the kinds of pleasure, the kinds of knowledge, the scale of\ngoods. These are only partially connected with one another. The dialogue\nis not rightly entitled 'Concerning pleasure' or 'Concerning good,' but\nshould rather be described as treating of the relations of pleasure\nand knowledge, after they have been duly analyzed, to the good. (1) The\nquestion is asked, whether pleasure or wisdom is the chief good, or some\nnature higher than either; and if the latter, how pleasure and wisdom\nare related to this higher good. (2) Before we can reply with exactness,\nwe must know the kinds of pleasure and the kinds of knowledge. (3) But\nstill we may affirm generally, that the combined life of pleasure and\nwisdom or knowledge has more of the character of the good than either of\nthem when isolated. (4) to determine which of them partakes most of the\nhigher nature, we must know under which of the four unities or elements\nthey respectively fall. These are, first, the infinite; secondly, the\nfinite; thirdly, the union of the two; fourthly, the cause of the union.\nPleasure is of the first, wisdom or knowledge of the third class, while\nreason or mind is akin to the fourth or highest.\n\n(5) Pleasures are of two kinds, the mixed and unmixed. Of mixed\npleasures there are three classes--(a) those in which both the pleasures\nand pains are corporeal, as in eating and hunger; (b) those in which\nthere is a pain of the body and pleasure of the mind, as when you\nare hungry and are looking forward to a feast; (c) those in which the\npleasure and pain are both mental. Of unmixed pleasures there are four\nkinds: those of sight, hearing, smell, knowledge.\n\n(6) The sciences are likewise divided into two classes, theoretical and\nproductive: of the latter, one part is pure, the other impure. The\npure part consists of arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing. Arts like\ncarpentering, which have an exact measure, are to be regarded as higher\nthan music, which for the most part is mere guess-work. But there is\nalso a higher arithmetic, and a higher mensuration, which is exclusively\ntheoretical; and a dialectical science, which is higher still and the\ntruest and purest knowledge.\n\n(7) We are now able to determine the composition of the perfect life.\nFirst, we admit the pure pleasures and the pure sciences; secondly, the\nimpure sciences, but not the impure pleasures. We have next to discover\nwhat element of goodness is contained in this mixture. There are three\ncriteria of goodness--beauty, symmetry, truth. These are clearly more\nakin to reason than to pleasure, and will enable us to fix the places\nof both of them in the scale of good. First in the scale is measure; the\nsecond place is assigned to symmetry; the third, to reason and wisdom;\nthe fourth, to knowledge and true opinion; the fifth, to pure pleasures;\nand here the Muse says 'Enough.'\n\n'Bidding farewell to Philebus and Socrates,' we may now consider the\nmetaphysical conceptions which are presented to us. These are (I)\nthe paradox of unity and plurality; (II) the table of categories or\nelements; (III) the kinds of pleasure; (IV) the kinds of knowledge;\n(V) the conception of the good. We may then proceed to examine (VI) the\nrelation of the Philebus to the Republic, and to other dialogues.\n\nI. The paradox of the one and many originated in the restless dialectic\nof Zeno, who sought to prove the absolute existence of the one by\nshowing the contradictions that are involved in admitting the existence\nof the many (compare Parm.). Zeno illustrated the contradiction by\nwell-known examples taken from outward objects. But Socrates seems\nto intimate that the time had arrived for discarding these hackneyed\nillustrations; such difficulties had long been solved by common sense\n('solvitur ambulando'); the fact of the co-existence of opposites was\na sufficient answer to them. He will leave them to Cynics and Eristics;\nthe youth of Athens may discourse of them to their parents. To no\nrational man could the circumstance that the body is one, but has many\nmembers, be any longer a stumbling-block.\n\nPlato's difficulty seems to begin in the region of ideas. He cannot\nunderstand how an absolute unity, such as the Eleatic Being, can be\nbroken up into a number of individuals, or be in and out of them at\nonce. Philosophy had so deepened or intensified the nature of one or\nBeing, by the thoughts of successive generations, that the mind could no\nlonger imagine 'Being' as in a state of change or division. To say that\nthe verb of existence is the copula, or that unity is a mere unit, is\nto us easy; but to the Greek in a particular stage of thought such an\nanalysis involved the same kind of difficulty as the conception of God\nexisting both in and out of the world would to ourselves. Nor was he\nassisted by the analogy of sensible objects. The sphere of mind was dark\nand mysterious to him; but instead of being illustrated by sense, the\ngreatest light appeared to be thrown on the nature of ideas when they\nwere contrasted with sense.\n\nBoth here and in the Parmenides, where similar difficulties are raised,\nPlato seems prepared to desert his ancient ground. He cannot tell the\nrelation in which abstract ideas stand to one another, and therefore he\ntransfers the one and many out of his transcendental world, and proceeds\nto lay down practical rules for their application to different branches\nof knowledge. As in the Republic he supposes the philosopher to proceed\nby regular steps, until he arrives at the idea of good; as in the\nSophist and Politicus he insists that in dividing the whole into its\nparts we should bisect in the middle in the hope of finding species;\nas in the Phaedrus (see above) he would have 'no limb broken' of the\norganism of knowledge;--so in the Philebus he urges the necessity of\nfilling up all the intermediate links which occur (compare Bacon's\n'media axiomata') in the passage from unity to infinity. With him the\nidea of science may be said to anticipate science; at a time when\nthe sciences were not yet divided, he wants to impress upon us the\nimportance of classification; neither neglecting the many individuals,\nnor attempting to count them all, but finding the genera and species\nunder which they naturally fall. Here, then, and in the parallel\npassages of the Phaedrus and of the Sophist, is found the germ of the\nmost fruitful notion of modern science.\n\nPlato describes with ludicrous exaggeration the influence exerted by\nthe one and many on the minds of young men in their first fervour of\nmetaphysical enthusiasm (compare Republic). But they are none the less\nan everlasting quality of reason or reasoning which never grows old in\nus. At first we have but a confused conception of them, analogous to the\neyes blinking at the light in the Republic. To this Plato opposes\nthe revelation from Heaven of the real relations of them, which some\nPrometheus, who gave the true fire from heaven, is supposed to have\nimparted to us. Plato is speaking of two things--(1) the crude notion of\nthe one and many, which powerfully affects the ordinary mind when first\nbeginning to think; (2) the same notion when cleared up by the help of\ndialectic.\n\nTo us the problem of the one and many has lost its chief interest and\nperplexity. We readily acknowledge that a whole has many parts, that the\ncontinuous is also the divisible, that in all objects of sense there is\na one and many, and that a like principle may be applied to analogy\nto purely intellectual conceptions. If we attend to the meaning of the\nwords, we are compelled to admit that two contradictory statements are\ntrue. But the antinomy is so familiar as to be scarcely observed by us.\nOur sense of the contradiction, like Plato's, only begins in a higher\nsphere, when we speak of necessity and free-will, of mind and body, of\nThree Persons and One Substance, and the like. The world of knowledge\nis always dividing more and more; every truth is at first the enemy of\nevery other truth. Yet without this division there can be no truth; nor\nany complete truth without the reunion of the parts into a whole. And\nhence the coexistence of opposites in the unity of the idea is regarded\nby Hegel as the supreme principle of philosophy; and the law of\ncontradiction, which is affirmed by logicians to be an ultimate\nprinciple of the human mind, is displaced by another law, which asserts\nthe coexistence of contradictories as imperfect and divided elements of\nthe truth. Without entering further into the depths of Hegelianism, we\nmay remark that this and all similar attempts to reconcile antinomies\nhave their origin in the old Platonic problem of the 'One and Many.'\n\nII. 1. The first of Plato's categories or elements is the infinite. This\nis the negative of measure or limit; the unthinkable, the unknowable;\nof which nothing can be affirmed; the mixture or chaos which preceded\ndistinct kinds in the creation of the world; the first vague impression\nof sense; the more or less which refuses to be reduced to rule, having\ncertain affinities with evil, with pleasure, with ignorance, and which\nin the scale of being is farthest removed from the beautiful and good.\nTo a Greek of the age of Plato, the idea of an infinite mind would\nhave been an absurdity. He would have insisted that 'the good is of the\nnature of the finite,' and that the infinite is a mere negative, which\nis on the level of sensation, and not of thought. He was aware that\nthere was a distinction between the infinitely great and the infinitely\nsmall, but he would have equally denied the claim of either to true\nexistence. Of that positive infinity, or infinite reality, which we\nattribute to God, he had no conception.\n\nThe Greek conception of the infinite would be more truly described, in\nour way of speaking, as the indefinite. To us, the notion of infinity\nis subsequent rather than prior to the finite, expressing not absolute\nvacancy or negation, but only the removal of limit or restraint, which\nwe suppose to exist not before but after we have already set bounds to\nthought and matter, and divided them after their kinds. From different\npoints of view, either the finite or infinite may be looked upon\nrespectively both as positive and negative (compare 'Omnis determinatio\nest negatio')' and the conception of the one determines that of the\nother. The Greeks and the moderns seem to be nearly at the opposite\npoles in their manner of regarding them. And both are surprised when\nthey make the discovery, as Plato has done in the Sophist, how large an\nelement negation forms in the framework of their thoughts.\n\n2, 3. The finite element which mingles with and regulates the infinite\nis best expressed to us by the word 'law.' It is that which measures all\nthings and assigns to them their limit; which preserves them in their\nnatural state, and brings them within the sphere of human cognition.\nThis is described by the terms harmony, health, order, perfection, and\nthe like. All things, in as far as they are good, even pleasures, which\nare for the most part indefinite, partake of this element. We should be\nwrong in attributing to Plato the conception of laws of nature derived\nfrom observation and experiment. And yet he has as intense a conviction\nas any modern philosopher that nature does not proceed by chance. But\nobserving that the wonderful construction of number and figure, which he\nhad within himself, and which seemed to be prior to himself, explained\na part of the phenomena of the external world, he extended their\nprinciples to the whole, finding in them the true type both of human\nlife and of the order of nature.\n\nTwo other points may be noticed respecting the third class. First, that\nPlato seems to be unconscious of any interval or chasm which separates\nthe finite from the infinite. The one is in various ways and degrees\nworking in the other. Hence he has implicitly answered the difficulty\nwith which he started, of how the one could remain one and yet be\ndivided among many individuals, or 'how ideas could be in and out of\nthemselves,' and the like. Secondly, that in this mixed class we find\nthe idea of beauty. Good, when exhibited under the aspect of measure\nor symmetry, becomes beauty. And if we translate his language into\ncorresponding modern terms, we shall not be far wrong in saying that\nhere, as well as in the Republic, Plato conceives beauty under the idea\nof proportion.\n\n4. Last and highest in the list of principles or elements is the cause\nof the union of the finite and infinite, to which Plato ascribes the\norder of the world. Reasoning from man to the universe, he argues that\nas there is a mind in the one, there must be a mind in the other, which\nhe identifies with the royal mind of Zeus. This is the first cause of\nwhich 'our ancestors spoke,' as he says, appealing to tradition, in the\nPhilebus as well as in the Timaeus. The 'one and many' is also supposed\nto have been revealed by tradition. For the mythical element has not\naltogether disappeared.\n\nSome characteristic differences may here be noted, which distinguish the\nancient from the modern mode of conceiving God.\n\na. To Plato, the idea of God or mind is both personal and impersonal.\nNor in ascribing, as appears to us, both these attributes to him, and in\nspeaking of God both in the masculine and neuter gender, did he seem\nto himself inconsistent. For the difference between the personal and\nimpersonal was not marked to him as to ourselves. We make a fundamental\ndistinction between a thing and a person, while to Plato, by the help of\nvarious intermediate abstractions, such as end, good, cause, they appear\nalmost to meet in one, or to be two aspects of the same. Hence, without\nany reconciliation or even remark, in the Republic he speaks at one time\nof God or Gods, and at another time of the Good. So in the Phaedrus he\nseems to pass unconsciously from the concrete to the abstract conception\nof the Ideas in the same dialogue. Nor in the Philebus is he careful to\nshow in what relation the idea of the divine mind stands to the supreme\nprinciple of measure.\n\nb. Again, to us there is a strongly-marked distinction between a first\ncause and a final cause. And we should commonly identify a first cause\nwith God, and the final cause with the world, which is His work. But\nPlato, though not a Pantheist, and very far from confounding God with\nthe world, tends to identify the first with the final cause. The cause\nof the union of the finite and infinite might be described as a higher\nlaw; the final measure which is the highest expression of the good\nmay also be described as the supreme law. Both these conceptions are\nrealized chiefly by the help of the material world; and therefore when\nwe pass into the sphere of ideas can hardly be distinguished.\n\nThe four principles are required for the determination of the relative\nplaces of pleasure and wisdom. Plato has been saying that we should\nproceed by regular steps from the one to the many. Accordingly, before\nassigning the precedence either to good or pleasure, he must first\nfind out and arrange in order the general principles of things. Mind\nis ascertained to be akin to the nature of the cause, while pleasure is\nfound in the infinite or indefinite class. We may now proceed to divide\npleasure and knowledge after their kinds.\n\nIII. 1. Plato speaks of pleasure as indefinite, as relative, as a\ngeneration, and in all these points of view as in a category distinct\nfrom good. For again we must repeat, that to the Greek 'the good is of\nthe nature of the finite,' and, like virtue, either is, or is nearly\nallied to, knowledge. The modern philosopher would remark that the\nindefinite is equally real with the definite. Health and mental\nqualities are in the concrete undefined; they are nevertheless real\ngoods, and Plato rightly regards them as falling under the finite class.\nAgain, we are able to define objects or ideas, not in so far as they are\nin the mind, but in so far as they are manifested externally, and can\ntherefore be reduced to rule and measure. And if we adopt the test\nof definiteness, the pleasures of the body are more capable of being\ndefined than any other pleasures. As in art and knowledge generally, we\nproceed from without inwards, beginning with facts of sense, and passing\nto the more ideal conceptions of mental pleasure, happiness, and the\nlike.\n\n2. Pleasure is depreciated as relative, while good is exalted as\nabsolute. But this distinction seems to arise from an unfair mode\nof regarding them; the abstract idea of the one is compared with the\nconcrete experience of the other. For all pleasure and all knowledge may\nbe viewed either abstracted from the mind, or in relation to the mind\n(compare Aristot. Nic. Ethics). The first is an idea only, which may be\nconceived as absolute and unchangeable, and then the abstract idea of\npleasure will be equally unchangeable with that of knowledge. But when\nwe come to view either as phenomena of consciousness, the same defects\nare for the most part incident to both of them. Our hold upon them is\nequally transient and uncertain; the mind cannot be always in a state of\nintellectual tension, any more than capable of feeling pleasure always.\nThe knowledge which is at one time clear and distinct, at another seems\nto fade away, just as the pleasure of health after sickness, or of\neating after hunger, soon passes into a neutral state of unconsciousness\nand indifference. Change and alternation are necessary for the mind as\nwell as for the body; and in this is to be acknowledged, not an element\nof evil, but rather a law of nature. The chief difference between\nsubjective pleasure and subjective knowledge in respect of permanence is\nthat the latter, when our feeble faculties are able to grasp it, still\nconveys to us an idea of unchangeableness which cannot be got rid of.\n\n3. In the language of ancient philosophy, the relative character of\npleasure is described as becoming or generation. This is relative to\nBeing or Essence, and from one point of view may be regarded as the\nHeraclitean flux in contrast with the Eleatic Being; from another,\nas the transient enjoyment of eating and drinking compared with the\nsupposed permanence of intellectual pleasures. But to us the distinction\nis unmeaning, and belongs to a stage of philosophy which has passed\naway. Plato himself seems to have suspected that the continuance or life\nof things is quite as much to be attributed to a principle of rest as\nof motion (compare Charm. Cratyl.). A later view of pleasure is found\nin Aristotle, who agrees with Plato in many points, e.g. in his view of\npleasure as a restoration to nature, in his distinction between bodily\nand mental, between necessary and non-necessary pleasures. But he is\nalso in advance of Plato; for he affirms that pleasure is not in the\nbody at all; and hence not even the bodily pleasures are to be spoken of\nas generations, but only as accompanied by generation (Nic. Eth.).\n\n4. Plato attempts to identify vicious pleasures with some form of error,\nand insists that the term false may be applied to them: in this he\nappears to be carrying out in a confused manner the Socratic doctrine,\nthat virtue is knowledge, vice ignorance. He will allow of no\ndistinction between the pleasures and the erroneous opinions on which\nthey are founded, whether arising out of the illusion of distance or\nnot. But to this we naturally reply with Protarchus, that the\npleasure is what it is, although the calculation may be false, or the\nafter-effects painful. It is difficult to acquit Plato, to use his own\nlanguage, of being a 'tyro in dialectics,' when he overlooks such\na distinction. Yet, on the other hand, we are hardly fair judges\nof confusions of thought in those who view things differently from\nourselves.\n\n5. There appears also to be an incorrectness in the notion which occurs\nboth here and in the Gorgias, of the simultaneousness of merely bodily\npleasures and pains. We may, perhaps, admit, though even this is not\nfree from doubt, that the feeling of pleasureable hope or recollection\nis, or rather may be, simultaneous with acute bodily suffering. But\nthere is no such coexistence of the pain of thirst with the pleasures\nof drinking; they are not really simultaneous, for the one expels the\nother. Nor does Plato seem to have considered that the bodily pleasures,\nexcept in certain extreme cases, are unattended with pain. Few\nphilosophers will deny that a degree of pleasure attends eating\nand drinking; and yet surely we might as well speak of the pains of\ndigestion which follow, as of the pains of hunger and thirst which\nprecede them. Plato's conception is derived partly from the extreme case\nof a man suffering pain from hunger or thirst, partly from the image\nof a full and empty vessel. But the truth is rather, that while the\ngratification of our bodily desires constantly affords some degree\nof pleasure, the antecedent pains are scarcely perceived by us, being\nalmost done away with by use and regularity.\n\n6. The desire to classify pleasures as accompanied or not accompanied by\nantecedent pains, has led Plato to place under one head the pleasures of\nsmell and sight, as well as those derived from sounds of music and from\nknowledge. He would have done better to make a separate class of the\npleasures of smell, having no association of mind, or perhaps to have\ndivided them into natural and artificial. The pleasures of sight and\nsound might then have been regarded as being the expression of ideas.\nBut this higher and truer point of view never appears to have occurred\nto Plato. Nor has he any distinction between the fine arts and the\nmechanical; and, neither here nor anywhere, an adequate conception of\nthe beautiful in external things.\n\n7. Plato agrees partially with certain 'surly or fastidious'\nphilosophers, as he terms them, who defined pleasure to be the absence\nof pain. They are also described as eminent in physics. There is\nunfortunately no school of Greek philosophy known to us which combined\nthese two characteristics. Antisthenes, who was an enemy of pleasure,\nwas not a physical philosopher; the atomists, who were physical\nphilosophers, were not enemies of pleasure. Yet such a combination of\nopinions is far from being impossible. Plato's omission to mention them\nby name has created the same uncertainty respecting them which also\noccurs respecting the 'friends of the ideas' and the 'materialists' in\nthe Sophist.\n\nOn the whole, this discussion is one of the least satisfactory in the\ndialogues of Plato. While the ethical nature of pleasure is scarcely\nconsidered, and the merely physical phenomenon imperfectly analysed,\ntoo much weight is given to ideas of measure and number, as the sole\nprinciple of good. The comparison of pleasure and knowledge is really\na comparison of two elements, which have no common measure, and which\ncannot be excluded from each other. Feeling is not opposed to knowledge,\nand in all consciousness there is an element of both. The most abstract\nkinds of knowledge are inseparable from some pleasure or pain, which\naccompanies the acquisition or possession of them: the student is liable\nto grow weary of them, and soon discovers that continuous mental energy\nis not granted to men. The most sensual pleasure, on the other hand, is\ninseparable from the consciousness of pleasure; no man can be happy who,\nto borrow Plato's illustration, is leading the life of an oyster. Hence\n(by his own confession) the main thesis is not worth determining; the\nreal interest lies in the incidental discussion. We can no more separate\npleasure from knowledge in the Philebus than we can separate justice\nfrom happiness in the Republic.\n\nIV. An interesting account is given in the Philebus of the rank and\norder of the sciences or arts, which agrees generally with the scheme\nof knowledge in the Sixth Book of the Republic. The chief difference is,\nthat the position of the arts is more exactly defined. They are divided\ninto an empirical part and a scientific part, of which the first is mere\nguess-work, the second is determined by rule and measure. Of the more\nempirical arts, music is given as an example; this, although affirmed\nto be necessary to human life, is depreciated. Music is regarded from\na point of view entirely opposite to that of the Republic, not as a\nsublime science, coordinate with astronomy, but as full of doubt and\nconjecture. According to the standard of accuracy which is here adopted,\nit is rightly placed lower in the scale than carpentering, because the\nlatter is more capable of being reduced to measure.\n\nThe theoretical element of the arts may also become a purely abstract\nscience, when separated from matter, and is then said to be pure and\nunmixed. The distinction which Plato here makes seems to be the same as\nthat between pure and applied mathematics, and may be expressed in the\nmodern formula--science is art theoretical, art is science practical.\nIn the reason which he gives for the superiority of the pure science of\nnumber over the mixed or applied, we can only agree with him in part. He\nsays that the numbers which the philosopher employs are always the same,\nwhereas the numbers which are used in practice represent different sizes\nor quantities. He does not see that this power of expressing different\nquantities by the same symbol is the characteristic and not the defect\nof numbers, and is due to their abstract nature;--although we admit of\ncourse what Plato seems to feel in his distinctions between pure and\nimpure knowledge, that the imperfection of matter enters into the\napplications of them.\n\nAbove the other sciences, as in the Republic, towers dialectic, which is\nthe science of eternal Being, apprehended by the purest mind and reason.\nThe lower sciences, including the mathematical, are akin to opinion\nrather than to reason, and are placed together in the fourth class of\ngoods. The relation in which they stand to dialectic is obscure in the\nRepublic, and is not cleared up in the Philebus.\n\nV. Thus far we have only attained to the vestibule or ante-chamber of\nthe good; for there is a good exceeding knowledge, exceeding\nessence, which, like Glaucon in the Republic, we find a difficulty\nin apprehending. This good is now to be exhibited to us under various\naspects and gradations. The relative dignity of pleasure and knowledge\nhas been determined; but they have not yet received their exact position\nin the scale of goods. Some difficulties occur to us in the enumeration:\nFirst, how are we to distinguish the first from the second class of\ngoods, or the second from the third? Secondly, why is there no mention\nof the supreme mind? Thirdly, the nature of the fourth class. Fourthly,\nthe meaning of the allusion to a sixth class, which is not further\ninvestigated.\n\n(I) Plato seems to proceed in his table of goods, from the more abstract\nto the less abstract; from the subjective to the objective; until at the\nlower end of the scale we fairly descend into the region of human action\nand feeling. To him, the greater the abstraction the greater the truth,\nand he is always tending to see abstractions within abstractions;\nwhich, like the ideas in the Parmenides, are always appearing one behind\nanother. Hence we find a difficulty in following him into the sphere of\nthought which he is seeking to attain. First in his scale of goods he\nplaces measure, in which he finds the eternal nature: this would be more\nnaturally expressed in modern language as eternal law, and seems to be\nakin both to the finite and to the mind or cause, which were two of the\nelements in the former table. Like the supreme nature in the Timaeus,\nlike the ideal beauty in the Symposium or the Phaedrus, or like the\nideal good in the Republic, this is the absolute and unapproachable\nbeing. But this being is manifested in symmetry and beauty everywhere,\nin the order of nature and of mind, in the relations of men to one\nanother. For the word 'measure' he now substitutes the word 'symmetry,'\nas if intending to express measure conceived as relation. He then\nproceeds to regard the good no longer in an objective form, but as the\nhuman reason seeking to attain truth by the aid of dialectic; such at\nleast we naturally infer to be his meaning, when we consider that both\nhere and in the Republic the sphere of nous or mind is assigned\nto dialectic. (2) It is remarkable (see above) that this personal\nconception of mind is confined to the human mind, and not extended to\nthe divine. (3) If we may be allowed to interpret one dialogue of Plato\nby another, the sciences of figure and number are probably classed\nwith the arts and true opinions, because they proceed from hypotheses\n(compare Republic). (4) The sixth class, if a sixth class is to be\nadded, is playfully set aside by a quotation from Orpheus: Plato means\nto say that a sixth class, if there be such a class, is not worth\nconsidering, because pleasure, having only gained the fifth place in the\nscale of goods, is already out of the running.\n\nVI. We may now endeavour to ascertain the relation of the Philebus to\nthe other dialogues. Here Plato shows the same indifference to his own\ndoctrine of Ideas which he has already manifested in the Parmenides and\nthe Sophist. The principle of the one and many of which he here speaks,\nis illustrated by examples in the Sophist and Statesman. Notwithstanding\nthe differences of style, many resemblances may be noticed between the\nPhilebus and Gorgias. The theory of the simultaneousness of pleasure\nand pain is common to both of them (Phil. Gorg.); there is also a common\ntendency in them to take up arms against pleasure, although the view of\nthe Philebus, which is probably the later of the two dialogues, is\nthe more moderate. There seems to be an allusion to the passage in\nthe Gorgias, in which Socrates dilates on the pleasures of itching and\nscratching. Nor is there any real discrepancy in the manner in which\nGorgias and his art are spoken of in the two dialogues. For Socrates\nis far from implying that the art of rhetoric has a real sphere of\npractical usefulness: he only means that the refutation of the claims\nof Gorgias is not necessary for his present purpose. He is saying\nin effect: 'Admit, if you please, that rhetoric is the greatest and\nusefullest of sciences:--this does not prove that dialectic is not the\npurest and most exact.' From the Sophist and Statesman we know that his\nhostility towards the sophists and rhetoricians was not mitigated in\nlater life; although both in the Statesman and Laws he admits of a\nhigher use of rhetoric.\n\nReasons have been already given for assigning a late date to the\nPhilebus. That the date is probably later than that of the Republic, may\nbe further argued on the following grounds:--1. The general resemblance\nto the later dialogues and to the Laws: 2. The more complete account of\nthe nature of good and pleasure: 3. The distinction between perception,\nmemory, recollection, and opinion which indicates a great progress\nin psychology; also between understanding and imagination, which is\ndescribed under the figure of the scribe and the painter. A superficial\nnotion may arise that Plato probably wrote shorter dialogues, such as\nthe Philebus, the Sophist, and the Statesman, as studies or preparations\nfor longer ones. This view may be natural; but on further reflection is\nseen to be fallacious, because these three dialogues are found to make\nan advance upon the metaphysical conceptions of the Republic. And we can\nmore easily suppose that Plato composed shorter writings after longer\nones, than suppose that he lost hold of further points of view which he\nhad once attained.\n\nIt is more easy to find traces of the Pythagoreans, Eleatics, Megarians,\nCynics, Cyrenaics and of the ideas of Anaxagoras, in the Philebus, than\nto say how much is due to each of them. Had we fuller records of those\nold philosophers, we should probably find Plato in the midst of the fray\nattempting to combine Eleatic and Pythagorean doctrines, and seeking to\nfind a truth beyond either Being or number; setting up his own concrete\nconception of good against the abstract practical good of the Cynics,\nor the abstract intellectual good of the Megarians, and his own idea of\nclassification against the denial of plurality in unity which is also\nattributed to them; warring against the Eristics as destructive of\ntruth, as he had formerly fought against the Sophists; taking up a\nmiddle position between the Cynics and Cyrenaics in his doctrine of\npleasure; asserting with more consistency than Anaxagoras the existence\nof an intelligent mind and cause. Of the Heracliteans, whom he is said\nby Aristotle to have cultivated in his youth, he speaks in the Philebus,\nas in the Theaetetus and Cratylus, with irony and contempt. But we have\nnot the knowledge which would enable us to pursue further the line of\nreflection here indicated; nor can we expect to find perfect clearness\nor order in the first efforts of mankind to understand the working of\ntheir own minds. The ideas which they are attempting to analyse, they\nare also in process of creating; the abstract universals of which they\nare seeking to adjust the relations have been already excluded by them\nfrom the category of relation.\n\n...\n\nThe Philebus, like the Cratylus, is supposed to be the continuation of\na previous discussion. An argument respecting the comparative claims of\npleasure and wisdom to rank as the chief good has been already carried\non between Philebus and Socrates. The argument is now transferred to\nProtarchus, the son of Callias, a noble Athenian youth, sprung from\na family which had spent 'a world of money' on the Sophists (compare\nApol.; Crat.; Protag.). Philebus, who appears to be the teacher, or\nelder friend, and perhaps the lover, of Protarchus, takes no further\npart in the discussion beyond asserting in the strongest manner his\nadherence, under all circumstances, to the cause of pleasure.\n\nSocrates suggests that they shall have a first and second palm of\nvictory. For there may be a good higher than either pleasure or wisdom,\nand then neither of them will gain the first prize, but whichever of the\ntwo is more akin to this higher good will have a right to the second.\nThey agree, and Socrates opens the game by enlarging on the diversity\nand opposition which exists among pleasures. For there are pleasures of\nall kinds, good and bad, wise and foolish--pleasures of the temperate as\nwell as of the intemperate. Protarchus replies that although pleasures\nmay be opposed in so far as they spring from opposite sources,\nnevertheless as pleasures they are alike. Yes, retorts Socrates,\npleasure is like pleasure, as figure is like figure and colour like\ncolour; yet we all know that there is great variety among figures and\ncolours. Protarchus does not see the drift of this remark; and Socrates\nproceeds to ask how he can have a right to attribute a new predicate\n(i.e. 'good') to pleasures in general, when he cannot deny that they are\ndifferent? What common property in all of them does he mean to indicate\nby the term 'good'? If he continues to assert that there is some trivial\nsense in which pleasure is one, Socrates may retort by saying that\nknowledge is one, but the result will be that such merely verbal and\ntrivial conceptions, whether of knowledge or pleasure, will spoil the\ndiscussion, and will prove the incapacity of the two disputants. In\norder to avoid this danger, he proposes that they shall beat a retreat,\nand, before they proceed, come to an understanding about the 'high\nargument' of the one and the many.\n\nProtarchus agrees to the proposal, but he is under the impression that\nSocrates means to discuss the common question--how a sensible object can\nbe one, and yet have opposite attributes, such as 'great' and 'small,'\n'light' and 'heavy,' or how there can be many members in one body, and\nthe like wonders. Socrates has long ceased to see any wonder in these\nphenomena; his difficulties begin with the application of number to\nabstract unities (e.g.'man,' 'good') and with the attempt to divide\nthem. For have these unities of idea any real existence? How, if\nimperishable, can they enter into the world of generation? How, as\nunits, can they be divided and dispersed among different objects? Or do\nthey exist in their entirety in each object? These difficulties are but\nimperfectly answered by Socrates in what follows.\n\nWe speak of a one and many, which is ever flowing in and out of all\nthings, concerning which a young man often runs wild in his first\nmetaphysical enthusiasm, talking about analysis and synthesis to his\nfather and mother and the neighbours, hardly sparing even his dog. This\n'one in many' is a revelation of the order of the world, which some\nPrometheus first made known to our ancestors; and they, who were better\nmen and nearer the gods than we are, have handed it down to us. To know\nhow to proceed by regular steps from one to many, and from many to one,\nis just what makes the difference between eristic and dialectic. And the\nright way of proceeding is to look for one idea or class in all things,\nand when you have found one to look for more than one, and for all that\nthere are, and when you have found them all and regularly divided a\nparticular field of knowledge into classes, you may leave the further\nconsideration of individuals. But you must not pass at once either from\nunity to infinity, or from infinity to unity. In music, for example, you\nmay begin with the most general notion, but this alone will not make you\na musician: you must know also the number and nature of the intervals,\nand the systems which are framed out of them, and the rhythms of the\ndance which correspond to them. And when you have a similar knowledge of\nany other subject, you may be said to know that subject. In speech again\nthere are infinite varieties of sound, and some one who was a wise man,\nor more than man, comprehended them all in the classes of mutes, vowels,\nand semivowels, and gave to each of them a name, and assigned them to\nthe art of grammar.\n\n'But whither, Socrates, are you going? And what has this to do with the\ncomparative eligibility of pleasure and wisdom:' Socrates replies, that\nbefore we can adjust their respective claims, we want to know the number\nand kinds of both of them. What are they? He is requested to answer the\nquestion himself. That he will, if he may be allowed to make one or two\npreliminary remarks. In the first place he has a dreamy recollection of\nhearing that neither pleasure nor knowledge is the highest good, for\nthe good should be perfect and sufficient. But is the life of pleasure\nperfect and sufficient, when deprived of memory, consciousness,\nanticipation? Is not this the life of an oyster? Or is the life of mind\nsufficient, if devoid of any particle of pleasure? Must not the union of\nthe two be higher and more eligible than either separately? And is not\nthe element which makes this mixed life eligible more akin to mind than\nto pleasure? Thus pleasure is rejected and mind is rejected. And yet\nthere may be a life of mind, not human but divine, which conquers still.\n\nBut, if we are to pursue this argument further, we shall require some\nnew weapons; and by this, I mean a new classification of existence. (1)\nThere is a finite element of existence, and (2) an infinite, and (3) the\nunion of the two, and (4) the cause of the union. More may be added if\nthey are wanted, but at present we can do without them. And first of the\ninfinite or indefinite:--That is the class which is denoted by the terms\nmore or less, and is always in a state of comparison. All words or\nideas to which the words 'gently,' 'extremely,' and other comparative\nexpressions are applied, fall under this class. The infinite would be\nno longer infinite, if limited or reduced to measure by number and\nquantity. The opposite class is the limited or finite, and includes all\nthings which have number and quantity. And there is a third class of\ngeneration into essence by the union of the finite and infinite, in\nwhich the finite gives law to the infinite;--under this are comprehended\nhealth, strength, temperate seasons, harmony, beauty, and the like. The\ngoddess of beauty saw the universal wantonness of all things, and gave\nlaw and order to be the salvation of the soul. But no effect can be\ngenerated without a cause, and therefore there must be a fourth class,\nwhich is the cause of generation; for the cause or agent is not the same\nas the patient or effect.\n\nAnd now, having obtained our classes, we may determine in which our\nconqueror life is to be placed: Clearly in the third or mixed class, in\nwhich the finite gives law to the infinite. And in which is pleasure to\nfind a place? As clearly in the infinite or indefinite, which alone,\nas Protarchus thinks (who seems to confuse the infinite with the\nsuperlative), gives to pleasure the character of the absolute good. Yes,\nretorts Socrates, and also to pain the character of absolute evil. And\ntherefore the infinite cannot be that which imparts to pleasure the\nnature of the good. But where shall we place mind? That is a very\nserious and awful question, which may be prefaced by another. Is mind\nor chance the lord of the universe? All philosophers will say the first,\nand yet, perhaps, they may be only magnifying themselves. And for this\nreason I should like to consider the matter a little more deeply, even\nthough some lovers of disorder in the world should ridicule my attempt.\n\nNow the elements earth, air, fire, water, exist in us, and they exist in\nthe cosmos; but they are purer and fairer in the cosmos than they are in\nus, and they come to us from thence. And as we have a soul as well as a\nbody, in like manner the elements of the finite, the infinite, the union\nof the two, and the cause, are found to exist in us. And if they, like\nthe elements, exist in us, and the three first exist in the world,\nmust not the fourth or cause which is the noblest of them, exist in the\nworld? And this cause is wisdom or mind, the royal mind of Zeus, who\nis the king of all, as there are other gods who have other noble\nattributes. Observe how well this agrees with the testimony of men of\nold, who affirmed mind to be the ruler of the universe. And remember\nthat mind belongs to the class which we term the cause, and pleasure to\nthe infinite or indefinite class. We will examine the place and origin\nof both.\n\nWhat is the origin of pleasure? Her natural seat is the mixed class,\nin which health and harmony were placed. Pain is the violation, and\npleasure the restoration of limit. There is a natural union of finite\nand infinite, which in hunger, thirst, heat, cold, is impaired--this is\npainful, but the return to nature, in which the elements are restored\nto their normal proportions, is pleasant. Here is our first class of\npleasures. And another class of pleasures and pains are hopes and fears;\nthese are in the mind only. And inasmuch as the pleasures are unalloyed\nby pains and the pains by pleasures, the examination of them may show\nus whether all pleasure is to be desired, or whether this entire\ndesirableness is not rather the attribute of another class. But if\npleasures and pains consist in the violation and restoration of limit,\nmay there not be a neutral state, in which there is neither dissolution\nnor restoration? That is a further question, and admitting, as we must,\nthe possibility of such a state, there seems to be no reason why\nthe life of wisdom should not exist in this neutral state, which is,\nmoreover, the state of the gods, who cannot, without indecency, be\nsupposed to feel either joy or sorrow.\n\nThe second class of pleasures involves memory. There are affections\nwhich are extinguished before they reach the soul, and of these there\nis no consciousness, and therefore no memory. And there are affections\nwhich the body and soul feel together, and this feeling is termed\nconsciousness. And memory is the preservation of consciousness, and\nreminiscence is the recovery of consciousness. Now the memory of\npleasure, when a man is in pain, is the memory of the opposite of his\nactual bodily state, and is therefore not in the body, but in the mind.\nAnd there may be an intermediate state, in which a person is balanced\nbetween pleasure and pain; in his body there is want which is a cause of\npain, but in his mind a sure hope of replenishment, which is pleasant.\n(But if the hope be converted into despair, he has two pains and not\na balance of pain and pleasure.) Another question is raised: May not\npleasures, like opinions, be true and false? In the sense of being real,\nboth must be admitted to be true: nor can we deny that to both of them\nqualities may be attributed; for pleasures as well as opinions may be\ndescribed as good or bad. And though we do not all of us allow that\nthere are true and false pleasures, we all acknowledge that there are\nsome pleasures associated with right opinion, and others with\nfalsehood and ignorance. Let us endeavour to analyze the nature of this\nassociation.\n\nOpinion is based on perception, which may be correct or mistaken. You\nmay see a figure at a distance, and say first of all, 'This is a man,'\nand then say, 'No, this is an image made by the shepherds.' And you\nmay affirm this in a proposition to your companion, or make the remark\nmentally to yourself. Whether the words are actually spoken or not,\non such occasions there is a scribe within who registers them, and a\npainter who paints the images of the things which the scribe has written\ndown in the soul,--at least that is my own notion of the process; and\nthe words and images which are inscribed by them may be either true\nor false; and they may represent either past, present, or future. And,\nrepresenting the future, they must also represent the pleasures and\npains of anticipation--the visions of gold and other fancies which are\nnever wanting in the mind of man. Now these hopes, as they are termed,\nare propositions, which are sometimes true, and sometimes false; for the\ngood, who are the friends of the gods, see true pictures of the future,\nand the bad false ones. And as there may be opinion about things which\nare not, were not, and will not be, which is opinion still, so there may\nbe pleasure about things which are not, were not, and will not be, which\nis pleasure still,--that is to say, false pleasure; and only when\nfalse, can pleasure, like opinion, be vicious. Against this conclusion\nProtarchus reclaims.\n\nLeaving his denial for the present, Socrates proceeds to show that\nsome pleasures are false from another point of view. In desire, as we\nadmitted, the body is divided from the soul, and hence pleasures and\npains are often simultaneous. And we further admitted that both of them\nbelonged to the infinite class. How, then, can we compare them? Are we\nnot liable, or rather certain, as in the case of sight, to be deceived\nby distance and relation? In this case the pleasures and pains are not\nfalse because based upon false opinion, but are themselves false. And\nthere is another illusion: pain has often been said by us to arise out\nof the derangement--pleasure out of the restoration--of our nature. But\nin passing from one to the other, do we not experience neutral states,\nwhich although they appear pleasureable or painful are really neither?\nFor even if we admit, with the wise man whom Protarchus loves (and only\na wise man could have ever entertained such a notion), that all things\nare in a perpetual flux, still these changes are often unconscious, and\ndevoid either of pleasure or pain. We assume, then, that there are three\nstates--pleasureable, painful, neutral; we may embellish a little by\ncalling them gold, silver, and that which is neither.\n\nBut there are certain natural philosophers who will not admit a third\nstate. Their instinctive dislike to pleasure leads them to affirm that\npleasure is only the absence of pain. They are noble fellows, and,\nalthough we do not agree with them, we may use them as diviners who\nwill indicate to us the right track. They will say, that the nature of\nanything is best known from the examination of extreme cases, e.g. the\nnature of hardness from the examination of the hardest things; and that\nthe nature of pleasure will be best understood from an examination of\nthe most intense pleasures. Now these are the pleasures of the body, not\nof the mind; the pleasures of disease and not of health, the pleasures\nof the intemperate and not of the temperate. I am speaking, not of the\nfrequency or continuance, but only of the intensity of such pleasures,\nand this is given them by contrast with the pain or sickness of body\nwhich precedes them. Their morbid nature is illustrated by the lesser\ninstances of itching and scratching, respecting which I swear that I\ncannot tell whether they are a pleasure or a pain. (1) Some of these\narise out of a transition from one state of the body to another, as from\ncold to hot; (2) others are caused by the contrast of an internal pain\nand an external pleasure in the body: sometimes the feeling of pain\npredominates, as in itching and tingling, when they are relieved by\nscratching; sometimes the feeling of pleasure: or the pleasure which\nthey give may be quite overpowering, and is then accompanied by all\nsorts of unutterable feelings which have a death of delights in them.\nBut there are also mixed pleasures which are in the mind only. For are\nnot love and sorrow as well as anger 'sweeter than honey,' and also full\nof pain? Is there not a mixture of feelings in the spectator of tragedy?\nand of comedy also? 'I do not understand that last.' Well, then, with\nthe view of lighting up the obscurity of these mixed feelings, let\nme ask whether envy is painful. 'Yes.' And yet the envious man finds\nsomething pleasing in the misfortunes of others? 'True.' And\nignorance is a misfortune? 'Certainly.' And one form of ignorance is\nself-conceit--a man may fancy himself richer, fairer, better, wiser than\nhe is? 'Yes.' And he who thus deceives himself may be strong or weak?\n'He may.' And if he is strong we fear him, and if he is weak we laugh\nat him, which is a pleasure, and yet we envy him, which is a pain? These\nmixed feelings are the rationale of tragedy and comedy, and equally the\nrationale of the greater drama of human life. (There appears to be some\nconfusion in this passage. There is no difficulty in seeing that in\ncomedy, as in tragedy, the spectator may view the performance with mixed\nfeelings of pain as well as of pleasure; nor is there any difficulty in\nunderstanding that envy is a mixed feeling, which rejoices not without\npain at the misfortunes of others, and laughs at their ignorance of\nthemselves. But Plato seems to think further that he has explained the\nfeeling of the spectator in comedy sufficiently by a theory which only\napplies to comedy in so far as in comedy we laugh at the conceit or\nweakness of others. He has certainly given a very partial explanation of\nthe ridiculous.) Having shown how sorrow, anger, envy are feelings of\na mixed nature, I will reserve the consideration of the remainder for\nanother occasion.\n\nNext follow the unmixed pleasures; which, unlike the philosophers of\nwhom I was speaking, I believe to be real. These unmixed pleasures are:\n(1) The pleasures derived from beauty of form, colour, sound, smell,\nwhich are absolutely pure; and in general those which are unalloyed with\npain: (2) The pleasures derived from the acquisition of knowledge, which\nin themselves are pure, but may be attended by an accidental pain of\nforgetting; this, however, arises from a subsequent act of reflection,\nof which we need take no account. At the same time, we admit that the\nlatter pleasures are the property of a very few. To these pure and\nunmixed pleasures we ascribe measure, whereas all others belong to the\nclass of the infinite, and are liable to every species of excess. And\nhere several questions arise for consideration:--What is the meaning of\npure and impure, of moderate and immoderate? We may answer the question\nby an illustration: Purity of white paint consists in the clearness or\nquality of the white, and this is distinct from the quantity or amount\nof white paint; a little pure white is fairer than a great deal which\nis impure. But there is another question:--Pleasure is affirmed by\ningenious philosophers to be a generation; they say that there are\ntwo natures--one self-existent, the other dependent; the one noble\nand majestic, the other failing in both these qualities. 'I do not\nunderstand.' There are lovers and there are loves. 'Yes, I know, but\nwhat is the application?' The argument is in play, and desires to\nintimate that there are relatives and there are absolutes, and that the\nrelative is for the sake of the absolute; and generation is for the\nsake of essence. Under relatives I class all things done with a view to\ngeneration; and essence is of the class of good. But if essence is\nof the class of good, generation must be of some other class; and our\nfriends, who affirm that pleasure is a generation, would laugh at the\nnotion that pleasure is a good; and at that other notion, that pleasure\nis produced by generation, which is only the alternative of destruction.\nWho would prefer such an alternation to the equable life of pure\nthought? Here is one absurdity, and not the only one, to which the\nfriends of pleasure are reduced. For is there not also an absurdity in\naffirming that good is of the soul only; or in declaring that the best\nof men, if he be in pain, is bad?\n\nAnd now, from the consideration of pleasure, we pass to that of\nknowledge. Let us reflect that there are two kinds of knowledge--the one\ncreative or productive, and the other educational and philosophical.\nOf the creative arts, there is one part purer or more akin to knowledge\nthan the other. There is an element of guess-work and an element\nof number and measure in them. In music, for example, especially in\nflute-playing, the conjectural element prevails; while in carpentering\nthere is more application of rule and measure. Of the creative arts,\nthen, we may make two classes--the less exact and the more exact. And\nthe exacter part of all of them is really arithmetic and mensuration.\nBut arithmetic and mensuration again may be subdivided with reference\neither to their use in the concrete, or to their nature in the\nabstract--as they are regarded popularly in building and binding, or\ntheoretically by philosophers. And, borrowing the analogy of pleasure,\nwe may say that the philosophical use of them is purer than the other.\nThus we have two arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration. And truest\nof all in the estimation of every rational man is dialectic, or the\nscience of being, which will forget and disown us, if we forget and\ndisown her.\n\n'But, Socrates, I have heard Gorgias say that rhetoric is the greatest\nand usefullest of arts; and I should not like to quarrel either with\nhim or you.' Neither is there any inconsistency, Protarchus, with\nhis statement in what I am now saying; for I am not maintaining that\ndialectic is the greatest or usefullest, but only that she is the truest\nof arts; my remark is not quantitative but qualitative, and refers not\nto the advantage or repetition of either, but to the degree of truth\nwhich they attain--here Gorgias will not care to compete; this is what\nwe affirm to be possessed in the highest degree by dialectic. And do not\nlet us appeal to Gorgias or Philebus or Socrates, but ask, on behalf of\nthe argument, what are the highest truths which the soul has the power\nof attaining. And is not this the science which has a firmer grasp\nof them than any other? For the arts generally are only occupied with\nmatters of opinion, and with the production and action and passion of\nthis sensible world. But the highest truth is that which is eternal and\nunchangeable. And reason and wisdom are concerned with the eternal; and\nthese are the very claimants, if not for the first, at least for the\nsecond place, whom I propose as rivals to pleasure.\n\nAnd now, having the materials, we may proceed to mix them--first\nrecapitulating the question at issue.\n\nPhilebus affirmed pleasure to be the good, and assumed them to be\none nature; I affirmed that they were two natures, and declared that\nknowledge was more akin to the good than pleasure. I said that the two\ntogether were more eligible than either taken singly; and to this we\nadhere. Reason intimates, as at first, that we should seek the good not\nin the unmixed life, but in the mixed.\n\nThe cup is ready, waiting to be mingled, and here are two fountains,\none of honey, the other of pure water, out of which to make the fairest\npossible mixture. There are pure and impure pleasures--pure and impure\nsciences. Let us consider the sections of each which have the most of\npurity and truth; to admit them all indiscriminately would be\ndangerous. First we will take the pure sciences; but shall we mingle the\nimpure--the art which uses the false rule and the false measure? That\nwe must, if we are any of us to find our way home; man cannot live upon\npure mathematics alone. And must I include music, which is admitted to\nbe guess-work? 'Yes, you must, if human life is to have any humanity.'\nWell, then, I will open the door and let them all in; they shall mingle\nin an Homeric 'meeting of the waters.' And now we turn to the pleasures;\nshall I admit them? 'Admit first of all the pure pleasures; secondly,\nthe necessary.' And what shall we say about the rest? First, ask the\npleasures--they will be too happy to dwell with wisdom. Secondly, ask\nthe arts and sciences--they reply that the excesses of intemperance are\nthe ruin of them; and that they would rather only have the pleasures of\nhealth and temperance, which are the handmaidens of virtue. But still we\nwant truth? That is now added; and so the argument is complete, and may\nbe compared to an incorporeal law, which is to hold fair rule over a\nliving body. And now we are at the vestibule of the good, in which there\nare three chief elements--truth, symmetry, and beauty. These will be the\ncriterion of the comparative claims of pleasure and wisdom.\n\nWhich has the greater share of truth? Surely wisdom; for pleasure is the\nveriest impostor in the world, and the perjuries of lovers have passed\ninto a proverb.\n\nWhich of symmetry? Wisdom again; for nothing is more immoderate than\npleasure.\n\nWhich of beauty? Once more, wisdom; for pleasure is often unseemly, and\nthe greatest pleasures are put out of sight.\n\nNot pleasure, then, ranks first in the scale of good, but measure, and\neternal harmony.\n\nSecond comes the symmetrical and beautiful and perfect.\n\nThird, mind and wisdom.\n\nFourth, sciences and arts and true opinions.\n\nFifth, painless pleasures.\n\nOf a sixth class, I have no more to say. Thus, pleasure and mind may\nboth renounce the claim to the first place. But mind is ten thousand\ntimes nearer to the chief good than pleasure. Pleasure ranks fifth and\nnot first, even though all the animals in the world assert the contrary.\n\n...\n\nFrom the days of Aristippus and Epicurus to our own times the nature\nof pleasure has occupied the attention of philosophers. 'Is pleasure\nan evil? a good? the only good?' are the simple forms which the enquiry\nassumed among the Socratic schools. But at an early stage of the\ncontroversy another question was asked: 'Do pleasures differ in kind?\nand are some bad, some good, and some neither bad nor good?' There are\nbodily and there are mental pleasures, which were at first confused but\nafterwards distinguished. A distinction was also made between necessary\nand unnecessary pleasures; and again between pleasures which had or had\nnot corresponding pains. The ancient philosophers were fond of asking,\nin the language of their age, 'Is pleasure a \"becoming\" only, and\ntherefore transient and relative, or do some pleasures partake of truth\nand Being?' To these ancient speculations the moderns have added a\nfurther question:--'Whose pleasure? The pleasure of yourself, or of your\nneighbour,--of the individual, or of the world?' This little addition\nhas changed the whole aspect of the discussion: the same word is now\nsupposed to include two principles as widely different as benevolence\nand self-love. Some modern writers have also distinguished between\npleasure the test, and pleasure the motive of actions. For the universal\ntest of right actions (how I know them) may not always be the highest or\nbest motive of them (why I do them).\n\nSocrates, as we learn from the Memorabilia of Xenophon, first drew\nattention to the consequences of actions. Mankind were said by him to\nact rightly when they knew what they were doing, or, in the language of\nthe Gorgias, 'did what they would.' He seems to have been the first who\nmaintained that the good was the useful (Mem.). In his eagerness for\ngeneralization, seeking, as Aristotle says, for the universal in Ethics\n(Metaph.), he took the most obvious intellectual aspect of human action\nwhich occurred to him. He meant to emphasize, not pleasure, but the\ncalculation of pleasure; neither is he arguing that pleasure is the\nchief good, but that we should have a principle of choice. He did not\nintend to oppose 'the useful' to some higher conception, such as the\nPlatonic ideal, but to chance and caprice. The Platonic Socrates pursues\nthe same vein of thought in the Protagoras, where he argues against the\nso-called sophist that pleasure and pain are the final standards and\nmotives of good and evil, and that the salvation of human life depends\nupon a right estimate of pleasures greater or less when seen near and\nat a distance. The testimony of Xenophon is thus confirmed by that of\nPlato, and we are therefore justified in calling Socrates the first\nutilitarian; as indeed there is no side or aspect of philosophy which\nmay not with reason be ascribed to him--he is Cynic and Cyrenaic,\nPlatonist and Aristotelian in one. But in the Phaedo the Socratic has\nalready passed into a more ideal point of view; and he, or rather\nPlato speaking in his person, expressly repudiates the notion that the\nexchange of a less pleasure for a greater can be an exchange of virtue.\nSuch virtue is the virtue of ordinary men who live in the world of\nappearance; they are temperate only that they may enjoy the pleasures\nof intemperance, and courageous from fear of danger. Whereas the\nphilosopher is seeking after wisdom and not after pleasure, whether near\nor distant: he is the mystic, the initiated, who has learnt to despise\nthe body and is yearning all his life long for a truth which will\nhereafter be revealed to him. In the Republic the pleasures of knowledge\nare affirmed to be superior to other pleasures, because the philosopher\nso estimates them; and he alone has had experience of both kinds.\n(Compare a similar argument urged by one of the latest defenders of\nUtilitarianism, Mill's Utilitarianism). In the Philebus, Plato, although\nhe regards the enemies of pleasure with complacency, still further\nmodifies the transcendentalism of the Phaedo. For he is compelled to\nconfess, rather reluctantly, perhaps, that some pleasures, i.e. those\nwhich have no antecedent pains, claim a place in the scale of goods.\n\nThere have been many reasons why not only Plato but mankind in general\nhave been unwilling to acknowledge that 'pleasure is the chief good.'\nEither they have heard a voice calling to them out of another world; or\nthe life and example of some great teacher has cast their thoughts\nof right and wrong in another mould; or the word 'pleasure' has been\nassociated in their mind with merely animal enjoyment. They could not\nbelieve that what they were always striving to overcome, and the power\nor principle in them which overcame, were of the same nature. The\npleasure of doing good to others and of bodily self-indulgence,\nthe pleasures of intellect and the pleasures of sense, are so\ndifferent:--Why then should they be called by a common name? Or, if the\nequivocal or metaphorical use of the word is justified by custom (like\nthe use of other words which at first referred only to the body, and\nthen by a figure have been transferred to the mind), still, why should\nwe make an ambiguous word the corner-stone of moral philosophy? To the\nhigher thinker the Utilitarian or hedonist mode of speaking has been at\nvariance with religion and with any higher conception both of politics\nand of morals. It has not satisfied their imagination; it has offended\ntheir taste. To elevate pleasure, 'the most fleeting of all things,'\ninto a general idea seems to such men a contradiction. They do not\ndesire to bring down their theory to the level of their practice. The\nsimplicity of the 'greatest happiness' principle has been acceptable to\nphilosophers, but the better part of the world has been slow to receive\nit.\n\nBefore proceeding, we may make a few admissions which will narrow the\nfield of dispute; and we may as well leave behind a few prejudices,\nwhich intelligent opponents of Utilitarianism have by this time 'agreed\nto discard'. We admit that Utility is coextensive with right, and that\nno action can be right which does not tend to the happiness of mankind;\nwe acknowledge that a large class of actions are made right or wrong\nby their consequences only; we say further that mankind are not too\nmindful, but that they are far too regardless of consequences, and that\nthey need to have the doctrine of utility habitually inculcated on them.\nWe recognize the value of a principle which can supply a connecting link\nbetween Ethics and Politics, and under which all human actions are or\nmay be included. The desire to promote happiness is no mean preference\nof expediency to right, but one of the highest and noblest motives by\nwhich human nature can be animated. Neither in referring actions to the\ntest of utility have we to make a laborious calculation, any more than\nin trying them by other standards of morals. For long ago they have been\nclassified sufficiently for all practical purposes by the thinker,\nby the legislator, by the opinion of the world. Whatever may be the\nhypothesis on which they are explained, or which in doubtful cases\nmay be applied to the regulation of them, we are very rarely, if ever,\ncalled upon at the moment of performing them to determine their effect\nupon the happiness of mankind.\n\nThere is a theory which has been contrasted with Utility by Paley and\nothers--the theory of a moral sense: Are our ideas of right and wrong\ninnate or derived from experience? This, perhaps, is another of those\nspeculations which intelligent men might 'agree to discard.' For it has\nbeen worn threadbare; and either alternative is equally consistent\nwith a transcendental or with an eudaemonistic system of ethics, with\na greatest happiness principle or with Kant's law of duty. Yet to avoid\nmisconception, what appears to be the truth about the origin of\nour moral ideas may be shortly summed up as follows:--To each of us\nindividually our moral ideas come first of all in childhood through\nthe medium of education, from parents and teachers, assisted by the\nunconscious influence of language; they are impressed upon a mind which\nat first is like a waxen tablet, adapted to receive them; but they soon\nbecome fixed or set, and in after life are strengthened, or perhaps\nweakened by the force of public opinion. They may be corrected and\nenlarged by experience, they may be reasoned about, they may be brought\nhome to us by the circumstances of our lives, they may be intensified\nby imagination, by reflection, by a course of action likely to confirm\nthem. Under the influence of religious feeling or by an effort of\nthought, any one beginning with the ordinary rules of morality may\ncreate out of them for himself ideals of holiness and virtue. They\nslumber in the minds of most men, yet in all of us there remains some\ntincture of affection, some desire of good, some sense of truth, some\nfear of the law. Of some such state or process each individual is\nconscious in himself, and if he compares his own experience with that\nof others he will find the witness of their consciences to coincide with\nthat of his own. All of us have entered into an inheritance which we\nhave the power of appropriating and making use of. No great effort of\nmind is required on our part; we learn morals, as we learn to talk,\ninstinctively, from conversing with others, in an enlightened age, in\na civilized country, in a good home. A well-educated child of ten years\nold already knows the essentials of morals: 'Thou shalt not steal,'\n'thou shalt speak the truth,' 'thou shalt love thy parents,' 'thou shalt\nfear God.' What more does he want?\n\nBut whence comes this common inheritance or stock of moral ideas? Their\nbeginning, like all other beginnings of human things, is obscure, and\nis the least important part of them. Imagine, if you will, that Society\noriginated in the herding of brutes, in their parental instincts, in\ntheir rude attempts at self-preservation:--Man is not man in that he\nresembles, but in that he differs from them. We must pass into another\ncycle of existence, before we can discover in him by any evidence\naccessible to us even the germs of our moral ideas. In the history of\nthe world, which viewed from within is the history of the human mind,\nthey have been slowly created by religion, by poetry, by law, having\ntheir foundation in the natural affections and in the necessity of some\ndegree of truth and justice in a social state; they have been deepened\nand enlarged by the efforts of great thinkers who have idealized and\nconnected them--by the lives of saints and prophets who have taught and\nexemplified them. The schools of ancient philosophy which seem so far\nfrom us--Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Epicureans, and\na few modern teachers, such as Kant and Bentham, have each of them\nsupplied 'moments' of thought to the world. The life of Christ has\nembodied a divine love, wisdom, patience, reasonableness. For his image,\nhowever imperfectly handed down to us, the modern world has received a\nstandard more perfect in idea than the societies of ancient times, but\nalso further removed from practice. For there is certainly a greater\ninterval between the theory and practice of Christians than between the\ntheory and practice of the Greeks and Romans; the ideal is more above\nus, and the aspiration after good has often lent a strange power to\nevil. And sometimes, as at the Reformation, or French Revolution, when\nthe upper classes of a so-called Christian country have become corrupted\nby priestcraft, by casuistry, by licentiousness, by despotism, the lower\nhave risen up and re-asserted the natural sense of religion and right.\n\nWe may further remark that our moral ideas, as the world grows older,\nperhaps as we grow older ourselves, unless they have been undermined in\nus by false philosophy or the practice of mental analysis, or\ninfected by the corruption of society or by some moral disorder in\nthe individual, are constantly assuming a more natural and necessary\ncharacter. The habit of the mind, the opinion of the world, familiarizes\nthem to us; and they take more and more the form of immediate intuition.\nThe moral sense comes last and not first in the order of their\ndevelopment, and is the instinct which we have inherited or acquired,\nnot the nobler effort of reflection which created them and which keeps\nthem alive. We do not stop to reason about common honesty. Whenever we\nare not blinded by self-deceit, as for example in judging the actions\nof others, we have no hesitation in determining what is right and wrong.\nThe principles of morality, when not at variance with some desire or\nworldly interest of our own, or with the opinion of the public, are\nhardly perceived by us; but in the conflict of reason and passion they\nassert their authority and are not overcome without remorse.\n\nSuch is a brief outline of the history of our moral ideas. We have to\ndistinguish, first of all, the manner in which they have grown up in the\nworld from the manner in which they have been communicated to each of\nus. We may represent them to ourselves as flowing out of the boundless\nocean of language and thought in little rills, which convey them to the\nheart and brain of each individual. But neither must we confound the\ntheories or aspects of morality with the origin of our moral ideas.\nThese are not the roots or 'origines' of morals, but the latest efforts\nof reflection, the lights in which the whole moral world has been\nregarded by different thinkers and successive generations of men. If we\nask: Which of these many theories is the true one? we may answer: All\nof them--moral sense, innate ideas, a priori, a posteriori notions, the\nphilosophy of experience, the philosophy of intuition--all of them have\nadded something to our conception of Ethics; no one of them is the whole\ntruth. But to decide how far our ideas of morality are derived from\none source or another; to determine what history, what philosophy has\ncontributed to them; to distinguish the original, simple elements from\nthe manifold and complex applications of them, would be a long enquiry\ntoo far removed from the question which we are now pursuing.\n\nBearing in mind the distinction which we have been seeking to establish\nbetween our earliest and our most mature ideas of morality, we may now\nproceed to state the theory of Utility, not exactly in the words, but\nin the spirit of one of its ablest and most moderate supporters (Mill's\nUtilitarianism):--'That which alone makes actions either right or\ndesirable is their utility, or tendency to promote the happiness of\nmankind, or, in other words, to increase the sum of pleasure in the\nworld. But all pleasures are not the same: they differ in quality as\nwell as in quantity, and the pleasure which is superior in quality is\nincommensurable with the inferior. Neither is the pleasure or happiness,\nwhich we seek, our own pleasure, but that of others,--of our family, of\nour country, of mankind. The desire of this, and even the sacrifice of\nour own interest to that of other men, may become a passion to a rightly\neducated nature. The Utilitarian finds a place in his system for this\nvirtue and for every other.'\n\nGood or happiness or pleasure is thus regarded as the true and only end\nof human life. To this all our desires will be found to tend, and\nin accordance with this all the virtues, including justice, may be\nexplained. Admitting that men rest for a time in inferior ends, and do\nnot cast their eyes beyond them, these ends are really dependent on the\ngreater end of happiness, and would not be pursued, unless in general\nthey had been found to lead to it. The existence of such an end is\nproved, as in Aristotle's time, so in our own, by the universal fact\nthat men desire it. The obligation to promote it is based upon the\nsocial nature of man; this sense of duty is shared by all of us in some\ndegree, and is capable of being greatly fostered and strengthened.\nSo far from being inconsistent with religion, the greatest happiness\nprinciple is in the highest degree agreeable to it. For what can be more\nreasonable than that God should will the happiness of all his creatures?\nand in working out their happiness we may be said to be 'working\ntogether with him.' Nor is it inconceivable that a new enthusiasm of\nthe future, far stronger than any old religion, may be based upon such a\nconception.\n\nBut then for the familiar phrase of the 'greatest happiness principle,'\nit seems as if we ought now to read 'the noblest happiness principle,'\n'the happiness of others principle'--the principle not of the greatest,\nbut of the highest pleasure, pursued with no more regard to our own\nimmediate interest than is required by the law of self-preservation.\nTransfer the thought of happiness to another life, dropping the external\ncircumstances which form so large a part of our idea of happiness\nin this, and the meaning of the word becomes indistinguishable from\nholiness, harmony, wisdom, love. By the slight addition 'of others,' all\nthe associations of the word are altered; we seem to have passed\nover from one theory of morals to the opposite. For allowing that the\nhappiness of others is reflected on ourselves, and also that every man\nmust live before he can do good to others, still the last limitation is\na very trifling exception, and the happiness of another is very far from\ncompensating for the loss of our own. According to Mr. Mill, he would\nbest carry out the principle of utility who sacrificed his own\npleasure most to that of his fellow-men. But if so, Hobbes and Butler,\nShaftesbury and Hume, are not so far apart as they and their followers\nimagine. The thought of self and the thought of others are alike\nsuperseded in the more general notion of the happiness of mankind at\nlarge. But in this composite good, until society becomes perfected, the\nfriend of man himself has generally the least share, and may be a great\nsufferer.\n\nAnd now what objection have we to urge against a system of moral\nphilosophy so beneficent, so enlightened, so ideal, and at the same time\nso practical,--so Christian, as we may say without exaggeration,--and\nwhich has the further advantage of resting morality on a principle\nintelligible to all capacities? Have we not found that which Socrates\nand Plato 'grew old in seeking'? Are we not desirous of happiness, at\nany rate for ourselves and our friends, if not for all mankind? If, as\nis natural, we begin by thinking of ourselves first, we are easily led\non to think of others; for we cannot help acknowledging that what\nis right for us is the right and inheritance of others. We feel the\nadvantage of an abstract principle wide enough and strong enough\nto override all the particularisms of mankind; which acknowledges a\nuniversal good, truth, right; which is capable of inspiring men like\na passion, and is the symbol of a cause for which they are ready to\ncontend to their life's end.\n\nAnd if we test this principle by the lives of its professors, it would\ncertainly appear inferior to none as a rule of action. From the days\nof Eudoxus (Arist. Ethics) and Epicurus to our own, the votaries of\npleasure have gained belief for their principles by their practice.\nTwo of the noblest and most disinterested men who have lived in this\ncentury, Bentham and J. S. Mill, whose lives were a long devotion to\nthe service of their fellows, have been among the most enthusiastic\nsupporters of utility; while among their contemporaries, some who were\nof a more mystical turn of mind, have ended rather in aspiration than in\naction, and have been found unequal to the duties of life. Looking back\non them now that they are removed from the scene, we feel that mankind\nhas been the better for them. The world was against them while they\nlived; but this is rather a reason for admiring than for depreciating\nthem. Nor can any one doubt that the influence of their philosophy on\npolitics--especially on foreign politics, on law, on social life, has\nbeen upon the whole beneficial. Nevertheless, they will never have\njustice done to them, for they do not agree either with the better\nfeeling of the multitude or with the idealism of more refined thinkers.\nWithout Bentham, a great word in the history of philosophy would have\nremained unspoken. Yet to this day it is rare to hear his name received\nwith any mark of respect such as would be freely granted to the\nambiguous memory of some father of the Church. The odium which attached\nto him when alive has not been removed by his death. For he shocked his\ncontemporaries by egotism and want of taste; and this generation which\nhas reaped the benefit of his labours has inherited the feeling of the\nlast. He was before his own age, and is hardly remembered in this.\n\nWhile acknowledging the benefits which the greatest happiness principle\nhas conferred upon mankind, the time appears to have arrived, not for\ndenying its claims, but for criticizing them and comparing them with\nother principles which equally claim to lie at the foundation of ethics.\nAny one who adds a general principle to knowledge has been a benefactor\nto the world. But there is a danger that, in his first enthusiasm, he\nmay not recognize the proportions or limitations to which his truth is\nsubjected; he does not see how far he has given birth to a truism, or\nhow that which is a truth to him is a truism to the rest of the world;\nor may degenerate in the next generation. He believes that to be the\nwhole which is only a part,--to be the necessary foundation which\nis really only a valuable aspect of the truth. The systems of all\nphilosophers require the criticism of 'the morrow,' when the heat of\nimagination which forged them has cooled, and they are seen in the\ntemperate light of day. All of them have contributed to enrich the mind\nof the civilized world; none of them occupy that supreme or exclusive\nplace which their authors would have assigned to them.\n\nWe may preface the criticism with a few preliminary remarks:--\n\nMr. Mill, Mr. Austin, and others, in their eagerness to maintain the\ndoctrine of utility, are fond of repeating that we are in a lamentable\nstate of uncertainty about morals. While other branches of knowledge\nhave made extraordinary progress, in moral philosophy we are supposed by\nthem to be no better than children, and with few exceptions--that is to\nsay, Bentham and his followers--to be no further advanced than men were\nin the age of Socrates and Plato, who, in their turn, are deemed to be\nas backward in ethics as they necessarily were in physics. But this,\nthough often asserted, is recanted almost in a breath by the same\nwriters who speak thus depreciatingly of our modern ethical philosophy.\nFor they are the first to acknowledge that we have not now to begin\nclassifying actions under the head of utility; they would not deny that\nabout the general conceptions of morals there is a practical agreement.\nThere is no more doubt that falsehood is wrong than that a stone falls\nto the ground, although the first does not admit of the same ocular\nproof as the second. There is no greater uncertainty about the duty\nof obedience to parents and to the law of the land than about the\nproperties of triangles. Unless we are looking for a new moral world\nwhich has no marrying and giving in marriage, there is no greater\ndisagreement in theory about the right relations of the sexes than about\nthe composition of water. These and a few other simple principles, as\nthey have endless applications in practice, so also may be developed in\ntheory into counsels of perfection.\n\nTo what then is to be attributed this opinion which has been often\nentertained about the uncertainty of morals? Chiefly to this,--that\nphilosophers have not always distinguished the theoretical and the\ncasuistical uncertainty of morals from the practical certainty. There\nis an uncertainty about details,--whether, for example, under given\ncircumstances such and such a moral principle is to be enforced, or\nwhether in some cases there may not be a conflict of duties: these are\nthe exceptions to the ordinary rules of morality, important, indeed, but\nnot extending to the one thousandth or one ten-thousandth part of human\nactions. This is the domain of casuistry. Secondly, the aspects under\nwhich the most general principles of morals may be presented to us are\nmany and various. The mind of man has been more than usually active\nin thinking about man. The conceptions of harmony, happiness, right,\nfreedom, benevolence, self-love, have all of them seemed to some\nphilosopher or other the truest and most comprehensive expression of\nmorality. There is no difference, or at any rate no great difference, of\nopinion about the right and wrong of actions, but only about the\ngeneral notion which furnishes the best explanation or gives the most\ncomprehensive view of them. This, in the language of Kant, is the sphere\nof the metaphysic of ethics. But these two uncertainties at either end,\nen tois malista katholou and en tois kath ekasta, leave space enough for\nan intermediate principle which is practically certain.\n\nThe rule of human life is not dependent on the theories of philosophers:\nwe know what our duties are for the most part before we speculate about\nthem. And the use of speculation is not to teach us what we already\nknow, but to inspire in our minds an interest about morals in general,\nto strengthen our conception of the virtues by showing that they confirm\none another, to prove to us, as Socrates would have said, that they\nare not many, but one. There is the same kind of pleasure and use in\nreducing morals, as in reducing physics, to a few very simple truths.\nAnd not unfrequently the more general principle may correct prejudices\nand misconceptions, and enable us to regard our fellow-men in a larger\nand more generous spirit.\n\nThe two qualities which seem to be most required in first principles of\nethics are, (1) that they should afford a real explanation of the facts,\n(2) that they should inspire the mind,--should harmonize, strengthen,\nsettle us. We can hardly estimate the influence which a simple principle\nsuch as 'Act so as to promote the happiness of mankind,' or 'Act so that\nthe rule on which thou actest may be adopted as a law by all rational\nbeings,' may exercise on the mind of an individual. They will often seem\nto open a new world to him, like the religious conceptions of faith or\nthe spirit of God. The difficulties of ethics disappear when we do not\nsuffer ourselves to be distracted between different points of view.\nBut to maintain their hold on us, the general principles must also be\npsychologically true--they must agree with our experience, they must\naccord with the habits of our minds.\n\nWhen we are told that actions are right or wrong only in so far as they\ntend towards happiness, we naturally ask what is meant by 'happiness.'\nFor the term in the common use of language is only to a certain extent\ncommensurate with moral good and evil. We should hardly say that a good\nman could be utterly miserable (Arist. Ethics), or place a bad man in\nthe first rank of happiness. But yet, from various circumstances, the\nmeasure of a man's happiness may be out of all proportion to his desert.\nAnd if we insist on calling the good man alone happy, we shall be\nusing the term in some new and transcendental sense, as synonymous with\nwell-being. We have already seen that happiness includes the happiness\nof others as well as our own; we must now comprehend unconscious as well\nas conscious happiness under the same word. There is no harm in this\nextension of the meaning, but a word which admits of such an extension\ncan hardly be made the basis of a philosophical system. The exactness\nwhich is required in philosophy will not allow us to comprehend under\nthe same term two ideas so different as the subjective feeling of\npleasure or happiness and the objective reality of a state which\nreceives our moral approval.\n\nLike Protarchus in the Philebus, we can give no answer to the question,\n'What is that common quality which in all states of human life we call\nhappiness? which includes the lower and the higher kind of happiness,\nand is the aim of the noblest, as well as of the meanest of mankind?' If\nwe say 'Not pleasure, not virtue, not wisdom, nor yet any quality which\nwe can abstract from these'--what then? After seeming to hover for a\ntime on the verge of a great truth, we have gained only a truism.\n\nLet us ask the question in another form. What is that which constitutes\nhappiness, over and above the several ingredients of health, wealth,\npleasure, virtue, knowledge, which are included under it? Perhaps we\nanswer, 'The subjective feeling of them.' But this is very far from\nbeing coextensive with right. Or we may reply that happiness is the\nwhole of which the above-mentioned are the parts. Still the question\nrecurs, 'In what does the whole differ from all the parts?' And if we\nare unable to distinguish them, happiness will be the mere aggregate of\nthe goods of life.\n\nAgain, while admitting that in all right action there is an element of\nhappiness, we cannot help seeing that the utilitarian theory supplies\na much easier explanation of some virtues than of others. Of many\npatriotic or benevolent actions we can give a straightforward account by\ntheir tendency to promote happiness. For the explanation of justice, on\nthe other hand, we have to go a long way round. No man is indignant\nwith a thief because he has not promoted the greatest happiness of\nthe greatest number, but because he has done him a wrong. There is an\nimmeasurable interval between a crime against property or life, and the\nomission of an act of charity or benevolence. Yet of this interval the\nutilitarian theory takes no cognizance. The greatest happiness principle\nstrengthens our sense of positive duties towards others, but weakens\nour recognition of their rights. To promote in every way possible the\nhappiness of others may be a counsel of perfection, but hardly seems\nto offer any ground for a theory of obligation. For admitting that our\nideas of obligation are partly derived from religion and custom, yet\nthey seem also to contain other essential elements which cannot be\nexplained by the tendency of actions to promote happiness. Whence comes\nthe necessity of them? Why are some actions rather than others which\nequally tend to the happiness of mankind imposed upon us with the\nauthority of law? 'You ought' and 'you had better' are fundamental\ndistinctions in human thought; and having such distinctions, why should\nwe seek to efface and unsettle them?\n\nBentham and Mr. Mill are earnest in maintaining that happiness includes\nthe happiness of others as well as of ourselves. But what two notions\ncan be more opposed in many cases than these? Granting that in a perfect\nstate of the world my own happiness and that of all other men would\ncoincide, in the imperfect state they often diverge, and I cannot truly\nbridge over the difficulty by saying that men will always find pleasure\nin sacrificing themselves or in suffering for others. Upon the greatest\nhappiness principle it is admitted that I am to have a share, and in\nconsistency I should pursue my own happiness as impartially as that of\nmy neighbour. But who can decide what proportion should be mine and what\nhis, except on the principle that I am most likely to be deceived in my\nown favour, and had therefore better give the larger share, if not all,\nto him?\n\nFurther, it is admitted that utility and right coincide, not in\nparticular instances, but in classes of actions. But is it not\ndistracting to the conscience of a man to be told that in the particular\ncase they are opposed? Happiness is said to be the ground of moral\nobligation, yet he must not do what clearly conduces to his own\nhappiness if it is at variance with the good of the whole. Nay, further,\nhe will be taught that when utility and right are in apparent conflict\nany amount of utility does not alter by a hair's-breadth the morality\nof actions, which cannot be allowed to deviate from established law or\nusage; and that the non-detection of an immoral act, say of telling a\nlie, which may often make the greatest difference in the consequences,\nnot only to himself, but to all the world, makes none whatever in the\nact itself.\n\nAgain, if we are concerned not with particular actions but with classes\nof actions, is the tendency of actions to happiness a principle upon\nwhich we can classify them? There is a universal law which imperatively\ndeclares certain acts to be right or wrong:--can there be any\nuniversality in the law which measures actions by their tendencies\ntowards happiness? For an act which is the cause of happiness to one\nperson may be the cause of unhappiness to another; or an act which if\nperformed by one person may increase the happiness of mankind may have\nthe opposite effect if performed by another. Right can never be wrong,\nor wrong right, that there are no actions which tend to the happiness\nof mankind which may not under other circumstances tend to their\nunhappiness. Unless we say not only that all right actions tend to\nhappiness, but that they tend to happiness in the same degree in which\nthey are right (and in that case the word 'right' is plainer), we weaken\nthe absoluteness of our moral standard; we reduce differences in kind\nto differences in degree; we obliterate the stamp which the authority of\nages has set upon vice and crime.\n\nOnce more: turning from theory to practice we feel the importance of\nretaining the received distinctions of morality. Words such as truth,\njustice, honesty, virtue, love, have a simple meaning; they have become\nsacred to us,--'the word of God' written on the human heart: to no other\nwords can the same associations be attached. We cannot explain them\nadequately on principles of utility; in attempting to do so we rob them\nof their true character. We give them a meaning often paradoxical and\ndistorted, and generally weaker than their signification in common\nlanguage. And as words influence men's thoughts, we fear that the hold\nof morality may also be weakened, and the sense of duty impaired, if\nvirtue and vice are explained only as the qualities which do or do not\ncontribute to the pleasure of the world. In that very expression we seem\nto detect a false ring, for pleasure is individual not universal; we\nspeak of eternal and immutable justice, but not of eternal and immutable\npleasure; nor by any refinement can we avoid some taint of bodily sense\nadhering to the meaning of the word.\n\nAgain: the higher the view which men take of life, the more they lose\nsight of their own pleasure or interest. True religion is not working\nfor a reward only, but is ready to work equally without a reward. It is\nnot 'doing the will of God for the sake of eternal happiness,' but doing\nthe will of God because it is best, whether rewarded or unrewarded. And\nthis applies to others as well as to ourselves. For he who sacrifices\nhimself for the good of others, does not sacrifice himself that they\nmay be saved from the persecution which he endures for their sakes,\nbut rather that they in their turn may be able to undergo similar\nsufferings, and like him stand fast in the truth. To promote their\nhappiness is not his first object, but to elevate their moral nature.\nBoth in his own case and that of others there may be happiness in the\ndistance, but if there were no happiness he would equally act as he\ndoes. We are speaking of the highest and noblest natures; and a passing\nthought naturally arises in our minds, 'Whether that can be the first\nprinciple of morals which is hardly regarded in their own case by the\ngreatest benefactors of mankind?'\n\nThe admissions that pleasures differ in kind, and that actions are\nalready classified; the acknowledgment that happiness includes the\nhappiness of others, as well as of ourselves; the confusion (not made\nby Aristotle) between conscious and unconscious happiness, or between\nhappiness the energy and happiness the result of the energy, introduce\nuncertainty and inconsistency into the whole enquiry. We reason readily\nand cheerfully from a greatest happiness principle. But we find that\nutilitarians do not agree among themselves about the meaning of the\nword. Still less can they impart to others a common conception or\nconviction of the nature of happiness. The meaning of the word is always\ninsensibly slipping away from us, into pleasure, out of pleasure, now\nappearing as the motive, now as the test of actions, and sometimes\nvarying in successive sentences. And as in a mathematical demonstration\nan error in the original number disturbs the whole calculation which\nfollows, this fundamental uncertainty about the word vitiates all the\napplications of it. Must we not admit that a notion so uncertain in\nmeaning, so void of content, so at variance with common language and\nopinion, does not comply adequately with either of our two requirements?\nIt can neither strike the imaginative faculty, nor give an explanation\nof phenomena which is in accordance with our individual experience. It\nis indefinite; it supplies only a partial account of human actions:\nit is one among many theories of philosophers. It may be compared\nwith other notions, such as the chief good of Plato, which may be best\nexpressed to us under the form of a harmony, or with Kant's obedience to\nlaw, which may be summed up under the word 'duty,' or with the Stoical\n'Follow nature,' and seems to have no advantage over them. All of these\npresent a certain aspect of moral truth. None of them are, or indeed\nprofess to be, the only principle of morals.\n\nAnd this brings us to speak of the most serious objection to the\nutilitarian system--its exclusiveness. There is no place for Kant or\nHegel, for Plato and Aristotle alongside of it. They do not reject the\ngreatest happiness principle, but it rejects them. Now the phenomena of\nmoral action differ, and some are best explained upon one principle and\nsome upon another: the virtue of justice seems to be naturally connected\nwith one theory of morals, the virtues of temperance and benevolence\nwith another. The characters of men also differ; and some are more\nattracted by one aspect of the truth, some by another. The firm\nstoical nature will conceive virtue under the conception of law, the\nphilanthropist under that of doing good, the quietist under that of\nresignation, the enthusiast under that of faith or love. The upright man\nof the world will desire above all things that morality should be plain\nand fixed, and should use language in its ordinary sense. Persons of an\nimaginative temperament will generally be dissatisfied with the words\n'utility' or 'pleasure': their principle of right is of a far higher\ncharacter--what or where to be found they cannot always distinctly\ntell;--deduced from the laws of human nature, says one; resting on the\nwill of God, says another; based upon some transcendental idea which\nanimates more worlds than one, says a third:\n\n     on nomoi prokeintai upsipodes, ouranian\n     di aithera teknothentes.\n\nTo satisfy an imaginative nature in any degree, the doctrine of utility\nmust be so transfigured that it becomes altogether different and loses\nall simplicity.\n\nBut why, since there are different characters among men, should we not\nallow them to envisage morality accordingly, and be thankful to the\ngreat men who have provided for all of us modes and instruments of\nthought? Would the world have been better if there had been no Stoics or\nKantists, no Platonists or Cartesians? No more than if the other pole\nof moral philosophy had been excluded. All men have principles which\nare above their practice; they admit premises which, if carried to their\nconclusions, are a sufficient basis of morals. In asserting liberty of\nspeculation we are not encouraging individuals to make right or wrong\nfor themselves, but only conceding that they may choose the form under\nwhich they prefer to contemplate them. Nor do we say that one of these\naspects is as true and good as another; but that they all of them, if\nthey are not mere sophisms and illusions, define and bring into relief\nsome part of the truth which would have been obscure without their\nlight. Why should we endeavour to bind all men within the limits of a\nsingle metaphysical conception? The necessary imperfection of language\nseems to require that we should view the same truth under more than one\naspect.\n\nWe are living in the second age of utilitarianism, when the charm of\nnovelty and the fervour of the first disciples has passed away. The\ndoctrine is no longer stated in the forcible paradoxical manner of\nBentham, but has to be adapted to meet objections; its corners are\nrubbed off, and the meaning of its most characteristic expressions is\nsoftened. The array of the enemy melts away when we approach him. The\ngreatest happiness of the greatest number was a great original idea when\nenunciated by Bentham, which leavened a generation and has left its mark\non thought and civilization in all succeeding times. His grasp of it\nhad the intensity of genius. In the spirit of an ancient philosopher he\nwould have denied that pleasures differed in kind, or that by happiness\nhe meant anything but pleasure. He would perhaps have revolted us by his\nthoroughness. The 'guardianship of his doctrine' has passed into other\nhands; and now we seem to see its weak points, its ambiguities, its want\nof exactness while assuming the highest exactness, its one-sidedness,\nits paradoxical explanation of several of the virtues. No philosophy has\never stood this criticism of the next generation, though the founders\nof all of them have imagined that they were built upon a rock. And the\nutilitarian system, like others, has yielded to the inevitable analysis.\nEven in the opinion of 'her admirers she has been terribly damaged'\n(Phil.), and is no longer the only moral philosophy, but one among many\nwhich have contributed in various degrees to the intellectual progress\nof mankind.\n\nBut because the utilitarian philosophy can no longer claim 'the prize,'\nwe must not refuse to acknowledge the great benefits conferred by it on\nthe world. All philosophies are refuted in their turn, says the sceptic,\nand he looks forward to all future systems sharing the fate of the past.\nAll philosophies remain, says the thinker; they have done a great work\nin their own day, and they supply posterity with aspects of the truth\nand with instruments of thought. Though they may be shorn of their\nglory, they retain their place in the organism of knowledge.\n\nAnd still there remain many rules of morals which are better explained\nand more forcibly inculcated on the principle of utility than on any\nother. The question Will such and such an action promote the happiness\nof myself, my family, my country, the world? may check the rising\nfeeling of pride or honour which would cause a quarrel, an estrangement,\na war. 'How can I contribute to the greatest happiness of others?' is\nanother form of the question which will be more attractive to the\nminds of many than a deduction of the duty of benevolence from a priori\nprinciples. In politics especially hardly any other argument can be\nallowed to have weight except the happiness of a people. All parties\nalike profess to aim at this, which though often used only as the\ndisguise of self-interest has a great and real influence on the minds\nof statesmen. In religion, again, nothing can more tend to mitigate\nsuperstition than the belief that the good of man is also the will of\nGod. This is an easy test to which the prejudices and superstitions of\nmen may be brought:--whatever does not tend to the good of men is not of\nGod. And the ideal of the greatest happiness of mankind, especially if\nbelieved to be the will of God, when compared with the actual fact, will\nbe one of the strongest motives to do good to others.\n\nOn the other hand, when the temptation is to speak falsely, to be\ndishonest or unjust, or in any way to interfere with the rights of\nothers, the argument that these actions regarded as a class will not\nconduce to the happiness of mankind, though true enough, seems to have\nless force than the feeling which is already implanted in the mind by\nconscience and authority. To resolve this feeling into the greatest\nhappiness principle takes away from its sacred and authoritative\ncharacter. The martyr will not go to the stake in order that he may\npromote the happiness of mankind, but for the sake of the truth:\nneither will the soldier advance to the cannon's mouth merely because he\nbelieves military discipline to be for the good of mankind. It is better\nfor him to know that he will be shot, that he will be disgraced, if he\nruns away--he has no need to look beyond military honour, patriotism,\n'England expects every man to do his duty.' These are stronger motives\nthan the greatest happiness of the greatest number, which is the thesis\nof a philosopher, not the watchword of an army. For in human actions\nmen do not always require broad principles; duties often come home to\nus more when they are limited and defined, and sanctioned by custom and\npublic opinion.\n\nLastly, if we turn to the history of ethics, we shall find that our\nmoral ideas have originated not in utility but in religion, in law, in\nconceptions of nature, of an ideal good, and the like. And many may be\ninclined to think that this conclusively disproves the claim of utility\nto be the basis of morals. But the utilitarian will fairly reply (see\nabove) that we must distinguish the origin of ethics from the principles\nof them--the historical germ from the later growth of reflection. And he\nmay also truly add that for two thousand years and more, utility, if\nnot the originating, has been the great corrective principle in law, in\npolitics, in religion, leading men to ask how evil may be diminished\nand good increased--by what course of policy the public interest may be\npromoted, and to understand that God wills the happiness, not of some\nof his creatures and in this world only, but of all of them and in every\nstage of their existence.\n\n'What is the place of happiness or utility in a system of moral\nphilosophy?' is analogous to the question asked in the Philebus, 'What\nrank does pleasure hold in the scale of goods?' Admitting the greatest\nhappiness principle to be true and valuable, and the necessary\nfoundation of that part of morals which relates to the consequences of\nactions, we still have to consider whether this or some other general\nnotion is the highest principle of human life. We may try them in this\ncomparison by three tests--definiteness, comprehensiveness, and motive\npower.\n\nThere are three subjective principles of morals,--sympathy, benevolence,\nself-love. But sympathy seems to rest morality on feelings which differ\nwidely even in good men; benevolence and self-love torture one half\nof our virtuous actions into the likeness of the other. The greatest\nhappiness principle, which includes both, has the advantage over all\nthese in comprehensiveness, but the advantage is purchased at the\nexpense of definiteness.\n\nAgain, there are the legal and political principles of morals--freedom,\nequality, rights of persons; 'Every man to count for one and no man\nfor more than one,' 'Every man equal in the eye of the law and of the\nlegislator.' There is also the other sort of political morality, which\nif not beginning with 'Might is right,' at any rate seeks to deduce\nour ideas of justice from the necessities of the state and of society.\nAccording to this view the greatest good of men is obedience to law: the\nbest human government is a rational despotism, and the best idea which\nwe can form of a divine being is that of a despot acting not wholly\nwithout regard to law and order. To such a view the present mixed\nstate of the world, not wholly evil or wholly good, is supposed to be a\nwitness. More we might desire to have, but are not permitted. Though a\nhuman tyrant would be intolerable, a divine tyrant is a very tolerable\ngovernor of the universe. This is the doctrine of Thrasymachus adapted\nto the public opinion of modern times.\n\nThere is yet a third view which combines the two:--freedom is obedience\nto the law, and the greatest order is also the greatest freedom; 'Act so\nthat thy action may be the law of every intelligent being.' This view\nis noble and elevating; but it seems to err, like other transcendental\nprinciples of ethics, in being too abstract. For there is the same\ndifficulty in connecting the idea of duty with particular duties as\nin bridging the gulf between phainomena and onta; and when, as in the\nsystem of Kant, this universal idea or law is held to be independent of\nspace and time, such a mataion eidos becomes almost unmeaning.\n\nOnce more there are the religious principles of morals:--the will of\nGod revealed in Scripture and in nature. No philosophy has supplied a\nsanction equal in authority to this, or a motive equal in strength to\nthe belief in another life. Yet about these too we must ask What will of\nGod? how revealed to us, and by what proofs? Religion, like happiness,\nis a word which has great influence apart from any consideration of its\ncontent: it may be for great good or for great evil. But true religion\nis the synthesis of religion and morality, beginning with divine\nperfection in which all human perfection is embodied. It moves among\nideas of holiness, justice, love, wisdom, truth; these are to God, in\nwhom they are personified, what the Platonic ideas are to the idea of\ngood. It is the consciousness of the will of God that all men should\nbe as he is. It lives in this world and is known to us only through\nthe phenomena of this world, but it extends to worlds beyond. Ordinary\nreligion which is alloyed with motives of this world may easily be\nin excess, may be fanatical, may be interested, may be the mask of\nambition, may be perverted in a thousand ways. But of that religion\nwhich combines the will of God with our highest ideas of truth and right\nthere can never be too much. This impossibility of excess is the note of\ndivine moderation.\n\nSo then, having briefly passed in review the various principles of moral\nphilosophy, we may now arrange our goods in order, though, like the\nreader of the Philebus, we have a difficulty in distinguishing the\ndifferent aspects of them from one another, or defining the point at\nwhich the human passes into the divine.\n\nFirst, the eternal will of God in this world and in another,--justice,\nholiness, wisdom, love, without succession of acts (ouch e genesis\nprosestin), which is known to us in part only, and reverenced by us as\ndivine perfection.\n\nSecondly, human perfection, or the fulfilment of the will of God in\nthis world, and co-operation with his laws revealed to us by reason and\nexperience, in nature, history, and in our own minds.\n\nThirdly, the elements of human perfection,--virtue, knowledge, and right\nopinion.\n\nFourthly, the external conditions of perfection,--health and the goods\nof life.\n\nFifthly, beauty and happiness,--the inward enjoyment of that which is\nbest and fairest in this world and in the human soul.\n\n...\n\nThe Philebus is probably the latest in time of the writings of Plato\nwith the exception of the Laws. We have in it therefore the last\ndevelopment of his philosophy. The extreme and one-sided doctrines of\nthe Cynics and Cyrenaics are included in a larger whole; the\nrelations of pleasure and knowledge to each other and to the good are\nauthoritatively determined; the Eleatic Being and the Heraclitean Flux\nno longer divide the empire of thought; the Mind of Anaxagoras has\nbecome the Mind of God and of the World. The great distinction between\npure and applied science for the first time has a place in philosophy;\nthe natural claim of dialectic to be the Queen of the Sciences is once\nmore affirmed. This latter is the bond of union which pervades the whole\nor nearly the whole of the Platonic writings. And here as in several\nother dialogues (Phaedrus, Republic, etc.) it is presented to us in a\nmanner playful yet also serious, and sometimes as if the thought of it\nwere too great for human utterance and came down from heaven direct. It\nis the organization of knowledge wonderful to think of at a time when\nknowledge itself could hardly be said to exist. It is this more than any\nother element which distinguishes Plato, not only from the presocratic\nphilosophers, but from Socrates himself.\n\nWe have not yet reached the confines of Aristotle, but we make a\nsomewhat nearer approach to him in the Philebus than in the earlier\nPlatonic writings. The germs of logic are beginning to appear, but they\nare not collected into a whole, or made a separate science or system.\nMany thinkers of many different schools have to be interposed between\nthe Parmenides or Philebus of Plato, and the Physics or Metaphysics of\nAristotle. It is this interval upon which we have to fix our minds if we\nwould rightly understand the character of the transition from one to the\nother. Plato and Aristotle do not dovetail into one another; nor does\nthe one begin where the other ends; there is a gulf between them not to\nbe measured by time, which in the fragmentary state of our knowledge\nit is impossible to bridge over. It follows that the one cannot be\ninterpreted by the other. At any rate, it is not Plato who is to be\ninterpreted by Aristotle, but Aristotle by Plato. Of all philosophy\nand of all art the true understanding is to be sought not in the\nafterthoughts of posterity, but in the elements out of which they have\narisen. For the previous stage is a tendency towards the ideal at which\nthey are aiming; the later is a declination or deviation from them, or\neven a perversion of them. No man's thoughts were ever so well expressed\nby his disciples as by himself.\n\nBut although Plato in the Philebus does not come into any close\nconnexion with Aristotle, he is now a long way from himself and from the\nbeginnings of his own philosophy. At the time of his death he left his\nsystem still incomplete; or he may be more truly said to have had\nno system, but to have lived in the successive stages or moments of\nmetaphysical thought which presented themselves from time to time. The\nearlier discussions about universal ideas and definitions seem to have\ndied away; the correlation of ideas has taken their place. The flowers\nof rhetoric and poetry have lost their freshness and charm; and a\ntechnical language has begun to supersede and overgrow them. But the\npower of thinking tends to increase with age, and the experience of life\nto widen and deepen. The good is summed up under categories which are\nnot summa genera, but heads or gradations of thought. The question of\npleasure and the relation of bodily pleasures to mental, which is hardly\ntreated of elsewhere in Plato, is here analysed with great subtlety. The\nmean or measure is now made the first principle of good. Some of these\nquestions reappear in Aristotle, as does also the distinction between\nmetaphysics and mathematics. But there are many things in Plato which\nhave been lost in Aristotle; and many things in Aristotle not to be\nfound in Plato. The most remarkable deficiency in Aristotle is the\ndisappearance of the Platonic dialectic, which in the Aristotelian\nschool is only used in a comparatively unimportant and trivial sense.\nThe most remarkable additions are the invention of the Syllogism, the\nconception of happiness as the foundation of morals, the reference of\nhuman actions to the standard of the better mind of the world, or of\nthe one 'sensible man' or 'superior person.' His conception of ousia,\nor essence, is not an advance upon Plato, but a return to the poor and\nmeagre abstractions of the Eleatic philosophy. The dry attempt to reduce\nthe presocratic philosophy by his own rather arbitrary standard of the\nfour causes, contrasts unfavourably with Plato's general discussion of\nthe same subject (Sophist). To attempt further to sum up the differences\nbetween the two great philosophers would be out of place here. Any\nreal discussion of their relation to one another must be preceded by an\nexamination into the nature and character of the Aristotelian writings\nand the form in which they have come down to us. This enquiry is not\nreally separable from an investigation of Theophrastus as well as\nAristotle and of the remains of other schools of philosophy as well as\nof the Peripatetics. But, without entering on this wide field, even a\nsuperficial consideration of the logical and metaphysical works which\npass under the name of Aristotle, whether we suppose them to have\ncome directly from his hand or to be the tradition of his school, is\nsufficient to show how great was the mental activity which prevailed in\nthe latter half of the fourth century B.C.; what eddies and\nwhirlpools of controversies were surging in the chaos of thought, what\ntransformations of the old philosophies were taking place everywhere,\nwhat eclecticisms and syncretisms and realisms and nominalisms were\naffecting the mind of Hellas. The decline of philosophy during this\nperiod is no less remarkable than the loss of freedom; and the two\nare not unconnected with each other. But of the multitudinous sea of\nopinions which were current in the age of Aristotle we have no exact\naccount. We know of them from allusions only. And we cannot with\nadvantage fill up the void of our knowledge by conjecture: we can only\nmake allowance for our ignorance.\n\nThere are several passages in the Philebus which are very characteristic\nof Plato, and which we shall do well to consider not only in their\nconnexion, but apart from their connexion as inspired sayings or\noracles which receive their full interpretation only from the history\nof philosophy in later ages. The more serious attacks on traditional\nbeliefs which are often veiled under an unusual simplicity or irony are\nof this kind. Such, for example, is the excessive and more than human\nawe which Socrates expresses about the names of the gods, which may\nbe not unaptly compared with the importance attached by mankind to\ntheological terms in other ages; for this also may be comprehended under\nthe satire of Socrates. Let us observe the religious and intellectual\nenthusiasm which shines forth in the following, 'The power and faculty\nof loving the truth, and of doing all things for the sake of the truth':\nor, again, the singular acknowledgment which may be regarded as the\nanticipation of a new logic, that 'In going to war for mind I must have\nweapons of a different make from those which I used before, although\nsome of the old ones may do again.' Let us pause awhile to reflect on\na sentence which is full of meaning to reformers of religion or to the\noriginal thinker of all ages: 'Shall we then agree with them of\nold time, and merely reassert the notions of others without risk to\nourselves; or shall we venture also to share in the risk and bear the\nreproach which will await us': i.e. if we assert mind to be the author\nof nature. Let us note the remarkable words, 'That in the divine nature\nof Zeus there is the soul and mind of a King, because there is in him\nthe power of the cause,' a saying in which theology and philosophy are\nblended and reconciled; not omitting to observe the deep insight into\nhuman nature which is shown by the repetition of the same thought 'All\nphilosophers are agreed that mind is the king of heaven and earth' with\nthe ironical addition, 'in this way truly they magnify themselves.' Nor\nlet us pass unheeded the indignation felt by the generous youth at the\n'blasphemy' of those who say that Chaos and Chance Medley created the\nworld; or the significance of the words 'those who said of old time that\nmind rules the universe'; or the pregnant observation that 'we are\nnot always conscious of what we are doing or of what happens to us,' a\nchance expression to which if philosophers had attended they would have\nescaped many errors in psychology. We may contrast the contempt which\nis poured upon the verbal difficulty of the one and many, and the\nseriousness with the unity of opposites is regarded from the higher\npoint of view of abstract ideas: or compare the simple manner in which\nthe question of cause and effect and their mutual dependence is regarded\nby Plato (to which modern science has returned in Mill and Bacon), and\nthe cumbrous fourfold division of causes in the Physics and Metaphysics\nof Aristotle, for which it has puzzled the world to find a use in so\nmany centuries. When we consider the backwardness of knowledge in\nthe age of Plato, the boldness with which he looks forward into the\ndistance, the many questions of modern philosophy which are anticipated\nin his writings, may we not truly describe him in his own words as a\n'spectator of all time and of all existence'?\n\n\n\n\nPHILEBUS\n\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Protarchus, Philebus.\n\n\nSOCRATES: Observe, Protarchus, the nature of the position which you are\nnow going to take from Philebus, and what the other position is which I\nmaintain, and which, if you do not approve of it, is to be controverted\nby you. Shall you and I sum up the two sides?\n\nPROTARCHUS: By all means.\n\nSOCRATES: Philebus was saying that enjoyment and pleasure and delight,\nand the class of feelings akin to them, are a good to every living\nbeing, whereas I contend, that not these, but wisdom and intelligence\nand memory, and their kindred, right opinion and true reasoning, are\nbetter and more desirable than pleasure for all who are able to partake\nof them, and that to all such who are or ever will be they are the most\nadvantageous of all things. Have I not given, Philebus, a fair statement\nof the two sides of the argument?\n\nPHILEBUS: Nothing could be fairer, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And do you, Protarchus, accept the position which is assigned\nto you?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I cannot do otherwise, since our excellent Philebus has left\nthe field.\n\nSOCRATES: Surely the truth about these matters ought, by all means, to\nbe ascertained.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Shall we further agree--\n\nPROTARCHUS: To what?\n\nSOCRATES: That you and I must now try to indicate some state and\ndisposition of the soul, which has the property of making all men happy.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, by all means.\n\nSOCRATES: And you say that pleasure, and I say that wisdom, is such a\nstate?\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And what if there be a third state, which is better than\neither? Then both of us are vanquished--are we not? But if this life,\nwhich really has the power of making men happy, turn out to be more\nakin to pleasure than to wisdom, the life of pleasure may still have the\nadvantage over the life of wisdom.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Or suppose that the better life is more nearly allied to\nwisdom, then wisdom conquers, and pleasure is defeated;--do you agree?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And what do you say, Philebus?\n\nPHILEBUS: I say, and shall always say, that pleasure is easily the\nconqueror; but you must decide for yourself, Protarchus.\n\nPROTARCHUS: You, Philebus, have handed over the argument to me, and have\nno longer a voice in the matter?\n\nPHILEBUS: True enough. Nevertheless I would clear myself and deliver my\nsoul of you; and I call the goddess herself to witness that I now do so.\n\nPROTARCHUS: You may appeal to us; we too will be the witnesses of your\nwords. And now, Socrates, whether Philebus is pleased or displeased, we\nwill proceed with the argument.\n\nSOCRATES: Then let us begin with the goddess herself, of whom Philebus\nsays that she is called Aphrodite, but that her real name is Pleasure.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very good.\n\nSOCRATES: The awe which I always feel, Protarchus, about the names of\nthe gods is more than human--it exceeds all other fears. And now I would\nnot sin against Aphrodite by naming her amiss; let her be called what\nshe pleases. But Pleasure I know to be manifold, and with her, as I was\njust now saying, we must begin, and consider what her nature is. She\nhas one name, and therefore you would imagine that she is one; and yet\nsurely she takes the most varied and even unlike forms. For do we\nnot say that the intemperate has pleasure, and that the temperate has\npleasure in his very temperance,--that the fool is pleased when he is\nfull of foolish fancies and hopes, and that the wise man has pleasure in\nhis wisdom? and how foolish would any one be who affirmed that all these\nopposite pleasures are severally alike!\n\nPROTARCHUS: Why, Socrates, they are opposed in so far as they spring\nfrom opposite sources, but they are not in themselves opposite. For must\nnot pleasure be of all things most absolutely like pleasure,--that is,\nlike itself?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, my good friend, just as colour is like colour;--in so far\nas colours are colours, there is no difference between them; and yet we\nall know that black is not only unlike, but even absolutely opposed\nto white: or again, as figure is like figure, for all figures are\ncomprehended under one class; and yet particular figures may be\nabsolutely opposed to one another, and there is an infinite diversity of\nthem. And we might find similar examples in many other things; therefore\ndo not rely upon this argument, which would go to prove the unity of\nthe most extreme opposites. And I suspect that we shall find a similar\nopposition among pleasures.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very likely; but how will this invalidate the argument?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, I shall reply, that dissimilar as they are, you apply to\nthem a new predicate, for you say that all pleasant things are good; now\nalthough no one can argue that pleasure is not pleasure, he may argue,\nas we are doing, that pleasures are oftener bad than good; but you call\nthem all good, and at the same time are compelled, if you are pressed,\nto acknowledge that they are unlike. And so you must tell us what is the\nidentical quality existing alike in good and bad pleasures, which makes\nyou designate all of them as good.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What do you mean, Socrates? Do you think that any one who\nasserts pleasure to be the good, will tolerate the notion that some\npleasures are good and others bad?\n\nSOCRATES: And yet you will acknowledge that they are different from one\nanother, and sometimes opposed?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Not in so far as they are pleasures.\n\nSOCRATES: That is a return to the old position, Protarchus, and so we\nare to say (are we?) that there is no difference in pleasures, but that\nthey are all alike; and the examples which have just been cited do\nnot pierce our dull minds, but we go on arguing all the same, like the\nweakest and most inexperienced reasoners? (Probably corrupt.)\n\nPROTARCHUS: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, I mean to say, that in self-defence I may, if I like,\nfollow your example, and assert boldly that the two things most unlike\nare most absolutely alike; and the result will be that you and I will\nprove ourselves to be very tyros in the art of disputing; and the\nargument will be blown away and lost. Suppose that we put back, and\nreturn to the old position; then perhaps we may come to an understanding\nwith one another.\n\nPROTARCHUS: How do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: Shall I, Protarchus, have my own question asked of me by you?\n\nPROTARCHUS: What question?\n\nSOCRATES: Ask me whether wisdom and science and mind, and those other\nqualities which I, when asked by you at first what is the nature of the\ngood, affirmed to be good, are not in the same case with the pleasures\nof which you spoke.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: The sciences are a numerous class, and will be found to\npresent great differences. But even admitting that, like the pleasures,\nthey are opposite as well as different, should I be worthy of the name\nof dialectician if, in order to avoid this difficulty, I were to say\n(as you are saying of pleasure) that there is no difference between one\nscience and another;--would not the argument founder and disappear like\nan idle tale, although we might ourselves escape drowning by clinging to\na fallacy?\n\nPROTARCHUS: May none of this befal us, except the deliverance! Yet I\nlike the even-handed justice which is applied to both our arguments. Let\nus assume, then, that there are many and diverse pleasures, and many and\ndifferent sciences.\n\nSOCRATES: And let us have no concealment, Protarchus, of the differences\nbetween my good and yours; but let us bring them to the light in\nthe hope that, in the process of testing them, they may show whether\npleasure is to be called the good, or wisdom, or some third quality; for\nsurely we are not now simply contending in order that my view or that\nyours may prevail, but I presume that we ought both of us to be fighting\nfor the truth.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly we ought.\n\nSOCRATES: Then let us have a more definite understanding and establish\nthe principle on which the argument rests.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What principle?\n\nSOCRATES: A principle about which all men are always in a difficulty,\nand some men sometimes against their will.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Speak plainer.\n\nSOCRATES: The principle which has just turned up, which is a marvel\nof nature; for that one should be many or many one, are wonderful\npropositions; and he who affirms either is very open to attack.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Do you mean, when a person says that I, Protarchus, am by\nnature one and also many, dividing the single 'me' into many 'me's,'\nand even opposing them as great and small, light and heavy, and in ten\nthousand other ways?\n\nSOCRATES: Those, Protarchus, are the common and acknowledged paradoxes\nabout the one and many, which I may say that everybody has by this time\nagreed to dismiss as childish and obvious and detrimental to the true\ncourse of thought; and no more favour is shown to that other puzzle, in\nwhich a person proves the members and parts of anything to be divided,\nand then confessing that they are all one, says laughingly in disproof\nof his own words: Why, here is a miracle, the one is many and infinite,\nand the many are only one.\n\nPROTARCHUS: But what, Socrates, are those other marvels connected\nwith this subject which, as you imply, have not yet become common and\nacknowledged?\n\nSOCRATES: When, my boy, the one does not belong to the class of things\nthat are born and perish, as in the instances which we were giving, for\nin those cases, and when unity is of this concrete nature, there is, as\nI was saying, a universal consent that no refutation is needed; but when\nthe assertion is made that man is one, or ox is one, or beauty one,\nor the good one, then the interest which attaches to these and similar\nunities and the attempt which is made to divide them gives birth to a\ncontroversy.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Of what nature?\n\nSOCRATES: In the first place, as to whether these unities have a real\nexistence; and then how each individual unity, being always the same,\nand incapable either of generation or of destruction, but retaining\na permanent individuality, can be conceived either as dispersed and\nmultiplied in the infinity of the world of generation, or as still\nentire and yet divided from itself, which latter would seem to be the\ngreatest impossibility of all, for how can one and the same thing be at\nthe same time in one and in many things? These, Protarchus, are the real\ndifficulties, and this is the one and many to which they relate;\nthey are the source of great perplexity if ill decided, and the right\ndetermination of them is very helpful.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Then, Socrates, let us begin by clearing up these questions.\n\nSOCRATES: That is what I should wish.\n\nPROTARCHUS: And I am sure that all my other friends will be glad to hear\nthem discussed; Philebus, fortunately for us, is not disposed to move,\nand we had better not stir him up with questions.\n\nSOCRATES: Good; and where shall we begin this great and multifarious\nbattle, in which such various points are at issue? Shall we begin thus?\n\nPROTARCHUS: How?\n\nSOCRATES: We say that the one and many become identified by thought, and\nthat now, as in time past, they run about together, in and out of every\nword which is uttered, and that this union of them will never cease, and\nis not now beginning, but is, as I believe, an everlasting quality of\nthought itself, which never grows old. Any young man, when he first\ntastes these subtleties, is delighted, and fancies that he has found\na treasure of wisdom; in the first enthusiasm of his joy he leaves no\nstone, or rather no thought unturned, now rolling up the many into the\none, and kneading them together, now unfolding and dividing them; he\npuzzles himself first and above all, and then he proceeds to puzzle his\nneighbours, whether they are older or younger, or of his own age--that\nmakes no difference; neither father nor mother does he spare; no\nhuman being who has ears is safe from him, hardly even his dog, and a\nbarbarian would have no chance of escaping him, if an interpreter could\nonly be found.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Considering, Socrates, how many we are, and that all of us\nare young men, is there not a danger that we and Philebus may all set\nupon you, if you abuse us? We understand what you mean; but is there no\ncharm by which we may dispel all this confusion, no more excellent way\nof arriving at the truth? If there is, we hope that you will guide us\ninto that way, and we will do our best to follow, for the enquiry in\nwhich we are engaged, Socrates, is not unimportant.\n\nSOCRATES: The reverse of unimportant, my boys, as Philebus calls you,\nand there neither is nor ever will be a better than my own favourite\nway, which has nevertheless already often deserted me and left me\nhelpless in the hour of need.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Tell us what that is.\n\nSOCRATES: One which may be easily pointed out, but is by no means easy\nof application; it is the parent of all the discoveries in the arts.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Tell us what it is.\n\nSOCRATES: A gift of heaven, which, as I conceive, the gods tossed among\nmen by the hands of a new Prometheus, and therewith a blaze of light;\nand the ancients, who were our betters and nearer the gods than we\nare, handed down the tradition, that whatever things are said to be are\ncomposed of one and many, and have the finite and infinite implanted in\nthem: seeing, then, that such is the order of the world, we too ought\nin every enquiry to begin by laying down one idea of that which is the\nsubject of enquiry; this unity we shall find in everything. Having found\nit, we may next proceed to look for two, if there be two, or, if not,\nthen for three or some other number, subdividing each of these units,\nuntil at last the unity with which we began is seen not only to be one\nand many and infinite, but also a definite number; the infinite must not\nbe suffered to approach the many until the entire number of the species\nintermediate between unity and infinity has been discovered,--then, and\nnot till then, we may rest from division, and without further troubling\nourselves about the endless individuals may allow them to drop into\ninfinity. This, as I was saying, is the way of considering and learning\nand teaching one another, which the gods have handed down to us. But\nthe wise men of our time are either too quick or too slow in conceiving\nplurality in unity. Having no method, they make their one and many\nanyhow, and from unity pass at once to infinity; the intermediate steps\nnever occur to them. And this, I repeat, is what makes the difference\nbetween the mere art of disputation and true dialectic.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I think that I partly understand you Socrates, but I should\nlike to have a clearer notion of what you are saying.\n\nSOCRATES: I may illustrate my meaning by the letters of the alphabet,\nProtarchus, which you were made to learn as a child.\n\nPROTARCHUS: How do they afford an illustration?\n\nSOCRATES: The sound which passes through the lips whether of an\nindividual or of all men is one and yet infinite.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet not by knowing either that sound is one or that sound\nis infinite are we perfect in the art of speech, but the knowledge of\nthe number and nature of sounds is what makes a man a grammarian.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And the knowledge which makes a man a musician is of the same\nkind.\n\nPROTARCHUS: How so?\n\nSOCRATES: Sound is one in music as well as in grammar?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And there is a higher note and a lower note, and a note of\nequal pitch:--may we affirm so much?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: But you would not be a real musician if this was all that you\nknew; though if you did not know this you would know almost nothing of\nmusic.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Nothing.\n\nSOCRATES: But when you have learned what sounds are high and what\nlow, and the number and nature of the intervals and their limits or\nproportions, and the systems compounded out of them, which our fathers\ndiscovered, and have handed down to us who are their descendants under\nthe name of harmonies; and the affections corresponding to them in the\nmovements of the human body, which when measured by numbers ought, as\nthey say, to be called rhythms and measures; and they tell us that the\nsame principle should be applied to every one and many;--when, I say,\nyou have learned all this, then, my dear friend, you are perfect; and\nyou may be said to understand any other subject, when you have a similar\ngrasp of it. But the infinity of kinds and the infinity of individuals\nwhich there is in each of them, when not classified, creates in every\none of us a state of infinite ignorance; and he who never looks for\nnumber in anything, will not himself be looked for in the number of\nfamous men.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I think that what Socrates is now saying is excellent,\nPhilebus.\n\nPHILEBUS: I think so too, but how do his words bear upon us and upon the\nargument?\n\nSOCRATES: Philebus is right in asking that question of us, Protarchus.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Indeed he is, and you must answer him.\n\nSOCRATES: I will; but you must let me make one little remark first about\nthese matters; I was saying, that he who begins with any individual\nunity, should proceed from that, not to infinity, but to a definite\nnumber, and now I say conversely, that he who has to begin with infinity\nshould not jump to unity, but he should look about for some number\nrepresenting a certain quantity, and thus out of all end in one. And\nnow let us return for an illustration of our principle to the case of\nletters.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: Some god or divine man, who in the Egyptian legend is said\nto have been Theuth, observing that the human voice was infinite, first\ndistinguished in this infinity a certain number of vowels, and then\nother letters which had sound, but were not pure vowels (i.e., the\nsemivowels); these too exist in a definite number; and lastly, he\ndistinguished a third class of letters which we now call mutes, without\nvoice and without sound, and divided these, and likewise the two other\nclasses of vowels and semivowels, into the individual sounds, and\ntold the number of them, and gave to each and all of them the name of\nletters; and observing that none of us could learn any one of them and\nnot learn them all, and in consideration of this common bond which in\na manner united them, he assigned to them all a single art, and this he\ncalled the art of grammar or letters.\n\nPHILEBUS: The illustration, Protarchus, has assisted me in understanding\nthe original statement, but I still feel the defect of which I just now\ncomplained.\n\nSOCRATES: Are you going to ask, Philebus, what this has to do with the\nargument?\n\nPHILEBUS: Yes, that is a question which Protarchus and I have been long\nasking.\n\nSOCRATES: Assuredly you have already arrived at the answer to the\nquestion which, as you say, you have been so long asking?\n\nPHILEBUS: How so?\n\nSOCRATES: Did we not begin by enquiring into the comparative eligibility\nof pleasure and wisdom?\n\nPHILEBUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And we maintain that they are each of them one?\n\nPHILEBUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And the precise question to which the previous discussion\ndesires an answer is, how they are one and also many (i.e., how they\nhave one genus and many species), and are not at once infinite, and what\nnumber of species is to be assigned to either of them before they pass\ninto infinity (i.e. into the infinite number of individuals).\n\nPROTARCHUS: That is a very serious question, Philebus, to which Socrates\nhas ingeniously brought us round, and please to consider which of us\nshall answer him; there may be something ridiculous in my being unable\nto answer, and therefore imposing the task upon you, when I have\nundertaken the whole charge of the argument, but if neither of us were\nable to answer, the result methinks would be still more ridiculous. Let\nus consider, then, what we are to do:--Socrates, if I understood him\nrightly, is asking whether there are not kinds of pleasure, and what is\nthe number and nature of them, and the same of wisdom.\n\nSOCRATES: Most true, O son of Callias; and the previous argument showed\nthat if we are not able to tell the kinds of everything that has unity,\nlikeness, sameness, or their opposites, none of us will be of the\nsmallest use in any enquiry.\n\nPROTARCHUS: That seems to be very near the truth, Socrates. Happy would\nthe wise man be if he knew all things, and the next best thing for him\nis that he should know himself. Why do I say so at this moment? I will\ntell you. You, Socrates, have granted us this opportunity of conversing\nwith you, and are ready to assist us in determining what is the best\nof human goods. For when Philebus said that pleasure and delight and\nenjoyment and the like were the chief good, you answered--No, not those,\nbut another class of goods; and we are constantly reminding ourselves\nof what you said, and very properly, in order that we may not forget to\nexamine and compare the two. And these goods, which in your opinion are\nto be designated as superior to pleasure, and are the true objects of\npursuit, are mind and knowledge and understanding and art, and the\nlike. There was a dispute about which were the best, and we playfully\nthreatened that you should not be allowed to go home until the question\nwas settled; and you agreed, and placed yourself at our disposal. And\nnow, as children say, what has been fairly given cannot be taken back;\ncease then to fight against us in this way.\n\nSOCRATES: In what way?\n\nPHILEBUS: Do not perplex us, and keep asking questions of us to which we\nhave not as yet any sufficient answer to give; let us not imagine that a\ngeneral puzzling of us all is to be the end of our discussion, but if\nwe are unable to answer, do you answer, as you have promised. Consider,\nthen, whether you will divide pleasure and knowledge according to their\nkinds; or you may let the matter drop, if you are able and willing to\nfind some other mode of clearing up our controversy.\n\nSOCRATES: If you say that, I have nothing to apprehend, for the words\n'if you are willing' dispel all my fear; and, moreover, a god seems to\nhave recalled something to my mind.\n\nPHILEBUS: What is that?\n\nSOCRATES: I remember to have heard long ago certain discussions about\npleasure and wisdom, whether awake or in a dream I cannot tell; they\nwere to the effect that neither the one nor the other of them was the\ngood, but some third thing, which was different from them, and better\nthan either. If this be clearly established, then pleasure will lose the\nvictory, for the good will cease to be identified with her:--Am I not\nright?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the\nkinds of pleasures, as I am inclined to think, but this will appear more\nclearly as we proceed.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Capital, Socrates; pray go on as you propose.\n\nSOCRATES: But, let us first agree on some little points.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What are they?\n\nSOCRATES: Is the good perfect or imperfect?\n\nPROTARCHUS: The most perfect, Socrates, of all things.\n\nSOCRATES: And is the good sufficient?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly, and in a degree surpassing all other things.\n\nSOCRATES: And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt\nafter good, and are eager to catch and have the good about them, and\ncare not for the attainment of anything which is not accompanied by\ngood.\n\nPROTARCHUS: That is undeniable.\n\nSOCRATES: Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of\nwisdom, and pass them in review.\n\nPROTARCHUS: How do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any\npleasure in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief good,\nit cannot be supposed to want anything, but if either is shown to want\nanything, then it cannot really be the chief good.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Impossible.\n\nSOCRATES: And will you help us to test these two lives?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then answer.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Ask.\n\nSOCRATES: Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in\nthe enjoyment of the greatest pleasures?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly I should.\n\nSOCRATES: Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to\nyou if you had perfect pleasure?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and\nforethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want\nsight?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things.\n\nSOCRATES: Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the\ngreatest pleasures?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I should.\n\nSOCRATES: But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge,\nnor true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of\nwhether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of\nintelligence.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect\nthat you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of\nthe pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if you\nhad no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you\nwere; and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to\ncalculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a\nman, but of an oyster or 'pulmo marinus.' Could this be otherwise?\n\nPROTARCHUS: No.\n\nSOCRATES: But is such a life eligible?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken away\nfrom me the power of speech.\n\nSOCRATES: We must keep up our spirits;--let us now take the life of mind\nand examine it in turn.\n\nPROTARCHUS: And what is this life of mind?\n\nSOCRATES: I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live,\nhaving wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but\nhaving no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and\nthe like feelings?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, nor is\nlikely, as I should imagine, to be chosen by any one else.\n\nSOCRATES: What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to\none that was made out of the union of the two?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, that is the life which I mean.\n\nPROTARCHUS: There can be no difference of opinion; not some but all\nwould surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and\nin addition to them.\n\nSOCRATES: But do you see the consequence?\n\nPROTARCHUS: To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the\nthree lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible\nfor man or for animal.\n\nSOCRATES: Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the\ngood, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and\nperfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able to\nlive such a life; and if any of us had chosen any other, he would have\nchosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his own\nfree will, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly that seems to be true.\n\nSOCRATES: And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus' goddess\nis not to be regarded as identical with the good?\n\nPHILEBUS: Neither is your 'mind' the good, Socrates, for that will be\nopen to the same objections.\n\nSOCRATES: Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my 'mind';\nbut of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise. However,\nI will not at present claim the first place for mind as against the\nmixed life; but we must come to some understanding about the second\nplace. For you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the\nmixed life; and in that case although neither of them would be the good,\none of them might be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might\nproceed further to argue in opposition to Philebus, that the element\nwhich makes this mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and more\nsimilar to mind than to pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot\nbe truly said to share either in the first or second place, and does\nnot, if I may trust my own mind, attain even to the third.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall;\nin fighting for the palm, she has been smitten by the argument, and is\nlaid low. I must say that mind would have fallen too, and may therefore\nbe thought to show discretion in not putting forward a similar claim.\nAnd if pleasure were deprived not only of the first but of the second\nplace, she would be terribly damaged in the eyes of her admirers, for\nnot even to them would she still appear as fair as before.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but had we not better leave her now, and not pain her by\napplying the crucial test, and finally detecting her?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Nonsense, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Why? because I said that we had better not pain pleasure,\nwhich is an impossibility?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, and more than that, because you do not seem to be\naware that none of us will let you go home until you have finished the\nargument.\n\nSOCRATES: Heavens! Protarchus, that will be a tedious business, and just\nat present not at all an easy one. For in going to war in the cause of\nmind, who is aspiring to the second prize, I ought to have weapons of\nanother make from those which I used before; some, however, of the old\nones may do again. And must I then finish the argument?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Of course you must.\n\nSOCRATES: Let us be very careful in laying the foundation.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: Let us divide all existing things into two, or rather, if you\ndo not object, into three classes.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Upon what principle would you make the division?\n\nSOCRATES: Let us take some of our newly-found notions.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Which of them?\n\nSOCRATES: Were we not saying that God revealed a finite element of\nexistence, and also an infinite?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Let us assume these two principles, and also a third, which\nis compounded out of them; but I fear that I am ridiculously clumsy at\nthese processes of division and enumeration.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What do you mean, my good friend?\n\nSOCRATES: I say that a fourth class is still wanted.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What will that be?\n\nSOCRATES: Find the cause of the third or compound, and add this as a\nfourth class to the three others.\n\nPROTARCHUS: And would you like to have a fifth class or cause of\nresolution as well as a cause of composition?\n\nSOCRATES: Not, I think, at present; but if I want a fifth at some future\ntime you shall allow me to have it.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Let us begin with the first three; and as we find two out of\nthe three greatly divided and dispersed, let us endeavour to reunite\nthem, and see how in each of them there is a one and many.\n\nPROTARCHUS: If you would explain to me a little more about them, perhaps\nI might be able to follow you.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, the two classes are the same which I mentioned before,\none the finite, and the other the infinite; I will first show that the\ninfinite is in a certain sense many, and the finite may be hereafter\ndiscussed.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I agree.\n\nSOCRATES: And now consider well; for the question to which I invite your\nattention is difficult and controverted. When you speak of hotter and\ncolder, can you conceive any limit in those qualities? Does not the more\nand less, which dwells in their very nature, prevent their having any\nend? for if they had an end, the more and less would themselves have an\nend.\n\nPROTARCHUS: That is most true.\n\nSOCRATES: Ever, as we say, into the hotter and the colder there enters a\nmore and a less.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, says the argument, there is never any end of them, and\nbeing endless they must also be infinite.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, that is exceedingly true.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, my dear Protarchus, and your answer reminds me that such\nan expression as 'exceedingly,' which you have just uttered, and also\nthe term 'gently,' have the same significance as more or less; for\nwhenever they occur they do not allow of the existence of quantity--they\nare always introducing degrees into actions, instituting a comparison\nof a more or a less excessive or a more or a less gentle, and at each\ncreation of more or less, quantity disappears. For, as I was just now\nsaying, if quantity and measure did not disappear, but were allowed to\nintrude in the sphere of more and less and the other comparatives, these\nlast would be driven out of their own domain. When definite quantity\nis once admitted, there can be no longer a 'hotter' or a 'colder' (for\nthese are always progressing, and are never in one stay); but definite\nquantity is at rest, and has ceased to progress. Which proves that\ncomparatives, such as the hotter and the colder, are to be ranked in the\nclass of the infinite.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Your remark certainly has the look of truth, Socrates; but\nthese subjects, as you were saying, are difficult to follow at first. I\nthink however, that if I could hear the argument repeated by you once or\ntwice, there would be a substantial agreement between us.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, and I will try to meet your wish; but, as I would rather\nnot waste time in the enumeration of endless particulars, let me know\nwhether I may not assume as a note of the infinite--\n\nPROTARCHUS: What?\n\nSOCRATES: I want to know whether such things as appear to us to admit\nof more or less, or are denoted by the words 'exceedingly,' 'gently,'\n'extremely,' and the like, may not be referred to the class of the\ninfinite, which is their unity, for, as was asserted in the previous\nargument, all things that were divided and dispersed should be brought\ntogether, and have the mark or seal of some one nature, if possible, set\nupon them--do you remember?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And all things which do not admit of more or less, but admit\ntheir opposites, that is to say, first of all, equality, and the equal,\nor again, the double, or any other ratio of number and measure--all\nthese may, I think, be rightly reckoned by us in the class of the\nlimited or finite; what do you say?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Excellent, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And now what nature shall we ascribe to the third or compound\nkind?\n\nPROTARCHUS: You, I think, will have to tell me that.\n\nSOCRATES: Rather God will tell you, if there be any God who will listen\nto my prayers.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Offer up a prayer, then, and think.\n\nSOCRATES: I am thinking, Protarchus, and I believe that some God has\nbefriended us.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What do you mean, and what proof have you to offer of what\nyou are saying?\n\nSOCRATES: I will tell you, and do you listen to my words.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Proceed.\n\nSOCRATES: Were we not speaking just now of hotter and colder?\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Add to them drier, wetter, more, less, swifter, slower,\ngreater, smaller, and all that in the preceding argument we placed under\nthe unity of more and less.\n\nPROTARCHUS: In the class of the infinite, you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes; and now mingle this with the other.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What is the other.\n\nSOCRATES: The class of the finite which we ought to have brought\ntogether as we did the infinite; but, perhaps, it will come to the same\nthing if we do so now;--when the two are combined, a third will appear.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What do you mean by the class of the finite?\n\nSOCRATES: The class of the equal and the double, and any class which\nputs an end to difference and opposition, and by introducing number\ncreates harmony and proportion among the different elements.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I understand; you seem to me to mean that the various\nopposites, when you mingle with them the class of the finite, takes\ncertain forms.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, that is my meaning.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Proceed.\n\nSOCRATES: Does not the right participation in the finite give health--in\ndisease, for instance?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And whereas the high and low, the swift and the slow are\ninfinite or unlimited, does not the addition of the principles aforesaid\nintroduce a limit, and perfect the whole frame of music?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Or, again, when cold and heat prevail, does not the\nintroduction of them take away excess and indefiniteness, and infuse\nmoderation and harmony?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And from a like admixture of the finite and infinite come the\nseasons, and all the delights of life?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Most true.\n\nSOCRATES: I omit ten thousand other things, such as beauty and health\nand strength, and the many beauties and high perfections of the soul:\nO my beautiful Philebus, the goddess, methinks, seeing the universal\nwantonness and wickedness of all things, and that there was in them no\nlimit to pleasures and self-indulgence, devised the limit of law and\norder, whereby, as you say, Philebus, she torments, or as I maintain,\ndelivers the soul.--What think you, Protarchus?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Her ways are much to my mind, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: You will observe that I have spoken of three classes?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, I think that I understand you: you mean to say that\nthe infinite is one class, and that the finite is a second class of\nexistences; but what you would make the third I am not so certain.\n\nSOCRATES: That is because the amazing variety of the third class is too\nmuch for you, my dear friend; but there was not this difficulty with\nthe infinite, which also comprehended many classes, for all of them were\nsealed with the note of more and less, and therefore appeared one.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And the finite or limit had not many divisions, and we readily\nacknowledged it to be by nature one?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, indeed; and when I speak of the third class, understand\nme to mean any offspring of these, being a birth into true being,\neffected by the measure which the limit introduces.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I understand.\n\nSOCRATES: Still there was, as we said, a fourth class to be\ninvestigated, and you must assist in the investigation; for does not\neverything which comes into being, of necessity come into being through\na cause?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly; for how can there be anything which has no\ncause?\n\nSOCRATES: And is not the agent the same as the cause in all except name;\nthe agent and the cause may be rightly called one?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And the same may be said of the patient, or effect; we shall\nfind that they too differ, as I was saying, only in name--shall we not?\n\nPROTARCHUS: We shall.\n\nSOCRATES: The agent or cause always naturally leads, and the patient or\neffect naturally follows it?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the cause and what is subordinate to it in generation are\nnot the same, but different?\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Did not the things which were generated, and the things out of\nwhich they were generated, furnish all the three classes?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the creator or cause of them has been satisfactorily\nproven to be distinct from them,--and may therefore be called a fourth\nprinciple?\n\nPROTARCHUS: So let us call it.\n\nSOCRATES: Quite right; but now, having distinguished the four, I think\nthat we had better refresh our memories by recapitulating each of them\nin order.\n\nPROTARCHUS: By all means.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the first I will call the infinite or unlimited, and\nthe second the finite or limited; then follows the third, an essence\ncompound and generated; and I do not think that I shall be far wrong in\nspeaking of the cause of mixture and generation as the fourth.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: And now what is the next question, and how came we hither?\nWere we not enquiring whether the second place belonged to pleasure or\nwisdom?\n\nPROTARCHUS: We were.\n\nSOCRATES: And now, having determined these points, shall we not be\nbetter able to decide about the first and second place, which was the\noriginal subject of dispute?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I dare say.\n\nSOCRATES: We said, if you remember, that the mixed life of pleasure and\nwisdom was the conqueror--did we not?\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And we see what is the place and nature of this life and to\nwhat class it is to be assigned?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Beyond a doubt.\n\nSOCRATES: This is evidently comprehended in the third or mixed class;\nwhich is not composed of any two particular ingredients, but of all the\nelements of infinity, bound down by the finite, and may therefore be\ntruly said to comprehend the conqueror life.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Most true.\n\nSOCRATES: And what shall we say, Philebus, of your life which is all\nsweetness; and in which of the aforesaid classes is that to be placed?\nPerhaps you will allow me to ask you a question before you answer?\n\nPHILEBUS: Let me hear.\n\nSOCRATES: Have pleasure and pain a limit, or do they belong to the class\nwhich admits of more and less?\n\nPHILEBUS: They belong to the class which admits of more, Socrates;\nfor pleasure would not be perfectly good if she were not infinite in\nquantity and degree.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor would pain, Philebus, be perfectly evil. And therefore the\ninfinite cannot be that element which imparts to pleasure some degree of\ngood. But now--admitting, if you like, that pleasure is of the nature\nof the infinite--in which of the aforesaid classes, O Protarchus and\nPhilebus, can we without irreverence place wisdom and knowledge and\nmind? And let us be careful, for I think that the danger will be very\nserious if we err on this point.\n\nPHILEBUS: You magnify, Socrates, the importance of your favourite god.\n\nSOCRATES: And you, my friend, are also magnifying your favourite\ngoddess; but still I must beg you to answer the question.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Socrates is quite right, Philebus, and we must submit to\nhim.\n\nPHILEBUS: And did not you, Protarchus, propose to answer in my place?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly I did; but I am now in a great strait, and I must\nentreat you, Socrates, to be our spokesman, and then we shall not say\nanything wrong or disrespectful of your favourite.\n\nSOCRATES: I must obey you, Protarchus; nor is the task which you impose\na difficult one; but did I really, as Philebus implies, disconcert you\nwith my playful solemnity, when I asked the question to what class mind\nand knowledge belong?\n\nPROTARCHUS: You did, indeed, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Yet the answer is easy, since all philosophers assert with\none voice that mind is the king of heaven and earth--in reality they are\nmagnifying themselves. And perhaps they are right. But still I should\nlike to consider the class of mind, if you do not object, a little more\nfully.\n\nPHILEBUS: Take your own course, Socrates, and never mind length; we\nshall not tire of you.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good; let us begin then, Protarchus, by asking a\nquestion.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What question?\n\nSOCRATES: Whether all this which they call the universe is left to the\nguidance of unreason and chance medley, or, on the contrary, as our\nfathers have declared, ordered and governed by a marvellous intelligence\nand wisdom.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Wide asunder are the two assertions, illustrious Socrates,\nfor that which you were just now saying to me appears to be blasphemy;\nbut the other assertion, that mind orders all things, is worthy of the\naspect of the world, and of the sun, and of the moon, and of the stars\nand of the whole circle of the heavens; and never will I say or think\notherwise.\n\nSOCRATES: Shall we then agree with them of old time in maintaining this\ndoctrine,--not merely reasserting the notions of others, without risk to\nourselves,--but shall we share in the danger, and take our part of the\nreproach which will await us, when an ingenious individual declares that\nall is disorder?\n\nPROTARCHUS: That would certainly be my wish.\n\nSOCRATES: Then now please to consider the next stage of the argument.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Let me hear.\n\nSOCRATES: We see that the elements which enter into the nature of the\nbodies of all animals, fire, water, air, and, as the storm-tossed sailor\ncries, 'land' (i.e., earth), reappear in the constitution of the world.\n\nPROTARCHUS: The proverb may be applied to us; for truly the storm\ngathers over us, and we are at our wit's end.\n\nSOCRATES: There is something to be remarked about each of these\nelements.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What is it?\n\nSOCRATES: Only a small fraction of any one of them exists in us, and\nthat of a mean sort, and not in any way pure, or having any power worthy\nof its nature. One instance will prove this of all of them; there is\nfire within us, and in the universe.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not our fire small and weak and mean? But the fire in\nthe universe is wonderful in quantity and beauty, and in every power\nthat fire has.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Most true.\n\nSOCRATES: And is the fire in the universe nourished and generated and\nruled by the fire in us, or is the fire in you and me, and in other\nanimals, dependent on the universal fire?\n\nPROTARCHUS: That is a question which does not deserve an answer.\n\nSOCRATES: Right; and you would say the same, if I am not mistaken, of\nthe earth which is in animals and the earth which is in the universe,\nand you would give a similar reply about all the other elements?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Why, how could any man who gave any other be deemed in his\nsenses?\n\nSOCRATES: I do not think that he could--but now go on to the next step.\nWhen we saw those elements of which we have been speaking gathered up in\none, did we not call them a body?\n\nPROTARCHUS: We did.\n\nSOCRATES: And the same may be said of the cosmos, which for the same\nreason may be considered to be a body, because made up of the same\nelements.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: But is our body nourished wholly by this body, or is this body\nnourished by our body, thence deriving and having the qualities of which\nwe were just now speaking?\n\nPROTARCHUS: That again, Socrates, is a question which does not deserve\nto be asked.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, tell me, is this question worth asking?\n\nPROTARCHUS: What question?\n\nSOCRATES: May our body be said to have a soul?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: And whence comes that soul, my dear Protarchus, unless the\nbody of the universe, which contains elements like those in our bodies\nbut in every way fairer, had also a soul? Can there be another source?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Clearly, Socrates, that is the only source.\n\nSOCRATES: Why, yes, Protarchus; for surely we cannot imagine that of the\nfour classes, the finite, the infinite, the composition of the two,\nand the cause, the fourth, which enters into all things, giving to our\nbodies souls, and the art of self-management, and of healing disease,\nand operating in other ways to heal and organize, having too all the\nattributes of wisdom;--we cannot, I say, imagine that whereas the\nself-same elements exist, both in the entire heaven and in great\nprovinces of the heaven, only fairer and purer, this last should not\nalso in that higher sphere have designed the noblest and fairest things?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Such a supposition is quite unreasonable.\n\nSOCRATES: Then if this be denied, should we not be wise in adopting\nthe other view and maintaining that there is in the universe a mighty\ninfinite and an adequate limit, of which we have often spoken, as well\nas a presiding cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years\nand seasons and months, and may be justly called wisdom and mind?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Most justly.\n\nSOCRATES: And wisdom and mind cannot exist without soul?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: And in the divine nature of Zeus would you not say that there\nis the soul and mind of a king, because there is in him the power of the\ncause? And other gods have other attributes, by which they are pleased\nto be called.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: Do not then suppose that these words are rashly spoken by us,\nO Protarchus, for they are in harmony with the testimony of those who\nsaid of old time that mind rules the universe.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And they furnish an answer to my enquiry; for they imply that\nmind is the parent of that class of the four which we called the cause\nof all; and I think that you now have my answer.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I have indeed, and yet I did not observe that you had\nanswered.\n\nSOCRATES: A jest is sometimes refreshing, Protarchus, when it interrupts\nearnest.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: I think, friend, that we have now pretty clearly set forth the\nclass to which mind belongs and what is the power of mind.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And the class to which pleasure belongs has also been long ago\ndiscovered?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And let us remember, too, of both of them, (1) that mind was\nakin to the cause and of this family; and (2) that pleasure is infinite\nand belongs to the class which neither has, nor ever will have in\nitself, a beginning, middle, or end of its own.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I shall be sure to remember.\n\nSOCRATES: We must next examine what is their place and under what\nconditions they are generated. And we will begin with pleasure, since\nher class was first examined; and yet pleasure cannot be rightly tested\napart from pain.\n\nPROTARCHUS: If this is the road, let us take it.\n\nSOCRATES: I wonder whether you would agree with me about the origin of\npleasure and pain.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: I mean to say that their natural seat is in the mixed class.\n\nPROTARCHUS: And would you tell me again, sweet Socrates, which of the\naforesaid classes is the mixed one?\n\nSOCRATES: I will, my fine fellow, to the best of my ability.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very good.\n\nSOCRATES: Let us then understand the mixed class to be that which we\nplaced third in the list of four.\n\nPROTARCHUS: That which followed the infinite and the finite; and in\nwhich you ranked health, and, if I am not mistaken, harmony.\n\nSOCRATES: Capital; and now will you please to give me your best\nattention?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Proceed; I am attending.\n\nSOCRATES: I say that when the harmony in animals is dissolved, there is\nalso a dissolution of nature and a generation of pain.\n\nPROTARCHUS: That is very probable.\n\nSOCRATES: And the restoration of harmony and return to nature is the\nsource of pleasure, if I may be allowed to speak in the fewest and\nshortest words about matters of the greatest moment.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I believe that you are right, Socrates; but will you try to\nbe a little plainer?\n\nSOCRATES: Do not obvious and every-day phenomena furnish the simplest\nillustration?\n\nPROTARCHUS: What phenomena do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: Hunger, for example, is a dissolution and a pain.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Whereas eating is a replenishment and a pleasure?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Thirst again is a destruction and a pain, but the effect\nof moisture replenishing the dry place is a pleasure: once more, the\nunnatural separation and dissolution caused by heat is painful, and the\nnatural restoration and refrigeration is pleasant.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And the unnatural freezing of the moisture in an animal is\npain, and the natural process of resolution and return of the elements\nto their original state is pleasure. And would not the general\nproposition seem to you to hold, that the destroying of the natural\nunion of the finite and infinite, which, as I was observing before, make\nup the class of living beings, is pain, and that the process of return\nof all things to their own nature is pleasure?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Granted; what you say has a general truth.\n\nSOCRATES: Here then is one kind of pleasures and pains originating\nseverally in the two processes which we have described?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Good.\n\nSOCRATES: Let us next assume that in the soul herself there is an\nantecedent hope of pleasure which is sweet and refreshing, and an\nexpectation of pain, fearful and anxious.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes; this is another class of pleasures and pains, which is\nof the soul only, apart from the body, and is produced by expectation.\n\nSOCRATES: Right; for in the analysis of these, pure, as I suppose\nthem to be, the pleasures being unalloyed with pain and the pains with\npleasure, methinks that we shall see clearly whether the whole class\nof pleasure is to be desired, or whether this quality of entire\ndesirableness is not rather to be attributed to another of the classes\nwhich have been mentioned; and whether pleasure and pain, like heat and\ncold, and other things of the same kind, are not sometimes to be desired\nand sometimes not to be desired, as being not in themselves good, but\nonly sometimes and in some instances admitting of the nature of good.\n\nPROTARCHUS: You say most truly that this is the track which the\ninvestigation should pursue.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, then, assuming that pain ensues on the dissolution, and\npleasure on the restoration of the harmony, let us now ask what will\nbe the condition of animated beings who are neither in process of\nrestoration nor of dissolution. And mind what you say: I ask whether\nany animal who is in that condition can possibly have any feeling of\npleasure or pain, great or small?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then here we have a third state, over and above that of\npleasure and of pain?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And do not forget that there is such a state; it will make a\ngreat difference in our judgment of pleasure, whether we remember this\nor not. And I should like to say a few words about it.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What have you to say?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, you know that if a man chooses the life of wisdom, there\nis no reason why he should not live in this neutral state.\n\nPROTARCHUS: You mean that he may live neither rejoicing nor sorrowing?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes; and if I remember rightly, when the lives were compared,\nno degree of pleasure, whether great or small, was thought to be\nnecessary to him who chose the life of thought and wisdom.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, certainly, we said so.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he will live without pleasure; and who knows whether this\nmay not be the most divine of all lives?\n\nPROTARCHUS: If so, the gods, at any rate, cannot be supposed to have\neither joy or sorrow.\n\nSOCRATES: Certainly not--there would be a great impropriety in the\nassumption of either alternative. But whether the gods are or are not\nindifferent to pleasure is a point which may be considered hereafter if\nin any way relevant to the argument, and whatever is the conclusion\nwe will place it to the account of mind in her contest for the second\nplace, should she have to resign the first.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Just so.\n\nSOCRATES: The other class of pleasures, which as we were saying is\npurely mental, is entirely derived from memory.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: I must first of all analyze memory, or rather perception\nwhich is prior to memory, if the subject of our discussion is ever to be\nproperly cleared up.\n\nPROTARCHUS: How will you proceed?\n\nSOCRATES: Let us imagine affections of the body which are extinguished\nbefore they reach the soul, and leave her unaffected; and again, other\naffections which vibrate through both soul and body, and impart a shock\nto both and to each of them.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Granted.\n\nSOCRATES: And the soul may be truly said to be oblivious of the first\nbut not of the second?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: When I say oblivious, do not suppose that I mean forgetfulness\nin a literal sense; for forgetfulness is the exit of memory, which in\nthis case has not yet entered; and to speak of the loss of that which\nis not yet in existence, and never has been, is a contradiction; do you\nsee?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: Then just be so good as to change the terms.\n\nPROTARCHUS: How shall I change them?\n\nSOCRATES: Instead of the oblivion of the soul, when you are describing\nthe state in which she is unaffected by the shocks of the body, say\nunconsciousness.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I see.\n\nSOCRATES: And the union or communion of soul and body in one feeling and\nmotion would be properly called consciousness?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Most true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then now we know the meaning of the word?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And memory may, I think, be rightly described as the\npreservation of consciousness?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Right.\n\nSOCRATES: But do we not distinguish memory from recollection?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I think so.\n\nSOCRATES: And do we not mean by recollection the power which the soul\nhas of recovering, when by herself, some feeling which she experienced\nwhen in company with the body?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And when she recovers of herself the lost recollection of\nsome consciousness or knowledge, the recovery is termed recollection and\nreminiscence?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: There is a reason why I say all this.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What is it?\n\nSOCRATES: I want to attain the plainest possible notion of pleasure and\ndesire, as they exist in the mind only, apart from the body; and the\nprevious analysis helps to show the nature of both.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Then now, Socrates, let us proceed to the next point.\n\nSOCRATES: There are certainly many things to be considered in discussing\nthe generation and whole complexion of pleasure. At the outset we must\ndetermine the nature and seat of desire.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Ay; let us enquire into that, for we shall lose nothing.\n\nSOCRATES: Nay, Protarchus, we shall surely lose the puzzle if we find\nthe answer.\n\nPROTARCHUS: A fair retort; but let us proceed.\n\nSOCRATES: Did we not place hunger, thirst, and the like, in the class of\ndesires?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet they are very different; what common nature have we in\nview when we call them by a single name?\n\nPROTARCHUS: By heavens, Socrates, that is a question which is not easily\nanswered; but it must be answered.\n\nSOCRATES: Then let us go back to our examples.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Where shall we begin?\n\nSOCRATES: Do we mean anything when we say 'a man thirsts'?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: We mean to say that he 'is empty'?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Of course.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not thirst desire?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, of drink.\n\nSOCRATES: Would you say of drink, or of replenishment with drink?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I should say, of replenishment with drink.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he who is empty desires, as would appear, the opposite of\nwhat he experiences; for he is empty and desires to be full?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Clearly so.\n\nSOCRATES: But how can a man who is empty for the first time, attain\neither by perception or memory to any apprehension of replenishment, of\nwhich he has no present or past experience?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Impossible.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet he who desires, surely desires something?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Of course.\n\nSOCRATES: He does not desire that which he experiences, for\nhe experiences thirst, and thirst is emptiness; but he desires\nreplenishment?\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Then there must be something in the thirsty man which in some\nway apprehends replenishment?\n\nPROTARCHUS: There must.\n\nSOCRATES: And that cannot be the body, for the body is supposed to be\nemptied?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: The only remaining alternative is that the soul apprehends the\nreplenishment by the help of memory; as is obvious, for what other way\ncan there be?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I cannot imagine any other.\n\nSOCRATES: But do you see the consequence?\n\nPROTARCHUS: What is it?\n\nSOCRATES: That there is no such thing as desire of the body.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Why so?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, because the argument shows that the endeavour of every\nanimal is to the reverse of his bodily state.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the impulse which leads him to the opposite of what he is\nexperiencing proves that he has a memory of the opposite state.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And the argument, having proved that memory attracts us\ntowards the objects of desire, proves also that the impulses and the\ndesires and the moving principle in every living being have their origin\nin the soul.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Most true.\n\nSOCRATES: The argument will not allow that our body either hungers or\nthirsts or has any similar experience.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Quite right.\n\nSOCRATES: Let me make a further observation; the argument appears to\nme to imply that there is a kind of life which consists in these\naffections.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Of what affections, and of what kind of life, are you\nspeaking?\n\nSOCRATES: I am speaking of being emptied and replenished, and of all\nthat relates to the preservation and destruction of living beings, as\nwell as of the pain which is felt in one of these states and of the\npleasure which succeeds to it.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And what would you say of the intermediate state?\n\nPROTARCHUS: What do you mean by 'intermediate'?\n\nSOCRATES: I mean when a person is in actual suffering and yet remembers\npast pleasures which, if they would only return, would relieve him;\nbut as yet he has them not. May we not say of him, that he is in an\nintermediate state?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Would you say that he was wholly pained or wholly pleased?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Nay, I should say that he has two pains; in his body\nthere is the actual experience of pain, and in his soul longing and\nexpectation.\n\nSOCRATES: What do you mean, Protarchus, by the two pains? May not a man\nwho is empty have at one time a sure hope of being filled, and at other\ntimes be quite in despair?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And has he not the pleasure of memory when he is hoping to be\nfilled, and yet in that he is empty is he not at the same time in pain?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then man and the other animals have at the same time both\npleasure and pain?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I suppose so.\n\nSOCRATES: But when a man is empty and has no hope of being filled, there\nwill be the double experience of pain. You observed this and inferred\nthat the double experience was the single case possible.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Quite true, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Shall the enquiry into these states of feeling be made the\noccasion of raising a question?\n\nPROTARCHUS: What question?\n\nSOCRATES: Whether we ought to say that the pleasures and pains of which\nwe are speaking are true or false? or some true and some false?\n\nPROTARCHUS: But how, Socrates, can there be false pleasures and pains?\n\nSOCRATES: And how, Protarchus, can there be true and false fears, or\ntrue and false expectations, or true and false opinions?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I grant that opinions may be true or false, but not\npleasures.\n\nSOCRATES: What do you mean? I am afraid that we are raising a very\nserious enquiry.\n\nPROTARCHUS: There I agree.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet, my boy, for you are one of Philebus' boys, the point\nto be considered, is, whether the enquiry is relevant to the argument.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Surely.\n\nSOCRATES: No tedious and irrelevant discussion can be allowed; what is\nsaid should be pertinent.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Right.\n\nSOCRATES: I am always wondering at the question which has now been\nraised.\n\nPROTARCHUS: How so?\n\nSOCRATES: Do you deny that some pleasures are false, and others true?\n\nPROTARCHUS: To be sure I do.\n\nSOCRATES: Would you say that no one ever seemed to rejoice and yet did\nnot rejoice, or seemed to feel pain and yet did not feel pain, sleeping\nor waking, mad or lunatic?\n\nPROTARCHUS: So we have always held, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: But were you right? Shall we enquire into the truth of your\nopinion?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I think that we should.\n\nSOCRATES: Let us then put into more precise terms the question which has\narisen about pleasure and opinion. Is there such a thing as opinion?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And such a thing as pleasure?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And an opinion must be of something?\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And a man must be pleased by something?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Quite correct.\n\nSOCRATES: And whether the opinion be right or wrong, makes no\ndifference; it will still be an opinion?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And he who is pleased, whether he is rightly pleased or not,\nwill always have a real feeling of pleasure?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes; that is also quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, how can opinion be both true and false, and pleasure\ntrue only, although pleasure and opinion are both equally real?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes; that is the question.\n\nSOCRATES: You mean that opinion admits of truth and falsehood, and hence\nbecomes not merely opinion, but opinion of a certain quality; and this\nis what you think should be examined?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And further, even if we admit the existence of qualities\nin other objects, may not pleasure and pain be simple and devoid of\nquality?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: But there is no difficulty in seeing that pleasure and pain\nas well as opinion have qualities, for they are great or small, and have\nvarious degrees of intensity; as was indeed said long ago by us.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: And if badness attaches to any of them, Protarchus, then we\nshould speak of a bad opinion or of a bad pleasure?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Quite true, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And if rightness attaches to any of them, should we not speak\nof a right opinion or right pleasure; and in like manner of the reverse\nof rightness?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And if the thing opined be erroneous, might we not say that\nthe opinion, being erroneous, is not right or rightly opined?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And if we see a pleasure or pain which errs in respect of its\nobject, shall we call that right or good, or by any honourable name?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Not if the pleasure is mistaken; how could we?\n\nSOCRATES: And surely pleasure often appears to accompany an opinion\nwhich is not true, but false?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly it does; and in that case, Socrates, as we were\nsaying, the opinion is false, but no one could call the actual pleasure\nfalse.\n\nSOCRATES: How eagerly, Protarchus, do you rush to the defence of\npleasure!\n\nPROTARCHUS: Nay, Socrates, I only repeat what I hear.\n\nSOCRATES: And is there no difference, my friend, between that pleasure\nwhich is associated with right opinion and knowledge, and that which is\noften found in all of us associated with falsehood and ignorance?\n\nPROTARCHUS: There must be a very great difference, between them.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, now let us proceed to contemplate this difference.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Lead, and I will follow.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, then, my view is--\n\nPROTARCHUS: What is it?\n\nSOCRATES: We agree--do we not?--that there is such a thing as false, and\nalso such a thing as true opinion?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And pleasure and pain, as I was just now saying, are often\nconsequent upon these--upon true and false opinion, I mean.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And do not opinion and the endeavour to form an opinion always\nspring from memory and perception?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Might we imagine the process to be something of this nature?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Of what nature?\n\nSOCRATES: An object may be often seen at a distance not very clearly,\nand the seer may want to determine what it is which he sees.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very likely.\n\nSOCRATES: Soon he begins to interrogate himself.\n\nPROTARCHUS: In what manner?\n\nSOCRATES: He asks himself--'What is that which appears to be standing by\nthe rock under the tree?' This is the question which he may be supposed\nto put to himself when he sees such an appearance.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: To which he may guess the right answer, saying as if in a\nwhisper to himself--'It is a man.'\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very good.\n\nSOCRATES: Or again, he may be misled, and then he will say--'No, it is a\nfigure made by the shepherds.'\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And if he has a companion, he repeats his thought to him in\narticulate sounds, and what was before an opinion, has now become a\nproposition.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: But if he be walking alone when these thoughts occur to him,\nhe may not unfrequently keep them in his mind for a considerable time.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, now, I wonder whether you would agree in my explanation\nof this phenomenon.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What is your explanation?\n\nSOCRATES: I think that the soul at such times is like a book.\n\nPROTARCHUS: How so?\n\nSOCRATES: Memory and perception meet, and they and their attendant\nfeelings seem to almost to write down words in the soul, and when the\ninscribing feeling writes truly, then true opinion and true propositions\nwhich are the expressions of opinion come into our souls--but when the\nscribe within us writes falsely, the result is false.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I quite assent and agree to your statement.\n\nSOCRATES: I must bespeak your favour also for another artist, who is\nbusy at the same time in the chambers of the soul.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Who is he?\n\nSOCRATES: The painter, who, after the scribe has done his work, draws\nimages in the soul of the things which he has described.\n\nPROTARCHUS: But when and how does he do this?\n\nSOCRATES: When a man, besides receiving from sight or some other sense\ncertain opinions or statements, sees in his mind the images of the\nsubjects of them;--is not this a very common mental phenomenon?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And the images answering to true opinions and words are true,\nand to false opinions and words false; are they not?\n\nPROTARCHUS: They are.\n\nSOCRATES: If we are right so far, there arises a further question.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What is it?\n\nSOCRATES: Whether we experience the feeling of which I am speaking only\nin relation to the present and the past, or in relation to the future\nalso?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I should say in relation to all times alike.\n\nSOCRATES: Have not purely mental pleasures and pains been described\nalready as in some cases anticipations of the bodily ones; from which\nwe may infer that anticipatory pleasures and pains have to do with the\nfuture?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Most true.\n\nSOCRATES: And do all those writings and paintings which, as we were\nsaying a little while ago, are produced in us, relate to the past and\npresent only, and not to the future?\n\nPROTARCHUS: To the future, very much.\n\nSOCRATES: When you say, 'Very much,' you mean to imply that all these\nrepresentations are hopes about the future, and that mankind are filled\nwith hopes in every stage of existence?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Exactly.\n\nSOCRATES: Answer me another question.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What question?\n\nSOCRATES: A just and pious and good man is the friend of the gods; is he\nnot?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly he is.\n\nSOCRATES: And the unjust and utterly bad man is the reverse?\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And all men, as we were saying just now, are always filled\nwith hopes?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And these hopes, as they are termed, are propositions which\nexist in the minds of each of us?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And the fancies of hope are also pictured in us; a man may\noften have a vision of a heap of gold, and pleasures ensuing, and in the\npicture there may be a likeness of himself mightily rejoicing over his\ngood fortune.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And may we not say that the good, being friends of the gods,\nhave generally true pictures presented to them, and the bad false\npictures?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: The bad, too, have pleasures painted in their fancy as well as\nthe good; but I presume that they are false pleasures.\n\nPROTARCHUS: They are.\n\nSOCRATES: The bad then commonly delight in false pleasures, and the good\nin true pleasures?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Doubtless.\n\nSOCRATES: Then upon this view there are false pleasures in the souls of\nmen which are a ludicrous imitation of the true, and there are pains of\na similar character?\n\nPROTARCHUS: There are.\n\nSOCRATES: And did we not allow that a man who had an opinion at all had\na real opinion, but often about things which had no existence either in\nthe past, present, or future?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: And this was the source of false opinion and opining; am I not\nright?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And must we not attribute to pleasure and pain a similar real\nbut illusory character?\n\nPROTARCHUS: How do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: I mean to say that a man must be admitted to have real\npleasure who is pleased with anything or anyhow; and he may be pleased\nabout things which neither have nor have ever had any real existence,\nand, more often than not, are never likely to exist.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, that again is undeniable.\n\nSOCRATES: And may not the same be said about fear and anger and the\nlike; are they not often false?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Quite so.\n\nSOCRATES: And can opinions be good or bad except in as far as they are\ntrue or false?\n\nPROTARCHUS: In no other way.\n\nSOCRATES: Nor can pleasures be conceived to be bad except in so far as\nthey are false.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Nay, Socrates, that is the very opposite of truth; for no\none would call pleasures and pains bad because they are false, but by\nreason of some other great corruption to which they are liable.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, of pleasures which are corrupt and caused by corruption\nwe will hereafter speak, if we care to continue the enquiry; for the\npresent I would rather show by another argument that there are many\nfalse pleasures existing or coming into existence in us, because this\nmay assist our final decision.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true; that is to say, if there are such pleasures.\n\nSOCRATES: I think that there are, Protarchus; but this is an opinion\nwhich should be well assured, and not rest upon a mere assertion.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very good.\n\nSOCRATES: Then now, like wrestlers, let us approach and grasp this new\nargument.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Proceed.\n\nSOCRATES: We were maintaining a little while since, that when desires,\nas they are termed, exist in us, then the body has separate feelings\napart from the soul--do you remember?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, I remember that you said so.\n\nSOCRATES: And the soul was supposed to desire the opposite of the bodily\nstate, while the body was the source of any pleasure or pain which was\nexperienced.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Then now you may infer what happens in such cases.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What am I to infer?\n\nSOCRATES: That in such cases pleasures and pains come simultaneously;\nand there is a juxtaposition of the opposite sensations which correspond\nto them, as has been already shown.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Clearly.\n\nSOCRATES: And there is another point to which we have agreed.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What is it?\n\nSOCRATES: That pleasure and pain both admit of more and less, and that\nthey are of the class of infinites.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly, we said so.\n\nSOCRATES: But how can we rightly judge of them?\n\nPROTARCHUS: How can we?\n\nSOCRATES: Is it our intention to judge of their comparative importance\nand intensity, measuring pleasure against pain, and pain against pain,\nand pleasure against pleasure?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, such is our intention, and we shall judge of them\naccordingly.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, take the case of sight. Does not the nearness or\ndistance of magnitudes obscure their true proportions, and make us opine\nfalsely; and do we not find the same illusion happening in the case of\npleasures and pains?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, and in a degree far greater.\n\nSOCRATES: Then what we are now saying is the opposite of what we were\nsaying before.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What was that?\n\nSOCRATES: Then the opinions were true and false, and infected the\npleasures and pains with their own falsity.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: But now it is the pleasures which are said to be true and\nfalse because they are seen at various distances, and subjected to\ncomparison; the pleasures appear to be greater and more vehement when\nplaced side by side with the pains, and the pains when placed side by\nside with the pleasures.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly, and for the reason which you mention.\n\nSOCRATES: And suppose you part off from pleasures and pains the element\nwhich makes them appear to be greater or less than they really are: you\nwill acknowledge that this element is illusory, and you will never say\nthat the corresponding excess or defect of pleasure or pain is real or\ntrue.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Next let us see whether in another direction we may not find\npleasures and pains existing and appearing in living beings, which are\nstill more false than these.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What are they, and how shall we find them?\n\nSOCRATES: If I am not mistaken, I have often repeated that pains\nand aches and suffering and uneasiness of all sorts arise out of a\ncorruption of nature caused by concretions, and dissolutions, and\nrepletions, and evacuations, and also by growth and decay?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, that has been often said.\n\nSOCRATES: And we have also agreed that the restoration of the natural\nstate is pleasure?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Right.\n\nSOCRATES: But now let us suppose an interval of time at which the body\nexperiences none of these changes.\n\nPROTARCHUS: When can that be, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: Your question, Protarchus, does not help the argument.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Why not, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: Because it does not prevent me from repeating mine.\n\nPROTARCHUS: And what was that?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, Protarchus, admitting that there is no such interval, I\nmay ask what would be the necessary consequence if there were?\n\nPROTARCHUS: You mean, what would happen if the body were not changed\neither for good or bad?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Why then, Socrates, I should suppose that there would be\nneither pleasure nor pain.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good; but still, if I am not mistaken, you do assert that\nwe must always be experiencing one of them; that is what the wise tell\nus; for, say they, all things are ever flowing up and down.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, and their words are of no mean authority.\n\nSOCRATES: Of course, for they are no mean authorities themselves; and I\nshould like to avoid the brunt of their argument. Shall I tell you how I\nmean to escape from them? And you shall be the partner of my flight.\n\nPROTARCHUS: How?\n\nSOCRATES: To them we will say: 'Good; but are we, or living things in\ngeneral, always conscious of what happens to us--for example, of\nour growth, or the like? Are we not, on the contrary, almost wholly\nunconscious of this and similar phenomena?' You must answer for them.\n\nPROTARCHUS: The latter alternative is the true one.\n\nSOCRATES: Then we were not right in saying, just now, that motions going\nup and down cause pleasures and pains?\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: A better and more unexceptionable way of speaking will be--\n\nPROTARCHUS: What?\n\nSOCRATES: If we say that the great changes produce pleasures and pains,\nbut that the moderate and lesser ones do neither.\n\nPROTARCHUS: That, Socrates, is the more correct mode of speaking.\n\nSOCRATES: But if this be true, the life to which I was just now\nreferring again appears.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What life?\n\nSOCRATES: The life which we affirmed to be devoid either of pain or of\njoy.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: We may assume then that there are three lives, one pleasant,\none painful, and the third which is neither; what say you?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I should say as you do that there are three of them.\n\nSOCRATES: But if so, the negation of pain will not be the same with\npleasure.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: Then when you hear a person saying, that always to live\nwithout pain is the pleasantest of all things, what would you understand\nhim to mean by that statement?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I think that by pleasure he must mean the negative of pain.\n\nSOCRATES: Let us take any three things; or suppose that we embellish a\nlittle and call the first gold, the second silver, and there shall be a\nthird which is neither.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very good.\n\nSOCRATES: Now, can that which is neither be either gold or silver?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Impossible.\n\nSOCRATES: No more can that neutral or middle life be rightly or\nreasonably spoken or thought of as pleasant or painful.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet, my friend, there are, as we know, persons who say and\nthink so.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And do they think that they have pleasure when they are free\nfrom pain?\n\nPROTARCHUS: They say so.\n\nSOCRATES: And they must think or they would not say that they have\npleasure.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I suppose not.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet if pleasure and the negation of pain are of distinct\nnatures, they are wrong.\n\nPROTARCHUS: But they are undoubtedly of distinct natures.\n\nSOCRATES: Then shall we take the view that they are three, as we were\njust now saying, or that they are two only--the one being a state of\npain, which is an evil, and the other a cessation of pain, which is of\nitself a good, and is called pleasant?\n\nPROTARCHUS: But why, Socrates, do we ask the question at all? I do not\nsee the reason.\n\nSOCRATES: You, Protarchus, have clearly never heard of certain enemies\nof our friend Philebus.\n\nPROTARCHUS: And who may they be?\n\nSOCRATES: Certain persons who are reputed to be masters in natural\nphilosophy, who deny the very existence of pleasure.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Indeed!\n\nSOCRATES: They say that what the school of Philebus calls pleasures are\nall of them only avoidances of pain.\n\nPROTARCHUS: And would you, Socrates, have us agree with them?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, no, I would rather use them as a sort of diviners, who\ndivine the truth, not by rules of art, but by an instinctive repugnance\nand extreme detestation which a noble nature has of the power of\npleasure, in which they think that there is nothing sound, and her\nseductive influence is declared by them to be witchcraft, and not\npleasure. This is the use which you may make of them. And when you have\nconsidered the various grounds of their dislike, you shall hear from\nme what I deem to be true pleasures. Having thus examined the nature of\npleasure from both points of view, we will bring her up for judgment.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Well said.\n\nSOCRATES: Then let us enter into an alliance with these philosophers\nand follow in the track of their dislike. I imagine that they would\nsay something of this sort; they would begin at the beginning, and\nask whether, if we wanted to know the nature of any quality, such as\nhardness, we should be more likely to discover it by looking at the\nhardest things, rather than at the least hard? You, Protarchus, shall\nanswer these severe gentlemen as you answer me.\n\nPROTARCHUS: By all means, and I reply to them, that you should look at\nthe greatest instances.\n\nSOCRATES: Then if we want to see the true nature of pleasures as a\nclass, we should not look at the most diluted pleasures, but at the most\nextreme and most vehement?\n\nPROTARCHUS: In that every one will agree.\n\nSOCRATES: And the obvious instances of the greatest pleasures, as we\nhave often said, are the pleasures of the body?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And are they felt by us to be or become greater, when we\nare sick or when we are in health? And here we must be careful in our\nanswer, or we shall come to grief.\n\nPROTARCHUS: How will that be?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, because we might be tempted to answer, 'When we are in\nhealth.'\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, that is the natural answer.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but are not those pleasures the greatest of which\nmankind have the greatest desires?\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And do not people who are in a fever, or any similar illness,\nfeel cold or thirst or other bodily affections more intensely? Am I not\nright in saying that they have a deeper want and greater pleasure in the\nsatisfaction of their want?\n\nPROTARCHUS: That is obvious as soon as it is said.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, then, shall we not be right in saying, that if a person\nwould wish to see the greatest pleasures he ought to go and look, not at\nhealth, but at disease? And here you must distinguish:--do not imagine\nthat I mean to ask whether those who are very ill have more pleasures\nthan those who are well, but understand that I am speaking of the\nmagnitude of pleasure; I want to know where pleasures are found to be\nmost intense. For, as I say, we have to discover what is pleasure, and\nwhat they mean by pleasure who deny her very existence.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I think I follow you.\n\nSOCRATES: You will soon have a better opportunity of showing whether you\ndo or not, Protarchus. Answer now, and tell me whether you see, I will\nnot say more, but more intense and excessive pleasures in wantonness\nthan in temperance? Reflect before you speak.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I understand you, and see that there is a great difference\nbetween them; the temperate are restrained by the wise man's aphorism of\n'Never too much,' which is their rule, but excess of pleasure possessing\nthe minds of fools and wantons becomes madness and makes them shout with\ndelight.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good, and if this be true, then the greatest pleasures\nand pains will clearly be found in some vicious state of soul and body,\nand not in a virtuous state.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And ought we not to select some of these for examination, and\nsee what makes them the greatest?\n\nPROTARCHUS: To be sure we ought.\n\nSOCRATES: Take the case of the pleasures which arise out of certain\ndisorders.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What disorders?\n\nSOCRATES: The pleasures of unseemly disorders, which our severe friends\nutterly detest.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What pleasures?\n\nSOCRATES: Such, for example, as the relief of itching and other ailments\nby scratching, which is the only remedy required. For what in Heaven's\nname is the feeling to be called which is thus produced in us?--Pleasure\nor pain?\n\nPROTARCHUS: A villainous mixture of some kind, Socrates, I should say.\n\nSOCRATES: I did not introduce the argument, O Protarchus, with any\npersonal reference to Philebus, but because, without the consideration\nof these and similar pleasures, we shall not be able to determine the\npoint at issue.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Then we had better proceed to analyze this family of\npleasures.\n\nSOCRATES: You mean the pleasures which are mingled with pain?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Exactly.\n\nSOCRATES: There are some mixtures which are of the body, and only in\nthe body, and others which are of the soul, and only in the soul; while\nthere are other mixtures of pleasures with pains, common both to soul\nand body, which in their composite state are called sometimes pleasures\nand sometimes pains.\n\nPROTARCHUS: How is that?\n\nSOCRATES: Whenever, in the restoration or in the derangement of nature,\na man experiences two opposite feelings; for example, when he is cold\nand is growing warm, or again, when he is hot and is becoming cool,\nand he wants to have the one and be rid of the other;--the sweet has a\nbitter, as the common saying is, and both together fasten upon him and\ncreate irritation and in time drive him to distraction.\n\nPROTARCHUS: That description is very true to nature.\n\nSOCRATES: And in these sorts of mixtures the pleasures and pains are\nsometimes equal, and sometimes one or other of them predominates?\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Of cases in which the pain exceeds the pleasure, an example\nis afforded by itching, of which we were just now speaking, and by the\ntingling which we feel when the boiling and fiery element is within, and\nthe rubbing and motion only relieves the surface, and does not reach the\nparts affected; then if you put them to the fire, and as a last resort\napply cold to them, you may often produce the most intense pleasure or\npain in the inner parts, which contrasts and mingles with the pain or\npleasure, as the case may be, of the outer parts; and this is due to\nthe forcible separation of what is united, or to the union of what is\nseparated, and to the juxtaposition of pleasure and pain.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Quite so.\n\nSOCRATES: Sometimes the element of pleasure prevails in a man, and\nthe slight undercurrent of pain makes him tingle, and causes a gentle\nirritation; or again, the excessive infusion of pleasure creates an\nexcitement in him,--he even leaps for joy, he assumes all sorts of\nattitudes, he changes all manner of colours, he gasps for breath, and is\nquite amazed, and utters the most irrational exclamations.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, indeed.\n\nSOCRATES: He will say of himself, and others will say of him, that he is\ndying with these delights; and the more dissipated and good-for-nothing\nhe is, the more vehemently he pursues them in every way; of all\npleasures he declares them to be the greatest; and he reckons him who\nlives in the most constant enjoyment of them to be the happiest of\nmankind.\n\nPROTARCHUS: That, Socrates, is a very true description of the opinions\nof the majority about pleasures.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, Protarchus, quite true of the mixed pleasures, which\narise out of the communion of external and internal sensations in the\nbody; there are also cases in which the mind contributes an opposite\nelement to the body, whether of pleasure or pain, and the two unite and\nform one mixture. Concerning these I have already remarked, that when a\nman is empty he desires to be full, and has pleasure in hope and pain in\nvacuity. But now I must further add what I omitted before, that in all\nthese and similar emotions in which body and mind are opposed (and they\nare innumerable), pleasure and pain coalesce in one.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I believe that to be quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: There still remains one other sort of admixture of pleasures\nand pains.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What is that?\n\nSOCRATES: The union which, as we were saying, the mind often experiences\nof purely mental feelings.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: Why, do we not speak of anger, fear, desire, sorrow, love,\nemulation, envy, and the like, as pains which belong to the soul only?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And shall we not find them also full of the most wonderful\npleasures? need I remind you of the anger\n\n'Which stirs even a wise man to violence, And is sweeter than honey and\nthe honeycomb?'\n\nAnd you remember how pleasures mingle with pains in lamentation and\nbereavement?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, there is a natural connexion between them.\n\nSOCRATES: And you remember also how at the sight of tragedies the\nspectators smile through their tears?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly I do.\n\nSOCRATES: And are you aware that even at a comedy the soul experiences a\nmixed feeling of pain and pleasure?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I do not quite understand you.\n\nSOCRATES: I admit, Protarchus, that there is some difficulty in\nrecognizing this mixture of feelings at a comedy.\n\nPROTARCHUS: There is, I think.\n\nSOCRATES: And the greater the obscurity of the case the more desirable\nis the examination of it, because the difficulty in detecting other\ncases of mixed pleasures and pains will be less.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Proceed.\n\nSOCRATES: I have just mentioned envy; would you not call that a pain of\nthe soul?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet the envious man finds something in the misfortunes of\nhis neighbours at which he is pleased?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And ignorance, and what is termed clownishness, are surely an\nevil?\n\nPROTARCHUS: To be sure.\n\nSOCRATES: From these considerations learn to know the nature of the\nridiculous.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Explain.\n\nSOCRATES: The ridiculous is in short the specific name which is used to\ndescribe the vicious form of a certain habit; and of vice in general it\nis that kind which is most at variance with the inscription at Delphi.\n\nPROTARCHUS: You mean, Socrates, 'Know thyself.'\n\nSOCRATES: I do; and the opposite would be, 'Know not thyself.'\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And now, O Protarchus, try to divide this into three.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Indeed I am afraid that I cannot.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you mean to say that I must make the division for you?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, and what is more, I beg that you will.\n\nSOCRATES: Are there not three ways in which ignorance of self may be\nshown?\n\nPROTARCHUS: What are they?\n\nSOCRATES: In the first place, about money; the ignorant may fancy\nhimself richer than he is.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, that is a very common error.\n\nSOCRATES: And still more often he will fancy that he is taller or fairer\nthan he is, or that he has some other advantage of person which he\nreally has not.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Of course.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet surely by far the greatest number err about the goods\nof the mind; they imagine themselves to be much better men than they\nare.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, that is by far the commonest delusion.\n\nSOCRATES: And of all the virtues, is not wisdom the one which the mass\nof mankind are always claiming, and which most arouses in them a spirit\nof contention and lying conceit of wisdom?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And may not all this be truly called an evil condition?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very evil.\n\nSOCRATES: But we must pursue the division a step further, Protarchus, if\nwe would see in envy of the childish sort a singular mixture of pleasure\nand pain.\n\nPROTARCHUS: How can we make the further division which you suggest?\n\nSOCRATES: All who are silly enough to entertain this lying conceit of\nthemselves may of course be divided, like the rest of mankind, into two\nclasses--one having power and might; and the other the reverse.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Let this, then, be the principle of division; those of them\nwho are weak and unable to revenge themselves, when they are laughed at,\nmay be truly called ridiculous, but those who can defend themselves may\nbe more truly described as strong and formidable; for ignorance in\nthe powerful is hateful and horrible, because hurtful to others both in\nreality and in fiction, but powerless ignorance may be reckoned, and in\ntruth is, ridiculous.\n\nPROTARCHUS: That is very true, but I do not as yet see where is the\nadmixture of pleasures and pains.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, then, let us examine the nature of envy.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Proceed.\n\nSOCRATES: Is not envy an unrighteous pleasure, and also an unrighteous\npain?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Most true.\n\nSOCRATES: There is nothing envious or wrong in rejoicing at the\nmisfortunes of enemies?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: But to feel joy instead of sorrow at the sight of our friends'\nmisfortunes--is not that wrong?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Undoubtedly.\n\nSOCRATES: Did we not say that ignorance was always an evil?\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And the three kinds of vain conceit in our friends which we\nenumerated--the vain conceit of beauty, of wisdom, and of wealth, are\nridiculous if they are weak, and detestable when they are powerful: May\nwe not say, as I was saying before, that our friends who are in this\nstate of mind, when harmless to others, are simply ridiculous?\n\nPROTARCHUS: They are ridiculous.\n\nSOCRATES: And do we not acknowledge this ignorance of theirs to be a\nmisfortune?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And do we feel pain or pleasure in laughing at it?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Clearly we feel pleasure.\n\nSOCRATES: And was not envy the source of this pleasure which we feel at\nthe misfortunes of friends?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the argument shows that when we laugh at the folly of our\nfriends, pleasure, in mingling with envy, mingles with pain, for envy\nhas been acknowledged by us to be mental pain, and laughter is pleasant;\nand so we envy and laugh at the same instant.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And the argument implies that there are combinations of\npleasure and pain in lamentations, and in tragedy and comedy, not only\non the stage, but on the greater stage of human life; and so in endless\nother cases.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I do not see how any one can deny what you say, Socrates,\nhowever eager he may be to assert the opposite opinion.\n\nSOCRATES: I mentioned anger, desire, sorrow, fear, love, emulation,\nenvy, and similar emotions, as examples in which we should find a\nmixture of the two elements so often named; did I not?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: We may observe that our conclusions hitherto have had\nreference only to sorrow and envy and anger.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I see.\n\nSOCRATES: Then many other cases still remain?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And why do you suppose me to have pointed out to you the\nadmixture which takes place in comedy? Why but to convince you that\nthere was no difficulty in showing the mixed nature of fear and love\nand similar affections; and I thought that when I had given you the\nillustration, you would have let me off, and have acknowledged as a\ngeneral truth that the body without the soul, and the soul without\nthe body, as well as the two united, are susceptible of all sorts of\nadmixtures of pleasures and pains; and so further discussion would have\nbeen unnecessary. And now I want to know whether I may depart; or will\nyou keep me here until midnight? I fancy that I may obtain my release\nwithout many words;--if I promise that to-morrow I will give you an\naccount of all these cases. But at present I would rather sail in\nanother direction, and go to other matters which remain to be settled,\nbefore the judgment can be given which Philebus demands.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very good, Socrates; in what remains take your own course.\n\nSOCRATES: Then after the mixed pleasures the unmixed should have their\nturn; this is the natural and necessary order.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Excellent.\n\nSOCRATES: These, in turn, then, I will now endeavour to indicate; for\nwith the maintainers of the opinion that all pleasures are a cessation\nof pain, I do not agree, but, as I was saying, I use them as witnesses,\nthat there are pleasures which seem only and are not, and there are\nothers again which have great power and appear in many forms, yet\nare intermingled with pains, and are partly alleviations of agony and\ndistress, both of body and mind.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Then what pleasures, Socrates, should we be right in\nconceiving to be true?\n\nSOCRATES: True pleasures are those which are given by beauty of colour\nand form, and most of those which arise from smells; those of\nsound, again, and in general those of which the want is painless and\nunconscious, and of which the fruition is palpable to sense and pleasant\nand unalloyed with pain.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Once more, Socrates, I must ask what you mean.\n\nSOCRATES: My meaning is certainly not obvious, and I will endeavour\nto be plainer. I do not mean by beauty of form such beauty as that of\nanimals or pictures, which the many would suppose to be my meaning; but,\nsays the argument, understand me to mean straight lines and circles,\nand the plane or solid figures which are formed out of them by\nturning-lathes and rulers and measurers of angles; for these I affirm\nto be not only relatively beautiful, like other things, but they are\neternally and absolutely beautiful, and they have peculiar pleasures,\nquite unlike the pleasures of scratching. And there are colours which\nare of the same character, and have similar pleasures; now do you\nunderstand my meaning?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I am trying to understand, Socrates, and I hope that you\nwill try to make your meaning clearer.\n\nSOCRATES: When sounds are smooth and clear, and have a single pure\ntone, then I mean to say that they are not relatively but absolutely\nbeautiful, and have natural pleasures associated with them.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, there are such pleasures.\n\nSOCRATES: The pleasures of smell are of a less ethereal sort, but they\nhave no necessary admixture of pain; and all pleasures, however and\nwherever experienced, which are unattended by pains, I assign to an\nanalogous class. Here then are two kinds of pleasures.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I understand.\n\nSOCRATES: To these may be added the pleasures of knowledge, if no hunger\nof knowledge and no pain caused by such hunger precede them.\n\nPROTARCHUS: And this is the case.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, but if a man who is full of knowledge loses his\nknowledge, are there not pains of forgetting?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Not necessarily, but there may be times of reflection, when\nhe feels grief at the loss of his knowledge.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, my friend, but at present we are enumerating only the\nnatural perceptions, and have nothing to do with reflection.\n\nPROTARCHUS: In that case you are right in saying that the loss of\nknowledge is not attended with pain.\n\nSOCRATES: These pleasures of knowledge, then, are unmixed with pain; and\nthey are not the pleasures of the many but of a very few.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: And now, having fairly separated the pure pleasures and\nthose which may be rightly termed impure, let us further add to our\ndescription of them, that the pleasures which are in excess have no\nmeasure, but that those which are not in excess have measure; the great,\nthe excessive, whether more or less frequent, we shall be right in\nreferring to the class of the infinite, and of the more and less, which\npours through body and soul alike; and the others we shall refer to the\nclass which has measure.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Quite right, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Still there is something more to be considered about\npleasures.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What is it?\n\nSOCRATES: When you speak of purity and clearness, or of excess,\nabundance, greatness and sufficiency, in what relation do these terms\nstand to truth?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Why do you ask, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: Because, Protarchus, I should wish to test pleasure and\nknowledge in every possible way, in order that if there be a pure and\nimpure element in either of them, I may present the pure element for\njudgment, and then they will be more easily judged of by you and by me\nand by all of us.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Most true.\n\nSOCRATES: Let us investigate all the pure kinds; first selecting for\nconsideration a single instance.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What instance shall we select?\n\nSOCRATES: Suppose that we first of all take whiteness.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very good.\n\nSOCRATES: How can there be purity in whiteness, and what purity? Is\nthat purest which is greatest or most in quantity, or that which is most\nunadulterated and freest from any admixture of other colours?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Clearly that which is most unadulterated.\n\nSOCRATES: True, Protarchus; and so the purest white, and not the\ngreatest or largest in quantity, is to be deemed truest and most\nbeautiful?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Right.\n\nSOCRATES: And we shall be quite right in saying that a little pure white\nis whiter and fairer and truer than a great deal that is mixed.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Perfectly right.\n\nSOCRATES: There is no need of adducing many similar examples in\nillustration of the argument about pleasure; one such is sufficient to\nprove to us that a small pleasure or a small amount of pleasure, if pure\nor unalloyed with pain, is always pleasanter and truer and fairer than a\ngreat pleasure or a great amount of pleasure of another kind.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Assuredly; and the instance you have given is quite\nsufficient.\n\nSOCRATES: But what do you say of another question:--have we not heard\nthat pleasure is always a generation, and has no true being? Do not\ncertain ingenious philosophers teach this doctrine, and ought not we to\nbe grateful to them?\n\nPROTARCHUS: What do they mean?\n\nSOCRATES: I will explain to you, my dear Protarchus, what they mean, by\nputting a question.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Ask, and I will answer.\n\nSOCRATES: I assume that there are two natures, one self-existent, and\nthe other ever in want of something.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What manner of natures are they?\n\nSOCRATES: The one majestic ever, the other inferior.\n\nPROTARCHUS: You speak riddles.\n\nSOCRATES: You have seen loves good and fair, and also brave lovers of\nthem.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I should think so.\n\nSOCRATES: Search the universe for two terms which are like these two and\nare present everywhere.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yet a third time I must say, Be a little plainer, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: There is no difficulty, Protarchus; the argument is only in\nplay, and insinuates that some things are for the sake of something\nelse (relatives), and that other things are the ends to which the former\nclass subserve (absolutes).\n\nPROTARCHUS: Your many repetitions make me slow to understand.\n\nSOCRATES: As the argument proceeds, my boy, I dare say that the meaning\nwill become clearer.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very likely.\n\nSOCRATES: Here are two new principles.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What are they?\n\nSOCRATES: One is the generation of all things, and the other is essence.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I readily accept from you both generation and essence.\n\nSOCRATES: Very right; and would you say that generation is for the sake\nof essence, or essence for the sake of generation?\n\nPROTARCHUS: You want to know whether that which is called essence is,\nproperly speaking, for the sake of generation?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes.\n\nPROTARCHUS: By the gods, I wish that you would repeat your question.\n\nSOCRATES: I mean, O my Protarchus, to ask whether you would tell me\nthat ship-building is for the sake of ships, or ships for the sake of\nship-building? and in all similar cases I should ask the same question.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Why do you not answer yourself, Socrates?\n\nSOCRATES: I have no objection, but you must take your part.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: My answer is, that all things instrumental, remedial,\nmaterial, are given to us with a view to generation, and that each\ngeneration is relative to, or for the sake of, some being or essence,\nand that the whole of generation is relative to the whole of essence.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Assuredly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, must surely be for the sake\nof some essence?\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And that for the sake of which something else is done must\nbe placed in the class of good, and that which is done for the sake of\nsomething else, in some other class, my good friend.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Most certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then pleasure, being a generation, will be rightly placed in\nsome other class than that of good?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Quite right.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, as I said at first, we ought to be very grateful to him\nwho first pointed out that pleasure was a generation only, and had no\ntrue being at all; for he is clearly one who laughs at the notion of\npleasure being a good.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Assuredly.\n\nSOCRATES: And he would surely laugh also at those who make generation\ntheir highest end.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Of whom are you speaking, and what do they mean?\n\nSOCRATES: I am speaking of those who when they are cured of hunger or\nthirst or any other defect by some process of generation are delighted\nat the process as if it were pleasure; and they say that they would not\nwish to live without these and other feelings of a like kind which might\nbe mentioned.\n\nPROTARCHUS: That is certainly what they appear to think.\n\nSOCRATES: And is not destruction universally admitted to be the opposite\nof generation?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then he who chooses thus, would choose generation and\ndestruction rather than that third sort of life, in which, as we were\nsaying, was neither pleasure nor pain, but only the purest possible\nthought.\n\nPROTARCHUS: He who would make us believe pleasure to be a good is\ninvolved in great absurdities, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Great, indeed; and there is yet another of them.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What is it?\n\nSOCRATES: Is there not an absurdity in arguing that there is nothing\ngood or noble in the body, or in anything else, but that good is in\nthe soul only, and that the only good of the soul is pleasure; and that\ncourage or temperance or understanding, or any other good of the soul,\nis not really a good?--and is there not yet a further absurdity in our\nbeing compelled to say that he who has a feeling of pain and not of\npleasure is bad at the time when he is suffering pain, even though he be\nthe best of men; and again, that he who has a feeling of pleasure, in\nso far as he is pleased at the time when he is pleased, in that degree\nexcels in virtue?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Nothing, Socrates, can be more irrational than all this.\n\nSOCRATES: And now, having subjected pleasure to every sort of test, let\nus not appear to be too sparing of mind and knowledge: let us ring their\nmetal bravely, and see if there be unsoundness in any part, until we\nhave found out what in them is of the purest nature; and then the truest\nelements both of pleasure and knowledge may be brought up for judgment.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Right.\n\nSOCRATES: Knowledge has two parts,--the one productive, and the other\neducational?\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And in the productive or handicraft arts, is not one part\nmore akin to knowledge, and the other less; and may not the one part be\nregarded as the pure, and the other as the impure?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Let us separate the superior or dominant elements in each of\nthem.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What are they, and how do you separate them?\n\nSOCRATES: I mean to say, that if arithmetic, mensuration, and weighing\nbe taken away from any art, that which remains will not be much.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Not much, certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: The rest will be only conjecture, and the better use of the\nsenses which is given by experience and practice, in addition to\na certain power of guessing, which is commonly called art, and is\nperfected by attention and pains.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Nothing more, assuredly.\n\nSOCRATES: Music, for instance, is full of this empiricism; for sounds\nare harmonized, not by measure, but by skilful conjecture; the music of\nthe flute is always trying to guess the pitch of each vibrating note,\nand is therefore mixed up with much that is doubtful and has little\nwhich is certain.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Most true.\n\nSOCRATES: And the same will be found to hold good of medicine and\nhusbandry and piloting and generalship.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: The art of the builder, on the other hand, which uses a number\nof measures and instruments, attains by their help to a greater degree\nof accuracy than the other arts.\n\nPROTARCHUS: How is that?\n\nSOCRATES: In ship-building and house-building, and in other branches of\nthe art of carpentering, the builder has his rule, lathe, compass, line,\nand a most ingenious machine for straightening wood.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: Then now let us divide the arts of which we were speaking into\ntwo kinds,--the arts which, like music, are less exact in their results,\nand those which, like carpentering, are more exact.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Let us make that division.\n\nSOCRATES: Of the latter class, the most exact of all are those which we\njust now spoke of as primary.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I see that you mean arithmetic, and the kindred arts of\nweighing and measuring.\n\nSOCRATES: Certainly, Protarchus; but are not these also distinguishable\ninto two kinds?\n\nPROTARCHUS: What are the two kinds?\n\nSOCRATES: In the first place, arithmetic is of two kinds, one of which\nis popular, and the other philosophical.\n\nPROTARCHUS: How would you distinguish them?\n\nSOCRATES: There is a wide difference between them, Protarchus; some\narithmeticians reckon unequal units; as for example, two armies, two\noxen, two very large things or two very small things. The party who are\nopposed to them insist that every unit in ten thousand must be the same\nas every other unit.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Undoubtedly there is, as you say, a great difference among\nthe votaries of the science; and there may be reasonably supposed to be\ntwo sorts of arithmetic.\n\nSOCRATES: And when we compare the art of mensuration which is used in\nbuilding with philosophical geometry, or the art of computation which\nis used in trading with exact calculation, shall we say of either of the\npairs that it is one or two?\n\nPROTARCHUS: On the analogy of what has preceded, I should be of opinion\nthat they were severally two.\n\nSOCRATES: Right; but do you understand why I have discussed the subject?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I think so, but I should like to be told by you.\n\nSOCRATES: The argument has all along been seeking a parallel to\npleasure, and true to that original design, has gone on to ask whether\none sort of knowledge is purer than another, as one pleasure is purer\nthan another.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Clearly; that was the intention.\n\nSOCRATES: And has not the argument in what has preceded, already shown\nthat the arts have different provinces, and vary in their degrees of\ncertainty?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And just now did not the argument first designate a particular\nart by a common term, thus making us believe in the unity of that art;\nand then again, as if speaking of two different things, proceed to\nenquire whether the art as pursed by philosophers, or as pursued by\nnon-philosophers, has more of certainty and purity?\n\nPROTARCHUS: That is the very question which the argument is asking.\n\nSOCRATES: And how, Protarchus, shall we answer the enquiry?\n\nPROTARCHUS: O Socrates, we have reached a point at which the difference\nof clearness in different kinds of knowledge is enormous.\n\nSOCRATES: Then the answer will be the easier.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly; and let us say in reply, that those arts into\nwhich arithmetic and mensuration enter, far surpass all others; and that\nof these the arts or sciences which are animated by the pure philosophic\nimpulse are infinitely superior in accuracy and truth.\n\nSOCRATES: Then this is your judgment; and this is the answer which,\nupon your authority, we will give to all masters of the art of\nmisinterpretation?\n\nPROTARCHUS: What answer?\n\nSOCRATES: That there are two arts of arithmetic, and two of mensuration;\nand also several other arts which in like manner have this double\nnature, and yet only one name.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Let us boldly return this answer to the masters of whom you\nspeak, Socrates, and hope for good luck.\n\nSOCRATES: We have explained what we term the most exact arts or\nsciences.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very good.\n\nSOCRATES: And yet, Protarchus, dialectic will refuse to acknowledge us,\nif we do not award to her the first place.\n\nPROTARCHUS: And pray, what is dialectic?\n\nSOCRATES: Clearly the science which has to do with all that knowledge of\nwhich we are now speaking; for I am sure that all men who have a grain\nof intelligence will admit that the knowledge which has to do with being\nand reality, and sameness and unchangeableness, is by far the truest of\nall. But how would you decide this question, Protarchus?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I have often heard Gorgias maintain, Socrates, that the art\nof persuasion far surpassed every other; this, as he says, is by far the\nbest of them all, for to it all things submit, not by compulsion, but of\ntheir own free will. Now, I should not like to quarrel either with you\nor with him.\n\nSOCRATES: You mean to say that you would like to desert, if you were not\nashamed?\n\nPROTARCHUS: As you please.\n\nSOCRATES: May I not have led you into a misapprehension?\n\nPROTARCHUS: How?\n\nSOCRATES: Dear Protarchus, I never asked which was the greatest or best\nor usefullest of arts or sciences, but which had clearness and accuracy,\nand the greatest amount of truth, however humble and little useful\nan art. And as for Gorgias, if you do not deny that his art has the\nadvantage in usefulness to mankind, he will not quarrel with you\nfor saying that the study of which I am speaking is superior in this\nparticular of essential truth; as in the comparison of white colours, a\nlittle whiteness, if that little be only pure, was said to be superior\nin truth to a great mass which is impure. And now let us give our best\nattention and consider well, not the comparative use or reputation of\nthe sciences, but the power or faculty, if there be such, which the soul\nhas of loving the truth, and of doing all things for the sake of it; let\nus search into the pure element of mind and intelligence, and then we\nshall be able to say whether the science of which I have been speaking\nis most likely to possess the faculty, or whether there be some other\nwhich has higher claims.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Well, I have been considering, and I can hardly think that\nany other science or art has a firmer grasp of the truth than this.\n\nSOCRATES: Do you say so because you observe that the arts in general and\nthose engaged in them make use of opinion, and are resolutely engaged in\nthe investigation of matters of opinion? Even he who supposes himself\nto be occupied with nature is really occupied with the things of this\nworld, how created, how acting or acted upon. Is not this the sort of\nenquiry in which his life is spent?\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: He is labouring, not after eternal being, but about things\nwhich are becoming, or which will or have become.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And can we say that any of these things which neither are nor\nhave been nor will be unchangeable, when judged by the strict rule of\ntruth ever become certain?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Impossible.\n\nSOCRATES: How can anything fixed be concerned with that which has no\nfixedness?\n\nPROTARCHUS: How indeed?\n\nSOCRATES: Then mind and science when employed about such changing things\ndo not attain the highest truth?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I should imagine not.\n\nSOCRATES: And now let us bid farewell, a long farewell, to you or me or\nPhilebus or Gorgias, and urge on behalf of the argument a single point.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What point?\n\nSOCRATES: Let us say that the stable and pure and true and unalloyed has\nto do with the things which are eternal and unchangeable and unmixed,\nor if not, at any rate what is most akin to them has; and that all other\nthings are to be placed in a second or inferior class.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: And of the names expressing cognition, ought not the fairest\nto be given to the fairest things?\n\nPROTARCHUS: That is natural.\n\nSOCRATES: And are not mind and wisdom the names which are to be honoured\nmost?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And these names may be said to have their truest and most\nexact application when the mind is engaged in the contemplation of true\nbeing?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And these were the names which I adduced of the rivals of\npleasure?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: In the next place, as to the mixture, here are the\ningredients, pleasure and wisdom, and we may be compared to artists who\nhave their materials ready to their hands.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes.\n\nSOCRATES: And now we must begin to mix them?\n\nPROTARCHUS: By all means.\n\nSOCRATES: But had we not better have a preliminary word and refresh our\nmemories?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Of what?\n\nSOCRATES: Of that which I have already mentioned. Well says the proverb,\nthat we ought to repeat twice and even thrice that which is good.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Well then, by Zeus, let us proceed, and I will make what I\nbelieve to be a fair summary of the argument.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Let me hear.\n\nSOCRATES: Philebus says that pleasure is the true end of all living\nbeings, at which all ought to aim, and moreover that it is the chief\ngood of all, and that the two names 'good' and 'pleasant' are correctly\ngiven to one thing and one nature; Socrates, on the other hand, begins\nby denying this, and further says, that in nature as in name they are\ntwo, and that wisdom partakes more than pleasure of the good. Is not and\nwas not this what we were saying, Protarchus?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And is there not and was there not a further point which was\nconceded between us?\n\nPROTARCHUS: What was it?\n\nSOCRATES: That the good differs from all other things.\n\nPROTARCHUS: In what respect?\n\nSOCRATES: In that the being who possesses good always everywhere and\nin all things has the most perfect sufficiency, and is never in need of\nanything else.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Exactly.\n\nSOCRATES: And did we not endeavour to make an imaginary separation of\nwisdom and pleasure, assigning to each a distinct life, so that pleasure\nwas wholly excluded from wisdom, and wisdom in like manner had no part\nwhatever in pleasure?\n\nPROTARCHUS: We did.\n\nSOCRATES: And did we think that either of them alone would be\nsufficient?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly not.\n\nSOCRATES: And if we erred in any point, then let any one who will, take\nup the enquiry again and set us right; and assuming memory and wisdom\nand knowledge and true opinion to belong to the same class, let him\nconsider whether he would desire to possess or acquire,--I will not say\npleasure, however abundant or intense, if he has no real perception\nthat he is pleased, nor any consciousness of what he feels, nor any\nrecollection, however momentary, of the feeling,--but would he desire to\nhave anything at all, if these faculties were wanting to him? And about\nwisdom I ask the same question; can you conceive that any one would\nchoose to have all wisdom absolutely devoid of pleasure, rather than\nwith a certain degree of pleasure, or all pleasure devoid of wisdom,\nrather than with a certain degree of wisdom?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly not, Socrates; but why repeat such questions any\nmore?\n\nSOCRATES: Then the perfect and universally eligible and entirely good\ncannot possibly be either of them?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Impossible.\n\nSOCRATES: Then now we must ascertain the nature of the good more or less\naccurately, in order, as we were saying, that the second place may be\nduly assigned.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Right.\n\nSOCRATES: Have we not found a road which leads towards the good?\n\nPROTARCHUS: What road?\n\nSOCRATES: Supposing that a man had to be found, and you could discover\nin what house he lived, would not that be a great step towards the\ndiscovery of the man himself?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And now reason intimates to us, as at our first beginning,\nthat we should seek the good, not in the unmixed life but in the mixed.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: There is greater hope of finding that which we are seeking in\nthe life which is well mixed than in that which is not?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Far greater.\n\nSOCRATES: Then now let us mingle, Protarchus, at the same time offering\nup a prayer to Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whoever is the god who\npresides over the ceremony of mingling.\n\nPROTARCHUS: By all means.\n\nSOCRATES: Are not we the cup-bearers? and here are two fountains which\nare flowing at our side: one, which is pleasure, may be likened to a\nfountain of honey; the other, wisdom, a sober draught in which no wine\nmingles, is of water unpleasant but healthful; out of these we must seek\nto make the fairest of all possible mixtures.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Tell me first;--should we be most likely to succeed if we\nmingled every sort of pleasure with every sort of wisdom?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Perhaps we might.\n\nSOCRATES: But I should be afraid of the risk, and I think that I can\nshow a safer plan.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What is it?\n\nSOCRATES: One pleasure was supposed by us to be truer than another, and\none art to be more exact than another.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: There was also supposed to be a difference in sciences; some\nof them regarding only the transient and perishing, and others the\npermanent and imperishable and everlasting and immutable; and when\njudged by the standard of truth, the latter, as we thought, were truer\nthan the former.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very good and right.\n\nSOCRATES: If, then, we were to begin by mingling the sections of each\nclass which have the most of truth, will not the union suffice to give\nus the loveliest of lives, or shall we still want some elements of\nanother kind?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I think that we ought to do what you suggest.\n\nSOCRATES: Let us suppose a man who understands justice, and has reason\nas well as understanding about the true nature of this and of all other\nthings.\n\nPROTARCHUS: We will suppose such a man.\n\nSOCRATES: Will he have enough of knowledge if he is acquainted only with\nthe divine circle and sphere, and knows nothing of our human spheres and\ncircles, but uses only divine circles and measures in the building of a\nhouse?\n\nPROTARCHUS: The knowledge which is only superhuman, Socrates, is\nridiculous in man.\n\nSOCRATES: What do you mean? Do you mean that you are to throw into the\ncup and mingle the impure and uncertain art which uses the false measure\nand the false circle?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, we must, if any of us is ever to find his way home.\n\nSOCRATES: And am I to include music, which, as I was saying just now, is\nfull of guesswork and imitation, and is wanting in purity?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, I think that you must, if human life is to be a life at\nall.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, then, suppose that I give way, and, like a doorkeeper\nwho is pushed and overborne by the mob, I open the door wide, and let\nknowledge of every sort stream in, and the pure mingle with the impure?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I do not know, Socrates, that any great harm would come of\nhaving them all, if only you have the first sort.\n\nSOCRATES: Well, then, shall I let them all flow into what Homer\npoetically terms 'a meeting of the waters'?\n\nPROTARCHUS: By all means.\n\nSOCRATES: There--I have let them in, and now I must return to the\nfountain of pleasure. For we were not permitted to begin by mingling\nin a single stream the true portions of both according to our original\nintention; but the love of all knowledge constrained us to let all the\nsciences flow in together before the pleasures.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Quite true.\n\nSOCRATES: And now the time has come for us to consider about the\npleasures also, whether we shall in like manner let them go all at once,\nor at first only the true ones.\n\nPROTARCHUS: It will be by far the safer course to let flow the true ones\nfirst.\n\nSOCRATES: Let them flow, then; and now, if there are any necessary\npleasures, as there were arts and sciences necessary, must we not mingle\nthem?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes; the necessary pleasures should certainly be allowed to\nmingle.\n\nSOCRATES: The knowledge of the arts has been admitted to be innocent\nand useful always; and if we say of pleasures in like manner that all of\nthem are good and innocent for all of us at all times, we must let them\nall mingle?\n\nPROTARCHUS: What shall we say about them, and what course shall we take?\n\nSOCRATES: Do not ask me, Protarchus; but ask the daughters of pleasure\nand wisdom to answer for themselves.\n\nPROTARCHUS: How?\n\nSOCRATES: Tell us, O beloved--shall we call you pleasures or by some\nother name?--would you rather live with or without wisdom? I am of\nopinion that they would certainly answer as follows:\n\nPROTARCHUS: How?\n\nSOCRATES: They would answer, as we said before, that for any single\nclass to be left by itself pure and isolated is not good, nor altogether\npossible; and that if we are to make comparisons of one class with\nanother and choose, there is no better companion than knowledge of\nthings in general, and likewise the perfect knowledge, if that may be,\nof ourselves in every respect.\n\nPROTARCHUS: And our answer will be:--In that ye have spoken well.\n\nSOCRATES: Very true. And now let us go back and interrogate wisdom and\nmind: Would you like to have any pleasures in the mixture? And they will\nreply:--'What pleasures do you mean?'\n\nPROTARCHUS: Likely enough.\n\nSOCRATES: And we shall take up our parable and say: Do you wish to have\nthe greatest and most vehement pleasures for your companions in addition\nto the true ones? 'Why, Socrates,' they will say, 'how can we? seeing\nthat they are the source of ten thousand hindrances to us; they trouble\nthe souls of men, which are our habitation, with their madness; they\nprevent us from coming to the birth, and are commonly the ruin of\nthe children which are born to us, causing them to be forgotten and\nunheeded; but the true and pure pleasures, of which you spoke, know to\nbe of our family, and also those pleasures which accompany health and\ntemperance, and which every Virtue, like a goddess, has in her train to\nfollow her about wherever she goes,--mingle these and not the others;\nthere would be great want of sense in any one who desires to see a fair\nand perfect mixture, and to find in it what is the highest good in man\nand in the universe, and to divine what is the true form of good--there\nwould be great want of sense in his allowing the pleasures, which are\nalways in the company of folly and vice, to mingle with mind in the\ncup.'--Is not this a very rational and suitable reply, which mind has\nmade, both on her own behalf, as well as on the behalf of memory and\ntrue opinion?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Most certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And still there must be something more added, which is a\nnecessary ingredient in every mixture.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What is that?\n\nSOCRATES: Unless truth enter into the composition, nothing can truly be\ncreated or subsist.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Impossible.\n\nSOCRATES: Quite impossible; and now you and Philebus must tell me\nwhether anything is still wanting in the mixture, for to my way of\nthinking the argument is now completed, and may be compared to an\nincorporeal law, which is going to hold fair rule over a living body.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I agree with you, Socrates.\n\nSOCRATES: And may we not say with reason that we are now at the\nvestibule of the habitation of the good?\n\nPROTARCHUS: I think that we are.\n\nSOCRATES: What, then, is there in the mixture which is most precious,\nand which is the principal cause why such a state is universally beloved\nby all? When we have discovered it, we will proceed to ask whether this\nomnipresent nature is more akin to pleasure or to mind.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Quite right; in that way we shall be better able to judge.\n\nSOCRATES: And there is no difficulty in seeing the cause which renders\nany mixture either of the highest value or of none at all.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What do you mean?\n\nSOCRATES: Every man knows it.\n\nPROTARCHUS: What?\n\nSOCRATES: He knows that any want of measure and symmetry in any mixture\nwhatever must always of necessity be fatal, both to the elements and\nto the mixture, which is then not a mixture, but only a confused medley\nwhich brings confusion on the possessor of it.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Most true.\n\nSOCRATES: And now the power of the good has retired into the region of\nthe beautiful; for measure and symmetry are beauty and virtue all the\nworld over.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Also we said that truth was to form an element in the mixture.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, if we are not able to hunt the good with one idea only,\nwith three we may catch our prey; Beauty, Symmetry, Truth are the\nthree, and these taken together we may regard as the single cause of\nthe mixture, and the mixture as being good by reason of the infusion of\nthem.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Quite right.\n\nSOCRATES: And now, Protarchus, any man could decide well enough whether\npleasure or wisdom is more akin to the highest good, and more honourable\namong gods and men.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Clearly, and yet perhaps the argument had better be pursued\nto the end.\n\nSOCRATES: We must take each of them separately in their relation to\npleasure and mind, and pronounce upon them; for we ought to see to which\nof the two they are severally most akin.\n\nPROTARCHUS: You are speaking of beauty, truth, and measure?\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, Protarchus, take truth first, and, after passing\nin review mind, truth, pleasure, pause awhile and make answer to\nyourself--as to whether pleasure or mind is more akin to truth.\n\nPROTARCHUS: There is no need to pause, for the difference between them\nis palpable; pleasure is the veriest impostor in the world; and it is\nsaid that in the pleasures of love, which appear to be the greatest,\nperjury is excused by the gods; for pleasures, like children, have not\nthe least particle of reason in them; whereas mind is either the same as\ntruth, or the most like truth, and the truest.\n\nSOCRATES: Shall we next consider measure, in like manner, and ask\nwhether pleasure has more of this than wisdom, or wisdom than pleasure?\n\nPROTARCHUS: Here is another question which may be easily answered; for I\nimagine that nothing can ever be more immoderate than the transports of\npleasure, or more in conformity with measure than mind and knowledge.\n\nSOCRATES: Very good; but there still remains the third test: Has mind\na greater share of beauty than pleasure, and is mind or pleasure the\nfairer of the two?\n\nPROTARCHUS: No one, Socrates, either awake or dreaming, ever saw or\nimagined mind or wisdom to be in aught unseemly, at any time, past,\npresent, or future.\n\nSOCRATES: Right.\n\nPROTARCHUS: But when we see some one indulging in pleasures, perhaps in\nthe greatest of pleasures, the ridiculous or disgraceful nature of the\naction makes us ashamed; and so we put them out of sight, and consign\nthem to darkness, under the idea that they ought not to meet the eye of\nday.\n\nSOCRATES: Then, Protarchus, you will proclaim everywhere, by word of\nmouth to this company, and by messengers bearing the tidings far and\nwide, that pleasure is not the first of possessions, nor yet the second,\nbut that in measure, and the mean, and the suitable, and the like, the\neternal nature has been found.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, that seems to be the result of what has been now said.\n\nSOCRATES: In the second class is contained the symmetrical and beautiful\nand perfect or sufficient, and all which are of that family.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: And if you reckon in the third class mind and wisdom, you will\nnot be far wrong, if I divine aright.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I dare say.\n\nSOCRATES: And would you not put in the fourth class the goods which we\nwere affirming to appertain specially to the soul--sciences and arts and\ntrue opinions as we called them? These come after the third class, and\nform the fourth, as they are certainly more akin to good than pleasure\nis.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Surely.\n\nSOCRATES: The fifth class are the pleasures which were defined by us\nas painless, being the pure pleasures of the soul herself, as we termed\nthem, which accompany, some the sciences, and some the senses.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Perhaps.\n\nSOCRATES: And now, as Orpheus says,\n\n     'With the sixth generation cease the glory of my song.'\n\nHere, at the sixth award, let us make an end; all that remains is to set\nthe crown on our discourse.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: Then let us sum up and reassert what has been said, thus\noffering the third libation to the saviour Zeus.\n\nPROTARCHUS: How?\n\nSOCRATES: Philebus affirmed that pleasure was always and absolutely the\ngood.\n\nPROTARCHUS: I understand; this third libation, Socrates, of which you\nspoke, meant a recapitulation.\n\nSOCRATES: Yes, but listen to the sequel; convinced of what I have just\nbeen saying, and feeling indignant at the doctrine, which is maintained,\nnot by Philebus only, but by thousands of others, I affirmed that mind\nwas far better and far more excellent, as an element of human life, than\npleasure.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: But, suspecting that there were other things which were also\nbetter, I went on to say that if there was anything better than either,\nthen I would claim the second place for mind over pleasure, and pleasure\nwould lose the second place as well as the first.\n\nPROTARCHUS: You did.\n\nSOCRATES: Nothing could be more satisfactorily shown than the\nunsatisfactory nature of both of them.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Very true.\n\nSOCRATES: The claims both of pleasure and mind to be the absolute good\nhave been entirely disproven in this argument, because they are both\nwanting in self-sufficiency and also in adequacy and perfection.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Most true.\n\nSOCRATES: But, though they must both resign in favour of another,\nmind is ten thousand times nearer and more akin to the nature of the\nconqueror than pleasure.\n\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\n\nSOCRATES: And, according to the judgment which has now been given,\npleasure will rank fifth.\n\nPROTARCHUS: True.\n\nSOCRATES: But not first; no, not even if all the oxen and horses and\nanimals in the world by their pursuit of enjoyment proclaim her to be\nso;--although the many trusting in them, as diviners trust in birds,\ndetermine that pleasures make up the good of life, and deem the lusts\nof animals to be better witnesses than the inspirations of divine\nphilosophy.\n\nPROTARCHUS: And now, Socrates, we tell you that the truth of what you\nhave been saying is approved by the judgment of all of us.\n\nSOCRATES: And will you let me go?\n\nPROTARCHUS: There is a little which yet remains, and I will remind you\nof it, for I am sure that you will not be the first to go away from an\nargument.","title":"Philebus","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":45417}