{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_1750/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_1750","id":"gutenberg_1750","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/1750","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Classics of Literature","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Political science -- Early works to 1800","State, The -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"Produced by Sue Asscher\n\n\n\n\n\nLAWS\n\nBy Plato\n\n\nTranslated By Benjamin Jowett\n\n\n\n\nINTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.\n\nThe genuineness of the Laws is sufficiently proved (1) by more than\ntwenty citations of them in the writings of Aristotle, who was residing\nat Athens during the last twenty years of the life of Plato, and who,\nhaving left it after his death (B.C. 347), returned thither twelve years\nlater (B.C. 335); (2) by the allusion of Isocrates\n\n(Oratio ad Philippum missa, p.84: To men tais paneguresin enochlein\nkai pros apantas legein tous sunprechontas en autais pros oudena legein\nestin, all omoios oi toioutoi ton logon (sc. speeches in the assembly)\nakuroi tugchanousin ontes tois nomois kai tais politeiais tais upo ton\nsophiston gegrammenais.) --writing 346 B.C., a year after the death\nof Plato, and probably not more than three or four years after the\ncomposition of the Laws--who speaks of the Laws and Republics written by\nphilosophers (upo ton sophiston); (3) by the reference (Athen.) of the\ncomic poet Alexis, a younger contemporary of Plato (fl. B.C 356-306), to\nthe enactment about prices, which occurs in Laws xi., viz that the same\ngoods should not be offered at two prices on the same day\n\n     (Ou gegone kreitton nomothetes tou plousiou\n     Aristonikou tithesi gar nuni nomon,\n     ton ichthuopolon ostis an polon tini\n     ichthun upotimesas apodot elattonos\n     es eipe times, eis to desmoterion\n     euthus apagesthai touton, ina dedoikotes\n     tes axias agaposin, e tes esperas\n     saprous apantas apopherosin oikade.\n\nMeineke, Frag. Com. Graec.); (4) by the unanimous voice of later\nantiquity and the absence of any suspicion among ancient writers worth\nspeaking of to the contrary; for it is not said of Philippus of Opus\nthat he composed any part of the Laws, but only that he copied them\nout of the waxen tablets, and was thought by some to have written the\nEpinomis (Diog. Laert.) That the longest and one of the best writings\nbearing the name of Plato should be a forgery, even if its genuineness\nwere unsupported by external testimony, would be a singular phenomenon\nin ancient literature; and although the critical worth of the consensus\nof late writers is generally not to be compared with the express\ntestimony of contemporaries, yet a somewhat greater value may be\nattributed to their consent in the present instance, because the\nadmission of the Laws is combined with doubts about the Epinomis,\na spurious writing, which is a kind of epilogue to the larger work\nprobably of a much later date. This shows that the reception of the Laws\nwas not altogether undiscriminating.\n\nThe suspicion which has attached to the Laws of Plato in the judgment\nof some modern writers appears to rest partly (1) on differences in\nthe style and form of the work, and (2) on differences of thought and\nopinion which they observe in them. Their suspicion is increased by the\nfact that these differences are accompanied by resemblances as striking\nto passages in other Platonic writings. They are sensible of a want\nof point in the dialogue and a general inferiority in the ideas,\nplan, manners, and style. They miss the poetical flow, the dramatic\nverisimilitude, the life and variety of the characters, the dialectic\nsubtlety, the Attic purity, the luminous order, the exquisite urbanity;\ninstead of which they find tautology, obscurity, self-sufficiency,\nsermonizing, rhetorical declamation, pedantry, egotism, uncouth forms\nof sentences, and peculiarities in the use of words and idioms. They are\nunable to discover any unity in the patched, irregular structure. The\nspeculative element both in government and education is superseded by\na narrow economical or religious vein. The grace and cheerfulness of\nAthenian life have disappeared; and a spirit of moroseness and religious\nintolerance has taken their place. The charm of youth is no longer\nthere; the mannerism of age makes itself unpleasantly felt. The\nconnection is often imperfect; and there is a want of arrangement,\nexhibited especially in the enumeration of the laws towards the end of\nthe work. The Laws are full of flaws and repetitions. The Greek is in\nplaces very ungrammatical and intractable. A cynical levity is displayed\nin some passages, and a tone of disappointment and lamentation over\nhuman things in others. The critics seem also to observe in them bad\nimitations of thoughts which are better expressed in Plato's other\nwritings. Lastly, they wonder how the mind which conceived the Republic\ncould have left the Critias, Hermocrates, and Philosophus incomplete or\nunwritten, and have devoted the last years of life to the Laws.\n\nThe questions which have been thus indirectly suggested may be\nconsidered by us under five or six heads: I, the characters; II, the\nplan; III, the style; IV, the imitations of other writings of Plato;\nV; the more general relation of the Laws to the Republic and the other\ndialogues; and VI, to the existing Athenian and Spartan states.\n\nI. Already in the Philebus the distinctive character of Socrates has\ndisappeared; and in the Timaeus, Sophist, and Statesman his function of\nchief speaker is handed over to the Pythagorean philosopher Timaeus, and\nto the Eleatic Stranger, at whose feet he sits, and is silent. More and\nmore Plato seems to have felt in his later writings that the character\nand method of Socrates were no longer suited to be the vehicle of his\nown philosophy. He is no longer interrogative but dogmatic; not 'a\nhesitating enquirer,' but one who speaks with the authority of a\nlegislator. Even in the Republic we have seen that the argument which is\ncarried on by Socrates in the old style with Thrasymachus in the first\nbook, soon passes into the form of exposition. In the Laws he is nowhere\nmentioned. Yet so completely in the tradition of antiquity is Socrates\nidentified with Plato, that in the criticism of the Laws which we find\nin the so-called Politics of Aristotle he is supposed by the writer\nstill to be playing his part of the chief speaker (compare Pol.).\n\nThe Laws are discussed by three representatives of Athens, Crete, and\nSparta. The Athenian, as might be expected, is the protagonist or chief\nspeaker, while the second place is assigned to the Cretan, who, as\none of the leaders of a new colony, has a special interest in the\nconversation. At least four-fifths of the answers are put into his\nmouth. The Spartan is every inch a soldier, a man of few words himself,\nbetter at deeds than words. The Athenian talks to the two others,\nalthough they are his equals in age, in the style of a master\ndiscoursing to his scholars; he frequently praises himself; he\nentertains a very poor opinion of the understanding of his companions.\nCertainly the boastfulness and rudeness of the Laws is the reverse of\nthe refined irony and courtesy which characterize the earlier dialogues.\nWe are no longer in such good company as in the Phaedrus and Symposium.\nManners are lost sight of in the earnestness of the speakers, and\ndogmatic assertions take the place of poetical fancies.\n\nThe scene is laid in Crete, and the conversation is held in the course\nof a walk from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus, which takes place\non one of the longest and hottest days of the year. The companions start\nat dawn, and arrive at the point in their conversation which terminates\nthe fourth book, about noon. The God to whose temple they are going is\nthe lawgiver of Crete, and this may be supposed to be the very cave\nat which he gave his oracles to Minos. But the externals of the scene,\nwhich are briefly and inartistically described, soon disappear, and we\nplunge abruptly into the subject of the dialogue. We are reminded by\ncontrast of the higher art of the Phaedrus, in which the summer's day,\nand the cool stream, and the chirping of the grasshoppers, and the\nfragrance of the agnus castus, and the legends of the place are present\nto the imagination throughout the discourse.\n\nThe typical Athenian apologizes for the tendency of his countrymen\n'to spin a long discussion out of slender materials,' and in a similar\nspirit the Lacedaemonian Megillus apologizes for the Spartan brevity\n(compare Thucydid.), acknowledging at the same time that there may be\noccasions when long discourses are necessary. The family of Megillus is\nthe proxenus of Athens at Sparta; and he pays a beautiful compliment to\nthe Athenian, significant of the character of the work, which, though\nborrowing many elements from Sparta, is also pervaded by an Athenian\nspirit. A good Athenian, he says, is more than ordinarily good, because\nhe is inspired by nature and not manufactured by law. The love of\nlistening which is attributed to the Timocrat in the Republic is also\nexhibited in him. The Athenian on his side has a pleasure in speaking to\nthe Lacedaemonian of the struggle in which their ancestors were jointly\nengaged against the Persians. A connexion with Athens is likewise\nintimated by the Cretan Cleinias. He is the relative of Epimenides,\nwhom, by an anachronism of a century,--perhaps arising as Zeller\nsuggests (Plat. Stud.) out of a confusion of the visit of Epimenides\nand Diotima (Symp.),--he describes as coming to Athens, not after the\nattempt of Cylon, but ten years before the Persian war. The Cretan and\nLacedaemonian hardly contribute at all to the argument of which the\nAthenian is the expounder; they only supply information when asked about\nthe institutions of their respective countries. A kind of simplicity or\nstupidity is ascribed to them. At first, they are dissatisfied with the\nfree criticisms which the Athenian passes upon the laws of Minos and\nLycurgus, but they acquiesce in his greater experience and knowledge of\nthe world. They admit that there can be no objection to the enquiry; for\nin the spirit of the legislator himself, they are discussing his laws\nwhen there are no young men present to listen. They are unwilling to\nallow that the Spartan and Cretan lawgivers can have been mistaken\nin honouring courage as the first part of virtue, and are puzzled at\nhearing for the first time that 'Goods are only evil to the evil.'\nSeveral times they are on the point of quarrelling, and by an effort\nlearn to restrain their natural feeling (compare Shakespeare, Henry V,\nact iii. sc. 2). In Book vii., the Lacedaemonian expresses a momentary\nirritation at the accusation which the Athenian brings against the\nSpartan institutions, of encouraging licentiousness in their women,\nbut he is reminded by the Cretan that the permission to criticize them\nfreely has been given, and cannot be retracted. His only criterion of\ntruth is the authority of the Spartan lawgiver; he is 'interested,'\nin the novel speculations of the Athenian, but inclines to prefer the\nordinances of Lycurgus.\n\nThe three interlocutors all of them speak in the character of old\nmen, which forms a pleasant bond of union between them. They have the\nfeelings of old age about youth, about the state, about human things in\ngeneral. Nothing in life seems to be of much importance to them; they\nare spectators rather than actors, and men in general appear to the\nAthenian speaker to be the playthings of the Gods and of circumstances.\nStill they have a fatherly care of the young, and are deeply impressed\nby sentiments of religion. They would give confidence to the aged by an\nincreasing use of wine, which, as they get older, is to unloose their\ntongues and make them sing. The prospect of the existence of the soul\nafter death is constantly present to them; though they can hardly be\nsaid to have the cheerful hope and resignation which animates Socrates\nin the Phaedo or Cephalus in the Republic. Plato appears to be\nexpressing his own feelings in remarks of this sort. For at the time of\nwriting the first book of the Laws he was at least seventy-four years of\nage, if we suppose him to allude to the victory of the Syracusans under\nDionysius the Younger over the Locrians, which occurred in the year 356.\nSuch a sadness was the natural effect of declining years and failing\npowers, which make men ask, 'After all, what profit is there in life?'\nThey feel that their work is beginning to be over, and are ready to say,\n'All the world is a stage;' or, in the actual words of Plato, 'Let us\nplay as good plays as we can,' though 'we must be sometimes serious,\nwhich is not agreeable, but necessary.' These are feelings which have\ncrossed the minds of reflective persons in all ages, and there is no\nreason to connect the Laws any more than other parts of Plato's writings\nwith the very uncertain narrative of his life, or to imagine that this\nmelancholy tone is attributable to disappointment at having failed to\nconvert a Sicilian tyrant into a philosopher.\n\nII. The plan of the Laws is more irregular and has less connexion than\nany other of the writings of Plato. As Aristotle says in the Politics,\n'The greater part consists of laws'; in Books v, vi, xi, xii the\ndialogue almost entirely disappears. Large portions of them are rather\nthe materials for a work than a finished composition which may rank with\nthe other Platonic dialogues. To use his own image, 'Some stones are\nregularly inserted in the building; others are lying on the ground ready\nfor use.' There is probably truth in the tradition that the Laws were\nnot published until after the death of Plato. We can easily believe that\nhe has left imperfections, which would have been removed if he had\nlived a few years longer. The arrangement might have been improved;\nthe connexion of the argument might have been made plainer, and the\nsentences more accurately framed. Something also may be attributed\nto the feebleness of old age. Even a rough sketch of the Phaedrus or\nSymposium would have had a very different look. There is, however, an\ninterest in possessing one writing of Plato which is in the process of\ncreation.\n\nWe must endeavour to find a thread of order which will carry us through\nthis comparative disorder. The first four books are described by Plato\nhimself as the preface or preamble. Having arrived at the conclusion\nthat each law should have a preamble, the lucky thought occurs to him at\nthe end of the fourth book that the preceding discourse is the\npreamble of the whole. This preamble or introduction may be abridged as\nfollows:--\n\nThe institutions of Sparta and Crete are admitted by the Lacedaemonian\nand Cretan to have one aim only: they were intended by the legislator\nto inspire courage in war. To this the Athenian objects that the true\nlawgiver should frame his laws with a view to all the virtues and not\nto one only. Better is he who has temperance as well as courage, than he\nwho has courage only; better is he who is faithful in civil broils,\nthan he who is a good soldier only. Better, too, is peace than war; the\nreconciliation than the defeat of an enemy. And he who would attain all\nvirtue should be trained amid pleasures as well as pains. Hence\nthere should be convivial intercourse among the citizens, and a man's\ntemperance should be tested in his cups, as we test his courage amid\ndangers. He should have a fear of the right sort, as well as a courage\nof the right sort.\n\nAt the beginning of the second book the subject of pleasure leads to\neducation, which in the early years of life is wholly a discipline\nimparted by the means of pleasure and pain. The discipline of pleasure\nis implanted chiefly by the practice of the song and the dance. Of\nthese the forms should be fixed, and not allowed to depend on the fickle\nbreath of the multitude. There will be choruses of boys, girls, and\ngrown-up persons, and all will be heard repeating the same strain, that\n'virtue is happiness.' One of them will give the law to the rest; this\nwill be the chorus of aged minstrels, who will sing the most beautiful\nand the most useful of songs. They will require a little wine, to mellow\nthe austerity of age, and make them amenable to the laws.\n\nAfter having laid down as the first principle of politics, that peace,\nand not war, is the true aim of the legislator, and briefly discussed\nmusic and festive intercourse, at the commencement of the third book\nPlato makes a digression, in which he speaks of the origin of society.\nHe describes, first of all, the family; secondly, the patriarchal stage,\nwhich is an aggregation of families; thirdly, the founding of regular\ncities, like Ilium; fourthly, the establishment of a military and\npolitical system, like that of Sparta, with which he identifies Argos\nand Messene, dating from the return of the Heraclidae. But the aims of\nstates should be good, or else, like the prayer of Theseus, they may\nbe ruinous to themselves. This was the case in two out of three of the\nHeracleid kingdoms. They did not understand that the powers in a state\nshould be balanced. The balance of powers saved Sparta, while the excess\nof tyranny in Persia and the excess of liberty at Athens have been the\nruin of both...This discourse on politics is suddenly discovered to have\nan immediate practical use; for Cleinias the Cretan is about to give\nlaws to a new colony.\n\nAt the beginning of the fourth book, after enquiring into the\ncircumstances and situation of the colony, the Athenian proceeds to make\nfurther reflections. Chance, and God, and the skill of the legislator,\nall co-operate in the formation of states. And the most favourable\ncondition for the foundation of a new one is when the government is\nin the hands of a virtuous tyrant who has the good fortune to be\nthe contemporary of a great legislator. But a virtuous tyrant is a\ncontradiction in terms; we can at best only hope to have magistrates who\nare the servants of reason and the law. This leads to the enquiry, what\nis to be the polity of our new state. And the answer is, that we are to\nfear God, and honour our parents, and to cultivate virtue and justice;\nthese are to be our first principles. Laws must be definite, and\nwe should create in the citizens a predisposition to obey them. The\nlegislator will teach as well as command; and with this view he will\nprefix preambles to his principal laws.\n\nThe fifth book commences in a sort of dithyramb with another and higher\npreamble about the honour due to the soul, whence are deduced the duties\nof a man to his parents and his friends, to the suppliant and stranger.\nHe should be true and just, free from envy and excess of all sorts,\nforgiving to crimes which are not incurable and are partly involuntary;\nand he should have a true taste. The noblest life has the greatest\npleasures and the fewest pains...Having finished the preamble, and\ntouched on some other preliminary considerations, we proceed to the\nLaws, beginning with the constitution of the state. This is not the best\nor ideal state, having all things common, but only the second-best,\nin which the land and houses are to be distributed among 5040 citizens\ndivided into four classes. There is to be no gold or silver among\nthem, and they are to have moderate wealth, and to respect number and\nnumerical order in all things.\n\nIn the first part of the sixth book, Plato completes his sketch of the\nconstitution by the appointment of officers. He explains the manner\nin which guardians of the law, generals, priests, wardens of town\nand country, ministers of education, and other magistrates are to be\nappointed; and also in what way courts of appeal are to be constituted,\nand omissions in the law to be supplied. Next--and at this point\nthe Laws strictly speaking begin--there follow enactments respecting\nmarriage and the procreation of children, respecting property in slaves\nas well as of other kinds, respecting houses, married life, common\ntables for men and women. The question of age in marriage suggests the\nconsideration of a similar question about the time for holding offices,\nand for military service, which had been previously omitted.\n\nResuming the order of the discussion, which was indicated in the\nprevious book, from marriage and birth we proceed to education in the\nseventh book. Education is to begin at or rather before birth; to be\ncontinued for a time by mothers and nurses under the supervision of\nthe state; finally, to comprehend music and gymnastics. Under music is\nincluded reading, writing, playing on the lyre, arithmetic, geometry,\nand a knowledge of astronomy sufficient to preserve the minds of the\ncitizens from impiety in after-life. Gymnastics are to be practised\nchiefly with a view to their use in war. The discussion of education,\nwhich was lightly touched upon in Book ii, is here completed.\n\nThe eighth book contains regulations for civil life, beginning with\nfestivals, games, and contests, military exercises and the like. On such\noccasions Plato seems to see young men and maidens meeting together,\nand hence he is led into discussing the relations of the sexes, the evil\nconsequences which arise out of the indulgence of the passions, and the\nremedies for them. Then he proceeds to speak of agriculture, of arts and\ntrades, of buying and selling, and of foreign commerce.\n\nThe remaining books of the Laws, ix-xii, are chiefly concerned with\ncriminal offences. In the first class are placed offences against the\nGods, especially sacrilege or robbery of temples: next follow offences\nagainst the state,--conspiracy, treason, theft. The mention of thefts\nsuggests a distinction between voluntary and involuntary, curable and\nincurable offences. Proceeding to the greater crime of homicide, Plato\ndistinguishes between mere homicide, manslaughter, which is partly\nvoluntary and partly involuntary, and murder, which arises from avarice,\nambition, fear. He also enumerates murders by kindred, murders by\nslaves, wounds with or without intent to kill, wounds inflicted in\nanger, crimes of or against slaves, insults to parents. To these,\nvarious modes of purification or degrees of punishment are assigned, and\nthe terrors of another world are also invoked against them.\n\nAt the beginning of Book x, all acts of violence, including sacrilege,\nare summed up in a single law. The law is preceded by an admonition, in\nwhich the offenders are informed that no one ever did an unholy act or\nsaid an unlawful word while he retained his belief in the existence of\nthe Gods; but either he denied their existence, or he believed that they\ntook no care of man, or that they might be turned from their course\nby sacrifices and prayers. The remainder of the book is devoted to the\nrefutation of these three classes of unbelievers, and concludes with the\nmeans to be taken for their reformation, and the announcement of their\npunishments if they continue obstinate and impenitent.\n\nThe eleventh book is taken up with laws and with admonitions relating to\nindividuals, which follow one another without any exact order. There are\nlaws concerning deposits and the finding of treasure; concerning slaves\nand freedmen; concerning retail trade, bequests, divorces, enchantments,\npoisonings, magical arts, and the like. In the twelfth book the same\nsubjects are continued. Laws are passed concerning violations of\nmilitary discipline, concerning the high office of the examiners and\ntheir burial; concerning oaths and the violation of them, and the\npunishments of those who neglect their duties as citizens. Foreign\ntravel is then discussed, and the permission to be accorded to citizens\nof journeying in foreign parts; the strangers who may come to visit\nthe city are also spoken of, and the manner in which they are to be\nreceived. Laws are added respecting sureties, searches for property,\nright of possession by prescription, abduction of witnesses, theatrical\ncompetition, waging of private warfare, and bribery in offices. Rules\nare laid down respecting taxation, respecting economy in sacred rites,\nrespecting judges, their duties and sentences, and respecting sepulchral\nplaces and ceremonies. Here the Laws end. Lastly, a Nocturnal Council\nis instituted for the preservation of the state, consisting of older and\nyounger members, who are to exhibit in their lives that virtue which is\nthe basis of the state, to know the one in many, and to be educated\nin divine and every other kind of knowledge which will enable them to\nfulfil their office.\n\nIII. The style of the Laws differs in several important respects from\nthat of the other dialogues of Plato: (1) in the want of character,\npower, and lively illustration; (2) in the frequency of mannerisms\n(compare Introduction to the Philebus); (3) in the form and rhythm of\nthe sentences; (4) in the use of words. On the other hand, there are\nmany passages (5) which are characterized by a sort of ethical grandeur;\nand (6) in which, perhaps, a greater insight into human nature, and a\ngreater reach of practical wisdom is shown, than in any other of Plato's\nwritings.\n\n1. The discourse of the three old men is described by themselves as an\nold man's game of play. Yet there is little of the liveliness of a game\nin their mode of treating the subject. They do not throw the ball to\nand fro, but two out of the three are listeners to the third, who is\nconstantly asserting his superior wisdom and opportunities of knowledge,\nand apologizing (not without reason) for his own want of clearness of\nspeech. He will 'carry them over the stream;' he will answer for them\nwhen the argument is beyond their comprehension; he is afraid of their\nignorance of mathematics, and thinks that gymnastic is likely to be more\nintelligible to them;--he has repeated his words several times, and yet\nthey cannot understand him. The subject did not properly take the form\nof dialogue, and also the literary vigour of Plato had passed away. The\nold men speak as they might be expected to speak, and in this there is\na touch of dramatic truth. Plato has given the Laws that form or want of\nform which indicates the failure of natural power. There is no regular\nplan--none of that consciousness of what has preceded and what is to\nfollow, which makes a perfect style,--but there are several attempts\nat a plan; the argument is 'pulled up,' and frequent explanations are\noffered why a particular topic was introduced.\n\nThe fictions of the Laws have no longer the verisimilitude which\nis characteristic of the Phaedrus and the Timaeus, or even of the\nStatesman. We can hardly suppose that an educated Athenian would have\nplaced the visit of Epimenides to Athens ten years before the\nPersian war, or have imagined that a war with Messene prevented the\nLacedaemonians from coming to the rescue of Hellas. The narrative of the\norigin of the Dorian institutions, which are said to have been due to\na fear of the growing power of the Assyrians, is a plausible invention,\nwhich may be compared with the tale of the island of Atlantis and the\npoem of Solon, but is not accredited by similar arts of deception.\nThe other statement that the Dorians were Achaean exiles assembled\nby Dorieus, and the assertion that Troy was included in the Assyrian\nEmpire, have some foundation (compare for the latter point, Diod.\nSicul.). Nor is there anywhere in the Laws that lively enargeia, that\nvivid mise en scene, which is as characteristic of Plato as of some\nmodern novelists.\n\nThe old men are afraid of the ridicule which 'will fall on their heads\nmore than enough,' and they do not often indulge in a joke. In one\nof the few which occur, the book of the Laws, if left incomplete, is\ncompared to a monster wandering about without a head. But we no longer\nbreathe the atmosphere of humour which pervades the Symposium and the\nEuthydemus, in which we pass within a few sentences from the broadest\nAristophanic joke to the subtlest refinement of wit and fancy; instead\nof this, in the Laws an impression of baldness and feebleness is often\nleft upon our minds. Some of the most amusing descriptions, as, for\nexample, of children roaring for the first three years of life; or of\nthe Athenians walking into the country with fighting-cocks under their\narms; or of the slave doctor who knocks about his patients finely; and\nthe gentleman doctor who courteously persuades them; or of the way of\nkeeping order in the theatre, 'by a hint from a stick,' are narrated\nwith a commonplace gravity; but where we find this sort of dry humour we\nshall not be far wrong in thinking that the writer intended to make us\nlaugh. The seriousness of age takes the place of the jollity of youth.\nLife should have holidays and festivals; yet we rebuke ourselves when we\nlaugh, and take our pleasures sadly. The irony of the earlier dialogues,\nof which some traces occur in the tenth book, is replaced by a severity\nwhich hardly condescends to regard human things. 'Let us say, if you\nplease, that man is of some account, but I was speaking of him in\ncomparison with God.'\n\nThe imagery and illustrations are poor in themselves, and are not\nassisted by the surrounding phraseology. We have seen how in the\nRepublic, and in the earlier dialogues, figures of speech such as 'the\nwave,' 'the drone,' 'the chase,' 'the bride,' appear and reappear at\nintervals. Notes are struck which are repeated from time to time, as\nin a strain of music. There is none of this subtle art in the Laws. The\nillustrations, such as the two kinds of doctors, 'the three kinds of\nfunerals,' the fear potion, the puppet, the painter leaving a successor\nto restore his picture, the 'person stopping to consider where three\nways meet,' the 'old laws about water of which he will not divert the\ncourse,' can hardly be said to do much credit to Plato's invention. The\ncitations from the poets have lost that fanciful character which gave\nthem their charm in the earlier dialogues. We are tired of images taken\nfrom the arts of navigation, or archery, or weaving, or painting, or\nmedicine, or music. Yet the comparisons of life to a tragedy, or of\nthe working of mind to the revolution of the self-moved, or of the aged\nparent to the image of a God dwelling in the house, or the reflection\nthat 'man is made to be the plaything of God, and that this rightly\nconsidered is the best of him,' have great beauty.\n\n2. The clumsiness of the style is exhibited in frequent mannerisms and\nrepetitions. The perfection of the Platonic dialogue consists in the\naccuracy with which the question and answer are fitted into one another,\nand the regularity with which the steps of the argument succeed one\nanother. This finish of style is no longer discernible in the Laws.\nThere is a want of variety in the answers; nothing can be drawn out\nof the respondents but 'Yes' or 'No,' 'True,' 'To be sure,' etc.; the\ninsipid forms, 'What do you mean?' 'To what are you referring?' are\nconstantly returning. Again and again the speaker is charged, or charges\nhimself, with obscurity; and he repeats again and again that he will\nexplain his views more clearly. The process of thought which should\nbe latent in the mind of the writer appears on the surface. In several\npassages the Athenian praises himself in the most unblushing manner,\nvery unlike the irony of the earlier dialogues, as when he declares that\n'the laws are a divine work given by some inspiration of the Gods,' and\nthat 'youth should commit them to memory instead of the compositions of\nthe poets.' The prosopopoeia which is adopted by Plato in the Protagoras\nand other dialogues is repeated until we grow weary of it. The\nlegislator is always addressing the speakers or the youth of the state,\nand the speakers are constantly making addresses to the legislator. A\ntendency to a paradoxical manner of statement is also observable. 'We\nmust have drinking,' 'we must have a virtuous tyrant'--this is too much\nfor the duller wits of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan, who at first start\nback in surprise. More than in any other writing of Plato the tone is\nhortatory; the laws are sermons as well as laws; they are considered to\nhave a religious sanction, and to rest upon a religious sentiment in the\nmind of the citizens. The words of the Athenian are attributed to the\nLacedaemonian and Cretan, who are supposed to have made them their own,\nafter the manner of the earlier dialogues. Resumptions of subjects which\nhave been half disposed of in a previous passage constantly occur: the\narrangement has neither the clearness of art nor the freedom of nature.\nIrrelevant remarks are made here and there, or illustrations used which\nare not properly fitted in. The dialogue is generally weak and laboured,\nand is in the later books fairly given up, apparently, because unsuited\nto the subject of the work. The long speeches or sermons of the\nAthenian, often extending over several pages, have never the grace\nand harmony which are exhibited in the earlier dialogues. For Plato is\nincapable of sustained composition; his genius is dramatic rather than\noratorical; he can converse, but he cannot make a speech. Even the\nTimaeus, which is one of his most finished works, is full of abrupt\ntransitions. There is the same kind of difference between the dialogue\nand the continuous discourse of Plato as between the narrative and\nspeeches of Thucydides.\n\n3. The perfection of style is variety in unity, freedom, ease,\nclearness, the power of saying anything, and of striking any note in the\nscale of human feelings without impropriety; and such is the divine gift\nof language possessed by Plato in the Symposium and Phaedrus. From this\nthere are many fallings-off in the Laws: first, in the structure of\nthe sentences, which are rhythmical and monotonous,--the formal and\nsophistical manner of the age is superseding the natural genius of\nPlato: secondly, many of them are of enormous length, and the latter end\noften forgets the beginning of them,--they seem never to have received\nthe second thoughts of the author; either the emphasis is wrongly\nplaced, or there is a want of point in a clause; or an absolute case\noccurs which is not properly separated from the rest of the sentence; or\nwords are aggregated in a manner which fails to show their relation to\none another; or the connecting particles are omitted at the beginning of\nsentences; the uses of the relative and antecedent are more indistinct,\nthe changes of person and number more frequent, examples of pleonasm,\ntautology, and periphrasis, antitheses of positive and negative, false\nemphasis, and other affectations, are more numerous than in the other\nwritings of Plato; there is also a more common and sometimes unmeaning\nuse of qualifying formulae, os epos eipein, kata dunamin, and of double\nexpressions, pante pantos, oudame oudamos, opos kai ope--these are too\nnumerous to be attributed to errors in the text; again, there is an\nover-curious adjustment of verb and participle, noun and epithet, and\nother artificial forms of cadence and expression take the place of\nnatural variety: thirdly, the absence of metaphorical language is\nremarkable--the style is not devoid of ornament, but the ornament is of\na debased rhetorical kind, patched on to instead of growing out of the\nsubject; there is a great command of words, and a laboured use of\nthem; forced attempts at metaphor occur in several passages,--e.g.\nparocheteuein logois; ta men os tithemena ta d os paratithemena; oinos\nkolazomenos upo nephontos eterou theou; the plays on the word nomos =\nnou dianome, ode etara: fourthly, there is a foolish extravagance of\nlanguage in other passages,--'the swinish ignorance of arithmetic;' 'the\njustice and suitableness of the discourse on laws;' over-emphasis; 'best\nof Greeks,' said of all the Greeks, and the like: fifthly, poor and\ninsipid illustrations are also common: sixthly, we may observe an\nexcessive use of climax and hyperbole, aischron legein chre pros autous\ndoulon te kai doulen kai paida kai ei pos oion te olen ten oikian: dokei\ntouto to epitedeuma kata phusin tas peri ta aphrodisia edonas ou monon\nanthropon alla kai therion diephtharkenai.\n\n4. The peculiarities in the use of words which occur in the Laws have\nbeen collected by Zeller (Platonische Studien) and Stallbaum\n(Legg.): first, in the use of nouns, such as allodemia, apeniautesis,\nglukuthumia, diatheter, thrasuxenia, koros, megalonoia, paidourgia:\nsecondly, in the use of adjectives, such as aistor, biodotes,\nechthodopos, eitheos, chronios, and of adverbs, such as aniditi, anatei,\nnepoivei: thirdly, in the use of verbs, such as athurein, aissein\n(aixeien eipein), euthemoneisthai, parapodizesthai, sebein, temelein,\ntetan. These words however, as Stallbaum remarks, are formed according\nto analogy, and nearly all of them have the support of some poetical or\nother authority.\n\nZeller and Stallbaum have also collected forms of words in the Laws,\ndiffering from the forms of the same words which occur in other places:\ne.g. blabos for blabe, abios for abiotos, acharistos for acharis,\ndouleios for doulikos, paidelos for paidikos, exagrio for exagriaino,\nileoumai for ilaskomai, and the Ionic word sophronistus, meaning\n'correction.' Zeller has noted a fondness for substantives ending in\n-ma and -sis, such as georgema, diapauma, epithumema, zemioma, komodema,\nomilema; blapsis, loidoresis, paraggelsis, and others; also a use\nof substantives in the plural, which are commonly found only in the\nsingular, maniai, atheotetes, phthonoi, phoboi, phuseis; also, a\npeculiar use of prepositions in composition, as in eneirgo, apoblapto,\ndianomotheteo, dieiretai, dieulabeisthai, and other words; also, a\nfrequent occurrence of the Ionic datives plural in -aisi and -oisi,\nperhaps used for the sake of giving an ancient or archaic effect.\n\nTo these peculiarities of words he has added a list of peculiar\nexpressions and constructions. Among the most characteristic are the\nfollowing: athuta pallakon spermata; amorphoi edrai; osa axiomata pros\narchontas; oi kata polin kairoi; muthos, used in several places of\n'the discourse about laws;' and connected with this the frequent use\nof paramuthion and paramutheisthai in the general sense of 'address,'\n'addressing'; aimulos eros; ataphoi praxeis; muthos akephalos; ethos\neuthuporon. He remarks also on the frequent employment of the abstract\nfor the concrete; e.g. uperesia for uperetai, phugai for phugades,\nmechanai in the sense of 'contrivers,' douleia for douloi, basileiai\nfor basileis, mainomena kedeumata for ganaika mainomenen; e chreia ton\npaidon in the sense of 'indigent children,' and paidon ikanotes; to\nethos tes apeirias for e eiothuia apeiria; kuparitton upse te kai kalle\nthaumasia for kuparittoi mala upselai kai kalai. He further notes some\ncurious uses of the genitive case, e.g. philias omologiai, maniai orges,\nlaimargiai edones, cheimonon anupodesiai, anosioi plegon tolmai; and of\nthe dative, omiliai echthrois, nomothesiai, anosioi plegon tolmai; and\nof the dative omiliai echthrois, nomothesiai epitropois; and also some\nrather uncommon periphrases, thremmata Neilou, xuggennetor teknon for\nalochos, Mouses lexis for poiesis, zographon paides, anthropon spermata\nand the like; the fondness for particles of limitation, especially\ntis and ge, sun tisi charisi, tois ge dunamenois and the like; the\npleonastic use of tanun, of os, of os eros eipein, of ekastote; and\nthe periphrastic use of the preposition peri. Lastly, he observes the\ntendency to hyperbata or transpositions of words, and to rhythmical\nuniformity as well as grammatical irregularity in the structure of the\nsentences.\n\nFor nearly all the expressions which are adduced by Zeller as arguments\nagainst the genuineness of the Laws, Stallbaum finds some sort of\nauthority. There is no real ground for doubting that the work was\nwritten by Plato, merely because several words occur in it which are\nnot found in his other writings. An imitator may preserve the usual\nphraseology of a writer better than he would himself. But, on the other\nhand, the fact that authorities may be quoted in support of most of\nthese uses of words, does not show that the diction is not peculiar.\nSeveral of them seem to be poetical or dialectical, and exhibit an\nattempt to enlarge the limits of Greek prose by the introduction of\nHomeric and tragic expressions. Most of them do not appear to have\nretained any hold on the later language of Greece. Like several\nexperiments in language of the writers of the Elizabethan age, they were\nafterwards lost; and though occasionally found in Plutarch and imitators\nof Plato, they have not been accepted by Aristotle or passed into the\ncommon dialect of Greece.\n\n5. Unequal as the Laws are in style, they contain a few passages which\nare very grand and noble. For example, the address to the poets: 'Best\nof strangers, we also are poets of the best and noblest tragedy; for\nour whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life, which we\naffirm to be indeed the very truth of tragedy.' Or again, the sight\nof young men and maidens in friendly intercourse with one another,\nsuggesting the dangers to which youth is liable from the violence of\npassion; or the eloquent denunciation of unnatural lusts in the same\npassage; or the charming thought that the best legislator 'orders\nwar for the sake of peace and not peace for the sake of war;' or the\npleasant allusion, 'O Athenian--inhabitant of Attica, I will not say,\nfor you seem to me worthy to be named after the Goddess Athene because\nyou go back to first principles;' or the pithy saying, 'Many a victory\nhas been and will be suicidal to the victors, but education is never\nsuicidal;' or the fine expression that 'the walls of a city should\nbe allowed to sleep in the earth, and that we should not attempt to\ndisinter them;' or the remark that 'God is the measure of all things in\na sense far higher than any man can be;' or that 'a man should be from\nthe first a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man as long\nas possible;' or the principle repeatedly laid down, that 'the sins of\nthe fathers are not to be visited on the children;' or the description\nof the funeral rites of those priestly sages who depart in innocence;\nor the noble sentiment, that we should do more justice to slaves than\nto equals; or the curious observation, founded, perhaps, on his own\nexperience, that there are a few 'divine men in every state however\ncorrupt, whose conversation is of inestimable value;' or the acute\nremark, that public opinion is to be respected, because the judgments\nof mankind about virtue are better than their practice; or the deep\nreligious and also modern feeling which pervades the tenth book\n(whatever may be thought of the arguments); the sense of the duty of\nliving as a part of a whole, and in dependence on the will of God, who\ntakes care of the least things as well as the greatest; and the picture\nof parents praying for their children--not as we may say, slightly\naltering the words of Plato, as if there were no truth or reality in the\nGentile religions, but as if there were the greatest--are very striking\nto us. We must remember that the Laws, unlike the Republic, do not\nexhibit an ideal state, but are supposed to be on the level of human\nmotives and feelings; they are also on the level of the popular\nreligion, though elevated and purified: hence there is an attempt made\nto show that the pleasant is also just. But, on the other hand, the\npriority of the soul to the body, and of God to the soul, is always\ninsisted upon as the true incentive to virtue; especially with great\nforce and eloquence at the commencement of Book v. And the work of\nlegislation is carried back to the first principles of morals.\n\n6. No other writing of Plato shows so profound an insight into the world\nand into human nature as the Laws. That 'cities will never cease from\nill until they are better governed,' is the text of the Laws as well as\nof the Statesman and Republic. The principle that the balance of power\npreserves states; the reflection that no one ever passed his whole life\nin disbelief of the Gods; the remark that the characters of men are best\nseen in convivial intercourse; the observation that the people must be\nallowed to share not only in the government, but in the administration\nof justice; the desire to make laws, not with a view to courage only,\nbut to all virtue; the clear perception that education begins with\nbirth, or even, as he would say, before birth; the attempt to purify\nreligion; the modern reflections, that punishment is not vindictive, and\nthat limits must be set to the power of bequest; the impossibility of\nundeceiving the victims of quacks and jugglers; the provision for water,\nand for other requirements of health, and for concealing the bodies\nof the dead with as little hurt as possible to the living; above all,\nperhaps, the distinct consciousness that under the actual circumstances\nof mankind the ideal cannot be carried out, and yet may be a guiding\nprinciple--will appear to us, if we remember that we are still in the\ndawn of politics, to show a great depth of political wisdom.\n\nIV. The Laws of Plato contain numerous passages which closely resemble\nother passages in his writings. And at first sight a suspicion arises\nthat the repetition shows the unequal hand of the imitator. For why\nshould a writer say over again, in a more imperfect form, what he had\nalready said in his most finished style and manner? And yet it may\nbe urged on the other side that an author whose original powers\nare beginning to decay will be very liable to repeat himself, as in\nconversation, so in books. He may have forgotten what he had written\nbefore; he may be unconscious of the decline of his own powers. Hence\narises a question of great interest, bearing on the genuineness of\nancient writers. Is there any criterion by which we can distinguish\nthe genuine resemblance from the spurious, or, in other words, the\nrepetition of a thought or passage by an author himself from the\nappropriation of it by another? The question has, perhaps, never been\nfully discussed; and, though a real one, does not admit of a precise\nanswer. A few general considerations on the subject may be offered:--\n\n(a) Is the difference such as might be expected to arise at different\ntimes of life or under different circumstances?--There would be nothing\nsurprising in a writer, as he grew older, losing something of his own\noriginality, and falling more and more under the spirit of his\nage. 'What a genius I had when I wrote that book!' was the pathetic\nexclamation of a famous English author, when in old age he chanced to\ntake up one of his early works. There would be nothing surprising again\nin his losing somewhat of his powers of expression, and becoming less\ncapable of framing language into a harmonious whole. There would also be\na strong presumption that if the variation of style was uniform, it was\nattributable to some natural cause, and not to the arts of the imitator.\nThe inferiority might be the result of feebleness and of want of\nactivity of mind. But the natural weakness of a great author would\ncommonly be different from the artificial weakness of an imitator; it\nwould be continuous and uniform. The latter would be apt to fill his\nwork with irregular patches, sometimes taken verbally from the writings\nof the author whom he personated, but rarely acquiring his spirit.\nHis imitation would be obvious, irregular, superficial. The patches\nof purple would be easily detected among his threadbare and tattered\ngarments. He would rarely take the pains to put the same thought into\nother words. There were many forgeries in English literature which\nattained a considerable degree of success 50 or 100 years ago; but it is\ndoubtful whether attempts such as these could now escape detection,\nif there were any writings of the same author or of the same age to\nbe compared with them. And ancient forgers were much less skilful than\nmodern; they were far from being masters in the art of deception, and\nhad rarely any motive for being so.\n\n(b) But, secondly, the imitator will commonly be least capable of\nunderstanding or imitating that part of a great writer which is most\ncharacteristic of him. In every man's writings there is something like\nhimself and unlike others, which gives individuality. To appreciate\nthis latent quality would require a kindred mind, and minute study\nand observation. There are a class of similarities which may be called\nundesigned coincidences, which are so remote as to be incapable of\nbeing borrowed from one another, and yet, when they are compared, find\na natural explanation in their being the work of the same mind. The\nimitator might copy the turns of style--he might repeat images or\nillustrations, but he could not enter into the inner circle of Platonic\nphilosophy. He would understand that part of it which became popular\nin the next generation, as for example, the doctrine of ideas or of\nnumbers: he might approve of communism. But the higher flights of Plato\nabout the science of dialectic, or the unity of virtue, or a person who\nis above the law, would be unintelligible to him.\n\n(c) The argument from imitation assumes a different character when\nthe supposed imitations are associated with other passages having the\nimpress of original genius. The strength of the argument from undesigned\ncoincidences of style is much increased when they are found side by\nside with thoughts and expressions which can only have come from a great\noriginal writer. The great excellence, not only of the whole, but even\nof the parts of writings, is a strong proof of their genuineness--for\nalthough the great writer may fall below, the forger or imitator cannot\nrise much above himself. Whether we can attribute the worst parts of a\nwork to a forger and the best to a great writer,--as for example, in the\ncase of some of Shakespeare's plays,--depends upon the probability that\nthey have been interpolated, or have been the joint work of two writers;\nand this can only be established either by express evidence or by a\ncomparison of other writings of the same class. If the interpolation or\ndouble authorship of Greek writings in the time of Plato could be shown\nto be common, then a question, perhaps insoluble, would arise, not\nwhether the whole, but whether parts of the Platonic dialogues are\ngenuine, and, if parts only, which parts. Hebrew prophecies and Homeric\npoems and Laws of Manu may have grown together in early times, but there\nis no reason to think that any of the dialogues of Plato is the result\nof a similar process of accumulation. It is therefore rash to say\nwith Oncken (Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles) that the form in which\nAristotle knew the Laws of Plato must have been different from that in\nwhich they have come down to us.\n\nIt must be admitted that these principles are difficult of application.\nYet a criticism may be worth making which rests only on probabilities\nor impressions. Great disputes will arise about the merits of different\npassages, about what is truly characteristic and original or trivial\nand borrowed. Many have thought the Laws to be one of the greatest of\nPlatonic writings, while in the judgment of Mr. Grote they hardly rise\nabove the level of the forged epistles. The manner in which a writer\nwould or would not have written at a particular time of life must be\nacknowledged to be a matter of conjecture. But enough has been said to\nshow that similarities of a certain kind, whether criticism is able to\ndetect them or not, may be such as must be attributed to an original\nwriter, and not to a mere imitator.\n\n(d) Applying these principles to the case of the Laws, we have now\nto point out that they contain the class of refined or unconscious\nsimilarities which are indicative of genuineness. The parallelisms are\nlike the repetitions of favourite thoughts into which every one is apt\nto fall unawares in conversation or in writing. They are found in a work\nwhich contains many beautiful and remarkable passages. We may therefore\nbegin by claiming this presumption in their favour. Such undesigned\ncoincidences, as we may venture to call them, are the following. The\nconception of justice as the union of temperance, wisdom, courage\n(Laws; Republic): the latent idea of dialectic implied in the notion\nof dividing laws after the kinds of virtue (Laws); the approval of the\nmethod of looking at one idea gathered from many things, 'than which a\ntruer was never discovered by any man' (compare Republic): or again the\ndescription of the Laws as parents (Laws; Republic): the assumption\nthat religion has been already settled by the oracle of Delphi (Laws;\nRepublic), to which an appeal is also made in special cases (Laws): the\nnotion of the battle with self, a paradox for which Plato in a manner\napologizes both in the Laws and the Republic: the remark (Laws) that\njust men, even when they are deformed in body, may still be perfectly\nbeautiful in respect of the excellent justice of their minds (compare\nRepublic): the argument that ideals are none the worse because they\ncannot be carried out (Laws; Republic): the near approach to the idea of\ngood in 'the principle which is common to all the four virtues,' a\ntruth which the guardians must be compelled to recognize (Laws; compare\nRepublic): or again the recognition by reason of the right pleasure and\npain, which had previously been matter of habit (Laws; Republic): or\nthe blasphemy of saying that the excellency of music is to give pleasure\n(Laws; Republic): again the story of the Sidonian Cadmus (Laws), which\nis a variation of the Phoenician tale of the earth-born men (Republic):\nthe comparison of philosophy to a yelping she-dog, both in the Republic\nand in the Laws: the remark that no man can practise two trades (Laws;\nRepublic): or the advantage of the middle condition (Laws; Republic):\nthe tendency to speak of principles as moulds or forms; compare the\nekmageia of song (Laws), and the tupoi of religion (Republic): or the\nremark (Laws) that 'the relaxation of justice makes many cities out of\none,' which may be compared with the Republic: or the description of\nlawlessness 'creeping in little by little in the fashions of music and\noverturning all things,'--to us a paradox, but to Plato's mind a fixed\nidea, which is found in the Laws as well as in the Republic: or the\nfigure of the parts of the human body under which the parts of the state\nare described (Laws; Republic): the apology for delay and diffuseness,\nwhich occurs not unfrequently in the Republic, is carried to an excess\nin the Laws (compare Theaet.): the remarkable thought (Laws) that the\nsoul of the sun is better than the sun, agrees with the relation in\nwhich the idea of good stands to the sun in the Republic, and with the\nsubstitution of mind for the idea of good in the Philebus: the passage\nabout the tragic poets (Laws) agrees generally with the treatment of\nthem in the Republic, but is more finely conceived, and worked out in a\nnobler spirit. Some lesser similarities of thought and manner should not\nbe omitted, such as the mention of the thirty years' old students in the\nRepublic, and the fifty years' old choristers in the Laws; or the\nmaking of the citizens out of wax (Laws) compared with the other image\n(Republic); or the number of the tyrant (729), which is NEARLY equal\nwith the number of days and nights in the year (730), compared with the\n'slight correction' of the sacred number 5040, which is divisible by all\nthe numbers from 1 to 12 except 11, and divisible by 11, if two families\nbe deducted; or once more, we may compare the ignorance of solid\ngeometry of which he complains in the Republic and the puzzle about\nfractions with the difficulty in the Laws about commensurable and\nincommensurable quantities--and the malicious emphasis on the word\ngunaikeios (Laws) with the use of the same word (Republic). These and\nsimilar passages tend to show that the author of the Republic is also\nthe author of the Laws. They are echoes of the same voice, expressions\nof the same mind, coincidences too subtle to have been invented by the\ningenuity of any imitator. The force of the argument is increased, if we\nremember that no passage in the Laws is exactly copied,--nowhere do\nfive or six words occur together which are found together elsewhere in\nPlato's writings.\n\nIn other dialogues of Plato, as well as in the Republic, there are to\nbe found parallels with the Laws. Such resemblances, as we might expect,\noccur chiefly (but not exclusively) in the dialogues which, on other\ngrounds, we may suppose to be of later date. The punishment of evil is\nto be like evil men (Laws), as he says also in the Theaetetus. Compare\nagain the dependence of tragedy and comedy on one another, of which he\ngives the reason in the Laws--'For serious things cannot be understood\nwithout laughable, nor opposites at all without opposites, if a man\nis really to have intelligence of either'; here he puts forward the\nprinciple which is the groundwork of the thesis of Socrates in the\nSymposium, 'that the genius of tragedy is the same as that of comedy,\nand that the writer of comedy ought to be a writer of tragedy also.'\nThere is a truth and right which is above Law (Laws), as we learn also\nfrom the Statesman. That men are the possession of the Gods (Laws), is\na reflection which likewise occurs in the Phaedo. The remark, whether\nserious or ironical (Laws), that 'the sons of the Gods naturally\nbelieved in the Gods, because they had the means of knowing about them,'\nis found in the Timaeus. The reign of Cronos, who is the divine ruler\n(Laws), is a reminiscence of the Statesman. It is remarkable that in the\nSophist and Statesman (Soph.), Plato, speaking in the character of the\nEleatic Stranger, has already put on the old man. The madness of the\npoets, again, is a favourite notion of Plato's, which occurs also in the\nLaws, as well as in the Phaedrus, Ion, and elsewhere. There are traces\nin the Laws of the same desire to base speculation upon history which\nwe find in the Critias. Once more, there is a striking parallel with\nthe paradox of the Gorgias, that 'if you do evil, it is better to be\npunished than to be unpunished,' in the Laws: 'To live having all goods\nwithout justice and virtue is the greatest of evils if life be immortal,\nbut not so great if the bad man lives but a short time.'\n\nThe point to be considered is whether these are the kind of parallels\nwhich would be the work of an imitator. Would a forger have had the wit\nto select the most peculiar and characteristic thoughts of Plato; would\nhe have caught the spirit of his philosophy; would he, instead of openly\nborrowing, have half concealed his favourite ideas; would he have formed\nthem into a whole such as the Laws; would he have given another\nthe credit which he might have obtained for himself; would he have\nremembered and made use of other passages of the Platonic writings and\nhave never deviated into the phraseology of them? Without pressing\nsuch arguments as absolutely certain, we must acknowledge that such a\ncomparison affords a new ground of real weight for believing the Laws to\nbe a genuine writing of Plato.\n\nV. The relation of the Republic to the Laws is clearly set forth by\nPlato in the Laws. The Republic is the best state, the Laws is the best\npossible under the existing conditions of the Greek world. The Republic\nis the ideal, in which no man calls anything his own, which may or may\nnot have existed in some remote clime, under the rule of some God, or\nson of a God (who can say?), but is, at any rate, the pattern of\nall other states and the exemplar of human life. The Laws distinctly\nacknowledge what the Republic partly admits, that the ideal is\ninimitable by us, but that we should 'lift up our eyes to the heavens'\nand try to regulate our lives according to the divine image. The\ncitizens are no longer to have wives and children in common, and are\nno longer to be under the government of philosophers. But the spirit of\ncommunism or communion is to continue among them, though reverence for\nthe sacredness of the family, and respect of children for parents, not\npromiscuous hymeneals, are now the foundation of the state; the sexes\nare to be as nearly on an equality as possible; they are to meet\nat common tables, and to share warlike pursuits (if the women will\nconsent), and to have a common education. The legislator has taken the\nplace of the philosopher, but a council of elders is retained, who are\nto fulfil the duties of the legislator when he has passed out of life.\nThe addition of younger persons to this council by co-optation is\nan improvement on the governing body of the Republic. The scheme of\neducation in the Laws is of a far lower kind than that which Plato had\nconceived in the Republic. There he would have his rulers trained in all\nknowledge meeting in the idea of good, of which the different branches\nof mathematical science are but the hand-maidens or ministers; here he\ntreats chiefly of popular education, stopping short with the preliminary\nsciences,--these are to be studied partly with a view to their practical\nusefulness, which in the Republic he holds cheap, and even more with a\nview to avoiding impiety, of which in the Republic he says nothing; he\ntouches very lightly on dialectic, which is still to be retained for\nthe rulers. Yet in the Laws there remain traces of the old educational\nideas. He is still for banishing the poets; and as he finds the works of\nprose writers equally dangerous, he would substitute for them the study\nof his own laws. He insists strongly on the importance of mathematics\nas an educational instrument. He is no more reconciled to the Greek\nmythology than in the Republic, though he would rather say nothing about\nit out of a reverence for antiquity; and he is equally willing to have\nrecourse to fictions, if they have a moral tendency. His thoughts recur\nto a golden age in which the sanctity of oaths was respected and in\nwhich men living nearer the Gods were more disposed to believe in them;\nbut we must legislate for the world as it is, now that the old beliefs\nhave passed away. Though he is no longer fired with dialectical\nenthusiasm, he would compel the guardians to 'look at one idea gathered\nfrom many things,' and to 'perceive the principle which is the same in\nall the four virtues.' He still recognizes the enormous influence of\nmusic, in which every youth is to be trained for three years; and he\nseems to attribute the existing degeneracy of the Athenian state and\nthe laxity of morals partly to musical innovation, manifested in the\nunnatural divorce of the instrument and the voice, of the rhythm from\nthe words, and partly to the influence of the mob who ruled at the\ntheatres. He assimilates the education of the two sexes, as far as\npossible, both in music and gymnastic, and, as in the Republic, he would\ngive to gymnastic a purely military character. In marriage, his object\nis still to produce the finest children for the state. As in the\nStatesman, he would unite in wedlock dissimilar natures--the passionate\nwith the dull, the courageous with the gentle. And the virtuous tyrant\nof the Statesman, who has no place in the Republic, again appears.\nIn this, as in all his writings, he has the strongest sense of the\ndegeneracy and incapacity of the rulers of his own time.\n\nIn the Laws, the philosophers, if not banished, like the poets, are\nat least ignored; and religion takes the place of philosophy in the\nregulation of human life. It must however be remembered that the\nreligion of Plato is co-extensive with morality, and is that purified\nreligion and mythology of which he speaks in the second book of the\nRepublic. There is no real discrepancy in the two works. In a practical\ntreatise, he speaks of religion rather than of philosophy; just as he\nappears to identify virtue with pleasure, and rather seeks to find\nthe common element of the virtues than to maintain his old paradoxical\ntheses that they are one, or that they are identical with knowledge. The\ndialectic and the idea of good, which even Glaucon in the Republic could\nnot understand, would be out of place in a less ideal work. There may\nalso be a change in his own mind, the purely intellectual aspect of\nphilosophy having a diminishing interest to him in his old age.\n\nSome confusion occurs in the passage in which Plato speaks of the\nRepublic, occasioned by his reference to a third state, which he\nproposes (D.V.) hereafter to expound. Like many other thoughts in the\nLaws, the allusion is obscure from not being worked out. Aristotle\n(Polit.) speaks of a state which is neither the best absolutely, nor\nthe best under existing conditions, but an imaginary state, inferior\nto either, destitute, as he supposes, of the necessaries of\nlife--apparently such a beginning of primitive society as is described\nin Laws iii. But it is not clear that by this the third state of Plato\nis intended. It is possible that Plato may have meant by his third state\nan historical sketch, bearing the same relation to the Laws which the\nunfinished Critias would have borne to the Republic; or he may, perhaps,\nhave intended to describe a state more nearly approximating than the\nLaws to existing Greek states.\n\nThe Statesman is a mere fragment when compared with the Laws, yet\ncombining a second interest of dialectic as well as politics, which is\nwanting in the larger work. Several points of similarity and contrast\nmay be observed between them. In some respects the Statesman is\neven more ideal than the Republic, looking back to a former state of\nparadisiacal life, in which the Gods ruled over mankind, as the Republic\nlooks forward to a coming kingdom of philosophers. Of this kingdom of\nCronos there is also mention in the Laws. Again, in the Statesman, the\nEleatic Stranger rises above law to the conception of the living voice\nof the lawgiver, who is able to provide for individual cases. A similar\nthought is repeated in the Laws: 'If in the order of nature, and by\ndivine destiny, a man were able to apprehend the truth about these\nthings, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for there is no\nlaw or order above knowledge, nor can mind without impiety be deemed\nthe subject or slave of any, but rather the lord of all.' The union of\nopposite natures, who form the warp and the woof of the political web,\nis a favourite thought which occurs in both dialogues (Laws; Statesman).\n\nThe Laws are confessedly a Second-best, an inferior Ideal, to which\nPlato has recourse, when he finds that the city of Philosophers is no\nlonger 'within the horizon of practical politics.' But it is curious\nto observe that the higher Ideal is always returning (compare Arist.\nPolit.), and that he is not much nearer the actual fact, nor more on\nthe level of ordinary life in the Laws than in the Republic. It is also\ninteresting to remark that the new Ideal is always falling away, and\nthat he hardly supposes the one to be more capable of being realized\nthan the other. Human beings are troublesome to manage; and the\nlegislator cannot adapt his enactments to the infinite variety of\ncircumstances; after all he must leave the administration of them to his\nsuccessors; and though he would have liked to make them as permanent\nas they are in Egypt, he cannot escape from the necessity of change.\nAt length Plato is obliged to institute a Nocturnal Council which is\nsupposed to retain the mind of the legislator, and of which some of the\nmembers are even supposed to go abroad and inspect the institutions of\nforeign countries, as a foundation for changes in their own. The spirit\nof such changes, though avoiding the extravagance of a popular assembly,\nbeing only so much change as the conservative temper of old members\nis likely to allow, is nevertheless inconsistent with the fixedness of\nEgypt which Plato wishes to impress upon Hellenic institutions. He is\ninconsistent with himself as the truth begins to dawn upon him that 'in\nthe execution things for the most part fall short of our conception of\nthem' (Republic).\n\nAnd is not this true of ideals of government in general? We are always\ndisappointed in them. Nothing great can be accomplished in the\nshort space of human life; wherefore also we look forward to another\n(Republic). As we grow old, we are sensible that we have no power\nactively to pursue our ideals any longer. We have had our opportunity\nand do not aspire to be more than men: we have received our 'wages and\nare going home.' Neither do we despair of the future of mankind, because\nwe have been able to do so little in comparison of the whole. We look in\nvain for consistency either in men or things. But we have seen enough of\nimprovement in our own time to justify us in the belief that the world\nis worth working for and that a good man's life is not thrown away. Such\nreflections may help us to bring home to ourselves by inward sympathy\nthe language of Plato in the Laws, and to combine into something like a\nwhole his various and at first sight inconsistent utterances.\n\nVI. The Republic may be described as the Spartan constitution appended\nto a government of philosophers. But in the Laws an Athenian element is\nalso introduced. Many enactments are taken from the Athenian; the four\nclasses are borrowed from the constitution of Cleisthenes, which Plato\nregards as the best form of Athenian government, and the guardians of\nthe law bear a certain resemblance to the archons. In the constitution\nof the Laws nearly all officers are elected by a vote more or less\npopular and by lot. But the assembly only exists for the purposes of\nelection, and has no legislative or executive powers. The Nocturnal\nCouncil, which is the highest body in the state, has several of the\nfunctions of the ancient Athenian Areopagus, after which it appears to\nbe modelled. Life is to wear, as at Athens, a joyous and festive look;\nthere are to be Bacchic choruses, and men of mature age are encouraged\nin moderate potations. On the other hand, the common meals, the public\neducation, the crypteia are borrowed from Sparta and not from Athens,\nand the superintendence of private life, which was to be practised by\nthe governors, has also its prototype in Sparta. The extravagant dislike\nwhich Plato shows both to a naval power and to extreme democracy is the\nreverse of Athenian.\n\nThe best-governed Hellenic states traced the origin of their laws to\nindividual lawgivers. These were real persons, though we are uncertain\nhow far they originated or only modified the institutions which are\nascribed to them. But the lawgiver, though not a myth, was a fixed idea\nin the mind of the Greek,--as fixed as the Trojan war or the earth-born\nCadmus. 'This was what Solon meant or said'--was the form in which the\nAthenian expressed his own conception of right and justice, or argued a\ndisputed point of law. And the constant reference in the Laws of Plato\nto the lawgiver is altogether in accordance with Greek modes of thinking\nand speaking.\n\nThere is also, as in the Republic, a Pythagorean element. The highest\nbranch of education is arithmetic; to know the order of the heavenly\nbodies, and to reconcile the apparent contradiction of their movements,\nis an important part of religion; the lives of the citizens are to have\na common measure, as also their vessels and coins; the great blessing of\nthe state is the number 5040. Plato is deeply impressed by the antiquity\nof Egypt, and the unchangeableness of her ancient forms of song and\ndance. And he is also struck by the progress which the Egyptians had\nmade in the mathematical sciences--in comparison of them the Greeks\nappeared to him to be little better than swine. Yet he censures the\nEgyptian meanness and inhospitality to strangers. He has traced the\ngrowth of states from their rude beginnings in a philosophical spirit;\nbut of any life or growth of the Hellenic world in future ages he is\nsilent. He has made the reflection that past time is the maker of states\n(Book iii.); but he does not argue from the past to the future, that\nthe process is always going on, or that the institutions of nations\nare relative to their stage of civilization. If he could have stamped\nindelibly upon Hellenic states the will of the legislator, he would have\nbeen satisfied. The utmost which he expects of future generations is\nthat they should supply the omissions, or correct the errors which\nyounger statesmen detect in his enactments. When institutions have been\nonce subjected to this process of criticism, he would have them fixed\nfor ever.\n\nTHE PREAMBLE.\n\nBOOK I. Strangers, let me ask a question of you--Was a God or a man the\nauthor of your laws? 'A God, Stranger. In Crete, Zeus is said to have\nbeen the author of them; in Sparta, as Megillus will tell you, Apollo.'\nYou Cretans believe, as Homer says, that Minos went every ninth year to\nconverse with his Olympian sire, and gave you laws which he brought from\nhim. 'Yes; and there was Rhadamanthus, his brother, who is reputed among\nus to have been a most righteous judge.' That is a reputation worthy of\nthe son of Zeus. And as you and Megillus have been trained under these\nlaws, I may ask you to give me an account of them. We can talk about\nthem in our walk from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus. I am told\nthat the distance is considerable, but probably there are shady places\nunder the trees, where, being no longer young, we may often rest and\nconverse. 'Yes, Stranger, a little onward there are beautiful groves of\ncypresses, and green meadows in which we may repose.'\n\nMy first question is, Why has the law ordained that you should have\ncommon meals, and practise gymnastics, and bear arms? 'My answer is,\nthat all our institutions are of a military character. We lead the life\nof the camp even in time of peace, keeping up the organization of an\narmy, and having meals in common; and as our country, owing to its\nruggedness, is ill-suited for heavy-armed cavalry or infantry, our\nsoldiers are archers, equipped with bows and arrows. The legislator was\nunder the idea that war was the natural state of all mankind, and that\npeace is only a pretence; he thought that no possessions had any\nvalue which were not secured against enemies.' And do you think that\nsuperiority in war is the proper aim of government? 'Certainly I do, and\nmy Spartan friend will agree with me.' And are there wars, not only of\nstate against state, but of village against village, of family against\nfamily, of individual against individual? 'Yes.' And is a man his own\nenemy? 'There you come to first principles, like a true votary of the\ngoddess Athene; and this is all the better, for you will the sooner\nrecognize the truth of what I am saying--that all men everywhere are the\nenemies of all, and each individual of every other and of himself;\nand, further, that there is a victory and defeat--the best and the\nworst--which each man sustains, not at the hands of another, but of\nhimself.' And does this extend to states and villages as well as to\nindividuals? 'Certainly; there is a better in them which conquers or\nis conquered by the worse.' Whether the worse ever really conquers\nthe better, is a question which may be left for the present; but your\nmeaning is, that bad citizens do sometimes overcome the good, and that\nthe state is then conquered by herself, and that when they are defeated\nthe state is victorious over herself. Or, again, in a family there may\nbe several brothers, and the bad may be a majority; and when the\nbad majority conquer the good minority, the family are worse than\nthemselves. The use of the terms 'better or worse than himself or\nthemselves' may be doubtful, but about the thing meant there can be no\ndispute. 'Very true.' Such a struggle might be determined by a judge.\nAnd which will be the better judge--he who destroys the worse and lets\nthe better rule, or he who lets the better rule and makes the others\nvoluntarily obey; or, thirdly, he who destroys no one, but reconciles\nthe two parties? 'The last, clearly.' But the object of such a judge or\nlegislator would not be war. 'True.' And as there are two kinds of war,\none without and one within a state, of which the internal is by far\nthe worse, will not the legislator chiefly direct his attention to\nthis latter? He will reconcile the contending factions, and unite them\nagainst their external enemies. 'Certainly.' Every legislator will\naim at the greatest good, and the greatest good is not victory in war,\nwhether civil or external, but mutual peace and good-will, as in the\nbody health is preferable to the purgation of disease. He who makes war\nhis object instead of peace, or who pursues war except for the sake of\npeace, is not a true statesman. 'And yet, Stranger, the laws both of\nCrete and Sparta aim entirely at war.' Perhaps so; but do not let us\nquarrel about your legislators--let us be gentle; they were in earnest\nquite as much as we are, and we must try to discover their meaning. The\npoet Tyrtaeus (you know his poems in Crete, and my Lacedaemonian friend\nis only too familiar with them)--he was an Athenian by birth, and a\nSpartan citizen:--'Well,' he says, 'I sing not, I care not about any\nman, however rich or happy, unless he is brave in war.' Now I should\nlike, in the name of us all, to ask the poet a question. Oh Tyrtaeus, I\nwould say to him, we agree with you in praising those who excel in war,\nbut which kind of war do you mean?--that dreadful war which is termed\ncivil, or the milder sort which is waged against foreign enemies? You\nsay that you abominate 'those who are not eager to taste their enemies'\nblood,' and you seem to mean chiefly their foreign enemies. 'Certainly\nhe does.' But we contend that there are men better far than your heroes,\nTyrtaeus, concerning whom another poet, Theognis the Sicilian, says that\n'in a civil broil they are worth their weight in gold and silver.' For\nin a civil war, not only courage, but justice and temperance and wisdom\nare required, and all virtue is better than a part. The mercenary\nsoldier is ready to die at his post; yet he is commonly a violent,\nsenseless creature. And the legislator, whether inspired or uninspired,\nwill make laws with a view to the highest virtue; and this is not brute\ncourage, but loyalty in the hour of danger. The virtue of Tyrtaeus,\nalthough needful enough in his own time, is really of a fourth-rate\ndescription. 'You are degrading our legislator to a very low level.'\nNay, we degrade not him, but ourselves, if we believe that the laws of\nLycurgus and Minos had a view to war only. A divine lawgiver would have\nhad regard to all the different kinds of virtue, and have arranged his\nlaws in corresponding classes, and not in the modern fashion, which\nonly makes them after the want of them is felt,--about inheritances and\nheiresses and assaults, and the like. As you truly said, virtue is the\nbusiness of the legislator; but you went wrong when you referred all\nlegislation to a part of virtue, and to an inferior part. For the object\nof laws, whether the Cretan or any other, is to make men happy. Now\nhappiness or good is of two kinds--there are divine and there are human\ngoods. He who has the divine has the human added to him; but he who\nhas lost the greater is deprived of both. The lesser goods are health,\nbeauty, strength, and, lastly, wealth; not the blind God, Pluto, but one\nwho has eyes to see and follow wisdom. For mind or wisdom is the most\ndivine of all goods; and next comes temperance, and justice springs from\nthe union of wisdom and temperance with courage, which is the fourth or\nlast. These four precede other goods, and the legislator will arrange\nall his ordinances accordingly, the human going back to the divine,\nand the divine to their leader mind. There will be enactments about\nmarriage, about education, about all the states and feelings and\nexperiences of men and women, at every age, in weal and woe, in war and\npeace; upon all the law will fix a stamp of praise and blame. There will\nalso be regulations about property and expenditure, about contracts,\nabout rewards and punishments, and finally about funeral rites and\nhonours of the dead. The lawgiver will appoint guardians to preside over\nthese things; and mind will harmonize his ordinances, and show them to\nbe in agreement with temperance and justice. Now I want to know whether\nthe same principles are observed in the laws of Lycurgus and Minos,\nor, as I should rather say, of Apollo and Zeus. We must go through the\nvirtues, beginning with courage, and then we will show that what has\npreceded has relation to virtue.\n\n'I wish,' says the Lacedaemonian, 'that you, Stranger, would first\ncriticize Cleinias and the Cretan laws.' Yes, is the reply, and I will\ncriticize you and myself, as well as him. Tell me, Megillus, were not\nthe common meals and gymnastic training instituted by your legislator\nwith a view to war? 'Yes; and next in the order of importance comes\nhunting, and fourth the endurance of pain in boxing contests, and in the\nbeatings which are the punishment of theft. There is, too, the so-called\nCrypteia or secret service, in which our youth wander about the country\nnight and day unattended, and even in winter go unshod and have no beds\nto lie on. Moreover they wrestle and exercise under a blazing sun, and\nthey have many similar customs.' Well, but is courage only a combat\nagainst fear and pain, and not against pleasure and flattery? 'Against\nboth, I should say.' And which is worse,--to be overcome by pain, or\nby pleasure? 'The latter.' But did the lawgivers of Crete and Sparta\nlegislate for a courage which is lame of one leg,--able to meet the\nattacks of pain but not those of pleasure, or for one which can meet\nboth? 'For a courage which can meet both, I should say.' But if so,\nwhere are the institutions which train your citizens to be equally brave\nagainst pleasure and pain, and superior to enemies within as well as\nwithout? 'We confess that we have no institutions worth mentioning which\nare of this character.' I am not surprised, and will therefore only\nrequest forbearance on the part of us all, in case the love of truth\nshould lead any of us to censure the laws of the others. Remember that\nI am more in the way of hearing criticisms of your laws than you can be;\nfor in well-ordered states like Crete and Sparta, although an old man\nmay sometimes speak of them in private to a ruler or elder, a similar\nliberty is not allowed to the young. But now being alone we shall not\noffend your legislator by a friendly examination of his laws. 'Take any\nfreedom which you like.'\n\nMy first observation is, that your lawgiver ordered you to endure\nhardships, because he thought that those who had not this discipline\nwould run away from those who had. But he ought to have considered\nfurther, that those who had never learned to resist pleasure would be\nequally at the mercy of those who had, and these are often among the\nworst of mankind. Pleasure, like fear, would overcome them and take away\ntheir courage and freedom. 'Perhaps; but I must not be hasty in giving\nmy assent.'\n\nNext as to temperance: what institutions have you which are adapted\nto promote temperance? 'There are the common meals and gymnastic\nexercises.' These are partly good and partly bad, and, as in medicine,\nwhat is good at one time and for one person, is bad at another time and\nfor another person. Now although gymnastics and common meals do good,\nthey are also a cause of evil in civil troubles, and they appear to\nencourage unnatural love, as has been shown at Miletus, in Boeotia, and\nat Thurii. And the Cretans are said to have invented the tale of Zeus\nand Ganymede in order to justify their evil practices by the example of\nthe God who was their lawgiver. Leaving the story, we may observe that\nall law has to do with pleasure and pain; these are two fountains which\nare ever flowing in human nature, and he who drinks of them when and as\nmuch as he ought, is happy, and he who indulges in them to excess, is\nmiserable. 'You may be right, but I still incline to think that the\nLacedaemonian lawgiver did well in forbidding pleasure, if I may judge\nfrom the result. For there is no drunken revelry in Sparta, and any one\nfound in a state of intoxication is severely punished; he is not excused\nas an Athenian would be at Athens on account of a festival. I myself\nhave seen the Athenians drunk at the Dionysia--and at our colony,\nTarentum, on a similar occasion, I have beheld the whole city in a\nstate of intoxication.' I admit that these festivals should be properly\nregulated. Yet I might reply, 'Yes, Spartans, that is not your vice; but\nlook at home and remember the licentiousness of your women.' And to\nall such accusations every one of us may reply in turn:--'Wonder not,\nStranger; there are different customs in different countries.' Now this\nmay be a sufficient answer; but we are speaking about the wisdom of\nlawgivers and not about the customs of men. To return to the question of\ndrinking: shall we have total abstinence, as you have, or hard drinking,\nlike the Scythians and Thracians, or moderate potations like the\nPersians? 'Give us arms, and we send all these nations flying before\nus.' My good friend, be modest; victories and defeats often arise\nfrom unknown causes, and afford no proof of the goodness or badness of\ninstitutions. The stronger overcomes the weaker, as the Athenians have\novercome the Ceans, or the Syracusans the Locrians, who are, perhaps,\nthe best governed state in that part of the world. People are apt to\npraise or censure practices without enquiring into the nature of them.\nThis is the way with drink: one person brings many witnesses, who sing\nthe praises of wine; another declares that sober men defeat drunkards\nin battle; and he again is refuted in turn. I should like to conduct the\nargument on some other method; for if you regard numbers, there are two\ncities on one side, and ten thousand on the other. 'I am ready to pursue\nany method which is likely to lead us to the truth.' Let me put the\nmatter thus: Somebody praises the useful qualities of a goat; another\nhas seen goats running about wild in a garden, and blames a goat or any\nother animal which happens to be without a keeper. 'How absurd!' Would\na pilot who is sea-sick be a good pilot? 'No.' Or a general who is sick\nand drunk with fear and ignorant of war a good general? 'A general\nof old women he ought to be.' But can any one form an estimate of any\nsociety, which is intended to have a ruler, and which he only sees in an\nunruly and lawless state? 'No.' There is a convivial form of society--is\nthere not? 'Yes.' And has this convivial society ever been rightly\nordered? Of course you Spartans and Cretans have never seen anything of\nthe kind, but I have had wide experience, and made many enquiries about\nsuch societies, and have hardly ever found anything right or good in\nthem. 'We acknowledge our want of experience, and desire to learn of\nyou.' Will you admit that in all societies there must be a leader?\n'Yes.' And in time of war he must be a man of courage and absolutely\ndevoid of fear, if this be possible? 'Certainly.' But we are talking now\nof a general who shall preside at meetings of friends--and as these\nhave a tendency to be uproarious, they ought above all others to have a\ngovernor. 'Very good.' He should be a sober man and a man of the world,\nwho will keep, make, and increase the peace of the society; a drunkard\nin charge of drunkards would be singularly fortunate if he avoided doing\na serious mischief. 'Indeed he would.' Suppose a person to censure such\nmeetings--he may be right, but also he may have known them only in their\ndisorderly state, under a drunken master of the feast; and a drunken\ngeneral or pilot cannot save his army or his ships. 'True; but although\nI see the advantage of an army having a good general, I do not equally\nsee the good of a feast being well managed.' If you mean to ask what\ngood accrues to the state from the right training of a single youth or\na single chorus, I should reply, 'Not much'; but if you ask what is the\ngood of education in general, I answer, that education makes good\nmen, and that good men act nobly and overcome their enemies in\nbattle. Victory is often suicidal to the victors, because it creates\nforgetfulness of education, but education itself is never suicidal. 'You\nimply that the regulation of convivial meetings is a part of education;\nhow will you prove this?' I will tell you. But first let me offer a\nword of apology. We Athenians are always thought to be fond of talking,\nwhereas the Lacedaemonian is celebrated for brevity, and the Cretan\nis considered to be sagacious and reserved. Now I fear that I may be\ncharged with spinning a long discourse out of slender materials. For\ndrinking cannot be rightly ordered without correct principles of music,\nand music runs up into education generally, and to discuss all these\nmatters may be tedious; if you like, therefore, we will pass on to\nanother part of our subject. 'Are you aware, Athenian, that our family\nis your proxenus at Sparta, and that from my boyhood I have regarded\nAthens as a second country, and having often fought your battles in my\nyouth, I have become attached to you, and love the sound of the Attic\ndialect? The saying is true, that the best Athenians are more than\nordinarily good, because they are good by nature; therefore, be assured\nthat I shall be glad to hear you talk as much as you please.' 'I,\ntoo,' adds Cleinias, 'have a tie which binds me to you. You know that\nEpimenides, the Cretan prophet, came and offered sacrifices in your city\nby the command of an oracle ten years before the Persian war. He told\nthe Athenians that the Persian host would not come for ten years, and\nwould go away again, having suffered more harm than they had inflicted.\nNow Epimenides was of my family, and when he visited Athens he entered\ninto friendship with your forefathers.' I see that you are willing to\nlisten, and I have the will to speak, if I had only the ability. But,\nfirst, I must define the nature and power of education, and by this\nroad we will travel on to the God Dionysus. The man who is to be good\nat anything must have early training;--the future builder must play at\nbuilding, and the husbandman at digging; the soldier must learn to ride,\nand the carpenter to measure and use the rule,--all the thoughts and\npleasures of children should bear on their after-profession.--Do you\nagree with me? 'Certainly.' And we must remember further that we are\nspeaking of the education, not of a trainer, or of the captain of a\nship, but of a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and how to obey;\nand such an education aims at virtue, and not at wealth or strength or\nmere cleverness. To the good man, education is of all things the most\nprecious, and is also in constant need of renovation. 'We agree.' And\nwe have before agreed that good men are those who are able to control\nthemselves, and bad men are those who are not. Let me offer you an\nillustration which will assist our argument. Man is one; but in one\nand the same man are two foolish counsellors who contend within\nhim--pleasure and pain, and of either he has expectations which we call\nhope and fear; and he is able to reason about good and evil, and reason,\nwhen affirmed by the state, becomes law. 'We cannot follow you.' Let\nme put the matter in another way: Every creature is a puppet of the\nGods--whether he is a mere plaything or has any serious use we do not\nknow; but this we do know, that he is drawn different ways by cords\nand strings. There is a soft golden cord which draws him towards\nvirtue--this is the law of the state; and there are other cords made\nof iron and hard materials drawing him other ways. The golden reasoning\ninfluence has nothing of the nature of force, and therefore requires\nministers in order to vanquish the other principles. This explains the\ndoctrine that cities and citizens both conquer and are conquered by\nthemselves. The individual follows reason, and the city law, which is\nembodied reason, either derived from the Gods or from the legislator.\nWhen virtue and vice are thus distinguished, education will be better\nunderstood, and in particular the relation of education to convivial\nintercourse. And now let us set wine before the puppet. You admit that\nwine stimulates the passions? 'Yes.' And does wine equally stimulate\nthe reasoning faculties? 'No; it brings the soul back to a state of\nchildhood.' In such a state a man has the least control over himself,\nand is, therefore, worst. 'Very true.' Then how can we believe that\ndrinking should be encouraged? 'You seem to think that it ought to be.'\nAnd I am ready to maintain my position. 'We should like to hear you\nprove that a man ought to make a beast of himself.' You are speaking\nof the degradation of the soul: but how about the body? Would any man\nwillingly degrade or weaken that? 'Certainly not.' And yet if he goes to\na doctor or a gymnastic master, does he not make himself ill in the hope\nof getting well? for no one would like to be always taking medicine, or\nalways to be in training. 'True.' And may not convivial meetings have a\nsimilar remedial use? And if so, are they not to be preferred to other\nmodes of training because they are painless? 'But have they any such\nuse?' Let us see: Are there not two kinds of fear--fear of evil and fear\nof an evil reputation? 'There are.' The latter kind of fear is opposed\nboth to the fear of pain and to the love of pleasure. This is called by\nthe legislator reverence, and is greatly honoured by him and by every\ngood man; whereas confidence, which is the opposite quality, is the\nworst fault both of individuals and of states. This sort of fear or\nreverence is one of the two chief causes of victory in war, fearlessness\nof enemies being the other. 'True.' Then every one should be both\nfearful and fearless? 'Yes.' The right sort of fear is infused into\na man when he comes face to face with shame, or cowardice, or the\ntemptations of pleasure, and has to conquer them. He must learn by\nmany trials to win the victory over himself, if he is ever to be made\nperfect. 'That is reasonable enough.' And now, suppose that the Gods had\ngiven mankind a drug, of which the effect was to exaggerate every sort\nof evil and danger, so that the bravest man entirely lost his presence\nof mind and became a coward for a time:--would such a drug have any\nvalue? 'But is there such a drug?' No; but suppose that there were;\nmight not the legislator use such a mode of testing courage and\ncowardice? 'To be sure.' The legislator would induce fear in order to\nimplant fearlessness; and would give rewards or punishments to those\nwho behaved well or the reverse, under the influence of the drug?\n'Certainly.' And this mode of training, whether practised in the case\nof one or many, whether in solitude or in the presence of a large\ncompany--if a man have sufficient confidence in himself to drink the\npotion amid his boon companions, leaving off in time and not taking too\nmuch,--would be an equally good test of temperance? 'Very true.' Let\nus return to the lawgiver and say to him, 'Well, lawgiver, no such\nfear-producing potion has been given by God or invented by man, but\nthere is a potion which will make men fearless.' 'You mean wine.'\nYes; has not wine an effect the contrary of that which I was just now\ndescribing,--first mellowing and humanizing a man, and then filling him\nwith confidence, making him ready to say or do anything? 'Certainly.'\nLet us not forget that there are two qualities which should be\ncultivated in the soul--first, the greatest fearlessness, and, secondly,\nthe greatest fear, which are both parts of reverence. Courage and\nfearlessness are trained amid dangers; but we have still to consider how\nfear is to be trained. We desire to attain fearlessness and confidence\nwithout the insolence and boldness which commonly attend them. For\ndo not love, ignorance, avarice, wealth, beauty, strength, while they\nstimulate courage, also madden and intoxicate the soul? What better and\nmore innocent test of character is there than festive intercourse? Would\nyou make a bargain with a man in order to try whether he is honest? Or\nwould you ascertain whether he is licentious by putting your wife or\ndaughter into his hands? No one would deny that the test proposed is\nfairer, speedier, and safer than any other. And such a test will be\nparticularly useful in the political science, which desires to know\nhuman natures and characters. 'Very true.'\n\nBOOK II. And are there any other uses of well-ordered potations? There\nare; but in order to explain them, I must repeat what I mean by right\neducation; which, if I am not mistaken, depends on the due regulation\nof convivial intercourse. 'A high assumption.' I believe that virtue\nand vice are originally present to the mind of children in the form of\npleasure and pain; reason and fixed principles come later, and happy is\nhe who acquires them even in declining years; for he who possesses\nthem is the perfect man. When pleasure and pain, and love and hate, are\nrightly implanted in the yet unconscious soul, and after the attainment\nof reason are discovered to be in harmony with her, this harmony of the\nsoul is virtue, and the preparatory stage, anticipating reason, I\ncall education. But the finer sense of pleasure and pain is apt to be\nimpaired in the course of life; and therefore the Gods, pitying the\ntoils and sorrows of mortals, have allowed them to have holidays,\nand given them the Muses and Apollo and Dionysus for leaders and\nplayfellows. All young creatures love motion and frolic, and utter\nsounds of delight; but man only is capable of taking pleasure in\nrhythmical and harmonious movements. With these education begins; and\nthe uneducated is he who has never known the discipline of the chorus,\nand the educated is he who has. The chorus is partly dance and partly\nsong, and therefore the well-educated must sing and dance well. But when\nwe say, 'He sings and dances well,' we mean that he sings and dances\nwhat is good. And if he thinks that to be good which is really good, he\nwill have a much higher music and harmony in him, and be a far greater\nmaster of imitation in sound and gesture than he who is not of this\nopinion. 'True.' Then, if we know what is good and bad in song and\ndance, we shall know what education is? 'Very true.' Let us now consider\nthe beauty of figure, melody, song, and dance. Will the same figures or\nsounds be equally well adapted to the manly and the cowardly when they\nare in trouble? 'How can they be, when the very colours of their faces\nare different?' Figures and melodies have a rhythm and harmony which are\nadapted to the expression of different feelings (I may remark, by the\nway, that the term 'colour,' which is a favourite word of music-masters,\nis not really applicable to music). And one class of harmonies is akin\nto courage and all virtue, the other to cowardice and all vice. 'We\nagree.' And do all men equally like all dances? 'Far otherwise.' Do some\nfigures, then, appear to be beautiful which are not? For no one will\nadmit that the forms of vice are more beautiful than the forms of\nvirtue, or that he prefers the first kind to the second. And yet most\npersons say that the merit of music is to give pleasure. But this is\nimpiety. There is, however, a more plausible account of the matter given\nby others, who make their likes or dislikes the criterion of excellence.\nSometimes nature crosses habit, or conversely, and then they say that\nsuch and such fashions or gestures are pleasant, but they do not like to\nexhibit them before men of sense, although they enjoy them in private.\n'Very true.' And do vicious measures and strains do any harm, or\ngood measures any good to the lovers of them? 'Probably.' Say, rather\n'Certainly': for the gentle indulgence which we often show to vicious\nmen inevitably makes us become like them. And what can be worse than\nthis? 'Nothing.' Then in a well-administered city, the poet will not be\nallowed to make the songs of the people just as he pleases, or to train\nhis choruses without regard to virtue and vice. 'Certainly not.' And\nyet he may do this anywhere except in Egypt; for there ages ago they\ndiscovered the great truth which I am now asserting, that the young\nshould be educated in forms and strains of virtue. These they fixed and\nconsecrated in their temples; and no artist or musician is allowed\nto deviate from them. They are literally the same which they were ten\nthousand years ago. And this practice of theirs suggests the reflection\nthat legislation about music is not an impossible thing. But the\nparticular enactments must be the work of God or of some God-inspired\nman, as in Egypt their ancient chants are said to be the composition\nof the goddess Isis. The melodies which have a natural truth and\ncorrectness should be embodied in a law, and then the desire of novelty\nis not strong enough to change the old fashions. Is not the origin of\nmusic as follows? We rejoice when we think that we prosper, and we think\nthat we prosper when we rejoice, and at such times we cannot rest, but\nour young men dance dances and sing songs, and our old men, who have\nlost the elasticity of youth, regale themselves with the memory of the\npast, while they contemplate the life and activity of the young. 'Most\ntrue.' People say that he who gives us most pleasure at such festivals\nis to win the palm: are they right? 'Possibly.' Let us not be hasty\nin deciding, but first imagine a festival at which the lord of the\nfestival, having assembled the citizens, makes a proclamation that\nhe shall be crowned victor who gives the most pleasure, from whatever\nsource derived. We will further suppose that there are exhibitions\nof rhapsodists and musicians, tragic and comic poets, and even\nmarionette-players--which of the pleasure-makers will win? Shall I\nanswer for you?--the marionette-players will please the children; youths\nwill decide for comedy; young men, educated women, and people in general\nwill prefer tragedy; we old men are lovers of Homer and Hesiod. Now\nwhich of them is right? If you and I are asked, we shall certainly say\nthat the old men's way of thinking ought to prevail. 'Very true.' So far\nI agree with the many that the excellence of music is to be measured by\npleasure; but then the pleasure must be that of the good and educated,\nor better still, of one supremely virtuous and educated man. The true\njudge must have both wisdom and courage. For he must lead the multitude\nand not be led by them, and must not weakly yield to the uproar of\nthe theatre, nor give false judgment out of that mouth which has just\nappealed to the Gods. The ancient custom of Hellas, which still prevails\nin Italy and Sicily, left the judgment to the spectators, but this\ncustom has been the ruin of the poets, who seek only to please their\npatrons, and has degraded the audience by the representation of inferior\ncharacters. What is the inference? The same which we have often drawn,\nthat education is the training of the young idea in what the law affirms\nand the elders approve. And as the soul of a child is too young to be\ntrained in earnest, a kind of education has been invented which tempts\nhim with plays and songs, as the sick are tempted by pleasant meats and\ndrinks. And the wise legislator will compel the poet to express in his\npoems noble thoughts in fitting words and rhythms. 'But is this the\npractice elsewhere than in Crete and Lacedaemon? In other states, as far\nas I know, dances and music are constantly changed at the pleasure of\nthe hearers.' I am afraid that I misled you; not liking to be always\nfinding fault with mankind as they are, I described them as they ought\nto be. But let me understand: you say that such customs exist among\nthe Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and that the rest of the world would be\nimproved by adopting them? 'Much improved.' And you compel your poets to\ndeclare that the righteous are happy, and that the wicked man, even if\nhe be as rich as Midas, is unhappy? Or, in the words of Tyrtaeus,\n'I sing not, I care not about him' who is a great warrior not having\njustice; if he be unjust, 'I would not have him look calmly upon death\nor be swifter than the wind'; and may he be deprived of every good--that\nis, of every true good. For even if he have the goods which men regard,\nthese are not really goods: first health; beauty next; thirdly wealth;\nand there are others. A man may have every sense purged and improved; he\nmay be a tyrant, and do what he likes, and live for ever: but you and\nI will maintain that all these things are goods to the just, but to the\nunjust the greatest of evils, if life be immortal; not so great if he\nlive for a short time only. If a man had health and wealth, and power,\nand was insolent and unjust, his life would still be miserable; he might\nbe fair and rich, and do what he liked, but he would live basely, and if\nbasely evilly, and if evilly painfully. 'There I cannot agree with you.'\nThen may heaven give us the spirit of agreement, for I am as convinced\nof the truth of what I say as that Crete is an island; and, if I were\na lawgiver, I would exercise a censorship over the poets, and I would\npunish them if they said that the wicked are happy, or that injustice is\nprofitable. And these are not the only matters in which I should make\nmy citizens talk in a different way to the world in general. If I asked\nZeus and Apollo, the divine legislators of Crete and Sparta,--'Are\nthe just and pleasant life the same or not the same'?--and they\nreplied,--'Not the same'; and I asked again--'Which is the happier'? And\nthey said'--'The pleasant life,' this is an answer not fit for a God\nto utter, and therefore I ought rather to put the same question to some\nlegislator. And if he replies 'The pleasant,' then I should say to\nhim, 'O my father, did you not tell me that I should live as justly as\npossible'? and if to be just is to be happy, what is that principle of\nhappiness or good which is superior to pleasure? Is the approval of\ngods and men to be deemed good and honourable, but unpleasant, and their\ndisapproval the reverse? Or is the neither doing nor suffering evil good\nand honourable, although not pleasant? But you cannot make men like what\nis not pleasant, and therefore you must make them believe that the\njust is pleasant. The business of the legislator is to clear up this\nconfusion. He will show that the just and the unjust are identical with\nthe pleasurable and the painful, from the point of view of the just man,\nof the unjust the reverse. And which is the truer judgment? Surely that\nof the better soul. For if not the truth, it is the best and most moral\nof fictions; and the legislator who desires to propagate this useful\nlie, may be encouraged by remarking that mankind have believed the story\nof Cadmus and the dragon's teeth, and therefore he may be assured that\nhe can make them believe anything, and need only consider what fiction\nwill do the greatest good. That the happiest is also the holiest, this\nshall be our strain, which shall be sung by all three choruses alike.\nFirst will enter the choir of children, who will lift up their voices\non high; and after them the young men, who will pray the God Paean to be\ngracious to the youth, and to testify to the truth of their words;\nthen will come the chorus of elder men, between thirty and sixty; and,\nlastly, there will be the old men, and they will tell stories enforcing\nthe same virtues, as with the voice of an oracle. 'Whom do you mean by\nthe third chorus?' You remember how I spoke at first of the restless\nnature of young creatures, who jumped about and called out in a\ndisorderly manner, and I said that no other animal attained any\nperception of rhythm; but that to us the Gods gave Apollo and the Muses\nand Dionysus to be our playfellows. Of the two first choruses I have\nalready spoken, and I have now to speak of the third, or Dionysian\nchorus, which is composed of those who are between thirty and sixty\nyears old. 'Let us hear.' We are agreed (are we not?) that men, women,\nand children should be always charming themselves with strains of\nvirtue, and that there should be a variety in the strains, that they may\nnot weary of them? Now the fairest and most useful of strains will be\nuttered by the elder men, and therefore we cannot let them off. But how\ncan we make them sing? For a discreet elderly man is ashamed to hear the\nsound of his own voice in private, and still more in public. The only\nway is to give them drink; this will mellow the sourness of age. No one\nshould be allowed to taste wine until they are eighteen; from eighteen\nto thirty they may take a little; but when they have reached forty\nyears, they may be initiated into the mystery of drinking. Thus they\nwill become softer and more impressible; and when a man's heart is warm\nwithin him, he will be more ready to charm himself and others with song.\nAnd what songs shall he sing? 'At Crete and Lacedaemon we only know\nchoral songs.' Yes; that is because your way of life is military. Your\nyoung men are like wild colts feeding in a herd together; no one takes\nthe individual colt and trains him apart, and tries to give him the\nqualities of a statesman as well as of a soldier. He who was thus\ntrained would be a greater warrior than those of whom Tyrtaeus speaks,\nfor he would be courageous, and yet he would know that courage was only\nfourth in the scale of virtue. 'Once more, I must say, Stranger, that\nyou run down our lawgivers.' Not intentionally, my good friend, but\nwhither the argument leads I follow; and I am trying to find some style\nof poetry suitable for those who dislike the common sort. 'Very good.'\nIn all things which have a charm, either this charm is their good, or\nthey have some accompanying truth or advantage. For example, in eating\nand drinking there is pleasure and also profit, that is to say, health;\nand in learning there is a pleasure and also truth. There is a pleasure\nor charm, too, in the imitative arts, as well as a law of proportion or\nequality; but the pleasure which they afford, however innocent, is not\nthe criterion of their truth. The test of pleasure cannot be applied\nexcept to that which has no other good or evil, no truth or falsehood.\nBut that which has truth must be judged of by the standard of truth, and\ntherefore imitation and proportion are to be judged of by their truth\nalone. 'Certainly.' And as music is imitative, it is not to be judged by\nthe criterion of pleasure, and the Muse whom we seek is the muse not of\npleasure but of truth, for imitation has a truth. 'Doubtless.' And if\nso, the judge must know what is being imitated before he decides on the\nquality of the imitation, and he who does not know what is true will not\nknow what is good. 'He will not.' Will any one be able to imitate the\nhuman body, if he does not know the number, proportion, colour, or\nfigure of the limbs? 'How can he?' But suppose we know some picture or\nfigure to be an exact resemblance of a man, should we not also require\nto know whether the picture is beautiful or not? 'Quite right.' The\njudge of the imitation is required to know, therefore, first the\noriginal, secondly the truth, and thirdly the merit of the execution?\n'True.' Then let us not weary in the attempt to bring music to the\nstandard of the Muses and of truth. The Muses are not like human poets;\nthey never spoil or mix rhythms or scales, or mingle instruments and\nhuman voices, or confuse the manners and strains of men and women, or of\nfreemen and slaves, or of rational beings and brute animals. They do\nnot practise the baser sorts of musical arts, such as the 'matured\njudgments,' of whom Orpheus speaks, would ridicule. But modern poets\nseparate metre from music, and melody and rhythm from words, and use the\ninstrument alone without the voice. The consequence is, that the meaning\nof the rhythm and of the time are not understood. I am endeavouring to\nshow how our fifty-year-old choristers are to be trained, and what\nthey are to avoid. The opinion of the multitude about these matters is\nworthless; they who are only made to step in time by sheer force cannot\nbe critics of music. 'Impossible.' Then our newly-appointed minstrels\nmust be trained in music sufficiently to understand the nature of\nrhythms and systems; and they should select such as are suitable to\nmen of their age, and will enable them to give and receive innocent\npleasure. This is a knowledge which goes beyond that either of the poets\nor of their auditors in general. For although the poet must understand\nrhythm and music, he need not necessarily know whether the imitation\nis good or not, which was the third point required in a judge; but our\nchorus of elders must know all three, if they are to be the instructors\nof youth.\n\nAnd now we will resume the original argument, which may be summed up as\nfollows: A convivial meeting is apt to grow tumultuous as the drinking\nproceeds; every man becomes light-headed, and fancies that he can rule\nthe whole world. 'Doubtless.' And did we not say that the souls of the\ndrinkers, when subdued by wine, are made softer and more malleable at\nthe hand of the legislator? the docility of childhood returns to them.\nAt times however they become too valiant and disorderly, drinking out\nof their turn, and interrupting one another. And the business of the\nlegislator is to infuse into them that divine fear, which we call shame,\nin opposition to this disorderly boldness. But in order to discipline\nthem there must be guardians of the law of drinking, and sober generals\nwho shall take charge of the private soldiers; they are as necessary in\ndrinking as in fighting, and he who disobeys these Dionysiac commanders\nwill be equally disgraced. 'Very good.' If a drinking festival were well\nregulated, men would go away, not as they now do, greater enemies, but\nbetter friends. Of the greatest gift of Dionysus I hardly like to speak,\nlest I should be misunderstood. 'What is that?' According to tradition\nDionysus was driven mad by his stepmother Here, and in order to revenge\nhimself he inspired mankind with Bacchic madness. But these are stories\nwhich I would rather not repeat. However I do acknowledge that all men\nare born in an imperfect state, and are at first restless, irrational\ncreatures: this, as you will remember, has been already said by us. 'I\nremember.' And that Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus gave us harmony\nand rhythm? 'Very true.' The other story implies that wine was given\nto punish us and make us mad; but we contend that wine is a balm and a\ncure; a spring of modesty in the soul, and of health and strength in\nthe body. Again, the work of the chorus is co-extensive with the work of\neducation; rhythm and melody answer to the voice, and the motions of the\nbody correspond to all three, and the sound enters in and educates\nthe soul in virtue. 'Yes.' And the movement which, when pursued as\nan amusement, is termed dancing, when studied with a view to the\nimprovement of the body, becomes gymnastic. Shall we now proceed to\nspeak of this? 'What Cretan or Lacedaemonian would approve of your\nomitting gymnastic?' Your question implies assent; and you will easily\nunderstand a subject which is familiar to you. Gymnastic is based on the\nnatural tendency of every animal to rapid motion; and man adds a sense\nof rhythm, which is awakened by music; music and dancing together form\nthe choral art. But before proceeding I must add a crowning word about\ndrinking. Like other pleasures, it has a lawful use; but if a state or\nan individual is inclined to drink at will, I cannot allow them. I\nwould go further than Crete or Lacedaemon and have the law of the\nCarthaginians, that no slave of either sex should drink wine at all, and\nno soldier while he is on a campaign, and no magistrate or officer while\nhe is on duty, and that no one should drink by daylight or on a bridal\nnight. And there are so many other occasions on which wine ought to\nbe prohibited, that there will not be many vines grown or vineyards\nrequired in the state.\n\nBOOK III. If a man wants to know the origin of states and societies, he\nshould behold them from the point of view of time. Thousands of cities\nhave come into being and have passed away again in infinite ages,\nevery one of them having had endless forms of government; and if we\ncan ascertain the cause of these changes in states, that will probably\nexplain their origin. What do you think of ancient traditions about\ndeluges and destructions of mankind, and the preservation of a remnant?\n'Every one believes in them.' Then let us suppose the world to have\nbeen destroyed by a deluge. The survivors would be hill-shepherds, small\nsparks of the human race, dwelling in isolation, and unacquainted with\nthe arts and vices of civilization. We may further suppose that the\ncities on the plain and on the coast have been swept away, and that all\ninventions, and every sort of knowledge, have perished. 'Why, if all\nthings were as they now are, nothing would have ever been invented. All\nour famous discoveries have been made within the last thousand years,\nand many of them are but of yesterday.' Yes, Cleinias, and you must not\nforget Epimenides, who was really of yesterday; he practised the lesson\nof moderation and abstinence which Hesiod only preached. 'True.' After\nthe great destruction we may imagine that the earth was a desert, in\nwhich there were a herd or two of oxen and a few goats, hardly enough\nto support those who tended them; while of politics and governments\nthe survivors would know nothing. And out of this state of things have\narisen arts and laws, and a great deal of virtue and a great deal of\nvice; little by little the world has come to be what it is. At first,\nthe few inhabitants would have had a natural fear of descending into the\nplains; although they would want to have intercourse with one another,\nthey would have a difficulty in getting about, having lost the arts,\nand having no means of extracting metals from the earth, or of felling\ntimber; for even if they had saved any tools, these would soon have been\nworn out, and they could get no more until the art of metallurgy had\nbeen again revived. Faction and war would be extinguished among them,\nfor being solitary they would incline to be friendly; and having\nabundance of pasture and plenty of milk and flesh, they would have\nnothing to quarrel about. We may assume that they had also dwellings,\nclothes, pottery, for the weaving and plastic arts do not require the\nuse of metals. In those days they were neither poor nor rich, and\nthere was no insolence or injustice among them; for they were of noble\nnatures, and lived up to their principles, and believed what they were\ntold; knowing nothing of land or naval warfare, or of legal practices\nor party conflicts, they were simpler and more temperate, and also more\njust than the men of our day. 'Very true.' I am showing whence the need\nof lawgivers arises, for in primitive ages they neither had nor wanted\nthem. Men lived according to the customs of their fathers, in a simple\nmanner, under a patriarchal government, such as still exists both among\nHellenes and barbarians, and is described in Homer as prevailing among\nthe Cyclopes:--\n\n'They have no laws, and they dwell in rocks or on the tops of mountains,\nand every one is the judge of his wife and children, and they do not\ntrouble themselves about one another.'\n\n'That is a charming poet of yours, though I know little of him, for in\nCrete foreign poets are not much read.' 'But he is well known in Sparta,\nthough he describes Ionian rather than Dorian manners, and he seems to\ntake your view of primitive society.' May we not suppose that government\narose out of the union of single families who survived the destruction,\nand were under the rule of patriarchs, because they had originally\ndescended from a single father and mother? 'That is very probable.' As\ntime went on, men increased in number, and tilled the ground, living in\na common habitation, which they protected by walls against wild beasts;\nbut the several families retained the laws and customs which they\nseparately received from their first parents. They would naturally like\ntheir own laws better than any others, and would be already formed by\nthem when they met in a common society: thus legislation imperceptibly\nbegan among them. For in the next stage the associated families would\nappoint plenipotentiaries, who would select and present to the chiefs\nthose of all their laws which they thought best. The chiefs in turn\nwould make a further selection, and would thus become the lawgivers\nof the state, which they would form into an aristocracy or a monarchy.\n'Probably.' In the third stage various other forms of government would\narise. This state of society is described by Homer in speaking of the\nfoundation of Dardania, which, he says,\n\n  'was built at the foot of many-fountained Ida, for Ilium,\n   the city of the plain, as yet was not.'\n\nHere, as also in the account of the Cyclopes, the poet by some divine\ninspiration has attained truth. But to proceed with our tale. Ilium was\nbuilt in a wide plain, on a low hill, which was surrounded by streams\ndescending from Ida. This shows that many ages must have passed; for the\nmen who remembered the deluge would never have placed their city at the\nmercy of the waters. When mankind began to multiply, many other cities\nwere built in similar situations. These cities carried on a ten years'\nwar against Troy, by sea as well as land, for men were ceasing to be\nafraid of the sea, and, in the meantime, while the chiefs of the army\nwere at Troy, their homes fell into confusion. The youth revolted and\nrefused to receive their own fathers; deaths, murders, exiles ensued.\nUnder the new name of Dorians, which they received from their chief\nDorieus, the exiles returned: the rest of the story is part of the\nhistory of Sparta.\n\nThus, after digressing from the subject of laws into music and drinking,\nwe return to the settlement of Sparta, which in laws and institutions is\nthe sister of Crete. We have seen the rise of a first, second, and third\nstate, during the lapse of ages; and now we arrive at a fourth state,\nand out of the comparison of all four we propose to gather the nature\nof laws and governments, and the changes which may be desirable in them.\n'If,' replies the Spartan, 'our new discussion is likely to be as\ngood as the last, I would think the longest day too short for such an\nemployment.'\n\nLet us imagine the time when Lacedaemon, and Argos, and Messene were all\nsubject, Megillus, to your ancestors. Afterwards, they distributed\nthe army into three portions, and made three cities--Argos, Messene,\nLacedaemon. 'Yes.' Temenus was the king of Argos, Cresphontes of\nMessene, Procles and Eurysthenes ruled at Lacedaemon. 'Just so.' And\nthey all swore to assist any one of their number whose kingdom was\nsubverted. 'Yes.' But did we not say that kingdoms or governments can\nonly be subverted by themselves? 'That is true.' Yes, and the truth is\nnow proved by facts: there were certain conditions upon which the three\nkingdoms were to assist one another; the government was to be mild and\nthe people obedient, and the kings and people were to unite in assisting\neither of the two others when they were wronged. This latter condition\nwas a great security. 'Clearly.' Such a provision is in opposition to\nthe common notion that the lawgiver should make only such laws as the\npeople like; but we say that he should rather be like a physician,\nprepared to effect a cure even at the cost of considerable suffering.\n'Very true.' The early lawgivers had another great advantage--they\nwere saved from the reproach which attends a division of land and the\nabolition of debts. No one could quarrel with the Dorians for dividing\nthe territory, and they had no debts of long standing. 'They had not.'\nThen what was the reason why their legislation signally failed? For\nthere were three kingdoms, two of them quickly lost their original\nconstitution. That is a question which we cannot refuse to answer, if\nwe mean to proceed with our old man's game of enquiring into laws\nand institutions. And the Dorian institutions are more worthy of\nconsideration than any other, having been evidently intended to be a\nprotection not only to the Peloponnese, but to all the Hellenes against\nthe Barbarians. For the capture of Troy by the Achaeans had given great\noffence to the Assyrians, of whose empire it then formed part, and\nthey were likely to retaliate. Accordingly the royal Heraclid brothers\ndevised their military constitution, which was organised on a far better\nplan than the old Trojan expedition; and the Dorians themselves were far\nsuperior to the Achaeans, who had taken part in that expedition, and had\nbeen conquered by them. Such a scheme, undertaken by men who had shared\nwith one another toils and dangers, sanctioned by the Delphian oracle,\nunder the guidance of the Heraclidae, seemed to have a promise of\npermanence. 'Naturally.' Yet this has not proved to be the case. Instead\nof the three being one, they have always been at war; had they been\nunited, in accordance with the original intention, they would have been\ninvincible.\n\nAnd what caused their ruin? Did you ever observe that there are\nbeautiful things of which men often say, 'What wonders they would have\neffected if rightly used?' and yet, after all, this may be a mistake.\nAnd so I say of the Heraclidae and their expedition, which I may perhaps\nhave been justified in admiring, but which nevertheless suggests to me\nthe general reflection,--'What wonders might not strength and military\nresources have accomplished, if the possessor had only known how to use\nthem!' For consider: if the generals of the army had only known how\nto arrange their forces, might they not have given their subjects\neverlasting freedom, and the power of doing what they would in all the\nworld? 'Very true.' Suppose a person to express his admiration of wealth\nor rank, does he not do so under the idea that by the help of these\nhe can attain his desires? All men wish to obtain the control of all\nthings, and they are always praying for what they desire. 'Certainly.'\nAnd we ask for our friends what they ask for themselves. 'Yes.' Dear is\nthe son to the father, and yet the son, if he is young and foolish, will\noften pray to obtain what the father will pray that he may not obtain.\n'True.' And when the father, in the heat of youth or the dotage of age,\nmakes some rash prayer, the son, like Hippolytus, may have reason to\npray that the word of his father may be ineffectual. 'You mean that a\nman should pray to have right desires, before he prays that his desires\nmay be fulfilled; and that wisdom should be the first object of our\nprayers?' Yes; and you will remember my saying that wisdom should be the\nprincipal aim of the legislator; but you said that defence in war\ncame first. And I replied, that there were four virtues, whereas you\nacknowledged one only--courage, and not wisdom which is the guide of all\nthe rest. And I repeat--in jest if you like, but I am willing that you\nshould receive my words in earnest--that 'the prayer of a fool is full\nof danger.' I will prove to you, if you will allow me, that the ruin\nof those states was not caused by cowardice or ignorance in war, but\nby ignorance of human affairs. 'Pray proceed: our attention will show\nbetter than compliments that we prize your words.' I maintain that\nignorance is, and always has been, the ruin of states; wherefore the\nlegislator should seek to banish it from the state; and the greatest\nignorance is the love of what is known to be evil, and the hatred of\nwhat is known to be good; this is the last and greatest conflict of\npleasure and reason in the soul. I say the greatest, because affecting\nthe greater part of the soul; for the passions are in the individual\nwhat the people are in a state. And when they become opposed to reason\nor law, and instruction no longer avails--that is the last and greatest\nignorance of states and men. 'I agree.' Let this, then, be our first\nprinciple:--That the citizen who does not know how to choose between\ngood and evil must not have authority, although he possess great mental\ngifts, and many accomplishments; for he is really a fool. On the other\nhand, he who has this knowledge may be unable either to read or swim;\nnevertheless, he shall be counted wise and permitted to rule. For how\ncan there be wisdom where there is no harmony?--the wise man is the\nsaviour, and he who is devoid of wisdom is the destroyer of states and\nhouseholds. There are rulers and there are subjects in states. And the\nfirst claim to rule is that of parents to rule over their children; the\nsecond, that of the noble to rule over the ignoble; thirdly, the elder\nmust govern the younger; in the fourth place, the slave must obey his\nmaster; fifthly, there is the power of the stronger, which the poet\nPindar declares to be according to nature; sixthly, there is the rule of\nthe wiser, which is also according to nature, as I must inform Pindar,\nif he does not know, and is the rule of law over obedient subjects.\n'Most true.' And there is a seventh kind of rule which the Gods\nlove,--in this the ruler is elected by lot.\n\nThen, now, we playfully say to him who fancies that it is easy to\nmake laws:--You see, legislator, the many and inconsistent claims to\nauthority; here is a spring of troubles which you must stay. And first\nof all you must help us to consider how the kings of Argos and Messene\nin olden days destroyed their famous empire--did they forget the saying\nof Hesiod, that 'the half is better than the whole'? And do we suppose\nthat the ignorance of this truth is less fatal to kings than to peoples?\n'Probably the evil is increased by their way of life.' The kings of\nthose days transgressed the laws and violated their oaths. Their deeds\nwere not in harmony with their words, and their folly, which seemed to\nthem wisdom, was the ruin of the state. And how could the legislator\nhave prevented this evil?--the remedy is easy to see now, but was not\neasy to foresee at the time. 'What is the remedy?' The institutions of\nSparta may teach you, Megillus. Wherever there is excess, whether the\nvessel has too large a sail, or the body too much food, or the mind\ntoo much power, there destruction is certain. And similarly, a man who\npossesses arbitrary power is soon corrupted, and grows hateful to\nhis dearest friends. In order to guard against this evil, the God who\nwatched over Sparta gave you two kings instead of one, that they\nmight balance one another; and further to lower the pulse of your body\npolitic, some human wisdom, mingled with divine power, tempered the\nstrength and self-sufficiency of youth with the moderation of age in\nthe institution of your senate. A third saviour bridled your rising and\nswelling power by ephors, whom he assimilated to officers elected by\nlot: and thus the kingly power was preserved, and became the preserver\nof all the rest. Had the constitution been arranged by the original\nlegislators, not even the portion of Aristodemus would have been saved;\nfor they had no political experience, and imagined that a youthful\nspirit invested with power could be restrained by oaths. Now that God\nhas instructed us in the arts of legislation, there is no merit in\nseeing all this, or in learning wisdom after the event. But if the\ncoming danger could have been foreseen, and the union preserved, then\nno Persian or other enemy would have dared to attack Hellas; and indeed\nthere was not so much credit to us in defeating the enemy, as discredit\nin our disloyalty to one another. For of the three cities one only\nfought on behalf of Hellas; and of the two others, Argos refused\nher aid; and Messenia was actually at war with Sparta: and if the\nLacedaemonians and Athenians had not united, the Hellenes would have\nbeen absorbed in the Persian empire, and dispersed among the barbarians.\nWe make these reflections upon past and present legislators because we\ndesire to find out what other course could have been followed. We were\nsaying just now, that a state can only be free and wise and harmonious\nwhen there is a balance of powers. There are many words by which we\nexpress the aims of the legislator,--temperance, wisdom, friendship; but\nwe need not be disturbed by the variety of expression,--these words have\nall the same meaning. 'I should like to know at what in your opinion\nthe legislator should aim.' Hear me, then. There are two mother forms\nof states--one monarchy, and the other democracy: the Persians have\nthe first in the highest form, and the Athenians the second; and no\ngovernment can be well administered which does not include both. There\nwas a time when both the Persians and Athenians had more the character\nof a constitutional state than they now have. In the days of Cyrus the\nPersians were freemen as well as lords of others, and their soldiers\nwere free and equal, and the kings used and honoured all the talent\nwhich they could find, and so the nation waxed great, because there was\nfreedom and friendship and communion of soul. But Cyrus, though a wise\ngeneral, never troubled himself about the education of his family. He\nwas a soldier from his youth upward, and left his children who were born\nin the purple to be educated by women, who humoured and spoilt them.\n'A rare education, truly!' Yes, such an education as princesses who had\nrecently grown rich might be expected to give them in a country where\nthe men were solely occupied with warlike pursuits. 'Likely enough.'\nTheir father had possessions of men and animals, and never considered\nthat the race to whom he was about to make them over had been educated\nin a very different school, not like the Persian shepherd, who was\nwell able to take care of himself and his own. He did not see that\nhis children had been brought up in the Median fashion, by women and\neunuchs. The end was that one of the sons of Cyrus slew the other, and\nlost the kingdom by his own folly. Observe, again, that Darius, who\nrestored the kingdom, had not received a royal education. He was one of\nthe seven chiefs, and when he came to the throne he divided the empire\ninto seven provinces; and he made equal laws, and implanted friendship\namong the people. Hence his subjects were greatly attached to him, and\ncheerfully helped him to extend his empire. Next followed Xerxes,\nwho had received the same royal education as Cambyses, and met with a\nsimilar fate. The reflection naturally occurs to us--How could Darius,\nwith all his experience, have made such a mistake! The ruin of Xerxes\nwas not a mere accident, but the evil life which is generally led by the\nsons of very rich and royal persons; and this is what the legislator has\nseriously to consider. Justly may the Lacedaemonians be praised for not\ngiving special honour to birth or wealth; for such advantages are not to\nbe highly esteemed without virtue, and not even virtue is to be esteemed\nunless it be accompanied by temperance. 'Explain.' No one would like\nto live in the same house with a courageous man who had no control over\nhimself, nor with a clever artist who was a rogue. Nor can justice\nand wisdom ever be separated from temperance. But considering these\nqualities with reference to the honour and dishonour which is to be\nassigned to them in states, would you say, on the other hand, that\ntemperance, if existing without the other virtues in the soul, is worth\nanything or nothing? 'I cannot tell.' You have answered well. It would\nbe absurd to speak of temperance as belonging to the class of honourable\nor of dishonourable qualities, because all other virtues in their\nvarious classes require temperance to be added to them; having the\naddition, they are honoured not in proportion to that, but to their own\nexcellence. And ought not the legislator to determine these classes?\n'Certainly.' Suppose then that, without going into details, we make\nthree great classes of them. Most honourable are the goods of the soul,\nalways assuming temperance as a condition of them; secondly, those of\nthe body; thirdly, external possessions. The legislator who puts them in\nanother order is doing an unholy and unpatriotic thing.\n\nThese remarks were suggested by the history of the Persian kings; and to\nthem I will now return. The ruin of their empire was caused by the\nloss of freedom and the growth of despotism; all community of feeling\ndisappeared. Hatred and spoliation took the place of friendship; the\npeople no longer fought heartily for their masters; the rulers, finding\ntheir myriads useless on the field of battle, resorted to mercenaries as\ntheir only salvation, and were thus compelled by their circumstances\nto proclaim the stupidest of falsehoods--that virtue is a trifle in\ncomparison of money.\n\nBut enough of the Persians: a different lesson is taught by the\nAthenians, whose example shows that a limited freedom is far better than\nan unlimited. Ancient Athens, at the time of the Persian invasion,\nhad such a limited freedom. The people were divided into four classes,\naccording to the amount of their property, and the universal love of\norder, as well as the fear of the approaching host, made them obedient\nand willing citizens. For Darius had sent Datis and Artaphernes,\ncommanding them under pain of death to subjugate the Eretrians and\nAthenians. A report, whether true or not, came to Athens that all the\nEretrians had been 'netted'; and the Athenians in terror sent all\nover Hellas for assistance. None came to their relief except the\nLacedaemonians, and they arrived a day too late, when the battle of\nMarathon had been already fought. In process of time Xerxes came to\nthe throne, and the Athenians heard of nothing but the bridge over the\nHellespont, and the canal of Athos, and the innumerable host and fleet.\nThey knew that these were intended to avenge the defeat of Marathon.\nTheir case seemed desperate, for there was no Hellene likely to assist\nthem by land, and at sea they were attacked by more than a thousand\nvessels;--their only hope, however slender, was in victory; so they\nrelied upon themselves and upon the Gods. Their common danger, and\nthe influence of their ancient constitution, greatly tended to promote\nharmony among them. Reverence and fear--that fear which the coward never\nknows--made them fight for their altars and their homes, and saved them\nfrom being dispersed all over the world. 'Your words, Athenian, are\nworthy of your country.' And you Megillus, who have inherited the\nvirtues of your ancestors, are worthy to hear them. Let me ask you\nto take the moral of my tale. The Persians have lost their liberty\nin absolute slavery, and we in absolute freedom. In ancient times the\nAthenian people were not the masters, but the servants of the laws. 'Of\nwhat laws?' In the first place, there were laws about music, and the\nmusic was of various kinds: there was one kind which consisted of hymns,\nanother of lamentations; there was also the paean and the dithyramb,\nand the so-called 'laws' (nomoi) or strains, which were played upon the\nharp. The regulation of such matters was not left to the whistling and\nclapping of the crowd; there was silence while the judges decided, and\nthe boys, and the audience in general, were kept in order by raps of a\nstick. But after a while there arose a new race of poets, men of genius\ncertainly, however careless of musical truth and propriety, who made\npleasure the only criterion of excellence. That was a test which the\nspectators could apply for themselves; the whole audience, instead of\nbeing mute, became vociferous, and a theatrocracy took the place of an\naristocracy. Could the judges have been free, there would have been no\ngreat harm done; a musical democracy would have been well enough--but\nconceit has been our ruin. Everybody knows everything, and is ready to\nsay anything; the age of reverence is gone, and the age of irreverence\nand licentiousness has succeeded. 'Most true.' And with this freedom\ncomes disobedience to rulers, parents, elders,--in the latter days to\nthe law also; the end returns to the beginning, and the old Titanic\nnature reappears--men have no regard for the Gods or for oaths; and the\nevils of the human race seem as if they would never cease. Whither are\nwe running away? Once more we must pull up the argument with bit and\ncurb, lest, as the proverb says, we should fall off our ass. 'Good.'\nOur purpose in what we have been saying is to prove that the legislator\nought to aim at securing for a state three things--freedom, friendship,\nwisdom. And we chose two states;--one was the type of freedom, and the\nother of despotism; and we showed that when in a mean they attained\ntheir highest perfection. In a similar spirit we spoke of the Dorian\nexpedition, and of the settlement on the hills and in the plains of\nTroy; and of music, and the use of wine, and of all that preceded.\n\nAnd now, has our discussion been of any use? 'Yes, stranger; for by\na singular coincidence the Cretans are about to send out a colony,\nof which the settlement has been confided to the Cnosians. Ten\ncommissioners, of whom I am one, are to give laws to the colonists, and\nwe may give any which we please--Cretan or foreign. And therefore let\nus make a selection from what has been said, and then proceed with the\nconstruction of the state.' Very good: I am quite at your service. 'And\nI too,' says Megillus.\n\nBOOK IV. And now, what is this city? I do not want to know what is to\nbe the name of the place (for some accident,--a river or a local deity,\nwill determine that), but what the situation is, whether maritime or\ninland. 'The city will be about eleven miles from the sea.' Are there\nharbours? 'Excellent.' And is the surrounding country self-supporting?\n'Almost.' Any neighbouring states? 'No; and that is the reason for\nchoosing the place, which has been deserted from time immemorial.' And\nis there a fair proportion of hill and plain and wood? 'Like Crete\nin general, more hill than plain.' Then there is some hope for your\ncitizens; had the city been on the sea, and dependent for support\non other countries, no human power could have preserved you from\ncorruption. Even the distance of eleven miles is hardly enough. For the\nsea, although an agreeable, is a dangerous companion, and a highway of\nstrange morals and manners as well as of commerce. But as the country is\nonly moderately fertile there will be no great export trade and no\ngreat returns of gold and silver, which are the ruin of states. Is there\ntimber for ship-building? 'There is no pine, nor much cypress; and very\nlittle stone-pine or plane wood for the interior of ships.' That is\ngood. 'Why?' Because the city will not be able to imitate the bad ways\nof her enemies. 'What is the bearing of that remark?' To explain my\nmeaning, I would ask you to remember what we said about the Cretan laws,\nthat they had an eye to war only; whereas I maintained that they ought\nto have included all virtue. And I hope that you in your turn will\nretaliate upon me if I am false to my own principle. For I consider that\nthe lawgiver should go straight to the mark of virtue and justice, and\ndisregard wealth and every other good when separated from virtue.\nWhat further I mean, when I speak of the imitation of enemies, I will\nillustrate by the story of Minos, if our Cretan friend will allow me to\nmention it. Minos, who was a great sea-king, imposed upon the Athenians\na cruel tribute, for in those days they were not a maritime power; they\nhad no timber for ship-building, and therefore they could not 'imitate\ntheir enemies'; and better far, as I maintain, would it have been for\nthem to have lost many times over the lives which they devoted to the\ntribute than to have turned soldiers into sailors. Naval warfare is not\na very praiseworthy art; men should not be taught to leap on shore, and\nthen again to hurry back to their ships, or to find specious excuses for\nthrowing away their arms; bad customs ought not to be gilded with fine\nwords. And retreat is always bad, as we are taught in Homer, when he\nintroduces Odysseus, setting forth to Agamemnon the danger of ships\nbeing at hand when soldiers are disposed to fly. An army of lions\ntrained in such ways would fly before a herd of deer. Further, a city\nwhich owes its preservation to a crowd of pilots and oarsmen and other\nundeserving persons, cannot bestow rewards of honour properly; and\nthis is the ruin of states. 'Still, in Crete we say that the battle of\nSalamis was the salvation of Hellas.' Such is the prevailing\nopinion. But I and Megillus say that the battle of Marathon began the\ndeliverance, and that the battle of Plataea completed it; for these\nbattles made men better, whereas the battles of Salamis and Artemisium\nmade them no better. And we further affirm that mere existence is not\nthe great political good of individuals or states, but the continuance\nof the best existence. 'Certainly.' Let us then endeavour to follow this\nprinciple in colonization and legislation.\n\nAnd first, let me ask you who are to be the colonists? May any one\ncome from any city of Crete? For you would surely not send a general\ninvitation to all Hellas. Yet I observe that in Crete there are people\nwho have come from Argos and Aegina and other places. 'Our recruits\nwill be drawn from all Crete, and of other Hellenes we should prefer\nPeloponnesians. As you observe, there are Argives among the Cretans;\nmoreover the Gortynians, who are the best of all Cretans, have come from\nGortys in Peloponnesus.'\n\nColonization is in some ways easier when the colony goes out in a swarm\nfrom one country, owing to the pressure of population, or revolution, or\nwar. In this case there is the advantage that the new colonists have\na community of race, language, and laws. But then again, they are less\nobedient to the legislator; and often they are anxious to keep the very\nlaws and customs which caused their ruin at home. A mixed multitude,\non the other hand, is more tractable, although there is a difficulty\nin making them pull together. There is nothing, however, which perfects\nmen's virtue more than legislation and colonization. And yet I have a\nword to say which may seem to be depreciatory of legislators. 'What is\nthat?'\n\nI was going to make the saddening reflection, that accidents of all\nsorts are the true legislators,--wars and pestilences and famines and\nthe frequent recurrence of bad seasons. The observer will be inclined to\nsay that almost all human things are chance; and this is certainly true\nabout navigation and medicine, and the art of the general. But there is\nanother thing which may equally be said. 'What is it?' That God governs\nall things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with Him. And\naccording to yet a third view, art has part with them, for surely in a\nstorm it is well to have a pilot? And the same is true of legislation:\neven if circumstances are favourable, a skilful lawgiver is still\nnecessary. 'Most true.' All artists would pray for certain conditions\nunder which to exercise their art: and would not the legislator do the\nsame? 'Certainly?' Come, legislator, let us say to him, and what are the\nconditions which you would have? He will answer, Grant me a city which\nis ruled by a tyrant; and let the tyrant be young, mindful, teachable,\ncourageous, magnanimous; and let him have the inseparable condition\nof all virtue, which is temperance--not prudence, but that natural\ntemperance which is the gift of children and animals, and is hardly\nreckoned among goods--with this he must be endowed, if the state is to\nacquire the form most conducive to happiness in the speediest manner.\nAnd I must add one other condition: the tyrant must be fortunate, and\nhis good fortune must consist in his having the co-operation of a great\nlegislator. When God has done all this, He has done the best which\nHe can for a state; not so well if He has given them two legislators\ninstead of one, and less and less well if He has given them a great\nmany. An orderly tyranny most easily passes into the perfect state;\nin the second degree, a monarchy; in the third degree, a democracy; an\noligarchy is worst of all. 'I do not understand.' I suppose that you\nhave never seen a city which is subject to a tyranny? 'I have no desire\nto see one.' You would have seen what I am describing, if you ever had.\nThe tyrant can speedily change the manners of a state, and affix\nthe stamp of praise or blame on any action which he pleases; for the\ncitizens readily follow the example which he sets. There is no quicker\nway of making changes; but there is a counterbalancing difficulty. It is\nhard to find the divine love of temperance and justice existing in any\npowerful form of government, whether in a monarchy or an oligarchy. In\nolden days there were chiefs like Nestor, who was the most eloquent and\ntemperate of mankind, but there is no one his equal now. If such an one\never arises among us, blessed will he be, and blessed they who listen to\nhis words. For where power and wisdom and temperance meet in one, there\nare the best laws and constitutions. I am endeavouring to show you how\neasy under the conditions supposed, and how difficult under any other,\nis the task of giving a city good laws. 'How do you mean?' Let us old\nmen attempt to mould in words a constitution for your new state, as\nchildren make figures out of wax. 'Proceed. What constitution shall we\ngive--democracy, oligarchy, or aristocracy?' To which of these classes,\nMegillus, do you refer your own state? 'The Spartan constitution seems\nto me to contain all these elements. Our state is a democracy and also\nan aristocracy; the power of the Ephors is tyrannical, and we have\nan ancient monarchy.' 'Much the same,' adds Cleinias, 'may be said of\nCnosus.' The reason is that you have polities, but other states are\nmere aggregations of men dwelling together, which are named after their\nseveral ruling powers; whereas a state, if an 'ocracy' at all, should\nbe called a theocracy. A tale of old will explain my meaning. There is\na tradition of a golden age, in which all things were spontaneous and\nabundant. Cronos, then lord of the world, knew that no mortal nature\ncould endure the temptations of power, and therefore he appointed demons\nor demi-gods, who are of a superior race, to have dominion over man, as\nman has dominion over the animals. They took care of us with great ease\nand pleasure to themselves, and no less to us; and the tradition says\nthat only when God, and not man, is the ruler, can the human race cease\nfrom ill. This was the manner of life which prevailed under Cronos, and\nwhich we must strive to follow so far as the principle of immortality\nstill abides in us and we live according to law and the dictates of\nright reason. But in an oligarchy or democracy, when the governing\nprinciple is athirst for pleasure, the laws are trampled under foot, and\nthere is no possibility of salvation. Is it not often said that there\nare as many forms of laws as there are governments, and that they\nhave no concern either with any one virtue or with all virtue, but are\nrelative to the will of the government? Which is as much as to say that\n'might makes right.' 'What do you mean?' I mean that governments enact\ntheir own laws, and that every government makes self-preservation its\nprincipal aim. He who transgresses the laws is regarded as an evil-doer,\nand punished accordingly. This was one of the unjust principles of\ngovernment which we mentioned when speaking of the different claims to\nrule. We were agreed that parents should rule their children, the elder\nthe younger, the noble the ignoble. But there were also several other\nprinciples, and among them Pindar's 'law of violence.' To whom then is\nour state to be entrusted? For many a government is only a victorious\nfaction which has a monopoly of power, and refuses any share to the\nconquered, lest when they get into office they should remember their\nwrongs. Such governments are not polities, but parties; nor are any laws\ngood which are made in the interest of particular classes only, and not\nof the whole. And in our state I mean to protest against making any\nman a ruler because he is rich, or strong, or noble. But those who are\nobedient to the laws, and who win the victory of obedience, shall be\npromoted to the service of the Gods according to the degree of their\nobedience. When I call the ruler the servant or minister of the law,\nthis is not a mere paradox, but I mean to say that upon a willingness to\nobey the law the existence of the state depends. 'Truly, Stranger,\nyou have a keen vision.' Why, yes; every man when he is old has his\nintellectual vision most keen. And now shall we call in our colonists\nand make a speech to them? Friends, we say to them, God holds in His\nhand the beginning, middle, and end of all things, and He moves in a\nstraight line towards the accomplishment of His will. Justice always\nbears Him company, and punishes those who fall short of His laws. He who\nwould be happy follows humbly in her train; but he who is lifted up with\npride, or wealth, or honour, or beauty, is soon deserted by God, and,\nbeing deserted, he lives in confusion and disorder. To many he seems a\ngreat man; but in a short time he comes to utter destruction. Wherefore,\nseeing these things, what ought we to do or think? 'Every man ought to\nfollow God.' What life, then, is pleasing to God? There is an old saying\nthat 'like agrees with like, measure with measure,' and God ought to\nbe our measure in all things. The temperate man is the friend of God\nbecause he is like Him, and the intemperate man is not His friend,\nbecause he is not like Him. And the conclusion is, that the best of all\nthings for a good man is to pray and sacrifice to the Gods; but the bad\nman has a polluted soul; and therefore his service is wasted upon the\nGods, while the good are accepted of them. I have told you the mark at\nwhich we ought to aim. You will say, How, and with what weapons? In the\nfirst place we affirm, that after the Olympian Gods and the Gods of the\nstate, honour should be given to the Gods below, and to them should\nbe offered everything in even numbers and of the second choice; the\nauspicious odd numbers and everything of the first choice are reserved\nfor the Gods above. Next demi-gods or spirits must be honoured, and\nthen heroes, and after them family gods, who will be worshipped at their\nlocal seats according to law. Further, the honour due to parents should\nnot be forgotten; children owe all that they have to them, and the debt\nmust be repaid by kindness and attention in old age. No unbecoming word\nmust be uttered before them; for there is an avenging angel who hears\nthem when they are angry, and the child should consider that the parent\nwhen he has been wronged has a right to be angry. After their death\nlet them have a moderate funeral, such as their fathers have had before\nthem; and there shall be an annual commemoration of them. Living on this\nwise, we shall be accepted of the Gods, and shall pass our days in good\nhope. The law will determine all our various duties towards relatives\nand friends and other citizens, and the whole state will be happy and\nprosperous. But if the legislator would persuade as well as command,\nhe will add prefaces to his laws which will predispose the citizens to\nvirtue. Even a little accomplished in the way of gaining the hearts of\nmen is of great value. For most men are in no particular haste to become\ngood. As Hesiod says:\n\n'Long and steep is the first half of the way to virtue, But when you\nhave reached the top the rest is easy.'\n\n'Those are excellent words.' Yes; but may I tell you the effect which\nthe preceding discourse has had upon me? I will express my meaning in\nan address to the lawgiver:--O lawgiver, if you know what we ought to do\nand say, you can surely tell us;--you are not like the poet, who, as you\nwere just now saying, does not know the effect of his own words. And the\npoet may reply, that when he sits down on the tripod of the Muses he is\nnot in his right mind, and that being a mere imitator he may be allowed\nto say all sorts of opposite things, and cannot tell which of them is\ntrue. But this licence cannot be allowed to the lawgiver. For example,\nthere are three kinds of funerals; one of them is excessive, another\nmean, a third moderate, and you say that the last is right. Now if I\nhad a rich wife, and she told me to bury her, and I were to sing of her\nburial, I should praise the extravagant kind; a poor man would commend\na funeral of the meaner sort, and a man of moderate means would prefer a\nmoderate funeral. But you, as legislator, would have to say exactly what\nyou meant by 'moderate.' 'Very true.' And is our lawgiver to have no\npreamble or interpretation of his laws, never offering a word of advice\nto his subjects, after the manner of some doctors? For of doctors are\nthere not two kinds? The one gentle and the other rough, doctors who are\nfreemen and learn themselves and teach their pupils scientifically, and\ndoctor's assistants who get their knowledge empirically by attending on\ntheir masters? 'Of course there are.' And did you ever observe that the\ngentlemen doctors practise upon freemen, and that slave doctors confine\nthemselves to slaves? The latter go about the country or wait for the\nslaves at the dispensaries. They hold no parley with their patients\nabout their diseases or the remedies of them; they practise by the rule\nof thumb, and give their decrees in the most arbitrary manner. When they\nhave doctored one patient they run off to another, whom they treat with\nequal assurance, their duty being to relieve the master of the care\nof his sick slaves. But the other doctor, who practises on freemen,\nproceeds in quite a different way. He takes counsel with his patient and\nlearns from him, and never does anything until he has persuaded him of\nwhat he is doing. He trusts to influence rather than force. Now is not\nthe use of both methods far better than the use of either alone? And\nboth together may be advantageously employed by us in legislation.\n\nWe may illustrate our proposal by an example. The laws relating to\nmarriage naturally come first, and therefore we may begin with them. The\nsimple law would be as follows:--A man shall marry between the ages of\nthirty and thirty-five; if he do not, he shall be fined or deprived of\ncertain privileges. The double law would add the reason why: Forasmuch\nas man desires immortality, which he attains by the procreation of\nchildren, no one should deprive himself of his share in this good. He\nwho obeys the law is blameless, but he who disobeys must not be a gainer\nby his celibacy; and therefore he shall pay a yearly fine, and shall not\nbe allowed to receive honour from the young. That is an example of what\nI call the double law, which may enable us to judge how far the addition\nof persuasion to threats is desirable. 'Lacedaemonians in general,\nStranger, are in favour of brevity; in this case, however, I prefer\nlength. But Cleinias is the real lawgiver, and he ought to be first\nconsulted.' 'Thank you, Megillus.' Whether words are to be many or few,\nis a foolish question:--the best and not the shortest forms are always\nto be approved. And legislators have never thought of the advantages\nwhich they might gain by using persuasion as well as force, but trust to\nforce only. And I have something else to say about the matter. Here have\nwe been from early dawn until noon, discoursing about laws, and all that\nwe have been saying is only the preamble of the laws which we are about\nto give. I tell you this, because I want you to observe that songs and\nstrains have all of them preludes, but that laws, though called by the\nsame name (nomoi), have never any prelude. Now I am disposed to give\npreludes to laws, dividing them into two parts--one containing the\ndespotic command, which I described under the image of the slave\ndoctor--the other the persuasive part, which I term the preamble. The\nlegislator should give preludes or preambles to his laws. 'That shall\nbe the way in my colony.' I am glad that you agree with me; this is\na matter which it is important to remember. A preamble is not always\nnecessary to a law: the lawgiver must determine when it is needed, as\nthe musician determines when there is to be a prelude to a song. 'Most\ntrue: and now, having a preamble, let us recommence our discourse.'\nEnough has been said of Gods and parents, and we may proceed to consider\nwhat relates to the citizens--their souls, bodies, properties,--their\noccupations and amusements; and so arrive at the nature of education.\n\nThe first word of the Laws somewhat abruptly introduces the thought\nwhich is present to the mind of Plato throughout the work, namely, that\nLaw is of divine origin. In the words of a great English writer--'Her\nseat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world.' Though\nthe particular laws of Sparta and Crete had a narrow and imperfect aim,\nthis is not true of divine laws, which are based upon the principles of\nhuman nature, and not framed to meet the exigencies of the moment. They\nhave their natural divisions, too, answering to the kinds of virtue;\nvery unlike the discordant enactments of an Athenian assembly or of an\nEnglish Parliament. Yet we may observe two inconsistencies in Plato's\ntreatment of the subject: first, a lesser, inasmuch as he does not\nclearly distinguish the Cretan and Spartan laws, of which the exclusive\naim is war, from those other laws of Zeus and Apollo which are said to\nbe divine, and to comprehend all virtue. Secondly, we may retort on him\nhis own complaint against Sparta and Crete, that he has himself given us\na code of laws, which for the most part have a military character; and\nthat we cannot point to 'obvious examples of similar institutions which\nare concerned with pleasure;' at least there is only one such, that\nwhich relates to the regulation of convivial intercourse. The military\nspirit which is condemned by him in the beginning of the Laws, reappears\nin the seventh and eighth books.\n\nThe mention of Minos the great lawgiver, and of Rhadamanthus the\nrighteous administrator of the law, suggests the two divisions of the\nlaws into enactments and appointments of officers. The legislator and\nthe judge stand side by side, and their functions cannot be wholly\ndistinguished. For the judge is in some sort a legislator, at any\nrate in small matters; and his decisions growing into precedents, must\ndetermine the innumerable details which arise out of the conflict of\ncircumstances. These Plato proposes to leave to a younger generation\nof legislators. The action of courts of law in making law seems to\nhave escaped him, probably because the Athenian law-courts were popular\nassemblies; and, except in a mythical form, he can hardly be said to\nhave had before his eyes the ideal of a judge. In reading the Laws of\nPlato, or any other ancient writing about Laws, we should consider\nhow gradual the process is by which not only a legal system, but the\nadministration of a court of law, becomes perfected.\n\nThere are other subjects on which Plato breaks ground, as his manner is,\nearly in the work. First, he gives a sketch of the subject of laws; they\nare to comprehend the whole of human life, from infancy to age, and from\nbirth to death, although the proposed plan is far from being regularly\nexecuted in the books which follow, partly owing to the necessity of\ndescribing the constitution as well as the laws of his new colony.\nSecondly, he touches on the power of music, which may exercise so\ngreat an influence on the character of men for good or evil; he refers\nespecially to the great offence--which he mentions again, and which he\nhad condemned in the Republic--of varying the modes and rhythms, as\nwell as to that of separating the words from the music. Thirdly, he\nreprobates the prevalence of unnatural loves in Sparta and Crete, which\nhe attributes to the practice of syssitia and gymnastic exercises, and\nconsiders to be almost inseparable from them. To this subject he again\nreturns in the eighth book. Fourthly, the virtues are affirmed to be\ninseparable from one another, even if not absolutely one; this, too, is\na principle which he reasserts at the conclusion of the work. As in\nthe beginnings of Plato's other writings, we have here several 'notes'\nstruck, which form the preludes of longer discussions, although the hint\nis less ingeniously given, and the promise more imperfectly fulfilled\nthan in the earlier dialogues.\n\nThe distinction between ethics and politics has not yet dawned upon\nPlato's mind. To him, law is still floating in a region between the two.\nHe would have desired that all the acts and laws of a state should\nhave regard to all virtue. But he did not see that politics and law are\nsubject to their own conditions, and are distinguished from ethics by\nnatural differences. The actions of which politics take cognisance are\nnecessarily collective or representative; and law is limited to external\nacts which affect others as well as the agents. Ethics, on the other\nhand, include the whole duty of man in relation both to himself and\nothers. But Plato has never reflected on these differences. He fancies\nthat the life of the state can be as easily fashioned as that of the\nindividual. He is favourable to a balance of power, but never seems\nto have considered that power might be so balanced as to produce an\nabsolute immobility in the state. Nor is he alive to the evils\nof confounding vice and crime; or to the necessity of governments\nabstaining from excessive interference with their subjects.\n\nYet this confusion of ethics and politics has also a better and a truer\nside. If unable to grasp some important distinctions, Plato is at any\nrate seeking to elevate the lower to the higher; he does not pull down\nthe principles of men to their practice, or narrow the conception of\nthe state to the immediate necessities of politics. Political ideals of\nfreedom and equality, of a divine government which has been or will be\nin some other age or country, have greatly tended to educate and ennoble\nthe human race. And if not the first author of such ideals (for they are\nas old as Hesiod), Plato has done more than any other writer to impress\nthem on the world. To those who censure his idealism we may reply in his\nown words--'He is not the worse painter who draws a perfectly beautiful\nfigure, because no such figure of a man could ever have existed'\n(Republic).\n\nA new thought about education suddenly occurs to him, and for a time\nexercises a sort of fascination over his mind, though in the later books\nof the Laws it is forgotten or overlooked. As true courage is allied to\ntemperance, so there must be an education which shall train mankind to\nresist pleasure as well as to endure pain. No one can be on his guard\nagainst that of which he has no experience. The perfectly trained\ncitizen should have been accustomed to look his enemy in the face, and\nto measure his strength against her. This education in pleasure is to be\ngiven, partly by festive intercourse, but chiefly by the song and dance.\nYouth are to learn music and gymnastics; their elders are to be trained\nand tested at drinking parties. According to the old proverb, in vino\nveritas, they will then be open and visible to the world in their true\ncharacters; and also they will be more amenable to the laws, and more\neasily moulded by the hand of the legislator. The first reason is\ncurious enough, though not important; the second can hardly be thought\ndeserving of much attention. Yet if Plato means to say that society\nis one of the principal instruments of education in after-life, he has\nexpressed in an obscure fashion a principle which is true, and to\nhis contemporaries was also new. That at a banquet a degree of moral\ndiscipline might be exercised is an original thought, but Plato has not\nyet learnt to express his meaning in an abstract form. He is sensible\nthat moderation is better than total abstinence, and that asceticism is\nbut a one-sided training. He makes the sagacious remark, that 'those who\nare able to resist pleasure may often be among the worst of mankind.' He\nis as much aware as any modern utilitarian that the love of pleasure is\nthe great motive of human action. This cannot be eradicated, and must\ntherefore be regulated,--the pleasure must be of the right sort.\nSuch reflections seem to be the real, though imperfectly expressed,\ngroundwork of the discussion. As in the juxtaposition of the Bacchic\nmadness and the great gift of Dionysus, or where he speaks of the\ndifferent senses in which pleasure is and is not the object of imitative\nart, or in the illustration of the failure of the Dorian institutions\nfrom the prayer of Theseus, we have to gather his meaning as well as we\ncan from the connexion.\n\nThe feeling of old age is discernible in this as well as in several\nother passages of the Laws. Plato has arrived at the time when men sit\nstill and look on at life; and he is willing to allow himself and others\nthe few pleasures which remain to them. Wine is to cheer them now that\ntheir limbs are old and their blood runs cold. They are the best critics\nof dancing and music, but cannot be induced to join in song unless they\nhave been enlivened by drinking. Youth has no need of the stimulus\nof wine, but age can only be made young again by its invigorating\ninfluence. Total abstinence for the young, moderate and increasing\npotations for the old, is Plato's principle. The fire, of which there is\ntoo much in the one, has to be brought to the other. Drunkenness, like\nmadness, had a sacredness and mystery to the Greek; if, on the one hand,\nas in the case of the Tarentines, it degraded a whole population, it was\nalso a mode of worshipping the god Dionysus, which was to be practised\non certain occasions. Moreover, the intoxication produced by the fruit\nof the vine was very different from the grosser forms of drunkenness\nwhich prevail among some modern nations.\n\nThe physician in modern times would restrict the old man's use of wine\nwithin narrow limits. He would tell us that you cannot restore strength\nby a stimulus. Wine may call back the vital powers in disease, but\ncannot reinvigorate old age. In his maxims of health and longevity,\nthough aware of the importance of a simple diet, Plato has omitted to\ndwell on the perfect rule of moderation. His commendation of wine is\nprobably a passing fancy, and may have arisen out of his own habits\nor tastes. If so, he is not the only philosopher whose theory has been\nbased upon his practice.\n\nPlato's denial of wine to the young and his approval of it for\ntheir elders has some points of view which may be illustrated by the\ntemperance controversy of our own times. Wine may be allowed to have a\nreligious as well as a festive use; it is commended both in the Old and\nNew Testament; it has been sung of by nearly all poets; and it may be\ntruly said to have a healing influence both on body and mind. Yet it is\nalso very liable to excess and abuse, and for this reason is prohibited\nby Mahometans, as well as of late years by many Christians, no less than\nby the ancient Spartans; and to sound its praises seriously seems to\npartake of the nature of a paradox. But we may rejoin with Plato that\nthe abuse of a good thing does not take away the use of it. Total\nabstinence, as we often say, is not the best rule, but moderate\nindulgence; and it is probably true that a temperate use of wine may\ncontribute some elements of character to social life which we can ill\nafford to lose. It draws men out of their reserve; it helps them to\nforget themselves and to appear as they by nature are when not on their\nguard, and therefore to make them more human and greater friends to\ntheir fellow-men. It gives them a new experience; it teaches them to\ncombine self-control with a measure of indulgence; it may sometimes\nrestore to them the simplicity of childhood. We entirely agree with\nPlato in forbidding the use of wine to the young; but when we are\nof mature age there are occasions on which we derive refreshment and\nstrength from moderate potations. It is well to make abstinence the\nrule, but the rule may sometimes admit of an exception. We are in a\nhigher, as well as in a lower sense, the better for the use of wine.\nThe question runs up into wider ones--What is the general effect of\nasceticism on human nature? and, Must there not be a certain proportion\nbetween the aspirations of man and his powers?--questions which have\nbeen often discussed both by ancient and modern philosophers. So\nby comparing things old and new we may sometimes help to realize to\nourselves the meaning of Plato in the altered circumstances of our own\nlife.\n\nLike the importance which he attaches to festive entertainments, his\ndepreciation of courage to the fourth place in the scale of virtue\nappears to be somewhat rhetorical and exaggerated. But he is speaking\nof courage in the lower sense of the term, not as including loyalty or\ntemperance. He does not insist in this passage, as in the Protagoras,\non the unity of the virtues; or, as in the Laches, on the identity of\nwisdom and courage. But he says that they all depend upon their leader\nmind, and that, out of the union of wisdom and temperance with courage,\nsprings justice. Elsewhere he is disposed to regard temperance rather\nas a condition of all virtue than as a particular virtue. He generalizes\ntemperance, as in the Republic he generalizes justice. The nature of the\nvirtues is to run up into one another, and in many passages Plato makes\nbut a faint effort to distinguish them. He still quotes the poets,\nsomewhat enlarging, as his manner is, or playing with their meaning. The\nmartial poet Tyrtaeus, and the oligarch Theognis, furnish him with\nhappy illustrations of the two sorts of courage. The fear of fear, the\ndivision of goods into human and divine, the acknowledgment that peace\nand reconciliation are better than the appeal to the sword, the analysis\nof temperance into resistance of pleasure as well as endurance of pain,\nthe distinction between the education which is suitable for a trade or\nprofession, and for the whole of life, are important and probably new\nethical conceptions. Nor has Plato forgotten his old paradox (Gorgias)\nthat to be punished is better than to be unpunished, when he says, that\nto the bad man death is the only mitigation of his evil. He is not less\nideal in many passages of the Laws than in the Gorgias or Republic. But\nhis wings are heavy, and he is unequal to any sustained flight.\n\nThere is more attempt at dramatic effect in the first book than in\nthe later parts of the work. The outburst of martial spirit in the\nLacedaemonian, 'O best of men'; the protest which the Cretan makes\nagainst the supposed insult to his lawgiver; the cordial acknowledgment\non the part of both of them that laws should not be discussed publicly\nby those who live under their rule; the difficulty which they alike\nexperience in following the speculations of the Athenian, are highly\ncharacteristic.\n\nIn the second book, Plato pursues further his notion of educating by\na right use of pleasure. He begins by conceiving an endless power of\nyouthful life, which is to be reduced to rule and measure by harmony and\nrhythm. Men differ from the lower animals in that they are capable of\nmusical discipline. But music, like all art, must be truly imitative,\nand imitative of what is true and good. Art and morality agree in\nrejecting pleasure as the criterion of good. True art is inseparable\nfrom the highest and most ennobling ideas. Plato only recognizes the\nidentity of pleasure and good when the pleasure is of the higher kind.\nHe is the enemy of 'songs without words,' which he supposes to have some\nconfusing or enervating effect on the mind of the hearer; and he is also\nopposed to the modern degeneracy of the drama, which he would probably\nhave illustrated, like Aristophanes, from Euripides and Agathon. From\nthis passage may be gathered a more perfect conception of art than\nfrom any other of Plato's writings. He understands that art is at\nonce imitative and ideal, an exact representation of truth, and also a\nrepresentation of the highest truth. The same double view of art may be\ngathered from a comparison of the third and tenth books of the Republic,\nbut is here more clearly and pointedly expressed.\n\nWe are inclined to suspect that both here and in the Republic Plato\nexaggerates the influence really exercised by the song and the dance.\nBut we must remember also the susceptible nature of the Greek, and the\nperfection to which these arts were carried by him. Further, the music\nhad a sacred and Pythagorean character; the dance too was part of a\nreligious festival. And only at such festivals the sexes mingled in\npublic, and the youths passed under the eyes of their elders.\n\nAt the beginning of the third book, Plato abruptly asks the question,\nWhat is the origin of states? The answer is, Infinite time. We have\nalready seen--in the Theaetetus, where he supposes that in the course of\nages every man has had numberless progenitors, kings and slaves, Greeks\nand barbarians; and in the Critias, where he says that nine thousand\nyears have elapsed since the island of Atlantis fought with Athens--that\nPlato is no stranger to the conception of long periods of time. He\nimagines human society to have been interrupted by natural convulsions;\nand beginning from the last of these, he traces the steps by which the\nfamily has grown into the state, and the original scattered society,\nbecoming more and more civilised, has finally passed into military\norganizations like those of Crete and Sparta. His conception of the\norigin of states is far truer in the Laws than in the Republic; but it\nmust be remembered that here he is giving an historical, there an ideal\npicture of the growth of society.\n\nModern enquirers, like Plato, have found in infinite ages the\nexplanation not only of states, but of languages, men, animals, the\nworld itself; like him, also, they have detected in later institutions\nthe vestiges of a patriarchal state still surviving. Thus far Plato\nspeaks as 'the spectator of all time and all existence,' who may be\nthought by some divine instinct to have guessed at truths which were\nhereafter to be revealed. He is far above the vulgar notion that Hellas\nis the civilized world (Statesman), or that civilization only began when\nthe Hellenes appeared on the scene. But he has no special knowledge\nof 'the days before the flood'; and when he approaches more historical\ntimes, in preparing the way for his own theory of mixed government,\nhe argues partially and erroneously. He is desirous of showing that\nunlimited power is ruinous to any state, and hence he is led to\nattribute a tyrannical spirit to the first Dorian kings. The decay of\nArgos and the destruction of Messene are adduced by him as a manifest\nproof of their failure; and Sparta, he thinks, was only preserved by the\nlimitations which the wisdom of successive legislators introduced into\nthe government. But there is no more reason to suppose that the Dorian\nrule of life which was followed at Sparta ever prevailed in Argos and\nMessene, than to assume that Dorian institutions were framed to protect\nthe Greeks against the power of Assyria; or that the empire of Assyria\nwas in any way affected by the Trojan war; or that the return of the\nHeraclidae was only the return of Achaean exiles, who received a new\nname from their leader Dorieus. Such fancies were chiefly based, as far\nas they had any foundation, on the use of analogy, which played a great\npart in the dawn of historical and geographical research. Because there\nwas a Persian empire which was the natural enemy of the Greek, there\nmust also have been an Assyrian empire, which had a similar hostility;\nand not only the fable of the island of Atlantis, but the Trojan war,\nin Plato's mind derived some features from the Persian struggle. So\nHerodotus makes the Nile answer to the Ister, and the valley of the Nile\nto the Red Sea. In the Republic, Plato is flying in the air regardless\nof fact and possibility--in the Laws, he is making history by analogy.\nIn the former, he appears to be like some modern philosophers,\nabsolutely devoid of historical sense; in the latter, he is on a level,\nnot with Thucydides, or the critical historians of Greece, but with\nHerodotus, or even with Ctesias.\n\nThe chief object of Plato in tracing the origin of society is to show\nthe point at which regular government superseded the patriarchical\nauthority, and the separate customs of different families were\nsystematized by legislators, and took the form of laws consented to\nby them all. According to Plato, the only sound principle on which any\ngovernment could be based was a mixture or balance of power. The balance\nof power saved Sparta, when the two other Heraclid states fell into\ndisorder. Here is probably the first trace of a political idea, which\nhas exercised a vast influence both in ancient and modern times. And\nyet we might fairly ask, a little parodying the language of Plato--O\nlegislator, is unanimity only 'the struggle for existence'; or is the\nbalance of powers in a state better than the harmony of them?\n\nIn the fourth book we approach the realities of politics, and Plato\nbegins to ascend to the height of his great argument. The reign of\nCronos has passed away, and various forms of government have succeeded,\nwhich are all based on self-interest and self-preservation. Right and\nwrong, instead of being measured by the will of God, are created by\nthe law of the state. The strongest assertions are made of the purely\nspiritual nature of religion--'Without holiness no man is accepted of\nGod'; and of the duty of filial obedience,--'Honour thy parents.' The\nlegislator must teach these precepts as well as command them. He is to\nbe the educator as well as the lawgiver of future ages, and his laws\nare themselves to form a part of the education of the state. Unlike the\npoet, he must be definite and rational; he cannot be allowed to say one\nthing at one time, and another thing at another--he must know what he\nis about. And yet legislation has a poetical or rhetorical element, and\nmust find words which will wing their way to the hearts of men. Laws\nmust be promulgated before they are put in execution, and mankind must\nbe reasoned with before they are punished. The legislator, when he\npromulgates a particular law, will courteously entreat those who are\nwilling to hear his voice. Upon the rebellious only does the heavy blow\ndescend. A sermon and a law in one, blending the secular punishment with\nthe religious sanction, appeared to Plato a new idea which might have a\ngreat result in reforming the world. The experiment had never been\ntried of reasoning with mankind; the laws of others had never had any\npreambles, and Plato seems to have great pleasure in contemplating his\ndiscovery.\n\nIn these quaint forms of thought and language, great principles of\nmorals and legislation are enunciated by him for the first time. They\nall go back to mind and God, who holds the beginning, middle, and end of\nall things in His hand. The adjustment of the divine and human elements\nin the world is conceived in the spirit of modern popular philosophy,\ndiffering not much in the mode of expression. At first sight the\nlegislator appears to be impotent, for all things are the sport of\nchance. But we admit also that God governs all things, and that chance\nand opportunity co-operate with Him (compare the saying, that chance is\nthe name of the unknown cause). Lastly, while we acknowledge that God\nand chance govern mankind and provide the conditions of human action,\nexperience will not allow us to deny a place to art. We know that there\nis a use in having a pilot, though the storm may overwhelm him; and a\nlegislator is required to provide for the happiness of a state, although\nhe will pray for favourable conditions under which he may exercise his\nart.\n\nBOOK V. Hear now, all ye who heard the laws about Gods and ancestors:\nOf all human possessions the soul is most divine, and most truly a man's\nown. For in every man there are two parts--a better which rules, and an\ninferior which serves; and the ruler is to be preferred to the servant.\nWherefore I bid every one next after the Gods to honour his own soul,\nand he can only honour her by making her better. A man does not honour\nhis soul by flattery, or gifts, or self-indulgence, or conceit of\nknowledge, nor when he blames others for his own errors; nor when he\nindulges in pleasure or refuses to bear pain; nor when he thinks that\nlife at any price is a good, because he fears the world below, which,\nfar from being an evil, may be the greatest good; nor when he prefers\nbeauty to virtue--not reflecting that the soul, which came from heaven,\nis more honourable than the body, which is earth-born; nor when\nhe covets dishonest gains, of which no amount is equal in value to\nvirtue;--in a word, when he counts that which the legislator pronounces\nevil to be good, he degrades his soul, which is the divinest part of\nhim. He does not consider that the real punishment of evil-doing is to\ngrow like evil men, and to shun the conversation of the good: and that\nhe who is joined to such men must do and suffer what they by nature do\nand say to one another, which suffering is not justice but retribution.\nFor justice is noble, but retribution is only the companion of\ninjustice. And whether a man escapes punishment or not, he is equally\nmiserable; for in the one case he is not cured, and in the other case he\nperishes that the rest may be saved.\n\nThe glory of man is to follow the better and improve the inferior. And\nthe soul is that part of man which is most inclined to avoid the evil\nand dwell with the good. Wherefore also the soul is second only to the\nGods in honour, and in the third place the body is to be esteemed, which\noften has a false honour. For honour is not to be given to the fair or\nthe strong, or the swift or the tall, or to the healthy, any more than\nto their opposites, but to the mean states of all these habits; and so\nof property and external goods. No man should heap up riches that he may\nleave them to his children. The best condition for them as for the state\nis a middle one, in which there is a freedom without luxury. And the\nbest inheritance of children is modesty. But modesty cannot be implanted\nby admonition only--the elders must set the example. He who would train\nthe young must first train himself.\n\nHe who honours his kindred and family may fairly expect that the Gods\nwill give him children. He who would have friends must think much of\ntheir favours to him, and little of his to them. He who prefers to an\nOlympic, or any other victory, to win the palm of obedience to the laws,\nserves best both the state and his fellow-citizens. Engagements with\nstrangers are to be deemed most sacred, because the stranger, having\nneither kindred nor friends, is immediately under the protection of\nZeus, the God of strangers. A prudent man will not sin against the\nstranger; and still more carefully will he avoid sinning against the\nsuppliant, which is an offence never passed over by the Gods.\n\nI will now speak of those particulars which are matters of praise and\nblame only, and which, although not enforced by the law, greatly affect\nthe disposition to obey the law. Truth has the first place among the\ngifts of Gods and men, for truth begets trust; but he is not to be\ntrusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary\nfalsehood is a fool. Neither the ignorant nor the untrustworthy man\nis happy; for they have no friends in life, and die unlamented and\nuntended. Good is he who does no injustice--better who prevents others\nfrom doing any--best of all who joins the rulers in punishing injustice.\nAnd this is true of goods and virtues in general; he who has and\ncommunicates them to others is the man of men; he who would, if he\ncould, is second-best; he who has them and is jealous of imparting them\nto others is to be blamed, but the good or virtue which he has is to be\nvalued still. Let every man contend in the race without envy; for the\nunenvious man increases the strength of the city; himself foremost in\nthe race, he harms no one with calumny. Whereas the envious man is\nweak himself, and drives his rivals to despair with his slanders, thus\ndepriving the whole city of incentives to the exercise of virtue, and\ntarnishing her glory. Every man should be gentle, but also passionate;\nfor he must have the spirit to fight against incurable and malignant\nevil. But the evil which is remediable should be dealt with more in\nsorrow than anger. He who is unjust is to be pitied in any case; for\nno man voluntarily does evil or allows evil to exist in his soul. And\ntherefore he who deals with the curable sort must be long-suffering and\nforbearing; but the incurable shall have the vials of our wrath poured\nout upon him. The greatest of all evils is self-love, which is thought\nto be natural and excusable, and is enforced as a duty, and yet is\nthe cause of many errors. The lover is blinded about the beloved, and\nprefers his own interests to truth and right; but the truly great\nman seeks justice before all things. Self-love is the source of\nthat ignorant conceit of knowledge which is always doing and never\nsucceeding. Wherefore let every man avoid self-love, and follow the\nguidance of those who are better than himself. There are lesser matters\nwhich a man should recall to mind; for wisdom is like a stream, ever\nflowing in and out, and recollection flows in when knowledge is failing.\nLet no man either laugh or grieve overmuch; but let him control his\nfeelings in the day of good- or ill-fortune, believing that the Gods\nwill diminish the evils and increase the blessings of the righteous.\nThese are thoughts which should ever occupy a good man's mind; he should\nremember them both in lighter and in more serious hours, and remind\nothers of them.\n\nSo much of divine matters and the relation of man to God. But man is\nman, and dependent on pleasure and pain; and therefore to acquire a true\ntaste respecting either is a great matter. And what is a true taste?\nThis can only be explained by a comparison of one life with another.\nPleasure is an object of desire, pain of avoidance; and the absence of\npain is to be preferred to pain, but not to pleasure. There are infinite\nkinds and degrees of both of them, and we choose the life which has more\npleasure and avoid that which has less; but we do not choose that life\nin which the elements of pleasure are either feeble or equally balanced\nwith pain. All the lives which we desire are pleasant; the choice of any\nothers is due to inexperience.\n\nNow there are four lives--the temperate, the rational, the courageous,\nthe healthful; and to these let us oppose four others--the intemperate,\nthe foolish, the cowardly, the diseased. The temperate life has gentle\npains and pleasures and placid desires, the intemperate life has violent\ndelights, and still more violent desires. And the pleasures of the\ntemperate exceed the pains, while the pains of the intemperate exceed\nthe pleasures. But if this is true, none are voluntarily intemperate,\nbut all who lack temperance are either ignorant or wanting in\nself-control: for men always choose the life which (as they think)\nexceeds in pleasure. The wise, the healthful, the courageous life have\na similar advantage--they also exceed their opposites in pleasure.\nAnd, generally speaking, the life of virtue is far more pleasurable and\nhonourable, fairer and happier far, than the life of vice. Let this be\nthe preamble of our laws; the strain will follow.\n\nAs in a web the warp is stronger than the woof, so should the rulers be\nstronger than their half-educated subjects. Let us suppose, then, that\nin the constitution of a state there are two parts, the appointment\nof the rulers, and the laws which they have to administer. But, before\ngoing further, there are some preliminary matters which have to be\nconsidered.\n\nAs of animals, so also of men, a selection must be made; the bad breed\nmust be got rid of, and the good retained. The legislator must purify\nthem, and if he be not a despot he will find this task to be a difficult\none. The severer kinds of purification are practised when great\noffenders are punished by death or exile, but there is a milder process\nwhich is necessary when the poor show a disposition to attack the\nproperty of the rich, for then the legislator will send them off to\nanother land, under the name of a colony. In our case, however, we\nshall only need to purify the streams before they meet. This is often\na troublesome business, but in theory we may suppose the operation\nperformed, and the desired purity attained. Evil men we will hinder from\ncoming, and receive the good as friends.\n\nLike the old Heraclid colony, we are fortunate in escaping the abolition\nof debts and the distribution of land, which are difficult and dangerous\nquestions. But, perhaps, now that we are speaking of the subject, we\nought to say how, if the danger existed, the legislator should try to\navert it. He would have recourse to prayers, and trust to the healing\ninfluence of time. He would create a kindly spirit between creditors and\ndebtors: those who have should give to those who have not, and poverty\nshould be held to be rather the increase of a man's desires than the\ndiminution of his property. Good-will is the only safe and enduring\nfoundation of the political society; and upon this our city shall\nbe built. The lawgiver, if he is wise, will not proceed with the\narrangement of the state until all disputes about property are settled.\nAnd for him to introduce fresh grounds of quarrel would be madness.\n\nLet us now proceed to the distribution of our state, and determine the\nsize of the territory and the number of the allotments. The territory\nshould be sufficient to maintain the citizens in moderation, and the\npopulation should be numerous enough to defend themselves, and sometimes\nto aid their neighbours. We will fix the number of citizens at 5040, to\nwhich the number of houses and portions of land shall correspond. Let\nthe number be divided into two parts and then into three; for it is\nvery convenient for the purposes of distribution, and is capable of\nfifty-nine divisions, ten of which proceed without interval from one to\nten. Here are numbers enough for war and peace, and for all contracts\nand dealings. These properties of numbers are true, and should be\nascertained with a view to use.\n\nIn carrying out the distribution of the land, a prudent legislator will\nbe careful to respect any provision for religious worship which has been\nsanctioned by ancient tradition or by the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, or\nAmmon. All sacrifices, and altars, and temples, whatever may be their\norigin, should remain as they are. Every division should have a patron\nGod or hero; to these a portion of the domain should be appropriated,\nand at their temples the inhabitants of the districts should meet\ntogether from time to time, for the sake of mutual help and friendship.\nAll the citizens of a state should be known to one another; for where\nmen are in the dark about each other's characters, there can be\nno justice or right administration. Every man should be true and\nsingle-minded, and should not allow himself to be deceived by others.\n\nAnd now the game opens, and we begin to move the pieces. At first sight,\nour constitution may appear singular and ill-adapted to a legislator who\nhas not despotic power; but on second thoughts will be deemed to be,\nif not the very best, the second best. For there are three forms of\ngovernment, a first, a second, and a third best, out of which Cleinias\nhas now to choose. The first and highest form is that in which friends\nhave all things in common, including wives and property,--in which they\nhave common fears, hopes, desires, and do not even call their eyes or\ntheir hands their own. This is the ideal state; than which there never\ncan be a truer or better--a state, whether inhabited by Gods or sons of\nGods, which will make the dwellers therein blessed. Here is the pattern\non which we must ever fix our eyes; but we are now concerned with\nanother, which comes next to it, and we will afterwards proceed to a\nthird.\n\nInasmuch as our citizens are not fitted either by nature or education to\nreceive the saying, Friends have all things in common, let them retain\ntheir houses and private property, but use them in the service of their\ncountry, who is their God and parent, and of the Gods and demigods of\nthe land. Their first care should be to preserve the number of their\nlots. This may be secured in the following manner: when the possessor of\na lot dies, he shall leave his lot to his best-beloved child, who will\nbecome the heir of all duties and interests, and will minister to the\nGods and to the family, to the living and to the dead. Of the remaining\nchildren, the females must be given in marriage according to the law to\nbe hereafter enacted; the males may be assigned to citizens who have no\nchildren of their own. How to equalize families and allotments will be\none of the chief cares of the guardians of the laws. When parents have\ntoo many children they may give to those who have none, or couples\nmay abstain from having children, or, if there is a want of offspring,\nspecial care may be taken to obtain them; or if the number of citizens\nbecomes excessive, we may send away the surplus to found a colony. If,\non the other hand, a war or plague diminishes the number of inhabitants,\nnew citizens must be introduced; and these ought not, if possible, to be\nmen of low birth or inferior training; but even God, it is said, cannot\nalways fight against necessity.\n\nWherefore we will thus address our citizens:--Good friends, honour\norder and equality, and above all the number 5040. Secondly, respect the\noriginal division of the lots, which must not be infringed by buying and\nselling, for the law says that the land which a man has is sacred and\nis given to him by God. And priests and priestesses will offer frequent\nsacrifices and pray that he who alienates either house or lot may\nreceive the punishment which he deserves, and their prayers shall be\ninscribed on tablets of cypress-wood for the instruction of posterity.\nThe guardians will keep a vigilant watch over the citizens, and they\nwill punish those who disobey God and the law.\n\nTo appreciate the benefit of such an institution a man requires to be\nwell educated; for he certainly will not make a fortune in our state, in\nwhich all illiberal occupations are forbidden to freemen. The law also\nprovides that no private person shall have gold or silver, except\na little coin for daily use, which will not pass current in other\ncountries. The state must also possess a common Hellenic currency, but\nthis is only to be used in defraying the expenses of expeditions, or of\nembassies, or while a man is on foreign travels; but in the latter case\nhe must deliver up what is over, when he comes back, to the treasury in\nreturn for an equal amount of local currency, on pain of losing the sum\nin question; and he who does not inform against an offender is to be\nmulcted in a like sum. No money is to be given or taken as a dowry, or\nto be lent on interest. The law will not protect a man in recovering\neither interest or principal. All these regulations imply that the\naim of the legislator is not to make the city as rich or as mighty as\npossible, but the best and happiest. Now men can hardly be at the same\ntime very virtuous and very rich. And why? Because he who makes twice as\nmuch and saves twice as much as he ought, receiving where he ought not\nand not spending where he ought, will be at least twice as rich as he\nwho makes money where he ought, and spends where he ought. On the other\nhand, an utterly bad man is generally profligate and poor, while he who\nacquires honestly, and spends what he acquires on noble objects, can\nhardly be very rich. A very rich man is therefore not a good man, and\ntherefore not a happy one. But the object of our laws is to make the\ncitizens as friendly and happy as possible, which they cannot be if they\nare always at law and injuring each other in the pursuit of gain. And\ntherefore we say that there is to be no silver or gold in the state,\nnor usury, nor the rearing of the meaner kinds of live-stock, but only\nagriculture, and only so much of this as will not lead men to neglect\nthat for the sake of which money is made, first the soul and afterwards\nthe body; neither of which are good for much without music and\ngymnastic. Money is to be held in honour last or third; the highest\ninterests being those of the soul, and in the second class are to be\nranked those of the body. This is the true order of legislation, which\nwould be inverted by placing health before temperance, and wealth before\nhealth.\n\nIt might be well if every man could come to the colony having equal\nproperty; but equality is impossible, and therefore we must avoid causes\nof offence by having property valued and by equalizing taxation. To\nthis end, let us make four classes in which the citizens may be placed\naccording to the measure of their original property, and the changes of\ntheir fortune. The greatest of evils is revolution; and this, as the\nlaw will say, is caused by extremes of poverty or wealth. The limit\nof poverty shall be the lot, which must not be diminished, and may be\nincreased fivefold, but not more. He who exceeds the limit must give up\nthe excess to the state; but if he does not, and is informed against,\nthe surplus shall be divided between the informer and the Gods, and\nhe shall pay a sum equal to the surplus out Of his own property. All\nproperty other than the lot must be inscribed in a register, so that any\ndisputes which arise may be easily determined.\n\nThe city shall be placed in a suitable situation, as nearly as possible\nin the centre of the country, and shall be divided into twelve wards.\nFirst, we will erect an acropolis, encircled by a wall, within which\nshall be placed the temples of Hestia, and Zeus, and Athene. From this\nshall be drawn lines dividing the city, and also the country, into\ntwelve sections, and the country shall be subdivided into 5040 lots.\nEach lot shall contain two parts, one at a distance, the other near the\ncity; and the distance of one part shall be compensated by the nearness\nof the other, the badness and goodness by the greater or less size.\nTwelve lots will be assigned to twelve Gods, and they will give their\nnames to the tribes. The divisions of the city shall correspond to those\nof the country; and every man shall have two habitations, one near the\ncentre of the country, the other at the extremity.\n\nThe objection will naturally arise, that all the advantages of which we\nhave been speaking will never concur. The citizens will not tolerate a\nsettlement in which they are deprived of gold and silver, and have the\nnumber of their families regulated, and the sites of their houses fixed\nby law. It will be said that our city is a mere image of wax. And the\nlegislator will answer: 'I know it, but I maintain that we ought to set\nforth an ideal which is as perfect as possible. If difficulties arise\nin the execution of the plan, we must avoid them and carry out the\nremainder. But the legislator must first be allowed to complete his idea\nwithout interruption.'\n\nThe number twelve, which we have chosen for the number of division,\nmust run through all parts of the state,--phratries, villages, ranks\nof soldiers, coins, and measures wet and dry, which are all to be made\ncommensurable with one another. There is no meanness in requiring that\nthe smallest vessels should have a common measure; for the divisions of\nnumber are useful in measuring height and depth, as well as sounds and\nmotions, upwards or downwards, or round and round. The legislator\nshould impress on his citizens the value of arithmetic. No instrument of\neducation has so much power; nothing more tends to sharpen and inspire\nthe dull intellect. But the legislator must be careful to instil a\nnoble and generous spirit into the students, or they will tend to become\ncunning rather than wise. This may be proved by the example of the\nEgyptians and Phoenicians, who, notwithstanding their knowledge of\narithmetic, are degraded in their general character; whether this defect\nin them is due to some natural cause or to a bad legislator. For it\nis clear that there are great differences in the power of regions to\nproduce good men: heat and cold, and water and food, have great effects\nboth on body and soul; and those spots are peculiarly fortunate in which\nthe air is holy, and the Gods are pleased to dwell. To all this the\nlegislator must attend, so far as in him lies.\n\nBOOK VI. And now we are about to consider (1) the appointment of\nmagistrates; (2) the laws which they will have to administer must\nbe determined. I may observe by the way that laws, however good,\nare useless and even injurious unless the magistrates are capable of\nexecuting them. And therefore (1) the intended rulers of our imaginary\nstate should be tested from their youth upwards until the time of their\nelection; and (2) those who are to elect them ought to be trained in\nhabits of law, that they may form a right judgment of good and bad men.\nBut uneducated colonists, who are unacquainted with each other, will not\nbe likely to choose well. What, then, shall we do? I will tell you: The\ncolony will have to be intrusted to the ten commissioners, of whom you\nare one, and I will help you and them, which is my reason for inventing\nthis romance. And I cannot bear that the tale should go wandering about\nthe world without a head,--it will be such an ugly monster. 'Very good.'\nYes; and I will be as good as my word, if God be gracious and old age\npermit. But let us not forget what a courageously mad creation this our\ncity is. 'What makes you say so?' Why, surely our courage is shown in\nimagining that the new colonists will quietly receive our laws? For no\nman likes to receive laws when they are first imposed: could we only\nwait until those who had been educated under them were grown up, and\nof an age to vote in the public elections, there would be far greater\nreason to expect permanence in our institutions. 'Very true.' The\nCnosian founders should take the utmost pains in the matter of the\ncolony, and in the election of the higher officers, particularly of the\nguardians of the law. The latter should be appointed in this way: The\nCnosians, who take the lead in the colony, together with the colonists,\nwill choose thirty-seven persons, of whom nineteen will be colonists,\nand the remaining eighteen Cnosians--you must be one of the eighteen\nyourself, and become a citizen of the new state. 'Why do not you and\nMegillus join us?' Athens is proud, and Sparta too; and they are both\na long way off. But let me proceed with my scheme. When the state is\npermanently established, the mode of election will be as follows: All\nwho are serving, or have served, in the army will be electors; and the\nelection will be held in the most sacred of the temples. The voter\nwill place on the altar a tablet, inscribing thereupon the name of the\ncandidate whom he prefers, and of his father, tribe, and ward, writing\nat the side of them his own name in like manner; and he may take away\nany tablet which does not appear written to his mind, and place it in\nthe Agora for thirty days. The 300 who obtain the greatest number of\nvotes will be publicly announced, and out of them there will be a\nsecond election of 100; and out of the 100 a third and final election\nof thirty-seven, accompanied by the solemnity of the electors passing\nthrough victims. But then who is to arrange all this? There is a common\nsaying, that the beginning is half the whole; and I should say a good\ndeal more than half. 'Most true.' The only way of making a beginning is\nfrom the parent city; and though in after ages the tie may be broken,\nand quarrels may arise between them, yet in early days the child\nnaturally looks to the mother for care and education. And, as I said\nbefore, the Cnosians ought to take an interest in the colony, and select\n100 elders of their own citizens, to whom shall be added 100 of the\ncolonists, to arrange and supervise the first elections and scrutinies;\nand when the colony has been started, the Cnosians may return home and\nleave the colonists to themselves.\n\nThe thirty-seven magistrates who have been elected in the manner\ndescribed, shall have the following duties: first, they shall be\nguardians of the law; secondly, of the registers of property in the\nfour classes--not including the one, two, three, four minae, which are\nallowed as a surplus. He who is found to possess what is not entered in\nthe registers, in addition to the confiscation of such property shall be\nproceeded against by law, and if he be cast he shall lose his share\nin the public property and in distributions of money; and his sentence\nshall be inscribed in some public place. The guardians are to continue\nin office twenty years only, and to commence holding office at fifty\nyears, or if elected at sixty they are not to remain after seventy.\n\nGenerals have now to be elected, and commanders of horse and brigadiers\nof foot. The generals shall be natives of the city, proposed by the\nguardians of the law, and elected by those who are or have been of the\nage for military service. Any one may challenge the person nominated\nand start another candidate, whom he affirms upon oath to be better\nqualified. The three who obtain the greatest number of votes shall\nbe elected. The generals thus elected shall propose the taxiarchs or\nbrigadiers, and the challenge may be made, and the voting shall take\nplace, in the same manner as before. The elective assembly will be\npresided over in the first instance, and until the prytanes and council\ncome into being, by the guardians of the law in some holy place; and\nthey shall divide the citizens into three divisions,--hoplites, cavalry,\nand the rest of the army--placing each of them by itself. All are to\nvote for generals and cavalry officers. The brigadiers are to be voted\nfor only by the hoplites. Next, the cavalry are to choose phylarchs for\nthe generals; but captains of archers and other irregular troops are to\nbe appointed by the generals themselves. The cavalry-officers shall be\nproposed and voted upon by the same persons who vote for the generals.\nThe two who have the greatest number of votes shall be leaders of all\nthe horse. Disputes about the voting may be raised once or twice, but,\nif a third time, the presiding officers shall decide.\n\nThe council shall consist of 360, who may be conveniently divided into\nfour sections, making ninety councillors of each class. In the first\nplace, all the citizens shall select candidates from the first class;\nand they shall be compelled to vote under pain of a fine. This shall\nbe the business of the first day. On the second day a similar selection\nshall be made from the second class under the same conditions. On the\nthird day, candidates shall be selected from the third class; but the\ncompulsion to vote shall only extend to the voters of the first three\nclasses. On the fourth day, members of the council shall be selected\nfrom the fourth class; they shall be selected by all, but the compulsion\nto vote shall only extend to the second class, who, if they do not vote,\nshall pay a fine of triple the amount which was exacted at first, and to\nthe first class, who shall pay a quadruple fine. On the fifth day, the\nnames shall be exhibited, and out of them shall be chosen by all the\ncitizens 180 of each class: these are severally to be reduced by lot to\nninety, and 90 x 4 will form the council for the year.\n\nThe mode of election which has been described is a mean between monarchy\nand democracy, and such a mean should ever be observed in the state.\nFor servants and masters cannot be friends, and, although equality makes\nfriendship, we must remember that there are two sorts of equality. One\nof them is the rule of number and measure; but there is also a higher\nequality, which is the judgment of Zeus. Of this he grants but little to\nmortal men; yet that little is the source of the greatest good to cities\nand individuals. It is proportioned to the nature of each man; it gives\nmore to the better and less to the inferior, and is the true political\njustice; to this we in our state desire to look, as every legislator\nshould, not to the interests either of tyrants or mobs. But justice\ncannot always be strictly enforced, and then equity and mercy have to\nbe substituted: and for a similar reason, when true justice will not be\nendured, we must have recourse to the rougher justice of the lot, which\nGod must be entreated to guide.\n\nThese are the principal means of preserving the state, but perpetual\ncare will also be required. When a ship is sailing on the sea, vigilance\nmust not be relaxed night or day; and the vessel of state is tossing in\na political sea, and therefore watch must continually succeed watch, and\nrulers must join hands with rulers. A small body will best perform\nthis duty, and therefore the greater part of the 360 senators may be\npermitted to go and manage their own affairs, but a twelfth portion must\nbe set aside in each month for the administration of the state. Their\nbusiness will be to receive information and answer embassies; also they\nmust endeavour to prevent or heal internal disorders; and with this\nobject they must have the control of all assemblies of the citizens.\n\nBesides the council, there must be wardens of the city and of the agora,\nwho will superintend houses, ways, harbours, markets, and fountains, in\nthe city and the suburbs, and prevent any injury being done to them by\nman or beast. The temples, also, will require priests and priestesses.\nThose who hold the priestly office by hereditary tenure shall not be\ndisturbed; but as there will probably be few or none such in a new\ncolony, priests and priestesses shall be appointed for the Gods who have\nno servants. Some of these officers shall be elected by vote, some by\nlot; and all classes shall mingle in a friendly manner at the elections.\nThe appointment of priests should be left to God,--that is, to the lot;\nbut the person elected must prove that he is himself sound in body and\nof legitimate birth, and that his family has been free from homicide or\nany other stain of impurity. Priests and priestesses are to be not less\nthan sixty years of age, and shall hold office for a year only. The laws\nwhich are to regulate matters of religion shall be brought from Delphi,\nand interpreters appointed to superintend their execution. These shall\nbe elected in the following manner:--The twelve tribes shall be formed\ninto three bodies of four, each of which shall select four candidates,\nand this shall be done three times: of each twelve thus selected the\nthree who receive the largest number of votes, nine in all, after\nundergoing a scrutiny shall go to Delphi, in order that the God may\nelect one out of each triad. They shall be appointed for life; and when\nany of them dies, another shall be elected by the four tribes who made\nthe original appointment. There shall also be treasurers of the temples;\nthree for the greater temples, two for the lesser, and one for those of\nleast importance.\n\nThe defence of the city should be committed to the generals and other\nofficers of the army, and to the wardens of the city and agora. The\ndefence of the country shall be on this wise:--The twelve tribes shall\nallot among themselves annually the twelve divisions of the country, and\neach tribe shall appoint five wardens and commanders of the watch. The\nfive wardens in each division shall choose out of their own tribe twelve\nguards, who are to be between twenty-five and thirty years of age. Both\nthe wardens and the guards are to serve two years; and they shall make a\nround of the divisions, staying a month in each. They shall go from West\nto East during the first year, and back from East to West during the\nsecond. Thus they will gain a perfect knowledge of the country at every\nseason of the year.\n\nWhile on service, their first duty will be to see that the country is\nwell protected by means of fortifications and entrenchments; they will\nuse the beasts of burden and the labourers whom they find on the\nspot, taking care however not to interfere with the regular course of\nagriculture. But while they thus render the country as inaccessible as\npossible to enemies, they will also make it as accessible as possible to\nfriends by constructing and maintaining good roads. They will restrain\nand preserve the rain which comes down from heaven, making the barren\nplaces fertile, and the wet places dry. They will ornament the fountains\nwith plantations and buildings, and provide water for irrigation at\nall seasons of the year. They will lead the streams to the temples and\ngroves of the Gods; and in such spots the youth shall make gymnasia for\nthemselves, and warm baths for the aged; there the rustic worn with toil\nwill receive a kindly welcome, and be far better treated than at the\nhands of an unskilful doctor.\n\nThese works will be both useful and ornamental; but the sixty wardens\nmust not fail to give serious attention to other duties. For they must\nwatch over the districts assigned to them, and also act as judges. In\nsmall matters the five commanders shall decide: in greater matters up to\nthree minae, the five commanders and the twelve guards. Like all other\njudges, except those who have the final decision, they shall be liable\nto give an account. If the wardens impose unjust tasks on the villagers,\nor take by force their crops or implements, or yield to flattery or\nbribes in deciding suits, let them be publicly dishonoured. In regard to\nany other wrong-doing, if the question be of a mina, let the neighbours\ndecide; but if the accused person will not submit, trusting that his\nmonthly removals will enable him to escape payment, and also in suits\nabout a larger amount, the injured party may have recourse to the common\ncourt; in the former case, if successful, he may exact a double penalty.\n\nThe wardens and guards, while on their two years' service, shall live\nand eat together, and the guard who is absent from the daily meals\nwithout permission or sleeps out at night, shall be regarded as a\ndeserter, and may be punished by any one who meets him. If any of the\ncommanders is guilty of such an irregularity, the whole sixty shall\nhave him punished; and he of them who screens him shall suffer a still\nheavier penalty than the offender himself. Now by service a man learns\nto rule; and he should pride himself upon serving well the laws and the\nGods all his life, and upon having served ancient and honourable men in\nhis youth. The twelve and the five should be their own servants, and use\nthe labour of the villagers only for the good of the public. Let them\nsearch the country through, and acquire a perfect knowledge of every\nlocality; with this view, hunting and field sports should be encouraged.\n\nNext we have to speak of the elections of the wardens of the agora and\nof the city. The wardens of the city shall be three in number, and they\nshall have the care of the streets, roads, buildings, and also of the\nwater-supply. They shall be chosen out of the highest class, and when\nthe number of candidates has been reduced to six who have the greatest\nnumber of votes, three out of the six shall be taken by lot, and, after\na scrutiny, shall be admitted to their office. The wardens of the agora\nshall be five in number--ten are to be first elected, and every one\nshall vote for all the vacant places; the ten shall be afterwards\nreduced to five by lot, as in the former election. The first and second\nclass shall be compelled to go to the assembly, but not the third and\nfourth, unless they are specially summoned. The wardens of the agora\nshall have the care of the temples and fountains which are in the agora,\nand shall punish those who injure them by stripes and bonds, if they be\nslaves or strangers; and by fines, if they be citizens. And the wardens\nof the city shall have a similar power of inflicting punishment and\nfines in their own department.\n\nIn the next place, there must be directors of music and gymnastic; one\nclass of them superintending gymnasia and schools, and the attendance\nand lodging of the boys and girls--the other having to do with contests\nof music and gymnastic. In musical contests there shall be one kind\nof judges of solo singing or playing, who will judge of rhapsodists,\nflute-players, harp-players and the like, and another of choruses. There\nshall be choruses of men and boys and maidens--one director will be\nenough to introduce them all, and he should not be less than forty years\nof age; secondly, of solos also there shall be one director, aged not\nless than thirty years; he will introduce the competitors and give\njudgment upon them. The director of the choruses is to be elected in\nan assembly at which all who take an interest in music are compelled\nto attend, and no one else. Candidates must only be proposed for their\nfitness, and opposed on the ground of unfitness. Ten are to be elected\nby vote, and the one of these on whom the lot falls shall be director\nfor a year. Next shall be elected out of the second and third classes\nthe judges of gymnastic contests, who are to be three in number, and\nare to be tested, after being chosen by lot out of twenty who have been\nelected by the three highest classes--these being compelled to attend at\nthe election.\n\nOne minister remains, who will have the general superintendence of\neducation. He must be not less than fifty years old, and be himself the\nfather of children born in wedlock. His office must be regarded by all\nas the highest in the state. For the right growth of the first shoot\nin plants and animals is the chief cause of matured perfection. Man is\nsupposed to be a tame animal, but he becomes either the gentlest or\nthe fiercest of creatures, accordingly as he is well or ill educated.\nWherefore he who is elected to preside over education should be the best\nman possible. He shall hold office for five years, and shall be elected\nout of the guardians of the law, by the votes of the other magistrates\nwith the exception of the senate and prytanes; and the election shall be\nheld by ballot in the temple of Apollo.\n\nWhen a magistrate dies before his term of office has expired, another\nshall be elected in his place; and, if the guardian of an orphan dies,\nthe relations shall appoint another within ten days, or be fined a\ndrachma a day for neglect.\n\nThe city which has no courts of law will soon cease to be a city; and a\njudge who sits in silence and leaves the enquiry to the litigants, as\nin arbitrations, is not a good judge. A few judges are better than\nmany, but the few must be good. The matter in dispute should be clearly\nelicited; time and examination will find out the truth. Causes should\nfirst be tried before a court of neighbours: if the decision is\nunsatisfactory, let them be referred to a higher court; or, if\nnecessary, to a higher still, of which the decision shall be final.\n\nEvery magistrate is a judge, and every judge is a magistrate, on the day\non which he is deciding the suit. This will therefore be an appropriate\nplace to speak of judges and their functions. The supreme tribunal\nwill be that on which the litigants agree; and let there be two other\ntribunals, one for public and the other for private causes. The high\ncourt of appeal shall be composed as follows:--All the officers of\nstate shall meet on the last day but one of the year in some temple, and\nchoose for a judge the best man out of every magistracy: and those who\nare elected, after they have undergone a scrutiny, shall be judges of\nappeal. They shall give their decisions openly, in the presence of the\nmagistrates who have elected them; and the public may attend. If anybody\ncharges one of them with having intentionally decided wrong, he shall\nlay his accusation before the guardians of the law, and if the judge\nbe found guilty he shall pay damages to the extent of half the injury,\nunless the guardians of the law deem that he deserves a severer\npunishment, in which case the judges shall assess the penalty.\n\nAs the whole people are injured by offences against the state, they\nshould share in the trial of them. Such causes should originate with the\npeople and be decided by them: the enquiry shall take place before any\nthree of the highest magistrates upon whom the defendant and plaintiff\ncan agree. Also in private suits all should judge as far as possible,\nand therefore there should be a court of law in every ward; for he who\nhas no share in the administration of justice, believes that he has no\nshare in the state. The judges in these courts shall be elected by lot\nand give their decision at once. The final judgment in all cases shall\nrest with the court of appeal. And so, having done with the appointment\nof courts and the election of officers, we will now make our laws.\n\n'Your way of proceeding, Stranger, is admirable.'\n\nThen so far our old man's game of play has gone off well.\n\n'Say, rather, our serious and noble pursuit.'\n\nPerhaps; but let me ask you whether you have ever observed the manner in\nwhich painters put in and rub out colour: yet their endless labour will\nlast but a short time, unless they leave behind them some successor who\nwill restore the picture and remove its defects. 'Certainly.' And have\nwe not a similar object at the present moment? We are old ourselves,\nand therefore we must leave our work of legislation to be improved\nand perfected by the next generation; not only making laws for our\nguardians, but making them lawgivers. 'We must at least do our best.'\nLet us address them as follows. Beloved saviours of the laws, we give\nyou an outline of legislation which you must fill up, according to a\nrule which we will prescribe for you. Megillus and Cleinias and I are\nagreed, and we hope that you will agree with us in thinking, that the\nwhole energies of a man should be devoted to the attainment of manly\nvirtue, whether this is to be gained by study, or habit, or desire, or\nopinion. And rather than accept institutions which tend to degrade and\nenslave him, he should fly his country and endure any hardship. These\nare our principles, and we would ask you to judge of our laws, and\npraise or blame them, accordingly as they are or are not capable of\nimproving our citizens.\n\nAnd first of laws concerning religion. We have already said that the\nnumber 5040 has many convenient divisions: and we took a twelfth part of\nthis (420), which is itself divisible by twelve, for the number of the\ntribe. Every divisor is a gift of God, and corresponds to the months\nof the year and to the revolution of the universe. All cities have a\nnumber, but none is more fortunate than our own, which can be divided by\nall numbers up to 12, with the exception of 11, and even by 11, if two\nfamilies are deducted. And now let us divide the state, assigning to\neach division some God or demigod, who shall have altars raised to them,\nand sacrifices offered twice a month; and assemblies shall be held\nin their honour, twelve for the tribes, and twelve for the city,\ncorresponding to their divisions. The object of them will be first\nto promote religion, secondly to encourage friendship and intercourse\nbetween families; for families must be acquainted before they marry\ninto one another, or great mistakes will occur. At these festivals there\nshall be innocent dances of young men and maidens, who may have the\nopportunity of seeing one another in modest undress. To the details\nof all this the masters of choruses and the guardians will attend,\nembodying in laws the results of their experience; and, after ten years,\nmaking the laws permanent, with the consent of the legislator, if he be\nalive, or, if he be not alive, of the guardians of the law, who shall\nperfect them and settle them once for all. At least, if any further\nchanges are required, the magistrates must take the whole people into\ncounsel, and obtain the sanction of all the oracles.\n\nWhenever any one who is between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five\nwants to marry, let him do so; but first let him hear the strain which\nwe will address to him:--\n\nMy son, you ought to marry, but not in order to gain wealth or to avoid\npoverty; neither should you, as men are wont to do, choose a wife who\nis like yourself in property and character. You ought to consult the\ninterests of the state rather than your own pleasure; for by equal\nmarriages a society becomes unequal. And yet to enact a law that the\nrich and mighty shall not marry the rich and mighty, that the quick\nshall be united to the slow, and the slow to the quick, will arouse\nanger in some persons and laughter in others; for they do not understand\nthat opposite elements ought to be mingled in the state, as wine should\nbe mingled with water. The object at which we aim must therefore be\nleft to the influence of public opinion. And do not forget our former\nprecept, that every one should seek to attain immortality and raise up\na fair posterity to serve God.--Let this be the prelude of the law about\nthe duty of marriage. But if a man will not listen, and at thirty-five\nyears of age is still unmarried, he shall pay an annual fine: if he be\nof the first class, 100 drachmas; if of the second, 70; if of the third,\n60; and if of the fourth, 30. This fine shall be sacred to Here; and if\nhe refuse to pay, a tenfold penalty shall be exacted by the treasurer of\nHere, who shall be responsible for the payment. Further, the unmarried\nman shall receive no honour or obedience from the young, and he shall\nnot retain the right of punishing others. A man is neither to give\nnor receive a dowry beyond a certain fixed sum; in our state, for his\nconsolation, if he be poor, let him know that he need neither receive\nnor give one, for every citizen is provided with the necessaries of\nlife. Again, if the woman is not rich, her husband will not be her\nhumble servant. He who disobeys this law shall pay a fine according to\nhis class, which shall be exacted by the treasurers of Here and Zeus.\n\nThe betrothal of the parties shall be made by the next of kin, or\nif there are none, by the guardians. The offerings and ceremonies of\nmarriage shall be determined by the interpreters of sacred rites. Let\nthe wedding party be moderate; five male and five female friends, and a\nlike number of kinsmen, will be enough. The expense should not exceed,\nfor the first class, a mina; and for the second, half a mina; and should\nbe in like proportion for the other classes. Extravagance is to be\nregarded as vulgarity and ignorance of nuptial proprieties. Much wine is\nonly to be drunk at the festivals of Dionysus, and certainly not on the\noccasion of a marriage. The bride and bridegroom, who are taking a great\nstep in life, ought to have all their wits about them; they should be\nespecially careful of the night on which God may give them increase, and\nwhich this will be none can say. Their bodies and souls should be in the\nmost temperate condition; they should abstain from all that partakes of\nthe nature of disease or vice, which will otherwise become hereditary.\nThere is an original divinity in man which preserves all things, if used\nwith proper respect. He who marries should make one of the two houses\non the lot the nest and nursery of his young; he should leave his father\nand mother, and then his affection for them will be only increased by\nabsence. He will go forth as to a colony, and will there rear up his\noffspring, handing on the torch of life to another generation.\n\nAbout property in general there is little difficulty, with the exception\nof property in slaves, which is an institution of a very doubtful\ncharacter. The slavery of the Helots is approved by some and condemned\nby others; and there is some doubt even about the slavery of the\nMariandynians at Heraclea and of the Thessalian Penestae. This makes us\nask, What shall we do about slaves? To which every one would agree in\nreplying,--Let us have the best and most attached whom we can get. All\nof us have heard stories of slaves who have been better to their masters\nthan sons or brethren. Yet there is an opposite doctrine, that slaves\nare never to be trusted; as Homer says, 'Slavery takes away half a man's\nunderstanding.' And different persons treat them in different ways:\nthere are some who never trust them, and beat them like dogs, until\nthey make them many times more slavish than they were before; and others\npursue the opposite plan. Man is a troublesome animal, as has been often\nshown, Megillus, notably in the revolts of the Messenians; and great\nmischiefs have arisen in countries where there are large bodies of\nslaves of one nationality. Two rules may be given for their management:\nfirst that they should not, if possible, be of the same country or have\na common language; and secondly, that they should be treated by their\nmaster with more justice even than equals, out of regard to himself\nquite as much as to them. For he who is righteous in the treatment of\nhis slaves, or of any inferiors, will sow in them the seed of virtue.\nMasters should never jest with their slaves: this, which is a common but\nfoolish practice, increases the difficulty and painfulness of managing\nthem.\n\nNext as to habitations. These ought to have been spoken of before; for\nno man can marry a wife, and have slaves, who has not a house for them\nto live in. Let us supply the omission. The temples should be placed\nround the Agora, and the city built in a circle on the heights. Near the\ntemples, which are holy places and the habitations of the Gods, should\nbe buildings for the magistrates, and the courts of law, including those\nin which capital offences are to be tried. As to walls, Megillus, I\nagree with Sparta that they should sleep in the earth; 'cold steel\nis the best wall,' as the poet finely says. Besides, how absurd to be\nsending out our youth to fortify and guard the borders of our country,\nand then to build a city wall, which is very unhealthy, and is apt to\nmake people fancy that they may run there and rest in idleness, not\nknowing that true repose comes from labour, and that idleness is only\na renewal of trouble. If, however, there must be a wall, the private\nhouses had better be so arranged as to form one wall; this will have an\nagreeable aspect, and the building will be safer and more defensible.\nThese objects should be attended to at the foundation of the city. The\nwardens of the city must see that they are carried out; and they\nmust also enforce cleanliness, and preserve the public buildings from\nencroachments. Moreover, they must take care to let the rain flow\noff easily, and must regulate other matters concerning the general\nadministration of the city. If any further enactments prove to be\nnecessary, the guardians of the law must supply them.\n\nAnd now, having provided buildings, and having married our citizens,\nwe will proceed to speak of their mode of life. In a well-constituted\nstate, individuals cannot be allowed to live as they please. Why do\nI say this? Because I am going to enact that the bridegroom shall not\nabsent himself from the common meals. They were instituted originally\non the occasion of some war, and, though deemed singular when first\nfounded, they have tended greatly to the security of states. There was a\ndifficulty in introducing them, but there is no difficulty in them now.\nThere is, however, another institution about which I would speak, if I\ndared. I may preface my proposal by remarking that disorder in a state\nis the source of all evil, and order of all good. Now in Sparta and\nCrete there are common meals for men, and this, as I was saying, is a\ndivine and natural institution. But the women are left to themselves;\nthey live in dark places, and, being weaker, and therefore wickeder,\nthan men, they are at the bottom of a good deal more than half the evil\nof states. This must be corrected, and the institution of common\nmeals extended to both sexes. But, in the present unfortunate state\nof opinion, who would dare to establish them? And still more, who can\ncompel women to eat and drink in public? They will defy the legislator\nto drag them out of their holes. And in any other state such a proposal\nwould be drowned in clamour, but in our own I think that I can show the\nattempt to be just and reasonable. 'There is nothing which we should\nlike to hear better.' Listen, then; having plenty of time, we will\ngo back to the beginning of things, which is an old subject with us.\n'Right.' Either the race of mankind never had a beginning and will never\nhave an end, or the time which has elapsed since man first came into\nbeing is all but infinite. 'No doubt.' And in this infinity of time\nthere have been changes of every kind, both in the order of the seasons\nand in the government of states and in the customs of eating and\ndrinking. Vines and olives were at length discovered, and the blessings\nof Demeter and Persephone, of which one Triptolemus is said to have been\nthe minister; before his time the animals had been eating one another.\nAnd there are nations in which mankind still sacrifice their fellow-men,\nand other nations in which they lead a kind of Orphic existence, and\nwill not sacrifice animals, or so much as taste of a cow--they offer\nfruits or cakes moistened with honey. Perhaps you will ask me what is\nthe bearing of these remarks? 'We would gladly hear.' I will endeavour\nto explain their drift. I see that the virtue of human life depends on\nthe due regulation of three wants or desires. The first is the desire\nof meat, the second of drink; these begin with birth, and make us\ndisobedient to any voice other than that of pleasure. The third and\nfiercest and greatest need is felt latest; this is love, which is a\nmadness setting men's whole nature on fire. These three disorders of\nmankind we must endeavour to restrain by three mighty influences--fear,\nand law, and reason, which, with the aid of the Muses and the Gods of\ncontests, may extinguish our lusts.\n\nBut to return. After marriage let us proceed to the generation of\nchildren, and then to their nurture and education--thus gradually\napproaching the subject of syssitia. There are, however, some other\npoints which are suggested by the three words--meat, drink, love.\n'Proceed,' the bride and bridegroom ought to set their mind on having a\nbrave offspring. Now a man only succeeds when he takes pains; wherefore\nthe bridegroom ought to take special care of the bride, and the bride\nof the bridegroom, at the time when their children are about to be born.\nAnd let there be a committee of matrons who shall meet every day at\nthe temple of Eilithyia at a time fixed by the magistrates, and inform\nagainst any man or woman who does not observe the laws of married life.\nThe time of begetting children and the supervision of the parents shall\nlast for ten years only; if at the expiration of this period they have\nno children, they may part, with the consent of their relatives and the\nofficial matrons, and with a due regard to the interests of either; if\na dispute arise, ten of the guardians of the law shall be chosen as\narbiters. The matrons shall also have power to enter the houses of the\nyoung people, if necessary, and to advise and threaten them. If their\nefforts fail, let them go to the guardians of the law; and if they\ntoo fail, the offender, whether man or woman, shall be forbidden to\nbe present at all family ceremonies. If when the time for begetting\nchildren has ceased, either husband or wife have connexion with others\nwho are of an age to beget children, they shall be liable to the same\npenalties as those who are still having a family. But when both parties\nhave ceased to beget children there shall be no penalties. If men\nand women live soberly, the enactments of law may be left to slumber;\npunishment is necessary only when there is great disorder of manners.\n\nThe first year of children's lives is to be registered in their\nancestral temples; the name of the archon of the year is to be inscribed\non a whited wall in every phratry, and the names of the living members\nof the phratry close to them, to be erased at their decease. The proper\ntime of marriage for a woman shall be from sixteen years to twenty; for\na man, from thirty to thirty-five (compare Republic). The age of holding\noffice for a woman is to be forty, for a man thirty years. The time for\nmilitary service for a man is to be from twenty years to sixty; for a\nwoman, from the time that she has ceased to bear children until fifty.\n\nBOOK VII. Now that we have married our citizens and brought their\nchildren into the world, we have to find nurture and education for them.\nThis is a matter of precept rather than of law, and cannot be precisely\nregulated by the legislator. For minute regulations are apt to be\ntransgressed, and frequent transgressions impair the habit of obedience\nto the laws. I speak darkly, but I will also try to exhibit my wares in\nthe light of day. Am I not right in saying that a good education tends\nto the improvement of body and mind? 'Certainly.' And the body is\nfairest which grows up straight and well-formed from the time of birth.\n'Very true.' And we observe that the first shoot of every living thing\nis the greatest; many even contend that man is not at twenty-five twice\nthe height that he was at five. 'True.' And growth without exercise of\nthe limbs is the source of endless evils in the body. 'Yes.' The body\nshould have the most exercise when growing most. 'What, the bodies of\nyoung infants?' Nay, the bodies of unborn infants. I should like to\nexplain to you this singular kind of gymnastics. The Athenians are fond\nof cock-fighting, and the people who keep cocks carry them about in\ntheir hands or under their arms, and take long walks, to improve, not\ntheir own health, but the health of the birds. Here is a proof of the\nusefulness of motion, whether of rocking, swinging, riding, or tossing\nupon the wave; for all these kinds of motion greatly increase strength\nand the powers of digestion. Hence we infer that our women, when they\nare with child, should walk about and fashion the embryo; and the\nchildren, when born, should be carried by strong nurses,--there must be\nmore than one of them,--and should not be suffered to walk until they\nare three years old. Shall we impose penalties for the neglect of these\nrules? The greatest penalty, that is, ridicule, and the difficulty of\nmaking the nurses do as we bid them, will be incurred by ourselves.\n'Then why speak of such matters?' In the hope that heads of families may\nlearn that the due regulation of them is the foundation of law and order\nin the state.\n\nAnd now, leaving the body, let us proceed to the soul; but we must first\nrepeat that perpetual motion by night and by day is good for the young\ncreature. This is proved by the Corybantian cure of motion, and by the\npractice of nurses who rock children in their arms, lapping them at\nthe same time in sweet strains. And the reason of this is obvious. The\naffections, both of the Bacchantes and of the children, arise from fear,\nand this fear is occasioned by something wrong which is going on\nwithin them. Now a violent external commotion tends to calm the violent\ninternal one; it quiets the palpitation of the heart, giving to the\nchildren sleep, and bringing back the Bacchantes to their right minds\nby the help of dances and acceptable sacrifices. But if fear has such\npower, will not a child who is always in a state of terror grow up timid\nand cowardly, whereas if he learns from the first to resist fear he will\ndevelop a habit of courage? 'Very true.' And we may say that the use\nof motion will inspire the souls of children with cheerfulness and\ntherefore with courage. 'Of course.' Softness enervates and\nirritates the temper of the young, and violence renders them mean and\nmisanthropical. 'But how is the state to educate them when they are as\nyet unable to understand the meaning of words?' Why, surely they roar\nand cry, like the young of any other animal, and the nurse knows the\nmeaning of these intimations of the child's likes or dislikes, and the\noccasions which call them forth. About three years is passed by children\nin a state of imperfect articulation, which is quite long enough time\nto make them either good- or ill-tempered. And, therefore, during these\nfirst three years, the infant should be as free as possible from fear\nand pain. 'Yes, and he should have as much pleasure as possible.' There,\nI think, you are wrong; for the influence of pleasure in the beginning\nof education is fatal. A man should neither pursue pleasure nor wholly\navoid pain. He should embrace the mean, and cultivate that state of calm\nwhich mankind, taught by some inspiration, attribute to God; and he who\nwould be like God should neither be too fond of pleasure himself, nor\nshould he permit any other to be thus given; above all, not the infant,\nwhose character is just in the making. It may sound ridiculous, but I\naffirm that a woman in her pregnancy should be carefully tended, and\nkept from excessive pleasures and pains.\n\n'I quite agree with you about the duty of avoiding extremes and\nfollowing the mean.'\n\nLet us consider a further point. The matters which are now in question\nare generally called customs rather than laws; and we have already made\nthe reflection that, though they are not, properly speaking, laws, yet\nneither can they be neglected. For they fill up the interstices of\nlaw, and are the props and ligatures on which the strength of the whole\nbuilding depends. Laws without customs never last; and we must not\nwonder if habit and custom sometimes lengthen out our laws. 'Very true.'\nUp to their third year, then, the life of children may be regulated by\ncustoms such as we have described. From three to six their minds have\nto be amused; but they must not be allowed to become self-willed and\nspoilt. If punishment is necessary, the same rule will hold as in the\ncase of slaves; they must neither be punished in hot blood nor ruined\nby indulgence. The children of that age will have their own modes of\namusing themselves; they should be brought for their play to the village\ntemples, and placed under the care of nurses, who will be responsible\nto twelve matrons annually chosen by the women who have authority over\nmarriage. These shall be appointed, one out of each tribe, and their\nduty shall be to keep order at the meetings: slaves who break the rules\nlaid down by them, they shall punish by the help of some of the public\nslaves; but citizens who dispute their authority shall be brought before\nthe magistrates. After six years of age there shall be a separation of\nthe sexes; the boys will go to learn riding and the use of arms, and the\ngirls may, if they please, also learn. Here I note a practical error in\nearly training. Mothers and nurses foolishly believe that the left hand\nis by nature different from the right, whereas the left leg and foot are\nacknowledged to be the same as the right. But the truth is that nature\nmade all things to balance, and the power of using the left hand, which\nis of little importance in the case of the plectrum of the lyre, may\nmake a great difference in the art of the warrior, who should be a\nskilled gymnast and able to fight and balance himself in any position.\nIf a man were a Briareus, he should use all his hundred hands at once;\nat any rate, let everybody employ the two which they have. To these\nmatters the magistrates, male and female, should attend; the women\nsuperintending the nursing and amusement of the children, and the men\nsuperintending their education, that all of them, boys and girls alike,\nmay be sound, wind and limb, and not spoil the gifts of nature by bad\nhabits.\n\nEducation has two branches--gymnastic, which is concerned with the body;\nand music, which improves the soul. And gymnastic has two parts, dancing\nand wrestling. Of dancing one kind imitates musical recitation and aims\nat stateliness and freedom; another kind is concerned with the training\nof the body, and produces health, agility, and beauty. There is no\nmilitary use in the complex systems of wrestling which pass under the\nnames of Antaeus and Cercyon, or in the tricks of boxing, which are\nattributed to Amycus and Epeius; but good wrestling and the habit of\nextricating the neck, hands, and sides, should be diligently learnt and\ntaught. In our dances imitations of war should be practised, as in the\ndances of the Curetes in Crete and of the Dioscuri at Sparta, or as\nin the dances in complete armour which were taught us Athenians by the\ngoddess Athene. Youths who are not yet of an age to go to war should\nmake religious processions armed and on horseback; and they should also\nengage in military games and contests. These exercises will be equally\nuseful in peace and war, and will benefit both states and families.\n\nNext follows music, to which we will once more return; and here I shall\nventure to repeat my old paradox, that amusements have great influence\non laws. He who has been taught to play at the same games and with the\nsame playthings will be content with the same laws. There is no greater\nevil in a state than the spirit of innovation. In the case of the\nseasons and winds, in the management of our bodies and in the habits of\nour minds, change is a dangerous thing. And in everything but what is\nbad the same rule holds. We all venerate and acquiesce in the laws to\nwhich we are accustomed; and if they have continued during long\nperiods of time, and there is no remembrance of their ever having been\notherwise, people are absolutely afraid to change them. Now how can we\ncreate this quality of immobility in the laws? I say, by not allowing\ninnovations in the games and plays of children. The children who are\nalways having new plays, when grown up will be always having new laws.\nChanges in mere fashions are not serious evils, but changes in our\nestimate of men's characters are most serious; and rhythms and music are\nrepresentations of characters, and therefore we must avoid novelties in\ndance and song. For securing permanence no better method can be imagined\nthan that of the Egyptians. 'What is their method?' They make a calendar\nfor the year, arranging on what days the festivals of the various\nGods shall be celebrated, and for each festival they consecrate an\nappropriate hymn and dance. In our state a similar arrangement shall\nin the first instance be framed by certain individuals, and afterwards\nsolemnly ratified by all the citizens. He who introduces other hymns\nor dances shall be excluded by the priests and priestesses and the\nguardians of the law; and if he refuses to submit, he may be prosecuted\nfor impiety. But we must not be too ready to speak about such great\nmatters. Even a young man, when he hears something unaccustomed, stands\nand looks this way and that, like a traveller at a place where three\nways meet; and at our age a man ought to be very sure of his ground\nin so singular an argument. 'Very true.' Then, leaving the subject for\nfurther examination at some future time, let us proceed with our laws\nabout education, for in this manner we may probably throw light upon our\npresent difficulty. 'Let us do as you say.' The ancients used the term\nnomoi to signify harmonious strains, and perhaps they fancied that\nthere was a connexion between the songs and laws of a country. And we\nsay--Whosoever shall transgress the strains by law established is a\ntransgressor of the laws, and shall be punished by the guardians of\nthe law and by the priests and priestesses. 'Very good.' How can we\nlegislate about these consecrated strains without incurring ridicule?\nMoulds or types must be first framed, and one of the types shall\nbe--Abstinence from evil words at sacrifices. When a son or brother\nblasphemes at a sacrifice there is a sound of ill-omen heard in the\nfamily; and many a chorus stands by the altar uttering inauspicious\nwords, and he is crowned victor who excites the hearers most with\nlamentations. Such lamentations should be reserved for evil days, and\nshould be uttered only by hired mourners; and let the singers not wear\ncirclets or ornaments of gold. To avoid every evil word, then, shall be\nour first type. 'Agreed.' Our second law or type shall be, that prayers\never accompany sacrifices; and our third, that, inasmuch as all prayers\nare requests, they shall be only for good; this the poets must be made\nto understand. 'Certainly.' Have we not already decided that no gold or\nsilver Plutus shall be allowed in our city? And did not this show that\nwe were dissatisfied with the poets? And may we not fear that, if they\nare allowed to utter injudicious prayers, they will bring the greatest\nmisfortunes on the state? And we must therefore make a law that the poet\nis not to contradict the laws or ideas of the state; nor is he to show\nhis poems to any private persons until they have first received the\nimprimatur of the director of education. A fourth musical law will be\nto the effect that hymns and praises shall be offered to Gods, and to\nheroes and demigods. Still another law will permit eulogies of eminent\ncitizens, whether men or women, but only after their death. As to songs\nand dances, we will enact as follows:--There shall be a selection made\nof the best ancient musical compositions and dances; these shall be\nchosen by judges, who ought not to be less than fifty years of age. They\nwill accept some, and reject or amend others, for which purpose they\nwill call, if necessary, the poets themselves into council. The severe\nand orderly music is the style in which to educate children, who,\nif they are accustomed to this, will deem the opposite kind to be\nilliberal, but if they are accustomed to the other, will count this to\nbe cold and unpleasing. 'True.' Further, a distinction should be made\nbetween the melodies of men and women. Nature herself teaches that\nthe grand or manly style should be assigned to men, and to women the\nmoderate and temperate. So much for the subjects of education. But to\nwhom are they to be taught, and when? I must try, like the shipwright,\nwho lays down the keel of a vessel, to build a secure foundation for the\nvessel of the soul in her voyage through life. Human affairs are hardly\nserious, and yet a sad necessity compels us to be serious about them.\nLet us, therefore, do our best to bring the matter to a conclusion.\n'Very good.' I say then, that God is the object of a man's most serious\nendeavours. But man is created to be the plaything of the Gods; and\ntherefore the aim of every one should be to pass through life, not in\ngrim earnest, but playing at the noblest of pastimes, in another spirit\nfrom that which now prevails. For the common opinion is, that work is\nfor the sake of play, war of peace; whereas in war there is neither\namusement nor instruction worth speaking of. The life of peace is that\nwhich men should chiefly desire to lengthen out and improve. They should\nlive sacrificing, singing, and dancing, with the view of propitiating\nGods and heroes. I have already told you the types of song and dance\nwhich they should follow: and 'Some things,' as the poet well says, 'you\nwill devise for yourself--others, God will suggest to you.'\n\nThese words of his may be applied to our pupils. They will partly teach\nthemselves, and partly will be taught by God, the art of propitiating\nHim; for they are His puppets, and have only a small portion in truth.\n'You have a poor opinion of man.' No wonder, when I compare him with\nGod; but, if you are offended, I will place him a little higher.\n\nNext follow the building for gymnasia and schools; these will be in\nthe midst of the city, and outside will be riding-schools and\narchery-grounds. In all of them there ought to be instructors of the\nyoung, drawn from foreign parts by pay, and they will teach them music\nand war. Education shall be compulsory; the children must attend school,\nwhether their parents like it or not; for they belong to the state more\nthan to their parents. And I say further, without hesitation, that the\nsame education in riding and gymnastic shall be given both to men and\nwomen. The ancient tradition about the Amazons confirms my view, and\nat the present day there are myriads of women, called Sauromatides,\ndwelling near the Pontus, who practise the art of riding as well as\narchery and the use of arms. But if I am right, nothing can be more\nfoolish than our modern fashion of training men and women differently,\nwhereby the power the city is reduced to a half. For reflect--if women\nare not to have the education of men, some other must be found for them,\nand what other can we propose? Shall they, like the women of Thrace,\ntend cattle and till the ground; or, like our own, spin and weave, and\ntake care of the house? or shall they follow the Spartan custom, which\nis between the two?--there the maidens share in gymnastic exercises and\nin music; and the grown women, no longer engaged in spinning, weave the\nweb of life, although they are not skilled in archery, like the Amazons,\nnor can they imitate our warrior goddess and carry shield or spear, even\nin the extremity of their country's need. Compared with our women,\nthe Sauromatides are like men. But your legislators, Megillus, as I\nmaintain, only half did their work; they took care of the men, and left\nthe women to take care of themselves.\n\n'Shall we suffer the Stranger, Cleinias, to run down Sparta in this\nway?'\n\n'Why, yes; for we cannot withdraw the liberty which we have already\nconceded to him.'\n\nWhat will be the manner of life of men in moderate circumstances, freed\nfrom the toils of agriculture and business, and having common tables\nfor themselves and their families which are under the inspection of\nmagistrates, male and female? Are men who have these institutions only\nto eat and fatten like beasts? If they do, how can they escape the fate\nof a fatted beast, which is to be torn in pieces by some other beast\nmore valiant than himself? True, theirs is not the perfect way of life,\nfor they have not all things in common; but the second best way of life\nalso confers great blessings. Even those who live in the second state\nhave a work to do twice as great as the work of any Pythian or Olympic\nvictor; for their labour is for the body only, but ours both for body\nand soul. And this higher work ought to be pursued night and day to the\nexclusion of every other. The magistrates who keep the city should be\nwakeful, and the master of the household should be up early and before\nall his servants; and the mistress, too, should awaken her handmaidens,\nand not be awakened by them. Much sleep is not required either for our\nsouls or bodies. When a man is asleep, he is no better than if he were\ndead; and he who loves life and wisdom will take no more sleep than\nis necessary for health. Magistrates who are wide awake at night are\nterrible to the bad; but they are honoured by the good, and are useful\nto themselves and the state.\n\nWhen the morning dawns, let the boy go to school. As the sheep need the\nshepherd, so the boy needs a master; for he is at once the most cunning\nand the most insubordinate of creatures. Let him be taken away from\nmothers and nurses, and tamed with bit and bridle, being treated as a\nfreeman in that he learns and is taught, but as a slave in that he\nmay be chastised by all other freemen; and the freeman who neglects to\nchastise him shall be disgraced. All these matters will be under the\nsupervision of the Director of Education.\n\nHim we will address as follows: We have spoken to you, O illustrious\nteacher of youth, of the song, the time, and the dance, and of martial\nstrains; but of the learning of letters and of prose writings, and of\nmusic, and of the use of calculation for military and domestic purposes\nwe have not spoken, nor yet of the higher use of numbers in reckoning\ndivine things--such as the revolutions of the stars, or the arrangements\nof days, months, and years, of which the true calculation is necessary\nin order that seasons and festivals may proceed in regular course, and\narouse and enliven the city, rendering to the Gods their due, and making\nmen know them better. There are, we say, many things about which we have\nnot as yet instructed you--and first, as to reading and music: Shall\nthe pupil be a perfect scholar and musician, or not even enter on these\nstudies? He should certainly enter on both:--to letters he will apply\nhimself from the age of ten to thirteen, and at thirteen he will begin\nto handle the lyre, and continue to learn music until he is sixteen;\nno shorter and no longer time will be allowed, however fond he or his\nparents may be of the pursuit. The study of letters he should carry\nto the extent of simple reading and writing, but he need not care for\ncalligraphy and tachygraphy, if his natural gifts do not enable him to\nacquire them in the three years. And here arises a question as to the\nlearning of compositions when unaccompanied with music, I mean, prose\ncompositions. They are a dangerous species of literature. Speak then, O\nguardians of the law, and tell us what we shall do about them. 'You seem\nto be in a difficulty.' Yes; it is difficult to go against the opinion\nof all the world. 'But have we not often already done so?' Very true.\nAnd you imply that the road which we are taking, though disagreeable\nto many, is approved by those whose judgment is most worth having.\n'Certainly.' Then I would first observe that we have many poets, comic\nas well as tragic, with whose compositions, as people say, youth are\nto be imbued and saturated. Some would have them learn by heart entire\npoets; others prefer extracts. Now I believe, and the general opinion\nis, that some of the things which they learn are good, and some bad.\n'Then how shall we reject some and select others?' A happy thought\noccurs to me; this long discourse of ours is a sample of what we want,\nand is moreover an inspired work and a kind of poem. I am naturally\npleased in reflecting upon all our words, which appear to me to be just\nthe thing for a young man to hear and learn. I would venture, then, to\noffer to the Director of Education this treatise of laws as a pattern\nfor his guidance; and in case he should find any similar compositions,\nwritten or oral, I would have him carefully preserve them, and commit\nthem in the first place to the teachers who are willing to learn them\n(he should turn off the teacher who refuses), and let them communicate\nthe lesson to the young.\n\nI have said enough to the teacher of letters; and now we will proceed to\nthe teacher of the lyre. He must be reminded of the advice which we gave\nto the sexagenarian minstrels; like them he should be quick to perceive\nthe rhythms suited to the expression of virtue, and to reject the\nopposite. With a view to the attainment of this object, the pupil and\nhis instructor are to use the lyre because its notes are pure; the voice\nand string should coincide note for note: nor should there be complex\nharmonies and contrasts of intervals, or variations of times or rhythms.\nThree years' study is not long enough to give a knowledge of these\nintricacies; and our pupils will have many things of more importance to\nlearn. The tunes and hymns which are to be consecrated for each festival\nhave been already determined by us.\n\nHaving given these instructions to the Director of Music, let us now\nproceed to dancing and gymnastic, which must also be taught to boys and\ngirls by masters and mistresses. Our minister of education will have a\ngreat deal to do; and being an old man, how will he get through so much\nwork? There is no difficulty;--the law will provide him with assistants,\nmale and female; and he will consider how important his office is,\nand how great the responsibility of choosing them. For if education\nprospers, the vessel of state sails merrily along; or if education\nfails, the consequences are not even to be mentioned. Of dancing and\ngymnastics something has been said already. We include under the latter\nmilitary exercises, the various uses of arms, all that relates to\nhorsemanship, and military evolutions and tactics. There should be\npublic teachers of both arts, paid by the state, and women as well as\nmen should be trained in them. The maidens should learn the armed dance,\nand the grown-up women be practised in drill and the use of arms, if\nonly in case of extremity, when the men are gone out to battle, and they\nare left to guard their families. Birds and beasts defend their young,\nbut women instead of fighting run to the altars, thus degrading man\nbelow the level of the animals. 'Such a lack of education, Stranger, is\nboth unseemly and dangerous.'\n\nWrestling is to be pursued as a military exercise, but the meaning of\nthis, and the nature of the art, can only be explained when action\nis combined with words. Next follows dancing, which is of two kinds;\nimitative, first, of the serious and beautiful; and, secondly, of the\nludicrous and grotesque. The first kind may be further divided into the\ndance of war and the dance of peace. The former is called the Pyrrhic;\nin this the movements of attack and defence are imitated in a direct and\nmanly style, which indicates strength and sufficiency of body and mind.\nThe latter of the two, the dance of peace, is suitable to orderly and\nlaw-abiding men. These must be distinguished from the Bacchic dances\nwhich imitate drunken revelry, and also from the dances by which\npurifications are effected and mysteries celebrated. Such dances cannot\nbe characterized either as warlike or peaceful, and are unsuited to a\ncivilized state. Now the dances of peace are of two classes:--the first\nof them is the more violent, being an expression of joy and triumph\nafter toil and danger; the other is more tranquil, symbolizing the\ncontinuance and preservation of good. In speaking or singing we\nnaturally move our bodies, and as we have more or less courage or\nself-control we become less or more violent and excited. Thus from the\nimitation of words in gestures the art of dancing arises. Now one man\nimitates in an orderly, another in a disorderly manner: and so the\npeaceful kinds of dance have been appropriately called Emmeleiai, or\ndances of order, as the warlike have been called Pyrrhic. In the latter\na man imitates all sorts of blows and the hurling of weapons and the\navoiding of them; in the former he learns to bear himself gracefully\nand like a gentleman. The types of these dances are to be fixed by the\nlegislator, and when the guardians of the law have assigned them to the\nseveral festivals, and consecrated them in due order, no further change\nshall be allowed.\n\nThus much of the dances which are appropriate to fair forms and noble\nsouls. Comedy, which is the opposite of them, remains to be considered.\nFor the serious implies the ludicrous, and opposites cannot be\nunderstood without opposites. But a man of repute will desire to\navoid doing what is ludicrous. He should leave such performances to\nslaves,--they are not fit for freemen; and there should be some element\nof novelty in them. Concerning tragedy, let our law be as follows: When\nthe inspired poet comes to us with a request to be admitted into our\nstate, we will reply in courteous words--We also are tragedians and your\nrivals; and the drama which we enact is the best and noblest, being the\nimitation of the truest and noblest life, with a view to which our state\nis ordered. And we cannot allow you to pitch your stage in the agora,\nand make your voices to be heard above ours, or suffer you to address\nour women and children and the common people on opposite principles\nto our own. Come then, ye children of the Lydian Muse, and present\nyourselves first to the magistrates, and if they decide that your hymns\nare as good or better than ours, you shall have your chorus; but if not,\nnot.\n\nThere remain three kinds of knowledge which should be learnt by\nfreemen--arithmetic, geometry of surfaces and of solids, and thirdly,\nastronomy. Few need make an accurate study of such sciences; and of\nspecial students we will speak at another time. But most persons must be\ncontent with the study of them which is absolutely necessary, and may\nbe said to be a necessity of that nature against which God himself is\nunable to contend. 'What are these divine necessities of knowledge?'\nNecessities of a knowledge without which neither gods, nor demigods,\ncan govern mankind. And far is he from being a divine man who cannot\ndistinguish one, two, odd and even; who cannot number day and night, and\nis ignorant of the revolutions of the sun and stars; for to every higher\nknowledge a knowledge of number is necessary--a fool may see this; how\nmuch, is a matter requiring more careful consideration. 'Very true.'\nBut the legislator cannot enter into such details, and therefore we\nmust defer the more careful consideration of these matters to another\noccasion. 'You seem to fear our habitual want of training in these\nsubjects.' Still more do I fear the danger of bad training, which is\noften worse than none at all. 'Very true.' I think that a gentleman\nand a freeman may be expected to know as much as an Egyptian child.\nIn Egypt, arithmetic is taught to children in their sports by a\ndistribution of apples or garlands among a greater or less number of\npeople; or a calculation is made of the various combinations which are\npossible among a set of boxers or wrestlers; or they distribute cups\namong the children, sometimes of gold, brass, and silver intermingled,\nsometimes of one metal only. The knowledge of arithmetic which is thus\nacquired is a great help, either to the general or to the manager of\na household; wherever measure is employed, men are more wide-awake in\ntheir dealings, and they get rid of their ridiculous ignorance. 'What do\nyou mean?' I have observed this ignorance among my countrymen--they are\nlike pigs--and I am heartily ashamed both on my own behalf and on that\nof all the Hellenes. 'In what respect?' Let me ask you a question. You\nknow that there are such things as length, breadth, and depth?\n'Yes.' And the Hellenes imagine that they are commensurable (1) with\nthemselves, and (2) with each other; whereas they are only commensurable\nwith themselves. But if this is true, then we are in an unfortunate\ncase, and may well say to our compatriots that not to possess necessary\nknowledge is a disgrace, though to possess such knowledge is nothing\nvery grand. 'Certainly.' The discussion of arithmetical problems is a\nmuch better amusement for old men than their favourite game of draughts.\n'True.' Mathematics, then, will be one of the subjects in which youth\nshould be trained. They may be regarded as an amusement, as well as a\nuseful and innocent branch of knowledge;--I think that we may include\nthem provisionally. 'Yes; that will be the way.' The next question is,\nwhether astronomy shall be made a part of education. About the stars\nthere is a strange notion prevalent. Men often suppose that it is\nimpious to enquire into the nature of God and the world, whereas the\nvery reverse is the truth. 'How do you mean?' What I am going to say may\nseem absurd and at variance with the usual language of age, and yet if\ntrue and advantageous to the state, and pleasing to God, ought not to be\nwithheld. 'Let us hear.' My dear friend, how falsely do we and all the\nHellenes speak about the sun and moon! 'In what respect?' We are always\nsaying that they and certain of the other stars do not keep the same\npath, and we term them planets. 'Yes; and I have seen the morning and\nevening stars go all manner of ways, and the sun and moon doing what we\nknow that they always do. But I wish that you would explain your meaning\nfurther.' You will easily understand what I have had no difficulty\nin understanding myself, though we are both of us past the time of\nlearning. 'True; but what is this marvellous knowledge which youth are\nto acquire, and of which we are ignorant?' Men say that the sun, moon,\nand stars are planets or wanderers; but this is the reverse of the fact.\nEach of them moves in one orbit only, which is circular, and not in\nmany; nor is the swiftest of them the slowest, as appears to human eyes.\nWhat an insult should we offer to Olympian runners if we were to put\nthe first last and the last first! And if that is a ridiculous error in\nspeaking of men, how much more in speaking of the Gods? They cannot be\npleased at our telling falsehoods about them. 'They cannot.' Then people\nshould at least learn so much about them as will enable them to avoid\nimpiety.\n\nEnough of education. Hunting and similar pursuits now claim our\nattention. These require for their regulation that mixture of law and\nadmonition of which we have often spoken; e.g., in what we were saying\nabout the nurture of young children. And therefore the whole duty of the\ncitizen will not consist in mere obedience to the laws; he must regard\nnot only the enactments but also the precepts of the legislator. I\nwill illustrate my meaning by an example. Of hunting there are many\nkinds--hunting of fish and fowl, man and beast, enemies and friends; and\nthe legislator can neither omit to speak about these things, nor make\npenal ordinances about them all. 'What is he to do then?' He will praise\nand blame hunting, having in view the discipline and exercise of youth.\nAnd the young man will listen obediently and will regard his praises and\ncensures; neither pleasure nor pain should hinder him. The legislator\nwill express himself in the form of a pious wish for the welfare of the\nyoung:--O my friends, he will say, may you never be induced to hunt for\nfish in the waters, either by day or night; or for men, whether by sea\nor land. Never let the wish to steal enter into your minds; neither\nbe ye fowlers, which is not an occupation for gentlemen. As to land\nanimals, the legislator will discourage hunting by night, and also\nthe use of nets and snares by day; for these are indolent and unmanly\nmethods. The only mode of hunting which he can praise is with horses\nand dogs, running, shooting, striking at close quarters. Enough of the\nprelude: the law shall be as follows:--\n\nLet no one hinder the holy order of huntsmen; but let the nightly\nhunters who lay snares and nets be everywhere prohibited. Let the fowler\nconfine himself to waste places and to the mountains. The fisherman is\nalso permitted to exercise his calling, except in harbours and sacred\nstreams, marshes and lakes; in all other places he may fish, provided he\ndoes not make use of poisonous mixtures.\n\nBOOK VIII. Next, with the help of the Delphian Oracle, we will appoint\nfestivals and sacrifices. There shall be 365 of them, one for every day\nin the year; and one magistrate, at least, shall offer sacrifice\ndaily according to rites prescribed by a convocation of priests and\ninterpreters, who shall co-operate with the guardians of the law, and\nsupply what the legislator has omitted. Moreover there shall be twelve\nfestivals to the twelve Gods after whom the twelve tribes are named:\nthese shall be celebrated every month with appropriate musical and\ngymnastic contests. There shall also be festivals for women, to be\ndistinguished from the men's festivals. Nor shall the Gods below be\nforgotten, but they must be separated from the Gods above--Pluto shall\nhave his own in the twelfth month. He is not the enemy, but the friend\nof man, who releases the soul from the body, which is at least as good a\nwork as to unite them. Further, those who have to regulate these matters\nshould consider that our state has leisure and abundance, and wishing to\nbe happy, like an individual, should lead a good life; for he who leads\nsuch a life neither does nor suffers injury, of which the first is very\neasy, and the second very difficult of attainment, and is only to be\nacquired by perfect virtue. A good city has peace, but the evil city is\nfull of wars within and without. To guard against the danger of external\nenemies the citizens should practise war at least one day in every\nmonth; they should go out en masse, including their wives and children,\nor in divisions, as the magistrates determine, and have mimic contests,\nimitating in a lively manner real battles; they should also have prizes\nand encomiums of valour, both for the victors in these contests, and for\nthe victors in the battle of life. The poet who celebrates the victors\nshould be fifty years old at least, and himself a man who has done great\ndeeds. Of such an one the poems may be sung, even though he is not the\nbest of poets. To the director of education and the guardians of the law\nshall be committed the judgment, and no song, however sweet, which has\nnot been licensed by them shall be recited. These regulations about\npoetry, and about military expeditions, apply equally to men and to\nwomen.\n\nThe legislator may be conceived to make the following address to\nhimself:--With what object am I training my citizens? Are they not\nstrivers for mastery in the greatest of combats? Certainly, will be\nthe reply. And if they were boxers or wrestlers, would they think of\nentering the lists without many days' practice? Would they not as far as\npossible imitate all the circumstances of the contest; and if they\nhad no one to box with, would they not practise on a lifeless image,\nheedless of the laughter of the spectators? And shall our soldiers go\nout to fight for life and kindred and property unprepared, because sham\nfights are thought to be ridiculous? Will not the legislator require\nthat his citizens shall practise war daily, performing lesser exercises\nwithout arms, while the combatants on a greater scale will carry arms,\nand take up positions, and lie in ambuscade? And let their combats be\nnot without danger, that opportunity may be given for distinction,\nand the brave man and the coward may receive their meed of honour\nor disgrace. If occasionally a man is killed, there is no great harm\ndone--there are others as good as he is who will replace him; and the\nstate can better afford to lose a few of her citizens than to lose the\nonly means of testing them.\n\n'We agree, Stranger, that such warlike exercises are necessary.' But why\nare they so rarely practised? Or rather, do we not all know the reasons?\nOne of them (1) is the inordinate love of wealth. This absorbs the soul\nof a man, and leaves him no time for any other pursuit. Knowledge is\nvalued by him only as it tends to the attainment of wealth. All is lost\nin the desire of heaping up gold and silver; anybody is ready to do\nanything, right or wrong, for the sake of eating and drinking, and\nthe indulgence of his animal passions. 'Most true.' This is one of the\ncauses which prevents a man being a good soldier, or anything else\nwhich is good; it converts the temperate and orderly into shopkeepers or\nservants, and the brave into burglars or pirates. Many of these latter\nare men of ability, and are greatly to be pitied, because their souls\nare hungering and thirsting all their lives long. The bad forms of\ngovernment (2) are another reason--democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, which,\nas I was saying, are not states, but states of discord, in which the\nrulers are afraid of their subjects, and therefore do not like them to\nbecome rich, or noble, or valiant. Now our state will escape both\nthese causes of evil; the society is perfectly free, and has plenty of\nleisure, and is not allowed by the laws to be absorbed in the pursuit\nof wealth; hence we have an excellent field for a perfect education, and\nfor the introduction of martial pastimes. Let us proceed to describe the\ncharacter of these pastimes. All gymnastic exercises in our state\nmust have a military character; no other will be allowed. Activity and\nquickness are most useful in war; and yet these qualities do not attain\ntheir greatest efficiency unless the competitors are armed. The runner\nshould enter the lists in armour, and in the races which our heralds\nproclaim, no prize is to be given except to armed warriors. Let there be\nsix courses--first, the stadium; secondly, the diaulos or double course;\nthirdly, the horse course; fourthly, the long course; fifthly, races (1)\nbetween heavy-armed soldiers who shall pass over sixty stadia and\nfinish at a temple of Ares, and (2) between still more heavily-armed\ncompetitors who run over smoother ground; sixthly, a race for archers,\nwho shall run over hill and dale a distance of a hundred stadia, and\ntheir goal shall be a temple of Apollo and Artemis. There shall be three\ncontests of each kind--one for boys, another for youths, a third for\nmen; the course for the boys we will fix at half, and that for the\nyouths at two-thirds of the entire length. Women shall join in the\nraces: young girls who are not grown up shall run naked; but after\nthirteen they shall be suitably dressed; from thirteen to eighteen they\nshall be obliged to share in these contests, and from eighteen to twenty\nthey may if they please and if they are unmarried. As to trials of\nstrength, single combats in armour, or battles between two and two, or\nof any number up to ten, shall take the place of wrestling and the heavy\nexercises. And there must be umpires, as there are now in wrestling,\nto determine what is a fair hit and who is conqueror. Instead of the\npancratium, let there be contests in which the combatants carry bows\nand wear light shields and hurl javelins and throw stones. The next\nprovision of the law will relate to horses, which, as we are in Crete,\nneed be rarely used by us, and chariots never; our horse-racing prizes\nwill only be given to single horses, whether colts, half-grown, or\nfull-grown. Their riders are to wear armour, and there shall be a\ncompetition between mounted archers. Women, if they have a mind, may\njoin in the exercises of men.\n\nBut enough of gymnastics, and nearly enough of music. All musical\ncontests will take place at festivals, whether every third or every\nfifth year, which are to be fixed by the guardians of the law, the\njudges of the games, and the director of education, who for this\npurpose shall become legislators and arrange times and conditions. The\nprinciples on which such contests are to be ordered have been often\nrepeated by the first legislator; no more need be said of them, nor\nare the details of them important. But there is another subject of the\nhighest importance, which, if possible, should be determined by the\nlaws, not of man, but of God; or, if a direct revelation is impossible,\nthere is need of some bold man who, alone against the world, will\nspeak plainly of the corruption of human nature, and go to war with the\npassions of mankind. 'We do not understand you.' I will try to make my\nmeaning plainer. In speaking of education, I seemed to see young men and\nmaidens in friendly intercourse with one another; and there arose in my\nmind a natural fear about a state, in which the young of either sex are\nwell nurtured, and have little to do, and occupy themselves chiefly with\nfestivals and dances. How can they be saved from those passions which\nreason forbids them to indulge, and which are the ruin of so many?\nThe prohibition of wealth, and the influence of education, and the\nall-seeing eye of the ruler, will alike help to promote temperance; but\nthey will not wholly extirpate the unnatural loves which have been the\ndestruction of states; and against this evil what remedy can be devised?\nLacedaemon and Crete give no assistance here; on the subject of love, as\nI may whisper in your ear, they are against us. Suppose a person were to\nurge that you ought to restore the natural use which existed before the\ndays of Laius; he would be quite right, but he would not be supported by\npublic opinion in either of your states. Or try the matter by the test\nwhich we apply to all laws,--who will say that the permission of such\nthings tends to virtue? Will he who is seduced learn the habit of\ncourage; or will the seducer acquire temperance? And will any legislator\nbe found to make such actions legal?\n\nBut to judge of this matter truly, we must understand the nature of love\nand friendship, which may take very different forms. For we speak of\nfriendship, first, when there is some similarity or equality of virtue;\nsecondly, when there is some want; and either of these, when in excess,\nis termed love. The first kind is gentle and sociable; the second is\nfierce and unmanageable; and there is also a third kind, which is akin\nto both, and is under the dominion of opposite principles. The one is of\nthe body, and has no regard for the character of the beloved; but he who\nis under the influence of the other disregards the body, and is a looker\nrather than a lover, and desires only with his soul to be knit to the\nsoul of his friend; while the intermediate sort is both of the body\nand of the soul. Here are three kinds of love: ought the legislator to\nprohibit all of them equally, or to allow the virtuous love to remain?\n'The latter, clearly.' I expected to gain your approval; but I will\nreserve the task of convincing our friend Cleinias for another occasion.\n'Very good.' To make right laws on this subject is in one point of view\neasy, and in another most difficult; for we know that in some cases most\nmen abstain willingly from intercourse with the fair. The unwritten\nlaw which prohibits members of the same family from such intercourse is\nstrictly obeyed, and no thought of anything else ever enters into the\nminds of men in general. A little word puts out the fire of their lusts.\n'What is it?' The declaration that such things are hateful to the Gods,\nand most abominable and unholy. The reason is that everywhere, in jest\nand earnest alike, this is the doctrine which is repeated to all\nfrom their earliest youth. They see on the stage that an Oedipus or a\nThyestes or a Macareus, when undeceived, are ready to kill themselves.\nThere is an undoubted power in public opinion when no breath is heard\nadverse to the law; and the legislator who would enslave these enslaving\npassions must consecrate such a public opinion all through the city.\n'Good: but how can you create it?' A fair objection; but I promised to\ntry and find some means of restraining loves to their natural objects. A\nlaw which would extirpate unnatural love as effectually as incest is\nat present extirpated, would be the source of innumerable blessings,\nbecause it would be in accordance with nature, and would get rid of\nexcess in eating and drinking and of adulteries and frenzies, making men\nlove their wives, and having other excellent effects. I can imagine that\nsome lusty youth overhears what we are saying, and roars out in abusive\nterms that we are legislating for impossibilities. And so a person\nmight have said of the syssitia, or common meals; but this is refuted by\nfacts, although even now they are not extended to women. 'True.' There\nis no impossibility or super-humanity in my proposed law, as I shall\nendeavour to prove. 'Do so.' Will not a man find abstinence more easy\nwhen his body is sound than when he is in ill-condition? 'Yes.' Have we\nnot heard of Iccus of Tarentum and other wrestlers who abstained wholly\nfor a time? Yet they were infinitely worse educated than our citizens,\nand far more lusty in their bodies. And shall they have abstained for\nthe sake of an athletic contest, and our citizens be incapable of a\nsimilar endurance for the sake of a much nobler victory,--the victory\nover pleasure, which is true happiness? Will not the fear of impiety\nenable them to conquer that which many who were inferior to them have\nconquered? 'I dare say.' And therefore the law must plainly declare\nthat our citizens should not fall below the other animals, who live all\ntogether in flocks, and yet remain pure and chaste until the time of\nprocreation comes, when they pair, and are ever after faithful to their\ncompact. But if the corruption of public opinion is too great to allow\nour first law to be carried out, then our guardians of the law must turn\nlegislators, and try their hand at a second law. They must minimize the\nappetites, diverting the vigour of youth into other channels, allowing\nthe practice of love in secret, but making detection shameful. Three\nhigher principles may be brought to bear on all these corrupt natures.\n'What are they?' Religion, honour, and the love of the higher qualities\nof the soul. Perhaps this is a dream only, yet it is the best of dreams;\nand if not the whole, still, by the grace of God, a part of what we\ndesire may be realized. Either men may learn to abstain wholly from any\nloves, natural or unnatural, except of their wedded wives; or, at\nleast, they may give up unnatural loves; or, if detected, they shall\nbe punished with loss of citizenship, as aliens from the state in their\nmorals. 'I entirely agree with you,' said Megillus, 'but Cleinias must\nspeak for himself.' 'I will give my opinion by-and-by.'\n\nWe were speaking of the syssitia, which will be a natural institution\nin a Cretan colony. Whether they shall be established after the model\nof Crete or Lacedaemon, or shall be different from either, is an\nunimportant question which may be determined without difficulty. We\nmay, therefore, proceed to speak of the mode of life among our citizens,\nwhich will be far less complex than in other cities; a state which is\ninland and not maritime requires only half the number of laws. There is\nno trouble about trade and commerce, and a thousand other things. The\nlegislator has only to regulate the affairs of husbandmen and shepherds,\nwhich will be easily arranged, now that the principal questions, such as\nmarriage, education, and government, have been settled.\n\nLet us begin with husbandry: First, let there be a law of Zeus against\nremoving a neighbour's landmark, whether he be a citizen or stranger.\nFor this is 'to move the immoveable'; and Zeus, the God of kindred,\nwitnesses to the wrongs of citizens, and Zeus, the God of strangers,\nto the wrongs of strangers. The offence of removing a boundary shall\nreceive two punishments--the first will be inflicted by the God himself;\nthe second by the judges. In the next place, the differences between\nneighbours about encroachments must be guarded against. He who\nencroaches shall pay twofold the amount of the injury; of all such\nmatters the wardens of the country shall be the judges, in lesser cases\nthe officers, and in greater the whole number of them belonging to\nany one division. Any injury done by cattle, the decoying of bees, the\ncareless firing of woods, the planting unduly near a neighbour's\nground, shall all be visited with proper damages. Such details have been\ndetermined by previous legislators, and need not now be mixed up with\ngreater matters. Husbandmen have had of old excellent rules about\nstreams and waters; and we need not 'divert their course.' Anybody\nmay take water from a common stream, if he does not thereby cut off a\nprivate spring; he may lead the water in any direction, except through\na house or temple, but he must do no harm beyond the channel. If land\nis without water the occupier shall dig down to the clay, and if at this\ndepth he find no water, he shall have a right of getting water from his\nneighbours for his household; and if their supply is limited, he\nshall receive from them a measure of water fixed by the wardens of the\ncountry. If there be heavy rains, the dweller on the higher ground must\nnot recklessly suffer the water to flow down upon a neighbour beneath\nhim, nor must he who lives upon lower ground or dwells in an adjoining\nhouse refuse an outlet. If the two parties cannot agree, they shall go\nbefore the wardens of the city or country, and if a man refuse to abide\nby their decision, he shall pay double the damage which he has caused.\n\nIn autumn God gives us two boons--one the joy of Dionysus not to be laid\nup--the other to be laid up. About the fruits of autumn let the law be\nas follows: He who gathers the storing fruits of autumn, whether\ngrapes or figs, before the time of the vintage, which is the rising of\nArcturus, shall pay fifty drachmas as a fine to Dionysus, if he gathers\non his own ground; if on his neighbour's ground, a mina, and two-thirds\nof a mina if on that of any one else. The grapes or figs not used for\nstoring a man may gather when he pleases on his own ground, but on that\nof others he must pay the penalty of removing what he has not laid down.\nIf he be a slave who has gathered, he shall receive a stroke for every\ngrape or fig. A metic must purchase the choice fruit; but a stranger may\npluck for himself and his attendant. This right of hospitality, however,\ndoes not extend to storing grapes. A slave who eats of the storing\ngrapes or figs shall be beaten, and the freeman be dismissed with a\nwarning. Pears, apples, pomegranates, may be taken secretly, but he who\nis detected in the act of taking them shall be lightly beaten off, if\nhe be not more than thirty years of age. The stranger and the elder may\npartake of them, but not carry any away; the latter, if he does not obey\nthe law, shall fail in the competition of virtue, if anybody brings up\nhis offence against him.\n\nWater is also in need of protection, being the greatest element of\nnutrition, and, unlike the other elements--soil, air, and sun--which\nconspire in the growth of plants, easily polluted. And therefore he\nwho spoils another's water, whether in springs or reservoirs, either by\ntrenching, or theft, or by means of poisonous substances, shall pay the\ndamage and purify the stream. At the getting-in of the harvest everybody\nshall have a right of way over his neighbour's ground, provided he is\ncareful to do no damage beyond the trespass, or if he himself will gain\nthree times as much as his neighbour loses. Of all this the magistrates\nare to take cognizance, and they are to assess the damage where the\ninjury does not exceed three minae; cases of greater damage can be\ntried only in the public courts. A charge against a magistrate is to\nbe referred to the public courts, and any one who is found guilty of\ndeciding corruptly shall pay twofold to the aggrieved person. Matters\nof detail relating to punishments and modes of procedure, and summonses,\nand witnesses to summonses, do not require the mature wisdom of the aged\nlegislator; the younger generation may determine them according to their\nexperience; but when once determined, they shall remain unaltered.\n\nThe following are to be the regulations respecting handicrafts:--No\ncitizen, or servant of a citizen, is to practise them. For the citizen\nhas already an art and mystery, which is the care of the state; and no\nman can practise two arts, or practise one and superintend another. No\nsmith should be a carpenter, and no carpenter, having many slaves who\nare smiths, should look after them himself; but let each man practise\none art which shall be his means of livelihood. The wardens of the city\nshould see to this, punishing the citizen who offends with temporary\ndeprival of his rights--the foreigner shall be imprisoned, fined,\nexiled. Any disputes about contracts shall be determined by the wardens\nof the city up to fifty drachmae--above that sum by the public courts.\nNo customs are to be exacted either on imports or exports. Nothing\nunnecessary is to be imported from abroad, whether for the service of\nthe Gods or for the use of man--neither purple, nor other dyes, nor\nfrankincense,--and nothing needed in the country is to be exported.\nThese things are to be decided on by the twelve guardians of the law who\nare next in seniority to the five elders. Arms and the materials of war\nare to be imported and exported only with the consent of the generals,\nand then only by the state. There is to be no retail trade either in\nthese or any other articles. For the distribution of the produce of the\ncountry, the Cretan laws afford a rule which may be usefully followed.\nAll shall be required to distribute corn, grain, animals, and other\nvaluable produce, into twelve portions. Each of these shall be\nsubdivided into three parts--one for freemen, another for servants,\nand the third shall be sold for the supply of artisans, strangers, and\nmetics. These portions must be equal whether the produce be much or\nlittle; and the master of a household may distribute the two portions\namong his family and his slaves as he pleases--the remainder is to be\nmeasured out to the animals.\n\nNext as to the houses in the country--there shall be twelve villages,\none in the centre of each of the twelve portions; and in every village\nthere shall be temples and an agora--also shrines for heroes or for\nany old Magnesian deities who linger about the place. In every division\nthere shall be temples of Hestia, Zeus, and Athene, as well as of the\nlocal deity, surrounded by buildings on eminences, which will be the\nguard-houses of the rural police. The dwellings of the artisans will be\nthus arranged:--The artisans shall be formed into thirteen guilds, one\nof which will be divided into twelve parts and settled in the city; of\nthe rest there shall be one in each division of the country. And the\nmagistrates will fix them on the spots where they will cause the least\ninconvenience and be most serviceable in supplying the wants of the\nhusbandmen.\n\nThe care of the agora will fall to the wardens of the agora. Their\nfirst duty will be the regulation of the temples which surround the\nmarket-place; and their second to see that the markets are orderly and\nthat fair dealing is observed. They will also take care that the sales\nwhich the citizens are required to make to strangers are duly executed.\nThe law shall be, that on the first day of each month the auctioneers to\nwhom the sale is entrusted shall offer grain; and at this sale a twelfth\npart of the whole shall be exposed, and the foreigner shall supply his\nwants for a month. On the tenth, there shall be a sale of liquids, and\non the twenty-third of animals, skins, woven or woollen stuffs, and\nother things which husbandmen have to sell and foreigners want to buy.\nNone of these commodities, any more than barley or flour, or any other\nfood, may be retailed by a citizen to a citizen; but foreigners may\nsell them to one another in the foreigners' market. There must also be\nbutchers who will sell parts of animals to foreigners and craftsmen,\nand their servants; and foreigners may buy firewood wholesale of the\ncommissioners of woods, and may sell retail to foreigners. All other\ngoods must be sold in the market, at some place indicated by the\nmagistrates, and shall be paid for on the spot. He who gives credit, and\nis cheated, will have no redress. In buying or selling, any excess or\ndiminution of what the law allows shall be registered. The same rule\nis to be observed about the property of metics. Anybody who practises a\nhandicraft may come and remain twenty years from the day on which he is\nenrolled; at the expiration of this time he shall take what he has and\ndepart. The only condition which is to be imposed upon him as the tax\nof his sojourn is good conduct; and he is not to pay any tax for being\nallowed to buy or sell. But if he wants to extend the time of his\nsojourn, and has done any service to the state, and he can persuade the\ncouncil and assembly to grant his request, he may remain. The children\nof metics may also be metics; and the period of twenty years, during\nwhich they are permitted to sojourn, is to count, in their case, from\ntheir fifteenth year.\n\nNo mention occurs in the Laws of the doctrine of Ideas. The will of God,\nthe authority of the legislator, and the dignity of the soul, have\ntaken their place in the mind of Plato. If we ask what is that truth or\nprinciple which, towards the end of his life, seems to have absorbed\nhim most, like the idea of good in the Republic, or of beauty in the\nSymposium, or of the unity of virtue in the Protagoras, we should\nanswer--The priority of the soul to the body: his later system mainly\nhangs upon this. In the Laws, as in the Sophist and Statesman, we pass\nout of the region of metaphysical or transcendental ideas into that of\npsychology.\n\nThe opening of the fifth book, though abrupt and unconnected in style,\nis one of the most elevated passages in Plato. The religious feeling\nwhich he seeks to diffuse over the commonest actions of life, the\nblessedness of living in the truth, the great mistake of a man living\nfor himself, the pity as well as anger which should be felt at evil,\nthe kindness due to the suppliant and the stranger, have the temper of\nChristian philosophy. The remark that elder men, if they want to educate\nothers, should begin by educating themselves; the necessity of creating\na spirit of obedience in the citizens; the desirableness of limiting\nproperty; the importance of parochial districts, each to be placed under\nthe protection of some God or demigod, have almost the tone of a modern\nwriter. In many of his views of politics, Plato seems to us, like some\npoliticians of our own time, to be half socialist, half conservative.\n\nIn the Laws, we remark a change in the place assigned by him to pleasure\nand pain. There are two ways in which even the ideal systems of morals\nmay regard them: either like the Stoics, and other ascetics, we may say\nthat pleasure must be eradicated; or if this seems unreal to us, we may\naffirm that virtue is the true pleasure; and then, as Aristotle says,\n'to be brought up to take pleasure in what we ought, exercises a great\nand paramount influence on human life' (Arist. Eth. Nic.). Or as Plato\nsays in the Laws, 'A man will recognize the noblest life as having the\ngreatest pleasure and the least pain, if he have a true taste.' If we\nadmit that pleasures differ in kind, the opposition between these two\nmodes of speaking is rather verbal than real; and in the greater part of\nthe writings of Plato they alternate with each other. In the Republic,\nthe mere suggestion that pleasure may be the chief good, is received\nby Socrates with a cry of abhorrence; but in the Philebus, innocent\npleasures vindicate their right to a place in the scale of goods. In the\nProtagoras, speaking in the person of Socrates rather than in his own,\nPlato admits the calculation of pleasure to be the true basis of ethics,\nwhile in the Phaedo he indignantly denies that the exchange of one\npleasure for another is the exchange of virtue. So wide of the mark\nare they who would attribute to Plato entire consistency in thoughts or\nwords.\n\nHe acknowledges that the second state is inferior to the first--in this,\nat any rate, he is consistent; and he still casts longing eyes upon the\nideal. Several features of the first are retained in the second: the\neducation of men and women is to be as far as possible the same; they\nare to have common meals, though separate, the men by themselves, the\nwomen with their children; and they are both to serve in the army; the\ncitizens, if not actually communists, are in spirit communistic;\nthey are to be lovers of equality; only a certain amount of wealth is\npermitted to them, and their burdens and also their privileges are to\nbe proportioned to this. The constitution in the Laws is a timocracy\nof wealth, modified by an aristocracy of merit. Yet the political\nphilosopher will observe that the first of these two principles is\nfixed and permanent, while the latter is uncertain and dependent on the\nopinion of the multitude. Wealth, after all, plays a great part in\nthe Second Republic of Plato. Like other politicians, he deems that a\nproperty qualification will contribute stability to the state. The four\nclasses are derived from the constitution of Athens, just as the form\nof the city, which is clustered around a citadel set on a hill, is\nsuggested by the Acropolis at Athens. Plato, writing under Pythagorean\ninfluences, seems really to have supposed that the well-being of the\ncity depended almost as much on the number 5040 as on justice and\nmoderation. But he is not prevented by Pythagoreanism from observing the\neffects which climate and soil exercise on the characters of nations.\n\nHe was doubtful in the Republic whether the ideal or communistic state\ncould be realized, but was at the same time prepared to maintain that\nwhether it existed or not made no difference to the philosopher, who\nwill in any case regulate his life by it (Republic). He has now lost\nfaith in the practicability of his scheme--he is speaking to 'men, and\nnot to Gods or sons of Gods' (Laws). Yet he still maintains it to be the\ntrue pattern of the state, which we must approach as nearly as possible:\nas Aristotle says, 'After having created a more general form of state,\nhe gradually brings it round to the other' (Pol.). He does not observe,\neither here or in the Republic, that in such a commonwealth there would\nbe little room for the development of individual character. In several\nrespects the second state is an improvement on the first, especially in\nbeing based more distinctly on the dignity of the soul. The standard\nof truth, justice, temperance, is as high as in the Republic;--in one\nrespect higher, for temperance is now regarded, not as a virtue, but as\nthe condition of all virtue. It is finally acknowledged that the virtues\nare all one and connected, and that if they are separated, courage is\nthe lowest of them. The treatment of moral questions is less speculative\nbut more human. The idea of good has disappeared; the excellences of\nindividuals--of him who is faithful in a civil broil, of the examiner\nwho is incorruptible, are the patterns to which the lives of the\ncitizens are to conform. Plato is never weary of speaking of the honour\nof the soul, which can only be honoured truly by being improved. To make\nthe soul as good as possible, and to prepare her for communion with the\nGods in another world by communion with divine virtue in this, is the\nend of life. If the Republic is far superior to the Laws in form and\nstyle, and perhaps in reach of thought, the Laws leave on the mind\nof the modern reader much more strongly the impression of a struggle\nagainst evil, and an enthusiasm for human improvement. When Plato says\nthat he must carry out that part of his ideal which is practicable,\nhe does not appear to have reflected that part of an ideal cannot be\ndetached from the whole.\n\nThe great defect of both his constitutions is the fixedness which he\nseeks to impress upon them. He had seen the Athenian empire, almost\nwithin the limits of his own life, wax and wane, but he never seems\nto have asked himself what would happen if, a century from the time at\nwhich he was writing, the Greek character should have as much changed as\nin the century which had preceded. He fails to perceive that the greater\npart of the political life of a nation is not that which is given them\nby their legislators, but that which they give themselves. He has never\nreflected that without progress there cannot be order, and that mere\norder can only be preserved by an unnatural and despotic repression. The\npossibility of a great nation or of an universal empire arising never\noccurred to him. He sees the enfeebled and distracted state of the\nHellenic world in his own later life, and thinks that the remedy is to\nmake the laws unchangeable. The same want of insight is apparent in his\njudgments about art. He would like to have the forms of sculpture and of\nmusic fixed as in Egypt. He does not consider that this would be fatal\nto the true principles of art, which, as Socrates had himself taught,\nwas to give life (Xen. Mem.). We wonder how, familiar as he was with\nthe statues of Pheidias, he could have endured the lifeless and\nhalf-monstrous works of Egyptian sculpture. The 'chants of Isis' (Laws),\nwe might think, would have been barbarous in an Athenian ear. But\nalthough he is aware that there are some things which are not so well\namong 'the children of the Nile,' he is deeply struck with the stability\nof Egyptian institutions. Both in politics and in art Plato seems to\nhave seen no way of bringing order out of disorder, except by taking a\nstep backwards. Antiquity, compared with the world in which he lived,\nhad a sacredness and authority for him: the men of a former age were\nsupposed by him to have had a sense of reverence which was wanting among\nhis contemporaries. He could imagine the early stages of civilization;\nhe never thought of what the future might bring forth. His experience\nis confined to two or three centuries, to a few Greek states, and to an\nuncertain report of Egypt and the East. There are many ways in which\nthe limitations of their knowledge affected the genius of the Greeks.\nIn criticism they were like children, having an acute vision of things\nwhich were near to them, blind to possibilities which were in the\ndistance.\n\nThe colony is to receive from the mother-country her original\nconstitution, and some of the first guardians of the law. The guardians\nof the law are to be ministers of justice, and the president of\neducation is to take precedence of them all. They are to keep the\nregisters of property, to make regulations for trade, and they are to\nbe superannuated at seventy years of age. Several questions of modern\npolitics, such as the limitation of property, the enforcement of\neducation, the relations of classes, are anticipated by Plato. He hopes\nthat in his state will be found neither poverty nor riches; every\nman having the necessaries of life, he need not go fortune-hunting in\nmarriage. Almost in the spirit of the Gospel he would say, 'How hardly\ncan a rich man dwell in a perfect state.' For he cannot be a good man\nwho is always gaining too much and spending too little (Laws; compare\nArist. Eth. Nic.). Plato, though he admits wealth as a political\nelement, would deny that material prosperity can be the foundation of\na really great community. A man's soul, as he often says, is more to be\nesteemed than his body; and his body than external goods. He repeats the\ncomplaint which has been made in all ages, that the love of money is the\ncorruption of states. He has a sympathy with thieves and burglars, 'many\nof whom are men of ability and greatly to be pitied, because their souls\nare hungering and thirsting all their lives long;' but he has\nlittle sympathy with shopkeepers or retailers, although he makes the\nreflection, which sometimes occurs to ourselves, that such occupations,\nif they were carried on honestly by the best men and women, would be\ndelightful and honourable. For traders and artisans a moderate gain was,\nin his opinion, best. He has never, like modern writers, idealized\nthe wealth of nations, any more than he has worked out the problems of\npolitical economy, which among the ancients had not yet grown into a\nscience. The isolation of Greek states, their constant wars, the want of\na free industrial population, and of the modern methods and instruments\nof 'credit,' prevented any great extension of commerce among them; and\nso hindered them from forming a theory of the laws which regulate the\naccumulation and distribution of wealth.\n\nThe constitution of the army is aristocratic and also democratic;\nofficial appointment is combined with popular election. The two\nprinciples are carried out as follows: The guardians of the law nominate\ngenerals out of whom three are chosen by those who are or have been\nof the age for military service; and the generals elected have the\nnomination of certain of the inferior officers. But if either in the\ncase of generals or of the inferior officers any one is ready to swear\nthat he knows of a better man than those nominated, he may put the\nclaims of his candidate to the vote of the whole army, or of the\ndivision of the service which he will, if elected, command. There is\na general assembly, but its functions, except at elections, are hardly\nnoticed. In the election of the Boule, Plato again attempts to mix\naristocracy and democracy. This is effected, first as in the Servian\nconstitution, by balancing wealth and numbers; for it cannot be supposed\nthat those who possessed a higher qualification were equal in number\nwith those who had a lower, and yet they have an equal number of\nrepresentatives. In the second place, all classes are compelled to vote\nin the election of senators from the first and second class; but the\nfourth class is not compelled to elect from the third, nor the third\nand fourth from the fourth. Thirdly, out of the 180 persons who are thus\nchosen from each of the four classes, 720 in all, 360 are to be taken by\nlot; these form the council for the year.\n\nThese political adjustments of Plato's will be criticised by the\npractical statesman as being for the most part fanciful and ineffectual.\nHe will observe, first of all, that the only real check on democracy\nis the division into classes. The second of the three proposals, though\ningenious, and receiving some light from the apathy to politics which\nis often shown by the higher classes in a democracy, would have little\npower in times of excitement and peril, when the precaution was most\nneeded. At such political crises, all the lower classes would vote\nequally with the higher. The subtraction of half the persons chosen\nat the first election by the chances of the lot would not raise the\ncharacter of the senators, and is open to the objection of uncertainty,\nwhich necessarily attends this and similar schemes of double\nrepresentative government. Nor can the voters be expected to retain the\ncontinuous political interest required for carrying out such a proposal\nas Plato's. Who could select 180 persons of each class, fitted to be\nsenators? And whoever were chosen by the voter in the first instance,\nhis wishes might be neutralized by the action of the lot. Yet the scheme\nof Plato is not really so extravagant as the actual constitution of\nAthens, in which all the senators appear to have been elected by\nlot (apo kuamou bouleutai), at least, after the revolution made by\nCleisthenes; for the constitution of the senate which was established\nby Solon probably had some aristocratic features, though their precise\nnature is unknown to us. The ancients knew that election by lot was\nthe most democratic of all modes of appointment, seeming to say in the\nobjectionable sense, that 'one man is as good as another.' Plato, who is\ndesirous of mingling different elements, makes a partial use of the lot,\nwhich he applies to candidates already elected by vote. He attempts also\nto devise a system of checks and balances such as he supposes to have\nbeen intended by the ancient legislators. We are disposed to say to\nhim, as he himself says in a remarkable passage, that 'no man ever\nlegislates, but accidents of all sorts, which legislate for us in all\nsorts of ways. The violence of war and the hard necessity of poverty are\nconstantly overturning governments and changing laws.' And yet, as he\nadds, the true legislator is still required: he must co-operate with\ncircumstances. Many things which are ascribed to human foresight are\nthe result of chance. Ancient, and in a less degree modern political\nconstitutions, are never consistent with themselves, because they are\nnever framed on a single design, but are added to from time to time as\nnew elements arise and gain the preponderance in the state. We often\nattribute to the wisdom of our ancestors great political effects which\nhave sprung unforeseen from the accident of the situation. Power, not\nwisdom, is most commonly the source of political revolutions. And\nthe result, as in the Roman Republic, of the co-existence of opposite\nelements in the same state is, not a balance of power or an equable\nprogress of liberal principles, but a conflict of forces, of which one\nor other may happen to be in the ascendant. In Greek history, as well as\nin Plato's conception of it, this 'progression by antagonism' involves\nreaction: the aristocracy expands into democracy and returns again to\ntyranny.\n\nThe constitution of the Laws may be said to consist, besides the\nmagistrates, mainly of three elements,--an administrative Council,\nthe judiciary, and the Nocturnal Council, which is an intellectual\naristocracy, composed of priests and the ten eldest guardians of the law\nand some younger co-opted members. To this latter chiefly are assigned\nthe functions of legislation, but to be exercised with a sparing hand.\nThe powers of the ordinary council are administrative rather than\nlegislative. The whole number of 360, as in the Athenian constitution,\nis distributed among the months of the year according to the number of\nthe tribes. Not more than one-twelfth is to be in office at once,\nso that the government would be made up of twelve administrations\nsucceeding one another in the course of the year. They are to exercise\na general superintendence, and, like the Athenian counsellors, are to\npreside in monthly divisions over all assemblies. Of the ecclesia\nover which they presided little is said, and that little relates to\ncomparatively trifling duties. Nothing is less present to the mind of\nPlato than a House of Commons, carrying on year by year the work of\nlegislation. For he supposes the laws to be already provided. As little\nwould he approve of a body like the Roman Senate. The people and the\naristocracy alike are to be represented, not by assemblies, but by\nofficers elected for one or two years, except the guardians of the law,\nwho are elected for twenty years.\n\nThe evils of this system are obvious. If in any state, as Plato says\nin the Statesman, it is easier to find fifty good draught-players than\nfifty good rulers, the greater part of the 360 who compose the council\nmust be unfitted to rule. The unfitness would be increased by the short\nperiod during which they held office. There would be no traditions\nof government among them, as in a Greek or Italian oligarchy, and no\nindividual would be responsible for any of their acts. Everything seems\nto have been sacrificed to a false notion of equality, according to\nwhich all have a turn of ruling and being ruled. In the constitution\nof the Magnesian state Plato has not emancipated himself from the\nlimitations of ancient politics. His government may be described as\na democracy of magistrates elected by the people. He never troubles\nhimself about the political consistency of his scheme. He does indeed\nsay that the greater part of the good of this world arises, not from\nequality, but from proportion, which he calls the judgment of Zeus\n(compare Aristotle's Distributive Justice), but he hardly makes any\nattempt to carry out the principle in practice. There is no attempt\nto proportion representation to merit; nor is there any body in his\ncommonwealth which represents the life either of a class or of the whole\nstate. The manner of appointing magistrates is taken chiefly from the\nold democratic constitution of Athens, of which it retains some of the\nworst features, such as the use of the lot, while by doing away with\nthe political character of the popular assembly the mainspring of the\nmachine is taken out. The guardians of the law, thirty-seven in number,\nof whom the ten eldest reappear as a part of the Nocturnal Council at\nthe end of the twelfth book, are to be elected by the whole military\nclass, but they are to hold office for twenty years, and would therefore\nhave an oligarchical rather than a democratic character. Nothing is said\nof the manner in which the functions of the Nocturnal Council are to\nbe harmonized with those of the guardians of the law, or as to how the\nordinary council is related to it.\n\nSimilar principles are applied to inferior offices. To some the\nappointment is made by vote, to others by lot. In the elections to the\npriesthood, Plato endeavours to mix or balance in a friendly manner\n'demus and not demus.' The commonwealth of the Laws, like the Republic,\ncannot dispense with a spiritual head, which is the same in both--the\noracle of Delphi. From this the laws about all divine things are to be\nderived. The final selection of the Interpreters, the choice of an heir\nfor a vacant lot, the punishment for removing a deposit, are also to be\ndetermined by it. Plato is not disposed to encourage amateur attempts\nto revive religion in states. For, as he says in the Laws, 'To institute\nreligious rites is the work of a great intelligence.'\n\nThough the council is framed on the model of the Athenian Boule, the law\ncourts of Plato do not equally conform to the pattern of the Athenian\ndicasteries. Plato thinks that the judges should speak and ask\nquestions:--this is not possible if they are numerous; he would,\ntherefore, have a few judges only, but good ones. He is nevertheless\naware that both in public and private suits there must be a\npopular element. He insists that the whole people must share in the\nadministration of justice--in public causes they are to take the first\nstep, and the final decision is to remain with them. In private suits\nthey are also to retain a share; 'for the citizen who has no part in the\nadministration of justice is apt to think that he has no share in the\nstate. For this reason there is to be a court of law in every tribe\n(i.e. for about every 2,000 citizens), and the judges are to be chosen\nby lot.' Of the courts of law he gives what he calls a superficial\nsketch. Nor, indeed is it easy to reconcile his various accounts\nof them. It is however clear that although some officials, like the\nguardians of the law, the wardens of the agora, city, and country have\npower to inflict minor penalties, the administration of justice is in\nthe main popular. The ingenious expedient of dividing the questions of\nlaw and fact between a judge and jury, which would have enabled Plato to\ncombine the popular element with the judicial, did not occur to him or\nto any other ancient political philosopher. Though desirous of limiting\nthe number of judges, and thereby confining the office to persons\nspecially fitted for it, he does not seem to have understood that a body\nof law must be formed by decisions as well as by legal enactments.\n\nHe would have men in the first place seek justice from their friends and\nneighbours, because, as he truly remarks, they know best the questions\nat issue; these are called in another passage arbiters rather than\njudges. But if they cannot settle the matter, it is to be referred to\nthe courts of the tribes, and a higher penalty is to be paid by the\nparty who is unsuccessful in the suit. There is a further appeal allowed\nto the select judges, with a further increase of penalty. The select\njudges are to be appointed by the magistrates, who are to choose one\nfrom every magistracy. They are to be elected annually, and therefore\nprobably for a year only, and are liable to be called to account before\nthe guardians of the law. In cases of which death is the penalty, the\ntrial takes place before a special court, which is composed of the\nguardians of the law and of the judges of appeal.\n\nIn treating of the subject in Book ix, he proposes to leave for the most\npart the methods of procedure to a younger generation of legislators;\nthe procedure in capital causes he determines himself. He insists that\nthe vote of the judges shall be given openly, and before they vote they\nare to hear speeches from the plaintiff and defendant. They are then\nto take evidence in support of what has been said, and to examine\nwitnesses. The eldest judge is to ask his questions first, and then\nthe second, and then the third. The interrogatories are to continue for\nthree days, and the evidence is to be written down. Apparently he does\nnot expect the judges to be professional lawyers, any more than he\nexpects the members of the council to be trained statesmen.\n\nIn forming marriage connexions, Plato supposes that the public interest\nwill prevail over private inclination. There was nothing in this very\nshocking to the notions of Greeks, among whom the feeling of love\ntowards the other sex was almost deprived of sentiment or romance.\nMarried life is to be regulated solely with a view to the good of the\nstate. The newly-married couple are not allowed to absent themselves\nfrom their respective syssitia, even during their honeymoon; they are\nto give their whole mind to the procreation of children; their duties to\none another at a later period of life are not a matter about which\nthe state is equally solicitous. Divorces are readily allowed for\nincompatibility of temper. As in the Republic, physical considerations\nseem almost to exclude moral and social ones. To modern feelings there\nis a degree of coarseness in Plato's treatment of the subject. Yet he\nalso makes some shrewd remarks on marriage, as for example, that a man\nwho does not marry for money will not be the humble servant of his wife.\nAnd he shows a true conception of the nature of the family, when he\nrequires that the newly-married couple 'should leave their father and\nmother,' and have a separate home. He also provides against extravagance\nin marriage festivals, which in some states of society, for instance in\nthe case of the Hindoos, has been a social evil of the first magnitude.\n\nIn treating of property, Plato takes occasion to speak of property in\nslaves. They are to be treated with perfect justice; but, for their own\nsake, to be kept at a distance. The motive is not so much humanity to\nthe slave, of which there are hardly any traces (although Plato allows\nthat many in the hour of peril have found a slave more attached than\nmembers of their own family), but the self-respect which the freeman and\ncitizen owes to himself (compare Republic). If they commit crimes, they\nare doubly punished; if they inform against illegal practices of their\nmasters, they are to receive a protection, which would probably be\nineffectual, from the guardians of the law; in rare cases they are to be\nset free. Plato still breathes the spirit of the old Hellenic world, in\nwhich slavery was a necessity, because leisure must be provided for the\ncitizen.\n\nThe education propounded in the Laws differs in several points from that\nof the Republic. Plato seems to have reflected as deeply and earnestly\non the importance of infancy as Rousseau, or Jean Paul (compare the\nsaying of the latter--'Not the moment of death, but the moment of\nbirth, is probably the more important'). He would fix the amusements of\nchildren in the hope of fixing their characters in after-life. In the\nspirit of the statesman who said, 'Let me make the ballads of a\ncountry, and I care not who make their laws,' Plato would say, 'Let the\namusements of children be unchanged, and they will not want to change\nthe laws. The 'Goddess Harmonia' plays a great part in Plato's ideas\nof education. The natural restless force of life in children, 'who do\nnothing but roar until they are three years old,' is gradually to be\nreduced to law and order. As in the Republic, he fixes certain forms\nin which songs are to be composed: (1) they are to be strains of\ncheerfulness and good omen; (2) they are to be hymns or prayers\naddressed to the Gods; (3) they are to sing only of the lawful and good.\nThe poets are again expelled or rather ironically invited to depart; and\nthose who remain are required to submit their poems to the censorship of\nthe magistrates. Youth are no longer compelled to commit to memory many\nthousand lyric and tragic Greek verses; yet, perhaps, a worse fate is\nin store for them. Plato has no belief in 'liberty of prophesying'; and\nhaving guarded against the dangers of lyric poetry, he remembers that\nthere is an equal danger in other writings. He cannot leave his old\nenemies, the Sophists, in possession of the field; and therefore he\nproposes that youth shall learn by heart, instead of the compositions of\npoets or prose writers, his own inspired work on laws. These, and music\nand mathematics, are the chief parts of his education.\n\nMathematics are to be cultivated, not as in the Republic with a view to\nthe science of the idea of good,--though the higher use of them is not\naltogether excluded,--but rather with a religious and political aim.\nThey are a sacred study which teaches men how to distribute the portions\nof a state, and which is to be pursued in order that they may learn not\nto blaspheme about astronomy. Against three mathematical errors Plato\nis in profound earnest. First, the error of supposing that the three\ndimensions of length, breadth, and height, are really commensurable\nwith one another. The difficulty which he feels is analogous to the\ndifficulty which he formerly felt about the connexion of ideas, and is\nequally characteristic of ancient philosophy: he fixes his mind on the\npoint of difference, and cannot at the same time take in the similarity.\nSecondly, he is puzzled about the nature of fractions: in the Republic,\nhe is disposed to deny the possibility of their existence. Thirdly, his\noptimism leads him to insist (unlike the Spanish king who thought that\nhe could have improved on the mechanism of the heavens) on the perfect\nor circular movement of the heavenly bodies. He appears to mean, that\ninstead of regarding the stars as overtaking or being overtaken by one\nanother, or as planets wandering in many paths, a more comprehensive\nsurvey of the heavens would enable us to infer that they all alike moved\nin a circle around a centre (compare Timaeus; Republic). He probably\nsuspected, though unacquainted with the true cause, that the appearance\nof the heavens did not agree with the reality: at any rate, his notions\nof what was right or fitting easily overpowered the results of actual\nobservation. To the early astronomers, who lived at the revival of\nscience, as to Plato, there was nothing absurd in a priori astronomy,\nand they would probably have made fewer real discoveries of they had\nfollowed any other track. (Compare Introduction to the Republic.)\n\nThe science of dialectic is nowhere mentioned by name in the Laws, nor\nis anything said of the education of after-life. The child is to begin\nto learn at ten years of age: he is to be taught reading and writing for\nthree years, from ten to thirteen, and no longer; and for three years\nmore, from thirteen to sixteen, he is to be instructed in music. The\ngreat fault which Plato finds in the contemporary education is the\nalmost total ignorance of arithmetic and astronomy, in which the Greeks\nwould do well to take a lesson from the Egyptians (compare Republic).\nDancing and wrestling are to have a military character, and women as\nwell as men are to be taught the use of arms. The military spirit which\nPlato has vainly endeavoured to expel in the first two books returns\nagain in the seventh and eighth. He has evidently a sympathy with the\nsoldier, as well as with the poet, and he is no mean master of the\nart, or at least of the theory, of war (compare Laws; Republic), though\ninclining rather to the Spartan than to the Athenian practice of\nit (Laws). Of a supreme or master science which was to be the\n'coping-stone' of the rest, few traces appear in the Laws. He seems to\nhave lost faith in it, or perhaps to have realized that the time for\nsuch a science had not yet come, and that he was unable to fill up\nthe outline which he had sketched. There is no requirement that the\nguardians of the law shall be philosophers, although they are to know\nthe unity of virtue, and the connexion of the sciences. Nor are we\ntold that the leisure of the citizens, when they are grown up, is to\nbe devoted to any intellectual employment. In this respect we note a\nfalling off from the Republic, but also there is 'the returning to it'\nof which Aristotle speaks in the Politics. The public and family duties\nof the citizens are to be their main business, and these would, no\ndoubt, take up a great deal more time than in the modern world we are\nwilling to allow to either of them. Plato no longer entertains the idea\nof any regular training to be pursued under the superintendence of the\nstate from eighteen to thirty, or from thirty to thirty-five; he has\ntaken the first step downwards on 'Constitution Hill' (Republic). But\nhe maintains as earnestly as ever that 'to men living under this second\npolity there remains the greatest of all works, the education of the\nsoul,' and that no bye-work should be allowed to interfere with it.\nNight and day are not long enough for the consummation of it.\n\nFew among us are either able or willing to carry education into later\nlife; five or six years spent at school, three or four at a university,\nor in the preparation for a profession, an occasional attendance at a\nlecture to which we are invited by friends when we have an hour to spare\nfrom house-keeping or money-making--these comprise, as a matter of fact,\nthe education even of the educated; and then the lamp is extinguished\n'more truly than Heracleitus' sun, never to be lighted again'\n(Republic). The description which Plato gives in the Republic of the\nstate of adult education among his contemporaries may be applied almost\nword for word to our own age. He does not however acquiesce in this\nwidely-spread want of a higher education; he would rather seek to make\nevery man something of a philosopher before he enters on the duties of\nactive life. But in the Laws he no longer prescribes any regular course\nof study which is to be pursued in mature years. Nor does he remark that\nthe education of after-life is of another kind, and must consist with\nthe majority of the world rather in the improvement of character than in\nthe acquirement of knowledge. It comes from the study of ourselves\nand other men: from moderation and experience: from reflection on\ncircumstances: from the pursuit of high aims: from a right use of the\nopportunities of life. It is the preservation of what we have been,\nand the addition of something more. The power of abstract study or\ncontinuous thought is very rare, but such a training as this can be\ngiven by every one to himself.\n\nThe singular passage in Book vii., in which Plato describes life as a\npastime, like many other passages in the Laws is imperfectly expressed.\nTwo thoughts seem to be struggling in his mind: first, the reflection,\nto which he returns at the end of the passage, that men are playthings\nor puppets, and that God only is the serious aim of human endeavours;\nthis suggests to him the afterthought that, although playthings, they\nare the playthings of the Gods, and that this is the best of them. The\ncynical, ironical fancy of the moment insensibly passes into a religious\nsentiment. In another passage he says that life is a game of which God,\nwho is the player, shifts the pieces so as to procure the victory of\ngood on the whole. Or once more: Tragedies are acted on the stage; but\nthe best and noblest of them is the imitation of the noblest life, which\nwe affirm to be the life of our whole state. Again, life is a chorus, as\nwell as a sort of mystery, in which we have the Gods for playmates. Men\nimagine that war is their serious pursuit, and they make war that they\nmay return to their amusements. But neither wars nor amusements are the\ntrue satisfaction of men, which is to be found only in the society of\nthe Gods, in sacrificing to them and propitiating them. Like a Christian\nascetic, Plato seems to suppose that life should be passed wholly in\nthe enjoyment of divine things. And after meditating in amazement on the\nsadness and unreality of the world, he adds, in a sort of parenthesis,\n'Be cheerful, Sirs' (Shakespeare, Tempest.)\n\nIn one of the noblest passages of Plato, he speaks of the relation of\nthe sexes. Natural relations between members of the same family have\nbeen established of old; a 'little word' has put a stop to incestuous\nconnexions. But unnatural unions of another kind continued to prevail\nat Crete and Lacedaemon, and were even justified by the example of the\nGods. They, too, might be banished, if the feeling that they were unholy\nand abominable could sink into the minds of men. The legislator is\nto cry aloud, and spare not, 'Let not men fall below the level of the\nbeasts.' Plato does not shrink, like some modern philosophers, from\n'carrying on war against the mightiest lusts of mankind;' neither does\nhe expect to extirpate them, but only to confine them to their natural\nuse and purpose, by the enactments of law, and by the influence of\npublic opinion. He will not feed them by an over-luxurious diet, nor\nallow the healthier instincts of the soul to be corrupted by music\nand poetry. The prohibition of excessive wealth is, as he says, a very\nconsiderable gain in the way of temperance, nor does he allow of those\nenthusiastic friendships between older and younger persons which in\nhis earlier writings appear to be alluded to with a certain degree of\namusement and without reproof (compare Introduction to the Symposium).\nSappho and Anacreon are celebrated by him in the Charmides and the\nPhaedrus; but they would have been expelled from the Magnesian state.\n\nYet he does not suppose that the rule of absolute purity can be enforced\non all mankind. Something must be conceded to the weakness of human\nnature. He therefore adopts a 'second legal standard of honourable and\ndishonourable, having a second standard of right.' He would abolish\naltogether 'the connexion of men with men...As to women, if any man has\nto do with any but those who come into his house duly married by sacred\nrites, and he offends publicly in the face of all mankind, we shall be\nright in enacting that he be deprived of civic honours and privileges.'\nBut feeling also that it is impossible wholly to control the mightiest\npassions of mankind,' Plato, like other legislators, makes a compromise.\nThe offender must not be found out; decency, if not morality, must\nbe respected. In this he appears to agree with the practice of all\ncivilized ages and countries. Much may be truly said by the moralist\non the comparative harm of open and concealed vice. Nor do we deny\nthat some moral evils are better turned out to the light, because,\nlike diseases, when exposed, they are more easily cured. And secrecy\nintroduces mystery which enormously exaggerates their power; a mere\nanimal want is thus elevated into a sentimental ideal. It may very\nwell be that a word spoken in season about things which are commonly\nconcealed may have an excellent effect. But having regard to the\neducation of youth, to the innocence of children, to the sensibilities\nof women, to the decencies of society, Plato and the world in general\nare not wrong in insisting that some of the worst vices, if they must\nexist, should be kept out of sight; this, though only a second-best\nrule, is a support to the weakness of human nature. There are some\nthings which may be whispered in the closet, but should not be shouted\non the housetop. It may be said of this, as of many other things, that\nit is a great part of education to know to whom they are to be spoken\nof, and when, and where.\n\nBOOK IX. Punishments of offences and modes of procedure come next in\norder. We have a sense of disgrace in making regulations for all the\ndetails of crime in a virtuous and well-ordered state. But seeing\nthat we are legislating for men and not for Gods, there is no\nuncharitableness in apprehending that some one of our citizens may have\na heart, like the seed which has touched the ox's horn, so hard as to be\nimpenetrable to the law. Let our first enactment be directed against the\nrobbing of temples. No well-educated citizen will be guilty of such a\ncrime, but one of their servants, or some stranger, may, and with a view\nto him, and at the same time with a remoter eye to the general infirmity\nof human nature, I will lay down the law, beginning with a prelude. To\nthe intending robber we will say--O sir, the complaint which troubles\nyou is not human; but some curse has fallen upon you, inherited from\nthe crimes of your ancestors, of which you must purge yourself: go and\nsacrifice to the Gods, associate with the good, avoid the wicked; and if\nyou are cured of the fatal impulse, well; but if not, acknowledge death\nto be better than life, and depart.\n\nThese are the accents, soft and low, in which we address the would-be\ncriminal. And if he will not listen, then cry aloud as with the sound of\na trumpet: Whosoever robs a temple, if he be a slave or foreigner shall\nbe branded in the face and hands, and scourged, and cast naked beyond\nthe border. And perhaps this may improve him: for the law aims either\nat the reformation of the criminal, or the repression of crime. No\npunishment is designed to inflict useless injury. But if the offender be\na citizen, he must be incurable, and for him death is the only fitting\npenalty. His iniquity, however, shall not be visited on his children,\nnor shall his property be confiscated.\n\nAs to the exaction of penalties, any person who is fined for an offence\nshall not be liable to pay the fine, unless he have property in excess\nof his lot. For the lots must never go uncultivated for lack of means;\nthe guardians of the law are to provide against this. If a fine is\ninflicted upon a man which he cannot pay, and for which his friends\nare unwilling to give security, he shall be imprisoned and otherwise\ndishonoured. But no criminal shall go unpunished:--whether death, or\nimprisonment, or stripes, or fines, or the stocks, or banishment to a\nremote temple, be the penalty. Capital offences shall come under the\ncognizance of the guardians of the law, and a college of the best of the\nlast year's magistrates. The order of suits and similar details we shall\nleave to the lawgivers of the future, and only determine the mode of\nvoting. The judges are to sit in order of seniority, and the proceedings\nshall begin with the speeches of the plaintiff and the defendant; and\nthen the judges, beginning with the eldest, shall ask questions and\ncollect evidence during three days, which, at the end of each day, shall\nbe deposited in writing under their seals on the altar of Hestia; and\nwhen they have evidence enough, after a solemn declaration that they\nwill decide justly, they shall vote and end the case. The votes are to\nbe given openly in the presence of the citizens.\n\nNext to religion, the preservation of the constitution is the first\nobject of the law. The greatest enemy of the state is he who attempts to\nset up a tyrant, or breeds plots and conspiracies; not far below him in\nguilt is a magistrate who either knowingly, or in ignorance, fails to\nbring the offender to justice. Any one who is good for anything will\ngive information against traitors. The mode of proceeding at such trials\nwill be the same as at trials for sacrilege; the penalty, death. But\nneither in this case nor in any other is the son to bear the iniquity of\nthe father, unless father, grandfather, great-grandfather, have all of\nthem been capitally convicted, and then the family of the criminal\nare to be sent off to the country of their ancestor, retaining their\nproperty, with the exception of the lot and its fixtures. And ten are to\nbe selected from the younger sons of the other citizens--one of whom is\nto be chosen by the oracle of Delphi to be heir of the lot.\n\nOur third law will be a general one, concerning the procedure and the\njudges in cases of treason. As regards the remaining or departure of the\nfamily of the offender, the same law shall apply equally to the traitor,\nthe sacrilegious, and the conspirator.\n\nA thief, whether he steals much or little, must refund twice the amount,\nif he can do so without impairing his lot; if he cannot, he must go to\nprison until he either pays the plaintiff, or in case of a public theft,\nthe city, or they agree to forgive him. 'But should all kinds of theft\nincur the same penalty?' You remind me of what I know--that legislation\nis never perfect. The men for whom laws are now made may be compared\nto the slave who is being doctored, according to our old image, by the\nunscientific doctor. For the empirical practitioner, if he chance to\nmeet the educated physician talking to his patient, and entering into\nthe philosophy of his disease, would burst out laughing and say, as\ndoctors delight in doing, 'Foolish fellow, instead of curing the patient\nyou are educating him!' 'And would he not be right?' Perhaps; and\nhe might add, that he who discourses in our fashion preaches to the\ncitizens instead of legislating for them. 'True.' There is, however, one\nadvantage which we possess--that being amateurs only, we may either take\nthe most ideal, or the most necessary and utilitarian view. 'But why\noffer such an alternative? As if all our legislation must be done\nto-day, and nothing put off until the morrow. We may surely rough-hew\nour materials first, and shape and place them afterwards.' That will be\nthe natural way of proceeding. There is a further point. Of all writings\neither in prose or verse the writings of the legislator are the most\nimportant. For it is he who has to determine the nature of good and\nevil, and how they should be studied with a view to our instruction.\nAnd is it not as disgraceful for Solon and Lycurgus to lay down false\nprecepts about the institutions of life as for Homer and Tyrtaeus?\nThe laws of states ought to be the models of writing, and what is at\nvariance with them should be deemed ridiculous. And we may further\nimagine them to express the affection and good sense of a father or\nmother, and not to be the fiats of a tyrant. 'Very true.'\n\nLet us enquire more particularly about sacrilege, theft and other\ncrimes, for which we have already legislated in part. And this leads\nus to ask, first of all, whether we are agreed or disagreed about the\nnature of the honourable and just. 'To what are you referring?' I will\nendeavour to explain. All are agreed that justice is honourable, whether\nin men or things, and no one who maintains that a very ugly men who is\njust, is in his mind fair, would be thought extravagant. 'Very true.'\nBut if honour is to be attributed to justice, are just sufferings\nhonourable, or only just actions? 'What do you mean?' Our laws supply a\ncase in point; for we enacted that the robber of temples and the traitor\nshould die; and this was just, but the reverse of honourable. In this\nway does the language of the many rend asunder the just and honourable.\n'That is true.' But is our own language consistent? I have already said\nthat the evil are involuntarily evil; and the evil are the unjust. Now\nthe voluntary cannot be the involuntary; and if you two come to me\nand say, 'Then shall we legislate for our city?' Of course, I shall\nreply.--'Then will you distinguish what crimes are voluntary and what\ninvoluntary, and shall we impose lighter penalties on the latter, and\nheavier on the former? Or shall we refuse to determine what is the\nmeaning of voluntary and involuntary, and maintain that our words have\ncome down from heaven, and that they should be at once embodied in a\nlaw?' All states legislate under the idea that there are two classes of\nactions, the voluntary and the involuntary, but there is great confusion\nabout them in the minds of men; and the law can never act unless they\nare distinguished. Either we must abstain from affirming that unjust\nactions are involuntary, or explain the meaning of this statement.\nBelieving, then, that acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary\nand involuntary, I must endeavour to find some other mode of classifying\nthem. Hurts are voluntary and involuntary, but all hurts are not\ninjuries: on the other hand, a benefit when wrongly conferred may be an\ninjury. An act which gives or takes away anything is not simply just;\nbut the legislator who has to decide whether the case is one of hurt or\ninjury, must consider the animus of the agent; and when there is hurt,\nhe must as far as possible, provide a remedy and reparation: but if\nthere is injustice, he must, when compensation has been made, further\nendeavour to reconcile the two parties. 'Excellent.' Where injustice,\nlike disease, is remediable, there the remedy must be applied in word\nor deed, with the assistance of pleasures and pains, of bounties and\npenalties, or any other influence which may inspire man with the love\nof justice, or hatred of injustice; and this is the noblest work of\nlaw. But when the legislator perceives the evil to be incurable, he will\nconsider that the death of the offender will be a good to himself,\nand in two ways a good to society: first, as he becomes an example to\nothers; secondly, because the city will be quit of a rogue; and in such\na case, but in no other, the legislator will punish with death.\n'There is some truth in what you say. I wish, however, that you would\ndistinguish more clearly the difference of injury and hurt, and the\ncomplications of voluntary and involuntary.' You will admit that anger\nis of a violent and destructive nature? 'Certainly.' And further, that\npleasure is different from anger, and has an opposite power, working by\npersuasion and deceit? 'Yes.' Ignorance is the third source of crimes;\nthis is of two kinds--simple ignorance and ignorance doubled by conceit\nof knowledge; the latter, when accompanied with power, is a source of\nterrible errors, but is excusable when only weak and childish. 'True.'\nWe often say that one man masters, and another is mastered by pleasure\nand anger. 'Just so.' But no one says that one man masters, and another\nis mastered by ignorance. 'You are right.' All these motives actuate men\nand sometimes drive them in different ways. 'That is so.' Now, then, I\nam in a position to define the nature of just and unjust. By injustice I\nmean the dominion of anger and fear, pleasure and pain, envy and desire,\nin the soul, whether doing harm or not: by justice I mean the rule of\nthe opinion of the best, whether in states or individuals, extending to\nthe whole of life; although actions done in error are often thought to\nbe involuntary injustice. No controversy need be raised about names at\npresent; we are only desirous of fixing in our memories the heads of\nerror. And the pain which is called fear and anger is our first head of\nerror; the second is the class of pleasures and desires; and the third,\nof hopes which aim at true opinion about the best;--this latter falls\ninto three divisions (i.e. (1) when accompanied by simple ignorance, (2)\nwhen accompanied by conceit of wisdom combined with power, or (3) with\nweakness), so that there are in all five. And the laws relating to them\nmay be summed up under two heads, laws which deal with acts of open\nviolence and with acts of deceit; to which may be added acts both\nviolent and deceitful, and these last should be visited with the utmost\nrigour of the law. 'Very properly.'\n\nLet us now return to the enactment of laws. We have treated of\nsacrilege, and of conspiracy, and of treason. Any of these crimes may be\ncommitted by a person not in his right mind, or in the second childhood\nof old age. If this is proved to be the fact before the judges, the\nperson in question shall only have to pay for the injury, and not be\npunished further, unless he have on his hands the stain of blood. In\nthis case he shall be exiled for a year, and if he return before the\nexpiration of the year, he shall be retained in the public prison two\nyears.\n\nHomicides may be divided into voluntary and involuntary: and first of\ninvoluntary homicide. He who unintentionally kills another man at the\ngames or in military exercises duly authorized by the magistrates,\nwhether death follow immediately or after an interval, shall be\nacquitted, subject only to the purification required by the Delphian\nOracle. Any physician whose patient dies against his will shall in like\nmanner be acquitted. Any one who unintentionally kills the slave of\nanother, believing that he is his own, with or without weapons, shall\nbear the master of the slave harmless, or pay a penalty amounting to\ntwice the value of the slave, and to this let him add a purification\ngreater than in the case of homicide at the games. If a man kill his\nown slave, a purification only is required of him. If he kill a freeman\nunintentionally, let him also make purification; and let him remember\nthe ancient tradition which says that the murdered man is indignant when\nhe sees the murderer walk about in his own accustomed haunts, and that\nhe terrifies him with the remembrance of his crime. And therefore the\nhomicide should keep away from his native land for a year, or, if he\nhave slain a stranger, let him avoid the land of the stranger for a like\nperiod. If he complies with this condition, the nearest kinsman of the\ndeceased shall take pity upon him and be reconciled to him; but if he\nrefuses to remain in exile, or visits the temples unpurified, then\nlet the kinsman proceed against him, and demand a double penalty. The\nkinsman who neglects this duty shall himself incur the curse, and any\none who likes may proceed against him, and compel him to leave his\ncountry for five years. If a stranger involuntarily kill a stranger, any\none may proceed against him in the same manner: and the homicide, if\nhe be a metic, shall be banished for a year; but if he be an entire\nstranger, whether he have murdered metic, citizen, or stranger, he shall\nbe banished for ever; and if he return, he shall be punished with death,\nand his property shall go to the next of kin of the murdered man. If\nhe come back by sea against his will, he shall remain on the seashore,\nwetting his feet in the water while he waits for a vessel to sail; or\nif he be brought back by land, the magistrates shall send him unharmed\nbeyond the border.\n\nNext follows murder done from anger, which is of two kinds--either\narising out of a sudden impulse, and attended with remorse; or committed\nwith premeditation, and unattended with remorse. The cause of both is\nanger, and both are intermediate between voluntary and involuntary.\nThe one which is committed from sudden impulse, though not wholly\ninvoluntary, bears the image of the involuntary, and is therefore the\nmore excusable of the two, and should receive a gentler punishment. The\nact of him who nurses his wrath is more voluntary, and therefore more\nculpable. The degree of culpability depends on the presence or absence\nof intention, to which the degree of punishment should correspond. For\nthe first kind of murder, that which is done on a momentary impulse,\nlet two years' exile be the penalty; for the second, that which is\naccompanied with malice prepense, three. When the time of any one's\nexile has expired, the guardians shall send twelve judges to the borders\nof the land, who shall have authority to decide whether he may return\nor not. He who after returning repeats the offence, shall be exiled\nand return no more, and, if he return, shall be put to death, like\nthe stranger in a similar case. He who in a fit of anger kills his own\nslave, shall purify himself; and he who kills another man's slave, shall\npay to his master double the value. Any one may proceed against the\noffender if he appear in public places, not having been purified;\nand may bring to trial both the next of kin to the dead man and the\nhomicide, and compel the one to exact, and the other to pay, a double\npenalty. If a slave kill his master, or a freeman who is not his master,\nin anger, the kinsmen of the murdered person may do with the murderer\nwhatever they please, but they must not spare his life. If a father or\nmother kill their son or daughter in anger, let the slayer remain in\nexile for three years; and on the return of the exile let the parents\nseparate, and no longer continue to cohabit, or have the same sacred\nrites with those whom he or she has deprived of a brother or sister. The\nsame penalty is decreed against the husband who murders his wife, and\nalso against the wife who murders her husband. Let them be absent three\nyears, and on their return never again share in the same sacred rites\nwith their children, or sit at the same table with them. Nor is a\nbrother or sister who have lifted up their hands against a brother or\nsister, ever to come under the same roof or share in the same rites\nwith those whom they have robbed of a child. If a son feels such hatred\nagainst his father or mother as to take the life of either of them,\nthen, if the parent before death forgive him, he shall only suffer the\npenalty due to involuntary homicide; but if he be unforgiven, there\nare many laws against which he has offended; he is guilty of outrage,\nimpiety, sacrilege all in one, and deserves to be put to death many\ntimes over. For if the law will not allow a man to kill the authors of\nhis being even in self-defence, what other penalty than death can be\ninflicted upon him who in a fit of passion wilfully slays his father\nor mother? If a brother kill a brother in self-defence during a civil\nbroil, or a citizen a citizen, or a slave a slave, or a stranger a\nstranger, let them be free from blame, as he is who slays an enemy in\nbattle. But if a slave kill a freeman, let him be as a parricide. In all\ncases, however, the forgiveness of the injured party shall acquit the\nagents; and then they shall only be purified, and remain in exile for a\nyear.\n\nEnough of actions that are involuntary, or done in anger; let us proceed\nto voluntary and premeditated actions. The great source of voluntary\ncrime is the desire of money, which is begotten by evil education;\nand this arises out of the false praise of riches, common both among\nHellenes and barbarians; they think that to be the first of goods which\nis really the third. For the body is not for the sake of wealth, but\nwealth for the body, as the body is for the soul. If this were better\nunderstood, the crime of murder, of which avarice is the chief cause,\nwould soon cease among men. Next to avarice, ambition is a source of\ncrime, troublesome to the ambitious man himself, as well as to the chief\nmen of the state. And next to ambition, base fear is a motive, which\nhas led many an one to commit murder in order that he may get rid of the\nwitnesses of his crimes. Let this be said as a prelude to all enactments\nabout crimes of violence; and the tradition must not be forgotten, which\ntells that the murderer is punished in the world below, and that when\nhe returns to this world he meets the fate which he has dealt out to\nothers. If a man is deterred by the prelude and the fear of future\npunishment, he will have no need of the law; but in case he disobey, let\nthe law be declared against him as follows:--He who of malice prepense\nkills one of his kindred, shall in the first place be outlawed; neither\ntemple, harbour, nor agora shall be polluted by his presence. And if a\nkinsman of the deceased refuse to proceed against his slayer, he shall\ntake the curse of pollution upon himself, and also be liable to be\nprosecuted by any one who will avenge the dead. The prosecutor, however,\nmust observe the customary ceremonial before he proceeds against the\noffender. The details of these observances will be best determined by a\nconclave of prophets and interpreters and guardians of the law, and the\njudges of the cause itself shall be the same as in cases of sacrilege.\nHe who is convicted shall be punished with death, and not be buried\nwithin the country of the murdered person. He who flies from the law\nshall undergo perpetual banishment; if he return, he may be put to\ndeath with impunity by any relative of the murdered man or by any other\ncitizen, or bound and delivered to the magistrates. He who accuses a man\nof murder shall demand satisfactory bail of the accused, and if this is\nnot forthcoming, the magistrate shall keep him in prison against the\nday of trial. If a man commit murder by the hand of another, he shall\nbe tried in the same way as in the cases previously supposed, but if the\noffender be a citizen, his body after execution shall be buried within\nthe land.\n\nIf a slave kill a freeman, either with his own hand or by contrivance,\nlet him be led either to the grave or to a place whence he can see the\ngrave of the murdered man, and there receive as many stripes at the hand\nof the public executioner as the person who took him pleases; and if he\nsurvive he shall be put to death. If a slave be put out of the way to\nprevent his informing of some crime, his death shall be punished like\nthat of a citizen. If there are any of those horrible murders of kindred\nwhich sometimes occur even in well-regulated societies, and of which the\nlegislator, however unwilling, cannot avoid taking cognizance, he will\nrepeat the old myth of the divine vengeance against the perpetrators of\nsuch atrocities. The myth will say that the murderer must suffer what he\nhas done: if he have slain his father, he must be slain by his children;\nif his mother, he must become a woman and perish at the hands of his\noffspring in another age of the world. Such a preamble may terrify him;\nbut if, notwithstanding, in some evil hour he murders father or\nmother or brethren or children, the mode of proceeding shall be as\nfollows:--Him who is convicted, the officers of the judges shall lead\nto a spot without the city where three ways meet, and there slay him and\nexpose his body naked; and each of the magistrates shall cast a stone\nupon his head and justify the city, and he shall be thrown unburied\nbeyond the border. But what shall we say of him who takes the life\nwhich is dearest to him, that is to say, his own; and this not from any\ndisgrace or calamity, but from cowardice and indolence? The manner of\nhis burial and the purification of his crime is a matter for God and the\ninterpreters to decide and for his kinsmen to execute. Let him, at any\nrate, be buried alone in some uncultivated and nameless spot, and\nbe without name or monument. If a beast kill a man, not in a public\ncontest, let it be prosecuted for murder, and after condemnation slain\nand cast without the border. Also inanimate things which have caused\ndeath, except in the case of lightning and other visitations from\nheaven, shall be carried without the border. If the body of a dead man\nbe found, and the murderer remain unknown, the trial shall take place\nall the same, and the unknown murderer shall be warned not to set foot\nin the temples or come within the borders of the land; if discovered, he\nshall die, and his body shall be cast out. A man is justified in taking\nthe life of a burglar, of a footpad, of a violator of women or youth;\nand he may take the life of another with impunity in defence of father,\nmother, brother, wife, or other relations.\n\nThe nurture and education which are necessary to the existence of men\nhave been considered, and the punishment of acts of violence which\ndestroy life. There remain maiming, wounding, and the like, which admit\nof a similar division into voluntary and involuntary. About this class\nof actions the preamble shall be: Whereas men would be like wild beasts\nunless they obeyed the laws, the first duty of citizens is the care\nof the public interests, which unite and preserve states, as private\ninterests distract them. A man may know what is for the public good, but\nif he have absolute power, human nature will impel him to seek pleasure\ninstead of virtue, and so darkness will come over his soul and over the\nstate. If he had mind, he would have no need of law; for mind is the\nperfection of law. But such a freeman, 'whom the truth makes free,' is\nhardly to be found; and therefore law and order are necessary, which are\nthe second-best, and they regulate things as they exist in part\nonly, but cannot take in the whole. For actions have innumerable\ncharacteristics, which must be partly determined by the law and partly\nleft to the judge. The judge must determine the fact; and to him also\nthe punishment must sometimes be left. What shall the law prescribe,\nand what shall be left to the judge? A city is unfortunate in which the\ntribunals are either secret and speechless, or, what is worse, noisy and\npublic, when the people, as if they were in a theatre, clap and hoot the\nvarious speakers. Such courts a legislator would rather not have; but\nif he is compelled to have them, he will speak distinctly, and leave as\nlittle as possible to their discretion. But where the courts are good,\nand presided over by well-trained judges, the penalties to be inflicted\nmay be in a great measure left to them; and as there are to be good\ncourts among our colonists, we need not determine beforehand the\nexact proportion of the penalty and the crime. Returning, then, to\nour legislator, let us indite a law about wounding, which shall run as\nfollows:--He who wounds with intent to kill, and fails in his object,\nshall be tried as if he had succeeded. But since God has favoured both\nhim and his victim, instead of being put to death, he shall be allowed\nto go into exile and take his property with him, the damage due to the\nsufferer having been previously estimated by the court, which shall be\nthe same as would have tried the case if death had ensued. If a child\nshould intentionally wound a parent, or a servant his master, or brother\nor sister wound brother or sister with malice prepense, the penalty\nshall be death. If a husband or wife wound one another with intent to\nkill, the penalty which is inflicted upon them shall be perpetual exile;\nand if they have young children, the guardians shall take care of them\nand administer their property as if they were orphans. If they have\nno children, their kinsmen male and female shall meet, and after a\nconsultation with the priests and guardians of the law, shall appoint an\nheir of the house; for the house and family belong to the state, being\na 5040th portion of the whole. And the state is bound to preserve\nher families happy and holy; therefore, when the heir of a house has\ncommitted a capital offence, or is in exile for life, the house is to be\npurified, and then the kinsmen of the house and the guardians of the law\nare to find out a family which has a good name and in which there are\nmany sons, and introduce one of them to be the heir and priest of the\nhouse. He shall assume the fathers and ancestors of the family, while\nthe first son dies in dishonour and his name is blotted out.\n\nSome actions are intermediate between the voluntary and involuntary.\nThose done from anger are of this class. If a man wound another in\nanger, let him pay double the damage, if the injury is curable; or\nfourfold, if curable, and at the same time dishonourable; and fourfold,\nif incurable; the amount is to be assessed by the judges. If the wounded\nperson is rendered incapable of military service, the injurer, besides\nthe other penalties, shall serve in his stead, or be liable to a suit\nfor refusing to serve. If brother wounds brother, then their parents\nand kindred, of both sexes, shall meet and judge the crime. The damages\nshall be assessed by the parents; and if the amount fixed by them is\ndisputed, an appeal shall be made to the male kindred; or in the last\nresort to the guardians of the law. Parents who wound their children are\nto be tried by judges of at least sixty years of age, who have children\nof their own; and they are to determine whether death, or some lesser\npunishment, is to be inflicted upon them--no relatives are to take part\nin the trial. If a slave in anger smite a freeman, he is to be delivered\nup by his master to the injured person. If the master suspect collusion\nbetween the slave and the injured person, he may bring the matter to\ntrial: and if he fail he shall pay three times the injury; or if he\nobtain a conviction, the contriver of the conspiracy shall be liable to\nan action for kidnapping. He who wounds another unintentionally shall\nonly pay for the actual harm done.\n\nIn all outrages and acts of violence, the elder is to be more regarded\nthan the younger. An injury done by a younger man to an elder is\nabominable and hateful; but the younger man who is struck by an elder\nis to bear with him patiently, considering that he who is twenty years\nolder is loco parentis, and remembering the reverence which is due to\nthe Gods who preside over birth. Let him keep his hands, too, from the\nstranger; instead of taking upon himself to chastise him when he is\ninsolent, he shall bring him before the wardens of the city, who shall\nexamine into the case, and if they find him guilty, shall scourge him\nwith as many blows as he has given; or if he be innocent, they shall\nwarn and threaten his accuser. When an equal strikes an equal, whether\nan old man an old man, or a young man a young man, let them use only\ntheir fists and have no weapons. He who being above forty years of age\ncommences a fight, or retaliates, shall be counted mean and base.\n\nTo this preamble, let the law be added: If a man smite another who is\nhis elder by twenty years or more, let the bystander, in case he be\nolder than the combatants, part them; or if he be younger than the\nperson struck, or of the same age with him, let him defend him as he\nwould a father or brother; and let the striker be brought to trial,\nand if convicted imprisoned for a year or more at the discretion of\nthe judges. If a stranger smite one who is his elder by twenty years or\nmore, he shall be imprisoned for two years, and a metic, in like case,\nshall suffer three years' imprisonment. He who is standing by and gives\nno assistance, shall be punished according to his class in one of four\npenalties--a mina, fifty, thirty, twenty drachmas. The generals and\nother superior officers of the army shall form the court which tries\nthis class of offences.\n\nLaws are made to instruct the good, and in the hope that there may be no\nneed of them; also to control the bad, whose hardness of heart will not\nbe hindered from crime. The uttermost penalty will fall upon those who\nlay violent hands upon a parent, having no fear of the Gods above, or of\nthe punishments which will pursue them in the world below. They are\ntoo wise in their own conceits to believe in such things: wherefore the\ntortures which await them in another life must be anticipated in this.\nLet the law be as follows:--\n\nIf a man, being in his right mind, dare to smite his father and mother,\nor his grandfather and grandmother, let the passer-by come to the\nrescue; and if he be a metic or stranger who comes to the rescue, he\nshall have the first place at the games; or if he do not come to the\nrescue, he shall be a perpetual exile. Let the citizen in the like\ncase be praised or blamed, and the slave receive freedom or a hundred\nstripes. The wardens of the agora, the city, or the country, as the\ncase may be, shall see to the execution of the law. And he who is an\ninhabitant of the same place and is present shall come to the rescue, or\nhe shall fall under a curse.\n\nIf a man be convicted of assaulting his parents, let him be banished for\never from the city into the country, and let him abstain from all sacred\nrites; and if he do not abstain, let him be punished by the wardens of\nthe country; and if he return to the city, let him be put to death. If\nany freeman consort with him, let him be purified before he returns to\nthe city. If a slave strike a freeman, whether citizen or stranger, let\nthe bystander be obliged to seize and deliver him into the hands of the\ninjured person, who may inflict upon him as many blows as he\npleases, and shall then return him to his master. The law will be as\nfollows:--The slave who strikes a freeman shall be bound by his master,\nand not set at liberty without the consent of the person whom he has\ninjured. All these laws apply to women as well as to men.\n\nBOOK X. The greatest wrongs arise out of youthful insolence, and the\ngreatest of all are committed against public temples; they are in the\nsecond degree great when private rites and sepulchres are insulted; in\nthe third degree, when committed against parents; in the fourth degree,\nwhen they are done against the authority or property of the rulers; in\nthe fifth degree, when the rights of individuals are violated. Most\nof these offences have been already considered; but there remains the\nquestion of admonition and punishment of offences against the Gods. Let\nthe admonition be in the following terms:--No man who ever intentionally\ndid or said anything impious, had a true belief in the existence of the\nGods; but either he thought that there were no Gods, or that they did\nnot care about men, or that they were easily appeased by sacrifices and\nprayers. 'What shall we say or do to such persons?' My good sir, let us\nfirst hear the jests which they in their superiority will make upon us.\n'What will they say?' Probably something of this kind:--'Strangers you\nare right in thinking that some of us do not believe in the existence of\nthe Gods; while others assert that they do not care for us, and others\nthat they are propitiated by prayers and offerings. But we want you to\nargue with us before you threaten; you should prove to us by reasonable\nevidence that there are Gods, and that they are too good to be bribed.\nPoets, priests, prophets, rhetoricians, even the best of them, speak\nto us of atoning for evil, and not of avoiding it. From legislators who\nprofess to be gentle we ask for instruction, which may, at least, have\nthe persuasive power of truth, if no other.' What have you to say?\n'Well, there is no difficulty in proving the being of the Gods. The sun,\nand earth, and stars, moving in their courses, the recurring seasons,\nfurnish proofs of their existence; and there is the general opinion\nof mankind.' I fear that the unbelievers--not that I care for their\nopinion--will despise us. You are not aware that their impiety proceeds,\nnot from sensuality, but from ignorance taking the garb of wisdom. 'What\ndo you mean?' At Athens there are tales current both in prose and verse\nof a kind which are not tolerated in a well-regulated state like yours.\nThe oldest of them relate the origin of the world, and the birth and\nlife of the Gods. These narratives have a bad influence on family\nrelations; but as they are old we will let them pass, and consider\nanother kind of tales, invented by the wisdom of a younger generation,\nwho, if any one argues for the existence of the Gods and claims that the\nstars have a divine being, insist that these are mere earth and stones,\nwhich can have no care of human things, and that all theology is a\ncooking up of words. Now what course ought we to take? Shall we suppose\nsome impious man to charge us with assuming the existence of the Gods,\nand make a defence? Or shall we leave the preamble and go on to the\nlaws? 'There is no hurry, and we have often said that the shorter and\nworse method should not be preferred to the longer and better. The proof\nthat there are Gods who are good, and the friends of justice, is the\nbest preamble of all our laws.' Come, let us talk with the impious, who\nhave been brought up from their infancy in the belief of religion, and\nhave heard their own fathers and mothers praying for them and talking\nwith the Gods as if they were absolutely convinced of their existence;\nwho have seen mankind prostrate in prayer at the rising and setting of\nthe sun and moon and at every turn of fortune, and have dared to despise\nand disbelieve all this. Can we keep our temper with them, when they\ncompel us to argue on such a theme? We must; or like them we shall go\nmad, though with more reason. Let us select one of them and address him\nas follows:\n\nO my son, you are young; time and experience will make you change many\nof your opinions. Do not be hasty in forming a conclusion about the\ndivine nature; and let me mention to you a fact which I know. You and\nyour friends are not the first or the only persons who have had these\nnotions about the Gods. There are always a considerable number who are\ninfected by them: I have known many myself, and can assure you that no\none who was an unbeliever in his youth ever persisted till he was old in\ndenying the existence of the Gods. The two other opinions, first, that\nthe Gods exist and have no care of men, secondly, that they care for\nmen, but may be propitiated by sacrifices and prayers, may indeed last\nthrough life in a few instances, but even this is not common. I would\nbeg of you to be patient, and learn the truth of the legislator and\nothers; in the mean time abstain from impiety. 'So far, our discourse\nhas gone well.'\n\nI will now speak of a strange doctrine, which is regarded by many as the\ncrown of philosophy. They affirm that all things come into being either\nby art or nature or chance, and that the greater things are done by\nnature and chance, and the lesser things by art, which receiving from\nnature the greater creations, moulds and fashions all those lesser works\nwhich are termed works of art. Their meaning is that fire, water, earth,\nand air all exist by nature and chance, and not by art; and that out of\nthese, according to certain chance affinities of opposites, the sun, the\nmoon, the stars, and the earth have been framed, not by any action of\nmind, but by nature and chance only. Thus, in their opinion, the heaven\nand earth were created, as well as the animals and plants. Art came\nlater, and is of mortal birth; by her power were invented certain\nimages and very partial imitations of the truth, of which kind are the\ncreations of musicians and painters: but they say that there are\nother arts which combine with nature, and have a deeper truth, such as\nmedicine, husbandry, gymnastic. Also the greater part of politics they\nimagine to co-operate with nature, but in a less degree, having more of\nart, while legislation is declared by them to be wholly a work of art.\n'How do you mean?' In the first place, they say that the Gods exist\nneither by nature nor by art, but by the laws of states, which are\ndifferent in different countries; and that virtue is one thing by nature\nand another by convention; and that justice is altogether conventional,\nmade by law, and having authority for the moment only. This is repeated\nto young men by sages and poets, and leads to impiety, and the pretended\nlife according to nature and in disobedience to law; for nobody believes\nthe Gods to be such as the law affirms. 'How true! and oh! how injurious\nto states and to families!' But then, what should the lawgiver do?\nShould he stand up in the state and threaten mankind with the severest\npenalties if they persist in their unbelief, while he makes no attempt\nto win them by persuasion? 'Nay, Stranger, the legislator ought never to\nweary of trying to persuade the world that there are Gods; and he should\ndeclare that law and art exist by nature.' Yes, Cleinias; but these are\ndifficult and tedious questions. 'And shall our patience, which was\nnot exhausted in the enquiry about music or drink, fail now that we are\ndiscoursing about the Gods? There may be a difficulty in framing laws,\nbut when written down they remain, and time and diligence will make them\nclear; if they are useful there would be neither reason nor religion in\nrejecting them on account of their length.' Most true. And the general\nspread of unbelief shows that the legislator should do something in\nvindication of the laws, when they are being undermined by bad men.\n'He should.' You agree with me, Cleinias, that the heresy consists in\nsupposing earth, air, fire, and water to be the first of all things.\nThese the heretics call nature, conceiving them to be prior to the soul.\n'I agree.' You would further agree that natural philosophy is the source\nof this impiety--the study appears to be pursued in a wrong way. 'In\nwhat way do you mean?' The error consists in transposing first and\nsecond causes. They do not see that the soul is before the body, and\nbefore all other things, and the author and ruler of them all. And if\nthe soul is prior to the body, then the things of the soul are prior to\nthe things of the body. In other words, opinion, attention, mind, art,\nlaw, are prior to sensible qualities; and the first and greater works of\ncreation are the results of art and mind, whereas the works of nature,\nas they are improperly termed, are secondary and subsequent. 'Why do you\nsay \"improperly\"?' Because when they speak of nature they seem to mean\nthe first creative power. But if the soul is first, and not fire and\nair, then the soul above all things may be said to exist by nature. And\nthis can only be on the supposition that the soul is prior to the body.\nShall we try to prove that it is so? 'By all means.' I fear that the\ngreenness of our argument will ludicrously contrast with the ripeness of\nour ages. But as we must go into the water, and the stream is strong, I\nwill first attempt to cross by myself, and if I arrive at the bank, you\nshall follow. Remembering that you are unaccustomed to such discussions,\nI will ask and answer the questions myself, while you listen in safety.\nBut first I must pray the Gods to assist at the demonstration of their\nown existence--if ever we are to call upon them, now is the time. Let\nme hold fast to the rope, and enter into the depths: Shall I put the\nquestion to myself in this form?--Are all things at rest, and is nothing\nin motion? or are some things in motion, and some things at rest? 'The\nlatter.' And do they move and rest, some in one place, some in more?\n'Yes.' There may be (1) motion in the same place, as in revolution on an\naxis, which is imparted swiftly to the larger and slowly to the lesser\ncircle; and there may be motion in different places, having sometimes\n(2) one centre of motion and sometimes (3) more. (4) When bodies in\nmotion come against other bodies which are at rest, they are divided\nby them, and (5) when they are caught between other bodies coming from\nopposite directions they unite with them; and (6) they grow by union and\n(7) waste by dissolution while their constitution remains the same, but\nare (8) destroyed when their constitution fails. There is a growth from\none dimension to two, and from a second to a third, which then becomes\nperceptible to sense; this process is called generation, and the\nopposite, destruction. We have now enumerated all possible motions\nwith the exception of two. 'What are they?' Just the two with which our\nenquiry is concerned; for our enquiry relates to the soul. There is one\nkind of motion which is only able to move other things; there is another\nwhich can move itself as well, working in composition and decomposition,\nby increase and diminution, by generation and destruction. 'Granted.'\n(9) That which moves and is moved by another is the ninth kind of\nmotion; (10) that which is self-moved and moves others is the tenth. And\nthis tenth kind of motion is the mightiest, and is really the first, and\nis followed by that which was improperly called the ninth. 'How do you\nmean?' Must not that which is moved by others finally depend upon that\nwhich is moved by itself? Nothing can be affected by any transition\nprior to self-motion. Then the first and eldest principle of motion,\nwhether in things at rest or not at rest, will be the principle of\nself-motion; and that which is moved by others and can move others will\nbe the second. 'True.' Let me ask another question:\n\nWhat is the name which is given to self-motion when manifested in any\nmaterial substance? 'Life.' And soul too is life? 'Very good.' And are\nthere not three kinds of knowledge--a knowledge (1) of the essence, (2)\nof the definition, (3) of the name? And sometimes the name leads us\nto ask the definition, sometimes the definition to ask the name. For\nexample, number can be divided into equal parts, and when thus divided\nis termed even, and the definition of even and the word 'even' refer\nto the same thing. 'Very true.' And what is the definition of the thing\nwhich is named 'soul'? Must we not reply, 'The self-moved'? And have we\nnot proved that the self-moved is the source of motion in other things?\n'Yes.' And the motion which is not self-moved will be inferior to this?\n'True.' And if so, we shall be right in saying that the soul is prior\nand superior to the body, and the body by nature subject and inferior to\nthe soul? 'Quite right.' And we agreed that if the soul was prior to\nthe body, the things of the soul were prior to the things of the body?\n'Certainly.' And therefore desires, and manners, and thoughts, and true\nopinions, and recollections, are prior to the length and breadth and\nforce of bodies. 'To be sure.' In the next place, we acknowledge that\nthe soul is the cause of good and evil, just and unjust, if we suppose\nher to be the cause of all things? 'Certainly.' And the soul which\norders all things must also order the heavens? 'Of course.' One soul\nor more? More; for less than two are inconceivable, one good, the other\nevil. 'Most true.' The soul directs all things by her movements, which\nwe call will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion true and\nfalse, joy, sorrow, courage, fear, hatred, love, and similar affections.\nThese are the primary movements, and they receive the secondary\nmovements of bodies, and guide all things to increase and diminution,\nseparation and union, and to all the qualities which accompany\nthem--cold, hot, heavy, light, hard, soft, white, black, sweet, bitter;\nthese and other such qualities the soul, herself a goddess, uses, when\ntruly receiving the divine mind she leads all things rightly to their\nhappiness; but under the impulse of folly she works out an opposite\nresult. For the controller of heaven and earth and the circle of the\nworld is either the wise and good soul, or the foolish and vicious soul,\nworking in them. 'What do you mean?' If we say that the whole course\nand motion of heaven and earth is in accordance with the workings and\nreasonings of mind, clearly the best soul must have the care of the\nheaven, and guide it along that better way. 'True.' But if the heavens\nmove wildly and disorderly, then they must be under the guidance of the\nevil soul. 'True again.' What is the nature of the movement of the soul?\nWe must not suppose that we can see and know the soul with our bodily\neyes, any more than we can fix them on the midday sun; it will be safer\nto look at an image only. 'How do you mean?' Let us find among the ten\nkinds of motion an image of the motion of the mind. You remember, as\nwe said, that all things are divided into two classes; and some of them\nwere moved and some at rest. 'Yes.' And of those which were moved, some\nwere moved in the same place, others in more places than one. 'Just so.'\nThe motion which was in one place was circular, like the motion of a\nspherical body; and such a motion in the same place, and in the same\nrelations, is an excellent image of the motion of mind. 'Very true.' The\nmotion of the other sort, which has no fixed place or manner or relation\nor order or proportion, is akin to folly and nonsense. 'Very true.'\nAfter what has been said, it is clear that, since the soul carries round\nall things, some soul which is either very good or the opposite carries\nround the circumference of heaven. But that soul can be no other than\nthe best. Again, the soul carries round the sun, moon, and stars, and if\nthe sun has a soul, then either the soul of the sun is within and moves\nthe sun as the human soul moves the body; or, secondly, the sun is\ncontained in some external air or fire, which the soul provides and\nthrough which she operates; or, thirdly, the course of the sun is guided\nby the soul acting in a wonderful manner without a body. 'Yes, in one\nof those ways the soul must guide all things.' And this soul of the\nsun, which is better than the sun, whether driving him in a chariot or\nemploying any other agency, is by every man called a God? 'Yes, by every\nman who has any sense.' And of the seasons, stars, moon, and year, in\nlike manner, it may be affirmed that the soul or souls from which they\nderive their excellence are divine; and without insisting on the manner\nof their working, no one can deny that all things are full of Gods. 'No\none.' And now let us offer an alternative to him who denies that there\nare Gods. Either he must show that the soul is not the origin of all\nthings, or he must live for the future in the belief that there are\nGods.\n\nNext, as to the man who believes in the Gods, but refuses to acknowledge\nthat they take care of human things--let him too have a word of\nadmonition. 'Best of men,' we will say to him, 'some affinity to the\nGods leads you to honour them and to believe in them. But you have heard\nthe happiness of wicked men sung by poets and admired by the world, and\nthis has drawn you away from your natural piety. Or you have seen the\nwicked growing old in prosperity, and leaving great offices to their\nchildren; or you have watched the tyrant succeeding in his career of\ncrime; and considering all these things you have been led to believe in\nan irrational way that the Gods take no care of human affairs. That your\nerror may not increase, I will endeavour to purify your soul.' Do you,\nMegillus and Cleinias, make answer for the youth, and when we come to\na difficulty, I will carry you over the water as I did before. 'Very\ngood.' He will easily be convinced that the Gods care for the small as\nwell as the great; for he heard what was said of their goodness and of\ntheir having all things under their care. 'He certainly heard.' Then now\nlet us enquire what is meant by the virtue of the Gods. To possess mind\nbelongs to virtue, and the contrary to vice. 'That is what we say.' And\nis not courage a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice? 'Certainly.'\nAnd to the Gods we ascribe virtues; but idleness and indolence are not\nvirtues. 'Of course not.' And is God to be conceived of as a careless,\nindolent fellow, such as the poet would compare to a stingless drone?\n'Impossible.' Can we be right in praising any one who cares for great\nmatters and leaves the small to take care of themselves? Whether God or\nman, he who does so, must either think the neglect of such matters to be\nof no consequence, or he is indolent and careless. For surely neither\nof them can be charged with neglect if they fail to attend to something\nwhich is beyond their power? 'Certainly not.'\n\nAnd now we will examine the two classes of offenders who admit that\nthere are Gods, but say,--the one that they may be appeased, the other\nthat they take no care of small matters: do they not acknowledge that\nthe Gods are omnipotent and omniscient, and also good and perfect?\n'Certainly.' Then they cannot be indolent, for indolence is the\noffspring of idleness, and idleness of cowardice, and there is no\ncowardice in God. 'True.' If the Gods neglect small matters, they must\neither know or not know that such things are not to be regarded. But of\ncourse they know that they should be regarded, and knowing, they\ncannot be supposed to neglect their duty, overcome by the seductions\nof pleasure or pain. 'Impossible.' And do not all human things share in\nsoul, and is not man the most religious of animals and the possession\nof the Gods? And the Gods, who are the best of owners, will surely\ntake care of their property, small or great. Consider further, that the\ngreater the power of perception, the less the power of action. For it is\nharder to see and hear the small than the great, but easier to control\nthem. Suppose a physician who had to cure a patient--would he\never succeed if he attended to the great and neglected the little?\n'Impossible.' Is not life made up of littles?--the pilot, general,\nhouseholder, statesman, all attend to small matters; and the builder\nwill tell you that large stones do not lie well without small ones.\nAnd God is not inferior to mortal craftsmen, who in proportion to their\nskill are careful in the details of their work; we must not imagine the\nbest and wisest to be a lazy good-for-nothing, who wearies of his work\nand hurries over small and easy matters. 'Never, never!' He who charges\nthe Gods with neglect has been forced to admit his error; but I should\nlike further to persuade him that the author of all has made every part\nfor the sake of the whole, and that the smallest part has an appointed\nstate of action or passion, and that the least action or passion of any\npart has a presiding minister. You, we say to him, are a minute fraction\nof this universe, created with a view to the whole; the world is not\nmade for you, but you for the world; for the good artist considers the\nwhole first, and afterwards the parts. And you are annoyed at not seeing\nhow you and the universe are all working together for the best, so\nfar as the laws of the common creation admit. The soul undergoes many\nchanges from her contact with bodies; and all that the player does is to\nput the pieces into their right places. 'What do you mean?' I mean that\nGod acts in the way which is simplest and easiest. Had each thing been\nformed without any regard to the rest, the transposition of the Cosmos\nwould have been endless; but now there is not much trouble in the\ngovernment of the world. For when the king saw the actions of the living\nsouls and bodies, and the virtue and vice which were in them, and the\nindestructibility of the soul and body (although they were not eternal),\nhe contrived so to arrange them that virtue might conquer and vice be\novercome as far as possible; giving them a seat and room adapted to\nthem, but leaving the direction of their separate actions to men's own\nwills, which make our characters to be what they are. 'That is very\nprobable.' All things which have a soul possess in themselves the\nprinciple of change, and in changing move according to fate and law;\nnatures which have undergone lesser changes move on the surface; but\nthose which have changed utterly for the worse, sink into Hades and the\ninfernal world. And in all great changes for good and evil which are\nproduced either by the will of the soul or the influence of others,\nthere is a change of place. The good soul, which has intercourse with\nthe divine nature, passes into a holier and better place; and the evil\nsoul, as she grows worse, changes her place for the worse. This,--as we\ndeclare to the youth who fancies that he is neglected of the Gods,--is\nthe law of divine justice--the worse to the worse, the better to the\nbetter, like to like, in life and in death. And from this law no man\nwill ever boast that he has escaped. Even if you say--'I am small,\nand will creep into the earth,' or 'I am high, and will mount to\nheaven'--you are not so small or so high that you shall not pay the\nfitting penalty, either here or in the world below. This is also the\nexplanation of the seeming prosperity of the wicked, in whose actions\nas in a mirror you imagined that you saw the neglect of the Gods, not\nconsidering that they make all things contribute to the whole. And\nhow then could you form any idea of true happiness?--If Cleinias and\nMegillus and I have succeeded in persuading you that you know not what\nyou say about the Gods, God will help you; but if there is still any\ndeficiency of proof, hear our answer to the third opponent.\n\nEnough has been said to prove that the Gods exist and care for us;\nthat they can be propitiated, or that they receive gifts, is not to be\nallowed or admitted for an instant. 'Let us proceed with the argument.'\nTell me, by the Gods, I say, how the Gods are to be propitiated by us?\nAre they not rulers, who may be compared to charioteers, pilots, perhaps\ngenerals, or physicians providing against the assaults of disease,\nhusbandmen observing the perils of the seasons, shepherds watching their\nflocks? To whom shall we compare them? We acknowledged that the world is\nfull both of good and evil, but having more of evil than of good. There\nis an immortal conflict going on, in which Gods and demigods are our\nallies, and we their property; for injustice and folly and wickedness\nmake war in our souls upon justice and temperance and wisdom. There is\nlittle virtue to be found on earth; and evil natures fawn upon the Gods,\nlike wild beasts upon their keepers, and believe that they can win them\nover by flattery and prayers. And this sin, which is termed dishonesty,\nis to the soul what disease is to the body, what pestilence is to the\nseasons, what injustice is to states. 'Quite so.' And they who maintain\nthat the Gods can be appeased must say that they forgive the sins of\nmen, if they are allowed to share in their spoils; as you might suppose\nwolves to mollify the dogs by throwing them a portion of the prey. 'That\nis the argument.' But let us apply our images to the Gods--are they the\npilots who are won by gifts to wreck their own ships--or the charioteers\nwho are bribed to lose the race--or the generals, or doctors, or\nhusbandmen, who are perverted from their duty--or the dogs who\nare silenced by wolves? 'God forbid.' Are they not rather our best\nguardians; and shall we suppose them to fall short even of a moderate\ndegree of human or even canine virtue, which will not betray justice for\nreward? 'Impossible.' He, then, who maintains such a doctrine, is the\nmost blasphemous of mankind.\n\nAnd now our three points are proven; and we are agreed (1) that there\nare Gods, (2) that they care for men, (3) that they cannot be bribed\nto do injustice. I have spoken warmly, from a fear lest this impiety of\ntheirs should lead to a perversion of life. And our warmth will not have\nbeen in vain, if we have succeeded in persuading these men to abominate\nthemselves, and to change their ways. 'So let us hope.' Then now that\nthe preamble is completed, we will make a proclamation commanding the\nimpious to renounce their evil ways; and in case they refuse, the law\nshall be added:--If a man is guilty of impiety in word or deed, let\nthe bystander inform the magistrates, and let the magistrates bring the\noffender before the court; and if any of the magistrates refuses to act,\nhe likewise shall be tried for impiety. Any one who is found guilty of\nsuch an offence shall be fined at the discretion of the court, and\nshall also be punished by a term of imprisonment. There shall be three\nprisons--one for common offences against life and property; another,\nnear by the spot where the Nocturnal Council will assemble, which is to\nbe called the 'House of Reformation'; the third, to be situated in some\ndesolate region in the centre of the country, shall be called by a name\nindicating retribution. There are three causes of impiety, and from each\nof them spring impieties of two kinds, six in all. First, there is the\nimpiety of those who deny the existence of the Gods; these may be honest\nmen, haters of evil, who are only dangerous because they talk loosely\nabout the Gods and make others like themselves; but there is also a more\nvicious class, who are full of craft and licentiousness. To this latter\nbelong diviners, jugglers, despots, demagogues, generals, hierophants\nof private mysteries, and sophists. The first class shall be only\nimprisoned and admonished. The second class should be put to death, if\nthey could be, many times over. The two other sorts of impiety, first of\nthose who deny the care of the Gods, and secondly, of those who affirm\nthat they may be propitiated, have similar subdivisions, varying in\ndegree of guilt. Those who have learnt to blaspheme from mere ignorance\nshall be imprisoned in the House of Reformation for five years at least,\nand not allowed to see any one but members of the Nocturnal Council,\nwho shall converse with them touching their souls health. If any of the\nprisoners come to their right mind, at the end of five years let them be\nrestored to sane company; but he who again offends shall die. As to\nthat class of monstrous natures who not only believe that the Gods are\nnegligent, or may be propitiated, but pretend to practise on the souls\nof quick and dead, and promise to charm the Gods, and to effect the ruin\nof houses and states--he, I say, who is guilty of these things, shall\nbe bound in the central prison, and shall have no intercourse with\nany freeman, receiving only his daily rations of food from the public\nslaves; and when he dies, let him be cast beyond the border; and if any\nfreeman assist to bury him, he shall be liable to a suit for impiety.\nBut the sins of the father shall not be visited upon his children, who,\nlike other orphans, shall be educated by the state. Further, let there\nbe a general law which will have a tendency to repress impiety. No man\nshall have religious services in his house, but he shall go with his\nfriends to pray and sacrifice in the temples. The reason of this is,\nthat religious institutions can only be framed by a great intelligence.\nBut women and weak men are always consecrating the event of the moment;\nthey are under the influence of dreams and apparitions, and they build\naltars and temples in every village and in any place where they have\nhad a vision. The law is designed to prevent this, and also to deter men\nfrom attempting to propitiate the Gods by secret sacrifices, which\nonly multiply their sins. Therefore let the law run:--No one shall\nhave private religious rites; and if a man or woman who has not been\npreviously noted for any impiety offend in this way, let them be\nadmonished to remove their rites to a public temple; but if the offender\nbe one of the obstinate sort, he shall be brought to trial before the\nguardians, and if he be found guilty, let him die.\n\nBOOK XI. As to dealings between man and man, the principle of them is\nsimple--Thou shalt not take what is not thine; and shalt do to others as\nthou wouldst that they should do to thee. First, of treasure trove:--May\nI never desire to find, or lift, if I find, or be induced by the counsel\nof diviners to lift, a treasure which one who was not my ancestor has\nlaid down; for I shall not gain so much in money as I shall lose in\nvirtue. The saying, 'Move not the immovable,' may be repeated in a\nnew sense; and there is a common belief which asserts that such deeds\nprevent a man from having a family. To him who is careless of such\nconsequences, and, despising the word of the wise, takes up a treasure\nwhich is not his--what will be done by the hand of the Gods, God only\nknows,--but I would have the first person who sees the offender, inform\nthe wardens of the city or the country; and they shall send to Delphi\nfor a decision, and whatever the oracle orders, they shall carry out.\nIf the informer be a freeman, he shall be honoured, and if a slave,\nset free; but he who does not inform, if he be a freeman, shall be\ndishonoured, and if a slave, shall be put to death. If a man leave\nanywhere anything great or small, intentionally or unintentionally, let\nhim who may find the property deem the deposit sacred to the Goddess\nof ways. And he who appropriates the same, if he be a slave, shall be\nbeaten with many stripes; if a freeman, he shall pay tenfold, and be\nheld to have done a dishonourable action. If a person says that another\nhas something of his, and the other allows that he has the property in\ndispute, but maintains it to be his own, let the ownership be proved out\nof the registers of property. If the property is registered as belonging\nto some one who is absent, possession shall be given to him who offers\nsufficient security on behalf of the absentee; or if the property is not\nregistered, let it remain with the three eldest magistrates, and if it\nshould be an animal, the defeated party must pay the cost of its keep. A\nman may arrest his own slave, and he may also imprison for safe-keeping\nthe runaway slave of a friend. Any one interfering with him must produce\nthree sureties; otherwise, he will be liable to an action for violence,\nand if he be cast, must pay a double amount of damages to him from whom\nhe has taken the slave. A freedman who does not pay due respect to his\npatron, may also be seized. Due respect consists in going three times\na month to the house of his patron, and offering to perform any lawful\nservice for him; he must also marry as his master pleases; and if his\nproperty be greater than his master's, he must hand over to him the\nexcess. A freedman may not remain in the state, except with the consent\nof the magistrates and of his master, for more than twenty years; and\nwhenever his census exceeds that of the third class, he must in any case\nleave the country within thirty days, taking his property with him. If\nhe break this regulation, the penalty shall be death, and his property\nshall be confiscated. Suits about these matters are to be decided in the\ncourts of the tribes, unless the parties have settled the matter before\na court of neighbours or before arbiters. If anybody claim a beast, or\nanything else, let the possessor refer to the seller or giver of the\nproperty within thirty days, if the latter reside in the city, or, if\nthe goods have been received from a stranger, within five months, of\nwhich the middle month shall include the summer solstice. All purchases\nand exchanges are to be made in the agora, and paid for on the spot; the\nlaw will not allow credit to be given. No law shall protect the money\nsubscribed for clubs. He who sells anything of greater value than fifty\ndrachmas shall abide in the city for ten days, and let his whereabouts\nbe known to the buyer, in case of any reclamation. When a slave is sold\nwho is subject to epilepsy, stone, or any other invisible disorder, the\nbuyer, if he be a physician or trainer, or if he be warned, shall have\nno redress; but in other cases within six months, or within twelve\nmonths in epileptic disorders, he may bring the matter before a jury of\nphysicians to be agreed upon by both parties; and the seller who loses\nthe suit, if he be an expert, shall pay twice the price; or if he be\na private person, the bargain shall be rescinded, and he shall simply\nrefund. If a person knowingly sells a homicide to another, who is\ninformed of his character, there is no redress. But if the judges--who\nare to be the five youngest guardians of the law--decide that the\npurchaser was not aware, then the seller is to pay threefold, and to\npurify the house of the buyer.\n\nHe who exchanges money for money, or beast for beast, must warrant\neither of them to be sound and good. As in the case of other laws, let\nus have a preamble, relating to all this class of crime. Adulteration\nis a kind of falsehood about which the many commonly say that at proper\ntimes the practice may often be right, but they do not define at what\ntimes. But the legislator will tell them, that no man should invoke the\nGods when he is practising deceit or fraud, in word or deed. For he is\nthe enemy of heaven, first, who swears falsely, not thinking of the Gods\nby whom he swears, and secondly, he who lies to his superiors. (Now\nthe superiors are the betters of inferiors,--the elder of the younger,\nparents of children, men of women, and rulers of subjects.) The trader\nwho cheats in the agora is a liar and is perjured--he respects neither\nthe name of God nor the regulations of the magistrates. If after hearing\nthis he will still be dishonest, let him listen to the law:--The seller\nshall not have two prices on the same day, neither must he puff his\ngoods, nor offer to swear about them. If he break the law, any citizen\nnot less than thirty years of age may smite him. If he sell adulterated\ngoods, the slave or metic who informs against him shall have the goods;\nthe citizen who brings such a charge, if he prove it, shall offer up the\ngoods in question to the Gods of the agora; or if he fail to prove it,\nshall be dishonoured. He who is detected in selling adulterated goods\nshall be deprived of them, and shall receive a stripe for every drachma\nof their value. The wardens of the agora and the guardians of the law\nshall take experienced persons into counsel, and draw up regulations for\nthe agora. These shall be inscribed on a column in front of the court\nof the wardens of the agora.--As to the wardens of the city, enough\nhas been said already. But if any omissions in the law are afterwards\ndiscovered, the wardens and the guardians shall supply them, and have\nthem inscribed after the original regulations on a column before the\ncourt of the wardens of the city.\n\nNext in order follows the subject of retail trades, which in their\nnatural use are the reverse of mischievous; for every man is a\nbenefactor who reduces what is unequal to symmetry and proportion. Money\nis the instrument by which this is accomplished, and the shop-keeper,\nthe merchant, and hotel-keeper do but supply the wants and equalize\nthe possessions of mankind. Why, then, does any dishonour attach to\na beneficent occupation? Let us consider the nature of the accusation\nfirst, and then see whether it can be removed. 'What is your drift?'\nDear Cleinias, there are few men who are so gifted by nature, and\nimproved by education, as to be able to control the desire of making\nmoney; or who are sober in their wishes and prefer moderation to\naccumulation. The great majority think that they can never have enough,\nand the consequence is that retail trade has become a reproach. Whereas,\nhowever ludicrous the idea may seem, if noble men and noble women could\nbe induced to open a shop, and to trade upon incorruptible principles,\nthen the aspect of things would change, and retail traders would be\nregarded as nursing fathers and mothers. In our own day the trader\ngoes and settles in distant places, and receives the weary traveller\nhospitably at first, but in the end treats him as an enemy and a\ncaptive, whom he only liberates for an enormous ransom. This is what\nhas brought retail trade into disrepute, and against this the legislator\nought to provide. Men have said of old, that to fight against two\nopponents is hard; and the two opponents of whom I am thinking are\nwealth and poverty--the one corrupting men by luxury; the other, through\nmisery, depriving them of the sense of shame. What remedies can a city\nfind for this disease? First, to have as few retail traders as possible;\nsecondly, to give retail trade over to a class whose corruption will not\ninjure the state; and thirdly, to restrain the insolence and meanness of\nthe retailers.\n\nLet us make the following laws:--(1) In the city of the Magnetes none of\nthe 5040 citizens shall be a retailer or merchant, or do any service to\nany private persons who do not equally serve him, except to his father\nand mother and their fathers and mothers, and generally to his elders\nwho are freemen, and whom he serves as a freeman. He who follows an\nilliberal pursuit may be cited for dishonouring his family, and kept\nin bonds for a year; and if he offend again, he shall be bound for two\nyears; and for every offence his punishment shall be doubled: (2) Every\nretailer shall be a metic or a foreigner: (3) The guardians of the law\nshall have a special care of this part of the community, whose calling\nexposes them to peculiar temptations. They shall consult with persons of\nexperience, and find out what prices will yield the traders a moderate\nprofit, and fix them.\n\nWhen a man does not fulfil his contract, he being under no legal or\nother impediment, the case shall be brought before the court of the\ntribes, if not previously settled by arbitration. The class of artisans\nis consecrated to Hephaestus and Athene; the makers of weapons to Ares\nand Athene: all of whom, remembering that the Gods are their ancestors,\nshould be ashamed to deceive in the practice of their craft. If any man\nis lazy in the fulfilment of his work, and fancies, foolish fellow, that\nhis patron God will not deal hardly with him, he will be punished by the\nGod; and let the law follow:--He who fails in his undertaking shall pay\nthe value, and do the work gratis in a specified time. The contractor,\nlike the seller, is enjoined by law to charge the simple value of his\nwork; in a free city, art should be a true thing, and the artist must\nnot practise on the ignorance of others. On the other hand, he who has\nordered any work and does not pay the workman according to agreement,\ndishonours Zeus and Athene, and breaks the bonds of society. And if\nhe does not pay at the time agreed, let him pay double; and although\ninterest is forbidden in other cases, let the workman receive after the\nexpiration of a year interest at the rate of an obol a month for every\ndrachma (equal to 200 per cent. per ann.). And we may observe by the\nway, in speaking of craftsmen, that if our military craft do their work\nwell, the state will praise those who honour them, and blame those who\ndo not honour them. Not that the first place of honour is to be assigned\nto the warrior; a higher still is reserved for those who obey the laws.\n\nMost of the dealings between man and man are now settled, with the\nexception of such as relate to orphans and guardianships. These lead\nus to speak of the intentions of the dying, about which we must make\nregulations. I say 'must'; for mankind cannot be allowed to dispose of\ntheir property as they please, in ways at variance with one another and\nwith law and custom. But a dying person is a strange being, and is not\neasily managed; he wants to be master of all he has, and is apt to use\nangry words. He will say,--'May I not do what I will with my own, and\ngive much to my friends, and little to my enemies?' 'There is reason\nin that.' O Cleinias, in my judgment the older lawgivers were too\nsoft-hearted, and wanting in insight into human affairs. They were\ntoo ready to listen to the outcry of a dying man, and hence they were\ninduced to give him an absolute power of bequest. But I would say to\nhim:--O creature of a day, you know neither what is yours nor yourself:\nfor you and your property are not your own, but belong to your whole\nfamily, past and to come, and property and family alike belong to the\nState. And therefore I must take out of your hands the charge of what\nyou leave behind you, with a view to the interests of all. And I hope\nthat you will not quarrel with us, now that you are going the way of all\nmankind; we will do our best for you and yours when you are no longer\nhere. Let this be our address to the living and dying, and let the law\nbe as follows:--The father who has sons shall appoint one of them to be\nthe heir of the lot; and if he has given any other son to be adopted by\nanother, the adoption shall also be recorded; and if he has still a son\nwho has no lot, and has a chance of going to a colony, he may give him\nwhat he has more than the lot; or if he has more than one son unprovided\nfor, he may divide the money between them. A son who has a house of his\nown, and a daughter who is betrothed, are not to share in the bequest of\nmoney; and the son or daughter who, having inherited one lot, acquires\nanother, is to bequeath the new inheritance to the next of kin. If a man\nhave only daughters, he may adopt the husband of any one of them; or if\nhe have lost a son, let him make mention of the circumstance in his will\nand adopt another. If he have no children, he may give away a tenth of\nhis acquired property to whomsoever he likes; but he must adopt an heir\nto inherit the lot, and may leave the remainder to him. Also he may\nappoint guardians for his children; or if he die without appointing them\nor without making a will, the nearest kinsmen,--two on the father's\nand two on the mother's side,--and one friend of the departed, shall be\nappointed guardians. The fifteen eldest guardians of the law are to have\nspecial charge of all orphans, the whole number of fifteen being\ndivided into bodies of three, who will succeed one another according\nto seniority every year for five years. If a man dying intestate leave\ndaughters, he must pardon the law which marries them for looking, first\nto kinship, and secondly to the preservation of the lot. The legislator\ncannot regard the character of the heir, which to the father is the\nfirst consideration. The law will therefore run as follows:--If the\nintestate leave daughters, husbands are to be found for them among\ntheir kindred according to the following table of affinity: first,\ntheir father's brothers; secondly, the sons of their father's brothers;\nthirdly, of their father's sisters; fourthly, their great-uncles;\nfifthly, the sons of a great-uncle; sixthly, the sons of a great-aunt.\nThe kindred in such cases shall always be reckoned in this way; the\nrelationship shall proceed upwards through brothers and sisters and\nbrothers' and sisters' children, and first the male line must be taken\nand then the female. If there is a dispute in regard to fitness of\nage for marriage, this the judge shall decide, after having made an\ninspection of the youth naked, and of the maiden naked down to the\nwaist. If the maiden has no relations within the degree of third cousin,\nshe may choose whom she likes, with the consent of her guardians; or she\nmay even select some one who has gone to a colony, and he, if he be a\nkinsman, will take the lot by law; if not, he must have her guardians'\nconsent, as well as hers. When a man dies without children and without\na will, let a young man and a young woman go forth from the family and\ntake up their abode in the desolate house. The woman shall be selected\nfrom the kindred in the following order of succession:--first, a\nsister of the deceased; second, a brother's daughter; third, a sister's\ndaughter; fourth, a father's sister; fifth, a daughter of a father's\nbrother; sixth, a daughter of a father's sister. For the man the\nsame order shall be observed as in the preceding case. The legislator\nforesees that laws of this kind will sometimes press heavily, and that\nhis intention cannot always be fulfilled; as for example, when there are\nmental and bodily defects in the persons who are enjoined to marry. But\nhe must be excused for not being always able to reconcile the general\nprinciples of public interest with the particular circumstances of\nindividuals; and he is willing to allow, in like manner, that the\nindividual cannot always do what the lawgiver wishes. And then arbiters\nmust be chosen, who will determine equitably the cases which may arise\nunder the law: e.g. a rich cousin may sometimes desire a grander match,\nor the requirements of the law can only be fulfilled by marrying a\nmadwoman. To meet such cases let the following law be enacted:--If any\none comes forward and says that the lawgiver, had he been alive, would\nnot have required the carrying out of the law in a particular case, let\nhim go to the fifteen eldest guardians of the law who have the care of\norphans; but if he thinks that too much power is thus given to them, he\nmay bring the case before the court of select judges.\n\nThus will orphans have a second birth. In order to make their sad\ncondition as light as possible, the guardians of the law shall be\ntheir parents, and shall be admonished to take care of them. And what\nadmonition can be more appropriate than the assurance which we formerly\ngave, that the souls of the dead watch over mortal affairs? About this\nthere are many ancient traditions, which may be taken on trust from the\nlegislator. Let men fear, in the first place, the Gods above; secondly,\nthe souls of the departed, who naturally care for their own descendants;\nthirdly, the aged living, who are quick to hear of any neglect of family\nduties, especially in the case of orphans. For they are the holiest\nand most sacred of all deposits, and the peculiar care of guardians and\nmagistrates; and those who try to bring them up well will contribute\nto their own good and to that of their families. He who listens to the\npreamble of the law will never know the severity of the legislator; but\nhe who disobeys, and injures the orphan, will pay twice the penalty he\nwould have paid if the parents had been alive. More laws might have been\nmade about orphans, did we not suppose that the guardians have children\nand property of their own which are protected by the laws; and the duty\nof the guardian in our state is the same as that of a father, though\nhis honour or disgrace is greater. A legal admonition and threat may,\nhowever, be of service: the guardian of the orphan and the guardian of\nthe law who is over him, shall love the orphan as their own children,\nand take more care of his or her property than of their own. If the\nguardian of the child neglect his duty, the guardian of the law shall\nfine him; and the guardian may also have the magistrate tried for\nneglect in the court of select judges, and he shall pay, if convicted,\na double penalty. Further, the guardian of the orphan who is careless\nor dishonest may be fined on the information of any of the citizens in a\nfourfold penalty, half to go to the orphan and half to the prosecutor\nof the suit. When the orphan is of age, if he thinks that he has been\nill-used, his guardian may be brought to trial by him within five years,\nand the penalty shall be fixed by the court. Or if the magistrate\nhas neglected the orphan, he shall pay damages to him; but if he have\ndefrauded him, he shall make compensation and also be deposed from his\noffice of guardian of the law.\n\nIf irremediable differences arise between fathers and sons, the father\nmay want to renounce his son, or the son may indict his father for\nimbecility: such violent separations only take place when the family are\n'a bad lot'; if only one of the two parties is bad, the differences do\nnot grow to so great a height. But here arises a difficulty. Although\nin any other state a son who is disinherited does not cease to be a\ncitizen, in ours he does; for the number of citizens cannot exceed 5040.\nAnd therefore he who is to suffer such a penalty ought to be abjured,\nnot only by his father, but by the whole family. The law, then, should\nrun as follows:--If any man's evil fortune or temper incline him to\ndisinherit his son, let him not do so lightly or on the instant; but let\nhim have a council of his own relations and of the maternal relations of\nhis son, and set forth to them the propriety of disinheriting him, and\nallow his son to answer. And if more than half of the kindred male and\nfemale, being of full age, condemn the son, let him be disinherited.\nIf any other citizen desires to adopt him, he may, for young men's\ncharacters often change in the course of life. But if, after ten years,\nhe remains unadopted, let him be sent to a colony. If disease, or old\nage, or evil disposition cause a man to go out of his mind, and he is\nruining his house and property, and his son doubts about indicting him\nfor insanity, let him lay the case before the eldest guardians of the\nlaw, and consult with them. And if they advise him to proceed, and the\nfather is decided to be imbecile, he shall have no more control over his\nproperty, but shall live henceforward like a child in the house.\n\nIf a man and his wife are of incompatible tempers, ten guardians of the\nlaw and ten of the matrons who regulate marriage shall take their case\nin hand, and reconcile them, if possible. If, however, their swelling\nsouls cannot be pacified, the wife may try and find a new husband, and\nthe husband a new wife; probably they are not very gentle creatures, and\nshould therefore be joined to milder natures. The younger of those\nwho are separated should also select their partners with a view to the\nprocreation of children; while the older should seek a companion for\ntheir declining years. If a woman dies, leaving children male or female,\nthe law will advise, but not compel, the widower to abstain from a\nsecond marriage; if she leave no children, he shall be compelled to\nmarry. Also a widow, if she is not old enough to live honestly without\nmarriage, shall marry again; and in case she have no children, she\nshould marry for the sake of them. There is sometimes an uncertainty\nwhich parent the offspring is to follow: in unions of a female slave\nwith a male slave, or with a freedman or free man, or of a free woman\nwith a male slave, the offspring is to belong to the master; but if the\nmaster or mistress be themselves the parent of the child, the slave and\nthe child are to be sent away to another land.\n\nConcerning duty to parents, let the preamble be as follows:--We honour\nthe Gods in their lifeless images, and believe that we thus propitiate\nthem. But he who has an aged father or mother has a living image, which\nif he cherish it will do him far more good than any statue. 'What do\nyou mean by cherishing them?' I will tell you. Oedipus and Amyntor and\nTheseus cursed their children, and their curses took effect. This proves\nthat the Gods hear the curses of parents who are wronged; and shall we\ndoubt that they hear and fulfil their blessings too?' 'Surely not.' And,\nas we were saying, no image is more honoured by the Gods than an aged\nfather and mother, to whom when honour is done, the God who hears their\nprayers is rejoiced, and their influence is greater than that of the\nlifeless statue; for they pray that good or evil may come to us in\nproportion as they are honoured or dishonoured, but the statue is\nsilent. 'Excellent.' Good men are glad when their parents live to\nextreme old age, or if they depart early, lament their loss; but to bad\nman their parents are always terrible. Wherefore let every one honour\nhis parents, and if this preamble fails of influencing him, let him hear\nthe law:--If any one does not take sufficient care of his parents, let\nthe aggrieved person inform the three eldest guardians of the law and\nthree of the women who are concerned with marriages. Women up to forty\nyears of age, and men up to thirty, who thus offend, shall be beaten\nand imprisoned. After that age they are to be brought before a court\ncomposed of the eldest citizens, who may inflict any punishment upon\nthem which they please. If the injured party cannot inform, let any\nfreeman who hears of the case inform; a slave who does so shall be\nset free,--if he be the slave of the one of the parties, by the\nmagistrate,--if owned by another, at the cost of the state; and let the\nmagistrates, take care that he is not wronged by any one out of revenge.\n\nThe injuries which one person does to another by the use of poisons\nare of two kinds;--one affects the body by the employment of drugs and\npotions; the other works on the mind by the practice of sorcery and\nmagic. Fatal cases of either sort have been already mentioned; and now\nwe must have a law respecting cases which are not fatal. There is no use\nin arguing with a man whose mind is disturbed by waxen images placed at\nhis own door, or on the sepulchre of his father or mother, or at a spot\nwhere three ways meet. But to the wizards themselves we must address\na solemn preamble, begging them not to treat the world as if they were\nchildren, or compel the legislator to expose them, and to show men that\nthe poisoner who is not a physician and the wizard who is not a prophet\nor diviner are equally ignorant of what they are doing. Let the law be\nas follows:--He who by the use of poison does any injury not fatal to\na man or his servants, or any injury whether fatal or not to another's\ncattle or bees, is to be punished with death if he be a physician, and\nif he be not a physician he is to suffer the punishment awarded by the\ncourt: and he who injures another by sorcery, if he be a diviner or\nprophet, shall be put to death; and, if he be not a diviner, the court\nshall determine what he ought to pay or suffer.\n\nAny one who injures another by theft or violence shall pay damages at\nleast equal to the injury; and besides the compensation, a suitable\npunishment shall be inflicted. The foolish youth who is the victim of\nothers is to have a lighter punishment; he whose folly is occasioned\nby his own jealousy or desire or anger is to suffer more heavily.\nPunishment is to be inflicted, not for the sake of vengeance, for\nwhat is done cannot be undone, but for the sake of prevention and\nreformation. And there should be a proportion between the punishment and\nthe crime, in which the judge, having a discretion left him, must,\nby estimating the crime, second the legislator, who, like a painter,\nfurnishes outlines for him to fill up.\n\nA madman is not to go about at large in the city, but is to be taken\ncare of by his relatives. Neglect on their part is to be punished in the\nfirst class by a fine of a hundred drachmas, and proportionally in\nthe others. Now madness is of various kinds; in addition to that\nwhich arises from disease there is the madness which originates in a\npassionate temperament, and makes men when engaged in a quarrel use\nfoul and abusive language against each other. This is intolerable in a\nwell-ordered state; and therefore our law shall be as follows:--No one\nis to speak evil of another, but when men differ in opinion they are to\ninstruct one another without speaking evil. Nor should any one seek\nto rouse the passions which education has calmed; for he who feeds and\nnurses his wrath is apt to make ribald jests at his opponent, with a\nloss of character or dignity to himself. And for this reason no one may\nuse any abusive word in a temple, or at sacrifices, or games, or in\nany public assembly, and he who offends shall be censured by the proper\nmagistrate; and the magistrate, if he fail to censure him, shall not\nclaim the prize of virtue. In any other place the angry man who indulges\nin revilings, whether he be the beginner or not, may be chastised by an\nelder. The reviler is always trying to make his opponent ridiculous; and\nthe use of ridicule in anger we cannot allow. We forbid the comic poet\nto ridicule our citizens, under a penalty of expulsion from the country\nor a fine of three minae. Jest in which there is no offence may be\nallowed; but the question of offence shall be determined by the director\nof education, who is to be the licenser of theatrical performances.\n\nThe righteous man who is in adversity will not be allowed to starve in a\nwell-ordered city; he will never be a beggar. Nor is a man to be pitied,\nmerely because he is hungry, unless he be temperate. Therefore let the\nlaw be as follows:--Let there be no beggars in our state; and he who\nbegs shall be expelled by the magistrates both from town and country.\n\nIf a slave, male or female, does any harm to the property of another,\nwho is not himself a party to the harm, the master shall compensate the\ninjury or give up the offending slave. But if the master argue that the\ncharge has arisen by collusion, with the view of obtaining the slave,\nhe may put the plaintiff on his trial for malpractices, and recover from\nhim twice the value of the slave; or if he is cast he must make good\nthe damage and deliver up the slave. The injury done by a horse or other\nanimal shall be compensated in like manner.\n\nA witness who will not come of himself may be summoned, and if he fail\nin appearing, he shall be liable for any harm which may ensue: if he\nswears that he does not know, he may leave the court. A judge who is\ncalled upon as a witness must not vote. A free woman, if she is over\nforty, may bear witness and plead, and, if she have no husband, she may\nalso bring an action. A slave, male or female, and a child may witness\nand plead only in case of murder, but they must give sureties that they\nwill appear at the trial, if they should be charged with false witness.\nSuch charges must be made pending the trial, and the accusations shall\nbe sealed by both parties and kept by the magistrates until the trial\nfor perjury comes off. If a man is twice convicted of perjury, he is not\nto be required, if three times, he is not to be allowed to bear witness,\nor, if he persists in bearing witness, is to be punished with death.\nWhen more than half the evidence is proved to be false there must be a\nnew trial.\n\nThe best and noblest things in human life are liable to be defiled and\nperverted. Is not justice the civilizer of mankind? And yet upon the\nnoble profession of the advocate has come an evil name. For he is said\nto make the worse appear the better cause, and only requires money\nin return for his services. Such an art will be forbidden by the\nlegislator, and if existing among us will be requested to depart to\nanother city. To the disobedient let the voice of the law be heard\nsaying:--He who tries to pervert justice in the minds of the judges, or\nto increase litigation, shall be brought before the supreme court. If he\ndoes so from contentiousness, let him be silenced for a time, and, if\nhe offend again, put to death. If he have acted from a love of gain,\nlet him be sent out of the country if he be a foreigner, or if he be a\ncitizen let him be put to death.\n\nBOOK XII. If a false message be taken to or brought from other states,\nwhether friendly or hostile, by ambassadors or heralds, they shall be\nindicted for having dishonoured their sacred office, and, if convicted,\nshall suffer a penalty.--Stealing is mean; robbery is shameless. Let no\nman deceive himself by the supposed example of the Gods, for no God or\nson of a God ever really practised either force or fraud. On this point\nthe legislator is better informed than all the poets put together. He\nwho listens to him shall be for ever happy, but he who will not listen\nshall have the following law directed against him:--He who steals much,\nor he who steals little of the public property is deserving of the same\npenalty; for they are both impelled by the same evil motive. When the\nlaw punishes one man more lightly than another, this is done under the\nidea, not that he is less guilty, but that he is more curable. Now a\nthief who is a foreigner or slave may be curable; but the thief who is\na citizen, and has had the advantages of education, should be put to\ndeath, for he is incurable.\n\nMuch consideration and many regulations are necessary about military\nexpeditions; the great principal of all is that no one, male or\nfemale, in war or peace, in great matters or small, shall be without a\ncommander. Whether men stand or walk, or drill, or pursue, or retreat,\nor wash, or eat, they should all act together and in obedience to\norders. We should practise from our youth upwards the habits of command\nand obedience. All dances, relaxations, endurances of meats and drinks,\nof cold and heat, and of hard couches, should have a view to war, and\ncare should be taken not to destroy the natural covering and use of the\nhead and feet by wearing shoes and caps; for the head is the lord of\nthe body, and the feet are the best of servants. The soldier should have\nthoughts like these; and let him hear the law:--He who is enrolled shall\nserve, and if he absent himself without leave he shall be indicted for\nfailure of service before his own branch of the army when the expedition\nreturns, and if he be found guilty he shall suffer the penalty which the\ncourts award, and never be allowed to contend for any prize of valour,\nor to accuse another of misbehaviour in military matters. Desertion\nshall also be tried and punished in the same manner. After the courts\nfor trying failure of service and desertion have been held, the generals\nshall hold another court, in which the several arms of the service will\naward prizes for the expedition which has just concluded. The prize is\nto be a crown of olive, which the victor shall offer up at the temple\nof his favourite war God...In any suit which a man brings, let the\nindictment be scrupulously true, for justice is an honourable maiden,\nto whom falsehood is naturally hateful. For example, when men are\nprosecuted for having lost their arms, great care should be taken by the\nwitnesses to distinguish between cases in which they have been lost from\nnecessity and from cowardice. If the hero Patroclus had not been killed\nbut had been brought back alive from the field, he might have been\nreproached with having lost the divine armour. And a man may lose\nhis arms in a storm at sea, or from a fall, and under many other\ncircumstances. There is a distinction of language to be observed in the\nuse of the two terms, 'thrower away of a shield' (ripsaspis), and 'loser\nof arms' (apoboleus oplon), one being the voluntary, the other the\ninvoluntary relinquishment of them. Let the law then be as follows:--If\nany one is overtaken by the enemy, having arms in his hands, and he\nleaves them behind him voluntarily, choosing base life instead of\nhonourable death, let justice be done. The old legend of Caeneus, who\nwas changed by Poseidon from a woman into a man, may teach by contraries\nthe appropriate punishment. Let the thrower away of his shield be\nchanged from a man into a woman--that is to say, let him be all his life\nout of danger, and never again be admitted by any commander into the\nranks of his army; and let him pay a heavy fine according to his class.\nAnd any commander who permits him to serve shall also be punished by a\nfine.\n\nAll magistrates, whatever be their tenure of office, must give an\naccount of their magistracy. But where shall we find the magistrate who\nis worthy to supervise them or look into their short-comings and crooked\nways? The examiner must be more than man who is sufficient for these\nthings. For the truth is that there are many causes of the dissolution\nof states; which, like ships or animals, have their cords, and girders,\nand sinews easily relaxed, and nothing tends more to their welfare and\npreservation than the supervision of them by examiners who are better\nthan the magistrates; failing in this they fall to pieces, and each\nbecomes many instead of one. Wherefore let the people meet after the\nsummer solstice, in the precincts of Apollo and the Sun, and appoint\nthree men of not less than fifty years of age. They shall proceed as\nfollows:--Each citizen shall select some one, not himself, whom he\nthinks the best. The persons selected shall be reduced to one half, who\nhave the greatest number of votes, if they are an even number; but if an\nodd number, he who has the smallest number of votes shall be previously\nwithdrawn. The voting shall continue in the same manner until three only\nremain; and if the number of votes cast for them be equal, a distinction\nbetween the first, second, and third shall be made by lot. The three\nshall be crowned with an olive wreath, and proclamation made, that the\ncity of the Magnetes, once more preserved by the Gods, presents her\nthree best men to Apollo and the Sun, to whom she dedicates them as long\nas their lives answer to the judgment formed of them. They shall choose\nin the first year of their office twelve examiners, to continue until\nthey are seventy-five years of age; afterwards three shall be added\nannually. While they hold office, they shall dwell within the precinct\nof the God. They are to divide all the magistracies into twelve classes,\nand may apply any methods of enquiry, and inflict any punishments which\nthey please; in some cases singly, in other cases together, announcing\nthe acquittal or punishment of the magistrate on a tablet which they\nwill place in the agora. A magistrate who has been condemned by the\nexaminers may appeal to the select judges, and, if he gain his suit,\nmay in turn prosecute the examiners; but if the appellant is cast,\nhis punishment shall be doubled, unless he was previously condemned to\ndeath.\n\nAnd what honours shall be paid to these examiners, whom the whole state\ncounts worthy of the rewards of virtue? They shall have the first place\nat all sacrifices and other ceremonies, and in all assemblies and\npublic places; they shall go on sacred embassies, and have the exclusive\nprivilege of wearing a crown of laurel. They are priests of Apollo\nand the Sun, and he of their number who is judged first shall be high\npriest, and give his name to the year. The manner of their burial, too,\nshall be different from that of the other citizens. The colour of their\nfuneral array shall be white, and, instead of the voice of lamentation,\naround the bier shall stand a chorus of fifteen boys and fifteen\nmaidens, chanting hymns in honour of the deceased in alternate strains\nduring an entire day; and at dawn a band of a hundred youths shall carry\nthe bier to the grave, marching in the garb of warriors, and the boys in\nfront of the bier shall sing their national hymn, while the maidens and\nwomen past child-bearing follow after. Priests and priestesses may also\nfollow, unless the Pythian oracle forbids. The sepulchre shall be a\nvault built underground, which will last for ever, having couches of\nstone placed side by side; on one of these they shall lay the departed\nsaint, and then cover the tomb with a mound, and plant trees on every\nside except one, where an opening shall be left for other interments.\nEvery year there shall be games--musical, gymnastic, or equestrian, in\nhonour of those who have passed every ordeal. But if any of them, after\nhaving been acquitted on any occasion, begin to show the wickedness\nof human nature, he who pleases may bring them to trial before a court\ncomposed of the guardians of the law, and of the select judges, and\nof any of the examiners who are alive. If he be convicted he shall be\ndeprived of his honours, and if the accuser do not obtain a fifth part\nof the votes, he shall pay a fine according to his class.\n\nWhat is called the judgment of Rhadamanthus is suited to 'ages of\nfaith,' but not to our days. He knew that his contemporaries believed\nin the Gods, for many of them were the sons of Gods; and he thought that\nthe easiest and surest method of ending litigation was to commit the\ndecision to Heaven. In our own day, men either deny the existence\nof Gods or their care of men, or maintain that they may be bribed by\nattentions and gifts; and the procedure of Rhadamanthus would therefore\nbe out of date. When the religious ideas of mankind change, their laws\nshould also change. Thus oaths should no longer be taken from plaintiff\nand defendant; simple statements of affirmation and denial should be\nsubstituted. For there is something dreadful in the thought, that nearly\nhalf the citizens of a state are perjured men. There is no objection\nto an oath, where a man has no interest in forswearing himself; as, for\nexample, when a judge is about to give his decision, or in voting at\nan election, or in the judgment of games and contests. But where\nthere would be a premium on perjury, oaths and imprecations should be\nprohibited as irrelevant, like appeals to feeling. Let the principles of\njustice be learned and taught without words of evil omen. The oaths of\na stranger against a stranger may be allowed, because strangers are not\npermitted to become permanent residents in our state.\n\nTrials in private causes are to be decided in the same manner as lesser\noffences against the state. The non-attendance at a chorus or sacrifice,\nor the omission to pay a war-tax, may be regarded as in the first\ninstance remediable, and the defaulter may give security; but if he\nforfeits the security, the goods pledged shall be sold and the money\ngiven to the state. And for obstinate disobedience, the magistrate shall\nhave the power of inflicting greater penalties.\n\nA city which is without trade or commerce must consider what it will do\nabout the going abroad of its own people and the admission of strangers.\nFor out of intercourse with strangers there arises great confusion of\nmanners, which in most states is not of any consequence, because the\nconfusion exists already; but in a well-ordered state it may be a great\nevil. Yet the absolute prohibition of foreign travel, or the exclusion\nof strangers, is impossible, and would appear barbarous to the rest of\nmankind. Public opinion should never be lightly regarded, for the many\nare not so far wrong in their judgments as in their lives. Even the\nworst of men have often a divine instinct, which enables them to judge\nof the differences between the good and bad. States are rightly advised\nwhen they desire to have the praise of men; and the greatest and truest\npraise is that of virtue. And our Cretan colony should, and probably\nwill, have a character for virtue, such as few cities have. Let\nthis, then, be our law about foreign travel and the reception of\nstrangers:--No one shall be allowed to leave the country who is under\nforty years of age--of course military service abroad is not included in\nthis regulation--and no one at all except in a public capacity. To the\nOlympic, and Pythian, and Nemean, and Isthmian games, shall be sent the\nfairest and best and bravest, who shall support the dignity of the city\nin time of peace. These, when they come home, shall teach the youth the\ninferiority of all other governments. Besides those who go on sacred\nmissions, other persons shall be sent out by permission of the guardians\nto study the institutions of foreign countries. For a people which has\nno experience, and no knowledge of the characters of men or the reason\nof things, but lives by habit only, can never be perfectly civilized.\nMoreover, in all states, bad as well as good, there are holy and\ninspired men; these the citizen of a well-ordered city should be ever\nseeking out; he should go forth to find them over sea and over land,\nthat he may more firmly establish institutions in his own state which\nare good already and amend the bad. 'What will be the best way of\naccomplishing such an object?' In the first place, let the visitor of\nforeign countries be between fifty and sixty years of age, and let him\nbe a citizen of repute, especially in military matters. On his return\nhe shall appear before the Nocturnal Council: this is a body which sits\nfrom dawn to sunrise, and includes amongst its members the priests who\nhave gained the prize of virtue, and the ten oldest guardians of the\nlaw, and the director and past directors of education; each of whom has\npower to bring with him a younger friend of his own selection, who is\nbetween thirty and forty. The assembly thus constituted shall consider\nthe laws of their own and other states, and gather information relating\nto them. Anything of the sort which is approved by the elder members of\nthe council shall be studied with all diligence by the younger; who are\nto be specially watched by the rest of the citizens, and shall receive\nhonour, if they are deserving of honour, or dishonour, if they prove\ninferior. This is the assembly to which the visitor of foreign countries\nshall come and tell anything which he has heard from others in the\ncourse of his travels, or which he has himself observed. If he be made\nneither better nor worse, let him at least be praised for his zeal; and\nlet him receive still more praise, and special honour after death, if\nhe be improved. But if he be deteriorated by his travels, let him be\nprohibited from speaking to any one; and if he submit, he may live as\na private individual: but if he be convicted of attempting to make\ninnovations in education and the laws, let him die.\n\nNext, as to the reception of strangers. Of these there are four\nclasses:--First, merchants, who, like birds of passage, find their way\nover the sea at a certain time of the year, that they may exhibit their\nwares. These should be received in markets and public buildings without\nthe city, by proper officers, who shall see that justice is done them,\nand shall also watch against any political designs which they may\nentertain; no more intercourse is to be held with them than is\nabsolutely necessary. Secondly, there are the visitors at the festivals,\nwho shall be entertained by hospitable persons at the temples for a\nreasonable time; the priests and ministers of the temples shall have\na care of them. In small suits brought by them or against them, the\npriests shall be the judges; but in the more important, the wardens of\nthe agora. Thirdly, there are ambassadors of foreign states; these are\nto be honourably received by the generals and commanders, and placed\nunder the care of the Prytanes and of the persons with whom they are\nlodged. Fourthly, there is the philosophical stranger, who, like our\nown spectators, from time to time goes to see what is rich and rare in\nforeign countries. Like them he must be fifty years of age: and let him\ngo unbidden to the doors of the wise and rich, that he may learn from\nthem, and they from him.\n\nThese are the rules of missions into foreign countries, and of the\nreception of strangers. Let Zeus, the God of hospitality, be honoured;\nand let not the stranger be excluded, as in Egypt, from meals and\nsacrifices, or, (as at Sparta,) driven away by savage proclamations.\n\nLet guarantees be clearly given in writing and before witnesses. The\nnumber of witnesses shall be three when the sum lent is under a thousand\ndrachmas, or five when above. The agent and principal at a fraudulent\nsale shall be equally liable. He who would search another man's house\nfor anything must swear that he expects to find it there; and he shall\nenter naked, or having on a single garment and no girdle. The owner\nshall place at the disposal of the searcher all his goods, sealed as\nwell as unsealed; if he refuse, he shall be liable in double the value\nof the property, if it shall prove to be in his possession. If the owner\nbe absent, the searcher may counter-seal the property which is under\nseal, and place watchers. If the owner remain absent more than five\ndays, the searcher shall take the magistrates, and open the sealed\nproperty, and seal it up again in their presence. The recovery of goods\ndisputed, except in the case of lands and houses, (about which there\ncan be no dispute in our state), is to be barred by time. The public and\nunimpeached use of anything for a year in the city, or for five years in\nthe country, or the private possession and domestic use for three years\nin the city, or for ten years in the country, is to give a right of\nownership. But if the possessor have the property in a foreign country,\nthere shall be no bar as to time. The proceedings of any trial are to\nbe void, in which either the parties or the witnesses, whether bond or\nfree, have been prevented by violence from attending:--if a slave be\nprevented, the suit shall be invalid; or if a freeman, he who is guilty\nof the violence shall be imprisoned for a year, and shall also be liable\nto an action for kidnapping. If one competitor forcibly prevents another\nfrom attending at the games, the other may be inscribed as victor in\nthe temples, and the first, whether victor or not, shall be liable to an\naction for damages. The receiver of stolen goods shall undergo the same\npunishment as the thief. The receiver of an exile shall be punished with\ndeath. A man ought to have the same friends and enemies as his country;\nand he who makes war or peace for himself shall be put to death. And if\na party in the state make war or peace, their leaders shall be indicted\nby the generals, and, if convicted, they shall be put to death. The\nministers and officers of a country ought not to receive gifts, even as\nthe reward of good deeds. He who disobeys shall die.\n\nWith a view to taxation a man should have his property and income\nvalued: and the government may, at their discretion, levy the tax upon\nthe annual return, or take a portion of the whole.\n\nThe good man will offer moderate gifts to the Gods; his land or hearth\ncannot be offered, because they are already consecrated to all Gods.\nGold and silver, which arouse envy, and ivory, which is taken from the\ndead body of an animal, are unsuitable offerings; iron and brass are\nmaterials of war. Wood and stone of a single piece may be offered; also\nwoven work which has not occupied one woman more than a month in making.\nWhite is a colour which is acceptable to the Gods; figures of birds and\nsimilar offerings are the best of gifts, but they must be such as the\npainter can execute in a day.\n\nNext concerning lawsuits. Judges, or rather arbiters, may be agreed\nupon by the plaintiff and defendant; and if no decision is obtained from\nthem, their fellow-tribesmen shall judge. At this stage there shall be\nan increase of the penalty: the defendant, if he be cast, shall pay a\nfifth more than the damages claimed. If he further persist, and appeal\na second time, the case shall be heard before the select judges; and\nhe shall pay, if defeated, the penalty and half as much again. And the\npursuer, if on the first appeal he is defeated, shall pay one fifth\nof the damages claimed by him; and if on the second, one half. Other\nmatters relating to trials, such as the assignment of judges to courts,\nthe times of sitting, the number of judges, the modes of pleading\nand procedure, as we have already said, may be determined by younger\nlegislators.\n\nThese are to be the rules of private courts. As regards public courts,\nmany states have excellent modes of procedure which may serve for\nmodels; these, when duly tested by experience, should be ratified and\nmade permanent by us.\n\nLet the judge be accomplished in the laws. He should possess writings\nabout them, and make a study of them; for laws are the highest\ninstrument of mental improvement, and derive their name from mind (nous,\nnomos). They afford a measure of all censure and praise, whether in\nverse or prose, in conversation or in books, and are an antidote to the\nvain disputes of men and their equally vain acquiescence in each other's\nopinions. The just judge, who imbibes their spirit, makes the city and\nhimself to stand upright. He establishes justice for the good, and cures\nthe tempers of the bad, if they can be cured; but denounces death, which\nis the only remedy, to the incurable, the threads of whose life cannot\nbe reversed.\n\nWhen the suits of the year are completed, execution is to follow. The\ncourt is to award to the plaintiff the property of the defendant, if he\nis cast, reserving to him only his lot of land. If the plaintiff is\nnot satisfied within a month, the court shall put into his hands the\nproperty of the defendant. If the defendant fails in payment to the\namount of a drachma, he shall lose the use and protection of the court;\nor if he rebel against the authority of the court, he shall be brought\nbefore the guardians of the law, and if found guilty he shall be put to\ndeath.\n\nMan having been born, educated, having begotten and brought up children,\nand gone to law, fulfils the debt of nature. The rites which are to be\ncelebrated after death in honour of the Gods above and below shall be\ndetermined by the Interpreters. The dead shall be buried in uncultivated\nplaces, where they will be out of the way and do least injury to the\nliving. For no one either in life or after death has any right to\ndeprive other men of the sustenance which mother earth provides for\nthem. No sepulchral mound is to be piled higher than five men can\nraise it in five days, and the grave-stone shall not be larger than is\nsufficient to contain an inscription of four heroic verses. The dead\nare only to be exposed for three days, which is long enough to test the\nreality of death. The legislator will instruct the people that the body\nis a mere shadow or image, and that the soul, which is our true being,\nis gone to give an account of herself before the Gods below. When they\nhear this, the good are full of hope, and the evil are terrified. It\nis also said that not much can be done for any one after death. And\ntherefore while in life all man should be helped by their kindred to\npass their days justly and holily, that they may depart in peace. When\na man loses a son or a brother, he should consider that the beloved one\nhas gone away to fulfil his destiny in another place, and should not\nwaste money over his lifeless remains. Let the law then order a moderate\nfuneral of five minae for the first class, of three for the second, of\ntwo for the third, of one for the fourth. One of the guardians of the\nlaw, to be selected by the relatives, shall assist them in arranging\nthe affairs of the deceased. There would be a want of delicacy in\nprescribing that there should or should not be mourning for the dead.\nBut, at any rate, such mourning is to be confined to the house; there\nmust be no processions in the streets, and the dead body shall be taken\nout of the city before daybreak. Regulations about other forms of burial\nand about the non-burial of parricides and other sacrilegious persons\nhave already been laid down. The work of legislation is therefore nearly\ncompleted; its end will be finally accomplished when we have provided\nfor the continuance of the state.\n\nDo you remember the names of the Fates? Lachesis, the giver of the lots,\nis the first of them; Clotho, the spinster, the second; Atropos, the\nunchanging one, is the third and last, who makes the threads of the web\nirreversible. And we too want to make our laws irreversible, for the\nunchangeable quality in them will be the salvation of the state, and the\nsource of health and order in the bodies and souls of our citizens. 'But\ncan such a quality be implanted?' I think that it may; and at any rate\nwe must try; for, after all our labour, to have been piling up a fabric\nwhich has no foundation would be too ridiculous. 'What foundation would\nyou lay?' We have already instituted an assembly which was composed\nof the ten oldest guardians of the law, and secondly, of those who had\nreceived prizes of virtue, and thirdly, of the travellers who had gone\nabroad to enquire into the laws of other countries. Moreover, each of\nthe members was to choose a young man, of not less than thirty years of\nage, to be approved by the rest; and they were to meet at dawn, when all\nthe world is at leisure. This assembly will be an anchor to the vessel\nof state, and provide the means of permanence; for the constitutions of\nstates, like all other things, have their proper saviours, which are to\nthem what the head and soul are to the living being. 'How do you mean?'\nMind in the soul, and sight and hearing in the head, or rather, the\nperfect union of mind and sense, may be justly called every man's\nsalvation. 'Certainly.' Yes; but of what nature is this union? In the\ncase of a ship, for example, the senses of the sailors are added to the\nintelligence of the pilot, and the two together save the ship and\nthe men in the ship. Again, the physician and the general have their\nobjects; and the object of the one is health, of the other victory.\nStates, too, have their objects, and the ruler must understand, first,\ntheir nature, and secondly, the means of attaining them, whether in laws\nor men. The state which is wanting in this knowledge cannot be\nexpected to be wise when the time for action arrives. Now what class\nor institution is there in our state which has such a saving power? 'I\nsuspect that you are referring to the Nocturnal Council.' Yes, to that\ncouncil which is to have all virtue, and which should aim directly at\nthe mark. 'Very true.' The inconsistency of legislation in most states\nis not surprising, when the variety of their objects is considered. One\nof them makes their rule of justice the government of a class; another\naims at wealth; another at freedom, or at freedom and power; and some\nwho call themselves philosophers maintain that you should seek for all\nof them at once. But our object is unmistakeably virtue, and virtue is\nof four kinds. 'Yes; and we said that mind is the chief and ruler of the\nthree other kinds of virtue and of all else.' True, Cleinias; and now,\nhaving already declared the object which is present to the mind of the\npilot, the general, the physician, we will interrogate the mind of the\nstatesman. Tell me, I say, as the physician and general have told us\ntheir object, what is the object of the statesman. Can you tell me? 'We\ncannot.' Did we not say that there are four virtues--courage, wisdom,\nand two others, all of which are called by the common name of virtue,\nand are in a sense one? 'Certainly we did.' The difficulty is, not in\nunderstanding the differences of the virtues, but in apprehending their\nunity. Why do we call virtue, which is a single thing, by the two names\nof wisdom and courage? The reason is that courage is concerned with\nfear, and is found both in children and in brutes; for the soul may\nbe courageous without reason, but no soul was, or ever will be, wise\nwithout reason. 'That is true.' I have explained to you the difference,\nand do you in return explain to me the unity. But first let us consider\nwhether any one who knows the name of a thing without the definition has\nany real knowledge of it. Is not such knowledge a disgrace to a man of\nsense, especially where great and glorious truths are concerned? and can\nany subject be more worthy of the attention of our legislators than the\nfour virtues of which we are speaking--courage, temperance, justice,\nwisdom? Ought not the magistrates and officers of the state to instruct\nthe citizens in the nature of virtue and vice, instead of leaving them\nto be taught by some chance poet or sophist? A city which is without\ninstruction suffers the usual fate of cities in our day. What then shall\nwe do? How shall we perfect the ideas of our guardians about virtue? how\nshall we give our state a head and eyes? 'Yes, but how do you apply the\nfigure?' The city will be the body or trunk; the best of our young men\nwill mount into the head or acropolis and be our eyes; they will look\nabout them, and inform the elders, who are the mind and use the younger\nmen as their instruments: together they will save the state. Shall this\nbe our constitution, or shall all be educated alike, and the special\ntraining be given up? 'That is impossible.' Let us then endeavour to\nattain to some more exact idea of education. Did we not say that the\ntrue artist or guardian ought to have an eye, not only to the many, but\nto the one, and to order all things with a view to the one? Can there be\nany more philosophical speculation than how to reduce many things which\nare unlike to one idea? 'Perhaps not.' Say rather, 'Certainly not.' And\nthe rulers of our divine state ought to have an exact knowledge of\nthe common principle in courage, temperance, justice, wisdom, which is\ncalled by the name of virtue; and unless we know whether virtue is one\nor many, we shall hardly know what virtue is. Shall we contrive some\nmeans of engrafting this knowledge on our state, or give the matter up?\n'Anything rather than that.' Let us begin by making an agreement. 'By\nall means, if we can.' Well, are we not agreed that our guardians ought\nto know, not only how the good and the honourable are many, but also how\nthey are one? 'Yes, certainly.' The true guardian of the laws ought to\nknow their truth, and should also be able to interpret and execute them?\n'He should.' And is there any higher knowledge than the knowledge of the\nexistence and power of the Gods? The people may be excused for following\ntradition; but the guardian must be able to give a reason of the faith\nwhich is in him. And there are two great evidences of religion--the\npriority of the soul and the order of the heavens. For no man of\nsense, when he contemplates the universe, will be likely to substitute\nnecessity for reason and will. Those who maintain that the sun and the\nstars are inanimate beings are utterly wrong in their opinions. The\nmen of a former generation had a suspicion, which has been confirmed\nby later thinkers, that things inanimate could never without mind have\nattained such scientific accuracy; and some (Anaxagoras) even in those\ndays ventured to assert that mind had ordered all things in heaven; but\nthey had no idea of the priority of mind, and they turned the world,\nor more properly themselves, upside down, and filled the universe\nwith stones, and earth, and other inanimate bodies. This led to\ngreat impiety, and the poets said many foolish things against the\nphilosophers, whom they compared to 'yelping she-dogs,' besides making\nother abusive remarks. No man can now truly worship the Gods who does\nnot believe that the soul is eternal, and prior to the body, and the\nruler of all bodies, and does not perceive also that there is mind\nin the stars; or who has not heard the connexion of these things with\nmusic, and has not harmonized them with manners and laws, giving a\nreason of things which are matters of reason. He who is unable to\nacquire this knowledge, as well as the ordinary virtues of a citizen,\ncan only be a servant, and not a ruler in the state.\n\nLet us then add another law to the effect that the Nocturnal Council\nshall be a guard set for the salvation of the state. 'Very good.' To\nestablish this will be our aim, and I hope that others besides myself\nwill assist. 'Let us proceed along the road in which God seems to guide\nus.' We cannot, Megillus and Cleinias, anticipate the details which will\nhereafter be needed; they must be supplied by experience. 'What do you\nmean?' First of all a register will have to be made of all those whose\nage, character, or education would qualify them to be guardians. The\nsubjects which they are to learn, and the order in which they are to\nbe learnt, are mysteries which cannot be explained beforehand, but not\nmysteries in any other sense. 'If that is the case, what is to be done?'\nWe must stake our all on a lucky throw, and I will share the risk by\nstating my views on education. And I would have you, Cleinias, who are\nthe founder of the Magnesian state, and will obtain the greatest glory\nif you succeed, and will at least be praised for your courage, if you\nfail, take especial heed of this matter. If we can only establish the\nNocturnal Council, we will hand over the city to its keeping; none of\nthe present company will hesitate about that. Our dream will then become\na reality; and our citizens, if they are carefully chosen and well\neducated, will be saviours and guardians such as the world hitherto has\nnever seen.\n\nThe want of completeness in the Laws becomes more apparent in the later\nbooks. There is less arrangement in them, and the transitions are more\nabrupt from one subject to another. Yet they contain several noble\npassages, such as the 'prelude to the discourse concerning the honour\nand dishonour of parents,' or the picture of the dangers attending the\n'friendly intercourse of young men and maidens with one another,' or the\nsoothing remonstrance which is addressed to the dying man respecting his\nright to do what he will with his own, or the fine description of the\nburial of the dead. The subject of religion in Book X is introduced as\na prelude to offences against the Gods, and this portion of the work\nappears to be executed in Plato's best manner.\n\nIn the last four books, several questions occur for consideration: among\nthem are (I) the detection and punishment of offences; (II) the nature\nof the voluntary and involuntary; (III) the arguments against atheism,\nand against the opinion that the Gods have no care of human affairs;\n(IV) the remarks upon retail trade; (V) the institution of the Nocturnal\nCouncil.\n\nI. A weak point in the Laws of Plato is the amount of inquisition into\nprivate life which is to be made by the rulers. The magistrate is\nalways watching and waylaying the citizens. He is constantly to receive\ninformation against improprieties of life. Plato does not seem to be\naware that espionage can only have a negative effect. He has not yet\ndiscovered the boundary line which parts the domain of law from that of\nmorality or social life. Men will not tell of one another; nor will\nhe ever be the most honoured citizen, who gives the most frequent\ninformation about offenders to the magistrates.\n\nAs in some writers of fiction, so also in philosophers, we may observe\nthe effect of age. Plato becomes more conservative as he grows older,\nand he would govern the world entirely by men like himself, who are\nabove fifty years of age; for in them he hopes to find a principle of\nstability. He does not remark that, in destroying the freedom he is\ndestroying also the life of the State. In reducing all the citizens to\nrule and measure, he would have been depriving the Magnesian colony of\nthose great men 'whose acquaintance is beyond all price;' and he would\nhave found that in the worst-governed Hellenic State, there was more of\na carriere ouverte for extraordinary genius and virtue than in his own.\n\nPlato has an evident dislike of the Athenian dicasteries; he prefers a\nfew judges who take a leading part in the conduct of trials to a great\nnumber who only listen in silence. He allows of two appeals--in each\ncase however with an increase of the penalty. Modern jurists would\ndisapprove of the redress of injustice being purchased only at an\nincreasing risk; though indirectly the burden of legal expenses, which\nseems to have been little felt among the Athenians, has a similar\neffect. The love of litigation, which is a remnant of barbarism quite\nas much as a corruption of civilization, and was innate in the Athenian\npeople, is diminished in the new state by the imposition of severe\npenalties. If persevered in, it is to be punished with death.\n\nIn the Laws murder and homicide besides being crimes, are also\npollutions. Regarded from this point of view, the estimate of such\noffences is apt to depend on accidental circumstances, such as the\nshedding of blood, and not on the real guilt of the offender or the\ninjury done to society. They are measured by the horror which they\narouse in a barbarous age. For there is a superstition in law as well as\nin religion, and the feelings of a primitive age have a traditional hold\non the mass of the people. On the other hand, Plato is innocent of the\nbarbarity which would visit the sins of the fathers upon the children,\nand he is quite aware that punishment has an eye to the future, and not\nto the past. Compared with that of most European nations in the last\ncentury his penal code, though sometimes capricious, is reasonable and\nhumane.\n\nA defect in Plato's criminal jurisprudence is his remission of the\npunishment when the homicide has obtained the forgiveness of the\nmurdered person; as if crime were a personal affair between\nindividuals, and not an offence against the State. There is a ridiculous\ndisproportion in his punishments. Because a slave may fairly receive\na blow for stealing one fig or one bunch of grapes, or a tradesman for\nselling adulterated goods to the value of one drachma, it is rather\nhard upon the slave that he should receive as many blows as he has taken\ngrapes or figs, or upon the tradesman who has sold adulterated goods\nto the value of a thousand drachmas that he should receive a thousand\nblows.\n\nII. But before punishment can be inflicted at all, the legislator\nmust determine the nature of the voluntary and involuntary. The great\nquestion of the freedom of the will, which in modern times has been worn\nthreadbare with purely abstract discussion, was approached both by Plato\nand Aristotle--first, from the judicial; secondly, from the sophistical\npoint of view. They were puzzled by the degrees and kinds of crime; they\nobserved also that the law only punished hurts which are inflicted by a\nvoluntary agent on an involuntary patient.\n\nIn attempting to distinguish between hurt and injury, Plato says that\nmere hurt is not injury; but that a benefit when done in a wrong spirit\nmay sometimes injure, e.g. when conferred without regard to right and\nwrong, or to the good or evil consequences which may follow. He means\nto say that the good or evil disposition of the agent is the principle\nwhich characterizes actions; and this is not sufficiently described by\nthe terms voluntary and involuntary. You may hurt another involuntarily,\nand no one would suppose that you had injured him; and you may hurt him\nvoluntarily, as in inflicting punishment--neither is this injury; but if\nyou hurt him from motives of avarice, ambition, or cowardly fear, this\nis injury. Injustice is also described as the victory of desire or\npassion or self-conceit over reason, as justice is the subordination of\nthem to reason. In some paradoxical sense Plato is disposed to affirm\nall injustice to be involuntary; because no man would do injustice who\nknew that it never paid and could calculate the consequences of what\nhe was doing. Yet, on the other hand, he admits that the distinction of\nvoluntary and involuntary, taken in another and more obvious sense, is\nthe basis of legislation. His conception of justice and injustice is\ncomplicated (1) by the want of a distinction between justice and virtue,\nthat is to say, between the quality which primarily regards others, and\nthe quality in which self and others are equally regarded; (2) by the\nconfusion of doing and suffering justice; (3) by the unwillingness to\nrenounce the old Socratic paradox, that evil is involuntary.\n\nIII. The Laws rest on a religious foundation; in this respect they\nbear the stamp of primitive legislation. They do not escape the almost\ninevitable consequence of making irreligion penal. If laws are based\nupon religion, the greatest offence against them must be irreligion.\nHence the necessity for what in modern language, and according to a\ndistinction which Plato would scarcely have understood, might be termed\npersecution. But the spirit of persecution in Plato, unlike that of\nmodern religious bodies, arises out of the desire to enforce a true and\nsimple form of religion, and is directed against the superstitions which\ntend to degrade mankind. Sir Thomas More, in his Utopia, is in favour\nof tolerating all except the intolerant, though he would not promote to\nhigh offices those who disbelieved in the immortality of the soul. Plato\nhas not advanced quite so far as this in the path of toleration. But\nin judging of his enlightenment, we must remember that the evils of\nnecromancy and divination were far greater than those of intolerance in\nthe ancient world. Human nature is always having recourse to the first;\nbut only when organized into some form of priesthood falls into the\nother; although in primitive as in later ages the institution of a\npriesthood may claim probably to be an advance on some form of religion\nwhich preceded. The Laws would have rested on a sounder foundation, if\nPlato had ever distinctly realized to his mind the difference between\ncrime and sin or vice. Of this, as of many other controversies, a clear\ndefinition might have been the end. But such a definition belongs to a\nlater age of philosophy.\n\nThe arguments which Plato uses for the being of a God, have an extremely\nmodern character: first, the consensus gentium; secondly, the argument\nwhich has already been adduced in the Phaedrus, of the priority of the\nself-moved. The answer to those who say that God 'cares not,' is, that\nHe governs by general laws; and that he who takes care of the great\nwill assuredly take care of the small. Plato did not feel, and has not\nattempted to consider, the difficulty of reconciling the special with\nthe general providence of God. Yet he is on the road to a solution, when\nhe regards the world as a whole, of which all the parts work together\ntowards the final end.\n\nWe are surprised to find that the scepticism, which we attribute to\nyoung men in our own day, existed then (compare Republic); that the\nEpicureanism expressed in the line of Horace (borrowed from Lucretius)--\n\n'Namque Deos didici securum agere aevum,'\n\nwas already prevalent in the age of Plato; and that the terrors of\nanother world were freely used in order to gain advantages over other\nmen in this. The same objection which struck the Psalmist--'when I saw\nthe prosperity of the wicked'--is supposed to lie at the root of the\nbetter sort of unbelief. And the answer is substantially the same which\nthe modern theologian would offer:--that the ways of God in this world\ncannot be justified unless there be a future state of rewards and\npunishments. Yet this future state of rewards and punishments is in\nPlato's view not any addition of happiness or suffering imposed from\nwithout, but the permanence of good and evil in the soul: here he is in\nadvance of many modern theologians. The Greek, too, had his difficulty\nabout the existence of evil, which in one solitary passage, remarkable\nfor being inconsistent with his general system, Plato explains,\nafter the Magian fashion, by a good and evil spirit (compare Theaet.,\nStatesman). This passage is also remarkable for being at variance with\nthe general optimism of the Tenth Book--not 'all things are ordered by\nGod for the best,' but some things by a good, others by an evil spirit.\n\nThe Tenth Book of the Laws presents a picture of the state of belief\namong the Greeks singularly like that of the world in which we live.\nPlato is disposed to attribute the incredulity of his own age to several\ncauses. First, to the bad effect of mythological tales, of which he\nretains his disapproval; but he has a weak side for antiquity, and is\nunwilling, as in the Republic, wholly to proscribe them. Secondly, he\nremarks the self-conceit of a newly-fledged generation of philosophers,\nwho declare that the sun, moon, and stars, are earth and stones only;\nand who also maintain that the Gods are made by the laws of the state.\nThirdly, he notes a confusion in the minds of men arising out of their\nmisinterpretation of the appearances of the world around them: they do\nnot always see the righteous rewarded and the wicked punished. So in\nmodern times there are some whose infidelity has arisen from doubts\nabout the inspiration of ancient writings; others who have been made\nunbelievers by physical science, or again by the seemingly political\ncharacter of religion; while there is a third class to whose minds the\ndifficulty of 'justifying the ways of God to man' has been the chief\nstumblingblock. Plato is very much out of temper at the impiety of some\nof his contemporaries; yet he is determined to reason with the victims,\nas he regards them, of these illusions before he punishes them. His\nanswer to the unbelievers is twofold: first, that the soul is prior to\nthe body; secondly, that the ruler of the universe being perfect has\nmade all things with a view to their perfection. The difficulties\narising out of ancient sacred writings were far less serious in the age\nof Plato than in our own.\n\nWe too have our popular Epicureanism, which would allow the world to go\non as if there were no God. When the belief in Him, whether of ancient\nor modern times, begins to fade away, men relegate Him, either in theory\nor practice, into a distant heaven. They do not like expressly to deny\nGod when it is more convenient to forget Him; and so the theory of the\nEpicurean becomes the practice of mankind in general. Nor can we be\nsaid to be free from that which Plato justly considers to be the worst\nunbelief--of those who put superstition in the place of true religion.\nFor the larger half of Christians continue to assert that the justice of\nGod may be turned aside by gifts, and, if not by the 'odour of fat, and\nthe sacrifice steaming to heaven,' still by another kind of\nsacrifice placed upon the altar--by masses for the quick and dead, by\ndispensations, by building churches, by rites and ceremonies--by the\nsame means which the heathen used, taking other names and shapes. And\nthe indifference of Epicureanism and unbelief is in two ways the parent\nof superstition, partly because it permits, and also because it\ncreates, a necessity for its development in religious and enthusiastic\ntemperaments. If men cannot have a rational belief, they will have an\nirrational. And hence the most superstitious countries are also at a\ncertain point of civilization the most unbelieving, and the revolution\nwhich takes one direction is quickly followed by a reaction in the\nother. So we may read 'between the lines' ancient history and philosophy\ninto modern, and modern into ancient. Whether we compare the theory of\nGreek philosophy with the Christian religion, or the practice of the\nGentile world with the practice of the Christian world, they will be\nfound to differ more in words and less in reality than we might have\nsupposed. The greater opposition which is sometimes made between them\nseems to arise chiefly out of a comparison of the ideal of the one with\nthe practice of the other.\n\nTo the errors of superstition and unbelief Plato opposes the simple and\nnatural truth of religion; the best and highest, whether conceived in\nthe form of a person or a principle--as the divine mind or as the idea\nof good--is believed by him to be the basis of human life. That all\nthings are working together for good to the good and evil to the evil in\nthis or in some other world to which human actions are transferred, is\nthe sum of his faith or theology. Unlike Socrates, he is absolutely free\nfrom superstition. Religion and morality are one and indivisible to him.\nHe dislikes the 'heathen mythology,' which, as he significantly remarks,\nwas not tolerated in Crete, and perhaps (for the meaning of his words\nis not quite clear) at Sparta. He gives no encouragement to individual\nenthusiasm; 'the establishment of religion could only be the work of a\nmighty intellect.' Like the Hebrews, he prohibits private rites; for the\navoidance of superstition, he would transfer all worship of the Gods\nto the public temples. He would not have men and women consecrating\nthe accidents of their lives. He trusts to human punishments and not to\ndivine judgments; though he is not unwilling to repeat the old tradition\nthat certain kinds of dishonesty 'prevent a man from having a family.'\nHe considers that the 'ages of faith' have passed away and cannot now\nbe recalled. Yet he is far from wishing to extirpate the sentiment of\nreligion, which he sees to be common to all mankind--Barbarians as well\nas Hellenes. He remarks that no one passes through life without, sooner\nor later, experiencing its power. To which we may add the further remark\nthat the greater the irreligion, the more violent has often been the\nreligious reaction.\n\nIt is remarkable that Plato's account of mind at the end of the Laws\ngoes beyond Anaxagoras, and beyond himself in any of his previous\nwritings. Aristotle, in a well-known passage (Met.) which is an echo of\nthe Phaedo, remarks on the inconsistency of Anaxagoras in introducing\nthe agency of mind, and yet having recourse to other and inferior,\nprobably material causes. But Plato makes the further criticism, that\nthe error of Anaxagoras consisted, not in denying the universal agency\nof mind, but in denying the priority, or, as we should say, the eternity\nof it. Yet in the Timaeus he had himself allowed that God made the world\nout of pre-existing materials: in the Statesman he says that there were\nseeds of evil in the world arising out of the remains of a former chaos\nwhich could not be got rid of; and even in the Tenth Book of the Laws he\nhas admitted that there are two souls, a good and evil. In the Meno, the\nPhaedrus, and the Phaedo, he had spoken of the recovery of ideas from a\nformer state of existence. But now he has attained to a clearer point of\nview: he has discarded these fancies. From meditating on the priority of\nthe human soul to the body, he has learnt the nature of soul absolutely.\nThe power of the best, of which he gave an intimation in the Phaedo\nand in the Republic, now, as in the Philebus, takes the form of an\nintelligence or person. He no longer, like Anaxagoras, supposes mind to\nbe introduced at a certain time into the world and to give order to\na pre-existing chaos, but to be prior to the chaos, everlasting and\nevermoving, and the source of order and intelligence in all things. This\nappears to be the last form of Plato's religious philosophy, which might\nalmost be summed up in the words of Kant, 'the starry heaven above and\nthe moral law within.' Or rather, perhaps, 'the starry heaven above and\nmind prior to the world.'\n\nIV. The remarks about retail trade, about adulteration, and about\nmendicity, have a very modern character. Greek social life was more\nlike our own than we are apt to suppose. There was the same division\nof ranks, the same aristocratic and democratic feeling, and, even in a\ndemocracy, the same preference for land and for agricultural pursuits.\nPlato may be claimed as the first free trader, when he prohibits the\nimposition of customs on imports and exports, though he was clearly\nnot aware of the importance of the principle which he enunciated. The\ndiscredit of retail trade he attributes to the rogueries of traders,\nand is inclined to believe that if a nobleman would keep a shop, which\nheaven forbid! retail trade might become honourable. He has hardly\nlighted upon the true reason, which appears to be the essential\ndistinction between buyers and sellers, the one class being necessarily\nin some degree dependent on the other. When he proposes to fix prices\n'which would allow a moderate gain,' and to regulate trade in several\nminute particulars, we must remember that this is by no means so absurd\nin a city consisting of 5040 citizens, in which almost every one would\nknow and become known to everybody else, as in our own vast population.\nAmong ourselves we are very far from allowing every man to charge what\nhe pleases. Of many things the prices are fixed by law. Do we not often\nhear of wages being adjusted in proportion to the profits of employers?\nThe objection to regulating them by law and thus avoiding the conflicts\nwhich continually arise between the buyers and sellers of labour, is not\nso much the undesirableness as the impossibility of doing so. Wherever\nfree competition is not reconcileable either with the order of society,\nor, as in the case of adulteration, with common honesty, the government\nmay lawfully interfere. The only question is,--Whether the interference\nwill be effectual, and whether the evil of interference may not be\ngreater than the evil which is prevented by it.\n\nHe would prohibit beggars, because in a well-ordered state no good man\nwould be left to starve. This again is a prohibition which might have\nbeen easily enforced, for there is no difficulty in maintaining the\npoor when the population is small. In our own times the difficulty of\npauperism is rendered far greater, (1) by the enormous numbers, (2) by\nthe facility of locomotion, (3) by the increasing tenderness for human\nlife and suffering. And the only way of meeting the difficulty seems\nto be by modern nations subdividing themselves into small bodies having\nlocal knowledge and acting together in the spirit of ancient communities\n(compare Arist. Pol.)\n\nV. Regarded as the framework of a polity the Laws are deemed by Plato to\nbe a decline from the Republic, which is the dream of his earlier years.\nHe nowhere imagines that he has reached a higher point of speculation.\nHe is only descending to the level of human things, and he often returns\nto his original idea. For the guardians of the Republic, who were\nthe elder citizens, and were all supposed to be philosophers, is now\nsubstituted a special body, who are to review and amend the laws,\npreserving the spirit of the legislator. These are the Nocturnal\nCouncil, who, although they are not specially trained in dialectic,\nare not wholly destitute of it; for they must know the relation of\nparticular virtues to the general principle of virtue. Plato has been\narguing throughout the Laws that temperance is higher than courage,\npeace than war, that the love of both must enter into the character of\nthe good citizen. And at the end the same thought is summed up by him in\nan abstract form. The true artist or guardian must be able to reduce the\nmany to the one, than which, as he says with an enthusiasm worthy of the\nPhaedrus or Philebus, 'no more philosophical method was ever devised\nby the wit of man.' But the sense of unity in difference can only be\nacquired by study; and Plato does not explain to us the nature of this\nstudy, which we may reasonably infer, though there is a remarkable\nomission of the word, to be akin to the dialectic of the Republic.\n\nThe Nocturnal Council is to consist of the priests who have obtained the\nrewards of virtue, of the ten eldest guardians of the law, and of the\ndirector and ex-directors of education; each of whom is to select for\napproval a younger coadjutor. To this council the 'Spectator,' who is\nsent to visit foreign countries, has to make his report. It is not\nan administrative body, but an assembly of sages who are to make\nlegislation their study. Plato is not altogether disinclined to changes\nin the law where experience shows them to be necessary; but he is also\nanxious that the original spirit of the constitution should never be\nlost sight of.\n\nThe Laws of Plato contain the latest phase of his philosophy, showing in\nmany respects an advance, and in others a decline, in his views of life\nand the world. His Theory of Ideas in the next generation passed\ninto one of Numbers, the nature of which we gather chiefly from the\nMetaphysics of Aristotle. Of the speculative side of this theory there\nare no traces in the Laws, but doubtless Plato found the practical value\nwhich he attributed to arithmetic greatly confirmed by the possibility\nof applying number and measure to the revolution of the heavens, and\nto the regulation of human life. In the return to a doctrine of numbers\nthere is a retrogression rather than an advance; for the most barren\nlogical abstraction is of a higher nature than number and figure.\nPhilosophy fades away into the distance; in the Laws it is confined to\nthe members of the Nocturnal Council. The speculative truth which was\nthe food of the guardians in the Republic, is for the majority of the\ncitizens to be superseded by practical virtues. The law, which is the\nexpression of mind written down, takes the place of the living word of\nthe philosopher. (Compare the contrast of Phaedrus, and Laws; also the\nplays on the words nous, nomos, nou dianome; and the discussion in the\nStatesman of the difference between the personal rule of a king and\nthe impersonal reign of law.) The State is based on virtue and religion\nrather than on knowledge; and virtue is no longer identified with\nknowledge, being of the commoner sort, and spoken of in the sense\ngenerally understood. Yet there are many traces of advance as well as\nretrogression in the Laws of Plato. The attempt to reconcile the ideal\nwith actual life is an advance; to 'have brought philosophy down from\nheaven to earth,' is a praise which may be claimed for him as well as\nfor his master Socrates. And the members of the Nocturnal Council are\nto continue students of the 'one in many' and of the nature of God.\nEducation is the last word with which Plato supposes the theory of the\nLaws to end and the reality to begin.\n\nPlato's increasing appreciation of the difficulties of human affairs,\nand of the element of chance which so largely influences them, is an\nindication not of a narrower, but of a maturer mind, which had become\nmore conversant with realities. Nor can we fairly attribute any want of\noriginality to him, because he has borrowed many of his provisions from\nSparta and Athens. Laws and institutions grow out of habits and customs;\nand they have 'better opinion, better confirmation,' if they have come\ndown from antiquity and are not mere literary inventions. Plato would\nhave been the first to acknowledge that the Book of Laws was not the\ncreation of his fancy, but a collection of enactments which had been\ndevised by inspired legislators, like Minos, Lycurgus, and Solon,\nto meet the actual needs of men, and had been approved by time and\nexperience.\n\nIn order to do justice therefore to the design of the work, it is\nnecessary to examine how far it rests on an historical foundation and\ncoincides with the actual laws of Sparta and Athens. The consideration\nof the historical aspect of the Laws has been reserved for this place.\nIn working out the comparison the writer has been greatly assisted\nby the excellent essays of C.F. Hermann ('De vestigiis institutorum\nveterum, imprimis Atticorum, per Platonis de Legibus libros indagandis,'\nand 'Juris domestici et familiaris apud Platonem in Legibus cum veteris\nGraeciae inque primis Athenarum institutis comparatio': Marburg, 1836),\nand by J.B. Telfy's 'Corpus Juris Attici' (Leipzig, 1868).\n\n\n\n\nEXCURSUS ON THE RELATION OF THE LAWS OF PLATO TO THE INSTITUTIONS OF\nCRETE AND LACEDAEMON AND TO THE LAWS AND CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS.\n\nThe Laws of Plato are essentially Greek: unlike Xenophon's Cyropaedia,\nthey contain nothing foreign or oriental. Their aim is to reconstruct\nthe work of the great lawgivers of Hellas in a literary form. They\npartake both of an Athenian and a Spartan character. Some of them too\nare derived from Crete, and are appropriately transferred to a Cretan\ncolony. But of Crete so little is known to us, that although, as\nMontesquieu (Esprit des Lois) remarks, 'the Laws of Crete are the\noriginal of those of Sparta and the Laws of Plato the correction of\nthese latter,' there is only one point, viz. the common meals, in which\nthey can be compared. Most of Plato's provisions resemble the laws and\ncustoms which prevailed in these three states (especially in the two\nformer), and which the personifying instinct of the Greeks attributed\nto Minos, Lycurgus, and Solon. A very few particulars may have been\nborrowed from Zaleucus (Cic. de Legibus), and Charondas, who is said to\nhave first made laws against perjury (Arist. Pol.) and to have forbidden\ncredit (Stob. Florileg., Gaisford). Some enactments are Plato's own, and\nwere suggested by his experience of defects in the Athenian and other\nGreek states. The Laws also contain many lesser provisions, which are\nnot found in the ordinary codes of nations, because they cannot be\nproperly defined, and are therefore better left to custom and common\nsense. 'The greater part of the work,' as Aristotle remarks (Pol.), 'is\ntaken up with laws': yet this is not wholly true, and applies to the\nlatter rather than to the first half of it. The book rests on an ethical\nand religious foundation: the actual laws begin with a hymn of praise\nin honour of the soul. And the same lofty aspiration after the good\nis perpetually recurring, especially in Books X, XI, XII, and whenever\nPlato's mind is filled with his highest themes. In prefixing to most of\nhis laws a prooemium he has two ends in view, to persuade and also\nto threaten. They are to have the sanction of laws and the effect of\nsermons. And Plato's 'Book of Laws,' if described in the language of\nmodern philosophy, may be said to be as much an ethical and educational,\nas a political or legal treatise.\n\nBut although the Laws partake both of an Athenian and a Spartan\ncharacter, the elements which are borrowed from either state are\nnecessarily very different, because the character and origin of the two\ngovernments themselves differed so widely. Sparta was the more ancient\nand primitive: Athens was suited to the wants of a later stage of\nsociety. The relation of the two states to the Laws may be conceived\nin this manner:--The foundation and ground-plan of the work are more\nSpartan, while the superstructure and details are more Athenian. At\nAthens the laws were written down and were voluminous; more than a\nthousand fragments of them have been collected by Telfy. Like the Roman\nor English law, they contained innumerable particulars. Those of them\nwhich regulated daily life were familiarly known to the Athenians; for\nevery citizen was his own lawyer, and also a judge, who decided the\nrights of his fellow-citizens according to the laws, often after hearing\nspeeches from the parties interested or from their advocates. It is to\nRome and not to Athens that the invention of law, in the modern sense\nof the term, is commonly ascribed. But it must be remembered that long\nbefore the times of the Twelve Tables (B.C. 451), regular courts and\nforms of law had existed at Athens and probably in the Greek colonies.\nAnd we may reasonably suppose, though without any express proof of the\nfact, that many Roman institutions and customs, like Latin literature\nand mythology, were partly derived from Hellas and had imperceptibly\ndrifted from one shore of the Ionian Sea to the other (compare\nespecially the constitutions of Servius Tullius and of Solon).\n\nIt is not proved that the laws of Sparta were in ancient times either\nwritten down in books or engraved on tablets of marble or brass. Nor is\nit certain that, if they had been, the Spartans could have read\nthem. They were ancient customs, some of them older probably than the\nsettlement in Laconia, of which the origin is unknown; they occasionally\nreceived the sanction of the Delphic oracle, but there was a still\nstronger obligation by which they were enforced,--the necessity of\nself-defence: the Spartans were always living in the presence of their\nenemies. They belonged to an age when written law had not yet taken\nthe place of custom and tradition. The old constitution was very rarely\naffected by new enactments, and these only related to the duties of the\nKings or Ephors, or the new relations of classes which arose as\ntime went on. Hence there was as great a difference as could well\nbe conceived between the Laws of Athens and Sparta: the one was the\ncreation of a civilized state, and did not differ in principle from our\nmodern legislation, the other of an age in which the people were held\ntogether and also kept down by force of arms, and which afterwards\nretained many traces of its barbaric origin 'surviving in culture.'\n\nNevertheless the Lacedaemonian was the ideal of a primitive Greek state.\nAccording to Thucydides it was the first which emerged out of confusion\nand became a regular government. It was also an army devoted to\nmilitary exercises, but organized with a view to self-defence and not\nto conquest. It was not quick to move or easily excited; but stolid,\ncautious, unambitious, procrastinating. For many centuries it retained\nthe same character which was impressed upon it by the hand of the\nlegislator. This singular fabric was partly the result of circumstances,\npartly the invention of some unknown individual in prehistoric times,\nwhose ideal of education was military discipline, and who, by the\nascendency of his genius, made a small tribe into a nation which became\nfamous in the world's history. The other Hellenes wondered at the\nstrength and stability of his work. The rest of Hellas, says Thucydides,\nundertook the colonisation of Heraclea the more readily, having a\nfeeling of security now that they saw the Lacedaemonians taking part in\nit. The Spartan state appears to us in the dawn of history as a vision\nof armed men, irresistible by any other power then existing in the\nworld. It can hardly be said to have understood at all the rights\nor duties of nations to one another, or indeed to have had any moral\nprinciple except patriotism and obedience to commanders. Men were so\ntrained to act together that they lost the freedom and spontaneity of\nhuman life in cultivating the qualities of the soldier and ruler. The\nSpartan state was a composite body in which kings, nobles, citizens,\nperioeci, artisans, slaves, had to find a 'modus vivendi' with one\nanother. All of them were taught some use of arms. The strength of the\nfamily tie was diminished among them by an enforced absence from\nhome and by common meals. Sparta had no life or growth; no poetry or\ntradition of the past; no art, no thought. The Athenians started on\ntheir great career some centuries later, but the Spartans would have\nbeen easily conquered by them, if Athens had not been deficient in the\nqualities which constituted the strength (and also the weakness) of her\nrival.\n\nThe ideal of Athens has been pictured for all time in the speech which\nThucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles, called the Funeral Oration.\nHe contrasts the activity and freedom and pleasantness of Athenian\nlife with the immobility and severe looks and incessant drill of the\nSpartans. The citizens of no city were more versatile, or more readily\nchanged from land to sea or more quickly moved about from place to\nplace. They 'took their pleasures' merrily, and yet, when the time for\nfighting arrived, were not a whit behind the Spartans, who were like men\nliving in a camp, and, though always keeping guard, were often too late\nfor the fray. Any foreigner might visit Athens; her ships found a way\nto the most distant shores; the riches of the whole earth poured in upon\nher. Her citizens had their theatres and festivals; they 'provided their\nsouls with many relaxations'; yet they were not less manly than the\nSpartans or less willing to sacrifice this enjoyable existence for their\ncountry's good. The Athenian was a nobler form of life than that of\ntheir rivals, a life of music as well as of gymnastic, the life of a\ncitizen as well as of a soldier. Such is the picture which Thucydides\nhas drawn of the Athenians in their glory. It is the spirit of this life\nwhich Plato would infuse into the Magnesian state and which he seeks to\ncombine with the common meals and gymnastic discipline of Sparta.\n\nThe two great types of Athens and Sparta had deeply entered into his\nmind. He had heard of Sparta at a distance and from common Hellenic\nfame: he was a citizen of Athens and an Athenian of noble birth. He must\noften have sat in the law-courts, and may have had personal experience\nof the duties of offices such as he is establishing. There is no need to\nask the question, whence he derived his knowledge of the Laws of\nAthens: they were a part of his daily life. Many of his enactments\nare recognized to be Athenian laws from the fragments preserved in\nthe Orators and elsewhere: many more would be found to be so if we had\nbetter information. Probably also still more of them would have been\nincorporated in the Magnesian code, if the work had ever been finally\ncompleted. But it seems to have come down to us in a form which is\npartly finished and partly unfinished, having a beginning and end,\nbut wanting arrangement in the middle. The Laws answer to Plato's own\ndescription of them, in the comparison which he makes of himself and his\ntwo friends to gatherers of stones or the beginners of some\ncomposite work, 'who are providing materials and partly putting them\ntogether:--having some of their laws, like stones, already fixed in\ntheir places, while others lie about.'\n\nPlato's own life coincided with the period at which Athens rose to her\ngreatest heights and sank to her lowest depths. It was impossible that\nhe should regard the blessings of democracy in the same light as the\nmen of a former generation, whose view was not intercepted by the evil\nshadow of the taking of Athens, and who had only the glories of Marathon\nand Salamis and the administration of Pericles to look back upon. On the\nother hand the fame and prestige of Sparta, which had outlived so many\ncrimes and blunders, was not altogether lost at the end of the life\nof Plato. Hers was the only great Hellenic government which preserved\nsomething of its ancient form; and although the Spartan citizens were\nreduced to almost one-tenth of their original number (Arist. Pol.),\nshe still retained, until the rise of Thebes and Macedon, a certain\nauthority and predominance due to her final success in the struggle with\nAthens and to the victories which Agesilaus won in Asia Minor.\n\nPlato, like Aristotle, had in his mind some form of a mean state which\nshould escape the evils and secure the advantages of both aristocracy\nand democracy. It may however be doubted whether the creation of such\na state is not beyond the legislator's art, although there have been\nexamples in history of forms of government, which through some community\nof interest or of origin, through a balance of parties in the state\nitself, or through the fear of a common enemy, have for a while\npreserved such a character of moderation. But in general there arises a\ntime in the history of a state when the struggle between the few and\nthe many has to be fought out. No system of checks and balances, such as\nPlato has devised in the Laws, could have given equipoise and stability\nto an ancient state, any more than the skill of the legislator could\nhave withstood the tide of democracy in England or France during the\nlast hundred years, or have given life to China or India.\n\nThe basis of the Magnesian constitution is the equal division of land.\nIn the new state, as in the Republic, there was to be neither poverty\nnor riches. Every citizen under all circumstances retained his lot, and\nas much money as was necessary for the cultivation of it, and no one was\nallowed to accumulate property to the amount of more than five times\nthe value of the lot, inclusive of it. The equal division of land was a\nSpartan institution, not known to have existed elsewhere in Hellas. The\nmention of it in the Laws of Plato affords considerable presumption that\nit was of ancient origin, and not first introduced, as Mr. Grote and\nothers have imagined, in the reformation of Cleomenes III. But at\nSparta, if we may judge from the frequent complaints of the accumulation\nof property in the hands of a few persons (Arist. Pol.), no provision\ncould have been made for the maintenance of the lot. Plutarch indeed\nspeaks of a law introduced by the Ephor Epitadeus soon after the\nPeloponnesian War, which first allowed the Spartans to sell their land\n(Agis): but from the manner in which Aristotle refers to the subject,\nwe should imagine this evil in the state to be of a much older standing.\nLike some other countries in which small proprietors have been numerous,\nthe original equality passed into inequality, and, instead of a large\nmiddle class, there was probably at Sparta greater disproportion in the\nproperty of the citizens than in any other state of Hellas. Plato was\naware of the danger, and has improved on the Spartan custom. The land,\nas at Sparta, must have been tilled by slaves, since other occupations\nwere found for the citizens. Bodies of young men between the ages of\ntwenty-five and thirty were engaged in making biennial peregrinations of\nthe country. They and their officers are to be the magistrates, police,\nengineers, aediles, of the twelve districts into which the colony was\ndivided. Their way of life may be compared with that of the Spartan\nsecret police or Crypteia, a name which Plato freely applies to them\nwithout apparently any consciousness of the odium which has attached to\nthe word in history.\n\nAnother great institution which Plato borrowed from Sparta (or Crete) is\nthe Syssitia or common meals. These were established in both states, and\nin some respects were considered by Aristotle to be better managed in\nCrete than at Lacedaemon (Pol.). In the Laws the Cretan custom appears\nto be adopted (This is not proved, as Hermann supposes ('De Vestigiis,'\netc.)): that is to say, if we may interpret Plato by Aristotle, the cost\nof them was defrayed by the state and not by the individuals (Arist.\nPol); so that the members of the mess, who could not pay their quota,\nstill retained their rights of citizenship. But this explanation is\nhardly consistent with the Laws, where contributions to the Syssitia\nfrom private estates are expressly mentioned. Plato goes further than\nthe legislators of Sparta and Crete, and would extend the common meals\nto women as well as men: he desires to curb the disorders, which existed\namong the female sex in both states, by the application to women of the\nsame military discipline to which the men were already subject. It\nwas an extension of the custom of Syssitia from which the ancient\nlegislators shrank, and which Plato himself believed to be very\ndifficult of enforcement.\n\nLike Sparta, the new colony was not to be surrounded by walls,--a state\nshould learn to depend upon the bravery of its citizens only--a fallacy\nor paradox, if it is not to be regarded as a poetical fancy, which is\nfairly enough ridiculed by Aristotle (Pol.). Women, too, must be ready\nto assist in the defence of their country: they are not to rush to the\ntemples and altars, but to arm themselves with shield and spear. In the\nregulation of the Syssitia, in at least one of his enactments respecting\nproperty, and in the attempt to correct the licence of women, Plato\nshows, that while he borrowed from the institutions of Sparta and\nfavoured the Spartan mode of life, he also sought to improve upon them.\n\nThe enmity to the sea is another Spartan feature which is transferred\nby Plato to the Magnesian state. He did not reflect that a non-maritime\npower would always be at the mercy of one which had a command of the\ngreat highway. Their many island homes, the vast extent of coast which\nhad to be protected by them, their struggles first of all with the\nPhoenicians and Carthaginians, and secondly with the Persian fleets,\nforced the Greeks, mostly against their will, to devote themselves to\nthe sea. The islanders before the inhabitants of the continent, the\nmaritime cities before the inland, the Corinthians and Athenians before\nthe Spartans, were compelled to fit out ships: last of all the Spartans,\nby the pressure of the Peloponnesian War, were driven to establish a\nnaval force, which, after the battle of Aegospotami, for more than\na generation commanded the Aegean. Plato, like the Spartans, had a\nprejudice against a navy, because he regarded it as the nursery of\ndemocracy. But he either never considered, or did not care to explain,\nhow a city, set upon an island and 'distant not more than ten miles from\nthe sea, having a seaboard provided with excellent harbours,' could have\nsafely subsisted without one.\n\nNeither the Spartans nor the Magnesian colonists were permitted to\nengage in trade or commerce. In order to limit their dealings as far\nas possible to their own country, they had a separate coinage; the\nMagnesians were only allowed to use the common currency of Hellas when\nthey travelled abroad, which they were forbidden to do unless they\nreceived permission from the government. Like the Spartans, Plato\nwas afraid of the evils which might be introduced into his state\nby intercourse with foreigners; but he also shrinks from the utter\nexclusiveness of Sparta, and is not unwilling to allow visitors of a\nsuitable age and rank to come from other states to his own, as he also\nallows citizens of his own state to go to foreign countries and bring\nback a report of them. Such international communication seemed to him\nboth honourable and useful.\n\nWe may now notice some points in which the commonwealth of the Laws\napproximates to the Athenian model. These are much more numerous than\nthe previous class of resemblances; we are better able to compare the\nlaws of Plato with those of Athens, because a good deal more is known to\nus of Athens than of Sparta.\n\nThe information which we possess about Athenian law, though\ncomparatively fuller, is still fragmentary. The sources from which our\nknowledge is derived are chiefly the following:--\n\n(1) The Orators,--Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Isocrates, Demosthenes,\nAeschines, Lycurgus, and others.\n\n(2) Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, as well as later\nwriters, such as Cicero de Legibus, Plutarch, Aelian, Pausanias.\n\n(3) Lexicographers, such as Harpocration, Pollux, Hesychius, Suidas, and\nthe compiler of the Etymologicum Magnum, many of whom are of uncertain\ndate, and to a great extent based upon one another. Their writings\nextend altogether over more than eight hundred years, from the second to\nthe tenth century.\n\n(4) The Scholia on Aristophanes, Plato, Demosthenes.\n\n(5) A few inscriptions.\n\nOur knowledge of a subject derived from such various sources and for the\nmost part of uncertain date and origin, is necessarily precarious. No\ncritic can separate the actual laws of Solon from those which passed\nunder his name in later ages. Nor do the Scholiasts and Lexicographers\nattempt to distinguish how many of these laws were still in force at the\ntime when they wrote, or when they fell into disuse and were to be found\nin books only. Nor can we hastily assume that enactments which occur\nin the Laws of Plato were also a part of Athenian law, however probable\nthis may appear.\n\nThere are two classes of similarities between Plato's Laws and those of\nAthens: (i) of institutions (ii) of minor enactments.\n\n(i) The constitution of the Laws in its general character resembles much\nmore nearly the Athenian constitution of Solon's time than that which\nsucceeded it, or the extreme democracy which prevailed in Plato's own\nday. It was a mean state which he hoped to create, equally unlike a\nSyracusan tyranny or the mob-government of the Athenian assembly. There\nare various expedients by which he sought to impart to it the quality of\nmoderation. (1) The whole people were to be educated: they could not be\nall trained in philosophy, but they were to acquire the simple elements\nof music, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy; they were also to be subject\nto military discipline, archontes kai archomenoi. (2) The majority of\nthem were, or had been at some time in their lives, magistrates, and had\nthe experience which is given by office. (3) The persons who held the\nhighest offices were to have a further education, not much inferior to\nthat provided for the guardians in the Republic, though the range of\ntheir studies is narrowed to the nature and divisions of virtue: here\ntheir philosophy comes to an end. (4) The entire number of the citizens\n(5040) rarely, if ever, assembled, except for purposes of elections. The\nwhole people were divided into four classes, each having the right to be\nrepresented by the same number of members in the Council. The result of\nsuch an arrangement would be, as in the constitution of Servius Tullius,\nto give a disproportionate share of power to the wealthier classes, who\nmay be supposed to be always much fewer in number than the poorer. This\ntendency was qualified by the complicated system of selection by vote,\nprevious to the final election by lot, of which the object seems to be\nto hand over to the wealthy few the power of selecting from the many\npoor, and vice versa. (5) The most important body in the state was the\nNocturnal Council, which is borrowed from the Areopagus at Athens, as it\nexisted, or was supposed to have existed, in the days before Ephialtes\nand the Eumenides of Aeschylus, when its power was undiminished. In\nsome particulars Plato appears to have copied exactly the customs and\nprocedure of the Areopagus: both assemblies sat at night (Telfy). There\nwas a resemblance also in more important matters. Like the Areopagus,\nthe Nocturnal Council was partly composed of magistrates and other\nstate officials, whose term of office had expired. (7) The constitution\nincluded several diverse and even opposing elements, such as\nthe Assembly and the Nocturnal Council. (8) There was much less\nexclusiveness than at Sparta; the citizens were to have an interest in\nthe government of neighbouring states, and to know what was going on in\nthe rest of the world.--All these were moderating influences.\n\nA striking similarity between Athens and the constitution of the\nMagnesian colony is the use of the lot in the election of judges\nand other magistrates. That such a mode of election should have\nbeen resorted to in any civilized state, or that it should have been\ntransferred by Plato to an ideal or imaginary one, is very singular\nto us. The most extreme democracy of modern times has never thought of\nleaving government wholly to chance. It was natural that Socrates\nshould scoff at it, and ask, 'Who would choose a pilot or carpenter or\nflute-player by lot' (Xen. Mem.)? Yet there were many considerations\nwhich made this mode of choice attractive both to the oligarch and to\nthe democrat:--(1) It seemed to recognize that one man was as good as\nanother, and that all the members of the governing body, whether few or\nmany, were on a perfect equality in every sense of the word. (2) To the\npious mind it appeared to be a choice made, not by man, but by heaven\n(compare Laws). (3) It afforded a protection against corruption and\nintrigue...It must also be remembered that, although elected by lot,\nthe persons so elected were subject to a scrutiny before they entered\non their office, and were therefore liable, after election, if\ndisqualified, to be rejected (Laws). They were, moreover, liable to be\ncalled to account after the expiration of their office. In the election\nof councillors Plato introduces a further check: they are not to be\nchosen directly by lot from all the citizens, but from a select body\npreviously elected by vote. In Plato's state at least, as we may infer\nfrom his silence on this point, judges and magistrates performed\ntheir duties without pay, which was a guarantee both of their\ndisinterestedness and of their belonging probably to the higher class of\ncitizens (compare Arist. Pol.). Hence we are not surprised that the use\nof the lot prevailed, not only in the election of the Athenian Council,\nbut also in many oligarchies, and even in Plato's colony. The\nevil consequences of the lot are to a great extent avoided, if the\nmagistrates so elected do not, like the dicasts at Athens, receive pay\nfrom the state.\n\nAnother parallel is that of the Popular Assembly, which at Athens was\nomnipotent, but in the Laws has only a faded and secondary existence. In\nPlato it was chiefly an elective body, having apparently no judicial and\nlittle political power entrusted to it. At Athens it was the mainspring\nof the democracy; it had the decision of war or peace, of life and\ndeath; the acts of generals or statesmen were authorized or condemned\nby it; no office or person was above its control. Plato was far from\nallowing such a despotic power to exist in his model community, and\ntherefore he minimizes the importance of the Assembly and narrows its\nfunctions. He probably never asked himself a question, which naturally\noccurs to the modern reader, where was to be the central authority in\nthis new community, and by what supreme power would the differences of\ninferior powers be decided. At the same time he magnifies and brings\ninto prominence the Nocturnal Council (which is in many respects a\nreflection of the Areopagus), but does not make it the governing body of\nthe state.\n\nBetween the judicial system of the Laws and that of Athens there was\nvery great similarity, and a difference almost equally great. Plato not\nunfrequently adopts the details when he rejects the principle. At\nAthens any citizen might be a judge and member of the great court of\nthe Heliaea. This was ordinarily subdivided into a number of inferior\ncourts, but an occasion is recorded on which the whole body, in\nnumber six thousand, met in a single court (Andoc. de Myst.). Plato\nsignificantly remarks that a few judges, if they are good, are better\nthan a great number. He also, at least in capital cases, confines the\nplaintiff and defendant to a single speech each, instead of allowing two\napiece, as was the common practice at Athens. On the other hand, in all\nprivate suits he gives two appeals, from the arbiters to the courts of\nthe tribes, and from the courts of the tribes to the final or supreme\ncourt. There was nothing answering to this at Athens. The three courts\nwere appointed in the following manner:--the arbiters were to be agreed\nupon by the parties to the cause; the judges of the tribes to be elected\nby lot; the highest tribunal to be chosen at the end of each year by the\ngreat officers of state out of their own number--they were to serve for\na year, to undergo a scrutiny, and, unlike the Athenian judges, to vote\nopenly. Plato does not dwell upon methods of procedure: these are the\nlesser matters which he leaves to the younger legislators. In cases of\nmurder and some other capital offences, the cause was to be tried by a\nspecial tribunal, as was the custom at Athens: military offences, too,\nas at Athens, were decided by the soldiers. Public causes in the Laws,\nas sometimes at Athens, were voted upon by the whole people: because, as\nPlato remarks, they are all equally concerned in them. They were to\nbe previously investigated by three of the principal magistrates. He\nbelieves also that in private suits all should take part; 'for he who\nhas no share in the administration of justice is apt to imagine that he\nhas no share in the state at all.' The wardens of the country, like the\nForty at Athens, also exercised judicial power in small matters, as\nwell as the wardens of the agora and city. The department of justice is\nbetter organized in Plato than in an ordinary Greek state, proceeding\nmore by regular methods, and being more restricted to distinct duties.\n\nThe executive of Plato's Laws, like the Athenian, was different from\nthat of a modern civilized state. The difference chiefly consists in\nthis, that whereas among ourselves there are certain persons or classes\nof persons set apart for the execution of the duties of government, in\nancient Greece, as in all other communities in the earlier stages of\ntheir development, they were not equally distinguished from the rest of\nthe citizens. The machinery of government was never so well organized as\nin the best modern states. The judicial department was not so completely\nseparated from the legislative, nor the executive from the judicial, nor\nthe people at large from the professional soldier, lawyer, or priest. To\nAristotle (Pol.) it was a question requiring serious consideration--Who\nshould execute a sentence? There was probably no body of police to whom\nwere entrusted the lives and properties of the citizens in any Hellenic\nstate. Hence it might be reasonably expected that every man should be\nthe watchman of every other, and in turn be watched by him. The ancients\ndo not seem to have remembered the homely adage that, 'What is every\nman's business is no man's business,' or always to have thought of\napplying the principle of a division of labour to the administration\nof law and to government. Every Athenian was at some time or on some\noccasion in his life a magistrate, judge, advocate, soldier, sailor,\npoliceman. He had not necessarily any private business; a good deal\nof his time was taken up with the duties of office and other public\noccupations. So, too, in Plato's Laws. A citizen was to interfere in a\nquarrel, if older than the combatants, or to defend the outraged party,\nif his junior. He was especially bound to come to the rescue of a parent\nwho was ill-treated by his children. He was also required to prosecute\nthe murderer of a kinsman. In certain cases he was allowed to arrest an\noffender. He might even use violence to an abusive person. Any\ncitizen who was not less than thirty years of age at times exercised\na magisterial authority, to be enforced even by blows. Both in the\nMagnesian state and at Athens many thousand persons must have shared\nin the highest duties of government, if a section only of the Council,\nconsisting of thirty or of fifty persons, as in the Laws, or at\nAthens after the days of Cleisthenes, held office for a month, or for\nthirty-five days only. It was almost as if, in our own country, the\nMinistry or the Houses of Parliament were to change every month. The\naverage ability of the Athenian and Magnesian councillors could not have\nbeen very high, considering there were so many of them. And yet they\nwere entrusted with the performance of the most important executive\nduties. In these respects the constitution of the Laws resembles Athens\nfar more than Sparta. All the citizens were to be, not merely soldiers,\nbut politicians and administrators.\n\n(ii) There are numerous minor particulars in which the Laws of Plato\nresemble those of Athens. These are less interesting than the preceding,\nbut they show even more strikingly how closely in the composition of his\nwork Plato has followed the laws and customs of his own country.\n\n(1) Evidence. (a) At Athens a child was not allowed to give evidence\n(Telfy). Plato has a similar law: 'A child shall be allowed to give\nevidence only in cases of murder.' (b) At Athens an unwilling witness\nmight be summoned; but he was not required to appear if he was ready\nto declare on oath that he knew nothing about the matter in question\n(Telfy). So in the Laws. (c) Athenian law enacted that when more than\nhalf the witnesses in a case had been convicted of perjury, there was to\nbe a new trial (anadikos krisis--Telfy). There is a similar provision in\nthe Laws. (d) False-witness was punished at Athens by atimia and a fine\n(Telfy). Plato is at once more lenient and more severe: 'If a man be\ntwice convicted of false-witness, he shall not be required, and if\nthrice, he shall not be allowed to bear witness; and if he dare to\nwitness after he has been convicted three times,...he shall be punished\nwith death.'\n\n(2) Murder. (a) Wilful murder was punished in Athenian law by death,\nperpetual exile, and confiscation of property (Telfy). Plato, too,\nhas the alternative of death or exile, but he does not confiscate the\nmurderer's property. (b) The Parricide was not allowed to escape by\ngoing into exile at Athens (Telfy), nor, apparently, in the Laws. (c)\nA homicide, if forgiven by his victim before death, received no\npunishment, either at Athens (Telfy), or in the Magnesian state. In both\n(Telfy) the contriver of a murder is punished as severely as the doer;\nand persons accused of the crime are forbidden to enter temples or\nthe agora until they have been tried (Telfy). (d) At Athens slaves who\nkilled their masters and were caught red-handed, were not to be put to\ndeath by the relations of the murdered man, but to be handed over to the\nmagistrates (Telfy). So in the Laws, the slave who is guilty of wilful\nmurder has a public execution: but if the murder is committed in anger,\nit is punished by the kinsmen of the victim.\n\n(3) Involuntary homicide. (a) The guilty person, according to the\nAthenian law, had to go into exile, and might not return, until the\nfamily of the man slain were conciliated. Then he must be purified\n(Telfy). If he is caught before he has obtained forgiveness, he may be\nput to death. These enactments reappear in the Laws. (b) The curious\nprovision of Plato, that a stranger who has been banished for\ninvoluntary homicide and is subsequently wrecked upon the coast, must\n'take up his abode on the sea-shore, wetting his feet in the sea, and\nwatching for an opportunity of sailing,' recalls the procedure of\nthe Judicium Phreatteum at Athens, according to which an involuntary\nhomicide, who, having gone into exile, is accused of a wilful murder,\nwas tried at Phreatto for this offence in a boat by magistrates on the\nshore. (c) A still more singular law, occurring both in the Athenian\nand Magnesian code, enacts that a stone or other inanimate object which\nkills a man is to be tried, and cast over the border (Telfy).\n\n(4) Justifiable or excusable homicide. Plato and Athenian law agree in\nmaking homicide justifiable or excusable in the following cases:--(1) at\nthe games (Telfy); (2) in war (Telfy); (3) if the person slain was found\ndoing violence to a free woman (Telfy); (4) if a doctor's patient dies;\n(5) in the case of a robber (Telfy); (6) in self-defence (Telfy).\n\n(5) Impiety. Death or expulsion was the Athenian penalty for impiety\n(Telfy). In the Laws it is punished in various cases by imprisonment for\nfive years, for life, and by death.\n\n(6) Sacrilege. Robbery of temples at Athens was punished by death,\nrefusal of burial in the land, and confiscation of property (Telfy).\nIn the Laws the citizen who is guilty of such a crime is to 'perish\ningloriously and be cast beyond the borders of the land,' but his\nproperty is not confiscated.\n\n(7) Sorcery. The sorcerer at Athens was to be executed (Telfy): compare\nLaws, where it is enacted that the physician who poisons and the\nprofessional sorcerer shall be punished with death.\n\n(8) Treason. Both at Athens and in the Laws the penalty for treason was\ndeath (Telfy), and refusal of burial in the country (Telfy).\n\n(9) Sheltering exiles. 'If a man receives an exile, he shall be punished\nwith death.' So, too, in Athenian law (Telfy.).\n\n(10) Wounding. Athenian law compelled a man who had wounded another to\ngo into exile; if he returned, he was to be put to death (Telfy). Plato\nonly punishes the offence with death when children wound their parents\nor one another, or a slave wounds his master.\n\n(11) Bribery. Death was the punishment for taking a bribe, both\nat Athens (Telfy) and in the Laws; but Athenian law offered an\nalternative--the payment of a fine of ten times the amount of the bribe.\n\n(12) Theft. Plato, like Athenian law (Telfy), punishes the theft of\npublic property by death; the theft of private property in both involves\na fine of double the value of the stolen goods (Telfy).\n\n(13) Suicide. He 'who slays him who of all men, as they say, is his own\nbest friend,' is regarded in the same spirit by Plato and by Athenian\nlaw. Plato would have him 'buried ingloriously on the borders of the\ntwelve portions of the land, in such places as are uncultivated and\nnameless,' and 'no column or inscription is to mark the place of his\ninterment.' Athenian law enacted that the hand which did the deed should\nbe separated from the body and be buried apart (Telfy).\n\n(14) Injury. In cases of wilful injury, Athenian law compelled the\nguilty person to pay double the damage; in cases of involuntary injury,\nsimple damages (Telfy). Plato enacts that if a man wounds another in\npassion, and the wound is curable, he shall pay double the damage, if\nincurable or disfiguring, fourfold damages. If, however, the wounding is\naccidental, he shall simply pay for the harm done.\n\n(15) Treatment of parents. Athenian law allowed any one to indict\nanother for neglect or illtreatment of parents (Telfy). So Plato bids\nbystanders assist a father who is assaulted by his son, and allows any\none to give information against children who neglect their parents.\n\n(16) Execution of sentences. Both Plato and Athenian law give to the\nwinner of a suit power to seize the goods of the loser, if he does not\npay within the appointed time (Telfy). At Athens the penalty was also\ndoubled (Telfy); not so in Plato. Plato however punishes contempt of\ncourt by death, which at Athens seems only to have been visited with a\nfurther fine (Telfy).\n\n(17) Property. (a) Both at Athens and in the Laws a man who has disputed\nproperty in his possession must give the name of the person from whom he\nreceived it (Telfy); and any one searching for lost property must enter\na house naked (Telfy), or, as Plato says, 'naked, or wearing only a\nshort tunic and without a girdle. (b) Athenian law, as well as Plato,\ndid not allow a father to disinherit his son without good reason and the\nconsent of impartial persons (Telfy). Neither grants to the eldest\nson any special claim on the paternal estate (Telfy). In the law of\ninheritance both prefer males to females (Telfy). (c) Plato and Athenian\nlaw enacted that a tree should be planted at a fair distance from a\nneighbour's property (Telfy), and that when a man could not get water,\nhis neighbour must supply him (Telfy). Both at Athens and in Plato there\nis a law about bees, the former providing that a beehive must be set up\nat not less a distance than 300 feet from a neighbour's (Telfy), and the\nlatter forbidding the decoying of bees.\n\n(18) Orphans. A ward must proceed against a guardian whom he suspects\nof fraud within five years of the expiration of the guardianship. This\nprovision is common to Plato and to Athenian law (Telfy). Further, the\nlatter enacted that the nearest male relation should marry or provide\na husband for an heiress (Telfy),--a point in which Plato follows it\nclosely.\n\n(19) Contracts. Plato's law that 'when a man makes an agreement which he\ndoes not fulfil, unless the agreement be of a nature which the law or\na vote of the assembly does not allow, or which he has made under the\ninfluence of some unjust compulsion, or which he is prevented from\nfulfilling against his will by some unexpected chance,--the other party\nmay go to law with him,' according to Pollux (quoted in Telfy's note)\nprevailed also at Athens.\n\n(20) Trade regulations. (a) Lying was forbidden in the agora both by\nPlato and at Athens (Telfy). (b) Athenian law allowed an action of\nrecovery against a man who sold an unsound slave as sound (Telfy).\nPlato's enactment is more explicit: he allows only an unskilled person\n(i.e. one who is not a trainer or physician) to take proceedings in such\na case. (c) Plato diverges from Athenian practice in the disapproval of\ncredit, and does not even allow the supply of goods on the deposit of\na percentage of their value (Telfy). He enacts that 'when goods are\nexchanged by buying and selling, a man shall deliver them and receive\nthe price of them at a fixed place in the agora, and have done with\nthe matter,' and that 'he who gives credit must be satisfied whether he\nobtain his money or not, for in such exchanges he will not be protected\nby law. (d) Athenian law forbad an extortionate rate of interest\n(Telfy); Plato allows interest in one case only--if a contractor does\nnot receive the price of his work within a year of the time agreed--and\nat the rate of 200 per cent. per annum for every drachma a monthly\ninterest of an obol. (e) Both at Athens and in the Laws sales were to be\nregistered (Telfy), as well as births (Telfy).\n\n(21) Sumptuary laws. Extravagance at weddings (Telfy), and at funerals\n(Telfy) was forbidden at Athens and also in the Magnesian state.\n\nThere remains the subject of family life, which in Plato's Laws\npartakes both of an Athenian and Spartan character. Under this head may\nconveniently be included the condition of women and of slaves. To family\nlife may be added citizenship.\n\nAs at Sparta, marriages are to be contracted for the good of the state;\nand they may be dissolved on the same ground, where there is a failure\nof issue,--the interest of the state requiring that every one of the\n5040 lots should have an heir. Divorces are likewise permitted by Plato\nwhere there is an incompatibility of temper, as at Athens by mutual\nconsent. The duty of having children is also enforced by a still higher\nmotive, expressed by Plato in the noble words:--'A man should cling to\nimmortality, and leave behind him children's children to be the servants\nof God in his place.' Again, as at Athens, the father is allowed to put\naway his undutiful son, but only with the consent of impartial persons\n(Telfy), and the only suit which may be brought by a son against a\nfather is for imbecility. The class of elder and younger men and women\nare still to regard one another, as in the Republic, as standing in the\nrelation of parents and children. This is a trait of Spartan character\nrather than of Athenian. A peculiar sanctity and tenderness was to be\nshown towards the aged; the parent or grandparent stricken with years\nwas to be loved and worshipped like the image of a God, and was to be\ndeemed far more able than any lifeless statue to bring good or ill\nto his descendants. Great care is to be taken of orphans: they are\nentrusted to the fifteen eldest Guardians of the Law, who are to be\n'lawgivers and fathers to them not inferior to their natural fathers,'\nas at Athens they were entrusted to the Archons. Plato wishes to make\nthe misfortune of orphanhood as little sad to them as possible.\n\nPlato, seeing the disorder into which half the human race had fallen at\nAthens and Sparta, is minded to frame for them a new rule of life. He\nrenounces his fanciful theory of communism, but still desires to place\nwomen as far as possible on an equality with men. They were to be\ntrained in the use of arms, they are to live in public. Their time was\npartly taken up with gymnastic exercises; there could have been little\nfamily or private life among them. Their lot was to be neither like that\nof Spartan women, who were made hard and common by excessive practice\nof gymnastic and the want of all other education,--nor yet like that of\nAthenian women, who, at least among the upper classes, retired into a\nsort of oriental seclusion,--but something better than either. They were\nto be the perfect mothers of perfect children, yet not wholly taken up\nwith the duties of motherhood, which were to be made easy to them as far\nas possible (compare Republic), but able to share in the perils of war\nand to be the companions of their husbands. Here, more than anywhere\nelse, the spirit of the Laws reverts to the Republic. In speaking of\nthem as the companions of their husbands we must remember that it is an\nAthenian and not a Spartan way of life which they are invited to share,\na life of gaiety and brightness, not of austerity and abstinence, which\noften by a reaction degenerated into licence and grossness.\n\nIn Plato's age the subject of slavery greatly interested the minds of\nthoughtful men; and how best to manage this 'troublesome piece of goods'\nexercised his own mind a good deal. He admits that they have often\nbeen found better than brethren or sons in the hour of danger, and are\ncapable of rendering important public services by informing against\noffenders--for this they are to be rewarded; and the master who puts\na slave to death for the sake of concealing some crime which he has\ncommitted, is held guilty of murder. But they are not always treated\nwith equal consideration. The punishments inflicted on them bear\nno proportion to their crimes. They are to be addressed only in the\nlanguage of command. Their masters are not to jest with them, lest they\nshould increase the hardship of their lot. Some privileges were granted\nto them by Athenian law of which there is no mention in Plato; they\nwere allowed to purchase their freedom from their master, and if they\ndespaired of being liberated by him they could demand to be sold, on the\nchance of falling into better hands. But there is no suggestion in\nthe Laws that a slave who tried to escape should be branded with the\nwords--kateche me, pheugo, or that evidence should be extracted from him\nby torture, that the whole household was to be executed if the master\nwas murdered and the perpetrator remained undetected: all these were\nprovisions of Athenian law. Plato is more consistent than either the\nAthenians or the Spartans; for at Sparta too the Helots were treated in\na manner almost unintelligible to us. On the one hand, they had arms put\ninto their hands, and served in the army, not only, as at Plataea, in\nattendance on their masters, but, after they had been manumitted, as a\nseparate body of troops called Neodamodes: on the other hand, they were\nthe victims of one of the greatest crimes recorded in Greek history\n(Thucyd.). The two great philosophers of Hellas sought to extricate\nthemselves from this cruel condition of human life, but acquiesced in\nthe necessity of it. A noble and pathetic sentiment of Plato, suggested\nby the thought of their misery, may be quoted in this place:--'The right\ntreatment of slaves is to behave properly to them, and to do to them, if\npossible, even more justice than to those who are our equals; for he\nwho naturally and genuinely reverences justice, and hates injustice, is\ndiscovered in his dealings with any class of men to whom he can easily\nbe unjust. And he who in regard to the natures and actions of his slaves\nis undefiled by impiety and injustice, will best sow the seeds of virtue\nin them; and this may be truly said of every master, and tyrant, and of\nevery other having authority in relation to his inferiors.'\n\nAll the citizens of the Magnesian state were free and equal; there was\nno distinction of rank among them, such as is believed to have prevailed\nat Sparta. Their number was a fixed one, corresponding to the 5040 lots.\nOne of the results of this is the requirement that younger sons or those\nwho have been disinherited shall go out to a colony. At Athens, where\nthere was not the same religious feeling against increasing the size of\nthe city, the number of citizens must have been liable to considerable\nfluctuations. Several classes of persons, who were not citizens by\nbirth, were admitted to the privilege. Perpetual exiles from other\ncountries, people who settled there to practise a trade (Telfy), any one\nwho had shown distinguished valour in the cause of Athens, the Plataeans\nwho escaped from the siege, metics and strangers who offered to serve\nin the army, the slaves who fought at Arginusae,--all these could or\ndid become citizens. Even those who were only on one side of Athenian\nparentage were at more than one period accounted citizens. But at times\nthere seems to have arisen a feeling against this promiscuous extension\nof the citizen body, an expression of which is to be found in the law\nof Pericles--monous Athenaious einai tous ek duoin Athenaion gegonotas\n(Plutarch, Pericles); and at no time did the adopted citizen enjoy the\nfull rights of citizenship--e.g. he might not be elected archon or to\nthe office of priest (Telfy), although this prohibition did not extend\nto his children, if born of a citizen wife. Plato never thinks of making\nthe metic, much less the slave, a citizen. His treatment of the former\nclass is at once more gentle and more severe than that which prevailed\nat Athens. He imposes upon them no tax but good behaviour, whereas at\nAthens they were required to pay twelve drachmae per annum, and to\nhave a patron: on the other hand, he only allows them to reside in the\nMagnesian state on condition of following a trade; they were required to\ndepart when their property exceeded that of the third class, and in any\ncase after a residence of twenty years, unless they could show that they\nhad conferred some great benefit on the state. This privileged position\nreflects that of the isoteleis at Athens, who were excused from the\nmetoikion. It is Plato's greatest concession to the metic, as the\nbestowal of freedom is his greatest concession to the slave.\n\nLastly, there is a more general point of view under which the Laws of\nPlato may be considered,--the principles of Jurisprudence which are\ncontained in them. These are not formally announced, but are scattered\nup and down, to be observed by the reflective reader for himself. Some\nof them are only the common principles which all courts of justice have\ngathered from experience; others are peculiar and characteristic. That\njudges should sit at fixed times and hear causes in a regular order,\nthat evidence should be laid before them, that false witnesses should\nbe disallowed, and corruption punished, that defendants should be\nheard before they are convicted,--these are the rules, not only of the\nHellenic courts, but of courts of law in all ages and countries.\nBut there are also points which are peculiar, and in which ancient\njurisprudence differs considerably from modern; some of them are of\ngreat importance...It could not be said at Athens, nor was it ever\ncontemplated by Plato, that all men, including metics and slaves, should\nbe equal 'in the eye of the law.' There was some law for the slave, but\nnot much; no adequate protection was given him against the cruelty of\nhis master...It was a singular privilege granted, both by the Athenian\nand Magnesian law, to a murdered man, that he might, before he died,\npardon his murderer, in which case no legal steps were afterwards to\nbe taken against him. This law is the remnant of an age in which the\npunishment of offences against the person was the concern rather of\nthe individual and his kinsmen than of the state...Plato's division of\ncrimes into voluntary and involuntary and those done from passion, only\npartially agrees with the distinction which modern law has drawn between\nmurder and manslaughter; his attempt to analyze them is confused by the\nSocratic paradox, that 'All vice is involuntary'...It is singular that\nboth in the Laws and at Athens theft is commonly punished by a twofold\nrestitution of the article stolen. The distinction between civil and\ncriminal courts or suits was not yet recognized...Possession gives a\nright of property after a certain time...The religious aspect under\nwhich certain offences were regarded greatly interfered with a just\nand natural estimate of their guilt...As among ourselves, the intent to\nmurder was distinguished by Plato from actual murder...We note that\nboth in Plato and the laws of Athens, libel in the market-place and\npersonality in the theatre were forbidden...Both in Plato and Athenian\nlaw, as in modern times, the accomplice of a crime is to be punished as\nwell as the principal...Plato does not allow a witness in a cause to\nact as a judge of it...Oaths are not to be taken by the parties to a\nsuit...Both at Athens and in Plato's Laws capital punishment for\nmurder was not to be inflicted, if the offender was willing to go into\nexile...Respect for the dead, duty towards parents, are to be enforced\nby the law as well as by public opinion...Plato proclaims the noble\nsentiment that the object of all punishment is the improvement of the\noffender... Finally, he repeats twice over, as with the voice of a\nprophet, that the crimes of the fathers are not to be visited upon the\nchildren. In this respect he is nobly distinguished from the Oriental,\nand indeed from the spirit of Athenian law (compare Telfy,--dei kai\nautous kai tous ek touton atimous einai), as the Hebrew in the age of\nEzekial is from the Jewish people of former ages.\n\nOf all Plato's provisions the object is to bring the practice of the law\nmore into harmony with reason and philosophy; to secure impartiality,\nand while acknowledging that every citizen has a right to share in the\nadministration of justice, to counteract the tendency of the courts to\nbecome mere popular assemblies.\n\n...\n\nThus we have arrived at the end of the writings of Plato, and at the\nlast stage of philosophy which was really his. For in what followed,\nwhich we chiefly gather from the uncertain intimations of Aristotle, the\nspirit of the master no longer survived. The doctrine of Ideas passed\ninto one of numbers; instead of advancing from the abstract to the\nconcrete, the theories of Plato were taken out of their context, and\neither asserted or refuted with a provoking literalism; the Socratic or\nPlatonic element in his teaching was absorbed into the Pythagorean or\nMegarian. His poetry was converted into mysticism; his unsubstantial\nvisions were assailed secundum artem by the rules of logic. His\npolitical speculations lost their interest when the freedom of Hellas\nhad passed away. Of all his writings the Laws were the furthest removed\nfrom the traditions of the Platonic school in the next generation. Both\nhis political and his metaphysical philosophy are for the most part\nmisinterpreted by Aristotle. The best of him--his love of truth, and\nhis 'contemplation of all time and all existence,' was soonest lost; and\nsome of his greatest thoughts have slept in the ear of mankind almost\never since they were first uttered.\n\nWe have followed him during his forty or fifty years of authorship, from\nthe beginning when he first attempted to depict the teaching of Socrates\nin a dramatic form, down to the time at which the character of Socrates\nhad disappeared, and we have the latest reflections of Plato's own mind\nupon Hellas and upon philosophy. He, who was 'the last of the poets,' in\nhis book of Laws writes prose only; he has himself partly fallen\nunder the rhetorical influences which in his earlier dialogues he was\ncombating. The progress of his writings is also the history of his life;\nwe have no other authentic life of him. They are the true self of the\nphilosopher, stripped of the accidents of time and place. The great\neffort which he makes is, first, to realize abstractions, secondly,\nto connect them. In the attempt to realize them, he was carried into a\ntranscendental region in which he isolated them from experience, and we\npass out of the range of science into poetry or fiction. The fancies of\nmythology for a time cast a veil over the gulf which divides phenomena\nfrom onta (Meno, Phaedrus, Symposium, Phaedo). In his return to earth\nPlato meets with a difficulty which has long ceased to be a difficulty\nto us. He cannot understand how these obstinate, unmanageable ideas,\nresiding alone in their heaven of abstraction, can be either combined\nwith one another, or adapted to phenomena (Parmenides, Philebus,\nSophist). That which is the most familiar process of our own minds, to\nhim appeared to be the crowning achievement of the dialectical art. The\ndifficulty which in his own generation threatened to be the destruction\nof philosophy, he has rendered unmeaning and ridiculous. For by his\nconquests in the world of mind our thoughts are widened, and he has\nfurnished us with new dialectical instruments which are of greater\ncompass and power. We have endeavoured to see him as he truly was, a\ngreat original genius struggling with unequal conditions of knowledge,\nnot prepared with a system nor evolving in a series of dialogues ideas\nwhich he had long conceived, but contradictory, enquiring as he goes\nalong, following the argument, first from one point of view and then\nfrom another, and therefore arriving at opposite conclusions, hovering\naround the light, and sometimes dazzled with excess of light, but always\nmoving in the same element of ideal truth. We have seen him also in his\ndecline, when the wings of his imagination have begun to droop, but his\nexperience of life remains, and he turns away from the contemplation of\nthe eternal to take a last sad look at human affairs.\n\n...\n\nAnd so having brought into the world 'noble children' (Phaedr.), he\nrests from the labours of authorship. More than two thousand two hundred\nyears have passed away since he returned to the place of Apollo and\nthe Muses. Yet the echo of his words continues to be heard among men,\nbecause of all philosophers he has the most melodious voice. He is the\ninspired prophet or teacher who can never die, the only one in whom the\noutward form adequately represents the fair soul within; in whom the\nthoughts of all who went before him are reflected and of all who come\nafter him are partly anticipated. Other teachers of philosophy are dried\nup and withered,--after a few centuries they have become dust; but he\nis fresh and blooming, and is always begetting new ideas in the minds of\nmen. They are one-sided and abstract; but he has many sides of wisdom.\nNor is he always consistent with himself, because he is always moving\nonward, and knows that there are many more things in philosophy than can\nbe expressed in words, and that truth is greater than consistency. He\nwho approaches him in the most reverent spirit shall reap most of\nthe fruit of his wisdom; he who reads him by the light of ancient\ncommentators will have the least understanding of him.\n\nWe may see him with the eye of the mind in the groves of the Academy,\nor on the banks of the Ilissus, or in the streets of Athens, alone or\nwalking with Socrates, full of those thoughts which have since become\nthe common possession of mankind. Or we may compare him to a statue hid\naway in some temple of Zeus or Apollo, no longer existing on earth,\na statue which has a look as of the God himself. Or we may once more\nimagine him following in another state of being the great company\nof heaven which he beheld of old in a vision (Phaedr.). So, 'partly\ntrifling, but with a certain degree of seriousness' (Symp.), we linger\naround the memory of a world which has passed away (Phaedr.).\n\n\n\n\n\nLAWS\n\n\n\n\nBOOK I.\n\nPERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: An Athenian Stranger, Cleinias (a Cretan),\nMegillus (a Lacedaemonian).\n\nATHENIAN: Tell me, Strangers, is a God or some man supposed to be the\nauthor of your laws?\n\nCLEINIAS: A God, Stranger; in very truth a God: among us Cretans he is\nsaid to have been Zeus, but in Lacedaemon, whence our friend here comes,\nI believe they would say that Apollo is their lawgiver: would they not,\nMegillus?\n\nMEGILLUS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And do you, Cleinias, believe, as Homer tells, that every\nninth year Minos went to converse with his Olympian sire, and was\ninspired by him to make laws for your cities?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes, that is our tradition; and there was Rhadamanthus, a\nbrother of his, with whose name you are familiar; he is reputed to have\nbeen the justest of men, and we Cretans are of opinion that he earned\nthis reputation from his righteous administration of justice when he was\nalive.\n\nATHENIAN: Yes, and a noble reputation it was, worthy of a son of Zeus.\nAs you and Megillus have been trained in these institutions, I dare say\nthat you will not be unwilling to give an account of your government and\nlaws; on our way we can pass the time pleasantly in talking about them,\nfor I am told that the distance from Cnosus to the cave and temple of\nZeus is considerable; and doubtless there are shady places under the\nlofty trees, which will protect us from this scorching sun. Being no\nlonger young, we may often stop to rest beneath them, and get over the\nwhole journey without difficulty, beguiling the time by conversation.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes, Stranger, and if we proceed onward we shall come to\ngroves of cypresses, which are of rare height and beauty, and there are\ngreen meadows, in which we may repose and converse.\n\nATHENIAN: Very good.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good, indeed; and still better when we see them; let us\nmove on cheerily.\n\nATHENIAN: I am willing--And first, I want to know why the law has\nordained that you shall have common meals and gymnastic exercises, and\nwear arms.\n\nCLEINIAS: I think, Stranger, that the aim of our institutions is easily\nintelligible to any one. Look at the character of our country: Crete is\nnot like Thessaly, a large plain; and for this reason they have horsemen\nin Thessaly, and we have runners--the inequality of the ground in our\ncountry is more adapted to locomotion on foot; but then, if you have\nrunners you must have light arms--no one can carry a heavy weight when\nrunning, and bows and arrows are convenient because they are light.\nNow all these regulations have been made with a view to war, and\nthe legislator appears to me to have looked to this in all his\narrangements:--the common meals, if I am not mistaken, were instituted\nby him for a similar reason, because he saw that while they are in the\nfield the citizens are by the nature of the case compelled to take their\nmeals together for the sake of mutual protection. He seems to me to have\nthought the world foolish in not understanding that all men are always\nat war with one another; and if in war there ought to be common meals\nand certain persons regularly appointed under others to protect an army,\nthey should be continued in peace. For what men in general term peace\nwould be said by him to be only a name; in reality every city is in a\nnatural state of war with every other, not indeed proclaimed by heralds,\nbut everlasting. And if you look closely, you will find that this was\nthe intention of the Cretan legislator; all institutions, private as\nwell as public, were arranged by him with a view to war; in giving them\nhe was under the impression that no possessions or institutions are of\nany value to him who is defeated in battle; for all the good things of\nthe conquered pass into the hands of the conquerors.\n\nATHENIAN: You appear to me, Stranger, to have been thoroughly trained\nin the Cretan institutions, and to be well informed about them; will\nyou tell me a little more explicitly what is the principle of government\nwhich you would lay down? You seem to imagine that a well-governed state\nought to be so ordered as to conquer all other states in war: am I right\nin supposing this to be your meaning?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly; and our Lacedaemonian friend, if I am not mistaken,\nwill agree with me.\n\nMEGILLUS: Why, my good friend, how could any Lacedaemonian say anything\nelse?\n\nATHENIAN: And is what you say applicable only to states, or also to\nvillages?\n\nCLEINIAS: To both alike.\n\nATHENIAN: The case is the same?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: And in the village will there be the same war of family\nagainst family, and of individual against individual?\n\nCLEINIAS: The same.\n\nATHENIAN: And should each man conceive himself to be his own\nenemy:--what shall we say?\n\nCLEINIAS: O Athenian Stranger--inhabitant of Attica I will not call you,\nfor you seem to deserve rather to be named after the goddess herself,\nbecause you go back to first principles,--you have thrown a light upon\nthe argument, and will now be better able to understand what I was just\nsaying,--that all men are publicly one another's enemies, and each man\nprivately his own.\n\n(ATHENIAN: My good sir, what do you mean?)--\n\nCLEINIAS:...Moreover, there is a victory and defeat--the first and best\nof victories, the lowest and worst of defeats--which each man gains or\nsustains at the hands, not of another, but of himself; this shows that\nthere is a war against ourselves going on within every one of us.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us now reverse the order of the argument: Seeing that\nevery individual is either his own superior or his own inferior, may we\nsay that there is the same principle in the house, the village, and the\nstate?\n\nCLEINIAS: You mean that in each of them there is a principle of\nsuperiority or inferiority to self?\n\nATHENIAN: Yes.\n\nCLEINIAS: You are quite right in asking the question, for there\ncertainly is such a principle, and above all in states; and the state\nin which the better citizens win a victory over the mob and over the\ninferior classes may be truly said to be better than itself, and may\nbe justly praised, where such a victory is gained, or censured in the\nopposite case.\n\nATHENIAN: Whether the better is ever really conquered by the worse, is\na question which requires more discussion, and may be therefore left for\nthe present. But I now quite understand your meaning when you say\nthat citizens who are of the same race and live in the same cities may\nunjustly conspire, and having the superiority in numbers may overcome\nand enslave the few just; and when they prevail, the state may be truly\ncalled its own inferior and therefore bad; and when they are defeated,\nits own superior and therefore good.\n\nCLEINIAS: Your remark, Stranger, is a paradox, and yet we cannot\npossibly deny it.\n\nATHENIAN: Here is another case for consideration;--in a family there\nmay be several brothers, who are the offspring of a single pair; very\npossibly the majority of them may be unjust, and the just may be in a\nminority.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very possibly.\n\nATHENIAN: And you and I ought not to raise a question of words as to\nwhether this family and household are rightly said to be superior when\nthey conquer, and inferior when they are conquered; for we are not\nnow considering what may or may not be the proper or customary way of\nspeaking, but we are considering the natural principles of right and\nwrong in laws.\n\nCLEINIAS: What you say, Stranger, is most true.\n\nMEGILLUS: Quite excellent, in my opinion, as far as we have gone.\n\nATHENIAN: Again; might there not be a judge over these brethren, of whom\nwe were speaking?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Now, which would be the better judge--one who destroyed the\nbad and appointed the good to govern themselves; or one who, while\nallowing the good to govern, let the bad live, and made them voluntarily\nsubmit? Or third, I suppose, in the scale of excellence might be placed\na judge, who, finding the family distracted, not only did not destroy\nany one, but reconciled them to one another for ever after, and gave\nthem laws which they mutually observed, and was able to keep them\nfriends.\n\nCLEINIAS: The last would be by far the best sort of judge and\nlegislator.\n\nATHENIAN: And yet the aim of all the laws which he gave would be the\nreverse of war.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: And will he who constitutes the state and orders the life\nof man have in view external war, or that kind of intestine war called\ncivil, which no one, if he could prevent, would like to have occurring\nin his own state; and when occurring, every one would wish to be quit of\nas soon as possible?\n\nCLEINIAS: He would have the latter chiefly in view.\n\nATHENIAN: And would he prefer that this civil war should be terminated\nby the destruction of one of the parties, and by the victory of the\nother, or that peace and friendship should be re-established, and that,\nbeing reconciled, they should give their attention to foreign enemies?\n\nCLEINIAS: Every one would desire the latter in the case of his own\nstate.\n\nATHENIAN: And would not that also be the desire of the legislator?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And would not every one always make laws for the sake of the\nbest?\n\nCLEINIAS: To be sure.\n\nATHENIAN: But war, whether external or civil, is not the best, and the\nneed of either is to be deprecated; but peace with one another, and\ngood will, are best. Nor is the victory of the state over itself to be\nregarded as a really good thing, but as a necessity; a man might as\nwell say that the body was in the best state when sick and purged by\nmedicine, forgetting that there is also a state of the body which needs\nno purge. And in like manner no one can be a true statesman, whether\nhe aims at the happiness of the individual or state, who looks only,\nor first of all, to external warfare; nor will he ever be a sound\nlegislator who orders peace for the sake of war, and not war for the\nsake of peace.\n\nCLEINIAS: I suppose that there is truth, Stranger, in that remark of\nyours; and yet I am greatly mistaken if war is not the entire aim and\nobject of our own institutions, and also of the Lacedaemonian.\n\nATHENIAN: I dare say; but there is no reason why we should rudely\nquarrel with one another about your legislators, instead of gently\nquestioning them, seeing that both we and they are equally in earnest.\nPlease follow me and the argument closely:--And first I will put forward\nTyrtaeus, an Athenian by birth, but also a Spartan citizen, who of all\nmen was most eager about war: Well, he says,\n\n     'I sing not, I care not, about any man,\n\neven if he were the richest of men, and possessed every good (and\nthen he gives a whole list of them), if he be not at all times a brave\nwarrior.' I imagine that you, too, must have heard his poems; our\nLacedaemonian friend has probably heard more than enough of them.\n\nMEGILLUS: Very true.\n\nCLEINIAS: And they have found their way from Lacedaemon to Crete.\n\nATHENIAN: Come now and let us all join in asking this question of\nTyrtaeus: O most divine poet, we will say to him, the excellent praise\nwhich you have bestowed on those who excel in war sufficiently proves\nthat you are wise and good, and I and Megillus and Cleinias of Cnosus\ndo, as I believe, entirely agree with you. But we should like to be\nquite sure that we are speaking of the same men; tell us, then, do you\nagree with us in thinking that there are two kinds of war; or what would\nyou say? A far inferior man to Tyrtaeus would have no difficulty\nin replying quite truly, that war is of two kinds,--one which is\nuniversally called civil war, and is, as we were just now saying, of all\nwars the worst; the other, as we should all admit, in which we fall out\nwith other nations who are of a different race, is a far milder form of\nwarfare.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly, far milder.\n\nATHENIAN: Well, now, when you praise and blame war in this high-flown\nstrain, whom are you praising or blaming, and to which kind of war are\nyou referring? I suppose that you must mean foreign war, if I am to\njudge from expressions of yours in which you say that you abominate\nthose\n\n'Who refuse to look upon fields of blood, and will not draw near and\nstrike at their enemies.'\n\nAnd we shall naturally go on to say to him,--You, Tyrtaeus, as it seems,\npraise those who distinguish themselves in external and foreign war; and\nhe must admit this.\n\nCLEINIAS: Evidently.\n\nATHENIAN: They are good; but we say that there are still better men\nwhose virtue is displayed in the greatest of all battles. And we too\nhave a poet whom we summon as a witness, Theognis, citizen of Megara in\nSicily:\n\n'Cyrnus,' he says, 'he who is faithful in a civil broil is worth his\nweight in gold and silver.'\n\nAnd such an one is far better, as we affirm, than the other in a more\ndifficult kind of war, much in the same degree as justice and temperance\nand wisdom, when united with courage, are better than courage only; for\na man cannot be faithful and good in civil strife without having all\nvirtue. But in the war of which Tyrtaeus speaks, many a mercenary\nsoldier will take his stand and be ready to die at his post, and yet\nthey are generally and almost without exception insolent, unjust,\nviolent men, and the most senseless of human beings. You will ask what\nthe conclusion is, and what I am seeking to prove: I maintain that\nthe divine legislator of Crete, like any other who is worthy of\nconsideration, will always and above all things in making laws have\nregard to the greatest virtue; which, according to Theognis, is loyalty\nin the hour of danger, and may be truly called perfect justice. Whereas,\nthat virtue which Tyrtaeus highly praises is well enough, and was\npraised by the poet at the right time, yet in place and dignity may be\nsaid to be only fourth rate (i.e., it ranks after justice, temperance,\nand wisdom.).\n\nCLEINIAS: Stranger, we are degrading our inspired lawgiver to a rank\nwhich is far beneath him.\n\nATHENIAN: Nay, I think that we degrade not him but ourselves, if we\nimagine that Lycurgus and Minos laid down laws both in Lacedaemon and\nCrete mainly with a view to war.\n\nCLEINIAS: What ought we to say then?\n\nATHENIAN: What truth and what justice require of us, if I am not\nmistaken, when speaking in behalf of divine excellence;--that the\nlegislator when making his laws had in view not a part only, and this\nthe lowest part of virtue, but all virtue, and that he devised classes\nof laws answering to the kinds of virtue; not in the way in which modern\ninventors of laws make the classes, for they only investigate and offer\nlaws whenever a want is felt, and one man has a class of laws about\nallotments and heiresses, another about assaults; others about ten\nthousand other such matters. But we maintain that the right way of\nexamining into laws is to proceed as we have now done, and I admired the\nspirit of your exposition; for you were quite right in beginning with\nvirtue, and saying that this was the aim of the giver of the law, but I\nthought that you went wrong when you added that all his legislation had\na view only to a part, and the least part of virtue, and this called\nforth my subsequent remarks. Will you allow me then to explain how I\nshould have liked to have heard you expound the matter?\n\nCLEINIAS: By all means.\n\nATHENIAN: You ought to have said, Stranger--The Cretan laws are with\nreason famous among the Hellenes; for they fulfil the object of laws,\nwhich is to make those who use them happy; and they confer every sort of\ngood. Now goods are of two kinds: there are human and there are divine\ngoods, and the human hang upon the divine; and the state which attains\nthe greater, at the same time acquires the less, or, not having the\ngreater, has neither. Of the lesser goods the first is health, the\nsecond beauty, the third strength, including swiftness in running and\nbodily agility generally, and the fourth is wealth, not the blind god\n(Pluto), but one who is keen of sight, if only he has wisdom for his\ncompanion. For wisdom is chief and leader of the divine class of goods,\nand next follows temperance; and from the union of these two with\ncourage springs justice, and fourth in the scale of virtue is courage.\nAll these naturally take precedence of the other goods, and this is the\norder in which the legislator must place them, and after them he will\nenjoin the rest of his ordinances on the citizens with a view to these,\nthe human looking to the divine, and the divine looking to their leader\nmind. Some of his ordinances will relate to contracts of marriage which\nthey make one with another, and then to the procreation and education of\nchildren, both male and female; the duty of the lawgiver will be to take\ncharge of his citizens, in youth and age, and at every time of life,\nand to give them punishments and rewards; and in reference to all their\nintercourse with one another, he ought to consider their pains and\npleasures and desires, and the vehemence of all their passions; he\nshould keep a watch over them, and blame and praise them rightly by the\nmouth of the laws themselves. Also with regard to anger and terror, and\nthe other perturbations of the soul, which arise out of misfortune, and\nthe deliverances from them which prosperity brings, and the experiences\nwhich come to men in diseases, or in war, or poverty, or the opposite\nof these; in all these states he should determine and teach what is\nthe good and evil of the condition of each. In the next place, the\nlegislator has to be careful how the citizens make their money and in\nwhat way they spend it, and to have an eye to their mutual contracts and\ndissolutions of contracts, whether voluntary or involuntary: he should\nsee how they order all this, and consider where justice as well as\ninjustice is found or is wanting in their several dealings with one\nanother; and honour those who obey the law, and impose fixed penalties\non those who disobey, until the round of civil life is ended, and the\ntime has come for the consideration of the proper funeral rites and\nhonours of the dead. And the lawgiver reviewing his work, will appoint\nguardians to preside over these things,--some who walk by intelligence,\nothers by true opinion only, and then mind will bind together all his\nordinances and show them to be in harmony with temperance and justice,\nand not with wealth or ambition. This is the spirit, Stranger, in which\nI was and am desirous that you should pursue the subject. And I want to\nknow the nature of all these things, and how they are arranged in the\nlaws of Zeus, as they are termed, and in those of the Pythian Apollo,\nwhich Minos and Lycurgus gave; and how the order of them is discovered\nto his eyes, who has experience in laws gained either by study or habit,\nalthough they are far from being self-evident to the rest of mankind\nlike ourselves.\n\nCLEINIAS: How shall we proceed, Stranger?\n\nATHENIAN: I think that we must begin again as before, and first consider\nthe habit of courage; and then we will go on and discuss another and\nthen another form of virtue, if you please. In this way we shall have\na model of the whole; and with these and similar discourses we will\nbeguile the way. And when we have gone through all the virtues, we will\nshow, by the grace of God, that the institutions of which I was speaking\nlook to virtue.\n\nMEGILLUS: Very good; and suppose that you first criticize this praiser\nof Zeus and the laws of Crete.\n\nATHENIAN: I will try to criticize you and myself, as well as him, for\nthe argument is a common concern. Tell me,--were not first the syssitia,\nand secondly the gymnasia, invented by your legislator with a view to\nwar?\n\nMEGILLUS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: And what comes third, and what fourth? For that, I think, is\nthe sort of enumeration which ought to be made of the remaining parts\nof virtue, no matter whether you call them parts or what their name is,\nprovided the meaning is clear.\n\nMEGILLUS: Then I, or any other Lacedaemonian, would reply that hunting\nis third in order.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us see if we can discover what comes fourth and fifth.\n\nMEGILLUS: I think that I can get as far as the fourth head, which is\nthe frequent endurance of pain, exhibited among us Spartans in certain\nhand-to-hand fights; also in stealing with the prospect of getting a\ngood beating; there is, too, the so-called Crypteia, or secret service,\nin which wonderful endurance is shown,--our people wander over the whole\ncountry by day and by night, and even in winter have not a shoe to\ntheir foot, and are without beds to lie upon, and have to attend upon\nthemselves. Marvellous, too, is the endurance which our citizens show in\ntheir naked exercises, contending against the violent summer heat; and\nthere are many similar practices, to speak of which in detail would be\nendless.\n\nATHENIAN: Excellent, O Lacedaemonian Stranger. But how ought we to\ndefine courage? Is it to be regarded only as a combat against fears and\npains, or also against desires and pleasures, and against flatteries;\nwhich exercise such a tremendous power, that they make the hearts even\nof respectable citizens to melt like wax?\n\nMEGILLUS: I should say the latter.\n\nATHENIAN: In what preceded, as you will remember, our Cnosian friend was\nspeaking of a man or a city being inferior to themselves:--Were you not,\nCleinias?\n\nCLEINIAS: I was.\n\nATHENIAN: Now, which is in the truest sense inferior, the man who is\novercome by pleasure or by pain?\n\nCLEINIAS: I should say the man who is overcome by pleasure; for all men\ndeem him to be inferior in a more disgraceful sense, than the other who\nis overcome by pain.\n\nATHENIAN: But surely the lawgivers of Crete and Lacedaemon have not\nlegislated for a courage which is lame of one leg, able only to meet\nattacks which come from the left, but impotent against the insidious\nflatteries which come from the right?\n\nCLEINIAS: Able to meet both, I should say.\n\nATHENIAN: Then let me once more ask, what institutions have you in\neither of your states which give a taste of pleasures, and do not avoid\nthem any more than they avoid pains; but which set a person in the midst\nof them, and compel or induce him by the prospect of reward to get the\nbetter of them? Where is an ordinance about pleasure similar to that\nabout pain to be found in your laws? Tell me what there is of this\nnature among you:--What is there which makes your citizen equally brave\nagainst pleasure and pain, conquering what they ought to conquer, and\nsuperior to the enemies who are most dangerous and nearest home?\n\nMEGILLUS: I was able to tell you, Stranger, many laws which were\ndirected against pain; but I do not know that I can point out any great\nor obvious examples of similar institutions which are concerned with\npleasure; there are some lesser provisions, however, which I might\nmention.\n\nCLEINIAS: Neither can I show anything of that sort which is at all\nequally prominent in the Cretan laws.\n\nATHENIAN: No wonder, my dear friends; and if, as is very likely, in our\nsearch after the true and good, one of us may have to censure the laws\nof the others, we must not be offended, but take kindly what another\nsays.\n\nCLEINIAS: You are quite right, Athenian Stranger, and we will do as you\nsay.\n\nATHENIAN: At our time of life, Cleinias, there should be no feeling of\nirritation.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly not.\n\nATHENIAN: I will not at present determine whether he who censures the\nCretan or Lacedaemonian polities is right or wrong. But I believe that\nI can tell better than either of you what the many say about them. For\nassuming that you have reasonably good laws, one of the best of them\nwill be the law forbidding any young men to enquire which of them are\nright or wrong; but with one mouth and one voice they must all agree\nthat the laws are all good, for they came from God; and any one who says\nthe contrary is not to be listened to. But an old man who remarks any\ndefect in your laws may communicate his observation to a ruler or to an\nequal in years when no young man is present.\n\nCLEINIAS: Exactly so, Stranger; and like a diviner, although not\nthere at the time, you seem to me quite to have hit the meaning of the\nlegislator, and to say what is most true.\n\nATHENIAN: As there are no young men present, and the legislator\nhas given old men free licence, there will be no impropriety in our\ndiscussing these very matters now that we are alone.\n\nCLEINIAS: True. And therefore you may be as free as you like in your\ncensure of our laws, for there is no discredit in knowing what is wrong;\nhe who receives what is said in a generous and friendly spirit will be\nall the better for it.\n\nATHENIAN: Very good; however, I am not going to say anything against\nyour laws until to the best of my ability I have examined them, but I am\ngoing to raise doubts about them. For you are the only people known to\nus, whether Greek or barbarian, whom the legislator commanded to eschew\nall great pleasures and amusements and never to touch them; whereas\nin the matter of pains or fears which we have just been discussing, he\nthought that they who from infancy had always avoided pains and fears\nand sorrows, when they were compelled to face them would run away from\nthose who were hardened in them, and would become their subjects. Now\nthe legislator ought to have considered that this was equally true of\npleasure; he should have said to himself, that if our citizens are from\ntheir youth upward unacquainted with the greatest pleasures, and unused\nto endure amid the temptations of pleasure, and are not disciplined\nto refrain from all things evil, the sweet feeling of pleasure will\novercome them just as fear would overcome the former class; and in\nanother, and even a worse manner, they will be the slaves of those\nwho are able to endure amid pleasures, and have had the opportunity of\nenjoying them, they being often the worst of mankind. One half of their\nsouls will be a slave, the other half free; and they will not be worthy\nto be called in the true sense men and freemen. Tell me whether you\nassent to my words?\n\nCLEINIAS: On first hearing, what you say appears to be the truth; but to\nbe hasty in coming to a conclusion about such important matters would be\nvery childish and simple.\n\nATHENIAN: Suppose, Cleinias and Megillus, that we consider the virtue\nwhich follows next of those which we intended to discuss (for after\ncourage comes temperance), what institutions shall we find relating to\ntemperance, either in Crete or Lacedaemon, which, like your military\ninstitutions, differ from those of any ordinary state.\n\nMEGILLUS: That is not an easy question to answer; still I should say\nthat the common meals and gymnastic exercises have been excellently\ndevised for the promotion both of temperance and courage.\n\nATHENIAN: There seems to be a difficulty, Stranger, with regard to\nstates, in making words and facts coincide so that there can be no\ndispute about them. As in the human body, the regimen which does good in\none way does harm in another; and we can hardly say that any one course\nof treatment is adapted to a particular constitution. Now the gymnasia\nand common meals do a great deal of good, and yet they are a source of\nevil in civil troubles; as is shown in the case of the Milesian, and\nBoeotian, and Thurian youth, among whom these institutions seem always\nto have had a tendency to degrade the ancient and natural custom of love\nbelow the level, not only of man, but of the beasts. The charge may be\nfairly brought against your cities above all others, and is true also\nof most other states which especially cultivate gymnastics. Whether\nsuch matters are to be regarded jestingly or seriously, I think that\nthe pleasure is to be deemed natural which arises out of the intercourse\nbetween men and women; but that the intercourse of men with men, or of\nwomen with women, is contrary to nature, and that the bold attempt was\noriginally due to unbridled lust. The Cretans are always accused of\nhaving invented the story of Ganymede and Zeus because they wanted\nto justify themselves in the enjoyment of unnatural pleasures by the\npractice of the god whom they believe to have been their lawgiver.\nLeaving the story, we may observe that any speculation about laws turns\nalmost entirely on pleasure and pain, both in states and in individuals:\nthese are two fountains which nature lets flow, and he who draws from\nthem where and when, and as much as he ought, is happy; and this\nholds of men and animals--of individuals as well as states; and he who\nindulges in them ignorantly and at the wrong time, is the reverse of\nhappy.\n\nMEGILLUS: I admit, Stranger, that your words are well spoken, and I\nhardly know what to say in answer to you; but still I think that the\nSpartan lawgiver was quite right in forbidding pleasure. Of the Cretan\nlaws, I shall leave the defence to my Cnosian friend. But the laws of\nSparta, in as far as they relate to pleasure, appear to me to be the\nbest in the world; for that which leads mankind in general into the\nwildest pleasure and licence, and every other folly, the law has clean\ndriven out; and neither in the country nor in towns which are under the\ncontrol of Sparta, will you find revelries and the many incitements of\nevery kind of pleasure which accompany them; and any one who meets a\ndrunken and disorderly person, will immediately have him most severely\npunished, and will not let him off on any pretence, not even at the time\nof a Dionysiac festival; although I have remarked that this may happen\nat your performances 'on the cart,' as they are called; and among our\nTarentine colonists I have seen the whole city drunk at a Dionysiac\nfestival; but nothing of the sort happens among us.\n\nATHENIAN: O Lacedaemonian Stranger, these festivities are praiseworthy\nwhere there is a spirit of endurance, but are very senseless when they\nare under no regulations. In order to retaliate, an Athenian has only\nto point out the licence which exists among your women. To all such\naccusations, whether they are brought against the Tarentines, or us, or\nyou, there is one answer which exonerates the practice in question from\nimpropriety. When a stranger expresses wonder at the singularity of\nwhat he sees, any inhabitant will naturally answer him:--Wonder not, O\nstranger; this is our custom, and you may very likely have some other\ncustom about the same things. Now we are speaking, my friends, not\nabout men in general, but about the merits and defects of the lawgivers\nthemselves. Let us then discourse a little more at length about\nintoxication, which is a very important subject, and will seriously task\nthe discrimination of the legislator. I am not speaking of drinking,\nor not drinking, wine at all, but of intoxication. Are we to follow the\ncustom of the Scythians, and Persians, and Carthaginians, and Celts, and\nIberians, and Thracians, who are all warlike nations, or that of your\ncountrymen, for they, as you say, altogether abstain? But the Scythians\nand Thracians, both men and women, drink unmixed wine, which they pour\non their garments, and this they think a happy and glorious institution.\nThe Persians, again, are much given to other practices of luxury which\nyou reject, but they have more moderation in them than the Thracians and\nScythians.\n\nMEGILLUS: O best of men, we have only to take arms into our hands, and\nwe send all these nations flying before us.\n\nATHENIAN: Nay, my good friend, do not say that; there have been, as\nthere always will be, flights and pursuits of which no account can be\ngiven, and therefore we cannot say that victory or defeat in battle\naffords more than a doubtful proof of the goodness or badness of\ninstitutions. For when the greater states conquer and enslave the\nlesser, as the Syracusans have done the Locrians, who appear to be the\nbest-governed people in their part of the world, or as the Athenians\nhave done the Ceans (and there are ten thousand other instances of the\nsame sort of thing), all this is not to the point; let us endeavour\nrather to form a conclusion about each institution in itself and say\nnothing, at present, of victories and defeats. Let us only say that such\nand such a custom is honourable, and another not. And first permit me to\ntell you how good and bad are to be estimated in reference to these very\nmatters.\n\nMEGILLUS: How do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: All those who are ready at a moment's notice to praise or\ncensure any practice which is matter of discussion, seem to me to\nproceed in a wrong way. Let me give you an illustration of what I\nmean:--You may suppose a person to be praising wheat as a good kind\nof food, whereupon another person instantly blames wheat, without ever\nenquiring into its effect or use, or in what way, or to whom, or with\nwhat, or in what state and how, wheat is to be given. And that is just\nwhat we are doing in this discussion. At the very mention of the word\nintoxication, one side is ready with their praises and the other with\ntheir censures; which is absurd. For either side adduce their witnesses\nand approvers, and some of us think that we speak with authority because\nwe have many witnesses; and others because they see those who abstain\nconquering in battle, and this again is disputed by us. Now I cannot say\nthat I shall be satisfied, if we go on discussing each of the remaining\nlaws in the same way. And about this very point of intoxication I should\nlike to speak in another way, which I hold to be the right one; for if\nnumber is to be the criterion, are there not myriads upon myriads of\nnations ready to dispute the point with you, who are only two cities?\n\nMEGILLUS: I shall gladly welcome any method of enquiry which is right.\n\nATHENIAN: Let me put the matter thus:--Suppose a person to praise the\nkeeping of goats, and the creatures themselves as capital things to\nhave, and then some one who had seen goats feeding without a goatherd\nin cultivated spots, and doing mischief, were to censure a goat or any\nother animal who has no keeper, or a bad keeper, would there be any\nsense or justice in such censure?\n\nMEGILLUS: Certainly not.\n\nATHENIAN: Does a captain require only to have nautical knowledge in\norder to be a good captain, whether he is sea-sick or not? What do you\nsay?\n\nMEGILLUS: I say that he is not a good captain if, although he have\nnautical skill, he is liable to sea-sickness.\n\nATHENIAN: And what would you say of the commander of an army? Will he be\nable to command merely because he has military skill if he be a coward,\nwho, when danger comes, is sick and drunk with fear?\n\nMEGILLUS: Impossible.\n\nATHENIAN: And what if besides being a coward he has no skill?\n\nMEGILLUS: He is a miserable fellow, not fit to be a commander of men,\nbut only of old women.\n\nATHENIAN: And what would you say of some one who blames or praises any\nsort of meeting which is intended by nature to have a ruler, and is well\nenough when under his presidency? The critic, however, has never seen\nthe society meeting together at an orderly feast under the control of a\npresident, but always without a ruler or with a bad one:--when observers\nof this class praise or blame such meetings, are we to suppose that what\nthey say is of any value?\n\nMEGILLUS: Certainly not, if they have never seen or been present at such\na meeting when rightly ordered.\n\nATHENIAN: Reflect; may not banqueters and banquets be said to constitute\na kind of meeting?\n\nMEGILLUS: Of course.\n\nATHENIAN: And did any one ever see this sort of convivial meeting\nrightly ordered? Of course you two will answer that you have never seen\nthem at all, because they are not customary or lawful in your country;\nbut I have come across many of them in many different places, and\nmoreover I have made enquiries about them wherever I went, as I may say,\nand never did I see or hear of anything of the kind which was carried on\naltogether rightly; in some few particulars they might be right, but in\ngeneral they were utterly wrong.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean, Stranger, by this remark? Explain. For we,\nas you say, from our inexperience in such matters, might very likely\nnot know, even if they came in our way, what was right or wrong in such\nsocieties.\n\nATHENIAN: Likely enough; then let me try to be your instructor: You\nwould acknowledge, would you not, that in all gatherings of mankind, of\nwhatever sort, there ought to be a leader?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly I should.\n\nATHENIAN: And we were saying just now, that when men are at war the\nleader ought to be a brave man?\n\nCLEINIAS: We were.\n\nATHENIAN: The brave man is less likely than the coward to be disturbed\nby fears?\n\nCLEINIAS: That again is true.\n\nATHENIAN: And if there were a possibility of having a general of an\narmy who was absolutely fearless and imperturbable, should we not by all\nmeans appoint him?\n\nCLEINIAS: Assuredly.\n\nATHENIAN: Now, however, we are speaking not of a general who is to\ncommand an army, when foe meets foe in time of war, but of one who is to\nregulate meetings of another sort, when friend meets friend in time of\npeace.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: And that sort of meeting, if attended with drunkenness, is apt\nto be unquiet.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly; the reverse of quiet.\n\nATHENIAN: In the first place, then, the revellers as well as the\nsoldiers will require a ruler?\n\nCLEINIAS: To be sure; no men more so.\n\nATHENIAN: And we ought, if possible, to provide them with a quiet ruler?\n\nCLEINIAS: Of course.\n\nATHENIAN: And he should be a man who understands society; for his duty\nis to preserve the friendly feelings which exist among the company\nat the time, and to increase them for the future by his use of the\noccasion.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Must we not appoint a sober man and a wise to be our master of\nthe revels? For if the ruler of drinkers be himself young and drunken,\nand not over-wise, only by some special good fortune will he be saved\nfrom doing some great evil.\n\nCLEINIAS: It will be by a singular good fortune that he is saved.\n\nATHENIAN: Now suppose such associations to be framed in the best way\npossible in states, and that some one blames the very fact of their\nexistence--he may very likely be right. But if he blames a practice\nwhich he only sees very much mismanaged, he shows in the first place\nthat he is not aware of the mismanagement, and also not aware that\neverything done in this way will turn out to be wrong, because done\nwithout the superintendence of a sober ruler. Do you not see that a\ndrunken pilot or a drunken ruler of any sort will ruin ship, chariot,\narmy--anything, in short, of which he has the direction?\n\nCLEINIAS: The last remark is very true, Stranger; and I see quite\nclearly the advantage of an army having a good leader--he will give\nvictory in war to his followers, which is a very great advantage; and\nso of other things. But I do not see any similar advantage which either\nindividuals or states gain from the good management of a feast; and I\nwant you to tell me what great good will be effected, supposing that\nthis drinking ordinance is duly established.\n\nATHENIAN: If you mean to ask what great good accrues to the state from\nthe right training of a single youth, or of a single chorus--when the\nquestion is put in that form, we cannot deny that the good is not very\ngreat in any particular instance. But if you ask what is the good of\neducation in general, the answer is easy--that education makes good\nmen, and that good men act nobly, and conquer their enemies in battle,\nbecause they are good. Education certainly gives victory, although\nvictory sometimes produces forgetfulness of education; for many have\ngrown insolent from victory in war, and this insolence has engendered in\nthem innumerable evils; and many a victory has been and will be suicidal\nto the victors; but education is never suicidal.\n\nCLEINIAS: You seem to imply, my friend, that convivial meetings, when\nrightly ordered, are an important element of education.\n\nATHENIAN: Certainly I do.\n\nCLEINIAS: And can you show that what you have been saying is true?\n\nATHENIAN: To be absolutely sure of the truth of matters concerning which\nthere are many opinions, is an attribute of the Gods not given to man,\nStranger; but I shall be very happy to tell you what I think, especially\nas we are now proposing to enter on a discussion concerning laws and\nconstitutions.\n\nCLEINIAS: Your opinion, Stranger, about the questions which are now\nbeing raised, is precisely what we want to hear.\n\nATHENIAN: Very good; I will try to find a way of explaining my meaning,\nand you shall try to have the gift of understanding me. But first let me\nmake an apology. The Athenian citizen is reputed among all the Hellenes\nto be a great talker, whereas Sparta is renowned for brevity, and the\nCretans have more wit than words. Now I am afraid of appearing to elicit\na very long discourse out of very small materials. For drinking indeed\nmay appear to be a slight matter, and yet is one which cannot be rightly\nordered according to nature, without correct principles of music; these\nare\n\nnecessary to any clear or satisfactory treatment of the subject, and\nmusic again runs up into education generally, and there is much to be\nsaid about all this. What would you say then to leaving these matters\nfor the present, and passing on to some other question of law?\n\nMEGILLUS: O Athenian Stranger, let me tell you what perhaps you do not\nknow, that our family is the proxenus of your state. I imagine that\nfrom their earliest youth all boys, when they are told that they are the\nproxeni of a particular state, feel kindly towards their second country;\nand this has certainly been my own feeling. I can well remember from the\ndays of my boyhood, how, when any Lacedaemonians praised or blamed\nthe Athenians, they used to say to me,--'See, Megillus, how ill or how\nwell,' as the case might be, 'has your state treated us'; and having\nalways had to fight your battles against detractors when I heard you\nassailed, I became warmly attached to you. And I always like to hear\nthe Athenian tongue spoken; the common saying is quite true, that a good\nAthenian is more than ordinarily good, for he is the only man who is\nfreely and genuinely good by the divine inspiration of his own nature,\nand is not manufactured. Therefore be assured that I shall like to hear\nyou say whatever you have to say.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes, Stranger; and when you have heard me speak, say boldly\nwhat is in your thoughts. Let me remind you of a tie which unites you to\nCrete. You must have heard here the story of the prophet Epimenides, who\nwas of my family, and came to Athens ten years before the Persian war,\nin accordance with the response of the Oracle, and offered certain\nsacrifices which the God commanded. The Athenians were at that time in\ndread of the Persian invasion; and he said that for ten years they would\nnot come, and that when they came, they would go away again without\naccomplishing any of their objects, and would suffer more evil than they\ninflicted. At that time my forefathers formed ties of hospitality with\nyou; thus ancient is the friendship which I and my parents have had for\nyou.\n\nATHENIAN: You seem to be quite ready to listen; and I am also ready\nto perform as much as I can of an almost impossible task, which I will\nnevertheless attempt. At the outset of the discussion, let me define the\nnature and power of education; for this is the way by which our argument\nmust travel onwards to the God Dionysus.\n\nCLEINIAS: Let us proceed, if you please.\n\nATHENIAN: Well, then, if I tell you what are my notions of education,\nwill you consider whether they satisfy you?\n\nCLEINIAS: Let us hear.\n\nATHENIAN: According to my view, any one who would be good at anything\nmust practise that thing from his youth upwards, both in sport and\nearnest, in its several branches: for example, he who is to be a good\nbuilder, should play at building children's houses; he who is to be a\ngood husbandman, at tilling the ground; and those who have the care of\ntheir education should provide them when young with mimic tools. They\nshould learn beforehand the knowledge which they will afterwards require\nfor their art. For example, the future carpenter should learn to measure\nor apply the line in play; and the future warrior should learn riding,\nor some other exercise, for amusement, and the teacher should endeavour\nto direct the children's inclinations and pleasures, by the help of\namusements, to their final aim in life. The most important part of\neducation is right training in the nursery. The soul of the child in his\nplay should be guided to the love of that sort of excellence in which\nwhen he grows up to manhood he will have to be perfected. Do you agree\nwith me thus far?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Then let us not leave the meaning of education ambiguous or\nill-defined. At present, when we speak in terms of praise or blame about\nthe bringing-up of each person, we call one man educated and another\nuneducated, although the uneducated man may be sometimes very well\neducated for the calling of a retail trader, or of a captain of a ship,\nand the like. For we are not speaking of education in this narrower\nsense, but of that other education in virtue from youth upwards, which\nmakes a man eagerly pursue the ideal perfection of citizenship, and\nteaches him how rightly to rule and how to obey. This is the only\neducation which, upon our view, deserves the name; that other sort of\ntraining, which aims at the acquisition of wealth or bodily strength,\nor mere cleverness apart from intelligence and justice, is mean and\nilliberal, and is not worthy to be called education at all. But let us\nnot quarrel with one another about a word, provided that the proposition\nwhich has just been granted hold good: to wit, that those who are\nrightly educated generally become good men. Neither must we cast a\nslight upon education, which is the first and fairest thing that the\nbest of men can ever have, and which, though liable to take a wrong\ndirection, is capable of reformation. And this work of reformation is\nthe great business of every man while he lives.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true; and we entirely agree with you.\n\nATHENIAN: And we agreed before that they are good men who are able to\nrule themselves, and bad men who are not.\n\nCLEINIAS: You are quite right.\n\nATHENIAN: Let me now proceed, if I can, to clear up the subject a little\nfurther by an illustration which I will offer you.\n\nCLEINIAS: Proceed.\n\nATHENIAN: Do we not consider each of ourselves to be one?\n\nCLEINIAS: We do.\n\nATHENIAN: And each one of us has in his bosom two counsellors, both\nfoolish and also antagonistic; of which we call the one pleasure, and\nthe other pain.\n\nCLEINIAS: Exactly.\n\nATHENIAN: Also there are opinions about the future, which have the\ngeneral name of expectations; and the specific name of fear, when the\nexpectation is of pain; and of hope, when of pleasure; and further,\nthere is reflection about the good or evil of them, and this, when\nembodied in a decree by the State, is called Law.\n\nCLEINIAS: I am hardly able to follow you; proceed, however, as if I\nwere.\n\nMEGILLUS: I am in the like case.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us look at the matter thus: May we not conceive each of us\nliving beings to be a puppet of the Gods, either their plaything only,\nor created with a purpose--which of the two we cannot certainly know?\nBut we do know, that these affections in us are like cords and strings,\nwhich pull us different and opposite ways, and to opposite actions; and\nherein lies the difference between virtue and vice. According to the\nargument there is one among these cords which every man ought to grasp\nand never let go, but to pull with it against all the rest; and this is\nthe sacred and golden cord of reason, called by us the common law of the\nState; there are others which are hard and of iron, but this one is soft\nbecause golden; and there are several other kinds. Now we ought always\nto cooperate with the lead of the best, which is law. For inasmuch as\nreason is beautiful and gentle, and not violent, her rule must needs\nhave ministers in order to help the golden principle in vanquishing the\nother principles. And thus the moral of the tale about our being puppets\nwill not have been lost, and the meaning of the expression 'superior\nor inferior to a man's self' will become clearer; and the individual,\nattaining to right reason in this matter of pulling the strings of the\npuppet, should live according to its rule; while the city, receiving the\nsame from some god or from one who has knowledge of these things, should\nembody it in a law, to be her guide in her dealings with herself and\nwith other states. In this way virtue and vice will be more clearly\ndistinguished by us. And when they have become clearer, education and\nother institutions will in like manner become clearer; and in particular\nthat question of convivial entertainment, which may seem, perhaps, to\nhave been a very trifling matter, and to have taken a great many more\nwords than were necessary.\n\nCLEINIAS: Perhaps, however, the theme may turn out not to be unworthy of\nthe length of discourse.\n\nATHENIAN: Very good; let us proceed with any enquiry which really bears\non our present object.\n\nCLEINIAS: Proceed.\n\nATHENIAN: Suppose that we give this puppet of ours drink,--what will be\nthe effect on him?\n\nCLEINIAS: Having what in view do you ask that question?\n\nATHENIAN: Nothing as yet; but I ask generally, when the puppet is\nbrought to the drink, what sort of result is likely to follow. I will\nendeavour to explain my meaning more clearly: what I am now asking is\nthis--Does the drinking of wine heighten and increase pleasures and\npains, and passions and loves?\n\nCLEINIAS: Very greatly.\n\nATHENIAN: And are perception and memory, and opinion and prudence,\nheightened and increased? Do not these qualities entirely desert a man\nif he becomes saturated with drink?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes, they entirely desert him.\n\nATHENIAN: Does he not return to the state of soul in which he was when a\nyoung child?\n\nCLEINIAS: He does.\n\nATHENIAN: Then at that time he will have the least control over himself?\n\nCLEINIAS: The least.\n\nATHENIAN: And will he not be in a most wretched plight?\n\nCLEINIAS: Most wretched.\n\nATHENIAN: Then not only an old man but also a drunkard becomes a second\ntime a child?\n\nCLEINIAS: Well said, Stranger.\n\nATHENIAN: Is there any argument which will prove to us that we ought to\nencourage the taste for drinking instead of doing all we can to avoid\nit?\n\nCLEINIAS: I suppose that there is; you at any rate, were just now saying\nthat you were ready to maintain such a doctrine.\n\nATHENIAN: True, I was; and I am ready still, seeing that you have both\ndeclared that you are anxious to hear me.\n\nCLEINIAS: To be sure we are, if only for the strangeness of the paradox,\nwhich asserts that a man ought of his own accord to plunge into utter\ndegradation.\n\nATHENIAN: Are you speaking of the soul?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: And what would you say about the body, my friend? Are you not\nsurprised at any one of his own accord bringing upon himself deformity,\nleanness, ugliness, decrepitude?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Yet when a man goes of his own accord to a doctor's shop, and\ntakes medicine, is he not aware that soon, and for many days afterwards,\nhe will be in a state of body which he would die rather than accept\nas the permanent condition of his life? Are not those who train in\ngymnasia, at first beginning reduced to a state of weakness?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes, all that is well known.\n\nATHENIAN: Also that they go of their own accord for the sake of the\nsubsequent benefit?\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: And we may conceive this to be true in the same way of other\npractices?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And the same view may be taken of the pastime of drinking\nwine, if we are right in supposing that the same good effect follows?\n\nCLEINIAS: To be sure.\n\nATHENIAN: If such convivialities should turn out to have any advantage\nequal in importance to that of gymnastic, they are in their very nature\nto be preferred to mere bodily exercise, inasmuch as they have no\naccompaniment of pain.\n\nCLEINIAS: True; but I hardly think that we shall be able to discover any\nsuch benefits to be derived from them.\n\nATHENIAN: That is just what we must endeavour to show. And let me ask\nyou a question:--Do we not distinguish two kinds of fear, which are very\ndifferent?\n\nCLEINIAS: What are they?\n\nATHENIAN: There is the fear of expected evil.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: And there is the fear of an evil reputation; we are afraid of\nbeing thought evil, because we do or say some dishonourable thing, which\nfear we and all men term shame.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: These are the two fears, as I called them; one of which is the\nopposite of pain and other fears, and the opposite also of the greatest\nand most numerous sort of pleasures.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: And does not the legislator and every one who is good for\nanything, hold this fear in the greatest honour? This is what he terms\nreverence, and the confidence which is the reverse of this he terms\ninsolence; and the latter he always deems to be a very great evil both\nto individuals and to states.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: Does not this kind of fear preserve us in many important ways?\nWhat is there which so surely gives victory and safety in war? For there\nare two things which give victory--confidence before enemies, and fear\nof disgrace before friends.\n\nCLEINIAS: There are.\n\nATHENIAN: Then each of us should be fearless and also fearful; and why\nwe should be either has now been determined.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And when we want to make any one fearless, we and the law\nbring him face to face with many fears.\n\nCLEINIAS: Clearly.\n\nATHENIAN: And when we want to make him rightly fearful, must we not\nintroduce him to shameless pleasures, and train him to take up arms\nagainst them, and to overcome them? Or does this principle apply to\ncourage only, and must he who would be perfect in valour fight against\nand overcome his own natural character,--since if he be unpractised and\ninexperienced in such conflicts, he will not be half the man which he\nmight have been,--and are we to suppose, that with temperance it is\notherwise, and that he who has never fought with the shameless and\nunrighteous temptations of his pleasures and lusts, and conquered them,\nin earnest and in play, by word, deed, and act, will still be perfectly\ntemperate?\n\nCLEINIAS: A most unlikely supposition.\n\nATHENIAN: Suppose that some God had given a fear-potion to men, and\nthat the more a man drank of this the more he regarded himself at\nevery draught as a child of misfortune, and that he feared everything\nhappening or about to happen to him; and that at last the most\ncourageous of men utterly lost his presence of mind for a time, and\nonly came to himself again when he had slept off the influence of the\ndraught.\n\nCLEINIAS: But has such a draught, Stranger, ever really been known among\nmen?\n\nATHENIAN: No; but, if there had been, might not such a draught have been\nof use to the legislator as a test of courage? Might we not go and say\nto him, 'O legislator, whether you are legislating for the Cretan, or\nfor any other state, would you not like to have a touchstone of the\ncourage and cowardice of your citizens?'\n\nCLEINIAS: 'I should,' will be the answer of every one.\n\nATHENIAN: 'And you would rather have a touchstone in which there is no\nrisk and no great danger than the reverse?'\n\nCLEINIAS: In that proposition every one may safely agree.\n\nATHENIAN: 'And in order to make use of the draught, you would lead them\namid these imaginary terrors, and prove them, when the affection of fear\nwas working upon them, and compel them to be fearless, exhorting and\nadmonishing them; and also honouring them, but dishonouring any one who\nwill not be persuaded by you to be in all respects such as you command\nhim; and if he underwent the trial well and manfully, you would let him\ngo unscathed; but if ill, you would inflict a punishment upon him? Or\nwould you abstain from using the potion altogether, although you have no\nreason for abstaining?'\n\nCLEINIAS: He would be certain, Stranger, to use the potion.\n\nATHENIAN: This would be a mode of testing and training which would\nbe wonderfully easy in comparison with those now in use, and might be\napplied to a single person, or to a few, or indeed to any number; and\nhe would do well who provided himself with the potion only, rather than\nwith any number of other things, whether he preferred to be by himself\nin solitude, and there contend with his fears, because he was ashamed to\nbe seen by the eye of man until he was perfect; or trusting to the force\nof his own nature and habits, and believing that he had been already\ndisciplined sufficiently, he did not hesitate to train himself in\ncompany with any number of others, and display his power in conquering\nthe irresistible change effected by the draught--his virtue being such,\nthat he never in any instance fell into any great unseemliness, but was\nalways himself, and left off before he arrived at the last cup, fearing\nthat he, like all other men, might be overcome by the potion.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes, Stranger, in that last case, too, he might equally show\nhis self-control.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us return to the lawgiver, and say to him:--'Well,\nlawgiver, there is certainly no such fear-potion which man has either\nreceived from the Gods or himself discovered; for witchcraft has no\nplace at our board. But is there any potion which might serve as a test\nof overboldness and excessive and indiscreet boasting?\n\nCLEINIAS: I suppose that he will say, Yes,--meaning that wine is such a\npotion.\n\nATHENIAN: Is not the effect of this quite the opposite of the effect of\nthe other? When a man drinks wine he begins to be better pleased with\nhimself, and the more he drinks the more he is filled full of brave\nhopes, and conceit of his power, and at last the string of his tongue\nis loosened, and fancying himself wise, he is brimming over with\nlawlessness, and has no more fear or respect, and is ready to do or say\nanything.\n\nCLEINIAS: I think that every one will admit the truth of your\ndescription.\n\nMEGILLUS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Now, let us remember, as we were saying, that there are two\nthings which should be cultivated in the soul: first, the greatest\ncourage; secondly, the greatest fear--\n\nCLEINIAS: Which you said to be characteristic of reverence, if I am not\nmistaken.\n\nATHENIAN: Thank you for reminding me. But now, as the habit of courage\nand fearlessness is to be trained amid fears, let us consider whether\nthe opposite quality is not also to be trained among opposites.\n\nCLEINIAS: That is probably the case.\n\nATHENIAN: There are times and seasons at which we are by nature more\nthan commonly valiant and bold; now we ought to train ourselves on these\noccasions to be as free from impudence and shamelessness as possible,\nand to be afraid to say or suffer or do anything that is base.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: Are not the moments in which we are apt to be bold and\nshameless such as these?--when we are under the influence of anger,\nlove, pride, ignorance, avarice, cowardice? or when wealth, beauty,\nstrength, and all the intoxicating workings of pleasure madden us? What\nis better adapted than the festive use of wine, in the first place to\ntest, and in the second place to train the character of a man, if care\nbe taken in the use of it? What is there cheaper, or more innocent? For\ndo but consider which is the greater risk:--Would you rather test a man\nof a morose and savage nature, which is the source of ten thousand acts\nof injustice, by making bargains with him at a risk to yourself, or by\nhaving him as a companion at the festival of Dionysus? Or would you, if\nyou wanted to apply a touchstone to a man who is prone to love, entrust\nyour wife, or your sons, or daughters to him, perilling your dearest\ninterests in order to have a view of the condition of his soul? I might\nmention numberless cases, in which the advantage would be manifest of\ngetting to know a character in sport, and without paying dearly for\nexperience. And I do not believe that either a Cretan, or any other\nman, will doubt that such a test is a fair test, and safer, cheaper, and\nspeedier than any other.\n\nCLEINIAS: That is certainly true.\n\nATHENIAN: And this knowledge of the natures and habits of men's souls\nwill be of the greatest use in that art which has the management of\nthem; and that art, if I am not mistaken, is politics.\n\nCLEINIAS: Exactly so.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK II.\n\nATHENIAN: And now we have to consider whether the insight into human\nnature is the only benefit derived from well-ordered potations, or\nwhether there are not other advantages great and much to be desired. The\nargument seems to imply that there are. But how and in what way these\nare to be attained, will have to be considered attentively, or we may be\nentangled in error.\n\nCLEINIAS: Proceed.\n\nATHENIAN: Let me once more recall our doctrine of right education;\nwhich, if I am not mistaken, depends on the due regulation of convivial\nintercourse.\n\nCLEINIAS: You talk rather grandly.\n\nATHENIAN: Pleasure and pain I maintain to be the first perceptions of\nchildren, and I say that they are the forms under which virtue and\nvice are originally present to them. As to wisdom and true and fixed\nopinions, happy is the man who acquires them, even when declining in\nyears; and we may say that he who possesses them, and the blessings\nwhich are contained in them, is a perfect man. Now I mean by education\nthat training which is given by suitable habits to the first instincts\nof virtue in children;--when pleasure, and friendship, and pain, and\nhatred, are rightly implanted in souls not yet capable of understanding\nthe nature of them, and who find them, after they have attained reason,\nto be in harmony with her. This harmony of the soul, taken as a whole,\nis virtue; but the particular training in respect of pleasure and pain,\nwhich leads you always to hate what you ought to hate, and love what you\nought to love from the beginning of life to the end, may be separated\noff; and, in my view, will be rightly called education.\n\nCLEINIAS: I think, Stranger, that you are quite right in all that you\nhave said and are saying about education.\n\nATHENIAN: I am glad to hear that you agree with me; for, indeed, the\ndiscipline of pleasure and pain which, when rightly ordered, is a\nprinciple of education, has been often relaxed and corrupted in human\nlife. And the Gods, pitying the toils which our race is born to undergo,\nhave appointed holy festivals, wherein men alternate rest with labour;\nand have given them the Muses and Apollo, the leader of the Muses, and\nDionysus, to be companions in their revels, that they may improve their\neducation by taking part in the festivals of the Gods, and with their\nhelp. I should like to know whether a common saying is in our opinion\ntrue to nature or not. For men say that the young of all creatures\ncannot be quiet in their bodies or in their voices; they are always\nwanting to move and cry out; some leaping and skipping, and overflowing\nwith sportiveness and delight at something, others uttering all sorts of\ncries. But, whereas the animals have no perception of order or disorder\nin their movements, that is, of rhythm or harmony, as they are\ncalled, to us, the Gods, who, as we say, have been appointed to be our\ncompanions in the dance, have given the pleasurable sense of harmony and\nrhythm; and so they stir us into life, and we follow them, joining hands\ntogether in dances and songs; and these they call choruses, which is a\nterm naturally expressive of cheerfulness. Shall we begin, then, with\nthe acknowledgment that education is first given through Apollo and the\nMuses? What do you say?\n\nCLEINIAS: I assent.\n\nATHENIAN: And the uneducated is he who has not been trained in the\nchorus, and the educated is he who has been well trained?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And the chorus is made up of two parts, dance and song?\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: Then he who is well educated will be able to sing and dance\nwell?\n\nCLEINIAS: I suppose that he will.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us see; what are we saying?\n\nCLEINIAS: What?\n\nATHENIAN: He sings well and dances well; now must we add that he sings\nwhat is good and dances what is good?\n\nCLEINIAS: Let us make the addition.\n\nATHENIAN: We will suppose that he knows the good to be good, and the bad\nto be bad, and makes use of them accordingly: which now is the better\ntrained in dancing and music--he who is able to move his body and to\nuse his voice in what is understood to be the right manner, but has no\ndelight in good or hatred of evil; or he who is incorrect in gesture and\nvoice, but is right in his sense of pleasure and pain, and welcomes what\nis good, and is offended at what is evil?\n\nCLEINIAS: There is a great difference, Stranger, in the two kinds of\neducation.\n\nATHENIAN: If we three know what is good in song and dance, then we truly\nknow also who is educated and who is uneducated; but if not, then we\ncertainly shall not know wherein lies the safeguard of education, and\nwhether there is any or not.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us follow the scent like hounds, and go in pursuit of\nbeauty of figure, and melody, and song, and dance; if these escape us,\nthere will be no use in talking about true education, whether Hellenic\nor barbarian.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: And what is beauty of figure, or beautiful melody? When a\nmanly soul is in trouble, and when a cowardly soul is in similar\ncase, are they likely to use the same figures and gestures, or to give\nutterance to the same sounds?\n\nCLEINIAS: How can they, when the very colours of their faces differ?\n\nATHENIAN: Good, my friend; I may observe, however, in passing, that in\nmusic there certainly are figures and there are melodies: and music is\nconcerned with harmony and rhythm, so that you may speak of a melody or\nfigure having good rhythm or good harmony--the term is correct enough;\nbut to speak metaphorically of a melody or figure having a 'good\ncolour,' as the masters of choruses do, is not allowable, although\nyou can speak of the melodies or figures of the brave and the coward,\npraising the one and censuring the other. And not to be tedious, let us\nsay that the figures and melodies which are expressive of virtue of soul\nor body, or of images of virtue, are without exception good, and those\nwhich are expressive of vice are the reverse of good.\n\nCLEINIAS: Your suggestion is excellent; and let us answer that these\nthings are so.\n\nATHENIAN: Once more, are all of us equally delighted with every sort of\ndance?\n\nCLEINIAS: Far otherwise.\n\nATHENIAN: What, then, leads us astray? Are beautiful things not the same\nto us all, or are they the same in themselves, but not in our opinion\nof them? For no one will admit that forms of vice in the dance are more\nbeautiful than forms of virtue, or that he himself delights in the forms\nof vice, and others in a muse of another character. And yet most persons\nsay, that the excellence of music is to give pleasure to our souls.\nBut this is intolerable and blasphemous; there is, however, a much more\nplausible account of the delusion.\n\nCLEINIAS: What?\n\nATHENIAN: The adaptation of art to the characters of men. Choric\nmovements are imitations of manners occurring in various actions,\nfortunes, dispositions,--each particular is imitated, and those to whom\nthe words, or songs, or dances are suited, either by nature or habit\nor both, cannot help feeling pleasure in them and applauding them, and\ncalling them beautiful. But those whose natures, or ways, or habits are\nunsuited to them, cannot delight in them or applaud them, and they call\nthem base. There are others, again, whose natures are right and their\nhabits wrong, or whose habits are right and their natures wrong, and\nthey praise one thing, but are pleased at another. For they say that\nall these imitations are pleasant, but not good. And in the presence of\nthose whom they think wise, they are ashamed of dancing and singing in\nthe baser manner, or of deliberately lending any countenance to such\nproceedings; and yet, they have a secret pleasure in them.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: And is any harm done to the lover of vicious dances or songs,\nor any good done to the approver of the opposite sort of pleasure?\n\nCLEINIAS: I think that there is.\n\nATHENIAN: 'I think' is not the word, but I would say, rather, 'I\nam certain.' For must they not have the same effect as when a man\nassociates with bad characters, whom he likes and approves rather than\ndislikes, and only censures playfully because he has a suspicion of his\nown badness? In that case, he who takes pleasure in them will surely\nbecome like those in whom he takes pleasure, even though he be ashamed\nto praise them. And what greater good or evil can any destiny ever make\nus undergo?\n\nCLEINIAS: I know of none.\n\nATHENIAN: Then in a city which has good laws, or in future ages is to\nhave them, bearing in mind the instruction and amusement which are given\nby music, can we suppose that the poets are to be allowed to teach in\nthe dance anything which they themselves like, in the way of rhythm, or\nmelody, or words, to the young children of any well-conditioned parents?\nIs the poet to train his choruses as he pleases, without reference to\nvirtue or vice?\n\nCLEINIAS: That is surely quite unreasonable, and is not to be thought\nof.\n\nATHENIAN: And yet he may do this in almost any state with the exception\nof Egypt.\n\nCLEINIAS: And what are the laws about music and dancing in Egypt?\n\nATHENIAN: You will wonder when I tell you: Long ago they appear to have\nrecognized the very principle of which we are now speaking--that their\nyoung citizens must be habituated to forms and strains of virtue. These\nthey fixed, and exhibited the patterns of them in their temples; and\nno painter or artist is allowed to innovate upon them, or to leave the\ntraditional forms and invent new ones. To this day, no alteration is\nallowed either in these arts, or in music at all. And you will find that\ntheir works of art are painted or moulded in the same forms which\nthey had ten thousand years ago;--this is literally true and no\nexaggeration,--their ancient paintings and sculptures are not a whit\nbetter or worse than the work of to-day, but are made with just the same\nskill.\n\nCLEINIAS: How extraordinary!\n\nATHENIAN: I should rather say, How statesmanlike, how worthy of a\nlegislator! I know that other things in Egypt are not so well. But what\nI am telling you about music is true and deserving of consideration,\nbecause showing that a lawgiver may institute melodies which have a\nnatural truth and correctness without any fear of failure. To do this,\nhowever, must be the work of God, or of a divine person; in Egypt they\nhave a tradition that their ancient chants which have been preserved for\nso many ages are the composition of the Goddess Isis. And therefore, as\nI was saying, if a person can only find in any way the natural melodies,\nhe may confidently embody them in a fixed and legal form. For the love\nof novelty which arises out of pleasure in the new and weariness of the\nold, has not strength enough to corrupt the consecrated song and dance,\nunder the plea that they have become antiquated. At any rate, they are\nfar from being corrupted in Egypt.\n\nCLEINIAS: Your arguments seem to prove your point.\n\nATHENIAN: May we not confidently say that the true use of music and\nof choral festivities is as follows: We rejoice when we think that we\nprosper, and again we think that we prosper when we rejoice?\n\nCLEINIAS: Exactly.\n\nATHENIAN: And when rejoicing in our good fortune, we are unable to be\nstill?\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: Our young men break forth into dancing and singing, and we who\nare their elders deem that we are fulfilling our part in life when we\nlook on at them. Having lost our agility, we delight in their sports and\nmerry-making, because we love to think of our former selves; and gladly\ninstitute contests for those who are able to awaken in us the memory of\nour youth.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Is it altogether unmeaning to say, as the common people do\nabout festivals, that he should be adjudged the wisest of men, and the\nwinner of the palm, who gives us the greatest amount of pleasure and\nmirth? For on such occasions, and when mirth is the order of the day,\nought not he to be honoured most, and, as I was saying, bear the palm,\nwho gives most mirth to the greatest number? Now is this a true way of\nspeaking or of acting?\n\nCLEINIAS: Possibly.\n\nATHENIAN: But, my dear friend, let us distinguish between different\ncases, and not be hasty in forming a judgment: One way of considering\nthe question will be to imagine a festival at which there are\nentertainments of all sorts, including gymnastic, musical, and\nequestrian contests: the citizens are assembled; prizes are offered,\nand proclamation is made that any one who likes may enter the lists,\nand that he is to bear the palm who gives the most pleasure to the\nspectators--there is to be no regulation about the manner how; but he\nwho is most successful in giving pleasure is to be crowned victor, and\ndeemed to be the pleasantest of the candidates: What is likely to be the\nresult of such a proclamation?\n\nCLEINIAS: In what respect?\n\nATHENIAN: There would be various exhibitions: one man, like Homer, will\nexhibit a rhapsody, another a performance on the lute; one will have a\ntragedy, and another a comedy. Nor would there be anything astonishing\nin some one imagining that he could gain the prize by exhibiting a\npuppet-show. Suppose these competitors to meet, and not these only, but\ninnumerable others as well--can you tell me who ought to be the victor?\n\nCLEINIAS: I do not see how any one can answer you, or pretend to know,\nunless he has heard with his own ears the several competitors; the\nquestion is absurd.\n\nATHENIAN: Well, then, if neither of you can answer, shall I answer this\nquestion which you deem so absurd?\n\nCLEINIAS: By all means.\n\nATHENIAN: If very small children are to determine the question, they\nwill decide for the puppet show.\n\nCLEINIAS: Of course.\n\nATHENIAN: The older children will be advocates of comedy; educated\nwomen, and young men, and people in general, will favour tragedy.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very likely.\n\nATHENIAN: And I believe that we old men would have the greatest pleasure\nin hearing a rhapsodist recite well the Iliad and Odyssey, or one of\nthe Hesiodic poems, and would award the victory to him. But, who would\nreally be the victor?--that is the question.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: Clearly you and I will have to declare that those whom we old\nmen adjudge victors ought to win; for our ways are far and away better\nthan any which at present exist anywhere in the world.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Thus far I too should agree with the many, that the excellence\nof music is to be measured by pleasure. But the pleasure must not be\nthat of chance persons; the fairest music is that which delights the\nbest and best educated, and especially that which delights the one man\nwho is pre-eminent in virtue and education. And therefore the judges\nmust be men of character, for they will require both wisdom and courage;\nthe true judge must not draw his inspiration from the theatre, nor ought\nhe to be unnerved by the clamour of the many and his own incapacity;\nnor again, knowing the truth, ought he through cowardice and unmanliness\ncarelessly to deliver a lying judgment, with the very same lips which\nhave just appealed to the Gods before he judged. He is sitting not\nas the disciple of the theatre, but, in his proper place, as their\ninstructor, and he ought to be the enemy of all pandering to the\npleasure of the spectators. The ancient and common custom of Hellas,\nwhich still prevails in Italy and Sicily, did certainly leave the\njudgment to the body of spectators, who determined the victor by show of\nhands. But this custom has been the destruction of the poets; for they\nare now in the habit of composing with a view to please the bad taste\nof their judges, and the result is that the spectators instruct\nthemselves;--and also it has been the ruin of the theatre; they ought\nto be having characters put before them better than their own, and\nso receiving a higher pleasure, but now by their own act the opposite\nresult follows. What inference is to be drawn from all this? Shall I\ntell you?\n\nCLEINIAS: What?\n\nATHENIAN: The inference at which we arrive for the third or fourth time\nis, that education is the constraining and directing of youth towards\nthat right reason, which the law affirms, and which the experience of\nthe eldest and best has agreed to be truly right. In order, then, that\nthe soul of the child may not be habituated to feel joy and sorrow in\na manner at variance with the law, and those who obey the law, but may\nrather follow the law and rejoice and sorrow at the same things as the\naged--in order, I say, to produce this effect, chants appear to have\nbeen invented, which really enchant, and are designed to implant\nthat harmony of which we speak. And, because the mind of the child is\nincapable of enduring serious training, they are called plays and songs,\nand are performed in play; just as when men are sick and ailing in their\nbodies, their attendants give them wholesome diet in pleasant meats and\ndrinks, but unwholesome diet in disagreeable things, in order that they\nmay learn, as they ought, to like the one, and to dislike the other. And\nsimilarly the true legislator will persuade, and, if he cannot persuade,\nwill compel the poet to express, as he ought, by fair and noble words,\nin his rhythms, the figures, and in his melodies, the music of temperate\nand brave and in every way good men.\n\nCLEINIAS: But do you really imagine, Stranger, that this is the way in\nwhich poets generally compose in States at the present day? As far as I\ncan observe, except among us and among the Lacedaemonians, there are no\nregulations like those of which you speak; in other places novelties are\nalways being introduced in dancing and in music, generally not under the\nauthority of any law, but at the instigation of lawless pleasures; and\nthese pleasures are so far from being the same, as you describe the\nEgyptian to be, or having the same principles, that they are never the\nsame.\n\nATHENIAN: Most true, Cleinias; and I daresay that I may have expressed\nmyself obscurely, and so led you to imagine that I was speaking of\nsome really existing state of things, whereas I was only saying what\nregulations I would like to have about music; and hence there occurred\na misapprehension on your part. For when evils are far gone and\nirremediable, the task of censuring them is never pleasant, although at\ntimes necessary. But as we do not really differ, will you let me ask you\nwhether you consider such institutions to be more prevalent among the\nCretans and Lacedaemonians than among the other Hellenes?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly they are.\n\nATHENIAN: And if they were extended to the other Hellenes, would it be\nan improvement on the present state of things?\n\nCLEINIAS: A very great improvement, if the customs which prevail among\nthem were such as prevail among us and the Lacedaemonians, and such as\nyou were just now saying ought to prevail.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us see whether we understand one another:--Are not the\nprinciples of education and music which prevail among you as follows:\nyou compel your poets to say that the good man, if he be temperate and\njust, is fortunate and happy; and this whether he be great and strong or\nsmall and weak, and whether he be rich or poor; and, on the other hand,\nif he have a wealth passing that of Cinyras or Midas, and be unjust,\nhe is wretched and lives in misery? As the poet says, and with truth:\nI sing not, I care not about him who accomplishes all noble things,\nnot having justice; let him who 'draws near and stretches out his hand\nagainst his enemies be a just man.' But if he be unjust, I would not\nhave him 'look calmly upon bloody death,' nor 'surpass in swiftness the\nThracian Boreas;' and let no other thing that is called good ever be\nhis. For the goods of which the many speak are not really good: first\nin the catalogue is placed health, beauty next, wealth third; and then\ninnumerable others, as for example to have a keen eye or a quick ear,\nand in general to have all the senses perfect; or, again, to be a tyrant\nand do as you like; and the final consummation of happiness is to have\nacquired all these things, and when you have acquired them to become at\nonce immortal. But you and I say, that while to the just and holy all\nthese things are the best of possessions, to the unjust they are all,\nincluding even health, the greatest of evils. For in truth, to have\nsight, and hearing, and the use of the senses, or to live at all without\njustice and virtue, even though a man be rich in all the so-called goods\nof fortune, is the greatest of evils, if life be immortal; but not so\ngreat, if the bad man lives only a very short time. These are the truths\nwhich, if I am not mistaken, you will persuade or compel your poets to\nutter with suitable accompaniments of harmony and rhythm, and in these\nthey must train up your youth. Am I not right? For I plainly declare\nthat evils as they are termed are goods to the unjust, and only evils\nto the just, and that goods are truly good to the good, but evil to the\nevil. Let me ask again, Are you and I agreed about this?\n\nCLEINIAS: I think that we partly agree and partly do not.\n\nATHENIAN: When a man has health and wealth and a tyranny which lasts,\nand when he is pre-eminent in strength and courage, and has the gift of\nimmortality, and none of the so-called evils which counter-balance these\ngoods, but only the injustice and insolence of his own nature--of such\nan one you are, I suspect, unwilling to believe that he is miserable\nrather than happy.\n\nCLEINIAS: That is quite true.\n\nATHENIAN: Once more: Suppose that he be valiant and strong, and handsome\nand rich, and does throughout his whole life whatever he likes, still,\nif he be unrighteous and insolent, would not both of you agree that he\nwill of necessity live basely? You will surely grant so much?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And an evil life too?\n\nCLEINIAS: I am not equally disposed to grant that.\n\nATHENIAN: Will he not live painfully and to his own disadvantage?\n\nCLEINIAS: How can I possibly say so?\n\nATHENIAN: How! Then may Heaven make us to be of one mind, for now we are\nof two. To me, dear Cleinias, the truth of what I am saying is as plain\nas the fact that Crete is an island. And, if I were a lawgiver, I would\ntry to make the poets and all the citizens speak in this strain, and\nI would inflict the heaviest penalties on any one in all the land who\nshould dare to say that there are bad men who lead pleasant lives, or\nthat the profitable and gainful is one thing, and the just another; and\nthere are many other matters about which I should make my citizens speak\nin a manner different from the Cretans and Lacedaemonians of this age,\nand I may say, indeed, from the world in general. For tell me, my good\nfriends, by Zeus and Apollo tell me, if I were to ask these same\nGods who were your legislators,--Is not the most just life also the\npleasantest? or are there two lives, one of which is the justest and the\nother the pleasantest?--and they were to reply that there are two; and\nthereupon I proceeded to ask, (that would be the right way of pursuing\nthe enquiry), Which are the happier--those who lead the justest, or\nthose who lead the pleasantest life? and they replied, Those who lead\nthe pleasantest--that would be a very strange answer, which I should not\nlike to put into the mouth of the Gods. The words will come with more\npropriety from the lips of fathers and legislators, and therefore I will\nrepeat my former questions to one of them, and suppose him to say again\nthat he who leads the pleasantest life is the happiest. And to that\nI rejoin:--O my father, did you not wish me to live as happily as\npossible? And yet you also never ceased telling me that I should live\nas justly as possible. Now, here the giver of the rule, whether he be\nlegislator or father, will be in a dilemma, and will in vain endeavour\nto be consistent with himself. But if he were to declare that the\njustest life is also the happiest, every one hearing him would enquire,\nif I am not mistaken, what is that good and noble principle in life\nwhich the law approves, and which is superior to pleasure. For what good\ncan the just man have which is separated from pleasure? Shall we say\nthat glory and fame, coming from Gods and men, though good and noble,\nare nevertheless unpleasant, and infamy pleasant? Certainly not, sweet\nlegislator. Or shall we say that the not-doing of wrong and there being\nno wrong done is good and honourable, although there is no pleasure in\nit, and that the doing wrong is pleasant, but evil and base?\n\nCLEINIAS: Impossible.\n\nATHENIAN: The view which identifies the pleasant and the pleasant and\nthe just and the good and the noble has an excellent moral and religious\ntendency. And the opposite view is most at variance with the designs of\nthe legislator, and is, in his opinion, infamous; for no one, if he\ncan help, will be persuaded to do that which gives him more pain than\npleasure. But as distant prospects are apt to make us dizzy, especially\nin childhood, the legislator will try to purge away the darkness and\nexhibit the truth; he will persuade the citizens, in some way or other,\nby customs and praises and words, that just and unjust are shadows only,\nand that injustice, which seems opposed to justice, when contemplated by\nthe unjust and evil man appears pleasant and the just most unpleasant;\nbut that from the just man's point of view, the very opposite is the\nappearance of both of them.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: And which may be supposed to be the truer judgment--that of\nthe inferior or of the better soul?\n\nCLEINIAS: Surely, that of the better soul.\n\nATHENIAN: Then the unjust life must not only be more base and depraved,\nbut also more unpleasant than the just and holy life?\n\nCLEINIAS: That seems to be implied in the present argument.\n\nATHENIAN: And even supposing this were otherwise, and not as the\nargument has proven, still the lawgiver, who is worth anything, if\nhe ever ventures to tell a lie to the young for their good, could not\ninvent a more useful lie than this, or one which will have a better\neffect in making them do what is right, not on compulsion but\nvoluntarily.\n\nCLEINIAS: Truth, Stranger, is a noble thing and a lasting, but a thing\nof which men are hard to be persuaded.\n\nATHENIAN: And yet the story of the Sidonian Cadmus, which is so\nimprobable, has been readily believed, and also innumerable other tales.\n\nCLEINIAS: What is that story?\n\nATHENIAN: The story of armed men springing up after the sowing of teeth,\nwhich the legislator may take as a proof that he can persuade the minds\nof the young of anything; so that he has only to reflect and find out\nwhat belief will be of the greatest public advantage, and then use all\nhis efforts to make the whole community utter one and the same word in\ntheir songs and tales and discourses all their life long. But if you do\nnot agree with me, there is no reason why you should not argue on the\nother side.\n\nCLEINIAS: I do not see that any argument can fairly be raised by either\nof us against what you are now saying.\n\nATHENIAN: The next suggestion which I have to offer is, that all our\nthree choruses shall sing to the young and tender souls of children,\nreciting in their strains all the noble thoughts of which we have\nalready spoken, or are about to speak; and the sum of them shall be,\nthat the life which is by the Gods deemed to be the happiest is also the\nbest;--we shall affirm this to be a most certain truth; and the minds of\nour young disciples will be more likely to receive these words of ours\nthan any others which we might address to them.\n\nCLEINIAS: I assent to what you say.\n\nATHENIAN: First will enter in their natural order the sacred choir\ncomposed of children, which is to sing lustily the heaven-taught lay to\nthe whole city. Next will follow the choir of young men under the age\nof thirty, who will call upon the God Paean to testify to the truth of\ntheir words, and will pray him to be gracious to the youth and to turn\ntheir hearts. Thirdly, the choir of elder men, who are from thirty to\nsixty years of age, will also sing. There remain those who are too old\nto sing, and they will tell stories, illustrating the same virtues, as\nwith the voice of an oracle.\n\nCLEINIAS: Who are those who compose the third choir, Stranger? for I do\nnot clearly understand what you mean to say about them.\n\nATHENIAN: And yet almost all that I have been saying has been said with\na view to them.\n\nCLEINIAS: Will you try to be a little plainer?\n\nATHENIAN: I was speaking at the commencement of our discourse, as you\nwill remember, of the fiery nature of young creatures: I said that they\nwere unable to keep quiet either in limb or voice, and that they called\nout and jumped about in a disorderly manner; and that no other animal\nattained to any perception of order, but man only. Now the order of\nmotion is called rhythm, and the order of the voice, in which high and\nlow are duly mingled, is called harmony; and both together are termed\nchoric song. And I said that the Gods had pity on us, and gave us\nApollo and the Muses to be our playfellows and leaders in the dance; and\nDionysus, as I dare say that you will remember, was the third.\n\nCLEINIAS: I quite remember.\n\nATHENIAN: Thus far I have spoken of the chorus of Apollo and the Muses,\nand I have still to speak of the remaining chorus, which is that of\nDionysus.\n\nCLEINIAS: How is that arranged? There is something strange, at any rate\non first hearing, in a Dionysiac chorus of old men, if you really mean\nthat those who are above thirty, and may be fifty, or from fifty to\nsixty years of age, are to dance in his honour.\n\nATHENIAN: Very true; and therefore it must be shown that there is good\nreason for the proposal.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Are we agreed thus far?\n\nCLEINIAS: About what?\n\nATHENIAN: That every man and boy, slave and free, both sexes, and the\nwhole city, should never cease charming themselves with the strains of\nwhich we have spoken; and that there should be every sort of change and\nvariation of them in order to take away the effect of sameness, so that\nthe singers may always receive pleasure from their hymns, and may never\nweary of them?\n\nCLEINIAS: Every one will agree.\n\nATHENIAN: Where, then, will that best part of our city which, by reason\nof age and intelligence, has the greatest influence, sing these fairest\nof strains, which are to do so much good? Shall we be so foolish as\nto let them off who would give us the most beautiful and also the most\nuseful of songs?\n\nCLEINIAS: But, says the argument, we cannot let them off.\n\nATHENIAN: Then how can we carry out our purpose with decorum? Will this\nbe the way?\n\nCLEINIAS: What?\n\nATHENIAN: When a man is advancing in years, he is afraid and reluctant\nto sing;--he has no pleasure in his own performances; and if compulsion\nis used, he will be more and more ashamed, the older and more discreet\nhe grows;--is not this true?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Well, and will he not be yet more ashamed if he has to stand\nup and sing in the theatre to a mixed audience?--and if moreover when he\nis required to do so, like the other choirs who contend for prizes, and\nhave been trained under a singing master, he is pinched and hungry, he\nwill certainly have a feeling of shame and discomfort which will make\nhim very unwilling to exhibit.\n\nCLEINIAS: No doubt.\n\nATHENIAN: How, then, shall we reassure him, and get him to sing? Shall\nwe begin by enacting that boys shall not taste wine at all until they\nare eighteen years of age; we will tell them that fire must not be\npoured upon fire, whether in the body or in the soul, until they begin\nto go to work--this is a precaution which has to be taken against the\nexcitableness of youth;--afterwards they may taste wine in moderation\nup to the age of thirty, but while a man is young he should abstain\naltogether from intoxication and from excess of wine; when, at length,\nhe has reached forty years, after dinner at a public mess, he may invite\nnot only the other Gods, but Dionysus above all, to the mystery and\nfestivity of the elder men, making use of the wine which he has given\nmen to lighten the sourness of old age; that in age we may renew our\nyouth, and forget our sorrows; and also in order that the nature of\nthe soul, like iron melted in the fire, may become softer and so more\nimpressible. In the first place, will not any one who is thus mellowed\nbe more ready and less ashamed to sing--I do not say before a large\naudience, but before a moderate company; nor yet among strangers,\nbut among his familiars, and, as we have often said, to chant, and to\nenchant?\n\nCLEINIAS: He will be far more ready.\n\nATHENIAN: There will be no impropriety in our using such a method of\npersuading them to join with us in song.\n\nCLEINIAS: None at all.\n\nATHENIAN: And what strain will they sing, and what muse will they hymn?\nThe strain should clearly be one suitable to them.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And what strain is suitable for heroes? Shall they sing a\nchoric strain?\n\nCLEINIAS: Truly, Stranger, we of Crete and Lacedaemon know no strain\nother than that which we have learnt and been accustomed to sing in our\nchorus.\n\nATHENIAN: I dare say; for you have never acquired the knowledge of the\nmost beautiful kind of song, in your military way of life, which is\nmodelled after the camp, and is not like that of dwellers in cities; and\nyou have your young men herding and feeding together like young colts.\nNo one takes his own individual colt and drags him away from his fellows\nagainst his will, raging and foaming, and gives him a groom to attend\nto him alone, and trains and rubs him down privately, and gives him the\nqualities in education which will make him not only a good soldier, but\nalso a governor of a state and of cities. Such an one, as we said at\nfirst, would be a greater warrior than he of whom Tyrtaeus sings; and\nhe would honour courage everywhere, but always as the fourth, and not as\nthe first part of virtue, either in individuals or states.\n\nCLEINIAS: Once more, Stranger, I must complain that you depreciate our\nlawgivers.\n\nATHENIAN: Not intentionally, if at all, my good friend; but whither\nthe argument leads, thither let us follow; for if there be indeed some\nstrain of song more beautiful than that of the choruses or the public\ntheatres, I should like to impart it to those who, as we say, are\nashamed of these, and want to have the best.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: When things have an accompanying charm, either the best\nthing in them is this very charm, or there is some rightness or utility\npossessed by them;--for example, I should say that eating and drinking,\nand the use of food in general, have an accompanying charm which we call\npleasure; but that this rightness and utility is just the healthfulness\nof the things served up to us, which is their true rightness.\n\nCLEINIAS: Just so.\n\nATHENIAN: Thus, too, I should say that learning has a certain\naccompanying charm which is the pleasure; but that the right and the\nprofitable, the good and the noble, are qualities which the truth gives\nto it.\n\nCLEINIAS: Exactly.\n\nATHENIAN: And so in the imitative arts--if they succeed in making\nlikenesses, and are accompanied by pleasure, may not their works be said\nto have a charm?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: But equal proportions, whether of quality or quantity, and not\npleasure, speaking generally, would give them truth or rightness.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: Then that only can be rightly judged by the standard of\npleasure, which makes or furnishes no utility or truth or likeness,\nnor on the other hand is productive of any hurtful quality, but exists\nsolely for the sake of the accompanying charm; and the term 'pleasure'\nis most appropriately applied to it when these other qualities are\nabsent.\n\nCLEINIAS: You are speaking of harmless pleasure, are you not?\n\nATHENIAN: Yes; and this I term amusement, when doing neither harm nor\ngood in any degree worth speaking of.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Then, if such be our principles, we must assert that imitation\nis not to be judged of by pleasure and false opinion; and this is\ntrue of all equality, for the equal is not equal or the symmetrical\nsymmetrical, because somebody thinks or likes something, but they are to\nbe judged of by the standard of truth, and by no other whatever.\n\nCLEINIAS: Quite true.\n\nATHENIAN: Do we not regard all music as representative and imitative?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Then, when any one says that music is to be judged of by\npleasure, his doctrine cannot be admitted; and if there be any music of\nwhich pleasure is the criterion, such music is not to be sought out or\ndeemed to have any real excellence, but only that other kind of music\nwhich is an imitation of the good.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: And those who seek for the best kind of song and music ought\nnot to seek for that which is pleasant, but for that which is true; and\nthe truth of imitation consists, as we were saying, in rendering the\nthing imitated according to quantity and quality.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And every one will admit that musical compositions are all\nimitative and representative. Will not poets and spectators and actors\nall agree in this?\n\nCLEINIAS: They will.\n\nATHENIAN: Surely then he who would judge correctly must know what\neach composition is; for if he does not know what is the character and\nmeaning of the piece, and what it represents, he will never discern\nwhether the intention is true or false.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly not.\n\nATHENIAN: And will he who does not know what is true be able to\ndistinguish what is good and bad? My statement is not very clear; but\nperhaps you will understand me better if I put the matter in another\nway.\n\nCLEINIAS: How?\n\nATHENIAN: There are ten thousand likenesses of objects of sight?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: And can he who does not know what the exact object is which\nis imitated, ever know whether the resemblance is truthfully executed?\nI mean, for example, whether a statue has the proportions of a body, and\nthe true situation of the parts; what those proportions are, and how\nthe parts fit into one another in due order; also their colours and\nconformations, or whether this is all confused in the execution: do\nyou think that any one can know about this, who does not know what the\nanimal is which has been imitated?\n\nCLEINIAS: Impossible.\n\nATHENIAN: But even if we know that the thing pictured or sculptured is a\nman, who has received at the hand of the artist all his proper parts and\ncolours and shapes, must we not also know whether the work is beautiful\nor in any respect deficient in beauty?\n\nCLEINIAS: If this were not required, Stranger, we should all of us be\njudges of beauty.\n\nATHENIAN: Very true; and may we not say that in everything imitated,\nwhether in drawing, music, or any other art, he who is to be a competent\njudge must possess three things;--he must know, in the first place,\nof what the imitation is; secondly, he must know that it is true;\nand thirdly, that it has been well executed in words and melodies and\nrhythms?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Then let us not faint in discussing the peculiar difficulty\nof music. Music is more celebrated than any other kind of imitation, and\ntherefore requires the greatest care of them all. For if a man makes a\nmistake here, he may do himself the greatest injury by welcoming evil\ndispositions, and the mistake may be very difficult to discern,\nbecause the poets are artists very inferior in character to the Muses\nthemselves, who would never fall into the monstrous error of assigning\nto the words of men the gestures and songs of women; nor after combining\nthe melodies with the gestures of freemen would they add on the rhythms\nof slaves and men of the baser sort; nor, beginning with the rhythms and\ngestures of freemen, would they assign to them a melody or words which\nare of an opposite character; nor would they mix up the voices and\nsounds of animals and of men and instruments, and every other sort of\nnoise, as if they were all one. But human poets are fond of introducing\nthis sort of inconsistent mixture, and so make themselves ridiculous in\nthe eyes of those who, as Orpheus says, 'are ripe for true pleasure.'\nThe experienced see all this confusion, and yet the poets go on and make\nstill further havoc by separating the rhythm and the figure of the dance\nfrom the melody, setting bare words to metre, and also separating the\nmelody and the rhythm from the words, using the lyre or the flute alone.\nFor when there are no words, it is very difficult to recognize the\nmeaning of the harmony and rhythm, or to see that any worthy object is\nimitated by them. And we must acknowledge that all this sort of thing,\nwhich aims only at swiftness and smoothness and a brutish noise, and\nuses the flute and the lyre not as the mere accompaniments of the\ndance and song, is exceedingly coarse and tasteless. The use of either\ninstrument, when unaccompanied, leads to every sort of irregularity and\ntrickery. This is all rational enough. But we are considering not how\nour choristers, who are from thirty to fifty years of age, and may be\nover fifty, are not to use the Muses, but how they are to use them. And\nthe considerations which we have urged seem to show in what way these\nfifty years' old choristers who are to sing, may be expected to be\nbetter trained. For they need to have a quick perception and knowledge\nof harmonies and rhythms; otherwise, how can they ever know whether a\nmelody would be rightly sung to the Dorian mode, or to the rhythm which\nthe poet has assigned to it?\n\nCLEINIAS: Clearly they cannot.\n\nATHENIAN: The many are ridiculous in imagining that they know what is in\nproper harmony and rhythm, and what is not, when they can only be made\nto sing and step in rhythm by force; it never occurs to them that they\nare ignorant of what they are doing. Now every melody is right when it\nhas suitable harmony and rhythm, and wrong when unsuitable.\n\nCLEINIAS: That is most certain.\n\nATHENIAN: But can a man who does not know a thing, as we were saying,\nknow that the thing is right?\n\nCLEINIAS: Impossible.\n\nATHENIAN: Then now, as would appear, we are making the discovery that\nour newly-appointed choristers, whom we hereby invite and, although\nthey are their own masters, compel to sing, must be educated to such an\nextent as to be able to follow the steps of the rhythm and the notes of\nthe song, that they may know the harmonies and rhythms, and be able to\nselect what are suitable for men of their age and character to sing; and\nmay sing them, and have innocent pleasure from their own performance,\nand also lead younger men to welcome with dutiful delight good\ndispositions. Having such training, they will attain a more accurate\nknowledge than falls to the lot of the common people, or even of the\npoets themselves. For the poet need not know the third point, viz.,\nwhether the imitation is good or not, though he can hardly help knowing\nthe laws of melody and rhythm. But the aged chorus must know all the\nthree, that they may choose the best, and that which is nearest to the\nbest; for otherwise they will never be able to charm the souls of young\nmen in the way of virtue. And now the original design of the argument\nwhich was intended to bring eloquent aid to the Chorus of Dionysus, has\nbeen accomplished to the best of our ability, and let us see whether\nwe were right:--I should imagine that a drinking assembly is likely to\nbecome more and more tumultuous as the drinking goes on: this, as we\nwere saying at first, will certainly be the case.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Every man has a more than natural elevation; his heart is glad\nwithin him, and he will say anything and will be restrained by nobody\nat such a time; he fancies that he is able to rule over himself and all\nmankind.\n\nCLEINIAS: Quite true.\n\nATHENIAN: Were we not saying that on such occasions the souls of the\ndrinkers become like iron heated in the fire, and grow softer and\nyounger, and are easily moulded by him who knows how to educate and\nfashion them, just as when they were young, and that this fashioner of\nthem is the same who prescribed for them in the days of their youth,\nviz., the good legislator; and that he ought to enact laws of the\nbanquet, which, when a man is confident, bold, and impudent, and\nunwilling to wait his turn and have his share of silence and speech, and\ndrinking and music, will change his character into the opposite--such\nlaws as will infuse into him a just and noble fear, which will take up\narms at the approach of insolence, being that divine fear which we have\ncalled reverence and shame?\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: And the guardians of these laws and fellow-workers with them\nare the calm and sober generals of the drinkers; and without their help\nthere is greater difficulty in fighting against drink than in fighting\nagainst enemies when the commander of an army is not himself calm; and\nhe who is unwilling to obey them and the commanders of Dionysiac feasts\nwho are more than sixty years of age, shall suffer a disgrace as great\nas he who disobeys military leaders, or even greater.\n\nCLEINIAS: Right.\n\nATHENIAN: If, then, drinking and amusement were regulated in this way,\nwould not the companions of our revels be improved? they would part\nbetter friends than they were, and not, as now, enemies. Their whole\nintercourse would be regulated by law and observant of it, and the sober\nwould be the leaders of the drunken.\n\nCLEINIAS: I think so too, if drinking were regulated as you propose.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us not then simply censure the gift of Dionysus as bad and\nunfit to be received into the State. For wine has many excellences, and\none pre-eminent one, about which there is a difficulty in speaking to\nthe many, from a fear of their misconceiving and misunderstanding what\nis said.\n\nCLEINIAS: To what do you refer?\n\nATHENIAN: There is a tradition or story, which has somehow crept about\nthe world, that Dionysus was robbed of his wits by his stepmother Here,\nand that out of revenge he inspires Bacchic furies and dancing madnesses\nin others; for which reason he gave men wine. Such traditions concerning\nthe Gods I leave to those who think that they may be safely uttered\n(compare Euthyph.; Republic); I only know that no animal at birth is\nmature or perfect in intelligence; and in the intermediate period, in\nwhich he has not yet acquired his own proper sense, he rages and roars\nwithout rhyme or reason; and when he has once got on his legs he jumps\nabout without rhyme or reason; and this, as you will remember, has been\nalready said by us to be the origin of music and gymnastic.\n\nCLEINIAS: To be sure, I remember.\n\nATHENIAN: And did we not say that the sense of harmony and rhythm\nsprang from this beginning among men, and that Apollo and the Muses and\nDionysus were the Gods whom we had to thank for them?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: The other story implied that wine was given man out of\nrevenge, and in order to make him mad; but our present doctrine, on the\ncontrary, is, that wine was given him as a balm, and in order to implant\nmodesty in the soul, and health and strength in the body.\n\nCLEINIAS: That, Stranger, is precisely what was said.\n\nATHENIAN: Then half the subject may now be considered to have been\ndiscussed; shall we proceed to the consideration of the other half?\n\nCLEINIAS: What is the other half, and how do you divide the subject?\n\nATHENIAN: The whole choral art is also in our view the whole of\neducation; and of this art, rhythms and harmonies form the part which\nhas to do with the voice.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: The movement of the body has rhythm in common with the\nmovement of the voice, but gesture is peculiar to it, whereas song is\nsimply the movement of the voice.\n\nCLEINIAS: Most true.\n\nATHENIAN: And the sound of the voice which reaches and educates the\nsoul, we have ventured to term music.\n\nCLEINIAS: We were right.\n\nATHENIAN: And the movement of the body, when regarded as an amusement,\nwe termed dancing; but when extended and pursued with a view to\nthe excellence of the body, this scientific training may be called\ngymnastic.\n\nCLEINIAS: Exactly.\n\nATHENIAN: Music, which was one half of the choral art, may be said to\nhave been completely discussed. Shall we proceed to the other half or\nnot? What would you like?\n\nCLEINIAS: My good friend, when you are talking with a Cretan and\nLacedaemonian, and we have discussed music and not gymnastic, what\nanswer are either of us likely to make to such an enquiry?\n\nATHENIAN: An answer is contained in your question; and I understand\nand accept what you say not only as an answer, but also as a command to\nproceed with gymnastic.\n\nCLEINIAS: You quite understand me; do as you say.\n\nATHENIAN: I will; and there will not be any difficulty in speaking\nintelligibly to you about a subject with which both of you are far more\nfamiliar than with music.\n\nCLEINIAS: There will not.\n\nATHENIAN: Is not the origin of gymnastics, too, to be sought in the\ntendency to rapid motion which exists in all animals; man, as we were\nsaying, having attained the sense of rhythm, created and invented\ndancing; and melody arousing and awakening rhythm, both united formed\nthe choral art?\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: And one part of this subject has been already discussed by us,\nand there still remains another to be discussed?\n\nCLEINIAS: Exactly.\n\nATHENIAN: I have first a final word to add to my discourse about drink,\nif you will allow me to do so.\n\nCLEINIAS: What more have you to say?\n\nATHENIAN: I should say that if a city seriously means to adopt the\npractice of drinking under due regulation and with a view to the\nenforcement of temperance, and in like manner, and on the same\nprinciple, will allow of other pleasures, designing to gain the victory\nover them--in this way all of them may be used. But if the State makes\ndrinking an amusement only, and whoever likes may drink whenever he\nlikes, and with whom he likes, and add to this any other indulgences,\nI shall never agree or allow that this city or this man should practise\ndrinking. I would go further than the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and am\ndisposed rather to the law of the Carthaginians, that no one while he is\non a campaign should be allowed to taste wine at all, but that he should\ndrink water during all that time, and that in the city no slave, male\nor female, should ever drink wine; and that no magistrates should drink\nduring their year of office, nor should pilots of vessels or judges\nwhile on duty taste wine at all, nor any one who is going to hold a\nconsultation about any matter of importance; nor in the day-time at all,\nunless in consequence of exercise or as medicine; nor again at night,\nwhen any one, either man or woman, is minded to get children. There are\nnumberless other cases also in which those who have good sense and good\nlaws ought not to drink wine, so that if what I say is true, no city\nwill need many vineyards. Their husbandry and their way of life in\ngeneral will follow an appointed order, and their cultivation of the\nvine will be the most limited and the least common of their employments.\nAnd this, Stranger, shall be the crown of my discourse about wine, if\nyou agree.\n\nCLEINIAS: Excellent: we agree.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK III.\n\nATHENIAN: Enough of this. And what, then, is to be regarded as the\norigin of government? Will not a man be able to judge of it best from\na point of view in which he may behold the progress of states and their\ntransitions to good or evil?\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: I mean that he might watch them from the point of view of\ntime, and observe the changes which take place in them during infinite\nages.\n\nCLEINIAS: How so?\n\nATHENIAN: Why, do you think that you can reckon the time which has\nelapsed since cities first existed and men were citizens of them?\n\nCLEINIAS: Hardly.\n\nATHENIAN: But are sure that it must be vast and incalculable?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And have not thousands and thousands of cities come into being\nduring this period and as many perished? And has not each of them\nhad every form of government many times over, now growing larger, now\nsmaller, and again improving or declining?\n\nCLEINIAS: To be sure.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us endeavour to ascertain the cause of these changes; for\nthat will probably explain the first origin and development of forms of\ngovernment.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good. You shall endeavour to impart your thoughts to us,\nand we will make an effort to understand you.\n\nATHENIAN: Do you believe that there is any truth in ancient traditions?\n\nCLEINIAS: What traditions?\n\nATHENIAN: The traditions about the many destructions of mankind which\nhave been occasioned by deluges and pestilences, and in many other ways,\nand of the survival of a remnant?\n\nCLEINIAS: Every one is disposed to believe them.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us consider one of them, that which was caused by the\nfamous deluge.\n\nCLEINIAS: What are we to observe about it?\n\nATHENIAN: I mean to say that those who then escaped would only be hill\nshepherds,--small sparks of the human race preserved on the tops of\nmountains.\n\nCLEINIAS: Clearly.\n\nATHENIAN: Such survivors would necessarily be unacquainted with the arts\nand the various devices which are suggested to the dwellers in cities\nby interest or ambition, and with all the wrongs which they contrive\nagainst one another.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us suppose, then, that the cities in the plain and on the\nsea-coast were utterly destroyed at that time.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: Would not all implements have then perished and every other\nexcellent invention of political or any other sort of wisdom have\nutterly disappeared?\n\nCLEINIAS: Why, yes, my friend; and if things had always continued as\nthey are at present ordered, how could any discovery have ever been\nmade even in the least particular? For it is evident that the arts were\nunknown during ten thousand times ten thousand years. And no more than\na thousand or two thousand years have elapsed since the discoveries of\nDaedalus, Orpheus and Palamedes,--since Marsyas and Olympus invented\nmusic, and Amphion the lyre--not to speak of numberless other inventions\nwhich are but of yesterday.\n\nATHENIAN: Have you forgotten, Cleinias, the name of a friend who is\nreally of yesterday?\n\nCLEINIAS: I suppose that you mean Epimenides.\n\nATHENIAN: The same, my friend; he does indeed far overleap the heads\nof all mankind by his invention; for he carried out in practice, as you\ndeclare, what of old Hesiod (Works and Days) only preached.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes, according to our tradition.\n\nATHENIAN: After the great destruction, may we not suppose that the state\nof man was something of this sort:--In the beginning of things there was\na fearful illimitable desert and a vast expanse of land; a herd or two\nof oxen would be the only survivors of the animal world; and there might\nbe a few goats, these too hardly enough to maintain the shepherds who\ntended them?\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: And of cities or governments or legislation, about which we\nare now talking, do you suppose that they could have any recollection at\nall?\n\nCLEINIAS: None whatever.\n\nATHENIAN: And out of this state of things has there not sprung all that\nwe now are and have: cities and governments, and arts and laws, and a\ngreat deal of vice and a great deal of virtue?\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: Why, my good friend, how can we possibly suppose that those\nwho knew nothing of all the good and evil of cities could have attained\ntheir full development, whether of virtue or of vice?\n\nCLEINIAS: I understand your meaning, and you are quite right.\n\nATHENIAN: But, as time advanced and the race multiplied, the world came\nto be what the world is.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Doubtless the change was not made all in a moment, but little\nby little, during a very long period of time.\n\nCLEINIAS: A highly probable supposition.\n\nATHENIAN: At first, they would have a natural fear ringing in their ears\nwhich would prevent their descending from the heights into the plain.\n\nCLEINIAS: Of course.\n\nATHENIAN: The fewness of the survivors at that time would have made\nthem all the more desirous of seeing one another; but then the means of\ntravelling either by land or sea had been almost entirely lost, as I\nmay say, with the loss of the arts, and there was great difficulty in\ngetting at one another; for iron and brass and all metals were jumbled\ntogether and had disappeared in the chaos; nor was there any possibility\nof extracting ore from them; and they had scarcely any means of felling\ntimber. Even if you suppose that some implements might have been\npreserved in the mountains, they must quickly have worn out and\nvanished, and there would be no more of them until the art of metallurgy\nhad again revived.\n\nCLEINIAS: There could not have been.\n\nATHENIAN: In how many generations would this be attained?\n\nCLEINIAS: Clearly, not for many generations.\n\nATHENIAN: During this period, and for some time afterwards, all the arts\nwhich require iron and brass and the like would disappear.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Faction and war would also have died out in those days, and\nfor many reasons.\n\nCLEINIAS: How would that be?\n\nATHENIAN: In the first place, the desolation of these primitive men\nwould create in them a feeling of affection and goodwill towards one\nanother; and, secondly, they would have no occasion to quarrel about\ntheir subsistence, for they would have pasture in abundance, except just\nat first, and in some particular cases; and from their pasture-land they\nwould obtain the greater part of their food in a primitive age, having\nplenty of milk and flesh; moreover they would procure other food by the\nchase, not to be despised either in quantity or quality. They would also\nhave abundance of clothing, and bedding, and dwellings, and utensils\neither capable of standing on the fire or not; for the plastic and\nweaving arts do not require any use of iron: and God has given these\ntwo arts to man in order to provide him with all such things, that,\nwhen reduced to the last extremity, the human race may still grow\nand increase. Hence in those days mankind were not very poor; nor was\npoverty a cause of difference among them; and rich they could not have\nbeen, having neither gold nor silver:--such at that time was their\ncondition. And the community which has neither poverty nor riches will\nalways have the noblest principles; in it there is no insolence or\ninjustice, nor, again, are there any contentions or envyings. And\ntherefore they were good, and also because they were what is called\nsimple-minded; and when they were told about good and evil, they in\ntheir simplicity believed what they heard to be very truth and practised\nit. No one had the wit to suspect another of a falsehood, as men do now;\nbut what they heard about Gods and men they believed to be true, and\nlived accordingly; and therefore they were in all respects such as we\nhave described them.\n\nCLEINIAS: That quite accords with my views, and with those of my friend\nhere.\n\nATHENIAN: Would not many generations living on in a simple manner,\nalthough ruder, perhaps, and more ignorant of the arts generally, and\nin particular of those of land or naval warfare, and likewise of\nother arts, termed in cities legal practices and party conflicts,\nand including all conceivable ways of hurting one another in word and\ndeed;--although inferior to those who lived before the deluge, or to the\nmen of our day in these respects, would they not, I say, be simpler and\nmore manly, and also more temperate and altogether more just? The reason\nhas been already explained.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: I should wish you to understand that what has preceded and\nwhat is about to follow, has been, and will be said, with the intention\nof explaining what need the men of that time had of laws, and who was\ntheir lawgiver.\n\nCLEINIAS: And thus far what you have said has been very well said.\n\nATHENIAN: They could hardly have wanted lawgivers as yet; nothing of\nthat sort was likely to have existed in their days, for they had no\nletters at this early period; they lived by habit and the customs of\ntheir ancestors, as they are called.\n\nCLEINIAS: Probably.\n\nATHENIAN: But there was already existing a form of government which,\nif I am not mistaken, is generally termed a lordship, and this still\nremains in many places, both among Hellenes and barbarians (compare\nArist. Pol.), and is the government which is declared by Homer to have\nprevailed among the Cyclopes:--\n\n'They have neither councils nor judgments, but they dwell in hollow\ncaves on the tops of high mountains, and every one gives law to his\nwife and children, and they do not busy themselves about one another.'\n(Odyss.)\n\nCLEINIAS: That seems to be a charming poet of yours; I have read some\nother verses of his, which are very clever; but I do not know much of\nhim, for foreign poets are very little read among the Cretans.\n\nMEGILLUS: But they are in Lacedaemon, and he appears to be the prince\nof them all; the manner of life, however, which he describes is not\nSpartan, but rather Ionian, and he seems quite to confirm what you are\nsaying, when he traces up the ancient state of mankind by the help of\ntradition to barbarism.\n\nATHENIAN: Yes, he does confirm it; and we may accept his witness to the\nfact that such forms of government sometimes arise.\n\nCLEINIAS: We may.\n\nATHENIAN: And were not such states composed of men who had been\ndispersed in single habitations and families by the poverty which\nattended the devastations; and did not the eldest then rule among them,\nbecause with them government originated in the authority of a father and\na mother, whom, like a flock of birds, they followed, forming one troop\nunder the patriarchal rule and sovereignty of their parents, which of\nall sovereignties is the most just?\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: After this they came together in greater numbers, and\nincreased the size of their cities, and betook themselves to husbandry,\nfirst of all at the foot of the mountains, and made enclosures of loose\nwalls and works of defence, in order to keep off wild beasts; thus\ncreating a single large and common habitation.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes; at least we may suppose so.\n\nATHENIAN: There is another thing which would probably happen.\n\nCLEINIAS: What?\n\nATHENIAN: When these larger habitations grew up out of the lesser\noriginal ones, each of the lesser ones would survive in the larger;\nevery family would be under the rule of the eldest, and, owing to their\nseparation from one another, would have peculiar customs in things\ndivine and human, which they would have received from their several\nparents who had educated them; and these customs would incline them to\norder, when the parents had the element of order in their nature, and to\ncourage, when they had the element of courage. And they would naturally\nstamp upon their children, and upon their children's children, their\nown likings; and, as we are saying, they would find their way into the\nlarger society, having already their own peculiar laws.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And every man surely likes his own laws best, and the laws of\nothers not so well.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: Then now we seem to have stumbled upon the beginnings of\nlegislation.\n\nCLEINIAS: Exactly.\n\nATHENIAN: The next step will be that these persons who have met\ntogether, will select some arbiters, who will review the laws of all of\nthem, and will publicly present such as they approve to the chiefs who\nlead the tribes, and who are in a manner their kings, allowing them to\nchoose those which they think best. These persons will themselves be\ncalled legislators, and will appoint the magistrates, framing some sort\nof aristocracy, or perhaps monarchy, out of the dynasties or lordships,\nand in this altered state of the government they will live.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes, that would be the natural order of things.\n\nATHENIAN: Then, now let us speak of a third form of government, in which\nall other forms and conditions of polities and cities concur.\n\nCLEINIAS: What is that?\n\nATHENIAN: The form which in fact Homer indicates as following the\nsecond. This third form arose when, as he says, Dardanus founded\nDardania:--\n\n'For not as yet had the holy Ilium been built on the plain to be a\ncity of speaking men; but they were still dwelling at the foot of\nmany-fountained Ida.'\n\nFor indeed, in these verses, and in what he said of the Cyclopes, he\nspeaks the words of God and nature; for poets are a divine race, and\noften in their strains, by the aid of the Muses and the Graces, they\nattain truth.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: Then now let us proceed with the rest of our tale, which\nwill probably be found to illustrate in some degree our proposed\ndesign:--Shall we do so?\n\nCLEINIAS: By all means.\n\nATHENIAN: Ilium was built, when they descended from the mountain, in\na large and fair plain, on a sort of low hill, watered by many rivers\ndescending from Ida.\n\nCLEINIAS: Such is the tradition.\n\nATHENIAN: And we must suppose this event to have taken place many ages\nafter the deluge?\n\nATHENIAN: A marvellous forgetfulness of the former destruction would\nappear to have come over them, when they placed their town right under\nnumerous streams flowing from the heights, trusting for their security\nto not very high hills, either.\n\nCLEINIAS: There must have been a long interval, clearly.\n\nATHENIAN: And, as population increased, many other cities would begin to\nbe inhabited.\n\nCLEINIAS: Doubtless.\n\nATHENIAN: Those cities made war against Troy--by sea as well as\nland--for at that time men were ceasing to be afraid of the sea.\n\nCLEINIAS: Clearly.\n\nATHENIAN: The Achaeans remained ten years, and overthrew Troy.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: And during the ten years in which the Achaeans were besieging\nIlium, the homes of the besiegers were falling into an evil plight.\nTheir youth revolted; and when the soldiers returned to their own cities\nand families, they did not receive them properly, and as they ought to\nhave done, and numerous deaths, murders, exiles, were the consequence.\nThe exiles came again, under a new name, no longer Achaeans, but\nDorians,--a name which they derived from Dorieus; for it was he\nwho gathered them together. The rest of the story is told by you\nLacedaemonians as part of the history of Sparta.\n\nMEGILLUS: To be sure.\n\nATHENIAN: Thus, after digressing from the original subject of laws into\nmusic and drinking-bouts, the argument has, providentially, come back to\nthe same point, and presents to us another handle. For we have reached\nthe settlement of Lacedaemon; which, as you truly say, is in laws and\nin institutions the sister of Crete. And we are all the better for\nthe digression, because we have gone through various governments and\nsettlements, and have been present at the foundation of a first, second,\nand third state, succeeding one another in infinite time. And now\nthere appears on the horizon a fourth state or nation which was once in\nprocess of settlement and has continued settled to this day. If, out of\nall this, we are able to discern what is well or ill settled, and what\nlaws are the salvation and what are the destruction of cities, and what\nchanges would make a state happy, O Megillus and Cleinias, we may\nnow begin again, unless we have some fault to find with the previous\ndiscussion.\n\nMEGILLUS: If some God, Stranger, would promise us that our new enquiry\nabout legislation would be as good and full as the present, I would go\na great way to hear such another, and would think that a day as long as\nthis--and we are now approaching the longest day of the year--was too\nshort for the discussion.\n\nATHENIAN: Then I suppose that we must consider this subject?\n\nMEGILLUS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us place ourselves in thought at the moment when\nLacedaemon and Argos and Messene and the rest of the Peloponnesus were\nall in complete subjection, Megillus, to your ancestors; for afterwards,\nas the legend informs us, they divided their army into three portions,\nand settled three cities, Argos, Messene, Lacedaemon.\n\nMEGILLUS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: Temenus was the king of Argos, Cresphontes of Messene, Procles\nand Eurysthenes of Lacedaemon.\n\nMEGILLUS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: To these kings all the men of that day made oath that they\nwould assist them, if any one subverted their kingdom.\n\nMEGILLUS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: But can a kingship be destroyed, or was any other form of\ngovernment ever destroyed, by any but the rulers themselves? No indeed,\nby Zeus. Have we already forgotten what was said a little while ago?\n\nMEGILLUS: No.\n\nATHENIAN: And may we not now further confirm what was then mentioned?\nFor we have come upon facts which have brought us back again to the\nsame principle; so that, in resuming the discussion, we shall not\nbe enquiring about an empty theory, but about events which actually\nhappened. The case was as follows:--Three royal heroes made oath to\nthree cities which were under a kingly government, and the cities to\nthe kings, that both rulers and subjects should govern and be governed\naccording to the laws which were common to all of them: the rulers\npromised that as time and the race went forward they would not make\ntheir rule more arbitrary; and the subjects said that, if the rulers\nobserved these conditions, they would never subvert or permit others to\nsubvert those kingdoms; the kings were to assist kings and peoples\nwhen injured, and the peoples were to assist peoples and kings in like\nmanner. Is not this the fact?\n\nMEGILLUS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: And the three states to whom these laws were given, whether\ntheir kings or any others were the authors of them, had therefore the\ngreatest security for the maintenance of their constitutions?\n\nMEGILLUS: What security?\n\nATHENIAN: That the other two states were always to come to the rescue\nagainst a rebellious third.\n\nMEGILLUS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: Many persons say that legislators ought to impose such laws as\nthe mass of the people will be ready to receive; but this is just as\nif one were to command gymnastic masters or physicians to treat or cure\ntheir pupils or patients in an agreeable manner.\n\nMEGILLUS: Exactly.\n\nATHENIAN: Whereas the physician may often be too happy if he can restore\nhealth, and make the body whole, without any very great infliction of\npain.\n\nMEGILLUS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: There was also another advantage possessed by the men of that\nday, which greatly lightened the task of passing laws.\n\nMEGILLUS: What advantage?\n\nATHENIAN: The legislators of that day, when they equalized property,\nescaped the great accusation which generally arises in legislation, if a\nperson attempts to disturb the possession of land, or to abolish debts,\nbecause he sees that without this reform there can never be any real\nequality. Now, in general, when the legislator attempts to make a new\nsettlement of such matters, every one meets him with the cry, that 'he\nis not to disturb vested interests,'--declaring with imprecations that\nhe is introducing agrarian laws and cancelling of debts, until a man\nis at his wits' end; whereas no one could quarrel with the Dorians for\ndistributing the land,--there was nothing to hinder them; and as for\ndebts, they had none which were considerable or of old standing.\n\nMEGILLUS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: But then, my good friends, why did the settlement and\nlegislation of their country turn out so badly?\n\nMEGILLUS: How do you mean; and why do you blame them?\n\nATHENIAN: There were three kingdoms, and of these, two quickly corrupted\ntheir original constitution and laws, and the only one which remained\nwas the Spartan.\n\nMEGILLUS: The question which you ask is not easily answered.\n\nATHENIAN: And yet must be answered when we are enquiring about laws,\nthis being our old man's sober game of play, whereby we beguile the way,\nas I was saying when we first set out on our journey.\n\nMEGILLUS: Certainly; and we must find out why this was.\n\nATHENIAN: What laws are more worthy of our attention than those which\nhave regulated such cities? or what settlements of states are greater or\nmore famous?\n\nMEGILLUS: I know of none.\n\nATHENIAN: Can we doubt that your ancestors intended these institutions\nnot only for the protection of Peloponnesus, but of all the Hellenes,\nin case they were attacked by the barbarian? For the inhabitants of the\nregion about Ilium, when they provoked by their insolence the Trojan\nwar, relied upon the power of the Assyrians and the Empire of Ninus,\nwhich still existed and had a great prestige; the people of those days\nfearing the united Assyrian Empire just as we now fear the Great King.\nAnd the second capture of Troy was a serious offence against them,\nbecause Troy was a portion of the Assyrian Empire. To meet the danger\nthe single army was distributed between three cities by the royal\nbrothers, sons of Heracles,--a fair device, as it seemed, and a far\nbetter arrangement than the expedition against Troy. For, firstly,\nthe people of that day had, as they thought, in the Heraclidae better\nleaders than the Pelopidae; in the next place, they considered that\ntheir army was superior in valour to that which went against Troy;\nfor, although the latter conquered the Trojans, they were themselves\nconquered by the Heraclidae--Achaeans by Dorians. May we not suppose\nthat this was the intention with which the men of those days framed the\nconstitutions of their states?\n\nMEGILLUS: Quite true.\n\nATHENIAN: And would not men who had shared with one another many\ndangers, and were governed by a single race of royal brothers, and had\ntaken the advice of oracles, and in particular of the Delphian Apollo,\nbe likely to think that such states would be firmly and lastingly\nestablished?\n\nMEGILLUS: Of course they would.\n\nATHENIAN: Yet these institutions, of which such great expectations were\nentertained, seem to have all rapidly vanished away; with the exception,\nas I was saying, of that small part of them which existed in your land.\nAnd this third part has never to this day ceased warring against the two\nothers; whereas, if the original idea had been carried out, and they had\nagreed to be one, their power would have been invincible in war.\n\nMEGILLUS: No doubt.\n\nATHENIAN: But what was the ruin of this glorious confederacy? Here is a\nsubject well worthy of consideration.\n\nMEGILLUS: Certainly, no one will ever find more striking instances of\nlaws or governments being the salvation or destruction of great and\nnoble interests, than are here presented to his view.\n\nATHENIAN: Then now we seem to have happily arrived at a real and\nimportant question.\n\nMEGILLUS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Did you never remark, sage friend, that all men, and we\nourselves at this moment, often fancy that they see some beautiful thing\nwhich might have effected wonders if any one had only known how to make\na right use of it in some way; and yet this mode of looking at things\nmay turn out after all to be a mistake, and not according to nature,\neither in our own case or in any other?\n\nMEGILLUS: To what are you referring, and what do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: I was thinking of my own admiration of the aforesaid Heracleid\nexpedition, which was so noble, and might have had such wonderful\nresults for the Hellenes, if only rightly used; and I was just laughing\nat myself.\n\nMEGILLUS: But were you not right and wise in speaking as you did, and we\nin assenting to you?\n\nATHENIAN: Perhaps; and yet I cannot help observing that any one who sees\nanything great or powerful, immediately has the feeling that--'If the\nowner only knew how to use his great and noble possession, how happy\nwould he be, and what great results would he achieve!'\n\nMEGILLUS: And would he not be justified?\n\nATHENIAN: Reflect; in what point of view does this sort of praise\nappear just: First, in reference to the question in hand:--If the then\ncommanders had known how to arrange their army properly, how would they\nhave attained success? Would not this have been the way? They would have\nbound them all firmly together and preserved them for ever, giving them\nfreedom and dominion at pleasure, combined with the power of doing\nin the whole world, Hellenic and barbarian, whatever they and their\ndescendants desired. What other aim would they have had?\n\nMEGILLUS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: Suppose any one were in the same way to express his admiration\nat the sight of great wealth or family honour, or the like, he would\npraise them under the idea that through them he would attain either all\nor the greater and chief part of what he desires.\n\nMEGILLUS: He would.\n\nATHENIAN: Well, now, and does not the argument show that there is one\ncommon desire of all mankind?\n\nMEGILLUS: What is it?\n\nATHENIAN: The desire which a man has, that all things, if possible,--at\nany rate, things human,--may come to pass in accordance with his soul's\ndesire.\n\nMEGILLUS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And having this desire always, and at every time of life,\nin youth, in manhood, in age, he cannot help always praying for the\nfulfilment of it.\n\nMEGILLUS: No doubt.\n\nATHENIAN: And we join in the prayers of our friends, and ask for them\nwhat they ask for themselves.\n\nMEGILLUS: We do.\n\nATHENIAN: Dear is the son to the father--the younger to the elder.\n\nMEGILLUS: Of course.\n\nATHENIAN: And yet the son often prays to obtain things which the father\nprays that he may not obtain.\n\nMEGILLUS: When the son is young and foolish, you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: Yes; or when the father, in the dotage of age or the heat of\nyouth, having no sense of right and justice, prays with fervour, under\nthe influence of feelings akin to those of Theseus when he cursed the\nunfortunate Hippolytus, do you imagine that the son, having a sense of\nright and justice, will join in his father's prayers?\n\nMEGILLUS: I understand you to mean that a man should not desire or be in\na hurry to have all things according to his wish, for his wish may be at\nvariance with his reason. But every state and every individual ought to\npray and strive for wisdom.\n\nATHENIAN: Yes; and I remember, and you will remember, what I said at\nfirst, that a statesman and legislator ought to ordain laws with a view\nto wisdom; while you were arguing that the good lawgiver ought to order\nall with a view to war. And to this I replied that there were four\nvirtues, but that upon your view one of them only was the aim of\nlegislation; whereas you ought to regard all virtue, and especially that\nwhich comes first, and is the leader of all the rest--I mean wisdom and\nmind and opinion, having affection and desire in their train. And now\nthe argument returns to the same point, and I say once more, in jest if\nyou like, or in earnest if you like, that the prayer of a fool is full\nof danger, being likely to end in the opposite of what he desires. And\nif you would rather receive my words in earnest, I am willing that you\nshould; and you will find, I suspect, as I have said already, that not\ncowardice was the cause of the ruin of the Dorian kings and of their\nwhole design, nor ignorance of military matters, either on the part of\nthe rulers or of their subjects; but their misfortunes were due to\ntheir general degeneracy, and especially to their ignorance of the most\nimportant human affairs. That was then, and is still, and always will\nbe the case, as I will endeavour, if you will allow me, to make out\nand demonstrate as well as I am able to you who are my friends, in the\ncourse of the argument.\n\nCLEINIAS: Pray go on, Stranger;--compliments are troublesome, but we\nwill show, not in word but in deed, how greatly we prize your words,\nfor we will give them our best attention; and that is the way in which a\nfreeman best shows his approval or disapproval.\n\nMEGILLUS: Excellent, Cleinias; let us do as you say.\n\nCLEINIAS: By all means, if Heaven wills. Go on.\n\nATHENIAN: Well, then, proceeding in the same train of thought, I say\nthat the greatest ignorance was the ruin of the Dorian power, and that\nnow, as then, ignorance is ruin. And if this be true, the legislator\nmust endeavour to implant wisdom in states, and banish ignorance to the\nutmost of his power.\n\nCLEINIAS: That is evident.\n\nATHENIAN: Then now consider what is really the greatest ignorance. I\nshould like to know whether you and Megillus would agree with me in what\nI am about to say; for my opinion is--\n\nCLEINIAS: What?\n\nATHENIAN: That the greatest ignorance is when a man hates that which he\nnevertheless thinks to be good and noble, and loves and embraces that\nwhich he knows to be unrighteous and evil. This disagreement between\nthe sense of pleasure and the judgment of reason in the soul is, in my\nopinion, the worst ignorance; and also the greatest, because affecting\nthe great mass of the human soul; for the principle which feels pleasure\nand pain in the individual is like the mass or populace in a state. And\nwhen the soul is opposed to knowledge, or opinion, or reason, which are\nher natural lords, that I call folly, just as in the state, when the\nmultitude refuses to obey their rulers and the laws; or, again, in the\nindividual, when fair reasonings have their habitation in the soul and\nyet do no good, but rather the reverse of good. All these cases I term\nthe worst ignorance, whether in individuals or in states. You will\nunderstand, Stranger, that I am speaking of something which is very\ndifferent from the ignorance of handicraftsmen.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes, my friend, we understand and agree.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us, then, in the first place declare and affirm that the\ncitizen who does not know these things ought never to have any kind of\nauthority entrusted to him: he must be stigmatized as ignorant,\neven though he be versed in calculation and skilled in all sorts of\naccomplishments, and feats of mental dexterity; and the opposite are to\nbe called wise, even although, in the words of the proverb, they know\nneither how to read nor how to swim; and to them, as to men of sense,\nauthority is to be committed. For, O my friends, how can there be the\nleast shadow of wisdom when there is no harmony? There is none; but the\nnoblest and greatest of harmonies may be truly said to be the greatest\nwisdom; and of this he is a partaker who lives according to reason;\nwhereas he who is devoid of reason is the destroyer of his house and\nthe very opposite of a saviour of the state: he is utterly ignorant of\npolitical wisdom. Let this, then, as I was saying, be laid down by us.\n\nCLEINIAS: Let it be so laid down.\n\nATHENIAN: I suppose that there must be rulers and subjects in states?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And what are the principles on which men rule and obey in\ncities, whether great or small; and similarly in families? What are\nthey, and how many in number? Is there not one claim of authority\nwhich is always just,--that of fathers and mothers and in general of\nprogenitors to rule over their offspring?\n\nCLEINIAS: There is.\n\nATHENIAN: Next follows the principle that the noble should rule over the\nignoble; and, thirdly, that the elder should rule and the younger obey?\n\nCLEINIAS: To be sure.\n\nATHENIAN: And, fourthly, that slaves should be ruled, and their masters\nrule?\n\nCLEINIAS: Of course.\n\nATHENIAN: Fifthly, if I am not mistaken, comes the principle that the\nstronger shall rule, and the weaker be ruled?\n\nCLEINIAS: That is a rule not to be disobeyed.\n\nATHENIAN: Yes, and a rule which prevails very widely among all\ncreatures, and is according to nature, as the Theban poet Pindar once\nsaid; and the sixth principle, and the greatest of all, is, that the\nwise should lead and command, and the ignorant follow and obey; and\nyet, O thou most wise Pindar, as I should reply him, this surely is not\ncontrary to nature, but according to nature, being the rule of law over\nwilling subjects, and not a rule of compulsion.\n\nCLEINIAS: Most true.\n\nATHENIAN: There is a seventh kind of rule which is awarded by lot, and\nis dear to the Gods and a token of good fortune: he on whom the lot\nfalls is a ruler, and he who fails in obtaining the lot goes away and is\nthe subject; and this we affirm to be quite just.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: 'Then now,' as we say playfully to any of those who lightly\nundertake the making of laws, 'you see, legislator, the principles of\ngovernment, how many they are, and that they are naturally opposed to\neach other. There we have discovered a fountain-head of seditions, to\nwhich you must attend. And, first, we will ask you to consider with us,\nhow and in what respect the kings of Argos and Messene violated these\nour maxims, and ruined themselves and the great and famous Hellenic\npower of the olden time. Was it because they did not know how wisely\nHesiod spoke when he said that the half is often more than the whole?\nHis meaning was, that when to take the whole would be dangerous, and to\ntake the half would be the safe and moderate course, then the moderate\nor better was more than the immoderate or worse.'\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: And may we suppose this immoderate spirit to be more fatal\nwhen found among kings than when among peoples?\n\nCLEINIAS: The probability is that ignorance will be a disorder\nespecially prevalent among kings, because they lead a proud and\nluxurious life.\n\nATHENIAN: Is it not palpable that the chief aim of the kings of that\ntime was to get the better of the established laws, and that they were\nnot in harmony with the principles which they had agreed to observe\nby word and oath? This want of harmony may have had the appearance\nof wisdom, but was really, as we assert, the greatest ignorance, and\nutterly overthrew the whole empire by dissonance and harsh discord.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very likely.\n\nATHENIAN: Good; and what measures ought the legislator to have then\ntaken in order to avert this calamity? Truly there is no great wisdom\nin knowing, and no great difficulty in telling, after the evil has\nhappened; but to have foreseen the remedy at the time would have taken a\nmuch wiser head than ours.\n\nMEGILLUS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: Any one who looks at what has occurred with you\nLacedaemonians, Megillus, may easily know and may easily say what ought\nto have been done at that time.\n\nMEGILLUS: Speak a little more clearly.\n\nATHENIAN: Nothing can be clearer than the observation which I am about\nto make.\n\nMEGILLUS: What is it?\n\nATHENIAN: That if any one gives too great a power to anything, too large\na sail to a vessel, too much food to the body, too much authority to the\nmind, and does not observe the mean, everything is overthrown, and, in\nthe wantonness of excess, runs in the one case to disorders, and in the\nother to injustice, which is the child of excess. I mean to say, my dear\nfriends, that there is no soul of man, young and irresponsible, who will\nbe able to sustain the temptation of arbitrary power--no one who will\nnot, under such circumstances, become filled with folly, that worst of\ndiseases, and be hated by his nearest and dearest friends: when this\nhappens his kingdom is undermined, and all his power vanishes from him.\nAnd great legislators who know the mean should take heed of the danger.\nAs far as we can guess at this distance of time, what happened was as\nfollows:--\n\nMEGILLUS: What?\n\nATHENIAN: A God, who watched over Sparta, seeing into the future, gave\nyou two families of kings instead of one; and thus brought you more\nwithin the limits of moderation. In the next place, some human wisdom\nmingled with divine power, observing that the constitution of your\ngovernment was still feverish and excited, tempered your inborn strength\nand pride of birth with the moderation which comes of age, making the\npower of your twenty-eight elders equal with that of the kings in the\nmost important matters. But your third saviour, perceiving that your\ngovernment was still swelling and foaming, and desirous to impose a curb\nupon it, instituted the Ephors, whose power he made to resemble that of\nmagistrates elected by lot; and by this arrangement the kingly\noffice, being compounded of the right elements and duly moderated, was\npreserved, and was the means of preserving all the rest. Since, if there\nhad been only the original legislators, Temenus, Cresphontes, and their\ncontemporaries, as far as they were concerned not even the portion of\nAristodemus would have been preserved; for they had no proper experience\nin legislation, or they would surely not have imagined that oaths\nwould moderate a youthful spirit invested with a power which might be\nconverted into a tyranny. Now that God has instructed us what sort of\ngovernment would have been or will be lasting, there is no wisdom, as I\nhave already said, in judging after the event; there is no difficulty\nin learning from an example which has already occurred. But if any one\ncould have foreseen all this at the time, and had been able to moderate\nthe government of the three kingdoms and unite them into one, he might\nhave saved all the excellent institutions which were then conceived; and\nno Persian or any other armament would have dared to attack us, or would\nhave regarded Hellas as a power to be despised.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: There was small credit to us, Cleinias, in defeating them;\nand the discredit was, not that the conquerors did not win glorious\nvictories both by land and sea, but what, in my opinion, brought\ndiscredit was, first of all, the circumstance that of the three cities\none only fought on behalf of Hellas, and the two others were so\nutterly good for nothing that the one was waging a mighty war against\nLacedaemon, and was thus preventing her from rendering assistance,\nwhile the city of Argos, which had the precedence at the time of the\ndistribution, when asked to aid in repelling the barbarian, would not\nanswer to the call, or give aid. Many things might be told about Hellas\nin connexion with that war which are far from honourable; nor, indeed,\ncan we rightly say that Hellas repelled the invader; for the truth is,\nthat unless the Athenians and Lacedaemonians, acting in concert, had\nwarded off the impending yoke, all the tribes of Hellas would have been\nfused in a chaos of Hellenes mingling with one another, of barbarians\nmingling with Hellenes, and Hellenes with barbarians; just as nations\nwho are now subject to the Persian power, owing to unnatural separations\nand combinations of them, are dispersed and scattered, and live\nmiserably. These, Cleinias and Megillus, are the reproaches which we\nhave to make against statesmen and legislators, as they are called, past\nand present, if we would analyse the causes of their failure, and find\nout what else might have been done. We said, for instance, just now,\nthat there ought to be no great and unmixed powers; and this was under\nthe idea that a state ought to be free and wise and harmonious, and that\na legislator ought to legislate with a view to this end. Nor is there\nany reason to be surprised at our continually proposing aims for\nthe legislator which appear not to be always the same; but we should\nconsider when we say that temperance is to be the aim, or wisdom is\nto be the aim, or friendship is to be the aim, that all these aims are\nreally the same; and if so, a variety in the modes of expression ought\nnot to disturb us.\n\nCLEINIAS: Let us resume the argument in that spirit. And now, speaking\nof friendship and wisdom and freedom, I wish that you would tell me at\nwhat, in your opinion, the legislator should aim.\n\nATHENIAN: Hear me, then: there are two mother forms of states from which\nthe rest may be truly said to be derived; and one of them may be called\nmonarchy and the other democracy: the Persians have the highest form of\nthe one, and we of the other; almost all the rest, as I was saying, are\nvariations of these. Now, if you are to have liberty and the combination\nof friendship with wisdom, you must have both these forms of government\nin a measure; the argument emphatically declares that no city can be\nwell governed which is not made up of both.\n\nCLEINIAS: Impossible.\n\nATHENIAN: Neither the one, if it be exclusively and excessively attached\nto monarchy, nor the other, if it be similarly attached to freedom,\nobserves moderation; but your states, the Laconian and Cretan, have more\nof it; and the same was the case with the Athenians and Persians of old\ntime, but now they have less. Shall I tell you why?\n\nCLEINIAS: By all means, if it will tend to elucidate our subject.\n\nATHENIAN: Hear, then:--There was a time when the Persians had more of\nthe state which is a mean between slavery and freedom. In the reign of\nCyrus they were freemen and also lords of many others: the rulers gave\na share of freedom to the subjects, and being treated as equals, the\nsoldiers were on better terms with their generals, and showed themselves\nmore ready in the hour of danger. And if there was any wise man among\nthem, who was able to give good counsel, he imparted his wisdom to the\npublic; for the king was not jealous, but allowed him full liberty of\nspeech, and gave honour to those who could advise him in any matter.\nAnd the nation waxed in all respects, because there was freedom and\nfriendship and communion of mind among them.\n\nCLEINIAS: That certainly appears to have been the case.\n\nATHENIAN: How, then, was this advantage lost under Cambyses, and again\nrecovered under Darius? Shall I try to divine?\n\nCLEINIAS: The enquiry, no doubt, has a bearing upon our subject.\n\nATHENIAN: I imagine that Cyrus, though a great and patriotic general,\nhad never given his mind to education, and never attended to the order\nof his household.\n\nCLEINIAS: What makes you say so?\n\nATHENIAN: I think that from his youth upwards he was a soldier, and\nentrusted the education of his children to the women; and they brought\nthem up from their childhood as the favourites of fortune, who were\nblessed already, and needed no more blessings. They thought that they\nwere happy enough, and that no one should be allowed to oppose them in\nany way, and they compelled every one to praise all that they said or\ndid. This was how they brought them up.\n\nCLEINIAS: A splendid education truly!\n\nATHENIAN: Such an one as women were likely to give them, and especially\nprincesses who had recently grown rich, and in the absence of the men,\ntoo, who were occupied in wars and dangers, and had no time to look\nafter them.\n\nCLEINIAS: What would you expect?\n\nATHENIAN: Their father had possessions of cattle and sheep, and many\nherds of men and other animals, but he did not consider that those to\nwhom he was about to make them over were not trained in his own calling,\nwhich was Persian; for the Persians are shepherds--sons of a rugged\nland, which is a stern mother, and well fitted to produce a sturdy race\nable to live in the open air and go without sleep, and also to fight, if\nfighting is required (compare Arist. Pol.). He did not observe that his\nsons were trained differently; through the so-called blessing of being\nroyal they were educated in the Median fashion by women and eunuchs,\nwhich led to their becoming such as people do become when they are\nbrought up unreproved. And so, after the death of Cyrus, his sons, in\nthe fulness of luxury and licence, took the kingdom, and first one slew\nthe other because he could not endure a rival; and, afterwards, the\nslayer himself, mad with wine and brutality, lost his kingdom through\nthe Medes and the Eunuch, as they called him, who despised the folly of\nCambyses.\n\nCLEINIAS: So runs the tale, and such probably were the facts.\n\nATHENIAN: Yes; and the tradition says, that the empire came back to the\nPersians, through Darius and the seven chiefs.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us note the rest of the story. Observe, that Darius was\nnot the son of a king, and had not received a luxurious education. When\nhe came to the throne, being one of the seven, he divided the country\ninto seven portions, and of this arrangement there are some shadowy\ntraces still remaining; he made laws upon the principle of introducing\nuniversal equality in the order of the state, and he embodied in his\nlaws the settlement of the tribute which Cyrus promised,--thus creating\na feeling of friendship and community among all the Persians, and\nattaching the people to him with money and gifts. Hence his armies\ncheerfully acquired for him countries as large as those which Cyrus had\nleft behind him. Darius was succeeded by his son Xerxes; and he again\nwas brought up in the royal and luxurious fashion. Might we not most\njustly say: 'O Darius, how came you to bring up Xerxes in the same way\nin which Cyrus brought up Cambyses, and not to see his fatal mistake?'\nFor Xerxes, being the creation of the same education, met with much the\nsame fortune as Cambyses; and from that time until now there has never\nbeen a really great king among the Persians, although they are all\ncalled Great. And their degeneracy is not to be attributed to chance, as\nI maintain; the reason is rather the evil life which is generally led\nby the sons of very rich and royal persons; for never will boy or man,\nyoung or old, excel in virtue, who has been thus educated. And this,\nI say, is what the legislator has to consider, and what at the present\nmoment has to be considered by us. Justly may you, O Lacedaemonians, be\npraised, in that you do not give special honour or a special education\nto wealth rather than to poverty, or to a royal rather than to a private\nstation, where the divine and inspired lawgiver has not originally\ncommanded them to be given. For no man ought to have pre-eminent honour\nin a state because he surpasses others in wealth, any more than because\nhe is swift of foot or fair or strong, unless he have some virtue in\nhim; nor even if he have virtue, unless he have this particular virtue\nof temperance.\n\nMEGILLUS: What do you mean, Stranger?\n\nATHENIAN: I suppose that courage is a part of virtue?\n\nMEGILLUS: To be sure.\n\nATHENIAN: Then, now hear and judge for yourself:--Would you like to\nhave for a fellow-lodger or neighbour a very courageous man, who had no\ncontrol over himself?\n\nMEGILLUS: Heaven forbid!\n\nATHENIAN: Or an artist, who was clever in his profession, but a rogue?\n\nMEGILLUS: Certainly not.\n\nATHENIAN: And surely justice does not grow apart from temperance?\n\nMEGILLUS: Impossible.\n\nATHENIAN: Any more than our pattern wise man, whom we exhibited as\nhaving his pleasures and pains in accordance with and corresponding to\ntrue reason, can be intemperate?\n\nMEGILLUS: No.\n\nATHENIAN: There is a further consideration relating to the due and undue\naward of honours in states.\n\nMEGILLUS: What is it?\n\nATHENIAN: I should like to know whether temperance without the other\nvirtues, existing alone in the soul of man, is rightly to be praised or\nblamed?\n\nMEGILLUS: I cannot tell.\n\nATHENIAN: And that is the best answer; for whichever alternative you had\nchosen, I think that you would have gone wrong.\n\nMEGILLUS: I am fortunate.\n\nATHENIAN: Very good; a quality, which is a mere appendage of things\nwhich can be praised or blamed, does not deserve an expression of\nopinion, but is best passed over in silence.\n\nMEGILLUS: You are speaking of temperance?\n\nATHENIAN: Yes; but of the other virtues, that which having this\nappendage is also most beneficial, will be most deserving of honour, and\nnext that which is beneficial in the next degree; and so each of them\nwill be rightly honoured according to a regular order.\n\nMEGILLUS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: And ought not the legislator to determine these classes?\n\nMEGILLUS: Certainly he should.\n\nATHENIAN: Suppose that we leave to him the arrangement of details. But\nthe general division of laws according to their importance into a first\nand second and third class, we who are lovers of law may make ourselves.\n\nMEGILLUS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: We maintain, then, that a State which would be safe and happy,\nas far as the nature of man allows, must and ought to distribute honour\nand dishonour in the right way. And the right way is to place the goods\nof the soul first and highest in the scale, always assuming temperance\nto be the condition of them; and to assign the second place to the\ngoods of the body; and the third place to money and property. And if any\nlegislator or state departs from this rule by giving money the place of\nhonour, or in any way preferring that which is really last, may we not\nsay, that he or the state is doing an unholy and unpatriotic thing?\n\nMEGILLUS: Yes; let that be plainly declared.\n\nATHENIAN: The consideration of the Persian governments led us thus far\nto enlarge. We remarked that the Persians grew worse and worse. And we\naffirm the reason of this to have been, that they too much diminished\nthe freedom of the people, and introduced too much of despotism, and so\ndestroyed friendship and community of feeling. And when there is an end\nof these, no longer do the governors govern on behalf of their subjects\nor of the people, but on behalf of themselves; and if they think that\nthey can gain ever so small an advantage for themselves, they devastate\ncities, and send fire and desolation among friendly races. And as they\nhate ruthlessly and horribly, so are they hated; and when they want\nthe people to fight for them, they find no community of feeling or\nwillingness to risk their lives on their behalf; their untold myriads\nare useless to them on the field of battle, and they think that their\nsalvation depends on the employment of mercenaries and strangers whom\nthey hire, as if they were in want of more men. And they cannot help\nbeing stupid, since they proclaim by their actions that the ordinary\ndistinctions of right and wrong which are made in a state are a trifle,\nwhen compared with gold and silver.\n\nMEGILLUS: Quite true.\n\nATHENIAN: And now enough of the Persians, and their present\nmal-administration of their government, which is owing to the excess of\nslavery and despotism among them.\n\nMEGILLUS: Good.\n\nATHENIAN: Next, we must pass in review the government of Attica in like\nmanner, and from this show that entire freedom and the absence of all\nsuperior authority is not by any means so good as government by others\nwhen properly limited, which was our ancient Athenian constitution at\nthe time when the Persians made their attack on Hellas, or, speaking\nmore correctly, on the whole continent of Europe. There were four\nclasses, arranged according to a property census, and reverence was our\nqueen and mistress, and made us willing to live in obedience to the laws\nwhich then prevailed. Also the vastness of the Persian armament, both by\nsea and on land, caused a helpless terror, which made us more and more\nthe servants of our rulers and of the laws; and for all these reasons an\nexceeding harmony prevailed among us. About ten years before the naval\nengagement at Salamis, Datis came, leading a Persian host by command\nof Darius, which was expressly directed against the Athenians and\nEretrians, having orders to carry them away captive; and these orders\nhe was to execute under pain of death. Now Datis and his myriads soon\nbecame complete masters of Eretria, and he sent a fearful report to\nAthens that no Eretrian had escaped him; for the soldiers of Datis had\njoined hands and netted the whole of Eretria. And this report, whether\nwell or ill founded, was terrible to all the Hellenes, and above all to\nthe Athenians, and they dispatched embassies in all directions, but\nno one was willing to come to their relief, with the exception of the\nLacedaemonians; and they, either because they were detained by the\nMessenian war, which was then going on, or for some other reason of\nwhich we are not told, came a day too late for the battle of Marathon.\nAfter a while, the news arrived of mighty preparations being made, and\ninnumerable threats came from the king. Then, as time went on, a rumour\nreached us that Darius had died, and that his son, who was young and\nhot-headed, had come to the throne and was persisting in his design.\nThe Athenians were under the impression that the whole expedition was\ndirected against them, in consequence of the battle of Marathon; and\nhearing of the bridge over the Hellespont, and the canal of Athos, and\nthe host of ships, considering that there was no salvation for them\neither by land or by sea, for there was no one to help them, and\nremembering that in the first expedition, when the Persians destroyed\nEretria, no one came to their help, or would risk the danger of an\nalliance with them, they thought that this would happen again, at least\non land; nor, when they looked to the sea, could they descry any hope\nof salvation; for they were attacked by a thousand vessels and more. One\nchance of safety remained, slight indeed and desperate, but their only\none. They saw that on the former occasion they had gained a seemingly\nimpossible victory, and borne up by this hope, they found that their\nonly refuge was in themselves and in the Gods. All these things created\nin them the spirit of friendship; there was the fear of the moment,\nand there was that higher fear, which they had acquired by obedience\nto their ancient laws, and which I have several times in the preceding\ndiscourse called reverence, of which the good man ought to be a willing\nservant, and of which the coward is independent and fearless. If this\nfear had not possessed them, they would never have met the enemy, or\ndefended their temples and sepulchres and their country, and everything\nthat was near and dear to them, as they did; but little by little they\nwould have been all scattered and dispersed.\n\nMEGILLUS: Your words, Athenian, are quite true, and worthy of yourself\nand of your country.\n\nATHENIAN: They are true, Megillus; and to you, who have inherited the\nvirtues of your ancestors, I may properly speak of the actions of that\nday. And I would wish you and Cleinias to consider whether my words have\nnot also a bearing on legislation; for I am not discoursing only for the\npleasure of talking, but for the argument's sake. Please to remark that\nthe experience both of ourselves and the Persians was, in a certain\nsense, the same; for as they led their people into utter servitude, so\nwe too led ours into all freedom. And now, how shall we proceed? for I\nwould like you to observe that our previous arguments have good deal to\nsay for themselves.\n\nMEGILLUS: True; but I wish that you would give us a fuller explanation.\n\nATHENIAN: I will. Under the ancient laws, my friends, the people was not\nas now the master, but rather the willing servant of the laws.\n\nMEGILLUS: What laws do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: In the first place, let us speak of the laws about\nmusic,--that is to say, such music as then existed--in order that we may\ntrace the growth of the excess of freedom from the beginning. Now music\nwas early divided among us into certain kinds and manners. One sort\nconsisted of prayers to the Gods, which were called hymns; and there\nwas another and opposite sort called lamentations, and another termed\npaeans, and another, celebrating the birth of Dionysus, called, I\nbelieve, 'dithyrambs.' And they used the actual word 'laws,' or nomoi,\nfor another kind of song; and to this they added the term 'citharoedic.'\nAll these and others were duly distinguished, nor were the performers\nallowed to confuse one style of music with another. And the authority\nwhich determined and gave judgment, and punished the disobedient,\nwas not expressed in a hiss, nor in the most unmusical shouts of the\nmultitude, as in our days, nor in applause and clapping of hands. But\nthe directors of public instruction insisted that the spectators\nshould listen in silence to the end; and boys and their tutors, and the\nmultitude in general, were kept quiet by a hint from a stick. Such was\nthe good order which the multitude were willing to observe; they would\nnever have dared to give judgment by noisy cries. And then, as time\nwent on, the poets themselves introduced the reign of vulgar and lawless\ninnovation. They were men of genius, but they had no perception of what\nis just and lawful in music; raging like Bacchanals and possessed with\ninordinate delights--mingling lamentations with hymns, and paeans with\ndithyrambs; imitating the sounds of the flute on the lyre, and making\none general confusion; ignorantly affirming that music has no truth,\nand, whether good or bad, can only be judged of rightly by the pleasure\nof the hearer (compare Republic). And by composing such licentious\nworks, and adding to them words as licentious, they have inspired the\nmultitude with lawlessness and boldness, and made them fancy that they\ncan judge for themselves about melody and song. And in this way\nthe theatres from being mute have become vocal, as though they had\nunderstanding of good and bad in music and poetry; and instead of an\naristocracy, an evil sort of theatrocracy has grown up (compare Arist.\nPol.). For if the democracy which judged had only consisted of educated\npersons, no fatal harm would have been done; but in music there\nfirst arose the universal conceit of omniscience and general\nlawlessness;--freedom came following afterwards, and men, fancying\nthat they knew what they did not know, had no longer any fear, and the\nabsence of fear begets shamelessness. For what is this shamelessness,\nwhich is so evil a thing, but the insolent refusal to regard the opinion\nof the better by reason of an over-daring sort of liberty?\n\nMEGILLUS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Consequent upon this freedom comes the other freedom, of\ndisobedience to rulers (compare Republic); and then the attempt to\nescape the control and exhortation of father, mother, elders, and when\nnear the end, the control of the laws also; and at the very end there\nis the contempt of oaths and pledges, and no regard at all for the\nGods,--herein they exhibit and imitate the old so-called Titanic nature,\nand come to the same point as the Titans when they rebelled against God,\nleading a life of endless evils. But why have I said all this? I ask,\nbecause the argument ought to be pulled up from time to time, and not\nbe allowed to run away, but held with bit and bridle, and then we shall\nnot, as the proverb says, fall off our ass. Let us then once more ask\nthe question, To what end has all this been said?\n\nMEGILLUS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: This, then, has been said for the sake--\n\nMEGILLUS: Of what?\n\nATHENIAN: We were maintaining that the lawgiver ought to have three\nthings in view: first, that the city for which he legislates should be\nfree; and secondly, be at unity with herself; and thirdly, should have\nunderstanding;--these were our principles, were they not?\n\nMEGILLUS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: With a view to this we selected two kinds of government,\nthe one the most despotic, and the other the most free; and now we are\nconsidering which of them is the right form: we took a mean in both\ncases, of despotism in the one, and of liberty in the other, and we saw\nthat in a mean they attained their perfection; but that when they were\ncarried to the extreme of either, slavery or licence, neither party were\nthe gainers.\n\nMEGILLUS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: And that was our reason for considering the settlement of\nthe Dorian army, and of the city built by Dardanus at the foot of the\nmountains, and the removal of cities to the seashore, and of our mention\nof the first men, who were the survivors of the deluge. And all that was\npreviously said about music and drinking, and what preceded, was said\nwith the view of seeing how a state might be best administered, and\nhow an individual might best order his own life. And now, Megillus and\nCleinias, how can we put to the proof the value of our words?\n\nCLEINIAS: Stranger, I think that I see how a proof of their value may be\nobtained. This discussion of ours appears to me to have been singularly\nfortunate, and just what I at this moment want; most auspiciously have\nyou and my friend Megillus come in my way. For I will tell you what\nhas happened to me; and I regard the coincidence as a sort of omen.\nThe greater part of Crete is going to send out a colony, and they have\nentrusted the management of the affair to the Cnosians; and the Cnosian\ngovernment to me and nine others. And they desire us to give them any\nlaws which we please, whether taken from the Cretan model or from\nany other; and they do not mind about their being foreign if they\nare better. Grant me then this favour, which will also be a gain to\nyourselves:--Let us make a selection from what has been said, and then\nlet us imagine a State of which we will suppose ourselves to be the\noriginal founders. Thus we shall proceed with our enquiry, and, at\nthe same time, I may have the use of the framework which you are\nconstructing, for the city which is in contemplation.\n\nATHENIAN: Good news, Cleinias; if Megillus has no objection, you may be\nsure that I will do all in my power to please you.\n\nCLEINIAS: Thank you.\n\nMEGILLUS: And so will I.\n\nCLEINIAS: Excellent; and now let us begin to frame the State.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK IV.\n\nATHENIAN: And now, what will this city be? I do not mean to ask what is\nor will hereafter be the name of the place; that may be determined\nby the accident of locality or of the original settlement--a river or\nfountain, or some local deity may give the sanction of a name to the\nnewly-founded city; but I do want to know what the situation is, whether\nmaritime or inland.\n\nCLEINIAS: I should imagine, Stranger, that the city of which we are\nspeaking is about eighty stadia distant from the sea.\n\nATHENIAN: And are there harbours on the seaboard?\n\nCLEINIAS: Excellent harbours, Stranger; there could not be better.\n\nATHENIAN: Alas! what a prospect! And is the surrounding country\nproductive, or in need of importations?\n\nCLEINIAS: Hardly in need of anything.\n\nATHENIAN: And is there any neighbouring State?\n\nCLEINIAS: None whatever, and that is the reason for selecting the place;\nin days of old, there was a migration of the inhabitants, and the region\nhas been deserted from time immemorial.\n\nATHENIAN: And has the place a fair proportion of hill, and plain, and\nwood?\n\nCLEINIAS: Like the rest of Crete in that.\n\nATHENIAN: You mean to say that there is more rock than plain?\n\nCLEINIAS: Exactly.\n\nATHENIAN: Then there is some hope that your citizens may be virtuous:\nhad you been on the sea, and well provided with harbours, and an\nimporting rather than a producing country, some mighty saviour would\nhave been needed, and lawgivers more than mortal, if you were ever to\nhave a chance of preserving your state from degeneracy and discordance\nof manners (compare Ar. Pol.). But there is comfort in the eighty\nstadia; although the sea is too near, especially if, as you say, the\nharbours are so good. Still we may be content. The sea is pleasant\nenough as a daily companion, but has indeed also a bitter and brackish\nquality; filling the streets with merchants and shopkeepers, and\nbegetting in the souls of men uncertain and unfaithful ways--making the\nstate unfriendly and unfaithful both to her own citizens, and also\nto other nations. There is a consolation, therefore, in the country\nproducing all things at home; and yet, owing to the ruggedness of\nthe soil, not providing anything in great abundance. Had there been\nabundance, there might have been a great export trade, and a great\nreturn of gold and silver; which, as we may safely affirm, has the most\nfatal results on a State whose aim is the attainment of just and noble\nsentiments: this was said by us, if you remember, in the previous\ndiscussion.\n\nCLEINIAS: I remember, and am of opinion that we both were and are in the\nright.\n\nATHENIAN: Well, but let me ask, how is the country supplied with timber\nfor ship-building?\n\nCLEINIAS: There is no fir of any consequence, nor pine, and not much\ncypress; and you will find very little stone-pine or plane-wood, which\nshipwrights always require for the interior of ships.\n\nATHENIAN: These are also natural advantages.\n\nCLEINIAS: Why so?\n\nATHENIAN: Because no city ought to be easily able to imitate its enemies\nin what is mischievous.\n\nCLEINIAS: How does that bear upon any of the matters of which we have\nbeen speaking?\n\nATHENIAN: Remember, my good friend, what I said at first about the\nCretan laws, that they looked to one thing only, and this, as you both\nagreed, was war; and I replied that such laws, in so far as they tended\nto promote virtue, were good; but in that they regarded a part only, and\nnot the whole of virtue, I disapproved of them. And now I hope that\nyou in your turn will follow and watch me if I legislate with a view\nto anything but virtue, or with a view to a part of virtue only. For I\nconsider that the true lawgiver, like an archer, aims only at that on\nwhich some eternal beauty is always attending, and dismisses everything\nelse, whether wealth or any other benefit, when separated from virtue.\nI was saying that the imitation of enemies was a bad thing; and I was\nthinking of a case in which a maritime people are harassed by enemies,\nas the Athenians were by Minos (I do not speak from any desire to recall\npast grievances); but he, as we know, was a great naval potentate, who\ncompelled the inhabitants of Attica to pay him a cruel tribute; and\nin those days they had no ships of war as they now have, nor was the\ncountry filled with ship-timber, and therefore they could not readily\nbuild them. Hence they could not learn how to imitate their enemy at\nsea, and in this way, becoming sailors themselves, directly repel their\nenemies. Better for them to have lost many times over the seven youths,\nthan that heavy-armed and stationary troops should have been turned into\nsailors, and accustomed to be often leaping on shore, and again to come\nrunning back to their ships; or should have fancied that there was no\ndisgrace in not awaiting the attack of an enemy and dying boldly; and\nthat there were good reasons, and plenty of them, for a man throwing\naway his arms, and betaking himself to flight,--which is not\ndishonourable, as people say, at certain times. This is the language of\nnaval warfare, and is anything but worthy of extraordinary praise. For\nwe should not teach bad habits, least of all to the best part of the\ncitizens. You may learn the evil of such a practice from Homer, by whom\nOdysseus is introduced, rebuking Agamemnon, because he desires to draw\ndown the ships to the sea at a time when the Achaeans are hard pressed\nby the Trojans,--he gets angry with him, and says:\n\n'Who, at a time when the battle is in full cry, biddest to drag the\nwell-benched ships into the sea, that the prayers of the Trojans may be\naccomplished yet more, and high ruin fall upon us. For the Achaeans will\nnot maintain the battle, when the ships are drawn into the sea, but they\nwill look behind and will cease from strife; in that the counsel which\nyou give will prove injurious.'\n\nYou see that he quite knew triremes on the sea, in the neighbourhood of\nfighting men, to be an evil;--lions might be trained in that way to fly\nfrom a herd of deer. Moreover, naval powers which owe their safety to\nships, do not give honour to that sort of warlike excellence which is\nmost deserving of it. For he who owes his safety to the pilot and the\ncaptain, and the oarsman, and all sorts of rather inferior persons,\ncannot rightly give honour to whom honour is due. But how can a state be\nin a right condition which cannot justly award honour?\n\nCLEINIAS: It is hardly possible, I admit; and yet, Stranger, we Cretans\nare in the habit of saying that the battle of Salamis was the salvation\nof Hellas.\n\nATHENIAN: Why, yes; and that is an opinion which is widely spread both\namong Hellenes and barbarians. But Megillus and I say rather, that the\nbattle of Marathon was the beginning, and the battle of Plataea the\ncompletion, of the great deliverance, and that these battles by\nland made the Hellenes better; whereas the sea-fights of Salamis and\nArtemisium--for I may as well put them both together--made them no\nbetter, if I may say so without offence about the battles which helped\nto save us. And in estimating the goodness of a state, we regard both\nthe situation of the country and the order of the laws, considering that\nthe mere preservation and continuance of life is not the most honourable\nthing for men, as the vulgar think, but the continuance of the best\nlife, while we live; and that again, if I am not mistaken, is a remark\nwhich has been made already.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: Then we have only to ask, whether we are taking the course\nwhich we acknowledge to be the best for the settlement and legislation\nof states.\n\nCLEINIAS: The best by far.\n\nATHENIAN: And now let me proceed to another question: Who are to be the\ncolonists? May any one come out of all Crete; and is the idea that\nthe population in the several states is too numerous for the means of\nsubsistence? For I suppose that you are not going to send out a general\ninvitation to any Hellene who likes to come. And yet I observe that to\nyour country settlers have come from Argos and Aegina and other parts of\nHellas. Tell me, then, whence do you draw your recruits in the present\nenterprise?\n\nCLEINIAS: They will come from all Crete; and of other Hellenes,\nPeloponnesians will be most acceptable. For, as you truly observe, there\nare Cretans of Argive descent; and the race of Cretans which has the\nhighest character at the present day is the Gortynian, and this has come\nfrom Gortys in the Peloponnesus.\n\nATHENIAN: Cities find colonization in some respects easier if the\ncolonists are one race, which like a swarm of bees is sent out from\na single country, either when friends leave friends, owing to some\npressure of population or other similar necessity, or when a portion\nof a state is driven by factions to emigrate. And there have been whole\ncities which have taken flight when utterly conquered by a superior\npower in war. This, however, which is in one way an advantage to the\ncolonist or legislator, in another point of view creates a difficulty.\nThere is an element of friendship in the community of race, and\nlanguage, and laws, and in common temples and rites of worship; but\ncolonies which are of this homogeneous sort are apt to kick against any\nlaws or any form of constitution differing from that which they had at\nhome; and although the badness of their own laws may have been the cause\nof the factions which prevailed among them, yet from the force of habit\nthey would fain preserve the very customs which were their ruin, and the\nleader of the colony, who is their legislator, finds them troublesome\nand rebellious. On the other hand, the conflux of several populations\nmight be more disposed to listen to new laws; but then, to make them\ncombine and pull together, as they say of horses, is a most difficult\ntask, and the work of years. And yet there is nothing which tends more\nto the improvement of mankind than legislation and colonization.\n\nCLEINIAS: No doubt; but I should like to know why you say so.\n\nATHENIAN: My good friend, I am afraid that the course of my speculations\nis leading me to say something depreciatory of legislators; but if\nthe word be to the purpose, there can be no harm. And yet, why am I\ndisquieted, for I believe that the same principle applies equally to all\nhuman things?\n\nCLEINIAS: To what are you referring?\n\nATHENIAN: I was going to say that man never legislates, but accidents of\nall sorts, which legislate for us in all sorts of ways. The violence\nof war and the hard necessity of poverty are constantly overturning\ngovernments and changing laws. And the power of disease has often caused\ninnovations in the state, when there have been pestilences, or when\nthere has been a succession of bad seasons continuing during many years.\nAny one who sees all this, naturally rushes to the conclusion of which\nI was speaking, that no mortal legislates in anything, but that in human\naffairs chance is almost everything. And this may be said of the arts of\nthe sailor, and the pilot, and the physician, and the general, and may\nseem to be well said; and yet there is another thing which may be said\nwith equal truth of all of them.\n\nCLEINIAS: What is it?\n\nATHENIAN: That God governs all things, and that chance and opportunity\nco-operate with Him in the government of human affairs. There is,\nhowever, a third and less extreme view, that art should be there also;\nfor I should say that in a storm there must surely be a great advantage\nin having the aid of the pilot's art. You would agree?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: And does not a like principle apply to legislation as well\nas to other things: even supposing all the conditions to be favourable\nwhich are needed for the happiness of the state, yet the true legislator\nmust from time to time appear on the scene?\n\nCLEINIAS: Most true.\n\nATHENIAN: In each case the artist would be able to pray rightly for\ncertain conditions, and if these were granted by fortune, he would then\nonly require to exercise his art?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And all the other artists just now mentioned, if they were\nbidden to offer up each their special prayer, would do so?\n\nCLEINIAS: Of course.\n\nATHENIAN: And the legislator would do likewise?\n\nCLEINIAS: I believe that he would.\n\nATHENIAN: 'Come, legislator,' we will say to him; 'what are the\nconditions which you require in a state before you can organize it?' How\nought he to answer this question? Shall I give his answer?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: He will say--'Give me a state which is governed by a tyrant,\nand let the tyrant be young and have a good memory; let him be quick\nat learning, and of a courageous and noble nature; let him have that\nquality which, as I said before, is the inseparable companion of all the\nother parts of virtue, if there is to be any good in them.'\n\nCLEINIAS: I suppose, Megillus, that this companion virtue of which the\nStranger speaks, must be temperance?\n\nATHENIAN: Yes, Cleinias, temperance in the vulgar sense; not that which\nin the forced and exaggerated language of some philosophers is called\nprudence, but that which is the natural gift of children and animals, of\nwhom some live continently and others incontinently, but when isolated,\nwas, as we said, hardly worth reckoning in the catalogue of goods. I\nthink that you must understand my meaning.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Then our tyrant must have this as well as the other qualities,\nif the state is to acquire in the best manner and in the shortest time\nthe form of government which is most conducive to happiness; for there\nneither is nor ever will be a better or speedier way of establishing a\npolity than by a tyranny.\n\nCLEINIAS: By what possible arguments, Stranger, can any man persuade\nhimself of such a monstrous doctrine?\n\nATHENIAN: There is surely no difficulty in seeing, Cleinias, what is in\naccordance with the order of nature?\n\nCLEINIAS: You would assume, as you say, a tyrant who was young,\ntemperate, quick at learning, having a good memory, courageous, of a\nnoble nature?\n\nATHENIAN: Yes; and you must add fortunate; and his good fortune must be\nthat he is the contemporary of a great legislator, and that some happy\nchance brings them together. When this has been accomplished, God has\ndone all that he ever does for a state which he desires to be eminently\nprosperous; He has done second best for a state in which there are two\nsuch rulers, and third best for a state in which there are three.\nThe difficulty increases with the increase, and diminishes with the\ndiminution of the number.\n\nCLEINIAS: You mean to say, I suppose, that the best government is\nproduced from a tyranny, and originates in a good lawgiver and an\norderly tyrant, and that the change from such a tyranny into a perfect\nform of government takes place most easily; less easily when from an\noligarchy; and, in the third degree, from a democracy: is not that your\nmeaning?\n\nATHENIAN: Not so; I mean rather to say that the change is best made out\nof a tyranny; and secondly, out of a monarchy; and thirdly, out of\nsome sort of democracy: fourth, in the capacity for improvement, comes\noligarchy, which has the greatest difficulty in admitting of such\na change, because the government is in the hands of a number of\npotentates. I am supposing that the legislator is by nature of the true\nsort, and that his strength is united with that of the chief men of the\nstate; and when the ruling element is numerically small, and at the\nsame time very strong, as in a tyranny, there the change is likely to be\neasiest and most rapid.\n\nCLEINIAS: How? I do not understand.\n\nATHENIAN: And yet I have repeated what I am saying a good many times;\nbut I suppose that you have never seen a city which is under a tyranny?\n\nCLEINIAS: No, and I cannot say that I have any great desire to see one.\n\nATHENIAN: And yet, where there is a tyranny, you might certainly see\nthat of which I am now speaking.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: I mean that you might see how, without trouble and in no very\nlong period of time, the tyrant, if he wishes, can change the manners\nof a state: he has only to go in the direction of virtue or of vice,\nwhichever he prefers, he himself indicating by his example the lines of\nconduct, praising and rewarding some actions and reproving others, and\ndegrading those who disobey.\n\nCLEINIAS: But how can we imagine that the citizens in general will at\nonce follow the example set to them; and how can he have this power both\nof persuading and of compelling them?\n\nATHENIAN: Let no one, my friends, persuade us that there is any quicker\nand easier way in which states change their laws than when the rulers\nlead: such changes never have, nor ever will, come to pass in any other\nway. The real impossibility or difficulty is of another sort, and is\nrarely surmounted in the course of ages; but when once it is surmounted,\nten thousand or rather all blessings follow.\n\nCLEINIAS: Of what are you speaking?\n\nATHENIAN: The difficulty is to find the divine love of temperate and\njust institutions existing in any powerful forms of government, whether\nin a monarchy or oligarchy of wealth or of birth. You might as well hope\nto reproduce the character of Nestor, who is said to have excelled\nall men in the power of speech, and yet more in his temperance. This,\nhowever, according to the tradition, was in the times of Troy; in our\nown days there is nothing of the sort; but if such an one either has\nor ever shall come into being, or is now among us, blessed is he and\nblessed are they who hear the wise words that flow from his lips. And\nthis may be said of power in general: When the supreme power in man\ncoincides with the greatest wisdom and temperance, then the best laws\nand the best constitution come into being; but in no other way. And\nlet what I have been saying be regarded as a kind of sacred legend or\noracle, and let this be our proof that, in one point of view, there may\nbe a difficulty for a city to have good laws, but that there is another\npoint of view in which nothing can be easier or sooner effected,\ngranting our supposition.\n\nCLEINIAS: How do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: Let us try to amuse ourselves, old boys as we are, by moulding\nin words the laws which are suitable to your state.\n\nCLEINIAS: Let us proceed without delay.\n\nATHENIAN: Then let us invoke God at the settlement of our state; may He\nhear and be propitious to us, and come and set in order the State and\nthe laws!\n\nCLEINIAS: May He come!\n\nATHENIAN: But what form of polity are we going to give the city?\n\nCLEINIAS: Tell us what you mean a little more clearly. Do you mean some\nform of democracy, or oligarchy, or aristocracy, or monarchy? For we\ncannot suppose that you would include tyranny.\n\nATHENIAN: Which of you will first tell me to which of these classes his\nown government is to be referred?\n\nMEGILLUS: Ought I to answer first, since I am the elder?\n\nCLEINIAS: Perhaps you should.\n\nMEGILLUS: And yet, Stranger, I perceive that I cannot say, without more\nthought, what I should call the government of Lacedaemon, for it seems\nto me to be like a tyranny,--the power of our Ephors is marvellously\ntyrannical; and sometimes it appears to me to be of all cities the most\ndemocratical; and who can reasonably deny that it is an aristocracy\n(compare Ar. Pol.)? We have also a monarchy which is held for life,\nand is said by all mankind, and not by ourselves only, to be the most\nancient of all monarchies; and, therefore, when asked on a sudden, I\ncannot precisely say which form of government the Spartan is.\n\nCLEINIAS: I am in the same difficulty, Megillus; for I do not feel\nconfident that the polity of Cnosus is any of these.\n\nATHENIAN: The reason is, my excellent friends, that you really have\npolities, but the states of which we were just now speaking are merely\naggregations of men dwelling in cities who are the subjects and servants\nof a part of their own state, and each of them is named after the\ndominant power; they are not polities at all. But if states are to be\nnamed after their rulers, the true state ought to be called by the name\nof the God who rules over wise men.\n\nCLEINIAS: And who is this God?\n\nATHENIAN: May I still make use of fable to some extent, in the hope that\nI may be better able to answer your question: shall I?\n\nCLEINIAS: By all means.\n\nATHENIAN: In the primeval world, and a long while before the cities came\ninto being whose settlements we have described, there is said to\nhave been in the time of Cronos a blessed rule and life, of which the\nbest-ordered of existing states is a copy (compare Statesman).\n\nCLEINIAS: It will be very necessary to hear about that.\n\nATHENIAN: I quite agree with you; and therefore I have introduced the\nsubject.\n\nCLEINIAS: Most appropriately; and since the tale is to the point, you\nwill do well in giving us the whole story.\n\nATHENIAN: I will do as you suggest. There is a tradition of the happy\nlife of mankind in days when all things were spontaneous and abundant.\nAnd of this the reason is said to have been as follows:--Cronos knew\nwhat we ourselves were declaring, that no human nature invested with\nsupreme power is able to order human affairs and not overflow with\ninsolence and wrong. Which reflection led him to appoint not men but\ndemigods, who are of a higher and more divine race, to be the kings and\nrulers of our cities; he did as we do with flocks of sheep and other\ntame animals. For we do not appoint oxen to be the lords of oxen, or\ngoats of goats; but we ourselves are a superior race, and rule over\nthem. In like manner God, in His love of mankind, placed over us the\ndemons, who are a superior race, and they with great ease and pleasure\nto themselves, and no less to us, taking care of us and giving us peace\nand reverence and order and justice never failing, made the tribes of\nmen happy and united. And this tradition, which is true, declares that\ncities of which some mortal man and not God is the ruler, have no escape\nfrom evils and toils. Still we must do all that we can to imitate the\nlife which is said to have existed in the days of Cronos, and, as far as\nthe principle of immortality dwells in us, to that we must hearken, both\nin private and public life, and regulate our cities and houses according\nto law, meaning by the very term 'law,' the distribution of mind. But if\neither a single person or an oligarchy or a democracy has a soul\neager after pleasures and desires--wanting to be filled with them, yet\nretaining none of them, and perpetually afflicted with an endless and\ninsatiable disorder; and this evil spirit, having first trampled\nthe laws under foot, becomes the master either of a state or of an\nindividual,--then, as I was saying, salvation is hopeless. And now,\nCleinias, we have to consider whether you will or will not accept this\ntale of mine.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly we will.\n\nATHENIAN: You are aware,--are you not?--that there are often said to be\nas many forms of laws as there are of governments, and of the latter we\nhave already mentioned all those which are commonly recognized. Now you\nmust regard this as a matter of first-rate importance. For what is to\nbe the standard of just and unjust, is once more the point at issue. Men\nsay that the law ought not to regard either military virtue, or virtue\nin general, but only the interests and power and preservation of the\nestablished form of government; this is thought by them to be the best\nway of expressing the natural definition of justice.\n\nCLEINIAS: How?\n\nATHENIAN: Justice is said by them to be the interest of the stronger\n(Republic).\n\nCLEINIAS: Speak plainer.\n\nATHENIAN: I will:--'Surely,' they say, 'the governing power makes\nwhatever laws have authority in any state'?\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: 'Well,' they would add, 'and do you suppose that tyranny or\ndemocracy, or any other conquering power, does not make the continuance\nof the power which is possessed by them the first or principal object of\ntheir laws'?\n\nCLEINIAS: How can they have any other?\n\nATHENIAN: 'And whoever transgresses these laws is punished as an\nevil-doer by the legislator, who calls the laws just'?\n\nCLEINIAS: Naturally.\n\nATHENIAN: 'This, then, is always the mode and fashion in which justice\nexists.'\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly, if they are correct in their view.\n\nATHENIAN: Why, yes, this is one of those false principles of government\nto which we were referring.\n\nCLEINIAS: Which do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: Those which we were examining when we spoke of who ought to\ngovern whom. Did we not arrive at the conclusion that parents ought\nto govern their children, and the elder the younger, and the noble the\nignoble? And there were many other principles, if you remember, and they\nwere not always consistent. One principle was this very principle of\nmight, and we said that Pindar considered violence natural and justified\nit.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes; I remember.\n\nATHENIAN: Consider, then, to whom our state is to be entrusted. For\nthere is a thing which has occurred times without number in states--\n\nCLEINIAS: What thing?\n\nATHENIAN: That when there has been a contest for power, those who gain\nthe upper hand so entirely monopolize the government, as to refuse all\nshare to the defeated party and their descendants--they live watching\none another, the ruling class being in perpetual fear that some one who\nhas a recollection of former wrongs will come into power and rise up\nagainst them. Now, according to our view, such governments are not\npolities at all, nor are laws right which are passed for the good of\nparticular classes and not for the good of the whole state. States\nwhich have such laws are not polities but parties, and their notions of\njustice are simply unmeaning. I say this, because I am going to assert\nthat we must not entrust the government in your state to any one\nbecause he is rich, or because he possesses any other advantage, such as\nstrength, or stature, or again birth: but he who is most obedient to the\nlaws of the state, he shall win the palm; and to him who is victorious\nin the first degree shall be given the highest office and chief ministry\nof the gods; and the second to him who bears the second palm; and on a\nsimilar principle shall all the other offices be assigned to those who\ncome next in order. And when I call the rulers servants or ministers of\nthe law, I give them this name not for the sake of novelty, but because\nI certainly believe that upon such service or ministry depends the well-\nor ill-being of the state. For that state in which the law is subject\nand has no authority, I perceive to be on the highway to ruin; but I see\nthat the state in which the law is above the rulers, and the rulers are\nthe inferiors of the law, has salvation, and every blessing which the\nGods can confer.\n\nCLEINIAS: Truly, Stranger, you see with the keen vision of age.\n\nATHENIAN: Why, yes; every man when he is young has that sort of vision\ndullest, and when he is old keenest.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: And now, what is to be the next step? May we not suppose the\ncolonists to have arrived, and proceed to make our speech to them?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: 'Friends,' we say to them,--'God, as the old tradition\ndeclares, holding in his hand the beginning, middle, and end of all\nthat is, travels according to His nature in a straight line towards the\naccomplishment of His end. Justice always accompanies Him, and is the\npunisher of those who fall short of the divine law. To justice, he who\nwould be happy holds fast, and follows in her company with all humility\nand order; but he who is lifted up with pride, or elated by wealth\nor rank, or beauty, who is young and foolish, and has a soul hot with\ninsolence, and thinks that he has no need of any guide or ruler, but is\nable himself to be the guide of others, he, I say, is left deserted\nof God; and being thus deserted, he takes to him others who are like\nhimself, and dances about, throwing all things into confusion, and many\nthink that he is a great man, but in a short time he pays a penalty\nwhich justice cannot but approve, and is utterly destroyed, and his\nfamily and city with him. Wherefore, seeing that human things are thus\nordered, what should a wise man do or think, or not do or think'?\n\nCLEINIAS: Every man ought to make up his mind that he will be one of the\nfollowers of God; there can be no doubt of that.\n\nATHENIAN: Then what life is agreeable to God, and becoming in His\nfollowers? One only, expressed once for all in the old saying that\n'like agrees with like, with measure measure,' but things which have no\nmeasure agree neither with themselves nor with the things which have.\nNow God ought to be to us the measure of all things, and not man\n(compare Crat.; Theaet.), as men commonly say (Protagoras): the words\nare far more true of Him. And he who would be dear to God must, as far\nas is possible, be like Him and such as He is. Wherefore the temperate\nman is the friend of God, for he is like Him; and the intemperate man is\nunlike Him, and different from Him, and unjust. And the same applies to\nother things; and this is the conclusion, which is also the noblest and\ntruest of all sayings,--that for the good man to offer sacrifice to the\nGods, and hold converse with them by means of prayers and offerings and\nevery kind of service, is the noblest and best of all things, and also\nthe most conducive to a happy life, and very fit and meet. But with the\nbad man, the opposite of this is true: for the bad man has an impure\nsoul, whereas the good is pure; and from one who is polluted, neither\na good man nor God can without impropriety receive gifts. Wherefore the\nunholy do only waste their much service upon the Gods, but when offered\nby any holy man, such service is most acceptable to them. This is the\nmark at which we ought to aim. But what weapons shall we use, and how\nshall we direct them? In the first place, we affirm that next after the\nOlympian Gods and the Gods of the State, honour should be given to the\nGods below; they should receive everything in even numbers, and of\nthe second choice, and ill omen, while the odd numbers, and the first\nchoice, and the things of lucky omen, are given to the Gods above, by\nhim who would rightly hit the mark of piety. Next to these Gods, a wise\nman will do service to the demons or spirits, and then to the heroes,\nand after them will follow the private and ancestral Gods, who are\nworshipped as the law prescribes in the places which are sacred to them.\nNext comes the honour of living parents, to whom, as is meet, we have to\npay the first and greatest and oldest of all debts, considering that all\nwhich a man has belongs to those who gave him birth and brought him up,\nand that he must do all that he can to minister to them, first, in his\nproperty, secondly, in his person, and thirdly, in his soul, in return\nfor the endless care and travail which they bestowed upon him of old,\nin the days of his infancy, and which he is now to pay back to them when\nthey are old and in the extremity of their need. And all his life long\nhe ought never to utter, or to have uttered, an unbecoming word to them;\nfor of light and fleeting words the penalty is most severe; Nemesis, the\nmessenger of justice, is appointed to watch over all such matters. When\nthey are angry and want to satisfy their feelings in word or deed,\nhe should give way to them; for a father who thinks that he has been\nwronged by his son may be reasonably expected to be very angry. At\ntheir death, the most moderate funeral is best, neither exceeding the\ncustomary expense, nor yet falling short of the honour which has been\nusually shown by the former generation to their parents. And let a man\nnot forget to pay the yearly tribute of respect to the dead, honouring\nthem chiefly by omitting nothing that conduces to a perpetual\nremembrance of them, and giving a reasonable portion of his fortune to\nthe dead. Doing this, and living after this manner, we shall receive our\nreward from the Gods and those who are above us (i.e. the demons); and\nwe shall spend our days for the most part in good hope. And how a man\nought to order what relates to his descendants and his kindred and\nfriends and fellow-citizens, and the rites of hospitality taught by\nHeaven, and the intercourse which arises out of all these duties, with a\nview to the embellishment and orderly regulation of his own life--these\nthings, I say, the laws, as we proceed with them, will accomplish,\npartly persuading, and partly when natures do not yield to the\npersuasion of custom, chastising them by might and right, and will thus\nrender our state, if the Gods co-operate with us, prosperous and happy.\nBut of what has to be said, and must be said by the legislator who is of\nmy way of thinking, and yet, if said in the form of law, would be out of\nplace--of this I think that he may give a sample for the instruction of\nhimself and of those for whom he is legislating; and then when, as far\nas he is able, he has gone through all the preliminaries, he may proceed\nto the work of legislation. Now, what will be the form of such prefaces?\nThere may be a difficulty in including or describing them all under a\nsingle form, but I think that we may get some notion of them if we can\nguarantee one thing.\n\nCLEINIAS: What is that?\n\nATHENIAN: I should wish the citizens to be as readily persuaded to\nvirtue as possible; this will surely be the aim of the legislator in all\nhis laws.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: The proposal appears to me to be of some value; and I think\nthat a person will listen with more gentleness and good-will to the\nprecepts addressed to him by the legislator, when his soul is not\naltogether unprepared to receive them. Even a little done in the way of\nconciliation gains his ear, and is always worth having. For there is\nno great inclination or readiness on the part of mankind to be made as\ngood, or as quickly good, as possible. The case of the many proves the\nwisdom of Hesiod, who says that the road to wickedness is smooth and can\nbe travelled without perspiring, because it is so very short:\n\n'But before virtue the immortal Gods have placed the sweat of labour,\nand long and steep is the way thither, and rugged at first; but when\nyou have reached the top, although difficult before, it is then easy.'\n(Works and Days.)\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes; and he certainly speaks well.\n\nATHENIAN: Very true: and now let me tell you the effect which the\npreceding discourse has had upon me.\n\nCLEINIAS: Proceed.\n\nATHENIAN: Suppose that we have a little conversation with the\nlegislator, and say to him--'O, legislator, speak; if you know what we\nought to say and do, you can surely tell.'\n\nCLEINIAS: Of course he can.\n\nATHENIAN: 'Did we not hear you just now saying, that the legislator\nought not to allow the poets to do what they liked? For that they would\nnot know in which of their words they went against the laws, to the hurt\nof the state.'\n\nCLEINIAS: That is true.\n\nATHENIAN: May we not fairly make answer to him on behalf of the poets?\n\nCLEINIAS: What answer shall we make to him?\n\nATHENIAN: That the poet, according to the tradition which has ever\nprevailed among us, and is accepted of all men, when he sits down on the\ntripod of the muse, is not in his right mind; like a fountain, he allows\nto flow out freely whatever comes in, and his art being imitative, he is\noften compelled to represent men of opposite dispositions, and thus to\ncontradict himself; neither can he tell whether there is more truth in\none thing that he has said than in another. This is not the case in a\nlaw; the legislator must give not two rules about the same thing, but\none only. Take an example from what you have just been saying. Of three\nkinds of funerals, there is one which is too extravagant, another is too\nniggardly, the third in a mean; and you choose and approve and order the\nlast without qualification. But if I had an extremely rich wife, and she\nbade me bury her and describe her burial in a poem, I should praise\nthe extravagant sort; and a poor miserly man, who had not much money to\nspend, would approve of the niggardly; and the man of moderate means,\nwho was himself moderate, would praise a moderate funeral. Now you in\nthe capacity of legislator must not barely say 'a moderate funeral,'\nbut you must define what moderation is, and how much; unless you are\ndefinite, you must not suppose that you are speaking a language that can\nbecome law.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly not.\n\nATHENIAN: And is our legislator to have no preface to his laws, but\nto say at once Do this, avoid that--and then holding the penalty in\nterrorem, to go on to another law; offering never a word of advice or\nexhortation to those for whom he is legislating, after the manner of\nsome doctors? For of doctors, as I may remind you, some have a gentler,\nothers a ruder method of cure; and as children ask the doctor to be\ngentle with them, so we will ask the legislator to cure our disorders\nwith the gentlest remedies. What I mean to say is, that besides doctors\nthere are doctors' servants, who are also styled doctors.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: And whether they are slaves or freemen makes no difference;\nthey acquire their knowledge of medicine by obeying and observing their\nmasters; empirically and not according to the natural way of learning,\nas the manner of freemen is, who have learned scientifically themselves\nthe art which they impart scientifically to their pupils. You are aware\nthat there are these two classes of doctors?\n\nCLEINIAS: To be sure.\n\nATHENIAN: And did you ever observe that there are two classes of\npatients in states, slaves and freemen; and the slave doctors run about\nand cure the slaves, or wait for them in the dispensaries--practitioners\nof this sort never talk to their patients individually, or let them talk\nabout their own individual complaints? The slave doctor prescribes what\nmere experience suggests, as if he had exact knowledge; and when he has\ngiven his orders, like a tyrant, he rushes off with equal assurance\nto some other servant who is ill; and so he relieves the master of the\nhouse of the care of his invalid slaves. But the other doctor, who is\na freeman, attends and practices upon freemen; and he carries his\nenquiries far back, and goes into the nature of the disorder; he enters\ninto discourse with the patient and with his friends, and is at once\ngetting information from the sick man, and also instructing him as far\nas he is able, and he will not prescribe for him until he has first\nconvinced him; at last, when he has brought the patient more and more\nunder his persuasive influences and set him on the road to health, he\nattempts to effect a cure. Now which is the better way of proceeding in\na physician and in a trainer? Is he the better who accomplishes his\nends in a double way, or he who works in one way, and that the ruder and\ninferior?\n\nCLEINIAS: I should say, Stranger, that the double way is far better.\n\nATHENIAN: Should you like to see an example of the double and single\nmethod in legislation?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly I should.\n\nATHENIAN: What will be our first law? Will not the legislator, observing\nthe order of nature, begin by making regulations for states about\nbirths?\n\nCLEINIAS: He will.\n\nATHENIAN: In all states the birth of children goes back to the connexion\nof marriage?\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: And, according to the true order, the laws relating to\nmarriage should be those which are first determined in every state?\n\nCLEINIAS: Quite so.\n\nATHENIAN: Then let me first give the law of marriage in a simple form;\nit may run as follows:--A man shall marry between the ages of thirty and\nthirty-five, or, if he does not, he shall pay such and such a fine, or\nshall suffer the loss of such and such privileges. This would be the\nsimple law about marriage. The double law would run thus:--A man shall\nmarry between the ages of thirty and thirty-five, considering that in a\nmanner the human race naturally partakes of immortality, which every man\nis by nature inclined to desire to the utmost; for the desire of every\nman that he may become famous, and not lie in the grave without a name,\nis only the love of continuance. Now mankind are coeval with all time,\nand are ever following, and will ever follow, the course of time; and so\nthey are immortal, because they leave children's children behind them,\nand partake of immortality in the unity of generation. And for a man\nvoluntarily to deprive himself of this gift, as he deliberately does who\nwill not have a wife or children, is impiety. He who obeys the law shall\nbe free, and shall pay no fine; but he who is disobedient, and does not\nmarry, when he has arrived at the age of thirty-five, shall pay a yearly\nfine of a certain amount, in order that he may not imagine his celibacy\nto bring ease and profit to him; and he shall not share in the honours\nwhich the young men in the state give to the aged. Comparing now the\ntwo forms of the law, you will be able to arrive at a judgment about any\nother laws--whether they should be double in length even when shortest,\nbecause they have to persuade as well as threaten, or whether they shall\nonly threaten and be of half the length.\n\nMEGILLUS: The shorter form, Stranger, would be more in accordance with\nLacedaemonian custom; although, for my own part, if any one were to ask\nme which I myself prefer in the state, I should certainly determine in\nfavour of the longer; and I would have every law made after the same\npattern, if I had to choose. But I think that Cleinias is the person to\nbe consulted, for his is the state which is going to use these laws.\n\nCLEINIAS: Thank you, Megillus.\n\nATHENIAN: Whether, in the abstract, words are to be many or few, is a\nvery foolish question; the best form, and not the shortest, is to be\napproved; nor is length at all to be regarded. Of the two forms of law\nwhich have been recited, the one is not only twice as good in practical\nusefulness as the other, but the case is like that of the two kinds\nof doctors, which I was just now mentioning. And yet legislators never\nappear to have considered that they have two instruments which they\nmight use in legislation--persuasion and force; for in dealing with the\nrude and uneducated multitude, they use the one only as far as they can;\nthey do not mingle persuasion with coercion, but employ force pure and\nsimple. Moreover, there is a third point, sweet friends, which ought to\nbe, and never is, regarded in our existing laws.\n\nCLEINIAS: What is it?\n\nATHENIAN: A point arising out of our previous discussion, which comes\ninto my mind in some mysterious way. All this time, from early dawn\nuntil noon, have we been talking about laws in this charming retreat:\nnow we are going to promulgate our laws, and what has preceded was only\nthe prelude of them. Why do I mention this? For this reason:--Because\nall discourses and vocal exercises have preludes and overtures, which\nare a sort of artistic beginnings intended to help the strain which\nis to be performed; lyric measures and music of every other kind have\npreludes framed with wonderful care. But of the truer and higher\nstrain of law and politics, no one has ever yet uttered any prelude, or\ncomposed or published any, as though there was no such thing in\nnature. Whereas our present discussion seems to me to imply that there\nis;--these double laws, of which we were speaking, are not exactly\ndouble, but they are in two parts, the law and the prelude of the law.\nThe arbitrary command, which was compared to the commands of doctors,\nwhom we described as of the meaner sort, was the law pure and simple;\nand that which preceded, and was described by our friend here as\nbeing hortatory only, was, although in fact, an exhortation, likewise\nanalogous to the preamble of a discourse. For I imagine that all this\nlanguage of conciliation, which the legislator has been uttering in the\npreface of the law, was intended to create good-will in the person whom\nhe addressed, in order that, by reason of this good-will, he might\nmore intelligently receive his command, that is to say, the law. And\ntherefore, in my way of speaking, this is more rightly described as the\npreamble than as the matter of the law. And I must further proceed to\nobserve, that to all his laws, and to each separately, the legislator\nshould prefix a preamble; he should remember how great will be the\ndifference between them, according as they have, or have not, such\npreambles, as in the case already given.\n\nCLEINIAS: The lawgiver, if he asks my opinion, will certainly legislate\nin the form which you advise.\n\nATHENIAN: I think that you are right, Cleinias, in affirming that all\nlaws have preambles, and that throughout the whole of this work of\nlegislation every single law should have a suitable preamble at the\nbeginning; for that which is to follow is most important, and it makes\nall the difference whether we clearly remember the preambles or not. Yet\nwe should be wrong in requiring that all laws, small and great alike,\nshould have preambles of the same kind, any more than all songs or\nspeeches; although they may be natural to all, they are not always\nnecessary, and whether they are to be employed or not has in each case\nto be left to the judgment of the speaker or the musician, or, in the\npresent instance, of the lawgiver.\n\nCLEINIAS: That I think is most true. And now, Stranger, without delay\nlet us return to the argument, and, as people say in play, make a second\nand better beginning, if you please, with the principles which we have\nbeen laying down, which we never thought of regarding as a preamble\nbefore, but of which we may now make a preamble, and not merely consider\nthem to be chance topics of discourse. Let us acknowledge, then, that\nwe have a preamble. About the honour of the Gods and the respect of\nparents, enough has been already said; and we may proceed to the topics\nwhich follow next in order, until the preamble is deemed by you to be\ncomplete; and after that you shall go through the laws themselves.\n\nATHENIAN: I understand you to mean that we have made a sufficient\npreamble about Gods and demigods, and about parents living or dead; and\nnow you would have us bring the rest of the subject into the light of\nday?\n\nCLEINIAS: Exactly.\n\nATHENIAN: After this, as is meet and for the interest of us all, I the\nspeaker, and you the listeners, will try to estimate all that relates\nto the souls and bodies and properties of the citizens, as regards both\ntheir occupations and amusements, and thus arrive, as far as in us lies,\nat the nature of education. These then are the topics which follow next\nin order.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK V.\n\nATHENIAN: Listen, all ye who have just now heard the laws about Gods,\nand about our dear forefathers:--Of all the things which a man has, next\nto the Gods, his soul is the most divine and most truly his own. Now in\nevery man there are two parts: the better and superior, which rules,\nand the worse and inferior, which serves; and the ruling part of him is\nalways to be preferred to the subject. Wherefore I am right in bidding\nevery one next to the Gods, who are our masters, and those who in order\nfollow them (i.e. the demons), to honour his own soul, which every one\nseems to honour, but no one honours as he ought; for honour is a divine\ngood, and no evil thing is honourable; and he who thinks that he can\nhonour the soul by word or gift, or any sort of compliance, without\nmaking her in any way better, seems to honour her, but honours her not\nat all. For example, every man, from his very boyhood, fancies that\nhe is able to know everything, and thinks that he honours his soul by\npraising her, and he is very ready to let her do whatever she may like.\nBut I mean to say that in acting thus he injures his soul, and is far\nfrom honouring her; whereas, in our opinion, he ought to honour her as\nsecond only to the Gods. Again, when a man thinks that others are to be\nblamed, and not himself, for the errors which he has committed from time\nto time, and the many and great evils which befell him in consequence,\nand is always fancying himself to be exempt and innocent, he is under\nthe idea that he is honouring his soul; whereas the very reverse is the\nfact, for he is really injuring her. And when, disregarding the word and\napproval of the legislator, he indulges in pleasure, then again he is\nfar from honouring her; he only dishonours her, and fills her full of\nevil and remorse; or when he does not endure to the end the labours and\nfears and sorrows and pains which the legislator approves, but gives way\nbefore them, then, by yielding, he does not honour the soul, but by all\nsuch conduct he makes her to be dishonourable; nor when he thinks that\nlife at any price is a good, does he honour her, but yet once more he\ndishonours her; for the soul having a notion that the world below is all\nevil, he yields to her, and does not resist and teach or convince her\nthat, for aught she knows, the world of the Gods below, instead of being\nevil, may be the greatest of all goods. Again, when any one prefers\nbeauty to virtue, what is this but the real and utter dishonour of the\nsoul? For such a preference implies that the body is more honourable\nthan the soul; and this is false, for there is nothing of earthly birth\nwhich is more honourable than the heavenly, and he who thinks otherwise\nof the soul has no idea how greatly he undervalues this wonderful\npossession; nor, again, when a person is willing, or not unwilling, to\nacquire dishonest gains, does he then honour his soul with gifts--far\notherwise; he sells her glory and honour for a small piece of gold; but\nall the gold which is under or upon the earth is not enough to give in\nexchange for virtue. In a word, I may say that he who does not estimate\nthe base and evil, the good and noble, according to the standard of the\nlegislator, and abstain in every possible way from the one and practise\nthe other to the utmost of his power, does not know that in all these\nrespects he is most foully and disgracefully abusing his soul, which is\nthe divinest part of man; for no one, as I may say, ever considers that\nwhich is declared to be the greatest penalty of evil-doing--namely, to\ngrow into the likeness of bad men, and growing like them to fly from the\nconversation of the good, and be cut off from them, and cleave to and\nfollow after the company of the bad. And he who is joined to them must\ndo and suffer what such men by nature do and say to one another,--a\nsuffering which is not justice but retribution; for justice and the\njust are noble, whereas retribution is the suffering which waits upon\ninjustice; and whether a man escape or endure this, he is miserable,--in\nthe former case, because he is not cured; while in the latter, he\nperishes in order that the rest of mankind may be saved.\n\nSpeaking generally, our glory is to follow the better and improve\nthe inferior, which is susceptible of improvement, as far as this is\npossible. And of all human possessions, the soul is by nature most\ninclined to avoid the evil, and track out and find the chief good; which\nwhen a man has found, he should take up his abode with it during the\nremainder of his life. Wherefore the soul also is second (or next to\nGod) in honour; and third, as every one will perceive, comes the honour\nof the body in natural order. Having determined this, we have next to\nconsider that there is a natural honour of the body, and that of honours\nsome are true and some are counterfeit. To decide which are which is the\nbusiness of the legislator; and he, I suspect, would intimate that they\nare as follows:--Honour is not to be given to the fair body, or to the\nstrong or the swift or the tall, or to the healthy body (although many\nmay think otherwise), any more than to their opposites; but the mean\nstates of all these habits are by far the safest and most moderate; for\nthe one extreme makes the soul braggart and insolent, and the other,\nilliberal and base; and money, and property, and distinction all go to\nthe same tune. The excess of any of these things is apt to be a source\nof hatreds and divisions among states and individuals; and the defect\nof them is commonly a cause of slavery. And, therefore, I would not have\nany one fond of heaping up riches for the sake of his children, in order\nthat he may leave them as rich as possible. For the possession of great\nwealth is of no use, either to them or to the state. The condition of\nyouth which is free from flattery, and at the same time not in need of\nthe necessaries of life, is the best and most harmonious of all, being\nin accord and agreement with our nature, and making life to be most\nentirely free from sorrow. Let parents, then, bequeath to their children\nnot a heap of riches, but the spirit of reverence. We, indeed, fancy\nthat they will inherit reverence from us, if we rebuke them when they\nshow a want of reverence. But this quality is not really imparted to\nthem by the present style of admonition, which only tells them that the\nyoung ought always to be reverential. A sensible legislator will rather\nexhort the elders to reverence the younger, and above all to take\nheed that no young man sees or hears one of themselves doing or saying\nanything disgraceful; for where old men have no shame, there young men\nwill most certainly be devoid of reverence. The best way of training the\nyoung is to train yourself at the same time; not to admonish them,\nbut to be always carrying out your own admonitions in practice. He who\nhonours his kindred, and reveres those who share in the same Gods and\nare of the same blood and family, may fairly expect that the Gods who\npreside over generation will be propitious to him, and will quicken his\nseed. And he who deems the services which his friends and acquaintances\ndo for him, greater and more important than they themselves deem them,\nand his own favours to them less than theirs to him, will have their\ngood-will in the intercourse of life. And surely in his relations to the\nstate and his fellow citizens, he is by far the best, who rather than\nthe Olympic or any other victory of peace or war, desires to win the\npalm of obedience to the laws of his country, and who, of all mankind,\nis the person reputed to have obeyed them best through life. In his\nrelations to strangers, a man should consider that a contract is a\nmost holy thing, and that all concerns and wrongs of strangers are\nmore directly dependent on the protection of God, than wrongs done to\ncitizens; for the stranger, having no kindred and friends, is more to be\npitied by Gods and men. Wherefore, also, he who is most able to avenge\nhim is most zealous in his cause; and he who is most able is the genius\nand the god of the stranger, who follow in the train of Zeus, the god\nof strangers. And for this reason, he who has a spark of caution in\nhim, will do his best to pass through life without sinning against\nthe stranger. And of offences committed, whether against strangers or\nfellow-countrymen, that against suppliants is the greatest. For the God\nwho witnessed to the agreement made with the suppliant, becomes in a\nspecial manner the guardian of the sufferer; and he will certainly not\nsuffer unavenged.\n\nThus we have fairly described the manner in which a man is to act about\nhis parents, and himself, and his own affairs; and in relation to the\nstate, and his friends, and kindred, both in what concerns his own\ncountrymen, and in what concerns the stranger. We will now consider what\nmanner of man he must be who would best pass through life in respect of\nthose other things which are not matters of law, but of praise and\nblame only; in which praise and blame educate a man, and make him more\ntractable and amenable to the laws which are about to be imposed.\n\nTruth is the beginning of every good thing, both to Gods and men; and he\nwho would be blessed and happy, should be from the first a partaker of\nthe truth, that he may live a true man as long as possible, for then\nhe can be trusted; but he is not to be trusted who loves voluntary\nfalsehood, and he who loves involuntary falsehood is a fool. Neither\ncondition is enviable, for the untrustworthy and ignorant has no friend,\nand as time advances he becomes known, and lays up in store for himself\nisolation in crabbed age when life is on the wane: so that, whether his\nchildren or friends are alive or not, he is equally solitary.--Worthy of\nhonour is he who does no injustice, and of more than twofold honour,\nif he not only does no injustice himself, but hinders others from doing\nany; the first may count as one man, the second is worth many men,\nbecause he informs the rulers of the injustice of others. And yet\nmore highly to be esteemed is he who co-operates with the rulers in\ncorrecting the citizens as far as he can--he shall be proclaimed the\ngreat and perfect citizen, and bear away the palm of virtue. The same\npraise may be given about temperance and wisdom, and all other goods\nwhich may be imparted to others, as well as acquired by a man for\nhimself; he who imparts them shall be honoured as the man of men, and he\nwho is willing, yet is not able, may be allowed the second place; but he\nwho is jealous and will not, if he can help, allow others to partake in\na friendly way of any good, is deserving of blame: the good, however,\nwhich he has, is not to be undervalued by us because it is possessed\nby him, but must be acquired by us also to the utmost of our power. Let\nevery man, then, freely strive for the prize of virtue, and let there be\nno envy. For the unenvious nature increases the greatness of states--he\nhimself contends in the race, blasting the fair fame of no man; but the\nenvious, who thinks that he ought to get the better by defaming others,\nis less energetic himself in the pursuit of true virtue, and reduces his\nrivals to despair by his unjust slanders of them. And so he makes the\nwhole city to enter the arena untrained in the practice of virtue, and\ndiminishes her glory as far as in him lies. Now every man should\nbe valiant, but he should also be gentle. From the cruel, or hardly\ncurable, or altogether incurable acts of injustice done to him by\nothers, a man can only escape by fighting and defending himself and\nconquering, and by never ceasing to punish them; and no man who is not\nof a noble spirit is able to accomplish this. As to the actions of\nthose who do evil, but whose evil is curable, in the first place, let us\nremember that the unjust man is not unjust of his own free will. For no\nman of his own free will would choose to possess the greatest of evils,\nand least of all in the most honourable part of himself. And the soul,\nas we said, is of a truth deemed by all men the most honourable. In\nthe soul, then, which is the most honourable part of him, no one, if\nhe could help, would admit, or allow to continue the greatest of evils\n(compare Republic). The unrighteous and vicious are always to be pitied\nin any case; and one can afford to forgive as well as pity him who is\ncurable, and refrain and calm one's anger, not getting into a passion,\nlike a woman, and nursing ill-feeling. But upon him who is incapable\nof reformation and wholly evil, the vials of our wrath should be poured\nout; wherefore I say that good men ought, when occasion demands, to be\nboth gentle and passionate.\n\nOf all evils the greatest is one which in the souls of most men\nis innate, and which a man is always excusing in himself and never\ncorrecting; I mean, what is expressed in the saying that 'Every man by\nnature is and ought to be his own friend.' Whereas the excessive love of\nself is in reality the source to each man of all offences; for the lover\nis blinded about the beloved, so that he judges wrongly of the just,\nthe good, and the honourable, and thinks that he ought always to prefer\nhimself to the truth. But he who would be a great man ought to regard,\nnot himself or his interests, but what is just, whether the just act be\nhis own or that of another. Through a similar error men are induced to\nfancy that their own ignorance is wisdom, and thus we who may be truly\nsaid to know nothing, think that we know all things; and because we will\nnot let others act for us in what we do not know, we are compelled to\nact amiss ourselves. Wherefore let every man avoid excess of self-love,\nand condescend to follow a better man than himself, not allowing any\nfalse shame to stand in the way. There are also minor precepts which are\noften repeated, and are quite as useful; a man should recollect them and\nremind himself of them. For when a stream is flowing out, there should\nbe water flowing in too; and recollection flows in while wisdom is\ndeparting. Therefore I say that a man should refrain from excess either\nof laughter or tears, and should exhort his neighbour to do the same;\nhe should veil his immoderate sorrow or joy, and seek to behave with\npropriety, whether the genius of his good fortune remains with him, or\nwhether at the crisis of his fate, when he seems to be mounting high and\nsteep places, the Gods oppose him in some of his enterprises. Still he\nmay ever hope, in the case of good men, that whatever afflictions are\nto befall them in the future God will lessen, and that present evils He\nwill change for the better; and as to the goods which are the opposite\nof these evils, he will not doubt that they will be added to them, and\nthat they will be fortunate. Such should be men's hopes, and such should\nbe the exhortations with which they admonish one another, never losing\nan opportunity, but on every occasion distinctly reminding themselves\nand others of all these things, both in jest and earnest.\n\nEnough has now been said of divine matters, both as touching the\npractices which men ought to follow, and as to the sort of persons\nwho they ought severally to be. But of human things we have not as yet\nspoken, and we must; for to men we are discoursing and not to Gods.\nPleasures and pains and desires are a part of human nature, and on them\nevery mortal being must of necessity hang and depend with the most eager\ninterest. And therefore we must praise the noblest life, not only as the\nfairest in appearance, but as being one which, if a man will only taste,\nand not, while still in his youth, desert for another, he will find to\nsurpass also in the very thing which we all of us desire,--I mean in\nhaving a greater amount of pleasure and less of pain during the whole of\nlife. And this will be plain, if a man has a true taste of them, as will\nbe quickly and clearly seen. But what is a true taste? That we have to\nlearn from the argument--the point being what is according to nature,\nand what is not according to nature. One life must be compared with\nanother, the more pleasurable with the more painful, after this\nmanner:--We desire to have pleasure, but we neither desire nor choose\npain; and the neutral state we are ready to take in exchange, not\nfor pleasure but for pain; and we also wish for less pain and greater\npleasure, but less pleasure and greater pain we do not wish for; and\nan equal balance of either we cannot venture to assert that we should\ndesire. And all these differ or do not differ severally in number and\nmagnitude and intensity and equality, and in the opposites of these when\nregarded as objects of choice, in relation to desire. And such being the\nnecessary order of things, we wish for that life in which there are\nmany great and intense elements of pleasure and pain, and in which the\npleasures are in excess, and do not wish for that in which the opposites\nexceed; nor, again, do we wish for that in which the elements of either\nare small and few and feeble, and the pains exceed. And when, as I said\nbefore, there is a balance of pleasure and pain in life, this is to be\nregarded by us as the balanced life; while other lives are preferred by\nus because they exceed in what we like, or are rejected by us because\nthey exceed in what we dislike. All the lives of men may be regarded by\nus as bound up in these, and we must also consider what sort of lives\nwe by nature desire. And if we wish for any others, I say that we desire\nthem only through some ignorance and inexperience of the lives which\nactually exist.\n\nNow, what lives are they, and how many in which, having searched out and\nbeheld the objects of will and desire and their opposites, and making of\nthem a law, choosing, I say, the dear and the pleasant and the best and\nnoblest, a man may live in the happiest way possible? Let us say that\nthe temperate life is one kind of life, and the rational another, and\nthe courageous another, and the healthful another; and to these four let\nus oppose four other lives--the foolish, the cowardly, the intemperate,\nthe diseased. He who knows the temperate life will describe it as in\nall things gentle, having gentle pains and gentle pleasures, and placid\ndesires and loves not insane; whereas the intemperate life is impetuous\nin all things, and has violent pains and pleasures, and vehement and\nstinging desires, and loves utterly insane; and in the temperate life\nthe pleasures exceed the pains, but in the intemperate life the pains\nexceed the pleasures in greatness and number and frequency. Hence one of\nthe two lives is naturally and necessarily more pleasant and the other\nmore painful, and he who would live pleasantly cannot possibly choose to\nlive intemperately. And if this is true, the inference clearly is that\nno man is voluntarily intemperate; but that the whole multitude of men\nlack temperance in their lives, either from ignorance, or from want of\nself-control, or both. And the same holds of the diseased and healthy\nlife; they both have pleasures and pains, but in health the pleasure\nexceeds the pain, and in sickness the pain exceeds the pleasure. Now our\nintention in choosing the lives is not that the painful should exceed,\nbut the life in which pain is exceeded by pleasure we have determined to\nbe the more pleasant life. And we should say that the temperate life\nhas the elements both of pleasure and pain fewer and smaller and less\nfrequent than the intemperate, and the wise life than the foolish life,\nand the life of courage than the life of cowardice; one of each pair\nexceeding in pleasure and the other in pain, the courageous surpassing\nthe cowardly, and the wise exceeding the foolish. And so the one\nclass of lives exceeds the other class in pleasure; the temperate and\ncourageous and wise and healthy exceed the cowardly and foolish and\nintemperate and diseased lives; and generally speaking, that which has\nany virtue, whether of body or soul, is pleasanter than the vicious\nlife, and far superior in beauty and rectitude and excellence and\nreputation, and causes him who lives accordingly to be infinitely\nhappier than the opposite.\n\nEnough of the preamble; and now the laws should follow; or, to speak\nmore correctly, an outline of them. As, then, in the case of a web\nor any other tissue, the warp and the woof cannot be made of the same\nmaterials (compare Statesman), but the warp is necessarily superior as\nbeing stronger, and having a certain character of firmness, whereas\nthe woof is softer and has a proper degree of elasticity;--in a\nsimilar manner those who are to hold great offices in states, should be\ndistinguished truly in each case from those who have been but slenderly\nproven by education. Let us suppose that there are two parts in the\nconstitution of a state--one the creation of offices, the other the laws\nwhich are assigned to them to administer.\n\nBut, before all this, comes the following consideration:--The shepherd\nor herdsman, or breeder of horses or the like, when he has received his\nanimals will not begin to train them until he has first purified them in\na manner which befits a community of animals; he will divide the healthy\nand unhealthy, and the good breed and the bad breed, and will send\naway the unhealthy and badly bred to other herds, and tend the rest,\nreflecting that his labours will be vain and have no effect, either on\nthe souls or bodies of those whom nature and ill nurture have corrupted,\nand that they will involve in destruction the pure and healthy nature\nand being of every other animal, if he should neglect to purify them.\nNow the case of other animals is not so important--they are only worth\nintroducing for the sake of illustration; but what relates to man is of\nthe highest importance; and the legislator should make enquiries, and\nindicate what is proper for each one in the way of purification and\nof any other procedure. Take, for example, the purification of a\ncity--there are many kinds of purification, some easier and others more\ndifficult; and some of them, and the best and most difficult of them,\nthe legislator, if he be also a despot, may be able to effect; but the\nlegislator, who, not being a despot, sets up a new government and laws,\neven if he attempt the mildest of purgations, may think himself happy if\nhe can complete his work. The best kind of purification is painful, like\nsimilar cures in medicine, involving righteous punishment and inflicting\ndeath or exile in the last resort. For in this way we commonly dispose\nof great sinners who are incurable, and are the greatest injury of the\nwhole state. But the milder form of purification is as follows:--when\nmen who have nothing, and are in want of food, show a disposition to\nfollow their leaders in an attack on the property of the rich--these,\nwho are the natural plague of the state, are sent away by the legislator\nin a friendly spirit as far as he is able; and this dismissal of them is\neuphemistically termed a colony. And every legislator should contrive to\ndo this at once. Our present case, however, is peculiar. For there is\nno need to devise any colony or purifying separation under the\ncircumstances in which we are placed. But as, when many streams flow\ntogether from many sources, whether springs or mountain torrents, into a\nsingle lake, we ought to attend and take care that the confluent waters\nshould be perfectly clear, and in order to effect this, should pump and\ndraw off and divert impurities, so in every political arrangement there\nmay be trouble and danger. But, seeing that we are now only discoursing\nand not acting, let our selection be supposed to be completed, and the\ndesired purity attained. Touching evil men, who want to join and be\ncitizens of our state, after we have tested them by every sort of\npersuasion and for a sufficient time, we will prevent them from coming;\nbut the good we will to the utmost of our ability receive as friends\nwith open arms.\n\nAnother piece of good fortune must not be forgotten, which, as we were\nsaying, the Heraclid colony had, and which is also ours,--that we have\nescaped division of land and the abolition of debts; for these are\nalways a source of dangerous contention, and a city which is driven by\nnecessity to legislate upon such matters can neither allow the old ways\nto continue, nor yet venture to alter them. We must have recourse to\nprayers, so to speak, and hope that a slight change may be cautiously\neffected in a length of time. And such a change can be accomplished\nby those who have abundance of land, and having also many debtors,\nare willing, in a kindly spirit, to share with those who are in want,\nsometimes remitting and sometimes giving, holding fast in a path of\nmoderation, and deeming poverty to be the increase of a man's desires\nand not the diminution of his property. For this is the great beginning\nof salvation to a state, and upon this lasting basis may be erected\nafterwards whatever political order is suitable under the circumstances;\nbut if the change be based upon an unsound principle, the future\nadministration of the country will be full of difficulties. That is a\ndanger which, as I am saying, is escaped by us, and yet we had better\nsay how, if we had not escaped, we might have escaped; and we may\nventure now to assert that no other way of escape, whether narrow\nor broad, can be devised but freedom from avarice and a sense of\njustice--upon this rock our city shall be built; for there ought to be\nno disputes among citizens about property. If there are quarrels of long\nstanding among them, no legislator of any degree of sense will proceed\na step in the arrangement of the state until they are settled. But that\nthey to whom God has given, as He has to us, to be the founders of a\nnew state as yet free from enmity--that they should create themselves\nenmities by their mode of distributing lands and houses, would be\nsuperhuman folly and wickedness.\n\nHow then can we rightly order the distribution of the land? In the first\nplace, the number of the citizens has to be determined, and also the\nnumber and size of the divisions into which they will have to be formed;\nand the land and the houses will then have to be apportioned by us\nas fairly as we can. The number of citizens can only be estimated\nsatisfactorily in relation to the territory and the neighbouring\nstates. The territory must be sufficient to maintain a certain number of\ninhabitants in a moderate way of life--more than this is not required;\nand the number of citizens should be sufficient to defend themselves\nagainst the injustice of their neighbours, and also to give them the\npower of rendering efficient aid to their neighbours when they are\nwronged. After having taken a survey of their's and their neighbours'\nterritory, we will determine the limits of them in fact as well as in\ntheory. And now, let us proceed to legislate with a view to perfecting\nthe form and outline of our state. The number of our citizens shall be\n5040--this will be a convenient number; and these shall be owners of the\nland and protectors of the allotment. The houses and the land will be\ndivided in the same way, so that every man may correspond to a lot. Let\nthe whole number be first divided into two parts, and then into three;\nand the number is further capable of being divided into four or five\nparts, or any number of parts up to ten. Every legislator ought to know\nso much arithmetic as to be able to tell what number is most likely\nto be useful to all cities; and we are going to take that number which\ncontains the greatest and most regular and unbroken series of divisions.\nThe whole of number has every possible division, and the number 5040\ncan be divided by exactly fifty-nine divisors, and ten of these proceed\nwithout interval from one to ten: this will furnish numbers for war and\npeace, and for all contracts and dealings, including taxes and divisions\nof the land. These properties of number should be ascertained at leisure\nby those who are bound by law to know them; for they are true, and\nshould be proclaimed at the foundation of the city, with a view to use.\nWhether the legislator is establishing a new state or restoring an old\nand decayed one, in respect of Gods and temples,--the temples which are\nto be built in each city, and the Gods or demi-gods after whom they\nare to be called,--if he be a man of sense, he will make no change in\nanything which the oracle of Delphi, or Dodona, or the God Ammon, or\nany ancient tradition has sanctioned in whatever manner, whether by\napparitions or reputed inspiration of Heaven, in obedience to which\nmankind have established sacrifices in connexion with mystic rites,\neither originating on the spot, or derived from Tyrrhenia or Cyprus\nor some other place, and on the strength of which traditions they have\nconsecrated oracles and images, and altars and temples, and portioned\nout a sacred domain for each of them. The least part of all these ought\nnot to be disturbed by the legislator; but he should assign to\nthe several districts some God, or demi-god, or hero, and, in the\ndistribution of the soil, should give to these first their chosen domain\nand all things fitting, that the inhabitants of the several districts\nmay meet at fixed times, and that they may readily supply their various\nwants, and entertain one another with sacrifices, and become friends\nand acquaintances; for there is no greater good in a state than that the\ncitizens should be known to one another. When not light but darkness and\nignorance of each other's characters prevails among them, no one will\nreceive the honour of which he is deserving, or the power or the justice\nto which he is fairly entitled: wherefore, in every state, above all\nthings, every man should take heed that he have no deceit in him, but\nthat he be always true and simple; and that no deceitful person take any\nadvantage of him.\n\nThe next move in our pastime of legislation, like the withdrawal of the\nstone from the holy line in the game of draughts, being an unusual one,\nwill probably excite wonder when mentioned for the first time. And yet,\nif a man will only reflect and weigh the matter with care, he will see\nthat our city is ordered in a manner which, if not the best, is the\nsecond best. Perhaps also some one may not approve this form, because he\nthinks that such a constitution is ill adapted to a legislator who\nhas not despotic power. The truth is, that there are three forms of\ngovernment, the best, the second and the third best, which we may just\nmention, and then leave the selection to the ruler of the settlement.\nFollowing this method in the present instance, let us speak of the\nstates which are respectively first, second, and third in excellence,\nand then we will leave the choice to Cleinias now, or to any one else\nwho may hereafter have to make a similar choice among constitutions, and\nmay desire to give to his state some feature which is congenial to him\nand which he approves in his own country.\n\nThe first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the\nlaw is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying, that\n'Friends have all things in common.' Whether there is anywhere now, or\nwill ever be, this communion of women and children and of property, in\nwhich the private and individual is altogether banished from life, and\nthings which are by nature private, such as eyes and ears and hands,\nhave become common, and in some way see and hear and act in common, and\nall men express praise and blame and feel joy and sorrow on the same\noccasions, and whatever laws there are unite the city to the utmost\n(compare Republic),--whether all this is possible or not, I say that no\nman, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a state which\nwill be truer or better or more exalted in virtue. Whether such a state\nis governed by Gods or sons of Gods, one, or more than one, happy are\nthe men who, living after this manner, dwell there; and therefore to\nthis we are to look for the pattern of the state, and to cling to this,\nand to seek with all our might for one which is like this. The state\nwhich we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest to immortality\nand the only one which takes the second place; and after that, by the\ngrace of God, we will complete the third one. And we will begin by\nspeaking of the nature and origin of the second.\n\nLet the citizens at once distribute their land and houses, and not\ntill the land in common, since a community of goods goes beyond\ntheir proposed origin, and nurture, and education. But in making the\ndistribution, let the several possessors feel that their particular\nlots also belong to the whole city; and seeing that the earth is their\nparent, let them tend her more carefully than children do their mother.\nFor she is a goddess and their queen, and they are her mortal subjects.\nSuch also are the feelings which they ought to entertain to the Gods and\ndemi-gods of the country. And in order that the distribution may always\nremain, they ought to consider further that the present number\nof families should be always retained, and neither increased nor\ndiminished. This may be secured for the whole city in the following\nmanner:--Let the possessor of a lot leave the one of his children who is\nhis best beloved, and one only, to be the heir of his dwelling, and\nhis successor in the duty of ministering to the Gods, the state and the\nfamily, as well the living members of it as those who are departed when\nhe comes into the inheritance; but of his other children, if he have\nmore than one, he shall give the females in marriage according to the\nlaw to be hereafter enacted, and the males he shall distribute as sons\nto those citizens who have no children, and are disposed to receive\nthem; or if there should be none such, and particular individuals\nhave too many children, male or female, or too few, as in the case\nof barrenness--in all these cases let the highest and most honourable\nmagistracy created by us judge and determine what is to be done with\nthe redundant or deficient, and devise a means that the number of 5040\nhouses shall always remain the same. There are many ways of regulating\nnumbers; for they in whom generation is affluent may be made to refrain\n(compare Arist. Pol.), and, on the other hand, special care may be taken\nto increase the number of births by rewards and stigmas, or we may meet\nthe evil by the elder men giving advice and administering rebuke to the\nyounger--in this way the object may be attained. And if after all\nthere be very great difficulty about the equal preservation of the 5040\nhouses, and there be an excess of citizens, owing to the too great love\nof those who live together, and we are at our wits' end, there is still\nthe old device often mentioned by us of sending out a colony, which will\npart friends with us, and be composed of suitable persons. If, on the\nother hand, there come a wave bearing a deluge of disease, or a plague\nof war, and the inhabitants become much fewer than the appointed number\nby reason of bereavement, we ought not to introduce citizens of spurious\nbirth and education, if this can be avoided; but even God is said not to\nbe able to fight against necessity.\n\nWherefore let us suppose this 'high argument' of ours to address us\nin the following terms:--Best of men, cease not to honour according to\nnature similarity and equality and sameness and agreement, as regards\nnumber and every good and noble quality. And, above all, observe the\naforesaid number 5040 throughout life; in the second place, do not\ndisparage the small and modest proportions of the inheritances which you\nreceived in the distribution, by buying and selling them to one another.\nFor then neither will the God who gave you the lot be your friend, nor\nwill the legislator; and indeed the law declares to the disobedient that\nthese are the terms upon which he may or may not take the lot. In the\nfirst place, the earth as he is informed is sacred to the Gods; and in\nthe next place, priests and priestesses will offer up prayers over a\nfirst, and second, and even a third sacrifice, that he who buys or sells\nthe houses or lands which he has received, may suffer the punishment\nwhich he deserves; and these their prayers they shall write down in the\ntemples, on tablets of cypress-wood, for the instruction of posterity.\nMoreover they will set a watch over all these things, that they may be\nobserved;--the magistracy which has the sharpest eyes shall keep watch\nthat any infringement of these commands may be discovered and punished\nas offences both against the law and the God. How great is the\nbenefit of such an ordinance to all those cities, which obey and are\nadministered accordingly, no bad man can ever know, as the old proverb\nsays; but only a man of experience and good habits. For in such an order\nof things there will not be much opportunity for making money; no\nman either ought, or indeed will be allowed, to exercise any ignoble\noccupation, of which the vulgarity is a matter of reproach to a freeman,\nand should never want to acquire riches by any such means.\n\nFurther, the law enjoins that no private man shall be allowed to possess\ngold and silver, but only coin for daily use, which is almost necessary\nin dealing with artisans, and for payment of hirelings, whether slaves\nor immigrants, by all those persons who require the use of them.\nWherefore our citizens, as we say, should have a coin passing current\namong themselves, but not accepted among the rest of mankind; with\na view, however, to expeditions and journeys to other lands,--for\nembassies, or for any other occasion which may arise of sending out a\nherald, the state must also possess a common Hellenic currency. If a\nprivate person is ever obliged to go abroad, let him have the consent of\nthe magistrates and go; and if when he returns he has any foreign money\nremaining, let him give the surplus back to the treasury, and receive\na corresponding sum in the local currency. And if he is discovered to\nappropriate it, let it be confiscated, and let him who knows and does\nnot inform be subject to curse and dishonour equally him who brought\nthe money, and also to a fine not less in amount than the foreign money\nwhich has been brought back. In marrying and giving in marriage, no one\nshall give or receive any dowry at all; and no one shall deposit money\nwith another whom he does not trust as a friend, nor shall he lend money\nupon interest; and the borrower should be under no obligation to repay\neither capital or interest. That these principles are best, any one may\nsee who compares them with the first principle and intention of a state.\nThe intention, as we affirm, of a reasonable statesman, is not what the\nmany declare to be the object of a good legislator, namely, that the\nstate for the true interests of which he is advising should be as great\nand as rich as possible, and should possess gold and silver, and have\nthe greatest empire by sea and land;--this they imagine to be the real\nobject of legislation, at the same time adding, inconsistently, that the\ntrue legislator desires to have the city the best and happiest possible.\nBut they do not see that some of these things are possible, and some\nof them are impossible; and he who orders the state will desire what is\npossible, and will not indulge in vain wishes or attempts to accomplish\nthat which is impossible. The citizen must indeed be happy and good, and\nthe legislator will seek to make him so; but very rich and very good\nat the same time he cannot be, not, at least, in the sense in which the\nmany speak of riches. For they mean by 'the rich' the few who have the\nmost valuable possessions, although the owner of them may quite well be\na rogue. And if this is true, I can never assent to the doctrine that\nthe rich man will be happy--he must be good as well as rich. And good in\na high degree, and rich in a high degree at the same time, he cannot be.\nSome one will ask, why not? And we shall answer--Because acquisitions\nwhich come from sources which are just and unjust indifferently, are\nmore than double those which come from just sources only; and the sums\nwhich are expended neither honourably nor disgracefully, are only\nhalf as great as those which are expended honourably and on honourable\npurposes. Thus, if the one acquires double and spends half, the other\nwho is in the opposite case and is a good man cannot possibly be\nwealthier than he. The first--I am speaking of the saver and not of the\nspender--is not always bad; he may indeed in some cases be utterly bad,\nbut, as I was saying, a good man he never is. For he who receives money\nunjustly as well as justly, and spends neither nor unjustly, will be a\nrich man if he be also thrifty. On the other hand, the utterly bad is\nin general profligate, and therefore very poor; while he who spends on\nnoble objects, and acquires wealth by just means only, can hardly be\nremarkable for riches, any more than he can be very poor. Our statement,\nthen, is true, that the very rich are not good, and, if they are not\ngood, they are not happy. But the intention of our laws was, that the\ncitizens should be as happy as may be, and as friendly as possible to\none another. And men who are always at law with one another, and amongst\nwhom there are many wrongs done, can never be friends to one another,\nbut only those among whom crimes and lawsuits are few and slight.\nTherefore we say that gold and silver ought not to be allowed in the\ncity, nor much of the vulgar sort of trade which is carried on by\nlending money, or rearing the meaner kinds of live stock; but only the\nproduce of agriculture, and only so much of this as will not compel us\nin pursuing it to neglect that for the sake of which riches exist--I\nmean, soul and body, which without gymnastics, and without education,\nwill never be worth anything; and therefore, as we have said not once\nbut many times, the care of riches should have the last place in our\nthoughts. For there are in all three things about which every man has\nan interest; and the interest about money, when rightly regarded, is the\nthird and lowest of them: midway comes the interest of the body; and,\nfirst of all, that of the soul; and the state which we are describing\nwill have been rightly constituted if it ordains honours according to\nthis scale. But if, in any of the laws which have been ordained, health\nhas been preferred to temperance, or wealth to health and temperate\nhabits, that law must clearly be wrong. Wherefore, also, the legislator\nought often to impress upon himself the question--'What do I want?' and\n'Do I attain my aim, or do I miss the mark?' In this way, and in\nthis way only, he may acquit himself and free others from the work of\nlegislation.\n\nLet the allottee then hold his lot upon the conditions which we have\nmentioned.\n\nIt would be well that every man should come to the colony having all\nthings equal; but seeing that this is not possible, and one man\nwill have greater possessions than another, for many reasons and in\nparticular in order to preserve equality in special crises of the state,\nqualifications of property must be unequal, in order that offices and\ncontributions and distributions may be proportioned to the value of\neach person's wealth, and not solely to the virtue of his ancestors or\nhimself, nor yet to the strength and beauty of his person, but also to\nthe measure of his wealth or poverty; and so by a law of inequality,\nwhich will be in proportion to his wealth, he will receive honours\nand offices as equally as possible, and there will be no quarrels\nand disputes. To which end there should be four different standards\nappointed according to the amount of property: there should be a first\nand a second and a third and a fourth class, in which the citizens will\nbe placed, and they will be called by these or similar names: they may\ncontinue in the same rank, or pass into another in any individual case,\non becoming richer from being poorer, or poorer from being richer. The\nform of law which I should propose as the natural sequel would be as\nfollows:--In a state which is desirous of being saved from the greatest\nof all plagues--not faction, but rather distraction;--there should\nexist among the citizens neither extreme poverty, nor, again, excess of\nwealth, for both are productive of both these evils. Now the legislator\nshould determine what is to be the limit of poverty or wealth. Let the\nlimit of poverty be the value of the lot; this ought to be preserved,\nand no ruler, nor any one else who aspires after a reputation for\nvirtue, will allow the lot to be impaired in any case. This the\nlegislator gives as a measure, and he will permit a man to acquire\ndouble or triple, or as much as four times the amount of this (compare\nArist. Pol.). But if a person have yet greater riches, whether he has\nfound them, or they have been given to him, or he has made them in\nbusiness, or has acquired by any stroke of fortune that which is in\nexcess of the measure, if he give back the surplus to the state, and to\nthe Gods who are the patrons of the state, he shall suffer no penalty or\nloss of reputation; but if he disobeys this our law, any one who likes\nmay inform against him and receive half the value of the excess, and the\ndelinquent shall pay a sum equal to the excess out of his own property,\nand the other half of the excess shall belong to the Gods. And let every\npossession of every man, with the exception of the lot, be publicly\nregistered before the magistrates whom the law appoints, so that all\nsuits about money may be easy and quite simple.\n\nThe next thing to be noted is, that the city should be placed as nearly\nas possible in the centre of the country; we should choose a place which\npossesses what is suitable for a city, and this may easily be imagined\nand described. Then we will divide the city into twelve portions, first\nfounding temples to Hestia, to Zeus and to Athene, in a spot which we\nwill call the Acropolis, and surround with a circular wall, making the\ndivision of the entire city and country radiate from this point. The\ntwelve portions shall be equalized by the provision that those which are\nof good land shall be smaller, while those of inferior quality shall be\nlarger. The number of the lots shall be 5040, and each of them shall\nbe divided into two, and every allotment shall be composed of two such\nsections; one of land near the city, the other of land which is at a\ndistance (compare Arist. Pol.). This arrangement shall be carried out in\nthe following manner: The section which is near the city shall be added\nto that which is on the borders, and form one lot, and the portion which\nis next nearest shall be added to the portion which is next farthest;\nand so of the rest. Moreover, in the two sections of the lots the\nsame principle of equalization of the soil ought to be maintained; the\nbadness and goodness shall be compensated by more and less. And the\nlegislator shall divide the citizens into twelve parts, and arrange the\nrest of their property, as far as possible, so as to form twelve equal\nparts; and there shall be a registration of all. After this they shall\nassign twelve lots to twelve Gods, and call them by their names, and\ndedicate to each God their several portions, and call the tribes after\nthem. And they shall distribute the twelve divisions of the city in the\nsame way in which they divided the country; and every man shall have\ntwo habitations, one in the centre of the country, and the other at the\nextremity. Enough of the manner of settlement.\n\nNow we ought by all means to consider that there can never be such a\nhappy concurrence of circumstances as we have described; neither can\nall things coincide as they are wanted. Men who will not take offence at\nsuch a mode of living together, and will endure all their life long to\nhave their property fixed at a moderate limit, and to beget children in\naccordance with our ordinances, and will allow themselves to be deprived\nof gold and other things which the legislator, as is evident from these\nenactments, will certainly forbid them; and will endure, further, the\nsituation of the land with the city in the middle and dwellings round\nabout;--all this is as if the legislator were telling his dreams, or\nmaking a city and citizens of wax. There is truth in these objections,\nand therefore every one should take to heart what I am going to say.\nOnce more, then, the legislator shall appear and address us:--'O my\nfriends,' he will say to us, 'do not suppose me ignorant that there is\na certain degree of truth in your words; but I am of opinion that, in\nmatters which are not present but future, he who exhibits a pattern of\nthat at which he aims, should in nothing fall short of the fairest\nand truest; and that if he finds any part of this work impossible of\nexecution he should avoid and not execute it, but he should contrive to\ncarry out that which is nearest and most akin to it; you must allow the\nlegislator to perfect his design, and when it is perfected, you should\njoin with him in considering what part of his legislation is expedient\nand what will arouse opposition; for surely the artist who is to be\ndeemed worthy of any regard at all, ought always to make his work\nself-consistent.'\n\nHaving determined that there is to be a distribution into twelve\nparts, let us now see in what way this may be accomplished. There is\nno difficulty in perceiving that the twelve parts admit of the greatest\nnumber of divisions of that which they include, or in seeing the other\nnumbers which are consequent upon them, and are produced out of them\nup to 5040; wherefore the law ought to order phratries and demes and\nvillages, and also military ranks and movements, as well as coins and\nmeasures, dry and liquid, and weights, so as to be commensurable\nand agreeable to one another. Nor should we fear the appearance of\nminuteness, if the law commands that all the vessels which a man\npossesses should have a common measure, when we consider generally that\nthe divisions and variations of numbers have a use in respect of all\nthe variations of which they are susceptible, both in themselves and as\nmeasures of height and depth, and in all sounds, and in motions, as well\nthose which proceed in a straight direction, upwards or downwards, as in\nthose which go round and round. The legislator is to consider all these\nthings and to bid the citizens, as far as possible, not to lose sight of\nnumerical order; for no single instrument of youthful education has such\nmighty power, both as regards domestic economy and politics, and in the\narts, as the study of arithmetic. Above all, arithmetic stirs up him who\nis by nature sleepy and dull, and makes him quick to learn, retentive,\nshrewd, and aided by art divine he makes progress quite beyond his\nnatural powers (compare Republic). All such things, if only the\nlegislator, by other laws and institutions, can banish meanness and\ncovetousness from the souls of men, so that they can use them properly\nand to their own good, will be excellent and suitable instruments of\neducation. But if he cannot, he will unintentionally create in them,\ninstead of wisdom, the habit of craft, which evil tendency may be\nobserved in the Egyptians and Phoenicians, and many other races, through\nthe general vulgarity of their pursuits and acquisitions, whether some\nunworthy legislator of theirs has been the cause, or some impediment\nof chance or nature. For we must not fail to observe, O Megillus and\nCleinias, that there is a difference in places, and that some beget\nbetter men and others worse; and we must legislate accordingly. Some\nplaces are subject to strange and fatal influences by reason of diverse\nwinds and violent heats, some by reason of waters; or, again, from the\ncharacter of the food given by the earth, which not only affects the\nbodies of men for good or evil, but produces similar results in their\nsouls. And in all such qualities those spots excel in which there is a\ndivine inspiration, and in which the demigods have their appointed lots,\nand are propitious, not adverse, to the settlers in them. To all these\nmatters the legislator, if he have any sense in him, will attend as\nfar as man can, and frame his laws accordingly. And this is what you,\nCleinias, must do, and to matters of this kind you must turn your mind\nsince you are going to colonize a new country.\n\nCLEINIAS: Your words, Athenian Stranger, are excellent, and I will do as\nyou say.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK VI.\n\nATHENIAN: And now having made an end of the preliminaries we will\nproceed to the appointment of magistracies.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: In the ordering of a state there are two parts: first, the\nnumber of the magistracies, and the mode of establishing them; and,\nsecondly, when they have been established, laws again will have to be\nprovided for each of them, suitable in nature and number. But before\nelecting the magistrates let us stop a little and say a word in season\nabout the election of them.\n\nCLEINIAS: What have you got to say?\n\nATHENIAN: This is what I have to say;--every one can see, that\nalthough the work of legislation is a most important matter, yet if a\nwell-ordered city superadd to good laws unsuitable offices, not only\nwill there be no use in having the good laws,--not only will they be\nridiculous and useless, but the greatest political injury and evil will\naccrue from them.\n\nCLEINIAS: Of course.\n\nATHENIAN: Then now, my friend, let us observe what will happen in\nthe constitution of out intended state. In the first place, you will\nacknowledge that those who are duly appointed to magisterial power, and\ntheir families, should severally have given satisfactory proof of what\nthey are, from youth upward until the time of election; in the next\nplace, those who are to elect should have been trained in habits of law,\nand be well educated, that they may have a right judgment, and may be\nable to select or reject men whom they approve or disapprove, as they\nare worthy of either. But how can we imagine that those who are brought\ntogether for the first time, and are strangers to one another, and also\nuneducated, will avoid making mistakes in the choice of magistrates?\n\nCLEINIAS: Impossible.\n\nATHENIAN: The matter is serious, and excuses will not serve the turn. I\nwill tell you, then, what you and I will have to do, since you, as\nyou tell me, with nine others, have offered to settle the new state on\nbehalf of the people of Crete, and I am to help you by the invention\nof the present romance. I certainly should not like to leave the tale\nwandering all over the world without a head;--a headless monster is such\na hideous thing.\n\nCLEINIAS: Excellent, Stranger.\n\nATHENIAN: Yes; and I will be as good as my word.\n\nCLEINIAS: Let us by all means do as you propose.\n\nATHENIAN: That we will, by the grace of God, if old age will only permit\nus.\n\nCLEINIAS: But God will be gracious.\n\nATHENIAN: Yes; and under his guidance let us consider a further point.\n\nCLEINIAS: What is it?\n\nATHENIAN: Let us remember what a courageously mad and daring creation\nthis our city is.\n\nCLEINIAS: What had you in your mind when you said that?\n\nATHENIAN: I had in my mind the free and easy manner in which we are\nordaining that the inexperienced colonists shall receive our laws. Now\na man need not be very wise, Cleinias, in order to see that no one can\neasily receive laws at their first imposition. But if we could anyhow\nwait until those who have been imbued with them from childhood, and have\nbeen nurtured in them, and become habituated to them, take their part in\nthe public elections of the state; I say, if this could be accomplished,\nand rightly accomplished by any way or contrivance--then, I think that\nthere would be very little danger, at the end of the time, of a state\nthus trained not being permanent.\n\nCLEINIAS: A reasonable supposition.\n\nATHENIAN: Then let us consider if we can find any way out of the\ndifficulty; for I maintain, Cleinias, that the Cnosians, above all the\nother Cretans, should not be satisfied with barely discharging their\nduty to the colony, but they ought to take the utmost pains to establish\nthe offices which are first created by them in the best and surest\nmanner. Above all, this applies to the selection of the guardians of the\nlaw, who must be chosen first of all, and with the greatest care; the\nothers are of less importance.\n\nCLEINIAS: What method can we devise of electing them?\n\nATHENIAN: This will be the method:--Sons of the Cretans, I shall say to\nthem, inasmuch as the Cnosians have precedence over the other states,\nthey should, in common with those who join this settlement, choose\na body of thirty-seven in all, nineteen of them being taken from the\nsettlers, and the remainder from the citizens of Cnosus. Of these latter\nthe Cnosians shall make a present to your colony, and you yourself shall\nbe one of the eighteen, and shall become a citizen of the new state; and\nif you and they cannot be persuaded to go, the Cnosians may fairly use a\nlittle violence in order to make you.\n\nCLEINIAS: But why, Stranger, do not you and Megillus take a part in our\nnew city?\n\nATHENIAN: O, Cleinias, Athens is proud, and Sparta too; and they are\nboth a long way off. But you and likewise the other colonists are\nconveniently situated as you describe. I have been speaking of the\nway in which the new citizens may be best managed under present\ncircumstances; but in after-ages, if the city continues to exist, let\nthe election be on this wise. All who are horse or foot soldiers, or\nhave seen military service at the proper ages when they were severally\nfitted for it (compare Arist. Pol.), shall share in the election of\nmagistrates; and the election shall be held in whatever temple the state\ndeems most venerable, and every one shall carry his vote to the altar\nof the God, writing down on a tablet the name of the person for whom he\nvotes, and his father's name, and his tribe, and ward; and at the side\nhe shall write his own name in like manner. Any one who pleases may take\naway any tablet which he does not think properly filled up, and exhibit\nit in the Agora for a period of not less than thirty days. The tablets\nwhich are judged to be first, to the number of 300, shall be shown by\nthe magistrates to the whole city, and the citizens shall in like manner\nselect from these the candidates whom they prefer; and this second\nselection, to the number of 100, shall be again exhibited to the\ncitizens; in the third, let any one who pleases select whom he pleases\nout of the 100, walking through the parts of victims, and let them\nchoose for magistrates and proclaim the seven-and-thirty who have the\ngreatest number of votes. But who, Cleinias and Megillus, will order for\nus in the colony all this matter of the magistrates, and the scrutinies\nof them? If we reflect, we shall see that cities which are in process of\nconstruction like ours must have some such persons, who cannot possibly\nbe elected before there are any magistrates; and yet they must be\nelected in some way, and they are not to be inferior men, but the\nbest possible. For as the proverb says, 'a good beginning is half the\nbusiness'; and 'to have begun well' is praised by all, and in my opinion\nis a great deal more than half the business, and has never been praised\nby any one enough.\n\nCLEINIAS: That is very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Then let us recognize the difficulty, and make clear to our\nown minds how the beginning is to be accomplished. There is only\none proposal which I have to offer, and that is one which, under our\ncircumstances, is both necessary and expedient.\n\nCLEINIAS: What is it?\n\nATHENIAN: I maintain that this colony of ours has a father and mother,\nwho are no other than the colonizing state. Well I know that many\ncolonies have been, and will be, at enmity with their parents. But in\nearly days the child, as in a family, loves and is beloved; even if\nthere come a time later when the tie is broken, still, while he is in\nwant of education, he naturally loves his parents and is beloved by\nthem, and flies to his relatives for protection, and finds in them his\nonly natural allies in time of need; and this parental feeling already\nexists in the Cnosians, as is shown by their care of the new city; and\nthere is a similar feeling on the part of the young city towards Cnosus.\nAnd I repeat what I was saying--for there is no harm in repeating a\ngood thing--that the Cnosians should take a common interest in all these\nmatters, and choose, as far as they can, the eldest and best of the\ncolonists, to the number of not less than a hundred; and let there\nbe another hundred of the Cnosians themselves. These, I say, on their\narrival, should have a joint care that the magistrates should be\nappointed according to law, and that when they are appointed they should\nundergo a scrutiny. When this has been effected, the Cnosians\nshall return home, and the new city do the best she can for her own\npreservation and happiness. I would have the seven-and-thirty now, and\nin all future time, chosen to fulfil the following duties:--Let them,\nin the first place, be the guardians of the law; and, secondly, of the\nregisters in which each one registers before the magistrate the amount\nof his property, excepting four minae which are allowed to citizens of\nthe first class, three allowed to the second, two to the third, and a\nsingle mina to the fourth. And if any one, despising the laws for the\nsake of gain, be found to possess anything more which has not been\nregistered, let all that he has in excess be confiscated, and let him be\nliable to a suit which shall be the reverse of honourable or fortunate.\nAnd let any one who will, indict him on the charge of loving base gains,\nand proceed against him before the guardians of the law. And if he be\ncast, let him lose his share of the public possessions, and when there\nis any public distribution, let him have nothing but his original lot;\nand let him be written down a condemned man as long as he lives, in\nsome place in which any one who pleases can read about his offences. The\nguardian of the law shall not hold office longer than twenty years, and\nshall not be less than fifty years of age when he is elected; or if he\nis elected when he is sixty years of age, he shall hold office for ten\nyears only; and upon the same principle, he must not imagine that he\nwill be permitted to hold such an important office as that of guardian\nof the laws after he is seventy years of age, if he live so long.\n\nThese are the three first ordinances about the guardians of the law; as\nthe work of legislation progresses, each law in turn will assign to them\ntheir further duties. And now we may proceed in order to speak of the\nelection of other officers; for generals have to be elected, and these\nagain must have their ministers, commanders, and colonels of horse,\nand commanders of brigades of foot, who would be more rightly called by\ntheir popular name of brigadiers. The guardians of the law shall propose\nas generals men who are natives of the city, and a selection from the\ncandidates proposed shall be made by those who are or have been of the\nage for military service. And if one who is not proposed is thought by\nsomebody to be better than one who is, let him name whom he prefers in\nthe place of whom, and make oath that he is better, and propose him;\nand whichever of them is approved by vote shall be admitted to the final\nselection; and the three who have the greatest number of votes shall\nbe appointed generals, and superintendents of military affairs, after\npreviously undergoing a scrutiny, like the guardians of the law. And let\nthe generals thus elected propose twelve brigadiers, one for each tribe;\nand there shall be a right of counter-proposal as in the case of the\ngenerals, and the voting and decision shall take place in the same way.\nUntil the prytanes and council are elected, the guardians of the law\nshall convene the assembly in some holy spot which is suitable to\nthe purpose, placing the hoplites by themselves, and the cavalry by\nthemselves, and in a third division all the rest of the army. All are\nto vote for the generals (and for the colonels of horse), but the\nbrigadiers are to be voted for only by those who carry shields (i.e. the\nhoplites). Let the body of cavalry choose phylarchs for the generals;\nbut captains of light troops, or archers, or any other division of the\narmy, shall be appointed by the generals for themselves. There only\nremains the appointment of officers of cavalry: these shall be proposed\nby the same persons who proposed the generals, and the election and the\ncounter-proposal of other candidates shall be arranged in the same\nway as in the case of the generals, and let the cavalry vote and the\ninfantry look on at the election; the two who have the greatest number\nof votes shall be the leaders of all the horse. Disputes about the\nvoting may be raised once or twice; but if the dispute be raised a third\ntime, the officers who preside at the several elections shall decide.\n\nThe council shall consist of 30 x 12 members--360 will be a convenient\nnumber for sub-division. If we divide the whole number into four parts\nof ninety each, we get ninety counsellors for each class. First, all\nthe citizens shall select candidates from the first class; they shall\nbe compelled to vote, and, if they do not, shall be duly fined. When the\ncandidates have been selected, some one shall mark them down; this shall\nbe the business of the first day. And on the following day, candidates\nshall be selected from the second class in the same manner and under the\nsame conditions as on the previous day; and on the third day a selection\nshall be made from the third class, at which every one may, if he likes\nvote, and the three first classes shall be compelled to vote; but the\nfourth and lowest class shall be under no compulsion, and any member of\nthis class who does not vote shall not be punished. On the fourth day\ncandidates shall be selected from the fourth and smallest class; they\nshall be selected by all, but he who is of the fourth class shall suffer\nno penalty, nor he who is of the third, if he be not willing to vote;\nbut he who is of the first or second class, if he does not vote shall be\npunished;--he who is of the second class shall pay a fine of triple\nthe amount which was exacted at first, and he who is of the first class\nquadruple. On the fifth day the rulers shall bring out the names noted\ndown, for all the citizens to see, and every man shall choose out of\nthem, under pain, if he do not, of suffering the first penalty; and\nwhen they have chosen 180 out of each of the classes, they shall choose\none-half of them by lot, who shall undergo a scrutiny:--These are to\nform the council for the year.\n\nThe mode of election which has been described is in a mean between\nmonarchy and democracy, and such a mean the state ought always to\nobserve; for servants and masters never can be friends, nor good and\nbad, merely because they are declared to have equal privileges. For to\nunequals equals become unequal, if they are not harmonised by measure;\nand both by reason of equality, and by reason of inequality, cities are\nfilled with seditions. The old saying, that 'equality makes friendship,'\nis happy and also true; but there is obscurity and confusion as to what\nsort of equality is meant. For there are two equalities which are called\nby the same name, but are in reality in many ways almost the opposite\nof one another; one of them may be introduced without difficulty, by any\nstate or any legislator in the distribution of honours: this is the rule\nof measure, weight, and number, which regulates and apportions them. But\nthere is another equality, of a better and higher kind, which is not so\neasily recognized. This is the judgment of Zeus; among men it avails\nbut little; that little, however, is the source of the greatest good\nto individuals and states. For it gives to the greater more, and to the\ninferior less and in proportion to the nature of each; and, above all,\ngreater honour always to the greater virtue, and to the less less;\nand to either in proportion to their respective measure of virtue\nand education. And this is justice, and is ever the true principle of\nstates, at which we ought to aim, and according to this rule order the\nnew city which is now being founded, and any other city which may be\nhereafter founded. To this the legislator should look,--not to the\ninterests of tyrants one or more, or to the power of the people, but to\njustice always; which, as I was saying, is the distribution of natural\nequality among unequals in each case. But there are times at which every\nstate is compelled to use the words, 'just,' 'equal,' in a secondary\nsense, in the hope of escaping in some degree from factions. For\nequity and indulgence are infractions of the perfect and strict rule of\njustice. And this is the reason why we are obliged to use the equality\nof the lot, in order to avoid the discontent of the people; and so we\ninvoke God and fortune in our prayers, and beg that they themselves will\ndirect the lot with a view to supreme justice. And therefore, although\nwe are compelled to use both equalities, we should use that into which\nthe element of chance enters as seldom as possible.\n\nThus, O my friends, and for the reasons given, should a state act which\nwould endure and be saved. But as a ship sailing on the sea has to be\nwatched night and day, in like manner a city also is sailing on a sea\nof politics, and is liable to all sorts of insidious assaults; and\ntherefore from morning to night, and from night to morning, rulers must\njoin hands with rulers, and watchers with watchers, receiving and giving\nup their trust in a perpetual succession. Now a multitude can never\nfulfil a duty of this sort with anything like energy. Moreover, the\ngreater number of the senators will have to be left during the greater\npart of the year to order their concerns at their own homes. They will\ntherefore have to be arranged in twelve portions, answering to the\ntwelve months, and furnish guardians of the state, each portion for a\nsingle month. Their business is to be at hand and receive any foreigner\nor citizen who comes to them, whether to give information, or to put one\nof those questions, to which, when asked by other cities, a city should\ngive an answer, and to which, if she ask them herself, she should\nreceive an answer; or again, when there is a likelihood of internal\ncommotions, which are always liable to happen in some form or other,\nthey will, if they can, prevent their occurring; or if they have already\noccurred, will lose no time in making them known to the city, and\nhealing the evil. Wherefore, also, this which is the presiding body of\nthe state ought always to have the control of their assemblies, and of\nthe dissolutions of them, ordinary as well as extraordinary. All this\nis to be ordered by the twelfth part of the council, which is always\nto keep watch together with the other officers of the state during one\nportion of the year, and to rest during the remaining eleven portions.\n\nThus will the city be fairly ordered. And now, who is to have the\nsuperintendence of the country, and what shall be the arrangement?\nSeeing that the whole city and the entire country have been both of\nthem divided into twelve portions, ought there not to be appointed\nsuperintendents of the streets of the city, and of the houses, and\nbuildings, and harbours, and the agora, and fountains, and sacred\ndomains, and temples, and the like?\n\nCLEINIAS: To be sure there ought.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us assume, then, that there ought to be servants of the\ntemples, and priests and priestesses. There must also be superintendents\nof roads and buildings, who will have a care of men, that they may do no\nharm, and also of beasts, both within the enclosure and in the suburbs.\nThree kinds of officers will thus have to be appointed, in order that\nthe city may be suitably provided according to her needs. Those who have\nthe care of the city shall be called wardens of the city; and those who\nhave the care of the agora shall be called wardens of the agora; and\nthose who have the care of the temples shall be called priests. Those\nwho hold hereditary offices as priests or priestesses, shall not be\ndisturbed; but if there be few or none such, as is probable at the\nfoundation of a new city, priests and priestesses shall be appointed to\nbe servants of the Gods who have no servants. Some of our officers shall\nbe elected, and others appointed by lot, those who are of the people and\nthose who are not of the people mingling in a friendly manner in every\nplace and city, that the state may be as far as possible of one mind.\nThe officers of the temples shall be appointed by lot; in this way their\nelection will be committed to God, that He may do what is agreeable to\nHim. And he who obtains a lot shall undergo a scrutiny, first, as to\nwhether he is sound of body and of legitimate birth; and in the second\nplace, in order to show that he is of a perfectly pure family, not\nstained with homicide or any similar impiety in his own person, and also\nthat his father and mother have led a similar unstained life. Now\nthe laws about all divine things should be brought from Delphi, and\ninterpreters appointed, under whose direction they should be used. The\ntenure of the priesthood should always be for a year and no longer; and\nhe who will duly execute the sacred office, according to the laws of\nreligion, must be not less than sixty years of age--the laws shall\nbe the same about priestesses. As for the interpreters, they shall be\nappointed thus:--Let the twelve tribes be distributed into groups of\nfour, and let each group select four, one out of each tribe within the\ngroup, three times; and let the three who have the greatest number of\nvotes (out of the twelve appointed by each group), after undergoing\na scrutiny, nine in all, be sent to Delphi, in order that the God may\nreturn one out of each triad; their age shall be the same as that of the\npriests, and the scrutiny of them shall be conducted in the same manner;\nlet them be interpreters for life, and when any one dies let the four\ntribes select another from the tribe of the deceased. Moreover, besides\npriests and interpreters, there must be treasurers, who will take charge\nof the property of the several temples, and of the sacred domains, and\nshall have authority over the produce and the letting of them; and\nthree of them shall be chosen from the highest classes for the greater\ntemples, and two for the lesser, and one for the least of all; the\nmanner of their election and the scrutiny of them shall be the same as\nthat of the generals. This shall be the order of the temples.\n\nLet everything have a guard as far as possible. Let the defence of the\ncity be commited to the generals, and taxiarchs, and hipparchs, and\nphylarchs, and prytanes, and the wardens of the city, and of the agora,\nwhen the election of them has been completed. The defence of the country\nshall be provided for as follows:--The entire land has been already\ndistributed into twelve as nearly as possible equal parts, and let the\ntribe allotted to a division provide annually for it five wardens of the\ncountry and commanders of the watch; and let each body of five have\nthe power of selecting twelve others out of the youth of their own\ntribe,--these shall be not less than twenty-five years of age, and not\nmore than thirty. And let there be allotted to them severally every\nmonth the various districts, in order that they may all acquire\nknowledge and experience of the whole country. The term of service\nfor commanders and for watchers shall continue during two years. After\nhaving had their stations allotted to them, they will go from place to\nplace in regular order, making their round from left to right as their\ncommanders direct them; (when I speak of going to the right, I mean that\nthey are to go to the east). And at the commencement of the second\nyear, in order that as many as possible of the guards may not only get\na knowledge of the country at any one season of the year, but may also\nhave experience of the manner in which different places are affected\nat different seasons of the year, their then commanders shall lead them\nagain towards the left, from place to place in succession, until they\nhave completed the second year. In the third year other wardens of\nthe country shall be chosen and commanders of the watch, five for each\ndivision, who are to be the superintendents of the bands of twelve.\nWhile on service at each station, their attention shall be directed\nto the following points:--In the first place, they shall see that the\ncountry is well protected against enemies; they shall trench and dig\nwherever this is required, and, as far as they can, they shall by\nfortifications keep off the evil-disposed, in order to prevent them from\ndoing any harm to the country or the property; they shall use the beasts\nof burden and the labourers whom they find on the spot: these will be\ntheir instruments whom they will superintend, taking them, as far\nas possible, at the times when they are not engaged in their regular\nbusiness. They shall make every part of the country inaccessible to\nenemies, and as accessible as possible to friends (compare Arist. Pol.);\nthere shall be ways for man and beasts of burden and for cattle, and\nthey shall take care to have them always as smooth as they can; and\nshall provide against the rains doing harm instead of good to the land,\nwhen they come down from the mountains into the hollow dells; and shall\nkeep in the overflow by the help of works and ditches, in order that the\nvalleys, receiving and drinking up the rain from heaven, and providing\nfountains and streams in the fields and regions which lie underneath,\nmay furnish even to the dry places plenty of good water. The fountains\nof water, whether of rivers or of springs, shall be ornamented with\nplantations and buildings for beauty; and let them bring together the\nstreams in subterraneous channels, and make all things plenteous; and if\nthere be a sacred grove or dedicated precinct in the neighbourhood,\nthey shall conduct the water to the actual temples of the Gods, and so\nbeautify them at all seasons of the year. Everywhere in such places the\nyouth shall make gymnasia for themselves, and warm baths for the\naged, placing by them abundance of dry wood, for the benefit of those\nlabouring under disease--there the weary frame of the rustic, worn with\ntoil, will receive a kindly welcome, far better than he would at the\nhands of a not over-wise doctor.\n\nThe building of these and the like works will be useful and ornamental;\nthey will provide a pleasing amusement, but they will be a serious\nemployment too; for the sixty wardens will have to guard their several\ndivisions, not only with a view to enemies, but also with an eye to\nprofessing friends. When a quarrel arises among neighbours or citizens,\nand any one whether slave or freeman wrongs another, let the five\nwardens decide small matters on their own authority; but where the\ncharge against another relates to greater matters, the seventeen\ncomposed of the fives and twelves, shall determine any charges which one\nman brings against another, not involving more than three minae. Every\njudge and magistrate shall be liable to give an account of his conduct\nin office, except those who, like kings, have the final decision.\nMoreover, as regards the aforesaid wardens of the country, if they do\nany wrong to those of whom they have the care, whether by imposing upon\nthem unequal tasks, or by taking the produce of the soil or implements\nof husbandry without their consent; also if they receive anything in\nthe way of a bribe, or decide suits unjustly, or if they yield to the\ninfluences of flattery, let them be publicly dishonoured; and in regard\nto any other wrong which they do to the inhabitants of the country,\nif the question be of a mina, let them submit to the decision of the\nvillagers in the neighbourhood; but in suits of greater amount, or in\ncase of lesser, if they refuse to submit, trusting that their monthly\nremoval into another part of the country will enable them to escape--in\nsuch cases the injured party may bring his suit in the common court, and\nif he obtain a verdict he may exact from the defendant, who refused to\nsubmit, a double penalty.\n\nThe wardens and the overseers of the country, while on their two years'\nservice, shall have common meals at their several stations, and shall\nall live together; and he who is absent from the common meal, or sleeps\nout, if only for one day or night, unless by order of his commanders, or\nby reason of absolute necessity, if the five denounce him and inscribe\nhis name in the agora as not having kept his guard, let him be deemed\nto have betrayed the city, as far as lay in his power, and let him\nbe disgraced and beaten with impunity by any one who meets him and is\nwilling to punish him. If any of the commanders is guilty of such an\nirregularity, the whole company of sixty shall see to it, and he who\nis cognisant of the offence, and does not bring the offender to trial,\nshall be amenable to the same laws as the younger offender himself, and\nshall pay a heavier fine, and be incapable of ever commanding the young.\nThe guardians of the law are to be careful inspectors of these matters,\nand shall either prevent or punish offenders. Every man should remember\nthe universal rule, that he who is not a good servant will not be a\ngood master; a man should pride himself more upon serving well than upon\ncommanding well: first upon serving the laws, which is also the service\nof the Gods; in the second place, upon having served ancient and\nhonourable men in the days of his youth. Furthermore, during the two\nyears in which any one is a warden of the country, his daily food ought\nto be of a simple and humble kind. When the twelve have been chosen, let\nthem and the five meet together, and determine that they will be\ntheir own servants, and, like servants, will not have other slaves and\nservants for their own use, neither will they use those of the villagers\nand husbandmen for their private advantage, but for the public\nservice only; and in general they should make up their minds to live\nindependently by themselves, servants of each other and of themselves.\nFurther, at all seasons of the year, summer and winter alike, let them\nbe under arms and survey minutely the whole country; thus they will at\nonce keep guard, and at the same time acquire a perfect knowledge of\nevery locality. There can be no more important kind of information than\nthe exact knowledge of a man's own country; and for this as well as for\nmore general reasons of pleasure and advantage, hunting with dogs and\nother kinds of sports should be pursued by the young. The service to\nwhom this is committed may be called the secret police or wardens of\nthe country; the name does not much signify, but every one who has\nthe safety of the state at heart will use his utmost diligence in this\nservice.\n\nAfter the wardens of the country, we have to speak of the election of\nwardens of the agora and of the city. The wardens of the country were\nsixty in number, and the wardens of the city will be three, and will\ndivide the twelve parts of the city into three; like the former, they\nshall have care of the ways, and of the different high roads which lead\nout of the country into the city, and of the buildings, that they may be\nall made according to law;--also of the waters, which the guardians of\nthe supply preserve and convey to them, care being taken that they may\nreach the fountains pure and abundant, and be both an ornament and\na benefit to the city. These also should be men of influence, and at\nleisure to take care of the public interest. Let every man propose as\nwarden of the city any one whom he likes out of the highest class, and\nwhen the vote has been given on them, and the number is reduced to the\nsix who have the greatest number of votes, let the electing officers\nchoose by lot three out of the six, and when they have undergone a\nscrutiny let them hold office according to the laws laid down for them.\nNext, let the wardens of the agora be elected in like manner, out of the\nfirst and second class, five in number: ten are to be first elected, and\nout of the ten five are to be chosen by lot, as in the election of the\nwardens of the city:--these when they have undergone a scrutiny are to\nbe declared magistrates. Every one shall vote for every one, and he who\nwill not vote, if he be informed against before the magistrates, shall\nbe fined fifty drachmae, and shall also be deemed a bad citizen. Let any\none who likes go to the assembly and to the general council; it shall\nbe compulsory to go on citizens of the first and second class, and they\nshall pay a fine of ten drachmae if they be found not answering to their\nnames at the assembly. But the third and fourth class shall be under no\ncompulsion, and shall be let off without a fine, unless the magistrates\nhave commanded all to be present, in consequence of some urgent\nnecessity. The wardens of the agora shall observe the order appointed\nby law for the agora, and shall have the charge of the temples and\nfountains which are in the agora; and they shall see that no one injures\nanything, and punish him who does, with stripes and bonds, if he be a\nslave or stranger; but if he be a citizen who misbehaves in this way,\nthey shall have the power themselves of inflicting a fine upon him to\nthe amount of a hundred drachmae, or with the consent of the wardens of\nthe city up to double that amount. And let the wardens of the city\nhave a similar power of imposing punishments and fines in their own\ndepartment; and let them impose fines by their own department; and let\nthem impose fines by their own authority, up to a mina, or up to two\nminae with the consent of the wardens of the agora.\n\nIn the next place, it will be proper to appoint directors of music\nand gymnastic, two kinds of each--of the one kind the business will be\neducation, of the other, the superintendence of contests. In speaking\nof education, the law means to speak of those who have the care of order\nand instruction in gymnasia and schools, and of the going to school, and\nof school buildings for boys and girls; and in speaking of contests,\nthe law refers to the judges of gymnastics and of music; these again\nare divided into two classes, the one having to do with music, the other\nwith gymnastics; and the same who judge of the gymnastic contests of\nmen, shall judge of horses; but in music there shall be one set of\njudges of solo singing, and of imitation--I mean of rhapsodists, players\non the harp, the flute and the like, and another who shall judge of\nchoral song. First of all, we must choose directors for the choruses of\nboys, and men, and maidens, whom they shall follow in the amusement of\nthe dance, and for our other musical arrangements;--one director will be\nenough for the choruses, and he should be not less than forty years of\nage. One director will also be enough to introduce the solo singers, and\nto give judgment on the competitors, and he ought not to be less than\nthirty years of age. The director and manager of the choruses shall be\nelected after the following manner:--Let any persons who commonly take\nan interest in such matters go to the meeting, and be fined if they do\nnot go (the guardians of the law shall judge of their fault), but those\nwho have no interest shall not be compelled. The elector shall propose\nas director some one who understands music, and he in the scrutiny may\nbe challenged on the one part by those who say he has no skill, and\ndefended on the other hand by those who say that he has. Ten are to be\nelected by vote, and he of the ten who is chosen by lot shall undergo a\nscrutiny, and lead the choruses for a year according to law. And in like\nmanner the competitor who wins the lot shall be leader of the solo and\nconcert music for that year; and he who is thus elected shall deliver\nthe award to the judges. In the next place, we have to choose judges\nin the contests of horses and of men; these shall be selected from\nthe third and also from the second class of citizens, and three first\nclasses shall be compelled to go to the election, but the lowest may\nstay away with impunity; and let there be three elected by lot out of\nthe twenty who have been chosen previously, and they must also have the\nvote and approval of the examiners. But if any one is rejected in the\nscrutiny at any ballot or decision, others shall be chosen in the same\nmanner, and undergo a similar scrutiny.\n\nThere remains the minister of the education of youth, male and female;\nhe too will rule according to law; one such minister will be sufficient,\nand he must be fifty years old, and have children lawfully begotten,\nboth boys and girls by preference, at any rate, one or the other. He who\nis elected, and he who is the elector, should consider that of all the\ngreat offices of state this is the greatest; for the first shoot of any\nplant, if it makes a good start towards the attainment of its natural\nexcellence, has the greatest effect on its maturity; and this is not\nonly true of plants, but of animals wild and tame, and also of men.\nMan, as we say, is a tame or civilized animal; nevertheless, he requires\nproper instruction and a fortunate nature, and then of all animals he\nbecomes the most divine and most civilized (Arist. Pol.); but if he\nbe insufficiently or ill educated he is the most savage of earthly\ncreatures. Wherefore the legislator ought not to allow the education of\nchildren to become a secondary or accidental matter. In the first place,\nhe who would be rightly provident about them, should begin by taking\ncare that he is elected, who of all the citizens is in every way\nbest; him the legislator shall do his utmost to appoint guardian and\nsuperintendent. To this end all the magistrates, with the exception of\nthe council and prytanes, shall go to the temple of Apollo, and elect by\nballot him of the guardians of the law whom they severally think will be\nthe best superintendent of education. And he who has the greatest number\nof votes, after he has undergone a scrutiny at the hands of all the\nmagistrates who have been his electors, with the exception of the\nguardians of the law,--shall hold office for five years; and in the\nsixth year let another be chosen in like manner to fill his office.\n\nIf any one dies while he is holding a public office, and more than\nthirty days before his term of office expires, let those whose business\nit is elect another to the office in the same manner as before. And if\nany one who is entrusted with orphans dies, let the relations both on\nthe father's and mother's side, who are residing at home, including\ncousins, appoint another guardian within ten days, or be fined a drachma\na day for neglect to do so.\n\nA city which has no regular courts of law ceases to be a city; and\nagain, if a judge is silent and says no more in preliminary proceedings\nthan the litigants, as is the case in arbitrations, he will never be\nable to decide justly; wherefore a multitude of judges will not easily\njudge well, nor a few if they are bad. The point in dispute between the\nparties should be made clear; and time, and deliberation, and repeated\nexamination, greatly tend to clear up doubts. For this reason, he who\ngoes to law with another, should go first of all to his neighbours and\nfriends who know best the questions at issue. And if he be unable to\nobtain from them a satisfactory decision, let him have recourse to\nanother court; and if the two courts cannot settle the matter, let a\nthird put an end to the suit.\n\nNow the establishment of courts of justice may be regarded as a choice\nof magistrates, for every magistrate must also be a judge of some\nthings; and the judge, though he be not a magistrate, yet in certain\nrespects is a very important magistrate on the day on which he is\ndetermining a suit. Regarding then the judges also as magistrates, let\nus say who are fit to be judges, and of what they are to be judges,\nand how many of them are to judge in each suit. Let that be the supreme\ntribunal which the litigants appoint in common for themselves, choosing\ncertain persons by agreement. And let there be two other tribunals: one\nfor private causes, when a citizen accuses another of wronging him and\nwishes to get a decision; the other for public causes, in which some\ncitizen is of opinion that the public has been wronged by an individual,\nand is willing to vindicate the common interests. And we must not forget\nto mention how the judges are to be qualified, and who they are to be.\nIn the first place, let there be a tribunal open to all private persons\nwho are trying causes one against another for the third time, and let\nthis be composed as follows:--All the officers of state, as well annual\nas those holding office for a longer period, when the new year is about\nto commence, in the month following after the summer solstice, on the\nlast day but one of the year, shall meet in some temple, and calling God\nto witness, shall dedicate one judge from every magistracy to be their\nfirst-fruits, choosing in each office him who seems to them to be\nthe best, and whom they deem likely to decide the causes of his\nfellow-citizens during the ensuing year in the best and holiest manner.\nAnd when the election is completed, a scrutiny shall be held in the\npresence of the electors themselves, and if any one be rejected another\nshall be chosen in the same manner. Those who have undergone the\nscrutiny shall judge the causes of those who have declined the inferior\ncourts, and shall give their vote openly. The councillors and other\nmagistrates who have elected them shall be required to be hearers and\nspectators of the causes; and any one else may be present who pleases.\nIf one man charges another with having intentionally decided wrong, let\nhim go to the guardians of the law and lay his accusation before them,\nand he who is found guilty in such a case shall pay damages to the\ninjured party equal to half the injury; but if he shall appear to\ndeserve a greater penalty, the judges shall determine what additional\npunishment he shall suffer, and how much more he ought to pay to the\npublic treasury, and to the party who brought the suit.\n\nIn the judgment of offences against the state, the people ought to\nparticipate, for when any one wrongs the state all are wronged, and may\nreasonably complain if they are not allowed to share in the decision.\nSuch causes ought to originate with the people, and the ought also to\nhave the final decision of them, but the trial of them shall take place\nbefore three of the highest magistrates, upon whom the plaintiff and the\ndefendant shall agree; and if they are not able to come to an agreement\nthemselves, the council shall choose one of the two proposed. And in\nprivate suits, too, as far as is possible, all should have a share; for\nhe who has no share in the administration of justice, is apt to imagine\nthat he has no share in the state at all. And for this reason there\nshall be a court of law in every tribe, and the judges shall be\nchosen by lot;--they shall give their decisions at once, and shall be\ninaccessible to entreaties. The final judgment shall rest with\nthat court which, as we maintain, has been established in the most\nincorruptible form of which human things admit: this shall be the court\nestablished for those who are unable to get rid of their suits either in\nthe courts of neighbours or of the tribes.\n\nThus much of the courts of law, which, as I was saying, cannot be\nprecisely defined either as being or not being offices; a superficial\nsketch has been given of them, in which some things have been told and\nothers omitted. For the right place of an exact statement of the laws\nrespecting suits, under their several heads, will be at the end of the\nbody of legislation;--let us then expect them at the end. Hitherto our\nlegislation has been chiefly occupied with the appointment of offices.\nPerfect unity and exactness, extending to the whole and every particular\nof political administration, cannot be attained to the full, until the\ndiscussion shall have a beginning, middle, and end, and is complete in\nevery part. At present we have reached the election of magistrates, and\nthis may be regarded as a sufficient termination of what preceded. And\nnow there need no longer be any delay or hesitation in beginning the\nwork of legislation.\n\nCLEINIAS: I like what you have said, Stranger; and I particularly like\nyour manner of tacking on the beginning of your new discourse to the end\nof the former one.\n\nATHENIAN: Thus far, then, the old men's rational pastime has gone off\nwell.\n\nCLEINIAS: You mean, I suppose, their serious and noble pursuit?\n\nATHENIAN: Perhaps; but I should like to know whether you and I are\nagreed about a certain thing.\n\nCLEINIAS: About what thing?\n\nATHENIAN: You know the endless labour which painters expend upon their\npictures--they are always putting in or taking out colours, or whatever\nbe the term which artists employ; they seem as if they would never cease\ntouching up their works, which are always being made brighter and more\nbeautiful.\n\nCLEINIAS: I know something of these matters from report, although I have\nnever had any great acquaintance with the art.\n\nATHENIAN: No matter; we may make use of the illustration\nnotwithstanding:--Suppose that some one had a mind to paint a figure in\nthe most beautiful manner, in the hope that his work instead of losing\nwould always improve as time went on--do you not see that being a\nmortal, unless he leaves some one to succeed him who will correct\nthe flaws which time may introduce, and be able to add what is left\nimperfect through the defect of the artist, and who will further\nbrighten up and improve the picture, all his great labour will last but\na short time?\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: And is not the aim of the legislator similar? First,\nhe desires that his laws should be written down with all possible\nexactness; in the second place, as time goes on and he has made an\nactual trial of his decrees, will he not find omissions? Do you imagine\nthat there ever was a legislator so foolish as not to know that many\nthings are necessarily omitted, which some one coming after him must\ncorrect, if the constitution and the order of government is not to\ndeteriorate, but to improve in the state which he has established?\n\nCLEINIAS: Assuredly, that is the sort of thing which every one would\ndesire.\n\nATHENIAN: And if any one possesses any means of accomplishing this by\nword or deed, or has any way great or small by which he can teach a\nperson to understand how he can maintain and amend the laws, he should\nfinish what he has to say, and not leave the work incomplete.\n\nCLEINIAS: By all means.\n\nATHENIAN: And is not this what you and I have to do at the present\nmoment?\n\nCLEINIAS: What have we to do?\n\nATHENIAN: As we are about to legislate and have chosen our guardians of\nthe law, and are ourselves in the evening of life, and they as compared\nwith us are young men, we ought not only to legislate for them, but to\nendeavour to make them not only guardians of the law but legislators\nthemselves, as far as this is possible.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly; if we can.\n\nATHENIAN: At any rate, we must do our best.\n\nCLEINIAS: Of course.\n\nATHENIAN: We will say to them--O friends and saviours of our laws, in\nlaying down any law, there are many particulars which we shall omit,\nand this cannot be helped; at the same time, we will do our utmost to\ndescribe what is important, and will give an outline which you shall\nfill up. And I will explain on what principle you are to act. Megillus\nand Cleinias and I have often spoken to one another touching these\nmatters, and we are of opinion that we have spoken well. And we hope\nthat you will be of the same mind with us, and become our disciples, and\nkeep in view the things which in our united opinion the legislator and\nguardian of the law ought to keep in view. There was one main point\nabout which we were agreed--that a man's whole energies throughout life\nshould be devoted to the acquisition of the virtue proper to a man,\nwhether this was to be gained by study, or habit, or some mode of\nacquisition, or desire, or opinion, or knowledge--and this applies\nequally to men and women, old and young--the aim of all should always be\nsuch as I have described; anything which may be an impediment, the good\nman ought to show that he utterly disregards. And if at last necessity\nplainly compels him to be an outlaw from his native land, rather than\nbow his neck to the yoke of slavery and be ruled by inferiors, and he\nhas to fly, an exile he must be and endure all such trials, rather than\naccept another form of government, which is likely to make men worse.\nThese are our original principles; and do you now, fixing your eyes\nupon the standard of what a man and a citizen ought or ought not to\nbe, praise and blame the laws--blame those which have not this power\nof making the citizen better, but embrace those which have; and with\ngladness receive and live in them; bidding a long farewell to other\ninstitutions which aim at goods, as they are termed, of a different\nkind.\n\nLet us proceed to another class of laws, beginning with their foundation\nin religion. And we must first return to the number 5040--the entire\nnumber had, and has, a great many convenient divisions, and the number\nof the tribes which was a twelfth part of the whole, being correctly\nformed by 21 x 20 (5040/(21 x 20), i.e., 5040/420 = 12), also has them.\nAnd not only is the whole number divisible by twelve, but also the\nnumber of each tribe is divisible by twelve. Now every portion should be\nregarded by us as a sacred gift of Heaven, corresponding to the months\nand to the revolution of the universe (compare Tim.). Every city has a\nguiding and sacred principle given by nature, but in some the division\nor distribution has been more right than in others, and has been more\nsacred and fortunate. In our opinion, nothing can be more right than the\nselection of the number 5040, which may be divided by all numbers from\none to twelve with the single exception of eleven, and that admits of a\nvery easy correction; for if, turning to the dividend (5040), we deduct\ntwo families, the defect in the division is cured. And the truth of this\nmay be easily proved when we have leisure. But for the present, trusting\nto the mere assertion of this principle, let us divide the state; and\nassigning to each portion some God or son of a God, let us give them\naltars and sacred rites, and at the altars let us hold assemblies for\nsacrifice twice in the month--twelve assemblies for the tribes, and\ntwelve for the city, according to their divisions; the first in honour\nof the Gods and divine things, and the second to promote friendship\nand 'better acquaintance,' as the phrase is, and every sort of good\nfellowship with one another. For people must be acquainted with those\ninto whose families and whom they marry and with those to whom they give\nin marriage; in such matters, as far as possible, a man should deem\nit all important to avoid a mistake, and with this serious purpose let\ngames be instituted (compare Republic) in which youths and maidens shall\ndance together, seeing one another and being seen naked, at a proper\nage, and on a suitable occasion, not transgressing the rules of modesty.\n\nThe directors of choruses will be the superintendents and regulators\nof these games, and they, together with the guardians of the law, will\nlegislate in any matters which we have omitted; for, as we said, where\nthere are numerous and minute details, the legislator must leave out\nsomething. And the annual officers who have experience, and know what is\nwanted, must make arrangements and improvements year by year, until\nsuch enactments and provisions are sufficiently determined. A ten years'\nexperience of sacrifices and dances, if extending to all particulars,\nwill be quite sufficient; and if the legislator be alive they shall\ncommunicate with him, but if he be dead then the several officers shall\nrefer the omissions which come under their notice to the guardians of\nthe law, and correct them, until all is perfect; and from that time\nthere shall be no more change, and they shall establish and use the new\nlaws with the others which the legislator originally gave them, and of\nwhich they are never, if they can help, to change aught; or, if some\nnecessity overtakes them, the magistrates must be called into counsel,\nand the whole people, and they must go to all the oracles of the Gods;\nand if they are all agreed, in that case they may make the change, but\nif they are not agreed, by no manner of means, and any one who dissents\nshall prevail, as the law ordains.\n\nWhenever any one over twenty-five years of age, having seen and been\nseen by others, believes himself to have found a marriage connexion\nwhich is to his mind, and suitable for the procreation of children, let\nhim marry if he be still under the age of five-and-thirty years; but\nlet him first hear how he ought to seek after what is suitable and\nappropriate (compare Arist. Pol.). For, as Cleinias says, every law\nshould have a suitable prelude.\n\nCLEINIAS: You recollect at the right moment, Stranger, and do not miss\nthe opportunity which the argument affords of saying a word in season.\n\nATHENIAN: I thank you. We will say to him who is born of good parents--O\nmy son, you ought to make such a marriage as wise men would approve. Now\nthey would advise you neither to avoid a poor marriage, nor specially\nto desire a rich one; but if other things are equal, always to honour\ninferiors, and with them to form connexions;--this will be for the\nbenefit of the city and of the families which are united; for the\nequable and symmetrical tends infinitely more to virtue than the\nunmixed. And he who is conscious of being too headstrong, and carried\naway more than is fitting in all his actions, ought to desire to become\nthe relation of orderly parents; and he who is of the opposite temper\nought to seek the opposite alliance. Let there be one word concerning\nall marriages:--Every man shall follow, not after the marriage which is\nmost pleasing to himself, but after that which is most beneficial to the\nstate. For somehow every one is by nature prone to that which is likest\nto himself, and in this way the whole city becomes unequal in property\nand in disposition; and hence there arise in most states the very\nresults which we least desire to happen. Now, to add to the law an\nexpress provision, not only that the rich man shall not marry into the\nrich family, nor the powerful into the family of the powerful, but that\nthe slower natures shall be compelled to enter into marriage with the\nquicker, and the quicker with the slower, may awaken anger as well as\nlaughter in the minds of many; for there is a difficulty in perceiving\nthat the city ought to be well mingled like a cup, in which the\nmaddening wine is hot and fiery, but when chastened by a soberer God,\nreceives a fair associate and becomes an excellent and temperate drink\n(compare Statesman). Yet in marriage no one is able to see that the same\nresult occurs. Wherefore also the law must let alone such matters, but\nwe should try to charm the spirits of men into believing the equability\nof their children's disposition to be of more importance than equality\nin excessive fortune when they marry; and him who is too desirous of\nmaking a rich marriage we should endeavour to turn aside by reproaches,\nnot, however, by any compulsion of written law.\n\nLet this then be our exhortation concerning marriage, and let us\nremember what was said before--that a man should cling to immortality,\nand leave behind him children's children to be the servants of God in\nhis place for ever. All this and much more may be truly said by way of\nprelude about the duty of marriage. But if a man will not listen, and\nremains unsocial and alien among his fellow-citizens, and is still\nunmarried at thirty-five years of age, let him pay a yearly fine;--he\nwho of the highest class shall pay a fine of a hundred drachmae, and he\nwho is of the second class a fine of seventy drachmae; the third class\nshall pay sixty drachmae, and the fourth thirty drachmae, and let the\nmoney be sacred to Here; he who does not pay the fine annually shall owe\nten times the sum, which the treasurer of the goddess shall exact; and\nif he fails in doing so, let him be answerable and give an account of\nthe money at his audit. He who refuses to marry shall be thus punished\nin money, and also be deprived of all honour which the younger show to\nthe elder; let no young man voluntarily obey him, and, if he attempt to\npunish any one, let every one come to the rescue and defend the injured\nperson, and he who is present and does not come to the rescue, shall be\npronounced by the law to be a coward and a bad citizen. Of the marriage\nportion I have already spoken; and again I say for the instruction of\npoor men that he who neither gives nor receives a dowry on account of\npoverty, has a compensation; for the citizens of our state are provided\nwith the necessaries of life, and wives will be less likely to be\ninsolent, and husbands to be mean and subservient to them on account of\nproperty. And he who obeys this law will do a noble action; but he who\nwill not obey, and gives or receives more than fifty drachmae as the\nprice of the marriage garments if he be of the lowest, or more than a\nmina, or a mina-and-a-half, if he be of the third or second classes,\nor two minae if he be of the highest class, shall owe to the public\ntreasury a similar sum, and that which is given or received shall be\nsacred to Here and Zeus; and let the treasurers of these Gods exact the\nmoney, as was said before about the unmarried--that the treasurers of\nHere were to exact the money, or pay the fine themselves.\n\nThe betrothal by a father shall be valid in the first degree, that by a\ngrandfather in the second degree, and in the third degree, betrothal by\nbrothers who have the same father; but if there are none of these alive,\nthe betrothal by a mother shall be valid in like manner; in cases\nof unexampled fatality, the next of kin and the guardians shall have\nauthority. What are to be the rites before marriages, or any other\nsacred acts, relating either to future, present, or past marriages,\nshall be referred to the interpreters; and he who follows their advice\nmay be satisfied. Touching the marriage festival, they shall assemble\nnot more than five male and five female friends of both families; and\na like number of members of the family of either sex, and no man shall\nspend more than his means will allow; he who is of the richest class\nmay spend a mina,--he who is of the second, half a mina, and in the same\nproportion as the census of each decreases: all men shall praise him who\nis obedient to the law; but he who is disobedient shall be punished\nby the guardians of the law as a man wanting in true taste, and\nuninstructed in the laws of bridal song. Drunkenness is always improper,\nexcept at the festivals of the God who gave wine; and peculiarly\ndangerous, when a man is engaged in the business of marriage; at such\na crisis of their lives a bride and bridegroom ought to have all their\nwits about them--they ought to take care that their offspring may be\nborn of reasonable beings; for on what day or night Heaven will give\nthem increase, who can say? Moreover, they ought not to begetting\nchildren when their bodies are dissipated by intoxication, but their\noffspring should be compact and solid, quiet and compounded properly;\nwhereas the drunkard is all abroad in all his actions, and beside\nhimself both in body and soul. Wherefore, also, the drunken man is bad\nand unsteady in sowing the seed of increase, and is likely to beget\noffspring who will be unstable and untrustworthy, and cannot be expected\nto walk straight either in body or mind. Hence during the whole year\nand all his life long, and especially while he is begetting children, he\nought to take care and not intentionally do what is injurious to health,\nor what involves insolence and wrong; for he cannot help leaving the\nimpression of himself on the souls and bodies of his offspring, and he\nbegets children in every way inferior. And especially on the day\nand night of marriage should a man abstain from such things. For the\nbeginning, which is also a God dwelling in man, preserves all things,\nif it meet with proper respect from each individual. He who marries is\nfurther to consider, that one of the two houses in the lot is the nest\nand nursery of his young, and there he is to marry and make a home\nfor himself and bring up his children, going away from his father and\nmother. For in friendships there must be some degree of desire, in order\nto cement and bind together diversities of character; but excessive\nintercourse not having the desire which is created by time, insensibly\ndissolves friendships from a feeling of satiety; wherefore a man and\nhis wife shall leave to his and her father and mother their own\ndwelling-places, and themselves go as to a colony and dwell there, and\nvisit and be visited by their parents; and they shall beget and bring up\nchildren, handing on the torch of life from one generation to another,\nand worshipping the Gods according to law for ever.\n\nIn the next place, we have to consider what sort of property will be\nmost convenient. There is no difficulty either in understanding or\nacquiring most kinds of property, but there is great difficulty in what\nrelates to slaves. And the reason is, that we speak about them in a way\nwhich is right and which is not right; for what we say about our slaves\nis consistent and also inconsistent with our practice about them.\n\nMEGILLUS: I do not understand, Stranger, what you mean.\n\nATHENIAN: I am not surprised, Megillus, for the state of the Helots\namong the Lacedaemonians is of all Hellenic forms of slavery the most\ncontroverted and disputed about, some approving and some condemning\nit; there is less dispute about the slavery which exists among the\nHeracleots, who have subjugated the Mariandynians, and about the\nThessalian Penestae. Looking at these and the like examples, what ought\nwe to do concerning property in slaves? I made a remark, in passing,\nwhich naturally elicited a question about my meaning from you. It was\nthis:--We know that all would agree that we should have the best and\nmost attached slaves whom we can get. For many a man has found his\nslaves better in every way than brethren or sons, and many times they\nhave saved the lives and property of their masters and their whole\nhouse--such tales are well known.\n\nMEGILLUS: To be sure.\n\nATHENIAN: But may we not also say that the soul of the slave is utterly\ncorrupt, and that no man of sense ought to trust them? And the wisest of\nour poets, speaking of Zeus, says:\n\n'Far-seeing Zeus takes away half the understanding of men whom the day\nof slavery subdues.'\n\nDifferent persons have got these two different notions of slaves in\ntheir minds--some of them utterly distrust their servants, and, as if\nthey were wild beasts, chastise them with goads and whips, and make\ntheir souls three times, or rather many times, as slavish as they were\nbefore;--and others do just the opposite.\n\nMEGILLUS: True.\n\nCLEINIAS: Then what are we to do in our own country, Stranger, seeing\nthat there are such differences in the treatment of slaves by their\nowners?\n\nATHENIAN: Well, Cleinias, there can be no doubt that man is a\ntroublesome animal, and therefore he is not very manageable, nor likely\nto become so, when you attempt to introduce the necessary division of\nslave, and freeman, and master.\n\nCLEINIAS: That is obvious.\n\nATHENIAN: He is a troublesome piece of goods, as has been often shown\nby the frequent revolts of the Messenians, and the great mischiefs which\nhappen in states having many slaves who speak the same language, and the\nnumerous robberies and lawless life of the Italian banditti, as they are\ncalled. A man who considers all this is fairly at a loss. Two remedies\nalone remain to us,--not to have the slaves of the same country, nor if\npossible, speaking the same language (compare Aris. Pol.); in this way\nthey will more easily be held in subjection: secondly, we should tend\nthem carefully, not only out of regard to them, but yet more out of\nrespect to ourselves. And the right treatment of slaves is to behave\nproperly to them, and to do to them, if possible, even more justice\nthan to those who are our equals; for he who naturally and genuinely\nreverences justice, and hates injustice, is discovered in his dealings\nwith any class of men to whom he can easily be unjust. And he who in\nregard to the natures and actions of his slaves is undefiled by impiety\nand injustice, will best sow the seeds of virtue in them; and this may\nbe truly said of every master, and tyrant, and of every other having\nauthority in relation to his inferiors. Slaves ought to be punished as\nthey deserve, and not admonished as if they were freemen, which will\nonly make them conceited. The language used to a servant ought always\nto be that of a command (compare Arist. Pol.), and we ought not to jest\nwith them, whether they are males or females--this is a foolish way\nwhich many people have of setting up their slaves, and making the life\nof servitude more disagreeable both for them and for their masters.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: Now that each of the citizens is provided, as far as possible,\nwith a sufficient number of suitable slaves who can help him in what he\nhas to do, we may next proceed to describe their dwellings.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: The city being new and hitherto uninhabited, care ought to be\ntaken of all the buildings, and the manner of building each of them,\nand also of the temples and walls. These, Cleinias, were matters which\nproperly came before the marriages;--but, as we are only talking,\nthere is no objection to changing the order. If, however, our plan of\nlegislation is ever to take effect, then the house shall precede the\nmarriage if God so will, and afterwards we will come to the regulations\nabout marriage; but at present we are only describing these matters in a\ngeneral outline.\n\nCLEINIAS: Quite true.\n\nATHENIAN: The temples are to be placed all round the agora, and the\nwhole city built on the heights in a circle (compare Arist. Pol.), for\nthe sake of defence and for the sake of purity. Near the temples are to\nbe placed buildings for the magistrates and the courts of law; in these\nplaintiff and defendant will receive their due, and the places will be\nregarded as most holy, partly because they have to do with holy things:\nand partly because they are the dwelling-places of holy Gods: and in\nthem will be held the courts in which cases of homicide and other trials\nof capital offences may fitly take place. As to the walls, Megillus, I\nagree with Sparta in thinking that they should be allowed to sleep in\nthe earth, and that we should not attempt to disinter them (compare\nArist. Pol.); there is a poetical saying, which is finely expressed,\nthat 'walls ought to be of steel and iron, and not of earth;' besides,\nhow ridiculous of us to be sending out our young men annually into\nthe country to dig and to trench, and to keep off the enemy by\nfortifications, under the idea that they are not to be allowed to set\nfoot in our territory, and then, that we should surround ourselves\nwith a wall, which, in the first place, is by no means conducive to the\nhealth of cities, and is also apt to produce a certain effeminacy in\nthe minds of the inhabitants, inviting men to run thither instead of\nrepelling their enemies, and leading them to imagine that their safety\nis due not to their keeping guard day and night, but that when they are\nprotected by walls and gates, then they may sleep in safety; as if they\nwere not meant to labour, and did not know that true repose comes from\nlabour, and that disgraceful indolence and a careless temper of mind\nis only the renewal of trouble. But if men must have walls, the private\nhouses ought to be so arranged from the first that the whole city may\nbe one wall, having all the houses capable of defence by reason of their\nuniformity and equality towards the streets (compare Arist. Pol.). The\nform of the city being that of a single dwelling will have an agreeable\naspect, and being easily guarded will be infinitely better for security.\nUntil the original building is completed, these should be the principal\nobjects of the inhabitants; and the wardens of the city should\nsuperintend the work, and should impose a fine on him who is negligent;\nand in all that relates to the city they should have a care of\ncleanliness, and not allow a private person to encroach upon any public\nproperty either by buildings or excavations. Further, they ought to\ntake care that the rains from heaven flow off easily, and of any other\nmatters which may have to be administered either within or without the\ncity. The guardians of the law shall pass any further enactments which\ntheir experience may show to be necessary, and supply any other points\nin which the law may be deficient. And now that these matters, and the\nbuildings about the agora, and the gymnasia, and places of instruction,\nand theatres, are all ready and waiting for scholars and spectators,\nlet us proceed to the subjects which follow marriage in the order of\nlegislation.\n\nCLEINIAS: By all means.\n\nATHENIAN: Assuming that marriages exist already, Cleinias, the mode\nof life during the year after marriage, before children are born, will\nfollow next in order. In what way bride and bridegroom ought to live in\na city which is to be superior to other cities, is a matter not at all\neasy for us to determine. There have been many difficulties already,\nbut this will be the greatest of them, and the most disagreeable to the\nmany. Still I cannot but say what appears to me to be right and true,\nCleinias.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: He who imagines that he can give laws for the public conduct\nof states, while he leaves the private life of citizens wholly to take\ncare of itself; who thinks that individuals may pass the day as they\nplease, and that there is no necessity of order in all things; he, I\nsay, who gives up the control of their private lives, and supposes that\nthey will conform to law in their common and public life, is making a\ngreat mistake. Why have I made this remark? Why, because I am going to\nenact that the bridegrooms should live at the common tables, just as\nthey did before marriage. This was a singularity when first enacted by\nthe legislator in your parts of the world, Megillus and Cleinias, as\nI should suppose, on the occasion of some war or other similar danger,\nwhich caused the passing of the law, and which would be likely to occur\nin thinly-peopled places, and in times of pressure. But when men had\nonce tried and been accustomed to a common table, experience showed that\nthe institution greatly conduced to security; and in some such manner\nthe custom of having common tables arose among you.\n\nCLEINIAS: Likely enough.\n\nATHENIAN: I said that there may have been singularity and danger in\nimposing such a custom at first, but that now there is not the same\ndifficulty. There is, however, another institution which is the natural\nsequel to this, and would be excellent, if it existed anywhere, but at\npresent it does not. The institution of which I am about to speak is not\neasily described or executed; and would be like the legislator 'combing\nwool into the fire,' as people say, or performing any other impossible\nand useless feat.\n\nCLEINIAS: What is the cause, Stranger, of this extreme hesitation?\n\nATHENIAN: You shall hear without any fruitless loss of time. That which\nhas law and order in a state is the cause of every good, but that\nwhich is disordered or ill-ordered is often the ruin of that which is\nwell-ordered; and at this point the argument is now waiting. For with\nyou, Cleinias and Megillus, the common tables of men are, as I said, a\nheaven-born and admirable institution, but you are mistaken in leaving\nthe women unregulated by law. They have no similar institution of public\ntables in the light of day, and just that part of the human race\nwhich is by nature prone to secrecy and stealth on account of their\nweakness--I mean the female sex--has been left without regulation by\nthe legislator, which is a great mistake. And, in consequence of this\nneglect, many things have grown lax among you, which might have been\nfar better, if they had been only regulated by law; for the neglect of\nregulations about women may not only be regarded as a neglect of half\nthe entire matter (Arist. Pol.), but in proportion as woman's nature\nis inferior to that of men in capacity for virtue, in that degree the\nconsequence of such neglect is more than twice as important. The careful\nconsideration of this matter, and the arranging and ordering on a\ncommon principle of all our institutions relating both to men and women,\ngreatly conduces to the happiness of the state. But at present, such\nis the unfortunate condition of mankind, that no man of sense will even\nventure to speak of common tables in places and cities in which they\nhave never been established at all; and how can any one avoid being\nutterly ridiculous, who attempts to compel women to show in public\nhow much they eat and drink? There is nothing at which the sex is more\nlikely to take offence. For women are accustomed to creep into dark\nplaces, and when dragged out into the light they will exert their\nutmost powers of resistance, and be far too much for the legislator. And\ntherefore, as I said before, in most places they will not endure to have\nthe truth spoken without raising a tremendous outcry, but in this state\nperhaps they may. And if we may assume that our whole discussion about\nthe state has not been mere idle talk, I should like to prove to you,\nif you will consent to listen, that this institution is good and proper;\nbut if you had rather not, I will refrain.\n\nCLEINIAS: There is nothing which we should both of us like better,\nStranger, than to hear what you have to say.\n\nATHENIAN: Very good; and you must not be surprised if I go back a\nlittle, for we have plenty of leisure, and there is nothing to prevent\nus from considering in every point of view the subject of law.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: Then let us return once more to what we were saying at first.\nEvery man should understand that the human race either had no beginning\nat all, and will never have an end, but always will be and has been; or\nthat it began an immense while ago.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Well, and have there not been constitutions and destructions\nof states, and all sorts of pursuits both orderly and disorderly, and\ndiverse desires of meats and drinks always, and in all the world, and\nall sorts of changes of the seasons in which animals may be expected to\nhave undergone innumerable transformations of themselves?\n\nCLEINIAS: No doubt.\n\nATHENIAN: And may we not suppose that vines appeared, which had\npreviously no existence, and also olives, and the gifts of Demeter\nand her daughter, of which one Triptolemus was the minister, and that,\nbefore these existed, animals took to devouring each other as they do\nstill?\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: Again, the practice of men sacrificing one another still\nexists among many nations; while, on the other hand, we hear of other\nhuman beings who did not even venture to taste the flesh of a cow and\nhad no animal sacrifices, but only cakes and fruits dipped in honey,\nand similar pure offerings, but no flesh of animals; from these they\nabstained under the idea that they ought not to eat them, and might not\nstain the altars of the Gods with blood. For in those days men are said\nto have lived a sort of Orphic life, having the use of all lifeless\nthings, but abstaining from all living things.\n\nCLEINIAS: Such has been the constant tradition, and is very likely true.\n\nATHENIAN: Some one might say to us, What is the drift of all this?\n\nCLEINIAS: A very pertinent question, Stranger.\n\nATHENIAN: And therefore I will endeavour, Cleinias, if I can, to draw\nthe natural inference.\n\nCLEINIAS: Proceed.\n\nATHENIAN: I see that among men all things depend upon three wants and\ndesires, of which the end is virtue, if they are rightly led by them, or\nthe opposite if wrongly. Now these are eating and drinking, which begin\nat birth--every animal has a natural desire for them, and is violently\nexcited, and rebels against him who says that he must not satisfy\nall his pleasures and appetites, and get rid of all the corresponding\npains--and the third and greatest and sharpest want and desire breaks\nout last, and is the fire of sexual lust, which kindles in men every\nspecies of wantonness and madness. And these three disorders we must\nendeavour to master by the three great principles of fear and law and\nright reason; turning them away from that which is called pleasantest\nto the best, using the Muses and the Gods who preside over contests to\nextinguish their increase and influx.\n\nBut to return:--After marriage let us speak of the birth of children,\nand after their birth of their nurture and education. In the course\nof discussion the several laws will be perfected, and we shall at\nlast arrive at the common tables. Whether such associations are to be\nconfined to men, or extended to women also, we shall see better when we\napproach and take a nearer view of them; and we may then determine what\nprevious institutions are required and will have to precede them. As I\nsaid before, we shall see them more in detail, and shall be better able\nto lay down the laws which are proper or suited to them.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us keep in mind the words which have now been spoken; for\nhereafter there may be need of them.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you bid us keep in mind?\n\nATHENIAN: That which we comprehended under the three words--first,\neating, secondly, drinking, thirdly, the excitement of love.\n\nCLEINIAS: We shall be sure to remember, Stranger.\n\nATHENIAN: Very good. Then let us now proceed to marriage, and teach\npersons in what way they shall beget children, threatening them, if they\ndisobey, with the terrors of the law.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: The bride and bridegroom should consider that they are to\nproduce for the state the best and fairest specimens of children which\nthey can. Now all men who are associated in any action always succeed\nwhen they attend and give their mind to what they are doing, but when\nthey do not give their mind or have no mind, they fail; wherefore\nlet the bridegroom give his mind to the bride and to the begetting of\nchildren, and the bride in like manner give her mind to the bridegroom,\nand particularly at the time when their children are not yet born. And\nlet the women whom we have chosen be the overseers of such matters, and\nlet them in whatever number, large or small, and at whatever time the\nmagistrates may command, assemble every day in the temple of Eileithyia\nduring a third part of the day, and being there assembled, let them\ninform one another of any one whom they see, whether man or woman, of\nthose who are begetting children, disregarding the ordinances given at\nthe time when the nuptial sacrifices and ceremonies were performed. Let\nthe begetting of children and the supervision of those who are begetting\nthem continue ten years and no longer, during the time when marriage is\nfruitful. But if any continue without children up to this time, let them\ntake counsel with their kindred and with the women holding the office\nof overseer and be divorced for their mutual benefit. If, however,\nany dispute arises about what is proper and for the interest of either\nparty, they shall choose ten of the guardians of the law and abide\nby their permission and appointment. The women who preside over\nthese matters shall enter into the houses of the young, and partly by\nadmonitions and partly by threats make them give over their folly and\nerror: if they persist, let the women go and tell the guardians of\nthe law, and the guardians shall prevent them. But if they too cannot\nprevent them, they shall bring the matter before the people; and let\nthem write up their names and make oath that they cannot reform such and\nsuch an one; and let him who is thus written up, if he cannot in a court\nof law convict those who have inscribed his name, be deprived of the\nprivileges of a citizen in the following respects:--let him not go to\nweddings nor to the thanksgivings after the birth of children; and if he\ngo, let any one who pleases strike him with impunity; and let the same\nregulations hold about women: let not a woman be allowed to appear\nabroad, or receive honour, or go to nuptial and birthday festivals, if\nshe in like manner be written up as acting disorderly and cannot obtain\na verdict. And if, when they themselves have done begetting children\naccording to the law, a man or woman have connexion with another man\nor woman who are still begetting children, let the same penalties be\ninflicted upon them as upon those who are still having a family; and\nwhen the time for procreation has passed let the man or woman who\nrefrains in such matters be held in esteem, and let those who do not\nrefrain be held in the contrary of esteem--that is to say, disesteem.\nNow, if the greater part of mankind behave modestly, the enactments of\nlaw may be left to slumber; but, if they are disorderly, the enactments\nhaving been passed, let them be carried into execution. To every man the\nfirst year is the beginning of life, and the time of birth ought to\nbe written down in the temples of their fathers as the beginning of\nexistence to every child, whether boy or girl. Let every phratria have\ninscribed on a whited wall the names of the successive archons by whom\nthe years are reckoned. And near to them let the living members of the\nphratria be inscribed, and when they depart life let them be erased. The\nlimit of marriageable ages for a woman shall be from sixteen to twenty\nyears at the longest,--for a man, from thirty to thirty-five years; and\nlet a woman hold office at forty, and a man at thirty years. Let a man\ngo out to war from twenty to sixty years, and for a woman, if there\nappear any need to make use of her in military service, let the time of\nservice be after she shall have brought forth children up to fifty years\nof age; and let regard be had to what is possible and suitable to each.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK VII.\n\nAnd now, assuming children of both sexes to have been born, it will\nbe proper for us to consider, in the next place, their nurture and\neducation; this cannot be left altogether unnoticed, and yet may be\nthought a subject fitted rather for precept and admonition than for\nlaw. In private life there are many little things, not always apparent,\narising out of the pleasures and pains and desires of individuals, which\nrun counter to the intention of the legislator, and make the characters\nof the citizens various and dissimilar:--this is an evil in states; for\nby reason of their smallness and frequent occurrence, there would be an\nunseemliness and want of propriety in making them penal by law; and if\nmade penal, they are the destruction of the written law because mankind\nget the habit of frequently transgressing the law in small matters. The\nresult is that you cannot legislate about them, and still less can you\nbe silent. I speak somewhat darkly, but I shall endeavour also to bring\nmy wares into the light of day, for I acknowledge that at present there\nis a want of clearness in what I am saying.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN. Am I not right in maintaining that a good education is that\nwhich tends most to the improvement of mind and body?\n\nCLEINIAS: Undoubtedly.\n\nATHENIAN: And nothing can be plainer than that the fairest bodies are\nthose which grow up from infancy in the best and straightest manner?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And do we not further observe that the first shoot of every\nliving thing is by far the greatest and fullest? Many will even contend\nthat a man at twenty-five does not reach twice the height which he\nattained at five.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: Well, and is not rapid growth without proper and abundant\nexercise the source endless evils in the body?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: And the body should have the most exercise when it receives\nmost nourishment?\n\nCLEINIAS: But, Stranger, are we to impose this great amount of exercise\nupon newly-born infants?\n\nATHENIAN: Nay, rather on the bodies of infants still unborn.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean, my good sir? In the process of gestation?\n\nATHENIAN: Exactly. I am not at all surprised that you have never\nheard of this very peculiar sort of gymnastic applied to such little\ncreatures, which, although strange, I will endeavour to explain to you.\n\nCLEINIAS: By all means.\n\nATHENIAN: The practice is more easy for us to understand than for you,\nby reason of certain amusements which are carried to excess by us at\nAthens. Not only boys, but often older persons, are in the habit of\nkeeping quails and cocks (compare Republic), which they train to fight\none another. And they are far from thinking that the contests in which\nthey stir them up to fight with one another are sufficient exercise;\nfor, in addition to this, they carry them about tucked beneath their\narmpits, holding the smaller birds in their hands, the larger under\ntheir arms, and go for a walk of a great many miles for the sake of\nhealth, that is to say, not their own health, but the health of the\nbirds; whereby they prove to any intelligent person, that all bodies\nare benefited by shakings and movements, when they are moved without\nweariness, whether the motion proceeds from themselves, or is caused by\na swing, or at sea, or on horseback, or by other bodies in whatever way\nmoving, and that thus gaining the mastery over food and drink, they are\nable to impart beauty and health and strength. But admitting all this,\nwhat follows? Shall we make a ridiculous law that the pregnant woman\nshall walk about and fashion the embryo within as we fashion wax before\nit hardens, and after birth swathe the infant for two years? Suppose\nthat we compel nurses, under penalty of a legal fine, to be always\ncarrying the children somewhere or other, either to the temples, or into\nthe country, or to their relations' houses, until they are well able to\nstand, and to take care that their limbs are not distorted by leaning\non them when they are too young (compare Arist. Pol.),--they should\ncontinue to carry them until the infant has completed its third year;\nthe nurses should be strong, and there should be more than one of them.\nShall these be our rules, and shall we impose a penalty for the neglect\nof them? No, no; the penalty of which we were speaking will fall upon\nour own heads more than enough.\n\nCLEINIAS: What penalty?\n\nATHENIAN: Ridicule, and the difficulty of getting the feminine and\nservant-like dispositions of the nurses to comply.\n\nCLEINIAS: Then why was there any need to speak of the matter at all?\n\nATHENIAN: The reason is, that masters and freemen in states, when they\nhear of it, are very likely to arrive at a true conviction that without\ndue regulation of private life in cities, stability in the laying down\nof laws is hardly to be expected (compare Republic); and he who makes\nthis reflection may himself adopt the laws just now mentioned, and,\nadopting them, may order his house and state well and be happy.\n\nCLEINIAS: Likely enough.\n\nATHENIAN: And therefore let us proceed with our legislation until we\nhave determined the exercises which are suited to the souls of young\nchildren, in the same manner in which we have begun to go through the\nrules relating to their bodies.\n\nCLEINIAS: By all means.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us assume, then, as a first principle in relation both to\nthe body and soul of very young creatures, that nursing and moving about\nby day and night is good for them all, and that the younger they are,\nthe more they will need it (compare Arist. Pol.); infants should live,\nif that were possible, as if they were always rocking at sea. This\nis the lesson which we may gather from the experience of nurses, and\nlikewise from the use of the remedy of motion in the rites of the\nCorybantes; for when mothers want their restless children to go to sleep\nthey do not employ rest, but, on the contrary, motion--rocking them in\ntheir arms; nor do they give them silence, but they sing to them and lap\nthem in sweet strains; and the Bacchic women are cured of their frenzy\nin the same manner by the use of the dance and of music.\n\nCLEINIAS: Well, Stranger, and what is the reason of this?\n\nATHENIAN: The reason is obvious.\n\nCLEINIAS: What?\n\nATHENIAN: The affection both of the Bacchantes and of the children is\nan emotion of fear, which springs out of an evil habit of the soul. And\nwhen some one applies external agitation to affections of this sort, the\nmotion coming from without gets the better of the terrible and violent\ninternal one, and produces a peace and calm in the soul, and quiets the\nrestless palpitation of the heart, which is a thing much to be desired,\nsending the children to sleep, and making the Bacchantes, although they\nremain awake, to dance to the pipe with the help of the Gods to whom\nthey offer acceptable sacrifices, and producing in them a sound mind,\nwhich takes the place of their frenzy. And, to express what I mean in a\nword, there is a good deal to be said in favour of this treatment.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: But if fear has such a power we ought to infer from these\nfacts, that every soul which from youth upward has been familiar with\nfears, will be made more liable to fear (compare Republic), and every\none will allow that this is the way to form a habit of cowardice and not\nof courage.\n\nCLEINIAS: No doubt.\n\nATHENIAN: And, on the other hand, the habit of overcoming, from our\nyouth upwards, the fears and terrors which beset us, may be said to be\nan exercise of courage.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: And we may say that the use of exercise and motion in the\nearliest years of life greatly contributes to create a part of virtue in\nthe soul.\n\nCLEINIAS: Quite true.\n\nATHENIAN: Further, a cheerful temper, or the reverse, may be regarded as\nhaving much to do with high spirit on the one hand, or with cowardice on\nthe other.\n\nCLEINIAS: To be sure.\n\nATHENIAN: Then now we must endeavour to show how and to what extent we\nmay, if we please, without difficulty implant either character in the\nyoung.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: There is a common opinion, that luxury makes the disposition\nof youth discontented and irascible and vehemently excited by trifles;\nthat on the other hand excessive and savage servitude makes men mean and\nabject, and haters of their kind, and therefore makes them undesirable\nassociates.\n\nCLEINIAS: But how must the state educate those who do not as yet\nunderstand the language of the country, and are therefore incapable of\nappreciating any sort of instruction?\n\nATHENIAN: I will tell you how:--Every animal that is born is wont to\nutter some cry, and this is especially the case with man, and he is also\naffected with the inclination to weep more than any other animal.\n\nCLEINIAS: Quite true.\n\nATHENIAN: Do not nurses, when they want to know what an infant desires,\njudge by these signs?--when anything is brought to the infant and he is\nsilent, then he is supposed to be pleased, but, when he weeps and cries\nout, then he is not pleased. For tears and cries are the inauspicious\nsigns by which children show what they love and hate. Now the time which\nis thus spent is no less than three years, and is a very considerable\nportion of life to be passed ill or well.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: Does not the discontented and ungracious nature appear to you\nto be full of lamentations and sorrows more than a good man ought to be?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Well, but if during these three years every possible care were\ntaken that our nursling should have as little of sorrow and fear, and in\ngeneral of pain as was possible, might we not expect in early childhood\nto make his soul more gentle and cheerful? (Compare Arist. Pol.)\n\nCLEINIAS: To be sure, Stranger--more especially if we could procure him\na variety of pleasures.\n\nATHENIAN: There I can no longer agree, Cleinias: you amaze me. To bring\nhim up in such a way would be his utter ruin; for the beginning is\nalways the most critical part of education. Let us see whether I am\nright.\n\nCLEINIAS: Proceed.\n\nATHENIAN: The point about which you and I differ is of great importance,\nand I hope that you, Megillus, will help to decide between us. For I\nmaintain that the true life should neither seek for pleasures, nor,\non the other hand, entirely avoid pains, but should embrace the middle\nstate (compare Republic), which I just spoke of as gentle and benign,\nand is a state which we by some divine presage and inspiration rightly\nascribe to God. Now, I say, he among men, too, who would be divine\nought to pursue after this mean habit--he should not rush headlong into\npleasures, for he will not be free from pains; nor should we allow\nany one, young or old, male or female, to be thus given any more than\nourselves, and least of all the newly-born infant, for in infancy more\nthan at any other time the character is engrained by habit. Nay, more,\nif I were not afraid of appearing to be ridiculous, I would say that a\nwoman during her year of pregnancy should of all women be most carefully\ntended, and kept from violent or excessive pleasures and pains, and\nshould at that time cultivate gentleness and benevolence and kindness.\n\nCLEINIAS: You need not ask Megillus, Stranger, which of us has most\ntruly spoken; for I myself agree that all men ought to avoid the life\nof unmingled pain or pleasure, and pursue always a middle course. And\nhaving spoken well, may I add that you have been well answered?\n\nATHENIAN: Very good, Cleinias; and now let us all three consider a\nfurther point.\n\nCLEINIAS: What is it?\n\nATHENIAN: That all the matters which we are now describing are commonly\ncalled by the general name of unwritten customs, and what are termed\nthe laws of our ancestors are all of similar nature. And the reflection\nwhich lately arose in our minds, that we can neither call these things\nlaws, nor yet leave them unmentioned, is justified; for they are the\nbonds of the whole state, and come in between the written laws which\nare or are hereafter to be laid down; they are just ancestral customs of\ngreat antiquity, which, if they are rightly ordered and made habitual,\nshield and preserve the previously existing written law; but if they\ndepart from right and fall into disorder, then they are like the props\nof builders which slip away out of their place and cause a universal\nruin--one part drags another down, and the fair super-structure falls\nbecause the old foundations are undermined. Reflecting upon this,\nCleinias, you ought to bind together the new state in every possible\nway, omitting nothing, whether great or small, of what are called laws\nor manners or pursuits, for by these means a city is bound together,\nand all these things are only lasting when they depend upon one another;\nand, therefore, we must not wonder if we find that many apparently\ntrifling customs or usages come pouring in and lengthening out our laws.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true: we are disposed to agree with you.\n\nATHENIAN: Up to the age of three years, whether of boy or girl, if a\nperson strictly carries out our previous regulations and makes them a\nprincipal aim, he will do much for the advantage of the young creatures.\nBut at three, four, five, and even six years the childish nature\nwill require sports; now is the time to get rid of self-will in him,\npunishing him, but not so as to disgrace him. We were saying about\nslaves, that we ought neither to add insult to punishment so as to anger\nthem, nor yet to leave them unpunished lest they become self-willed; and\na like rule is to be observed in the case of the free-born. Children at\nthat age have certain natural modes of amusement which they find out for\nthemselves when they meet. And all the children who are between the\nages of three and six ought to meet at the temples of the villages, the\nseveral families of a village uniting on one spot. The nurses are to see\nthat the children behave properly and orderly--they themselves and all\ntheir companies are to be under the control of twelve matrons, one for\neach company, who are annually selected to inspect them from the women\npreviously mentioned [i.e. the women who have authority over marriage],\nwhom the guardians of the law appoint. These matrons shall be chosen by\nthe women who have authority over marriage, one out of each tribe;\nall are to be of the same age; and let each of them, as soon as she is\nappointed, hold office and go to the temples every day, punishing all\noffenders, male or female, who are slaves or strangers, by the help of\nsome of the public slaves; but if any citizen disputes the punishment,\nlet her bring him before the wardens of the city; or, if there be no\ndispute, let her punish him herself. After the age of six years the time\nhas arrived for the separation of the sexes--let boys live with boys,\nand girls in like manner with girls. Now they must begin to learn--the\nboys going to teachers of horsemanship and the use of the bow, the\njavelin, and sling, and the girls too, if they do not object, at any\nrate until they know how to manage these weapons, and especially how to\nhandle heavy arms; for I may note, that the practice which now prevails\nis almost universally misunderstood.\n\nCLEINIAS: In what respect?\n\nATHENIAN: In that the right and left hand are supposed to be by nature\ndifferently suited for our various uses of them; whereas no difference\nis found in the use of the feet and the lower limbs; but in the use of\nthe hands we are, as it were, maimed by the folly of nurses and mothers;\nfor although our several limbs are by nature balanced, we create\na difference in them by bad habit. In some cases this is of no\nconsequence, as, for example, when we hold the lyre in the left hand,\nand the plectrum in the right, but it is downright folly to make the\nsame distinction in other cases. The custom of the Scythians proves our\nerror; for they not only hold the bow from them with the left hand and\ndraw the arrow to them with their right, but use either hand for both\npurposes. And there are many similar examples in charioteering and other\nthings, from which we may learn that those who make the left side weaker\nthan the right act contrary to nature. In the case of the plectrum,\nwhich is of horn only, and similar instruments, as I was saying, it\nis of no consequence, but makes a great difference, and may be of very\ngreat importance to the warrior who has to use iron weapons, bows and\njavelins, and the like; above all, when in heavy armour, he has to fight\nagainst heavy armour. And there is a very great difference between one\nwho has learnt and one who has not, and between one who has been trained\nin gymnastic exercises and one who has not been. For as he who is\nperfectly skilled in the Pancratium or boxing or wrestling, is not\nunable to fight from his left side, and does not limp and draggle\nin confusion when his opponent makes him change his position, so in\nheavy-armed fighting, and in all other things, if I am not mistaken, the\nlike holds--he who has these double powers of attack and defence ought\nnot in any case to leave them either unused or untrained, if he can\nhelp; and if a person had the nature of Geryon or Briareus he ought\nto be able with his hundred hands to throw a hundred darts. Now, the\nmagistrates, male and female, should see to all these things, the women\nsuperintending the nursing and amusements of the children, and the men\nsuperintending their education, that all of them, boys and girls alike,\nmay be sound hand and foot, and may not, if they can help, spoil the\ngifts of nature by bad habits.\n\nEducation has two branches--one of gymnastic, which is concerned with\nthe body, and the other of music, which is designed for the improvement\nof the soul. And gymnastic has also two branches--dancing and wrestling;\nand one sort of dancing imitates musical recitation, and aims at\npreserving dignity and freedom, the other aims at producing health,\nagility, and beauty in the limbs and parts of the body, giving the\nproper flexion and extension to each of them, a harmonious motion being\ndiffused everywhere, and forming a suitable accompaniment to the dance.\nAs regards wrestling, the tricks which Antaeus and Cercyon devised in\ntheir systems out of a vain spirit of competition, or the tricks of\nboxing which Epeius or Amycus invented, are useless and unsuitable for\nwar, and do not deserve to have much said about them; but the art of\nwrestling erect and keeping free the neck and hands and sides, working\nwith energy and constancy, with a composed strength, for the sake of\nhealth--these are always useful, and are not to be neglected, but to\nbe enjoined alike on masters and scholars, when we reach that part\nof legislation; and we will desire the one to give their instructions\nfreely, and the others to receive them thankfully. Nor, again, must we\nomit suitable imitations of war in our choruses; here in Crete you have\nthe armed dances of the Curetes, and the Lacedaemonians have those of\nthe Dioscuri. And our virgin lady, delighting in the amusement of the\ndance, thought it not fit to amuse herself with empty hands; she must be\nclothed in a complete suit of armour, and in this attire go through\nthe dance; and youths and maidens should in every respect imitate her,\nesteeming highly the favour of the Goddess, both with a view to the\nnecessities of war, and to festive occasions: it will be right also for\nthe boys, until such time as they go out to war, to make processions and\nsupplications to all the Gods in goodly array, armed and on horseback,\nin dances and marches, fast or slow, offering up prayers to the Gods\nand to the sons of Gods; and also engaging in contests and preludes of\ncontests, if at all, with these objects. For these sorts of exercises,\nand no others, are useful both in peace and war, and are beneficial\nalike to states and to private houses. But other labours and sports and\nexercises of the body are unworthy of freemen, O Megillus and Cleinias.\n\nI have now completely described the kind of gymnastic which I said\nat first ought to be described; if you know of any better, will you\ncommunicate your thoughts?\n\nCLEINIAS: It is not easy, Stranger, to put aside these principles of\ngymnastic and wrestling and to enunciate better ones.\n\nATHENIAN: Now we must say what has yet to be said about the gifts of the\nMuses and of Apollo: before, we fancied that we had said all, and that\ngymnastic alone remained; but now we see clearly what points have been\nomitted, and should be first proclaimed; of these, then, let us proceed\nto speak.\n\nCLEINIAS: By all means.\n\nATHENIAN: Let me tell you once more--although you have heard me say the\nsame before--that caution must be always exercised, both by the speaker\nand by the hearer, about anything that is very singular and unusual. For\nmy tale is one which many a man would be afraid to tell, and yet I have\na confidence which makes me go on.\n\nCLEINIAS: What have you to say, Stranger?\n\nATHENIAN: I say that in states generally no one has observed that the\nplays of childhood have a great deal to do with the permanence or want\nof permanence in legislation. For when plays are ordered with a view to\nchildren having the same plays, and amusing themselves after the same\nmanner, and finding delight in the same playthings, the more solemn\ninstitutions of the state are allowed to remain undisturbed. Whereas\nif sports are disturbed, and innovations are made in them, and they\nconstantly change, and the young never speak of their having the same\nlikings, or the same established notions of good and bad taste, either\nin the bearing of their bodies or in their dress, but he who devises\nsomething new and out of the way in figures and colours and the like is\nheld in special honour, we may truly say that no greater evil can happen\nin a state; for he who changes the sports is secretly changing the\nmanners of the young, and making the old to be dishonoured among them\nand the new to be honoured. And I affirm that there is nothing which is\na greater injury to all states than saying or thinking thus. Will you\nhear me tell how great I deem the evil to be?\n\nCLEINIAS: You mean the evil of blaming antiquity in states?\n\nATHENIAN: Exactly.\n\nCLEINIAS: If you are speaking of that, you will find in us hearers\nwho are disposed to receive what you say not unfavourably but most\nfavourably.\n\nATHENIAN: I should expect so.\n\nCLEINIAS: Proceed.\n\nATHENIAN: Well, then, let us give all the greater heed to one another's\nwords. The argument affirms that any change whatever except from evil\nis the most dangerous of all things; this is true in the case of the\nseasons and of the winds, in the management of our bodies and the habits\nof our minds--true of all things except, as I said before, of the bad.\nHe who looks at the constitution of individuals accustomed to eat any\nsort of meat, or drink any drink, or to do any work which they can get,\nmay see that they are at first disordered by them, but afterwards, as\ntime goes on, their bodies grow adapted to them, and they learn to know\nand like variety, and have good health and enjoyment of life; and if\never afterwards they are confined again to a superior diet, at first\nthey are troubled with disorders, and with difficulty become habituated\nto their new food. A similar principle we may imagine to hold good about\nthe minds of men and the natures of their souls. For when they have\nbeen brought up in certain laws, which by some Divine Providence have\nremained unchanged during long ages, so that no one has any memory or\ntradition of their ever having been otherwise than they are, then every\none is afraid and ashamed to change that which is established. The\nlegislator must somehow find a way of implanting this reverence for\nantiquity, and I would propose the following way: People are apt to\nfancy, as I was saying before, that when the plays of children are\naltered they are merely plays, not seeing that the most serious and\ndetrimental consequences arise out of the change; and they readily\ncomply with the child's wishes instead of deterring him, not considering\nthat these children who make innovations in their games, when they grow\nup to be men, will be different from the last generation of children,\nand, being different, will desire a different sort of life, and under\nthe influence of this desire will want other institutions and laws; and\nno one of them reflects that there will follow what I just now called\nthe greatest of evils to states. Changes in bodily fashions are no such\nserious evils, but frequent changes in the praise and censure of manners\nare the greatest of evils, and require the utmost prevision.\n\nCLEINIAS: To be sure.\n\nATHENIAN: And now do we still hold to our former assertion, that rhythms\nand music in general are imitations of good and evil characters in men?\nWhat say you?\n\nCLEINIAS: That is the only doctrine which we can admit.\n\nATHENIAN: Must we not, then, try in every possible way to prevent our\nyouth from even desiring to imitate new modes either in dance or song?\nnor must any one be allowed to offer them varieties of pleasures.\n\nCLEINIAS: Most true.\n\nATHENIAN: Can any of us imagine a better mode of effecting this object\nthan that of the Egyptians?\n\nCLEINIAS: What is their method?\n\nATHENIAN: To consecrate every sort of dance or melody. First we should\nordain festivals--calculating for the year what they ought to be, and\nat what time, and in honour of what Gods, sons of Gods, and heroes they\nought to be celebrated; and, in the next place, what hymns ought to\nbe sung at the several sacrifices, and with what dances the particular\nfestival is to be honoured. This has to be arranged at first by certain\npersons, and, when arranged, the whole assembly of the citizens are to\noffer sacrifices and libations to the Fates and all the other Gods, and\nto consecrate the several odes to Gods and heroes: and if any one\noffers any other hymns or dances to any one of the Gods, the priests\nand priestesses, acting in concert with the guardians of the law, shall,\nwith the sanction of religion and the law, exclude him, and he who is\nexcluded, if he do not submit, shall be liable all his life long to have\na suit of impiety brought against him by any one who likes.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: In the consideration of this subject, let us remember what is\ndue to ourselves.\n\nCLEINIAS: To what are you referring?\n\nATHENIAN: I mean that any young man, and much more any old one, when he\nsees or hears anything strange or unaccustomed, does not at once run to\nembrace the paradox, but he stands considering, like a person who is at\na place where three paths meet, and does not very well know his way--he\nmay be alone or he may be walking with others, and he will say to\nhimself and them, 'Which is the way?' and will not move forward until he\nis satisfied that he is going right. And this is what we must do in the\npresent instance: A strange discussion on the subject of law has arisen,\nwhich requires the utmost consideration, and we should not at our age be\ntoo ready to speak about such great matters, or be confident that we can\nsay anything certain all in a moment.\n\nCLEINIAS: Most true.\n\nATHENIAN: Then we will allow time for reflection, and decide when we\nhave given the subject sufficient consideration. But that we may not\nbe hindered from completing the natural arrangement of our laws, let us\nproceed to the conclusion of them in due order; for very possibly, if\nGod will, the exposition of them, when completed, may throw light on our\npresent perplexity.\n\nCLEINIAS: Excellent, Stranger; let us do as you propose.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us then affirm the paradox that strains of music are our\nlaws (nomoi), and this latter being the name which the ancients gave\nto lyric songs, they probably would not have very much objected to our\nproposed application of the word. Some one, either asleep or awake, must\nhave had a dreamy suspicion of their nature. And let our decree be as\nfollows: No one in singing or dancing shall offend against public and\nconsecrated models, and the general fashion among the youth, any more\nthan he would offend against any other law. And he who observes this law\nshall be blameless; but he who is disobedient, as I was saying, shall\nbe punished by the guardians of the laws, and by the priests and\npriestesses. Suppose that we imagine this to be our law.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: Can any one who makes such laws escape ridicule? Let us see.\nI think that our only safety will be in first framing certain models for\ncomposers. One of these models shall be as follows: If when a sacrifice\nis going on, and the victims are being burnt according to law--if, I\nsay, any one who may be a son or brother, standing by another at the\naltar and over the victims, horribly blasphemes, will not his words\ninspire despondency and evil omens and forebodings in the mind of his\nfather and of his other kinsmen?\n\nCLEINIAS: Of course.\n\nATHENIAN: And this is just what takes place in almost all our cities. A\nmagistrate offers a public sacrifice, and there come in not one but many\nchoruses, who take up a position a little way from the altar, and from\ntime to time pour forth all sorts of horrible blasphemies on the sacred\nrites, exciting the souls of the audience with words and rhythms and\nmelodies most sorrowful to hear; and he who at the moment when the city\nis offering sacrifice makes the citizens weep most, carries away the\npalm of victory. Now, ought we not to forbid such strains as these? And\nif ever our citizens must hear such lamentations, then on some unblest\nand inauspicious day let there be choruses of foreign and hired\nminstrels, like those hirelings who accompany the departed at funerals\nwith barbarous Carian chants. That is the sort of thing which will be\nappropriate if we have such strains at all; and let the apparel of the\nsingers be, not circlets and ornaments of gold, but the reverse. Enough\nof all this. I will simply ask once more whether we shall lay down as\none of our principles of song--\n\nCLEINIAS: What?\n\nATHENIAN: That we should avoid every word of evil omen; let that kind of\nsong which is of good omen be heard everywhere and always in our state.\nI need hardly ask again, but shall assume that you agree with me.\n\nCLEINIAS: By all means; that law is approved by the suffrages of us all.\n\nATHENIAN: But what shall be our next musical law or type? Ought not\nprayers to be offered up to the Gods when we sacrifice?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And our third law, if I am not mistaken, will be to the effect\nthat our poets, understanding prayers to be requests which we make to\nthe Gods, will take especial heed that they do not by mistake ask\nfor evil instead of good. To make such a prayer would surely be too\nridiculous.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Were we not a little while ago quite convinced that no silver\nor golden Plutus should dwell in our state?\n\nCLEINIAS: To be sure.\n\nATHENIAN: And what has it been the object of our argument to show? Did\nwe not imply that the poets are not always quite capable of knowing what\nis good or evil? And if one of them utters a mistaken prayer in song or\nwords, he will make our citizens pray for the opposite of what is good\nin matters of the highest import; than which, as I was saying, there can\nbe few greater mistakes. Shall we then propose as one of our laws and\nmodels relating to the Muses--\n\nCLEINIAS: What? will you explain the law more precisely?\n\nATHENIAN: Shall we make a law that the poet shall compose nothing\ncontrary to the ideas of the lawful, or just, or beautiful, or good,\nwhich are allowed in the state? nor shall he be permitted to communicate\nhis compositions to any private individuals, until he shall have shown\nthem to the appointed judges and the guardians of the law, and they\nare satisfied with them. As to the persons whom we appoint to be our\nlegislators about music and as to the director of education, these have\nbeen already indicated. Once more then, as I have asked more than once,\nshall this be our third law, and type, and model--What do you say?\n\nCLEINIAS: Let it be so, by all means.\n\nATHENIAN: Then it will be proper to have hymns and praises of the Gods,\nintermingled with prayers; and after the Gods prayers and praises should\nbe offered in like manner to demigods and heroes, suitable to their\nseveral characters.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: In the next place there will be no objection to a law, that\ncitizens who are departed and have done good and energetic deeds, either\nwith their souls or with their bodies, and have been obedient to the\nlaws, should receive eulogies; this will be very fitting.\n\nCLEINIAS: Quite true.\n\nATHENIAN: But to honour with hymns and panegyrics those who are still\nalive is not safe; a man should run his course, and make a fair ending,\nand then we will praise him; and let praise be given equally to women\nas well as men who have been distinguished in virtue. The order of\nsongs and dances shall be as follows: There are many ancient musical\ncompositions and dances which are excellent, and from these the\nnewly-founded city may freely select what is proper and suitable; and\nthey shall choose judges of not less than fifty years of age, who shall\nmake the selection, and any of the old poems which they deem sufficient\nthey shall include; any that are deficient or altogether unsuitable,\nthey shall either utterly throw aside, or examine and amend, taking\ninto their counsel poets and musicians, and making use of their poetical\ngenius; but explaining to them the wishes of the legislator in order\nthat they may regulate dancing, music, and all choral strains, according\nto the mind of the judges; and not allowing them to indulge, except\nin some few matters, their individual pleasures and fancies. Now the\nirregular strain of music is always made ten thousand times better by\nattaining to law and order, and rejecting the honeyed Muse--not however\nthat we mean wholly to exclude pleasure, which is the characteristic\nof all music. And if a man be brought up from childhood to the age of\ndiscretion and maturity in the use of the orderly and severe music,\nwhen he hears the opposite he detests it, and calls it illiberal; but\nif trained in the sweet and vulgar music, he deems the severer kind cold\nand displeasing. So that, as I was saying before, while he who hears\nthem gains no more pleasure from the one than from the other, the one\nhas the advantage of making those who are trained in it better men,\nwhereas the other makes them worse.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Again, we must distinguish and determine on some general\nprinciple what songs are suitable to women, and what to men, and must\nassign to them their proper melodies and rhythms. It is shocking for a\nwhole harmony to be inharmonical, or for a rhythm to be unrhythmical,\nand this will happen when the melody is inappropriate to them. And\ntherefore the legislator must assign to these also their forms. Now both\nsexes have melodies and rhythms which of necessity belong to them; and\nthose of women are clearly enough indicated by their natural difference.\nThe grand, and that which tends to courage, may be fairly called manly;\nbut that which inclines to moderation and temperance, may be declared\nboth in law and in ordinary speech to be the more womanly quality. This,\nthen, will be the general order of them.\n\nLet us now speak of the manner of teaching and imparting them, and the\npersons to whom, and the time when, they are severally to be imparted.\nAs the shipwright first lays down the lines of the keel, and thus, as\nit were, draws the ship in outline, so do I seek to distinguish the\npatterns of life, and lay down their keels according to the nature of\ndifferent men's souls; seeking truly to consider by what means, and in\nwhat ways, we may go through the voyage of life best. Now human affairs\nare hardly worth considering in earnest, and yet we must be in earnest\nabout them--a sad necessity constrains us. And having got thus far,\nthere will be a fitness in our completing the matter, if we can only\nfind some suitable method of doing so. But what do I mean? Some one may\nask this very question, and quite rightly, too.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: I say that about serious matters a man should be serious, and\nabout a matter which is not serious he should not be serious; and that\nGod is the natural and worthy object of our most serious and blessed\nendeavours, for man, as I said before, is made to be the plaything of\nGod, and this, truly considered, is the best of him; wherefore also\nevery man and woman should walk seriously, and pass life in the noblest\nof pastimes, and be of another mind from what they are at present.\n\nCLEINIAS: In what respect?\n\nATHENIAN: At present they think that their serious pursuits should be\nfor the sake of their sports, for they deem war a serious pursuit, which\nmust be managed well for the sake of peace; but the truth is, that\nthere neither is, nor has been, nor ever will be, either amusement\nor instruction in any degree worth speaking of in war, which is\nnevertheless deemed by us to be the most serious of our pursuits. And\ntherefore, as we say, every one of us should live the life of peace as\nlong and as well as he can. And what is the right way of living? Are\nwe to live in sports always? If so, in what kind of sports? We ought to\nlive sacrificing, and singing, and dancing, and then a man will be able\nto propitiate the Gods, and to defend himself against his enemies and\nconquer them in battle. The type of song or dance by which he will\npropitiate them has been described, and the paths along which he is to\nproceed have been cut for him. He will go forward in the spirit of the\npoet:\n\n'Telemachus, some things thou wilt thyself find in thy heart, but other\nthings God will suggest; for I deem that thou wast not born or brought\nup without the will of the Gods.'\n\nAnd this ought to be the view of our alumni; they ought to think that\nwhat has been said is enough for them, and that any other things their\nGenius and God will suggest to them--he will tell them to whom, and\nwhen, and to what Gods severally they are to sacrifice and perform\ndances, and how they may propitiate the deities, and live according to\nthe appointment of nature; being for the most part puppets, but having\nsome little share of reality.\n\nMEGILLUS: You have a low opinion of mankind, Stranger.\n\nATHENIAN: Nay, Megillus, be not amazed, but forgive me: I was comparing\nthem with the Gods; and under that feeling I spoke. Let us grant, if you\nwish, that the human race is not to be despised, but is worthy of some\nconsideration.\n\nNext follow the buildings for gymnasia and schools open to all; these\nare to be in three places in the midst of the city; and outside the city\nand in the surrounding country, also in three places, there shall be\nschools for horse exercise, and large grounds arranged with a view to\narchery and the throwing of missiles, at which young men may learn and\npractise. Of these mention has already been made; and if the mention be\nnot sufficiently explicit, let us speak further of them and embody them\nin laws. In these several schools let there be dwellings for teachers,\nwho shall be brought from foreign parts by pay, and let them teach those\nwho attend the schools the art of war and the art of music, and the\nchildren shall come not only if their parents please, but if they do not\nplease; there shall be compulsory education, as the saying is, of all\nand sundry, as far as this is possible; and the pupils shall be regarded\nas belonging to the state rather than to their parents. My law would\napply to females as well as males; they shall both go through the same\nexercises. I assert without fear of contradiction that gymnastic and\nhorsemanship are as suitable to women as to men. Of the truth of this\nI am persuaded from ancient tradition, and at the present day there are\nsaid to be countless myriads of women in the neighbourhood of the Black\nSea, called Sauromatides, who not only ride on horseback like men, but\nhave enjoined upon them the use of bows and other weapons equally\nwith the men. And I further affirm, that if these things are possible,\nnothing can be more absurd than the practice which prevails in our own\ncountry, of men and women not following the same pursuits with all\ntheir strength and with one mind, for thus the state, instead of being\na whole, is reduced to a half, but has the same imposts to pay and\nthe same toils to undergo; and what can be a greater mistake for any\nlegislator to make than this?\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true; yet much of what has been asserted by us, Stranger,\nis contrary to the custom of states; still, in saying that the discourse\nshould be allowed to proceed, and that when the discussion is completed,\nwe should choose what seems best, you spoke very properly, and I now\nfeel compunction for what I have said. Tell me, then, what you would\nnext wish to say.\n\nATHENIAN: I should wish to say, Cleinias, as I said before, that if the\npossibility of these things were not sufficiently proven in fact, then\nthere might be an objection to the argument, but the fact being as\nI have said, he who rejects the law must find some other ground of\nobjection; and, failing this, our exhortation will still hold good,\nnor will any one deny that women ought to share as far as possible in\neducation and in other ways with men. For consider; if women do not\nshare in their whole life with men, then they must have some other order\nof life.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And what arrangement of life to be found anywhere is\npreferable to this community which we are now assigning to them? Shall\nwe prefer that which is adopted by the Thracians and many other races\nwho use their women to till the ground and to be shepherds of their\nherds and flocks, and to minister to them like slaves? Or shall we do\nas we and people in our part of the world do--getting together, as the\nphrase is, all our goods and chattels into one dwelling, we entrust them\nto our women, who are the stewards of them, and who also preside over\nthe shuttles and the whole art of spinning? Or shall we take a middle\ncourse, as in Lacedaemon, Megillus--letting the girls share in gymnastic\nand music, while the grown-up women, no longer employed in spinning\nwool, are hard at work weaving the web of life, which will be no cheap\nor mean employment, and in the duty of serving and taking care of the\nhousehold and bringing up the children, in which they will observe a\nsort of mean, not participating in the toils of war; and if there were\nany necessity that they should fight for their city and families, unlike\nthe Amazons, they would be unable to take part in archery or any other\nskilled use of missiles, nor could they, after the example of the\nGoddess, carry shield or spear, or stand up nobly for their country when\nit was being destroyed, and strike terror into their enemies, if only\nbecause they were seen in regular order? Living as they do, they would\nnever dare at all to imitate the Sauromatides, who, when compared with\nordinary women, would appear to be like men. Let him who will, praise\nyour legislators, but I must say what I think. The legislator ought to\nbe whole and perfect, and not half a man only; he ought not to let the\nfemale sex live softly and waste money and have no order of life, while\nhe takes the utmost care of the male sex, and leaves half of life only\nblest with happiness, when he might have made the whole state happy.\n\nMEGILLUS: What shall we do, Cleinias? Shall we allow a stranger to run\ndown Sparta in this fashion?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes; for as we have given him liberty of speech we must let\nhim go on until we have perfected the work of legislation.\n\nMEGILLUS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Then now I may proceed?\n\nCLEINIAS: By all means.\n\nATHENIAN: What will be the manner of life among men who may be supposed\nto have their food and clothing provided for them in moderation, and who\nhave entrusted the practice of the arts to others, and whose husbandry\ncommitted to slaves paying a part of the produce, brings them a return\nsufficient for men living temperately; who, moreover, have common tables\nin which the men are placed apart, and near them are the common tables\nof their families, of their daughters and mothers, which day by day,\nthe officers, male and female, are to inspect--they shall see to the\nbehaviour of the company, and so dismiss them; after which the presiding\nmagistrate and his attendants shall honour with libations those Gods to\nwhom that day and night are dedicated, and then go home? To men whose\nlives are thus ordered, is there no work remaining to be done which is\nnecessary and fitting, but shall each one of them live fattening like a\nbeast? Such a life is neither just nor honourable, nor can he who lives\nit fail of meeting his due; and the due reward of the idle fatted beast\nis that he should be torn in pieces by some other valiant beast whose\nfatness is worn down by brave deeds and toil. These regulations, if we\nduly consider them, will never be exactly carried into execution under\npresent circumstances, nor as long as women and children and houses and\nall other things are the private property of individuals; but if we can\nattain the second-best form of polity, we shall be very well off. And\nto men living under this second polity there remains a work to be\naccomplished which is far from being small or insignificant, but is the\ngreatest of all works, and ordained by the appointment of righteous law.\nFor the life which may be truly said to be concerned with the virtue of\nbody and soul is twice, or more than twice, as full of toil and trouble\nas the pursuit after Pythian and Olympic victories, which debars a\nman from every employment of life. For there ought to be no bye-work\ninterfering with the greater work of providing the necessary exercise\nand nourishment for the body, and instruction and education for the\nsoul. Night and day are not long enough for the accomplishment of their\nperfection and consummation; and therefore to this end all freemen ought\nto arrange the way in which they will spend their time during the whole\ncourse of the day, from morning till evening and from evening till the\nmorning of the next sunrise. There may seem to be some impropriety\nin the legislator determining minutely the numberless details of the\nmanagement of the house, including such particulars as the duty of\nwakefulness in those who are to be perpetual watchmen of the whole city;\nfor that any citizen should continue during the whole of any night in\nsleep, instead of being seen by all his servants, always the first to\nawake and get up--this, whether the regulation is to be called a law or\nonly a practice, should be deemed base and unworthy of a freeman; also\nthat the mistress of the house should be awakened by her hand-maidens\ninstead of herself first awakening them, is what the slaves, male and\nfemale, and the serving-boys, and, if that were possible, everybody and\neverything in the house should regard as base. If they rise early, they\nmay all of them do much of their public and of their household business,\nas magistrates in the city, and masters and mistresses in their private\nhouses, before the sun is up. Much sleep is not required by nature,\neither for our souls or bodies, or for the actions which they perform.\nFor no one who is asleep is good for anything, any more than if he were\ndead; but he of us who has the most regard for life and reason keeps\nawake as long as he can, reserving only so much time for sleep as is\nexpedient for health; and much sleep is not required, if the habit of\nmoderation be once rightly formed. Magistrates in states who keep awake\nat night are terrible to the bad, whether enemies or citizens, and are\nhonoured and reverenced by the just and temperate, and are useful to\nthemselves and to the whole state.\n\nA night which is passed in such a manner, in addition to all the\nabove-mentioned advantages, infuses a sort of courage into the minds of\nthe citizens. When the day breaks, the time has arrived for youth to go\nto their schoolmasters. Now neither sheep nor any other animals can live\nwithout a shepherd, nor can children be left without tutors, or slaves\nwithout masters. And of all animals the boy is the most unmanageable,\ninasmuch as he has the fountain of reason in him not yet regulated;\nhe is the most insidious, sharp-witted, and insubordinate of animals.\nWherefore he must be bound with many bridles; in the first place, when\nhe gets away from mothers and nurses, he must be under the management\nof tutors on account of his childishness and foolishness; then, again,\nbeing a freeman, he must be controlled by teachers, no matter what they\nteach, and by studies; but he is also a slave, and in that regard\nany freeman who comes in his way may punish him and his tutor and his\ninstructor, if any of them does anything wrong; and he who comes across\nhim and does not inflict upon him the punishment which he deserves,\nshall incur the greatest disgrace; and let the guardian of the law, who\nis the director of education, see to him who coming in the way of the\noffences which we have mentioned, does not chastise them when he ought,\nor chastises them in a way which he ought not; let him keep a sharp\nlook-out, and take especial care of the training of our children,\ndirecting their natures, and always turning them to good according to\nthe law.\n\nBut how can our law sufficiently train the director of education\nhimself; for as yet all has been imperfect, and nothing has been said\neither clear or satisfactory? Now, as far as possible, the law ought\nto leave nothing to him, but to explain everything, that he may be\nan interpreter and tutor to others. About dances and music and choral\nstrains, I have already spoken both as to the character of the selection\nof them, and the manner in which they are to be amended and consecrated.\nBut we have not as yet spoken, O illustrious guardian of education,\nof the manner in which your pupils are to use those strains which are\nwritten in prose, although you have been informed what martial strains\nthey are to learn and practise; what relates in the first place to the\nlearning of letters, and secondly, to the lyre, and also to calculation,\nwhich, as we were saying, is needful for them all to learn, and any\nother things which are required with a view to war and the management of\nhouse and city, and, looking to the same object, what is useful in the\nrevolutions of the heavenly bodies--the stars and sun and moon, and\nthe various regulations about these matters which are necessary for the\nwhole state--I am speaking of the arrangements of days in periods of\nmonths, and of months in years, which are to be observed, in order that\nseasons and sacrifices and festivals may have their regular and natural\norder, and keep the city alive and awake, the Gods receiving the honours\ndue to them, and men having a better understanding about them: all these\nthings, O my friend, have not yet been sufficiently declared to you by\nthe legislator. Attend, then, to what I am now going to say: We were\ntelling you, in the first place, that you were not sufficiently informed\nabout letters, and the objection was to this effect--that you were never\ntold whether he who was meant to be a respectable citizen should apply\nhimself in detail to that sort of learning, or not apply himself at all;\nand the same remark holds good of the study of the lyre. But now we say\nthat he ought to attend to them. A fair time for a boy of ten years old\nto spend in letters is three years; the age of thirteen is the proper\ntime for him to begin to handle the lyre, and he may continue at this\nfor another three years, neither more nor less, and whether his father\nor himself like or dislike the study, he is not to be allowed to spend\nmore or less time in learning music than the law allows. And let him who\ndisobeys the law be deprived of those youthful honours of which we shall\nhereafter speak. Hear, however, first of all, what the young ought to\nlearn in the early years of life, and what their instructors ought to\nteach them. They ought to be occupied with their letters until they\nare able to read and write; but the acquisition of perfect beauty or\nquickness in writing, if nature has not stimulated them to acquire these\naccomplishments in the given number of years, they should let alone. And\nas to the learning of compositions committed to writing which are not\nset to the lyre, whether metrical or without rhythmical divisions,\ncompositions in prose, as they are termed, having no rhythm or\nharmony--seeing how dangerous are the writings handed down to us by\nmany writers of this class--what will you do with them, O most excellent\nguardians of the law? or how can the lawgiver rightly direct you about\nthem? I believe that he will be in great difficulty.\n\nCLEINIAS: What troubles you, Stranger? and why are you so perplexed in\nyour mind?\n\nATHENIAN: You naturally ask, Cleinias, and to you and Megillus, who are\nmy partners in the work of legislation, I must state the more difficult\nas well as the easier parts of the task.\n\nCLEINIAS: To what do you refer in this instance?\n\nATHENIAN: I will tell you. There is a difficulty in opposing many\nmyriads of mouths.\n\nCLEINIAS: Well, and have we not already opposed the popular voice in\nmany important enactments?\n\nATHENIAN: That is quite true; and you mean to imply that the road which\nwe are taking may be disagreeable to some but is agreeable to as many\nothers, or if not to as many, at any rate to persons not inferior to\nthe others, and in company with them you bid me, at whatever risk,\nto proceed along the path of legislation which has opened out of our\npresent discourse, and to be of good cheer, and not to faint.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And I do not faint; I say, indeed, that we have a great many\npoets writing in hexameter, trimeter, and all sorts of measures--some\nwho are serious, others who aim only at raising a laugh--and all mankind\ndeclare that the youth who are rightly educated should be brought up in\nthem and saturated with them; some insist that they should be constantly\nhearing them read aloud, and always learning them, so as to get by heart\nentire poets; while others select choice passages and long speeches,\nand make compendiums of them, saying that these ought to be committed to\nmemory, if a man is to be made good and wise by experience and learning\nof many things. And you want me now to tell them plainly in what they\nare right and in what they are wrong.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes, I do.\n\nATHENIAN: But how can I in one word rightly comprehend all of them? I\nam of opinion, and, if I am not mistaken, there is a general agreement,\nthat every one of these poets has said many things well and many things\nthe reverse of well; and if this be true, then I do affirm that much\nlearning is dangerous to youth.\n\nCLEINIAS: How would you advise the guardian of the law to act?\n\nATHENIAN: In what respect?\n\nCLEINIAS: I mean to what pattern should he look as his guide in\npermitting the young to learn some things and forbidding them to learn\nothers. Do not shrink from answering.\n\nATHENIAN: My good Cleinias, I rather think that I am fortunate.\n\nCLEINIAS: How so?\n\nATHENIAN: I think that I am not wholly in want of a pattern, for when I\nconsider the words which we have spoken from early dawn until now, and\nwhich, as I believe, have been inspired by Heaven, they appear to me to\nbe quite like a poem. When I reflected upon all these words of ours,\nI naturally felt pleasure, for of all the discourses which I have ever\nlearnt or heard, either in poetry or prose, this seemed to me to be the\njustest, and most suitable for young men to hear; I cannot imagine any\nbetter pattern than this which the guardian of the law who is also the\ndirector of education can have. He cannot do better than advise the\nteachers to teach the young these words and any which are of a like\nnature, if he should happen to find them, either in poetry or prose, or\nif he come across unwritten discourses akin to ours, he should certainly\npreserve them, and commit them to writing. And, first of all, he shall\nconstrain the teachers themselves to learn and approve them, and any of\nthem who will not, shall not be employed by him, but those whom he finds\nagreeing in his judgment, he shall make use of and shall commit to them\nthe instruction and education of youth. And here and on this wise let my\nfanciful tale about letters and teachers of letters come to an end.\n\nCLEINIAS: I do not think, Stranger, that we have wandered out of the\nproposed limits of the argument; but whether we are right or not in our\nwhole conception, I cannot be very certain.\n\nATHENIAN: The truth, Cleinias, may be expected to become clearer when,\nas we have often said, we arrive at the end of the whole discussion\nabout laws.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: And now that we have done with the teacher of letters, the\nteacher of the lyre has to receive orders from us.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: I think that we have only to recollect our previous\ndiscussions, and we shall be able to give suitable regulations touching\nall this part of instruction and education to the teachers of the lyre.\n\nCLEINIAS: To what do you refer?\n\nATHENIAN: We were saying, if I remember rightly, that the sixty\nyears old choristers of Dionysus were to be specially quick in their\nperceptions of rhythm and musical composition, that they might be able\nto distinguish good and bad imitation, that is to say, the imitation of\nthe good or bad soul when under the influence of passion, rejecting the\none and displaying the other in hymns and songs, charming the souls\nof youth, and inviting them to follow and attain virtue by the way of\nimitation.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: And with this view the teacher and the learner ought to use\nthe sounds of the lyre, because its notes are pure, the player who\nteaches and his pupil rendering note for note in unison; but complexity,\nand variation of notes, when the strings give one sound and the poet or\ncomposer of the melody gives another--also when they make concords and\nharmonies in which lesser and greater intervals, slow and quick, or\nhigh and low notes, are combined--or, again, when they make complex\nvariations of rhythms, which they adapt to the notes of the lyre--all\nthat sort of thing is not suited to those who have to acquire speedy and\nuseful knowledge of music in three years; for opposite principles are\nconfusing, and create a difficulty in learning, and our young men should\nlearn quickly, and their mere necessary acquirements are not few or\ntrifling, as will be shown in due course. Let the director of education\nattend to the principles concerning music which we are laying down. As\nto the songs and words themselves which the masters of choruses are to\nteach and the character of them, they have been already described by us,\nand are the same which, when consecrated and adapted to the different\nfestivals, we said were to benefit cities by affording them an innocent\namusement.\n\nCLEINIAS: That, again, is true.\n\nATHENIAN: Then let him who has been elected a director of music receive\nthese rules from us as containing the very truth; and may he prosper in\nhis office! Let us now proceed to lay down other rules in addition to\nthe preceding about dancing and gymnastic exercise in general. Having\nsaid what remained to be said about the teaching of music, let us speak\nin like manner about gymnastic. For boys and girls ought to learn to\ndance and practise gymnastic exercises--ought they not?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: Then the boys ought to have dancing masters, and the girls\ndancing mistresses to exercise them.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: Then once more let us summon him who has the chief concern\nin the business, the superintendent of youth [i.e. the director of\neducation]; he will have plenty to do, if he is to have the charge of\nmusic and gymnastic.\n\nCLEINIAS: But how will an old man be able to attend to such great\ncharges?\n\nATHENIAN: O my friend, there will be no difficulty, for the law has\nalready given and will give him permission to select as his assistants\nin this charge any citizens, male or female, whom he desires; and he\nwill know whom he ought to choose, and will be anxious not to make a\nmistake, from a due sense of responsibility, and from a consciousness of\nthe importance of his office, and also because he will consider that\nif young men have been and are well brought up, then all things go\nswimmingly, but if not, it is not meet to say, nor do we say, what will\nfollow, lest the regarders of omens should take alarm about our\ninfant state. Many things have been said by us about dancing and about\ngymnastic movements in general; for we include under gymnastics all\nmilitary exercises, such as archery, and all hurling of weapons, and the\nuse of the light shield, and all fighting with heavy arms, and military\nevolutions, and movements of armies, and encampings, and all that\nrelates to horsemanship. Of all these things there ought to be public\nteachers, receiving pay from the state, and their pupils should be the\nmen and boys in the state, and also the girls and women, who are to know\nall these things. While they are yet girls they should have practised\ndancing in arms and the whole art of fighting--when grown-up women,\nthey should apply themselves to evolutions and tactics, and the mode of\ngrounding and taking up arms; if for no other reason, yet in case\nthe whole military force should have to leave the city and carry on\noperations of war outside, that those who will have to guard the young\nand the rest of the city may be equal to the task; and, on the other\nhand, when enemies, whether barbarian or Hellenic, come from without\nwith mighty force and make a violent assault upon them, and thus compel\nthem to fight for the possession of the city, which is far from being\nan impossibility, great would be the disgrace to the state, if the women\nhad been so miserably trained that they could not fight for their young,\nas birds will, against any creature however strong, and die or undergo\nany danger, but must instantly rush to the temples and crowd at the\naltars and shrines, and bring upon human nature the reproach, that of\nall animals man is the most cowardly!\n\nCLEINIAS: Such a want of education, Stranger, is certainly an unseemly\nthing to happen in a state, as well as a great misfortune.\n\nATHENIAN: Suppose that we carry our law to the extent of saying that\nwomen ought not to neglect military matters, but that all citizens, male\nand female alike, shall attend to them?\n\nCLEINIAS: I quite agree.\n\nATHENIAN: Of wrestling we have spoken in part, but of what I should\ncall the most important part we have not spoken, and cannot easily speak\nwithout showing at the same time by gesture as well as in word what we\nmean; when word and action combine, and not till then, we shall explain\nclearly what has been said, pointing out that of all movements wrestling\nis most akin to the military art, and is to be pursued for the sake of\nthis, and not this for the sake of wrestling.\n\nCLEINIAS: Excellent. ATHENIAN: Enough of wrestling; we will now proceed\nto speak of other movements of the body. Such motion may be in general\ncalled dancing, and is of two kinds: one of nobler figures, imitating\nthe honourable, the other of the more ignoble figures, imitating the\nmean; and of both these there are two further subdivisions. Of the\nserious, one kind is of those engaged in war and vehement action, and is\nthe exercise of a noble person and a manly heart; the other exhibits a\ntemperate soul in the enjoyment of prosperity and modest pleasures,\nand may be truly called and is the dance of peace. The warrior dance is\ndifferent from the peaceful one, and may be rightly termed Pyrrhic; this\nimitates the modes of avoiding blows and missiles by dropping or giving\nway, or springing aside, or rising up or falling down; also the opposite\npostures which are those of action, as, for example, the imitation of\narchery and the hurling of javelins, and of all sorts of blows. And when\nthe imitation is of brave bodies and souls, and the action is direct and\nmuscular, giving for the most part a straight movement to the limbs of\nthe body--that, I say, is the true sort; but the opposite is not right.\nIn the dance of peace what we have to consider is whether a man bears\nhimself naturally and gracefully, and after the manner of men who duly\nconform to the law. But before proceeding I must distinguish the dancing\nabout which there is any doubt, from that about which there is no doubt.\nWhich is the doubtful kind, and how are the two to be distinguished?\nThere are dances of the Bacchic sort, both those in which, as they say,\nthey imitate drunken men, and which are named after the Nymphs, and Pan,\nand Silenuses, and Satyrs; and also those in which purifications are\nmade or mysteries celebrated--all this sort of dancing cannot be rightly\ndefined as having either a peaceful or a warlike character, or indeed as\nhaving any meaning whatever, and may, I think, be most truly described\nas distinct from the warlike dance, and distinct from the peaceful, and\nnot suited for a city at all. There let it lie; and so leaving it to\nlie, we will proceed to the dances of war and peace, for with these\nwe are undoubtedly concerned. Now the unwarlike muse, which honours in\ndance the Gods and the sons of the Gods, is entirely associated with\nthe consciousness of prosperity; this class may be subdivided into two\nlesser classes, of which one is expressive of an escape from some labour\nor danger into good, and has greater pleasures, the other expressive of\npreservation and increase of former good, in which the pleasure is less\nexciting--in all these cases, every man when the pleasure is greater,\nmoves his body more, and less when the pleasure is less; and, again,\nif he be more orderly and has learned courage from discipline he moves\nless, but if he be a coward, and has no training or self-control, he\nmakes greater and more violent movements, and in general when he is\nspeaking or singing he is not altogether able to keep his body still;\nand so out of the imitation of words in gestures the whole art of\ndancing has arisen. And in these various kinds of imitation one man\nmoves in an orderly, another in a disorderly manner; and as the ancients\nmay be observed to have given many names which are according to nature\nand deserving of praise, so there is an excellent one which they have\ngiven to the dances of men who in their times of prosperity are moderate\nin their pleasures--the giver of names, whoever he was, assigned to\nthem a very true, and poetical, and rational name, when he called them\nEmmeleiai, or dances of order, thus establishing two kinds of dances of\nthe nobler sort, the dance of war which he called the Pyrrhic, and the\ndance of peace which he called Emmeleia, or the dance of order; giving\nto each their appropriate and becoming name. These things the legislator\nshould indicate in general outline, and the guardian of the law should\nenquire into them and search them out, combining dancing with music, and\nassigning to the several sacrificial feasts that which is suitable to\nthem; and when he has consecrated all of them in due order, he shall for\nthe future change nothing, whether of dance or song. Thenceforward\nthe city and the citizens shall continue to have the same pleasures,\nthemselves being as far as possible alike, and shall live well and\nhappily.\n\nI have described the dances which are appropriate to noble bodies and\ngenerous souls. But it is necessary also to consider and know uncomely\npersons and thoughts, and those which are intended to produce laughter\nin comedy, and have a comic character in respect of style, song, and\ndance, and of the imitations which these afford. For serious things\ncannot be understood without laughable things, nor opposites at all\nwithout opposites, if a man is really to have intelligence of either;\nbut he cannot carry out both in action, if he is to have any degree of\nvirtue. And for this very reason he should learn them both, in order\nthat he may not in ignorance do or say anything which is ridiculous and\nout of place--he should command slaves and hired strangers to imitate\nsuch things, but he should never take any serious interest in them\nhimself, nor should any freeman or freewoman be discovered taking pains\nto learn them; and there should always be some element of novelty in\nthe imitation. Let these then be laid down, both in law and in our\ndiscourse, as the regulations of laughable amusements which are\ngenerally called comedy. And, if any of the serious poets, as they are\ntermed, who write tragedy, come to us and say--'O strangers, may we go\nto your city and country or may we not, and shall we bring with us our\npoetry--what is your will about these matters?'--how shall we answer\nthe divine men? I think that our answer should be as follows: Best of\nstrangers, we will say to them, we also according to our ability are\ntragic poets, and our tragedy is the best and noblest; for our whole\nstate is an imitation of the best and noblest life, which we affirm to\nbe indeed the very truth of tragedy. You are poets and we are poets,\nboth makers of the same strains, rivals and antagonists in the noblest\nof dramas, which true law can alone perfect, as our hope is. Do not then\nsuppose that we shall all in a moment allow you to erect your stage in\nthe agora, or introduce the fair voices of your actors, speaking above\nour own, and permit you to harangue our women and children, and the\ncommon people, about our institutions, in language other than our own,\nand very often the opposite of our own. For a state would be mad which\ngave you this licence, until the magistrates had determined whether your\npoetry might be recited, and was fit for publication or not. Wherefore,\nO ye sons and scions of the softer Muses, first of all show your songs\nto the magistrates, and let them compare them with our own, and if they\nare the same or better we will give you a chorus; but if not, then,\nmy friends, we cannot. Let these, then, be the customs ordained by law\nabout all dances and the teaching of them, and let matters relating\nto slaves be separated from those relating to masters, if you do not\nobject.\n\nCLEINIAS: We can have no hesitation in assenting when you put the matter\nthus.\n\nATHENIAN: There still remain three studies suitable for freemen.\nArithmetic is one of them; the measurement of length, surface, and depth\nis the second; and the third has to do with the revolutions of the stars\nin relation to one another. Not every one has need to toil through all\nthese things in a strictly scientific manner, but only a few, and who\nthey are to be we will hereafter indicate at the end, which will be the\nproper place; not to know what is necessary for mankind in general, and\nwhat is the truth, is disgraceful to every one: and yet to enter into\nthese matters minutely is neither easy, nor at all possible for every\none; but there is something in them which is necessary and cannot be\nset aside, and probably he who made the proverb about God originally had\nthis in view when he said, that 'not even God himself can fight against\nnecessity;' he meant, if I am not mistaken, divine necessity; for as to\nthe human necessities of which the many speak, when they talk in this\nmanner, nothing can be more ridiculous than such an application of the\nwords.\n\nCLEINIAS: And what necessities of knowledge are there, Stranger, which\nare divine and not human?\n\nATHENIAN: I conceive them to be those of which he who has no use nor any\nknowledge at all cannot be a God, or demi-god, or hero to mankind, or\nable to take any serious thought or charge of them. And very unlike a\ndivine man would he be, who is unable to count one, two, three, or\nto distinguish odd and even numbers, or is unable to count at all,\nor reckon night and day, and who is totally unacquainted with the\nrevolution of the sun and moon, and the other stars. There would be\ngreat folly in supposing that all these are not necessary parts of\nknowledge to him who intends to know anything about the highest kinds of\nknowledge; but which these are, and how many there are of them, and\nwhen they are to be learned, and what is to be learned together and what\napart, and the whole correlation of them, must be rightly apprehended\nfirst; and these leading the way we may proceed to the other parts of\nknowledge. For so necessity grounded in nature constrains us, against\nwhich we say that no God contends, or ever will contend.\n\nCLEINIAS: I think, Stranger, that what you have now said is very true\nand agreeable to nature.\n\nATHENIAN: Yes, Cleinias, that is so. But it is difficult for the\nlegislator to begin with these studies; at a more convenient time we\nwill make regulations for them.\n\nCLEINIAS: You seem, Stranger, to be afraid of our habitual ignorance\nof the subject: there is no reason why that should prevent you from\nspeaking out.\n\nATHENIAN: I certainly am afraid of the difficulties to which you allude,\nbut I am still more afraid of those who apply themselves to this sort\nof knowledge, and apply themselves badly. For entire ignorance is not so\nterrible or extreme an evil, and is far from being the greatest of\nall; too much cleverness and too much learning, accompanied with an ill\nbringing up, are far more fatal.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: All freemen I conceive, should learn as much of these branches\nof knowledge as every child in Egypt is taught when he learns the\nalphabet. In that country arithmetical games have been invented for the\nuse of mere children, which they learn as a pleasure and amusement. They\nhave to distribute apples and garlands, using the same number sometimes\nfor a larger and sometimes for a lesser number of persons; and they\narrange pugilists and wrestlers as they pair together by lot or remain\nover, and show how their turns come in natural order. Another mode of\namusing them is to distribute vessels, sometimes of gold, brass, silver,\nand the like, intermixed with one another, sometimes of one metal only;\nas I was saying they adapt to their amusement the numbers in common use,\nand in this way make more intelligible to their pupils the arrangements\nand movements of armies and expeditions, and in the management of a\nhousehold they make people more useful to themselves, and more wide\nawake; and again in measurements of things which have length, and\nbreadth, and depth, they free us from that natural ignorance of all\nthese things which is so ludicrous and disgraceful.\n\nCLEINIAS: What kind of ignorance do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: O my dear Cleinias, I, like yourself, have late in life heard\nwith amazement of our ignorance in these matters; to me we appear to be\nmore like pigs than men, and I am quite ashamed, not only of myself, but\nof all Hellenes.\n\nCLEINIAS: About what? Say, Stranger, what you mean.\n\nATHENIAN: I will; or rather I will show you my meaning by a question,\nand do you please to answer me: You know, I suppose, what length is?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And what breadth is?\n\nCLEINIAS: To be sure.\n\nATHENIAN: And you know that these are two distinct things, and that\nthere is a third thing called depth?\n\nCLEINIAS: Of course.\n\nATHENIAN: And do not all these seem to you to be commensurable with\nthemselves?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: That is to say, length is naturally commensurable with length,\nand breadth with breadth, and depth in like manner with depth?\n\nCLEINIAS: Undoubtedly.\n\nATHENIAN: But if some things are commensurable and others wholly\nincommensurable, and you think that all things are commensurable, what\nis your position in regard to them?\n\nCLEINIAS: Clearly, far from good.\n\nATHENIAN: Concerning length and breadth when compared with depth, or\nbreadth and length when compared with one another, are not all the\nHellenes agreed that these are commensurable with one another in some\nway?\n\nCLEINIAS: Quite true.\n\nATHENIAN: But if they are absolutely incommensurable, and yet all of us\nregard them as commensurable, have we not reason to be ashamed of our\ncompatriots; and might we not say to them: O ye best of Hellenes, is not\nthis one of the things of which we were saying that not to know them\nis disgraceful, and of which to have a bare knowledge only is no great\ndistinction?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And there are other things akin to these, in which there\nspring up other errors of the same family.\n\nCLEINIAS: What are they?\n\nATHENIAN: The natures of commensurable and incommensurable quantities in\ntheir relation to one another. A man who is good for anything ought\nto be able, when he thinks, to distinguish them; and different persons\nshould compete with one another in asking questions, which will be a far\nbetter and more graceful way of passing their time than the old man's\ngame of draughts.\n\nCLEINIAS: I dare say; and these pastimes are not so very unlike a game\nof draughts.\n\nATHENIAN: And these, as I maintain, Cleinias, are the studies which\nour youth ought to learn, for they are innocent and not difficult; the\nlearning of them will be an amusement, and they will benefit the state.\nIf any one is of another mind, let him say what he has to say.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Then if these studies are such as we maintain, we will include\nthem; if not, they shall be excluded.\n\nCLEINIAS: Assuredly: but may we not now, Stranger, prescribe these\nstudies as necessary, and so fill up the lacunae of our laws?\n\nATHENIAN: They shall be regarded as pledges which may be hereafter\nredeemed and removed from our state, if they do not please either us who\ngive them, or you who accept them.\n\nCLEINIAS: A fair condition.\n\nATHENIAN: Next let us see whether we are or are not willing that the\nstudy of astronomy shall be proposed for our youth.\n\nCLEINIAS: Proceed.\n\nATHENIAN: Here occurs a strange phenomenon, which certainly cannot in\nany point of view be tolerated.\n\nCLEINIAS: To what are you referring?\n\nATHENIAN: Men say that we ought not to enquire into the supreme God\nand the nature of the universe, nor busy ourselves in searching out the\ncauses of things, and that such enquiries are impious; whereas the very\nopposite is the truth.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: Perhaps what I am saying may seem paradoxical, and at variance\nwith the usual language of age. But when any one has any good and\ntrue notion which is for the advantage of the state and in every way\nacceptable to God, he cannot abstain from expressing it.\n\nCLEINIAS: Your words are reasonable enough; but shall we find any good\nor true notion about the stars?\n\nATHENIAN: My good friends, at this hour all of us Hellenes tell lies,\nif I may use such an expression, about those great Gods, the Sun and the\nMoon.\n\nCLEINIAS: Lies of what nature?\n\nATHENIAN: We say that they and divers other stars do not keep the same\npath, and we call them planets or wanderers.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true, Stranger; and in the course of my life I have often\nmyself seen the morning star and the evening star and divers others not\nmoving in their accustomed course, but wandering out of their path in\nall manner of ways, and I have seen the sun and moon doing what we all\nknow that they do.\n\nATHENIAN: Just so, Megillus and Cleinias; and I maintain that our\ncitizens and our youth ought to learn about the nature of the Gods in\nheaven, so far as to be able to offer sacrifices and pray to them in\npious language, and not to blaspheme about them.\n\nCLEINIAS: There you are right, if such a knowledge be only attainable;\nand if we are wrong in our mode of speaking now, and can be better\ninstructed and learn to use better language, then I quite agree with\nyou that such a degree of knowledge as will enable us to speak rightly\nshould be acquired by us. And now do you try to explain to us your whole\nmeaning, and we, on our part, will endeavour to understand you.\n\nATHENIAN: There is some difficulty in understanding my meaning, but not\na very great one, nor will any great length of time be required. And of\nthis I am myself a proof; for I did not know these things long ago, nor\nin the days of my youth, and yet I can explain them to you in a brief\nspace of time; whereas if they had been difficult I could certainly\nnever have explained them all, old as I am, to old men like yourselves.\n\nCLEINIAS: True; but what is this study which you describe as wonderful\nand fitting for youth to learn, but of which we are ignorant? Try and\nexplain the nature of it to us as clearly as you can.\n\nATHENIAN: I will. For, O my good friends, that other doctrine about the\nwandering of the sun and the moon and the other stars is not the truth,\nbut the very reverse of the truth. Each of them moves in the same\npath--not in many paths, but in one only, which is circular, and the\nvarieties are only apparent. Nor are we right in supposing that the\nswiftest of them is the slowest, nor conversely, that the slowest is\nthe quickest. And if what I say is true, only just imagine that we had a\nsimilar notion about horses running at Olympia, or about men who ran in\nthe long course, and that we addressed the swiftest as the slowest and\nthe slowest as the swiftest, and sang the praises of the vanquished as\nthough he were the victor--in that case our praises would not be true,\nnor very agreeable to the runners, though they be but men; and now, to\ncommit the same error about the Gods which would have been ludicrous and\nerroneous in the case of men--is not that ludicrous and erroneous?\n\nCLEINIAS: Worse than ludicrous, I should say.\n\nATHENIAN: At all events, the Gods cannot like us to be spreading a false\nreport of them.\n\nCLEINIAS: Most true, if such is the fact.\n\nATHENIAN: And if we can show that such is really the fact, then all\nthese matters ought to be learned so far as is necessary for the\navoidance of impiety; but if we cannot, they may be let alone, and let\nthis be our decision.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: Enough of laws relating to education and learning. But\nhunting and similar pursuits in like manner claim our attention. For\nthe legislator appears to have a duty imposed upon him which goes beyond\nmere legislation. There is something over and above law which lies in a\nregion between admonition and law, and has several times occurred to us\nin the course of discussion; for example, in the education of very young\nchildren there were things, as we maintain, which are not to be defined,\nand to regard them as matters of positive law is a great absurdity.\nNow, our laws and the whole constitution of our state having been thus\ndelineated, the praise of the virtuous citizen is not complete when he\nis described as the person who serves the laws best and obeys them most,\nbut the higher form of praise is that which describes him as the good\ncitizen who passes through life undefiled and is obedient to the words\nof the legislator, both when he is giving laws and when he assigns\npraise and blame. This is the truest word that can be spoken in praise\nof a citizen; and the true legislator ought not only to write his\nlaws, but also to interweave with them all such things as seem to him\nhonourable and dishonourable. And the perfect citizen ought to seek to\nstrengthen these no less than the principles of law which are sanctioned\nby punishments. I will adduce an example which will clear up my meaning,\nand will be a sort of witness to my words. Hunting is of wide extent,\nand has a name under which many things are included, for there is a\nhunting of creatures in the water, and of creatures in the air, and\nthere is a great deal of hunting of land animals of all kinds, and\nnot of wild beasts only. The hunting after man is also worthy of\nconsideration; there is the hunting after him in war, and there is often\na hunting after him in the way of friendship, which is praised and also\nblamed; and there is thieving, and the hunting which is practised by\nrobbers, and that of armies against armies. Now the legislator, in\nlaying down laws about hunting, can neither abstain from noting these\nthings, nor can he make threatening ordinances which will assign rules\nand penalties about all of them. What is he to do? He will have to\npraise and blame hunting with a view to the exercise and pursuits of\nyouth. And, on the other hand, the young man must listen obediently;\nneither pleasure nor pain should hinder him, and he should regard as his\nstandard of action the praises and injunctions of the legislator rather\nthan the punishments which he imposes by law. This being premised, there\nwill follow next in order moderate praise and censure of hunting; the\npraise being assigned to that kind which will make the souls of young\nmen better, and the censure to that which has the opposite effect. And\nnow let us address young men in the form of a prayer for their welfare:\nO friends, we will say to them, may no desire or love of hunting in the\nsea, or of angling or of catching the creatures in the waters, ever take\npossession of you, either when you are awake or when you are asleep, by\nhook or with weels, which latter is a very lazy contrivance; and let not\nany desire of catching men and of piracy by sea enter into your souls\nand make you cruel and lawless hunters. And as to the desire of thieving\nin town or country, may it never enter into your most passing thoughts;\nnor let the insidious fancy of catching birds, which is hardly worthy\nof freemen, come into the head of any youth. There remains therefore for\nour athletes only the hunting and catching of land animals, of which the\none sort is called hunting by night, in which the hunters sleep in turn\nand are lazy; this is not to be commended any more than that which has\nintervals of rest, in which the wild strength of beasts is subdued by\nnets and snares, and not by the victory of a laborious spirit. Thus,\nonly the best kind of hunting is allowed at all--that of quadrupeds,\nwhich is carried on with horses and dogs and men's own persons, and they\nget the victory over the animals by running them down and striking them\nand hurling at them, those who have a care of godlike manhood taking\nthem with their own hands. The praise and blame which is assigned to all\nthese things has now been declared; and let the law be as follows: Let\nno one hinder these who verily are sacred hunters from following the\nchase wherever and whithersoever they will; but the hunter by night, who\ntrusts to his nets and gins, shall not be allowed to hunt anywhere.\nThe fowler in the mountains and waste places shall be permitted, but on\ncultivated ground and on consecrated wilds he shall not be permitted;\nand any one who meets him may stop him. As to the hunter in waters, he\nmay hunt anywhere except in harbours or sacred streams or marshes or\npools, provided only that he do not pollute the water with poisonous\njuices. And now we may say that all our enactments about education are\ncomplete.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK VIII.\n\nATHENIAN: Next, with the help of the Delphian oracle, we have to\ninstitute festivals and make laws about them, and to determine what\nsacrifices will be for the good of the city, and to what Gods they shall\nbe offered; but when they shall be offered, and how often, may be partly\nregulated by us.\n\nCLEINIAS: The number--yes.\n\nATHENIAN: Then we will first determine the number; and let the whole\nnumber be 365--one for every day--so that one magistrate at least will\nsacrifice daily to some God or demi-god on behalf of the city, and the\ncitizens, and their possessions. And the interpreters, and priests, and\npriestesses, and prophets shall meet, and, in company with the guardians\nof the law, ordain those things which the legislator of necessity omits;\nand I may remark that they are the very persons who ought to take\nnote of what is omitted. The law will say that there are twelve feasts\ndedicated to the twelve Gods, after whom the several tribes are named;\nand that to each of them they shall sacrifice every month, and appoint\nchoruses, and musical and gymnastic contests, assigning them so as to\nsuit the Gods and seasons of the year. And they shall have festivals for\nwomen, distinguishing those which ought to be separated from the men's\nfestivals, and those which ought not. Further, they shall not confuse\nthe infernal deities and their rites with the Gods who are termed\nheavenly and their rites, but shall separate them, giving to Pluto his\nown in the twelfth month, which is sacred to him, according to the\nlaw. To such a deity warlike men should entertain no aversion, but\nthey should honour him as being always the best friend of man. For the\nconnexion of soul and body is no way better than the dissolution of\nthem, as I am ready to maintain quite seriously. Moreover, those who\nwould regulate these matters rightly should consider, that our city\namong existing cities has no fellow, either in respect of leisure or\ncommand of the necessaries of life, and that like an individual she\nought to live happily. And those who would live happily should in the\nfirst place do no wrong to one another, and ought not themselves to be\nwronged by others; to attain the first is not difficult, but there is\ngreat difficulty in acquiring the power of not being wronged. No man can\nbe perfectly secure against wrong, unless he has become perfectly good;\nand cities are like individuals in this, for a city if good has a life\nof peace, but if evil, a life of war within and without. Wherefore the\ncitizens ought to practise war--not in time of war, but rather while\nthey are at peace. And every city which has any sense, should take\nthe field at least for one day in every month, and for more if the\nmagistrates think fit, having no regard to winter cold or summer\nheat; and they should go out en masse, including their wives and their\nchildren, when the magistrates determine to lead forth the whole people,\nor in separate portions when summoned by them; and they should always\nprovide that there should be games and sacrificial feasts, and they\nshould have tournaments, imitating in as lively a manner as they can\nreal battles. And they should distribute prizes of victory and valour to\nthe competitors, passing censures and encomiums on one another according\nto the characters which they bear in the contests and in their whole\nlife, honouring him who seems to be the best, and blaming him who is the\nopposite. And let poets celebrate the victors--not however every poet,\nbut only one who in the first place is not less than fifty years of\nage; nor should he be one who, although he may have musical and poetical\ngifts, has never in his life done any noble or illustrious action; but\nthose who are themselves good and also honourable in the state, creators\nof noble actions--let their poems be sung, even though they be not very\nmusical. And let the judgment of them rest with the instructor of youth\nand the other guardians of the laws, who shall give them this privilege,\nand they alone shall be free to sing; but the rest of the world shall\nnot have this liberty. Nor shall any one dare to sing a song which has\nnot been approved by the judgment of the guardians of the laws, not even\nif his strain be sweeter than the songs of Thamyras and Orpheus; but\nonly such poems as have been judged sacred and dedicated to the Gods,\nand such as are the works of good men, in which praise or blame has been\nawarded and which have been deemed to fulfil their design fairly.\n\nThe regulations about war, and about liberty of speech in poetry, ought\nto apply equally to men and women. The legislator may be supposed to\nargue the question in his own mind: Who are my citizens for whom I have\nset in order the city? Are they not competitors in the greatest of all\ncontests, and have they not innumerable rivals? To be sure, will be the\nnatural reply. Well, but if we were training boxers, or pancratiasts,\nor any other sort of athletes, would they never meet until the hour\nof contest arrived; and should we do nothing to prepare ourselves\npreviously by daily practice? Surely, if we were boxers, we should have\nbeen learning to fight for many days before, and exercising ourselves\nin imitating all those blows and wards which we were intending to use in\nthe hour of conflict; and in order that we might come as near to reality\nas possible, instead of cestuses we should put on boxing-gloves, that\nthe blows and the wards might be practised by us to the utmost of our\npower. And if there were a lack of competitors, the ridicule of fools\nwould not deter us from hanging up a lifeless image and practising at\nthat. Or if we had no adversary at all, animate or inanimate, should we\nnot venture in the dearth of antagonists to spar by ourselves? In what\nother manner could we ever study the art of self-defence?\n\nCLEINIAS: The way which you mention, Stranger, would be the only way.\n\nATHENIAN: And shall the warriors of our city, who are destined when\noccasion calls to enter the greatest of all contests, and to fight for\ntheir lives, and their children, and their property, and the whole city,\nbe worse prepared than boxers? And will the legislator, because he\nis afraid that their practising with one another may appear to some\nridiculous, abstain from commanding them to go out and fight; will he\nnot ordain that soldiers shall perform lesser exercises without arms\nevery day, making dancing and all gymnastic tend to this end; and also\nwill he not require that they shall practise some gymnastic exercises,\ngreater as well as lesser, as often as every month; and that they shall\nhave contests one with another in every part of the country, seizing\nupon posts and lying in ambush, and imitating in every respect the\nreality of war; fighting with boxing-gloves and hurling javelins, and\nusing weapons somewhat dangerous, and as nearly as possible like the\ntrue ones, in order that the sport may not be altogether without fear,\nbut may have terrors and to a certain degree show the man who has\nand who has not courage; and that the honour and dishonour which are\nassigned to them respectively, may prepare the whole city for the true\nconflict of life? If any one dies in these mimic contests, the homicide\nis involuntary, and we will make the slayer, when he has been purified\naccording to law, to be pure of blood, considering that if a few men\nshould die, others as good as they will be born; but that if fear is\ndead, then the citizens will never find a test of superior and inferior\nnatures, which is a far greater evil to the state than the loss of a\nfew.\n\nCLEINIAS: We are quite agreed, Stranger, that we should legislate about\nsuch things, and that the whole state should practise them.\n\nATHENIAN: And what is the reason that dances and contests of this sort\nhardly ever exist in states, at least not to any extent worth speaking\nof? Is this due to the ignorance of mankind and their legislators?\n\nCLEINIAS: Perhaps.\n\nATHENIAN: Certainly not, sweet Cleinias; there are two causes, which are\nquite enough to account for the deficiency.\n\nCLEINIAS: What are they?\n\nATHENIAN: One cause is the love of wealth, which wholly absorbs men,\nand never for a moment allows them to think of anything but their own\nprivate possessions; on this the soul of every citizen hangs suspended,\nand can attend to nothing but his daily gain; mankind are ready to learn\nany branch of knowledge, and to follow any pursuit which tends to this\nend, and they laugh at every other: that is one reason why a city will\nnot be in earnest about such contests or any other good and honourable\npursuit. But from an insatiable love of gold and silver, every man will\nstoop to any art or contrivance, seemly or unseemly, in the hope of\nbecoming rich; and will make no objection to performing any action,\nholy, or unholy and utterly base; if only like a beast he have the power\nof eating and drinking all kinds of things, and procuring for himself in\nevery sort of way the gratification of his lusts.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: Let this, then, be deemed one of the causes which prevent\nstates from pursuing in an efficient manner the art of war, or any other\nnoble aim, but makes the orderly and temperate part of mankind into\nmerchants, and captains of ships, and servants, and converts the valiant\nsort into thieves and burglars, and robbers of temples, and violent,\ntyrannical persons; many of whom are not without ability, but they are\nunfortunate.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: Must not they be truly unfortunate whose souls are compelled\nto pass through life always hungering?\n\nCLEINIAS: Then that is one cause, Stranger; but you spoke of another.\n\nATHENIAN: Thank you for reminding me.\n\nCLEINIAS: The insatiable lifelong love of wealth, as you were saying,\nis one cause which absorbs mankind, and prevents them from rightly\npractising the arts of war: Granted; and now tell me, what is the other?\n\nATHENIAN: Do you imagine that I delay because I am in a perplexity?\n\nCLEINIAS: No; but we think that you are too severe upon the money-loving\ntemper, of which you seem in the present discussion to have a peculiar\ndislike.\n\nATHENIAN: That is a very fair rebuke, Cleinias; and I will now proceed\nto the second cause.\n\nCLEINIAS: Proceed.\n\nATHENIAN: I say that governments are a cause--democracy, oligarchy,\ntyranny, concerning which I have often spoken in the previous discourse;\nor rather governments they are not, for none of them exercises a\nvoluntary rule over voluntary subjects; but they may be truly called\nstates of discord, in which while the government is voluntary, the\nsubjects always obey against their will, and have to be coerced; and\nthe ruler fears the subject, and will not, if he can help, allow him to\nbecome either noble, or rich, or strong, or valiant, or warlike at all.\nThese two are the chief causes of almost all evils, and of the evils of\nwhich I have been speaking they are notably the causes. But our state\nhas escaped both of them; for her citizens have the greatest leisure,\nand they are not subject to one another, and will, I think, be made by\nthese laws the reverse of lovers of money. Such a constitution may be\nreasonably supposed to be the only one existing which will accept the\neducation which we have described, and the martial pastimes which have\nbeen perfected according to our idea.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: Then next we must remember, about all gymnastic contests, that\nonly the warlike sort of them are to be practised and to have prizes\nof victory; and those which are not military are to be given up. The\nmilitary sort had better be completely described and established by law;\nand first, let us speak of running and swiftness.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: Certainly the most military of all qualities is general\nactivity of body, whether of foot or hand. For escaping or for capturing\nan enemy, quickness of foot is required; but hand-to-hand conflict and\ncombat need vigour and strength.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Neither of them can attain their greatest efficiency without\narms.\n\nCLEINIAS: How can they?\n\nATHENIAN: Then our herald, in accordance with the prevailing practice,\nwill first summon the runner--he will appear armed, for to an unarmed\ncompetitor we will not give a prize. And he shall enter first who is to\nrun the single course bearing arms; next, he who is to run the double\ncourse; third, he who is to run the horse-course; and fourthly, he who\nis to run the long course; the fifth whom we start, shall be the first\nsent forth in heavy armour, and shall run a course of sixty stadia to\nsome temple of Ares--and we will send forth another, whom we will style\nthe more heavily armed, to run over smoother ground. There remains the\narcher; and he shall run in the full equipments of an archer a distance\nof 100 stadia over mountains, and across every sort of country, to a\ntemple of Apollo and Artemis; this shall be the order of the contest,\nand we will wait for them until they return, and will give a prize to\nthe conqueror in each.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us suppose that there are three kinds of contests--one of\nboys, another of beardless youths, and a third of men. For the youths\nwe will fix the length of the contest at two-thirds, and for the boys\nat half of the entire course, whether they contend as archers or as\nheavy-armed. Touching the women, let the girls who are not grown up\ncompete naked in the stadium and the double course, and the horse-course\nand the long course, and let them run on the race-ground itself; those\nwho are thirteen years of age and upwards until their marriage shall\ncontinue to share in contests if they are not more than twenty, and\nshall be compelled to run up to eighteen; and they shall descend into\nthe arena in suitable dresses. Let these be the regulations about\ncontests in running both for men and women.\n\nRespecting contests of strength, instead of wrestling and similar\ncontests of the heavier sort, we will institute conflicts in armour of\none against one, and two against two, and so on up to ten against ten.\nAs to what a man ought not to suffer or do, and to what extent, in order\nto gain the victory--as in wrestling, the masters of the art have laid\ndown what is fair and what is not fair, so in fighting in armour--we\nought to call in skilful persons, who shall judge for us and be our\nassessors in the work of legislation; they shall say who deserves to be\nvictor in combats of this sort, and what he is not to do or have done\nto him, and in like manner what rule determines who is defeated; and\nlet these ordinances apply to women until they are married as well as\nto men. The pancration shall have a counterpart in a combat of the\nlight-armed; they shall contend with bows and with light shields and\nwith javelins and in the throwing of stones by slings and by hand: and\nlaws shall be made about it, and rewards and prizes given to him who\nbest fulfils the ordinances of the law.\n\nNext in order we shall have to legislate about the horse contests. Now\nwe do not need many horses, for they cannot be of much use in a country\nlike Crete, and hence we naturally do not take great pains about the\nrearing of them or about horse races. There is no one who keeps a\nchariot among us, and any rivalry in such matters would be altogether\nout of place; there would be no sense nor any shadow of sense in\ninstituting contests which are not after the manner of our country. And\ntherefore we give our prizes for single horses--for colts who have not\nyet cast their teeth, and for those who are intermediate, and for the\nfull-grown horses themselves; and thus our equestrian games will accord\nwith the nature of the country. Let them have conflict and rivalry\nin these matters in accordance with the law, and let the colonels and\ngenerals of horse decide together about all courses and about the armed\ncompetitors in them. But we have nothing to say to the unarmed either in\ngymnastic exercises or in these contests. On the other hand, the Cretan\nbowman or javelin-man who fights in armour on horseback is useful, and\ntherefore we may as well place a competition of this sort among\nour amusements. Women are not to be forced to compete by laws and\nordinances; but if from previous training they have acquired the habit\nand are strong enough and like to take part, let them do so, girls as\nwell as boys, and no blame to them.\n\nThus the competition in gymnastic and the mode of learning it have been\ndescribed; and we have spoken also of the toils of the contest, and of\ndaily exercises under the superintendence of masters. Likewise, what\nrelates to music has been, for the most part, completed. But as to\nrhapsodes and the like, and the contests of choruses which are to\nperform at feasts, all this shall be arranged when the months and days\nand years have been appointed for Gods and demi-gods, whether every\nthird year, or again every fifth year, or in whatever way or manner the\nGods may put into men's minds the distribution and order of them. At the\nsame time, we may expect that the musical contests will be celebrated\nin their turn by the command of the judges and the director of education\nand the guardians of the law meeting together for this purpose, and\nthemselves becoming legislators of the times and nature and conditions\nof the choral contests and of dancing in general. What they ought\nseverally to be in language and song, and in the admixture of harmony\nwith rhythm and the dance, has been often declared by the original\nlegislator; and his successors ought to follow him, making the games and\nsacrifices duly to correspond at fitting times, and appointing public\nfestivals. It is not difficult to determine how these and the like\nmatters may have a regular order; nor, again, will the alteration of\nthem do any great good or harm to the state. There is, however, another\nmatter of great importance and difficulty, concerning which God should\nlegislate, if there were any possibility of obtaining from Him an\nordinance about it. But seeing that divine aid is not to be had, there\nappears to be a need of some bold man who specially honours plainness\nof speech, and will say outright what he thinks best for the city and\ncitizens--ordaining what is good and convenient for the whole state amid\nthe corruptions of human souls, opposing the mightiest lusts, and having\nno man his helper but himself standing alone and following reason only.\n\nCLEINIAS: What is this, Stranger, that you are saying? For we do not as\nyet understand your meaning.\n\nATHENIAN: Very likely; I will endeavour to explain myself more clearly.\nWhen I came to the subject of education, I beheld young men and maidens\nholding friendly intercourse with one another. And there naturally arose\nin my mind a sort of apprehension--I could not help thinking how one is\nto deal with a city in which youths and maidens are well nurtured, and\nhave nothing to do, and are not undergoing the excessive and servile\ntoils which extinguish wantonness, and whose only cares during their\nwhole life are sacrifices and festivals and dances. How, in such a state\nas this, will they abstain from desires which thrust many a man and\nwoman into perdition; and from which reason, assuming the functions of\nlaw, commands them to abstain? The ordinances already made may possibly\nget the better of most of these desires; the prohibition of excessive\nwealth is a very considerable gain in the direction of temperance, and\nthe whole education of our youth imposes a law of moderation on them;\nmoreover, the eye of the rulers is required always to watch over the\nyoung, and never to lose sight of them; and these provisions do, as far\nas human means can effect anything, exercise a regulating influence\nupon the desires in general. But how can we take precautions against the\nunnatural loves of either sex, from which innumerable evils have come\nupon individuals and cities? How shall we devise a remedy and way of\nescape out of so great a danger? Truly, Cleinias, here is a difficulty.\nIn many ways Crete and Lacedaemon furnish a great help to those who\nmake peculiar laws; but in the matter of love, as we are alone, I must\nconfess that they are quite against us. For if any one following nature\nshould lay down the law which existed before the days of Laius, and\ndenounce these lusts as contrary to nature, adducing the animals as a\nproof that such unions were monstrous, he might prove his point, but\nhe would be wholly at variance with the custom of your states. Further,\nthey are repugnant to a principle which we say that a legislator should\nalways observe; for we are always enquiring which of our enactments\ntends to virtue and which not. And suppose we grant that these loves are\naccounted by law to the honourable, or at least not disgraceful, in what\ndegree will they contribute to virtue? Will such passions implant in the\nsoul of him who is seduced the habit of courage, or in the soul of the\nseducer the principle of temperance? Who will ever believe this? or\nrather, who will not blame the effeminacy of him who yields to pleasures\nand is unable to hold out against them? Will not all men censure\nas womanly him who imitates the woman? And who would ever think of\nestablishing such a practice by law? certainly no one who had in his\nmind the image of true law. How can we prove that what I am saying is\ntrue? He who would rightly consider these matters must see the nature of\nfriendship and desire, and of these so-called loves, for they are of two\nkinds, and out of the two arises a third kind, having the same name; and\nthis similarity of name causes all the difficulty and obscurity.\n\nCLEINIAS: How is that?\n\nATHENIAN: Dear is the like in virtue to the like, and the equal to the\nequal; dear also, though unlike, is he who has abundance to him who is\nin want. And when either of these friendships becomes excessive, we term\nthe excess love.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: The friendship which arises from contraries is horrible and\ncoarse, and has often no tie of communion; but that which arises from\nlikeness is gentle, and has a tie of communion which lasts through life.\nAs to the mixed sort which is made up of them both, there is, first of\nall, a difficulty in determining what he who is possessed by this third\nlove desires; moreover, he is drawn different ways, and is in doubt\nbetween the two principles; the one exhorting him to enjoy the beauty of\nyouth, and the other forbidding him. For the one is a lover of the\nbody, and hungers after beauty, like ripe fruit, and would fain satisfy\nhimself without any regard to the character of the beloved; the other\nholds the desire of the body to be a secondary matter, and looking\nrather than loving and with his soul desiring the soul of the other in\na becoming manner, regards the satisfaction of the bodily love as\nwantonness; he reverences and respects temperance and courage and\nmagnanimity and wisdom, and wishes to live chastely with the chaste\nobject of his affection. Now the sort of love which is made up of the\nother two is that which we have described as the third. Seeing then\nthat there are these three sorts of love, ought the law to prohibit and\nforbid them all to exist among us? Is it not rather clear that we should\nwish to have in the state the love which is of virtue and which desires\nthe beloved youth to be the best possible; and the other two, if\npossible, we should hinder? What do you say, friend Megillus?\n\nMEGILLUS: I think, Stranger, that you are perfectly right in what you\nhave been now saying.\n\nAthenian: I knew well, my friend, that I should obtain your assent,\nwhich I accept, and therefore have no need to analyze your custom any\nfurther. Cleinias shall be prevailed upon to give me his assent at some\nother time. Enough of this; and now let us proceed to the laws.\n\nMEGILLUS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: Upon reflection I see a way of imposing the law, which, in one\nrespect, is easy, but, in another, is of the utmost difficulty.\n\nMEGILLUS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: We are all aware that most men, in spite of their lawless\nnatures, are very strictly and precisely restrained from intercourse\nwith the fair, and this is not at all against their will, but entirely\nwith their will.\n\nMEGILLUS: When do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: When any one has a brother or sister who is fair; and about\na son or daughter the same unwritten law holds, and is a most perfect\nsafeguard, so that no open or secret connexion ever takes place between\nthem. Nor does the thought of such a thing ever enter at all into the\nminds of most of them.\n\nMEGILLUS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Does not a little word extinguish all pleasures of that sort?\n\nMEGILLUS: What word?\n\nATHENIAN: The declaration that they are unholy, hated of God, and most\ninfamous; and is not the reason of this that no one has ever said\nthe opposite, but every one from his earliest childhood has heard men\nspeaking in the same manner about them always and everywhere, whether in\ncomedy or in the graver language of tragedy? When the poet introduces\non the stage a Thyestes or an Oedipus, or a Macareus having secret\nintercourse with his sister, he represents him, when found out, ready to\nkill himself as the penalty of his sin.\n\nMEGILLUS: You are very right in saying that tradition, if no breath of\nopposition ever assails it, has a marvellous power.\n\nATHENIAN: Am I not also right in saying that the legislator who wants\nto master any of the passions which master man may easily know how to\nsubdue them? He will consecrate the tradition of their evil character\namong all, slaves and freemen, women and children, throughout the city:\nthat will be the surest foundation of the law which he can make.\n\nMEGILLUS: Yes; but will he ever succeed in making all mankind use the\nsame language about them?\n\nATHENIAN: A good objection; but was I not just now saying that I had\na way to make men use natural love and abstain from unnatural, not\nintentionally destroying the seeds of human increase, or sowing them in\nstony places, in which they will take no root; and that I would command\nthem to abstain too from any female field of increase in which that\nwhich is sown is not likely to grow? Now if a law to this effect could\nonly be made perpetual, and gain an authority such as already prevents\nintercourse of parents and children--such a law, extending to other\nsensual desires, and conquering them, would be the source of ten\nthousand blessings. For, in the first place, moderation is the\nappointment of nature, and deters men from all frenzy and madness of\nlove, and from all adulteries and immoderate use of meats and drinks,\nand makes them good friends to their own wives. And innumerable other\nbenefits would result if such a law could only be enforced. I can\nimagine some lusty youth who is standing by, and who, on hearing this\nenactment, declares in scurrilous terms that we are making foolish and\nimpossible laws, and fills the world with his outcry. And therefore I\nsaid that I knew a way of enacting and perpetuating such a law, which\nwas very easy in one respect, but in another most difficult. There is no\ndifficulty in seeing that such a law is possible, and in what way; for,\nas I was saying, the ordinance once consecrated would master the soul of\nevery man, and terrify him into obedience. But matters have now come to\nsuch a pass that even then the desired result seems as if it could not\nbe attained, just as the continuance of an entire state in the practice\nof common meals is also deemed impossible. And although this latter is\npartly disproven by the fact of their existence among you, still even in\nyour cities the common meals of women would be regarded as unnatural and\nimpossible. I was thinking of the rebelliousness of the human heart\nwhen I said that the permanent establishment of these things is very\ndifficult.\n\nMEGILLUS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Shall I try and find some sort of persuasive argument which\nwill prove to you that such enactments are possible, and not beyond\nhuman nature?\n\nCLEINIAS: By all means.\n\nATHENIAN: Is a man more likely to abstain from the pleasures of love\nand to do what he is bidden about them, when his body is in a good\ncondition, or when he is in an ill condition, and out of training?\n\nCLEINIAS: He will be far more temperate when he is in training.\n\nATHENIAN: And have we not heard of Iccus of Tarentum, who, with a view\nto the Olympic and other contests, in his zeal for his art, and also\nbecause he was of a manly and temperate disposition, never had any\nconnexion with a woman or a youth during the whole time of his training?\nAnd the same is said of Crison and Astylus and Diopompus and many\nothers; and yet, Cleinias, they were far worse educated in their minds\nthan your and my citizens, and in their bodies far more lusty.\n\nCLEINIAS: No doubt this fact has been often affirmed positively by the\nancients of these athletes.\n\nATHENIAN: And had they the courage to abstain from what is ordinarily\ndeemed a pleasure for the sake of a victory in wrestling, running, and\nthe like; and shall our young men be incapable of a similar endurance\nfor the sake of a much nobler victory, which is the noblest of all, as\nfrom their youth upwards we will tell them, charming them, as we hope,\ninto the belief of this by tales and sayings and songs?\n\nCLEINIAS: Of what victory are you speaking?\n\nATHENIAN: Of the victory over pleasure, which if they win, they will\nlive happily; or if they are conquered, the reverse of happily. And,\nfurther, may we not suppose that the fear of impiety will enable them to\nmaster that which other inferior people have mastered?\n\nCLEINIAS: I dare say.\n\nATHENIAN: And since we have reached this point in our legislation,\nand have fallen into a difficulty by reason of the vices of mankind, I\naffirm that our ordinance should simply run in the following terms:\nOur citizens ought not to fall below the nature of birds and beasts in\ngeneral, who are born in great multitudes, and yet remain until the age\nfor procreation virgin and unmarried, but when they have reached the\nproper time of life are coupled, male and female, and lovingly pair\ntogether, and live the rest of their lives in holiness and innocence,\nabiding firmly in their original compact: surely, we will say to them,\nyou should be better than the animals. But if they are corrupted by the\nother Hellenes and the common practice of barbarians, and they see\nwith their eyes and hear with their ears of the so-called free love\neverywhere prevailing among them, and they themselves are not able to\nget the better of the temptation, the guardians of the law, exercising\nthe functions of lawgivers, shall devise a second law against them.\n\nCLEINIAS: And what law would you advise them to pass if this one failed?\n\nATHENIAN: Clearly, Cleinias, the one which would naturally follow.\n\nCLEINIAS: What is that?\n\nATHENIAN: Our citizens should not allow pleasures to strengthen with\nindulgence, but should by toil divert the aliment and exuberance of them\ninto other parts of the body; and this will happen if no immodesty be\nallowed in the practice of love. Then they will be ashamed of frequent\nintercourse, and they will find pleasure, if seldom enjoyed, to be a\nless imperious mistress. They should not be found out doing anything of\nthe sort. Concealment shall be honourable, and sanctioned by custom and\nmade law by unwritten prescription; on the other hand, to be detected\nshall be esteemed dishonourable, but not, to abstain wholly. In this way\nthere will be a second legal standard of honourable and dishonourable,\ninvolving a second notion of right. Three principles will comprehend all\nthose corrupt natures whom we call inferior to themselves, and who form\nbut one class, and will compel them not to transgress.\n\nCLEINIAS: What are they?\n\nATHENIAN: The principle of piety, the love of honour, and the desire of\nbeauty, not in the body but in the soul. These are, perhaps, romantic\naspirations; but they are the noblest of aspirations, if they could only\nbe realised in all states, and, God willing, in the matter of love\nwe may be able to enforce one of two things--either that no one shall\nventure to touch any person of the freeborn or noble class except his\nwedded wife, or sow the unconsecrated and bastard seed among harlots, or\nin barren and unnatural lusts; or at least we may abolish altogether the\nconnection of men with men; and as to women, if any man has to do with\nany but those who come into his house duly married by sacred rites,\nwhether they be bought or acquired in any other way, and he offends\npublicly in the face of all mankind, we shall be right in enacting that\nhe be deprived of civic honours and privileges, and be deemed to be, as\nhe truly is, a stranger. Let this law, then, whether it is one, or ought\nrather to be called two, be laid down respecting love in general, and\nthe intercourse of the sexes which arises out of the desires, whether\nrightly or wrongly indulged.\n\nMEGILLUS: I, for my part, Stranger, would gladly receive this law.\nCleinias shall speak for himself, and tell you what is his opinion.\n\nCLEINIAS: I will, Megillus, when an opportunity offers; at present, I\nthink that we had better allow the Stranger to proceed with his laws.\n\nMEGILLUS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: We had got about as far as the establishment of the common\ntables, which in most places would be difficult, but in Crete no\none would think of introducing any other custom. There might arise a\nquestion about the manner of them--whether they shall be such as they\nare here in Crete, or such as they are in Lacedaemon--or is there a\nthird kind which may be better than either of them? The answer to this\nquestion might be easily discovered, but the discovery would do no great\ngood, for at present they are very well ordered.\n\nLeaving the common tables, we may therefore proceed to the means of\nproviding food. Now, in cities the means of life are gained in many ways\nand from divers sources, and in general from two sources, whereas our\ncity has only one. For most of the Hellenes obtain their food from sea\nand land, but our citizens from land only. And this makes the task of\nthe legislator less difficult--half as many laws will be enough, and\nmuch less than half; and they will be of a kind better suited to free\nmen. For he has nothing to do with laws about shipowners and merchants\nand retailers and inn-keepers and tax collectors and mines and\nmoneylending and compound interest and innumerable other things--bidding\ngood-bye to these, he gives laws to husbandmen and shepherds and\nbee-keepers, and to the guardians and superintendents of their\nimplements; and he has already legislated for greater matters, as\nfor example, respecting marriage and the procreation and nurture of\nchildren, and for education, and the establishment of offices--and\nnow he must direct his laws to those who provide food and labour in\npreparing it.\n\nLet us first of all, then, have a class of laws which shall be called\nthe laws of husbandmen. And let the first of them be the law of Zeus,\nthe God of boundaries. Let no one shift the boundary line either of a\nfellow-citizen who is a neighbour, or, if he dwells at the extremity of\nthe land, of any stranger who is conterminous with him, considering\nthat this is truly 'to move the immovable,' and every one should be more\nwilling to move the largest rock which is not a landmark, than the\nleast stone which is the sworn mark of friendship and hatred between\nneighbours; for Zeus, the god of kindred, is the witness of the citizen,\nand Zeus, the god of strangers, of the stranger, and when aroused,\nterrible are the wars which they stir up. He who obeys the law will\nnever know the fatal consequences of disobedience, but he who despises\nthe law shall be liable to a double penalty, the first coming from the\nGods, and the second from the law. For let no one wilfully remove the\nboundaries of his neighbour's land, and if any one does, let him who\nwill inform the landowners, and let them bring him into court, and if\nhe be convicted of re-dividing the land by stealth or by force, let the\ncourt determine what he ought to suffer or pay. In the next place,\nmany small injuries done by neighbours to one another, through their\nmultiplication, may cause a weight of enmity, and make neighbourhood\na very disagreeable and bitter thing. Wherefore a man ought to be very\ncareful of committing any offence against his neighbour, and especially\nof encroaching on his neighbour's land; for any man may easily do harm,\nbut not every man can do good to another. He who encroaches on his\nneighbour's land, and transgresses his boundaries, shall make good the\ndamage, and, to cure him of his impudence and also of his meanness, he\nshall pay a double penalty to the injured party. Of these and the like\nmatters the wardens of the country shall take cognizance, and be the\njudges of them and assessors of the damage; in the more important cases,\nas has been already said, the whole number of them belonging to any\none of the twelve divisions shall decide, and in the lesser cases the\ncommanders: or, again, if any one pastures his cattle on his neighbour's\nland, they shall see the injury, and adjudge the penalty. And if any\none, by decoying the bees, gets possession of another's swarms, and\ndraws them to himself by making noises, he shall pay the damage; or if\nany one sets fire to his own wood and takes no care of his neighbour's\nproperty, he shall be fined at the discretion of the magistrates. And\nif in planting he does not leave a fair distance between his own and\nhis neighbour's land, he shall be punished, in accordance with the\nenactments of many lawgivers, which we may use, not deeming it necessary\nthat the great legislator of our state should determine all the trifles\nwhich might be decided by any body; for example, husbandmen have had of\nold excellent laws about waters, and there is no reason why we should\npropose to divert their course: He who likes may draw water from the\nfountain-head of the common stream on to his own land, if he do not cut\noff the spring which clearly belongs to some other owner; and he may\ntake the water in any direction which he pleases, except through a house\nor temple or sepulchre, but he must be careful to do no harm beyond the\nchannel. And if there be in any place a natural dryness of the earth,\nwhich keeps in the rain from heaven, and causes a deficiency in the\nsupply of water, let him dig down on his own land as far as the clay,\nand if at this depth he finds no water, let him obtain water from his\nneighbours, as much as is required for his servants' drinking, and if\nhis neighbours, too, are limited in their supply, let him have a fixed\nmeasure, which shall be determined by the wardens of the country.\nThis he shall receive each day, and on these terms have a share of his\nneighbours' water. If there be heavy rain, and one of those on the lower\nground injures some tiller of the upper ground, or some one who has a\ncommon wall, by refusing to give them an outlet for water; or, again,\nif some one living on the higher ground recklessly lets off the water on\nhis lower neighbour, and they cannot come to terms with one another, let\nhim who will call in a warden of the city, if he be in the city, or\nif he be in the country, a warden of the country, and let him obtain\na decision determining what each of them is to do. And he who will not\nabide by the decision shall suffer for his malignant and morose temper,\nand pay a fine to the injured party, equivalent to double the value of\nthe injury, because he was unwilling to submit to the magistrates.\n\nNow the participation of fruits shall be ordered on this wise. The\ngoddess of Autumn has two gracious gifts: one the joy of Dionysus which\nis not treasured up; the other, which nature intends to be stored. Let\nthis be the law, then, concerning the fruits of autumn: He who tastes\nthe common or storing fruits of autumn, whether grapes or figs, before\nthe season of vintage which coincides with Arcturus, either on his own\nland or on that of others--let him pay fifty drachmae, which shall be\nsacred to Dionysus, if he pluck them from his own land; and if from his\nneighbour's land, a mina, and if from any others', two-thirds of a mina.\nAnd he who would gather the 'choice' grapes or the 'choice' figs, as\nthey are now termed, if he take them off his own land, let him pluck\nthem how and when he likes; but if he take them from the ground of\nothers without their leave, let him in that case be always punished in\naccordance with the law which ordains that he should not move what\nhe has not laid down. And if a slave touches any fruit of this sort,\nwithout the consent of the owner of the land, he shall be beaten with\nas many blows as there are grapes on the bunch, or figs on the fig-tree.\nLet a metic purchase the 'choice' autumnal fruit, and then, if he\npleases, he may gather it; but if a stranger is passing along the road,\nand desires to eat, let him take of the 'choice' grape for himself and\na single follower without payment, as a tribute of hospitality. The law\nhowever forbids strangers from sharing in the sort which is not used for\neating; and if any one, whether he be master or slave, takes of them\nin ignorance, let the slave be beaten, and the freeman dismissed with\nadmonitions, and instructed to take of the other autumnal fruits which\nare unfit for making raisins and wine, or for laying by as dried figs.\nAs to pears, and apples, and pomegranates, and similar fruits, there\nshall be no disgrace in taking them secretly; but he who is caught, if\nhe be of less than thirty years of age, shall be struck and beaten off,\nbut not wounded; and no freeman shall have any right of satisfaction for\nsuch blows. Of these fruits the stranger may partake, just as he may of\nthe fruits of autumn. And if an elder, who is more than thirty years of\nage, eat of them on the spot, let him, like the stranger, be allowed to\npartake of all such fruits, but he must carry away nothing. If, however,\nhe will not obey the law, let him run the risk of failing in the\ncompetition of virtue, in case any one takes notice of his actions\nbefore the judges at the time.\n\nWater is the greatest element of nutrition in gardens, but is easily\npolluted. You cannot poison the soil, or the sun, or the air, which\nare the other elements of nutrition in plants, or divert them, or steal\nthem; but all these things may very likely happen in regard to water,\nwhich must therefore be protected by law. And let this be the law: If\nany one intentionally pollutes the water of another, whether the water\nof a spring, or collected in reservoirs, either by poisonous substances,\nor by digging, or by theft, let the injured party bring the cause before\nthe wardens of the city, and claim in writing the value of the loss;\nif the accused be found guilty of injuring the water by deleterious\nsubstances, let him not only pay damages, but purify the stream or the\ncistern which contains the water, in such manner as the laws of the\ninterpreters order the purification to be made by the offender in each\ncase.\n\nWith respect to the gathering in of the fruits of the soil, let a man,\nif he pleases, carry his own fruits through any place in which he either\ndoes no harm to any one, or himself gains three times as much as\nhis neighbour loses. Now of these things the magistrates should be\ncognizant, as of all other things in which a man intentionally does\ninjury to another or to the property of another, by fraud or force,\nin the use which he makes of his own property. All these matters a man\nshould lay before the magistrates, and receive damages, supposing the\ninjury to be not more than three minae; or if he have a charge against\nanother which involves a larger amount, let him bring his suit into\nthe public courts and have the evil-doer punished. But if any of the\nmagistrates appear to adjudge the penalties which he imposes in an\nunjust spirit, let him be liable to pay double to the injured party.\nAny one may bring the offences of magistrates, in any particular case,\nbefore the public courts. There are innumerable little matters relating\nto the modes of punishment, and applications for suits, and summonses\nand the witnesses to summonses--for example, whether two witnesses\nshould be required for a summons, or how many--and all such details,\nwhich cannot be omitted in legislation, but are beneath the wisdom of an\naged legislator. These lesser matters, as they indeed are in comparison\nwith the greater ones, let a younger generation regulate by law, after\nthe patterns which have preceded, and according to their own experience\nof the usefulness and necessity of such laws; and when they are duly\nregulated let there be no alteration, but let the citizens live in the\nobservance of them.\n\nNow of artisans, let the regulations be as follows: In the first place,\nlet no citizen or servant of a citizen be occupied in handicraft arts;\nfor he who is to secure and preserve the public order of the state, has\nan art which requires much study and many kinds of knowledge, and does\nnot admit of being made a secondary occupation; and hardly any human\nbeing is capable of pursuing two professions or two arts rightly, or\nof practising one art himself, and superintending some one else who is\npractising another. Let this, then, be our first principle in the\nstate: No one who is a smith shall also be a carpenter, and if he be a\ncarpenter, he shall not superintend the smith's art rather than his own,\nunder the pretext that in superintending many servants who are working\nfor him, he is likely to superintend them better, because more revenue\nwill accrue to him from them than from his own art; but let every man in\nthe state have one art, and get his living by that. Let the wardens of\nthe city labour to maintain this law, and if any citizen incline to\nany other art rather than the study of virtue, let them punish him\nwith disgrace and infamy, until they bring him back into his own right\ncourse; and if any stranger profess two arts, let them chastise him\nwith bonds and money penalties, and expulsion from the state, until they\ncompel him to be one only and not many.\n\nBut as touching payments for hire, and contracts of work, or in case any\none does wrong to any of the citizens, or they do wrong to any other, up\nto fifty drachmae, let the wardens of the city decide the case; but if a\ngreater amount be involved, then let the public courts decide according\nto law. Let no one pay any duty either on the importation or exportation\nof goods; and as to frankincense and similar perfumes, used in the\nservice of the Gods, which come from abroad, and purple and other dyes\nwhich are not produced in the country, or the materials of any art which\nhave to be imported, and which are not necessary--no one should import\nthem; nor, again, should any one export anything which is wanted in\nthe country. Of all these things let there be inspectors and\nsuperintendents, taken from the guardians of the law; and they shall be\nthe twelve next in order to the five seniors. Concerning arms, and all\nimplements which are required for military purposes, if there be need\nof introducing any art, or plant, or metal, or chains of any kind, or\nanimals for use in war, let the commanders of the horse and the generals\nhave authority over their importation and exportation; the city shall\nsend them out and also receive them, and the guardians of the law shall\nmake fit and proper laws about them. But let there be no retail trade\nfor the sake of moneymaking, either in these or any other articles, in\nthe city or country at all.\n\nWith respect to food and the distribution of the produce of the country,\nthe right and proper way seems to be nearly that which is the custom of\nCrete; for all should be required to distribute the fruits of the soil\ninto twelve parts, and in this way consume them. Let the twelfth portion\nof each as for instance of wheat and barley, to which the rest of the\nfruits of the earth shall be added, as well as the animals which are for\nsale in each of the twelve divisions, be divided in due proportion into\nthree parts; one part for freemen, another for their servants, and a\nthird for craftsmen and in general for strangers, whether sojourners who\nmay be dwelling in the city, and like other men must live, or those\nwho come on some business which they have with the state, or with some\nindividual. Let only this third part of all necessaries be required to\nbe sold; out of the other two-thirds no one shall be compelled to\nsell. And how will they be best distributed? In the first place, we see\nclearly that the distribution will be of equals in one point of view,\nand in another point of view of unequals.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: I mean that the earth of necessity produces and nourishes the\nvarious articles of food, sometimes better and sometimes worse.\n\nCLEINIAS: Of course.\n\nATHENIAN: Such being the case, let no one of the three portions be\ngreater than either of the other two--neither that which is assigned\nto masters or to slaves, nor again that of the stranger; but let the\ndistribution to all be equal and alike, and let every citizen take his\ntwo portions and distribute them among slaves and freemen, he having\npower to determine the quantity and quality. And what remains he shall\ndistribute by measure and number among the animals who have to be\nsustained from the earth, taking the whole number of them.\n\nIn the second place, our citizens should have separate houses duly\nordered; and this will be the order proper for men like them. There\nshall be twelve hamlets, one in the middle of each twelfth portion,\nand in each hamlet they shall first set apart a market-place, and the\ntemples of the Gods, and of their attendant demi-gods; and if there\nbe any local deities of the Magnetes, or holy seats of other ancient\ndeities, whose memory has been preserved, to these let them pay their\nancient honours. But Hestia, and Zeus, and Athene will have temples\neverywhere together with the God who presides in each of the twelve\ndistricts. And the first erection of houses shall be around these\ntemples, where the ground is highest, in order to provide the safest\nand most defensible place of retreat for the guards. All the rest of\nthe country they shall settle in the following manner: They shall make\nthirteen divisions of the craftsmen; one of them they shall establish\nin the city, and this, again, they shall subdivide into twelve lesser\ndivisions, among the twelve districts of the city, and the remainder\nshall be distributed in the country round about; and in each village\nthey shall settle various classes of craftsmen, with a view to the\nconvenience of the husbandmen. And the chief officers of the wardens\nof the country shall superintend all these matters, and see how many of\nthem, and which class of them, each place requires; and fix them\nwhere they are likely to be least troublesome, and most useful to the\nhusbandman. And the wardens of the city shall see to similar matters in\nthe city.\n\nNow the wardens of the agora ought to see to the details of the agora.\nTheir first care, after the temples which are in the agora have been\nseen to, should be to prevent any one from doing any wrong in dealings\nbetween man and man; in the second place, as being inspectors of\ntemperance and violence, they should chastise him who requires\nchastisement. Touching articles of sale, they should first see whether\nthe articles which the citizens are under regulations to sell to\nstrangers are sold to them, as the law ordains. And let the law be as\nfollows: On the first day of the month, the persons in charge, whoever\nthey are, whether strangers or slaves, who have the charge on behalf of\nthe citizens, shall produce to the strangers the portion which falls to\nthem, in the first place, a twelfth portion of the corn--the stranger\nshall purchase corn for the whole month, and other cereals, on the first\nmarket day; and on the tenth day of the month the one party shall sell,\nand the other buy, liquids sufficient to last during the whole month;\nand on the twenty-third day there shall be a sale of animals by those\nwho are willing to sell to the people who want to buy, and of implements\nand other things which husbandmen sell, (such as skins and all kinds of\nclothing, either woven or made of felt and other goods of the same sort)\nand which strangers are compelled to buy and purchase of others. As to\nthe retail trade in these things, whether of barley or wheat set apart\nfor meal and flour, or any other kind of food, no one shall sell them\nto citizens or their slaves, nor shall any one buy of a citizen; but let\nthe stranger sell them in the market of strangers, to artisans and their\nslaves, making an exchange of wine and food, which is commonly called\nretail trade. And butchers shall offer for sale parts of dismembered\nanimals to the strangers, and artisans, and their servants. Let any\nstranger who likes buy fuel from day to day wholesale, from those who\nhave the care of it in the country, and let him sell to the strangers as\nmuch as he pleases and when he pleases. As to other goods and implements\nwhich are likely to be wanted, they shall sell them in the common\nmarket, at any place which the guardians of the law and the wardens\nof the market and city, choosing according to their judgment, shall\ndetermine; at such places they shall exchange money for goods, and goods\nfor money, neither party giving credit to the other; and he who gives\ncredit must be satisfied, whether he obtain his money or not, for in\nsuch exchanges he will not be protected by law. But whenever property\nhas been bought or sold, greater in quantity or value than is allowed by\nthe law, which has determined within what limits a man may increase and\ndiminish his possessions, let the excess be registered in the books\nof the guardians of the law; or in case of diminution, let there be an\nerasure made. And let the same rule be observed about the registration\nof the property of the metics. Any one who likes may come and be a metic\non certain conditions; a foreigner, if he likes, and is able to settle,\nmay dwell in the land, but he must practise an art, and not abide more\nthan twenty years from the time at which he has registered himself; and\nhe shall pay no sojourner's tax, however small, except good conduct,\nnor any other tax for buying and selling. But when the twenty years have\nexpired, he shall take his property with him and depart. And if in the\ncourse of these years he should chance to distinguish himself by any\nconsiderable benefit which he confers on the state, and he thinks that\nhe can persuade the council and assembly, either to grant him delay\nin leaving the country, or to allow him to remain for the whole of his\nlife, let him go and persuade the city, and whatever they assent to at\nhis instance shall take effect. For the children of the metics, being\nartisans, and of fifteen years of age, let the time of their sojourn\ncommence after their fifteenth year; and let them remain for twenty\nyears, and then go where they like; but any of them who wishes to\nremain, may do so, if he can persuade the council and assembly. And if\nhe depart, let him erase all the entries which have been made by him in\nthe register kept by the magistrates.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK IX.\n\nNext to all the matters which have preceded in the natural order of\nlegislation will come suits of law. Of suits those which relate to\nagriculture have been already described, but the more important have not\nbeen described. Having mentioned them severally under their usual names,\nwe will proceed to say what punishments are to be inflicted for each\noffence, and who are to be the judges of them.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: There is a sense of disgrace in legislating, as we are about\nto do, for all the details of crime in a state which, as we say, is\nto be well regulated and will be perfectly adapted to the practice of\nvirtue. To assume that in such a state there will arise some one who\nwill be guilty of crimes as heinous as any which are ever perpetrated\nin other states, and that we must legislate for him by anticipation, and\nthreaten and make laws against him if he should arise, in order to deter\nhim, and punish his acts, under the idea that he will arise--this, as I\nwas saying, is in a manner disgraceful. Yet seeing that we are not\nlike the ancient legislators, who gave laws to heroes and sons of gods,\nbeing, according to the popular belief, themselves the offspring of the\ngods, and legislating for others, who were also the children of divine\nparents, but that we are only men who are legislating for the sons of\nmen, there is no uncharitableness in apprehending that some one of our\ncitizens may be like a seed which has touched the ox's horn, having a\nheart so hard that it cannot be softened any more than those seeds can\nbe softened by fire. Among our citizens there may be those who cannot be\nsubdued by all the strength of the laws; and for their sake, though\nan ungracious task, I will proclaim my first law about the robbing of\ntemples, in case any one should dare to commit such a crime. I do not\nexpect or imagine that any well-brought-up citizen will ever take the\ninfection, but their servants, and strangers, and strangers' servants\nmay be guilty of many impieties. And with a view to them especially,\nand yet not without a provident eye to the weakness of human nature\ngenerally, I will proclaim the law about robbers of temples and similar\nincurable, or almost incurable, criminals. Having already agreed that\nsuch enactments ought always to have a short prelude, we may speak to\nthe criminal, whom some tormenting desire by night and by day tempts\nto go and rob a temple, the fewest possible words of admonition and\nexhortation: O sir, we will say to him, the impulse which moves you to\nrob temples is not an ordinary human malady, nor yet a visitation\nof heaven, but a madness which is begotten in a man from ancient and\nunexpiated crimes of his race, an ever-recurring curse--against this you\nmust guard with all your might, and how you are to guard we will explain\nto you. When any such thought comes into your mind, go and perform\nexpiations, go as a suppliant to the temples of the Gods who avert\nevils, go to the society of those who are called good men among you;\nhear them tell and yourself try to repeat after them, that every man\nshould honour the noble and the just. Fly from the company of the\nwicked--fly and turn not back; and if your disorder is lightened by\nthese remedies, well and good, but if not, then acknowledge death to be\nnobler than life, and depart hence.\n\nSuch are the preludes which we sing to all who have thoughts of unholy\nand treasonable actions, and to him who hearkens to them the law has\nnothing to say. But to him who is disobedient when the prelude is over,\ncry with a loud voice--He who is taken in the act of robbing temples, if\nhe be a slave or stranger, shall have his evil deed engraven on his face\nand hands, and shall be beaten with as many stripes as may seem good to\nthe judges, and be cast naked beyond the borders of the land. And if he\nsuffers this punishment he will probably return to his right mind and\nbe improved; for no penalty which the law inflicts is designed for evil,\nbut always makes him who suffers either better or not so much worse as\nhe would have been. But if any citizen be found guilty of any great or\nunmentionable wrong, either in relation to the Gods, or his parents,\nor the state, let the judge deem him to be incurable, remembering that\nafter receiving such an excellent education and training from youth\nupward, he has not abstained from the greatest of crimes. His punishment\nshall be death, which to him will be the least of evils; and his example\nwill benefit others, if he perish ingloriously, and be cast beyond the\nborders of the land. But let his children and family, if they avoid the\nways of their father, have glory, and let honourable mention be made of\nthem, as having nobly and manfully escaped out of evil into good. None\nof them should have their goods confiscated to the state, for the lots\nof the citizens ought always to continue the same and equal.\n\nTouching the exaction of penalties, when a man appears to have done\nanything which deserves a fine, he shall pay the fine, if he have\nanything in excess of the lot which is assigned to him; but more than\nthat he shall not pay. And to secure exactness, let the guardians of the\nlaw refer to the registers, and inform the judges of the precise truth,\nin order that none of the lots may go uncultivated for want of money.\nBut if any one seems to deserve a greater penalty, let him undergo a\nlong and public imprisonment and be dishonoured, unless some of his\nfriends are willing to be surety for him, and liberate him by assisting\nhim to pay the fine. No criminal shall go unpunished, not even for a\nsingle offence, nor if he have fled the country; but let the penalty be\naccording to his deserts--death, or bonds, or blows, or degrading places\nof sitting or standing, or removal to some temple on the borders of the\nland; or let him pay fines, as we said before. In cases of death, let\nthe judges be the guardians of the law, and a court selected by merit\nfrom the last year's magistrates. But how the causes are to be brought\ninto court, how the summonses are to be served, and the like, these\nthings may be left to the younger generation of legislators to\ndetermine; the manner of voting we must determine ourselves.\n\nLet the vote be given openly; but before they come to the vote let the\njudges sit in order of seniority over against plaintiff and defendant,\nand let all the citizens who can spare time hear and take a serious\ninterest in listening to such causes. First of all the plaintiff shall\nmake one speech, and then the defendant shall make another; and after\nthe speeches have been made the eldest judge shall begin to examine\nthe parties, and proceed to make an adequate enquiry into what has been\nsaid; and after the oldest has spoken, the rest shall proceed in order\nto examine either party as to what he finds defective in the evidence,\nwhether of statement or omission; and he who has nothing to ask shall\nhand over the examination to another. And on so much of what has been\nsaid as is to the purpose all the judges shall set their seals, and\nplace the writings on the altar of Hestia. On the next day they shall\nmeet again, and in like manner put their questions and go through the\ncause, and again set their seals upon the evidence; and when they have\nthree times done this, and have had witnesses and evidence enough, they\nshall each of them give a holy vote, after promising by Hestia that they\nwill decide justly and truly to the utmost of their power; and so they\nshall put an end to the suit.\n\nNext, after what relates to the Gods, follows what relates to the\ndissolution of the state: Whoever by permitting a man to power enslaves\nthe laws, and subjects the city to factions, using violence and stirring\nup sedition contrary to law, him we will deem the greatest enemy of the\nwhole state. But he who takes no part in such proceedings, and, being\none of the chief magistrates of the state, has no knowledge of treason,\nor, having knowledge of it, by reason of cowardice does not interfere on\nbehalf of his country, such an one we must consider nearly as bad. Every\nman who is worth anything will inform the magistrates, and bring the\nconspirator to trial for making a violent and illegal attempt to change\nthe government. The judges of such cases shall be the same as of the\nrobbers of temples; and let the whole proceeding be carried on in the\nsame way, and the vote of the majority condemn to death. But let there\nbe a general rule, that the disgrace and punishment of the father is\nnot to be visited on the children, except in the case of some one whose\nfather, grandfather, and great-grandfather have successively undergone\nthe penalty of death. Such persons the city shall send away with all\ntheir possessions to the city and country of their ancestors, retaining\nonly and wholly their appointed lot. And out of the citizens who have\nmore than one son of not less than ten years of age, they shall select\nten whom their father or grandfather by the mother's or father's side\nshall appoint, and let them send to Delphi the names of those who are\nselected, and him whom the God chooses they shall establish as heir\nof the house which has failed; and may he have better fortune than his\npredecessors!\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: Once more let there be a third general law respecting the\njudges who are to give judgment, and the manner of conducting suits\nagainst those who are tried on an accusation of treason; and as\nconcerning the remaining or departure of their descendants--there shall\nbe one law for all three, for the traitor, and the robber of temples,\nand the subverter by violence of the laws of the state. For a thief,\nwhether he steal much or little, let there be one law, and one\npunishment for all alike: in the first place, let him pay double the\namount of the theft if he be convicted, and if he have so much over and\nabove the allotment--if he have not, he shall be bound until he pay the\npenalty, or persuade him who has obtained the sentence against him to\nforgive him. But if a person be convicted of a theft against the state,\nthen if he can persuade the city, or if he will pay back twice the\namount of the theft, he shall be set free from his bonds.\n\nCLEINIAS: What makes you say, Stranger, that a theft is all one, whether\nthe thief may have taken much or little, and either from sacred\nor secular places--and these are not the only differences in\nthefts--seeing, then, that they are of many kinds, ought not the\nlegislator to adapt himself to them, and impose upon them entirely\ndifferent penalties?\n\nATHENIAN: Excellent. I was running on too fast, Cleinias, and you\nimpinged upon me, and brought me to my senses, reminding me of what,\nindeed, had occurred to my mind already, that legislation was never yet\nrightly worked out, as I may say in passing. Do you remember the image\nin which I likened the men for whom laws are now made to slaves who are\ndoctored by slaves? For of this you may be very sure, that if one of\nthose empirical physicians, who practise medicine without science, were\nto come upon the gentleman physician talking to his gentleman patient,\nand using the language almost of philosophy, beginning at the beginning\nof the disease and discoursing about the whole nature of the body, he\nwould burst into a hearty laugh--he would say what most of those who\nare called doctors always have at their tongue's end: Foolish fellow, he\nwould say, you are not healing the sick man, but you are educating him;\nand he does not want to be made a doctor, but to get well.\n\nCLEINIAS: And would he not be right?\n\nATHENIAN: Perhaps he would; and he might remark upon us, that he who\ndiscourses about laws, as we are now doing, is giving the citizens\neducation and not laws; that would be rather a telling observation.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: But we are fortunate.\n\nCLEINIAS: In what way?\n\nATHENIAN: Inasmuch as we are not compelled to give laws, but we may take\ninto consideration every form of government, and ascertain what is\nbest and what is most needful, and how they may both be carried into\nexecution; and we may also, if we please, at this very moment choose\nwhat is best, or, if we prefer, what is most necessary--which shall we\ndo?\n\nCLEINIAS: There is something ridiculous, Stranger, in our proposing such\nan alternative, as if we were legislators, simply bound under some great\nnecessity which cannot be deferred to the morrow. But we, as I may by\nthe grace of Heaven affirm, like gatherers of stones or beginners of\nsome composite work, may gather a heap of materials, and out of this, at\nour leisure, select what is suitable for our projected construction. Let\nus then suppose ourselves to be at leisure, not of necessity building,\nbut rather like men who are partly providing materials, and partly\nputting them together. And we may truly say that some of our laws, like\nstones, are already fixed in their places, and others lie at hand.\n\nATHENIAN: Certainly, in that case, Cleinias, our view of law will be\nmore in accordance with nature. For there is another matter affecting\nlegislators, which I must earnestly entreat you to consider.\n\nCLEINIAS: What is it?\n\nATHENIAN: There are many writings to be found in cities, and among\nthem there are discourses composed by legislators as well as by other\npersons.\n\nCLEINIAS: To be sure.\n\nATHENIAN: Shall we give heed rather to the writings of those\nothers--poets and the like, who either in metre or out of metre have\nrecorded their advice about the conduct of life, and not to the writings\nof legislators? or shall we give heed to them above all?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes; to them far above all others.\n\nATHENIAN: And ought the legislator alone among writers to withhold his\nopinion about the beautiful, the good, and the just, and not to teach\nwhat they are, and how they are to be pursued by those who intend to be\nhappy?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly not.\n\nATHENIAN: And is it disgraceful for Homer and Tyrtaeus and other poets\nto lay down evil precepts in their writings respecting life and the\npursuits of men, but not so disgraceful for Lycurgus and Solon and\nothers who were legislators as well as writers? Is it not true that of\nall the writings to be found in cities, those which relate to laws, when\nyou unfold and read them, ought to be by far the noblest and the\nbest? and should not other writings either agree with them, or if they\ndisagree, be deemed ridiculous? We should consider whether the laws\nof states ought not to have the character of loving and wise parents,\nrather than of tyrants and masters, who command and threaten, and,\nafter writing their decrees on walls, go their ways; and whether, in\ndiscoursing of laws, we should not take the gentler view of them which\nmay or may not be attainable--at any rate, we will show our readiness\nto entertain such a view, and be prepared to undergo whatever may be the\nresult. And may the result be good, and if God be gracious, it will be\ngood!\n\nCLEINIAS: Excellent; let us do as you say.\n\nATHENIAN: Then we will now consider accurately, as we proposed, what\nrelates to robbers of temples, and all kinds of thefts, and offences in\ngeneral; and we must not be annoyed if, in the course of legislation,\nwe have enacted some things, and have not made up our minds about some\nothers; for as yet we are not legislators, but we may soon be. Let us,\nif you please, consider these matters.\n\nCLEINIAS: By all means.\n\nATHENIAN: Concerning all things honourable and just, let us then\nendeavour to ascertain how far we are consistent with ourselves, and how\nfar we are inconsistent, and how far the many, from whom at any rate we\nshould profess a desire to differ, agree and disagree among themselves.\n\nCLEINIAS: What are the inconsistencies which you observe in us?\n\nATHENIAN: I will endeavour to explain. If I am not mistaken, we are all\nagreed that justice, and just men and things and actions, are all fair,\nand, if a person were to maintain that just men, even when they are\ndeformed in body, are still perfectly beautiful in respect of the\nexcellent justice of their minds, no one would say that there was any\ninconsistency in this.\n\nCLEINIAS: They would be quite right.\n\nATHENIAN: Perhaps; but let us consider further, that if all things which\nare just are fair and honourable, in the term 'all' we must include just\nsufferings which are the correlatives of just actions.\n\nCLEINIAS: And what is the inference?\n\nATHENIAN: The inference is, that a just action in partaking of the just\npartakes also in the same degree of the fair and honourable.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And must not a suffering which partakes of the just principle\nbe admitted to be in the same degree fair and honourable, if the\nargument is consistently carried out?\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: But then if we admit suffering to be just and yet\ndishonourable, and the term 'dishonourable' is applied to justice, will\nnot the just and the honourable disagree?\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: A thing not difficult to understand; the laws which have been\nalready enacted would seem to announce principles directly opposed to\nwhat we are saying.\n\nCLEINIAS: To what?\n\nATHENIAN: We had enacted, if I am not mistaken, that the robber of\ntemples, and he who was the enemy of law and order, might justly be put\nto death, and we were proceeding to make divers other enactments of\na similar nature. But we stopped short, because we saw that these\nsufferings are infinite in number and degree, and that they are, at\nonce, the most just and also the most dishonourable of all sufferings.\nAnd if this be true, are not the just and the honourable at one time all\nthe same, and at another time in the most diametrical opposition?\n\nCLEINIAS: Such appears to be the case.\n\nATHENIAN: In this discordant and inconsistent fashion does the language\nof the many rend asunder the honourable and just.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true, Stranger.\n\nATHENIAN: Then now, Cleinias, let us see how far we ourselves are\nconsistent about these matters.\n\nCLEINIAS: Consistent in what?\n\nATHENIAN: I think that I have clearly stated in the former part of the\ndiscussion, but if I did not, let me now state--\n\nCLEINIAS: What?\n\nATHENIAN: That all bad men are always involuntarily bad; and from this I\nmust proceed to draw a further inference.\n\nCLEINIAS: What is it?\n\nATHENIAN: That the unjust man may be bad, but that he is bad against his\nwill. Now that an action which is voluntary should be done involuntarily\nis a contradiction; wherefore he who maintains that injustice is\ninvoluntary will deem that the unjust does injustice involuntarily.\nI too admit that all men do injustice involuntarily, and if any\ncontentious or disputatious person says that men are unjust against\ntheir will, and yet that many do injustice willingly, I do not agree\nwith him. But, then, how can I avoid being inconsistent with myself, if\nyou, Cleinias, and you, Megillus, say to me--Well, Stranger, if all this\nbe as you say, how about legislating for the city of the Magnetes--shall\nwe legislate or not--what do you advise? Certainly we will, I should\nreply. Then will you determine for them what are voluntary and what\nare involuntary crimes, and shall we make the punishments greater of\nvoluntary errors and crimes and less for the involuntary? or shall we\nmake the punishment of all to be alike, under the idea that there is no\nsuch thing as voluntary crime?\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good, Stranger; and what shall we say in answer to these\nobjections?\n\nATHENIAN: That is a very fair question. In the first place, let us--\n\nCLEINIAS: Do what?\n\nATHENIAN: Let us remember what has been well said by us already,\nthat our ideas of justice are in the highest degree confused and\ncontradictory. Bearing this in mind, let us proceed to ask ourselves\nonce more whether we have discovered a way out of the difficulty. Have\nwe ever determined in what respect these two classes of actions differ\nfrom one another? For in all states and by all legislators whatsoever,\ntwo kinds of actions have been distinguished--the one, voluntary, the\nother, involuntary; and they have legislated about them accordingly. But\nshall this new word of ours, like an oracle of God, be only spoken, and\nget away without giving any explanation or verification of itself?\nHow can a word not understood be the basis of legislation? Impossible.\nBefore proceeding to legislate, then, we must prove that they are two,\nand what is the difference between them, that when we impose the penalty\nupon either, every one may understand our proposal, and be able in some\nway to judge whether the penalty is fitly or unfitly inflicted.\n\nCLEINIAS: I agree with you, Stranger; for one of two things is certain:\neither we must not say that all unjust acts are involuntary, or we must\nshow the meaning and truth of this statement.\n\nATHENIAN: Of these two alternatives, the one is quite intolerable--not\nto speak what I believe to be the truth would be to me unlawful and\nunholy. But if acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary and\ninvoluntary, I must endeavour to find some other distinction between\nthem.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true, Stranger; there cannot be two opinions among us\nupon that point.\n\nATHENIAN: Reflect, then; there are hurts of various kinds done by the\ncitizens to one another in the intercourse of life, affording plentiful\nexamples both of the voluntary and involuntary.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: I would not have any one suppose that all these hurts are\ninjuries, and that these injuries are of two kinds--one, voluntary, and\nthe other, involuntary; for the involuntary hurts of all men are quite\nas many and as great as the voluntary. And please to consider whether I\nam right or quite wrong in what I am going to say; for I deny, Cleinias\nand Megillus, that he who harms another involuntarily does him an injury\ninvoluntarily, nor should I legislate about such an act under the idea\nthat I am legislating for an involuntary injury. But I should rather say\nthat such a hurt, whether great or small, is not an injury at all; and,\non the other hand, if I am right, when a benefit is wrongly conferred,\nthe author of the benefit may often be said to injure. For I maintain, O\nmy friends, that the mere giving or taking away of anything is not to be\ndescribed either as just or unjust; but the legislator has to consider\nwhether mankind do good or harm to one another out of a just principle\nand intention. On the distinction between injustice and hurt he must\nfix his eye; and when there is hurt, he must, as far as he can, make the\nhurt good by law, and save that which is ruined, and raise up that\nwhich is fallen, and make that which is dead or wounded whole. And when\ncompensation has been given for injustice, the law must always seek to\nwin over the doers and sufferers of the several hurts from feelings of\nenmity to those of friendship.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: Then as to unjust hurts (and gains also, supposing the\ninjustice to bring gain), of these we may heal as many as are capable\nof being healed, regarding them as diseases of the soul; and the cure of\ninjustice will take the following direction.\n\nCLEINIAS: What direction?\n\nATHENIAN: When any one commits any injustice, small or great, the law\nwill admonish and compel him either never at all to do the like again,\nor never voluntarily, or at any rate in a far less degree; and he must\nin addition pay for the hurt. Whether the end is to be attained by word\nor action, with pleasure or pain, by giving or taking away privileges,\nby means of fines or gifts, or in whatsoever way the law shall proceed\nto make a man hate injustice, and love or not hate the nature of the\njust--this is quite the noblest work of law. But if the legislator sees\nany one who is incurable, for him he will appoint a law and a penalty.\nHe knows quite well that to such men themselves there is no profit in\nthe continuance of their lives, and that they would do a double good to\nthe rest of mankind if they would take their departure, inasmuch as they\nwould be an example to other men not to offend, and they would relieve\nthe city of bad citizens. In such cases, and in such cases only, the\nlegislator ought to inflict death as the punishment of offences.\n\nCLEINIAS: What you have said appears to me to be very reasonable, but\nwill you favour me by stating a little more clearly the difference\nbetween hurt and injustice, and the various complications of the\nvoluntary and involuntary which enter into them?\n\nATHENIAN: I will endeavour to do as you wish: Concerning the soul, thus\nmuch would be generally said and allowed, that one element in her nature\nis passion, which may be described either as a state or a part of her,\nand is hard to be striven against and contended with, and by irrational\nforce overturns many things.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: And pleasure is not the same with passion, but has an opposite\npower, working her will by persuasion and by the force of deceit in all\nthings.\n\nCLEINIAS: Quite true.\n\nATHENIAN: A man may truly say that ignorance is a third cause of crimes.\nIgnorance, however, may be conveniently divided by the legislator into\ntwo sorts: there is simple ignorance, which is the source of lighter\noffences, and double ignorance, which is accompanied by a conceit of\nwisdom; and he who is under the influence of the latter fancies that he\nknows all about matters of which he knows nothing. This second kind of\nignorance, when possessed of power and strength, will be held by the\nlegislator to be the source of great and monstrous crimes, but when\nattended with weakness, will only result in the errors of children\nand old men; and these he will treat as errors, and will make laws\naccordingly for those who commit them, which will be the mildest and\nmost merciful of all laws.\n\nCLEINIAS: You are perfectly right.\n\nATHENIAN: We all of us remark of one man that he is superior to pleasure\nand passion, and of another that he is inferior to them; and this is\ntrue.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: But no one was ever yet heard to say that one of us is\nsuperior and another inferior to ignorance.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: We are speaking of motives which incite men to the fulfilment\nof their will; although an individual may be often drawn by them in\nopposite directions at the same time.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes, often.\n\nATHENIAN: And now I can define to you clearly, and without ambiguity,\nwhat I mean by the just and unjust, according to my notion of them:\nWhen anger and fear, and pleasure and pain, and jealousies and desires,\ntyrannize over the soul, whether they do any harm or not--I call all\nthis injustice. But when the opinion of the best, in whatever part\nof human nature states or individuals may suppose that to dwell, has\ndominion in the soul and orders the life of every man, even if it be\nsometimes mistaken, yet what is done in accordance therewith, and the\nprinciple in individuals which obeys this rule, and is best for the\nwhole life of man, is to be called just; although the hurt done by\nmistake is thought by many to be involuntary injustice. Leaving the\nquestion of names, about which we are not going to quarrel, and having\nalready delineated three sources of error, we may begin by recalling\nthem somewhat more vividly to our memory: One of them was of the painful\nsort, which we denominate anger and fear.\n\nCLEINIAS: Quite right.\n\nATHENIAN: There was a second consisting of pleasures and desires, and a\nthird of hopes, which aimed at true opinion about the best. The latter\nbeing subdivided into three, we now get five sources of actions, and for\nthese five we will make laws of two kinds.\n\nCLEINIAS: What are the two kinds?\n\nATHENIAN: There is one kind of actions done by violence and in the light\nof day, and another kind of actions which are done in darkness and with\nsecret deceit, or sometimes both with violence and deceit; the laws\nconcerning these last ought to have a character of severity.\n\nCLEINIAS: Naturally.\n\nATHENIAN: And now let us return from this digression and complete the\nwork of legislation. Laws have been already enacted by us concerning the\nrobbers of the Gods, and concerning traitors, and also concerning those\nwho corrupt the laws for the purpose of subverting the government. A\nman may very likely commit some of these crimes, either in a state of\nmadness or when affected by disease, or under the influence of extreme\nold age, or in a fit of childish wantonness, himself no better than\na child. And if this be made evident to the judges elected to try the\ncause, on the appeal of the criminal or his advocate, and he be judged\nto have been in this state when he committed the offence, he shall\nsimply pay for the hurt which he may have done to another; but he shall\nbe exempt from other penalties, unless he have slain some one, and have\non his hands the stain of blood. And in that case he shall go to another\nland and country, and there dwell for a year; and if he return before\nthe expiration of the time which the law appoints, or even set his foot\nat all on his native land, he shall be bound by the guardians of the law\nin the public prison for two years, and then go free.\n\nHaving begun to speak of homicide, let us endeavour to lay down\nlaws concerning every different kind of homicide; and, first of all,\nconcerning violent and involuntary homicides. If any one in an athletic\ncontest, and at the public games, involuntarily kills a friend, and\nhe dies either at the time or afterwards of the blows which he has\nreceived; or if the like misfortune happens to any one in war, or\nmilitary exercises, or mimic contests of which the magistrates enjoin\nthe practice, whether with or without arms, when he has been purified\naccording to the law brought from Delphi relating to these matters, he\nshall be innocent. And so in the case of physicians: if their patient\ndies against their will, they shall be held guiltless by the law. And if\none slay another with his own hand, but unintentionally, whether he be\nunarmed or have some instrument or dart in his hand; or if he kill him\nby administering food or drink, or by the application of fire or cold,\nor by suffocating him, whether he do the deed by his own hand, or by the\nagency of others, he shall be deemed the agent, and shall suffer one of\nthe following penalties: If he kill the slave of another in the belief\nthat he is his own, he shall bear the master of the dead man harmless\nfrom loss, or shall pay a penalty of twice the value of the dead man,\nwhich the judges shall assess; but purifications must be used greater\nand more numerous than for those who committed homicide at the\ngames--what they are to be, the interpreters whom the God appoints shall\nbe authorised to declare. And if a man kills his own slave, when he has\nbeen purified according to law, he shall be quit of the homicide. And\nif a man kills a freeman unintentionally, he shall undergo the same\npurification as he did who killed the slave. But let him not forget also\na tale of olden time, which is to this effect: He who has suffered a\nviolent end, when newly dead, if he has had the soul of a freeman in\nlife, is angry with the author of his death; and being himself full of\nfear and panic by reason of his violent end, when he sees his murderer\nwalking about in his own accustomed haunts, he is stricken with terror\nand becomes disordered, and this disorder of his, aided by the guilty\nrecollection of the other, is communicated by him with overwhelming\nforce to the murderer and his deeds. Wherefore also the murderer must\ngo out of the way of his victim for the entire period of a year, and not\nhimself be found in any spot which was familiar to him throughout the\ncountry. And if the dead man be a stranger, the homicide shall be\nkept from the country of the stranger during a like period. If any one\nvoluntarily obeys this law, the next of kin to the deceased, seeing all\nthat has happened, shall take pity on him, and make peace with him,\nand show him all gentleness. But if any one is disobedient, and either\nventures to go to any of the temples and sacrifice unpurified, or will\nnot continue in exile during the appointed time, the next of kin to the\ndeceased shall proceed against him for murder; and if he be convicted,\nevery part of his punishment shall be doubled. And if the next of kin\ndo not proceed against the perpetrator of the crime, then the pollution\nshall be deemed to fall upon his own head--the murdered man will fix the\nguilt upon his kinsman, and he who has a mind to proceed against him may\ncompel him to be absent from his country during five years, according\nto law. If a stranger unintentionally kill a stranger who is dwelling in\nthe city, he who likes shall prosecute the cause according to the same\nrules. If he be a metic, let him be absent for a year, or if he be an\nentire stranger, in addition to the purification, whether he have slain\na stranger, or a metic, or a citizen, he shall be banished for life\nfrom the country which is in possession of our laws. And if he return\ncontrary to law, let the guardians of the law punish him with death; and\nlet them hand over his property, if he have any, to him who is next\nof kin to the sufferer. And if he be wrecked, and driven on the coast\nagainst his will, he shall take up his abode on the seashore, wetting\nhis feet in the sea, and watching for an opportunity of sailing; but\nif he be brought by land, and is not his own master, let the magistrate\nwhom he first comes across in the city, release him and send him\nunharmed over the border.\n\nIf any one slays a freeman with his own hand, and the deed be done\nin passion, in the case of such actions we must begin by making a\ndistinction. For a deed is done from passion either when men suddenly,\nand without intention to kill, cause the death of another by blows and\nthe like on a momentary impulse, and are sorry for the deed immediately\nafterwards; or again, when after having been insulted in deed or word,\nmen pursue revenge, and kill a person intentionally, and are not sorry\nfor the act. And, therefore, we must assume that these homicides are of\ntwo kinds, both of them arising from passion, which may be justly said\nto be in a mean between the voluntary and involuntary; at the same time,\nthey are neither of them anything more than a likeness or shadow\nof either. He who treasures up his anger, and avenges himself, not\nimmediately and at the moment, but with insidious design, and after an\ninterval, is like the voluntary; but he who does not treasure up his\nanger, and takes vengeance on the instant, and without malice prepense,\napproaches to the involuntary; and yet even he is not altogether\ninvoluntary, but is only the image or shadow of the involuntary;\nwherefore about homicides committed in hot blood, there is a difficulty\nin determining whether in legislating we shall reckon them as voluntary\nor as partly involuntary. The best and truest view is to regard them\nrespectively as likenesses only of the voluntary and involuntary, and\nto distinguish them accordingly as they are done with or without\npremeditation. And we should make the penalties heavier for those who\ncommit homicide with angry premeditation, and lighter for those who do\nnot premeditate, but smite upon the instant; for that which is like a\ngreater evil should be punished more severely, and that which is like\na less evil should be punished less severely: this shall be the rule of\nour laws.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us proceed: If any one slays a freeman with his own hand,\nand the deed be done in a moment of anger, and without premeditation,\nlet the offender suffer in other respects as the involuntary homicide\nwould have suffered, and also undergo an exile of two years, that he may\nlearn to school his passions. But he who slays another from passion, yet\nwith premeditation, shall in other respects suffer as the former; and\nto this shall be added an exile of three instead of two years--his\npunishment is to be longer because his passion is greater. The manner of\ntheir return shall be on this wise: (and here the law has difficulty in\ndetermining exactly; for in some cases the murderer who is judged by the\nlaw to be the worse may really be the less cruel, and he who is judged\nthe less cruel may be really the worse, and may have executed the murder\nin a more savage manner, whereas the other may have been gentler. But in\ngeneral the degrees of guilt will be such as we have described them. Of\nall these things the guardians of the law must take cognizance): When a\nhomicide of either kind has completed his term of exile, the guardians\nshall send twelve judges to the borders of the land; these during the\ninterval shall have informed themselves of the actions of the criminals,\nand they shall judge respecting their pardon and reception; and the\nhomicides shall abide by their judgment. But if after they have returned\nhome, any one of them in a moment of anger repeats the deed, let him be\nan exile, and return no more; or if he returns, let him suffer as the\nstranger was to suffer in a similar case. He who kills his own slave\nshall undergo a purification, but if he kills the slave of another in\nanger, he shall pay twice the amount of the loss to his owner. And\nif any homicide is disobedient to the law, and without purification\npollutes the agora, or the games, or the temples, he who pleases may\nbring to trial the next of kin to the dead man for permitting him, and\nthe murderer with him, and may compel the one to exact and the other to\nsuffer a double amount of fines and purifications; and the accuser shall\nhimself receive the fine in accordance with the law. If a slave in a fit\nof passion kills his master, the kindred of the deceased man may do with\nthe murderer (provided only they do not spare his life) whatever they\nplease, and they will be pure; or if he kills a freeman, who is not\nhis master, the owner shall give up the slave to the relatives of the\ndeceased, and they shall be under an obligation to put him to death,\nbut this may be done in any manner which they please. And if (which is\na rare occurrence, but does sometimes happen) a father or a mother in\na moment of passion slays a son or daughter by blows, or some other\nviolence, the slayer shall undergo the same purification as in other\ncases, and be exiled during three years; but when the exile returns the\nwife shall separate from the husband, and the husband from the wife, and\nthey shall never afterwards beget children together, or live under the\nsame roof, or partake of the same sacred rites with those whom they\nhave deprived of a child or of a brother. And he who is impious and\ndisobedient in such a case shall be brought to trial for impiety by any\none who pleases. If in a fit of anger a husband kills his wedded wife,\nor the wife her husband, the slayer shall undergo the same purification,\nand the term of exile shall be three years. And when he who has\ncommitted any such crime returns, let him have no communication in\nsacred rites with his children, neither let him sit at the same table\nwith them, and the father or son who disobeys shall be liable to be\nbrought to trial for impiety by any one who pleases. If a brother or\na sister in a fit of passion kills a brother or a sister, they shall\nundergo purification and exile, as was the case with parents who killed\ntheir offspring: they shall not come under the same roof, or share in\nthe sacred rites of those whom they have deprived of their brethren, or\nof their children. And he who is disobedient shall be justly liable to\nthe law concerning impiety, which relates to these matters. If any one\nis so violent in his passion against his parents, that in the madness\nof his anger he dares to kill one of them, if the murdered person before\ndying freely forgives the murderer, let him undergo the purification\nwhich is assigned to those who have been guilty of involuntary homicide,\nand do as they do, and he shall be pure. But if he be not acquitted, the\nperpetrator of such a deed shall be amenable to many laws--he shall\nbe amenable to the extreme punishments for assault, and impiety, and\nrobbing of temples, for he has robbed his parent of life; and if a man\ncould be slain more than once, most justly would he who in a fit of\npassion has slain father or mother, undergo many deaths. How can he,\nwhom, alone of all men, even in defence of his life, and when about to\nsuffer death at the hands of his parents, no law will allow to kill\nhis father or his mother who are the authors of his being, and whom the\nlegislator will command to endure any extremity rather than do this--how\ncan he, I say, lawfully receive any other punishment? Let death then be\nthe appointed punishment of him who in a fit of passion slays his father\nor his mother. But if brother kills brother in a civil broil, or under\nother like circumstances, if the other has begun, and he only defends\nhimself, let him be free from guilt, as he would be if he had slain an\nenemy; and the same rule will apply if a citizen kill a citizen, or\na stranger a stranger. Or if a stranger kill a citizen or a citizen a\nstranger in self-defence, let him be free from guilt in like manner; and\nso in the case of a slave who has killed a slave; but if a slave have\nkilled a freeman in self-defence, let him be subject to the same law\nas he who has killed a father; and let the law about the remission\nof penalties in the case of parricide apply equally to every other\nremission. Whenever any sufferer of his own accord remits the guilt of\nhomicide to another, under the idea that his act was involuntary, let\nthe perpetrator of the deed undergo a purification and remain in exile\nfor a year, according to law.\n\nEnough has been said of murders violent and involuntary and committed in\npassion: we have now to speak of voluntary crimes done with injustice of\nevery kind and with premeditation, through the influence of pleasures,\nand desires, and jealousies.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us first speak, as far as we are able, of their various\nkinds. The greatest cause of them is lust, which gets the mastery of the\nsoul maddened by desire; and this is most commonly found to exist where\nthe passion reigns which is strongest and most prevalent among the mass\nof mankind: I mean where the power of wealth breeds endless desires of\nnever-to-be-satisfied acquisition, originating in natural disposition,\nand a miserable want of education. Of this want of education, the\nfalse praise of wealth which is bruited about both among Hellenes and\nbarbarians is the cause; they deem that to be the first of goods which\nin reality is only the third. And in this way they wrong both posterity\nand themselves, for nothing can be nobler and better than that the truth\nabout wealth should be spoken in all states--namely, that riches are for\nthe sake of the body, as the body is for the sake of the soul. They are\ngood, and wealth is intended by nature to be for the sake of them, and\nis therefore inferior to them both, and third in order of excellence.\nThis argument teaches us that he who would be happy ought not to seek to\nbe rich, or rather he should seek to be rich justly and temperately, and\nthen there would be no murders in states requiring to be purged away\nby other murders. But now, as I said at first, avarice is the chiefest\ncause and source of the worst trials for voluntary homicide. A second\ncause is ambition: this creates jealousies, which are troublesome\ncompanions, above all to the jealous man himself, and in a less degree\nto the chiefs of the state. And a third cause is cowardly and unjust\nfear, which has been the occasion of many murders. When a man is doing\nor has done something which he desires that no one should know him to be\ndoing or to have done, he will take the life of those who are likely to\ninform of such things, if he have no other means of getting rid of them.\nLet this be said as a prelude concerning crimes of violence in general;\nand I must not omit to mention a tradition which is firmly believed by\nmany, and has been received by them from those who are learned in the\nmysteries: they say that such deeds will be punished in the world below,\nand also that when the perpetrators return to this world they will pay\nthe natural penalty which is due to the sufferer, and end their lives in\nlike manner by the hand of another. If he who is about to commit murder\nbelieves this, and is made by the mere prelude to dread such a penalty,\nthere is no need to proceed with the proclamation of the law. But if\nhe will not listen, let the following law be declared and registered\nagainst him: Whoever shall wrongfully and of design slay with his own\nhand any of his kinsmen, shall in the first place be deprived of legal\nprivileges; and he shall not pollute the temples, or the agora, or the\nharbours, or any other place of meeting, whether he is forbidden of men\nor not; for the law, which represents the whole state, forbids him, and\nalways is and will be in the attitude of forbidding him. And if a cousin\nor nearer relative of the deceased, whether on the male or female side,\ndoes not prosecute the homicide when he ought, and have him proclaimed\nan outlaw, he shall in the first place be involved in the pollution, and\nincur the hatred of the Gods, even as the curse of the law stirs up the\nvoices of men against him; and in the second place he shall be liable to\nbe prosecuted by any one who is willing to inflict retribution on behalf\nof the dead. And he who would avenge a murder shall observe all the\nprecautionary ceremonies of lavation, and any others which the God\ncommands in cases of this kind. Let him have proclamation made, and then\ngo forth and compel the perpetrator to suffer the execution of justice\naccording to the law. Now the legislator may easily show that these\nthings must be accomplished by prayers and sacrifices to certain Gods,\nwho are concerned with the prevention of murders in states. But who\nthese Gods are, and what should be the true manner of instituting such\ntrials with due regard to religion, the guardians of the law, aided by\nthe interpreters, and the prophets, and the God, shall determine, and\nwhen they have determined let them carry on the prosecution at law. The\ncause shall have the same judges who are appointed to decide in the case\nof those who plunder temples. Let him who is convicted be punished with\ndeath, and let him not be buried in the country of the murdered man, for\nthis would be shameless as well as impious. But if he fly and will not\nstand his trial, let him fly for ever; or, if he set foot anywhere\non any part of the murdered man's country, let any relation of the\ndeceased, or any other citizen who may first happen to meet with him,\nkill him with impunity, or bind and deliver him to those among the\njudges of the case who are magistrates, that they may put him to death.\nAnd let the prosecutor demand surety of him whom he prosecutes; three\nsureties sufficient in the opinion of the magistrates who try the cause\nshall be provided by him, and they shall undertake to produce him at the\ntrial. But if he be unwilling or unable to provide sureties, then the\nmagistrates shall take him and keep him in bonds, and produce him at the\nday of trial.\n\nIf a man do not commit a murder with his own hand, but contrives the\ndeath of another, and is the author of the deed in intention and design,\nand he continues to dwell in the city, having his soul not pure of\nthe guilt of murder, let him be tried in the same way, except in what\nrelates to the sureties; and also, if he be found guilty, his body after\nexecution may have burial in his native land, but in all other respects\nhis case shall be as the former; and whether a stranger shall kill a\ncitizen, or a citizen a stranger, or a slave a slave, there shall be\nno difference as touching murder by one's own hand or by contrivance,\nexcept in the matter of sureties; and these, as has been said, shall be\nrequired of the actual murderer only, and he who brings the accusation\nshall bind them over at the time. If a slave be convicted of slaying a\nfreeman voluntarily, either by his own hand or by contrivance, let the\npublic executioner take him in the direction of the sepulchre, to a\nplace whence he can see the tomb of the dead man, and inflict upon him\nas many stripes as the person who caught him orders, and if he survive,\nlet him put him to death. And if any one kills a slave who has done no\nwrong, because he is afraid that he may inform of some base and evil\ndeeds of his own, or for any similar reason, in such a case let him pay\nthe penalty of murder, as he would have done if he had slain a citizen.\nThere are things about which it is terrible and unpleasant to legislate,\nbut impossible not to legislate. If, for example, there should be\nmurders of kinsmen, either perpetrated by the hands of kinsmen, or by\ntheir contrivance, voluntary and purely malicious, which most often\nhappen in ill-regulated and ill-educated states, and may perhaps occur\neven in a country where a man would not expect to find them, we must\nrepeat once more the tale which we narrated a little while ago, in\nthe hope that he who hears us will be the more disposed to abstain\nvoluntarily on these grounds from murders which are utterly abominable.\nFor the myth, or saying, or whatever we ought to call it, has been\nplainly set forth by priests of old; they have pronounced that the\njustice which guards and avenges the blood of kindred, follows the\nlaw of retaliation, and ordains that he who has done any murderous act\nshould of necessity suffer that which he has done. He who has slain a\nfather shall himself be slain at some time or other by his children--if\na mother, he shall of necessity take a woman's nature, and lose his life\nat the hands of his offspring in after ages; for where the blood of a\nfamily has been polluted there is no other purification, nor can the\npollution be washed out until the homicidal soul which did the deed has\ngiven life for life, and has propitiated and laid to sleep the wrath\nof the whole family. These are the retributions of Heaven, and by such\npunishments men should be deterred. But if they are not deterred, and\nany one should be incited by some fatality to deprive his father, or\nmother, or brethren, or children, of life voluntarily and of purpose,\nfor him the earthly lawgiver legislates as follows: There shall be the\nsame proclamations about outlawry, and there shall be the same sureties\nwhich have been enacted in the former cases. But in his case, if he be\nconvicted, the servants of the judges and the magistrates shall slay him\nat an appointed place without the city where three ways meet, and there\nexpose his body naked, and each of the magistrates on behalf of the\nwhole city shall take a stone and cast it upon the head of the dead man,\nand so deliver the city from pollution; after that, they shall bear him\nto the borders of the land, and cast him forth unburied, according to\nlaw. And what shall he suffer who slays him who of all men, as they\nsay, is his own best friend? I mean the suicide, who deprives himself\nby violence of his appointed share of life, not because the law of the\nstate requires him, nor yet under the compulsion of some painful and\ninevitable misfortune which has come upon him, nor because he has had\nto suffer from irremediable and intolerable shame, but who from sloth or\nwant of manliness imposes upon himself an unjust penalty. For him, what\nceremonies there are to be of purification and burial God knows, and\nabout these the next of kin should enquire of the interpreters and of\nthe laws thereto relating, and do according to their injunctions. They\nwho meet their death in this way shall be buried alone, and none shall\nbe laid by their side; they shall be buried ingloriously in the borders\nof the twelve portions of the land, in such places as are uncultivated\nand nameless, and no column or inscription shall mark the place of their\ninterment. And if a beast of burden or other animal cause the death\nof any one, except in the case of anything of that kind happening to\na competitor in the public contests, the kinsmen of the deceased shall\nprosecute the slayer for murder, and the wardens of the country, such,\nand so many as the kinsmen appoint, shall try the cause, and let the\nbeast when condemned be slain by them, and let them cast it beyond the\nborders. And if any lifeless thing deprive a man of life, except in the\ncase of a thunderbolt or other fatal dart sent from the Gods--whether\na man is killed by lifeless objects falling upon him, or by his falling\nupon them, the nearest of kin shall appoint the nearest neighbour to be\na judge, and thereby acquit himself and the whole family of guilt. And\nhe shall cast forth the guilty thing beyond the border, as has been said\nabout the animals.\n\nIf a man is found dead, and his murderer be unknown, and after a\ndiligent search cannot be detected, there shall be the same proclamation\nas in the previous cases, and the same interdict on the murderer; and\nhaving proceeded against him, they shall proclaim in the agora by a\nherald, that he who has slain such and such a person, and has been\nconvicted of murder, shall not set his foot in the temples, nor at all\nin the country of the murdered man, and if he appears and is discovered,\nhe shall die, and be cast forth unburied beyond the border. Let this one\nlaw then be laid down by us about murder; and let cases of this sort be\nso regarded.\n\nAnd now let us say in what cases and under what circumstances the\nmurderer is rightly free from guilt: If a man catch a thief coming into\nhis house by night to steal, and he take and kill him, or if he slay\na footpad in self-defence, he shall be guiltless. And any one who does\nviolence to a free woman or a youth, shall be slain with impunity by the\ninjured person, or by his or her father or brothers or sons. If a man\nfind his wife suffering violence, he may kill the violator, and be\nguiltless in the eye of the law; or if a person kill another in warding\noff death from his father or mother or children or brethren or wife who\nare doing no wrong, he shall assuredly be guiltless.\n\nThus much as to the nurture and education of the living soul of man,\nhaving which, he can, and without which, if he unfortunately be without\nthem, he cannot live; and also concerning the punishments which are\nto be inflicted for violent deaths, let thus much be enacted. Of the\nnurture and education of the body we have spoken before, and next in\norder we have to speak of deeds of violence, voluntary and involuntary,\nwhich men do to one another; these we will now distinguish, as far as we\nare able, according to their nature and number, and determine what will\nbe the suitable penalties of each, and so assign to them their proper\nplace in the series of our enactments. The poorest legislator will have\nno difficulty in determining that wounds and mutilations arising out of\nwounds should follow next in order after deaths. Let wounds be divided\nas homicides were divided--into those which are involuntary, and which\nare given in passion or from fear, and those inflicted voluntarily\nand with premeditation. Concerning all this, we must make some such\nproclamation as the following: Mankind must have laws, and conform to\nthem, or their life would be as bad as that of the most savage beast.\nAnd the reason of this is that no man's nature is able to know what is\nbest for human society; or knowing, always able and willing to do what\nis best. In the first place, there is a difficulty in apprehending that\nthe true art of politics is concerned, not with private but with public\ngood (for public good binds together states, but private only distracts\nthem); and that both the public and private good as well of individuals\nas of states is greater when the state and not the individual is first\nconsidered. In the second place, although a person knows in the abstract\nthat this is true, yet if he be possessed of absolute and irresponsible\npower, he will never remain firm in his principles or persist in\nregarding the public good as primary in the state, and the private good\nas secondary. Human nature will be always drawing him into avarice and\nselfishness, avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and\nwill bring these to the front, obscuring the juster and better; and so\nworking darkness in his soul will at last fill with evils both him and\nthe whole city. For if a man were born so divinely gifted that he could\nnaturally apprehend the truth, he would have no need of laws to rule\nover him; for there is no law or order which is above knowledge, nor can\nmind, without impiety, be deemed the subject or slave of any man, but\nrather the lord of all. I speak of mind, true and free, and in harmony\nwith nature. But then there is no such mind anywhere, or at least not\nmuch; and therefore we must choose law and order, which are second\nbest. These look at things as they exist for the most part only, and\nare unable to survey the whole of them. And therefore I have spoken as I\nhave.\n\nAnd now we will determine what penalty he ought to pay or suffer who has\nhurt or wounded another. Any one may easily imagine the questions which\nhave to be asked in all such cases: What did he wound, or whom, or\nhow, or when? for there are innumerable particulars of this sort which\ngreatly vary from one another. And to allow courts of law to determine\nall these things, or not to determine any of them, is alike impossible.\nThere is one particular which they must determine in all cases--the\nquestion of fact. And then, again, that the legislator should not permit\nthem to determine what punishment is to be inflicted in any of these\ncases, but should himself decide about all of them, small or great, is\nnext to impossible.\n\nCLEINIAS: Then what is to be the inference?\n\nATHENIAN: The inference is, that some things should be left to courts of\nlaw; others the legislator must decide for himself.\n\nCLEINIAS: And what ought the legislator to decide, and what ought he to\nleave to the courts of law?\n\nATHENIAN: I may reply, that in a state in which the courts are bad\nand mute, because the judges conceal their opinions and decide causes\nclandestinely; or what is worse, when they are disorderly and noisy,\nas in a theatre, clapping or hooting in turn this or that orator--I say\nthat then there is a very serious evil, which affects the whole state.\nUnfortunate is the necessity of having to legislate for such courts,\nbut where the necessity exists, the legislator should only allow them to\nordain the penalties for the smallest offences; if the state for which\nhe is legislating be of this character, he must take most matters into\nhis own hands and speak distinctly. But when a state has good\ncourts, and the judges are well trained and scrupulously tested, the\ndetermination of the penalties or punishments which shall be inflicted\non the guilty may fairly and with advantage be left to them. And we are\nnot to be blamed for not legislating concerning all that large class\nof matters which judges far worse educated than ours would be able to\ndetermine, assigning to each offence what is due both to the perpetrator\nand to the sufferer. We believe those for whom we are legislating to be\nbest able to judge, and therefore to them the greater part may be left.\nAt the same time, as I have often said, we should exhibit to the\njudges, as we have done, the outline and form of the punishments to be\ninflicted, and then they will not transgress the just rule. That was an\nexcellent practice, which we observed before, and which now that we are\nresuming the work of legislation, may with advantage be repeated by us.\n\nLet the enactment about wounding be in the following terms: If any one\nhas a purpose and intention to slay another who is not his enemy, and\nwhom the law does not permit him to slay, and he wounds him, but is\nunable to kill him, he who had the intent and has wounded him is not\nto be pitied--he deserves no consideration, but should be regarded as\na murderer and be tried for murder. Still having respect to the fortune\nwhich has in a manner favoured him, and to the providence which in pity\nto him and to the wounded man saved the one from a fatal blow, and the\nother from an accursed fate and calamity--as a thank-offering to this\ndeity, and in order not to oppose his will--in such a case the law will\nremit the punishment of death, and only compel the offender to emigrate\nto a neighbouring city for the rest of his life, where he shall remain\nin the enjoyment of all his possessions. But if he have injured the\nwounded man, he shall make such compensation for the injury as the court\ndeciding the cause shall assess, and the same judges shall decide who\nwould have decided if the man had died of his wounds. And if a child\nintentionally wound his parents, or a servant his master, death shall be\nthe penalty. And if a brother or a sister intentionally wound a brother\nor a sister, and is found guilty, death shall be the penalty. And if a\nhusband wound a wife, or a wife a husband, with intent to kill, let him\nor her undergo perpetual exile; if they have sons or daughters who are\nstill young, the guardians shall take care of their property, and have\ncharge of the children as orphans. If their sons are grown up, they\nshall be under no obligation to support the exiled parent, but they\nshall possess the property themselves. And if he who meets with such a\nmisfortune has no children, the kindred of the exiled man to the\ndegree of sons of cousins, both on the male and female side, shall meet\ntogether, and after taking counsel with the guardians of the law and\nthe priests, shall appoint a 5040th citizen to be the heir of the house,\nconsidering and reasoning that no house of all the 5040 belongs to\nthe inhabitant or to the whole family, but is the public and private\nproperty of the state. Now the state should seek to have its houses as\nholy and happy as possible. And if any one of the houses be unfortunate,\nand stained with impiety, and the owner leave no posterity, but dies\nunmarried, or married and childless, having suffered death as the\npenalty of murder or some other crime committed against the Gods or\nagainst his fellow-citizens, of which death is the penalty distinctly\nlaid down in the law; or if any of the citizens be in perpetual exile,\nand also childless, that house shall first of all be purified and\nundergo expiation according to law; and then let the kinsmen of the\nhouse, as we were just now saying, and the guardians of the law, meet\nand consider what family there is in the state which is of the highest\nrepute for virtue and also for good fortune, in which there are a number\nof sons; from that family let them take one and introduce him to the\nfather and forefathers of the dead man as their son, and, for the sake\nof the omen, let him be called so, that he may be the continuer of their\nfamily, the keeper of their hearth, and the minister of their sacred\nrites with better fortune than his father had; and when they have made\nthis supplication, they shall make him heir according to law, and the\noffending person they shall leave nameless and childless and portionless\nwhen calamities such as these overtake him.\n\nNow the boundaries of some things do not touch one another, but there is\na borderland which comes in between, preventing them from touching. And\nwe were saying that actions done from passion are of this nature, and\ncome in between the voluntary and involuntary. If a person be convicted\nof having inflicted wounds in a passion, in the first place he shall\npay twice the amount of the injury, if the wound be curable, or, if\nincurable, four times the amount of the injury; or if the wound be\ncurable, and at the same time cause great and notable disgrace to the\nwounded person, he shall pay fourfold. And whenever any one in wounding\nanother injures not only the sufferer, but also the city, and makes him\nincapable of defending his country against the enemy, he, besides the\nother penalties, shall pay a penalty for the loss which the state has\nincurred. And the penalty shall be, that in addition to his own times of\nservice, he shall serve on behalf of the disabled person, and shall take\nhis place in war; or, if he refuse, he shall be liable to be convicted\nby law of refusal to serve. The compensation for the injury, whether to\nbe twofold or threefold or fourfold, shall be fixed by the judges who\nconvict him. And if, in like manner, a brother wounds a brother, the\nparents and kindred of either sex, including the children of cousins,\nwhether on the male or female side, shall meet, and when they have\njudged the cause, they shall entrust the assessment of damages to\nthe parents, as is natural; and if the estimate be disputed, then the\nkinsmen on the male side shall make the estimate, or if they cannot,\nthey shall commit the matter to the guardians of the law. And when\nsimilar charges of wounding are brought by children against their\nparents, those who are more than sixty years of age, having children of\ntheir own, not adopted, shall be required to decide; and if any one\nis convicted, they shall determine whether he or she ought to die, or\nsuffer some other punishment either greater than death, or, at any rate,\nnot much less. A kinsman of the offender shall not be allowed to judge\nthe cause, not even if he be of the age which is prescribed by the law.\nIf a slave in a fit of anger wound a freeman, the owner of the slave\nshall give him up to the wounded man, who may do as he pleases with him,\nand if he do not give him up he shall himself make good the injury.\nAnd if any one says that the slave and the wounded man are conspiring\ntogether, let him argue the point, and if he is cast, he shall pay for\nthe wrong three times over, but if he gains his case, the freeman who\nconspired with the slave shall be liable to an action for kidnapping.\nAnd if any one unintentionally wounds another he shall simply pay for\nthe harm, for no legislator is able to control chance. In such a case\nthe judges shall be the same as those who are appointed in the case of\nchildren suing their parents; and they shall estimate the amount of the\ninjury.\n\nAll the preceding injuries and every kind of assault are deeds of\nviolence; and every man, woman, or child ought to consider that the\nelder has the precedence of the younger in honour, both among the Gods\nand also among men who would live in security and happiness. Wherefore\nit is a foul thing and hateful to the Gods to see an elder man assaulted\nby a younger in the city, and it is reasonable that a young man when\nstruck by an elder should lightly endure his anger, laying up in store\nfor himself a like honour when he is old. Let this be the law: Every one\nshall reverence his elder in word and deed; he shall respect any one who\nis twenty years older than himself, whether male or female, regarding\nhim or her as his father or mother; and he shall abstain from laying\nhands on any one who is of an age to have been his father or mother, out\nof reverence to the Gods who preside over birth; similarly he shall\nkeep his hands from a stranger, whether he be an old inhabitant or newly\narrived; he shall not venture to correct such an one by blows, either\nas the aggressor or in self-defence. If he thinks that some stranger has\nstruck him out of wantonness or insolence, and ought to be punished, he\nshall take him to the wardens of the city, but let him not strike him,\nthat the stranger may be kept far away from the possibility of lifting\nup his hand against a citizen, and let the wardens of the city take\nthe offender and examine him, not forgetting their duty to the God of\nStrangers, and in case the stranger appears to have struck the citizen\nunjustly, let them inflict upon him as many blows with the scourge as he\nwas himself inflicted, and quell his presumption. But if he be innocent,\nthey shall threaten and rebuke the man who arrested him, and let them\nboth go. If a person strikes another of the same age or somewhat older\nthan himself, who has no children, whether he be an old man who strikes\nan old man or a young man who strikes a young man, let the person struck\ndefend himself in the natural way without a weapon and with his hands\nonly. He who, being more than forty years of age, dares to fight with\nanother, whether he be the aggressor or in self-defence, shall\nbe regarded as rude and ill-mannered and slavish--this will be a\ndisgraceful punishment, and therefore suitable to him. The obedient\nnature will readily yield to such exhortations, but the disobedient,\nwho heeds not the prelude, shall have the law ready for him: If any man\nsmite another who is older than himself, either by twenty or by more\nyears, in the first place, he who is at hand, not being younger than the\ncombatants, nor their equal in age, shall separate them, or be disgraced\naccording to law; but if he be the equal in age of the person who is\nstruck or younger, he shall defend the person injured as he would a\nbrother or father or still older relative. Further, let him who dares to\nsmite an elder be tried for assault, as I have said, and if he be found\nguilty, let him be imprisoned for a period of not less than a year, or\nif the judges approve of a longer period, their decision shall be final.\nBut if a stranger or metic smite one who is older by twenty years or\nmore, the same law shall hold about the bystanders assisting, and he who\nis found guilty in such a suit, if he be a stranger but not resident,\nshall be imprisoned during a period of two years; and a metic who\ndisobeys the laws shall be imprisoned for three years, unless the court\nassign him a longer term. And let him who was present in any of these\ncases and did not assist according to law be punished, if he be of the\nhighest class, by paying a fine of a mina; or if he be of the second\nclass, of fifty drachmas; or if of the third class, by a fine of thirty\ndrachmas; or if he be of the fourth class, by a fine of twenty drachmas;\nand the generals and taxiarchs and phylarchs and hipparchs shall form\nthe court in such cases.\n\nLaws are partly framed for the sake of good men, in order to instruct\nthem how they may live on friendly terms with one another, and partly\nfor the sake of those who refuse to be instructed, whose spirit cannot\nbe subdued, or softened, or hindered from plunging into evil. These are\nthe persons who cause the word to be spoken which I am about to utter;\nfor them the legislator legislates of necessity, and in the hope that\nthere may be no need of his laws. He who shall dare to lay violent hands\nupon his father or mother, or any still older relative, having no fear\neither of the wrath of the Gods above, or of the punishments that are\nspoken of in the world below, but transgresses in contempt of ancient\nand universal traditions as though he were too wise to believe in them,\nrequires some extreme measure of prevention. Now death is not the worst\nthat can happen to men; far worse are the punishments which are said to\npursue them in the world below. But although they are most true tales,\nthey work on such souls no prevention; for if they had any effect there\nwould be no slayers of mothers, or impious hands lifted up against\nparents; and therefore the punishments of this world which are inflicted\nduring life ought not in such cases to fall short, if possible, of the\nterrors of the world below. Let our enactment then be as follows: If\na man dare to strike his father or his mother, or their fathers or\nmothers, he being at the time of sound mind, then let any one who is\nat hand come to the rescue as has been already said, and the metic or\nstranger who comes to the rescue shall be called to the first place\nin the games; but if he do not come he shall suffer the punishment of\nperpetual exile. He who is not a metic, if he comes to the rescue, shall\nhave praise, and if he do not come, blame. And if a slave come to the\nrescue, let him be made free, but if he do not come to the rescue, let\nhim receive 100 strokes of the whip, by order of the wardens of the\nagora, if the occurrence take place in the agora; or if somewhere in the\ncity beyond the limits of the agora, any warden of the city who is in\nresidence shall punish him; or if in the country, then the commanders\nof the wardens of the country. If those who are near at the time be\ninhabitants of the same place, whether they be youths, or men, or women,\nlet them come to the rescue and denounce him as the impious one; and he\nwho does not come to the rescue shall fall under the curse of Zeus, the\nGod of kindred and of ancestors, according to law. And if any one is\nfound guilty of assaulting a parent, let him in the first place be\nforever banished from the city into the country, and let him abstain\nfrom the temples; and if he do not abstain, the wardens of the country\nshall punish him with blows, or in any way which they please, and if\nhe return he shall be put to death. And if any freeman eat or drink, or\nhave any other sort of intercourse with him, or only meeting him have\nvoluntarily touched him, he shall not enter into any temple, nor into\nthe agora, nor into the city, until he is purified; for he should\nconsider that he has become tainted by a curse. And if he disobeys the\nlaw, and pollutes the city and the temples contrary to law, and one of\nthe magistrates sees him and does not indict him, when he gives in his\naccount this omission shall be a most serious charge.\n\nIf a slave strike a freeman, whether a stranger or a citizen, let\nany one who is present come to the rescue, or pay the penalty already\nmentioned; and let the bystanders bind him, and deliver him up to\nthe injured person, and he receiving him shall put him in chains, and\ninflict on him as many stripes as he pleases; but having punished him he\nmust surrender him to his master according to law, and not deprive him\nof his property. Let the law be as follows: The slave who strikes a\nfreeman, not at the command of the magistrates, his owner shall receive\nbound from the man whom he has stricken, and not release him until the\nslave has persuaded the man whom he has stricken that he ought to be\nreleased. And let there be the same laws about women in relation to\nwomen, and about men and women in relation to one another.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK X.\n\nAnd now having spoken of assaults, let us sum up all acts of violence\nunder a single law, which shall be as follows: No one shall take or\ncarry away any of his neighbour's goods, neither shall he use anything\nwhich is his neighbour's without the consent of the owner; for these are\nthe offences which are and have been, and will ever be, the source\nof all the aforesaid evils. The greatest of them are excesses and\ninsolences of youth, and are offences against the greatest when they are\ndone against religion; and especially great when in violation of public\nand holy rites, or of the partly-common rites in which tribes and\nphratries share; and in the second degree great when they are committed\nagainst private rites and sepulchres, and in the third degree (not\nto repeat the acts formerly mentioned), when insults are offered to\nparents; the fourth kind of violence is when any one, regardless of the\nauthority of the rulers, takes or carries away or makes use of anything\nwhich belongs to them, not having their consent; and the fifth kind\nis when the violation of the civil rights of an individual demands\nreparation. There should be a common law embracing all these cases. For\nwe have already said in general terms what shall be the punishment of\nsacrilege, whether fraudulent or violent, and now we have to determine\nwhat is to be the punishment of those who speak or act insolently toward\nthe Gods. But first we must give them an admonition which may be in the\nfollowing terms: No one who in obedience to the laws believed that\nthere were Gods, ever intentionally did any unholy act, or uttered\nany unlawful word; but he who did must have supposed one of three\nthings--either that they did not exist--which is the first possibility,\nor secondly, that, if they did, they took no care of man, or thirdly,\nthat they were easily appeased and turned aside from their purpose by\nsacrifices and prayers.\n\nCLEINIAS: What shall we say or do to these persons?\n\nATHENIAN: My good friend, let us first hear the jests which I suspect\nthat they in their superiority will utter against us.\n\nCLEINIAS: What jests?\n\nATHENIAN: They will make some irreverent speech of this sort: 'O\ninhabitants of Athens, and Sparta, and Cnosus,' they will reply, 'in\nthat you speak truly; for some of us deny the very existence of the\nGods, while others, as you say, are of opinion that they do not care\nabout us; and others that they are turned from their course by gifts.\nNow we have a right to claim, as you yourself allowed, in the matter of\nlaws, that before you are hard upon us and threaten us, you should argue\nwith us and convince us--you should first attempt to teach and persuade\nus that there are Gods by reasonable evidences, and also that they are\ntoo good to be unrighteous, or to be propitiated, or turned from their\ncourse by gifts. For when we hear such things said of them by those who\nare esteemed to be the best of poets, and orators, and prophets, and\npriests, and by innumerable others, the thoughts of most of us are\nnot set upon abstaining from unrighteous acts, but upon doing them and\natoning for them. When lawgivers profess that they are gentle and not\nstern, we think that they should first of all use persuasion to us, and\nshow us the existence of Gods, if not in a better manner than other men,\nat any rate in a truer; and who knows but that we shall hearken to you?\nIf then our request is a fair one, please to accept our challenge.\n\nCLEINIAS: But is there any difficulty in proving the existence of the\nGods?\n\nATHENIAN: How would you prove it?\n\nCLEINIAS: How? In the first place, the earth and the sun, and the stars\nand the universe, and the fair order of the seasons, and the division of\nthem into years and months, furnish proofs of their existence, and also\nthere is the fact that all Hellenes and barbarians believe in them.\n\nATHENIAN: I fear, my sweet friend, though I will not say that I much\nregard, the contempt with which the profane will be likely to assail us.\nFor you do not understand the nature of their complaint, and you fancy\nthat they rush into impiety only from a love of sensual pleasure.\n\nCLEINIAS: Why, Stranger, what other reason is there?\n\nATHENIAN: One which you who live in a different atmosphere would never\nguess.\n\nCLEINIAS: What is it?\n\nATHENIAN: A very grievous sort of ignorance which is imagined to be the\ngreatest wisdom.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: At Athens there are tales preserved in writing which the\nvirtue of your state, as I am informed, refuses to admit. They speak of\nthe Gods in prose as well as verse, and the oldest of them tell of the\norigin of the heavens and of the world, and not far from the beginning\nof their story they proceed to narrate the birth of the Gods, and how\nafter they were born they behaved to one another. Whether these stories\nhave in other ways a good or a bad influence, I should not like to be\nsevere upon them, because they are ancient; but, looking at them with\nreference to the duties of children to their parents, I cannot praise\nthem, or think that they are useful, or at all true. Of the words of the\nancients I have nothing more to say; and I should wish to say of them\nonly what is pleasing to the Gods. But as to our younger generation and\ntheir wisdom, I cannot let them off when they do mischief. For do but\nmark the effect of their words: when you and I argue for the existence\nof the Gods, and produce the sun, moon, stars, and earth, claiming for\nthem a divine being, if we would listen to the aforesaid philosophers we\nshould say that they are earth and stones only, which can have no care\nat all of human affairs, and that all religion is a cooking up of words\nand a make-believe.\n\nCLEINIAS: One such teacher, O stranger, would be bad enough, and you\nimply that there are many of them, which is worse.\n\nATHENIAN: Well, then; what shall we say or do? Shall we assume that some\none is accusing us among unholy men, who are trying to escape from the\neffect of our legislation; and that they say of us--How dreadful that\nyou should legislate on the supposition that there are Gods! Shall we\nmake a defence of ourselves? or shall we leave them and return to\nour laws, lest the prelude should become longer than the law? For the\ndiscourse will certainly extend to great length, if we are to treat the\nimpiously disposed as they desire, partly demonstrating to them at some\nlength the things of which they demand an explanation, partly making\nthem afraid or dissatisfied, and then proceed to the requisite\nenactments.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes, Stranger; but then how often have we repeated already\nthat on the present occasion there is no reason why brevity should be\npreferred to length; for who is 'at our heels?' as the saying goes, and\nit would be paltry and ridiculous to prefer the shorter to the better.\nIt is a matter of no small consequence, in some way or other to prove\nthat there are Gods, and that they are good, and regard justice more\nthan men do. The demonstration of this would be the best and noblest\nprelude of all our laws. And therefore, without impatience, and without\nhurry, let us unreservedly consider the whole matter, summoning up all\nthe power of persuasion which we possess.\n\nATHENIAN: Seeing you thus in earnest, I would fain offer up a prayer\nthat I may succeed: but I must proceed at once. Who can be calm when he\nis called upon to prove the existence of the Gods? Who can avoid hating\nand abhorring the men who are and have been the cause of this argument;\nI speak of those who will not believe the tales which they have heard as\nbabes and sucklings from their mothers and nurses, repeated by them\nboth in jest and earnest, like charms, who have also heard them in\nthe sacrificial prayers, and seen sights accompanying them--sights and\nsounds delightful to children--and their parents during the sacrifices\nshowing an intense earnestness on behalf of their children and of\nthemselves, and with eager interest talking to the Gods, and beseeching\nthem, as though they were firmly convinced of their existence; who\nlikewise see and hear the prostrations and invocations which are made by\nHellenes and barbarians at the rising and setting of the sun and moon,\nin all the vicissitudes of life, not as if they thought that there were\nno Gods, but as if there could be no doubt of their existence, and no\nsuspicion of their non-existence; when men, knowing all these things,\ndespise them on no real grounds, as would be admitted by all who have\nany particle of intelligence, and when they force us to say what we are\nnow saying, how can any one in gentle terms remonstrate with the like of\nthem, when he has to begin by proving to them the very existence of the\nGods? Yet the attempt must be made; for it would be unseemly that one\nhalf of mankind should go mad in their lust of pleasure, and the other\nhalf in their indignation at such persons. Our address to these lost\nand perverted natures should not be spoken in passion; let us suppose\nourselves to select some one of them, and gently reason with him,\nsmothering our anger: O my son, we will say to him, you are young, and\nthe advance of time will make you reverse many of the opinions which\nyou now hold. Wait awhile, and do not attempt to judge at present of\nthe highest things; and that is the highest of which you now think\nnothing--to know the Gods rightly and to live accordingly. And in\nthe first place let me indicate to you one point which is of great\nimportance, and about which I cannot be deceived: You and your friends\nare not the first who have held this opinion about the Gods. There\nhave always been persons more or less numerous who have had the same\ndisorder. I have known many of them, and can tell you, that no one who\nhad taken up in youth this opinion, that the Gods do not exist, ever\ncontinued in the same until he was old; the two other notions certainly\ndo continue in some cases, but not in many; the notion, I mean, that the\nGods exist, but take no heed of human things, and the other notion that\nthey do take heed of them, but are easily propitiated with sacrifices\nand prayers. As to the opinion about the Gods which may some day become\nclear to you, I advise you to wait and consider if it be true or not;\nask of others, and above all of the legislator. In the meantime take\ncare that you do not offend against the Gods. For the duty of the\nlegislator is and always will be to teach you the truth of these\nmatters.\n\nCLEINIAS: Our address, Stranger, thus far, is excellent.\n\nATHENIAN: Quite true, Megillus and Cleinias, but I am afraid that we\nhave unconsciously lighted on a strange doctrine.\n\nCLEINIAS: What doctrine do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: The wisest of all doctrines, in the opinion of many.\n\nCLEINIAS: I wish that you would speak plainer.\n\nATHENIAN: The doctrine that all things do become, have become, and will\nbecome, some by nature, some by art, and some by chance.\n\nCLEINIAS: Is not that true?\n\nATHENIAN: Well, philosophers are probably right; at any rate we may as\nwell follow in their track, and examine what is the meaning of them and\ntheir disciples.\n\nCLEINIAS: By all means.\n\nATHENIAN: They say that the greatest and fairest things are the work of\nnature and of chance, the lesser of art, which, receiving from nature\nthe greater and primeval creations, moulds and fashions all those lesser\nworks which are generally termed artificial.\n\nCLEINIAS: How is that?\n\nATHENIAN: I will explain my meaning still more clearly. They say that\nfire and water, and earth and air, all exist by nature and chance,\nand none of them by art, and that as to the bodies which come next in\norder--earth, and sun, and moon, and stars--they have been created\nby means of these absolutely inanimate existences. The elements are\nseverally moved by chance and some inherent force according to certain\naffinities among them--of hot with cold, or of dry with moist, or of\nsoft with hard, and according to all the other accidental admixtures of\nopposites which have been formed by necessity. After this fashion and\nin this manner the whole heaven has been created, and all that is in the\nheaven, as well as animals and all plants, and all the seasons come from\nthese elements, not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any God,\nor from art, but as I was saying, by nature and chance only. Art sprang\nup afterwards and out of these, mortal and of mortal birth, and produced\nin play certain images and very partial imitations of the truth, having\nan affinity to one another, such as music and painting create and their\ncompanion arts. And there are other arts which have a serious purpose,\nand these co-operate with nature, such, for example, as medicine, and\nhusbandry, and gymnastic. And they say that politics co-operate\nwith nature, but in a less degree, and have more of art; also that\nlegislation is entirely a work of art, and is based on assumptions which\nare not true.\n\nCLEINIAS: How do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: In the first place, my dear friend, these people would say\nthat the Gods exist not by nature, but by art, and by the laws of\nstates, which are different in different places, according to the\nagreement of those who make them; and that the honourable is one thing\nby nature and another thing by law, and that the principles of justice\nhave no existence at all in nature, but that mankind are always\ndisputing about them and altering them; and that the alterations which\nare made by art and by law have no basis in nature, but are of authority\nfor the moment and at the time at which they are made. These, my\nfriends, are the sayings of wise men, poets and prose writers, which\nfind a way into the minds of youth. They are told by them that the\nhighest right is might, and in this way the young fall into impieties,\nunder the idea that the Gods are not such as the law bids them imagine;\nand hence arise factions, these philosophers inviting them to lead a\ntrue life according to nature, that is, to live in real dominion over\nothers, and not in legal subjection to them.\n\nCLEINIAS: What a dreadful picture, Stranger, have you given, and how\ngreat is the injury which is thus inflicted on young men to the ruin\nboth of states and families!\n\nATHENIAN: True, Cleinias; but then what should the lawgiver do when\nthis evil is of long standing? should he only rise up in the state and\nthreaten all mankind, proclaiming that if they will not say and think\nthat the Gods are such as the law ordains (and this may be extended\ngenerally to the honourable, the just, and to all the highest things,\nand to all that relates to virtue and vice), and if they will not make\ntheir actions conform to the copy which the law gives them, then he\nwho refuses to obey the law shall die, or suffer stripes and bonds,\nor privation of citizenship, or in some cases be punished by loss of\nproperty and exile? Should he not rather, when he is making laws for\nmen, at the same time infuse the spirit of persuasion into his words,\nand mitigate the severity of them as far as he can?\n\nCLEINIAS: Why, Stranger, if such persuasion be at all possible, then a\nlegislator who has anything in him ought never to weary of persuading\nmen; he ought to leave nothing unsaid in support of the ancient opinion\nthat there are Gods, and of all those other truths which you were\njust now mentioning; he ought to support the law and also art, and\nacknowledge that both alike exist by nature, and no less than nature, if\nthey are the creations of mind in accordance with right reason, as\nyou appear to me to maintain, and I am disposed to agree with you in\nthinking.\n\nATHENIAN: Yes, my enthusiastic Cleinias; but are not these things when\nspoken to a multitude hard to be understood, not to mention that they\ntake up a dismal length of time?\n\nCLEINIAS: Why, Stranger, shall we, whose patience failed not when\ndrinking or music were the themes of discourse, weary now of discoursing\nabout the Gods, and about divine things? And the greatest help to\nrational legislation is that the laws when once written down are always\nat rest; they can be put to the test at any future time, and therefore,\nif on first hearing they seem difficult, there is no reason for\napprehension about them, because any man however dull can go over them\nand consider them again and again; nor if they are tedious but useful,\nis there any reason or religion, as it seems to me, in any man refusing\nto maintain the principles of them to the utmost of his power.\n\nMEGILLUS: Stranger, I like what Cleinias is saying.\n\nATHENIAN: Yes, Megillus, and we should do as he proposes; for if impious\ndiscourses were not scattered, as I may say, throughout the world, there\nwould have been no need for any vindication of the existence of the\nGods--but seeing that they are spread far and wide, such arguments are\nneeded; and who should come to the rescue of the greatest laws, when\nthey are being undermined by bad men, but the legislator himself?\n\nMEGILLUS: There is no more proper champion of them.\n\nATHENIAN: Well, then, tell me, Cleinias--for I must ask you to be my\npartner--does not he who talks in this way conceive fire and water and\nearth and air to be the first elements of all things? these he calls\nnature, and out of these he supposes the soul to be formed afterwards;\nand this is not a mere conjecture of ours about his meaning, but is what\nhe really means.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Then, by Heaven, we have discovered the source of this vain\nopinion of all those physical investigators; and I would have you\nexamine their arguments with the utmost care, for their impiety is\na very serious matter; they not only make a bad and mistaken use of\nargument, but they lead away the minds of others: that is my opinion of\nthem.\n\nCLEINIAS: You are right; but I should like to know how this happens.\n\nATHENIAN: I fear that the argument may seem singular.\n\nCLEINIAS: Do not hesitate, Stranger; I see that you are afraid of such\na discussion carrying you beyond the limits of legislation. But if there\nbe no other way of showing our agreement in the belief that there are\nGods, of whom the law is said now to approve, let us take this way, my\ngood sir.\n\nATHENIAN: Then I suppose that I must repeat the singular argument of\nthose who manufacture the soul according to their own impious notions;\nthey affirm that which is the first cause of the generation and\ndestruction of all things, to be not first, but last, and that which is\nlast to be first, and hence they have fallen into error about the true\nnature of the Gods.\n\nCLEINIAS: Still I do not understand you.\n\nATHENIAN: Nearly all of them, my friends, seem to be ignorant of the\nnature and power of the soul, especially in what relates to her origin:\nthey do not know that she is among the first of things, and before all\nbodies, and is the chief author of their changes and transpositions. And\nif this is true, and if the soul is older than the body, must not the\nthings which are of the soul's kindred be of necessity prior to those\nwhich appertain to the body?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Then thought and attention and mind and art and law will be\nprior to that which is hard and soft and heavy and light; and the great\nand primitive works and actions will be works of art; they will be\nthe first, and after them will come nature and works of nature, which\nhowever is a wrong term for men to apply to them; these will follow, and\nwill be under the government of art and mind.\n\nCLEINIAS: But why is the word 'nature' wrong?\n\nATHENIAN: Because those who use the term mean to say that nature is\nthe first creative power; but if the soul turn out to be the primeval\nelement, and not fire or air, then in the truest sense and beyond other\nthings the soul may be said to exist by nature; and this would be true\nif you proved that the soul is older than the body, but not otherwise.\n\nCLEINIAS: You are quite right.\n\nATHENIAN: Shall we, then, take this as the next point to which our\nattention should be directed?\n\nCLEINIAS: By all means.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us be on our guard lest this most deceptive argument with\nits youthful looks, beguiling us old men, give us the slip and make a\nlaughing-stock of us. Who knows but we may be aiming at the greater, and\nfail of attaining the lesser? Suppose that we three have to pass a rapid\nriver, and I, being the youngest of the three and experienced in rivers,\ntake upon me the duty of making the attempt first by myself; leaving you\nin safety on the bank, I am to examine whether the river is passable\nby older men like yourselves, and if such appears to be the case then\nI shall invite you to follow, and my experience will help to convey you\nacross; but if the river is impassable by you, then there will have been\nno danger to anybody but myself--would not that seem to be a very fair\nproposal? I mean to say that the argument in prospect is likely to be\ntoo much for you, out of your depth and beyond your strength, and I\nshould be afraid that the stream of my questions might create in you who\nare not in the habit of answering, giddiness and confusion of mind,\nand hence a feeling of unpleasantness and unsuitableness might arise.\nI think therefore that I had better first ask the questions and then\nanswer them myself while you listen in safety; in that way I can carry\non the argument until I have completed the proof that the soul is prior\nto the body.\n\nCLEINIAS: Excellent, Stranger, and I hope that you will do as you\npropose.\n\nATHENIAN: Come, then, and if ever we are to call upon the Gods, let us\ncall upon them now in all seriousness to come to the demonstration of\ntheir own existence. And so holding fast to the rope we will venture\nupon the depths of the argument. When questions of this sort are asked\nof me, my safest answer would appear to be as follows: Some one says to\nme, 'O Stranger, are all things at rest and nothing in motion, or is the\nexact opposite of this true, or are some things in motion and others at\nrest?' To this I shall reply that some things are in motion and others\nat rest. 'And do not things which move move in a place, and are not the\nthings which are at rest at rest in a place?' Certainly. 'And some move\nor rest in one place and some in more places than one?' You mean to say,\nwe shall rejoin, that those things which rest at the centre move in one\nplace, just as the circumference goes round of globes which are said to\nbe at rest? 'Yes.' And we observe that, in the revolution, the motion\nwhich carries round the larger and the lesser circle at the same time\nis proportionally distributed to greater and smaller, and is greater and\nsmaller in a certain proportion. Here is a wonder which might be thought\nan impossibility, that the same motion should impart swiftness and\nslowness in due proportion to larger and lesser circles. 'Very true.'\nAnd when you speak of bodies moving in many places, you seem to me to\nmean those which move from one place to another, and sometimes have\none centre of motion and sometimes more than one because they turn upon\ntheir axis; and whenever they meet anything, if it be stationary, they\nare divided by it; but if they get in the midst between bodies which are\napproaching and moving towards the same spot from opposite directions,\nthey unite with them. 'I admit the truth of what you are saying.'\nAlso when they unite they grow, and when they are divided they waste\naway--that is, supposing the constitution of each to remain, or if that\nfails, then there is a second reason of their dissolution. 'And when are\nall things created and how?' Clearly, they are created when the first\nprinciple receives increase and attains to the second dimension, and\nfrom this arrives at the one which is neighbour to this, and after\nreaching the third becomes perceptible to sense. Everything which is\nthus changing and moving is in process of generation; only when at\nrest has it real existence, but when passing into another state it is\ndestroyed utterly. Have we not mentioned all motions that there are,\nand comprehended them under their kinds and numbered them with the\nexception, my friends, of two?\n\nCLEINIAS: Which are they?\n\nATHENIAN: Just the two, with which our present enquiry is concerned.\n\nCLEINIAS: Speak plainer.\n\nATHENIAN: I suppose that our enquiry has reference to the soul?\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us assume that there is a motion able to move other\nthings, but not to move itself; that is one kind; and there is\nanother kind which can move itself as well as other things, working in\ncomposition and decomposition, by increase and diminution and generation\nand destruction--that is also one of the many kinds of motion.\n\nCLEINIAS: Granted.\n\nATHENIAN: And we will assume that which moves other, and is changed by\nother, to be the ninth, and that which changes itself and others, and\nis coincident with every action and every passion, and is the true\nprinciple of change and motion in all that is--that we shall be inclined\nto call the tenth.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And which of these ten motions ought we to prefer as being the\nmightiest and most efficient?\n\nCLEINIAS: I must say that the motion which is able to move itself is ten\nthousand times superior to all the others.\n\nATHENIAN: Very good; but may I make one or two corrections in what I\nhave been saying?\n\nCLEINIAS: What are they?\n\nATHENIAN: When I spoke of the tenth sort of motion, that was not quite\ncorrect.\n\nCLEINIAS: What was the error?\n\nATHENIAN: According to the true order, the tenth was really the first\nin generation and power; then follows the second, which was strangely\nenough termed the ninth by us.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: I mean this: when one thing changes another, and that another,\nof such will there be any primary changing element? How can a thing\nwhich is moved by another ever be the beginning of change? Impossible.\nBut when the self-moved changes other, and that again other, and thus\nthousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must\nnot the beginning of all this motion be the change of the self-moving\nprinciple?\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true, and I quite agree.\n\nATHENIAN: Or, to put the question in another way, making answer to\nourselves: If, as most of these philosophers have the audacity\nto affirm, all things were at rest in one mass, which of the\nabove-mentioned principles of motion would first spring up among them?\n\nCLEINIAS: Clearly the self-moving; for there could be no change in them\narising out of any external cause; the change must first take place in\nthemselves.\n\nATHENIAN: Then we must say that self-motion being the origin of all\nmotions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well as\namong things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of change,\nand that which is changed by another and yet moves other is second.\n\nCLEINIAS: Quite true.\n\nATHENIAN: At this stage of the argument let us put a question.\n\nCLEINIAS: What question?\n\nATHENIAN: If we were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery,\nor fiery substance, simple or compound--how should we describe it?\n\nCLEINIAS: You mean to ask whether we should call such a self-moving\npower life?\n\nATHENIAN: I do.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly we should.\n\nATHENIAN: And when we see soul in anything, must we not do the\nsame--must we not admit that this is life?\n\nCLEINIAS: We must.\n\nATHENIAN: And now, I beseech you, reflect--you would admit that we have\na threefold knowledge of things?\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: I mean that we know the essence, and that we know the\ndefinition of the essence, and the name--these are the three; and there\nare two questions which may be raised about anything.\n\nCLEINIAS: How two?\n\nATHENIAN: Sometimes a person may give the name and ask the definition;\nor he may give the definition and ask the name. I may illustrate what I\nmean in this way.\n\nCLEINIAS: How?\n\nATHENIAN: Number like some other things is capable of being divided\ninto equal parts; when thus divided, number is named 'even,' and the\ndefinition of the name 'even' is 'number divisible into two equal\nparts'?\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: I mean, that when we are asked about the definition and\ngive the name, or when we are asked about the name and give the\ndefinition--in either case, whether we give name or definition, we speak\nof the same thing, calling 'even' the number which is divided into two\nequal parts.\n\nCLEINIAS: Quite true.\n\nATHENIAN: And what is the definition of that which is named 'soul'? Can\nwe conceive of any other than that which has been already given--the\nmotion which can move itself?\n\nCLEINIAS: You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the\nself-moved is the same with that which has the name soul?\n\nATHENIAN: Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there\nis anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin\nand moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their\ncontraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change\nand motion in all things?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has\nbeen most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things.\n\nATHENIAN: And is not that motion which is produced in another, by reason\nof another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being in truth\nthe change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or by any lower\nnumber which you may prefer?\n\nCLEINIAS: Exactly.\n\nATHENIAN: Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolute\ntruth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the body\nis second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul, which is\nthe ruler?\n\nCLEINIAS: Nothing can be more true.\n\nATHENIAN: Do you remember our old admission, that if the soul was prior\nto the body the things of the soul were also prior to those of the body?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Then characters and manners, and wishes and reasonings, and\ntrue opinions, and reflections, and recollections are prior to length\nand breadth and depth and strength of bodies, if the soul is prior to\nthe body.\n\nCLEINIAS: To be sure.\n\nATHENIAN: In the next place, we must not of necessity admit that the\nsoul is the cause of good and evil, base and honourable, just and\nunjust, and of all other opposites, if we suppose her to be the cause of\nall things?\n\nCLEINIAS: We must.\n\nATHENIAN: And as the soul orders and inhabits all things that move,\nhowever moving, must we not say that she orders also the heavens?\n\nCLEINIAS: Of course.\n\nATHENIAN: One soul or more? More than one--I will answer for you; at any\nrate, we must not suppose that there are less than two--one the author\nof good, and the other of evil.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Yes, very true; the soul then directs all things in heaven,\nand earth, and sea by her movements, and these are described by the\nterms--will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion true and\nfalse, joy and sorrow, confidence, fear, hatred, love, and other primary\nmotions akin to these; which again receive the secondary motions of\ncorporeal substances, and guide all things to growth and decay, to\ncomposition and decomposition, and to the qualities which accompany\nthem, such as heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness and\nsoftness, blackness and whiteness, bitterness and sweetness, and all\nthose other qualities which the soul uses, herself a goddess, when truly\nreceiving the divine mind she disciplines all things rightly to their\nhappiness; but when she is the companion of folly, she does the very\ncontrary of all this. Shall we assume so much, or do we still entertain\ndoubts?\n\nCLEINIAS: There is no room at all for doubt.\n\nATHENIAN: Shall we say then that it is the soul which controls heaven\nand earth, and the whole world? that it is a principle of wisdom and\nvirtue, or a principle which has neither wisdom nor virtue? Suppose that\nwe make answer as follows:\n\nCLEINIAS: How would you answer?\n\nATHENIAN: If, my friend, we say that the whole path and movement of\nheaven, and of all that is therein, is by nature akin to the movement\nand revolution and calculation of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws,\nthen, as is plain, we must say that the best soul takes care of the\nworld and guides it along the good path.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: But if the world moves wildly and irregularly, then the evil\nsoul guides it.\n\nCLEINIAS: True again.\n\nATHENIAN: Of what nature is the movement of mind? To this question it is\nnot easy to give an intelligent answer; and therefore I ought to assist\nyou in framing one.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: Then let us not answer as if we would look straight at the\nsun, making ourselves darkness at midday--I mean as if we were under the\nimpression that we could see with mortal eyes, or know adequately the\nnature of mind--it will be safer to look at the image only.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: Let us select of the ten motions the one which mind chiefly\nresembles; this I will bring to your recollection, and will then make\nthe answer on behalf of us all.\n\nCLEINIAS: That will be excellent.\n\nATHENIAN: You will surely remember our saying that all things were\neither at rest or in motion?\n\nCLEINIAS: I do.\n\nATHENIAN: And that of things in motion some were moving in one place,\nand others in more than one?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: Of these two kinds of motion, that which moves in one place\nmust move about a centre like globes made in a lathe, and is most\nentirely akin and similar to the circular movement of mind.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: In saying that both mind and the motion which is in one place\nmove in the same and like manner, in and about the same, and in relation\nto the same, and according to one proportion and order, and are like the\nmotion of a globe, we invented a fair image, which does no discredit to\nour ingenuity.\n\nCLEINIAS: It does us great credit.\n\nATHENIAN: And the motion of the other sort which is not after the same\nmanner, nor in the same, nor about the same, nor in relation to the\nsame, nor in one place, nor in order, nor according to any rule or\nproportion, may be said to be akin to senselessness and folly?\n\nCLEINIAS: That is most true.\n\nATHENIAN: Then, after what has been said, there is no difficulty in\ndistinctly stating, that since soul carries all things round, either the\nbest soul or the contrary must of necessity carry round and order and\narrange the revolution of the heaven.\n\nCLEINIAS: And judging from what has been said, Stranger, there would be\nimpiety in asserting that any but the most perfect soul or souls carries\nround the heavens.\n\nATHENIAN: You have understood my meaning right well, Cleinias, and now\nlet me ask you another question.\n\nCLEINIAS: What are you going to ask?\n\nATHENIAN: If the soul carries round the sun and moon, and the other\nstars, does she not carry round each individual of them?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Then of one of them let us speak, and the same argument will\napply to all.\n\nCLEINIAS: Which will you take?\n\nATHENIAN: Every one sees the body of the sun, but no one sees his soul,\nnor the soul of any other body living or dead; and yet there is great\nreason to believe that this nature, unperceived by any of our senses, is\ncircumfused around them all, but is perceived by mind; and therefore by\nmind and reflection only let us apprehend the following point.\n\nCLEINIAS: What is that?\n\nATHENIAN: If the soul carries round the sun, we shall not be far wrong\nin supposing one of three alternatives.\n\nCLEINIAS: What are they?\n\nATHENIAN: Either the soul which moves the sun this way and that, resides\nwithin the circular and visible body, like the soul which carries us\nabout every way; or the soul provides herself with an external body\nof fire or air, as some affirm, and violently propels body by body;\nor thirdly, she is without such a body, but guides the sun by some\nextraordinary and wonderful power.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes, certainly; the soul can only order all things in one of\nthese three ways.\n\nATHENIAN: And this soul of the sun, which is therefore better than the\nsun, whether taking the sun about in a chariot to give light to men, or\nacting from without, or in whatever way, ought by every man to be deemed\na God.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes, by every man who has the least particle of sense.\n\nATHENIAN: And of the stars too, and of the moon, and of the years and\nmonths and seasons, must we not say in like manner, that since a soul\nor souls having every sort of excellence are the causes of all of them,\nthose souls are Gods, whether they are living beings and reside in\nbodies, and in this way order the whole heaven, or whatever be the\nplace and mode of their existence--and will any one who admits all this\nventure to deny that all things are full of Gods?\n\nCLEINIAS: No one, Stranger, would be such a madman.\n\nATHENIAN: And now, Megillus and Cleinias, let us offer terms to him who\nhas hitherto denied the existence of the Gods, and leave him.\n\nCLEINIAS: What terms?\n\nATHENIAN: Either he shall teach us that we were wrong in saying that the\nsoul is the original of all things, and arguing accordingly; or, if he\nbe not able to say anything better, then he must yield to us and live\nfor the remainder of his life in the belief that there are Gods. Let us\nsee, then, whether we have said enough or not enough to those who deny\nthat there are Gods.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly, quite enough, Stranger.\n\nATHENIAN: Then to them we will say no more. And now we are to address\nhim who, believing that there are Gods, believes also that they take no\nheed of human affairs: To him we say--O thou best of men, in believing\nthat there are Gods you are led by some affinity to them, which attracts\nyou towards your kindred and makes you honour and believe in them. But\nthe fortunes of evil and unrighteous men in private as well as public\nlife, which, though not really happy, are wrongly counted happy in\nthe judgment of men, and are celebrated both by poets and prose\nwriters--these draw you aside from your natural piety. Perhaps you have\nseen impious men growing old and leaving their children's children in\nhigh offices, and their prosperity shakes your faith--you have known or\nheard or been yourself an eyewitness of many monstrous impieties, and\nhave beheld men by such criminal means from small beginnings attaining\nto sovereignty and the pinnacle of greatness; and considering all these\nthings you do not like to accuse the Gods of them, because they are your\nrelatives; and so from some want of reasoning power, and also from an\nunwillingness to find fault with them, you have come to believe that\nthey exist indeed, but have no thought or care of human things. Now,\nthat your present evil opinion may not grow to still greater impiety,\nand that we may if possible use arguments which may conjure away the\nevil before it arrives, we will add another argument to that originally\naddressed to him who utterly denied the existence of the Gods. And do\nyou, Megillus and Cleinias, answer for the young man as you did before;\nand if any impediment comes in our way, I will take the word out of your\nmouths, and carry you over the river as I did just now.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good; do as you say, and we will help you as well as we\ncan.\n\nATHENIAN: There will probably be no difficulty in proving to him that\nthe Gods care about the small as well as about the great. For he was\npresent and heard what was said, that they are perfectly good, and that\nthe care of all things is most entirely natural to them.\n\nCLEINIAS: No doubt he heard that.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us consider together in the next place what we mean by\nthis virtue which we ascribe to them. Surely we should say that to be\ntemperate and to possess mind belongs to virtue, and the contrary to\nvice?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Yes; and courage is a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice?\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: And the one is honourable, and the other dishonourable?\n\nCLEINIAS: To be sure.\n\nATHENIAN: And the one, like other meaner things, is a human quality, but\nthe Gods have no part in anything of the sort?\n\nCLEINIAS: That again is what everybody will admit.\n\nATHENIAN: But do we imagine carelessness and idleness and luxury to be\nvirtues? What do you think?\n\nCLEINIAS: Decidedly not.\n\nATHENIAN: They rank under the opposite class?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: And their opposites, therefore, would fall under the opposite\nclass?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: But are we to suppose that one who possesses all these good\nqualities will be luxurious and heedless and idle, like those whom the\npoet compares to stingless drones?\n\nCLEINIAS: And the comparison is a most just one.\n\nATHENIAN: Surely God must not be supposed to have a nature which He\nHimself hates? he who dares to say this sort of thing must not be\ntolerated for a moment.\n\nCLEINIAS: Of course not. How could he have?\n\nATHENIAN: Should we not on any principle be entirely mistaken in\npraising any one who has some special business entrusted to him, if he\nhave a mind which takes care of great matters and no care of small ones?\nReflect; he who acts in this way, whether he be God or man, must act\nfrom one of two principles.\n\nCLEINIAS: What are they?\n\nATHENIAN: Either he must think that the neglect of the small matters\nis of no consequence to the whole, or if he knows that they are of\nconsequence, and he neglects them, his neglect must be attributed to\ncarelessness and indolence. Is there any other way in which his neglect\ncan be explained? For surely, when it is impossible for him to take care\nof all, he is not negligent if he fails to attend to these things\ngreat or small, which a God or some inferior being might be wanting in\nstrength or capacity to manage?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly not.\n\nATHENIAN: Now, then, let us examine the offenders, who both alike\nconfess that there are Gods, but with a difference--the one saying that\nthey may be appeased, and the other that they have no care of small\nmatters: there are three of us and two of them, and we will say to\nthem--In the first place, you both acknowledge that the Gods hear and\nsee and know all things, and that nothing can escape them which is\nmatter of sense and knowledge: do you admit this?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: And do you admit also that they have all power which mortals\nand immortals can have?\n\nCLEINIAS: They will, of course, admit this also.\n\nATHENIAN: And surely we three and they two--five in all--have\nacknowledged that they are good and perfect?\n\nCLEINIAS: Assuredly.\n\nATHENIAN: But, if they are such as we conceive them to be, can we\npossibly suppose that they ever act in the spirit of carelessness\nand indolence? For in us inactivity is the child of cowardice, and\ncarelessness of inactivity and indolence.\n\nCLEINIAS: Most true.\n\nATHENIAN: Then not from inactivity and carelessness is any God ever\nnegligent; for there is no cowardice in them.\n\nCLEINIAS: That is very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Then the alternative which remains is, that if the Gods\nneglect the lighter and lesser concerns of the universe, they\nneglect them because they know that they ought not to care about such\nmatters--what other alternative is there but the opposite of their\nknowing?\n\nCLEINIAS: There is none.\n\nATHENIAN: And, O most excellent and best of men, do I understand you to\nmean that they are careless because they are ignorant, and do not\nknow that they ought to take care, or that they know, and yet like the\nmeanest sort of men, knowing the better, choose the worse because they\nare overcome by pleasures and pains?\n\nCLEINIAS: Impossible.\n\nATHENIAN: Do not all human things partake of the nature of soul? And is\nnot man the most religious of all animals?\n\nCLEINIAS: That is not to be denied.\n\nATHENIAN: And we acknowledge that all mortal creatures are the property\nof the Gods, to whom also the whole of heaven belongs?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And, therefore, whether a person says that these things are to\nthe Gods great or small--in either case it would not be natural for the\nGods who own us, and who are the most careful and the best of owners, to\nneglect us. There is also a further consideration.\n\nCLEINIAS: What is it?\n\nATHENIAN: Sensation and power are in an inverse ratio to each other in\nrespect to their ease and difficulty.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: I mean that there is greater difficulty in seeing and hearing\nthe small than the great, but more facility in moving and controlling\nand taking care of small and unimportant things than of their opposites.\n\nCLEINIAS: Far more.\n\nATHENIAN: Suppose the case of a physician who is willing and able to\ncure some living thing as a whole--how will the whole fare at his hands\nif he takes care only of the greater and neglects the parts which are\nlesser?\n\nCLEINIAS: Decidedly not well.\n\nATHENIAN: No better would be the result with pilots or generals, or\nhouseholders or statesmen, or any other such class, if they neglected\nthe small and regarded only the great--as the builders say, the larger\nstones do not lie well without the lesser.\n\nCLEINIAS: Of course not.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us not, then, deem God inferior to human workmen, who, in\nproportion to their skill, finish and perfect their works, small as well\nas great, by one and the same art; or that God, the wisest of\nbeings, who is both willing and able to take care, is like a lazy\ngood-for-nothing, or a coward, who turns his back upon labour and gives\nno thought to smaller and easier matters, but to the greater only.\n\nCLEINIAS: Never, Stranger, let us admit a supposition about the Gods\nwhich is both impious and false.\n\nATHENIAN: I think that we have now argued enough with him who delights\nto accuse the Gods of neglect.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes.\n\nATHENIAN: He has been forced to acknowledge that he is in error, but he\nstill seems to me to need some words of consolation.\n\nCLEINIAS: What consolation will you offer him?\n\nATHENIAN: Let us say to the youth: The ruler of the universe has ordered\nall things with a view to the excellence and preservation of the whole,\nand each part, as far as may be, has an action and passion appropriate\nto it. Over these, down to the least fraction of them, ministers have\nbeen appointed to preside, who have wrought out their perfection with\ninfinitesimal exactness. And one of these portions of the universe is\nthine own, unhappy man, which, however little, contributes to the whole;\nand you do not seem to be aware that this and every other creation is\nfor the sake of the whole, and in order that the life of the whole may\nbe blessed; and that you are created for the sake of the whole, and not\nthe whole for the sake of you. For every physician and every skilled\nartist does all things for the sake of the whole, directing his effort\ntowards the common good, executing the part for the sake of the whole,\nand not the whole for the sake of the part. And you are annoyed because\nyou are ignorant how what is best for you happens to you and to the\nuniverse, as far as the laws of the common creation admit. Now, as the\nsoul combining first with one body and then with another undergoes all\nsorts of changes, either of herself, or through the influence of another\nsoul, all that remains to the player of the game is that he should shift\nthe pieces; sending the better nature to the better place, and the worse\nto the worse, and so assigning to them their proper portion.\n\nCLEINIAS: In what way do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: In a way which may be supposed to make the care of all things\neasy to the Gods. If any one were to form or fashion all things without\nany regard to the whole--if, for example, he formed a living element of\nwater out of fire, instead of forming many things out of one or one out\nof many in regular order attaining to a first or second or third birth,\nthe transmutation would have been infinite; but now the ruler of the\nworld has a wonderfully easy task.\n\nCLEINIAS: How so?\n\nATHENIAN: I will explain: When the king saw that our actions had life,\nand that there was much virtue in them and much vice, and that the soul\nand body, although not, like the Gods of popular opinion, eternal, yet\nhaving once come into existence, were indestructible (for if either of\nthem had been destroyed, there would have been no generation of living\nbeings); and when he observed that the good of the soul was ever by\nnature designed to profit men, and the evil to harm them--he, seeing all\nthis, contrived so to place each of the parts that their position might\nin the easiest and best manner procure the victory of good and the\ndefeat of evil in the whole. And he contrived a general plan by which\na thing of a certain nature found a certain seat and room. But the\nformation of qualities he left to the wills of individuals. For every\none of us is made pretty much what he is by the bent of his desires and\nthe nature of his soul.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes, that is probably true.\n\nATHENIAN: Then all things which have a soul change, and possess in\nthemselves a principle of change, and in changing move according to\nlaw and to the order of destiny: natures which have undergone a lesser\nchange move less and on the earth's surface, but those which have\nsuffered more change and have become more criminal sink into the abyss,\nthat is to say, into Hades and other places in the world below, of which\nthe very names terrify men, and which they picture to themselves as in\na dream, both while alive and when released from the body. And whenever\nthe soul receives more of good or evil from her own energy and the\nstrong influence of others--when she has communion with divine virtue\nand becomes divine, she is carried into another and better place, which\nis perfect in holiness; but when she has communion with evil, then she\nalso changes the place of her life.\n\n'This is the justice of the Gods who inhabit Olympus.'\n\nO youth or young man, who fancy that you are neglected by the Gods, know\nthat if you become worse you shall go to the worse souls, or if better\nto the better, and in every succession of life and death you will do\nand suffer what like may fitly suffer at the hands of like. This is the\njustice of heaven, which neither you nor any other unfortunate will\never glory in escaping, and which the ordaining powers have specially\nordained; take good heed thereof, for it will be sure to take heed of\nyou. If you say: I am small and will creep into the depths of the earth,\nor I am high and will fly up to heaven, you are not so small or so high\nbut that you shall pay the fitting penalty, either here or in the world\nbelow or in some still more savage place whither you shall be conveyed.\nThis is also the explanation of the fate of those whom you saw, who had\ndone unholy and evil deeds, and from small beginnings had grown great,\nand you fancied that from being miserable they had become happy; and in\ntheir actions, as in a mirror, you seemed to see the universal neglect\nof the Gods, not knowing how they make all things work together and\ncontribute to the great whole. And thinkest thou, bold man, that thou\nneedest not to know this? he who knows it not can never form any true\nidea of the happiness or unhappiness of life or hold any rational\ndiscourse respecting either. If Cleinias and this our reverend company\nsucceed in proving to you that you know not what you say of the Gods,\nthen will God help you; but should you desire to hear more, listen\nto what we say to the third opponent, if you have any understanding\nwhatsoever. For I think that we have sufficiently proved the existence\nof the Gods, and that they care for men: The other notion that they are\nappeased by the wicked, and take gifts, is what we must not concede to\nany one, and what every man should disprove to the utmost of his power.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good; let us do as you say.\n\nATHENIAN: Well, then, by the Gods themselves I conjure you to tell\nme--if they are to be propitiated, how are they to be propitiated? Who\nare they, and what is their nature? Must they not be at least rulers who\nhave to order unceasingly the whole heaven?\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: And to what earthly rulers can they be compared, or who to\nthem? How in the less can we find an image of the greater? Are they\ncharioteers of contending pairs of steeds, or pilots of vessels? Perhaps\nthey might be compared to the generals of armies, or they might be\nlikened to physicians providing against the diseases which make war\nupon the body, or to husbandmen observing anxiously the effects of the\nseasons on the growth of plants; or perhaps to shepherds of flocks. For\nas we acknowledge the world to be full of many goods and also of evils,\nand of more evils than goods, there is, as we affirm, an immortal\nconflict going on among us, which requires marvellous watchfulness; and\nin that conflict the Gods and demigods are our allies, and we are their\nproperty. Injustice and insolence and folly are the destruction of us,\nand justice and temperance and wisdom are our salvation; and the place\nof these latter is in the life of the Gods, although some vestige of\nthem may occasionally be discerned among mankind. But upon this earth\nwe know that there dwell souls possessing an unjust spirit, who may be\ncompared to brute animals, which fawn upon their keepers, whether dogs\nor shepherds, or the best and most perfect masters; for they in like\nmanner, as the voices of the wicked declare, prevail by flattery and\nprayers and incantations, and are allowed to make their gains with\nimpunity. And this sin, which is termed dishonesty, is an evil of the\nsame kind as what is termed disease in living bodies or pestilence in\nyears or seasons of the year, and in cities and governments has another\nname, which is injustice.\n\nCLEINIAS: Quite true.\n\nATHENIAN: What else can he say who declares that the Gods are always\nlenient to the doers of unjust acts, if they divide the spoil with them?\nAs if wolves were to toss a portion of their prey to the dogs, and they,\nmollified by the gift, suffered them to tear the flocks. Must not he who\nmaintains that the Gods can be propitiated argue thus?\n\nCLEINIAS: Precisely so.\n\nATHENIAN: And to which of the above-mentioned classes of guardians would\nany man compare the Gods without absurdity? Will he say that they\nare like pilots, who are themselves turned away from their duty by\n'libations of wine and the savour of fat,' and at last overturn both\nship and sailors?\n\nCLEINIAS: Assuredly not.\n\nATHENIAN: And surely they are not like charioteers who are bribed to\ngive up the victory to other chariots?\n\nCLEINIAS: That would be a fearful image of the Gods.\n\nATHENIAN: Nor are they like generals, or physicians, or husbandmen, or\nshepherds; and no one would compare them to dogs who have been silenced\nby wolves.\n\nCLEINIAS: A thing not to be spoken of.\n\nATHENIAN: And are not all the Gods the chiefest of all guardians, and do\nthey not guard our highest interests?\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes; the chiefest.\n\nATHENIAN: And shall we say that those who guard our noblest interests,\nand are the best of guardians, are inferior in virtue to dogs, and to\nmen even of moderate excellence, who would never betray justice for the\nsake of gifts which unjust men impiously offer them?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly not; nor is such a notion to be endured, and he who\nholds this opinion may be fairly singled out and characterized as of all\nimpious men the wickedest and most impious.\n\nATHENIAN: Then are the three assertions--that the Gods exist, and\nthat they take care of men, and that they can never be persuaded to do\ninjustice, now sufficiently demonstrated? May we say that they are?\n\nCLEINIAS: You have our entire assent to your words.\n\nATHENIAN: I have spoken with vehemence because I am zealous against evil\nmen; and I will tell you, dear Cleinias, why I am so. I would not have\nthe wicked think that, having the superiority in argument, they may do\nas they please and act according to their various imaginations about the\nGods; and this zeal has led me to speak too vehemently; but if we have\nat all succeeded in persuading the men to hate themselves and love their\nopposites, the prelude of our laws about impiety will not have been\nspoken in vain.\n\nCLEINIAS: So let us hope; and even if we have failed, the style of our\nargument will not discredit the lawgiver.\n\nATHENIAN: After the prelude shall follow a discourse, which will be the\ninterpreter of the law; this shall proclaim to all impious persons that\nthey must depart from their ways and go over to the pious. And to those\nwho disobey, let the law about impiety be as follows: If a man is guilty\nof any impiety in word or deed, any one who happens to be present shall\ngive information to the magistrates, in aid of the law; and let the\nmagistrates who first receive the information bring him before the\nappointed court according to the law; and if a magistrate, after\nreceiving information, refuses to act, he shall be tried for impiety at\nthe instance of any one who is willing to vindicate the laws; and if\nany one be cast, the court shall estimate the punishment of each act of\nimpiety; and let all such criminals be imprisoned. There shall be three\nprisons in the state: the first of them is to be the common prison in\nthe neighbourhood of the agora for the safe-keeping of the generality\nof offenders; another is to be in the neighbourhood of the nocturnal\ncouncil, and is to be called the 'House of Reformation'; another, to be\nsituated in some wild and desolate region in the centre of the country,\nshall be called by some name expressive of retribution. Now, men fall\ninto impiety from three causes, which have been already mentioned, and\nfrom each of these causes arise two sorts of impiety, in all six, which\nare worth distinguishing, and should not all have the same punishment.\nFor he who does not believe in the Gods, and yet has a righteous nature,\nhates the wicked and dislikes and refuses to do injustice, and avoids\nunrighteous men, and loves the righteous. But they who besides believing\nthat the world is devoid of Gods are intemperate, and have at the same\ntime good memories and quick wits, are worse; although both of them are\nunbelievers, much less injury is done by the one than by the other. The\none may talk loosely about the Gods and about sacrifices and oaths, and\nperhaps by laughing at other men he may make them like himself, if he be\nnot punished. But the other who holds the same opinions and is called a\nclever man, is full of stratagem and deceit--men of this class deal in\nprophecy and jugglery of all kinds, and out of their ranks sometimes\ncome tyrants and demagogues and generals and hierophants of private\nmysteries and the Sophists, as they are termed, with their ingenious\ndevices. There are many kinds of unbelievers, but two only for whom\nlegislation is required; one the hypocritical sort, whose crime is\ndeserving of death many times over, while the other needs only bonds and\nadmonition. In like manner also the notion that the Gods take no thought\nof men produces two other sorts of crimes, and the notion that they may\nbe propitiated produces two more. Assuming these divisions, let those\nwho have been made what they are only from want of understanding, and\nnot from malice or an evil nature, be placed by the judge in the House\nof Reformation, and ordered to suffer imprisonment during a period\nof not less than five years. And in the meantime let them have no\nintercourse with the other citizens, except with members of the\nnocturnal council, and with them let them converse with a view to\nthe improvement of their soul's health. And when the time of their\nimprisonment has expired, if any of them be of sound mind let him be\nrestored to sane company, but if not, and if he be condemned a second\ntime, let him be punished with death. As to that class of monstrous\nnatures who not only believe that there are no Gods, or that they are\nnegligent, or to be propitiated, but in contempt of mankind conjure the\nsouls of the living and say that they can conjure the dead and promise\nto charm the Gods with sacrifices and prayers, and will utterly\noverthrow individuals and whole houses and states for the sake of\nmoney--let him who is guilty of any of these things be condemned by the\ncourt to be bound according to law in the prison which is in the centre\nof the land, and let no freeman ever approach him, but let him receive\nthe rations of food appointed by the guardians of the law from the hands\nof the public slaves; and when he is dead let him be cast beyond the\nborders unburied, and if any freeman assist in burying him, let him pay\nthe penalty of impiety to any one who is willing to bring a suit against\nhim. But if he leaves behind him children who are fit to be citizens,\nlet the guardians of orphans take care of them, just as they would of\nany other orphans, from the day on which their father is convicted.\n\nIn all these cases there should be one law, which will make men in\ngeneral less liable to transgress in word or deed, and less foolish,\nbecause they will not be allowed to practise religious rites contrary\nto law. And let this be the simple form of the law: No man shall have\nsacred rites in a private house. When he would sacrifice, let him go to\nthe temples and hand over his offerings to the priests and priestesses,\nwho see to the sanctity of such things, and let him pray himself, and\nlet any one who pleases join with him in prayer. The reason of this is\nas follows: Gods and temples are not easily instituted, and to establish\nthem rightly is the work of a mighty intellect. And women especially,\nand men too, when they are sick or in danger, or in any sort of\ndifficulty, or again on their receiving any good fortune, have a way of\nconsecrating the occasion, vowing sacrifices, and promising shrines to\nGods, demigods, and sons of Gods; and when they are awakened by terrible\napparitions and dreams or remember visions, they find in altars and\ntemples the remedies of them, and will fill every house and village with\nthem, placing them in the open air, or wherever they may have had such\nvisions; and with a view to all these cases we should obey the law. The\nlaw has also regard to the impious, and would not have them fancy that\nby the secret performance of these actions--by raising temples and by\nbuilding altars in private houses, they can propitiate the God secretly\nwith sacrifices and prayers, while they are really multiplying their\ncrimes infinitely, bringing guilt from heaven upon themselves, and also\nupon those who permit them, and who are better men than they are;\nand the consequence is that the whole state reaps the fruit of their\nimpiety, which, in a certain sense, is deserved. Assuredly God will not\nblame the legislator, who will enact the following law: No one shall\npossess shrines of the Gods in private houses, and he who is found\nto possess them, and perform any sacred rites not publicly\nauthorised--supposing the offender to be some man or woman who is not\nguilty of any other great and impious crime--shall be informed against\nby him who is acquainted with the fact, which shall be announced by him\nto the guardians of the law; and let them issue orders that he or she\nshall carry away their private rites to the public temples, and if they\ndo not persuade them, let them inflict a penalty on them until they\ncomply. And if a person be proven guilty of impiety, not merely from\nchildish levity, but such as grown-up men may be guilty of, whether he\nhave sacrificed publicly or privately to any Gods, let him be punished\nwith death, for his sacrifice is impure. Whether the deed has been done\nin earnest, or only from childish levity, let the guardians of the law\ndetermine, before they bring the matter into court and prosecute the\noffender for impiety.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK XI.\n\nIn the next place, dealings between man and man require to be suitably\nregulated. The principle of them is very simple: Thou shalt not, if thou\ncanst help, touch that which is mine, or remove the least thing which\nbelongs to me without my consent; and may I be of a sound mind, and do\nto others as I would that they should do to me. First, let us speak of\ntreasure-trove: May I never pray the Gods to find the hidden treasure,\nwhich another has laid up for himself and his family, he not being one\nof my ancestors, nor lift, if I should find, such a treasure. And may I\nnever have any dealings with those who are called diviners, and who in\nany way or manner counsel me to take up the deposit entrusted to the\nearth, for I should not gain so much in the increase of my possessions,\nif I take up the prize, as I should grow in justice and virtue of soul,\nif I abstain; and this will be a better possession to me than the other\nin a better part of myself; for the possession of justice in the soul\nis preferable to the possession of wealth. And of many things it is\nwell said--'Move not the immovables,' and this may be regarded as one of\nthem. And we shall do well to believe the common tradition which says,\nthat such deeds prevent a man from having a family. Now as to him who is\ncareless about having children and regardless of the legislator, taking\nup that which neither he deposited, nor any ancestor of his, without\nthe consent of the depositor, violating the simplest and noblest of laws\nwhich was the enactment of no mean man: 'Take not up that which was not\nlaid down by thee'--of him, I say, who despises these two legislators,\nand takes up, not some small matter which he has not deposited, but\nperhaps a great heap of treasure, what he ought to suffer at the hands\nof the Gods, God only knows; but I would have the first person who sees\nhim go and tell the wardens of the city, if the occurrence has taken\nplace in the city, or if the occurrence has taken place in the agora he\nshall tell the wardens of the agora, or if in the country he shall tell\nthe wardens of the country and their commanders. When information has\nbeen received the city shall send to Delphi, and, whatever the God\nanswers about the money and the remover of the money, that the city\nshall do in obedience to the oracle; the informer, if he be a freeman,\nshall have the honour of doing rightly, and he who informs not, the\ndishonour of doing wrongly; and if he be a slave who gives information,\nlet him be freed, as he ought to be, by the state, which shall give his\nmaster the price of him; but if he do not inform he shall be punished\nwith death. Next in order shall follow a similar law, which shall apply\nequally to matters great and small: If a man happens to leave behind him\nsome part of his property, whether intentionally or unintentionally, let\nhim who may come upon the left property suffer it to remain, reflecting\nthat such things are under the protection of the Goddess of ways, and\nare dedicated to her by the law. But if any one defies the law, and\ntakes the property home with him, let him, if the thing is of little\nworth, and the man who takes it a slave, be beaten with many stripes by\nhim who meets him, being a person of not less than thirty years of age.\nOr if he be a freeman, in addition to being thought a mean person and\na despiser of the laws, let him pay ten times the value of the treasure\nwhich he has moved to the leaver. And if some one accuses another of\nhaving anything which belongs to him, whether little or much, and the\nother admits that he has this thing, but denies that the property in\ndispute belongs to the other, if the property be registered with the\nmagistrates according to law, the claimant shall summon the possessor,\nwho shall bring it before the magistrates; and when it is brought into\ncourt, if it be registered in the public registers, to which of the\nlitigants it belonged, let him take it and go his way. Or if the\nproperty be registered as belonging to some one who is not present,\nwhoever will offer sufficient surety on behalf of the absent person that\nhe will give it up to him, shall take it away as the representative of\nthe other. But if the property which is deposited be not registered with\nthe magistrates, let it remain until the time of trial with three of the\neldest of the magistrates; and if it be an animal which is deposited,\nthen he who loses the suit shall pay the magistrates for its keep, and\nthey shall determine the cause within three days.\n\nAny one who is of sound mind may arrest his own slave, and do with him\nwhatever he will of such things as are lawful; and he may arrest the\nrunaway slave of any of his friends or kindred with a view to his\nsafe-keeping. And if any one takes away him who is being carried off as\na slave, intending to liberate him, he who is carrying him off shall let\nhim go; but he who takes him away shall give three sufficient sureties;\nand if he give them, and not without giving them, he may take him away,\nbut if he take him away after any other manner he shall be deemed guilty\nof violence, and being convicted shall pay as a penalty double the\namount of the damages claimed to him who has been deprived of the slave.\nAny man may also carry off a freedman, if he do not pay respect or\nsufficient respect to him who freed him. Now the respect shall be, that\nthe freedman go three times in the month to the hearth of the person who\nfreed him, and offer to do whatever he ought, so far as he can; and he\nshall agree to make such a marriage as his former master approves.\nHe shall not be permitted to have more property than he who gave him\nliberty, and what more he has shall belong to his master. The freedman\nshall not remain in the state more than twenty years, but like other\nforeigners shall go away, taking his entire property with him, unless he\nhas the consent of the magistrates and of his former master to remain.\nIf a freedman or any other stranger has a property greater than the\ncensus of the third class, at the expiration of thirty days from the day\non which this comes to pass, he shall take that which is his and go his\nway, and in this case he shall not be allowed to remain any longer by\nthe magistrates. And if any one disobeys this regulation, and is brought\ninto court and convicted, he shall be punished with death, and his\nproperty shall be confiscated. Suits about these matters shall take\nplace before the tribes, unless the plaintiff and defendant have got rid\nof the accusation either before their neighbours or before judges chosen\nby them. If a man lay claim to any animal or anything else which he\ndeclares to be his, let the possessor refer to the seller or to some\nhonest and trustworthy person, who has given, or in some legitimate way\nmade over the property to him; if he be a citizen or a metic, sojourning\nin the city, within thirty days, or, if the property have been delivered\nto him by a stranger, within five months, of which the middle month\nshall include the summer solstice. When goods are exchanged by selling\nand buying, a man shall deliver them, and receive the price of them, at\na fixed place in the agora, and have done with the matter; but he shall\nnot buy or sell anywhere else, nor give credit. And if in any other\nmanner or in any other place there be an exchange of one thing for\nanother, and the seller give credit to the man who buys from him, he\nmust do this on the understanding that the law gives no protection in\ncases of things sold not in accordance with these regulations. Again,\nas to contributions, any man who likes may go about collecting\ncontributions as a friend among friends, but if any difference arises\nabout the collection, he is to act on the understanding that the law\ngives no protection in such cases. He who sells anything above the value\nof fifty drachmas shall be required to remain in the city for ten days,\nand the purchaser shall be informed of the house of the seller, with a\nview to the sort of charges which are apt to arise in such cases, and\nthe restitutions which the law allows. And let legal restitution be on\nthis wise: If a man sells a slave who is in a consumption, or who has\nthe disease of the stone, or of strangury, or epilepsy, or some other\ntedious and incurable disorder of body or mind, which is not discernible\nto the ordinary man, if the purchaser be a physician or trainer, he\nshall have no right of restitution; nor shall there be any right of\nrestitution if the seller has told the truth beforehand to the buyer.\nBut if a skilled person sells to another who is not skilled, let the\nbuyer appeal for restitution within six months, except in the case of\nepilepsy, and then the appeal may be made within a year. The cause shall\nbe determined by such physicians as the parties may agree to choose; and\nthe defendant, if he lose the suit, shall pay double the price at which\nhe sold. If a private person sell to another private person, he shall\nhave the right of restitution, and the decision shall be given as\nbefore, but the defendant, if he be cast, shall only pay back the price\nof the slave. If a person sells a homicide to another, and they both\nknow of the fact, let there be no restitution in such a case, but if he\ndo not know of the fact, there shall be a right of restitution, whenever\nthe buyer makes the discovery; and the decision shall rest with the five\nyoungest guardians of the law, and if the decision be that the seller\nwas cognisant of the fact, he shall purify the house of the purchaser,\naccording to the law of the interpreters, and shall pay back three times\nthe purchase-money.\n\nIf a man exchanges either money for money, or anything whatever for\nanything else, either with or without life, let him give and receive\nthem genuine and unadulterated, in accordance with the law. And let us\nhave a prelude about all this sort of roguery, like the preludes of our\nother laws. Every man should regard adulteration as of one and the same\nclass with falsehood and deceit, concerning which the many are too fond\nof saying that at proper times and places the practice may often\nbe right. But they leave the occasion, and the when, and the where,\nundefined and unsettled, and from this want of definiteness in their\nlanguage they do a great deal of harm to themselves and to others. Now\na legislator ought not to leave the matter undetermined; he ought to\nprescribe some limit, either greater or less. Let this be the rule\nprescribed: No one shall call the Gods to witness, when he says or does\nanything false or deceitful or dishonest, unless he would be the most\nhateful of mankind to them. And he is most hateful to them who takes a\nfalse oath, and pays no heed to the Gods; and in the next degree, he who\ntells a falsehood in the presence of his superiors. Now better men are\nthe superiors of worse men, and in general elders are the superiors of\nthe young; wherefore also parents are the superiors of their offspring,\nand men of women and children, and rulers of their subjects; for all\nmen ought to reverence any one who is in any position of authority, and\nespecially those who are in state offices. And this is the reason why\nI have spoken of these matters. For every one who is guilty of\nadulteration in the agora tells a falsehood, and deceives, and when he\ninvokes the Gods, according to the customs and cautions of the wardens\nof the agora, he does but swear without any respect for God or man.\nCertainly, it is an excellent rule not lightly to defile the names of\nthe Gods, after the fashion of men in general, who care little about\npiety and purity in their religious actions. But if a man will not\nconform to this rule, let the law be as follows: He who sells anything\nin the agora shall not ask two prices for that which he sells, but he\nshall ask one price, and if he do not obtain this, he shall take away\nhis goods; and on that day he shall not value them either at more or\nless; and there shall be no praising of any goods, or oath taken about\nthem. If a person disobeys this command, any citizen who is present, not\nbeing less than thirty years of age, may with impunity chastise and beat\nthe swearer, but if instead of obeying the laws he takes no heed, he\nshall be liable to the charge of having betrayed them. If a man sells\nany adulterated goods and will not obey these regulations, he who\nknows and can prove the fact, and does prove it in the presence of the\nmagistrates, if he be a slave or a metic, shall have the adulterated\ngoods; but if he be a citizen, and do not pursue the charge, he shall be\ncalled a rogue, and deemed to have robbed the Gods of the agora; or if\nhe proves the charge, he shall dedicate the goods to the Gods of the\nagora. He who is proved to have sold any adulterated goods, in addition\nto losing the goods themselves, shall be beaten with stripes--a stripe\nfor a drachma, according to the price of the goods; and the herald shall\nproclaim in the agora the offence for which he is going to be beaten.\nThe wardens of the agora and the guardians of the law shall obtain\ninformation from experienced persons about the rogueries and\nadulterations of the sellers, and shall write up what the seller ought\nand ought not to do in each case; and let them inscribe their laws on a\ncolumn in front of the court of the wardens of the agora, that they may\nbe clear instructors of those who have business in the agora. Enough\nhas been said in what has preceded about the wardens of the city, and if\nanything seems to be wanting, let them communicate with the guardians of\nthe law, and write down the omission, and place on a column in the court\nof the wardens of the city the primary and secondary regulations which\nare laid down for them about their office.\n\nAfter the practices of adulteration naturally follow the practices of\nretail trade. Concerning these, we will first of all give a word of\ncounsel and reason, and the law shall come afterwards. Retail trade in\na city is not by nature intended to do any harm, but quite the\ncontrary; for is not he a benefactor who reduces the inequalities and\nincommensurabilities of goods to equality and common measure? And this\nis what the power of money accomplishes, and the merchant may be said to\nbe appointed for this purpose. The hireling and the tavern-keeper, and\nmany other occupations, some of them more and others less seemly--all\nalike have this object--they seek to satisfy our needs and equalize our\npossessions. Let us then endeavour to see what has brought retail trade\ninto ill-odour, and wherein lies the dishonour and unseemliness of it,\nin order that if not entirely, we may yet partially, cure the evil by\nlegislation. To effect this is no easy matter, and requires a great deal\nof virtue.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: Dear Cleinias, the class of men is small--they must have been\nrarely gifted by nature, and trained by education--who, when assailed by\nwants and desires, are able to hold out and observe moderation, and when\nthey might make a great deal of money are sober in their wishes, and\nprefer a moderate to a large gain. But the mass of mankind are the\nvery opposite: their desires are unbounded, and when they might gain in\nmoderation they prefer gains without limit; wherefore all that relates\nto retail trade, and merchandise, and the keeping of taverns, is\ndenounced and numbered among dishonourable things. For if what I trust\nmay never be and will not be, we were to compel, if I may venture to say\na ridiculous thing, the best men everywhere to keep taverns for a\ntime, or carry on retail trade, or do anything of that sort; or if, in\nconsequence of some fate or necessity, the best women were compelled to\nfollow similar callings, then we should know how agreeable and pleasant\nall these things are; and if all such occupations were managed on\nincorrupt principles, they would be honoured as we honour a mother or a\nnurse. But now that a man goes to desert places and builds houses which\ncan only be reached by long journeys, for the sake of retail trade, and\nreceives strangers who are in need at the welcome resting-place, and\ngives them peace and calm when they are tossed by the storm, or cool\nshade in the heat; and then instead of behaving to them as friends, and\nshowing the duties of hospitality to his guests, treats them as enemies\nand captives who are at his mercy, and will not release them until they\nhave paid the most unjust, abominable, and extortionate ransom--these\nare the sort of practises, and foul evils they are, which cast a\nreproach upon the succour of adversity. And the legislator ought always\nto be devising a remedy for evils of this nature. There is an ancient\nsaying, which is also a true one--'To fight against two opponents is a\ndifficult thing,' as is seen in diseases and in many other cases. And in\nthis case also the war is against two enemies--wealth and poverty; one\nof whom corrupts the soul of man with luxury, while the other drives him\nby pain into utter shamelessness. What remedy can a city of sense find\nagainst this disease? In the first place, they must have as few retail\ntraders as possible; and in the second place, they must assign the\noccupation to that class of men whose corruption will be the least\ninjury to the state; and in the third place, they must devise some way\nwhereby the followers of these occupations themselves will not readily\nfall into habits of unbridled shamelessness and meanness.\n\nAfter this preface let our law run as follows, and may fortune favour\nus: No landowner among the Magnetes, whose city the God is restoring and\nresettling--no one, that is, of the 5040 families, shall become a\nretail trader either voluntarily or involuntarily; neither shall he be\na merchant, or do any service for private persons unless they equally\nserve him, except for his father or his mother, and their fathers and\nmothers; and in general for his elders who are freemen, and whom he\nserves as a freeman. Now it is difficult to determine accurately the\nthings which are worthy or unworthy of a freeman, but let those who have\nobtained the prize of virtue give judgment about them in accordance\nwith their feelings of right and wrong. He who in any way shares in the\nilliberality of retail trades may be indicted for dishonouring his race\nby any one who likes, before those who have been judged to be the first\nin virtue; and if he appear to throw dirt upon his father's house by an\nunworthy occupation, let him be imprisoned for a year and abstain from\nthat sort of thing; and if he repeat the offence, for two years; and\nevery time that he is convicted let the length of his imprisonment be\ndoubled. This shall be the second law: He who engages in retail trade\nmust be either a metic or a stranger. And a third law shall be: In\norder that the retail trader who dwells in our city may be as good or\nas little bad as possible, the guardians of the law shall remember\nthat they are not only guardians of those who may be easily watched and\nprevented from becoming lawless or bad, because they are well-born and\nbred; but still more should they have a watch over those who are of\nanother sort, and follow pursuits which have a very strong tendency to\nmake men bad. And, therefore, in respect of the multifarious occupations\nof retail trade, that is to say, in respect of such of them as are\nallowed to remain, because they seem to be quite necessary in a\nstate--about these the guardians of the law should meet and take counsel\nwith those who have experience of the several kinds of retail trade, as\nwe before commanded concerning adulteration (which is a matter akin to\nthis), and when they meet they shall consider what amount of receipts,\nafter deducting expenses, will produce a moderate gain to the retail\ntrades, and they shall fix in writing and strictly maintain what they\nfind to be the right percentage of profit; this shall be seen to by the\nwardens of the agora, and by the wardens of the city, and by the wardens\nof the country. And so retail trade will benefit every one, and do the\nleast possible injury to those in the state who practise it.\n\nWhen a man makes an agreement which he does not fulfil, unless the\nagreement be of a nature which the law or a vote of the assembly does\nnot allow, or which he has made under the influence of some unjust\ncompulsion, or which he is prevented from fulfilling against his will\nby some unexpected chance, the other party may go to law with him in\nthe courts of the tribes, for not having completed his agreement, if\nthe parties are not able previously to come to terms before arbiters or\nbefore their neighbours. The class of craftsmen who have furnished human\nlife with the arts is dedicated to Hephaestus and Athene; and there is\na class of craftsmen who preserve the works of all craftsmen by arts of\ndefence, the votaries of Ares and Athene, to which divinities they\ntoo are rightly dedicated. All these continue through life serving the\ncountry and the people; some of them are leaders in battle; others make\nfor hire implements and works, and they ought not to deceive in such\nmatters, out of respect to the Gods who are their ancestors. If any\ncraftsman through indolence omit to execute his work in a given\ntime, not reverencing the God who gives him the means of life, but\nconsidering, foolish fellow, that he is his own God and will let him off\neasily, in the first place, he shall suffer at the hands of the God, and\nin the second place, the law shall follow in a similar spirit. He shall\nowe to him who contracted with him the price of the works which he has\nfailed in performing, and he shall begin again and execute them gratis\nin the given time. When a man undertakes a work, the law gives him the\nsame advice which was given to the seller, that he should not attempt to\nraise the price, but simply ask the value; this the law enjoins also on\nthe contractor; for the craftsman assuredly knows the value of his work.\nWherefore, in free states the man of art ought not to attempt to impose\nupon private individuals by the help of his art, which is by nature a\ntrue thing; and he who is wronged in a matter of this sort, shall have\na right of action against the party who has wronged him. And if any one\nlets out work to a craftsman, and does not pay him duly according to the\nlawful agreement, disregarding Zeus the guardian of the city and Athene,\nwho are the partners of the state, and overthrows the foundations of\nsociety for the sake of a little gain, in his case let the law and the\nGods maintain the common bonds of the state. And let him who, having\nalready received the work in exchange, does not pay the price in the\ntime agreed, pay double the price; and if a year has elapsed, although\ninterest is not to be taken on loans, yet for every drachma which he\nowes to the contractor let him pay a monthly interest of an obol. Suits\nabout these matters are to be decided by the courts of the tribes; and\nby the way, since we have mentioned craftsmen at all, we must not\nforget that other craft of war, in which generals and tacticians are the\ncraftsmen, who undertake voluntarily or involuntarily the work of our\nsafety, as other craftsmen undertake other public works--if they execute\ntheir work well the law will never tire of praising him who gives them\nthose honours which are the just rewards of the soldier; but if any one,\nhaving already received the benefit of any noble service in war, does\nnot make the due return of honour, the law will blame him. Let this then\nbe the law, having an ingredient of praise, not compelling but advising\nthe great body of the citizens to honour the brave men who are the\nsaviours of the whole state, whether by their courage or by their\nmilitary skill--they should honour them, I say, in the second place; for\nthe first and highest tribute of respect is to be given to those who are\nable above other men to honour the words of good legislators.\n\nThe greater part of the dealings between man and man have been now\nregulated by us with the exception of those that relate to orphans and\nthe supervision of orphans by their guardians. These follow next in\norder, and must be regulated in some way. But to arrive at them we must\nbegin with the testamentary wishes of the dying and the case of those\nwho may have happened to die intestate. When I said, Cleinias, that we\nmust regulate them, I had in my mind the difficulty and perplexity in\nwhich all such matters are involved. You cannot leave them unregulated,\nfor individuals would make regulations at variance with one another, and\nrepugnant to the laws and habits of the living and to their own previous\nhabits, if a person were simply allowed to make any will which he\npleased, and this were to take effect in whatever state he may have been\nat the end of his life; for most of us lose our senses in a manner, and\nfeel crushed when we think that we are about to die.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean, Stranger?\n\nATHENIAN: O Cleinias, a man when he is about to die is an intractable\ncreature, and is apt to use language which causes a great deal of\nanxiety and trouble to the legislator.\n\nCLEINIAS: In what way?\n\nATHENIAN: He wants to have the entire control of all his property, and\nwill use angry words.\n\nCLEINIAS: Such as what?\n\nATHENIAN: O ye Gods, he will say, how monstrous that I am not allowed\nto give, or not to give, my own to whom I will--less to him who has been\nbad to me, and more to him who has been good to me, and whose badness\nand goodness have been tested by me in time of sickness or in old age\nand in every other sort of fortune!\n\nCLEINIAS: Well, Stranger, and may he not very fairly say so?\n\nATHENIAN: In my opinion, Cleinias, the ancient legislators were\ntoo good-natured, and made laws without sufficient observation or\nconsideration of human things.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: I mean, my friend, that they were afraid of the testator's\nreproaches, and so they passed a law to the effect that a man should be\nallowed to dispose of his property in all respects as he liked; but you\nand I, if I am not mistaken, will have something better to say to our\ndeparting citizens.\n\nCLEINIAS: What?\n\nATHENIAN: O my friends, we will say to them, hard is it for you, who\nare creatures of a day, to know what is yours--hard too, as the Delphic\noracle says, to know yourselves at this hour. Now I, as the legislator,\nregard you and your possessions, not as belonging to yourselves, but as\nbelonging to your whole family, both past and future, and yet more do I\nregard both family and possessions as belonging to the state; wherefore,\nif some one steals upon you with flattery, when you are tossed on the\nsea of disease or old age, and persuades you to dispose of your property\nin a way that is not for the best, I will not, if I can help, allow\nthis; but I will legislate with a view to the whole, considering what\nis best both for the state and for the family, esteeming as I ought\nthe feelings of an individual at a lower rate; and I hope that you will\ndepart in peace and kindness towards us, as you are going the way of\nall mankind; and we will impartially take care of all your concerns, not\nneglecting any of them, if we can possibly help. Let this be our prelude\nand consolation to the living and dying, Cleinias, and let the law be as\nfollows: He who makes a disposition in a testament, if he be the father\nof a family, shall first of all inscribe as his heir any one of his sons\nwhom he may think fit; and if he gives any of his children to be adopted\nby another citizen, let the adoption be inscribed. And if he has a son\nremaining over and above who has not been adopted upon any lot, and who\nmay be expected to be sent out to a colony according to law, to him his\nfather may give as much as he pleases of the rest of his property, with\nthe exception of the paternal lot and the fixtures on the lot. And if\nthere are other sons, let him distribute among them what there is more\nthan the lot in such portions as he pleases. And if one of the sons\nhas already a house of his own, he shall not give him of the money, nor\nshall he give money to a daughter who has been betrothed, but if she is\nnot betrothed he may give her money. And if any of the sons or daughters\nshall be found to have another lot of land in the country, which has\naccrued after the testament has been made, they shall leave the lot\nwhich they have inherited to the heir of the man who has made the will.\nIf the testator has no sons, but only daughters, let him choose the\nhusband of any one of his daughters whom he pleases, and leave and\ninscribe him as his son and heir. And if a man have lost his son, when\nhe was a child, and before he could be reckoned among grown up men,\nwhether his own or an adopted son, let the testator make mention of the\ncircumstance and inscribe whom he will to be his second son in hope of\nbetter fortune. If the testator has no children at all, he may select\nand give to any one whom he pleases the tenth part of the property which\nhe has acquired; but let him not be blamed if he gives all the rest to\nhis adopted son, and makes a friend of him according to the law. If the\nsons of a man require guardians, and the father when he dies leaves a\nwill appointing guardians, those who have been named by him, whoever\nthey are and whatever their number be, if they are able and willing\nto take charge of the children, shall be recognised according to the\nprovisions of the will. But if he dies and has made no will, or a will\nin which he has appointed no guardians, then the next of kin, two on\nthe father's and two on the mother's side, and one of the friends of the\ndeceased, shall have the authority of guardians, whom the guardians\nof the law shall appoint when the orphans require guardians. And the\nfifteen eldest guardians of the law shall have the whole care and charge\nof the orphans, divided into threes according to seniority--a body of\nthree for one year, and then another body of three for the next year,\nuntil the cycle of the five periods is complete; and this, as far as\npossible, is to continue always. If a man dies, having made no will at\nall, and leaves sons who require the care of guardians, they shall share\nin the protection which is afforded by these laws. And if a man dying\nby some unexpected fate leaves daughters behind him, let him pardon the\nlegislator if when he gives them in marriage, he have a regard only to\ntwo out of three conditions--nearness of kin and the preservation of\nthe lot, and omits the third condition, which a father would naturally\nconsider, for he would choose out of all the citizens a son for himself,\nand a husband for his daughter, with a view to his character and\ndisposition--the father, I say, shall forgive the legislator if he\ndisregards this, which to him is an impossible consideration. Let the\nlaw about these matters where practicable be as follows: If a man dies\nwithout making a will, and leaves behind him daughters, let his brother,\nbeing the son of the same father or of the same mother, having no lot,\nmarry the daughter and have the lot of the dead man. And if he have no\nbrother, but only a brother's son, in like manner let them marry, if\nthey be of a suitable age; and if there be not even a brother's son,\nbut only the son of a sister, let them do likewise, and so in the fourth\ndegree, if there be only the testator's father's brother, or in the\nfifth degree, his father's brother's son, or in the sixth degree, the\nchild of his father's sister. Let kindred be always reckoned in this\nway: if a person leaves daughters the relationship shall proceed upwards\nthrough brothers and sisters, and brothers' and sisters' children,\nand first the males shall come, and after them the females in the same\nfamily. The judge shall consider and determine the suitableness or\nunsuitableness of age in marriage; he shall make an inspection of the\nmales naked, and of the women naked down to the navel. And if there be a\nlack of kinsmen in a family extending to grandchildren of a brother, or\nto the grandchildren of a grandfather's children, the maiden may choose\nwith the consent of her guardians any one of the citizens who is willing\nand whom she wills, and he shall be the heir of the dead man, and the\nhusband of his daughter. Circumstances vary, and there may sometimes be\na still greater lack of relations within the limits of the state; and if\nany maiden has no kindred living in the city, and there is some one who\nhas been sent out to a colony, and she is disposed to make him the heir\nof her father's possessions, if he be indeed of her kindred, let him\nproceed to take the lot according to the regulation of the law; but if\nhe be not of her kindred, she having no kinsmen within the city, and he\nbe chosen by the daughter of the dead man, and empowered to marry by\nthe guardians, let him return home and take the lot of him who died\nintestate. And if a man has no children, either male or female, and dies\nwithout making a will, let the previous law in general hold; and let a\nman and a woman go forth from the family and share the deserted house,\nand let the lot belong absolutely to them; and let the heiress in\nthe first degree be a sister, and in a second degree a daughter of a\nbrother, and in the third, a daughter of a sister, in the fourth degree\nthe sister of a father, and in the fifth degree the daughter of a\nfather's brother, and in a sixth degree of a father's sister; and\nthese shall dwell with their male kinsmen, according to the degree of\nrelationship and right, as we enacted before. Now we must not conceal\nfrom ourselves that such laws are apt to be oppressive and that there\nmay sometimes be a hardship in the lawgiver commanding the kinsman\nof the dead man to marry his relation; he may be thought not to have\nconsidered the innumerable hindrances which may arise among men in\nthe execution of such ordinances; for there may be cases in which the\nparties refuse to obey, and are ready to do anything rather than marry,\nwhen there is some bodily or mental malady or defect among those who\nare bidden to marry or be married. Persons may fancy that the legislator\nnever thought of this, but they are mistaken; wherefore let us make a\ncommon prelude on behalf of the lawgiver and of his subjects, the law\nbegging the latter to forgive the legislator, in that he, having to\ntake care of the common weal, cannot order at the same time the\nvarious circumstances of individuals, and begging him to pardon them if\nnaturally they are sometimes unable to fulfil the act which he in his\nignorance imposes upon them.\n\nCLEINIAS: And how, Stranger, can we act most fairly under the\ncircumstances?\n\nATHENIAN: There must be arbiters chosen to deal with such laws and the\nsubjects of them.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: I mean to say, that a case may occur in which the nephew,\nhaving a rich father, will be unwilling to marry the daughter of his\nuncle; he will have a feeling of pride, and he will wish to look higher.\nAnd there are cases in which the legislator will be imposing upon him\nthe greatest calamity, and he will be compelled to disobey the law,\nif he is required, for example, to take a wife who is mad, or has some\nother terrible malady of soul or body, such as makes life intolerable\nto the sufferer. Then let what we are saying concerning these cases\nbe embodied in a law: If any one finds fault with the established laws\nrespecting testaments, both as to other matters and especially in what\nrelates to marriage, and asserts that the legislator, if he were alive\nand present, would not compel him to obey--that is to say, would\nnot compel those who are by our law required to marry or be given in\nmarriage, to do either--and some kinsman or guardian dispute this, the\nreply is that the legislator left fifteen of the guardians of the law to\nbe arbiters and fathers of orphans, male or female, and to them let the\ndisputants have recourse, and by their aid determine any matters of the\nkind, admitting their decision to be final. But if any one thinks that\ntoo great power is thus given to the guardians of the law, let him bring\nhis adversaries into the court of the select judges, and there have\nthe points in dispute determined. And he who loses the cause shall have\ncensure and blame from the legislator, which, by a man of sense, is felt\nto be a penalty far heavier than a great loss of money.\n\nThus will orphan children have a second birth. After their first birth\nwe spoke of their nurture and education, and after their second birth,\nwhen they have lost their parents, we ought to take measures that the\nmisfortune of orphanhood may be as little sad to them as possible. In\nthe first place, we say that the guardians of the law are lawgivers and\nfathers to them, not inferior to their natural fathers. Moreover, they\nshall take charge of them year by year as of their own kindred; and we\nhave given both to them and to the children's own guardians as suitable\nadmonition concerning the nurture of orphans. And we seem to have spoken\nopportunely in our former discourse, when we said that the souls of the\ndead have the power after death of taking an interest in human affairs,\nabout which there are many tales and traditions, long indeed, but true;\nand seeing that they are so many and so ancient, we must believe them,\nand we must also believe the lawgivers, who tell us that these things\nare true, if they are not to be regarded as utter fools. But if these\nthings are really so, in the first place men should have a fear of the\nGods above, who regard the loneliness of the orphans; and in the second\nplace of the souls of the departed, who by nature incline to take an\nespecial care of their own children, and are friendly to those who\nhonour, and unfriendly to those who dishonour them. Men should also fear\nthe souls of the living who are aged and high in honour; wherever a city\nis well ordered and prosperous, their descendants cherish them, and so\nlive happily; old persons are quick to see and hear all that relates to\nthem, and are propitious to those who are just in the fulfilment of such\nduties, and they punish those who wrong the orphan and the desolate,\nconsidering that they are the greatest and most sacred of trusts. To all\nwhich matters the guardian and magistrate ought to apply his mind, if\nhe has any, and take heed of the nurture and education of the orphans,\nseeking in every possible way to do them good, for he is making a\ncontribution to his own good and that of his children. He who obeys the\ntale which precedes the law, and does no wrong to an orphan, will never\nexperience the wrath of the legislator. But he who is disobedient, and\nwrongs any one who is bereft of father or mother, shall pay twice the\npenalty which he would have paid if he had wronged one whose parents had\nbeen alive. As touching other legislation concerning guardians in their\nrelation to orphans, or concerning magistrates and their superintendence\nof the guardians, if they did not possess examples of the manner in\nwhich children of freemen would be brought up in the bringing up of\ntheir own children, and of the care of their property in the care of\ntheir own, or if they had not just laws fairly stated about these very\nthings--there would have been reason in making laws for them, under the\nidea that they were a peculiar class, and we might distinguish and make\nseparate rules for the life of those who are orphans and of those who\nare not orphans. But as the case stands, the condition of orphans with\nus is not different from the case of those who have a father, though in\nregard to honour and dishonour, and the attention given to them, the two\nare not usually placed upon a level. Wherefore, touching the legislation\nabout orphans, the law speaks in serious accents, both of persuasion and\nthreatening, and such a threat as the following will be by no means\nout of place: He who is the guardian of an orphan of either sex, and\nhe among the guardians of the law to whom the superintendence of this\nguardian has been assigned, shall love the unfortunate orphan as though\nhe were his own child, and he shall be as careful and diligent in the\nmanagement of his possessions as he would be if they were his own, or\neven more careful and diligent. Let every one who has the care of an\norphan observe this law. But any one who acts contrary to the law on\nthese matters, if he be a guardian of the child, may be fined by a\nmagistrate, or, if he be himself a magistrate, the guardian may bring\nhim before the court of select judges, and punish him, if convicted, by\nexacting a fine of double the amount of that inflicted by the court. And\nif a guardian appears to the relations of the orphan, or to any other\ncitizen, to act negligently or dishonestly, let them bring him before\nthe same court, and whatever damages are given against him, let him pay\nfourfold, and let half belong to the orphan and half to him who procured\nthe conviction. If any orphan arrives at years of discretion, and thinks\nthat he has been ill-used by his guardians, let him within five years\nof the expiration of the guardianship be allowed to bring them to trial;\nand if any of them be convicted, the court shall determine what he shall\npay or suffer. And if a magistrate shall appear to have wronged the\norphan by neglect, and he be convicted, let the court determine what\nhe shall suffer or pay to the orphan, and if there be dishonesty in\naddition to neglect, besides paying the fine, let him be deposed from\nhis office of guardian of the law, and let the state appoint another\nguardian of the law for the city and for the country in his room.\n\nGreater differences than there ought to be sometimes arise between\nfathers and sons, on the part either of fathers who will be of opinion\nthat the legislator should enact that they may, if they wish, lawfully\nrenounce their son by the proclamation of a herald in the face of the\nworld, or of sons who think that they should be allowed to indict their\nfathers on the charge of imbecility when they are disabled by disease\nor old age. These things only happen, as a matter of fact, where the\nnatures of men are utterly bad; for where only half is bad, as, for\nexample, if the father be not bad, but the son be bad, or conversely,\nno great calamity is the result of such an amount of hatred as this. In\nanother state, a son disowned by his father would not of necessity cease\nto be a citizen, but in our state, of which these are to be the laws,\nthe disinherited must necessarily emigrate into another country, for\nno addition can be made even of a single family to the 5040 households;\nand, therefore, he who deserves to suffer these things must be renounced\nnot only by his father, who is a single person, but by the whole family,\nand what is done in these cases must be regulated by some such law as\nthe following: He who in the sad disorder of his soul has a mind, justly\nor unjustly, to expel from his family a son whom he has begotten and\nbrought up, shall not lightly or at once execute his purpose; but first\nof all he shall collect together his own kinsmen, extending to cousins,\nand in like manner his son's kinsmen by the mother's side, and in their\npresence he shall accuse his son, setting forth that he deserves at the\nhands of them all to be dismissed from the family; and the son shall be\nallowed to address them in a similar manner, and show that he does not\ndeserve to suffer any of these things. And if the father persuades them,\nand obtains the suffrages of more than half of his kindred, exclusive\nof the father and mother and the offender himself--I say, if he obtains\nmore than half the suffrages of all the other grown-up members of the\nfamily, of both sexes, the father shall be permitted to put away his\nson, but not otherwise. And if any other citizen is willing to adopt\nthe son who is put away, no law shall hinder him; for the characters of\nyoung men are subject to many changes in the course of their lives. And\nif he has been put away, and in a period of ten years no one is\nwilling to adopt him, let those who have the care of the superabundant\npopulation which is sent out into colonies, see to him, in order that\nhe may be suitably provided for in the colony. And if disease or age or\nharshness of temper, or all these together, makes a man to be more out\nof his mind than the rest of the world are--but this is not observable,\nexcept to those who live with him--and he, being master of his property,\nis the ruin of the house, and his son doubts and hesitates about\nindicting his father for insanity, let the law in that case ordain that\nhe shall first of all go to the eldest guardians of the law and tell\nthem of his father's misfortune, and they shall duly look into the\nmatter, and take counsel as to whether he shall indict him or not. And\nif they advise him to proceed, they shall be both his witnesses and his\nadvocates; and if the father is cast, he shall henceforth be incapable\nof ordering the least particular of his life; let him be as a child\ndwelling in the house for the remainder of his days. And if a man and\nhis wife have an unfortunate incompatibility of temper, ten of the\nguardians of the law, who are impartial, and ten of the women who\nregulate marriages, shall look to the matter, and if they are able to\nreconcile them they shall be formally reconciled; but if their souls\nare too much tossed with passion, they shall endeavour to find other\npartners. Now they are not likely to have very gentle tempers; and,\ntherefore, we must endeavour to associate with them deeper and softer\nnatures. Those who have no children, or only a few, at the time of\ntheir separation, should choose their new partners with a view to the\nprocreation of children; but those who have a sufficient number of\nchildren should separate and marry again in order that they may have\nsome one to grow old with and that the pair may take care of one another\nin age. If a woman dies, leaving children, male or female, the law will\nadvise rather than compel the husband to bring up the children without\nintroducing into the house a stepmother. But if he have no children,\nthen he shall be compelled to marry until he has begotten a sufficient\nnumber of sons to his family and to the state. And if a man dies leaving\na sufficient number of children, the mother of his children shall remain\nwith them and bring them up. But if she appears to be too young to live\nvirtuously without a husband, let her relations communicate with the\nwomen who superintend marriage, and let both together do what they think\nbest in these matters; if there is a lack of children, let the choice be\nmade with a view to having them; two children, one of either sex, shall\nbe deemed sufficient in the eye of the law. When a child is admitted\nto be the offspring of certain parents and is acknowledged by them,\nbut there is need of a decision as to which parent the child is to\nfollow--in case a female slave have intercourse with a male slave, or\nwith a freeman or freedman, the offspring shall always belong to the\nmaster of the female slave. Again, if a free woman have intercourse with\na male slave, the offspring shall belong to the master of the slave; but\nif a child be born either of a slave by her master, or of his mistress\nby a slave--and this be proven--the offspring of the woman and its\nfather shall be sent away by the women who superintend marriage into\nanother country, and the guardians of the law shall send away the\noffspring of the man and its mother.\n\nNeither God, nor a man who has understanding, will ever advise any\none to neglect his parents. To a discourse concerning the honour and\ndishonour of parents, a prelude such as the following, about the service\nof the Gods, will be a suitable introduction: There are ancient customs\nabout the Gods which are universal, and they are of two kinds: some of\nthe Gods we see with our eyes and we honour them, of others we honour\nthe images, raising statues of them which we adore; and though they\nare lifeless, yet we imagine that the living Gods have a good will and\ngratitude to us on this account. Now, if a man has a father or mother,\nor their fathers or mothers treasured up in his house stricken in years,\nlet him consider that no statue can be more potent to grant his requests\nthan they are, who are sitting at his hearth, if only he knows how to\nshow true service to them.\n\nCLEINIAS: And what do you call the true mode of service?\n\nATHENIAN: I will tell you, O my friend, for such things are worth\nlistening to.\n\nCLEINIAS: Proceed.\n\nATHENIAN: Oedipus, as tradition says, when dishonoured by his sons,\ninvoked on them curses which every one declares to have been heard and\nratified by the Gods, and Amyntor in his wrath invoked curses on his son\nPhoenix, and Theseus upon Hippolytus, and innumerable others have also\ncalled down wrath upon their children, whence it is clear that the Gods\nlisten to the imprecations of parents; for the curses of parents are,\nas they ought to be, mighty against their children as no others are. And\nshall we suppose that the prayers of a father or mother who is specially\ndishonoured by his or her children, are heard by the Gods in accordance\nwith nature; and that if a parent is honoured by them, and in the\ngladness of his heart earnestly entreats the Gods in his prayers to do\nthem good, he is not equally heard, and that they do not minister to his\nrequest? If not, they would be very unjust ministers of good, and that\nwe affirm to be contrary to their nature.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: May we not think, as I was saying just now, that we can\npossess no image which is more honoured by the Gods, than that of a\nfather or grandfather, or of a mother stricken in years? whom when a man\nhonours, the heart of the God rejoices, and he is ready to answer their\nprayers. And, truly, the figure of an ancestor is a wonderful thing,\nfar higher than that of a lifeless image. For the living, when they are\nhonoured by us, join in our prayers, and when they are dishonoured,\nthey utter imprecations against us; but lifeless objects do neither. And\ntherefore, if a man makes a right use of his father and grandfather and\nother aged relations, he will have images which above all others will\nwin him the favour of the Gods.\n\nCLEINIAS: Excellent.\n\nATHENIAN: Every man of any understanding fears and respects the prayers\nof parents, knowing well that many times and to many persons they have\nbeen accomplished. Now these things being thus ordered by nature, good\nmen think it a blessing from heaven if their parents live to old age and\nreach the utmost limit of human life, or if taken away before their time\nthey are deeply regretted by them; but to bad men parents are always\na cause of terror. Wherefore let every man honour with every sort of\nlawful honour his own parents, agreeably to what has now been said. But\nif this prelude be an unmeaning sound in the ears of any one, let the\nlaw follow, which may be rightly imposed in these terms: If any one in\nthis city be not sufficiently careful of his parents, and do not regard\nand gratify in every respect their wishes more than those of his sons\nand of his other offspring or of himself--let him who experiences this\nsort of treatment either come himself, or send some one to inform the\nthree eldest guardians of the law, and three of the women who have the\ncare of marriages; and let them look to the matter and punish youthful\nevil-doers with stripes and bonds if they are under thirty years of age,\nthat is to say, if they be men, or if they be women, let them undergo\nthe same punishment up to forty years of age. But if, when they are\nstill more advanced in years, they continue the same neglect of their\nparents, and do any hurt to any of them, let them be brought before\na court in which every single one of the eldest citizens shall be the\njudges, and if the offender be convicted, let the court determine what\nhe ought to pay or suffer, and any penalty may be imposed on him which\na man can pay or suffer. If the person who has been wronged be unable\nto inform the magistrates, let any freeman who hears of his case inform,\nand if he do not, he shall be deemed base, and shall be liable to have a\nsuit for damage brought against him by any one who likes. And if a slave\ninform, he shall receive freedom; and if he be the slave of the injurer\nor injured party, he shall be set free by the magistrates, or if he\nbelong to any other citizen, the public shall pay a price on his behalf\nto the owner; and let the magistrates take heed that no one wrongs him\nout of revenge, because he has given information.\n\nCases in which one man injures another by poisons, and which prove\nfatal, have been already discussed; but about other cases in which a\nperson intentionally and of malice harms another with meats, or drinks,\nor ointments, nothing has as yet been determined. For there are two\nkinds of poisons used among men, which cannot clearly be distinguished.\nThere is the kind just now explicitly mentioned, which injures bodies\nby the use of other bodies according to a natural law; there is also\nanother kind which persuades the more daring class that they can do\ninjury by sorceries, and incantations, and magic knots, as they are\ntermed, and makes others believe that they above all persons are injured\nby the powers of the magician. Now it is not easy to know the nature of\nall these things; nor if a man do know can he readily persuade others to\nbelieve him. And when men are disturbed in their minds at the sight of\nwaxen images fixed either at their doors, or in a place where three\nways meet, or on the sepulchres of parents, there is no use in trying to\npersuade them that they should despise all such things because they have\nno certain knowledge about them. But we must have a law in two parts,\nconcerning poisoning, in whichever of the two ways the attempt is made,\nand we must entreat, and exhort, and advise men not to have recourse to\nsuch practises, by which they scare the multitude out of their wits, as\nif they were children, compelling the legislator and the judge to heal\nthe fears which the sorcerer arouses, and to tell them in the first\nplace, that he who attempts to poison or enchant others knows not what\nhe is doing, either as regards the body (unless he has a knowledge of\nmedicine), or as regards his enchantments (unless he happens to be a\nprophet or diviner). Let the law, then, run as follows about poisoning\nor witchcraft: He who employs poison to do any injury, not fatal, to a\nman himself, or to his servants, or any injury, whether fatal or not,\nto his cattle or his bees, if he be a physician, and be convicted of\npoisoning, shall be punished with death; or if he be a private person,\nthe court shall determine what he is to pay or suffer. But he who\nseems to be the sort of man who injures others by magic knots, or\nenchantments, or incantations, or any of the like practices, if he be\na prophet or diviner, let him die; and if, not being a prophet, he be\nconvicted of witchcraft, as in the previous case, let the court fix what\nhe ought to pay or suffer.\n\nWhen a man does another any injury by theft or violence, for the greater\ninjury let him pay greater damages to the injured man, and less for the\nsmaller injury; but in all cases, whatever the injury may have been, as\nmuch as will compensate the loss. And besides the compensation of the\nwrong, let a man pay a further penalty for the chastisement of his\noffence: he who has done the wrong instigated by the folly of another,\nthrough the lightheartedness of youth or the like, shall pay a lighter\npenalty; but he who has injured another through his own folly, when\novercome by pleasure or pain, in cowardly fear, or lust, or envy, or\nimplacable anger, shall endure a heavier punishment. Not that he is\npunished because he did wrong, for that which is done can never be\nundone, but in order that in future times, he, and those who see him\ncorrected, may utterly hate injustice, or at any rate abate much of\ntheir evil-doing. Having an eye to all these things, the law, like a\ngood archer, should aim at the right measure of punishment, and in all\ncases at the deserved punishment. In the attainment of this the judge\nshall be a fellow-worker with the legislator, whenever the law leaves\nto him to determine what the offender shall suffer or pay; and the\nlegislator, like a painter, shall give a rough sketch of the cases in\nwhich the law is to be applied. This is what we must do, Megillus and\nCleinias, in the best and fairest manner that we can, saying what the\npunishments are to be of all actions of theft and violence, and giving\nlaws of such a kind as the Gods and sons of Gods would have us give.\n\nIf a man is mad he shall not be at large in the city, but his relations\nshall keep him at home in any way which they can; or if not, let them\npay a penalty--he who is of the highest class shall pay a penalty of one\nhundred drachmas, whether he be a slave or a freeman whom he neglects;\nand he of the second class shall pay four-fifths of a mina; and he of\nthe third class three-fifths; and he of the fourth class two-fifths. Now\nthere are many sorts of madness, some arising out of disease, which we\nhave already mentioned; and there are other kinds, which originate in an\nevil and passionate temperament, and are increased by bad education;\nout of a slight quarrel this class of madmen will often raise a storm of\nabuse against one another, and nothing of that sort ought to be allowed\nto occur in a well-ordered state. Let this, then, be the law about\nabuse, which shall relate to all cases: No one shall speak evil of\nanother; and when a man disputes with another he shall teach and\nlearn of the disputant and the company, but he shall abstain from\nevil-speaking; for out of the imprecations which men utter against one\nanother, and the feminine habit of casting aspersions on one another,\nand using foul names, out of words light as air, in very deed the\ngreatest enmities and hatreds spring up. For the speaker gratifies his\nanger, which is an ungracious element of his nature; and nursing up his\nwrath by the entertainment of evil thoughts, and exacerbating that part\nof his soul which was formerly civilised by education, he lives in a\nstate of savageness and moroseness, and pays a bitter penalty for\nhis anger. And in such cases almost all men take to saying something\nridiculous about their opponent, and there is no man who is in the\nhabit of laughing at another who does not miss virtue and earnestness\naltogether, or lose the better half of greatness. Wherefore let no one\nutter any taunting word at a temple, or at the public sacrifices, or at\nthe games, or in the agora, or in a court of justice, or in any public\nassembly. And let the magistrate who presides on these occasions\nchastise an offender, and he shall be blameless; but if he fails in\ndoing so, he shall not claim the prize of virtue; for he is one who\nheeds not the laws, and does not do what the legislator commands. And if\nin any other place any one indulges in these sort of revilings, whether\nhe has begun the quarrel or is only retaliating, let any elder who is\npresent support the law, and control with blows those who indulge in\npassion, which is another great evil; and if he do not, let him be\nliable to pay the appointed penalty. And we say now, that he who deals\nin reproaches against others cannot reproach them without attempting to\nridicule them; and this, when done in a moment of anger, is what we make\nmatter of reproach against him. But then, do we admit into our state\nthe comic writers who are so fond of making mankind ridiculous, if they\nattempt in a good-natured manner to turn the laugh against our citizens?\nor do we draw the distinction of jest and earnest, and allow a man\nto make use of ridicule in jest and without anger about any thing or\nperson; though as we were saying, not if he be angry and have a set\npurpose? We forbid earnest--that is unalterably fixed; but we have still\nto say who are to be sanctioned or not to be sanctioned by the law in\nthe employment of innocent humour. A comic poet, or maker of iambic or\nsatirical lyric verse, shall not be permitted to ridicule any of the\ncitizens, either by word or likeness, either in anger or without anger.\nAnd if any one is disobedient, the judges shall either at once expel him\nfrom the country, or he shall pay a fine of three minae, which shall be\ndedicated to the God who presides over the contests. Those only who have\nreceived permission shall be allowed to write verses at one another, but\nthey shall be without anger and in jest; in anger and in serious earnest\nthey shall not be allowed. The decision of this matter shall be left to\nthe superintendent of the general education of the young, and whatever\nhe may license, the writer shall be allowed to produce, and whatever he\nrejects let not the poet himself exhibit, or ever teach anybody else,\nslave or freeman, under the penalty of being dishonoured, and held\ndisobedient to the laws.\n\nNow he is not to be pitied who is hungry, or who suffers any bodily\npain, but he who is temperate, or has some other virtue, or part of a\nvirtue, and at the same time suffers from misfortune; it would be an\nextraordinary thing if such an one, whether slave or freeman, were\nutterly forsaken and fell into the extremes of poverty in any tolerably\nwell-ordered city or government. Wherefore the legislator may safely\nmake a law applicable to such cases in the following terms: Let there\nbe no beggars in our state; and if anybody begs, seeking to pick up a\nlivelihood by unavailing prayers, let the wardens of the agora turn him\nout of the agora, and the wardens of the city out of the city, and\nthe wardens of the country send him out of any other parts of the land\nacross the border, in order that the land may be cleared of this sort of\nanimal.\n\nIf a slave of either sex injure anything, which is not his or her own,\nthrough inexperience, or some improper practice, and the person who\nsuffers damage be not himself in part to blame, the master of the slave\nwho has done the harm shall either make full satisfaction, or give up\nthe slave who has done the injury. But if the master argue that the\ncharge has arisen by collusion between the injured party and the\ninjurer, with the view of obtaining the slave, let him sue the person,\nwho says that he has been injured, for malpractices. And if he gain a\nconviction, let him receive double the value which the court fixes as\nthe price of the slave; and if he lose his suit, let him make amends for\nthe injury, and give up the slave. And if a beast of burden, or horse,\nor dog, or any other animal, injure the property of a neighbour, the\nowner shall in like manner pay for the injury.\n\nIf any man refuses to be a witness, he who wants him shall summon him,\nand he who is summoned shall come to the trial; and if he knows and is\nwilling to bear witness, let him bear witness, but if he says he does\nnot know let him swear by the three divinities Zeus, and Apollo, and\nThemis, that he does not, and have no more to do with the cause. And\nhe who is summoned to give witness and does not answer to his summoner,\nshall be liable for the harm which ensues according to law. And if a\nperson calls up as a witness any one who is acting as a judge, let him\ngive his witness, but he shall not afterwards vote in the cause. A free\nwoman may give her witness and plead, if she be more than forty years of\nage, and may bring an action if she have no husband; but if her husband\nbe alive she shall only be allowed to bear witness. A slave of either\nsex and a child shall be allowed to give evidence and to plead, but only\nin cases of murder; and they must produce sufficient sureties that they\nwill certainly remain until the trial, in case they should be charged\nwith false witness. And either of the parties in a cause may bring an\naccusation of perjury against witnesses, touching their evidence in\nwhole or in part, if he asserts that such evidence has been given; but\nthe accusation must be brought previous to the final decision of the\ncause. The magistrates shall preserve the accusations of false witness,\nand have them kept under the seal of both parties, and produce them on\nthe day when the trial for false witness takes place. If a man be twice\nconvicted of false witness, he shall not be required, and if thrice, he\nshall not be allowed to bear witness; and if he dare to witness after he\nhas been convicted three times, let any one who pleases inform against\nhim to the magistrates, and let the magistrates hand him over to the\ncourt, and if he be convicted he shall be punished with death. And in\nany case in which the evidence is rightly found to be false, and yet to\nhave given the victory to him who wins the suit, and more than half the\nwitnesses are condemned, the decision which was gained by these means\nshall be rescinded, and there shall be a discussion and a decision as\nto whether the suit was determined by that false evidence or not; and\nin whichever way the decision may be given, the previous suit shall be\ndetermined accordingly.\n\nThere are many noble things in human life, but to most of them attach\nevils which are fated to corrupt and spoil them. Is not justice noble,\nwhich has been the civiliser of humanity? How then can the advocate\nof justice be other than noble? And yet upon this profession which is\npresented to us under the fair name of art has come an evil reputation.\nIn the first place, we are told that by ingenious pleas and the help\nof an advocate the law enables a man to win a particular cause, whether\njust or unjust; and that both the art, and the power of speech which is\nthereby imparted, are at the service of him who is willing to pay for\nthem. Now in our state this so-called art, whether really an art or only\nan experience and practice destitute of any art, ought if possible never\nto come into existence, or if existing among us should listen to the\nrequest of the legislator and go away into another land, and not speak\ncontrary to justice. If the offenders obey we say no more; but for those\nwho disobey, the voice of the law is as follows: If any one thinks that\nhe will pervert the power of justice in the minds of the judges, and\nunseasonably litigate or advocate, let any one who likes indict him for\nmalpractices of law and dishonest advocacy, and let him be judged in the\ncourt of select judges; and if he be convicted, let the court determine\nwhether he may be supposed to act from a love of money or from\ncontentiousness. And if he is supposed to act from contentiousness, the\ncourt shall fix a time during which he shall not be allowed to institute\nor plead a cause; and if he is supposed to act as he does from love of\nmoney, in case he be a stranger, he shall leave the country, and never\nreturn under penalty of death; but if he be a citizen, he shall die,\nbecause he is a lover of money, in whatever manner gained; and equally,\nif he be judged to have acted more than once from contentiousness, he\nshall die.\n\n\n\n\nBOOK XII.\n\nIf a herald or an ambassador carry a false message from our city to any\nother, or bring back a false message from the city to which he is sent,\nor be proved to have brought back, whether from friends or enemies, in\nhis capacity of herald or ambassador, what they have never said, let him\nbe indicted for having violated, contrary to the law, the commands and\nduties imposed upon him by Hermes and Zeus, and let there be a penalty\nfixed, which he shall suffer or pay if he be convicted.\n\nTheft is a mean, and robbery a shameless thing; and none of the sons of\nZeus delight in fraud and violence, or ever practised either. Wherefore\nlet no one be deluded by poets or mythologers into a mistaken belief\nof such things, nor let him suppose, when he thieves or is guilty\nof violence, that he is doing nothing base, but only what the Gods\nthemselves do. For such tales are untrue and improbable; and he who\nsteals or robs contrary to the law, is never either a God or the son of\na God; of this the legislator ought to be better informed than all the\npoets put together. Happy is he and may he be for ever happy, who is\npersuaded and listens to our words; but he who disobeys shall have to\ncontend against the following law: If a man steal anything belonging\nto the public, whether that which he steals be much or little, he shall\nhave the same punishment. For he who steals a little steals with the\nsame wish as he who steals much, but with less power, and he who\ntakes up a greater amount, not having deposited it, is wholly unjust.\nWherefore the law is not disposed to inflict a less penalty on the one\nthan on the other because his theft is less, but on the ground that the\nthief may possibly be in one case still curable, and may in another case\nbe incurable. If any one convict in a court of law a stranger or a slave\nof a theft of public property, let the court determine what punishment\nhe shall suffer, or what penalty he shall pay, bearing in mind that he\nis probably not incurable. But the citizen who has been brought up\nas our citizens will have been, if he be found guilty of robbing his\ncountry by fraud or violence, whether he be caught in the act or not,\nshall be punished with death; for he is incurable.\n\nNow for expeditions of war much consideration and many laws are\nrequired; the great principle of all is that no one of either sex should\nbe without a commander; nor should the mind of any one be accustomed to\ndo anything, either in jest or earnest, of his own motion, but in war\nand in peace he should look to and follow his leader, even in the least\nthings being under his guidance; for example, he should stand or move,\nor exercise, or wash, or take his meals, or get up in the night to keep\nguard and deliver messages when he is bidden; and in the hour of danger\nhe should not pursue and not retreat except by order of his superior;\nand in a word, not teach the soul or accustom her to know or understand\nhow to do anything apart from others. Of all soldiers the life should\nbe always and in all things as far as possible in common and together;\nthere neither is nor ever will be a higher, or better, or more\nscientific principle than this for the attainment of salvation and\nvictory in war. And we ought in time of peace from youth upwards to\npractise this habit of commanding others, and of being commanded by\nothers; anarchy should have no place in the life of man or of the beasts\nwho are subject to man. I may add that all dances ought to be performed\nwith a view to military excellence; and agility and ease should be\ncultivated for the same object, and also endurance of the want of meats\nand drinks, and of winter cold and summer heat, and of hard couches;\nand, above all, care should be taken not to destroy the peculiar\nqualities of the head and the feet by surrounding them with extraneous\ncoverings, and so hindering their natural growth of hair and soles. For\nthese are the extremities, and of all the parts of the body, whether\nthey are preserved or not is of the greatest consequence; the one is\nthe servant of the whole body, and the other the master, in whom all the\nruling senses are by nature set. Let the young men imagine that he hears\nin what has preceded the praises of the military life; the law shall\nbe as follows: He shall serve in war who is on the roll or appointed\nto some special service, and if any one is absent from cowardice, and\nwithout the leave of the generals, he shall be indicted before the\nmilitary commanders for failure of service when the army comes home; and\nthe soldiers shall be his judges; the heavy-armed, and the cavalry, and\nthe other arms of the service shall form separate courts; and they shall\nbring the heavy-armed before the heavy-armed, and the horsemen before\nthe horsemen, and the others in like manner before their peers; and he\nwho is found guilty shall never be allowed to compete for any prize of\nvalour, or indict another for not serving on an expedition, or be\nan accuser at all in any military matters. Moreover, the court shall\nfurther determine what punishment he shall suffer, or what penalty he\nshall pay. When the suits for failure of service are completed, the\nleaders of the several kinds of troops shall again hold an assembly, and\nthey shall adjudge the prizes of valour; and he who likes searching\nfor judgment in his own branch of the service, saying nothing about any\nformer expedition, nor producing any proof or witnesses to confirm\nhis statement, but speaking only of the present occasion. The crown of\nvictory shall be an olive wreath which the victor shall offer up at\nthe temple of any war-god whom he likes, adding an inscription for a\ntestimony to last during life, that such an one has received the first,\nthe second, or the third prize. If any one goes on an expedition, and\nreturns home before the appointed time, when the generals have not\nwithdrawn the army, he shall be indicted for desertion before the same\npersons who took cognizance of failure of service, and if he be found\nguilty, the same punishment shall be inflicted on him. Now every man\nwho is engaged in any suit ought to be very careful of bringing false\nwitness against any one, either intentionally or unintentionally, if\nhe can help; for justice is truly said to be an honourable maiden, and\nfalsehood is naturally repugnant to honour and justice. A witness ought\nto be very careful not to sin against justice, as for example in what\nrelates to the throwing away of arms--he must distinguish the throwing\nthem away when necessary, and not make that a reproach, or bring\nan action against some innocent person on that account. To make the\ndistinction may be difficult; but still the law must attempt to define\nthe different kinds in some way. Let me endeavour to explain my meaning\nby an ancient tale: If Patroclus had been brought to the tent still\nalive but without his arms (and this has happened to innumerable\npersons), the original arms, which the poet says were presented to\nPeleus by the Gods as a nuptial gift when he married Thetis, remaining\nin the hands of Hector, then the base spirits of that day might have\nreproached the son of Menoetius with having cast away his arms. Again,\nthere is the case of those who have been thrown down precipices and lost\ntheir arms; and of those who at sea, and in stormy places, have been\nsuddenly overwhelmed by floods of water; and there are numberless things\nof this kind which one might adduce by way of extenuation, and with the\nview of justifying a misfortune which is easily misrepresented. We must,\ntherefore, endeavour to divide to the best of our power the greater and\nmore serious evil from the lesser. And a distinction may be drawn in the\nuse of terms of reproach. A man does not always deserve to be called the\nthrower away of his shield; he may be only the loser of his arms.\nFor there is a great or rather absolute difference between him who is\ndeprived of his arms by a sufficient force, and him who voluntarily lets\nhis shield go. Let the law then be as follows: If a person having arms\nis overtaken by the enemy and does not turn round and defend himself,\nbut lets them go voluntarily or throws them away, choosing a base\nlife and a swift escape rather than a courageous and noble and blessed\ndeath--in such a case of the throwing away of arms let justice be done,\nbut the judge need take no note of the case just now mentioned; for\nthe bad men ought always to be punished, in the hope that he may be\nimproved, but not the unfortunate, for there is no advantage in that.\nAnd what shall be the punishment suited to him who has thrown away his\nweapons of defence? Tradition says that Caeneus, the Thessalian, was\nchanged by a God from a woman into a man; but the converse miracle\ncannot now be wrought, or no punishment would be more proper than that\nthe man who throws away his shield should be changed into a woman. This\nhowever is impossible, and therefore let us make a law as nearly like\nthis as we can--that he who loves his life too well shall be in no\ndanger for the remainder of his days, but shall live for ever under the\nstigma of cowardice. And let the law be in the following terms: When a\nman is found guilty of disgracefully throwing away his arms in war, no\ngeneral or military officer shall allow him to serve as a soldier, or\ngive him any place at all in the ranks of soldiers; and the officer\nwho gives the coward any place, shall suffer a penalty which the public\nexaminer shall exact of him; and if he be of the highest class, he shall\npay a thousand drachmae; or if he be of the second class, five minae; or\nif he be of the third, three minae; or if he be of the fourth class,\none mina. And he who is found guilty of cowardice, shall not only be\ndismissed from manly dangers, which is a disgrace appropriate to his\nnature, but he shall pay a thousand drachmae, if he be of the highest\nclass, and five minae if he be of the second class, and three if he\nbe of the third class, and a mina, like the preceding, if he be of the\nfourth class.\n\nWhat regulations will be proper about examiners, seeing that some of our\nmagistrates are elected by lot, and for a year, and some for a longer\ntime and from selected persons? Of such magistrates, who will be a\nsufficient censor or examiner, if any of them, weighed down by the\npressure of office or his own inability to support the dignity of his\noffice, be guilty of any crooked practice? It is by no means easy to\nfind a magistrate who excels other magistrates in virtue, but still we\nmust endeavour to discover some censor or examiner who is more than\nman. For the truth is, that there are many elements of dissolution in a\nstate, as there are also in a ship, or in an animal; they all have their\ncords, and girders, and sinews--one nature diffused in many places, and\ncalled by many names; and the office of examiner is a most important\nelement in the preservation and dissolution of states. For if the\nexaminers are better than the magistrates, and their duty is fulfilled\njustly and without blame, then the whole state and country flourishes\nand is happy; but if the examination of the magistrates is carried on\nin a wrong way, then, by the relaxation of that justice which is the\nuniting principle of all constitutions, every power in the state is rent\nasunder from every other; they no longer incline in the same direction,\nbut fill the city with faction, and make many cities out of one, and\nsoon bring all to destruction. Wherefore the examiners ought to be\nadmirable in every sort of virtue. Let us invent a mode of creating\nthem, which shall be as follows: Every year, after the summer solstice,\nthe whole city shall meet in the common precincts of Helios and Apollo,\nand shall present to the God three men out of their own number in the\nmanner following: Each citizen shall select, not himself, but some other\ncitizen whom he deems in every way the best, and who is not less\nthan fifty years of age. And out of the selected persons who have the\ngreatest number of votes, they shall make a further selection until they\nreduce them to one-half, if they are an even number; but if they are not\nan even number, they shall subtract the one who has the smallest number\nof votes, and make them an even number, and then leave the half which\nhave the greater number of votes. And if two persons have an equal\nnumber of votes, and thus increase the number beyond one-half, they\nshall withdraw the younger of the two and do away the excess; and then\nincluding all the rest they shall again vote, until there are left three\nhaving an unequal number of votes. But if all the three, or two out of\nthe three, have equal votes, let them commit the election to good fate\nand fortune, and separate off by lot the first, and the second, and the\nthird; these they shall crown with an olive wreath and give them the\nprize of excellence, at the same time proclaiming to all the world\nthat the city of the Magnetes, by the providence of the Gods, is again\npreserved, and presents to the Sun and to Apollo her three best men as\nfirst-fruits, to be a common offering to them, according to the ancient\nlaw, as long as their lives answer to the judgment formed of them. And\nthese shall appoint in their first year twelve examiners, to continue\nuntil each has completed seventy-five years, to whom three shall\nafterwards be added yearly; and let these divide all the magistracies\ninto twelve parts, and prove the holders of them by every sort of test\nto which a freeman may be subjected; and let them live while they hold\noffice in the precinct of Helios and Apollo, in which they were chosen,\nand let each one form a judgment of some things individually, and of\nothers in company with his colleagues; and let him place a writing in\nthe agora about each magistracy, and what the magistrate ought to suffer\nor pay, according to the decision of the examiners. And if a magistrate\ndoes not admit that he has been justly judged, let him bring the\nexaminers before the select judges, and if he be acquitted by their\ndecision, let him, if he will, accuse the examiners themselves; if,\nhowever, he be convicted, and have been condemned to death by the\nexaminers, let him die (and of course he can only die once): but any\nother penalties which admit of being doubled let him suffer twice over.\n\nAnd now let us pass under review the examiners themselves; what will\ntheir examination be, and how conducted? During the life of these men,\nwhom the whole state counts worthy of the rewards of virtue, they\nshall have the first seat at all public assemblies, and at all Hellenic\nsacrifices and sacred missions, and other public and holy ceremonies in\nwhich they share. The chiefs of each sacred mission shall be selected\nfrom them, and they only of all the citizens shall be adorned with a\ncrown of laurel; they shall all be priests of Apollo and Helios; and one\nof them, who is judged first of the priests created in that year, shall\nbe high priest; and they shall write up his name in each year to be a\nmeasure of time as long as the city lasts; and after their death they\nshall be laid out and carried to the grave and entombed in a manner\ndifferent from the other citizens. They shall be decked in a robe all\nof white, and there shall be no crying or lamentation over them; but a\nchorus of fifteen maidens, and another of boys, shall stand around the\nbier on either side, hymning the praises of the departed priests in\nalternate responses, declaring their blessedness in song all day long;\nand at dawn a hundred of the youths who practise gymnastic exercises,\nand whom the relations of the departed shall choose, shall carry the\nbier to the sepulchre, the young men marching first, dressed in the garb\nof warriors--the cavalry with their horses, the heavy-armed with their\narms, and the others in like manner. And boys near the bier and in front\nof it shall sing their national hymn, and maidens shall follow behind,\nand with them the women who have passed the age of child-bearing;\nnext, although they are interdicted from other burials, let priests\nand priestesses follow, unless the Pythian oracle forbid them; for this\nburial is free from pollution. The place of burial shall be an oblong\nvaulted chamber underground, constructed of tufa, which will last for\never, having stone couches placed side by side. And here they will lay\nthe blessed person, and cover the sepulchre with a circular mound of\nearth and plant a grove of trees around on every side but one; and on\nthat side the sepulchre shall be allowed to extend for ever, and a new\nmound will not be required. Every year they shall have contests in music\nand gymnastics, and in horsemanship, in honour of the dead. These are\nthe honours which shall be given to those who at the examination are\nfound blameless; but if any of them, trusting to the scrutiny being\nover, should, after the judgment has been given, manifest the wickedness\nof human nature, let the law ordain that he who pleases shall indict\nhim, and let the cause be tried in the following manner. In the first\nplace, the court shall be composed of the guardians of the law, and to\nthem the surviving examiners shall be added, as well as the court of\nselect judges; and let the pursuer lay his indictment in this form--he\nshall say that so-and-so is unworthy of the prize of virtue and of his\noffice; and if the defendant be convicted let him be deprived of his\noffice, and of the burial, and of the other honours given him. But if\nthe prosecutor do not obtain the fifth part of the votes, let him, if\nhe be of the first-class, pay twelve minae, and eight if he be of the\nsecond class, and six if he be of the third class, and two minae if he\nbe of the fourth class.\n\nThe so-called decision of Rhadamanthus is worthy of all admiration. He\nknew that the men of his own time believed and had no doubt that there\nwere Gods, which was a reasonable belief in those days, because most men\nwere the sons of Gods, and according to tradition he was one himself. He\nappears to have thought that he ought to commit judgment to no man, but\nto the Gods only, and in this way suits were simply and speedily decided\nby him. For he made the two parties take an oath respecting the points\nin dispute, and so got rid of the matter speedily and safely. But now\nthat a certain portion of mankind do not believe at all in the existence\nof the Gods, and others imagine that they have no care of us, and the\nopinion of most men, and of the worst men, is that in return for a small\nsacrifice and a few flattering words they will be their accomplices in\npurloining large sums and save them from many terrible punishments, the\nway of Rhadamanthus is no longer suited to the needs of justice; for as\nthe opinions of men about the Gods are changed, the laws should also\nbe changed--in the granting of suits a rational legislation ought to do\naway with the oaths of the parties on either side--he who obtains leave\nto bring an action should write down the charges, but should not add\nan oath; and the defendant in like manner should give his denial to the\nmagistrates in writing, and not swear; for it is a dreadful thing to\nknow, when many lawsuits are going on in a state, that almost half the\npeople who meet one another quite unconcernedly at the public meals and\nin other companies and relations of private life are perjured. Let the\nlaw, then, be as follows: A judge who is about to give judgment shall\ntake an oath, and he who is choosing magistrates for the state shall\neither vote on oath or with a voting tablet which he brings from\na temple; so too the judge of dances and of all music, and the\nsuperintendents and umpires of gymnastic and equestrian contests, and\nany matters in which, as far as men can judge, there is nothing to be\ngained by a false oath; but all cases in which a denial confirmed by\nan oath clearly results in a great advantage to the taker of the oath,\nshall be decided without the oath of the parties to the suit, and the\npresiding judges shall not permit either of them to use an oath for the\nsake of persuading, nor to call down curses on himself and his race, nor\nto use unseemly supplications or womanish laments. But they shall ever\nbe teaching and learning what is just in auspicious words; and he who\ndoes otherwise shall be supposed to speak beside the point, and the\njudges shall again bring him back to the question at issue. On the other\nhand, strangers in their dealings with strangers shall as at present\nhave power to give and receive oaths, for they will not often grow old\nin the city or leave a fry of young ones like themselves to be the sons\nand heirs of the land.\n\nAs to the initiation of private suits, let the manner of deciding causes\nbetween all citizens be the same as in cases in which any freeman is\ndisobedient to the state in minor matters, of which the penalty is not\nstripes, imprisonment, or death. But as regards attendance at choruses\nor processions or other shows, and as regards public services, whether\nthe celebration of sacrifice in peace, or the payment of contributions\nin war--in all these cases, first comes the necessity of providing a\nremedy for the loss; and by those who will not obey, there shall be\nsecurity given to the officers whom the city and the law empower to\nexact the sum due; and if they forfeit their security, let the goods\nwhich they have pledged be sold and the money given to the city; but\nif they ought to pay a larger sum, the several magistrates shall impose\nupon the disobedient a suitable penalty, and bring them before the\ncourt, until they are willing to do what they are ordered.\n\nNow a state which makes money from the cultivation of the soil only, and\nhas no foreign trade, must consider what it will do about the emigration\nof its own people to other countries, and the reception of strangers\nfrom elsewhere. About these matters the legislator has to consider,\nand he will begin by trying to persuade men as far as he can. The\nintercourse of cities with one another is apt to create a confusion of\nmanners; strangers are always suggesting novelties to strangers. When\nstates are well governed by good laws the mixture causes the greatest\npossible injury; but seeing that most cities are the reverse of\nwell-ordered, the confusion which arises in them from the reception\nof strangers, and from the citizens themselves rushing off into other\ncities, when any one either young or old desires to travel anywhere\nabroad at whatever time, is of no consequence. On the other hand, the\nrefusal of states to receive others, and for their own citizens never\nto go to other places, is an utter impossibility, and to the rest of\nthe world is likely to appear ruthless and uncivilised; it is a practice\nadopted by people who use harsh words, such as xenelasia or banishment\nof strangers, and who have harsh and morose ways, as men think. And to\nbe thought or not to be thought well of by the rest of the world is no\nlight matter; for the many are not so far wrong in their judgment of who\nare bad and who are good, as they are removed from the nature of\nvirtue in themselves. Even bad men have a divine instinct which guesses\nrightly, and very many who are utterly depraved form correct notions\nand judgments of the differences between the good and bad. And the\ngenerality of cities are quite right in exhorting us to value a\ngood reputation in the world, for there is no truth greater and more\nimportant than this--that he who is really good (I am speaking of the\nmen who would be perfect) seeks for reputation with, but not without,\nthe reality of goodness. And our Cretan colony ought also to acquire the\nfairest and noblest reputation for virtue from other men; and there is\nevery reason to expect that, if the reality answers to the idea, she\nwill be one of the few well-ordered cities which the sun and the other\nGods behold. Wherefore, in the matter of journeys to other countries and\nthe reception of strangers, we enact as follows: In the first place, let\nno one be allowed to go anywhere at all into a foreign country who is\nless than forty years of age; and no one shall go in a private capacity,\nbut only in some public one, as a herald, or on an embassy, or on a\nsacred mission. Going abroad on an expedition or in war is not to be\nincluded among travels of the class authorised by the state. To Apollo\nat Delphi and to Zeus at Olympia and to Nemea and to the Isthmus,\ncitizens should be sent to take part in the sacrifices and games there\ndedicated to the Gods; and they should send as many as possible, and the\nbest and fairest that can be found, and they will make the city renowned\nat holy meetings in time of peace, procuring a glory which shall be the\nconverse of that which is gained in war; and when they come home they\nshall teach the young that the institutions of other states are inferior\nto their own. And they shall send spectators of another sort, if they\nhave the consent of the guardians, being such citizens as desire to look\na little more at leisure at the doings of other men; and these no law\nshall hinder. For a city which has no experience of good and bad men or\nintercourse with them, can never be thoroughly and perfectly civilised,\nnor, again, can the citizens of a city properly observe the laws by\nhabit only, and without an intelligent understanding of them. And there\nalways are in the world a few inspired men whose acquaintance is beyond\nprice, and who spring up quite as much in ill-ordered as in well-ordered\ncities. These are they whom the citizens of a well-ordered city should\nbe ever seeking out, going forth over sea and over land to find him who\nis incorruptible--that he may establish more firmly institutions in\nhis own state which are good already, and amend what is deficient; for\nwithout this examination and enquiry a city will never continue perfect\nany more than if the examination is ill-conducted.\n\nCLEINIAS: How can we have an examination and also a good one?\n\nATHENIAN: In this way: In the first place, our spectator shall be of not\nless than fifty years of age; he must be a man of reputation, especially\nin war, if he is to exhibit to other cities a model of the guardians of\nthe law, but when he is more than sixty years of age he shall no longer\ncontinue in his office of spectator. And when he has carried on his\ninspection during as many out of the ten years of his office as he\npleases, on his return home let him go to the assembly of those who\nreview the laws. This shall be a mixed body of young and old men, who\nshall be required to meet daily between the hour of dawn and the rising\nof the sun. They shall consist, in the first place, of the priests\nwho have obtained the rewards of virtue; and, in the second place,\nof guardians of the law, the ten eldest being chosen; the general\nsuperintendent of education shall also be a member, as well as the last\nappointed as those who have been released from the office; and each of\nthem shall take with him as his companion a young man, whomsoever he\nchooses, between the ages of thirty and forty. These shall be always\nholding conversation and discourse about the laws of their own city\nor about any specially good ones which they may hear to be existing\nelsewhere; also about kinds of knowledge which may appear to be of use\nand will throw light upon the examination, or of which the want will\nmake the subject of laws dark and uncertain to them. Any knowledge of\nthis sort which the elders approve, the younger men shall learn with all\ndiligence; and if any one of those who have been invited appear to be\nunworthy, the whole assembly shall blame him who invited him. The rest\nof the city shall watch over those among the young men who distinguish\nthemselves, having an eye upon them, and especially honouring them if\nthey succeed, but dishonouring them above the rest if they turn out\nto be inferior. This is the assembly to which he who has visited the\ninstitutions of other men, on his return home shall straightway go,\nand if he have discovered any one who has anything to say about the\nenactment of laws or education or nurture, or if he have himself made\nany observations, let him communicate his discoveries to the whole\nassembly. And if he be seen to have come home neither better nor worse,\nlet him be praised at any rate for his enthusiasm; and if he be much\nbetter, let him be praised so much the more; and not only while he lives\nbut after his death let the assembly honour him with fitting honours.\nBut if on his return home he appear to have been corrupted, pretending\nto be wise when he is not, let him hold no communication with any one,\nwhether young or old; and if he will hearken to the rulers, then he\nshall be permitted to live as a private individual; but if he will not,\nlet him die, if he be convicted in a court of law of interfering about\neducation and the laws. And if he deserve to be indicted, and none of\nthe magistrates indict him, let that be counted as a disgrace to them\nwhen the rewards of virtue are decided.\n\nLet such be the character of the person who goes abroad, and let him go\nabroad under these conditions. In the next place, the stranger who comes\nfrom abroad should be received in a friendly spirit. Now there are four\nkinds of strangers, of whom we must make some mention--the first is he\nwho comes and stays throughout the summer; this class are like birds of\npassage, taking wing in pursuit of commerce, and flying over the sea\nto other cities, while the season lasts; he shall be received in\nmarket-places and harbours and public buildings, near the city but\noutside, by those magistrates who are appointed to superintend these\nmatters; and they shall take care that a stranger, whoever he be, duly\nreceives justice; but he shall not be allowed to make any innovation.\nThey shall hold the intercourse with him which is necessary, and this\nshall be as little as possible. The second kind is just a spectator who\ncomes to see with his eyes and hear with his ears the festivals of the\nMuses; such ought to have entertainment provided them at the temples by\nhospitable persons, and the priests and ministers of the temples\nshould see and attend to them. But they should not remain more than a\nreasonable time; let them see and hear that for the sake of which they\ncame, and then go away, neither having suffered nor done any harm. The\npriests shall be their judges, if any of them receive or do any wrong up\nto the sum of fifty drachmae, but if any greater charge be brought,\nin such cases the suit shall come before the wardens of the agora. The\nthird kind of stranger is he who comes on some public business from\nanother land, and is to be received with public honours. He is to be\nreceived only by the generals and commanders of horse and foot, and the\nhost by whom he is entertained, in conjunction with the Prytanes, shall\nhave the sole charge of what concerns him. There is a fourth class of\npersons answering to our spectators, who come from another land to look\nat ours. In the first place, such visits will be rare, and the visitor\nshould be at least fifty years of age; he may possibly be wanting to\nsee something that is rich and rare in other states, or himself to show\nsomething in like manner to another city. Let such an one, then, go\nunbidden to the doors of the wise and rich, being one of them himself:\nlet him go, for example, to the house of the superintendent of\neducation, confident that he is a fitting guest of such a host, or let\nhim go to the house of some of those who have gained the prize of virtue\nand hold discourse with them, both learning from them, and also teaching\nthem; and when he has seen and heard all, he shall depart, as a friend\ntaking leave of friends, and be honoured by them with gifts and suitable\ntributes of respect. These are the customs, according to which our\ncity should receive all strangers of either sex who come from other\ncountries, and should send forth her own citizens, showing respect to\nZeus, the God of hospitality, not forbidding strangers at meals and\nsacrifices, as is the manner which prevails among the children of the\nNile, nor driving them away by savage proclamations.\n\nWhen a man becomes surety, let him give the security in a distinct form,\nacknowledging the whole transaction in a written document, and in the\npresence of not less than three witnesses if the sum be under a thousand\ndrachmae, and of not less than five witnesses if the sum be above a\nthousand drachmae. The agent of a dishonest or untrustworthy seller\nshall himself be responsible; both the agent and the principal shall\nbe equally liable. If a person wishes to find anything in the house of\nanother, he shall enter naked, or wearing only a short tunic and without\na girdle, having first taken an oath by the customary Gods that he\nexpects to find it there; he shall then make his search, and the other\nshall throw open his house and allow him to search things both sealed\nand unsealed. And if a person will not allow the searcher to make his\nsearch, he who is prevented shall go to law with him, estimating the\nvalue of the goods after which he is searching, and if the other be\nconvicted he shall pay twice the value of the article. If the master\nbe absent from home, the dwellers in the house shall let him search the\nunsealed property, and on the sealed property the searcher shall set\nanother seal, and shall appoint any one whom he likes to guard them\nduring five days; and if the master of the house be absent during a\nlonger time, he shall take with him the wardens of the city, and so make\nhis search, opening the sealed property as well as the unsealed, and\nthen, together with the members of the family and the wardens of the\ncity, he shall seal them up again as they were before. There shall be\na limit of time in the case of disputed things, and he who has had\npossession of them during a certain time shall no longer be liable to be\ndisturbed. As to houses and lands there can be no dispute in this state\nof ours; but if a man has any other possessions which he has used and\nopenly shown in the city and in the agora and in the temples, and no one\nhas put in a claim to them, and some one says that he was looking for\nthem during this time, and the possessor is proved to have made no\nconcealment, if they have continued for a year, the one having the goods\nand the other looking for them, the claim of the seeker shall not be\nallowed after the expiration of the year; or if he does not use or show\nthe lost property in the market or in the city, but only in the country,\nand no one offers himself as the owner during five years, at the\nexpiration of the five years the claim shall be barred for ever after;\nor if he uses them in the city but within the house, then the appointed\ntime of claiming the goods shall be three years, or ten years if he\nhas them in the country in private. And if he has them in another land,\nthere shall be no limit of time or prescription, but whenever the owner\nfinds them he may claim them.\n\nIf any one prevents another by force from being present at a trial,\nwhether a principal party or his witnesses; if the person prevented be\na slave, whether his own or belonging to another, the suit shall be\nincomplete and invalid; but if he who is prevented be a freeman, besides\nthe suit being incomplete, the other who has prevented him shall be\nimprisoned for a year, and shall be prosecuted for kidnapping by any\none who pleases. And if any one hinders by force a rival competitor in\ngymnastic or music, or any other sort of contest, from being present\nat the contest, let him who has a mind inform the presiding judges, and\nthey shall liberate him who is desirous of competing; and if they are\nnot able, and he who hinders the other from competing wins the prize,\nthen they shall give the prize of victory to him who is prevented, and\ninscribe him as the conqueror in any temples which he pleases; and he\nwho hinders the other shall not be permitted to make any offering or\ninscription having reference to that contest, and in any case he shall\nbe liable for damages, whether he be defeated or whether he conquer.\n\nIf any one knowingly receives anything which has been stolen, he shall\nundergo the same punishment as the thief, and if a man receives an exile\nhe shall be punished with death. Every man should regard the friend and\nenemy of the state as his own friend and enemy; and if any one makes\npeace or war with another on his own account, and without the authority\nof the state, he, like the receiver of the exile, shall undergo the\npenalty of death. And if any fraction of the city declare war or peace\nagainst any, the generals shall indict the authors of this proceeding,\nand if they are convicted death shall be the penalty. Those who serve\ntheir country ought to serve without receiving gifts, and there ought to\nbe no excusing or approving the saying, 'Men should receive gifts as the\nreward of good, but not of evil deeds'; for to know which we are doing,\nand to stand fast by our knowledge, is no easy matter. The safest course\nis to obey the law which says, 'Do no service for a bribe,' and let him\nwho disobeys, if he be convicted, simply die. With a view to taxation,\nfor various reasons, every man ought to have had his property valued:\nand the tribesmen should likewise bring a register of the yearly\nproduce to the wardens of the country, that in this way there may be\ntwo valuations; and the public officers may use annually whichever on\nconsideration they deem the best, whether they prefer to take a certain\nportion of the whole value, or of the annual revenue, after subtracting\nwhat is paid to the common tables.\n\nTouching offerings to the Gods, a moderate man should observe moderation\nin what he offers. Now the land and the hearth of the house of all men\nis sacred to all Gods; wherefore let no man dedicate them a second time\nto the Gods. Gold and silver, whether possessed by private persons or in\ntemples, are in other cities provocative of envy, and ivory, the product\nof a dead body, is not a proper offering; brass and iron, again, are\ninstruments of war; but of wood let a man bring what offering he likes,\nprovided it be a single block, and in like manner of stone, to the\npublic temples; of woven work let him not offer more than one woman can\nexecute in a month. White is a colour suitable to the Gods, especially\nin woven works, but dyes should only be used for the adornments of war.\nThe most divine of gifts are birds and images, and they should be such\nas one painter can execute in a single day. And let all other offerings\nfollow a similar rule.\n\nNow that the whole city has been divided into parts of which the nature\nand number have been described, and laws have been given about all the\nmost important contracts as far as this was possible, the next thing\nwill be to have justice done. The first of the courts shall consist of\nelected judges, who shall be chosen by the plaintiff and the defendant\nin common: these shall be called arbiters rather than judges. And in\nthe second court there shall be judges of the villages and tribes\ncorresponding to the twelvefold division of the land, and before these\nthe litigants shall go to contend for greater damages, if the suit be\nnot decided before the first judges; the defendant, if he be defeated\nthe second time, shall pay a fifth more than the damages mentioned in\nthe indictment; and if he find fault with his judges and would try a\nthird time, let him carry the suit before the select judges, and if he\nbe again defeated, let him pay the whole of the damages and half as much\nagain. And the plaintiff, if when defeated before the first judges he\npersist in going on to the second, shall if he wins receive in addition\nto the damages a fifth part more, and if defeated he shall pay a like\nsum; but if he is not satisfied with the previous decision, and will\ninsist on proceeding to a third court, then if he win he shall receive\nfrom the defendant the amount of the damages and, as I said before,\nhalf as much again, and the plaintiff, if he lose, shall pay half of the\ndamages claimed. Now the assignment by lot of judges to courts and the\ncompletion of the number of them, and the appointment of servants to the\ndifferent magistrates, and the times at which the several causes\nshould be heard, and the votings and delays, and all the things that\nnecessarily concern suits, and the order of causes, and the time in\nwhich answers have to be put in and parties are to appear--of these and\nother things akin to these we have indeed already spoken, but there\nis no harm in repeating what is right twice or thrice: All lesser and\neasier matters which the elder legislator has omitted may be supplied by\nthe younger one. Private courts will be sufficiently regulated in this\nway, and the public and state courts, and those which the magistrates\nmust use in the administration of their several offices, exist in many\nother states. Many very respectable institutions of this sort have\nbeen framed by good men, and from them the guardians of the law may\nby reflection derive what is necessary for the order of our new state,\nconsidering and correcting them, and bringing them to the test of\nexperience, until every detail appears to be satisfactorily determined;\nand then putting the final seal upon them, and making them irreversible,\nthey shall use them for ever afterwards. As to what relates to the\nsilence of judges and the abstinence from words of evil omen and the\nreverse, and the different notions of the just and good and honourable\nwhich exist in our own as compared with other states, they have been\npartly mentioned already, and another part of them will be mentioned\nhereafter as we draw near the end. To all these matters he who would be\nan equal judge shall justly look, and he shall possess writings about\nthem that he may learn them. For of all kinds of knowledge the knowledge\nof good laws has the greatest power of improving the learner; otherwise\nthere would be no meaning in the divine and admirable law possessing\na name akin to mind (nous, nomos). And of all other words, such as the\npraises and censures of individuals which occur in poetry and also in\nprose, whether written down or uttered in daily conversation, whether\nmen dispute about them in the spirit of contention or weakly assent\nto them, as is often the case--of all these the one sure test is the\nwritings of the legislator, which the righteous judge ought to have in\nhis mind as the antidote of all other words, and thus make himself\nand the city stand upright, procuring for the good the continuance and\nincrease of justice, and for the bad, on the other hand, a\nconversion from ignorance and intemperance, and in general from all\nunrighteousness, as far as their evil minds can be healed, but to those\nwhose web of life is in reality finished, giving death, which is the\nonly remedy for souls in their condition, as I may say truly again and\nagain. And such judges and chiefs of judges will be worthy of receiving\npraise from the whole city.\n\nWhen the suits of the year are completed the following laws shall\nregulate their execution: In the first place, the judge shall assign to\nthe party who wins the suit the whole property of him who loses, with\nthe exception of mere necessaries, and the assignment shall be made\nthrough the herald immediately after each decision in the hearing of\nthe judges; and when the month arrives following the month in which the\ncourts are sitting, (unless the gainer of the suit has been previously\nsatisfied) the court shall follow up the case, and hand over to the\nwinner the goods of the loser; but if they find that he has not the\nmeans of paying, and the sum deficient is not less than a drachma, the\ninsolvent person shall not have any right of going to law with any other\nman until he have satisfied the debt of the winning party; but other\npersons shall still have the right of bringing suits against him. And if\nany one after he is condemned refuses to acknowledge the authority\nwhich condemned him, let the magistrates who are thus deprived of their\nauthority bring him before the court of the guardians of the law, and if\nhe be cast, let him be punished with death, as a subverter of the whole\nstate and of the laws.\n\nThus a man is born and brought up, and after this manner he begets and\nbrings up his own children, and has his share of dealings with\nother men, and suffers if he has done wrong to any one, and receives\nsatisfaction if he has been wronged, and so at length in due time he\ngrows old under the protection of the laws, and his end comes in the\norder of nature. Concerning the dead of either sex, the religious\nceremonies which may fittingly be performed, whether appertaining to the\nGods of the under-world or of this, shall be decided by the interpreters\nwith absolute authority. Their sepulchres are not to be in places which\nare fit for cultivation, and there shall be no monuments in such spots,\neither large or small, but they shall occupy that part of the country\nwhich is naturally adapted for receiving and concealing the bodies of\nthe dead with as little hurt as possible to the living. No man, living\nor dead, shall deprive the living of the sustenance which the earth,\ntheir foster-parent, is naturally inclined to provide for them. And\nlet not the mound be piled higher than would be the work of five men\ncompleted in five days; nor shall the stone which is placed over the\nspot be larger than would be sufficient to receive the praises of the\ndead included in four heroic lines. Nor shall the laying out of the\ndead in the house continue for a longer time than is sufficient to\ndistinguish between him who is in a trance only and him who is really\ndead, and speaking generally, the third day after death will be a fair\ntime for carrying out the body to the sepulchre. Now we must believe the\nlegislator when he tells us that the soul is in all respects superior to\nthe body, and that even in life what makes each one of us to be what we\nare is only the soul; and that the body follows us about in the likeness\nof each of us, and therefore, when we are dead, the bodies of the dead\nare quite rightly said to be our shades or images; for the true and\nimmortal being of each one of us which is called the soul goes on her\nway to other Gods, before them to give an account--which is an inspiring\nhope to the good, but very terrible to the bad, as the laws of our\nfathers tell us; and they also say that not much can be done in the way\nof helping a man after he is dead. But the living--he should be helped\nby all his kindred, that while in life he may be the holiest and justest\nof men, and after death may have no great sins to be punished in the\nworld below. If this be true, a man ought not to waste his substance\nunder the idea that all this lifeless mass of flesh which is in process\nof burial is connected with him; he should consider that the son, or\nbrother, or the beloved one, whoever he may be, whom he thinks he\nis laying in the earth, has gone away to complete and fulfil his own\ndestiny, and that his duty is rightly to order the present, and to spend\nmoderately on the lifeless altar of the Gods below. But the legislator\ndoes not intend moderation to be taken in the sense of meanness. Let the\nlaw, then, be as follows: The expenditure on the entire funeral of him\nwho is of the highest class, shall not exceed five minae; and for him\nwho is of the second class, three minae, and for him who is of the third\nclass, two minae, and for him who is of the fourth class, one mina,\nwill be a fair limit of expense. The guardians of the law ought to\ntake especial care of the different ages of life, whether childhood, or\nmanhood, or any other age. And at the end of all, let there be some one\nguardian of the law presiding, who shall be chosen by the friends of\nthe deceased to superintend, and let it be glory to him to manage with\nfairness and moderation what relates to the dead, and a discredit to him\nif they are not well managed. Let the laying out and other ceremonies be\nin accordance with custom, but to the statesman who adopts custom as his\nlaw we must give way in certain particulars. It would be monstrous for\nexample that he should command any man to weep or abstain from weeping\nover the dead; but he may forbid cries of lamentation, and not allow the\nvoice of the mourner to be heard outside the house; also, he may forbid\nthe bringing of the dead body into the open streets, or the processions\nof mourners in the streets, and may require that before daybreak they\nshould be outside the city. Let these, then, be our laws relating to\nsuch matters, and let him who obeys be free from penalty; but he who\ndisobeys even a single guardian of the law shall be punished by them all\nwith a fitting penalty. Other modes of burial, or again the denial of\nburial, which is to be refused in the case of robbers of temples and\nparricides and the like, have been devised and are embodied in the\npreceding laws, so that now our work of legislation is pretty nearly at\nan end; but in all cases the end does not consist in doing something or\nacquiring something or establishing something--the end will be attained\nand finally accomplished, when we have provided for the perfect and\nlasting continuance of our institutions; until then our creation is\nincomplete.\n\nCLEINIAS: That is very good, Stranger; but I wish you would tell me more\nclearly what you mean.\n\nATHENIAN: O Cleinias, many things of old time were well said and sung;\nand the saying about the Fates was one of them.\n\nCLEINIAS: What is it?\n\nATHENIAN: The saying that Lachesis or the giver of the lots is the first\nof them, and that Clotho or the spinster is the second of them, and that\nAtropos or the unchanging one is the third of them; and that she is\nthe preserver of the things which we have spoken, and which have been\ncompared in a figure to things woven by fire, they both (i.e. Atropos\nand the fire) producing the quality of unchangeableness. I am speaking\nof the things which in a state and government give not only health and\nsalvation to the body, but law, or rather preservation of the law, in\nthe soul; and, if I am not mistaken, this seems to be still wanting\nin our laws: we have still to see how we can implant in them this\nirreversible nature.\n\nCLEINIAS: It will be no small matter if we can only discover how such a\nnature can be implanted in anything.\n\nATHENIAN: But it certainly can be; so much I clearly see.\n\nCLEINIAS: Then let us not think of desisting until we have imparted this\nquality to our laws; for it is ridiculous, after a great deal of labour\nhas been spent, to place a thing at last on an insecure foundation.\n\nATHENIAN: I approve of your suggestion, and am quite of the same mind\nwith you.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good: And now what, according to you, is to be the\nsalvation of our government and of our laws, and how is it to be\neffected?\n\nATHENIAN: Were we not saying that there must be in our city a council\nwhich was to be of this sort: The ten oldest guardians of the law, and\nall those who have obtained prizes of virtue, were to meet in the same\nassembly, and the council was also to include those who had visited\nforeign countries in the hope of hearing something that might be of use\nin the preservation of the laws, and who, having come safely home, and\nhaving been tested in these same matters, had proved themselves to be\nworthy to take part in the assembly--each of the members was to select\nsome young man of not less than thirty years of age, he himself judging\nin the first instance whether the young man was worthy by nature and\neducation, and then suggesting him to the others, and if he seemed to\nthem also to be worthy they were to adopt him; but if not, the decision\nat which they arrived was to be kept a secret from the citizens at\nlarge, and, more especially, from the rejected candidate. The meeting of\nthe council was to be held early in the morning, when everybody was most\nat leisure from all other business, whether public or private--was not\nsomething of this sort said by us before?\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: Then, returning to the council, I would say further, that\nif we let it down to be the anchor of the state, our city, having\neverything which is suitable to her, will preserve all that we wish to\npreserve.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: Now is the time for me to speak the truth in all earnestness.\n\nCLEINIAS: Well said, and I hope that you will fulfil your intention.\n\nATHENIAN: Know, Cleinias, that everything, in all that it does, has a\nnatural saviour, as of an animal the soul and the head are the chief\nsaviours.\n\nCLEINIAS: Once more, what do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: The well-being of those two is obviously the preservation of\nevery living thing.\n\nCLEINIAS: How is that?\n\nATHENIAN: The soul, besides other things, contains mind, and the head,\nbesides other things, contains sight and hearing; and the mind, mingling\nwith the noblest of the senses, and becoming one with them, may be truly\ncalled the salvation of all.\n\nCLEINIAS: Yes, quite so.\n\nATHENIAN: Yes, indeed; but with what is that intellect concerned which,\nmingling with the senses, is the salvation of ships in storms as well as\nin fair weather? In a ship, when the pilot and the sailors unite their\nperceptions with the piloting mind, do they not save both themselves and\ntheir craft?\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: We do not want many illustrations about such matters: What aim\nwould the general of an army, or what aim would a physician propose to\nhimself, if he were seeking to attain salvation?\n\nCLEINIAS: Very good.\n\nATHENIAN: Does not the general aim at victory and superiority in war,\nand do not the physician and his assistants aim at producing health in\nthe body?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And a physician who is ignorant about the body, that is to\nsay, who knows not that which we just now called health, or a general\nwho knows not victory, or any others who are ignorant of the particulars\nof the arts which we mentioned, cannot be said to have understanding\nabout any of these matters.\n\nCLEINIAS: They cannot.\n\nATHENIAN: And what would you say of the state? If a person proves to be\nignorant of the aim to which the statesman should look, ought he, in the\nfirst place, to be called a ruler at all; and further, will he ever be\nable to preserve that of which he does not even know the aim?\n\nCLEINIAS: Impossible.\n\nATHENIAN: And therefore, if our settlement of the country is to be\nperfect, we ought to have some institution, which, as I was saying,\nwill tell what is the aim of the state, and will inform us how we are\nto attain this, and what law or what man will advise us to that end. Any\nstate which has no such institution is likely to be devoid of mind and\nsense, and in all her actions will proceed by mere chance.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: In which, then, of the parts or institutions of the state is\nany such guardian power to be found? Can we say?\n\nCLEINIAS: I am not quite certain, Stranger; but I have a suspicion that\nyou are referring to the assembly which you just now said was to meet at\nnight.\n\nATHENIAN: You understand me perfectly, Cleinias; and we must assume, as\nthe argument implies, that this council possesses all virtue; and the\nbeginning of virtue is not to make mistakes by guessing many things, but\nto look steadily at one thing, and on this to fix all our aims.\n\nCLEINIAS: Quite true.\n\nATHENIAN: Then now we shall see why there is nothing wonderful in states\ngoing astray--the reason is that their legislators have such different\naims; nor is there anything wonderful in some laying down as their rule\nof justice, that certain individuals should bear rule in the state,\nwhether they be good or bad, and others that the citizens should be\nrich, not caring whether they are the slaves of other men or not. The\ntendency of others, again, is towards freedom; and some legislate with\na view to two things at once--they want to be at the same time free and\nthe lords of other states; but the wisest men, as they deem themselves\nto be, look to all these and similar aims, and there is no one of them\nwhich they exclusively honour, and to which they would have all things\nlook.\n\nCLEINIAS: Then, Stranger, our former assertion will hold; for we were\nsaying that laws generally should look to one thing only; and this, as\nwe admitted, was rightly said to be virtue.\n\nATHENIAN: Yes.\n\nCLEINIAS: And we said that virtue was of four kinds?\n\nATHENIAN: Quite true.\n\nCLEINIAS: And that mind was the leader of the four, and that to her the\nthree other virtues and all other things ought to have regard?\n\nATHENIAN: You follow me capitally, Cleinias, and I would ask you to\nfollow me to the end, for we have already said that the mind of the\npilot, the mind of the physician and of the general look to that\none thing to which they ought to look; and now we may turn to mind\npolitical, of which, as of a human creature, we will ask a question: O\nwonderful being, and to what are you looking? The physician is able\nto tell his single aim in life, but you, the superior, as you declare\nyourself to be, of all intelligent beings, when you are asked are not\nable to tell. Can you, Megillus, and you, Cleinias, say distinctly what\nis the aim of mind political, in return for the many explanations of\nthings which I have given you?\n\nCLEINIAS: We cannot, Stranger.\n\nATHENIAN: Well, but ought we not to desire to see it, and to see where\nit is to be found?\n\nCLEINIAS: For example, where?\n\nATHENIAN: For example, we were saying that there are four kinds of\nvirtue, and as there are four of them, each of them must be one.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And further, all four of them we call one; for we say that\ncourage is virtue, and that prudence is virtue, and the same of the two\nothers, as if they were in reality not many but one, that is, virtue.\n\nCLEINIAS: Quite so.\n\nATHENIAN: There is no difficulty in seeing in what way the two differ\nfrom one another, and have received two names, and so of the rest. But\nthere is more difficulty in explaining why we call these two and the\nrest of them by the single name of virtue.\n\nCLEINIAS: How do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: I have no difficulty in explaining what I mean. Let us\ndistribute the subject into questions and answers.\n\nCLEINIAS: Once more, what do you mean?\n\nATHENIAN: Ask me what is that one thing which I call virtue, and then\nagain speak of as two, one part being courage and the other wisdom. I\nwill tell you how that occurs: One of them has to do with fear; in this\nthe beasts also participate, and quite young children--I mean courage;\nfor a courageous temper is a gift of nature and not of reason. But\nwithout reason there never has been, or is, or will be a wise and\nunderstanding soul; it is of a different nature.\n\nCLEINIAS: That is true.\n\nATHENIAN: I have now told you in what way the two are different, and\ndo you in return tell me in what way they are one and the same. Suppose\nthat I ask you in what way the four are one, and when you have answered\nme, you will have a right to ask of me in return in what way they are\nfour; and then let us proceed to enquire whether in the case of things\nwhich have a name and also a definition to them, true knowledge consists\nin knowing the name only and not the definition. Can he who is good\nfor anything be ignorant of all this without discredit where great and\nglorious truths are concerned?\n\nCLEINIAS: I suppose not.\n\nATHENIAN: And is there anything greater to the legislator and the\nguardian of the law, and to him who thinks that he excels all other men\nin virtue, and has won the palm of excellence, than these very qualities\nof which we are now speaking--courage, temperance, wisdom, justice?\n\nCLEINIAS: How can there be anything greater?\n\nATHENIAN: And ought not the interpreters, the teachers, the lawgivers,\nthe guardians of the other citizens, to excel the rest of mankind,\nand perfectly to show him who desires to learn and know or whose evil\nactions require to be punished and reproved, what is the nature of\nvirtue and vice? Or shall some poet who has found his way into the city,\nor some chance person who pretends to be an instructor of youth, show\nhimself to be better than him who has won the prize for every virtue?\nAnd can we wonder that when the guardians are not adequate in speech\nor action, and have no adequate knowledge of virtue, the city being\nunguarded should experience the common fate of cities in our day?\n\nCLEINIAS: Wonder! no.\n\nATHENIAN: Well, then, must we do as we said? Or can we give our\nguardians a more precise knowledge of virtue in speech and action than\nthe many have? or is there any way in which our city can be made to\nresemble the head and senses of rational beings because possessing such\na guardian power?\n\nCLEINIAS: What, Stranger, is the drift of your comparison?\n\nATHENIAN: Do we not see that the city is the trunk, and are not the\nyounger guardians, who are chosen for their natural gifts, placed in the\nhead of the state, having their souls all full of eyes, with which\nthey look about the whole city? They keep watch and hand over their\nperceptions to the memory, and inform the elders of all that happens in\nthe city; and those whom we compared to the mind, because they have many\nwise thoughts--that is to say, the old men--take counsel, and making use\nof the younger men as their ministers, and advising with them--in this\nway both together truly preserve the whole state: Shall this or some\nother be the order of our state? Are all our citizens to be equal in\nacquirements, or shall there be special persons among them who have\nreceived a more careful training and education?\n\nCLEINIAS: That they should be equal, my good sir, is impossible.\n\nATHENIAN: Then we ought to proceed to some more exact training than any\nwhich has preceded.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: And must not that of which we are in need be the one to which\nwe were just now alluding?\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true.\n\nATHENIAN: Did we not say that the workman or guardian, if he be perfect\nin every respect, ought not only to be able to see the many aims, but he\nshould press onward to the one? This he should know, and knowing, order\nall things with a view to it.\n\nCLEINIAS: True.\n\nATHENIAN: And can any one have a more exact way of considering or\ncontemplating anything, than the being able to look at one idea gathered\nfrom many different things?\n\nCLEINIAS: Perhaps not.\n\nATHENIAN: Not 'Perhaps not,' but 'Certainly not,' my good sir, is the\nright answer. There never has been a truer method than this discovered\nby any man.\n\nCLEINIAS: I bow to your authority, Stranger; let us proceed in the way\nwhich you propose.\n\nATHENIAN: Then, as would appear, we must compel the guardians of our\ndivine state to perceive, in the first place, what that principle is\nwhich is the same in all the four--the same, as we affirm, in courage\nand in temperance, and in justice and in prudence, and which, being one,\nwe call as we ought, by the single name of virtue. To this, my friends,\nwe will, if you please, hold fast, and not let go until we have\nsufficiently explained what that is to which we are to look, whether to\nbe regarded as one, or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way. Are\nwe likely ever to be in a virtuous condition, if we cannot tell whether\nvirtue is many, or four, or one? Certainly, if we take counsel among\nourselves, we shall in some way contrive that this principle has a place\namongst us; but if you have made up your mind that we should let the\nmatter alone, we will.\n\nCLEINIAS: We must not, Stranger, by the God of strangers I swear that we\nmust not, for in our opinion you speak most truly; but we should like to\nknow how you will accomplish your purpose.\n\nATHENIAN: Wait a little before you ask; and let us, first of all, be\nquite agreed with one another that the purpose has to be accomplished.\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly, it ought to be, if it can be.\n\nATHENIAN: Well, and about the good and the honourable, are we to take\nthe same view? Are our guardians only to know that each of them is many,\nor also how and in what way they are one?\n\nCLEINIAS: They must consider also in what sense they are one.\n\nATHENIAN: And are they to consider only, and to be unable to set forth\nwhat they think?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly not; that would be the state of a slave.\n\nATHENIAN: And may not the same be said of all good things--that the true\nguardians of the laws ought to know the truth about them, and to be able\nto interpret them in words, and carry them out in action, judging of\nwhat is and of what is not well, according to nature?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly.\n\nATHENIAN: Is not the knowledge of the Gods which we have set forth with\nso much zeal one of the noblest sorts of knowledge--to know that they\nare, and know how great is their power, as far as in man lies? We do\nindeed excuse the mass of the citizens, who only follow the voice of\nthe laws, but we refuse to admit as guardians any who do not labour to\nobtain every possible evidence that there is respecting the Gods; our\ncity is forbidden and not allowed to choose as a guardian of the law, or\nto place in the select order of virtue, him who is not an inspired man,\nand has not laboured at these things.\n\nCLEINIAS: It is certainly just, as you say, that he who is indolent\nabout such matters or incapable should be rejected, and that things\nhonourable should be put away from him.\n\nATHENIAN: Are we assured that there are two things which lead men to\nbelieve in the Gods, as we have already stated?\n\nCLEINIAS: What are they?\n\nATHENIAN: One is the argument about the soul, which has been already\nmentioned--that it is the eldest and most divine of all things, to which\nmotion attaining generation gives perpetual existence; the other was an\nargument from the order of the motion of the stars, and of all things\nunder the dominion of the mind which ordered the universe. If a man look\nupon the world not lightly or ignorantly, there was never any one so\ngodless who did not experience an effect opposite to that which the many\nimagine. For they think that those who handle these matters by the help\nof astronomy, and the accompanying arts of demonstration, may become\ngodless, because they see, as far as they can see, things happening by\nnecessity, and not by an intelligent will accomplishing good.\n\nCLEINIAS: But what is the fact?\n\nATHENIAN: Just the opposite, as I said, of the opinion which once\nprevailed among men, that the sun and stars are without soul. Even in\nthose days men wondered about them, and that which is now ascertained\nwas then conjectured by some who had a more exact knowledge of\nthem--that if they had been things without soul, and had no mind, they\ncould never have moved with numerical exactness so wonderful; and even\nat that time some ventured to hazard the conjecture that mind was the\norderer of the universe. But these same persons again mistaking the\nnature of the soul, which they conceived to be younger and not older\nthan the body, once more overturned the world, or rather, I should say,\nthemselves; for the bodies which they saw moving in heaven all appeared\nto be full of stones, and earth, and many other lifeless substances, and\nto these they assigned the causes of all things. Such studies gave\nrise to much atheism and perplexity, and the poets took occasion to be\nabusive--comparing the philosophers to she-dogs uttering vain howlings,\nand talking other nonsense of the same sort. But now, as I said, the\ncase is reversed.\n\nCLEINIAS: How so?\n\nATHENIAN: No man can be a true worshipper of the Gods who does not know\nthese two principles--that the soul is the eldest of all things which\nare born, and is immortal and rules over all bodies; moreover, as I have\nnow said several times, he who has not contemplated the mind of nature\nwhich is said to exist in the stars, and gone through the previous\ntraining, and seen the connexion of music with these things, and\nharmonized them all with laws and institutions, is not able to give a\nreason of such things as have a reason. And he who is unable to acquire\nthis in addition to the ordinary virtues of a citizen, can hardly be a\ngood ruler of a whole state; but he should be the subordinate of other\nrulers. Wherefore, Cleinias and Megillus, let us consider whether we\nmay not add to all the other laws which we have discussed this further\none--that the nocturnal assembly of the magistrates, which has also\nshared in the whole scheme of education proposed by us, shall be a guard\nset according to law for the salvation of the state. Shall we propose\nthis?\n\nCLEINIAS: Certainly, my good friend, we will if the thing is in any\ndegree possible.\n\nATHENIAN: Let us make a common effort to gain such an object; for I\ntoo will gladly share in the attempt. Of these matters I have had much\nexperience, and have often considered them, and I dare say that I shall\nbe able to find others who will also help.\n\nCLEINIAS: I agree, Stranger, that we should proceed along the road in\nwhich God is guiding us; and how we can proceed rightly has now to be\ninvestigated and explained.\n\nATHENIAN: O Megillus and Cleinias, about these matters we cannot\nlegislate further until the council is constituted; when that is done,\nthen we will determine what authority they shall have of their own; but\nthe explanation of how this is all to be ordered would only be given\nrightly in a long discourse.\n\nCLEINIAS: What do you mean, and what new thing is this?\n\nATHENIAN: In the first place, a list would have to be made out of those\nwho by their ages and studies and dispositions and habits are well\nfitted for the duty of a guardian. In the next place, it will not be\neasy for them to discover themselves what they ought to learn, or become\nthe disciple of one who has already made the discovery. Furthermore, to\nwrite down the times at which, and during which, they ought to receive\nthe several kinds of instruction, would be a vain thing; for the\nlearners themselves do not know what is learned to advantage until the\nknowledge which is the result of learning has found a place in the soul\nof each. And so these details, although they could not be truly said\nto be secret, might be said to be incapable of being stated beforehand,\nbecause when stated they would have no meaning.\n\nCLEINIAS: What then are we to do, Stranger, under these circumstances?\n\nATHENIAN: As the proverb says, the answer is no secret, but open to all\nof us: We must risk the whole on the chance of throwing, as they say,\nthrice six or thrice ace, and I am willing to share with you the danger\nby stating and explaining to you my views about education and nurture,\nwhich is the question coming to the surface again. The danger is not a\nslight or ordinary one, and I would advise you, Cleinias, in particular,\nto see to the matter; for if you order rightly the city of the Magnetes,\nor whatever name God may give it, you will obtain the greatest glory;\nor at any rate you will be thought the most courageous of men in the\nestimation of posterity. Dear companions, if this our divine assembly\ncan only be established, to them we will hand over the city; none of the\npresent company of legislators, as I may call them, would hesitate about\nthat. And the state will be perfected and become a waking reality, which\na little while ago we attempted to create as a dream and in idea only,\nmingling together reason and mind in one image, in the hope that our\ncitizens might be duly mingled and rightly educated; and being educated,\nand dwelling in the citadel of the land, might become perfect guardians,\nsuch as we have never seen in all our previous life, by reason of the\nsaving virtue which is in them.\n\nMEGILLUS: Dear Cleinias, after all that has been said, either we must\ndetain the Stranger, and by supplications and in all manner of ways\nmake him share in the foundation of the city, or we must give up the\nundertaking.\n\nCLEINIAS: Very true, Megillus; and you must join with me in detaining\nhim.\n\nMEGILLUS: I will.","title":"Laws","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":238601}