{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_17522/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_17522","id":"gutenberg_17522","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/17522","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Psychiatry/Psychology","Category: Teaching & Education","Essays"],"text":"Produced by Marc D'Hooghe.\n\n\n\nFrom images generously made available by Gallica\n(Bibliotheque Nationale de France) at http://gallica.bnf.fr.\n\n\n\n\n\nPRACTICAL ESSAYS.\n\nby\n\nALEXANDER BAIN, LL.D.,\n\nEMERITUS PROFESSOR OF LOGIC IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN.\n\n\nLONDON:\n\n1884.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nThe present volume is in great part a reprint of articles contributed to\nReviews. The principal bond of union among them is their practical\ncharacter. Beyond that, there is little to connect them apart from the\nindividuality of the author and the range of his studies.\n\nThat there is a certain amount of novelty in the various suggestions\nhere embodied, will be admitted on the most cursory perusal. The farther\nquestion of their worth is necessarily left open.\n\nThe first two essays are applications of the laws of mind to some\nprevailing Errors.\n\nThe next two have an educational bearing: the one is on the subjects\nproper for Competitive Examinations; the other, on the present position\nof the much vexed Classical controversy.\n\nThe fifth considers the range of Philosophical or Metaphysical Study,\nand the mode of conducting this study in Debating Societies.\n\nThe sixth contains a retrospect of the growth of the Universities, with\nmore especial reference to those of Scotland; and also a discussion of\nthe University Ideal, as something more than professional teaching.\n\nThe seventh is a chapter omitted from the author's \"Science of\nEducation\"; it is mainly devoted to the methods of self-education by\nmeans of books. The situation thus assumed has peculiarities that admit\nof being handled apart from the general theory of Education.\n\nThe eighth contends for the extension of liberty of thought, as regards\nSectarian Creeds and Subscription to Articles. The total emancipation of\nthe clerical body from the thraldom of subscription, is here advocated\nwithout reservation.\n\nThe concluding essay discusses the Procedure of Deliberative Bodies. Its\nnovelty lies chiefly in proposing to carry out, more thoroughly than has\nyet been done, a few devices already familiar. But for an extraordinary\nreluctance in all quarters to adapt simple and obvious remedies to a\ngrowing evil, the article need never have appeared. It so happens, that\nthe case principally before the public mind at present, is the deadlock\nin the House of Commons; yet, had that stood alone, the author would not\nhave ventured to meddle with the subject. The difficulty, however, is\nwidely felt: and the principles here put forward are perfectly general;\nbeing applicable wherever deliberative bodies are numerously constituted\nand heavily laden with business.\n\nABERDEEN, _March_, 1884.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\nI.\n\nCOMMON ERRORS ON THE MIND.\n\n\nError regarding Mind as a whole--that Mind can be exerted without bodily\nexpenditure.\n\n\nErrors with regard to the FEELINGS.\n\nI. Advice to take on cheerfulness.\n\nAuthorities for this prescription.\n\nPresumptions against our ability to comply with it.\n\nConcurrence of the cheerful temperament with youth and health.\n\nWith special corporeal vigour. With absence of care and anxiety.\n\nLimitation of Force applies to the mind.\n\nThe only means of rescuing from dulness--to increase the supports and\ndiminish the burdens of life.\n\nDifficulties In the choice of amusements\n\nII. Prescribing certain tastes, or pursuits, to persons\nindiscriminately.\n\nTastes must repose as natural endowment, or else in prolonged education.\n\nIII. Inverted relationship of Feelings and Imagination.\n\nImagination does not determine Feeling, but the reverse.\n\nExamples:--Bacon, Shelley, Byron, Burke, Chalmers, the Orientals, the\nChinese, the Celt, and the Saxon.\n\nIV. Fallaciousness of the view, that happiness is best gained by not\nbeing aimed at.\n\nSeemingly a self-contradiction.\n\nButler's view of the disinterestedness of Appetite.\n\nApart from pleasure and pain, Appetite would not move us.\n\nParallel from other ends of pursuit--Health.\n\nLife has two aims--Happiness and Virtue--each to be sought directly on\nits own account.\n\n\nErrors connected with the WILL.\n\nI. Cost of energy, of Will. Need of a suitable physical confirmation.\n\nCourage, Prudence, Belief.\n\nII. Free-will a centre of various fallacies.\n\nDoctrines repudiated from the offence given to personal dignity.\nOperation of this on the history of Free-will.\n\nIII. Departing from the usual rendering of a fact, treated as denying\nthe fact.\n\nMetaphysical and Ethical examples.\n\nAlliance of Mind and Matter.\n\nPerception of a Material World.\n\nIV. The terms Freedom and Necessity miss the real point of the human\nwill.\n\nV. Moral Ability and Inability.--Fallacy of seizing a question by the\nwrong end.\n\nProper signification of Moral Inability--insufficiency of the ordinary\nmotives, but not of all motives.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nII.\n\nERRORS OF SUPPRESSED CORRELATIVES.\n\n\nMeanings of Relativity--intellectual and emotional.\n\nAll impressions greatest at first. Law of Accommodation and habit.\n\nThe pleasure of rest presupposes toil.\n\nKnowledge has its charm from previous ignorance.\n\nSilence is of value, after excess of speech.\n\nPrevious pain not, in all cases, necessary to pleasure.\n\nSimplicity of Style praiseworthy only under prevailing artificiality. To\nextol Knowledge is to reprobate Ignorance.\n\nAuthority appealed to, when in our favour, repudiated when against us.\n\nFallacy of declaring all labour honourable alike.\n\nThe happiness of Justice supposes reciprocity.\n\nLove and Benevolence need to be reciprocated.\n\nThe _moral nature_ of God--a fallacy of suppressed correlative\n\nA perpetual miracle--a self-contradiction.\n\nFallacy that, in the world, everything is mysterious.\n\nProper meaning of Mystery.\n\nLocke and Newton on the true nature of Explanation\n\nThe Understanding cannot transcend its own experience.--Time and Space,\ntheir Infinity.\n\nWe can assimilate facts, and generalise the many into one. This alone\nconstitutes Explanation.\n\nExample from Gravity: not now mysterious.\n\nBody and Mind. In what ways the mysteriousness of their union might be\ndone away with.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIII.\n\nTHE CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS.\n\n\nI. HISTORICAL SKETCH.\n\nFirst official recommendation of Competitive Examinations.\n\nSuccessive steps towards their adoption.\n\nFirst absolutely open Competition--in the India Service.\n\nMacaulay's Report on the subjects for examination and their values.\n\nTable of Subjects. Innovations of Lord Salisbury.\n\nAn amended Table.\n\n\nII. THE SCIENCE CONSIDERED.\n\nDoubts expressed as to the expediency of the competitive system.\n\nCriticism of the present prescription for the higher Services.\n\nThe Commissioners' Scheme of Mathematics and Natural Science\nobjectionable.\n\nClassification of the Sciences into Abstract or fundamental, and\nConcrete or derivative.\n\nThose of the first class have a fixed order, the order of dependence.\n\nThe other class is represented by the Natural History Sciences, which\nbring into play the Logic of Classification.\n\nEach of these is allied to one or other members of the primary Sciences.\n\nThe Commissioners' Table misstates the relationships of the various\nSciences.\n\nThe London University Scheme a better model.\n\nThe choice allowed by the Commissioners not founded on a proper\nprinciple.\n\nThe higher Mathematics encouraged to excess.\n\nAmended scheme of comparative values.\n\nPosition of Languages in the examinations.\n\nThe place in education of Language generally.\n\nPurposes of Language acquisition.\n\nAltered position of the Classical, languages.\n\nAlleged benefits of these languages, after ceasing to be valuable in\ntheir original use.\n\nThe teaching of the languages does not correspond to these secondary\nvalues.\n\nLanguages are not a proper subject for competition with a view to\nappointments.\n\nFor foreign service, there should be a pass examination in the languages\nneedful.\n\nThe training powers attributed to languages should be tested in its own\ncharacter.\n\nInstead of the Languages of Greece, Rome, &c., substitute the History\nand Literature.\n\nAllocation of marks under this view.\n\nObjections answered.\n\nCertain subjects should be obligatory.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIV.\n\nTHE CLASSICAL CONTROVERSY.\n\nITS PRESENT ASPECT.\n\n\nAttack on Classics by Combe, fifty years ago.\n\nAlternative proposals at the present day:--\n\n1. The existing system Attempts at extending the Science course under\nthis system.\n\n2. Remitting Greek in favour of a modern language. A defective\narrangement.\n\n3. Remitting both Latin and Greek in favour of French and German.\n\n4. Complete bifurcation of the Classical and the Modern sides.\n\nThe Universities must be prepared to admit a thorough modern alternative\ncourse.\n\nLatin should not be compulsory in the modern side.\n\nDefences of Classics.\n\nThe argument from the Greeks knowing only their own language--never\nanswered.\n\nAdmission that the teaching of classics needs improvement.\n\nAlleged results of contact with the great authors of Greece and\nRome--unsupported by facts.\n\nAmount of benefit attainable without knowledge of originals.\n\nThe element of training may be obtained from modern languages.\n\nThe classics said to keep the mind free from party bias.\n\nCanon Liddon's argument in favour of Greek as a study.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nV.\n\nMETAPHYSICS AND DEBATING SOCIETIES.\n\nMetaphysics here taken as comprising Psychology, Logic, and their\ndependent sciences.\n\nImportance of the two fundamental departments.\n\nThe great problems, such as Free-will and External Perception should be\nrun up into systematic Psychology.\n\nLogic also requires to be followed out systematically.\n\nSlender connection of Logic and Psychology.\n\nDerivative Sciences:--Education.\n\nAesthetics--a corner of the larger field of Human Happiness\n\nThe treatment of Happiness should be dissevered from Ethics\n\nAdam Smith's loose rendering of the conditions of happiness\n\nSociology--treated, partly in its own field, and partly as a derivative\nof Psychology.\n\nThrough it lies the way to Ethics.\n\nThe sociological and the ethical ends compared.\n\nFactitious applications of Metaphysical study.\n\nBearings on Theology, as regards both attack and defence.\n\nIncapable of supplying the place of Theology.\n\nPolemical handling of Metaphysics.\n\nMethodised Debate in the Greek Schools.\n\nMuch must always be done by the solitary thinker.\n\nBest openings for Polemic:--Settling' the meanings of terms.\n\nDiscussing the broader generalities.\n\nThe Debate a light for mastery, and ill-suited for nice adjustments.\n\nThe Essay should be a centre of amicable co-operation, which would have\nspecial advantages.\n\nAvoidance of such debates as are from their very nature interminable.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nVI.\n\nTHE UNIVERSITY IDEAL--PAST AND PRESENT.\n\n\nThe Higher Teaching in Greece.\n\nThe Middle Age and Boethius.\n\nEve of the University.\n\nSeparation of Philosophy from Theology.\n\nThe Universities of Scotland founded--their history.\n\nFirst Period.--The Teaching Body.\n\nThe Subjects taught and manner of teaching.\n\nSecond Period.--The Reformation.\n\nModified Curriculum--Andrew Melville.\n\nAttempted reforms in teaching.\n\nSystem of Disputation.\n\nImprovements constituting the transition to the Third Period.\n\nThe Universities and the political revolutions.\n\nHow far the Universities are essential to professional teaching:\nperennial alternative of Apprenticeship.\n\nThe Ideal Graduate.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nVII.\n\nTHE ART OF STUDY.\n\n\nStudy more immediately supposes learning from Books.\n\nThe Greeks did not found an Art of Study, but afforded examples:\nDemosthenes.\n\nQuintilian's \"Institutes\" a landmark.\n\nBacon's Essay on Studies. Hobbes.\n\nMilton's Tractate on Education.\n\nLocke's \"Conduct of the Understanding\" very specific as to rules of\nStudy.\n\nWatts's work entitled \"The Improvement of the Mind\".\n\nWhat an Art of Study should attempt.\n\nMode of approaching it.\n\n\nI. First Maxim--\"Select a Text-book-in-chief\".\n\nViolations of the maxim: Milton's system.\n\nForm or Method to be looked to, in the chief text-book.\n\nThe Sciences. History.\n\nNon-methodical subjects.\n\nRepudiation of plans of study by some.\n\nMerits to be sought in a principal Text-book.\n\nQuestion as between old writers and new.\n\nParadoxical extreme--one book and no more.\n\nSingle all-sufficing books do not exist.\n\nIllustration from Locke's treatment of the Bible.\n\n\nII. \"What constitutes the study of a book?\"\n\n1. Copying literally:--Defects of this plan.\n\n2. Committing to memory word for word.\n\nProfitable only for brief portions of a book.\n\nMemory in extension and intension.\n\n3. Making Abstracts.\n\nVariety of modes of abstracting.\n\n4. Locke's plan of reading.\n\nA sense of Form must concur with abstracting.\n\nExample from the Practice of Medicine.\n\nExample from the Oratorical Art\n\nChoice of a series of Speeches to begin upon.\n\nAn oratorical scheme essential.\n\nExemplary Speeches.\n\nIllustration from the oratorical quality of negative tact. Macaulay's\nSpeeches on Reform.\n\nStudy for improvement in Style.\n\n\nIII. Distributing the Attention in Reading.\n\n\nIV. Desultory Reading.\n\n\nV. Proportion of book-reading to Observation at first hand.\n\n\nVI. Adjuncts of Reading.--Conversation.\n\nOriginal Composition.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nVIII.\n\nRELIGIOUS TESTS AND SUBSCRIPTIONS.\n\nPursuit of Truth has three departments:--order of nature, ends of\npractice, and the supernatural.\n\nGrowth of Intolerance. How innovations became possible.\n\nIn early society, religion a part of the civil government.\n\nBeginnings of toleration--dissentients from the State Church.\n\nEvils attendant on Subscription:--the practice inherently fallacious.\n\nEnforcement of creeds nugatory for the end in view.\n\nDogmatic uniformity only a part of the religious character: element of\nFeeling.\n\nRecital of the general argument for religious liberty.\n\nBeginnings of prosecution for heresy in Greece:--Anaxagoras, Socrates,\nPlato, Aristotle.\n\nForced reticence in recent times:--Carlyle, Macaulay, Lyell.\n\nEvil of disfranchising the Clerical class.\n\nOutspokenness a virtue to be encouraged.\n\nSpecial necessities of the present time: conflict of advancing knowledge\nwith the received orthodoxy.\n\nObjections answered:--The Church has engaged itself to the State to\nteach given tenets.\n\nPossible abuse of freedom by the clergy.\n\nThe history of the English Presbyterian Church exemplifies the absence\nof Subscription.\n\nVarious modes of transition from the prevailing practice.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIX.\n\nPROCEDURE OF DELIBERATIVE BODIES.\n\nGrowing evil of the intolerable length of Debates.\n\nHurried decisions might be obviated by allowing an interval previous to\nthe vote.\n\nThe oral debate reviewed.--Assumptions underlying it, fully examined.\n\nEvidence that, in Parliament, it is not the main engine of persuasion.\n\nIts real service is to supply the newspaper reports.\n\nPrinting, without speaking, would serve the end in view.\n\nProposal to print and distribute beforehand the reasons for each Motion.\n\nIllustration from decisions on Reports of Committees.\n\nMovers of Amendments to follow the same course.\n\nFurther proposal to give to each member the liberty of circulating a\nspeech in print, instead of delivering it.\n\nThe dramatic element in legislation much thought of.\n\nComparison of the advantages of reading and of listening.\n\nThe numbers of backers to a motion should be proportioned to the size of\nthe assembly.\n\nAbsurdity of giving so much power to individuals.\n\nIn the House of Commons twenty backers to each bill not too many.\n\nThe advantages of printed speeches. Objections.\n\nUnworkability of the plan in Committees. How remedied.\n\nIn putting questions to Ministers, there should be at least ten backers.\n\nHow to compensate for the suppression of oratory in the\nHouse:--Sectional discussions.\n\nThe divisions occasioned at one sitting to be taken at the beginning of\nthe next.\n\nEvery deliberative body must be free to determine what amount of\nspeaking it requires.\n\nThe English Parliamentary system considered as a model.\n\nLord Derby and Lord Sherbrooke on the extension of printing.\n\nDefects of the present system becoming more apparent.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n_Notes and References in connection with Essay VIII. on Subscription_\n\nFirst imposition of Tests after the English Reformation.\n\nDean Milman's speech in favour of total abolition of Tests.\n\nTests in Scotland: Mr. Taylor Innes on the \"Law of Creeds\".\n\nResumption of Subscription in the English Presbyterian Church.\n\nOther English Dissenting Churches.\n\nPresbyterian Church in the United States.\n\nFrench Protestant Church--its two divisions.\n\nSwitzerland:--Canton of Valid.\n\nIndependent Evangelical Church of Neuchatel.\n\nNational Protestant Church of Geneva.\n\nFree Church of Geneva. Germanic Switzerland.\n\nHungarian Reformed Church.\n\nGermany:--Recent prosecutions for heresy.\n\nHolland:--Calvinists and Modern School.\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nI.\n\nCOMMON ERRORS ON THE MIND.[1]\n\n\nOn the prevailing errors on the mind, proposed to be considered in this\npaper, some relate to the Feelings, others to the Will.\n\nIn regard to Mind as a whole, there are still to be found among us some\nremnants of a mistake, once universally prevalent and deeply rooted,\nnamely, the opinion that mind is not only a different fact from\nbody--which is true, and a vital and fundamental truth--but is to a\ngreater or less extent independent of the body. In former times, the\nremark seldom occurred to any one, unless obtruded by some extreme\ninstance, that to work the mind is also to work a number of bodily\norgans; that not a feeling can arise, not a thought can pass, without a\nset of concurring bodily processes. At the present day, however, this\ndoctrine is very generally preached by men of science. The improved\ntreatment of the insane has been one consequence of its reception. The\nhusbanding of mental power, through a bodily _regime_, is a no less\nimportant application. Instead of supposing that mind is something\nindefinite, elastic, inexhaustible,--a sort of perpetual motion, or\nmagician's bottle, all expenditure, and no supply,--we now find that\nevery single throb of pleasure, every smart of pain, every purpose,\nthought, argument, imagination, must have its fixed quota of oxygen,\ncarbon, and other materials, combined and transformed in certain\nphysical organs. And, as the possible extent of physical transformation\nin each person's framework is limited in amount, the forces resulting\ncannot be directed to one purpose without being lost for other purposes.\nIf an extra share passes to the muscles, there is less for the nerves;\nif the cerebral functions are pushed to excess, other functions have to\nbe correspondingly abated. In several of the prevailing opinions about\nto be criticised, failure to recognise this cardinal truth is the prime\nsource of mistake.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTo begin with the FEELINGS.\n\nI. We shall first consider an advice or prescription repeatedly put\nforth, not merely by the unthinking mass, but by men of high repute: it\nis, that with a view to happiness, to virtue, and to the accomplishment\nof great designs, we should all be cheerful, light-hearted, gay.\n\nI quote a passage from the writings of one of the Apostolic Fathers, the\nPastor of Hermas, as given in Dr. Donaldson's abstract:--\n\n\"Command tenth affirms that sadness is the sister of doubt, mistrust,\nand wrath; that it is worse than all other spirits, and grieves the Holy\nSpirit. It is therefore to be completely driven away, and, instead of\nit, we are to put on cheerfulness, which is pleasing to God. 'Every\ncheerful man works well, and always thinks those things which are good,\nand despises sadness. The sad man, on the other hand, is always\nbad.'\"[2]\n\n[FALLACY OF PRESCRIBING CHEERFULNESS.]\n\nDugald Stewart inculcates Good-humour as a means of happiness and\nvirtue; his language implying that the quality is one within our power\nto appropriate.\n\nIn Mr. Smiles's work entitled \"Self-Help,\" we find an analogous strain\nof remarks:--\n\n\"To wait patiently, however, man must work cheerfully. Cheerfulness is\nan excellent working quality, imparting great elasticity to the\ncharacter. As a Bishop has said, 'Temper is nine-tenths of\nChristianity,' so are cheerfulness and diligence [a considerable\nmake-weight] nine-tenths of practical wisdom.\"\n\nSir Arthur Helps, in those essays of his, combining profound observation\nwith strong genial sympathies and the highest charms of style,\nrepeatedly adverts to the dulness, the want of sunny light-hearted\nenjoyment of the English temperament, and, on one occasion, piquantly\nquotes the remark of Froissart on our Saxon progenitors: \"They took\ntheir pleasures sadly, as was their fashion; _ils se divertirent moult\ntristement a la mode de leur pays_\"\n\nThere is no dispute as to the value or the desirableness of this\naccomplishment. Hume, in his \"Life,\" says of himself, \"he was ever\ndisposed to see the favourable more than the unfavourable side of\nthings; a turn of mind which it is more happy to possess than to be born\nto an estate of ten thousand a year\". This sanguine, happy temper, is\nmerely another form of the cheerfulness recommended to general adoption.\n\nI contend, nevertheless, that to bid a man be habitually cheerful, he\nnot being so already, is like bidding him treble his fortune, or add a\ncubit to his stature. The quality of a cheerful, buoyant temperament\npartly belongs to the original cast of the constitution--like the bone,\nthe muscle, the power of memory, the aptitude for science or for music;\nand is partly the outcome of the whole manner of life. In order to\nsustain the quality, the physical (as the support of the mental) forces\nof the system must run largely in one particular channel; and, of\ncourse, as the same forces are not available elsewhere, so notable a\nfeature of strength will be accompanied with counterpart weaknesses or\ndeficiencies. Let us briefly review the facts bearing upon the point.\n\nThe first presumption in favour of the position is grounded in the\nconcomitance of the cheerful temperament with youth, health, abundant\nnourishment. It appears conspicuously along with whatever promotes\nphysical vigour. The state is partially attained during holidays, in\nsalubrious climates, and health-bringing avocations; it is lost, in the\nmidst of toils, in privation of comforts, and in physical prostration.\nThe seeming exception of elated spirits in bodily decay, in fasting, and\nin ascetic practices, is no disproof of the general principle, but\nmerely the introduction of another principle, namely, that we can feed\none part of the system at the expense of degrading and prematurely\nwasting others.\n\n[LIGHT-HEARTEDNESS NOT IN OUR OWN POWER.]\n\nA second presumption is furnished also from our familiar experience. The\nhigh-pitched, hilarious temperament and disposition commonly appear in\ncompany with some well-marked characteristics of corporeal vigour. Such\npersons are usually of a robust mould; often large and full in person,\nvigorous in circulation and in digestion; able for fatigue, endurance,\nand exhausting pleasures. An eminent example of this constitution was\nseen in Charles James Fox, whose sociability, cheerfulness, gaiety, and\npower of dissipation were the marvel of his age. Another example might\nbe quoted in the admirable physical frame of Lord Palmerston. It is no\nmore possible for an ordinarily constituted person to emulate the flow\nand the animation of these men, than it is to digest with another\nperson's stomach, or to perform the twelve labours of Hercules.\n\nA third fact, less on the surface, but no less certain, is, that the men\nof cheerful and buoyant temperament, as a rule, sit easy to the cares\nand obligations of life. They are not much given to care and anxiety as\nregards their own affairs, and it is not to be expected that they should\nbe more anxious about other people's. In point of fact, this is the\nconstitution of somewhat easy virtue: it is not distinguished by a\nsevere, rigid attention to the obligations and the punctualities of\nlife. We should not be justified in calling such persons selfish; still\nless should we call them cold-hearted: their exuberance overflows upon\nothers in the form of heartiness, geniality, joviality, and even lavish\ngenerosity. Still, they can seldom be got to look far before them; they\ndo not often assume the painfully circumspect attitude required in the\nmore arduous enterprises. They are not conscientious in trifles. They\ncast off readily the burdensome parts of life. All which is in keeping\nwith our principle. To take on burdens and cares is to draw upon the\nvital forces--to leave so much the less to cheerfulness and buoyant\nspirits. The same corporeal framework cannot afford a lavish expenditure\nin several different ways at one time. Fox had no long-sightedness, no\ntendency to forecast evils, or to burden himself with possible\nmisfortunes. It is very doubtful if Palmerston could have borne the part\nof Wellington in the Peninsula; his easy-going temperament would not\nhave submitted itself to all the anxieties and precautions of that vast\nenterprise. But Palmerston was hale and buoyant, and the Prime Minister\nof England at eighty: Wellington began to be infirm at sixty.\n\n[LIMITATIONS OF THE MENTAL FORCES.]\n\nTo these three experimental proofs we may add the confirmation derived\nfrom the grand doctrine named the Correlation, Conservation,\nPersistence, or Limitation of Force, as applied to the human body and\nthe human mind. We cannot create force anywhere; we merely appropriate\nexisting force. The heat of our fires has been derived from the solar\nfire. We cannot lift a weight in the hand without the combustion of a\ncertain amount of food; we cannot think a thought without a similar\ndemand; and the force that goes in one way is unavailable in any other\nway. While we are expending ourselves largely in any single function--in\nmuscular exercise, in digestion, in thought and feeling, the remaining\nfunctions must continue for the time in comparative abeyance. Now, the\nmaintenance of a high strain of elated feeling, unquestionably costs a\ngreat deal to the forces of the system. All the facts confirm this high\nestimate. An unusually copious supply of arterial blood to the brain is\nan indispensable requisite, even although other organs should be\npartially starved, and consequently be left in a weak condition, or else\ndeteriorate before their time. To support the excessive demand of power\nfor one object, less must be exacted from other functions. Hard bodily\nlabour and severe mental application sap the very foundations of\nbuoyancy; they may not entail much positive suffering, but they are\nscarcely compatible with exuberant spirits. There may be exceptional\nindividuals whose _total_ of power is a very large figure, who can bear\nmore work, endure more privation, and yet display more buoyancy, without\nshortened life, than the average human being. Hardly any man can attain\ncommanding greatness without being constituted larger than his fellows\nin the sum of human vitality. But until this is proved to be the fact\nin any given instance, we are safe in presuming that extraordinary\nendowment in one thing implies deficiency in other things. More\nespecially must we conclude, provisionally at least, that a buoyant,\nhopeful, elated temperament lacks some other virtues, aptitudes, or\npowers, such as are seen flourishing in the men whose temperament is\nsombre, inclining to despondency. Most commonly the contradictory demand\nis reconciled by the proverbial \"short life and merry\".\n\nAdverting now to the object that Helps had so earnestly at\nheart--namely, to rouse and rescue the English population from their\ncomparative dulness to a more lively and cheerful flow of existence--let\nus reflect how, upon the foregoing principles, this is to be done. Not\ncertainly by an eloquent appeal to the nation to get up and be amused.\nThe process will turn out to be a more circuitous one.\n\nThe mental conformation of the English people, which we may admit to be\nless lively and less easily amused than the temperament of Irishmen,\nFrenchmen, Spaniards, Italians, or even the German branch of our own\nTeutonic race, is what it is from natural causes, whether remote\ndescent, or that coupled with the operation of climate and other local\npeculiarities. How long would it take, and what would be the way to\nestablish in us a second nature on the point of cheerfulness?\n\nAgain, with the national temperament such as it is, there may be great\nindividual differences; and it may be possible by force of\ncircumstances, to improve the hilarity and the buoyancy of any given\nperson. Many of our countrymen are as joyous themselves, and as much the\ncause of joy in others, as the most light-hearted Irishman, or the\ngayest Frenchman or Italian. How shall we increase the number of such,\nso as to make them the rule rather than the exception?\n\n[SOLE MEANS OF ATTAINING CHEERFULLNESS.]\n\nThe only answer not at variance with the laws of the human constitution\nis--_Increase the supports and diminish the burdens of life_.\n\nFor example, if by any means you can raise the standard of health and\nlongevity, you will at once effect a stride in the direction sought. But\nwhat an undertaking is this! It is not merely setting up what we call\nsanitary arrangements, to which, in our crowded populations, there must\nsoon be a limit reached (for how can you secure to the mass of men even\nthe one condition of sufficient breathing-space?), it is that health\ncannot be attained, in any high general standard, without worldly means\nfar above the average at the disposal of the existing population; while\nthe most abundant resources are often neutralised by ineradicable\nhereditary taint. To which it is to be added, that mankind can hardly as\nyet be said to be in earnest in the matter of health.\n\nFarther: it is especially necessary to cheerfulness, that a man should\nnot be overworked, as many of us are, whether from choice or from\nnecessity. Much, I believe, turns upon this circumstance. Severe toil\nconsumes the forces of the constitution, without leaving the remainder\nrequisite for hilarity of tone. The Irishman fed upon three meals of\npotatoes a day, the lazy Highlander, the Lazaroni of Naples living upon\nsixpence a week, are very poorly supported; but then their vitality is\nso little drawn upon by work, that they may exceed in buoyancy of\nspirits the well-fed but hard-worked labourer. We, the English people,\nwould not change places with them, notwithstanding: our _ideal_ is\nindustry with abundance; but then our industry sobers our temperament,\nand inclines us to the dulness that Helps regrets. Possibly, we may one\nday hit a happier mean; but to the human mind extremes have generally\nbeen found easiest.\n\nOnce more: the light-hearted races trouble themselves little about their\npolitical constitution, about despotism or liberty; they enjoy the\npassing moments of a despot's smiles, and if he turns round and crushes\nthem, they quietly submit. We live in dread of tyranny. Our liberty is\na serious object; it weighs upon our minds. Now any weight upon the mind\nis so much taken from our happiness; hilarity may attend on poverty, but\nnot so well on a serious, forecasting disposition. Our regard to the\nfuture makes us both personally industrious and politically anxious;\na temper not to be amused with the relaxations of the Parisian in his\n_cafe_ on the boulevards, or with the Sunday merry-go-round of the\nlight-hearted Dane. Our very pleasures have still a sadness in them.\n\nThen, again, what are to be our amusements? By what recreative\nstimulants shall we irradiate the gloom of our idle hours and vacation\nperiods? Doubtless there have been many amusements invented by the\nbenefactors of our species--society, games, music, public\nentertainments, books; and in a well-chosen round of these, many\ncontrive to pass their time in a tolerable flow of satisfaction. But\nthey all cost something; they all cost money, either directly, to\nprocure them, or indirectly, to be educated for them. There are few very\ncheap pleasures. Books are not so difficult to obtain, but the enjoying\nof them in any high degree implies an amount of cultivation that cannot\nbe had cheaply.\n\nMoreover, look at the difficulties that beset the pursuit of amusements.\nHow fatiguing are they very often! How hard to distribute the time and\nthe strength between them and our work or our duties! It needs some art\nto steer one's way in the midst of variety of pleasures. Hence there\nwill always be, in a cautious-minded people, a disposition to remain\nsatisfied with few and safe delights; to assume a sobriety of aims that\nHelps might call dulness, but that many of us call the middle path.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[FALLACY OF PRESCRIBING TASTES.]\n\nII. A second error against the limits of the human powers is the\nprescribing to persons indiscriminately, certain tastes, pursuits, and\nsubjects of interest, on the ground that what is a spring of enjoyment\nto one or a few may be taken up, as a matter of course, by others with\nthe same relish. It is, indeed, a part of happiness to have some taste,\noccupation, or pursuit, adequate to charm and engross us--a ruling\npassion, a favourite study. Accordingly, the victims of dulness and\n_ennui_ are often advised to betake themselves to something of this\npotent character. Kingsley, in his little book on the \"Wonders of the\nShore,\" endeavoured to convert mankind at large into marine naturalists;\nand, some time ago, there appeared in the newspapers a letter from\nCarlyle, regretting that he himself had not been indoctrinated into the\nzoology of our waysides. I have heard a man out of health, hypochondriac,\nand idle, recommended to begin botany, geology, or chemistry, as a\ndiversion of his misery. The idea is plausible and superficial. An\noverpowering taste for any subject--botany, zoology, antiquities,\nmusic--is properly affirmed to be born with a man. The forces of the\nbrain must from the first incline largely to that one species of\nimpressions, to which must be added years of engrossing pursuit. We may\ngaze with envy at the fervour of a botanist over his dried plants, and\nmay wish to take up so fascinating a pursuit: we may just as easily wish\nto be Archimedes when he leaped out of the bath; a man cannot re-cast\nhis brain nor re-live his life. A taste of a high order, founded on\nnatural endowment, formed by education, and strengthened by active\ndevotion, is also paid for by the atrophy of other tastes, pursuits, and\npowers. Carlyle might have contracted an interest in frogs, and spiders,\nand bees, and the other denizens of the wayside, but it would have been\nwith the surrender of some other interest, the diversion of his genius\nout of its present channels. The strong emotions of the mind are not to\nbe turned off and on, to this subject and to that. If you begin early\nwith a human being, you may impress a particular direction upon the\nfeelings, you may even cross a natural tendency, and work up a taste on\na small basis of predisposition. Place any youth in the midst of\nartists, and you may induce a taste for art that shall at length be\ndecided and strong. But if you were to take the same person in middle\nlife and immure him in a laboratory, that he might become an\nenthusiastic chemist, the limits of human nature would probably forbid\nyour success.\n\nSuch very strong tastes as impart a high and perennial zest to one's\nlife are merely the special direction of a natural exuberance of feeling\nor emotion. A spare and thin emotional temperament will undoubtedly have\npreferences, likings and dislikings, but it can never supply the\nmaterial for fervour or enthusiasm in anything.\n\nThe early determining of natural tastes is a subject of high practical\ninterest. We shall only remark at present that a varied and broad\ngroundwork of early education is the best known device for this end.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[RELATION OF FEELINGS TO IMAGINATION.]\n\nIII. A third error, deserving of brief comment, is a singular inversion\nof the relationship of the Feelings to the Imagination. It is frequently\naffirmed, both in criticism and in philosophy, that the Feelings depend\nupon, or have their basis in, the Imagination.\n\nAn able and polished writer, discussing the character of Edmund Burke,\nremarks: \"The passions of Burke were strong; this is attributable in\ngreat measure to the intensity of the imaginative faculty\". Again,\nDugald Stewart, observing upon the influence of the Imagination on\nHappiness, says: \"All that part of our happiness or misery which arises\nfrom our _hopes_ or our _fears_ derives its existence entirely from the\npower of imagination\". He even goes the length of affirming that\n\"_cowardice_ is entirely a disease of the imagination\". Another writer\naccounts for the intensity of the amatory sentiments in Robert Burns by\nthe strength of his imagination.\n\n[IMAGINATION GROUNDED IN FEELING.]\n\nNow, I venture to affirm that this view very nearly reverses the fact.\nThe Imagination is determined by the Feelings, and not the Feelings by\nthe Imagination. Intensity of feeling, emotion, or passion, is the\nearlier fact: the intellect swayed and controlled by feeling, shaping\nforms to correspond with an existing emotional tone, is Imagination. It\nwas not the imaginative faculty that gave Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley,\nand the poets generally, their great enjoyment of nature; but the love\nof nature, pre-existing, turned the attention and the thoughts upon\nnature, filling the mind as a consequence with the impressions, images,\nrecollections of nature; out of which grew the poetic imaginings.\nImagination is a compound of intellectual power and feeling. The\nintellectual power may be great, but if it is not accompanied with\nfeeling, it will not minister to feeling; or it will minister to many\nfeelings by turns, and to none in particular. As far as the intellectual\npower of a poet goes, few men have excelled Bacon. He had a mind stored\nwith imagery, able to produce various and vivid illustrations of\nwhatever thought came before him; but these illustrations touched no\ndeep feeling; they were fresh, original, racy, fanciful, picturesque,\na play of the head that never touched the heart. The man was by nature\ncold; he had not the emotional depth or compass of an average\nEnglishman. Perhaps his strongest feeling of an enlarged or generous\ndescription was for human progress, but it did not rise to passion;\nthere was no fervour, no fury in it. Compare him with Shelley on the\nsame subject, and you will see the difference between meagreness and\nintensity of feeling. What intellect can be, without strong feeling,\nwe have in Bacon; what intellect is, with strong feeling, we have in\nShelley. The feeling gives the tone to the thoughts; sets the intellect\nat work to find language having its own intensity, to pile up lofty and\nimpressive circumstances; and then we have the poet, the orator, the\nthoughts that breathe, and the words that burn. Bacon wrote on many\nimpressive themes--on Truth, on Love, on Religion, on Death, and on the\nVirtues in detail; he was always original, illustrative, fanciful; if\nintellectual means and resources could make a man feel in these things,\nhe would have felt deeply; yet he never did. The material of feeling is\nnot contained in the intellect; it has a seat and a source apart. There\nwas nothing in mere intellectual gifts to make Byron a misanthrope: but,\ngiven that state of the feelings, the intellect would be detained and\nengrossed by it; would minister to, expand, and illustrate it; and\nintellect so employed is Imagination.\n\nBurke had indisputably a powerful imagination. He had both\nelements:--the intellectual power, or the richly stored and highly\nproductive mind; and the emotional power, or the strength of passion\nthat gives the lead to intellect. His intellectual strength was often\nput forth in the Baconian manner of illustration, in light and sportive\nfancies. There were many occasions where his feelings were not much\nroused. He had topics to urge, views to express, and he poured out\narguments, and enlivened them with illustrations. He was, on those\noccasions, an able expounder, and no more. But when his passions were\nstirred to the depths by the French Revolution, his intellectual power,\ntaking a new flight, supplied him with figures of extraordinary\nintensity; it was no longer the play of a cool man, but the thunders of\nan aroused man; we have then \"the hoofs of the swinish multitude,\"--\"the\nten thousand swords leaping from their scabbards\". Such feelings were\nnot produced by the speaker's imagination: they were produced by\nthemselves; they had their independent source in the region of feeling:\ncoupled with adequate powers of intellect, they burst out into strong\nimagery.[3]\n\nThe Orientals, as a rule, are distinguished for imaginative flights.\nThis is apparent in their religion, their morality, their poetry, and\ntheir science. The explanation is to be sought in the strength of their\nfeelings, coupled with a certain intellectual force. The same intellect,\nwithout the feelings, would have issued differently. The Chinese are the\nexception. They want the feelings, and they want the imagination. They\nare below Europeans in this respect. When we bring before them our own\nimaginative themes, our own cast of religion, accommodated as it is to\nour own peculiar temperament, we fail in the desired effect. Our august\nmysteries are responded to, not with reverential regard, but with, cold\nanalysis.\n\nThe Celt and the Saxon are often contrasted on the point of imagination;\nthe prior fact is the comparative endowment for emotion.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[HOW HAPPINESS SHOULD BE AIMED AT.]\n\nIV. There is a fallacious mode of presenting the attainment of\nhappiness; namely, that happiness is best secured by not being aimed at.\nWe should be aiming always at something else.\n\nWhen examined closely, the doctrine resolves itself into a kind of\nparadox. All sorts of puzzles come up when we attempt to follow it to\nits consequences.\n\nWe might ask, first, whether there is any other object of pursuit in the\nsame predicament--wealth, health, knowledge, fame, power. These are,\nevery one, a means or instrument of happiness, if not happiness itself.\nMust we, then, in the case of each, avoid aiming straight at the goal?\nmust we look askance in some other direction?\n\nNext, in the case of happiness proper, are we to aim at nothing at all,\nto drift at random; or may we aim at a definite object, provided it is\nnot happiness; or, lastly, is there one side aim in particular that we\nmust take? The answer here would probably be--Aim at duty in general,\nand at the good of others in particular. These ends are not the same as\nhappiness, yet by keeping them steadily in the view, and not thinking of\nself at all, we shall eventually realise our greatest happiness.\n\nWithout, at present, raising any question as to the fact alleged, we\nmust again remark that the prescription seems to contradict itself.\nMoralists of the austere type will never allow us to pursue happiness at\nall; we must never mention the thing to ourselves: duty or virtue is the\none single aim and end of being. Such teachers may be right or they may\nbe wrong, but they do not contradict themselves. When, however, we are\ntold that by aiming at virtue, we are on the best possible road to\nhappiness, this is but another way of letting us into the secret of\nhappiness, of putting us on the right, instead of on the wrong, track,\nto attain it. Our teacher assumes that we are in search of happiness,\nand he tells us how we are to proceed; not by keeping it straight in the\nview, but by keeping virtue straight in the view. Instead of pointing us\nto the vulgar happiness-seeker who would take the goal in a line, he\ncorrects the course, and shows us the deviation that is necessary in\norder to arrive at it; like the sailor making allowance for the\ndeviation of the magnetic pole, in steering. Happiness is not gained by\na point-blank aim; we must take a boomerang flight in some other line,\nand come back upon the target by an oblique or reflected movement. It is\nthe idea of Young on the Love of Praise (Satire I., 5.)--\n\n    The love of Praise howe'er concealed by art,\n    Reigns more or less and glows in every heart,\n    The proud to gain it, toils on toils endure,\n    _The modest shun it but to make it sure_.\n\nUnder this corrected method, we are happiness seekers all the same; only\nour aims are better directed, and our fruition more assured.\n\nThese remarks are intended to show that the doctrine of making men aim\nat virtue, in order to happiness, has no further effect than to teach us\nto include the interests of others with our own; by showing that our own\ninterests do not thereby suffer, but the contrary. The doctrine does not\nsubstitute a virtuous motive for a selfish one; it is a refined artifice\nfor squaring the two. The world is no doubt a gainer by the change of\nview, although the individual is not made really more meritorious.\n\nWe must next consider whether, in fact, the oblique aim at happiness is\nreally the most effectual.\n\nA few words, first, as to the original source of the doctrine of a\ndevious course. Bishop Butler is renowned for his distinction between\nSelf-Love and Appetite; he contends that in Appetite the object of\npursuit is not the pleasure of eating, but the food: consequently,\neating is not properly a self-seeking act, it is an indifferent or\ndisinterested act, to which there is an incidental accompaniment of\npleasure. We should, under the stimulus of Hunger, seek the food,\nwhether it gave us pleasure or not.\n\nNow, any truth that there is in Butler's view amounts to this:--In our\nAppetites we are not thinking every instant of subduing pain and\nattaining pleasure; we are ultimately moved by these feelings; but,\nhaving once seen that the medium of their gratification is a certain\nmaterial object (food), we direct our whole aim to procuring that. The\nhungry wolf ceases to think of his pains of hunger when he is in sight\nof a sheep; but for these pains he would have paid no heed to the sheep;\nyet when the sheep has to be caught, the hunger is submerged for the\ntime; the only relevant course, even on its account, is to give the\nwhole mind and body to the chase of the sheep. Butler calls this\nindifferent or disinterested pursuit; and as much as says, that the wolf\nis not self-seeking, but sheep-seeking, in its chase. Now, it is quite\ntrue that if the wolf could give no place in its mind for anything but\nits hungry pains, it would be in a bad way. It is wiser than that; it\nknows the remedy; it is prepared to dismiss the pains from its thoughts,\nin favour of a concentrated attention upon the distant flock. This\nproves nothing as to its unselfishness; nor does it prove that Appetite\nis a different thing from self-seeking or self-love.\n\n[APPETITE DECLARED UNSELFISH.]\n\nThere may be disinterested motives in our constitution; but Appetite is\nnot in any sense one of these. We may have instincts answering to the\ntraditional phrase used in defining instinct, \"a blind propensity\" to\nact, without aiming at anything in particular, and without any\nexpectation of pleasure or benefit. Such instincts would conform to\nButler's notion of appetite: they would be entirely out of the course of\nself-love or self-seeking of any sort. Whether the nest-building\nactivity of birds, and the constructiveness of ants, bees, and beavers,\ncomply with this condition, I do not undertake to say. There is one\nprocess better known to ourselves, not exactly an instinct, but probably\na mixture of instinct and acquirement--I mean the process of\nImitation--which works very much upon this model. Although coming under\nthe control of the Will, yet in its own proper character it operates\nblindly, or without purpose; neither courting pleasure, nor chasing\npain. In like manner, Sympathy, in its most characteristic form,\nproceeds without any distinct aim of pleasure to ourselves.\n\nNothing of this can be affirmed of the Appetites. In them, nature places\nus, as Bentham says, under the government of two sovereign masters,\n_pain_ and _pleasure_. An appetite would cease to move us, if its\npainful and pleasurable accompaniments were done away with. It matters\nnot that we remit our attention, at times, to the pain or the pleasure;\nthese are always in the background; and the strength of the appetite is\ntheir strength.\n\nSo far as concerns Butler's example of the Appetites, there is no case\nfor the view that to obtain happiness we must avoid aiming at it\ndirectly. If we do not aim at the pleasure in its own subjective\ncharacter, we aim at the thing that immediately brings the pleasure;\nwhich is, for all practical purposes, to aim at the pleasure.\n\nThe prescription to look away from the final end, Happiness, in order to\nsecure that end, may be tested on the example of one of our intermediate\npursuits, as Health. It is not a good thing to be always dwelling on the\nstate of our health: by doing so, we get into a morbid condition of\nself-consciousness, which is in itself pernicious. It does not follow\nthat we are to live at random, without ever giving a thought to our\nhealth. There is a plain middle course. Guided by our own experience,\nand by the experience of those that have gone before us, we arrange our\nplan of life so as to preserve health; and our actions consist in\nadhering to that plan in the detail. So long as our scheme answers\nexpectation, we think of nothing but of putting it in force, as occasion\narises; we do not dwell upon our states of good health at all. It is\nsome interruption that makes us self-conscious; and then it is that we\nhave to exercise ourselves about a remedial course. This, when found, is\nlikewise objectively pursued; our only subjectiveness lies in being\naware of gradual recovery; and we are glad to get back to the state of\npaying no attention to the workings of our viscera. We do not,\ntherefore, remit our pursuit; only, it is enough to observe the routine\nof outward actions, whose sole motive is to keep us in health.\n\nThe pursuit of the still wider end, Happiness, has much in common with\nthe narrower pursuit. When we have discovered what things promote, and\nwhat things impede our happiness, we transfer our attention to these, as\nthe most direct mode of compassing the end. If we are satisfied that\nworking for other people brings us happiness, we work accordingly; this\nis no side aim, it is as direct as any aim can be. It may involve\nimmediate sacrifice, but that does not alter the case; we can get no\nconsiderable happiness from any source without temporary sacrifice.\n\n[HAPPINESS AND VIRTUE DISTINCT AIMS.]\n\nIf it be said that the best mode of attaining happiness is to put\nourselves entirely out of account, and to work for others exclusively,\nthis, as already noted, is a self-contradiction. It is to tell people\nnot to think of their own happiness, and yet to know that they are\nsecuring that in the most effectual way. It is also very questionable,\nindeed absolutely erroneous, in fact. The most apparent way to secure\nhappiness is to ply all the known means of happiness, just as far as,\nand no farther than, they are discovered to produce the effect. We must\nkeep a check upon the methods that we employ, and abandon those that do\nnot answer. So long as we find happiness in serving others, so long we\ncontinue in that course. And it is a melancholy fact that Pope's bold\nassertion--\"Virtue alone is happiness below,\"--cannot be upheld against\nthe stern realities of life. Life needs to be made up of two aims--the\none, Happiness, the other Virtue, each on its own account. There is a\ncertain mutual connection of the two, but all attempts at making out\ntheir identity are failures.\n\nIt is of very great importance to teach men the bearings of virtue on\nhappiness, so far as these are known. There will, however, always remain\na portion of duty that detracts from happiness, and must be done as\nduty, nevertheless. Men are entitled to pursue happiness as directly as\never they please; only, they must couple with the pursuit their round of\nduties to others; in which they may or may not reap a share of the\ncoveted good for self.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nLet us, next, consider some of the difficulties and mistakes attaching\nto the WILL. Here there are the questions of world-renown, questions\nknown even in Pandemonium--Free-will, Responsibility, Moral Ability, and\nInability. It is now suspected, on good grounds, that, on these\nquestions, we have somehow got into a wrong groove--that we are lost in\na maze of our own constructing.\n\n[A STRONG WILL THE GIFT OF NATURE.]\n\nI. We shall first notice a misconception akin to some of the foregoing\nmistakes respecting the feelings. In addressing men with a view to spur\ntheir activity, there is usually a too low estimate of what is implied\nin great and energetic efforts of will. Here, exactly as in the cheerful\ntemperament, we find a certain constitutional endowment, a certain\nnatural force of character, having its physical supports of brain,\nmuscle, and other tissue; and neither persuasion, nor even education,\ncan go very far to alter that character. If there be anything at all in\nthe observations of phrenology, it is the connection of energetic\ndetermination with size of brain. Lay your hand first on the head of an\nenergetic man, and then on the head of a feeble man, and you will find\na difference that is not to be explained away. Now it passes all the\npowers of persuasion and education combined to make up for a great\ncranial inequality. Something always comes of assiduous discipline; but\nto set up a King Alfred, or a Luther, as a model to be imitated by an\nordinary man, on the points of energy, perseverance, endurance, courage,\nis to pass the bounds of the human constitution. Persistent energy of a\nhigh order, like the temperament for happiness, costs a great deal to\nthe human system. A large share of the total forces of the constitution\ngo to support it; and the diversion of power often leaves great defects\nin other parts of the character, as for example, a low order of the\nsensibilities, and a narrow range of sympathies. The men of\nextraordinary vigour and activity--our Roman emperors and conquering\nheroes--are often brutal and coarse. Nature does not supply power\nprofusely on all sides; and delicate sympathies, of themselves, use up\na very large fraction of the forces of the organisation. Even\nintellectually estimated, the power of sympathising with many various\nminds and conditions would occupy as much room in the brain as a\nlanguage, or an accomplishment. A man both energetic and sympathetic--a\nPericles, a King Alfred, an Oliver Cromwell--is one of nature's giants,\nseveral men in one.\n\nThere is no more notable phase of our active nature than Courage. Great\nenergy generally implies great courage, and courage--at least in\nnine-tenths of its amount--comes by nature. To exhort any one to be\ncourageous is waste of words. We may animate, for the time, a naturally\ntimid person, by explaining away the signs of danger, and by assuming a\nconfident attitude ourselves; but the absolute force of courage is what\nneither we nor the man himself can add to. A long and careful education\nmight effect a slight increase in this, as in other aspects of energy of\ncharacter: we can hardly say how much, because it is a matter that is\nscarcely ever subjected to the trial; the very conditions of the\nexperiment have not been thought of.\n\nThe moral qualities expressed by Prudence, Forethought, Circumspection,\nare talked of with a like insufficient estimate of what they cost. Great\nare the rewards of prudence, but great also is the expenditure of the\nprudent man. To retain an abiding sense of all the possible evils, risks\nand contingencies of an ordinary man's position--professional, family,\nand personal--is to go about under a constant burden; the difference\nbetween a thorough-going and an easy-going circumspection is a large\nadditional demand upon the forces of the brain. The being on the alert\nto duck the head at every bullet is a charge to the vital powers; so\nmuch so, that there comes a point when it is better to run risks than to\npile up costly precautions and bear worrying anxieties.\n\nLastly, the attribute of our active nature called Belief, Confidence,\nConviction, is subject to the same line of remark. This great\nquality--the opposite of distrust and timidity, the ally of courage, the\nadjunct of a buoyant temperament--is not fed upon airy nothings. It is,\nindeed, a true mental quality, an offshoot of our mental nature; yet,\nalthough not material, it is based upon certain forces of the physical\nconstitution; it grows when these grow, and is nourished when they are\nnourished. People possessed of great confidence have it as a gift all\nthrough life, like a broad chest or a good digestion. Preaching and\neducation have their fractional efficacy, and deserve to be plied,\nprovided the operator is aware of nature's impassable barriers, and does\nnot suppose that he is working by charm. It is said of Hannibal that he\ndissolved obstructions in the Alps by vinegar; in the moral world,\nbarriers are not to be removed either by acetic acid or by honey.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[PREJUDICES DUE TO PERSONAL DIGNITY.]\n\nII. The question of Free-will might be a text for discoursing on some of\nthe most inveterate erroneous tendencies of the mind.\n\nFor one thing, it gives occasion to remark on the influence exerted over\nour opinions by the feeling of Personal Dignity. Of sources of bias,\nprejudices, \"Idola,\" \"fallacies _a priori_\" this may be allowed\nprecedence. For example, the maxim has been enunciated by some\nphilosophers, that, of two differing opinions, preference is to be given\n(not to what is true, but) to what ennobles and dignifies human nature.\nOne of the objections seriously entertained against Darwin's theory is\nthat it humbles our ancestral pride. So, to ascribe to our mental powers\na material foundation is held to be degrading to our nobler part. Again,\na philosopher of our own day--Sir W. Hamilton--has placed on the\ntitle-page of his principal work this piece of rhetoric: \"On earth,\nthere is nothing great but man; in man, there is nothing great but\nmind\". Now one would suppose that there are on earth many things besides\nman deserving the appellation of \"great\"; and that the mechanism of the\nbody is, in any view, quite as remarkable a piece of work as the\nmechanism of the mind. There was one step more that Hamilton, as an\nAristotelian, should have made: \"In mind, there is nothing great but\nintellect\". Doubtless, we ought not to dissect an epigram; but epigrams\nbrought into a perverting contact with science are not harmless. Such\ngross pandering to human vanity must be held as disfiguring a work on\nphilosophy.\n\nThe sentiment of dignity has much to answer for in the doctrine of\nFree-will. In Aristotle, the question had not assumed its modern\nperplexity; but the vicious element of factitious personal importance\nhad already peeped out, it being one of the few points wherein the bias\nof the feelings operated decidedly in his well-balanced mind. In\nmaintaining the doctrine that vice is voluntary, he argues, that if\nvirtue is voluntary, vice (its opposite) must also be voluntary; now to\nassert virtue not to be voluntary would be to cast an _indignity_ upon\nit. This is the earliest association of the feeling of personal dignity\nwith the exercise of the human will.\n\n[FALSE PRIDE IN CONNECTION WITH FREE-WILL.]\n\nThe Stoics are commonly said to have started the free-will difficulty.\nThis needs an explanation. A leading tenet of theirs was the distinction\nbetween things in our power and things not in our power; and they\ngreatly overstrained the limits of what is in our power. Looking at the\nsentiment about death, where the _idea_ is everything, and at many of\nour desires and aversions, also purely sentimental, that is, made and\nunmade by our education (as, for example, pride of birth), they\nconsidered that pains in general, even physical pains and grief for\nthe loss of friends, could be got over by a mental discipline, by\nintellectually holding them not to be pains. They extolled and magnified\nthe power of the will that could command such a transcendent discipline,\nand infused an emotion of _pride_ into the consciousness of this\ngreatness of will. In subsequent ages, poets, moralists, and theologians\nfollowed up the theme; and the appeal to the pride of will may be said\nto be a standing engine of moral suasion. This originating of a point of\nhonour or dignity in connection with our Will has been the main lure in\nbringing us into the jungle of Free-will and Necessity.\n\nIt is in the Alexandrian school that we find the next move in the\nquestion. In Philo Judaeus, the good man is spoken of as free, the\nwicked man as a slave. Except as the medium of a compliment to virtue,\nthe word \"freedom\" is not very apposite, seeing that, to the highest\ngoodness, there attaches submission or restraint, rather than liberty.\n\nThe early Christian Fathers (notably Augustine) advanced the question to\nthe Theological stage, by connecting it with the great doctrines of\nOriginal Sin and Predestination; in which stage it shared all the\nspeculative difficulties attaching to these doctrines. The Theological\nworld, however, has always been divided between Free-will and Necessity;\nand probably the weightiest names are to be found among the\nNecessitarians. No man ever brought greater acumen into theological\ncontroversy than did Jonathan Edwards; and he took the side of\nNecessity.\n\nLatterly, however, since the question has become one of pure\nmetaphysics, Free-will has been the favourite dogma, as being most\nconsonant to the dignity of man, which appears to be its chief\nrecommendation, and its only argument. The weight of reasoning is, I\nbelieve, in favour of necessity; but the word carries with it a seeming\naffront, and hardly any amount of argument will reconcile men to\nindignity.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIII. Another weakness of the human mind receives illustration from the\nfree-will controversy, and deserves to be noticed, as helping to account\nfor the prolonged existence of the dispute: I mean the disposition to\nregard any departure from the accustomed rendering of a fact as denying\nthe fact itself. The rose under another name is not merely less sweet,\nit is not a rose at all. Some of the greatest questions have suffered by\nthis weakness.\n\n[ANALYSIS DOES NOT DESTROY THE FACT.]\n\nThe physical theory of matter that resolves it into _points of force_\nwill seem to many as doing away with matter no less effectually than the\nBerkeleyan Idealism. A universe of inane mathematical points, attracting\nand repelling each other, must appear to the ordinary mind a sorry\nsubstitute for the firm-set earth, and the majestically-fretted vault\nof heaven, with its planets, stars, and galaxies. It takes a special\neducation to reconcile any one to this theory. Even if it were\neverything that a scientific hypothesis should be, the previously\nestablished modes of speech would be a permanent obstruction to its\nbeing received as the popular doctrine.\n\nBut the best illustrations occur in the Ethical and Metaphysical\ndepartments. For example, some ethical theorists endeavour to show that\nConscience is not a primitive and distinct power of the mind, like the\nsense of colour, or the feeling of resistance, but a growth and a\ncompound, being made up of various primitive impulses, together with a\nprocess of education. Again and again has this view been represented as\ndenying conscience altogether. Exactly parallel has been the handling of\nthe sentiment of Benevolence. Some have attempted to resolve it into\nsimpler elements of the mind, and have been attacked as denying the\nexistence of the sentiment. Hobbes, in particular, has been subjected to\nthis treatment. Because he held pity to be a form of self-love, his\nopponents charged him with declaring that there is no such thing as pity\nor sympathy in the human constitution.\n\nA more notable example is the doctrine of the alliance of Mind with\nMatter. It is impossible that any mode of viewing this alliance can\nerase the distinction between the two modes of existence--the material\nand the mental; between extended inert bodies, on the one hand, and\npleasures and pains, thoughts and volitions, on the other. Yet, after\nthe world has been made familiar with the Cartesian doctrine of two\ndistinct substances--the one for the inherence of material facts, and\nthe other for mental facts--any thinker maintaining the separate mental\nsubstance to be unproved, and unnecessary, is denounced as trying to\nblot out our mental existence, and to resolve us into watches,\nsteam-engines, or speaking and calculating machines. The upholder of the\nsingle substance has to spend himself in protestations that he is not\ndenying the existence of the fact, or the phenomena called mind, but is\nmerely challenging an arbitrary and unfounded hypothesis for\nrepresenting that fact.\n\n[PERCEPTION OF A MATERIAL WORLD.]\n\nThe still greater controversy--distinct from the foregoing, although\noften confounded with it--relating to the Perception of a Material\nWorld, is the crowning instance of the weakness we are considering.\nBerkeley has been unceasingly stigmatised as holding that there is no\nmaterial world, merely because he exposed a self-contradiction in the\nmode of viewing it, common to the vulgar and to philosophers, and\nsuggested a mode of escaping the contradiction by an altered rendering\nof the facts. The case is very peculiar. The received and\nself-contradictory view is exceedingly simple and intelligible in its\nstatement; it is well adapted, not merely for all the commoner purposes\nof life, but even for most scientific purposes. The supposition of an\nindependent material world, and an independent mental world, created\napart, and coming into mutual contact--the one the objects perceived,\nand the other the mind perceiving--expresses (or over-expresses) the\ndivision of the sciences into sciences of matter and sciences of mind;\nand the highest laws of the material world at least are in no respect\nfalsified by it. On the other hand, any attempt to state the facts of\nthe outer world on Berkeley's plan, or on any plan that avoids the\nself-contradiction, is most cumbrous and unmanageable. A smaller, but\nexactly parallel instance of the situation is familiar to us. The daily\ncircuit of the sun around the earth, supposed to be fixed, so exactly\nanswers all the common uses that, in spite of its being false, we adhere\nto it in the language of every-day life. It is a convenient\nmisrepresentation, and deceives nobody. And such will, in all\nlikelihood, be the usage regarding the external world, after the\ncontradiction is admitted, and rectified by a metaphysical circumlocution.\nSpeculators are still only trying their hand at an unobjectionable\ncircumlocution; but we may almost be sure that nothing will ever\nsupersede, for practical uses, the notion of the distinct worlds of Mind\nand Matter. If, after the Copernican demonstration of the true position\nof the sun, we still find it requisite to keep up the fiction of his\ndaily course; much more, after the final accomplishment of the\nBerkeleyan revolution (to my mind inevitable), shall we retain the\nfiction of an independent external world: only, we shall then know how\nto fall back upon some mode of stating the case, without incurring the\ncontradiction.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIV. To return to the Will. The fact that we have to save, and to\nrepresent in adequate language, is this:--A voluntary action is a\nsequence distinct and _sui generis;_ a human being avoiding the cold,\nsearching for food, and clinging to other beings, is not to be\nconfounded with a pure material sequence, as the fall of rain, or the\nexplosion of gunpowder. The phenomena, in both kinds, are phenomena of\nsequence, and of _regular_ or _uniform_ sequence; but the things that\nmake up the sequence are widely different: in the one, a feeling of the\nmind, or a concurrence of feelings, is followed by a conscious muscular\nexertion; in the other, both steps are made up of purely material\ncircumstances. It is the difference between a mental or psychological,\nand a material or physical sequence--in short, the difference between\nmind and matter; the greatest contrast within the whole compass of\nnature, within the universe of being. Now language must be found to give\nample explicitness to this diametrical antithesis; still, I am satisfied\nthat rarely in the usages of human speech has a more unfortunate choice\nbeen made than to employ, in the present instance, the antithetic\ncouple--Freedom and Necessity. It misses the real point, and introduces\nmeanings alien to the case. It converts the glory of the human character\ninto a reproach (although its leading motive throughout has been to pay\nus a compliment). The _constancy_ of man's emotional nature (but for\nwhich our life would be a chaos, an impossibility) has to be explained\naway, for no other reason than that, at one time, a blundering epithet\nwas applied to designate the mental sequences. Great is the difference\nbetween Mind and Matter; but the terms Freedom and Necessity represent\nthe point of agreement as the point of difference; and this being made\nfamiliar, through iteration, as the mode of expressing the contrast, the\nrectification is supposed to unsettle everything, and to obliterate the\nwide distinction of the two natures.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[SEIZING A QUESTION BY THE WRONG END.]\n\nV. What is called Moral Ability and Inability is another artificial\nperplexity in regard to the will, and might also be the text for a\nsermon on prevailing errors. More especially, it exemplifies what may be\ntermed _seizing a question by the wrong end_.\n\nThe votary, we shall say, of alcoholic liquor is found fault with, and\nmakes the excuse, he cannot help it--he cannot resist the temptation. So\nfar, the language may pass. But what shall we say to the not uncommon\nreply,--You could help it if you would. Surely there is some\nmystification here; it is not one of those plain statements that we\ndesire in practical affairs. Whether we are dealing with matter or with\nmind, we ought to point out some clear and practicable method of\nattaining an end in view. To get a good crop, we till and enrich the\nsoil; to make a youth knowing in mathematics, we send him to a good\nmaster, and stimulate his attention by combined reward and punishment.\nThere are also intelligible courses of reforming the vicious: withdraw\nthem from temptation till their habits are remodelled; entice them to\nother courses, by presenting objects of superior attraction; or, at\nlowest, keep the fact of punishment before their eyes. By these methods\nmany are kept from vices, and not a few reclaimed after having fallen.\nBut to say, \"You can be virtuous if you will,\" is either unmeaning, or\nit disguises a real meaning. If it have any force at all--and it would\nnot be used unless, some efficacy had been found attaching to it,--the\nforce must be in the indirect circumstances or accompaniments. What,\nthen, is the meaning that is so unhappily expressed? In the first place,\nit is a vehicle for conveying the strong wish and determination of the\nspeaker; it is a clumsy substitute for--\"I do wish you would amend your\nconduct\"; an expression containing a real efficacy, greater or less\naccording to the estimate formed of the speaker by the person spoken to.\nIn the next place, it presents to the mind of the delinquent the _ideal_\nof improvement, which might also be done in unexceptionable phrase; as\none might say--\"Reflect upon your own state, and compare yourself with\nthe correct and virtuous liver\". Then, there is a touch of the stoical\ndignity and pride of will. Lastly, there may be a hint or suggestion to\nthe mind of good and evil consequences, which is the most powerful\nmotive of all. In giving rise to these various considerations, even the\nobjectionable expression may have a genuine efficacy; but that does not\njustify the form itself, which by no interpretation can be construed\ninto sense or intelligibility.\n\n[MEANING OF MORAL INABILITY.]\n\nMoral Inability means that ordinary motives are insufficient, but not\nall motives. The confirmed drunkard or thief has got into the stage of\nmoral inability; the common motives that keep mankind sober and honest\nhave failed. Yet there are motives that would succeed, if we could\ncommand them. Men may be sometimes cured of intemperance when the\nconstitution is so susceptible that pain follows at once on indulgence.\nAnd so long as pleasure and pain, in fact and in prospect, operate upon\nthe will, so long as the individual is in a state wherein motives\noperate, there may be moral weakness, but there is nothing more. In such\ncases, punishment may be properly employed as a corrective, and is\nlikely to answer its end. This is the state termed accountability, or,\nwith more correctness, PUNISHABILITY, for being accountable is merely an\nincident bound up with liability to punishment. Moral weakness is a\nmatter of a degree, and in its lowest grades shades into insanity, the\nstate wherein motives have lost their usual power--when pleasure and\npain cease to be apprehended by the mind in their proper character. At\n_this_ point, punishment is unavailing; the moral inability has passed\ninto something like physical inability; the loss of self-control is as\ncomplete as if the muscles were paralysed.\n\nIn the plea of insanity, entered on behalf of any one charged with\ncrime, the business of the jury is to ascertain whether the accused is\nunder the operation of the usual motives--whether pain in prospect has a\ndeterring effect on the conduct. If a man is as ready to jump out of the\nwindow as to walk downstairs, of course he is not a moral agent; but so\nlong as he observes, of his own accord, the usual precautions against\nharm to himself, he is to be punished for his misdeeds.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThese various questions respecting the Will, if stripped of unsuitable\nphraseology, are not very difficult questions. They are about as easy to\ncomprehend as the air-pump, the law of refraction of light, or the\natomic theory of chemistry. Distort them by inapposite metaphors, view\nthem in perplexing attitudes, and you may make them more abstruse than\nthe hardest proposition of the \"Principia\". What is far worse, by\ninvolving a simple fact in inextricable contradictions, they have led\npeople gravely to recognise self-contradiction as the natural and the\nproper condition of a certain class of questions. Consistency is very\nwell so far, and for the humbler matters of every-day life, but there is\na higher and a sacred region where it does not hold; where the\nprinciples are to be received all the more readily that they land us in\ncontradictions. In ordinary matters, inconsistency is the test of\nfalsehood; in transcendental subjects, it is accounted the badge of\ntruth.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 1: _Fortnightly Review_, August, 1868.]\n\n[Footnote 2: Donaldson's \"History of Christian Literature and Doctrine,\"\nVol. I., p. 277.]\n\n[Footnote 3: Intensity of passion stands confessed in the\nself-delineations of men of imaginative genius. We forbear to quote the\nfamiliar instances of Wordsworth, Shelley, or Burns, but may refer to a\nremarkable chapter in the life of the famous Scotch preacher, Dr. Thomas\nChalmers. The mere title of the chapter is enough for our purpose. It\nrelated to his early youth, and ran thus, in his own words:--\"A year of\nmental elysium\". It is while living at a white-heat that all the\nthoughts and conceptions take a lofty, hyperbolical character; and the\noutpouring of these at the time, or afterwards, is the imagination of\nthe orator or the poet.\n\nThe spread of the misconception that we have been combating is perhaps\naccounted for by the circumstance that imagination in one man is the\ncause of feeling _in others_. Wordsworth, by his imaginative colouring,\nhas excited a warmer sentiment for nature in many spectators of the lake\ncountry. That, however, is a different thing. We may also allow that the\npoet intensifies his own feelings by his creative embodiments of them.]\n\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nII.\n\nERRORS OF SUPPRESSED CORRELATIVES.[4]\n\n\nBy Relativity is here meant the all-pervading fact of our nature that we\nare not impressed, made conscious, or mentally alive, without some\nchange of state or impression. An unvarying action on any of our senses\nis the same as no action at all. An even temperature, such as that\nenjoyed by the fishes in the tropical seas, leaves the mind an entire\nblank as regards heat and cold. We can neither feel nor know without\nrecognising two distinct states. Hence all knowledge is double, or is\nthe knowledge of contrasts or opposites: heavy is relative to light; up\nsupposes down; being awake implies the state of sleep.\n\nThe applications of the law in the sphere of emotion are chiefly\ncontemplated in what follows. Pleasure and pain are never absolute\nstates; they have reference always to the previous condition. Until we\nknow what that has been in any case, we cannot pronounce upon the\nefficacy of a present stimulation. We see a person reposing, apparently\nin luxurious ease; if the state has been immediately consequent upon a\nprotracted and severe exertion, we are right in calling it highly\npleasurable. Under other circumstances, it might be quite the reverse.\n\nThere is an offshoot or modification of the principle, arising out of\nthe operation of habit. Impressions made upon us are greatest when they\nare absolutely new: after repetition they all lose something of their\npower; although, by remission and alternative, the causes of pleasure\nand pain have still a very considerable efficacy. Many of the\nconsequences of this great fact are sufficiently acknowledged, or, if\nthey are not, it is from other causes than our ignorance. The weakness\nis moral, rather than intellectual, that makes us expect that the first\nflush of a great pleasure, a newly-attained joy or success, will\ncontinue unabated. The poor man, probably, does not overrate the\ngratification of newly-attained wealth; what he fails to allow for is\nthe deadening effect of an unbroken experience of ease and plenty. The\nauthor of \"Romola\" says of the hero and the heroine, in the early\nmoments of their affection, that they could not look forward to a time\nwhen their kisses should be common things. So it is with the attainment\nof all great objects of pursuit: the first access of good fortune may\nnot disappoint us; but as we are more and more removed from the state of\nprivation, as the memory of the prior experience fades away, so does the\nvividness of the present enjoyment. It is the same with changes for the\nworse: the agony of a great loss is at first overpowering; gradually,\nhowever, the system accommodates itself to the new condition, and the\nseverity dies away. What is called on these occasions the \"force of\ncustom\" is the application of the law of Accommodation, or Relativity\nmodified by habit.\n\n[RELATIVITY IN PLEASURES.]\n\nIt is a familiar experience of mankind, yet hard to realise upon mere\ntestimony, that the pleasures of rest, repose, retirement, are wholly\nrelative to foregone labour and toil; after the first shock of\ntransition, they are less and less felt, and can be renewed only after\na renewal of the contrasting experience. The description, in \"Paradise\nLost,\" of the delicious repose of Adam and Eve in Eden is fallacious;\nthe poet credits them with an intensity of pleasure attainable only by\nthe brow-sweating labourer under the curse.\n\nThe delights of Knowledge are relative to previous Ignorance; for,\nalthough the possession of knowledge is in many ways a lasting good, yet\nthe full intensity of the charm is felt only at the moment of passing\nfrom mystery to explanation, from blankness of impression to\nintellectual attainment. This form of the pleasure is sustained only by\nnew acquisitions and new discoveries. Moreover, in the minor forms of\nthe gratification due to knowledge, we never escape the law of\nrelativity; the \"power\" delights us by relation to our previous\nimpotence. Plato supposed that, in knowledge, we have an example of a\n_pure_ pleasure, meaning one that had no reference to foregone privation\nor pain; but such \"purity\" would be a barren fact, not unlike the pure\nair of a bladeless and waterless desert. A state of uninterrupted good\nhealth, although a prime condition of enjoyment, is of itself a state of\nneutrality or indifference. The man that has never been ill cannot sing\nthe joys of health; the exultation of that strain is attainable only by\nthe valetudinarian.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThese examples have been remarked upon in every age. It is the moral\nweakness of being carried away by a present strong feeling, as if the\nstate would last for ever, that blinds each of us in turn to the stern\nreality of the fact. There are, however, numerous instances, coming\nunder Relativity, wherein the indispensable correlative is more or less\ndropped out of sight and disavowed. These are the proper errors or\nfallacies of Relativity, a branch of the comprehensive class termed\n\"Fallacies of Confusion\". The object of the present essay is to exhibit\na few of these errors as they occur in questions of practical moment.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhen it is said, as by Carlyle and others, \"speech is silvern, silence\nis golden,\" there is implied a condition of things where speech has been\nin excess; and but for this excess, the assertion is untrue. One might\nas well talk of the delights of hunger, or of cold, or of solitary\nconfinement, on the ground of there being times when food, warmth, or\nsociety may be in excess, and when the opposing states would be a joyful\nchange.\n\nThe Relativity of Pleasures, although admitted in many individual cases,\nhas often been misconceived. The view is sometimes expressed, that there\ncan be no pleasure without a previous pain; but this goes beyond the\nexigencies of the principle. We cannot go on for ever with any delight;\nbut mere remission, without any counterpart pain, is enough for our\nentering with zest on many of our pleasures. A healthy man enjoys his\nmeals without any sensible previous pain of hunger. We do not need to\nhave been miserable for some time as a preparation for the reading of a\nnew poem. It is true that if the sense of privation has been acute, the\npleasure is proportionally increased; and that few pleasures of any\ngreat intensity grow up from indifference: still, remission and\nalternation may give a zest for enjoyment without any consciousness of\npain.\n\nThe principle of Comparison is capriciously made use of by Paley, in his\naccount of the elements of Happiness. He applies it forcibly and\nfelicitously to depreciate certain pleasures--as greatness, rank, and\nstation--and withholds its application from the pleasures that he more\nparticularly countenances,--namely, the social affections, the exercise\nof the faculties, and health.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[SIMPLICITY OF STYLE A RELATIVE MERIT.]\n\nThe great praise often accorded to Simplicity of Style, in literature,\nis an example of the suppression of the correlative in a case of mutual\nrelationship. Simplicity is not an absolute merit; it is frequently a\nmerit by correlation. Thus, if a certain subject has never been treated\nexcept in abstruse and difficult terminology, a man of surpassing\nliterary powers, setting it forth in homely and intelligible language,\nproduces a work whose highest praise is expressed by Simplicity. Again,\nafter the last century period of artificial, complex, and highly-wrought\ncomposition, the reaction of Cowper and Wordsworth in favour of\nsimplicity was an agreeable and refreshing change, and was in great part\nacceptable because of the change. It does not appear that Wordsworth\ncomprehended this obvious fact; to him, a simplicity that cost nothing\nto the composer, and brought no novelty to the reader, had still a\ntranscendent merit.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt has been a frequent practice of late years to celebrate the praises\nof Knowledge. Many eloquent speakers have dilated on the happiness and\nthe superiority of the enlightened and the cultivated man. Now, the\ncorrelative or obverse must be equally true: there must be a\ncorresponding degradation and disqualification attaching to ignorance\nand the want of instruction. This correlative and equally cogent\nstatement is suppressed on certain occasions, and by persons that would\nnot demur to the praises of knowledge: as, when we are told of the\nnative good sense, the untaught sagacity, the admirable instincts of the\npeople,--that is, of the ignorant or the uneducated. Hence the great\nvalue of the expository device of following up every principle with its,\ncounter-statement, the matter denied when the principle is affirmed. If\nknowledge is a thing superlatively good, ignorance--the opposite of\nknowledge--is a thing superlatively bad. There is no middle standing\nground.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn the way that people use the argument from Authority, there is often\nan unfelt contradiction from not adverting to the correlative\nimplication. If I lay stress upon some one's authority as lending weight\nto my opinion, I ought to be equally moved in the opposite direction\nwhen the same authority is against me. The common case, however, is to\nmake a great flourish when the authority is one way, and to ignore it\nwhen it is the other way. This is especially the fashion in dealing with\nthe ancient philosophers. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are quoted with\nmuch complacency when they chime in with a modern view; but, in points\nwhere they contradict our cherished sentiments, we treat them with a\nkind of pity as half-informed pagans. It is not seen that men liable\nto such gross errors as they are alleged to have committed--say on\nEthics--are by that fact deprived of all weight in allied subjects, as,\nfor example, Politics--in which Aristotle is still quoted as an\nauthority.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[DIGNITY OF ALL LABOUR ABSURD.]\n\nMany of the sins against Relativity can be traced to rhetorical\nexaggeration. Some remarkable instances of this can be cited.\n\nWhen a system of ranks and dignities has once been established, there\nare associations of dignity and of indignity with different conditions\nand occupations. It is more dignified to serve in the army than to\nengage in trade; to be a surgeon is more honourable than to be a\nwatchmaker. In this state of things a fervid rhetorician, eager to\nredress the inequalities of mankind, starts forth to preach the dignity\nof _all_ labour. The device is a self-contradiction. Make all labour\nalike dignified, and nothing is dignified; you simply abolish dignity by\ndepriving it of the contrast that it subsists upon.\n\nPope's lines--\n\n    Honour and shame from no condition rise;\n    Act well your part; there all the honour lies--\n\ncannot be exempted from the fallacy of self-contradiction. Differences\nof condition are made by differences in the degree of honour thereto\nattached. If every man that did his work well were put on a level, in\npoint of honour, with every other man that did the same; if the\ngatekeeper of a mansion, by being unfailingly punctual in opening the\ngate, were to be equally honoured with a great leader of the House of\nCommons, then, indeed, equality of pay would be the only thing wanted to\nabolish all differences of condition. There is, no doubt, in society, a\nquantity of misplaced honour; but so long as there are employments\nexceptionally arduous, and virtues signally beneficent in their\noperation, honour is a legitimate spur and reward, and should be\ngraduated according to the desert in each case.\n\nIn spurring the ardour of youth to studious exertion, it is common to\nrepeat the Homeric maxim, \"to supplant every one else, and stand out\nfirst\". The stimulating effect is undoubted; it is strong rhetorical\nbrandy. Yet only one man can be first, and the exhortation is given\nsimultaneously to a thousand.[5]\n\n[JUSTICE ADMIRABLE ONLY IF RECIPROCATED.]\n\nIn the discussion and inculcation of the moral duties and virtues, there\nhas been, in all ages, a tendency to suppress correlative facts, and to\naffirm unconditionally what is true only with a condition. Thus, the\nadmirable nature of Justice, and the happiness of the Just man, are a\nproper theme to be extolled with all the power of eloquence. It has been\nso with every civilized people, pagan as well as Christian. In the\ndialogues of Plato, justice is a prominent subject, and is adorned with\nthe full splendour of his genius. Aristotle, in one of the few moments\nwhen he rises to poetry, pronounces justice \"greater than the\nevening-star or the morning-star\". Now all this panegyric is admissible\nonly on the supposition of _reciprocal_ justice. Plato, indeed, had the\nhardihood to say that the just man is happy in himself, and by reason of\nhis justice, even although others are unjust to him; but the position is\nuntenable. A man is happy in his justice if it procure for him justice\nin return; as a citizen is happy in his civil obedience, if it gain him\nprotection in return. There are two parties in the case, and the\nmoralist should obtain access to both; he should induce the one to\nfulfil his share before promising to the other the happiness of justice\nand obedience. It may be rhetorical, but it is not true, that justice\nwill make a man happy in a society where it is not reciprocated.\nJustice, in these circumstances, is highly noble, praiseworthy,\nvirtuous; but the applying of these lofty compliments is the proof that\nit does not bring happiness, and is an attempt to compensate the\ndeficiency. There is a certain tendency, not very great as human nature\nis constituted, for justice to beget justice in return--for social\nvirtue on one side to procure it on the other side. This is a certain\nencouragement to each man to perform his own part, in hope that the\nother party concerned may do the same. Still, the reciprocity\noccasionally fails, and with that the benefits to the just agent. It is\nnecessary to urge strongly upon individuals, to impress upon the young,\nthe necessity of performing their duty to society; it is equally\nimplied, and equally indispensable, that society should perform its part\nto them. The suppressing of the correlative obligation of the State to\nthe individual leaves a one-sided doctrine; the motive of the\nsuppression, doubtless, is that society does not often fail of its\nduties to the individual, whereas individuals frequently fail of their\nduties to society. This may be the fact generally, but not always. It is\nnot the fact where there are bad laws and corrupt administration. It is\nnot the fact where the restraints on liberty are greater than the\nexigencies of the State demand. It is not the fact, so long as there is\na single vestige of persecution for opinions. To be thoroughly\nveracious, for example, in a society that restrains the discussion and\nexpression of opinions, is more than such a society is entitled to.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[PLEASURES OF BENEVOLENCE CONDITIONAL.]\n\nThe same fallacy occurs in an allied theme,--the joys of Love and\nBenevolence. That love and benevolence are productive of great happiness\nis beyond question; but then the feeling must be mutual, it must be\nreciprocated. One-sided love or benevolence is a _virtue_, which is as\nmuch as to say it is _not_ a pleasure. The delights of benevolence are\nthe delights of reciprocated benevolence; until reciprocated, in some\nform, the benevolent man has, strictly speaking, the sacrifice and\nnothing more. There is a great reluctance to encounter this simple naked\ntruth; to state it in theory, at least, for it is fully admitted in\npractice. We fence it off by the assumption that benevolence will always\nhave its reward somehow; that if the objects of it are ungrateful,\nothers will make good the defect at last. Now these qualifications are\nvery pertinent, very suitable to be urged after allowing the plain\ntruth, that benevolence is intrinsically a sacrifice, a painful act; and\nthat this act is redeemed, and far more than redeemed, by a fair\nreciprocity of benevolence. Only such an admission can keep us out of a\nmesh of contradictions. Like justice in itself, Benevolence in itself is\npainful; any virtue is pain in the first instance, although, when\nequally responded to, it brings a surplus of pleasure. There may be acts\nof a beneficent tendency that cost the performer nothing, or that even\nmay chance to be agreeable; but these examples must not be given as the\nrule, or the type. It is the essence of virtuous acts, the prevailing\ncharacter of the class, to tax the agent, to deprive him of some\nsatisfaction to himself; this is what we must start from; we are then in\na position to explain how and when, and under what circumstances, and\nwith what limitations, the virtuous man, whether his virtue be justice\nor benevolence, is from that cause a happy man.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIt is a fallacy of the suppressed relative to describe virtue as\ndetermined by the _moral nature_ of God, as opposed to his arbitrary\nwill. The essence of Morality is obedience to a superior, to a Law;\nwhere there is no superior there is nothing either moral or immoral. The\nsupreme power is incapable of an immoral act. Parliament may do what is\ninjurious, it cannot do what is illegal. So the Deity may be beneficent\nor maleficent, he cannot be moral or immoral.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAmong the various ways, proposed in the seventeenth century, of solving\nthe difficulty of the mutual action of the heterogeneous agencies--matter\nand mind--one was a mode of Divine interference, called the \"Theory of\nOccasional Causes\". According to this view, the Deity exerted himself by\na _perpetual miracle_ to bring about the mental changes corresponding to\nthe physical agents operating on our senses--light, sound, &c. Now in\nthe mode of action suggested there is nothing self-contradictory; but in\nthe use of the word \"miracle\" there is a mistake of relativity. The\nmeaning of a miracle is an exceptional interference; it supposes an\nhabitual state of things, from which it is a deviation. The very idea of\nmiracle is abolished if every act is to be alike miraculous.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[MYSTERY CORRELATES WITH THE INTELLIGIBLE.]\n\nWe shall devote the remainder of this exposition to a still more notable\nclass of mistakes due to the suppression of a correlative member in a\nrelative couple--those, namely, connected with the designation,\n\"Mystery,\" a term greatly abused, in various ways, and especially by\ndisregarding its relative character. Mystery supposes certain things\nthat are plain, intelligible, knowable, revealed; and, by contrast to\nthese, refers to certain other things that are obscure, unintelligible,\nunknowable, unrevealed. When a man's conduct is entirely plain,\nstraightforward, or accounted for, we call that an intelligible case;\nwhen we are perplexed by the tortuosities of a crafty, double-dealing\nperson, we say it is all very mysterious. So, in nature, we consider\nthat we understand certain phenomena: such as gravity, and all its\nconsequences, in the fall of bodies, the flow of rivers, the motions of\nthe planets, the tides. On the other hand, earthquakes and volcanoes are\nvery mysterious; we do not know what they depend upon, how or in what\ncircumstances they are produced. Some of the operations of living bodies\nare understood,--as the heart's action in the mechanical propulsion of\nthe blood; others, and the greater number, are mysterious, as the whole\nprocess of germination and growth. Now the existence of the contrast\nbetween things plainly understood, and things not understood, gives one\ndistinct meaning to the term Mystery. In some cases, a mystery is formed\nby an apparent contradiction, as in the Theological mystery of Free-will\nand Divine Foreknowledge; here, too, there is a contrast with the great\nmass of consistent and reconcilable things. But now, when we are told by\nsensational writers, that _everything is mysterious;_ that the simplest\nphenomenon in nature--the fall of a stone, the swing of a pendulum, the\ncontinuance of a ball shot in the air--are wonderful, marvellous,\nmiraculous, our understanding is confounded; there being then nothing\nplain at all, there is nothing mysterious. The wonderful rises from the\ncommon; as the lofty is lofty by relation to something lower: if there\nis nothing common, then there is nothing wonderful; if all phenomena are\nmysterious, nothing is mysterious; if we are to stand aghast in\namazement because three times four is twelve, what phenomenon can we\ntake as the type of the plain and the intelligible? You must always keep\nup a standard of the common, the easy, the comprehensible, if you are to\nregard other things as wonderful, difficult, inexplicable.\n\n[LOCKE ON THE LIMITS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.]\n\nThe real character of a MYSTERY, and what constitutes the Explanation of\na fact, have been greatly misconceived. The changes of view on these\npoints make up a chapter in the history of the education of the human\nmind. Perhaps the most decisive turning point was the publication of\nLocke's \"Essay concerning Human Understanding,\" the motive of which, as\nstated in the homely and forcible language of the preface, was to\nascertain what our understandings can do, what subjects they are fit to\ndeal with, and where they should stop. I quote a few sentences:--\n\n\"If by this inquiry into the nature of the Understanding, I can discover\nthe powers thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any\ndegree proportionate; and where they fail us: I suppose it may be of\nuse, to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in\nmeddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at\nthe utmost extent of its tether; and to sit down in a quiet ignorance of\nthose things which, upon examination, are proved to be beyond the reach\nof our capacities.\" \"The candle that is set up in us, shines bright\nenough for all our purposes. The discoveries we can make with this ought\nto satisfy us. And we shall then use our Understandings aright, when we\nentertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are suited to\nour faculties, and upon those grounds they are capable of being proposed\nto us.\" \"It is of great use for the sailor to know the length of his\nline, though he cannot fathom with it all the depths of the ocean.\"\n\nThe course of physical science was preparing the same salutary lesson.\nLocke's great contemporary and friend, Isaac Newton, was his\nfellow-worker in this tutorial undertaking; nor should Bacon be\nforgotten, although there is dispute as to the extent and character of\nhis influence. The combined operation of these great leaders of thought\nwas apparent in the altered views of scientific inquirers as to what is\ncompetent in research--what is the proper aim of inquiry. There arose a\ndisposition to abandon the pursuit of mysterious essences and grand\npervading unities, and ascertain with precision the facts and the laws\nof natural phenomena. The study of astronomy was inaugurated in\nGreenwich Observatory. The experiments of Priestley and of Franklin\nfarther exemplified the eighteenth-century key to the secrets of the\nuniverse.\n\nThe lesson imparted by Newton and Locke and their successors still\nremains to be carried out and embodied in the subtler inquiries. The\nbearing upon what constitutes a Mystery, and what constitutes\nExplanation, or the accounting for appearances, may be expressed thus:--\n\nIn the first place, the Understanding can never pass out of its own\nexperience--its acquired knowledge, whether of body or of mind. What we\nobtain by our various sensibilities to the world about us, and by our\nself-consciousness, are the foundation, the ABC of everything that we\nare capable of knowing. We know colours, and we know sound; we know\npleasure and pain, and the various emotions of wonder, fear, love,\nanger. If there be any being endowed with senses different from ours,\nwith that being we can have no communion. If there be any phenomena that\nescape our limited sensibilities, they transcend the possibility of our\nknowledge.\n\nIt is necessary, however, to take account of the combining or\nconstructive aptitudes of the mind. We can go a certain length in\nputting together our alphabet of sensation and experience into many\nvarious compounds. We can imagine a paradise or a pandemonium; but only\nas made up of our own knowledge of things good and evil. The limits of\nthis constructive power are soon reached. We are baffled to enter into\nthe feelings of our own kindred, when they are far removed in character\nand circumstances from ourselves. The youth at twenty cannot approximate\nto the feelings of men of middle age. The healthy are unable to\ncomprehend the life of the invalid.\n\n[TIME AND SPACE RELATIVE TO OUR FACULTIES.]\n\nTo come to the practical applications. The great leading notions called\nTime and Space are known to us only under the conditions of our own\nsensibility. Time is made known by all our actions, all our senses, all\nour feelings, and by the succession of our thoughts; it is experienced\nas a continuance and a repetition of movement, sight, sound, fear, or\nany other state of feeling, or of thinking. One motion or sensation is\ncontinued longer than another; or it is more frequently repeated after\nintermission, giving the _numerical_ estimate of time, as in the beats\nof the pendulum. In these ways we form estimates of seconds, minutes,\nhours, days. And our constructive faculty can be brought into play to\nconceive the larger tracts of duration--a century, or a hundred\ncenturies. Nay, by our arithmetical powers we can put down in cipher,\nor conceive _symbolically_ (which is the meagrest of all conceptions)\nmillions of millions of centuries; these being after all but compounds\nof our alphabet of enduring or repeated sensations and thoughts. We can\nsuppose this arithmetical process to operate upon past duration or upon\nfuture duration, and there is no limit to the numbers that we can write\ndown. But there is one thing that we cannot do; we cannot fix upon a\npoint when Time or succession began, or upon a point when it will cease.\nThat is an operation not in keeping with our faculties; the very\nsupposition is impracticable. We cannot entertain the notion of a state\nof things wherein the fact of continuance had no place; the effort\nbelies itself. Time is inseparable from our mental nature; whatever we\nimagine, we must imagine as enduring. Some philosophers have supposed\nthat we must be endowed by nature with the conception of Time, before we\nbegin to exercise our senses; but the difficulty would be to deprive us\nof that adjunct without extinguishing our mental nature. Give us\nsensibility, and you cannot withhold the element of Time. The\nsupposition of Kant and others, that it is implanted in us as an empty\nform, before we begin to employ our senses upon things, is needless; for\nas soon as we move, see, hear, think, are pleased or pained, we create\ntime. And our notion of Time in general is exactly what these\nsensibilities make it, only enlarged by our constructive power already\nspoken of.\n\n[MATTER AND VOID SUPPLEMENTARY.]\n\nWhile all our senses and feelings give us time, it is our experience of\nMotion and Resistance,--the energetic or active side of our nature\nalone,--that gives us Space. The simplest feature of Space is the\nalternation of Resistance and Non-Resistance, of obstructed motion and\nfreedom to move. The hand presses dead upon an obstacle; the obstacle\ngives way and allows free motion; these two contrasting experiences are\nthe elements of the two contrasting facts--Matter and Space. By none of\nthe five senses, in their pure and proper character as senses, can we\nobtain these experiences; and hence at an earlier stage of inquiry into\nthe mind, when our knowledge-giving sensibilities were referred to the\nfive senses, there was no adequate account of the notion of Space or\nExtension. Space includes more than this simple contrast of the\nresisting and the non-resisting; it includes what we call the\nCo-existing or Contemporaneous, the great aggregate of the outspread\nworld, as existing at any moment, a somewhat complicated attainment,\nwhich I am not now specially concerned with. It sufficiently illustrates\nthe limitation of our knowledge by our sensibilities, from the nature of\nspace, to fasten attention on the double and mutually supplementing\nexperience of Matter and Void; the one resisting movement, and giving\nthe consciousness of resistance, or dead strain, the other permitting\nmovement, and giving the consciousness of the unobstructed sweep of the\nlimbs or members. Whatever else may be in space, this freedom to move,\nto soar, to expatiate (in contrast to being hemmed in, obstructed, held\nfast), is an essential part of the conception, and is formed out of our\nactive or moving sensibilities. Now, as far as movement is concerned, we\nmust be in one of two states;--we must be putting forth energy without\neffecting movement, being met by obstacles called matter; or we must be\nputting forth energy unresisted and effecting movement, which is what we\nmean by empty space. There is no third position in the matter of putting\nforth our active energy. Where resistance ends and freedom begins, there\nis space; where freedom ends, and obstruction begins, there is matter.\nWe find our sentient life to be made up, as regards movement, of a\ncertain number and range of these two alternations; in other words, free\nspaces and resisting barriers. And we can, by the constructive power\nalready mentioned, imagine other proportions of the two experiences; we\ncan imagine the scope for movement, the absence of obstruction, to be\nenlarged more and more, to be counted by thousands and millions of\nmiles; but the only terminus or boundary that we can imagine is\nresistance, a dead obstacle. We are able to conceive the starry spaces\nwidened and prolonged from galaxy to galaxy through enormous strides of\nincreasing amplitude, but when we try to think an end to this career, we\ncan think only of a dead wall. There is no other end of space within the\ngrasp of our faculties; and that termination is not an end of extension;\nfor we know that solid matter, viewed in other ways than as obstructing\nmovement, has the same property of the extended belonging to the empty\nvoid. The inference is, that the limitation of our means of knowledge\nrenders altogether incompetent the imagination of an end to either Time\nor Space. The greatest efforts of our combining faculty cannot exceed\nthe elements presented to it, and these elements contain nothing that\nwould set forth the situation of space ending, and obstruction not\nbeginning.\n\n[ARE TIME AND SPACE INFINITE?]\n\nUnder these circumstances, it is an irrevelant enquiry, to ask, Are Time\nand Space finite or infinite? Many philosophers have put the question,\nand even answered it. They say Time has no beginning and no end, and\nSpace has no boundaries; or, as otherwise expressed,--Time and Space are\nInfinite: an answer of such vagueness as to mean anything, from a\nharmless and proper assertion of the limits of our faculties, up to the\nverge of extravagance and self-contradiction.\n\nWhen, in fact, people talk of the Infinite in Time and Space, they can\npoint to one intelligible signification; as to the rest, this word is\nnot a subject for scientific propositions, and the attempt at such can\nlead only to contradictions. The Infinite is a phrase most various in\nits purport: it is for the most part an emotional word, expressing human\ndesire and aspiration; a word of poetry, imagination, and preaching, not\na word to be discussed under science; no intellectual definition would\nexhibit its emotional force.\n\nThe second property of our intelligence is, that we can generalise many\nfacts into one. Tracing agreement among the multifarious appearances of\nthings, we can comprehend in one statement a vast number of details. The\nsingle law of gravity expresses the fall of a stone, the flow of rivers,\nthe retention of the moon in her circuit round the earth. Now, this\ngeneralising sweep is a real advance in our knowledge, an ascent in the\nmatter of intelligence, a step towards centralising the empire of\nscience. What is more, this is the only real meaning of EXPLANATION.\nA difficulty is solved, a mystery unriddled; when it can be shown to\nresemble something else; to be an example of a fact already known.\nMystery is isolation, exception, or, it may be, apparent contradiction;\nthe resolution of the mystery is found in assimilation, identity,\nfraternity. When all things are assimilated, so far as assimilation can\ngo, so far as likeness holds, there is an end to explanation; there is\nan end to what the mind can do, or can intelligently desire.\n\n[GRAVITY NOT A MYSTERY.]\n\nThus, when Gravity was generalised, by assimilating the terrestrial\nattraction seen in falling bodies with the celestial attraction of the\nsun and planets; and when, by fair presumption, the same power was\nextended to the remote stars; when, also, the _law_ was ascertained, so\nthat the movements of the various bodies could be computed and\npredicted, there was nothing further to be done; explanation was\nexhausted. Unless we can find some other force to fraternise with\ngravity, so that the two might become a still more comprehensive unity,\nwe must rest in gravity as the ultimatum of our faculties. There is no\nconceivable modification, or substitute, that would better our position.\nBefore Newton, it was a mystery what kept the moon and the planets in\ntheir places; the assimilation with falling bodies was the solution.\nBut, say many persons, is not gravity itself a mystery? We say No;\ngravity has passed through all the stages of legitimate and possible\nexplanation; it is the most highly generalised of all physical facts,\nand by no assignable transformation could it be made more intelligible\nthan it is. It is singularly easy of comprehension; its law is exactly\nknown; and, excepting the details of calculation, in its more complex\nworkings, there is nothing to complain of, nothing to rectify, nothing\nto pretend ignorance about; it is the very pattern, the model, the\nconsummation of knowledge. The path of science, as exhibited in modern\ntimes, is towards generality, wider and wider, until we reach the\nhighest, the widest laws of every department of things; there\nexplanation is finished, mystery ends, perfect vision is gained.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWhat is always reckoned the mystery by pre-eminence is the union of BODY\nand MIND. How, then, should we treat this Mystery according to the\nspirit of modern thought, according to the modern laws of explanation?\nThe course is to _conceive_ the elements according to the only possible\nplan, our own sensibility or consciousness; which gives us matter as one\nclass of facts--extension, inertness, weight, and so on; and mind as\nanother class of facts--pleasures, pains, volitions, ideas. The\ndifference between these two is total, diametrical, complete; there is\nreally nothing common to the experience of pleasure and the experience\nof a tree; difference has here reached its _acme_; agreement is\neliminated; there is no higher genus to include these two in one; as the\nultimate, the highest elements of knowledge, they admit of 110 fusion,\nno resolution, no unity. Our utmost flight of generality leaves us in\npossession of a double, a _couple_ of absolutely heterogeneous elements.\nMatter cannot be resolved into mind; mind cannot be resolved into\nmatter; each has its own definition; each negatives the other.\n\nThis being the fact, we accept it, and acquiesce. There is surely\nnothing to be dissatisfied with, to complain of, in the circumstance\nthat the elements of our experience are, in the last resort, two, and\nnot one. If we had been provided with fifty ultimate experiences, none\nof them having a single property in common with any other; and if we had\nonly our present limited intellects, we might be entitled to complain\nof the world's mysteriousness in the one proper acceptation of\nmystery--namely, as overpowering our means of comprehension, as loading\nus with unassimilable facts. As it is, matter, in its commoner aspects\nand properties, is perfectly intelligible; in the great number and\nvariety of its endowments or properties, it is revealed to us slowly and\nwith much difficulty, and these subtle properties--the deep affinities\nand molecular arrangements--- are the mysteries rightly so called. Mind\nin itself is also intelligible; a pleasure is as intelligible as would\nbe any transmutation of it into the inscrutable essence that people\noften desiderate. It is one of the facts of our sensibility, and has\na great many facts of its own kindred, which makes it all the more\nintelligible.\n\nThe varieties of pleasure, pain, and emotion are very numerous; and to\nknow, remember, and classify them, is a work of labour, a _legitimate_\nmystery. The subtle links of thought are also very various, although\nprobably all reducible to a small number; and the ascertaining and\nfollowing out of these has been a work of labour and time; they have,\ntherefore, been mysterious; mystery and intellectual toil being the real\ncorrelatives. The _complications_ of matter and the _complications_ of\nmind are genuine mysteries; the reducing or simplifying of these\ncomplications, by the exertions of thinking men, is the way, and the\nonly way out of the darkness into light.\n\n[UNION OF MIND AND BODY.]\n\nBut what now of the mysterious _union_ of the two great ultimate facts\nof human experience? What should the followers of Newton and Locke say\nto this crowning instance of deep and awful mystery? Only one answer can\nbe given. Accept the union, and generalise it. Find out the fewest\nnumber of simple laws, such as will express all the phenomena of this\nconjoint life. Resolve into the highest possible generalities the\nconnections of pleasure and pain, with all the physical stimulants of\nthe senses--food, tastes, odours, sounds, lights--with all the play of\nfeature and of gesture, and all the resulting movements and bodily\nchanges; and when you have done that, you have so far truly, fully,\nfinally explained the union of body and mind. Extend your generalities\nto the course of the thoughts; determine what physical changes accompany\nthe memory, the reason, the imagination, and express those changes in\nthe most general, comprehensive laws, and you have explained the how and\nthe why brain causes thought, and thought works in brain. There is no\nother explanation needful, no other competent, no other that would be\nexplanation. Instead of our being \"unfortunate,\" as is sometimes said,\nin not being able to know the essence of either matter or mind--in not\ncomprehending their union; our misfortune would be to have to know\nanything different from what we do or may know. If there be still much\nmystery attaching to this linking of the two extreme facts of our\nexperience, it is simply this: that we have made so little way in\nascertaining what in one goes with what in the other. We know a good\ndeal about the feelings and their alliances, some of which are open and\npalpable to all mankind; and we have obtained some important\ngeneralities in these alliances. Of the connections of thought with\nphysical changes we know very little: these connections, therefore,\nare truly and properly mysterious; but they are not intrinsically or\nhopelessly so. The advancing study of the physical organs, on the one\nhand, and of the mental functions, on the other, may gradually abate\nthis mystery. And if a day arrive when the links that unite our\nintellectual workings with the workings of the nervous system and the\nother bodily organs shall be fully ascertained and adequately\ngeneralised, no one thoroughly educated in the scientific spirit of the\nlast two centuries will call the union of mind and body any longer\ninscrutable or mysterious.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 4: _Fortnightly Review_, October, 1868.]\n\n[Footnote 5: We may here recall an incident highly characteristic of the\nlate Earl of Carlisle. Being elected on one occasion to the office of\nLord Rector of Marischal College, Aberdeen, he had to deliver an address\nto the students on the usual topics of diligence and hopefulness in\ntheir studious career. Referring for a model to the addresses of former\nrectors, he found, in that of his immediate predecessor, Lord Eglinton,\nthe Homeric sentiment above alluded to. It grated harshly on his mind,\nand he avowed the fact to the students, he could not reconcile himself\nto the elevating of one man upon the humiliation of all the rest. In a\nstrain more befitting a civilized age, he urged upon his hearers the\npursuit of excellence as such, without involving as a necessary\naccompaniment the supplanting or throwing down of other men. He probably\ndid not sufficiently guard himself against a fallacy of Relativity; for\nexcellence is purely comparative; it subsists upon inferior grades of\nattainment: still, there are many modes of it shared in by a great\nnumber, and not confined to one or a few.]\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nIII.\n\nTHE CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS[6]\n\n\n1. HISTORICAL SKETCH.\n\n\nUp to the year 1853, the appointing of Civil Servants lay wholly in the\nhands of patrons. In 1853, patronage was severely condemned and\ncompetitive examination officially recommended, for the first time, in a\nReport by Sir Stafford Northcote and Sir Charles Trevelyan; but, while\nthe recommendation was taken up in the following year and immediately\nacted upon in the Indian Civil Service, it was not till very much later\nthat it was fully adopted in the Home Service. The history, indeed, of\nthis last is somewhat peculiar. After the Report already referred to,\ncame an Order of Council, of date May 21, 1855, in which we find it\n\"ordered that all such young men as may be proposed to be appointed to\nany junior situation in any department of the Civil Service shall,\nbefore they are admitted to probation, be examined by or under the\nDirectors of the said Commissioners, and shall receive from them a\nCertificate of Qualification for such situation\". This order was\nrigorously carried out by the Commissioners, and, although its absolute\nrequirement was simply that the nominees should pass a certain\nexamination, it, nevertheless, allowed the heads of departments to\ninstitute competition if they cared. Accordingly, we find that\ncompetition--_but limited_--was immediately set on foot in several of\nthe offices, and the result led to the following remark in the Report of\n1856:--\n\n\"We do not think it within our province to discuss the expediency of\nadopting the principle of open competition as contra-distinguished from\nexamination; but we must remark that, both in the competitive\nexamination for clerkships in our own and in other offices, those who\nhave succeeded in attaining the appointments have appeared to us to\npossess considerably higher attainments than those who have come in upon\nsimple nomination; and, we may add, that we cannot doubt that if it be\nadopted as a usual course to nominate several candidates to compete for\neach vacancy, the expectation of this ordeal will act most beneficially\non the education and industry of those young persons who are looking\nforward to public employment.\"\n\nIn 1857, a near approach was made to open competition, in the case of\nfour clerkships awarded by the competing examination in the\nCommissioners' own establishment. \"The fact of the competition was not\nmade public, but was communicated to one or two heads of schools and\ncolleges, and mentioned casually to other persons at various times. The\nnumber of competitors who presented themselves was forty-six, of which\nnumber, forty-four were actually examined.\"\n\n[BEGINNING OF OPEN COMPETITION.]\n\nIt was reserved for 1858 to see the first absolutely open competition,\nin the case of eight writerships in the Office of the Secretary of State\nfor India; and in that year, too, a step in advance was made when the\nCommissioners in their Report \"pointed out the advantage which would\nresult from enlarging the field of competition by substituting, for the\nplan of nominating three persons only to compete for each vacant\nsituation, the system of nominating a proportionate number of candidates\nto compete for several appointments at one examination\".\n\nThe year 1860 sounded the death-knell of simple pass examination. It was\nthen recommended by a Select Committee of the House of Commons, and the\nrecommendation was adopted, that the competitive method, in its limited\nform, should be henceforth _universally_ applied to junior situations.\nThis recommendation was at once acted upon in the case of clerkships\nunder the control of the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury, and others\nby and by followed; but, as matter of fact, it was never strictly\ncarried out in all its scope and rigour; and as late as 1868 the\nCommissioners in their Report stated that \"the number of situations\nfilled on the competitive method has been comparatively small\".\nMeanwhile, competitive examination was making way in other quarters.\n\nFrom 1857, the Commissioners had been in the habit of examining\ncompetitively, at the request of the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, such\ncandidates as might be nominated for cadetships in the Royal Irish\nConstabulary; and, in 1861, the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty\n\"threw open to public competition\" appointments as apprentices in Her\nMajesty's dockyards, and appointments as \"engineer students\" in the\nsteam factories connected therewith.\n\nIn 1870, the end so long aimed at was attained, and by an Order in\nCouncil of June 4, open competition was made the only door of entry to\nthe general Civil Service.\n\nIn entire contrast with this, as has been already said, was the action\nin the case of the Indian Civil Service. Here the principle of open\ncompetition was adopted from the first, and the examination took a very\nelevated start, comprising the highest branches of a learned education.\nThese branches were duly specified in a Report drawn up in November,\n1854, by a Committee, of which Lord Macaulay was chairman; and, with the\nexception of Sanskrit and Arabic, they included simply (as might have\nbeen expected) the literary and scientific subjects ordinarily taught at\nthe principal seats of general education in the Kingdom. These were:--\n\nEnglish Language and Literature (Composition, History, and General\nLiterature,--to each of which 500 marks were assigned, making a total of\n1,500); Greek and Latin (each with 750 marks); French, German, and\nItalian (valued at 375 marks, respectively); Mathematics, pure and mixed\n(marks 1,000); Natural and Moral Sciences (each 500); Sanscrit and\nArabic (375 each).\n\n[PRINCIPLE OF SELECTION OF SUBJECTS.]\n\nThe principle of selection here is clear and obvious. It did not rest\nupon any doctrine regarding the utility or value of subjects for mental\ntraining, but simply upon this, that those subjects already in the field\nmust be accepted, and that (as Mr. Jowett, in his letter to Sir Charles\nTrevelyan, of January, 1854, put it) \"it will not do to frame our\nexamination on any mere theory of education. We must test a young man's\nability by what he knows, not by what we wish him to know.\" Indeed, this\nis explicitly avowed in the Report by the author of the Scheme himself.\nThe Natural Sciences are included, because (it is confessed) \"of late\nyears they have been introduced as a part of general education into\nseveral of our universities and colleges\": and, as for the Moral\nSciences, \"those Sciences are, it is well known, much studied both at\nOxford and at the Scottish Universities\".\n\nInto the details of Macaulay's interesting Report, I need not here\nenter. Room, however, must be found for one quotation. It deals with the\ndistribution of marks, and is both characteristic and puts the matter in\nsmall compass. \"It will be necessary,\" says the writer, \"that a certain\nnumber of marks should be assigned to each subject, and that the place\nof a candidate should be determined by the sum total of the marks which\nhe has gained. The marks ought, we conceive, to be distributed among the\nsubjects of examination in such a manner that no part of the kingdom,\nand no class of schools, shall exclusively furnish servants to the East\nIndia Company. It would be grossly unjust, for example, to the great\nacademical institutions of England, not to allow skill in Greek and\nLatin versification to have a considerable share in determining the\nissue of the competition. Skill in Greek and Latin versification has,\nindeed, no direct tendency to form a judge, a financier, or a\ndiplomatist. But the youth who does best what all the ablest and most\nambitious youths about him are trying to do well will generally prove a\nsuperior man; nor can we doubt that an accomplishment by which Fox and\nCanning, Grenville and Wellesley, Mansfield and Tenterden first\ndistinguished themselves above their fellows, indicates powers of mind,\nwhich, properly trained and directed, may do great service to the State.\nOn the other hand, we must remember that in the north of this island the\nart of metrical composition in the ancient languages is very little\ncultivated, and that men so eminent as Dugald Stewart, Horner, Jeffrey,\nand Mackintosh, would probably have been quite unable to write a good\ncopy of Latin alcaics, or to translate ten lines of Shakspeare into\nGreek iambics. We wish to see such a system of examination established\nas shall not exclude from the service of the East India Company either\na Mackintosh or a Tenterden, either a Canning or a Horner.\"\n\n[ORIGINAL SCHEME FOR THE INDIA SERVICE.]\n\nNow, reverting to Macaulay's Table of Subjects as above exhibited, I may\nobserve that, till quite recently, no very serious alterations were ever\nmade upon it. The scale of marks, indeed, was altered more than once,\nand sometimes Sanskrit and Arabic were struck off, and Jurisprudence and\nPolitical Economy put in their stead; but, if we except the exclusion of\nPolitical Philosophy in 1858, at the desire of the present Lord Derby,\nfrom the Moral Science branch, the list remained, till Lord Salisbury's\nlate innovation, to all intents and purposes what it was at the\nbeginning. Here, for instance, is the prescription for 1875:--\n\n                                                              MAKES\n    English Composition                                         500\n    History of England, including that of the laws\n      and constitution                                          500\n    English Language and Literature                             500\n    Language, literature, and history of Greece                 750\n                                         Rome                   750\n                                         France                 375\n                                         Germany                375\n                                         Italy                  375\n    Mathematics, pure and mixed                               1,250\n    Natural Sciences, that is, (1) chemistry, including\n      heat; (2) electricity and magnetism; (3) geology\n      and mineralogy; (4) zoology; (5) botany                 1,000\n\n    *** The total (1,000) marks may be obtained by\n    adequate proficiency in any two or more of the five\n    branches of science included under this head.\n\n    Moral Sciences, that is, logic, mental and\n      moral philosophy                                          500\n    Sanskrit, language and literature                           500\n    Arabic, language and literature                             500\n\nBut Lord Salisbury's changes have been great and sweeping. They are\nprobably in keeping with the restriction of the competitor's age to\n\"over 17 under 19\"; but, if so, they serve only to shew all the more\nconclusively that the restriction is a mistake. A scheme that\ndistributes marks on anything but a rational and intelligent system; a\nscheme that excludes the Natural History Sciences, mineralogy and\nGeology, as well as Psychology and Moral Philosophy from its scope\naltogether; a scheme that prescribes only _Elements_ and _Outlines_ of\nsuch important subjects as Natural Science (Chemistry, Electricity and\nMagnetism, &c.) and Political Economy--stands self-condemned. But, to do\nit justice, let us produce the Table _in extenso_:--\n\n                                                              MAKES.\n\n    English Composition                                         300\n    History of England, including _a period selected_\n      by the candidate                                          300\n    English Literature including _books selected_ by\n      the candidate                                             300\n    Greek                                                       600\n    Latin                                                       800\n    French                                                      500\n    German                                                      500\n    Italian                                                     400\n    Mathematics, pure and mixed                               1,000\n    Natural Science, that is, the _Elements_ of any\n      two of the following Sciences viz.:--\n    Chemistry, 500; Electricity and Magnetism,\n      300; Experimental Laws of Heat and Light,\n      300; Mechanical Philosophy, with _Outlines_\n      of Astronomy, 300.\n    Logic                                                       300\n    _Elements_ of Political Economy                        300\n    Sanskrit                                                    500\n    Arabic                                                      500\n\n    Further remarks are reserved for the sequel. Meanwhile,\n    I give the scheme advocated by myself in the\n    present Essay:--\n\n    GENERAL SCIENCES:--\n\n    Mathematics                                                 500\n    Natural Philosophy                                          500\n    Chemistry                                                   500\n    Biology, as physiology                                      500\n    Mental Science                                              500\n\n    SPECIAL OR CONCRETE SCIENCES:--\n    Mineralogy                                           }\n    Botany                                               } each 250\n    Zoology                                              } or   300\n    Geology                                              }\n\n    As a substitute for language, literature, and philosophy\n    of Greece, Rome, France, Germany, and Italy:--\n    Greece--Institutions and History                            500\n            Literature                                          250\n    Rome--Institutions and History                              500\n          Literature                                            250\n    France--Literature                                          250\n    Germany--Literature                                         250\n    Italy--Literature                                           250\n    Modern History                                            1,000\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nII. THE SCHEME CONSIDERED.\n\nThe system of competitive examinations for the public service, of which\nI have laid before the Section a brief history compiled from the\nReports, is one of those radical innovations that may ultimately lead to\ngreat consequences. For the present, however, it leads to many debates.\nNot merely does the working out of the scheme involve conflicting views,\nbut there is still, in many quarters, great hesitation as to whether the\ninnovation is to be productive of good or of evil. The Report of the\nPlayfair Commission, and the more recent Report relative to the changes\nin the India Civil Service Regulations, indicate pretty broadly the\ndoubts that still cleave to many minds on the whole question. It is\nenough to refer to the views of Sir Arthur Helps, W.R. Greg, and Dr.\nFarr, expressed to the Playfair Commission, as decidedly adverse to the\ncompetitive system. The authorities cited in the Report on the India\nExaminations scarcely go the length of total condemnation; but many\nacquiesce only because there is no hope of a reversal.\n\nThe question of the expediency of the system as a whole is not well\nsuited to a sectional discussion. We shall be much better employed in\nadverting to some of those details in the conduct of the examinations\nthat have a bearing on the general education of the country, as well as\non the Civil Service itself. It was very well for the Commissioners, at\nfirst starting, to be guided, in their choice of subjects and in their\nassigning of values to those subjects, by the received branches of\neducation in the schools and colleges. But, sooner or later, these\nsubjects must be discussed on their intrinsic merits for the ends in\nview. Indeed, the scheme of Lord Salisbury has already made the venture\nthat Macaulay declined to make; it has absolutely excluded some of the\nbest recognised subjects of our school and college teaching, instead of\nleaving them to the option of the candidates.\n\nI will occupy the present paper with the consideration of two\ndepartments in the examination programme--the one relating to the\nPHYSICAL or NATURAL SCIENCES, the other relating to LANGUAGES.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[COMMISSIONER' SCHEME OF SCIENCE.]\n\nThe Commissioners' scheme of Mathematics and Natural Science is not, in\nmy opinion, accordant either with the best views of the relations of the\nsciences, or with the best teaching usages.\n\nIn the classification of the Sciences, the first and most important\ndistinction is between the fundamental sciences, sometimes called the\nAbstract sciences, and the derivative or Concrete branches. My purpose\ndoes not require any nice clearing of the meanings of those technical\nterms. It is sufficient to say that the fundamental sciences are those\nthat embrace distinct departments of the natural forces or phenomena;\nand the derivative or concrete departments assume all the laws laid down\nin the others, and apply them in certain spheres of natural objects. For\nexample, Chemistry is a primary, fundamental, or abstract science; and\nMineralogy is a derivative and concrete science. In Chemistry the stress\nlies in explaining a peculiar kind of force, called chemical force; in\nMineralogy the stress is laid on the description and classification of\na select group of natural objects.\n\nThe fundamental, or departmental sciences, as most commonly accepted,\nare these:--1. Mathematics; 2. Natural Philosophy, or Physics; 3.\nChemistry; 4. Biology; 5. Psychology. They may be, therefore, expressed\nas Formal, Inanimate, Animate, and Mental. In these sciences, the idea\nis to view exhaustively some department of natural phenomena, and to\nassume the order best suited for the elucidation of the phenomena.\nMathematics, the Formal Science, exhausts the relations of Quantity\nand Number; measure being a universal property of things. Natural\nPhilosophy, in its two divisions (molar and molecular), deals with one\nkind of force; Chemistry with another: and the two together conspire to\nexhaust the phenomena of _inanimate_ nature; being indispensably aided\nby the laws and formulae of quantity, as given in Mathematics. Biology\nturns over a new leaf; it takes up the phenomenon--Life, or the\n_animated_ world. Finally, Psychology makes another stride, and embraces\nthe sphere of _mind_.\n\nNow, there is no fact or phenomenon of the world that is not comprised\nunder the doctrines expounded in some one or other of these sciences.\nWe may have fifty \"ologies\" besides, but they will merely repeat for\nspecial ends, or in special connections, the principles already\ncomprised in these five fundamental subjects. The regular, systematic,\nexhaustive account of the laws of nature is to be found within their\ncompass.\n\n[ORDER OF THE FUNDAMENTAL SCIENCES.]\n\nAgain, these sciences have a fixed order or sequence, the order of\ndependence. Mathematics precedes them all, as being not dependent upon\nany, while all are more or less dependent upon it. The physical forces\nhave to be viewed prior to the chemical; and both physical and chemical\nforces are preparatory to vital. So there are reasons for placing Mental\nScience last of all. Hence a student cannot comprehend chemistry without\nnatural philosophy, nor biology without both. You cannot stand a thorough\nexamination in chemistry without indirectly showing your knowledge of\nphysics; and a testing examination in biology would guarantee, with some\nslight qualifications, both physics and chemistry.\n\nLet us now turn to the other sciences--those that are not fundamental,\nbut derivative. The chief examples are the three commonly called Natural\nHistory sciences--Mineralogy, Botany, Zoology. In these sciences no law\nor principle is at work that has not been already brought forward in\nthe primary sciences. The properties of a Mineral are mathematical,\nphysical, and chemical: the testing of minerals is by measurement, by\nphysical tests, by chemical tests. The aim of this science is not to\nteach forces unknown to the student of physics and chemistry; it is to\nembrace, under the best classification, all the bodies called minerals,\nand to describe the species in detail under mathematical, physical, and\nchemical characters. It is the first in order of the _classificatory_\nsciences. Its purpose in the economy of education is distinct and\npeculiar; it imparts knowledge, not respecting laws, forces, or\nprinciples of operating, but respecting the concrete constituents of\nthe world. It gives us a commanding view of one whole department of\nthe material universe; supplying information useful in practice, and\ninteresting to the feelings. It also brings into exercise the great\nlogical process, wanted on many occasions, the process of\nCLASSIFICATION.\n\n[CLASSIFICATORY SCIENCES.]\n\nSo much for an instance from the Inorganic world, as showing the\ndistinction between the two kinds of sciences. Another example may be\ncited from the field of Biology; it is a little more perplexing. For\n\"biology\" is sometimes given as the name for the two concrete\nclassificatory sciences--botany and zoology. In point of fact, however,\nthere is a science that precedes those two branches, although blending\nwith them; the science commonly expressed by the older term,\n'Physiology,' which is not a classificatory and a dependent science, but\na mother science, like chemistry. It expounds the peculiarities of\nliving bodies, as such, and the laws of living processes--such processes\nas assimilation, nutrition, respiration, innervation, reproduction, and\nso on. One division is Vegetable Physiology, which is generally fused\nwith the classificatory science of botany. Animal Physiology is allied\nwith zoology, but more commonly stands alone. Lastly, the Physiology of\nthe Human animal has been from time immemorial a distinct branch of\nknowledge, and is, of course, the chief of them all. Man being the most\ncomplicated of all organised beings, not only are the laws of his\nvitality the most numerous, and the most practically interesting, but\nthey go far to include all that is to be said of the workings of animal\nlife in general. Thus, then, the mother science of Biology, as a general\nor fundamental science, comprises Vegetable, Animal, and Human\nphysiology. The classificatory adjunct sciences are Botany and Zoology.\nIt is in the various aspects of the mother science that we look for the\naccount of all vital phenomena, and all practical applications to the\npreservation of life. Even if we stop at these, we shall have a full\ncommand of the laws of the animate world. But we may go farther, and\nembrace the sciences that arrange, classify, and describe the\ninnumerable host of living beings. These have their own independent\ninterest and value, but they are not the sciences that of themselves\nteach us the living processes.\n\nThus, then, a proper scheme of scientific instruction starts from the\nessential, fundamental, and law-giving sciences--Mathematics, Physics,\nChemistry, Biology, and Mind. It then proceeds to the adjunct branches\n--such as Mineralogy, Botany, Zoology: and I might add others, as\nGeology, Meteorology, Geography, no one of which is primary; for they\nall repeat in new connections, and for special purposes, the laws\nsystematically set forth in the primary sciences.\n\nIn the foregoing remarks, I do not advance any new or debatable views.\nI believe the scientific world to be substantially in accord upon all\nthat I have here stated; any differences that there are in the manner\nof expressing the points do not affect my present purpose--namely, to\ndiscuss the scheme of the mathematical and physical sciences as set\nforth in the Civil Service Examinations.\n\n[BAD GROUPINGS OF SCIENCES.]\n\nUnder Mathematics (pure and mixed) the Commissioners (in their Scheme of\n1875), include mathematics, properly so called, and those departments of\nnatural philosophy that are mathematically handled--statics, dynamics,\nand optics. But the next branch, entitled \"Natural Science,\" is what I\nam chiefly to remark upon. Under it there is a fivefold enumeration:\n--(1) Chemistry, including Heat; (2) Electricity and Magnetism; (3)\nGeology and Mineralogy; (4) Zoology; (5) Botany. I cannot pretend to say\nwhere the Commissioners obtained this arrangement of natural knowledge.\nIt is not supported by any authority that I am acquainted with. If the\nscheme just set forth is the correct one, it has _three_ defects. First,\nit does not embrace in one group the remaining parts of natural\nphilosophy, the _experimental_ branches which, with the mathematical\ntreatment, complete the department; one of these, Heat, is attached to\nchemistry, to which undoubtedly it has important relations, but not such\nas to withdraw it from physics and embody it in chemistry. Then, again,\nthe physical branches, Electricity and Magnetism, are coupled in a\ndepartment and made of co-equal value with chemistry together with heat.\nI need not say that the united couple--electricity and magnetism--is in\npoint of extent of study not a half or a third of what is included in\nthe other coupling. Lastly, the three remaining members of the\nenumeration are three natural history sciences; geology being coupled\nwith mineralogy--which is a secondary consideration. Now I think it\nis quite right that these three sciences should have a place in the\ncompetition. What is objectionable is, that Biology is represented\nsolely by its two classificatory components or adjuncts, botany and\nzoology; there is no mother science of Physiology: and consequently the\nknowledge of the vast region of the Laws of Life goes for nothing. Nor\ncan it be said that physiology is given with the others. The subject of\n_vegetable_ physiology could easily enough be taken with Botany: I would\nnot make a quarrel upon this part. It is zoology and animal physiology\nthat cannot be so coupled. If we look to the questions actually set\nunder zoology, we shall see that there is no pretence to take in\nphysiology. I contend, therefore, that there is a radical omission in\nthe scheme of natural science; an omission that seems without any\njustification. I am not here to sing the praises of Physiology: its\nplace is fixed and determined by the concurrence of all competent\njudges: I merely point out that Zoology does not include it, but\npresupposes it.\n\nThe Science scheme of the London University, to which the first Civil\nService Commissioners, Sir Edward Ryan and Sir John Lefevre, were\nparties, is very nearly what I contend for. It gives the\norder--Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Biology, Mental\nScience (including Logic). In the working of that scheme, however,\nBiology is made to comprehend both the mother science, Physiology, and\nthe two classificatory sciences, Botany and Zoology. Of course the\npresence of two such enormous adjuncts cramps and confines the purely\nphysiological examination, which in my opinion should have full justice\ndone to it in the first instance: still, the physiology is not\nsuppressed nor reduced to a mere formality. Now, in any science scheme,\nI would provide for the general sciences first, and take the others, so\nfar as expedient, in a new grouping, where those of a kind shall appear\ntogether, and stand in their proper character, not as law-giving, but as\narranging and describing sciences. There is no more reason for coupling\nZoology with Physiology, than for tacking on Mineralogy to Chemistry.\nIn point of outward form, Mineralogy and Zoology are kindred subjects.\n\nWhen the subjects are placed in the order that I have suggested, there\nis an end of that promiscuous and random choosing that the arrangement\nof the Commissioners suggests and encourages. To the specification of\nthe five heads of natural science, it is added, that the whole of the\n1,000 marks may be gained by high eminence in any two; as if the choice\nwere a matter of indifference. Now, I cannot think that this suggestion\nis in conformity with a just view of the continuity of science. When the\nsciences are rightly arranged, there is but one order in the mother\nsciences; if we are to choose a single science, it must be (with some\nqualifications) the first; if two, the first and second, and so on. To\nchoose one of the higher sciences, Chemistry or Physiology, without the\nothers that precede, is irrational. Indeed, it would scarcely ever be\ndone, and for this reason. A man cannot have mastered Physiology without\nhaving gone through Physics and Chemistry; and, although it is not\nnecessary that he should retain a hold of everything in these previous\nsciences, yet he is sure to have done enough in both one and the other\nto make it worth his while to take these up in the examination. So a\ngood chemist must have so much familiarity with Physics, as to make it\nbad economy on his part not to give in Physics as well. The only case\nwhere an earlier science might be dropped is Mathematics; for although\nthat finds its application extensively in Physics and indirectly in\nChemistry, yet there is a very large body of physical and chemical\ndoctrine that is not dependent upon any of the more difficult branches,\nso that these may admit of being partially neglected. But, as an\nexamination in Physics ought to include (as in the London University)\nall the mathematical applications, short of the higher calculus, it is\nnot likely that Mathematics would be often dropped. So that, as regards\nthe _mother_ sciences, the variation of choice would be reduced to the\ndifferent lengths that the candidate would go in the order as laid down.\nAs regards the other sciences--those of _classification_ and\n_description_--the selection might certainly be arbitrary to this\nextent, that Mineralogy, Botany, and Zoology might each be prescribed\nalone. But then, whoever presented one of these would also present the\nrelated mother science. He that took up Mineralogy, would infallibly\nalso take up the three first as far as Chemistry. He that gave in Botany\nwould probably take up Physiology, although not so necessarily, because\nthe area of plant Physiology is very limited, and has little bearing on\ndescriptive Botany, so that anything like a familiarity with Physiology\nmight be evaded. But he that took up Zoology, would to a certainty take\nup Physiology; and very probably also the antecedent members of the\nfundamental group. As to Geology, it is usually coupled with Mineralogy,\nalthough involving also a slight knowledge of Botany and Zoology.\nA competent mineralogist would be pretty sure to add Geology to his\nprofessional subjects.\n\nBefore considering the re-arrangement of marks entailed by the proposed\ndistribution of the sciences, I must advert to the position of\nMathematics in the Commissioners' scheme. This position was first\nassigned in the original draft of 1854, and on the motives therein set\nforth with such ostentatious candour; namely, the wish to reward the\nexisting subjects of teaching, whatever they might be. Now, I contend\nthat it is wholly beside the ends either of the Indian Civil Service, or\nof the Home Service, with known exceptions, to stimulate the very high\nmathematical knowledge that has hitherto entered into the examination\nscheme. A certain amount of Mathematics, the amount required in a pass\nexamination in the London University, is essential as a basis of\nrational culture; but, for a good general education, all beyond that is\nmisdirected energy. After receiving the modicum required, the student\nshould pass on to the other sciences, and employ his strength in adding\nExperimental Physics and Chemistry to his stock. Whether a candidate\nsucceeds or fails in the competitions, this is his best policy.\n\n[PROPER SCIENCE VALUES.]\n\nWithout arguing the point farther, I will now come to the amended scheme\nof science markings. It would be over-refining, and would not bring\nconviction to the general public, to make out a case for inequality in\nthe five fundamental branches. It may be said that Physiology is of more\nvalue than Chemistry, because it is farther on, and takes Chemistry with\nit; the answer is, let the Physiology candidate go in and take marks in\nChemistry also, which he is sure to do. I have purposely avoided all\ndiscussion about Mental Science; I merely assume it as a branch\ncoordinate with the prior sciences placed before it in the general list.\nI would then simply, in conclusion, give the _primary sciences_,\nMathematics, Natural Philosophy, Chemistry, Biology (as explained),\nMental Philosophy, each 500 marks. The other sciences, Mineralogy,\nBotany, Zoology, Geology, I would make equal as between themselves, but\nsomewhat lower than the primaries. The reasons are already apparent: the\ncandidate for them would always have some of the others to present; and\ntheir importance is, on the whole, less than the importance of the\nlaw-giving sciences. I should conceive that 250 or 300 marks apiece\nwould be a proper amount of consideration shewn towards them. With that\nfigure, I believe many science students could take up one or other in\naddition to the general sciences.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe other topic that I am to bring forward is one of very serious\nimport. It concerns the Civil Service competitions only as a part of our\nwhole scheme of Education. I mean the position of LANGUAGES in our\nexaminations. While the vast field of Natural Science is comprised in\none heading, with a total of 1,000 marks (raised finally to 1,400), our\nCivil Service scheme presents a row of five languages besides our\nown--two ancient, and three modern--with an aggregate value of 2,625\nmarks, or 2,800, as finally adjusted. The India scheme has, in addition,\nSanskrit and Arabic, at 500 marks each; the reasons for this\nprescription being, however, not the same as for the foregoing.\n\nThe place of Language in education is not confined to the question as\nbetween the ancient and the modern languages. There is a wider enquiry\nas to the place of languages as a whole. In pursuing this enquiry, we\nmay begin with certain things that are obvious and incontestable.\n\nIn the first place, it is apparent that if a man is sent to hold\nintercourse with the people of a foreign nation, he must be able to\nunderstand and to speak the language of that nation. Our India civil\nservants are on that ground required to master the Hindoo spoken\ndialects.\n\n[PLACE OF LANGUAGE IN EDUCATION.]\n\nIn the next place, if a certain range of information that you find\nindispensable is locked up in a foreign language, you are obliged to\nlearn the language. If, in course of time, all this information is\ntransferred to our native tongue, the necessity apparently ceases. These\ntwo extreme suppositions will be allowed at once. There may, however,\nbe an indefinite number of intermediate stages. The information may be\npartially translated; and it will then be a question whether the trouble\nof learning the language should be incurred for the sake of the\nuntranslated part. Or, it may be wholly translated: but, conscious of\nthe necessary defects even of good translations, if the subject-matter\nbe supremely important, some people will think it worth while to learn\nthe language in order to obtain the knowledge in its greatest purity and\nprecision. This is a situation that admits of no certain rule. Our\nclergy are expected to know the original languages of the Bible,\nnotwithstanding the abundance of translations; many of which must be far\nsuperior in worth and authority to the judgment of a merely ordinary\nproficient in Hebrew and in Greek.\n\nIt is now generally conceded that the classical languages are no longer\nthe exclusive depository of any kind of valuable information, as they\nwere two or three centuries ago. Yet they are still continued in the\nschools as if they possessed their original function unabated. We do not\nspeak in them, nor listen to them spoken, nor write in them, nor read in\nthem, for obtaining information. Why then are they kept up? Many reasons\nare given, as we know. There is an endeavour to show that even in their\noriginal function, they are not quite effete. Certain professions are\nsaid to rely upon them for some points of information not fully\ncommunicated by the medium of English. Such is the rather indirect\nexample of the clergy with Greek. So, it is said that Law is not\nthoroughly understood without Latin, because the great source of law,\nthe Roman code, is written in Latin, and is in many points\nuntranslatable. Further, it is contended that Greek philosophy cannot\nbe fully mastered without a knowledge of the language of Plato and\nAristotle. But an argument that is reduced to these examples must be\nnear its vanishing point. Not one of the cases stands a rigorous\nscrutiny; and they are not relied upon as the main justification of the\ncontinuance of classics. A new line of defence is opened up which was\nnot at all present to the minds of sixteenth century scholars. We are\ntold of numerous indirect and secondary advantages of cultivating\nlanguage in general and the classic languages in particular, which make\nthe acquisition a rewarding labour, even without one particle of the\nprimary use. But for these secondary advantages, languages could have no\nclaim to appear, with such enormous values, in the Civil Service scheme.\n\n[LANGUAGE MAY HAVE SECONDARY USES.]\n\nMy purpose requires me to advert in these alleged secondary uses of\nlanguage, not, however, for the view of counter-arguing them, but rather\nin order to indicate what seems to me the true mode of bringing them to\nthe proof.\n\nThe most usual phraseology for describing the indirect benefit of\nlanguages is, that they supply a _training_ to the powers of the mind;\nthat, if not information, they are _culture_; that they re-act upon our\nmastery of our own language, and so on. It is quite necessary, however,\nto find phrases more definite and tangible than the slippery words\n\"culture\" and \"training\": we must know precisely what particular powers\nor aptitudes are increased by the study of a foreign language.\nNevertheless, the conclusions set forth in this paper do not require me\nto work out an exhaustive review of these advantages. It is enough to\ngive as many as will serve for examples.\n\nNow, it must be freely admitted as a possible case, that a practice\nintroduced in the first instance for a particular purpose, may be found\napplicable to many other purposes; so much so, that, ceasing to be\nemployed for the original use, the practice may be kept up for the sake\nof the after uses. For example, clothing was no doubt primarily\ncontrived for warmth; but it is not now confined to that: decoration or\nornament, distinction of sexes, ranks and offices, modesty--are also\nattained by means of clothes. This example is a suggestive one. We have\nonly to suppose ourselves migrating to some African climate, where\nclothing for warmth is absolutely dispensed with. We should not on that\naccount adopt literal nudity--we should still desire to maintain those\nother advantages. The artistic decoration of the person would continue\nto be thought of; and, as no amount of painting and tattooing, with\nstrings of beads superadded, would answer to our ideal of personal\nelegance, we should have recourse to some light filmy textures, such as\nwould allow the varieties of drapery, colours, and design, and show off\nthe poetry of motion; we should also indicate the personal differences\nthat we were accustomed to show by vesture. But now comes the point of\nthe moral; we should not maintain our close heavy fabrics, our\ngreat-coats, shawls and cloaks. These would cease with the need for\nthem. Perhaps the first emigrants would keep up the prejudice for their\nwarm things, but not so their successors.\n\nWell, then, suppose the extreme case of a foreign language that is\nentirely and avowedly superseded as regards communication and\ninterpretation of thoughts, but still furnishing so many valuable aids\nto mental improvement, that we keep it up for the sake of these. As we\nare not to hear, speak, or read the language, we do not need absolutely\nto know the meaning of every word: we may, perhaps, dispense with much\nof the technicality of its grammar. The vocables and the grammar would\nbe kept up exactly so far as to serve the other purposes, and no\nfarther. The teacher would have in view the secondary uses alone.\nSupposing the language related to our own by derivation of words, and\nthat this was what we put stress upon; then the derivation would always\nbe uppermost in the teacher's thoughts. If it were to illustrate\nUniversal Grammar and Philology, this would be brought out to the\nneglect of translation.\n\n[CLASSICAL TEACHER'S IDEAL.]\n\nI have made an imaginary supposition to prepare the way for the real\ncase. The classical or language teacher, is assumed to be fully\nconscious of the fact that the primary use of the languages is as good\nas defunct; and that he is continued in office because of certain\nclearly assigned secondary uses, but for which he would be superseded\nentirely. Some of the secondary uses present to his mind, at all events\none of those that are put forward in argument, is that a foreign\nlanguage, and especially Latin, conduces to good composition in our own\nlanguage. And as we do compose in our own language, and never compose in\nLatin, the teacher is bound to think mainly of the English part of the\ntask--to see that the pupils succeed in the English translation, whether\nthey succeed in the other or not. They may be left in a state of\nconsiderable ignorance of good Latin forms (ignorance will never expose\nthem); but any defects in their English expression will be sure to be\ndisclosed. Again, it is said that Universal Grammar or Philology is\ntaught upon the basis of a foreign language. Is this object, in point of\nfact, present to the mind of every teacher, and brought forward, even to\nthe sacrifice of the power of reading and writing, which, by the\nsupposition, is never to be wanted? Further, the Latin Grammar is said\nto be a logical discipline. Is this, too, kept in view as a\npredominating end? Once more, it is declared that, through the classics,\nwe attain the highest cultivation of Taste, by seeing models of\nunparalleled literary form. Be it so: is this habitually attended to in\nthe teaching of these languages?\n\nI believe I am safe in saying that, whilst these various secondary\nadvantages are put forward in the polemic as to the value of languages,\nthe teaching practice is by no means in harmony therewith. Even when in\nword the supporters of classics put forward the secondary uses, in deed\nthey belie themselves. Excellence in teaching is held by them to\nconsist, in the first instance, in the power of accurate\ninterpretation,--as if that obsolete use were still _the_ use. If a\nteacher does this well, he is reckoned a good teacher, although he does\nlittle or nothing for the other ends, which in argument are treated as\nthe reason of his existence. Indeed, this is the kind of teaching that\nis alone to be expected from the ordinary teacher; all the other ends\nare more difficult than simple word teaching. Even when English\nComposition, Logic and Taste are taught in the most direct way, they\nare more abstruse than the simple teaching of a foreign language for\npurposes of interpretation; but when tacked on as accessories to\ninstruction in a language, they are still more troublesome to impart.\nA teacher of rare excellence may help his pupils in English style, in\nphilology, in logic, and in taste; but the mass of teachers can do very\nlittle in any of those directions. They are never found fault with\nmerely because their teaching does not rise to the height of the great\narguments that justify their vocation; they would be found fault with,\nif their pupils were supposed to have made little way in that first\nfunction of language which is never to be called into exercise.\n\nI do not rest satisfied with quoting the palpable inconsistency between\nthe practice of the teacher and the polemic of the defender of\nlanguages. I believe, further, that it is not expedient to carry on so\nmany different acquisitions together. If you want to teach thorough\nEnglish, you need to arrange a course of English, allot a definite time\nto it, and follow it with undivided attention during that time. If you\nwish to teach Philology you must provide a systematic scheme, or else\na text-book of Philology, and bring together all the most select\nillustrations from languages generally. So for Logic and for Taste.\nThese subjects are far too serious to be imparted in passing allusions\nwhile the pupil is engaged in struggling with linguistic difficulties.\nThey need a place in the programme to themselves; and, when so provided\nfor, the small dropping contributions of the language teacher may easily\nbe dispensed with.\n\n[SECONDARY ENDS OF LANGUAGE NOT PRESSED.]\n\nThe argument for Languages may, no doubt, take a bolder flight, and go\nso far as to maintain that the teacher does not need to turn aside from\nhis plain path to secure these secondary ends--now the only valuable\nends. The contention may be that in the close and rigorous attention to\nmere interpretation, just as if interpretation were still the living\nuse, these other purposes are inevitably secured--good English,\nuniversal grammar, logic, taste, &c. I think, however, that this is too\nfar from the fact to be very confidently maintained. Of course, were it\ncorrect, the teacher should never have departed from it, as the best\nteachers continually do, and glory in doing.\n\nOn the face of the thing, it must seem an unworkable position to\nsurrender the value of a language, as a language, and keep it up for\nsomething else. The teaching must always be guided by the original,\nalthough defunct, use; this is the natural, the easy, course to follow;\nfor the mass of teachers at all times it is the broad way. Whatever the\nnecessities of argument may drive a man to say, yet in his teaching he\ncannot help postulating to himself, as an indispensable fiction, that\nhis pupils are some day or other to hear, to read, to speak, or to write\nthe language.\n\nThe intense conservatism in the matter of Languages--the alacrity to\nprescribe languages on all sides, without inquiring whether they are\nlikely to be turned to account--may be referred to various causes. For\none thing--although the remark may seem ungracious and invidious--many\nminds, not always of the highest force, are absorbed and intoxicated by\nlanguages. But apart from this, languages are, by comparison, easy to\nteach, and easy to examine upon. Now, if there is any motive in\neducation more powerful than another, it is ease in the work itself. We\nare all, as teachers, copyists of that Irish celebrity who, when he came\nto a good bit of road, paced it to and fro a number of times before\ngoing forward to his destination on the rougher footing.\n\nSo far I may seem to be arguing against the teaching of language at all,\nor, at any rate, the languages expressively called dead. I am not,\nhowever, pressing this point farther than as an illustration. I do not\nask anyone to give an opinion against Classics as a subject of\ninstruction; although, undoubtedly, if this opinion were prevalent, my\nprincipal task would be very much lightened. I have merely analysed the\nutilities ascribed to the ancient and the modern languages, with a view\nto settling their place in competitive examinations.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[LANGUAGES NOT PROPER FOR THE COMPETITION.]\n\nMy thesis, then, is, that languages are not a proper subject for\ncompetition with a view to professional appointments. The explanation\nfalls under two heads.\n\nIn the first place, there are certain avocations where a foreign\nlanguage must be known, because it has to be used in actual business.\nSuch are the Indian spoken languages. Now, it is clear that in these\ncases the knowledge of the language, as being a _sine qua non_, must be\nmade imperative. This, however, as I think, is not a case for\ncompetition, but for a sufficient pass. There is a certain pitch of\nattainment that is desirable even at first entering the service; no one\nshould fall below this, and to rise much above it cannot matter a great\ndeal. At all events, I think the measure should be absolute and not\nrelative. I would not give a man merit in a competition because another\nman happens to be worse than himself in a matter that all must know;\nboth the men may be absolutely bad.\n\nIt may be the case that certain languages are so admirably constructed\nand so full of beauties that to study them is a liberal education in\nitself. But this does not necessarily hold of every language that an\nofficial of the British Empire may happen to need. It does not apply to\nthe Indian tongues, nor to Chinese, nor, I should suppose, to the Fiji\ndialects. The only human faculty that is tested and brought into play in\nthese acquisitions is the commonest kind of memory exercised for a\ncertain time. The value to the Service of the man that can excel in\nspoken languages does not lie in his superior administrative ability,\nbut in his being sooner fitted for actual duty. Undoubtedly, if two men\ngo out to Calcutta so unequal in their knowledge of native languages, or\nin the preparation for that knowledge, that one can begin work in six\nmonths, while the other takes nine, there is an important difference\nbetween them. But what is the obvious mode of rewarding the difference?\nNot, I should think, by pronouncing one a higher man in the scale of the\ncompetition, but by giving him some money prize in proportion to the\nredemption of his time for official work.\n\nNow, as regards the second kind of languages--those that are supposed to\ncarry with them all the valuable indirect consequences that we have just\nreviewed. There are in the Civil Service Scheme five such languages--two\nancient, and three modern. They are kept there, not because they are\never to be read or spoken in the Service, but because they exercise some\nmagical efficacy in elevating the whole tone of the human intellect.\n\nIf I were discussing the Indian Civil Service in its own specialities,\nI would deprecate the introduction of extraneous languages into the\ncompetition, for this reason, that the Service itself taxes the verbal\npowers more than any other service. I do not think that Lord Macaulay\nand his colleagues had this circumstance fully in view. Macaulay was\nhimself a glutton for language; and, while in India, read a great\nquantity of Latin and Greek. But he was exempted from the ordinary lot\nof the Indian civil servant; he had no native languages to acquire and\nto use. If a man both speaks and writes in good English, and converses\nfamiliarly in several Oriental dialects, his language memory is\nsufficiently well taxed, and if he carries with him one European\nlanguage besides, it is as much as belongs to the fitness of things in\nthat department.\n\n[SECONDARY USES OF LANGUAGE DIRECTLY TESTED.]\n\nMy proposal, then, goes the length of excluding all these five\ncultivated languages from the competition, notwithstanding the influence\nthat they may be supposed to have as general culture. In supporting it,\nI shall assume that everything that can be said in their favour is true\nto the letter: that they assist us in our own language, that they\ncultivate logic and taste, that they exemplify universal grammar, and so\non. All that my purpose requires is to affirm that the same good ends\nmay be attained in other ways: that Latin, Greek, &c, are but one of\nseveral instruments for instructing us in English composition,\nreasoning, or taste. My contention, then, is that the _ends_ themselves\nare to be looked to, and not the means or instruments, since these are\nvery various. English composition is, of course, a valuable end, whether\ngot through the study of Latin, or through the study of English authors\nthemselves, or through the inspiration of natural genius. Whatever\namount of skill and attainment a candidate can show in this department\nshould be valued _the examination for English_; and all the good that\nLatin has done for him would thus be entered to his credit. If, then,\nthe study of Latin is found the best means of securing good marks in\nEnglish, it will be pursued on that account; if the candidate is able to\ndiscover other less laborious ways of attaining the end, he will prefer\nthese ways.\n\nThe same applies to all the other secondary ends of language. Let them\nbe valued _in their own departments_. Let the improvement of the\nreasoning faculty be counted wherever that is shown in the examination.\nGood reasoning powers will evince themselves in many places, and will\nhave their, reward.\n\nThe principle is a plain and obvious one. It is that of payment for\nresults, without inquiring into the means. There are certain extreme\ncases where the means are not improperly coupled with the results in the\nfinal examination; and these are illustrations of the principle. Thus,\nin passing a candidate for the medical profession, the final end is his\nor her knowledge of diseases and their remedies. As it is admitted,\nhowever, that there are certain indispensable preparatory\nstudies--anatomy, physiology, and materia medica--such studies are made\npart of the examination, because they contribute to the testing for the\nfinal end.\n\n[HISTORY AND LITERATURE DETACHABLE FROM LANGUAGE.]\n\nThe argument is not complete until we survey another branch of the\nsubject of examination in languages. It will be observed in the wording\nof the programme that each separate language is coupled with 'literature\nand history (or, as latterly expressed, 'literature--including books\nselected by the candidate')'. It is the Language, Literature, and\nHistory of Rome, Greece, &c. And the examination questions show the\nexact scope of these adjuncts, and also the values attached to them, as\ncompared with the language by itself.\n\nLet us consider this matter a little. Take History first, as being the\nleast perplexed. Greece and Rome have both a certain lasting importance\nattaching to their history and institutions; and these accordingly are a\nuseful study. Of course, the extant writings are the chief groundwork of\nour knowledge of these, and must be read. But, at the present day, all\nthat can be extracted from the originals is presented to the student in\nEnglish books; and to these he is exclusively referred for this part of\nhis knowledge. In the small portion of original texts that a pupil at\nschool or college toils through, he necessarily gets a few of the\nhistorical facts at first hand; but he could much more easily get these\nfew where he gets the rest--in the English compilations. Admitting,\nthen, that the history and institutions of Greece and Rome constitute a\nvaluable education, it is in our power to secure it independently of the\noriginal tongues.\n\nThe other branch--Literature--is not so easily disposed of. In fact, the\nseparating of the literature from the language, you will say, is a\nself-evident absurdity. That, however, only shows that you have not\nlooked carefully into examination papers. I am not concerned with what\nthe _a priori_ imagination may suppose to be Literature, but with the\nactual questions put by examiners under that name. I find that such\nquestions are, generally speaking, very few, perhaps one or two in a\nlong paper, and nearly all pertain to the outworks of literature, so to\nspeak. Here is the Latin literature of one paper:--In what special\nbranch of literature were the Romans independent of the Greeks? Mention\nthe principal writers in it, with the peculiar characteristics of each.\nWho was the first to employ the hexameter in Latin poetry, and in what\npoem? To what language is Latin most nearly related; and what is the\ncause of their great resemblance? The Greek literature of the same\nexamination involves these points:--The Aristophanic estimate of\nEuripides, with criticisms on its taste and justice (for which, however,\na historical subject is given as an alternative); the Greek chorus, and\nchoric metres. Now such an examination is, in the first place, a most\nmeagre view of literature: it does not necessarily exercise the faculty\nof critical discernment. In the next place, it is chiefly a matter of\ncompilation from English sources; the actual readings of the candidate\nin Greek and Latin would be of little account in the matter. Of course,\nthe choric metres could not be described without some knowledge of\nGreek, but the matter is of very trifling importance in an educational\npoint of view. Generally speaking, the questions in literature, which in\nnumber bear no proportion to historical questions, are such as might be\nincluded under history, as the department of the History of Literature.\n\n[LANGUAGES EXAMINATION PAPERS REVIEWED.]\n\nThe distribution of the 750 marks allotted respectively to Latin and to\nGreek, in the scheme of 1875, is this. There are three papers: two are\noccupied exclusively with translation. The third is language,\nliterature, and history: the language means purely grammatical\nquestions; so that possibly 583 marks are for the language proper. The\nremaining number, 167, should be allotted equally between literature and\nhistory, but history has always the lion's share, and is in fact the\nonly part of the whole examination that has, to my mind, any real worth.\nIt is generally a very searching view of important institutions and\nevents, together with what may be called their philosophy. Now, the\nreform that seems to me to be wanted is to strike out everything else\nfrom the examination. At the same time, I should like to see the\nexperiment of a _real_ literary examination, such as did not necessarily\nimply a knowledge of the originals.\n\nIt is interesting to turn to the examination in modern languages, where\nthe ancient scheme is copied, by appending literature and history. Here\nthe Literature is decidedly more prominent and thorough. There is also\na fair paper of History questions. What strikes us, however, in this,\nis a slavish adherence to the form, without the reality, of the ancient\nsituation. We have independent histories of Greece and Rome, but\nscarcely of Germany, France, and Italy. Instead of partitioning Modern\nEuropean history among the language-examiners for English, French,\nGerman, Italian, it would be better to relieve them of history\naltogether, and place the subject as a whole in the hands of a distinct\nexaminer. I would still allow merit for a literary examination in\nFrench, German, and Italian, but would strike off the languages, and let\nthe candidate get up the literature as he chose. The basis of a\ncandidate's literary knowledge, and his first introduction to\nliterature, ought to be his own language: but he may extend his\ndiscrimination and his power by other literatures, either in\ntranslations or in originals, as he pleases; still the examination, as\nbefore, should test the discrimination and the power, and not the\nvocabulary of the languages themselves.\n\nIn order to do full justice to classical antiquity, I would allow\nmarkings at the rate of 500 for Political Institutions and History, and\n250 for Literature. Some day this will be thought too much; but\npolitical philosophy or sociology may become more systematic than at\npresent, and history questions will then take a different form.\n\nIn like manner, I would abolish the language-examination in modern\nlanguages, and give 250 marks for the literature of each of the three\nmodern languages--French, German, Italian. The history would be taken as\nModern History, with an adequate total value.\n\nThe objections to this proposal will mainly resolve themselves into its\nrevolutionary character. The remark will at once be made that the\nclassical languages would cease to be taught, and even the modern\nlanguages discouraged. The meaning of this I take to be, that, if such\nteaching is judged solely by its fruits, it must necessarily be\ncondemned.\n\nThe only way to fence this unpalatable conclusion, is to maintain that\nthe results could not be fully tested in an examination as suggested.\nSome of these are so fine, impalpable, and spiritual in their texture,\nthat they cannot be seized by any questions that can be put; and would\nbe dropped out if the present system were changed. But results so\nuntraceable cannot be proved to exist at all.\n\n[LANGUAGE QUESTIONS TAKE THE PLACE OF THE SUBJECT.]\n\nSo far from the results being missed by disusing the exercises of\ntranslation, one might contend that they would only begin to be\nappreciated fairly when the whole stress of the examination is put upon\nthem. If an examiner sets a paper in Roman Law, containing long Latin\nextracts to be translated, he is starving the examination in Law by\nsubstituting for it an examination in Latin. Whatever knowledge of Latin\nterminology is necessary to the knowledge of Law should be required, and\nno more. So, it is not an examination in Aristotle to require long\ntranslations from the Greek; only by dispensing with all this, does the\nmain subject receive proper attention.\n\nIf the properly literary part of the present examinations were much of\na reality, there would be a nice discussion as to the amount of literary\ntact that could be imparted in connection with a foreign language, as\ntranslated or translatable. But I have made an ample concession, when I\npropose that the trial should be made of examining in literature in this\nfashion; and I do not see any difficulty beyond the initial repugnance\nof the professors of languages to be employed in this task, and the\nfear, on the part of candidates, that, undue stress might be placed on\npoints that need a knowledge of originals.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nI will conclude with a remark on the apparent tendency of the wide\noptions in the Commissioners' scheme. No one subject is obligatory; and\nthe choice is so wide that by a very narrow range of acquirements a man\nmay sometimes succeed. No doubt, as a rule, it requires a considerable\nmixture of subjects: both sciences and literature have to be included.\nBut I find the case of a man entering the Indian Service by force of\nLanguages alone, which I cannot but think a miscarriage. Then the very\nhigh marks assigned to Mathematics allow a man to win with no other\nscience, and no other culture, but a middling examination in English.\nTo those that think so highly of foreign languages, this must seem a much\ngreater anomaly than it does to me. I would prefer, however, that such a\ncandidate had traversed a wider field of science, instead of excelling\nin high mathematics alone.\n\nThere are, I should say, _three_ great regions of study that should be\nfairly represented by every successful candidate. The first is the\nSciences as a whole, in the form and order that I have suggested. The\nsecond is English Composition, in which successful men in the Indian\ncompetition sometimes show a cipher. The third is what I may call\nloosely the Humanities, meaning the department of institutions and\nhistory, with perhaps literature: to be computed in any or all of the\nregions of ancient and modern history. In every one of these three\ndepartments, I would fix a minimum, below which the candidate must not\nfall.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 6: _The Civil Service Examination Scheme, considered with\nreference (1) to Sciences, and (2) to Languages_. A paper read before\nthe Educational Section of the Social Science Association, at the\nmeeting in Aberdeen. 1877: with additions relevant to Lord Salisbury's\nScheme.]\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nIV.\n\nTHE CLASSICAL CONTROVERSY.\n\nITS PRESENT ASPECT.[7]\n\n\nIn the present state of the controversy on classical studies, the\npublication of George Combe's contributions to Education is highly\nopportune. Combe took the lead in the attack on these studies fifty\nyears ago, and Mr. Jolly, the editor of the volume, gives a connected\nview of the struggle that followed. The results were, on the whole, not\nvery great. A small portion of natural science was introduced into the\nsecondary schools; but as the classical teaching was kept up as before,\nthe pupils were simply subjected to a greater crush of subjects; they\ncould derive very little benefit from science introduced on such terms.\nThe effect on the Universities was _nil_; they were true to Dugald\nStewart's celebrated deliverance on their conservatism.[8] The general\npublic, however, were not unmoved; during a number of years there was\na most material reduction in the numbers attending all the Scotch\nUniversities, and the anti-classical agitation was reputed to be the\ncause.\n\nThe reasonings of Combe will still repay perusal. He puts with great\nfelicity and clearness the standing objections to the classical system;\nwhile he is exceedingly liberal in his concessions, and moderate in his\ndemands. \"I do not denounce the ancient languages and classical\nliterature on their own account, or desire to see them cast into utter\noblivion. I admit them to be refined studies, and think that there are\nindividuals who, having a natural turn for them, learn them easily and\nenjoy them much. They ought, therefore, to be cultivated by all such\npersons. My objection is solely to the practice of rendering them the\nmain substance of the education bestowed on young men who have no taste\nor talent for them, and whose pursuits in life will not render them a\nvaluable acquisition.\"\n\nBefore alluding to the more recent utterances in defence of classical\nteaching, I wish to lay out as distinctly as I can the various\nalternatives that are apparently now before us as respects the higher\neducation--that is to say, the education begun in the secondary or\ngrammar schools, and completed and stamped in the Universities.\n\n[THE EXISTING CLASSICAL TEACHING.]\n\n1. The existing system of requiring proficiency in both classical\nlanguages. Except in the University of London, this requirement is still\nimperative. The other Universities agree in exacting Latin and Greek as\nthe condition of an Arts' Degree, and in very little else. The defenders\nof classics say with some truth that these languages are the principal\nbasis of uniformity in our degrees; if they were struck out, the public\nwould not know what a degree meant.\n\nHow exclusive was the study of Latin and Greek in the schools in\nEngland, until lately, is too well known to need any detailed statement.\nA recent utterance of Mr. Gladstone, however, has felicitously supplied\nthe crowning illustration. At Eton, in his time, the engrossment with\nclassics was such as to keep out religious instruction!\n\nAs not many contend that Latin and Greek make an education in\nthemselves, we may not improperly call to mind what other things it has\nbeen found possible to include with them in the scope of the Arts'\nDegree. The Scotch Universities were always distinguished from the\nEnglish in the breadth of their requirements: they have comprised, for\nmany ages, three other subjects; mathematics, natural philosophy, and\nmental philosophy (including logic and ethics). In exceptional\ninstances, another science is added; in one case, natural history, in\nanother, chemistry. According to the notions of scientific order and\ncompleteness in the present day, a full course of the primary sciences\nwould comprise mathematics, natural philosophy, chemistry, physiology or\nbiology, and mental philosophy. The natural history branches are not\nlooked upon as primary sciences; they give no laws, but repeat the laws\nof the primary sciences while classifying the kingdoms of Nature. (See\nparagraph that begins with: In the classification of the sciences ...).\n\nIn John Stuart Mill's celebrated Address at St. Andrews, he stood up for\nthe continuance of the Classics in all their integrity, and suddenly\nbecame a great authority with numbers of persons who probably had never\ntreated him as an authority before. But his advocacy of the classics was\ncoupled with an equally strenuous advocacy for the extension of the\nscientific course to the full circle of the primary sciences; that is to\nsay, he urged the addition of chemistry and physiology to the received\nsciences. Those that have so industriously brandished his authority for\nretaining classics, are discreetly silent upon this other\nrecommendation. He was too little conversant with the working of\nUniversities to be aware that the addition of two sciences to the\nexisting course was impracticable; and he was never asked which\nalternative he would prefer. I am inclined to believe that he would have\nsacrificed the classics to scientific completeness; he would have been\nsatisfied with the quantum of these already gained at school. But while\nwe have no positive assurance on this point, I consider that his opinion\nshould be wholly discounted as not bearing on the actual case.\n\n[UNIVERSITY OF LONDON CURRICULUM.]\n\nThe founders of the University of London attempted to realise Mill's\nconception to the full. They retained Classics; they added English and\na modern language, and completed the course of the primary sciences by\nincluding both Chemistry and Physiology. This was a noble experiment,\nand we can now report on its success. The classical languages, English\nand French or German, mathematics and natural philosophy, and (after a\ntime) logic and moral philosophy, were all kept at a good standard; thus\nexceeding the requirements of the Scotch Universities at the time by\nEnglish and a modern language. The amount of attainment in chemistry was\nvery small, and was disposed of in the Matriculation examination.\nPhysiology was reserved for the final B.A. examination, and was the\nleast satisfactory of all. Having myself sat at the Examining Board\nwhile Dr. Sharpey was Examiner in Physiology, I had occasion to know\nthat he considered it prudent to be content with a mere show of studying\nthe subject. Thus, though the experience of the University of London, as\nwell as of the Scotch Universities, proves that the classical languages\nare compatible with a very tolerable scientific education, yet these\nwill need to be curtailed if every one of the fundamental sciences, as\nMill urged, is to be represented at a passable figure.\n\nIn the various new proposals for extending the sphere of scientific\nknowledge, a much smaller amount of classics is to be required, but\nneither of the two languages is wholly dispensed with. If not taught at\ncollege, they must be taken up at school as a preparation for entering\non the Arts' curriculum in the University. This can hardly be a\npermanent state of things, but it is likely to be in operation for some\ntime.\n\n2. The remitting of Greek in favour of a modern language is the\nalternative most prominently before the public at present. It accepts\nthe mixed form of the old curriculum, and replaces one of the dead\nlanguages by one of the living. Resisted by nearly the whole might of\nthe classical party, this proposal finds favour with the lay professions\nas giving one language that will actually be useful to the pupils as a\nlanguage. It is the very smallest change that would be a real relief.\nThat it will speedily be carried we do not doubt.\n\nExcept as a relaxation of the grip of classicism, this change is not\naltogether satisfactory. That there must be two languages (besides\nEnglish) in order to an Arts' Degree is far from obvious. Moreover,\nalthough it is very desirable that every pupil should have facilities at\nschool or at college for commencing modern languages, these do not rank\nas indispensable and universal culture, like the knowledge of sciences\nand of literature generally. They would have to be taught along with\ntheir respective literatures to correspond to the classics.\n\nAnother objection to replacing classics by modern languages is the\nnecessity of importing foreigners as teachers. Now, although there are\nplenty of Frenchmen and Germans that can teach as well as any\nEnglishman, it is a painful fact that foreigners do oftener miscarry,\nboth in teaching and in discipline, with English pupils, than our own\ncountrymen. Foreign masters are well enough for those that go to them\nvoluntarily with the desire of being taught; it is as teachers in a\ncompulsory curriculum that their inferiority becomes apparent.\n\nThe retort is sometimes made to this proposal--Why omit Greek rather\nthan Latin? Should you not retain the greater of the two languages? This\nmay be pronounced as mainly a piece of tactics; for every one must know\nthat the order of teaching Latin and Greek at the schools will never be\ntopsyturvied to suit the fancy of an individual here and there, even\nalthough John Stuart Mill himself was educated in that order. On the\nscheme of withdrawing all foreign languages from the imperative\ncurriculum, and providing for them as voluntary adjuncts, such freedom\nof selection would be easy.[9]\n\n[ALTERNATIVE OF MODERN LANGUAGES.]\n\n3. Another alternative is to remit both Latin and Greek in favour of\nFrench and German. Strange to say, this advance upon the previous\nalternative was actually contained in Mr. Gladstone's ill-fated Irish\nUniversity Bill. Had that Bill succeeded, the Irish would have been\nfor fourteen years in the enjoyment of a full option for both the\nlanguages.[10] From a careful perusal of the debates, I could not\ndiscover that the opposition ever fastened upon this bold surrender of\nthe classical exclusiveness.\n\nThe proposal was facilitated by the existence of professors of French\nand German in the Queen's Colleges, In the English and Scotch Colleges\nendowments are not as yet provided for these languages; although it\nwould be easy enough to make provision for them in Oxford and Cambridge.\n\nIn favour of this alternative, it is urged that the classics, if entered\non at all, should be entered on thoroughly and entirely. The two\nlanguages and literatures form a coherent whole, a homogeneous\ndiscipline; and those that do not mean to follow this out should not\nbegin it. Some of the upholders of classics take this view.\n\n4. More thorough-going still is the scheme of complete bifurcation of\nthe classical and the modern sides. In our great schools there has been\ninstituted what is called the _modern side_, made up of sciences and\nmodern languages, together with Latin. The understanding hitherto has\nbeen, that the votaries of the ancient and classical side should alone\nproceed to the Universities; the modern side being the introduction to\ncommercial life, and to professions that dispense with a University\ndegree. Here, as far as the schools are concerned, a fair scope is given\nto modern studies.\n\nAs was to be expected, the modern side is now demanding admission to the\nUniversities on its own terms; that is, to continue the same line of\nstudies there, and to be crowned with the same distinctions as the\nclassical side. This attempt to render school and college homogeneous\nthroughout, to treat ancient studies and modern studies as of equal\nvalue in the eye of the law, will of course be resisted to the utmost.\nYet it seems the only solution likely to bring about a settlement that\nwill last.\n\nThe defenders of the classical system in its extreme exclusiveness are\nfond of adducing examples of very illustrious men who at college showed\nan utter incapacity for science in its simplest elements. They say that,\nby classics alone, these men are what they are, and if their way had\nbeen stopped by serious scientific requirements, they would have never\ncome before the world at all. The allegation is somewhat strongly put;\nyet we shall assume it to be correct, on condition of being allowed to\ndraw an inference. If some minds are so constituted for languages, and\nfor classics in particular, may not there be other minds equally\nconstituted for science, and equally incapable of taking up two\nclassical languages? Should this be granted, the next question is--Ought\nthese two classes of minds to be treated as equal in rights and\nprivileges? The upholders of the present system say, No. The Language\nmind is the true aristocrat; the Science mind is an inferior creation.\nDegrees and privileges are for the man that can score languages, with\nnever so little science; outer darkness is assigned to the man whose\n_forte_ is science alone. But a war of caste in education is an unseemly\nthing; and, after all the levelling operations that we have passed\nthrough, it is not likely that this distinction will be long preserved.\n\n[CLAIMS OF THE MODERN SIDE.]\n\nThe modern side, as at present constituted, still retains Latin. There\nis a considerable strength of feeling in favour of that language for all\nkinds of people; it is thought to be a proper appendage of the lay\nprofessions; and there is a wide-spread opinion in favour of its utility\nfor English. So much is this the case, that the modern-siders are at\npresent quite willing to come under a pledge to keep up Latin, and to\npass in it with a view to the University. In fact, the schools find this\nfor the present the most convenient arrangement. It is easier to supply\nteaching in Latin than in a modern language, or in most other things;\nand while Latin continues to be held in respect, it will remain\nuntouched. Yet the quantity of time occupied by it, with so little\nresult, must ultimately force a departure from the present curriculum.\nThe real destination of the modern side is to be modern throughout. It\nshould not be rigorously tied down even to a certain number of modern\nlanguages. English and one other language ought to be quite enough; and\nthe choice should be free. On this footing, the modern side ought to\nhave its place in the schools as the co-equal of classics; it would be\nthe natural precursor of the modernised alternatives in the\nUniversities; those where knowledge subjects predominate.\n\nThe proposal to give an _inferior degree_ to a curriculum that excludes\nGreek should, in my judgment, be simply declined. It is, however, a\nmatter of opinion whether, in point of tactics, the modern party did not\ndo well to accept this as an instalment in the meantime. The Oxford\noffer, as I understand it, was so far liberal, that the new degree was\nto rank equal in privileges with the old, although inferior in\n_prestige_. In Scotland, the decree conceded by the classical party to\na Greekless education was worthless, and was offered for that very\nreason.[11]\n\n[SURRENDER OF CLAIMS FOR SOME.]\n\nAmong the adherents of classics, Professor Blackie is distinguished for\nsurrendering the study of them in the case of those that cannot profit\nby them. He believes that with a free alternative, such as the thorough\nbifurcation into two sides would give, they would still hold their\nground, and bear all their present fruits. His classical brethren,\nhowever, do not in general share this conviction. They seem to think\nthat if they can no longer compel every University graduate to pass\nbeneath the double yoke of Rome and Greece, these two illustrious\nnationalities will be in danger of passing out of the popular mind\naltogether. For my own part, I do not share their fears, nor do I think\nthat, even on the voluntary footing, the study of the two languages will\ndecline with any great rapidity. As I have said, the belief in Latin is\nwide and deep. Whatever may be urged as to the extraordinary stringency\nof the intellectual discipline now said to be given by means of Latin\nand Greek, I am satisfied that the feeling with both teachers and\nscholars is, that the process of acquisition is not toilsome to either\nparty; less so perhaps than anything that would come in their place.\nOf the hundreds of hours spent over them, a very large number are\nassociated with listless idleness. Carlyle describes Scott's novels as\na \"beatific lubber land\"; with the exception of the \"beatific,\" we might\nsay nearly the same of classics. To all which must be added the immense\nendowments of classical teaching; not only of old date but of recent\nacquisition. It will be a very long time before these endowments can be\ndiverted, even although the study decline steadily in estimation.\n\nThe thing that stands to reason is to place the modern and the ancient\nstudies on exactly the same footing; to accord a fair field and no\nfavour. The public will decide for themselves in the long run. If the\nclassical advocates are afraid of this test, they have no faith in the\nmerits of their own case.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe arguments _pro_ and _con_ on the question have been almost\nexhausted. Nothing is left except to vary the expression and\nillustration. Still, so long as the monopoly exists, it will be argued\nand counter-argued; and, if there are no new reasons, the old will have\nto be iterated.\n\n[EXAMPLE FROM THE GREEKS THEMSELVES]\n\nPerhaps the most hackneyed of all the answers to the case for the\nclassics is the one that has been most rarely replied to. I mean the\nfact that the Greeks were not acquainted with any language but their\nown. I have never known an attempt to parry this thrust. Yet, besides\nthe fact itself, there are strong presumptions in favour of the position\nthat to know a language well, you should devote your time and strength\nto it alone, and not attempt to learn three or four. Of course, the\nGreeks were in possession of the most perfect language, and were not\nlikely to be gainers by studying the languages of their contemporaries.\nSo, we too are in possession of a very admirable language, although put\ntogether in a nondescript fashion; and it is not impossible that if\nPlato had his Dialogues to compose among us, he would give his whole\nstrength to working up our own resources, and not trouble himself with\nGreek. The popular dictum--_multum non multa_, doing one thing well--may\nbe plausibly adduced in behalf of parsimony in the study of languages.\n\nThe recent agitation in Cambridge, in Oxford, and indeed, all over the\ncountry, for remitting the study of Greek as an essential of the Arts'\nDegree, has led to a reproduction of the usual defences of things as\nthey are. The articles in the March number of the _Contemporary Review,\n1879_, by Professors Blackie and Bonamy Price, may claim to be the\n_derniers mots_.\n\nProfessor Blackie's article is a warning to the teachers of classics, to\nthe effect that they must change their front; that, whereas the value of\nthe classics as a key to thought has diminished, and is diminishing,\nthey must by all means in the first place improve their drill. In fact,\nunless something can be done to lessen the labour of the acquisition by\nbetter teaching, and to secure the much-vaunted intellectual discipline\nof the languages, the battle will soon be lost. Accordingly, the\nprofessor goes minutely into what he conceives the best methods of\nteaching. It is not my purpose to follow him in this sufficiently\ninteresting discussion. I simply remark that he is staking the case, for\nthe continuance of Latin and Greek in the schools, on the possibility of\nsomething like an entire revolution in the teaching art. Revolution is\nnot too strong a word for what is proposed. The weak part of the new\nposition is that the value of the languages _as languages_ has declined,\nand has to be made up by the incident of their value as _drill_. This\nis, to say the least, a paradoxical position for a language teacher. If\nit is mere drill that is wanted, a very small corner of one language\nwould suffice. The teacher and the pupil alike are placed between the\ntwo stools--interpretation and drill. A new generation of teachers must\narise to attain the dexterity requisite for the task.\n\nProfessor Blackie's concession is of no small importance in the actual\nsituation. \"No one is to receive a full degree without showing a fair\nproficiency in two foreign languages, one ancient and one modern, with\nfree option.\" This would almost satisfy the present demand everywhere,\nand for some time to come.\n\n[ARGUMENT FROM RESULTS.]\n\nThe article of Professor Bonamy Price is conceived in even a higher\nstrain than the other. There is so far a method of argumentation in it\nthat the case is laid out under four distinct heads, but there is no\ndecisive separation of reasons; many of the things said under one head\nmight easily be transferred without the sense of dislocation to any\nother head. The writer indulges in high-flown rhetorical assertions\nrather than in specific facts and arguments. The first merit of classics\nis that \"they are languages; not particular sciences, nor definite\nbranches of knowledge, but literatures\". Under this head we have such\nglowing sentences as these: \"Think of the many elements of thought a boy\ncomes in contact with when he reads Caesar and Tacitus in succession,\nHerodotus and Homer, Thucydides and Aristotle\". \"See what is implied in\nhaving read Homer intelligently through, or Thucydides or Demosthenes;\nwhat light will have been shed on the essence and laws of human\nexistence, on political society, on the relations of man to man, on\nhuman nature itself.\" There are various conceivable ways of\ncounter-arguing these assertions, but the shortest is to call for the\nfacts--the results upon the many thousands that have passed through\ntheir ten years of classical drill. Professor Campbell of St. Andrews,\nonce remarked, with reference to the value of Greek in particular, that\nthe question would have to be ultimately decided by the inner\nconsciousness of those that have undergone the study. To this we are\nentitled to add, their powers as manifested to the world, of which\npowers spectators can be the judges. When, with a few brilliant\nexceptions, we discover nothing at all remarkable in the men that have\nbeen subjected to the classical training, we may consider it as almost\na waste of time to analyse the grandiloquent assertions of Mr. Bonamy\nPrice. But if we were to analyse them, we should find that _boys_ never\nread Caesar and Tacitus through in succession; still less Thucydides\nDemosthenes, and Aristotle; that very few _men_ read and understand\nthese writers; that the shortest way to come into contact with Aristotle\nis to avoid his Greek altogether, and take his expositors and\ntranslators in the modern languages.\n\nThe professor is not insensible to the reproach that the vaunted\nclassical education has been a failure, as compared with these splendid\npromises. He says, however, that though many have failed to become\nclassical scholars in the full sense of the word, \"it does not follow\nthat they have gained nothing from their study of Greek and Latin; just\nthe contrary is the truth\". The \"contrary\" must mean that they have\ngained something; which something is stated to be \"the extent to which\nthe faculties of the boy have been developed, the quantity of impalpable\nbut not less real attainments he has achieved, and his general readiness\nfor life, and for action as a man\". But it is becoming more and more\ndifficult to induce people to spend a long course of youthful years upon\na confessedly _impalpable_ result. We might give up a few months to a\nspeculative and doubtful good, but we need palpable consequences to show\nfor our years spent on classics. Next comes the admission that the\nteaching is often bad. But why should the teaching be so bad, and what\nis the hope of making it better? Then we are told that science by itself\nleaves the largest and most important portion of the youths' nature\nabsolutely undeveloped. But, in the first place, it is not proposed to\nreduce the school and college curriculum to science alone; and, in the\nnext place, who can say what are the \"impalpable\" results of science?\n\n[WORTH OF THE CLASSICAL WRITERS.]\n\nThe second branch of the argument relates to the greatness of the\nclassical writers. Undoubtedly the Greek and Roman worlds produced some\nvery great writers, and a good many not great. But the greatness of\nHerodotus, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Plato, and Aristotle can be\nexhibited in a modern rendering; while no small portion of the poetical\nexcellence of Homer and the Dramatists can be made apparent without\ntoiling at the original tongues. The value of the languages then\nresolves itself, as has been often remarked, into a _residuum_.\nSomething also is to be said for the greatness of the writers that have\nwritten in modern times. Sir John Herschel remarked long ago that the\nhuman intellect cannot have degenerated, so long as we are able to quote\nNewton, Lagrange and Laplace, against Aristotle and Archimedes. I would\nnot undertake to say that any modern mind has equalled Aristotle in the\n_range_ of his intellectual powers; but in point of intensity of grasp\nin any one subject, he has many rivals; so that to obtain his equal, we\nhave only to take two or three first-rate moderns.\n\nIf a few fanatics are to go on lauding to the skies the exclusive and\ntranscendent greatness of the classical writers, we shall probably be\ntempted to scrutinize their merits more severely than is usual. Many\nthings could be said against their sufficiency as instructors in matters\nof thought; and many more against the low and barbarous tone of their\n_morale_--the inhumanity and brutality of both their principles and\ntheir practice. All this might no doubt be very easily overdone, and\nwould certainly be so, if undertaken in the style of Professor Price's\npanegyric.\n\nThe professor's third branch of the argument comes to the real point;\nnamely, what is there in Greek and Latin that there is not in the modern\ntongues? For one thing, says the professor, they are dead; which of\ncourse we allow. Then, being dead, they must be learnt by book and by\nrule; they cannot be learnt by ear. Here, however, Professor Blackie\nwould dissent, and would say that the great improvement of teaching, on\nwhich the salvation of classical study now hangs, is to make it a\nteaching by the ear. But, says Professor Price: \"A Greek or Latin\nsentence is a nut with a strong shell concealing the kernel--a puzzle,\ndemanding reflection, adaptation of means to end, and labour for its\nsolution, and the educational value resides in the shell and in the\npuzzle\". As this strain of remark is not new, there is nothing new to be\nsaid in answer to it. Such puzzling efforts are certainly not the rule\nin learning Latin and Greek. Moreover, the very same terms would\ndescribe what may happen equally often in reading difficult authors in\nFrench, German, or Italian. Would not the pupil find puzzles and\ndifficulties in Dante, or in Goethe? And are there not many puzzling\nexercises in deciphering English authors? Besides, what is the great\nobjection to science, but that it is too puzzling for minds that are\nquite competent for the puzzles of Greek and Latin? Once more, the\n_teaching_ of any language must be very imperfect, if it brings about\nhabitually such situations of difficulty as are here described.\n\n[ARGUMENTS FOR CLASSICS.]\n\nThe professor relapses into a cooler and correcter strain when he\nremarks that the pupil's mind is necessarily more delayed over the\nexpression of a thought in a foreign language (whether dead or alive\nmatters not), and therefore remembers the meaning better. Here, however,\nthe desiderated reform of teaching might come into play. Granted that\nthe boy left to himself would go more rapidly through Burke than through\nThucydides, might not his pace be retarded by a well-directed\ncross-examination; with this advantage, that the length of attention\nmight be graduated according to the importance of the subject, and not\naccording to the accidental difficulty of the language?\n\nThe professor boldly grapples with the alleged waste of time in\nclassics, and urges that \"the gain may be measured by the time\nexpended,\" which is very like begging the question.\n\nOne advantage adduced under this head deserves notice. The languages\nbeing dead, as well as all the societies and interests that they\nrepresent, they do not excite the prejudices and passions of modern\nlife. This, however, may need some qualification. Grote wrote his\nhistory of Greece to counterwork the party bias of Mitford. The battles\nof despotism, oligarchy, and democracy are to this hour fought over the\ndead bodies of Greece and Rome. If the professor meant to insinuate,\nthat those that have gone through the classical training are less\nviolent as partisans, more dispassionate in political judgments, than\nthe rest of mankind, we can only say that we should not have known this\nfrom our actual experience. The discovery of some sweet, oblivious,\nantidote to party feeling seems, as far as we can judge, to be still in\nthe future. If we want studies that will, while they last, thoroughly\ndivert the mind from the prejudices of party, science is even better\nthan ancient history; there are no party cries connected with the\nBinomial Theorem.\n\nThe professor's last branch of argument, I am obliged, with all\ndeference, to say, contains no argument at all. It is that, in classical\neducation, a close contact is established between the mind of the boy\nand the mind of the master. He does not even attempt to show how the\neffect is peculiar to classical teaching. The whole of this part of the\npaper is, in fact, addressed, by way of remonstrance, to the writer's\nown friends, the classical teachers. He reproaches them for their\ninefficiency, for their not being Arnolds. It is not my business to\ninterfere between him and them in this matter. So much stress does he\nlay upon the teacher's part in the work, that I almost expected the\nadmission--that a good teacher in English, German, natural history,\npolitical economy, might even be preferable to a bad teacher of Latin\nand Greek.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[CANON LIDDON'S ARGUMENT.]\n\nThe recent Oxford contest has brought out the eminent oratorical powers\nof Canon Liddon; and we have some curiosity in noting his contributions\nto the classical side. I refer to his letters in the _Times_. The gist\nof his advocacy of Greek is contained in the following allegations.\nFirst, the present system enables a man to recur with profit and\nadvantage to Greek literature. To this, it has been often replied, that\nby far the greater number are too little familiarized with the classical\nlanguages, and especially Greek, to make the literature easy reading.\nBut farther, the recurring to the study of ancient authors by busy\nprofessional men in the present day, is an event of such extreme rarity\nthat it cannot be taken into account in any question of public policy.\nThe second remark is, that the half-knowledge of the ordinary graduate\nis a link between the total blank of the outer world, and the thorough\nknowledge of the accomplished classic. I am not much struck by the force\nof this argument. I think that the classical scholar, might, by\nexpositions, commentaries, and translations, address the outer world\nequally well, without the intervening mass of imperfect scholars.\nLastly, the Canon puts in a claim for his own cloth. The knowledge of\nGreek paves the way for serious men to enter the ministry in middle\nlife. Argument would be thrown away upon any one that could for a moment\nentertain this as a sufficient reason for compelling every graduate in\nArts to study Greek. The observation that I would make upon it has a\nwider bearing. Middle life is not too late for learning any language\nthat we suddenly discover to be a want; the stimulus of necessity or of\nstrong interest, and the wider compass of general knowledge, compensate\nfor the diminution of verbal memory.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 7: CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, August, 1879. A few months previously,\nthere were printed, in the Review, papers on the Classical question, by\nProfessors Blackie and Bonamy Price; both of which are here alluded to\nand quoted, so far as either is controverted or concurred with.]\n\n[Footnote 8: \"The academical establishments of some parts of Europe are\nnot without their use to the historian of the human mind. Immovably\nmoored to the same station by the strength of their cables and the\nweight of their anchors, they enable him to measure the rapidity of the\ncurrent by which the rest of the world is borne along.\"]\n\n[Footnote 9: If the two Literatures were studied, as they might be, by\nmeans of expositions and translations, the Greek would be first as a\ntiling of course. Historians of the Latin authors are obliged to trace\ntheir subject, in every department, to the corresponding authors in\nGreece.]\n\n[Footnote 10: No doubt the classical languages would have been required,\nto some extent, in matriculating to enter college. This arrangement,\nhowever, as regarded the students that chose the modern languages, would\nhave been found too burdensome by our Irish friends, and, on their\nexpressing themselves to that effect, would have been soon dispensed\nwith.]\n\n[Footnote 11: One possible consequence of a Natural Science Degree might\nhave been, that the public would have turned to it with favour, while\nthe old one sank into discredit.]\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nV.\n\nMETAPHYSICS AND DEBATING SOCIETIES.[12]\n\n\nBy \"Metaphysical Study,\" or \"Metaphysics,\" I here mean--what seems\nintended by the designation in its current employment at present--the\ncircle of the mental or subjective sciences. The central department of\nthe field is PSYCHOLOGY, and the adjunct to psychology is LOGIC, which\nhas its foundations partly in psychology, but still more in the sciences\naltogether, whose procedure it gathers up and formulates. The outlying\nand dependent branches are: the narrower metaphysics or Ontology,\nEthics, Sociology, together with Art or Aesthetics. There are other\napplied sciences of the department, as Education and Philology.\n\nThe branches most usually looked upon as the cognate or allied studies\nof the subjective department of human knowledge are, Psychology, Logic,\nOntology, Ethics. The debates in a society like the present will\ngenerally be found to revolve in the orbit thus chalked out. It is the\nsphere of the most animated controversies, and the widest discordance of\nview. The additional branch most nearly connected with the group is\nSociology, which under that name, and under the older title, the\nPhilosophy of History, has opened up a new series of problems, of the\nkind to divide opinions and provoke debate. A quieter interest attaches\nto Aesthetics, although the subject is a not unfruitful application and\ntest of psychological laws.\n\nMy remarks will embrace, first, the aims, real and factitious, in the\nstudy of this group of sciences; and next, the polemic conduct of such\nstudy, or the utility and management of debating societies, instituted\nin connection therewith.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[PSYCHOLOGY AND LOGIC FUNDAMENTAL.]\n\nThe two sciences--PSYCHOLOGY and LOGIC--I consider the fundamental and\nknowledge-giving departments. The others are the applications of these\nto the more stirring questions of human life. Now, the successful\ncultivation of the field requires you to give at least as much attention\nto the root sciences as you give to the branch sciences. That is to say,\npsychology, in its pure and proper character, and logic, in its\nsystematic array, should be kept before the view, concurrently with\nontology, ethics, and sociology. Essays and debates tending to clear up\nand expound systematic psychology and systematic logic should make a\nfull half of the society's work.\n\nDoes any one feel a doubt upon the point, as so stated? If so, it will\nbe upon him to show that Psychology, in its methodical pursuit, is a\nneedless and superfluous employment of strength; that the problems of\nethics, ontology, &c., can be solved without it--a hard task indeed, so\nlong as they are unsolved in any way. I have no space for indulging in\na dissertation on the value of methodical study and arrangement in the\nextension of our knowledge, as opposed to the promiscuous mingling of\ndifferent kinds of facts, which is often required in practice, but\nrepugnant to the increase of knowledge. If you want to improve our\nacquaintance with the sense of touch, you accumulate and methodize all\nthe experiences relating to touch; you compare them, see whether they\nare consistent or inconsistent, select the good, reject the bad, improve\nthe statement of one by light borrowed from the others; you mark\ndesiderata, experiments to be tried, or observations to be sought.\nAll that time, you refrain from wandering into other spheres of mental\nphenomena. You make use of comparison with the rest of the senses, it\nmay be, but you keep strictly to the points of analogy, where mutual\nlights are to be had. This is the culture of knowledge as such, and is\nthe best, the essential, preparation for practical questions involving\nthe particular subject along with others.\n\nTo take an example from the question of the Will. I do not object: to\nthe detaching and isolating of the problem of free-will, as a matter for\ndiscussion and debate; but I think that it can be handled to equal, if\nnot greater advantage, in the systematic psychology of voluntary power.\nThose that have never tried it in this last form have not obtained the\nbest vantage-ground for overcoming the inevitable subtleties that invest\nit.\n\nThe great problem of External Perception has a psychological place,\nwhere its difficulties are very much attenuated, to say the least of it;\nand, however convenient it may be to treat it as a detached problem, we\nshould carry with us into the discussion all the lights that we obtain\nwhile regarding it as it stands among the intellectual powers.\n\nIt is in systematic Psychology that we are most free to attend to the\ndefining of terms (without which a professed science is mere moonshine),\nto the formulating of axioms and generalities, to the concatenating and\ntaking stock of all the existing knowledge, and to the appraising of it\nat its real value. If these things are neglected, there is nothing that\nI see to constitute a psychology at all.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[DISCUSSIONS IN LOGIC PROPER.]\n\nAs to the other fundamental science, LOGIC, the same remarks may be\nrepeated. Of debated questions, a certain number pertain properly to\nlogic; yet most of these relate to logic at its points of contact with\npsychology. Since we have got out of the narrow round of the\nAristotelian syllogism, we have agreed to call logic _ars artium_, or,\nbetter still, _scientia scientiarum_, the science that deals with the\nsciences altogether--both object sciences and subject sciences. Now this\nI take to be a study quite apart from psychology in particular,\nalthough, as I have said, touching it at several points. It reviews all\nscience and all knowledge, as to its structure, method, arrangement,\nclassification, probation, enlargement. It deals in generalities the\nmost general of any. By taking up what belongs to all knowledge, it\nseems to rise above the matter of knowledge to the region of pure form;\nit demands, therefore, a peculiar subtlety of handling, and may easily\nland us, as we are all aware, in knotty questions and quagmires.\n\nNow what I have to repeat in this connection is, that you should, in\nyour debates, overhaul portions or chapters of systematic logic, with a\nview to present the difficulties in their natural position in the\nsubject. You might, for example, take up the question as to the Province\nof logic, with its divisions, parts, and order--all which admit of many\nvarious views--and bring forward the vexed controversies under lights\nfavourable to their resolution. Regarding logic as an aid to the\nfaculties in tackling whatever is abstruse, you should endeavour to\ncultivate and enhance its powers, in this particular, by detailed\nexposition and criticism of all its canons and prescriptions. The\ndepartment of Classification is a good instance; a region full of\ndelicate subtleties as well as \"bread-and-butter\" applications.\n\nIt is in this last view of logic that we can canvass philosophical\nsystems upon the ground of their method or procedure alone. Looking at\nthe absence, in any given system, of the arts and precautions that are\nindispensable to the establishment of truth in the special case, we may\npronounce against it, _a priori_; we know that such a system can be true\nonly by accident, or else by miracle. We may reasonably demand of a\nsystem-builder--Is he in the narrow way that leadeth to truth, or in the\nbroad way that leadeth somewhere else?\n\nI have said that I consider the connection between Logic and Psychology\nto be but slender, although not unimportant. The amount and nature of\nthis connection would reward a careful consideration. There would be\nconsiderable difficulty in seeing any connection at all between the\nAristotelian Syllogism and psychology, but for the high-sounding\ndesignations appended to the notion and the proposition--simple\napprehension and judgment--of which I fail to discover the propriety or\nrelevance. I know that Grote gave a very profound turn to the employment\nof the term \"judgment\" by Aristotle, as being a recognition of the\nrelativity of knowledge to the affirming mind. I am not to say,\nabsolutely, \"Ice is cold\"; I am to say that, to the best of my judgment\nor belief, or in so far as I am concerned, ice is cold. This, however,\nhas little to do with the logic of the syllogism, and not much with any\nlogic. So, when we speak of a \"notion,\" we must understand it as\napprehended by some mind; but for nearly all purposes, this is assumed\ntacitly; it need not appear in a formal designation, which, not being\nwanted, is calculated to mislead.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[APPLIED OR DERIVATIVE SCIENCES.]\n\nWith these remarks on the two fundamental sciences of our group, I now\nturn to the _applied_ or _derivative_ sciences, wherein the great\ncontroversies stand out most conspicuous, which, in fact, exist for the\npurpose of contention--Ontology and Ethics. These branches were in\nrequest long before the mother sciences--psychology and logic--came into\nbeing at all. They had occupied their chief positions without consulting\nthe others, partly because these were not there to consult, and partly\nbecause they were not inclined to consult any extraneous authority. By\nOntology we may designate the standing controversies of the intellectual\npowers--perception, innate ideas, nominalism _versus_ realism, and\nnoumenon _versus_ phenomenon. I am not going to pronounce upon these\nquestions; I have already recommended the alternative mode of\napproaching them under systematic psychology and logic; and I will now\nregard them as constituents of the fourfold enumeration of the\nmetaphysical sciences.\n\nThe Germans may be credited for teaching us, or trying to teach us, to\ndistinguish \"bread and butter\" from what passes beyond, transcends bread\nand butter. With them the distinction is thoroughly ingrained, and comes\nto hand at a moment's notice. If I am to review in detail what may be\nconsidered the practical or applied departments of logic and psychology,\nI am in danger of trenching on their \"bread-and-butter\" region. Before\ndescending, therefore, into the larder, let us first spend a few seconds\nin considering psychology as the pursuit of _truth_ in all that relates\nto our mental constitution. If difficulty be a stimulus to the human\nexertions, it may be found here. To ascertain, fix, and embody the\nprecise truth in regard to the facts of the mind is about as hard an\nundertaking as could be prescribed to a man. But this is another way of\nsaying that psychology is not a very advanced science; is not well\nstored with clear and certain doctrines; and is unable, therefore, to\nconfer any very great precision on its dependent branches, whether\npurely speculative or practical. In a word, the greatest modesty or\nhumility is the deportment most becoming to all that engage in this\nfield of labour, even when doing their best; while the same virtues in\neven greater measure are due from those engaging in it without doing\ntheir best.\n\nIt must be admitted, however, that the highest evidence and safeguard of\ntruth is application. In every other science, the utility test is final.\nThe great parent sciences--mathematics, physics, chemistry,\nphysiology--have each a host of filial dependents, in close contact with\nthe supply of human wants; and the success of the applications is the\ntestimony to the truth of the sciences applied. Thus, although we may\nnot narrow the sphere of truth to bread and butter, yet we have no surer\ntest of the truth itself. Our trade requires navigation, and navigation\nverifies astronomy; and, but for navigation, we may be pretty confident\nthat astronomy would now have very little accuracy to boast of.\n\nTo come then to the practical bearings or outgoings of psychology,\nassisted by logic. My contention is that the parent sciences and the\nfilial sciences should be carried on together; that theses should be\nextracted by turns from all; that the lights thus obtained would be\nmutual. I will support the position by a review of the subjects thus\ndrawn into the metaphysical field.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[PROBLEMS OF EDUCATION.]\n\nForemost among these applied sciences I would place EDUCATION, the\nsubject of the day. The priority of mention is due not so much to its\nspecial or pre-eminent importance, as to its being the most feasible and\nhopeful of the practical applications of conjoined psychology and logic.\nI say this, however, with a more express eye to _intellectual_\neducation. I deem it quite possible to frame a practical, science\napplicable to the training of the intellect that shall be precise and\ndefinite in a very considerable measure. The elements that make up our\nintellectual furniture can be stated with clearness; the laws of\nintellectual growth or acquisition are almost the best ascertained\ngeneralities of the human mind; even the most complicated studies can be\nanalyzed into their components, partly by psychology and partly by the\nhigher logic. In a word, if we cannot make a science of education, as\nfar as Intellect is concerned, we may abandon metaphysical study\naltogether.\n\nI do not speak with the same confidence as to _moral_ education. There\nhas long been in existence a respectable rule-of-thumb practice in this\nregion, the result of a sufficiently wide experience. There are certain\npsychological laws, especially those relating to the formation of moral\nhabits, that have a considerable value; but to frame a theory of moral\neducation, on a level in a point of definiteness with the possible\ntheory of intellectual education, is a task that I should not like to\nhave imposed upon me. In point of fact, two problems are joined in one,\nto the confusion of both. There is _first_ the vast question of _moral\ncontrol_, which stretches far and wide over many fields, and would have\nto be tracked with immense labour: it belongs to the arts of government;\nit comes under moral suasion, as exercised by the preacher and orator;\nit even implicates the tact of diplomacy. I do not regard this as a\nproperly educational question (although it refers to an art that every\nteacher must try to master); that is to say, its solution is not\nconnected with education processes strictly so called. The _second_\nproblem of moral education is the one really within the scope of the\nsubject--the problem of _fixing moral bents_ or habits, when the right\nconduct is once initiated. On this head, some scientific insight is\nattainable; and suggestions of solid value may in time accrue, although\nthere never can be the precision attainable in the intellectual region.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nI will next advert to the applied science of Art or Aesthetics, long a\nbarren ground, so far as scientific handling was concerned, but now a\nland of promise. The old thesis, \"What is Beauty?\" a good debating\nsociety topic, is, I hope, past contending about. The numerous\ninfluences that concur in works of art, or in natural beauty, present a\nfine opening for delicate analysis; at the same time, they implicate the\nvaguest and least advanced portion of psychology--the Emotions. The\nGerman philosophers have usually ranked aesthetics as one of the\nsubjective sciences; but, it is only of late that the department has\ntaken shape in their country. Lessing gave a great impulse to literary\nart, and originated a number of pregnant suggestions; and the German\nlove of music has necessarily led to theories as well as to\ncompositions. We are now in the way to that consummation of aesthetics\nwhich may be described as containing (1) a reference to psychology as\nthe mother science, (2) a classification, comparison, and contrast of\nthe fine arts themselves, and (3) an induction of the principles of art\ncomposition from the best examples. Anything like a thorough sifting of\nfine-art questions would strain psychology at every point--senses,\nemotions, intellect; and, if criticism is to go deep, it must ground\nupon psychological reasons. Now the mere artist can never be a\npsychologist; the art critic may, but seldom will; hence, as they will\nnot come over to us, some of us must go over to them. The Art discussion\nof the greatest fountains of human feeling--love and anger--would react\nwith advantage upon the very difficult psychology of these emotions, so\nlong the sport of superficiality.\n\n[AESTHETICS: HEDONICS.]\n\nBut I hold that aesthetics is but a corner of a larger field that is\nseldom even named among the sciences of mind; I mean human happiness as\na whole, \"eudaemonics,\" or \"hedonics,\" or whatever you please to call\nit. That the subject is neglected, I do not affirm; but it is not\ncultivated in the proper place, or in the proper light-giving\nconnection--that is to say, under the psychology of the human feelings.\nIt should have at once a close reference to psychology, and an\nindependent construction; while either in comprehending aesthetics, or\nin lying side by side with that, it would give and receive illumination.\nThe researches now making into the laws and limits of human sensibility,\nif they have any value, ought to lead to the economy of pleasure and the\nabatement of pain. The analysis of sensation and of emotion points to\nthis end. Whoever raises any question as to human happiness should refer\nit, in the first instance, to psychology; in the next, to some general\nscheme that would answer for a science of happiness; and, thirdly, to an\ninduction of the facts of human experience; the three distinct appeals\ncorrecting one another. If psychology can contribute nothing to the\npoint, it confesses to a desideratum for future inquirers.\n\n[HEDONICS SEPARATE FROM ETHICS.]\n\nI am not at all satisfied with the coupling of happiness with ethics, as\nis usually done. Ethics is the sphere of duty; happiness is mentioned\nonly to be repressed and discouraged. This is not the situation for\nunfolding all the blossoms of human delight, nor for studying to allay\nevery rising uneasiness. He would be a rare ethical philosopher that\nwould permit full scope to such an operation within his grounds; neither\nEpicurus nor Bentham could come up to this mark. But even if the thing\nwere permitted, the lights are not there; it is only by combining the\nparent psychology and the hedonic derivative, that the work can be done.\nIt is neither disrespect nor disadvantage to duty, that it is not\nmentioned in the department until the very end. To cultivate happiness\nis not selfishness or vice, unless you confine it to self; and the mere\nact of inquiring does not so confine it. If you are in other respects a\nselfish man, you will apply your knowledge for your own sole behoof; if\nyou are not selfish, you will apply it for the good of your fellows\nalso, which is another name for virtue.\n\nBut the obstacles to a science of happiness are not solely clue to the\ngaps and deficiencies in our psychological knowledge; they are equally\nowing to the prevailing terrorism in favour of self-denial at all hands.\nMany of the maxims as to happiness would not stand examination if people\nfelt themselves free to discuss them. You must work yourselves into a\nfervour of revolt and defiance, before you call in question Paley's\ndeclaration that \"happiness is equally distributed among all orders of\nthe community\". I do not know whether I should wonder most at the\ncheerful temperament or the complacent optimism of Adam Smith, when he\nasks, \"What can be added to the happiness of the man who is in health,\nwho is out of debt, and has a clear conscience?\"[13] When the greatest\nphilosophers talk thus, what is to be expected from the unphilosophic\nmob? The dependence of health on activity is always kept very loose, it\nmay be for the convenience of shutting our mouths against complaints of\nbeing overworked. To render this dependence precise is a matter of pure\npsychology.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[SOCIOLOGY.]\n\nBefore coming to Ethics I must, as a preparation, view another\nderivative branch of psychology, the old subject of politics and\nsociety, under its new name, SOCIOLOGY. It is obvious that all terms\nused in describing social facts and their generalities are terms of\nmind: command and obedience, law and right, order and progress, are\nnotions made up of human feelings, purposes, and thoughts.\n\nSociology is usually studied in its own special field, and nowhere else;\nthat is to say, the sociologist employs himself in observing and\ncomparing the operations of societies under all varieties of\ncircumstances, and in all historic ages. The field is essentially human\nnature, and the laws arrived at are laws of human nature. A consummate\nsociologist is not often to be found; the really great theorists in\nsociety could be counted on one's fingers. Some of them have been\npsychologists as well; I need mention only Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke,\nHume, the Mills. Others as Vico, Montesquieu, Millar, Condorcet, Auguste\nComte, De Tocqueville, have not independently studied the mind on the\nbroad psychological basis. Now the bearings on sociology of a pure\npsychological preparation can be convincingly shown. The laws of\nsociety, if not the merest empiricisms, are derivative laws of the mind;\nhence a theorist cannot be trusted with the handling of a derivative\nlaw, unless he knows, as well as can be known, the simple or constituent\nlaws. All the elements of human character crop up in men's social\nrelations; in the foreground are their self-interest or sense of\nself-preservation, together with their social and anti-social\npromptings; a little farther back are their active energy, their\nintelligence, their artistic feelings, and their religious\nsusceptibilities. Now all these should be broadly examined as elements\nof the mind, without an immediate reference to the political machine.\nOf course, the social feelings need a social situation, and cannot be\nstudied without that; but there are many social situations that give\nscope for examining them, besides what is contemplated in political\nsociety; and the psychologist proper ought to avail himself of all the\nopportunities of rendering the statement of these various elements\nprecise. For this purpose, his chief aim is the ultimate analysis of the\nvarious faculties and feelings. This analysis nobody but himself cares\nto institute; and yet a knowledge of the ultimate constitution of an\nemotional tendency is one of the best aids in appreciating its mode of\nworking. Without a good preliminary analysis of the social and\nanti-social emotions, for example, you are almost sure to be counting\nthe same thing twice over, or else confounding two different facts under\none designation. On the one hand, the precise relationship of the states\nnamed love, sympathy, disinterestedness; and, on the other hand, the\ncommon basis of domination, resentment, pride, egotism,--should be\ndistinctly cleared up, as is possible only in psychological study\nstrictly so called. The workings of the religious sentiment cannot be\nshown sociologically, without a previous analysis of the constituent\nemotions.\n\n[SOCIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS.]\n\nAn allusion so very slender to so vast a subject as sociology would be a\nwaste of words, but for the conviction, that through sociology is the\nway to the great field of Ethics. This is to reverse the traditional\narrangement--ethics, politics, or government--followed even by Bentham.\nThe lights of ethics are, in the first instance, psychological; its\ndiscussions presuppose a number of definitions and distinctions that are\npure psychology. But before these have to be adduced, the subject has to\nbe set forth as a problem of sociology. \"How is the King's government to\nbe carried on?\" \"How is society to be held together?\" is the first\nconsideration; and the sociologist--as constitution-builder,\nadministrator, judge--is the person to grapple with the problem. It is\nwith him that law, obligation, right, command, obedience, sanction, have\ntheir origin and their explanation. Ethics is an important supplement to\nsocial or political law. But it is still a department of law. In any\nother view it is a maze, a mystery, a hopeless embroilment.\n\nThat ethics is involved in society is of course admitted; what is not\nadmitted is, that ethical terms should be settled under the social\nscience in the first place. I may refer to the leading term \"law,\" whose\nmeaning in sociology is remarkably clear; in ethics remarkably the\nreverse. The confusion deepens when the moral faculty is brought\nforward. In the eye of the sociologist, nothing could be simpler than\nthe conception of that part of our nature that is appealed to for\nsecuring obedience. He assumes a certain effort of the intelligence for\nunderstanding the signification of a command or a law; and, for the\nmotive part, he counts upon nothing but volition in its most ordinary\nform--the avoidance of a pain. Intelligence and Will, in their usual and\nrecognised workings, are all that are required for social obedience; law\nis conceived and framed exactly to suit the every-day and every-hour\nmanifestations of these powers. The lawgiver does not speak of an\nobedience-faculty, nor even of a social-faculty. If there were in the\nmind a power unique and apart, having nothing in common with our usual\nintelligence, and nothing in common with our usual will or volition,\nthat power ought to be expressed in terms that exclude the smallest\nparticipation of both knowledge and will; it ought to have a form\nspecial to itself, and not the form:--\"Do this, and ye shall be made to\nsuffer\".\n\nI am quite aware that there are elements in ethics not included in the\nproblem of social obedience; what I contend for is, that the ground\nshould be cleared by marking out the two provinces, as is actually done\nby a very small number of theorists, of whom John Austin is about the\nbest example.\n\nThe ethical philosopher, from not building on a foregone sociology, is\nobliged to extemporize, in a paragraph, the social system; just as the\nphysical philosopher would, if he had no regularly constructed\nmathematics to fall back upon, but had to stop every now and then to\nenunciate a mathematical theorem.\n\nThe question of the ethical end should first appear as the question of\nthe sociological end. For what purpose or purposes is society\nmaintained? All the ethical difficulties are here met by anticipation,\nand in a form much better adapted to their solution. It is from the\npoint of view of the social ruler, that you learn reserve, moderation,\nand sobriety in your aims; you learn to think that something much less\nthan the Utopias--universal happiness and universal virtue--should be\npropounded; you find that a definite and limited province can be\nassigned, separating what the social power is able to do, must do, and\ncan advantageously do, from what it is unable to do, need not do, and\ncannot with advantage do; and this or a similar demarcation is\nreproducible in ethics.\n\n[PRECEPTS OF ETHICS MAINLY SOCIAL.]\n\nThe precepts of ethics are mainly the precepts of social authority; at\nall events the social precepts and their sanctions have the priority\nin scientific method. Some of the highest virtues are sociological;\npatriotic self-sacrifice is one of the conditions of social\npreservation. The inculcation of this and of many other virtues would\nnot appear in ethics at all, or only in a supplementary treatment, if\nsocial science took its proper sphere, and fully occupied that sphere.\n\nOnce more. The great problem of moral control, which I would remove\nentirely from a science of education, would be first dealt with in\nSociology. It there appears in the form of the choice and gradation\nof punishments, in prison discipline, and in the reformation of\ncriminals,--all which have been made the subject of enlightened, not\nto say scientific, treatment. It is in the best experience in those\nsubjects that I would begin to seek for lights on the comprehensive\nquestion. I would next go to diplomacy for the arts of delicate address\nin reconciling opposing interests; after which I would look to the\nmanagement of parties and conflicting interests in the State. I would\nfarther inquire how armies are disciplined, and subordination combined\nwith the enthusiasm that leads to noble deeds.\n\nThere is an abundant field for the application of pure psychology to\nethics, when it takes its own proper ground. The exact psychological\ncharacter of disinterested impulse needs to be assigned; and, if that\nimpulse can be fully referred to the sympathetic or social instincts and\nhabits, the supposed moral faculty is finally eviscerated of its\ncontents for all ethical purposes.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nSo far I have exemplified what seems to me real or genuine aims and\napplications of metaphysical study. I now proceed to the objects that\nare more or less factitious. We are here on delicate ground, and run the\nrisk of discrediting our pursuit, as regards the very things that in the\neyes of many people make its value.\n\nFirst, then, as psychology involves all our sensibilities, pleasures,\naffections, aspirations, capacities, it is thought on that ground to\nhave a special nobility and greatness, and a special power of evoking in\nthe student the feelings themselves. The mathematician, dealing with\nconic sections, spirals, and differential equations, is in danger of\nbeing ultimately resolved into a function or a co-efficient; the\nmetaphysician, by investigating conscience, must become conscientious;\ndriving fat oxen is the way to grow fat.\n\n[MAN'S RELATIONS TO THE INFINITE.]\n\nBut to pass to a far graver application. It has usually been supposed\nthat metaphysical theory is more especially akin to the speculation that\nmounts to the supernatural and the transcendental world. \"Man's\nrelations to the infinite\" is a frequent phrase in the mouth of the\nmetaphysician. Metaphysics is supposed to be \"philosophy\" by way of\neminence; and philosophy in the large sense has not merely to satisfy\nthe curiosity of the human mind, it has to provide scope for its\nemotions and aspirations; in fact, to play the part of theology. In\ntimes when the prevailing orthodox beliefs are shaken, some scheme of\nphilosophy is brought forward to take their place. If I understand\naright the drift of the German metaphysical systems for a century back,\nthey all more or less propose to themselves to supply the same spiritual\nwants as religion supplies. In our own country, such of us as are not\nunder German influence put the matter differently; but we still consider\nthat we have something to say on the \"highest questions\". We are apt to\nbelieve that on us more than on any other class of thinkers, does it\ndepend whether the prevailing theology shall be upheld, impugned, or\ntransformed. The chief weapons of the defenders of the faith are forged\nin the schools of metaphysics. Locke and Butler, Reid, Stewart and Brown\nare theological authorities. And when theology is attacked, its\nmetaphysical buttresses have to be assailed as the very first thing. If\nthese are declared unsound, either it must fall, or it must change its\nfront. It is Natural Theology, more particularly, that is thus allied to\nmetaphysics; yet, not exclusively; for the defence of Revelation by\nmiracles involves at the outset a point of logic.\n\nNow I do not mean to say, that this is a purely factitious and\nill-grounded employment of the metaphysical sciences. I fully admit that\nthe later defences of theology, as well as the attacks, have been\nfurnished from psychology, logic, ethics, and ontology. The earliest\nbeliefs in religion, the greatest and strongest convictions, had little\nto do with any of these departments of speculation. But when simple\ntraditionary faith gave place to the questionings of the reason, the\nbasis of religion was transferred to the reason-built sciences; and\nmetaphysics came in for a large share in the decision.\n\n[METAPHYSICS AND THEOLOGY.]\n\nWhat I maintain is, that there is something factitious in the degree of\nprominence given to metaphysics in this great enterprise; that its\npretentions are excessive, its importance over-stated; and when most\nemployed for such a purpose, it is least to be trusted. Theological\npolemic is only in part conducted through science; and physical science\nshares equally with moral. The most serious shocks to the traditional\northodoxy have come from the physical sciences. The argument from Design\nhas no doubt a metaphysical or logical element--the estimate of the\ndegree of analogy between the universe and a piece of human workmanship;\nbut the argument itself needs a scientific survey of the entire\nphenomena of nature, both matter and mind. Our Bridgewater Treatises\nproceeded upon this view; they embraced the consideration of the whole\ncircle of the sciences, as bearing on the theological argument. The\nscheme was so far just and to the purpose; the obvious drawback to the\nvalue of the Treatises lay in their being special pleadings, backed by a\nfee of a thousand pounds to each writer for maintaining one side. If a\nsimilar fee had been given to nine equally able writers to represent the\nother side, the argument from design would have been far more\nsatisfactorily sifted than by the exclusively metaphysical criticism of\nKant.\n\nWhen theology is supported exclusively by such doctrines as--an\nindependent and immaterial soul, a special moral faculty, and what is\ncalled free-will,--the metaphysician is a person of importance in the\ncontest; he is powerful either to uphold or to subvert the fabric. But,\nif these were ever to constitute the chief stronghold of the faith, its\ntenure would not be very secure. It is only a metaphysician, however,\nthat believes or disbelieves in metaphysical grounds alone; such a man\nas Cousin, no doubt, rests his whole spiritual philosophy on this\nfoundation. But the great mass will either adhere to religion in spite\nof metaphysical difficulties, or else abandon it notwithstanding its\nmetaphysical evidences. An eminent man now departed said in my hearing,\nthat he was a believer in Christianity until he became acquainted with\ngeology, when, finding the first chapter of Genesis at variance with\ngeological doctrines, he applied to the Bible the rule _falsus in uno,\nfalsus in omnibus,_ and thenceforth abandoned his old belief. I never\nheard of any one that was so worked upon by a purely metaphysical\nargument.\n\nThe aspect of theological doctrine that has come most to the front of\nlate is the question of the Divine goodness, as shown in the plan of the\nuniverse. Speculations are divided between optimism and pessimism. How\nshall we decide between these extremes, or, if repudiating both, how\nshall we fix the mean? Is a metaphysician more especially qualified to\nfind out the truth? I hardly think so. I believe he could contribute,\nwith others, to such a solution as may be possible. He has, we shall\nsuppose, surveyed closely the compass of the human sensibilities, and is\nable to assign, with more than common precision, what things operate on\nthem favourably or unfavourably. So far good. Then, as a logician, he is\nmore expert at detecting bad inferences in regard to the form of\nreasoning; but whether certain allegations of fact are well or ill\nfounded, he may not be able to say, at least out of his own department.\nIf a mixed commission of ten were nominated to adjudicate upon this vast\nproblem, metaphysics might claim to be represented by two.\n\n[FILLING THE THEOLOGICAL VOID.]\n\nLeast of all, do I understand the claims made in behalf of this\ndepartment to supply the spiritual void in case the old theology is no\nlonger accredited. When one looks closely at the stream and tendency of\nthought, one sees a growing alliance and kinship between religion and\npoetry or art. There is, as we know, a dogmatic, precise, severe,\nlogical side of theology, by which creeds are constructed, religious\ntests imposed, and belief made a matter of legal compulsion. There is\nalso a sentimental, ideal, imaginative side that resists definition,\nthat refuses dogmatic prescription, and seeks only to satisfy spiritual\nneeds and emotions. Metaphysics may no doubt take a part in the dogmatic\nor doctrinal treatment, but it must qualify itself by biblical study,\nand become altogether theology. In the other aspect, metaphysics, as I\nconceive it, is unavailing; the poet is the proper medium for keeping up\nthe emotional side, under all transformations of doctrinal belief. But\nas conceived by others, metaphysics is philosophy and poetry in one, to\nwhich I can never agree. The combination of the two, as hitherto\nexhibited, has been made at the expense of both. The leading terms of\nphilosophy--reason, spirit, soul, the ideal, the infinite, the absolute,\nphenomenal truth, being, consciousness--are lubricated with emotion, and\nthrown together in ways that defy the understanding. The unintelligible,\nwhich ought to be the shame of philosophy, is made its glory.\n\nThese remarks prepare for the conclusion that I arrive at as to the\nscope of metaphysics with reference to the higher questions. That it has\nbearings upon these questions I allow; and those bearings are\nlegitimately within the range of metaphysical debates. But I make a wide\ndistinction between metaphysical discussion and theological discussion;\nand do not consider that they can be combined to advantage. In the great\nlatitude of free inquiry in the present day, theology is freely\ncanvassed, and societies might be properly devoted to that express\nobject; but I cannot see any benefit that would arise by a philosophical\nsociety undertaking, in addition to its own province, to raise the\nquestions belonging to theology. I am well aware that there is one\nsociety of very distinguished persons in the metropolis, calling itself\nmetaphysical, that freely ventures upon the perilous seas of theological\ndebate.[14] No doubt good comes from any exercise of the liberty of\ndiscussion, so long restrained in this region; yet, I can hardly suppose\nthat purely metaphysical, studies can thrive in such a connection. Many\nof the members must think far more of the theological issues than of the\ncultivation of mental and logical science; and a purely metaphysical\ndebate can seldom be pursued with profit under these conditions.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[POLEMICS IN GREECE.]\n\nI now pass to the POLEMICAL handling of the metaphysical subjects. We\nowe to the Greeks the study of philosophy through methodised debate; and\nthe state of scientific knowledge in the age of the early Athenian\nschools was favourable to that mode of treatment. The conversations of\nSocrates, the Dialogues of Plato, and the Topics of Aristotle, are the\nmonuments of Greek contentiousness, turned to account as a great\nrefinement in social intercourse, as a stimulus to individual thought,\nand a means of advancing at least the speculative departments of\nknowledge. Grote, both in his \"Plato,\" and in his \"Aristotle,\" while\ncopiously illustrating all these consequences, has laid extraordinary\nstress on still another aspect of the polemic of Socrates and Plato,\nthe aspect of _free-thought_, as against venerated tradition and the\nreceived commonplaces of society. The assertion of the right of private\njudgment in matters of doctrine and belief, was, according to Grote, the\ngreatest of all the fruits of the systematised negation begun by Zeno,\nand carried out in the \"Search Dialogues\" of Plato. In the \"Exposition\nDialogues\" it is wanting; and in the \"Topica,\" where Eristic is reduced\nto method and system by one of Aristotle's greatest logical\nachievements, the freethinker's wings are very much clipt; the execution\nof Socrates probably had to answer for that. It is to the Platonic\ndialogues that we look for the full grandeur of Grecian debate in all\nits phases. The Plato of Grote is the apotheosis of Negation; it is not\na philosophy so much as an epic; the theme--\"The Noble Wrath of the\nGreek Dissenter\".\n\nAt all times, there is much that has to be achieved by solitary\nthinking. Some definite shape must be given to our thoughts before we\ncan submit them to the operation of other minds; the greater the\noriginality, the longer must be the process of solitary elaboration.\nThe \"Principia\" was composed from first to last by recluse meditation;\nprobably the attempt to discuss or debate any parts of it would have\nonly fretted and paralysed the author's invention. Indeed, after an\nenormous strain of the constructive intellect, a man may be in no humour\nto have his work carped at, even to improve it. In the region of fact,\nin observation and experiment, there must be a mass of individual and\nunassisted exertion. The use of allies in this region is to check and\nconfirm the accuracy of the first observer.\n\nAgain, an inquirer, by dint of prolonged familiarity with a subject, may\nbe his own best critic; he may be better able to detect flaws than any\none he could call in. This is another way of stating the superiority of\na particular individual over all others in the same walk. Such a\nmonarchical position as removes a man alike from the rivalry and from\nthe sympathy of his fellows, is the exception; mutual criticism and\nmutual encouragement are the rule. The social stimulants are of avail in\nknowledge and in truth as well as everything else.\n\nA comparison of the state of speculation in the golden age of debate,\nwith the state of the sciences in the present day, both metaphysical and\nphysical, shows us clearly enough, what are the fields where polemic is\nmost profitable. I set aside the struggles of politics and theology, and\nlook to the scientific form of knowledge, which is, after all, the type\nof our highest certainty everywhere. Now, undoubtedly, it is in\nclassifying, generalising, defining, and in the so-called logical\nprocesses--induction and deduction--that a man can be least left to\nhimself. Until many men have gone over the same field of facts, a\nclassification, a definition, or an induction, cannot be held as safe\nand sound. In modern science, there are numerous matters that have\npassed through the fiery furnace of iterated criticism, seven times\npurified; but there are, attaching to every science, a number of things\nstill in the furnace. Most of all does this apply to the metaphysical or\nsubject sciences, where, according to the popular belief, nothing has\nyet passed finally out of the fiery trial. In psychology, in logic, in\neudaemonics, in sociology, in ethics, the facts are nearly all around\nour feet; the question is how to classify, define, generalise, express\nthem. This was the situation of Zeno, Socrates, and Plato, for which\nthey invoked the militant ardour of the mind. Man, they saw, is a\nfighting being; if fighting will do a thing, he will do it well.\n\n[MOST USEFUL CLASSES OF DEBATES.]\n\nIn conformity with this view, the foremost class of debates, and\ncertainly not the least profitable, are such as discuss the meanings of\nimportant terms. The genius of Socrates perceived that this was the\nbeginning of all valid knowledge, and, in seeing this, laid the\nfoundation of reasoned truth. I need not repeat the leading terms of\nmetaphysical philosophy; but you can at once understand the form of\nproceeding by such an instance as \"consciousness,\" debated so as to\nbring out the question whether, as Hamilton supposed, it is necessarily\ngrounded on knowledge.\n\nNext to the leading terms are the broader and more fundamental\ngeneralities: for example, the law of relativity; the laws of memory and\nits conditions, such as the intensity of the present consciousness;\nHamilton's inverse relationship of sensation and perception. These are\na few psychological instances. The value of a debate on any of these\nquestions depends entirely upon its resolving itself into an inductive\nsurvey of the facts, and such surveys are never without fruit.\n\nA debating society that includes logic in its sphere should cultivate\nthe methods of debate; setting an example to other societies and to\nmankind in general. The \"Topica\" of Aristotle shows an immensity of\npower expended on this object, doubtless without corresponding results.\nNevertheless the attempt, if resumed at the present day, with our\nclearer and wider views of logical method, would not be barren. This is\ntoo little thought of by us; and we may say that polemic, as an art, is\nstill immature. The best examples of procedure are to be found in the\nLaw Courts, some of whose methods might be borrowed in other debates.\nFor one thing, I think that each of the two leaders should provide the\nmembers beforehand with a synopsis of the leading arguments or positions\nto be set forth in the debate. This, I believe, should be insisted on\neverywhere, not even excepting the debates of Parliament.\n\nIt is the custom of debating societies to alternate the Debate and the\nEssay: a very important distinction, as it seems to me; and I will\nendeavour to indicate how it should be maintained. Frequently there is\nno substantial distinction observed; an essay is simply the opening of a\ndebate, and a debate the criticism of an essay. I should like to see the\ntwo carried out each on its own principle, as I shall now endeavour to\nexplain.\n\n[THE DEBATE: A FIGHT FOR MASTERY.]\n\nThe Debate is _the fight for mastery_ as between two sides. The\ncombatants strain their powers to say everything that can be said so\nas to shake the case of their opponents. The debate is a field-day,\na challenge to a trial of strength. Now, while I admit that the\nintellectual powers may be quickened to unusual perspicacity under the\nsound of the trumpet and the shock of arms, I also see in the operation\nmany perils and shortcomings, when the subject of contest is truth. In\na heated controversy, only the more glaring and prominent facts,\nconsiderations, doctrines, distinctions, can obtain a footing. Now truth\nis the still small voice; it subsists often upon delicate differences,\nunobtrusive instances, fine calculations. Whether or not man is a wholly\nselfish being, may be submitted to a contentious debate, because the\nfacts and appearances on both sides are broad and palpable; but whether\nall our actions are, in the last resort or final analysis,\nself-regarding, is almost too delicate for debate. Chalmers upholds, as\na thesis, the intrinsic misery of the vicious affections: there could\nnot be a finer topic of pure debate.\n\nMy conception of the Essay, on the other hand, is that it should\nrepresent _amicable co-operation_, with an eye to the truth. By it you\nshould rise from the lower or competitive, to the higher or communistic\nattitude. There may be a loss of energy, but there is a gain in the\nmanner of applying it. The essayist should set himself to ascertain the\ntruth upon a subject; he should not be anxious to make a case. The\nlisteners, in the same spirit, should welcome all his suggestions, help\nhim out where he is in difficulties, be indulgent to his failings,\nendeavour to see good in everything. If there be a real occasion for\ndebate, it should be purposely forborne and reserved. In propounding\nsubjects, the respective fitness for the debate and for the essay might\nbe taken into account.\n\n[CO-OPERATIVE DISCUSSION IN THE ESSAY.]\n\nWhen questions have been often debated without coming nearer to a\nconclusion, it should be regarded as a sign that they are too delicate\nand subtle for debate. A trial should then be made of the amicable or\nco-operative treatment represented by the Essay. The Freedom of the Will\nmight, I think, be adjusted by friendly accommodation, but not by force\nof contention. External Perception is beyond the province of debate.\nIt is fair and legitimate to try all problems by debate, in the first\ninstance, because the excitement quickens the intelligence, and leads to\nnew suggestions; but if the question involves an adjustment of various\nconsiderations and minute differences, the contending sides will be\ncontentious still.\n\nA society that really aims at the furtherance of knowledge, might test\nits operations by now and then preparing a report of progress; setting\nforth what problems had been debated, what themes elucidated, and with\nwhat results. It would be very refreshing to see a candid avowal that\nafter several attempts--both debate and essay--some leading topic of the\ndepartment remained exactly where it stood at the outset. After such a\nconfession, the Society might well resolve itself into a Committee of\nthe Whole House, to consider its ways, and indeed its entire position,\nwith a view to a new start on some more hopeful track.\n\nMy closing remark is, as to avoiding debates that are in their very\nnature interminable. It is easy to fix upon a few salient features that\nmake all the difference between a hopeful and a hopeless controversy.\nFor one thing, there is a certain intensity of emotion, interest, bias,\nor prejudice if you will, that can neither reason nor be reasoned with.\nOn the purely intellectual side, the disqualifying circumstances are\ncomplexity and vagueness. If a topic necessarily hauls in numerous other\ntopics of difficulty, the essay may do something for it, but not the\ndebate. Worst of all is the presence of several large, ill-defined, or\nunsettled terms, of which there are still plenty in our department. A\nnot unfrequent case is a combination of the several defects each perhaps\nin a small degree. A tinge of predilection or party, a double or triple\ncomplication of doctrines, and one or two hazy terms, will make a debate\nthat is pretty sure to end as it began. Thus it is that a question,\nplausible to appearance, may contain within it capacities of\nmisunderstanding, cross-purposes, and pointless issues, sufficient to\noccupy the long night of Pandemonium, or beguile the journey to the\nnearest fixed star.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 12: An Address, delivered on the 28th of March, 1877, to the\nEdinburgh University Philosophical Society. CONTEMPORARY REVIEW, April,\n1877.]\n\n[Footnote 13: This very plausible utterance begs every question. There\nwould be some difficulty in condensing an equal amount of fallacy,\nconfusion of thought, in so few words.\n\nIn the first place, it assumes that the three requisites--health,\nfreedom from debt, and a good conscience--are matters of easy and\ngeneral attainment; that they are, in fact, the rule among human beings.\nIs this really so?\n\nTake Health, a word of very wide import. There is a certain small\namount, such as is marked by being out of the physician's hands, but\nimplying very little of the energy needed for the labours and the\nenjoyment of life. There is a high and resplendent degree that renders\ntoil easy, and responds to the commonest stimulants, so that enjoyment\ncannot be quashed without unusually unfavourable circumstances. The\nfirst kind is widely diffused; the second is very rare, except in the\nearlier portion of life. Most men and women, as they pass middle age,\nlose the elasticity required for easy and spontaneous enjoyment, and,\neven if they keep the appearance of health, have too little animal\nspirits for enjoyment under cheap and ordinary excitements.\n\nBut there is more to be said. In order to obtain, and to retain, health,\nfreedom from debt, and a good conscience, there are pre-supposed very\nconsiderable advantages. We cannot continue healthy and out of debt,\nunless we have a fair start in life, that is, unless we have a tolerable\nprovision to begin with; a circumstance that the maxim keeps out of\nsight.\n\nYet farther. The conditions named are of themselves mere negatives; they\nimply simply the absence of certain decided causes of\nunhappiness--ill-health, poverty, and bad conduct. There is a farther\nstealthy assumption, namely, that the individual is placed in a\nsituation otherwise conducive to happiness. Health, absence of debt, and\na good conscience will not make happiness, under severe or ungenial\ntoil, irritation, ill-usage, affliction, sorrow,--- even if they could\nbe long maintained under such circumstances. Nor even, in the case of\nexemption from the worst ills of life, can we be happy without some\npositive agreeables--family, general society, amusements, and\ngratifications. There is a certain degree of loneliness, seclusion,\ndulness, that destroys happiness without sapping health, or miming us\ninto debt and vice.\n\nThe maxim, as expressed, professes to aim at happiness, but it more\nproperly belongs to duty. If we fail in the conditions mentioned, we run\nthe risk rather of neglecting our duties than of missing our pleasures.\nIt is not every form of ill-health that makes us miserable; and we may\nbecome seared to debt and ill-conduct, so as to suffer only the\nincidental misery of being dunned, which many can take with great\ncomposure.\n\nThe definition of happiness by Paley is vague and incomplete; but it\ndoes not omit the positive conditions. After health, Paley enumerates\nthe exercise of the affections and some engaging occupation or pursuit;\nboth which are highly relevant to the attainment of happiness. Indeed\nwith an exemption from cares, and a considerable share of the positive\ngratifications, we can enjoy life on a very slender stock of health;\notherwise, where should we be in the inevitable decline that age brings\nwith it?]\n\n[Footnote 14: This Society has since been dissolved.]\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nVI.\n\nTHE UNIVERSITY IDEAL--PAST AND PRESENT.[15]\n\n\nGENTLEMEN,\n\nBy your flattering estimate of my services, I have been unexpectedly\nsummoned from retirement, to assume the honours and the duties of the\npurple, and to occupy the most historically important office in the\nUniversities of Europe.\n\nThe present demands upon the Rectorship somewhat resemble what we are\ntold of the Homeric chief, who, in company with his Council or Senate,\nthe _Boule_, and the Popular Assembly, or _Agora_, made up the political\nconstitution of the tribe. The functions of the chief, it is said, were\nto supply wise counsel to the _Boule_ (as we might call our Court), and\nunctuous eloquence to the _Agora_. The second of these requirements is\nwhat weighs upon me at the present moment.\n\nWhatever may have been the practice of my predecessors, generally\nstrangers to you, it would be altogether unbecoming in me to travel out\nof our University life, for the materials of an Address. My remarks then\nwill principally bear on the UNIVERSITY IDEAL.\n\n[THE HIGHER TEACHING IN GREECE.]\n\nTo the Greeks we are indebted for the earliest germ of the University.\nIt was with them chiefly that education took that great leap, the\ngreatest ever made, from the traditional teaching of the home, the shop,\nthe social surroundings, to schoolmaster teaching properly so called.\nNowadays, we, schoolmasters, think so much of ourselves, that we do not\nmake full allowance for that other teaching, which was, for unknown\nages, the only teaching of mankind. The Greeks were the first to\nintroduce, not perhaps the primary schoolmaster, for the R's, but\ncertainly the secondary or higher schoolmaster, known as Rhetorician or\nSophist, who taught the higher professions; while their Philosophers or\nwise men, introduced a kind of knowledge that gave scope to the\nintellectual faculties, with or without professional applications; the\nvery idea of our Faculty of Arts.\n\nSo self-asserting were these new-born teachers of the Sophist class,\nthat Plato thought it necessary to recall attention to the good old\nperennial source of instruction, the home, the trade, and the society.\nHe pointed out that the pretenders to teach virtue by moral lecturing,\nwere as yet completely outrivalled by the influence of the family and\nthe social pressure of the community. In like manner, the arts of life\nwere all originally handed down by apprenticeship and imitation. The\ngreatest statesmen and generals of early times had simply the education\nof the actual work. Philip of Macedon could have had no other teaching;\nhis greater son was the first of the line to receive what we may call\na liberal, or a general education, under the educator of all Europe.\n\n[LOGIC IN THE MIDDLE AGES.]\n\nTHE MIDDLE AGE AND BOETHIUS.\n\nI must skip eight centuries, to introduce the man that linked the\nancient and the modern world, and was almost the sole luminary in the\nwest during the dark ages, namely, Boethius, minister of the Gothic\nEmperor Theodoric. As much of Aristotle as was known between the 6th and\nthe 11th centuries was handed down by him. During that time, only the\nlogical treatises existed among the Latins; and of these the best parts\nwere neglected. Historical importance attaches to a small circle of them\nknown as the Old Logic (_vectus logica_), which were the pabulum of\nabstract thought for five dreary centuries. These consisted of the two\ntreatises or chapters of Aristotle called the \"Categories,\" and the \"De\nInterpretatione,\" or the Theory of Propositions; and of a book of\nPorphyry the Neo-Platonist, entitled 'Introduction' (_Isagoge_), and\ntreating of the so-called Five Predicables. A hundred average pages\nwould include them all; and three weeks would suffice to master them.\n\nBoethius, however, did much more than hand on these works to the\nmediaeval students; he translated the whole of Aristotle's logical\nwritings (the Organon), but the others were seldom taken up. It was he\ntoo that handled the question of Universals in his first Dialogue on\nPorphyry, and sowed the seed that was not to germinate till four\ncenturies afterwards, but which, when the time came, was to bear fruit\nin no measured amount. And Boethius is the name associated with the\nscheme of higher education that preceded the University teaching, called\nthe _quadrivium_, or quadruple group of subjects, namely, Arithmetic,\nGeometry, Music and Astronomy. This, together with the _trivium_, or\npreparatory group of three subjects--Grammar, Rhetoric, and\nLogic--constituted what was known as the _seven liberal arts_; but, in\nthe darkest ages, the quadrivium was almost lost sight of, and few went\nbeyond the trivium.\n\n\nEVE OF THE UNIVERSITY.\n\nIn the 7th century, the era of deepest intellectual gloom, philosophy\nwas at an entire stand-still. Light arises with the 8th, when we are\nintroduced to the Cathedral and Cloister Schools of Charlemagne; and the\n9th saw these schools fully established, and an educational reform\ncompleted that was to be productive of lasting good results. But the\nrange of instruction was still narrow, scarcely proceeding beyond the\nOld Logic, and the teachers were, as formerly, the Monks. The 11th\ncentury is really the period of dawn. The East was now opened up through\nthe Crusades, and there was frequent intercourse with the learned\nSaracens of Spain; and thus there were brought into the West the whole\nof Aristotle's works, with Arabic commentaries, chiefly in Latin\ntranslations. The effervescence was prodigious and alarming. The schools\nwere reinforced by a higher class of teachers, Lay as well as Clerical;\na marked advance was made in Logic and Dialectic; and the great\ncontroversy of Realism _versus_ Nominalism, which had found its birth in\nthe previous century, raged with extraordinary vigour. We are now on the\neve of the founding of the Universities; Bologna, indeed, being already\nin existence.\n\n[TWO CLASSES OF MEDIEVAL CHURCHMEN.]\n\nSEPARATION OF PHILOSOPHY FROM THEOLOGY.\n\nThe University proper, however, can hardly be dated earlier than the\n12th century; and the important particulars in its first constitution\nare these:--First, the separation of Philosophy from Theology. To\nexpound this, would be to give a chapter of mediaeval history. Suffice\nit to say that Aristotle and the awakening intellect of the 11th century\nwere the main causes of it. Two classes of minds at this time divided\nthe Church--the pious, devout believers (such as St. Bernard), who\nneeded no reasons for their faith, and the polemic speculative divines\n(such as Abaelard), who wished to make Theology rational. It was an age,\ntoo, of stirring political events; the crusading spirit was abroad, and\nfound a certain gratification even in the war of words. The nature of\nUniversals was eagerly debated; but when this controversy came into\ncollision with such leading theological doctrines as the Trinity and\nPredestination, it was no longer possible for Philosophy and Theology to\nremain conjoined.\n\nA separation was effected, and determined the leading feature of the\nUniversity system. The foundation was Philosophy, and the fundamental\nFaculty the Faculty of Arts. Bologna, indeed, was eminent for Law or\nJurisprudence, and this celebrity it retained for ages; but the\nUniversity of Paris, which is the prototype of our Scottish\nUniversities, as of so many others, taught nothing but Philosophy--in\nother words, had no Faculty but Arts--for many years. Neither Theology,\nMedicine, nor Law had existence there till the 13th century.\n\nSecond, the system of conferring Degrees, after appropriate trials.\nThese were at first simply a licence to teach. They acquired their\ncommanding importance through the action of Pope Nicholas I, who gave to\nthe graduates of the University of Paris, the power of teaching\neverywhere, a power that our own countrymen were the foremost to turn to\naccount.\n\n\nTHE OFFICE OF RECTOR.\n\nThird, the Organisation of the primitive University. Europe was\nunsettled; even in the capitals, the civil power was often unhinged.\nWherever multitudes came together, there was manifested a spirit of\nturbulence. The Universities often exemplified this fact; and it was\nfound necessary to establish a government within themselves. The basis\nwas popular; but, while, in Paris, only the teaching body was\nincorporated, in Bologna, the students had a voice. They elected the\nRector, and his jurisdiction was very great indeed, and much more\nimportant than speechifying to his constituents. His Court had the power\nof internal regulation, with both a civil and criminal jurisdiction. The\nScotch Universities, on this point, followed Bologna; and that fact is\nthe remote cause of this day's meeting.\n\n[SCOTCHMEN ABROAD.]\n\nTHE UNIVERSITIES OF SCOTLAND FOUNDED.\n\nSo started the University. The idea took; and in three centuries, many\nof the leading towns in Italy, France, the German Empire, had their\nUniversities; in England arose Oxford and Cambridge; the model was Paris\nor Bologna.\n\nScotland did not at first enter the race of University-founding, but\nworked on the plan of the cuckoo, by laying its eggs in the nests of\nothers. For two centuries, Scotchmen were almost shut out of England;\nand so could not make for themselves a career in Oxford and Cambridge,\nas in later times. They had, however, at home, good grammar schools,\nwhere they were grounded in Latin. They perambulated Europe, and were\nfamiliar figures in the great University towns, and especially Paris.\nFrom their disputatious and metaphysical aptitude, they worked their\nupward way--\n\n    And gladly would they learn and gladly teach.\n\nAt length, the nation did take up the work in good earnest. In 1411, was\nfounded the first of the St. Andrews' Colleges; 1451 is the date of\nGlasgow; 1494, King's College, Aberdeen. These are the pre-Reformation\ncolleges; but for the Reformation, we might not have had any other.\nTheir founders were ecclesiastics; their constitution and ceremonial\nwere ecclesiastical. They were intended, no doubt, to keep the Scotch\nstudents at home. They were also expected to serve as bulwarks to the\nChurch against the rising heretics of the times. In this they were a\ndisappointment; the first-begotten of them became the cradle of the\nReformation.\n\nIn these our three eldest foundations, we are to seek the primitive\nconstitution and the teaching system of our Universities. In essentials,\nthey were the same; only between the dates of Glasgow and Old Aberdeen\noccurred two great events. One was the taking of Constantinople, which\nspread the Greek scholars with their treasures over Europe. The other\nwas the progress of printing. In 1451, when Glasgow commenced, there was\nno printed text-book. In 1494, when King's College began, the ancient\nclassics had been largely printed; the early editions of Aristotle in\nour Library, show the date of 1486.\n\n\nFIRST PERIOD--THE TEACHING BODY.\n\nOur Universities have three well-marked periods; the first anterior to\nthe Reformation; the second from the Reformation to the beginning of\nlast century; the third, the last and present centuries. Confining\nourselves still to the Faculty of Arts, the features of the\nPre-Reformation University were these:--\n\nFirst, as regards the teaching Body. The quadriennial Arts' course was\nconducted by so-called Regents, who each carried the same students\nthrough all the four years, thus taking upon himself the burden of all\nthe sciences--a walking Encyclopaedia. The system was in full force, in\nspite of attempts to change it, during both the first and the second\nperiods. You, the students of Arts, at the present day, encountering in\nyour four years, seven faces, seven voices, seven repositories of\nknowledge, need an effort to understand how your predecessors could be\ncheerful and happy, confined all through to one personality; sometimes\njuvenile, sometimes senile, often feeble at his best.\n\n[ARISTOTLE THE BASIS OF THE TEACHING.]\n\nTHE SUBJECTS TAUGHT.\n\nNext, as regards the Subjects taught. To know these you have simply to\nknow what are the writings of Aristotle. The little work on him by Sir\nAlexander Grant supplies the needful information. The records of the\nGlasgow University furnish the curriculum of Arts soon after its\nfoundation. The subjects are laid out in two heads--Logic and\nPhilosophy. The Logic comprised first the three Treatises of the Old\nLogic; to these were now added the whole of the works making up\nAristotle's Organon. This brought in the Syllogism, and allied matters.\nThere was also a selection from the work known as the _Topics_, not now\nincluded in Logical teaching, yet one of the most remarkable and\ndistinctive of Aristotle's writings. It is a highly laboured account of\nthe whole art of Disputation, laid out under his scheme of the\nPredicables. The selection fell chiefly on two books--the second,\ncomprising what Aristotle had to say on Induction, and the sixth, on\nDefinition; together with the \"Logical Captions\" or Fallacies.\nDisputation was one of the products of the Greek mind; and Aristotle was\nits prophet.\n\nNow for Philosophy. This comprised nearly the whole of Aristotle's\nPhysical treatises--his very worst side--together with his Metaphysics,\nsome parts of which are hardly distinguishable from the Physics. Next\nwas the very difficult treatise--_De Anima_, on the mind, or Soul--and\nsome allied Psychological treatises, as that on Memory. Such was the\nordinary and sufficing curriculum. It was allowed to be varied with a\npart of the Ethics; but in this age we do not find the Politics; and the\nRhetoric is never mentioned. So also, the really valuable Biological\nworks of Aristotle, including his book on Animals, appear to have been\nneglected.\n\nCertain portions of Mathematics always found a place in the curriculum.\nLikewise, some work on Astronomy, which was one of the quadrivium\nsubjects.\n\nAll this was given in Latin. Greek was not then known (it was introduced\ninto Scotland, in 1534). No classical Latin author is given; the\neducation in Latin was finished at the Grammar School.\n\n[TEACHING EXCLUSIVELY IN TEXTS.]\n\nMANNER OF TEACHING.\n\nSuch was the Arts' Faculty of the 15th century; a dreary, single-manned,\nAristotelian quadriennium. The position is not completely before us,\ntill we understand farther the manner of working.\n\nThe pupils could not, as a rule, possess the text of Aristotle. The\nteacher read and expounded the text for them; but a very large portion\nof the time was always occupied in dictating, or \"diting,\" notes, which\nthe pupils were examined upon, _viva voce_; their best plan usually\nbeing to get them by heart, as any one might ask them to repeat passages\nliterally; while perhaps few could examine well upon the meaning. The\nnotes would be selections and abridgments from Aristotle, with the\ncomments of modern writers. The \"diting\" system was often complained of\nas waste of time, but was not discontinued till the third, or present,\nUniversity dynasty, and not entirely then, as many of us know.\n\nThe teaching was thus exclusively _Text_ teaching. The teacher had\nlittle or nothing to say for himself (at least in the earliest period).\nHe was even restricted in the remarks he might make by way of\ncommentary. He was as nearly as possible a machine.\n\nBut lastly, to complete the view of the first period, we must add the\npractice of Disputation, of which we shall have a better idea from the\nrecords of the next period. This practice was co-eval with the\nUniversities; it was the single mode of stimulating the thought of the\nindividual student; the chief antidote to the mechanical teaching by\nText-books and dictation.\n\nThe pre-Reformation period of Aberdeen University was little more than\nsixty years. For a portion of those years it attained celebrity. In\n1541, the town was honoured by a visit from James V., and the University\ncontributed to his entertainment. The somewhat penny-a-lining account\nis, that there were exercises and disputations in Greek, Latin, and\nother languages! The official records, however, show that the College at\nthat very time had sunk into a convent and conventual school.\n\n\nSECOND PERIOD--THE REFORMATION.\n\nThe Reformation introduced the second period, and made important\nchanges. First of all, in the great convulsion of European thought, the\nascendancy of Aristotle was shaken. It is enough to mention two\nincidents in the downfall of the mighty Stagyrite. One was the attack on\nhim by the renowned Peter Rainus, in the University of Paris. Our\ncountryman, Andrew Melville, attended Ramus's Lectures, and became the\nmeans of introducing his system into Scotland. The other incident is\nstill more notable. The Reformers had to consider their attitude towards\nAristotle. At first their opinion was condemnatory. Luther regarded him\nas a very devil; he was \"a godless bulwark of the Papists\". Melancthon\nwas also hostile; but he soon perceived that Theology would crumble into\nfanatical dissolution without the co-operation of some philosophy. As\nyet there was nothing to fall back upon except the pagan systems. Of\nthese, Melancthon was obliged to confess that Aristotle was the least\nobjectionable, and was, moreover, in possession. The plan, therefore,\nwas to accept him as a basis, and fence him round with orthodox\nemendations. This done, Aristotle, no longer despotic, but as a limited\nconstitutional monarch, had his reign prolonged a century and a half.\n\n[NEW SUBJECTS INTRODUCED BY MELVILLE.]\n\nTHE MODIFIED CURRICULUM--ANDREW MELVILLE.\n\nThe first thing, after the Reformation in Scotland, was to purge the\nUniversities of the inflexible adherents of the old faith. Then came\nthe question of amending the Curriculum, not simply with a view to\nProtestantism, but for the sake of an enlightened teaching. The right\nman appeared at the right moment. In 1574, Andrew Melville, then in\nGeneva, received pressing invitations to come home and take part in the\nneeded reforms. He was immediately made Principal of Glasgow University,\nat that time in a state of utter collapse and ruin. He had matured his\nplans, after consultation with George Buchanan, and they were worthy of\na great reformer. He sketched a curriculum, substantially the curriculum\nof the second University period. The modifications upon the almost\nexclusive Aristotelianism of the first period, were significant. The\nGreek language was introduced, and Greek classical authors read. The\nreading in the Roman classics was extended. A text-book on Rhetoric\naccompanied the classical readings. The dialectics of Ramus made the\nprelude to Logic, instead of the three treatises of the old Logic. The\nMathematics included Euclid. Geography and Cosmography were taken up.\nThen came a course of Moral Philosophy on an enlarged basis. With the\nEthics and Politics of Aristotle, were combined Cicero's Ethical works\nand certain Dialogues of Plato. Finally, in the Physics, Melville still\nused Aristotle, but along with a more modern treatise. He also gave a\nview of Universal History and Chronology.\n\nThis curriculum, which Melville took upon himself to teach, in order to\ntrain future teachers, was the point of departure of the courses in all\nthe Universities during the second period. With variations of time and\nplace, the Arts' course may be described as made up of the Greek and\nLatin classics, with Rhetoric, Logic, and Dialectics, Moral Philosophy,\nor Ethics, Mathematics, Physics, and Astronomy. The little text-book of\nRhetoric, by Talon or Talaeus, was made up of notes from the Lectures of\nPeter Ramus, and used in all our Colleges till superseded by the better\ncompilation of the Dutch scholar, Gerard John Voss.\n\nMelville had to contend with many opponents, among them the sticklers\nfor the infallibility of the Stagyrite. Like the German Reformers, he\nhad accepted Aristotelianism as a basis, with a similar process of\nreconciliation. So it was that Aristotle and Calvin were brought to kiss\neach other.\n\n[MELVILLE DEFEATED ON THE REGENTING.]\n\nATTEMPT TO ABOLISH REGENTING.\n\nMelville's next proposal was all too revolutionary. It consisted in\nrestricting the Regents each to a special group of subjects; in fact,\nanticipating our modern professoriate. He actually set up this plan in\nGlasgow: one Regent took Greek and Latin; another, his nephew, James\nMelville, took Mathematics, Logic, and Moral Philosophy; a third,\nPhysics and Astronomy. The system went on, in appearance at least, for\nfifty years; it is only in 1642, that we find the Regents given without\na specific designation. Why it should have gone on so long, and been\nthen dropt, we are not informed. Melville's influence started it in the\nother Universities, but it was defeated in every one from the very\noutset. After six years at Glasgow, he went to St. Andrew's as Principal\nand Professor of Divinity, and tried there the same reforms, but the\nresistance was too great. In spite of a public enactment, the division\nof labour among the Regents was never carried out. Yet such was\nMelville's authority, that the same enactment was extended to King's\nCollege, in a scheme having a remarkable history--the so-called New\nFoundation of Aberdeen University, promulgated in a Royal Charter of\nabout the year 1581. The Earl Marischal was a chief promoter of the plan\nof reform comprised in this charter. The division of labour among the\nRegents was most expressly enjoined. The plan fell through; and there\nwas a legal dispute fifty years afterwards as to whether it had ever any\nlegal validity. Charles I. was made to express indignation at the idea\nof reducing the University to a school!\n\nWe now approach the foundation of Marischal College. The Earl Marischal\nmay have been actuated by the failure of his attempt to reform King's\nCollege. At all events, his mind was made up to follow Melville in\nassigning separate subjects to his Regents. The Charter is explicit on\nthis head. Yet in spite of the Charter and in spite of his own presence,\nthe intention was thwarted; the old Regenting lasted 160 years.\n\n\nARISTOTELIAN PHYSICS TOO LONG MAINTAINED.\n\nStill the Curriculum reform was gained. There was, indeed, one great\nmiss. The year before Marischal College was founded, Galileo had\npublished his work on Mechanics, which, taken with what had been\naccomplished by Archimedes and others, laid the foundations of our\nmodern Physics. Copernicus had already published his work on the\nHeavens. It was now time that the Aristotelian Physics should be clean\nswept away. In this whole department, Aristotle had made a reign of\nconfusion; he had thrown the subject back, being himself off the rails\nfrom first to last. Had there been in Scotland an adviser in this\ndepartment, like Melville in general literature, or like Napier of\nMerchiston in pure mathematics, one fourth of the college teaching might\nhave been reclaimed from utter waste, and a healthy tone of thinking\ndiffused through the remainder.\n\nA curious fascination always attached to the study of Astronomy, even\nwhen there was not much to be said, apart from the unsatisfactory\ndisquisitions of Aristotle. A little book, entitled \"_Sacrobosco_ on the\nSphere,\" containing little more than what we should now teach to boys\nand girls, along with the Globes, was a University text-book throughout\nEurope for centuries. I was informed by a late King's College professor\nthat the Use of the Globes was, within his memory, taught in the\nMagistrand Class. This would be simply what is termed a \"survival\".\n\n[GRADUATION BY MEANS OF DISPUTES ON THESIS.]\n\nSYSTEM OF DISPUTATION.\n\nNow as to the mode of instruction. There were _viva voce_ examinations\nupon the notes, such as we can imagine. But the stress was laid on\nDisputations and Declamations in various forms. Besides disputing and\ndeclaiming on the regular class work before the Regent, we find that,\nin Edinburgh, and I suppose elsewhere, the classes were divided into\ncompanies, who met apart, and conferred and debated among themselves\ndaily. The students were occupied, altogether, six hours a day. Then the\nhigher classes were frequently pitched against each other. This was a\nfavourite occupation on Saturdays. The doctrines espoused by the leading\nstudents became their nicknames. The pass for Graduation consisted in\nthe _propugning_ or _impugning_ of questions by each candidate in turn.\nAn elaborate Thesis was drawn up by the Regent, giving the heads of his\nphilosophy course; this was accepted by the candidates, signed by them,\nand printed at their expense. Then on the day of trial, at a long\nsitting, each candidate stood up and propunged or impunged a portion of\nthe Thesis; all were heard in turn; and on the result the Degree was\nconferred. A good many of these Theses are preserved in our Library;\nsome of them are very long--a hundred pages of close type; they are our\nbest clue to the teaching of the period. We can see how far Aristotle\nwas qualified by modern views.\n\n\nREGENTING DOOMED.\n\nI said there might have been times when the students never had the\nrelief of a second face all the four years. The exceptions are of\nimportance. First, as regards Marischal College. Within a few years of\nthe foundation, Dr. Duncan Liddell founded the Mathematical Chair, and\nthus withdrew from the Regents the subject that most of all needed a\nspecialist; a succession of very able mathematicians sat in this chair.\nKing's College had not the same good fortune. From its foundation it\npossessed a separate functionary, the Humanist or Grammarian; but he had\nalso, till 1753, to act as Rector of the Grammar School. Edinburgh\nobtained from an early date a Mathematical chair, occupied by men of\ncelebrity. There was no other innovation till near the end of the 17th\ncentury, when Greek was isolated both in Edinburgh and in Marischal\nCollege; but the end of Regenting was then near.\n\nThe old system, however, had some curious writhings. During the troubled\n17th century, University reform could not command persistent attention.\nBut after the 1688-Revolution, opinions were strongly expressed in\nfavour of the Melville system. The obvious argument was urged, that, by\ndivision of labour each man would be able to master a special subject,\nand do it justice in teaching. Yet, it was replied, that, by the\ncontinued intercourse, the master knew better the humours, inclinations,\nand talents of their scholars. To which the answer was--the humours and\ninclinations of scholars are not so deeply hid but that in a few weeks\nthey appear. Moreover, it was said, the students are more respectful to\na Master while he is new to them.\n\nThe final division of subjects took place in Edinburgh, in 1708; in\nGlasgow, in 1727; in St. Andrews, in 1747. In Marischal College, the\nchange was made by a minute of 11th Jan., 1753; but, whether from\nignorance, or from want of grace, the Senatus did not record its\nsatisfaction at having, after a lapse of five generations, fulfilled the\nwishes of the pious founder. In King's College, the old system lasted\ntill 1798.\n\nThis closes the second age of the Universities, and introduces the third\nage, the age of the Professoriate, of Lecturing instead of Text-books,\nthe end of Disputation, and the use of the English Language. It was now,\nand not till now, that the Scottish Universities stood forth, in several\nleading departments of knowledge, as the teachers of the world.\n\n[AGE OF THE PROFESSORIATE.]\n\nTHE UNIVERSITIES AND THE POLITICAL REVOLUTIONS.\n\nThe second age of the Universities was Scotland's most trying time. In a\nhundred and thirty years, the country had passed through four revolutions\nand counter-revolutions; every one of which told upon the Universities.\nThe victorious party imposed its test upon the University teacher, and\ndrove out recusants. You must all know something of the purging of the\nUniversity and the Ministry of Aberdeen by the Covenanting General\nAssembly of 1640. These deposed Aberdeen doctors may have had too strong\nleanings to episcopacy in the Church and to absolutism in the State, but\nthey were not Vicars of Bray. The first half of the century was adorned\nby a band of scholars, who have gained renown by their cultivation of\nLatin poetry; a little oasis in the desert of Aristotelian Dialectics.\nIt would be needless and ungracious to enquire whether this was the best\nthing that could have been done for the generation of Bishop Patrick\nForbes.\n\nYour reading in the History of Scotland will thus bring you face to face\nwith the great powers that contended for the mastery from 1560: the\nMonarchy, always striving to be absolute; the Church, whose position\nmade it the advocate of popular freedom; the Universities, fluctuating\nas regards political liberty, but standing up for intellectual liberty.\nIn the 17th century the Church ruled the Universities; in the 18th, it\nmay be said, that the Universities returned the compliment.\n\n[PROFESSIONAL TEACHING BY APPRENTICESHIP]\n\nUNIVERSITIES NOT ESSENTIAL FOR PROFESSIONS.\n\nEnough for the past. A word or two on the present. What is now the need\nfor a University system, and what must the system be to answer that\nneed? Many things are altered since the 12th century.\n\nFirst, then, Universities, as I understand them, are not absolutely\nessential to the teaching of professions. Let me make an extreme\nsupposition. A great naval commander, like Nelson, is sent on board\nship, at eleven or twelve; his previous knowledge, or general training,\nis what you may suppose for that age. It is in the course of actual\nservice, and in no other way, that he acquires his professional fitness\nfor commanding fleets. Is this right or is it wrong? Perhaps it is\nwrong, but it has gone on so for a long time. Well, why may not a\npreacher be formed on the same plan? John Wesley was not a greater man\nin preaching, than Nelson in seamanship. Take, then, a youth of thirteen\nfrom the school. Apprentice him to the minister of a parish. Let him\nmake at once preparations for clerical work. Let him store his memory\nwith sermons, let him make abstracts of Divinity systems; master the\nbest exegetical commentators. Then, in a year or two, he would begin to\ncatechise the young, to give addresses in the way of exposition,\nexhortation, encouragement, and rebuke. Practice would bring facility.\nMight not, I say; seven years of the actual work, in the susceptible\nperiod of life, make a preacher of no mean power, without the Grammar\nSchool, without the Arts' Classes, without the Divinity Hall?\n\nWhat then do we gain by taking such a roundabout approach to our\nprofessional work? The answer is twofold.\n\nFirst, as regards the profession itself. Nearly every skilled\noccupation, in our time, involves principles and facts that have been\ninvestigated, and are taught, outside the profession; to the medical man\nare given courses of Chemistry, Physiology, and so on. Hence to be\ncompletely equipped for your professional work, you must repair to the\nteachers of those tributary departments of knowledge. The requirement,\nhowever, is not absolute; it admits of being evaded. Your professional\nteachers ought to master these outside subjects, and give you just as\nmuch of them as you need, and no more; which would be an obvious economy\nof your valuable time.\n\nThus, I apprehend, the strictly professional uses of general knowledge\nfail to justify the Grammar School and the Arts' curriculum. Something,\nindeed, may still be said for the higher grades of professional\nexcellence, and for introducing improved methods into the practice of\nthe several crafts; for which wider outside studies lend their aid.\nThis, however, is not enough; inventors are the exception. In fact, the\nground must be widened, and include, secondly, _the life beyond the\nprofession_. We are citizens of a self-governed country; members of\nvarious smaller societies; heads, or members of families. We have,\nmoreover, to carve out recreation and enjoyment as the alternative and\nthe reward of our professional toil. Now the entire tone and character\nof this life outside the profession, is profoundly dependent on the\ncompass of our early studies. He that leaves the school for the shop at\nthirteen, is on one platform. He that spends the years from thirteen to\ntwenty in acquiring general knowledge, is on a totally different\nplatform; he is, in the best sense, an aristocrat. Those that begin work\nat thirteen, and those that are born not to work at all, are alike his\ninferiors. He should be able to spread light all around. He it is that\nmay stand forth before the world as the model man.\n\n[THE GRADUATE AS SUCH.]\n\nTHE IDEAL GRADUATE.\n\nAll this supposes that you realise the position; that you fill up the\nmeasure of the opportunities; that you keep in view at once the\nProfessional life, the Citizen life, and the life of Intellectual\ntastes. The mere professional man, however prosperous, cannot be a power\nin society, as the Arts' graduate may become. His leisure occupations\nare all of a lower stamp. He does not participate in the march of\nknowledge. He must be aware of his incompetence to judge for himself in\nthe greater questions of our destiny; his part is to be a follower, and\nnot a leader.\n\nIt is not, then, the name of graduate that will do all this. It is not a\nscrape pass; it is not decent mediocrity with a languid interest. It is\na fair and even attention throughout, supplemented by auxiliaries to the\nclass work. It is such a hold of the leading subjects, such a mastery of\nthe various alphabets, as will make future references intelligible, and\na continuation of the study possible.\n\nOur curriculum is one of the completest in the country, or perhaps\nanywhere. By the happy thought of the Senatus of Marischal College, in\n1753, you have a fundamental class (Natural History) not existing in the\nother colleges. You have a fair representation of the three great lines\nof science--the Abstract, the Experimental, and the Classifying. When it\nis a general education that you are thinking of, every scheme of option\nis imperfect that does not provide for such three-sided cultivation of\nour reasoning powers. A larger quantity of one will no more serve for\nthe absence of the rest than a double covering of one part of the body,\nwill enable another part to be left bare.\n\n\nVOLUNTARY EXTENSION OF THE BASIS.\n\nYour time in the Arts' curriculum is not entirely used up by the\nclasses. You can make up for deficiences in the course, when once you\nhave formed your ideal of completeness. For a year, or two after\ngraduating, while still rejoicing in youthful freshness, you can be\nwidening your foundations. The thing then is, to possess a good scheme\nand to abide by it. Now, making every allowance for the variation of\ntastes and of circumstances, and looking solely to what is desirable\nfor a citizen and a man, it is impossible to refuse the claims of\nthe department of Historical and Social study. One or two good\nrepresentative historical periods might be thoroughly mastered in\nconjunction with the best theoretical compends of Social Philosophy.\n\n[THE WELL-INSTRUCTED MAN.]\n\nFarther, the ideal graduate, who is to guide and not follow opinion,\nshould be well versed in all the bearings of the Spiritual Philosophy of\nthe time. The subject branches out into wide regions, but not wider than\nyou should be capable of following it. This is not a professional study\nmerely; it is the study of a well-instructed man.\n\nOnce more. A share of attention should be bestowed early on the higher\nLiterature of the Imagination. As, in after life, poetry and elegant\ncomposition are to be counted on as a pleasure and solace, they should\nbe taken up at first as a study. The critical examination of styles, and\nof authors, which forms an admirable basis of a student's society,\nshould be a work of study and research. The advantages will be many and\nlasting. To conceive the exact scope and functions of the Imagination in\nart, in science, in religion, and everywhere, will repay the trouble.\n\n\nTHE ARTS' GRADUATE IN LITERATURE.\n\nEver since I remember, I have been accustomed to hear of the superiority\nof the Arts' graduate, in various crafts, more especially as a teacher.\nMany of you in these days pass into another vocation--Letters, or the\nPress. Here too, almost everything you learn will pay you professionally.\nStill, I am careful not to rest the case for general education on\nprofessional grounds alone. I might show you that the highest work of\nall--original enquiry--needs a broad basis of liberal study; or at all\nevents is vastly aided by that. Genius will work on even a narrow basis,\nbut imperfect preparatory study leaves marks of imperfection in the\nproduct.\n\nThe same considerations that determine your voluntary studies, determine\nalso the University Ideal. A University, in my view, stands or falls\nwith its Arts' Faculty. Without debating the details, we may say that\nthis Faculty should always be representative of the needs of our\nintelligence, both for the professional and for the extra-professional\nlife; it should not be of the shop, shoppy. The University exists\nbecause the professions would stagnate without it; and still more,\nbecause it may be a means of enlarging knowledge at all points. Its\nwatchword is Progress. We have, at last, the division of labour in\nteaching; outside the University, teachers too much resemble the Regent\nof old--having too many subjects, and too much time spent in grinding.\nOur teachers are exactly the reverse.\n\nYet, there cannot be progress without a sincere and single eye to the\ntruth. The fatal sterility of the middle ages, and of our first and\nsecond University periods, had to do with the mistake of gagging men's\nmouths, and dictating all their conclusions. Things came to be so\narranged that contradictory views ran side by side, like opposing\nelectric currents; the thick wrappage of ingenious phraseology arresting\nthe destructive discharge. There was, indeed, an elaborate and\npretentious Logic, supplied by Aristotle, and amended by Bacon; what was\nstill wanted was a taste of the Logic of Freedom.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 15: RECTORIAL ADDRESS, to the Students of Aberdeen University,\n_15th November_, 1882.]\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nVII.\n\nTHE ART OF STUDY.\n\n\nOf hackneyed subjects, a foremost place may be assigned to the Art of\nStudy. Allied to the theory and practice of Education generally, it has\nstill a field of its own, although not very precisely marked out. It\nrelates more to self-education than to instruction under masters; it\nsupposes the voluntary choice of the individual rather than the\nconstraint of an outward discipline. Consequently, the time for its\napplication is when the pupil is emancipated from the prescription and\ncontrol of the scholastic curriculum.\n\nThere is another idea closely associated with our notion of study--namely,\nlearning from books. We may stretch the word, without culpable licence,\nto comprise the observation of facts of all kinds, but it more naturally\nsuggests the resort to book lore for the knowledge that we are in quest\nof. There is a considerable propriety in restricting it to this meaning;\nor, at all events, in treating the art of becoming wise through reading,\nas different from the arts of observing facts at first hand. In short,\nstudy should not be made co-extensive with knowledge getting, but with\nbook learning. In thus narrowing the field, we have the obvious advantage\nof cultivating it more carefully, and the unobvious, but very real,\nadvantage of dealing with one homogeneous subject.\n\nIn the current phrase, \"_studying under_ some one,\" there is a more\nexpress reference to being taught by a master, as in listening to\nlectures. There is, however, the implication that the learner is\napplying his own mind to the special field, and, at the same time, is\nnot neglecting the other sources of knowledge, such as books. The master\nis looked upon rather as a guide to enquiry, than as the sole fountain\nof the information sought.\n\nThus, then, the mental exercise that we now call \"study\" began when\nbooks began; when knowledge was reduced to language and laid out\nsystematically in verbal compositions. A certain form of it existed in\nthe days when language was as yet oral merely; when there might be long\ncompositions existing only in the memory of experts, and communicable by\nspeech alone. But study then was a very simple affair: it would consist\nmainly in attentive listening to recitation, so as to store up in the\nmemory what was thus communicated. The art, if any, would attach equally\nto the reciter and to the listener; the duty of the one would be to\naccommodate his lessons in time, quantity, and mode of delivery to the\nretentive capacity of the other; who, in his turn, would be required to\ncon and recapitulate what he had been told, until he made it his own,\nwhatever it might be worth.\n\n[BOOK STUDY AMONG THE ANCIENTS]\n\nEven when books came into existence, an art of study would be at first\nvery simple. The whole extent of book literature among the Jews before\nChrist would be soon read; and, when once read, there was nothing left\nbut to re-read it in whole or in part, with a view of committal to\nmemory, whether for meditative reflection, or for awakening the\nemotions. We see, in the Psalms of David, the emphasis attached to\nmental dwelling on the particulars of the Mosaic Law, as the nourishment\nof the feelings of devotion.\n\nThe Greek Literature about 350 B.C., when Aristotle and Demosthenes had\nreached manhood (being then 34), had attained a considerable mass; as\none may see at a glance from Jebb's chronology attached to his Primer.\nThere was a splendid poetical library, including all the great\ntragedians, with the older and the middle Comedy. There were the three\ngreat historians--Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon; and the\norators--- Lysias, Isocrates, and Isaeus; there were the precursors of\nSocrates in Philosophy; and, finally, the Platonic Dialogues. To\novertake all these would employ several years of learned leisure; and to\nimbibe their substance would be a rich and varied culture, especially of\nthe poetic and rhetorical kind. To make the most of the field, a\njudicious procedure would be very helpful; there was evident scope for\nan art of study. The fertile intellect of the Greeks produced the first\nsystematic guides to high culture; the Rhetorical art for Oratory and\nPoetry, the Logical art for Reasoning, and the Eristic art for\nDisputation. There was nothing precisely corresponding to an Art of\nStudy, but there were examples of the self-culture of celebrated men.\nThe most notorious of these is Demosthenes; of whom we know that, while\nhe took special lessons in the art of oratory, he also bestowed\nextraordinary pains upon the general cultivation of his intellectual\npowers. His application to Thucydides in particular is recounted in\nterms of obvious mythical exaggeration; showing, nevertheless, his idea\nof fixing upon a special book with a view to extracting from it every\nparticle of intellectual nourishment that it could yield: in which we\nhave an example of the art of study as I have defined it. Then, it is\nsaid that, in his anxiety to master his author, he copied the entire\nwork eight times, with his own hand, and had it by heart _verbatim_, so\nas to be able to re-write it when the manuscripts were accidentally\ndestroyed. Both points enter into the art of study, and will come under\nreview in the sequel.\n\nWe do not possess from the genius of Aristotle--the originator or\nimprover of so many practical departments--an Art of Study. The omission\nwas not supplied by any other Greek writer known to us. The oratorical\nart was a prominent part of education both in Greece and in Rome; and\nwas discussed by many authors--notably by Cicero himself; but the\nexhaustive treatment is found in Quintilian. The very wide scope of the\n\"Institutes of Oratory\" comprises a chapter upon the orator's reading,\nin which the author reviews the principal Greek and Roman classics from\nHomer to Seneca, with remarks upon the value of each for the mental\ncultivation of the oratorical pupil. Something of this sort might be\nlegitimately included in the art of study, but might also be withheld,\nas being provided in the critical estimates already formed respecting\nall writers of note.\n\n[MODERN GUIDES TO STUDY.]\n\nAfter Ouintilian, it is little use to search for an art of study, either\namong the later Latin classics, or among the mediaeval authors\ngenerally. I proceed at once to remark upon the well-known essay of\nBacon, which shows his characteristic subtlety, judiciousness, and\nweight; yet is too short for practical guidance. He hits the point, as\nI conceive it, when he identifies study with reading, and brings in, but\nonly by way of contrast and complement, conference or conversation and\ncomposition. He endeavours to indicate the worth of book learning, as\nan essential addition to the actual practice of business, and the\nexperience, of life. He marks a difference between books that we are\nmerely to dip into (books to be tasted) and such as are to be mastered;\nwithout, however, stating examples. He ventures also to settle the\nrespective kinds of culture assignable to different departments of\nknowledge--history, poetry, mathematics, natural philosophy, moral\nphilosophy, logic and rhetoric; a very useful attempt in its own way,\nand one that may well enough enter into a comprehensive art of study,\nif not provided for in the still wider theory of Education at large.\n\nBacon's illustrious friend, Hobbes, did not write on studies, but made\na notable remark bearing on one topic connected with the art,--namely,\nthat if he had read as much as other men, he should have remained still\nas ignorant as other men. This must not be interpreted too literally.\nHobbes was really a great reader of the ancients, and must have studied\nwith care some of the philosophers immediately preceding himself. Still,\nit indicates an important point for discussion in the art of study, in\nwhich great men have gone to opposite extremes--I mean in reference to\nthe amount of attention to be given to previous writers, in taking up\nnew ground.\n\nTo come down to another great name, we have Milton's ideal of Education,\ngiven in his short Tractate. Here, with many protestations of knowing\nthings, rather than words, we find an enormous prescription of book\nreading, including, in fact, every known author on every one of a wide\ncircle of subjects. This was characteristic of the man: he was a\nvoracious reader himself, and an example to show, in opposition to\nHobbes, that original genius is not necessarily quenched by great or\neven excessive erudition. As bearing on the art of study, especially for\nstriplings under twenty, Milton's scheme is open to two criticisms:\nfirst, that the amount of reading on the whole is too great; second,\nthat in subjects handled by several authors of repute, one should have\nbeen selected as the leading text-book and got up thoroughly; the others\nbeing taken in due time as enlarging or correcting the knowledge thus\nlaid in. Think of a boy learning Rhetoric upon six authors taken\ntogether!\n\n[LOCKE'S CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING.]\n\nThe transition from Milton to Locke is the inverse of that from Hobbes\nto Milton. Locke was also a man of few books. If he had been sent to\nschool under Milton, as he might have been,[16] he would have very soon\nthrown up the learned drudgery prescribed for him, and would have\nbolted.\n\nThe practical outcome of Locke's enquiries respecting the human\nfaculties is to be found in the little treatise named--\"The Conduct of\nthe Understanding\". It is an earnest appeal in favour of devotion to the\nattainment of truth, and an exposure of _all_ the various sources of\nerror, moral and intellectual; more especially prejudices and bias.\nThere are not, however, many references to book study; and such as we\nfind are chiefly directed to the one aim of painful and laborious\nexamination, first, of an author's meaning, and next of the goodness of\nhis arguments. Two or three sentences will give the clue. \"Those who\nhave read of everything, are thought to understand everything too; but\nit is not always so. Reading furnishes the mind only with materials of\nknowledge; it is thinking makes what we read ours. We are of the\nruminating kind, and it is not enough to cram ourselves with a great\ndeal of collections, unless we chew them over again, they will not give\nus strength and nourishment.\" Farther: \"Books and reading are looked\nupon to be the great helps of the understanding, and instruments of\nknowledge, as it must be allowed that they are; and yet I beg leave to\nquestion whether these do not prove a hindrance to many, and keep\nseveral bookish men from attaining to solid and true knowledge\". Here,\nagain, is his stern way of dealing with any author:--\"To fix in the mind\nthe clear and distinct idea of the question stripped of words; and so\nlikewise, in the train of argumentation, to take up the author's ideas,\nneglecting his words, observing how they connect or separate those in\nthe question.\" Of this last, more afterwards.\n\n[WATT'S IMPROVEMENT OF THE MIND.]\n\nA disciple of Locke, and a man of considerable and various powers, the\nnon-conformist divine Isaac Watts, produced perhaps the first\nconsiderable didactic treatise on Study. I refer, of course, to his\nwell-known work entitled \"The Improvement of the Mind\"; on which, he\ntells us, he was occupied at intervals for twenty years. It has two\nParts: one on the acquisition of knowledge; the other on Communication\nor leaching. The scheme is a very wide one. Observation, Reading,\nattending Lectures, Conversation,--are all included. To the word\n\"Study,\" Watts attaches a special meaning, namely Meditation and\nReflection, together with the control or regulation of all the exercises\nof the mind. I doubt if this meaning is well supported by usage. At all\nevents it is not the signification that I propose to attach to the term.\nObservation is an art in itself: so is Conversation, whether amicable or\ncontentious. The _proportions_ that these exercises should bear to\nreading, would fairly claim a place in the complete Art of Study.\n\nWatts has two short chapters on Books and Reading, containing sensible\nremarks. He urges the importance of thorough mastery of select authors;\nbut assumes a power of discriminating good and bad beyond the reach of\na learner, and does not show how it is to be attained. He is very much\nconcerned all through as to the moral tone and religious orthodoxy of\nthe books read, he also reproves hasty and ill-natured judgments upon\nthe authors.\n\nWatts's Essay is so pithily written, and so full of sense and propriety,\nthat it long maintained a high position in our literature; he tells us,\nthat it had become a text-book in the University. I do not know of any\nbetter work on the same plan. A \"Student's Guide,\" by an American named\nTodd, was in vogue with us, some time ago; but anyone looking at its\ncontents, will not be sorry that it is now forgotten. It would not,\nhowever, be correct to say that the subject has died out. If there have\nnot been many express didactic treatises of late, there has been an\ninnumerable host of small dissertations, in the form of addresses,\nspeeches, incidental discussions, leading articles, sermons--all\nintended to guide both young and old in the path of useful study. What\nto read, when to read, and how to read,--have been themes of many an\nessay, texts of many a discourse. According as Education at large has\nbeen more and more discussed, the particular province of self-education,\nas here marked out, has had an ample share of attention from more or\nless qualified advisers.\n\nWhat we have got before us, then, is, first, to define our ground, and\nthen to appropriate and value the accumulated fruits of the labour\nexpended on it. I have already indicated how I would narrow the subject\nof Study, so as to occupy a field apart, and not jumble together matters\nthat follow distinct laws. The theory of Education in general is the\ntheory of good Teaching: that is a field by itself, although many things\nin it are applicable also to self-education. To estimate the values of\ndifferent acquisitions--Science, Language, and the rest, is good for\nall modes of culture. The laws of the understanding in general, and of\nthe memory in particular, must be taken into account under every mode of\nacquiring knowledge. Yet the alteration of circumstances, when a pupil\nis carving out his own course, and working under his own free-will,\nleads to new and distinct rules of procedure. Also, that part of\nself-education consisting in the application to books is distinct from\nthe other forms of mental cultivation, namely, conversing, disputing,\noriginal composition, and tutorial aid. Each of these has its own rules\nor methods, which I do not mean to notice except by brief allusion.\n\nIn connection with the Plan of study, it is material to ask what the\nindividual is studying for. Each profession, each accomplishment, has\nits own course of education. If book reading is an essential part, then\nthe choice of books must follow the line of the special pursuit. This is\nobvious; but does not do away with the consideration of the best modes\nof studying whatever books are suitable for the end. One man has to read\nin Chemistry, another in Law, another in Divinity, and so on. For each\nand all of these, there is a profitable and an unprofitable mode of\nworking, and the speciality of the matter is unessential.\n\n[DIFFERENT ENDS OF STUDY.]\n\nThe more important differences of subject, involving differences of\nmethod, are seen in such contrasted departments as Science and Language,\nThought and Style, Reality and Poetry, Generality and Particularity. In\napplying the mind to these various branches, and in using books as the\nmedium of acquisition, there are considerable differences in the mode of\nprocedure. The study of a book of Science is not on the same plan as the\nstudy of a History or a Poem. Yet even in these last, there are many\ncircumstances in common, arising out of the constitution of our\nfaculties and the nature of a verbal medium of communication of thought.\n\nAn art of Study in general should not presume to follow out in minute\ndetail the education of the several professions. There should still be,\nfor example, a distinct view of the training special in an Orator, on\nwhich the ancients bestowed so much pains; there being no corresponding\ncourse hitherto chalked out for a Philosopher as such, or even for a\nPoet.\n\nNext, there is an important distinction between studies for a\nprofessional walk, and the studies of a man's leisure, with a view to\ngratifying a special taste, or for the higher object of independent\nthinking on all the higher questions belonging to a citizen and a man.\nBoth positions has its peculiarities; and an art of study should be\ncatholic enough to embrace them. To have the best part of the day for\nstudy, and the rest for recreation and refreshment, is one thing: and to\nstudy in by-hours, in snatches of time, and in holidays is quite another\nthing. In the latter case, the choice of subjects, and the extent of\nthem, must be considerably different; while the consideration of the\nbest modes of economizing time and strength, and of harmonizing one's\nlife as a whole, is more pressing and more arduous. But, when the course\nis chalked out, the details of study must conform to the general\nconditions of all acquirements in knowledge through the instrumentality\nof books.\n\nOne, and only one, more preliminary clearing. When an instructor\nproceeds, as Milton in his school, or as James Mill with his son, by\nprescribing to each pupil a mass of books to be read, with more or less\nof examination as to their contents; in such a case, education from\nwithout has passed into study in our narrow sense; and the procedure for\none situation is applicable to both. The two cases are equally in\ncontrast to educating by the direct instruction of the teacher. In so\nfar, however, as any teacher requires book study to co-operate with his\nown addresses, to that extent do the methods laid down for private study\ncome into play.\n\nUnder every view, it is a momentous fact, that the man of modern times\nhas become a book-reading animal. The acquisition of knowledge and the\ncultivation of the intellectual powers of the mind, form only a small\npart of the use of books; although the part more properly named Study.\nThe moral tendencies are controlled; the emotions regulated; sympathy\nwith mankind, or the opposite, generated; pleasurable excitement\nafforded. These other uses may be provided apart, as in our literature\nof amusement, or they may be given in combination with the element of\nknowledge, in which case they are apt to be a disturbing force,\nrendering uncertain our calculations as to the efficacy of particular\nmodes of study.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe practical problem of Study is not to be approached by any high\n_priori_ road; in other words, by setting out from abstract principles\nas to the nature of the mind's receptivity and the operation of\nbook-reading upon that receptivity. A humbler line of approach will be\nmore likely to succeed.\n\nThere exist a number of received maxims on study, the result of many\nmen's experience and wisdom. Our endeavour will be to collect these,\narrange them in a methodical plan, so that they may give mutual aid, and\nsupply each other's defects. We shall go a little farther, and criticise\nthem according to the best available lights; and, when too vague or\nsweeping, supply needful qualifications.\n\nThe Choice of Books, in the first instance, depends on the merits\nattributed to them severally by persons most conversant with the special\ndepartment. In some degree, too, this choice is controlled by the\nconsideration of the best modes of study, as will soon be apparent.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[A TEXT-BOOK-IN-CHIEF.]\n\n1. Our first maxim is--\"Select a Text-book-in-chief\". The meaning is,\nthat when a large subject is to be overtaken by book study alone, some\none work should be chosen to apply to, in the first instance, which work\nshould be conned and mastered before any other is taken up. There being,\nin most subjects, a variety of good books, the thorough student will not\nbe satisfied in the long run without consulting several, and perhaps\nmaking a study of them all; yet, it is unwise to distract the attention\nwith more than one, while the elements are to be learnt. In Geometry,\nthe pupil begins upon Euclid, or some other compendium, and is not\nallowed to deviate from the single line of his author. If he is once\nthoroughly at home on the main ideas and the leading propositions of\nGeometry, he is safe in dipping into other manuals, in comparing the\ndifferences of treatment, and in widening his knowledge by additional\ntheorems, and by various modes of demonstration.\n\nIn principle, the maxim is generally allowed. Nevertheless, it is often\ndeparted from in practice. This happens in several ways.\n\n[MILTON'S PLAN WITH HIS PUPILS.]\n\n[KEEPING TO A SINGLE LINE OF THOUGHT.]\n\nOne way is exemplified in Milton's Tractate, already referred to. His\nmethod of teaching any subject would appear to have been to take, the\nreceived authors, and to read them one after another, probably according\nto date; the reading pace, and degree of concentration, being apparently\nequal all through. His six authors on Rhetoric were--Plato (select\nDialogues, of course), Aristotle, Phalereus, Cicero, Hermogenes,\nLonginus. To read their several treatises through in the order named,\nwith equal attention, would undoubtedly leave in the mind a good many\nthoughts on Rhetoric, but in a somewhat chaotic state. Much better would\nit have been to have adopted a Text-book-in-chief, the choice lying\nbetween Aristotle and Ouintilian (who comes in at a prior stage of the\nMiltonic curriculum). The book so chosen would be read, and re-read; or\nrather each chapter would be gone over several times, with appropriate\ntesting exercises and examinations. The other works might then be\novertaken and compared with the principal text-book; the judgment of\nthe pupil being so far matured, as to see what in them was already\nsuperseded, and what might be adopted as additions to his already\nacquired stock of ideas. Milton's views of education embraced the useful\nto a remarkable degree; he was no pamperer of imagination and the\nornamental. His list of subjects might be said to be utility run\nwild:--comprising the chief parts of Mathematics, together with\nEngineering, Navigation, Architecture, and Fortification; Natural\nPhilosophy; Natural History; Anatomy, and Practice of Physic; Ethics,\nPolitics, Economics, Jurisprudence, Theology; a full course of the\nOrators and Poets; Logic, Rhetoric, and Poetics. He tumbles out a whole\nlibrary of reading: but only in Ethics, does he indicate a leading or\npreferential work; the half-dozen of classical books on the subject are\nto be perused, \"under the determinate sentence\" of the scripture\nauthorities. With all this voracity for the useful, Milton had no\nconception of scientific form, or method; and indeed, few of the\nsubjects had as yet passed the stage of desultory treatment; so that the\nidea of casting the knowledge into some one form, under the guidance of\na chosen author, would never occur to him. Better things might have been\nexpected of James Mill, in conducting the education of his son. Yet we\nfind his plan to have been to require an even and exhaustive perusal of\nnearly every book on nearly every subject, without singling out any one\nto impart the best known form in each case. The disadvantage of the\nprocess would be that, at first, all the writers were regarded as\nprofitable alike. Nevertheless, in the special subjects that he knew\nhimself, he gave his own instructions as the leading text, and his\npupil's knowledge took form according to these. In some cases, accident\ngave a text-in-chief, as when young Mill at ten years of age, studied\nThomson's Chemistry, without the distraction of any other work. If there\nhad been half-a-dozen Chemical manuals in existence, he would probably\nhave read them all, and fared much worse. It happens, however, that,\nin the more exact sciences, there is a greater sameness in the leading\nideas, than in Politics, Morals, or the Human Mind; and the evil of\ndistraction is so much smaller. Undoubtedly, the best of all ways of\nlearning anything is to have a competent master to dole out a fixed\nquantity every day, just sufficient to be taken in, and no more; the\npupils to apply themselves to the matter so imparted, and to do nothing\nelse. The singleness of aim is favourable to the greatest rapidity of\nacquirement; and any defects are to be left out of account, until one\nthread of ideas is firmly set in the mind. Not unfrequently, however,\nand not improperly, the teacher has a text-book in aid of his oral\ninstructions. To make this a help, and not a hindrance, demands the\ngreatest delicacy; the sole consideration being that the pupil must\nbe kept _in one single line of thought_, and never be required to\ncomprehend, on the same point, conflicting or varying statements.\n\nEven the foot-notes to a work may have to be disregarded, in the first\ninstance. They may act like a second author, and keep up an irritating\nfriction. There is, doubtless, a consummate power of annotation that\nanticipates difficulties, and clears away haze, without distracting the\nmind. There is also an art of bringing out relief by an accompaniment,\nlike the two images of the stereoscope. This is most likely to arise\nthrough a living teacher or commentator, who, by his tones and emphasis,\nas well as by his very guarded and reserved additions, can make the\nmeaning of the author take shape and fulness.\n\nAs the chief text-book is chosen, among other reasons, for its method\nand system, any defects on this head may be very suitably supplied,\nduring the reader's progress, by notes or otherwise. When the end is\nclearly kept in view, we shall not go wrong as to the means: the spirit\nwill remedy an undue bias to the letter.\n\nThe subjects that depend for their full comprehension upon a certain\nmethod and order of details, are numerous, and include the most\nimportant branches of human culture. The Sciences, in mass, are avowedly\nof this character: even such departments as Theology, Ethics, Rhetoric,\nand Criticism have their definite form; and, until the mind of the\nstudent is fully impressed with this, all the particulars are vague and\nchaotic, and comparatively useless for practical application. So, any\nsubject cast in a _polemic_ form must be received and held in the\nconnection thereby given to it. If the arguments _pro_ and _con_ fall\nout of their places in the mind of the reader, their force is missed or\nmisconceived.\n\nHistory is pre-eminently a subject for method, and, therefore, involves\nsome such plan as is here recommended. Every narrative read otherwise\nthan for mere amusement, as we read a novel, should leave in the\nmind--(1) the Chronological sequence (more or less detailed); and (2)\nthe Causal sequence, that is, the influences at work in bringing about\nthe events. These are best gained by application to a single work in the\nfirst place; other works being resorted to in due time.\n\nOf the non-methodical subjects, forming an illustrative contrast,\nmention may be made of purely didactic treatises, where the precepts are\neach valuable for itself, and by itself: such as, until very recently,\nthe works on Agriculture, and even on Medicine. A book of Domestic\nReceipts, consulted by index, is not a work for study.\n\nPoems and fictitious narrations will naturally be regarded as of the\nun-methodical class. If there are exceptions, they consist of long\npoems--Epics and Dramas--whose plan is highly artistic, and must be felt\nin order to the full effect. Probably, however, this is the merit that\nthe generality of readers are content to miss, especially if greater\nstrain of attention is needed to discover it. Readers bent on enjoyment\ndwell on the passing page, and are not inclined to carry with them what\nhas gone before, in order to understand what is to follow.\n\n[REPUDIATION OF METHOD BY MEN OF REPUTE.]\n\nVery intelligent and superior men have wholly repudiated the notion of\nstudy by method. We must not lay too much stress upon these disclaimers,\nseeing that they are usually cited from those in advanced years, or men\nwhose day of methodical education is passed. When Johnson said--\"A man\nought to read just as inclination leads him,\" he was not thinking of\nbeginners, for whom he would probably have dictated a different course.\nStill, it is a prevailing tendency of many minds, to read all books\nequally, provided the interest or enjoyment of them is equal. Macaulay,\nSir William Hamilton, De Quincey, as well as Johnson, and a numerous\nhost besides, were book-gluttons, books in breeches; they imbibed\ninformation copiously, and also retained it, but as a matter of chance.\nThe enjoyment of their life was to read; whereas, to master thoroughly a\nconsiderable field of knowledge, can never be all enjoyment. Gibbon was\na book devourer, but he had a plan; he was organizing a vast work of\ncomposition. Macaulay, also, showed himself capable of realizing a\nscheme of composition; both his History and his Speeches have the stamp\nof method, even to the pitch of being valuable as models. Hamilton and\nDe Quincey, each in his way, could form high ideals of work, and in part\nexecute them; but their productiveness suffered from too much bookish\nintoxication. While readers generally mix the motive of instruction with\nstimulation, the class that seek instruction solely is but small; the\nother extreme is frequent enough.\n\n[DIFFICULTY IN CHOOSING A FIRST TEXT-BOOK.]\n\nIn many subjects, the difficulties of fixing upon the proper Text-book\nare not inconsiderable. The mere reputation of a book may be great, and\nwell-founded; and yet the merits may not be of the kind that fits it for\nthe commencing student. Such conditions as the following must be taken\ninto account. The Form or Method should be of a high order: this we\nshall have occasion to illustrate under the next head. It should be\nabreast: of the time, on its own subject. It should be moderately full,\nwithout being necessarily exhaustive in detail. It is on this point that\nthe cheap primers of the present day are mainly defective. They state\ngeneral ideas, and lay down outlines; but they do not provide\nsufficiently expanded illustration to stamp these on the mind of the\nlearner. A shilling primer is really a more advanced book than one on a\ntriple scale, that should embrace the same compass of leading ideas.\nAs a farther condition, the work chosen should not have so much of\nindividuality as to fail in the character of representing the prevailing\nviews. The greatest authors often err on this point; and, while a work\nof genius is not to be neglected, it may, for this reason, have to take\nthe second place in the order of study. Newton's _Principia_ could never\nbe a work suited for an early stage of mathematical study. Lyell's\nGeology has been a landmark in the history of the subject; but it is not\ncast in the form for a beginner in Geology. It is, in its whole plan,\nargumentative; setting up and defending a special thesis in Geology; the\nfacts being arrayed with that view. Many other great works have assumed\na like form; such are Malthus on Population, Grove's Correlation of\nPhysical Forces, Darwin's Origin of Species. Even expressly didactic\nworks are often composed more to bring forward a peculiar view, than\nfrom the desire to develop a subject in its due proportions. Locke's\nEssay on the Understanding does not propose to give a methodical and\nexhaustive handling of the Powers of the Mind, or even of the Intellect.\nThat was reserved for Reid.\n\nThe question as between old writers and new, would receive an easy\nsolution upon such grounds as the foregoing, were it not for the\nsentiment of veneration for the old, because they are old. If an ancient\nwriter retains a place by virtue of surpassing merits, as against all\nsubsequent writers, his case is quite clear. In the nature of things,\nthis must be rare: if there be an example, it is Euclid; yet his\nposition is held only through the mutual jealousy of his modern rivals.\n\nThe only motive for commencing a study upon a very old writer is a\ndesire to work out a subject historically; which, in some instances may\nbe allowed, but not very often. In Politics, Ethics, and Rhetoric, the\nplan might have its advantages; but, with this imperative condition,\nthat we shall follow out the development in the modern works. In\nproportion as a subject assumes a scientific shape, it must carefully\ndefine its terms, marshal its propositions in proper dependence, and\noffer strict proof of all matters of fact; now, in these respects, every\nknown branch of knowledge has improved with the lapse of ages; so that\nthe more recent works are necessarily the best for entering upon the\nstudy. A historical sequence may be proper to be observed; but that\nshould be backward and not forward. The earlier stages of some subjects\nare absolutely worthless; as, for example, Physics, Chemistry, and most\nof Biology, in other subjects, as Politics and Ethics, the tentatives of\nsuch men as Plato and Aristotle have an undying value; nevertheless, the\nstudent should not begin, but end, with them.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThere is an extreme form of putting our present doctrine that runs it\ninto paradox: namely, the one-book-and-no-more maxim. Scarcely any book\nin existence is so all-sufficient for its purpose that a student is\nbetter occupied in re-reading it for the tenth time, than in reading\nsome others once. Even the merits of the one book are not fully known\nunless we compare it with others; nor have we grasped any subject unless\nwe are able to see it stated in various forms, without being distracted\nor confused. It is not a high knowledge of horsemanship that can be\ngained by the most thorough acquaintance with one horse.\n\n[NO WORK ENTIRELY SELF-SUFFICIENT.]\n\nAny truth that there is in the paradox of excluding all books but one\nfrom perusal, belongs to it as a form of the maxim we have now been\nconsidering. There is not in existence a work corresponding to the\nnotion of absolute self-sufficiency. Suppose we were to go over the\n_chef-d'oeuvres_ of human genius, we should not find one in the position\nof entire independence of all others. Take, for example, the poems of\nHomer; the Republic and a few other of Plato's pre-eminent Dialogues;\nthe great speeches of Demosthenes; the Ethics and Politics of Aristotle;\nthe poems of Dante; Shakespeare, as a whole; Bacon's Novum Organum;\nNewton's Principia; Locke on the Understanding; the _Mechanique Celeste_\nof Laplace. No one of all these could produce its effect on the mind\nwithout referring to other works, previous, contemporary, or following.\nThe remark is not confined to works of elucidation and comment\nmerely--as the contemporary history of Greece, or the speeches of\nDemosthenes--but extends to other compositions, of the very same tenor,\nby different, although inferior, writers. Shakespeare himself is made\nmuch more profitable by a perusal of the other Elizabethans, and by a\ncomparison with dramatic models before and after him.\n\nThe nearest approach to a perfectly all-sufficing book is seen in\nscientific compilations by a conjunction of highly accomplished editors.\nA new edition of Quain's Anatomy, revised and brought up to date by the\nbest anatomists, would, for the moment, probably be fully adequate to\nthe wants of the student, and dispense with all other references\nwhatsoever. Not that even then, it would be desirable to abstain from\never opening a different compendium; although undoubtedly there would be\nthe very minimum of necessity for doing so. Nevertheless, literature\npresents few analogous instances. One of the great works of an original\ngenius, like Aristotle, might, by profuse annotation, be made nearly\nsufficing; but this is another way of reading by quotation a plurality\nof writers; and it would be better still to peruse some of these in\nfull, there being no need for studying them with the degree of intensity\nbestowed on a main work.\n\n[LOCKE'S TREATMENT OF THE BIBLE.]\n\nThe example, by pre-eminence, of one self-sufficing work is the Bible.\nBeing the sole and ultimate authority of Christian doctrine, it holds a\nposition entirely apart; and, among Protestants at least, there is a\nbecoming jealousy of allowing any extraneous writing to overbear its\ncontents. Yet we are not to infer, as many have done practically, that\nno other work needs to be read in company with it. Granting that its\ngenuine doctrines have been overlaid by subsequent accretions, the way\nto get clear of these is not to neglect the entire body of fathers,\ncommentators, and theologians, and to give the whole attention to the\nscriptural text. Locke himself set an example of this attempt. He\nproposed, in his \"Reasonableness of Christianity,\" to ascertain the\nexact meaning of the New Testament, by casting aside all the glosses of\ncommentators and divines, and applying his own unassisted judgment to\nspell out its teachings. He did not disdain to use the lights of\nextraneous history, and the traditions of the heathen world; he only\nrefused to be bound by any of the artificial creeds and systems devised\nin later ages to embody the doctrines supposed to be found in the Bible.\nThe fallacy of his position obviously was, that he could not strip\nhimself of his education and acquired notions, the result of the\nteaching of the orthodox church. He seemed unconscious of the necessity\nof trying to make allowance for his unavoidable prepossessions. In\nconsequence, he simply fell into an old groove of received doctrines;\nand these he handled under the set purpose of simplifying the\nfundamentals of Christianity to the utmost. Such purpose was not the\nresult of his Bible study, but of his wish to overcome the political\ndifficulties of the time. He found, by keeping close to the Gospels and\nby making proper selections from the Epistles, that the belief in Christ\nas the Messiah could be shown to be the central fact of the Christian\nfaith; that the other main doctrines followed out of this by a process\nof reasoning; and that, as all minds might not perform the process\nalike, these doctrines could not be essential to the acceptance of\nChristianity. He got out of the difficulty of framing a creed, as many\nothers have done, by simply using Scripture language, without subjecting\nit to any very strict definition; certainly without the operation of\nstripping the meaning of its words, to see what it amounted to. That his\nshort and easy method was not very successful, the history of the\nDeistical controversy sufficiently proves. The end in view would, in our\ntime, be sought by an opposite course. Instead of disregarding\ncommentators, and the successions of creed embodiments, a scholar of the\npresent day would ascend through these to the original, and find out its\nmeaning, after making allowance for all the tendencies that operated to\ngive a bias to that meaning. As to putting us in the position of\nlistening to the Bible authors at first hand, we should trust more to\nthe erudition of a Pusey or an Ewald, than to the unassisted judgment of\na Locke.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nII. \"What constitutes the study of a book?\" Mere perusal at the average\nreading pace is not the way to imbibe the contents of any work of\nimportance, especially if the subject is new and difficult.\n\nThere are various methods in use among authoritative guides. To revert\nto the Demosthenic traditions: we find two modes indicated--namely,\nrepeated copying, and committing to memory _verbatim_. A third is,\nmaking abstracts in writing. A fourth may be designated the Lockian\nmethod. Let us consider the respective merits of the four.\n\n[STUDY BY LITERAL COPYING.]\n\n1. Of copying a book literally through, there is this to be said, that\nit engages the attention upon every word, until the act of writing\nserves to impress the memory. But there are very important\nqualifications to be assigned in judging of the worth of the exercise.\nObserve what is the main design of the copyist. It is to produce a\n_replica_ of an original upon paper. He cannot do this without a certain\namount of attention to the original; enough at least to enable him to\nput down the exact words in the copy; and, by such attention, he is so\nfar impressed with the matter, that a certain portion may remain in the\nmemory. If, however, instead of the paper, he could write directly on\nthe brain, he would be aiming straight at his object. Now, experience\nshows that the making of a copy of any document is compatible with a\nvery small amount of attention to the purport. The extreme case is the\ncopying clerk. He can literally reproduce an original, with entire\nforgetfulness of what it is about. If his eye takes a faithful note of\nthe sequence of words, he may entirely neglect the meaning. In point of\nfact, he constantly does so. He remembers nobody's secrets; and he\ncannot be counted on to check blunders that make nonsense of his text.\nProbably no one could go on copying for eight hours a day unless the\nstrain of attention to the originals were at a minimum. I conceive,\ntherefore, that copying habits arising from a certain amount of\nexperience at the vocation, would be utterly fatal to the employment of\nthe exercise as a means of study. It may be valuable to such as have\nseldom used their pen except in original composition. Very probably, in\nschool lessons, to write an exercise two or three times may be a help to\nthe usual routine of saying off the book. I have heard experienced\nteachers testify to the good effects of the practice. Yet very little\nwould turn the attention the wrong way. Even the requirement of neatness\non the part of the master, or the pupil's own liking for it, would abate\nthe desired impression. The multiplied copying set as punishment might\nstamp a thing on the memory through disgust; it might also engender the\nmechanical routine of the copyist. In short, to sit down and copy a long\nwork is about the last thing that I should dream of, as a means of\nstudy. To copy Thucydides eight times, as the tradition respecting\nDemosthenes goes, would be about the same as copying Gibbon three times:\nand who would undertake that?\n\n[COMMITTING TO MEMORY WORD FOR WORD.]\n\n2. Committing to memory _verbatim_, or nearly so. This too belongs to\nthe same tradition regarding Demosthenes, and is probably as inaccurate\nas the other. Certainly the eight copyings would not suffice for having\nthe whole by heart. Excepting a professional rhapsodist, or some one\ngifted with extraordinary powers of memory that would hardly be\ncompatible with a great understanding, nobody would think of committing\nThucydides to memory. That Demosthenes should be a perfect master both\nof the narrated facts, and of the sagacious theorisings of Thucydides\nin those facts, we may take for granted. And, farther, the orations\ndelivered by opposing speakers in the great critical debates, might very\nwell have been committed _verbatim_ by a young orator; many of them are\nmasterpieces of oratory in every point of view. But the reason for\ngetting them by heart does not apply to the general narrative. Even to\nimbibe the best qualities of the style of Thucydides would not require\nwhole pages to be learnt _verbatim_; a much better way would readily\noccur to any intelligent man.\n\nIn fact, there is no case where it is profitable to load the memory with\na whole book, or with large portions of a book. There are many small\nportions of every leading work that might be committed with advantage.\nPrincipal propositions ought to be retained to the letter. Passages,\nhere and there, remarkable for compact force, for argumentative power,\nor elegant diction, might be read and re-read till they clung to the\nmemory; but this should be the consummation of a thorough and critical\nestimate of their merits. To commit to memory without thinking of the\nmeaning is a senseless act; and could not be ascribed to Demosthenes.\nAt the stage when the young student is forming a style, he is assisted by\nlaying up _memoriter_ a number of passages of great authors; but it is\nnever necessary to go beyond select paragraphs. Detached sentences are\nvaluable, and strain the memory least. Entire paragraphs have a farther\nvalue in impressing good paragraph connection; but, to string a number\nof paragraphs together, or to learn whole chapters by memory, has\nnothing to recommend it in the way of mental culture.\n\nThere is a memory in _extension_ that holds a long string of words and\nideas together. Its value is to get readily at anything occurring in a\ncertain train, as in a given book. It is the memory of easy reference.\nThere is also a memory of _intension_, that takes a strong grasp of\nbrief expressions and thoughts, and brings them out for use, on the\nslightest relevancy. The two modes interfere with each other's\ndevelopment; we cannot be great in both; while, for original force, the\nsecond is worth the most: it extracts and resets gems to tesselate our\nfuture structures; it constitutes depth as against fluency.\n\nTo commit poetical passages to memory is a valuable contribution to our\nstock of material for emotional resuscitation in after years. It also\naids in adorning our style, even although we may not aspire to compose\nin poetry. But the burden of holding the connection of a long poem\nshould be eschewed. Children can readily learn a short psalm or hymn,\nand can retain it in permanence; but to repeat the 119th psalm from the\nbeginning is the mere _tour-de-force_ of a strong natural memory, and a\nwaste of power; just as much as committing an entire book of the Aeneid\nor of Paradise Lost.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[MAKING ABSTRACTS.]\n\n3. Making Abstracts.--This is the plan of studying that most advances\nour intelligent comprehension of any work of difficulty, and also\nimpresses it on the memory in the best form. But there are many ways of\ndoing it; and beginners, from the very fact that they are beginners,\nare not competent to choose the best. If a book has an obvious and\nmethodical plan in itself, the reader can follow that plan, taking down\nthe leading positions, selecting some of the chief examples or\nillustrations, giving short headings of chapters and paragraphs, and\nthus making a synopsis, or full table of contents. All this is useful.\nThe memory is much better impressed through the exertion of picking,\nchoosing, and condensing, than by copying _verbatim_; and the plan or\nevolution of the whole is more fully comprehended. But, if a work does\nnot easily lend itself to a methodical abstract, the task of the\nbeginner is much harder. To abstract the treatises of Aristotle was\nfitting employment for Hobbes. The \"Wealth of Nations\" is not easy to\nabstract; but, at the present day, it would not be chosen as the\nText-book-in-chief for Political Economy: as a third or fourth work to\nbe perused at a reading pace, it would have its proper effect. The best\nstudious exercise upon it would be to mark the agreements and\ndisagreements with the newer authority, the weak and strong points of\nthe exposition, and the perennial force of a certain number of the\npropositions and examples. Many parts could be skipped entirely as not\neven repaying historical study. Yet, as the work of a great and original\nmind, its interest is perennial.\n\nTo go back once more to the example of Thucydides. Setting aside, from\nintrinsic improbability, both the traditions--the copyings, and the\ncommittal to memory _verbatim_,--we can easily see what Demosthenes\ncould find in the work, and how he could make the most of it. The\nnarrative or story could be indelibly fixed in his memory by a few\nperusals, and, if need be, by a full chronology drawn up by his own\nhand. The speeches could be committed in whole or in part, for their\narguments and language; and a minute study could be made of the turns of\nexpression, as they seemed to be either meritorious or defective. The\nyoung orator had already studied the more finished styles of Isocrates,\nLysias, Isanis, and Plato, and could make comparisons between their\nforms and the peculiarities of Thucydides, which belonged to an earlier\nage. This, however, was a discipline altogether apart, and had nothing\nto do with copying, committing, or abstracting. It involved one exercise\nmore or less allied to the last, namely, _making changes upon an author,\naccording to ones best ideal at the time_: changes, if possible, for the\nbetter, but perhaps not; still requiring, however, an effort of mind,\nand so far favourable to culture.\n\n[VARIOUS MODES OF ABSTRACTING.]\n\nEvery one's first attempts at abstracting must be very bad. There is no\nmore opportune occasion for the assistance of a tutor or intelligent\nmonitor, than to revise an abstract. The weaknesses of a beginner are\napparent at a glance; even better than by a _viva voce_ interrogation.\nUseful abstracting comes at a late stage of study, when one or two\nsubjects have been pretty well mastered. It is then that the pupil can\nbest overtake more advanced works on the subjects already commenced, or\ncan enter upon an entirely new department, in the light of previous\nacquisitions.\n\nAny work that deserves thorough study deserves the labour of making an\nabstract; without which, indeed, the study is not thorough. It is quite\npossible to read so as to comprehend the drift of a book, and yet forget\nit entirely. The point for us to consider is--Are we likely to want any\nportion of it afterwards? If we can fix upon the parts most likely to be\nuseful, we either copy or abstract these, or preserve a reference so as\nto turn them up when wanted. In the case of a work, containing a mass of\nnew and valuable materials, such as we wish to incorporate with our\nintellectual structure, we must act the part of the beginner in a new\nfield, and make an abstract on the most approved plan: that is, by such\nchanges as shall at once preserve the author's ideas, and intersperse\nthem with our own. There is an ideal balance of two opposing tendencies:\none to take down the writer too literally, which fails to impress the\nmeaning; the other to accommodate him too much to our own language and\nthinking, in which case, we shall remember more, but it will be\nremembering ourselves and not him. He that can hit the just mean between\nthese extremes is the perfect student.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThere are easier modes of abstracting, such as serve many useful\npurposes, although not sufficient for the mastery of a leading\nText-book, or even of a second or third in a new subject. We may pencil\non the margin, or underscore, all the leading propositions, and the\ntypical examples. In a well-composed scientific manual, the proceeding\nis too obvious to be impressive. Very often, however, the main points\nare not given in the most methodical way, but have to be searched out\nby carefully scanning each paragraph. This is an exercise that both\ninstructs and impresses us; it is the kind of change that calls our\nfaculties into play, and gives us a better hold of an author, without\nsuperseding him.\n\nA Table of Contents carefully examined is favourable to a comprehensive\nview of the whole; and, this attained, the details are remembered in the\nbest possible way, that is, by taking their place in the scheme. Any\nother form of recollection is of the desultory kind.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[LOCKE'S RECOMMENDATIONS.]\n\n4. Let us next glance at Locke's method of reading, which is unique and\noriginal, like the man himself. It is given with much iteration in his\nConduct of the Understanding, but comes in substance to this:--\n\nWe are to fix in the mind the author's ideas, stripped of his words; to\ndistinguish between such ideas as are pertinent to the subject, and such\nas are not; to keep the precise question steadily before our minds; to\nappreciate the bearing of the arguments; and, finally, to see what the\nquestion bottoms upon, or what are the fundamental verities or\nassumptions underneath.\n\nAll this is very thorough in its way; but, in the first place, it\napplies chiefly to argumentative works, and, in the second place, it is\nentirely beyond the powers of ordinary students. Such an examination of\nan author as Locke contemplates is not seen many times in a generation.\nHis own controversies give but indifferent examples of it; several of\nBentham's works and a few of John Mill's polemical articles also give an\nidea of thorough handling; but it is not so properly a studious effort,\nas the consummated product of a highly logical discipline, and is within\nthe reach of only a small elect number.\n\nLocke would have been more intelligible, if, instead of telling us to\nstrip an author's meaning of the words, he had impressed strongly the\nnecessity of _defining all leading terms_; and of making sure that each\nwas always used in the same meaning. While, in order to veracious\nconclusions, it is necessary that every matter of fact should be truly\ngiven, it is equally necessary that the language should be free from\nambiguity. If an author uses the word \"law,\" at one time as an\nenactment: by some authority, and at another time, as a sequence in the\norder of nature, he is sure to land us in fallacy and confusion, as\nButler did in explaining the Divine government. The remedy is, not to\nperform the operation of separating the meaning entirely from the\nlanguage, but to vary the language, so as to substitute terms that have\nno ambiguity. \"Law\" is equivocal; \"social enactment,\" and \"order of\nnature,\" are both unequivocal; and when one is chosen, and adhered to,\nthe confusion is at an end.\n\nThe mere art of study is no preparation for such a task. It demands a\nvery advanced condition of knowledge on the particular subject, as well\nas a logical habit of mind, however acquired; and to include it in a\npractical essay on the Conduct of the Understanding is to overstep the\nlimits of the subject.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nAs our present head represents the very pith and marrow of the art of\nstudy, we may dwell a little longer on the process of changing the form\nof an author, whether by condensing, expanding, varying the expression,\naltering the order, selecting, and rejecting,--or by any other known\ndevice. Worst of all is change for the mere sake of change; it is simply\nbetter than literal copying. But, to rise above it, needs a sense of\nFORM already attained. According as this sense is developed, the\nexercise of altering or amending is more and more profitable.\nConsequently, there should be an express application of the mind to the\nattainment of form; and particular works pre-eminent for that quality\nshould be sought out and read. \"Form\" is doubtless a wide word, and\ncomprises both the logical or pervading method of a work, and the\nexpression or dress throughout. Method by itself can be soonest acquired\nbecause it turns on a small number of points; language is a multifarious\nacquirement, and can hardly be forced, although it will come eventually\nby due application.\n\n[EXAMPLE FROM PRACTICE OF MEDICINE.]\n\nTo show what is meant by learning Form, with a view to the more\neffectual study of subject-matter, I will take the example of a work on\nthe Practice of Medicine; in which the idea is to describe Diseases\n_seriatim_, with their treatment or cures. At the present day, this\nsubject possesses method or form: there is a systematic classification\nof diseased processes and diseases; also, a regular plan of setting\nforth the specific marks of each disease, its diagnosis, and, finally,\nits remedies. There are more and less perfect models of the methodical\nelement; while there are differences among authors in the fulness of the\ndetailed information. There is, besides, a Logic of Medicine,\nrepresenting the absolute form, in a kind of logical synopsis, by which\nit is more easily comprehended in the first instance: not to mention the\ngeneral body of the Logic of the Inductive Sciences, of which medicine\nis one. Now, undoubtedly, the best work to begin with--the\nText-book-in-chief--would be one where Form is in its highest\nperfection; the amount of matter being of less consequence. In a subject\nof great complication, and vast detail, the student cannot too soon get\npossession of the best method or form of arrangement. When a work of\nthis character is before him, he is to read and re-read it, till the\nform becomes strongly apparent; he is to compare one part with another,\nto see how the author adheres to his own pervading method; he should, if\npossible, make a synopsis of the plan in itself, disentangling it from\nthe applications, for greater clearness. The scheme of a medical work,\nfor example, comprises the Classification of Diseases, the parting off\nof Diseased Processes---Fever, Inflammation, &c.--from Diseases properly\nso called; the modes of defining Disease; the separation of defining\nmarks, from predications, and so on: all involved in a strict Logic of\nDisease. Armed with these logical or methodical preliminaries, the\nstudent next attacks one of the extended treatises on the Practice of\nMedicine. He is now prepared to work the process of abstracting to the\nutmost advantage, both for clearness of understanding, and for\nimpressing the memory. As in such a vast subject, no one author is\ndeemed adequate to a full exposition, and as, moreover, a great portion\nof the information occurs, apart from systems, in detached memoirs or\nmonographs,--the only mode of unifying and holding together the\naggregate, is to reduce all the statements to a common form and order,\nby help of the pre-acquired plan. The progress of study may amend the\nplan, as well as add to the particular information; but absolute\nperfection in the scheme is not so essential as strict adherence to it\nthrough all the details. To work without a plan at all, is not merely to\ntax the memory beyond its powers, but probably also to misconceive and\njumble the facts.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTo enhance the illustration of the two main heads of the Art of Study,\nI will so far deviate from the idea of the essay, as to take up a special\nbranch of education, which, more than any other, has been reduced to\nform and rule, I mean the great accomplishment of Oratory, or the Art of\nPersuasion. The practical Science of Rhetoric, cultivated both by\nancients and by moderns, has especially occupied itself with directions\nfor acquiring this great engine of influencing mankind.\n\nIt was emphatically averred by the ancient teachers of the Oratorical\nart, that it must be grounded on a wide basis of general information.\nI do not here discuss the exact scope of this preparatory study, as my\npurpose is to narrow the illustration to what is special to the faculty\nof persuasion. I must even omit all those points relating to delivery or\nelocution, on which so much depends; and also the consideration of how\nto attain readiness or fluency in spoken address, except in so far as\nthat follows from abundant oratorical resources. We thus sink the\ndifference between spoken oratory, and persuasion through the press.\n\nEven as thus limited, oratory is still too wide for a pointed\nillustration: and, so, I propose farther to confine my references to the\ndepartment of Political Oratory; coupling with that, however, the\nForensic branch--which has much in common with the other, and has given\nbirth to some of our most splendid examples of the art of persuasion.\n\nWhile declining to enter on the wide field of the general education of\nthe orator, I may not improperly advert to the more immediate\npreparation for the political orator, by a familiar acquaintance with\nHistory and Political Philosophy, howsoever obtained. Then, on the other\nhand, the course here to be chalked out assumes a considerable\nproficiency in language or expression. The special education will\nincidentally improve both these accomplishments, but must not be relied\non for creating them, or for causing a marked advance in either. The\neffect to be looked for is rather to give them direction for the special\nend.\n\n[EXAMPLE FROM THE ART OF ORATORY.]\n\nThese things premised, the line of proceeding manifestly is to study the\nchoicest examples of the oratorical art, according to the methods\nalready laid down, with due adaptation to the peculiarities of the case.\n\nNow, we have not, as in a Science, two or three systematic works, one of\nwhich is to be chosen as a chief, to be followed by a reference more or\nless to the others. Our material is a long series of detached orations;\nfrom these we must make a selection at starting, and such selection,\nwhich may comprise ten or twenty or more, will have to be treated with\nthe intense single-minded devotion that we hitherto limited to a single\nwork. Repeated perusal, with a process of abstracting to be described\npresently, must be bestowed upon the chosen examples, before embarking,\nas will be necessary, upon the wide field of miscellaneous oratory.\n\nNo doubt, an oratorical education could be grounded in a general and\nequal study of the orators at large, taking the ancients either first or\nlast, according to fancy. Probably the greater number of students have\nfallen into this apparently obvious course. Our present contention is,\nthat it is better to make a thorough study of a proper selection of the\ngreatest speeches, together with the most persuasive unspoken\ncompositions. This, however, is not all. We are following the wisdom of\nthe ancients, in insisting on the farther expedient of proceeding to the\nstudy of the great examples by the aid of an oratorical scheme. At a\nvery early stage of Oratory in Greece, its methods began to be studied,\nand, in the education of the orator, these methods were made to\naccompany the study of exemplary speeches.\n\nThe principles of Rhetoric at large, and of the Persuasive art in\nparticular, have been elaborated by successive stages, and are now in a\ntolerable state of advancement. The learner will choose the scheme that\nis judged best, and will endeavour to master it provisionally, before\nentering on the oratorical models; holding it open to amendment from\ntime to time, as his education goes on. The scheme and the examples\nmutually act and re-act: the better the scheme, the more rapidly will\nthe examples fructify; and the scheme will, in its turn, profit by the\nmastery of the details.\n\n[NECESSITY OF AN ORATORICAL ANALYSIS.]\n\nOne great use of an oratorical analysis, as supplied by the teachers of\nRhetoric, is to part off the different merits of a perfect oration; and\nto show which are to be extracted from the various exemplary orators.\nOne man excels in forcible arguments, another in the lucid array of\nfacts; one is impressive and impassioned, another is quiet but\ncircumspect. Now, the benefit of studying on principle, instead of\nworking at random, is, that we concentrate attention on each one's\nstrong points, and disregard the rest. But it needs a preparatory\nanalysis, in order to make the discrimination. All that the uninstructed\nreader or hearer of a great oration knows is, that the oration is great:\nthis may be enough for the persons to be moved; it is insufficient for\nan oratorical disciple.\n\nIn the hazardous task of pursuing the illustration by naming the\nexamples of oratory most suitable to commence with, I shall pass over\nliving men, and choose from the past orators of our own country. Without\ndiscussing minutely the respective merits of individuals, I am safe in\nselecting, as in every way suitable for our purpose, Burke, Fox,\nErskine, Canning, Brougham, and Macaulay. Burke's Speeches on America;\nFox on the Westminster Scrutiny; Erskine on Stockdale, and on Hardy,\nTooke, &c.; Canning on the Slave Trade; Brougham, Lyndhurst, and Denman\nin the Queen's Trial; Macaulay on the Reform Bill,--would comprise, in a\nmoderate compass, a considerable range of oratorical excellence. I doubt\nif any member of the list would be more suitable for a beginning than\nMacaulay's Reform Speeches. These are no mere displays of a brilliant\nimagination: they are known to have influenced thousands of minds\notherwise averse to political change. The reader finds in them an\nimmense repository of historical facts as well as of doctrines; but\nfacts and doctrines, by themselves, do not make oratory. It is the use\nmade of these, that gives us the instruction we are now in quest of. In\na first or second reading, however, matter and form equally captivate\nthe mind. It would be impossible, at that early stage, to make an\nabstract such as would separate the oratorical from the non-oratorical\nmerits. Only when, by help of our scheme, we have made a critical\ndistinction between the two kinds of excellence, are we able to arrive\nat an approach to a pure oratorical lesson; and, for a long time, we\nshall fail to make the desired isolation. We have to learn not to expect\ntoo much from any one speech: to pass over in Macaulay, what is more\nconspicuously shown, say in Fox, or in Erskine. If our political and\nhistorical education has made some progress, the mere thoughts and facts\ndo not detain us; their employment for the end of persuasion is what we\nhave to take account of.\n\n[COMPREHENSIVE PRINCIPLE OF ORATORY.]\n\nIt is impossible here to indicate, except in a very general way, the\nsuccessive steps of the operation. The one summary consideration in the\nRhetoric of Oratory, from which flows the entire array of details, is\nthe regard to the dispositions and state of mind of the audience; the\npresenting of topics and considerations that chime in with these\ndispositions, and the avoiding of everything that would conflict with\nthem. To grasp this comprehensive view, and to follow it out in some of\nthe chief circumstantials of persuasive address--the leading forms of\nargument, and the appeals to the more prominent feelings,--would soon\nprovide a touchstone to a great oration, and lead us to distinguish the\nmaterials of oratory from the use made of them.\n\nTake the circumstance of _negative tact_; by which is meant the careful\navoidance of whatever might grate on the minds of those addressed.\nForensic oratory in general, and the oratory of Parliamentary leaders in\nparticular, will show this in perfection; and, for a first study of it,\nthere is probably nothing to surpass the Erskine Speeches above cited.\nIt could, however, be found in Macaulay; although in a different\nproportion to the other merits.\n\nThe Macaulay Speeches have the abundance of matter, and the powers of\nstyle, that minister to oratory, although not constituting its\ndistinctive feature. In these speeches, we may note how he guages the\nminds of the men of rank and property, in and out of Parliament, who\nconstituted the opposition to Reform; how tenderly he deals with their\nprejudices and class interests; how he shapes and adduces his arguments\nso as to gain those very feelings to the side he advocates; how he\nbrings his accumulated store of historical illustrations to his aid,\nunder the guidance of both the positive and the negative tact of the\norator; saying everything to gain, and nothing to alienate the\ndispositions that he has carefully measured.\n\nAfter Erskine and Macaulay have yielded their first contribution to the\noratorical student, he could turn with profit to Burke, who has the\nmaterials of oratory in the same high order as Macaulay, but who in the\nemployment of them so often miscarries--sometimes partially, at other\ntimes wholly. It then becomes an exercise to distinguish his successes\nfrom his failures; to resolve these into their elementary merits and\ndefects, according to the oratorical scheme. The close study of one or\ntwo orations is still the preferable course; and the most profitable\ntransition from the Burke sample is to the selected speech or speeches\nof some other orator as Canning or Brougham. All the time, the pupil\nmust be enlarging and improving his analytic scheme, which is the means\nof keeping his mind to the point in hand, amid the distraction of the\norator's gorgeous material.\n\nThe subsequent stages of oratorical study are much plainer than the\ncommencement. A time comes when the pupil will roam freely over the\ngreat field of oratory, modern and ancient, knowing more and more\nexactly what to appropriate and what to neglect. He will be quite aware\nof the necessity of rivalling the great masters in resources of\nknowledge on the one hand, and of style on the other; but he will look\nfor these elsewhere, as well as in the professed orators.\n\n[EXAMPLES OF PERSUASIVE ART.]\n\nMoreover, as the persuasive art is exemplified in men that have never\nbeen public speakers, the oratorical pupil will make a selection from\nthe most influential of this class. He will find, for example, in the\nargumentative treatises of Johnson, in the Letters of Junius, in the\nwritings of Godwin, in Sydney Smith, in Bentham, in Cobbett, in Robert\nHall, in Fonblanque, in J.S. Mill, in Whately, and a host besides, the\nexemplification of oratorical merits, together with materials that are\nof value. It is understood, however, that the search for materials and\nthe acquisition of oratorical form, are not made to advantage on the\nsame lines, and, for this and other reasons, should not go together.\n\nThe extreme test of the principle of concentration as against equal\napplication, is the acquirement of Style, or the extending of our\nresources of diction and expression in all its particulars. Being a\nmatter of endless minute details, we may feel ourselves at a loss to\ncompass it by the intensive study of a narrow and select example. Still,\nwith due allowance for the speciality of the case, the principle will\nstill be found applicable. We should, however, carry along with us, the\nmaxim exemplified under oratory, of separating in our study, as far as\nmay be, the style from the matter. We begin by choosing a treatise of\nsome great master. We may then operate either (1) by simple reading and\nre-reading, or (2) by committing portions to memory _verbatim_, or (3),\nbest of all, by making some changes according to an already acquired\nideal of good composition. This too shows the great importance of\nattaining as early as possible some regulating principles of goodness of\nstyle: the action and reaction of these, on the most exemplary authors,\nconstitute our progress in the art, and, in the quickest way, store the\nmemory with the resources of good expression.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[ECONOMICS OF BOOK READING.]\n\nIII. The head just now finished includes really by far the greatest\nportion of the economy of study. There are various other devices of\nimportance in their way, but much less liable to error in practice. Of\nthese, a leading place may be assigned to the best modes of Distributing\nthe Attention in reading. Such questions as the following present\nthemselves for consideration to the earnest student. How many distinct\nstudies can be carried on together? What interval should be allowed in\npassing from one to another? How much time should be given to the art of\nreading, and how much to subsequent meditating or ruminating on what has\nbeen read? These points are all susceptible of being determined, within\nmoderate limits of error. As to the first, the remark was made by\nQuintilian, that, in youth, we can most easily pass from one study to\nanother. The reason of this, however, is, that youth does not take very\nseriously to any study. When a special study becomes engrossing, the\nalternatives must rather be recreative than acquisitive; not much\nprogress being made in what is slighted, or left over to the exhaustion\ncaused by attention to the favourite topic. A more precise answer can be\nmade to the second and third queries, namely, as to an interval for\nrecall and meditation, after putting down a book, and before turning the\nattention into other channels. There is a very clear principle of\neconomy here. We should save as far as possible the fatigue of the\nreading process, or make a given amount of attention to the printed page\nyield the greatest impression on the memory. This is done by the\nexercise of recalling without the book; an advantage that we do not\npossess in listening to a lecture, until the whole is finished, when we\nhave too much to recall. To hurry from book to book is to gain\nstimulation at the cost of acquisition.\n\nI have alluded to the case of an engrossing subject, which starves all\naccompanying studies. There are but two ways of obviating the evil, if\nit be an evil; which it indeed becomes, when the alternative demands\nalso are legitimate. The one is peremptorily to limit the time given to\nit daily, so as to rescue some portion of the strength for other topics.\nThe other is to intermit it wholly for a certain period, and let other\nsubjects have their swing. In advancing life, and when our studious\nleisure is only what is left from professional occupation, two different\nstudies can hardly go on together. The alternative of a single study\nneeds to be purely recreative.\n\nOne other point may be noted under this head. In the application to a\nbook of importance and difficulty, there are two ways of going to work:\nto move on slowly, and master as we go; or to move on quickly to the\nend, and begin again. There is most to be said for the first method,\nalthough distinguished men have worked upon the other. The freshness of\nthe matter is taken off by a single reading; the re-reading is so much\nflatter in point of interest. Moreover, there is a great satisfaction in\nmaking our footing sure at each step, as well as in finishing the task\nwhen the first perusal is completed. We cannot well dispense with\nre-reading, but it need not extend to the whole; marked passages should\nshow where the comprehension and mastery are still lagging.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[DESULTORY READING.]\n\nIV. Another topic is Desultory Reading. This is the whole of the reading\nof the unstudious mass; it is but a part of the reading of the true\nstudent. It may mean, for one thing, jumping from book to book, perhaps\nreading no one through, except for pure amusement. It may also include\nthe reading of periodicals, where no one subject is treated at any\nlength. As a general rule, such reading does not give us new\nfoundations, or constitute the point of departure of a fresh department\nof knowledge; yet the amount of labour and thought bestowed upon\narticles in periodicals, may render them efficacious in adding to a\nprevious stock of materials, or in correcting imperfect views. The truth\nis, that to the studious man, the desultory is not desultory. The only\ndifference with him is that he has two _attitudes_ that he may\nassume--the severe and the easy-going; the one is most associated with\nsystematic works on leading subjects; the other with short essays,\nperiodicals, newspapers, and conversation. In this last attitude, which\nis reserved for hours of relaxation, he skips matters of difficulty, and\nabsorbs scattered and interesting particulars without expressly aiming\nat the solution of problems or the discussion of abstract principles.\nThere is no reason why an essay in a periodical, a pamphlet, or a speech\nin Parliament, may not take a first place in anyone's education. All the\nlabour and resource that go to form a work of magnitude may be\nconcentrated in any one of these. Still, they are presented in the form\nthat we are accustomed to associate with our desultory work, and our\ntimes of relaxation; and so, they seldom produce in the minds of readers\nthe effect that they are capable of producing. The thorough student will\nnot fail to extract materials from one and all of them, but even he will\nscarcely choose from such sources the text for the commencement of a new\nstudy.\n\nThe desultory is not a bad way of increasing our resources of\nexpression. Although there be a systematic and a best mode of acquiring\nlanguage, there is also an inferior, yet not ineffective mode; namely,\nreading copiously whatever authors have at once a good style and a\nsustaining interest. Hence, for this purpose, shifting from book to\nbook, taking up short and light compositions, may be of considerable\nvalue; anything is better than not reading at all, or than reading\ncompositions inferior in point of style. The desultory man will not be\nwithout a certain flow of language as well as a command of ideas;\nnotwithstanding which, he will never be confounded with the studious\nman.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nV. A fifth point is the proportion of book-reading to Observation of the\nfacts at first hand. From want of opportunity, or from disinclination,\nmany persons have all their information on certain subjects cast in the\nbookish mould, and do not fully conceive the particular facts as these\nstrike the mind in their own character. A reader of History, with no\nexperience of affairs, is likely to have imperfect bookish notions; just\nas a man of affairs, not a reader, is subject to narrowness of another\nkind. It was remarked by Sir G. Cornewall Lewis, that the German\nhistorians of the Athenian Democracy write like men that never had any\nactual experience of popular assemblies. A lawyer must be equally versed\nin principles and in cases as heard in court: this is a type of\nknowledge generally. In the Natural History Sciences, observation and\nreading go hand in hand from the first. In the science of the Human\nMind, there are general doctrines, contrived to embrace the world of\nmental phenomena: the student may have to begin with these, and work\nupon them exclusively for a time, but in the end, phenomena must be\nindependently viewed by him in their naked character, as exhibited\ndirectly in his own mind, and inferentially in the minds of those that\nfall under his observation. Book knowledge of Disease has to be coupled\nwith bed-side knowledge; neither will take the place of the other.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nVI. I began by limiting the meaning of study to the reading of books,\nand have reviewed the various points in the economy of this process. The\nother means of attaining, enlarging, deepening our knowledge, namely,\nObservation of facts, Conversation, Disputation, Composition, have each\nan art of its own--especially Disputation, which has long been reduced\nto rule. Observation also admits of specific directions, but, in stating\nthe necessity of combining observation with book theories and\ndescriptions, I have assumed the knowledge of how to observe.\n\n[AIDS OF CONVERSATION AND COMPOSITION.]\n\nOf all the adjuncts of study, none is so familiar, so available, and,\non the whole, so helpful, as Conversation. The authors of Guides to\nStudents, as Isaac Watts, give elaborate rules for carrying on\nconversation, a good many of them being more moral than intellectual;\nbut an art of conversation would be very difficult to formulate; it\nwould take quite as long an essay as I have devoted to study, and even\nthen would not follow half of the windings of the subject. The only\nnotice of it that my plan requires, is such as I have already bestowed\nupon Observation: namely, to point out the advantage of combining a\ncertain amount of reading with, conversation; a thing that almost\neverybody does according to their opportunities. To rehearse what we\nhave read to some willing and sympathizing listener, is the best way\nof impressing the memory and of clearing up difficulties to the\nunderstanding. It brings in the social stimulus, which ranks so high\namong human motives. It is a wholesome change of attitude; relieving the\nfatigue of book-study, while adding to its fruitfulness. Even beginners\nin study are mutually helpful, by exchanging the results of their\nseveral book acquirements; while it is possible to raise conversation to\nthe rank of a high art, both for intellectual improvement and for mutual\ndelectation. I cannot say that the ideal is often realized; since two or\nmore must combine to conversation, and it is not often that the mutual\naction and re-action is perfectly adjusted for the highest effect.\n\nThe last great adjunct of study is original Composition, which also\nwould need to be formulated distinct from the theory of book-study.\nViewed in the same way as we have viewed the other collateral exercises,\none can pronounce it too an invaluable adjunct to book-reading, as well\nas an end in itself; it is a variation of effort that diverts the mental\nstrain, and re-acts powerfully upon the extraction of nutriment from\nbooks. Besides the pride of achievement, it evokes the social stimulus\nwith the highest effect; our compositions being usually intended for\nsome listeners. But, when to begin the work of original composition, as\ndistinct from the written exercises upon books, in the way of abstracting,\namending, and the rest; what forms it should assume at the outset, and\nby what steps it should gradually ascend to the culminating effects of\nthe art,--would all admit of expansion and discussion as an altogether\nseparate theme. Enough to remark here, that a course of book-reading\nwithout attempts at original composition is as faulty an extreme, as to\nbegin and carry on writing upon a stinted basis of reading. The thorough\nstudent, as concerned in my present essay, carrying on book-study in the\nmanner I have sketched, will almost infallibly end, at the proper time,\nin a self-thinker, and a self-originator. An adequate familiarity with\nthe great writers of the past both checks presumptuous or hasty efforts\nof reproduction, and encourages modest attempts of our own as we feel\nourselves becoming gradually invigorated through the combined influence\nof all the various modes of well-directed study.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 16: Milton had charge of pupils in 1644, when Locke was\ntwelve.]\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nVIII.\n\nRELIGIOUS TESTS AND SUBSCRIPTIONS.\n\n\nEvery man has an interest in arriving at truth for himself. However\nuseful it may be to mislead other people, however sweet to look down\nfrom a height on the erring throng beneath, it is neither useful nor\nsweet to be ourselves at sea without a compass. We may not care to walk\nby the light we have, but we do not choose to exchange it for darkness.\n\nThis reflection is most obvious with reference to the order of Nature.\nOur life depends on adapting means to ends; which supposes that we know\ncause and effect in the world around us. A long story is cut short by\nthe adage, \"Knowledge is power\"; otherwise rendered, \"Truth is bliss\".\n\nThe bearing of truth is free from all doubt when the problem is, how to\ngain certain ends--how to be fed, how to get from one place to another,\nhow to cure disease. A new case is presented by the choice of ends. The\ntyrannical French minister, when appealed to by a starving peasantry in\nthe terms, \"We must live,\" replied, \"I do not see the necessity\". There\nwas here no question of true and false, no problem for science to solve.\nIt was a question of ends, and could not be reargued. The only possible\nretort was to ask, \"What does your Excellency consider a necessity?\" If\nthe reply were, \"That I and my King may rule France and be happy,\" then\nmight the starving wretches find some aid from a political scientist who\ncould show that, in the order of nature, ruler and people must stand or\nfall together. So, it is no question of true or false in the order of\nnature, whether I shall adopt, as the end of life, my own gratification\npurely, the good of others purely, or part of both. In like manner the\nBenthamite, who propounds happiness as the general end of human society,\ncannot prove this, as Newton could prove that gravity follows the\ninverse square of the distance; nor can his position be impugned in the\nway that Newton impugned the vortices of Descartes, by showing that they\nwere at variance with fact.\n\nThere is a third case. Assertions are made out of the sphere of the\nsensible world, and beyond the reach of verification by the methods of\nscience. There is a region of the supersensible or supernatural, where\ncause and effect may be affirmed and human interests involved, but where\nwe cannot supply the same evidence or the same confutation as in\nsublunary knowledge. That all human beings shall have an existence after\ndeath is matter of truth or falsehood, but the evidence is of a kind\nthat would not be adduced for proving that a caterpillar becomes a\nbutterfly or that a seed turns to a plant. The reasoning employed, no\ndoubt, makes references to facts of the order of nature; but it is\ncircuitous and analogical, and is admitted merely because better cannot\nbe had.\n\n[THREE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF ASSERTIONS.]\n\nThe peculiarity of this last class of affirmations is that they give\ngreat room for the indulgence of our likings. So little being fixed with\nany precision, we can shape our beliefs to please ourselves. Even as\nregards the sensible world, we can sometimes accommodate our views to\nwhat we wish, as when we assume that our favourite foods and stimulants\nare wholesome; but such license soon meets with checks in the physical\nsphere, while there are no such checks in the realms of the\nsuperphysical.\n\nNow, in all these three departments of opinion, the interest of mankind\nlies in obtaining the best views that can possibly be obtained. As\nregards the first and third--- the region of true and false, one in the\nsensible, the other in the supersensible world--we are clearly\ninterested in getting the truth. As regards the second--the region of\nends--if there be one class of ends preferable to another, we should\nfind out that class.\n\nThe only doubt that can arise anywhere is, whether in the third case--the\ncase of the supernatural,--truth is of the same consequence to us. Such\na doubt, however, begs the whole question at issue. If the truth be of\nno consequence here, it is because we shall never be landed in any\nreality corresponding to what is declared: that the nature of the future\nlife is purely imaginary and not to be converted into fact; in other\nwords, that there is no future life; that there is merely a land of\ndreams and fiction, which can never be proved true and never proved\nfalse. It would then be a projection of thought from the present life,\nand would cease with that life. All that people could claim in the\nmatter would be the liberty of imagination; and this being so, we are\nnot to be committed to any one form. In short, we are to picture what we\nplease in a world that cannot be made out to exist. The point is not, to\nbe true or false; it is, to be well or ill imagined.\n\nWhat, then, is to be the criterion of proper or improper imagination? On\nwhat grounds are we to make our preference between the different schemes\nof the supersensible world? Is each one of us to be free to imagine for\nourselves, or are we to submit to the dictation of others? These\nquestions lead up to another. How far are the interests of the present\nlife concerned in the form given to our conceptions of a future life?\n\nIt would seem to be an unanswerable assumption that, in all the three\nsituations above supposed, we should do the very best that the case\nadmits of. In the order of nature we should get, as far as possible, the\ntruth and the whole truth; in the choice of ends for this life we should\nembrace the best ends; in the shaping of another life we should be free\nto follow out whatever may be the course suitable to the operation.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[EARLY SOURCES OF INTOLERANCE.]\n\nThe means for arriving at truth in the order of nature is an active\nsearch according to certain well-known methods. It farther involves the\nnegative condition of perfect freedom to canvass, to controvert, or to\nrefute, every received doctrine or opinion. There is no use in going\nafter new facts, or in rising to new generalities, if we are not to be\nallowed to displace errors. This is now conceded, except at the points\nof contact of the natural and the supernatural. In spite of the wide\nseparation of the two worlds--the world of fact and the world of\nimagination,--we cannot conceive the second except in terms of the\nfirst; and if the shaping of the supernatural acquires fixity and\nconsecration, the natural facts made use of in the fabric acquire a\ncorresponding fixity, even although the rendering is found to be\ninaccurate. The prevailing conception of a future life needs a view of\nthe separate and independent subsistence of the mental powers of man,\nvery difficult to reconcile with present knowledge.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe growth of intolerance is quite explicable, but the explanation is\nnot necessarily a justification. Although every division of the human\nfamily must have passed through many social phases, and must therefore\nhave experienced revolutionary shocks, yet the rule of man's existence\nhas been a rigorous fixity of institutions, with a hatred of change.\nInnovations, when not the effect of conquest, would be made under the\npressure of some great crisis, or some tremendous difficulty that could\nnot otherwise be met. The idea of individuals being allowed, in quiet\ntimes, to propose alterations in government, in religion, in morals, or\neven in the common arts of life, was thought of only to be stamped out.\nThere was a step in advance of the ancient and habitual order of things,\nwhen an innovating citizen was permitted to make his proposal to the\nassembled tribe, with a rope about his neck, to be drawn tight if he\nfailed to convince his audience. This might make men think twice before\nadvancing new views, but it was not an entire suppression of them.\n\nThe first introduction of the great religions of the world would in each\ncase afford an interesting study of the difficulties of change and of\nthe modes of surmounting these difficulties. There must always have\nconcurred at least two things,--general uneasiness or discontent from\nsome cause or other; and the moral or intellectual ascendency of some\none man, whose views, although original, were yet of a kind to be\nfinally accepted by the people. These conditions are equally shown in\npolitical changes, and are historically illustrated in many notable\ninstances. It is enough to cite the Greek legislation of Lycurgus and of\nSolon.\n\nSuch changes are the exceptions in human affairs; they occur only at\ngreat intervals. In the ordinary course of societies, the governing\npowers not merely adhere to what is established, but forbid under severe\npenalties the very suggestion of change. The chronic misery of the race\nis compatible with unreasoning acquiescence in a state of things once\nestablished; incipient reformers are at once immolated _pour encourager\nles autres_. It is the aim of governments to make themselves\nsuperfluously strong; they take precautions against unfavourable ideas\nno less than against open revolt. In this, they are seconded by the\ngeneral community, which would make things too hot even for a reforming\nking.\n\n[SEPARATION OF RELIGION FROM POLITICS.]\n\nIt is said by the evolution or historical school of politicians, that\nthis was all as it should be. The free permission to question the\nexisting institutions, political and religious, would have been\nincompatible with stability. In early society more especially, religion\nand morality were a part of civil government; a dissenter in religion\nwas the same thing as a rebel in politics; the distinction between the\ncivil and the religious could not yet be drawn.\n\nWithout saying whether this was the case or not--for I should not like\nto commit myself to the position, \"Whatever was, was right\" at the\ntime--I trust we are now far on the way to being agreed that the civil\nand the religious are no longer to be identified; that the State, as a\nstate, is not concerned to uphold any one form of religious belief.\nModern civilized communities are believed capable of existing without\nan official religion; the citizens being free to form themselves into\nself-governed religious bodies, as various as the prevailing modes of\nreligious belief. It may be long ere this goal be fully reached; but\neven the upholders of the present state religions admit that, supposing\nthese were not in existence, nobody would now propose to institute them.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe foregoing remarks may appear somewhat desultory, as well as too\nbrief for the extent of the theme. They must be accepted, however, as an\nintroduction to a more limited topic, which presupposes in some measure\nthe general principle of toleration by the state of all forms of\nreligious opinion. Whether with or without established religions,\nperfect freedom of dissent is now demanded, and, with some hankering\nreservations, pretty generally conceded. Individuals are allowed to\ncongregate into religious societies, on the most various and opposite\ncreeds.\n\nSo far good. Yet there remains a difficulty. Long before the age of\ntoleration, when each state had an established religion, the people in\ngeneral formed their habits of religious observance in connection with\nthe State Church--its doctrines, its ritual, its buildings, and its\nsacred places. When disruption took place, the separatists formed\nthemselves into societies on the original model, merely dropping the\nmatters of disagreement. Fixity of creed and of ritual was still\nenacted; the only remedy for dissatisfaction on either subject was to\nswarm afresh, and set up a new variety of doctrine or of ritual, to\nwhich a rigid adherence was still expected as a condition of membership.\n\nBy this costly and troublesome process, Churches have been multiplied\naccording to the changes of view among sections of the community. A\ncertain energy of conviction has always been necessary to such a result.\nEqually great changes of opinion occur among members of the older Church\ncommunities, without inducing them to break with these; so that nominal\nmembership ceases to be a mark of real adhesion to the articles of\nbelief.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[EVILS OF PENAL RESTRAINT ON DISCUSSION.]\n\nThese few commonplaces are meant to introduce the enquiry--now a\npressing one--whether, and how far, fixed creeds are desirable or\nexpedient in religious bodies generally; no difference being made\nbetween state Churches and voluntary Churches. This is the question of\nSubscription to Articles by the clergy.\n\nLet us now review the evils attendant on subscription, and next consider\nthe objections to its removal.\n\nIn the first place, the process of restraining discussion by penal tests\nis inherently untenable, absurd, and fallacious.\n\nIn support of this strong assertion, we have only to repeat, that every\nman has an interest in getting at the truth, and consequently in\nwhatever promotes that end. We live by the truth; error is death. To\nstand between a man and the attainment of truth, is to inflict an injury\nof incalculable amount. The circumstances wherein the prohibition of\ntruth is desirable, must be extraordinary and altogether exceptional.\nThe few may have a self-interest in withholding truth from the many;\nneither the few nor the many have an interest in its being withheld from\nthemselves. Each one of us has the most direct concern in knowing on\nwhat plan this universe is constituted, what are its exact arrangements\nand laws. Whether for the present life, or for any other life, we must\nsteer our course by our knowledge, and that knowledge needs to be true.\nObstruction to the truth recoils upon the obstructors. To flee to the\nrefuge of lies is not the greatest happiness of anybody.\n\nIt has been maintained that there are illusions so beneficial as to be\npreferable to truth. Occasionally, in private life, we practise little\ndeceptions upon individuals when the truth would cause some great\ntemporary mischief. This case need not be discussed. The important\ninstance is in reference to religious belief. A benevolent Deity and a\nfuture life are so cheering and consoling, it is said, that they should\nbe secured against challenge or criticism; they ought not to be weakened\nby discussion. This, of course, assumes that these doctrines are unable\nto maintain themselves against opponents, that, with all their intrinsic\ncharm (which nobody can be indifferent to), they would give way under a\nfree handling. Such a confession is fatal. Men will go on cherishing\npleasing illusions, but not such as need to be _protected_ in order to\nexist. According to Plato, the belief in the goodness of the Deity was\nof so great importance that it was to be maintained by state\npenalties--about the worst way of making the belief efficacious for its\nend. What should we think of an Act passed to imprison whoever disputed\nthe goodness of King Alfred, the Man of Ross, or Howard?\n\nGranting that certain illusions are highly beneficial, it does not\nfollow that they are to be exempted from criticism. Their effect depends\non the prestige of their truth. That is, they must have reasons on their\nside. But a doctrine is not supported by reasons, unless the objections\nare stated and answered; not sham objections, but the real difficulties\nof an enquiring mind. If the statement of such difficulties is forcibly\nsuppressed, the rational foundations will sooner or later be sapped.\n\n[FREEDOM ESSENTIAL TO THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH.]\n\nIf illusions are themselves good, freedom of thought will give us the\nbest. Why should we protect inferior illusions against the discovery of\nthe superior? The unfettered march of the intellect may improve the\nquality of our illusions as illusions, while also strengthening their\nfoundations. If religion be a good thing, the best religion is the best\nthing; and we cannot be sure of having the best, if men are forbidden to\nmake a search.\n\nSupposing, then, truth is desirable, the means to the end are desirable.\nNow one of the means is perfect liberty to call in question every\nopinion whatsoever. This is not all that is necessary; it is not even\nthe principal condition of the discovery of new truth. It is, however,\nan indispensable adjunct, a negative condition. While laborious search\nfor facts, care in comparing them, genius in detecting deep identities,\nare the highways to knowledge,--the permission to promulgate new\ndoctrines and to counter-argue the old is equally essential. Men cannot\nbe expected to go through the toil of making discoveries at the hazard\nof persecution. If a few have done so, it is their glory and everybody\nelse's shame.\n\nThat the torch of truth should be shaken till it shine, is generally\nadmitted. Still, exceptions are made; otherwise the present argument\nwould be superfluous. On certain subjects there is a demand for\nprotection against innovating views. The implication is that, in these\nsubjects, truth is better arrived at by delegating the search to a few,\nand treating their judgment as final. I need not ask where we should\nhave been, if this mode of arriving at truth had been followed\nuniversally. The monopoly of enquiry claimed for the higher subjects,\nif set up in the lower, would be treated as the empire of darkness.\n\nSecond. The subscription to articles, and the enforcement of a creed by\npenalties, are nugatory for their own purpose; they fail to secure\nuniformity of belief.\n\nThis is shown in various ways. For instance, to inculcate adhesion to\na set of articles, is merely to ensure that none shall use words that\nformally deny one or other of the doctrines prescribed. It does not say,\nthat the subscriber shall teach the whole round of doctrines, in their\ndue order and proportion. A preacher may at pleasure omit from his\npulpit discourses any single doctrine; so that, in so far as his\nministrations are concerned, to the hearers such doctrine is\nnon-existent; without being denied, it is ignored. Against omission,\na prosecution for heresy would not hold. In this way, the clergy have\nalways had a certain amount of liberty, and have freely used it. In so\ndoing, they have altered the whole character of the prescribed creed,\nwithout being technically heterodox. Everyone of us has listened to\npreachers of this description. Some ignore the Trinity, some the\nAtonement; many nowadays, without denying future punishment, never\nmention hell to ears polite. If the rigorous exclusion of a leading\ndoctrine should excite misgivings, a very slight, formal, and passing\nadmission may be made, while the stress of exhortation is thrown upon\nquite different points.\n\n[SUBSCRIPTION FAILS TO ATTAIN ITS END.]\n\nTo attain a conviction for heresy, involving deprivation of office, the\nforms of justice must be respected. It is only under peculiar\ncircumstances, that the ecclesiastical authority can be content with\nsaying, \"I do not like thee, Dr. Fell, or Dr. Smith, and I depose thee\naccordingly\". A regular trial, with proof of specific contradiction of\nspecific articles, allowing the accused the full benefit of his\nexplanations, must be the rule in every corporation that respects\njustice. In the Church of England, a man cannot be deprived unless he\ncontradict the articles clearly and consistently; the smallest\nincoherence on his part, the slightest vacillation in the rigour of his\ndenial, is enough to save him. We may easily imagine, therefore, how\nwidely a clergyman may stray from the fair, ordinary, current rendering\nof the doctrines of the Church, without danger. The whole essence of\nChristianity may be perverted under a few cunning precautions and by\nobserving a few verbal formalities.\n\nIt has been pointed out, many times over, that the legally imposed\ncreeds were the creatures of accident and circumstances at the time of\ntheir enactment, and are wholly unsuitable to the conservation of the\nmore permanent and essential articles of the Christian faith. The amount\nof heresy, as against the more truly representative doctrines, that may\npass through their meshes is very great.\n\nThis weakness is aggravated by another--the want of any provision for\namending the creed from time to time. If it were desirable to adopt\nmeasures for maintaining uniformity of opinions among the clergy, the\ncreed should be excised, or added to, according to the needs of every\nage. That this is not done, shows that the machinery of tests is\naltogether abnormal; it is not within the type of regular legislation.\nThat any given creed should be regarded as out of keeping, as both\nredundant and defective, and yet that the ecclesiastical authority\nshould shrink from applying a remedy to its most obvious defects, proves\nthat the system itself is bad. All healthy legislation lends itself to\nperpetual improvement; that the enactments of articles of belief cannot\nbe reconsidered, is a sign of rottenness.\n\nA third objection to tests is, that mere dogmatic uniformity, if it were\nmore complete than any tests can make it, is at best but a part of the\nreligious character. It does nothing to secure or promote fervour,\nfeeling, the emotional element in religion. It is by moral heat, far\nmore than by its mould of doctrine, that religion influences mankind.\nThere is no means of censuring preachers for coldness or languid\nindifference; or rather, there is another and more legitimate means than\npenal prosecutions, namely, expressed dissatisfaction and the preference\nof those that excel in the quality. A warm, glowing manner, an unctuous\ndelivery, commands hearers and conducts to popularity and importance.\nThe men of cold and unfeeling natures may get into office, but they are\nlightly esteemed. They are not had up to a public trial and deposed, but\nthey are treated, and spoken of, in such a way as to discourage men of\ntheir type from becoming preachers, and to encourage the other sort.\nThere are many qualifications that go to forming a good preacher; the\nholding of the creed of the body is only one. Yet, with the exception of\ngross immorality or abandonment of duty, correctness of creed is the\nonly one that is subjected to the extreme penalty of loss of office; the\nothers are secured by different means. Is it too much to infer that,\nwithout the extreme penalty, a reasonable conformity to the prevailing\ncreed might also be secured?\n\n[ELEMENT OF FEELING NOT SECURED.]\n\nThe importance of the element of feeling has been most perceived in\ntimes when the religious current was strongest. At these times, its\nexpression would not be hemmed in by rigorous formulas. The first\ncommunication of religious doctrines has always partaken of a broad and\nfree rendering; apparent discrepancies were disregarded. To reduce all\nthe utterances of the prophets and the apostles to definite forms and\nrigid dogmas, was to misconceive the situation. We may well suppose that\nthe New Testament writers would have refused to subscribe the Athanasian\nCreed or the Westminster Confession; not because these were in flat\ncontradiction to Scripture, but because the way of embodying the\nreligious verities in these documents would be repugnant to their ideas\nof form in such matters. The creed-builders may have been never so\nanxious to give exact equivalents of the original authorities; yet their\nfine distinctions and subtle logic would have, in all probability, been\nranked by Paul and Peter among the latter-day perversions of the faith.\nThe very composition of a creed would have been as distasteful to the\nfirst century, as it is incongruous to the nineteenth.\n\nThe evil operation of religious tests, and of the accompanying\nintolerance of the public mind as shown towards any form of dissent from\nthe stereotyped orthodoxy, admits of a very wide handling. It is of\ncourse the problem of religious liberty. Some parts of the argument need\nto be reproduced here, to help us in replying to the objections against\nan unconditional abolition of compulsory creeds.\n\nIn conversing, many years ago, with the late Jules Mohl, the great\nOriental scholar, professor of Persian in the College de France, I was\nmuch struck with his account of the nature of his duties as an expounder\nof the modern Persian authors. These authors, for example the poet Sadi,\nwere in creed adherents of the ancient Persian fire-worship,\nnotwithstanding the Mohammedan conquest of their country. They were, of\ncourse, forbidden to avow that creed directly; and in consequence, they\nhad recourse to a form of composition by _doubles entendres_, veiling\nthe ancient creed under Mohammedan forms. Mohl's business, as their\nexpounder, was to strip off the disguise and show the true bearings of\nthe writers, under their show of conformity to the established opinions.\n\nThis is a typical illustration of what has happened in Europe for more\nthan two thousand years. The first recorded martyr to free speculation\nin philosophy was Anaxagoras in Greece. Muleted in the sum of five\ntalents, and expelled from Athens, he was considered fortunate in being\nallowed to retire to Lampsacus and end his days there. His fate,\nhowever, was soon eclipsed by the execution of Socrates,--an event\nwhereby the Athenian burghers were enabled to bias the expression of\nfree opinions from that time to this. The first person to feel the shock\nwas Plato. That he was affected by it, to the extent of suppressing his\nviews on the higher questions, we can infer with the greatest\nprobability.\n\n[CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXECUTION OF SOCRATES.]\n\nAristotle was equally cowed. A little before his death, the chief priest\nof Eleusis, following the Socratic precedent, entered an indictment\nagainst him for impiety. This indictment was supported by citations of\ncertain heretical doctrines from his published writings; on which Grote\nmakes the significant remark, that his paean in honour of his friend\nHermeias would be more offensive to the feelings of an ordinary Athenian\ncitizen than any philosophical dogma extracted from the _cautious prose\ncompositions_ of Aristotle. That is to say, the execution of Socrates\nwas always before his eyes; he had to pare his expressions so as not to\ngive offence to Athenian orthodoxy. We can never know the full bearings\nof such a disturbing force. The editors of Aristotle complain of the\ncorruptness of his text; a far worse corruptness lies behind. In Greece,\nSocrates alone had the courage of his opinions. While his views as to a\nfuture life, for example, are plain and frank, the real opinion of\nAristotle on the question is an insoluble problem. Now, considering the\nenormous sway of Aristotle in modern Europe,--how desirable was it that\nhis real sentiments had reached us unperverted by the Athenian burgher\nand the hemlock!\n\nIt would be too adventurous to continue the illustration in detail\nthrough the Christian ages. It is well known that the later schoolmen\nstrove to represent reason as against authority, but wrote under the\ncurb of the Papal power; hence their aims can only be divined. A modern\ninstance or two will be still more effective.\n\nIt can at last be clearly seen what was the motive of Carlyle's\nperplexing style of composition. We now know what his opinions were,\nwhen he began to write, and that to express them then would have been\nfatal to his success; yet he was not a man to indulge in rank hypocrisy.\nHe, accordingly, adopted a studied and ambiguous phraseology, which for\nlong imposed upon the religious public, who put their own interpretation\nupon his mystical utterances, and gave him the benefit of any doubts. In\nthe \"Life of Sterling\" he threw off the mask, but still was not taken at\nhis word. Had there been a perfect tolerance of all opinions he would\nhave begun as he ended; and his strain of composition, while still\nmystical and high-flown, would never have been identified with our\nnational orthodoxy.\n\nI have grave doubts as to whether we possess Macaulay's real opinions on\nreligion. His way of dealing with the subject is so like the hedging of\nan unbeliever that, without some good assurance to the contrary, I must\ninclude him also among the imitators of Aristotle's \"caution\". Some\nfuture critic will devote himself, like Professor Mohl, to expounding\nhis ambiguous utterances.\n\n[EVIL OF DISFRANCHISING THE CLERGY.]\n\nWhen Sir Charles Lyell brought out his \"Antiquity of Man\" he too was\ncautious. Knowing the dangers of his footing, he abstained from giving\nan estimate of the extension of time required by his evidences of human\nremains. Society in London, however, would not put up with that\nreticence, and he had to disclose at dinner parties what he had withheld\nfrom the public--namely, that, in his opinion, the duration of man\ncould not be less than fifty thousand years.\n\nThese few instances must suffice to represent a long history of\ncompelled reticence on the part of the men best qualified to instruct\nmankind. The question now is--What has been gained by it? What did the\ncondemnation of Socrates do for the Athenian public? What did the chief\npriest of Eleusis hope to attain by indicting Aristotle? Unless we can\nshow, as is no doubt attempted, that the set of opinions that happen to\nbe consecrated at any one time, whether right or wrong, were essential\nto the existence of society,--then the attempt to improve upon them was\ntruly meritorious, instead of being censurable. If the good of society\nas a whole is not plainly implicated, there remains only the interest of\nthe place-holders under the existing system, as opposed to the interest\nof the mass of the people, who are, one and all, concerned in knowing\nthe truth.\n\nAgain contracting the discussion to the narrow limits of the title of\nthe essay, I must urge the special injury done to mankind by\ndisfranchising the whole clerical class; that is to say, by depriving\ntheir authority of its proper weight in matters of faith. It is an\nincontrovertible rule of evidence, that the authority of an interested\nparty is devoid of worth. Reasons are good in themselves, whoever utters\nthem; but in trusting to authority, apart from reason, we need a\ndisinterested authority. This the clergy at present are not, except on\nthe points left undecided by the articles. If a man has five thousand a\nyear, conditional on his holding certain views, his holding those views\nsays nothing in their favour. For a much less bribe, plenty of men can\nbe 'got to maintain any opinions whatsoever. When to this is added that,\nfor certain other views, the holders are subjected to loss--it may be\nto fine, imprisonment, or death,--the value of men's adhesion to the\nfavoured creed, as mere authority, is simply _nil_.\n\nTruth, honesty, outspokenness, are not so well established as virtues,\nthat we can afford to subject them to discouragement. The contrary\ncourse would be more for the general good in every way. When the law is\nintolerant in principle, men will be hypocrites from policy. You cannot\ntrain children to speak the truth if, from whatever cause, they have an\ninterest in deception. A repressive discipline induces a coarse outward\nsubmission, but cannot reach the inward parts: it only engenders hatred,\nand substitutes for open revolt an insidious secret retaliation. Those\nonly that come under the generous nurture of freedom can be counted on\nfor hearty and willing devotion. If we would reap the higher virtues, we\nmust sow on the soil of liberty. Encourage a man to say whatever he\nthinks, and you make the most of him; for difficult questions, where the\nmind needs all its powers, there should be no burdensome 'caution' in\ngiving out the results.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[RELAXATION NOW PRESSING.]\n\nThe imposing of subscription has its defenders, and these have to be\nfairly met. First, however, let us advert to the reasons why relaxation\nis more pressing now than formerly.\n\nIt is known that, among dissentients from the leading dogmas of the\nprevailing creed of Christendom, are to be included some of the most\nauthoritative names of the last three centuries; our present formulas\nwould not have been subscribed by Bacon, Newton, Locke, Kant; unless\nfrom mere pliancy and for the sake of quiet, like Hobbes. If they had\nbeen in clerical orders, and had freely avowed their opinions as we know\nthem, they would have been liable to deposition. Yet the difficulties\nthat these men might feel were far less than those that now beset the\nprofession of our prevailing creeds. The advances of knowledge on all\nthe subjects that come into contact with the various articles, as\nreceived by the orthodox Churches, may not, indeed, compel the\nrelinquishment of those articles, but will force the holders to change\nfront, to re-shape them in different forms. To such necessary\nmodification, the creeds are a fatal obstacle. On a few points, such as\nthe Creation in six days, these have been found elastic. The doctrine\nthat death came by the fall has been explained away as spiritual death.\nThis process cannot go much further, without too much paltering with\nobvious meanings. The recently-proclaimed doctrine of the Antiquity of\nMan comes into apparent conflict with man's creation and fall, as set\nforth in Genesis, on which are suspended the most vital doctrines of our\ncreed. A reconciliation may be possible, but not without a very\nextensive modification of the scheme of the Atonement. It is not\nnecessary to press Darwin's doctrine of Evolution; the deficiency of\npositive proof for that hypothesis may always be pleaded, as against the\nhavoc it would make with the more distinctive points of Christian\ndoctrine. But the existence of man on the earth, at the very lowest\nstatement, must be carried back twenty thousand years; this is not\nhypothesis, but fact. The record of the creation and the fall of man\nwill probably have to be subjected to a process of allegorising, but\nwith inevitable loss. Now, whoever refuses a matter of fact counts on\nbeing severely handled; it is a different thing to refuse an allegory.\n\nThe modern doctrine named the \"struggle for existence\" is the old\ndifficulty, known as \"the origin of evil,\" presented in a new shape. It\nis rendered more formidable, as a stumbling-block to the benevolence of\nthe Author of nature, by making what was considered exceptional the\nrule. It gathers up into one comprehensive statement the scattered\noccasions of misery, and reveals a system whereby the few thrive at the\nexpense of the many. The apologist for Divine goodness has thus an\naggravation of his load, and needs to be freed from all unnecessary\ntrammels in the shaping of his creed.\n\n[OPPOSING DOGMAS TO THE RECONCILED.]\n\nIt has not escaped attention, that the honours paid to the illustrious\nDarwin, are an admission that our received Christianity is open to\nrevision. In consequence of a few conciliatory phrases, Darwin has been\ncredited with theism; nevertheless he has ridden rough-shod over all\nthat is characteristic in our established creeds. Can the creeds come\nscathless out of the ordeal?\n\nIt is passing from the greater to the less, to dwell upon the increasing\ndifficulties connected with the Inspiration of the Bible. The\nChurch-of-Englander luckily escapes making shipwreck here; the legal\ninterpretation of the formularies saves him. Yet to mankind, generally,\nit seems necessary that a superior weight should attach to a revealed\nbook; and the other Churches cling to some form of inspiration,\nnotwithstanding the growing difficulties attending it. Here too there\nmust be more freedom given to the men that would extricate the\nsituation. At all events, the doctrine should be made an open question.\nEven Cardinal Newman suggests doubts as to its being an imperative\nportion of the creed.\n\nThe attacks made on all sides against the Miraculous element in religion\nwill force on a change of front. When an eminent popular writer and\nsincere friend of the Church of England surrenders miracles without the\nslightest compunction, it needs not the elaborate argumentation of\n\"Supernatural Religion\" to show that some new treatment of the question\nis called for. But may it not be impossible to put the new wine into the\nsworn bottles?\n\nLike most great innovations, the proposal to liberate the clergy from\nall restraint as to the opinions that they may promulgate, necessarily\nencounters opposition. We are, therefore, bound to consider the reasons\non the other side.\n\nThese reasons may be quoted in mass. As regards Established Churches in\nparticular, it is said there is a State compact or understanding with\nthe clergy that they should teach certain doctrines and no other; that\nif tests were abolished, there would be no security against the most\nextreme opinions; men eating the bread of a Reformed Church might\ninculcate Romanism instead of Protestantism; the pulpits might give\nforth Deism or Agnosticism. No sect could hope to maintain its\nprinciples, if the clergy might preach any doctrine that pleased\nthemselves. More especially would it be monstrous and unjust, to allow\nthe rich benefices of our highly endowed Church of England to be enjoyed\nby men whose hearts are in some quite different form of religion, or no\nreligion, and who would occupy themselves in drawing men away from the\nfaith.\n\nOn certain assumptions, these arguments have great force. Clearly a man\nought not to take pay for doing one thing and do something quite\ndifferent. When a body of religionists come together upon certain\ntenets, it would be a _reductio ad absurdum_ for any of its ministers to\nbe occupied in denying and controverting these tenets.\n\nAll this supposes, however, that men will not be made to conform by any\nmeans short of prosecution and deprivation; that the suspending of a\nsevere penalty over men's heads is in itself a harmless device; and that\nreligious systems are now stereotyped to our satisfaction, so that to\ndeviate from them is mere wantonness and love of singularity. Such are\nthe assumptions that we feel called upon to challenge.\n\nThe plea that the Church has engaged itself to the State to teach\ncertain tenets, in return for its emoluments and privileges, has lost\nits point in our time. 'L'etat, c'est moi.' The Church and the State are\ncomposed of the same persons. Gibbon's famous _mot_ has collapsed. 'The\nreligions of the Roman world,' he says, 'were all considered by the\npeople as equally true, by the philosopher as equally false, and by the\nmagistrate as equally useful' The people are now their own magistrates,\nand the true and the useful must contrive to unite upon the same thing.\nIf the Church feels subscription and fixity of creed a burden, it has\nonly to turn its members to account in their capacity of citizens of the\nState to relieve itself. If it silently ignores the creed, it is still\nresponsible mainly to itself.\n\n[POSSIBLE ABUSES OF CLERICAL FREEDOM.]\n\nThe more serious objection is the possible abuse of the freedom of the\nclergy to utter opinions at variance with the prevailing creed. This\nposition needs a careful scrutiny.\n\nIn the first place, the argument: supposes a condition of things that\nhas now ceased. When creeds were accepted in their literality by the\nbodies professing them, when the state of general opinion contained\nnothing hostile, and suggested no difficulties,--for any one member of a\nbody to turn traitor may have well seemed mere perversity, temper, love\nof singularity, or anything but a wish to get at truth. The offence\nassumed the character of a moral obliquity, and discipline can never be\nrelaxed for immorality proper.\n\nAll the circumstances are now changed. The ministers and members of\nreligious communities no longer cherish the same set of doctrines with\nonly immaterial varieties; they no longer accept their articles in the\nsense of the original framers. The body at large has contracted the\nimmoral taint; the whole head is sick; any remaining soundness is not\nwith the acquiescent mass, but with the out-spoken individuals. In such\na state of things, ordinary rules are inapplicable. There is a sort of\nparalysis of authority, an uncertainty whether to punish or to wink at\nflagrant heresy. To say in such a case that the relaxation of the creed\nis not a thing to be proposed, is to confess, like Livy on the condition\nof Rome, that we can endure neither our vices nor their remedies.\n\nToo much has at all times been made of individual divergences from the\nestablished creed. The influence of a solitary preacher smitten with the\nlove of heretical peculiarity has been grossly overrated. The assumption\nis, that his own flock will, as a matter of course, follow their\nshepherd; that is to say, the adhesion of individual congregations to\nthe creed of the Church depends upon its being faithfully reproduced by\ntheir regular minister. Such is not by any means the fact; the creed of\nthe members of a Church is not at the mercy of any passing influence.\nIt has been engrained by a plurality of influences; one man did not make\nit, and one man cannot unmake it. Moreover, allowance should be made for\nthe spirit of opposition found in Church members, as well as in other\npeople.\n\n[INDIVIDUAL DIVERGENCES UNIMPORTANT.]\n\nIt may be said that persons ought not to be subjected to the annoyance\nof hearing attacks upon their hereditary tenets, in which they expect\nto be more and more confirmed by their spiritual teacher. This is of\ncourse, in itself, an evil. We are not to expect ordinary men to\nrecognise the necessity of listening to the arguments against their\nviews, in order to hold these all the stronger. If this height were\ngenerally reached, every Church would invite, as a part of its\nconstituted machinery, a representative of all the heresies afloat; a\ncertain number of its ministers should be the avowed champions of the\nviews most opposed to its own--_advocati diaboli_, so to speak. There\nwould then be nothing irregular in the retention of converts from its\nown number to these other doctrines. It would be, however, altogether\nimproper to found any argument on the supposition of such a state of\nmatters.\n\nIt is an incident of every institution made up of a large collection of\nofficials, that some one or more are always below the standard of\nefficiency, whence those that depend on their services must suffer\ninconvenience. A great amount of dulness in preaching has always to be\ntolerated; so also might an occasional deviation from orthodoxy; the\nmore so, that the severity of the discipline for heresy has a good deal\nto do with the dulness.\n\nIf heretical tendencies have shown themselves in a Church communion,\neither they are absurd, unmeaning, irrelevant--perhaps a reversion to\nsome defunct opinion,--or they are the suggestion of new knowledge in\ntheology, or outside of it. In the first case, they will die a natural\ndeath, unless prosecution gives them importance; in the other case, they\nare to be candidly examined, to be met by argument rather than by\ndeposition. An individual heretic can always be neglected; if he is\nenthusiastic and able, he may have a temporary following, especially\nwhen the community has sunk into torpor. If two or three in a hundred\nadopt erroneous opinions, it is nothing; if thirty or forty in a hundred\nhave been led astray, the matter hangs dubious, and discretion is\nadvisable. When a majority is gained, the fulness of the time has\narrived; the heresy has triumphed.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nHowever strong may be the theoretical reasons for the abolition of the\npenal sanctions to orthodoxy, they do not dispense with the confirmation\nof experience; and I must next refer to the more prominent examples of\nChurches constituted on the principle of freedom to the clergy.\n\n[THE ENGLISH PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH EXEMPLARY.]\n\nThe most remarkable and telling instance is that furnished by the\nEnglish Presbyterian Church, with its coadjutor in Ireland. The history\nof this Church is not unfamiliar to us; the great lawsuit relating to\nLady Hewley's charity gave notoriety to the changes of opinion that had\ncome over it in the course of a century. But whoever is earnest on the\nquestion as to the expediency of tests should study the history\nthoroughly, as being in every way most instructive. The leading facts,\nas concerns the present argument, are mainly these:--\n\nFirst, the great decision at the Salters' Hall conference, on the 10th\nof March, 1719, when, by a majority of 73 to 69, it was resolved to\nexact no test from the clergy as a condition of their being ordained\nministers of the body. The point more immediately at issue was the\nTrinity, on which opinions had been already divided; but the decision\nwas general. The principle of the right of private judgment admitted of\nno exceptions.\n\nSecond. Long before this decision, the minds of the ministers had been\nripening to the conviction, that creeds and subscriptions could do no\ngood, and often did harm, indeed, the terms employed by some of them are\neverything that we now desire. For example, Joseph Hunter, on the eve of\nthe decision, wrote thus: \"We have always thought that such human\ndeclarations of faith were far from being eligible on their own account,\nsince they tend to narrow the foundations of Christianity and to\nrestrain that latitude of expression in which our great Legislator has\nseen fit to deliver His Will to us\".\n\nThird. Most remarkable is it to witness the consequences of this great\nact of emancipation. A hundred and sixty-five years have elapsed--a\nsufficient time for judging of the experiment. The Presbyterian body at\nthe time were made up partly of Arians, partly of Trinitarians, who held\neach other in mutual tolerance; the ministers freely exchanging pulpits.\nNo bad consequence followed. We do not hear of individual ministers\ngoing to extravagant lengths in either direction. A large body\ngravitated, in the course of time, to the modern Unitarian position;\nbut, considering the start, the stride was not great. In such a century\nas the eighteenth, there might well have been greater modifications of\nthe creeds than actually occurred. Evidently, in the absence of any\ncompulsory adherence to settled articles, there was an abundant tendency\nto conservatism. Commencing with Baxter, Howe, and Calamy, we find, in\nthe course of the century, such names as Lardner, Price, Priestley,\nBelsham, Kippis, James Lindsay, Lant Carpenter--men of liberal and\nenlightened views on all political questions, and earnest in their good\nworks. These men's testimony to what is truth in religion, is of more\nvalue to us than the opinions of the creed-bound clergy. Reason is still\nreason, but the weight of authority is with the free enquirers.\n\nFourth. The history of the Presbyterians answers a question that may be\nproperly asked of the creed-abolitionist; namely, What bond is left to\nhold a religious community together? The bond, in their case, simply was\nvoluntary adhesion and custom. A religious community may hold together,\nlike a political party, with only a vague tacit understanding. When a\nbody is once formed, it has an outward cohesion, which is quite enough\nfor maintaining it in the absence of explosive materials. The\nestablished Churches could retain their historical continuity under any\nmodification of the articles. By the present system, they have been\nhabituated to take their creed as their legal definition; for that they\ncould substitute their history and framework.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[MODES OF TRANSITION FROM THE PRESENT SYSTEM.]\n\nVarious modes have been suggested for making the transition from the\npresent system.\n\nOne way is, to fall back upon the Bible as a test. This is the same as\nno test at all. A man could not call himself a Christian minister, if he\ndid not accept the Bible in some sense; and it would be obviously\nimpracticable to frame a libel, and conduct a process for heresy, on an\nappeal to the Old and New Testaments at large. The Bible may be the\nfirst source of the Christian faith, but other confluent streams have\nentered into its development; and we must accept the consequences of a\nfact that we cannot deny. However much religion may have to be broadened\nand liberalised, the operation cannot consist in reverting to the\nliteral phraseology of the Bible.\n\nA second method is, to prune away the portions of the creed that are no\nlonger tenable. It could not have been intended by the original framers\nof the creeds, that they should remain untouched for centuries. With\nmany Churches, there was a clear understanding that the formulas should\nbe revised at brief intervals. The non-established Churches show a\ndisposition to resume this power. The United Presbyterian Church of\nScotland has had the courage to make a beginning; still, relief will not\nin this way be given to minorities, and small changes do not correspond\nto the demands of new situations.\n\nA more effectual mode is to discourage and suspend prosecutions for\nheresy. The practice of heresy-hunting might be allowed to fall into\ndisuse. Instead of deposing heretics, the orthodox champions should\nsimply refute them.\n\nIn the Church of England, in particular, a change of the law may be\nnecessary to give the desired relaxation. The judges before whom\nheretics are tried are very exacting in the matter of evidence, but they\ncannot stop a prosecution made in regular form. The Church of Scotland\nhas more latitude in this respect, and has already given indications of\nentering on the path leading to desuetude.[17]\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 17: See, at the end, Notes and References on the history and\npractice of Subscription and Penal Tests.]\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nIX.\n\nTHE PROCEDURE OF DELIBERATIVE BODIES.[18]\n\n\nThat great institution of political liberty, the Deliberative Assembly,\nseems to be on the eve of breaking down. I do not speak merely of the\nhighest assembly in the country, but of the numerous smaller bodies as\nwell, from many of which a cry of distress may be heard. The one evil in\nall is the intolerable length of the debates. Business has increased,\nlocal representative bodies have a larger membership than formerly, and,\nnotwithstanding the assistance rendered by committees, the meetings are\nprotracted beyond bounds.\n\nIn this difficulty, attention naturally fastens, in the first instance,\non the fact that the larger part of the speaking is entirely useless;\nneither informing nor convincing any of the hearers, and yet occupying\nthe time allotted for the despatch of business. How to eliminate and\nsuppress this ineffectual oratory would appear to be the point to\nconsider. But as Inspiration itself did not reveal a mode of separating\nin advance the tares from the wheat, so there is not now any patent\nprocess for insuring that, in the debates of corporate bodies, the good\nspeaking, and only the good speaking, shall be allowed.\n\nPartial solutions of the difficulty are not wanting. The inventors of\ncorporate government--the Greeks, were necessarily the inventors of the\nforms of debate, and they introduced the timing of the speakers. To this\nis added, occasionally, the selection of the speakers, a practice that\ncould be systematically worked, if nothing else would do. Both methods\nhave their obvious disadvantages. The arbitrary selection of speakers,\neven by the most impartial Committee of Selection, would, according to\nour present notions, seem to infringe upon a natural right, the right of\neach member of a body to deliver an opinion, and give the reasons for\nit. It would seem like reviving the censorship of the press, to allow\nonly a select number to be heard on all occasions.\n\nMay not something be done to circumvent this vast problem? May there not\nbe a greater extension given to maxims and forms of procedure already in\nexistence?\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[OBVIATING HURRIED DECISIONS.]\n\nFirst, then, we recognize in various ways the propriety of obviating\nhurried and unpremeditated decisions. Giving previous notice of motions\nhas that end in view; although, perhaps, this is more commonly regarded\nsimply as a protection to absentees. Advantage is necessarily taken of\nthe foreknowledge of the business to prepare for the debates. It is a\nfarther help, that the subject has been already discussed somewhere or\nother by a committee of the body, or by the agency of the public press.\nVery often an assembly is merely called upon to decide upon the adoption\nof a proposal that has been long canvassed out of doors. The task of the\nspeakers is then easy--we might almost say no speaking should be\nrequired: but this is to anticipate.\n\nIn legislation by Parliament, the forms allow repetition of the debates\nat least three times in both Houses. This is rather a cumbrous and\ncostly remedy for the disadvantage, in debate, of having to reply to a\nspeaker who has just sat down. In principle, no one ought to be called\nto answer an argumentative speech on the spur of the moment. The\ngenerality of speakers are utterly unfit for the task, and accordingly\ndo it ill. A few men, by long training, acquire the power of casting\ntheir thoughts into speaking train, so as to make a good appearance in\nextempore reply; yet even these would do still better if they had a\nlittle time. The adjournment of a debate, and the reopening of a\nquestion at successive stages, furnish the real opportunities for\neffective reply. In a debate begun and ended at one sitting, the\nspeaking takes very little of the form of an exhaustive review, by each\nspeaker, of the speeches that went before.\n\nIt is always reckoned a thing of course to take the vote as soon as the\ndebate is closed. There are some historical occasions when a speech on\none side has been so extraordinarily impressive that an adjournment has\nbeen moved to let the fervour subside; but it is usually not thought\ndesirable to let a day elapse between the final reply and the division.\nThis is a matter of necessity in the case of the smaller corporations,\nwhich have to dispose of all current business at one sitting; but when a\nbody meets for a succession of days, it would seem to be in accordance\nwith sound principle not to take the vote on the same day as the debate.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[ASSUMPTIONS AT THE BASIS OF ORAL DEBATE.]\n\nThese few remarks upon one important element of procedure are meant to\nclear the way for a somewhat searching examination of the principles\nthat govern the, entire system of oral debate. It is this practice that\nI propose to put upon its trial. The grounds of the practice I take to\nbe the following:--\n\n1. That each member of a deliberative body shall be provided with a\ncomplete statement of the facts and reasons in favour of a proposed\nmeasure, and also an equally complete account of whatever can be said\nagainst it. And this is a requirement I would concede to the fullest\nextent. No decision should be asked upon a question until the reasonings\n_pro_ and _con_ are brought fairly within the reach of every one; to\nwhich I would add--in circumstances that give due time for consideration\nof the whole case.\n\n2. The second ground is that this ample provision of arguments, for and\nagainst, should be made by oral delivery. Whatever opportunities members\nmay have previously enjoyed for mastering a question, these are all\ndiscounted when the assembly is called to pronounce its decision. The\nproposer of the resolution invariably summarizes, if he is able, all\nthat is to be said for his proposal; his arguments are enforced and\nsupplemented by other speakers on his side; while the opposition\nendeavours to be equally exhaustive. In short, though one were to come\nto the meeting with a mind entirely blank, yet such a one, having\nordinary faculties of judging, would in the end be completely informed,\nand prepared for an intelligent vote.\n\nNow, I am fully disposed to acquiesce in this second assumption\nlikewise, but with a qualification that is of considerable moment, as we\nshall see presently.\n\n3. The third and last assumption is as follows:--Not only is the\nquestion in all its bearings supposed to be adequately set forth in the\nspeeches constituting the debate, but, in point of fact, the mass of the\nmembers, or a very important section or proportion of them, rely upon\nthis source, make full use of it, and are equipped for their decision by\nmeans of it; so much so, that if it were withdrawn none of the other\nmethods as at present plied, or as they might be plied, would give the\ndue preparation for an intelligent vote; whence must ensue a degradation\nin the quality of the decisions.\n\nIt is this assumption that I am now to challenge, in the greatest\ninstance of all, as completely belied by the facts. But, indeed, the\ncase is so notoriously the opposite, that the statement of it will be\nunavoidably made up of the stalest commonplaces; and the novelty will\nlie wholly in the inference.\n\nThe ordinary attendance in the House of Commons could be best described\nby a member or a regular official. An outsider can represent it only by\nthe current reports. My purpose does not require great accuracy; it is\nenough, that only a very small fraction of the body makes up the average\naudience. If an official were posted to record the fluctuating numbers\nat intervals of five minutes, the attendance might be recorded and\npresented in a curve like the fluctuations of the barometer; but this\nwould be misleading as to the proportion of effective listeners--those\nthat sat out entire debates, or at all events the leading speeches of\nthe debates, or whose intelligence was mainly fed from the speaking in\neach instance. The number of this class is next to impossible to get at;\nbut it will be allowed on all hands to be very small.\n\nPerhaps, in such an inquiry, most can be made of indirect evidences. If\nmembers are to be qualified for an intelligent decision in chief part by\nlistening to the speeches, why is not the House made large enough to\naccommodate them all at once? It would appear strange, on the\nspoken-debate theory of enlightenment, that more than one-third should\nbe permanently excluded by want of space. One might naturally suppose\nthat, in this fact, there was a breach of privilege of the most\nportentous kind. That it is so rarely alluded to as a grievance, even\nalthough amounting to the exclusion of a large number of the members\nfrom some of the grandest displays of eloquence and the most exciting\nState communications, is a proof that attendance in the House is not\nlooked upon as a high privilege, or as the _sine qua non_ of political\nschooling.\n\n[EVIDENCE OF THE INUTILITY OF THE MERE SPEAKING.]\n\nIf it were necessary to listen to the debates in order to know how to\nvote, the messages of the whips would take a different form. The members\non each side would be warned of the time of commencement of each debate,\nthat they might hear the comprehensive statement of the opener, and\nremain at least through the chief speech in reply. They might not attend\nall through the inferior and desultory speaking, but they would be ready\nto pop in when an able debater was on his legs, and they would hear the\nleaders wind up at the close. Such, however, is not the theory acted on\nby the whips. They are satisfied if they can procure attendance at the\ndivision, and look upon the many hours spent in the debate as an\ninsignificant accessory, which could be disregarded at pleasure. It\nwould take the genius of a satirist to treat the whipping-up machinery\nas it might well deserve to be treated. We are here concerned with a\ngraver view of it--namely, to inquire whether the institution of oral\ndebate may not be transformed and contracted in dimensions, to the great\nrelief of our legislative machinery.\n\nOf course, no one is ignorant of the fact that the great body of members\nof Parliament refrain altogether from weighing individually the opposing\narguments in the several questions, and trust implicitly to their leaders.\nThis, however, is merely another nail in the coffin of the debating\nsystem. The theory of independent and intelligent consideration, by each\nmember, of every measure that comes up, is the one most favourable to\nthe present plan, while, even on that theory, its efficiency breaks down\nunder a critical handling.\n\nIt is time now to turn to what will have come into the mind of every\nreader of the last few paragraphs--the reporting of the speeches. Here,\nI admit, there is a real and indispensable service to legislation. My\ncontention is, that in it we possess what is alone valuable; and, if we\ncould secure this, in its present efficiency, with only a very small\nminimum of oral delivery, we should be as well off as we are now. The\napparent self-contradiction of the proposal to report speeches without\nspeaking, is not hard to resolve.\n\nTo come at once, then, to the mode of arriving at the printed debates,\nI shall proceed by a succession of steps, each one efficient in itself,\nwithout necessitating a farther. The first and easiest device, and one\nthat would be felt of advantage in all bodies whatsoever, would be for\nthe mover of a resolution to give in, along with the terms of his\nresolution, his reasons--in fact, what he intends as his speech, to be\nprinted and distributed to each member previous to the meeting. Two\nimportant ends are at once gained--the time of a speech is saved, and\nthe members are in possession beforehand of the precise arguments to be\nused. The debate is in this way advanced an important step without any\nspeaking; opponents can prepare for, instead of having to improvise\ntheir reply, and every one is at the outset a good way towards a final\njudgment.\n\n[DEBATES INTRODUCED BY PRINTED STATEMENTS.]\n\nAs this single device could be adopted alone, I will try and meet the\nobjections to it, if I am only fortunate enough to light on any. My\nexperience of public bodies suggests but very few; and I think the\nstrongest is the reluctance to take the requisite trouble. Most men\nthink beforehand what they are to say in introducing a resolution to a\npublic body, but do not consider it necessary to write down their speech\nat full. Then, again, there is a peculiar satisfaction in holding the\nattention of a meeting for a certain time, great in proportion to the\nsuccess of the effort. But, on the other hand, many persons do write\ntheir speeches, and many are not so much at ease in speaking but that\nthey would dispense with it willingly. The conclusive answer on the\nwhole is--the greater good of the commonwealth. Such objections as these\nare not of a kind to weigh down the manifest advantages, at all events,\nin the case of corporations full of business and pressed for time.\n\nI believe that a debate so introduced would be shortened by more than\nthe time gained by cutting off the speech of the mover. The greater\npreparation of everyone's mind at the commencement would make people\nsatisfied with a less amount of speaking, and what there was would be\nmore to the purpose.\n\nWe can best understand the effects of such an innovation by referring to\nthe familiar experience of having to decide on the Report of Committee,\nwhich has been previously circulated among the members. This is usually\nthe most summary act of a deliberative body; partly owing, no doubt, to\nthe fact that the concurrence of a certain proportion is already gained;\nwhile the _pros_ and _cons_ have been sifted by a regular conference and\ndebate. Yet we all feel that we are in a much better position by having\nhad before us in print, for some time previous, the materials necessary\nto a conclusion. At a later stage, I will consider the modes of raising\nthe quality and status of the introductory speech to something of the\nnature of a Committee's Report.[19]\n\nThe second step is to impose upon the mover of every amendment the same\nobligation to hand in his speech, in writing, along with the terms of\nthe amendment. Many public bodies do not require notice of amendments.\nIt would be in all cases a great improvement to insist upon such notice,\nand of course a still greater improvement to require the reasons to be\ngiven in also, that they might be circulated as above. The debate is now\ntwo steps in advance without a moment's loss of time to the constituted\nmeeting; while what remains is likely to be much more rapidly gone\nthrough.\n\nThe movers of resolutions and of amendments should, as a matter of\ncourse, have the right of reply; a portion of the oral system that\nwould, I presume, survive all the advances towards printing direct.\n\nThere remains, however, one farther move, in itself as defensible, and\nas much fraught with advantage as the two others. The resolution and the\namendments being in the hands of the members of a body, together with\nthe speeches in support of each, any member might be at liberty to send\nin, also for circulation in print, whatever remarks would constitute his\nspeech in the debate, thereby making a still greater saving of the time\nof the body. This would, no doubt, be felt as the greatest innovation of\nall, being tantamount to the extinction of oral debate; there being then\nnothing left but the replies of the movers. We need not, however, go the\nlength of compulsion; while a certain number would choose to print at\nonce, the others could still, if they chose, abide by the old plan of\noral address. One can easily surmise that these last would need to\njustify their choice by conspicuous merit; an assembly, having in print\nso many speeches already, would not be in a mood to listen to others of\nindifferent quality.\n\n[THE MAGIC OF ORATORY NOT DONE AWAY WITH.]\n\nSuch a wholesale transfer of living speech to the silent perusal of the\nprinted page, if seriously proposed in any assembly, would lead to a\nvehement defence of the power of spoken oratory. We should be told of\nthe miraculous sway of the human voice, of the way that Whitfield\nentranced Hume and emptied Franklin's purse; while, most certainly,\nneither of these two would ever have perused one of his printed sermons.\nAnd, if the reply were that Whitfield was not a legislator, we should be\nmet by the speeches of Wilberforce and Canning and Brougham upon slavery,\nwhere the thrill of the living voice accelerated the conviction of the\naudience. In speaking of the Homeric Assembly, Mr. Gladstone remarks, in\nanswer to Grote's argument to prove it a political nullity, that the\nspeakers were repeatedly cheered, and that the cheering of an audience\ncontributes to the decision.\n\nNow, I am not insensible to the power of speech, nor to the\nmultitudinous waves of human feeling aroused in the encounters of\noratory before a large assembly. Apart from this excitement, it would\noften be difficult to get people to go through the drudgery of public\nmeetings. Any plan that would abolish entirely the dramatic element of\nlegislation would have small chance of being adopted. It is only when\nthe painful side of debate comes into predominance, that we willingly\nforego some of its pleasures: the intolerable weariness, the close air,\nthe late nights, must be counted along with the occasional thrills of\ndelirious excitement. But as far as regards our great legislative\nbodies, it will be easy to show that there would still exist, in other\nforms, an ample scope for living oratory to make up for the deadness\nthat would fall upon the chief assembly.\n\nA friend of mine once went to Roebuck to ask his attention to some point\ncoming up in the House of Commons, and offered him a paper to read.\nRoebuck said, \"I will not read, but I will hear\". This well illustrates\none of the favourable aspects of speech. People with time on their hands\nprefer being instructed by the living voice; the exertion is less, and\nthe enlivening tones of a speaker impart an extraneous interest, to\nwhich we have to add the sympathy of the surrounding multitude. The\nearly stages of instruction must be conducted _viva voce_; it is a late\nacquirement to be able to extract information from a printed page. Yet\ncircumstances arise when the advantage of the printed page predominates.\nThe more frequent experience in approaching public men is to be told,\nthat they will not listen but will read. An hour's address can be read\nin ten minutes: it is not impossible, therefore, to master a\nParliamentary debate in one-tenth of the time occupied in the delivery.\n\nA passing remark is enough to point out the revolution that would take\nplace in Parliamentary reporting, and in the diffusion of political\ninstruction through the press, by the system of printing the speeches\ndirect. The full importance of this result will be more apparent in a\nlittle. There has been much talk of late about the desirability of a\nmore perfect system of reporting, with a view to the preservation of the\ndebates. Yet it may be very much doubted, whether the House of Commons\nwould ever incur the expense of making up for the defects of newspaper\nreporting, by providing short-hand writers to take down every word, with\na view to printing in full.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[SECONDING EXTENDED TO A PLURALITY OF BACKERS.]\n\n[PROPORTIONING OF BACKERS.]\n\nBefore completing the survey of possible improvements in deliberative\nprocedure, I propose to extend the employment of another device already\nin use, but scarcely more than a form; I mean the requiring of a\nseconder before a proposal can be debated. The signification of this\nmust be, that in order to obtain the judgment of an assembly on any\nproposal, the mover must have the concurrence of one other member; a\nmost reasonable condition surely. What I would urge farther in the same\ndirection is that, instead of demanding one person in addition to the\nmover, as necessary in all cases, there should be a varying number\naccording to the number of the assembly. In a copartnery of three or\nfour, to demand a seconder to a motion would be absurd; in a body of six\nor eight it is scarcely admissible. I have known bodies of ten and\ntwelve, where motions could be discussed without a seconder; but even\nwith these, there would be a manifest propriety in compelling a member\nto convince at least one other person privately before putting the body\nto the trouble of a discussion. If, however, we should begin the\npractice of seconding with ten, is one seconder enough for twenty,\nfifty, a hundred, or six hundred? Ought there not to be a scale of\nsteady increase in the numbers whose opinions have been gained\nbeforehand? Let us say three or four for an assembly of five-and-twenty,\nsix for fifty, ten or fifteen for a hundred, forty for six hundred. It\nis permissible, no doubt, to bring before a public body resolutions that\nthere is no immediate chance of carrying; what is termed \"ventilating\"\nan opinion is a recognized usage, and is not to be prohibited. But when\nbusiness multiplies, and time is precious, a certain check should be put\nupon the ventilating of views that have as yet not got beyond one or two\nindividuals; the process of conversion by out-of-door agency should have\nmade some progress in order to justify an appeal to the body in the\nregular course of business. That the House of Commons should ever be\noccupied by a debate, where the movers could not command more than four\nor five votes, is apparently out of all reason. The power of the\nindividual is unduly exalted at the expense of the collective body.\nThere are plenty of other opportunities of gaining adherents to any\nproposal that has something to be said for it; and these should be plied\nup to the point of securing a certain minimum of concurrence, before the\near of the House can be commanded. With a body of six hundred and fifty,\nthe number of previously obtained adherents would not be extravagantly\nhigh, if it were fixed at forty. Yet considering that the current\nbusiness, in large assemblies, is carried on by perhaps one-third or\none-fourth of the whole, and that the quorum in the House of Commons is\nsuch as to make it possible for twenty-one votes to carry a decision of\nthe House, there would be an inconsistency in requiring more than twenty\nnames to back every bill and every resolution and amendment that churned\nto be discussed. Now I can hardly imagine restriction upon the liberty\nof individual members more defensible than this. If it were impossible\nto find any other access to the minds of individual members than by\nspeeches in the House, or if all other modes of conversion to new views\nwere difficult and inefficient in comparison, then we should say that\nthe time of the House must be taxed for the ventilating process. Nothing\nof the kind, however, can be maintained. Moreover, although the House\nmay be obliged to listen to a speech for a proposal that has merely half\na dozen of known supporters, yet, whenever this is understood to be the\ncase, scarcely any one will be at the trouble of counter-arguing it, and\nthe question really makes no way; the mover is looked upon as a bore,\nand the House is impatient for the extinguisher of a division. The\nsecuring of twenty names would cost nothing to the Government, or to any\nof the parties or sections that make up the House: an individual\nstanding alone should be made to work privately, until he has secured\nhis backing of nineteen more names, and the exercise would be most\nwholesome as a preparation for convincing a majority of the House.\n\nIf I might be allowed to assume such an extension of the device of\nseconding motions, I could make a much stronger case for the beneficial\nconsequences of the operation of printing speeches without delivery.\nThe House would never be moved by an individual standing alone; every\nproposal would be from the first a collective judgment, and the reasons\ngiven in along with it, although composed by one, would be revised and\nconsidered by the supporters collectively. Members would put forth their\nstrength in one weighty statement to start with; no pains would be\nspared to make the argument of the nominal mover exhaustive and\nforcible. So with the amendment; there would be more put into the chief\nstatement, and less left to the succeeding speakers, than at present.\nAnd, although the mover of the resolution and the mover of the amendment\nwould each have a reply, little would be left to detain the House,\nunless when some great interests were at stake.\n\nOf course the preparation of the case in favour of each measure would be\nentrusted to the best hands; in Government business, it would be to some\nofficial in the department, or some one engaged by the chief in shaping\nthe measure itself. The statement so prepared would have the value of a\ncarefully drawn-up report, and nothing short of this should ever be\nsubmitted to Parliament in the procuring of new enactments. In like\nmanner, the opponents and critics could employ any one they pleased to\nassist them in their compositions, A member's speech need not be in any\nsense his own; if he borrows, or uses another hand, it is likely to be\nsome one wiser than himself, and the public gets the benefit of the\ndifference.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[OBJECTIONS TO DIRECT PRINTING OF SPEECHES.]\n\nI may now go back for a little upon the details of the scheme of direct\nprinting, with the view of pressing some of its advantages a little\nfarther, as well as of considering objections. I must remark more\nparticularly upon the permission, accorded to the members generally, to\nsend in their speeches to be circulated with the proceedings. This I\nregard as not the least essential step in an effective reform of the\ndebating system. It is the only possible plan of giving free scope to\nindividuals, without wasting the time of the assembly. There need be no\nlimit to the printing of speeches; the number may be unnecessarily\ngreat, and the length sometimes excessive, but the abuse may be left to\nthe corrective of neglect. The only material disadvantage attending the\nplan of sending in speeches in writing, without delivery, is that the\nspeakers would have before them only the statements-in-chief of the\nmovers of motion and amendment. They could not comment upon one another,\nas in the oral debate. Not but this might not: be practicable, by\nkeeping the question open for a certain length of time, and circulating\nevery morning the speeches given in the day previously; but the\ncumbrousness of such an operation would not have enough to recommend it.\nThe chief speakers might be expected to present a sufficiently broad\npoint for criticism; while the greater number are well content, if\nallowed to give their own views and arguments without reference to those\nof others. And not to mention that, in Parliament, all questions of\nprinciple may be debated several times over, it is rare that any measure\ncomes up without such an amount of previous discussion out of doors as\nfully to bring out the points for attack and defence. Moreover, the oral\ndebate, as usually conducted, contains little of the reality of\neffective rejoinder by each successive speaker to the one preceding.\n\nThe combined plan of printing speeches, and of requiring twenty backers\nto every proposal, while tolerable perhaps in the introduction of bills,\nand in resolutions of great moment, will seem to stand self-condemned\nin passing the bills through Committee, clause by clause. That every\namendment, however trivial, should have to go through such a roundabout\ncourse, may well appear ridiculous in the extreme. To this I would say,\nin the first place, that the exposing of every clause of every measure\nof importance to the criticism of a large assembly, has long been\nregarded as the weak point of the Parliamentary system. It is thirty\nyears since I heard the remark that a Code would never get through the\nHouse of Commons; so many people thinking themselves qualified to cavil\nat its details. In Mill's \"Representative Government,\" there is a\nsuggestion to the effect, that Parliament should be assisted in passing\ngreat measures by consultative commissions, who would have the\npreparation of the details; and that the House should not make\nalterations in the clauses, but recommit the whole with some expression\nof disapproval that would guide the commission in recasting the measure.\n\n[DIFFICULTIES OF PRINTING IN COMMITTEES.]\n\nIt must be self-evident that only a small body can work advantageously\nin adjusting the details of a measure, including the verbal expressions.\nIf this work is set before an assembly of two hundred, it is only by the\nreticence of one hundred and ninety that progress can be made.\nAmendments to the clauses of a bill may come under two heads: those of\nprinciple, where the force of parties expends itself; and those of\nwording or expression, for clearing away ambiguities or misconstruction.\nFor the one class, all the machinery that I have described is fully\napplicable. To mature and present an amendment of principle, there\nshould be a concurrence of the same number as is needed to move or\noppose a second reading; there should be the same giving in of reasons,\nand the same unrestricted speech (in print) of individual members,\nculminating in replies by the movers. If this had to be done on all\noccasions, there would be much greater concentration of force upon\nspecial points, and the work of Committee would get on faster. As to the\nsecond class of amendments, I do not think that these are suitable for\nan open discussion. They should rather be given as suggestions privately\nto the promoter of the measure. But, be the matter small or great, I\ncontend that nothing should bring about a vote in the House of Commons\nthat has not already acquired a proper minimum of support.\n\nI am very far from presuming to remodel the entire procedure of the\nHouse of Commons. What I have said applies only to the one branch, not\nthe least important, of the passing of bills. There are other\ndepartments that might, or might not, be subjected to the printing\nsystem, coupled with the twentyfold backing; for example, the very large\nsubject of Supply, on which there is a vast expenditure of debating. The\ndemand for twenty names to every amendment would extinguish a very\nconsiderable amount of these discussions.\n\nThere is a department of the business of the House that has lately\nassumed alarming proportions--the putting of questions to Ministers upon\nevery conceivable topic. I would here apply, without hesitation, the\nprinting direct and the plural backing, and sweep away the practice\nentirely from the public proceedings of the House. No single member\nunsupported should have the power of trotting out a Minister at will. I\ndo not say that so large a number of backers should be required in this\ncase, but I would humbly suggest that the concurrence of ten members\nshould be required even to put a public question. The leader of the\nOpposition, in himself a host, would not be encumbered with such a\nformality, but everyone else would have to procure ten signatures to an\ninterrogative: the question would be sent in, and answered; while\nquestion and answer would simply appear in the printed proceedings of\nthe House, and not occupy a single moment of the legislative time. This\nis a provision that would stand to be argued on its own merits,\neverything else remaining as it is. The loss would be purely in the\ndramatic interest attaching to the deliberations.\n\n[ALTERNATIVE SCOPE FOR ORATORY.]\n\nThe all but total extinction of oral debate by the revolutionary sweep\nof two simple devices, would be far from destroying the power of speech\nin other ways. The influence exerted by conversation on the small scale,\nand by oratory on the great, would still be exercised. While the\nconferences in private society, and the addresses at public meetings,\nwould continue, and perhaps be increased in importance, there would be a\nmuch greater activity of sectional discussion, than at present; in fact,\nthe sectional deliberations, preparatory to motions in the House, would\nbecome an organized institution. A certain number of rooms would be set\naside for the use of the different sections; and the meetings would rise\ninto public importance, and have their record in the public press. The\nspeaking that now protracts the sittings of the House would be\ntransferred to these; even the highest oratory would not disdain to\nshine where the reward of publicity would still be reaped. As no man\nwould be allowed to engage the attention of the House without a\nfollowing, it would be in the sections, in addition to private society\nand the press, that new opinions would have to be ventilated, and the\nfirst converts gained.\n\nAmong the innovations that are justified by the principle of avoiding at\nall points hurried decisions, there is nothing that would appear more\ndefensible than to give an interval between the close of a debate and\nthe taking of the vote. I apprehend that the chief and only reason why\nthis has never been thought of is, that most bodies have to finish a\nmass of current business at one sitting. In assemblies that meet day\nafter day, the votes on all concluded debates could be postponed till\nnext day; giving a deliberate interval in private that might improve,\nand could not: deteriorate, the chances of a good decision. Let us\nimagine that, in the House of Commons, for example, the first hour at\neach meeting should be occupied with the divisions growing out of the\nprevious day's debates. The consequences would be enormous, but would\nany of them be bad? The hollowness of the oral debate as a means of\npersuasion would doubtless receive a blasting exposure; many would come\nup to vote, few would remain to listen to speeches. The greater number\nof those that cared to know what was said, would rest satisfied with the\nreports in the morning papers.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nWe need to take account of the fact that even greater moderation in the\nlength of speeches would not entirely overcome the real difficulty--the\nquantity of business thrown upon our legislative bodies. Doubtless, if\nthere were less talk upon burning questions there would be more\nattention given to unobtrusive matters at present neglected. The mere\nquantity of work is too great for an assembly to do well. If this amount\ncannot be lessened--and I do not see how it can be--there are still the\nsix competing vehicles at old Temple Bar. The single legislative rail is\ncrowded, and the only device equal to the occasion is to remove some of\nthe traffic to other rails. Let a large part of the speaking be got rid\nof, or else be transferred to some different arena.\n\n[EVERY BODY ENTITLED TO CONTROL SPEECH-MAKING.]\n\nI regard as unassailable Lord Sherbrooke's position that every\ndeliberative body must possess the entire control of its own procedure,\neven to the point of saying how much speaking it will allow on each\ntopic. The rough-and-ready method of coughing down a superfluous speaker\nis perfectly constitutional, because absolutely necessary. If a more\nrefined method of curtailing debates could be devised, without bringing\nin other evils, it should be welcomed. The forcible shutting of anyone's\nmouth will always tend to irritate, and it is impossible by any plan to\nprevent a minority from clogging the wheels of business. The freedom of\nprint seems to me one good safety-valve for incontinent speech-makers;\nit allows them an equal privilege with their fellows, and yet does not\nwaste legislative time.\n\nI remember hearing, some time ago, that our Chancellor of the Exchequer\nwas induced, on the suggestion of the _Times_, to put into print and\ncirculate to the House beforehand the figures and tables connected with\nhis financial statement. I could not help remarking, why might the\nChancellor not circulate, in the same fashion, the whole statement, down\nto the point of the declaration of the new taxes? It would save the\nHouse at least an hour and a half, while not a third of that time would\nbe required to read the printed statement. I believe the first thing\nthat would occur to anyone hearing this suggestion would be--\"so the\nChancellor might, but the same reason would apply to the movers of\nbills, and to all other business as well \".\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nOur English Parliamentary system having been matured by centuries of\nexperience, has become a model for other countries just entering upon\nrepresentative government. But the imitation, if too literal, will not\nbe found to work. Our system supposes a large gentry, staying half the\nyear in London for pure pleasure, to which we may add the rich men of\nbusiness resident there. A sufficient number of these classes can at any\ntime be got to make up the House of Commons; and, the majority being\ncomposed of such, the ways of the House are regulated accordingly. Daily\nconstant attendance, when necessary, and readiness to respond to the\nwhip at short notice, are assumed as costing nothing. But in other\ncountries, the case is not the same. In the Italian Chamber I found\nprofessors of the University of Turin, who still kept up their\nclass-work, and made journeys to Rome at intervals of a week or two, on\nthe emergence of important business. Even the payment of members is not\nenough to bring people away from their homes, and break up their\navocations, for several months every year. The forms of procedure, as\nfamiliar to us, do not fit under such circumstances. The system of\nprinted speeches, with division days at two or three weeks' interval,\nmight be found serviceable. But, at all events, the entire arrangements\nof public deliberation need to be revised on much broader grounds than\nwe have been accustomed to; and it is in this view, more than with any\nhope of bringing about immediate changes, that I have ventured to\npropound the foregoing suggestions.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[OPINIONS FAVOURABLE TO PRINTING.]\n\nSince the foregoing paper was written, opinions have been expressed\nfavourable to the use of printing as a means of shortening the debates\nin the House of Commons. Among the most notable of the authorities that\nhave declared their views, we may count Lord Derby and Lord Sherbrooke.\nBoth advocate the printing of the answers by ministers to the daily\nstring of questions addressed to them. Lord Derby goes a step farther.\nHe would have everyone introducing a bill to prepare a statement of his\nreasons, to be circulated among members at the public expense. Even this\nsmall beginning would be fruitful of important consequences; the\ngreatest being the inevitable extension of the system.\n\nI am not aware that my suggestion as to requiring a plurality of members\nto back every bill and every proposal, has gained any degree of support.\nIt was urged that, if the power were taken away from single members to\nmove in any case whatever, the few that are accustomed to find\nthemselves alone, would form into a group to back each other. I do not\nhesitate to say that the supposition is contrary to all experience.\nCrotcheteers have this in common with the insane, that they can seldom\nagree in any conjoined action. Even in the very large body constituting\nour House of Commons, it is not infrequent for motions to be made\nwithout obtaining a seconder. The requirement of even five concurring\nmembers would put an extinguisher upon a number of propositions that\nhave at present to be entertained.\n\nThe last session (1883) has opened the eyes of many to the absurdity of\nallowing a single member to block a bill. When it is considered that, in\nan assembly of six hundred, there is probably at least one man, like\nFergus O'Conner, verging on insanity, and out of the reach of all the\ncommon motives,--we may well wonder that a deliberative body should so\nput itself at the mercy of individuals. Surely the rule, for stopping\nbills at half-past twelve, might have been accompanied with the\nrequirement of a seconder, which would have saved many in the course of\nthe recent sessions. It is the gross abuse of this power that is forcing\nupon reluctant minds the first advance to plural backing, and there is\nnow a demand for five or six to unite in placing a block against a\nmeasure.\n\nIt occurred to Mr. Gladstone, during the autumn session of 1882, to take\ndown the statistics of attendance in the House for several days running.\nHis figures were detailed to the House, in one of his speeches, and were\nexactly what we were prepared for. They completely \"pounded and\npulverised\" the notion, that listening to the debates is the way that\nmembers have their minds made up for giving their votes.\n\n[EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION INCREASING.]\n\nThe recent parliamentary recess has witnessed an unusual development in\nthe out-of-door discussion of burning questions. In addition to a full\nallowance of vacation oratory, and the unremitted current of the\nnewspaper press, the monthlies have given forth a number of reasoned\narticles by cabinet ministers and by men of ministerial rank in the\nopposition. The whole tendency of our time is, to supersede\nparliamentary discussion by more direct appeals to the mind of the\npublic.\n\nTo stop entirely the oral discussion of business in Parliament would\nhave some inconveniences; but the want of adequate consideration of such\nmeasures as possessed the smallest interest with any class, would not be\none of them.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 18: _Contemporary Review_, November, 1880.]\n\n[Footnote 19: I have often thought that, the practice of circulating,\nwith a motion, the proposer's reasons, would, on many occasions, be\nworthy of being voluntarily adopted.]\n\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\n_Notes and References in connection with Essay VIII., on Subscription._\n\n\nIt may be useful here to supply a few memoranda as to the history and\npresent practice of Subscription to Articles.\n\nIn the _Quarterly Review_, No. 117, the following observations are made\nrespecting the first imposition of Tests after the English\nReformation:--\n\n\"Before the Reformation no subscription was required from the body of\nthe clergy, as none was necessary. The bishops at their consecration\ntook an oath of obedience to the King, in which, besides promising\nsubjection in matters temporal, they 'utterly renounced and clearly\nforsook all such clauses, words, sentences, and grants, which they had\nor should have of the Pope's Holiness, that in any wise were hurtful or\nprejudicial to His Highness or His Estate Royal'; whilst to the Pope\nthey bound themselves by oath to keep the rules of the Holy Fathers, the\ndecrees, ordinances, sentences, dispositions, reservations, provisions,\nand commandments Apostolic, and, to their powers, to cause them to be\nkept by others. And, as their command over their clergy was complete,\nand they could at once remove any who violated the established rule of\nopinion, no additional obligation or engagement from men under such\nstrict discipline was requisite. The statement, therefore (by Dean\nStanley), that 'the Roman Catholic clergy, and the clergy of the Eastern\nChurch, neither formerly, nor now, were bound by any definite forms of\nsubscription; and that the unity of the Church is preserved there as the\nunity of the State is preserved everywhere, not by preliminary promises\nor oaths, but by the general laws of discipline and order'; though true\nto the letter, is really wholly untrue in its application to the\nargument concerning subscriptions. For it is to the total absence of\nliberty, and to the severity of 'the general laws of discipline and\norder,' and not to a liberty greater than our own, that this absence of\nsubscription is due.\n\n\"In point of fact, the requirement of subscription from the clergy was\ncoeval with the upgrowth of liberty of opinion: while the circumstances\nof the English Reformation of religion made it essential to the success\nand the safety of that great movement. It was essential to its success;\nfor as it was accomplished mainly by a numerical minority, both of the\nclergy and laity of the land, there could be no other guarantee of its\nmaintenance than the assurance that its doctrines would be honestly\ntaught, and its ritual observed by the whole body of the conforming\nclergy.\n\n\"Thus the _Reformation subscriptions aimed at the prevention of covert\nPopery_, a danger to which the Reforming laity felt that they were\nexposed by the strong wishes of a majority of their own class; by the\nundissembled bias of many of the parochial clergy; and by the secret\nbias of some even of the bi-hops; whilst the diminution of their\nabsolute control over the clergy lessened the power of enforcing the new\nopinions when the bishop was sincerely attached to them.\"\n\nThe entire article is of value both for its historical information as to\nthe history of Tests in the English Church, and for its mode of\nadvocating the retention of subscription to the Articles, as at present\nenforced.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Subscription came with the English Reformation.]\n\nThe Report of the Royal Commission of 1864, on Subscription in the\nEnglish Church, supplied a complete account of all the changes in\nsubscription from the Reformation downwards. Reference may also be made\nto Stoughton's \"History of Religion in England,\" for the incidents in\ngreater detail.\n\nPerhaps the most remarkable defence of Liberty, as against the\nprevailing view in the English Church, is Dean Milman's speech before\nthe Clerical Subscription Commission, of which he was a member. It is\nprinted in _Fraser's Magazine_, March, 1865, and is included in the\ncriticism of the _Quarterly Review_ article, already quoted.\n\nThe Dean's Resolution submitted to the Commission was as follows:--\n\n\"Conformity to the Liturgy of the Church of England being the best and\nthe surest attainable security for 'the declared agreement of the Clergy\nwith the doctrines of the Church'; with many the daily, with all the\nweekly public reading of the services of the Church of England\n(containing, as they do, the ancient creeds of the Church Catholic), and\nthe constant use of the Sacramental offices and other formularies in the\nBook of Common Prayer, being a solemn and reiterated pledge of their\nbelief in those doctrines, the Subscription to the thirty-nine Articles\nis unnecessary. Such Subscription adds no further guarantee for the\nclergyman's faithfulness to the doctrines of the Church; while the\npeculiar form and controversial tone in which the Articles were compiled\nis the cause of much perplexity, embarrassment, and difficulty,\nespecially to the younger clergy and to those about to enter into Holy\nOrders.\"\n\nMuch doubt was entertained, whether this motion came within the terms of\nthe Commission. It was not pressed by the Dean.\n\nI give the following quotation from the speech:--\n\n... \"And if I venture to question the expediency, the wisdom, I will say\nthe righteousness of retaining subscription to the thirty-nine Articles\nas obligatory on all clergymen, I do so, not from any difficulty in\nreconciling with my own conscience what, during my life, I have done\nmore than once, but from the deep and deliberate conviction that such\nsubscription is altogether unnecessary as a safeguard for the essential\ndoctrines of Christianity, which are more safely and fully protected by\nother means. It never has been, is not, and never will be a solid\nsecurity for its professed object, the reconciling or removing religious\ndifferences, which it tends rather to create and keep alive; is\nembarrassing to many men who might be of the most valuable service in\nthe ministry of the Church; is objectionable as concentrating and\nenforcing the attention of the youngest clergy on questions, some\nabstruse, some antiquated, and in themselves at once so minute and\ncomprehensive as to harass less instructed and profound thinkers, to\nperplex and tax the sagacity of the most able lawyers and the most\nlearned divines....\n\n\"One of my chief objections to subscription to the thirty-nine Articles\nas a perpetual test of English Churchmanship is that they are throughout\ncontroversial, and speak, as of necessity they must speak, the\ncontroversial language of their day; they cannot, therefore, in my\nopinion, be fully, clearly, and distinctly understood without a careful\nstudy and a very wide knowledge of the disputes and opinions of those\ntimes, a calm yet deep examination of their meaning, objects,\nlimitations, which cannot be expected from young theological students,\nfrom men fresh from their academical pursuits. I venture to add, indeed\nto argue, that their true bearing and interpretation seems to me to have\nescaped some of our most eminent judges from want of that full study and\nperfect knowledge; and I must say that, in these laborious and practical\nday, it may be questioned whether this study of controversies, many of\nthem bygone, will be so useful, so profitable, as entire devotion to the\nplainer and simpler duties of the clergyman.\n\n\"Their immense range, too, the infinite questions into which they branch\nout (it has been said, I know not how truly, that five hundred questions\nmay be raised upon them), is a further objection to their maintenance as\na preliminary and indispensable requirement before the young man is\nadmitted to Holy Orders. On the whole I stand, without hesitation, to my\nproposition, that the doctrines of the English Church are not only more\nsimply, but more fully, assuredly, more winningly, taught in our Liturgy\nand our Formularies than in our Articles.\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe very elaborate work of Mr. Taylor Innes, entitled the \"Law of\nCreeds,\" is exhaustive for Scotland; including both the Established\nChurch and the various sects of Protestant Dissenters. It also\nincidentally takes notice of some of the more critical decisions on\nheresy cases in the English Church. Mr. Innes properly points out, that\nthe abolition of Subscription is compatible with compulsory adherence to\nArticles. The relaxation of the forms of Subscription in the English\nChurch, by the Act of 1865, gave a certain amount of relief to the\nconsciences of the clergy, but left them as much exposed as ever to\nsuits for heresy.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[Report of Presbyterian Alliance.]\n\nFor the usages of the Reformed Churches, on the Continent, and in\nAmerica, a mass of valuable information has been furnished in the Report\nof the Second General Council of the Presbyterian Alliance, convened at\nPhiladelphia, September, 1880. At the previous meeting of the Council,\nheld at Edinburgh, July, 1877, a Committee was appointed to Report on\nthe Creeds and Subscriptions in use among the various bodies forming the\nAlliance. It is unnecessary to refer to the answers given in to the\nCommittee's Queries, from Great Britain and Ireland, except to complete\nthe history of the Presbyterian Church of England, so long distinguished\nfor the abeyance of clerical subscription.\n\nIt was in 1755, that the Presbytery of Newcastle made a movement towards\ndisclaiming the Arian, Socinian and other heresies, but without\nproposing a Confession. In 1784, the same Presbytery adopted a Formula\naccepting the Westminster Confession; in 1802, however, subscription to\nthe Formula was rescinded. Through Scottish influence, the return to the\nWestminster Confession was gradually brought about in the early part of\nthe century. That Confession was formally adopted by the Presbytery of\nNewcastle in 1824; and since 1836, all the ministers of the body have\nbeen required to accept it in the most unqualified manner.\n\nThe Calvinistic Methodists of Wales drew up, in 1823, a Confession\nconsisting of forty-four articles, agreeing substantially with the\nWestminster Confession. Subscription is not required: but the clergy,\nprior to ordination, make a statement of their doctrinal views, which\namounts to nearly the same thing. Like the Roman Catholic Church, the\nMethodists depend upon discipline rather than upon Subscription.\n\nThe Congregational Churches take up almost the same attitude towards\ntheir clergy. There is no subscription; but any great deviation from the\nprevailing views of the body leads to forfeiture of the position of\nbrotherhood, and possibly also to severance from the charge of a\ncongregation. Still, the absence of a binding and penal test is\nfavourable to freedom, from the present tendency of men's minds in that\ndirection.\n\nAs regards the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, we\nfind that the first Presbytery was constituted in 1705. No formal\nstatement of doctrine was considered necessary till the lapse of about\na quarter of a century, when the spread of Arianism in England urged the\nSynod of Philadelphia to pass what was called the \"Adopting Act\" in\n1729, by which they hoped to exclude from American churches British\nministers tainted with Arian views. They agreed that all the ministers\nof this Synod, or that shall hereafter be admitted into this Synod,\nshall declare their agreement in and approbation of the Confession of\nFaith, with the Larger and Shorter Catechisms of the Assembly of Divines\nat Westminster, as being, in all the essential and necessary articles,\ngood forms of sound words and systems of Christian doctrine, \"and we do\nalso adopt the said confession and the catechisms as the Confession of\nour faith \".\n\nThe formula subscribed by ministers at their ordination is, however,\nless stringent than that in use in the Churches of Scotland.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[French Protestant Churches.]\n\nTurning next to the Continent we may refer, first, to the French\nProtestant Church, now consisting of two divisions--(1) The Reformed\nChurch united to the State, and (2) The Union of the Evangelical\nChurches.\n\nThe Gallic Confession, styled \"La Rochelle,\" the joint work of Calvin\nand Chaudien, was adopted as the doctrinal standard of the Reformed\nFrench Churches in their first national synod, which met at Paris in\nMay, 1559, and was revised and confirmed by the seventh synod, which\nassembled at La Rochelle under the presidency of Theodore Beza in 1571.\nIt is composed of forty articles, which reproduce faithfully the\nCalvinistic doctrine. But it is not accepted as infallible; the final\nauthority, in the light of which successive synods may reform it, is the\nBible.\n\n\"The reformed doctrine, as sanctioned by the Confession of La Rochelle,\nwas, in its essential features, recognised and professed by all\nProtestant France; and, notwithstanding its sufferings and internal\ndissensions, the Church during the first quarter of the 17th century\nheld its own course and remained faithful to itself. A consistory, that\nof Caen, had, even as late as 1840, restored in the churches of its\njurisdiction the Confession of La Rochelle in its full vigour. Little by\nlittle, however, under the influence of the naturalistic philosophy of\nthe 18th century, the negative criticism of Germany, and above all the\nreligious indifference which followed the repose which the Church was\nenjoying after two centuries of persecution, the Confession of Faith as\nwell as the discipline fell into disuse. It was never really\nabrogated.... However, it is a practical fact that the partisans of one\nof the two sections which to-day divide the Reformed Church of France,\nnot only do not consider themselves bound by the Confession of La\nRochelle, but, tending more and more towards Rationalism, and seeing in\nProtestantism only the religion of free thought, have come to reject the\ngreat miracles of the gospel, and to demand for their pastors, in the\nbosom of the Church, unlimited freedom in teaching. While on the one\nhand the sovereignty of the Holy Scriptures is claimed, on the other is\nheld the rule of individual conscience.\"\n\nThe majority of the official synod which met at Paris in September,\n1848, refused to put an end to the doctrinal disorder in the Church by\nestablishing in the Church a clear and positive law of faith. The\nminority, regarding the adverse vote as an official sufferance of\nindifference on doctrinal matters, separated themselves from their\nbrethren, and founded the \"Union of the Evangelical Churches of France\".\n\n[General Synod of Paris in 1872.]\n\nIn 1872, \"in the face of attacks directly aimed, in the bosom of the\nChurch, at the unity of her doctrine,\" the thirtieth general synod,\nassembled at Paris, drew up, not a complete Confession of Faith, but\na declaration determining the doctrinal limits of the Church, and\nproclaiming \"the sovereign authority of the Holy Scriptures with regard\nto belief, and salvation through faith in Jesus Christ, the only\nbegotten Son of God, who died for our sins and rose again for our\njustification\".[20]\n\nDown to 1824, new pastors indicated their adherence to the Confession of\nFaith by signature. In 1824, however, signature was replaced by a solemn\npromise. \"Since that time different formulas have been used at the will\nof the pastors performing the ordination, without any one of them having\nthe sanction of a synod, and without the manner of adherence having been\nexpressly stipulated.\"\n\n\"Since the Synod of 1872, in ordinations over which pastors attached to\nthe Synodal Church have presided, candidates are required to conform\nformally, in the presence of the congregation, to the declaration of\nfaith adopted by the Synod. Article 2, of the complete law, declares:\n'Every candidate for holy orders must, before receiving ordination,\naffirm that he adheres to the faith of the Church as stated by the\ngeneral synod'.\"\n\nTheological professors were sometimes appointed without conditions.\nStill they were not permitted to teach doctrines in glaring\ncontradiction to the general belief of the Churches. For example, in\n1812, M. Gasc, professor of theology at Montauban, attacked in his\nlectures the doctrine of the Trinity, whereupon several consistories\nrequired him either to retract his opinions or to resign his post.\nM. Gasc retracted his opinions.\n\n\"The Evangelical Churches of France, composed of members who have made\nan explicit and individual profession of faith, and who recognise in\nreligious matters no other authority than that of Jesus Christ, the only\nand sovereign head of the Church,\" accept the Old and New Testaments as\ndirectly inspired by God and so constituting the only and infallible\nrule of faith and life.\n\n[Churches of Switzerland.]\n\nThe Churches of Switzerland have the pre-eminence in the relaxation or\ndisuse of Tests. The following is a summary of their practice:--\n\n_The Reformed Church of the Canton of Vaud_.\n\nAccording to the ecclesiastical law of May 19, 1863 (slightly modified\nby a decree of December 2, 1874), the _National Church_ of the Canton of\nVaud \"desires chiefly that its members should lead a Christian life,\"\nand \"admits no other rule of instruction than the Word of God contained\nin the Holy Scriptures\". Every candidate for the ministry is required by\nthe ecclesiastical law of December 14, 1839, to \"swear that he will\ndischarge conscientiously the duties which the National Reformed\nEvangelical Church imposes upon its ministers, and that he will preach\nthe Word of God in its purity and integrity as it is contained in the\nHoly Scriptures\". \"When accusation is brought against any minister on\nthe ground of doctrine, the proceedings are distinctly marked; but in\nreality it is simply required that 'the jurymen give a conscientious\nverdict'.\"\n\nThe _Free Evangelical Church_ of the Canton of Vaud requires that\ncandidates for the ministry be examined as to their religious life,\ntheir calling to the ministry, their doctrine and their ecclesiastical\nprinciples by a committee of the synodical commission, with pastors and\nelders. After examination the candidate must \"declare his cordial\nadhesion to the doctrines and institutions of the Free Church\". This\npledge is verbal.\n\n\n_Independent Evangelical Church of Neuchatel._\n\nThe ancient Reformed Church of Neuchatel never put forth any special\nConfession of Faith. The assembly of Pastors, the governing body of the\nChurch, down to 1848, accepted the Holy Scriptures, the forms used in\nbaptism and the communion, and the Apostles' Creed as fully adequate to\nexpress the faith of the Church. The Synod, who took over the government\nof the Church in 1848, maintained the same position, refusing in 1857 to\nsanction an abridged Confession.\n\nOn May 20, 1873, the Grand Council of the Republic and Canton of\nNeuchatel passed a new law regulating the relation of Church and State.\nArticle 12 says: \"Liberty of conscience in matters of religion is\ninviolable; it may neither be fettered by regulations, vows, or\npromises, by disciplinary penalties, by formulas or a creed, nor by any\nmeasures whatsoever\".\n\nHence resulted the separation of those that formed the Independent\nEvangelical Church of Neuchatel, which, in 1874, adopted a Confession\n\"acknowledging as the only source and rule of its faith the Old and New\nTestaments, and proclaiming the great truths of salvation contained in\nthe Apostles' Creed\". The ministers, on ordination, take an oath to\nadvance the honour and glory of God above all things; to maintain his\nword at the risk of life, body, and property; to be in unity with the\nbrethren in the doctrines of religion and in the holy ministry; and to\navoid all sectarianism and schism in the Church.\n\n\n_National Protestant Church of Geneva_.\n\n[Historical Changes in the Church of Geneva.]\n\nDuring the 16th century, from 1536 onwards, the National Protestant\nChurch of Geneva was in constant turmoil through the insistence on, and\nthe opposition to, the doctrines laid down by Calvin in his Confession\nof Faith and System of Ecclesiastical Ordinances. The 17th century is\nmarked by the conflicts of Calvinism and Arminianism. After numerous\nvariations, the oath of consecration was, in June 1725, changed hack to\nthe form provided by the Ecclesiastical Ordinance of 1576: \"You swear to\nhold the doctrine of the holy prophets and apostles, as it is contained\nin the books of the Old and New Testaments, of which doctrine our\nCatechism is a summary \". This oath remained in force for nearly a\ncentury, till 1806. \"It was asserted in the discussion (in the Assembly)\nthat no one should be forced to follow entirely Calvin's Catechism. It\nis further expected that the candidates for the ministry should be\nrequested not to discuss in the pulpit any striking or useless matter\nwhich might tend to disturb the peace. At this time, the Confession of\nFaith of the 17th century was abolished to return to that of the 16th\ncentury, interpreting the latter with much freedom. The Lower Council\nratified this decision, but ordered the Assembly to keep the most\nabsolute silence upon this subject, especially in the presence of\nstrangers.\" In 1788, the Assembly adopted a new Catechism, containing\nnumerous points of divergence from the orthodox Catechism of Calvin,\nwhich it superseded with the sanction of the Lower Council. In 1806, the\nnew formula of consecration threw out the Catechism; it ran thus--\"You\npromise to teach divine truth as it is contained in the books of the Old\nand New Testaments, of which we have an abridgment in the Apostles'\nCreed\". In 1810, after long deliberation, there was published a revision\nin the latitudinarian and utilitarian sense of the Larger Catechism. In\nthe same year, the Apostles' Creed was thrown out of the pledge of the\nministers, which now read thus: \"You promise ... to preach, in its\npurity, the gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, to recognise as the only\ninfallible rule of faith and conduct the word of God, as it is contained\nin the sacred books of the Old and New Testaments\". Presently, however,\nin 1813, a religious revival led to dangerous discussions, and the\nministers were bound \"to abstain from all sectarian spirit, to avoid all\nthat would create any schism and break the union of the Church\"--an\naddition suppressed towards 1850; and in 1817, they were required to\npledge themselves to abstain from discussing four points in\nparticular--the manner of the union of the divine and human nature in\nthe person of Jesus Christ; original sin; the manner in which grace\noperates, or saving grace; and predestination; and, if led to utter\ntheir thoughts on any one of these subjects, they were \"to do so without\ntoo much positiveness, to avoid expressions foreign to the Holy\nScriptures, and to use, as much as possible, the terms which they\nemploy\". In 1847, the organisation of the Protestant worship was set\nforth in a special law, and in 1849, the Consistory called in accordance\nwith this, adopted an organic rule for the Church. According to Article\n74, the functionaries of the Church may be subjected to discipline \"in\ncase of teaching, preaching, or publicly professing any doctrine that\nmay bring scandal upon the Church\". Various modifications followed. In\n1874 (April 26), Article 123 was made to declare that \"each pastor\nteaches and preaches freely on his own responsibility, and no restraint\ncan be put upon this liberty either by the Confession of Faith or by the\nliturgic formulas\". In the end of the same year, however (Oct. 3), the\nState Council promulgated a new organic law, \"in virtue of which a\npastor can either be suspended or dismissed by the Consistory or by the\nCouncil of State for dogmatic motives\". In 1875, the pastor obtained the\nright to use in his religious teaching any catechetical manual he\npreferred, provided he informed the Consistory of his choice. The use of\nthe _liturgical prayers_, published by the Consistory, became optional.\nThe pastors were now required merely to declare before God that \"they\nwill teach and preach conscientiously, according to their lights and\nfaith the Christian truth contained in our holy hooks\". The _liturgical\ncollection_, published by the Consistory in 1875, contains two series of\nformulas, expressed in a dogmatic sense on the one hand, and in a\nliberal sense on the other. The Apostles' Creed is optional.\n\n\n_Free Evangelical Church of Geneva_.\n\nThe Free Evangelical Church of Geneva demands only a formal adherence to\nits Profession of Faith from the elders (including the ministers) and\nthe deacons. \"Some of these officers have even been permitted to hold\ncertain reserves on such or such article.\"\n\n\n_Germanic Switzerland_.\n\nPastor Bernard of Berne, having enumerated the symbolical writings of\nGermanic Switzerland, says: \"For centuries the pastors were obliged to\nsign them, although it is true that the Second Confession of Helvetic\nFaith was alone recognised as the general rule imposed upon pastors.\nThe signing of the Formula Consensus was exacted only temporarily (being\ndiscarded about 1720). It has been only from the beginning of this\ncentury that, under the influence of rationalism, pastors have been\nrequired to preach the Gospel merely according to the _principles_ of\nthe Helvetic Confession. To-day we find all confession of faith\nabolished in our Germanic Swiss Churches. Pastors preach what pleases\nthem. Chosen by the parishes, they owe to them solely an avowal of their\ndoctrines.\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nThe Hungarian Reformed Church has a singular history, in respect of\nCreeds. The Report of the Council goes very minutely into the detail of\neleven confessions held successively by that church. Of these, there\nsurvive two--the Helvetic Confession and the Catechism of Heidelberg, by\nwhich ministers and office--bearers are still bound.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n[German Churches.]\n\nNext as to Germany. As the several states have their separate\necclesiastical usages, the same rule does not apply everywhere. For an\nextreme case of absence of toleration, we may refer to the Grand Duchy\nof Mecklenburg. Lutheranism is the established religion; and the Duchy\nis the stronghold of mediaeval conservatism both in politics and in\nreligion. The, removal of Baumgarten from the University of Rostock is\nan example in point; and the decree is so characteristic, and\nillustrative that it deserves to be given at length.\n\n\"We have to our sincere regret been given to understand that, in your\nwritings published in and since the year 1854, you have advanced\ndoctrines and principles that are in the most important points at\nvariance with the doctrines and principles of the symbolic books of our\nEvangelical-Lutheran Church and of our rules of Church Discipline, to\nsuch an extent as to amount to an attempt to shake to the very\nfoundation the basis whereon these doctrines and principles and our\nchurch rest. In order to reach more exact certainty on these things, we\nhave assembled our Consistory to consider this matter, and from them we\nhave received the annexed opinion, by which the above-mentioned view has\nbeen fully confirmed.\n\n\"Whereas, then, it is required by our Church Ordinances of 1552 and 1602\n(1650) that the Christian doctrine shall be taught 'pure and unchanged,'\nas it is contained in Holy Writ, the general symbols of the Christian\nChurch, in Dr. Luther's Catechism and Confession, and in the Augsburg\nConfession of 1530, and that, if an academical teacher fall away from\nthese, he shall be proceeded against; whereas, further, in Articles II.\nto IV. of the Reversals of 1621, the sovereigns gave the States the\nassurance that in the University of Rostock there should be neither\nappointed nor tolerated any other teachers but such as should be\nattached to the Augsburg Confession and the Lutheran religion: the\nestablishment of the University of Rostock on the pure doctrine of the\nChristian symbols and of the Augsburg Confession has been repeated in\nSec. 4 of the Regulations upon the relations of the town of Rostock to the\nState University of 1827, and once again in Sec. 1 of the Statutes of the\nUniversity of 1837; no less do the statutes of the Theological Faculty\nof Rostock of 1564, and the later Regulation as to this Faculty of 1791,\nbind the members of the Faculty to expound the writings of the Prophets\nand the Apostles in the sense laid down in the general Christian\nsymbols, in the Augsburg Confession, the Smalkald Articles, and the\nwritings of Dr. Luther; your appointment of 31st August, 1850, referred\nyou to the Statutes of the University and of the Theological Faculty,\nand also directed you to comport yourself in accordance with the rule\nand line of the revealed word of God, the unchanged Augsburg Confession,\nthe _formula concordia_, and all the other symbolic books received in\nour (lands) country, as well as with the Mecklenburg Church Ordinances\nrelating to these, without any innovation; you also on your induction on\nthe 19th of Oct., 1850, bound yourself by oath to the duties contained\nin your appointment and to the Statutes of the University and of the\nTheological Faculty.\"\n\n[Removal of Baumgarten from Rostock.]\n\n\"We can the shorter time entrust you with the vocation of an academic\nteacher of the Evangelical-Lutheran Theology as you have united with\nyour backslidings in theological doctrine at the same time political\ndoctrines of the most delicate kind, deduced relatively from those; and\nwe will, therefore--after hearing of our High Consistory, and after the\nforegoing resolution of our ministry according to Sec. 10, Lit. H. of the\nOrdinance of 4th April, 1853, relating to the organisation of the\nMinisters--hereby remove you from the office, hitherto filled by you, of\nan ordinary Professor of Theology in our State University of Rostock.\"\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nIn Prussia, the Clergy, and especially the University Professors of\nTheology, enjoy more liberty than in Mecklenburg; but they are not\nwholly secure from the attempts of the Church Courts to enforce\ndiscipline against heretical teaching. The following are recent cases.\n\n1. The St. Jacobi Gemeinde (parish) in Berlin, belonging, as is the rule\nin Prussia, to the \"Unirte Kirche\"--a fusion of the Lutheran and the\nReformed Churches--in 1877, chose, as its pastor, Lic. Horzbach. The\nConsistory of Brandenburg, within whose jurisdiction Berlin lies,\nrefused to admit him on account of his heterodox views. By the\necclesiastical law, a pastor translated from one consistory to another,\nhas to be approved of by the one he enters; which gives an opportunity\nof exercising a disciplinary power, not beyond what is possessed by the\nconsistory where he has once been admitted, but more opportunely and\nconveniently brought into play. St. Jacobi parish, having apparently a\ntaste for advanced views, next chose a Dr. Schramm; but he too was\nrejected on the same grounds. The third selection fell on Pastor Werner\n(Guben); this was confirmed by the Consistory, but was quashed by the\n\"Oberkirchenrath,\" or supreme ecclesiastical authority of the country,\nlocated in Berlin. The parish was now considered to have forfeited its\nright of election; and a pastor was chosen for it by the Oberkirchenrath.\nHappily his views were not too strict for the congregation, and peace\nwas restored. In all the three instances, the rejection took place on\nthe complaint of a small orthodox minority in the parish.\n\n2. Rev. Luehr, pastor at Eckenforda, in the Prussian Province of\nSchleswig-Holstein, was accused of heresy, and deprived by the\nProvincial Consistory of Kiel in December, 1881. Pastor Luehr appealed to\nthe Berlin Oberkirchenrath, who reversed the sentence, and let him off\nwith a reproof for the use of incautious language.\n\nThere have been two still more notorious heresy hunts: one, the case of\nDr. Sydow in Berlin; the other, Pastor Kalzhoff, who was ultimately\ndeposed, and is now minister of an independent congregation in Berlin.\n\nBoth the central ecclesiastical authority and the provincial\nconsistories, being nominated by the Government, reflect the religious\ntendencies of the Emperor and his Ministers for the time being. At\npresent, these are probably behind the country at large in point of\nliberality.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nNext to Switzerland, Holland is most distinguished for advanced views as\nto the remission of Tests, and the liberty of the clergy. A very\ncomplete account of the history and present position of the Dutch sects\nis given in a pamphlet, entitled \"The Ecclesiastical Institutions of\nHolland, by Philip H. Wicksteed, M.A. (Williams & Norgate)\".\n\n[Subscription in the Dutch Church.]\n\nIt is pretty well known that in doctrinal views the majority in the\nDutch Church is Calvinist; while a minority forms the \"Modern School,\"\na school partaking of the rationalism of our century in matters of faith.\nThe battle of the Confessions began in 1842, and is not yet finished. In\nthis year an attempt was made to revive the binding authority of the old\nconfessions. The General Synod in that and the following years\nsuccessfully resisted the movement. In 1854, a new formula of\nsubscription applicable to candidates for the ministry was introduced,\nless stringent and more liberal than the old one. The orthodoxy party\nendeavoured to make it more stringent, the liberals proposed to make it\nstill less so. In 1874, a majority of the General Synod passed the\nfollowing declaration:--\n\n\"The doctrine contained in the Netherland Confession, the Heidelberg\nCatechism, and the Canons of the Synod of Dort, forms the historical\nfoundation of the Reformed Church of the Netherlands.\n\n\"Inasmuch as this doctrine is not confessed with sufficient unanimity by\nthe community, there can, under the existing circumstances, be no\npossibility of 'maintaining the doctrine' in the ecclesiastical sense.\nThe community, building on the principles of the Church, as manifested\nin her origin and development, continues to confess her Christian faith,\nand thereby to form the expression which may in course of time once more\nbecome the adequate and unanimous Confession of the Church.\n\n\"Meantime, care for the interests of the Christian Church in general and\nthe Reformed in particular, quickening of Christian religion and\nmorality, increase of religious knowledge, preservation of order and\nunity, and furtherance of love for King and Fatherland--are ever the\nmain object of all to whom any ecclesiastical office is entrusted, and\nno one can be rejected as a member or a teacher who, complying with all\nother requirements, declares himself to be convinced in his own\nconscience that in compliance with the above-named principles, he may\nbelong to the Reformed Church of the Netherlands.\"[21]\n\nThis declaration, however, did not pass the Provincial Church Courts,\nwhich possess the right of veto; and the law therefore remained as it\nwas. But, in 1881, a new proposal for altering the formula of\nsubscription passed the General Synod. Next year, it was definitely\napproved, and is now the law of the church. According to it, licentiates\nto the Ministry, on being admitted by the Provincial Church Courts, are\nmade to promise that they will labour in the Ministry according to their\nvocation with zeal and faithfulness; that they will further with all\ntheir power the interests of the kingdom of God, and, so far as\nconsistent therewith, the interests of the Dutch Reformed Church, and\ngive obedience to the regulations of that Church.\n\nThere is, however, both in orthodox and in semi-orthodox circles, a\nwide-spread dissatisfaction with this amount of latitude, and fears are\nentertained for its continuance.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[Footnote 20: The debates in this Synod were conducted with the highest\nability on both sides. Guizot took a part on the side of orthodoxy. The\npublished report will be found abstracted in the _British Quarterly_,\nNo. CXIV.]\n\n[Footnote 21: Mr. Wicksteed makes the following curious remark:--\"I am\noften asked whether the 'Moderns' are Unitarians. The question is rather\nstartling. It is as if one were asked whether the majority of English\nastronomers had ceased to uphold the Ptolemaic system yet. The best\nanswer I can give is a reference to the chapter on 'God' in a popular\nwork by Dr. Matthes which has run through four editions. In this chapter\nthere is not a word about the Trinity, but at the close occurs this\nfootnote: On the antiquated doctrine of the _Trinity_, see the\nfourteenth note at the end of the book,--where, accordingly, the\ndoctrine is expounded and its confusions pointed out rather with the\ncalm interest of the antiquarian than the eagerness of the\ncontroversialist.'\"]\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\n\nWORKS BY PROFESSOR BAIN.\n\n\nA FIRST ENGLISH GRAMMAR, 90th Thousand.\n\nA KEY, with additional Exercises.\n\nA HIGHER ENGLISH GRAMMAR, 80th Thousand of\n\nRevised Edition.\n\nA COMPANION TO THE HIGHER GRAMMAR.\n\nENGLISH COMPOSITION AND RHETORIC.\n\nLOGIC, in Two Parts--\n\nDEDUCTION.\n\nINDUCTION.\n\nMENTAL AND MORAL SCIENCE.\n\n_The same, in Two Parts_,\n\nMENTAL SCIENCE--PSYCHOLOGY AND HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.\n\nMORAL SCIENCE--ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICAL SYSTEMS.\n\nTHE SENSES AND THE INTELLECT, 3rd Edition.\n\nTHE EMOTIONS AND THE WILL, 3rd Edition.\n\nJOHN STUART MILL, a Criticism: with Personal Recollections.\n\nJAMES MILL, a Biography.","title":"Practical Essays","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":85485}