{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_17556/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_17556","id":"gutenberg_17556","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/17556","summary":null,"tags":["Category: History - Ancient","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Philosophy","Sextus Empiricus","Skepticism"],"text":"Produced by Turgut Dincer, Ted Garvin and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nSEXTUS EMPIRICUS\nAND\nGREEK SCEPTICISM\n\n\n_A Thesis accepted for the Degree of Doctor of_\n_Philosophy in the University of Bern_\n_Switzerland, November_ 1897\n\nby\n\nMARY MILLS PATRICK\n\nPRESIDENT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE, CONSTANTINOPLE\nTURKEY\n\n\n_This Thesis is accompanied by a Translation from the Greek_\n_of the First Book of the \"Pyrrhonic Sketches_\"\n_by Sextus Empiricus_\n\n\nCAMBRIDGE\n\nDEIGHTON BELL & CO.\n\nLONDON GEORGE BELL & SONS\n\n1899\n\nCAMBRIDGE\n\nPRINTED BY JONATHAN PALMER\n\nALEXANDRA STREET\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\n\nThe following treatise on Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism\nhas been prepared to supply a need much felt in the English\nlanguage by students of Greek philosophy. For while other\nschools of Greek philosophy have been exhaustively and\ncritically discussed by English scholars, there are few sources\nof information available to the student who wishes to make\nhimself familiar with the teachings of Pyrrhonism. The aim has\nbeen, accordingly, to give a concise presentation of Pyrrhonism\nin relation to its historical development and the Scepticism of\nthe Academy, with critical references to the French and German\nworks existing on the subject. The time and manner of the\nconnection of Sextus Empiricus with the Pyrrhonean School has\nalso been discussed.\n\nAs the First Book of the _Hypotyposes_, or Pyrrhonic Sketches by\nSextus Empiricus, contains the substance of the teachings of\nPyrrhonism, it has been hoped that a translation of it into\nEnglish might prove a useful contribution to the literature on\nPyrrhonism, and this translation has been added to the critical\npart of the work.\n\nIn making this translation, and in the general study of the\nworks of Sextus, the Greek text of Immanuel Bekker, Berlin,\n1842, has been used, with frequent consultation of the text of\nJ.A. Fabricius, 1718, which was taken directly from the existing\nmanuscripts of the works of Sextus. The divisions into chapters,\nwith the headings of the chapters in the translation, is the\nsame as Fabricius gives from the manuscripts, although not used\nby Bekker, and the numbers of the paragraphs are the same as\nthose given by both Fabricius and Bekker. References to Diogenes\nLaertius and other ancient works have been carefully verified.\n\nThe principal modern authors consulted are the following:\n\nRitter, _Geschichte der Philosophie_, II. Auf., Hamburg,\n  1836-38.\n\nZeller, _Philosophie der Griechen_, III. Auf., Leipzig,\n  1879-89.\n\nLewes, _History of Philosophy_, Vol. I., London, 1866.\n\nUeberweg, _History of Philosophy_, IV. ed., translated by\n  Morris, 1871.\n\nBrochard, _Les Sceptiques Grecs_, Paris, 1877.\n\nBrochard, _Pyrrhon et le Scepticism Primitive_, No. 5, Ribot's\n  _Revue Phil._, Paris, 1885.\n\nSaisset, _Le Scepticism Aenesideme-Pascal-Kant_, Paris, 1867.\n\nChaignet, _Histoire de la Psychologie des Grecs_, Paris,\n  1887-90.\n\nHaas, _Leben des Sextus Empiricus_, Burghausen, 1882.\n\nNatorp, _Forschungen zur Geschichte des Erkenntnisproblems bei\n  den Alten_, Berlin, 1884.\n\nHirzel, _Untersuchungen zu Cicero's philosophischen Schriften_,\n  Leipzig, 1877-83.\n\nPappenheim, _Erlaeuterung zu des Sextus Empiricus Pyrrhoneischen\n  Grundzuegen_, Heidelberg, 1882.\n\nPappenheim, _Die Tropen der Greichischen Skeptiker_, Berlin,\n  1885.\n\nPappenheim, _Lebensverhaeltnisse des Sextus Empiricus_, Berlin,\n  1887.\n\nPappenheim, _Der angebliche Heraclitismus des Skeptikers\n  Ainesidemos_, Berlin, 1887.\n\nPappenheim, _Der Sitz der Schule der Griechischen Skeptiker,\n  Archiv fuer Geschichte der Philosophie_, I. 1, S. 47, 1887.\n\nMaccoll, _The Greek Sceptics from Pyrrho to Sextus_, London,\n  1869.\n\nMy grateful acknowledgments are due to Dr. Ludwig Stein,\nProfessor of Philosophy in the University of Bern, for valuable\nassistance in relation to the plan of the work and advice in\nregard to the best authorities to be consulted. Thanks are also\ndue to Dr. Louisos Iliou, of Robert College, Constantinople, for\nkind suggestions concerning the translation.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE HISTORICAL RELATIONS OF SEXTUS EMPIRICUS ... 1\n\nIntroductory paragraph.--The name of Sextus Empiricus.\nHis profession.--The time when he lived.--The place of\nhis birth.--The seat of the Sceptical School while Sextus\nwas at its head.--The character of the writings of Sextus\nEmpiricus.\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nTHE POSITION AND AIM OF PYRRHONIC SCEPTICISM ... 23\n\nThe subject-matter of the Hypotyposes.--The origin of\nPyrrhonism.--The nomenclature of Pyrrhonism.--Its\ncriterion.--Its aim.--[Greek: epoche] and [Greek: ataraxia].--The\nstandpoint of Pyrrhonism.\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nTHE SCEPTICAL TROPES ... 31\n\nOrigin of the name.--The ten Tropes of [Greek: epoche].--The\nFirst Trope.--The Second Trope.--The Third Trope.--The Fourth\nTrope.--The Fifth Trope.--The Sixth Trope.--The Seventh\nTrope.--The Eighth Trope.--The Ninth Trope.--The Tenth\nTrope.--The five Tropes of Agrippa.--The two Tropes.--The Tropes\nof Aenesidemus against Aetiology.\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nAENESIDEMUS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF HERACLITUS ... 63\n\nStatement of the problem.--The theory of Pappenheim.--The theory\nof Brochard.--Zeller's theory.--The theory of Ritter and\nSaisset.--The theory of Hirzel and Natorp.--Critical examination\nof the subject.\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nCRITICAL EXAMINATION OF PYRRHONISM ... 81\n\nPyrrhonism and Pyrrho.--Pyrrhonism and the Academy. Strength and\nweakness of Pyrrhonism.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nTHE FIRST BOOK OF THE PYRRHONIC SKETCHES BY SEXTUS\nEMPIRICUS, TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK ... 101\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\n\n_The Historical Relations of Sextus Empiricus._\n\nInterest has revived in the works of Sextus Empiricus in recent\ntimes, especially, one may say, since the date of Herbart. There\nis much in the writings of Sextus that finds a parallel in the\nmethods of modern philosophy. There is a common starting-point\nin the study of the power and limitations of human thought.\nThere is a common desire to investigate the phenomena of\nsense-perception, and the genetic relations of man to the lower\nanimals, and a common interest in the theory of human knowledge.\n\nWhile, however, some of the pages of Sextus' works would form a\npossible introduction to certain lines of modern philosophical\nthought, we cannot carry the analogy farther, for Pyrrhonism as\na whole lacked the essential element of all philosophical\nprogress, which is a belief in the possibility of finding and\nestablishing the truth in the subjects investigated.\n\nBefore beginning a critical study of the writings of Sextus\nEmpiricus, and the light which they throw on the development of\nGreek Scepticism, it is necessary to make ourselves somewhat\nfamiliar with the environment in which he lived and wrote. We\nshall thus be able to comprehend more fully the standpoint from\nwhich he regarded philosophical questions.\n\nLet us accordingly attempt to give some details of his life,\nincluding his profession, the time when he lived, the place of\nhis birth, the country in which he taught, and the general aim\nand character of his works. Here, however, we encounter great\ndifficulties, for although we possess most of the writings of\nSextus well preserved, the evidence which they provide on the\npoints mentioned is very slight. He does not give us\nbiographical details in regard to himself, nor does he refer to\nhis contemporaries in a way to afford any exact knowledge of\nthem. His name even furnishes us with a problem impossible of\nsolution. He is called [Greek: Sextos ho empeirikos] by Diogenes\nLaertius[1]: [Greek: Herodotou de diekouse Sextos ho empeirikos\nhou kai ta deka ton skeptikon kai alla kallista' Sextou de\ndiekouse Satorninos ho Kythenas, empeirikos kai autos]. Although\nin this passage Diogenes speaks of Sextus the second time\nwithout the surname, we cannot understand the meaning otherwise\nthan that Diogenes considered Sextus a physician of the\nEmpirical School. Other evidence also is not wanting that Sextus\nbore this surname. Fabricius, in his edition of the works of\nSextus, quotes from the _Tabella de Sectis Medicorum_ of\nLambecius the statement that Sextus was called Empiricus because\nof his position in medicine.[2]\n\nPseudo-Galen also refers to him as one of the directors of the\nEmpirical School, and calls him [Greek: Sextos ho\nempeirikos].[3] His name is often found in the manuscripts\nwritten with the surname, as for example at the end of _Logic\nII_.[4] In other places it is found written without the surname,\nas Fabricius testifies, where Sextus is mentioned as a Sceptic\nin connection with Pyrrho.\n\n    [1] Diog. Laert. IX. 12, 116.\n\n    [2] Fabricius _Testimonia_, p. 2.\n\n    [3] Pseudo-Galen _Isag._ 4; Fabricius _Testimonia_, p. 2.\n\n    [4] Bekker _Math._ VIII. 481.\n\nThe Sceptical School was long closely connected with the\nEmpirical School of medicine, and the later Pyrrhoneans, when\nthey were physicians, as was often the case, belonged for the\nmost part to this school. Menedotus of Nicomedia is the first\nSceptic, however, who is formally spoken of as an Empirical\nphysician,[1] and his contemporary Theodas of Laodicea was also\nan Empirical physician. The date of Menedotus and Theodas is\ndifficult to fix, but Brochard and Hass agree that it was about\n150 A.D.[2] After the time of these two physicians, who were\nalso each in turn at the head of the Sceptical School,[3] there\nseems to have been a definite alliance between Pyrrhonism and\nEmpiricism in medicine, and we have every reason to believe that\nthis alliance existed until the time of Sextus.\n\n    [1] Diog. IX. 12, 115.\n\n    [2] Brochard _Op. cit. Livre_ IV. p. 311.\n\n    [3] Diog. IX. 12, 116.\n\nThe difficulty in regard to the name arises from Sextus' own\ntestimony. In the first book of the _Hypotyposes_ he takes\nstrong ground against the identity of Pyrrhonism and Empiricism\nin medicine. Although he introduces his objections with the\nadmission that \"some say that they are the same,\" in recognition\nof the close union that had existed between them, he goes on to\nsay that \"Empiricism is neither Scepticism itself, nor would it\nsuit the Sceptic to take that sect upon himself\",[1] for the\nreason that Empiricism maintains dogmatically the impossibility\nof knowledge, but he would prefer to belong to the Methodical\nSchool, which was the only medical school worthy of the Sceptic.\n\"For this alone of all the medical sects, does not proceed\nrashly it seems to me, in regard to unknown things, and does not\npresume to say whether they are comprehensible or not, but it is\nguided by phenomena.[2] It will thus be seen that the Methodical\nSchool of medicine has a certain relationship to Scepticism\nwhich is closer than that of the other medical sects.\"[3]\n\n    [1] _Hyp_. I. 236.\n\n    [2] _Hyp_. I. 237.\n\n    [3] _Hyp_. I. 241.\n\nWe know from the testimony of Sextus himself that he was a\nphysician. In one case he uses the first person for himself as a\nphysician,[1] and in another he speaks of Asclepius as \"the\nfounder of our science,\"[2] and all his illustrations show a\nbreadth and variety of medical knowledge that only a physician\ncould possess. He published a medical work which he refers to\nonce as [Greek: iatrika hupomnemata],[3] and again as [Greek:\nempeirika hupomnemata][4] These passages probably refer to the\nsame work,[5] which, unfortunately for the solution of the\ndifficult question that we have in hand, is lost, and nothing is\nknown of its contents.\n\nIn apparent contradiction to his statement in _Hypotyposes_ I.,\nthat Scepticism and Empiricism are opposed to each other, in\nthat Empiricism denies the possibility of knowledge, and\nScepticism makes no dogmatic statements of any kind, Sextus\nclasses the Sceptics and Empiricists together in another\ninstance, as regarding knowledge as impossible[6] [Greek: all oi\nmen phasin auta me katalambanesthai, hoster hoi apo tes\nempeirias iatroi kai hoi apo tes skepseos phiolosophoi]. In\nanother case, on the contrary, he contrasts the Sceptics sharply\nwith the Empiricists in regard to the [Greek: apodeixeis].[7]\n[Greek: hoi de empeirikoi anairousin, hoi de skeptikoi en epoche\ntauten ephylaxan].\n\n    [1] _Hyp_. ii. 238.\n\n    [2] _Adv. Math_. A. 260.\n\n    [3] _Adv. Math_. vii. 202.\n\n    [4] _Adv. Math_. A. 61.\n\n    [5] Zeller _Op. cit._. iii. 43.\n\n    [6] _Adv. Math._ viii. 191.\n\n    [7] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 328.\n\nPappenheim thinks that Sextus belonged to the Methodical School,\nboth from his strong expression in favor of that school in\n_Hyp_. I. 236, as above, and also because many of his\nmedical opinions, as found in his works, agree with the\nteachings of the Methodical School, more nearly than with those\nof the Empiricists. Pappenheim also claims that we find no\ninconsistency with this view in the passage given where Sextus\nclasses the Sceptics with the Empiricists, but considers that\nstatement an instance of carelessness in expressing himself, on\nthe part of Sextus.[1]\n\n    [1] _Lebensverhaeltnisse des Sex. Em._ 36.\n\nThe position of Pappenheim is assailable for the reason that in\ndealing with any problem regarding an author on the basis of\ninternal evidence, we have no right to consider one of his\nstatements worthy of weight, and another one unworthy, on the\nsupposition that he expressed himself carelessly in the second\ninstance. Rather must we attempt to find his true standpoint by\nfairly meeting all the difficulties offered in apparently\nconflicting passages. This has been attempted by Zeller,\nBrochard, Natorp and others, with the general result that all\nthings considered they think without doubt that Sextus belonged\nto the Empirical School.[1] His other references are too strong\nto allow his fidelity to it to be doubted. He is called one of\nthe leaders of Empiricism by Pseudo-Galen, and his only medical\nwork bore the title [Greek: empeirika hupomnemata.] The opinion\nof the writers above referred to is that the passage which we\nhave quoted from the _Hypotyposes_ does not necessarily mean\nthat Sextus was not an Empiricist, but as he was more of a\nSceptic than a physician, he gave preference to those doctrines\nthat were most consistent with Scepticism, and accordingly\nclaimed that it was not absolutely necessary that a Sceptic\nphysician should be an Empiricist. Natorp considers that the\ndifferent standpoint from which Sextus judges the Empirical and\nMethodical Schools in his different works is accounted for on\nthe supposition that he was an Empiricist, but disagreed with\nthat school on the one point only.[2] Natorp points out that\nSextus does not speak more favourably of the medical stand of\nthe Methodical School, but only compares the way in which both\nschools regarded the question of the possibility of knowledge,\nand thinks that Sextus could have been an Empiricist as a\nphysician notwithstanding his condemnation of the attitude of\nthe Empirical School in relation to the theory of knowledge.\nThis difference between the two schools was a small one, and on\na subtle and unimportant point; in fact, a difference in\nphilosophical theory, and not in medical practice.\n\n    [1] Brochard _Op. cit. Livre_ IV. 317; Zeller _Op. cit_.\n        III. 15; Natorp _Op. cit._ p. 155.\n\n    [2] Natorp _Op. cit_. 157.\n\nWhile we would agree with the authors above referred to, that\nSextus very probably recognized the bond between the Empirical\nSchool of medicine and Pyrrhonism, yet to make his possible\nconnection with that school the explanation of his name, gives\nhim more prominence as a physician than is consistent with what\nwe know of his career. The long continued union of Empiricism\nand Scepticism would naturally support the view that Sextus was,\nat least during the earlier part of his life, a physician of\nthat school, and yet it may be that he was not named Empiricus\nfor that reason. There is one instance in ancient writings where\nEmpiricus is known as a simple proper name.[1] It may have been\na proper name in Sextus' case, or there are many other ways in\nwhich it could have originated, as those who have studied the\norigin of names will readily grant, perhaps indeed, from the\ntitle of the above-named work, [Greek: empeirika hupomnemata.]\nThe chief argument for this view of the case is that there were\nother leaders of the Sceptical School, for whom we can claim far\ngreater influence as Empiricists than for Sextus, and for whom\nthe surname Empiricus would have been more appropriate, if it\nwas given in consequence of prominence in the Empirical School.\nSextus is known to the world as a Sceptic, and not as a\nphysician. He was classed in later times with Pyrrho, and his\nphilosophical works survived, while his medical writings did\nnot, but are chiefly known from his own mention of them.\nMoreover, the passage which we have quoted from the\n_Hypotyposes_ is too strong to allow us easily to believe that\nSextus remained all his life a member of the Empirical School.\nHe could hardly have said, \"Nor would it suit the Sceptic to\ntake that sect upon himself,\" if he at the same time belonged to\nit. His other references to the Empirical School, of a more\nfavorable character, can be easily explained on the ground of\nthe long continued connection which had existed between the two\nschools. It is quite possible to suppose that Sextus was an\nEmpiricist a part of his life, and afterwards found the\nMethodical School more to his liking, and such a change would\nnot in any way have affected his stand as a physician.\n\n    [1] Pappenheim _Leb. Ver. Sex. Em_. 6.\n\nIn regard to the exact time when Sextus Empiricus lived, we gain\nvery little knowledge from internal evidence, and outside\nsources of information are equally uncertain. Diogenes Laertius\nmust have been a generation younger than Sextus, as he mentions\nthe disciple of Sextus, Saturninus, as an Empirical\nphysician.[1] The time of Diogenes is usually estimated as the\nfirst half of the third century A.D.,[2] therefore Sextus cannot\nbe brought forward later than the beginning of the century.\nSextus, however, directs his writings entirely against the\nDogmatics, by whom he distinctly states that he means the\nStoics,[3] and the influence of the Stoics began to decline in\nthe beginning of the third century A.D. A fact often used as a\nhelp in fixing the date of Sextus is his mention of Basilides\nthe Stoic,[4] [Greek: alla kai oi stoikoi, os oi peri ton\nBasileiden]. This Basilides was supposed to be identical with\none of the teachers of Marcus Aurelius.[5] This is accepted by\nZeller in the second edition of his _History of Philosophy_, but\nnot in the third for the reason that Sextus, in all the work\nfrom which this reference is taken, _i.e. Math_. VII.-XI.,\nmentions no one besides Aenesidemus, who lived later than the\nmiddle of the last century B.C.[6] The Basilides referred to by\nSextus may be one mentioned in a list of twenty Stoics, in a\nfragment of Diogenes Laertius, recently published in Berlin by\nVal Rose.[7] Too much importance has, however, been given to the\nrelation of the mention of Basilides the Stoic to the question\nof the date of Sextus. Even if the Basilides referred to by\nSextus is granted to have been the teacher of Marcus Aurelius,\nit only serves to show that Sextus lived either at the same time\nwith Marcus Aurelius or after him, which is a conclusion that we\nmust in any case reach for other reasons.\n\n    [1] Diog. IX. 12, 116.\n\n    [2] Ueberweg _Hist. of Phil._ p. 21.\n\n    [3] Hyp. I. 65.\n\n    [4] _Adv. Math_. VII. 258.\n\n    [5] Fabricius _Vita Sexti._\n\n    [6] Zeller _Op. cit_. III. 8.\n\n    [7] Brochard _Op. cit_. IV. 315.\n\nThe fact that has caused the greatest uncertainty in regard to\nthe date of Sextus is that Claudius Galen in his works mentions\nseveral Sceptics who were also physicians of the Empirical\nSchool,[1] and often speaks of Herodotus, supposed to be\nidentical with the teacher of Sextus given by Diogenes\nLaertius,[2] but makes no reference whatever to Sextus. As\nGalen's time passes the limit of the second century A.D., we\nmust either infer that Sextus was not the well-known physician\nthat he was stated to be by Pseudo-Galen, and consequently not\nknown to Galen, or that Galen wrote before Sextus became\nprominent as a Sceptic. This silence on the part of Galen in\nregard to Sextus increases the doubt, caused by Sextus' own\ncriticism of the Empirical School of medicine, as to his having\nbeen an Empiricist. The question is made more complicated, as it\nis difficult to fix the identity of the Herodotus so often\nreferred to by Galen.[3] As Galen died about 200 A.D. at the age\nof seventy,[4] we should fix the date of Sextus early in the\nthird century, and that of Diogenes perhaps a little later than\nthe middle, were it not that early in the third century the\nStoics began to decline in influence, and could hardly have\nexcited the warmth of animosity displayed by Sextus. We must\nthen suppose that Sextus wrote at the very latter part of the\nsecond century, and either that Galen did not know him, or that\nGalen's books were published before Sextus became prominent\neither as a physician or as a Sceptic. The fact that he may have\nbeen better known as the latter than as the former does not\nsufficiently account for Galen's silence, as other Sceptics are\nmentioned by him of less importance than Sextus, and the latter,\neven if not as great a physician as Pseudo-Galen asserts, was\ncertainly both a Sceptic and a physician, and must have belonged\nto one of the two medical schools so thoroughly discussed by\nGalen--either the Empirical or the Methodical. Therefore, if\nSextus were a contemporary of Galen, he was so far removed from\nthe circle of Galen's acquaintances as to have made no\nimpression upon him, either as a Sceptic or a physician, a\nsupposition that is very improbable. We must then fix the date\nof Sextus late in the second century, and conclude that the\nclimax of his public career was reached after Galen had finished\nthose of his writings which are still extant.\n\n    [1] Zeller, III. 7.\n\n    [2] Diog. XI. 12, 116.\n\n    [3] Pappenheim _Lebens. Ver. Sex. Em._ 30.\n\n    [4] Zeller _Grundriss der Ges. der Phil._ p. 260.\n\nSextus has a Latin name, but he was a Greek; we know this from\nhis own statement.[1] We also know that he must have been a\nGreek from the beauty and facility of his style, and from his\nacquaintance with Greek dialects. The place of his birth can\nonly, however, be conjectured, from arguments indirectly derived\nfrom his writings. His constant references throughout his works\nto the minute customs of different nations ought to give us a\nclue to the solution of this question, but strange to say they\ndo not give us a decided one. Of these references a large\nnumber, however, relate to the customs of Libya, showing a\nminute knowledge in regard to the political and religious\ncustoms of this land that he displays in regard to no other\ncountry except Egypt.[2] Fabricius thinks Libya was not his\nbirth place because of a reference which he makes to it in the\n_Hypotyposes_--[Greek: Thrakon de kai Gaitoulon (Libyon de\nethnos touto)].[3] This conclusion is, however, entirely\nunfounded, as the explanation of Sextus simply shows that the\npeople whom he was then addressing were not familiar with the\nnations of Libya. Suidas speaks of two men called Sextus, one\nfrom Chaeronea and one from Libya, both of whom he calls\nSceptics, and to one of whom he attributes Sextus' books. All\nauthorities agree in asserting that great confusion exists in\nthe works of Suidas; and Fabricius, Zeller, and Pappenheim place\nno weight upon this testimony of Suidas.[4] Haas, however,\ncontends[5] that it is unreasonable to suppose that this\nconfusion could go as far as to attribute the writings of Sextus\nEmpiricus to Sextus of Chaeronea, and also make the latter a\nSceptic, and he considers it far more reasonable to accept the\ntestimony of Suidas, as it coincides so well with the internal\nevidence of Sextus' writings in regard to his native land. It is\nnevertheless evident, from his familiarity with the customs,\nlanguage, and laws of Athens, Alexandria and Rome, that he must\nhave resided at some time in each of these cities.\n\n    [1] _Adv. Math._ A. 246; _Hyp._ I. 152; _Hyp._ III. 211,\n        214.\n\n    [2] Haas _Op. cit._ p. 10.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ III. 213.\n\n    [4] Pappenheim _Lebens. Ver. Sex. Em._ 5, 22; Zeller _Op.\n        cit._ III. 39; Fabricius _Vita de Sextus_.\n\n    [5] Haas _Op. cit_. p. 6.\n\nOf all the problems connected with the historical details of the\nlife of Sextus, the one that is the most difficult of solution,\nand also the most important for our present purpose of making a\ncritical study of his teaching, is to fix the seat of the\nSceptical School during the time that he was in charge of it.\nThe _Hypotyposes_ are lectures delivered in public in that\nperiod of his life. Where then were they delivered? We know that\nthe Sceptical School must have had a long continued existence as\na definite philosophical movement, although some have contended\notherwise. The fact of its existence as an organized direction\nof thought, is demonstrated by its formulated teachings, and the\nlist given by Diogenes Laertius of its principal leaders,[1] and\nby references from the writings of Sextus. In the first book of\n_Hypotyposes_ he refers to Scepticism as a distinct system of\nphilosophy, [Greek: kai taen diakrisin taes skepseos apo ton\nparakeimenon autae philosophion].[2] He speaks also of the older\nSceptics,[3] and the later Sceptics.[4]\n\nPyrrho, the founder of the school, taught in Elis, his native\nvillage; but even as early as the time of Timon, his immediate\nfollower, his teachings were somewhat known in Alexandria, where\nTimon for a while resided.[5] The immediate disciples of Timon,\nas given by Diogenes, were not men known in Greece or mentioned\nin Greek writings. Then we have the well-known testimony of\nAristocles the Peripatetic in regard to Aenesidemus, that he\ntaught Pyrrhonism in Alexandria[6]--[Greek: echthes kai proaen\nen Alexandreia tae kat' Aigypton Ainaesidaemos tis anazopyrein\naerxato ton huthlon touton].\n\n    [1] Diog. XI. 12, 115, 116.\n\n    [2] _Hyp_. I. 5.\n\n    [3] _Hyp_. I. 36.\n\n    [4] _Hyp_. I. 164.\n\n    [5] Chaignet _Op. cit._ 45.\n\n    [6] Aristocles of Euseb. _Praep. Ev._ XIV. E. 446.\n\nThis was after the dogmatic tendency of the Academy under\nAntiochus and his followers had driven Pyrrhonism from the\npartial union with the Academy, which it had experienced after\nthe breaking up of the school under the immediate successors of\nTimon. Aenesidemus taught about the time of our era in\nAlexandria, and established the school there anew; and his\nfollowers are spoken of in a way that presupposes their\ncontinuing in the same place. There is every reason to think\nthat the connection of Sextus with Alexandria was an intimate\none, not only because Alexandria had been for so long a time the\nseat of Pyrrhonism, but also from internal evidence from his\nwritings and their subsequent historical influence; and yet the\n_Hypotyposes_ could not have been delivered in Alexandria, as he\noften refers to that place in comparison with the place where he\nwas then speaking. He says, furthermore, that he teaches in the\nsame place where his master taught.[1] [Greek: Blepon te hoti\nentha ho huphaegaetaes ho emos dielegeto, entautha ego nun\ndialegomai]. Therefore the school must have been removed from\nAlexandria, in or before the time of the teacher of Sextus, to\nsome other centre. The _Hypotyposes_ are from beginning to end a\ndirect attack on the Dogmatics; therefore Sextus must have\ntaught either in some city where the dogmatic philosophy was\nstrong, or in some rival philosophical centre. The _Hypotyposes_\nshow also that the writer had access to some large library.\nAlexandria, Rome and Athens are the three places the most\nprobable for selection for such a purpose. For whatever reason\nthe seat of the school was removed from Alexandria by the master\nof Sextus, or by himself, from the place where it had so long\nbeen united with the Empirical School of medicine, Athens would\nseem the most suitable city for its recontinuance, in the land\nwhere Pyrrhonism first had its birth. Sextus, however, in one\ninstance, in referring to things invisible because of their\noutward relations, says in illustration, \"as the city of Athens\nis invisible to us at present.\"[2] In other places also he\ncontrasts the Athenians with the people whom he is addressing,\nequally with the Alexandrians, thus putting Athens as well as\nAlexandria out of the question.\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ III. 120.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ II. 98.\n\nOf the different writers on Sextus Empiricus, those who have\ntreated this part of the subject most critically are Haas and\nPappenheim. We will therefore consider, somewhat at length, the\nresults presented by these two authors. Haas thinks that the\n_Hypotyposes_ were delivered in Rome for the following reasons.\nSextus' lectures must have been given in some centre of\nphilosophical schools and of learning. He never opposes Roman\nrelations to those of the place where he is speaking, as he does\nin regard to Athens and Alexandria. He uses the name \"Romans\"\nonly three times,[1] once comparing them to the Rhodians, once\nto the Persians, and once in general to other nations.[2] In the\nfirst two of these references, the expression \"among the Romans\"\nin the first part of the antithesis is followed by the\nexpression, \"among us,\" in the second part, which Haas\nunderstands to be synonymous. The third reference is in regard\nto a Roman law, and the use of the word 'Roman' does not at all\nshow that Sextus was not then in Rome. The character of the laws\nreferred to by Sextus as [Greek: par' haemin] shows that they\nwere always Roman laws, and his definition of law[3] is\nespecially a definition of Roman law. This argument might, it\nwould seem, apply to any part of the Roman Empire, but Haas\nclaims that the whole relation of law to custom as treated of by\nSextus, and all his statements of customs forbidden at that time\nby law, point to Rome as the place of his residence. Further,\nHaas considers the Herodotus mentioned by Galen[4] as a\nprominent physician in Rome, to have been the predecessor and\nmaster of Sextus, in whose place Sextus says that he is\nteaching.[5] Haas also thinks that Sextus' refutation of the\nidentity of Pyrrhonism with Empiricism evidently refers to a\nparagraph in Galen's _Subfiguratio Empirica_,[6] which would be\nnatural if the _Hypotyposes_ were written shortly after Galen's\n_Sub. Em._, and in the same place. Further, Hippolytus, who\nwrote in or near Rome very soon after the time of Sextus,\napparently used the _Hypotyposes_, which would be more natural\nif he wrote in the same place. According to Haas, every thing in\ninternal evidence, and outward testimony, points to Rome as\nhaving been the city where Sextus occupied his position as the\nhead of the Sceptical School.\n\n    [1] Haas _Op. cit._ p. 15.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 149, 152; III. 211.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 146.\n\n    [4] Galen _de puls._ IV. 11; Bd. VIII. 751.\n\n    [5] _Hyp_. III. 120.\n\n    [6] Galen _Sub. Em._ 123 B-126 D. (Basileae, 1542).\n\nComing now to the position of Pappenheim on this subject, we\nfind that he takes very decided ground against the seat of the\nSceptical School having been in Rome, even for a short time, in\nhis latest publication regarding it.[1] This opinion is the\nresult of late study on the part of Pappenheim, for in his work\non the _Lebensverhaeltnisse des Sextus Empiricus_ Berlin 1875, he\nsays, \"Dass Herodotus in Rom lebte sagt Galen. Vermuthlich auch\nSextus.\" His reasons given in the later article for not\nconnecting the Sceptical School at all with Rome are as follows.\nHe finds no proof of the influence of Scepticism in Rome, as\nCicero remarks that Pyrrhonism is extinct,[2] and he also gives\nweight to the well-known sarcastic saying of Seneca, _Quis est\nqui tradat praecepta Pyrrhonis!_[3] While Haas claims that\nSextus would naturally seek one of the centres of dogmatism, in\norder most effectively to combat it, Pappenheim, on the\ncontrary, contends that it would have been foolishness on the\npart of Sextus to think of starting the Sceptical School in\nRome, where Stoicism was the favored philosophy of the Roman\nEmperors; and when either for the possible reason of strife\nbetween the Empirical and Methodical Schools, or for some other\ncause, the Pyrrhonean School was removed from Alexandria,\nPappenheim claims that all testimony points to the conclusion\nthat it was founded in some city of the East. The name of Sextus\nis never known in Roman literature, but in the East, on the\ncontrary, literature speaks for centuries of Sextus and Pyrrho.\nThe _Hypotyposes_, especially, were well-known in the East, and\nreferences to Sextus are found there in philosophical and\nreligious dogmatic writings. The Emperor Julian makes use of the\nworks of Sextus, and he is frequently quoted by the Church\nFathers of the Eastern Church.[4] Pappenheim accordingly\nconcludes that the seat of Pyrrhonism after the school was\nremoved from Alexandria, was in some unknown city of the East.\n\n    [1] Pappenheim _Sitz der Skeptischen Schule. Archiv fuer\n        Geschichte der Phil._ 1888.\n\n    [2] Cicero _De Orat._ III. 17, 62.\n\n    [3] Seneca _nat. qu._ VII. 32. 2.\n\n    [4] Fabricius _de Sexto Empirico Testimonia_.\n\nIn estimating the weight of these arguments, we must accept with\nPappenheim the close connection of Pyrrhonism with Alexandria,\nand the subsequent influence which it exerted upon the\nliterature of the East. All historical relations tend to fix the\npermanent seat of Pyrrhonism, after its separation from the\nAcademy, in Alexandria. There is nothing to point to its removal\nfrom Alexandria before the time of Menodotus, who is the teacher\nof Herodotus,[1] and for many reasons to be considered the real\nteacher of Sextus. It was Menodotus who perfected the Empirical\ndoctrines, and who brought about an official union between\nScepticism and Empiricism, and who gave Pyrrhonism in great\nmeasure, the _eclat_ that it enjoyed in Alexandria, and who\nappears to have been the most powerful influence in the school,\nfrom the time of Aenesidemus to that of Sextus. Furthermore,\nSextus' familiarity with Alexandrian customs bears the imprint\nof original knowledge, and he cannot, as Zeller implies, be\naccepted as simply quoting. One could hardly agree with\nZeller,[2] that the familiarity shown by Sextus with the customs\nof both Alexandria and Rome in the _Hypotyposes_ does not\nnecessarily show that he ever lived in either of those places,\nbecause a large part of his works are compilations from other\nbooks; but on the contrary, the careful reader of Sextus' works\nmust find in all of them much evidence of personal knowledge of\nAlexandria, Athens and Rome.\n\n    [1] Diog. IX. 12, 116.\n\n    [2] Zeller _Op. cit._ III. p. 39.\n\nA part of Sextus' books also may have been written in\nAlexandria. [Greek: Pros phusikous] could have been written in\nAlexandria.[1] If these were also lectures, then Sextus taught\nin Alexandria as well as elsewhere. The history of Eastern\nliterature for the centuries immediately following the time of\nSextus, showing as it does in so many instances the influence of\nPyrrhonism, and a knowledge of the _Hypotyposes_, furnishes us\nwith an incontestable proof that the school could not have been\nfor a long time removed from the East, and the absence of such\nknowledge in Roman literature is also a strong argument against\nits long continuance in that city. It would seem, however, from\nall the data at command, that during the years that the\nSceptical School was removed from Alexandria, its head quarters\nwere in Rome, and that the Pyrrhonean _Hypotyposes_ were\ndelivered in Rome. Let us briefly consider the arguments in\nfavour of such a hypothesis. Scepticism was not unknown in Rome.\nPappenheim quotes the remark of Cicero that Pyrrhonism was long\nsince dead, and the sarcasm of Seneca, _Quis est qui tradat\npraecepta Pyrrhonis?_ as an argument against the knowledge of\nPyrrhonism in Rome. We must remember, however, that in Cicero's\ntime Aenesidemus had not yet separated himself from the Academy;\nor if we consider the Lucius Tubero to whom Aenesidemus\ndedicated his works, as the same Lucius Tubero who was the\nfriend of Cicero in his youth, and accordingly fix the date of\nAenesidemus about 50 B.C.,[2] even then Aenesidemus' work in\nAlexandria was too late to have necessarily been known to\nCicero, whose remark must have been referred to the old school\nof Scepticism. Should we grant, however, that the statements of\nCicero and Seneca prove that in their time Pyrrhonism was\nextinct in Rome, they certainly do not show that after their\ndeath it could not have again revived, for the _Hypotyposes_\nwere delivered more than a century after the death of Seneca.\nThere are very few writers in Aenesidemus' own time who showed\nany influence of his teachings.[3] This influence was felt\nlater, as Pyrrhonism became better known. That Pyrrhonism\nreceived some attention in Rome before the time of Sextus is\nnevertheless demonstrated by the teachings of Favorinus there.\nAlthough Favorinus was known as an Academician, the title of his\nprincipal work was [Greek: tous philosophoumenous auto ton\nlogon, hon aristoi hoi Purrhoneioi].[4] Suidas calls Favorinus a\ngreat author and learned in all science and philosophy,[5] and\nFavorinus made Rome the centre of his teaching and writing. His\ndate is fixed by Zeller at 80-150 A.D., therefore Pyrrhonism was\nknown in Rome shortly before the time of Sextus.\n\n    [1] Pappenheim _Sitz der Skeptischen Schule; Archiv fuer\n        Geschichte der Phil._, 1888; _Adv. Math._ X. 15, 95.\n\n    [2] Zeller _Op. cit._ III. 10.\n\n    [3] Zeller _Op. cit._ p. 63.\n\n    [4] Zeller _Op. cit._ p. 67.\n\n    [5] Brochard _Op. cit._ 329.\n\nThe whole tone of the _Hypotyposes_, with the constant\nreferences to the Stoics as living present opponents, shows that\nthese lectures must have been delivered in one of the centres of\nStoicism. As Alexandria and Athens are out of the question, all\ntestimony points to Rome as having been the seat of the\nPyrrhonean School, for at least a part of the time that Sextus\nwas at its head. We would then accept the teacher of Sextus, in\nwhose place he says he taught, as the Herodotus so often\nreferred to by Galen[1] who lived in Rome. Sextus' frequent\nreferences to Asclepiades, whom he mentions ten different times\nby name in his works,[2] speak in favour of Rome in the matter\nunder discussion, as Asclepiades made that city one of the\ncentres of medical culture. On the other hand, the fact that\nthere is no trace of the _Hypotyposes_ in later Roman\nliterature, with the one exception of the works of Hippolytus,\nas opposed to the wide-spread knowledge of them shown in the\nEast for centuries, is incontestable historical proof that the\nSceptical School could not long have had its seat at Rome. From\nthe two passages given above from Sextus' work against physics,\nhe must either have written that book in Alexandria, it would\nseem, or have quoted those passages from some other work. May we\nnot then conclude, that Sextus was at the head of the school in\nRome for a short time, where it may have been removed\ntemporarily, on account of the difficulty with the Empiricists,\nimplied in _Hyp_. I. 236-241, or in order to be better able to\nattack the Stoics, but that he also taught in Alexandria, where\nthe real home of the school was certainly found? There it\nprobably came to an end about fifty years after the time of\nSextus, and from that centre the Sceptical works of Sextus had\ntheir wide-spread influence in the East.\n\n    [1] Galen VIII. 751.\n\n    [2] Bekker _Index_.\n\nThe books of Sextus Empiricus furnish us with the best and\nfullest presentation of ancient Scepticism which has been\npreserved to modern times, and give Sextus the position of one\nof the greatest men of the Sceptical School. His works which are\nstill extant are the _Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes_ in three volumes,\nand the two works comprising eleven books which have been united\nin later times under the title of [Greek: pros mathematikous],\none of which is directed against the sciences in general, and\nthe other against the dogmatic philosophers. The six books\ncomposing the first of these are written respectively against\ngrammarians, rhetoricians, geometricians, arithmeticians,\nastronomers and musicians. The five books of the latter consist\nof two against the logicians, two against physics, and one\nagainst systems of morals. If the last short work of the first\nbook directed against the arithmeticians is combined with the\none preceding against the geometricians, as it well could be,\nthe two works together would be divided into ten different\nparts; there is evidence to show that in ancient times such a\ndivision was made.[1] There were two other works of Sextus which\nare now lost, the medical work before referred to, and a book\nentitled [Greek: peri psuches]. The character of the extant\nworks of Sextus is similar, as they are all directed either\nagainst science or against the dogmatics, and they all present\nthe negative side of Pyrrhonism. The vast array of arguments\ncomprising the subject-matter, often repeated in the same and\ndifferent forms, are evidently taken largely from the Sceptical\nworks which Sextus had resource to, and are, in fact, a summing\nup of all the wisdom of the Sceptical School. The style of these\nbooks is fluent, and the Greek reminds one of Plutarch and\nThucydides, and although Sextus does not claim originality, but\npresents in all cases the arguments of the Sceptic, yet the\nillustrations and the form in which the arguments are presented,\noften bear the marks of his own thought, and are characterized\nhere and there by a wealth of humor that has not been\nsufficiently noticed in the critical works on Sextus. Of all the\nauthors who have reviewed Sextus, Brochard is the only one who\nseems to have understood and appreciated his humorous side.\n\nWe shall now proceed to the consideration of the general\nposition and aim of Pyrrhonism.\n\n[1] Diog. IX. 12, 116.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\n\n_The Position and Aim of Pyrrhonism_.\n\nThe first volume of the _Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes_ gives the most\ncomplete statement found in any of the works of Sextus Empiricus\nof the teachings of Pyrrhonism and its relation to other schools\nof philosophy. The chief source of the subject-matter presented\nis a work of the same name by Aenesidemus,[1] either directly\nused by Sextus, or through the writings of those who followed\nAenesidemus. The comprehensive title [Greek: Purrhoneioi\nhupotuposeis] was very probably used in general to designate\ncourses of lectures given by the leaders of the Sceptical\nSchool.\n\nIn the opening chapters of the _Hypotyposes_ Sextus undertakes\nto define the position and aim of Pyrrhonism.[2] In introducing\nhis subject he treats briefly of the differences between\nphilosophical schools, dividing them into three classes; those\nwhich claim that they have found the truth, like the schools of\nAristotle and Epicurus and the Stoics; those which deny the\npossibility of finding it, like that of the Academicians; and\nthose that still seek it, like the Sceptical School. The\naccusation against the Academicians, that they denied the\npossibility of finding the truth, was one that the Sceptics were\nvery fond of making. We shall discuss the justice of it later,\nsimply remarking here, that to affirm the \"incomprehensibility\nof the unknown,\" was a form of expression that the Pyrrhonists\nthemselves were sometimes betrayed into, notwithstanding their\ncareful avoidance of dogmatic statements.[3]\n\n    [1] Diog. IX. 11, 78.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 3, 4.\n\n    [3] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 191.\n\nAfter defining the three kinds of philosophy as the Dogmatic,\nthe Academic and the Sceptic, Sextus reminds his hearers that he\ndoes not speak dogmatically in anything that he says, but that\nhe intends simply to present the Sceptical arguments\nhistorically, and as they appear to him. He characterizes his\ntreatment of the subject as general rather than critical,\nincluding a statement of the character of Scepticism, its idea,\nits principles, its manner of reasoning, its criterion and aim,\nand a presentation of the Tropes, or aspects of doubt, and the\nSceptical formulae and the distinction between Scepticism and\nthe related schools of philosophy.[1]\n\nThe result of all the gradual changes which the development of\nthought had brought about in the outward relations of the\nSceptical School, was to increase the earnestness of the claim\nof the Sceptics to be simply followers of Pyrrho, the great\nfounder of the movement. In discussing the names given to the\nSceptics, Sextus gives precedence very decidedly to the title\n\"Pyrrhonean,\" because Pyrrho appears the best representative of\nScepticism, and more prominent than all who before him occupied\nthemselves with it.[2]\n\nIt was a question much discussed among philosophers in ancient\ntimes, whether Pyrrhonism should be considered a philosophical\nsect or not. Thus we find that Hippobotus in his work entitled\n[Greek: peri haireseon], written shortly before our era, does\nnot include Pyrrhonism among the other sects.[3] Diogenes\nhimself, after some hesitation remarking that many do not\nconsider it a sect, finally decides to call it so.[4]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 5, 6.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 7.\n\n    [3] Diog. _Pro._ 19.\n\n    [4] Diog. _Pro._ 20.\n\nSextus in discussing this subject calls Scepticism an [Greek:\nagoge], or a movement, rather than a [Greek: hairesis], saying\nthat Scepticism is not a sect, if that word implies a systematic\narrangement of dogmas, for the Sceptic has no dogmas. If,\nhowever, a sect may mean simply the following of a certain\nsystem of reasoning according to what appears to be true, then\nScepticism is a sect.[1] From a quotation given later on by\nSextus from Aenesidemus, we know that the latter used the term\n[Greek: agoge].[2] Sextus gives also the other titles, so well\nknown as having been applied to Scepticism, namely, [Greek:\nzetetike], [Greek: ephektike], and [Greek: aporetike].[3] The\n[Greek: dunamis][4] of Scepticism is to oppose the things of\nsense and intellect in every possible way to each other, and\nthrough the equal weight of things opposed, or [Greek:\nisostheneia], to reach first the state of suspension of\njudgement, and afterwards ataraxia, or \"repose and tranquillity\nof soul.\"[5] The purpose of Scepticism is then the hope of\nataraxia, and its origin was in the troubled state of mind\ninduced by the inequality of things, and uncertainty in regard\nto the truth. Therefore, says Sextus, men of the greatest talent\nbegan the Sceptical system by placing in opposition to every\nargument an equal one, thus leading to a philosophical system\nwithout a dogma, for the Sceptic claims that he has no dogma.[6]\nThe Sceptic is never supposed to state a decided opinion, but\nonly to say what appears to him. Even the Sceptical formulae,\nsuch as \"Nothing more,\"[7] or \"I decide nothing,\"[8] or \"All is\nfalse,\" include themselves with other things. The only\nstatements that the Sceptic can make, are in regard to his own\nsensations. He cannot deny that he is warm or cold or hungry.\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 15, 17.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 210.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 7; Diog. IX. 11, 70.\n\n    [4] _Hyp._ I. 8.\n\n    [5] _Hyp._ I. 10.\n\n    [6] _Hyp._ I. 12.\n\n    [7] _Hyp._ I. 14.\n\n    [8] _Hyp._ I. 14.\n\nSextus replies to the charge that the Sceptics deny phenomena by\nrefuting it.[1] The Sceptic does not deny phenomena, because\nthey are the only criteria by which he can regulate his actions.\n\"We call the criterion of the Sceptical School the phenomenon,\nmeaning by this name the idea of it.\"[2] Phenomena are the only\nthings which the Sceptic does not deny, and he guides his life\nby them. They are, however, subjective. Sextus distinctly\naffirms that sensations are the phenomena,[3] and that they lie\nin susceptibility and voluntary feeling, and that they\nconstitute the appearances of objects.[4] We see from this that\nSextus makes the only reality to consist in subjective\nexperience, but he does not follow this to its logical\nconclusion, and doubt the existence of anything outside of mind.\nHe rather takes for granted that there is a something unknown\noutside, about which the Sceptic can make no assertions.\nPhenomena are the criteria according to which the Sceptic orders\nhis daily life, as he cannot be entirely inactive, and they\naffect life in four different ways. They constitute the guidance\nof nature, the impulse of feeling; they give rise to the\ntraditions of customs and laws, and make the teaching of the\narts important.[5] According to the tradition of laws and\ncustoms, piety is a good in daily life, but it is not in itself\nan abstract good. The Sceptic of Sextus' time also inculcated\nthe teaching of the arts, as indeed must be the case with\nprofessing physicians, as most of the leading Sceptics were.\nSextus says, \"We are not without energy in the arts which we\nundertake.\"[6] This was a positive tendency which no philosophy,\nhowever negative, could escape, and the Sceptic tried to avoid\ninconsistency in this respect, by separating his philosophy from\nhis theory of life. His philosophy controlled his opinions, and\nhis life was governed by phenomena.\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 19.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 19.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 22; Diog. IX. 11, 105.\n\n    [4] _Hyp._ I. 22.\n\n    [5] _Hyp._ I. 23.\n\n    [6] _Hyp._ I. 24.\n\nThe aim of Pyrrhonism was ataraxia in those things which pertain\nto opinion, and moderation in the things which life imposes.[1]\nIn other words, we find here the same natural desire of the\nhuman being to rise above and beyond the limitations which pain\nand passion impose, which is expressed in other forms, and under\nother names, in other schools of philosophy. The method,\nhowever, by which ataraxia or peace of mind could be reached,\nwas peculiar to the Sceptic. It is a state of psychological\nequilibrium, which results from the equality of the weight of\ndifferent arguments that are opposed to each other, and the\nconsequent impossibility of affirming in regard to either one,\nthat it is correct.[2] The discovery of ataraxia was, in the\nfirst instance, apparently accidental, for while the Sceptic\nwithheld his opinion, unable to decide what things were true,\nand what things were false, ataraxia fortunately followed.[3]\nAfter he had begun to philosophize, with a desire to\ndiscriminate in regard to ideas, and to separate the true from\nthe false[4] during the time of [Greek: epoche], or suspension\nof judgement, ataraxia followed as if by chance, as the shadow\nfollows the body.[5]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 25.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 26.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 26.\n\n    [4] Diog. IX. 11, 107.\n\n    [5] _Hyp._ I. 29.\n\nThe Sceptic in seeking ataraxia in the things of opinion, does\nnot entirely escape from suffering from his sensations. He is\nnot wholly undisturbed, for he is sometimes cold and hungry, and\nso on.[1] He claims, nevertheless, that he suffers less than the\ndogmatist, who is beset with two kinds of suffering, one from\nthe feelings themselves, and also from the conviction that they\nare by nature an evil.[2] To the Sceptic nothing is in itself\neither an evil or a good, and so he thinks that \"he escapes from\ndifficulties easier.\"[3] For instance, he who considers riches a\ngood in themselves, is unhappy in the loss of them, and in\npossession of them is in fear of losing them, while the Sceptic,\nremembering the Sceptical saying \"No more,\" is untroubled in\nwhatever condition he may be found, as the loss of riches is no\nmore an evil than the possession of them is a good.[4] For he\nwho considers anything good or bad by nature is always troubled,\nand when that which seemed good is not present with him, he\nthinks that he is tortured by that which is by nature bad, and\nfollows after what he thinks to be good. Having acquired it,\nhowever, he is not at rest, for his reason tells him that a\nsudden change may deprive him of this thing that he considers a\ngood.[5] The Sceptic, however, endeavours neither to avoid nor\nseek anything eagerly.[6]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 30.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 30.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 30; Diog. IX. 11, 61.\n\n    [4] _Adv. Math._ XI. 146-160.\n\n    [5] _Hyp._ I. 27.\n\n    [6] _Hyp._ I. 28.\n\nAtaraxia came to the Sceptic as success in painting the foam on\na horse's mouth came to Apelles the painter. After many attempts\nto do this, and many failures, he gave up in despair, and threw\nthe sponge at the picture that he had used to wipe the colors\nfrom the painting with. As soon as it touched the picture it\nproduced a representation of the foam.[1] Thus the Sceptics were\nnever able to attain to ataraxia by examining the anomaly\nbetween the phenomena and the things of thought, but it came to\nthem of its own accord just when they despaired of finding it.\n\nThe intellectual preparation for producing ataraxia, consists in\nplacing arguments in opposition to each other, both in regard to\nphenomena, and to things of the intellect. By placing the\nphenomenal in opposition to the phenomenal, the intellectual to\nthe intellectual, and the phenomenal to the intellectual, and\n_vice versa_, the present to the present, past, and future, one\nwill find that no argument exists that is incontrovertible. It\nis not necessary to accept any statement whatever as true, and\nconsequently a state of [Greek: epoche] may always be\nmaintained.[2] Although ataraxia concerns things of the opinion,\nand must be preceded by the intellectual process described\nabove, it is not itself a function of the intellect, or any\nsubtle kind of reasoning, but seems to be rather a unique form\nof moral perfection, leading to happiness, or is itself\nhappiness.\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 28, 29.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 32-35.\n\nIt was the aim of Scepticism to know nothing, and to assert\nnothing in regard to any subject, but at the same time not to\naffirm that knowledge on all subjects is impossible, and\nconsequently to have the attitude of still seeking. The\nstandpoint of Pyrrhonism was materialistic. We find from the\nteachings of Sextus that he affirmed the non-existence of the\nsoul,[1] or the ego, and denied absolute existence\naltogether.[2] The introductory statements of Diogenes regarding\nPyrrhonism would agree with this standpoint.[3]\n\nThere is no criterion of truth in Scepticism. We cannot prove\nthat the phenomena represent objects, or find out what the\nrelation of phenomena to objects is. There is no criterion to\ntell us which one is true of all the different representations\nof the same object, and of all the varieties of sensation that\narise through the many phases of relativity of the conditions\nwhich control the character of the phenomena.\n\nEvery effort to find the truth can deal only with phenomena, and\nabsolute reality can never be known.\n\n    [1] _Adv. Math._ VII. 55; _Hyp._ II. 32.\n\n    [2] _Adv. Math._ XI. 140.\n\n    [3] Diog. IX. 11, 61.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\n\n_The Sceptical Tropes_.\n\nThe exposition of the Tropes of Pyrrhonism constitutes\nhistorically and philosophically the most important part of the\nwritings of Sextus Empiricus. These Tropes represent the sum\ntotal of the wisdom of the older Sceptical School, and were held\nin high respect for centuries, not only by the Pyrrhoneans, but\nalso by many outside the narrow limits of that School. In the\nfirst book of the _Hypotyposes_ Sextus gives two classes of\nTropes, those of [Greek: epoche] and the eight Tropes of\nAenesidemus against Aetiology.\n\nThe Tropes of [Greek: epoche] are arranged in groups of ten,\nfive and two, according to the period of the Sceptical School to\nwhich they belong; the first of these groups is historically the\nmost important, or the Ten Tropes of [Greek: epoche], as these\nare far more closely connected with the general development of\nScepticism, than the later ones. By the name [Greek: tropos] or\nTrope, the Sceptic understood a manner of thought, or form of\nargument, or standpoint of judgement. It was a term common in\nGreek philosophy, used in this sense, from the time of\nAristotle.[1] The Stoics, however, used the word with a\ndifferent meaning from that attributed to it by the Sceptics.[2]\nStephanus and Fabricius translate it by the Latin word\n_modus_[3] and [Greek: tropos] also is often used\ninterchangeably with the word [Greek: logos] by Sextus, Diogenes\nLaertius, and others; sometimes also as synonymous with [Greek:\ntopos],[4] and [Greek: typos] is found in the oldest edition of\nSextus.[5] Diogenes defines the word as the standpoint, or\nmanner of argument, by which the Sceptics arrived at the\ncondition of doubt, in consequence of the equality of\nprobabilities, and he calls the Tropes, the ten Tropes of\ndoubt.[6] All writers on Pyrrhonism after the time of\nAenesidemus give the Tropes the principal place in their\ntreatment of the subject. Sextus occupies two thirds of the\nfirst book of the _Hypotyposes_ in stating and discussing them;\nand about one fourth of his presentation of Scepticism is\ndevoted to the Tropes by Diogenes. In addition to these two\nauthors, Aristocles the Peripatetic refers to them in his attack\non Scepticism.[7] Favorinus wrote a book entitled _Pyrrhonean\nTropes_, and Plutarch one called _The Ten ([Greek: topoi]) Topes\nof Pyrrho_.[8] Both of these latter works are lost.\n\n    [1] Pappenheim _Erlauterung Pyrrh. Grundzugen_, p. 35.\n\n    [2] Diog I. 76; _Adv. Math._ VIII. 227.\n\n    [3] Fabricius, Cap. XIV. 7.\n\n    [4] _Hyp._ I. 36.\n\n    [5] Fabricius on _Hyp._ I. 36; Cap. XIV. G.\n\n    [6] Diog. IX. 11, 79-108.\n\n    [7] Aristocles _Euseb. praep. ev._ X. 14, 18.\n\n    [8] Fabricius on _Hyp._ I. 36.\n\nAll authorities unite in attributing to Aenesidemus the work of\nsystematizing and presenting to the world the ten Tropes of\n[Greek: epoche]. He was the first to conceive the project of\nopposing an organized philosophical system of Pyrrhonism to the\ndogmatism of his contemporaries.[1] Moreover, the fact that\nDiogenes introduces the Tropes into his life of Pyrrho, does not\nnecessarily imply that he considered Pyrrho their author, for\nDiogenes invariably combines the teachings of the followers of a\nmovement with those of the founders themselves; he gives these\nTropes after speaking of Aenesidemus' work entitled _Pyrrhonean\nHypotyposes_, and apparently quotes from this book, in giving at\nleast a part of his presentation of Pyrrhonism, either directly\nor through, the works of others. Nietzsche proposes a correction\nof the text of Diogenes IX. 11, 79, which would make him quote the\nTropes from a book by Theodosius,[2] author of a commentary on\nthe works of Theodas. No writer of antiquity claims for the\nTropes an older source than the books of Aenesidemus, to whom\nAristocles also attributes them.[3] They are not mentioned in\nDiogenes' life of Timon, the immediate disciple of Pyrrho.\nCicero has no knowledge of them, and does not refer to them in\nhis discussion of Scepticism.\n\n    [1] Compare Saisset _Op. cit._ p. 78.\n\n    [2] Brochard _Op. cit._ 254, Note 4.\n\n    [3] Aristocles _Eus. praep. ev._ XIV. 18. 8.\n\nAenesidemus was undoubtedly the first to formulate these Tropes,\nbut many things tend to show that they resulted, in reality,\nfrom the gradual classification of the results of the teachings\nof Pyrrho, in the subsequent development of thought from his own\ntime to that of Aenesidemus. The ideas contained in the Tropes\nwere not original with Aenesidemus, but are more closely\nconnected with the thought of earlier times. The decidedly\nempirical character of the Tropes proves this connection, for\nthe eight Tropes of Aetiology, which were original with\nAenesidemus, bear a far stronger dialectic stamp, thus showing a\nmore decided dialectic influence of the Academy than is found in\nthe Tropes of [Greek: epoche]. Many of the illustrations given\nof the Tropes also, testify to a time of greater antiquity than\nthat of Aenesidemus. The name Trope was well known in ancient\ntimes, and the number ten reminds us of the ten opposing\nprinciples of Pythagoras, and the ten categories of Aristotle,\nthe fourth of which was the same as the eighth Trope. The\nterminology, however, with very few exceptions, points to a\nlater period than that of Pyrrho. Zeller points out a number of\nexpressions in both Diogenes' and Sextus' exposition of the\nTropes, which could not date back farther than the time of\nAenesidemus.[1] One of the most striking features of the whole\npresentation of the Tropes, especially as given by Sextus, is\ntheir mosaic character, stamping them not as the work of one\nperson, but as a growth, and also an agglutinous growth, lacking\nvery decidedly the symmetry of thought that the work of one mind\nwould have shown.\n\n    [1] Zeller _Op. cit._ p. 25.\n\nAt the time of the separation of Pyrrhonism from the Academy, no\nother force was as strong in giving life to the school as the\nsystematic treatment by Aenesidemus of the Ten Tropes of [Greek:\nepoche]. The reason of this is evident. It was not that the\nideas of the Sceptical Tropes were original with Aenesidemus,\nbut because a definite statement of belief is always a far more\npowerful influence than principles which are vaguely understood\nand accepted. There is always, however, the danger to the\nSceptic, in making a statement even of the principles of\nScepticism, that the psychological result would be a dogmatic\ntendency of mind, as we shall see later was the case, even with\nAenesidemus himself. That the Sceptical School could not escape\nthe accusation of dogmatizing, from the Dogmatics, even in\nstating the grounds of their Scepticism, we know from\nDiogenes.[1] To avoid this dogmatic tendency of the ten Tropes,\nSextus makes the frequent assertion that he does not affirm\nthings to be absolutely true, but states them as they appear to\nhim, and that they may be otherwise from what he has said.[2]\n\n    [1] Diog. IX. 11, 102.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 4, 24.\n\nSextus tells us that \"Certain Tropes, ten in number, for\nproducing the state of [Greek: epoche] have been handed down\nfrom the older Sceptics.\"[1] He refers to them in another work\nas the \"Tropes of Aenesidemus.\"[2] There is no evidence that the\nsubstance of these Tropes was changed after the time of\nAenesidemus, although many of the illustrations given by Sextus\nmust have been of a later date, added during the two centuries\nthat elapsed between the time of Aenesidemus and Sextus. In\ngiving these Tropes Sextus does not claim to offer a systematic\nmethodical classification, and closes his list of them, in their\noriginal concise form, with the remark, \"We make this order\nourselves.\"[3] The order is given differently by Diogenes, and\nalso by Favorinus.[4] The Trope which Sextus gives as the tenth\nis the fifth given by Diogenes, the seventh by Sextus is the\neighth given by Diogenes, the fifth by Sextus, the seventh by\nDiogenes, the tenth by Diogenes, the eighth by Sextus. Diogenes\nsays that the one he gives as the ninth Favorinus calls the\neighth, and Sextus and Aenesidemus the tenth. This statement\ndoes not correspond with the list of the Tropes which Sextus\ngives, proving that Diogenes took some other text than that of\nSextus as his authority.[5] The difference in the order of the\nTropes shows, also, that the order was not considered a matter\nof great importance. There is a marked contrast in the spirit of\nthe two presentations of the Tropes given by Sextus and\nDiogenes. The former gives them not only as an orator, but as\none who feels that he is defending his own cause, and the school\nof which he is the leader, against mortal enemies, while\nDiogenes relates them as an historian.\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 36.\n\n    [2] _Adv. Math._ VII. 345.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 38.\n\n    [4] Diog. IX. 11, 87.\n\n    [5] Diog. IX. 11, 87.\n\nPappenheim tries to prove[1] that Aenesidemus originally gave\nonly nine Tropes in his _Pyrrhonean Hypotyposes_, as Aristocles\nmentions only nine in referring to the Tropes of Aenesidemus,\nand that the tenth was added later. Had this been the case,\nhowever, the fact would surely have been mentioned either by\nDiogenes or Sextus, who both refer to the ten Tropes of\nAenesidemus.\n\nThe Tropes claim to prove that the character of phenomena is so\nrelative and changeable, that certain knowledge cannot be based\nupon them, and as we have shown, there is no other criterion of\nknowledge for the Sceptic than phenomena.[2] All of the Tropes,\nexcept the tenth, are connected with sense-perception, and\nrelate to the difference of the results obtained through the\nsenses under different circumstances. They may be divided into\ntwo classes, _i.e._, those based upon differences of our\nphysical organism, and those based upon external differences. To\nthe first class belong the first, second, third and fourth; to\nthe second class, the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth, and also\nthe ninth. The eighth, or that of relation, is applied\nobjectively both by Sextus and Diogenes in their treatment of\nthe Tropes, and is not used for objects of thought alone, but\nprincipally to show the relation of outward objects to each\nother. The tenth is the only one which has a moral significance,\nand it has also a higher subjective value than the others; it\ntakes its arguments from an entirely different sphere of\nthought, and deals with metaphysical and religious\ncontradictions in opinion, and with the question of good and\nevil. That this Trope is one of the oldest, we know from its\ndistinct mention in connection with the foundation theories of\nPyrrho, by Diogenes.[3] In treating of the subjective reasons\nfor doubt as to the character of external reality, the Sceptics\nwere very near the denial of all outward reality, a point,\nhowever, which they never quite reached.\n\n    [1] Pappenheim, _Die Tropen der Griechen_, p. 23.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 22.\n\n    [3] Diog. IX. 11, 61.\n\nThere is evidently much of Sextus' own thought mixed with the\nillustrations of the Tropes, but it is impossible to separate\nthe original parts from the material that was the common\nproperty of the Sceptical School. Many of these illustrations\nshow, however, perfect familiarity with the scientific and\nmedical teachings of the time. Before entering upon his\nexposition of the Tropes, Sextus gives them in the short concise\nform in which they must first have existed[1]--\n\n   (i) Based upon the variety of animals.\n\n  (ii) Based upon the differences between men.\n\n (iii) Based upon differences in the constitution of\n       the sense organs.\n\n  (iv) Based upon circumstances.\n\n   (v) Based upon position, distance and place.\n\n  (vi) Based upon mixtures.\n\n (vii) Based upon the quantities and constitutions\n       of objects.\n\n(viii) Relation.\n\n  (ix) Based upon frequency or rarity of occurences.\n\n   (x) Based upon systems, customs and laws,\n       mythical beliefs, and dogmatic opinions.\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 36-38.\n\nAlthough Sextus is careful not to dogmatise regarding the\narrangement of the Tropes, yet there is in his classification of\nthem a regular gradation, from the arguments based upon\ndifferences in animals to those in man, first considering the\nlatter in relation to the physical constitution, and then to\ncircumstances outside of us, and finally the treatment of\nmetaphysical and moral differences.\n\n_The First Trope_.[1] That the same mental representations are\nnot found in different animals, may be inferred from their\ndifferences in constitution resulting from their different\norigins, and from the variety in their organs of sense. Sextus\ntakes up the five senses in order, giving illustrations to prove\nthe relative results of the mental representations in all of\nthem, as for example the subjectivity of color[2] and sound.[3]\nAll knowledge of objects through the senses is relative and not\nabsolute. Sextus does not, accordingly, confine the\nimpossibility of certain knowledge to the qualities that Locke\nregards as secondary, but includes also the primary ones in this\nstatement.[4] The form and shape of objects as they appear to us\nmay be changed by pressure on the eyeball. Furthermore, the\ncharacter of reflections in mirrors depend entirely on their\nshape, as the images in concave mirrors are very different from\nthose in convex ones; and so in the same way as the eyes of\nanimals are of different shapes, and supplied with different\nfluids, the ideas of dogs, fishes, men and grasshoppers must be\nvery different.[5]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._. I. 40-61.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._. I. 44-46.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._. I. 50.\n\n    [4] _Hyp._. I. 47.\n\n    [5] _Hyp._. I. 49.\n\nIn discussing the mental representations of animals of different\ngrades of intelligence, Sextus shows a very good comprehension\nof the philogenetic development of the organs of sense, and\ndraws the final conclusion that external objects are regarded\ndifferently by animals, according to their difference in\nconstitution.[1] These differences in the ideas which different\nanimals have of the same objects are demonstrated by their\ndifferent tastes, as the things desired by some are fatal to\nothers.[2] The practical illustrations given of this result show\na familiarity with natural history, and cognizance of the tastes\nand habits of many animals,[3] but were probably few of them\noriginal with Sextus, unless perhaps in their application; that\nthis train of reasoning was the common property of the Sceptic\nSchool, we know from the fact that Diogenes begins his\nexposition of the first Trope in a way similar to that of\nSextus.[4] His illustrations are, however, few and meagre\ncompared with those of Sextus, and the scientific facts used by\nboth of them may mostly be found in other authors of antiquity\ngiven in a similar way.[5] The logical result of the reasoning\nused to explain the first Trope, is that we cannot compare the\nideas of the animals with each other, nor with our own; nor can\nwe prove that our ideas are more trustworthy than those of the\nanimals.[6] As therefore an examination of ideas is impossible,\nany decided opinion about their trustworthiness is also\nimpossible, and this Trope leads to the suspension of judgment\nregarding external objects, or to [Greek: epoche.][7]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._. I. 54.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._. I. 55.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._. I. 55-59.\n\n    [4] Diog. IX. 11, 79-80.\n\n    [5] Pappenheim _Erlauterung Pyrr. Grundzuege Par_. 41.\n\n    [6] _Hyp_. I. 59.\n\n    [7] _Hyp_. I. 61.\n\nAfter reaching this conclusion, Sextus introduces a long chapter\nto prove that animals can reason. There is no reference to this\nin Diogenes, but there is other testimony to show that it was a\nfavourite line of argument with the Sceptics.[1] Sextus,\nhowever, says that his course of reasoning is different from\nthat of most of the Sceptics on the subject,[2] as they usually\napplied their arguments to all animals, while he selected only\none, namely the dog.[3] This chapter is full of sarcastic\nattacks on the Dogmatics, and contains the special allusion to\nthe Stoics as the greatest opponents of the Sceptics, which has\nbeen before referred to.[4]\n\nSextus claims with a greater freedom of diction than in some\napparently less original chapters, and with a wealth of special\nillustrations, that the dog is superior to man in acuteness of\nperception,[5] that he has the power of choice, and possesses an\nart, that of hunting,[6] and, also, is not deprived of\nvirtue,[7] as the true nature of virtue is to show justice to\nall, which the dog does by guarding loyally those who are kind\nto him, and keeping off those who do evil.[8] The reasoning\npower of this animal is proved by the story taken from\nChrysippus, of the dog that came to a meeting of three roads in\nfollowing a scent. After seeking the scent in vain in two of the\nroads, he takes the third road without scenting it as a result\nof a quick process of thought, which proves that he shares in\nthe famous dialectic of Chrysippus,[9] the five forms of [Greek:\n_anapodeiktoi logoi_,] of which the dog chooses the fifth.\nEither _A_ or _B_ or _C_, not _A_ or _B,_ therefore _C_.\n\n    [1] _Hyp_. I. 238.\n\n    [2] Compare Brochard _Op. cit._ 256.\n\n    [3] _Hyp_. I. 62-63.\n\n    [4] _Hyp_. I. 65.\n\n    [5] _Hyp_. I. 64.\n\n    [6] _Hyp_. I. 66.\n\n    [7] _Hyp_. I. 67.\n\n    [8] _Hyp_. I. 67.\n\n    [9] _Hyp_. I. 69; _Hyp_. II. 166; Diog. VII. 1, 79.\n\nThe dog and other irrational animals may also possess spoken\nlanguage, as the only proof that we have to the contrary, is the\nfact that we cannot understand the sounds that they make.[1] We\nhave an example in this chapter of the humor of Sextus, who\nafter enlarging on the perfect character of the dog, remarks,\n\"For which reason it seems to me some philosophers have honoured\nthemselves with the name of this animal,\"[2] thus making a\nsarcastic allusion to the Cynics, especially Antisthenes.[3]\n\n    [1] _Hyp_. I. 74.\n\n    [2] _Hyp_. I. 72.\n\n    [3] Diog. VI. 1, 13.\n\n_The Second Trope_. Passing on to the second Trope, Sextus aims\nto prove that even if we leave the differences of the mental\nimages of animals out of the discussion, there is not a\nsufficient unanimity in the mental images of human beings to\nallow us to base any assertions upon them in regard to the\ncharacter of external objects.[1] He had previously announced\nthat he intended to oppose the phenomenal to the intellectual\n\"in any way whatever,\"[2] so he begins here by referring to the\ntwo parts of which man is said to be composed, the soul and the\nbody, and proceeds to discuss the differences among men in\nsense-perception and in opinion.[3] Most of the illustrations\ngiven of differences in sense-perception are medical ones; of\nthe more general of these I will note the only two which are\nalso given by Diogenes in his exposition of this Trope,[4] viz.,\nDemophon, Alexander's table waiter, who shivered in the sun, and\nAndron the Argive, who was so free from thirst that he travelled\nthrough the desert of Libya without seeking a drink. Some have\nreasoned from the presence of the first of these illustrations\nin the exposition of the Tropes, that a part of this material at\nleast goes back to the time of Pyrrho, as Pyrrho from his\nintimacy with Alexander, when he accompanied him to India, had\nabundant opportunities to observe the peculiarities of his\nservant Demophon.[5] The illustration of Andron the Argive is\ntaken from Aristotle, according to Diogenes.[6]\n\n    [1] _Hyp_. I. 79.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 8.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 80.\n\n    [4] Diog. IX. 11, 80-81.\n\n    [5] Compare _Pyrrhon et le Scepticism primitive, Revue\n        phil._, Paris 1885, No. 5; Victor Brochard, p. 521.\n\n    [6] Diog. IX. 11, 81.\n\nPassing on to differences of opinion, we have another example of\nthe sarcastic humor of Sextus, as he refers to the [Greek:\nphysiognomonike sophia][1] as the authority for believing that\nthe body is a type of the soul. As the bodies of men differ, so\nthe souls also probably differ. The differences of mind among\nmen is not referred to by Diogenes, except in the general\nstatement that they choose different professions; while Sextus\nelaborates this point, speaking of the great differences in\nopposing schools of philosophy, and in the objects of choice and\navoidance, and sources of pleasure for different men.[2] The\npoets well understand this marked difference in human desires,\nas Homer says,\n\n      \"One man enjoys this, another enjoys that.\"\n\nSextus also quotes the beautiful lines of Pindar,[3]\n\n      \"One delights in getting honours and crowns through\n             stormfooted horses,\n       Others in passing life in rooms rich in gold,\n       Another safe travelling enjoys, in a swift ship,\n             on a wave of the sea.\"\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 85.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 87-89.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 86.\n\n_The Third Trope_. The third Trope limits the argument to the\nsense-perceptions of one man, a Dogmatic, if preferred, or to\none whom the Dogmatics consider wise,[1] and states that as the\nideas given by the different sense organs differ radically in a\nway that does not admit of their being compared with each other,\nthey furnish no reliable testimony regarding the nature of\nobjects.[2] \"Each of the phenomena perceived by us seems to\npresent itself in many forms, as the apple, smooth, fragrant\nbrown and sweet.\" The apple was evidently the ordinary example\ngiven for this Trope, for Diogenes uses the same, but in a much\nmore condensed form, and not with equal understanding of the\nresults to be deduced from it.[3] The consequence of the\nincompatibility of the mental representations produced through\nthe several sense organs by the apple, may be the acceptance of\neither of the three following propositions: (i) That only those\nqualities exist in the apple which we perceive. (ii) That more\nthan these exist. (iii) That even those perceived do not\nexist.[4] Accordingly, any experience which can give rise to\nsuch different views regarding outward objects, cannot be relied\nupon as a testimony concerning them.\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 90.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 94.\n\n    [3] Diog. IX. 11 81.\n\n    [4] _Hyp._ I. 99.\n\nThe non-homogeneous nature of the mental images connected with\nthe different sense organs, as presented by Sextus, reminds us\nof the discussion of the same subject by Berkeley in his _Theory\nof Vision_.\n\nSextus says that a man born with less than the usual number of\nsenses, would form altogether different ideas of the external\nworld than those who have the usual number, and as our ideas of\nobjects depend on our mental images, a greater number of sense\norgans would give us still different ideas of outward\nreality.[1] The strong argument of the Stoics against such\nreasoning as this, was their doctrine of pre-established harmony\nbetween nature and the soul, so that when a representation is\nproduced in us of a real object, a [Greek: kataleptike\nphantasia],[2] by this representation the soul grasps a real\nexistence. There is a [Greek: logos] in us which is of the same\nkind, [Greek: syngenos], or in relation to all nature. This\nargument of pre-established harmony between the faculties of the\nsoul and the objects of nature, is the one that has been used in\nall ages to combat philosophical teaching that denies that we\napprehend the external world as it is. It was used against Kant\nby his opponents, who thought in this way to refute his\nteachings.[3] The Sceptics could not, of course, accept a theory\nof nature that included the soul and the external world in one\nharmonious whole, but Sextus in his discussion of the third\nTrope does not refute this argument as fully as he does later in\nhis work against logic.[4] He simply states here that\nphilosophers themselves cannot agree as to what nature is, and\nfurthermore, that a philosopher himself is a part of the\ndiscord, and to be judged, rather than being capable of judging,\nand that no conclusion can be reached by those who are\nthemselves an element of the uncertainty.[5]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 96-97.\n\n    [2] _Adv. Math._ VII. 93.\n\n    [3] Ueberweg _Op. cit._ 195.\n\n    [4] _Adv. Math._ VII. 354.\n\n    [5] _Hyp._ I. 98-99.\n\n_The Fourth Trope_. This Trope limits the argument to each\nseparate sense, and the effect is considered of the condition of\nbody and mind upon sense-perception in relation to the several\nsense-organs.[1] The physical states which modify\nsense-perception are health and illness, sleeping and waking,\nyouth and age, hunger and satiety, drunkenness and sobriety. All\nof these conditions of the body entirely change the character of\nthe mental images, producing different judgments of the color,\ntaste, and temperature of objects, and of the character of\nsounds. A man who is asleep is in a different world from one\nawake, the existence of both worlds being relative to the\ncondition of waking and sleeping.[2]\n\nThe subjective states which Sextus mentions here as modifying\nthe character of the mental representations are hating or\nloving, courage or fear, sorrow or joy, and sanity or\ninsanity.[3] No man is ever twice in exactly the same condition\nof body or mind, and never able to review the differences of his\nideas as a sum total, for those of the present moment only are\nsubject to careful inspection.[4] Furthermore, no one is free\nfrom the influence of all conditions of body or mind, so that he\ncan be unbiassed to judge his ideas, and no criterion can be\nestablished that can be shown to be true, but on the contrary,\nwhatever course is pursued on the subject, both the criterion\nand the proof will be thrown into the _circulus in probando_,\nfor the truth of each rests on the other.[5]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 100.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 104.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 100.\n\n    [4] _Hyp._ I. 112.\n\n    [5] _Hyp._ I. 117.\n\nDiogenes gives in part the same illustrations of this Trope, but\nin a much more condensed form. The marked characteristic of this\ntrain of reasoning is the attempt to prove that abnormal\nconditions are also natural. In referring at first to the\nopposing states of body and mind, which so change the character\nof sense-perception, Sextus classifies them according to the\npopular usage as [Greek: kata physin] and [Greek: para physin].\nThis distinction was an important one, even with Aristotle, and\nwas especially developed by the Stoics[1] in a broader sense\nthan referring merely to health and sickness. The Stoics,\nhowever, considered only normal conditions as being according to\nnature. Sextus, on the contrary, declares that abnormal states\nare also conditions according to nature,[2] and just as those\nwho are in health are in a state that is natural to those who\nare in health, so also those not in health are in a state that\nis natural to those not in health, and in some respects\naccording to nature. Existence, then, and non-existence are not\nabsolute, but relative, and the world of sleep as really exists\nfor those who are asleep as the things that exist in waking\nexist, although they do not exist in sleep.[3] One mental\nrepresentation, therefore, cannot be judged by another, which is\nalso in a state of relation to existing physical and mental\nconditions. Diogenes states this principle even more decidedly\nin his exposition of this Trope. \"The insane are not in a\ncondition opposed to nature; why they more than we? For we also\nsee the sun as if it were stationary.\"[4] Furthermore, in\ndifferent periods of life ideas differ. Children are fond of\nballs and hoops, while those in their prime prefer other things,\nand the aged still others.[5] The wisdom contained in this Trope\nin reference to the relative value of the things most sought\nafter is not original with Sextus, but is found in the more\nearnest ethical teachings of older writers. Sextus does not,\nhowever, draw any moral conclusions from this reasoning, but\nonly uses it as an argument for [Greek: epoche].\n\n    [1] Diog. VII. 1, 86.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 103.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 104.\n\n    [4] Diog. IX. 11, 82.\n\n    [5] _Hyp._ I. 106.\n\n_The Fifth Trope_. This Trope leaves the discussion of the\ndependence of the ideas upon the physical nature, and takes up\nthe influence of the environment upon them. It makes the\ndifference in ideas depend upon the position, distance, and\nplace of objects, thus taking apparently their real existence\nfor granted. Things change their form and shape according to the\ndistance from which they are observed, and the position in which\nthey stand.[1]\n\nThe same light or tone alters decidedly in different\nsurroundings. Perspective in paintings depends on the angle at\nwhich the picture is suspended.[2] With Diogenes this Trope is\nthe seventh,[3] and his exposition of it is similar, but as\nusual, shorter. Both Sextus and Diogenes give the\nillustration[4] of the neck of the dove differing in color in\ndifferent degrees of inclination, an illustration used by\nProtagoras also to prove the relativity of perception by the\nsenses. \"The black neck of the dove in the shade appears black,\nbut in the light sunny and purple.\"[5] Since, then, all\nphenomena are regarded in a certain place, and from a certain\ndistance, and according to a certain position, each of which\nrelations makes a great difference with the mental images, we\nshall be obliged also by this Trope to come to the reserving of\nthe opinion.[6]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 118.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 120.\n\n    [3] Diog. IX. 11, 85.\n\n    [4] _Hyp._ I. 120; Diog. IX. 11, 86.\n\n    [5] _Schol. zu Arist._ 60, 18, ed. Brandis; Pappen. _Er.\n        Pyrr. Grundzuege_, p. 54.\n\n    [6] _Hyp._ I. 121.\n\n_The Sixth Trope_. This Trope leads to [Greek: epoche] regarding\nthe nature of objects, because no object can ever be presented\nto the organs of sense directly, but must always be perceived\nthrough some medium, or in some mixture.[1] This mixture may be\nan outward one, connected with the temperature, or the rarity of\nthe air, or the water[2] surrounding an object, or it may be a\nmixture resulting from the different humors of the\nsense-organs.[3] A man with the jaundice, for example, sees\ncolors differently from one who is in health. The illustration\nof the jaundice is a favorite one with the Sceptics. Diogenes\nuses it several times in his presentation of Scepticism, and it\noccurs in Sextus' writings in all, as an illustration, in eight\ndifferent places.[4] The condition of the organ of the [Greek:\nhegemonikon], or the ruling faculty, may also cause mixtures.\nPappenheim thinks that we have here Kant's idea of _a priori_,\nonly on a materialistic foundation.[5] A careful consideration\nof the passage, however, shows us that Sextus' thought is more\nin harmony with the discoveries of modern psychiatry than with\nthe philosophy of Kant. If the sentence, [Greek: isos de kai\naute (he dianoia) epimixian tina idian poieitai pros ta hypo ton\naistheseon anangellomena],[6] stood alone, without further\nexplanation, it might well refer to _a priori_ laws of thought,\nbut the explanation which follows beginning with \"because\" makes\nthat impossible.[7] \"Because in each of the places where the\nDogmatics think that the ruling faculty is, we see present\ncertain humors, which are the cause of mixtures.\" Sextus does\nnot advance any opinion as to the place of the ruling faculty in\nthe body, which is, according to the Stoics, the principal part\nof the soul, where ideas, desires, and reasoning originate,[8]\nbut simply refers to the two theories of the Dogmatics, which\nclaim on the one hand that it is in the brain, and on the other\nthat it is in the heart.[9] This subject he deals with more\nfully in his work against logic.[10] As, however, he bases his\nargument, in discussing possible intellectual mixtures in\nillustration of the sixth Trope, entirely on the condition of\nthe organ of the intellect, it is evident that his theory of the\nsoul was a materialistic one.\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 124.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 125.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 126.\n\n    [4] See Index to Bekker's edition of Sextus.\n\n    [5] Papp. _Er. Pyr. Gr._ p. 55.\n\n    [6] _Hyp._ I. 128.\n\n    [7] _Hyp._ I. 128.\n\n    [8] Diog. VII. 1, 159.\n\n    [9] _Hyp._ I. 128.\n\n    [10] _Adv. Math._ VII. 313.\n\n_The Seventh Trope_. This Trope, based upon the quantities and\ncompositions of objects, is illustrated by examples of different\nkinds of food, drink, and medicine, showing the different\neffects according to the quantity taken, as the harmfulness and\nthe usefulness of most things depend on their quantity. Things\nact differently upon the senses if applied in small or large\nquantities, as filings of metal or horn, and separate grains of\nsand have a different color and touch from the same taken in the\nform of a solid.[1] The result is that ideas vary according to\nthe composition of the object, and this Trope also brings to\nconfusion the existence of outward objects, and leads us to\nreserve our opinion in regard to them.[2] This Trope is\nillustrated by Diogenes with exceeding brevity.[3]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 129-131.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 134.\n\n    [3] Diog. IX. 11, 86.\n\n_The Eighth Trope_. The Trope based upon relation contains, as\nSextus rightly remarks, the substance of the other nine,[1] for\nthe general statement of the relativity of knowledge includes\nthe other statements made. The prominence which Sextus gave this\nTrope in his introduction to the ten Tropes leads one to expect\nhere new illustrations and added[2] arguments for [Greek:\nepoche]. We find, however, neither of these, but simply a\nstatement that all things are in relation in one of two ways,\neither directly, or as being a part of a difference. These two\nkinds of relation are given by Protagoras, and might have been\nused to good purpose in the introduction to the Tropes, or at\nthe end, to prove that all the others were really subordinate to\nthe eighth. The reasoning is, however simply applied to the\nrelation of objects to each other, and nothing is added that is\nnot found elsewhere where as an argument for [Greek: epoche].[3]\nThis Trope is the tenth by Diogenes, and he strengthens his\nreasoning in regard to it, by a statement that Sextus does not\ndirectly make, _i.e._, that everything is in relation to the\nunderstanding.[4]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 39.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 135-140.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 135-140.\n\n    [4] Diog. IX. 11, 88.\n\n_The Ninth Trope_. This is based upon the frequency and rarity\nof events, and refers to some of the phenomena of nature, such\nas the rising of the sun, and the sea, as no longer a source of\nastonishment, while a comet or an earthquake are wonders to\nthose not accustomed to them.[1] The value of objects also\ndepends on their rarity, as for example the value of gold.[2]\nFurthermore, things may be valuable at one time, and at another\nnot so, according to the frequency and rarity of the\noccurrence.[3] Therefore this Trope also leads to [Greek:\nepoche]. Diogenes gives only two illustrations to this Trope,\nthat of the sun and the earthquake.[4]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 141-142.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 143.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 144.\n\n    [4] Diog. IX. 11, 87.\n\n_The Tenth Trope_. We have already remarked on the difference in\nthe character of the tenth Trope, dealing as it does, not with\nthe ideas of objects, like the other nine Tropes, but with\nphilosophical and religious opinions, and questions of right and\nwrong. It was the well-known aim of the Sceptics to submit to\nthe laws and customs of the land where they were found, and to\nconform to certain moral teachings and religious ceremonies;\nthis they did without either affirming or denying the truth of\nthe principles upon which these teachings were based,[1] and\nalso without any passion or strong feeling in regard to them,[2]\nas nothing in itself can be proved to be good or evil. The tenth\nTrope accordingly, brings forward contradictions in customs,\nlaws, and the beliefs of different lands, to show that they are\nalso changeable and relative, and not of absolute worth. The\nfoundation-thought of this Trope is given twice by Diogenes,\nonce as we have before stated in his introduction[3] to the life\nof Pyrrho, and also as one of the Tropes.[4] As it is apparently\none of the oldest of the Tropes, it would naturally be much used\nin discussing with the Stoics, whose philosophy had such a wide\nethical significance, and must also have held an important place\nin the Sceptical School in all metaphysical and philosophical\ndiscussions. The definition[5] in the beginning of Sextus'\nexposition of this Trope Fabricius thinks was taken from\nAristotle, of schools, laws, customs, mythical beliefs and\ndogmatic opinions,[6] and the definition which Diogenes gives of\nlaw in his life of Plato[7] is similar. Pappenheim, however,\nthinks they were taken from the Stoics, perhaps from\nChrysippus.[8] The argument is based upon the differences in\ndevelopment of thought, as affecting the standpoint of judgment\nin philosophy, in morals, and religion, the results of which we\nfind in the widely opposing schools of philosophy, in the\nvariety in religious belief, and in the laws and customs of\ndifferent countries. Therefore the decisions reached in the\nworld of thought leave us equally in doubt regarding the\nabsolute value of any standards, with those obtained through\nsense-perception, and the universal conflict of opinion\nregarding all questions of philosophy and ethics leads us also\naccording to this Trope to the reserving of the opinion.[9] This\nTrope is the fifth as given by Diogenes, who placed it directly\nafter the first four which relate more especially to human\ndevelopment,[10] while Sextus uses it as the final one, perhaps\nthinking that an argument based upon the higher powers of man\ndeserves the last place, or is the summation of the other\narguments.\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 24.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ III. 235.\n\n    [3] Diog. IX. 11, 61.\n\n    [4] Diog. IX. 11, 83.\n\n    [5] _Hyp._ I. 145-147.\n\n    [6] Fabricius, Cap. IV. H.\n\n    [7] Diog. III. 86.\n\n    [8] Pappenheim _Gr. Pyrr. Grundzuege_, p. 50.\n\n    [9] _Hyp._ I. 163.\n\n    [10] Diog. IX. 11, 83.\n\nFollowing the exposition of the ten Tropes of the older\nSceptics, Sextus gives the five Tropes which he attributes to\nthe \"later Sceptics.\"[1] Sextus nowhere mentions the author of\nthese Tropes. Diogenes, however, attributes them to Agrippa, a\nman of whom we know nothing except his mention of him. He was\nevidently one of the followers of Aenesidemus, and a scholar of\ninfluence in the Sceptical School, who must have himself had\ndisciples, as Diogenes says, [Greek: hoi peri Agrippan][2] add\nto these tropes other five tropes, using the plural verb.\nAnother Sceptic, also mentioned by Diogenes, and a man unknown\nfrom other sources, named some of his books after Agrippa.[3]\nAgrippa is not given by Diogenes in the list of the leaders of\nthe Sceptical School, but[4] his influence in the development of\nthe thought of the School must have been great, as the\ntransition from the ten Tropes of the \"older Sceptics\" to the\nfive attributed to Agrippa is a marked one, and shows the\nentrance into the school of a logical power before unknown in\nit. The latter are not a reduction of the Tropes of Aenesidemus,\nbut are written from an entirely different standpoint. The ten\nTropes are empirical, and aim to furnish objective proofs of the\nfoundation theories of Pyrrhonism, while the five are rather\nrules of thought leading to logical proof, and are dialectic in\ntheir character. We find this distinction illustrated by the\ndifferent way in which the Trope of relativity is treated in the\ntwo groups. In the first it points to an objective relativity,\nbut with Agrippa to a general subjective logical principle. The\noriginality of the Tropes of Agrippa does not lie in their\nsubstance matter, but in their formulation and use in the\nSceptical School. These methods of proof were, of course, not\nnew, but were well known to Aristotle, and were used by the\nSceptical Academy, and probably also by Timon,[5] while the\n[Greek: pros ti] goes back at least to Protagoras. The five\nTropes are as follows.\n\n  (i) The one based upon discord.\n (ii) The _regressus in infinitum_.\n(iii) Relation.\n (iv) The hypothetical.\n  (v) The _circulus in probando_.\n\nTwo of these are taken from the old list, the first and the\nthird, and Sextus says that the five Tropes are intended to\nsupplement the ten Tropes, and to show the audacity of the\nDogmatics in a variety of ways.[6] The order of these Tropes is\nthe same with Diogenes as with Sextus, but the definitions of\nthem differ sufficiently to show that the two authors took their\nmaterial from different sources. According to the first one\neverything in question is either sensible or intellectual, and\nin attempting to judge it either in life, practically, or \"among\nphilosophers,\" a position is developed from which it is\nimpossible to reach a conclusion.[7] According to the second,\nevery proof requires another proof, and so on to infinity, and\nthere is no standpoint from which to begin the reasoning.[8]\nAccording to the third, all perceptions are relative, as the\nobject is colored by the condition of the judge, and the\ninfluence of other things around it.[9] According to the fourth,\nit is impossible to escape from the _regressus in infinitum_ by\nmaking a hypothesis the starting point, as the Dogmatics attempt\nto do.[10] And the fifth, or the _circulus in probando_, arises\nwhen that which should be the proof needs to be sustained by the\nthing to be proved.\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 164.\n\n    [2] Diog. IX. 11, 88.\n\n    [3] Diog. IX. 11, 106.\n\n    [4] Diog. IX. 12, 115-116.\n\n    [5] Compare Natorp. _Op. cit._ p. 302.\n\n    [6] _Hyp._ I. 177.\n\n    [7] _Hyp._ I. 165.\n\n    [8] _Hyp._ I. 166.\n\n    [9] _Hyp._ I. 167.\n\n    [10] _Hyp._ I. 168.\n\nSextus claims that all things can be included in these Tropes,\nwhether sensible or intellectual.[1] For whether, as some say,\nonly the things of sense are true, or as others claim, only\nthose of the understanding, or as still others contend, some\nthings both of sense and understanding are true, a discord must\narise that is impossible to be judged, for it cannot be judged\nby the sensible, nor by the intellectual, for the things of the\nintellect themselves require a proof; accordingly, the result of\nall reasoning must be either hypothetical, or fall into the\n_regressus in infinitum_ or the _circulus in probando_.[2] The\nreference above to some who say that only the things of sense\nare true, is to Epicurus and Protagoras; to some that only the\nthings of thought are true, to Democritus and Plato; and to\nthose that claimed some of both to be true, to the Stoics and\nthe Peripatetics.[3] The three new Tropes added by Agrippa have\nnothing to do with sense-perception, but bear entirely upon the\npossibility of reasoning, as demanded by the science of logic,\nin contrast to the earlier ones which related almost entirely,\nwith the exception of the tenth, to material objects. Sextus\nclaims that these five Tropes also lead to the suspension of\njudgment,[4] but their logical result is rather the dogmatic\ndenial of all possibility of knowledge, showing as Hirzel has\nwell demonstrated, far more the influence of the New Academy\nthan the spirit of the Sceptical School.[5] It was the\nstandpoint of the older Sceptics, that although the search for\nthe truth had not yet succeeded, yet they were still seekers,\nand Sextus claims to be faithful to this old aim of the\nPyrrhonists. He calls himself a seeker,[6] and in reproaching\nthe New Academy for affirming that knowledge is impossible,\nSextus says, \"Moreover, we say that our ideas are equal as\nregards trustworthiness and untrustworthiness.\"[7] The ten\nTropes claim to establish doubt only in regard to a knowledge of\nthe truth, but the five Tropes of Agrippa aim to logically prove\nthe impossibility of knowledge. It is very strange that Sextus\ndoes not see this decided contrast in the attitude of the two\nsets of Tropes, and expresses his approval of those of Agrippa,\nand makes more frequent use of the fifth of these, [Greek: ho\ndiallelos], in his subsequent reasoning than of any other\nargument.[8]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 169.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 170-171.\n\n    [3] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 185-186; VIII. 56; VII. 369.\n\n    [4] _Hyp._ I. 177.\n\n    [5] Hirzel _Op. cit._ p. 131.\n\n    [6] _Hyp._ I. 3, 7.\n\n    [7] _Hyp._ I. 227.\n\n    [8] See Index of Bekker's edition of Sextus' works.\n\nWe find here in the Sceptical School, shortly after the time of\nAenesidemus, the same tendency to dogmatic teaching that--so far\nas the dim and shadowy history of the last years of the New\nAcademy can be unravelled, and the separation of Pyrrhonism can\nbe understood, at the time that the Academy passed over into\neclecticism--was one of the causes of that separation.\n\nIt is true that the Tropes of Agrippa show great progress in the\ndevelopment of thought. They furnish an organisation of the\nSchool far superior to what went before, placing the reasoning\non the firm basis of the laws of logic, and simplifying the\namount of material to be used. In a certain sense Saisset is\ncorrect in saying that Agrippa contributed more than any other\nin completing the organisation of Scepticism,[1] but it is not\ncorrect when we consider the true spirit of Scepticism with\nwhich the Tropes of Agrippa were not in harmony. It was through\nthe very progress shown in the production of these Tropes that\nthe school finally lost the strength of its position.\n\nNot content with having reduced the number of the Tropes from\nten to five, others tried to limit the number still further to\ntwo.[2] Sextus gives us no hint of the authorship of the two\nTropes. Ritter attributes them to Menodotus and his followers,\nand Zeller agrees with that opinion,[3] while Saisset thinks\nthat Agrippa was also the author of these,[4] which is a strange\ntheory to propound, as some of the material of the five is\nrepeated in the two, and the same man could certainly not appear\nas an advocate of five, and at the same time of two Tropes.\n\n    [1] Saisset _Op. cit._ p. 237.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 178.\n\n    [3] Zeller III. 38; Ritter IV. 277.\n\n    [4] Saisset _Op. cit._ p. 231.\n\nThe two Tropes are founded on the principle that anything must\nbe known through itself or through something else. It cannot be\nknown through itself, because of the discord existing between\nall things of the senses and intellect, nor can it be known\nthrough something else, as then either the _regressus in\ninfinitum_ or the _circulus in probando_ follow.[1] Diogenes\nLaertius does not refer to these two Tropes.\n\nIn regard to all these Tropes of the suspension of judgment,\nSextus has well remarked in his introduction to them, that they\nare included in the eighth, or that of relation.[2]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 178-179.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 39.\n\n_The Tropes of Aetiology_. The eight Tropes against causality\nbelong chronologically before the five Tropes of Agrippa, in the\nhistory of the development of sceptical thought. They have a\nmuch closer connection with the spirit of Scepticism than the\nTropes of Agrippa, including, as they do, the fundamental\nthought of Pyrrhonism, _i.e._, that the phenomena do not reveal\nthe unknown.\n\nThe Sceptics did not deny the phenomena, but they denied that\nthe phenomena are signs capable of being interpreted, or of\nrevealing the reality of causes. It is impossible by a research\nof the signs to find out the unknown, or the explanation of\nthings, as the Stoics and Epicureans claim. The theory of\nAenesidemus which lies at the foundation of his eight Tropes\nagainst aetiology, is given to us by Photius as follows:[1]\n\"There are no visible signs of the unknown, and those who\nbelieve in its existence are the victims of a vain illusion.\"\nThis statement of Aenesidemus is confirmed by a fuller\nexplanation of it given later on by Sextus.[2] If phenomena are\nnot signs of the unknown there is no causality, and a refutation\nof causality is a proof of the impossibility of science, as all\nscience is the science of causes, the power of studying causes\nfrom effects, or as Sextus calls them, phenomena.\n\nIt is very noticeable to any one who reads the refutation of\ncausality by Aenesidemus, as given by Sextus,[3] that there is\nno reference to the strongest argument of modern Scepticism,\nsince the time of Hume, against causality, namely that the\norigin of the idea of causality cannot be so accounted for as to\njustify our relying upon it as a form of cognition.[4]\n\n    [1] _Myriob._ 170 B. 12.\n\n    [2] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 207.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 180-186.\n\n    [4] Ueberweg _Op. cit._ p. 217.\n\nThe eight Tropes are directed against the possibility of\nknowledge of nature, which Aenesidemus contested against in all\nhis Tropes, the ten as well as the eight.[1] They are written\nfrom a materialistic standpoint. These Tropes are given with\nillustrations by Fabricius as follows:\n\nI. Since aetiology in general refers to things that are unseen,\nit does not give testimony that is incontestable in regard to\nphenomena. For example, the Pythagoreans explain the distance of\nthe planets by a musical proportion.\n\nII. From many equally plausible reasons which might be given for\nthe same thing, one only is arbitrarily chosen, as some explain\nthe inundation of the Nile by a fall of snow at its source,\nwhile there could be other causes, as rain, or wind, or the\naction of the sun.\n\nIII. Things take place in an orderly manner, but the causes\npresented do not show any order, as for example, the motion of\nthe stars is explained by their mutual pressure, which does not\ntake into account the order that reigns among them.\n\nIV. The unseen things are supposed to take place in the same way\nas phenomena, as vision is explained in the same way as the\nappearance of images in a dark room.\n\nV. Most philosophers present theories of aetiology which agree\nwith their own individual hypotheses about the elements, but not\nwith common and accepted ideas, as to explain the world by atoms\nlike Epicurus, by homoeomeriae like Anaxagoras, or by matter and\nform like Aristotle.\n\nVI. Theories are accepted which agree with individual\nhypotheses, and others equally probable are passed by, as\nAristotle's explanation of comets, that they are a collection of\nvapors near the earth, because that coincided with his theory of\nthe universe.\n\nVII. Theories of aetiology are presented which conflict not only\nwith individual hypotheses, but also with phenomena, as to admit\nlike Epicurus an inclination or desire of the soul, which was\nincompatible with the necessity which he advocated.\n\nVIII. The inscrutable is explained by things equally\ninscrutable, as the rising of sap in plants is explained by the\nattraction of a sponge for water, a fact contested by some.[2]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 98.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 180-186; Fabricius, Cap. XVII. 180 z.\n\nDiogenes does not mention these Tropes in this form, but he\ngives a _resume_ of the general arguments of the Sceptics\nagainst aetiology,[1] which has less in common with the eight\nTropes of Aenesidemus, than with the presentation of the subject\nby Sextus later,[2] when he multiplies his proofs exceedingly to\nshow [Greek: meden einai aition]. Although the Tropes of\nAenesidemus have a dialectic rather than an objective character,\nit would not seem that he made the distinction, which is so\nprominent with Sextus, between the signs [Greek: hypomnestika]\nand [Greek: endeiktika],[3] especially as Diogenes sums up his\nargument on the subject with the general assertion, [Greek:\nSemeion ouk einai],[4] and proceeds to introduce the logical\nconsequence of the denial of aetiology. The summing up of the\nTropes of Aenesidemus is given as follows, in the _Hypotyposes_,\nby Sextus:--\"A cause in harmony with all the sects of\nphilosophy, and with Scepticism, and with phenomena, is perhaps\nnot possible, for the phenomena and the unknown altogether\ndisagree.\"[5]\n\nIt is interesting to remark in connection with the seventh of\nthese Tropes, that Aenesidemus asserts that causality has only a\nsubjective value, which from his materialistic standpoint was an\nargument against its real existence, and the same argument is\nused by Kant to prove that causality is a necessary condition of\nthought.[6]\n\nChaignet characterises the Tropes of Aenesidemus as false and\nsophistical,[7] but as Maccoll has well said, they are\nremarkable for their judicious and strong criticism, and are\ndirected against the false method of observing facts through the\nlight of preconceived opinion.[8] They have, however, a stronger\ncritical side than sceptical, and show the positive tendency of\nthe thought of Aenesidemus.\n\n    [1] Diog. IX. 11, 96-98.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ III. 24-28.\n\n    [3] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 151.\n\n    [4] Diog. IX. 11, 96.\n\n    [5] _Hyp._ I. 185.\n\n    [6] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 77.\n\n    [7] Chaignet _Op. cit._ 507.\n\n    [8] Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 88.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\n\n_Aenesidemus and the Philosophy of Heraclitus._\n\nA paragraph in the First Book of the _Hypotyposes_ which has\ngiven rise to much speculation and many different theories, is\nthe comparison which Sextus makes of Scepticism with the\nphilosophy of Heraclitus.[1] In this paragraph the statement is\nmade that Aenesidemus and his followers, [Greek: hoi peri ton\nAinesidemon], said that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy\nof Heraclitus, because the doctrine that contradictory\npredicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, leads the\nway to the one that contradictory predicates are in reality\napplicable to the same thing.[2] [Greek: hoi peri ton\nAinesidemon elegon hodon einai ten skeptiken agogen epi ten\nHerakleiteion philosophian, dioti proegeitai tou tanantia peri\nto auto hyparchein to tanantia peri to auto phainesthai]. As the\nSceptics say that contradictory predicates appear to be\napplicable to the same thing, the Heraclitans come from this to\nthe more positive doctrine that they are in reality so.[3]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 210.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 210.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 210.\n\nThis connection which Aenesidemus is said to have affirmed\nbetween Scepticism and the philosophy of Heraclitus is earnestly\ncombated by Sextus, who declares that the fact that\ncontradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same\nthing is not a dogma of the Sceptics, but a fact which presents\nitself to all men, and not to the Sceptics only. No one for\ninstance, whether he be a Sceptic or not, would dare to say that\nhoney does not taste sweet to those in health, and bitter to\nthose who have the jaundice, so that Heraclitus begins from a\npreconception common to all men, as to us also, and perhaps to\nthe other schools of philosophy as well.[1] As the statement\nconcerning the appearance of contradictory predicates in regard\nto the same thing is not an exclusively sceptical one, then\nScepticism is no more a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus\nthan to other schools of philosophy, or to life, as all use\ncommon subject matter. \"But we are afraid that the Sceptical\nSchool not only does not help towards the knowledge of the\nphilosophy of Heraclitus, but even hinders that result. Since\nthe Sceptic accuses Heraclitus of having rashly dogmatised,\npresenting on the one hand the doctrine of 'conflagration' and\non the other that 'contradictory predicates are in reality\napplicable to the same thing.'\"[2] \"It is absurd, then, to say\nthat this conflicting school is a path to the sect with which it\nconflicts. It is therefore absurd to say that the Sceptical\nSchool is a path to the philosophy of Heraclitus.\"[3]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 211.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 212.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 212.\n\nThis is not the only place in the writings of Sextus which\nstates that Aenesidemus at some time of his life was an advocate\nof the doctrines of Heraclitus. In no instance, however, where\nSextus refers to this remarkable fact, does he offer any\nexplanation of it, or express any bitterness against\nAenesidemus, whom he always speaks of with respect as a leader\nof the Sceptical School. We are thus furnished with one of the\nmost difficult problems of ancient Scepticism, the problem of\nreconciling the apparent advocacy of Aenesidemus of the\nteachings of Heraclitus with his position in the Sceptical\nSchool.\n\nA comparison with each other of the references made by Sextus\nand other writers to the teachings of Aenesidemus, and a\nconsideration of the result, gives us two pictures of\nAenesidemus which conflict most decidedly with each other. We\nhave on the one hand, the man who was the first to give\nPyrrhonism a position as an influential school, and the first to\ncollect and present to the world the results of preceding\nSceptical thought. He was the compiler of the ten Tropes of\n[Greek: epoche], and perhaps in part their author, and the\nauthor of the eight Tropes against aetiology.[1] He develops his\nScepticism from the standpoint that neither the senses nor the\nintellect can give us any certain knowledge of reality.[2] He\ndenied the possibility of studying phenomena as signs of the\nunknown.[3] He denied all possibility of truth, and the reality\nof motion, origin and decay. There was according to his teaching\nno pleasure or happiness, and no wisdom or supreme good. He\ndenied the possibility of finding out the nature of things, or\nof proving the existence of the gods, and finally he declared\nthat no ethical aim is possible.\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 180.\n\n    [2] Photius 170, B. 12.\n\n    [3] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 40.\n\nThe picture on the other hand, presented to us by Sextus and\nTertullian, is that of a man with a system of beliefs and\ndogmas, which lead, he says, to the philosophy of Heraclitus. In\nstrange contradiction to his assertion of the impossibility of\nall knowledge, he advocates a theory that the original substance\nis air,[1] which is most certainly a dogma, although indeed a\ndeviation from the teachings of Heraclitus, of which Sextus\nseemed unconscious, as he says, [Greek: to te on kata ton\nHerakleiton aer estin, hos physin ho Ainesidemos]. Aenesidemus\ndogmatised also regarding number and time and unity of the\noriginal world-stuff.[2] He seems to have dogmatised further\nabout motion,[3] and about the soul.[4]\n\nIf Sextus' language is taken according to its apparent meaning,\nwe find ourselves here in the presence of a system of beliefs\nwhich would be naturally held by a follower of the\nStoic-Heraclitan physics,[5] and absolutely inexplicable from\nthe standpoint of a man who advocated so radical a Scepticism as\nAenesidemus. Sextus in the passage that we first quoted,[6]\nexpresses great indignation against the idea that Scepticism\ncould form the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, but he does\nnot express surprise or indignation against Aenesidemus\npersonally, or offer any explanation of the apparent\ncontradiction; and while his writings abound in references to\nhim as a respected leader of the Sceptical School, he sometimes\nseems to include him with the Dogmatics, mentioning him with the\n[Greek: dogmatikon philosophon].[7] In fact, the task of\npresenting any consistent history of the development of thought\nthrough which Aenesidemus passed is such a puzzling one, that\nBrochard brilliantly remarks that possibly the best attitude to\ntake towards it would be to follow the advice of Aenesidemus\nhimself, and suspend one's judgment altogether regarding it. Is\nit possible to suppose that so sharp and subtle a thinker as\nAenesidemus held at the same time such opposing opinions?\n\n    [1] _Adv. Math._ X. 233.\n\n    [2] _Adv. Math._ IX. 337; X. 216.\n\n    [3] _Adv. Math._ X. 38.\n\n    [4] _Adv. Math._ VII. 349.\n\n    [5] Compare Zeller _Op. cit._ III. p. 33.\n\n    [6] _Hyp._ I. 210-212.\n\n    [7] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 8; X. 215.\n\nThe conjecture that he was first a Heraclitan Stoic, and later a\nSceptic, which might be possible, does not offer any explanation\nof Sextus' statement, that he regarded Scepticism as a path to\nthe philosophy of Heraclitus. Nor would it be logical to think\nthat after establishing the Sceptical School in renewed\ninfluence and power, he reverted to the Heraclitan theories as\nthey were modified by the Stoics. These same theories were the\ncause of his separation from the Academy, for his chief\naccusation against the Academy was that it was adopting the\ndogmatism of the Stoics.[1] The matter is complicated by the\nfact that Tertullian also attributes to Aenesidemus\nanthropological and physical teachings that agree with the\nStoical Heraclitan doctrines. It is not strange that in view of\nthese contradictory assertions in regard to the same man, some\nhave suggested the possibility that they referred to two\ndifferent men of the same name, a supposition, however, that no\none has been able to authoritatively vindicate.\n\nLet us consider briefly some of the explanations which have been\nattempted of the apparent heresy of Aenesidemus towards the\nSceptical School. We will begin with the most ingenious, that of\nPappenheim.[2]\n\nPappenheim claims that Sextus was not referring to Aenesidemus\nhimself in these statements which he joins with his name. In the\nmost important of these, the one quoted from the\n_Hypotyposes_,[3] which represents Aenesidemus as claiming that\nScepticism is the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, the\nexpression used is [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon], and in\nmany of the other places where Sextus refers to the dogmatic\nstatements of Aenesidemus, the expression is either [Greek: hoi\nperi ton Ainesidemon], or [Greek: Ainesidemos kath'\nHerakleiton], while when Sextus quotes Aenesidemus to sustain\nScepticism, he uses his name alone.\n\n    [1] Compare Zeller _Op. cit._ III. p. 16.\n\n    [2] _Die angebliche Heraclitismus des Skeptikers\n    Ainesidemos_, Berlin 1889.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 210-212.\n\nPappenheim thinks that Sextus' conflict was not with the dead\nAenesidemus, who had lived two centuries before him, but with\nhis own contemporaries. He also seeks to prove that Sextus could\nnot have gained his knowledge of these sayings of Aenesidemus\nfrom any of Aenesidemus' own writings, as neither by the\nancients, nor by later writers, was any book spoken of which\ncould well have contained them. Neither Aristocles nor Diogenes\nmentions any such book.\n\nPappenheim also makes much of the argument that Sextus in no\ninstance seems conscious of inconsistency on the part of\nAenesidemus, even when most earnestly combating his alleged\nteachings, but in referring to him personally he always speaks\nof him with great respect.\n\nPappenheim suggests, accordingly, that the polemic of Sextus was\nagainst contemporaries, those who accepted the philosophy of\nHeraclitus in consequence of, or in some connection with, the\nteachings of Aenesidemus. He entirely ignores the fact that\nthere is no trace of any such school or sect in history, calling\nthemselves followers of \"Aenesidemus according to Heraclitus,\"\nbut still thinks it possible that such a movement existed in\nAlexandria at the time of Sextus, where so many different sects\nwere found. Sextus use Aenesidemus' name in four different\nways:--alone, [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon], [Greek:\nAinesidemos kath' Herakleiton], and in one instance [Greek: hoi\nperi ton Ainesidemon kath' Herakleiton].[1]\n\n    [1] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 8.\n\nPappenheim advances the theory that some of these contemporaries\nagainst whom Sextus directed his arguments had written a book\nentitled [Greek: Ainesidemos kath' Herakleiton], to prove the\nharmony between Aenesidemus and Heraclitus, and that it was from\nthis book that Sextus quoted the dogmatic statements which he\nintroduced with that formula. He claims, further, that the\npassage quoted from _Hypotyposes I._ even, is directed\nagainst contemporaries, who founded their system of proofs of\nthe harmony between Aenesidemus and Heraclitus on the connection\nof the celebrated formula which was such a favourite with the\nSceptics: \"Contrary predicates appear to apply to the same\nthing,\" with the apparent deduction from this, that \"Contrary\npredicates in reality apply to the same thing.\" Sextus wishes,\naccording to Pappenheim, to prove to these contemporaries that\nthey had misunderstood Aenesidemus, and Sextus does not report\nAenesidemus to be a Dogmatic, nor to have taught the doctrines\nof Heraclitus; neither has he misunderstood Aenesidemus, nor\nconsequently misrepresented him; but on the contrary, these\ndogmatic quotations have nothing to do with Aenesidemus, but\nrefer altogether to contemporaries who pretended to be Sceptics\nwhile they accepted the teachings of Heraclitus. Sextus\nnaturally warmly combats this tendency, as he wishes to preserve\nPyrrhonism pure.\n\nBrochard advocates a change of opinion on the part of\nAenesidemus as an explanation of the difficulty in question.[1]\nHe starts from the supposition, the reasonableness of which we\nshall consider later, that Aenesidemus had passed through one\nchange of opinion already when he severed his connection with\nthe New Academy; and to the two phases of his life, which such a\nchange has already made us familiar with, he adds a third.\nAenesidemus would not be the first who has accepted different\nbeliefs at different periods of his life, and Brochard claims\nthat such a development in the opinions of Aenesidemus is\nlogical. He does not accuse Aenesidemus of having, as might seem\nfrom the perusal of Sextus, suddenly changed his basis, but\nrather of having gradually come to accept much in the teachings\nof Heraclitus. Aenesidemus modifies his Scepticism only to the\nextent of pretending to know something of absolute reality. The\nSceptic says, \"Contradictory predicates are apparently\napplicable to the same thing,\" and Aenesidemus accepts the\nHeraclitan result--\"Contradictory predicates are in reality\napplicable to the same thing.\" From Sextus' report, Aenesidemus\nwould seem to have renounced his position as a Sceptic in saying\nthat Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus. He\ndoes not, however, renounce Scepticism, but he finds it\nincomplete. In deliberating concerning the appearance of\ncontradictory predicates in regard to the same object, he would\nnaturally ask, \"Whence come these contradictory appearances?\"\nAfter having doubted all things, he wished to know wherefore he\ndoubts. The system of Heraclitus offers a solution, and he\naccepts it. Contradictory predicates produce equilibrium in the\nsoul because they are an expression of reality.\n\n    [1] Brochard _Op. cit._ 272.\n\nAs a Sceptic he claims that knowledge is impossible, and he does\nnot find that the statement of Heraclitus disproves this, but\nrather that it supports his theory. He had denied the existence\nof science. He still does so, but now he knows why he denies it.\nBrochard asks why it is any more impossible that Aenesidemus\nshould have been a follower of Heraclitus than that Protagoras\nwas so, as Protagoras was after all a Sceptic. In conclusion,\nBrochard claims that the dogmatic theories attributed to\nAenesidemus relate to the doctrine of the truth of contradictory\npredicates, which seemed to him a logical explanation of the\nfoundation theories of Scepticism. It is right to call him a\nSceptic, for he was so, and that sincerely; and he deserves his\nrank as one of the chiefs of the Sceptical School.\n\nComing now to the opinion of Zeller,[1] we find that he\nadvocates a misconception of Aenesidemus on the part of Sextus.\nThe whole difficulty is removed, Zeller thinks, by the simple\nfact that Sextus had not understood Aenesidemus; and as\nTertullian and Sextus agree in this misconception of the views\nof Aenesidemus, they must have been misled by consulting a\ncommon author in regard to Aenesidemus, who confused what\nAenesidemus said of Heraclitus with his own opinion. Zeller\nmaintains that the expression so often repeated by\nSextus--[Greek: Ainesidemos kath' Herakleiton]--shows that some\none of Aenesidemus' books contained a report of Heraclitus'\ndoctrines, as Aenesidemus was in the habit of quoting as many\nauthorities as possible to sustain his Scepticism. To justify\nhis quotations from Heraclitus, he had possibly given a short\nabstract of Heraclitus' teachings; and the misconception\nadvocated by Zeller and found both in Tertullian and Sextus,\nrefers rather to the spirit than to the words quoted from\nAenesidemus, and is a misconception due to some earlier author,\nwho had given a false impression of the meaning of Aenesidemus\nin quoting what Aenesidemus wrote about Heraclitus. That is to\nsay, Heraclitus was classed by Aenesidemus only among those who\nprepared the way for Scepticism, just as Diogenes[2] mentions\nmany philosophers in that way; and that Soranus[3] and Sextus\nboth had the same misunderstanding can only be explained by a\nmistake on the part of the authority whom they consulted.\n\n    [1] Zeller _Op. cit._ III, pp. 31-35; _Grundriss der\n        Geschichte der Griechischen Phil._ p. 263.\n\n    [2] Diog. Laert. IX. 11, 71-74.\n\n    [3] Tertullian.\n\nThis explanation, however, makes Sextus a very stupid man.\nAenesidemus' books were well known, and Sextus would most\ncertainly take the trouble to read them. His reputation as an\nhistorian would not sustain such an accusation, as Diogenes\ncalls his books [Greek: ta deka ton skeptikon kai alla\nkallista].[1] Furthermore, that Sextus used Aenesidemus' own\nbooks we know from the direct quotation from them in regard to\nPlato,[2] which he combines with the ideas of Menodotus[3] and\nhis own.\n\n    [1] Diog. IX. 12, 116.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 222.\n\n    [3] Following the Greek of Bekker.\n\nSextus' references to Aenesidemus in connection with Heraclitus\nare very numerous, and it is absurd to suppose that he would\nhave trusted entirely to some one who reported him for authority\non such a subject. Even were it possible that Sextus did not\nrefer directly to the works of Aenesidemus, which we do not\nadmit, even then, there had been many writers in the Sceptical\nSchool since the time of Aenesidemus, and they certainly could\nnot all have misrepresented him. We must remember that Sextus\nwas at the head of the School, and had access to all of its\nliterature. His honor would not allow of such a mistake, and if\nhe had indeed made it, his contemporaries must surely have\ndiscovered it before Diogenes characterised his books as [Greek:\nkallista]. Whatever may be said against the accuracy of Sextus\nas a general historian of philosophy, especially in regard to\nthe older schools, he cannot certainly be accused of ignorance\nrespecting the school of which he was at that time the head.\n\nThe opinion of Ritter on this subject is that Aenesidemus must\nhave been a Dogmatic.[1] Saisset contends[2] that Aenesidemus\nreally passed from the philosophy of Heraclitus to that of\nPyrrho, and made the statement that Scepticism is the path to\nthe philosophy of Heraclitus to defend his change of view,\nalthough in his case the change had been just the opposite to\nthe one he defends. Saisset propounds as a law in the history of\nphilosophy a fact which he claims to be true, that Scepticism\nalways follows sensationalism, for which he gives two examples,\nPyrrho, who was first a disciple of Democritus, and Hume, who\nwas a disciple of Locke It is not necessary to discuss the\nabsurdity of such a law, which someone has well remarked would\ninvolve an _a priori_ construction of history. There is no\napparent reason for Saisset's conjecture in regard to\nAenesidemus, for it is exactly the opposite of what Sextus has\nreported. Strange to say, Saisset himself remarks in another\nplace that we owe religious respect to any text, and that it\nshould be the first law of criticism to render this.[3] Such\nrespect to the text of Sextus, as he himself advocates, puts\nSaisset's explanation of the subject under discussion out of the\nquestion.\n\n    [1] Ritter, _Op. cit._ p. 280. Book IV.\n\n    [2] Saisset, _Op. cit._ p. 206.\n\n    [3] Saisset _Op. cit._ p. 206.\n\nHirzel and Natorp do not find such a marked contradiction in the\ntwo views presented of the theories of Aenesidemus, nor do they\nthink that Sextus has misrepresented them. They rather maintain,\nthat in declaring the coexistence of contradictory predicates\nregarding the same object, Aenesidemus does not cease to be a\nSceptic, for he did not believe that the predicates are\napplicable in a dogmatic sense of the word, but are only\napplicable in appearance, that is, applicable to phenomena. The\nHeraclitism of Aenesidemus would be then only in appearance, as\nhe understood the statement, that \"Contradictory predicates are\nin reality applicable to the same thing,\" only in the phenomenal\nsense.[1] Hirzel says in addition, that contradictory predicates\nare in reality applicable to those phenomena which are the same\nfor all, and consequently true, for Aenesidemus considered those\nphenomena true that are the same for all.[2] As Protagoras, the\ndisciple of Heraclitus, declared the relative character of\nsensations, that things exist only for us, and that their nature\ndepends on our perception of them; so, in the phenomenal sense,\nAenesidemus accepts the apparent fact that contradictory\npredicates in reality apply to the same thing.\n\n    [1] Natorp _Op. cit._ 115, 122.\n\n    [2] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 8; Hirzel _Op. cit._ p. 95.\n\nThis explanation entirely overlooks the fact that we have to do\nwith the word [Greek: huparchein], in the statement that\ncontradictory predicates in reality apply to the same thing;\nwhile in the passage quoted where Aenesidemus declares common\nphenomena to be true ones, we have the word [Greek: alethe], so\nthat this explanation of the difficulty would advocate a very\nstrange use of the word [Greek: huparchein].\n\nAll of these different views of the possible solution of this\nperplexing problem are worthy of respect, as the opinion of men\nwho have given much thought to this and other closely Belated\nsubjects. While we may not altogether agree with any one of\nthem, they nevertheless furnish many suggestions, which are very\nvaluable in helping to construct a theory on the subject that\nshall satisfactorily explain the difficulties, and present a\nconsistent view of the attitude of Aenesidemus.\n\nFirst, in regard to the Greek expression [Greek: hoi peri] in\nconnection with proper names, upon which Pappenheim bases so\nmuch of his argument. All Greek scholars would agree that the\nexpression does not apply usually only to the disciples of any\nteacher, but [Greek: hoi peri ton Ainesidemon], for instance,\nincludes Aenesidemus with his followers, and is literally\ntranslated, \"Aenesidemus and his followers.\" It is noticeable,\nhowever, in the writings of Sextus that he uses the expression\n[Greek: hoi peri] often for the name of the founder of a school\nalone, as Pappenheim himself admits.[1] We find examples of this\nin the mention of Plato and Democritus and Arcesilaus, as\n[Greek: hoi peri ton Platona kai Demokriton][2] and [Greek: hoi\nperi ton Arkesilaon],[3] and accordingly we have no right to\ninfer that his use of the name Aenesidemus in this way has an\nexceptional significance. It may mean Aenesidemus alone, or it\nmay signify Aenesidemus in connection with his followers.\n\n    [1] Pappenheim _Op. cit._ p. 21.\n\n    [2] _Adv. Math._ VIII. 6.\n\n    [3] _Adv. Math._ VII. 150.\n\nIn reply to Zeller's position, that Sextus and Tertullian have\nmisunderstood Aenesidemus, and quote from some common author who\nmisrepresents him, we would admit that such a misunderstanding\nmight be possible where Sextus gives long explanations of\nHeraclitus' teachings, beginning with quoting Aenesidemus, and\ncontinuing in such a way that it is not always possible to\ndistinguish just the part that is attributed to Aenesidemus; but\nsuch a misunderstanding certainly cannot be asserted in regard\nto the direct statement that Aenesidemus regarded Scepticism as\nthe path to the philosophy of Heraclitus, for the reasons\npreviously given. Neither would we agree with Brochard, whose\nsolution of the difficulty is on the whole the most logical,\n_i.e._, that Aenesidemus had necessarily already passed through\ntwo phases of philosophical belief. It is possible to admit a\ngradual evolution of thought in Aenesidemus without supposing in\neither case a change of basis. His withdrawal from the Academy\nis an argument against, rather than in favor of a change on his\npart, and was caused by the well-known change in the attitude of\nthe Academy.\n\nMany of the teachings of the Sceptical School were taken\ndirectly from the Academy, belonging to those doctrines\nadvocated in the Academy before the eclectic dogmatic tendency\nintroduced by Antiochus. In fact, Sextus himself claims a close\nrelation between the Middle Academy and Pyrrhonism.[1]\nAenesidemus, although he was a Sceptic, belonged to the Academy,\nand on leaving it became, as it were, a pioneer in Pyrrhonism,\nand cannot be judged in the same way as we should judge a\nSceptic of Sextus' time.\n\nIt seems a self-evident fact that during the two centuries which\nelapsed between the time of Aenesidemus and Sextus, the\nstandpoint of judgment in the Sceptical School had greatly\nchanged. An example illustrating this change we find in a\ncomparison of the presentation of Scepticism by Diogenes with\nthat of Sextus. The author Whom Diogenes follows, probably one\nof the Sceptical writers, considers Xenophanes, Zeno, and\nDemocritus, Sceptics, and also Plato,[2] while Sextus, in regard\nto all of these men, opposes the idea that they were\nSceptics.[3] Diogenes also calls Heraclitus a Sceptic, and even\nHomer,[4] and quotes sceptical sayings from the Seven Wise\nMen;[5] he includes in the list of Sceptics, Archilochus,\nEuripides, Empedocles, and Hippocrates,[6] and, furthermore,\nsays that Theodosius, probably one of the younger Sceptics,\nobjected to the name 'Pyrrhonean' on the ground that Pyrrho was\nnot the first Sceptic.[7]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 232.\n\n    [2] Diog. IX. 11, 17-72.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 213-214; I. 223-225.\n\n    [4] Diog. IX. 11, 71.\n\n    [5] Diog. IX. 11, 71.\n\n    [6] Diog. IX. 11, 71-73.\n\n    [7] Diog. IX. 11. 70.\n\nWe have given the testimony from many sources to the effect that\nbefore the time of Sextus the Empirical School of Medicine was\nconsidered identical with Scepticism, although not so by Sextus\nhimself. From all of these things we may infer a narrowing of\nthe limits of Pyrrhonism in the time of Sextus.\n\nLet us accept with Brochard the development of thought seen in\nAenesidemus from the beginning to the end of his career, without\nagreeing with him that Aenesidemus ever consciously changed his\nbasis. He was a Sceptic in the Academy. He left the Academy on\nthat account, and he remained a Sceptic to the end, in so far as\na man can be a Sceptic, and take the positive stand that\nAenesidemus did.\n\nTwo things might account for his apparent dogmatism--\n\n (i) The eclectic spirit of his time.\n\n(ii) The psychological effect upon himself of this\n     careful systemisation of the Sceptical teachings.\n\nLet us consider the first of these causes. Aenesidemus, although\nnot the first of the later Sceptics, was apparently the first to\nseparate himself from the Academy. He was the founder of a new\nmovement, the attempt to revive the older Scepticism as taught\nby Pyrrho and Timon, and separate it from the dogmatic teachings\nof the Stoics which were so greatly affecting the Scepticism of\nthe New Academy. It was the spirit of his time to seek to\nsustain all philosophical teaching by the authority of as many\nas possible of the older philosophers, and he could hardly\nescape the tendency which his training in the Academy had\nunconsciously given him. Therefore we find him trying to prove\nthat the philosophy of Heraclitus follows from Scepticism. It is\nnot necessary either to explain the matter, as both Hirzel and\nNatorp so ingeniously attempt to do, by claiming that the truth\nof contradictory predicates which Aenesidemus accepted from\nHeraclitus referred only to phenomena. The history of philosophy\ngives us abundant proof of the impossibility of absolute\nScepticism, and Aenesidemus furnishes us with one example of\nmany of this impossibility, and of the dogmatism that must exist\nin connection with all thought. In the case of Aenesidemus, who\nevidently gave the best efforts of his life to establish the\nSceptical School, the dogmatism was probably unconscious. That\nhe remained to the end a Sceptic is shown by the fact that he\nwas known as such to posterity. Nowhere do we find a change of\nbasis referred to in regard to him, and Sextus, in refuting the\nmistakes which he attributes to Aenesidemus, does it, as it\nwere, to point out something of which Aenesidemus had been\nunconscious.\n\nLet us consider here the second cause of Aenesidemus' Dogmatism,\nthe psychological effect upon himself of formulating Sceptical\nbeliefs. The work that he did for the Sceptical School was a\npositive one. It occupied years of his life, and stamped itself\nupon his mental development. In formulating Scepticism, and in\nadvocating it against the many enemies of the School, and amidst\nall the excitement of the disruption from the Academy, and of\nestablishing a new School, it was inevitable that his mind\nshould take a dogmatic tendency. He remained a Sceptic as he had\nalways been, but must have grown dogmatic in his attitude\ntowards the Sceptical formulae, and was thus able to adopt some\nof the teachings of Heraclitus, unconscious of their\ninconsistency.\n\nWhere should we find a modern writer who is consistent in all\nhis statements? Could we read the works of Aenesidemus, we might\nbetter understand the connection between the apparently\ncontradictory ideas in his teaching, but the inconsistencies in\nstatement would probably remain. It is necessary to remember the\nposition of Aenesidemus in breaking away from the Academy and in\nfounding a new school, the full significance of which he could\nnot foresee. There must necessarily be some crudeness in pioneer\nwork, and some failure to see the bearing of all its parts, and\na compiler like Sextus could point out the inconsistencies which\nthe two centuries since the time of Aenesidemus had made plain.\nAenesidemus was too positive a character to admit of absolute\nSceptical consistency. He was nevertheless the greatest thinker\nthe Sceptical School had known since the age of Pyrrho, its\nfounder. In claiming a union between Pyrrhonism and the\nphilosophy of Heraclitus, he recognised also the pre-Socratic\ntendency of the Sceptical School. The name of Socrates was all\npowerful in the Academy, but Aenesidemus comprehended the fact\nthat the true spirit of Pyrrhonism was of earlier origin than\nthe Academic Scepsis.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\n\n_Critical Examination of Pyrrhonism_.\n\nThe distinct philosophical movement of which Pyrrho was the\nauthor bore his name for five centuries after his death. It had\nan acknowledged existence as a philosophical tendency, if indeed\nnot a sect, for a great part of that time. Yet, when we\ncarefully analyse the relation of Pyrrhonism, as presented to us\nby Sextus, to the teachings of Pyrrho himself, in so far as they\ncan be known, we find many things in Pyrrhonism for which Pyrrho\nwas not responsible.\n\nThe foundation elements of the movement, the spirit of Empirical\ndoubt that lay underneath and caused its development in certain\ndirections rather than others, are due to Pyrrho. The methods of\nthe school, however, were very foreign to anything found in the\nlife or teachings of Pyrrho. Pyrrho was eminently a moralist. He\nwas also to a great degree an ascetic, and he lived his\nphilosophy, giving it thus a positive side wanting in the\nPyrrhonism presented to us by Sextus. Timon represents him as\ndesiring to escape from the tedious philosophical discussions of\nhis time--\n\n       [Greek:\n       o geron o Purrhon, pos e pothen ekdusin heures\n       latreies doxon te kenophrosunes te sophiston;]\n\nand again he speaks of his modest and tranquil life--\n\n      [Greek:\n      touto moi, o Purrhon, himeiretai etor akousai\n      pos pot' aner et' ageis panta meth' hesuchies\n      mounos d'anthropoisi theou tropon hegemoneueis\n      ..... pheista meth' hesuchies\n      aiei aphrontistos kai akinetos kata tauta\n      me prosech' indalmois hedulogou sophies.][1]\n\nPyrrho wished more than anything else to live in peace, and his\ndislike of the Sophists[2] may well have made him try to avoid\ndialectic; while, on the contrary, in the Pyrrhonean School of\nlater times discussion was one of the principal methods of\ncontest, at least after the time of Agrippa. Pyrrhonism seems to\nhave been originally a theory of life, like the philosophy of\nSocrates, to whom Pyrrho is often compared,[3] and Pyrrho, like\nSocrates, lived his philosophy. Our knowledge of Pyrrho is\ngained from Aristocles, Sextus Empiricus, and Diogenes, and from\nthe Academic traditions given by Cicero. Diogenes gives us\ndetails of his life which he attributes to Antigonus of\nCarystius, who lived about the time of Pyrrho.[4] Pyrrho was a\ndisciple and admirer of Democritus,[5] some of whose teachings\nbore a lasting influence over the subsequent development of\nPyrrhonism. He accompanied Alexander the Great to India, where\nhe remained as a member of his suite for some time, and the\nphilosophical ideas of India were not without influence on his\nteachings. Oriental philosophy was not unknown in Greece long\nbefore the time of Pyrrho, but his personal contact with the\nMagi and the Gymnosophists of the far East, apparently impressed\nupon his mind teachings for which he was not unprepared by his\nprevious study and natural disposition. In his indifference to\nworldly goods we find a strong trace of the Buddhistic teaching\nregarding the vanity of human life. He showed also a similar\nhopelessness in regard to the possibility of finding a\nsatisfactory philosophy, or absolute truth. He evidently\nreturned from India with the conviction that truth was not to be\nattained.[6]\n\n    [1] Diog. IX. 11, 65. Given from Mullach's edition of\n        Timon by Brochard, _Pyrrhon et le Scepticism primitive_,\n        p. 525.\n\n    [2] Diog. IX. 11, 69.\n\n    [3] Lewes _Op. cit._ p. 460.\n\n    [4] Diog. IX. 11, 62.\n\n    [5] Diog. IX. 11, 67.\n\n    [6] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._\n\nAfter the death of Alexander and Pyrrho's return to Greece, he\nlived quietly with his sister at Elis, and Diogenes says that he\nwas consistent in his life, asserting and denying nothing, but\nin everything withholding his opinion, as nothing in itself is\ngood or shameful, just or unjust.[1] He was not a victim of\nfalse pride, but sold animals in the market place, and, if\nnecessary, washed the utensils himself.[2] He lived in equality\nof spirit, and practised his teachings with serenity. If one\nwent out while he was talking he paid no attention, but went\ncalmly on with his remarks.[3] He liked to live alone, and to\ntravel alone, and on one occasion, being knocked about in a\nvessel by a storm at sea, he did not lose his imperturbability,\nbut pointed to a swine calmly eating on board, and said that the\nwise man should have as much calmness of soul as that. He\nendured difficult surgical operations with indifference,[4] and\nwhen his friend Anaxarchus was once unfortunate enough to fall\ninto a morass, he went calmly by without stopping to help him,\nfor which consistency of conduct Anaxarchus afterwards praised\nhim. There are two instances given by Diogenes when he lost\ncontrol of himself; once in getting angry with his sister, and\nonce in trying to save himself when chased by a dog. When\naccused of inconsistency, he said it was difficult to entirely\ngive up one's humanity.[5] He was greatly venerated by the\npeople among whom he lived, who made him high priest, and on his\naccount exempted all philosophers from taxation,[6] and after\nhis death erected a statue to his memory. These facts testify to\nhis moral character, and also to fulfil the functions of high\npriest a certain amount of dogmatism must have been necessary.\n\n    [1] Diog. IX. 11, 61, 62.\n\n    [2] Diog. IX. 11, 66.\n\n    [3] Diog. IX. 11, 63.\n\n    [4] Diog. IX. 11, 67.\n\n    [5] Diog. IX. 11, 66.\n\n    [6] Diog. IX. 11, 64.\n\nAccording to Diogenes, \"We cannot know,\" said Pyrrho, \"what\nthings are in themselves, either by sensation or by judgment,\nand, as we cannot distinguish the true from the false, therefore\nwe should live impassively, and without an opinion.\" The term\n[Greek: epoche], so characteristic of Pyrrhonism, goes back,\naccording to Diogenes, to the time of Pyrrho.[1] Nothing is, in\nitself, one thing more than another, but all experience is\nrelated to phenomena, and no knowledge is possible through the\nsenses.[2] Pyrrho's aim was [Greek: ataraxia] and his life\nfurnished a marked example of the spirit of indifference, for\nwhich the expression [Greek: apatheia] is better suited than the\nlater one, [Greek: ataraxia]. The description of his life with\nhis sister confirms this, where the term [Greek: adiaphoria] is\nused to describe his conduct.[3] He founded his Scepticism on\nthe equivalence of opposing arguments.[4]\n\n    [1] Diog. IX. 11, 61.\n\n    [2] Diog. IX. 11, 61-62.\n\n    [3] Diog. IX. 11. 66.\n\n    [4] Diog. IX. 11. 106.\n\nThe picture given of Pyrrho by Cicero is entirely different from\nthat of Diogenes, and contrasts decidedly with it.[1] Cicero\nknows Pyrrho as a severe moralist, not as a Sceptic. Both\nauthors attribute to Pyrrho the doctrine of indifference and\napathy, but, according to Cicero, Pyrrho taught of virtue,\nhonesty, and the _summum bonum_, while Diogenes plainly tells us\nthat he considered nothing as good in itself, \"and of all things\nnothing as true.\"[2] Cicero does not once allude to Pyrrhonean\ndoubt. We see on the one hand, in Cicero's idea of Pyrrho, the\ninfluence of the Academy, perhaps even of Antiochus himself,[3]\nwhich probably colored the representations given of Pyrrho; but,\non the other hand, there is much in Diogenes' account of\nPyrrho's life and teachings, and in the writings of Timon, which\nshows us the positive side of Pyrrho. Pyrrho, in denying the\npossibility of all knowledge, made that rather a motive for\nindifference in the relations of life, than the foundation\nthought of a philosophical system. His teaching has a decided\nethical side, showing in that respect the strong influence of\nDemocritus over him, who, like Pyrrho, made happiness to consist\nin a state of feeling.[4] The one motive of all of Pyrrho's\nteaching is a positive one, the desire for happiness.\n\n    [1] _De orat._ III, 62.\n\n    [2] Diog. IX. 11, 61.\n\n    [3] Compare Natorp _Op. cit._ p. 71.\n\n    [4] Zeller _Grundriss der Griechischen Phil._ p. 70.\n\nThe essence of Pyrrhonism as given by Timon is as follows:[1]\nMan desires to be happy. To realise his desire he must consider\nthree things:\n\n  (i) What is the nature of things?\n\n (ii) How should man conduct himself in relation to\n      them?\n\n(iii) What is the result to him of this relation?\n\nThe nature of things is unknown. Our relation to them must be\none of suspension of judgment, without activity, desire, or\nbelief,--that is, an entirely negative relation. The result is\nthat state of having no opinion, called [Greek: epoche], which\nis followed in turn by [Greek: ataraxia].\n\n    [1] Aristocles _ap. Eusebium Praep. Ev._ XIV. 18.\n\n[1]The problem of philosophy is here proposed very nearly in the\nterms of Kant, but not with the positive motive, like that of\nthe great philosopher of Germany, of evolving a system to\npresent the truth. Yet the importance of these questions shows\nthe originality of Pyrrho. The earnestness of Pyrrho is further\nshown by an example given by Diogenes. Once on being found\ntalking to himself alone, he said, when asked the reason, that\nhe was meditating how to become a good man ([Greek:\nchrestos]),[2] thus showing an entirely different spirit from\nanything found in Sextus' books. The explanation of his life and\nteachings is to be found largely in his own disposition. Such an\nattitude of indifference must belong to a placid nature, and\ncannot be entirely the result of a philosophical system, and,\nwhile it can be aimed at, it can never be perfectly imitated.\nOne of his disciples recognised this, and said that it was\nnecessary to have the disposition of Pyrrho in order to hold his\ndoctrines.[3] Diogenes tells us that he was the first to advance\nany formulae of Scepticism,[4] but they must have been very\nelementary, as Pyrrho himself wrote nothing. We find no trace of\nformulated Tropes in Pyrrho's teachings, yet it is probable that\nhe indicated some of the contradictions in sensation, and\npossibly the Tropes in some rudimentary form. Of the large\nnumber of sceptical formulae, or [Greek: phonai], the three\nwhich seem to have the oldest connection with Scepticism are the\n[Greek: antilogia], the [Greek: ouden horizo], and the [Greek:\nou mallon].[5] We know from Diogenes that Protagoras is the\nauthority for saying that in regard to everything there are two\nopposing arguments.[6] The saying \"to determine nothing\" is\nquoted from Timon's _Python_ by Diogenes,[7] and the other two\nmentioned are also attributed to him by Aristocles.[8] We have\nalso in the [Greek: ou mallon] a direct connection with\nDemocritus, although the difference in the meaning which he\nattributed to it is shown by Sextus.[9] So while the expression\nis the same, the explanation of it given by Pyrrho must have\nbeen different. It would seem probable that Pyrrho used all of\nthese three sayings, from the account of Diogenes, and that even\nthen they gave rise to the accusation of the Dogmatics, that\nsimply by possessing such sayings the Sceptics dogmatised,[10]\nfor the refutation of this used by Sextus occurs in the old\naccount of the sayings, namely, that these formulae include also\nthemselves in the meaning, as a cathartic removes itself\ntogether with other harmful objects.[11]\n\n    [1] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 21.\n\n    [2] Diog. IX. 11, 64.\n\n    [3] Diog. IX. 11, 70, 64.\n\n    [4] Diog. IX. 11, 69; IX. 11, 61.\n\n    [5] _Hyp._ I. 202; Diog. IX. 8, 51; _Photius_ Bekker's ed.\n       280 H.\n\n    [6] _Photius_ Bekker's ed. 280 H.\n\n    [7] _Hyp._ I. 197; Diog. IX. 11, 76.\n\n    [8] _Aristocles ap. Eusebium, Praep. Ev._ XIV. 18.\n\n    [9] _Hyp._ I. 213.\n\n    [10] Diog. IX. 11, 68-76.\n\n    [11] Diog. IX. 11, 76; _Hyp._ I. 206.\n\nIn comparing the later Pyrrhonism with the teachings of Pyrrho,\nwe would sharply contrast the moral attitude of the two. With\nPyrrho equilibrium of soul was a means to be applied to his\npositive theory of life; with the later Pyrrhoneans it was the\nend to be attained. We would attribute, however, the empirical\ntendency shown during the whole history of Pyrrhonism to Pyrrho\nas its originator. He was an empirical philosopher, and the\nresult of his influence in this respect, as seen in the\nsubsequent development of the school, stands in marked contrast\nto the dialectic spirit of the Academic Scepsis. The empiricism\nof the school is shown in its scientific lore, in the fact that\nso many of the Sceptics were physicians, and in the character of\nthe ten Tropes of [Greek: epoche]. We may safely affirm that\nthe foundation principles of Pyrrhonism are due to Pyrrho, and\nthe originality which gave the school its power. The elaborated\narguments, however, and the details of its formulae belong to\nlater times.\n\nComing now to the relation of Pyrrhonism to the Academy, the\nconnection between the two is difficult to exactly determine,\nbetween the time of Pyrrho and that of Aenesidemus. Scepticism\nin the Academy was, however, never absolutely identical with\nPyrrhonism, although at certain periods of the history of the\nAcademy the difference was slight. We can trace throughout the\nevolution of doubt, as shown to us in Pyrrhonism, and in\nAcademic Scepticism, the different results which followed the\ndifference in origin of the two movements, and these differences\nfollowed according to general laws of development of thought.\nArcesilaus, who introduced doubt into the Academy, claimed to\nreturn to the dialectic of Socrates, and suppressing the\nlectures,[1] which were the method of teaching in the later\nschools of philosophy, introduced discussions instead, as being\nmore decidedly a Socratic method. Although, according to Sextus,\nhe was the one leader of the Academy whose Scepticism most\nnearly approached that of Pyrrhonism,[2] yet underneath his\nwhole teaching lay that dialectic principle so thoroughly in\nopposition to the empiricism of Pyrrho. The belief of Socrates\nand Plato in the existence of absolute truth never entirely lost\nits influence over the Academy, but was like a hidden germ,\ndestined to reappear after Scepticism had passed away. It\nfinally led the Academy back to Dogmatism, and prepared the way\nfor the Eclecticism with which it disappeared from history.\n\n    [1] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ p. 36.\n\n    [2] _Hyp_. I. 232.\n\nThe history of Pyrrhonism and that of Academic Scepticism were\nfor a time contemporaneous. The immediate follower of Pyrrho,\nTimon, called by Sextus the \"prophet of Pyrrho,\"[1] was a\ncontemporary of Arcesilaus. That he did not consider the\nScepticism of the Academy identical with Pyrrhonism is proved\nfrom the fact that he did not himself join the Academy, but was,\non the contrary, far from doing so. That he regarded Arcesilaus\nas a Dogmatic is evident from his writings.[2] One day, on\nseeing the chief of the Academy approaching, he cried out, \"What\nare you doing here among us who are free?\"[3] After the death of\nTimon, the Pyrrhonean School had no representative till the time\nof Ptolemy of Cyrene,[4] and Greek Scepticism was represented by\nthe Academy. That Pyrrho had a strong influence over Arcesilaus,\nthe founder of the Middle Academy, is evident[5]; but there was\nalso never a time when the Academy entirely broke away from all\nthe teachings of Plato, even in their deepest doubt.[6] It is\ntrue that Arcesilaus removed, nominally as well as in spirit,\nsome of the dialogues of Plato from the Academy, but only those\nthat bore a dogmatic character, while those that presented a\nmore decided Socratic mode of questioning without reaching any\ndecided result, men regarded as authority for Scepticism.\n\n    [1] _Adv. Math._ I. 53.\n\n    [2] Diog. IV. 6, 33, 34.\n\n    [3] Diog. IX. 12, 114.\n\n    [4] Diog. IX. 12, 115.\n\n    [5] Diog. IV. 6, 33.\n\n    [6] Diog. IV. 6, 32.\n\nSextus does not deny that Arcesilaus was almost a Pyrrhonean,\nbut he claims that his Pyrrhonism was only apparent, and not\nreal, and was used as a cloak to hide his loyalty to the\nteachings of Plato.[1] As Ariston said of him,[2] \"Plato before,\nPyrrho behind, Diodorus in the middle.\" Sextus also\ncharacterises the method of Arcesilaus as dialectic,[3] and we\nknow from Cicero that it was his pride to pretend to return to\nthe dialectic of Socrates.\n\nIt is interesting to note that Sextus, in his refutation of the\nposition that the Academy is the same as Pyrrhonism, takes up\nthe entire development of Academic thought from the time of\nPlato till that of Antiochus, and does not limit the argument to\nScepticism under Arcesilaus. The claim made by some that the two\nschools were the same, is stated by him,[4] and the word 'some'\nprobably refers to members of both schools at different periods\nof their history. Sextus recognises three Academies, although he\nremarks that some make even a further division, calling that of\nPhilo and Charmides, the fourth, and that of Antiochus and his\nfollowers, the fifth.\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 234.\n\n    [2] Diog. IV. 6, 33.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 234.\n\n    [4] _Hyp._ I. 220.\n\nThat many in the Academy, and even outside of it, regarded Plato\nas a Sceptic, and an authority for subsequent Scepticism, we\nfind both from Sextus and Diogenes.[1] As Lewes justly remarks,\none could well find authority for Scepticism in the works of\nPlato, as indeed the Academicians did, but not when the sum\ntotal of his teachings was considered. The spirit of Plato's\nteachings was dogmatic, as Sextus most decidedly recognises, and\nas Aenesidemus and Menodotus[2] recognised before him.[3] Sextus\nhimself shows us that Plato's idealism and ethical teachings can\nhave nothing in common with Scepticism, for if he accepts the\ndesirability of the virtuous life, and the existence of\nProvidence, he dogmatises; and if he even regards them as\nprobable, he gives preference to one set of ideas over another,\nand departs from the sceptical character. Sextus characterises\nthe sceptical side of Plato's writings as mental gymnastics,[4]\nwhich do not authorise his being called a Sceptic, and affirms\nthat Plato is not a Sceptic, since he prefers some unknown\nthings to others in trustworthiness. The ethical difference\nunderlying the teachings of the Academy and Pyrrhonism, Sextus\nwas very quick to see, and although it is very probable that the\npart of the _Hypotyposes_ which defines the difference between\nthe Academy and Pyrrhonism may be largely quoted from the\nintroduction to Aenesidemus' works, yet Sextus certainly gives\nthese statements the strong stamp of his approval. He condemns\nthe Academy because of the theory that good and evil exist, or\nif this cannot be decidedly proved, yet that it is more probable\nthat what is called good exists than the contrary.[5]\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 221; Diog. IX. 11, 72.\n\n    [2] Bekker's edition of _Hyp._ I. 222.\n\n    [3] _Hyp._ I. 222.\n\n    [4] _Hyp._ I. 223.\n\n    [5] _Hyp_. I. 226.\n\nThe whole Academic teaching of probabilities contradicted the\nstandpoint of the Sceptics--that our ideas are equal as regards\ntrustworthiness and untrustworthiness,[1] for the Academicians\ndeclared that some ideas are probable and some improbable, and\nthey make a difference even in those ideas that they call\nprobable.\n\nSextus claims that there are three fundamental grounds of\ndifference between Pyrrhonism and the Academy. The first is the\ndoctrine of probability which the Academicians accept in regard\nto the superior trustworthiness of some ideas over others.[2]\nThe second is the different way in which the two schools follow\ntheir teachers. The Pyrrhoneans follow without striving or\nstrong effort, or even strong inclination, as a child follows\nhis teacher, while the Academicians follow with sympathy and\nassent, as Carneades and Clitomachus affirm.[3] The third\ndifference is in the aim, for the Academicians follow what is\nprobable in life. The Sceptics follow nothing, but live\naccording to laws, customs, and natural feelings\nundogmatically.[4]\n\nThe difference between the later teaching of the Academy and\nPyrrhonism is evident, and Sextus treats of it briefly, as not\nrequiring discussion,[5] as Philo taught that the nature of\nfacts is incomprehensible, and Antiochus transferred the Stoa to\nthe Academy. It is therefore evident, from the comparison which\nwe have made, that we do not find in the Academy, with which\nScepticism after the death of Timon was so long united, the\nexact continuance of Pyrrhonism. The philosophical enmity of the\ntwo contemporaries, Timon and Arcesilaus, the Academician who\nhad most in common with Pyrrhonism, is an expression of the\nfundamental incompatibility between the two schools.\n\n    [1] _Hyp_. I. 227.\n\n    [2] _Hyp_. I. 229.\n\n    [3] _Hyp_. I. 230.\n\n    [4] _Hyp_. I. 231.\n\n    [5] _Hyp_. I. 235.\n\nDuring all the chequered history of the Academy the dormant\nidealism was there, underlying the outward development. Although\nduring the time of Arcesilaus and Carneades the difference was\nso slight as to seem a mere matter of form of expression, yet\nthe different foundations on which the two schools stood was\nalways recognisable. On the one hand there was the germ of\nidealism which was destined to awake to a new life, and on the\nother, the attempt at absolute negation which was to result in\nthe final extinction of Pyrrhonism. We find in both, it is true,\nespecially in the time of Arcesilaus, the aim of [Greek:\nepoche].[1] Both placed great weight on [Greek: isostheneia], or\nthe equal value of opposing arguments.[2] The foundation of the\n[Greek: epoche] was, however, different in the two cases.\nArcesilaus founded his on dialectic, while Pyrrho's was\nempirical.\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 232.\n\n    [2] Diog. IX. 73; _Hyp._ II. 130; III. 65.\n\nThe Pyrrhonean believed that ideas give us no knowledge of the\nouter world; the Academic Sceptic believed that we cannot\ndistinguish between true and false ideas, so such knowledge is\nimpossible. The Pyrrhonean denied that truth could exist in\nideas because of their contradictory nature, and consequently\nthe existence of all truth, [Greek: meden einai te aletheia epi\npanton].[1] The Academic Sceptic granted that the truth was\npossibly contained in ideas, but affirmed that it could never be\nknown to us. The Pyrrhoneans prided themselves on still being\nseekers, for although ordinary ideas are too contradictory to\ngive knowledge of the outer world, they did not deny that such\nknowledge might be possible, but simply suspended the judgment\nregarding it. To the Pyrrhonean the result corresponded to the\nmethod. All ideas thus far known revealed nothing of the truth,\ntherefore he still sought. The Academician tried logically to\nprove that the truth is impossible to find. It is the relation\nof the dialectician to the empiricist, and the two varieties of\nScepticism are explained by their difference in origin. In\nPyrrhonism there was no constructive element. In the Academic\nScepsis such an element was found throughout all its history in\nthe theory of Probability. Arcesilaus himself laid great stress\nupon this doctrine, which Sextus carefully shows us[2] is\nutterly inconsistent with Pyrrhonism. Arcesilaus plainly teaches\nthat, having suspended one's judgment in regard to matters of\nknowledge, one should control his choices, his refusals, and his\nactions by the probable.[3]\n\n    [1] Diog. IX. 11, 61.\n\n    [2] _Hyp._ I. 229.\n\n    [3] Compare Maccoll _Op. cit._ 39.\n\nAfter Antiochus introduced Eclecticism into the Academy,\nPyrrhonism was the only representative of Greek Scepticism, and\nit flourished for over two centuries after our era, and then\nalso disappeared, no more to exist as a regular philosophical\nschool.\n\nHaving considered at length the essence of Pyrrhonism as\npresented by Sextus Empiricus, it now remains to briefly note\nthe characteristics that formed its strength and weakness, and\nthe causes of its final downfall. Herbart says that every\nphilosopher is a Sceptic in the beginning, but every Sceptic\nremains always in the beginning. This remark may well be applied\nto Pyrrhonism. We find in its teachings many fundamental\nphilosophical truths which might have formed the beginning of\ngreat philosophical progress, but which were never developed to\nany positive results. The teachings of Pyrrhonism were some of\nthem well fitted to prepare the way to idealism. The great idea\nof the relativity of _Vorstellungen_ is made very prominent by\nthe ten Tropes of [Greek: epoche]. Aenesidemus, in his eight\nTropes against aetiology, shows the absurdity of the doctrine of\ncausality when upheld on materialistic grounds. That was to him\nfinal, [Greek: epei ouk estai aition.] He could not divine that\nalthough the result which he presented was logical, it only led\nto a higher truth. It was reserved for the greatest of modern\nphilosophers to reveal to the world that causality is a\ncondition, and a necessary condition, of thought. When\nAenesidemus proved by his seventh Trope that causality is\nsubjective, he regarded it as fatal to the doctrine; yet this\nconclusion was a marked step in advance in critical philosophy,\nalthough Aenesidemus could not himself see it in all its\nbearings. The great difference between Aenesidemus and Kant is\nthe difference between the materialist and the believer in\nsubjective reality. Both agreed in the unknown nature of the\n_Ding an sich_, but this was to the Pyrrhonist the end of all\nhis philosophy; to Kant, however, the beginning.\n\nPyrrhonism has rendered, notwithstanding its points of fatal\nweakness, marked service to the world in science, philosophy,\nethics, and religion. It quickened scientific thought by\nemphasising empirical methods of investigation, and by\ncriticising all results founded without sufficient data upon\nfalse hypotheses. If, instead of denying the possibility of all\nscience because of the want of a criterion of the truth of\nphenomena, the Pyrrhonists had comprehended the possibility of a\nscience of phenomena, they might have led the world in\nscientific progress.[1] Their service to philosophy lay in the\nstimulus to thought that their frequent attacks on dogmatic\nbeliefs occasioned. Pyrrhonism brought together all the most\nprominent theories of the old schools of philosophy to test\ntheir weakness and expose their contradictions, and this very\nprocess of criticism often demonstrated the power of the truth\nwhich they contained.\n\nSextus Empiricus was often charged by the Church Fathers with\ncorrupting religious belief, and yet the greatest service which\nPyrrhonism has rendered the world was in religious and ethical\nlines. This service did not, naturally, consist in destroying\nbelief in absolute truth, as the Sceptic professed to do, but in\npreparing the way to find it. The bold attacks of Scepticism on\nall truth led men to investigate ethical and religious\nteachings, to examine the grounds of their belief, and to put in\npractical use the right of reason and free discussion.\n\nScepticism was the antecedent of freedom of conscience and\nrational criticism,[2] and the absolute right of scientific\nthought. The Sceptics, however, reaped none of the benefits of\ntheir own system. They remained, as it were, always on the\nthreshold of possible progress. With the keys to great\ndiscoveries in their hands, the doors of philosophical and\nscientific advancement were for ever closed to them by the\nlimitations of their own system. The inherent weakness of\nPyrrhonism lay in its psychological inconsistency and in its\nnegative character. I think that we may safely say that\nPyrrhonism was the most consistent system of Scepticism ever\noffered to the world, and yet it proves most decidedly that\ncomplete Scepticism is psychologically impossible. A man may\ngive up his belief in one set of ideas, and, if they are ideas\nthat are popularly accepted, he will be called a Sceptic, as was\nthe case with Hume. He must, however, replace these ideas by\nothers equally positive, and then he is no longer a Sceptic, but\na Dogmatic, for he believes in something.\n\n    [1] Compare Lewes _Op. cit._ p. 463.\n\n    [2] Compare Chaignet _Op. cit._ p. 460.\n\nWe have shown that the greatest thinkers of Pyrrhonism, Pyrrho,\nAenesidemus, and Agrippa, were not examples of absolute\nScepticism, and although Sextus Empiricus realised what\nconsistency demanded in this respect, and affirmed on almost\nevery page that he was asserting nothing, yet there is not a\nparagraph of his books in which he does not, after all,\ndogmatise on some subject. Complete Scepticism is contrary to\nthe fundamental laws of language, as all use of verbs involves\nsome affirmation. The Pyrrhonists realised this, and therefore\nsome of them wrote nothing, like Pyrrho, their leader, and\nothers advocated [Greek: aphasia][1] as one of the doctrines of\ntheir system.\n\n    [1] _Hyp._ I. 192.\n\nThe very aim of Pyrrhonism was an inconsistent one. [Greek:\nAtaraxia] was only another name for happiness, and in one\ninstance, even, is given as [Greek: hedone], and thus, in spite\nof themselves, the Sceptics introduced a theory of happiness.\nPyrrho, like others of his time, sought the highest good, and\nthought that he had found it in [Greek: ataraxia], the peace of\nmind that appears in other systems of philosophy in other forms.\nThe difference of aim between the Pyrrhonists, Stoics, and\nEpicureans was more apparent than real. To them all philosophy\nwas a path to lead to happiness. The method of Pyrrhonism was,\nhowever, negative. Its strength consisted in its attacks on\nDogmatism, and not in any positive aim of its own, for its\npositive side could not be recognised according to its own\ndoctrines. Therefore there was no real development in\nPyrrhonism, for a negative thought cannot be developed.\n\nWe find, accordingly, from the time of Pyrrho to Sextus, no\ngrowth in breadth of philosophical outlook, only improvement in\nmethods. Philosophical activity can never have doubt as its aim,\nas that would form, as we have shown, a psychological\ncontradiction. The true essence of Pyrrhonism was passivity, but\npassivity can never lead to progress. Much of the polemical work\nof Pyrrhonism prepared the way for scientific progress by\nproviding a vast store of scientific data, but progress was to\nthe Pyrrhonists impossible. They sounded their own scientific\ndeath-knell by declaring the impossibility of science, and\nputting an end to all theories.\n\nThe life of all scientific and philosophic progress is in the\nattempt to find the hidden truth. To the Sceptic there was no\ntruth, and there could be no progress. As progress is a law in\nthe evolution of the human race, so Scepticism as a philosophy\ncould never be a permanent growth, any more than asceticism in\nreligion can be a lasting influence. Both of them are only\noutgrowths. As the foundation principles of Scepticism were\nopposed to anything like real growth, it was a system that could\nnever originate anything. Pyrrho taught from the beginning that\nthe Sceptic must live according to law and custom; not, however,\nbecause one law or custom is better than another in itself, but\nsimply for the sake of peace. This basis of action was itself a\ndeath-blow to all reform in social or political life. It was a\nselfish, negative way of seeking what was, after all, a positive\nthing, the [Greek: ataraxia] that the Sceptic desired. Life with\nthe Pyrrhonist was phenomenal, and not phenomenal simply in\nregard to the outer world, but also subjectively, and no\nabsolute knowledge of the subjective life or of personal\nexistence was possible.\n\nThe cause of the downfall of Pyrrhonism lay in the fact that it\nhad nothing to offer to humanity in the place of what it had\ndestroyed. It made no appeal to human sympathies, and ignored\nall the highest motives to human action. The especial\nmaterialistic standpoint from which Pyrrhonism judged all that\npertains to knowledge and life shut out the ideal, and all\npossibility of absolute truth. It was an expression of the\nphilosophic decadence of the age when it flourished, and\nalthough it possessed some philosophic worth, yet it bore in\nitself the causes of its decay.\n\n\n\n\nPYRRHONIC SKETCHES\n\nBY\n\nSEXTUS EMPIRICUS.\n\n\nBOOK I.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\n\n_The Principal Differences between Philosophers._\n\nIt is probable that those who seek after anything whatever, will     1\neither find it as they continue the search, will deny that it\ncan be found and confess it to be out of reach, or will go on\nseeking it. Some have said, accordingly, in regard to the things\nsought in philosophy, that they have found the truth, while          2\nothers have declared it impossible to find, and still others\ncontinue to seek it. Those who think that they have found it are\nthose who are especially called Dogmatics, as for example, the\nSchools of Aristotle and Epicurus, the Stoics and some others.\nThose who have declared it impossible to find are Clitomachus,       3\nCarneades, with their respective followers, and other\nAcademicians. Those who still seek it are the Sceptics. It\nappears therefore, reasonable to conclude that the three             4\nprincipal kinds of philosophy are the Dogmatic, the Academic,\nand the Sceptic. Others may suitably treat of the other Schools,\nbut as for the Sceptical School, we shall now give an outline of\nit, remarking in advance that in respect to nothing that will be\nsaid do we speak positively, that it must be absolutely so, but\nwe shall state each thing historically as it now appears to us.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\n\n_Ways of Treating Scepticism._\n\nOne way of treating the Sceptical philosophy is called               5\ngeneral, and the other special. The general method is that by\nwhich we set forth the character of Scepticism, declaring what\nits idea is, what its principles are, its mode of reasoning, its\ncriterion, and its aim. It presents also, the aspects of doubt,\n[Greek: hoi tropoi tes epoches], and the way in which we should\nunderstand the Sceptical formulae, and the distinction between\nScepticism and the related Schools of philosophy. The special\nmethod, on the contrary, is that by which we 6 speak against         6\neach part of so-called philosophy. Let us then treat Scepticism\nat first in the general way, beginning our delineation with the\nnomenclature of the Sceptical School.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\n\n_The Nomenclature of Scepticism._\n\nThe Sceptical School is also called the \"Seeking School,\" from       7\nits spirit of research and examination; the \"Suspending School,\"\nfrom the condition of mind in which one is left after the\nsearch, in regard to the things that he has examined; and the\n\"Doubting School,\" either because, as some say, the Sceptics\ndoubt and are seeking in regard to everything, or because they\nnever know whether to deny or affirm. It is also called the\nPyrrhonean School, because Pyrrho appears to us the best\nrepresentative of Scepticism, and is more prominent than all who\nbefore him occupied themselves with it.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\n\n_What is Scepticism?_\n\nThe [Greek: dynamis] of the Sceptical School is to place the         8\nphenomenal in opposition to the intellectual \"in any way\nwhatever,\" and thus through the equilibrium of the reasons and\nthings ([Greek: isostheneia ton logon]) opposed to each other,\nto reach, first the state of suspension of judgment, [Greek:\nepoche] and afterwards that of imperturbability, [Greek:\nataraxia]. We do not use the word [Greek: dynamis] in any            9\nunusual sense, but simply, meaning the force of the system. By\nthe phenomenal, we understand the sensible, hence we place the\nintellectual in opposition to it. The phrase \"in any way\nwhatever,\" may refer to the word [Greek: dynamis] in order that\nwe may understand that word in a simple sense as we said, or it\nmay refer to the placing the phenomenal and intellectual in\nopposition. For we place these in opposition to each other in a\nvariety of ways, the phenomenal to the phenomenal, and the\nintellectual to the intellectual, or reciprocally, and we say\n\"in any way whatever,\" in order that all methods of opposition\nmay be included. Or \"in any way whatever\" may refer to the\nphenomenal and the intellectual, so that we need not ask how\ndoes the phenomenal appear, or how are the thoughts conceived,\nbut that we may understand these things in a simple sense. By\n\"reasons opposed to each other,\" we do not by any means             10\nunderstand that they deny or affirm anything, but simply that\nthey offset each other. By equilibrium, we mean equality in\nregard to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness, so that of the\nreasons that are placed in opposition to each other, one should\nnot excel another in trustworthiness. [Greek: epoche] is a\nholding back of the opinion, in consequence of which we neither\ndeny nor affirm anything. [Greek: ataraxia] is repose and\ntranquillity of soul. We shall explain how [Greek: ataraxia]\naccompanies [Greek: epoche] when we speak of the aim.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\n\n_The Sceptic._\n\nWhat is meant by a Pyrrhonean philosopher can be understood from    11\nthe idea of the Sceptical School. He is a Pyrrhonean, namely,\nwho identifies himself with this system.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\n\n_The Origin of Scepticism._\n\nScepticism arose in the beginning from the hope of attaining        12\n[Greek: ataraxia]; for men of the greatest talent were perplexed\nby the contradiction of things, and being at a loss what to\nbelieve, began to question what things are true, and what false,\nhoping to attain [Greek: ataraxia] as a result of the decision.\nThe fundamental principle of the Sceptical system is especially\nthis, namely, to oppose every argument by one of equal weight,\nfor it seems to us that in this way we finally reach the\nposition where we have no dogmas.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\n\n_Does the Sceptic Dogmatise?_\n\nWe say that the Sceptic does not dogmatise. We do not say           13\nthis, meaning by the word dogma the popular assent to certain\nthings rather than others (for the Sceptic does assent to\nfeelings that are a necessary result of sensation, as for\nexample, when he is warm or cold, he cannot say that he thinks\nhe is not warm or cold), but we say this, meaning by dogma the\nacceptance of any opinion in regard to the unknown things\ninvestigated by science. For the Pyrrhonean assents to nothing\nthat is unknown. Furthermore, he does not dogmatise even when       14\nhe utters the Sceptical formulae in regard to things that are\nunknown, such as \"Nothing more,\" or \"I decide nothing,\" or any\nof the others about which we shall speak later. For the one who\ndogmatises regards the thing about which he is said to\ndogmatise, as existing in itself; the Sceptic does not however\nregard these formulae as having an absolute existence, for he\nassumes that the saying \"All is false,\" includes itself with\nother things as false, and likewise the saying \"Nothing is\ntrue\"; in the same way \"Nothing more,\" states that together with\nother things it itself is nothing more, and cancels itself\ntherefore, as well as other things. We say the same also in\nregard to the other Sceptical expressions. In short, if he who      15\ndogmatises, assumes as existing in itself that about which he\ndogmatises, the Sceptic, on the contrary, expresses his sayings\nin such a way that they are understood to be themselves\nincluded, and it cannot be said that he dogmatises in saying\nthese things. The principal thing in uttering these formulae is\nthat he says what appears to him, and communicates his own\nfeelings in an unprejudiced way, without asserting anything in\nregard to external objects.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\n\n_Is Scepticism a Sect?_\n\nWe respond in a similar way if we are asked whether                 16\nScepticism is a sect or not. If the word sect is defined as\nmeaning a body of persons who hold dogmas which are in\nconformity with each other, and also with phenomena, and dogma\nmeans an assent to anything that is unknown, then we reply that\nwe have no sect. If, however, one means by sect, a school           17\nwhich follows a certain line of reasoning based on phenomena,\nand that reasoning shows how it is possible to apparently live\nrightly, not understanding \"rightly\" as referring to virtue\nonly, but in a broader sense; if, also, it leads one to be able\nto suspend the judgment, then we reply that we have a sect. For\nwe follow a certain kind of reasoning which is based upon\nphenomena, and which shows us how to live according to the\nhabits, laws, and teachings of the fatherland, and our own\nfeelings.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\n\n\n_Does the Sceptic Study Natural Science?_\n\nWe reply similarly also to the question whether the Sceptic         18\nshould study natural science. For we do not study natural\nscience in order to express ourselves with confidence regarding\nany of the dogmas that it teaches, but we take it up in order to\nbe able to meet every argument by one of equal weight, and also\nfor the sake of [Greek: ataraxia]. In the same way we study the\nlogical and ethical part of so-called philosophy.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\n\n\n_Do the Sceptics deny Phenomena?_\n\nThose who say that the Sceptics deny phenomena appear to me to      19\nbe in ignorance of our teachings. For as we said before, we do\nnot deny the sensations which we think we have, and which lead\nus to assent involuntarily to them, and these are the phenomena.\nWhen, however, we ask whether the object is such as it appears\nto be, while we concede that it appears so and so, we question,\nnot the phenomenon, but in regard to that which is asserted of\nthe phenomenon, and that is different from doubting the\nphenomenon itself. For example, it appears to us that honey is\nsweet. This we concede, for we experience sweetness through         20\nsensation. We doubt, however, whether it is sweet by reason of\nits essence, which is not a question of the phenomenon, but of\nthat which is asserted of the phenomenon. Should we, however,\nargue directly against the phenomena, it is not with the\nintention of denying their existence, but to show the rashness\nof the Dogmatics. For if reasoning is such a deceiver that it\nwell nigh snatches away the phenomena from before your eyes, how\nshould we not distrust it in regard to things that are unknown,\nso as not to rashly follow it?\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\n\n\n_The Criterion of Scepticism._\n\nIt is evident that we pay careful attention to phenomena from       21\nwhat we say about the criterion of the Sceptical School. The\nword criterion is used in two ways. First, it is understood as a\nproof of existence or non-existence, in regard to which we shall\nspeak in the opposing argument. Secondly, when it refers to\naction, meaning the criterion to which we give heed in life, in\ndoing some things and refraining from doing others, and it is\nabout this that we shall now speak. We say, consequently, that\nthe criterion of the Sceptical School is the phenomenon, and in\ncalling it so, we mean the idea of it. It cannot be doubted,        22\nas it is based upon susceptibility and involuntary feeling.\nHence no one doubts, perhaps, that an object appears so and so,\nbut one questions if it is as it appears. Therefore, as we\ncannot be entirely inactive as regards the observances of daily\nlife, we live by giving heed to phenomena, and in an\nunprejudiced way. But this observance of what pertains to the       23\ndaily life, appears to be of four different kinds. Sometimes it\nis directed by the guidance of nature, sometimes by the\nnecessity of the feelings, sometimes by the tradition of laws\nand of customs, and sometimes by the teaching of the arts. It is\ndirected by the guidance of nature, for by nature we are            24\ncapable of sensation and thought; by the necessity of the\nfeelings, for hunger leads us to food, and thirst to drink; by\nthe traditions of laws and customs, for according to them we\nconsider piety a good in daily life, and impiety an evil; by the\nteaching of the arts, for we are not inactive in the arts we\nundertake. We say all these things, however, without expressing\na decided opinion.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\n\n\n_What is the aim of Scepticism?_\n\nIt follows naturally in order to treat of the aim of the            25\nSceptical School. An aim is that for which as an end all things\nare done or thought, itself depending on nothing, or in other\nwords, it is the ultimatum of things to be desired. We say,\nthen, that the aim of the Sceptic is [Greek: ataraxia] in those\nthings which pertain to the opinion, and moderation in the\nthings that life imposes. For as soon as he began to                26\nphilosophise he wished to discriminate between ideas, and to\nunderstand which are true and which are false, in order to\nattain [Greek: ataraxia]. He met, however, with contradictions\nof equal weight, and, being unable to judge, he withheld his\nopinion; and while his judgment was in suspension [Greek:\nataraxia] followed, as if by chance, in regard to matters of\nopinion. For he who is of the opinion that anything is either       27\ngood or bad by nature is always troubled, and when he does not\npossess those things that seem to him good he thinks that he is\ntortured by the things which are by nature bad, and pursues\nthose that he thinks to be good. Having acquired them, however,\nhe falls into greater perturbation, because he is excited beyond\nreason and without measure from fear of a change, and he does\neverything in his power to retain the things that seem to him\ngood. But he who is undecided, on the contrary, regarding           28\nthings that are good and bad by nature, neither seeks nor avoids\nanything eagerly, and is therefore in a state of [Greek:\nataraxia]. For that which is related of Apelles the painter\nhappened to the Sceptic. It is said that as he was once painting\na horse he wished to represent the foam of his mouth in the\npicture, but he could not succeed in doing so, and he gave it up\nand threw the sponge at the picture with which he had wiped the\ncolors from the painting. As soon, however, as it touched the\npicture it produced a good copy of the foam. The Sceptics\nlikewise hoped to gain [Greek: ataraxia] by forming judgments       29\nin regard to the anomaly between phenomena and the things of\nthought, but they were unable to do this, and so they suspended\ntheir judgment; and while their judgment was in suspension\n[Greek: ataraxia] followed, as if by chance, as the shadow\nfollows a body. Nevertheless, we do not consider the Sceptic\nwholly undisturbed, but he is disturbed by some things that are\ninevitable. We confess that sometimes he is cold and thirsty,\nand that he suffers in such ways. But in these things even the\nignorant are beset in two ways, from the feelings themselves,       30\nand not less also from the fact that they think these conditions\nare bad by nature. The Sceptic, however, escapes more easily, as\nhe rejects the opinion that anything is in itself bad by nature.\nTherefore we say that the aim of the Sceptic is [Greek:\nataraxia] in matters of opinion, and moderation of feeling in\nthose things that are inevitable. Some notable Sceptics have\nadded also suspension of judgment in investigation.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\n\n\n_The General Method of Scepticism._\n\nSince we have said that [Greek: ataraxia] follows the suspension    31\nof judgment in regard to everything, it behooves us to\nexplain how the suspension of judgment takes place. Speaking in\ngeneral it takes place through placing things in opposition to\neach other. We either place phenomena in opposition to\nphenomena, or the intellectual in opposition to the\nintellectual, or reciprocally. For example, we place                32\nphenomena in opposition to phenomena when we say that this tower\nappears round from a distance but square near by; the\nintellectual in opposition to the intellectual, when to the one\nwho from the order of the heavens builds a tower of reasoning to\nprove that a providence exists, we oppose the fact that\nadversity often falls to the good and prosperity to the evil,\nand that therefore we draw the conclusion that there is no\nprovidence. The intellectual is placed in opposition to             33\nphenomena, as when Anaxagoras opposed the fact that snow is\nwhite, by saying that snow is frozen water, and, as water is\nblack, snow must also be black. Likewise we sometimes place the\npresent in opposition to the present, similarly to the\nabove-mentioned cases, and sometimes also the present in\nopposition to the past or the future. As for example, when\nsomeone proposes an argument to us that we cannot refute, we say\nto him, \"Before the founder of the sect to which you belong         34\nwas born, the argument which you propose in accordance with it\nhad not appeared as a valid argument, but was dormant in nature,\nso in the same way it is possible that its refutation also\nexists in nature, but has not yet appeared to us, so that it is\nnot at all necessary for us to agree with an argument that now\nseems to be strong.\" In order to make it clearer to us what         35\nwe mean by these oppositions, I will proceed to give the Tropes\n([Greek: tropoi]), through which the suspension of judgment is\nproduced, without asserting anything about their meaning or\ntheir number, because they may be unsound, or there may be more\nthan I shall enumerate.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\n\n\n_The Ten Tropes._\n\nCertain Tropes were commonly handed down by the older Sceptics,     36\nby means of which [Greek: epoche] seems to take place.\nThey are ten in number, and are called synonymously [Greek:\nlogoi] and [Greek: tropoi]. They are these: The first is based\nupon the differences in animals; the second upon the differences\nin men; the third upon the difference in the constitution of the\norgans of sense; the fourth upon circumstances; the fifth upon\nposition, distance, and place; the sixth upon mixtures; the\nseventh upon the quantity and constitution of objects; the\neighth upon relation; the ninth upon frequency or rarity of         37\noccurences; the tenth upon systems, customs, laws, mythical\nbeliefs, and dogmatic opinions. We make this order ourselves.       38\nThese Tropes come under three general heads: the standpoint\nof the judge, the standpoint of the thing judged, and the\nstandpoint of both together. Under the standpoint of the judge\ncome the first four, for the judge is either an animal, or a\nman, or a sense, and exists under certain circumstances. Under\nthe standpoint of that which is judged, come the seventh and the\ntenth. Under the one composed of both together, come the fifth\nand the sixth, the eighth and the ninth. Again, these three\ndivisions are included under the Trope of relation, because         39\nthat is the most general one; it includes the three special\ndivisions, and these in turn include the ten. We say these\nthings in regard to their probable number, and we proceed in the\nfollowing chapter to speak of their meaning.\n\n\nTHE FIRST TROPE.\n\nThe first Trope, we said, is the one based upon the                 40\ndifferences in animals, and according to this Trope, different\nanimals do not get the same ideas of the same objects through\nthe senses. This we conclude from the different origin of the\nanimals, and also from the difference in the constitution of\ntheir bodies. In regard to the difference in origin, some\nanimals originate without mixture of the sexes, while others\noriginate through sexual intercourse. Of those which                41\noriginate without intercourse of the sexes, some come from fire,\nas the little animals which appear in the chimneys, others from\nstagnant water, as musquitoes, others from fermented wine, as\nthe stinging ants, others from the earth, others from the mud,\nlike the frogs, others from slime, as the worms, others from\ndonkeys, as the beetles, others from cabbage, as caterpillars,\nothers from fruit, as the gall insect from the wild figs, others\nfrom putrified animals, as bees from bulls, and wasps from\nhorses. Again, of those originating from intercourse of the         42\nsexes, some come from animals of the same kind, as in most\ncases, and others from those of different kinds, as mules.\nAgain, of animals in general, some are born alive, as men,\nothers from eggs, as birds, and others are born a lump of flesh,\nas bears. It is probable therefore, that the inequalities and       43\ndifferences in origin cause great antipathies in the animals,\nand the result is incompatibility, discord, and conflict between\nthe sensations of the different animals. Again, the differences\nin the principal parts of the body, especially in those             44\nfitted by nature to judge and to perceive, may cause the\ngreatest differences in their ideas of objects, according to the\ndifferences in the animals themselves. As for example, those who\nhave the jaundice call that yellow which appears to us white,\nand those who have bloodshot eyes call it blood-red.\nAccordingly, as some animals have yellow eyes, and others\nblood-shot ones, and still others whitish ones, and others eyes\nof other colors, it is probable, I think, that they have a\ndifferent perception of colors. Furthermore, when we look\nsteadily at the sun for a long time, and then look down at a        45\nbook, the letters seem to us gold colored, and dance around. Now\nsome animals have by nature a lustre in their eyes, and these\nemit a fine and sparkling light so that they see at night, and\nwe may reasonably suppose that external things do not appear the\nsame to them as to us. Jugglers by lightly rubbing the wick         46\nof the lamp with metal rust, or with the dark yellow fluid of\nthe sepia, make those who are present appear now copper-colored\nand now black, according to the amount of the mixture used; if\nthis be so it is much more reasonable to suppose that because of\nthe mixture of different fluids in the eyes of animals, their\nideas of objects would be different. Furthermore, when we           47\npress the eye on the side, the figures, forms and sizes of\nthings seen appear elongated and narrow. It is therefore\nprobable that such animals as have the pupil oblique and long,\nas goats, cats, and similar animals, have ideas different from\nthose of the animals which have a round pupil. Mirrors according\nto their different construction, sometimes show the external        48\nobject smaller than reality, as concave ones, and sometimes long\nand narrow, as the convex ones do; others show the head of the\none looking into it down, and the feet up. As some of the\nvessels around the eye fall entirely outside the eye, on            49\naccount of their protuberance, while others are more sunken, and\nstill others are placed in an even surface, it is probable that\nfor this reason also the ideas vary, and dogs, fishes, lions,\nmen, and grasshoppers do not see the same things, either of the\nsame size, or of similar form, but according to the impression\non the organ of sight of each animal respectively. The same\nthing is true in regard to the other senses; for how can it         50\nbe said that shell-fish, birds of prey, animals covered with\nspines, those with feathers and those with scales would be\naffected in the same way by the sense of touch? and how can the\nsense of hearing perceive alike in animals which have the\nnarrowest auditory passages, and in those that are furnished\nwith the widest, or in those with hairy ears and those with\nsmooth ones? For we, even, hear differently when we partially\nstop up the ears, from what we do when we use them naturally.\nThe sense of smell also varies according to differences in          51\nanimals, since even our sense of smell is affected when we have\ntaken cold and the phlegm is too abundant, and also when parts\naround our head are flooded with too much blood, for we then\navoid odors that seem agreeable to others, and feel as if we\nwere injured by them. Since also some of the animals are moist\nby nature and full of secretions, and others are very full of\nblood, and still others have either yellow or black bile\nprevalent and abundant, it is reasonable because of this to\nthink that odorous things appear different to each one of them.\nAnd it is the same in regard to things of taste, as some            52\nanimals have the tongue rough and dry and others very moist. We\ntoo, when we have a dry tongue in fever, think that whatever we\ntake is gritty, bad tasting, or bitter; and this we experience\nbecause of the varying degrees of the humors that are said to be\nin us. Since, then, different animals have different organs for\ntaste, and a greater or less amount of the various humors, it\ncan well be that they form different ideas of the same objects\nas regards their taste. For just as the same food on being          53\nabsorbed becomes in some places veins, in other places arteries,\nand in other places bones, nerves, or other tissues, showing\ndifferent power according to the difference of the parts\nreceiving it; just as the same water absorbed by the trees\nbecomes in some places bark, in other places branches, and in\nother places fruit, perhaps a fig or a pomegranate, or something\nelse; just as the breath of the musician, one and the same          54\nwhen blown into the flute, becomes sometimes a high tone and\nsometimes a low one, and the same pressure of the hand upon the\nlyre sometimes causes a deep tone and sometimes a high tone, so\nit is natural to suppose that external objects are regarded\ndifferently according to the different constitution of the\nanimals which perceive them. We may see this more clearly in        55\nthe things that are sought for and avoided by animals. For\nexample, myrrh appears very agreeable to men and intolerable to\nbeetles and bees. Oil also, which is useful to men, destroys\nwasps and bees if sprinkled on them; and sea-water, while it is\nunpleasant and poisonous to men if they drink it, is most\nagreeable and sweet to fishes. Swine also prefer to wash in vile\nfilth rather than in pure clean water. Furthermore, some            56\nanimals eat grass and some eat herbs; some live in the woods,\nothers eat seeds; some are carnivorous, and others lactivorous;\nsome enjoy putrified food, and others fresh food; some raw food\nand others that which is prepared by cooking; and in general\nthat which is agreeable to some is disagreeable and fatal to\nothers, and should be avoided by them. Thus hemlock makes the       57\nquail fat, and henbane the hogs, and these, as it is known,\nenjoy eating lizards; deer also eat poisonous animals, and\nswallows, the cantharidae. Moreover, ants and flying ants, when\nswallowed by men, cause discomfort and colic; but the bear, on\nthe contrary, whatever sickness he may have, becomes stronger by\ndevouring them. The viper is benumbed if one twig of the oak        58\ntouches it, as is also the bat by a leaf of the plane-tree. The\nelephant flees before the ram, and the lion before the cock, and\nseals from the rattling of beans that are being pounded, and the\ntiger from the sound of the drum. Many other examples could be\ngiven, but that we may not seem to dwell longer than is\nnecessary on this subject, we conclude by saying that since the\nsame things are pleasant to some and unpleasant to others, and\nthe pleasure and displeasure depend on the ideas, it must be\nthat different animals have different ideas of objects. And\nsince the same things appear different according to the             59\ndifference in the animals, it will be possible for us to say how\nthe external object appears to us, but as to how it is in\nreality we shall suspend our judgment. For we cannot ourselves\njudge between our own ideas and those of other animals, being\nourselves involved in the difference, and therefore much more in\nneed of being judged than being ourselves able to judge. And\nfurthermore, we cannot give the preference to our own mental        60\nrepresentations over those of other animals, either without\nevidence or with evidence, for besides the fact that perhaps\nthere is no evidence, as we shall show, the evidence so called\nwill be either manifest to us or not. If it is not manifest to\nus, then we cannot accept it with conviction; if it is manifest\nto us, since the question is in regard to what is manifest to\nanimals, and we use as evidence that which is manifest to us who\nare animals, then it is to be questioned if it is true as it is\nmanifest to us. It is absurd, however, to try to base the           61\nquestionable on the questionable, because the same thing is to\nbe believed and not to be believed, which is certainly\nimpossible. The evidence is to be believed in so far as it will\nfurnish a proof, and disbelieved in so far as it is itself to be\nproved. We shall therefore have no evidence according to which\nwe can give preference to our own ideas over those of so-called\nirrational animals. Since therefore ideas differ according to\nthe difference in animals, and it is impossible to judge them,\nit is necessary to suspend the judgment in regard to external\nobjects.\n\n\n_Have the So-called Irrational Animals Reason_?\n\nWe continue the comparison of the so-called irrational animals      62\nwith man, although it is needless to do so, for in truth we do\nnot refuse to hold up to ridicule the conceited and bragging\nDogmatics, after having given the practical arguments. Now most     63\nof our number were accustomed to compare all the irrational\nanimals together with man, but because the Dogmatics playing\nupon words say that the comparison is unequal, we carry our\nridicule farther, although it is most superfluous to do so, and\nfix the discussion on one animal, as the dog, if it suits you,\nwhich seems to be the most contemptible animal; for we shall\neven then find that animals, about which we are speaking, are\nnot inferior to us in respect to the trustworthiness of their\nperceptions. Now the Dogmatics grant that this animal is            64\nsuperior to us in sense perception, for he perceives better\nthrough smell than we, as by this sense he tracks wild animals\nthat he cannot see, and he sees them quicker with his eyes than\nwe do, and he perceives them more acutely by hearing. Let us\nalso consider reasoning, which is of two kinds, reasoning in        65\nthought and in speech. Let us look first to that of thought.\nThis kind of reasoning, judging from the teachings of those\nDogmatics who are now our greatest opponents, those of the Stoa,\nseems to fluctuate between the following things: the choice of\nthe familiar, and avoidance of the alien; the knowledge of the\narts that lead to this choice; and the comprehension of those\nvirtues that belong to the individual nature, as regards the\nfeelings. The dog then, upon whom it was decided to fix the\nargument as an example, makes a choice of things suitable to        66\nhim, and avoids those that are harmful, for he hunts for food,\nbut draws back when the whip is lifted up; he possesses also an\nart by which he procures the things that are suitable for him,\nthe art of hunting. He is not also without virtue; since the        67\ntrue nature of justice is to give to every one according to his\nmerit, as the dog wags his tail to those who belong to the\nfamily, and to those who behave well to him, guards them, and\nkeeps off strangers and evil doers, he is surely not without\njustice. Now if he has this virtue, since the virtues follow        68\neach other in turn, he has the other virtues also, which the\nwise men say, most men do not possess. We see the dog also brave\nin warding off attacks, and sagacious, as Homer testified when\nhe represented Odysseus as unrecognised by all in his house, and\nrecognised only by Argos, because the dog was not deceived by\nthe physical change in the man, and had not lost the [Greek:\nphantasia kataleptike] which he proved that he had kept better\nthan the men had. But according to Chrysippus even, who most        69\nattacked the irrational animals, the dog takes a part in the\ndialectic about which so much is said. At any rate, the man\nabove referred to said that the dog follows the fifth of the\nseveral non-apodictic syllogisms, for when he comes to a meeting\nof three roads, after seeking the scent in the two roads,\nthrough which his prey has not passed, he presses forward\nquickly in the third without scenting it. For the dog reasons in\nthis way, potentially said the man of olden time; the animal\npassed through this, or this, or this; it was neither through\nthis nor this, therefore it was through this. The dog also\nunderstands his own sufferings and mitigates them. As soon as       70\na sharp stick is thrust into him, he sets out to remove it, by\nrubbing his foot on the ground, as also with his teeth; and if\never he has a wound anywhere, for the reason that uncleansed\nwounds are difficult to cure, and those that are cleansed are\neasily cured, he gently wipes off the collected matter; and         71\nhe observes the Hippocratic advice exceedingly well, for since\nquiet is a relief for the foot, if he has ever a wound in the\nfoot, he lifts it up, and keeps it undisturbed as much as\npossible. When he is troubled by disturbing humours, he eats\ngrass, with which he vomits up that which was unfitting, and\nrecovers. Since therefore it has been shown that the animal         72\nthat we fixed the argument upon for the sake of an example,\nchooses that which is suitable for him, and avoids what is\nharmful, and that he has an art by which he provides what is\nsuitable, and that he comprehends his own sufferings and\nmitigates them, and that he is not without virtue, things in\nwhich perfection of reasoning in thought consists, so according\nto this it would seem that the dog has reached perfection. It is\nfor this reason, it appears to me, that some philosophers have\nhonoured themselves with the name of this animal. In regard to\nreasoning in speech, it is not necessary at present to bring        73\nthe matter in question. For some of the Dogmatics, even, have\nput this aside, as opposing the acquisition of virtue, for which\nreason they practiced silence when studying. Besides, let it be\nsupposed that a man is dumb, no one would say that he is\nconsequently irrational. However, aside from this, we see after\nall, that animals, about which we are speaking, do produce human\nsounds, as the jay and some others. Aside from this also, even\nif we do not understand the sounds of the so-called irrational      74\nirrational animals, it is not at all unlikely that they\nconverse, and that we do not understand their conversation. For\nwhen we hear the language of foreigners, we do not understand\nbut it all seems like one sound to us. Furthermore, we hear dogs\ngiving out one kind of sound when they are resisting someone,       75\nand another sound when they howl, and another when they are\nbeaten, and a different kind when they wag their tails, and\ngenerally speaking, if one examines into this, he will find a\ngreat difference in the sounds of this and other animals under\ndifferent circumstances; so that in all likelihood, it may be\nsaid that the so-called irrational animals partake also in\nspoken language. If then, they are not inferior to men in the       76\naccuracy of their perceptions, nor in reasoning in thought, nor\nin reasoning by speech, as it is superfluous to say, then they\nare not more untrustworthy than we are, it seems to me, in\nregard to their ideas. Perhaps it would be possible to prove\nthis, should we direct the argument to each of the irrational       77\nanimals in turn. As for example, who would not say that the\nbirds are distinguished for shrewdness, and make use of\narticulate speech? for they not only know the present but the\nfuture, and this they augur to those that are able to understand\nit, audibly as well as in other ways. I have made this\ncomparison superfluously, as I pointed out above, as I think        78\nI had sufficiently shown before, that we cannot consider our own\nideas superior to those of the irrational animals. In short, if\nthe irrational animals are not more untrustworthy than we in\nregard to the judgment of their ideas, and the ideas are\ndifferent according to the difference in the animals, I shall be\nable to say how each object appears to me, but in regard to what\nit is by nature I shall be obliged to suspend my judgment.\n\n\nTHE SECOND TROPE.\n\nSuch is the first Trope of [Greek: epoche]. The second, we said     79\nabove, is based upon the differences in men. For even if one\nassent to the hypothesis that men are more trustworthy than the\nirrational animals, we shall find that doubt arises as soon as\nwe consider our own differences. For since man is said to be\ncomposed of two things, soul and body, we differ from each other\nin respect to both of these things; for example, as regards the\nbody, we differ both in form and personal peculiarities. For the    80\nbody of a Scythian differs from the body of an Indian in\nform, the difference resulting, it is said, from the different\ncontrol of the humors. According to different control of the\nhumors, differences in ideas arise also, as we represented under\nthe first Trope. For this reason there is certainly a great\ndifference among men in the choice and avoidance of external\nthings. The Indians delight in different things from our own\npeople, and the enjoyment of different things is a sign that\ndifferent ideas are received of the external objects. We differ     81\nin personal peculiarities, as some digest beef better than\nthe little fish from rocky places, and some are affected with\npurging by the weak wine of Lesbos. There was, they say, an old\nwoman in Attica who could drink thirty drachmas of hemlock\nwithout danger, and Lysis took four drachmas of opium unhurt,\nand Demophon, Alexander's table waiter, shivered when he was        82\nin the sun or in a hot bath, and felt warm in the shade;\nAthenagoras also, from Argos, did not suffer harm if stung by\nscorpions and venomous spiders; the so-called Psylli were not\ninjured when bitten by snakes or by the aspis, and the\nTentyrites among the Egyptians are not harmed by the crocodiles\naround them; those also of the Ethiopians who live on the           83\nHydaspes river, opposite Meroe, eat scorpions and serpents, and\nsimilar things without danger; Rufinus in Chalcis could drink\nhellebore without vomiting or purging, and he enjoyed and\ndigested it as something to which he was accustomed; Chrysermos,\nthe Herophilian, ran the risk of stomach-ache if he ever took       84\npepper, and Soterichus, the surgeon, was seized by purging if he\nperceived the odor of roasting shad; Andron, the Argive, was so\nfree from thirst that he could travel even through the waterless\nLibya without looking for a drink; Tiberius, the emperor, saw in\nthe dark, and Aristotle tells the story of a certain Thracian,\nwho thought that he saw the figure of a man always going before\nhim as a guide. While therefore such a difference exists in men     85\nin regard to the body, and we must be satisfied with\nreferring to a few only of the many examples given by the\nDogmatics, it is probable that men also differ from each other\nin respect to the soul itself, for the body is a kind of type of\nthe soul, as the physiognomical craft also shows. The best\nexample of the numerous and infinite differences of opinion\namong men is the contradiction in the sayings of the Dogmatics,\nnot only about other things, but about what it is well to seek\nand to avoid. The poets have also fittingly spoken about            86\nthis, for Pindar said--\n\n   \"One delights in getting honors and crowns through\n        storm-footed horses,\n    Another in passing life in rooms rich in gold,\n    Another still, safe travelling enjoys, in a swift ship,\n        on a wave of the sea.\"\n\nAnd the poet says--\n\n   \"One man enjoys this, another enjoys that.\"\n\nThe tragedies also abound in such expressions, for instance,\nit is said--\n\n   \"If to all, the same were good and wise,\n    Quarrels and disputes among men would not have been.\"\n\nAnd again--\n\n   \"It is awful indeed, that the same thing some mortals\n        should please,\n    And by others be hated.\"\n\nSince therefore the choice and the avoidance of things,             87\ndepends on the pleasure and displeasure which they give, and the\npleasure and displeasure have their seat in perception and\nideas, when some choose the things that others avoid, it is\nlogical for us to conclude that they are not acted upon\nsimilarly by the same things, for otherwise they would have\nchosen or avoided alike. Now if the same things act upon\ndifferent men differently, on account of the difference in the\nmen, for this cause also suspension of the judgment may\nreasonably be introduced, and we may perhaps say how each object\nappears to us, and what its individual differences are, but we\nshall not be able to declare what it is as to the nature of its\nessence. For we must either believe all men or some men; but        88\nto believe all is to undertake an impossibility, and to accept\nthings that are in opposition to each other. If we believe some\nonly, let someone tell us with whom to agree, for the Platonist\nwould say with Plato, the Epicurean with Epicurus, and others\nwould advise in a corresponding manner; and so as they disagree,\nwith no one to decide, they bring us round again to the\nsuspension of judgment. Furthermore, he who tells us to agree       89\nwith the majority proposes something childish, as no one could\ngo to all men and find out what pleases the majority, for it is\npossible that in some nations which we do not know the things\nwhich to us are rare are common to the majority, and those\nthings which happen commonly to us are rare. As for example, it\nmight happen that the majority should not suffer when bitten by\nvenomous spiders, or that they should seldom feel pain, or have\nother personal peculiarities similar to those spoken of above.\nIt is necessary therefore to suspend the judgment on account of\nthe differences in men.\n\n\nTHE THIRD TROPE.\n\nWhile, however, the Dogmatics are conceited enough to think         90\nthat they should be preferred to other men in the judgement of\nthings, we know that their claim is absurd, for they themselves\nform a part of the disagreement; and if they give themselves\npreference in this way in the judgment of phenomena, they beg\nthe question before they begin the judgment, as they trust the\njudgment to themselves. Nevertheless, in order that we should       91\nreach the result of the suspension of judgment by limiting\nthe argument to one man, one who for example they deem to be\nwise, let us take up the third Trope. This is the one that is\nbased upon differences in perception. That the perceptions          92\ndiffer from each other is evident. For example, paintings seem\nto have hollows and prominences to the sense of sight, but not\nto the sense of touch, and honey to the tongue of some people\nappears pleasant, but unpleasant to the eyes; therefore it is\nimpossible to say whether it is really pleasant or unpleasant.\nIn regard to myrrh it is the same, for it delights the sense of\nsmell, but disgusts the sense of taste. Also in regard to           93\neuphorbium, since it is harmful to the eyes and harmless to\nall the rest of the body, we are not able to say whether it is\nreally harmless to bodies or not, as far as its own nature is\nconcerned. Rain-water, too, is useful to the eyes, but it makes\nthe trachea and the lungs rough, just as oil does, although it\nsoothes the skin; and the sea-torpedo placed on the extremities\nmakes them numb, but is harmless when placed on the rest of the\nbody. Wherefore we cannot say what each of these things is by\nnature. It is possible only to say how it appears each time. We     94\ncould cite more examples than these, but in order not to\nspend too long in laying out the plan of this book we shall\nsimply say the following: Each of the phenomena perceived by us\nseems to present itself in many forms, as the apple, smooth,\nfragrant, sweet, yellow. Now it is not known whether it has in\nreality only those qualities which appear to us, or if it has\nonly one quality, but appears different on account of the\ndifferent constitution of the sense organs, or if it has more\nqualities than appear to us, but some of them do not affect us.\nThat it has only one quality might be concluded from what we        95\nhave said about the food distributed in bodies, and the water\ndistributed in trees, and the breath in the flute and syrinx,\nand in similar instruments; for it is possible that the apple\nalso has only one quality, but appears different on account of\nthe difference in the sense organs by which it is perceived. On     96\nthe other hand, that the apple has more qualities than those\nthat appear to us, can be argued in this way: Let us imagine\nsomeone born with the sense of touch, of smell, and of taste,\nbut neither hearing nor seeing. He will then assume that neither\nanything visible nor anything audible exists at all, but only\nthe three kinds of qualities which he can apprehend. It is          97\npossible then that as we have only the five senses, we apprehend\nonly those qualities of the apple which we are able to grasp,\nbut it may be supposed that other qualities exist which would\naffect other sense organs if we possessed them; as it is, we do\nnot feel the sensations which would be felt through them. But       98\nnature, one will say, has brought the senses into harmony\nwith the objects to be perceived. What kind of nature? Among the\nDogmatics a great difference of opinion reigns about the real\nexistence of nature anyway; for he who decides whether there is\na nature or not, if he is an uneducated man, would be according\nto them untrustworthy; if he is a philosopher, he is a part of\nthe disagreement, and is himself to be judged, but is not a\njudge. In short, if it is possible that only those qualities        99\nexist in the apple which we seem to perceive, or that more than\nthese are there, or that not even those which we perceive exist,\nit will be unknown to us what kind of a thing the apple is. The\nsame argument holds for other objects of perception. If,\nhowever, the senses do not comprehend the external world, the\nintellect cannot comprehend it either, so that for this reason\nalso it will appear that the suspension of judgment follows in\nregard to external objects.\n\n\nTHE FOURTH TROPE.\n\nIn order to attain to [Greek: epoche] by fixing the argument on    100\neach separate sense, or even by putting aside the senses\naltogether, we take up the fourth Trope of [Greek: epoche]. This\nis the one based upon circumstances, and by circumstances we\nmean conditions. This Trope comes under consideration, we may\nsay, with regard to conditions that are according to nature, or\ncontrary to nature; such as waking or sleeping, the age of life,\nmoving or keeping still, hating or loving, need or satiety,\ndrunkenness or sobriety, predispositions, being courageous or\nafraid, sorrowing or rejoicing. For example, things appear         101\ndifferent as they are according to nature, or contrary to it; as\nfor instance, the insane and those inspired by a god, think that\nthey hear gods, while we do not; in like manner they often say\nthat they perceive the odor of storax or frankincense, or the\nlike, and many other things which we do not perceive. Water,\nalso, that seems lukewarm to us, if poured over places that are\ninflamed, will feel hot, and a garment that appears\norange-coloured to those that have blood-shot eyes, would not\nlook so to me, and the same honey appears sweet to me, but\nbitter to those who have the jaundice. If one should say           102\nthat those who are not in a natural state have unusual ideas of\nobjects, because of the intermingling of certain humors, then\none must also say, that it may be that objects which are really\nwhat they seem to be to those who are in an unnatural condition,\nappear different to those who are in health, for even those who\nare in health have humors that are mixed with each other. For to   103\ngive to one kind of fluid a power to change objects, and not\nto another kind, is a fiction of the mind; for just as those who\nare in health are in a condition that is natural to those who\nare in health, and contrary to the nature of those who are not\nin health, so also those who are not in health, are in a\ncondition contrary to the nature of those in health, but natural\nto those not in health, and we must therefore believe that they\nalso are in some respect in a natural condition. Furthermore,      104\nin sleep or in waking, the ideas are different, because we\ndo not see things in the same way when we are awake as we do in\nsleep; neither do we see them in the same way in sleep as we do\nwhen awake, so that the existence or non-existence of these\nthings is not absolute, but relative, that is in relation to a\nsleeping or waking condition. It is therefore probable that we\nsee those things in sleep which in a waking condition do not\nexist, but they are not altogether non-existent, for they exist\nin sleep, just as those things which exist when we are awake,\nexist, although they do not exist in sleep. Furthermore, things    105\npresent themselves differently according to the age of life,\nfor the same air seems cold to the aged, but temperate to those\nin their prime, and the same color appears dim to those who are\nold, and bright to those in their prime, and likewise the same\ntone seems faint to the former, and audible to the latter.\nPeople in different ages are also differently disposed             106\ntowards things to be chosen or avoided; children, for example,\nare very fond of balls and hoops, while those in their prime\nprefer other things, and the old still others, from which it\nfollows that the ideas in regard to the same objects differ in\ndifferent periods of life. Furthermore, things appear different    107\nin a condition of motion and rest, since that which we see at\nrest when we are still, seems to move when we are sailing\nby it. There are also differences which depend on liking or        108\ndisliking, as some detest swine flesh exceedingly, but others\neat it with pleasure. As Menander said--\n\n      \"O how his face appears\n       Since he became such a man! What a creature!\n       Doing no injustice would make us also beautiful.\"\n\nMany also that love ugly women consider them very beautiful\nFurthermore, there are differences which depend on hunger or       109\nsatiety, as the same food seems agreeable to those who are\nhungry, and disagreeable to those who are satisfied. There are\nalso differences depending on drunkenness and sobriety, as that\nwhich we consider ugly when we are sober does not appear ugly to\nus when we are drunk. Again, there are differences depending       110\non predispositions, as the same wine appears sourish to those\nwho have previously eaten dates or dried figs, but agreeable to\nthose who have taken nuts or chickpeas; the vestibule of the\nbath warms those who enter from without, but cools those who go\nout, if they rest in it. Furthermore, there are differences        111\ndepending on being afraid or courageous, as the same thing\nseems fearful and terrible to the coward, but in no wise so to\nhim who is brave. There are differences, also, depending on\nbeing sad or joyful, as the same things are unpleasant to the\nsad, but pleasant to the joyful. Since therefore the               112\nanomalies depending on conditions are so great, and since men\nare in different conditions at different times, it is perhaps\neasy to say how each object appears to each man, but not so of\nwhat kind it is, because the anomaly is not of a kind to be\njudged. For he who would pass judgment upon this is either in\nsome one of the conditions mentioned above, or is in absolutely\nno condition whatever; but to say that he is in no condition at\nall, as, for example, that he is neither in health nor in\nillness, that he is neither moving nor quiet, that he is not of\nany age, and also that he is free from the other conditions, is\nwholly absurd. But if he judges the ideas while he is in any       113\ncondition whatever, he is a part of the contradiction, and,\nbesides, he is no genuine critic of external objects, because he\nis confused by the condition in which he finds himself.\nTherefore neither can the one who is awake compare the ideas of\nthose who are asleep with those who are awake, nor can he who is\nin health compare the ideas of the sick with those of the well;\nfor we believe more in the things that are present, and\naffecting us at present, than in the things not present. In        114\nanother way, the anomaly in such ideas is impossible to be\njudged, for whoever prefers one idea to another, and one\ncondition to another, does this either without a criterion and a\nproof, or with a criterion and a proof; but he can do this\nneither without them, for he would then be untrustworthy, nor\nwith them; for if he judges ideas, he judges them wholly by a\ncriterion, and he will say that this criterion is either true or\nfalse. But if it is false, he will be untrustworthy; if, on        115\nthe contrary, he says that it is true, he will say that the\ncriterion is true either without proof or with proof. If without\nproof, he will be untrustworthy; if he says that it is true with\nproof, it is certainly necessary that the proof be true, or he\nwill be untrustworthy. Now will he say that the proof which he\nhas accepted for the accrediting of the criterion is true,\nhaving judged it, or without having judged it? If he says so       116\nwithout judging it, he will be untrustworthy; if he has judged\nit, it is evident that he will say that he has judged according\nto some criterion, and we must seek a proof for this criterion,\nand for that proof a criterion. For the proof always needs a\ncriterion to establish it, and the criterion needs a proof that\nit may be shown to be true; and a proof can neither be sound\nwithout a pre-existing criterion that is true, nor a criterion\ntrue without a proof that is shown beforehand to be trustworthy.\nAnd so both the criterion and the proof are thrown into the        117\n_circulus in probando_, by which it is found that they are both\nof them untrustworthy, for as each looks for proof from the\nother, each is as untrustworthy as the other. Since then one\ncannot prefer one idea to another, either without a proof and a\ncriterion or with them, the ideas that differ according to\ndifferent conditions cannot be judged, so that the suspension of\njudgment in regard to the nature of external objects follows\nthrough this Trope also.\n\n\nTHE FIFTH TROPE.\n\nThe fifth Trope is that based upon position, distance, and         118\nplace, for, according to each of these, the same things appear\ndifferent, as for example, the same arcade seen from either end\nappears curtailed, but from the middle it looks symmetrical on\nevery side; and the same ship appears small and motionless from\nafar, and large and in motion near by, and the same tower\nappears round from a distance, but square near by. So much for\ndistance. Now in reference to place, we say that the light         119\nof the lamp appears dim in the sun, but bright in the dark; and\nthe same rudder appears broken in the sea, but straight out of\nit; and the egg in the bird is soft, but in the air hard; and\nthe lyngurion is a fluid in the lynx, but is hard in the air;\nand the coral is soft in the sea, but hard in the air; and a\ntone of voice appears different produced by a syrinx, and by a\nflute, and different simply in the air. Also in reference to       120\nposition, the same picture leaned back appears smooth, and\nleaned forward a little seems to have hollows and protuberances,\nand the necks of doves appear different in color according to\nthe difference in inclination. Since then all phenomena are        121\nseen in relation to place, distance, and position, each of which\nrelation makes a great difference with the idea, as we have\nmentioned, we shall be obliged by this Trope also to come to the\nsuspension of judgment. For he who wishes to give preference to\ncertain ones of these ideas will attempt the impossible. For if    122\nhe simply makes the decision without proof he will be\nuntrustworthy. If, however, he wishes to make use of a proof,\nshould he say that the proof is false, he contradicts himself,\nbut if he declares the proof to be true, proof of its proof will\nbe demanded of him, and another proof for that, which proof also\nmust be true, and so on to the _regressus in infinitum_. It is\nimpossible, however, to present proofs _in infinitum_, so          123\nthat one will not be able to prove that one idea is to be\npreferred to another. Since then one cannot either without proof\nor with proof judge the ideas in question, the suspension of\njudgment results, and how each thing appears according to this\nor that position, or this or that distance, or this or that\nplace, we perhaps are able to say, but what it really is it is\nimpossible to declare, for the reasons which we have mentioned.\n\n\nTHE SIXTH TROPE.\n\nThe sixth Trope is the one based upon mixtures, according to       124\nwhich we conclude that since no object presents itself alone,\nbut always together with something else, it is perhaps possible\nto say of what nature the mixture is, of the thing itself, and\nof that with which it is seen, but of what sort the external\nobject really is we shall not be able to say. Now it is evident,\nI think, that nothing from without is known to us by itself, but\nalways with something else, and that because of this fact it\nappears different. The color of our skin, for example, is          125\ndifferent seen in warm air from what it is in cold, and we\ncould not say what our color really is, only what it is when\nviewed under each of these conditions. The same sound appears\ndifferent in rare air from what it is in dense, and aromas are\nmore overpowering in the warm bath and in the sun than they are\nin the cold air, and a body surrounded by water is light, but by\nair heavy. Leaving aside, however, outer mixtures, our eyes        126\nhave inside of them coatings and humors. Since then visible\nthings are not seen without these, they will not be accurately\ncomprehended, for it is the mixture that we perceive, and for\nthis reason those who have the jaundice see everything yellow,\nand those with bloodshot eyes bloody. Since the same sound\nappears different in broad open places from what it does in\nnarrow and winding ones, and different in pure air and in\nimpure, it is probable that we do not perceive the tones\nunmixed; for the ears have narrow winding passages filled with\nvaporous secretions, which it is said gather from places around\nthe head. Since also there are substances present in the           127\nnostrils and in the seat of the sense of taste, we perceive the\nthings smelled and the things tasted in connection with them,\nand not unmixed. So that because of mixture the senses do not\nperceive accurately what the external objects are. The intellect   128\neven does not do this, chiefly because its guides, the\nsenses, make mistakes, and perhaps it itself adds a certain\nspecial mixture to those messages communicated by the senses;\nfor in each place where the Dogmatics think that the ruling\nfaculty is situated, we see that certain humors are present,\nwhether one would locate it in the region of the brain, in the\nregion of the heart, or somewhere else. Since therefore\naccording to this Trope also, we see that we cannot say anything\nregarding the nature of external objects, we are obliged to\nsuspend our judgment.\n\n\nTHE SEVENTH TROPE.\n\nThe seventh Trope is the one which, as we said, is based           129\nupon the quantity and constitution of objects, constitution\ncommonly meaning composition. And it is evident that we are\nobliged to suspend our judgment according to this Trope also in\nregard to the nature of things. As for example, filings from the\nhorn of the goat appear white when they are seen separately and\nwithout being put together; put together, however, in the form\nof a horn, they look black. And the parts of silver, the filings\nthat is, by themselves appear black, but as a whole appear\nwhite; and parts of the Taenarus stone look white when ground,\nbut in the whole stone appear yellow; grains of sand               130\nscattered apart from each other appear to be rough, but put\ntogether in a heap, they produce a soft feeling; hellebore taken\nfine and downy, causes choking, but it no longer does so when\ntaken coarse; wine also taken moderately strengthens us, but       131\nwhen taken in excess relaxes the body; food similarly, has a\ndifferent effect according to the quantity, at least, it often\ndisturbs the body when too much is taken, causing dyspepsia and\ndischarge. We shall be able here also to say of what kind          132\nthe cutting from the horn is, and what many cuttings put\ntogether are, of what kind a filing of silver is, and what many\nof them put together are, of what kind the tiny Taenarus stone,\nand what one composed of many small ones is, and in regard to\nthe grains of sand, and the hellebore, and the wine, and the\nfood, what they are in relation, but no longer the nature of the\nthing by itself, because of the anomaly in the ideas which we\nhave of things, according to the way in which they are put\ntogether. In general it appears that useful things become          133\nharmful when an intemperate use is made of them, and things that\nseem harmful when taken in excess, are not injurious in a small\nquantity. What we see in the effect of medicines witnesses\nespecially to this fact, as an exact mixture of simple remedies\nmakes a compound which is helpful, but sometimes when a very\nsmall inclination of the balance is overlooked, the medicine is\nnot only not helpful, but very harmful, and often poisonous. So    134\nthe argument based upon the quantity and constitution of\nobjects, puts in confusion the existence of external objects.\nTherefore this Trope naturally leads us to suspend our judgment,\nas we are not able to declare exactly the nature of external\nobjects.\n\n\nTHE EIGHTH TROPE.\n\nThe eighth Trope is the one based upon relation, from which        135\nwe conclude to suspend our judgment as to what things are\nabsolutely, in their nature, since every thing is in relation to\nsomething else. And we must bear in mind that we use the word\n_is_ incorrectly, in place of _appears_, meaning to say, every\nthing _appears_ to be in relation. This is said, however, with\ntwo meanings: first, that every thing is in relation to the one\nwho judges, for the external object, _i.e._ the thing judged,\nappears to be in relation to the judge; the other way is that\nevery thing is in relation to the things considered together\nwith it, as the relation of the right hand to the left. But we     136\ncame to the conclusion above, that every thing is in relation\nto something, as for example, to the one judging; each thing\nappears in relation to this or that animal, and this or that\nman, and this or that sense, and in certain circumstances;\nas regards things considered together, also, each thing appears\nin relation to this or that mixture, and this or that Trope, and\nthis or that composition, quantity and place. And in another way\nit is possible to conclude that every thing is in relation         137\nto something, as follows: does the being in difference differ\nfrom the being in relation, or not? If it does not differ, then\nit is the same as relation; if it does differ, since every thing\nwhich differs is in some relation, for it is said to be in\nrelation to that from which it differs, those things which are\nin a difference are in a relation to something. Now according      138\nto the Dogmatics, some beings belong to the highest genera,\nothers to the lowest species, and others to both genera\nand species at the same time; all of these are in relation to\nsomething, therefore every thing is in relation to something.\nFurthermore, among things, some things are manifest, and others\nare hidden, as the Dogmatics themselves say, and the things that\nmake themselves known to us are the phenomena, and the things\nthat are made known to us by the phenomena are the hidden\nthings, for according to the Dogmatics, the phenomena are the\noutward appearance of the unknown; then that which makes known,\nand that which is made known, are in relation to something;\nevery thing, therefore, is in relation to something. In            139\naddition to this, some things are similar to each other, and\nothers are dissimilar, some are equal, and others are unequal.\nNow these things are in relation to something, therefore every\nthing is in relation to something, and whoever says that every\nthing is not in relation to something, himself establishes the\nfact that every thing is in relation to something, for even in\nsaying that every thing is not in relation to something, he        140\nproves it in reference to us, and not in general, by his\nobjections to us. In short, as we have shown that every thing is\nin relation to something, it is then evident that we shall not\nbe able to say exactly what each object is by nature, but what\nit appears to be like in relation to something else. It follows\nfrom this, that we must suspend our judgment regarding the\nnature of things.\n\n\nTHE NINTH TROPE.\n\nIn regard to the Trope based on the frequency and rarity of        141\nevents, which we call the ninth of the series, we give the\nfollowing explanation: The sun is certainly a much more\nastonishing thing than a comet, but because we see the sun\ncontinually and the comet rarely we are so much astonished at\nthe comet that it even seems an omen, while we are not at all\nastonished at the sun. If, however, we should imagine the sun\nappearing at rare intervals, and at rare intervals setting, in\nthe first instance suddenly lighting up all things, and in the\nsecond casting everything into shade, we should see great\nastonishment at the sight. An earthquake, too, does not trouble    142\nthose who experience it for the first time in the same manner\nas those who have become accustomed to it. How great the\nastonishment of a man who beholds the sea for the first time!\nAnd the beauty of the human body, seen suddenly for the first\ntime, moves us more than if we are accustomed to seeing it. That\nwhich is rare seems valuable, while things that are familiar       143\nand easily obtained seem by no means so. If, for example, we\nshould imagine water as rare, of how much greater value would it\nseem than all other valuable things! or if we imagine gold as\nsimply thrown about on the ground in large quantities like\nstones, to whom do we think it would be valuable, or by whom\nwould it be hoarded, as it is now? Since then the same things\naccording to the frequency or rarity that they are met with seem\nto be now valuable and now not so, we conclude that it may be\nthat we shall be able to say what kind of a thing each of          144\nthem appears to be according to the frequency or rarity with\nwhich it occurs, but we are not able to say what each external\nobject is absolutely. Therefore, according to this Trope also,\nwe suspend our judgment regarding these things.\n\n\nTHE TENTH TROPE.\n\nThe tenth Trope is the one principally connected with              145\nmorals, relating to schools, customs, laws, mythical beliefs,\nand dogmatic opinions. Now a school is a choice of a manner of\nlife, or of something held by one or many, as for example the\nschool of Diogenes or the Laconians. A law is a written            146\ncontract among citizens, the transgressor of which is punished.\nA custom or habit, for there is no difference, is a common\nacceptance of a certain thing by many, the deviator from which\nis in no wise punished. For example, it is a law not to commit\nadultery, and it is a custom with us [Greek: to me demosia\ngynaiki mignusthai]. A mythical belief is a tradition              147\nregarding things which never took place, but were invented, as\namong others, the tales about Cronus, for many are led to\nbelieve them. A dogmatic opinion is the acceptance of something\nthat seems to be established by a course of reasoning, or by\nsome proof, as for example, that atoms are elements of things,\nand that they are either homogeneous, or infinitesimal, or of\nsome other description. Now we place each of these things\nsometimes in opposition to itself, and sometimes in opposition\nto each one of the others. For example, we place a custom in       148\nopposition to a custom thus: some of the Ethiopians tattoo\nnew-born children, but we do not, and the Persians think it is\nseemly to have a garment of many colors and reaching to the\nfeet, but we think it not so. The Indians [Greek: tais gynaixi\ndeomosia mignyntai] but most of the other nations consider it a\nshame. We place a law in opposition to a law in this way:          149\namong the Romans he who renounces his paternal inheritance does\nnot pay his father's debts, but among the Rhodians he pays them\nin any case; and among the Tauri in Scythia it was a law to\noffer strangers in sacrifice to Artemis, but with us it is\nforbidden to kill a man near a temple. We place a school in        150\nopposition to a school when we oppose the school of Diogenes to\nthat of Aristippus, or that of the Laconians to that of the\nItalians. We place a mythical belief in opposition to a mythical\nbelief, as by some traditions Jupiter is said to be the father\nof men and gods, and by others Oceanus, as we say--\n\n   \"Oceanus father of the gods, and Tethys the mother.\"\n\nWe place dogmatic opinions in opposition to each other, when       151\nwe say that some declare that there is only one element, but\nothers that they are infinite in number, and some that the soul\nis mortal, others that it is immortal; and some say that our\naffairs are directed by the providence of the gods, but others\nthat there is no providence. We place custom in opposition         152\nto other things, as for example to a law, when we say that among\nthe Persians it is the custom to practice [Greek: arrenomixiai],\nbut among the Romans it is forbidden by law to do it; by us\nadultery is forbidden, but among the Massagetae indifference in\nthis respect is allowed by custom, as Eudoxos of Cnidus relates\nin the first part of his book of travels; among us it is\nforbidden [Greek: metrasi mignusthai], but among the Persians it\nis the custom by preference to marry so; the Egyptians marry\nsisters also, which among us is forbidden by law. Further,         153\nwe place a custom in opposition to a school, when we say that\nmost men [Greek: anachorountes mignuontai tais heauton gunaixin,\nho de Krates te Hipparchia demosia], and Diogenes went around\nwith one shoulder bare, but we go around with our customary\nclothes. We place a custom in opposition to a mythical             154\nbelief, as when the myths say that Cronus ate his own children,\nwhile with us it is the custom to take care of our children; and\namong us it is the custom to venerate the gods as good, and not\nliable to evil, but they are described by the poets as being\nwounded, and also as being jealous of each other. We place a\ncustom in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when we say that        155\nit is a custom with us to seek good things from the gods, but\nthat Epicurus says that the divine pays no heed to us;\nAristippus also held it to be a matter of indifference to wear a\nwoman's robe, but we consider it shameful. We place a school in\nopposition to a law, as according to the law it is not allowed     156\nto beat a free and noble born man, but the wrestlers and\nboxers strike each other according to the teaching of their\nmanner of life, and although murder is forbidden, the gladiators\nkill each other for the same reason. We place a mythical           157\nbelief in opposition to a school when we say that, although the\nmyths say of Hercules that in company with Omphale--\n\n      \"He carded wool, and bore servitude,\"\n\nand did things that not even an ordinary good man would have\ndone, yet Hercules' theory of life was noble. We place a           158\nmythical belief in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when we\nsay that athletes seeking after glory as a good, enter for its\nsake upon a laborious profession, but many philosophers, on the\nother hand, teach that glory is worthless. We place law in\nopposition to mythical belief when we say the poets                159\nrepresent the gods as working adultery and sin, but among us the\nlaw forbids those things. We place law in opposition to dogmatic\nopinion when we say that the followers of Chrysippus hold          160\nthat it is a matter of indifference to marry one's mother or\nsister, but the law forbids these things. We place a mythical\nbelief in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when we say that        161\nthe poets represent Jupiter as descending and holding\nintercourse with mortal women, but the Dogmatics think this was\nimpossible; also that the poet says that Jupiter, on account       162\nof his sorrow for Sarpedon, rained drops of blood upon the\nearth, but it is a dogma of the philosophers that the divine is\nexempt from suffering; and they deny the myth of the\nhorse-centaurs, giving us the horse-centaur as an example of\nnon-existence. Now we could give many other examples of each       163\nof the antitheses mentioned above, but for a brief argument,\nthese are sufficient. Since, however, such anomaly of things is\nshown by this Trope also, we shall not be able to say what\nobjects are by nature, but only what each thing appears to be\nlike, according to this or that school, or this or that law, or\nthis or that custom, or according to each of the other\nconditions. Therefore, by this Trope also, we must suspend our\njudgment in regard to the nature of external objects. Thus we\narrive at [Greek: epoche] through the ten Tropes.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\n\n\n_The Five Tropes._\n\nThe later Sceptics, however, teach the following five Tropes       164\nof [Greek: epoche]: first, the one based upon contradiction;\nsecond, the _regressus in infinitum_; third, relation; fourth,\nthe hypothetical; fifth, the _circulus in probando_. The one       165\nbased upon contradiction is the one from which we find, that in\nreference to the thing put before us for investigation, a\nposition has been developed which is impossible to be judged,\neither practically, or theoretically, and therefore, as we are\nnot able to either accept or reject anything, we end in\nsuspending the judgment. The one based upon the _regressus         166\nin infinitum_ is that in which we say that the proof brought\nforward for the thing set before us calls for another proof, and\nthat one another, and so on to infinity, so that, not having\nanything from which to begin the reasoning, the suspension of\njudgment follows. The one based upon relation, as we have          167\nsaid before, is that one in which the object appears of this\nkind or that kind, as related to the judge and to the things\nregarded together with it, but we suspend our judgment as to\nwhat it is in reality. The one based upon hypothesis is            168\nillustrated by the Dogmatics, when in the _regressus in\ninfinitum_ they begin from something that they do not found on\nreason, but which they simply take for granted without proof.\nThe Trope, _circulus in probando_, arises when the thing           169\nwhich ought to prove the thing sought for, needs to be sustained\nby the thing sought for, and as we are unable to take the one\nfor the proof of the other, we suspend our judgment in regard to\nboth. Now we shall briefly show that it is possible to refer\nevery thing under investigation to one or another of these\nTropes, as follows: the thing before us is either sensible or\nintellectual; difference of opinion exists, however, as to what\nit is in itself, for some say that only the things of sense        170\nare true, others, only those belonging to the understanding, and\nothers say that some things of sense, and some of thought, are\ntrue. Now, will it be said that this difference of opinion can\nbe judged or cannot be judged? If it cannot be judged, then we\nhave the result necessarily of suspension of judgment, because\nit is impossible to express opinion in regard to things about\nwhich a difference of opinion exists which cannot be judged. If\nit can be judged, then we ask how it is to be judged? For          171\nexample, the sensible, for we shall limit the argument first to\nthis--Is it to be judged by sensible or by intellectual\nstandards? For if it is to be judged by a sensible one, since we\nare in doubt about the sensible, that will also need something\nelse to sustain it; and if that proof is also something\nsensible, something else will again be necessary to prove it,\nand so on _in infinitum_. If, on the contrary, the sensible must\nbe judged by something intellectual, as there is disagreement      172\nin regard to the intellectual, this intellectual thing will\nrequire also judgment and proof. Now, how is it to be proved?\nIf by something intellectual, it will likewise be thrown\ninto _infinitum_; if by something sensible, as the intellectual\nhas been taken for the proof of the sensible, and the sensible\nhas been taken for that of the intellectual, the _circulus in\nprobando_ is introduced. If, however, in order to escape           173\nfrom this, the one who is speaking to us expects us to take\nsomething for granted which has not been proved, in order to\nprove what follows, the hypothetical Trope is introduced, which\nprovides no way of escape. For if the one who makes the\nhypothesis is worthy of confidence, we should in every case be\nno less worthy of confidence in making a contrary hypothesis. If\nthe one who makes the assumption assumes something true, he\nmakes it suspicious by using it as a hypothesis, and not as an\nestablished fact; if it is false, the foundation of the\nreasoning is unsound. If a hypothesis is any help towards a        174\ntrustworthy result, let the thing in question itself be assumed,\nand not something else, by which, forsooth, one would establish\nthe thing under discussion. If it is absurd to assume the thing\nquestioned, it is also absurd to assume that upon which it\nrests. That all things belonging to the senses are also in         175\nrelation to something else is evident, because they are in\nrelation to those who perceive them. It is clear then, that\nwhatever thing of sense is brought before us, it may be easily\nreferred to one of the five Tropes. And we come to a similar\nconclusion in regard to intellectual things. For if it should be\nsaid that there is a difference of opinion regarding them which\ncannot be judged, it will be granted that we must suspend the\njudgment concerning it. In case the difference of opinion          176\ncan be judged, if it is judged through anything intellectual, we\nfall into the _regressus in infinitum_, and if through anything\nsensible into the _circulus in probando_; for, as the sensible\nis again subject to difference of opinion, and cannot be judged\nby the sensible on account of the _regressus in infinitum_, it\nwill have need of the intellectual, just as the intellectual has\nneed of the sensible. But he who accepts anything which is\nhypothetical again is absurd. Intellectual things stand also       177\nin relation, because the form in which they are expressed\ndepends on the mind of the thinker, and, if they were in reality\nexactly as they are described, there would not have been any\ndifference of opinion about them. Therefore the intellectual\nalso is brought under the five Tropes, and consequently it is\nnecessary to suspend the judgment altogether with regard to\nevery thing that is brought before us. Such are the five Tropes\ntaught by the later Sceptics. They set them forth, not to throw\nout the ten Tropes, but in order to put to shame the audacity of\nthe Dogmatics in a variety of ways, by these Tropes as well as\nby those.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\n\n\n_The Two Tropes._\n\nTwo other Tropes of [Greek: epoche] are also taught. For as it     178\nappears that everything that is comprehended is either\ncomprehended through itself or through something else, it is\nthought that this fact introduces doubt in regard to all things.\nAnd that nothing can be understood through itself is evident, it\nis said, from the disagreement which exists altogether among the\nphysicists in regard to sensible and intellectual things. I\nmean, of course, a disagreement which cannot be judged, as we\nare not able to use a sensible or an intellectual criterion in\njudging it, for everything that we would take has a part in the\ndisagreement, and is untrustworthy. Nor is it conceded that\nanything can be comprehended through something else; for if        179\na thing is comprehended through something, that must always in\nturn be comprehended through something else, and the _regressus\nin infinitum_ or the _circulus in probando_ follow. If, on the\ncontrary, a thing is comprehended through something that one\nwishes to use as if it had been comprehended through itself,\nthis is opposed to the fact that nothing can be comprehended\nthrough itself, according to what we have said. We do not know\nhow that which contradicts itself can be comprehended, either\nthrough itself or through something else, as no criterion of the\ntruth or of comprehension appears, and signs without proof would\nbe rejected, as we shall see in the next book. So much will\nsuffice for the present about suspension of judgment.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII.\n\n\n_What are the Tropes for the overturning of Aetiology?_\n\nIn the same manner as we teach the Tropes of [Greek: epoche],      180\nsome set forth Tropes through which we oppose the Dogmatics,\nby expressing doubt in regard to the aetiology of which they are\nespecially proud. So Aenesidemus teaches eight Tropes, by which\nhe thinks that he can prove all the dogmatic aetiology useless.\nThe first of these Tropes, he said, relates to the character       181\nof aetiology in general, which does not give incontestable\ntestimony in regard to phenomena, because it treats of unseen\nthings. The second Trope states that although abundant resources\nexist by which to investigate the cause of a thing in question,\nsome Dogmatics investigate it in one way only. The third Trope     182\nstates that the Dogmatics assign causes which do not show\nany order for things which have taken place in an orderly\nmanner. The fourth Trope states that the Dogmatics, accepting\nphenomena as they take place, think that they also understand\nhow unseen things take place, although perhaps the unseen things\nhave taken place in the same way as the phenomena, and perhaps\nin some other way peculiar to themselves. The fifth Trope states   183\nthat they all, so to speak, assign causes according to their\nown hypotheses about the elements, but not according to any\ncommonly accepted methods. The sixth states that they often\nexplain things investigated according to their own hypotheses,\nbut ignore opposing hypotheses which have equal probability. The\nseventh states that they often give reasons for things that        184\nnot only conflict with phenomena, but also with their own\nhypotheses. The eighth states that although that which seems\nmanifest, and that which is to be investigated, are often\nequally inscrutable, they build up a theory from the one about\nthe other, although both are equally inscrutable. It is not\nimpossible, Aenesidemus said also, that some Dogmatics             185\nshould fail in their theories of causality from other\ncombinations of reasons deducible from the Tropes given above.\nPerhaps also the five Tropes of [Greek: epoche] are sufficient\nto refute aetiology, for he who proposes a cause will propose\none which is either in harmony with all the sects of philosophy,\nwith Scepticism, and with phenomena, or one that is not.\nPerhaps, however, it is not possible that a cause should be in\nharmony with them, for phenomena and unknown things altogether\ndisagree with each other. If it is not in harmony with them, the\nreason of this will also be demanded of the one who proposed       186\nit; and if he accepts a phenomenon as the cause of a phenomenon,\nor something unknown as the cause of the unknown, he will be\nthrown into the _regressus in infinitum_; if he uses one cause\nto account for another one, into the _circulus in probando_; but\nif he stops anywhere, he will either say that the cause that he\nproposes holds good so far as regards the things that have been\nsaid, and introduce relation, abolishing an absolute standpoint;\nor if he accepts anything by hypothesis, he will be attacked by\nus. Therefore it is perhaps possible to put the temerity of the\nDogmatics to shame in aetiology by these Tropes.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII.\n\n\n_The Sceptical Formulae._\n\nWhen we use any one of these Tropes, or the Tropes of              187\n[Greek: epoche], we employ with them certain formulae which show\nthe Sceptical method and our own feeling, as for instance, the\nsayings, \"No more,\" \"One must determine nothing,\" and certain\nothers. It is fitting therefore to treat of these in this place.\nLet us begin with \"No more.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX.\n\n\n_The Formula \"No more.\"_\n\nWe sometimes express this as I have given it, and sometimes        188\nthus, \"Nothing more.\" For we do not accept the \"No more,\" as\nsome understand it, for the examination of the special, and\n\"Nothing more\" for that of the general, but we use \"No more\" and\n\"Nothing more\" without any difference, and we shall at present\ntreat of them as one and the same expression. Now this formula\nis defective, for as when we say a double one we really mean a\ndouble garment, and when we say a broad one we really mean a\nbroad road; so when we say \"No more\" we mean really no more than\nthis, or in every way the same. But some of the Sceptics use       189\ninstead of the interrogation \"No?\" the interrogation \"What, this\nrather than this?\" using the word \"what\" in the sense of \"what\nis the reason,\" so that the formula means, \"What is the reason\nfor this rather than for this?\" It is a customary thing,\nhowever, to use an interrogation instead of a statement, as \"Who\nof the mortals does not know the wife of Jupiter?\" and also to\nuse a statement instead of an interrogation, as \"I seek where\nDion dwells,\" and \"I ask why one should admire a poet.\" The word\n\"what\" is also used instead of \"what for\" by Menander--\"(For)\nwhat did I remain behind?\" The formula \"Not more this than this\"\nexpresses our own condition of mind, and signifies that            190\nbecause of the equality of the things that are opposed to each\nother we finally attain to a state of equilibrium of soul. We\nmean by equality that equality which appears to us as probable,\nby things placed in opposition to each other we mean simply\nthings which conflict with each other, and by a state of\nequilibrium we mean a state in which we do not assent to one\nthing more than to another. Even if the formula \"Nothing           191\nmore\" seems to express assent or denial, we do not use it so,\nbut we use it loosely, and not with accuracy, either instead of\nan interrogation or instead of saying, \"I do not know to which\nof these I would assent, and to which I would not.\" What lies\nbefore us is to express what appears to us, but we are\nindifferent to the words by which we express it. This must be\nunderstood, however, that we use the formula \"Nothing more\"\nwithout affirming in regard to it that it is wholly sure and\ntrue, but we present it as it appears to us.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX.\n\n\n_Aphasia._\n\nWe explain Aphasia as follows: The word [Greek: phasis] is used    192\nin two ways, having a general and a special signification.\nAccording to the general signification, it expresses affirmation\nor negation, as \"It is day\" or \"It is not day\"; according to the\nspecial signification, it expresses an affirmation only, and\nnegations are not called [Greek: phaseis]. Now Aphasia is the\nopposite of [Greek: phasis] in its general signification, which,\nas we said, comprises both affirmation and negation. It follows\nthat Aphasia is a condition of mind, according to which we say\nthat we neither affirm nor deny anything. It is evident from\nthis that we do not understand by Aphasia something that           193\ninevitably results from the nature of things, but we mean that\nwe now find ourselves in the condition of mind expressed by it\nin regard to the things that are under investigation. It is\nnecessary to remember that we do not say that we affirm or deny\nany of those things that are dogmatically stated in regard to\nthe unknown, for we yield assent only to those things which\naffect our feelings and oblige us to assent to them.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI.\n\n\n_\"Perhaps,\" and \"It is possible,\" and \"It may be.\"_\n\nThe formulae \"Perhaps,\" and \"Perhaps not,\" and \"It is              194\npossible,\" and \"It is not possible,\" and \"It may be,\" and \"It\nmay not be,\" we use instead of \"Perhaps it is,\" and \"Perhaps it\nis not,\" and \"It is possible that it is,\" and \"It is possible\nthat it is not,\" and \"It may be that it is,\" and \"It may be that\nit is not.\" That is, we use the formula \"It is not possible\" for\nthe sake of brevity, instead of saying \"It is not possible to\nbe,\" and \"It may not be\" instead of \"It may not be that it is,\"\nand \"Perhaps not\" instead of \"Perhaps it is not.\" Again, we do\nnot here dispute about words, neither do we question if the        195\nformulae mean these things absolutely, but we use them loosely,\nas I said before. Yet I think it is evident that these formulae\nexpress Aphasia. For certainly the formula \"Perhaps it is\"\nreally includes that which seems to contradict it, _i.e._ the\nformula \"Perhaps it is not,\" because it does not affirm in in\nregard to anything that it is really so. It is the same also in\nregard to the others.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII.\n\n\n[Greek: epoche] _or the Suspension of Judgment._\n\nWhen I say that I suspend my judgment, I mean that I cannot        196\nsay which of those things presented should be believed, and\nwhich should not be believed, showing that things appear equal\nto me in respect to trustworthiness and untrustworthiness. Now\nwe do not affirm that they are equal, but we state what appears\nto us in regard to them at the time when they present themselves\nto us. [Greek: epoche] means the holding back of the opinion, so\nas neither to affirm nor deny anything because of the equality\nof the things in question.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII.\n\n\n_The Formula \"I determine Nothing.\"_\n\nIn regard to the formula \"I determine nothing,\" we say the         197\nfollowing: By \"determine\" we mean, not simply to speak, but to\ngive assent to an affirmation with regard to some unknown thing.\nFor it will soon be found that the Sceptic determines nothing,\nnot even the formula \"I determine nothing,\" for this formula is\nnot a dogmatic opinion, that is an assent to something unknown,\nbut an expression declaring what our condition of mind is. When,\nfor example, the Sceptic says, \"I determine nothing,\" he means\nthis: \"According to my present feeling I can assert or deny\nnothing dogmatically regarding the things under investigation,\"\nand in saying this he expresses what appears to him in reference\nto the things under discussion. He does not express himself\npositively, but he states what he feels.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV.\n\n\n_The Formula \"Every thing is Undetermined.\"_\n\nThe expression \"Indetermination\" furthermore shows a state         198\nof mind in which we neither deny nor affirm positively anything\nregarding things that are investigated in a dogmatic way, that\nis the things that are unknown. When then the Sceptic says\n\"Every thing is undetermined,\" he uses \"is undetermined,\" in the\nsense of \"it appears undetermined to him.\" The words \"every\nthing\" do not mean all existences, but those that he has\nexamined of the unknown things that are investigated by the\nDogmatists. By \"undetermined,\" he means that there is no\npreference in the things that are placed in opposition to each\nother, or that they simply conflict with each other in respect\nto trustworthiness or untrustworthiness. And as the one who        199\nsays \"I am walking\" really means \"It is I that am walking,\" so\nhe who says \"Every thing is undetermined\" means at the same\ntime, according to our teachings, \"as far as I am concerned,\" or\n\"as it appears to me,\" as if he were saying \"As far as I have\nexamined the things that are under investigation in a dogmatic\nmanner, it appears to me that no one of them excels the one\nwhich conflicts with it in trustworthiness or\nuntrustworthiness.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV.\n\n\n_The Formula \"Every thing is Incomprehensible.\"_\n\nWe treat the formula \"Every thing is incomprehensible\" in          200\nthe same way. For \"every thing\" we interpret in the same way as\nabove, and we supply the words \"to me\" so that what we say is\nthis: \"As far as I have inspected the unknown things which are\ndogmatically examined, it appears to me that every thing is\nincomprehensible.\" This is not, however, to affirm that the\nthings which are examined by the Dogmatists are of such a nature\nas to be necessarily incomprehensible, but one expresses his own\nfeeling in saying \"I see that I have not thus far comprehended\nany of those things because of the equilibrium of the things\nthat are placed in opposition to each other.\" Whence it seems to\nme that every thing that has been brought forward to dispute our\nformulae has fallen wide of the mark.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVI.\n\n\n_The Formulae \"I do not comprehend\" and \"I do not\nunderstand.\"_\n\nThe formulae \"I do not comprehend\" and \"I do not understand\"       201\nshow a condition of mind in which the Sceptic stands aloof for\nthe present from asserting or denying anything in regard to the\nunknown things under investigation, as is evident from what we\nsaid before about the other formulae.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVII.\n\n\n_The Formula \"To place an equal Statement in opposition\nto every Statement.\"_\n\nFurthermore, when we say \"Every statement may have an equal        202\nstatement placed in opposition to it,\" by \"every,\" we mean all\nthe statements that we have examined; we do not use the word\n\"statement\" simply, but for a statement which seeks to prove\nsomething dogmatically about things that are unknown, and not at\nall one that shows a process of reasoning from premises and\nconclusions, but something which is put together in any sort of\nway. We use the word \"equal\" in reference to trustworthiness or\nuntrustworthiness. \"Is placed in opposition\" we use instead of\nthe common expression \"to conflict with,\" and we supply \"as it\nappears to me.\" When therefore one says, \"It seems to me           203\nthat every statement which I have examined, which proves\nsomething dogmatically, may have another statement placed in\nopposition to it which also proves something dogmatically, and\nwhich is equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness,\"\nthis is not asserted dogmatically, but is an expression of human\nfeeling as it appears to the one who feels it. Some Sceptics       204\nexpress the formula as follows: \"Every statement should have an\nequal one placed in opposition to it,\" demanding it\nauthoritatively thus: \"Let us place in opposition to every\nstatement that proves something dogmatically another conflicting\nstatement which also seeks to prove something dogmatically, and\nis equal to it in trustworthiness and untrustworthiness.\"\nNaturally this is directed to the Sceptics, but the infinitive\nshould be used instead of the imperative, that is, \"to oppose\"\ninstead of \"let us oppose.\" This formula is recommended to the     205\nSceptic, lest he should be deceived by the Dogmatists and\ngive up his investigations, and rashly fail of the [Greek:\nataraxia] which is thought to accompany [Greek: epoche] in\nregard to everything, as we have explained above.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVIII.\n\n\n_General Observations on the Formulae of the Sceptics._\n\nWe have treated of a sufficient number of these formulae for       206\nan outline, especially since what we have said about those\nmentioned applies also to others that we have omitted. In regard\nto all the Sceptical formulae, it must be understood in advance\nthat we do not affirm them to be absolutely true, because we say\nthat they can even refute themselves, since they are themselves\nincluded in those things to which they refer, just as cathartic\nmedicines not only purge the body of humors, but carry off\nthemselves with the humors. We say then that we use these          207\nformulae, not as literally making known the things for which\nthey are used, but loosely, and if one wishes, inaccurately. It\nis not fitting for the Sceptic to dispute about words,\nespecially as it contributes to our purpose to say that these\nformulae have no absolute meaning; their meaning is a relative\none, that is, relative to the Sceptics. Besides, it is to be       208\nremembered that we do not say them about all things in general,\nbut about the unknown, and things that are dogmatically\ninvestigated, and that we say what appears to us, and that we do\nnot express ourselves decidedly about the nature of external\nobjects. By this means I think that every sophism brought\nagainst the Sceptical formulae can be overturned. We have now      209\nshown the character of Scepticism by examining its idea, its\nparts, its criterion and aim, and also the Tropes of [Greek:\nepoche], and by treating of the Sceptical formulae. We think it\ntherefore appropriate to enter briefly into the distinction\nbetween Scepticism and the nearly related schools of philosophy\nin order to more clearly understand the Sceptical School. We\nwill begin with the philosophy of Heraclitus.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIX.\n\n\n_In what does the Sceptical School differ from the Philosophy\nof Heraclitus?_\n\nNow that this school differs from ours is evident, for             210\nHeraclitus expresses himself about many unknown things\ndogmatically, which we do not, as has been said. Aenesidemus and\nhis followers said that the Sceptical School is the way to the\nphilosophy of Heraclitus. They gave as a reason for this that\nthe statement that contradictory predicates appear to be\napplicable to the same thing, leads the way to the statement\nthat contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the\nsame thing; and as the Sceptics say that contradictory\npredicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, the\nHeraclitans proceed from this to the doctrine that such\npredicates are in reality applicable. We reply to this that the\nstatement that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable\nto the same thing is not a dogma of the Sceptics, but is a fact\nthat presents itself not only to the Sceptics, but to other\nphilosophers, and to all men. No one, for instance, would          211\nventure to say that honey does not taste sweet to those in\nhealth, and bitter to those who have the jaundice, so that the\nHeraclitans start from a preconception common to all men, as do\nwe also, and perhaps the other schools of philosophy likewise.\nIf, however, they had attributed the origin of the statement\nthat contradictory predicates are present in the same thing to\nany of the Sceptical teachings, as, for example, to the formula\n\"Every thing is incomprehensible,\" or \"I determine nothing,\" or\nany of the other similar ones, it may be that which they say\nwould follow; but since they start from that which is a common\nexperience, not only to us, but to other philosophers, and in\nlife, why should one say that our school is a path to the\nphilosophy of Heraclitus more than any of the other schools of\nphilosophy, or than life itself, as we all make use of the same\nsubject matter? On the other hand, the Sceptical School may not    212\nonly fail to help towards the knowledge of the philosophy of\nHeraclitus, but may even hinder it! For the Sceptic attacks all\nthe dogmas of Heraclitus as having been rashly given, and\nopposes on the one hand the doctrine of conflagration, and on\nthe other, the doctrine that contradictory predicates in reality\napply to the same thing, and in regard to every dogma of\nHeraclitus he scorns his dogmatic rashness, and then, in the\nmanner that I have before referred to, adduces the formulae \"I\ndo not understand\" and \"I determine nothing,\" which conflict\nwith the Heraclitan doctrines. It is absurd to say that this\nconflicting school is a path to the very sect with which it\nconflicts. It is then absurd to say that the Sceptical School is\na path to the philosophy of Heraclitus.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXX.\n\n\n_In what does the Sceptical School differ from the Philosophy\nof Democritus?_\n\nThe philosophy of Democritus is also said to have community        213\nwith Scepticism, because it seems to use the same matter that we\ndo. For, from the fact that honey seems sweet to some and bitter\nto others, Democritus reasons, it is said, that honey is neither\nsweet nor bitter, and therefore he accords with the formula \"No\nmore,\" which is a formula of the Sceptics. But the Sceptics and\nthe Democritans use the formula \"No more\" differently from each\nother, for they emphasise the negation in the expression, but\nwe, the not knowing whether both of the phenomena exist or\nneither one, and so we differ in this respect. The distinction,\nhowever, becomes most evident when Democritus says that            214\natoms and empty space are real, for by real he means existing in\nreality. Now, although he begins with the anomaly in phenomena,\nyet, since he says that atoms and empty space really exist, it\nis superfluous, I think, even to say that he differs from us.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXI.\n\n\n_In what does Scepticism differ from the Cyrenaic Philosophy?_\n\nSome say that the Cyrenaic School is the same as the               215\nSceptical, because that school also claims to comprehend only\nconditions of mind. It differs, however, from it, because, while\nthe former makes pleasure and the gentle motion of the flesh its\naim, we make [Greek: ataraxia] ours, and this is opposed to the\naim of their school. For whether pleasure is present or not,\nconfusion awaits him who maintains that pleasure is an aim, as I\nhave shown in what I said about the aim. And then, in addition,\nwe suspend our judgment as far as the reasoning with regard to\nexternal objects is concerned, but the Cyrenaics pronounce the\nnature of these inscrutable.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXII.\n\n\n_In what does Scepticism differ from the Philosophy of\nProtagoras?_\n\nProtagoras makes man the measure of all things, of things          216\nthat are that they are, and things that are not that they are\nnot, meaning by measure, criterion, and by things, events, that\nis to say really, man is the criterion for all events, of things\nthat are that they are, and of things that are not that they are\nnot. And for that reason he accepts only the phenomena that\nappear to each man, and thus he introduces relation. Therefore     217\nhe seems to have community with the Pyrrhoneans. He differs,\nhowever, from them, and we shall see the difference after we\nhave somewhat explained how things seemed to Protagoras. He\nsays, for example, that matter is fluid, and as it flows,\nadditions are constantly made in the place of that which is\ncarried away; the perceptions also are arranged anew and\nchanged, according to the age and according to other conditions\nof the body. He says also, that the reasons of all phenomena       218\nare present in matter, so that matter can be all that it appears\nto be to all men as far as its power is concerned. Men, however,\napprehend differently at different times, according to the\ndifferent conditions that they are in; for he that is in a\nnatural condition will apprehend those qualities in matter that\ncan appear to those who are in a natural condition, while on       219\nthe contrary, those who are in an unnatural condition will\napprehend those qualities that can appear to the abnormal.\nFurthermore, the same reasoning would hold true in regard to\ndifferences in age, to sleeping and waking, and each of the\nother different conditions. Therefore man becomes the criterion\nof things that are, for all things that appear to men exist for\nmen, and those things that do not appear to any one among men do\nnot exist. We see that he dogmatises in saying that matter is\nfluid, and also in saying that the reasons for all phenomena\nhave their foundation in matter, while these things are unknown,\nand to us are things regarding which we suspend our judgment.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIII.\n\n\n_In what does Scepticism differ from the Academic\nPhilosophy?_\n\nSome say further that the Academic philosophy is the same as       220\nScepticism, therefore it seems appropriate to me to treat of\nthat also. There have been, as the most say, three\nAcademies--the most ancient one, that of Plato and his\nfollowers; the second and middle one, that of Arcesilaus and his\nfollowers, Arcesilaus being the pupil of Polemo; the third and\nnew Academy, that of Carneades and Clitomachus and their\nfollowers; some add also a fourth, that of Philo and Charmides,\nand their followers; and some count even a fifth, that of\nAntiochus and his followers. Beginning then from the old\nAcademy, let us consider the difference between the schools of\nphilosophy mentioned. Now some have said that Plato was a          221\nDogmatic, others that he was a Sceptic, and others that he was\nin some things a Sceptic and in some things a Dogmatic. For in\nthe fencing dialogues, where Socrates is introduced as either\nmaking sport of someone or contending against the Sophists,\nPlato has, they say, a fencing and sceptical character, but he\nis dogmatic when he expresses himself seriously, either through\nSocrates or Timaeus or any such person. In regard to those         222\nwho say that he is a Dogmatic, or a Dogmatic in some things and\na Sceptic in others, it would be superfluous, it seems to me, to\nspeak now, for they themselves grant that he is different from\nus. The question as to whether he was really a Sceptic or not we\ntreat more fully in the Memoranda, but here we state briefly\nthat according to Menodotus and Aenesidemus (for these\nespecially defended this position) Plato dogmatises when he\nexpresses himself regarding ideas, and regarding the existence\nof Providence, and when he states that the virtuous life is more\nto be chosen than the one of vice. If he assents to these things\nas true, he dogmatises; or even if he accepts them as more\nprobable than otherwise he departs from the sceptical character,\nsince he gives a preference to one thing above another in\ntrustworthiness or untrustworthiness; for how foreign this is to\nus is evident from what we have said before. Even if when he       223\nperforms mental gymnastics, as they say, he expresses some\nthings sceptically, he is not because of this a Sceptic. For he\nwho dogmatises about one thing, or, in short, gives preference\nto one mental image over another in trustworthiness or\nuntrustworthiness in respect to anything that is unknown, is a\nDogmatic in character, as Timon shows by what he said of\nXenophanes. For after having praised Xenophanes in many            224\nthings, and even after having dedicated his Satires to him, he\nmade him mourn and say--\n\n   \"Would that I also might gain that mind profound,\n   Able to look both ways. In a treacherous path have\n          I been decoyed,\n   And still in old age am with all wisdom unwed.\n   For wherever I turned my view\n   All things were resolved into unity; all things, alway\n   From all sources drawn, were merged into nature the same.\"\n\nTimon calls him somewhat, but not entirely, free from\nvanity, when he said--\n\n  \"Xenophanes somewhat free from vanity, mocker of\n          Homeric deceit,\n   Far from men he conceived a god, on all sides equal,\n   Above pain, a being spiritualised, or intellect.\"\n\nIn saying that he was somewhat free from vanity, he meant that\nhe was in some things free from vanity. He called him a mocker\nof the Homeric deceit because he had scoffed at the deceit in\nHomer. Xenophanes also dogmatised, contrary to the assumptions     225\nof other men, that all things are one, and that God is grown\ntogether with all things, that He is spherical, insensible,\nunchangeable, and reasonable, whence the difference of\nXenophanes from us is easily proved. In short, from what has\nbeen said, it is evident that although Plato expresses doubt\nabout some things, so long as he has expressed himself in\ncertain places in regard to the existence of unknown things, or\nas preferring some things to others in trustworthiness, he\ncannot be, it seems to me, a Sceptic. Those of the New Academy,\nalthough they say that all things are incomprehensible,            226\ndiffer from the Sceptics, perhaps even in saying that all things\nare incomprehensible (for they assert decidedly in regard to\nthis, but the Sceptic thinks it possible that some things may be\ncomprehended), but they differ evidently still further from us\nin their judgment of good and evil. For the Academicians say\nthat there is such a thing as good and evil, not as we say it,\nbut more with the conviction that that which they call good\nexists than that it does not; and likewise in regard to the\nevil, while we do not say anything is good or evil with the\nconviction that it is probably so, but we live our lives in an\nunprejudiced way in order not to be inactive. Moreover, we say\nthat our ideas are equal to each other in trustworthiness          227\nand untrustworthiness, as far as their nature goes, while they\nsay that some are probable and others improbable. They make a\ndifference also between the improbable ones, for they believe\nthat some of them are only probable, others probable and\nundisputed, still others probable, undisputed, and tested. As\nfor example, when a coiled rope is lying in a somewhat dark\nroom, he who comes in suddenly gets only a probable idea of it,\nand thinks that it is a serpent; but it appears to be a rope       228\nto him who has looked carefully around, and found out that it\ndoes not move, and that it is of such a color, and so on,\naccording to an idea which is probable and undisputed. The\ntested idea is like this: It is said that Hercules led Alcestis\nafter she was dead back again from Hades and showed her to\nAdmetus, and he received an idea that was probable and\nundisputed regarding Alcestis. As, however, he knew that she was\ndead, his mind drew back from belief and inclined to disbelief.\nNow those belonging to the New Academy prefer the idea which       229\nis probable and undisputed to the simply probable one. To both\nof these, however, they prefer that which is probable,\nundisputed, and tested. If, however, both those of the Academy\nand the Sceptics say that they believe certain things, there is\nan evident difference between the two schools of philosophy even\nin this; for \"to believe\" is used in a different sense,            230\nmeaning, on the one hand, not to resist, but simply to accept\nwithout strong inclination and approval, as the child is said to\nbelieve the teacher; on the other hand, \"to believe\" is used to\nsignify assenting to something with choice, and, as it were,\nwith the sympathy that accompanies strong will, as the prodigal\nfollows the one who chooses to live a luxurious life. Therefore,\nsince Carneades, Clitomachus, and their followers say that they\nare strongly inclined to believe that a thing is probable, and\nwe simply allow that it may be so without assent, we differ        231\nfrom them, I think, in this way. We differ from the New Academy\nlikewise in things concerning the aim; for while the men who say\nthat they govern themselves according to that School avail\nthemselves of the idea of the probable in life, we live\naccording to the laws and customs, and our natural feelings, in\nan unprejudiced way. We could say more regarding the distinction\nbetween the two schools if we did not aim at brevity.\nNevertheless, Arcesilaus, who as we said was the leader and        232\nchief of the Middle Academy, seems to me to have very much in\ncommon with the Pyrrhonean teachings, so that his school and\nours are almost one. For neither does one find that he expressed\nan opinion about the existence or non-existence of anything, nor\ndoes he prefer one thing to another as regards trustworthiness\nor untrustworthiness; he suspends his judgment regarding all\nthings, and the aim of his philosophy is [Greek: epoche], which\nis accompanied by [Greek: ataraxia], and this agrees with what\nwe have said. But he calls the particular instances of             233\n[Greek: epoche] _bona_, and the particular instances of assent\n_mala_. The difference is that we say these things according to\nwhat appears to us, and not affirmatively, while he says them as\nif speaking of realities, that is, he says that [Greek: epoche]\nis in itself good, and assent an evil. If we are to believe also\nthe things that are said about him, he appeared at first           234\nsight to be a Pyrrhonean, but he was in truth a Dogmatic, for he\nused to test his companions by the method of doubt to see\nwhether they were gifted enough to take in Plato's dogmas, so\nthat he appeared to be a Sceptic, but at the same time he\ncommunicated the doctrines of Plato to those of his companions\nwho were gifted. Hence Ariston also said about him--\n\n   \"Plato in front, Pyrrhon behind, Diodorus in the middle,\"\n\nbecause he availed himself of the dialectic of Diodorus, but was   235\nwholly a Platonist. Now Philo and his followers say that as\nfar as the Stoic criterion is concerned, that is to say the\n[Greek: phantasia kataleptike], things are incomprehensible, but\nas far as the nature of things is concerned, they are\ncomprehensible. Antiochus, however, transferred the Stoa to the\nAcademy, so that it was even said of him that he taught the\nStoic philosophy in the Academy, because he tried to show that\nthe Stoic doctrines are found in Plato. The difference,\ntherefore, between the Sceptical School and the Fourth and Fifth\nAcademy is evident.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIV.\n\n\n_Is Empiricism in Medicine the same as Scepticism?_\n\nSome say that the medical sect called Empiricism is the same       236\nas Scepticism. Yet the fact must be recognised, that even if\nEmpiricism does maintain the impossibility of knowledge, it is\nneither Scepticism itself, nor would it suit the Sceptic to take\nthat sect upon himself. He could rather, it seems to me, belong\nto the so-called Methodic School. For this alone, of all the\nmedical sects, does not seem to proceed rashly in regard to        237\nunknown things, and does not presume to say whether they are\ncomprehensible or not, but is guided by phenomena, and receives\nfrom them the same help which they seem to give to the Sceptical\nsystem. For we have said in what has gone before, that the\nevery-day life which the Sceptic lives is of four parts,\ndepending on the guidance of nature, on the necessity of the\nfeelings, on the traditions of laws and customs, and on the\nteaching of the arts. Now as by necessity of the feelings          238\nthe Sceptic is led by thirst to drink, and by hunger to food,\nand to supply similar needs in the same way, so also the\nphysician of the Methodic School is led by the feelings to find\nsuitable remedies; in constipation he produces a relaxation, as\none takes refuge in the sun from the shrinking on account of\nintense cold; he is led by a flux to the stopping of it, as\nthose in a hot bath who are dripping from a profuse perspiration\nand are relaxed, hasten to check it by going into the cold air.\nMoreover, it is evident that the Methodic physician forces those\nthings which are of a foreign nature to adapt themselves to\ntheir own nature, as even the dog tries to get a sharp stick out\nthat is thrust into him. In order, however, that I should          239\nnot overstep the outline character of this work by discussing\ndetails, I think that all the things that the Methodics have\nthus said can be classified as referring to the necessity of the\nfeelings that are natural or those that are unnatural. Besides\nthis, it is common to both schools to have no dogmas, and to use\nwords loosely. For as the Sceptic uses the formula \"I              240\ndetermine nothing,\" and \"I understand nothing,\" as we said\nabove, so the Methodic also uses the expressions \"Community,\"\nand \"To go through,\" and other similar ones without over much\ncare. In a similar way he uses the word \"Indication\"\nundogmatically, meaning that the symptoms of the patient either\nnatural or unnatural, indicate the remedies that would be\nsuitable, as we said in speaking of thirst, hunger, and other\nthings. It will thus be seen that the Methodic School of           241\nmedicine has a certain relationship to Scepticism which is\ncloser than that of the other medical sects, speaking\ncomparatively if not absolutely from these and similar tokens.\nHaving said so much in reference to the schools that seem to\nclosely resemble Scepticism, we conclude the general\nconsideration of Scepticism and the First Book of the Sketches.","title":"Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":48070}