{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_17611/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_17611","id":"gutenberg_17611","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/17611","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Catholic Church -- Doctrines -- Early works to 1800","Christianity","God -- Attributes -- Early works to 1800","God -- Omnipresence -- Early works to 1800","Theology, Doctrinal -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"Produced by Sandra K. Perry, with corrections and\nsupplementation by David McClamrock\n\n\n\n\n\n\nST. THOMAS AQUINAS\n\nSUMMA THEOLOGICA\n\nPART I (\"Prima Pars\")\n\nTranslated by\nFathers of the English Dominican Province\n\nBENZIGER BROTHERS\nNEW YORK\n_______________________\n\nDEDICATION\n\nTo the Blessed Virgin\nMary Immaculate\nSeat of Wisdom\n_______________________\n\nNOTE TO THIS ELECTRONIC EDITION\n\nThe text of this electronic edition was originally produced by Sandra\nK. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio, and made available through the Christian\nClassics Ethereal Library <http://www.ccel.org>. I have eliminated\nunnecessary formatting in the text, corrected some errors in\ntranscription, and added the dedication, tables of contents,\nPrologue, and the numbers of the questions and articles, as they\nappeared in the printed translation published by Benziger Brothers.\nEach article is now designated by part, question number, and article\nnumber in brackets, like this:\n\n> SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 2]\n\n> Whether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil?\n\nIn a few places, where obvious errors appeared in the Benziger\nBrothers edition, I have corrected them by reference to a Latin text\nof the _Summa._ These corrections are indicated by English text in\nbrackets. For example, in Part I, Question 45, Article 2, the first\nsentence in the Benziger Brothers edition begins: \"Not only is it\nimpossible that anything should be created by God....\" By reference\nto the Latin, \"non solum _non_ est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari\"\n(emphasis added), this has been corrected to \"Not only is it [not]\nimpossible that anything should be created by God....\"\n\nThis electronic edition also differs from the Benziger Brothers\nedition in the following details (as well as the obvious lack of the\noriginal page numbers and headers):\n\n* The repetitive expression \"We proceed thus to the [next] Article\"\ndoes not appear directly below the title of each article.\n\n* Italics are represented by underscores at the beginning and end,\n_like this._ Quotations and other \"quotable\" matter, however, are\nordinarily set off by quotation marks with no underscores in this\nedition, in accordance with common English usage, even where they\nwere set in italics with no quotation marks in the Benziger Brothers\nedition. Titles of books are set off by underscores when they appear\nin the text with no parentheses, but not when the books are cited in\nparentheses.\n\n* Bible chapters and verses are cited with arabic numerals separated\nby colons, like this: \"Dan. 7:10\"--not like this: \"Dan. vii. 10.\"\nSmall roman numerals have been retained where they appear in\ncitations to books other than the Bible.\n\n* Any matter that appeared in a footnote in the Benziger Brothers\nedition is presented in brackets at the point in the text where the\nfootnote mark appeared.\n\n* Greek words are presented in Roman transliteration.\n\n* Paragraphs are not indented and are separated by blank lines.\n\n* Numbered topics, set forth at the beginning of each question and\nat certain other places, are ordinarily presented on a separate line\nfor each topic.\n\n* Titles of questions are in all caps.\n\nAnything else in this electronic edition that does not correspond to\nthe content of the Benziger Brothers edition may be regarded as a\ndefect in this edition and attributed to me (David McClamrock).\n\n_______________________\n\nCONTENTS\n\nPROLOGUE\n\nFIRST PART (QQ. 1-119)\n\nQuestion\n\n1.   The Nature and Extent of Sacred Doctrine\n2.   The Existence of God\n3.   On the Simplicity of God\n4.   The Perfection of God\n5.   Of Goodness in General\n6.   The Goodness of God\n7.   The Infinity of God\n8.   The Existence of God in Things\n9.   The Immutability of God\n10.  The Eternity of God\n11.  The Unity of God\n12.  How God Is Known by Us\n13.  The Names of God\n14.  Of God's Knowledge\n15.  Of Ideas\n16.  Of Truth\n17.  Concerning Falsity\n18.  The Life of God\n19.  The Will of God\n20.  God's Love\n21.  The Justice and Mercy of God\n22.  The Providence of God\n23.  Of Predestination\n24.  The Book of Life\n25.  The Power of God\n26.  Of the Divine Beatitude\n\nTREATISE ON THE TRINITY\n\n27.  The Procession of the Divine Persons\n28.  The Divine Relations\n29.  The Divine Persons\n30.  The Plurality of Persons in God\n31.  Of What Belongs to the Unity or Plurality in God\n32.  The Knowledge of the Divine Persons\n33.  Of the Person of the Father\n34.  Of the Person of the Son\n35.  Of the Image\n36.  Of the Person of the Holy Ghost\n37.  Of the Name of the Holy Ghost--Love\n38.  Of the Name of the Holy Ghost, as Gift\n39.  Of the Persons in Relation to the Essence\n40.  Of the Persons as Compared to the Relations or Properties\n41.  Of the Persons in Reference to the Notional Acts\n42.  Of Equality and Likeness Among the Divine Persons\n43.  The Mission of the Divine Persons\n\nTREATISE ON THE CREATION\n\n44.  The Procession of Creatures from God, and of the First Cause\n       of All Things\n45.  The Mode of Emanation of Things from the First Principle\n46.  Of the Beginning of the Duration of Creatures\n47.  Of the Distinction of Things in General\n48.  The Distinction of Things in Particular\n49.  The Cause of Evil\n\nTREATISE ON THE ANGELS\n\n50.  Of the Substance of the Angels Absolutely Considered\n51.  Of the Angels in Comparison with Bodies\n52.  Of the Angels in Relation to Place\n53.  Of the Local Movement of the Angels\n54.  Of the Knowledge of the Angels\n55.  Of the Medium of the Angelic Knowledge\n56.  Of the Angels' Knowledge of Immaterial Things\n57.  Of the Angels' Knowledge of Material Things\n58.  Of the Mode of the Angelic Knowledge\n59.  The Will of the Angels\n60.  Of the Love or Dilection of the Angels\n61.  Of the Production of the Angels in the Order of Natural Being\n62.  Of the Perfection of the Angels in the Order of Grace and of\n       Glory\n63.  The Malice of the Angels with Regard to Sin\n64.  The Punishment of the Demons\n\nTREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS\n\n65.  The Work of Creation of Corporeal Creatures\n66.  On the Order of Creation Towards Distinction\n67.  On the Work of Distinction in Itself\n68.  On the Work of the Second Day\n69.  On the Work of the Third Day\n70.  On the Work of Adornment, as Regards the Fourth Day\n71.  On the Work of the Fifth Day\n72.  On the Work of the Sixth Day\n73.  On the Things That Belong to the Seventh Day\n74.  On All the Seven Days in Common\n\nTREATISE ON MAN\n\n75.  Of Man Who Is Composed of a Spiritual and a Corporeal Substance:\n       and in the First Place, Concerning What Belongs to the Essence\n       of the Soul\n76.  Of the Union of Body and Soul\n77.  Of Those Things Which Belong to the Powers of the Soul in General\n78.  Of the Specific Powers of the Soul\n79.  Of the Intellectual Powers\n80.  Of the Appetitive Powers in General\n81.  Of the Power of Sensuality\n82.  Of the Will\n83.  Of Free-Will\n84.  How the Soul While United to the Body Understands Corporeal\n       Things Beneath It\n85.  Of the Mode and Order of Understanding\n86.  What Our Intellect Knows in Material Things\n87.  How the Intellectual Soul Knows Itself and All Within Itself\n88.  How the Human Soul Knows What Is Above Itself\n89.  Of the Knowledge of the Separated Soul\n90.  Of the First Production of Man's Soul\n91.  The Production of the First Man's Body\n92.  The Production of the Woman\n93.  The End or Term of the Production of Man\n94.  Of the State and Condition of the First Man as Regards His\n       Intellect\n95.  Of Things Pertaining to the First Man's Will--Namely, Grace\n       and Righteousness\n96.  Of the Mastership Belonging to Man in the State of Innocence\n97.  Of the Preservation of the Individual in the Primitive State\n98.  Of the Preservation of the Species\n99.  Of the Condition of the Offspring As to the Body\n100. Of the Condition of the Offspring As Regards Righteousness\n101. Of the Condition of the Offspring As Regards Knowledge\n102. Of Man's Abode, Which Is Paradise\n\nTREATISE ON THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT\n\n103. Of the Government of Things in General\n104. The Special Effects of the Divine Government\n105. Of the Change of Creatures by God\n106. How One Creature Moves Another\n107. The Speech of the Angels\n108. Of the Angelic Degrees of Hierarchies and Orders\n109. The Ordering of the Bad Angels\n110. How Angels Act on Bodies\n111. The Action of the Angels on Man\n112. The Mission of the Angels\n113. Of the Guardianship of the Good Angels\n114. Of the Assaults of the Demons\n115. Of the Action of the Corporeal Creature\n116. On Fate\n117. Of Things Pertaining to the Action of Man\n118. Of the Production of Man from Man As to the Soul\n119. Of the Propagation of Man As to the Body\n_______________________\n\nPROLOGUE\n\nBecause the Master of Catholic Truth ought not only to teach the\nproficient, but also to instruct beginners (according to the Apostle:\nAs Unto Little Ones in Christ, I Gave You Milk to Drink, Not Meat--\n1 Cor. iii. 1, 2)--we purpose in this book to treat of whatever\nbelongs to the Christian Religion, in such a way as may tend to the\ninstruction of beginners. We have considered that students in this\nScience have not seldom been hampered by what they have found written\nby other authors, partly on account of the multiplication of useless\nquestions, articles, and arguments; partly also because those things\nthat are needful for them to know are not taught according to the\norder of the subject-matter, but according as the plan of the book\nmight require, or the occasion of the argument offer; partly, too,\nbecause frequent repetition brought weariness and confusion to the\nminds of the readers.\n\nEndeavoring to avoid these and other like faults, we shall try, by\nGod's help, to set forth whatever is included in this Sacred Science\nas briefly and clearly as the matter itself may allow.\n_______________________\n\nSUMMA THEOLOGICA\n\nFIRST PART\n[\"I,\" \"Prima Pars\"]\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 1\n\nTHE NATURE AND EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE\n(in Ten Articles)\n\nTo place our purpose within proper limits, we first endeavor to\ninvestigate the nature and extent of this sacred doctrine. Concerning\nthis there are ten points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is necessary?\n\n(2) Whether it is a science?\n\n(3) Whether it is one or many?\n\n(4) Whether it is speculative or practical?\n\n(5) How it is compared with other sciences?\n\n(6) Whether it is the same as wisdom?\n\n(7) Whether God is its subject-matter?\n\n(8) Whether it is a matter of argument?\n\n(9) Whether it rightly employs metaphors and similes?\n\n(10) Whether the Sacred Scripture of this doctrine may be expounded\nin different senses?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]\n\nWhether, besides Philosophy, any Further Doctrine Is Required?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no\nneed of any further knowledge. For man should not seek to know what is\nabove reason: \"Seek not the things that are too high for thee\"\n(Ecclus. 3:22). But whatever is not above reason is fully treated of\nin philosophical science. Therefore any other knowledge besides\nphilosophical science is superfluous.\n\nObj. 2: Further, knowledge can be concerned only with being, for\nnothing can be known, save what is true; and all that is, is true. But\neverything that is, is treated of in philosophical science--even God\nHimself; so that there is a part of philosophy called theology, or the\ndivine science, as Aristotle has proved (Metaph. vi). Therefore,\nbesides philosophical science, there is no need of any further\nknowledge.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Tim. 3:16): \"All Scripture inspired\nof God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in\njustice.\" Now Scripture, inspired of God, is no part of philosophical\nscience, which has been built up by human reason. Therefore it is\nuseful that besides philosophical science, there should be other\nknowledge, i.e. inspired of God.\n\n_I answer that,_ It was necessary for man's salvation that there should\nbe a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical science built up\nby human reason. Firstly, indeed, because man is directed to God, as\nto an end that surpasses the grasp of his reason: \"The eye hath not\nseen, O God, besides Thee, what things Thou hast prepared for them\nthat wait for Thee\" (Isa. 66:4). But the end must first be known by men\nwho are to direct their thoughts and actions to the end. Hence it was\nnecessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed\nhuman reason should be made known to him by divine revelation. Even as\nregards those truths about God which human reason could have\ndiscovered, it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine\nrevelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover,\nwould only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the\nadmixture of many errors. Whereas man's whole salvation, which is in\nGod, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order\nthat the salvation of men might be brought about more fitly and more\nsurely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by\ndivine revelation. It was therefore necessary that besides\nphilosophical science built up by reason, there should be a sacred\nscience learned through revelation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although those things which are beyond man's\nknowledge may not be sought for by man through his reason,\nnevertheless, once they are revealed by God, they must be accepted by\nfaith. Hence the sacred text continues, \"For many things are shown to\nthee above the understanding of man\" (Ecclus. 3:25). And in this, the\nsacred science consists.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sciences are differentiated according to the\nvarious means through which knowledge is obtained. For the astronomer\nand the physicist both may prove the same conclusion: that the earth,\nfor instance, is round: the astronomer by means of mathematics (i.e.\nabstracting from matter), but the physicist by means of matter itself.\nHence there is no reason why those things which may be learned from\nphilosophical science, so far as they can be known by natural reason,\nmay not also be taught us by another science so far as they fall\nwithin revelation. Hence theology included in sacred doctrine differs\nin kind from that theology which is part of philosophy.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Sacred Doctrine Is a Science?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not a science. For every\nscience proceeds from self-evident principles. But sacred doctrine\nproceeds from articles of faith which are not self-evident, since\ntheir truth is not admitted by all: \"For all men have not faith\" (2\nThess. 3:2). Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no science deals with individual facts. But this\nsacred science treats of individual facts, such as the deeds of\nAbraham, Isaac and Jacob and such like. Therefore sacred doctrine is\nnot a science.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) \"to this science\nalone belongs that whereby saving faith is begotten, nourished,\nprotected and strengthened.\" But this can be said of no science except\nsacred doctrine. Therefore sacred doctrine is a science.\n\n_I answer that,_ Sacred doctrine is a science. We must bear in mind that\nthere are two kinds of sciences. There are some which proceed from a\nprinciple known by the natural light of intelligence, such as\narithmetic and geometry and the like. There are some which proceed\nfrom principles known by the light of a higher science: thus the\nscience of perspective proceeds from principles established by\ngeometry, and music from principles established by arithmetic. So it\nis that sacred doctrine is a science because it proceeds from\nprinciples established by the light of a higher science, namely, the\nscience of God and the blessed. Hence, just as the musician accepts on\nauthority the principles taught him by the mathematician, so sacred\nscience is established on principles revealed by God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The principles of any science are either in\nthemselves self-evident, or reducible to the conclusions of a higher\nscience; and such, as we have said, are the principles of sacred\ndoctrine.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Individual facts are treated of in sacred\ndoctrine, not because it is concerned with them principally, but they\nare introduced rather both as examples to be followed in our lives (as\nin moral sciences) and in order to establish the authority of those\nmen through whom the divine revelation, on which this sacred scripture\nor doctrine is based, has come down to us.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Sacred Doctrine Is One Science?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not one science; for\naccording to the Philosopher (Poster. i) \"that science is one which\ntreats only of one class of subjects.\" But the creator and the\ncreature, both of whom are treated of in sacred doctrine, cannot be\ngrouped together under one class of subjects. Therefore sacred\ndoctrine is not one science.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in sacred doctrine we treat of angels, corporeal\ncreatures and human morality. But these belong to separate\nphilosophical sciences. Therefore sacred doctrine cannot be one\nscience.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Holy Scripture speaks of it as one science: \"Wisdom\ngave him the knowledge [scientiam] of holy things\" (Wis. 10:10).\n\n_I answer that,_ Sacred doctrine is one science. The unity of a faculty\nor habit is to be gauged by its object, not indeed, in its material\naspect, but as regards the precise formality under which it is an\nobject. For example, man, ass, stone agree in the one precise\nformality of being colored; and color is the formal object of sight.\nTherefore, because Sacred Scripture considers things precisely under\nthe formality of being divinely revealed, whatever has been divinely\nrevealed possesses the one precise formality of the object of this\nscience; and therefore is included under sacred doctrine as under one\nscience.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sacred doctrine does not treat of God and\ncreatures equally, but of God primarily, and of creatures only so far\nas they are referable to God as their beginning or end. Hence the\nunity of this science is not impaired.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents inferior faculties or habits\nfrom being differentiated by something which falls under a higher\nfaculty or habit as well; because the higher faculty or habit regards\nthe object in its more universal formality, as the object of the\n_common sense_ is whatever affects the senses, including, therefore,\nwhatever is visible or audible. Hence the _common sense,_ although one\nfaculty, extends to all the objects of the five senses. Similarly,\nobjects which are the subject-matter of different philosophical\nsciences can yet be treated of by this one single sacred science under\none aspect precisely so far as they can be included in revelation. So\nthat in this way, sacred doctrine bears, as it were, the stamp of the\ndivine science which is one and simple, yet extends to everything.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Sacred Doctrine Is a Practical Science?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is a practical science; for\na practical science is that which ends in action according to the\nPhilosopher (Metaph. ii). But sacred doctrine is ordained to action:\n\"Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only\" (James 1:22).\nTherefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sacred doctrine is divided into the Old and the\nNew Law. But law implies a moral science which is a practical science.\nTherefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Every practical science is concerned with human\noperations; as moral science is concerned with human acts, and\narchitecture with buildings. But sacred doctrine is chiefly concerned\nwith God, whose handiwork is especially man. Therefore it is not a\npractical but a speculative science.\n\n_I answer that,_ Sacred doctrine, being one, extends to things which\nbelong to different philosophical sciences because it considers in\neach the same formal aspect, namely, so far as they can be known\nthrough divine revelation. Hence, although among the philosophical\nsciences one is speculative and another practical, nevertheless sacred\ndoctrine includes both; as God, by one and the same science, knows\nboth Himself and His works. Still, it is speculative rather than\npractical because it is more concerned with divine things than with\nhuman acts; though it does treat even of these latter, inasmuch as man\nis ordained by them to the perfect knowledge of God in which consists\neternal bliss. This is a sufficient answer to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Sacred Doctrine Is Nobler than Other Sciences?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that sacred doctrine is not nobler than other\nsciences; for the nobility of a science depends on the certitude it\nestablishes. But other sciences, the principles of which cannot be\ndoubted, seem to be more certain than sacred doctrine; for its\nprinciples--namely, articles of faith--can be doubted. Therefore\nother sciences seem to be nobler.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is the sign of a lower science to depend upon\na higher; as music depends on arithmetic. But sacred doctrine does in\na sense depend upon philosophical sciences; for Jerome observes, in\nhis Epistle to Magnus, that \"the ancient doctors so enriched their\nbooks with the ideas and phrases of the philosophers, that thou\nknowest not what more to admire in them, their profane erudition or\ntheir scriptural learning.\" Therefore sacred doctrine is inferior to\nother sciences.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Other sciences are called the handmaidens of this\none: \"Wisdom sent her maids to invite to the tower\" (Prov. 9:3).\n\n_I answer that,_ Since this science is partly speculative and partly\npractical, it transcends all others speculative and practical. Now one\nspeculative science is said to be nobler than another, either by\nreason of its greater certitude, or by reason of the higher worth of\nits subject-matter. In both these respects this science surpasses\nother speculative sciences; in point of greater certitude, because\nother sciences derive their certitude from the natural light of human\nreason, which can err; whereas this derives its certitude from the\nlight of divine knowledge, which cannot be misled: in point of the\nhigher worth of its subject-matter because this science treats chiefly\nof those things which by their sublimity transcend human reason; while\nother sciences consider only those things which are within reason's\ngrasp. Of the practical sciences, that one is nobler which is ordained\nto a further purpose, as political science is nobler than military\nscience; for the good of the army is directed to the good of the\nState. But the purpose of this science, in so far as it is practical,\nis eternal bliss; to which as to an ultimate end the purposes of every\npractical science are directed. Hence it is clear that from every\nstandpoint, it is nobler than other sciences.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It may well happen that what is in itself the\nmore certain may seem to us the less certain on account of the\nweakness of our intelligence, \"which is dazzled by the clearest\nobjects of nature; as the owl is dazzled by the light of the sun\"\n(Metaph. ii, lect. i). Hence the fact that some happen to doubt about\narticles of faith is not due to the uncertain nature of the truths,\nbut to the weakness of human intelligence; yet the slenderest\nknowledge that may be obtained of the highest things is more desirable\nthan the most certain knowledge obtained of lesser things, as is said\nin _de Animalibus_ xi.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This science can in a sense depend upon the\nphilosophical sciences, not as though it stood in need of them, but\nonly in order to make its teaching clearer. For it accepts its\nprinciples not from other sciences, but immediately from God, by\nrevelation. Therefore it does not depend upon other sciences as upon\nthe higher, but makes use of them as of the lesser, and as\nhandmaidens: even so the master sciences make use of the sciences that\nsupply their materials, as political of military science. That it thus\nuses them is not due to its own defect or insufficiency, but to the\ndefect of our intelligence, which is more easily led by what is known\nthrough natural reason (from which proceed the other sciences) to that\nwhich is above reason, such as are the teachings of this science.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 6]\n\nWhether This Doctrine Is the Same as Wisdom?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that this doctrine is not the same as wisdom.\nFor no doctrine which borrows its principles is worthy of the name of\nwisdom; seeing that the wise man directs, and is not directed (Metaph.\ni). But this doctrine borrows its principles. Therefore this science\nis not wisdom.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is a part of wisdom to prove the principles\nof other sciences. Hence it is called the chief of sciences, as is\nclear in Ethic. vi. But this doctrine does not prove the principles of\nother sciences. Therefore it is not the same as wisdom.\n\nObj. 3: Further, this doctrine is acquired by study, whereas\nwisdom is acquired by God's inspiration; so that it is numbered among\nthe gifts of the Holy Spirit (Isa. 11:2). Therefore this doctrine is\nnot the same as wisdom.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 4:6): \"This is your wisdom and\nunderstanding in the sight of nations.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ This doctrine is wisdom above all human wisdom; not\nmerely in any one order, but absolutely. For since it is the part of a\nwise man to arrange and to judge, and since lesser matters should be\njudged in the light of some higher principle, he is said to be wise in\nany one order who considers the highest principle in that order: thus\nin the order of building, he who plans the form of the house is called\nwise and architect, in opposition to the inferior laborers who trim\nthe wood and make ready the stones: \"As a wise architect, I have laid\nthe foundation\" (1 Cor. 3:10). Again, in the order of all human life,\nthe prudent man is called wise, inasmuch as he directs his acts to a\nfitting end: \"Wisdom is prudence to a man\" (Prov. 10: 23). Therefore\nhe who considers absolutely the highest cause of the whole universe,\nnamely God, is most of all called wise. Hence wisdom is said to be the\nknowledge of divine things, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 14). But\nsacred doctrine essentially treats of God viewed as the highest\ncause--not only so far as He can be known through creatures just as\nphilosophers knew Him--\"That which is known of God is manifest in\nthem\" (Rom. 1:19)--but also as far as He is known to Himself alone\nand revealed to others. Hence sacred doctrine is especially called\nwisdom.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sacred doctrine derives its principles not from\nany human knowledge, but from the divine knowledge, through which, as\nthrough the highest wisdom, all our knowledge is set in order.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The principles of other sciences either are\nevident and cannot be proved, or are proved by natural reason through\nsome other science. But the knowledge proper to this science comes\nthrough revelation and not through natural reason. Therefore it has no\nconcern to prove the principles of other sciences, but only to judge\nof them. Whatsoever is found in other sciences contrary to any truth\nof this science must be condemned as false: \"Destroying counsels and\nevery height that exalteth itself against the knowledge of God\" (2\nCor. 10:4, 5).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since judgment appertains to wisdom, the twofold\nmanner of judging produces a twofold wisdom. A man may judge in one\nway by inclination, as whoever has the habit of a virtue judges\nrightly of what concerns that virtue by his very inclination towards\nit. Hence it is the virtuous man, as we read, who is the measure and\nrule of human acts. In another way, by knowledge, just as a man\nlearned in moral science might be able to judge rightly about virtuous\nacts, though he had not the virtue. The first manner of judging divine\nthings belongs to that wisdom which is set down among the gifts of the\nHoly Ghost: \"The spiritual man judgeth all things\" (1 Cor. 2:15). And\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): \"Hierotheus is taught not by mere\nlearning, but by experience of divine things.\" The second manner of\njudging belongs to this doctrine which is acquired by study, though\nits principles are obtained by revelation.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 7]\n\nWhether God Is the Object of This Science?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is not the object of this science. For\nin every science, the nature of its object is presupposed. But this\nscience cannot presuppose the essence of God, for Damascene says (De\nFide Orth. i, iv): \"It is impossible to define the essence of God.\"\nTherefore God is not the object of this science.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever conclusions are reached in any science\nmust be comprehended under the object of the science. But in Holy Writ\nwe reach conclusions not only concerning God, but concerning many\nother things, such as creatures and human morality. Therefore God is\nnot the object of this science.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The object of the science is that of which it\nprincipally treats. But in this science, the treatment is mainly about\nGod; for it is called theology, as treating of God. Therefore God is\nthe object of this science.\n\n_I answer that,_ God is the object of this science. The relation between\na science and its object is the same as that between a habit or\nfaculty and its object. Now properly speaking, the object of a faculty\nor habit is the thing under the aspect of which all things are\nreferred to that faculty or habit, as man and stone are referred to\nthe faculty of sight in that they are colored. Hence colored things\nare the proper objects of sight. But in sacred science, all things are\ntreated of under the aspect of God: either because they are God\nHimself or because they refer to God as their beginning and end. Hence\nit follows that God is in very truth the object of this science. This\nis clear also from the principles of this science, namely, the\narticles of faith, for faith is about God. The object of the\nprinciples and of the whole science must be the same, since the whole\nscience is contained virtually in its principles. Some, however,\nlooking to what is treated of in this science, and not to the aspect\nunder which it is treated, have asserted the object of this science to\nbe something other than God--that is, either things and signs; or the\nworks of salvation; or the whole Christ, as the head and members. Of\nall these things, in truth, we treat in this science, but so far as\nthey have reference to God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although we cannot know in what consists the\nessence of God, nevertheless in this science we make use of His\neffects, either of nature or of grace, in place of a definition, in\nregard to whatever is treated of in this science concerning God; even\nas in some philosophical sciences we demonstrate something about a\ncause from its effect, by taking the effect in place of a definition\nof the cause.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Whatever other conclusions are reached in this\nsacred science are comprehended under God, not as parts or species or\naccidents but as in some way related to Him.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Sacred Doctrine is a Matter of Argument?\n\nObjection 1: It seems this doctrine is not a matter of argument. For\nAmbrose says (De Fide 1): \"Put arguments aside where faith is sought.\"\nBut in this doctrine, faith especially is sought: \"But these things\nare written that you may believe\" (John 20:31). Therefore sacred\ndoctrine is not a matter of argument.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if it is a matter of argument, the argument is\neither from authority or from reason. If it is from authority, it\nseems unbefitting its dignity, for the proof from authority is the\nweakest form of proof. But if it is from reason, this is unbefitting\nits end, because, according to Gregory (Hom. 26), \"faith has no merit\nin those things of which human reason brings its own experience.\"\nTherefore sacred doctrine is not a matter of argument.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Scripture says that a bishop should \"embrace that\nfaithful word which is according to doctrine, that he may be able to\nexhort in sound doctrine and to convince the gainsayers\" (Titus 1:9).\n\n_I answer that,_ As other sciences do not argue in proof of their\nprinciples, but argue from their principles to demonstrate other\ntruths in these sciences: so this doctrine does not argue in proof of\nits principles, which are the articles of faith, but from them it goes\non to prove something else; as the Apostle from the resurrection of\nChrist argues in proof of the general resurrection (1 Cor. 15).\nHowever, it is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical\nsciences, that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles\nnor dispute with those who deny them, but leave this to a higher\nscience; whereas the highest of them, viz. metaphysics, can dispute\nwith one who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make\nsome concession; but if he concede nothing, it can have no dispute\nwith him, though it can answer his objections. Hence Sacred Scripture,\nsince it has no science above itself, can dispute with one who denies\nits principles only if the opponent admits some at least of the truths\nobtained through divine revelation; thus we can argue with heretics\nfrom texts in Holy Writ, and against those who deny one article of\nfaith, we can argue from another. If our opponent believes nothing of\ndivine revelation, there is no longer any means of proving the\narticles of faith by reasoning, but only of answering his\nobjections--if he has any--against faith. Since faith rests upon\ninfallible truth, and since the contrary of a truth can never be\ndemonstrated, it is clear that the arguments brought against faith\ncannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can be answered.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although arguments from human reason cannot\navail to prove what must be received on faith, nevertheless, this\ndoctrine argues from articles of faith to other truths.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This doctrine is especially based upon arguments\nfrom authority, inasmuch as its principles are obtained by revelation:\nthus we ought to believe on the authority of those to whom the\nrevelation has been made. Nor does this take away from the dignity of\nthis doctrine, for although the argument from authority based on human\nreason is the weakest, yet the argument from authority based on divine\nrevelation is the strongest. But sacred doctrine makes use even of\nhuman reason, not, indeed, to prove faith (for thereby the merit of\nfaith would come to an end), but to make clear other things that are\nput forward in this doctrine. Since therefore grace does not destroy\nnature but perfects it, natural reason should minister to faith as the\nnatural bent of the will ministers to charity. Hence the Apostle says:\n\"Bringing into captivity every understanding unto the obedience of\nChrist\" (2 Cor. 10:5). Hence sacred doctrine makes use also of the\nauthority of philosophers in those questions in which they were able\nto know the truth by natural reason, as Paul quotes a saying of\nAratus: \"As some also of your own poets said: For we are also His\noffspring\" (Acts 17:28). Nevertheless, sacred doctrine makes use of\nthese authorities as extrinsic and probable arguments; but properly\nuses the authority of the canonical Scriptures as an incontrovertible\nproof, and the authority of the doctors of the Church as one that may\nproperly be used, yet merely as probable. For our faith rests upon the\nrevelation made to the apostles and prophets who wrote the canonical\nbooks, and not on the revelations (if any such there are) made to\nother doctors. Hence Augustine says (Epis. ad Hieron. xix, 1): \"Only\nthose books of Scripture which are called canonical have I learned to\nhold in such honor as to believe their authors have not erred in any\nway in writing them. But other authors I so read as not to deem\neverything in their works to be true, merely on account of their\nhaving so thought and written, whatever may have been their holiness\nand learning.\"\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 9]\n\nWhether Holy Scripture Should Use Metaphors?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that Holy Scripture should not use metaphors.\nFor that which is proper to the lowest science seems not to befit this\nscience, which holds the highest place of all. But to proceed by the\naid of various similitudes and figures is proper to poetry, the least\nof all the sciences. Therefore it is not fitting that this science\nshould make use of such similitudes.\n\nObj. 2: Further, this doctrine seems to be intended to make truth\nclear. Hence a reward is held out to those who manifest it: \"They that\nexplain me shall have life everlasting\" (Ecclus. 24:31). But by such\nsimilitudes truth is obscured. Therefore, to put forward divine truths\nby likening them to corporeal things does not befit this science.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the higher creatures are, the nearer they\napproach to the divine likeness. If therefore any creature be taken to\nrepresent God, this representation ought chiefly to be taken from the\nhigher creatures, and not from the lower; yet this is often found in\nScriptures.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Osee 12:10): \"I have multiplied\nvisions, and I have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets.\"\nBut to put forward anything by means of similitudes is to use\nmetaphors. Therefore this sacred science may use metaphors.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is befitting Holy Writ to put forward divine and\nspiritual truths by means of comparisons with material things. For God\nprovides for everything according to the capacity of its nature. Now\nit is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible\nobjects, because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in\nHoly Writ, spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of\nmaterial things. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i): \"We\ncannot be enlightened by the divine rays except they be hidden within\nthe covering of many sacred veils.\" It is also befitting Holy Writ,\nwhich is proposed to all without distinction of persons--\"To the wise\nand to the unwise I am a debtor\" (Rom. 1:14)--that spiritual truths\nbe expounded by means of figures taken from corporeal things, in order\nthat thereby even the simple who are unable by themselves to grasp\nintellectual things may be able to understand it.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Poetry makes use of metaphors to produce a\nrepresentation, for it is natural to man to be pleased with\nrepresentations. But sacred doctrine makes use of metaphors as both\nnecessary and useful.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The ray of divine revelation is not extinguished\nby the sensible imagery wherewith it is veiled, as Dionysius says\n(Coel. Hier. i); and its truth so far remains that it does not allow\nthe minds of those to whom the revelation has been made, to rest in\nthe metaphors, but raises them to the knowledge of truths; and through\nthose to whom the revelation has been made others also may receive\ninstruction in these matters. Hence those things that are taught\nmetaphorically in one part of Scripture, in other parts are taught\nmore openly. The very hiding of truth in figures is useful for the\nexercise of thoughtful minds and as a defense against the ridicule of\nthe impious, according to the words \"Give not that which is holy to\ndogs\" (Matt. 7:6).\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Dionysius says, (Coel. Hier. i) it is more\nfitting that divine truths should be expounded under the figure of\nless noble than of nobler bodies, and this for three reasons. Firstly,\nbecause thereby men's minds are the better preserved from error. For\nthen it is clear that these things are not literal descriptions of\ndivine truths, which might have been open to doubt had they been\nexpressed under the figure of nobler bodies, especially for those who\ncould think of nothing nobler than bodies. Secondly, because this is\nmore befitting the knowledge of God that we have in this life. For\nwhat He is not is clearer to us than what He is. Therefore similitudes\ndrawn from things farthest away from God form within us a truer\nestimate that God is above whatsoever we may say or think of Him.\nThirdly, because thereby divine truths are the better hidden from the\nunworthy.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 10]\n\nWhether in Holy Scripture a Word may have Several Senses?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that in Holy Writ a word cannot have several\nsenses, historical or literal, allegorical, tropological or moral, and\nanagogical. For many different senses in one text produce confusion\nand deception and destroy all force of argument. Hence no argument,\nbut only fallacies, can be deduced from a multiplicity of\npropositions. But Holy Writ ought to be able to state the truth\nwithout any fallacy. Therefore in it there cannot be several senses to\na word.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De util. cred. iii) that \"the\nOld Testament has a fourfold division as to history, etiology, analogy\nand allegory.\" Now these four seem altogether different from the four\ndivisions mentioned in the first objection. Therefore it does not seem\nfitting to explain the same word of Holy Writ according to the four\ndifferent senses mentioned above.\n\nObj. 3: Further, besides these senses, there is the parabolical,\nwhich is not one of these four.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xx, 1): \"Holy Writ by the manner\nof its speech transcends every science, because in one and the same\nsentence, while it describes a fact, it reveals a mystery.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The author of Holy Writ is God, in whose power it is to\nsignify His meaning, not by words only (as man also can do), but also\nby things themselves. So, whereas in every other science things are\nsignified by words, this science has the property, that the things\nsignified by the words have themselves also a signification. Therefore\nthat first signification whereby words signify things belongs to the\nfirst sense, the historical or literal. That signification whereby\nthings signified by words have themselves also a signification is\ncalled the spiritual sense, which is based on the literal, and\npresupposes it. Now this spiritual sense has a threefold division. For\nas the Apostle says (Heb. 10:1) the Old Law is a figure of the New\nLaw, and Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) \"the New Law itself is a\nfigure of future glory.\" Again, in the New Law, whatever our Head has\ndone is a type of what we ought to do. Therefore, so far as the things\nof the Old Law signify the things of the New Law, there is the\nallegorical sense; so far as the things done in Christ, or so far as\nthe things which signify Christ, are types of what we ought to do,\nthere is the moral sense. But so far as they signify what relates to\neternal glory, there is the anagogical sense. Since the literal sense\nis that which the author intends, and since the author of Holy Writ is\nGod, Who by one act comprehends all things by His intellect, it is not\nunfitting, as Augustine says (Confess. xii), if, even according to the\nliteral sense, one word in Holy Writ should have several senses.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The multiplicity of these senses does not\nproduce equivocation or any other kind of multiplicity, seeing that\nthese senses are not multiplied because one word signifies several\nthings, but because the things signified by the words can be\nthemselves types of other things. Thus in Holy Writ no confusion\nresults, for all the senses are founded on one--the literal--from\nwhich alone can any argument be drawn, and not from those intended in\nallegory, as Augustine says (Epis. 48). Nevertheless, nothing of Holy\nScripture perishes on account of this, since nothing necessary to\nfaith is contained under the spiritual sense which is not elsewhere\nput forward by the Scripture in its literal sense.\n\nReply Obj. 2: These three--history, etiology, analogy--are\ngrouped under the literal sense. For it is called history, as\nAugustine expounds (Epis. 48), whenever anything is simply related; it\nis called etiology when its cause is assigned, as when Our Lord gave\nthe reason why Moses allowed the putting away of wives--namely, on\naccount of the hardness of men's hearts; it is called analogy whenever\nthe truth of one text of Scripture is shown not to contradict the\ntruth of another. Of these four, allegory alone stands for the three\nspiritual senses. Thus Hugh of St. Victor (Sacram. iv, 4 Prolog.)\nincludes the anagogical under the allegorical sense, laying down three\nsenses only--the historical, the allegorical, and the tropological.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The parabolical sense is contained in the\nliteral, for by words things are signified properly and figuratively.\nNor is the figure itself, but that which is figured, the literal\nsense. When Scripture speaks of God's arm, the literal sense is not\nthat God has such a member, but only what is signified by this member,\nnamely operative power. Hence it is plain that nothing false can ever\nunderlie the literal sense of Holy Writ.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 2\n\nTHE EXISTENCE OF GOD\n(In Three Articles)\n\nBecause the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of\nGod, not only as He is in Himself, but also as He is the beginning of\nthings and their last end, and especially of rational creatures, as is\nclear from what has been already said, therefore, in our endeavor to\nexpound this science, we shall treat:\n\n(1) Of God;\n\n(2) Of the rational creature's advance towards God;\n\n(3) Of Christ, Who as man, is our way to God.\n\nIn treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall\nconsider:\n\n(1) Whatever concerns the Divine Essence;\n\n(2) Whatever concerns the distinctions of Persons;\n\n(3) Whatever concerns the procession of creatures from Him.\n\nConcerning the Divine Essence, we must consider:\n\n(1) Whether God exists?\n\n(2) The manner of His existence, or, rather, what is _not_ the\nmanner of His existence;\n\n(3) Whatever concerns His operations--namely, His knowledge, will,\npower.\n\nConcerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the proposition \"God exists\" is self-evident?\n\n(2) Whether it is demonstrable?\n\n(3) Whether God exists?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Existence of God Is Self-Evident?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now\nthose things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which\nis naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first\nprinciples. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), \"the\nknowledge of God is naturally implanted in all.\" Therefore the\nexistence of God is self-evident.\n\nObj. 2: Further, those things are said to be self-evident which\nare known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1\nPoster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration.\nThus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once\nrecognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as\nthe signification of the word \"God\" is understood, it is at once seen\nthat God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which\nnothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and\nmentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore,\nsince as soon as the word \"God\" is understood it exists mentally, it\nalso follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition \"God\nexists\" is self-evident.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For\nwhoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not\nexist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition \"Truth does\nnot exist\" is true: and if there is anything true, there must be\ntruth. But God is truth itself: \"I am the way, the truth, and the\nlife\" (John 14:6) Therefore \"God exists\" is self-evident.\n\n_On the contrary,_ No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is\nself-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states\nconcerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of\nthe proposition \"God is\" can be mentally admitted: \"The fool said in\nhis heart, There is no God\" (Ps. 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is\nnot self-evident.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on\nthe one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other,\nself-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident\nbecause the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as\n\"Man is an animal,\" for animal is contained in the essence of man. If,\ntherefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all,\nthe proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard\nto the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are\ncommon things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being,\nwhole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the\nessence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will\nbe self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the\nmeaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it\nhappens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: \"Whether\nall that is, is good\"), \"that there are some mental concepts\nself-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are\nnot in space.\" Therefore I say that this proposition, \"God exists,\" of\nitself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject,\nbecause God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (Q. 3,\nArt. 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition\nis not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that\nare more known to us, though less known in their nature--namely, by\neffects.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To know that God exists in a general and\nconfused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's\nbeatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally\ndesired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not\nto know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is\napproaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even\nthough it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine\nthat man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and\nothers in pleasures, and others in something else.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Perhaps not everyone who hears this word \"God\"\nunderstands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be\nthought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted\nthat everyone understands that by this word \"God\" is signified\nsomething than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it\ndoes not therefore follow that he understands that what the word\nsignifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can\nit be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there\nactually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought;\nand this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not\nexist.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The existence of truth in general is\nself-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident\nto us.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Can Be Demonstrated That God Exists?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the existence of God cannot be\ndemonstrated. For it is an article of faith that God exists. But what\nis of faith cannot be demonstrated, because a demonstration produces\nscientific knowledge; whereas faith is of the unseen (Heb. 11:1).\nTherefore it cannot be demonstrated that God exists.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration.\nBut we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what\nit does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore\nwe cannot demonstrate that God exists.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this\ncould only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate\nto Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between\nthe finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a\ncause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it\nseems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says: \"The invisible things of Him are\nclearly seen, being understood by the things that are made\" (Rom.\n1:20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be\ndemonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we\nmust know of anything is whether it exists.\n\n_I answer that,_ Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through\nthe cause, and is called _a priori,_ and this is to argue from what is\nprior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a\ndemonstration _a posteriori_; this is to argue from what is prior\nrelatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its\ncause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And\nfrom every effect the existence of its proper cause can be\ndemonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because\nsince every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the\ncause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is\nnot self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects\nwhich are known to us.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The existence of God and other like truths about\nGod, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith,\nbut are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural\nknowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes\nsomething that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to\nprevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of\nfaith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically\nknown and demonstrated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When the existence of a cause is demonstrated\nfrom an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the\ncause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case\nin regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of\nanything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of\nthe word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows\non the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are\nderived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence\nof God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning\nof the word \"God\".\n\nReply Obj. 3: From effects not proportionate to the cause no\nperfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect\nthe existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can\ndemonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we\ncannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 2, Art. 3]\n\nWhether God Exists?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two\ncontraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But\nthe word \"God\" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God\nexisted, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the\nworld. Therefore God does not exist.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be\naccounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it\nseems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by\nother principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things\ncan be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary\nthings can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will.\nTherefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said in the person of God: \"I am Who am.\" (Ex.\n3:14)\n\n_I answer that,_ The existence of God can be proved in five ways.\n\nThe first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is\ncertain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are\nin motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for\nnothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards\nwhich it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act.\nFor motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from\npotentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from\npotentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of\nactuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which\nis potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes\nit. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in\nactuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different\nrespects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be\npotentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is\ntherefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a\nthing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself.\nTherefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If\nthat by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this\nalso must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another\nagain. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be\nno first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that\nsubsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the\nfirst mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by\nthe hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in\nmotion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.\n\nThe second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world\nof sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no\ncase known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found\nto be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to\nitself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not\npossible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes\nfollowing in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause,\nand the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the\nintermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause\nis to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause\namong efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any\nintermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on\nto infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will\nthere be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes;\nall of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a\nfirst efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.\n\nThe third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus.\nWe find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since\nthey are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they\nare possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these\nalways to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is\nnot. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time\nthere could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true,\neven now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does\nnot exist only begins to exist by something already existing.\nTherefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been\nimpossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now\nnothing would be in existence--which is absurd. Therefore, not all\nbeings are merely possible, but there must exist something the\nexistence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has\nits necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on\nto infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by\nanother, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes.\nTherefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having\nof itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but\nrather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as\nGod.\n\nThe fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things.\nAmong beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and\nthe like. But _more_ and _less_ are predicated of different things,\naccording as they resemble in their different ways something which is\nthe maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more\nnearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something\nwhich is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently,\nsomething which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest\nin truth are greatest in being, as it is written in _Metaph._ ii. Now\nthe maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire,\nwhich is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore\nthere must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their\nbeing, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.\n\nThe fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that\nthings which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an\nend, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always,\nin the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain\nthat not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now\nwhatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be\ndirected by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the\narrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent\nbeing exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and\nthis being we call God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): \"Since God\nis the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His\nworks, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good\neven out of evil.\" This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that\nHe should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since nature works for a determinate end under\nthe direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs\nbe traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done\nvoluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than\nhuman reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things\nthat are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an\nimmovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body\nof the Article.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 3\n\nOF THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWhen the existence of a thing has been ascertained there remains the\nfurther question of the manner of its existence, in order that we may\nknow its essence. Now, because we cannot know what God is, but rather\nwhat He is not, we have no means for considering how God is, but\nrather how He is not.\n\nTherefore, we must consider:\n\n(1) How He is not;\n\n(2) How He is known by us;\n\n(3) How He is named.\n\nNow it can be shown how God is not, by denying Him whatever is opposed\nto the idea of Him, viz. composition, motion, and the like. Therefore\n\n(1) we must discuss His simplicity, whereby we deny composition in\nHim; and because whatever is simple in material things is imperfect\nand a part of something else, we shall discuss (2) His perfection;\n(3) His infinity; (4) His immutability; (5) His unity.\n\nConcerning His simplicity, there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether God is a body?\n\n(2) Whether He is composed of matter and form?\n\n(3) Whether in Him there is composition of quiddity, essence\nor nature, and subject?\n\n(4) Whether He is composed of essence and existence?\n\n(5) Whether He is composed of genus and difference?\n\n(6) Whether He is composed of subject and accident?\n\n(7) Whether He is in any way composite, or wholly simple?\n\n(8) Whether He enters into composition with other things?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 1]\n\nWhether God Is a Body?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is a body. For a body is that which has\nthe three dimensions. But Holy Scripture attributes the three\ndimensions to God, for it is written: \"He is higher than Heaven, and\nwhat wilt thou do? He is deeper than Hell, and how wilt thou know? The\nmeasure of Him is longer than the earth and broader than the sea\" (Job\n11:8, 9). Therefore God is a body.\n\nObj. 2: Further, everything that has figure is a body, since\nfigure is a quality of quantity. But God seems to have figure, for it\nis written: \"Let us make man to our image and likeness\" (Gen. 1:26).\nNow a figure is called an image, according to the text: \"Who being the\nbrightness of His glory and the figure,\" i.e. the image, \"of His\nsubstance\" (Heb. 1:3). Therefore God is a body.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever has corporeal parts is a body. Now\nScripture attributes corporeal parts to God. \"Hast thou an arm like\nGod?\" (Job 40:4); and \"The eyes of the Lord are upon the just\" (Ps.\n33:16); and \"The right hand of the Lord hath wrought strength\" (Ps.\n117:16). Therefore God is a body.\n\nObj. 4: Further, posture belongs only to bodies. But something\nwhich supposes posture is said of God in the Scriptures: \"I saw the\nLord sitting\" (Isa. 6:1), and \"He standeth up to judge\" (Isa. 3:13).\nTherefore God is a body.\n\nObj. 5: Further, only bodies or things corporeal can be a local\nterm _wherefrom_ or _whereto._ But in the Scriptures God is spoken of\nas a local term _whereto,_ according to the words, \"Come ye to Him and\nbe enlightened\" (Ps. 33:6), and as a term _wherefrom_: \"All they that\ndepart from Thee shall be written in the earth\" (Jer. 17:13).\nTherefore God is a body.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written in the Gospel of St. John (John 4:24):\n\"God is a spirit.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is absolutely true that God is not a body; and this\ncan be shown in three ways. First, because no body is in motion unless\nit be put in motion, as is evident from induction. Now it has been\nalready proved (Q. 2, A. 3), that God is the First Mover, and is\nHimself unmoved. Therefore it is clear that God is not a body.\nSecondly, because the first being must of necessity be in act, and in\nno way in potentiality. For although in any single thing that passes\nfrom potentiality to actuality, the potentiality is prior in time to\nthe actuality; nevertheless, absolutely speaking, actuality is prior\nto potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality can be reduced into\nactuality only by some being in actuality. Now it has been already\nproved that God is the First Being. It is therefore impossible that in\nGod there should be any potentiality. But every body is in\npotentiality because the continuous, as such, is divisible to\ninfinity; it is therefore impossible that God should be a body.\nThirdly, because God is the most noble of beings. Now it is impossible\nfor a body to be the most noble of beings; for a body must be either\nanimate or inanimate; and an animate body is manifestly nobler than\nany inanimate body. But an animate body is not animate precisely as\nbody; otherwise all bodies would be animate. Therefore its animation\ndepends upon some other thing, as our body depends for its animation\non the soul. Hence that by which a body becomes animated must be\nnobler than the body. Therefore it is impossible that God should be a\nbody.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 1, A. 9), Holy Writ\nputs before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of\ncorporeal things. Hence, when it attributes to God the three\ndimensions under the comparison of corporeal quantity, it implies His\nvirtual quantity; thus, by depth, it signifies His power of knowing\nhidden things; by height, the transcendence of His excelling power; by\nlength, the duration of His existence; by breadth, His act of love for\nall. Or, as says Dionysius (Div. Nom. ix), by the depth of God is\nmeant the incomprehensibility of His essence; by length, the\nprocession of His all-pervading power; by breadth, His overspreading\nall things, inasmuch as all things lie under His protection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Man is said to be after the image of God, not as\nregards his body, but as regards that whereby he excels other animals.\nHence, when it is said, \"Let us make man to our image and likeness\",\nit is added, \"And let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea\"\n(Gen. 1:26). Now man excels all animals by his reason and intelligence;\nhence it is according to his intelligence and reason, which are\nincorporeal, that man is said to be according to the image of God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Corporeal parts are attributed to God in\nScripture on account of His actions, and this is owing to a certain\nparallel. For instance the act of the eye is to see; hence the eye\nattributed to God signifies His power of seeing intellectually, not\nsensibly; and so on with the other parts.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Whatever pertains to posture, also, is only\nattributed to God by some sort of parallel. He is spoken of as\nsitting, on account of His unchangeableness and dominion; and as\nstanding, on account of His power of overcoming whatever withstands\nHim.\n\nReply Obj. 5: We draw near to God by no corporeal steps, since\nHe is everywhere, but by the affections of our soul, and by the\nactions of that same soul do we withdraw from Him; thus, to draw near\nto or to withdraw signifies merely spiritual actions based on the\nmetaphor of local motion.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 2]\n\nWhether God Is Composed of Matter and Form?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is composed of matter and form. For\nwhatever has a soul is composed of matter and form; since the soul is\nthe form of the body. But Scripture attributes a soul to God; for it\nis mentioned in Hebrews (Heb. 10:38), where God says: \"But My just man\nliveth by faith; but if he withdraw himself, he shall not please My\nsoul.\" Therefore God is composed of matter and form.\n\nObj. 2: Further, anger, joy and the like are passions of the\ncomposite. But these are attributed to God in Scripture: \"The Lord was\nexceeding angry with His people\" (Ps. 105:40). Therefore God is\ncomposed of matter and form.\n\nObj. 3: Further, matter is the principle of individualization.\nBut God seems to be individual, for He cannot be predicated of many.\nTherefore He is composed of matter and form.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Whatever is composed of matter and form is a body;\nfor dimensive quantity is the first property of matter. But God is not\na body as proved in the preceding Article; therefore He is not\ncomposed of matter and form.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible that matter should exist in God.\nFirst, because matter is in potentiality. But we have shown (Q. 2, A. 3)\nthat God is pure act, without any potentiality. Hence it is\nimpossible that God should be composed of matter and form. Secondly,\nbecause everything composed of matter and form owes its perfection and\ngoodness to its form; therefore its goodness is participated, inasmuch\nas matter participates the form. Now the first good and the\nbest--viz. God--is not a participated good, because the essential\ngood is prior to the participated good. Hence it is impossible that\nGod should be composed of matter and form. Thirdly, because every\nagent acts by its form; hence the manner in which it has its form is\nthe manner in which it is an agent. Therefore whatever is primarily\nand essentially an agent must be primarily and essentially form. Now\nGod is the first agent, since He is the first efficient cause. He is\ntherefore of His essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A soul is attributed to God because His acts\nresemble the acts of a soul; for, that we will anything, is due to our\nsoul. Hence what is pleasing to His will is said to be pleasing to His\nsoul.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Anger and the like are attributed to God on\naccount of a similitude of effect. Thus, because to punish is properly\nthe act of an angry man, God's punishment is metaphorically spoken of\nas His anger.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Forms which can be received in matter are\nindividualized by matter, which cannot be in another as in a subject\nsince it is the first underlying subject; although form of itself,\nunless something else prevents it, can be received by many. But that\nform which cannot be received in matter, but is self-subsisting, is\nindividualized precisely because it cannot be received in a subject;\nand such a form is God. Hence it does not follow that matter exists in\nGod.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 3]\n\nWhether God is the Same as His Essence or Nature?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is not the same as His essence or\nnature. For nothing can be in itself. But the substance or nature of\nGod--i.e. the Godhead--is said to be in God. Therefore it seems that\nGod is not the same as His essence or nature.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the effect is assimilated to its cause; for\nevery agent produces its like. But in created things the _suppositum_\nis not identical with its nature; for a man is not the same as his\nhumanity. Therefore God is not the same as His Godhead.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said of God that He is life itself, and not\nonly that He is a living thing: \"I am the way, the truth, and the\nlife\" (John 14:6). Now the relation between Godhead and God is the same\nas the relation between life and a living thing. Therefore God is His\nvery Godhead.\n\n_I answer that,_ God is the same as His essence or nature. To understand\nthis, it must be noted that in things composed of matter and form, the\nnature or essence must differ from the _suppositum,_ because the\nessence or nature connotes only what is included in the definition of\nthe species; as, humanity connotes all that is included in the\ndefinition of man, for it is by this that man is man, and it is this\nthat humanity signifies, that, namely, whereby man is man. Now\nindividual matter, with all the individualizing accidents, is not\nincluded in the definition of the species. For this particular flesh,\nthese bones, this blackness or whiteness, etc., are not included in\nthe definition of a man. Therefore this flesh, these bones, and the\naccidental qualities distinguishing this particular matter, are not\nincluded in humanity; and yet they are included in the thing which is\nman. Hence the thing which is a man has something more in it than has\nhumanity. Consequently humanity and a man are not wholly identical;\nbut humanity is taken to mean the formal part of a man, because the\nprinciples whereby a thing is defined are regarded as the formal\nconstituent in regard to the individualizing matter. On the other\nhand, in things not composed of matter and form, in which\nindividualization is not due to individual matter--that is to say, to\n_this_ matter--the very forms being individualized of themselves--it\nis necessary the forms themselves should be subsisting _supposita._\nTherefore _suppositum_ and nature in them are identified. Since God\nthen is not composed of matter and form, He must be His own Godhead,\nHis own Life, and whatever else is thus predicated of Him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We can speak of simple things only as though\nthey were like the composite things from which we derive our\nknowledge. Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to\nsignify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist\nwhich are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His\nsimplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are\nin God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect\nunderstands, but not that there is any composition in God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The effects of God do not imitate Him perfectly,\nbut only as far as they are able; and the imitation is here defective,\nprecisely because what is simple and one, can only be represented by\ndivers things; consequently, composition is accidental to them, and\ntherefore, in them _suppositum_ is not the same as nature.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Essence and Existence Are the Same in God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that essence and existence are not the same in\nGod. For if it be so, then the divine being has nothing added to it.\nNow being to which no addition is made is universal being which is\npredicated of all things. Therefore it follows that God is being in\ngeneral which can be predicated of everything. But this is false: \"For\nmen gave the incommunicable name to stones and wood\" (Wis. 14:21).\nTherefore God's existence is not His essence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, we can know _whether_ God exists as said above\n(Q. 2, A. 2); but we cannot know _what_ He is. Therefore God's\nexistence is not the same as His essence--that is, as His quiddity or\nnature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (Trin. vii): \"In God existence is not an\naccidental quality, but subsisting truth.\" Therefore what subsists in\nGod is His existence.\n\n_I answer that,_ God is not only His own essence, as shown in the\npreceding article, but also His own existence. This may be shown in\nseveral ways. First, whatever a thing has besides its essence must be\ncaused either by the constituent principles of that essence (like a\nproperty that necessarily accompanies the species--as the faculty of\nlaughing is proper to a man--and is caused by the constituent\nprinciples of the species), or by some exterior agent--as heat is\ncaused in water by fire. Therefore, if the existence of a thing\ndiffers from its essence, this existence must be caused either by some\nexterior agent or by its essential principles. Now it is impossible\nfor a thing's existence to be caused by its essential constituent\nprinciples, for nothing can be the sufficient cause of its own\nexistence, if its existence is caused. Therefore that thing, whose\nexistence differs from its essence, must have its existence caused by\nanother. But this cannot be true of God; because we call God the first\nefficient cause. Therefore it is impossible that in God His existence\nshould differ from His essence. Secondly, existence is that which\nmakes every form or nature actual; for goodness and humanity are\nspoken of as actual, only because they are spoken of as existing.\nTherefore existence must be compared to essence, if the latter is a\ndistinct reality, as actuality to potentiality. Therefore, since in\nGod there is no potentiality, as shown above (A. 1), it follows\nthat in Him essence does not differ from existence. Therefore His\nessence is His existence. Thirdly, because, just as that which has\nfire, but is not itself fire, is on fire by participation; so that\nwhich has existence but is not existence, is a being by participation.\nBut God is His own essence, as shown above (A. 3); if, therefore, He\nis not His own existence He will be not essential, but participated\nbeing. He will not therefore be the first being--which is absurd.\nTherefore God is His own existence, and not merely His own essence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A thing that has nothing added to it can be of\ntwo kinds. Either its essence precludes any addition; thus, for\nexample, it is of the essence of an irrational animal to be without\nreason. Or we may understand a thing to have nothing added to it,\ninasmuch as its essence does not require that anything should be added\nto it; thus the genus animal is without reason, because it is not of\nthe essence of animal in general to have reason; but neither is it to\nlack reason. And so the divine being has nothing added to it in the\nfirst sense; whereas universal being has nothing added to it in the\nsecond sense.\n\nReply Obj. 2: \"To be\" can mean either of two things. It may\nmean the act of essence, or it may mean the composition of a\nproposition effected by the mind in joining a predicate to a subject.\nTaking \"to be\" in the first sense, we cannot understand God's\nexistence nor His essence; but only in the second sense. We know that\nthis proposition which we form about God when we say \"God is,\" is\ntrue; and this we know from His effects (Q. 2, A. 2).\n______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 5]\n\nWhether God Is Contained in a Genus?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is contained in a genus. For a\nsubstance is a being that subsists of itself. But this is especially\ntrue of God. Therefore God is in a genus of substance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing can be measured save by something of its\nown genus; as length is measured by length and numbers by number. But\nGod is the measure of all substances, as the Commentator shows\n(Metaph. x). Therefore God is in the genus of substance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In the mind, genus is prior to what it contains. But\nnothing is prior to God either really or mentally. Therefore God is\nnot in any genus.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing can be in a genus in two ways; either\nabsolutely and properly, as a species contained under a genus; or as\nbeing reducible to it, as principles and privations. For example, a\npoint and unity are reduced to the genus of quantity, as its\nprinciples; while blindness and all other privations are reduced to\nthe genus of habit. But in neither way is God in a genus. That He\ncannot be a species of any genus may be shown in three ways. First,\nbecause a species is constituted of genus and difference. Now that\nfrom which the difference constituting the species is derived, is\nalways related to that from which the genus is derived, as actuality\nis related to potentiality. For animal is derived from sensitive\nnature, by concretion as it were, for that is animal, which has a\nsensitive nature. Rational being, on the other hand, is derived from\nintellectual nature, because that is rational, which has an\nintellectual nature, and intelligence is compared to sense, as\nactuality is to potentiality. The same argument holds good in other\nthings. Hence since in God actuality is not added to potentiality, it\nis impossible that He should be in any genus as a species. Secondly,\nsince the existence of God is His essence, if God were in any genus,\nHe would be the genus _being,_ because, since genus is predicated as\nan essential it refers to the essence of a thing. But the Philosopher\nhas shown (Metaph. iii) that being cannot be a genus, for every genus\nhas differences distinct from its generic essence. Now no difference\ncan exist distinct from being; for non-being cannot be a difference.\nIt follows then that God is not in a genus. Thirdly, because all in\none genus agree in the quiddity or essence of the genus which is\npredicated of them as an essential, but they differ in their\nexistence. For the existence of man and of horse is not the same; as\nalso of this man and that man: thus in every member of a genus,\nexistence and quiddity--i.e. essence--must differ. But in God they\ndo not differ, as shown in the preceding article. Therefore it is\nplain that God is not in a genus as if He were a species. From this it\nis also plain that He has no genus nor difference, nor can there be\nany definition of Him; nor, save through His effects, a demonstration\nof Him: for a definition is from genus and difference; and the mean of\na demonstration is a definition. That God is not in a genus, as\nreducible to it as its principle, is clear from this, that a principle\nreducible to any genus does not extend beyond that genus; as, a point\nis the principle of continuous quantity alone; and unity, of\ndiscontinuous quantity. But God is the principle of all being.\nTherefore He is not contained in any genus as its principle.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The word substance signifies not only what\nexists of itself--for existence cannot of itself be a genus, as shown\nin the body of the article; but, it also signifies an essence that has\nthe property of existing in this way--namely, of existing of itself;\nthis existence, however, is not its essence. Thus it is clear that God\nis not in the genus of substance.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This objection turns upon proportionate measure\nwhich must be homogeneous with what is measured. Now, God is not a\nmeasure proportionate to anything. Still, He is called the measure of\nall things, in the sense that everything has being only according as\nit resembles Him.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 6]\n\nWhether in God There Are Any Accidents?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that there are accidents in God. For substance\ncannot be an accident, as Aristotle says (Phys. i). Therefore that\nwhich is an accident in one, cannot, in another, be a substance. Thus\nit is proved that heat cannot be the substantial form of fire, because\nit is an accident in other things. But wisdom, virtue, and the like,\nwhich are accidents in us, are attributes of God. Therefore in God\nthere are accidents.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in every genus there is a first principle. But\nthere are many genera of accidents. If, therefore, the primal\nmembers of these genera are not in God, there will be many primal\nbeings other than God--which is absurd.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Every accident is in a subject. But God cannot be a\nsubject, for \"no simple form can be a subject\", as Boethius says (De\nTrin.). Therefore in God there cannot be any accident.\n\n_I answer that,_ From all we have said, it is clear there can be no\naccident in God. First, because a subject is compared to its accidents\nas potentiality to actuality; for a subject is in some sense made\nactual by its accidents. But there can be no potentiality in God, as\nwas shown (Q. 2, A. 3). Secondly, because God is His own\nexistence; and as Boethius says (Hebdom.), although every essence may\nhave something superadded to it, this cannot apply to absolute being:\nthus a heated substance can have something extraneous to heat added to\nit, as whiteness, nevertheless absolute heat can have nothing else\nthan heat. Thirdly, because what is essential is prior to what is\naccidental. Whence as God is absolute primal being, there can be in\nHim nothing accidental. Neither can He have any essential accidents\n(as the capability of laughing is an essential accident of man),\nbecause such accidents are caused by the constituent principles of the\nsubject. Now there can be nothing caused in God, since He is the first\ncause. Hence it follows that there is no accident in God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Virtue and wisdom are not predicated of God and\nof us univocally. Hence it does not follow that there are accidents in\nGod as there are in us.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since substance is prior to its accidents, the\nprinciples of accidents are reducible to the principles of the\nsubstance as to that which is prior; although God is not first as if\ncontained in the genus of substance; yet He is first in respect to all\nbeing, outside of every genus.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 7]\n\nWhether God Is Altogether Simple?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is not altogether simple. For whatever\nis from God must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all\nbeings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which\nGod has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither is God\naltogether simple.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is best must be attributed to God. But\nwith us that which is composite is better than that which is simple;\nthus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals\nthan the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that God\nis altogether simple.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): \"God is truly and\nabsolutely simple.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many\nways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is\nneither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a\nbody; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ\nfrom His _suppositum_; nor His essence from His existence; neither is\nthere in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and\naccident. Therefore, it is clear that God is nowise composite, but is\naltogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to\nits component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first\nbeing, as shown above (Q. 2, A. 3). Thirdly, because every\ncomposite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite\nunless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown\nabove (Q. 2, A. 3), since He is the first efficient cause.\nFourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and\nactuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts\nactuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the\nwhole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any\nsingle one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of\ndissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts\nof the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although\nsomething which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part\n(as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water),\nnevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot\nbe predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume\nof water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every\ncomposite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this\ncould be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which\nis not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does\nnot belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself,\nthere is nothing besides itself. And so, since God is absolute form,\nor rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary\nimplies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): \"God, Who is\nstrength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is\nlight, composed of things that are dim.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Whatever is from God imitates Him, as caused\nthings imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to\nbe in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from\nits essence, as will be shown hereafter, (Q. 4, A. 3).\n\nReply Obj. 2: With us composite things are better than simple\nthings, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in\none simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine\ngoodness is found in one simple thing (QQ. 4, A. 1, and 6, A. 2).\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 8]\n\nWhether God Enters into the Composition of Other Things?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God enters into the composition of other\nthings, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): \"The being of all things\nis that which is above being--the Godhead.\" But the being of all\nthings enters into the composition of everything. Therefore God enters\ninto the composition of other things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb.\nDom. [Serm. xxxviii]) that, \"the word of God, which is God, is an\nuncreated form.\" But a form is part of a compound. Therefore God is\npart of some compound.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from\neach other, are the same. But God and primary matter exist, and in no\nway differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same.\nBut primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also\ndoes God. Proof of the minor--whatever things differ, they differ by\nsome differences, and therefore must be composite. But God and primary\nmatter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each\nother.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): \"There can be no\ntouching Him,\" i.e. God, \"nor any other union with Him by mingling\npart with part.\"\n\nFurther, the first cause rules all things without commingling with\nthem, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).\n\n_I answer that,_ On this point there have been three errors. Some have\naffirmed that God is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De\nCiv. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those\nwho assert that God is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others\nhave said that God is the formal principle of all things; and this was\nthe theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of\nDinant, who most absurdly taught that God was primary matter. Now all\nthese contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for God to\nenter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a\nmaterial principle. First, because God is the first efficient cause.\nNow the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of\nthe thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But\nprimary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical\nwith an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the\nlatter is actual. Secondly, because, since God is the first efficient\ncause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which\nenters into composition with anything does not act primarily and\nessentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not\nact, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence God\ncannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound\ncan be absolutely primal among beings--not even matter, nor form,\nthough they are the primal parts of every compound. For matter is\nmerely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to\nactuality, as is clear from the foregoing (Q. 3, A. 1): while a\nform which is part of a compound is a participated form; and as that\nwhich participates is posterior to that which is essential, so\nlikewise is that which is participated; as fire in ignited objects is\nposterior to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved\nthat God is absolutely primal being (Q. 2, A. 3).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Godhead is called the being of all things,\nas their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form\nthat is part of a compound.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Simple things do not differ by added\ndifferences--for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and\nhorse differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which\ndifferences, however, do not differ from each other by other\ndifferences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that\nthey are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the\nPhilosopher (Metaph. x), \"things which are diverse are absolutely\ndistinct, but things which are different differ by something.\"\nTherefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and God do not differ,\nbut are by their very being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they\nare the same.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 4\n\nTHE PERFECTION OF GOD\n(In Three Articles)\n\nHaving considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of God's\nperfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is\ncalled good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly\nof the divine goodness.\n\nConcerning the first there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether God is perfect?\n\n(2) Whether God is perfect universally, as having in Himself the\nperfections of all things?\n\n(3) Whether creatures can be said to be like God?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 1]\n\nWhether God is Perfect?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that perfection does not belong to God. For we\nsay a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not befit\nGod to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God is the first beginning of things. But the\nbeginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of\nanimal and vegetable life. Therefore God is imperfect.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 4), God's essence\nis existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most\nuniversal and receptive of all modification. Therefore God is\nimperfect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written: \"Be you perfect as also your heavenly\nFather is perfect\" (Matt. 5:48).\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient\nphilosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not\npredicate \"best\" and \"most perfect\" of the first principle. The reason\nwas that the ancient philosophers considered only a material\nprinciple; and a material principle is most imperfect. For since\nmatter as such is merely potential, the first material principle must\nbe simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first\nprinciple, not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which\nmust be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely\npotential, an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the\nfirst active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore most\nperfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of\nactuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the\nmode of its perfection.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): \"Though our\nlips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of God.\" For that\nwhich is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because\ncreated things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they\nare brought into actuality, this word \"perfect\" signifies whatever is\nnot wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or not.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The material principle which with us is found to\nbe imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by\nsomething perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life\nreproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from\nwhich is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be\nthat which is actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into\nact by some being already actual.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Existence is the most perfect of all things, for\nit is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual;\nfor nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence\nis that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is\nnot compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but\nrather as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the\nexistence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is considered\na formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which\nexists.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Perfections of All Things Are in God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the perfections of all things are not in\nGod. For God is simple, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7); whereas the\nperfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections\nof all things are not in God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of\nthings are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by its\nspecific difference. But the differences by which genera are\ndivided, and species constituted, are opposed to each other.\nTherefore because opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it\nseems that the perfections of all things are not in God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely\nexists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore\nlife is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the\nessence of God is existence itself. Therefore He has not the\nperfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that \"God in His one\nexistence prepossesses all things.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken\nof as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator,\n_Metaph._ v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may\nbe seen from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection\nexists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the\nsame formality, if it is a univocal agent--as when man reproduces man;\nor in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent--thus in the\nsun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it\nis plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause:\nand although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to\npre-exist in a more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect,\nand an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the\nefficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more\nperfect way. Since therefore God is the first effective cause of\nthings, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in God in a more\neminent way. Dionysius implies the same line of argument by saying of\nGod (Div. Nom. v): \"It is not that He is this and not that, but that He\nis all, as the cause of all.\" Secondly, from what has been already\nproved, God is existence itself, of itself subsistent (Q. 3, A. 4).\nConsequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of\nbeing. For it is clear that if some hot thing has not the whole\nperfection of heat, this is because heat is not participated in its\nfull perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the\nvirtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore God is\nsubsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be\nwanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the\nperfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far as they\nhave being after some fashion. It follows therefore that the perfection\nof no one thing is wanting to God. This line of argument, too, is\nimplied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, \"God exists not\nin any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely,\nwithout limitation, uniformly;\" and afterwards he adds that, \"He is the\nvery existence to subsisting things.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div.\nNom. v)), while remaining one and shining uniformly, contains within\nitself first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many\nand diverse qualities; _a fortiori_ should all things in a kind of\nnatural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things\ndiverse and in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in God as\none, without injury to His simplicity. This suffices for the Reply to\nthe Second Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that,\nalthough existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if\nthey are considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living\nthing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living things\nalso exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although\ntherefore existence does not include life and wisdom, because that\nwhich participates in existence need not participate in every mode of\nexistence; nevertheless God's existence includes in itself life and\nwisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to\nHim who is subsisting being itself.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Any Creature Can Be Like God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that no creature can be like God. For it is\nwritten (Ps. 85:8): \"There is none among the gods like unto Thee, O\nLord.\" But of all creatures the most excellent are those which are\ncalled by participation gods. Therefore still less can other creatures be\nsaid to be like God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, likeness implies comparison. But there can be no\ncomparison between things in a different genus. Therefore neither\ncan there be any likeness. Thus we do not say that sweetness is like\nwhiteness. But no creature is in the same genus as God: since God is\nno genus, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 5). Therefore no creature is\nlike God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, we speak of those things as like which agree in\nform. But nothing can agree with God in form; for, save in God alone,\nessence and existence differ. Therefore no creature can be like to\nGod.\n\nObj. 4: Further, among like things there is mutual likeness; for\nlike is like to like. If therefore any creature is like God, God will\nbe like some creature, which is against what is said by Isaias: \"To\nwhom have you likened God?\" (Isa. 40:18).\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written: \"Let us make man to our image and\nlikeness\" (Gen. 1:26), and: \"When He shall appear we shall be like to\nHim\" (1 John 3:2).\n\n_I answer that,_ Since likeness is based upon agreement or communication\nin form, it varies according to the many modes of communication in\nform. Some things are said to be like, which communicate in the same\nform according to the same formality, and according to the same mode;\nand these are said to be not merely like, but equal in their likeness;\nas two things equally white are said to be alike in whiteness; and\nthis is the most perfect likeness. In another way, we speak of things\nas alike which communicate in form according to the same formality,\nthough not according to the same measure, but according to more or\nless, as something less white is said to be like another thing more\nwhite; and this is imperfect likeness. In a third way some things are\nsaid to be alike which communicate in the same form, but not according\nto the same formality; as we see in non-univocal agents. For since\nevery agent reproduces itself so far as it is an agent, and everything\nacts according to the manner of its form, the effect must in some way\nresemble the form of the agent. If therefore the agent is contained in\nthe same species as its effect, there will be a likeness in form\nbetween that which makes and that which is made, according to the same\nformality of the species; as man reproduces man. If, however, the\nagent and its effect are not contained in the same species, there will\nbe a likeness, but not according to the formality of the same species;\nas things generated by the sun's heat may be in some sort spoken of as\nlike the sun, not as though they received the form of the sun in its\nspecific likeness, but in its generic likeness. Therefore if there is\nan agent not contained in any genus, its effect will still more\ndistantly reproduce the form of the agent, not, that is, so as to\nparticipate in the likeness of the agent's form according to the same\nspecific or generic formality, but only according to some sort of\nanalogy; as existence is common to all. In this way all created\nthings, so far as they are beings, are like God as the first and\nuniversal principle of all being.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix), when Holy Writ\ndeclares that nothing is like God, it does not mean to deny all\nlikeness to Him. For, \"the same things can be like and unlike to God:\nlike, according as they imitate Him, as far as He, Who is not\nperfectly imitable, can be imitated; unlike according as they fall\nshort of their cause,\" not merely in intensity and remission, as that\nwhich is less white falls short of that which is more white; but\nbecause they are not in agreement, specifically or generically.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God is not related to creatures as though\nbelonging to a different genus, but as transcending every genus,\nand as the principle of all genera.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Likeness of creatures to God is not affirmed on\naccount of agreement in form according to the formality of the same\ngenus or species, but solely according to analogy, inasmuch as God is\nessential being, whereas other things are beings by participation.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Although it may be admitted that creatures are\nin some sort like God, it must nowise be admitted that God is like\ncreatures; because, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): \"A mutual\nlikeness may be found between things of the same order, but not\nbetween a cause and that which is caused.\" For, we say that a statue\nis like a man, but not conversely; so also a creature can be spoken of\nas in some sort like God; but not that God is like a creature.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 5\n\nOF GOODNESS IN GENERAL\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe next consider goodness: First, goodness in general. Secondly, the\ngoodness of God.\n\nUnder the first head there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?\n\n(2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?\n\n(3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?\n\n(4) To what cause should goodness be reduced?\n\n(5) Whether goodness consists in mode, species, and order?\n\n(6) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the\npleasant?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Goodness Differs Really from Being?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that goodness differs really from being. For\nBoethius says (De Hebdom.): \"I perceive that in nature the fact that\nthings are good is one thing: that they are is another.\" Therefore\ngoodness and being really differ.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing can be its own form. \"But that is called\ngood which has the form of being,\" according to the commentary on _De\nCausis._ Therefore goodness differs really from being.\n\nObj. 3: Further, goodness can be more or less. But being cannot\nbe more or less. Therefore goodness differs really from being.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 42) that,\n\"inasmuch as we exist we are good.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only\nin idea; which is clear from the following argument. The essence of\ngoodness consists in this, that it is in some way desirable. Hence the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. i): \"Goodness is what all desire.\" Now it is\nclear that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for\nall desire their own perfection. But everything is perfect so far as\nit is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as\nit exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is\nclear from the foregoing (Q. 3, A. 4; Q. 4, A. 1). Hence it is\nclear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness\npresents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although goodness and being are the same really,\nnevertheless since they differ in thought, they are not predicated of\na thing absolutely in the same way. Since being properly signifies\nthat something actually is, and actuality properly correlates to\npotentiality; a thing is, in consequence, said simply to have being,\naccordingly as it is primarily distinguished from that which is only\nin potentiality; and this is precisely each thing's substantial being.\nHence by its substantial being, everything is said to have being\nsimply; but by any further actuality it is said to have being\nrelatively. Thus to be white implies relative being, for to be white\ndoes not take a thing out of simply potential being; because only a\nthing that actually has being can receive this mode of being. But\ngoodness signifies perfection which is desirable; and consequently of\nultimate perfection. Hence that which has ultimate perfection is said\nto be simply good; but that which has not the ultimate perfection it\nought to have (although, in so far as it is at all actual, it has some\nperfection), is not said to be perfect simply nor good simply, but\nonly relatively. In this way, therefore, viewed in its primal (i.e.\nsubstantial) being a thing is said to be simply, and to be good\nrelatively (i.e. in so far as it has being) but viewed in its complete\nactuality, a thing is said to be relatively, and to be good simply.\nHence the saying of Boethius (De Hebdom.), \"I perceive that in nature\nthe fact that things are good is one thing; that they are is another,\"\nis to be referred to a thing's goodness simply, and having being\nsimply. Because, regarded in its primal actuality, a thing simply\nexists; and regarded in its complete actuality, it is good simply--in\nsuch sort that even in its primal actuality, it is in some sort good,\nand even in its complete actuality, it in some sort has being.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Goodness is a form so far as absolute goodness\nsignifies complete actuality.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Again, goodness is spoken of as more or less\naccording to a thing's superadded actuality, for example, as to\nknowledge or virtue.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Goodness Is Prior in Idea to Being?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that goodness is prior in idea to being. For\nnames are arranged according to the arrangement of the things\nsignified by the names. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. iii) assigned the\nfirst place, amongst the other names of God, to His goodness rather\nthan to His being. Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is the more extensive is prior in\nidea. But goodness is more extensive than being, because, as Dionysius\nnotes (Div. Nom. v), \"goodness extends to things both existing and\nnon-existing; whereas existence extends to existing things alone.\"\nTherefore goodness is in idea prior to being.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is the more universal is prior in idea. But\ngoodness seems to be more universal than being, since goodness has the\naspect of desirable; whereas to some non-existence is desirable; for\nit is said of Judas: \"It were better for him, if that man had not been\nborn\" (Matt. 26:24). Therefore in idea goodness is prior to being.\n\nObj. 4: Further, not only is existence desirable, but life,\nknowledge, and many other things besides. Thus it seems that existence\nis a particular appetible, and goodness a universal appetible.\nTherefore, absolutely, goodness is prior in idea to being.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said by Aristotle (De Causis) that \"the first\nof created things is being.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning\nsignified by the name of a thing is that which the mind conceives of\nthe thing and intends by the word that stands for it. Therefore, that\nis prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the\nfirst thing conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is\nknowable only inasmuch as it is in actuality. Hence, being is the\nproper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as\nsound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is\nprior to goodness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Dionysius discusses the Divine Names (Div. Nom.\ni, iii) as implying some causal relation in God; for we name God, as\nhe says, from creatures, as a cause from its effects. But goodness,\nsince it has the aspect of desirable, implies the idea of a final\ncause, the causality of which is first among causes, since an agent\ndoes not act except for some end; and by an agent matter is moved to\nits form. Hence the end is called the cause of causes. Thus goodness,\nas a cause, is prior to being, as is the end to the form. Therefore\namong the names signifying the divine causality, goodness precedes\nbeing. Again, according to the Platonists, who, through not\ndistinguishing primary matter from privation, said that matter was\nnon-being, goodness is more extensively participated than being; for\nprimary matter participates in goodness as tending to it, for all seek\ntheir like; but it does not participate in being, since it is presumed\nto be non-being. Therefore Dionysius says that \"goodness extends to\nnon-existence\" (Div. Nom. v).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The same solution is applied to this objection.\nOr it may be said that goodness extends to existing and non-existing\nthings, not so far as it can be predicated of them, but so far as it\ncan cause them--if, indeed, by non-existence we understand not simply\nthose things which do not exist, but those which are potential, and\nnot actual. For goodness has the aspect of the end, in which not only\nactual things find their completion, but also towards which tend even\nthose things which are not actual, but merely potential. Now being\nimplies the habitude of a formal cause only, either inherent or\nexemplar; and its causality does not extend save to those things which\nare actual.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Non-being is desirable, not of itself, but only\nrelatively--i.e. inasmuch as the removal of an evil, which can only\nbe removed by non-being, is desirable. Now the removal of an evil\ncannot be desirable, except so far as this evil deprives a thing of\nsome being. Therefore being is desirable of itself; and non-being only\nrelatively, inasmuch as one seeks some mode of being of which one\ncannot bear to be deprived; thus even non-being can be spoken of as\nrelatively good.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Life, wisdom, and the like, are desirable only\nso far as they are actual. Hence, in each one of them some sort of\nbeing is desired. And thus nothing can be desired except being; and\nconsequently nothing is good except being.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Every Being Is Good?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is\nsomething superadded to being, as is clear from A. 1. But whatever is\nadded to being limits it; as substance, quantity, quality, etc.\nTherefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being is good.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no evil is good: \"Woe to you that call evil good\nand good evil\" (Isa. 5:20). But some things are called evil. Therefore\nnot every being is good.\n\nObj. 3: Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary\nmatter does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires.\nTherefore primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness.\nTherefore not every being is good.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that \"in\nmathematics goodness does not exist.\" But mathematics are entities;\notherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not\nevery being is good.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Every being that is not God is God's creature. Now\nevery creature of God is good (1 Tim. 4:4): and God is the greatest\ngood. Therefore every being is good.\n\n_I answer that,_ Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as\nbeing, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act\nimplies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability\nand goodness, as is clear from A. 1. Hence it follows that every being\nas such is good.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Substance, quantity, quality, and everything\nincluded in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or\nnature. Now in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being\nbeyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper\nto being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not\nlimit being.\n\nReply Obj. 2: No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as\nbeing, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be\nevil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil,\nbecause it lacks the power to see well.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As primary matter has only potential being, so\nit is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists,\nprimary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the\nprivation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does participate to a\ncertain extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or aptitude for,\ngoodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to\ndesire.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Mathematical entities do not subsist as\nrealities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted;\nbut they have only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted\nfrom motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end,\nwhich itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant\nthat there should be in some logical entity neither goodness nor form\nof goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness,\nas was said in the preceding article.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Goodness Has the Aspect of a Final Cause?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final\ncause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div.\nNom. iv), \"Goodness is praised as beauty.\" But beauty has the aspect\nof a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal\ncause.\n\nObj. 2: Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says\n(Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and\nare. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause.\nTherefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that\n\"we exist because God is good.\" But we owe our existence to God as the\nefficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient\ncause.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that \"that is to be\nconsidered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of\nwhich something is.\" Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final\ncause.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since goodness is that which all things desire, and\nsince this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies\nthe aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes\nthe idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see\nthat what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g.\nheats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the\nheat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in causing,\ngoodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act;\nsecondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes\nthe form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take\nplace, so that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being;\nsecondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect\nin being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as\nthe Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the\nformality of goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical\nfundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the\nform; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ\nlogically, for goodness properly relates to the appetite (goodness\nbeing what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an\nend (the appetite being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the\nother hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful\nthings are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due\nproportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in\nwhat is after their own kind--because even sense is a sort of reason,\njust as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by\nassimilation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs\nto the nature of a formal cause.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the\nsense that an end is said to move.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He who has a will is said to be good, so far as\nhe has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever\npowers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good\nunderstanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end\nas to its proper object. Thus the saying, \"we exist because God is\ngood\" has reference to the final cause.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Essence of Goodness Consists in Mode, Species and Order?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in\nmode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But\nmode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it\nis written: \"Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and\nweight\" (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can be reduced species, mode\nand order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): \"Measure fixes the\nmode of everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it\nrest and stability.\" Therefore the essence of goodness does not\nconsist in mode, species and order.\n\nObj. 2: Further, mode, species and order are themselves good.\nTherefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and\norder, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The\nsame would be the case with species and order in endless succession.\n\nObj. 3: Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and\norder. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the\nessence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.\n\nObj. 4: Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness\ncannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species\nand order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode,\nspecies and order.\n\nObj. 5: Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight,\nnumber and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But\nnot every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says\n(Hexam. i, 9): \"It is of the nature of light not to have been created\nin number, weight and measure.\" Therefore the essence of goodness does\nnot consist in mode, species and order.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): \"These\nthree--mode, species and order--as common good things, are in\neverything God has made; thus, where these three abound the things are\nvery good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they\ndo not exist at all, there can be nothing good.\" But this would not be\nunless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the\nessence of goodness consists in mode, species and order.\n\n_I answer that,_ Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect;\nfor in that way only is it desirable (as shown above, AA. 1, 3). Now\na thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the\nmode of its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form\n(and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form\ncertain things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect\nand good it must have a form, together with all that precedes and\nfollows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or\ncommensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient, and\nthis is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks\nthe mode. But the form itself is signified by the species; for\neverything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is\nsaid to give the species, for definitions signifying species are like\nnumbers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a unit added\nto, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a difference added\nto, or taken from a definition, changes its species. Further, upon the\nform follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something\nof the sort; for everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends\ntowards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to\nweight and order. Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists\nin perfection, consists also in mode, species and order.\n\nReply Obj. 1: These three only follow upon being, so far as it\nis perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Mode, species and order are said to be good, and\nto be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but\nbecause it is through them that other things are both beings and good.\nHence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: for\nthey are spoken of as good, not as though formally constituted so by\nsomething else, but as formally constituting others good: thus\nwhiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything\nelse; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an\nobject that is white.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Every being is due to some form. Hence,\naccording to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus,\na man has a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned\nand so on; according to everything predicated of him. But evil\ndeprives a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of\nthat being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every mode, species\nand order, but only such as follow upon the being of sight.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), \"Every\nmode, as mode, is good\" (and the same can be said of species and\norder). \"But an evil mode, species and order are so called as being\nless than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they\nought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out\nof place and incongruous.\"\n\nReply Obj. 5: The nature of light is spoken of as being\nwithout number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison\nwith corporeal things, because the power of light extends to all\ncorporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first\nbody that causes change, i.e. the heavens.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Goodness Is Rightly Divided into the Virtuous*, the Useful\nand the Pleasant? [*\"Bonum honestum\" is the virtuous good considered\nas fitting. Cf. II-II, Q. 141, A. 3; Q. 145.]\n\nObjection 1: It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the\nvirtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by the\nten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the\nvirtuous, the useful and the pleasant can be found under one\npredicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every division is made by opposites. But these\nthree do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and\nno wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the\ndivision were made by opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful\nwould be opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore\nthis division is incorrect.\n\nObj. 3: Further, where one thing is on account of another, there\nis only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far as it\nis pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided\nagainst the pleasant and the virtuous.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De\nOffic. i, 9)\n\n_I answer that,_ This division properly concerns human goodness. But if\nwe consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal\npoint of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns\ngoodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable,\nand is a term of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose\nmovement can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural\nbody. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end\nabsolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the\nend, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of\nmovement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the\nultimate term of movement can be taken in two ways, either as the\nthing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state\nof rest in that thing. Thus, in the movement of the appetite, the\nthing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite relatively,\nas a means by which something tends towards another, is called the\nuseful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating\nthe movement of the appetite, as a thing towards which for its own\nsake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous is\nthat which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the\nmovement of the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is\ncalled the pleasant.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Goodness, so far as it is identical with being,\nis divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it\naccording to its proper formality.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This division is not by opposite things; but by\nopposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no\nother formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant,\nbeing sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful\napplies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are\ndesired only as helpful to something further, as the taking of bitter\nmedicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in\nthemselves.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Goodness is not divided into these three as\nsomething univocal to be predicated equally of them all; but as\nsomething analogical to be predicated of them according to priority\nand posteriority. Hence it is predicated chiefly of the virtuous; then\nof the pleasant; and lastly of the useful.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 6\n\nTHE GOODNESS OF GOD\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe next consider the goodness of God; under which head there are four\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether goodness belongs to God?\n\n(2) Whether God is the supreme good?\n\n(3) Whether He alone is essentially good?\n\n(4) Whether all things are good by the divine goodness?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 6, Art. 1]\n\nWhether God is good?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that to be good does not belong to God. For\ngoodness consists in mode, species and order. But these do not seem to\nbelong to God; since God is immense and is not ordered to anything\nelse. Therefore to be good does not belong to God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the good is what all things desire. But all\nthings do not desire God, because all things do not know Him; and\nnothing is desired unless it is known. Therefore to be good does not\nbelong to God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lam. 3:25): \"The Lord is good to them\nthat hope in Him, to the soul that seeketh Him.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ To be good belongs pre-eminently to God. For a thing is\ngood according to its desirableness. Now everything seeks after its\nown perfection; and the perfection and form of an effect consist in a\ncertain likeness to the agent, since every agent makes its like; and\nhence the agent itself is desirable and has the nature of good. For\nthe very thing which is desirable in it is the participation of its\nlikeness. Therefore, since God is the first effective cause of all\nthings, it is manifest that the aspect of good and of desirableness\nbelong to Him; and hence Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) attributes good to\nGod as to the first efficient cause, saying that, God is called good\n\"as by Whom all things subsist.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: To have mode, species and order belongs to the\nessence of caused good; but good is in God as in its cause, and hence\nit belongs to Him to impose mode, species and order on others;\nwherefore these three things are in God as in their cause.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All things, by desiring their own perfection,\ndesire God Himself, inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so\nmany similitudes of the divine being; as appears from what is said\nabove (Q. 4, A. 3). And so of those things which desire God, some\nknow Him as He is Himself, and this is proper to the rational\ncreature; others know some participation of His goodness, and this\nbelongs also to sensible knowledge; others have a natural desire\nwithout knowledge, as being directed to their ends by a higher\nintelligence.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 6, Art. 2]\n\nWhether God Is the Supreme Good?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is not the supreme good. For the\nsupreme good adds something to good; otherwise it would belong to\nevery good. But everything which is an addition to anything else is a\ncompound thing: therefore the supreme good is a compound. But God is\nsupremely simple; as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore God\nis not the supreme good.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"Good is what all desire,\" as the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. i, 1). Now what all desire is nothing but God, Who is the\nend of all things: therefore there is no other good but God. This\nappears also from what is said (Luke 18:19): \"None is good but God\nalone.\" But we use the word supreme in comparison with others, as e.g.\nsupreme heat is used in comparison with all other heats. Therefore God\ncannot be called the supreme good.\n\nObj. 3: Further, supreme implies comparison. But things not in\nthe same genus are not comparable; as, sweetness is not properly\ngreater or less than a line. Therefore, since God is not in the same\ngenus as other good things, as appears above (QQ. 3, A. 5;\n4, A. 3) it seems that God cannot be called the supreme good in\nrelation to others.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. ii) that, the Trinity of the\ndivine persons is \"the supreme good, discerned by purified minds.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ God is the supreme good simply, and not only as\nexisting in any genus or order of things. For good is attributed to\nGod, as was said in the preceding article, inasmuch as all desired\nperfections flow from Him as from the first cause. They do not,\nhowever, flow from Him as from a univocal agent, as shown above\n(Q. 4, A. 2); but as from an agent which does not agree with its\neffects either in species or genus. Now the likeness of an effect in\nthe univocal cause is found uniformly; but in the equivocal cause it\nis found more excellently, as, heat is in the sun more excellently\nthan it is in fire. Therefore as good is in God as in the first, but\nnot the univocal, cause of all things, it must be in Him in a most\nexcellent way; and therefore He is called the supreme good.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The supreme good does not add to good any\nabsolute thing, but only a relation. Now a relation of God to\ncreatures, is not a reality in God, but in the creature; for it is in\nGod in our idea only: as, what is knowable is so called with relation\nto knowledge, not that it depends on knowledge, but because knowledge\ndepends on it. Thus it is not necessary that there should be\ncomposition in the supreme good, but only that other things are\ndeficient in comparison with it.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When we say that good is what all desire, it is\nnot to be understood that every kind of good thing is desired by all;\nbut that whatever is desired has the nature of good. And when it is\nsaid, \"None is good but God alone,\" this is to be understood of\nessential goodness, as will be explained in the next article.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Things not of the same genus are in no way\ncomparable to each other if indeed they are in different genera. Now\nwe say that God is not in the same genus with other good things; not\nthat He is any other genus, but that He is outside genus, and is the\nprinciple of every genus; and thus He is compared to others by excess,\nand it is this kind of comparison the supreme good implies.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I. Q. 6, Art. 3]\n\nWhether to Be Essentially Good Belongs to God Alone?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that to be essentially good does not belong to\nGod alone. For as _one_ is convertible with _being,_ so is _good;_ as\nwe said above (Q. 5, A. 1). But every being is one essentially, as\nappears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iv); therefore every being is\ngood essentially.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if good is what all things desire, since being\nitself is desired by all, then the being of each thing is its good.\nBut everything is a being essentially; therefore every being is good\nessentially.\n\nObj. 3: Further, everything is good by its own goodness.\nTherefore if there is anything which is not good essentially, it is\nnecessary to say that its goodness is not its own essence. Therefore\nits goodness, since it is a being, must be good; and if it is good by\nsome other goodness, the same question applies to that goodness also;\ntherefore we must either proceed to infinity, or come to some goodness\nwhich is not good by any other goodness. Therefore the first\nsupposition holds good. Therefore everything is good essentially.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Hebdom.), that \"all things but God\nare good by participation.\" Therefore they are not good essentially.\n\n_I answer that,_ God alone is good essentially. For everything is called\ngood according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is\nthreefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being;\nsecondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its\nperfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to\nsomething else as the end. Thus, for instance, the first perfection of\nfire consists in its existence, which it has through its own\nsubstantial form; its secondary perfection consists in heat, lightness\nand dryness, and the like; its third perfection is to rest in its own\nplace. This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own\nessence; it belongs to God only, in Whom alone essence is existence;\nin Whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others\naccidentally belongs to Him essentially; as, to be powerful, wise and\nthe like, as appears from what is stated above (Q. 3, A. 6); and\nHe is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the\nlast end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every\nkind of perfection by His own essence; therefore He Himself alone is\ngood essentially.\n\nReply Obj. 1: \"One\" does not include the idea of perfection,\nbut only of indivision, which belongs to everything according to its\nown essence. Now the essences of simple things are undivided both\nactually and potentially, but the essences of compounds are undivided\nonly actually; and therefore everything must be one essentially, but\nnot good essentially, as was shown above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although everything is good in that it has\nbeing, yet the essence of a creature is not very being; and therefore\nit does not follow that a creature is good essentially.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The goodness of a creature is not its very\nessence, but something superadded; it is either its existence, or some\nadded perfection, or the order to its end. Still, the goodness itself\nthus added is good, just as it is being. But for this reason is it\ncalled being because by it something has being, not because it itself\nhas being through something else: hence for this reason is it called\ngood because by it something is good, and not because it itself has\nsome other goodness whereby it is good.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 6, Art. 4]\n\nWhether All Things Are Good by the Divine Goodness?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness.\nFor Augustine says (De Trin. viii), \"This and that are good; take away\nthis and that, and see good itself if thou canst; and so thou shalt\nsee God, good not by any other good, but the good of every good.\" But\neverything is good by its own good; therefore everything is good by\nthat very good which is God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), all things are\ncalled good, accordingly as they are directed to God, and this is by\nreason of the divine goodness; therefore all things are good by the\ndivine goodness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ All things are good, inasmuch as they have being. But\nthey are not called beings through the divine being, but through their\nown being; therefore all things are not good by the divine goodness,\nbut by their own goodness.\n\n_I answer that,_ As regards relative things, we must admit extrinsic\ndenomination; as, a thing is denominated \"placed\" from \"place,\" and\n\"measured\" from \"measure.\" But as regards absolute things opinions\ndiffer. Plato held the existence of separate ideas (Q. 84, A. 4)\nof all things, and that individuals were denominated by them as\nparticipating in the separate ideas; for instance, that Socrates is\ncalled man according to the separate idea of man. Now just as he laid\ndown separate ideas of man and horse which he called absolute man and\nabsolute horse, so likewise he laid down separate ideas of \"being\" and\nof \"one,\" and these he called absolute being and absolute oneness; and\nby participation of these, everything was called \"being\" or \"one\"; and\nwhat was thus absolute being and absolute one, he said was the supreme\ngood. And because good is convertible with being, as one is also; he\ncalled God the absolute good, from whom all things are called good by\nway of participation.\n\nAlthough this opinion appears to be unreasonable in affirming separate\nideas of natural things as subsisting of themselves--as Aristotle\nargues in many ways--still, it is absolutely true that there is first\nsomething which is essentially being and essentially good, which we\ncall God, as appears from what is shown above (Q. 2, A. 3), and\nAristotle agrees with this. Hence from the first being, essentially\nsuch, and good, everything can be called good and a being, inasmuch as\nit participates in it by way of a certain assimilation which is far\nremoved and defective; as appears from the above (Q. 4, A. 3).\n\nEverything is therefore called good from the divine goodness, as from\nthe first exemplary effective and final principle of all goodness.\nNevertheless, everything is called good by reason of the similitude of\nthe divine goodness belonging to it, which is formally its own\ngoodness, whereby it is denominated good. And so of all things there\nis one goodness, and yet many goodnesses.\n\nThis is a sufficient Reply to the Objections.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 7\n\nTHE INFINITY OF GOD\n(In Four Articles)\n\nAfter considering the divine perfection we must consider the divine\ninfinity, and God's existence in things: for God is everywhere, and in\nall things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite.\n\nConcerning the first, there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether God is infinite?\n\n(2) Whether anything besides Him is infinite in essence?\n\n(3) Whether anything can be infinitude in magnitude?\n\n(4) Whether an infinite multitude can exist?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 7, Art. 1]\n\nWhether God Is Infinite?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is not infinite. For everything\ninfinite is imperfect, as the Philosopher says; because it has parts\nand matter, as is said in Phys. iii. But God is most perfect;\ntherefore He is not infinite.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. i), finite\nand infinite belong to quantity. But there is no quantity in God, for\nHe is not a body, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 1). Therefore it\ndoes not belong to Him to be infinite.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is here in such a way as not to be\nelsewhere, is finite according to place. Therefore that which is a\nthing in such a way as not to be another thing, is finite according to\nsubstance. But God is this, and not another; for He is not a stone or\nwood. Therefore God is not infinite in substance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4) that \"God is\ninfinite and eternal, and boundless.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ All the ancient philosophers attribute infinitude to\nthe first principle, as is said (Phys. iii), and with reason; for they\nconsidered that things flow forth infinitely from the first principle.\nBut because some erred concerning the nature of the first principle,\nas a consequence they erred also concerning its infinity; forasmuch as\nthey asserted that matter was the first principle; consequently they\nattributed to the first principle a material infinity to the effect\nthat some infinite body was the first principle of things.\n\nWe must consider therefore that a thing is called infinite because it\nis not finite. Now matter is in a way made finite by form, and the\nform by matter. Matter indeed is made finite by form, inasmuch as\nmatter, before it receives its form, is in potentiality to many forms;\nbut on receiving a form, it is terminated by that one. Again, form is\nmade finite by matter, inasmuch as form, considered in itself, is\ncommon to many; but when received in matter, the form is determined to\nthis one particular thing. Now matter is perfected by the form by\nwhich it is made finite; therefore infinite as attributed to matter,\nhas the nature of something imperfect; for it is as it were formless\nmatter. On the other hand, form is not made perfect by matter, but\nrather is contracted by matter; and hence the infinite, regarded on\nthe part of the form not determined by matter, has the nature of\nsomething perfect. Now being is the most formal of all things, as\nappears from what is shown above (Q. 4, A. 1, Obj. 3). Since\ntherefore the divine being is not a being received in anything, but He\nis His own subsistent being as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 4), it is\nclear that God Himself is infinite and perfect.\n\nFrom this appears the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Quantity is terminated by its form, which can be\nseen in the fact that a figure which consists in quantity terminated,\nis a kind of quantitative form. Hence the infinite of quantity is the\ninfinite of matter; such a kind of infinite cannot be attributed to\nGod; as was said above, in this article.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The fact that the being of God is self-subsisting,\nnot received in any other, and is thus called infinite, shows Him\nto be distinguished from all other beings, and all others to be\napart from Him. Even so, were there such a thing as a\nself-subsisting whiteness, the very fact that it did not exist in\nanything else, would make it distinct from every other whiteness\nexisting in a subject.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 7, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Anything but God Can Be Essentially Infinite?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that something else besides God can be\nessentially infinite. For the power of anything is proportioned to its\nessence. Now if the essence of God is infinite, His power must also be\ninfinite. Therefore He can produce an infinite effect, since the\nextent of a power is known by its effect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever has infinite power, has an infinite\nessence. Now the created intellect has an infinite power; for it\napprehends the universal, which can extend itself to an infinitude of\nsingular things. Therefore every created intellectual substance is\ninfinite.\n\nObj. 3: Further, primary matter is something other than God, as\nwas shown above (Q. 3, A. 8). But primary matter is infinite.\nTherefore something besides God can be infinite.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The infinite cannot have a beginning, as said in\nPhys. iii. But everything outside God is from God as from its first\nprinciple. Therefore besides God nothing can be infinite.\n\n_I answer that,_ Things other than God can be relatively infinite, but\nnot absolutely infinite. For with regard to infinite as applied to\nmatter, it is manifest that everything actually existing possesses a\nform; and thus its matter is determined by form. But because matter,\nconsidered as existing under some substantial form, remains in\npotentiality to many accidental forms, which is absolutely finite can\nbe relatively infinite; as, for example, wood is finite according to\nits own form, but still it is relatively infinite, inasmuch as it is\nin potentiality to an infinite number of shapes. But if we speak of\nthe infinite in reference to form, it is manifest that those things,\nthe forms of which are in matter, are absolutely finite, and in no way\ninfinite. If, however, any created forms are not received into matter,\nbut are self-subsisting, as some think is the case with angels, these\nwill be relatively infinite, inasmuch as such kinds of forms are not\nterminated, nor contracted by any matter. But because a created form\nthus subsisting has being, and yet is not its own being, it follows\nthat its being is received and contracted to a determinate nature.\nHence it cannot be absolutely infinite.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is against the nature of a made thing for its\nessence to be its existence; because subsisting being is not a created\nbeing; hence it is against the nature of a made thing to be absolutely\ninfinite. Therefore, as God, although He has infinite power, cannot\nmake a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two\ncontradictories are true at the same time), so likewise He cannot make\nanything to be absolutely infinite.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The fact that the power of the intellect extends\nitself in a way to infinite things, is because the intellect is a form\nnot in matter, but either wholly separated from matter, as is the\nangelic substance, or at least an intellectual power, which is not the\nact of any organ, in the intellectual soul joined to a body.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Primary matter does not exist by itself in\nnature, since it is not actually being, but potentially only; hence it\nis something concreated rather than created. Nevertheless, primary\nmatter even as a potentiality is not absolutely infinite, but\nrelatively, because its potentiality extends only to natural forms.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 7, Art. 3]\n\nWhether an Actually Infinite Magnitude Can Exist?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that there can be something actually infinite in\nmagnitude. For in mathematics there is no error, since \"there is no\nlie in things abstract,\" as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii). But\nmathematics uses the infinite in magnitude; thus, the geometrician in\nhis demonstrations says, \"Let this line be infinite.\" Therefore it is\nnot impossible for a thing to be infinite in magnitude.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what is not against the nature of anything, can\nagree with it. Now to be infinite is not against the nature of\nmagnitude; but rather both the finite and the infinite seem to be\nproperties of quantity. Therefore it is not impossible for some\nmagnitude to be infinite.\n\nObj. 3: Further, magnitude is infinitely divisible, for the\ncontinuous is defined that which is infinitely divisible, as is clear\nfrom Phys. iii. But contraries are concerned about one and the same\nthing. Since therefore addition is opposed to division, and increase\nopposed to diminution, it appears that magnitude can be increased to\ninfinity. Therefore it is possible for magnitude to be infinite.\n\nObj. 4: Further, movement and time have quantity and continuity\nderived from the magnitude over which movement passes, as is said in\nPhys. iv. But it is not against the nature of time and movement to be\ninfinite, since every determinate indivisible in time and circular\nmovement is both a beginning and an end. Therefore neither is it\nagainst the nature of magnitude to be infinite.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Every body has a surface. But every body which has a\nsurface is finite; because surface is the term of a finite body.\nTherefore all bodies are finite. The same applies both to surface and\nto a line. Therefore nothing is infinite in magnitude.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is one thing to be infinite in essence, and another\nto be infinite in magnitude. For granted that a body exists infinite\nin magnitude, as fire or air, yet this could not be infinite in\nessence, because its essence would be terminated in a species by its\nform, and confined to individuality by matter. And so assuming from\nthese premises that no creature is infinite in essence, it still\nremains to inquire whether any creature can be infinite in magnitude.\n\nWe must therefore observe that a body, which is a complete magnitude,\ncan be considered in two ways; mathematically, in respect to its\nquantity only; and naturally, as regards its matter and form.\n\nNow it is manifest that a natural body cannot be actually infinite.\nFor every natural body has some determined substantial form. Since\ntherefore the accidents follow upon the substantial form, it is\nnecessary that determinate accidents should follow upon a determinate\nform; and among these accidents is quantity. So every natural body has\na greater or smaller determinate quantity. Hence it is impossible for\na natural body to be infinite. The same appears from movement; because\nevery natural body has some natural movement; whereas an infinite body\ncould not have any natural movement; neither direct, because nothing\nmoves naturally by a direct movement unless it is out of its place;\nand this could not happen to an infinite body, for it would occupy\nevery place, and thus every place would be indifferently its own\nplace. Neither could it move circularly; forasmuch as circular motion\nrequires that one part of the body is necessarily transferred to a\nplace occupied by another part, and this could not happen as regards\nan infinite circular body: for if two lines be drawn from the centre,\nthe farther they extend from the centre, the farther they are from\neach other; therefore, if a body were infinite, the lines would be\ninfinitely distant from each other; and thus one could never occupy\nthe place belonging to any other.\n\nThe same applies to a mathematical body. For if we imagine a\nmathematical body actually existing, we must imagine it under some\nform, because nothing is actual except by its form; hence, since the\nform of quantity as such is figure, such a body must have some figure,\nand so would be finite; for figure is confined by a term or boundary.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A geometrician does not need to assume a line\nactually infinite, but takes some actually finite line, from which he\nsubtracts whatever he finds necessary; which line he calls infinite.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although the infinite is not against the nature\nof magnitude in general, still it is against the nature of any species\nof it; thus, for instance, it is against the nature of a bicubical or\ntricubical magnitude, whether circular or triangular, and so on. Now\nwhat is not possible in any species cannot exist in the genus; hence\nthere cannot be any infinite magnitude, since no species of magnitude\nis infinite.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The infinite in quantity, as was shown above,\nbelongs to matter. Now by division of the whole we approach to matter,\nforasmuch as parts have the aspect of matter; but by addition we\napproach to the whole which has the aspect of a form. Therefore the\ninfinite is not in the addition of magnitude, but only in division.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Movement and time are whole, not actually but\nsuccessively; hence they have potentiality mixed with actuality. But\nmagnitude is an actual whole; therefore the infinite in quantity\nrefers to matter, and does not agree with the totality of magnitude;\nyet it agrees with the totality of time and movement: for it is proper\nto matter to be in potentiality.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 7, Art. 4]\n\nWhether an Infinite Multitude Can Exist?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that an actually infinite multitude is possible.\nFor it is not impossible for a potentiality to be made actual. But\nnumber can be multiplied to infinity. Therefore it is possible for an\ninfinite multitude actually to exist.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is possible for any individual of any species\nto be made actual. But the species of figures are infinite. Therefore\nan infinite number of actual figures is possible.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things not opposed to each other do not obstruct\neach other. But supposing a multitude of things to exist, there can\nstill be many others not opposed to them. Therefore it is not\nimpossible for others also to coexist with them, and so on to\ninfinitude; therefore an actual infinite number of things is possible.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written, \"Thou hast ordered all things in\nmeasure, and number, and weight\" (Wis. 11:21).\n\n_I answer that,_ A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some, as\nAvicenna and Algazel, said that it was impossible for an actually\ninfinite multitude to exist absolutely; but that an accidentally\ninfinite multitude was not impossible. A multitude is said to be\ninfinite absolutely, when an infinite multitude is necessary that\nsomething may exist. Now this is impossible; because it would entail\nsomething dependent on an infinity for its existence; and hence its\ngeneration could never come to be, because it is impossible to pass\nthrough an infinite medium.\n\nA multitude is said to be accidentally infinite when its existence as\nsuch is not necessary, but accidental. This can be shown, for example,\nin the work of a carpenter requiring a certain absolute multitude;\nnamely, art in the soul, the movement of the hand, and a hammer; and\nsupposing that such things were infinitely multiplied, the\ncarpentering work would never be finished, forasmuch as it would\ndepend on an infinite number of causes. But the multitude of hammers,\ninasmuch as one may be broken and another used, is an accidental\nmultitude; for it happens by accident that many hammers are used, and\nit matters little whether one or two, or many are used, or an infinite\nnumber, if the work is carried on for an infinite time. In this way\nthey said that there can be an accidentally infinite multitude.\n\nThis, however, is impossible; since every kind of multitude must\nbelong to a species of multitude. Now the species of multitude are to\nbe reckoned by the species of numbers. But no species of number is\ninfinite; for every number is multitude measured by one. Hence it is\nimpossible for there to be an actually infinite multitude, either\nabsolute or accidental. Likewise multitude in nature is created; and\neverything created is comprehended under some clear intention of the\nCreator; for no agent acts aimlessly. Hence everything created must be\ncomprehended in a certain number. Therefore it is impossible for an\nactually infinite multitude to exist, even accidentally. But a\npotentially infinite multitude is possible; because the increase of\nmultitude follows upon the division of magnitude; since the more a\nthing is divided, the greater number of things result. Hence, as the\ninfinite is to be found potentially in the division of the continuous,\nbecause we thus approach matter, as was shown in the preceding\narticle, by the same rule, the infinite can be also found potentially\nin the addition of multitude.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Every potentiality is made actual according to\nits mode of being; for instance, a day is reduced to act successively,\nand not all at once. Likewise the infinite in multitude is reduced to\nact successively, and not all at once; because every multitude can be\nsucceeded by another multitude to infinity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Species of figures are infinite by infinitude of\nnumber. Now there are various species of figures, such as trilateral,\nquadrilateral and so on; and as an infinitely numerable multitude is\nnot all at once reduced to act, so neither is the multitude of\nfigures.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the supposition of some things does not\npreclude the supposition of others, still the supposition of an\ninfinite number is opposed to any single species of multitude. Hence\nit is not possible for an actually infinite multitude to exist.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 8\n\nTHE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THINGS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nSince it evidently belongs to the infinite to be present everywhere,\nand in all things, we now consider whether this belongs to God; and\nconcerning this there arise four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether God is in all things?\n\n(2) Whether God is everywhere?\n\n(3) Whether God is everywhere by essence, power, and presence?\n\n(4) Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 1]\n\nWhether God Is in All Things?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is not in all things. For what is above\nall things is not in all things. But God is above all, according to\nthe Psalm (Ps. 112:4), \"The Lord is high above all nations,\" etc.\nTherefore God is not in all things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what is in anything is thereby contained. Now\nGod is not contained by things, but rather does He contain them.\nTherefore God is not in things but things are rather in Him. Hence\nAugustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 20), that \"in Him things are,\nrather than He is in any place.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, the more powerful an agent is, the more extended\nis its action. But God is the most powerful of all agents. Therefore\nHis action can extend to things which are far removed from Him; nor is\nit necessary that He should be in all things.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the demons are beings. But God is not in the\ndemons; for there is no fellowship between light and darkness (2 Cor.\n6:14). Therefore God is not in all things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A thing is wherever it operates. But God operates in\nall things, according to Isa. 26:12, \"Lord . . . Thou hast wrought all\nour works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us.\" Therefore God is in all things.\n\n_I answer that,_ God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their\nessence, nor as an accident, but as an agent is present to that upon\nwhich it works. For an agent must be joined to that wherein it acts\nimmediately and touch it by its power; hence it is proved in Phys. vii\nthat the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Now since\nGod is very being by His own essence, created being must be His proper\neffect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. Now God causes this\neffect in things not only when they first begin to be, but as long as\nthey are preserved in being; as light is caused in the air by the sun\nas long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing\nhas being, God must be present to it, according to its mode of being.\nBut being is innermost in each thing and most fundamentally inherent\nin all things since it is formal in respect of everything found in a\nthing, as was shown above (Q. 7, A. 1). Hence it must be that God\nis in all things, and innermostly.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God is above all things by the excellence of His\nnature; nevertheless, He is in all things as the cause of the being of\nall things; as was shown above in this article.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although corporeal things are said to be in\nanother as in that which contains them, nevertheless, spiritual things\ncontain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body.\nHence also God is in things containing them; nevertheless, by a\ncertain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are\nin God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him.\n\nReply Obj. 3: No action of an agent, however powerful it may\nbe, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the\ngreat power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence\nnothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself.\nBut things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in\nnature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence of His own\nnature.\n\nReply Obj. 4: In the demons there is their nature which is\nfrom God, and also the deformity of sin which is not from Him;\ntherefore, it is not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the\ndemons, except with the addition, \"inasmuch as they are beings.\" But\nin things not deformed in their nature, we must say absolutely that\nGod is.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 2]\n\nWhether God Is Everywhere?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is not everywhere. For to be everywhere\nmeans to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong\nto God, to Whom it does not belong to be in place at all; for\n\"incorporeal things,\" as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), \"are not in a\nplace.\" Therefore God is not everywhere.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the relation of time to succession is the same\nas the relation of place to permanence. But one indivisible part of\naction or movement cannot exist in different times; therefore neither\ncan one indivisible part in the genus of permanent things be in every\nplace. Now the divine being is not successive but permanent. Therefore\nGod is not in many places; and thus He is not everywhere.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is wholly in any one place is not in part\nelsewhere. But if God is in any one place He is all there; for He has\nno parts. No part of Him then is elsewhere; and therefore God is not\neverywhere.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written, \"I fill heaven and earth.\" (Jer.\n   23:24).\n\n_I answer that,_ Since place is a thing, to be in place can be\nunderstood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things--i.e. as\none thing is said to be in another no matter how; and thus the\naccidents of a place are in place; or by a way proper to place; and\nthus things placed are in a place. Now in both these senses, in some\nway God is in every place; and this is to be everywhere. First, as He\nis in all things giving them being, power and operation; so He is in\nevery place as giving it existence and locative power. Again, things\nplaced are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every\nplace; not, indeed, like a body, for a body is said to fill place\ninasmuch as it excludes the co-presence of another body; whereas by\nGod being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed,\nby the very fact that He gives being to the things that fill every\nplace, He Himself fills every place.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Incorporeal things are in place not by contact\nof dimensive quantity, as bodies are but by contact of power.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The indivisible is twofold. One is the term of\nthe continuous; as a point in permanent things, and as a moment in\nsuccession; and this kind of the indivisible in permanent things,\nforasmuch as it has a determinate site, cannot be in many parts of\nplace, or in many places; likewise the indivisible of action or\nmovement, forasmuch as it has a determinate order in movement or\naction, cannot be in many parts of time. Another kind of the\nindivisible is outside of the whole genus of the continuous; and in\nthis way incorporeal substances, like God, angel and soul, are called\nindivisible. Such a kind of indivisible does not belong to the\ncontinuous, as a part of it, but as touching it by its power; hence,\naccording as its power can extend itself to one or to many, to a small\nthing, or to a great one, in this way it is in one or in many places,\nand in a small or large place.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A whole is so called with reference to its\nparts. Now part is twofold: viz. a part of the essence, as the form\nand the matter are called parts of the composite, while genus and\ndifference are called parts of species. There is also part of quantity\ninto which any quantity is divided. What therefore is whole in any\nplace by totality of quantity, cannot be outside of that place,\nbecause the quantity of anything placed is commensurate to the\nquantity of the place; and hence there is no totality of quantity\nwithout totality of place. But totality of essence is not commensurate\nto the totality of place. Hence it is not necessary for that which is\nwhole by totality of essence in a thing, not to be at all outside of\nit. This appears also in accidental forms which have accidental\nquantity; as an example, whiteness is whole in each part of the\nsurface if we speak of its totality of essence; because according to\nthe perfect idea of its species it is found to exist in every part of\nthe surface. But if its totality be considered according to quantity\nwhich it has accidentally, then it is not whole in every part of the\nsurface. On the other hand, incorporeal substances have no totality\neither of themselves or accidentally, except in reference to the\nperfect idea of their essence. Hence, as the soul is whole in every\npart of the body, so is God whole in all things and in each one.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 3]\n\nWhether God Is Everywhere by Essence, Presence and Power?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the mode of God's existence in all things\nis not properly described by way of essence, presence and power. For\nwhat is by essence in anything, is in it essentially. But God is not\nessentially in things; for He does not belong to the essence of\nanything. Therefore it ought not to be said that God is in things by\nessence, presence and power.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to be present in anything means not to be absent\nfrom it. Now this is the meaning of God being in things by His\nessence, that He is not absent from anything. Therefore the presence\nof God in all things by essence and presence means the same thing.\nTherefore it is superfluous to say that God is present in things by\nHis essence, presence and power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as God by His power is the principle of all\nthings, so He is the same likewise by His knowledge and will. But it\nis not said that He is in things by knowledge and will. Therefore\nneither is He present by His power.\n\nObj. 4: Further, as grace is a perfection added to the substance\nof a thing, so many other perfections are likewise added. Therefore if\nGod is said to be in certain persons in a special way by grace, it\nseems that according to every perfection there ought to be a special\nmode of God's existence in things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on the Canticle of Canticles (5) says that,\n\"God by a common mode is in all things by His presence, power and\nsubstance; still He is said to be present more familiarly in some by\ngrace.\" [*The quotation is from St. Gregory, (Hom. viii in Ezech.)].\n\n_I answer that,_ God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way\nafter the manner of an efficient cause; and thus He is in all things\ncreated by Him; in another way he is in things as the object of\noperation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of\nthe soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and\nthe thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is\nespecially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually\nor habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this\nprerogative by grace, as will be shown later (Q. 12). He is said\nto be thus in the saints by grace.\n\nBut how He is in other things created by Him, may be considered from\nhuman affairs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom\nby his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is\nsaid to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its\ninspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who\nnevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house.\nLastly, a thing is said to be by way of substance or essence in that\nplace in which its substance may be. Now there were some (the\nManichees) who said that spiritual and incorporeal things were subject\nto the divine power; but that visible and corporeal things were\nsubject to the power of a contrary principle. Therefore against these\nit is necessary to say that God is in all things by His power.\n\nBut others, though they believed that all things were subject to the\ndivine power, still did not allow that divine providence extended to\nthese inferior bodies, and in the person of these it is said, \"He\nwalketh about the poles of the heavens; and He doth not consider our\nthings [*Vulg.: 'He doth not consider . . . and He walketh,' etc.]\"\n(Job 22:14). Against these it is necessary to say that God is in all\nthings by His presence.\n\nFurther, others said that, although all things are subject to God's\nprovidence, still all things are not immediately created by God; but\nthat He immediately created the first creatures, and these created the\nothers. Against these it is necessary to say that He is in all things\nby His essence.\n\nTherefore, God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things\nare subject to His power; He is by His presence in all things, as all\nthings are bare and open to His eyes; He is in all things by His\nessence, inasmuch as He is present to all as the cause of their being.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God is said to be in all things by essence, not\nindeed by the essence of the things themselves, as if He were of their\nessence; but by His own essence; because His substance is present to\nall things as the cause of their being.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A thing can be said to be present to another,\nwhen in its sight, though the thing may be distant in substance, as\nwas shown in this article; and therefore two modes of presence are\nnecessary; viz. by essence and by presence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Knowledge and will require that the thing known\nshould be in the one who knows, and the thing willed in the one who\nwills. Hence by knowledge and will things are more truly in God than\nGod in things. But power is the principle of acting on another; hence\nby power the agent is related and applied to an external thing; thus\nby power an agent may be said to be present to another.\n\nReply Obj. 4: No other perfection, except grace, added to\nsubstance, renders God present in anything as the object known and\nloved; therefore only grace constitutes a special mode of God's\nexistence in things. There is, however, another special mode of God's\nexistence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place\n(Part III).\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 8, Art. 4]\n\nWhether to Be Everywhere Belongs to God Alone?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that to be everywhere does not belong to God\nalone. For the universal, according to the Philosopher (Poster. i), is\neverywhere, and always; primary matter also, since it is in all\nbodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God, as appears from\nwhat is said above (Q. 3). Therefore to be everywhere does not\nbelong to God alone.\n\nObj. 2: Further, number is in things numbered. But the whole\nuniverse is constituted in number, as appears from the Book of Wisdom\n(Wis. 11:21). Therefore there is some number which is in the whole\nuniverse, and is thus everywhere.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the universe is a kind of \"whole perfect body\"\n(Coel. et Mund. i). But the whole universe is everywhere, because\nthere is no place outside it. Therefore to be everywhere does not\nbelong to God alone.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if any body were infinite, no place would exist\noutside of it, and so it would be everywhere. Therefore to be\neverywhere does not appear to belong to God alone.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the soul, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), is\n\"whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts.\"\nTherefore if there was only one animal in the world, its soul would be\neverywhere; and thus to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.\n\nObj. 6: Further, as Augustine says (Ep. 137), \"The soul feels\nwhere it sees, and lives where it feels, and is where it lives.\" But\nthe soul sees as it were everywhere: for in a succession of glances it\ncomprehends the entire space of the heavens in its sight. Therefore\nthe soul is everywhere.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): \"Who dares to\ncall the Holy Ghost a creature, Who in all things, and everywhere, and\nalways is, which assuredly belongs to the divinity alone?\"\n\n_I answer that,_ To be everywhere primarily and absolutely, is proper to\nGod. Now to be everywhere primarily is said of that which in its whole\nself is everywhere; for if a thing were everywhere according to its\nparts in different places, it would not be primarily everywhere,\nforasmuch as what belongs to anything according to part does not\nbelong to it primarily; thus if a man has white teeth, whiteness\nbelongs primarily not to the man but to his teeth. But a thing is\neverywhere absolutely when it does not belong to it to be everywhere\naccidentally, that is, merely on some supposition; as a grain of\nmillet would be everywhere, supposing that no other body existed. It\nbelongs therefore to a thing to be everywhere absolutely when, on any\nsupposition, it must be everywhere; and this properly belongs to God\nalone. For whatever number of places be supposed, even if an infinite\nnumber be supposed besides what already exist, it would be necessary\nthat God should be in all of them; for nothing can exist except by\nHim. Therefore to be everywhere primarily and absolutely belongs to\nGod and is proper to Him: because whatever number of places be\nsupposed to exist, God must be in all of them, not as to a part of\nHim, but as to His very self.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The universal, and also primary matter are\nindeed everywhere; but not according to the same mode of existence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Number, since it is an accident, does not, of\nitself, exist in place, but accidentally; neither is the whole but\nonly part of it in each of the things numbered; hence it does not\nfollow that it is primarily and absolutely everywhere.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The whole body of the universe is everywhere,\nbut not primarily; forasmuch as it is not wholly in each place, but\naccording to its parts; nor again is it everywhere absolutely,\nbecause, supposing that other places existed besides itself, it would\nnot be in them.\n\nReply Obj. 4: If an infinite body existed, it would be\neverywhere; but according to its parts.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Were there one animal only, its soul would be\neverywhere primarily indeed, but only accidentally.\n\nReply Obj. 6: When it is said that the soul sees anywhere,\nthis can be taken in two senses. In one sense the adverb \"anywhere\"\ndetermines the act of seeing on the part of the object; and in this\nsense it is true that while it sees the heavens, it sees in the\nheavens; and in the same way it feels in the heavens; but it does not\nfollow that it lives or exists in the heavens, because to live and to\nexist do not import an act passing to an exterior object. In another\nsense it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act\nof the seer, as proceeding from the seer; and thus it is true that\nwhere the soul feels and sees, there it is, and there it lives\naccording to this mode of speaking; and thus it does not follow that\nit is everywhere.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 9\n\nTHE IMMUTABILITY OF GOD\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe next consider God's immutability, and His eternity following on His\nimmutability. On the immutability of God there are two points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether God is altogether immutable?\n\n(2) Whether to be immutable belongs to God alone?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 9, Art. 1]\n\nWhether God is altogether immutable?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is not altogether immutable. For\nwhatever moves itself is in some way mutable. But, as Augustine says\n(Gen. ad lit, viii, 20), \"The Creator Spirit moves Himself neither by\ntime, nor by place.\" Therefore God is in some way mutable.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is said of Wisdom, that \"it is more mobile\nthan all things active [Vulg. 'mobilior']\" (Wis. 7:24). But God is\nwisdom itself; therefore God is movable.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to approach and to recede signify movement. But\nthese are said of God in Scripture, \"Draw nigh to God and He will draw\nnigh to you\" (James 4:8). Therefore God is mutable.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written, \"I am the Lord, and I change not\"\n(Malachi 3:6).\n\n_I answer that,_ From what precedes, it is shown that God is altogether\nimmutable. First, because it was shown above that there is some first\nbeing, whom we call God; and that this first being must be pure act,\nwithout the admixture of any potentiality, for the reason that,\nabsolutely, potentiality is posterior to act. Now everything which is\nin any way changed, is in some way in potentiality. Hence it is\nevident that it is impossible for God to be in any way changeable.\nSecondly, because everything which is moved, remains as it was in\npart, and passes away in part; as what is moved from whiteness to\nblackness, remains the same as to substance; thus in everything which\nis moved, there is some kind of composition to be found. But it has\nbeen shown above (Q. 3, A. 7) that in God there is no composition,\nfor He is altogether simple. Hence it is manifest that God cannot be\nmoved. Thirdly, because everything which is moved acquires something\nby its movement, and attains to what it had not attained previously.\nBut since God is infinite, comprehending in Himself all the plenitude\nof perfection of all being, He cannot acquire anything new, nor extend\nHimself to anything whereto He was not extended previously. Hence\nmovement in no way belongs to Him. So, some of the ancients,\nconstrained, as it were, by the truth, decided that the first\nprinciple was immovable.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine there speaks in a similar way to\nPlato, who said that the first mover moves Himself; calling every\noperation a movement, even as the acts of understanding, and willing,\nand loving, are called movements. Therefore because God understands\nand loves Himself, in that respect they said that God moves Himself,\nnot, however, as movement and change belong to a thing existing in\npotentiality, as we now speak of change and movement.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Wisdom is called mobile by way of similitude,\naccording as it diffuses its likeness even to the outermost of things;\nfor nothing can exist which does not proceed from the divine wisdom by\nway of some kind of imitation, as from the first effective and formal\nprinciple; as also works of art proceed from the wisdom of the artist.\nAnd so in the same way, inasmuch as the similitude of the divine\nwisdom proceeds in degrees from the highest things, which participate\nmore fully of its likeness, to the lowest things which participate of\nit in a lesser degree, there is said to be a kind of procession and\nmovement of the divine wisdom to things; as when we say that the sun\nproceeds to the earth, inasmuch as the ray of light touches the earth.\nIn this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. i) expounds the matter, that every\nprocession of the divine manifestation comes to us from the movement\nof the Father of light.\n\nReply Obj. 3: These things are said of God in Scripture\nmetaphorically. For as the sun is said to enter a house, or to go out,\naccording as its rays reach the house, so God is said to approach to\nus, or to recede from us, when we receive the influx of His goodness,\nor decline from Him.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I. Q. 9, Art. 2]\n\nWhether to Be Immutable Belongs to God Alone?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that to be immutable does not belong to God\nalone. For the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that \"matter is in\neverything which is moved.\" But, according to some, certain created\nsubstances, as angels and souls, have not matter. Therefore to be\nimmutable does not belong to God alone.\n\nObj. 2: Further, everything in motion moves to some end. What\ntherefore has already attained its ultimate end, is not in motion. But\nsome creatures have already attained to their ultimate end; as all the\nblessed in heaven. Therefore some creatures are immovable.\n\nObj. 3: Further, everything which is mutable is variable. But\nforms are invariable; for it is said (Sex Princip. i) that \"form is\nessence consisting of the simple and invariable.\" Therefore it does\nnot belong to God alone to be immutable.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. i), \"God alone is\nimmutable; and whatever things He has made, being from nothing, are\nmutable.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ God alone is altogether immutable; whereas every\ncreature is in some way mutable. Be it known therefore that a mutable\nthing can be called so in two ways: by a power in itself; and by a\npower possessed by another. For all creatures before they existed,\nwere possible, not by any created power, since no creature is eternal,\nbut by the divine power alone, inasmuch as God could produce them into\nexistence. Thus, as the production of a thing into existence depends\non the will of God, so likewise it depends on His will that things\nshould be preserved; for He does not preserve them otherwise than by\never giving them existence; hence if He took away His action from\nthem, all things would be reduced to nothing, as appears from\nAugustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 12). Therefore as it was in the Creator's\npower to produce them before they existed in themselves, so likewise\nit is in the Creator's power when they exist in themselves to bring\nthem to nothing. In this way therefore, by the power of\nanother--namely, of God--they are mutable, inasmuch as they are\nproducible from nothing by Him, and are by Him reducible from\nexistence to non-existence.\n\nIf, however, a thing is called mutable by a power in itself, thus also\nin some manner every creature is mutable. For every creature has a\ntwofold power, active and passive; and I call that power passive which\nenables anything to attain its perfection either in being, or in\nattaining to its end. Now if the mutability of a thing be considered\naccording to its power for being, in that way all creatures are not\nmutable, but those only in which what is potential in them is\nconsistent with non-being. Hence, in the inferior bodies there is\nmutability both as regards substantial being, inasmuch as their matter\ncan exist with privation of their substantial form, and also as\nregards their accidental being, supposing the subject to coexist with\nprivation of accident; as, for example, this subject _man_ can exist\nwith _not-whiteness_ and can therefore be changed from white to\nnot-white. But supposing the accident to be such as to follow on the\nessential principles of the subject, then the privation of such an\naccident cannot coexist with the subject. Hence the subject cannot be\nchanged as regards that kind of accident; as, for example, snow cannot\nbe made black. Now in the celestial bodies matter is not consistent\nwith privation of form, because the form perfects the whole\npotentiality of the matter; therefore these bodies are not mutable as\nto substantial being, but only as to locality, because the subject is\nconsistent with privation of this or that place. On the other hand\nincorporeal substances, being subsistent forms which, although with\nrespect to their own existence are as potentiality to act, are not\nconsistent with the privation of this act; forasmuch as existence is\nconsequent upon form, and nothing corrupts except it lose its form.\nHence in the form itself there is no power to non-existence; and so\nthese kinds of substances are immutable and invariable as regards\ntheir existence. Wherefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that\n\"intellectual created substances are pure from generation and from\nevery variation, as also are incorporeal and immaterial substances.\"\nStill, there remains in them a twofold mutability: one as regards\ntheir potentiality to their end; and in that way there is in them a\nmutability according to choice from good to evil, as Damascene says\n(De Fide ii, 3,4); the other as regards place, inasmuch as by their\nfinite power they attain to certain fresh places--which cannot be\nsaid of God, who by His infinity fills all places, as was shown above\n(Q. 8, A. 2).\n\nThus in every creature there is a potentiality to change either as\nregards substantial being as in the case of things corruptible; or as\nregards locality only, as in the case of the celestial bodies; or as\nregards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to\ndivers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all\ncreatures generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose\npower is their existence and non-existence. Hence since God is in none\nof these ways mutable, it belongs to Him alone to be altogether\nimmutable.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This objection proceeds from mutability as\nregards substantial or accidental being; for philosophers treated of\nsuch movement.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The good angels, besides their natural endowment\nof immutability of being, have also immutability of election by divine\npower; nevertheless there remains in them mutability as regards place.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Forms are called invariable, forasmuch as they\ncannot be subjects of variation; but they are subject to variation\nbecause by them their subject is variable. Hence it is clear that they\nvary in so far as they are; for they are not called beings as though\nthey were the subject of being, but because through them something has\nbeing.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 10\n\nTHE ETERNITY OF GOD\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the eternity of God, concerning which arise six\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is eternity?\n\n(2) Whether God is eternal?\n\n(3) Whether to be eternal belongs to God alone?\n\n(4) Whether eternity differs from time?\n\n(5) The difference of aeviternity and of time.\n\n(6) Whether there is only one aeviternity, as there is one time, and\none eternity?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 10, Art. 1]\n\nWhether This Is a Good Definition of Eternity, \"The Simultaneously-\nWhole and Perfect Possession of Interminable Life\"?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the definition of eternity given by\nBoethius (De Consol. v) is not a good one: \"Eternity is the\nsimultaneously-whole and perfect possession of interminable life.\" For\nthe word \"interminable\" is a negative one. But negation only belongs\nto what is defective, and this does not belong to eternity. Therefore\nin the definition of eternity the word \"interminable\" ought not to be\nfound.\n\nObj. 2: Further, eternity signifies a certain kind of duration.\nBut duration regards existence rather than life. Therefore the word\n\"life\" ought not to come into the definition of eternity; but rather\nthe word \"existence.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, a whole is what has parts. But this is alien to\neternity which is simple. Therefore it is improperly said to be\n\"whole.\"\n\nObj. 4: Many days cannot occur together, nor can many times exist\nall at once. But in eternity, days and times are in the plural, for it\nis said, \"His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of\neternity\" (Micah 5:2); and also it is said, \"According to the\nrevelation of the mystery hidden from eternity\" (Rom. 16:25).\nTherefore eternity is not omni-simultaneous.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the whole and the perfect are the same thing.\nSupposing, therefore, that it is \"whole,\" it is superfluously\ndescribed as \"perfect.\"\n\nObj. 6: Further, duration does not imply \"possession.\" But eternity\nis a kind of duration. Therefore eternity is not possession.\n\n_I answer that,_ As we attain to the knowledge of simple things by way\nof compound things, so must we reach to the knowledge of eternity by\nmeans of time, which is nothing but the numbering of movement by\n_before_ and _after._ For since succession occurs in every movement,\nand one part comes after another, the fact that we reckon before and\nafter in movement, makes us apprehend time, which is nothing else but\nthe measure of before and after in movement. Now in a thing bereft of\nmovement, which is always the same, there is no before or after. As\ntherefore the idea of time consists in the numbering of before and\nafter in movement; so likewise in the apprehension of the uniformity\nof what is outside of movement, consists the idea of eternity.\n\nFurther, those things are said to be measured by time which have a\nbeginning and an end in time, because in everything which is moved\nthere is a beginning, and there is an end. But as whatever is wholly\nimmutable can have no succession, so it has no beginning, and no end.\n\nThus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is\neternal is interminable--that is, has no beginning nor end (that is,\nno term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession,\nbeing simultaneously whole.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Simple things are usually defined by way of negation;\nas \"a point is that which has no parts.\" Yet this is not to be taken\nas if the negation belonged to their essence, but because our\nintellect which first apprehends compound things, cannot attain to\nthe knowledge of simple things except by removing the opposite.\n\nReply Obj. 2: What is truly eternal, is not only being, but also\nliving; and life extends to operation, which is not true of being.\nNow the protraction of duration seems to belong to operation rather\nthan to being; hence time is the numbering of movement.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Eternity is called whole, not because it has parts, but\nbecause it is wanting in nothing.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As God, although incorporeal, is named in Scripture\nmetaphorically by corporeal names, so eternity though simultaneously\nwhole, is called by names implying time and succession.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Two things are to be considered in time: time itself,\nwhich is successive; and the \"now\" of time, which is imperfect. Hence\nthe expression \"simultaneously-whole\" is used to remove the idea of\ntime, and the word \"perfect\" is used to exclude the \"now\" of time.\n\nReply Obj. 6: Whatever is possessed, is held firmly and quietly;\ntherefore to designate the immutability and permanence of eternity,\nwe use the word \"possession.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 10, Art. 2]\n\nWhether God is Eternal?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is not eternal. For nothing made can be\npredicated of God; for Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, \"The now that\nflows away makes time, the now that stands still makes eternity;\" and\nAugustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. 28) \"that God is the author of\neternity.\" Therefore God is not eternal.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what is before eternity, and after eternity, is\nnot measured by eternity. But, as Aristotle says (De Causis), \"God is\nbefore eternity and He is after eternity\": for it is written that \"the\nLord shall reign for eternity, and beyond [*Douay: 'for ever and\never']\" (Ex. 15:18). Therefore to be eternal does not belong to God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, eternity is a kind of measure. But to be measured\nbelongs not to God. Therefore it does not belong to Him to be eternal.\n\nObj. 4: Further, in eternity, there is no present, past or future,\nsince it is simultaneously whole; as was said in the preceding\narticle. But words denoting present, past and future time are applied\nto God in Scripture. Therefore God is not eternal.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says in his Creed: \"The Father is eternal,\nthe Son is eternal, the Holy Ghost is eternal.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The idea of eternity follows immutability, as the idea\nof time follows movement, as appears from the preceding article.\nHence, as God is supremely immutable, it supremely belongs to Him to\nbe eternal. Nor is He eternal only; but He is His own eternity;\nwhereas, no other being is its own duration, as no other is its own\nbeing. Now God is His own uniform being; and hence as He is His own\nessence, so He is His own eternity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The \"now\" that stands still, is said to make eternity\naccording to our apprehension. As the apprehension of time is caused\nin us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the \"now,\" so the\napprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the\n\"now\" standing still. When Augustine says that \"God is the author of\neternity,\" this is to be understood of participated eternity. For God\ncommunicates His eternity to some in the same way as He communicates\nHis immutability.\n\nReply Obj. 2: From this appears the answer to the Second Objection.\nFor God is said to be before eternity, according as it is shared by\nimmaterial substances. Hence, also, in the same book, it is said that\n\"intelligence is equal to eternity.\" In the words of Exodus, \"The\nLord shall reign for eternity, and beyond,\" eternity stands for age,\nas another rendering has it. Thus it is said that the Lord will reign\nbeyond eternity, inasmuch as He endures beyond every age, i.e. beyond\nevery kind of duration. For age is nothing more than the period of\neach thing, as is said in the book _De Coelo_ i. Or to reign beyond\neternity can be taken to mean that if any other thing were conceived\nto exist for ever, as the movement of the heavens according to some\nphilosophers, then God would still reign beyond, inasmuch as His\nreign is simultaneously whole.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Eternity is nothing else but God Himself. Hence God is\nnot called eternal, as if He were in any way measured; but the idea\nof measurement is there taken according to the apprehension of our\nmind alone.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Words denoting different times are applied to God,\nbecause His eternity includes all times; not as if He Himself were\naltered through present, past and future.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 10, Art. 3]\n\nWhether to Be Eternal Belongs to God Alone?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that it does not belong to God alone to be\neternal. For it is written that \"those who instruct many to justice,\"\nshall be \"as stars unto perpetual eternities [*Douay: 'for all\neternity']\" (Dan. 12:3). Now if God alone were eternal, there could\nnot be many eternities. Therefore God alone is not the only eternal.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written \"Depart, ye cursed into eternal\n[Douay: 'everlasting'] fire\" (Matt. 25:41). Therefore God is not the\nonly eternal.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every necessary thing is eternal. But there are\nmany necessary things; as, for instance, all principles of\ndemonstration and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore God is\nnot the only eternal.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (Ep. ad Damasum, xv) that \"God is the\nonly one who has no beginning.\" Now whatever has a beginning, is not\neternal. Therefore God is the only one eternal.\n\n_I answer that,_ Eternity truly and properly so called is in God alone,\nbecause eternity follows on immutability; as appears from the first\narticle. But God alone is altogether immutable, as was shown above\n(Q. 9, A. 1). Accordingly, however, as some receive immutability\nfrom Him, they share in His eternity. Thus some receive immutability\nfrom God in the way of never ceasing to exist; in that sense it is\nsaid of the earth, \"it standeth for ever\" (Eccl. 1:4). Again, some\nthings are called eternal in Scripture because of the length of their\nduration, although they are in nature corruptible; thus (Ps. 75:5) the\nhills are called \"eternal\" and we read \"of the fruits of the eternal\nhills.\" (Deut. 33:15). Some again, share more fully than others in the\nnature of eternity, inasmuch as they possess unchangeableness either\nin being or further still in operation; like the angels, and the\nblessed, who enjoy the Word, because \"as regards that vision of the\nWord, no changing thoughts exist in the Saints,\" as Augustine says (De\nTrin. xv). Hence those who see God are said to have eternal life;\naccording to that text, \"This is eternal life, that they may know Thee\nthe only true God,\" etc. (John 17:3).\n\nReply Obj. 1: There are said to be many eternities, accordingly as\nmany share in eternity, by the contemplation of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The fire of hell is called eternal, only because it\nnever ends. Still, there is change in the pains of the lost,\naccording to the words \"To extreme heat they will pass from snowy\nwaters\" (Job 24:19). Hence in hell true eternity does not exist, but\nrather time; according to the text of the Psalm \"Their time will be\nfor ever\" (Ps. 80:16).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Necessary means a certain mode of truth; and truth,\naccording to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi), is in the mind. Therefore\nin this sense the true and necessary are eternal, because they are in\nthe eternal mind, which is the divine intellect alone; hence it does\nnot follow that anything beside God is eternal.\n______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I. Q. 10, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Eternity Differs from Time?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that eternity does not differ from time. For two\nmeasures of duration cannot exist together, unless one is part of the\nother; for instance two days or two hours cannot be together;\nnevertheless, we may say that a day or an hour are together,\nconsidering hour as part of a day. But eternity and time occur\ntogether, each of which imports a certain measure of duration. Since\ntherefore eternity is not a part of time, forasmuch as eternity\nexceeds time, and includes it, it seems that time is a part of\neternity, and is not a different thing from eternity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv), the \"now\"\nof time remains the same in the whole of time. But the nature of\neternity seems to be that it is the same indivisible thing in the\nwhole space of time. Therefore eternity is the \"now\" of time. But the\n\"now\" of time is not substantially different from time. Therefore\neternity is not substantially different from time.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as the measure of the first movement is the\nmeasure of every movement, as said in Phys. iv, it thus appears that\nthe measure of the first being is that of every being. But eternity is\nthe measure of the first being--that is, of the divine being.\nTherefore eternity is the measure of every being. But the being of\nthings corruptible is measured by time. Time therefore is either\neternity or is a part of eternity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Eternity is simultaneously whole. But time has a\n\"before\" and an \"after.\" Therefore time and eternity are not the same\nthing.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is manifest that time and eternity are not the same.\nSome have founded this difference on the fact that eternity has\nneither beginning nor an end; whereas time has a beginning and an end.\nThis, however, makes a merely accidental, and not an absolute\ndifference because, granted that time always was and always will be,\naccording to the idea of those who think the movement of the heavens\ngoes on for ever, there would yet remain a difference between eternity\nand time, as Boethius says (De Consol. v), arising from the fact that\neternity is simultaneously whole; which cannot be applied to time: for\neternity is the measure of a permanent being; while time is a measure\nof movement. Supposing, however, that the aforesaid difference be\nconsidered on the part of the things measured, and not as regards the\nmeasures, then there is some reason for it, inasmuch as that alone is\nmeasured by time which has beginning and end in time. Hence, if the\nmovement of the heavens lasted always, time would not be of its\nmeasure as regards the whole of its duration, since the infinite is\nnot measurable; but it would be the measure of that part of its\nrevolution which has beginning and end in time.\n\nAnother reason for the same can be taken from these measures in\nthemselves, if we consider the end and the beginning as\npotentialities; because, granted also that time always goes on, yet it\nis possible to note in time both the beginning and the end, by\nconsidering its parts: thus we speak of the beginning and the end of a\nday or of a year; which cannot be applied to eternity. Still these\ndifferences follow upon the essential and primary differences, that\neternity is simultaneously whole, but that time is not so.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Such a reason would be a valid one if time and eternity\nwere the same kind of measure; but this is seen not to be the case\nwhen we consider those things of which the respective measures are\ntime and eternity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The \"now\" of time is the same as regards its subject in\nthe whole course of time, but it differs in aspect; for inasmuch as\ntime corresponds to movement, its \"now\" corresponds to what is\nmovable; and the thing movable has the same one subject in all time,\nbut differs in aspect a being here and there; and such alteration is\nmovement. Likewise the flow of the \"now\" as alternating in aspect is\ntime. But eternity remains the same according to both subject and\naspect; and hence eternity is not the same as the \"now\" of time.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As eternity is the proper measure of permanent being,\nso time is the proper measure of movement; and hence, according as\nany being recedes from permanence of being, and is subject to change,\nit recedes from eternity, and is subject to time. Therefore the being\nof things corruptible, because it is changeable, is not measured by\neternity, but by time; for time measures not only things actually\nchanged, but also things changeable; hence it not only measures\nmovement but it also measures repose, which belongs to whatever is\nnaturally movable, but is not actually in motion.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 10, Art. 5]\n\nThe Difference of Aeviternity and Time\n\nObjection 1: It seems that aeviternity is the same as time. For\nAugustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20, 22, 23), that \"God moves the\nspiritual through time.\" But aeviternity is said to be the measure of\nspiritual substances. Therefore time is the same as aeviternity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is essential to time to have \"before\" and\n\"after\"; but it is essential to eternity to be simultaneously whole,\nas was shown above in the first article. Now aeviternity is not\neternity; for it is written (Ecclus. 1:1) that eternal \"Wisdom is\nbefore age.\" Therefore it is not simultaneously whole but has \"before\"\nand \"after\"; and thus it is the same as time.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if there is no \"before\" and \"after\" in\naeviternity, it follows that in aeviternal things there is no\ndifference between being, having been, or going to be. Since then it\nis impossible for aeviternal things not to have been, it follows that\nit is impossible for them not to be in the future; which is false,\nsince God can reduce them to nothing.\n\nObj. 4: Further, since the duration of aeviternal things is\ninfinite as to subsequent duration, if aeviternity is simultaneously\nwhole, it follows that some creature is actually infinite; which is\nimpossible. Therefore aeviternity does not differ from time.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iii) \"Who commandest time\nto be separate from aeviternity.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Aeviternity differs from time, and from eternity, as\nthe mean between them both. This difference is explained by some to\nconsist in the fact that eternity has neither beginning nor end,\naeviternity, a beginning but no end, and time both beginning and end.\nThis difference, however, is but an accidental one, as was shown\nabove, in the preceding article; because even if aeviternal things had\nalways been, and would always be, as some think, and even if they\nmight sometimes fail to be, which is possible to God to allow; even\ngranted this, aeviternity would still be distinguished from eternity,\nand from time.\n\nOthers assign the difference between these three to consist in the\nfact that eternity has no \"before\" and \"after\"; but that time has\nboth, together with innovation and veteration; and that aeviternity\nhas \"before\" and \"after\" without innovation and veteration. This\ntheory, however, involves a contradiction; which manifestly appears\nif innovation and veteration be referred to the measure itself. For\nsince \"before\" and \"after\" of duration cannot exist together, if\naeviternity has \"before\" and \"after,\" it must follow that with the\nreceding of the first part of aeviternity, the after part of\naeviternity must newly appear; and thus innovation would occur in\naeviternity itself, as it does in time. And if they be referred to\nthe things measured, even then an incongruity would follow. For a\nthing which exists in time grows old with time, because it has a\nchangeable existence, and from the changeableness of a thing\nmeasured, there follows \"before\" and \"after\" in the measure, as is\nclear from _Physic._ iv. Therefore the fact that an aeviternal thing\nis neither inveterate, nor subject to innovation, comes from its\nchangelessness; and consequently its measure does not contain\n\"before\" and \"after.\" We say then that since eternity is the measure\nof a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence\nof being, it recedes from eternity. Now some things recede from\npermanence of being, so that their being is subject to change, or\nconsists in change; and these things are measured by time, as are all\nmovements, and also the being of all things corruptible. But others\nrecede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being\nneither consists in change, nor is the subject of change;\nnevertheless they have change annexed to them either actually or\npotentially. This appears in the heavenly bodies, the substantial\nbeing of which is unchangeable; and yet with unchangeable being they\nhave changeableness of place. The same applies to the angels, who\nhave an unchangeable being as regards their nature with\nchangeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness\nof intelligence, of affections and of places in their own degree.\nTherefore these are measured by aeviternity which is a mean between\neternity and time. But the being that is measured by eternity is not\nchangeable, nor is it annexed to change. In this way time has\n\"before\" and \"after\"; aeviternity in itself has no \"before\" and\n\"after,\" which can, however, be annexed to it; while eternity has\nneither \"before\" nor \"after,\" nor is it compatible with such at all.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Spiritual creatures as regards successive affections\nand intelligences are measured by time. Hence also Augustine says\n(Gen. ad lit. viii, 20, 22, 23) that to be moved through time, is\nto be moved by affections. But as regards their nature they are\nmeasured by aeviternity; whereas as regards the vision of glory, they\nhave a share of eternity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Aeviternity is simultaneously whole; yet it is not\neternity, because \"before\" and \"after\" are compatible with it.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the very being of an angel considered absolutely,\nthere is no difference of past and future, but only as regards\naccidental change. Now to say that an angel was, or is, or will be,\nis to be taken in a different sense according to the acceptation of\nour intellect, which apprehends the angelic existence by comparison\nwith different parts of time. But when we say that an angel is, or\nwas, we suppose something, which being supposed, its opposite is not\nsubject to the divine power. Whereas when we say he will be, we do\nnot as yet suppose anything. Hence, since the existence and\nnon-existence of an angel considered absolutely is subject to the\ndivine power, God can make the existence of an angel not future; but\nHe cannot cause him not to be while he is, or not to have been, after\nhe has been.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The duration of aeviternity is infinite, forasmuch as\nit is not finished by time. Hence, there is no incongruity in saying\nthat a creature is infinite, inasmuch as it is not ended by any other\ncreature.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I. Q. 10, Art. 6]\n\nWhether There Is Only One Aeviternity?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that there is not only one aeviternity; for it\nis written in the apocryphal books of Esdras: \"Majesty and power of\nages are with Thee, O Lord.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, different genera have different measures. But\nsome aeviternal things belong to the corporeal genus, as the heavenly\nbodies; and others are spiritual substances, as are the angels.\nTherefore there is not only one aeviternity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, since aeviternity is a term of duration, where\nthere is one aeviternity, there is also one duration. But not all\naeviternal things have one duration, for some begin to exist after\nothers; as appears in the case especially of human souls. Therefore\nthere is not only one aeviternity.\n\nObj. 4: Further, things not dependent on each other do not seem\nto have one measure of duration; for there appears to be one time for\nall temporal things; since the first movement, measured by time, is in\nsome way the cause of all movement. But aeviternal things do not\ndepend on each other, for one angel is not the cause of another angel.\nTherefore there is not only one aeviternity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Aeviternity is a more simple thing than time, and is\nnearer to eternity. But time is one only. Therefore much more is\naeviternity one only.\n\n_I answer that,_ A twofold opinion exists on this subject. Some say\nthere is only one aeviternity; others that there are many\naeviternities. Which of these is true, may be considered from the\ncause why time is one; for we can rise from corporeal things to the\nknowledge of spiritual things.\n\nNow some say that there is only one time for temporal things,\nforasmuch as one number exists for all things numbered; as time is a\nnumber, according to the Philosopher (Physic. iv). This, however,\nis not a sufficient reason; because time is not a number abstracted\nfrom the thing numbered, but existing in the thing numbered;\notherwise it would not be continuous; for ten ells of cloth are\ncontinuous not by reason of the number, but by reason of the thing\nnumbered. Now number as it exists in the thing numbered, is not the\nsame for all; but it is different for different things. Hence, others\nassert that the unity of eternity as the principle of all duration is\nthe cause of the unity of time. Thus all durations are one in that\nview, in the light of their principle, but are many in the light of\nthe diversity of things receiving duration from the influx of the\nfirst principle. On the other hand others assign primary matter as\nthe cause why time is one; as it is the first subject of movement,\nthe measure of which is time. Neither of these reasons, however, is\nsufficient; forasmuch as things which are one in principle, or in\nsubject, especially if distant, are not one absolutely, but\naccidentally. Therefore the true reason why time is one, is to be\nfound in the oneness of the first movement by which, since it is most\nsimple, all other movements are measured. Therefore time is referred\nto that movement, not only as a measure is to the thing measured, but\nalso as accident is to subject; and thus receives unity from it.\nWhereas to other movements it is compared only as the measure is to\nthe thing measured. Hence it is not multiplied by their multitude,\nbecause by one separate measure many things can be measured.\n\nThis being established, we must observe that a twofold opinion existed\nconcerning spiritual substances. Some said that all proceeded from God\nin a certain equality, as Origen said (Peri Archon. i); or at least\nmany of them, as some others thought. Others said that all spiritual\nsubstances proceeded from God in a certain degree and order; and\nDionysius (Coel. Hier. x) seems to have thought so, when he said that\namong spiritual substances there are the first, the middle and the\nlast; even in one order of angels. Now according to the first opinion,\nit must be said that there are many aeviternities as there are many\naeviternal things of first degree. But according to the second\nopinion, it would be necessary to say that there is one aeviternity\nonly; because since each thing is measured by the most simple element\nof its genus, it must be that the existence of all aeviternal things\nshould be measured by the existence of the first aeviternal thing,\nwhich is all the more simple the nearer it is to the first. Wherefore\nbecause the second opinion is truer, as will be shown later\n(Q. 47, A. 2); we concede at present that there is only one\naeviternity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Aeviternity is sometimes taken for age, that is, a\nspace of a thing's duration; and thus we say many aeviternities when\nwe mean ages.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although the heavenly bodies and spiritual things\ndiffer in the genus of their nature, still they agree in having a\nchangeless being, and are thus measured by aeviternity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All temporal things did not begin together;\nnevertheless there is one time for all of them, by reason of the\nfirst measured by time; and thus all aeviternal things have one\naeviternity by reason of the first, though all did not begin together.\n\nReply Obj. 4: For things to be measured by one, it is not necessary\nthat the one should be the cause of all, but that it be more simple\nthan the rest.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 11\n\nTHE UNITY OF GOD\n(In Four Articles)\n\nAfter the foregoing, we consider the divine unity; concerning which\nthere are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether \"one\" adds anything to \"being\"?\n\n(2) Whether \"one\" and \"many\" are opposed to each other?\n\n(3) Whether God is one?\n\n(4) Whether He is in the highest degree one?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 1]\n\nWhether \"One\" Adds Anything to \"Being\"?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that \"one\" adds something to \"being.\" For\neverything is in a determinate genus by addition to being, which\npenetrates all _genera._ But \"one\" is a determinate genus, for it is\nthe principle of number, which is a species of quantity. Therefore\n\"one\" adds something to \"being.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, what divides a thing common to all, is an\naddition to it. But \"being\" is divided by \"one\" and by \"many.\"\nTherefore \"one\" is an addition to \"being.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, if \"one\" is not an addition to \"being,\" \"one\"\nand \"being\" must have the same meaning. But it would be nugatory to\ncall \"being\" by the name of \"being\"; therefore it would be equally so\nto call being \"one.\" Now this is false. Therefore \"one\" is an addition\nto \"being.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 5, ult.): \"Nothing which\nexists is not in some way one,\" which would be false if \"one\" were an\naddition to \"being,\" in the sense of limiting it. Therefore \"one\" is\nnot an addition to \"being.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ \"One\" does not add any reality to \"being\"; but is only\na negation of division; for \"one\" means undivided \"being.\" This is the\nvery reason why \"one\" is the same as \"being.\" Now every being is\neither simple or compound. But what is simple is undivided, both\nactually and potentially. Whereas what is compound, has not being\nwhilst its parts are divided, but after they make up and compose it.\nHence it is manifest that the being of anything consists in\nundivision; and hence it is that everything guards its unity as it\nguards its being.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some, thinking that the \"one\" convertible with \"being\"\nis the same as the \"one\" which is the principle of number, were\ndivided into contrary opinions. Pythagoras and Plato, seeing that the\n\"one\" convertible with \"being\" did not add any reality to \"being,\"\nbut signified the substance of \"being\" as undivided, thought that the\nsame applied to the \"one\" which is the principle of number. And\nbecause number is composed of unities, they thought that numbers were\nthe substances of all things. Avicenna, however, on the contrary,\nconsidering that \"one\" which is the principle of number, added a\nreality to the substance of \"being\" (otherwise number made of unities\nwould not be a species of quantity), thought that the \"one\"\nconvertible with \"being\" added a reality to the substance of beings;\nas \"white\" to \"man.\" This, however, is manifestly false, inasmuch as\neach thing is \"one\" by its substance. For if a thing were \"one\" by\nanything else but by its substance, since this again would be \"one,\"\nsupposing it were again \"one\" by another thing, we should be driven\non to infinity. Hence we must adhere to the former statement;\ntherefore we must say that the \"one\" which is convertible with\n\"being,\" does not add a reality to being; but that the \"one\" which is\nthe principle of number, does add a reality to \"being,\" belonging to\nthe genus of quantity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is\ndivided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in\nnumber, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is\nin one way \"one,\" and in another way \"many.\" Still, if it is\nabsolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what\nbelongs to its essence, though it may be divided as regards what is\noutside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many\naccidents; or because it is undivided actually, and divided\npotentially, as what is \"one\" in the whole, and is \"many\" in parts;\nin such a case a thing will be \"one\" absolutely and \"many\"\naccidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and\ndivided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in\nidea or in principle or cause, it will be \"many\" absolutely and \"one\"\naccidentally; as what are \"many\" in number and \"one\" in species or\n\"one\" in principle. Hence in that way, being is divided by \"one\" and\nby \"many\"; as it were by \"one\" absolutely and by \"many\" accidentally.\nFor multitude itself would not be contained under \"being,\" unless it\nwere in some way contained under \"one.\" Thus Dionysius says (Div.\nNom., cap. ult.) that \"there is no kind of multitude that is not in\na way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole;\nand what are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many\nin number, are one in species; and what are many in species, are one\nin genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: It does not follow that it is nugatory to say\n\"being\" is \"one\"; forasmuch as \"one\" adds an idea to \"being.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 2]\n\nWhether \"One\" and \"Many\" Are Opposed to Each Other?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that \"one\" and \"many\" are not mutually opposed.\nFor no opposite thing is predicated of its opposite. But every\n_multitude_ is in a certain way _one,_ as appears from the preceding\narticle. Therefore \"one\" is not opposed to \"multitude.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, no opposite thing is constituted by its\nopposite. But _multitude_ is constituted by _one._ Therefore it is not\nopposed to \"multitude.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"one\" is opposed to \"one.\" But the idea of \"few\"\nis opposed to \"many.\" Therefore \"one\" is not opposed to \"many.\"\n\nObj. 4: Further, if \"one\" is opposed to \"multitude,\" it is\nopposed as the undivided is to the divided; and is thus opposed to it\nas privation is to habit. But this appears to be incongruous; because\nit would follow that \"one\" comes after \"multitude,\" and is defined by\nit; whereas, on the contrary, \"multitude\" is defined by \"one.\" Hence\nthere would be a vicious circle in the definition; which is\ninadmissible. Therefore \"one\" and \"many\" are not opposed.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Things which are opposed in idea, are themselves\nopposed to each other. But the idea of \"one\" consists in\nindivisibility; and the idea of \"multitude\" contains division.\nTherefore \"one\" and \"many\" are opposed to each other.\n\n_I answer that,_ \"One\" is opposed to \"many,\" but in various ways. The\n_one_ which is the principle of number is opposed to _multitude_ which\nis number, as the measure is to the thing measured. For \"one\" implies\nthe idea of a primary measure; and number is _multitude_ measured by\n_one,_ as is clear from _Metaph._ x. But the _one_ which is convertible\nwith _being_ is opposed to _multitude_ by way of privation; as the\nundivided is to the thing divided.\n\nReply Obj. 1: No privation entirely takes away the being of a thing,\ninasmuch as privation means \"negation in the subject,\" according to\nthe Philosopher (Categor. viii). Nevertheless every privation takes\naway some being; and so in being, by reason of its universality, the\nprivation of being has its foundation in being; which is not the case\nin privations of special forms, as of sight, or of whiteness and the\nlike. And what applies to being applies also to one and to good,\nwhich are convertible with being, for the privation of good is\nfounded in some good; likewise the removal of unity is founded in\nsome one thing. Hence it happens that multitude is some one thing;\nand evil is some good thing, and non-being is some kind of being.\nNevertheless, opposite is not predicated of opposite; forasmuch as\none is absolute, and the other is relative; for what is relative\nbeing (as a potentiality) is non-being absolutely, i.e. actually; or\nwhat is absolute being in the genus of substance is non-being\nrelatively as regards some accidental being. In the same way, what is\nrelatively good is absolutely bad, or vice versa; likewise what is\nabsolutely _one_ is relatively _many,_ and vice versa.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A _whole_ is twofold. In one sense it is homogeneous,\ncomposed of like parts; in another sense it is heterogeneous,\ncomposed of dissimilar parts. Now in every homogeneous whole, the\nwhole is made up of parts having the form of the whole; as, for\ninstance, every part of water is water; and such is the constitution\nof a continuous thing made up of its parts. In every heterogeneous\nwhole, however, every part is wanting in the form belonging to the\nwhole; as, for instance, no part of a house is a house, nor is any\npart of a man a man. Now multitude is such a kind of a whole.\nTherefore inasmuch as its part has not the form of the multitude, the\nlatter is composed of unities, as a house is composed of not houses;\nnot, indeed, as if unities constituted multitude so far as they are\nundivided, in which way they are opposed to multitude; but so far as\nthey have being, as also the parts of a house make up the house by\nthe fact that they are beings, not by the fact that they are not\nhouses.\n\nReply Obj. 3: \"Many\" is taken in two ways: absolutely, and in that\nsense it is opposed to \"one\"; in another way as importing some kind\nof excess, in which sense it is opposed to \"few\"; hence in the first\nsense two are many but not in the second sense.\n\nReply Obj. 4: \"One\" is opposed to \"many\" privatively, inasmuch as the\nidea of \"many\" involves division. Hence division must be prior to\nunity, not absolutely in itself, but according to our way of\napprehension. For we apprehend simple things by compound things; and\nhence we define a point to be, \"what has no part,\" or \"the beginning\nof a line.\" \"Multitude\" also, in idea, follows on \"one\"; because we\ndo not understand divided things to convey the idea of multitude\nexcept by the fact that we attribute unity to every part. Hence \"one\"\nis placed in the definition of \"multitude\"; but \"multitude\" is not\nplaced in the definition of \"one.\" But division comes to be\nunderstood from the very negation of being: so what first comes to\nmind is being; secondly, that this being is not that being, and thus\nwe apprehend division as a consequence; thirdly, comes the notion of\none; fourthly, the notion of multitude.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 3]\n\nWhether God Is One?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is not one. For it is written \"For\nthere be many gods and many lords\" (1 Cor. 8:5).\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"One,\" as the principle of number, cannot be\npredicated of God, since quantity is not predicated of God; likewise,\nneither can \"one\" which is convertible with \"being\" be predicated of\nGod, because it imports privation, and every privation is an\nimperfection, which cannot apply to God. Therefore God is not one.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written \"Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is\none Lord\" (Deut. 6:4).\n\n_I answer that,_ It can be shown from these three sources that God is\none. First from His simplicity. For it is manifest that the reason why\nany singular thing is \"this particular thing\" is because it cannot be\ncommunicated to many: since that whereby Socrates is a man, can be\ncommunicated to many; whereas, what makes him this particular man, is\nonly communicable to one. Therefore, if Socrates were a man by what\nmakes him to be this particular man, as there cannot be many Socrates,\nso there could not in that way be many men. Now this belongs to God\nalone; for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above\n(Q. 3, A. 3). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He\nis this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.\n\nSecondly, this is proved from the infinity of His perfection. For it\nwas shown above (Q. 4, A. 2) that God comprehends in Himself the\nwhole perfection of being. If then many gods existed, they would\nnecessarily differ from each other. Something therefore would belong\nto one which did not belong to another. And if this were a privation,\none of them would not be absolutely perfect; but if a perfection, one\nof them would be without it. So it is impossible for many gods to\nexist. Hence also the ancient philosophers, constrained as it were by\ntruth, when they asserted an infinite principle, asserted likewise\nthat there was only one such principle.\n\nThirdly, this is shown from the unity of the world. For all things\nthat exist are seen to be ordered to each other since some serve\nothers. But things that are diverse do not harmonize in the same\norder, unless they are ordered thereto by one. For many are reduced\ninto one order by one better than by many: because one is the _per se_\ncause of one, and many are only the accidental cause of one, inasmuch\nas they are in some way one. Since therefore what is first is most\nperfect, and is so _per se_ and not accidentally, it must be that the\nfirst which reduces all into one order should be only one. And this\none is God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Gods are called many by the error of some who\nworshipped many deities, thinking as they did that the planets and\nother stars were gods, and also the separate parts of the world.\nHence the Apostle adds: \"Our God is one,\" etc.\n\nReply Obj. 2: \"One\" which is the principle of number is not\npredicated of God, but only of material things. For \"one\" the\nprinciple of number belongs to the genus of mathematics, which are\nmaterial in being, and abstracted from matter only in idea. But \"one\"\nwhich is convertible with being is a metaphysical entity and does not\ndepend on matter in its being. And although in God there is no\nprivation, still, according to the mode of our apprehension, He is\nknown to us by way only of privation and remotion. Thus there is no\nreason why a certain kind of privation should not be predicated of\nGod; for instance, that He is incorporeal and infinite; and in the\nsame way it is said of God that He is one.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 11, Art. 4]\n\nWhether God Is Supremely One?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is not supremely _one._ For \"one\" is so\ncalled from the privation of division. But privation cannot be greater\nor less. Therefore God is not more \"one\" than other things which are\ncalled \"one.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing seems to be more indivisible than what\nis actually and potentially indivisible; such as a point and unity.\nBut a thing is said to be more \"one\" according as it is indivisible.\nTherefore God is not more _one_ than unity is _one_ and a point is\n_one._\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is essentially good is supremely good.\nTherefore what is essentially _one_ is supremely _one._ But every\nbeing is essentially _one,_ as the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv).\nTherefore every being is supremely _one;_ and therefore God is not\n_one_ more than any other being is _one._\n\n_On the contrary,_ Bernard says (De Consid. v): \"Among all things called\none, the unity of the Divine Trinity holds the first place.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since _one_ is an undivided being, if anything is\nsupremely _one_ it must be supremely being, and supremely undivided.\nNow both of these belong to God. For He is supremely being, inasmuch\nas His being is not determined by any nature to which it is adjoined;\nsince He is being itself, subsistent, absolutely undetermined. But He\nis supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor\npotentially, by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple,\nas was shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Hence it is manifest that God is\n_one_ in the supreme degree.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although privation considered in itself is not\nsusceptive of more or less, still according as its opposite is\nsubject to more or less, privation also can be considered itself in\nthe light of more and less. Therefore according as a thing is more\ndivided, or is divisible, either less or not at all, in the degree it\nis called more, or less, or supremely, _one._\n\nReply Obj. 2: A point and unity which is the principle of number, are\nnot supremely being, inasmuch as they have being only in some\nsubject. Hence neither of them can be supremely _one._ For as a\nsubject cannot be supremely _one,_ because of the difference within\nit of accident and subject, so neither can an accident.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although every being is _one_ by its substance, still\nevery such substance is not equally the cause of unity; for the\nsubstance of some things is compound and of others simple.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 12\n\nHOW GOD IS KNOWN BY US\n(In Thirteen Articles)\n\nAs hitherto we have considered God as He is in Himself, we now go on\nto consider in what manner He is in the knowledge of creatures;\nconcerning which there are thirteen points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether any created intellect can see the essence of God?\n\n(2) Whether the essence of God is seen by the intellect through any\ncreated image?\n\n(3) Whether the essence of God can be seen by the corporeal eye?\n\n(4) Whether any created intellectual substance is sufficient by its\nown natural powers to see the essence of God?\n\n(5) Whether the created intellect needs any created light in order\nto see the essence of God?\n\n(6) Whether of those who see God, one sees Him more perfectly than\nanother?\n\n(7) Whether any created intellect can comprehend the essence of God?\n\n(8) Whether the created intellect seeing the essence of God, knows\nall things in it?\n\n(9) Whether what is there known is known by any similitudes?\n\n(10) Whether the created intellect knows at once what it sees in God?\n\n(11) Whether in the state of this life any man can see the essence of\nGod?\n\n(12) Whether by natural reason we can know God in this life?\n\n(13) Whether there is in this life any knowledge of God through grace\nabove the knowledge of natural reason?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Any Created Intellect Can See the Essence of God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that no created intellect can see the essence of\nGod. For Chrysostom (Hom. xiv. in Joan.) commenting on John 1:18, \"No\nman hath seen God at any time,\" says: \"Not prophets only, but neither\nangels nor archangels have seen God. For how can a creature see what\nis increatable?\" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God:\n\"Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor\nknowledge of Him.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But\nGod is infinite, as was shown above (Q. 7, A. 1). Therefore in\nHimself He is unknown.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the created intellect knows only existing things.\nFor what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is\nbeing. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather\nsuper-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is\nnot intelligible; but above all intellect.\n\nObj. 4: Further, there must be some proportion between the knower\nand the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no\nproportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is\nan infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect\ncannot see the essence of God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written: \"We shall see Him as He is\" (1 John\n2:2).\n\n_I answer that,_ Since everything is knowable according as it is actual,\nGod, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in\nHimself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself,\nmay not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the\nexcess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for\nexample, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the\nbat by reason of its excess of light.\n\nTherefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can\nsee the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as\nthe ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest\nfunction, which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that\nthe created intellect could never see God, it would either never\nattain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else\nbeside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of\nthe rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of\nits being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its\nprinciple. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there\nresides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect\nwhich he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect\nof the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause\nof things, the natural desire would remain void.\n\nHence it must be absolutely granted that the blessed see the essence\nof God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Both of these authorities speak of the vision of\ncomprehension. Hence Dionysius premises immediately before the words\ncited, \"He is universally to all incomprehensible,\" etc. Chrysostom\nlikewise after the words quoted says: \"He says this of the most\ncertain vision of the Father, which is such a perfect consideration\nand comprehension as the Father has of the Son.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The infinity of matter not made perfect by form, is\nunknown in itself, because all knowledge comes by the form; whereas\nthe infinity of the form not limited by matter, is in itself\nsupremely known. God is Infinite in this way, and not in the first\nway: as appears from what was said above (Q. 7, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: God is not said to be not existing as if He did not\nexist at all, but because He exists above all that exists; inasmuch\nas He is His own existence. Hence it does not follow that He cannot\nbe known at all, but that He exceeds every kind of knowledge; which\nmeans that He is not comprehended.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Proportion is twofold. In one sense it means a certain\nrelation of one quantity to another, according as double, treble and\nequal are species of proportion. In another sense every relation of\none thing to another is called proportion. And in this sense there\ncan be a proportion of the creature to God, inasmuch as it is related\nto Him as the effect of its cause, and as potentiality to its act;\nand in this way the created intellect can be proportioned to know God.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Essence of God Is Seen by the Created Intellect Through an\nImage?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the essence of God is seen through an image\nby the created intellect. For it is written: \"We know that when He\nshall appear, we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall\nsee Him as He is\" (1 John 3:2).\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v): \"When we know God,\nsome likeness of God is made in us.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, the intellect in act is the actual intelligible;\nas sense in act is the actual sensible. But this comes about inasmuch\nas sense is informed with the likeness of the sensible object, and the\nintellect with the likeness of the thing understood. Therefore, if God\nis seen by the created intellect in act, it must be that He is seen by\nsome similitude.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv) that when the Apostle\nsays, \"We see through a glass and in an enigma [*Douay: 'in a dark\nmanner'],\" \"by the terms 'glass' and 'enigma' certain similitudes are\nsignified by him, which are accommodated to the vision of God.\" But to\nsee the essence of God is not an enigmatic nor a speculative vision,\nbut is, on the contrary, of an opposite kind. Therefore the divine\nessence is not seen through a similitude.\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things are required both for sensible and for\nintellectual vision--viz. power of sight, and union of the thing seen\nwith the sight. For vision is made actual only when the thing seen is\nin a certain way in the seer. Now in corporeal things it is clear that\nthe thing seen cannot be by its essence in the seer, but only by its\nlikeness; as the similitude of a stone is in the eye, whereby the\nvision is made actual; whereas the substance of the stone is not\nthere. But if the principle of the visual power and the thing seen\nwere one and the same thing, it would necessarily follow that the seer\nwould receive both the visual power and the form whereby it sees, from\nthat one same thing.\n\nNow it is manifest both that God is the author of the intellectual\npower, and that He can be seen by the intellect. And since the\nintellective power of the creature is not the essence of God, it\nfollows that it is some kind of participated likeness of Him who is\nthe first intellect. Hence also the intellectual power of the\ncreature is called an intelligible light, as it were, derived from\nthe first light, whether this be understood of the natural power, or\nof some perfection superadded of grace or of glory. Therefore, in\norder to see God, there must be some similitude of God on the part of\nthe visual faculty, whereby the intellect is made capable of seeing\nGod. But on the part of the object seen, which must necessarily be\nunited to the seer, the essence of God cannot be seen by any created\nsimilitude. First, because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), \"by the\nsimilitudes of the inferior order of things, the superior can in no\nway be known;\" as by the likeness of a body the essence of an\nincorporeal thing cannot be known. Much less therefore can the\nessence of God be seen by any created likeness whatever. Secondly,\nbecause the essence of God is His own very existence, as was shown\nabove (Q. 3, A. 4), which cannot be said of any created form; and so\nno created form can be the similitude representing the essence of God\nto the seer. Thirdly, because the divine essence is uncircumscribed,\nand contains in itself super-eminently whatever can be signified or\nunderstood by the created intellect. Now this cannot in any way be\nrepresented by any created likeness; for every created form is\ndetermined according to some aspect of wisdom, or of power, or of\nbeing itself, or of some like thing. Hence to say that God is seen by\nsome similitude, is to say that the divine essence is not seen at\nall; which is false.\n\nTherefore it must be said that to see the essence of God, there is\nrequired some similitude in the visual faculty, namely, the light of\nglory strengthening the intellect to see God, which is spoken of in\nthe Psalm (35:10), \"In Thy light we shall see light.\" The essence of\nGod, however, cannot be seen by any created similitude representing\nthe divine essence itself as it really is.\n\nReply Obj. 1: That authority speaks of the similitude which is\ncaused by participation of the light of glory.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks of the knowledge of God here on earth.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The divine essence is existence itself. Hence as\nother intelligible forms which are not their own existence are united\nto the intellect by means of some entity, whereby the intellect itself\nis informed, and made in act; so the divine essence is united to the\ncreated intellect, as the object actually understood, making the\nintellect in act by and of itself.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Essence of God Can Be Seen with the Bodily Eye?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the essence of God can be seen by the\ncorporeal eye. For it is written (Job 19:26): \"In my flesh I shall see\n. . . God,\" and (Job 42:5), \"With the hearing of the ear I have heard\nThee, but now my eye seeth Thee.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxix, 29): \"Those\neyes\" (namely the glorified) \"will therefore have a greater power of\nsight, not so much to see more keenly, as some report of the sight of\nserpents or of eagles (for whatever acuteness of vision is possessed\nby these creatures, they can see only corporeal things) but to see\neven incorporeal things.\" Now whoever can see incorporeal things, can\nbe raised up to see God. Therefore the glorified eye can see God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, God can be seen by man through a vision of the\nimagination. For it is written: \"I saw the Lord sitting upon a\nthrone,\" etc. (Isa. 6:1). But an imaginary vision originates from\nsense; for the imagination is moved by sense to act. Therefore God can\nbe seen by a vision of sense.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): \"No one\nhas ever seen God either in this life, as He is, nor in the angelic\nlife, as visible things are seen by corporeal vision.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible for God to be seen by the sense of\nsight, or by any other sense, or faculty of the sensitive power. For\nevery such kind of power is the act of a corporeal organ, as will be\nshown later (Q. 78). Now act is proportional to the nature which\npossesses it. Hence no power of that kind can go beyond corporeal\nthings. For God is incorporeal, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 1).\nHence He cannot be seen by the sense or the imagination, but only by\nthe intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The words, \"In my flesh I shall see God my Saviour,\" do\nnot mean that God will be seen with the eye of the flesh, but that\nman existing in the flesh after the resurrection will see God.\nLikewise the words, \"Now my eye seeth Thee,\" are to be understood of\nthe mind's eye, as the Apostle says: \"May He give unto you the spirit\nof wisdom . . . in the knowledge of Him, that the eyes of your heart\"\nmay be \"enlightened\" (Eph. 1:17, 18).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks as one inquiring, and conditionally.\nThis appears from what he says previously: \"Therefore they will have\nan altogether different power (viz. the glorified eyes), if they\nshall see that incorporeal nature;\" and afterwards he explains this,\nsaying: \"It is very credible, that we shall so see the mundane bodies\nof the new heaven and the new earth, as to see most clearly God\neverywhere present, governing all corporeal things, not as we now see\nthe invisible things of God as understood by what is made; but as\nwhen we see men among whom we live, living and exercising the\nfunctions of human life, we do not believe they live, but see it.\"\nHence it is evident how the glorified eyes will see God, as now our\neyes see the life of another. But life is not seen with the corporeal\neye, as a thing in itself visible, but as the indirect object of the\nsense; which indeed is not known by sense, but at once, together with\nsense, by some other cognitive power. But that the divine presence is\nknown by the intellect immediately on the sight of, and through,\ncorporeal things, happens from two causes--viz. from the perspicuity\nof the intellect, and from the refulgence of the divine glory infused\ninto the body after its renovation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The essence of God is not seen in a vision of the\nimagination; but the imagination receives some form representing God\naccording to some mode of similitude; as in the divine Scripture\ndivine things are metaphorically described by means of sensible\nthings.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Any Created Intellect by Its Natural Powers Can See the Divine\nEssence?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that a created intellect can see the Divine\nessence by its own natural power. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv):\n\"An angel is a pure mirror, most clear, receiving, if it is right to\nsay so, the whole beauty of God.\" But if a reflection is seen, the\noriginal thing is seen. Therefore since an angel by his natural power\nunderstands himself, it seems that by his own natural power he\nunderstands the Divine essence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what is supremely visible, is made less visible to\nus by reason of our defective corporeal or intellectual sight. But\nthe angelic intellect has no such defect. Therefore, since God is\nsupremely intelligible in Himself, it seems that in like manner He is\nsupremely so to an angel. Therefore, if he can understand other\nintelligible things by his own natural power, much more can he\nunderstand God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, corporeal sense cannot be raised up to understand\nincorporeal substance, which is above its nature. Therefore if to see\nthe essence of God is above the nature of every created intellect, it\nfollows that no created intellect can reach up to see the essence of\nGod at all. But this is false, as appears from what is said above (A.\n1). Therefore it seems that it is natural for a created intellect to\nsee the Divine essence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written: \"The grace of God is life everlasting\"\n(Rom. 6:23). But life everlasting consists in the vision of the Divine\nessence, according to the words: \"This is eternal life, that they may\nknow Thee the only true God,\" etc. (John 17:3). Therefore to see the\nessence of God is possible to the created intellect by grace, and not\nby nature.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible for any created intellect to see the\nessence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated\naccording as the thing known is in the knower. But the thing known is\nin the knower according to the mode of the knower. Hence the knowledge\nof every knower is ruled according to its own nature. If therefore the\nmode of anything's being exceeds the mode of the knower, it must\nresult that the knowledge of the object is above the nature of the\nknower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things\nhave being only in this one individual matter; as all bodies. But\nothers are subsisting natures, not residing in matter at all, which,\nhowever, are not their own existence, but receive it; and these are\nthe incorporeal beings, called angels. But to God alone does it belong\nto be His own subsistent being. Therefore what exists only in\nindividual matter we know naturally, forasmuch as our soul, whereby we\nknow, is the form of certain matter. Now our soul possesses two\ncognitive powers; one is the act of a corporeal organ, which naturally\nknows things existing in individual matter; hence sense knows only the\nsingular. But there is another kind of cognitive power in the soul,\ncalled the intellect; and this is not the act of any corporeal organ.\nWherefore the intellect naturally knows natures which exist only in\nindividual matter; not as they are in such individual matter, but\naccording as they are abstracted therefrom by the considering act of\nthe intellect; hence it follows that through the intellect we can\nunderstand these objects as universal; and this is beyond the power of\nthe sense. Now the angelic intellect naturally knows natures that are\nnot in matter; but this is beyond the power of the intellect of our\nsoul in the state of its present life, united as it is to the body. It\nfollows therefore that to know self-subsistent being is natural to the\ndivine intellect alone; and this is beyond the natural power of any\ncreated intellect; for no creature is its own existence, forasmuch as\nits existence is participated. Therefore the created intellect cannot\nsee the essence of God, unless God by His grace unites Himself to the\ncreated intellect, as an object made intelligible to it.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This mode of knowing God is natural to an\nangel--namely, to know Him by His own likeness refulgent in the angel\nhimself. But to know God by any created similitude is not to know the\nessence of God, as was shown above (A. 2). Hence it does not follow\nthat an angel can know the essence of God by his own power.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The angelic intellect is not defective, if defect be\ntaken to mean privation, as if it were without anything which it\nought to have. But if the defect be taken negatively, in that sense\nevery creature is defective, when compared with God; forasmuch as it\ndoes not possess the excellence which is in God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The sense of sight, as being altogether material,\ncannot be raised up to immateriality. But our intellect, or the\nangelic intellect, inasmuch as it is elevated above matter in its own\nnature, can be raised up above its own nature to a higher level by\ngrace. The proof is, that sight cannot in any way know abstractedly\nwhat it knows concretely; for in no way can it perceive a nature\nexcept as this one particular nature; whereas our intellect is able\nto consider abstractedly what it knows concretely. Now although it\nknows things which have a form residing in matter, still it resolves\nthe composite into both of these elements; and it considers the form\nseparately by itself. Likewise, also, the intellect of an angel,\nalthough it naturally knows the concrete in any nature, still it is\nable to separate that existence by its intellect; since it knows that\nthe thing itself is one thing, and its existence is another. Since\ntherefore the created intellect is naturally capable of apprehending\nthe concrete form, and the concrete being abstractedly, by way of a\nkind of resolution of parts; it can by grace be raised up to know\nseparate subsisting substance, and separate subsisting existence.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Created Intellect Needs Any Created Light in Order to See the\nEssence of God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the created intellect does not need any\ncreated light in order to see the essence of God. For what is of\nitself lucid in sensible things does not require any other light in\norder to be seen. Therefore the same applies to intelligible things.\nNow God is intelligible light. Therefore He is not seen by means of\nany created light.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if God is seen through a medium, He is not seen\nin His essence. But if seen by any created light, He is seen through a\nmedium. Therefore He is not seen in His essence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is created can be natural to some creature.\nTherefore if the essence of God is seen through any created light,\nsuch a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus,\nthat creature would not need any other light to see God; which is\nimpossible. Therefore it is not necessary that every creature should\nrequire a superadded light in order to see the essence of God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written: \"In Thy light we shall see light\" (Ps.\n35:10).\n\n_I answer that,_ Everything which is raised up to what exceeds its\nnature, must be prepared by some disposition above its nature; as, for\nexample, if air is to receive the form of fire, it must be prepared by\nsome disposition for such a form. But when any created intellect sees\nthe essence of God, the essence of God itself becomes the intelligible\nform of the intellect. Hence it is necessary that some supernatural\ndisposition should be added to the intellect in order that it may be\nraised up to such a great and sublime height. Now since the natural\npower of the created intellect does not avail to enable it to see the\nessence of God, as was shown in the preceding article, it is necessary\nthat the power of understanding should be added by divine grace. Now\nthis increase of the intellectual powers is called the illumination of\nthe intellect, as we also call the intelligible object itself by the\nname of light of illumination. And this is the light spoken of in the\nApocalypse (Apoc. 21:23): \"The glory of God hath enlightened\nit\"--viz. the society of the blessed who see God. By this light the\nblessed are made \"deiform\"--i.e. like to God, according to the\nsaying: \"When He shall appear we shall be like to Him, and [Vulg.:\n'because'] we shall see Him as He is\" (1 John 2:2).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The created light is necessary to see the\nessence of God, not in order to make the essence of God intelligible,\nwhich is of itself intelligible, but in order to enable the intellect\nto understand in the same way as a habit makes a power abler to act.\nEven so corporeal light is necessary as regards external sight,\ninasmuch as it makes the medium actually transparent, and susceptible\nof color.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This light is required to see the divine\nessence, not as a similitude in which God is seen, but as a perfection\nof the intellect, strengthening it to see God. Therefore it may be\nsaid that this light is to be described not as a medium in which God\nis seen, but as one by which He is seen; and such a medium does not\ntake away the immediate vision of God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The disposition to the form of fire can be\nnatural only to the subject of that form. Hence the light of glory\ncannot be natural to a creature unless the creature has a divine\nnature; which is impossible. But by this light the rational creature\nis made deiform, as is said in this article.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I. Q. 12, Art. 6]\n\nWhether of Those Who See the Essence of God, One Sees More Perfectly Than\nAnother?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that of those who see the essence of God, one\ndoes not see more perfectly than another. For it is written (1 John\n3:2): \"We shall see Him as He is.\" But He is only in one way.\nTherefore He will be seen by all in one way only; and therefore He\nwill not be seen more perfectly by one and less perfectly by another.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xxxii):\n\"One person cannot see one and the same thing more perfectly than\nanother.\" But all who see the essence of God, understand the Divine\nessence, for God is seen by the intellect and not by sense, as was\nshown above (A. 3). Therefore of those who see the divine essence,\none does not see more clearly than another.\n\nObj. 3: Further, That anything be seen more perfectly than another\ncan happen in two ways: either on the part of the visible object, or\non the part of the visual power of the seer. On the part of the\nobject, it may so happen because the object is received more\nperfectly in the seer, that is, according to the greater perfection\nof the similitude; but this does not apply to the present question,\nfor God is present to the intellect seeing Him not by way of\nsimilitude, but by His essence. It follows then that if one sees Him\nmore perfectly than another, this happens according to the difference\nof the intellectual power; thus it follows too that the one whose\nintellectual power is higher, will see Him the more clearly; and this\nis incongruous; since equality with angels is promised to men as\ntheir beatitude.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Eternal life consists in the vision of God, according\nto John 17:3: \"This is eternal life, that they may know Thee the only\ntrue God,\" etc. Therefore if all saw the essence of God equally in\neternal life, all would be equal; the contrary to which is declared by\nthe Apostle: \"Star differs from star in glory\" (1 Cor. 15:41).\n\n_I answer that,_ Of those who see the essence of God, one sees Him more\nperfectly than another. This, indeed, does not take place as if one\nhad a more perfect similitude of God than another, since that vision\nwill not spring from any similitude; but it will take place because\none intellect will have a greater power or faculty to see God than\nanother. The faculty of seeing God, however, does not belong to the\ncreated intellect naturally, but is given to it by the light of glory,\nwhich establishes the intellect in a kind of \"deiformity,\" as appears\nfrom what is said above, in the preceding article.\n\nHence the intellect which has more of the light of glory will see God\nthe more perfectly; and he will have a fuller participation of the\nlight of glory who has more charity; because where there is the\ngreater charity, there is the more desire; and desire in a certain\ndegree makes the one desiring apt and prepared to receive the object\ndesired. Hence he who possesses the more charity, will see God the\nmore perfectly, and will be the more beatified.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the words, \"We shall see Him as He is,\" the\nconjunction \"as\" determines the mode of vision on the part of the\nobject seen, so that the meaning is, we shall see Him to be as He is,\nbecause we shall see His existence, which is His essence. But it does\nnot determine the mode of vision on the part of the one seeing; as if\nthe meaning was that the mode of seeing God will be as perfect as is\nthe perfect mode of God's existence.\n\nThus appears the answer to the Second Objection. For when it is said\nthat one intellect does not understand one and the same thing better\nthan another, this would be true if referred to the mode of the thing\nunderstood, for whoever understands it otherwise than it really is,\ndoes not truly understand it, but not if referred to the mode of\nunderstanding, for the understanding of one is more perfect than the\nunderstanding of another.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The diversity of seeing will not arise on the part of\nthe object seen, for the same object will be presented to all--viz.\nthe essence of God; nor will it arise from the diverse participation\nof the object seen by different similitudes; but it will arise on the\npart of the diverse faculty of the intellect, not, indeed, the\nnatural faculty, but the glorified faculty.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Those Who See the Essence of God Comprehend Him?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that those who see the divine essence,\ncomprehend God. For the Apostle says (Phil. 3:12): \"But I follow\nafter, if I may by any means comprehend [Douay: 'apprehend'].\" But the\nApostle did not follow in vain; for he said (1 Cor. 9:26): \"I . . . so\nrun, not as at an uncertainty.\" Therefore he comprehended; and in the\nsame way, others also, whom he invites to do the same, saying: \"So run\nthat you may comprehend.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Vid. Deum, Ep. cxlvii): \"That\nis comprehended which is so seen as a whole, that nothing of it is\nhidden from the seer.\" But if God is seen in His essence, He is seen\nwhole, and nothing of Him is hidden from the seer, since God is\nsimple. Therefore whoever sees His essence, comprehends Him.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if we say that He is seen as a \"whole,\" but not\n\"wholly,\" it may be contrarily urged that \"wholly\" refers either to\nthe mode of the seer, or to the mode of the thing seen. But he who\nsees the essence of God, sees Him wholly, if the mode of the thing\nseen is considered; forasmuch as he sees Him as He is; also, likewise,\nhe sees Him wholly if the mode of the seer is meant, forasmuch as the\nintellect will with its full power see the Divine essence. Therefore\nall who see the essence of God see Him wholly; therefore they\ncomprehend Him.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written: \"O most mighty, great, and powerful,\nthe Lord of hosts is Thy Name. Great in counsel, and incomprehensible\nin thought\" (Jer. 32:18,19). Therefore He cannot be comprehended.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible for any created intellect to\ncomprehend God; yet \"for the mind to attain to God in some degree is\ngreat beatitude,\" as Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. xxxviii).\n\nIn proof of this we must consider that what is comprehended is\nperfectly known; and that is perfectly known which is known so far as\nit can be known. Thus, if anything which is capable of scientific\ndemonstration is held only by an opinion resting on a probably proof,\nit is not comprehended; as, for instance, if anyone knows by\nscientific demonstration that a triangle has three angles equal to two\nright angles, he comprehends that truth; whereas if anyone accepts it\nas a probable opinion because wise men or most men teach it, he cannot\nbe said to comprehend the thing itself, because he does not attain to\nthat perfect mode of knowledge of which it is intrinsically capable.\nBut no created intellect can attain to that perfect mode of the\nknowledge of the Divine intellect whereof it is intrinsically capable.\nWhich thus appears--Everything is knowable according to its\nactuality. But God, whose being is infinite, as was shown above\n(Q. 7), is infinitely knowable. Now no created intellect can know\nGod infinitely. For the created intellect knows the Divine essence\nmore or less perfectly in proportion as it receives a greater or\nlesser light of glory. Since therefore the created light of glory\nreceived into any created intellect cannot be infinite, it is clearly\nimpossible for any created intellect to know God in an infinite\ndegree. Hence it is impossible that it should comprehend God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: \"Comprehension\" is twofold: in one sense it is taken\nstrictly and properly, according as something is included in the one\ncomprehending; and thus in no way is God comprehended either by\nintellect, or in any other way; forasmuch as He is infinite and\ncannot be included in any finite being; so that no finite being can\ncontain Him infinitely, in the degree of His own infinity. In this\nsense we now take comprehension. But in another sense \"comprehension\"\nis taken more largely as opposed to \"non-attainment\"; for he who\nattains to anyone is said to comprehend him when he attains to him.\nAnd in this sense God is comprehended by the blessed, according to\nthe words, \"I held him, and I will not let him go\" (Cant. 3:4); in\nthis sense also are to be understood the words quoted from the\nApostle concerning comprehension. And in this way \"comprehension\" is\none of the three prerogatives of the soul, responding to hope, as\nvision responds to faith, and fruition responds to charity. For even\namong ourselves not everything seen is held or possessed, forasmuch\nas things either appear sometimes afar off, or they are not in our\npower of attainment. Neither, again, do we always enjoy what we\npossess; either because we find no pleasure in them, or because such\nthings are not the ultimate end of our desire, so as to satisfy and\nquell it. But the blessed possess these three things in God; because\nthey see Him, and in seeing Him, possess Him as present, having the\npower to see Him always; and possessing Him, they enjoy Him as the\nultimate fulfilment of desire.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God is called incomprehensible not because anything of\nHim is not seen; but because He is not seen as perfectly as He is\ncapable of being seen; thus when any demonstrable proposition is\nknown by probable reason only, it does not follow that any part of it\nis unknown, either the subject, or the predicate, or the composition;\nbut that it is not as perfectly known as it is capable of being\nknown. Hence Augustine, in his definition of comprehension, says the\nwhole is comprehended when it is seen in such a way that nothing of\nit is hidden from the seer, or when its boundaries can be completely\nviewed or traced; for the boundaries of a thing are said to be\ncompletely surveyed when the end of the knowledge of it is attained.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The word \"wholly\" denotes a mode of the object; not\nthat the whole object does not come under knowledge, but that the\nmode of the object is not the mode of the one who knows. Therefore he\nwho sees God's essence, sees in Him that He exists infinitely, and is\ninfinitely knowable; nevertheless, this infinite mode does not extend\nto enable the knower to know infinitely; thus, for instance, a person\ncan have a probable opinion that a proposition is demonstrable,\nalthough he himself does not know it as demonstrated.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Those Who See the Essence of God See All in God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God see all\nthings in God. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv): \"What do they not see,\nwho see Him Who sees all things?\" But God sees all things. Therefore\nthose who see God see all things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whoever sees a mirror, sees what is reflected in\nthe mirror. But all actual or possible things shine forth in God as in\na mirror; for He knows all things in Himself. Therefore whoever sees\nGod, sees all actual things in Him, and also all possible things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whoever understands the greater, can understand\nthe least, as is said in _De Anima_ iii. But all that God does, or can\ndo, are less than His essence. Therefore whoever understands God, can\nunderstand all that God does, or can do.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the rational creature naturally desires to know\nall things. Therefore if in seeing God it does not know all things,\nits natural desire will not rest satisfied; thus, in seeing God it\nwill not be fully happy; which is incongruous. Therefore he who sees\nGod knows all things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The angels see the essence of God; and yet do not\nknow all things. For as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), \"the\ninferior angels are cleansed from ignorance by the superior angels.\"\nAlso they are ignorant of future contingent things, and of secret\nthoughts; for this knowledge belongs to God alone. Therefore whosoever\nsees the essence of God, does not know all things.\n\n_I answer that,_ The created intellect, in seeing the divine essence,\ndoes not see in it all that God does or can do. For it is manifest\nthat things are seen in God as they are in Him. But all other things\nare in God as effects are in the power of their cause. Therefore all\nthings are seen in God as an effect is seen in its cause. Now it is\nclear that the more perfectly a cause is seen, the more of its effects\ncan be seen in it. For whoever has a lofty understanding, as soon as\none demonstrative principle is put before him can gather the knowledge\nof many conclusions; but this is beyond one of a weaker intellect, for\nhe needs things to be explained to him separately. And so an intellect\ncan know all the effects of a cause and the reasons for those effects\nin the cause itself, if it comprehends the cause wholly. Now no\ncreated intellect can comprehend God wholly, as shown above\n(A. 7). Therefore no created intellect in seeing God can know all\nthat God does or can do, for this would be to comprehend His power;\nbut of what God does or can do any intellect can know the more, the\nmore perfectly it sees God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Gregory speaks as regards the object being sufficient,\nnamely, God, who in Himself sufficiently contains and shows forth all\nthings; but it does not follow that whoever sees God knows all\nthings, for he does not perfectly comprehend Him.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is not necessary that whoever sees a mirror should\nsee all that is in the mirror, unless his glance comprehends the\nmirror itself.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although it is more to see God than to see all things\nelse, still it is a greater thing to see Him so that all things are\nknown in Him, than to see Him in such a way that not all things, but\nthe fewer or the more, are known in Him. For it has been shown in\nthis article that the more things are known in God according as He is\nseen more or less perfectly.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The natural desire of the rational creature is to know\neverything that belongs to the perfection of the intellect, namely,\nthe species and the genera of things and their types, and these\neveryone who sees the Divine essence will see in God. But to know\nother singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does not belong to\nthe perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire\ngo out to these things; neither, again, does it desire to know things\nthat exist not as yet, but which God can call into being. Yet if God\nalone were seen, Who is the fount and principle of all being and of\nall truth, He would so fill the natural desire of knowledge that\nnothing else would be desired, and the seer would be completely\nbeatified. Hence Augustine says (Confess. v): \"Unhappy the man who\nknoweth all these\" (i.e. all creatures) \"and knoweth not Thee! but\nhappy whoso knoweth Thee although he know not these. And whoso\nknoweth both Thee and them is not the happier for them, but for Thee\nalone.\"\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 9]\n\nWhether What Is Seen in God by Those Who See the Divine Essence, Is Seen\nThrough Any Similitude?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that what is seen in God by those who see the\nDivine essence, is seen by means of some similitude. For every kind of\nknowledge comes about by the knower being assimilated to the object\nknown. For thus the intellect in act becomes the actual intelligible,\nand the sense in act becomes the actual sensible, inasmuch as it is\ninformed by a similitude of the object, as the eye by the similitude\nof color. Therefore if the intellect of one who sees the Divine\nessence understands any creatures in God, it must be informed by their\nsimilitudes.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what we have seen, we keep in memory. But Paul,\nseeing the essence of God whilst in ecstasy, when he had ceased to see\nthe Divine essence, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 28,34),\nremembered many of the things he had seen in the rapture; hence he\nsaid: \"I have heard secret words which it is not granted to man to\nutter\" (2 Cor. 12:4). Therefore it must be said that certain\nsimilitudes of what he remembered, remained in his mind; and in the\nsame way, when he actually saw the essence of God, he had certain\nsimilitudes or ideas of what he actually saw in it.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one\nlikeness. But all things are seen in God as in an intelligible mirror.\nTherefore if God Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own\nessence, neither are the things seen in Him seen by any similitudes or\nideas.\n\n_I answer that,_ Those who see the divine essence see what they see in\nGod not by any likeness, but by the divine essence itself united to\ntheir intellect. For each thing is known in so far as its likeness is\nin the one who knows. Now this takes place in two ways. For as things\nwhich are like one and the same thing are like to each other, the\ncognitive faculty can be assimilated to any knowable object in two\nways. In one way it is assimilated by the object itself, when it is\ndirectly informed by a similitude, and then the object is known in\nitself. In another way when informed by a similitude which resembles\nthe object; and in this way, the knowledge is not of the thing in\nitself, but of the thing in its likeness. For the knowledge of a man\nin himself differs from the knowledge of him in his image. Hence to\nknow things thus by their likeness in the one who knows, is to know\nthem in themselves or in their own nature; whereas to know them by\ntheir similitudes pre-existing in God, is to see them in God. Now\nthere is a difference between these two kinds of knowledge. Hence,\naccording to the knowledge whereby things are known by those who see\nthe essence of God, they are seen in God Himself not by any other\nsimilitudes but by the Divine essence alone present to the intellect;\nby which also God Himself is seen.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The created intellect of one who sees God is\nassimilated to what is seen in God, inasmuch as it is united to the\nDivine essence, in which the similitudes of all things pre-exist.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Some of the cognitive faculties form other images from\nthose first conceived; thus the imagination from the preconceived\nimages of a mountain and of gold can form the likeness of a golden\nmountain; and the intellect, from the preconceived ideas of genus and\ndifference, forms the idea of species; in like manner from the\nsimilitude of an image we can form in our minds the similitude of the\noriginal of the image. Thus Paul, or any other person who sees God,\nby the very vision of the divine essence, can form in himself the\nsimilitudes of what is seen in the divine essence, which remained in\nPaul even when he had ceased to see the essence of God. Still this\nkind of vision whereby things are seen by this likeness thus\nconceived, is not the same as that whereby things are seen in God.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 10]\n\nWhether Those Who See the Essence of God See All They See in It at the\nSame Time?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that those who see the essence of God do not see\nall they see in Him at one and the same time. For according to the\nPhilosopher (Topic. ii): \"It may happen that many things are known,\nbut only one is understood.\" But what is seen in God, is understood;\nfor God is seen by the intellect. Therefore those who see God do not\nsee all in Him at the same time.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 22, 23), \"God\nmoves the spiritual creature according to time\"--i.e. by intelligence\nand affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God.\nTherefore those who see God understand and are affected successively;\nfor time means succession.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xvi): \"Our thoughts will not\nbe unstable, going to and fro from one thing to another; but we shall\nsee all we know at one glance.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ What is seen in the Word is seen not successively, but\nat the same time. In proof whereof, we ourselves cannot know many\nthings all at once, forasmuch as understand many things by means of\nmany ideas. But our intellect cannot be actually informed by many\ndiverse ideas at the same time, so as to understand by them; as one\nbody cannot bear different shapes simultaneously. Hence, when many\nthings can be understood by one idea, they are understood at the same\ntime; as the parts of a whole are understood successively, and not all\nat the same time, if each one is understood by its own idea; whereas\nif all are understood under the one idea of the whole, they are\nunderstood simultaneously. Now it was shown above that things seen in\nGod, are not seen singly by their own similitude; but all are seen by\nthe one essence of God. Hence they are seen simultaneously, and not\nsuccessively.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We understand one thing only when we understand by one\nidea; but many things understood by one idea are understood\nsimultaneously, as in the idea of a man we understand \"animal\" and\n\"rational\"; and in the idea of a house we understand the wall and the\nroof.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As regards their natural knowledge, whereby they know\nthings by diverse ideas given them, the angels do not know all things\nsimultaneously, and thus they are moved in the act of understanding\naccording to time; but as regards what they see in God, they see all\nat the same time.\n_______________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 11]\n\nWhether Anyone in This Life Can See the Essence of God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that one can in this life see the Divine\nessence. For Jacob said: \"I have seen God face to face\" (Gen. 32:30).\nBut to see Him face to face is to see His essence, as appears from the\nwords: \"We see now in a glass and in a dark manner, but then face to\nface\" (1 Cor. 13:12).\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Lord said to Moses: \"I speak to him mouth to\nmouth, and plainly, and not by riddles and figures doth he see the\nLord\" (Num. 12:8); but this is to see God in His essence. Therefore it\nis possible to see the essence of God in this life.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that wherein we know all other things, and whereby\nwe judge of other things, is known in itself to us. But even now we\nknow all things in God; for Augustine says (Confess. viii): \"If we\nboth see that what you say is true, and we both see that what I say\nis true; where, I ask, do we see this? neither I in thee, nor thou in\nme; but both of us in the very incommutable truth itself above our\nminds.\" He also says (De Vera Relig. xxx) that, \"We judge of all\nthings according to the divine truth\"; and (De Trin. xii) that, \"it\nis the duty of reason to judge of these corporeal things according to\nthe incorporeal and eternal ideas; which unless they were above the\nmind could not be incommutable.\" Therefore even in this life we see\nGod Himself.\n\nObj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24, 25),\nthose things that are in the soul by their essence are seen by\nintellectual vision. But intellectual vision is of intelligible\nthings, not by similitudes, but by their very essences, as he also\nsays (Gen. ad lit. xiii, 24, 25). Therefore since God is in our soul\nby His essence, it follows that He is seen by us in His essence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written, \"Man shall not see Me, and live\" (Ex.\n32:20), and a gloss upon this says, \"In this mortal life God can be\nseen by certain images, but not by the likeness itself of His own\nnature.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ God cannot be seen in His essence by a mere human\nbeing, except he be separated from this mortal life. The reason is\nbecause, as was said above (A. 4), the mode of knowledge follows\nthe mode of the nature of the knower. But our soul, as long as we live\nin this life, has its being in corporeal matter; hence naturally it\nknows only what has a form in matter, or what can be known by such a\nform. Now it is evident that the Divine essence cannot be known\nthrough the nature of material things. For it was shown above\n(AA. 2, 9) that the knowledge of God by means of any created\nsimilitude is not the vision of His essence. Hence it is impossible\nfor the soul of man in this life to see the essence of God. This can\nbe seen in the fact that the more our soul is abstracted from\ncorporeal things, the more it is capable of receiving abstract\nintelligible things. Hence in dreams and alienations of the bodily\nsenses divine revelations and foresight of future events are perceived\nthe more clearly. It is not possible, therefore, that the soul in this\nmortal life should be raised up to the supreme of intelligible\nobjects, i.e. to the divine essence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv) a man is said\nin the Scriptures to see God in the sense that certain figures are\nformed in the senses or imagination, according to some similitude\nrepresenting in part the divinity. So when Jacob says, \"I have seen\nGod face to face,\" this does not mean the Divine essence, but some\nfigure representing God. And this is to be referred to some high mode\nof prophecy, so that God seems to speak, though in an imaginary\nvision; as will later be explained (II-II, Q. 174) in treating of the\ndegrees of prophecy. We may also say that Jacob spoke thus to\ndesignate some exalted intellectual contemplation, above the ordinary\nstate.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As God works miracles in corporeal things, so also He\ndoes supernatural wonders above the common order, raising the minds\nof some living in the flesh beyond the use of sense, even up to the\nvision of His own essence; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 26,\n27, 28) of Moses, the teacher of the Jews; and of Paul, the teacher\nof the Gentiles. This will be treated more fully in the question of\nrapture (II-II, Q. 175).\n\nReply Obj. 3: All things are said to be seen in God and all things\nare judged in Him, because by the participation of His light, we know\nand judge all things; for the light of natural reason itself is a\nparticipation of the divine light; as likewise we are said to see and\njudge of sensible things in the sun, i.e., by the sun's light. Hence\nAugustine says (Soliloq. i, 8), \"The lessons of instruction can only\nbe seen as it were by their own sun,\" namely God. As therefore in\norder to see a sensible object, it is not necessary to see the\nsubstance of the sun, so in like manner to see any intelligible\nobject, it is not necessary to see the essence of God.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Intellectual vision is of the things which are in the\nsoul by their essence, as intelligible things are in the intellect.\nAnd thus God is in the souls of the blessed; not thus is He in our\nsoul, but by presence, essence and power.\n_______________________\n\nTWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 12]\n\nWhether God Can Be Known in This Life by Natural Reason?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that by natural reason we cannot know God in\nthis life. For Boethius says (De Consol. v) that \"reason does not\ngrasp simple form.\" But God is a supremely simple form, as was shown\nabove (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore natural reason cannot attain to know\nHim.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the soul understands nothing by natural reason\nwithout the use of the imagination. But we cannot have an imagination\nof God, Who is incorporeal. Therefore we cannot know God by natural\nknowledge.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the knowledge of natural reason belongs to both\ngood and evil, inasmuch as they have a common nature. But the\nknowledge of God belongs only to the good; for Augustine says (De\nTrin. i): \"The weak eye of the human mind is not fixed on that\nexcellent light unless purified by the justice of faith.\" Therefore\nGod cannot be known by natural reason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 1:19), \"That which is known of\nGod,\" namely, what can be known of God by natural reason, \"is manifest\nin them.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Our natural knowledge begins from sense. Hence our\nnatural knowledge can go as far as it can be led by sensible things.\nBut our mind cannot be led by sense so far as to see the essence of\nGod; because the sensible effects of God do not equal the power of God\nas their cause. Hence from the knowledge of sensible things the whole\npower of God cannot be known; nor therefore can His essence be seen.\nBut because they are His effects and depend on their cause, we can be\nled from them so far as to know of God \"whether He exists,\" and to\nknow of Him what must necessarily belong to Him, as the first cause of\nall things, exceeding all things caused by Him.\n\nHence we know that His relationship with creatures so far as to be the\ncause of them all; also that creatures differ from Him, inasmuch as He\nis not in any way part of what is caused by Him; and that creatures\nare not removed from Him by reason of any defect on His part, but\nbecause He superexceeds them all.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Reason cannot reach up to simple form, so as to\nknow \"what it is\"; but it can know \"whether it is.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: God is known by natural knowledge through the\nimages of His effects.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the knowledge of God's essence is by grace, it\nbelongs only to the good; but the knowledge of Him by natural reason\ncan belong to both good and bad; and hence Augustine says (Retract.\ni), retracting what he had said before: \"I do not approve what I said\nin prayer, 'God who willest that only the pure should know truth.'\nFor it can be answered that many who are not pure can know many\ntruths,\" i.e. by natural reason.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 12, Art. 13]\n\nWhether by Grace a Higher Knowledge of God Can Be Obtained Than by\nNatural Reason?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that by grace a higher knowledge of God is not\nobtained than by natural reason. For Dionysius says (De Mystica Theol.\ni) that whoever is the more united to God in this life, is united to\nHim as to one entirely unknown. He says the same of Moses, who\nnevertheless obtained a certain excellence by the knowledge conferred\nby grace. But to be united to God while ignoring of Him \"what He is,\"\ncomes about also by natural reason. Therefore God is not more known to\nus by grace than by natural reason.\n\nObj. 2: Further, we can acquire the knowledge of divine things by\nnatural reason only through the imagination; and the same applies to\nthe knowledge given by grace. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i) that\n\"it is impossible for the divine ray to shine upon us except as\nscreened round about by the many colored sacred veils.\" Therefore we\ncannot know God more fully by grace than by natural reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, our intellect adheres to God by grace of faith.\nBut faith does not seem to be knowledge; for Gregory says (Hom. xxvi\nin Ev.) that \"things not seen are the objects of faith, and not of\nknowledge.\" Therefore there is not given to us a more excellent\nknowledge of God by grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says that \"God hath revealed to us His\nspirit,\" what \"none of the princes of this world knew\" (1 Cor. 2:10),\nnamely, the philosophers, as the gloss expounds.\n\n_I answer that,_ We have a more perfect knowledge of God by grace than\nby natural reason. Which is proved thus. The knowledge which we have\nby natural reason contains two things: images derived from the\nsensible objects; and the natural intelligible light, enabling us to\nabstract from them intelligible conceptions.\n\nNow in both of these, human knowledge is assisted by the revelation of\ngrace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the\ninfusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the\nhuman imagination are divinely formed, so as to express divine things\nbetter than those do which we receive from sensible objects, as\nappears in prophetic visions; while sometimes sensible things, or even\nvoices, are divinely formed to express some divine meaning; as in the\nBaptism, the Holy Ghost was seen in the shape of a dove, and the voice\nof the Father was heard, \"This is My beloved Son\" (Matt. 3:17).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although by the revelation of grace in this life we\ncannot know of God \"what He is,\" and thus are united to Him as to one\nunknown; still we know Him more fully according as many and more\nexcellent of His effects are demonstrated to us, and according as we\nattribute to Him some things known by divine revelation, to which\nnatural reason cannot reach, as, for instance, that God is Three and\nOne.\n\nReply Obj. 2: From the images either received from sense in the\nnatural order, or divinely formed in the imagination, we have so much\nthe more excellent intellectual knowledge, the stronger the\nintelligible light is in man; and thus through the revelation given\nby the images a fuller knowledge is received by the infusion of the\ndivine light.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Faith is a kind of knowledge, inasmuch as the intellect\nis determined by faith to some knowable object. But this\ndetermination to one object does not proceed from the vision of the\nbeliever, but from the vision of Him who is believed. Thus as far as\nfaith falls short of vision, it falls short of the knowledge which\nbelongs to science, for science determines the intellect to one\nobject by the vision and understanding of first principles.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 13\n\nTHE NAMES OF GOD\n(In Twelve Articles)\n\nAfter the consideration of those things which belong to the divine\nknowledge, we now proceed to the consideration of the divine names.\nFor everything is named by us according to our knowledge of it.\n\nUnder this head, there are twelve points for inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether God can be named by us?\n\n(2) Whether any names applied to God are predicated of Him\nsubstantially?\n\n(3) Whether any names applied to God are said of Him literally, or\nare all to be taken metaphorically?\n\n(4) Whether any names applied to God are synonymous?\n\n(5) Whether some names are applied to God and to creatures univocally\nor equivocally?\n\n(6) Whether, supposing they are applied analogically, they are\napplied first to God or to creatures?\n\n(7) Whether any names are applicable to God from time?\n\n(8) Whether this name \"God\" is a name of nature, or of the operation?\n\n(9) Whether this name \"God\" is a communicable name?\n\n(10) Whether it is taken univocally or equivocally as signifying God,\nby nature, by participation, and by opinion?\n\n(11) Whether this name, \"Who is,\" is the supremely appropriate name\nof God?\n\n(12) Whether affirmative propositions can be formed about God?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 1]\n\nWhether a Name Can Be Given to God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that no name can be given to God. For Dionysius\nsays (Div. Nom. i) that, \"Of Him there is neither name, nor can one be\nfound of Him;\" and it is written: \"What is His name, and what is the\nname of His Son, if thou knowest?\" (Prov. 30:4).\n\nObj. 2: Further, every name is either abstract or concrete. But\nconcrete names do not belong to God, since He is simple, nor do\nabstract names belong to Him, forasmuch as they do not signify any\nperfect subsisting thing. Therefore no name can be said of God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nouns are taken to signify substance with quality;\nverbs and participles signify substance with time; pronouns the same\nwith demonstration or relation. But none of these can be applied to\nGod, for He has no quality, nor accident, nor time; moreover, He\ncannot be felt, so as to be pointed out; nor can He be described by\nrelation, inasmuch as relations serve to recall a thing mentioned\nbefore by nouns, participles, or demonstrative pronouns. Therefore\nGod cannot in any way be named by us.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 15:3): \"The Lord is a man of war,\nAlmighty is His name.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i),\nwords are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitude of things, it is\nevident that words relate to the meaning of things signified through\nthe medium of the intellectual conception. It follows therefore that\nwe can give a name to anything in as far as we can understand it. Now\nit was shown above (Q. 12, AA. 11, 12) that in this life we cannot\nsee the essence of God; but we know God from creatures as their\nprinciple, and also by way of excellence and remotion. In this way\ntherefore He can be named by us from creatures, yet not so that the\nname which signifies Him expresses the divine essence in itself. Thus\nthe name \"man\" expresses the essence of man in himself, since it\nsignifies the definition of man by manifesting his essence; for the\nidea expressed by the name is the definition.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The reason why God has no name, or is said to be\nabove being named, is because His essence is above all that we\nunderstand about God, and signify in word.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Because we know and name God from creatures, the\nnames we attribute to God signify what belongs to material creatures,\nof which the knowledge is natural to us. And because in creatures of\nthis kind what is perfect and subsistent is compound; whereas their\nform is not a complete subsisting thing, but rather is that whereby a\nthing is; hence it follows that all names used by us to signify a\ncomplete subsisting thing must have a concrete meaning as applicable\nto compound things; whereas names given to signify simple forms,\nsignify a thing not as subsisting, but as that whereby a thing is; as,\nfor instance, whiteness signifies that whereby a thing is white. And\nas God is simple, and subsisting, we attribute to Him abstract names\nto signify His simplicity, and concrete names to signify His substance\nand perfection, although both these kinds of names fail to express His\nmode of being, forasmuch as our intellect does not know Him in this\nlife as He is.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To signify substance with quality is to signify the\n_suppositum_ with a nature or determined form in which it subsists.\nHence, as some things are said of God in a concrete sense, to signify\nHis subsistence and perfection, so likewise nouns are applied to God\nsignifying substance with quality. Further, verbs and participles\nwhich signify time, are applied to Him because His eternity includes\nall time. For as we can apprehend and signify simple subsistences\nonly by way of compound things, so we can understand and express\nsimple eternity only by way of temporal things, because our intellect\nhas a natural affinity to compound and temporal things. But\ndemonstrative pronouns are applied to God as describing what is\nunderstood, not what is sensed. For we can only describe Him as far\nas we understand Him. Thus, according as nouns, participles and\ndemonstrative pronouns are applicable to God, so far can He be\nsignified by relative pronouns.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Any Name Can Be Applied to God Substantially?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that no name can be applied to God\nsubstantially. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 9): \"Everything\nsaid of God signifies not His substance, but rather shows forth what\nHe is not; or expresses some relation, or something following from His\nnature or operation.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): \"You will find a\nchorus of holy doctors addressed to the end of distinguishing clearly\nand praiseworthily the divine processions in the denomination of God.\"\nThus the names applied by the holy doctors in praising God are\ndistinguished according to the divine processions themselves. But what\nexpresses the procession of anything, does not signify its essence.\nTherefore the names applied to God are not said of Him substantially.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a thing is named by us according as we\nunderstand it. But God is not understood by us in this life in His\nsubstance. Therefore neither is any name we can use applied\nsubstantially to God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi): \"The being of God is\nthe being strong, or the being wise, or whatever else we may say of\nthat simplicity whereby His substance is signified.\" Therefore all\nnames of this kind signify the divine substance.\n\n_I answer that,_ Negative names applied to God, or signifying His\nrelation to creatures manifestly do not at all signify His substance,\nbut rather express the distance of the creature from Him, or His\nrelation to something else, or rather, the relation of creatures to\nHimself.\n\nBut as regards absolute and affirmative names of God, as \"good,\"\n\"wise,\" and the like, various and many opinions have been given. For\nsome have said that all such names, although they are applied to God\naffirmatively, nevertheless have been brought into use more to express\nsome remotion from God, rather than to express anything that exists\npositively in Him. Hence they assert that when we say that God lives,\nwe mean that God is not like an inanimate thing; and the same in like\nmanner applies to other names; and this was taught by Rabbi Moses.\nOthers say that these names applied to God signify His relationship\ntowards creatures: thus in the words, \"God is good,\" we mean, God is\nthe cause of goodness in things; and the same rule applies to other\nnames.\n\nBoth of these opinions, however, seem to be untrue for three reasons.\nFirst because in neither of them can a reason be assigned why some\nnames more than others are applied to God. For He is assuredly the\ncause of bodies in the same way as He is the cause of good things;\ntherefore if the words \"God is good,\" signified no more than, \"God is\nthe cause of good things,\" it might in like manner be said that God is\na body, inasmuch as He is the cause of bodies. So also to say that He\nis a body implies that He is not a mere potentiality, as is primary\nmatter. Secondly, because it would follow that all names applied to\nGod would be said of Him by way of being taken in a secondary sense,\nas healthy is secondarily said of medicine, forasmuch as it signifies\nonly the cause of the health in the animal which primarily is called\nhealthy. Thirdly, because this is against the intention of those who\nspeak of God. For in saying that God lives, they assuredly mean more\nthan to say the He is the cause of our life, or that He differs from\ninanimate bodies.\n\nTherefore we must hold a different doctrine--viz. that these names\nsignify the divine substance, and are predicated substantially of God,\nalthough they fall short of a full representation of Him. Which is\nproved thus. For these names express God, so far as our intellects\nknow Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows\nHim as far as creatures represent Him. Now it is shown above\n(Q. 4, A. 2) that God prepossesses in Himself all the perfections\nof creatures, being Himself simply and universally perfect. Hence\nevery creature represents Him, and is like Him so far as it possesses\nsome perfection; yet it represents Him not as something of the same\nspecies or genus, but as the excelling principle of whose form the\neffects fall short, although they derive some kind of likeness\nthereto, even as the forms of inferior bodies represent the power of\nthe sun. This was explained above (Q. 4, A. 3), in treating of the\ndivine perfection. Therefore the aforesaid names signify the divine\nsubstance, but in an imperfect manner, even as creatures represent it\nimperfectly. So when we say, \"God is good,\" the meaning is not, \"God\nis the cause of goodness,\" or \"God is not evil\"; but the meaning is,\n\"Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God,\" and in a\nmore excellent and higher way. Hence it does not follow that God is\ngood, because He causes goodness; but rather, on the contrary, He\ncauses goodness in things because He is good; according to what\nAugustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), \"Because He is good, we\nare.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Damascene says that these names do not signify what God\nis, forasmuch as by none of these names is perfectly expressed what\nHe is; but each one signifies Him in an imperfect manner, even as\ncreatures represent Him imperfectly.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In the significance of names, that from which the name\nis derived is different sometimes from what it is intended to\nsignify, as for instance, this name \"stone\" [lapis] is imposed from\nthe fact that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem], but it is not imposed\nto signify that which hurts the foot, but rather to signify a certain\nkind of body; otherwise everything that hurts the foot would be a\nstone [*This refers to the Latin etymology of the word _lapis,_ which\nhas no place in English]. So we must say that these kinds of divine\nnames are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to\nthe diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the\nrepresentations of God, although in an imperfect manner; so likewise\nour intellect knows and names God according to each kind of\nprocession; but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify\nthe procession themselves, as if when we say \"God lives,\" the sense\nwere, \"life proceeds from Him\"; but to signify the principle itself\nof things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it\npre-exists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or\nsignified.\n\nReply Obj. 3: We cannot know the essence of God in this life, as He\nreally is in Himself; but we know Him accordingly as He is\nrepresented in the perfections of creatures; and thus the names\nimposed by us signify Him in that manner only.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Any Name Can Be Applied to God in Its Literal Sense?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that no name is applied literally to God. For\nall names which we apply to God are taken from creatures; as was\nexplained above (A. 1). But the names of creatures are applied to\nGod metaphorically, as when we say, God is a stone, or a lion, or the\nlike. Therefore names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no name can be applied literally to anything if it\nshould be withheld from it rather than given to it. But all such\nnames as \"good,\" \"wise,\" and the like are more truly withheld from\nGod than given to Him; as appears from Dionysius says (Coel. Hier.\nii). Therefore none of these names belong to God in their literal\nsense.\n\nObj. 3: Further, corporeal names are applied to God in a metaphorical\nsense only; since He is incorporeal. But all such names imply some\nkind of corporeal condition; for their meaning is bound up with time\nand composition and like corporeal conditions. Therefore all these\nnames are applied to God in a metaphorical sense.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii), \"Some names there are\nwhich express evidently the property of the divinity, and some which\nexpress the clear truth of the divine majesty, but others there are\nwhich are applied to God metaphorically by way of similitude.\"\nTherefore not all names are applied to God in a metaphorical sense,\nbut there are some which are said of Him in their literal sense.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the preceding article, our knowledge of\nGod is derived from the perfections which flow from Him to creatures,\nwhich perfections are in God in a more eminent way than in creatures.\nNow our intellect apprehends them as they are in creatures, and as it\napprehends them it signifies them by names. Therefore as to the names\napplied to God--viz. the perfections which they signify, such as\ngoodness, life and the like, and their mode of signification. As\nregards what is signified by these names, they belong properly to God,\nand more properly than they belong to creatures, and are applied\nprimarily to Him. But as regards their mode of signification, they do\nnot properly and strictly apply to God; for their mode of\nsignification applies to creatures.\n\nReply Obj. 1: There are some names which signify these perfections\nflowing from God to creatures in such a way that the imperfect way in\nwhich creatures receive the divine perfection is part of the very\nsignification of the name itself as \"stone\" signifies a material\nbeing, and names of this kind can be applied to God only in a\nmetaphorical sense. Other names, however, express these perfections\nabsolutely, without any such mode of participation being part of\ntheir signification as the words \"being,\" \"good,\" \"living,\" and the\nlike, and such names can be literally applied to God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Such names as these, as Dionysius shows, are denied of\nGod for the reason that what the name signifies does not belong to\nHim in the ordinary sense of its signification, but in a more eminent\nway. Hence Dionysius says also that God is above all substance and\nall life.\n\nReply Obj. 3: These names which are applied to God literally imply\ncorporeal conditions not in the thing signified, but as regards their\nmode of signification; whereas those which are applied to God\nmetaphorically imply and mean a corporeal condition in the thing\nsignified.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Names Applied to God Are Synonymous?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that these names applied to God are synonymous\nnames. For synonymous names are those which mean exactly the same. But\nthese names applied to God mean entirely the same thing in God; for\nthe goodness of God is His essence, and likewise it is His wisdom.\nTherefore these names are entirely synonymous.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if it be said these names signify one and the same\nthing in reality, but differ in idea, it can be objected that an idea\nto which no reality corresponds is a vain notion. Therefore if these\nideas are many, and the thing is one, it seems also that all these\nideas are vain notions.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a thing which is one in reality and in idea, is more\none than what is one in reality and many in idea. But God is\nsupremely one. Therefore it seems that He is not one in reality and\nmany in idea; and thus the names applied to God do not signify\ndifferent ideas; and thus they are synonymous.\n\n_On the contrary,_ All synonyms united with each other are redundant, as\nwhen we say, \"vesture clothing.\" Therefore if all names applied to God\nare synonymous, we cannot properly say \"good God\" or the like, and yet\nit is written, \"O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts\nis Thy name\" (Jer. 32:18).\n\n_I answer that,_ These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This\nwould be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to\nremove, or to express the relation of cause to creatures; for thus it\nwould follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse\nthings denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted. But even\naccording to what was said above (A. 2), that these names signify\nthe divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also\nclear from what has been said (AA. 1, 2) that they have diverse\nmeanings. For the idea signified by the name is the conception in the\nintellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since\nit knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms\nconceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to\ncreatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply,\nwhereas in creatures they are received and divided and multiplied. As\ntherefore, to the different perfections of creatures, there\ncorresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections\nof creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various\nand multiplied conceptions of our intellect, there corresponds one\naltogether simple principle, according to these conceptions,\nimperfectly understood. Therefore although the names applied to God\nsignify one thing, still because they signify that under many and\ndifferent aspects, they are not synonymous.\n\nThus appears the solution of the First Objection, since synonymous\nterms signify one thing under one aspect; for words which signify\ndifferent aspects of one thing, do not signify primarily and\nabsolutely one thing; because the term only signifies the thing\nthrough the medium of the intellectual conception, as was said above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The many aspects of these names are not empty and\nvain, for there corresponds to all of them one simple reality\nrepresented by them in a manifold and imperfect manner.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The perfect unity of God requires that what are\nmanifold and divided in others should exist in Him simply and\nunitedly. Thus it comes about that He is one in reality, and yet\nmultiple in idea, because our intellect apprehends Him in a manifold\nmanner, as things represent Him.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 5]\n\nWhether What Is Said of God and of Creatures Is Univocally Predicated\nof Them?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the things attributed to God and creatures\nare univocal. For every equivocal term is reduced to the univocal, as\nmany are reduced to one; for if the name \"dog\" be said equivocally of\nthe barking dog, and of the dogfish, it must be said of some\nunivocally--viz. of all barking dogs; otherwise we proceed to\ninfinitude. Now there are some univocal agents which agree with their\neffects in name and definition, as man generates man; and there are\nsome agents which are equivocal, as the sun which causes heat,\nalthough the sun is hot only in an equivocal sense. Therefore it seems\nthat the first agent to which all other agents are reduced, is an\nunivocal agent: and thus what is said of God and creatures, is\npredicated univocally.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there is no similitude among equivocal things.\nTherefore as creatures have a certain likeness to God, according to\nthe word of Genesis (Gen. 1:26), \"Let us make man to our image and\nlikeness,\" it seems that something can be said of God and creatures\nunivocally.\n\nObj. 3: Further, measure is homogeneous with the thing measured.\nBut God is the first measure of all beings. Therefore God is\nhomogeneous with creatures; and thus a word may be applied univocally\nto God and to creatures.\n\n_On the contrary,_ whatever is predicated of various things under the\nsame name but not in the same sense, is predicated equivocally. But no\nname belongs to God in the same sense that it belongs to creatures;\nfor instance, wisdom in creatures is a quality, but not in God. Now a\ndifferent genus changes an essence, since the genus is part of the\ndefinition; and the same applies to other things. Therefore whatever\nis said of God and of creatures is predicated equivocally.\n\nFurther, God is more distant from creatures than any creatures are\nfrom each other. But the distance of some creatures makes any univocal\npredication of them impossible, as in the case of those things which\nare not in the same genus. Therefore much less can anything be\npredicated univocally of God and creatures; and so only equivocal\npredication can be applied to them.\n\n_I answer that,_ Univocal predication is impossible between God and\ncreatures. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an\nadequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the\nsimilitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that\nfalls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects\nresides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example\nthe sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various\nforms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the\npreceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and\nmultiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing\nperfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection\ndistinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term\n\"wise\" applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a\nman's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all\nsimilar things; whereas when we apply to it God, we do not mean to\nsignify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence.\nThus also this term \"wise\" applied to man in some degree circumscribes\nand comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when\nit is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as\nincomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence\nit is evident that this term \"wise\" is not applied in the same way to\nGod and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is\npredicated univocally of God and of creatures.\n\nNeither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in\na purely equivocal sense, as some have said. Because if that were so,\nit follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated\nabout God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the\nfallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who\nproved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says:\n\"The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the\nthings that are made\" (Rom. 1:20). Therefore it must be said that\nthese names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e.\naccording to proportion.\n\nNow names are thus used in two ways: either according as many things\nare proportionate to one, thus for example \"healthy\" predicated of\nmedicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body,\nof which the former is the sign and the latter the cause: or\naccording as one thing is proportionate to another, thus \"healthy\" is\nsaid of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in\nthe animal body. And in this way some things are said of God and\ncreatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely\nunivocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures (A. 1). Thus\nwhatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the\nrelation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all\nperfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of\ncommunity of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple\nunivocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals,\none and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but\na term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various\nproportions to some one thing; thus \"healthy\" applied to urine\nsignifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine\nsignifies the cause of the same health.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although equivocal predications must be reduced to\nunivocal, still in actions, the non-univocal agent must precede the\nunivocal agent. For the non-univocal agent is the universal cause of\nthe whole species, as for instance the sun is the cause of the\ngeneration of all men; whereas the univocal agent is not the\nuniversal efficient cause of the whole species (otherwise it would be\nthe cause of itself, since it is contained in the species), but is a\nparticular cause of this individual which it places under the species\nby way of participation. Therefore the universal cause of the whole\nspecies is not an univocal agent; and the universal cause comes\nbefore the particular cause. But this universal agent, whilst it is\nnot univocal, nevertheless is not altogether equivocal, otherwise it\ncould not produce its own likeness, but rather it is to be called an\nanalogical agent, as all univocal predications are reduced to one\nfirst non-univocal analogical predication, which is being.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, for\nit does not represent one and the same generic thing (Q. 4, A. 3).\n\nReply Obj. 3: God is not the measure proportioned to things measured;\nhence it is not necessary that God and creatures should be in the\nsame genus.\n\nThe arguments adduced in the contrary sense prove indeed that these\nnames are not predicated univocally of God and creatures; yet they do\nnot prove that they are predicated equivocally.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Names Predicated of God Are Predicated Primarily of Creatures?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that names are predicated primarily of creatures\nrather than of God. For we name anything accordingly as we know it,\nsince \"names\", as the Philosopher says, \"are signs of ideas.\" But we\nknow creatures before we know God. Therefore the names imposed by us\nare predicated primarily of creatures rather than of God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): \"We name God from\ncreatures.\" But names transferred from creatures to God, are said\nprimarily of creatures rather than of God, as \"lion,\" \"stone,\" and the\nlike. Therefore all names applied to God and creatures are applied\nprimarily to creatures rather than to God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all names equally applied to God and creatures,\nare applied to God as the cause of all creatures, as Dionysius says\n(De Mystica Theol.). But what is applied to anything through its\ncause, is applied to it secondarily, for \"healthy\" is primarily\npredicated of animal rather than of medicine, which is the cause of\nhealth. Therefore these names are said primarily of creatures rather\nthan of God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written, \"I bow my knees to the Father, of our\nLord Jesus Christ, of Whom all paternity in heaven and earth is named\"\n(Eph. 3:14,15); and the same applies to the other names applied to God\nand creatures. Therefore these names are applied primarily to God\nrather than to creatures.\n\n_I answer that,_ In names predicated of many in an analogical sense,\nall are predicated because they have reference to some one thing; and\nthis one thing must be placed in the definition of them all. And\nsince that expressed by the name is the definition, as the\nPhilosopher says (Metaph. iv), such a name must be applied primarily\nto that which is put in the definition of such other things, and\nsecondarily to these others according as they approach more or less\nto that first. Thus, for instance, \"healthy\" applied to animals comes\ninto the definition of \"healthy\" applied to medicine, which is called\nhealthy as being the cause of health in the animal; and also into the\ndefinition of \"healthy\" which is applied to urine, which is called\nhealthy in so far as it is the sign of the animal's health. Thus all\nnames applied metaphorically to God, are applied to creatures\nprimarily rather than to God, because when said of God they mean only\nsimilitudes to such creatures. For as \"smiling\" applied to a field\nmeans only that the field in the beauty of its flowering is like the\nbeauty of the human smile by proportionate likeness, so the name of\n\"lion\" applied to God means only that God manifests strength in His\nworks, as a lion in his. Thus it is clear that applied to God the\nsignification of names can be defined only from what is said of\ncreatures. But to other names not applied to God in a metaphorical\nsense, the same rule would apply if they were spoken of God as the\ncause only, as some have supposed. For when it is said, \"God is\ngood,\" it would then only mean \"God is the cause of the creature's\ngoodness\"; thus the term good applied to God would included in its\nmeaning the creature's goodness. Hence \"good\" would apply primarily\nto creatures rather than to God. But as was shown above (A. 2), these\nnames are applied to God not as the cause only, but also essentially.\nFor the words, \"God is good,\" or \"wise,\" signify not only that He is\nthe cause of wisdom or goodness, but that these exist in Him in a\nmore excellent way. Hence as regards what the name signifies, these\nnames are applied primarily to God rather than to creatures, because\nthese perfections flow from God to creatures; but as regards the\nimposition of the names, they are primarily applied by us to\ncreatures which we know first. Hence they have a mode of\nsignification which belongs to creatures, as said above (A. 3).\n\nReply Obj. 1: This objection refers to the imposition of the name.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The same rule does not apply to metaphorical and\nto other names, as said above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This objection would be valid if these names were\napplied to God only as cause, and not also essentially, for\ninstance as \"healthy\" is applied to medicine.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Names Which Imply Relation to Creatures Are Predicated of\nGod Temporally?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures\nare not predicated of God temporally. For all such names signify the\ndivine substance, as is universally held. Hence also Ambrose says (De\nFide i) that this name \"Lord\" is the name of power, which is the\ndivine substance; and \"Creator\" signifies the action of God, which is\nHis essence. Now the divine substance is not temporal, but eternal.\nTherefore these names are not applied to God temporally, but\neternally.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that to which something applies temporally can be\ndescribed as made; for what is white temporally is made white. But to\nmake does not apply to God. Therefore nothing can be predicated of\nGod temporally.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if any names are applied to God temporally as\nimplying relation to creatures, the same rule holds good of all\nthings that imply relation to creatures. But some names are spoken of\nGod implying relation of God to creatures from eternity; for from\neternity He knew and loved the creature, according to the word: \"I\nhave loved thee with an everlasting love\" (Jer. 31:3). Therefore also\nother names implying relation to creatures, as \"Lord\" and \"Creator,\"\nare applied to God from eternity.\n\nObj. 4: Further, names of this kind signify relation. Therefore that\nrelation must be something in God, or in the creature only. But it\ncannot be that it is something in the creature only, for in that case\nGod would be called \"Lord\" from the opposite relation which is in\ncreatures; and nothing is named from its opposite. Therefore the\nrelation must be something in God also. But nothing temporal can be\nin God, for He is above time. Therefore these names are not applied\nto God temporally.\n\nObj. 5: Further, a thing is called relative from relation; for\ninstance lord from lordship, as white from whiteness. Therefore if\nthe relation of lordship is not really in God, but only in idea, it\nfollows that God is not really Lord, which is plainly false.\n\nObj. 6: Further, in relative things which are not simultaneous in\nnature, one can exist without the other; as a thing knowable can\nexist without the knowledge of it, as the Philosopher says (Praedic.\nv). But relative things which are said of God and creatures are not\nsimultaneous in nature. Therefore a relation can be predicated of God\nto the creature even without the existence of the creature; and thus\nthese names \"Lord\" and \"Creator\" are predicated of God from eternity,\nand not temporally.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. v) that this relative\nappellation \"Lord\" is applied to God temporally.\n\n_I answer that,_ The names which import relation to creatures are\napplied to God temporally, and not from eternity.\n\nTo see this we must learn that some have said that relation is not a\nreality, but only an idea. But this is plainly seen to be false from\nthe very fact that things themselves have a mutual natural order and\nhabitude. Nevertheless it is necessary to know that since relation has\ntwo extremes, it happens in three ways that a relation is real or\nlogical. Sometimes from both extremes it is an idea only, as when\nmutual order or habitude can only go between things in the\napprehension of reason; as when we say a thing \"the same as itself.\"\nFor reason apprehending one thing twice regards it as two; thus it\napprehends a certain habitude of a thing to itself. And the same\napplies to relations between _being_ and _non-being_ formed by reason,\napprehending _non-being_ as an extreme. The same is true of relations\nthat follow upon an act of reason, as genus and species, and the like.\n\nNow there are other relations which are realities as regards both\nextremes, as when for instance a habitude exists between two things\naccording to some reality that belongs to both; as is clear of all\nrelations, consequent upon quantity; as great and small, double and\nhalf, and the like; for quantity exists in both extremes: and the same\napplies to relations consequent upon action and passion, as motive\npower and the movable thing, father and son, and the like.\n\nAgain, sometimes a relation in one extreme may be a reality, while in\nthe other extreme it is an idea only; and this happens whenever two\nextremes are not of one order; as sense and science refer respectively\nto sensible things and to intellectual things; which, inasmuch as they\nare realities existing in nature, are outside the order of sensible\nand intellectual existence. Therefore in science and in sense a real\nrelation exists, because they are ordered either to the knowledge or\nto the sensible perception of things; whereas the things looked at in\nthemselves are outside this order, and hence in them there is no real\nrelation to science and sense, but only in idea, inasmuch as the\nintellect apprehends them as terms of the relations of science and\nsense. Hence the Philosopher says (Metaph. v) that they are called\nrelative, not forasmuch as they are related to other things, but as\nothers are related to them. Likewise for instance, \"on the right\" is\nnot applied to a column, unless it stands as regards an animal on the\nright side; which relation is not really in the column, but in the\nanimal.\n\nSince therefore God is outside the whole order of creation, and all\ncreatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, it is manifest that\ncreatures are really related to God Himself; whereas in God there is\nno real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea, inasmuch\nas creatures are referred to Him. Thus there is nothing to prevent\nthese names which import relation to the creature from being\npredicated of God temporally, not by reason of any change in Him, but\nby reason of the change of the creature; as a column is on the right\nof an animal, without change in itself, but by change in the animal.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some relative names are imposed to signify the\nrelative habitudes themselves, as \"master\" and \"servant,\" \"father,\"\nand \"son,\" and the like, and these relatives are called predicamental\n[secundum esse]. But others are imposed to signify the things from\nwhich ensue certain habitudes, as the mover and the thing moved, the\nhead and the thing that has a head, and the like: and these relatives\nare called transcendental [secundum dici]. Thus, there is the same\ntwo-fold difference in divine names. For some signify the habitude\nitself to the creature, as \"Lord,\" and these do not signify the divine\nsubstance directly, but indirectly, in so far as they presuppose the\ndivine substance; as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine\nsubstance. Others signify the divine essence directly, and\nconsequently the corresponding habitudes, as \"Saviour,\" \"Creator,\" and\nsuchlike; and these signify the action of God, which is His essence.\nYet both names are said of God temporarily so far as they imply a\nhabitude either principally or consequently, but not as signifying the\nessence, either directly or indirectly.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As relations applied to God temporally are only\nin God in our idea, so, \"to become\" or \"to be made\" are applied to God\nonly in idea, with no change in Him, as for instance when we say,\n\"Lord, Thou art become [Douay: 'hast been'] our refuge\" (Ps. 89:1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The operation of the intellect and the will is\nin the operator, therefore names signifying relations following upon\nthe action of the intellect or will, are applied to God from eternity;\nwhereas those following upon the actions proceeding according to our\nmode of thinking to external effects are applied to God temporally, as\n\"Saviour,\" \"Creator,\" and the like.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Relations signified by these names which are\napplied to God temporally, are in God only in idea; but the opposite\nrelations in creatures are real. Nor is it incongruous that God should\nbe denominated from relations really existing in the thing, yet so\nthat the opposite relations in God should also be understood by us at\nthe same time; in the sense that God is spoken of relatively to the\ncreature, inasmuch as the creature is related to Him: thus the\nPhilosopher says (Metaph. v) that the object is said to be knowable\nrelatively because knowledge relates to it.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Since God is related to the creature for the\nreason that the creature is related to Him: and since the relation of\nsubjection is real in the creature, it follows that God is Lord not in\nidea only, but in reality; for He is called Lord according to the\nmanner in which the creature is subject to Him.\n\nReply Obj. 6: To know whether relations are simultaneous by\nnature or otherwise, it is not necessary [to consider the order] of\nthings to which they belong but the meaning of the relations\nthemselves. For if one in its idea includes another, and vice versa,\nthen they are simultaneous by nature: as double and half, father and\nson, and the like. But if one in its idea includes another, and not\nvice versa, they are not simultaneous by nature. This applies to\nscience and its object; for the object knowable is considered as a\npotentiality, and the science as a habit, or as an act. Hence the\nknowable object in its mode of signification exists before science,\nbut if the same object is considered in act, then it is simultaneous\nwith science in act; for the object known is nothing as such unless it\nis known. Thus, though God is prior to the creature, still because the\nsignification of Lord includes the idea of a servant and vice versa,\nthese two relative terms, \"Lord\" and \"servant,\" are simultaneous by\nnature. Hence, God was not \"Lord\" until He had a creature subject to\nHimself.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 8]\n\nWhether This Name \"God\" Is a Name of the Nature?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that this name, \"God,\" is not a name of the\nnature. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 1) that \"God (_Theos_) is so\ncalled from _theein_ which means to take care of, and to cherish all\nthings; or from _aithein_ that is, to burn, for our God is a fire\nconsuming all malice; or from _theasthai,_ which means to consider all\nthings.\" But all these names belong to operation. Therefore this name\n\"God\" signifies His operation and not His nature.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a thing is named by us as we know it. But the\ndivine nature is unknown to us. Therefore this name \"God\" does not\nsignify the divine nature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide i) that \"God\" is a name of the\nnature.\n\n_I answer that,_ Whence a name is imposed, and what the name signifies\nare not always the same thing. For as we know substance from its\nproperties and operations, so we name substance sometimes for its\noperation, or its property; e.g. we name the substance of a stone from\nits act, as for instance that it hurts the foot [loedit pedem]; but\nstill this name is not meant to signify the particular action, but the\nstone's substance. The things, on the other hand, known to us in\nthemselves, such as heat, cold, whiteness and the like, are not named\nfrom other things. Hence as regards such things the meaning of the\nname and its source are the same.\n\nBecause therefore God is not known to us in His nature, but is made\nknown to us from His operations or effects, we name Him from these, as\nsaid in A. 1; hence this name \"God\" is a name of operation so far as\nrelates to the source of its meaning. For this name is imposed from\nHis universal providence over all things; since all who speak of God\nintend to name God as exercising providence over all; hence Dionysius\nsays (Div. Nom. ii), \"The Deity watches over all with perfect\nprovidence and goodness.\" But taken from this operation, this name\n\"God\" is imposed to signify the divine nature.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All that Damascene says refers to providence; which is\nthe source of the signification of the name \"God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: We can name a thing according to the knowledge we have\nof its nature from its properties and effects. Hence because we can\nknow what stone is in itself from its property, this name \"stone\"\nsignifies the nature of the stone itself; for it signifies the\ndefinition of stone, by which we know what it is, for the idea which\nthe name signifies is the definition, as is said in _Metaph._ iv. Now\nfrom the divine effects we cannot know the divine nature in itself,\nso as to know what it is; but only by way of eminence, and by way of\ncausality, and of negation as stated above (Q. 12, A. 12). Thus the\nname \"God\" signifies the divine nature, for this name was imposed to\nsignify something existing above all things, the principle of all\nthings and removed from all things; for those who name God intend to\nsignify all this.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 9]\n\nWhether This Name \"God\" Is Communicable?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that this name \"God\" is communicable. For\nwhosoever shares in the thing signified by a name shares in the name\nitself. But this name \"God\" signifies the divine nature, which is\ncommunicable to others, according to the words, \"He hath given us\ngreat [Vulg.: 'most great'] and precious promises, that by these we\n[Vulg.: 'ye'] may be made partakers of the divine nature\" (2 Pet.\n1:4). Therefore this name \"God\" can be communicated to others.\n\nObj. 2: Further, only proper names are not communicable. Now this\nname \"God\" is not a proper, but an appellative noun; which appears\nfrom the fact that it has a plural, according to the text, \"I have\nsaid, You are gods\" (Ps. 81:6). Therefore this name \"God\" is\ncommunicable.\n\nObj. 3: Further, this name \"God\" comes from operation, as explained.\nBut other names given to God from His operations or effects are\ncommunicable; as \"good,\" \"wise,\" and the like. Therefore this name\n\"God\" is communicable.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written: \"They gave the incommunicable name to\nwood and stones\" (Wis. 14:21), in reference to the divine name.\nTherefore this name \"God\" is incommunicable.\n\n_I answer that,_ A name is communicable in two ways: properly, and by\nsimilitude. It is properly communicable in the sense that its whole\nsignification can be given to many; by similitude it is communicable\naccording to some part of the signification of the name. For instance\nthis name \"lion\" is properly communicable to all things of the same\nnature as \"lion\"; by similitude it is communicable to those who\nparticipate in the nature of a lion, as for instance by courage, or\nstrength, and those who thus participate are called lions\nmetaphorically. To know, however, what names are properly\ncommunicable, we must consider that every form existing in the\nsingular subject, by which it is individualized, is common to many\neither in reality, or in idea; as human nature is common to many in\nreality, and in idea; whereas the nature of the sun is not common to\nmany in reality, but only in idea; for the nature of the sun can be\nunderstood as existing in many subjects; and the reason is because the\nmind understands the nature of every species by abstraction from the\nsingular. Hence to be in one singular subject or in many is outside\nthe idea of the nature of the species. So, given the idea of a\nspecies, it can be understood as existing in many. But the singular,\nfrom the fact that it is singular, is divided off from all others.\nHence every name imposed to signify any singular thing is\nincommunicable both in reality and idea; for the plurality of this\nindividual thing cannot be; nor can it be conceived in idea. Hence no\nname signifying any individual thing is properly communicable to many,\nbut only by way of similitude; as for instance a person can be called\n\"Achilles\" metaphorically, forasmuch as he may possess something of\nthe properties of Achilles, such as strength. On the other hand, forms\nwhich are individualized not by any _suppositum,_ but by and of\nthemselves, as being subsisting forms, if understood as they are in\nthemselves, could not be communicable either in reality or in idea;\nbut only perhaps by way of similitude, as was said of individuals.\nForasmuch as we are unable to understand simple self-subsisting forms\nas they really are, we understand them as compound things having forms\nin matter; therefore, as was said in the first article, we give them\nconcrete names signifying a nature existing in some _suppositum._\nHence, so far as concerns images, the same rules apply to names we\nimpose to signify the nature of compound things as to names given to\nus to signify simple subsisting natures.\n\nSince, then, this name \"God\" is given to signify the divine nature as\nstated above (A. 8), and since the divine nature cannot be multiplied\nas shown above (Q. 11, A. 3), it follows that this name \"God\" is\nincommunicable in reality, but communicable in opinion; just in the\nsame way as this name \"sun\" would be communicable according to the\nopinion of those who say there are many suns. Therefore, it is\nwritten: \"You served them who by nature are not gods,\" (Gal. 4:8),\nand a gloss adds, \"Gods not in nature, but in human opinion.\"\nNevertheless this name \"God\" is communicable, not in its whole\nsignification, but in some part of it by way of similitude; so that\nthose are called gods who share in divinity by likeness, according to\nthe text, \"I have said, You are gods\" (Ps. 81:6).\n\nBut if any name were given to signify God not as to His nature but as\nto His _suppositum,_ accordingly as He is considered as \"this\nsomething,\" that name would be absolutely incommunicable; as, for\ninstance, perhaps the Tetragrammaton among the Hebrew; and this is\nlike giving a name to the sun as signifying this individual thing.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The divine nature is only communicable according to the\nparticipation of some similitude.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This name \"God\" is an appellative name, and not a\nproper name, for it signifies the divine nature in the possessor;\nalthough God Himself in reality is neither universal nor particular.\nFor names do not follow upon the mode of being in things, but upon\nthe mode of being as it is in our mind. And yet it is incommunicable\naccording to the truth of the thing, as was said above concerning the\nname \"sun.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: These names \"good,\" \"wise,\" and the like, are imposed\nfrom the perfections proceeding from God to creatures; but they do\nnot signify the divine nature, but rather signify the perfections\nthemselves absolutely; and therefore they are in truth communicable\nto many. But this name \"God\" is given to God from His own proper\noperation, which we experience continually, to signify the divine\nnature.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 10]\n\nWhether This Name \"God\" Is Applied to God Univocally by Nature,\nby Participation, and According to Opinion?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that this name \"God\" is applied to God\nunivocally by nature, by participation, and according to opinion. For\nwhere a diverse signification exists, there is no contradiction of\naffirmation and negation; for equivocation prevents contradiction. But\na Catholic who says: \"An idol is not God,\" contradicts a pagan who\nsays: \"An idol is God.\" Therefore \"God\" in both senses is spoken of\nunivocally.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as an idol is God in opinion, and not in truth,\nso the enjoyment of carnal pleasures is called happiness in opinion,\nand not in truth. But this name \"beatitude\" is applied univocally to\nthis supposed happiness, and also to true happiness. Therefore also\nthis name \"God\" is applied univocally to the true God, and to God also\nin opinion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, names are called univocal because they contain one\nidea. Now when a Catholic says: \"There is one God,\" he understands by\nthe name God an omnipotent being, and one venerated above all; while\nthe heathen understands the same when he says: \"An idol is God.\"\nTherefore this name \"God\" is applied univocally to both.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The idea in the intellect is the likeness of what is\nin the thing as is said in Peri Herm. i. But the word \"animal\" applied\nto a true animal, and to a picture of one, is equivocal. Therefore\nthis name \"God\" applied to the true God and to God in opinion is\napplied equivocally.\n\nFurther, No one can signify what he does not know. But the heathen\ndoes not know the divine nature. So when he says an idol is God, he\ndoes not signify the true Deity. On the other hand, a Catholic\nsignifies the true Deity when he says that there is one God. Therefore\nthis name \"God\" is not applied univocally, but equivocally to the true\nGod, and to God according to opinion.\n\n_I answer that,_ This name \"God\" in the three aforesaid significations\nis taken neither univocally nor equivocally, but analogically. This is\napparent from this reason: Univocal terms mean absolutely the same\nthing, but equivocal terms absolutely different; whereas in analogical\nterms a word taken in one signification must be placed in the\ndefinition of the same word taken in other senses; as, for instance,\n\"being\" which is applied to \"substance\" is placed in the definition of\nbeing as applied to \"accident\"; and \"healthy\" applied to animal is\nplaced in the definition of healthy as applied to urine and medicine.\nFor urine is the sign of health in the animal, and medicine is the\ncause of health.\n\nThe same applies to the question at issue. For this name \"God,\" as\nsignifying the true God, includes the idea of God when it is used to\ndenote God in opinion, or participation. For when we name anyone god\nby participation, we understand by the name of god some likeness of\nthe true God. Likewise, when we call an idol god, by this name god we\nunderstand and signify something which men think is God; thus it is\nmanifest that the name has different meanings, but that one of them is\ncomprised in the other significations. Hence it is manifestly said\nanalogically.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The multiplication of names does not depend on the\npredication of the name, but on the signification: for this name\n\"man,\" of whomsoever it is predicated, whether truly or falsely, is\npredicated in one sense. But it would be multiplied if by the name\n\"man\" we meant to signify different things; for instance, if one\nmeant to signify by this name \"man\" what man really is, and another\nmeant to signify by the same name a stone, or something else. Hence\nit is evident that a Catholic saying that an idol is not God\ncontradicts the pagan asserting that it is God; because each of them\nuses this name \"God\" to signify the true God. For when the pagan says\nan idol is God, he does not use this name as meaning God in opinion,\nfor he would then speak the truth, as also Catholics sometimes use\nthe name in that sense, as in the Psalm, \"All the gods of the\nGentiles are demons\" (Ps. 95:5).\n\nThe same remark applies to the Second and Third Objections. For these\nreasons proceed from the different predication of the name, and not\nfrom its various significations.\n\nReply Obj. 4 [\"On the contrary,\" par. 1]: The term \"animal\" applied\nto a true and a pictured animal is not purely equivocal; for the\nPhilosopher takes equivocal names in a large sense, including\nanalogous names; because also being, which is predicated\nanalogically, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of\ndifferent predicaments.\n\nReply Obj. 5 [\"On the contrary,\" par. 2] : Neither a Catholic nor a\npagan knows the very nature of God as it is in itself; but each one\nknows it according to some idea of causality, or excellence, or\nremotion (Q. 12, A. 12). So a pagan can take this name \"God\" in the\nsame way when he says an idol is God, as the Catholic does in saying\nan idol is not God. But if anyone should be quite ignorant of God\naltogether, he could not even name Him, unless, perhaps, as we use\nnames the meaning of which we know not.\n_______________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 11]\n\nWhether This Name, HE WHO IS, Is the Most Proper Name of God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that this name HE WHO IS is not the most proper\nname of God. For this name \"God\" is an incommunicable name. But this\nname HE WHO IS, is not an incommunicable name. Therefore this name HE\nWHO IS is not the most proper name of God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iii) that \"the name of\ngood excellently manifests all the processions of God.\" But it\nespecially belongs to God to be the universal principle of all things.\nTherefore this name \"good\" is supremely proper to God, and not this\nname HE WHO IS.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every divine name seems to imply relation to\ncreatures, for God is known to us only through creatures. But this\nname HE WHO IS imports no relation to creatures. Therefore this name\nHE WHO IS is not the most applicable to God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written that when Moses asked, \"If they should\nsay to me, What is His name? what shall I say to them?\" The Lord\nanswered him, \"Thus shalt thou say to them, HE WHO IS hath sent me to\nyou\" (Ex. 3:13, 14). Therefore this name HE WHO IS most properly belongs\nto God.\n\n_I answer that,_ This name HE WHO IS is most properly applied to God,\nfor three reasons:\n\nFirst, because of its signification. For it does not signify form, but\nsimply existence itself. Hence since the existence of God is His\nessence itself, which can be said of no other (Q. 3, A. 4), it is\nclear that among other names this one specially denominates God, for\neverything is denominated by its form.\n\nSecondly, on account of its universality. For all other names are\neither less universal, or, if convertible with it, add something above\nit at least in idea; hence in a certain way they inform and determine\nit. Now our intellect cannot know the essence of God itself in this\nlife, as it is in itself, but whatever mode it applies in determining\nwhat it understands about God, it falls short of the mode of what God\nis in Himself. Therefore the less determinate the names are, and the\nmore universal and absolute they are, the more properly they are\napplied to God. Hence Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i) that, \"HE WHO\nIS, is the principal of all names applied to God; for comprehending\nall in itself, it contains existence itself as an infinite and\nindeterminate sea of substance.\" Now by any other name some mode of\nsubstance is determined, whereas this name HE WHO IS, determines no\nmode of being, but is indeterminate to all; and therefore it\ndenominates the \"infinite ocean of substance.\"\n\nThirdly, from its consignification, for it signifies present\nexistence; and this above all properly applies to God, whose existence\nknows not past or future, as Augustine says (De Trin. v).\n\nReply Obj. 1: This name HE WHO IS is the name of God more properly\nthan this name \"God,\" as regards its source, namely, existence; and\nas regards the mode of signification and consignification, as said\nabove. But as regards the object intended by the name, this name\n\"God\" is more proper, as it is imposed to signify the divine nature;\nand still more proper is the Tetragrammaton, imposed to signify the\nsubstance of God itself, incommunicable and, if one may so speak,\nsingular.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This name \"good\" is the principal name of God in so far\nas He is a cause, but not absolutely; for existence considered\nabsolutely comes before the idea of cause.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is not necessary that all the divine names should\nimport relation to creatures, but it suffices that they be imposed\nfrom some perfections flowing from God to creatures. Among these the\nfirst is existence, from which comes this name, HE WHO IS.\n_______________________\n\nTWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 12]\n\nWhether Affirmative Propositions Can Be Formed About God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that affirmative propositions cannot be formed\nabout God. For Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii) that \"negations about\nGod are true; but affirmations are vague.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. ii) that \"a simple form\ncannot be a subject.\" But God is the most absolutely simple form, as\nshown (Q. 3): therefore He cannot be a subject. But everything about\n which an affirmative proposition is made is taken as a subject.\nTherefore an affirmative proposition cannot be formed about God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every intellect is false which understands a\nthing otherwise than as it is. But God has existence without any\ncomposition as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7). Therefore since every\naffirmative intellect understands something as compound, it follows\nthat a true affirmative proposition about God cannot be made.\n\n_On the contrary,_ What is of faith cannot be false. But some\naffirmative propositions are of faith; as that God is Three and One;\nand that He is omnipotent. Therefore true affirmative propositions can\nbe formed about God.\n\n_I answer that,_ True affirmative propositions can be formed about God.\nTo prove this we must know that in every true affirmative proposition\nthe predicate and the subject signify in some way the same thing in\nreality, and different things in idea. And this appears to be the case\nboth in propositions which have an accidental predicate, and in those\nwhich have an essential predicate. For it is manifest that \"man\" and\n\"white\" are the same in subject, and different in idea; for the idea\nof man is one thing, and that of whiteness is another. The same\napplies when I say, \"man is an animal\"; since the same thing which is\nman is truly animal; for in the same _suppositum_ there is sensible\nnature by reason of which he is called animal, and the rational nature\nby reason of which he is called man; hence here again predicate and\nsubject are the same as to _suppositum,_ but different as to idea. But\nin propositions where one same thing is predicated of itself, the same\nrule in some way applies, inasmuch as the intellect draws to the\n_suppositum_ what it places in the subject; and what it places in the\npredicate it draws to the nature of the form existing in the\n_suppositum_; according to the saying that \"predicates are to be taken\nformally, and subjects materially.\" To this diversity in idea\ncorresponds the plurality of predicate and subject, while the\nintellect signifies the identity of the thing by the composition\nitself.\n\nGod, however, as considered in Himself, is altogether one and simple,\nyet our intellect knows Him by different conceptions because it cannot\nsee Him as He is in Himself. Nevertheless, although it understands Him\nunder different conceptions, it knows that one and the same simple\nobject corresponds to its conceptions. Therefore the plurality of\npredicate and subject represents the plurality of idea; and the\nintellect represents the unity by composition.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Dionysius says that the affirmations about God\nare vague or, according to another translation, \"incongruous,\"\ninasmuch as no name can be applied to God according to its mode of\nsignification.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Our intellect cannot comprehend simple subsisting\nforms, as they really are in themselves; but it apprehends them as\ncompound things in which there is something taken as subject and\nsomething that is inherent. Therefore it apprehends the simple form\nas a subject, and attributes something else to it.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This proposition, \"The intellect understanding anything\notherwise than it is, is false,\" can be taken in two senses,\naccordingly as this adverb \"otherwise\" determines the word\n\"understanding\" on the part of the thing understood, or on the part\nof the one who understands. Taken as referring to the thing\nunderstood, the proposition is true, and the meaning is: Any\nintellect which understands that the thing is otherwise than it is,\nis false. But this does not hold in the present case; because our\nintellect, when forming a proposition about God, does not affirm that\nHe is composite, but that He is simple. But taken as referring to the\none who understands, the proposition is false. For the mode of the\nintellect in understanding is different from the mode of the thing in\nits essence. Since it is clear that our intellect understands\nmaterial things below itself in an immaterial manner; not that it\nunderstands them to be immaterial things; but its manner of\nunderstanding is immaterial. Likewise, when it understands simple\nthings above itself, it understands them according to its own mode,\nwhich is in a composite manner; yet not so as to understand them to\nbe composite things. And thus our intellect is not false in forming\ncomposition in its ideas concerning God.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 14\n\nOF GOD'S KNOWLEDGE\n(In Sixteen Articles)\n\nHaving considered what belongs to the divine substance, we have now\nto treat of God's operation. And since one kind of operation is\nimmanent, and another kind of operation proceeds to the exterior\neffect, we treat first of knowledge and of will (for understanding\nabides in the intelligent agent, and will is in the one who wills);\nand afterwards of the power of God, the principle of the divine\noperation as proceeding to the exterior effect. Now because to\nunderstand is a kind of life, after treating of the divine knowledge,\nwe consider the divine life. And as knowledge concerns truth, we\nconsider truth and falsehood. Further, as everything known is in the\nknower, and the types of things as existing in the knowledge of God\nare called ideas, to the consideration of knowledge will be added the\ntreatment of ideas.\n\nConcerning knowledge, there are sixteen points for inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there is knowledge in God?\n\n(2) Whether God understands Himself?\n\n(3) Whether He comprehends Himself?\n\n(4) Whether His understanding is His substance?\n\n(5) Whether He understands other things besides Himself?\n\n(6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?\n\n(7) Whether the knowledge of God is discursive?\n\n(8) Whether the knowledge of God is the cause of things?\n\n(9) Whether God has knowledge of non-existing things?\n\n(10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?\n\n(11) Whether He has knowledge of individual things?\n\n(12) Whether He knows the infinite?\n\n(13) Whether He knows future contingent things?\n\n(14) Whether He knows enunciable things?\n\n(15) Whether the knowledge of God is variable?\n\n(16) Whether God has speculative or practical knowledge of things?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Is Knowledge [*Scientia] in God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that in God there is not knowledge. For\nknowledge is a habit; and habit does not belong to God, since it is\nthe mean between potentiality and act. Therefore knowledge is not in\nGod.\n\nObj. 2: Further, since science is about conclusions, it is a kind of\nknowledge caused by something else which is the knowledge of\nprinciples. But nothing is caused in God; therefore science is not in\nGod.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all knowledge is universal, or particular. But in God\nthere is no universal or particular (Q. 3, A. 5). Therefore in God\nthere is not knowledge.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says, \"O the depth of the riches of the\nwisdom and of the knowledge of God\" (Rom. 11:33).\n\n_I answer that,_ In God there exists the most perfect knowledge. To\nprove this, we must note that intelligent beings are distinguished\nfrom non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own\nform; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also\nthe form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in\nthe knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent\nbeing is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of\nintelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore\nthe Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that \"the soul is in a sense all\nthings.\" Now the contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence,\nas we have said above (Q. 7, A. 1) forms according as they are the\nmore immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore\nit is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason why it is\ncognitive; and according to the mode of immateriality is the mode of\nknowledge. Hence it is said in _De Anima_ ii that plants do not know,\nbecause they are wholly material. But sense is cognitive because it\ncan receive images free from matter, and the intellect is still\nfurther cognitive, because it is more separated from matter and\nunmixed, as said in _De Anima_ iii. Since therefore God is in the\nhighest degree of immateriality as stated above (Q. 7, A. 1), it\nfollows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Because perfections flowing from God to creatures exist\nin a higher state in God Himself (Q. 4, A. 2), whenever a name taken\nfrom any created perfection is attributed to God, it must be\nseparated in its signification from anything that belongs to that\nimperfect mode proper to creatures. Hence knowledge is not a quality\nof God, nor a habit; but substance and pure act.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Whatever is divided and multiplied in creatures exists\nin God simply and unitedly (Q. 13, A. 4). Now man has different kinds\nof knowledge, according to the different objects of His knowledge. He\nhas _intelligence_ as regards the knowledge of principles; he has\n_science_ as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has _wisdom,_\naccording as he knows the highest cause; he has _counsel_ or\n_prudence,_ according as he knows what is to be done. But God knows\nall these by one simple act of knowledge, as will be shown (A. 7).\nHence the simple knowledge of God can be named by all these names; in\nsuch a way, however, that there must be removed from each of them, so\nfar as they enter into divine predication, everything that savors of\nimperfection; and everything that expresses perfection is to be\nretained in them. Hence it is said, \"With Him is wisdom and strength,\nHe hath counsel and understanding\" (Job 12:13).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Knowledge is according to the mode of the one who\nknows; for the thing known is in the knower according to the mode of\nthe knower. Now since the mode of the divine essence is higher than\nthat of creatures, divine knowledge does not exist in God after the\nmode of created knowledge, so as to be universal or particular, or\nhabitual, or potential, or existing according to any such mode.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 2]\n\nWhether God Understands Himself?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God does not understand Himself. For it is\nsaid by the Philosopher (De Causis), \"Every knower who knows his own\nessence, returns completely to his own essence.\" But God does not go\nout from His own essence, nor is He moved at all; thus He cannot\nreturn to His own essence. Therefore He does not know His own essence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to understand is a kind of passion and movement,\nas the Philosopher says (De Anima iii); and knowledge also is a kind\nof assimilation to the object known; and the thing known is the\nperfection of the knower. But nothing is moved, or suffers, or is made\nperfect by itself, \"nor,\" as Hilary says (De Trin. iii), \"is a thing\nits own likeness.\" Therefore God does not understand Himself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, we are like to God chiefly in our intellect,\nbecause we are the image of God in our mind, as Augustine says (Gen.\nad lit. vi). But our intellect understands itself, only as it\nunderstands other things, as is said in _De Anima_ iii. Therefore God\nunderstands Himself only so far perchance as He understands other\nthings.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written: \"The things that are of God no man\nknoweth, but the Spirit of God\" (1 Cor. 2:11).\n\n_I answer that,_ God understands Himself through Himself. In proof\nwhereof it must be known that although in operations which pass to an\nexternal effect, the object of the operation, which is taken as the\nterm, exists outside the operator; nevertheless in operations that\nremain in the operator, the object signified as the term of operation,\nresides in the operator; and accordingly as it is in the operator, the\noperation is actual. Hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that\n\"the sensible in act is sense in act, and the intelligible in act is\nintellect in act.\" For the reason why we actually feel or know a thing\nis because our intellect or sense is actually informed by the sensible\nor intelligible species. And because of this only, it follows that\nsense or intellect is distinct from the sensible or intelligible\nobject, since both are in potentiality.\n\nSince therefore God has nothing in Him of potentiality, but is pure\nact, His intellect and its object are altogether the same; so that He\nneither is without the intelligible species, as is the case with our\nintellect when it understands potentially; nor does the intelligible\nspecies differ from the substance of the divine intellect, as it\ndiffers in our intellect when it understands actually; but the\nintelligible species itself is the divine intellect itself, and thus\nGod understands Himself through Himself.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Return to its own essence means only that a thing\nsubsists in itself. Inasmuch as the form perfects the matter by\ngiving it existence, it is in a certain way diffused in it; and it\nreturns to itself inasmuch as it has existence in itself. Therefore\nthose cognitive faculties which are not subsisting, but are the acts\nof organs, do not know themselves, as in the case of each of the\nsenses; whereas those cognitive faculties which are subsisting, know\nthemselves; hence it is said in _De Causis_ that, \"whoever knows his\nessence returns to it.\" Now it supremely belongs to God to be\nself-subsisting. Hence according to this mode of speaking, He\nsupremely returns to His own essence, and knows Himself.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Movement and passion are taken equivocally, according\nas to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as\nstated in _De Anima_ iii. For to understand is not a movement that is\nan act of something imperfect passing from one to another, but it is\nan act, existing in the agent itself, of something perfect. Likewise\nthat the intellect is perfected by the intelligible object, i.e. is\nassimilated to it, this belongs to an intellect which is sometimes in\npotentiality; because the fact of its being in a state of\npotentiality makes it differ from the intelligible object and\nassimilates it thereto through the intelligible species, which is the\nlikeness of the thing understood, and makes it to be perfected\nthereby, as potentiality is perfected by act. On the other hand, the\ndivine intellect, which is no way in potentiality, is not perfected\nby the intelligible object, nor is it assimilated thereto, but is its\nown perfection, and its own intelligible object.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Existence in nature does not belong to primary matter,\nwhich is a potentiality, unless it is reduced to act by a form. Now\nour passive intellect has the same relation to intelligible objects\nas primary matter has to natural things; for it is in potentiality as\nregards intelligible objects, just as primary matter is to natural\nthings. Hence our passive intellect can be exercised concerning\nintelligible objects only so far as it is perfected by the\nintelligible species of something; and in that way it understands\nitself by an intelligible species, as it understands other things:\nfor it is manifest that by knowing the intelligible object it\nunderstands also its own act of understanding, and by this act knows\nthe intellectual faculty. But God is a pure act in the order of\nexistence, as also in the order of intelligible objects; therefore He\nunderstands Himself through Himself.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 3]\n\nWhether God Comprehends Himself?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God does not comprehend Himself. For\nAugustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that \"whatever comprehends\nitself is finite as regards itself.\" But God is in all ways infinite.\nTherefore He does not comprehend Himself.\n\nObj. 2: If it is said that God is infinite to us, and finite to\nHimself, it can be urged to the contrary, that everything in God is\ntruer than it is in us. If therefore God is finite to Himself, but\ninfinite to us, then God is more truly finite than infinite; which is\nagainst what was laid down above (Q. 7, A. 1). Therefore God does\nnot comprehend Himself.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. xv), that\n\"Everything that understands itself, comprehends itself.\" But God\nunderstands Himself. Therefore He comprehends Himself.\n\n_I answer that,_ God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus\nproved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the\nknowledge of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known\nas perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable\nproposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however,\nwhen it is known by some probable reason. Now it is manifest that God\nknows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything\nis knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing\nis not known according as it is in potentiality, but in so far as it\nis in actuality, as said in _Metaph._ ix. Now the power of God in\nknowing is as great as His actuality in existing; because it is from\nthe fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality,\nthat God is cognitive, as shown above (AA. 1, 2). Whence it is\nmanifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that\nreason He perfectly comprehends Himself.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The strict meaning of \"comprehension\" signifies that\none thing holds and includes another; and in this sense everything\ncomprehended is finite, as also is everything included in another.\nBut God is not said to be comprehended by Himself in this sense, as\nif His intellect were a faculty apart from Himself, and as if it held\nand included Himself; for these modes of speaking are to be taken by\nway of negation. But as God is said to be in Himself, forasmuch as He\nis not contained by anything outside of Himself; so He is said to be\ncomprehended by Himself, forasmuch as nothing in Himself is hidden\nfrom Himself. For Augustine says (De Vid. Deum. ep. cxii), \"The whole\nis comprehended when seen, if it is seen in such a way that nothing\nof it is hidden from the seer.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: When it is said, \"God is finite to Himself,\" this is to\nbe understood according to a certain similitude of proportion,\nbecause He has the same relation in not exceeding His intellect, as\nanything finite has in not exceeding finite intellect. But God is not\nto be called finite to Himself in this sense, as if He understood\nHimself to be something finite.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Act of God's Intellect Is His Substance?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the act of God's intellect is not His\nsubstance. For to understand is an operation. But an operation\nsignifies something proceeding from the operator. Therefore the act of\nGod's intellect is not His substance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to understand one's act of understanding, is to\nunderstand something that is neither great nor chiefly understood,\nbut secondary and accessory. If therefore God be his own act of\nunderstanding, His act of understanding will be as when we understand\nour act of understanding: and thus God's act of understanding will not\nbe something great.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every act of understanding means understanding\nsomething. When therefore God understands Himself, if He Himself is\nnot distinct from this act of understanding, He understands that He\nunderstands Himself; and so on to infinity. Therefore the act of God's\nintellect is not His substance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vii), \"In God to be is\nthe same as to be wise.\" But to be wise is the same thing as to\nunderstand. Therefore in God to be is the same thing as to\nunderstand. But God's existence is His substance, as shown above\n(Q. 3, A. 4). Therefore the act of God's intellect is His substance.\n\n_I answer that,_ It must be said that the act of God's intellect is\nHis substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His\nsubstance, then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph.\nxii), would be the act and perfection of the divine substance, to\nwhich the divine substance would be related, as potentiality is to\nact, which is altogether impossible; because the act of understanding\nis the perfection and act of the one understanding. Let us now\nconsider how this is. As was laid down above (A. 2), to understand is\nnot an act passing to anything extrinsic; for it remains in the\noperator as his own act and perfection; as existence is the\nperfection of the one existing: just as existence follows on the\nform, so in like manner to understand follows on the intelligible\nspecies. Now in God there is no form which is something other than\nHis existence, as shown above (Q. 3). Hence as His essence itself is\nalso His intelligible species, it necessarily follows that His act of\nunderstanding must be His essence and His existence.\n\nThus it follows from all the foregoing that in God, intellect, and\nthe object understood, and the intelligible species, and His act of\nunderstanding are entirely one and the same. Hence when God is said\nto be understanding, no kind of multiplicity is attached to His\nsubstance.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To understand is not an operation proceeding out of the\noperator, but remaining in him.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When that act of understanding which is not subsistent\nis understood, something not great is understood; as when we\nunderstand our act of understanding; and so this cannot be likened to\nthe act of the divine understanding which is subsistent.\n\nThus appears the Reply to the Third Objection. For the act of divine\nunderstanding subsists in itself, and belongs to its very self and is\nnot another's; hence it need not proceed to infinity.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 5]\n\nWhether God Knows Things Other Than Himself?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God does not know things besides Himself.\nFor all other things but God are outside of God. But Augustine says\n(Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi) that \"God does not behold anything out\nof Himself.\" Therefore He does not know things other than Himself.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the object understood is the perfection of the one\nwho understands. If therefore God understands other things besides\nHimself, something else will be the perfection of God, and will be\nnobler than He; which is impossible.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the act of understanding is specified by the\nintelligible object, as is every other act from its own object. Hence\nthe intellectual act is so much the nobler, the nobler the object\nunderstood. But God is His own intellectual act. If therefore God\nunderstands anything other than Himself, then God Himself is specified\nby something else than Himself; which cannot be. Therefore He does not\nunderstand things other than Himself.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written: \"All things are naked and open to His\neyes\" (Heb. 4:13).\n\n_I answer that,_ God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For\nit is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His\nexistence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of\nunderstanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of\nnecessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of\nanything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power\nextends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by\nthe very fact that it is the first effective cause of all things, as\nis clear from the aforesaid (Q. 2, A. 3), God must necessarily know\nthings other than Himself. And this appears still more plainly if we\nadd that the very existence of the first effective cause--viz.\nGod--is His own act of understanding. Hence whatever effects\npre-exist in God, as in the first cause, must be in His act of\nunderstanding, and all things must be in Him according to an\nintelligible mode: for everything which is in another, is in it\naccording to the mode of that in which it is.\n\nNow in order to know how God knows things other than Himself, we must\nconsider that a thing is known in two ways: in itself, and in another.\nA thing is known in itself when it is known by the proper species\nadequate to the knowable object; as when the eye sees a man through\nthe image of a man. A thing is seen in another through the image of\nthat which contains it; as when a part is seen in the whole by the\nimage of the whole; or when a man is seen in a mirror by the image in\nthe mirror, or by any other mode by which one thing is seen in\nanother.\n\nSo we say that God sees Himself in Himself, because He sees Himself\nthrough His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but\nin Himself; inasmuch as His essence contains the similitude of things\nother than Himself.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The passage of Augustine in which it is said that God\n\"sees nothing outside Himself\" is not to be taken in such a way, as\nif God saw nothing outside Himself, but in the sense that what is\noutside Himself He does not see except in Himself, as above explained.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The object understood is a perfection of the one\nunderstanding not by its substance, but by its image, according to\nwhich it is in the intellect, as its form and perfection, as is said\nin _De Anima_ iii. For \"a stone is not in the soul, but its image.\"\nNow those things which are other than God are understood by God,\ninasmuch as the essence of God contains their images as above\nexplained; hence it does not follow that there is any perfection in\nthe divine intellect other than the divine essence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The intellectual act is not specified by what is\nunderstood in another, but by the principal object understood in which\nother things are understood. For the intellectual act is specified by\nits object, inasmuch as the intelligible form is the principle of the\nintellectual operation: since every operation is specified by the form\nwhich is its principle of operation; as heating by heat. Hence the\nintellectual operation is specified by that intelligible form which\nmakes the intellect in act. And this is the image of the principal\nthing understood, which in God is nothing but His own essence in which\nall images of things are comprehended. Hence it does not follow that\nthe divine intellectual act, or rather God Himself, is specified by\nanything else than the divine essence itself.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 6]\n\nWhether God Knows Things Other Than Himself by Proper Knowledge?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God does not know things other than\nHimself by proper knowledge. For, as was shown (A. 5), God knows\nthings other than Himself, according as they are in Himself. But\nother things are in Him as in their common and universal cause, and\nare known by God as in their first and universal cause. This is to\nknow them by general, and not by proper knowledge. Therefore God\nknows things besides Himself by general, and not by proper knowledge.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the created essence is as distant from the divine\nessence, as the divine essence is distant from the created essence.\nBut the divine essence cannot be known by the created essence, as\nsaid above (Q. 12, A. 2). Therefore neither can the created essence\nbe known by the divine essence. Thus as God knows only by His\nessence, it follows that He does not know what the creature is in its\nessence, so as to know \"what it is,\" which is to have proper\nknowledge of it.\n\nObj. 3: Further, proper knowledge of a thing can come only through\nits proper ratio [i.e., concept]. But as God knows all things by His\nessence, it seems that He does not know each thing by its proper\nratio; for one thing cannot be the proper ratio of many and diverse\nthings. Therefore God has not a proper knowledge of things, but a\ngeneral knowledge; for to know things otherwise than by their proper\nratio is to have only a common and general knowledge of them.\n\n_On the contrary,_ To have a proper knowledge of things is to know them\nnot only in general, but as they are distinct from each other. Now God\nknows things in that manner. Hence it is written that He reaches \"even\nto the division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the\nmarrow, and is a discerner of thoughts and intents of the heart;\nneither is there any creature invisible in His sight\" (Heb. 4:12,13).\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have erred on this point, saying that God knows\nthings other than Himself only in general, that is, only as beings.\nFor as fire, if it knew itself as the principle of heat, would know\nthe nature of heat, and all things else in so far as they are hot; so\nGod, through knowing Himself as the principle of being, knows the\nnature of being, and all other things in so far as they are beings.\n\nBut this cannot be. For to know a thing in general and not in\nparticular, is to have an imperfect knowledge. Hence our intellect,\nwhen it is reduced from potentiality to act, acquires first a\nuniversal and confused knowledge of things, before it knows them in\nparticular; as proceeding from the imperfect to the perfect, as is\nclear from _Phys._ i. If therefore the knowledge of God regarding things\nother than Himself is only universal and not special, it would follow\nthat His understanding would not be absolutely perfect; therefore\nneither would His being be perfect; and this is against what was said\nabove (Q. 4, A. 1). We must therefore hold that God knows things\nother than Himself with a proper knowledge; not only in so far as\nbeing is common to them, but in so far as one is distinguished from\nthe other. In proof thereof we may observe that some wishing to show\nthat God knows many things by one, bring forward some examples, as,\nfor instance, that if the centre knew itself, it would know all lines\nthat proceed from the centre; or if light knew itself, it would know\nall colors.\n\nNow these examples although they are similar in part, namely, as\nregards universal causality, nevertheless they fail in this respect,\nthat multitude and diversity are caused by the one universal\nprinciple, not as regards that which is the principle of distinction,\nbut only as regards that in which they communicate. For the diversity\nof colors is not caused by the light only, but by the different\ndisposition of the diaphanous medium which receives it; and likewise,\nthe diversity of the lines is caused by their different position.\nHence it is that this kind of diversity and multitude cannot be known\nin its principle by proper knowledge, but only in a general way. In\nGod, however, it is otherwise. For it was shown above (Q. 4, A. 2)\nthat whatever perfection exists in any creature, wholly pre-exists and\nis contained in God in an excelling manner. Now not only what is\ncommon to creatures--viz. being--belongs to their perfection, but\nalso what makes them distinguished from each other; as living and\nunderstanding, and the like, whereby living beings are distinguished\nfrom the non-living, and the intelligent from the non-intelligent.\nLikewise every form whereby each thing is constituted in its own\nspecies, is a perfection; and thus all things pre-exist in God, not\nonly as regards what is common to all, but also as regards what\ndistinguishes one thing from another. And therefore as God contains\nall perfections in Himself, the essence of God is compared to all\nother essences of things, not as the common to the proper, as unity is\nto numbers, or as the centre (of a circle) to the (radiating) lines;\nbut as perfect acts to imperfect; as if I were to compare man to\nanimal; or six, a perfect number, to the imperfect numbers contained\nunder it. Now it is manifest that by a perfect act imperfect acts can\nbe known not only in general, but also by proper knowledge; thus, for\nexample, whoever knows a man, knows an animal by proper knowledge; and\nwhoever knows the number six, knows the number three also by proper\nknowledge.\n\nAs therefore the essence of God contains in itself all the perfection\ncontained in the essence of any other being, and far more, God can\nknow in Himself all of them with proper knowledge. For the nature\nproper to each thing consists in some degree of participation in the\ndivine perfection. Now God could not be said to know Himself perfectly\nunless He knew all the ways in which His own perfection can be shared\nby others. Neither could He know the very nature of being perfectly,\nunless He knew all modes of being. Hence it is manifest that God knows\nall things with proper knowledge, in their distinction from each\nother.\n\nReply Obj. 1: So to know a thing as it is in the knower, may be\nunderstood in two ways. In one way this adverb \"so\" imports the mode\nof knowledge on the part of the thing known; and in that sense it is\nfalse. For the knower does not always know the object known according\nto the existence it has in the knower; since the eye does not know a\nstone according to the existence it has in the eye; but by the image\nof the stone which is in the eye, the eye knows the stone according\nto its existence outside the eye. And if any knower has a knowledge\nof the object known according to the (mode of) existence it has in\nthe knower, the knower nevertheless knows it according to its (mode\nof) existence outside the knower; thus the intellect knows a stone\naccording to the intelligible existence it has in the intellect,\ninasmuch as it knows that it understands; while nevertheless it knows\nwhat a stone is in its own nature. If however the adverb 'so' be\nunderstood to import the mode (of knowledge) on the part of the\nknower, in that sense it is true that only the knower has knowledge\nof the object known as it is in the knower; for the more perfectly\nthe thing known is in the knower, the more perfect is the mode of\nknowledge.\n\nWe must say therefore that God not only knows that all things are in\nHimself; but by the fact that they are in Him, He knows them in their\nown nature and all the more perfectly, the more perfectly each one is\nin Him.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The created essence is compared to the essence of God\nas the imperfect to the perfect act. Therefore the created essence\ncannot sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence,\nbut rather the converse.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The same thing cannot be taken in an equal manner as\nthe ratio of different things. But the divine essence excels all\ncreatures. Hence it can be taken as the proper ratio of each thing\naccording to the diverse ways in which diverse creatures participate\nin, and imitate it.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Knowledge of God Is Discursive?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is discursive. For the\nknowledge of God is not habitual knowledge, but actual knowledge. Now\nthe Philosopher says (Topic. ii): \"The habit of knowledge may regard\nmany things at once; but actual understanding regards only one thing\nat a time.\" Therefore as God knows many things, Himself and others, as\nshown above (AA. 2, 5), it seems that He does not understand all at\nonce, but discourses from one to another.\n\nObj. 2: Further, discursive knowledge is to know the effect through\nits cause. But God knows things through Himself; as an effect (is\nknown) through its cause. Therefore His knowledge is discursive.\n\nObj. 3: Further, God knows each creature more perfectly than we know\nit. But we know the effects in their created causes; and thus we go\ndiscursively from causes to things caused. Therefore it seems that\nthe same applies to God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv), \"God does not see all\nthings in their particularity or separately, as if He saw alternately\nhere and there; but He sees all things together at once.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In the divine knowledge there is no discursion; the\nproof of which is as follows. In our knowledge there is a twofold\ndiscursion: one is according to succession only, as when we have\nactually understood anything, we turn ourselves to understand\nsomething else; while the other mode of discursion is according to\ncausality, as when through principles we arrive at the knowledge of\nconclusions. The first kind of discursion cannot belong to God. For\nmany things, which we understand in succession if each is considered\nin itself, we understand simultaneously if we see them in some one\nthing; if, for instance, we understand the parts in the whole, or see\ndifferent things in a mirror. Now God sees all things in one (thing),\nwhich is Himself. Therefore God sees all things together, and not\nsuccessively. Likewise the second mode of discursion cannot be\napplied to God. First, because this second mode of discursion\npresupposes the first mode; for whosoever proceeds from principles to\nconclusions does not consider both at once; secondly, because to\ndiscourse thus is to proceed from the known to the unknown. Hence it\nis manifest that when the first is known, the second is still\nunknown; and thus the second is known not in the first, but from the\nfirst. Now the term of discursive reasoning is attained when the\nsecond is seen in the first, by resolving the effects into their\ncauses; and then the discursion ceases. Hence as God sees His effects\nin Himself as their cause, His knowledge is not discursive.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although there is only one act of understanding in\nitself, nevertheless many things may be understood in one (medium),\nas shown above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God does not know by their cause, known, as it were\npreviously, effects unknown; but He knows the effects in the cause;\nand hence His knowledge is not discursive, as was shown above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God sees the effects of created causes in the causes\nthemselves, much better than we can; but still not in such a manner\nthat the knowledge of the effects is caused in Him by the knowledge\nof the created causes, as is the case with us; and hence His\nknowledge is not discursive.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Knowledge of God Is the Cause of Things?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not the cause of\nthings. For Origen says, on Rom. 8:30, \"Whom He called, them He also\njustified,\" etc.: \"A thing will happen not because God knows it as\nfuture; but because it is future, it is on that account known by God,\nbefore it exists.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the\nknowledge of God is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of God is\nthe cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"The thing known is prior to knowledge, and is\nits measure,\" as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x). But what is\nposterior and measured cannot be a cause. Therefore the knowledge\nof God is not the cause of things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv), \"Not because they are,\ndoes God know all creatures spiritual and temporal, but because He\nknows them, therefore they are.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The knowledge of God is the cause of things. For the\nknowledge of God is to all creatures what the knowledge of the\nartificer is to things made by his art. Now the knowledge of the\nartificer is the cause of the things made by his art from the fact\nthat the artificer works by his intellect. Hence the form of the\nintellect must be the principle of action; as heat is the principle of\nheating. Nevertheless, we must observe that a natural form, being a\nform that remains in that to which it gives existence, denotes a\nprinciple of action according only as it has an inclination to an\neffect; and likewise, the intelligible form does not denote a\nprinciple of action in so far as it resides in the one who understands\nunless there is added to it the inclination to an effect, which\ninclination is through the will. For since the intelligible form has a\nrelation to opposite things (inasmuch as the same knowledge relates to\nopposites), it would not produce a determinate effect unless it were\ndetermined to one thing by the appetite, as the Philosopher says\n(Metaph. ix). Now it is manifest that God causes things by His\nintellect, since His being is His act of understanding; and hence His\nknowledge must be the cause of things, in so far as His will is joined\nto it. Hence the knowledge of God as the cause of things is usually\ncalled the \"knowledge of approbation.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Origen spoke in reference to that aspect of knowledge\nto which the idea of causality does not belong unless the will is\njoined to it, as is said above.\n\nBut when he says the reason why God foreknows some things is because\nthey are future, this must be understood according to the cause of\nconsequence, and not according to the cause of essence. For if things\nare in the future, it follows that God knows them; but not that the\nfuturity of things is the cause why God knows them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The knowledge of God is the cause of things according\nas things are in His knowledge. Now that things should be eternal was\nnot in the knowledge of God; hence although the knowledge of God is\neternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Natural things are midway between the knowledge of God\nand our knowledge: for we receive knowledge from natural things, of\nwhich God is the cause by His knowledge. Hence, as the natural\nobjects of knowledge are prior to our knowledge, and are its measure,\nso, the knowledge of God is prior to natural things, and is the\nmeasure of them; as, for instance, a house is midway between the\nknowledge of the builder who made it, and the knowledge of the one\nwho gathers his knowledge of the house from the house already built.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 9]\n\nWhether God Has Knowledge of Things That Are Not?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God has not knowledge of things that are\nnot. For the knowledge of God is of true things. But \"truth\" and\n\"being\" are convertible terms. Therefore the knowledge of God is not\nof things that are not.\n\nObj. 2: Further, knowledge requires likeness between the knower and\nthe thing known. But those things that are not cannot have any\nlikeness to God, Who is very being. Therefore what is not, cannot be\nknown by God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the cause of what is known\nby Him. But it is not the cause of things that are not, because a\nthing that is not, has no cause. Therefore God has no knowledge of\nthings that are not.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says: \"Who . . . calleth those things\nthat are not as those that are\" (Rom. 4:17).\n\n_I answer that,_ God knows all things whatsoever that in any way are.\nNow it is possible that things that are not absolutely, should be in a\ncertain sense. For things absolutely are which are actual; whereas\nthings which are not actual, are in the power either of God Himself or\nof a creature, whether in active power, or passive; whether in power\nof thought or of imagination, or of any other manner of meaning\nwhatsoever. Whatever therefore can be made, or thought, or said by the\ncreature, as also whatever He Himself can do, all are known to God,\nalthough they are not actual. And in so far it can be said that He has\nknowledge even of things that are not.\n\nNow a certain difference is to be noted in the consideration of those\nthings that are not actual. For though some of them may not be in act\nnow, still they were, or they will be; and God is said to know all\nthese with the knowledge of vision: for since God's act of\nunderstanding, which is His being, is measured by eternity; and since\neternity is without succession, comprehending all time, the present\nglance of God extends over all time, and to all things which exist in\nany time, as to objects present to Him. But there are other things in\nGod's power, or the creature's, which nevertheless are not, nor will\nbe, nor were; and as regards these He is said to have knowledge, not\nof vision, but of simple intelligence. This is so called because the\nthings we see around us have distinct being outside the seer.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Those things that are not actual are true in so far as\nthey are in potentiality; for it is true that they are in\npotentiality; and as such they are known by God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since God is very being everything is, in so far as it\nparticipates in the likeness of God; as everything is hot in so far\nas it participates in heat. So, things in potentiality are known by\nGod, although they are not in act.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The knowledge of God, joined to His will is the cause\nof things. Hence it is not necessary that what ever God knows, is, or\nwas, or will be; but only is this necessary as regards what He wills\nto be, or permits to be. Further, it is in the knowledge of God not\nthat they be, but that they be possible.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 10]\n\nWhether God Knows Evil Things?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God does not know evil things. For the\nPhilosopher (De Anima iii) says that the intellect which is not in\npotentiality does not know privation. But \"evil is the privation of\ngood,\" as Augustine says (Confess. iii, 7). Therefore, as the\nintellect of God is never in potentiality, but is always in act, as is\nclear from the foregoing (A. 2), it seems that God does not know evil\nthings.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all knowledge is either the cause of the thing\nknown, or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not the cause\nof evil, nor is it caused by evil. Therefore God does not know evil\nthings.\n\nObj. 3: Further, everything known is known either by its likeness,\nor by its opposite. But whatever God knows, He knows through His\nessence, as is clear from the foregoing (A. 5). Now the divine\nessence neither is the likeness of evil, nor is evil contrary to it;\nfor to the divine essence there is no contrary, as Augustine says (De\nCiv. Dei xii). Therefore God does not know evil things.\n\nObj. 4: Further, what is known through another and not through\nitself, is imperfectly known. But evil is not known by God; for the\nthing known must be in the knower. Therefore if evil is known through\nanother, namely, through good, it would be known by Him imperfectly;\nwhich cannot be, for the knowledge of God is not imperfect. Therefore\nGod does not know evil things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 15:11), \"Hell and destruction\nare before God [Vulg: 'the Lord'].\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Whoever knows a thing perfectly, must know all that\ncan be accidental to it. Now there are some good things to which\ncorruption by evil may be accidental. Hence God would not know good\nthings perfectly, unless He also knew evil things. Now a thing is\nknowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the\nessence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that\nGod knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is\nknown darkness. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): \"God through\nHimself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing\ndarkness except through light.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as\nmeaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not\nknow privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what\nhe said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are\nknown by privation of division. This is because simple and\nindivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only\npotentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not\nbe known by privation. It is thus that simple things are known by\nseparate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation\nexisting in Himself, but by the opposite good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is\nthe cause of the good whereby evil is known.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence,\nwhich is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of\nGod, which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the\nopposite evils.\n\nReply Obj. 4: To know a thing by something else only, belongs to\nimperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is\nnot of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means\nthe privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor\nknown except by good.\n_______________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 11]\n\nWhether God Knows Singular Things?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God does not know singular things. For the\ndivine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now the\nhuman intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular\nthings; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), \"reason has to do\nwith universals, sense with singular things.\" Therefore God does not\nknow singular things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which\nreceive the species not abstracted from material conditions. But in\nGod things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality.\nTherefore God does not know singular things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some\nlikeness. But the likeness of singular things in so far as they are\nsingular, does not seem to be in God; for the principle of\nsingularity is matter, which, since it is in potentiality only, is\naltogether unlike God, Who is pure act. Therefore God cannot know\nsingular things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 16:2), \"All the ways of a man\nare open to His eyes.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ God knows singular things. For all perfections found\nin creatures pre-exist in God in a higher way, as is clear from the\nforegoing (Q. 4, A. 2). Now to know singular things is part of our\nperfection. Hence God must know singular things. Even the Philosopher\nconsiders it incongruous that anything known by us should be unknown\nto God; and thus against Empedocles he argues (De Anima i and _Metaph._\niii) that God would be most ignorant if He did not know discord. Now\nthe perfections which are divided among inferior beings, exist simply\nand unitedly in God; hence, although by one faculty we know the\nuniversal and immaterial, and by another we know singular and material\nthings, nevertheless God knows both by His simple intellect.\n\nNow some, wishing to show how this can be, said that God knows\nsingular things by universal causes. For nothing exists in any\nsingular thing, that does not arise from some universal cause. They\ngive the example of an astrologer who knows all the universal\nmovements of the heavens, and can thence foretell all eclipses that\nare to come. This, however, is not enough; for singular things from\nuniversal causes attain to certain forms and powers which, however\nthey may be joined together, are not individualized except by\nindividual matter. Hence he who knows Socrates because he is white, or\nbecause he is the son of Sophroniscus, or because of something of that\nkind, would not know him in so far as he is this particular man. Hence\naccording to the aforesaid mode, God would not know singular things in\ntheir singularity.\n\nOn the other hand, others have said that God knows singular things by\nthe application of universal causes to particular effects. But this\nwill not hold; forasmuch as no one can apply a thing to another unless\nhe first knows that thing; hence the said application cannot be the\nreason of knowing the particular, for it presupposes the knowledge of\nsingular things.\n\nTherefore it must be said otherwise, that, since God is the cause of\nthings by His knowledge, as stated above (A. 8), His knowledge\nextends as far as His causality extends. Hence as the active power of\nGod extends not only to forms, which are the source of universality,\nbut also to matter, as we shall prove further on (Q. 44, A. 2), the\nknowledge of God must extend to singular things, which are\nindividualized by matter. For since He knows things other than\nHimself by His essence, as being the likeness of things, or as their\nactive principle, His essence must be the sufficing principle of\nknowing all things made by Him, not only in the universal, but also in\nthe singular. The same would apply to the knowledge of the artificer,\nif it were productive of the whole thing, and not only of the form.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from\nthe individualizing principles; hence the intelligible species in our\nintellect cannot be the likeness of the individual principles; and on\nthat account our intellect does not know the singular. But the\nintelligible species in the divine intellect, which is the essence of\nGod, is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself, being the\nprinciple of all the principles which enter into the composition of\nthings, whether principles of the species or principles of the\nindividual; hence by it God knows not only universal, but also\nsingular things.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although as regards the species in the divine intellect\nits being has no material conditions like the images received in the\nimagination and sense, yet its power extends to both immaterial and\nmaterial things.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although matter as regards its potentiality recedes\nfrom likeness to God, yet, even in so far as it has being in this\nwise, it retains a certain likeness to the divine being.\n_______________________\n\nTWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 12]\n\nWhether God Can Know Infinite Things?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God cannot know infinite things. For the\ninfinite, as such, is unknown; since the infinite is that which, \"to\nthose who measure it, leaves always something more to be measured,\"\nas the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De\nCiv. Dei xii) that \"whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded\nby the comprehension of the knower.\" Now infinite things have no\nboundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehended by the knowledge of\nGod.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if we say that things infinite in themselves are\nfinite in God's knowledge, against this it may be urged that the\nessence of the infinite is that it is untraversable, and the finite\nthat it is traversable, as said in _Phys._ iii. But the infinite is\nnot traversable either by the finite or by the infinite, as is proved\nin Phys. vi. Therefore the infinite cannot be bounded by the finite,\nnor even by the infinite; and so the infinite cannot be finite in\nGod's knowledge, which is infinite.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the knowledge of God is the measure of what is\nknown. But it is contrary to the essence of the infinite that it be\nmeasured. Therefore infinite things cannot be known by God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii), \"Although we cannot\nnumber the infinite, nevertheless it can be comprehended by Him whose\nknowledge has no bounds.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since God knows not only things actual but also\nthings possible to Himself or to created things, as shown above (A.\n9), and as these must be infinite, it must be held that He knows\ninfinite things. Although the knowledge of vision which has relation\nonly to things that are, or will be, or were, is not of infinite\nthings, as some say, for we do not say that the world is eternal, nor\nthat generation and movement will go on for ever, so that individuals\nbe infinitely multiplied; yet, if we consider more attentively, we\nmust hold that God knows infinite things even by the knowledge of\nvision. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of hearts,\nwhich will be multiplied to infinity as rational creatures go on for\never.\n\nThe reason of this is to be found in the fact that the knowledge of\nevery knower is measured by the mode of the form which is the\nprinciple of knowledge. For the sensible image in sense is the\nlikeness of only one individual thing, and can give the knowledge of\nonly one individual. But the intelligible species of our intellect is\nthe likeness of the thing as regards its specific nature, which is\nparticipable by infinite particulars; hence our intellect by the\nintelligible species of man in a certain way knows infinite men; not\nhowever as distinguished from each other, but as communicating in the\nnature of the species; and the reason is because the intelligible\nspecies of our intellect is the likeness of man not as to the\nindividual principles, but as to the principles of the species. On\nthe other hand, the divine essence, whereby the divine intellect\nunderstands, is a sufficing likeness of all things that are, or can\nbe, not only as regards the universal principles, but also as regards\nthe principles proper to each one, as shown above. Hence it follows\nthat the knowledge of God extends to infinite things, even as\ndistinct from each other.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The idea of the infinite pertains to quantity, as the\nPhilosopher says (Phys. i). But the idea of quantity implies the\norder of parts. Therefore to know the infinite according to the mode\nof the infinite is to know part after part; and in this way the\ninfinite cannot be known; for whatever quantity of parts be taken,\nthere will always remain something else outside. But God does not\nknow the infinite or infinite things, as if He enumerated part after\npart; since He knows all things simultaneously, and not successively,\nas said above (A. 7). Hence there is nothing to prevent Him from\nknowing infinite things.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Transition imports a certain succession of parts; and\nhence it is that the infinite cannot be traversed by the finite, nor\nby the infinite. But equality suffices for comprehension, because\nthat is said to be comprehended which has nothing outside the\ncomprehender. Hence it is not against the idea of the infinite to be\ncomprehended by the infinite. And so, what is infinite in itself can\nbe called finite to the knowledge of God as comprehended; but not as\nif it were traversable.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The knowledge of God is the measure of things, not\nquantitatively, for the infinite is not subject to this kind of\nmeasure; but it is the measure of the essence and truth of things.\nFor everything has truth of nature according to the degree in which\nit imitates the knowledge of God, as the thing made by art agrees\nwith the art. Granted, however, an actually infinite number of\nthings, for instance, an infinitude of men, or an infinitude in\ncontinuous quantity, as an infinitude of air, as some of the ancients\nheld; yet it is manifest that these would have a determinate and\nfinite being, because their being would be limited to some\ndeterminate nature. Hence they would be measurable as regards the\nknowledge of God.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 13]\n\nWhether the Knowledge of God Is of Future Contingent Things?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is not of future\ncontingent things. For from a necessary cause proceeds a necessary\neffect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of things known, as said\nabove (A. 8). Since therefore that knowledge is necessary, what He\nknows must also be necessary. Therefore the knowledge of God is not of\ncontingent things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every conditional proposition of which the\nantecedent is absolutely necessary must have an absolutely necessary\nconsequent. For the antecedent is to the consequent as principles are\nto the conclusion: and from necessary principles only a necessary\nconclusion can follow, as is proved in _Poster._ i. But this is a true\nconditional proposition, \"If God knew that this thing will be, it will\nbe,\" for the knowledge of God is only of true things. Now the\nantecedent conditional of this is absolutely necessary, because it is\neternal, and because it is signified as past. Therefore the consequent\nis also absolutely necessary. Therefore whatever God knows, is\nnecessary; and so the knowledge of God is not of contingent things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, everything known by God must necessarily be,\nbecause even what we ourselves know, must necessarily be; and, of\ncourse, the knowledge of God is much more certain than ours. But no\nfuture contingent things must necessarily be. Therefore no contingent\nfuture thing is known by God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 32:15), \"He Who hath made the\nhearts of every one of them; Who understandeth all their works,\" i.e.\nof men. Now the works of men are contingent, being subject to free\nwill. Therefore God knows future contingent things.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since as was shown above (A. 9), God knows all\nthings; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and\ncreature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it\nfollows that God knows future contingent things.\n\nIn evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be\nconsidered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in\nact: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as\npresent; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference)\nto one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this\nit can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to\nthe sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In\nanother way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its\ncause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a\ncontingent thing not yet determined to one; forasmuch as a contingent\ncause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent\nthing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a\ncontingent effect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural\nknowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they\nare in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in\nitself. And although contingent things become actual successively,\nnevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they\nare in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is\nbecause His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being;\nand eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said\nabove (Q. 10, A. 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to\nGod from eternity, not only because He has the types of things\npresent within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried\nfrom eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality.\nHence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by\nGod, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their\npresentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to\ntheir own causes.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may\nbe contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as\nthe germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate\ncontingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first\ncause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent\non account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God,\nwhich is the first cause, is necessary.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Some say that this antecedent, \"God knew this\ncontingent to be future,\" is not necessary, but contingent; because,\nalthough it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This\nhowever does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had\nrelation to the future, must have had it, although the future\nsometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this\nantecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and\ncontingent; as this saying is contingent, \"Socrates is a white man.\"\nBut this also is to no purpose; for when we say, \"God knew this\ncontingent to be future,\" contingent is used here only as the matter\nof the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its\ncontingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or\ncontingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it\nmay be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said\nSocrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and\ncontingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely\nnecessary. Nor does it follow, as some say, that the consequent is\nabsolutely necessary, because the antecedent is the remote cause of\nthe consequent, which is contingent by reason of the proximate cause.\nBut this is to no purpose. For the conditional would be false were\nits antecedent the remote necessary cause, and the consequent a\ncontingent effect; as, for example, if I said, \"if the sun moves, the\ngrass will grow.\"\n\nTherefore we must reply otherwise; that when the antecedent contains\nanything belonging to an act of the soul, the consequent must be\ntaken not as it is in itself, but as it is in the soul: for the\nexistence of a thing in itself is different from the existence of a\nthing in the soul. For example, when I say, \"What the soul\nunderstands is immaterial,\" this is to be understood that it is\nimmaterial as it is in the intellect, not as it is in itself.\nLikewise if I say, \"If God knew anything, it will be,\" the consequent\nmust be understood as it is subject to the divine knowledge, i.e. as\nit is in its presentiality. And thus it is necessary, as also is the\nantecedent: \"For everything that is, while it is, must be necessarily\nbe,\" as the Philosopher says in _Peri Herm._ i.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Things reduced to act in time, as known by us\nsuccessively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is\nabove time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know\nfuture contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God\nalone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who\ngoes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas\nhe who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling\nby the way. Hence what is known by us must be necessary, even as it\nis in itself; for what is future contingent in itself, cannot be\nknown by us. Whereas what is known by God must be necessary according\nto the mode in which they are subject to the divine knowledge, as\nalready stated, but not absolutely as considered in their own causes.\nHence also this proposition, \"Everything known by God must\nnecessarily be,\" is usually distinguished; for this may refer to the\nthing, or to the saying. If it refers to the thing, it is divided and\nfalse; for the sense is, \"Everything which God knows is necessary.\"\nIf understood of the saying, it is composite and true; for the sense\nis, \"This proposition, 'that which is known by God is' is necessary.\"\n\nNow some urge an objection and say that this distinction holds good\nwith regard to forms that are separable from the subject; thus if I\nsaid, \"It is possible for a white thing to be black,\" it is false as\napplied to the saying, and true as applied to the thing: for a thing\nwhich is white, can become black; whereas this saying, \"a white thing\nis black\" can never be true. But in forms that are inseparable from\nthe subject, this distinction does not hold, for instance, if I said,\n\"A black crow can be white\"; for in both senses it is false. Now to\nbe known by God is inseparable from the thing; for what is known by\nGod cannot be known. This objection, however, would hold if these\nwords \"that which is known\" implied any disposition inherent to the\nsubject; but since they import an act of the knower, something can be\nattributed to the thing known, in itself (even if it always be\nknown), which is not attributed to it in so far as it stands under\nactual knowledge; thus material existence is attributed to a stone in\nitself, which is not attributed to it inasmuch as it is known.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 14]\n\nWhether God Knows Enunciable Things?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God does not know enunciable things. For to\nknow enunciable things belongs to our intellect as it composes and\ndivides. But in the divine intellect, there is no composition.\nTherefore God does not know enunciable things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every kind of knowledge is made through some\nlikeness. But in God there is no likeness of enunciable things, since\nHe is altogether simple. Therefore God does not know enunciable\nthings.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written: \"The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men\"\n(Ps. 93:11). But enunciable things are contained in the thoughts of\nmen. Therefore God knows enunciable things.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since it is in the power of our intellect to form\nenunciations, and since God knows whatever is in His own power or in\nthat of creatures, as said above (A. 9), it follows of necessity\nthat God knows all enunciations that can be formed.\n\nNow just as He knows material things immaterially, and composite\nthings simply, so likewise He knows enunciable things not after the\nmanner of enunciable things, as if in His intellect there were\ncomposition or division of enunciations; for He knows each thing by\nsimple intelligence, by understanding the essence of each thing; as if\nwe by the very fact that we understand what man is, were to understand\nall that can be predicated of man. This, however, does not happen in\nour intellect, which discourses from one thing to another, forasmuch\nas the intelligible species represents one thing in such a way as not\nto represent another. Hence when we understand what man is, we do not\nforthwith understand other things which belong to him, but we\nunderstand them one by one, according to a certain succession. On this\naccount the things we understand as separated, we must reduce to one\nby way of composition or division, by forming an enunciation. Now the\nspecies of the divine intellect, which is God's essence, suffices to\nrepresent all things. Hence by understanding His essence, God knows\nthe essences of all things, and also whatever can be accidental to\nthem.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This objection would avail if God knew enunciable\nthings after the manner of enunciable things.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Enunciatory composition signifies some existence of a\nthing; and thus God by His existence, which is His essence, is the\nsimilitude of all those things which are signified by enunciation.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 15]\n\nWhether the Knowledge of God Is Variable?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the knowledge of God is variable. For\nknowledge is related to what is knowable. But whatever imports\nrelation to the creature is applied to God from time, and varies\naccording to the variation of creatures. Therefore the knowledge of\nGod is variable according to the variation of creatures.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever God can make, He can know. But God can\nmake more than He does. Therefore He can know more than He knows.\nThus His knowledge can vary according to increase and diminution.\n\nObj. 3: Further, God knew that Christ would be born. But He does\nnot know now that Christ will be born; because Christ is not to be\nborn in the future. Therefore God does not know everything He once\nknew; and thus the knowledge of God is variable.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said, that in God \"there is no change nor\nshadow of alteration\" (James 1:17).\n\n_I answer that,_ Since the knowledge of God is His substance, as is\nclear from the foregoing (A. 4), just as His substance is altogether\nimmutable, as shown above (Q. 9, A. 1), so His knowledge likewise\nmust be altogether invariable.\n\nReply Obj. 1: \"Lord\", \"Creator\" and the like, import relations to\ncreatures in so far as they are in themselves. But the knowledge of\nGod imports relation to creatures in so far as they are in God;\nbecause everything is actually understood according as it is in the\none who understands. Now created things are in God in an invariable\nmanner; while they exist variably in themselves. We may also say that\n\"Lord\", \"Creator\" and the like, import the relations consequent upon\nthe acts which are understood as terminating in the creatures\nthemselves, as they are in themselves; and thus these relations are\nattributed to God variously, according to the variation of creatures.\nBut \"knowledge\" and \"love,\" and the like, import relations consequent\nupon the acts which are understood to be in God; and therefore these\nare predicated of God in an invariable manner.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God knows also what He can make, and does not make.\nHence from the fact that He can make more than He makes, it does not\nfollow that He can know more than He knows, unless this be referred\nto the knowledge of vision, according to which He is said to know\nthose things which are in act in some period of time. But from the\nfact that He knows some things might be which are not, or that some\nthings might not be which are, it does not follow that His knowledge\nis variable, but rather that He knows the variability of things. If,\nhowever, anything existed which God did not previously know, and\nafterwards knew, then His knowledge would be variable. But this could\nnot be; for whatever is, or can be in any period of time, is known by\nGod in His eternity. Therefore from the fact that a thing exists in\nsome period of time, it follows that it is known by God from\neternity. Therefore it cannot be granted that God can know more than\nHe knows; because such a proposition implies that first of all He did\nnot know, and then afterwards knew.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The ancient Nominalists said that it was the same thing\nto say \"Christ is born\" and \"will be born\" and \"was born\"; because\nthe same thing is signified by these three--viz. the nativity of\nChrist. Therefore it follows, they said, that whatever God knew, He\nknows; because now He knows that Christ is born, which means the same\nthing as that Christ will be born. This opinion, however, is false;\nboth because the diversity in the parts of a sentence causes a\ndiversity of enunciations; and because it would follow that a\nproposition which is true once would be always true; which is\ncontrary to what the Philosopher lays down (Categor. iii) when he\nsays that this sentence, \"Socrates sits,\" is true when he is sitting,\nand false when he rises up. Therefore, it must be conceded that this\nproposition is not true, \"Whatever God knew He knows,\" if referred to\nenunciable propositions. But because of this, it does not follow that\nthe knowledge of God is variable. For as it is without variation in\nthe divine knowledge that God knows one and the same thing sometime\nto be, and sometime not to be, so it is without variation in the\ndivine knowledge that God knows an enunciable proposition is sometime\ntrue, and sometime false. The knowledge of God, however, would be\nvariable if He knew enunciable things by way of enunciation, by\ncomposition and division, as occurs in our intellect. Hence our\nknowledge varies either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if\nwhen either as regards truth and falsity, for example, if when a\nthing suffers change we retained the same opinion about it; or as\nregards diverse opinions, as if we first thought that anyone was\nsitting, and afterwards thought that he was not sitting; neither of\nwhich can be in God.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 16]\n\nWhether God Has a Speculative Knowledge of Things?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God has not a speculative knowledge of\nthings. For the knowledge of God is the cause of things, as shown\nabove (A. 8). But speculative knowledge is not the cause of the\nthings known. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.\n\nObj. 2: Further, speculative knowledge comes by abstraction from\nthings; which does not belong to the divine knowledge. Therefore the\nknowledge of God is not speculative.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Whatever is the more excellent must be attributed to\nGod. But speculative knowledge is more excellent than practical\nknowledge, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of Metaphysics.\nTherefore God has a speculative knowledge of things.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some knowledge is speculative only; some is practical\nonly; and some is partly speculative and partly practical. In proof\nwhereof it must be observed that knowledge can be called speculative\nin three ways: first, on the part of the things known, which are not\noperable by the knower; such is the knowledge of man about natural or\ndivine thing[s]. Secondly, as regards the manner of knowing--as, for\ninstance, if a builder consider a house by defining and dividing, and\nconsidering what belongs to it in general: for this is to consider\noperable things in a speculative manner, and not as practically\noperable; for operable means the application of form to matter, and\nnot the resolution of the composite into its universal formal\nprinciples. Thirdly, as regards the end; \"for the practical intellect\ndiffers in its end from the speculative,\" as the Philosopher says (De\nAnima iii). For the practical intellect is ordered to the end of the\noperation; whereas the end of the speculative intellect is the\nconsideration of truth. Hence if a builder should consider how a house\ncan be made, not ordering this to the end of operation, but only to\nknow (how to do it), this would be only a speculative considerations\nas regards the end, although it concerns an operable thing. Therefore\nknowledge which is speculative by reason of the thing itself known, is\nmerely speculative. But that which is speculative either in its mode\nor as to its end is partly speculative and partly practical: and when\nit is ordained to an operative end it is simply practical.\n\nIn accordance with this, therefore, it must be said that God has of\nHimself a speculative knowledge only; for He Himself is not operable.\nBut of all other things He has both speculative and practical\nknowledge. He has speculative knowledge as regards the mode; for\nwhatever we know speculatively in things by defining and dividing, God\nknows all this much more perfectly.\n\nNow of things which He can make, but does not make at any time, He has\nnot a practical knowledge, according as knowledge is called practical\nfrom the end. But He has a practical knowledge of what He makes in\nsome period of time. And, as regards evil things, although they are\nnot operable by Him, yet they fall under His practical knowledge, like\ngood things, inasmuch as He permits, or impedes, or directs them; as\nalso sicknesses fall under the practical knowledge of the physician,\ninasmuch as he cures them by his art.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The knowledge of God is the cause, not indeed of\nHimself, but of other things. He is actually the cause of some, that\nis, of things that come to be in some period of time; and He is\nvirtually the cause of others, that is, of things which He can make,\nand which nevertheless are never made.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The fact that knowledge is derived from things known\ndoes not essentially belong to speculative knowledge, but only\naccidentally in so far as it is human.\n\nIn answer to what is objected on the contrary, we must say that\nperfect knowledge of operable things is obtainable only if they are\nknown in so far as they are operable. Therefore, since the knowledge\nof God is in every way perfect, He must know what is operable by Him,\nformally as such, and not only in so far as they are speculative.\nNevertheless this does not impair the nobility of His speculative\nknowledge, forasmuch as He sees all things other than Himself in\nHimself, and He knows Himself speculatively; and so in the speculative\nknowledge of Himself, he possesses both speculative and practical\nknowledge of all other things.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 15\n\nOF IDEAS\n(In Three Articles)\n\nAfter considering the knowledge of God, it remains to consider ideas.\nAnd about this there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there are ideas?\n\n(2) Whether they are many, or one only?\n\n(3) Whether there are ideas of all things known by God?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 15, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Are Ideas?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that there are no ideas. For Dionysius says\n(Div. Nom. vii), that God does not know things by ideas. But ideas\nare for nothing else except that things may be known through them.\nTherefore there are no ideas.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God knows all things in Himself, as has been\nalready said (Q. 14, A. 5). But He does not know Himself through\nan idea; neither therefore other things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, an idea is considered to be the principle of\nknowledge and action. But the divine essence is a sufficient\nprinciple of knowing and effecting all things. It is not therefore\nnecessary to suppose ideas.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),\n\"Such is the power inherent in ideas, that no one can be wise unless\nthey are understood.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is necessary to suppose ideas in the divine mind.\nFor the Greek word _Idea_ is in Latin _Forma._ Hence by ideas are\nunderstood the forms of things, existing apart from the things\nthemselves. Now the form of anything existing apart from the thing\nitself can be for one of two ends: either to be the type of that of\nwhich it is called the form, or to be the principle of the knowledge\nof that thing, inasmuch as the forms of things knowable are said to be\nin him who knows them. In either case we must suppose ideas, as is\nclear for the following reason:\n\nIn all things not generated by chance, the form must be the end of\nany generation whatsoever. But an agent does not act on account of\nthe form, except in so far as the likeness of the form is in the\nagent, as may happen in two ways. For in some agents the form of the\nthing to be made pre-exists according to its natural being, as in\nthose that act by their nature; as a man generates a man, or fire\ngenerates fire. Whereas in other agents (the form of the thing to be\nmade pre-exists) according to intelligible being, as in those that\nact by the intellect; and thus the likeness of a house pre-exists in\nthe mind of the builder. And this may be called the idea of the\nhouse, since the builder intends to build his house like to the form\nconceived in his mind. As then the world was not made by chance, but\nby God acting by His intellect, as will appear later (Q. 46, A. 1),\nthere must exist in the divine mind a form to the likeness of which\nthe world was made. And in this the notion of an idea consists.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God does not understand things according to an idea\nexisting outside Himself. Thus Aristotle (Metaph. ix) rejects the\nopinion of Plato, who held that ideas existed of themselves, and not\nin the intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although God knows Himself and all else by His own\nessence, yet His essence is the operative principle of all things,\nexcept of Himself. It has therefore the nature of an idea with\nrespect to other things; though not with respect to Himself.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God is the similitude of all things according to His\nessence; therefore an idea in God is identical with His essence.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 15, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Ideas Are Many?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that ideas are not many. For an idea in God is\nHis essence. But God's essence is one only. Therefore there is only\none idea.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as the idea is the principle of knowing and\noperating, so are art and wisdom. But in God there are not several\narts or wisdoms. Therefore in Him there is no plurality of ideas.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if it be said that ideas are multiplied according to\ntheir relations to different creatures, it may be argued on the\ncontrary that the plurality of ideas is eternal. If, then, ideas are\nmany, but creatures temporal, then the temporal must be the cause of\nthe eternal.\n\nObj. 4: Further, these relations are either real in creatures only,\nor in God also. If in creatures only, since creatures are not from\neternity, the plurality of ideas cannot be from eternity, if ideas\nare multiplied only according to these relations. But if they are\nreal in God, it follows that there is a real plurality in God other\nthan the plurality of Persons: and this is against the teaching of\nDamascene (De Fide Orth. i, 10), who says, in God all things are one,\nexcept \"ingenerability, generation, and procession.\" Ideas therefore\nare not many.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi),\n\"Ideas are certain principal forms, or permanent and immutable types\nof things, they themselves not being formed. Thus they are eternal,\nand existing always in the same manner, as being contained in the\ndivine intelligence. Whilst, however, they themselves neither come\ninto being nor decay, yet we say that in accordance with them\neverything is formed that can rise or decay, and all that actually\ndoes so.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It must necessarily be held that ideas are many. In\nproof of which it is to be considered that in every effect the\nultimate end is the proper intention of the principal agent, as the\norder of an army (is the proper intention) of the general. Now the\nhighest good existing in things is the good of the order of the\nuniverse, as the Philosopher clearly teaches in _Metaph._ xii.\nTherefore the order of the universe is properly intended by God, and\nis not the accidental result of a succession of agents, as has been\nsupposed by those who have taught that God created only the first\ncreature, and that this creature created the second creature, and so\non, until this great multitude of beings was produced. According to\nthis opinion God would have the idea of the first created thing\nalone; whereas, if the order itself of the universe was created by\nHim immediately, and intended by Him, He must have the idea of the\norder of the universe. Now there cannot be an idea of any whole,\nunless particular ideas are had of those parts of which the whole is\nmade; just as a builder cannot conceive the idea of a house unless he\nhas the idea of each of its parts. So, then, it must needs be that in\nthe divine mind there are the proper ideas of all things. Hence\nAugustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi), \"that each thing was\ncreated by God according to the idea proper to it,\" from which it\nfollows that in the divine mind ideas are many. Now it can easily be\nseen how this is not repugnant to the simplicity of God, if we\nconsider that the idea of a work is in the mind of the operator as\nthat which is understood, and not as the image whereby he\nunderstands, which is a form that makes the intellect in act. For the\nform of the house in the mind of the builder, is something understood\nby him, to the likeness of which he forms the house in matter. Now,\nit is not repugnant to the simplicity of the divine mind that it\nunderstand many things; though it would be repugnant to its\nsimplicity were His understanding to be formed by a plurality of\nimages. Hence many ideas exist in the divine mind, as things\nunderstood by it; as can be proved thus. Inasmuch as He knows His own\nessence perfectly, He knows it according to every mode in which it\ncan be known. Now it can be known not only as it is in itself, but as\nit can be participated in by creatures according to some degree of\nlikeness. But every creature has its own proper species, according to\nwhich it participates in some degree in likeness to the divine\nessence. So far, therefore, as God knows His essence as capable of\nsuch imitation by any creature, He knows it as the particular type\nand idea of that creature; and in like manner as regards other\ncreatures. So it is clear that God understands many particular types\nof things and these are many ideas.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The divine essence is not called an idea in so far as\nit is that essence, but only in so far as it is the likeness or type\nof this or that thing. Hence ideas are said to be many, inasmuch as\nmany types are understood through the self-same essence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: By wisdom and art we signify that by which God\nunderstands; but an idea, that which God understands. For God by one\nunderstands many things, and that not only according to what they are\nin themselves, but also according as they are understood, and this is\nto understand the several types of things. In the same way, an\narchitect is said to understand a house, when he understands the form\nof the house in matter. But if he understands the form of a house, as\ndevised by himself, from the fact that he understands that he\nunderstands it, he thereby understands the type or idea of the house.\nNow not only does God understand many things by His essence, but He\nalso understands that He understands many things by His essence. And\nthis means that He understands the several types of things; or that\nmany ideas are in His intellect as understood by Him.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Such relations, whereby ideas are multiplied, are\ncaused not by the things themselves, but by the divine intellect\ncomparing its own essence with these things.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Relations multiplying ideas do not exist in created\nthings, but in God. Yet they are not real relations, such as those\nwhereby the Persons are distinguished, but relations understood by\nGod.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 15, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Are Ideas of All Things That God Knows?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that there are not ideas in God of all things\nthat He knows. For the idea of evil is not in God; since it would\nfollow that evil was in Him. But evil things are known by God.\nTherefore there are not ideas of all things that God knows.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God knows things that neither are, nor will be,\nnor have been, as has been said above (A. 9). But of such things\nthere are no ideas, since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v): \"Acts of\nthe divine will are the determining and effective types of things.\"\nTherefore there are not in God ideas of all things known by Him.\n\nObj. 3: Further, God knows primary matter, of which there can be\nno idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is certain that God knows not only species, but\nalso genera, singulars, and accidents. But there are not ideas of\nthese, according to Plato's teaching, who first taught ideas, as\nAugustine says (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). Therefore there are\nnot ideas in God of all things known by Him.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ideas are types existing in the divine mind, as is\nclear from Augustine (Octog. Tri. Quaest. qu. xlvi). But God has the\nproper types of all things that He knows; and therefore He has ideas\nof all things known by Him.\n\n_I answer that,_ As ideas, according to Plato, are principles of the\nknowledge of things and of their generation, an idea has this twofold\noffice, as it exists in the mind of God. So far as the idea is the\nprinciple of the making of things, it may be called an \"exemplar,\" and\nbelongs to practical knowledge. But so far as it is a principle of\nknowledge, it is properly called a \"type,\" and may belong to\nspeculative knowledge also. As an exemplar, therefore, it has respect\nto everything made by God in any period of time; whereas as a\nprinciple of knowledge it has respect to all things known by God, even\nthough they never come to be in time; and to all things that He knows\naccording to their proper type, in so far as they are known by Him in\na speculative manner.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Evil is known by God not through its own type, but\nthrough the type of good. Evil, therefore, has no idea in God,\nneither in so far as an idea is an \"exemplar\" nor as a \"type.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: God has no practical knowledge, except virtually, of\nthings which neither are, nor will be, nor have been. Hence, with\nrespect to these there is no idea in God in so far as idea signifies\nan \"exemplar\" but only in so far as it denotes a \"type.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Plato is said by some to have considered matter as not\ncreated; and therefore he postulated not an idea of matter but a\nconcause with matter. Since, however, we hold matter to be created by\nGod, though not apart from form, matter has its idea in God; but not\napart from the idea of the composite; for matter in itself can\nneither exist, nor be known.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Genus can have no idea apart from the idea of species,\nin so far as idea denotes an \"exemplar\"; for genus cannot exist\nexcept in some species. The same is the case with those accidents\nthat inseparably accompany their subject; for these come into being\nalong with their subject. But accidents which supervene to the\nsubject, have their special idea. For an architect produces through\nthe form of the house all the accidents that originally accompany it;\nwhereas those that are superadded to the house when completed, such\nas painting, or any other such thing, are produced through some other\nform. Now individual things, according to Plato, have no other idea\nthan that of species; both because particular things are\nindividualized by matter, which, as some say, he held to be uncreated\nand the concause with the idea; and because the intention of nature\nregards the species, and produces individuals only that in them the\nspecies may be preserved. However, divine providence extends not\nmerely to species; but to individuals as will be shown later (Q. 22,\nA. 3).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 16\n\nOF TRUTH\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nSince knowledge is of things that are true, after the consideration\nof the knowledge of God, we must inquire concerning truth. About this\nthere are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether truth resides in the thing, or only in the intellect?\n\n(2) Whether it resides only in the intellect composing and dividing?\n\n(3) On the comparison of the true to being.\n\n(4) On the comparison of the true to the good.\n\n(5) Whether God is truth?\n\n(6) Whether all things are true by one truth, or by many?\n\n(7) On the eternity of truth.\n\n(8) On the unchangeableness of truth.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Truth Resides Only in the Intellect?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the\nintellect, but rather in things. For Augustine (Soliloq. ii, 5)\ncondemns this definition of truth, \"That is true which is seen\"; since\nit would follow that stones hidden in the bosom of the earth would not\nbe true stones, as they are not seen. He also condemns the following,\n\"That is true which is as it appears to the knower, who is willing and\nable to know,\" for hence it would follow that nothing would be true,\nunless someone could know it. Therefore he defines truth thus: \"That\nis true which is.\" It seems, then, that truth resides in things, and\nnot in the intellect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is true, is true by reason of truth. If,\nthen, truth is only in the intellect, nothing will be true except in\nso far as it is understood. But this is the error of the ancient\nphilosophers, who said that whatever seems to be true is so.\nConsequently mutual contradictories seem to be true as seen by\ndifferent persons at the same time.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"that, on account of which a thing is so, is itself\nmore so,\" as is evident from the Philosopher (Poster. i). But it is\nfrom the fact that a thing is or is not, that our thought or word is\ntrue or false, as the Philosopher teaches (Praedicam. iii). Therefore\ntruth resides rather in things than in the intellect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Metaph. vi), \" The true and the\nfalse reside not in things, but in the intellect.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As the good denotes that towards which the appetite\ntends, so the true denotes that towards which the intellect tends. Now\nthere is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or\nany knowledge whatsoever, that knowledge is according as the thing\nknown is in the knower, whilst appetite is according as the desirer\ntends towards the thing desired. Thus the term of the appetite, namely\ngood, is in the object desirable, and the term of the intellect,\nnamely true, is in the intellect itself. Now as good exists in a thing\nso far as that thing is related to the appetite--and hence the aspect\nof goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the appetite, in so\nfar as the appetite is called good if its object is good; so, since\nthe true is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the\nobject understood, the aspect of the true must needs pass from the\nintellect to the object understood, so that also the thing understood\nis said to be true in so far as it has some relation to the intellect.\nNow a thing understood may be in relation to an intellect either\nessentially or accidentally. It is related essentially to an intellect\non which it depends as regards its essence; but accidentally to an\nintellect by which it is knowable; even as we may say that a house is\nrelated essentially to the intellect of the architect, but\naccidentally to the intellect upon which it does not depend.\n\nNow we do not judge of a thing by what is in it accidentally, but by\nwhat is in it essentially. Hence, everything is said to be true\nabsolutely, in so far as it is related to the intellect from which it\ndepends; and thus it is that artificial things are said to be true as\nbeing related to our intellect. For a house is said to be true that\nexpresses the likeness of the form in the architect's mind; and words\nare said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the\nintellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so\nfar as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine\nmind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to\na stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus,\nthen, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in\nthings according as they are related to the intellect as their\nprinciple. Consequently there are various definitions of truth.\nAugustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxvi), \"Truth is that whereby is made\nmanifest that which is;\" and Hilary says (De Trin. v) that \"Truth\nmakes being clear and evident\" and this pertains to truth according as\nit is in the intellect. As to the truth of things in so far as they\nare related to the intellect, we have Augustine's definition (De Vera\nRelig. xxxvi), \"Truth is a supreme likeness without any unlikeness to\na principle\": also Anselm's definition (De Verit. xii), \"Truth is\nrightness, perceptible by the mind alone\"; for that is right which is\nin accordance with the principle; also Avicenna's definition (Metaph.\nviii, 6), \"The truth of each thing is a property of the essence which\nis immutably attached to it.\" The definition that \"Truth is the\nequation of thought and thing\" is applicable to it under either\naspect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking about the truth of things, and\nexcludes from the notion of this truth, relation to our intellect;\nfor what is accidental is excluded from every definition.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The ancient philosophers held that the species of\nnatural things did not proceed from any intellect, but were produced\nby chance. But as they saw that truth implies relation to intellect,\nthey were compelled to base the truth of things on their relation to\nour intellect. From this, conclusions result that are inadmissible,\nand which the Philosopher refutes (Metaph. iv). Such, however, do not\nfollow, if we say that the truth of things consists in their relation\nto the divine intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the truth of our intellect is caused by the\nthing, yet it is not necessary that truth should be there primarily,\nany more than that health should be primarily in medicine, rather\nthan in the animal: for the virtue of medicine, and not its health,\nis the cause of health, for here the agent is not univocal. In the\nsame way, the being of the thing, not its truth, is the cause of\ntruth in the intellect. Hence the Philosopher says that a thought or\na word is true \"from the fact that a thing is, not because a thing is\ntrue.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Truth Resides Only in the Intellect Composing and Dividing?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that truth does not reside only in the intellect\ncomposing and dividing. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that\nas the senses are always true as regards their proper sensible\nobjects, so is the intellect as regards \"what a thing is.\" Now\ncomposition and division are neither in the senses nor in the\nintellect knowing \"what a thing is.\" Therefore truth does not reside\nonly in the intellect composing and dividing.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Isaac says in his book _On Definitions_ that truth\nis the equation of thought and thing. Now just as the intellect with\nregard to complex things can be equated to things, so also with regard\nto simple things; and this is true also of sense apprehending a thing\nas it is. Therefore truth does not reside only in the intellect\ncomposing and dividing.\n\n_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi) that with regard to\nsimple things and \"what a thing is,\" truth is \"found neither in the\nintellect nor in things.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated before, truth resides, in its primary aspect,\nin the intellect. Now since everything is true according as it has the\nform proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing,\nmust be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this\nbeing its form, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the\nconformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity\nis to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For although\nsight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the\ncomparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself\napprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own\nconformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it\nby knowing of a thing \"what a thing is.\" When, however, it judges that\na thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing,\nthen first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and\ndividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes\nfrom the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the\npredicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing,\nas is also the intellect, when it knows \"what a thing is\"; but it does\nnot thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with\ncomplex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or\nin the intellect knowing \"what a thing is,\" as in anything that is\ntrue; yet not as the thing known in the knower, which is implied by\nthe word \"truth\"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as\nknown. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect\ncomposing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect\nknowing \"what a thing is.\"\n\nAnd thus the Objections given are solved.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the True and Being Are Convertible Terms?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the true and being are not convertible\nterms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated\n(A. 1); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not\nconvertible.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not\nconvertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being;\nfor it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not.\nTherefore the true and being are not convertible.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things which stand to each other in order of\npriority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true\nappears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except\nunder the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not\nconvertible.\n\n_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the\nsame disposition of things in being and in truth.\n\n_I answer that,_ As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth\nis related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so\nfar is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in _De Anima_ iii that \"the\nsoul is in some manner all things,\" through the senses and the\nintellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the\ntrue. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true\nadds relation to the intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The true resides in things and in the intellect, as\nsaid before (A. 1). But the true that is in things is convertible\nwith being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect\nis convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested;\nfor this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already (A.\n1). It may, however, be said that being also is in things and in the\nintellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in the\nintellect, while being is primarily in things; and this is so because\ntruth and being differ in idea.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be\nknown; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it\nknowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is\na kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except\nunder the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In\nthe one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the\nidea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In\nthe other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless\nthe idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the\ntrue cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended\nalso; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is\nthe same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being\ncannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be\nunderstood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly,\nbeing when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by\nunderstanding being.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Good Is Logically Prior to the True?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For\nwhat is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from _Phys._\ni. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a\nkind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is\nlogically prior to the true.\n\nObj. 2: Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect\ncomposing and dividing as said above (A. 2). But that which is in\nthings is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is\nlogically prior to the true.\n\nObj. 3: Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from\n_Ethic._ iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine\nsays (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind.\nTherefore the good is prior to the true.\n\n_On the contrary,_ What is in more things is prior logically. But the\ntrue is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in\nmathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good.\n\n_I answer that,_ Although the good and the true are convertible with\nbeing, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner\nthe true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two\nreasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than\nis good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately;\nwhile the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some\nway perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from\nthe fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the\ntrue regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true\nmust be prior in idea to the good.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The will and the intellect mutually include one\nanother: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills\nthe intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the\nobject of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the\nintellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable,\ngood stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas\nin the order of intelligible things the converse is the case. From the\nfact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good\nis prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior\nabsolutely.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to\nthe intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself;\nsecondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it\napprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first,\nthat of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in\nthings.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The virtue which is called \"truth\" is not truth in\ngeneral, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows\nhimself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to\n\"life\" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in\nhis life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it\nhas been said that truth exists in other things (A. 1). Whereas the\ntruth of \"justice\" is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his\nneighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these\nparticular truths to truth in general.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 5]\n\nWhether God Is Truth?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is not truth. For truth consists in the\nintellect composing and dividing. But in God there is not composition\nand division. Therefore in Him there is not truth.\n\nObj. 2: Further, truth, according to Augustine (De Vera Relig. xxxvi)\nis a \"likeness to the principle.\" But in God there is no likeness to\na principle. Therefore in God there is not truth.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever is said of God, is said of Him as of the\nfirst cause of all things; thus the being of God is the cause of all\nbeing; and His goodness the cause of all good. If therefore there is\ntruth in God, all truth will be from Him. But it is true that someone\nsins. Therefore this will be from God; which is evidently false.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord says, \"I am the Way, the Truth, and the\nLife\" (John 14:6).\n\n_I answer that,_ As said above (A. 1), truth is found in the\nintellect according as it apprehends a thing as it is; and in things\naccording as they have being conformable to an intellect. This is to\nthe greatest degree found in God. For His being is not only conformed\nto His intellect, but it is the very act of His intellect; and His act\nof understanding is the measure and cause of every other being and of\nevery other intellect, and He Himself is His own existence and act of\nunderstanding. Whence it follows not only that truth is in Him, but\nthat He is truth itself, and the sovereign and first truth.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although in the divine intellect there is neither\ncomposition nor division, yet in His simple act of intelligence He\njudges of all things and knows all things complex; and thus there is\ntruth in His intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The truth of our intellect is according to its\nconformity with its principle, that is to say, to the things from\nwhich it receives knowledge. The truth also of things is according to\ntheir conformity with their principle, namely, the divine intellect.\nNow this cannot be said, properly speaking, of divine truth; unless\nperhaps in so far as truth is appropriated to the Son, Who has a\nprinciple. But if we speak of divine truth in its essence, we cannot\nunderstand this unless the affirmative must be resolved into the\nnegative, as when one says: \"the Father is of Himself, because He is\nnot from another.\" Similarly, the divine truth can be called a\n\"likeness to the principle,\" inasmuch as His existence is not\ndissimilar to His intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Not-being and privation have no truth of themselves,\nbut only in the apprehension of the intellect. Now all apprehension\nof the intellect is from God. Hence all the truth that exists in the\nstatement--\"that a person commits fornication is true\"--is entirely\nfrom God. But to argue, \"Therefore that this person fornicates is\nfrom God\", is a fallacy of Accident.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 6]\n\nWhether There Is Only One Truth, According to Which All Things Are True?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that there is only one truth, according to which\nall things are true. For according to Augustine (De Trin. xv, 1),\n\"nothing is greater than the mind of man, except God.\" Now truth is\ngreater than the mind of man; otherwise the mind would be the judge of\ntruth: whereas in fact it judges all things according to truth, and\nnot according to its own measure. Therefore God alone is truth.\nTherefore there is no other truth but God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Anselm says (De Verit. xiv), that, \"as is the\nrelation of time to temporal things, so is that of truth to true\nthings.\" But there is only one time for all temporal things.\nTherefore there is only one truth, by which all things are true.\n\n_On the contrary,_ it is written (Ps. 11:2), \"Truths are decayed from\namong the children of men.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In one sense truth, whereby all things are true, is\none, and in another sense it is not. In proof of which we must\nconsider that when anything is predicated of many things univocally,\nit is found in each of them according to its proper nature; as animal\nis found in each species of animal. But when anything is predicated of\nmany things analogically, it is found in only one of them according to\nits proper nature, and from this one the rest are denominated. So\nhealthiness is predicated of animal, of urine, and of medicine, not\nthat health is only in the animal; but from the health of the animal,\nmedicine is called healthy, in so far as it is the cause of health,\nand urine is called healthy, in so far as it indicates health. And\nalthough health is neither in medicine nor in urine, yet in either\nthere is something whereby the one causes, and the other indicates\nhealth. Now we have said (A. 1) that truth resides primarily in\nthe intellect; and secondarily in things, according as they are\nrelated to the divine intellect. If therefore we speak of truth, as it\nexists in the intellect, according to its proper nature, then are\nthere many truths in many created intellects; and even in one and the\nsame intellect, according to the number of things known. Whence a\ngloss on Ps. 11:2, \"Truths are decayed from among the children of\nmen,\" says: \"As from one man's face many likenesses are reflected in a\nmirror, so many truths are reflected from the one divine truth.\" But\nif we speak of truth as it is in things, then all things are true by\none primary truth; to which each one is assimilated according to its\nown entity. And thus, although the essences or forms of things are\nmany, yet the truth of the divine intellect is one, in conformity to\nwhich all things are said to be true.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The soul does not judge of things according to any kind\nof truth, but according to the primary truth, inasmuch as it is\nreflected in the soul, as in a mirror, by reason of the first\nprinciples of the understanding. It follows, therefore, that the\nprimary truth is greater than the soul. And yet, even created truth,\nwhich resides in our intellect, is greater than the soul, not simply,\nbut in a certain degree, in so far as it is its perfection; even as\nscience may be said to be greater than the soul. Yet it is true that\nnothing subsisting is greater than the rational soul, except God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The saying of Anselm is correct in so far as things are\nsaid to be true by their relation to the divine intellect.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Created Truth Is Eternal?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that created truth is eternal. For Augustine\nsays (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 8) \"Nothing is more eternal than the nature\nof a circle, and that two added to three make five.\" But the truth of\nthese is a created truth. Therefore created truth is eternal.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is always, is eternal. But universals\nare always and everywhere; therefore they are eternal. So therefore\nis truth, which is the most universal.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it was always true that what is true in the present\nwas to be in the future. But as the truth of a proposition regarding\nthe present is a created truth, so is that of a proposition regarding\nthe future. Therefore some created truth is eternal.\n\nObj. 4: Further, all that is without beginning and end is eternal.\nBut the truth of enunciables is without beginning and end; for if\ntheir truth had a beginning, since it was not before, it was true\nthat truth was not, and true, of course, by reason of truth; so that\ntruth was before it began to be. Similarly, if it be asserted that\ntruth has an end, it follows that it is after it has ceased to be,\nfor it will still be true that truth is not. Therefore truth is\neternal.\n\n_On the contrary,_ God alone is eternal, as laid down before\n(Q. 10, Art. 3).\n\n_I answer that,_ The truth of enunciations is no other than the truth of\nthe intellect. For an enunciation resides in the intellect, and in\nspeech. Now according as it is in the intellect it has truth of\nitself: but according as it is in speech, it is called enunciable\ntruth, according as it signifies some truth of the intellect, not on\naccount of any truth residing in the enunciation, as though in a\nsubject. Thus urine is called healthy, not from any health within it\nbut from the health of an animal which it indicates. In like manner it\nhas been already said that things are called true from the truth of\nthe intellect. Hence, if no intellect were eternal, no truth would be\neternal. Now because only the divine intellect is eternal, in it alone\ntruth has eternity. Nor does it follow from this that anything else\nbut God is eternal; since the truth of the divine intellect is God\nHimself, as shown already (A. 5).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The nature of a circle, and the fact that two and three\nmake five, have eternity in the mind of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That something is always and everywhere, can be\nunderstood in two ways. In one way, as having in itself the power of\nextension to all time and to all places, as it belongs to God to be\neverywhere and always. In the other way as not having in itself\ndetermination to any place or time, as primary matter is said to be\none, not because it has one form, but by the absence of all\ndistinguishing form. In this manner all universals are said to be\neverywhere and always, in so far as universals are independent of\nplace and time. It does not, however, follow from this that they are\neternal, except in an intellect, if one exists that is eternal.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That which now is, was future, before it (actually)\nwas; because it was in its cause that it would be. Hence, if the\ncause were removed, that thing's coming to be was not future. But the\nfirst cause is alone eternal. Hence it does not follow that it was\nalways true that what now is would be, except in so far as its future\nbeing was in the sempiternal cause; and God alone is such a cause.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Because our intellect is not eternal, neither is the\ntruth of enunciable propositions which are formed by us, eternal, but\nit had a beginning in time. Now before such truth existed, it was not\ntrue to say that such a truth did exist, except by reason of the\ndivine intellect, wherein alone truth is eternal. But it is true now\nto say that that truth did not then exist: and this is true only by\nreason of the truth that is now in our intellect; and not by reason\nof any truth in the things. For this is truth concerning not-being;\nand not-being has not truth of itself, but only so far as our\nintellect apprehends it. Hence it is true to say that truth did not\nexist, in so far as we apprehend its not-being as preceding its being.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Truth Is Immutable?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De\nLib. Arbit. ii, 12), that \"Truth and mind do not rank as equals,\notherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, what remains after every change is immutable; as\nprimary matter is unbegotten and incorruptible, since it remains after\nall generation and corruption. But truth remains after all change; for\nafter every change it is true to say that a thing is, or is not.\nTherefore truth is immutable.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the truth of an enunciation changes, it changes\nmostly with the changing of the thing. But it does not thus change.\nFor truth, according to Anselm (De Verit. viii), \"is a certain\nrightness\" in so far as a thing answers to that which is in the\ndivine mind concerning it. But this proposition that \"Socrates sits\",\nreceives from the divine mind the signification that Socrates does\nsit; and it has the same signification even though he does not sit.\nTherefore the truth of the proposition in no way changes.\n\nObj. 4: Further, where there is the same cause, there is the same\neffect. But the same thing is the cause of the truth of the three\npropositions, \"Socrates sits, will sit, sat.\" Therefore the truth of\neach is the same. But one or other of these must be the true one.\nTherefore the truth of these propositions remains immutable; and for\nthe same reason that of any other.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 11:2), \"Truths are decayed from\namong the children of men.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Truth, properly speaking, resides only in the\nintellect, as said before (A. 1); but things are called true in\nvirtue of the truth residing in an intellect. Hence the mutability of\ntruth must be regarded from the point of view of the intellect, the\ntruth of which consists in its conformity to the thing understood. Now\nthis conformity may vary in two ways, even as any other likeness,\nthrough change in one of the two extremes. Hence in one way truth\nvaries on the part of the intellect, from the fact that a change of\nopinion occurs about a thing which in itself has not changed, and in\nanother way, when the thing is changed, but not the opinion; and in\neither way there can be a change from true to false. If, then, there\nis an intellect wherein there can be no alternation of opinions, and\nthe knowledge of which nothing can escape, in this is immutable truth.\nNow such is the divine intellect, as is clear from what has been said\nbefore (Q. 14, A. 15). Hence the truth of the divine intellect is\nimmutable. But the truth of our intellect is mutable; not because it\nis itself the subject of change, but in so far as our intellect\nchanges from truth to falsity, for thus forms may be called mutable.\nWhereas the truth of the divine intellect is that according to which\nnatural things are said to be true, and this is altogether immutable.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of divine truth.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The true and being are convertible terms. Hence just as\nbeing is not generated nor corrupted of itself, but accidentally, in\nso far as this being or that is corrupted or generated, as is said in\n_Phys._ i, so does truth change, not so as that no truth remains, but\nbecause that truth does not remain which was before.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A proposition not only has truth, as other things are\nsaid to have it, in so far, that is, as they correspond to that which\nis the design of the divine intellect concerning them; but it is said\nto have truth in a special way, in so far as it indicates the truth\nof the intellect, which consists in the conformity of the intellect\nwith a thing. When this disappears, the truth of an opinion changes,\nand consequently the truth of the proposition. So therefore this\nproposition, \"Socrates sits,\" is true, as long as he is sitting, both\nwith the truth of the thing, in so far as the expression is\nsignificative, and with the truth of signification, in so far as it\nsignifies a true opinion. When Socrates rises, the first truth\nremains, but the second is changed.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The sitting of Socrates, which is the cause of the\ntruth of the proposition, \"Socrates sits,\" has not the same meaning\nwhen Socrates sits, after he sits, and before he sits. Hence the\ntruth which results, varies, and is variously signified by these\npropositions concerning present, past, or future. Thus it does not\nfollow, though one of the three propositions is true, that the same\ntruth remains invariable.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 17\n\nCONCERNING FALSITY\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe next consider falsity. About this four points of inquiry arise:\n\n(1) Whether falsity exists in things?\n\n(2) Whether it exists in the sense?\n\n(3) Whether it exists in the intellect?\n\n(4) Concerning the opposition of the true and the false.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 17, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Falsity Exists in Things?\n\nObjection 1: It appears that falsity does not exist in things. For\nAugustine says (Soliloq. ii, 8), \"If the true is that which is, it\nwill be concluded that the false exists nowhere; whatever reason may\nappear to the contrary.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, false is derived from _fallere_ (to deceive). But\nthings do not deceive; for, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 33),\nthey show nothing but their own species. Therefore the false is not\nfound in things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the true is said to exist in things by conformity to\nthe divine intellect, as stated above (Q. 16). But everything, in so\nfar as it exists, imitates God. Therefore everything is true without\nadmixture of falsity; and thus nothing is false.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 34): \"Every body is a\ntrue body and a false unity: for it imitates unity without being\nunity.\" But everything imitates the divine unity yet falls short of\nit. Therefore in all things falsity exists.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since true and false are opposed, and since opposites\nstand in relation to the same thing, we must needs seek falsity, where\nprimarily we find truth; that is to say, in the intellect. Now, in\nthings, neither truth nor falsity exists, except in relation to the\nintellect. And since every thing is denominated simply by what belongs\nto it _per se,_ but is denominated relatively by what belongs to it\naccidentally; a thing indeed may be called false simply when compared\nwith the intellect on which it depends, and to which it is compared\n_per se_ but may be called false relatively as directed to another\nintellect, to which it is compared accidentally. Now natural things\ndepend on the divine intellect, as artificial things on the human.\nWherefore artificial things are said to be false simply and in\nthemselves, in so far as they fall short of the form of the art;\nwhence a craftsman is said to produce a false work, if it falls short\nof the proper operation of his art.\n\nIn things that depend on God, falseness cannot be found, in so far as\nthey are compared with the divine intellect; since whatever takes\nplace in things proceeds from the ordinance of that intellect, unless\nperhaps in the case of voluntary agents only, who have it in their\npower to withdraw themselves from what is so ordained; wherein\nconsists the evil of sin. Thus sins themselves are called untruths and\nlies in the Scriptures, according to the words of the text, \"Why do\nyou love vanity, and seek after lying?\" (Ps. 4:3): as on the other\nhand virtuous deeds are called the \"truth of life\" as being obedient\nto the order of the divine intellect. Thus it is said, \"He that doth\ntruth, cometh to the light\" (John 3:21).\n\nBut in relation to our intellect, natural things which are compared\nthereto accidentally, can be called false; not simply, but relatively;\nand that in two ways. In one way according to the thing signified, and\nthus a thing is said to be false as being signified or represented by\nword or thought that is false. In this respect anything can be said to\nbe false as regards any quality not possessed by it; as if we should\nsay that a diameter is a false commensurable thing, as the Philosopher\nsays (Metaph. v, 34). So, too, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 10): \"The\ntrue tragedian is a false Hector\": even as, on the contrary, anything\ncan be called true, in regard to that which is becoming to it. In\nanother way a thing can be called false, by way of cause--and thus a\nthing is said to be false that naturally begets a false opinion. And\nwhereas it is innate in us to judge things by external appearances,\nsince our knowledge takes its rise from sense, which principally and\nnaturally deals with external accidents, therefore those external\naccidents, which resemble things other than themselves, are said to be\nfalse with respect to those things; thus gall is falsely honey; and\ntin, false gold. Regarding this, Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6): \"We\ncall those things false that appear to our apprehension like the\ntrue:\" and the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 34): \"Things are called\nfalse that are naturally apt to appear such as they are not, or what\nthey are not.\" In this way a man is called false as delighting in\nfalse opinions or words, and not because he can invent them; for in\nthis way many wise and learned persons might be called false, as\nstated in _Metaph._ v, 34.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A thing compared with the intellect is said to be true\nin respect to what it is; and false in respect to what it is not.\nHence, \"The true tragedian is a false Hector,\" as stated in Soliloq.\nii, 6. As, therefore, in things that are is found a certain\nnon-being, so in things that are is found a degree of falseness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Things do not deceive by their own nature, but by\naccident. For they give occasion to falsity, by the likeness they\nbear to things which they actually are not.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Things are said to be false, not as compared with the\ndivine intellect, in which case they would be false simply, but as\ncompared with our intellect; and thus they are false only relatively.\n\nTo the argument which is urged on the contrary, likeness or defective\nrepresentation does not involve the idea of falsity except in so far\nas it gives occasion to false opinion. Hence a thing is not always\nsaid to be false, because it resembles another thing; but only when\nthe resemblance is such as naturally to produce a false opinion, not\nin any one case, but in the majority of instances.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 17, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Is Falsity in the Senses?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the senses. For Augustine\nsays (De Vera Relig. 33): \"If all the bodily senses report as they are\naffected, I do not know what more we can require from them.\" Thus it\nseems that we are not deceived by the senses; and therefore that\nfalsity is not in them.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. iv, 24) that falsity\nis not proper to the senses, but to the imagination.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in non-complex things there is neither true nor\nfalse, but in complex things only. But affirmation and negation do\nnot belong to the senses. Therefore in the senses there is no falsity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 6), \"It appears that the\nsenses entrap us into error by their deceptive similitudes.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Falsity is not to be sought in the senses except as\ntruth is in them. Now truth is not in them in such a way as that the\nsenses know truth, but in so far as they apprehend sensible things\ntruly, as said above (Q. 16, A. 2), and this takes place through\nthe senses apprehending things as they are, and hence it happens that\nfalsity exists in the senses through their apprehending or judging\nthings to be otherwise than they really are.\n\nThe knowledge of things by the senses is in proportion to the\nexistence of their likeness in the senses; and the likeness of a thing\ncan exist in the senses in three ways. In the first way, primarily and\nof its own nature, as in sight there is the likeness of colors, and of\nother sensible objects proper to it. Secondly, of its own nature,\nthough not primarily; as in sight there is the likeness of shape,\nsize, and of other sensible objects common to more than one sense.\nThirdly, neither primarily nor of its own nature, but accidentally, as\nin sight, there is the likeness of a man, not as man, but in so far as\nit is accidental to the colored object to be a man.\n\nSense, then, has no false knowledge about its proper objects, except\naccidentally and rarely, and then, because of the unsound organ it\ndoes not receive the sensible form rightly; just as other passive\nsubjects because of their indisposition receive defectively the\nimpressions of the agent. Hence, for instance, it happens that on\naccount of an unhealthy tongue sweet seems bitter to a sick person.\nBut as to common objects of sense, and accidental objects, even a\nrightly disposed sense may have a false judgment, because it is\nreferred to them not directly, but accidentally, or as a consequence\nof being directed to other things.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The affection of sense is its sensation itself. Hence,\nfrom the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that\nwe are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we\nexperience sensation. Since, however, sense is sometimes affected\nerroneously of that object, it follows that it sometimes reports\nerroneously of that object; and thus we are deceived by sense about\nthe object, but not about the fact of sensation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Falsity is said not to be proper to sense, since sense\nis not deceived as to its proper object. Hence in another translation\nit is said more plainly, \"Sense, about its proper object, is never\nfalse.\" Falsity is attributed to the imagination, as it represents\nthe likeness of something even in its absence. Hence, when anyone\nperceives the likeness of a thing as if it were the thing itself,\nfalsity results from such an apprehension; and for this reason the\nPhilosopher says (Metaph. v, 34) that shadows, pictures, and dreams\nare said to be false inasmuch as they convey the likeness of things\nthat are not present in substance.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument proves that the false is not in the\nsense, as in that which knows the true and the false.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 17, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Falsity Is in the Intellect?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For\nAugustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 32), \"Everyone who is deceived,\nunderstands not that in which he is deceived.\" But falsity is said to\nexist in any knowledge in so far as we are deceived therein. Therefore\nfalsity does not exist in the intellect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 51) that the\nintellect is always right. Therefore there is no falsity in the\nintellect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said in _De Anima_ iii, 21, 22 that \"where\nthere is composition of objects understood, there is truth and\nfalsehood.\" But such composition is in the intellect. Therefore truth\nand falsehood exist in the intellect.\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as a thing has being by its proper form, so the\nknowing faculty has knowledge by the likeness of the thing known.\nHence, as natural things cannot fall short of the being that belongs\nto them by their form, but may fall short of accidental or consequent\nqualities, even as a man may fail to possess two feet, but not fail\nto be a man; so the faculty of knowing cannot fail in knowledge of\nthe thing with the likeness of which it is informed; but may fail\nwith regard to something consequent upon that form, or accidental\nthereto. For it has been said (A. 2) that sight is not deceived in\nits proper sensible, but about common sensibles that are consequent\nto that object; or about accidental objects of sense. Now as the\nsense is directly informed by the likeness of its proper object, so\nis the intellect by the likeness of the essence of a thing. Hence the\nintellect is not deceived about the essence of a thing, as neither\nthe sense about its proper object. But in affirming and denying, the\nintellect may be deceived, by attributing to the thing of which it\nunderstands the essence, something which is not consequent upon it,\nor is opposed to it. For the intellect is in the same position as\nregards judging of such things, as sense is as to judging of common,\nor accidental, sensible objects. There is, however, this difference,\nas before mentioned regarding truth (Q. 16, A. 2), that falsity can\nexist in the intellect not only because the knowledge of the\nintellect is false, but because the intellect is conscious of that\nknowledge, as it is conscious of truth; whereas in sense falsity does\nnot exist as known, as stated above (A. 2).\n\nBut because falsity of the intellect is concerned essentially only\nwith the composition of the intellect, falsity occurs also\naccidentally in that operation of the intellect whereby it knows the\nessence of a thing, in so far as composition of the intellect is\nmixed up in it. This can take place in two ways. In one way, by the\nintellect applying to one thing the definition proper to another; as\nthat of a circle to a man. Wherefore the definition of one thing is\nfalse of another. In another way, by composing a definition of parts\nwhich are mutually exclusive. For thus the definition is not only\nfalse of the thing, but false in itself. A definition such as \"a\nreasonable four-footed animal\" would be of this kind, and the\nintellect false in making it; for such a statement as \"some\nreasonable animals are four-footed\" is false in itself. For this\nreason the intellect cannot be false in its knowledge of simple\nessences; but it is either true, or it understands nothing at all.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Because the essence of a thing is the proper object of\nthe intellect, we are properly said to understand a thing when we\nreduce it to its essence, and judge of it thereby; as takes place in\ndemonstrations, in which there is no falsity. In this sense\nAugustine's words must be understood, \"that he who is deceived,\nunderstands not that wherein he is deceived;\" and not in the sense\nthat no one is ever deceived in any operation of the intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The intellect is always right as regards first\nprinciples; since it is not deceived about them for the same reason\nthat it is not deceived about what a thing is. For self-known\nprinciples are such as are known as soon as the terms are understood,\nfrom the fact that the predicate is contained in the definition of\nthe subject.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 17, Art. 4]\n\nWhether True and False Are Contraries?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that true and false are not contraries. For true\nand false are opposed, as that which is to that which is not; for\n\"truth,\" as Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 5), \"is that which is.\" But\nthat which is and that which is not are not opposed as contraries.\nTherefore true and false are not contrary things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, one of two contraries is not in the other. But\nfalsity is in truth, because, as Augustine says, (Soliloq. ii, 10),\n\"A tragedian would not be a false Hector, if he were not a true\ntragedian.\" Therefore true and false are not contraries.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in God there is no contrariety, for \"nothing is\ncontrary to the Divine Substance,\" as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei\nxii, 2). But falsity is opposed to God, for an idol is called in\nScripture a lie, \"They have laid hold on lying\" (Jer. 8:5), that is\nto say, \"an idol,\" as a gloss says. Therefore false and true are not\ncontraries.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Peri Herm. ii), that a false\nopinion is contrary to a true one.\n\n_I answer that,_ True and false are opposed as contraries, and not, as\nsome have said, as affirmation and negation. In proof of which it must\nbe considered that negation neither asserts anything nor determines\nany subject, and can therefore be said of being as of not-being, for\ninstance not-seeing or not-sitting. But privation asserts nothing,\nwhereas it determines its subject, for it is \"negation in a subject,\"\nas stated in _Metaph._ iv, 4: v. 27; for blindness is not said except of\none whose nature it is to see. Contraries, however, both assert\nsomething and determine the subject, for blackness is a species of\ncolor. Falsity asserts something, for a thing is false, as the\nPhilosopher says (Metaph. iv, 27), inasmuch as something is said or\nseems to be something that it is not, or not to be what it really is.\nFor as truth implies an adequate apprehension of a thing, so falsity\nimplies the contrary. Hence it is clear that true and false are\ncontraries.\n\nReply Obj. 1: What is in things is the truth of the thing; but what\nis apprehended, is the truth of the intellect, wherein truth\nprimarily resides. Hence the false is that which is not as\napprehended. To apprehend being, and not-being, implies contrariety;\nfor, as the Philosopher proves (Peri Herm. ii), the contrary of this\nstatement \"God is good,\" is, \"God is not good.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Falsity is not founded in the truth which is contrary\nto it, just as evil is not founded in the good which is contrary to\nit, but in that which is its proper subject. This happens in either,\nbecause true and good are universals, and convertible with being.\nHence, as every privation is founded in a subject, that is a being,\nso every evil is founded in some good, and every falsity in some\ntruth.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Because contraries, and opposites by way of privation,\nare by nature about one and the same thing, therefore there is\nnothing contrary to God, considered in Himself, either with respect\nto His goodness or His truth, for in His intellect there can be\nnothing false. But in our apprehension of Him contraries exist, for\nthe false opinion concerning Him is contrary to the true. So idols\nare called lies, opposed to the divine truth, inasmuch as the false\nopinion concerning them is contrary to the true opinion of the divine\nunity.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 18\n\nTHE LIFE OF GOD\n(In Four Articles)\n\nSince to understand belongs to living beings, after considering the\ndivine knowledge and intellect, we must consider the divine life.\nAbout this, four points of inquiry arise:\n\n(1) To whom does it belong to live?\n\n(2) What is life?\n\n(3) Whether life is properly attributed to God?\n\n(4) Whether all things in God are life?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 18, Art. 1]\n\nWhether to Live Belongs to All Natural Things?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that to live belongs to all natural things. For\nthe Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 1) that \"Movement is like a kind of\nlife possessed by all things existing in nature.\" But all natural\nthings participate in movement. Therefore all natural things partake\nof life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, plants are said to live, inasmuch as they have in\nthemselves a principle of movement of growth and decay. But local\nmovement is naturally more perfect than, and prior to, movement of\ngrowth and decay, as the Philosopher shows (Phys. viii, 56, 57).\nSince then, all natural bodies have in themselves some principle of\nlocal movement, it seems that all natural bodies live.\n\nObj. 3: Further, amongst natural bodies the elements are the less\nperfect. Yet life is attributed to them, for we speak of \"living\nwaters.\" Much more, therefore, have other natural bodies life.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vi, 1) that \"The last\necho of life is heard in the plants,\" whereby it is inferred that\ntheir life is life in its lowest degree. But inanimate bodies are\ninferior to plants. Therefore they have not life.\n\n_I answer that,_ We can gather to what things life belongs, and to what\nit does not, from such things as manifestly possess life. Now life\nmanifestly belongs to animals, for it said in _De Vegetab._ i [*De\nPlantis i, 1] that in animals life is manifest. We must, therefore,\ndistinguish living from lifeless things, by comparing them to that by\nreason of which animals are said to live: and this it is in which life\nis manifested first and remains last. We say then that an animal\nbegins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such\nmovement appears in it, so long as it is considered to be alive. When\nit no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another\npower, then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead.\nWhereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that\nmove themselves by some kind of movement, whether it be movement\nproperly so called, as the act of an imperfect being, i.e. of a thing\nin potentiality, is called movement; or movement in a more general\nsense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding\nand feeling are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be\nalive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind:\nwhereas those things that cannot by their nature do so, cannot be\ncalled living, unless by a similitude.\n\nReply Obj. 1: These words of the Philosopher may be understood either\nof the first movement, namely, that of the celestial bodies, or of\nthe movement in its general sense. In either way is movement called\nthe life, as it were, of natural bodies, speaking by a similitude,\nand not attributing it to them as their property. The movement of the\nheavens is in the universe of corporeal natures as the movement of\nthe heart, whereby life is preserved, is in animals. Similarly also\nevery natural movement in respect to natural things has a certain\nsimilitude to the operations of life. Hence, if the whole corporeal\nuniverse were one animal, so that its movement came from an\n\"intrinsic moving force,\" as some in fact have held, in that case\nmovement would really be the life of all natural bodies.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To bodies, whether heavy or light, movement does not\nbelong, except in so far as they are displaced from their natural\nconditions, and are out of their proper place; for when they are in\nthe place that is proper and natural to them, then they are at rest.\nPlants and other living things move with vital movement, in\naccordance with the disposition of their nature, but not by\napproaching thereto, or by receding from it, for in so far as they\nrecede from such movement, so far do they recede from their natural\ndisposition. Heavy and light bodies are moved by an extrinsic force,\neither generating them and giving them form, or removing obstacles\nfrom their way. They do not therefore move themselves, as do living\nbodies.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Waters are called living that have a continuous\ncurrent: for standing waters, that are not connected with a\ncontinually flowing source, are called dead, as in cisterns and\nponds. This is merely a similitude, inasmuch as the movement they are\nseen to possess makes them look as if they were alive. Yet this is\nnot life in them in its real sense, since this movement of theirs is\nnot from themselves but from the cause that generates them. The same\nis the case with the movement of other heavy and light bodies.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 18, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Life Is an Operation?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that life is an operation. For nothing is\ndivided except into parts of the same genus. But life is divided by\ncertain operations, as is clear from the Philosopher (De Anima ii,\n13), who distinguishes four kinds of life, namely, nourishment,\nsensation, local movement and understanding. Therefore life is an\noperation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the active life is said to be different from the\ncontemplative. But the contemplative is only distinguished from the\nactive by certain operations. Therefore life is an operation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to know God is an operation. But this is life,\nas is clear from the words of John 18:3, \"Now this is eternal life,\nthat they may know Thee, the only true God.\" Therefore life is an\noperation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 37), \"In living\nthings, to live is to be.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been said (Q. 17, A. 3),\nour intellect, which takes cognizance of the essence of a thing as\nits proper object, gains knowledge from sense, of which the proper\nobjects are external accidents. Hence from external appearances we\ncome to the knowledge of the essence of things. And because we name a\nthing in accordance with our knowledge of it, as is clear from what\nhas already been said (Q. 13, A. 1), so from external properties\nnames are often imposed to signify essences. Hence such names are\nsometimes taken strictly to denote the essence itself, the\nsignification of which is their principal object; but sometimes, and\nless strictly, to denote the properties by reason of which they are\nimposed. And so we see that the word \"body\" is used to denote a genus\nof substances from the fact of their possessing three dimensions: and\nis sometimes taken to denote the dimensions themselves; in which\nsense body is said to be a species of quantity. The same must be said\nof life. The name is given from a certain external appearance,\nnamely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather\na substance to which self-movement and the application of itself to\nany kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is\nnothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies\nthis, though in the abstract, just as the word \"running\" denotes \"to\nrun\" in the abstract.\n\nHence \"living\" is not an accidental but an essential predicate.\nSometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from\nwhich its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9)\nthat to live is principally to sense or to understand.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher here takes \"to live\" to mean an\noperation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and\nintelligence and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations,\nsometimes for the existence itself of the operator. For he says\n(Ethic. ix, 9) that to live is to sense or to understand--in other\nwords, to have a nature capable of sensation or understanding. Thus,\nthen, he distinguishes life by the four operations mentioned. For in\nthis lower world there are four kinds of living things. It is the\nnature of some to be capable of nothing more than taking nourishment,\nand, as a consequence, of growing and generating. Others are able, in\naddition, to sense, as we see in the case of shellfish and other\nanimals without movement. Others have the further power of moving from\nplace to place, as perfect animals, such as quadrupeds, and birds, and\nso on. Others, as man, have the still higher faculty of understanding.\n\nReply Obj. 2: By vital operations are meant those whose principles\nare within the operator, and in virtue of which the operator produces\nsuch operations of itself. It happens that there exist in men not\nmerely such natural principles of certain operations as are their\nnatural powers, but something over and above these, such as habits\ninclining them like a second nature to particular kinds of\noperations, so that the operations become sources of pleasure. Thus,\nas by a similitude, any kind of work in which a man takes delight, so\nthat his bent is towards it, his time spent in it, and his whole life\nordered with a view to it, is said to be the life of that man. Hence\nsome are said to lead a life of self-indulgence, others a life of\nvirtue. In this way the contemplative life is distinguished from the\nactive, and thus to know God is said to be life eternal.\n\nWherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is clear.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 18, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Life Is Properly Attributed to God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that life is not properly attributed to God.\nFor things are said to live inasmuch as they move themselves, as\npreviously stated (A. 2). But movement does not belong to God.\nNeither therefore does life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in all living things we must needs suppose some\nprinciple of life. Hence it is said by the Philosopher (De Anima ii,\n4) that \"the soul is the cause and principle of the living body.\" But\nGod has no principle. Therefore life cannot be attributed to Him.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the principle of life in the living things that\nexist among us is the vegetative soul. But this exists only in\ncorporeal things. Therefore life cannot be attributed to incorporeal\nthings.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 83:3): \"My heart and my flesh have\nrejoiced in the living God.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Life is in the highest degree properly in God. In\nproof of which it must be considered that since a thing is said to\nlive in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another,\nthe more perfectly this power is found in anything, the more perfect\nis the life of that thing. In things that move and are moved, a\nthreefold order is found. In the first place, the end moves the\nagent: and the principal agent is that which acts through its form,\nand sometimes it does so through some instrument that acts by virtue\nnot of its own form, but of the principal agent, and does no more\nthan execute the action. Accordingly there are things that move\nthemselves, not in respect of any form or end naturally inherent in\nthem, but only in respect of the executing of the movement; the form\nby which they act, and the end of the action being alike determined\nfor them by their nature. Of this kind are plants, which move\nthemselves according to their inherent nature, with regard only to\nexecuting the movements of growth and decay.\n\nOther things have self-movement in a higher degree, that is, not only\nwith regard to executing the movement, but even as regards to the\nform, the principle of movement, which form they acquire of\nthemselves. Of this kind are animals, in which the principle of\nmovement is not a naturally implanted form; but one received through\nsense. Hence the more perfect is their sense, the more perfect is\ntheir power of self-movement. Such as have only the sense of touch, as\nshellfish, move only with the motion of expansion and contraction; and\nthus their movement hardly exceeds that of plants. Whereas such as\nhave the sensitive power in perfection, so as to recognize not only\nconnection and touch, but also objects apart from themselves, can move\nthemselves to a distance by progressive movement. Yet although animals\nof the latter kind receive through sense the form that is the\nprinciple of their movement, nevertheless they cannot of themselves\npropose to themselves the end of their operation, or movement; for\nthis has been implanted in them by nature; and by natural instinct\nthey are moved to any action through the form apprehended by sense.\nHence such animals as move themselves in respect to an end they\nthemselves propose are superior to these. This can only be done by\nreason and intellect; whose province it is to know the proportion\nbetween the end and the means to that end, and duly coordinate them.\nHence a more perfect degree of life is that of intelligent beings;\nfor their power of self-movement is more perfect. This is shown by the\nfact that in one and the same man the intellectual faculty moves the\nsensitive powers; and these by their command move the organs of\nmovement. Thus in the arts we see that the art of using a ship, i.e.\nthe art of navigation, rules the art of ship-designing; and this in\nits turn rules the art that is only concerned with preparing the\nmaterial for the ship.\n\nBut although our intellect moves itself to some things, yet others are\nsupplied by nature, as are first principles, which it cannot doubt;\nand the last end, which it cannot but will. Hence, although with\nrespect to some things it moves itself, yet with regard to other\nthings it must be moved by another. Wherefore that being whose act of\nunderstanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally\npossesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most\nperfect degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life.\nFrom this the Philosopher concludes (Metaph. xii, 51), after showing\nGod to be intelligent, that God has life most perfect and eternal,\nsince His intellect is most perfect and always in act.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated in _Metaph._ ix, 16, action is twofold. Actions\nof one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst\nactions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to\nsense and to will. The difference between them is this, that the\nformer action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of\nthe thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the\nagent. Hence, because movement is an act of the thing in movement,\nthe latter action, in so far as it is the act of the operator, is\ncalled its movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act\nof the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent,\nalthough movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in\npotentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that\nis to say, of what is in act as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 28. In the\nsense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which\nunderstands itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that\nPlato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which\nmovement is an act of the imperfect.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As God is His own very existence and understanding, so\nis He His own life; and therefore He so lives that He has no\nprinciple of life.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Life in this lower world is bestowed on a corruptible\nnature, that needs generation to preserve the species, and\nnourishment to preserve the individual. For this reason life is not\nfound here below apart from a vegetative soul: but this does not hold\ngood with incorruptible natures.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 18, Art. 4]\n\nWhether All Things Are Life in God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that not all things are life in God. For it is\nsaid (Acts 17:28), \"In Him we live, and move, and be.\" But not all\nthings in God are movement. Therefore not all things are life in Him.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all things are in God as their first model. But\nthings modelled ought to conform to the model. Since, then, not all\nthings have life in themselves, it seems that not all things are life\nin God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 29), a living\nsubstance is better than a substance that does not live. If,\ntherefore, things which in themselves have not life, are life in God,\nit seems that things exist more truly in God than themselves. But this\nappears to be false; since in themselves they exist actually, but in\nGod potentially.\n\nObj. 4: Further, just as good things and things made in time are\nknown by God, so are bad things, and things that God can make, but\nthat never will be made. If, therefore, all things are life in God,\ninasmuch as known by Him, it seems that even bad things and things\nthat will never be made are life in God, as known by Him, and this\nappears inadmissible.\n\n_On the contrary,_ (John 1:3, 4), it is said, \"What was made, in Him\nwas life.\" But all things were made, except God. Therefore all things\nare life in God.\n\n_I answer that,_ In God to live is to understand, as before stated\n(A. 3). In God intellect, the thing understood, and the act of\nunderstanding, are one and the same. Hence whatever is in God as\nunderstood is the very living or life of God. Now, wherefore, since\nall things that have been made by God are in Him as things understood,\nit follows that all things in Him are the divine life itself.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Creatures are said to be in God in a twofold sense. In\none way, so far are they are held together and preserved by the\ndivine power; even as we say that things that are in our power are in\nus. And creatures are thus said to be in God, even as they exist in\ntheir own natures. In this sense we must understand the words of the\nApostle when he says, \"In Him we live, move, and be\"; since our\nbeing, living, and moving are themselves caused by God. In another\nsense things are said to be in God, as in Him who knows them, in\nwhich sense they are in God through their proper ideas, which in God\nare not distinct from the divine essence. Hence things as they are in\nGod are the divine essence. And since the divine essence is life and\nnot movement, it follows that things existing in God in this manner\nare not movement, but life.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The thing modelled must be like the model according to\nthe form, not the mode of being. For sometimes the form has being of\nanother kind in the model from that which it has in the thing\nmodelled. Thus the form of a house has in the mind of the architect\nimmaterial and intelligible being; but in the house that exists\noutside his mind, material and sensible being. Hence the ideas of\nthings, though not existing in themselves, are life in the divine\nmind, as having a divine existence in that mind.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If form only, and not matter, belonged to natural\nthings, then in all respects natural things would exist more truly in\nthe divine mind, by the ideas of them, than in themselves. For which\nreason, in fact, Plato held that the _separate_ man was the true man;\nand that man as he exists in matter, is man only by participation.\nBut since matter enters into the being of natural things, we must say\nthat those things have simply being in the divine mind more truly\nthan in themselves, because in that mind they have an uncreated\nbeing, but in themselves a created being: whereas this particular\nbeing, a man, or horse, for example, has this being more truly in its\nown nature than in the divine mind, because it belongs to human\nnature to be material, which, as existing in the divine mind, it is\nnot. Even so a house has nobler being in the architect's mind than in\nmatter; yet a material house is called a house more truly than the\none which exists in the mind; since the former is actual, the latter\nonly potential.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Although bad things are in God's knowledge, as being\ncomprised under that knowledge, yet they are not in God as created by\nHim, or preserved by Him, or as having their type in Him. They are\nknown by God through the types of good things. Hence it cannot be\nsaid that bad things are life in God. Those things that are not in\ntime may be called life in God in so far as life means understanding\nonly, and inasmuch as they are understood by God; but not in so far\nas life implies a principle of operation.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 19\n\nTHE WILL OF GOD\n(In Twelve Articles)\n\nAfter considering the things belonging to the divine knowledge, we\nconsider what belongs to the divine will. The first consideration is\nabout the divine will itself; the second about what belongs strictly\nto His will; the third about what belongs to the intellect in\nrelation to His will. About His will itself there are twelve points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there is will in God?\n\n(2) Whether God wills things apart from Himself?\n\n(3) Whether whatever God wills, He wills necessarily?\n\n(4) Whether the will of God is the cause of things?\n\n(5) Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?\n\n(6) Whether the divine will is always fulfilled?\n\n(7) Whether the will of God is mutable?\n\n(8) Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?\n\n(9) Whether there is in God the will of evil?\n\n(10) Whether God has free will?\n\n(11) Whether the will of expression is distinguished in God?\n\n(12) Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the\ndivine will?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Is Will in God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that there is not will in God. For the object of\nwill is the end and the good. But we cannot assign to God any end.\nTherefore there is not will in God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, will is a kind of appetite. But appetite, as it\nis directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which\ncannot be imputed to God. Therefore there is not will in God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 54),\nthe will moves, and is moved. But God is the first cause of movement,\nand Himself is unmoved, as proved in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there\nis not will in God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 12:2): \"That you may prove\nwhat is the will of God.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ There is will in God, as there is intellect: since\nwill follows upon intellect. For as natural things have actual\nexistence by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by\nits intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its\nnatural form, that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when\nit has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural\nperfection, which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things\nwithout knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also\nintellectual natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its\nintelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not\npossessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will.\nHence in every intellectual being there is will, just as in every\nsensible being there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in\nGod, since there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own\nexistence, so is His will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although nothing apart from God is His end, yet He\nHimself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this\nby His essence, for by His essence He is good, as shown above (Q. 6,\nA. 3): for the end has the aspect of good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Will in us belongs to the appetitive part, which,\nalthough named from appetite, has not for its only act the seeking\nwhat it does not possess; but also the loving and the delighting in\nwhat it does possess. In this respect will is said to be in God, as\nhaving always good which is its object, since, as already said, it is\nnot distinct from His essence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A will of which the principal object is a good outside\nitself, must be moved by another; but the object of the divine will\nis His goodness, which is His essence. Hence, since the will of God\nis His essence, it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself\nalone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be\nmovement. This is what Plato meant when he said that the first mover\nmoves itself.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 2]\n\nWhether God Wills Things Apart from Himself?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God does not will things apart from\nHimself. For the divine will is the divine existence. But God is not\nother than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than\nHimself.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the\nappetite, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 54. If, therefore, God wills\nanything apart from Himself, His will must be moved by another; which\nis impossible.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks\nnothing beyond it. But His own goodness suffices God, and completely\nsatisfies His will. Therefore God does not will anything apart from\nHimself.\n\nObj. 4: Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the\nnumber of their objects. If, therefore, God wills Himself and things\napart from Himself, it follows that the act of His will is manifold,\nand consequently His existence, which is His will. But this is\nimpossible. Therefore God does not will things apart from Himself.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Thess. 4:3): \"This is the will of\nGod, your sanctification.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ God wills not only Himself, but other things apart\nfrom Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above\n(A. 1). For natural things have a natural inclination not only\ntowards their own proper good, to acquire it if not possessed, and,\nif possessed, to rest therein; but also to spread abroad their own\ngood amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every\nagent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It\npertains, therefore, to the nature of the will to communicate as far\nas possible to others the good possessed; and especially does this\npertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in\nsome kind of likeness. Hence, if natural things, in so far as they\nare perfect, communicate their good to others, much more does it\nappertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own good\nto others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to\nbe, and other things to be; but Himself as the end, and other things\nas ordained to that end; inasmuch as it befits the divine goodness\nthat other things should be partakers therein.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The divine will is God's own existence essentially,\nyet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of\nunderstanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has\nalready been said (Q. 13, A. 4). For when we say that God exists, no\nrelation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say\nthat God wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from\nHimself, yet He does will things apart from Himself.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole\nreason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the\nwill, as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of\nthe end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills\nnothing else than health; and this alone moves his will. It is\ndifferent with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone\nmay will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its own\nsake. Hence, although God wills things apart from Himself only for\nthe sake of the end, which is His own goodness, it does not follow\nthat anything else moves His will, except His goodness. So, as He\nunderstands things apart from Himself by understanding His own\nessence, so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own\ngoodness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: From the fact that His own goodness suffices the divine\nwill, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, but\nrather that it wills nothing except by reason of its goodness. Thus,\ntoo, the divine intellect, though its perfection consists in its very\nknowledge of the divine essence, yet in that essence knows other\nthings.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As the divine intellect is one, as seeing the many only\nin the one, in the same way the divine will is one and simple, as\nwilling the many only through the one, that is, through its own\ngoodness.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Whatever God Wills He Wills Necessarily?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that whatever God wills He wills necessarily.\nFor everything eternal is necessary. But whatever God wills, He wills\nfrom eternity, for otherwise His will would be mutable. Therefore\nwhatever He wills, He wills necessarily.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He\nwills His own goodness. Now God wills His own goodness necessarily.\nTherefore He wills things apart from Himself necessarily.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever belongs to the nature of God is necessary,\nfor God is of Himself necessary being, and the principle of all\nnecessity, as above shown (Q. 2, A. 3). But it belongs to His nature\nto will whatever He wills; since in God there can be nothing over and\nabove His nature as stated in _Metaph._ v, 6. Therefore whatever He\nwills, He wills necessarily.\n\nObj. 4: Further, being that is not necessary, and being that is\npossible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore, God\ndoes not necessarily will a thing that He wills, it is possible for\nHim not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He\ndoes not will. And so the divine will is contingent upon one or the\nother of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is\nimperfect and mutable.\n\nObj. 5: Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or\nthe other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to\none or the other by some other power, as the Commentator [*Averroes]\nsays in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of God is indifferent with\nregard to anything, it follows that His determination to act comes\nfrom another; and thus He has some cause prior to Himself.\n\nObj. 6: Further, whatever God knows, He knows necessarily. But as the\ndivine knowledge is His essence, so is the divine will. Therefore\nwhatever God wills, He wills necessarily.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 1:11): \"Who worketh all things\naccording to the counsel of His will.\" Now, what we work according to\nthe counsel of the will, we do not will necessarily. Therefore God\ndoes not will necessarily whatever He wills.\n\n_I answer that,_ There are two ways in which a thing is said to be\nnecessary, namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to\nbe absolutely necessary from the relation of the terms, as when the\npredicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is\nabsolutely necessary that man is an animal. It is the same when the\nsubject forms part of the notion of the predicate; thus it is\nabsolutely necessary that a number must be odd or even. In this way it\nis not necessary that Socrates sits: wherefore it is not necessary\nabsolutely, though it may be so by supposition; for, granted that he\nis sitting, he must necessarily sit, as long as he is sitting.\nAccordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills\nsomething of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He\nwills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine\ngoodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own\ngoodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily,\nand as any other faculty has necessary relation to its proper and\nprincipal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to\nit by its own nature. But God wills things apart from Himself in so\nfar as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in\nwilling an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it,\nunless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them; as,\nwe will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship in order to\ncross the sea. But we do not necessarily will things without which the\nend is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on\nfoot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to\nother means. Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can\nexist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him\nfrom them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is\nnot absolutely necessary. Yet it can be necessary by supposition, for\nsupposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as\nHis will cannot change.\n\nReply Obj. 1: From the fact that God wills from eternity whatever He\nwills, it does not follow that He wills it necessarily; except by\nsupposition.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although God necessarily wills His own goodness, He\ndoes not necessarily will things willed on account of His goodness;\nfor it can exist without other things.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is not natural to God to will any of those other\nthings that He does not will necessarily; and yet it is not unnatural\nor contrary to His nature, but voluntary.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Sometimes a necessary cause has a non-necessary\nrelation to an effect; owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not\nin the cause. Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation\nto some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the\nsolar power, but in the effect that proceeds not necessarily from the\ncause. In the same way, that God does not necessarily will some of\nthe things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine\nwill, but from a defect belonging to the nature of the thing willed,\nnamely, that the perfect goodness of God can be without it; and such\ndefect accompanies all created good.\n\nReply Obj. 5: A naturally contingent cause must be determined to act\nby some external power. The divine will, which by its nature is\nnecessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no\nnecessary relation.\n\nReply Obj. 6: As the divine essence is necessary of itself, so is the\ndivine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a\nnecessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the\nthing willed. The reason for this is that knowledge is of things as\nthey exist in the knower; but the will is directed to things as they\nexist in themselves. Since then all other things have necessary\nexistence inasmuch as they exist in God; but no absolute necessity so\nas to be necessary in themselves, in so far as they exist in\nthemselves; it follows that God knows necessarily whatever He wills,\nbut does not will necessarily whatever He wills.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Will of God Is the Cause of Things?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things.\nFor Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): \"As our sun, not by reason nor\nby pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can\nparticipate in its light, so the divine good by its very essence pours\nthe rays of goodness upon everything that exists.\" But every voluntary\nagent acts by reason and pre-election. Therefore God does not act by\nwill; and so His will is not the cause of things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, The first in any order is that which is essentially\nso, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which is\nfire by its essence. But God is the first agent. Therefore He acts by\nHis essence; and that is His nature. He acts then by nature, and not\nby will. Therefore the divine will is not the cause of things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Whatever is the cause of anything, through being\n_such_ a thing, is the cause by nature, and not by will. For fire is\nthe cause of heat, as being itself hot; whereas an architect is the\ncause of a house, because he wills to build it. Now Augustine says (De\nDoctr. Christ. i, 32), \"Because God is good, we exist.\" Therefore God\nis the cause of things by His nature, and not by His will.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Of one thing there is one cause. But the [cause of]\ncreated things is the knowledge of God, as said before (Q. 14, A. 8).\nTherefore the will of God cannot be considered the cause of things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Wis. 11:26), \"How could anything endure,\nif Thou wouldst not?\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We must hold that the will of God is the cause of\nthings; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed,\nby a necessity of His nature.\n\nThis can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of\nactive causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as\nproved in _Phys._ ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the\nnecessary means predetermined for it by some higher intellect; as the\nend and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the\narcher. Hence the intellectual and voluntary agent must precede the\nagent that acts by nature. Hence, since God is first in the order of\nagents, He must act by intellect and will.\n\nThis is shown, secondly, from the character of a natural agent, of\nwhich the property is to produce one and the same effect; for nature\noperates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is\nbecause the nature of the act is according to the nature of the agent;\nand hence as long as it has that nature, its acts will be in\naccordance with that nature; for every natural agent has a determinate\nbeing. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in\nHimself the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a\nnecessity of His nature, unless He were to cause something\nundetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has\nbeen already shown (Q. 7, A. 2). He does not, therefore, act by a\nnecessity of His nature, but determined effects proceed from His own\ninfinite perfection according to the determination of His will and\nintellect.\n\nThirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their cause. For\neffects proceed from the agent that causes them, in so far as they\npre-exist in the agent; since every agent produces its like. Now\neffects pre-exist in their cause after the mode of the cause.\nWherefore since the Divine Being is His own intellect, effects\npre-exist in Him after the mode of intellect, and therefore proceed\nfrom Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him\nafter the mode of will, for His inclination to put in act what His\nintellect has conceived appertains to the will. Therefore the will of\nGod is the cause of things.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Dionysius in these words does not intend to exclude\nelection from God absolutely; but only in a certain sense, in so far,\nthat is, as He communicates His goodness not merely to certain\nthings, but to all; and as election implies a certain distinction.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Because the essence of God is His intellect and will,\nfrom the fact of His acting by His essence, it follows that He acts\nafter the mode of intellect and will.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Good is the object of the will. The words, therefore,\n\"Because God is good, we exist,\" are true inasmuch as His goodness is\nthe reason of His willing all other things, as said before (A. 2, ad\n2).\n\nReply Obj. 4: Even in us the cause of one and the same effect is\nknowledge as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived,\nand will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the intellect\nonly is not determined to exist or not to exist in the effect, except\nby the will. Hence, the speculative intellect has nothing to say to\noperation. But the power is cause, as executing the effect, since it\ndenotes the immediate principle of operation. But in God all these\nthings are one.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Any Cause Can Be Assigned to the Divine Will?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that some cause can be assigned to the divine\nwill. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): \"Who would venture to say\nthat God made all things irrationally?\" But to a voluntary agent, what\nis the reason of operating, is the cause of willing. Therefore the\nwill of God has some cause.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and\nwhose will is influenced by no cause, there can be no cause assigned\nexcept by the will of him who wills. But the will of God is the cause\nof all things, as has been already shown (A. 4). If, then, there is\nno cause of His will, we cannot seek in any natural things any cause,\nexcept the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain,\nsince science seeks to assign causes to effects. This seems\ninadmissible, and therefore we must assign some cause to the divine\nwill.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no cause,\ndepends simply on his will. If, therefore, the will of God has no\ncause, it follows that all things made depend simply on His will, and\nhave no other cause. But this also is not admissible.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): \"Every efficient\ncause is greater than the thing effected.\" But nothing is greater than\nthe will of God. We must not then seek for a cause of it.\n\n_I answer that,_ In no wise has the will of God a cause. In proof of\nwhich we must consider that, since the will follows from the\nintellect, there is cause of the will in the person who wills, in the\nsame way as there is a cause of the understanding, in the person that\nunderstands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the\npremiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other,\nthe understanding the premiss is the cause that the conclusion is\nknown. If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss\nitself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in\nthis case the knowing of the conclusion would not be caused by\nunderstanding the premisses, since a thing cannot be its own cause;\nand yet, it would be true that the thinker would understand the\npremisses to be the cause of the conclusion. It is the same with the\nwill, with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the\nmeans to the end, as do the premisses to the conclusion with regard to\nthe understanding.\n\nHence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means\nto that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the\nmeans. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both end and\nmeans; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say\nthat he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by\none act understands all things in His essence, so by one act He wills\nall things in His goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the cause\nis not the cause of His understanding the effect, for He understands\nthe effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause\nof His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to\nthe end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not\nwill this on account of that.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The will of God is reasonable, not because anything is\nto God a cause of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to be\non account of another.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since God wills effects to proceed from definite\ncauses, for the preservation of order in the universe, it is not\nunreasonable to seek for causes secondary to the divine will. It\nwould, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as\nprimary, and not as dependent on the will of God. In this sense\nAugustine says (De Trin. iii, 2): \"Philosophers in their vanity have\nthought fit to attribute contingent effects to other causes, being\nutterly unable to perceive the cause that is shown above all others,\nthe will of God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since God wills effects to come from causes, all\neffects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the\nwill of God, but on something else besides: but the first effect\ndepends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that\nGod willed man to have hands to serve his intellect by their work,\nand intellect, that he might be man; and willed him to be man that he\nmight enjoy Him, or for the completion of the universe. But this\ncannot be reduced to other created secondary ends. Hence such things\ndepend on the simple will of God; but the others on the order of\nother causes.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Will of God Is Always Fulfilled?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled.\nFor the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:4): \"God will have all men to be saved,\nand to come to the knowledge of the truth.\" But this does not happen.\nTherefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as is the relation of knowledge to truth, so is that\nof the will to good. Now God knows all truth. Therefore He wills all\ngood. But not all good actually exists; for much more good might\nexist. Therefore the will of God is not always fulfilled.\n\nObj. 3: Further, since the will of God is the first cause, it does\nnot exclude intermediate causes. But the effect of a first cause may\nbe hindered by a defect of a secondary cause; as the effect of the\nmotive power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore\nthe effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the\nsecondary causes. The will of God, therefore, is not always fulfilled.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 113:11): \"God hath done all things,\nwhatsoever He would.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The will of God must needs always be fulfilled. In\nproof of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to\nthe agent according to its form, the rule is the same with active\ncauses as with formal causes. The rule in forms is this: that although\na thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of\nthe universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a\nman or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence the\nsame must happen in active causes. Something may fall outside the\norder of any particular active cause, but not outside the order of the\nuniversal cause; under which all particular causes are included: and\nif any particular cause fails of its effect, this is because of the\nhindrance of some other particular cause, which is included in the\norder of the universal cause. Therefore an effect cannot possibly\nescape the order of the universal cause. Even in corporeal things this\nis clearly seen. For it may happen that a star is hindered from\nproducing its effects; yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal\nthings, from this hindrance of a corporeal cause, must be referred\nthrough intermediate causes to the universal influence of the first\nheaven. Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all\nthings, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its\neffect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one\norder, returns into it in another order; as does the sinner, who by\nsin falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls\nback into the order of that will, when by its justice he is punished.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The words of the Apostle, \"God will have all men to be\nsaved,\" etc. can be understood in three ways. First, by a restricted\napplication, in which case they would mean, as Augustine says (De\npraed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), \"God wills all men to be saved\nthat are saved, not because there is no man whom He does not wish\nsaved, but because there is no man saved whose salvation He does not\nwill.\" Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of\nindividuals, not to every individual of each class; in which case\nthey mean that God wills some men of every class and condition to be\nsaved, males and females, Jews and Gentiles, great and small, but not\nall of every condition. Thirdly, according to Damascene (De Fide\nOrth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will of God; not\nof the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as\napplying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing\nantecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed.\n\nTo understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it\nis good, is willed by God. A thing taken in its primary sense, and\nabsolutely considered, may be good or evil, and yet when some\nadditional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent\nconsideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a man should\nlive is good; and that a man should be killed is evil, absolutely\nconsidered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a\nmurderer or dangerous to society, to kill him is a good; that he live\nis an evil. Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he\nwills all men to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be\nhanged. In the same way God antecedently wills all men to be saved,\nbut consequently wills some to be damned, as His justice exacts. Nor\ndo we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it in\na qualified manner; for the will is directed to things as they are in\nthemselves, and in themselves they exist under particular\nqualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it\nwhen all particular circumstances are considered; and this is what is\nmeant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge\nwills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he\nwould will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a\nqualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute\nwill. Thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills takes place;\nalthough what He wills antecedently may not take place.\n\nReply Obj. 2: An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the\nthing known is in the knower; while an act of the appetite faculty is\ndirected to things as they exist in themselves. But all that can have\nthe nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does\nnot all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but\ndoes not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom\nall good virtually exists.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A first cause can be hindered in its effect by\ndeficiency in the secondary cause, when it is not the universal first\ncause, including within itself all causes; for then the effect could\nin no way escape its order. And thus it is with the will of God, as\nsaid above.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Will of God Is Changeable?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the will of God is changeable. For the Lord\nsays (Gen. 6:7): \"It repenteth Me that I have made man.\" But whoever\nrepents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore God has\na changeable will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is said in the person of the Lord: \"I will speak\nagainst a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull\ndown, and to destroy it; but if that nation shall repent of its evil,\nI also will repent of the evil that I have thought to do to them\"\n(Jer. 18:7, 8). Therefore God has a changeable will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever God does, He does voluntarily. But God does\nnot always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the law to\nbe observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a\nchangeable will.\n\nObj. 4: Further, God does not will of necessity what He wills, as\nsaid before (A. 3). Therefore He can both will and not will the\nsame thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is\nchangeable substantially; and that which can exist in a place or not\nin that place, is changeable locally. Therefore God is changeable as\nregards His will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said: \"God is not as a man, that He should lie,\nnor as the son of man, that He should be changed\" (Num. 23:19).\n\n_I answer that,_ The will of God is entirely unchangeable. On this\npoint we must consider that to change the will is one thing; to will\nthat certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to\nwill a thing to be done now, and its contrary afterwards; and yet for\nthe will to remain permanently the same: whereas the will would be\nchanged, if one should begin to will what before he had not willed;\nor cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen,\nunless we presuppose change either in the knowledge or in the\ndisposition of the substance of the willer. For since the will\nregards good, a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way\nwhen that thing begins to be good for him, and this does not take\nplace without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it\nbecomes good to sit by the fire; though it was not so before. In\nanother way when he knows for the first time that a thing is good for\nhim, though he did not know it before; hence we take counsel in order\nto know what is good for us. Now it has already been shown that both\nthe substance of God and His knowledge are entirely unchangeable (QQ.\n9, A. 1; 14, A. 15). Therefore His will must be entirely unchangeable.\n\nReply Obj. 1: These words of the Lord are to be understood\nmetaphorically, and according to the likeness of our nature. For when\nwe repent, we destroy what we have made; although we may even do so\nwithout change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the\nsame time intending to destroy it later. Therefore God is said to\nhave repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so\nfar as by the deluge He destroyed from the face of the earth man whom\nHe had made.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The will of God, as it is the first and universal\ncause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to\nproduce certain effects. Since however all intermediate causes are\ninferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the\ndivine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order\nof inferior causes. Thus in the case of the raising of Lazarus, one\nwho looked only on inferior causes might have said: \"Lazarus will not\nrise again,\" but looking at the divine first cause might have said:\n\"Lazarus will rise again.\" And God wills both: that is, that in the\norder of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but that in the\norder of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will\nconversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a\nthing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior\ncauses, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not\nbeing in the designs of the divine and higher cause. Thus He foretold\nto Ezechias: \"Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not\nlive\" (Isa. 38:1). Yet this did not take place, since from eternity it\nwas otherwise disposed in the divine knowledge and will, which is\nunchangeable. Hence Gregory says (Moral. xvi, 5): \"The sentence of\nGod changes, but not His counsel\"--that is to say, the counsel of His\nwill. When therefore He says, \"I also will repent,\" His words must be\nunderstood metaphorically. For men seem to repent, when they do not\nfulfill what they have threatened.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It does not follow from this argument that God has a\nwill that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should\nchange.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Although God's willing a thing is not by absolute\nnecessity, yet it is necessary by supposition, on account of the\nunchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above (A. 3).\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Will of God Imposes Necessity on the Things Willed?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the will of God imposes necessity on the\nthings willed. For Augustine says (Enchiridion 103): \"No one is saved,\nexcept whom God has willed to be saved. He must therefore be asked to\nwill it; for if He wills it, it must necessarily be.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, every cause that cannot be hindered, produces its\neffect necessarily, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 84)\n\"Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder\nit.\" But the will of God cannot be hindered. For the Apostle says\n(Rom. 9:19): \"Who resisteth His will?\" Therefore the will of God\nimposes necessity on the things willed.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever is necessary by its antecedent cause is\nnecessary absolutely; it is thus necessary that animals should die,\nbeing compounded of contrary elements. Now things created by God are\nrelated to the divine will as to an antecedent cause, whereby they\nhave necessity. For the conditional statement is true that if God\nwills a thing, it comes to pass; and every true conditional statement\nis necessary. It follows therefore that all that God wills is\nnecessary absolutely.\n\n_On the contrary,_ All good things that exist God wills to be. If\ntherefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that\nall good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will,\ncounsel, and all other such things.\n\n_I answer that,_ The divine will imposes necessity on some things\nwilled but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign\nto intermediate causes, holding that what God produces by necessary\ncauses is necessary; and what He produces by contingent causes\ncontingent.\n\nThis does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons.\nFirst, because the effect of a first cause is contingent on account of\nthe secondary cause, from the fact that the effect of the first cause\nis hindered by deficiency in the second cause, as the sun's power is\nhindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary cause\ncan hinder God's will from producing its effect. Secondly, because if\nthe distinction between the contingent and the necessary is to be\nreferred only to secondary causes, this must be independent of the\ndivine intention and will; which is inadmissible. It is better\ntherefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the\ndivine will. For when a cause is efficacious to act, the effect\nfollows upon the cause, not only as to the thing done, but also as to\nits manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power\nin the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in\naccidental points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the\ndivine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things\nare done, which God wills to be done, but also that they are done in\nthe way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done\nnecessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for\nthe building up of the universe. Therefore to some effects He has\nattached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible\nand contingent causes, from which arise contingent effects. Hence it\nis not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects\nwilled by God happen contingently, but because God prepared contingent\ncauses for them, it being His will that they should happen\ncontingently.\n\nReply Obj. 1: By the words of Augustine we must understand a\nnecessity in things willed by God that is not absolute, but\nconditional. For the conditional statement that if God wills a\nthing it must necessarily be, is necessarily true.\n\nReply Obj. 2: From the very fact that nothing resists the divine\nwill, it follows that not only those things happen that God wills\nto happen, but that they happen necessarily or contingently\naccording to His will.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Consequents have necessity from their antecedents\naccording to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by\nthe divine will have that kind of necessity that God wills them to\nhave, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore,\nare absolute necessities.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 8]\n\nWhether God Wills Evils?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God wills evils. For every good that\nexists, God wills. But it is a good that evil should exist. For\nAugustine says (Enchiridion 95): \"Although evil in so far as it is\nevil is not a good, yet it is good that not only good things should\nexist, but also evil things.\" Therefore God wills evil things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): \"Evil would\nconduce to the perfection of everything,\" i.e. the universe. And\nAugustine says (Enchiridion 10, 11): \"Out of all things is built up\nthe admirable beauty of the universe, wherein even that which is\ncalled evil, properly ordered and disposed, commends the good more\nevidently in that good is more pleasing and praiseworthy when\ncontrasted with evil.\" But God wills all that appertains to the\nperfection and beauty of the universe, for this is what God desires\nabove all things in His creatures. Therefore God wills evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that evil should exist, and should not exist, are\ncontradictory opposites. But God does not will that evil should not\nexist; otherwise, since various evils do exist, God's will would not\nalways be fulfilled. Therefore God wills that evil should exist.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Qq. 83,3): \"No wise man is the\ncause of another man becoming worse. Now God surpasses all men in\nwisdom. Much less therefore is God the cause of man becoming worse;\nand when He is said to be the cause of a thing, He is said to will\nit.\" Therefore it is not by God's will that man becomes worse. Now it\nis clear that every evil makes a thing worse. Therefore God wills not\nevil things.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since the ratio of good is the ratio of\nappetibility, as said before (Q. 5, A. 1), and since evil is opposed\nto good, it is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought\nfor by the appetite, either natural, or animal, or by the\nintellectual appetite which is the will. Nevertheless evil may be\nsought accidentally, so far as it accompanies a good, as appears in\neach of the appetites. For a natural agent intends not privation or\ncorruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some\nother form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the\ncorruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is\nfood, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means.\nSimilarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the\ndeformity of sin is only an accompaniment. Now the evil that\naccompanies one good, is the privation of another good. Never\ntherefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless\nthe good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of\nwhich the evil is the privation. Now God wills no good more than He\nwills His own goodness; yet He wills one good more than another.\nHence He in no way wills the evil of sin, which is the privation of\nright order towards the divine good. The evil of natural defect, or\nof punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils\nare attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in\nwilling the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things\nto be naturally corrupted.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some have said that although God does not will evil,\nyet He wills that evil should be or be done, because, although evil\nis not a good, yet it is good that evil should be or be done. This\nthey said because things evil in themselves are ordered to some good\nend; and this order they thought was expressed in the words \"that\nevil should be or be done.\" This, however, is not correct; since evil\nis not of itself ordered to good, but accidentally. For it is beside\nthe intention of the sinner, that any good should follow from his\nsin; as it was beside the intention of tyrants that the patience of\nthe martyrs should shine forth from all their persecutions. It cannot\ntherefore be said that such an ordering to good is implied in the\nstatement that it is a good thing that evil should be or be done,\nsince nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it\naccidentally, but by that which belongs to it essentially.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Evil does not operate towards the perfection and beauty\nof the universe, except accidentally, as said above (ad 1). Therefore\nDionysius in saying that \"evil would conduce to the perfection of the\nuniverse,\" draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists\nnot, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone\nwills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so\nopposed; since either is affirmative. God therefore neither wills\nevil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit\nevil to be done; and this is a good.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 10]\n\nWhether God Has Free-Will?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God has not free-will. For Jerome says, in\na homily on the prodigal son [*Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; \"God alone is He\nwho is not liable to sin, nor can be liable: all others, as having\nfree-will, can be inclined to either side.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, free-will is the faculty of the reason and will, by\nwhich good and evil are chosen. But God does not will evil, as has\nbeen said (A. 9). Therefore there is not free-will in God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii, 3): \"The Holy Spirit\ndivideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free\nchoice of the will, not in obedience to necessity.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We have free-will with respect to what we will not of\nnecessity, nor by natural instinct. For our will to be happy does not\nappertain to free-will, but to natural instinct. Hence other animals,\nthat are moved to act by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by\nfree-will. Since then God necessarily wills His own goodness, but\nother things not necessarily, as shown above (A. 3), He has free\nwill with respect to what He does not necessarily will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Jerome seems to deny free-will to God not simply, but\nonly as regards the inclination to sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since the evil of sin consists in turning away from the\ndivine goodness, by which God wills all things, as above shown, it is\nmanifestly impossible for Him to will the evil of sin; yet He can\nmake choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing\nto be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without sin, can\nwill to sit down, and not will to sit down.\n_______________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 11]\n\nWhether the Will of Expression Is to Be Distinguished in God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the will of expression is not to be\ndistinguished in God. For as the will of God is the cause of things,\nso is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine\nwisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine\nwill.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the\nmind of him who expresses himself, is false. If therefore the\nexpressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with\nthat will, they are false. But if they do agree, they are\nsuperfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine\nwill.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The will of God is one, since it is the very\nessence of God. Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the\nwords of Ps. 110:2: \"Great are the works of the Lord, sought out\naccording to all His wills.\" Therefore sometimes the sign must be\ntaken for the will.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some things are said of God in their strict sense;\nothers by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before\n(Q. 13, A. 3). When certain human passions are predicated of the\nGodhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the\neffect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is\nsignified metaphorically in God under the name of that passion. Thus\nwith us it is usual for an angry man to punish, so that punishment\nbecomes an expression of anger. Therefore punishment itself is\nsignified by the word anger, when anger is attributed to God. In the\nsame way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes\nmetaphorically called will in God; just as when anyone lays down a\nprecept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a\ndivine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the will of God, as in\nthe words: \"Thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven\" (Matt.\n6:10). There is, however, this difference between will and anger, that\nanger is never attributed to God properly, since in its primary\nmeaning it includes passion; whereas will is attributed to Him\nproperly. Therefore in God there are distinguished will in its proper\nsense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper\nsense is called the will of good pleasure; and will metaphorically\ntaken is the will of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of will\nis called will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Knowledge is not the cause of a thing being done,\nunless through the will. For we do not put into act what we know,\nunless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to\nknowledge, but to will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as\nbeing signs that God wills anything; but because what in us is the\nusual expression of our will, is called the divine will in God. Thus\npunishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called\nanger in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in\nourselves.\n_______________________\n\nTWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 19, Art. 12]\n\nWhether Five Expressions of Will Are Rightly Assigned to the Divine\nWill?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that five expressions of will--namely,\nprohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission--are not\nrightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that God\nbids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in\nus, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes\npermits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God works nothing unless He wills it, as the\nScripture says (Wis. 11:26). But the will of expression is distinct\nfrom the will of good pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be\ncomprehended in the will of expression.\n\nObj. 3: Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures\nin common, since God works in them all, and permits some action in\nthem all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational\ncreatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one\ndivision, not being of one order.\n\nObj. 4: Further, evil happens in more ways than good, since \"good\nhappens in one way, but evil in all kinds of ways,\" as declared by\nthe Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6), and Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 22). It\nis not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of\nevil--namely, prohibition--and two--namely, counsel and precept--in\nthe case of good.\n\n_I answer that,_ By these signs we name the expression of will by\nwhich we are accustomed to show that we will something. A man may\nshow that he wills something, either by himself or by means of\nanother. He may show it by himself, by doing something either\ndirectly, or indirectly and accidentally. He shows it directly when\nhe works in his own person; in that way the expression of his will is\nhis own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering the doing\nof a thing; for what removes an impediment is called an accidental\nmover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He\ndeclares his will by means of another when he orders another to\nperform a work, either by insisting upon it as necessary by precept,\nand by prohibiting its contrary; or by persuasion, which is a part of\ncounsel. Since in these ways the will of man makes itself known, the\nsame five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will,\nas the expression of that will. That precept, counsel, and\nprohibition are called the will of God is clear from the words of\nMatt. 6:10: \"Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven.\" That\npermission and operation are called the will of God is clear from\nAugustine (Enchiridion 95), who says: \"Nothing is done, unless the\nAlmighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually\ndoing it.\"\n\nOr it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time,\npermission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good.\nWhilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to evil, precept\nto good that is necessary and counsel to good that is of\nsupererogation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will\nabout the same matter in different ways; thus we find many words that\nmean the same thing. Hence there is no reason why the same thing\nshould not be the subject of precept, operation, and counsel; or of\nprohibition or permission.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As God may by metaphor be said to will what by His\nwill, properly speaking, He wills not; so He may by metaphor be said\nto will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing\nto prevent the same thing being the object of the will of good\npleasure, and of the will of expression. But operation is always the\nsame as the will of good pleasure; while precept and counsel are not;\nboth because the former regards the present, and the two latter the\nfuture; and because the former is of itself the effect of the will;\nthe latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and\nfor this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are\nassigned to their acts, inasmuch as God ordains rational creatures to\nact voluntarily and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved\nby the divine operation; therefore only operation and permission are\nconcerned with these.\n\nReply Obj. 4: All evil of sin, though happening in many ways, agrees\nin being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to\nevil, only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the\nother hand, good stands in various relations to the divine goodness,\nsince there are good deeds without which we cannot attain to the\nfruition of that goodness, and these are the subject of precept; and\nthere are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and these\nare the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not\nonly concerned with the obtaining of greater good; but also with the\navoiding of lesser evils.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 20\n\nGOD'S LOVE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of\nGod. In the appetitive part of the soul there are found in ourselves\nboth the passions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the\nhabits of the moral virtues, as justice, fortitude and the like.\nHence we shall first consider the love of God, and secondly His\njustice and mercy. About the first there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether love exists in God?\n\n(2) Whether He loves all things?\n\n(3) Whether He loves one thing more than another?\n\n(4) Whether He loves more the better things?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Love Exists in God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that love does not exist in God. For in God\nthere are no passions. Now love is a passion. Therefore love is not\nin God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, love, anger, sorrow and the like, are mutually\ndivided against one another. But sorrow and anger are not attributed\nto God, unless by metaphor. Therefore neither is love attributed to\nHim.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): \"Love is a uniting\nand binding force.\" But this cannot take place in God, since He is\nsimple. Therefore love does not exist in God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written: \"God is love\" (John 4:16).\n\n_I answer that,_ We must needs assert that in God there is love:\nbecause love is the first movement of the will and of every\nappetitive faculty. For since the acts of the will and of every\nappetitive faculty tend towards good and evil, as to their proper\nobjects: and since good is essentially and especially the object of\nthe will and the appetite, whereas evil is only the object\nsecondarily and indirectly, as opposed to good; it follows that the\nacts of the will and appetite that regard good must naturally be\nprior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to\nsorrow, love to hate: because what exists of itself is always prior\nto that which exists through another. Again, the more universal is\nnaturally prior to what is less so. Hence the intellect is first\ndirected to universal truth; and in the second place to particular\nand special truths. Now there are certain acts of the will and\nappetite that regard good under some special condition, as joy and\ndelight regard good present and possessed; whereas desire and hope\nregard good not as yet possessed. Love, however, regards good\nuniversally, whether possessed or not. Hence love is naturally the\nfirst act of the will and appetite; for which reason all the other\nappetite movements presuppose love, as their root and origin. For\nnobody desires anything nor rejoices in anything, except as a good\nthat is loved: nor is anything an object of hate except as opposed to\nthe object of love. Similarly, it is clear that sorrow, and other\nthings like to it, must be referred to love as to their first\nprinciple. Hence, in whomsoever there is will and appetite, there\nmust also be love: since if the first is wanting, all that follows is\nalso wanting. Now it has been shown that will is in God (Q. 19, A.\n1), and hence we must attribute love to Him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The cognitive faculty does not move except through the\nmedium of the appetitive: and just as in ourselves the universal\nreason moves through the medium of the particular reason, as stated\nin _De Anima_ iii, 58, 75, so in ourselves the intellectual appetite,\nor the will as it is called, moves through the medium of the\nsensitive appetite. Hence, in us the sensitive appetite is the\nproximate motive-force of our bodies. Some bodily change therefore\nalways accompanies an act of the sensitive appetite, and this change\naffects especially the heart, which, as the Philosopher says (De\npart. animal. iii, 4), is the first principle of movement in animals.\nTherefore acts of the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as they have\nannexed to them some bodily change, are called passions; whereas acts\nof the will are not so called. Love, therefore, and joy and delight\nare passions; in so far as they denote acts of the intellective\nappetite, they are not passions. It is in this latter sense that they\nare in God. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii): \"God rejoices by\nan operation that is one and simple,\" and for the same reason He\nloves without passion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In the passions of the sensitive appetite there may be\ndistinguished a certain material element--namely, the bodily\nchange--and a certain formal element, which is on the part of the\nappetite. Thus in anger, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 15,\n63, 64), the material element is the kindling of the blood about the\nheart; but the formal, the appetite for revenge. Again, as regards\nthe formal element of certain passions a certain imperfection is\nimplied, as in desire, which is of the good we have not, and in\nsorrow, which is about the evil we have. This applies also to anger,\nwhich supposes sorrow. Certain other passions, however, as love and\njoy, imply no imperfection. Since therefore none of these can be\nattributed to God on their material side, as has been said (ad 1);\nneither can those that even on their formal side imply imperfection\nbe attributed to Him; except metaphorically, and from likeness of\neffects, as already show (Q. 3, A. 2, ad 2; Q. 19, A. 11). Whereas,\nthose that do not imply imperfection, such as love and joy, can be\nproperly predicated of God, though without attributing passion to\nHim, as said before (Q. 19, A. 11).\n\nReply Obj. 3: An act of love always tends towards two things; to the\ngood that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it: since\nto love a person is to wish that person good. Hence, inasmuch as we\nlove ourselves, we wish ourselves good; and, so far as possible,\nunion with that good. So love is called the unitive force, even in\nGod, yet without implying composition; for the good that He wills for\nHimself, is no other than Himself, Who is good by His essence, as\nabove shown (Q. 6, AA. 1, 3). And by the fact that anyone loves\nanother, he wills good to that other. Thus he puts the other, as it\nwere, in the place of himself; and regards the good done to him as\ndone to himself. So far love is a binding force, since it aggregates\nanother to ourselves, and refers his good to our own. And then again\nthe divine love is a binding force, inasmuch as God wills good to\nothers; yet it implies no composition in God.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 2]\n\nWhether God Loves All Things?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God does not love all things. For\naccording to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover\noutside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object\nof his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed\noutside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is\ninadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from\nGod are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love\nanything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it\nis no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other\nthan Himself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, love is twofold--the love, namely, of desire, and\nthe love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures\nwith the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself.\nNor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship\nwith irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2).\nTherefore God does not love all things.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 5:7): \"Thou hatest all the\nworkers of iniquity.\" Now nothing is at the same time hated and\nloved. Therefore God does not love all things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Wis. 11:25): \"Thou lovest all things\nthat are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ God loves all existing things. For all existing\nthings, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a\nthing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it\npossesses. Now it has been shown above (Q. 19, A. 4) that God's will\nis the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing\nhas existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by\nGod. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since\nto love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it\nis manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we\nlove. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of\nthings, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we\nwill good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but\nconversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our\nlove, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and\nreceive besides the good it has not, and to this end we direct our\nactions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass\ninto the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the\nbeloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works\nfor his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): \"On behalf of\nthe truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the\ncause of all things, by His abounding love and goodness, is placed\noutside Himself by His providence for all existing things.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although creatures have not existed from eternity,\nexcept in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God\nhas known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason\nhas loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know\nthings existing in themselves.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Friendship cannot exist except towards rational\ncreatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one\nwith another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or\nill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to\nthem is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational\ncreatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the\nintellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking,\ntherefore, God does not love irrational creatures with the love of\nfriendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He\norders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is\nnot because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His\ngoodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a\nthing for others as well as for ourselves.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved\nunder one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners\nin so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and\nhave it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not\nexistence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from\nGod. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 3]\n\nWhether God Loves All Things Equally?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God loves all things equally. For it is\nsaid: \"He hath equally care of all\" (Wis. 6:8). But God's providence\nover things comes from the love wherewith He loves them. Therefore He\nloves all things equally.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the love of God is His essence. But God's essence\ndoes not admit of degree; neither therefore does His love. He does\nnot therefore love some things more than others.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as God's love extends to created things, so do His\nknowledge and will extend. But God is not said to know some things\nmore than others; nor will one thing more than another. Neither\ntherefore does He love some things more than others.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. in Joan. cx): \"God loves all\nthings that He has made, and amongst them rational creatures more, and\nof these especially those who are members of His only-begotten Son\nHimself.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since to love a thing is to will it good, in a\ntwofold way anything may be loved more, or less. In one way on the\npart of the act of the will itself, which is more or less intense. In\nthis way God does not love some things more than others, because He\nloves all things by an act of the will that is one, simple, and\nalways the same. In another way on the part of the good itself that a\nperson wills for the beloved. In this way we are said to love that\none more than another, for whom we will a greater good, though our\nwill is not more intense. In this way we must needs say that God\nloves some things more than others. For since God's love is the cause\nof goodness in things, as has been said (A. 2), no one thing would be\nbetter than another, if God did not will greater good for one than\nfor another.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God is said to have equally care of all, not because by\nHis care He deals out equal good to all, but because He administers\nall things with a like wisdom and goodness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument is based on the intensity of love on the\npart of the act of the will, which is the divine essence. But the\ngood that God wills for His creatures, is not the divine essence.\nTherefore there is no reason why it may not vary in degree.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To understand and to will denote the act alone, and do\nnot include in their meaning objects from the diversity of which God\nmay be said to know or will more or less, as has been said with\nrespect to God's love.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 20, Art. 4]\n\nWhether God Always Loves More the Better Things?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God does not always love more the better\nthings. For it is manifest that Christ is better than the whole human\nrace, being God and man. But God loved the human race more than He\nloved Christ; for it is said: \"He spared not His own Son, but\ndelivered Him up for us all\" (Rom. 8:32). Therefore God does not\nalways love more the better things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an angel is better than a man. Hence it is said of\nman: \"Thou hast made him a little less than the angels\" (Ps. 8:6).\nBut God loved men more than He loved the angels, for it is said:\n\"Nowhere doth He take hold of the angels, but of the seed of Abraham\nHe taketh hold\" (Heb. 2:16). Therefore God does not always love more\nthe better things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Peter was better than John, since he loved Christ\nmore. Hence the Lord, knowing this to be true, asked Peter, saying:\n\"Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me more than these?\" Yet Christ\nloved John more than He loved Peter. For as Augustine says,\ncommenting on the words, \"Simon, son of John, lovest thou Me?\": \"By\nthis very mark is John distinguished from the other disciples, not\nthat He loved him only, but that He loved him more than the rest.\"\nTherefore God does not always love more the better things.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the innocent man is better than the repentant, since\nrepentance is, as Jerome says (Cap. 3 in Isa.), \"a second plank after\nshipwreck.\" But God loves the penitent more than the innocent; since\nHe rejoices over him the more. For it is said: \"I say to you that\nthere shall be joy in heaven upon the one sinner that doth penance,\nmore than upon ninety-nine just who need not penance\" (Luke 15:7).\nTherefore God does not always love more the better things.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the\npredestined sinner. Now God loves more the predestined sinner, since\nHe wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore God does not\nalways love more the better things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Everything loves what is like it, as appears from\n(Ecclus. 13:19): \"Every beast loveth its like.\" Now the better a thing\nis, the more like is it to God. Therefore the better things are more\nloved by God.\n\n_I answer that,_ It must needs be, according to what has been said\nbefore, that God loves more the better things. For it has been shown\n(AA. 2, 3), that God's loving one thing more than another is nothing\nelse than His willing for that thing a greater good: because God's\nwill is the cause of goodness in things; and the reason why some\nthings are better than others, is that God wills for them a greater\ngood. Hence it follows that He loves more the better things.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God loves Christ not only more than He loves the whole\nhuman race, but more than He loves the entire created universe:\nbecause He willed for Him the greater good in giving Him \"a name that\nis above all names,\" in so far as He was true God. Nor did anything\nof His excellence diminish when God delivered Him up to death for the\nsalvation of the human race; rather did He become thereby a glorious\nconqueror: \"The government was placed upon His shoulder,\" according\nto Isa. 9:6.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God loves the human nature assumed by the Word of God\nin the person of Christ more than He loves all the angels; for that\nnature is better, especially on the ground of the union with the\nGodhead. But speaking of human nature in general, and comparing it\nwith the angelic, the two are found equal, in the order of grace and\nof glory: since according to Rev 21:17, the measure of a man and of\nan angel is the same. Yet so that, in this respect, some angels are\nfound nobler than some men, and some men nobler than some angels. But\nas to natural condition an angel is better than a man. God therefore\ndid not assume human nature because He loved man, absolutely\nspeaking, more; but because the needs of man were greater; just as\nthe master of a house may give some costly delicacy to a sick\nservant, that he does not give to his own son in sound health.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This doubt concerning Peter and John has been solved in\nvarious ways. Augustine interprets it mystically, and says that the\nactive life, signified by Peter, loves God more than the\ncontemplative signified by John, because the former is more conscious\nof the miseries of this present life, and therefore the more ardently\ndesires to be freed from them, and depart to God. God, he says, loves\nmore the contemplative life, since He preserves it longer. For it\ndoes not end, as the active life does, with the life of the body.\n\nSome say that Peter loved Christ more in His members, and therefore\nwas loved more by Christ also, for which reason He gave him the care\nof the Church; but that John loved Christ more in Himself, and so was\nloved more by Him; on which account Christ commended His mother to his\ncare. Others say that it is uncertain which of them loved Christ more\nwith the love of charity, and uncertain also which of them God loved\nmore and ordained to a greater degree of glory in eternal life. Peter\nis said to have loved more, in regard to a certain promptness and\nfervor; but John to have been more loved, with respect to certain\nmarks of familiarity which Christ showed to him rather than to others,\non account of his youth and purity. While others say that Christ loved\nPeter more, from his more excellent gift of charity; but John more,\nfrom his gifts of intellect. Hence, absolutely speaking, Peter was the\nbetter and more beloved; but, in a certain sense, John was the better,\nand was loved the more. However, it may seem presumptuous to pass\njudgment on these matters; since \"the Lord\" and no other \"is the\nweigher of spirits\" (Prov. 16:2).\n\nReply Obj. 4: The penitent and the innocent are related as exceeding\nand exceeded. For whether innocent or penitent, those are the better\nand better loved who have most grace. Other things being equal,\ninnocence is the nobler thing and the more beloved. God is said to\nrejoice more over the penitent than over the innocent, because often\npenitents rise from sin more cautious, humble, and fervent. Hence\nGregory commenting on these words (Hom. 34 in Ev.) says that, \"In\nbattle the general loves the soldier who after flight returns and\nbravely pursues the enemy, more than him who has never fled, but has\nnever done a brave deed.\"\n\nOr it may be answered that gifts of grace, equal in themselves, are\nmore as conferred on the penitent, who deserved punishment, than as\nconferred on the innocent, to whom no punishment was due; just as a\nhundred pounds [marcoe] are a greater gift to a poor man than to a\nking.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Since God's will is the cause of goodness in things,\nthe goodness of one who is loved by God is to be reckoned according\nto the time when some good is to be given to him by divine goodness.\nAccording therefore to the time, when there is to be given by the\ndivine will to the predestined sinner a greater good, the sinner is\nbetter; although according to some other time he is the worse;\nbecause even according to some time he is neither good nor bad.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 21\n\nTHE JUSTICE AND MERCY OF GOD\n(In Four Articles)\n\nAfter considering the divine love, we must treat of God's justice and\nmercy. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there is justice in God?\n\n(2) Whether His justice can be called truth?\n\n(3) Whether there is mercy in God?\n\n(4) Whether in every work of God there are justice and mercy?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Is Justice in God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that there is not justice in God. For justice is\ndivided against temperance. But temperance does not exist in God:\nneither therefore does justice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, he who does whatsoever he wills and pleases does\nnot work according to justice. But, as the Apostle says: \"God worketh\nall things according to the counsel of His will\" (Eph. 1:11).\nTherefore justice cannot be attributed to Him.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the act of justice is to pay what is due. But\nGod is no man's debtor. Therefore justice does not belong to God.\n\nObj. 4: Further, whatever is in God, is His essence. But justice\ncannot belong to this. For Boethius says (De Hebdom.): \"Good regards\nthe essence; justice the act.\" Therefore justice does not belong to\nGod.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 10:8): \"The Lord is just, and hath\nloved justice.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ There are two kinds of justice. The one consists in\nmutual giving and receiving, as in buying and selling, and other kinds\nof intercourse and exchange. This the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 4) calls\ncommutative justice, that directs exchange and intercourse of\nbusiness. This does not belong to God, since, as the Apostle says:\n\"Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made him?\" (Rom.\n11:35). The other consists in distribution, and is called distributive\njustice; whereby a ruler or a steward gives to each what his rank\ndeserves. As then the proper order displayed in ruling a family or any\nkind of multitude evinces justice of this kind in the ruler, so the\norder of the universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in\neffects of will, shows forth the justice of God. Hence Dionysius says\n(Div. Nom. viii, 4): \"We must needs see that God is truly just, in\nseeing how He gives to all existing things what is proper to the\ncondition of each; and preserves the nature of each in the order and\nwith the powers that properly belong to it.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Certain of the moral virtues are concerned with the\npassions, as temperance with concupiscence, fortitude with fear and\ndaring, meekness with anger. Such virtues as these can only\nmetaphorically be attributed to God; since, as stated above (Q. 20,\nA. 1), in God there are no passions; nor a sensitive appetite, which\nis, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), the subject of those\nvirtues. On the other hand, certain moral virtues are concerned with\nworks of giving and expending; such as justice, liberality, and\nmagnificence; and these reside not in the sensitive faculty, but in\nthe will. Hence, there is nothing to prevent our attributing these\nvirtues to God; although not in civil matters, but in such acts as\nare not unbecoming to Him. For, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x,\n8), it would be absurd to praise God for His political virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since good as perceived by intellect is the object of\nthe will, it is impossible for God to will anything but what His\nwisdom approves. This is, as it were, His law of justice, in\naccordance with which His will is right and just. Hence, what He does\naccording to His will He does justly: as we do justly what we do\naccording to law. But whereas law comes to us from some higher power,\nGod is a law unto Himself.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To each one is due what is his own. Now that which is\ndirected to a man is said to be his own. Thus the master owns the\nservant, and not conversely, for that is free which is its own cause.\nIn the word debt, therefore, is implied a certain exigence or\nnecessity of the thing to which it is directed. Now a twofold order\nhas to be considered in things: the one, whereby one created thing is\ndirected to another, as the parts of the whole, accident to\nsubstance, and all things whatsoever to their end; the other, whereby\nall created things are ordered to God. Thus in the divine operations\ndebt may be regarded in two ways, as due either to God, or to\ncreatures, and in either way God pays what is due. It is due to God\nthat there should be fulfilled in creatures what His will and wisdom\nrequire, and what manifests His goodness. In this respect, God's\njustice regards what befits Him; inasmuch as He renders to Himself\nwhat is due to Himself. It is also due to a created thing that it\nshould possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to man to have\nhands, and that other animals should serve him. Thus also God\nexercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by\nits nature and condition. This debt however is derived from the\nformer; since what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it\naccording to the divine wisdom. And although God in this way pays\neach thing its due, yet He Himself is not the debtor, since He is not\ndirected to other things, but rather other things to Him. Justice,\ntherefore, in God is sometimes spoken of as the fitting accompaniment\nof His goodness; sometimes as the reward of merit. Anselm touches on\neither view where he says (Prosolog. 10): \"When Thou dost punish the\nwicked, it is just, since it agrees with their deserts; and when Thou\ndost spare the wicked, it is also just; since it befits Thy goodness.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Although justice regards act, this does not prevent its\nbeing the essence of God; since even that which is of the essence of\na thing may be the principle of action. But good does not always\nregard act; since a thing is called good not merely with respect to\nact, but also as regards perfection in its essence. For this reason\nit is said (De Hebdom.) that the good is related to the just, as the\ngeneral to the special.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Justice of God Is Truth?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the justice of God is not truth. For\njustice resides in the will; since, as Anselm says (Dial. Verit. 13),\nit is a rectitude of the will, whereas truth resides in the intellect,\nas the Philosopher says (Metaph. vi; Ethic. vi, 2,6). Therefore\njustice does not appertain to truth.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7),\ntruth is a virtue distinct from justice. Truth therefore does not\nappertain to the idea of justice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ it is said (Ps. 84:11): \"Mercy and truth have met\neach other\": where truth stands for justice.\n\n_I answer that,_ Truth consists in the equation of mind and thing, as\nsaid above (Q. 16, A. 1). Now the mind, that is the cause of the\nthing, is related to it as its rule and measure; whereas the converse\nis the case with the mind that receives its knowledge from things.\nWhen therefore things are the measure and rule of the mind, truth\nconsists in the equation of the mind to the thing, as happens in\nourselves. For according as a thing is, or is not, our thoughts or our\nwords about it are true or false. But when the mind is the rule or\nmeasure of things, truth consists in the equation of the thing to the\nmind; just as the work of an artist is said to be true, when it is in\naccordance with his art.\n\nNow as works of art are related to art, so are works of justice\nrelated to the law with which they accord. Therefore God's justice,\nwhich establishes things in the order conformable to the rule of His\nwisdom, which is the law of His justice, is suitably called truth.\nThus we also in human affairs speak of the truth of justice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Justice, as to the law that governs, resides in the\nreason or intellect; but as to the command whereby our actions are\ngoverned according to the law, it resides in the will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The truth of which the Philosopher is speaking in this\npassage, is that virtue whereby a man shows himself in word and deed\nsuch as he really is. Thus it consists in the conformity of the sign\nwith the thing signified; and not in that of the effect with its\ncause and rule: as has been said regarding the truth of justice.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Mercy Can Be Attributed to God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that mercy cannot be attributed to God. For\nmercy is a kind of sorrow, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 14).\nBut there is no sorrow in God; and therefore there is no mercy in Him.\n\nObj. 2: Further, mercy is a relaxation of justice. But God cannot\nremit what appertains to His justice. For it is said (2 Tim. 2:13):\n\"If we believe not, He continueth faithful: He cannot deny Himself.\"\nBut He would deny Himself, as a gloss says, if He should deny His\nwords. Therefore mercy is not becoming to God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ it is said (Ps. 110:4): \"He is a merciful and\ngracious Lord.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Mercy is especially to be attributed to God, as seen\nin its effect, but not as an affection of passion. In proof of which\nit must be considered that a person is said to be merciful\n[misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at heart [miserum\ncor]; being affected with sorrow at the misery of another as though\nit were his own. Hence it follows that he endeavors to dispel the\nmisery of this other, as if it were his; and this is the effect of\nmercy. To sorrow, therefore, over the misery of others belongs not to\nGod; but it does most properly belong to Him to dispel that misery,\nwhatever be the defect we call by that name. Now defects are not\nremoved, except by the perfection of some kind of goodness; and the\nprimary source of goodness is God, as shown above (Q. 6, A. 4). It\nmust, however, be considered that to bestow perfections appertains\nnot only to the divine goodness, but also to His justice, liberality,\nand mercy; yet under different aspects. The communicating of\nperfections, absolutely considered, appertains to goodness, as shown\nabove (Q. 6, AA. 1, 4); in so far as perfections are given to things\nin proportion, the bestowal of them belongs to justice, as has been\nalready said (A. 1); in so far as God does not bestow them for His\nown use, but only on account of His goodness, it belongs to\nliberality; in so far as perfections given to things by God expel\ndefects, it belongs to mercy.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument is based on mercy, regarded as an\naffection of passion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God acts mercifully, not indeed by going against His\njustice, but by doing something more than justice; thus a man who\npays another two hundred pieces of money, though owing him only one\nhundred, does nothing against justice, but acts liberally or\nmercifully. The case is the same with one who pardons an offence\ncommitted against him, for in remitting it he may be said to bestow a\ngift. Hence the Apostle calls remission a forgiving: \"Forgive one\nanother, as Christ has forgiven you\" (Eph. 4:32). Hence it is clear\nthat mercy does not destroy justice, but in a sense is the fulness\nthereof. And thus it is said: \"Mercy exalteth itself above judgement\"\n(James 2:13).\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 21, Art. 4]\n\nWhether in Every Work of God There Are Mercy and Justice?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that not in every work of God are mercy and\njustice. For some works of God are attributed to mercy, as the\njustification of the ungodly; and others to justice, as the damnation\nof the wicked. Hence it is said: \"Judgment without mercy to him that\nhath not done mercy\" (James 2:13). Therefore not in every work of God\ndo mercy and justice appear.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle attributes the conversion of the Jews to\njustice and truth, but that of the Gentiles to mercy (Rom. 15).\nTherefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, many just persons are afflicted in this world; which\nis unjust. Therefore not in every work of God are justice and mercy.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is the part of justice to pay what is due, but of\nmercy to relieve misery. Thus both justice and mercy presuppose\nsomething in their works: whereas creation presupposes nothing.\nTherefore in creation neither mercy nor justice is found.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 24:10): \"All the ways of the Lord\nare mercy and truth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Mercy and truth are necessarily found in all God's\nworks, if mercy be taken to mean the removal of any kind of defect.\nNot every defect, however, can properly be called a misery; but only\ndefect in a rational nature whose lot is to be happy; for misery is\nopposed to happiness. For this necessity there is a reason, because\nsince a debt paid according to the divine justice is one due either to\nGod, or to some creature, neither the one nor the other can be lacking\nin any work of God: because God can do nothing that is not in accord\nwith His wisdom and goodness; and it is in this sense, as we have\nsaid, that anything is due to God. Likewise, whatever is done by Him\nin created things, is done according to proper order and proportion\nwherein consists the idea of justice. Thus justice must exist in all\nGod's works. Now the work of divine justice always presupposes the\nwork of mercy; and is founded thereupon. For nothing is due to\ncreatures, except for something pre-existing in them, or foreknown.\nAgain, if this is due to a creature, it must be due on account of\nsomething that precedes. And since we cannot go on to infinity, we\nmust come to something that depends only on the goodness of the divine\nwill--which is the ultimate end. We may say, for instance, that to\npossess hands is due to man on account of his rational soul; and his\nrational soul is due to him that he may be man; and his being man is\non account of the divine goodness. So in every work of God, viewed at\nits primary source, there appears mercy. In all that follows, the\npower of mercy remains, and works indeed with even greater force; as\nthe influence of the first cause is more intense than that of second\ncauses. For this reason does God out of abundance of His goodness\nbestow upon creatures what is due to them more bountifully than is\nproportionate to their deserts: since less would suffice for\npreserving the order of justice than what the divine goodness confers;\nbecause between creatures and God's goodness there can be no\nproportion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Certain works are attributed to justice, and certain\nothers to mercy, because in some justice appears more forcibly and in\nothers mercy. Even in the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen,\nwhich, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in\npunishing short of what is deserved.\n\nIn the justification of the ungodly, justice is seen, when God remits\nsins on account of love, though He Himself has mercifully infused that\nlove. So we read of Magdalen: \"Many sins are forgiven her, because she\nhath loved much\" (Luke 7:47).\n\nReply Obj. 2: God's justice and mercy appear both in the conversion\nof the Jews and of the Gentiles. But an aspect of justice appears in\nthe conversion of the Jews which is not seen in the conversion of the\nGentiles; inasmuch as the Jews were saved on account of the promises\nmade to the fathers.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Justice and mercy appear in the punishment of the just\nin this world, since by afflictions lesser faults are cleansed in\nthem, and they are the more raised up from earthly affections to God.\nAs to this Gregory says (Moral. xxvi, 9): \"The evils that press on us\nin this world force us to go to God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Although creation presupposes nothing in the universe;\nyet it does presuppose something in the knowledge of God. In this way\ntoo the idea of justice is preserved in creation; by the production\nof beings in a manner that accords with the divine wisdom and\ngoodness. And the idea of mercy, also, is preserved in the change of\ncreatures from non-existence to existence.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 22\n\nTHE PROVIDENCE OF GOD\n(In Four Articles)\n\nHaving considered all that relates to the will absolutely, we must\nnow proceed to those things which have relation to both the intellect\nand the will, namely providence, in respect to all created things;\npredestination and reprobation and all that is connected with these\nacts in respect especially of man as regards his eternal salvation.\nFor in the science of morals, after the moral virtues themselves,\ncomes the consideration of prudence, to which providence would seem\nto belong. Concerning God's providence there are four points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether providence is suitably assigned to God?\n\n(2) Whether everything comes under divine providence?\n\n(3) Whether divine providence is immediately concerned with all\nthings?\n\n(4) Whether divine providence imposes any necessity upon things\nforeseen?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Providence Can Suitably Be Attributed to God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that providence is not becoming to God. For\nprovidence, according to Tully (De Invent. ii), is a part of\nprudence. But prudence, since, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.\nvi, 5, 9, 18), it gives good counsel, cannot belong to God, Who never\nhas any doubt for which He should take counsel. Therefore providence\ncannot belong to God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is in God, is eternal. But providence is\nnot anything eternal, for it is concerned with existing things that\nare not eternal, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 29).\nTherefore there is no providence in God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there is nothing composite in God. But providence\nseems to be something composite, because it includes both the\nintellect and the will. Therefore providence is not in God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Wis. 14:3): \"But Thou, Father,\ngovernest all things by providence [*Vulg. But 'Thy providence, O\nFather, governeth it.'].\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is necessary to attribute providence to God. For\nall the good that is in created things has been created by God, as\nwas shown above (Q. 6, A. 4). In created things good is found not\nonly as regards their substance, but also as regards their order\ntowards an end and especially their last end, which, as was said\nabove, is the divine goodness (Q. 21, A. 4). This good of order\nexisting in things created, is itself created by God. Since, however,\nGod is the cause of things by His intellect, and thus it behooves\nthat the type of every effect should pre-exist in Him, as is clear\nfrom what has gone before (Q. 19, A. 4), it is necessary that the\ntype of the order of things towards their end should pre-exist in the\ndivine mind: and the type of things ordered towards an end is,\nproperly speaking, providence. For it is the chief part of prudence,\nto which two other parts are directed--namely, remembrance of the\npast, and understanding of the present; inasmuch as from the\nremembrance of what is past and the understanding of what is present,\nwe gather how to provide for the future. Now it belongs to prudence,\naccording to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 12), to direct other things\ntowards an end whether in regard to oneself--as for instance, a man\nis said to be prudent, who orders well his acts towards the end of\nlife--or in regard to others subject to him, in a family, city or\nkingdom; in which sense it is said (Matt. 24:45), \"a faithful and wise\nservant, whom his lord hath appointed over his family.\" In this way\nprudence or providence may suitably be attributed to God. For in God\nHimself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the\nlast end. This type of order in things towards an end is therefore in\nGod called providence. Whence Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6) that\n\"Providence is the divine type itself, seated in the Supreme Ruler;\nwhich disposeth all things\": which disposition may refer either to\nthe type of the order of things towards an end, or to the type of the\norder of parts in the whole.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 9, 10),\n\"Prudence is what, strictly speaking, commands all that 'ebulia' has\nrightly counselled and 'synesis' rightly judged\" [*Cf. I-II, Q. 57,\nA. 6]. Whence, though to take counsel may not be fitting to God, from\nthe fact that counsel is an inquiry into matters that are doubtful,\nnevertheless to give a command as to the ordering of things towards\nan end, the right reason of which He possesses, does belong to God,\naccording to Ps. 148:6: \"He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass\naway.\" In this manner both prudence and providence belong to God.\nAlthough at the same time it may be said that the very reason of\nthings to be done is called counsel in God; not because of any\ninquiry necessitated, but from the certitude of the knowledge, to\nwhich those who take counsel come by inquiry. Whence it is said: \"Who\nworketh all things according to the counsel of His will\" (Eph. 1:11).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Two things pertain to the care of providence--namely,\nthe \"reason of order,\" which is called providence and disposition;\nand the execution of order, which is termed government. Of these, the\nfirst is eternal, and the second is temporal.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Providence resides in the intellect; but presupposes\nthe act of willing the end. Nobody gives a precept about things done\nfor an end; unless he will that end. Hence prudence presupposes the\nmoral virtues, by means of which the appetitive faculty is directed\ntowards good, as the Philosopher says. Even if Providence has to do\nwith the divine will and intellect equally, this would not affect the\ndivine simplicity, since in God both the will and intellect are one\nand the same thing, as we have said above (Q. 19).\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Everything Is Subject to the Providence of God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that everything is not subject to divine\nprovidence. For nothing foreseen can happen by chance. If then\neverything was foreseen by God, nothing would happen by chance. And\nthus hazard and luck would disappear; which is against common opinion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a wise provider excludes any defect or evil, as far\nas he can, from those over whom he has a care. But we see many evils\nexisting. Either, then, God cannot hinder these, and thus is not\nomnipotent; or else He does not have care for everything.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever happens of necessity does not require\nprovidence or prudence. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Ethic.\nvi, 5, 9, 10, 11): \"Prudence is the right reason of things contingent\nconcerning which there is counsel and choice.\" Since, then, many\nthings happen from necessity, everything cannot be subject to\nprovidence.\n\nObj. 4: Further, whatsoever is left to itself cannot be subject to\nthe providence of a governor. But men are left to themselves by God\nin accordance with the words: \"God made man from the beginning, and\nleft him in the hand of his own counsel\" (Ecclus. 15:14). And\nparticularly in reference to the wicked: \"I let them go according to\nthe desires of their heart\" (Ps. 80:13). Everything, therefore,\ncannot be subject to divine providence.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): \"God doth not care\nfor oxen [*Vulg. 'Doth God take care for oxen?']\": and we may say the\nsame of other irrational creatures. Thus everything cannot be under\nthe care of divine providence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said of Divine Wisdom: \"She reacheth from\nend to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly\" (Wis. 8:1).\n\n_I answer that,_ Certain persons totally denied the existence of\nprovidence, as Democritus and the Epicureans, maintaining that the\nworld was made by chance. Others taught that incorruptible things\nonly were subject to providence and corruptible things not in their\nindividual selves, but only according to their species; for in this\nrespect they are incorruptible. They are represented as saying (Job\n22:14): \"The clouds are His covert; and He doth not consider our\nthings; and He walketh about the poles of heaven.\" Rabbi Moses,\nhowever, excluded men from the generality of things corruptible, on\naccount of the excellence of the intellect which they possess, but in\nreference to all else that suffers corruption he adhered to the\nopinion of the others.\n\nWe must say, however, that all things are subject to divine\nprovidence, not only in general, but even in their own individual\nselves. This is made evident thus. For since every agent acts for an\nend, the ordering of effects towards that end extends as far as the\ncausality of the first agent extends. Whence it happens that in the\neffects of an agent something takes place which has no reference\ntowards the end, because the effect comes from a cause other than,\nand outside the intention of the agent. But the causality of God, Who\nis the first agent, extends to all being, not only as to constituent\nprinciples of species, but also as to the individualizing principles;\nnot only of things incorruptible, but also of things corruptible.\nHence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily\ndirected by God towards some end; as the Apostle says: \"Those things\nthat are of God are well ordered [*Vulg. 'Those powers that are, are\nordained of God': 'Quae autem sunt, a Deo ordinatae sunt.' St. Thomas\noften quotes this passage, and invariably reads: 'Quae a Deo sunt,\nordinata sunt.']\" (Rom. 13:1). Since, therefore, as the providence of\nGod is nothing less than the type of the order of things towards an\nend, as we have said; it necessarily follows that all things,\ninasmuch as they participate in existence, must likewise be subject\nto divine providence. It has also been shown (Q. 14, AA. 6, 11) that\nGod knows all things, both universal and particular. And since His\nknowledge may be compared to the things themselves, as the knowledge\nof art to the objects of art, all things must of necessity come under\nHis ordering; as all things wrought by art are subject to the\nordering of that art.\n\nReply Obj. 1: There is a difference between universal and particular\ncauses. A thing can escape the order of a particular cause; but not\nthe order of a universal cause. For nothing escapes the order of a\nparticular cause, except through the intervention and hindrance of\nsome other particular cause; as, for instance, wood may be prevented\nfrom burning, by the action of water. Since then, all particular\ncauses are included under the universal cause, it could not be that\nany effect should take place outside the range of that universal\ncause. So far then as an effect escapes the order of a particular\ncause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in respect to that\ncause; but if we regard the universal cause, outside whose range no\neffect can happen, it is said to be foreseen. Thus, for instance, the\nmeeting of two servants, although to them it appears a chance\ncircumstance, has been fully foreseen by their master, who has\npurposely sent them to meet at the one place, in such a way that the\none knows not about the other.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular\nthing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular\nprovider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far\nas he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little\ndefect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered.\nHence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be\ncontrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the\nplan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields\nto the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the\ncorruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it\nis that a species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides\nuniversally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit\ncertain defects in particular effects, that the perfect good of the\nuniverse may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much\ngood would be absent from the universe. A lion would cease to live,\nif there were no slaying of animals; and there would be no patience\nof martyrs if there were no tyrannical persecution. Thus Augustine\nsays (Enchiridion 2): \"Almighty God would in no wise permit evil to\nexist in His works, unless He were so almighty and so good as to\nproduce good even from evil.\" It would appear that it was on account\nof these two arguments to which we have just replied, that some were\npersuaded to consider corruptible things--e.g. casual and evil\nthings--as removed from the care of divine providence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man is not the author of nature; but he uses natural\nthings in applying art and virtue to his own use. Hence human\nprovidence does not reach to that which takes place in nature from\nnecessity; but divine providence extends thus far, since God is the\nauthor of nature. Apparently it was this argument that moved those\nwho withdrew the course of nature from the care of divine providence,\nattributing it rather to the necessity of matter, as Democritus, and\nothers of the ancients.\n\nReply Obj. 4: When it is said that God left man to himself, this does\nnot mean that man is exempt from divine providence; but merely that\nhe has not a prefixed operating force determined to only the one\neffect; as in the case of natural things, which are only acted upon\nas though directed by another towards an end; and do not act of\nthemselves, as if they directed themselves towards an end, like\nrational creatures, through the possession of free will, by which\nthese are able to take counsel and make a choice. Hence it is\nsignificantly said: \"In the hand of his own counsel.\" But since the\nvery act of free will is traced to God as to a cause, it necessarily\nfollows that everything happening from the exercise of free will must\nbe subject to divine providence. For human providence is included\nunder the providence of God, as a particular under a universal cause.\nGod, however, extends His providence over the just in a certain more\nexcellent way than over the wicked; inasmuch as He prevents anything\nhappening which would impede their final salvation. For \"to them that\nlove God, all things work together unto good\" (Rom. 8:28). But from\nthe fact that He does not restrain the wicked from the evil of sin,\nHe is said to abandon them: not that He altogether withdraws His\nprovidence from them; otherwise they would return to nothing, if they\nwere not preserved in existence by His providence. This was the\nreason that had weight with Tully, who withdrew from the care of\ndivine providence human affairs concerning which we take counsel.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Since a rational creature has, through its free will,\ncontrol over its actions, as was said above (Q. 19, A. 10), it is\nsubject to divine providence in an especial manner, so that something\nis imputed to it as a fault, or as a merit; and there is given it\naccordingly something by way of punishment or reward. In this way,\nthe Apostle withdraws oxen from the care of God: not, however, that\nindividual irrational creatures escape the care of divine providence;\nas was the opinion of the Rabbi Moses.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 3]\n\nWhether God Has Immediate Providence Over Everything?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God has not immediate providence over all\nthings. For whatever is contained in the notion of dignity, must be\nattributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king, that he\nshould have ministers; through whose mediation he provides for his\nsubjects. Therefore much less has God Himself immediate providence\nover all things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it belongs to providence to order all things to an\nend. Now the end of everything is its perfection and its good. But it\nappertains to every cause to direct its effect to good; wherefore\nevery active cause is a cause of the effect of providence. If\ntherefore God were to have immediate providence over all things, all\nsecondary causes would be withdrawn.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 17) that, \"It is better\nto be ignorant of some things than to know them, for example, vile\nthings\": and the Philosopher says the same (Metaph. xii, 51). But\nwhatever is better must be assigned to God. Therefore He has not\nimmediate providence over bad and vile things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Job 34:13): \"What other hath He\nappointed over the earth? or whom hath He set over the world which He\nmade?\" On which passage Gregory says (Moral. xxiv, 20): \"Himself He\nruleth the world which He Himself hath made.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things belong to providence--namely, the type of\nthe order of things foreordained towards an end; and the execution of\nthis order, which is called government. As regards the first of these,\nGod has immediate providence over everything, because He has in His\nintellect the types of everything, even the smallest; and whatsoever\ncauses He assigns to certain effects, He gives them the power to\nproduce those effects. Whence it must be that He has beforehand the\ntype of those effects in His mind. As to the second, there are certain\nintermediaries of God's providence; for He governs things inferior by\nsuperior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of\nthe abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is\nimparted even to creatures. Thus Plato's opinion, as narrated by\nGregory of Nyssa (De Provid. viii, 3), is exploded. He taught a\nthreefold providence. First, one which belongs to the supreme Deity,\nWho first and foremost has provision over spiritual things, and thus\nover the whole world as regards genus, species, and universal causes.\nThe second providence, which is over the individuals of all that can\nbe generated and corrupted, he attributed to the divinities who\ncirculate in the heavens; that is, certain separate substances, which\nmove corporeal things in a circular direction. The third providence,\nover human affairs, he assigned to demons, whom the Platonic\nphilosophers placed between us and the gods, as Augustine tells us (De\nCiv. Dei, 1, 2: viii, 14).\n\nReply Obj. 1: It pertains to a king's dignity to have ministers who\nexecute his providence. But the fact that he has not the plan of\nthose things which are done by them arises from a deficiency in\nhimself. For every operative science is the more perfect, the more it\nconsiders the particular things with which its action is concerned.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God's immediate provision over everything does not\nexclude the action of secondary causes; which are the executors of\nHis order, as was said above (Q. 19, AA. 5, 8).\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is better for us not to know low and vile things,\nbecause by them we are impeded in our knowledge of what is better and\nhigher; for we cannot understand many things simultaneously; because\nthe thought of evil sometimes perverts the will towards evil. This\ndoes not hold with God, Who sees everything simultaneously at one\nglance, and whose will cannot turn in the direction of evil.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 22, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Providence Imposes Any Necessity on Things Foreseen?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that divine providence imposes necessity upon\nthings foreseen. For every effect that has a _per se_ cause, either\npresent or past, which it necessarily follows, happens from necessity;\nas the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vi, 7). But the providence of God,\nsince it is eternal, pre-exists; and the effect flows from it of\nnecessity, for divine providence cannot be frustrated. Therefore\ndivine providence imposes a necessity upon things foreseen.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every provider makes his work as stable as he\ncan, lest it should fail. But God is most powerful. Therefore He\nassigns the stability of necessity to things provided.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6): \"Fate from the\nimmutable source of providence binds together human acts and fortunes\nby the indissoluble connection of causes.\" It seems therefore that\nprovidence imposes necessity upon things foreseen.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says that (Div. Nom. iv, 23) \"to corrupt\nnature is not the work of providence.\" But it is in the nature of some\nthings to be contingent. Divine providence does not therefore impose\nany necessity upon things so as to destroy their contingency.\n\n_I answer that,_ Divine providence imposes necessity upon some things;\nnot upon all, as some formerly believed. For to providence it belongs\nto order things towards an end. Now after the divine goodness, which\nis an extrinsic end to all things, the principal good in things\nthemselves is the perfection of the universe; which would not be, were\nnot all grades of being found in things. Whence it pertains to divine\nprovidence to produce every grade of being. And thus it has prepared\nfor some things necessary causes, so that they happen of necessity;\nfor others contingent causes, that they may happen by contingency,\naccording to the nature of their proximate causes.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The effect of divine providence is not only that\nthings should happen somehow; but that they should happen either by\nnecessity or by contingency. Therefore whatsoever divine providence\nordains to happen infallibly and of necessity happens infallibly and\nof necessity; and that happens from contingency, which the plan of\ndivine providence conceives to happen from contingency.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The order of divine providence is unchangeable and\ncertain, so far as all things foreseen happen as they have been\nforeseen, whether from necessity or from contingency.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That indissolubility and unchangeableness of\nwhich Boethius speaks, pertain to the certainty of providence, which\nfails not to produce its effect, and that in the way foreseen; but\nthey do not pertain to the necessity of the effects. We must remember\nthat properly speaking \"necessary\" and \"contingent\" are consequent\nupon being, as such. Hence the mode both of necessity and of\ncontingency falls under the foresight of God, who provides universally\nfor all being; not under the foresight of causes that provide only for\nsome particular order of things.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 23\n\nOF PREDESTINATION\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nAfter consideration of divine providence, we must treat of\npredestination and the book of life. Concerning predestination there\nare eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether predestination is suitably attributed to God?\n\n(2) What is predestination, and whether it places anything in the\npredestined?\n\n(3) Whether to God belongs the reprobation of some men?\n\n(4) On the comparison of predestination to election; whether, that is\nto say, the predestined are chosen?\n\n(5) Whether merits are the cause or reason of predestination, or\nreprobation, or election?\n\n(6) of the certainty of predestination; whether the predestined will\ninfallibly be saved?\n\n(7) Whether the number of the predestined is certain?\n\n(8) Whether predestination can be furthered by the prayers of the\nsaints?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Men Are Predestined by God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that men are not predestined by God, for\nDamascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): \"It must be borne in mind that\nGod foreknows but does not predetermine everything, since He foreknows\nall that is in us, but does not predetermine it all.\" But human merit\nand demerit are in us, forasmuch as we are the masters of our own acts\nby free will. All that pertains therefore to merit or demerit is not\npredestined by God; and thus man's predestination is done away.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all creatures are directed to their end by divine\nprovidence, as was said above (Q. 22, AA. 1, 2). But other creatures\nare not said to be predestined by God. Therefore neither are men.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the angels are capable of beatitude, as well as men.\nBut predestination is not suitable to angels, since in them there\nnever was any unhappiness (miseria); for predestination, as Augustine\nsays (De praedest. sanct. 17), is the \"purpose to take pity\n[miserendi]\" [*See Q. 22, A. 3]. Therefore men are not predestined.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the benefits God confers upon men are revealed by\nthe Holy Ghost to holy men according to the saying of the Apostle (1\nCor. 2:12): \"Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but\nthe Spirit that is of God: that we may know the things that are given\nus from God.\" Therefore if man were predestined by God, since\npredestination is a benefit from God, his predestination would be\nmade known to each predestined; which is clearly false.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 8:30): \"Whom He predestined,\nthem He also called.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is fitting that God should predestine men. For\nall things are subject to His providence, as was shown above (Q. 22,\nA. 2). Now it belongs to providence to direct things towards their\nend, as was also said (Q. 22, AA. 1, 2). The end towards which\ncreated things are directed by God is twofold; one which exceeds all\nproportion and faculty of created nature; and this end is life\neternal, that consists in seeing God which is above the nature of\nevery creature, as shown above (Q. 12, A. 4). The other end, however,\nis proportionate to created nature, to which end created being can\nattain according to the power of its nature. Now if a thing cannot\nattain to something by the power of its nature, it must be directed\nthereto by another; thus, an arrow is directed by the archer towards\na mark. Hence, properly speaking, a rational creature, capable of\neternal life, is led towards it, directed, as it were, by God. The\nreason of that direction pre-exists in God; as in Him is the type of\nthe order of all things towards an end, which we proved above to be\nprovidence. Now the type in the mind of the doer of something to be\ndone, is a kind of pre-existence in him of the thing to be done.\nHence the type of the aforesaid direction of a rational creature\ntowards the end of life eternal is called predestination. For to\ndestine, is to direct or send. Thus it is clear that predestination,\nas regards its objects, is a part of providence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Damascene calls predestination an imposition of\nnecessity, after the manner of natural things which are predetermined\ntowards one end. This is clear from his adding: \"He does not will\nmalice, nor does He compel virtue.\" Whence predestination is not\nexcluded by Him.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which\nexceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly\nsaid to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in\nrespect of any other end.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Predestination applies to angels, just as it does to\nmen, although they have never been unhappy. For movement does not\ntake its species from the term _wherefrom_ but from the term\n_whereto._ Because it matters nothing, in respect of the notion of\nmaking white, whether he who is made white was before black, yellow\nor red. Likewise it matters nothing in respect of the notion of\npredestination whether one is predestined to life eternal from the\nstate of misery or not. Although it may be said that every conferring\nof good above that which is due pertains to mercy; as was shown\npreviously (Q. 21, AA. 3, 4).\n\nReply Obj. 4: Even if by a special privilege their predestination\nwere revealed to some, it is not fitting that it should be revealed\nto everyone; because, if so, those who were not predestined would\ndespair; and security would beget negligence in the predestined.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Predestination Places Anything in the Predestined?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that predestination does place something in the\npredestined. For every action of itself causes passion. If therefore\npredestination is action in God, predestination must be passion in the\npredestined.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Origen says on the text, \"He who was predestined,\"\netc. (Rom. 1:4): \"Predestination is of one who is not; destination,\nof one who is.\" And Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct.): \"What is\npredestination but the destination of one who is?\" Therefore\npredestination is only of one who actually exists; and it thus places\nsomething in the predestined.\n\nObj. 3: Further, preparation is something in the thing prepared. But\npredestination is the preparation of God's benefits, as Augustine\nsays (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14). Therefore predestination is something\nin the predestined.\n\nObj. 4: Further, nothing temporal enters into the definition of\neternity. But grace, which is something temporal, is found in the\ndefinition of predestination. For predestination is the preparation\nof grace in the present; and of glory in the future. Therefore\npredestination is not anything eternal. So it must needs be that it is\nin the predestined, and not in God; for whatever is in Him is eternal.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 14) that\n\"predestination is the foreknowledge of God's benefits.\" But\nforeknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the person who\nforeknows them. Therefore, predestination is in the one who\npredestines, and not in the predestined.\n\n_I answer that,_ Predestination is not anything in the predestined;\nbut only in the person who predestines. We have said above that\npredestination is a part of providence. Now providence is not\nanything in the things provided for; but is a type in the mind of the\nprovider, as was proved above (Q. 22, A. 1). But the execution of\nprovidence which is called government, is in a passive way in the\nthing governed, and in an active way in the governor. Whence it is\nclear that predestination is a kind of type of the ordering of some\npersons towards eternal salvation, existing in the divine mind. The\nexecution, however, of this order is in a passive way in the\npredestined, but actively in God. The execution of predestination is\nthe calling and magnification; according to the Apostle (Rom. 8:30):\n\"Whom He predestined, them He also called and whom He called, them He\nalso magnified [Vulg. 'justified'].\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Actions passing out to external matter imply of\nthemselves passion--for example, the actions of warming and cutting;\nbut not so actions remaining in the agent, as understanding and\nwilling, as said above (Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 18, A. 3, ad 1).\nPredestination is an action of this latter class. Wherefore, it does\nnot put anything in the predestined. But its execution, which passes\nout to external things, has an effect in them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Destination sometimes denotes a real mission of someone\nto a given end; thus, destination can only be said of someone\nactually existing. It is taken, however, in another sense for a\nmission which a person conceives in the mind; and in this manner we\nare said to destine a thing which we firmly propose in our mind. In\nthis latter way it is said that Eleazar \"determined not to do any\nunlawful things for the love of life\" (2 Macc. 6:20). Thus\ndestination can be of a thing which does not exist. Predestination,\nhowever, by reason of the antecedent nature it implies, can be\nattributed to a thing which does not actually exist; in whatsoever\nway destination is accepted.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Preparation is twofold: of the patient in respect to\npassion and this is in the thing prepared; and of the agent to\naction, and this is in the agent. Such a preparation is\npredestination, and as an agent by intellect is said to prepare\nitself to act, accordingly as it preconceives the idea of what is to\nbe done. Thus, God from all eternity prepared by predestination,\nconceiving the idea of the order of some towards salvation.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Grace does not come into the definition of\npredestination, as something belonging to its essence, but inasmuch\nas predestination implies a relation to grace, as of cause to effect,\nand of act to its object. Whence it does not follow that\npredestination is anything temporal.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 3]\n\nWhether God Reprobates Any Man?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God reprobates no man. For nobody\nreprobates what he loves. But God loves every man, according to (Wis.\n11:25): \"Thou lovest all things that are, and Thou hatest none of the\nthings Thou hast made.\" Therefore God reprobates no man.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if God reprobates any man, it would be necessary for\nreprobation to have the same relation to the reprobates as\npredestination has to the predestined. But predestination is the\ncause of the salvation of the predestined. Therefore reprobation will\nlikewise be the cause of the loss of the reprobate. But this false.\nFor it is said (Osee 13:9): \"Destruction is thy own, O Israel; Thy\nhelp is only in Me.\" God does not, then, reprobate any man.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to no one ought anything be imputed which he cannot\navoid. But if God reprobates anyone, that one must perish. For it is\nsaid (Eccles. 7:14): \"Consider the works of God, that no man can\ncorrect whom He hath despised.\" Therefore it could not be imputed to\nany man, were he to perish. But this is false. Therefore God does not\nreprobate anyone.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Malachi 1:2,3): \"I have loved Jacob, but\nhave hated Esau.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ God does reprobate some. For it was said above (A.\n1) that predestination is a part of providence. To providence,\nhowever, it belongs to permit certain defects in those things which\nare subject to providence, as was said above (Q. 22, A. 2). Thus, as\nmen are ordained to eternal life through the providence of God, it\nlikewise is part of that providence to permit some to fall away from\nthat end; this is called reprobation. Thus, as predestination is a\npart of providence, in regard to those ordained to eternal salvation,\nso reprobation is a part of providence in regard to those who turn\naside from that end. Hence reprobation implies not only\nforeknowledge, but also something more, as does providence, as was\nsaid above (Q. 22, A. 1). Therefore, as predestination includes the\nwill to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will\nto permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of\ndamnation on account of that sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God loves all men and all creatures, inasmuch as He\nwishes them all some good; but He does not wish every good to them\nall. So far, therefore, as He does not wish this particular\ngood--namely, eternal life--He is said to hate or reprobated them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Reprobation differs in its causality from\npredestination. This latter is the cause both of what is expected in\nthe future life by the predestined--namely, glory--and of what is\nreceived in this life--namely, grace. Reprobation, however, is not\nthe cause of what is in the present--namely, sin; but it is the cause\nof abandonment by God. It is the cause, however, of what is assigned\nin the future--namely, eternal punishment. But guilt proceeds from\nthe free-will of the person who is reprobated and deserted by grace.\nIn this way, the word of the prophet is true--namely, \"Destruction is\nthy own, O Israel.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Reprobation by God does not take anything away from the\npower of the person reprobated. Hence, when it is said that the\nreprobated cannot obtain grace, this must not be understood as\nimplying absolute impossibility: but only conditional impossibility:\nas was said above (Q. 19, A. 3), that the predestined must\nnecessarily be saved; yet a conditional necessity, which does not do\naway with the liberty of choice. Whence, although anyone reprobated\nby God cannot acquire grace, nevertheless that he falls into this or\nthat particular sin comes from the use of his free-will. Hence it is\nrightly imputed to him as guilt.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Predestined Are Chosen by God? [*\"Eligantur.\"]\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God. For\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1) that as the corporeal sun sends his\nrays upon all without selection, so does God His goodness. But the\ngoodness of God is communicated to some in an especial manner through\na participation of grace and glory. Therefore God without any\nselection communicates His grace and glory; and this belongs to\npredestination.\n\nObj. 2: Further, election is of things that exist. But predestination\nfrom all eternity is also of things which do not exist. Therefore,\nsome are predestined without election.\n\nObj. 3: Further, election implies some discrimination. Now God \"wills\nall men to be saved\" (1 Tim. 2:4). Therefore, predestination which\nordains men towards eternal salvation, is without election.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Eph. 1:4): \"He chose us in Him before\nthe foundation of the world.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Predestination presupposes election in the order of\nreason; and election presupposes love. The reason of this is that\npredestination, as stated above (A. 1), is a part of providence. Now\nprovidence, as also prudence, is the plan existing in the intellect\ndirecting the ordering of some things towards an end; as was proved\nabove (Q. 22, A. 2). But nothing is directed towards an end unless\nthe will for that end already exists. Whence the predestination of\nsome to eternal salvation presupposes, in the order of reason, that\nGod wills their salvation; and to this belong both election and\nlove:--love, inasmuch as He wills them this particular good of\neternal salvation; since to love is to wish well to anyone, as stated\nabove (Q. 20, AA. 2 ,3):--election, inasmuch as He wills this good to\nsome in preference to others; since He reprobates some, as stated\nabove (A. 3). Election and love, however, are differently ordered in\nGod, and in ourselves: because in us the will in loving does not\ncause good, but we are incited to love by the good which already\nexists; and therefore we choose someone to love, and so election in\nus precedes love. In God, however, it is the reverse. For His will,\nby which in loving He wishes good to someone, is the cause of that\ngood possessed by some in preference to others. Thus it is clear that\nlove precedes election in the order of reason, and election precedes\npredestination. Whence all the predestinate are objects of election\nand love.\n\nReply Obj. 1: If the communication of the divine goodness in general\nbe considered, God communicates His goodness without election;\ninasmuch as there is nothing which does not in some way share in His\ngoodness, as we said above (Q. 6, A. 4). But if we consider the\ncommunication of this or that particular good, He does not allot it\nwithout election; since He gives certain goods to some men, which He\ndoes not give to others. Thus in the conferring of grace and glory\nelection is implied.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When the will of the person choosing is incited to make\na choice by the good already pre-existing in the object chosen, the\nchoice must needs be of those things which already exist, as happens\nin our choice. In God it is otherwise; as was said above (Q. 20, A.\n2). Thus, as Augustine says (De Verb. Ap. Serm. 11): \"Those are\nchosen by God, who do not exist; yet He does not err in His choice.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: God wills all men to be saved by His antecedent will,\nwhich is to will not simply but relatively; and not by His consequent\nwill, which is to will simply.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Foreknowledge of Merits Is the Cause of Predestination?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of\npredestination. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:29): \"Whom He foreknew,\nHe also predestined.\" Again a gloss of Ambrose on Rom. 9:15: \"I will\nhave mercy upon whom I will have mercy\" says: \"I will give mercy to\nhim who, I foresee, will turn to Me with his whole heart.\" Therefore\nit seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Divine predestination includes the divine will,\nwhich by no means can be irrational; since predestination is \"the\npurpose to have mercy,\" as Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. ii, 17).\nBut there can be no other reason for predestination than the\nforeknowledge of merits. Therefore it must be the cause of reason of\npredestination.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"There is no injustice in God\" (Rom. 9:14). Now\nit would seem unjust that unequal things be given to equals. But all\nmen are equal as regards both nature and original sin; and inequality\nin them arises from the merits or demerits of their actions. Therefore\nGod does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating and\nreprobating, unless through the foreknowledge of their merits and\ndemerits.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Titus 3:5): \"Not by works of\njustice which we have done, but according to His mercy He saved us.\"\nBut as He saved us, so He predestined that we should be saved.\nTherefore, foreknowledge of merits is not the cause or reason of\npredestination.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since predestination includes will, as was said\nabove (A. 4), the reason of predestination must be sought for in the\nsame way as was the reason of the will of God. Now it was shown above\n(Q. 19, A. 5), that we cannot assign any cause of the divine will on\nthe part of the act of willing; but a reason can be found on the part\nof the things willed; inasmuch as God wills one thing on account of\nsomething else. Wherefore nobody has been so insane as to say that\nmerit is the cause of divine predestination as regards the act of the\npredestinator. But this is the question, whether, as regards the\neffect, predestination has any cause; or what comes to the same\nthing, whether God pre-ordained that He would give the effect of\npredestination to anyone on account of any merits.\n\nAccordingly there were some who held that the effect of\npredestination was pre-ordained for some on account of pre-existing\nmerits in a former life. This was the opinion of Origen, who thought\nthat the souls of men were created in the beginning, and according to\nthe diversity of their works different states were assigned to them\nin this world when united with the body. The Apostle, however, rebuts\nthis opinion where he says (Rom. 9:11,12): \"For when they were not\nyet born, nor had done any good or evil . . . not of works, but of\nHim that calleth, it was said of her: The elder shall serve the\nyounger.\"\n\nOthers said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and\ncause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that\nthe beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from\nGod: so that it came about that the effect of predestination was\ngranted to one, and not to another, because the one made a beginning\nby preparing, whereas the other did not. But against this we have the\nsaying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 3:5), that \"we are not sufficient to\nthink anything of ourselves as of ourselves.\" Now no principle of\naction can be imagined previous to the act of thinking. Wherefore it\ncannot be said that anything begun in us can be the reason of the\neffect of predestination.\n\nAnd so others said that merits following the effect of predestination\nare the reason of predestination; giving us to understand that God\ngives grace to a person, and pre-ordains that He will give it, because\nHe knows beforehand that He will make good use of that grace, as if a\nking were to give a horse to a soldier because he knows he will make\ngood use of it. But these seem to have drawn a distinction between\nthat which flows from grace, and that which flows from free will, as\nif the same thing cannot come from both. It is, however, manifest that\nwhat is of grace is the effect of predestination; and this cannot be\nconsidered as the reason of predestination, since it is contained in\nthe notion of predestination. Therefore, if anything else in us be the\nreason of predestination, it will outside the effect of\npredestination. Now there is no distinction between what flows from\nfree will, and what is of predestination; as there is not distinction\nbetween what flows from a secondary cause and from a first cause. For\nthe providence of God produces effects through the operation of\nsecondary causes, as was above shown (Q. 22, A. 3). Wherefore,\nthat which flows from free-will is also of predestination. We must\nsay, therefore, that the effect of predestination may be considered in\na twofold light--in one way, in particular; and thus there is no\nreason why one effect of predestination should not be the reason or\ncause of another; a subsequent effect being the reason of a previous\neffect, as its final cause; and the previous effect being the reason\nof the subsequent as its meritorious cause, which is reduced to the\ndisposition of the matter. Thus we might say that God pre-ordained to\ngive glory on account of merit, and that He pre-ordained to give grace\nto merit glory. In another way, the effect of predestination may be\nconsidered in general. Thus, it is impossible that the whole of the\neffect of predestination in general should have any cause as coming\nfrom us; because whatsoever is in man disposing him towards salvation,\nis all included under the effect of predestination; even the\npreparation for grace. For neither does this happen otherwise than by\ndivine help, according to the prophet Jeremias (Lam. 5:21): \"convert\nus, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.\" Yet predestination\nhas in this way, in regard to its effect, the goodness of God for its\nreason; towards which the whole effect of predestination is directed\nas to an end; and from which it proceeds, as from its first moving\nprinciple.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The use of grace foreknown by God is not the cause of\nconferring grace, except after the manner of a final cause; as was\nexplained above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Predestination has its foundation in the goodness of\nGod as regards its effects in general. Considered in its particular\neffects, however, one effect is the reason of another; as already\nstated.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The reason for the predestination of some, and\nreprobation of others, must be sought for in the goodness of God. Thus\nHe is said to have made all things through His goodness, so that the\ndivine goodness might be represented in things. Now it is necessary\nthat God's goodness, which in itself is one and undivided, should be\nmanifested in many ways in His creation; because creatures in\nthemselves cannot attain to the simplicity of God. Thus it is that for\nthe completion of the universe there are required different grades of\nbeing; some of which hold a high and some a low place in the universe.\nThat this multiformity of grades may be preserved in things, God\nallows some evils, lest many good things should never happen, as was\nsaid above (Q. 22, A. 2). Let us then consider the whole of the\nhuman race, as we consider the whole universe. God wills to manifest\nHis goodness in men; in respect to those whom He predestines, by means\nof His mercy, as sparing them; and in respect of others, whom he\nreprobates, by means of His justice, in punishing them. This is the\nreason why God elects some and rejects others. To this the Apostle\nrefers, saying (Rom. 9:22, 23): \"What if God, willing to show His wrath\n[that is, the vengeance of His justice], and to make His power known,\nendured [that is, permitted] with much patience vessels of wrath,\nfitted for destruction; that He might show the riches of His glory on\nthe vessels of mercy, which He hath prepared unto glory\" and (2 Tim.\n2:20): \"But in a great house there are not only vessels of gold and\nsilver; but also of wood and of earth; and some, indeed, unto honor,\nbut some unto dishonor.\" Yet why He chooses some for glory, and\nreprobates others, has no reason, except the divine will. Whence\nAugustine says (Tract. xxvi. in Joan.): \"Why He draws one, and another\nHe draws not, seek not to judge, if thou dost not wish to err.\" Thus\ntoo, in the things of nature, a reason can be assigned, since primary\nmatter is altogether uniform, why one part of it was fashioned by God\nfrom the beginning under the form of fire, another under the form of\nearth, that there might be a diversity of species in things of nature.\nYet why this particular part of matter is under this particular form,\nand that under another, depends upon the simple will of God; as from\nthe simple will of the artificer it depends that this stone is in part\nof the wall, and that in another; although the plan requires that some\nstones should be in this place, and some in that place. Neither on\nthis account can there be said to be injustice in God, if He prepares\nunequal lots for not unequal things. This would be altogether contrary\nto the notion of justice, if the effect of predestination were granted\nas a debt, and not gratuitously. In things which are given\ngratuitously, a person can give more or less, just as he pleases\n(provided he deprives nobody of his due), without any infringement of\njustice. This is what the master of the house said: \"Take what is\nthine, and go thy way. Is it not lawful for me to do what I will?\"\n(Matt. 20:14,15).\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Predestination Is Certain?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that predestination is not certain. Because\non the words \"Hold fast that which thou hast, that no one take thy\ncrown,\" (Rev 3:11), Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 15): \"Another\nwill not receive, unless this one were to lose it.\" Hence the crown\nwhich is the effect of predestination can be both acquired and lost.\nTherefore predestination cannot be certain.\n\nObj. 2: Further, granted what is possible, nothing impossible\nfollows. But it is possible that one predestined--e.g. Peter--may\nsin and then be killed. But if this were so, it would follow that\nthe effect of predestination would be thwarted. This then, is not\nimpossible. Therefore predestination is not certain.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever God could do in the past, He can do\nnow. But He could have not predestined whom He hath predestined.\nTherefore now He is able not to predestine him. Therefore\npredestination is not certain.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 8:29: \"Whom He foreknew, He also\npredestinated\", says: \"Predestination is the foreknowledge and\npreparation of the benefits of God, by which whosoever are freed will\nmost certainly be freed.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Predestination most certainly and infallibly takes\neffect; yet it does not impose any necessity, so that, namely, its\neffect should take place from necessity. For it was said above (A.\n1), that predestination is a part of providence. But not all things\nsubject to providence are necessary; some things happening from\ncontingency, according to the nature of the proximate causes, which\ndivine providence has ordained for such effects. Yet the order of\nprovidence is infallible, as was shown above (Q. 22, A. 4). So also\nthe order of predestination is certain; yet free-will is not\ndestroyed; whence the effect of predestination has its contingency.\nMoreover all that has been said about the divine knowledge and will\n(Q. 14, A. 13; Q. 19, A. 4) must also be taken into consideration;\nsince they do not destroy contingency in things, although they\nthemselves are most certain and infallible.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The crown may be said to belong to a person in two\nways; first, by God's predestination, and thus no one loses his\ncrown: secondly, by the merit of grace; for what we merit, in a\ncertain way is ours; and thus anyone may lose his crown by mortal\nsin. Another person receives that crown thus lost, inasmuch as he\ntakes the former's place. For God does not permit some to fall,\nwithout raising others; according to Job 34:24: \"He shall break in\npieces many and innumerable, and make others to stand in their\nstead.\" Thus men are substituted in the place of the fallen angels;\nand the Gentiles in that of the Jews. He who is substituted for\nanother in the state of grace, also receives the crown of the fallen\nin that in eternal life he will rejoice at the good the other has\ndone, in which life he will rejoice at all good whether done by\nhimself or by others.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although it is possible for one who is predestinated\nconsidered in himself to die in mortal sin; yet it is not possible,\nsupposed, as in fact it is supposed. that he is predestinated. Whence\nit does not follow that predestination can fall short of its effect.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since predestination includes the divine will as stated\nabove (A. 4): and the fact that God wills any created thing is\nnecessary on the supposition that He so wills, on account of the\nimmutability of the divine will, but is not necessary absolutely; so\nthe same must be said of predestination. Wherefore one ought not to\nsay that God is able not to predestinate one whom He has\npredestinated, taking it in a composite sense, thought, absolutely\nspeaking, God can predestinate or not. But in this way the certainty\nof predestination is not destroyed.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Number of the Predestined Is Certain?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the number of the predestined is not\ncertain. For a number to which an addition can be made is not certain.\nBut there can be an addition to the number of the predestined as it\nseems; for it is written (Deut. 1:11): \"The Lord God adds to this number\nmany thousands,\" and a gloss adds, \"fixed by God, who knows those who\nbelong to Him.\" Therefore the number of the predestined is not\ncertain.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no reason can be assigned why God pre-ordains to\nsalvation one number of men more than another. But nothing is arranged\nby God without a reason. Therefore the number to be saved pre-ordained\nby God cannot be certain.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the operations of God are more perfect than those of\nnature. But in the works of nature, good is found in the majority of\nthings; defect and evil in the minority. If, then, the number of the\nsaved were fixed by God at a certain figure, there would be more\nsaved than lost. Yet the contrary follows from Matt. 7:13,14: \"For\nwide is the gate, and broad the way that leadeth to destruction, and\nmany there are who go in thereat. How narrow is the gate, and strait\nis the way that leadeth to life; and few there are who find it!\"\nTherefore the number of those pre-ordained by God to be saved is not\ncertain.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Corr. et Grat. 13): \"The number\nof the predestined is certain, and can neither be increased nor\ndiminished.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The number of the predestined is certain. Some have\nsaid that it was formally, but not materially certain; as if we were\nto say that it was certain that a hundred or a thousand would be\nsaved; not however these or those individuals. But this destroys the\ncertainty of predestination; of which we spoke above (A. 6).\nTherefore we must say that to God the number of the predestined is\ncertain, not only formally, but also materially. It must, however, be\nobserved that the number of the predestined is said to be certain to\nGod, not by reason of His knowledge, because, that is to say, He knows\nhow many will be saved (for in this way the number of drops of rain\nand the sands of the sea are certain to God); but by reason of His\ndeliberate choice and determination. For the further evidence of which\nwe must remember that every agent intends to make something finite, as\nis clear from what has been said above when we treated of the infinite\n(Q. 7, AA. 2 ,3). Now whosoever intends some definite measure in\nhis effect thinks out some definite number in the essential parts,\nwhich are by their very nature required for the perfection of the\nwhole. For of those things which are required not principally, but\nonly on account of something else, he does not select any definite\nnumber _per se_; but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are\nnecessary on account of that other thing. For instance, a builder\nthinks out the definite measurements of a house, and also the definite\nnumber of rooms which he wishes to make in the house; and definite\nmeasurements of the walls and roof; he does not, however, select a\ndefinite number of stones, but accepts and uses just so many as are\nsufficient for the required measurements of the wall. So also must we\nconsider concerning God in regard to the whole universe, which is His\neffect. For He pre-ordained the measurements of the whole of the\nuniverse, and what number would befit the essential parts of that\nuniverse--that is to say, which have in some way been ordained in\nperpetuity; how many spheres, how many stars, how many elements, and\nhow many species. Individuals, however, which undergo corruption, are\nnot ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in a\nsecondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species is preserved\nthrough them. Whence, although God knows the total number of\nindividuals, the number of oxen, flies and such like, is not\npre-ordained by God _per se_; but divine providence produces just so\nmany as are sufficient for the preservation of the species. Now of all\ncreatures the rational creature is chiefly ordained for the good of\nthe universe, being as such incorruptible; more especially those who\nattain to eternal happiness, since they more immediately reach the\nultimate end. Whence the number of the predestined is certain to God;\nnot only by way of knowledge, but also by way of a principal\npre-ordination.\n\nIt is not exactly the same thing in the case of the number of the\nreprobate, who would seem to be pre-ordained by God for the good of\nthe elect, in whose regard \"all things work together unto good\" (Rom.\n8:28). Concerning the number of all the predestined, some say that so\nmany men will be saved as angels fell; some, so many as there were\nangels left; others, as many as the number of angels created by God.\nIt is, however, better to say that, \"to God alone is known the number\nfor whom is reserved eternal happiness [*From the 'secret' prayer of\nthe missal, 'pro vivis et defunctis.']\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: These words of Deuteronomy must be taken as applied to\nthose who are marked out by God beforehand in respect to present\nrighteousness. For their number is increased and diminished, but not\nthe number of the predestined.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The reason of the quantity of any one part must be\njudged from the proportion of that part of the whole. Thus in God the\nreason why He has made so many stars, or so many species of things,\nor predestined so many, is according to the proportion of the\nprincipal parts to the good of the whole universe.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The good that is proportionate to the common state of\nnature is to be found in the majority; and is wanting in the\nminority. The good that exceeds the common state of nature is to be\nfound in the minority, and is wanting in the majority. Thus it is\nclear that the majority of men have a sufficient knowledge for the\nguidance of life; and those who have not this knowledge are said to\nbe half-witted or foolish; but they who attain to a profound\nknowledge of things intelligible are a very small minority in respect\nto the rest. Since their eternal happiness, consisting in the vision\nof God, exceeds the common state of nature, and especially in so far\nas this is deprived of grace through the corruption of original sin,\nthose who are saved are in the minority. In this especially, however,\nappears the mercy of God, that He has chosen some for that salvation,\nfrom which very many in accordance with the common course and\ntendency of nature fall short.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 23, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Predestination Can Be Furthered by the Prayers of the Saints?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that predestination cannot be furthered by the\nprayers of the saints. For nothing eternal can be preceded by anything\ntemporal; and in consequence nothing temporal can help towards making\nsomething else eternal. But predestination is eternal. Therefore,\nsince the prayers of the saints are temporal, they cannot so help as\nto cause anyone to become predestined. Predestination therefore is not\nfurthered by the prayers of the saints.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as there is no need of advice except on account of\ndefective knowledge, so there is no need of help except through\ndefective power. But neither of these things can be said of God when\nHe predestines. Whence it is said: \"Who hath helped the Spirit of the\nLord? [*Vulg.: 'Who hath known the mind of the Lord?'] Or who hath\nbeen His counsellor?\" (Rom. 11:34). Therefore predestination cannot\nbe furthered by the prayers of the saints.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if a thing can be helped, it can also be hindered.\nBut predestination cannot be hindered by anything. Therefore it\ncannot be furthered by anything.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said that \"Isaac besought the Lord for his\nwife because she was barren; and He heard him and made Rebecca to\nconceive\" (Gen. 25:21). But from that conception Jacob was born, and\nhe was predestined. Now his predestination would not have happened if\nhe had never been born. Therefore predestination can be furthered by\nthe prayers of the saints.\n\n_I answer that,_ Concerning this question, there were different\nerrors. Some, regarding the certainty of divine predestination, said\nthat prayers were superfluous, as also anything else done to attain\nsalvation; because whether these things were done or not, the\npredestined would attain, and the reprobate would not attain, eternal\nsalvation. But against this opinion are all the warnings of Holy\nScripture, exhorting us to prayer and other good works.\n\nOthers declared that the divine predestination was altered through\nprayer. This is stated to have the opinion of the Egyptians, who\nthought that the divine ordination, which they called fate, could be\nfrustrated by certain sacrifices and prayers. Against this also is the\nauthority of Scripture. For it is said: \"But the triumpher in Israel\nwill not spare and will not be moved to repentance\" (1 Kings 15:29);\nand that \"the gifts and the calling of God are without repentance\"\n(Rom. 11:29).\n\nWherefore we must say otherwise that in predestination two things are\nto be considered--namely, the divine ordination; and its effect. As\nregards the former, in no possible way can predestination be furthered\nby the prayers of the saints. For it is not due to their prayers that\nanyone is predestined by God. As regards the latter, predestination is\nsaid to be helped by the prayers of the saints, and by other good\nworks; because providence, of which predestination is a part, does not\ndo away with secondary causes but so provides effects, that the order\nof secondary causes falls also under providence. So, as natural\neffects are provided by God in such a way that natural causes are\ndirected to bring about those natural effects, without which those\neffects would not happen; so the salvation of a person is predestined\nby God in such a way, that whatever helps that person towards\nsalvation falls under the order of predestination; whether it be one's\nown prayers or those of another; or other good works, and such like,\nwithout which one would not attain to salvation. Whence, the\npredestined must strive after good works and prayer; because through\nthese means predestination is most certainly fulfilled. For this\nreason it is said: \"Labor more that by good works you may make sure\nyour calling and election\" (2 Pet. 1:10).\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument shows that predestination is not\nfurthered by the prayers of the saints, as regards the preordination.\n\nReply Obj. 2: One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one\nway, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus\nbelongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are\nto understand, \"Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord?\" In another\nway one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out\nhis work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by\nus; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. 3:9: \"We\nare God's co-adjutors.\" Nor is this on account of any defect in the\npower of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order\nthat the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also\nthat He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Secondary causes cannot escape the order of the first\nuniversal cause, as has been said above (Q. 19, A. 6), indeed, they\nexecute that order. And therefore predestination can be furthered by\ncreatures, but it cannot be impeded by them.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 24\n\nTHE BOOK OF LIFE\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is the book of life?\n\n(2) Of what life is it the book?\n\n(3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 24, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Book of Life Is the Same As Predestination?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the book of life is not the same thing as\npredestination. For it is said, \"All things are the book of life\"\n(Ecclus. 4:32)--i.e. the Old and New Testament according to a gloss.\nThis, however, is not predestination. Therefore the book of life is\nnot predestination.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 14) that \"the book\nof life is a certain divine energy, by which it happens that to each\none his good or evil works are recalled to memory.\" But divine energy\nbelongs seemingly, not to predestination, but rather to divine power.\nTherefore the book of life is not the same thing as predestination.\n\nObj. 3: Further, reprobation is opposed to predestination. So, if the\nbook of life were the same as predestination, there should also be a\nbook of death, as there is a book of life.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said in a gloss upon Ps. 68:29, \"Let them be\nblotted out of the book of the living,\" \"This book is the knowledge\nof God, by which He hath predestined to life those whom He foreknew.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The book of life is in God taken in a metaphorical\nsense, according to a comparison with human affairs. For it is usual\namong men that they who are chosen for any office should be inscribed\nin a book; as, for instance, soldiers, or counsellors, who formerly\nwere called \"conscript\" fathers. Now it is clear from the preceding\n(Q. 23, A. 4) that all the predestined are chosen by God to possess\neternal life. This conscription, therefore, of the predestined is\ncalled the book of life. A thing is said metaphorically to be written\nupon the mind of anyone when it is firmly held in the memory,\naccording to Prov. 3:3: \"Forget not My Law, and let thy heart keep My\ncommandments,\" and further on, \"Write them in the tables of thy\nheart.\" For things are written down in material books to help the\nmemory. Whence, the knowledge of God, by which He firmly remembers\nthat He has predestined some to eternal life, is called the book of\nlife. For as the writing in a book is the sign of things to be done,\nso the knowledge of God is a sign in Him of those who are to be\nbrought to eternal life, according to 2 Tim. 11:19: \"The sure\nfoundation of God standeth firm, having this seal; the Lord knoweth\nwho are His.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The book of life may be understood in two senses. In\none sense as the inscription of those who are chosen to life; thus we\nnow speak of the book of life. In another sense the inscription of\nthose things which lead us to life may be called the book of life;\nand this also is twofold, either as of things to be done; and thus\nthe Old and New Testament are called a book of life; or of things\nalready done, and thus that divine energy by which it happens that to\neach one his deeds will be recalled to memory, is spoken of as the\nbook of life. Thus that also may be called the book of war, whether\nit contains the names inscribed of those chosen for military service;\nor treats of the art of warfare, or relates the deeds of soldiers.\n\nHence the solution of the Second Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is the custom to inscribe, not those who are\nrejected, but those who are chosen. Whence there is no book of death\ncorresponding to reprobation; as the book of life to predestination.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Predestination and the book of life are different\naspects of the same thing. For this latter implies the knowledge of\npredestination; as also is made clear from the gloss quoted above.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 24, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Book of Life Regards Only the Life of Glory of the\nPredestined?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the book of life does not only regard\nthe life of glory of the predestined. For the book of life is the\nknowledge of life. But God, through His own life, knows all other\nlife. Therefore the book of life is so called in regard to divine\nlife; and not only in regard to the life of the predestined.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as the life of glory comes from God, so also does\nthe life of nature. Therefore, if the knowledge of the life of glory\nis called the book of life; so also should the knowledge of the life\nof nature be so called.\n\nObj. 3: Further, some are chosen to the life of grace who are not\nchosen to the life of glory; as it is clear from what is said: \"Have\nnot I chosen you twelve, and one of you is a devil?\" (John 6:71). But\nthe book of life is the inscription of the divine election, as stated\nabove (A. 1). Therefore it applies also to the life of grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The book of life is the knowledge of\npredestination, as stated above (ibid.). But predestination does not\nregard the life of grace, except so far as it is directed to glory;\nfor those are not predestined who have grace and yet fail to obtain\nglory. The book of life altogether is only so called in regard to the\nlife of glory.\n\n_I answer that,_ The book of life, as stated above (A. 1), implies a\nconscription or a knowledge of those chosen to life. Now a man is\nchosen for something which does not belong to him by nature; and\nagain that to which a man is chosen has the aspect of an end. For a\nsoldier is not chosen or inscribed merely to put on armor, but to\nfight; since this is the proper duty to which military service is\ndirected. But the life of glory is an end exceeding human nature, as\nsaid above (Q. 23, A. 1). Wherefore, strictly speaking, the book of\nlife regards the life of glory.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The divine life, even considered as a life of glory, is\nnatural to God; whence in His regard there is no election, and in\nconsequence no book of life: for we do not say that anyone is chosen\nto possess the power of sense, or any of those things that are\nconsequent on nature.\n\nFrom this we gather the Reply to the Second Objection. For there is\nno election, nor a book of life, as regards the life of nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The life of grace has the aspect, not of an end, but of\nsomething directed towards an end. Hence nobody is said to be chosen\nto the life of grace, except so far as the life of grace is directed\nto glory. For this reason those who, possessing grace, fail to obtain\nglory, are not said to be chosen simply, but relatively. Likewise\nthey are not said to be written in the book of life simply, but\nrelatively; that is to say, that it is in the ordination and\nknowledge of God that they are to have some relation to eternal life,\naccording to their participation in grace.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 24, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Anyone May Be Blotted Out of the Book of Life?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that no one may be blotted out of the book of\nlife. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xx, 15): \"God's foreknowledge,\nwhich cannot be deceived, is the book of life.\" But nothing can be\ntaken away from the foreknowledge of God, nor from predestination.\nTherefore neither can anyone be blotted out from the book of life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is in a thing is in it according to the\ndisposition of that thing. But the book of life is something eternal\nand immutable. Therefore whatsoever is written therein, is there not\nin a temporary way, but immovably, and indelibly.\n\nObj. 3: Further, blotting out is the contrary to inscription. But\nnobody can be written a second time in the book of life. Neither\ntherefore can he be blotted out.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said, \"Let them be blotted out from the book\nof the living\" (Ps. 68:29).\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have said that none could be blotted out of the\nbook of life as a matter of fact, but only in the opinion of men. For\nit is customary in the Scriptures to say that something is done when\nit becomes known. Thus some are said to be written in the book of\nlife, inasmuch as men think they are written therein, on account of\nthe present righteousness they see in them; but when it becomes\nevident, either in this world or in the next, that they have fallen\nfrom that state of righteousness, they are then said to be blotted\nout. And thus a gloss explains the passage: \"Let them be blotted out\nof the book of the living.\" But because not to be blotted out of the\nbook of life is placed among the rewards of the just, according to the\ntext, \"He that shall overcome, shall thus be clothed in white\ngarments, and I will not blot his name out of the book of life\" (Apoc.\n3:5) (and what is promised to holy men, is not merely something in the\nopinion of men), it can therefore be said that to be blotted out, and\nnot blotted out, of the book of life is not only to be referred to the\nopinion of man, but to the reality of the fact. For the book of life\nis the inscription of those ordained to eternal life, to which one is\ndirected from two sources; namely, from predestination, which\ndirection never fails, and from grace; for whoever has grace, by this\nvery fact becomes fitted for eternal life. This direction fails\nsometimes; because some are directed by possessing grace, to obtain\neternal life, yet they fail to obtain it through mortal sin. Therefore\nthose who are ordained to possess eternal life through divine\npredestination are written down in the book of life simply, because\nthey are written therein to have eternal life in reality; such are\nnever blotted out from the book of life. Those, however, who are\nordained to eternal life, not through divine predestination, but\nthrough grace, are said to be written in the book of life not simply,\nbut relatively, for they are written therein not to have eternal life\nin itself, but in its cause only. Yet though these latter can be said\nto be blotted out of the book of life, this blotting out must not be\nreferred to God, as if God foreknew a thing, and afterwards knew it\nnot; but to the thing known, namely, because God knows one is first\nordained to eternal life, and afterwards not ordained when he falls\nfrom grace.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The act of blotting out does not refer to the book of\nlife as regards God's foreknowledge, as if in God there were any\nchange; but as regards things foreknown, which can change.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although things are immutably in God, yet in themselves\nthey are subject to change. To this it is that the blotting out of\nthe book of life refers.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The way in which one is said to be blotted out of the\nbook of life is that in which one is said to be written therein anew;\neither in the opinion of men, or because he begins again to have\nrelation towards eternal life through grace; which also is included\nin the knowledge of God, although not anew.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 25\n\nTHE POWER OF GOD\n(In Six Articles)\n\nAfter considering the divine foreknowledge and will, and other things\npertaining thereto, it remains for us to consider the power of God.\nAbout this are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there is power in God?\n\n(2) Whether His power is infinite?\n\n(3) Whether He is almighty?\n\n(4) Whether He could make the past not to have been?\n\n(5) Whether He could do what He does not, or not do what He does?\n\n(6) Whether what He makes He could make better?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Is Power in God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that power is not in God. For as primary matter\nis to power, so God, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary\nmatter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the\nfirst agent--namely, God--is devoid of power.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vi, 19),\nbetter than every power is its act. For form is better than matter;\nand action than active power, since it is its end. But nothing is\nbetter than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God, as\nwas shown above (Q. 3, A. 3). Therefore, there is no power in\nGod.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Power is the principle of operation. But the divine\npower is God's essence, since there is nothing accidental in God: and\nof the essence of God there is no principle. Therefore there is no\npower in God.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it was shown above (Q. 14, A. 8; Q. 19, A. 4) that\nGod's knowledge and will are the cause of things. But the cause and\nprinciple of a thing are identical. We ought not, therefore, to\nassign power to God; but only knowledge and will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said: \"Thou art mighty, O Lord, and Thy truth\nis round about Thee\" (Ps. 88:9).\n\n_I answer that,_ Power is twofold--namely, passive, which exists not\nat all in God; and active, which we must assign to Him in the highest\ndegree. For it is manifest that everything, according as it is in act\nand is perfect, is the active principle of something: whereas\neverything is passive according as it is deficient and imperfect. Now\nit was shown above (Q. 3, A. 2; Q. 4, AA. 1, 2), that God is pure\nact, simply and in all ways perfect, nor in Him does any imperfection\nfind place. Whence it most fittingly belongs to Him to be an active\nprinciple, and in no way whatsoever to be passive. On the other hand,\nthe notion of active principle is consistent with active power. For\nactive power is the principle of acting upon something else; whereas\npassive power is the principle of being acted upon by something else,\nas the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, 17). It remains, therefore, that\nin God there is active power in the highest degree.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Active power is not contrary to act, but is founded\nupon it, for everything acts according as it is actual: but passive\npower is contrary to act; for a thing is passive according as it is\npotential. Whence this potentiality is not in God, but only active\npower.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Whenever act is distinct from power, act must be nobler\nthan power. But God's action is not distinct from His power, for both\nare His divine essence; neither is His existence distinct from His\nessence. Hence it does not follow that there should be anything in\nGod nobler than His power.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In creatures, power is the principle not only of\naction, but likewise of effect. Thus in God the idea of power is\nretained, inasmuch as it is the principle of an effect; not, however,\nas it is a principle of action, for this is the divine essence\nitself; except, perchance, after our manner of understanding,\ninasmuch as the divine essence, which pre-contains in itself all\nperfection that exists in created things, can be understood either\nunder the notion of action, or under that of power; as also it is\nunderstood under the notion of _suppositum_ possessing nature, and\nunder that of nature. Accordingly the notion of power is retained in\nGod in so far as it is the principle of an effect.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Power is predicated of God not as something really\ndistinct from His knowledge and will, but as differing from them\nlogically; inasmuch as power implies a notion of a principle putting\ninto execution what the will commands, and what knowledge directs,\nwhich three things in God are identified. Or we may say, that the\nknowledge or will of God, according as it is the effective principle,\nhas the notion of power contained in it. Hence the consideration of\nthe knowledge and will of God precedes the consideration of His\npower, as the cause precedes the operation and effect.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Power of God Is Infinite?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the power of God is not infinite. For\neverything that is infinite is imperfect according to the Philosopher\n(Phys. iii, 6). But the power of God is far from imperfect. Therefore\nit is not infinite.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every power is made known by its effect; otherwise\nit would be ineffectual. If, then, the power of God were infinite, it\ncould produce an infinite effect, but this is impossible.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 79) that if the\npower of any corporeal thing were infinite, it would cause\ninstantaneous movement. God, however, does not cause instantaneous\nmovement, but moves the spiritual creature in time, and the corporeal\ncreature in place and time, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. 20, 22,\n23). Therefore, His power is not infinite.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. viii), that \"God's power is\nimmeasurable. He is the living mighty one.\" Now everything that is\nimmeasurable is infinite. Therefore the power of God is infinite.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), active power exists in God\naccording to the measure in which He is actual. Now His existence is\ninfinite, inasmuch as it is not limited by anything that receives it,\nas is clear from what has been said, when we discussed the infinity of\nthe divine essence (Q. 7, A. 1). Wherefore, it is necessary that\nthe active power in God should be infinite. For in every agent is it\nfound that the more perfectly an agent has the form by which it acts\nthe greater its power to act. For instance, the hotter a thing is, the\ngreater the power has it to give heat; and it would have infinite\npower to give heat, were its own heat infinite. Whence, since the\ndivine essence, through which God acts, is infinite, as was shown\nabove (Q. 7, A. 1) it follows that His power likewise is infinite.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is here speaking of an infinity in\nregard to matter not limited by any form; and such infinity belongs\nto quantity. But the divine essence is otherwise, as was shown above\n(Q. 7, A. 1); and consequently so also His power. It does not follow,\ntherefore, that it is imperfect.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The power of a univocal agent is wholly manifested in\nits effect. The generative power of man, for example, is not able to\ndo more than beget man. But the power of a non-univocal agent does\nnot wholly manifest itself in the production of its effect: as, for\nexample, the power of the sun does not wholly manifest itself in the\nproduction of an animal generated from putrefaction. Now it is clear\nthat God is not a univocal agent. For nothing agrees with Him either\nin species or in genus, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 5; Q. 4, A. 3).\nWhence it follows that His effect is always less than His power. It\nis not necessary, therefore, that the infinite power of God should be\nmanifested so as to produce an infinite effect. Yet even if it were\nto produce no effect, the power of God would not be ineffectual;\nbecause a thing is ineffectual which is ordained towards an end to\nwhich it does not attain. But the power of God is not ordered toward\nits effect as towards an end; rather, it is the end of the effect\nproduced by it.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 79) proves that if a body\nhad infinite power, it would cause a non-temporal movement. And he\nshows that the power of the mover of heaven is infinite, because it\ncan move in an infinite time. It remains, therefore, according to his\nreckoning, that the infinite power of a body, if such existed, would\nmove without time; not, however, the power of an incorporeal mover.\nThe reason of this is that one body moving another is a univocal\nagent; wherefore it follows that the whole power of the agent is made\nknown in its motion. Since then the greater the power of a moving\nbody, the more quickly does it move; the necessary conclusion is that\nif its power were infinite, it would move beyond comparison faster,\nand this is to move without time. An incorporeal mover, however, is\nnot a univocal agent; whence it is not necessary that the whole of\nits power should be manifested in motion, so as to move without time;\nand especially since it moves in accordance with the disposition of\nits will.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 3]\n\nWhether God Is Omnipotent?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is not omnipotent. For movement and\npassiveness belong to everything. But this is impossible with God,\nfor He is immovable, as was said above (Q. 2, A. 3). Therefore He\nis not omnipotent.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sin is an act of some kind. But God cannot sin,\nnor \"deny Himself\" as it is said in 2 Tim. 2:13. Therefore He is\nnot omnipotent.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is said of God that He manifests His omnipotence\n\"especially by sparing and having mercy\" [*Collect, 10th Sunday after\nPentecost]. Therefore the greatest act possible to the divine power\nis to spare and have mercy. There are things much greater, however,\nthan sparing and having mercy; for example, to create another world,\nand the like. Therefore God is not omnipotent.\n\nObj. 4: Further, upon the text, \"God hath made foolish the wisdom of\nthis world\" (1 Cor. 1:20), a gloss says: \"God hath made the wisdom of\nthis world foolish [*Vulg.: 'Hath not God', etc.] by showing those\nthings to be possible which it judges to be impossible.\" Whence it\nwould seem that nothing is to be judged possible or impossible in\nreference to inferior causes, as the wisdom of this world judges\nthem; but in reference to the divine power. If God, then, were\nomnipotent, all things would be possible; nothing, therefore\nimpossible. But if we take away the impossible, then we destroy also\nthe necessary; for what necessarily exists is impossible not to\nexist. Therefore there would be nothing at all that is necessary in\nthings if God were omnipotent. But this is an impossibility.\nTherefore God is not omnipotent.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said: \"No word shall be impossible with God\"\n(Luke 1:37).\n\n_I answer that,_ All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems\ndifficult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for\nthere may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word 'all' when we\nsay that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter\naright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this\nphrase, \"God can do all things,\" is rightly understood to mean that\nGod can do all things that are possible; and for this reason He is\nsaid to be omnipotent. Now according to the Philosopher (Metaph. v,\n17), a thing is said to be possible in two ways. First in relation to\nsome power, thus whatever is subject to human power is said to be\npossible to man. Secondly absolutely, on account of the relation in\nwhich the very terms stand to each other. Now God cannot be said to be\nomnipotent through being able to do all things that are possible to\ncreated nature; for the divine power extends farther than that. If,\nhowever, we were to say that God is omnipotent because He can do all\nthings that are possible to His power, there would be a vicious circle\nin explaining the nature of His power. For this would be saying\nnothing else but that God is omnipotent, because He can do all that He\nis able to do.\n\nIt remains therefore, that God is called omnipotent because He can do\nall things that are possible absolutely; which is the second way of\nsaying a thing is possible. For a thing is said to be possible or\nimpossible absolutely, according to the relation in which the very\nterms stand to one another, possible if the predicate is not\nincompatible with the subject, as that Socrates sits; and absolutely\nimpossible when the predicate is altogether incompatible with the\nsubject, as, for instance, that a man is a donkey.\n\nIt must, however, be remembered that since every agent produces an\neffect like itself, to each active power there corresponds a thing\npossible as its proper object according to the nature of that act on\nwhich its active power is founded; for instance, the power of giving\nwarmth is related as to its proper object to the being capable of\nbeing warmed. The divine existence, however, upon which the nature of\npower in God is founded, is infinite, and is not limited to any genus\nof being; but possesses within itself the perfection of all being.\nWhence, whatsoever has or can have the nature of being, is numbered\namong the absolutely possible things, in respect of which God is\ncalled omnipotent. Now nothing is opposed to the idea of being except\nnon-being. Therefore, that which implies being and non-being at the\nsame time is repugnant to the idea of an absolutely possible thing,\nwithin the scope of the divine omnipotence. For such cannot come under\nthe divine omnipotence, not because of any defect in the power of God,\nbut because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing.\nTherefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is\nnumbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is\ncalled omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not\ncome within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have\nthe aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things\ncannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to\nthe word of the angel, saying: \"No word shall be impossible with God.\"\nFor whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no\nintellect can possibly conceive such a thing.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God is said to be omnipotent in respect to His active\npower, not to passive power, as was shown above (A. 1). Whence the\nfact that He is immovable or impassible is not repugnant to His\nomnipotence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To sin is to fall short of a perfect action; hence to\nbe able to sin is to be able to fall short in action, which is\nrepugnant to omnipotence. Therefore it is that God cannot sin,\nbecause of His omnipotence. Nevertheless, the Philosopher says\n(Topic. iv, 3) that God can deliberately do what is evil. But this\nmust be understood either on a condition, the antecedent of which is\nimpossible--as, for instance, if we were to say that God can do evil\nthings if He will. For there is no reason why a conditional\nproposition should not be true, though both the antecedent and\nconsequent are impossible: as if one were to say: \"If man is a\ndonkey, he has four feet.\" Or he may be understood to mean that God\ncan do some things which now seem to be evil: which, however, if He\ndid them, would then be good. Or he is, perhaps, speaking after the\ncommon manner of the heathen, who thought that men became gods, like\nJupiter or Mercury.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God's omnipotence is particularly shown in sparing and\nhaving mercy, because in this is it made manifest that God has\nsupreme power, that He freely forgives sins. For it is not for one\nwho is bound by laws of a superior to forgive sins of his own free\nwill. Or, because by sparing and having mercy upon men, He leads them\non to the participation of an infinite good; which is the ultimate\neffect of the divine power. Or because, as was said above (Q. 21, A.\n4), the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the\ndivine works. For nothing is due to anyone, except on account of\nsomething already given him gratuitously by God. In this way the\ndivine omnipotence is particularly made manifest, because to it\npertains the first foundation of all good things.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The absolute possible is not so called in reference\neither to higher causes, or to inferior causes, but in reference to\nitself. But the possible in reference to some power is named possible\nin reference to its proximate cause. Hence those things which it\nbelongs to God alone to do immediately--as, for example, to create,\nto justify, and the like--are said to be possible in reference to a\nhigher cause. Those things, however, which are of such kind as to be\ndone by inferior causes are said to be possible in reference to those\ninferior causes. For it is according to the condition of the\nproximate cause that the effect has contingency or necessity, as was\nshown above (Q. 14, A. 1, ad 2). Thus is it that the wisdom of the\nworld is deemed foolish, because what is impossible to nature, it\njudges to be impossible to God. So it is clear that the omnipotence\nof God does not take away from things their impossibility and\nnecessity.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 4]\n\nWhether God Can Make the Past Not to Have Been?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God can make the past not to have been.\nFor what is impossible in itself is much more impossible than that\nwhich is only impossible accidentally. But God can do what is\nimpossible in itself, as to give sight to the blind, or to raise the\ndead. Therefore, and much more can He do what is only impossible\naccidentally. Now for the past not to have been is impossible\naccidentally: thus for Socrates not to be running is accidentally\nimpossible, from the fact that his running is a thing of the past.\nTherefore God can make the past not to have been.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what God could do, He can do now, since His power is\nnot lessened. But God could have effected, before Socrates ran, that\nhe should not run. Therefore, when he has run, God could effect that\nhe did not run.\n\nObj. 3: Further, charity is a more excellent virtue than virginity.\nBut God can supply charity that is lost; therefore also lost\nvirginity. Therefore He can so effect that what was corrupt should\nnot have been corrupt.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (Ep. 22 ad Eustoch.): \"Although God can\ndo all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been\ncorrupted.\" Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot effect that\nanything else which is past should not have been.\n\n_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 7, A. 2), there does not\nfall under the scope of God's omnipotence anything that implies a\ncontradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a\ncontradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates\nis sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did\nnot sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the\npast. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not happen.\nWhence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the\nscope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says\n(Contra Faust. xxix, 5): \"Whosoever says, If God is almighty, let Him\nmake what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to\nsay: If God is almighty let Him effect that what is true, by the very\nfact that it is true, be false\": and the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,\n2): \"Of this one thing alone is God deprived--namely, to make undone\nthe things that have been done.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not\nto have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for\ninstance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is\nconsidered as past, that it should not have been is impossible, not\nonly in itself, but absolutely since it implies a contradiction.\nThus, it is more impossible than the raising of the dead; in which\nthere is nothing contradictory, because this is reckoned impossible\nin reference to some power, that is to say, some natural power; for\nsuch impossible things do come beneath the scope of divine power.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As God, in accordance with the perfection of the divine\npower, can do all things, and yet some things are not subject to His\npower, because they fall short of being possible; so, also, if we\nregard the immutability of the divine power, whatever God could do,\nHe can do now. Some things, however, at one time were in the nature\nof possibility, whilst they were yet to be done, which now fall short\nof the nature of possibility, when they have been done. So is God\nsaid not to be able to do them, because they themselves cannot be\ndone.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from\na woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot\nbe removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having\nsinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 5]\n\nWhether God Can Do What He Does Not?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God cannot do other than what He does. For\nGod cannot do what He has not foreknown and pre-ordained that He would\ndo. But He neither foreknew nor pre-ordained that He would do anything\nexcept what He does. Therefore He cannot do except what He does.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God can only do what ought to be done and what is\nright to be done. But God is not bound to do what He does not; nor is\nit right that He should do what He does not. Therefore He cannot do\nexcept what He does.\n\nObj. 3: Further, God cannot do anything that is not good and\nbefitting creation. But it is not good for creatures nor befitting\nthem to be otherwise than as they are. Therefore God cannot do except\nwhat He does.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said: \"Thinkest thou that I cannot ask My\nFather, and He will give Me presently more than twelve legions of\nangels?\" (Matt. 26:53). But He neither asked for them, nor did His\nFather show them to refute the Jews. Therefore God can do what He\ndoes not.\n\n_I answer that,_ In this matter certain persons erred in two ways. Some\nlaid it down that God acts from natural necessity in such way that as\nfrom the action of nature nothing else can happen beyond what actually\ntakes place--as, for instance, from the seed of man, a man must come,\nand from that of an olive, an olive; so from the divine operation\nthere could not result other things, nor another order of things, than\nthat which now is. But we showed above (Q. 19, A. 3) that God\ndoes not act from natural necessity, but that His will is the cause of\nall things; nor is that will naturally and from any necessity\ndetermined to those things. Whence in no way at all is the present\ncourse of events produced by God from any necessity, so that other\nthings could not happen. Others, however, said that the divine power\nis restricted to this present course of events through the order of\nthe divine wisdom and justice without which God does nothing. But\nsince the power of God, which is His essence, is nothing else but His\nwisdom, it can indeed be fittingly said that there is nothing in the\ndivine power which is not in the order of the divine wisdom; for the\ndivine wisdom includes the whole potency of the divine power. Yet the\norder placed in creation by divine wisdom, in which order the notion\nof His justice consists, as said above (Q. 21, A. 2), is not so\nadequate to the divine wisdom that the divine wisdom should be\nrestricted to this present order of things. Now it is clear that the\nwhole idea of order which a wise man puts into things made by him is\ntaken from their end. So, when the end is proportionate to the things\nmade for that end, the wisdom of the maker is restricted to some\ndefinite order. But the divine goodness is an end exceeding beyond all\nproportion things created. Whence the divine wisdom is not so\nrestricted to any particular order that no other course of events\ncould happen. Wherefore we must simply say that God can do other\nthings than those He has done.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In ourselves, in whom power and essence are distinct\nfrom will and intellect, and again intellect from wisdom, and will\nfrom justice, there can be something in the power which is not in the\njust will nor in the wise intellect. But in God, power and essence,\nwill and intellect, wisdom and justice, are one and the same. Whence,\nthere can be nothing in the divine power which cannot also be in His\njust will or in His wise intellect. Nevertheless, because His will\ncannot be determined from necessity to this or that order of things,\nexcept upon supposition, as was said above (Q. 19, A. 3), neither are\nthe wisdom and justice of God restricted to this present order, as\nwas shown above; so nothing prevents there being something in the\ndivine power which He does not will, and which is not included in the\norder which He has place in things. Again, because power is\nconsidered as executing, the will as commanding, and the intellect\nand wisdom as directing; what is attributed to His power considered\nin itself, God is said to be able to do in accordance with His\nabsolute power. Of such a kind is everything which has the nature of\nbeing, as was said above (A. 3). What is, however, attributed to the\ndivine power, according as it carries into execution the command of a\njust will, God is said to be able to do by His ordinary power. In\nthis manner, we must say that God can do other things by His absolute\npower than those He has foreknown and pre-ordained He would do. But\nit could not happen that He should do anything which He had not\nforeknown, and had not pre-ordained that He would do, because His\nactual doing is subject to His foreknowledge and pre-ordination,\nthough His power, which is His nature, is not so. For God does things\nbecause He wills so to do; yet the power to do them does not come\nfrom His will, but from His nature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God is bound to nobody but Himself. Hence, when it is\nsaid that God can only do what He ought, nothing else is meant by\nthis than that God can do nothing but what is befitting to Himself,\nand just. But these words \"befitting\" and \"just\" may be understood in\ntwo ways: one, in direct connection with the verb \"is\"; and thus they\nwould be restricted to the present order of things; and would concern\nHis power. Then what is said in the objection is false; for the sense\nis that God can do nothing except what is now fitting and just. If,\nhowever, they be joined directly with the verb \"can\" (which has the\neffect of extending the meaning), and then secondly with \"is,\" the\npresent will be signified, but in a confused and general way. The\nsentence would then be true in this sense: \"God cannot do anything\nexcept that which, if He did it, would be suitable and just.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although this order of things be restricted to what now\nexists, the divine power and wisdom are not thus restricted. Whence,\nalthough no other order would be suitable and good to the things\nwhich now are, yet God can do other things and impose upon them\nanother order.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 25, Art. 6]\n\nWhether God Can Do Better Than What He Does?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God cannot do better than He does. For\nwhatever God does, He does in a most powerful and wise way. But a\nthing is so much the better done as it is more powerfully and wisely\ndone. Therefore God cannot do anything better than He does.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine thus argues (Contra Maximin. iii, 8):\n\"If God could, but would not, beget a Son His equal, He would have\nbeen envious.\" For the same reason, if God could have made better\nthings than He has done, but was not willing so to do, He would have\nbeen envious. But envy is far removed from God. Therefore God makes\neverything of the best. He cannot therefore make anything better\nthan He does.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is very good and the best of all cannot be\nbettered; because nothing is better than the best. But as Augustine\nsays (Enchiridion 10), \"each thing that God has made is good, and,\ntaken all together they are very good; because in them all consists\nthe wondrous beauty of the universe.\" Therefore the good in the\nuniverse could not be made better by God.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Christ as man is full of grace and truth, and has\nthe Spirit without measure; and so He cannot be better. Again created\nhappiness is described as the highest good, and thus cannot be\nbetter. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is raised above all the choirs of\nangels, and so cannot be better than she is. God cannot therefore\nmake all things better than He has made them.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Eph. 3:20): \"God is able to do all\nthings more abundantly than we desire or understand.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The goodness of anything is twofold; one, which is of\nthe essence of it--thus, for instance, to be rational pertains to the\nessence of man. As regards this good, God cannot make a thing better\nthan it is itself; although He can make another thing better than it;\neven as He cannot make the number four greater than it is; because if\nit were greater it would no longer be four, but another number. For\nthe addition of a substantial difference in definitions is after the\nmanner of the addition of unity of numbers (Metaph. viii, 10). Another\nkind of goodness is that which is over and above the essence; thus,\nthe good of a man is to be virtuous or wise. As regards this kind of\ngoodness, God can make better the things He has made. Absolutely\nspeaking, however, God can make something else better than each thing\nmade by Him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When it is said that God can make a thing better than\nHe makes it, if \"better\" is taken substantively, this proposition is\ntrue. For He can always make something else better than each\nindividual thing: and He can make the same thing in one way better\nthan it is, and in another way not; as was explained above. If,\nhowever, \"better\" is taken as an adverb, implying the manner of the\nmaking; thus God cannot make anything better than He makes it,\nbecause He cannot make it from greater wisdom and goodness. But if it\nimplies the manner of the thing done, He can make something better;\nbecause He can give to things made by Him a better manner of\nexistence as regards the accidents, although not as regards the\nsubstance.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is of the nature of a son that he should be equal to\nhis father, when he comes to maturity. But it is not of the nature of\nanything created, that it should be better than it was made by God.\nHence the comparison fails.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The universe, the present creation being supposed,\ncannot be better, on account of the most beautiful order given to\nthings by God; in which the good of the universe consists. For if any\none thing were bettered, the proportion of order would be destroyed;\nas if one string were stretched more than it ought to be, the melody\nof the harp would be destroyed. Yet God could make other things, or\nadd something to the present creation; and then there would be\nanother and a better universe.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The humanity of Christ, from the fact that it is united\nto the Godhead; and created happiness from the fact that it is the\nfruition of God; and the Blessed Virgin from the fact that she is the\nmother of God; have all a certain infinite dignity from the infinite\ngood, which is God. And on this account there cannot be anything\nbetter than these; just as there cannot be anything better than God.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 26\n\nOF THE DIVINE BEATITUDE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nAfter considering all that pertains to the unity of the divine\nessence, we come to treat of the divine beatitude. Concerning this,\nthere are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether beatitude belongs to God?\n\n(2) In regard to what is God called blessed; does this regard His act\nof intellect?\n\n(3) Whether He is essentially the beatitude of each of the blessed?\n\n(4) Whether all other beatitude is included in the divine beatitude?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 26, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Beatitude Belongs to God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For\nbeatitude according to Boethius (De Consol. iv) \"is a state made\nperfect by the aggregation of all good things.\" But the aggregation of\ngoods has no place in God; nor has composition. Therefore beatitude\ndoes not belong to God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, beatitude or happiness is the reward of virtue,\naccording to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9). But reward does not apply\nto God; as neither does merit. Therefore neither does beatitude.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says: \"Which in His times He shall\nshow, who is the Blessed and only Almighty, the King of Kings and\nLord of Lords.\" (1 Tim. 6:15).\n\n_I answer that,_ Beatitude belongs to God in a very special manner.\nFor nothing else is understood to be meant by the term beatitude than\nthe perfect good of an intellectual nature; which is capable of\nknowing that it has a sufficiency of the good which it possesses, to\nwhich it is competent that good or ill may befall, and which can\ncontrol its own actions. All of these things belong in a most\nexcellent manner to God, namely, to be perfect, and to possess\nintelligence. Whence beatitude belongs to God in the highest degree.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Aggregation of good is in God, after the manner not of\ncomposition, but of simplicity; for those things which in creatures\nis manifold, pre-exist in God, as was said above (Q. 4, A. 2; Q. 13,\nA. 4), in simplicity and unity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It belongs as an accident to beatitude or happiness to\nbe the reward of virtue, so far as anyone attains to beatitude; even\nas to be the term of generation belongs accidentally to a being, so\nfar as it passes from potentiality to act. As, then, God has being,\nthough not begotten; so He has beatitude, although not acquired by\nmerit.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 26, Art. 2]\n\nWhether God Is Called Blessed in Respect of His Intellect?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is not called blessed in respect to\nHis intellect. For beatitude is the highest good. But good is said to\nbe in God in regard to His essence, because good has reference to\nbeing which is according to essence, according to Boethius (De\nHebdom.). Therefore beatitude also is said to be in God in regard to\nHis essence, and not to His intellect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Beatitude implies the notion of end. Now the end is\nthe object of the will, as also is the good. Therefore beatitude is\nsaid to be in God with reference to His will, and not with reference\nto His intellect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxii, 7): \"He is in glory,\nWho whilst He rejoices in Himself, needs not further praise.\" To be\nin glory, however, is the same as to be blessed. Therefore, since we\nenjoy God in respect to our intellect, because \"vision is the whole\nof the reward,\" as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii), it would seem\nthat beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His intellect. it\nwould seem that beatitude is said to be in God in respect of His\nintellect.\n\n_I answer that,_ Beatitude, as stated above (A. 1), is the perfect\ngood of an intellectual nature. Thus it is that, as everything desires\nthe perfection of its nature, intellectual nature desires naturally to\nbe happy. Now that which is most perfect in any intellectual nature is\nthe intellectual operation, by which in some sense it grasps\neverything. Whence the beatitude of every intellectual nature consists\nin understanding. Now in God, to be and to understand are one and the\nsame thing; differing only in the manner of our understanding them.\nBeatitude must therefore be assigned to God in respect of His\nintellect; as also to the blessed, who are called blessed [beati] by\nreason of the assimilation to His beatitude.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument proves that beatitude belongs to God; not\nthat beatitude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His\nessence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since beatitude is a good, it is the object of the\nwill; now the object is understood as prior to the act of a power.\nWhence in our manner of understanding, divine beatitude precedes the\nact of the will at rest in it. This cannot be other than the act of\nthe intellect; and thus beatitude is to be found in an act of the\nintellect.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 26, Art. 3]\n\nWhether God Is the Beatitude of Each of the Blessed?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that God is the beatitude of each of the\nblessed. For God is the supreme good, as was said above (Q. 6, AA. 2,\n4). But it is quite impossible that there should be many supreme\ngoods, as also is clear from what has been said above (Q. 11, A. 3).\nTherefore, since it is of the essence of beatitude that it should be\nthe supreme good, it seems that beatitude is nothing else but God\nHimself.\n\nObj. 2: Further, beatitude is the last end of the rational\nnature. But to be the last end of the rational nature belongs only to\nGod. Therefore the beatitude of every blessed is God alone.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The beatitude of one is greater than that of\nanother, according to 1 Cor. 15:41: \"Star differeth from star in\nglory.\" But nothing is greater than God. Therefore beatitude is\nsomething different from God.\n\n_I answer that,_ The beatitude of an intellectual nature consists in\nan act of the intellect. In this we may consider two things, namely,\nthe object of the act, which is the thing understood; and the act\nitself which is to understand. If, then, beatitude be considered on\nthe side of the object, God is the only beatitude; for everyone is\nblessed from this sole fact, that he understands God, in accordance\nwith the saying of Augustine (Confess. v, 4): \"Blessed is he who\nknoweth Thee, though he know nought else.\" But as regards the act of\nunderstanding, beatitude is a created thing in beatified creatures;\nbut in God, even in this way, it is an uncreated thing.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Beatitude, as regards its object, is the supreme good\nabsolutely, but as regards its act, in beatified creatures it is\ntheir supreme good, not absolutely, but in that kind of goods which a\ncreature can participate.\n\nReply Obj. 2: End is twofold, namely, _objective_ and _subjective,_\nas the Philosopher says (Greater Ethics i, 3), namely, the \"thing\nitself\" and \"its use.\" Thus to a miser the end is money, and its\nacquisition. Accordingly God is indeed the last end of a rational\ncreature, as the thing itself; but created beatitude is the end, as\nthe use, or rather fruition, of the thing.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 26, Art. 4]\n\nWhether All Other Beatitude Is Included in the Beatitude of God?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the divine beatitude does not embrace all\nother beatitudes. For there are some false beatitudes. But nothing\nfalse can be in God. Therefore the divine beatitude does not embrace\nall other beatitudes.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a certain beatitude, according to some, consists\nin things corporeal; as in pleasure, riches, and such like. Now none\nof these have to do with God, since He is incorporeal. Therefore His\nbeatitude does not embrace all other beatitudes.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Beatitude is a certain perfection. But the divine\nperfection embraces all other perfection, as was shown above\n(Q. 4, A. 2). Therefore the divine beatitude embraces all other\nbeatitudes.\n\n_I answer that,_ Whatever is desirable in whatsoever beatitude, whether\ntrue or false, pre-exists wholly and in a more eminent degree in the\ndivine beatitude. As to contemplative happiness, God possesses a\ncontinual and most certain contemplation of Himself and of all things\nelse; and as to that which is active, He has the governance of the\nwhole universe. As to earthly happiness, which consists in delight,\nriches, power, dignity, and fame, according to Boethius (De Consol.\niii, 10), He possesses joy in Himself and all things else for His\ndelight; instead of riches He has that complete self-sufficiency,\nwhich is promised by riches; in place of power, He has omnipotence;\nfor dignities, the government of all things; and in place of fame, He\npossesses the admiration of all creatures.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A particular kind of beatitude is false according as it\nfalls short of the idea of true beatitude; and thus it is not in God.\nBut whatever semblance it has, howsoever slight, of beatitude, the\nwhole of it pre-exists in the divine beatitude.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The good that exists in things corporeal in a corporeal\nmanner, is also in God, but in a spiritual manner.\n\nWe have now spoken enough concerning what pertains to the unity of\nthe divine essence.\n_______________________\n\nTREATISE ON THE MOST HOLY TRINITY (QQ. 27-43)\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 27\n\nTHE PROCESSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS\n(In Five Articles)\n\nHaving considered what belongs to the unity of the divine essence, it\nremains to treat of what belongs to the Trinity of the persons in God.\nAnd because the divine Persons are distinguished from each other\naccording to the relations of origin, the order of the doctrine leads\nus to consider firstly, the question of origin or procession;\nsecondly, the relations of origin; thirdly, the persons.\n\nConcerning procession there are five points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there is procession in God?\n\n(2) Whether any procession in God can be called generation?\n\n(3) Whether there can be any other procession in God besides\ngeneration?\n\n(4) Whether that other procession can be called generation?\n\n(5) Whether there are more than two processions in God?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 27, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Is Procession in God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there cannot be any procession in God.\nFor procession signifies outward movement. But in God there is nothing\nmobile, nor anything extraneous. Therefore neither is there procession\nin God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, everything which proceeds differs from that whence\nit proceeds. But in God there is no diversity; but supreme\nsimplicity. Therefore in God there is no procession.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to proceed from another seems to be against the\nnature of the first principle. But God is the first principle, as\nshown above (Q. 2, A. 3). Therefore in God there is no procession.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord says, \"From God I proceeded\" (John 8:42).\n\n_I answer that,_ Divine Scripture uses, in relation to God, names which\nsignify procession. This procession has been differently understood.\nSome have understood it in the sense of an effect, proceeding from its\ncause; so Arius took it, saying that the Son proceeds from the Father\nas His primary creature, and that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the\nFather and the Son as the creature of both. In this sense neither the\nSon nor the Holy Ghost would be true God: and this is contrary to what\nis said of the Son, \"That . . . we may be in His true Son. This is\ntrue God\" (1 John 5:20). Of the Holy Ghost it is also said, \"Know you\nnot that your members are the temple of the Holy Ghost?\" (1 Cor.\n6:19). Now, to have a temple is God's prerogative. Others take this\nprocession to mean the cause proceeding to the effect, as moving it,\nor impressing its own likeness on it; in which sense it was understood\nby Sabellius, who said that God the Father is called Son in assuming\nflesh from the Virgin, and that the Father also is called Holy Ghost\nin sanctifying the rational creature, and moving it to life. The words\nof the Lord contradict such a meaning, when He speaks of Himself, \"The\nSon cannot of Himself do anything\" (John 5:19); while many other\npassages show the same, whereby we know that the Father is not the\nSon. Careful examination shows that both of these opinions take\nprocession as meaning an outward act; hence neither of them affirms\nprocession as existing in God Himself; whereas, since procession\nalways supposes action, and as there is an outward procession\ncorresponding to the act tending to external matter, so there must be\nan inward procession corresponding to the act remaining within the\nagent. This applies most conspicuously to the intellect, the action of\nwhich remains in the intelligent agent. For whenever we understand, by\nthe very fact of understanding there proceeds something within us,\nwhich is a conception of the object understood, a conception issuing\nfrom our intellectual power and proceeding from our knowledge of that\nobject. This conception is signified by the spoken word; and it is\ncalled the word of the heart signified by the word of the voice.\n\nAs God is above all things, we should understand what is said of God,\nnot according to the mode of the lowest creatures, namely bodies, but\nfrom the similitude of the highest creatures, the intellectual\nsubstances; while even the similitudes derived from these fall short\nin the representation of divine objects. Procession, therefore, is not\nto be understood from what it is in bodies, either according to local\nmovement or by way of a cause proceeding forth to its exterior effect,\nas, for instance, like heat from the agent to the thing made hot.\nRather it is to be understood by way of an intelligible emanation, for\nexample, of the intelligible word which proceeds from the speaker, yet\nremains in him. In that sense the Catholic Faith understands\nprocession as existing in God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This objection comes from the idea of procession in the\nsense of local motion, or of an action tending to external matter, or\nto an exterior effect; which kind of procession does not exist in\nGod, as we have explained.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Whatever proceeds by way of outward procession is\nnecessarily distinct from the source whence it proceeds, whereas,\nwhatever proceeds within by an intelligible procession is not\nnecessarily distinct; indeed, the more perfectly it proceeds, the\nmore closely it is one with the source whence it proceeds. For it is\nclear that the more a thing is understood, the more closely is the\nintellectual conception joined and united to the intelligent agent;\nsince the intellect by the very act of understanding is made one with\nthe object understood. Thus, as the divine intelligence is the very\nsupreme perfection of God (Q. 14, A. 2), the divine Word is of\nnecessity perfectly one with the source whence He proceeds, without\nany kind of diversity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To proceed from a principle, so as to be something\noutside and distinct from that principle, is irreconcilable with the\nidea of a first principle; whereas an intimate and uniform procession\nby way of an intelligible act is included in the idea of a first\nprinciple. For when we call the builder the principle of the house,\nin the idea of such a principle is included that of his art; and it\nwould be included in the idea of the first principle were the builder\nthe first principle of the house. God, Who is the first principle of\nall things, may be compared to things created as the architect is to\nthings designed.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 27, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Any Procession in God Can Be Called Generation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no procession in God can be called\ngeneration. For generation is change from non-existence to existence,\nand is opposed to corruption; while matter is the subject of both.\nNothing of all this belongs to God. Therefore generation cannot exist\nin God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, procession exists in God, according to an\nintelligible mode, as above explained (A. 1). But such a process is\nnot called generation in us; therefore neither is it to be so called\nin God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, anything that is generated derives existence from\nits generator. Therefore such existence is a derived existence. But\nno derived existence can be a self-subsistence. Therefore, since the\ndivine existence is self-subsisting (Q. 3, A. 4), it follows that no\ngenerated existence can be the divine existence. Therefore there is\nno generation in God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 2:7): \"This day have I begotten\nThee.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The procession of the Word in God is called\ngeneration. In proof whereof we must observe that generation has a\ntwofold meaning: one common to everything subject to generation and\ncorruption; in which sense generation is nothing but change from\nnon-existence to existence. In another sense it is proper and belongs\nto living things; in which sense it signifies the origin of a living\nbeing from a conjoined living principle; and this is properly called\nbirth. Not everything of that kind, however, is called begotten; but,\nstrictly speaking, only what proceeds by way of similitude. Hence a\nhair has not the aspect of generation and sonship, but only that has\nwhich proceeds by way of a similitude. Nor will any likeness suffice;\nfor a worm which is generated from animals has not the aspect of\ngeneration and sonship, although it has a generic similitude; for\nthis kind of generation requires that there should be a procession by\nway of similitude in the same specific nature; as a man proceeds from\na man, and a horse from a horse. So in living things, which proceed\nfrom potential to actual life, such as men and animals, generation\nincludes both these kinds of generation. But if there is a being\nwhose life does not proceed from potentiality to act, procession (if\nfound in such a being) excludes entirely the first kind of\ngeneration; whereas it may have that kind of generation which belongs\nto living things. So in this manner the procession of the Word in God\nis generation; for He proceeds by way of intelligible action, which\nis a vital operation:--from a conjoined principle (as above\ndescribed):--by way of similitude, inasmuch as the concept of the\nintellect is a likeness of the object conceived:--and exists in the\nsame nature, because in God the act of understanding and His\nexistence are the same, as shown above (Q. 14, A. 4). Hence the\nprocession of the Word in God is called generation; and the Word\nHimself proceeding is called the Son.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This objection is based on the idea of generation in\nthe first sense, importing the issuing forth from potentiality to\nact; in which sense it is not found in God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The act of human understanding in ourselves is not the\nsubstance itself of the intellect; hence the word which proceeds\nwithin us by intelligible operation is not of the same nature as the\nsource whence it proceeds; so the idea of generation cannot be\nproperly and fully applied to it. But the divine act of intelligence\nis the very substance itself of the one who understands (Q. 14, A.\n4). The Word proceeding therefore proceeds as subsisting in the same\nnature; and so is properly called begotten, and Son. Hence Scripture\nemploys terms which denote generation of living things in order to\nsignify the procession of the divine Wisdom, namely, conception and\nbirth; as is declared in the person of the divine Wisdom, \"The depths\nwere not as yet, and I was already conceived; before the hills, I was\nbrought forth.\" (Prov. 8:24). In our way of understanding we use the\nword \"conception\" in order to signify that in the word of our\nintellect is found the likeness of the thing understood, although\nthere be no identity of nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Not everything derived from another has existence in\nanother subject; otherwise we could not say that the whole substance\nof created being comes from God, since there is no subject that could\nreceive the whole substance. So, then, what is generated in God\nreceives its existence from the generator, not as though that\nexistence were received into matter or into a subject (which would\nconflict with the divine self-subsistence); but when we speak of His\nexistence as received, we mean that He Who proceeds receives divine\nexistence from another; not, however, as if He were other from the\ndivine nature. For in the perfection itself of the divine existence\nare contained both the Word intelligibly proceeding and the principle\nof the Word, with whatever belongs to His perfection (Q. 4, A. 2).\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 27, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Any Other Procession Exists in God Besides That of the Word?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no other procession exists in God\nbesides the generation of the Word. Because, for whatever reason we\nadmit another procession, we should be led to admit yet another, and\nso on to infinitude; which cannot be. Therefore we must stop at the\nfirst, and hold that there exists only one procession in God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every nature possesses but one mode of\nself-communication; because operations derive unity and diversity\nfrom their terms. But procession in God is only by way of\ncommunication of the divine nature. Therefore, as there is only one\ndivine nature (Q. 11, A. 4), it follows that only one procession\nexists in God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if any other procession but the intelligible\nprocession of the Word existed in God, it could only be the\nprocession of love, which is by the operation of the will. But such a\nprocession is identified with the intelligible procession of the\nintellect, inasmuch as the will in God is the same as His intellect\n(Q. 19, A. 1). Therefore in God there is no other procession but the\nprocession of the Word.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father (John\n15:26); and He is distinct from the Son, according to the words, \"I\nwill ask My Father, and He will give you another Paraclete\" (John\n14:16). Therefore in God another procession exists besides the\nprocession of the Word.\n\n_I answer that,_ There are two processions in God; the procession of the\nWord, and another.\n\nIn evidence whereof we must observe that procession exists in God,\nonly according to an action which does not tend to anything external,\nbut remains in the agent itself. Such an action in an intellectual\nnature is that of the intellect, and of the will. The procession of\nthe Word is by way of an intelligible operation. The operation of the\nwill within ourselves involves also another procession, that of love,\nwhereby the object loved is in the lover; as, by the conception of the\nword, the object spoken of or understood is in the intelligent agent.\nHence, besides the procession of the Word in God, there exists in Him\nanother procession called the procession of love.\n\nReply Obj. 1: There is no need to go on to infinitude in the divine\nprocessions; for the procession which is accomplished within the\nagent in an intellectual nature terminates in the procession of the\nwill.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All that exists in God, is God (Q. 3, AA. 3, 4);\nwhereas the same does not apply to others. Therefore the divine\nnature is communicated by every procession which is not outward, and\nthis does not apply to other natures.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Though will and intellect are not diverse in God,\nnevertheless the nature of will and intellect requires the\nprocessions belonging to each of them to exist in a certain order.\nFor the procession of love occurs in due order as regards the\nprocession of the Word; since nothing can be loved by the will unless\nit is conceived in the intellect. So as there exists a certain order\nof the Word to the principle whence He proceeds, although in God the\nsubstance of the intellect and its concept are the same; so, although\nin God the will and the intellect are the same, still, inasmuch as\nlove requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the\nconcept of the intellect, there is a distinction of order between the\nprocession of love and the procession of the Word in God.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 27, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Procession of Love in God Is Generation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the procession of love in God is\ngeneration. For what proceeds by way of likeness of nature among\nliving things is said to be generated and born. But what proceeds in\nGod by way of love proceeds in the likeness of nature; otherwise it\nwould be extraneous to the divine nature, and would be an external\nprocession. Therefore what proceeds in God by way of love, proceeds\nas generated and born.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as similitude is of the nature of the word, so does\nit belong to love. Hence it is said, that \"every beast loves its\nlike\" (Ecclus. 13:19). Therefore if the Word is begotten and born by\nway of likeness, it seems becoming that love should proceed by way of\ngeneration.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is not in any species is not in the genus. So\nif there is a procession of love in God, there ought to be some\nspecial name besides this common name of procession. But no other\nname is applicable but generation. Therefore the procession of love\nin God is generation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Were this true, it would follow that the Holy Ghost\nWho proceeds as love, would proceed as begotten; which is against the\nstatement of Athanasius: \"The Holy Ghost is from the Father and the\nSon, not made, nor begotten, but proceeding.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The procession of love in God ought not to be called\ngeneration. In evidence whereof we must consider that the intellect\nand the will differ in this respect, that the intellect is made actual\nby the object understood residing according to its own likeness in the\nintellect; whereas the will is made actual, not by any similitude of\nthe object willed within it, but by its having a certain inclination\nto the thing willed. Thus the procession of the intellect is by way of\nsimilitude, and is called generation, because every generator begets\nits own like; whereas the procession of the will is not by way of\nsimilitude, but rather by way of impulse and movement towards an\nobject.\n\nSo what proceeds in God by way of love, does not proceed as begotten,\nor as son, but proceeds rather as spirit; which name expresses a\ncertain vital movement and impulse, accordingly as anyone is described\nas moved or impelled by love to perform an action.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All that exists in God is one with the divine nature.\nHence the proper notion of this or that procession, by which one\nprocession is distinguished from another, cannot be on the part of\nthis unity: but the proper notion of this or that procession must be\ntaken from the order of one procession to another; which order is\nderived from the nature of the will and intellect. Hence, each\nprocession in God takes its name from the proper notion of will and\nintellect; the name being imposed to signify what its nature really\nis; and so it is that the Person proceeding as love receives the\ndivine nature, but is not said to be born.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Likeness belongs in a different way to the word and to\nlove. It belongs to the word as being the likeness of the object\nunderstood, as the thing generated is the likeness of the generator;\nbut it belongs to love, not as though love itself were a likeness,\nbut because likeness is the principle of loving. Thus it does not\nfollow that love is begotten, but that the one begotten is the\nprinciple of love.\n\nReply Obj. 3: We can name God only from creatures (Q. 13, A. 1). As\nin creatures generation is the only principle of communication of\nnature, procession in God has no proper or special name, except that\nof generation. Hence the procession which is not generation has\nremained without a special name; but it can be called spiration, as\nit is the procession of the Spirit.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 27, Art. 5]\n\nWhether There Are More Than Two Processions in God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are more than two processions\nin God. As knowledge and will are attributed to God, so is power.\nTherefore, if two processions exist in God, of intellect and will,\nit seems that there must also be a third procession of power.\n\nObj. 2: Further, goodness seems to be the greatest principle of\nprocession, since goodness is diffusive of itself. Therefore there\nmust be a procession of goodness in God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in God there is greater power of fecundity than\nin us. But in us there is not only one procession of the word, but\nthere are many: for in us from one word proceeds another; and also\nfrom one love proceeds another. Therefore in God there are more\nthan two processions.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In God there are not more than two who\nproceed--the Son and the Holy Ghost. Therefore there are in Him\nbut two processions.\n\n_I answer that,_ The divine processions can be derived only from\nthe actions which remain within the agent. In a nature which is\nintellectual, and in the divine nature these actions are two, the\nacts of intelligence and of will. The act of sensation, which also\nappears to be an operation within the agent, takes place outside the\nintellectual nature, nor can it be reckoned as wholly removed from\nthe sphere of external actions; for the act of sensation is perfected\nby the action of the sensible object upon sense. It follows that no\nother procession is possible in God but the procession of the Word,\nand of Love.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Power is the principle whereby one thing acts on\nanother. Hence it is that external action points to power. Thus the\ndivine power does not imply the procession of a divine person; but\nis indicated by the procession therefrom of creatures.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Boethius says (De Hebdom.), goodness belongs to\nthe essence and not to the operation, unless considered as the\nobject of the will.\n\nThus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain\nactions; no other processions can be understood in God according to\ngoodness and the like attributes except those of the Word and of love,\naccording as God understands and loves His own essence, truth and\ngoodness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As above explained (Q. 14, A. 5; Q. 19, A. 5), God\nunderstands all things by one simple act; and by one act also He\nwills all things. Hence there cannot exist in Him a procession of\nWord from Word, nor of Love from Love: for there is in Him only one\nperfect Word, and one perfect Love; thereby being manifested His\nperfect fecundity.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 28\n\nTHE DIVINE RELATIONS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nThe divine relations are next to be considered, in four points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there are real relations in God?\n\n(2) Whether those relations are the divine essence itself, or are\nextrinsic to it?\n\n(3) Whether in God there can be several relations distinct from\neach other?\n\n(4) The number of these relations.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 28, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Are Real Relations in God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are no real relations in God.\nFor Boethius says (De Trin. iv), \"All possible predicaments used as\nregards the Godhead refer to the substance; for nothing can be\npredicated relatively.\" But whatever really exists in God can be\npredicated of Him. Therefore no real relation exists in God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Trin. iv) that, \"Relation in the\nTrinity of the Father to the Son, and of both to the Holy Ghost, is\nthe relation of the same to the same.\" But a relation of this kind is\nonly a logical one; for every real relation requires and implies in\nreality two terms. Therefore the divine relations are not real\nrelations, but are formed only by the mind.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the relation of paternity is the relation of a\nprinciple. But to say that God is the principle of creatures does not\nimport any real relation, but only a logical one. Therefore paternity\nin God is not a real relation; while the same applies for the same\nreason to the other relations in God.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the divine generation proceeds by way of an\nintelligible word. But the relations following upon the operation of\nthe intellect are logical relations. Therefore paternity and\nfiliation in God, consequent upon generation, are only logical\nrelations.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Father is denominated only from paternity;\nand the Son only from filiation. Therefore, if no real paternity or\nfiliation existed in God, it would follow that God is not really\nFather or Son, but only in our manner of understanding; and this is\nthe Sabellian heresy.\n\n_I answer that,_ relations exist in God really; in proof whereof we\nmay consider that in relations alone is found something which is only\nin the apprehension and not in reality. This is not found in any\nother genus; forasmuch as other genera, as quantity and quality, in\ntheir strict and proper meaning, signify something inherent in a\nsubject. But relation in its own proper meaning signifies only what\nrefers to another. Such regard to another exists sometimes in the\nnature of things, as in those things which by their own very nature\nare ordered to each other, and have a mutual inclination; and such\nrelations are necessarily real relations; as in a heavy body is found\nan inclination and order to the centre; and hence there exists in the\nheavy body a certain respect in regard to the centre and the same\napplies to other things. Sometimes, however, this regard to another,\nsignified by relation, is to be found only in the apprehension of\nreason comparing one thing to another, and this is a logical relation\nonly; as, for instance, when reason compares man to animal as the\nspecies to the genus. But when something proceeds from a principle of\nthe same nature, then both the one proceeding and the source of\nprocession, agree in the same order; and then they have real\nrelations to each other. Therefore as the divine processions are in\nthe identity of the same nature, as above explained (Q. 27, AA. 2,\n4), these relations, according to the divine processions, are\nnecessarily real relations.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Relationship is not predicated of God according to its\nproper and formal meaning, that is to say, in so far as its proper\nmeaning denotes comparison to that in which relation is inherent, but\nonly as denoting regard to another. Nevertheless Boethius did not\nwish to exclude relation in God; but he wished to show that it was\nnot to be predicated of Him as regards the mode of inherence in\nHimself in the strict meaning of relation; but rather by way of\nrelation to another.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The relation signified by the term \"the same\" is a\nlogical relation only, if in regard to absolutely the same thing;\nbecause such a relation can exist only in a certain order observed by\nreason as regards the order of anything to itself, according to some\ntwo aspects thereof. The case is otherwise, however, when things are\ncalled the same, not numerically, but generically or specifically.\nThus Boethius likens the divine relations to a relation of identity,\nnot in every respect, but only as regards the fact that the substance\nis not diversified by these relations, as neither is it by relation\nof identity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the creature proceeds from God in diversity of\nnature, God is outside the order of the whole creation, nor does any\nrelation to the creature arise from His nature; for He does not\nproduce the creature by necessity of His nature, but by His intellect\nand will, as is above explained (Q. 14, AA. 3, 4; Q. 19, A. 8).\nTherefore there is no real relation in God to the creature; whereas\nin creatures there is a real relation to God; because creatures are\ncontained under the divine order, and their very nature entails\ndependence on God. On the other hand, the divine processions are in\none and the same nature. Hence no parallel exists.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Relations which result from the mental operation alone\nin the objects understood are logical relations only, inasmuch as\nreason observes them as existing between two objects perceived by the\nmind. Those relations, however, which follow the operation of the\nintellect, and which exist between the word intellectually proceeding\nand the source whence it proceeds, are not logical relations only,\nbut are real relations; inasmuch as the intellect and the reason are\nreal things, and are really related to that which proceeds from them\nintelligibly; as a corporeal thing is related to that which proceeds\nfrom it corporeally. Thus paternity and filiation are real relations\nin God.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 28, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Relation in God Is the Same As His Essence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the divine relation is not the same as\nthe divine essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. v) that \"not all that\nis said of God is said of His substance, for we say some things\nrelatively, as Father in respect of the Son: but such things do not\nrefer to the substance.\" Therefore the relation is not the divine\nessence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii) that, \"every relative\nexpression is something besides the relation expressed, as master is\na man, and slave is a man.\" Therefore, if relations exist in God,\nthere must be something else besides relation in God. This can only\nbe His essence. Therefore essence differs from relation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the essence of relation is the being referred to\nanother, as the Philosopher says (Praedic. v). So if relation is the\ndivine essence, it follows that the divine essence is essentially\nitself a relation to something else; whereas this is repugnant to the\nperfection of the divine essence, which is supremely absolute and\nself-subsisting (Q. 3, A. 4). Therefore relation is not the divine\nessence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Everything which is not the divine essence is a\ncreature. But relation really belongs to God; and if it is not the\ndivine essence, it is a creature; and it cannot claim the adoration of\nlatria; contrary to what is sung in the Preface: \"Let us adore the\ndistinction of the Persons, and the equality of their Majesty.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is reported that Gilbert de la Porree erred on\nthis point, but revoked his error later at the council of Rheims.\nFor he said that the divine relations are assistant, or externally\naffixed.\n\nTo perceive the error here expressed, we must consider that in each of\nthe nine genera of accidents there are two points for remark. One is\nthe nature belonging to each one of them considered as an accident;\nwhich commonly applies to each of them as inherent in a subject, for\nthe essence of an accident is to inhere. The other point of remark is\nthe proper nature of each one of these genera. In the genera, apart\nfrom that of _relation,_ as in quantity and quality, even the true\nidea of the genus itself is derived from a respect to the subject; for\nquantity is called the measure of substance, and quality is the\ndisposition of substance. But the true idea of relation is not taken\nfrom its respect to that in which it is, but from its respect to\nsomething outside. So if we consider even in creatures, relations\nformally as such, in that aspect they are said to be \"assistant,\" and\nnot intrinsically affixed, for, in this way, they signify a respect\nwhich affects a thing related and tends from that thing to something\nelse; whereas, if relation is considered as an accident, it inheres in\na subject, and has an accidental existence in it. Gilbert de la Porree\nconsidered relation in the former mode only.\n\nNow whatever has an accidental existence in creatures, when considered\nas transferred to God, has a substantial existence; for there is no\naccident in God; since all in Him is His essence. So, in so far as\nrelation has an accidental existence in creatures, relation really\nexisting in God has the existence of the divine essence in no way\ndistinct therefrom. But in so far as relation implies respect to\nsomething else, no respect to the essence is signified, but rather to\nits opposite term.\n\nThus it is manifest that relation really existing in God is really the\nsame as His essence and only differs in its mode of intelligibility;\nas in relation is meant that regard to its opposite which is not\nexpressed in the name of essence. Thus it is clear that in God\nrelation and essence do not differ from each other, but are one and\nthe same.\n\nReply Obj. 1: These words of Augustine do not imply that paternity or\nany other relation which is in God is not in its very being the same\nas the divine essence; but that it is not predicated under the mode\nof substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied; but as a\nrelation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in God, since\nother predicaments import habitude to that of which they are spoken,\nboth in their generic and in their specific nature; but nothing that\nexists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of\nwhom it is spoken, except the relation of identity; and this by\nreason of God's supreme simplicity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the relation which exists in creatures involves not\nonly a regard to another, but also something absolute, so the same\napplies to God, yet not in the same way. What is contained in the\ncreature above and beyond what is contained in the meaning of\nrelation, is something else besides that relation; whereas in God\nthere is no distinction, but both are one and the same; and this is\nnot perfectly expressed by the word \"relation,\" as if it were\ncomprehended in the ordinary meaning of that term. For it was above\nexplained (Q. 13, A. 2), in treating of the divine names, that more\nis contained in the perfection of the divine essence than can be\nsignified by any name. Hence it does not follow that there exists in\nGod anything besides relation in reality; but only in the various\nnames imposed by us.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If the divine perfection contained only what is\nsignified by relative names, it would follow that it is imperfect,\nbeing thus related to something else; as in the same way, if nothing\nmore were contained in it than what is signified by the word\n\"wisdom,\" it would not in that case be a subsistence. But as the\nperfection of the divine essence is greater than can be included in\nany name, it does not follow, if a relative term or any other name\napplied to God signify something imperfect, that the divine essence\nis in any way imperfect; for the divine essence comprehends within\nitself the perfection of every genus (Q. 4, A. 2).\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 28, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Relations in God Are Really Distinguished from Each Other?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the divine relations are not really\ndistinguished from each other. For things which are identified with\nthe same, are identified with each other. But every relation in God\nis really the same as the divine essence. Therefore the relations are\nnot really distinguished from each other.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as paternity and filiation are by name distinguished\nfrom the divine essence, so likewise are goodness and power. But this\nkind of distinction does not make any real distinction of the divine\ngoodness and power. Therefore neither does it make any real\ndistinction of paternity and filiation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in God there is no real distinction but that of\norigin. But one relation does not seem to arise from another.\nTherefore the relations are not really distinguished from each other.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Trin.) that in God \"the substance\ncontains the unity; and relation multiplies the trinity.\" Therefore,\nif the relations were not really distinguished from each other, there\nwould be no real trinity in God, but only an ideal trinity, which is\nthe error of Sabellius.\n\n_I answer that,_ The attributing of anything to another involves the\nattribution likewise of whatever is contained in it. So when \"man\" is\nattributed to anyone, a rational nature is likewise attributed to him.\nThe idea of relation, however, necessarily means regard of one to\nanother, according as one is relatively opposed to another. So as in\nGod there is a real relation (A. 1), there must also be a real\nopposition. The very nature of relative opposition includes\ndistinction. Hence, there must be real distinction in God, not,\nindeed, according to that which is absolute--namely, essence, wherein\nthere is supreme unity and simplicity--but according to that which is\nrelative.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Phys. iii), this argument\nholds, that whatever things are identified with the same thing are\nidentified with each other, if the identity be real and logical; as,\nfor instance, a tunic and a garment; but not if they differ\nlogically. Hence in the same place he says that although action is\nthe same as motion, and likewise passion; still it does not follow\nthat action and passion are the same; because action implies\nreference as of something \"from which\" there is motion in the thing\nmoved; whereas passion implies reference as of something \"which is\nfrom\" another. Likewise, although paternity, just as filiation, is\nreally the same as the divine essence; nevertheless these two in\ntheir own proper idea and definitions import opposite respects. Hence\nthey are distinguished from each other.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Power and goodness do not import any opposition in\ntheir respective natures; and hence there is no parallel argument.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although relations, properly speaking, do not arise or\nproceed from each other, nevertheless they are considered as opposed\naccording to the procession of one from another.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 28, Art. 3]\n\nWhether in God There Are Only Four Real Relations--Paternity,\nFiliation, Spiration, and Procession?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in God there are not only four real\nrelations--paternity, filiation, spiration and procession. For it\nmust be observed that in God there exist the relations of the\nintelligent agent to the object understood; and of the one willing to\nthe object willed; which are real relations not comprised under those\nabove specified. Therefore there are not only four real relations in\nGod.\n\nObj. 2: Further, real relations in God are understood as coming\nfrom the intelligible procession of the Word. But intelligible\nrelations are infinitely multiplied, as Avicenna says. Therefore\nin God there exists an infinite series of real relations.\n\nObj. 3: Further, ideas in God are eternal (Q. 15, A. 1); and are only\ndistinguished from each other by reason of their regard to things, as\nabove stated. Therefore in God there are many more eternal relations.\n\nObj. 4: Further, equality, and likeness, and identity are relations:\nand they are in God from eternity. Therefore several more relations\nare eternal in God than the above named.\n\nObj. 5: Further, it may also contrariwise be said that there are\nfewer relations in God than those above named. For, according to the\nPhilosopher (Phys. iii text 24), \"It is the same way from Athens to\nThebes, as from Thebes to Athens.\" By the same way of reasoning there\nis the same relation from the Father to the Son, that of paternity,\nand from the Son to the Father, that of filiation; and thus there are\nnot four relations in God.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), every\nrelation is based either on quantity, as double and half; or on\naction and passion, as the doer and the deed, the father and the son,\nthe master and the servant, and the like. Now as there is no quantity\nin God, for He is great without quantity, as Augustine says (De Trin.\ni, 1) it follows that a real relation in God can be based only on\naction. Such relations are not based on the actions of God according\nto any extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of God to\ncreatures are not real in Him (Q. 13, A. 7). Hence, it follows that\nreal relations in God can be understood only in regard to those\nactions according to which there are internal, and not external,\nprocessions in God. These processions are two only, as above\nexplained (Q. 27, A. 5), one derived from the action of the\nintellect, the procession of the Word; and the other from the action\nof the will, the procession of love. In respect of each of these\nprocessions two opposite relations arise; one of which is the\nrelation of the person proceeding from the principle; the other is\nthe relation of the principle Himself. The procession of the Word is\ncalled generation in the proper sense of the term, whereby it is\napplied to living things. Now the relation of the principle of\ngeneration in perfect living beings is called paternity; and the\nrelation of the one proceeding from the principle is called\nfiliation. But the procession of Love has no proper name of its own\n(Q. 27, A. 4); and so neither have the ensuing relations a proper\nname of their own. The relation of the principle of this procession\nis called spiration; and the relation of the person proceeding is\ncalled procession: although these two names belong to the processions\nor origins themselves, and not to the relations.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In those things in which there is a difference between\nthe intellect and its object, and the will and its object, there can\nbe a real relation, both of science to its object, and of the willer\nto the object willed. In God, however, the intellect and its object\nare one and the same; because by understanding Himself, God\nunderstands all other things; and the same applies to His will and\nthe object that He wills. Hence it follows that in God these kinds of\nrelations are not real; as neither is the relation of a thing to\nitself. Nevertheless, the relation to the word is a real relation;\nbecause the word is understood as proceeding by an intelligible\naction; and not as a thing understood. For when we understand a\nstone; that which the intellect conceives from the thing understood,\nis called the word.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Intelligible relations in ourselves are infinitely\nmultiplied, because a man understands a stone by one act, and by\nanother act understands that he understands the stone, and again by\nanother, understands that he understands this; thus the acts of\nunderstanding are infinitely multiplied, and consequently also the\nrelations understood. This does not apply to God, inasmuch as He\nunderstands all things by one act alone.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Ideal relations exist as understood by God. Hence it\ndoes not follow from their plurality that there are many relations in\nGod; but that God knows these many relations.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Equality and similitude in God are not real relations;\nbut are only logical relations (Q. 42, A. 3, ad 4).\n\nReply Obj. 5: The way from one term to another and conversely is the\nsame; nevertheless the mutual relations are not the same. Hence, we\ncannot conclude that the relation of the father to the son is the\nsame as that of the son to the father; but we could conclude this of\nsomething absolute, if there were such between them.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 29\n\nTHE DIVINE PERSONS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nHaving premised what have appeared necessary notions concerning the\nprocessions and the relations, we must now approach the subject of the\npersons.\n\nFirst, we shall consider the persons absolutely, and then\ncomparatively as regards each other. We must consider the persons\nabsolutely first in common; and then singly.\n\nThe general consideration of the persons seemingly involves four\npoints:\n\n(1) The signification of this word \"person\";\n\n(2) the number of the persons;\n\n(3) what is involved in the number of persons, or is opposed thereto;\nas diversity, and similitude, and the like; and\n\n(4) what belongs to our knowledge of the persons.\n\nFour subjects of inquiry are comprised in the first point:\n\n(1) The definition of \"person.\"\n\n(2) The comparison of person to essence, subsistence, and hypostasis.\n\n(3) Whether the name of person is becoming to God?\n\n(4) What does it signify in Him?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 1]\n\nThe Definition of \"Person\"\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the definition of person given by\nBoethius (De Duab. Nat.) is insufficient--that is, \"a person is an\nindividual substance of a rational nature.\" For nothing singular can\nbe subject to definition. But \"person\" signifies something singular.\nTherefore person is improperly defined.\n\nObj. 2: Further, substance as placed above in the definition of\nperson, is either first substance, or second substance. If it is the\nformer, the word \"individual\" is superfluous, because first substance\nis individual substance; if it stands for second substance, the word\n\"individual\" is false, for there is contradiction of terms; since\nsecond substances are the genera or species. Therefore this\ndefinition is incorrect.\n\nObj. 3: Further, an intentional term must not be included in the\ndefinition of a thing. For to define a man as \"a species of animal\"\nwould not be a correct definition; since man is the name of a thing,\nand species is a name of an intention. Therefore, since person is\nthe name of a thing (for it signifies a substance of a rational\nnature), the word \"individual\" which is an intentional name comes\nimproperly into the definition.\n\nObj. 4: Further, \"Nature is the principle of motion and rest, in\nthose things in which it is essentially, and not accidentally,\" as\nAristotle says (Phys. ii). But person exists in things immovable, as\nin God, and in the angels. Therefore the word \"nature\" ought not to\nenter into the definition of person, but the word should rather be\n\"essence.\"\n\nObj. 5: Further, the separated soul is an individual substance of\nthe rational nature; but it is not a person. Therefore person is not\nproperly defined as above.\n\n_I answer that,_ Although the universal and particular exist in every\ngenus, nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs\nto the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself;\nwhereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the\nsubstance; since this particular whiteness is called \"this,\" because\nit exists in this particular subject. And so it is reasonable that the\nindividuals of the genus substance should have a special name of their\nown; for they are called \"hypostases,\" or first substances.\n\nFurther still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and\nthe individual are found in the rational substances which have\ndominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act,\nlike others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to\nsingulars. Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have\na special name even among other substances; and this name is \"person.\"\n\nThus the term \"individual substance\" is placed in the definition of\nperson, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the\nterm \"rational nature\" is added, as signifying the singular in\nrational substances.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although this or that singular may not be definable,\nyet what belongs to the general idea of singularity can be defined;\nand so the Philosopher (De Praedic., cap. De substantia) gives a\ndefinition of first substance; and in this way Boethius defines\nperson.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In the opinion of some, the term \"substance\" in the\ndefinition of person stands for first substance, which is the\nhypostasis; nor is the term \"individual\" superfluously added,\nforasmuch as by the name of hypostasis or first substance the idea of\nuniversality and of part is excluded. For we do not say that man in\ngeneral is an hypostasis, nor that the hand is since it is only a\npart. But where \"individual\" is added, the idea of assumptibility is\nexcluded from person; for the human nature in Christ is not a person,\nsince it is assumed by a greater--that is, by the Word of God. It is,\nhowever, better to say that substance is here taken in a general\nsense, as divided into first and second, and when \"individual\" is\nadded, it is restricted to first substance.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Substantial differences being unknown to us, or at\nleast unnamed by us, it is sometimes necessary to use accidental\ndifferences in the place of substantial; as, for example, we may say\nthat fire is a simple, hot, and dry body: for proper accidents are\nthe effects of substantial forms, and make them known. Likewise,\nterms expressive of intention can be used in defining realities if\nused to signify things which are unnamed. And so the term\n\"individual\" is placed in the definition of person to signify the\nmode of subsistence which belongs to particular substances.\n\nReply Obj. 4: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v, 5), the word\n\"nature\" was first used to signify the generation of living things,\nwhich is called nativity. And because this kind of generation comes\nfrom an intrinsic principle, this term is extended to signify the\nintrinsic principle of any kind of movement. In this sense he defines\n\"nature\" (Phys. ii, 3). And since this kind of principle is either\nformal or material, both matter and form are commonly called nature.\nAnd as the essence of anything is completed by the form; so the\nessence of anything, signified by the definition, is commonly called\nnature. And here nature is taken in that sense. Hence Boethius says\n(De Duab. Nat.) that, \"nature is the specific difference giving its\nform to each thing,\" for the specific difference completes the\ndefinition, and is derived from the special form of a thing. So in\nthe definition of \"person,\" which means the singular in a determined\ngenus, it is more correct to use the term \"nature\" than \"essence,\"\nbecause the latter is taken from being, which is most common.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The soul is a part of the human species; and so,\nalthough it may exist in a separate state, yet since it ever retains\nits nature of unibility, it cannot be called an individual substance,\nwhich is the hypostasis or first substance, as neither can the hand\nnor any other part of man; thus neither the definition nor the name\nof person belongs to it.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 2]\n\nWhether \"Person\" Is the Same As Hypostasis, Subsistence, and Essence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that \"person\" is the same as \"hypostasis,\"\n\"subsistence,\" and \"essence.\" For Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that\n\"the Greeks called the individual substance of the rational nature by\nthe name hypostasis.\" But this with us signifies \"person.\" Therefore\n\"person\" is altogether the same as \"hypostasis.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, as we say there are three persons in God, so we say\nthere are three subsistences in God; which implies that \"person\" and\n\"subsistence\" have the same meaning. Therefore \"person\" and\n\"subsistence\" mean the same.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that the Greek _ousia,_\nwhich means essence, signifies a being composed of matter and form.\nNow that which is composed of matter and form is the individual\nsubstance called \"hypostasis\" and \"person.\" Therefore all the\naforesaid names seem to have the same meaning.\n\nObj. 4: _On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.) that genera\nand species only subsist; whereas individuals are not only\nsubsistent, but also substand. But subsistences are so called from\nsubsisting, as substance or hypostasis is so called from substanding.\nTherefore, since genera and species are not hypostases or persons,\nthese are not the same as subsistences.\n\nObj. 5: Further, Boethius says (Com. Praed.) that matter is called\nhypostasis, and form is called _ousiosis_--that is, subsistence. But\nneither form nor matter can be called person. Therefore person\ndiffers from the others.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. v), substance\nis twofold. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified\nby its definition, and thus we say that the definition means the\nsubstance of a thing; in which sense substance is called by the\nGreeks _ousia,_ what we may call \"essence.\" In another sense\nsubstance means a subject or _suppositum,_ which subsists in the\ngenus of substance. To this, taken in a general sense, can be\napplied a name expressive of an intention; and thus it is called\n_suppositum._ It is also called by three names signifying a\nreality--that is, \"a thing of nature,\" \"subsistence,\" and\n\"hypostasis,\" according to a threefold consideration of the substance\nthus named. For, as it exists in itself and not in another, it is\ncalled \"subsistence\"; as we say that those things subsist which exist\nin themselves, and not in another. As it underlies some common\nnature, it is called \"a thing of nature\"; as, for instance, this\nparticular man is a human natural thing. As it underlies the\naccidents, it is called \"hypostasis,\" or \"substance.\" What these\nthree names signify in common to the whole genus of substances, this\nname \"person\" signifies in the genus of rational substances.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Among the Greeks the term \"hypostasis,\" taken in the\nstrict interpretation of the word, signifies any individual of the\ngenus substance; but in the usual way of speaking, it means the\nindividual of the rational nature, by reason of the excellence of\nthat nature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As we say \"three persons\" plurally in God, and \"three\nsubsistences,\" so the Greeks say \"three hypostases.\" But because the\nword \"substance,\" which, properly speaking, corresponds in meaning to\n\"hypostasis,\" is used among us in an equivocal sense, since it\nsometimes means essence, and sometimes means hypostasis, in order to\navoid any occasion of error, it was thought preferable to use\n\"subsistence\" for hypostasis, rather than \"substance.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Strictly speaking, the essence is what is expressed by\nthe definition. Now, the definition comprises the principles of the\nspecies, but not the individual principles. Hence in things composed\nof matter and form, the essence signifies not only the form, nor only\nthe matter, but what is composed of matter and the common form, as\nthe principles of the species. But what is composed of this matter\nand this form has the nature of hypostasis and person. For soul,\nflesh, and bone belong to the nature of man; whereas this soul, this\nflesh and this bone belong to the nature of this man. Therefore\nhypostasis and person add the individual principles to the idea of\nessence; nor are these identified with the essence in things composed\nof matter and form, as we said above when treating of divine\nsimplicity (Q. 3, A. 3).\n\nReply Obj. 4: Boethius says that genera and species subsist, inasmuch\nas it belongs to some individual things to subsist, from the fact\nthat they belong to genera and species comprised in the predicament\nof substance, but not because the species and genera themselves\nsubsist; except in the opinion of Plato, who asserted that the\nspecies of things subsisted separately from singular things. To\nsubstand, however, belongs to the same individual things in relation\nto the accidents, which are outside the essence of genera and species.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The individual composed of matter and form substands in\nrelation to accident from the very nature of matter. Hence Boethius\nsays (De Trin.): \"A simple form cannot be a subject.\" Its\nself-subsistence is derived from the nature of its form, which does\nnot supervene to the things subsisting, but gives actual existence to\nthe matter and makes it subsist as an individual. On this account,\ntherefore, he ascribes hypostasis to matter, and _ousiosis,_ or\nsubsistence, to the form, because the matter is the principle of\nsubstanding, and form is the principle of subsisting.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Word \"Person\" Should Be Said of God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the name \"person\" should not be said\nof God. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.): \"No one should ever dare to\nsay or think anything of the supersubstantial and hidden Divinity,\nbeyond what has been divinely expressed to us by the oracles.\" But the\nname \"person\" is not expressed to us in the Old or New Testament.\nTherefore \"person\" is not to be applied to God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Duab. Nat.): \"The word person\nseems to be taken from those persons who represented men in comedies\nand tragedies. For person comes from sounding through [personando],\nsince a greater volume of sound is produced through the cavity in the\nmask. These \"persons\" or masks the Greeks called _prosopa,_ as they\nwere placed on the face and covered the features before the eyes.\"\nThis, however, can apply to God only in a metaphorical sense.\nTherefore the word \"person\" is only applied to God metaphorically.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every person is a hypostasis. But the word\n\"hypostasis\" does not apply to God, since, as Boethius says (De Duab.\nNat.), it signifies what is the subject of accidents, which do not\nexist in God. Jerome also says (Ep. ad Damas.) that, \"in this word\nhypostasis, poison lurks in honey.\" Therefore the word \"person\"\nshould not be said of God.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if a definition is denied of anything, the thing\ndefined is also denied of it. But the definition of \"person,\" as\ngiven above, does not apply to God. Both because reason implies a\ndiscursive knowledge, which does not apply to God, as we proved above\n(Q. 14, A. 12); and thus God cannot be said to have \"a rational\nnature.\" And also because God cannot be called an individual\nsubstance, since the principle of individuation is matter; while God\nis immaterial: nor is He the subject of accidents, so as to be called\na substance. Therefore the word \"person\" ought not to be attributed\nto God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In the Creed of Athanasius we say: \"One is the person\nof the Father, another of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ \"Person\" signifies what is most perfect in all\nnature--that is, a subsistent individual of a rational nature. Hence,\nsince everything that is perfect must be attributed to God, forasmuch\nas His essence contains every perfection, this name \"person\" is\nfittingly applied to God; not, however, as it is applied to creatures,\nbut in a more excellent way; as other names also, which, while giving\nthem to creatures, we attribute to God; as we showed above when\ntreating of the names of God (Q. 13, A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the word \"person\" is not found applied to God\nin Scripture, either in the Old or New Testament, nevertheless what\nthe word signifies is found to be affirmed of God in many places of\nScripture; as that He is the supreme self-subsisting being, and the\nmost perfectly intelligent being. If we could speak of God only in\nthe very terms themselves of Scripture, it would follow that no one\ncould speak about God in any but the original language of the Old or\nNew Testament. The urgency of confuting heretics made it necessary to\nfind new words to express the ancient faith about God. Nor is such a\nkind of novelty to be shunned; since it is by no means profane, for\nit does not lead us astray from the sense of Scripture. The Apostle\nwarns us to avoid \"profane novelties of words\" (1 Tim. 6:20).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although this name \"person\" may not belong to God as\nregards the origin of the term, nevertheless it excellently belongs\nto God in its objective meaning. For as famous men were represented\nin comedies and tragedies, the name \"person\" was given to signify\nthose who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the\nChurch came to be called \"persons.\" Thence by some the definition of\nperson is given as \"hypostasis distinct by reason of dignity.\" And\nbecause subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity,\ntherefore every individual of the rational nature is called a\n\"person.\" Now the dignity of the divine nature excels every other\ndignity; and thus the name \"person\" pre-eminently belongs to God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The word \"hypostasis\" does not apply to God as regards\nits source of origin, since He does not underlie accidents; but it\napplies to Him in its objective sense, for it is imposed to signify\nthe subsistence. Jerome said that \"poison lurks in this word,\"\nforasmuch as before it was fully understood by the Latins, the\nheretics used this term to deceive the simple, to make people profess\nmany essences as they profess several hypostases, inasmuch as the\nword \"substance,\" which corresponds to hypostasis in Greek, is\ncommonly taken amongst us to mean essence.\n\nReply Obj. 4: It may be said that God has a rational _nature,_ if\nreason be taken to mean, not discursive thought, but in a general\nsense, an intelligent nature. But God cannot be called an\n\"individual\" in the sense that His individuality comes from matter;\nbut only in the sense which implies incommunicability. \"Substance\"\ncan be applied to God in the sense of signifying self-subsistence.\nThere are some, however, who say that the definition of Boethius,\nquoted above (A. 1), is not a definition of person in the sense we\nuse when speaking of persons in God. Therefore Richard of St. Victor\namends this definition by adding that \"Person\" in God is \"the\nincommunicable existence of the divine nature.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 29, Art. 4]\n\nWhether This Word \"Person\" Signifies Relation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that this word \"person,\" as applied to God,\ndoes not signify relation, but substance. For Augustine says (De Trin.\nvii, 6): \"When we speak of the person of the Father, we mean nothing\nelse but the substance of the Father, for person is said in regard to\nHimself, and not in regard to the Son.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, the interrogation \"What?\" refers to essence. But, as\nAugustine says: \"When we say there are three who bear witness in\nheaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost, and it is asked,\nThree what? the answer is, Three persons.\" Therefore person signifies\nessence.\n\nObj. 3: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv), the meaning of a\nword is its definition. But the definition of \"person\" is this: \"The\nindividual substance of the rational nature,\" as above stated.\nTherefore \"person\" signifies substance.\n\nObj. 4: Further, person in men and angels does not signify relation,\nbut something absolute. Therefore, if in God it signified relation,\nit would bear an equivocal meaning in God, in man, and in angels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Trin.) that \"every word that\nrefers to the persons signifies relation.\" But no word belongs to\nperson more strictly than the very word \"person\" itself. Therefore\nthis word \"person\" signifies relation.\n\n_I answer that,_ A difficulty arises concerning the meaning of this\nword \"person\" in God, from the fact that it is predicated plurally\nof the Three in contrast to the nature of the names belonging to the\nessence; nor does it in itself refer to another, as do the words\nwhich express relation.\n\nHence some have thought that this word \"person\" of itself expresses\nabsolutely the divine essence; as this name \"God\" and this word\n\"Wise\"; but that to meet heretical attack, it was ordained by\nconciliar decree that it was to be taken in a relative sense, and\nespecially in the plural, or with the addition of a distinguishing\nadjective; as when we say, \"Three persons,\" or, \"one is the person of\nthe Father, another of the Son,\" etc. Used, however, in the singular,\nit may be either absolute or relative. But this does not seem to be a\nsatisfactory explanation; for, if this word \"person,\" by force of its\nown signification, expresses the divine essence only, it follows that\nforasmuch as we speak of \"three persons,\" so far from the heretics\nbeing silenced, they had still more reason to argue. Seeing this,\nothers maintained that this word \"person\" in God signifies both the\nessence and the relation. Some of these said that it signifies\ndirectly the essence, and relation indirectly, forasmuch as \"person\"\nmeans as it were \"by itself one\" [per se una]; and unity belongs to\nthe essence. And what is \"by itself\" implies relation indirectly; for\nthe Father is understood to exist \"by Himself,\" as relatively distinct\nfrom the Son. Others, however, said, on the contrary, that it\nsignifies relation directly; and essence indirectly; forasmuch as in\nthe definition of \"person\" the term nature is mentioned indirectly;\nand these come nearer to the truth.\n\nTo determine the question, we must consider that something may be\nincluded in the meaning of a less common term, which is not included\nin the more common term; as \"rational\" is included in the meaning of\n\"man,\" and not in the meaning of \"animal.\" So that it is one thing to\nask the meaning of the word animal, and another to ask its meaning\nwhen the animal in question is man. Also, it is one thing to ask the\nmeaning of this word \"person\" in general; and another to ask the\nmeaning of \"person\" as applied to God. For \"person\" in general\nsignifies the individual substance of a rational figure. The\nindividual in itself is undivided, but is distinct from others.\nTherefore \"person\" in any nature signifies what is distinct in that\nnature: thus in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, and\nthis soul, which are the individuating principles of a man, and which,\nthough not belonging to \"person\" in general, nevertheless do belong to\nthe meaning of a particular human person.\n\nNow distinction in God is only by relation of origin, as stated above\n(Q. 28, AA. 2, 3), while relation in God is not as an accident in\na subject, but is the divine essence itself; and so it is subsistent,\nfor the divine essence subsists. Therefore, as the Godhead is God so\nthe divine paternity is God the Father, Who is a divine person.\nTherefore a divine person signifies a relation as subsisting. And this\nis to signify relation by way of substance, and such a relation is a\nhypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, although in truth that\nwhich subsists in the divine nature is the divine nature itself. Thus\nit is true to say that the name \"person\" signifies relation directly,\nand the essence indirectly; not, however, the relation as such, but as\nexpressed by way of a hypostasis. So likewise it signifies directly\nthe essence, and indirectly the relation, inasmuch as the essence is\nthe same as the hypostasis: while in God the hypostasis is expressed\nas distinct by the relation: and thus relation, as such, enters into\nthe notion of the person indirectly. Thus we can say that this\nsignification of the word \"person\" was not clearly perceived before it\nwas attacked by heretics. Hence, this word \"person\" was used just as\nany other absolute term. But afterwards it was applied to express\nrelation, as it lent itself to that signification, so that this word\n\"person\" means relation not only by use and custom, according to the\nfirst opinion, but also by force of its own proper signification.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This word \"person\" is said in respect to itself, not to\nanother; forasmuch as it signifies relation not as such, but by way\nof a substance--which is a hypostasis. In that sense Augustine says\nthat it signifies the essence, inasmuch as in God essence is the same\nas the hypostasis, because in God what He is, and whereby He is are\nthe same.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The term \"what\" refers sometimes to the nature\nexpressed by the definition, as when we ask; What is man? and we\nanswer: A mortal rational animal. Sometimes it refers to the\n_suppositum,_ as when we ask, What swims in the sea? and answer, A\nfish. So to those who ask, Three what? we answer, Three persons.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In God the individual--i.e. distinct and incommunicable\nsubstance--includes the idea of relation, as above explained.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The different sense of the less common term does not\nproduce equivocation in the more common. Although a horse and an ass\nhave their own proper definitions, nevertheless they agree univocally\nin animal, because the common definition of animal applies to both.\nSo it does not follow that, although relation is contained in the\nsignification of divine person, but not in that of an angelic or of a\nhuman person, the word \"person\" is used in an equivocal sense. Though\nneither is it applied univocally, since nothing can be said\nunivocally of God and creatures (Q. 13, A. 5).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 30\n\nTHE PLURALITY OF PERSONS IN GOD\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe are now led to consider the plurality of the persons: about which\nthere are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there are several persons in God?\n\n(2) How many are they?\n\n(3) What the numeral terms signify in God?\n\n(4) The community of the term \"person.\"\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 30, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Are Several Persons in God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are not several persons in God.\nFor person is \"the individual substance of a rational nature.\" If then\nthere are several persons in God, there must be several substances;\nwhich appears to be heretical.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Plurality of absolute properties does not make a\ndistinction of persons, either in God, or in ourselves. Much less\ntherefore is this effected by a plurality of relations. But in God\nthere is no plurality but of relations (Q. 28, A. 3). Therefore\nthere cannot be several persons in God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Boethius says of God (De Trin. i), that \"this is\ntruly one which has no number.\" But plurality implies number.\nTherefore there are not several persons in God.\n\nObj. 4: Further, where number is, there is whole and part. Thus,\nif in God there exist a number of persons, there must be whole and\npart in God; which is inconsistent with the divine simplicity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says: \"One is the person of the Father,\nanother of the Son, another of the Holy Ghost.\" Therefore the Father,\nand the Son, and the Holy Ghost are several persons.\n\n_I answer that,_ It follows from what precedes that there are several\npersons in God. For it was shown above (Q. 29, A. 4) that this\nword \"person\" signifies in God a relation as subsisting in the divine\nnature. It was also established (Q. 28, A. 1) that there are\nseveral real relations in God; and hence it follows that there are\nalso several realities subsistent in the divine nature; which means\nthat there are several persons in God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The definition of \"person\" includes \"substance,\" not as\nmeaning the essence, but the _suppositum_ which is made clear by the\naddition of the term \"individual.\" To signify the substance thus\nunderstood, the Greeks use the name \"hypostasis.\" So, as we say,\n\"Three persons,\" they say \"Three hypostases.\" We are not, however,\naccustomed to say Three substances, lest we be understood to mean\nthree essences or natures, by reason of the equivocal signification\nof the term.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The absolute properties in God, such as goodness and\nwisdom, are not mutually opposed; and hence, neither are they really\ndistinguished from each other. Therefore, although they subsist,\nnevertheless they are not several subsistent realities--that is,\nseveral persons. But the absolute properties in creatures do not\nsubsist, although they are really distinguished from each other, as\nwhiteness and sweetness; on the other hand, the relative properties\nin God subsist, and are really distinguished from each other (Q. 28,\nA. 3). Hence the plurality of persons in God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The supreme unity and simplicity of God exclude every\nkind of plurality of absolute things, but not plurality of relations.\nBecause relations are predicated relatively, and thus the relations\ndo not import composition in that of which they are predicated, as\nBoethius teaches in the same book.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Number is twofold, simple or absolute, as two and three\nand four; and number as existing in things numbered, as two men and\ntwo horses. So, if number in God is taken absolutely or abstractedly,\nthere is nothing to prevent whole and part from being in Him, and\nthus number in Him is only in our way of understanding; forasmuch as\nnumber regarded apart from things numbered exists only in the\nintellect. But if number be taken as it is in the things numbered, in\nthat sense as existing in creatures, one is part of two, and two of\nthree, as one man is part of two men, and two of three; but this does\nnot apply to God, because the Father is of the same magnitude as the\nwhole Trinity, as we shall show further on (Q. 42, AA. 1, 4).\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 30, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Are More Than Three Persons in God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are more than three persons in\nGod. For the plurality of persons in God arises from the plurality of\nthe relative properties as stated above (A. 1). But there are four\nrelations in God as stated above (Q. 28, A. 4), paternity, filiation,\ncommon spiration, and procession. Therefore there are four persons in\nGod.\n\nObj. 2: The nature of God does not differ from His will more than\nfrom His intellect. But in God, one person proceeds from the will, as\nlove; and another proceeds from His nature, as Son. Therefore another\nproceeds from His intellect, as Word, besides the one Who proceeds\nfrom His nature, as Son; thus again it follows that there are not\nonly three persons in God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the more perfect a creature is, the more interior\noperations it has; as a man has understanding and will beyond other\nanimals. But God infinitely excels every creature. Therefore in God\nnot only is there a person proceeding from the will, and another from\nthe intellect, but also in an infinite number of ways. Therefore\nthere are an infinite number of persons in God.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is from the infinite goodness of the Father that\nHe communicates Himself infinitely in the production of a divine\nperson. But also in the Holy Ghost is infinite goodness. Therefore\nthe Holy Ghost produces a divine person; and that person another; and\nso to infinity.\n\nObj. 5: Further, everything within a determinate number is measured,\nfor number is a measure. But the divine persons are immense, as we\nsay in the Creed of Athanasius: \"The Father is immense, the Son is\nimmense, the Holy Ghost is immense.\" Therefore the persons are not\ncontained within the number three.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said: \"There are three who bear witness in\nheaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost\" (1 John 5:7). To\nthose who ask, \"Three what?\" we answer, with Augustine (De Trin. vii,\n4), \"Three persons.\" Therefore there are but three persons in God.\n\n_I answer that,_ As was explained above, there can be only three\npersons in God. For it was shown above that the several persons are\nthe several subsisting relations really distinct from each other. But\na real distinction between the divine relations can come only from\nrelative opposition. Therefore two opposite relations must needs\nrefer to two persons: and if any relations are not opposite they must\nneeds belong to the same person. Since then paternity and filiation\nare opposite relations, they belong necessarily to two persons.\nTherefore the subsisting paternity is the person of the Father; and\nthe subsisting filiation is the person of the Son. The other two\nrelations are not opposed to each other; therefore these two cannot\nbelong to one person: hence either one of them must belong to both of\nthe aforesaid persons; or one must belong to one person, and the\nother to the other. Now, procession cannot belong to the Father and\nthe Son, or to either of them; for thus it would follows that the\nprocession of the intellect, which in God is generation, wherefrom\npaternity and filiation are derived, would issue from the procession\nof love, whence spiration and procession are derived, if the person\ngenerating and the person generated proceeded from the person\nspirating; and this is against what was laid down above (Q. 27, AA.\n3, 4). We must consequently admit that spiration belongs to the\nperson of the Father, and to the person of the Son, forasmuch as it\nhas no relative opposition either to paternity or to filiation; and\nconsequently that procession belongs to the other person who is\ncalled the person of the Holy Ghost, who proceeds by way of love, as\nabove explained. Therefore only three persons exist in God, the\nFather, the Son, and the Holy Ghost.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although there are four relations in God, one of them,\nspiration, is not separated from the person of the Father and of the\nSon, but belongs to both; thus, although it is a relation, it is not\ncalled a property, because it does not belong to only one person; nor\nis it a personal relation--i.e. constituting a person. The three\nrelations--paternity, filiation, and procession--are called personal\nproperties, constituting as it were the persons; for paternity is the\nperson of the Father, filiation is the person of the Son, procession\nis the person of the Holy Ghost proceeding.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That which proceeds by way of intelligence, as word,\nproceeds according to similitude, as also that which proceeds by way\nof nature; thus, as above explained (Q. 27, A. 3), the procession of\nthe divine Word is the very same as generation by way of nature. But\nlove, as such, does not proceed as the similitude of that whence it\nproceeds; although in God love is co-essential as being divine; and\ntherefore the procession of love is not called generation in God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As man is more perfect than other animals, he has more\nintrinsic operations than other animals, because his perfection is\nsomething composite. Hence the angels, who are more perfect and more\nsimple, have fewer intrinsic operations than man, for they have no\nimagination, or feeling, or the like. In God there exists only one\nreal operation--that is, His essence. How there are in Him two\nprocessions was above explained (Q. 27, AA. 1, 4).\n\nReply Obj. 4: This argument would prove if the Holy Ghost possessed\nanother goodness apart from the goodness of the Father; for then if\nthe Father produced a divine person by His goodness, the Holy Ghost\nalso would do so. But the Father and the Holy Ghost have one and the\nsame goodness. Nor is there any distinction between them except by\nthe personal relations. So goodness belongs to the Holy Ghost, as\nderived from another; and it belongs to the Father, as the principle\nof its communication to another. The opposition of relation does not\nallow the relation of the Holy Ghost to be joined with the relation\nof principle of another divine person; because He Himself proceeds\nfrom the other persons who are in God.\n\nReply Obj. 5: A determinate number, if taken as a simple number,\nexisting in the mind only, is measured by one. But when we speak of a\nnumber of things as applied to the persons in God, the notion of\nmeasure has no place, because the magnitude of the three persons is\nthe same (Q. 42, AA. 1, 4), and the same is not measured by the same.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 30, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Numeral Terms Denote Anything Real in God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the numeral terms denote something\nreal in God. For the divine unity is the divine essence. But every\nnumber is unity repeated. Therefore every numeral term in God\nsignifies the essence; and therefore it denotes something real in\nGod.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is said of God and of creatures, belongs to\nGod in a more eminent manner than to creatures. But the numeral terms\ndenote something real in creatures; therefore much more so in God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the numeral terms do not denote anything real in\nGod, and are introduced simply in a negative and removing sense, as\nplurality is employed to remove unity, and unity to remove plurality;\nit follows that a vicious circle results, confusing the mind and\nobscuring the truth; and this ought not to be. Therefore it must be\nsaid that the numeral terms denote something real in God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): \"If we admit\ncompanionship\"--that is, plurality--\"we exclude the idea of oneness\nand of solitude;\" and Ambrose says (De Fide i): \"When we say one God,\nunity excludes plurality of gods, and does not imply quantity in God.\"\nHence we see that these terms are applied to God in order to remove\nsomething; and not to denote anything positive.\n\n_I answer that,_ The Master (Sent. i, D, 24) considers that the numeral\nterms do not denote anything positive in God, but have only a negative\nmeaning. Others, however, assert the contrary.\n\nIn order to resolve this point, we may observe that all plurality is a\nconsequence of division. Now division is twofold; one is material, and\nis division of the continuous; from this results number, which is a\nspecies of quantity. Number in this sense is found only in material\nthings which have quantity. The other kind of division is called\nformal, and is effected by opposite or diverse forms; and this kind of\ndivision results in a multitude, which does not belong to a genus, but\nis transcendental in the sense in which being is divided by one and by\nmany. This kind of multitude is found only in immaterial things.\n\nSome, considering only that multitude which is a species of discrete\nquantity, and seeing that such kind of quantity has no place in God,\nasserted that the numeral terms do not denote anything real in God,\nbut remove something from Him. Others, considering the same kind of\nmultitude, said that as knowledge exists in God according to the\nstrict sense of the word, but not in the sense of its genus (as in God\nthere is no such thing as a quality), so number exists in God in the\nproper sense of number, but not in the sense of its genus, which is\nquantity.\n\nBut we say that numeral terms predicated of God are not derived from\nnumber, a species of quantity, for in that sense they could bear only\na metaphorical sense in God, like other corporeal properties, such as\nlength, breadth, and the like; but that they are taken from multitude\nin a transcendent sense. Now multitude so understood has relation to\nthe many of which it is predicated, as \"one\" convertible with \"being\"\nis related to being; which kind of oneness does not add anything to\nbeing, except a negation of division, as we saw when treating of the\ndivine unity (Q. 11, A. 1); for \"one\" signifies undivided being.\nSo, of whatever we say \"one,\" we imply its undivided reality: thus,\nfor instance, \"one\" applied to man signifies the undivided nature or\nsubstance of a man. In the same way, when we speak of many things,\nmultitude in this latter sense points to those things as being each\nundivided in itself.\n\nBut number, if taken as a species of quantity, denotes an accident\nadded to being; as also does \"one\" which is the principle of that\nnumber. Therefore the numeral terms in God signify the things of which\nthey are said, and beyond this they add negation only, as stated\n(Sent. i, D, 24); in which respect the Master was right (Sent. i, D,\n24). So when we say, the essence is one, the term \"one\" signifies the\nessence undivided; and when we say the person is one, it signifies the\nperson undivided; and when we say the persons are many, we signify\nthose persons, and their individual undividedness; for it is of the\nvery nature of multitude that it should be composed of units.\n\nReply Obj. 1: One, as it is a transcendental, is wider and more\ngeneral than substance and relation. And so likewise is multitude;\nhence in God it may mean both substance and relation, according to\nthe context. Still, the very signification of such names adds a\nnegation of division, beyond substance and relation; as was explained\nabove.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Multitude, which denotes something real in creatures,\nis a species of quantity, and cannot be used when speaking of God:\nunlike transcendental multitude, which adds only indivision to those\nof which it is predicated. Such a kind of multitude is applicable to\nGod.\n\nReply Obj. 3: \"One\" does not exclude multitude, but division, which\nlogically precedes one or multitude. Multitude does not remove unity,\nbut division from each of the individuals which compose the\nmultitude. This was explained when we treated of the divine unity (Q.\n11, A. 2).\n\nIt must be observed, nevertheless, that the opposite arguments do not\nsufficiently prove the point advanced. Although the idea of solitude\nis excluded by plurality, and the plurality of gods by unity, it does\nnot follow that these terms express this signification alone. For\nblackness is excluded by whiteness; nevertheless, the term whiteness\ndoes not signify the mere exclusion of blackness.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 30, Art. 4]\n\nWhether This Term \"Person\" Can Be Common to the Three Persons?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that this term \"person\" cannot be common to\nthe three persons. For nothing is common to the three persons but the\nessence. But this term \"person\" does not signify the essence directly.\nTherefore it is not common to all three.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the common is the opposite to the incommunicable.\nBut the very meaning of person is that it is incommunicable; as\nappears from the definition given by Richard of St. Victor (Q. 29, A.\n3, ad 4). Therefore this term \"person\" is not common to all the three\npersons.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the name \"person\" is common to the three, it is\ncommon either really, or logically. But it is not so really;\notherwise the three persons would be one person; nor again is it so\nlogically; otherwise person would be a universal. But in God there is\nneither universal nor particular; neither genus nor species, as we\nproved above (Q. 3, A. 5). Therefore this term 'person' is not common\nto the three.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 4) that when we ask,\n\"Three what?\" we say, \"Three persons,\" because what a person is, is\ncommon to them.\n\n_I answer that,_ The very mode of expression itself shows that this\nterm \"person\" is common to the three when we say \"three persons\"; for\nwhen we say \"three men\" we show that \"man\" is common to the three.\nNow it is clear that this is not community of a real thing, as if one\nessence were common to the three; otherwise there would be only one\nperson of the three, as also one essence.\n\nWhat is meant by such a community has been variously determined by\nthose who have examined the subject. Some have called it a community\nof exclusion, forasmuch as the definition of \"person\" contains the\nword \"incommunicable.\" Others thought it to be a community of\nintention, as the definition of person contains the word \"individual\";\nas we say that to be a species is common to horse and ox. Both of\nthese explanations, however, are excluded by the fact that \"person\" is\nnot a name of exclusion nor of intention, but the name of a reality.\nWe must therefore resolve that even in human affairs this name\n\"person\" is common by a community of idea, not as genus or species,\nbut as a vague individual thing. The names of genera and species, as\nman or animal, are given to signify the common natures themselves, but\nnot the intentions of those common natures, signified by the terms\ngenus or species. The vague individual thing, as \"some man,\"\nsignifies the common nature with the determinate mode of existence of\nsingular things--that is, something self-subsisting, as distinct from\nothers. But the name of a designated singular thing signifies that\nwhich distinguishes the determinate thing; as the name Socrates\nsignifies this flesh and this bone. But there is this\ndifference--that the term \"some man\" signifies the nature, or the\nindividual on the part of its nature, with the mode of existence of\nsingular things; while this name \"person\" is not given to signify the\nindividual on the part of the nature, but the subsistent reality in\nthat nature. Now this is common in idea to the divine persons, that\neach of them subsists distinctly from the others in the divine nature.\nThus this name \"person\" is common in idea to the three divine persons.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument is founded on a real community.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although person is incommunicable, yet the mode itself\nof incommunicable existence can be common to many.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although this community is logical and not real, yet it\ndoes not follow that in God there is universal or particular, or\ngenus, or species; both because neither in human affairs is the\ncommunity of person the same as community of genus or species; and\nbecause the divine persons have one being; whereas genus and species\nand every other universal are predicated of many which differ in\nbeing.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 31\n\nOF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OR PLURALITY IN GOD\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe now consider what belongs to the unity or plurality in God; which\ngives rise to four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Concerning the word \"Trinity\";\n\n(2) Whether we can say that the Son is other than the Father?\n\n(3) Whether an exclusive term, which seems to exclude otherness, can\nbe joined to an essential name in God?\n\n(4) Whether it can be joined to a personal term?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 31, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Is Trinity in God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem there is not trinity in God. For every name\nin God signifies substance or relation. But this name \"Trinity\" does\nnot signify the substance; otherwise it would be predicated of each\none of the persons: nor does it signify relation; for it does not\nexpress a name that refers to another. Therefore the word \"Trinity\" is\nnot to be applied to God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, this word \"trinity\" is a collective term, since it\nsignifies multitude. But such a word does not apply to God; as the\nunity of a collective name is the least of unities, whereas in God\nthere exists the greatest possible unity. Therefore this word\n\"trinity\" does not apply to God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every trine is threefold. But in God there is not\ntriplicity; since triplicity is a kind of inequality. Therefore\nneither is there trinity in God.\n\nObj. 4: Further, all that exists in God exists in the unity of the\ndivine essence; because God is His own essence. Therefore, if Trinity\nexists in God, it exists in the unity of the divine essence; and thus\nin God there would be three essential unities; which is heresy.\n\nObj. 5: Further, in all that is said of God, the concrete is\npredicated of the abstract; for Deity is God and paternity is the\nFather. But the Trinity cannot be called trine; otherwise there would\nbe nine realities in God; which, of course, is erroneous. Therefore\nthe word trinity is not to be applied to God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says: \"Unity in Trinity; and Trinity in\nUnity is to be revered.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The name \"Trinity\" in God signifies the determinate\nnumber of persons. And so the plurality of persons in God requires\nthat we should use the word trinity; because what is indeterminately\nsignified by plurality, is signified by trinity in a determinate\nmanner.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In its etymological sense, this word \"Trinity\" seems to\nsignify the one essence of the three persons, according as trinity\nmay mean trine-unity. But in the strict meaning of the term it rather\nsignifies the number of persons of one essence; and on this account\nwe cannot say that the Father is the Trinity, as He is not three\npersons. Yet it does not mean the relations themselves of the\nPersons, but rather the number of persons related to each other; and\nhence it is that the word in itself does not express regard to\nanother.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Two things are implied in a collective term, plurality\nof the _supposita,_ and a unity of some kind of order. For \"people\"\nis a multitude of men comprehended under a certain order. In the\nfirst sense, this word \"trinity\" is like other collective words; but\nin the second sense it differs from them, because in the divine\nTrinity not only is there unity of order, but also with this there is\nunity of essence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: \"Trinity\" is taken in an absolute sense; for it\nsignifies the threefold number of persons. \"Triplicity\" signifies a\nproportion of inequality; for it is a species of unequal proportion,\naccording to Boethius (Arithm. i, 23). Therefore in God there is not\ntriplicity, but Trinity.\n\nReply Obj. 4: In the divine Trinity is to be understood both number\nand the persons numbered. So when we say, \"Trinity in Unity,\" we do\nnot place number in the unity of the essence, as if we meant three\ntimes one; but we place the Persons numbered in the unity of nature;\nas the _supposita_ of a nature are said to exist in that nature. On\nthe other hand, we say \"Unity in Trinity\"; meaning that the nature is\nin its _supposita._\n\nReply Obj. 5: When we say, \"Trinity is trine,\" by reason of the\nnumber implied, we signify the multiplication of that number by\nitself; since the word trine imports a distinction in the _supposita_\nof which it is spoken. Therefore it cannot be said that the Trinity\nis trine; otherwise it follows that, if the Trinity be trine, there\nwould be three _supposita_ of the Trinity; as when we say, \"God is\ntrine,\" it follows that there are three _supposita_ of the Godhead.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 31, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Son Is Other Than the Father?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Son is not other than the Father.\nFor \"other\" is a relative term implying diversity of substance. If,\nthen, the Son is other than the Father, He must be different from the\nFather; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De Trin. vii), that\nwhen we speak of three persons, \"we do not mean to imply diversity.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, whosoever are other from one another, differ in\nsome way from one another. Therefore, if the Son is other than the\nFather, it follows that He differs from the Father; which is against\nwhat Ambrose says (De Fide i), that \"the Father and the Son are one\nin Godhead; nor is there any difference in substance between them,\nnor any diversity.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, the term alien is taken from _alius_ (other).\nBut the Son is not alien from the Father, for Hilary says (De Trin.\nvii) that \"in the divine persons there is nothing diverse, nothing\nalien, nothing separable.\" Therefore the Son is not other than the\nFather.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the terms \"other person\" and \"other thing\" [alius et\naliud] have the same meaning, differing only in gender. So if the Son\nis another person from the Father, it follows that the Son is a thing\napart from the Father.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine [*Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i.] says:\n\"There is one essence of the Father and Son and Holy Ghost, in which\nthe Father is not one thing, the Son another, and the Holy Ghost\nanother; although the Father is one person, the Son another, and the\nHoly Ghost another.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since as Jerome remarks [*In substance, Ep. lvii.], a\nheresy arises from words wrongly used, when we speak of the Trinity we\nmust proceed with care and with befitting modesty; because, as\nAugustine says (De Trin. i, 3), \"nowhere is error more harmful, the\nquest more toilsome, the finding more fruitful.\" Now, in treating of\nthe Trinity, we must beware of two opposite errors, and proceed\ncautiously between them--namely, the error of Arius, who placed a\nTrinity of substance with the Trinity of persons; and the error of\nSabellius, who placed unity of person with the unity of essence.\n\nThus, to avoid the error of Arius we must shun the use of the terms\ndiversity and difference in God, lest we take away the unity of\nessence: we may, however, use the term \"distinction\" on account of the\nrelative opposition. Hence whenever we find terms of \"diversity\" or\n\"difference\" of Persons used in an authentic work, these terms of\n\"diversity\" or \"difference\" are taken to mean \"distinction.\" But lest\nthe simplicity and singleness of the divine essence be taken away, the\nterms \"separation\" and \"division,\" which belong to the parts of a\nwhole, are to be avoided: and lest quality be taken away, we avoid the\nuse of the term \"disparity\": and lest we remove similitude, we avoid\nthe terms \"alien\" and \"discrepant.\" For Ambrose says (De Fide i) that\n\"in the Father and the Son there is no discrepancy, but one Godhead\":\nand according to Hilary, as quoted above, \"in God there is nothing\nalien, nothing separable.\"\n\nTo avoid the heresy of Sabellius, we must shun the term \"singularity,\"\nlest we take away the communicability of the divine essence. Hence\nHilary says (De Trin. vii): \"It is sacrilege to assert that the Father\nand the Son are separate in Godhead.\" We must avoid the adjective\n\"only\" (unici) lest we take away the number of persons. Hence Hilary\nsays in the same book: \"We exclude from God the idea of singularity or\nuniqueness.\" Nevertheless, we say \"the only Son,\" for in God there is\nno plurality of Sons. Yet, we do not say \"the only God,\" for the Deity\nis common to several. We avoid the word \"confused,\" lest we take away\nfrom the Persons the order of their nature. Hence Ambrose says (De\nFide i): \"What is one is not confused; and there is no multiplicity\nwhere there is no difference.\" The word \"solitary\" is also to be\navoided, lest we take away the society of the three persons; for, as\nHilary says (De Trin. iv), \"We confess neither a solitary nor a\ndiverse God.\"\n\nThis word \"other\" [alius], however, in the masculine sense, means only\na distinction of _suppositum_; and hence we can properly say that \"the\nSon is other than the Father,\" because He is another _suppositum_ of\nthe divine nature, as He is another person and another hypostasis.\n\nReply Obj. 1: \"Other,\" being like the name of a particular thing,\nrefers to the _suppositum_; and so, there is sufficient reason for\nusing it, where there is a distinct substance in the sense of\nhypostasis or person. But diversity requires a distinct substance in\nthe sense of essence. Thus we cannot say that the Son is diverse from\nthe Father, although He is another.\n\nReply Obj. 2: \"Difference\" implies distinction of form. There is one\nform in God, as appears from the text, \"Who, when He was in the form\nof God\" (Phil. 2:6). Therefore the term \"difference\" does not\nproperly apply to God, as appears from the authority quoted. Yet,\nDamascene (De Fide Orth. i, 5) employs the term \"difference\" in the\ndivine persons, as meaning that the relative property is signified by\nway of form. Hence he says that the hypostases do not differ from\neach other in substance, but according to determinate properties. But\n\"difference\" is taken for \"distinction,\" as above stated.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The term \"alien\" means what is extraneous and\ndissimilar; which is not expressed by the term \"other\" [alius]; and\ntherefore we say that the Son is \"other\" than the Father, but not\nthat He is anything \"alien.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: The neuter gender is formless; whereas the masculine is\nformed and distinct; and so is the feminine. So the common essence is\nproperly and aptly expressed by the neuter gender, but by the\nmasculine and feminine is expressed the determined subject in the\ncommon nature. Hence also in human affairs, if we ask, Who is this\nman? we answer, Socrates, which is the name of the _suppositum_;\nwhereas, if we ask, What is he? we reply, A rational and mortal\nanimal. So, because in God distinction is by the persons, and not by\nthe essence, we say that the Father is other than the Son, but not\nsomething else; while conversely we say that they are one thing, but\nnot one person.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 31, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Exclusive Word \"Alone\" Should Be Added to the Essential\nTerm in God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the exclusive word \"alone\" [solus] is\nnot to be added to an essential term in God. For, according to the\nPhilosopher (Elench. ii, 3), \"He is alone who is not with another.\"\nBut God is with the angels and the souls of the saints. Therefore we\ncannot say that God is alone.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is joined to the essential term in God can\nbe predicated of every person _per se,_ and of all the persons\ntogether; for, as we can properly say that God is wise, we can say\nthe Father is a wise God; and the Trinity is a wise God. But\nAugustine says (De Trin. vi, 9): \"We must consider the opinion that\nthe Father is not true God alone.\" Therefore God cannot be said to be\nalone.\n\nObj. 3: Further if this expression \"alone\" is joined to an essential\nterm, it would be so joined as regards either the personal predicate\nor the essential predicate. But it cannot be the former, as it is\nfalse to say, \"God alone is Father,\" since man also is a father; nor,\nagain, can it be applied as regards the latter, for, if this saying\nwere true, \"God alone creates,\" it would follow that the \"Father\nalone creates,\" as whatever is said of God can be said of the Father;\nand it would be false, as the Son also creates. Therefore this\nexpression \"alone\" cannot be joined to an essential term in God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said, \"To the King of ages, immortal,\ninvisible, the only God\" (1 Tim. 1:17).\n\n_I answer that,_ This term \"alone\" can be taken as a categorematical\nterm, or as a syncategorematical term. A categorematical term is one\nwhich ascribes absolutely its meaning to a given _suppositum_; as, for\ninstance, \"white\" to man, as when we say a \"white man.\" If the term\n\"alone\" is taken in this sense, it cannot in any way be joined to any\nterm in God; for it would mean solitude in the term to which it is\njoined; and it would follow that God was solitary, against what is\nabove stated (A. 2). A syncategorematical term imports the order\nof the predicate to the subject; as this expression \"every one\" or\n\"no one\"; and likewise the term \"alone,\" as excluding every other\n_suppositum_ from the predicate. Thus, when we say, \"Socrates alone\nwrites,\" we do not mean that Socrates is solitary, but that he has no\ncompanion in writing, though many others may be with him. In this way\nnothing prevents the term \"alone\" being joined to any essential term\nin God, as excluding the predicate from all things but God; as if we\nsaid \"God alone is eternal,\" because nothing but God is eternal.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the angels and the souls of the saints are\nalways with God, nevertheless, if plurality of persons did not exist\nin God, He would be alone or solitary. For solitude is not removed by\nassociation with anything that is extraneous in nature; thus anyone\nis said to be alone in a garden, though many plants and animals are\nwith him in the garden. Likewise, God would be alone or solitary,\nthough angels and men were with Him, supposing that several persons\nwere not within Him. Therefore the society of angels and of souls\ndoes not take away absolute solitude from God; much less does it\nremove respective solitude, in reference to a predicate.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This expression \"alone,\" properly speaking, does not\naffect the predicate, which is taken formally, for it refers to the\n_suppositum,_ as excluding any other suppositum from the one which it\nqualifies. But the adverb \"only,\" being exclusive, can be applied\neither to subject or predicate. For we can say, \"Only Socrates\"--that\nis, no one else--\"runs: and Socrates runs only\"--that is, he does\nnothing else. Hence it is not properly said that the Father is God\nalone, or the Trinity is God alone, unless some implied meaning be\nassumed in the predicate, as, for instance, \"The Trinity is God Who\nalone is God.\" In that sense it can be true to say that the Father is\nthat God Who alone is God, if the relative be referred to the\npredicate, and not to the _suppositum._ So, when Augustine says that\nthe Father is not God alone, but that the Trinity is God alone, he\nspeaks expositively, as he might explain the words, \"To the King of\nages, invisible, the only God,\" as applying not to the Father, but to\nthe Trinity alone.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In both ways can the term \"alone\" be joined to an\nessential term. For this proposition, \"God alone is Father,\" can mean\ntwo things, because the word \"Father\" can signify the person of the\nFather; and then it is true; for no man is that person: or it can\nsignify that relation only; and thus it is false, because the\nrelation of paternity is found also in others, though not in a\nunivocal sense. Likewise it is true to say God alone creates; nor,\ndoes it follow, \"therefore the Father alone creates,\" because, as\nlogicians say, an exclusive diction so fixes the term to which it is\njoined that what is said exclusively of that term cannot be said\nexclusively of an individual contained in that term: for instance,\nfrom the premiss, \"Man alone is a mortal rational animal,\" we cannot\nconclude, \"therefore Socrates alone is such.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 31, Art. 4]\n\nWhether an Exclusive Diction Can Be Joined to the Personal Term?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an exclusive diction can be joined to\nthe personal term, even though the predicate is common. For our Lord\nspeaking to the Father, said: \"That they may know Thee, the only true\nGod\" (John 17:3). Therefore the Father alone is true God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, He said: \"No one knows the Son but the Father\" (Matt.\n11:27); which means that the Father alone knows the Son. But to know\nthe Son is common (to the persons). Therefore the same conclusion\nfollows.\n\nObj. 3: Further, an exclusive diction does not exclude what enters\ninto the concept of the term to which it is joined. Hence it does not\nexclude the part, nor the universal; for it does not follow that if\nwe say \"Socrates alone is white,\" that therefore \"his hand is not\nwhite,\" or that \"man is not white.\" But one person is in the\nconcept of another; as the Father is in the concept of the Son; and\nconversely. Therefore, when we say, The Father alone is God, we do\nnot exclude the Son, nor the Holy Ghost; so that such a mode of\nspeaking is true.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Church sings: \"Thou alone art Most High, O Jesus\nChrist.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ This proposition \"The Father alone is God\" includes\ntwo assertions--namely, that the Father is God, and that no other\nbesides the Father is God. But this second proposition is false, for\nthe Son is another from the Father, and He is God. Therefore this is\nfalse, The Father alone is God; and the same of the like sayings.\n\n_I answer that,_ When we say, \"The Father alone is God,\" such a\nproposition can be taken in several senses. If \"alone\" means solitude\nin the Father, it is false in a categorematical sense; but if taken in\na syncategorematical sense it can again be understood in several ways.\nFor if it exclude (all others) from the form of the subject, it is\ntrue, the sense being \"the Father alone is God\"--that is, \"He who\nwith no other is the Father, is God.\" In this way Augustine expounds\nwhen he says (De Trin. vi, 6): \"We say the Father alone, not because\nHe is separate from the Son, or from the Holy Ghost, but because they\nare not the Father together with Him.\" This, however, is not the usual\nway of speaking, unless we understand another implication, as though\nwe said \"He who alone is called the Father is God.\" But in the strict\nsense the exclusion affects the predicate. And thus the proposition is\nfalse if it excludes another in the masculine sense; but true if it\nexcludes it in the neuter sense; because the Son is another person\nthan the Father, but not another thing; and the same applies to the\nHoly Ghost. But because this diction \"alone,\" properly speaking,\nrefers to the subject, it tends to exclude another Person rather than\nother things. Hence such a way of speaking is not to be taken too\nliterally, but it should be piously expounded, whenever we find it in\nan authentic work.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When we say, \"Thee the only true God,\" we do not\nunderstand it as referring to the person of the Father, but to the\nwhole Trinity, as Augustine expounds (De Trin. vi, 9). Or, if\nunderstood of the person of the Father, the other persons are not\nexcluded by reason of the unity of essence; in so far as the word\n\"only\" excludes another thing, as above explained.\n\nThe same Reply can be given to Obj. 2. For an essential term applied\nto the Father does not exclude the Son or the Holy Ghost, by reason of\nthe unity of essence. Hence we must understand that in the text quoted\nthe term \"no one\" [*Nemo = non-homo, i.e. no man] is not the same as\n\"no man,\" which the word itself would seem to signify (for the person\nof the Father could not be excepted), but is taken according to the\nusual way of speaking in a distributive sense, to mean any rational\nnature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The exclusive diction does not exclude what enters into\nthe concept of the term to which it is adjoined, if they do not\ndiffer in _suppositum,_ as part and universal. But the Son differs in\n_suppositum_ from the Father; and so there is no parity.\n\nReply Obj. 4: We do not say absolutely that the Son alone is Most\nHigh; but that He alone is Most High \"with the Holy Ghost, in the\nglory of God the Father.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 32\n\nTHE KNOWLEDGE OF THE DIVINE PERSONS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe proceed to inquire concerning the knowledge of the divine persons;\nand this involves four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the divine persons can be known by natural reason?\n\n(2) Whether notions are to be attributed to the divine persons?\n\n(3) The number of the notions?\n\n(4) Whether we may lawfully have various contrary opinions of these\nnotions?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 32, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Trinity of the Divine Persons Can Be Known by Natural\nReason?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the trinity of the divine persons can\nbe known by natural reason. For philosophers came to the knowledge of\nGod not otherwise than by natural reason. Now we find that they said\nmany things about the trinity of persons, for Aristotle says (De Coelo\net Mundo i, 2): \"Through this number\"--namely, three--\"we bring\nourselves to acknowledge the greatness of one God, surpassing all\nthings created.\" And Augustine says (Confess. vii, 9): \"I have read in\ntheir works, not in so many words, but enforced by many and various\nreasons, that in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with\nGod, and the Word was God,\" and so on; in which passage the\ndistinction of persons is laid down. We read, moreover, in a gloss on\nRom. 1 and Ex. 8 that the magicians of Pharaoh failed in the third\nsign--that is, as regards knowledge of a third person--i.e. of the\nHoly Ghost--and thus it is clear that they knew at least two\npersons. Likewise Trismegistus says: \"The monad begot a monad, and\nreflected upon itself its own heat.\" By which words the generation of\nthe Son and procession of the Holy Ghost seem to be indicated.\nTherefore knowledge of the divine persons can be obtained by natural\nreason.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Richard St. Victor says (De Trin. i, 4): \"I believe\nwithout doubt that probable and even necessary arguments can be found\nfor any explanation of the truth.\" So even to prove the Trinity some\nhave brought forward a reason from the infinite goodness of God, who\ncommunicates Himself infinitely in the procession of the divine\npersons; while some are moved by the consideration that \"no good\nthing can be joyfully possessed without partnership.\" Augustine\nproceeds (De Trin. x, 4; x, 11, 12) to prove the trinity of persons\nby the procession of the word and of love in our own mind; and we\nhave followed him in this (Q. 27, AA. 1, 3). Therefore the trinity of\npersons can be known by natural reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it seems to be superfluous to teach what cannot be\nknown by natural reason. But it ought not to be said that the divine\ntradition of the Trinity is superfluous. Therefore the trinity of\npersons can be known by natural reason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. i), \"Let no man think to\nreach the sacred mystery of generation by his own mind.\" And Ambrose\nsays (De Fide ii, 5), \"It is impossible to know the secret of\ngeneration. The mind fails, the voice is silent.\" But the trinity of\nthe divine persons is distinguished by origin of generation and\nprocession (Q. 30, A. 2). Since, therefore, man cannot know, and with\nhis understanding grasp that for which no necessary reason can be\ngiven, it follows that the trinity of persons cannot be known by\nreason.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the\nTrinity by natural reason. For, as above explained (Q. 12, AA. 4,\n12), man cannot obtain the knowledge of God by natural reason except\nfrom creatures. Now creatures lead us to the knowledge of God, as\neffects do to their cause. Accordingly, by natural reason we can know\nof God that only which of necessity belongs to Him as the principle\nof things, and we have cited this fundamental principle in treating\nof God as above (Q. 12, A. 12). Now, the creative power of God is\ncommon to the whole Trinity; and hence it belongs to the unity of the\nessence, and not to the distinction of the persons. Therefore, by\nnatural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of the essence,\nbut not what belongs to the distinction of the persons. Whoever,\nthen, tries to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason,\nderogates from faith in two ways. Firstly, as regards the dignity of\nfaith itself, which consists in its being concerned with invisible\nthings, that exceed human reason; wherefore the Apostle says that\n\"faith is of things that appear not\" (Heb. 11:1), and the same\nApostle says also, \"We speak wisdom among the perfect, but not the\nwisdom of this world, nor of the princes of this world; but we speak\nthe wisdom of God in a mystery which is hidden\" (1 Cor. 2:6, 7).\nSecondly, as regards the utility of drawing others to the faith. For\nwhen anyone in the endeavor to prove the faith brings forward reasons\nwhich are not cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers:\nsince they suppose that we stand upon such reasons, and that we\nbelieve on such grounds.\n\nTherefore, we must not attempt to prove what is of faith, except by\nauthority alone, to those who receive the authority; while as regards\nothers it suffices to prove that what faith teaches is not impossible.\nHence it is said by Dionysius (Div. Nom. ii): \"Whoever wholly resists\nthe word, is far off from our philosophy; whereas if he regards the\ntruth of the word\"--i.e. \"the sacred word, we too follow this rule.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The philosophers did not know the mystery of the\ntrinity of the divine persons by its proper attributes, such as\npaternity, filiation, and procession, according to the Apostle's\nwords, \"We speak the wisdom of God which none of the princes of the\nworld\"--i.e. the philosophers--\"knew\" (1 Cor. 2:6). Nevertheless,\nthey knew some of the essential attributes appropriated to the\npersons, as power to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the\nHoly Ghost; as will later on appear. So, when Aristotle said, \"By this\nnumber,\" etc., we must not take it as if he affirmed a threefold\nnumber in God, but that he wished to say that the ancients used the\nthreefold number in their sacrifices and prayers on account of some\nperfection residing in the number three. In the Platonic books also\nwe find, \"In the beginning was the word,\" not as meaning the Person\nbegotten in God, but as meaning the ideal type whereby God made all\nthings, and which is appropriated to the Son. And although they knew\nthese were appropriated to the three persons, yet they are said to\nhave failed in the third sign--that is, in the knowledge of the third\nperson, because they deviated from the goodness appropriated to the\nHoly Ghost, in that knowing God \"they did not glorify Him as God\"\n(Rom. 1); or, because the Platonists asserted the existence of one\nPrimal Being whom they also declared to be the father of the universe,\nthey consequently maintained the existence of another substance\nbeneath him, which they called \"mind\" or the \"paternal intellect,\"\ncontaining the idea of all things, as Macrobius relates (Som. Scip.\niv). They did not, however, assert the existence of a third separate\nsubstance which might correspond to the Holy Ghost. So also we do not\nassert that the Father and the Son differ in substance, which was the\nerror of Origen and Arius, who in this followed the Platonists. When\nTrismegistus says, \"Monad begot monad,\" etc., this does not refer to\nthe generation of the Son, or to the procession of the Holy Ghost, but\nto the production of the world. For one God produced one world by\nreason of His love for Himself.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Reason may be employed in two ways to establish a\npoint: firstly, for the purpose of furnishing sufficient proof of\nsome principle, as in natural science, where sufficient proof can be\nbrought to show that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform\nvelocity. Reason is employed in another way, not as furnishing a\nsufficient proof of a principle, but as confirming an already\nestablished principle, by showing the congruity of its results, as in\nastrology the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as\nestablished, because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly\nmovements can be explained; not, however, as if this proof were\nsufficient, forasmuch as some other theory might explain them. In the\nfirst way, we can prove that God is one; and the like. In the second\nway, reasons avail to prove the Trinity; as, when assumed to be true,\nsuch reasons confirm it. We must not, however, think that the trinity\nof persons is adequately proved by such reasons. This becomes evident\nwhen we consider each point; for the infinite goodness of God is\nmanifested also in creation, because to produce from nothing is an\nact of infinite power. For if God communicates Himself by His\ninfinite goodness, it is not necessary that an infinite effect should\nproceed from God: but that according to its own mode and capacity it\nshould receive the divine goodness. Likewise, when it is said that\njoyous possession of good requires partnership, this holds in the\ncase of one not having perfect goodness: hence it needs to share some\nother's good, in order to have the goodness of complete happiness.\nNor is the image in our mind an adequate proof in the case of God,\nforasmuch as the intellect is not in God and ourselves univocally.\nHence, Augustine says (Tract. xxvii. in Joan.) that by faith we\narrive at knowledge, and not conversely.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There are two reasons why the knowledge of the divine\npersons was necessary for us. It was necessary for the right idea of\ncreation. The fact of saying that God made all things by His Word\nexcludes the error of those who say that God produced things by\nnecessity. When we say that in Him there is a procession of love, we\nshow that God produced creatures not because He needed them, nor\nbecause of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of\nHis own goodness. So Moses, when he had said, \"In the beginning God\ncreated heaven and earth,\" subjoined, \"God said, Let there be light,\"\nto manifest the divine Word; and then said, \"God saw the light that\nit was good,\" to show proof of the divine love. The same is also\nfound in the other works of creation. In another way, and chiefly,\nthat we may think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race,\naccomplished by the Incarnate Son, and by the gift of the Holy Ghost.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 32, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Are Notions in God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in God there are no notions. For\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. i): \"We must not dare to say anything of God\nbut what is taught to us by the Holy Scripture.\" But Holy Scripture\ndoes not say anything concerning notions. Therefore there are none in\nGod.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all that exists in God concerns the unity of the\nessence or the trinity of the persons. But the notions do not concern\nthe unity of the essence, nor the trinity of the persons; for neither\ncan what belongs to the essence be predicated of the notions: for\ninstance, we do not say that paternity is wise or creates; nor can\nwhat belongs to the persons be so predicated; for example, we do not\nsay that paternity begets, nor that filiation is begotten. Therefore\nthere do not exist notions in God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, we do not require to presuppose any abstract notions\nas principles of knowing things which are devoid of composition: for\nthey are known of themselves. But the divine persons are supremely\nsimple. Therefore we are not to suppose any notions in God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 5): \"We\nrecognize difference of hypostases [i.e. of persons], in the three\nproperties; i.e. in the paternal, the filial, and the processional.\"\nTherefore we must admit properties and notions in God.\n\n_I answer that,_ Prepositivus, considering the simplicity of the\npersons, said that in God there were no properties or notions, and\nwherever there were mentioned, he propounded the abstract for the\nconcrete. For as we are accustomed to say, \"I beseech your\nkindness\"--i.e. you who are kind--so when we speak of paternity in\nGod, we mean God the Father.\n\nBut, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 3, ad 1), the use of concrete and\nabstract names in God is not in any way repugnant to the divine\nsimplicity; forasmuch as we always name a thing as we understand it.\nNow, our intellect cannot attain to the absolute simplicity of the\ndivine essence, considered in itself, and therefore, our human\nintellect apprehends and names divine things, according to its own\nmode, that is in so far as they are found in sensible objects, whence\nits knowledge is derived. In these things we use abstract terms to\nsignify simple forms; and to signify subsistent things we use concrete\nterms. Hence also we signify divine things, as above stated, by\nabstract names, to express their simplicity; whereas, to express their\nsubsistence and completeness, we use concrete names.\n\nBut not only must essential names be signified in the abstract and in\nthe concrete, as when we say Deity and God; or wisdom and wise; but\nthe same applies to the personal names, so that we may say paternity\nand Father.\n\nTwo chief motives for this can be cited. The first arises from the\nobstinacy of heretics. For since we confess the Father, the Son, and\nthe Holy Ghost to be one God and three persons, to those who ask:\n\"Whereby are They one God? and whereby are They three persons?\" as we\nanswer that They are one in essence or deity; so there must also be\nsome abstract terms whereby we may answer that the persons are\ndistinguished; and these are the properties or notions signified by an\nabstract term, as paternity and filiation. Therefore the divine\nessence is signified as \"What\"; and the person as \"Who\"; and the\nproperty as \"Whereby.\"\n\nThe second motive is because one person in God is related to two\npersons--namely, the person of the Father to the person of the Son\nand the person of the Holy Ghost. This is not, however, by one\nrelation; otherwise it would follow that the Son also and the Holy\nGhost would be related to the Father by one and the same relation.\nThus, since relation alone multiplies the Trinity, it would follow\nthat the Son and the Holy Ghost would not be two persons. Nor can it\nbe said with Prepositivus that as God is related in one way to\ncreatures, while creatures are related to Him in divers ways, so the\nFather is related by one relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost;\nwhereas these two persons are related to the Father by two relations.\nFor, since the very specific idea of a relation is that it refers to\nanother, it must be said that two relations are not specifically\ndifferent if but one opposite relation corresponds to them. For the\nrelation of lord and father must differ according to the difference of\nfiliation and servitude. Now, all creatures are related to God as His\ncreatures by one specific relation. But the Son and the Holy Ghost are\nnot related to the Father by one and the same kind of relation. Hence\nthere is no parity.\n\nFurther, in God there is no need to admit any real relation to the\ncreature (Q. 28, A. 1, 3); while there is no reason against our\nadmitting in God, many logical relations. But in the Father there\nmust be a real relation to the Son and to the Holy Ghost. Hence,\ncorresponding to the two relations of the Son and of the Holy Ghost,\nwhereby they are related to the Father, we must understand two\nrelations in the Father, whereby He is related to the Son and to the\nHoly Ghost. Hence, since there is only one Person of the Father, it is\nnecessary that the relations should be separately signified in the\nabstract; and these are what we mean by properties and notions.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the notions are not mentioned in Holy\nScripture, yet the persons are mentioned, comprising the idea of\nnotions, as the abstract is contained in the concrete.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In God the notions have their significance not after\nthe manner of realities, but by way of certain ideas whereby the\npersons are known; although in God these notions or relations are\nreal, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 1). Therefore whatever has order to\nany essential or personal act, cannot be applied to the notions;\nforasmuch as this is against their mode of signification. Hence we\ncannot say that paternity begets, or creates, or is wise, or is\nintelligent. The essentials, however, which are not ordered to any\nact, but simply remove created conditions from God, can be predicated\nof the notions; for we can say that paternity is eternal, or immense,\nor such like. So also on account of the real identity, substantive\nterms, whether personal or essential, can be predicated of the\nnotions; for we can say that paternity is God, and that paternity is\nthe Father.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the persons are simple, still without\nprejudice to their simplicity, the proper ideas of the persons can be\nabstractedly signified, as above explained.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 32, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Are Five Notions?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are not five notions. For the\nnotions proper to the persons are the relations whereby they are\ndistinguished from each other. But the relations in God are only four\n(Q. 28, A. 4). Therefore the notions are only four in number.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as there is only one essence in God, He is called\none God, and because in Him there are three persons, He is called the\nTrine God. Therefore, if in God there are five notions, He may be\ncalled quinary; which cannot be allowed.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if there are five notions for the three persons in\nGod, there must be in some one person two or more notions, as in the\nperson of the Father there is innascibility and paternity, and common\nspiration. Either these three notions really differ, or not. If they\nreally differ, it follows that the person of the Father is composed\nof several things. But if they differ only logically, it follows that\none of them can be predicated of another, so that we can say that as\nthe divine goodness is the same as the divine wisdom by reason of the\ncommon reality, so common spiration is paternity; which is not to be\nadmitted. Therefore there are not five notions.\n\nObj. 4: _On the contrary,_ It seems that there are more; because as\nthe Father is from no one, and therefrom is derived the notion of\ninnascibility; so from the Holy Ghost no other person proceeds. And\nin this respect there ought to be a sixth notion.\n\nObj. 5: Further, as the Father and the Son are the common origin of\nthe Holy Ghost, so it is common to the Son and the Holy Ghost to\nproceed from the Father. Therefore, as one notion is common to the\nFather and the Son, so there ought to be one notion common to the Son\nand to the Holy Ghost.\n\n_I answer that,_ A notion is the proper idea whereby we know a divine\nPerson. Now the divine persons are multiplied by reason of their\norigin: and origin includes the idea of someone from whom another\ncomes, and of someone that comes from another, and by these two modes\na person can be known. Therefore the Person of the Father cannot be\nknown by the fact that He is from another; but by the fact that He is\nfrom no one; and thus the notion that belongs to Him is called\n\"innascibility.\" As the source of another, He can be known in two\nways, because as the Son is from Him, the Father is known by the\nnotion of \"paternity\"; and as the Holy Ghost is from Him, He is known\nby the notion of \"common spiration.\" The Son can be known as begotten\nby another, and thus He is known by \"filiation\"; and also by another\nperson proceeding from Him, the Holy Ghost, and thus He is known in\nthe same way as the Father is known, by \"common spiration.\" The Holy\nGhost can be known by the fact that He is from another, or from\nothers; thus He is known by \"procession\"; but not by the fact that\nanother is from Him, as no divine person proceeds from Him.\n\nTherefore, there are Five notions in God: \"innascibility,\"\n\"paternity,\" \"filiation,\" \"common spiration,\" and \"procession.\" Of\nthese only four are relations, for \"innascibility\" is not a relation,\nexcept by reduction, as will appear later (Q. 33, A. 4, ad 3).\nFour only are properties. For \"common spiration\" is not a property;\nbecause it belongs to two persons. Three are personal notions--i.e.\nconstituting persons, \"paternity,\" \"filiation,\" and \"procession.\"\n\"Common spiration\" and \"innascibility\" are called notions of Persons,\nbut not personal notions, as we shall explain further on (Q. 40, A. 1,\nad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Besides the four relations, another notion must be\nadmitted, as above explained.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The divine essence is signified as a reality; and\nlikewise the persons are signified as realities; whereas the notions\nare signified as ideas notifying the persons. Therefore, although God\nis one by unity of essence, and trine by trinity of persons,\nnevertheless He is not quinary by the five notions.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since the real plurality in God is founded only on\nrelative opposition, the several properties of one Person, as they\nare not relatively opposed to each other, do not really differ. Nor\nagain are they predicated of each other, because they are different\nideas of the persons; as we do not say that the attribute of power is\nthe attribute of knowledge, although we do say that knowledge is\npower.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Since Person implies dignity, as stated above (Q. 19,\nA. 3), we cannot derive a notion of the Holy Spirit from the fact\nthat no person is from Him. For this does not belong to His dignity,\nas it belongs to the authority of the Father that He is from no one.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The Son and the Holy Ghost do not agree in one special\nmode of existence derived from the Father; as the Father and the Son\nagree in one special mode of producing the Holy Ghost. But the\nprinciple on which a notion is based must be something special; thus\nno parity of reasoning exists.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 32, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Is Lawful to Have Various Contrary Opinions of Notions?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not lawful to have various\ncontrary opinions of the notions. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 3):\n\"No error is more dangerous than any as regards the Trinity\": to which\nmystery the notions assuredly belong. But contrary opinions must be in\nsome way erroneous. Therefore it is not right to have contrary\nopinions of the notions.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the persons are known by the notions. But no\ncontrary opinion concerning the persons is to be tolerated. Therefore\nneither can there be about the notions.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The notions are not articles of faith. Therefore\ndifferent opinions of the notions are permissible.\n\n_I answer that,_ Anything is of faith in two ways; directly, where any\ntruth comes to us principally as divinely taught, as the trinity and\nunity of God, the Incarnation of the Son, and the like; and concerning\nthese truths a false opinion of itself involves heresy, especially if\nit be held obstinately. A thing is of faith, indirectly, if the denial\nof it involves as a consequence something against faith; as for\ninstance if anyone said that Samuel was not the son of Elcana, for it\nfollows that the divine Scripture would be false. Concerning such\nthings anyone may have a false opinion without danger of heresy,\nbefore the matter has been considered or settled as involving\nconsequences against faith, and particularly if no obstinacy be shown;\nwhereas when it is manifest, and especially if the Church has decided\nthat consequences follow against faith, then the error cannot be free\nfrom heresy. For this reason many things are now considered as\nheretical which were formerly not so considered, as their consequences\nare now more manifest.\n\nSo we must decide that anyone may entertain contrary opinions about\nthe notions, if he does not mean to uphold anything at variance with\nfaith. If, however, anyone should entertain a false opinion of the\nnotions, knowing or thinking that consequences against the faith would\nfollow, he would lapse into heresy.\n\nBy what has been said all the objections may be solved.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 33\n\nOF THE PERSON OF THE FATHER\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe now consider the persons singly; and first, the Person of the\nFather, concerning Whom there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the Father is the Principle?\n\n(2) Whether the person of the Father is properly signified by this\nname \"Father\"?\n\n(3) Whether \"Father\" in God is said personally before it is said\nessentially?\n\n(4) Whether it belongs to the Father alone to be unbegotten?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 33, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Belongs to the Father to Be the Principle?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Father cannot be called the\nprinciple of the Son, or of the Holy Ghost. For principle and cause\nare the same, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. iv). But we do not\nsay that the Father is the cause of the Son. Therefore we must not say\nthat He is the principle of the Son.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a principle is so called in relation to the thing\nprincipled. So if the Father is the principle of the Son, it follows\nthat the Son is a person principled, and is therefore created; which\nappears false.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the word principle is taken from priority. But in\nGod there is no \"before\" and \"after,\" as Athanasius says. Therefore\nin speaking of God we ought not to used the term principle.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), \"The Father is\nthe Principle of the whole Deity.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The word \"principle\" signifies only that whence\nanother proceeds: since anything whence something proceeds in any way\nwe call a principle; and conversely. As the Father then is the one\nwhence another proceeds, it follows that the Father is a principle.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Greeks use the words \"cause\" and \"principle\"\nindifferently, when speaking of God; whereas the Latin Doctors do not\nuse the word \"cause,\" but only \"principle.\" The reason is because\n\"principle\" is a wider term than \"cause\"; as \"cause\" is more common\nthan \"element.\" For the first term of a thing, as also the first\npart, is called the principle, but not the cause. Now the wider a\nterm is, the more suitable it is to use as regards God (Q. 13, A.\n11), because the more special terms are, the more they determine the\nmode adapted to the creature. Hence this term \"cause\" seems to mean\ndiversity of substance, and dependence of one from another; which is\nnot implied in the word \"principle.\" For in all kinds of causes there\nis always to be found between the cause and the effect a distance of\nperfection or of power: whereas we use the term \"principle\" even in\nthings which have no such difference, but have only a certain order\nto each other; as when we say that a point is the principle of a\nline; or also when we say that the first part of a line is the\nprinciple of a line.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is the custom with the Greeks to say that the Son\nand the Holy Ghost are principled. This is not, however, the custom\nwith our Doctors; because, although we attribute to the Father\nsomething of authority by reason of His being the principle, still we\ndo not attribute any kind of subjection or inferiority to the Son, or\nto the Holy Ghost, to avoid any occasion of error. In this way,\nHilary says (De Trin. ix): \"By authority of the Giver, the Father is\nthe greater; nevertheless the Son is not less to Whom oneness of\nnature is give.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although this word principle, as regards its\nderivation, seems to be taken from priority, still it does not\nsignify priority, but origin. For what a term signifies, and the\nreason why it was imposed, are not the same thing, as stated above\n(Q. 13, A. 8).\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 33, Art. 2]\n\nWhether This Name \"Father\" Is Properly the Name of a Divine Person?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that this name \"Father\" is not properly\nthe name of a divine person. For the name \"Father\" signifies\nrelation. Moreover \"person\" is an individual substance. Therefore\nthis name \"Father\" is not properly a name signifying a Person.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a begetter is more common than father; for every\nfather begets; but it is not so conversely. But a more common term is\nmore properly applied to God, as stated above (Q. 13, A. 11).\nTherefore the more proper name of the divine person is begetter and\ngenitor than Father.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a metaphorical term cannot be the proper name of\nanyone. But the word is by us metaphorically called begotten, or\noffspring; and consequently, he of whom is the word, is\nmetaphorically called father. Therefore the principle of the Word in\nGod is not properly called Father.\n\nObj. 4: Further, everything which is said properly of God, is said of\nGod first before creatures. But generation appears to apply to\ncreatures before God; because generation seems to be truer when the\none who proceeds is distinct from the one whence it proceeds, not\nonly by relation but also by essence. Therefore the name \"Father\"\ntaken from generation does not seem to be the proper name of any\ndivine person.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 88:27): \"He shall cry out to me:\nThou art my Father.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The proper name of any person signifies that whereby\nthe person is distinguished from all other persons. For as body and\nsoul belong to the nature of man, so to the concept of this particular\nman belong this particular soul and this particular body; and by these\nis this particular man distinguished from all other men. Now it is\npaternity which distinguishes the person of the Father from all other\npersons. Hence this name \"Father,\" whereby paternity is signified, is\nthe proper name of the person of the Father.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Among us relation is not a subsisting person. So this\nname \"father\" among us does not signify a person, but the relation of\na person. In God, however, it is not so, as some wrongly thought; for\nin God the relation signified by the name \"Father\" is a subsisting\nperson. Hence, as above explained (Q. 29, A. 4), this name \"person\"\nin God signifies a relation subsisting in the divine nature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 49), a\nthing is denominated chiefly by its perfection, and by its end. Now\ngeneration signifies something in process of being made, whereas\npaternity signifies the complement of generation; and therefore the\nname \"Father\" is more expressive as regards the divine person than\ngenitor or begettor.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In human nature the word is not a subsistence, and\nhence is not properly called begotten or son. But the divine Word is\nsomething subsistent in the divine nature; and hence He is properly\nand not metaphorically called Son, and His principle is called Father.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The terms \"generation\" and \"paternity\" like the other\nterms properly applied to God, are said of God before creatures as\nregards the thing signified, but not as regards the mode of\nsignification. Hence also the Apostle says, \"I bend my knee to the\nFather of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all paternity in heaven and\non earth is named\" (Eph. 3:14). This is explained thus. It is\nmanifest that generation receives its species from the term which is\nthe form of the thing generated; and the nearer it is to the form of\nthe generator, the truer and more perfect is the generation; as\nunivocal generation is more perfect than non-univocal, for it belongs\nto the essence of a generator to generate what is like itself in\nform. Hence the very fact that in the divine generation the form of\nthe Begetter and Begotten is numerically the same, whereas in\ncreatures it is not numerically, but only specifically, the same,\nshows that generation, and consequently paternity, is applied to God\nbefore creatures. Hence the very fact that in God a distinction\nexists of the Begotten from the Begetter as regards relation only,\nbelongs to the truth of the divine generation and paternity.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 33, Art. 3]\n\nWhether This Name \"Father\" Is Applied to God, Firstly As a Personal\nName?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that this name \"Father\" is not applied to\nGod, firstly as a personal name. For in the intellect the common\nprecedes the particular. But this name \"Father\" as a personal name,\nbelongs to the person of the Father; and taken in an essential sense\nit is common to the whole Trinity; for we say \"Our Father\" to the\nwhole Trinity. Therefore \"Father\" comes first as an essential name\nbefore its personal sense.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in things of which the concept is the same there is\nno priority of predication. But paternity and filiation seem to be of\nthe same nature, according as a divine person is Father of the Son,\nand the whole Trinity is our Father, or the creature's; since,\naccording to Basil (Hom. xv, De Fide), to receive is common to the\ncreature and to the Son. Therefore \"Father\" in God is not taken as an\nessential name before it is taken personally.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is not possible to compare things which have not\na common concept. But the Son is compared to the creature by reason\nof filiation or generation, according to Col. 1:15: \"Who is the image\nof the invisible God, the first-born of every creature.\" Therefore\npaternity taken in a personal sense is not prior to, but has the same\nconcept as, paternity taken essentially.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The eternal comes before the temporal. But God is\nthe Father of the Son from eternity; while He is the Father of the\ncreature in time. Therefore paternity in God is taken in a personal\nsense as regards the Son, before it is so taken as regards the\ncreature.\n\n_I answer that,_ A name is applied to that wherein is perfectly\ncontained its whole signification, before it is applied to that which\nonly partially contains it; for the latter bears the name by reason of\na kind of similitude to that which answers perfectly to the\nsignification of the name; since all imperfect things are taken from\nperfect things. Hence this name \"lion\" is applied first to the animal\ncontaining the whole nature of a lion, and which is properly so\ncalled, before it is applied to a man who shows something of a lion's\nnature, as courage, or strength, or the like; and of whom it is said\nby way of similitude.\n\nNow it is manifest from the foregoing (Q. 27, A. 2; Q. 28, A. 4),\nthat the perfect idea of paternity and filiation is to be found in\nGod the Father, and in God the Son, because one is the nature and\nglory of the Father and the Son. But in the creature, filiation is\nfound in relation to God, not in a perfect manner, since the Creator\nand the creature have not the same nature; but by way of a certain\nlikeness, which is the more perfect the nearer we approach to the\ntrue idea of filiation. For God is called the Father of some\ncreatures, by reason only of a trace, for instance of irrational\ncreatures, according to Job 38:28: \"Who is the father of the rain? or\nwho begot the drops of dew?\" Of some, namely, the rational creature\n(He is the Father), by reason of the likeness of His image, according\nto Deut. 32:6: \"Is He not thy Father, who possessed, and made, and\ncreated thee?\" And of others He is the Father by similitude of grace,\nand these are also called adoptive sons, as ordained to the heritage\nof eternal glory by the gift of grace which they have received,\naccording to Rom. 8:16, 17: \"The Spirit Himself gives testimony to\nour spirit that we are the sons of God; and if sons, heirs also.\"\nLastly, He is the Father of others by similitude of glory, forasmuch\nas they have obtained possession of the heritage of glory, according\nto Rom. 5:2: \"We glory in the hope of the glory of the sons of God.\"\nTherefore it is plain that \"paternity\" is applied to God first, as\nimporting regard of one Person to another Person, before it imports\nthe regard of God to creatures.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Common terms taken absolutely, in the order of our\nintelligence, come before proper terms; because they are included in\nthe understanding of proper terms; but not conversely. For in the\nconcept of the person of the Father, God is understood; but not\nconversely. But common terms which import relation to the creature\ncome after proper terms which import personal relations; because the\nperson proceeding in God proceeds as the principle of the production\nof creatures. For as the word conceived in the mind of the artist is\nfirst understood to proceed from the artist before the thing\ndesigned, which is produced in likeness to the word conceived in the\nartist's mind; so the Son proceeds from the Father before the\ncreature, to which the name of filiation is applied as it\nparticipates in the likeness of the Son, as is clear from the words\nof Rom. 8:29: \"Whom He foreknew and predestined to be made\nconformable to the image of His Son.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: To \"receive\" is said to be common to the creature and\nto the Son not in a univocal sense, but according to a certain remote\nsimilitude whereby He is called the First Born of creatures. Hence\nthe authority quoted subjoins: \"That He may be the First Born among\nmany brethren,\" after saying that some were conformed to the image of\nthe Son of God. But the Son of God possesses a position of\nsingularity above others, in having by nature what He receives, as\nBasil also declares (Hom. xv De Fide); hence He is called the only\nbegotten (John 1:18): \"The only begotten Who is in the bosom of the\nFather, He hath declared unto us.\"\n\nFrom this appears the Reply to the Third Objection.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 33, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Is Proper to the Father to Be Unbegotten?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not proper to the Father to be\nunbegotten. For every property supposes something in that of which it\nis the property. But \"unbegotten\" supposes nothing in the Father; it\nonly removes something. Therefore it does not signify a property of\nthe Father.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Unbegotten is taken either in a privative, or in\na negative sense. If in a negative sense, then whatever is not\nbegotten can be called unbegotten. But the Holy Ghost is not begotten;\nneither is the divine essence. Therefore to be unbegotten belongs also\nto the essence; thus it is not proper to the Father. But if it be\ntaken in a privative sense, as every privation signifies imperfection\nin the thing which is the subject of privation, it follows that the\nPerson of the Father is imperfect; which cannot be.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in God, \"unbegotten\" does not signify relation,\nfor it is not used relatively. Therefore it signifies substance;\ntherefore unbegotten and begotten differ in substance. But the Son,\nWho is begotten, does not differ from the Father in substance.\nTherefore the Father ought not to be called unbegotten.\n\nObj. 4: Further, property means what belongs to one alone. Since,\nthen, there are more than one in God proceeding from another, there\nis nothing to prevent several not receiving their being from another.\nTherefore the Father is not alone unbegotten.\n\nObj. 5: Further, as the Father is the principle of the person\nbegotten, so is He of the person proceeding. So if by reason of his\nopposition to the person begotten, it is proper to the Father to be\nunbegotten it follows that it is proper to Him also to be\nunproceeding.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): \"One is from one--that\nis, the Begotten is from the Unbegotten--namely, by the property in\neach one respectively of innascibility and origin.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As in creatures there exist a first and a secondary\nprinciple, so also in the divine Persons, in Whom there is no before\nor after, is formed the principle not from a principle, Who is the\nFather; and the principle from a principle, Who is the Son.\n\nNow in things created a first principle is known in two ways; in one\nway as the first _principle,_ by reason of its having a relation to\nwhat proceeds from itself; in another way, inasmuch as it is a _first_\nprinciple by reason of its not being from another. Thus therefore the\nFather is known both by paternity and by common spiration, as regards\nthe persons proceeding from Himself. But as the principle, not from a\nprinciple He is known by the fact that He is not from another; and\nthis belongs to the property of innascibility, signified by this word\n\"begotten.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some there are who say that innascibility, signified by\nthe word \"unbegotten,\" as a property of the Father, is not a negative\nterm only, but either that it means both these things\ntogether--namely, that the Father is from no one, and that He is the\nprinciple of others; or that it imports universal authority, or also\nHis plenitude as the source of all. This, however, does not seem\ntrue, because thus innascibility would not be a property distinct\nfrom paternity and spiration; but would include them as the proper is\nincluded in the common. For source and authority signify in God\nnothing but the principle of origin. We must therefore say with\nAugustine (De Trin. v, 7) that \"unbegotten\" imports the negation of\npassive generation. For he says that \"unbegotten\" has the same\nmeaning as \"not a son.\" Nor does it follow that \"unbegotten\" is not\nthe proper notion of the Father; for primary and simple things are\nnotified by negations; as, for instance, a point is defined as what\nhas no part.\n\nReply Obj. 2: \"Unbegotten\" is taken sometimes in a negative sense\nonly, and in that sense Jerome says that \"the Holy Ghost is\nunbegotten,\" that is, He is not begotten. Otherwise \"unbegotten\" may\nbe taken in a kind of privative sense, but not as implying any\nimperfection. For privation can be taken in many ways; in one way\nwhen a thing has not what is naturally belongs to another, even\nthough it is not of its own nature to have it; as, for instance, if a\nstone be called a dead thing, as wanting life, which naturally\nbelongs to some other things. In another sense, privation is so\ncalled when something has not what naturally belongs to some members\nof its genus; as for instance when a mole is called blind. In a third\nsense privation means the absence of what something ought to have; in\nwhich sense, privation imports an imperfection. In this sense,\n\"unbegotten\" is not attributed to the Father as a privation, but it\nmay be so attributed in the second sense, meaning that a certain\nperson of the divine nature is not begotten, while some person of the\nsame nature is begotten. In this sense the term \"unbegotten\" can be\napplied also to the Holy Ghost. Hence to consider it as a term proper\nto the Father alone, it must be further understood that the name\n\"unbegotten\" belongs to a divine person as the principle of another\nperson; so that it be understood to imply negation in the genus of\nprinciple taken personally in God. Or that there be understood in the\nterm \"unbegotten\" that He is not in any way derived from another; and\nnot only that He is not from another by way only of generation. In\nthis sense the term \"unbegotten\" does not belong at all to the Holy\nGhost, Who is from another by procession, as a subsisting person; nor\ndoes it belong to the divine essence, of which it may be said that it\nis in the Son or in the Holy Ghost from another--namely, from the\nFather.\n\nReply Obj. 3: According to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 9),\n\"unbegotten\" in one sense signifies the same as \"uncreated\"; and thus\nit applies to the substance, for thereby does the created substance\ndiffer from the uncreated. In another sense it signifies what is not\nbegotten, and in this sense it is a relative term; just as negation\nis reduced to the genus of affirmation, as \"not man\" is reduced to\nthe genus of substance, and \"not white\" to the genus of quality.\nHence, since \"begotten\" implies relation in God, \"unbegotten\" belongs\nalso to relation. Thus it does not follow that the Father unbegotten\nis substantially distinguished from the Son begotten; but only by\nrelation; that is, as the relation of Son is denied of the Father.\n\nReply Obj. 4: In every genus there must be something first; so in the\ndivine nature there must be some one principle which is not from\nanother, and which we call \"unbegotten.\" To admit two innascibles is\nto suppose the existence of two Gods, and two divine natures. Hence\nHilary says (De Synod.): \"As there is one God, so there cannot be two\ninnascibles.\" And this especially because, did two innascibles exist,\none would not be from the other, and they would not be distinguished\nby relative opposition: therefore they would be distinguished from\neach other by diversity of nature.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The property of the Father, whereby He is not from\nanother, is more clearly signified by the removal of the nativity of\nthe Son, than by the removal of the procession of the Holy Ghost;\nboth because the procession of the Holy Ghost has no special name, as\nstated above (Q. 27, A. 4, ad 3), and because also in the order of\nnature it presupposes the generation of the Son. Hence, it being\ndenied of the Father that He is begotten, although He is the\nprinciple of generation, it follows, as a consequence, that He does\nnot proceed by the procession of the Holy Ghost, because the Holy\nGhost is not the principle of generation, but proceeds from the\nperson begotten.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 34\n\nOF THE PERSON OF THE SON\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe next consider the person of the Son. Three names are attributed to\nthe Son--namely, \"Son,\" \"Word,\" and \"Image.\" The idea of Son is\ngathered from the idea of Father. Hence it remains for us to consider\nWord and Image.\n\nConcerning Word there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether Word is an essential term in God, or a personal term?\n\n(2) Whether it is the proper name of the Son?\n\n(3) Whether in the name of Word is expressed relation to creatures?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 34, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Word in God Is a Personal Name?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that Word in God is not a personal name.\nFor personal names are applied to God in a proper sense, as Father and\nSon. But Word is applied to God metaphorically, as Origen says on\n(John 1:1), \"In the beginning was the Word.\" Therefore Word is not a\npersonal name in God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. ix, 10), \"The Word\nis knowledge with love;\" and according to Anselm (Monol. lx), \"To\nspeak is to the Supreme Spirit nothing but to see by thought.\" But\nknowledge and thought, and sight, are essential terms in God.\nTherefore Word is not a personal term in God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is essential to word to be spoken. But, according\nto Anselm (Monol. lix), as the Father is intelligent, the Son is\nintelligent, and the Holy Ghost is intelligent, so the Father speaks,\nthe Son speaks, and the Holy Ghost speaks; and likewise, each one of\nthem is spoken. Therefore, the name Word is used as an essential term\nin God, and not in a personal sense.\n\nObj. 4: Further, no divine person is made. But the Word of God is\nsomething made. For it is said, \"Fire, hail, snow, ice, the storms\nwhich do His Word\" (Ps. 148:8). Therefore the Word is not a personal\nname in God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): \"As the Son is\nrelated to the Father, so also is the Word to Him Whose Word He is.\"\nBut the Son is a personal name, since it is said relatively. Therefore\nso also is Word.\n\n_I answer that,_ The name of Word in God, if taken in its proper sense,\nis a personal name, and in no way an essential name.\n\nTo see how this is true, we must know that our own word taken in its\nproper sense has a threefold meaning; while in a fourth sense it is\ntaken improperly or figuratively. The clearest and most common sense\nis when it is said of the word spoken by the voice; and this proceeds\nfrom an interior source as regards two things found in the exterior\nword--that is, the vocal sound itself, and the signification of the\nsound. For, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i) vocal sound\nsignifies the concept of the intellect. Again the vocal sound proceeds\nfrom the signification or the imagination, as stated in _De Anima_ ii,\ntext 90. The vocal sound, which has no signification cannot be called\na word: wherefore the exterior vocal sound is called a word from the\nfact the it signifies the interior concept of the mind. Therefore it\nfollows that, first and chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is\ncalled a word; secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the\ninterior concept, is so called; and thirdly, the imagination of the\nvocal sound is called a word. Damascene mentions these three kinds of\nwords (De Fide Orth. i, 17), saying that \"word\" is called \"the natural\nmovement of the intellect, whereby it is moved, and understands, and\nthinks, as light and splendor;\" which is the first kind. \"Again,\" he\nsays, \"the word is what is not pronounced by a vocal word, but is\nuttered in the heart;\" which is the third kind. \"Again,\" also, \"the\nword is the angel\"--that is, the messenger \"of intelligence;\" which\nis the second kind. Word is also used in a fourth way figuratively for\nthat which is signified or effected by a word; thus we are wont to\nsay, \"this is the word I have said,\" or \"which the king has\ncommanded,\" alluding to some deed signified by the word either by way\nof assertion or of command.\n\nNow word is taken strictly in God, as signifying the concept of the\nintellect. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 10): \"Whoever can\nunderstand the word, not only before it is sounded, but also before\nthought has clothed it with imaginary sound, can already see some\nlikeness of that Word of Whom it is said: In the beginning was the\nWord.\" The concept itself of the heart has of its own nature to\nproceed from something other than itself--namely, from the knowledge\nof the one conceiving. Hence \"Word,\" according as we use the term\nstrictly of God, signifies something proceeding from another; which\nbelongs to the nature of personal terms in God, inasmuch as the divine\npersons are distinguished by origin (Q. 27, AA. 3, 4, 5). Hence the\nterm \"Word,\" according as we use the term strictly of God, is to be\ntaken as said not essentially, but personally.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Arians, who sprang from Origen, declared that the\nSon differed in substance from the Father. Hence, they endeavored to\nmaintain that when the Son of God is called the Word, this is not to\nbe understood in a strict sense; lest the idea of the Word proceeding\nshould compel them to confess that the Son of God is of the same\nsubstance as the Father. For the interior word proceeds in such a\nmanner from the one who pronounces it, as to remain within him. But\nsupposing Word to be said metaphorically of God, we must still admit\nWord in its strict sense. For if a thing be called a word\nmetaphorically, this can only be by reason of some manifestation;\neither it makes something manifest as a word, or it is manifested by\na word. If manifested by a word, there must exist a word whereby it\nis manifested. If it is called a word because it exteriorly\nmanifests, what it exteriorly manifests cannot be called word except\nin as far as it signifies the interior concept of the mind, which\nanyone may also manifest by exterior signs. Therefore, although Word\nmay be sometimes said of God metaphorically, nevertheless we must\nalso admit Word in the proper sense, and which is said personally.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Nothing belonging to the intellect can be applied to\nGod personally, except word alone; for word alone signifies that\nwhich emanates from another. For what the intellect forms in its\nconception is the word. Now, the intellect itself, according as it is\nmade actual by the intelligible species, is considered absolutely;\nlikewise the act of understanding which is to the actual intellect\nwhat existence is to actual being; since the act of understanding\ndoes not signify an act going out from the intelligent agent, but an\nact remaining in the agent. Therefore when we say that word is\nknowledge, the term knowledge does not mean the act of a knowing\nintellect, or any one of its habits, but stands for what the\nintellect conceives by knowing. Hence also Augustine says (De Trin.\nvii, 1) that the Word is \"begotten wisdom;\" for it is nothing but the\nconcept of the Wise One; and in the same way It can be called\n\"begotten knowledge.\" Thus can also be explained how \"to speak\" is in\nGod \"to see by thought,\" forasmuch as the Word is conceived by the\ngaze of the divine thought. Still the term \"thought\" does not\nproperly apply to the Word of God. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv,\n16): \"Therefore do we speak of the Word of God, and not of the\nThought of God, lest we believe that in God there is something\nunstable, now assuming the form of Word, now putting off that form\nand remaining latent and as it were formless.\" For thought consists\nproperly in the search after the truth, and this has no place in God.\nBut when the intellect attains to the form of truth, it does not\nthink, but perfectly contemplates the truth. Hence Anselm (Monol. lx)\ntakes \"thought\" in an improper sense for \"contemplation.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As, properly speaking, Word in God is said personally,\nand not essentially, so likewise is to \"speak.\" Hence, as the Word is\nnot common to the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, so it is not true that\nthe Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one speaker. So Augustine says\n(De Trin. vii, 1): \"He who speaks in that co-eternal Word is\nunderstood as not alone in God, but as being with that very Word,\nwithout which, forsooth, He would not be speaking.\" On the other\nhand, \"to be spoken\" belongs to each Person, for not only is the word\nspoken, but also the thing understood or signified by the word.\nTherefore in this manner to one person alone in God does it belong to\nbe spoken in the same way as a word is spoken; whereas in the way\nwhereby a thing is spoken as being understood in the word, it belongs\nto each Person to be spoken. For the Father, by understanding\nHimself, the Son and the Holy Ghost, and all other things comprised\nin this knowledge, conceives the Word; so that thus the whole Trinity\nis \"spoken\" in the Word; and likewise also all creatures: as the\nintellect of a man by the word he conceives in the act of\nunderstanding a stone, speaks a stone. Anselm took the term \"speak\"\nimproperly for the act of understanding; whereas they really differ\nfrom each other; for \"to understand\" means only the habitude of the\nintelligent agent to the thing understood, in which habitude no trace\nof origin is conveyed, but only a certain information of our\nintellect; forasmuch as our intellect is made actual by the form of\nthe thing understood. In God, however, it means complete identity,\nbecause in God the intellect and the thing understood are altogether\nthe same, as was proved above (Q. 14, AA. 4, 5). Whereas to \"speak\"\nmeans chiefly the habitude to the word conceived; for \"to speak\" is\nnothing but to utter a word. But by means of the word it imports a\nhabitude to the thing understood which in the word uttered is\nmanifested to the one who understands. Thus, only the Person who\nutters the Word is \"speaker\" in God, although each Person understands\nand is understood, and consequently is spoken by the Word.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The term \"word\" is there taken figuratively, as the\nthing signified or effected by word is called word. For thus\ncreatures are said to do the word of God, as executing any effect,\nwhereto they are ordained from the word conceived of the divine\nwisdom; as anyone is said to do the word of the king when he does the\nwork to which he is appointed by the king's word.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 34, Art. 2]\n\nWhether \"Word\" Is the Son's Proper Name?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that \"Word\" is not the proper name of the\nSon. For the Son is a subsisting person in God. But word does not\nsignify a subsisting thing, as appears in ourselves. Therefore word\ncannot be the proper name of the person of the Son.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the word proceeds from the speaker by being uttered.\nTherefore if the Son is properly the word, He proceeds from the\nFather, by way only of utterance; which is the heresy of Valentine;\nas appears from Augustine (De Haeres. xi).\n\nObj. 3: Further, every proper name of a person signifies some\nproperty of that person. Therefore, if the Word is the Son's proper\nname, it signifies some property of His; and thus there will be\nseveral more properties in God than those above mentioned.\n\nObj. 4: Further, whoever understands conceives a word in the act of\nunderstanding. But the Son understands. Therefore some word belongs\nto the Son; and consequently to be Word is not proper to the Son.\n\nObj. 5: Further, it is said of the Son (Heb. 1:3): \"Bearing all\nthings by the word of His power;\" whence Basil infers (Cont. Eunom.\nv, 11) that the Holy Ghost is the Son's Word. Therefore to be Word is\nnot proper to the Son.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 11): \"By Word we\nunderstand the Son alone.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ \"Word,\" said of God in its proper sense, is used\npersonally, and is the proper name of the person of the Son. For it\nsignifies an emanation of the intellect: and the person Who proceeds\nin God, by way of emanation of the intellect, is called the Son; and\nthis procession is called generation, as we have shown above (Q. 27,\nA. 2). Hence it follows that the Son alone is properly called Word in\nGod.\n\nReply Obj. 1: \"To be\" and \"to understand\" are not the same in us.\nHence that which in us has intellectual being, does not belong to our\nnature. But in God \"to be\" and \"to understand\" are one and the same:\nhence the Word of God is not an accident in Him, or an effect of His;\nbut belongs to His very nature. And therefore it must needs be\nsomething subsistent; for whatever is in the nature of God subsists;\nand so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that \"the Word of God is\nsubstantial and has a hypostatic being; but other words [as our own]\nare activities if the soul.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The error of Valentine was condemned, not as the Arians\npretended, because he asserted that the Son was born by being\nuttered, as Hilary relates (De Trin. vi); but on account of the\ndifferent mode of utterance proposed by its author, as appears from\nAugustine (De Haeres. xi).\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the term \"Word\" the same property is comprised as in\nthe name Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 11): \"Word and Son\nexpress the same.\" For the Son's nativity, which is His personal\nproperty, is signified by different names, which are attributed to\nthe Son to express His perfection in various ways. To show that He is\nof the same nature as the Father, He is called the Son; to show that\nHe is co-eternal, He is called the Splendor; to show that He is\naltogether like, He is called the Image; to show that He is begotten\nimmaterially, He is called the Word. All these truths cannot be\nexpressed by only one name.\n\nReply Obj. 4: To be intelligent belongs to the Son, in the same way\nas it belongs to Him to be God, since to understand is said of God\nessentially, as stated above (Q. 14, AA. 2, 4). Now the Son is God\nbegotten, and not God begetting; and hence He is intelligent, not as\nproducing a Word, but as the Word proceeding; forasmuch as in God the\nWord proceeding does not differ really from the divine intellect, but\nis distinguished from the principle of the Word only by relation.\n\nReply Obj. 5: When it is said of the Son, \"Bearing all things by the\nword of His power\"; \"word\" is taken figuratively for the effect of\nthe Word. Hence a gloss says that \"word\" is here taken to mean\ncommand; inasmuch as by the effect of the power of the Word, things\nare kept in being, as also by the effect of the power of the Word\nthings are brought into being. Basil speaks widely and figuratively\nin applying Word to the Holy Ghost; in the sense perhaps that\neverything that makes a person known may be called his word, and so\nin that way the Holy Ghost may be called the Son's Word, because He\nmanifests the Son.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 34, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Name \"Word\" Imports Relation to Creatures?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the name 'Word' does not import\nrelation to creatures. For every name that connotes some effect in\ncreatures, is said of God essentially. But Word is not said\nessentially, but personally. Therefore Word does not import relation\nto creatures.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever imports relation to creatures is said of\nGod in time; as \"Lord\" and \"Creator.\" But Word is said of God from\neternity. Therefore it does not import relation to the creature.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Word imports relation to the source whence it\nproceeds. Therefore, if it imports relation to the creature, it\nfollows that the Word proceeds from the creature.\n\nObj. 4: Further, ideas (in God) are many according to their various\nrelations to creatures. Therefore if Word imports relation to\ncreatures, it follows that in God there is not one Word only, but\nmany.\n\nObj. 5: Further, if Word imports relation to the creature, this can\nonly be because creatures are known by God. But God does not know\nbeings only; He knows also non-beings. Therefore in the Word are\nimplied relations to non-beings; which appears to be false.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 63), that \"the\nname Word signifies not only relation to the Father, but also\nrelation to those beings which are made through the Word, by His\noperative power.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Word implies relation to creatures. For God by\nknowing Himself, knows every creature. Now the word conceived in the\nmind is representative of everything that is actually understood.\nHence there are in ourselves different words for the different things\nwhich we understand. But because God by one act understands Himself\nand all things, His one only Word is expressive not only of the\nFather, but of all creatures.\n\nAnd as the knowledge of God is only cognitive as regards God, whereas\nas regards creatures, it is both cognitive and operative, so the Word\nof God is only expressive of what is in God the Father, but is both\nexpressive and operative of creatures; and therefore it is said (Ps.\n32:9): \"He spake, and they were made;\" because in the Word is implied\nthe operative idea of what God makes.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The nature is also included indirectly in the name of\nthe person; for person is an individual substance of a rational\nnature. Therefore the name of a divine person, as regards the\npersonal relation, does not imply relation to the creature, but it is\nimplied in what belongs to the nature. Yet there is nothing to\nprevent its implying relation to creatures, so far as the essence is\nincluded in its meaning: for as it properly belongs to the Son to be\nthe Son, so it properly belongs to Him to be God begotten, or the\nCreator begotten; and in this way the name Word imports relation to\ncreatures.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since the relations result from actions, some names\nimport the relation of God to creatures, which relation follows on\nthe action of God which passes into some exterior effect, as to\ncreate and to govern; and the like are applied to God in time. But\nothers import a relation which follows from an action which does not\npass into an exterior effect, but abides in the agent--as to know and\nto will: such are not applied to God in time; and this kind of\nrelation to creatures is implied in the name of the Word. Nor is it\ntrue that all names which import the relation of God to creatures are\napplied to Him in time; but only those names are applied in time\nwhich import relation following on the action of God passing into\nexterior effect.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Creatures are known to God not by a knowledge derived\nfrom the creatures themselves, but by His own essence. Hence it is\nnot necessary that the Word should proceed from creatures, although\nthe Word is expressive of creatures.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The name of Idea is imposed chiefly to signify relation\nto creatures; and therefore it is applied in a plural sense to God;\nand it is not said personally. But the name of Word is imposed\nchiefly to signify the speaker, and consequently, relation to\ncreatures, inasmuch as God, by understanding Himself, understands\nevery creature; and so there is only one Word in God, and that is a\npersonal one.\n\nReply Obj. 5: God's knowledge of non-beings and God's Word about\nnon-beings are the same; because the Word of God contains no less\nthan does the knowledge of God, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 14).\nNevertheless the Word is expressive and operative of beings, but is\nexpressive and manifestive of non-beings.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 35\n\nOF THE IMAGE\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe next inquire concerning the image: about which there are two points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether Image in God is said personally?\n\n(2) Whether this name belongs to the Son alone?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 35, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Image in God Is Said Personally?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that image is not said personally of God.\nFor Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says, \"The Godhead\nof the Holy Trinity and the Image whereunto man is made are one.\"\nTherefore Image is said of God essentially, and not personally.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Hilary says (De Synod.): \"An image is a like\nspecies of that which it represents.\" But species or form is said\nof God essentially. Therefore so also is Image.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Image is derived from imitation, which implies\n\"before\" and \"after.\" But in the divine persons there is no \"before\"\nand \"after.\" Therefore Image cannot be a personal name in God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 1): \"What is more\nabsurd than to say that an image is referred to itself?\" Therefore\nthe Image in God is a relation, and is thus a personal name.\n\n_I answer that,_ Image includes the idea of similitude. Still, not\nany kind of similitude suffices for the notion of image, but only\nsimilitude of species, or at least of some specific sign. In corporeal\nthings the specific sign consists chiefly in the figure. For we see\nthat the species of different animals are of different figures; but\nnot of different colors. Hence if the color of anything is depicted on\na wall, this is not called an image unless the figure is likewise\ndepicted. Further, neither the similitude of species or of figure is\nenough for an image, which requires also the idea of origin; because,\nas Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74): \"One egg is not the image of\nanother, because it is not derived from it.\" Therefore for a true\nimage it is required that one proceeds from another like to it in\nspecies, or at least in specific sign. Now whatever imports procession\nor origin in God, belongs to the persons. Hence the name \"Image\" is a\npersonal name.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Image, properly speaking, means whatever proceeds forth\nin likeness to another. That to the likeness of which anything\nproceeds, is properly speaking called the exemplar, and is improperly\ncalled the image. Nevertheless Augustine (Fulgentius) uses the name\nof Image in this sense when he says that the divine nature of the\nHoly Trinity is the Image to whom man was made.\n\nReply Obj. 2: species, as mentioned by Hilary in the definition of\nimage, means the form derived from one thing to another. In this\nsense image is said to be the species of anything, as that which is\nassimilated to anything is called its form, inasmuch as it has a like\nform.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Imitation in God does not signify posteriority, but\nonly assimilation.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 35, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Name of Image Is Proper to the Son?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the name of Image is not proper to the\nSon; because, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18), \"The Holy Ghost\nis the Image of the Son.\" Therefore Image does not belong to the Son\nalone.\n\nObj. 2: Further, similitude in expression belongs to the nature of an\nimage, as Augustine says (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 74). But this belongs to\nthe Holy Ghost, Who proceeds from another by way of similitude.\nTherefore the Holy Ghost is an Image; and so to be Image does not\nbelong to the Son alone.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man is also called the image of God, according to 1\nCor. 11:7, \"The man ought not to cover his head, for he is the image\nand the glory of God.\" Therefore Image is not proper to the Son.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 2): \"The Son alone is\nthe Image of the Father.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The Greek Doctors commonly say that the Holy Ghost\nis the Image of both the Father and of the Son; but the Latin Doctors\nattribute the name Image to the Son alone. For it is not found in the\ncanonical Scripture except as applied to the Son; as in the words,\n\"Who is the Image of the invisible God, the firstborn of creatures\"\n(Col. 1:15) and again: \"Who being the brightness of His glory, and\nthe figure of His substance.\" (Heb. 1:3).\n\nSome explain this by the fact that the Son agrees with the Father, not\nin nature only, but also in the notion of principle: whereas the Holy\nGhost agrees neither with the Son, nor with the Father in any notion.\nThis, however, does not seem to suffice. Because as it is not by\nreason of the relations that we consider either equality or inequality\nin God, as Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6), so neither (by reason\nthereof do we consider) that similitude which is essential to image.\nHence others say that the Holy Ghost cannot be called the Image of the\nSon, because there cannot be an image of an image; nor of the Father,\nbecause again the image must be immediately related to that which it\nis the image; and the Holy Ghost is related to the Father through the\nSon; nor again is He the Image of the Father and the Son, because then\nthere would be one image of two; which is impossible. Hence it follows\nthat the Holy Ghost is in no way an Image. But this is no proof: for\nthe Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost, as we\nshall explain further on (Q. 36, A. 4). Hence there is nothing\nto prevent there being one Image of the Father and of the Son,\ninasmuch as they are one; since even man is one image of the whole\nTrinity.\n\nTherefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that, as the\nHoly Ghost, although by His procession He receives the nature of the\nFather, as the Son also receives it, nevertheless is not said to be\n\"born\"; so, although He receives the likeness of the Father, He is\nnot called the Image; because the Son proceeds as word, and it is\nessential to word to be like species with that whence it proceeds;\nwhereas this does not essentially belong to love, although it may\nbelong to that love which is the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is the\ndivine love.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Damascene and the other Greek Doctors commonly employ\nthe term image as meaning a perfect similitude.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although the Holy Ghost is like to the Father and the\nSon, still it does not follow that He is the Image, as above\nexplained.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The image of a thing may be found in something in two\nways. In one way it is found in something of the same specific\nnature; as the image of the king is found in his son. In another way\nit is found in something of a different nature, as the king's image\non the coin. In the first sense the Son is the Image of the Father;\nin the second sense man is called the image of God; and therefore in\norder to express the imperfect character of the divine image in man,\nman is not simply called the image, but \"to the image,\" whereby is\nexpressed a certain movement of tendency to perfection. But it cannot\nbe said that the Son of God is \"to the image,\" because He is the\nperfect Image of the Father.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 36\n\nOF THE PERSON OF THE HOLY GHOST\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe proceed to treat of what belongs to the person of the Holy Ghost,\nWho is called not only the Holy Ghost, but also the Love and Gift of\nGod. Concerning the name \"Holy Ghost\" there are four points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether this name, \"Holy Ghost,\" is the proper name of one divine\nPerson?\n\n(2) Whether that divine person Who is called the Holy Ghost, proceeds\nfrom the Father and the Son?\n\n(3) Whether He proceeds from the Father through the Son?\n\n(4) Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy\nGhost?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 36, Art. 1]\n\nWhether This Name \"Holy Ghost\" Is the Proper Name of One Divine Person?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that this name, \"Holy Ghost,\" is not the\nproper name of one divine person. For no name which is common to the\nthree persons is the proper name of any one person. But this name of\n'Holy Ghost' [*It should be borne in mind that the word \"ghost\" is the\nold English equivalent for the Latin \"spiritus,\"] whether in the sense\nof \"breath\" or \"blast,\" or in the sense of \"spirit,\" as an immaterial\nsubstance. Thus, we read in the former sense (Hampole, Psalter x, 7),\n\"The Gost of Storms\" [spiritus procellarum], and in the latter\n\"Trubled gost is sacrifice of God\" (Prose Psalter, A.D. 1325), and\n\"Oure wrestlynge is . . . against the spiritual wicked gostes of the\nayre\" (More, \"Comfort against Tribulation\"); and in our modern\nexpression of \"giving up the ghost.\" As applied to God, and not\nspecially to the third Holy Person, we have an example from Maunder,\n\"Jhesu Criste was the worde and the goste of Good.\" (See Oxford\nDictionary).) is common to the three persons; for Hilary (De Trin.\nviii) shows that the \"Spirit of God\" sometimes means the Father, as in\nthe words of Isa. 61:1: \"The Spirit of the Lord is upon me;\" and\nsometimes the Son, as when the Son says: \"In the Spirit of God I cast\nout devils\" (Matt. 12:28), showing that He cast out devils by His own\nnatural power; and that sometimes it means the Holy Ghost, as in the\nwords of Joel 2:28: \"I will pour out of My Spirit over all flesh.\"\nTherefore this name 'Holy Ghost' is not the proper name of a divine\nperson.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the names of the divine persons are relative terms,\nas Boethius says (De Trin.). But this name \"Holy Ghost\" is not a\nrelative term. Therefore this name is not the proper name of a divine\nPerson.\n\nObj. 3: Further, because the Son is the name of a divine Person He\ncannot be called the Son of this or of that. But the spirit is spoken\nof as of this or that man, as appears in the words, \"The Lord said to\nMoses, I will take of thy spirit and will give to them\" (Num. 11:17)\nand also \"The Spirit of Elias rested upon Eliseus\" (4 Kings 2:15).\nTherefore \"Holy Ghost\" does not seem to be the proper name of a\ndivine Person.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (1 John 5:7): \"There are three who bear\nwitness in heaven, the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost.\" As\nAugustine says (De Trin. vii, 4): \"When we ask, Three what? we say,\nThree persons.\" Therefore the Holy Ghost is the name of a divine\nperson.\n\n_I answer that,_ While there are two processions in God, one of\nthese, the procession of love, has no proper name of its own, as\nstated above (Q. 27, A. 4, ad 3). Hence the relations also which\nfollow from this procession are without a name (Q. 28, A. 4): for\nwhich reason the Person proceeding in that manner has not a proper\nname. But as some names are accommodated by the usual mode of\nspeaking to signify the aforesaid relations, as when we use the names\nof procession and spiration, which in the strict sense more fittingly\nsignify the notional acts than the relations; so to signify the\ndivine Person, Who proceeds by way of love, this name \"Holy Ghost\" is\nby the use of scriptural speech accommodated to Him. The\nappropriateness of this name may be shown in two ways. Firstly, from\nthe fact that the person who is called \"Holy Ghost\" has something in\ncommon with the other Persons. For, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv,\n17; v, 11), \"Because the Holy Ghost is common to both, He Himself is\ncalled that properly which both are called in common. For the Father\nalso is a spirit, and the Son is a spirit; and the Father is holy,\nand the Son is holy.\" Secondly, from the proper signification of the\nname. For the name spirit in things corporeal seems to signify\nimpulse and motion; for we call the breath and the wind by the term\nspirit. Now it is a property of love to move and impel the will of\nthe lover towards the object loved. Further, holiness is attributed\nto whatever is ordered to God. Therefore because the divine person\nproceeds by way of the love whereby God is loved, that person is most\nproperly named \"The Holy Ghost.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The expression Holy Spirit, if taken as two words, is\napplicable to the whole Trinity: because by 'spirit' the\nimmateriality of the divine substance is signified; for corporeal\nspirit is invisible, and has but little matter; hence we apply this\nterm to all immaterial and invisible substances. And by adding the\nword \"holy\" we signify the purity of divine goodness. But if Holy\nSpirit be taken as one word, it is thus that the expression, in the\nusage of the Church, is accommodated to signify one of the three\npersons, the one who proceeds by way of love, for the reason above\nexplained.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although this name \"Holy Ghost\" does not indicate a\nrelation, still it takes the place of a relative term, inasmuch as it\nis accommodated to signify a Person distinct from the others by\nrelation only. Yet this name may be understood as including a\nrelation, if we understand the Holy Spirit as being breathed\n[spiratus].\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the name Son we understand that relation only which\nis of something from a principle, in regard to that principle: but in\nthe name \"Father\" we understand the relation of principle; and\nlikewise in the name of Spirit inasmuch as it implies a moving power.\nBut to no creature does it belong to be a principle as regards a\ndivine person; but rather the reverse. Therefore we can say \"our\nFather,\" and \"our Spirit\"; but we cannot say \"our Son.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 36, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Holy Ghost Proceeds from the Son?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from\nthe Son. For as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i): \"We must not dare to say\nanything concerning the substantial Divinity except what has been\ndivinely expressed to us by the sacred oracles.\" But in the Sacred\nScripture we are not told that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son;\nbut only that He proceeds from the Father, as appears from John 15:26:\n\"The Spirit of truth, Who proceeds from the Father.\" Therefore the\nHoly Ghost does not proceed from the Son.\n\nObj. 2: Further, In the creed of the council of Constantinople (Can.\nvii) we read: \"We believe in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Life-giver,\nwho proceeds from the Father; with the Father and the Son to be\nadored and glorified.\" Therefore it should not be added in our Creed\nthat the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son; and those who added such a\nthing appear to be worthy of anathema.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i): \"We say that the\nHoly Ghost is from the Father, and we name Him the spirit of the\nFather; but we do not say that the Holy Ghost is from the Son, yet we\nname Him the Spirit of the Son.\" Therefore the Holy Ghost does not\nproceed from the Son.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Nothing proceeds from that wherein it rests. But the\nHoly Ghost rests in the Son; for it is said in the legend of St.\nAndrew: \"Peace be to you and to all who believe in the one God the\nFather, and in His only Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and in the one\nHoly Ghost proceeding from the Father, and abiding in the Son.\"\nTherefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the Son proceeds as the Word. But our breath\n[spiritus] does not seem to proceed in ourselves from our word.\nTherefore the Holy Ghost does not proceed from the Son.\n\nObj. 6: Further, the Holy Ghost proceeds perfectly from the Father.\nTherefore it is superfluous to say that He proceeds from the Son.\n\nObj. 7: Further \"the actual and the possible do not differ in things\nperpetual\" (Phys. iii, text 32), and much less so in God. But it is\npossible for the Holy Ghost to be distinguished from the Son, even if\nHe did not proceed from Him. For Anselm says (De Process. Spir.\nSancti, ii): \"The Son and the Holy Ghost have their Being from the\nFather; but each in a different way; one by Birth, the other by\nProcession, so that they are thus distinct from one another.\" And\nfurther on he says: \"For even if for no other reason were the Son and\nthe Holy Ghost distinct, this alone would suffice.\" Therefore the\nHoly Spirit is distinct from the Son, without proceeding from Him.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says: \"The Holy Ghost is from the Father\nand the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It must be said that the Holy Ghost is from the Son.\nFor if He were not from Him, He could in no wise be personally\ndistinguished from Him; as appears from what has been said above (Q.\n28, A. 3; Q. 30, A. 2). For it cannot be said that the divine Persons\nare distinguished from each other in any absolute sense; for it would\nfollow that there would not be one essence of the three persons:\nsince everything that is spoken of God in an absolute sense, belongs\nto the unity of essence. Therefore it must be said that the divine\npersons are distinguished from each other only by the relations. Now\nthe relations cannot distinguish the persons except forasmuch as they\nare opposite relations; which appears from the fact that the Father\nhas two relations, by one of which He is related to the Son, and by\nthe other to the Holy Ghost; but these are not opposite relations,\nand therefore they do not make two persons, but belong only to the\none person of the Father. If therefore in the Son and the Holy Ghost\nthere were two relations only, whereby each of them were related to\nthe Father, these relations would not be opposite to each other, as\nneither would be the two relations whereby the Father is related to\nthem. Hence, as the person of the Father is one, it would follow that\nthe person of the Son and of the Holy Ghost would be one, having two\nrelations opposed to the two relations of the Father. But this is\nheretical since it destroys the Faith in the Trinity. Therefore the\nSon and the Holy Ghost must be related to each other by opposite\nrelations. Now there cannot be in God any relations opposed to each\nother, except relations of origin, as proved above (Q. 28, A. 4). And\nopposite relations of origin are to be understood as of a\n\"principle,\" and of what is \"from the principle.\" Therefore we must\nconclude that it is necessary to say that either the Son is from the\nHoly Ghost; which no one says; or that the Holy Ghost is from the\nSon, as we confess.\n\nFurthermore, the order of the procession of each one agrees with this\nconclusion. For it was said above (Q. 27, AA. 2, 4; Q. 28, A. 4),\nthat the Son proceeds by the way of the intellect as Word, and the\nHoly Ghost by way of the will as Love. Now love must proceed from a\nword. For we do not love anything unless we apprehend it by a mental\nconception. Hence also in this way it is manifest that the Holy Ghost\nproceeds from the Son.\n\nWe derive a knowledge of the same truth from the very order of nature\nitself. For we nowhere find that several things proceed from one\nwithout order except in those which differ only by their matter; as\nfor instance one smith produces many knives distinct from each other\nmaterially, with no order to each other; whereas in things in which\nthere is not only a material distinction we always find that some\norder exists in the multitude produced. Hence also in the order of\ncreatures produced, the beauty of the divine wisdom is displayed. So\nif from the one Person of the Father, two persons proceed, the Son and\nthe Holy Ghost, there must be some order between them. Nor can any\nother be assigned except the order of their nature, whereby one is\nfrom the other. Therefore it cannot be said that the Son and the Holy\nGhost proceed from the Father in such a way as that neither of them\nproceeds from the other, unless we admit in them a material\ndistinction; which is impossible.\n\nHence also the Greeks themselves recognize that the procession of the\nHoly Ghost has some order to the Son. For they grant that the Holy\nGhost is the Spirit \"of the Son\"; and that He is from the Father\n\"through the Son.\" Some of them are said also to concede that \"He is\nfrom the Son\"; or that \"He flows from the Son,\" but not that He\nproceeds; which seems to come from ignorance or obstinacy. For a just\nconsideration of the truth will convince anyone that the word\nprocession is the one most commonly applied to all that denotes origin\nof any kind. For we use the term to describe any kind of origin; as\nwhen we say that a line proceeds from a point, a ray from the sun, a\nstream from a source, and likewise in everything else. Hence, granted\nthat the Holy Ghost originates in any way from the Son, we can\nconclude that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We ought not to say about God anything which is not\nfound in Holy Scripture either explicitly or implicitly. But although\nwe do not find it verbally expressed in Holy Scripture that the Holy\nGhost proceeds from the Son, still we do find it in the sense of\nScripture, especially where the Son says, speaking of the Holy Ghost,\n\"He will glorify Me, because He shall receive of Mine\" (John 16:14).\nIt is also a rule of Holy Scripture that whatever is said of the\nFather, applies to the Son, although there be added an exclusive\nterm; except only as regards what belongs to the opposite relations,\nwhereby the Father and the Son are distinguished from each other. For\nwhen the Lord says, \"No one knoweth the Son, but the Father,\" the\nidea of the Son knowing Himself is not excluded. So therefore when we\nsay that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, even though it be\nadded that He proceeds from the Father alone, the Son would not\nthereby be at all excluded; because as regards being the principle of\nthe Holy Ghost, the Father and the Son are not opposed to each other,\nbut only as regards the fact that one is the Father, and the other is\nthe Son.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In every council of the Church a symbol of faith has\nbeen drawn up to meet some prevalent error condemned in the council\nat that time. Hence subsequent councils are not to be described as\nmaking a new symbol of faith; but what was implicitly contained in\nthe first symbol was explained by some addition directed against\nrising heresies. Hence in the decision of the council of Chalcedon it\nis declared that those who were congregated together in the council\nof Constantinople, handed down the doctrine about the Holy Ghost, not\nimplying that there was anything wanting in the doctrine of their\npredecessors who had gathered together at Nicaea, but explaining what\nthose fathers had understood of the matter. Therefore, because at the\ntime of the ancient councils the error of those who said that the\nHoly Ghost did not proceed from the Son had not arisen, it was not\nnecessary to make any explicit declaration on that point; whereas,\nlater on, when certain errors rose up, another council [*Council of\nRome, under Pope Damasus] assembled in the west, the matter was\nexplicitly defined by the authority of the Roman Pontiff, by whose\nauthority also the ancient councils were summoned and confirmed.\nNevertheless the truth was contained implicitly in the belief that\nthe Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Nestorians were the first to introduce the error\nthat the Holy Ghost did not proceed from the Son, as appears in a\nNestorian creed condemned in the council of Ephesus. This error was\nembraced by Theodoric the Nestorian, and several others after him,\namong whom was also Damascene. Hence, in that point his opinion is\nnot to be held. Although, too, it has been asserted by some that\nwhile Damascene did not confess that the Holy Ghost was from the Son,\nneither do those words of his express a denial thereof.\n\nReply Obj. 4: When the Holy Ghost is said to rest or abide in the\nSon, it does not mean that He does not proceed from Him; for the Son\nalso is said to abide in the Father, although He proceeds from the\nFather. Also the Holy Ghost is said to rest in the Son as the love of\nthe lover abides in the beloved; or in reference to the human nature\nof Christ, by reason of what is written: \"On whom thou shalt see the\nSpirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is who baptizes\" (John\n1:33).\n\nReply Obj. 5: The Word in God is not taken after the similitude of\nthe vocal word, whence the breath [spiritus] does not proceed; for it\nwould then be only metaphorical; but after the similitude of the\nmental word, whence proceeds love.\n\nReply Obj. 6: For the reason that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the\nFather perfectly, not only is it not superfluous to say He proceeds\nfrom the Son, but rather it is absolutely necessary. Forasmuch as one\npower belongs to the Father and the Son; and because whatever is from\nthe Father, must be from the Son unless it be opposed to the property\nof filiation; for the Son is not from Himself, although He is from\nthe Father.\n\nReply Obj. 7: The Holy Ghost is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch\nas the origin of one is distinguished from the origin of the other;\nbut the difference itself of origin comes from the fact that the Son\nis only from the Father, whereas the Holy Ghost is from the Father\nand the Son; for otherwise the processions would not be distinguished\nfrom each other, as explained above, and in Q. 27.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 36, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Holy Ghost Proceeds from the Father Through the Son?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost does not proceed from\nthe Father through the Son. For whatever proceeds from one through\nanother, does not proceed immediately. Therefore, if the Holy Ghost\nproceeds from the Father through the Son, He does not proceed\nimmediately; which seems to be unfitting.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father through\nthe Son, He does not proceed from the Son, except on account of the\nFather. But \"whatever causes a thing to be such is yet more so.\"\nTherefore He proceeds more from the Father than from the Son.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Son has His being by generation. Therefore if\nthe Holy Ghost is from the Father through the Son, it follows that\nthe Son is first generated and afterwards the Holy Ghost proceeds;\nand thus the procession of the Holy Ghost is not eternal, which is\nheretical.\n\nObj. 4: Further, when anyone acts through another, the same may be\nsaid conversely. For as we say that the king acts through the\nbailiff, so it can be said conversely that the bailiff acts through\nthe king. But we can never say that the Son spirates the Holy Ghost\nthrough the Father. Therefore it can never be said that the Father\nspirates the Holy Ghost through the Son.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. xii): \"Keep me, I pray, in\nthis expression of my faith, that I may ever possess the\nFather--namely Thyself: that I may adore Thy Son together with Thee:\nand that I may deserve Thy Holy Spirit, who is through Thy Only\nBegotten.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Whenever one is said to act through another, this\npreposition \"through\" points out, in what is covered by it, some cause\nor principle of that act. But since action is a mean between the agent\nand the thing done, sometimes that which is covered by the preposition\n\"through\" is the cause of the action, as proceeding from the agent;\nand in that case it is the cause of why the agent acts, whether it be\na final cause or a formal cause, whether it be effective or motive. It\nis a final cause when we say, for instance, that the artisan works\nthrough love of gain. It is a formal cause when we say that he works\nthrough his art. It is a motive cause when we say that he works\nthrough the command of another. Sometimes, however, that which is\ncovered by this preposition \"through\" is the cause of the action\nregarded as terminated in the thing done; as, for instance, when we\nsay, the artisan acts through the mallet, for this does not mean that\nthe mallet is the cause why the artisan acts, but that it is the cause\nwhy the thing made proceeds from the artisan, and that it has even\nthis effect from the artisan. This is why it is sometimes said that\nthis preposition \"through\" sometimes denotes direct authority, as when\nwe say, the king works through the bailiff; and sometimes indirect\nauthority, as when we say, the bailiff works through the king.\n\nTherefore, because the Son receives from the Father that the Holy\nGhost proceeds from Him, it can be said that the Father spirates the\nHoly Ghost through the Son, or that the Holy Ghost proceeds from the\nFather through the Son, which has the same meaning.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In every action two things are to be considered, the\n_suppositum_ acting, and the power whereby it acts; as, for instance,\nfire heats through heat. So if we consider in the Father and the Son\nthe power whereby they spirate the Holy Ghost, there is no mean, for\nthis is one and the same power. But if we consider the persons\nthemselves spirating, then, as the Holy Ghost proceeds both from the\nFather and from the Son, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father\nimmediately, as from Him, and mediately, as from the Son; and thus He\nis said to proceed from the Father through the Son. So also did Abel\nproceed immediately from Adam, inasmuch as Adam was his father; and\nmediately, as Eve was his mother, who proceeded from Adam; although,\nindeed, this example of a material procession is inept to signify the\nimmaterial procession of the divine persons.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If the Son received from the Father a numerically\ndistinct power for the spiration of the Holy Ghost, it would follow\nthat He would be a secondary and instrumental cause; and thus the\nHoly Ghost would proceed more from the Father than from the Son;\nwhereas, on the contrary, the same spirative power belongs to the\nFather and to the Son; and therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds equally\nfrom both, although sometimes He is said to proceed principally or\nproperly from the Father, because the Son has this power from the\nFather.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the begetting of the Son is co-eternal with the\nbegetter (and hence the Father does not exist before begetting the\nSon), so the procession of the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with His\nprinciple. Hence, the Son was not begotten before the Holy Ghost\nproceeded; but each of the operations is eternal.\n\nReply Obj. 4: When anyone is said to work through anything, the\nconverse proposition is not always true. For we do not say that the\nmallet works through the carpenter; whereas we can say that the\nbailiff acts through the king, because it is the bailiff's place to\nact, since he is master of his own act, but it is not the mallet's\nplace to act, but only to be made to act, and hence it is used only\nas an instrument. The bailiff is, however, said to act through the\nking, although this preposition \"through\" denotes a medium, for the\nmore a _suppositum_ is prior in action, so much the more is its power\nimmediate as regards the effect, inasmuch as the power of the first\ncause joins the second cause to its effect. Hence also first\nprinciples are said to be immediate in the demonstrative sciences.\nTherefore, so far as the bailiff is a medium according to the order\nof the subject's acting, the king is said to work through the\nbailiff; but according to the order of powers, the bailiff is said to\nact through the king, forasmuch as the power of the king gives the\nbailiff's action its effect. Now there is no order of power between\nFather and Son, but only order of 'supposita'; and hence we say that\nthe Father spirates through the Son; and not conversely.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 36, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Father and the Son Are One Principle of the Holy Ghost?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Father and the Son are not one\nprinciple of the Holy Ghost. For the Holy Ghost does not proceed from\nthe Father and the Son as they are one; not as they are one in nature,\nfor the Holy Ghost would in that way proceed from Himself, as He is\none in nature with Them; nor again inasmuch as they are united in any\none property, for it is clear that one property cannot belong to two\nsubjects. Therefore the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the\nSon as distinct from one another. Therefore the Father and the Son are\nnot one principle of the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in this proposition \"the Father and the Son are one\nprinciple of the Holy Ghost,\" we do not designate personal unity,\nbecause in that case the Father and the Son would be one person; nor\nagain do we designate the unity of property, because if one property\nwere the reason of the Father and the Son being one principle of the\nHoly Ghost, similarly, on account of His two properties, the Father\nwould be two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost, which\ncannot be admitted. Therefore the Father and the Son are not one\nprinciple of the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Son is not one with the Father more than is the\nHoly Ghost. But the Holy Ghost and the Father are not one principle\nas regards any other divine person. Therefore neither are the Father\nand the Son.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the\nHoly Ghost, this one is either the Father or it is not the Father.\nBut we cannot assert either of these positions because if the one is\nthe Father, it follows that the Son is the Father; and if the one is\nnot the Father, it follows that the Father is not the Father.\nTherefore we cannot say that the Father and the Son are one principle\nof the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 5: Further, if the Father and the Son are one principle of the\nHoly Ghost, it seems necessary to say, conversely, that the one\nprinciple of the Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son. But this seems\nto be false; for this word \"principle\" stands either for the person\nof the Father, or for the person of the Son; and in either sense it\nis false. Therefore this proposition also is false, that the Father\nand the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 6: Further, unity in substance makes identity. So if the Father\nand the Son are the one principle of the Holy Ghost, it follows that\nthey are the same principle; which is denied by many. Therefore we\ncannot grant that the Father and the Son are one principle of the\nHoly Ghost.\n\nObj. 7: Further, the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are called one\nCreator, because they are the one principle of the creature. But the\nFather and the Son are not one, but two Spirators, as many assert;\nand this agrees also with what Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that \"the\nHoly Ghost is to be confessed as proceeding from Father and Son as\nauthors.\" Therefore the Father and the Son are not one principle of\nthe Holy Ghost.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. v, 14) that the Father and\nthe Son are not two principles, but one principle of the Holy Ghost.\n\n_I answer that,_ The Father and the Son are in everything one, wherever\nthere is no distinction between them of opposite relation. Hence since\nthere is no relative opposition between them as the principle of the\nHoly Ghost it follows that the Father and the Son are one principle of\nthe Holy Ghost.\n\nSome, however, assert that this proposition is incorrect: \"The Father\nand the Son are one principle of the Holy Ghost,\" because, they\ndeclare, since the word \"principle\" in the singular number does not\nsignify \"person,\" but \"property,\" it must be taken as an adjective;\nand forasmuch as an adjective cannot be modified by another adjective,\nit cannot properly be said that the Father and the Son are one\nprinciple of the Holy Ghost unless one be taken as an adverb, so that\nthe meaning should be: They are one principle--that is, in one and\nthe same way. But then it might be equally right to say that the\nFather is two principles of the Son and of the Holy Ghost--namely, in\ntwo ways. Therefore, we must say that, although this word \"principle\"\nsignifies a property, it does so after the manner of a substantive, as\ndo the words \"father\" and \"son\" even in things created. Hence it takes\nits number from the form it signifies, like other substantives.\nTherefore, as the Father and the Son are one God, by reason of the\nunity of the form that is signified by this word \"God\"; so they are\none principle of the Holy Ghost by reason of the unity of the property\nthat is signified in this word \"principle.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: If we consider the spirative power, the Holy Ghost\nproceeds from the Father and the Son as they are one in the spirative\npower, which in a certain way signifies the nature with the property,\nas we shall see later (ad 7). Nor is there any reason against one\nproperty being in two _supposita_ that possess one common nature. But\nif we consider the _supposita_ of the spiration, then we may say that\nthe Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son, as distinct; for\nHe proceeds from them as the unitive love of both.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In the proposition \"the Father and the Son are one\nprinciple of the Holy Ghost,\" one property is designated which is the\nform signified by the term. It does not thence follow that by reason\nof the several properties the Father can be called several\nprinciples, for this would imply in Him a plurality of subjects.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is not by reason of relative properties that we\nspeak of similitude or dissimilitude in God, but by reason of the\nessence. Hence, as the Father is not more like to Himself than He is\nto the Son; so likewise neither is the Son more like to the Father\nthan is the Holy Ghost.\n\nReply Obj. 4: These two propositions, \"The Father and the Son are one\nprinciple which is the Father,\" or, \"one principle which is not the\nFather,\" are not mutually contradictory; and hence it is not\nnecessary to assert one or other of them. For when we say the Father\nand the Son are one principle, this word \"principle\" has not\ndeterminate supposition but rather it stands indeterminately for two\npersons together. Hence there is a fallacy of \"figure of speech\" as\nthe argument concludes from the indeterminate to the determinate.\n\nReply Obj. 5: This proposition is also true:--The one principle of\nthe Holy Ghost is the Father and the Son; because the word\n\"principle\" does not stand for one person only, but indistinctly for\nthe two persons as above explained.\n\nReply Obj. 6: There is no reason against saying that the Father and\nthe Son are the same principle, because the word \"principle\" stands\nconfusedly and indistinctly for the two Persons together.\n\nReply Obj. 7: Some say that although the Father and the Son are one\nprinciple of the Holy Ghost, there are two spirators, by reason of\nthe distinction of _supposita,_ as also there are two spirating,\nbecause acts refer to subjects. Yet this does not hold good as to the\nname \"Creator\"; because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and\nthe Son as from two distinct persons, as above explained; whereas the\ncreature proceeds from the three persons not as distinct persons, but\nas united in essence. It seems, however, better to say that because\nspirating is an adjective, and spirator a substantive, we can say\nthat the Father and the Son are two spirating, by reason of the\nplurality of the _supposita_ but not two spirators by reason of the\none spiration. For adjectival words derive their number from the\n_supposita_ but substantives from themselves, according to the form\nsignified. As to what Hilary says, that \"the Holy Ghost is from the\nFather and the Son as His authors,\" this is to be explained in the\nsense that the substantive here stands for the adjective.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 37\n\nOF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST--LOVE\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe now inquire concerning the name \"Love,\" on which arise two points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?\n\n(2) Whether the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 37, Art. 2]\n\nWhether \"Love\" Is the Proper Name of the Holy Ghost?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that \"Love\" is not the proper name of the\nHoly Ghost. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 17): \"As the Father, Son\nand Holy Ghost are called Wisdom, and are not three Wisdoms, but one;\nI know not why the Father, Son and Holy Ghost should not be called\nCharity, and all together one Charity.\" But no name which is\npredicated in the singular of each person and of all together, is a\nproper name of a person. Therefore this name, \"Love,\" is not the\nproper name of the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Holy Ghost is a subsisting person, but love is\nnot used to signify a subsisting person, but rather an action passing\nfrom the lover to the beloved. Therefore Love is not the proper name\nof the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Love is the bond between lovers, for as Dionysius\nsays (Div. Nom. iv): \"Love is a unitive force.\" But a bond is a\nmedium between what it joins together, not something proceeding from\nthem. Therefore, since the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and\nthe Son, as was shown above (Q. 36, A. 2), it seems that He is not\nthe Love or bond of the Father and the Son.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Love belongs to every lover. But the Holy Ghost is a\nlover: therefore He has love. So if the Holy Ghost is Love, He must\nbe love of love, and spirit from spirit; which is not admissible.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xxx, in Pentecost.): \"The Holy\nGhost Himself is Love.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The name Love in God can be taken essentially and\npersonally. If taken personally it is the proper name of the Holy\nGhost; as Word is the proper name of the Son.\n\nTo see this we must know that since as shown above (Q. 27, AA. 2, 3,\n4, 5), there are two processions in God, one by way of the intellect,\nwhich is the procession of the Word, and another by way of the will,\nwhich is the procession of Love; forasmuch as the former is the more\nknown to us, we have been able to apply more suitable names to\nexpress our various considerations as regards that procession, but\nnot as regards the procession of the will. Hence, we are obliged to\nemploy circumlocution as regards the person Who proceeds, and the\nrelations following from this procession which are called\n\"procession\" and \"spiration,\" as stated above (Q. 27, A. 4, ad 3),\nand yet express the origin rather than the relation in the strict\nsense of the term. Nevertheless we must consider them in respect of\neach procession simply. For as when a thing is understood by anyone,\nthere results in the one who understands a conception of the object\nunderstood, which conception we call word; so when anyone loves an\nobject, a certain impression results, so to speak, of the thing loved\nin the affection of the lover; by reason of which the object loved is\nsaid to be in the lover; as also the thing understood is in the one\nwho understands; so that when anyone understands and loves himself he\nis in himself, not only by real identity, but also as the object\nunderstood is in the one who understands, and the thing loved is in\nthe lover. As regards the intellect, however, words have been found\nto describe the mutual relation of the one who understands the object\nunderstood, as appears in the word \"to understand\"; and other words\nare used to express the procession of the intellectual\nconception--namely, \"to speak,\" and \"word.\" Hence in God, \"to\nunderstand\" is applied only to the essence; because it does not\nimport relation to the Word that proceeds; whereas \"Word\" is said\npersonally, because it signifies what proceeds; and the term \"to\nspeak\" is a notional term as importing the relation of the principle\nof the Word to the Word Himself. On the other hand, on the part of\nthe will, with the exception of the words \"dilection\" and \"love,\"\nwhich express the relation of the lover to the object loved, there\nare no other terms in use, which express the relation of the\nimpression or affection of the object loved, produced in the lover by\nfact that he loves--to the principle of that impression, or \"vice\nversa.\" And therefore, on account of the poverty of our vocabulary,\nwe express these relations by the words \"love\" and \"dilection\": just\nas if we were to call the Word \"intelligence conceived,\" or \"wisdom\nbegotten.\"\n\nIt follows that so far as love means only the relation of the lover to\nthe object loved, \"love\" and \"to love\" are said of the essence, as\n\"understanding\" and \"to understand\"; but, on the other hand, so far as\nthese words are used to express the relation to its principle, of what\nproceeds by way of love, and \"vice versa,\" so that by \"love\" is\nunderstood the \"love proceeding,\" and by \"to love\" is understood \"the\nspiration of the love proceeding,\" in that sense \"love\" is the name of\nthe person and \"to love\" is a notional term, as \"to speak\" and \"to\nbeget.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is there speaking of charity as it means the\ndivine essence, as was said above (here and Q. 24, A. 2, ad 4).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although to understand, and to will, and to love\nsignify actions passing on to their objects, nevertheless they are\nactions that remain in the agents, as stated above (Q. 14, A. 4),\nyet in such a way that in the agent itself they import a certain\nrelation to their object. Hence, love also in ourselves is something\nthat abides in the lover, and the word of the heart is something\nabiding in the speaker; yet with a relation to the thing expressed by\nword, or loved. But in God, in whom there is nothing accidental, there\nis more than this; because both Word and Love are subsistent.\nTherefore, when we say that the Holy Ghost is the Love of the Father\nfor the Son, or for something else; we do not mean anything that\npasses into another, but only the relation of love to the beloved; as\nalso in the Word is imported the relation of the Word to the thing\nexpressed by the Word.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Holy Ghost is said to be the bond of the Father and\nSon, inasmuch as He is Love; because, since the Father loves Himself\nand the Son with one Love, and conversely, there is expressed in the\nHoly Ghost, as Love, the relation of the Father to the Son, and\nconversely, as that of the lover to the beloved. But from the fact\nthat the Father and the Son mutually love one another, it necessarily\nfollows that this mutual Love, the Holy Ghost, proceeds from both. As\nregards origin, therefore, the Holy Ghost is not the medium, but the\nthird person in the Trinity; whereas as regards the aforesaid\nrelation He is the bond between the two persons, as proceeding from\nboth.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As it does not belong to the Son, though He\nunderstands, to produce a word, for it belongs to Him to understand\nas the word proceeding; so in like manner, although the Holy Ghost\nloves, taking Love as an essential term, still it does not belong to\nHim to spirate love, which is to take love as a notional term;\nbecause He loves essentially as love proceeding; but not as the one\nwhence love proceeds.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 37, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Father and the Son Love Each Other by the Holy Ghost?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Father and the Son do not love\neach other by the Holy Ghost. For Augustine (De Trin. vii, 1) proves\nthat the Father is not wise by the Wisdom begotten. But as the Son is\nWisdom begotten, so the Holy Ghost is the Love proceeding, as\nexplained above (Q. 27, A. 3). Therefore the Father and the Son do\nnot love Themselves by the Love proceeding, which is the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in the proposition, \"The Father and the Son love\neach other by the Holy Ghost,\" this word \"love\" is to be taken either\nessentially or notionally. But it cannot be true if taken\nessentially, because in the same way we might say that \"the Father\nunderstands by the Son\"; nor, again, if it is taken notionally, for\nthen, in like manner, it might be said that \"the Father and the Son\nspirate by the Holy Ghost,\" or that \"the Father generates by the\nSon.\" Therefore in no way is this proposition true: \"The Father and\nthe Son love each other by the Holy Ghost.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, by the same love the Father loves the Son, and\nHimself, and us. But the Father does not love Himself by the Holy\nGhost; for no notional act is reflected back on the principle of the\nact; since it cannot be said that the \"Father begets Himself,\" or\nthat \"He spirates Himself.\" Therefore, neither can it be said that\n\"He loves Himself by the Holy Ghost,\" if \"to love\" is taken in a\nnotional sense. Again, the love wherewith He loves us is not the Holy\nGhost; because it imports a relation to creatures, and this belongs\nto the essence. Therefore this also is false: \"The Father loves the\nSon by the Holy Ghost.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 5): \"The Holy Ghost\nis He whereby the Begotten is loved by the one begetting and loves\nHis Begetter.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A difficulty about this question is objected to the\neffect that when we say, \"the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost,\"\nsince the ablative is construed as denoting a cause, it seems to mean\nthat the Holy Ghost is the principle of love to the Father and the\nSon; which cannot be admitted.\n\nIn view of this difficulty some have held that it is false, that \"the\nFather and the Son love each other by the Holy Ghost\"; and they add\nthat it was retracted by Augustine when he retracted its equivalent to\nthe effect that \"the Father is wise by the Wisdom begotten.\" Others\nsay that the proposition is inaccurate and ought to be expounded, as\nthat \"the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost\"--that is, \"by His\nessential Love,\" which is appropriated to the Holy Ghost. Others\nfurther say that this ablative should be construed as importing a\nsign, so that it means, \"the Holy Ghost is the sign that the Father\nloves the Son\"; inasmuch as the Holy Ghost proceeds from them both, as\nLove. Others, again, say that this ablative must be construed as\nimporting the relation of formal cause, because the Holy Ghost is the\nlove whereby the Father and the Son formally love each other. Others,\nagain, say that it should be construed as importing the relation of a\nformal effect; and these approach nearer to the truth.\n\nTo make the matter clear, we must consider that since a thing is\ncommonly denominated from its forms, as \"white\" from whiteness, and\n\"man\" from humanity; everything whence anything is denominated, in\nthis particular respect stands to that thing in the relation of form.\nSo when I say, \"this man is clothed with a garment,\" the ablative is\nto be construed as having relation to the formal cause, although the\ngarment is not the form. Now it may happen that a thing may be\ndenominated from that which proceeds from it, not only as an agent is\nfrom its action, but also as from the term itself of the action--that\nis, the effect, when the effect itself is included in the idea of the\naction. For we say that fire warms by heating, although heating is not\nthe heat which is the form of the fire, but is an action proceeding\nfrom the fire; and we say that a tree flowers with the flower,\nalthough the flower is not the tree's form, but is the effect\nproceeding from the form. In this way, therefore, we must say that\nsince in God \"to love\" is taken in two ways, essentially and\nnotionally, when it is taken essentially, it means that the Father and\nthe Son love each other not by the Holy Ghost, but by their essence.\nHence Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 7): \"Who dares to say that the\nFather loves neither Himself, nor the Son, nor the Holy Ghost, except\nby the Holy Ghost?\" The opinions first quoted are to be taken in this\nsense. But when the term Love is taken in a notional sense it means\nnothing else than \"to spirate love\"; just as to speak is to produce a\nword, and to flower is to produce flowers. As therefore we say that a\ntree flowers by its flower, so do we say that the Father, by the Word\nor the Son, speaks Himself, and His creatures; and that the Father and\nthe Son love each other and us, by the Holy Ghost, or by Love\nproceeding.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To be wise or intelligent is taken only essentially in\nGod; therefore we cannot say that \"the Father is wise or intelligent\nby the Son.\" But to love is taken not only essentially, but also in a\nnotional sense; and in this way, we can say that the Father and the\nSon love each other by the Holy Ghost, as was above explained.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When the idea of an action includes a determined\neffect, the principle of the action may be denominated both from the\naction, and from the effect; so we can say, for instance, that a tree\nflowers by its flowering and by its flower. When, however, the idea\nof an action does not include a determined effect, then in that case,\nthe principle of the action cannot be denominated from the effect,\nbut only from the action. For we do not say that the tree produces\nthe flower by the flower, but by the production of the flower. So\nwhen we say, \"spirates\" or \"begets,\" this imports only a notional\nact. Hence we cannot say that the Father spirates by the Holy Ghost,\nor begets by the Son. But we can say that the Father speaks by the\nWord, as by the Person proceeding, \"and speaks by the speaking,\" as\nby a notional act; forasmuch as \"to speak\" imports a determinate\nperson proceeding; since \"to speak\" means to produce a word. Likewise\nto love, taken in a notional sense, means to produce love; and so it\ncan be said that the Father loves the Son by the Holy Ghost, as by\nthe person proceeding, and by Love itself as a notional act.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Father loves not only the Son, but also Himself and\nus, by the Holy Ghost; because, as above explained, to love, taken in\na notional sense, not only imports the production of a divine person,\nbut also the person produced, by way of love, which has relation to\nthe object loved. Hence, as the Father speaks Himself and every\ncreature by His begotten Word, inasmuch as the Word \"begotten\"\nadequately represents the Father and every creature; so He loves\nHimself and every creature by the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as the Holy\nGhost proceeds as the love of the primal goodness whereby the Father\nloves Himself and every creature. Thus it is evident that relation to\nthe creature is implied both in the Word and in the proceeding Love,\nas it were in a secondary way, inasmuch as the divine truth and\ngoodness are a principle of understanding and loving all creatures.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 38\n\nOF THE NAME OF THE HOLY GHOST, AS GIFT\n(In Two Articles)\n\nThere now follows the consideration of the Gift; concerning which\nthere are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether \"Gift\" can be a personal name?\n\n(2) Whether it is the proper name of the Holy Ghost?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 38, Art. 1]\n\nWhether \"Gift\" Is a Personal Name?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that \"Gift\" is not a personal name. For\nevery personal name imports a distinction in God. But the name of\n\"Gift\" does not import a distinction in God; for Augustine says (De\nTrin. xv, 19): that \"the Holy Ghost is so given as God's Gift, that He\nalso gives Himself as God.\" Therefore \"Gift\" is not a personal name.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no personal name belongs to the divine essence. But\nthe divine essence is the Gift which the Father gives to the Son, as\nHilary says (De Trin. ix). Therefore \"Gift\" is not a personal name.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. iv, 19) there\nis no subjection nor service in the divine persons. But gift implies\na subjection both as regards him to whom it is given, and as regards\nhim by whom it is given. Therefore \"Gift\" is not a personal name.\n\nObj. 4: Further, \"Gift\" imports relation to the creature, and it thus\nseems to be said of God in time. But personal names are said of God\nfrom eternity; as \"Father,\" and \"Son.\" Therefore \"Gift\" is not a\npersonal name.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 19): \"As the body of\nflesh is nothing but flesh; so the gift of the Holy Ghost is nothing\nbut the Holy Ghost.\" But the Holy Ghost is a personal name; so also\ntherefore is \"Gift.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The word \"gift\" imports an aptitude for being given.\nAnd what is given has an aptitude or relation both to the giver and to\nthat to which it is given. For it would not be given by anyone, unless\nit was his to give; and it is given to someone to be his. Now a divine\nperson is said to belong to another, either by origin, as the Son\nbelongs to the Father; or as possessed by another. But we are said to\npossess what we can freely use or enjoy as we please: and in this way\na divine person cannot be possessed, except by a rational creature\nunited to God. Other creatures can be moved by a divine person, not,\nhowever, in such a way as to be able to enjoy the divine person, and\nto use the effect thereof. The rational creature does sometimes attain\nthereto; as when it is made partaker of the divine Word and of the\nLove proceeding, so as freely to know God truly and to love God\nrightly. Hence the rational creature alone can possess the divine\nperson. Nevertheless in order that it may possess Him in this manner,\nits own power avails nothing: hence this must be given it from above;\nfor that is said to be given to us which we have from another source.\nThus a divine person can \"be given,\" and can be a \"gift.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The name \"Gift\" imports a personal distinction, in so\nfar as gift imports something belonging to another through its\norigin. Nevertheless, the Holy Ghost gives Himself, inasmuch as He is\nHis own, and can use or rather enjoy Himself; as also a free man\nbelongs to himself. And as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix):\n\"What is more yours than yourself?\" Or we might say, and more\nfittingly, that a gift must belong in a way to the giver. But the\nphrase, \"this is this one's,\" can be understood in several senses. In\none way it means identity, as Augustine says (In Joan. Tract. xxix);\nand in that sense \"gift\" is the same as \"the giver,\" but not the same\nas the one to whom it is given. The Holy Ghost gives Himself in that\nsense. In another sense, a thing is another's as a possession, or as\na slave; and in that sense gift is essentially distinct from the\ngiver; and the gift of God so taken is a created thing. In a third\nsense \"this is this one's\" through its origin only; and in this sense\nthe Son is the Father's; and the Holy Ghost belongs to both.\nTherefore, so far as gift in this way signifies the possession of the\ngiver, it is personally distinguished from the giver, and is a\npersonal name.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The divine essence is the Father's gift in the first\nsense, as being the Father's by way of identity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Gift as a personal name in God does not imply\nsubjection, but only origin, as regards the giver; but as regards the\none to whom it is given, it implies a free use, or enjoyment, as\nabove explained.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Gift is not so called from being actually given, but\nfrom its aptitude to be given. Hence the divine person is called Gift\nfrom eternity, although He is given in time. Nor does it follow that\nit is an essential name because it imports relation to the creature;\nbut that it includes something essential in its meaning; as the\nessence is included in the idea of person, as stated above (Q. 34, A.\n3).\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 38, Art. 2]\n\nWhether \"Gift\" Is the Proper Name of the Holy Ghost?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that Gift is not the proper name of the\nHoly Ghost. For the name Gift comes from being given. But, as Isaiah\nsays (9:16): \"A Son is given to us.\" Therefore to be Gift belongs to\nthe Son, as well as to the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every proper name of a person signifies a property.\nBut this word Gift does not signify a property of the Holy Ghost.\nTherefore Gift is not a proper name of the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Holy Ghost can be called the spirit of a man,\nwhereas He cannot be called the gift of any man, but \"God's Gift\"\nonly. Therefore Gift is not the proper name of the Holy Ghost.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): \"As 'to be born'\nis, for the Son, to be from the Father, so, for the Holy Ghost, 'to be\nthe Gift of God' is to proceed from Father and Son.\" But the Holy\nGhost receives His proper name from the fact that He proceeds from\nFather and Son. Therefore Gift is the proper name of the Holy Ghost.\n\n_I answer that,_ Gift, taken personally in God, is the proper name of\nthe Holy Ghost.\n\nIn proof of this we must know that a gift is properly an unreturnable\ngiving, as Aristotle says (Topic. iv, 4)--i.e. a thing which is not\ngiven with the intention of a return--and it thus contains the idea\nof a gratuitous donation. Now, the reason of donation being\ngratuitous is love; since therefore do we give something to anyone\ngratuitously forasmuch as we wish him well. So what we first give him\nis the love whereby we wish him well. Hence it is manifest that love\nhas the nature of a first gift, through which all free gifts are\ngiven. So since the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, as stated above (Q.\n27, A. 4; Q. 37, A. 1), He proceeds as the first gift. Hence\nAugustine says (De Trin. xv, 24): \"By the gift, which is the Holy\nGhost, many particular gifts are portioned out to the members of\nChrist.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the Son is properly called the Image because He\nproceeds by way of a word, whose nature it is to be the similitude of\nits principle, although the Holy Ghost also is like to the Father; so\nalso, because the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father as love, He is\nproperly called Gift, although the Son, too, is given. For that the\nSon is given is from the Father's love, according to the words, \"God\nso loved the world, as to give His only begotten Son\" (John 3:16).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The name Gift involves the idea of belonging to the\nGiver through its origin; and thus it imports the property of the\norigin of the Holy Ghost--that is, His procession.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Before a gift is given, it belongs only to the giver;\nbut when it is given, it is his to whom it is given. Therefore,\nbecause \"Gift\" does not import the actual giving, it cannot be called\na gift of man, but the Gift of God giving. When, however, it has been\ngiven, then it is the spirit of man, or a gift bestowed on man.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 39\n\nOF THE PERSONS IN RELATION TO THE ESSENCE\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nThose things considered which belong to the divine persons absolutely,\nwe next treat of what concerns the person in reference to the essence,\nto the properties, and to the notional acts; and of the comparison of\nthese with each other.\n\nAs regards the first of these, there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the essence in God is the same as the person?\n\n(2) Whether we should say that the three persons are of one essence?\n\n(3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in\nthe plural, or in the singular?\n\n(4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be\npredicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense?\n\n(5) Whether the same can be predicated of essential names taken in\nthe abstract?\n\n(6) Whether the names of the persons can be predicated of concrete\nessential names?\n\n(7) Whether essential attributes can be appropriated to the persons?\n\n(8) Which attributes should be appropriated to each person?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 1]\n\nWhether in God the Essence Is the Same As the Person?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in God the essence is not the same as\nperson. For whenever essence is the same as person or _suppositum,_\nthere can be only one _suppositum_ of one nature, as is clear in the\ncase of all separate substances. For in those things which are really\none and the same, one cannot be multiplied apart from the other. But\nin God there is one essence and three persons, as is clear from what\nis above expounded (Q. 28, A. 3; Q. 30, A. 2). Therefore essence is\nnot the same as person.\n\nObj. 2: Further, simultaneous affirmation and negation of the same\nthings in the same respect cannot be true. But affirmation and\nnegation are true of essence and of person. For person is distinct,\nwhereas essence is not. Therefore person and essence are not the same.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nothing can be subject to itself. But person is\nsubject to essence; whence it is called _suppositum_ or \"hypostasis.\"\nTherefore person is not the same as essence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 7): \"When we say the\nperson of the Father we mean nothing else but the substance of the\nFather.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The truth of this question is quite clear if we\nconsider the divine simplicity. For it was shown above (Q. 3, A. 3)\nthat the divine simplicity requires that in God essence is the same\nas _suppositum,_ which in intellectual substances is nothing else\nthan person. But a difficulty seems to arise from the fact that while\nthe divine persons are multiplied, the essence nevertheless retains\nits unity. And because, as Boethius says (De Trin. i), \"relation\nmultiplies the Trinity of persons,\" some have thought that in God\nessence and person differ, forasmuch as they held the relations to be\n\"adjacent\"; considering only in the relations the idea of \"reference\nto another,\" and not the relations as realities. But as it was shown\nabove (Q. 28, A. 2) in creatures relations are accidental, whereas in\nGod they are the divine essence itself. Thence it follows that in God\nessence is not really distinct from person; and yet that the persons\nare really distinguished from each other. For person, as above stated\n(Q. 29, A. 4), signifies relation as subsisting in the divine nature.\nBut relation as referred to the essence does not differ therefrom\nreally, but only in our way of thinking; while as referred to an\nopposite relation, it has a real distinction by virtue of that\nopposition. Thus there are one essence and three persons.\n\nReply Obj. 1: There cannot be a distinction of _suppositum_ in\ncreatures by means of relations, but only by essential principles;\nbecause in creatures relations are not subsistent. But in God\nrelations are subsistent, and so by reason of the opposition between\nthem they distinguish the _supposita_; and yet the essence is not\ndistinguished, because the relations themselves are not distinguished\nfrom each other so far as they are identified with the essence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As essence and person in God differ in our way\nof thinking, it follows that something can be denied of the one and\naffirmed of the other; and therefore, when we suppose the one, we need\nnot suppose the other.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Divine things are named by us after the way of\ncreated things, as above explained (Q. 13, AA. 1, 3). And since\ncreated natures are individualized by matter which is the subject of\nthe specific nature, it follows that individuals are called\n\"subjects,\" _supposita,_ or \"hypostases.\" So the divine persons are\nnamed _supposita_ or \"hypostases,\" but not as if there really existed\nany real \"supposition\" or \"subjection.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Must Be Said That the Three Persons Are of One Essence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem not right to say that the three persons are\nof one essence. For Hilary says (De Synod.) that the Father, Son and\nHoly Ghost \"are indeed three by substance, but one in harmony.\" But\nthe substance of God is His essence. Therefore the three persons are\nnot of one essence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing is to be affirmed of God except what can be\nconfirmed by the authority of Holy Writ, as appears from Dionysius\n(Div. Nom. i). Now Holy Writ never says that the Father, Son and Holy\nGhost are of one essence. Therefore this should not be asserted.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the divine nature is the same as the divine essence.\nIt suffices therefore to say that the three persons are of one nature.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is not usual to say that the person is of the\nessence; but rather that the essence is of the person. Therefore it\ndoes not seem fitting to say that the three persons are of one\nessence.\n\nObj. 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that we do not say\nthat the three persons are \"from one essence [ex una essentia],\" lest\nwe should seem to indicate a distinction between the essence and the\npersons in God. But prepositions which imply transition, denote the\noblique case. Therefore it is equally wrong to say that the three\npersons are \"of one essence [unius essentiae].\"\n\nObj. 6: Further, nothing should be said of God which can be occasion\nof error. Now, to say that the three persons are of one essence or\nsubstance, furnishes occasion of error. For, as Hilary says (De\nSynod.): \"One substance predicated of the Father and the Son\nsignifies either one subsistent, with two denominations; or one\nsubstance divided into two imperfect substances; or a third prior\nsubstance taken and assumed by the other two.\" Therefore it must not\nbe said that the three persons are of one substance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii) that the word\n_homoousion,_ which the Council of Nicaea adopted against the Arians,\nmeans that the three persons are of one essence.\n\n_I answer that,_ As above explained (Q. 13, AA. 1, 2), divine things\nare named by our intellect, not as they really are in themselves, for\nin that way it knows them not; but in a way that belongs to things\ncreated. And as in the objects of the senses, whence the intellect\nderives its knowledge, the nature of the species is made individual by\nthe matter, and thus the nature is as the form, and the individual is\nthe _suppositum_ of the form; so also in God the essence is taken as\nthe form of the three persons, according to our mode of signification.\nNow in creatures we say that every form belongs to that whereof it is\nthe form; as the health and beauty of a man belongs to the man. But we\ndo not say of that which has a form, that it belongs to the form,\nunless some adjective qualifies the form; as when we say: \"That woman\nis of a handsome figure,\" or: \"This man is of perfect virtue.\" In like\nmanner, as in God the persons are multiplied, and the essence is not\nmultiplied, we speak of one essence of the three persons, and three\npersons of the one essence, provided that these genitives be\nunderstood as designating the form.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Substance is here taken for the \"hypostasis,\" and not\nfor the essence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although we may not find it declared in Holy Writ in so\nmany words that the three persons are of one essence, nevertheless we\nfind it so stated as regards the meaning; for instance, \"I and the\nFather are one (John 10:30),\" and \"I am in the Father, and the Father\nin Me (John 10:38)\"; and there are many other texts of the same\nimport.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Because \"nature\" designates the principle of action\nwhile \"essence\" comes from being [essendo], things may be said to be\nof one nature which agree in some action, as all things which give\nheat; but only those things can be said to be of \"one essence\" which\nhave one being. So the divine unity is better described by saying\nthat the three persons are \"of one essence,\" than by saying they are\n\"of one nature.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Form, in the absolute sense, is wont to be designated\nas belonging to that of which it is the form, as we say \"the virtue\nof Peter.\" On the other hand, the thing having form is not wont to be\ndesignated as belonging to the form except when we wish to qualify or\ndesignate the form. In which case two genitives are required, one\nsignifying the form, and the other signifying the determination of\nthe form, as, for instance, when we say, \"Peter is of great virtue\n[magnae virtutis],\" or else one genitive must have the force of two,\nas, for instance, \"he is a man of blood\"--that is, he is a man who\nsheds much blood [multi sanguinis]. So, because the divine essence\nsignifies a form as regards the person, it may properly be said that\nthe essence is of the person; but we cannot say the converse, unless\nwe add some term to designate the essence; as, for instance, the\nFather is a person of the \"divine essence\"; or, the three persons are\n\"of one essence.\"\n\nReply Obj. 5: The preposition \"from\" or \"out of\" does not designate\nthe habitude of a formal cause, but rather the habitude of an\nefficient or material cause; which causes are in all cases\ndistinguished from those things of which they are the causes. For\nnothing can be its own matter, nor its own active principle. Yet a\nthing may be its own form, as appears in all immaterial things. So,\nwhen we say, \"three persons of one essence,\" taking essence as having\nthe habitude of form, we do not mean that essence is different from\nperson, which we should mean if we said, \"three persons from the same\nessence.\"\n\nReply Obj. 6: As Hilary says (De Synod.): \"It would be prejudicial to\nholy things, if we had to do away with them, just because some do not\nthink them holy. So if some misunderstand _homoousion,_ what is that\nto me, if I understand it rightly? . . . The oneness of nature does\nnot result from division, or from union or from community of\npossession, but from one nature being proper to both Father and Son.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Essential Names Should Be Predicated in the Singular of the\nThree Persons?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that essential names, as the name \"God,\"\nshould not be predicated in the singular of the three persons, but in\nthe plural. For as \"man\" signifies \"one that has humanity,\" so God\nsignifies \"one that has Godhead.\" But the three persons are three who\nhave Godhead. Therefore the three persons are \"three Gods.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gen. 1:1, where it is said, \"In the beginning God\ncreated heaven and earth,\" the Hebrew original has \"Elohim,\" which may\nbe rendered \"Gods\" or \"Judges\": and this word is used on account of\nthe plurality of persons. Therefore the three persons are \"several\nGods,\" and not \"one\" God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, this word \"thing\" when it is said absolutely,\nseems to belong to substance. But it is predicated of the three\npersons in the plural. For Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5):\n\"The things that are the objects of our future glory are the Father,\nSon and Holy Ghost.\" Therefore other essential names can be\npredicated in the plural of the three persons.\n\nObj. 4: Further, as this word \"God\" signifies \"a being who has\nDeity,\" so also this word \"person\" signifies a being subsisting in\nan intellectual nature. But we say there are three persons. So for\nthe same reason we can say there are \"three Gods.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Deut. 6:4): \"Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy\nGod is one God.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Some essential names signify the essence after the\nmanner of substantives; while others signify it after the manner of\nadjectives. Those which signify it as substantives are predicated of\nthe three persons in the singular only, and not in the plural. Those\nwhich signify the essence as adjectives are predicated of the three\npersons in the plural. The reason of this is that substantives\nsignify something by way of substance, while adjectives signify\nsomething by way of accident, which adheres to a subject. Now just as\nsubstance has existence of itself, so also it has of itself unity or\nmultitude; wherefore the singularity or plurality of a substantive\nname depends upon the form signified by the name. But as accidents\nhave their existence in a subject, so they have unity or plurality\nfrom their subject; and therefore the singularity and plurality of\nadjectives depends upon their _supposita._ In creatures, one form\ndoes not exist in several _supposita_ except by unity of order, as\nthe form of an ordered multitude. So if the names signifying such a\nform are substantives, they are predicated of many in the singular,\nbut otherwise if they adjectives. For we say that many men are a\ncollege, or an army, or a people; but we say that many men are\ncollegians. Now in God the divine essence is signified by way of a\nform, as above explained (A. 2), which, indeed, is simple and\nsupremely one, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7; Q. 11, A. 4). So, names\nwhich signify the divine essence in a substantive manner are\npredicated of the three persons in the singular, and not in the\nplural. This, then, is the reason why we say that Socrates, Plato and\nCicero are \"three men\"; whereas we do not say the Father, Son and\nHoly Ghost are \"three Gods,\" but \"one God\"; forasmuch as in the three\n_supposita_ of human nature there are three humanities, whereas in\nthe three divine Persons there is but one divine essence. On the\nother hand, the names which signify essence in an adjectival manner\nare predicated of the three persons plurally, by reason of the\nplurality of _supposita._ For we say there are three \"existent\" or\nthree \"wise\" beings, or three \"eternal,\" \"uncreated,\" and \"immense\"\nbeings, if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense. But if\ntaken in a substantive sense, we say \"one uncreated, immense, eternal\nbeing,\" as Athanasius declares.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Though the name \"God\" signifies a being having Godhead,\nnevertheless the mode of signification is different. For the name\n\"God\" is used substantively; whereas \"having Godhead\" is used\nadjectively. Consequently, although there are \"three having Godhead,\"\nit does not follow that there are three Gods.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Various languages have diverse modes of expression. So\nas by reason of the plurality of _supposita_ the Greeks said \"three\nhypostases,\" so also in Hebrew \"Elohim\" is in the plural. We,\nhowever, do not apply the plural either to \"God\" or to \"substance,\"\nlest plurality be referred to the substance.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This word \"thing\" is one of the transcendentals.\nWhence, so far as it is referred to relation, it is predicated of God\nin the plural; whereas, so far as it is referred to the substance, it\nis predicated in the singular. So Augustine says, in the passage\nquoted, that \"the same Trinity is a thing supreme.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: The form signified by the word \"person\" is not essence\nor nature, but personality. So, as there are three\npersonalities--that is, three personal properties in the Father, Son\nand Holy Ghost--it is predicated of the three, not in the singular,\nbut in the plural.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Concrete Essential Names Can Stand for the Person?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot\nstand for the person, so that we can truly say \"God begot God.\" For,\nas the logicians say, \"a singular term signifies what it stands for.\"\nBut this name \"God\" seems to be a singular term, for it cannot be\npredicated in the plural, as above explained (A. 3). Therefore, since\nit signifies the essence, it stands for essence, and not for person.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a term in the subject is not modified by a term in\nthe predicate, as to its signification; but only as to the sense\nsignified in the predicate. But when I say, \"God creates,\" this name\n\"God\" stands for the essence. So when we say \"God begot,\" this term\n\"God\" cannot by reason of the notional predicate, stand for person.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if this be true, \"God begot,\" because the Father\ngenerates; for the same reason this is true, \"God does not beget,\"\nbecause the Son does not beget. Therefore there is God who begets,\nand there is God who does not beget; and thus it follows that there\nare two Gods.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if \"God begot God,\" He begot either God, that is\nHimself, or another God. But He did not beget God, that is Himself;\nfor, as Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1), \"nothing begets itself.\"\nNeither did He beget another God; as there is only one God. Therefore\nit is false to say, \"God begot God.\"\n\nObj. 5: Further, if \"God begot God,\" He begot either God who is the\nFather, or God who is not the Father. If God who is the Father, then\nGod the Father was begotten. If God who is not the Father, then there\nis a God who is not God the Father: which is false. Therefore it\ncannot be said that \"God begot God.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ In the Creed it is said, \"God of God.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have said that this name \"God\" and the like,\nproperly according to their nature, stand for the essence, but by\nreason of some notional adjunct are made to stand for the Person. This\nopinion apparently arose from considering the divine simplicity, which\nrequires that in God, He \"who possesses\" and \"what is possessed\" be\nthe same. So He who possesses Godhead, which is signified by the name\nGod, is the same as Godhead. But when we consider the proper way of\nexpressing ourselves, the mode of signification must be considered no\nless than the thing signified. Hence as this word \"God\" signifies the\ndivine essence as in Him Who possesses it, just as the name \"man\"\nsignifies humanity in a subject, others more truly have said that this\nword \"God,\" from its mode of signification, can, in its proper sense,\nstand for person, as does the word \"man.\" So this word \"God\" sometimes\nstands for the essence, as when we say \"God creates\"; because this\npredicate is attributed to the subject by reason of the form\nsignified--that is, Godhead. But sometimes it stands for the person,\neither for only one, as when we say, \"God begets,\" or for two, as when\nwe say, \"God spirates\"; or for three, as when it is said: \"To the King\nof ages, immortal, invisible, the only God,\" etc. (1 Tim. 1:17).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although this name \"God\" agrees with singular terms as\nregards the form signified not being multiplied; nevertheless it\nagrees also with general terms so far as the form signified is to be\nfound in several _supposita._ So it need not always stand for the\nessence it signifies.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This holds good against those who say that the word\n\"God\" does not naturally stand for person.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The word \"God\" stands for the person in a different way\nfrom that in which this word \"man\" does; for since the form signified\nby this word \"man\"--that is, humanity--is really divided among its\ndifferent subjects, it stands of itself for the person, even if there\nis no adjunct determining it to the person--that is, to a distinct\nsubject. The unity or community of the human nature, however, is not\na reality, but is only in the consideration of the mind. Hence this\nterm \"man\" does not stand for the common nature, unless this is\nrequired by some adjunct, as when we say, \"man is a species\"; whereas\nthe form signified by the name \"God\"--that is, the divine essence--is\nreally one and common. So of itself it stands for the common nature,\nbut by some adjunct it may be restricted so as to stand for the\nperson. So, when we say, \"God generates,\" by reason of the notional\nact this name \"God\" stands for the person of the Father. But when we\nsay, \"God does not generate,\" there is no adjunct to determine this\nname to the person of the Son, and hence the phrase means that\ngeneration is repugnant to the divine nature. If, however, something\nbe added belonging to the person of the Son, this proposition, for\ninstance, \"God begotten does not beget,\" is true. Consequently, it\ndoes not follow that there exists a \"God generator,\" and a \"God not\ngenerator\"; unless there be an adjunct pertaining to the persons; as,\nfor instance, if we were to say, \"the Father is God the generator\"\nand the \"Son is God the non-generator\" and so it does not follow that\nthere are many Gods; for the Father and the Son are one God, as was\nsaid above (A. 3).\n\nReply Obj. 4: This is false, \"the Father begot God, that is Himself,\"\nbecause the word \"Himself,\" as a reciprocal term, refers to the same\n_suppositum._ Nor is this contrary to what Augustine says (Ep. lxvi\nad Maxim.) that \"God the Father begot another self [alterum se],\"\nforasmuch as the word \"se\" is either in the ablative case, and then\nit means \"He begot another from Himself,\" or it indicates a single\nrelation, and thus points to identity of nature. This is, however,\neither a figurative or an emphatic way of speaking, so that it would\nreally mean, \"He begot another most like to Himself.\" Likewise also\nit is false to say, \"He begot another God,\" because although the Son\nis another than the Father, as above explained (Q. 31, A. 2),\nnevertheless it cannot be said that He is \"another God\"; forasmuch as\nthis adjective \"another\" would be understood to apply to the\nsubstantive God; and thus the meaning would be that there is a\ndistinction of Godhead. Yet this proposition \"He begot another God\"\nis tolerated by some, provided that \"another\" be taken as a\nsubstantive, and the word \"God\" be construed in apposition with it.\nThis, however, is an inexact way of speaking, and to be avoided, for\nfear of giving occasion to error.\n\nReply Obj. 5: To say, \"God begot God Who is God the Father,\" is\nwrong, because since the word \"Father\" is construed in apposition to\n\"God,\" the word \"God\" is restricted to the person of the Father; so\nthat it would mean, \"He begot God, Who is Himself the Father\"; and\nthen the Father would be spoken of as begotten, which is false.\nWherefore the negative of the proposition is true, \"He begot God Who\nis not God the Father.\" If however, we understand these words not to\nbe in apposition, and require something to be added, then, on the\ncontrary, the affirmative proposition is true, and the negative is\nfalse; so that the meaning would be, \"He begot God Who is God Who is\nthe Father.\" Such a rendering however appears to be forced, so that\nit is better to say simply that the affirmative proposition is false,\nand the negative is true. Yet Prepositivus said that both the\nnegative and affirmative are false, because this relative \"Who\" in\nthe affirmative proposition can be referred to the _suppositum_;\nwhereas in the negative it denotes both the thing signified and the\n_suppositum._ Whence, in the affirmative the sense is that \"to be God\nthe Father\" is befitting to the person of the Son; and in the\nnegative sense is that \"to be God the Father,\" is to be removed from\nthe Son's divinity as well as from His personality. This, however,\nappears to be irrational; since, according to the Philosopher (Peri\nHerm. ii), what is open to affirmation, is open also to negation.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Abstract Essential Names Can Stand for the Person?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that abstract essential names can stand\nfor the person, so that this proposition is true, \"Essence begets\nessence.\" For Augustine says (De Trin. vii, i, 2): \"The Father and\nthe Son are one Wisdom, because they are one essence; and taken\nsingly Wisdom is from Wisdom, as essence from essence.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, generation or corruption in ourselves implies\ngeneration or corruption of what is within us. But the Son is\ngenerated. Therefore since the divine essence is in the Son, it\nseems that the divine essence is generated.\n\nObj. 3: Further, God and the divine essence are the same, as is clear\nfrom what is above explained (Q. 3, A. 3). But, as was shown, it is\ntrue to say that \"God begets God.\" Therefore this is also true:\n\"Essence begets essence.\"\n\nObj. 4: Further, a predicate can stand for that of which it is\npredicated. But the Father is the divine essence; therefore essence\ncan stand for the person of the Father. Thus the essence begets.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the essence is \"a thing begetting,\" because the\nessence is the Father who is begetting. Therefore if the essence is\nnot begetting, the essence will be \"a thing begetting,\" and \"not\nbegetting\": which cannot be.\n\nObj. 6: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): \"The Father is the\nprinciple of the whole Godhead.\" But He is principle only by\nbegetting or spirating. Therefore the Father begets or spirates the\nGodhead.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. i, 1): \"Nothing begets\nitself.\" But if the essence begets the essence, it begets itself only,\nsince nothing exists in God as distinguished from the divine essence.\nTherefore the essence does not beget essence.\n\n_I answer that,_ Concerning this, the abbot Joachim erred in\nasserting that as we can say \"God begot God,\" so we can say \"Essence\nbegot essence\": considering that, by reason of the divine simplicity\nGod is nothing else but the divine essence. In this he was wrong,\nbecause if we wish to express ourselves correctly, we must take into\naccount not only the thing which is signified, but also the mode of\nits signification as above stated (A. 4). Now although \"God\" is\nreally the same as \"Godhead,\" nevertheless the mode of signification\nis not in each case the same. For since this word \"God\" signifies the\ndivine essence in Him that possesses it, from its mode of\nsignification it can of its own nature stand for person. Thus the\nthings which properly belong to the persons, can be predicated of\nthis word, \"God,\" as, for instance, we can say \"God is begotten\" or\nis \"Begetter,\" as above explained (A. 4). The word \"essence,\"\nhowever, in its mode of signification, cannot stand for Person,\nbecause it signifies the essence as an abstract form. Consequently,\nwhat properly belongs to the persons whereby they are distinguished\nfrom each other, cannot be attributed to the essence. For that would\nimply distinction in the divine essence, in the same way as there\nexists distinction in the _supposita._\n\nReply Obj. 1: To express unity of essence and of person, the holy\nDoctors have sometimes expressed themselves with greater emphasis\nthan the strict propriety of terms allows. Whence instead of\nenlarging upon such expressions we should rather explain them: thus,\nfor instance, abstract names should be explained by concrete names,\nor even by personal names; as when we find \"essence from essence\"; or\n\"wisdom from wisdom\"; we should take the sense to be, _the Son_ who\nis essence and wisdom, is from the Father who is essence and wisdom.\nNevertheless, as regards these abstract names a certain order should\nbe observed, forasmuch as what belongs to action is more nearly\nallied to the persons because actions belong to _supposita._ So\n\"nature from nature,\" and \"wisdom from wisdom\" are less inexact than\n\"essence from essence.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: In creatures the one generated has not the same nature\nnumerically as the generator, but another nature, numerically\ndistinct, which commences to exist in it anew by generation, and\nceases to exist by corruption, and so it is generated and corrupted\naccidentally; whereas God begotten has the same nature numerically as\nthe begetter. So the divine nature in the Son is not begotten either\ndirectly or accidentally.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although God and the divine essence are really the\nsame, nevertheless, on account of their different mode of\nsignification, we must speak in a different way about each of them.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The divine essence is predicated of the Father by mode\nof identity by reason of the divine simplicity; yet it does not\nfollow that it can stand for the Father, its mode of signification\nbeing different. This objection would hold good as regards things\nwhich are predicated of another as the universal of a particular.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The difference between substantive and adjectival names\nconsist in this, that the former carry their subject with them,\nwhereas the latter do not, but add the thing signified to the\nsubstantive. Whence logicians are wont to say that the substantive is\nconsidered in the light of _suppositum,_ whereas the adjective\nindicates something added to the _suppositum._ Therefore substantive\npersonal terms can be predicated of the essence, because they are\nreally the same; nor does it follow that a personal property makes a\ndistinct essence; but it belongs to the _suppositum_ implied in the\nsubstantive. But notional and personal adjectives cannot be\npredicated of the essence unless we add some substantive. We cannot\nsay that the \"essence is begetting\"; yet we can say that the \"essence\nis a thing begetting,\" or that it is \"God begetting,\" if \"thing\" and\nGod stand for person, but not if they stand for essence. Consequently\nthere exists no contradiction in saying that \"essence is a thing\nbegetting,\" and \"a thing not begetting\"; because in the first case\n\"thing\" stands for person, and in the second it stands for the\nessence.\n\nReply Obj. 6: So far as Godhead is one in several _supposita,_ it\nagrees in a certain degree with the form of a collective term. So\nwhen we say, \"the Father is the principle of the whole Godhead,\" the\nterm Godhead can be taken for all the persons together, inasmuch as\nit is the principle in all the divine persons. Nor does it follow\nthat He is His own principle; as one of the people may be called the\nruler of the people without being ruler of himself. We may also say\nthat He is the principle of the whole Godhead; not as generating or\nspirating it, but as communicating it by generation and spiration.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Persons Can Be Predicated of the Essential Terms?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the persons cannot be predicated of\nthe concrete essential names; so that we can say for instance, \"God is\nthree persons\"; or \"God is the Trinity.\" For it is false to say, \"man\nis every man,\" because it cannot be verified as regards any particular\nsubject. For neither Socrates, nor Plato, nor anyone else is every\nman. In the same way this proposition, \"God is the Trinity,\" cannot be\nverified of any one of the _supposita_ of the divine nature. For the\nFather is not the Trinity; nor is the Son; nor is the Holy Ghost. So\nto say, \"God is the Trinity,\" is false.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the lower is not predicated of the higher except\nby accidental predication; as when I say, \"animal is man\"; for it is\naccidental to animal to be man. But this name \"God\" as regards the\nthree persons is as a general term to inferior terms, as Damascene\nsays (De Fide Orth. iii, 4). Therefore it seems that the names of\nthe persons cannot be predicated of this name \"God,\" except in an\naccidental sense.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in his sermon on Faith [*Serm. ii,\nin coena Domini], \"We believe that one God is one divinely named\nTrinity.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As above explained (A. 5), although adjectival\nterms, whether personal or notional, cannot be predicated of the\nessence, nevertheless substantive terms can be so predicated, owing to\nthe real identity of essence and person. The divine essence is not\nonly really the same as one person, but it is really the same as the\nthree persons. Whence, one person, and two, and three, can be\npredicated of the essence as if we were to say, \"The essence is the\nFather, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost.\" And because this word \"God\"\ncan of itself stand for the essence, as above explained (A. 4, ad 3),\nhence, as it is true to say, \"The essence is the three persons\"; so\nlikewise it is true to say, \"God is the three persons.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: As above explained this term \"man\" can of itself stand\nfor person, whereas an adjunct is required for it to stand for the\nuniversal human nature. So it is false to say, \"Man is every man\";\nbecause it cannot be verified of any particular human subject. On the\ncontrary, this word \"God\" can of itself be taken for the divine\nessence. So, although to say of any of the _supposita_ of the divine\nnature, \"God is the Trinity,\" is untrue, nevertheless it is true of\nthe divine essence. This was denied by Porretanus because he did not\ntake note of this distinction.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When we say, \"God,\" or \"the divine essence is the\nFather,\" the predication is one of identity, and not of the lower in\nregard to a higher species: because in God there is no universal and\nsingular. Hence, as this proposition, \"The Father is God\" is of\nitself true, so this proposition \"God is the Father\" is true of\nitself, and by no means accidentally.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Essential Names Should Be Appropriated to the Persons?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the essential names should not be\nappropriated to the persons. For whatever might verge on error in\nfaith should be avoided in the treatment of divine things; for, as\nJerome says, \"careless words involve risk of heresy\" [*In substance\nEp. lvii.]. But to appropriate to any one person the names which are\ncommon to the three persons, may verge on error in faith; for it may\nbe supposed either that such belong only to the person to whom they\nare appropriated or that they belong to Him in a fuller degree than\nto the others. Therefore the essential attributes should not be\nappropriated to the persons.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the essential attributes expressed in the abstract\nsignify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to another;\nsince a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is\nthe form. Therefore the essential attributes, especially when\nexpressed in the abstract, are not to be appropriated to the persons.\n\nObj. 3: Further, property is prior to the appropriated, for property\nis included in the idea of the appropriated. But the essential\nattributes, in our way of understanding, are prior to the persons; as\nwhat is common is prior to what is proper. Therefore the essential\nattributes are not to be appropriated to the persons.\n\n_On the contrary,_ the Apostle says: \"Christ the power of God and the\nwisdom of God\" (1 Cor. 1:24).\n\n_I answer that,_ For the manifestation of our faith it is fitting\nthat the essential attributes should be appropriated to the persons.\nFor although the trinity of persons cannot be proved by\ndemonstration, as was above expounded (Q. 32, A. 1), nevertheless it\nis fitting that it be declared by things which are more known to us.\nNow the essential attributes of God are more clear to us from the\nstandpoint of reason than the personal properties; because we can\nderive certain knowledge of the essential attributes from creatures\nwhich are sources of knowledge to us, such as we cannot obtain\nregarding the personal properties, as was above explained (Q. 32, A.\n1). As, therefore, we make use of the likeness of the trace or image\nfound in creatures for the manifestation of the divine persons, so\nalso in the same manner do we make use of the essential attributes.\nAnd such a manifestation of the divine persons by the use of the\nessential attributes is called \"appropriation.\"\n\nThe divine person can be manifested in a twofold manner by the\nessential attributes; in one way by similitude, and thus the things\nwhich belong to the intellect are appropriated to the Son, Who\nproceeds by way of intellect, as Word. In another way by\ndissimilitude; as power is appropriated to the Father, as Augustine\nsays, because fathers by reason of old age are sometimes feeble;\nlest anything of the kind be imagined of God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The essential attributes are not appropriated to the\npersons as if they exclusively belonged to them; but in order to make\nthe persons manifest by way of similitude, or dissimilitude, as above\nexplained. So, no error in faith can arise, but rather manifestation\nof the truth.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If the essential attributes were appropriated to the\npersons as exclusively belonging to each of them, then it would\nfollow that one person would be as a form as regards another; which\nAugustine altogether repudiates (De Trin. vi, 2), showing that the\nFather is wise, not by Wisdom begotten by Him, as though only the Son\nwere Wisdom; so that the Father and the Son together only can be\ncalled wise, but not the Father without the Son. But the Son is\ncalled the Wisdom of the Father, because He is Wisdom from the Father\nWho is Wisdom. For each of them is of Himself Wisdom; and both\ntogether are one Wisdom. Whence the Father is not wise by the wisdom\nbegotten by Him, but by the wisdom which is His own essence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the essential attribute is in its proper\nconcept prior to person, according to our way of understanding;\nnevertheless, so far as it is appropriated, there is nothing to\nprevent the personal property from being prior to that which is\nappropriated. Thus color is posterior to body considered as body,\nbut is naturally prior to \"white body,\" considered as white.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Essential Attributes Are Appropriated to the Persons in\na Fitting Manner by the Holy Doctors?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the essential attributes are\nappropriated to the persons unfittingly by the holy doctors. For\nHilary says (De Trin. ii): \"Eternity is in the Father, the species in\nthe Image; and use is in the Gift.\" In which words he designates\nthree names proper to the persons: the name of the \"Father,\" the name\n\"Image\" proper to the Son (Q. 35, A. 2), and the name \"Bounty\" or\n\"Gift,\" which is proper to the Holy Ghost (Q. 38, A. 2). He also\ndesignates three appropriated terms. For he appropriates \"eternity\"\nto the Father, species to the Son, and \"use\" to the Holy Ghost.\nThis he does apparently without reason. For \"eternity\" imports\nduration of existence; species, the principle of existence; and\n'use' belongs to the operation. But essence and operation are not\nfound to be appropriated to any person. Therefore the above terms are\nnot fittingly appropriated to the persons.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5): \"Unity is\nin the Father, equality in the Son, and in the Holy Ghost is the\nconcord of equality and unity.\" This does not, however, seem fitting;\nbecause one person does not receive formal denomination from what is\nappropriated to another. For the Father is not wise by the wisdom\nbegotten, as above explained (Q. 37, A. 2, ad 1). But, as he\nsubjoins, \"All these three are one by the Father; all are equal by\nthe Son, and all united by the Holy Ghost.\" The above, therefore, are\nnot fittingly appropriated to the Persons.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Augustine, to the Father is attributed\n\"power,\" to the Son \"wisdom,\" to the Holy Ghost \"goodness.\" Nor does\nthis seem fitting; for \"strength\" is part of power, whereas strength\nis found to be appropriated to the Son, according to the text,\n\"Christ the strength [*Douay: power] of God\" (1 Cor. 1:24). So it is\nlikewise appropriated to the Holy Ghost, according to the words,\n\"strength [*Douay: virtue] came out from Him and healed all\" (Luke\n6:19). Therefore power should not be appropriated to the Father.\n\nObj. 4: Likewise Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): \"What the Apostle\nsays, \"From Him, and by Him, and in Him,\" is not to be taken in a\nconfused sense.\" And (Contra Maxim. ii) \"'from Him' refers to the\nFather, 'by Him' to the Son, 'in Him' to the Holy Ghost.\" This,\nhowever, seems to be incorrectly said; for the words \"in Him\" seem to\nimply the relation of final cause, which is first among the causes.\nTherefore this relation of cause should be appropriated to the\nFather, Who is \"the principle from no principle.\"\n\nObj. 5: Likewise, Truth is appropriated to the Son, according to John\n14:6, \"I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life\"; and likewise \"the book\nof life,\" according to Ps. 39:9, \"In the beginning of the book it is\nwritten of Me,\" where a gloss observes, \"that is, with the Father Who\nis My head,\" also this word \"Who is\"; because on the text of Isaias,\n\"Behold I go to the Gentiles\" (65:1), a gloss adds, \"The Son speaks\nWho said to Moses, I am Who am.\" These appear to belong to the Son,\nand are not appropriated. For \"truth,\" according to Augustine (De\nVera Relig. 36), \"is the supreme similitude of the principle without\nany dissimilitude.\" So it seems that it properly belongs to the Son,\nWho has a principle. Also the \"book of life\" seems proper to the Son,\nas signifying \"a thing from another\"; for every book is written by\nsomeone. This also, \"Who is,\" appears to be proper to the Son;\nbecause if when it was said to Moses, \"I am Who am,\" the Trinity\nspoke, then Moses could have said, \"He Who is Father, Son, and Holy\nGhost, and the Holy Ghost sent me to you,\" so also he could have said\nfurther, \"He Who is the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost sent\nme to you,\" pointing out a certain person. This, however, is false;\nbecause no person is Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Therefore it cannot\nbe common to the Trinity, but is proper to the Son.\n\n_I answer that,_ Our intellect, which is led to the knowledge of God\nfrom creatures, must consider God according to the mode derived from\ncreatures. In considering any creature four points present themselves\nto us in due order. Firstly, the thing itself taken absolutely is\nconsidered as a being. Secondly, it is considered as one. Thirdly, its\nintrinsic power of operation and causality is considered. The fourth\npoint of consideration embraces its relation to its effects. Hence\nthis fourfold consideration comes to our mind in reference to God.\n\nAccording to the first point of consideration, whereby we consider\nGod absolutely in His being, the appropriation mentioned by Hilary\napplies, according to which \"eternity\" is appropriated to the Father,\nspecies to the Son, \"use\" to the Holy Ghost. For \"eternity\" as\nmeaning a \"being\" without a principle, has a likeness to the property\nof the Father, Who is \"a principle without a principle.\" Species or\nbeauty has a likeness to the property of the Son. For beauty includes\nthree conditions, \"integrity\" or \"perfection,\" since those things\nwhich are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due \"proportion\" or\n\"harmony\"; and lastly, \"brightness\" or \"clarity,\" whence things are\ncalled beautiful which have a bright color.\n\nThe first of these has a likeness to the property of the Son, inasmuch\nas He as Son has in Himself truly and perfectly the nature of the\nFather. To insinuate this, Augustine says in his explanation (De Trin.\nvi, 10): \"Where--that is, in the Son--there is supreme and primal\nlife,\" etc.\n\nThe second agrees with the Son's property, inasmuch as He is the\nexpress Image of the Father. Hence we see that an image is said to be\nbeautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing. This is\nindicated by Augustine when he says (De Trin. vi, 10), \"Where there\nexists wondrous proportion and primal equality,\" etc.\n\nThe third agrees with the property of the Son, as the Word, which is\nthe light and splendor of the intellect, as Damascene says (De Fide\nOrth. iii, 3). Augustine alludes to the same when he says (De Trin.\nvi, 10): \"As the perfect Word, not wanting in anything, and, so to\nspeak, the art of the omnipotent God,\" etc.\n\n\"Use\" has a likeness to the property of the Holy Ghost; provided the\n\"use\" be taken in a wide sense, as including also the sense of \"to\nenjoy\"; according as \"to use\" is to employ something at the beck of\nthe will, and \"to enjoy\" means to use joyfully, as Augustine says (De\nTrin. x, 11). So \"use,\" whereby the Father and the Son enjoy each\nother, agrees with the property of the Holy Ghost, as Love. This is\nwhat Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10): \"That love, that delectation,\nthat felicity or beatitude, is called use by him\" (Hilary). But the\n\"use\" by which we enjoy God, is likened to the property of the Holy\nGhost as the Gift; and Augustine points to this when he says (De Trin.\nvi, 10): \"In the Trinity, the Holy Ghost, the sweetness of the\nBegettor and the Begotten, pours out upon us mere creatures His\nimmense bounty and wealth.\" Thus it is clear how \"eternity,\"\nspecies, and \"use\" are attributed or appropriated to the persons,\nbut not essence or operation; because, being common, there is nothing\nin their concept to liken them to the properties of the Persons.\n\nThe second consideration of God regards Him as \"one.\" In that view\nAugustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5) appropriates \"unity\" to the Father,\n\"equality\" to the Son, \"concord\" or \"union\" to the Holy Ghost. It is\nmanifest that these three imply unity, but in different ways. For\n\"unity\" is said absolutely, as it does not presuppose anything else;\nand for this reason it is appropriated to the Father, to Whom any\nother person is not presupposed since He is the \"principle without\nprinciple.\" \"Equality\" implies unity as regards another; for that is\nequal which has the same quantity as another. So equality is\nappropriated to the Son, Who is the \"principle from a principle.\"\n\"Union\" implies the unity of two; and is therefore appropriated to the\nHoly Ghost, inasmuch as He proceeds from two. And from this we can\nunderstand what Augustine means when he says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5)\nthat \"The Three are one, by reason of the Father; They are equal by\nreason of the Son; and are united by reason of the Holy Ghost.\" For it\nis clear that we trace a thing back to that in which we find it first:\njust as in this lower world we attribute life to the vegetative soul,\nbecause therein we find the first trace of life. Now \"unity\" is\nperceived at once in the person of the Father, even if by an\nimpossible hypothesis, the other persons were removed. So the other\npersons derive their unity from the Father. But if the other persons\nbe removed, we do not find equality in the Father, but we find it as\nsoon as we suppose the Son. So, all are equal by reason of the Son,\nnot as if the Son were the principle of equality in the Father, but\nthat, without the Son equal to the Father, the Father could not be\ncalled equal; because His equality is considered firstly in regard to\nthe Son: for that the Holy Ghost is equal to the Father, is also from\nthe Son. Likewise, if the Holy Ghost, Who is the union of the two, be\nexcluded, we cannot understand the oneness of the union between the\nFather and the Son. So all are connected by reason of the Holy Ghost;\nbecause given the Holy Ghost, we find whence the Father and the Son\nare said to be united.\n\nAccording to the third consideration, which brings before us the\nadequate power of God in the sphere of causality, there is said to be\na third kind of appropriation, of \"power,\" \"wisdom,\" and \"goodness.\"\nThis kind of appropriation is made both by reason of similitude as\nregards what exists in the divine persons, and by reason of\ndissimilitude if we consider what is in creatures. For \"power\" has\nthe nature of a principle, and so it has a likeness to the heavenly\nFather, Who is the principle of the whole Godhead. But in an earthly\nfather it is wanting sometimes by reason of old age. \"Wisdom\" has\nlikeness to the heavenly Son, as the Word, for a word is nothing but\nthe concept of wisdom. In an earthly son this is sometimes absent by\nreason of lack of years. \"Goodness,\" as the nature and object of love,\nhas likeness to the Holy Ghost; but seems repugnant to the earthly\nspirit, which often implies a certain violent impulse, according to\nIsa. 25:4: \"The spirit of the strong is as a blast beating on the\nwall.\" \"Strength\" is appropriated to the Son and to the Holy Ghost,\nnot as denoting the power itself of a thing, but as sometimes used to\nexpress that which proceeds from power; for instance, we say that the\nstrong work done by an agent is its strength.\n\nAccording to the fourth consideration, i.e. God's relation to His\neffects, there arise[s] appropriation of the expression \"from Whom, by\nWhom, and in Whom.\" For this preposition \"from\" [ex] sometimes implies\na certain relation of the material cause; which has no place in God;\nand sometimes it expresses the relation of the efficient cause, which\ncan be applied to God by reason of His active power; hence it is\nappropriated to the Father in the same way as power. The preposition\n\"by\" [per] sometimes designates an intermediate cause; thus we may say\nthat a smith works \"by\" a hammer. Hence the word \"by\" is not always\nappropriated to the Son, but belongs to the Son properly and strictly,\naccording to the text, \"All things were made by Him\" (John 1:3); not\nthat the Son is an instrument, but as \"the principle from a\nprinciple.\" Sometimes it designates the habitude of a form \"by\" which\nan agent works; thus we say that an artificer works by his art. Hence,\nas wisdom and art are appropriated to the Son, so also is the\nexpression \"by Whom.\" The preposition \"in\" strictly denotes the\nhabitude of one containing. Now, God contains things in two ways: in\none way by their similitudes; thus things are said to be in God, as\nexisting in His knowledge. In this sense the expression \"in Him\"\nshould be appropriated to the Son. In another sense things are\ncontained in God forasmuch as He in His goodness preserves and\ngoverns them, by guiding them to a fitting end; and in this sense the\nexpression \"in Him\" is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as likewise is\n\"goodness.\" Nor need the habitude of the final cause (though the first\nof causes) be appropriated to the Father, Who is \"the principle\nwithout a principle\": because the divine persons, of Whom the Father\nis the principle, do not proceed from Him as towards an end, since\neach of Them is the last end; but They proceed by a natural\nprocession, which seems more to belong to the nature of a natural\npower.\n\nRegarding the other points of inquiry, we can say that since \"truth\"\nbelongs to the intellect, as stated above (Q. 16, A. 1), it is\nappropriated to the Son, without, however, being a property of His.\nFor truth can be considered as existing in the thought or in the thing\nitself. Hence, as intellect and thing in their essential meaning, are\nreferred to the essence, and not to the persons, so the same is to be\nsaid of truth. The definition quoted from Augustine belongs to truth\nas appropriated to the Son. The \"book of life\" directly means\nknowledge but indirectly it means life. For, as above explained\n(Q. 24, A. 1), it is God's knowledge regarding those who are to\npossess eternal life. Consequently, it is appropriated to the Son;\nalthough life is appropriated to the Holy Ghost, as implying a certain\nkind of interior movement, agreeing in that sense with the property of\nthe Holy Ghost as Love. To be written by another is not of the essence\nof a book considered as such; but this belongs to it only as a work\nproduced. So this does not imply origin; nor is it personal, but an\nappropriation to a person. The expression \"Who is\" is appropriated to\nthe person of the Son, not by reason of itself, but by reason of an\nadjunct, inasmuch as, in God's word to Moses, was prefigured the\ndelivery of the human race accomplished by the Son. Yet, forasmuch as\nthe word \"Who\" is taken in a relative sense, it may sometimes relate\nto the person of the Son; and in that sense it would be taken\npersonally; as, for instance, were we to say, \"The Son is the\nbegotten 'Who is,'\" inasmuch as \"God begotten is personal.\" But\ntaken indefinitely, it is an essential term. And although the pronoun\n\"this\" [iste] seems grammatically to point to a particular person,\nnevertheless everything that we can point to can be grammatically\ntreated as a person, although in its own nature it is not a person;\nas we may say, \"this stone,\" and \"this ass.\" So, speaking in a\ngrammatical sense, so far as the word \"God\" signifies and stands for\nthe divine essence, the latter may be designated by the pronoun\n\"this,\" according to Ex. 15:2: \"This is my God, and I will glorify\nHim.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 40\n\nOF THE PERSONS AS COMPARED TO THE RELATIONS OR PROPERTIES\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe now consider the persons in connection with the relations, or\nproperties; and there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether relation is the same as person?\n\n(2) Whether the relations distinguish and constitute the persons?\n\n(3) Whether mental abstraction of the relations from the persons\nleaves the hypostases distinct?\n\n(4) Whether the relations, according to our mode of understanding,\npresuppose the acts of the persons, or contrariwise?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 40, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Relation Is the Same As Person?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in God relation is not the same as\nperson. For when things are identical, if one is multiplied the others\nare multiplied. But in one person there are several relations; as in\nthe person of the Father there is paternity and common spiration.\nAgain, one relation exists in two person, as common spiration in the\nFather and in the Son. Therefore relation is not the same as person.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 24),\nnothing is contained by itself. But relation is in the person; nor\ncan it be said that this occurs because they are identical, for\notherwise relation would be also in the essence. Therefore relation,\nor property, is not the same as person in God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, when several things are identical, what is\npredicated of one is predicated of the others. But all that is\npredicated of a Person is not predicated of His property. For we say\nthat the Father begets; but not that the paternity is begetting.\nTherefore property is not the same as person in God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ in God \"what is\" and \"whereby it is\" are the same,\naccording to Boethius (De Hebdom.). But the Father is Father by\npaternity. In the same way, the other properties are the same as the\npersons.\n\n_I answer that,_ Different opinions have been held on this point. Some\nhave said that the properties are not the persons, nor in the persons;\nand these have thought thus owing to the mode of signification of the\nrelations, which do not indeed signify existence \"in\" something, but\nrather existence \"towards\" something. Whence, they styled the\nrelations \"assistant,\" as above explained (Q. 28, A. 2). But\nsince relation, considered as really existing in God, is the divine\nessence Itself, and the essence is the same as person, as appears from\nwhat was said above (Q. 39, A. 1), relation must necessarily be\nthe same as person.\n\nOthers, therefore, considering this identity, said that the properties\nwere indeed the persons; but not \"in\" the persons; for, they said,\nthere are no properties in God except in our way of speaking, as\nstated above (Q. 32, A. 2). We must, however, say that there are\nproperties in God; as we have shown (Q. 32, A. 2). These are\ndesignated by abstract terms, being forms, as it were, of the persons.\nSo, since the nature of a form requires it to be \"in\" that of which it\nis the form, we must say that the properties are in the persons, and\nyet that they are the persons; as we say that the essence is in God,\nand yet is God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Person and property are really the same, but differ in\nconcept. Consequently, it does not follow that if one is multiplied,\nthe other must also be multiplied. We must, however, consider that in\nGod, by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold real identity\nexists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since the\ndivine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and form, it\nfollows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete, as\n\"Godhead\" and \"God.\" And as the divine simplicity excludes the\ncomposition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is\nattributed to God, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power\nare the same in God, because they are both in the divine essence.\nAccording to this twofold identity, property in God is the same as\nperson. For personal properties are the same as the persons because\nthe abstract and the concrete are the same in God; since they are the\nsubsisting persons themselves, as paternity is the Father Himself,\nand filiation is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost. But the\nnon-personal properties are the same as the persons according to the\nother reason of identity, whereby whatever is attributed to God is\nHis own essence. Thus, common spiration is the same as the person of\nthe Father, and the person of the Son; not that it is one\nself-subsisting person; but that as there is one essence in the two\npersons, so also there is one property in the two persons, as above\nexplained (Q. 30, A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The properties are said to be in the essence, only by\nmode of identity; but in the persons they exist by mode of identity,\nnot merely in reality, but also in the mode of signification; as the\nform exists in its subject. Thus the properties determine and\ndistinguish the persons, but not the essence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Notional participles and verbs signify the notional\nacts: and acts belong to a _suppositum._ Now, properties are not\ndesignated as _supposita,_ but as forms of _supposita._ And so their\nmode of signification is against notional participles and verbs being\npredicated of the properties.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 40, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Persons Are Distinguished by the Relations?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the persons are not distinguished by\nthe relations. For simple things are distinct by themselves. But the\npersons are supremely simple. Therefore they are distinguished by\nthemselves, and not by the relation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a form is distinguished only in relation to its\ngenus. For white is distinguished from black only by quality. But\n\"hypostasis\" signifies an individual in the genus of substance.\nTherefore the hypostases cannot be distinguished by relations.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is absolute comes before what is relative. But\nthe distinction of the divine persons is the primary distinction.\nTherefore the divine persons are not distinguished by the relations.\n\nObj. 4: Further, whatever presupposes distinction cannot be the first\nprinciple of distinction. But relation presupposes distinction, which\ncomes into its definition; for a relation is essentially what is\ntowards another. Therefore the first distinctive principle in God\ncannot be relation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Trin.): \"Relation alone\nmultiplies the Trinity of the divine persons.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In whatever multitude of things is to be found\nsomething common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of\ndistinction. So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence,\nwe must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are\nseveral. Now, there are two principles of difference between the\ndivine persons, and these are \"origin\" and \"relation.\" Although these\ndo not really differ, yet they differ in the mode of signification;\nfor \"origin\" is signified by way of act, as \"generation\"; and\n\"relation\" by way of the form, as \"paternity.\"\n\nSome, then, considering that relation follows upon act, have said that\nthe divine hypostases are distinguished by origin, so that we may say\nthat the Father is distinguished from the Son, inasmuch as the former\nbegets and the latter is begotten. Further, that the relations, or the\nproperties, make known the distinctions of the hypostases or persons\nas resulting therefrom; as also in creatures the properties manifest\nthe distinctions of individuals, which distinctions are caused by the\nmaterial principles.\n\nThis opinion, however, cannot stand--for two reasons. Firstly,\nbecause, in order that two things be understood as distinct, their\ndistinction must be understood as resulting from something intrinsic\nto both; thus in things created it results from their matter or their\nform. Now origin of a thing does not designate anything intrinsic, but\nmeans the way from something, or to something; as generation signifies\nthe way to a thing generated, and as proceeding from the generator.\nHence it is not possible that what is generated and the generator\nshould be distinguished by generation alone; but in the generator and\nin the thing generated we must presuppose whatever makes them to be\ndistinguished from each other. In a divine person there is nothing to\npresuppose but essence, and relation or property. Whence, since the\npersons agree in essence, it only remains to be said that the persons\nare distinguished from each other by the relations. Secondly: because\nthe distinction of the divine persons is not to be so understood as if\nwhat is common to them all is divided, because the common essence\nremains undivided; but the distinguishing principles themselves must\nconstitute the things which are distinct. Now the relations or the\nproperties distinguish or constitute the hypostases or persons,\ninasmuch as they are themselves the subsisting persons; as paternity\nis the Father, and filiation is the Son, because in God the abstract\nand the concrete do not differ. But it is against the nature of origin\nthat it should constitute hypostasis or person. For origin taken in an\nactive sense signifies proceeding from a subsisting person, so that it\npresupposes the latter; while in a passive sense origin, as\n\"nativity,\" signifies the way to a subsisting person, and as not yet\nconstituting the person.\n\nIt is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are\ndistinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although in\nboth ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of\nunderstanding they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations;\nwhence this name \"Father\" signifies not only a property, but also the\nhypostasis; whereas this term \"Begetter\" or \"Begetting\" signifies\nproperty only; forasmuch as this name \"Father\" signifies the relation\nwhich is distinctive and constitutive of the hypostasis; and this term\n\"Begetter\" or \"Begotten\" signifies the origin which is not distinctive\nand constitutive of the hypostasis.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The persons are the subsisting relations themselves.\nHence it is not against the simplicity of the divine persons for them\nto be distinguished by the relations.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The divine persons are not distinguished as regards\nbeing, in which they subsist, nor in anything absolute, but only as\nregards something relative. Hence relation suffices for their\ndistinction.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The more prior a distinction is, the nearer it\napproaches to unity; and so it must be the least possible\ndistinction. So the distinction of the persons must be by that which\ndistinguishes the least possible; and this is by relation.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Relation presupposes the distinction of the subjects,\nwhen it is an accident; but when the relation is subsistent, it does\nnot presuppose, but brings about distinction. For when it is said\nthat relation is by nature to be towards another, the word \"another\"\nsignifies the correlative which is not prior, but simultaneous in the\norder of nature.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 40, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Hypostases Remain If the Relations Are Mentally Abstracted\nfrom the Persons?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the hypostases remain if the\nproperties or relations are mentally abstracted from the persons. For\nthat to which something is added, may be understood when the addition\nis taken away; as man is something added to animal which can be\nunderstood if rational be taken away. But person is something added to\nhypostasis; for person is \"a hypostasis distinguished by a property of\ndignity.\" Therefore, if a personal property be taken away from a\nperson, the hypostasis remains.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that the Father is Father, and that He is someone,\nare not due to the same reason. For as He is the Father by paternity,\nsupposing He is some one by paternity, it would follow that the Son,\nin Whom there is not paternity, would not be \"someone.\" So when\npaternity is mentally abstracted from the Father, He still remains\n\"someone\"--that is, a hypostasis. Therefore, if property be removed\nfrom person, the hypostasis remains.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 6): \"Unbegotten is not\nthe same as Father; for if the Father had not begotten the Son,\nnothing would prevent Him being called unbegotten.\" But if He had not\nbegotten the Son, there would be no paternity in Him. Therefore, if\npaternity be removed, there still remains the hypostasis of the\nFather as unbegotten.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): \"The Son has nothing\nelse than birth.\" But He is Son by \"birth.\" Therefore, if filiation\nbe removed, the Son's hypostasis no more remains; and the same holds\nas regards the other persons.\n\n_I answer that,_ Abstraction by the intellect is twofold--when the\nuniversal is abstracted from the particular, as animal abstracted from\nman; and when the form is abstracted from the matter, as the form of a\ncircle is abstracted by the intellect from any sensible matter. The\ndifference between these two abstractions consists in the fact that in\nthe abstraction of the universal from the particular, that from which\nthe abstraction is made does not remain; for when the difference of\nrationality is removed from man, the man no longer remains in the\nintellect, but animal alone remains. But in the abstraction of the\nform from the matter, both the form and the matter remain in the\nintellect; as, for instance, if we abstract the form of a circle from\nbrass, there remains in our intellect separately the understanding\nboth of a circle, and of brass. Now, although there is no universal\nnor particular in God, nor form and matter, in reality; nevertheless,\nas regards the mode of signification there is a certain likeness of\nthese things in God; and thus Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 6)\nthat \"substance is common and hypostasis is particular.\" So, if we\nspeak of the abstraction of the universal from the particular, the\ncommon universal essence remains in the intellect if the properties\nare removed; but not the hypostasis of the Father, which is, as it\nwere, a particular.\n\nBut as regards the abstraction of the form from the matter, if the\nnon-personal properties are removed, then the idea of the hypostases\nand persons remains; as, for instance, if the fact of the Father's\nbeing unbegotten or spirating be mentally abstracted from the Father,\nthe Father's hypostasis or person remains.\n\nIf, however, the personal property be mentally abstracted, the idea of\nthe hypostasis no longer remains. For the personal properties are not\nto be understood as added to the divine hypostases, as a form is added\nto a pre-existing subject: but they carry with them their own\n_supposita,_ inasmuch as they are themselves subsisting persons; thus\npaternity is the Father Himself. For hypostasis signifies something\ndistinct in God, since hypostasis means an individual substance. So,\nas relation distinguishes and constitutes the hypostases, as above\nexplained (A. 2), it follows that if the personal relations are\nmentally abstracted, the hypostases no longer remain. Some, however,\nthink, as above noted, that the divine hypostases are not\ndistinguished by the relations, but only by origin; so that the Father\nis a hypostasis as not from another, and the Son is a hypostasis as\nfrom another by generation. And that the consequent relations which\nare to be regarded as properties of dignity, constitute the notion of\na person, and are thus called \"personal properties.\" Hence, if these\nrelations are mentally abstracted, the hypostasis, but not the\npersons, remain.\n\nBut this is impossible, for two reasons: first, because the relations\ndistinguish and constitute the hypostases, as shown above (A. 2);\nsecondly, because every hypostasis of a rational nature is a person,\nas appears from the definition of Boethius (De Duab. Nat.) that,\n\"person is the individual substance of a rational nature.\" Hence, to\nhave hypostasis and not person, it would be necessary to abstract the\nrationality from the nature, but not the property from the person.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Person does not add to hypostasis a distinguishing\nproperty absolutely, but a distinguishing property of dignity, all\nof which must be taken as the difference. Now, this distinguishing\nproperty is one of dignity precisely because it is understood as\nsubsisting in a rational nature. Hence, if the distinguishing\nproperty be removed from the person, the hypostasis no longer\nremains; whereas it would remain were the rationality of the nature\nremoved; for both person and hypostasis are individual substances.\nConsequently, in God the distinguishing relation belongs essentially\nto both.\n\nReply Obj. 2: By paternity the Father is not only Father, but is a\nperson, and is \"someone,\" or a hypostasis. It does not follow,\nhowever, that the Son is not \"someone\" or a hypostasis; just as it\ndoes not follow that He is not a person.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Augustine does not mean to say that the hypostasis of\nthe Father would remain as unbegotten, if His paternity were removed,\nas if innascibility constituted and distinguished the hypostasis of\nthe Father; for this would be impossible, since \"being unbegotten\"\nsays nothing positive and is only a negation, as he himself says. But\nhe speaks in a general sense, forasmuch as not every unbegotten being\nis the Father. So, if paternity be removed, the hypostasis of the\nFather does not remain in God, as distinguished from the other\npersons, but only as distinguished from creatures; as the Jews\nunderstand it.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 40, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the properties presuppose the notional acts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are understood\nbefore the properties. For the Master of the Sentences says (Sent. i,\nD, xxvii) that \"the Father always is, because He is ever begetting the\nSon.\" So it seems that generation precedes paternity in the order of\nintelligence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in the order of intelligence every relation\npresupposes that on which it is founded; as equality presupposes\nquantity. But paternity is a relation founded on the action of\ngeneration. Therefore paternity presupposes generation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, active generation is to paternity as nativity is\nto filiation. But filiation presupposes nativity; for the Son is so\ncalled because He is born. Therefore paternity also presupposes\ngeneration.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Generation is the operation of the person of the\nFather. But paternity constitutes the person of the Father. Therefore\nin the order of intelligence, paternity is prior to generation.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the opinion that the properties do not\ndistinguish and constitute the hypostases in God, but only manifest\nthem as already distinct and constituted, we must absolutely say that\nthe relations in our mode of understanding follow upon the notional\nacts, so that we can say, without qualifying the phrase, that \"because\nHe begets, He is the Father.\" A distinction, however, is needed if we\nsuppose that the relations distinguish and constitute the divine\nhypostases. For origin has in God an active and passive\nsignification--active, as generation is attributed to the Father, and\nspiration, taken for the notional act, is attributed to the Father and\nthe Son; passive, as nativity is attributed to the Son, and procession\nto the Holy Ghost. For, in the order of intelligence, origin, in the\npassive sense, simply precedes the personal properties of the person\nproceeding; because origin, as passively understood, signifies the way\nto a person constituted by the property. Likewise, origin signified\nactively is prior in the order of intelligence to the non-personal\nrelation of the person originating; as the notional act of spiration\nprecedes, in the order of intelligence, the unnamed relative property\ncommon to the Father and the Son. The personal property of the Father\ncan be considered in a twofold sense: firstly, as a relation; and thus\nagain in the order of intelligence it presupposes the notional act,\nfor relation, as such, is founded upon an act: secondly, according as\nit constitutes the person; and thus the notional act presupposes the\nrelation, as an action presupposes a person acting.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When the Master says that \"because He begets, He is\nFather,\" the term \"Father\" is taken as meaning relation only, but not\nas signifying the subsisting person; for then it would be necessary\nto say conversely that because He is Father He begets.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This objection avails of paternity as a relation, but\nnot as constituting a person.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Nativity is the way to the person of the Son; and so,\nin the order of intelligence, it precedes filiation, even as\nconstituting the person of the Son. But active generation signifies a\nproceeding from the person of the Father; wherefore it presupposes\nthe personal property of the Father.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 41\n\nOF THE PERSONS IN REFERENCE TO THE NOTIONAL ACTS\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts,\nconcerning which six points of inquiry arise:\n\n(1) Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?\n\n(2) Whether these acts are necessary, or voluntary?\n\n(3) Whether as regards these acts, a person proceeds from nothing or\nfrom something?\n\n(4) Whether in God there exists a power as regards the notional acts?\n\n(5) What this power means?\n\n(6) Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Notional Acts Are to Be Attributed to the Persons?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are not to be\nattributed to the persons. For Boethius says (De Trin.): \"Whatever\nis predicated of God, of whatever genus it be, becomes the divine\nsubstance, except what pertains to the relation.\" But action is one\nof the ten genera. Therefore any action attributed to God belongs\nto His essence, and not to a notion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 4,5) that, \"everything\nwhich is said of God, is said of Him as regards either His substance,\nor relation.\" But whatever belongs to the substance is signified by\nthe essential attributes; and whatever belongs to the relations, by\nthe names of the persons, or by the names of the properties.\nTherefore, in addition to these, notional acts are not to be\nattributed to the persons.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the nature of action is of itself to cause passion.\nBut we do not place passions in God. Therefore neither are notional\nacts to be placed in God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum ii) says:\n\"It is a property of the Father to beget the Son.\" Therefore notional\nacts are to be placed in God.\n\n_I answer that,_ In the divine persons distinction is founded on\norigin. But origin can be properly designated only by certain acts.\nWherefore, to signify the order of origin in the divine persons, we\nmust attribute notional acts to the persons.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Every origin is designated by an act. In God there is a\ntwofold order of origin: one, inasmuch as the creature proceeds from\nHim, and this is common to the three persons; and so those actions\nwhich are attributed to God to designate the proceeding of creatures\nfrom Him, belong to His essence. Another order of origin in God\nregards the procession of person from person; wherefore the acts\nwhich designate the order of this origin are called notional; because\nthe notions of the persons are the mutual relations of the persons,\nas is clear from what was above explained (Q. 32, A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The notional acts differ from the relations of the\npersons only in their mode of signification; and in reality are\naltogether the same. Whence the Master says that \"generation and\nnativity in other words are paternity and filiation\" (Sent. i, D,\nxxvi). To see this, we must consider that the origin of one thing\nfrom another is firstly inferred from movement: for that anything be\nchanged from its disposition by movement evidently arises from some\ncause. Hence action, in its primary sense, means origin of movement;\nfor, as movement derived from another into a mobile object, is called\n\"passion,\" so the origin of movement itself as beginning from another\nand terminating in what is moved, is called \"action.\" Hence, if we\ntake away movement, action implies nothing more than order of origin,\nin so far as action proceeds from some cause or principle to what is\nfrom that principle. Consequently, since in God no movement exists,\nthe personal action of the one producing a person is only the\nhabitude of the principle to the person who is from the principle;\nwhich habitudes are the relations, or the notions. Nevertheless we\ncannot speak of divine and intelligible things except after the\nmanner of sensible things, whence we derive our knowledge, and\nwherein actions and passions, so far as these imply movement, differ\nfrom the relations which result from action and passion, and\ntherefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of the persons\nseparately after the manner of act, and separately after the manner\nof relations. Thus it is evident that they are really the same,\ndiffering only in their mode of signification.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Action, so far as it means origin of movement,\nnaturally involves passion; but action in that sense is not\nattributed to God. Whence, passions are attributed to Him only from a\ngrammatical standpoint, and in accordance with our manner of\nspeaking, as we attribute \"to beget\" with the Father, and to the Son\n\"to be begotten.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Notional Acts Are Voluntary?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are voluntary. For\nHilary says (De Synod.): \"Not by natural necessity was the Father led\nto beget the Son.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says, \"He transferred us to the kingdom\nof the Son of His love\" (Col. 1:13). But love belongs to the will.\nTherefore the Son was begotten of the Father by will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy\nGhost proceeds as Love from the Father and the Son. Therefore He\nproceeds voluntarily.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Son proceeds by mode of the intellect, as the\nWord. But every word proceeds by the will from a speaker. Therefore\nthe Son proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature.\n\nObj. 5: Further, what is not voluntary is necessary. Therefore if the\nFather begot the Son, not by the will, it seems to follow that He\nbegot Him by necessity; and this is against what Augustine says (Ad\nOrosium qu. vii).\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in the same book, that, \"the Father\nbegot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ When anything is said to be, or to be made by the\nwill, this can be understood in two senses. In one sense, the\nablative designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man\nby my will--that is, I will to be a man; and in this way it can be\nsaid that the Father begot the Son by will; as also He is God by\nwill, because He wills to be God, and wills to beget the Son. In the\nother sense, the ablative imports the habitude of a principle as it\nis said that the workman works by his will, as the will is the\nprinciple of his work; and thus in that sense it must be said the God\nthe Father begot the Son, not by His will; but that He produced the\ncreature by His will. Whence in the book _De Synod.,_ it is said: \"If\nanyone say that the Son was made by the Will of God, as a creature is\nsaid to be made, let him be anathema.\" The reason of this is that\nwill and nature differ in their manner of causation, in such a way\nthat nature is determined to one, while the will is not determined to\none; and this because the effect is assimilated to the form of the\nagent, whereby the latter acts. Now it is manifest that of one thing\nthere is only one natural form whereby it exists; and hence such as\nit is itself, such also is its work. But the form whereby the will\nacts is not only one, but many, according to the number of ideas\nunderstood. Hence the quality of the will's action does not depend on\nthe quality of the agent, but on the agent's will and understanding.\nSo the will is the principle of those things which may be this way or\nthat way; whereas of those things which can be only in one way, the\nprinciple is nature. What, however, can exist in different ways is\nfar from the divine nature, whereas it belongs to the nature of a\ncreated being; because God is of Himself necessary being, whereas a\ncreature is made from nothing. Thus, the Arians, wishing to prove the\nSon to be a creature, said that the Father begot the Son by will,\ntaking will in the sense of principle. But we, on the contrary, must\nassert that the Father begot the Son, not by will, but by nature.\nWherefore Hilary says (De Synod.): \"The will of God gave to all\ncreatures their substance: but perfect birth gave the Son a nature\nderived from a substance impassible and unborn. All things created\nare such as God willed them to be; but the Son, born of God, subsists\nin the perfect likeness of God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: This saying is directed against those who did not admit\neven the concomitance of the Father's will in the generation of the\nSon, for they said that the Father begot the Son in such a manner by\nnature that the will to beget was wanting; just as we ourselves\nsuffer many things against our will from natural necessity--as, for\ninstance, death, old age, and like ills. This appears from what\nprecedes and from what follows as regards the words quoted, for thus\nwe read: \"Not against His will, nor as it were, forced, nor as if He\nwere led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Apostle calls Christ the Son of the love of God,\ninasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by God; not, however, as if\nlove were the principle of the Son's generation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The will, as a natural faculty, wills something\nnaturally, as man's will naturally tends to happiness; and likewise\nGod naturally wills and loves Himself; whereas in regard to things\nother than Himself, the will of God is in a way, undetermined in\nitself, as above explained (Q. 19, A. 3). Now, the Holy Ghost\nproceeds as Love, inasmuch as God loves Himself, and hence He\nproceeds naturally, although He proceeds by mode of will.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Even as regards the intellectual conceptions of the\nmind, a return is made to those first principles which are naturally\nunderstood. But God naturally understands Himself, and thus the\nconception of the divine Word is natural.\n\nReply Obj. 5: A thing is said to be necessary \"of itself,\" and \"by\nreason of another.\" Taken in the latter sense, it has a twofold\nmeaning: firstly, as an efficient and compelling cause, and thus\nnecessary means what is violent; secondly, it means a final cause,\nwhen a thing is said to be necessary as the means to an end, so far\nas without it the end could not be attained, or, at least, so well\nattained. In neither of these ways is the divine generation\nnecessary; because God is not the means to an end, nor is He subject\nto compulsion. But a thing is said to be necessary \"of itself\" which\ncannot but be: in this sense it is necessary for God to be; and in\nthe same sense it is necessary that the Father beget the Son.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Notional Acts Proceed from Something?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the notional acts do not proceed from\nanything. For if the Father begets the Son from something, this will\nbe either from Himself or from something else. If from something else,\nsince that whence a thing is generated exists in what is generated, it\nfollows that something different from the Father exists in the Son,\nand this contradicts what is laid down by Hilary (De Trin. vii) that,\n\"In them nothing diverse or different exists.\" If the Father begets\nthe Son from Himself, since again that whence a thing is generated, if\nit be something permanent, receives as predicate the thing generated\ntherefrom just as we say, \"The man is white,\" since the man remains,\nwhen not from white he is made white--it follows that either the\nFather does not remain after the Son is begotten, or that the Father\nis the Son, which is false. Therefore the Father does not beget the\nSon from something, but from nothing.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that whence anything is generated is the principle\nregarding what is generated. So if the Father generate the Son from\nHis own essence or nature, it follows that the essence or nature of\nthe Father is the principle of the Son. But it is not a material\nprinciple, because in God nothing material exists; and therefore it\nis, as it were, an active principle, as the begetter is the principle\nof the one begotten. Thus it follows that the essence generates,\nwhich was disproved above (Q. 39, A. 5).\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that the three\npersons are not from the same essence; because the essence is not\nanother thing from person. But the person of the Son is not another\nthing from the Father's essence. Therefore the Son is not from the\nFather's essence.\n\nObj. 4: Further, every creature is from nothing. But in Scripture\nthe Son is called a creature; for it is said (Ecclus. 24:5), in the\nperson of the Wisdom begotten,\"I came out of the mouth of the Most\nHigh, the first-born before all creatures\": and further on (Ecclus.\n24:14) it is said as uttered by the same Wisdom, \"From the beginning,\nand before the world was I created.\" Therefore the Son was not\nbegotten from something, but from nothing. Likewise we can object\nconcerning the Holy Ghost, by reason of what is said (Zech. 12:1):\n\"Thus saith the Lord Who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the\nfoundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him\";\nand (Amos 4:13) according to another version [*The Septuagint]: \"I\nWho form the earth, and create the spirit.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i, 1) says:\n\"God the Father, of His nature, without beginning, begot the Son equal\nto Himself.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The Son was not begotten from nothing, but from the\nFather's substance. For it was explained above (Q. 27, A. 2; Q. 33,\nAA. 2 ,3) that paternity, filiation and nativity really and truly\nexist in God. Now, this is the difference between true \"generation,\"\nwhereby one proceeds from another as a son, and \"making,\" that the\nmaker makes something out of external matter, as a carpenter makes a\nbench out of wood, whereas a man begets a son from himself. Now, as a\ncreated workman makes a thing out of matter, so God makes things out\nof nothing, as will be shown later on (Q. 45, A. 1), not as if this\nnothing were a part of the substance of the thing made, but because\nthe whole substance of a thing is produced by Him without anything\nelse whatever presupposed. So, were the Son to proceed from the\nFather as out of nothing, then the Son would be to the Father what\nthe thing made is to the maker, whereto, as is evident, the name of\nfiliation would not apply except by a kind of similitude. Thus, if\nthe Son of God proceeds from the Father out of nothing, He could not\nbe properly and truly called the Son, whereas the contrary is stated\n(1 John 5:20): \"That we may be in His true Son Jesus Christ.\"\nTherefore the true Son of God is not from nothing; nor is He made,\nbut begotten.\n\nThat certain creatures made by God out of nothing are called sons of\nGod is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a certain\nlikeness of assimilation to Him Who is the true Son. Whence, as He is\nthe only true and natural Son of God, He is called the \"only\nbegotten,\" according to John 1:18, \"The only begotten Son, Who is in\nthe bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him\"; and so as others are\nentitled sons of adoption by their similitude to Him, He is called the\n\"first begotten,\" according to Rom. 8:29: \"Whom He foreknew He also\npredestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He\nmight be the first born of many brethren.\" Therefore the Son of God is\nbegotten of the substance of the Father, but not in the same way as\nman is born of man; for a part of the human substance in generation\npasses into the substance of the one begotten, whereas the divine\nnature cannot be parted; whence it necessarily follows that the Father\nin begetting the Son does not transmit any part of His nature, but\ncommunicates His whole nature to Him, the distinction only of origin\nremaining as explained above (Q. 40, A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 1: When we say that the Son was born of the Father, the\npreposition \"of\" designates a consubstantial generating principle,\nbut not a material principle. For that which is produced from matter,\nis made by a change of form in that whence it is produced. But the\ndivine essence is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of another form.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When we say the Son is begotten of the essence of the\nFather, as the Master of the Sentences explains (Sent. i, D, v), this\ndenotes the habitude of a kind of active principle, and as he\nexpounds, \"the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father\"--that\nis, of the Father Who is essence; and so Augustine says (De Trin. xv,\n13): \"When I say of the Father Who is essence, it is the same as if I\nsaid more explicitly, of the essence of the Father.\"\n\nThis, however, is not enough to explain the real meaning of the\nwords. For we can say that the creature is from God Who is essence;\nbut not that it is from the essence of God. So we may explain them\notherwise, by observing that the preposition \"of\" [de] always denotes\nconsubstantiality. We do not say that a house is \"of\" [de] the\nbuilder, since he is not the consubstantial cause. We can say,\nhowever, that something is \"of\" another, if this is its\nconsubstantial principle, no matter in what way it is so, whether it\nbe an active principle, as the son is said to be \"of\" the father, or\na material principle, as a knife is \"of\" iron; or a formal principle,\nbut in those things only in which the forms are subsisting, and not\naccidental to another, for we can say that an angel is \"of\" an\nintellectual nature. In this way, then, we say that the Son is\nbegotten 'of' the essence of the Father, inasmuch as the essence of\nthe Father, communicated by generation, subsists in the Son.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When we say that the Son is begotten of the essence of\nthe Father, a term is added which saves the distinction. But when we\nsay that the three persons are 'of' the divine essence, there is\nnothing expressed to warrant the distinction signified by the\npreposition, so there is no parity of argument.\n\nReply Obj. 4: When we say \"Wisdom was created,\" this may be\nunderstood not of Wisdom which is the Son of God, but of created\nwisdom given by God to creatures: for it is said, \"He created her\n[namely, Wisdom] in the Holy Ghost, and He poured her out over all\nHis works\" (Ecclus. 1:9, 10). Nor is it inconsistent for Scripture in\none text to speak of the Wisdom begotten and wisdom created, for\nwisdom created is a kind of participation of the uncreated Wisdom.\nThe saying may also be referred to the created nature assumed by the\nSon, so that the sense be, \"From the beginning and before the world\nwas I made\"--that is, I was foreseen as united to the creature. Or\nthe mention of wisdom as both created and begotten insinuates into\nour minds the mode of the divine generation; for in generation what\nis generated receives the nature of the generator and this pertains\nto perfection; whereas in creation the Creator is not changed, but\nthe creature does not receive the Creator's nature. Thus the Son is\ncalled both created and begotten, in order that from the idea of\ncreation the immutability of the Father may be understood, and from\ngeneration the unity of nature in the Father and the Son. In this way\nHilary expounds the sense of this text of Scripture (De Synod.). The\nother passages quoted do not refer to the Holy Ghost, but to the\ncreated spirit, sometimes called wind, sometimes air, sometimes the\nbreath of man, sometimes also the soul, or any other invisible\nsubstance.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 4]\n\nWhether in God There Is a Power in Respect of the Notional Acts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in God there is no power in respect\nof the notional acts. For every kind of power is either active or\npassive; neither of which can be here applied, there being in God\nnothing which we call passive power, as above explained (Q. 25, A.\n1); nor can active power belong to one person as regards another,\nsince the divine persons were not made, as stated above (A. 3).\nTherefore in God there is no power in respect of the notional acts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the object of power is what is possible. But the\ndivine persons are not regarded as possible, but necessary.\nTherefore, as regards the notional acts, whereby the divine persons\nproceed, there cannot be power in God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Son proceeds as the word, which is the concept\nof the intellect; and the Holy Ghost proceeds as love, which belongs\nto the will. But in God power exists as regards effects, and not as\nregards intellect and will, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1). Therefore,\nin God power does not exist in reference to the notional acts.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 1): \"If God the\nFather could not beget a co-equal Son, where is the omnipotence of\nGod the Father?\" Power therefore exists in God regarding the notional\nacts.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the notional acts exist in God, so must there be\nalso a power in God regarding these acts; since power only means the\nprinciple of act. So, as we understand the Father to be principle of\ngeneration; and the Father and the Son to be the principle of\nspiration, we must attribute the power of generating to the Father,\nand the power of spiration to the Father and the Son; for the power\nof generation means that whereby the generator generates. Now every\ngenerator generates by something. Therefore in every generator we\nmust suppose the power of generating, and in the spirator the power\nof spirating.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As a person, according to notional acts, does not\nproceed as if made; so the power in God as regards the notional acts\nhas no reference to a person as if made, but only as regards the\nperson as proceeding.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Possible, as opposed to what is necessary, is a\nconsequence of a passive power, which does not exist in God. Hence,\nin God there is no such thing as possibility in this sense, but only\nin the sense of possible as contained in what is necessary; and in\nthis latter sense it can be said that as it is possible for God to\nbe, so also is it possible that the Son should be generated.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Power signifies a principle: and a principle implies\ndistinction from that of which it is the principle. Now we must\nobserve a double distinction in things said of God: one is a real\ndistinction, the other is a distinction of reason only. By a real\ndistinction, God by His essence is distinct from those things of\nwhich He is the principle by creation: just as one person is distinct\nfrom the other of which He is principle by a notional act. But in God\nthe distinction of action and agent is one of reason only, otherwise\naction would be an accident in God. And therefore with regard to\nthose actions in respect of which certain things proceed which are\ndistinct from God, either personally or essentially, we may ascribe\npower to God in its proper sense of principle. And as we ascribe to\nGod the power of creating, so we may ascribe the power of begetting\nand of spirating. But \"to understand\" and \"to will\" are not such\nactions as to designate the procession of something distinct from\nGod, either essentially or personally. Wherefore, with regard to\nthese actions we cannot ascribe power to God in its proper sense, but\nonly after our way of understanding and speaking: inasmuch as we\ndesignate by different terms the intellect and the act of\nunderstanding in God, whereas in God the act of understanding is His\nvery essence which has no principle.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Power of Begetting Signifies a Relation, and Not the\nEssence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the power of begetting, or of\nspirating, signifies the relation and not the essence. For power\nsignifies a principle, as appears from its definition: for active\npower is the principle of action, as we find in _Metaph._ v, text 17.\nBut in God principle in regard to Person is said notionally.\nTherefore, in God, power does not signify essence but relation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in God, the power to act [posse] and 'to act' are\nnot distinct. But in God, begetting signifies relation. Therefore,\nthe same applies to the power of begetting.\n\nObj. 3: Further, terms signifying the essence in God, are common to\nthe three persons. But the power of begetting is not common to the\nthree persons, but proper to the Father. Therefore it does not\nsignify the essence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ As God has the power to beget the Son, so also He\nwills to beget Him. But the will to beget signifies the essence.\nTherefore, also, the power to beget.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have said that the power to beget signifies\nrelation in God. But this is not possible. For in every agent, that is\nproperly called power, by which the agent acts. Now, everything that\nproduces something by its action, produces something like itself, as\nto the form by which it acts; just as man begotten is like his\nbegetter in his human nature, in virtue of which the father has the\npower to beget a man. In every begetter, therefore, that is the power\nof begetting in which the begotten is like the begetter.\n\nNow the Son of God is like the Father, who begets Him, in the divine\nnature. Wherefore the divine nature in the Father is in Him the power\nof begetting. And so Hilary says (De Trin. v): \"The birth of God\ncannot but contain that nature from which it proceeded; for He cannot\nsubsist other than God, Who subsists from no other source than God.\"\n\nWe must therefore conclude that the power of begetting signifies\nprincipally the divine essence as the Master says (Sent. i, D, vii),\nand not the relation only. Nor does it signify the essence as\nidentified with the relation, so as to signify both equally. For\nalthough paternity is signified as the form of the Father,\nnevertheless it is a personal property, being in respect to the person\nof the Father, what the individual form is to the individual creature.\nNow the individual form in things created constitutes the person\nbegetting, but is not that by which the begetter begets, otherwise\nSocrates would beget Socrates. So neither can paternity be understood\nas that by which the Father begets, but as constituting the person of\nthe Father, otherwise the Father would beget the Father. But that by\nwhich the Father begets is the divine nature, in which the Son is like\nto Him. And in this sense Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 18) that\ngeneration is the \"work of nature,\" not of nature generating, but of\nnature, as being that by which the generator generates. And therefore\nthe power of begetting signifies the divine nature directly, but the\nrelation indirectly.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Power does not signify the relation itself of a\nprinciple, for thus it would be in the genus of relation; but it\nsignifies that which is a principle; not, indeed, in the sense in\nwhich we call the agent a principle, but in the sense of being that\nby which the agent acts. Now the agent is distinct from that which it\nmakes, and the generator from that which it generates: but that by\nwhich the generator generates is common to generated and generator,\nand so much more perfectly, as the generation is more perfect. Since,\ntherefore, the divine generation is most perfect, that by which the\nBegetter begets, is common to Begotten and Begetter by a community of\nidentity, and not only of species, as in things created. Therefore,\nfrom the fact that we say that the divine essence \"is the principle\nby which the Begetter begets,\" it does not follow that the divine\nessence is distinct (from the Begotten): which would follow if we\nwere to say that the divine essence begets.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As in God, the power of begetting is the same as the\nact of begetting, so the divine essence is the same in reality as the\nact of begetting or paternity; although there is a distinction of\nreason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When I speak of the \"power of begetting,\" power is\nsignified directly, generation indirectly: just as if I were to say,\nthe \"essence of the Father.\" Wherefore in respect of the essence,\nwhich is signified, the power of begetting is common to the three\npersons: but in respect of the notion that is connoted, it is proper\nto the person of the Father.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Several Persons Can Be the Term of One Notional Act?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a notional act can be directed to\nseveral Persons, so that there may be several Persons begotten or\nspirated in God. For whoever has the power of begetting can beget. But\nthe Son has the power of begetting. Therefore He can beget. But He\ncannot beget Himself: therefore He can beget another son. Therefore\nthere can be several Sons in God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 12): \"The Son\ndid not beget a Creator: not that He could not, but that it behoved\nHim not.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, God the Father has greater power to beget than\nhas a created father. But a man can beget several sons. Therefore God\ncan also: the more so that the power of the Father is not diminished\nafter begetting the Son.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In God \"that which is possible,\" and \"that which is\"\ndo not differ. If, therefore, in God it were possible for there to be\nseveral Sons, there would be several Sons. And thus there would be\nmore than three Persons in God; which is heretical.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Athanasius says, in God there is only \"one Father,\none Son, one Holy Ghost.\" For this four reasons may be given.\n\nThe first reason is in regard to the relations by which alone are\nthe Persons distinct. For since the divine Persons are the relations\nthemselves as subsistent, there would not be several Fathers, or\nseveral Sons in God, unless there were more than one paternity, or\nmore than one filiation. And this, indeed, would not be possible\nexcept owing to a material distinction: since forms of one species\nare not multiplied except in respect of matter, which is not in God.\nWherefore there can be but one subsistent filiation in God: just as\nthere could be but one subsistent whiteness.\n\nThe second reason is taken from the manner of the processions. For God\nunderstands and wills all things by one simple act. Wherefore there\ncan be but one person proceeding after the manner of word, which\nperson is the Son; and but one person proceeding after the manner of\nlove, which person is the Holy Ghost.\n\nThe third reason is taken from the manner in which the persons\nproceed. For the persons proceed naturally, as we have said\n(A. 2), and nature is determined to one.\n\nThe fourth reason is taken from the perfection of the divine persons.\nFor this reason is the Son perfect, that the entire divine filiation\nis contained in Him, and that there is but one Son. The argument is\nsimilar in regard to the other persons.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We can grant, without distinction, that the Son has the\nsame power as the Father; but we cannot grant that the Son has the\npower \"generandi\" [of begetting] thus taking \"generandi\" as the\ngerund of the active verb, so that the sense would be that the Son\nhas the \"power to beget.\" Just as, although Father and Son have the\nsame being, it does not follow that the Son is the Father, by reason\nof the notional term added. But if the word \"generandi\" [of being\nbegotten] is taken as the gerundive of the passive verb, the power\n\"generandi\" is in the Son--that is, the power of being begotten. The\nsame is to be said if it be taken as the gerundive of an impersonal\nverb, so that the sense be \"the power of generation\"--that is, a\npower by which it is generated by some person.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Augustine does not mean to say by those words that the\nSon could beget a Son: but that if He did not, it was not because He\ncould not, as we shall see later on (Q. 42, A. 6, ad 3).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Divine perfection and the total absence of matter in\nGod require that there cannot be several Sons in God, as we have\nexplained. Wherefore that there are not several Sons is not due to\nany lack of begetting power in the Father.\\\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 42\n\nOF EQUALITY AND LIKENESS AMONG THE DIVINE PERSONS\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe now have to consider the persons as compared to one another:\nfirstly, with regard to equality and likeness; secondly, with regard\nto mission. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry.\n\n(1) Whether there is equality among the divine persons?\n\n(2) Whether the person who proceeds is equal to the one from Whom He\nproceeds in eternity?\n\n(3) Whether there is any order among the divine persons?\n\n(4) Whether the divine persons are equal in greatness?\n\n(5) Whether the one divine person is in another?\n\n(6) Whether they are equal in power?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Is Equality in God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that equality is not becoming to the\ndivine persons. For equality is in relation to things which are one\nin quantity as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 20). But in the\ndivine persons there is no quantity, neither continuous intrinsic\nquantity, which we call size, nor continuous extrinsic quantity,\nwhich we call place and time. Nor can there be equality by reason of\ndiscrete quantity, because two persons are more than one. Therefore\nequality is not becoming to the divine persons.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the divine persons are of one essence, as we have\nsaid (Q. 39, A. 2). Now essence is signified by way of form. But\nagreement in form makes things to be alike, not to be equal.\nTherefore, we may speak of likeness in the divine persons, but not\nof equality.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things wherein there is to be found equality, are\nequal to one another, for equality is reciprocal. But the divine\npersons cannot be said to be equal to one another. For as Augustine\nsays (De Trin. vi, 10): \"If an image answers perfectly to that\nwhereof it is the image, it may be said to be equal to it; but that\nwhich it represents cannot be said to be equal to the image.\" But the\nSon is the image of the Father; and so the Father is not equal to the\nSon. Therefore equality is not to be found among the divine persons.\n\nObj. 4: Further, equality is a relation. But no relation is common to\nthe three persons; for the persons are distinct by reason of the\nrelations. Therefore equality is not becoming to the divine persons.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Athanasius says that \"the three persons are\nco-eternal and co-equal to one another.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We must needs admit equality among the divine persons.\nFor, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x, text 15, 16, 17),\nequality signifies the negation of greater or less. Now we cannot\nadmit anything greater or less in the divine persons; for as Boethius\nsays (De Trin. i): \"They must needs admit a difference [namely, of\nGodhead] who speak of either increase or decrease, as the Arians do,\nwho sunder the Trinity by distinguishing degrees as of numbers, thus\ninvolving a plurality.\" Now the reason of this is that unequal things\ncannot have the same quantity. But quantity, in God, is nothing else\nthan His essence. Wherefore it follows, that if there were any\ninequality in the divine persons, they would not have the same\nessence; and thus the three persons would not be one God; which is\nimpossible. We must therefore admit equality among the divine persons.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Quantity is twofold. There is quantity of \"bulk\" or\ndimensive quantity, which is to be found only in corporeal things,\nand has, therefore, no place in God. There is also quantity of\n\"virtue,\" which is measured according to the perfection of some\nnature or form: to this sort of quantity we allude when we speak of\nsomething as being more, or less, hot; forasmuch as it is more or\nless, perfect in heat. Now this virtual quantity is measured firstly\nby its source--that is, by the perfection of that form or nature:\nsuch is the greatness of spiritual things, just as we speak of great\nheat on account of its intensity and perfection. And so Augustine\nsays (De Trin. vi, 18) that \"in things which are great, but not in\nbulk, to be greater is to be better,\" for the more perfect a thing is\nthe better it is. Secondly, virtual quantity is measured by the\neffects of the form. Now the first effect of form is being, for\neverything has being by reason of its form. The second effect is\noperation, for every agent acts through its form. Consequently\nvirtual quantity is measured both in regard to being and in regard to\naction: in regard to being, forasmuch as things of a more perfect\nnature are of longer duration; and in regard to action, forasmuch as\nthings of a more perfect nature are more powerful to act. And so as\nAugustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i) says: \"We understand\nequality to be in the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, inasmuch as no one\nof them either precedes in eternity, or excels in greatness, or\nsurpasses in power.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Where we have equality in respect of virtual quantity,\nequality includes likeness and something besides, because it excludes\nexcess. For whatever things have a common form may be said to be\nalike, even if they do not participate in that form equally, just as\nthe air may be said to be like fire in heat; but they cannot be said\nto be equal if one participates in the form more perfectly than\nanother. And because not only is the same nature in both Father and\nSon, but also is it in both in perfect equality, therefore we say not\nonly that the Son is like to the Father, in order to exclude the\nerror of Eunomius, but also that He is equal to the Father to exclude\nthe error of Arius.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Equality and likeness in God may be designated in two\nways--namely, by nouns and by verbs. When designated by nouns,\nequality in the divine persons is mutual, and so is likeness; for the\nSon is equal and like to the Father, and conversely. This is because\nthe divine essence is not more the Father's than the Son's.\nWherefore, just as the Son has the greatness of the Father, and is\ntherefore equal to the Father, so the Father has the greatness of the\nSon, and is therefore equal to the Son. But in reference to\ncreatures, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ix): \"Equality and likeness are\nnot mutual.\" For effects are said to be like their causes, inasmuch\nas they have the form of their causes; but not conversely, for the\nform is principally in the cause, and secondarily in the effect.\n\nBut verbs signify equality with movement. And although movement is not\nin God, there is something that receives. Since, therefore, the Son\nreceives from the Father, this, namely, that He is equal to the\nFather, and not conversely, for this reason we say that the Son is\nequalled to the Father, but not conversely.\n\nReply Obj. 4: In the divine persons there is nothing for us to\nconsider but the essence which they have in common and the relations\nin which they are distinct. Now equality implies both--namely,\ndistinction of persons, for nothing can be said to be equal to\nitself; and unity of essence, since for this reason are the persons\nequal to one another, that they are of the same greatness and\nessence. Now it is clear that the relation of a thing to itself is\nnot a real relation. Nor, again, is one relation referred to another\nby a further relation: for when we say that paternity is opposed to\nfiliation, opposition is not a relation mediating between paternity\nand filiation. For in both these cases relation would be multiplied\nindefinitely. Therefore equality and likeness in the divine persons\nis not a real relation distinct from the personal relations: but in\nits concept it includes both the relations which distinguish the\npersons, and the unity of essence. For this reason the Master says\n(Sent. i, D, xxxi) that in these \"it is only the terms that are\nrelative.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Person Proceeding Is Co-eternal with His Principle, As\nthe Son with the Father?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the person proceeding is not\nco-eternal with His principle, as the Son with the Father. For Arius\ngives twelve modes of generation. The first mode is like the issue of\na line from a point; wherein is wanting equality of simplicity. The\nsecond is like the emission of rays from the sun; wherein is absent\nequality of nature. The third is like the mark or impression made by a\nseal; wherein is wanting consubstantiality and executive power. The\nfourth is the infusion of a good will from God; wherein also\nconsubstantiality is wanting. The fifth is the emanation of an\naccident from its subject; but the accident has no subsistence. The\nsixth is the abstraction of a species from matter, as sense receives\nthe species from the sensible object; wherein is wanting equality of\nspiritual simplicity. The seventh is the exciting of the will by\nknowledge, which excitation is merely temporal. The eighth is\ntransformation, as an image is made of brass; which transformation is\nmaterial. The ninth is motion from a mover; and here again we have\neffect and cause. The tenth is the taking of species from genera; but\nthis mode has no place in God, for the Father is not predicated of the\nSon as the genus of a species. The eleventh is the realization of an\nidea [ideatio], as an external coffer arises from the one in the mind.\nThe twelfth is birth, as a man is begotten of his father; which\nimplies priority and posteriority of time. Thus it is clear that\nequality of nature or of time is absent in every mode whereby one\nthing is from another. So if the Son is from the Father, we must say\nthat He is less than the Father, or later than the Father, or both.\n\nObj. 2: Further, everything that comes from another has a principle.\nBut nothing eternal has a principle. Therefore the Son is not\neternal; nor is the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 3: Further, everything which is corrupted ceases to be. Hence\neverything generated begins to be; for the end of generation is\nexistence. But the Son is generated by the Father. Therefore He\nbegins to exist, and is not co-eternal with the Father.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if the Son be begotten by the Father, either He is\nalways being begotten, or there is some moment in which He is\nbegotten. If He is always being begotten, since, during the process\nof generation, a thing must be imperfect, as appears in successive\nthings, which are always in process of becoming, as time and motion,\nit follows that the Son must be always imperfect, which cannot be\nadmitted. Thus there is a moment to be assigned for the begetting of\nthe Son, and before that moment the Son did not exist.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Athanasius declares that \"all the three persons are\nco-eternal with each other.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We must say that the Son is co-eternal with the\nFather. In proof of which we must consider that for a thing which\nproceeds from a principle to be posterior to its principle may be due\nto two reasons: one on the part of the agent, and the other on the\npart of the action. On the part of the agent this happens differently\nas regards free agents and natural agents. In free agents, on account\nof the choice of time; for as a free agent can choose the form it\ngives to the effect, as stated above (Q. 41, A. 2), so it can choose\nthe time in which to produce its effect. In natural agents, however,\nthe same happens from the agent not having its perfection of natural\npower from the very first, but obtaining it after a certain time; as,\nfor instance, a man is not able to generate from the very first.\nConsidered on the part of action, anything derived from a principle\ncannot exist simultaneously with its principle when the action is\nsuccessive. So, given that an agent, as soon as it exists, begins to\nact thus, the effect would not exist in the same instant, but in the\ninstant of the action's termination. Now it is manifest, according to\nwhat has been said (Q. 41, A. 2), that the Father does not beget the\nSon by will, but by nature; and also that the Father's nature was\nperfect from eternity; and again that the action whereby the Father\nproduces the Son is not successive, because thus the Son would be\nsuccessively generated, and this generation would be material, and\naccompanied with movement; which is quite impossible. Therefore we\nconclude that the Son existed whensoever the Father existed and thus\nthe Son is co-eternal with the Father, and likewise the Holy Ghost is\nco-eternal with both.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Verbis Domini, Serm. 38), no mode\nof the procession of any creature perfectly represents the divine\ngeneration. Hence we need to gather a likeness of it from many of\nthese modes, so that what is wanting in one may be somewhat supplied\nfrom another; and thus it is declared in the council of Ephesus: \"Let\nSplendor tell thee that the co-eternal Son existed always with the\nFather; let the Word announce the impassibility of His birth; let the\nname Son insinuate His consubstantiality.\" Yet, above them all the\nprocession of the word from the intellect represents it more exactly;\nthe intellectual word not being posterior to its source except in an\nintellect passing from potentiality to act; and this cannot be said\nof God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Eternity excludes the principle of duration, but not\nthe principle of origin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Every corruption is a change; and so all that corrupts\nbegins not to exist and ceases to be. The divine generation, however,\nis not changed, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 2). Hence the Son is ever\nbeing begotten, and the Father is always begetting.\n\nReply Obj. 4: In time there is something indivisible--namely, the\ninstant; and there is something else which endures--namely, time. But\nin eternity the indivisible \"now\" stands ever still, as we have said\nabove (Q. 10, A. 2, ad 1; A. 4, ad 2). But the generation of the Son\nis not in the \"now\" of time, or in time, but in eternity. And so to\nexpress the presentiality and permanence of eternity, we can say that\n\"He is ever being born,\" as Origen said (Hom. in Joan. i). But as\nGregory [*Moral. xxix, 21] and Augustine [*Super Ps. 2:7] said, it is\nbetter to say \"ever born,\" so that \"ever\" may denote the permanence\nof eternity, and \"born\" the perfection of the only Begotten. Thus,\ntherefore, neither is the Son imperfect, nor \"was there a time when\nHe was not,\" as Arius said.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 3]\n\nWhether in the Divine Persons There Exists an Order of Nature?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that among the divine persons there does\nnot exist an order of nature. For whatever exists in God is the\nessence, or a person, or a notion. But the order of nature does not\nsignify the essence, nor any of the persons, or notions. Therefore\nthere is no order of nature in God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, wherever order of nature exists, there one comes\nbefore another, at least, according to nature and intellect. But in\nthe divine persons there exists neither priority nor posteriority, as\ndeclared by Athanasius. Therefore, in the divine persons there is no\norder of nature.\n\nObj. 3: Further, wherever order exists, distinction also exists.\nBut there is no distinction in the divine nature. Therefore it is\nnot subject to order; and order of nature does not exist in it.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the divine nature is the divine essence. But\nthere is no order of essence in God. Therefore neither is there\nof nature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Where plurality exists without order, confusion\nexists. But in the divine persons there is no confusion, as Athanasius\nsays. Therefore in God order exists.\n\n_I answer that,_ Order always has reference to some principle.\nWherefore since there are many kinds of principle--namely, according\nto site, as a point; according to intellect, as the principle of\ndemonstration; and according to each individual cause--so are there\nmany kinds of order. Now principle, according to origin, without\npriority, exists in God as we have stated (Q. 33, A. 1): so there\nmust likewise be order according to origin, without priority; and\nthis is called 'the order of nature': in the words of Augustine\n(Contra Maxim. iv): \"Not whereby one is prior to another, but whereby\none is from another.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The order of nature signifies the notion of origin in\ngeneral, not a special kind of origin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In things created, even when what is derived from a\nprinciple is co-equal in duration with its principle, the principle\nstill comes first in the order of nature and reason, if formally\nconsidered as principle. If, however, we consider the relations of\ncause and effect, or of the principle and the thing proceeding\ntherefrom, it is clear that the things so related are simultaneous in\nthe order of nature and reason, inasmuch as the one enters the\ndefinition of the other. But in God the relations themselves are the\npersons subsisting in one nature. So, neither on the part of the\nnature, nor on the part the relations, can one person be prior to\nanother, not even in the order of nature and reason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The order of nature means not the ordering of nature\nitself, but the existence of order in the divine Persons according to\nnatural origin.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Nature in a certain way implies the idea of a\nprinciple, but essence does not; and so the order of origin is more\ncorrectly called the order of nature than the order of essence.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Son Is Equal to the Father in Greatness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father in\ngreatness. For He Himself said (John 14:28): \"The Father is greater\nthan I\"; and the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:28): \"The Son Himself shall\nbe subject to Him that put all things under Him.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, paternity is part of the Father's dignity. But\npaternity does not belong to the Son. Therefore the Son does not\npossess all the Father's dignity; and so He is not equal in greatness\nto the Father.\n\nObj. 3: Further, wherever there exist a whole and a part, many parts\nare more than one only, or than fewer parts; as three men are more\nthan two, or than one. But in God a universal whole exists, and a\npart; for under relation or notion, several notions are included.\nTherefore, since in the Father there are three notions, while in the\nSon there are only two, the Son is evidently not equal to the Father.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Phil. 2:6): \"He thought it not robbery\nto be equal with God.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in\ngreatness. For the greatness of God is nothing but the perfection of\nHis nature. Now it belongs to the very nature of paternity and\nfiliation that the Son by generation should attain to the possession\nof the perfection of the nature which is in the Father, in the same\nway as it is in the Father Himself. But since in men generation is a\ncertain kind of transmutation of one proceeding from potentiality to\nact, it follows that a man is not equal at first to the father who\nbegets him, but attains to equality by due growth, unless owing to a\ndefect in the principle of generation it should happen otherwise.\nFrom what precedes (Q. 27, A. 2; Q. 33, AA. 2 ,3), it is evident that\nin God there exist real true paternity and filiation. Nor can we say\nthat the power of generation in the Father was defective, nor that\nthe Son of God arrived at perfection in a successive manner and by\nchange. Therefore we must say that the Son was eternally equal to the\nFather in greatness. Hence, Hilary says (De Synod. Can. 27): \"Remove\nbodily weakness, remove the beginning of conception, remove pain and\nall human shortcomings, then every son, by reason of his natural\nnativity, is the father's equal, because he has a like nature.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: These words are to be understood of Christ's human\nnature, wherein He is less than the Father, and subject to Him; but\nin His divine nature He is equal to the Father. This is expressed by\nAthanasius, \"Equal to the Father in His Godhead; less than the Father\nin humanity\": and by Hilary (De Trin. ix): \"By the fact of giving,\nthe Father is greater; but He is not less to Whom the same being is\ngiven\"; and (De Synod.): \"The Son subjects Himself by His inborn\npiety\"--that is, by His recognition of paternal authority; whereas\n\"creatures are subject by their created weakness.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Equality is measured by greatness. In God greatness\nsignifies the perfection of nature, as above explained (A. 1, ad 1),\nand belongs to the essence. Thus equality and likeness in God have\nreference to the essence; nor can there be inequality or\ndissimilitude arising from the distinction of the relations.\nWherefore Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii, 13), \"The question of\norigin is, Who is from whom? but the question of equality is, Of what\nkind, or how great, is he?\" Therefore, paternity is the Father's\ndignity, as also the Father's essence: since dignity is something\nabsolute, and pertains to the essence. As, therefore, the same\nessence, which in the Father is paternity, in the Son is filiation,\nso the same dignity which, in the Father is paternity, in the Son is\nfiliation. It is thus true to say that the Son possesses whatever\ndignity the Father has; but we cannot argue--\"the Father has\npaternity, therefore the Son has paternity,\" for there is a\ntransition from substance to relation. For the Father and the Son\nhave the same essence and dignity, which exist in the Father by the\nrelation of giver, and in the Son by relation of receiver.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In God relation is not a universal whole, although it\nis predicated of each of the relations; because all the relations are\none in essence and being, which is irreconcilable with the idea of\nuniversal, the parts of which are distinguished in being. Person\nlikewise is not a universal term in God as we have seen above (Q. 30,\nA. 4). Wherefore all the relations together are not greater than only\none; nor are all the persons something greater than only one; because\nthe whole perfection of the divine nature exists in each person.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Son Is in the Father, and Conversely?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Son and the Father are not in each\nother. For the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text. 23) gives eight modes of\none thing existing in another, according to none of which is the Son\nin the Father, or conversely; as is patent to anyone who examines each\nmode. Therefore the Son and the Father are not in each other.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing that has come out from another is within.\nBut the Son from eternity came out from the Father, according to Mic.\n5:2: \"His going forth is from the beginning, from the days of\neternity.\" Therefore the Son is not in the Father.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one of two opposites cannot be in the other. But the\nSon and the Father are relatively opposed. Therefore one cannot be in\nthe other.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (John 14:10): \"I am in the Father, and\nthe Father is in Me.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ There are three points of consideration as regards\nthe Father and the Son; the essence, the relation and the origin; and\naccording to each the Son and the Father are in each other. The\nFather is in the Son by His essence, forasmuch as the Father is His\nown essence and communicates His essence to the Son not by any change\non His part. Hence it follows that as the Father's essence is in the\nSon, the Father Himself is in the Son; likewise, since the Son is His\nown essence, it follows that He Himself is in the Father in Whom is\nHis essence. This is expressed by Hilary (De Trin. v), \"The\nunchangeable God, so to speak, follows His own nature in begetting an\nunchangeable subsisting God. So we understand the nature of God to\nsubsist in Him, for He is God in God.\" It is also manifest that as\nregards the relations, each of two relative opposites is in the\nconcept of the other. Regarding origin also, it is clear that the\nprocession of the intelligible word is not outside the intellect,\ninasmuch as it remains in the utterer of the word. What also is\nuttered by the word is therein contained. And the same applies to the\nHoly Ghost.\n\nReply Obj. 1: What is contained in creatures does not sufficiently\nrepresent what exists in God; so according to none of the modes\nenumerated by the Philosopher, are the Son and the Father in each\nother. The mode the most nearly approaching to the reality is to be\nfound in that whereby something exists in its originating principle,\nexcept that the unity of essence between the principle and that which\nproceeds therefrom is wanting in things created.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Son's going forth from the Father is by mode of the\ninterior procession whereby the word emerges from the heart and\nremains therein. Hence this going forth in God is only by the\ndistinction of the relations, not by any kind of essential separation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Father and the Son are relatively opposed, but not\nessentially; while, as above explained, one relative opposite is in\nthe other.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Son Is Equal to the Father in Power?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Son is not equal to the Father\nin power. For it is said (John 5:19): \"The Son cannot do anything of\nHimself but what He seeth the Father doing.\" But the Father can act\nof Himself. Therefore the Father's power is greater than the Son's.\n\nObj. 2: Further, greater is the power of him who commands and teaches\nthan of him who obeys and hears. But the Father commands the Son\naccording to John 14:31: \"As the Father gave Me commandment so do I.\"\nThe Father also teaches the Son: \"The Father loveth the Son, and\nshoweth Him all things that Himself doth\" (John 5:20). Also, the Son\nhears: \"As I hear, so I judge\" (John 5:30). Therefore the Father has\ngreater power than the Son.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it belongs to the Father's omnipotence to be able to\nbeget a Son equal to Himself. For Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii,\n7), \"Were He unable to beget one equal to Himself, where would be the\nomnipotence of God the Father?\" But the Son cannot beget a Son, as\nproved above (Q. 41, A. 6). Therefore the Son cannot do all that\nbelongs to the Father's omnipotence; and hence He is not equal to Him\npower.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (John 5:19): \"Whatsoever things the\nFather doth, these the Son also doth in like manner.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The Son is necessarily equal to the Father in power.\nPower of action is a consequence of perfection in nature. In\ncreatures, for instance, we see that the more perfect the nature, the\ngreater power is there for action. Now it was shown above (A. 4) that\nthe very notion of the divine paternity and filiation requires that\nthe Son should be the Father's equal in greatness--that is, in\nperfection of nature. Hence it follows that the Son is equal to the\nFather in power; and the same applies to the Holy Ghost in relation\nto both.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The words, \"the Son cannot of Himself do anything,\" do\nnot withdraw from the Son any power possessed by the Father, since it\nis immediately added, \"Whatsoever things the Father doth, the Son\ndoth in like manner\"; but their meaning is to show that the Son\nderives His power from the Father, of Whom He receives His nature.\nHence, Hilary says (De Trin. ix), \"The unity of the divine nature\nimplies that the Son so acts of Himself [per se], that He does not\nact by Himself [a se].\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Father's \"showing\" and the Son's \"hearing\" are to\nbe taken in the sense that the Father communicates knowledge to the\nSon, as He communicates His essence. The command of the Father can be\nexplained in the same sense, as giving Him from eternity knowledge\nand will to act, by begetting Him. Or, better still, this may be\nreferred to Christ in His human nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the same essence is paternity in the Father, and\nfiliation in the Son: so by the same power the Father begets, and the\nSon is begotten. Hence it is clear that the Son can do whatever the\nFather can do; yet it does not follow that the Son can beget; for to\nargue thus would imply transition from substance to relation, for\ngeneration signifies a divine relation. So the Son has the same\nomnipotence as the Father, but with another relation; the Father\npossessing power as \"giving\" signified when we say that He is able to\nbeget; while the Son possesses the power of \"receiving,\" signified by\nsaying that He can be begotten.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 43\n\nTHE MISSION OF THE DIVINE PERSONS\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe next consider the mission of the divine persons, concerning which\nthere are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is suitable for a divine person to be sent?\n\n(2) Whether mission is eternal, or only temporal?\n\n(3) In what sense a divine person is invisibly sent?\n\n(4) Whether it is fitting that each person be sent?\n\n(5) Whether both the Son and the Holy Ghost are invisibly sent?\n\n(6) To whom the invisible mission is directed?\n\n(7) Of the visible mission.\n\n(8) Whether any person sends Himself visibly or invisibly?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 1]\n\nWhether a Divine Person Can Be Properly Sent?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a divine person cannot be properly\nsent. For one who is sent is less than the sender. But one divine\nperson is not less than another. Therefore one person is not sent by\nanother.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what is sent is separated from the sender; hence\nJerome says, commenting on Ezech. 16:53: \"What is joined and tied in\none body cannot be sent.\" But in the divine persons there is nothing\nthat is separable, as Hilary says (De Trin. vii). Therefore one\nperson is not sent by another.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whoever is sent, departs from one place and comes\nanew into another. But this does not apply to a divine person, Who is\neverywhere. Therefore it is not suitable for a divine person to be\nsent.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (John 8:16): \"I am not alone, but I and\nthe Father that sent Me.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ the notion of mission includes two things: the\nhabitude of the one sent to the sender; and that of the one sent to\nthe end whereto he is sent. Anyone being sent implies a certain kind\nof procession of the one sent from the sender: either according to\ncommand, as the master sends the servant; or according to counsel, as\nan adviser may be said to send the king to battle; or according to\norigin, as a tree sends forth its flowers. The habitude to the term\nto which he is sent is also shown, so that in some way he begins to\nbe present there: either because in no way was he present before in\nthe place whereto he is sent, or because he begins to be there in\nsome way in which he was not there hitherto. Thus the mission of a\ndivine person is a fitting thing, as meaning in one way the\nprocession of origin from the sender, and as meaning a new way of\nexisting in another; thus the Son is said to be sent by the Father\ninto the world, inasmuch as He began to exist visibly in the world by\ntaking our nature; whereas \"He was\" previously \"in the world\" (John\n1:1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Mission implies inferiority in the one sent, when it\nmeans procession from the sender as principle, by command or counsel;\nforasmuch as the one commanding is the greater, and the counsellor is\nthe wiser. In God, however, it means only procession of origin, which\nis according to equality, as explained above (Q. 42, AA. 4, 6).\n\nReply Obj. 2: What is so sent as to begin to exist where previously\nit did not exist, is locally moved by being sent; hence it is\nnecessarily separated locally from the sender. This, however, has no\nplace in the mission of a divine person; for the divine person sent\nneither begins to exist where he did not previously exist, nor ceases\nto exist where He was. Hence such a mission takes place without a\nseparation, having only distinction of origin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This objection rests on the idea of mission according\nto local motion, which is not in God.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Mission Is Eternal, or Only Temporal?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that mission can be eternal. For Gregory\nsays (Hom. xxvi, in Ev.), \"The Son is sent as He is begotten.\" But\nthe Son's generation is eternal. Therefore mission is eternal.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a thing is changed if it becomes something\ntemporally. But a divine person is not changed. Therefore the\nmission of a divine person is not temporal, but eternal.\n\nObj. 3: Further, mission implies procession. But the procession of\nthe divine persons is eternal. Therefore mission is also eternal.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gal. 4:4): \"When the fullness of the\ntime was come, God sent His Son.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A certain difference is to be observed in all the\nwords that express the origin of the divine persons. For some express\nonly relation to the principle, as \"procession\" and \"going forth.\"\nOthers express the term of procession together with the relation to\nthe principle. Of these some express the eternal term, as\n\"generation\" and \"spiration\"; for generation is the procession of the\ndivine person into the divine nature, and passive spiration is the\nprocession of the subsisting love. Others express the temporal term\nwith the relation to the principle, as \"mission\" and \"giving.\" For a\nthing is sent that it may be in something else, and is given that it\nmay be possessed; but that a divine person be possessed by any\ncreature, or exist in it in a new mode, is temporal.\n\nHence \"mission\" and \"giving\" have only a temporal significance in\nGod; but \"generation\" and \"spiration\" are exclusively eternal;\nwhereas \"procession\" and \"giving,\" in God, have both an eternal and a\ntemporal signification: for the Son may proceed eternally as God; but\ntemporally, by becoming man, according to His visible mission, or\nlikewise by dwelling in man according to His invisible mission.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Gregory speaks of the temporal generation of the Son,\nnot from the Father, but from His mother; or it may be taken to mean\nthat He could be sent because eternally begotten.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That a divine person may newly exist in anyone, or be\npossessed by anyone in time, does not come from change of the divine\nperson, but from change in the creature; as God Himself is called\nLord temporally by change of the creature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Mission signifies not only procession from the\nprinciple, but also determines the temporal term of the procession.\nHence mission is only temporal. Or we may say that it includes the\neternal procession, with the addition of a temporal effect. For the\nrelation of a divine person to His principle must be eternal. Hence\nthe procession may be called a twin procession, eternal and temporal,\nnot that there is a double relation to the principle, but a double\nterm, temporal and eternal.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Invisible Mission of the Divine Person Is Only According\nto the Gift of Sanctifying Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the invisible mission of the divine\nperson is not only according to the gift of sanctifying grace. For the\nsending of a divine person means that He is given. Hence if the divine\nperson is sent only according to the gift of sanctifying grace, the\ndivine person Himself will not be given, but only His gifts; and this\nis the error of those who say that the Holy Ghost is not given, but\nthat His gifts are given.\n\nObj. 2: Further, this preposition, \"according to,\" denotes the\nhabitude of some cause. But the divine person is the cause why the\ngift of sanctifying grace is possessed, and not conversely, according\nto Rom. 5:5, \"the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the\nHoly Ghost, Who is given to us.\" Therefore it is improperly said that\nthe divine person is sent according to the gift of sanctifying grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that \"the Son, when\ntemporally perceived by the mind, is sent.\" But the Son is known not\nonly by sanctifying grace, but also by gratuitous grace, as by faith\nand knowledge. Therefore the divine person is not sent only according\nto the gift of sanctifying grace.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Rabanus says that the Holy Ghost was given to the\napostles for the working of miracles. This, however, is not a gift of\nsanctifying grace, but a gratuitous grace. Therefore the divine\nperson is not given only according to the gift of sanctifying grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that \"the Holy\nGhost proceeds temporally for the creature's sanctification.\" But\nmission is a temporal procession. Since then the creature's\nsanctification is by sanctifying grace, it follows that the mission\nof the divine person is only by sanctifying grace.\n\n_I answer that,_ The divine person is fittingly sent in the sense that\nHe exists newly in any one; and He is given as possessed by anyone;\nand neither of these is otherwise than by sanctifying grace.\n\nFor God is in all things by His essence, power and presence, according\nto His one common mode, as the cause existing in the effects which\nparticipate in His goodness. Above and beyond this common mode,\nhowever, there is one special mode belonging to the rational nature\nwherein God is said to be present as the object known is in the\nknower, and the beloved in the lover. And since the rational creature\nby its operation of knowledge and love attains to God Himself,\naccording to this special mode God is said not only to exist in the\nrational creature but also to dwell therein as in His own temple. So\nno other effect can be put down as the reason why the divine person is\nin the rational creature in a new mode, except sanctifying grace.\nHence, the divine person is sent, and proceeds temporally only\naccording to sanctifying grace.\n\nAgain, we are said to possess only what we can freely use or enjoy:\nand to have the power of enjoying the divine person can only be\naccording to sanctifying grace. And yet the Holy Ghost is possessed\nby man, and dwells within him, in the very gift itself of sanctifying\ngrace. Hence the Holy Ghost Himself is given and sent.\n\nReply Obj. 1: By the gift of sanctifying grace the rational creature\nis perfected so that it can freely use not only the created gift\nitself, but enjoy also the divine person Himself; and so the\ninvisible mission takes place according to the gift of sanctifying\ngrace; and yet the divine person Himself is given.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sanctifying grace disposes the soul to possess the\ndivine person; and this is signified when it is said that the Holy\nGhost is given according to the gift of grace. Nevertheless the gift\nitself of grace is from the Holy Ghost; which is meant by the words,\n\"the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the Son can be known by us according to other\neffects, yet neither does He dwell in us, nor is He possessed by us\naccording to those effects.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The working of miracles manifests sanctifying grace as\nalso does the gift of prophecy and any other gratuitous graces. Hence\ngratuitous grace is called the \"manifestation of the Spirit\" (1 Cor.\n12:7). So the Holy Ghost is said to be given to the apostles for the\nworking of miracles, because sanctifying grace was given to them with\nthe outward sign. Were the sign only of sanctifying grace given to\nthem without the grace itself, it would not be simply said that the\nHoly Ghost was given, except with some qualifying term; just as we\nread of certain ones receiving the gift of the spirit of prophecy, or\nof miracles, as having from the Holy Ghost the power of prophesying\nor of working miracles.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Father Can Be Fittingly Sent?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is fitting also that the Father\nshould be sent. For being sent means that the divine person is given.\nBut the Father gives Himself since He can only be possessed by His\ngiving Himself. Therefore it can be said that the Father sends\nHimself.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the divine person is sent according to the\nindwelling of grace. But by grace the whole Trinity dwells in us\naccording to John 14:23: \"We will come to him and make Our abode with\nhim.\" Therefore each one of the divine persons is sent.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever belongs to one person, belongs to them all,\nexcept the notions and persons. But mission does not signify any\nperson; nor even a notion, since there are only five notions, as\nstated above (Q. 32, A. 3). Therefore every divine person can be sent.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. ii, 3), \"The Father alone\nis never described as being sent.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The very idea of mission means procession from\nanother, and in God it means procession according to origin, as above\nexpounded. Hence, as the Father is not from another, in no way is it\nfitting for Him to be sent; but this can only belong to the Son and\nto the Holy Ghost, to Whom it belongs to be from another.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the sense of \"giving\" as a free bestowal of\nsomething, the Father gives Himself, as freely bestowing Himself to\nbe enjoyed by the creature. But as implying the authority of the\ngiver as regards what is given, \"to be given\" only applies in God to\nthe Person Who is from another; and the same as regards \"being sent.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although the effect of grace is also from the Father,\nWho dwells in us by grace, just as the Son and the Holy Ghost, still\nHe is not described as being sent, for He is not from another. Thus\nAugustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that \"The Father, when known by\nanyone in time, is not said to be sent; for there is no one whence He\nis, or from whom He proceeds.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Mission, meaning procession from the sender, includes\nthe signification of a notion, not of a special notion, but in\ngeneral; thus \"to be from another\" is common to two of the notions.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 5]\n\nWhether It Is Fitting for the Son to Be Sent Invisibly?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not fitting for the Son to be\nsent invisibly. For invisible mission of the divine person is\naccording to the gift of grace. But all gifts of grace belong to the\nHoly Ghost, according to 1 Cor. 12:11: \"One and the same Spirit\nworketh all things.\" Therefore only the Holy Ghost is sent invisibly.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the mission of the divine person is according to\nsanctifying grace. But the gifts belonging to the perfection of the\nintellect are not gifts of sanctifying grace, since they can be held\nwithout the gift of charity, according to 1 Cor. 13:2: \"If I should\nhave prophecy, and should know all mysteries, and all knowledge, and\nif I should have all faith so that I could move mountains, and have\nnot charity, I am nothing.\" Therefore, since the Son proceeds as the\nword of the intellect, it seems unfitting for Him to be sent\ninvisibly.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the mission of the divine person is a procession, as\nexpounded above (AA. 1, 4). But the procession of the Son and of the\nHoly Ghost differ from each other. Therefore they are distinct\nmissions if both are sent; and then one of them would be superfluous,\nsince one would suffice for the creature's sanctification.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said of divine Wisdom (Wis. 9:10): \"Send her\nfrom heaven to Thy Saints, and from the seat of Thy greatness.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The whole Trinity dwells in the mind by sanctifying\ngrace, according to John 14:23: \"We will come to him, and will make Our\nabode with him.\" But that a divine person be sent to anyone by\ninvisible grace signifies both that this person dwells in a new way\nwithin him and that He has His origin from another. Hence, since both\nto the Son and to the Holy Ghost it belongs to dwell in the soul by\ngrace, and to be from another, it therefore belongs to both of them to\nbe invisibly sent. As to the Father, though He dwells in us by grace,\nstill it does not belong to Him to be from another, and consequently\nHe is not sent.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although all the gifts, considered as such, are\nattributed to the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as He is by His nature the\nfirst Gift, since He is Love, as stated above (Q. 38, A. 1), some\ngifts nevertheless, by reason of their own particular nature, are\nappropriated in a certain way to the Son, those, namely, which belong\nto the intellect, and in respect of which we speak of the mission of\nthe Son. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20) that \"The Son is sent\nto anyone invisibly, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The soul is made like to God by grace. Hence for a\ndivine person to be sent to anyone by grace, there must needs be a\nlikening of the soul to the divine person Who is sent, by some gift\nof grace. Because the Holy Ghost is Love, the soul is assimilated to\nthe Holy Ghost by the gift of charity: hence the mission of the Holy\nGhost is according to the mode of charity. Whereas the Son is the\nWord, not any sort of word, but one Who breathes forth Love. Hence\nAugustine says (De Trin. ix 10): \"The Word we speak of is knowledge\nwith love.\" Thus the Son is sent not in accordance with every and any\nkind of intellectual perfection, but according to the intellectual\nillumination, which breaks forth into the affection of love, as is\nsaid (John 6:45): \"Everyone that hath heard from the Father and hath\nlearned, cometh to Me,\" and (Ps. 38:4): \"In my meditation a fire\nshall flame forth.\" Thus Augustine plainly says (De Trin. iv, 20):\n\"The Son is sent, whenever He is known and perceived by anyone.\" Now\nperception implies a certain experimental knowledge; and this is\nproperly called wisdom [sapientia], as it were a sweet knowledge\n[sapida scientia], according to Ecclus. 6:23: \"The wisdom of doctrine\nis according to her name.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since mission implies the origin of the person Who is\nsent, and His indwelling by grace, as above explained (A. 1), if we\nspeak of mission according to origin, in this sense the Son's mission\nis distinguished from the mission of the Holy Ghost, as generation is\ndistinguished from procession. If we consider mission as regards the\neffect of grace, in this sense the two missions are united in the\nroot which is grace, but are distinguished in the effects of grace,\nwhich consist in the illumination of the intellect and the kindling\nof the affection. Thus it is manifest that one mission cannot be\nwithout the other, because neither takes place without sanctifying\ngrace, nor is one person separated from the other.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Invisible Mission Is to All Who Participate Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the invisible mission is not to all\nwho participate grace. For the Fathers of the Old Testament had their\nshare of grace. Yet to them was made no invisible mission; for it is\nsaid (John 7:39): \"The Spirit was not yet given, because Jesus was\nnot yet glorified.\" Therefore the invisible mission is not to all\npartakers in grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, progress in virtue is only by grace. But the\ninvisible mission is not according to progress in virtue; because\nprogress in virtue is continuous, since charity ever increases or\ndecreases; and thus the mission would be continuous. Therefore the\ninvisible mission is not to all who share in grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Christ and the blessed have fullness of grace.\nBut mission is not to them, for mission implies distance, whereas\nChrist, as man, and all the blessed are perfectly united to God.\nTherefore the invisible mission is not to all sharers in grace.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Sacraments of the New Law contain grace, and\nit is not said that the invisible mission is sent to them. Therefore\nthe invisible mission is not to all that have grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ According to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4; xv, 27),\nthe invisible mission is for the creature's sanctification. Now every\ncreature that has grace is sanctified. Therefore the invisible mission\nis to every such creature.\n\n_I answer that,_ As above stated (AA. 3, 4 ,5), mission in its very\nmeaning implies that he who is sent either begins to exist where he\nwas not before, as occurs to creatures; or begins to exist where he\nwas before, but in a new way, in which sense mission is ascribed to\nthe divine persons. Thus, mission as regards the one to whom it is\nsent implies two things, the indwelling of grace, and a certain\nrenewal by grace. Thus the invisible mission is sent to all in whom\nare to be found these two conditions.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The invisible mission was directed to the Old Testament\nFathers, as appears from what Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20), that\nthe invisible mission of the Son \"is in man and with men. This was\ndone in former times with the Fathers and the Prophets.\" Thus the\nwords, \"the Spirit was not yet given,\" are to be applied to that\ngiving accompanied with a visible sign which took place on the day\nof Pentecost.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The invisible mission takes place also as regards\nprogress in virtue or increase of grace. Hence Augustine says (De\nTrin. iv, 20), that \"the Son is sent to each one when He is known\nand perceived by anyone, so far as He can be known and perceived\naccording to the capacity of the soul, whether journeying towards\nGod, or united perfectly to Him.\" Such invisible mission, however,\nchiefly occurs as regards anyone's proficiency in the performance of\na new act, or in the acquisition of a new state of grace; as, for\nexample, the proficiency in reference to the gift of miracles or of\nprophecy, or in the fervor of charity leading a man to expose himself\nto the danger of martyrdom, or to renounce his possessions, or to\nundertake any arduous work.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The invisible mission is directed to the blessed at the\nvery beginning of their beatitude. The invisible mission is made to\nthem subsequently, not by \"intensity\" of grace, but by the further\nrevelation of mysteries; which goes on till the day of judgment. Such\nan increase is by the \"extension\" of grace, because it extends to a\ngreater number of objects. To Christ the invisible mission was sent\nat the first moment of His conception; but not afterwards, since from\nthe beginning of His conception He was filled with all wisdom and\ngrace.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Grace resides instrumentally in the sacraments of the\nNew Law, as the form of a thing designed resides in the instruments\nof the art designing, according to a process flowing from the agent\nto the passive object. But mission is only spoken of as directed to\nits term. Hence the mission of the divine person is not sent to the\nsacraments, but to those who receive grace through the sacraments.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 7]\n\nWhether It Is Fitting for the Holy Ghost to Be Sent Visibly?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent\nin a visible manner. For the Son as visibly sent to the world is said\nto be less than the Father. But the Holy Ghost is never said to be\nless than the Father. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not fittingly sent\nin a visible manner.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the visible mission takes place by way of union to\na visible creature, as the Son's mission according to the flesh. But\nthe Holy Ghost did not assume any visible creature; and hence it\ncannot be said that He exists otherwise in some creatures than in\nothers, unless perhaps as in a sign, as He is also present in the\nsacraments, and in all the figures of the law. Thus the Holy Ghost\nis either not sent visibly at all, or His visible mission takes\nplace in all these things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every visible creature is an effect showing forth\nthe whole Trinity. Therefore the Holy Ghost is not sent by reason\nof those visible creatures more than any other person.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Son was visibly sent by reason of the noblest\nkind of creature--namely, the human nature. Therefore if the Holy\nGhost is sent visibly, He ought to be sent by reason of rational\ncreatures.\n\nObj. 5: Further, whatever is done visibly by God is dispensed by the\nministry of the angels; as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4,5,9). So\nvisible appearances, if there have been any, came by means of the\nangels. Thus the angels are sent, and not the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 6: Further, the Holy Ghost being sent in a visible manner\nis only for the purpose of manifesting the invisible mission; as\ninvisible things are made known by the visible. So those to whom the\ninvisible mission was not sent, ought not to receive the visible\nmission; and to all who received the invisible mission, whether in\nthe New or in the Old Testament, the visible mission ought likewise\nto be sent; and this is clearly false. Therefore the Holy Ghost is\nnot sent visibly.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Matt. 3:16) that, when our Lord was\nbaptized, the Holy Ghost descended upon Him in the shape of a dove.\n\n_I answer that,_ God provides for all things according to the nature of\neach thing. Now the nature of man requires that he be led to the\ninvisible by visible things, as explained above (Q. 12, A. 12).\nWherefore the invisible things of God must be made manifest to man by\nthe things that are visible. As God, therefore, in a certain way has\ndemonstrated Himself and His eternal processions to men by visible\ncreatures, according to certain signs; so was it fitting that the\ninvisible missions also of the divine persons should be made manifest\nby some visible creatures.\n\nThis mode of manifestation applies in different ways to the Son and\nto the Holy Ghost. For it belongs to the Holy Ghost, Who proceeds as\nLove, to be the gift of sanctification; to the Son as the principle of\nthe Holy Ghost, it belongs to the author of this sanctification. Thus\nthe Son has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification; the\nHoly Ghost as the sign of sanctification.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Son assumed the visible creature, wherein He\nappeared, into the unity of His person, so that whatever can be said\nof that creature can be said of the Son of God; and so, by reason of\nthe nature assumed, the Son is called less than the Father. But the\nHoly Ghost did not assume the visible creature, in which He appeared,\ninto the unity of His person; so that what is said of it cannot be\npredicated of Him. Hence He cannot be called less than the Father by\nreason of any visible creature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The visible mission of the Holy Ghost does not apply to\nthe imaginary vision which is that of prophecy; because as Augustine\nsays (De Trin. ii, 6): \"The prophetic vision is not displayed to\ncorporeal eyes by corporeal shapes, but is shown in the spirit by the\nspiritual images of bodies. But whoever saw the dove and the fire,\nsaw them by their eyes. Nor, again, has the Holy Ghost the same\nrelation to these images that the Son has to the rock, because it is\nsaid, 'The rock was Christ' (1 Cor. 10:4). For that rock was already\ncreated, and after the manner of an action was named Christ, Whom it\ntypified; whereas the dove and the fire suddenly appeared to signify\nonly what was happening. They seem, however, to be like to the flame\nof the burning bush seen by Moses and to the column which the people\nfollowed in the desert, and to the lightning and thunder issuing\nforth when the law was given on the mountain. For the purpose of the\nbodily appearances of those things was that they might signify, and\nthen pass away.\" Thus the visible mission is neither displayed by\nprophetic vision, which belongs to the imagination, and not to the\nbody, nor by the sacramental signs of the Old and New Testament,\nwherein certain pre-existing things are employed to signify\nsomething. But the Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, inasmuch as\nHe showed Himself in certain creatures as in signs especially made\nfor that purpose.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the whole Trinity makes those creatures, still\nthey are made in order to show forth in some special way this or that\nperson. For as the Father, Son and Holy Ghost are signified by\ndiverse names, so also can They each one be signified by different\nthings; although neither separation nor diversity exists amongst Them.\n\nReply Obj. 4: It was necessary for the Son to be declared as the\nauthor of sanctification, as explained above. Thus the visible\nmission of the Son was necessarily made according to the rational\nnature to which it belongs to act, and which is capable of\nsanctification; whereas any other creature could be the sign of\nsanctification. Nor was such a visible creature, formed for such a\npurpose, necessarily assumed by the Holy Ghost into the unity of His\nperson, since it was not assumed or used for the purpose of action,\nbut only for the purpose of a sign; and so likewise it was not\nrequired to last beyond what its use required.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Those visible creatures were formed by the ministry of\nthe angels, not to signify the person of an angel, but to signify the\nPerson of the Holy Ghost. Thus, as the Holy Ghost resided in those\nvisible creatures as the one signified in the sign, on that account\nthe Holy Ghost is said to be sent visibly, and not as an angel.\n\nReply Obj. 6: It is not necessary that the invisible mission should\nalways be made manifest by some visible external sign; but, as is\nsaid (1 Cor. 12:7)--\"the manifestation of the Spirit is given to\nevery man unto profit\"--that is, of the Church. This utility consists\nin the confirmation and propagation of the faith by such visible\nsigns. This has been done chiefly by Christ and by the apostles,\naccording to Heb. 2:3, \"which having begun to be declared by the\nLord, was confirmed unto us by them that heard.\"\n\nThus in a special sense, a mission of the Holy Ghost was directed to\nChrist, to the apostles, and to some of the early saints on whom the\nChurch was in a way founded; in such a manner, however, that the\nvisible mission made to Christ should show forth the invisible mission\nmade to Him, not at that particular time, but at the first moment of\nHis conception. The visible mission was directed to Christ at the time\nof His baptism by the figure of a dove, a fruitful animal, to show\nforth in Christ the authority of the giver of grace by spiritual\nregeneration; hence the Father's voice spoke, \"This is My beloved Son\"\n(Matt. 3:17), that others might be regenerated to the likeness of the\nonly Begotten. The Transfiguration showed it forth in the appearance\nof a bright cloud, to show the exuberance of doctrine; and hence it\nwas said, \"Hear ye Him\" (Matt. 17:5). To the apostles the mission was\ndirected in the form of breathing to show forth the power of their\nministry in the dispensation of the sacraments; and hence it was said,\n\"Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven\" (John 20:23): and\nagain under the sign of fiery tongues to show forth the office of\nteaching; whence it is said that, \"they began to speak with divers\ntongues\" (Acts 2:4). The visible mission of the Holy Ghost was\nfittingly not sent to the fathers of the Old Testament, because the\nvisible mission of the Son was to be accomplished before that of the\nHoly Ghost; since the Holy Ghost manifests the Son, as the Son\nmanifests the Father. Visible apparitions of the divine persons were,\nhowever, given to the Fathers of the Old Testament which, indeed,\ncannot be called visible missions; because, according to Augustine (De\nTrin. ii, 17), they were not sent to designate the indwelling of the\ndivine person by grace, but for the manifestation of something else.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 43, Art. 8]\n\nWhether a Divine Person Is Sent Only by the Person Whence He Proceeds\nEternally?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a divine person is sent only by the\none whence He proceeds eternally. For as Augustine says (De Trin. iv),\n\"The Father is sent by no one because He is from no one.\" Therefore if\na divine person is sent by another, He must be from that other.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the sender has authority over the one sent. But\nthere can be no authority as regards a divine person except from\norigin. Therefore the divine person sent must proceed from the one\nsending.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if a divine person can be sent by one whence He does\nnot proceed, then the Holy Ghost may be given by a man, although He\nproceeds not from him; which is contrary to what Augustine says (De\nTrin. xv). Therefore the divine person is sent only by the one whence\nHe proceeds.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Son is sent by the Holy Ghost, according to Isa.\n48:16, \"Now the Lord God hath sent Me and His Spirit.\" But the Son is\nnot from the Holy Ghost. Therefore a divine person is sent by one from\nWhom He does not proceed.\n\n_I answer that,_ There are different opinions on this point. Some say\nthat the divine person is sent only by the one whence He proceeds\neternally; and so, when it is said that the Son of God is sent by the\nHoly Ghost, this is to be explained as regards His human nature, by\nreason of which He was sent to preach by the Holy Ghost. Augustine,\nhowever, says (De Trin. ii, 5) that the Son is sent by Himself, and by\nthe Holy Ghost; and the Holy Ghost is sent by Himself, and by the Son;\nso that to be sent in God does not apply to each person, but only to\nthe person proceeding from another, whereas to send belongs to each\nperson.\n\nThere is some truth in both of these opinions; because when a person\nis described as being sent, the person Himself existing from another\nis designated, with the visible or invisible effect, applicable to the\nmission of the divine person. Thus if the sender be designated as the\nprinciple of the person sent, in this sense not each person sends, but\nthat person only Who is the principle of that person who is sent; and\nthus the Son is sent only by the Father; and the Holy Ghost by the\nFather and the Son. If, however, the person sending is understood as\nthe principle of the effect implied in the mission, in that sense the\nwhole Trinity sends the person sent. This reason does not prove that a\nman can send the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as man cannot cause the effect\nof grace.\n\nThe answers to the objections appear from the above.\n_______________________\n\nTREATISE ON THE CREATION (QQ. 44-49)\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 44\n\nTHE PROCESSION OF CREATURES FROM GOD, AND OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF ALL\nTHINGS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nAfter treating of the procession of the divine persons, we must\nconsider the procession of creatures from God. This consideration\nwill be threefold:\n\n(1) of the production of creatures;\n\n(2) of the distinction between them;\n\n(3) of their preservation and government.\n\nConcerning the first point there are three things to be considered:\n\n(1) the first cause of beings;\n\n(2) the mode of procession of creatures from the first cause;\n\n(3) the principle of the duration of things.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether God is the efficient cause of all beings?\n\n(2) Whether primary matter is created by God, or is an independent\ncoordinate principle with Him?\n\n(3) Whether God is the exemplar cause of beings or whether there\nare other exemplar causes?\n\n(4) Whether He is the final cause of things?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 44, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Is Necessary That Every Being Be Created by God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not necessary that every being\nbe created by God. For there is nothing to prevent a thing from being\nwithout that which does not belong to its essence, as a man can be\nfound without whiteness. But the relation of the thing caused to its\ncause does not appear to be essential to beings, for some beings can\nbe understood without it; therefore they can exist without it; and\ntherefore it is possible that some beings should not be created by\nGod.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a thing requires an efficient cause in order to\nexist. Therefore whatever cannot but exist does not require an\nefficient cause. But no necessary thing can not exist, because\nwhatever necessarily exists cannot but exist. Therefore as there are\nmany necessary things in existence, it appears that not all beings are\nfrom God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever things have a cause, can be demonstrated\nby that cause. But in mathematics demonstration is not made by the\nefficient cause, as appears from the Philosopher (Metaph. iii, text\n3); therefore not all beings are from God as from their efficient\ncause.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Rom. 11:36): \"Of Him, and by Him, and\nin Him are all things.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It must be said that every being in any way existing\nis from God. For whatever is found in anything by participation, must\nbe caused in it by that to which it belongs essentially, as iron\nbecomes ignited by fire. Now it has been shown above (Q. 3, A. 4)\nwhen treating of the divine simplicity that God is the essentially\nself-subsisting Being; and also it was shown (Q. 11, AA. 3, 4) that\nsubsisting being must be one; as, if whiteness were self-subsisting,\nit would be one, since whiteness is multiplied by its recipients.\nTherefore all beings apart from God are not their own being, but are\nbeings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things which\nare diversified by the diverse participation of being, so as to be\nmore or less perfect, are caused by one First Being, Who possesses\nbeing most perfectly.\n\nHence Plato said (Parmen. xxvi) that unity must come before multitude;\nand Aristotle said (Metaph. ii, text 4) that whatever is greatest in\nbeing and greatest in truth, is the cause of every being and of every\ntruth; just as whatever is the greatest in heat is the cause of all\nheat.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Though the relation to its cause is not part of the\ndefinition of a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on\nwhat belongs to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has\nbeing by participation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a\nbeing cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without\nhaving the faculty of laughing. But, since to be caused does not\nenter into the essence of being as such, therefore is it possible for\nus to find a being uncaused.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This objection has led some to say that what is\nnecessary has no cause (Phys. viii, text 46). But this is manifestly\nfalse in the demonstrative sciences, where necessary principles are\nthe causes of necessary conclusions. And therefore Aristotle says\n(Metaph. v, text 6), that there are some necessary things which have\na cause of their necessity. But the reason why an efficient cause is\nrequired is not merely because the effect is not necessary, but\nbecause the effect might not be if the cause were not. For this\nconditional proposition is true, whether the antecedent and\nconsequent be possible or impossible.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The science of mathematics treats its object as though\nit were something abstracted mentally, whereas it is not abstract in\nreality. Now, it is becoming that everything should have an efficient\ncause in proportion to its being. And so, although the object of\nmathematics has an efficient cause, still, its relation to that cause\nis not the reason why it is brought under the consideration of the\nmathematician, who therefore does not demonstrate that object from\nits efficient cause.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 44, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Primary Matter Is Created by God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that primary matter is not created by God.\nFor whatever is made is composed of a subject and of something else\n(Phys. i, text 62). But primary matter has no subject. Therefore\nprimary matter cannot have been made by God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, action and passion are opposite members of a\ndivision. But as the first active principle is God, so the first\npassive principle is matter. Therefore God and primary matter are two\nprinciples divided against each other, neither of which is from the\nother.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every agent produces its like, and thus, since\nevery agent acts in proportion to its actuality, it follows that\neverything made is in some degree actual. But primary matter is only\nin potentiality, formally considered in itself. Therefore it is\nagainst the nature of primary matter to be a thing made.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. xii, 7), Two \"things hast\nThou made, O Lord; one nigh unto Thyself\"--viz. angels--\"the other\nnigh unto nothing\"--viz. primary matter.\n\n_I answer that,_ The ancient philosophers gradually, and as it were\nstep by step, advanced to the knowledge of truth. At first being of\ngrosser mind, they failed to realize that any beings existed except\nsensible bodies. And those among them who admitted movement, did not\nconsider it except as regards certain accidents, for instance, in\nrelation to rarefaction and condensation, by union and separation.\nAnd supposing as they did that corporeal substance itself was\nuncreated, they assigned certain causes for these accidental changes,\nas for instance, affinity, discord, intellect, or something of that\nkind. An advance was made when they understood that there was a\ndistinction between the substantial form and matter, which latter\nthey imagined to be uncreated, and when they perceived transmutation\nto take place in bodies in regard to essential forms. Such\ntransmutations they attributed to certain universal causes, such as\nthe oblique circle [*The zodiac, according to Aristotle (De Gener.\nii)], or ideas, according to Plato. But we must take into\nconsideration that matter is contracted by its form to a determinate\nspecies, as a substance, belonging to a certain species, is\ncontracted by a supervening accident to a determinate mode of being;\nfor instance, man by whiteness. Each of these opinions, therefore,\nconsidered \"being\" under some particular aspect, either as \"this\" or\nas \"such\"; and so they assigned particular efficient causes to\nthings. Then others there were who arose to the consideration of\n\"being,\" as being, and who assigned a cause to things, not as\n\"these,\" or as \"such,\" but as \"beings.\"\n\nTherefore whatever is the cause of things considered as beings, must\nbe the cause of things, not only according as they are \"such\" by\naccidental forms, nor according as they are \"these\" by substantial\nforms, but also according to all that belongs to their being at all in\nany way. And thus it is necessary to say that also primary matter is\ncreated by the universal cause of things.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Phys. i, text 62), is speaking of\n\"becoming\" in particular--that is, from form to form, either\naccidental or substantial. But here we are speaking of things\naccording to their emanation from the universal principle of being;\nfrom which emanation matter itself is not excluded, although it is\nexcluded from the former mode of being made.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Passion is an effect of action. Hence it is reasonable\nthat the first passive principle should be the effect of the first\nactive principle, since every imperfect thing is caused by one\nperfect. For the first principle must be most perfect, as Aristotle\nsays (Metaph. xii, text 40).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The reason adduced does not show that matter is not\ncreated, but that it is not created without form; for though\neverything created is actual, still it is not pure act. Hence it is\nnecessary that even what is potential in it should be created, if all\nthat belongs to its being is created.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 44, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Exemplar Cause Is Anything Besides God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the exemplar cause is something\nbesides God. For the effect is like its exemplar cause. But creatures\nare far from being like God. Therefore God is not their exemplar\ncause.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is by participation is reduced to something\nself-existing, as a thing ignited is reduced to fire, as stated above\n(A. 1). But whatever exists in sensible things exists only by\nparticipation of some species. This appears from the fact that in all\nsensible species is found not only what belongs to the species, but\nalso individuating principles added to the principles of the species.\nTherefore it is necessary to admit self-existing species, as for\ninstance, a _per se_ man, and a _per se_ horse, and the like, which\nare called the exemplars. Therefore exemplar causes exist besides God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sciences and definitions are concerned with species\nthemselves, but not as these are in particular things, because there\nis no science or definition of particular things. Therefore there are\nsome beings, which are beings or species not existing in singular\nthings, and these are called exemplars. Therefore the same conclusion\nfollows as above.\n\nObj. 4: Further, this likewise appears from Dionysius, who says (Div.\nNom. v) that self-subsisting being is before self-subsisting life,\nand before self-subsisting wisdom.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The exemplar is the same as the idea. But ideas,\naccording to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 46), are \"the master forms, which\nare contained in the divine intelligence.\" Therefore the exemplars of\nthings are not outside God.\n\n_I answer that,_ God is the first exemplar cause of all things. In\nproof whereof we must consider that if for the production of anything\nan exemplar is necessary, it is in order that the effect may receive\na determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in\nmatter by reason of the exemplar before him, whether it is the\nexemplar beheld externally, or the exemplar interiorily conceived in\nthe mind. Now it is manifest that things made by nature receive\ndeterminate forms. This determination of forms must be reduced to the\ndivine wisdom as its first principle, for divine wisdom devised the\norder of the universe, which order consists in the variety of things.\nAnd therefore we must say that in the divine wisdom are the types of\nall things, which types we have called ideas--i.e. exemplar forms\nexisting in the divine mind (Q. 15, A. 1). And these ideas, though\nmultiplied by their relations to things, in reality are not apart\nfrom the divine essence, according as the likeness to that essence\ncan be shared diversely by different things. In this manner therefore\nGod Himself is the first exemplar of all things. Moreover, in things\ncreated one may be called the exemplar of another by the reason of\nits likeness thereto, either in species, or by the analogy of some\nkind of imitation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although creatures do not attain to a natural likeness\nto God according to similitude of species, as a man begotten is like\nto the man begetting, still they do attain to likeness to Him,\nforasmuch as they represent the divine idea, as a material house is\nlike to the house in the architect's mind.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is of a man's nature to be in matter, and so a man\nwithout matter is impossible. Therefore although this particular man\nis a man by participation of the species, he cannot be reduced to\nanything self-existing in the same species, but to a superior\nspecies, such as separate substances. The same applies to other\nsensible things.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although every science and definition is concerned only\nwith beings, still it is not necessary that a thing should have the\nsame mode in reality as the thought of it has in our understanding.\nFor we abstract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from\nthe particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the\nuniversals should exist outside the particulars in order to be their\nexemplars.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), by \"self-existing\nlife and self-existing wisdom\" he sometimes denotes God Himself,\nsometimes the powers given to things themselves; but not any\nself-subsisting things, as the ancients asserted.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 44, Art. 4]\n\nWhether God Is the Final Cause of All Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God is not the final cause of all\nthings. For to act for an end seems to imply need of the end. But God\nneeds nothing. Therefore it does not become Him to act for an end.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the end of generation, and the form of the thing\ngenerated, and the agent cannot be identical (Phys. ii, text 70),\nbecause the end of generation is the form of the thing generated. But\nGod is the first agent producing all things. Therefore He is not the\nfinal cause of all things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all things desire their end. But all things do not\ndesire God, for all do not even know Him. Therefore God is not the\nend of all things.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the final cause is the first of causes. If,\ntherefore, God is the efficient cause and the final cause, it\nfollows that before and after exist in Him; which is impossible.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Prov. 16:4): \"The Lord has made all\nthings for Himself.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Every agent acts for an end: otherwise one thing would\nnot follow more than another from the action of the agent, unless it\nwere by chance. Now the end of the agent and of the patient considered\nas such is the same, but in a different way respectively. For the\nimpression which the agent intends to produce, and which the patient\nintends to receive, are one and the same. Some things, however, are\nboth agent and patient at the same time: these are imperfect agents,\nand to these it belongs to intend, even while acting, the acquisition\nof something. But it does not belong to the First Agent, Who is agent\nonly, to act for the acquisition of some end; He intends only to\ncommunicate His perfection, which is His goodness; while every\ncreature intends to acquire its own perfection, which is the likeness\nof the divine perfection and goodness. Therefore the divine goodness\nis the end of all things.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To act from need belongs only to an imperfect agent,\nwhich by its nature is both agent and patient. But this does not\nbelong to God, and therefore He alone is the most perfectly liberal\ngiver, because He does not act for His own profit, but only for His\nown goodness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The form of the thing generated is not the end of\ngeneration, except inasmuch as it is the likeness of the form of the\ngenerator, which intends to communicate its own likeness; otherwise\nthe form of the thing generated would be more noble than the\ngenerator, since the end is more noble than the means to the end.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All things desire God as their end, when they desire\nsome good thing, whether this desire be intellectual or sensible, or\nnatural, i.e. without knowledge; because nothing is good and\ndesirable except forasmuch as it participates in the likeness to God.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final\ncause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows\nthat the first principle of all things is one in reality. But this\ndoes not prevent us from mentally considering many things in Him,\nsome of which come into our mind before others.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 45\n\nTHE MODE OF EMANATION OF THINGS FROM THE FIRST PRINCIPLE\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nThe next question concerns the mode of the emanation of things from\nthe First Principle, and this is called creation, and includes eight\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is creation?\n\n(2) Whether God can create anything?\n\n(3) Whether creation is anything in the very nature of things?\n\n(4) To what things it belongs to be created?\n\n(5) Whether it belongs to God alone to create?\n\n(6) Whether creation is common to the whole Trinity, or proper to any\none Person?\n\n(7) Whether any trace of the Trinity is to be found in created things?\n\n(8) Whether the work of creation is mingled with the works of nature\nand of the will?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 1]\n\nWhether to Create Is to Make Something from Nothing?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that to create is not to make anything\nfrom nothing. For Augustine says (Contra Adv. Leg. et Proph. i): \"To\nmake concerns what did not exist at all; but to create is to make\nsomething by bringing forth something from what was already.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, the nobility of action and of motion is considered\nfrom their terms. Action is therefore nobler from good to good, and\nfrom being to being, than from nothing to something. But creation\nappears to be the most noble action, and first among all actions.\nTherefore it is not from nothing to something, but rather from being\nto being.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the preposition \"from\" [ex] imports relation of some\ncause, and especially of the material cause; as when we say that a\nstatue is made from brass. But \"nothing\" cannot be the matter of\nbeing, nor in any way its cause. Therefore to create is not to make\nsomething from nothing.\n\n_On the contrary,_ On the text of Gen. 1, \"In the beginning God\ncreated,\" etc., the gloss has, \"To create is to make something from\nnothing.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As said above (Q. 44, A. 2), we must consider not\nonly the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but\nalso the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is\nGod; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now\nwhat proceeds by particular emanation, is not presupposed to that\nemanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is\nmade from \"not-man,\" and white from \"not-white.\" Hence if the\nemanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be\nconsidered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed\nbefore this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore\nas the generation of a man is from the \"not-being\" which is\n\"not-man,\" so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from\nthe \"not-being\" which is \"nothing.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine uses the word creation in an equivocal sense,\naccording as to be created signifies improvement in things; as when\nwe say that a bishop is created. We do not, however, speak of\ncreation in that way here, but as it is described above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Changes receive species and dignity, not from the term\n_wherefrom,_ but from the term _whereto._ Therefore a change is more\nperfect and excellent when the term _whereto_ of the change is more\nnoble and excellent, although the term _wherefrom,_ corresponding to\nthe term _whereto,_ may be more imperfect: thus generation is simply\nnobler and more excellent than alteration, because the substantial\nform is nobler than the accidental form; and yet the privation of the\nsubstantial form, which is the term _wherefrom_ in generation, is\nmore imperfect than the contrary, which is the term _wherefrom_ in\nalteration. Similarly creation is more perfect and excellent than\ngeneration and alteration, because the term _whereto_ is the whole\nsubstance of the thing; whereas what is understood as the term\n_wherefrom_ is simply not-being.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When anything is said to be made from nothing, this\npreposition \"from\" [ex] does not signify the material cause, but only\norder; as when we say, \"from morning comes midday\"--i.e. after\nmorning is midday. But we must understand that this preposition\n\"from\" [ex] can comprise the negation implied when I say the word\n\"nothing,\" or can be included in it. If taken in the first sense,\nthen we affirm the order by stating the relation between what is now\nand its previous non-existence. But if the negation includes the\npreposition, then the order is denied, and the sense is, \"It is made\nfrom nothing--i.e. it is not made from anything\"--as if we were to\nsay, \"He speaks of nothing,\" because he does not speak of anything.\nAnd this is verified in both ways, when it is said, that anything is\nmade from nothing. But in the first way this preposition \"from\" [ex]\nimplies order, as has been said in this reply. In the second sense,\nit imports the material cause, which is denied.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 2]\n\nWhether God Can Create Anything?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God cannot create anything, because,\naccording to the Philosopher (Phys. i, text 34), the ancient\nphilosophers considered it as a commonly received axiom that \"nothing\nis made from nothing.\" But the power of God does not extend to the\ncontraries of first principles; as, for instance, that God could make\nthe whole to be less than its part, or that affirmation and negation\nare both true at the same time. Therefore God cannot make anything\nfrom nothing, or create.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if to create is to make something from nothing, to\nbe created is to be made. But to be made is to be changed. Therefore\ncreation is change. But every change occurs in some subject, as\nappears by the definition of movement: for movement is the act of\nwhat is in potentiality. Therefore it is impossible for anything to\nbe made out of nothing by God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what has been made must have at some time been\nbecoming. But it cannot be said that what is created, at the same\ntime, is becoming and has been made, because in permanent things what\nis becoming, is not, and what has been made, already is: and so it\nwould follow that something would be, and not be, at the same time.\nTherefore when anything is made, its becoming precedes its having\nbeen made. But this is impossible, unless there is a subject in which\nthe becoming is sustained. Therefore it is impossible that anything\nshould be made from nothing.\n\nObj. 4: Further, infinite distance cannot be crossed. But infinite\ndistance exists between being and nothing. Therefore it does not\nhappen that something is made from nothing.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): \"In the beginning God\ncreated heaven and earth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Not only is it [not] impossible that anything should\nbe created by God, but it is necessary to say that all things were\ncreated by God, as appears from what has been said (Q. 44, A. 1). For\nwhen anyone makes one thing from another, this latter thing from\nwhich he makes is presupposed to his action, and is not produced by\nhis action; thus the craftsman works from natural things, as wood or\nbrass, which are caused not by the action of art, but by the action\nof nature. So also nature itself causes natural things as regards\ntheir form, but presupposes matter. If therefore God did only act\nfrom something presupposed, it would follow that the thing\npresupposed would not be caused by Him. Now it has been shown above\n(Q. 44, AA. 1, 2), that nothing can be, unless it is from God, Who is\nthe universal cause of all being. Hence it is necessary to say that\nGod brings things into being from nothing.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Ancient philosophers, as is said above (Q. 44, A. 2),\nconsidered only the emanation of particular effects from particular\ncauses, which necessarily presuppose something in their action;\nwhence came their common opinion that \"nothing is made from nothing.\"\nBut this has no place in the first emanation from the universal\nprinciple of things.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Creation is not change, except according to a mode of\nunderstanding. For change means that the same something should be\ndifferent now from what it was previously. Sometimes, indeed, the\nsame actual thing is different now from what it was before, as in\nmotion according to quantity, quality and place; but sometimes it is\nthe same being only in potentiality, as in substantial change, the\nsubject of which is matter. But in creation, by which the whole\nsubstance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as\ndifferent now and before only according to our way of understanding,\nso that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and\nafterwards as existing. But as action and passion coincide as to the\nsubstance of motion, and differ only according to diverse relations\n(Phys. iii, text 20, 21), it must follow that when motion is\nwithdrawn, only diverse relations remain in the Creator and in the\ncreature. But because the mode of signification follows the mode of\nunderstanding as was said above (Q. 13, A. 1), creation is signified\nby mode of change; and on this account it is said that to create is\nto make something from nothing. And yet \"to make\" and \"to be made\"\nare more suitable expressions here than \"to change\" and \"to be\nchanged,\" because \"to make\" and \"to be made\" import a relation of\ncause to the effect, and of effect to the cause, and imply change\nonly as a consequence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In things which are made without movement, to become\nand to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the\nterm of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated\nand is illuminated at the same time) or whether it is not the term of\nmovement, as the word is being made in the mind and is made at the\nsame time. In these things what is being made, is; but when we speak\nof its being made, we mean that it is from another, and was not\npreviously. Hence since creation is without movement, a thing is\nbeing created and is already created at the same time.\n\nReply Obj. 4: This objection proceeds from a false imagination, as if\nthere were an infinite medium between nothing and being; which is\nplainly false. This false imagination comes from creation being taken\nto signify a change existing between two forms.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Creation Is Anything in the Creature?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that creation is not anything in the\ncreature. For as creation taken in a passive sense is attributed to\nthe creature, so creation taken in an active sense is attributed to\nthe Creator. But creation taken actively is not anything in the\nCreator, because otherwise it would follow that in God there would be\nsomething temporal. Therefore creation taken passively is not anything\nin the creature.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there is no medium between the Creator and the\ncreature. But creation is signified as the medium between them both:\nsince it is not the Creator, as it is not eternal; nor is it the\ncreature, because in that case it would be necessary for the same\nreason to suppose another creation to create it, and so on to\ninfinity. Therefore creation is not anything in the creature.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if creation is anything besides the created\nsubstance, it must be an accident belonging to it. But every accident\nis in a subject. Therefore a thing created would be the subject of\ncreation, and so the same thing would be the subject and also the term\nof creation. This is impossible, because the subject is before the\naccident, and preserves the accident; while the term is after the\naction and passion whose term it is, and as soon as it exists, action\nand passion cease. Therefore creation itself is not any thing.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is greater for a thing to be made according to\nits entire substance, than to be made according to its substantial or\naccidental form. But generation taken simply, or relatively, whereby\nanything is made according to the substantial or the accidental form,\nis something in the thing generated. Therefore much more is creation,\nwhereby a thing is made according to its whole substance, something\nin the thing created.\n\n_I answer that,_ Creation places something in the thing created\naccording to relation only; because what is created, is not made by\nmovement, or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is\nmade from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the\nparticular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the\nproduction of all being by the universal cause of all beings, which is\nGod. Hence God by creation produces things without movement. Now when\nmovement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains, as\nwas said above (A. 2, ad 2). Hence creation in the creature is only a\ncertain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even\nas in passion, which implies movement, is implied a relation to the\nprinciple of motion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Creation signified actively means the divine action,\nwhich is God's essence, with a relation to the creature. But in God\nrelation to the creature is not a real relation, but only a relation\nof reason; whereas the relation of the creature to God is a real\nrelation, as was said above (Q. 13, A. 7) in treating of the divine\nnames.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Because creation is signified as a change, as was said\nabove (A. 2, ad 2), and change is a kind of medium between the mover\nand the moved, therefore also creation is signified as a medium\nbetween the Creator and the creature. Nevertheless passive creation\nis in the creature, and is a creature. Nor is there need of a further\ncreation in its creation; because relations, or their entire nature\nbeing referred to something, are not referred by any other relations,\nbut by themselves; as was also shown above (Q. 42, A. 1, ad 4), in\ntreating of the equality of the Persons.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The creature is the term of creation as signifying a\nchange, but is the subject of creation, taken as a real relation, and\nis prior to it in being, as the subject is to the accident.\nNevertheless creation has a certain aspect of priority on the part of\nthe object to which it is directed, which is the beginning of the\ncreature. Nor is it necessary that as long as the creature is it\nshould be created; because creation imports a relation of the\ncreature to the Creator, with a certain newness or beginning.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 4]\n\nWhether to Be Created Belongs to Composite and Subsisting Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that to be created does not belong to\ncomposite and subsisting things. For in the book, _De Causis_ (prop.\niv) it is said, \"The first of creatures is being.\" But the being of a\nthing created is not subsisting. Therefore creation properly speaking\ndoes not belong to subsisting and composite things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is created is from nothing. But composite\nthings are not from nothing, but are the result of their own\ncomponent parts. Therefore composite things are not created.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is presupposed in the second emanation is\nproperly produced by the first: as natural generation produces the\nnatural thing, which is presupposed in the operation of art. But the\nthing supposed in natural generation is matter. Therefore matter,\nand not the composite, is, properly speaking, that which is created.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): \"In the beginning God\ncreated heaven and earth.\" But heaven and earth are subsisting\ncomposite things. Therefore creation belongs to them.\n\n_I answer that,_ To be created is, in a manner, to be made, as was\nshown above (Q. 44, A. 2, ad 2, 3). Now, to be made is directed to the\nbeing of a thing. Hence to be made and to be created properly belong\nto whatever being belongs; which, indeed, belongs properly to\nsubsisting things, whether they are simple things, as in the case of\nseparate substances, or composite, as in the case of material\nsubstances. For being belongs to that which has being--that is, to\nwhat subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like\nare called beings, not as if they themselves were, but because\nsomething is by them; as whiteness is called a being, inasmuch as its\nsubject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph.\nvii, text 2) accident is more properly said to be \"of a being\" than \"a\nbeing.\" Therefore, as accidents and forms and the like non-subsisting\nthings are to be said to co-exist rather than to exist, so they ought\nto be called rather \"concreated\" than \"created\" things; whereas,\nproperly speaking, created things are subsisting beings.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the proposition \"the first of created things is\nbeing,\" the word \"being\" does not refer to the subject of creation,\nbut to the proper concept of the object of creation. For a created\nthing is called created because it is a being, not because it is\n\"this\" being, since creation is the emanation of all being from the\nUniversal Being, as was said above (A. 1). We use a similar way of\nspeaking when we say that \"the first visible thing is color,\"\nalthough, strictly speaking, the thing colored is what is seen.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Creation does not mean the building up of a composite\nthing from pre-existing principles; but it means that the \"composite\"\nis created so that it is brought into being at the same time with all\nits principles.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This reason does not prove that matter alone is\ncreated, but that matter does not exist except by creation; for\ncreation is the production of the whole being, and not only matter.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 5]\n\nWhether It Belongs to God Alone to Create?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to God alone to\ncreate, because, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii, text 34),\nwhat is perfect can make its own likeness. But immaterial creatures\nare more perfect than material creatures, which nevertheless can make\ntheir own likeness, for fire generates fire, and man begets man.\nTherefore an immaterial substance can make a substance like to itself.\nBut immaterial substance can be made only by creation, since it has no\nmatter from which to be made. Therefore a creature can create.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the greater the resistance is on the part of the\nthing made, so much the greater power is required in the maker. But\na \"contrary\" resists more than \"nothing.\" Therefore it requires more\npower to make (something) from its contrary, which nevertheless a\ncreature can do, than to make a thing from nothing. Much more\ntherefore can a creature do this.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the power of the maker is considered according to\nthe measure of what is made. But created being is finite, as we\nproved above when treating of the infinity of God (Q. 7, AA. 2, 3,\n4). Therefore only a finite power is needed to produce a creature by\ncreation. But to have a finite power is not contrary to the nature of\na creature. Therefore it is not impossible for a creature to create.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8) that neither good\nnor bad angels can create anything. Much less therefore can any other\ncreatures.\n\n_I answer that,_ It sufficiently appears at the first glance,\naccording to what precedes (A. 1), that to create can be the action\nof God alone. For the more universal effects must be reduced to the\nmore universal and prior causes. Now among all effects the most\nuniversal is being itself: and hence it must be the proper effect of\nthe first and most universal cause, and that is God. Hence also it is\nsaid (De Causis prop., iii) that \"neither intelligence nor the soul\ngives us being, except inasmuch as it works by divine operation.\" Now\nto produce being absolutely, not as this or that being, belongs to\ncreation. Hence it is manifest that creation is the proper act of God\nalone.\n\nIt happens, however, that something participates the proper action of\nanother, not by its own power, but instrumentally, inasmuch as it acts\nby the power of another; as air can heat and ignite by the power of\nfire. And so some have supposed that although creation is the proper\nact of the universal cause, still some inferior cause acting by the\npower of the first cause, can create. And thus Avicenna asserted that\nthe first separate substance created by God created another after\nitself, and the substance of the world and its soul; and that the\nsubstance of the world creates the matter of inferior bodies. And in\nthe same manner the Master says (Sent. iv, D, 5) that God can\ncommunicate to a creature the power of creating, so that the latter\ncan create ministerially, not by its own power.\n\nBut such a thing cannot be, because the secondary instrumental cause\ndoes not participate the action of the superior cause, except inasmuch\nas by something proper to itself it acts dispositively to the effect\nof the principal agent. If therefore it effects nothing, according to\nwhat is proper to itself, it is used to no purpose; nor would there be\nany need of certain instruments for certain actions. Thus we see that\na saw, in cutting wood, which it does by the property of its own form,\nproduces the form of a bench, which is the proper effect of the\nprincipal agent. Now the proper effect of God creating is what is\npresupposed to all other effects, and that is absolute being. Hence\nnothing else can act dispositively and instrumentally to this effect,\nsince creation is not from anything presupposed, which can be disposed\nby the action of the instrumental agent. So therefore it is impossible\nfor any creature to create, either by its own power or\ninstrumentally--that is, ministerially.\n\nAnd above all it is absurd to suppose that a body can create, for no\nbody acts except by touching or moving; and thus it requires in its\naction some pre-existing thing, which can be touched or moved, which\nis contrary to the very idea of creation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A perfect thing participating any nature, makes a\nlikeness to itself, not by absolutely producing that nature, but by\napplying it to something else. For an individual man cannot be the\ncause of human nature absolutely, because he would then be the cause\nof himself; but he is the cause of human nature being in the man\nbegotten; and thus he presupposes in his action a determinate matter\nwhereby he is an individual man. But as an individual man\nparticipates human nature, so every created being participates, so to\nspeak, the nature of being; for God alone is His own being, as we\nhave said above (Q. 7, AA. 1, 2). Therefore no created being can\nproduce a being absolutely, except forasmuch as it causes \"being\" in\n\"this\": and so it is necessary to presuppose that whereby a thing is\nthis thing, before the action whereby it makes its own likeness. But\nin an immaterial substance it is not possible to presuppose anything\nwhereby it is this thing; because it is what it is by its form,\nwhereby it has being, since it is a subsisting form. Therefore an\nimmaterial substance cannot produce another immaterial substance like\nto itself as regards its being, but only as regards some added\nperfection; as we may say that a superior angel illuminates an\ninferior, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, x). In this way even in\nheaven there is paternity, as the Apostle says (Eph. 3:15): \"From\nwhom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named.\" From which\nevidently appears that no created being can cause anything, unless\nsomething is presupposed; which is against the very idea of creation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A thing is made from its contrary indirectly (Phys. i,\ntext 43), but directly from the subject which is in potentiality. And\nso the contrary resists the agent, inasmuch as it impedes the\npotentiality from the act which the agent intends to induce, as fire\nintends to reduce the matter of water to an act like to itself, but\nis impeded by the form and contrary dispositions, whereby the\npotentiality (of the water) is restrained from being reduced to act;\nand the more the potentiality is restrained, the more power is\nrequired in the agent to reduce the matter to act. Hence a much\ngreater power is required in the agent when no potentiality\npre-exists. Thus therefore it appears that it is an act of much\ngreater power to make a thing from nothing, than from its contrary.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The power of the maker is reckoned not only from the\nsubstance of the thing made, but also from the mode of its being\nmade; for a greater heat heats not only more, but quicker. Therefore\nalthough to create a finite effect does not show an infinite power,\nyet to create it from nothing does show an infinite power: which\nappears from what has been said (ad 2). For if a greater power is\nrequired in the agent in proportion to the distance of the\npotentiality from the act, it follows that the power of that which\nproduces something from no presupposed potentiality is infinite,\nbecause there is no proportion between \"no potentiality\" and the\npotentiality presupposed by the power of a natural agent, as there is\nno proportion between \"not being\" and \"being.\" And because no\ncreature has simply an infinite power, any more than it has an\ninfinite being, as was proved above (Q. 7, A. 2), it follows that no\ncreature can create.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 6]\n\nWhether to Create Is Proper to Any Person?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that to create is proper to some Person.\nFor what comes first is the cause of what is after; and what is\nperfect is the cause of what is imperfect. But the procession of the\ndivine Person is prior to the procession of the creature: and is more\nperfect, because the divine Person proceeds in perfect similitude of\nits principle; whereas the creature proceeds in imperfect similitude.\nTherefore the processions of the divine Persons are the cause of the\nprocessions of things, and so to create belongs to a Person.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the divine Persons are distinguished from each\nother only by their processions and relations. Therefore whatever\ndifference is attributed to the divine Persons belongs to them\naccording to the processions and relations of the Persons. But the\ncausation of creatures is diversely attributed to the divine Persons;\nfor in the Creed, to the Father is attributed that \"He is the Creator\nof all things visible and invisible\"; to the Son is attributed that by\nHim \"all things were made\"; and to the Holy Ghost is attributed that\nHe is \"Lord and Life-giver.\" Therefore the causation of creatures\nbelongs to the Persons according to processions and relations.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if it be said that the causation of the creature\nflows from some essential attribute appropriated to some one Person,\nthis does not appear to be sufficient; because every divine effect\nis caused by every essential attribute--viz. by power, goodness and\nwisdom--and thus does not belong to one more than to another.\nTherefore any determinate mode of causation ought not to be attributed\nto one Person more than to another, unless they are distinguished in\ncreating according to relations and processions.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii) that all things\ncaused are the common work of the whole Godhead.\n\n_I answer that,_ To create is, properly speaking, to cause or produce\nthe being of things. And as every agent produces its like, the\nprinciple of action can be considered from the effect of the action;\nfor it must be fire that generates fire. And therefore to create\nbelongs to God according to His being, that is, His essence, which is\ncommon to the three Persons. Hence to create is not proper to any one\nPerson, but is common to the whole Trinity.\n\nNevertheless the divine Persons, according to the nature of their\nprocession, have a causality respecting the creation of things. For\nas was said above (Q. 14, A. 8; Q. 19, A. 4), when treating of the\nknowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by His\nintellect and will, just as the craftsman is cause of the things made\nby his craft. Now the craftsman works through the word conceived in\nhis mind, and through the love of his will regarding some object.\nHence also God the Father made the creature through His Word, which\nis His Son; and through His Love, which is the Holy Ghost. And so\nthe processions of the Persons are the type of the productions of\ncreatures inasmuch as they include the essential attributes,\nknowledge and will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of\ncreation, as above explained.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the divine nature, although common to the three\nPersons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the\nSon receives the divine nature from the Father, and the Holy Ghost\nfrom both: so also likewise the power of creation, whilst common to\nthe three Persons, belongs to them in a kind of order. For the Son\nreceives it from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both. Hence to\nbe the Creator is attributed to the Father as to Him Who does not\nreceive the power of creation from another. And of the Son it is said\n(John 1:3), \"Through Him all things were made,\" inasmuch as He has\nthe same power, but from another; for this preposition \"through\"\nusually denotes a mediate cause, or \"a principle from a principle.\"\nBut to the Holy Ghost, Who has the same power from both, is\nattributed that by His sway He governs, and quickens what is created\nby the Father through the Son. Again, the reason for this particular\nappropriation may be taken from the common notion of the\nappropriation of the essential attributes. For, as above stated (Q.\n39, A. 8, ad 3), to the Father is appropriated power which is chiefly\nshown in creation, and therefore it is attributed to Him to be the\nCreator. To the Son is appropriated wisdom, through which the\nintellectual agent acts; and therefore it is said: \"Through Whom all\nthings were made.\" And to the Holy Ghost is appropriated goodness, to\nwhich belong both government, which brings things to their proper\nend, and the giving of life--for life consists in a certain interior\nmovement; and the first mover is the end, and goodness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although every effect of God proceeds from each\nattribute, each effect is reduced to that attribute with which it is\nnaturally connected; thus the order of things is reduced to \"wisdom,\"\nand the justification of the sinner to \"mercy\" and \"goodness\" poured\nout super-abundantly. But creation, which is the production of the\nvery substance of a thing, is reduced to \"power.\"\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 7]\n\nWhether in Creatures Is Necessarily Found a Trace of the Trinity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in creatures there is not necessarily\nfound a trace of the Trinity. For anything can be traced through its\ntraces. But the trinity of persons cannot be traced from the\ncreatures, as was above stated (Q. 32, A. 1). Therefore there is no\ntrace of the Trinity in creatures.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is in creatures is created. Therefore if\nthe trace of the Trinity is found in creatures according to some of\ntheir properties, and if everything created has a trace of the\nTrinity, it follows that we can find a trace of the Trinity in each\nof these (properties): and so on to infinitude.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the effect represents only its own cause. But the\ncausality of creatures belongs to the common nature, and not to the\nrelations whereby the Persons are distinguished and numbered.\nTherefore in the creature is to be found a trace not of the Trinity\nbut of the unity of essence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10), that \"the trace\nof the Trinity appears in creatures.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Every effect in some degree represents its cause,\nbut diversely. For some effects represent only the causality of the\ncause, but not its form; as smoke represents fire. Such a\nrepresentation is called a \"trace\": for a trace shows that someone\nhas passed by but not who it is. Other effects represent the cause as\nregards the similitude of its form, as fire generated represents fire\ngenerating; and a statue of Mercury represents Mercury; and this is\ncalled the representation of \"image.\" Now the processions of the\ndivine Persons are referred to the acts of intellect and will, as was\nsaid above (Q. 27). For the Son proceeds as the word of the intellect;\nand the Holy Ghost proceeds as love of the will. Therefore in\nrational creatures, possessing intellect and will, there is found the\nrepresentation of the Trinity by way of image, inasmuch as there is\nfound in them the word conceived, and the love proceeding.\n\nBut in all creatures there is found the trace of the Trinity, inasmuch\nas in every creature are found some things which are necessarily\nreduced to the divine Persons as to their cause. For every creature\nsubsists in its own being, and has a form, whereby it is determined to\na species, and has relation to something else. Therefore as it is a\ncreated substance, it represents the cause and principle; and so in\nthat manner it shows the Person of the Father, Who is the \"principle\nfrom no principle.\" According as it has a form and species, it\nrepresents the Word as the form of the thing made by art is from the\nconception of the craftsman. According as it has relation of order, it\nrepresents the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He is love, because the order\nof the effect to something else is from the will of the Creator. And\ntherefore Augustine says (De Trin. vi 10) that the trace of the\nTrinity is found in every creature, according \"as it is one\nindividual,\" and according \"as it is formed by a species,\" and\naccording as it \"has a certain relation of order.\" And to these also\nare reduced those three, \"number,\" \"weight,\" and \"measure,\" mentioned\nin the Book of Wisdom (9:21). For \"measure\" refers to the substance of\nthe thing limited by its principles, \"number\" refers to the species,\n\"weight\" refers to the order. And to these three are reduced the other\nthree mentioned by Augustine (De Nat. Boni iii), \"mode,\" species,\nand \"order,\" and also those he mentions (QQ. 83, qu. 18): \"that which\nexists; whereby it is distinguished; whereby it agrees.\" For a thing\nexists by its substance, is distinct by its form, and agrees by its\norder. Other similar expressions may be easily reduced to the above.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The representation of the trace is to be referred to\nthe appropriations: in which manner we are able to arrive at a\nknowledge of the trinity of the divine persons from creatures, as we\nhave said (Q. 32, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 2: A creature properly speaking is a thing\nself-subsisting; and in such are the three above-mentioned things to\nbe found. Nor is it necessary that these three things should be found\nin all that exists in the creature; but only to a subsisting being is\nthe trace ascribed in regard to those three things.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The processions of the persons are also in some way the\ncause and type of creation; as appears from the above (A. 6).\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 45, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Creation Is Mingled with Works of Nature and Art?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that creation is mingled in works of\nnature and art. For in every operation of nature and art some form is\nproduced. But it is not produced from anything, since matter has no\npart in it. Therefore it is produced from nothing; and thus in every\noperation of nature and art there is creation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the effect is not more powerful than its cause. But\nin natural things the only agent is the accidental form, which is an\nactive or a passive form. Therefore the substantial form is not\nproduced by the operation of nature; and therefore it must be\nproduced by creation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in nature like begets like. But some things are\nfound generated in nature by a thing unlike to them; as is evident in\nanimals generated through putrefaction. Therefore the form of these\nis not from nature, but by creation; and the same reason applies to\nother things.\n\nObj. 4: Further, what is not created, is not a creature. If therefore\nin nature's productions there were not creation, it would follow that\nnature's productions are not creatures; which is heretical.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Super Gen. v, 6,14,15) distinguishes\nthe work of propagation, which is a work of nature, from the work of\ncreation.\n\n_I answer that,_ The doubt on this subject arises from the forms which,\nsome said, do not come into existence by the action of nature, but\npreviously exist in matter; for they asserted that forms are latent.\nThis arose from ignorance concerning matter, and from not knowing how\nto distinguish between potentiality and act. For because forms\npre-exist in matter, \"in potentiality,\" they asserted that they\npre-exist \"simply.\" Others, however, said that the forms were given or\ncaused by a separate agent by way of creation; and accordingly, that\nto each operation of nature is joined creation. But this opinion arose\nfrom ignorance concerning form. For they failed to consider that the\nform of the natural body is not subsisting, but is that by which a\nthing is. And therefore, since to be made and to be created belong\nproperly to a subsisting thing alone, as shown above (A. 4), it\ndoes not belong to forms to be made or to be created, but to be\n\"concreated.\" What, indeed, is properly made by the natural agent is\nthe \"composite,\" which is made from matter.\n\nHence in the works of nature creation does not enter, but is\npresupposed to the work of nature.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Forms begin to be actual when the composite things are\nmade, not as though they were made \"directly,\" but only \"indirectly.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The active qualities in nature act by virtue of\nsubstantial forms: and therefore the natural agent not only produces\nits like according to quality, but according to species.\n\nReply Obj. 3: For the generation of imperfect animals, a universal\nagent suffices, and this is to be found in the celestial power to\nwhich they are assimilated, not in species, but according to a kind\nof analogy. Nor is it necessary to say that their forms are created\nby a separate agent. However, for the generation of perfect animals\nthe universal agent does not suffice, but a proper agent is required,\nin the shape of a univocal generator.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The operation of nature takes place only on the\npresupposition of created principles; and thus the products of nature\nare called creatures.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 46\n\nOF THE BEGINNING OF THE DURATION OF CREATURES\n(In Three Articles)\n\nNext must be considered the beginning of the duration of creatures,\nabout which there are three points for treatment:\n\n(1) Whether creatures always existed?\n\n(2) Whether that they began to exist is an article of Faith?\n\n(3) How God is said to have created heaven and earth in the\nbeginning?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 46, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Universe of Creatures Always Existed?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the universe of creatures, called the\nworld, had no beginning, but existed from eternity. For everything\nwhich begins to exist, is a possible being before it exists: otherwise\nit would be impossible for it to exist. If therefore the world began\nto exist, it was a possible being before it began to exist. But\npossible being is matter, which is in potentiality to existence,\nwhich results from a form, and to non-existence, which results from\nprivation of form. If therefore the world began to exist, matter must\nhave existed before the world. But matter cannot exist without form:\nwhile the matter of the world with its form is the world. Therefore\nthe world existed before it began to exist: which is impossible.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing which has power to be always, sometimes is\nand sometimes is not; because so far as the power of a thing extends\nso long it exists. But every incorruptible thing has power to be\nalways; for its power does not extend to any determinate time.\nTherefore no incorruptible thing sometimes is, and sometimes is not:\nbut everything which has a beginning at some time is, and at some\ntime is not; therefore no incorruptible thing begins to exist. But\nthere are many incorruptible things in the world, as the celestial\nbodies and all intellectual substances. Therefore the world did not\nbegin to exist.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is unbegotten has no beginning. But the\nPhilosopher (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is unbegotten, and\nalso (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) that the heaven is unbegotten.\nTherefore the universe did not begin to exist.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a vacuum is where there is not a body, but there\nmight be. But if the world began to exist, there was first no body\nwhere the body of the world now is; and yet it could be there,\notherwise it would not be there now. Therefore before the world\nthere was a vacuum; which is impossible.\n\nObj. 5: Further, nothing begins anew to be moved except through\neither the mover or the thing moved being otherwise than it was\nbefore. But what is otherwise now than it was before, is moved.\nTherefore before every new movement there was a previous movement.\nTherefore movement always was; and therefore also the thing moved\nalways was, because movement is only in a movable thing.\n\nObj. 6: Further, every mover is either natural or voluntary. But\nneither begins to move except by some pre-existing movement. For\nnature always moves in the same manner: hence unless some change\nprecede either in the nature of the mover, or in the movable thing,\nthere cannot arise from the natural mover a movement which was not\nthere before. And the will, without itself being changed, puts off\ndoing what it proposes to do; but this can be only by some imagined\nchange, at least on the part of time. Thus he who wills to make a\nhouse tomorrow, and not today, awaits something which will be\ntomorrow, but is not today; and at least awaits for today to pass,\nand for tomorrow to come; and this cannot be without change, because\ntime is the measure of movement. Therefore it remains that before\nevery new movement, there was a previous movement; and so the same\nconclusion follows as before.\n\nObj. 7: Further, whatever is always in its beginning, and always in\nits end, cannot cease and cannot begin; because what begins is not in\nits end, and what ceases is not in its beginning. But time always is\nin its beginning and end, because there is no time except \"now\" which\nis the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore\ntime cannot begin or end, and consequently neither can movement, the\nmeasure of what is time.\n\nObj. 8: Further, God is before the world either in the order of\nnature only, or also by duration. If in the order of nature only,\ntherefore, since God is eternal, the world also is eternal. But if\nGod is prior by duration; since what is prior and posterior in\nduration constitutes time, it follows that time existed before the\nworld, which is impossible.\n\nObj. 9: Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect;\nfor a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause,\nrequiring something else to make the effect follow. But God is the\nsufficient cause of the world; being the final cause, by reason of\nHis goodness, the exemplar cause by reason of His wisdom, and the\nefficient cause, by reason of His power as appears from the above (Q.\n44, AA. 2, 3, 4). Since therefore God is eternal, the world is also\neternal.\n\nObj. 10: Further, eternal action postulates an eternal effect. But\nthe action of God is His substance, which is eternal. Therefore the\nworld is eternal.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (John 17:5), \"Glorify Me, O Father,\nwith Thyself with the glory which I had before the world was\"; and\n(Prov. 8:22), \"The Lord possessed Me in the beginning of His ways,\nbefore He made anything from the beginning.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Nothing except God can be eternal. And this\nstatement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown\nabove (Q. 19, A. 4) that the will of God is the cause of things.\nTherefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for God\nto will them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the\nnecessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above\n(Q. 19, A. 3), that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that\nGod should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore\nnecessary for God to will that the world should always exist; but the\nworld exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the being of\nthe world depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not\ntherefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot\nbe proved by demonstration.\n\nNor are Aristotle's reasons (Phys. viii) simply, but relatively,\ndemonstrative--viz. in order to contradict the reasons of some of the\nancients who asserted that the world began to exist in some quite\nimpossible manner. This appears in three ways. Firstly, because, both\nin _Phys._ viii and in _De Coelo_ i, text 101, he premises some\nopinions, as those of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato, and brings\nforward reasons to refute them. Secondly, because wherever he speaks\nof this subject, he quotes the testimony of the ancients, which is\nnot the way of a demonstrator, but of one persuading of what is\nprobable. Thirdly, because he expressly says (Topic. i, 9), that\nthere are dialectical problems, about which we have nothing to say\nfrom reason, as, \"whether the world is eternal.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Before the world existed it was possible for the world\nto be, not, indeed, according to a passive power which is matter, but\naccording to the active power of God; and also, according as a thing\nis called absolutely possible, not in relation to any power, but from\nthe sole habitude of the terms which are not repugnant to each other;\nin which sense possible is opposed to impossible, as appears from the\nPhilosopher (Metaph. v, text 17).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Whatever has power always to be, from the fact of\nhaving that power, cannot sometimes be and sometimes not be; but\nbefore it received that power, it did not exist.\n\nHence this reason which is given by Aristotle (De Coelo i, text 120)\ndoes not prove simply that incorruptible things never began to exist;\nbut that they did not begin by the natural mode whereby things\ngenerated and corruptible begin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Aristotle (Phys. i, text 82) proves that matter is\nunbegotten from the fact that it has not a subject from which to\nderive its existence; and (De Coelo et Mundo i, text 20) he proves\nthat heaven is ungenerated, forasmuch as it has no contrary from\nwhich to be generated. Hence it appears that no conclusion follows\neither way, except that matter and heaven did not begin by\ngeneration, as some said, especially about heaven. But we say that\nmatter and heaven were produced into being by creation, as appears\nabove (Q. 44, A. 1, ad 2).\n\nReply Obj. 4: The notion of a vacuum is not only \"in which is\nnothing,\" but also implies a space capable of holding a body and in\nwhich there is not a body, as appears from Aristotle (Phys. iv, text\n60). Whereas we hold that there was no place or space before the\nworld was.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The first mover was always in the same state: but the\nfirst movable thing was not always so, because it began to be whereas\nhitherto it was not. This, however, was not through change, but by\ncreation, which is not change, as said above (Q. 45, A. 2, ad 2).\nHence it is evident that this reason, which Aristotle gives (Phys.\nviii), is valid against those who admitted the existence of eternal\nmovable things, but not eternal movement, as appears from the\nopinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles. But we hold that from the\nmoment that movable things began to exist movement also existed.\n\nReply Obj. 6: The first agent is a voluntary agent. And although He\nhad the eternal will to produce some effect, yet He did not produce\nan eternal effect. Nor is it necessary for some change to be\npresupposed, not even on account of imaginary time. For we must take\ninto consideration the difference between a particular agent, that\npresupposes something and produces something else, and the universal\nagent, who produces the whole. The particular agent produces the\nform, and presupposes the matter; and hence it is necessary that it\nintroduce the form in due proportion into a suitable matter. Hence it\nis correct to say that it introduces the form into such matter, and\nnot into another, on account of the different kinds of matter. But\nit is not correct to say so of God Who produces form and matter\ntogether: whereas it is correct to say of Him that He produces\nmatter fitting to the form and to the end. Now, a particular agent\npresupposes time just as it presupposes matter. Hence it is correctly\ndescribed as acting in time \"after\" and not in time \"before,\"\naccording to an imaginary succession of time after time. But the\nuniversal agent who produces the thing and time also, is not\ncorrectly described as acting now, and not before, according to an\nimaginary succession of time succeeding time, as if time were\npresupposed to His action; but He must be considered as giving time\nto His effect as much as and when He willed, and according to what\nwas fitting to demonstrate His power. For the world leads more\nevidently to the knowledge of the divine creating power, if it was\nnot always, than if it had always been; since everything which was\nnot always manifestly has a cause; whereas this is not so manifest\nof what always was.\n\nReply Obj. 7: As is stated (Phys. iv, text 99), \"before\" and \"after\"\nbelong to time, according as they are in movement. Hence beginning\nand end in time must be taken in the same way as in movement. Now,\ngranted the eternity of movement, it is necessary that any given\nmoment in movement be a beginning and an end of movement; which need\nnot be if movement be a beginning. The same applies to the \"now\" of\ntime. Thus it appears that the idea of the instant \"now,\" as being\nalways the beginning and end of time, presupposes the eternity of\ntime and movement. Hence Aristotle brings forward this reason (Phys.\nviii, text 10) against those who asserted the eternity of time, but\ndenied the eternity of movement.\n\nReply Obj. 8: God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But\nthe word \"prior\" signifies priority not of time, but of eternity. Or\nwe may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not\nof time really existing; thus, when we say that above heaven there is\nnothing, the word \"above\" signifies only an imaginary place,\naccording as it is possible to imagine other dimensions beyond those\nof the heavenly body.\n\nReply Obj. 9: As the effect follows from the cause that acts by\nnature, according to the mode of its form, so likewise it follows\nfrom the voluntary agent, according to the form preconceived and\ndetermined by the agent, as appears from what was said above (Q. 19,\nA. 4; Q. 41, A. 2). Therefore, although God was from eternity the\nsufficient cause of the world, we should not say that the world was\nproduced by Him, except as preordained by His will--that is, that it\nshould have being after not being, in order more manifestly to\ndeclare its author.\n\nReply Obj. 10: Given the action, the effect follows according to the\nrequirement of the form, which is the principle of action. But in\nagents acting by will, what is conceived and preordained is to be\ntaken as the form, which is the principle of action. Therefore from\nthe eternal action of God an eternal effect did not follow; but such\nan effect as God willed, an effect, to wit, which has being after not\nbeing.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 46, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is an Article of Faith That the World Began?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a\ndemonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that\nis made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved\ndemonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; indeed\nthis is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can\nbe demonstratively proved that the world began.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if it is necessary to say that the world was made by\nGod, it must therefore have been made from nothing or from something.\nBut it was not made from something; otherwise the matter of the world\nwould have preceded the world; against which are the arguments of\nAristotle (De Coelo i), who held that heaven was ungenerated.\nTherefore it must be said that the world was made from nothing; and\nthus it has being after not being. Therefore it must have begun.\n\nObj. 3: Further, everything which works by intellect works from some\nprinciple, as appears in all kinds of craftsmen. But God acts by\nintellect: therefore His work has a principle. The world, therefore,\nwhich is His effect, did not always exist.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it appears manifestly that certain arts have\ndeveloped, and certain countries have begun to be inhabited at some\nfixed time. But this would not be the case if the world had been\nalways. Therefore it is manifest that the world did not always exist.\n\nObj. 5: Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But\nif the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration.\nTherefore it is certain that the world did not always exist.\n\nObj. 6: Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that\ninfinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass\nthrough an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at\nthis present day; which is manifestly false.\n\nObj. 7: Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was\neternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite\nseries. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii,\ntext 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be an infinite\nseries, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5).\n\nObj. 8: Further, if the world and generation always were, there have\nbeen an infinite number of men. But man's soul is immortal: therefore\nan infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is\nimpossible. Therefore it can be known with certainty that the world\nbegan, and not only is it known by faith.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The articles of faith cannot be proved\ndemonstratively, because faith is of things \"that appear not\" (Heb.\n11:1). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world\nbegan, is an article of faith; for we say, \"I believe in one God,\"\netc. And again, Gregory says (Hom. i in Ezech.), that Moses\nprophesied of the past, saying, \"In the beginning God created heaven\nand earth\": in which words the newness of the world is stated.\nTherefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and\ntherefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.\n\n_I answer that,_ By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration\ncan it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said\nabove of the mystery of the Trinity (Q. 32, A. 1). The reason of this\nis that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part\nof the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the\nessence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is\nabstracted from \"here\" and \"now\"; whence it is said that universals\nare everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man,\nor heaven, or a stone were not always. Likewise neither can it be\ndemonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will.\nFor the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as\nregards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He\nwills about creatures is not among these, as was said above (Q. 19,\nA. 3). But the divine will can be manifested by revelation, on which\nfaith rests. Hence that the world began to exist is an object of\nfaith, but not of demonstration or science. And it is useful to\nconsider this, lest anyone, presuming to demonstrate what is of\nfaith, should bring forward reasons that are not cogent, so as to\ngive occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds\nwe believe things that are of faith.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 4), the opinion of\nphilosophers who asserted the eternity of the world was twofold. For\nsome said that the substance of the world was not from God, which is\nan intolerable error; and therefore it is refuted by proofs that are\ncogent. Some, however, said that the world was eternal, although made\nby God. For they hold that the world has a beginning, not of time,\nbut of creation, so that in a certain hardly intelligible way it was\nalways made. \"And they try to explain their meaning thus (De Civ. Dei\nx, 31): for as, if the foot were always in the dust from eternity,\nthere would always be a footprint which without doubt was caused by\nhim who trod on it, so also the world always was, because its Maker\nalways existed.\" To understand this we must consider that the\nefficient cause, which acts by motion, of necessity precedes its\neffect in time; because the effect is only in the end of the action,\nand every agent must be the principle of action. But if the action is\ninstantaneous and not successive, it is not necessary for the maker\nto be prior to the thing made in duration as appears in the case of\nillumination. Hence they say that it does not follow necessarily if\nGod is the active cause of the world, that He should be prior to the\nworld in duration; because creation, by which He produced the world,\nis not a successive change, as was said above (Q. 45, A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those who would say that the world was eternal, would\nsay that the world was made by God from nothing, not that it was made\nafter nothing, according to what we understand by the word creation,\nbut that it was not made from anything; and so also some of them do\nnot reject the word creation, as appears from Avicenna (Metaph. ix,\ntext 4).\n\nReply Obj. 3: This is the argument of Anaxagoras (as quoted in Phys.\nviii, text 15). But it does not lead to a necessary conclusion,\nexcept as to that intellect which deliberates in order to find out\nwhat should be done, which is like movement. Such is the human\nintellect, but not the divine intellect (Q. 14, AA. 7, 12).\n\nReply Obj. 4: Those who hold the eternity of the world hold that\nsome region was changed an infinite number of times, from being\nuninhabitable to being inhabitable and \"vice versa,\" and likewise\nthey hold that the arts, by reason of various corruptions and\naccidents, were subject to an infinite variety of advance and decay.\nHence Aristotle says (Meteor. i), that it is absurd from such\nparticular changes to hold the opinion of the newness of the whole\nworld.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Even supposing that the world always was, it would not\nbe equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6);\nbecause the divine Being is all being simultaneously without\nsuccession; but with the world it is otherwise.\n\nReply Obj. 6: Passage is always understood as being from term to\nterm. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there\nis a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection\nis founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite\nnumber of mean terms.\n\nReply Obj. 7: In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to\ninfinity _per se_--thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes\nthat are _per se_ required for a certain effect; for instance, that a\nstone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to\ninfinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity\n_accidentally_ as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the\ncauses thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one\ncause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by\nmeans of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may\nbe broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer\nacts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to\nthis particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for\nhe generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men\ngenerating hold one grade in efficient causes--viz. the grade of a\nparticular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be\ngenerated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible\nif the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an\nelementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.\n\nReply Obj. 8: Those who hold the eternity of the world evade this\nreason in many ways. For some do not think it impossible for there to\nbe an actual infinity of souls, as appears from the Metaphysics of\nAlgazel, who says that such a thing is an accidental infinity. But\nthis was disproved above (Q. 7, A. 4). Some say that the soul is\ncorrupted with the body. And some say that of all souls only one will\nremain. But others, as Augustine says [*Serm. xiv, De Temp. 4, 5; De\nHaeres., haeres. 46; De Civ. Dei xii. 13], asserted on this account a\ncircuit of souls--viz. that souls separated from their bodies return\nagain thither after a course of time; a fuller consideration of which\nmatters will be given later (Q. 75, A. 2; Q. 118, A. 6). But be it\nnoted that this argument considers only a particular case. Hence one\nmight say that the world was eternal, or at least some creature, as\nan angel, but not man. But we are considering the question in\ngeneral, as to whether any creature can exist from eternity.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 46, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Creation of Things Was in the Beginning of Time?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the creation of things was not in the\nbeginning of time. For whatever is not in time, is not of any part of\ntime. But the creation of things was not in time; for by the creation\nthe substance of things was brought into being; and time does not\nmeasure the substance of things, and especially of incorporeal things.\nTherefore creation was not in the beginning of time.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 40) that\neverything which is made, was being made; and so to be made implies\na \"before\" and \"after.\" But in the beginning of time, since it is\nindivisible, there is no \"before\" and \"after.\" Therefore, since to be\ncreated is a kind of \"being made,\" it appears that things were not\ncreated in the beginning of time.\n\nObj. 3: Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be\ncreated in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the\nbeginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things\nwas not in the beginning of time.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): \"In the beginning God\ncreated heaven and earth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The words of Genesis, \"In the beginning God created\nheaven and earth,\" are expounded in a threefold sense in order to\nexclude three errors. For some said that the world always was, and\nthat time had no beginning; and to exclude this the words \"In the\nbeginning\" are expounded--viz. \"of time.\" And some said that there\nare two principles of creation, one of good things and the other of\nevil things, against which \"In the beginning\" is expounded--\"in the\nSon.\" For as the efficient principle is appropriated to the Father by\nreason of power, so the exemplar principle is appropriated to the Son\nby reason of wisdom, in order that, as it is said (Ps. 103:24), \"Thou\nhast made all things in wisdom,\" it may be understood that God made\nall things in the beginning--that is, in the Son; according to the\nword of the Apostle (Col. 1:16), \"In Him\"--viz. the Son--\"were\ncreated all things.\" But others said that corporeal things were\ncreated by God through the medium of spiritual creation; and to\nexclude this it is expounded thus: \"In the beginning\"--i.e. before\nall things--\"God created heaven and earth.\" For four things are\nstated to be created together--viz. the empyrean heaven, corporeal\nmatter, by which is meant the earth, time, and the angelic nature.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Things are said to be created in the beginning of time,\nnot as if the beginning of time were a measure of creation, but\nbecause together with time heaven and earth were created.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This saying of the Philosopher is understood \"of being\nmade\" by means of movement, or as the term of movement. Because,\nsince in every movement there is \"before\" and \"after,\" before any one\npoint in a given movement--that is, whilst anything is in the process\nof being moved and made, there is a \"before\" and also an \"after,\"\nbecause what is in the beginning of movement or in its term is not\nin \"being moved.\" But creation is neither movement nor the term of\nmovement, as was said above (Q. 45, AA. 2, 3). Hence a thing is\ncreated in such a way that it was not being created before.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Nothing is made except as it exists. But nothing exists\nof time except \"now.\" Hence time cannot be made except according to\nsome \"now\"; not because in the first \"now\" is time, but because from\nit time begins.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 47\n\nOF THE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN GENERAL\n(In Three Articles)\n\nAfter considering the production of creatures, we come to the\nconsideration of the distinction of things. This consideration will be\nthreefold--first, of the distinction of things in general; secondly,\nof the distinction of good and evil; thirdly, of the distinction of\nthe spiritual and corporeal creature.\n\nUnder the first head, there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) The multitude or distinction of things.\n\n(2) Their inequality.\n\n(3) The unity of the world.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 47, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Multitude and Distinction of Things Come from God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the multitude and distinction of\nthings does not come from God. For one naturally always makes one.\nBut God is supremely one, as appears from what precedes (Q. 11, A.\n4). Therefore He produces but one effect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the representation is assimilated to its exemplar.\nBut God is the exemplar cause of His effect, as was said above (Q.\n44, A. 3). Therefore, as God is one, His effect is one only, and not\ndiverse.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the means are proportional to the end. But the end\nof the creation is one--viz. the divine goodness, as was shown above\n(Q. 44, A. 4). Therefore the effect of God is but one.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:4, 7) that God \"divided the\nlight from the darkness,\" and \"divided waters from waters.\" Therefore\nthe distinction and multitude of things is from God.\n\n_I answer that,_ The distinction of things has been ascribed to many\ncauses. For some attributed the distinction to matter, either by\nitself or with the agent. Democritus, for instance, and all the\nancient natural philosophers, who admitted no cause but matter,\nattributed it to matter alone; and in their opinion the distinction\nof things comes from chance according to the movement of matter.\nAnaxagoras, however, attributed the distinction and multitude of\nthings to matter and to the agent together; and he said that the\nintellect distinguishes things by extracting what is mixed up in\nmatter.\n\nBut this cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because, as was shown\nabove (Q. 44, A. 2), even matter itself was created by God. Hence we\nmust reduce whatever distinction comes from matter to a higher cause.\nSecondly, because matter is for the sake of the form, and not the\nform for the matter, and the distinction of things comes from their\nproper forms. Therefore the distinction of things is not on account\nof the matter; but rather, on the contrary, created matter is\nformless, in order that it may be accommodated to different forms.\n\nOthers have attributed the distinction of things to secondary agents,\nas did Avicenna, who said that God by understanding Himself, produced\nthe first intelligence; in which, forasmuch as it was not its own\nbeing, there is necessarily composition of potentiality and act, as\nwill appear later (Q. 50, A. 3). And so the first intelligence,\ninasmuch as it understood the first cause, produced the second\nintelligence; and in so far as it understood itself as in potentiality\nit produced the heavenly body, which causes movement, and inasmuch as\nit understood itself as having actuality it produced the soul of the\nheavens.\n\nBut this opinion cannot stand, for two reasons. First, because it\nwas shown above (Q. 45, A. 5) that to create belongs to God alone,\nand hence what can be caused only by creation is produced by God\nalone--viz. all those things which are not subject to generation and\ncorruption. Secondly, because, according to this opinion, the\nuniversality of things would not proceed from the intention of the\nfirst agent, but from the concurrence of many active causes; and such\nan effect we can describe only as being produced by chance. Therefore,\nthe perfection of the universe, which consists of the diversity of\nthings, would thus be a thing of chance, which is impossible.\n\nHence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come\nfrom the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought\nthings into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to\ncreatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could\nnot be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many\nand diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the\nrepresentation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another.\nFor goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is\nmanifold and divided and hence the whole universe together\nparticipates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it\nbetter than any single creature whatever.\n\nAnd because the divine wisdom is the cause of the distinction of\nthings, therefore Moses said that things are made distinct by the word\nof God, which is the concept of His wisdom; and this is what we read\nin Gen. 1:3, 4: \"God said: Be light made . . . And He divided the\nlight from the darkness.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The natural agent acts by the form which makes\nit what it is, and which is only one in one thing; and therefore its\neffect is one only. But the voluntary agent, such as God is, as was\nshown above (Q. 19, A. 4), acts by an intellectual form. Since,\ntherefore, it is not against God's unity and simplicity to understand\nmany things, as was shown above (Q. 15, A. 2), it follows that,\nalthough He is one, He can make many things.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This reason would apply to the representation\nwhich reflects the exemplar perfectly, and which is multiplied by\nreason of matter only; hence the uncreated image, which is perfect, is\nonly one. But no creature represents the first exemplar perfectly,\nwhich is the divine essence; and, therefore, it can be represented by\nmany things. Still, according as ideas are called exemplars, the\nplurality of ideas corresponds in the divine mind to the plurality of\nthings.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In speculative things the medium of\ndemonstration, which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly, is one\nonly; whereas probable means of proof are many. Likewise when\noperation is concerned, if the means be equal, so to speak, to the\nend, one only is sufficient. But the creature is not such a means to\nits end, which is God; and hence the multiplication of creatures is\nnecessary.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 47, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Inequality of Things Is from God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the inequality of things is not from\nGod. For it belongs to the best to produce the best. But among things\nthat are best, one is not greater than another. Therefore, it belongs\nto God, Who is the Best, to make all things equal.\n\nObj. 2: Further, equality is the effect of unity (Metaph. v, text\n20). But God is one. Therefore, He has made all things equal.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is the part of justice to give unequal to unequal\nthings. But God is just in all His works. Since, therefore, no\ninequality of things is presupposed to the operation whereby He gives\nbeing to things, it seems that He has made all things equal.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ecclus. 33:7): \"Why does one day excel\nanother, and one light another, and one year another year, one sun\nanother sun? [Vulg.: 'when all come of the sun']. By the knowledge of\nthe Lord they were distinguished.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ When Origen wished to refute those who said that the\ndistinction of things arose from the contrary principles of good and\nevil, he said that in the beginning all things were created equal by\nGod. For he asserted that God first created only the rational\ncreatures and all equal; and that inequality arose in them from\nfree-will, some being turned to God more and some less, and others\nturned more and others less away from God. And so those rational\ncreatures which were turned to God by free-will, were promoted to the\norder of angels according to the diversity of merits. And those who\nwere turned away from God were bound down to bodies according to the\ndiversity of their sin; and he said this was the cause of the creation\nand diversity of bodies. But according to this opinion, it would\nfollow that the universality of bodily creatures would not be the\neffect of the goodness of God as communicated to creatures, but it\nwould be for the sake of the punishment of sin, which is contrary to\nwhat is said: \"God saw all the things that He had made, and they were\nvery good\" (Gen. 1:31). And, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 3):\n\"What can be more foolish than to say that the divine Architect\nprovided this one sun for the one world, not to be an ornament to its\nbeauty, nor for the benefit of corporeal things, but that it happened\nthrough the sin of one soul; so that, if a hundred souls had sinned,\nthere would be a hundred suns in the world?\"\n\nTherefore it must be said that as the wisdom of God is the cause of\nthe distinction of things, so the same wisdom is the cause of their\ninequality. This may be explained as follows. A twofold distinction\nis found in things; one is a formal distinction as regards things\ndiffering specifically; the other is a material distinction as regards\nthings differing numerically only. And as the matter is on account\nof the form, material distinction exists for the sake of the formal\ndistinction. Hence we see that in incorruptible things there is only\none individual of each species, forasmuch as the species is\nsufficiently preserved in the one; whereas in things generated and\ncorruptible there are many individuals of one species for the\npreservation of the species. Whence it appears that formal distinction\nis of greater consequence than material. Now, formal distinction\nalways requires inequality, because as the Philosopher says (Metaph.\nviii, 10), the forms of things are like numbers in which species vary\nby addition or subtraction of unity. Hence in natural things species\nseem to be arranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect\nthan the elements, and plants than minerals, and animals than plants,\nand men than other animals; and in each of these one species is more\nperfect than others. Therefore, as the divine wisdom is the cause of\nthe distinction of things for the sake of the perfection of the\nuniverse, so it is the cause of inequality. For the universe would not\nbe perfect if only one grade of goodness were found in things.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is part of the best agent to produce an effect which\nis best in its entirety; but this does not mean that He makes every\npart of the whole the best absolutely, but in proportion to the\nwhole; in the case of an animal, for instance, its goodness would be\ntaken away if every part of it had the dignity of an eye. Thus,\ntherefore, God also made the universe to be best as a whole,\naccording to the mode of a creature; whereas He did not make each\nsingle creature best, but one better than another. And therefore we\nfind it said of each creature, \"God saw the light that it was good\"\n(Gen. 1:4); and in like manner of each one of the rest. But of all\ntogether it is said, \"God saw all the things that He had made, and\nthey were very good\" (Gen. 1:31).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The first effect of unity is equality; and then comes\nmultiplicity; and therefore from the Father, to Whom, according to\nAugustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5), is appropriated unity, the Son\nproceeds to Whom is appropriated equality, and then from Him the\ncreature proceeds, to which belongs inequality; but nevertheless\neven creatures share in a certain equality--namely, of proportion.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This is the argument that persuaded Origen: but it\nholds only as regards the distribution of rewards, the inequality of\nwhich is due to unequal merits. But in the constitution of things\nthere is no inequality of parts through any preceding inequality,\neither of merits or of the disposition of the matter; but inequality\ncomes from the perfection of the whole. This appears also in works\ndone by art; for the roof of a house differs from the foundation, not\nbecause it is made of other material; but in order that the house may\nbe made perfect of different parts, the artificer seeks different\nmaterial; indeed, he would make such material if he could.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 47, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Is Only One World?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is not only one world, but many.\nBecause, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46), it is unfitting to say\nthat God has created things without a reason. But for the same reason\nHe created one, He could create many, since His power is not limited\nto the creation of one world; but rather it is infinite, as was shown\nabove (Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore God has produced many worlds.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nature does what is best and much more does God.\nBut it is better for there to be many worlds than one, because many\ngood things are better than a few. Therefore many worlds have been\nmade by God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, everything which has a form in matter can be\nmultiplied in number, the species remaining the same, because\nmultiplication in number comes from matter. But the world has a form\nin matter. Thus as when I say \"man\" I mean the form, and when I say\n\"this man,\" I mean the form in matter; so when we say \"world,\" the\nform is signified, and when we say \"this world,\" the form in the\nmatter is signified. Therefore there is nothing to prevent the\nexistence of many worlds.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (John 1:10): \"The world was made by\nHim,\" where the world is named as one, as if only one existed.\n\n_I answer that,_ The very order of things created by God shows the\nunity of the world. For this world is called one by the unity of\norder, whereby some things are ordered to others. But whatever things\ncome from God, have relation of order to each other, and to God\nHimself, as shown above (Q. 11, A. 3; Q. 21, A. 1). Hence it must be\nthat all things should belong to one world. Therefore those only can\nassert that many worlds exist who do not acknowledge any ordaining\nwisdom, but rather believe in chance, as Democritus, who said that\nthis world, besides an infinite number of other worlds, was made\nfrom a casual concourse of atoms.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This reason proves that the world is one because all\nthings must be arranged in one order, and to one end. Therefore from\nthe unity of order in things Aristotle infers (Metaph. xii, text 52)\nthe unity of God governing all; and Plato (Tim.), from the unity of\nthe exemplar, proves the unity of the world, as the thing designed.\n\nReply Obj. 2: No agent intends material plurality as the end\nforasmuch as material multitude has no certain limit, but of itself\ntends to infinity, and the infinite is opposed to the notion of end.\nNow when it is said that many worlds are better than one, this has\nreference to material order. But the best in this sense is not the\nintention of the divine agent; forasmuch as for the same reason it\nmight be said that if He had made two worlds, it would be better if\nHe had made three; and so on to infinite.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The world is composed of the whole of its matter. For\nit is not possible for there to be another earth than this one, since\nevery earth would naturally be carried to this central one, wherever\nit was. The same applies to the other bodies which are part of the\nworld.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 48\n\nTHE DISTINCTION OF THINGS IN PARTICULAR\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the distinction of things in particular; and\nfirstly the distinction of good and evil; and then the distinction of\nthe spiritual and corporeal creatures.\n\nConcerning the first, we inquire into evil and its cause.\n\nConcerning evil, six points are to be considered:\n\n(1) Whether evil is a nature?\n\n(2) Whether evil is found in things?\n\n(3) Whether good is the subject of evil?\n\n(4) Whether evil totally corrupts good?\n\n(5) The division of evil into pain and fault.\n\n(6) Whether pain, or fault, has more the nature of evil?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Evil Is a Nature?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that evil is a nature. For every genus is\na nature. But evil is a genus; for the Philosopher says (Praedic. x)\nthat \"good and evil are not in a genus, but are genera of other\nthings.\" Therefore evil is a nature.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every difference which constitutes a species is a\nnature. But evil is a difference constituting a species of morality;\nfor a bad habit differs in species from a good habit, as liberality\nfrom illiberality. Therefore evil signifies a nature.\n\nObj. 3: Further, each extreme of two contraries is a nature. But evil\nand good are not opposed as privation and habit, but as contraries,\nas the Philosopher shows (Praedic. x) by the fact that between good\nand evil there is a medium, and from evil there can be a return to\ngood. Therefore evil signifies a nature.\n\nObj. 4: Further, what is not, acts not. But evil acts, for it\ncorrupts good. Therefore evil is a being and a nature.\n\nObj. 5: Further, nothing belongs to the perfection of the universe\nexcept what is a being and a nature. But evil belongs to the\nperfection of the universe of things; for Augustine says (Enchir.\n10, 11) that the \"admirable beauty of the universe is made up of all\nthings. In which even what is called evil, well ordered and in its\nplace, is the eminent commendation of what is good.\" Therefore evil\nis a nature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), \"Evil is neither\na being nor a good.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ One opposite is known through the other, as darkness\nis known through light. Hence also what evil is must be known from the\nnature of good. Now, we have said above that good is everything\nappetible; and thus, since every nature desires its own being and its\nown perfection, it must be said also that the being and the perfection\nof any nature is good. Hence it cannot be that evil signifies being,\nor any form or nature. Therefore it must be that by the name of evil\nis signified the absence of good. And this is what is meant by saying\nthat \"evil is neither a being nor a good.\" For since being, as such,\nis good, the absence of one implies the absence of the other.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Aristotle speaks there according to the opinion of\nPythagoreans, who thought that evil was a kind of nature; and\ntherefore they asserted the existence of the genus of good and evil.\nFor Aristotle, especially in his logical works, brings forward\nexamples that in his time were probable in the opinion of some\nphilosophers. Or, it may be said that, as the Philosopher says\n(Metaph. iv, text 6), \"the first kind of contrariety is habit and\nprivation,\" as being verified in all contraries; since one contrary\nis always imperfect in relation to another, as black in relation to\nwhite, and bitter in relation to sweet. And in this way good and evil\nare said to be genera not simply, but in regard to contraries;\nbecause, as every form has the nature of good, so every privation, as\nsuch, has the nature of evil.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Good and evil are not constitutive differences except\nin morals, which receive their species from the end, which is the\nobject of the will, the source of all morality. And because good has\nthe nature of an end, therefore good and evil are specific\ndifferences in moral things; good in itself, but evil as the absence\nof the due end. Yet neither does the absence of the due end by itself\nconstitute a moral species, except as it is joined to the undue end;\njust as we do not find the privation of the substantial form in\nnatural things, unless it is joined to another form. Thus, therefore,\nthe evil which is a constitutive difference in morals is a certain\ngood joined to the privation of another good; as the end proposed by\nthe intemperate man is not the privation of the good of reason, but\nthe delight of sense without the order of reason. Hence evil is not a\nconstitutive difference as such, but by reason of the good that is\nannexed.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This appears from the above. For the Philosopher speaks\nthere of good and evil in morality. Because in that respect, between\ngood and evil there is a medium, as good is considered as something\nrightly ordered, and evil as a thing not only out of right order, but\nalso as injurious to another. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv,\ni) that a \"prodigal man is foolish, but not evil.\" And from this evil\nin morality, there may be a return to good, but not from any sort of\nevil, for from blindness there is no return to sight, although\nblindness is an evil.\n\nReply Obj. 4: A thing is said to act in a threefold sense. In one\nway, formally, as when we say that whiteness makes white; and in that\nsense evil considered even as a privation is said to corrupt good,\nforasmuch as it is itself a corruption or privation of good. In\nanother sense a thing is said to act effectively, as when a painter\nmakes a wall white. Thirdly, it is said in the sense of the final\ncause, as the end is said to effect by moving the efficient cause.\nBut in these two ways evil does not effect anything of itself, that\nis, as a privation, but by virtue of the good annexed to it. For\nevery action comes from some form; and everything which is desired as\nan end, is a perfection. And therefore, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.\niv): \"Evil does not act, nor is it desired, except by virtue of some\ngood joined to it: while of itself it is nothing definite, and beside\nthe scope of our will and intention.\"\n\nReply Obj. 5: As was said above, the parts of the universe are\nordered to each other, according as one acts on the other, and\naccording as one is the end and exemplar of the other. But, as was\nsaid above, this can only happen to evil as joined to some good.\nHence evil neither belongs to the perfection of the universe, nor\ndoes it come under the order of the same, except accidentally, that\nis, by reason of some good joined to it.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Evil Is Found in Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that evil is not found in things. For\nwhatever is found in things, is either something, or a privation of\nsomething, that is a \"not-being.\" But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)\nthat \"evil is distant from existence, and even more distant from\nnon-existence.\" Therefore evil is not at all found in things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"being\" and \"thing\" are convertible. If therefore\nevil is a being in things, it follows that evil is a thing, which is\ncontrary to what has been said (A. 1).\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"the white unmixed with black is the most white,\" as\nthe Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 4). Therefore also the good unmixed\nwith evil is the greater good. But God makes always what is best,\nmuch more than nature does. Therefore in things made by God there is\nno evil.\n\n_On the contrary,_ On the above assumptions, all prohibitions and\npenalties would cease, for they exist only for evils.\n\n_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 47, AA. 1, 2), the perfection\nof the universe requires that there should be inequality in things,\nso that every grade of goodness may be realized. Now, one grade of\ngoodness is that of the good which cannot fail. Another grade of\ngoodness is that of the good which can fail in goodness, and this\ngrade is to be found in existence itself; for some things there are\nwhich cannot lose their existence as incorruptible things, while\nsome there are which can lose it, as things corruptible.\n\nAs, therefore, the perfection of the universe requires that there\nshould be not only beings incorruptible, but also corruptible beings;\nso the perfection of the universe requires that there should be some\nwhich can fail in goodness, and thence it follows that sometimes they\ndo fail. Now it is in this that evil consists, namely, in the fact\nthat a thing fails in goodness. Hence it is clear that evil is found\nin things, as corruption also is found; for corruption is itself an\nevil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Evil is distant both from simple being and from simple\n\"not-being,\" because it is neither a habit nor a pure negation, but a\nprivation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 14), being is\ntwofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the entity of a\nthing, as divisible by the ten \"predicaments\"; and in that sense it\nis convertible with thing, and thus no privation is a being, and\nneither therefore is evil a being. In another sense being conveys the\ntruth of a proposition which unites together subject and attribute by\na copula, notified by this word \"is\"; and in this sense being is what\nanswers to the question, \"Does it exist?\" and thus we speak of\nblindness as being in the eye; or of any other privation. In this way\neven evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this\ndistinction some, considering that things may be evil, or that evil\nis said to be in things, believed that evil was a positive thing in\nitself.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God and nature and any other agent make what is best in\nthe whole, but not what is best in every single part, except in order\nto the whole, as was said above (Q. 47, A. 2). And the whole itself,\nwhich is the universe of creatures, is all the better and more\nperfect if some things in it can fail in goodness, and do sometimes\nfail, God not preventing this. This happens, firstly, because \"it\nbelongs to Providence not to destroy, but to save nature,\" as\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); but it belongs to nature that what may\nfail should sometimes fail; secondly, because, as Augustine says\n(Enchir. 11), \"God is so powerful that He can even make good out of\nevil.\" Hence many good things would be taken away if God permitted no\nevil to exist; for fire would not be generated if air was not\ncorrupted, nor would the life of a lion be preserved unless the ass\nwere killed. Neither would avenging justice nor the patience of a\nsufferer be praised if there were no injustice.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Evil Is in Good As in Its Subject?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject.\nFor good is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv,\n4) that \"evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists.\"\nTherefore, evil is not in good as its subject.\n\nObj. 2: Further, evil is not a being; whereas good is a being. But\n\"non-being\" does not require being as its subject. Therefore, neither\ndoes evil require good as its subject.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one contrary is not the subject of another. But good\nand evil are contraries. Therefore, evil is not in good as in its\nsubject.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the subject of whiteness is called white. Therefore\nalso the subject of evil is evil. If, therefore, evil is in good as\nin its subject, it follows that good is evil, against what is said\n(Isa. 5:20): \"Woe to you who call evil good, and good evil!\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion 14) that \"evil exists\nonly in good.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 1), evil imports the absence\nof good. But not every absence of good is evil. For absence of good\ncan be taken in a privative and in a negative sense. Absence of good,\ntaken negatively, is not evil; otherwise, it would follow that what\ndoes not exist is evil, and also that everything would be evil,\nthrough not having the good belonging to something else; for instance,\na man would be evil who had not the swiftness of the roe, or the\nstrength of a lion. But the absence of good, taken in a privative\nsense, is an evil; as, for instance, the privation of sight is called\nblindness.\n\nNow, the subject of privation and of form is one and the same--viz.\nbeing in potentiality, whether it be being in absolute potentiality,\nas primary matter, which is the subject of the substantial form, and\nof privation of the opposite form; or whether it be being in relative\npotentiality, and absolute actuality, as in the case of a transparent\nbody, which is the subject both of darkness and light. It is, however,\nmanifest that the form which makes a thing actual is a perfection and\na good; and thus every actual being is a good; and likewise every\npotential being, as such, is a good, as having a relation to good. For\nas it has being in potentiality, so has it goodness in potentiality.\nTherefore, the subject of evil is good.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Dionysius means that evil is not in existing things as\na part, or as a natural property of any existing thing.\n\nReply Obj. 2: \"Not-being,\" understood negatively, does not require a\nsubject; but privation is negation in a subject, as the Philosopher\nsays (Metaph. iv, text 4), and such \"not-being\" is an evil.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Evil is not in the good opposed to it as in its\nsubject, but in some other good, for the subject of blindness is not\n\"sight,\" but \"animal.\" Yet, it appears, as Augustine says\n(Enchiridion 13), that the rule of dialectics here fails, where it is\nlaid down that contraries cannot exist together. But this is to be\ntaken as referring to good and evil in general, but not in reference\nto any particular good and evil. For white and black, sweet and\nbitter, and the like contraries, are only considered as contraries in\na special sense, because they exist in some determinate genus;\nwhereas good enters into every genus. Hence one good can coexist with\nthe privation of another good.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The prophet invokes woe to those who say that good as\nsuch is evil. But this does not follow from what is said above, as is\nclear from the explanation given.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Evil Corrupts the Whole Good?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that evil corrupts the whole good. For\none contrary is wholly corrupted by another. But good and evil are\ncontraries. Therefore evil corrupts the whole good.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that \"evil hurts\ninasmuch as it takes away good.\" But good is all of a piece and\nuniform. Therefore it is wholly taken away by evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, evil, as long as it lasts, hurts, and takes away\ngood. But that from which something is always being removed, is at\nsome time consumed, unless it is infinite, which cannot be said of\nany created good. Therefore evil wholly consumes good.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion 12) that \"evil cannot\nwholly consume good.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Evil cannot wholly consume good. To prove this we must\nconsider that good is threefold. One kind of good is wholly destroyed\nby evil, and this is the good opposed to evil, as light is wholly\ndestroyed by darkness, and sight by blindness. Another kind of good is\nneither wholly destroyed nor diminished by evil, and that is the good\nwhich is the subject of evil; for by darkness the substance of the air\nis not injured. And there is also a kind of good which is diminished\nby evil, but is not wholly taken away; and this good is the aptitude\nof a subject to some actuality.\n\nThe diminution, however, of this kind of good is not to be considered\nby way of subtraction, as diminution in quantity, but rather by way of\nremission, as diminution in qualities and forms. The remission\nlikewise of this habitude is to be taken as contrary to its intensity.\nFor this kind of aptitude receives its intensity by the dispositions\nwhereby the matter is prepared for actuality; which the more they are\nmultiplied in the subject the more is it fitted to receive its\nperfection and form; and, on the contrary, it receives its remission\nby contrary dispositions which, the more they are multiplied in the\nmatter, and the more they are intensified, the more is the\npotentiality remitted as regards the actuality.\n\nTherefore, if contrary dispositions cannot be multiplied and\nintensified to infinity, but only to a certain limit, neither is the\naforesaid aptitude diminished or remitted infinitely, as appears in\nthe active and passive qualities of the elements; for coldness and\nhumidity, whereby the aptitude of matter to the form of fire is\ndiminished or remitted, cannot be infinitely multiplied. But if the\ncontrary dispositions can be infinitely multiplied, the aforesaid\naptitude is also infinitely diminished or remitted; yet, nevertheless,\nit is not wholly taken away, because its root always remains, which is\nthe substance of the subject. Thus, if opaque bodies were interposed\nto infinity between the sun and the air, the aptitude of the air to\nlight would be infinitely diminished, but still it would never be\nwholly removed while the air remained, which in its very nature is\ntransparent. Likewise, addition in sin can be made to infinitude,\nwhereby the aptitude of the soul to grace is more and more lessened;\nand these sins, indeed, are like obstacles interposed between us and\nGod, according to Isa. 59:2: \"Our sins have divided between us and\nGod.\" Yet the aforesaid aptitude of the soul is not wholly taken away,\nfor it belongs to its very nature.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The good which is opposed to evil is wholly taken away;\nbut other goods are not wholly removed, as said above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The aforesaid aptitude is a medium between subject and\nact. Hence, where it touches act, it is diminished by evil; but where\nit touches the subject, it remains as it was. Therefore, although\ngood is like to itself, yet, on account of its relation to different\nthings, it is not wholly, but only partially taken away.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Some, imagining that the diminution of this kind of\ngood is like the diminution of quantity, said that just as the\ncontinuous is infinitely divisible, if the division be made in an\never same proportion (for instance, half of half, or a third of a\nthird), so is it in the present case. But this explanation does not\navail here. For when in a division we keep the same proportion, we\ncontinue to subtract less and less; for half of half is less than\nhalf of the whole. But a second sin does not necessarily diminish the\nabove mentioned aptitude less than a preceding sin, but perchance\neither equally or more.\n\nTherefore it must be said that, although this aptitude is a finite\nthing, still it may be so diminished infinitely, not _per se,_ but\naccidentally; according as the contrary dispositions are also\nincreased infinitely, as explained above.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Evil Is Adequately Divided into Pain* and Fault?\n\n[*Pain here means \"penalty\": such was its original signification,\nbeing derived from \"poena.\" In this sense we say \"Pain of death, Pain\nof loss, Pain of sense.\"--Ed.]\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that evil is not adequately divided into\npain and fault. For every defect is a kind of evil. But in all\ncreatures there is the defect of not being able to preserve their own\nexistence, which nevertheless is neither a pain nor a fault. Therefore\nevil is inadequately divided into pain and fault.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in irrational creatures there is neither fault nor\npain; but, nevertheless, they have corruption and defect, which are\nevils. Therefore not every evil is a pain or a fault.\n\nObj. 3: Further, temptation is an evil, but it is not a fault; for\n\"temptation which involves no consent, is not a sin, but an occasion\nfor the exercise of virtue,\" as is said in a gloss on 2 Cor. 12; not\nis it a pain; because temptation precedes the fault, and the pain\nfollows afterwards. Therefore, evil is not sufficiently divided into\npain and fault.\n\nObj. 4: _On the contrary,_ It would seem that this division is\nsuperfluous: for, as Augustine says (Enchiridion 12), a thing is evil\n\"because it hurts.\" But whatever hurts is penal. Therefore every evil\ncomes under pain.\n\n_I answer that,_ Evil, as was said above (A. 3), is the privation of\ngood, which chiefly and of itself consists in perfection and act. Act,\nhowever, is twofold; first, and second. The first act is the form and\nintegrity of a thing; the second act is its operation. Therefore evil\nalso is twofold. In one way it occurs by the subtraction of the form,\nor of any part required for the integrity of the thing, as blindness\nis an evil, as also it is an evil to be wanting in any member of the\nbody. In another way evil exists by the withdrawal of the due\noperation, either because it does not exist, or because it has not its\ndue mode and order. But because good in itself is the object of the\nwill, evil, which is the privation of good, is found in a special way\nin rational creatures which have a will. Therefore the evil which\ncomes from the withdrawal of the form and integrity of the thing, has\nthe nature of a pain; and especially so on the supposition that all\nthings are subject to divine providence and justice, as was shown\nabove (Q. 22, A. 2); for it is of the very nature of a pain to be\nagainst the will. But the evil which consists in the subtraction of\nthe due operation in voluntary things has the nature of a fault; for\nthis is imputed to anyone as a fault to fail as regards perfect\naction, of which he is master by the will. Therefore every evil in\nvoluntary things is to be looked upon as a pain or a fault.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Because evil is the privation of good, and not a mere\nnegation, as was said above (A. 3), therefore not every defect of\ngood is an evil, but the defect of the good which is naturally due.\nFor the want of sight is not an evil in a stone, but it is an evil\nin an animal; since it is against the nature of a stone to see. So,\nlikewise, it is against the nature of a creature to be preserved in\nexistence by itself, because existence and conservation come from one\nand the same source. Hence this kind of defect is not an evil as\nregards a creature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Pain and fault do not divide evil absolutely\nconsidered, but evil that is found in voluntary things.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Temptation, as importing provocation to evil, is always\nan evil of fault in the tempter; but in the one tempted it is not,\nproperly speaking, a fault; unless through the temptation some change\nis wrought in the one who is tempted; for thus is the action of the\nagent in the patient. And if the tempted is changed to evil by the\ntempter he falls into fault.\n\nReply Obj. 4: In answer to the opposite argument, it must be said\nthat the very nature of pain includes the idea of injury to the agent\nin himself, whereas the idea of fault includes the idea of injury to\nthe agent in his operation; and thus both are contained in evil, as\nincluding the idea of injury.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 48, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Pain Has the Nature of Evil More Than Fault Has?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that pain has more of evil than fault. For\nfault is to pain what merit is to reward. But reward has more good\nthan merit, as its end. Therefore pain has more evil in it than fault\nhas.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that is the greater evil which is opposed to the\ngreater good. But pain, as was said above (A. 5), is opposed to\nthe good of the agent, while fault is opposed to the good of the\naction. Therefore, since the agent is better than the action, it\nseems that pain is worse than fault.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the privation of the end is a pain consisting in\nforfeiting the vision of God; whereas the evil of fault is privation\nof the order to the end. Therefore pain is a greater evil than fault.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A wise workman chooses a less evil in order to\nprevent a greater, as the surgeon cuts off a limb to save the whole\nbody. But divine wisdom inflicts pain to prevent fault. Therefore\nfault is a greater evil than pain.\n\n_I answer that,_ Fault has the nature of evil more than pain has; not\nonly more than pain of sense, consisting in the privation of corporeal\ngoods, which kind of pain appeals to most men; but also more than any\nkind of pain, thus taking pain in its most general meaning, so as to\ninclude privation of grace or glory.\n\nThere is a twofold reason for this. The first is that one becomes evil\nby the evil of fault, but not by the evil of pain, as Dionysius says\n(Div. Nom. iv): \"To be punished is not an evil; but it is an evil to\nbe made worthy of punishment.\" And this because, since good absolutely\nconsidered consists in act, and not in potentiality, and the ultimate\nact is operation, or the use of something possessed, it follows that\nthe absolute good of man consists in good operation, or the good use\nof something possessed. Now we use all things by the act of the will.\nHence from a good will, which makes a man use well what he has, man is\ncalled good, and from a bad will he is called bad. For a man who has a\nbad will can use ill even the good he has, as when a grammarian of his\nown will speaks incorrectly. Therefore, because the fault itself\nconsists in the disordered act of the will, and the pain consists in\nthe privation of something used by the will, fault has more of evil in\nit than pain has.\n\nThe second reason can be taken from the fact that God is the author of\nthe evil of pain, but not of the evil of fault. And this is because\nthe evil of pain takes away the creature's good, which may be either\nsomething created, as sight, destroyed by blindness, or something\nuncreated, as by being deprived of the vision of God, the creature\nforfeits its uncreated good. But the evil of fault is properly opposed\nto uncreated good; for it is opposed to the fulfilment of the divine\nwill, and to divine love, whereby the divine good is loved for itself,\nand not only as shared by the creature. Therefore it is plain that\nfault has more evil in it than pain has.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although fault results in pain, as merit in reward, yet\nfault is not intended on account of the pain, as merit is for the\nreward; but rather, on the contrary, pain is brought about so that\nthe fault may be avoided, and thus fault is worse than pain.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The order of action which is destroyed by fault is the\nmore perfect good of the agent, since it is the second perfection,\nthan the good taken away by pain, which is the first perfection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Pain and fault are not to be compared as end and order\nto the end; because one may be deprived of both of these in some way,\nboth by fault and by pain; by pain, accordingly as a man is removed\nfrom the end and from the order to the end; by fault, inasmuch as\nthis privation belongs to the action which is not ordered to its due\nend.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 49\n\nTHE CAUSE OF EVIL\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe next inquire into the cause of evil. Concerning this there are\nthree points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether good can be the cause of evil?\n\n(2) Whether the supreme good, God, is the cause of evil?\n\n(3) Whether there be any supreme evil, which is the first cause of\nall evils?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Good Can Be the Cause of Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that good cannot be the cause of evil. For\nit is said (Matt. 7:18): \"A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, one contrary cannot be the cause of another. But\nevil is the contrary to good. Therefore good cannot be the cause of\nevil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a deficient effect can proceed only from a deficient\ncause. But evil is a deficient effect. Therefore its cause, if it has\none, is deficient. But everything deficient is an evil. Therefore the\ncause of evil can only be evil.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil has no\ncause. Therefore good is not the cause of evil.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Julian. i, 9): \"There is no\npossible source of evil except good.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It must be said that every evil in some way has a\ncause. For evil is the absence of the good, which is natural and due\nto a thing. But that anything fail from its natural and due\ndisposition can come only from some cause drawing it out of its proper\ndisposition. For a heavy thing is not moved upwards except by some\nimpelling force; nor does an agent fail in its action except from some\nimpediment. But only good can be a cause; because nothing can be a\ncause except inasmuch as it is a being, and every being, as such, is\ngood.\n\nAnd if we consider the special kinds of causes, we see that the\nagent, the form, and the end, import some kind of perfection which\nbelongs to the notion of good. Even matter, as a potentiality to\ngood, has the nature of good. Now that good is the cause of evil by\nway of the material cause was shown above (Q. 48, A. 3). For it was\nshown that good is the subject of evil. But evil has no formal cause,\nrather is it a privation of form; likewise, neither has it a final\ncause, but rather is it a privation of order to the proper end; since\nnot only the end has the nature of good, but also the useful, which\nis ordered to the end. Evil, however, has a cause by way of an agent,\nnot directly, but accidentally.\n\nIn proof of this, we must know that evil is caused in the action\notherwise than in the effect. In the action evil is caused by reason\nof the defect of some principle of action, either of the principal or\nthe instrumental agent; thus the defect in the movement of an animal\nmay happen by reason of the weakness of the motive power, as in the\ncase of children, or by reason only of the ineptitude of the\ninstrument, as in the lame. On the other hand, evil is caused in a\nthing, but not in the proper effect of the agent, sometimes by the\npower of the agent, sometimes by reason of a defect, either of the\nagent or of the matter. It is caused by reason of the power or\nperfection of the agent when there necessarily follows on the form\nintended by the agent the privation of another form; as, for instance,\nwhen on the form of fire there follows the privation of the form of\nair or of water. Therefore, as the more perfect the fire is in\nstrength, so much the more perfectly does it impress its own form, so\nalso the more perfectly does it corrupt the contrary. Hence that evil\nand corruption befall air and water comes from the perfection of the\nfire: but this is accidental; because fire does not aim at the\nprivation of the form of water, but at the bringing in of its own\nform, though by doing this it also accidentally causes the other.\nBut if there is a defect in the proper effect of the fire--as, for\ninstance, that it fails to heat--this comes either by defect of the\naction, which implies the defect of some principle, as was said above,\nor by the indisposition of the matter, which does not receive the\naction of the fire, the agent. But this very fact that it is a\ndeficient being is accidental to good to which of itself it belongs to\nact. Hence it is true that evil in no way has any but an accidental\ncause; and thus is good the cause of evil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Contra Julian. i): \"The Lord calls\nan evil will the evil tree, and a good will a good tree.\" Now, a good\nwill does not produce a morally bad act, since it is from the good\nwill itself that a moral act is judged to be good. Nevertheless the\nmovement itself of an evil will is caused by the rational creature,\nwhich is good; and thus good is the cause of evil.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Good does not cause that evil which is contrary to\nitself, but some other evil: thus the goodness of the fire causes\nevil to the water, and man, good as to his nature, causes an act\nmorally evil. And, as explained above (Q. 19, A. 9), this is by\naccident. Moreover, it does happen sometimes that one contrary causes\nanother by accident: for instance, the exterior surrounding cold\nheats (the body) through the concentration of the inward heat.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things\notherwise than in natural things. For the natural agent produces the\nsame kind of effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded by some\nexterior thing; and this amounts to some defect belonging to it.\nHence evil never follows in the effect, unless some other evil\npre-exists in the agent or in the matter, as was said above. But in\nvoluntary things the defect of the action comes from the will\nactually deficient, inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself\nto its proper rule. This defect, however, is not a fault, but fault\nfollows upon it from the fact that the will acts with this defect.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental cause,\nas was said above.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the supreme good, God, is the cause of\nevil. For it is said (Isa. 45:5,7): \"I am the Lord, and there is no\nother God, forming the light, and creating darkness, making peace, and\ncreating evil.\" And Amos 3:6, \"Shall there be evil in a city, which\nthe Lord hath not done?\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, the effect of the secondary cause is reduced to the\nfirst cause. But good is the cause of evil, as was said above (A. 1).\nTherefore, since God is the cause of every good, as was shown above\n(Q. 2, A. 3; Q. 6, AA. 1, 4), it follows that also every evil is from\nGod.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as is said by the Philosopher (Phys. ii, text 30),\nthe cause of both safety and danger of the ship is the same. But God\nis the cause of the safety of all things. Therefore He is the cause\nof all perdition and of all evil.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21), that, \"God is not\nthe author of evil because He is not the cause of tending to\nnot-being.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As appears from what was said (A. 1), the evil which\nconsists in the defect of action is always caused by the defect of\nthe agent. But in God there is no defect, but the highest perfection,\nas was shown above (Q. 4, A. 1). Hence, the evil which consists in\ndefect of action, or which is caused by defect of the agent, is not\nreduced to God as to its cause.\n\nBut the evil which consists in the corruption of some things is\nreduced to God as the cause. And this appears as regards both natural\nthings and voluntary things. For it was said (A. 1) that some agent\ninasmuch as it produces by its power a form to which follows\ncorruption and defect, causes by its power that corruption and\ndefect. But it is manifest that the form which God chiefly intends in\nthings created is the good of the order of the universe. Now, the\norder of the universe requires, as was said above (Q. 22, A. 2, ad 2;\nQ. 48, A. 2), that there should be some things that can, and do\nsometimes, fail. And thus God, by causing in things the good of the\norder of the universe, consequently and as it were by accident,\ncauses the corruptions of things, according to 1 Kings 2:6: \"The Lord\nkilleth and maketh alive.\" But when we read that \"God hath not made\ndeath\" (Wis. 1:13), the sense is that God does not will death for its\nown sake. Nevertheless the order of justice belongs to the order of\nthe universe; and this requires that penalty should be dealt out to\nsinners. And so God is the author of the evil which is penalty, but\nnot of the evil which is fault, by reason of what is said above.\n\nReply Obj. 1: These passages refer to the evil of penalty, and not to\nthe evil of fault.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced\nto the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and\nperfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as\nwhatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the\nmotive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not\ncome from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And,\nlikewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is\nreduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not\ncaused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The sinking of a ship is attributed to the sailor as\nthe cause, from the fact that he does not fulfil what the safety of\nthe ship requires; but God does not fail in doing what is necessary\nfor the safety of all. Hence there is no parity.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Be One Supreme Evil Which Is the Cause of Every Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is one supreme evil which is\nthe cause of every evil. For contrary effects have contrary causes.\nBut contrariety is found in things, according to Ecclus. 33:15: \"Good\nis set against evil, and life against death; so also is the sinner\nagainst a just man.\" Therefore there are many contrary principles,\none of good, the other of evil.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if one contrary is in nature, so is the other. But\nthe supreme good is in nature, and is the cause of every good, as was\nshown above (Q. 2, A. 3; Q. 6, AA. 2, 4). Therefore, also, there is a\nsupreme evil opposed to it as the cause of every evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as we find good and better things, so we find evil\nand worse. But good and better are so considered in relation to what\nis best. Therefore evil and worse are so considered in relation to\nsome supreme evil.\n\nObj. 4: Further, everything participated is reduced to what is\nessential. But things which are evil among us are evil not\nessentially, but by participation. Therefore we must seek for\nsome supreme essential evil, which is the cause of every evil.\n\nObj. 5: Further, whatever is accidental is reduced to that which is\n_per se._ But good is the accidental cause of evil. Therefore, we\nmust suppose some supreme evil which is the _per se_ cause of evils.\nNor can it be said that evil has no _per se_ cause, but only an\naccidental cause; for it would then follow that evil would not exist\nin the many, but only in the few.\n\nObj. 6: Further, the evil of the effect is reduced to the evil of the\ncause; because the deficient effect comes from the deficient cause,\nas was said above (AA. 1, 2). But we cannot proceed to infinity in\nthis matter. Therefore, we must suppose one first evil as the cause\nof every evil.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The supreme good is the cause of every being, as\nwas shown above (Q. 2, A. 3; Q. 6, A. 4). Therefore there cannot be\nany principle opposed to it as the cause of evils.\n\n_I answer that,_ It appears from what precedes that there is no one\nfirst principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good.\n\nFirst, indeed, because the first principle of good is essentially\ngood, as was shown above (Q. 6, AA. 3, 4). But nothing can be\nessentially bad. For it was shown above that every being, as such,\nis good (Q. 5, A. 3); and that evil can exist only in good as in\nits subject (Q. 48, A. 3).\n\nSecondly, because the first principle of good is the highest and\nperfect good which pre-contains in itself all goodness, as shown above\n(Q. 6, A. 2). But there cannot be a supreme evil; because, as was\nshown above (Q. 48, A. 4), although evil always lessens good, yet\nit never wholly consumes it; and thus, while good ever remains,\nnothing can be wholly and perfectly bad. Therefore, the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. iv, 5) that \"if the wholly evil could be, it would\ndestroy itself\"; because all good being destroyed (which it need be\nfor something to be wholly evil), evil itself would be taken away,\nsince its subject is good.\n\nThirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a\nfirst principle; both because every evil is caused by good, as was\nshown above (A. 1), and because evil can be only an accidental\ncause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accidental\ncause is subsequent to the direct cause.\n\nThose, however, who upheld two first principles, one good and the\nother evil, fell into this error from the same cause, whence also\narose other strange notions of the ancients; namely, because they\nfailed to consider the universal cause of all being, and considered\nonly the particular causes of particular effects. For on that account,\nif they found a thing hurtful to something by the power of its own\nnature, they thought that the very nature of that thing was evil; as,\nfor instance, if one should say that the nature of fire was evil\nbecause it burnt the house of a poor man. The judgment, however, of\nthe goodness of anything does not depend upon its order to any\nparticular thing, but rather upon what it is in itself, and on its\norder to the whole universe, wherein every part has its own perfectly\nordered place, as was said above (Q. 47, A. 2, ad 1).\n\nLikewise, because they found two contrary particular causes of two\ncontrary particular effects, they did not know how to reduce these\ncontrary particular causes to the universal common cause; and\ntherefore they extended the contrariety of causes even to the first\nprinciples. But since all contraries agree in something common, it\nis necessary to search for one common cause for them above their own\ncontrary proper causes; as above the contrary qualities of the\nelements exists the power of a heavenly body; and above all things\nthat exist, no matter how, there exists one first principle of being,\nas was shown above (Q. 2, A. 3).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Contraries agree in one genus, and they also agree\nin the nature of being; and therefore, although they have contrary\nparticular causes, nevertheless we must come at last to one first\ncommon cause.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Privation and habit belong naturally to the same\nsubject. Now the subject of privation is a being in potentiality, as\nwas said above (Q. 48, A. 3). Hence, since evil is privation of good,\nas appears from what was said above (Q. 48, AA. 1, 2, 3), it is\nopposed to that good which has some potentiality, but not to the\nsupreme good, who is pure act.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Increase in intensity is in proportion to the nature\nof  a thing. And as the form is a perfection, so privation removes a\nperfection. Hence every form, perfection, and good is intensified by\napproach to the perfect term; but privation and evil by receding from\nthat term. Hence a thing is not said to be evil and worse, by reason\nof access to the supreme evil, in the same way as it is said to be\ngood and better, by reason of access to the supreme good.\n\nReply Obj. 4: No being is called evil by participation, but by\nprivation of participation. Hence it is not necessary to reduce it\nto any essential evil.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Evil can only have an accidental cause, as was shown\nabove (A. 1). Hence reduction to any 'per se' cause of evil is\nimpossible. And to say that evil is in the greater number is simply\nfalse. For things which are generated and corrupted, in which alone\ncan there be natural evil, are the smaller part of the whole\nuniverse. And again, in every species the defect of nature is in the\nsmaller number. In man alone does evil appear as in the greater\nnumber; because the good of man as regards the senses is not the good\nof man as man--that is, in regard to reason; and more men seek good\nin regard to the senses than good according to reason.\n\nReply Obj. 6: In the causes of evil we do not proceed to infinity,\nbut reduce all evils to some good cause, whence evil follows\naccidentally.\n_______________________\n\nTREATISE ON THE ANGELS (QQ. 50-64)\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 50\n\nOF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ANGELS ABSOLUTELY CONSIDERED\n(In Five Articles)\n\nNow we consider the distinction of corporeal and spiritual creatures:\nfirstly, the purely spiritual creature which in Holy Scripture is\ncalled angel; secondly, the creature wholly corporeal; thirdly, the\ncomposite creature, corporeal and spiritual, which is man.\n\nConcerning the angels, we consider first what belongs to their\nsubstance; secondly, what belongs to their intellect; thirdly, what\nbelongs to their will; fourthly, what belongs to their creation.\n\nTheir substance we consider absolutely and in relation to corporeal\nthings.\n\nConcerning their substance absolutely considered, there are five\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there is any entirely spiritual creature, altogether\nincorporeal?\n\n(2) Supposing that an angel is such, we ask whether it is composed\nof matter and form?\n\n(3) We ask concerning their number.\n\n(4) Of their difference from each other.\n\n(5) Of their immortality or incorruptibility.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 1]\n\nWhether an Angel Is Altogether Incorporeal?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an angel is not entirely incorporeal.\nFor what is incorporeal only as regards ourselves, and not in relation\nto God, is not absolutely incorporeal. But Damascene says (De Fide\nOrth. ii) that \"an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial as\nregards us; but compared to God it is corporeal and material.\nTherefore he is not simply incorporeal.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing is moved except a body, as the Philosopher\nsays (Phys. vi, text 32). But Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that\n\"an angel is an ever movable intellectual substance.\" Therefore an\nangel is a corporeal substance.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Ambrose says (De Spir. Sanct. i, 7): \"Every creature\nis limited within its own nature.\" But to be limited belongs to\nbodies. Therefore, every creature is corporeal. Now angels are God's\ncreatures, as appears from Ps. 148:2: \"Praise ye\" the Lord, \"all His\nangels\"; and, farther on (verse 4), \"For He spoke, and they were\nmade; He commanded, and they were created.\" Therefore angels are\ncorporeal.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 103:4): \"Who makes His angels\nspirits.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ There must be some incorporeal creatures. For what\nis principally intended by God in creatures is good, and this\nconsists in assimilation to God Himself. And the perfect assimilation\nof an effect to a cause is accomplished when the effect imitates the\ncause according to that whereby the cause produces the effect; as\nheat makes heat. Now, God produces the creature by His intellect and\nwill (Q. 14, A. 8; Q. 19, A. 4). Hence the perfection of the universe\nrequires that there should be intellectual creatures. Now\nintelligence cannot be the action of a body, nor of any corporeal\nfaculty; for every body is limited to \"here\" and \"now.\" Hence the\nperfection of the universe requires the existence of an incorporeal\ncreature.\n\nThe ancients, however, not properly realizing the force of\nintelligence, and failing to make a proper distinction between sense\nand intellect, thought that nothing existed in the world but what\ncould be apprehended by sense and imagination. And because bodies\nalone fall under imagination, they supposed that no being existed\nexcept bodies, as the Philosopher observes (Phys. iv, text 52,57).\nThence came the error of the Sadducees, who said there was no spirit\n(Acts 23:8).\n\nBut the very fact that intellect is above sense is a reasonable proof\nthat there are some incorporeal things comprehensible by the intellect\nalone.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Incorporeal substances rank between God and corporeal\ncreatures. Now the medium compared to one extreme appears to be the\nother extreme, as what is tepid compared to heat seems to be cold;\nand thus it is said that angels, compared to God, are material and\ncorporeal, not, however, as if anything corporeal existed in them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Movement is there taken in the sense in which it is\napplied to intelligence and will. Therefore an angel is called an\never mobile substance, because he is ever actually intelligent, and\nnot as if he were sometimes actually and sometimes potentially, as we\nare. Hence it is clear that the objection rests on an equivocation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To be circumscribed by local limits belongs to bodies\nonly; whereas to be circumscribed by essential limits belongs to all\ncreatures, both corporeal and spiritual. Hence Ambrose says (De Spir.\nSanct. i, 7) that \"although some things are not contained in\ncorporeal place, still they are none the less circumscribed by their\nsubstance.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 2]\n\nWhether an Angel Is Composed of Matter and Form?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an angel is composed of matter and\nform. For everything which is contained under any genus is composed of\nthe genus, and of the difference which added to the genus makes the\nspecies. But the genus comes from the matter, and the difference from\nthe form (Metaph. xiii, text 6). Therefore everything which is in a\ngenus is composed of matter and form. But an angel is in the genus of\nsubstance. Therefore he is composed of matter and form.\n\nObj. 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter exist, there is\nmatter. Now the properties of matter are to receive and to substand;\nwhence Boethius says (De Trin.) that \"a simple form cannot be a\nsubject\": and the above properties are found in the angel. Therefore\nan angel is composed of matter and form.\n\nObj. 3: Further, form is act. So what is form only is pure act. But\nan angel is not pure act, for this belongs to God alone. Therefore an\nangel is not form only, but has a form in matter.\n\nObj. 4: Further, form is properly limited and perfected by matter. So\nthe form which is not in matter is an infinite form. But the form of\nan angel is not infinite, for every creature is finite. Therefore the\nform of an angel is in matter.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): \"The first\ncreatures are understood to be as immaterial as they are incorporeal.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Some assert that the angels are composed of matter\nand form; which opinion Avicebron endeavored to establish in his book\nof the _Fount of Life._ For he supposes that whatever things are\ndistinguished by the intellect are really distinct. Now as regards\nincorporeal substance, the intellect apprehends that which\ndistinguishes it from corporeal substance, and that which it has in\ncommon with it. Hence he concludes that what distinguishes\nincorporeal from corporeal substance is a kind of form to it, and\nwhatever is subject to this distinguishing form, as it were something\ncommon, is its matter. Therefore, he asserts the universal matter of\nspiritual and corporeal things is the same; so that it must be\nunderstood that the form of incorporeal substance is impressed in the\nmatter of spiritual things, in the same way as the form of quantity\nis impressed in the matter of corporeal things.\n\nBut one glance is enough to show that there cannot be one matter of\nspiritual and of corporeal things. For it is not possible that a\nspiritual and a corporeal form should be received into the same part\nof matter, otherwise one and the same thing would be corporeal and\nspiritual. Hence it would follow that one part of matter receives the\ncorporeal form, and another receives the spiritual form. Matter,\nhowever, is not divisible into parts except as regarded under\nquantity; and without quantity substance is indivisible, as Aristotle\nsays (Phys. i, text 15). Therefore it would follow that the matter of\nspiritual things is subject to quantity; which cannot be. Therefore it\nis impossible that corporeal and spiritual things should have the same\nmatter.\n\nIt is, further, impossible for an intellectual substance to have any\nkind of matter. For the operation belonging to anything is according\nto the mode of its substance. Now to understand is an altogether\nimmaterial operation, as appears from its object, whence any act\nreceives its species and nature. For a thing is understood according\nto its degree of immateriality; because forms that exist in matter are\nindividual forms which the intellect cannot apprehend as such. Hence\nit must be that every individual substance is altogether immaterial.\n\nBut things distinguished by the intellect are not necessarily\ndistinguished in reality; because the intellect does not apprehend\nthings according to their mode, but according to its own mode. Hence\nmaterial things which are below our intellect exist in our intellect\nin a simpler mode than they exist in themselves. Angelic substances,\non the other hand, are above our intellect; and hence our intellect\ncannot attain to apprehend them, as they are in themselves, but by its\nown mode, according as it apprehends composite things; and in this way\nalso it apprehends God (Q. 3).\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is difference which constitutes the species. Now\neverything is constituted in a species according as it is determined\nto some special grade of being because \"the species of things are\nlike numbers,\" which differ by addition and subtraction of unity, as\nthe Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text 10). But in material things\nthere is one thing which determines to a special grade, and that is\nthe form; and another thing which is determined, and this is the\nmatter; and hence from the latter the genus is derived, and from\nthe former the \"difference.\" Whereas in immaterial things there is\nno separate determinator and thing determined; each thing by its\nown self holds a determinate grade in being; and therefore in them\ngenus and \"difference\" are not derived from different things, but\nfrom one and the same. Nevertheless, this differs in our mode of\nconception; for, inasmuch as our intellect considers it as\nindeterminate, it derives the idea of their genus; and inasmuch\nas it considers it determinately, it derives the idea of their\n\"difference.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: This reason is given in the book on the _Fount of\nLife,_ and it would be cogent, supposing that the receptive mode of\nthe intellect and of matter were the same. But this is clearly false.\nFor matter receives the form, that thereby it may be constituted in\nsome species, either of air, or of fire, or of something else. But\nthe intellect does not receive the form in the same way; otherwise\nthe opinion of Empedocles (De Anima i, 5, text 26) would be true, to\nthe effect that we know earth by earth, and fire by fire. But the\nintelligible form is in the intellect according to the very nature of\na form; for as such is it so known by the intellect. Hence such a way\nof receiving is not that of matter, but of an immaterial substance.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although there is no composition of matter and form in\nan angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made\nevident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a\ntwofold composition. The first is that of form and matter, whereby\nthe nature is constituted. Such a composite nature is not its own\nexistence but existence is its act. Hence the nature itself is\nrelated to its own existence as potentiality to act. Therefore if\nthere be no matter, and supposing that the form itself subsists\nwithout matter, there nevertheless still remains the relation of the\nform to its very existence, as of potentiality to act. And such a\nkind of composition is understood to be in the angels; and this is\nwhat some say, that an angel is composed of, \"whereby he is,\" and\n\"what is,\" or \"existence,\" and \"what is,\" as Boethius says. For\n\"what is,\" is the form itself subsisting; and the existence itself is\nwhereby the substance is; as the running is whereby the runner runs.\nBut in God \"existence\" and \"what is\" are not different as was\nexplained above (Q. 3, A. 4). Hence God alone is pure act.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Every creature is simply finite, inasmuch as its\nexistence is not absolutely subsisting, but is limited to some nature\nto which it belongs. But there is nothing against a creature being\nconsidered relatively infinite. Material creatures are infinite on\nthe part of matter, but finite in their form, which is limited by the\nmatter which receives it. But immaterial created substances are\nfinite in their being; whereas they are infinite in the sense that\ntheir forms are not received in anything else; as if we were to say,\nfor example, that whiteness existing separate is infinite as regards\nthe nature of whiteness, forasmuch as it is not contracted to any one\nsubject; while its \"being\" is finite as determined to some one\nspecial nature.\n\nWhence it is said (De Causis, prop. 16) that \"intelligence is finite\nfrom above,\" as receiving its being from above itself, and is\n\"infinite from below,\" as not received in any matter.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Angels Exist in Any Great Number?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels are not in great numbers.\nFor number is a species of quantity, and follows the division of a\ncontinuous body. But this cannot be in the angels, since they are\nincorporeal, as was shown above (A. 1). Therefore the angels\ncannot exist in any great number.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the more a thing approaches to unity, so much the\nless is it multiplied, as is evident in numbers. But among other\ncreated natures the angelic nature approaches nearest to God.\nTherefore since God is supremely one, it seems that there is the\nleast possible number in the angelic nature.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the proper effect of the separate substances seems\nto be the movements of the heavenly bodies. But the movements of the\nheavenly bodies fall within some small determined number, which we\ncan apprehend. Therefore the angels are not in greater number than\nthe movements of the heavenly bodies.\n\nObj. 4: Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"all intelligible and\nintellectual substances subsist because of the rays of the divine\ngoodness.\" But a ray is only multiplied according to the different\nthings that receive it. Now it cannot be said that their matter is\nreceptive of an intelligible ray, since intellectual substances are\nimmaterial, as was shown above (A. 2). Therefore it seems that the\nmultiplication of intellectual substances can only be according to\nthe requirements of the first bodies--that is, of the heavenly ones,\nso that in some way the shedding form of the aforesaid rays may be\nterminated in them; and hence the same conclusion is to be drawn as\nbefore.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Dan. 7:10): \"Thousands of thousands\nministered to Him, and ten thousands times a hundred thousand stood\nbefore Him.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ There have been various opinions with regard to the\nnumber of the separate substances. Plato contended that the separate\nsubstances are the species of sensible things; as if we were to\nmaintain that human nature is a separate substance of itself: and\naccording to this view it would have to be maintained that the number\nof the separate substances is the number of the species of sensible\nthings. Aristotle, however, rejects this view (Metaph. i, text 31)\nbecause matter is of the very nature of the species of sensible\nthings. Consequently the separate substances cannot be the exemplar\nspecies of these sensible things; but have their own fixed natures,\nwhich are higher than the natures of sensible things. Nevertheless\nAristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43) that those more perfect natures\nbear relation to these sensible things, as that of mover and end; and\ntherefore he strove to find out the number of the separate substances\naccording to the number of the first movements.\n\nBut since this appears to militate against the teachings of Sacred\nScripture, Rabbi Moses the Jew, wishing to bring both into harmony,\nheld that the angels, in so far as they are styled immaterial\nsubstances, are multiplied according to the number of heavenly\nmovements or bodies, as Aristotle held (Metaph. xi, text 43); while he\ncontended that in the Scriptures even men bearing a divine message are\nstyled angels; and again, even the powers of natural things, which\nmanifest God's almighty power. It is, however, quite foreign to the\ncustom of the Scriptures for the powers of irrational things to be\ndesignated as angels.\n\nHence it must be said that the angels, even inasmuch as they are\nimmaterial substances, exist in exceeding great number, far beyond all\nmaterial multitude. This is what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xiv):\n\"There are many blessed armies of the heavenly intelligences,\nsurpassing the weak and limited reckoning of our material numbers.\"\nThe reason whereof is this, because, since it is the perfection of the\nuniverse that God chiefly intends in the creation of things, the more\nperfect some things are, in so much greater an excess are they created\nby God. Now, as in bodies such excess is observed in regard to their\nmagnitude, so in things incorporeal is it observed in regard to their\nmultitude. We see, in fact, that incorruptible bodies, exceed\ncorruptible bodies almost incomparably in magnitude; for the entire\nsphere of things active and passive is something very small in\ncomparison with the heavenly bodies. Hence it is reasonable to\nconclude that the immaterial substances as it were incomparably\nexceed material substances as to multitude.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the angels number is not that of discrete\nquantity, brought about by division of what is continuous, but that\nwhich is caused by distinction of forms; according as multitude is\nreckoned among the transcendentals, as was said above (Q. 30, A. 3; Q. 11).\n\nReply Obj. 2: From the angelic nature being the nighest unto\nGod, it must needs have least of multitude in its composition, but not\nso as to be found in few subjects.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This is Aristotle's argument (Metaph. xii, text\n44), and it would conclude necessarily if the separate substances were\nmade for corporeal substances. For thus the immaterial substances\nwould exist to no purpose, unless some movement from them were to\nappear in corporeal things. But it is not true that the immaterial\nsubstances exist on account of the corporeal, because the end is\nnobler than the means to the end. Hence Aristotle says (Metaph. xii,\ntext 44) that this is not a necessary argument, but a probable one. He\nwas forced to make use of this argument, since only through sensible\nthings can we come to know intelligible ones.\n\nReply Obj. 4: This argument comes from the opinion of such as\nhold that matter is the cause of the distinction of things; but this\nwas refuted above (Q. 47, A. 1). Accordingly, the multiplication\nof the angels is not to be taken according to matter, nor according to\nbodies, but according to the divine wisdom devising the various orders\nof immaterial substances.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Angels Differ in Species?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels do not differ in species.\nFor since the \"difference\" is nobler than the 'genus,' all things\nwhich agree in what is noblest in them, agree likewise in their\nultimate constitutive difference; and so they are the same according\nto species. But all angels agree in what is noblest in them--that is\nto say, in intellectuality. Therefore all the angels are of one\nspecies.\n\nObj. 2: Further, more and less do not change a species. But the\nangels seem to differ only from one another according to more and\nless--namely, as one is simpler than another, and of keener\nintellect. Therefore the angels do not differ specifically.\n\nObj. 3: Further, soul and angel are contra-distinguished mutually\nfrom each other. But all souls are of the one species. So therefore\nare the angels.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the more perfect a thing is in nature, the more\nought it to be multiplied. But this would not be so if there were but\none individual under one species. Therefore there are many angels of\none species.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In things of one species there is no such thing as\n\"first\" and \"second\" [prius et posterius], as the Philosopher says\n(Metaph. iii, text 2). But in the angels even of the one order there\nare first, middle, and last, as Dionysius says (Hier. Ang. x).\nTherefore the angels are not of the same species.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have said that all spiritual substances, even\nsouls, are of the one species. Others, again, that all the angels are\nof the one species, but not souls; while others allege that all the\nangels of one hierarchy, or even of one order, are of the one species.\n\nBut this is impossible. For such things as agree in species but differ\nin number, agree in form, but are distinguished materially. If,\ntherefore, the angels be not composed of matter and form, as was said\nabove (A. 2), it follows that it is impossible for two angels to\nbe of one species; just as it would be impossible for there to be\nseveral whitenesses apart, or several humanities, since whitenesses\nare not several, except in so far as they are in several substances.\nAnd if the angels had matter, not even then could there be several\nangels of one species. For it would be necessary for matter to be the\nprinciple of distinction of one from the other, not, indeed, according\nto the division of quantity, since they are incorporeal, but according\nto the diversity of their powers; and such diversity of matter causes\ndiversity not merely of species, but of genus.\n\nReply Obj. 1: \"Difference\" is nobler than genus, as the determined\nis more noble than the undetermined, and the proper than the common,\nbut not as one nature is nobler than another; otherwise it would be\nnecessary that all irrational animals be of the same species; or that\nthere should be in them some form which is higher than the sensible\nsoul. Therefore irrational animals differ in species according to the\nvarious determined degrees of sensitive nature; and in like manner\nall the angels differ in species according to the diverse degrees of\nintellectual nature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: More and less change the species, not according as they\nare caused by the intensity or remissness of one form, but according\nas they are caused by forms of diverse degrees; for instance, if we\nsay that fire is more perfect than air: and in this way the angels\nare diversified according to more or less.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The good of the species preponderates over the good\nof the individual. Hence it is much better for the species to be\nmultiplied in the angels than for individuals to be multiplied in\nthe one species.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Numerical multiplication, since it can be drawn out\ninfinitely, is not intended by the agent, but only specific\nmultiplication, as was said above (Q. 47, A. 3). Hence the perfection\nof the angelic nature calls for the multiplying of species, but not\nfor the multiplying of individuals in one species.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 50, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Angels Are Incorruptible?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels are not incorruptible; for\nDamascene, speaking of the angel, says (De Fide Orth. ii, 3) that he\nis \"an intellectual substance, partaking of immortality by favor, and\nnot by nature.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, Plato says in the Timaeus: \"O gods of gods, whose\nmaker and father am I: You are indeed my works, dissoluble by nature,\nyet indissoluble because I so will it.\" But gods such as these can\nonly be understood to be the angels. Therefore the angels are\ncorruptible by their nature\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xvi), \"all things would\ntend towards nothing, unless the hand of the Almighty preserved\nthem.\" But what can be brought to nothing is corruptible. Therefore,\nsince the angels were made by God, it would appear that they are\ncorruptible of their own nature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the\nintellectual substances \"have unfailing life, being free from all\ncorruption, death, matter, and generation.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It must necessarily be maintained that the angels\nare incorruptible of their own nature. The reason for this is, that\nnothing is corrupted except by its form being separated from the\nmatter. Hence, since an angel is a subsisting form, as is clear from\nwhat was said above (A. 2), it is impossible for its substance to\nbe corruptible. For what belongs to anything considered in itself can\nnever be separated from it; but what belongs to a thing, considered in\nrelation to something else, can be separated, when that something else\nis taken away, in view of which it belonged to it. Roundness can never\nbe taken from the circle, because it belongs to it of itself; but a\nbronze circle can lose roundness, if the bronze be deprived of its\ncircular shape. Now to be belongs to a form considered in itself; for\neverything is an actual being according to its form: whereas matter is\nan actual being by the form. Consequently a subject composed of matter\nand form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the\nmatter. But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the\nangels, as was said above (A. 2), it cannot lose its being.\nTherefore, the angel's immateriality is the cause why it is\nincorruptible by its own nature.\n\nA token of this incorruptibility can be gathered from its intellectual\noperation; for since everything acts according as it is actual, the\noperation of a thing indicates its mode of being. Now the species and\nnature of the operation is understood from the object. But an\nintelligible object, being above time, is everlasting. Hence every\nintellectual substance is incorruptible of its own nature.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Damascene is dealing with perfect immortality, which\nincludes complete immutability; since \"every change is a kind of\ndeath,\" as Augustine says (Contra Maxim. iii). The angels obtain\nperfect immutability only by favor, as will appear later (Q. 62).\n\nReply Obj. 2: By the expression 'gods' Plato understands the heavenly\nbodies, which he supposed to be made up of elements, and therefore\ndissoluble of their own nature; yet they are for ever preserved in\nexistence by the Divine will.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As was observed above (Q. 44, A. 1) there is a kind of\nnecessary thing which has a cause of its necessity. Hence it is not\nrepugnant to a necessary or incorruptible being to depend for its\nexistence on another as its cause. Therefore, when it is said that\nall things, even the angels, would lapse into nothing, unless\npreserved by God, it is not to be gathered therefrom that there is\nany principle of corruption in the angels; but that the nature of the\nangels is dependent upon God as its cause. For a thing is said to be\ncorruptible not merely because God can reduce it to non-existence, by\nwithdrawing His act of preservation; but also because it has some\nprinciple of corruption within itself, or some contrariety, or at\nleast the potentiality of matter.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 51\n\nOF THE ANGELS IN COMPARISON WITH BODIES\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe next inquire about the angels in comparison with corporeal things;\nand in the first place about their comparison with bodies; secondly,\nof the angels in comparison with corporeal places; and, thirdly, of\ntheir comparison with local movement.\n\nUnder the first heading there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them?\n\n(2) Whether they assume bodies?\n\n(3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies assumed?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 51, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Angels Have Bodies Naturally United to Them?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that angels have bodies naturally united\nto them. For Origen says (Peri Archon i): \"It is God's attribute\nalone--that is, it belongs to the Father, the Son, and the Holy\nGhost, as a property of nature, that He is understood to exist\nwithout any material substance and without any companionship of\ncorporeal addition.\" Bernard likewise says (Hom. vi. super Cant.):\n\"Let us assign incorporeity to God alone even as we do immortality,\nwhose nature alone, neither for its own sake nor on account of\nanything else, needs the help of any corporeal organ. But it is clear\nthat every created spirit needs corporeal substance.\" Augustine also\nsays (Gen. ad lit. iii): \"The demons are called animals of the\natmosphere because their nature is akin to that of aerial bodies.\"\nBut the nature of demons and angels is the same. Therefore angels\nhave bodies naturally united to them.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory (Hom. x in Ev.) calls an angel a rational\nanimal. But every animal is composed of body and soul. Therefore\nangels have bodies naturally united to them.\n\nObj. 3: Further, life is more perfect in the angels than in souls.\nBut the soul not only lives, but gives life to the body. Therefore\nthe angels animate bodies which are naturally united to them.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"the angels\nare understood to be incorporeal.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The angels have not bodies naturally united to\nthem. For whatever belongs to any nature as an accident is not found\nuniversally in that nature; thus, for instance, to have wings,\nbecause it is not of the essence of an animal, does not belong to\nevery animal. Now since to understand is not the act of a body, nor\nof any corporeal energy, as will be shown later (Q. 75, A. 2), it\nfollows that to have a body united to it is not of the nature of an\nintellectual substance, as such; but it is accidental to some\nintellectual substance on account of something else. Even so it\nbelongs to the human soul to be united to a body, because it is\nimperfect and exists potentially in the genus of intellectual\nsubstances, not having the fulness of knowledge in its own nature,\nbut acquiring it from sensible things through the bodily senses, as\nwill be explained later on (Q. 84, A. 6; Q. 89, A. 1). Now whenever\nwe find something imperfect in any genus we must presuppose something\nperfect in that genus. Therefore in the intellectual nature there are\nsome perfectly intellectual substances, which do not need to acquire\nknowledge from sensible things. Consequently not all intellectual\nsubstances are united to bodies; but some are quite separated from\nbodies, and these we call angels.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As was said above (Q. 50, A. 1) it was the opinion of\nsome that every being is a body; and consequently some seem to have\nthought that there were no incorporeal substances existing except as\nunited to bodies; so much so that some even held that God was the\nsoul of the world, as Augustine tells us (De Civ. Dei vii). As this\nis contrary to Catholic Faith, which asserts that God is exalted\nabove all things, according to Ps. 8:2: \"Thy magnificence is exalted\nbeyond the heavens\"; Origen, while refusing to say such a thing of\nGod, followed the above opinion of others regarding the other\nsubstances; being deceived here as he was also in many other points,\nby following the opinions of the ancient philosophers. Bernard's\nexpression can be explained, that the created spirit needs some\nbodily instrument, which is not naturally united to it, but assumed\nfor some purpose, as will be explained (A. 2). Augustine speaks,\nnot as asserting the fact, but merely using the opinion of the\nPlatonists, who maintained that there are some aerial animals,\nwhich they termed demons.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Gregory calls the angel a rational animal\nmetaphorically, on account of the likeness to the rational nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To give life effectively is a perfection simply\nspeaking; hence it belongs to God, as is said (1 Kings 2:6): \"The\nLord killeth, and maketh alive.\" But to give life formally belongs to\na substance which is part of some nature, and which has not within\nitself the full nature of the species. Hence an intellectual\nsubstance which is not united to a body is more perfect than one\nwhich is united to a body.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 51, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Angels Assume Bodies?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that angels do not assume bodies. For there\nis nothing superfluous in the work of an angel, as there is nothing of\nthe kind in the work of nature. But it would be superfluous for the\nangels to assume bodies, because an angel has no need for a body,\nsince his own power exceeds all bodily power. Therefore an angel does\nnot assume a body.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every assumption is terminated in some union;\nbecause to assume implies a taking to oneself [ad se sumere]. But a\nbody is not united to an angel as to a form, as stated (A. 1); while\nin so far as it is united to the angel as to a mover, it is not said\nto be assumed, otherwise it would follow that all bodies moved by the\nangels are assumed by them. Therefore the angels do not assume bodies.\n\nObj. 3: Further, angels do not assume bodies from the earth or water,\nor they could not suddenly disappear; nor again from fire, otherwise\nthey would burn whatever things they touched; nor again from air,\nbecause air is without shape or color. Therefore the angels do not\nassume bodies.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi) that angels\nappeared to Abraham under assumed bodies.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that the angels never assume\nbodies, but that all that we read in Scripture of apparitions of\nangels happened in prophetic vision--that is, according to\nimagination. But this is contrary to the intent of Scripture; for\nwhatever is beheld in imaginary vision is only in the beholder's\nimagination, and consequently is not seen by everybody. Yet Divine\nScripture from time to time introduces angels so apparent as to be\nseen commonly by all; just as the angels who appeared to Abraham were\nseen by him and by his whole family, by Lot, and by the citizens of\nSodom; in like manner the angel who appeared to Tobias was seen by all\npresent. From all this it is clearly shown that such apparitions were\nbeheld by bodily vision, whereby the object seen exists outside the\nperson beholding it, and can accordingly be seen by all. Now by such a\nvision only a body can be beheld. Consequently, since the angels are\nnot bodies, nor have they bodies naturally united with them, as is\nclear from what has been said (A. 1; Q. 50, A. 1), it follows that\nthey sometimes assume bodies.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Angels need an assumed body, not for themselves, but on\nour account; that by conversing familiarly with men they may give\nevidence of that intellectual companionship which men expect to have\nwith them in the life to come. Moreover that angels assumed bodies\nunder the Old Law was a figurative indication that the Word of God\nwould take a human body; because all the apparitions in the Old\nTestament were ordained to that one whereby the Son of God appeared\nin the flesh.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The body assumed is united to the angel not as its\nform, nor merely as its mover, but as its mover represented by the\nassumed movable body. For as in the Sacred Scripture the properties\nof intelligible things are set forth by the likenesses of things\nsensible, in the same way by Divine power sensible bodies are so\nfashioned by angels as fittingly to represent the intelligible\nproperties of an angel. And this is what we mean by an angel\nassuming a body.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although air as long as it is in a state of rarefaction\nhas neither shape nor color, yet when condensed it can both be shaped\nand colored as appears in the clouds. Even so the angels assume\nbodies of air, condensing it by the Divine power in so far as is\nneedful for forming the assumed body.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 51, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Angels Exercise Functions of Life in the Bodies Assumed?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels exercise functions of life\nin assumed bodies. For pretence is unbecoming in angels of truth. But\nit would be pretence if the body assumed by them, which seems to live\nand to exercise vital functions, did not possess these functions.\nTherefore the angels exercise functions of life in the assumed body.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in the works of the angels there is nothing without\na purpose. But eyes, nostrils, and the other instruments of the\nsenses, would be fashioned without a purpose in the body assumed by\nthe angel, if he perceived nothing by their means. Consequently, the\nangel perceives by the assumed body; and this is the most special\nfunction of life.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to move hither and thither is one of the functions\nof life, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii). But the angels are\nmanifestly seen to move in their assumed bodies. For it was said\n(Gen. 18:16) that \"Abraham walked with\" the angels, who had appeared\nto him, \"bringing them on the way\"; and when Tobias said to the angel\n(Tob. 5:7, 8): \"Knowest thou the way that leadeth to the city of\nMedes?\" he answered: \"I know it; and I have often walked through all\nthe ways thereof.\" Therefore the angels often exercise functions of\nlife in assumed bodies.\n\nObj. 4: Further, speech is the function of a living subject, for it\nis produced by the voice, while the voice itself is a sound conveyed\nfrom the mouth. But it is evident from many passages of Sacred\nScripture that angels spoke in assumed bodies. Therefore in their\nassumed bodies they exercise functions of life.\n\nObj. 5: Further, eating is a purely animal function. Hence the Lord\nafter His Resurrection ate with His disciples in proof of having\nresumed life (Luke 24). Now when angels appeared in their assumed\nbodies they ate, and Abraham offered them food, after having\npreviously adored them as God (Gen. 18). Therefore the angels\nexercise functions of life in assumed bodies.\n\nObj. 6: Further, to beget offspring is a vital act. But this has\nbefallen the angels in their assumed bodies; for it is related:\n\"After the sons of God went in to the daughters of men, and they\nbrought forth children, these are the mighty men of old, men of\nrenown\" (Gen. 6:4). Consequently the angels exercised vital\nfunctions in their assumed bodies.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The bodies assumed by angels have no life, as was\nstated in the previous article (ad 3). Therefore they cannot exercise\nfunctions of life through assumed bodies.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some functions of living subjects have something in\ncommon with other operations; just as speech, which is the function of\na living creature, agrees with other sounds of inanimate things, in so\nfar as it is sound; and walking agrees with other movements, in so far\nas it is movement. Consequently vital functions can be performed in\nassumed bodies by the angels, as to that which is common in such\noperations; but not as to that which is special to living subjects;\nbecause, according to the Philosopher (De Somn. et Vig. i), \"that\nwhich has the faculty has the action.\" Hence nothing can have a\nfunction of life except what has life, which is the potential\nprinciple of such action.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As it is in no wise contrary to truth for intelligible\nthings to be set forth in Scripture under sensible figures, since it\nis not said for the purpose of maintaining that intelligible things\nare sensible, but in order that properties of intelligible things may\nbe understood according to similitude through sensible figures; so it\nis not contrary to the truth of the holy angels that through their\nassumed bodies they appear to be living men, although they are really\nnot. For the bodies are assumed merely for this purpose, that the\nspiritual properties and works of the angels may be manifested by the\nproperties of man and of his works. This could not so fittingly be\ndone if they were to assume true men; because the properties of such\nmen would lead us to men, and not to angels.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sensation is entirely a vital function. Consequently it\ncan in no way be said that the angels perceive through the organs of\ntheir assumed bodies. Yet such bodies are not fashioned in vain; for\nthey are not fashioned for the purpose of sensation through them, but\nto this end, that by such bodily organs the spiritual powers of the\nangels may be made manifest; just as by the eye the power of the\nangel's knowledge is pointed out, and other powers by the other\nmembers, as Dionysius teaches (Coel. Hier.).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Movement coming from a united mover is a proper\nfunction of life; but the bodies assumed by the angels are not thus\nmoved, since the angels are not their forms. Yet the angels are moved\naccidentally, when such bodies are moved, since they are in them as\nmovers are in the moved; and they are here in such a way as not to be\nelsewhere, which cannot be said of God. Accordingly, although God is\nnot moved when the things are moved in which He exists, since He is\neverywhere; yet the angels are moved accidentally according to the\nmovement of the bodies assumed. But they are not moved according to\nthe movement of the heavenly bodies, even though they be in them as\nthe movers in the thing moved, because the heavenly bodies do not\nchange place in their entirety; nor for the spirit which moves the\nworld is there any fixed locality according to any restricted part of\nthe world's substance, which now is in the east, and now in the west,\nbut according to a fixed quarter; because \"the moving energy is\nalways in the east,\" as stated in Phys. viii, text 84.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Properly speaking, the angels do not talk through their\nassumed bodies; yet there is a semblance of speech, in so far as they\nfashion sounds in the air like to human voices.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Properly speaking, the angels cannot be said to eat,\nbecause eating involves the taking of food convertible into the\nsubstance of the eater.\n\nAlthough after the Resurrection food was not converted into the\nsubstance of Christ's body, but resolved into pre-existing matter;\nnevertheless Christ had a body of such a true nature that food could\nbe changed into it; hence it was a true eating. But the food taken by\nangels was neither changed into the assumed body, nor was the body of\nsuch a nature that food could be changed into it; consequently, it was\nnot a true eating, but figurative of spiritual eating. This is what\nthe angel said to Tobias: \"When I was with you, I seemed indeed to eat\nand to drink; but I use an invisible meat and drink\" (Tob. 12:19).\n\nAbraham offered them food, deeming them to be men, in whom,\nnevertheless, he worshipped God, as God is wont to be in the\nprophets, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xvi).\n\nReply Obj. 6: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xv): \"Many persons\naffirm that they have had the experience, or have heard from such as\nhave experienced it, that the Satyrs and Fauns, whom the common folk\ncall incubi, have often presented themselves before women, and have\nsought and procured intercourse with them. Hence it is folly to deny\nit. But God's holy angels could not fall in such fashion before the\ndeluge. Hence by the sons of God are to be understood the sons of\nSeth, who were good; while by the daughters of men the Scripture\ndesignates those who sprang from the race of Cain. Nor is it to be\nwondered at that giants should be born of them; for they were not all\ngiants, albeit there were many more before than after the deluge.\"\nStill if some are occasionally begotten from demons, it is not from\nthe seed of such demons, nor from their assumed bodies, but from the\nseed of men taken for the purpose; as when the demon assumes first\nthe form of a woman, and afterwards of a man; just as they take the\nseed of other things for other generating purposes, as Augustine says\n(De Trin. iii), so that the person born is not the child of a demon,\nbut of a man.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 52\n\nOF THE ANGELS IN RELATION TO PLACE\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe now inquire into the place of the angels. Touching this there are\nthree subjects of inquiry:\n\n(1) Is the angel in a place?\n\n(2) Can he be in several places at once?\n\n(3) Can several angels be in the same place?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 52, Art. 1]\n\nWhether an Angel Is in a Place?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an angel is not in a place. For\nBoethius says (De Hebdom.): \"The common opinion of the learned is\nthat things incorporeal are not in a place.\" And again, Aristotle\nobserves (Phys. iv, text 48,57) that \"it is not everything existing\nwhich is in a place, but only a movable body.\" But an angel is not\na body, as was shown above (Q. 50). Therefore an angel is not in a\nplace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, place is a \"quantity having position.\" But\neverything which is in a place has some position. Now to have a\nposition cannot befit an angel, since his substance is devoid of\nquantity, the proper difference of which is to have a position.\nTherefore an angel is not in a place.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to be in a place is to be measured and to be\ncontained by such place, as is evident from the Philosopher (Phys.\niv, text 14,119). But an angel can neither be measured nor contained\nby a place, because the container is more formal than the contained;\nas air with regard to water (Phys. iv, text 35,49). Therefore an\nangel is not in a place.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said in the Collect [*Prayer at Compline,\nDominican Breviary]: \"Let Thy holy angels who dwell herein, keep us\nin peace.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is befitting an angel to be in a place; yet an angel\nand a body are said to be in a place in quite a different sense. A\nbody is said to be in a place in such a way that it is applied to such\nplace according to the contact of dimensive quantity; but there is no\nsuch quantity in the angels, for theirs is a virtual one. Consequently\nan angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the\nangelic power in any manner whatever to any place.\n\nAccordingly there is no need for saying that an angel can be deemed\ncommensurate with a place, or that he occupies a space in the\ncontinuous; for this is proper to a located body which is endowed with\ndimensive quantity. In similar fashion it is not necessary on this\naccount for the angel to be contained by a place; because an\nincorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it comes\ninto contact, and is not contained by it: for the soul is in the body\nas containing it, not as contained by it. In the same way an angel is\nsaid to be in a place which is corporeal, not as the thing contained,\nbut as somehow containing it.\n\nAnd hereby we have the answers to the objections.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 52, Art. 2]\n\nWhether an Angel Can Be in Several Places at Once?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an angel can be in several places at\nonce. For an angel is not less endowed with power than the soul. But\nthe soul is in several places at once, for it is entirely in every\npart of the body, as Augustine says (De Trin. vi). Therefore an angel\ncan be in several places at once.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an angel is in the body which he assumes; and, since\nthe body which he assumes is continuous, it would appear that he is\nin every part thereof. But according to the various parts there are\nvarious places. Therefore the angel is at one time in various places.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that \"where the\nangel operates, there he is.\" But occasionally he operates in several\nplaces at one time, as is evident from the angel destroying Sodom\n(Gen. 19:25). Therefore an angel can be in several places at the one\ntime.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that \"while the\nangels are in heaven, they are not on earth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ An angel's power and nature are finite, whereas the\nDivine power and essence, which is the universal cause of all things,\nis infinite: consequently God through His power touches all things,\nand is not merely present in some places, but is everywhere. Now since\nthe angel's power is finite, it does not extend to all things, but to\none determined thing. For whatever is compared with one power must be\ncompared therewith as one determined thing. Consequently since all\nbeing is compared as one thing to God's universal power, so is one\nparticular being compared as one with the angelic power. Hence, since\nthe angel is in a place by the application of his power to the place,\nit follows that he is not everywhere, nor in several places, but in\nonly one place.\n\nSome, however, have been deceived in this matter. For some who were\nunable to go beyond the reach of their imaginations supposed the\nindivisibility of the angel to be like that of a point; consequently\nthey thought that an angel could be only in a place which is a point.\nBut they were manifestly deceived, because a point is something\nindivisible, yet having its situation; whereas the angel is\nindivisible, and beyond the genus of quantity and situation.\nConsequently there is no occasion for determining in his regard one\nindivisible place as to situation: any place which is either divisible\nor indivisible, great or small suffices, according as to his own\nfree-will he applies his power to a great or to a small body. So the\nentire body to which he is applied by his power, corresponds as one\nplace to him.\n\nNeither, if any angel moves the heavens, is it necessary for him to\nbe everywhere. First of all, because his power is applied only to\nwhat is first moved by him. Now there is one part of the heavens in\nwhich there is movement first of all, namely, the part to the east:\nhence the Philosopher (Phys. vii, text 84) attributes the power of\nthe heavenly mover to the part which is in the east. Secondly,\nbecause philosophers do not hold that one separate substance moves\nall the spheres immediately. Hence it need not be everywhere.\n\nSo, then, it is evident that to be in a place appertains quite\ndifferently to a body, to an angel, and to God. For a body is in a\nplace in a circumscribed fashion, since it is measured by the place.\nAn angel, however, is not there in a circumscribed fashion, since he\nis not measured by the place, but definitively, because he is in a\nplace in such a manner that he is not in another. But God is neither\ncircumscriptively nor definitively there, because He is everywhere.\n\nFrom this we can easily gather an answer to the objections: because\nthe entire subject to which the angelic power is immediately applied,\nis reputed as one place, even though it be continuous.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 52, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Several Angels Can Be at the Same Time in the Same Place?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that several angels can be at the same\ntime in the same place. For several bodies cannot be at the same time\nin the same place, because they fill the place. But the angels do not\nfill a place, because only a body fills a place, so that it be not\nempty, as appears from the Philosopher (Phys. iv, text 52,58).\nTherefore several angels can be in the one place.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there is a greater difference between an angel and a\nbody than there is between two angels. But an angel and a body are at\nthe one time in the one place: because there is no place which is not\nfilled with a sensible body, as we find proved in Phys. iv, text. 58.\nMuch more, then, can two angels be in the same place.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the soul is in every part of the body, according to\nAugustine (De Trin. vi). But demons, although they do not obsess\nsouls, do obsess bodies occasionally; and thus the soul and the demon\nare at the one time in the same place; and consequently for the same\nreason all other spiritual substances.\n\n_On the contrary,_ There are not two souls in the same body.\nTherefore for a like reason there are not two angels in the same\nplace.\n\n_I answer that,_ There are not two angels in the same place. The\nreason of this is because it is impossible for two complete causes to\nbe the causes immediately of one and the same thing. This is evident\nin every class of causes: for there is one proximate form of one\nthing, and there is one proximate mover, although there may be\nseveral remote movers. Nor can it be objected that several\nindividuals may row a boat, since no one of them is a perfect mover,\nbecause no one man's strength is sufficient for moving the boat;\nwhile all together are as one mover, in so far as their united\nstrengths all combine in producing the one movement. Hence, since the\nangel is said to be in one place by the fact that his power touches\nthe place immediately by way of a perfect container, as was said (A.\n1), there can be but one angel in one place.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Several angels are not hindered from being in the same\nplace because of their filling the place; but for another reason, as\nhas been said.\n\nReply Obj. 2: An angel and a body are not in a place in the same way;\nhence the conclusion does not follow.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Not even a demon and a soul are compared to a body\naccording to the same relation of causality; since the soul is its\nform, while the demon is not. Hence the inference does not follow.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 53\n\nOF THE LOCAL MOVEMENT OF THE ANGELS\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe must next consider the local movement of the angels; under which\nheading there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether an angel can be moved locally.\n\n(2) Whether in passing from place to place he passes through\nintervening space?\n\n(3) Whether the angel's movement is in time or instantaneous?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 53, Art. 1]\n\nWhether an Angel Can Be Moved Locally?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that an angel cannot be moved locally. For, as\nthe Philosopher proves (Phys. vi, text 32, 86) \"nothing which is devoid\nof parts is moved\"; because, while it is in the term _wherefrom,_ it\nis not moved; nor while it is in the term _whereto,_ for it is then\nalready moved; consequently it remains that everything which is moved,\nwhile it is being moved, is partly in the term _wherefrom_ and partly\nin the term _whereto._ But an angel is without parts. Therefore an\nangel cannot be moved locally.\n\nObj. 2: Further, movement is \"the act of an imperfect being,\" as\nthe Philosopher says (Phys. iii, text 14). But a beatified angel is\nnot imperfect. Consequently a beatified angel is not moved locally.\n\nObj. 3: Further, movement is simply because of want. But the holy\nangels have no want. Therefore the holy angels are not moved locally.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be\nmoved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be\nsaid that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of\nfaith that Christ's soul descended into Hell. Therefore a beatified\nangel is moved locally.\n\n_I answer that,_ A beatified angel can be moved locally. As, however,\nto be in a place belongs equivocally to a body and to an angel, so\nlikewise does local movement. For a body is in a place in so far as\nit is contained under the place, and is commensurate with the place.\nHence it is necessary for local movement of a body to be commensurate\nwith the place, and according to its exigency. Hence it is that the\ncontinuity of movement is according to the continuity of magnitude;\nand according to priority and posteriority of local movement, as the\nPhilosopher says (Phys. iv, text 99). But an angel is not in a place\nas commensurate and contained, but rather as containing it. Hence it\nis not necessary for the local movement of an angel to be\ncommensurate with the place, nor for it to be according to the\nexigency of the place, so as to have continuity therefrom; but it is\na non-continuous movement. For since the angel is in a place only by\nvirtual contact, as was said above (Q. 52, A. 1), it follows\nnecessarily that the movement of an angel in a place is nothing else\nthan the various contacts of various places successively, and not at\nonce; because an angel cannot be in several places at one time, as\nwas said above (Q. 52, A. 2). Nor is it necessary for these contacts\nto be continuous. Nevertheless a certain kind of continuity can be\nfound in such contacts. Because, as was said above (Q. 52, A. 1),\nthere is nothing to hinder us from assigning a divisible place to an\nangel according to virtual contact; just as a divisible place is\nassigned to a body by contact of magnitude. Hence as a body\nsuccessively, and not all at once, quits the place in which it was\nbefore, and thence arises continuity in its local movement; so\nlikewise an angel can successively quit the divisible place in which\nhe was before, and so his movement will be continuous. And he can all\nat once quit the whole place, and in the same instant apply himself\nto the whole of another place, and thus his movement will not be\ncontinuous.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument fails of its purpose for a twofold\nreason. First of all, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with\nwhat is indivisible according to quantity, to which responds a place\nnecessarily indivisible. And this cannot be said of an angel.\n\nSecondly, because Aristotle's demonstration deals with movement which\nis continuous. For if the movement were not continuous, it might be\nsaid that a thing is moved where it is in the term _wherefrom,_ and\nwhile it is in the term _whereto_: because the very succession of\n\"wheres,\" regarding the same thing, would be called movement: hence,\nin whichever of those \"wheres\" the thing might be, it could be said\nto be moved. But the continuity of movement prevents this; because\nnothing which is continuous is in its term, as is clear, because the\nline is not in the point. Therefore it is necessary for the thing\nmoved to be not totally in either of the terms while it is being\nmoved; but partly in the one, and partly in the other. Therefore,\naccording as the angel's movement is not continuous, Aristotle's\ndemonstration does not hold good. But according as the angel's\nmovement is held to be continuous, it can be so granted, that, while\nan angel is in movement, he is partly in the term _wherefrom,_ and\npartly in the term _whereto_ (yet so that such partiality be not\nreferred to the angel's substance, but to the place); because at the\noutset of his continuous movement the angel is in the whole divisible\nplace from which he begins to be moved; but while he is actually in\nmovement, he is in part of the first place which he quits, and in part\nof the second place which he occupies. This very fact that he can\noccupy the parts of two places appertains to the angel from this, that\nhe can occupy a divisible place by applying his power; as a body does\nby application of magnitude. Hence it follows regarding a body which\nis movable according to place, that it is divisible according to\nmagnitude; but regarding an angel, that his power can be applied to\nsomething which is divisible.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the\nact of an imperfect agent. But the movement which is by application\nof energy is the act of one in act: because energy implies actuality.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The movement of that which is in potentiality is the\nact of an imperfect but the movement of what is in act is not for any\nneed of its own, but for another's need. In this way, because of our\nneed, the angel is moved locally, according to Heb. 1:14: \"They are\nall [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all . . . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to\nminister for them who receive the inheritance of salvation.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 53, Art. 2]\n\nWhether an Angel Passes Through Intermediate Space?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an angel does not pass through\nintermediate space. For everything that passes through a middle space\nfirst travels along a place of its own dimensions, before passing\nthrough a greater. But the place responding to an angel, who is\nindivisible, is confined to a point. Therefore if the angel passes\nthrough middle space, he must reckon infinite points in his movement:\nwhich is not possible.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an angel is of simpler substance than the soul.\nBut our soul by taking thought can pass from one extreme to another\nwithout going through the middle: for I can think of France and\nafterwards of Syria, without ever thinking of Italy, which stands\nbetween them. Therefore much more can an angel pass from one\nextreme to another without going through the middle.\n\n_On the contrary,_ If the angel be moved from one place to another,\nthen, when he is in the term \"whither,\" he is no longer in motion, but\nis changed. But a process of changing precedes every actual change:\nconsequently he was being moved while existing in some place. But he\nwas not moved so long as he was in the term \"whence.\" Therefore, he\nwas moved while he was in mid-space: and so it was necessary for him\nto pass through intervening space.\n\n_I answer that,_ As was observed above in the preceding article, the\nlocal motion of an angel can be continuous, and non-continuous. If it\nbe continuous, the angel cannot pass from one extreme to another\nwithout passing through the mid-space; because, as is said by the\nPhilosopher (Phys. v, text 22; vi, text 77), \"The middle is that into\nwhich a thing which is continually moved comes, before arriving at the\nlast into which it is moved\"; because the order of first and last in\ncontinuous movement, is according to the order of the first and last\nin magnitude, as he says (Phys. iv, text 99).\n\nBut if an angel's movement be not continuous, it is possible for him\nto pass from one extreme to another without going through the middle:\nwhich is evident thus. Between the two extreme limits there are\ninfinite intermediate places; whether the places be taken as divisible\nor as indivisible. This is clearly evident with regard to places which\nare indivisible; because between every two points that are infinite\nintermediate points, since no two points follow one another without a\nmiddle, as is proved in Phys. vi, text. 1. And the same must of\nnecessity be said of divisible places: and this is shown from the\ncontinuous movement of a body. For a body is not moved from place to\nplace except in time. But in the whole time which measures the\nmovement of a body, there are not two \"nows\" in which the body moved\nis not in one place and in another; for if it were in one and the same\nplace in two \"nows,\" it would follow that it would be at rest there;\nsince to be at rest is nothing else than to be in the same place now\nand previously. Therefore since there are infinite \"nows\" between the\nfirst and the last \"now\" of the time which measures the movement,\nthere must be infinite places between the first from which the\nmovement begins, and the last where the movement ceases. This again is\nmade evident from sensible experience. Let there be a body of a palm's\nlength, and let there be a plane measuring two palms, along which it\ntravels; it is evident that the first place from which the movement\nstarts is that of the one palm; and the place wherein the movement\nends is that of the other palm. Now it is clear that when it begins to\nmove, it gradually quits the first palm and enters the second.\nAccording, then, as the magnitude of the palm is divided, even so are\nthe intermediate places multiplied; because every distinct point in\nthe magnitude of the first palm is the beginning of a place, and a\ndistinct point in the magnitude of the other palm is the limit of the\nsame. Accordingly, since magnitude is infinitely divisible and the\npoints in every magnitude are likewise infinite in potentiality, it\nfollows that between every two places there are infinite intermediate\nplaces.\n\nNow a movable body only exhausts the infinity of the intermediate\nplaces by the continuity of its movement; because, as the\nintermediate places are infinite in potentiality, so likewise must\nthere be reckoned some infinitudes in movement which is continuous.\nConsequently, if the movement be not continuous, then all the parts\nof the movement will be actually numbered. If, therefore, any movable\nbody be moved, but not by continuous movement, it follows, either\nthat it does not pass through all the intermediate places, or else\nthat it actually numbers infinite places: which is not possible.\nAccordingly, then, as the angel's movement is not continuous, he does\nnot pass through all intermediate places.\n\nNow, the actual passing from one extreme to the other, without going\nthrough the mid-space, is quite in keeping with an angel's nature;\nbut not with that of a body, because a body is measured by and\ncontained under a place; hence it is bound to follow the laws of\nplace in its movement. But an angel's substance is not subject to\nplace as contained thereby, but is above it as containing it: hence\nit is under his control to apply himself to a place just as he wills,\neither through or without the intervening place.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The place of an angel is not taken as equal to him\naccording to magnitude, but according to contact of power: and so the\nangel's place can be divisible, and is not always a mere point. Yet\neven the intermediate divisible places are infinite, as was said\nabove: but they are consumed by the continuity of the movement, as is\nevident from the foregoing.\n\nReply Obj. 2: While an angel is moved locally, his essence is applied\nto various places: but the soul's essence is not applied to the\nthings thought of, but rather the things thought of are in it. So\nthere is no comparison.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In continuous movement the actual change is not a part\nof the movement, but its conclusion; hence movement must precede\nchange. Accordingly such movement is through the mid-space. But in\nmovement which is not continuous, the change is a part, as a unit is\na part of number: hence the succession of the various places, even\nwithout the mid-space, constitutes such movement.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 53, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Movement of an Angel Is Instantaneous?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an angel's movement is instantaneous.\nFor the greater the power of the mover, and the less the moved resist\nthe mover, the more rapid is the movement. But the power of an angel\nmoving himself exceeds beyond all proportion the power which moves a\nbody. Now the proportion of velocities is reckoned according to the\nlessening of the time. But between one length of time and any other\nlength of time there is proportion. If therefore a body is moved in\ntime, an angel is moved in an instant.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the angel's movement is simpler than any bodily\nchange. But some bodily change is effected in an instant, such as\nillumination; both because the subject is not illuminated\nsuccessively, as it gets hot successively; and because a ray does not\nreach sooner what is near than what is remote. Much more therefore is\nthe angel's movement instantaneous.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if an angel be moved from place to place in time, it\nis manifest that in the last instant of such time he is in the term\n_whereto_: but in the whole of the preceding time, he is either in\nthe place immediately preceding, which is taken as the term\n_wherefrom_; or else he is partly in the one, and partly in the\nother, it follows that he is divisible; which is impossible.\nTherefore during the whole of the preceding time he is in the term\n_wherefrom._ Therefore he rests there: since to be at rest is to be\nin the same place now and previously, as was said (A. 2). Therefore\nit follows that he is not moved except in the last instant of time.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In every change there is a before and after. Now\nthe before and after of movement is reckoned by time. Consequently\nevery movement, even of an angel, is in time, since there is a before\nand after in it.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that the local movement of an\nangel is instantaneous. They said that when an angel is moved from\nplace to place, during the whole of the preceding time he is in the\nterm _wherefrom_; but in the last instant of such time he is in the\nterm _whereto._ Nor is there any need for a medium between the terms,\njust as there is no medium between time and the limit of time. But\nthere is a mid-time between two \"nows\" of time: hence they say that a\nlast \"now\" cannot be assigned in which it was in the term _wherefrom,_\njust as in illumination, and in the substantial generation of fire,\nthere is no last instant to be assigned in which the air was dark, or\nin which the matter was under the privation of the form of fire: but a\nlast time can be assigned, so that in the last instant of such time\nthere is light in the air, or the form of fire in the matter. And so\nillumination and substantial generation are called instantaneous\nmovements.\n\nBut this does not hold good in the present case; and it is shown\nthus. It is of the nature of rest that the subject in repose be not\notherwise disposed now than it was before: and therefore in every\n\"now\" of time which measures rest, the subject reposing is in the\nsame \"where\" in the first, in the middle, and in the last \"now.\" On\nthe other hand, it is of the very nature of movement for the subject\nmoved to be otherwise now than it was before: and therefore in every\n\"now\" of time which measures movement, the movable subject is in\nvarious dispositions; hence in the last \"now\" it must have a\ndifferent form from what it had before. So it is evident that to rest\nduring the whole time in some (disposition), for instance, in\nwhiteness, is to be in it in every instant of such time. Hence it is\nnot possible for anything to rest in one term during the whole of the\npreceding time, and afterwards in the last instant of that time to be\nin the other term. But this is possible in movement: because to be\nmoved in any whole time, is not to be in the same disposition in\nevery instant of that time. Therefore all instantaneous changes of\nthe kind are terms of a continuous movement: just as generation is\nthe term of the alteration of matter, and illumination is the term of\nthe local movement of the illuminating body. Now the local movement\nof an angel is not the term of any other continuous movement, but is\nof itself, depending upon no other movement. Consequently it is\nimpossible to say that he is in any place during the whole time, and\nthat in the last \"now\" he is in another place: but some \"now\" must be\nassigned in which he was last in the preceding place. But where there\nare many \"nows\" succeeding one another, there is necessarily time;\nsince time is nothing else than the reckoning of before and after in\nmovement. It remains, then, that the movement of an angel is in time.\nIt is in continuous time if his movement be continuous, and in\nnon-continuous time if his movement is non-continuous for, as was\nsaid (A. 1), his movement can be of either kind, since the continuity\nof time comes of the continuity of movement, as the Philosopher says\n(Phys. iv, text 99).\n\nBut that time, whether it be continuous or not, is not the same as\nthe time which measures the movement of the heavens, and whereby all\ncorporeal things are measured, which have their changeableness from\nthe movement of the heavens; because the angel's movement does not\ndepend upon the movement of the heavens.\n\nReply Obj. 1: If the time of the angel's movement be not continuous,\nbut a kind of succession of 'nows,' it will have no proportion to the\ntime which measures the movement of corporeal things, which is\ncontinuous; since it is not of the same nature. If, however, it be\ncontinuous, it is indeed proportionable, not, indeed, because of the\nproportion of the mover and the movable, but on account of the\nproportion of the magnitudes in which the movement exists. Besides,\nthe swiftness of the angel's movement is not measured by the quantity\nof his power, but according to the determination of his will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Illumination is the term of a movement; and is an\nalteration, not a local movement, as though the light were understood\nto be moved to what is near, before being moved to what is remote.\nBut the angel's movement is local, and, besides, it is not the term\nof movement; hence there is no comparison.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This objection is based on continuous time. But the\nsame time of an angel's movement can be non-continuous. So an angel\ncan be in one place in one instant, and in another place in the next\ninstant, without any time intervening. If the time of the angel's\nmovement be continuous, he is changed through infinite places\nthroughout the whole time which precedes the last 'now'; as was\nalready shown (A. 2). Nevertheless he is partly in one of the\ncontinuous places, and partly in another, not because his substance\nis susceptible of parts, but because his power is applied to a part\nof the first place and to a part of the second, as was said above\n(A. 2).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 54\n\nOF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ANGELS\n(In Five Articles)\n\nAfter considering what belongs to the angel's substance, we now\nproceed to his knowledge. This investigation will be fourfold. In\nthe first place inquiry must be made into his power of knowledge:\nsecondly, into his medium of knowledge: thirdly, into the objects\nknown: and fourthly, into the manner whereby he knows them.\n\nUnder the first heading there are five points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Is the angel's understanding his substance?\n\n(2) Is his being his understanding?\n\n(3) Is his substance his power of intelligence?\n\n(4) Is there in the angels an active and a passive intellect?\n\n(5) Is there in them any other power of knowledge besides the\nintellect?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 1]\n\nWhether an Angel's Act of Understanding Is His Substance?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angel's act of understanding is\nhis substance. For the angel is both higher and simpler than the\nactive intellect of a soul. But the substance of the active intellect\nis its own action; as is evident from Aristotle (De Anima iii) and\nfrom his Commentator [*Averroes, A.D. 1126-1198]. Therefore much more\nis the angel's substance his action--that is, his act of\nunderstanding.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text 39) that\n\"the action of the intellect is life.\" But \"since in living things to\nlive is to be,\" as he says (De Anima ii, text 37), it seems that life\nis essence. Therefore the action of the intellect is the essence of\nan angel who understands.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not\ndiffer from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than the\nmiddle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood\nare the same, at least in so far as he understands his own essence.\nTherefore the act of understanding, which is between the intellect\nand the thing understood, is one with the substance of the angel who\nunderstands.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The action of anything differs more from its\nsubstance than does its existence. But no creature's existence is its\nsubstance, for this belongs to God only, as is evident from what was\nsaid above (Q. 3, A. 4). Therefore neither the action of an angel,\nnor of any other creature, is its substance.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible for the action of an angel, or of\nany creature, to be its own substance. For an action is properly the\nactuality of a power; just as existence is the actuality of a\nsubstance or of an essence. Now it is impossible for anything which\nis not a pure act, but which has some admixture of potentiality, to\nbe its own actuality: because actuality is opposed to potentiality.\nBut God alone is pure act. Hence only in God is His substance the\nsame as His existence and His action.\n\nBesides, if an angel's act of understanding were his substance, it\nwould be necessary for it to be subsisting. Now a subsisting act of\nintelligence can be but one; just as an abstract thing that subsists.\nConsequently an angel's substance would neither be distinguished from\nGod's substance, which is His very act of understanding subsisting in\nitself, nor from the substance of another angel.\n\nAlso, if the angel were his own act of understanding, there could then\nbe no degrees of understanding more or less perfectly; for this comes\nabout through the diverse participation of the act of understanding.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When the active intellect is said to be its own action,\nsuch predication is not essential, but concomitant, because, since\nits very nature consists in act, instantly, so far as lies in itself,\naction accompanies it: which cannot be said of the passive intellect,\nfor this has no actions until after it has been reduced to act.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The relation between \"life\" and \"to live\" is not the\nsame as that between \"essence\" and \"to be\"; but rather as that\nbetween \"a race\" and \"to run,\" one of which signifies the act in the\nabstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow,\nif \"to live\" is \"to be,\" that \"life\" is \"essence.\" Although life is\nsometimes put for the essence, as Augustine says (De Trin. x),\n\"Memory and understanding and will are one essence, one life\": yet it\nis not taken in this sense by the Philosopher, when he says that \"the\nact of the intellect is life.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The action which is transient, passing to some\nextrinsic object, is really a medium between the agent and the\nsubject receiving the action. The action which remains within the\nagent, is not really a medium between the agent and the object, but\nonly according to the manner of expression; for it really follows the\nunion of the object with the agent. For the act of understanding is\nbrought about by the union of the object understood with the one who\nunderstands it, as an effect which differs from both.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 2]\n\nWhether in the Angel to Understand Is to Exist?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in the angel to understand is to\nexist. For in living things to live is to be, as the Philosopher says\n(De Anima ii, text. 37). But to \"understand is in a sense to live\"\n(De Anima ii, text. 37). Therefore in the angel to understand is to\nexist.\n\nObj. 2: Further, cause bears the same relation to cause, as effect to\neffect. But the form whereby the angel exists is the same as the form\nby which he understands at least himself. Therefore in the angel to\nunderstand is to exist.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The angel's act of understanding is his movement,\nas is clear from Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But to exist is not\nmovement. Therefore in the angel to be is not to understand.\n\n_I answer that,_ The action of the angel, as also the action of any\ncreature, is not his existence. For as it is said (Metaph. ix, text.\n16), there is a twofold class of action; one which passes out to\nsomething beyond, and causes passion in it, as burning and cutting;\nand another which does not pass outwards, but which remains within the\nagent, as to feel, to understand, to will; by such actions nothing\noutside is changed, but the whole action takes place within the agent.\nIt is quite clear regarding the first kind of action that it cannot be\nthe agent's very existence: because the agent's existence is signified\nas within him, while such an action denotes something as issuing from\nthe agent into the thing done. But the second action of its own nature\nhas infinity, either simple or relative. As an example of simple\ninfinity, we have the act \"to understand,\" of which the object is \"the\ntrue\"; and the act \"to will,\" of which the object is \"the good\"; each\nof which is convertible with being; and so, to understand and to will,\nof themselves, bear relation to all things, and each receives its\nspecies from its object. But the act of sensation is relatively\ninfinite, for it bears relation to all sensible things; as sight does\nto all things visible. Now the being of every creature is restricted\nto one in genus and species; God's being alone is simply infinite,\ncomprehending all things in itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).\nHence the Divine nature alone is its own act of understanding and its\nown act of will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Life is sometimes taken for the existence of the living\nsubject: sometimes also for a vital operation, that is, for one\nwhereby something is shown to be living. In this way the Philosopher\nsays that to understand is, in a sense, to live: for there he\ndistinguishes the various grades of living things according to the\nvarious functions of life.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The essence of an angel is the reason of his entire\nexistence, but not the reason of his whole act of understanding,\nsince he cannot understand everything by his essence. Consequently\nin its own specific nature as such an essence, it is compared to the\nexistence of the angel, whereas to his act of understanding it is\ncompared as included in the idea of a more universal object, namely,\ntruth and being. Thus it is evident, that, although the form is the\nsame, yet it is not the principle of existence and of understanding\naccording to the same formality. On this account it does not follow\nthat in the angel \"to be\" is the same as 'to understand.'\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 3]\n\nWhether an Angel's Power of Intelligence Is His Essence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in an angel the power or faculty of\nunderstanding is not different from his essence. For, \"mind\" and\n\"intellect\" express the power of understanding. But in many passages\nof his writings, Dionysius styles angels \"intellects\" and \"minds.\"\nTherefore the angel is his own power of intelligence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if the angel's power of intelligence be anything\nbesides his essence, then it must needs be an accident; for that which\nis besides the essence of anything, we call it accident. But \"a simple\nform cannot be a subject,\" as Boethius states (De Trin. 1). Thus an\nangel would not be a simple form, which is contrary to what has been\npreviously said (Q. 50, A. 2).\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine (Confess. xii) says, that God made the\nangelic nature \"nigh unto Himself,\" while He made primary matter \"nigh\nunto nothing\"; from this it would seem that the angel is of a simpler\nnature than primary matter, as being closer to God. But primary matter\nis its own power. Therefore much more is an angel his own power of\nintelligence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xi) that \"the angels\nare divided into substance, power, and operation.\" Therefore\nsubstance, power, and operation, are all distinct in them.\n\n_I answer that,_ Neither in an angel nor in any creature, is the power\nor operative faculty the same as its essence: which is made evident\nthus. Since every power is ordained to an act, then according to the\ndiversity of acts must be the diversity of powers; and on this account\nit is said that each proper act responds to its proper power. But in\nevery creature the essence differs from the existence, and is compared\nto it as potentiality is to act, as is evident from what has been\nalready said (Q. 44, A. 1). Now the act to which the operative\npower is compared is operation. But in the angel to understand is not\nthe same as to exist, nor is any operation in him, nor in any other\ncreated thing, the same as his existence. Hence the angel's essence is\nnot his power of intelligence: nor is the essence of any creature its\npower of operation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: An angel is called \"intellect\" and \"mind,\" because all\nhis knowledge is intellectual: whereas the knowledge of a soul is\npartly intellectual and partly sensitive.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A simple form which is pure act cannot be the subject\nof accident, because subject is compared to accident as potentiality\nis to act. God alone is such a form: and of such is Boethius speaking\nthere. But a simple form which is not its own existence, but is\ncompared to it as potentiality is to act, can be the subject of\naccident; and especially of such accident as follows the species: for\nsuch accident belongs to the form--whereas an accident which belongs\nto the individual, and which does not belong to the whole species,\nresults from the matter, which is the principle of individuation. And\nsuch a simple form is an angel.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The power of matter is a potentiality in regard to\nsubstantial being itself, whereas the power of operation regards\naccidental being. Hence there is no comparison.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 4]\n\nWhether There Is an Active and a Passive Intellect in an Angel?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is both an active and a passive\nintellect in an angel. The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 17)\nthat, \"in the soul, just as in every nature, there is something\nwhereby it can become all things, and there is something whereby it\ncan make all things.\" But an angel is a kind of nature. Therefore\nthere is an active and a passive intellect in an angel.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the proper function of the passive intellect is to\nreceive; whereas to enlighten is the proper function of the active\nintellect, as is made clear in _De Anima_ iii, text. 2, 3, 18. But an\nangel receives enlightenment from a higher angel, and enlightens a\nlower one. Therefore there is in him an active and a passive\nintellect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The distinction of active and passive intellect in\nus is in relation to the phantasms, which are compared to the passive\nintellect as colors to the sight; but to the active intellect as\ncolors to the light, as is clear from _De Anima_ iii, text. 18. But\nthis is not so in the angel. Therefore there is no active and passive\nintellect in the angel.\n\n_I answer that,_ The necessity for admitting a passive intellect in\nus is derived from the fact that we understand sometimes only in\npotentiality, and not actually. Hence there must exist some power,\nwhich, previous to the act of understanding, is in potentiality to\nintelligible things, but which becomes actuated in their regard when\nit apprehends them, and still more when it reflects upon them. This is\nthe power which is denominated the passive intellect. The necessity\nfor admitting an active intellect is due to this--that the natures of\nthe material things which we understand do not exist outside the soul,\nas immaterial and actually intelligible, but are only intelligible in\npotentiality so long as they are outside the soul. Consequently it is\nnecessary that there should be some power capable of rendering such\nnatures actually intelligible: and this power in us is called the\nactive intellect.\n\nBut each of these necessities is absent from the angels. They are\nneither sometimes understanding only in potentiality, with regard to\nsuch things as they naturally apprehend; nor, again, are their\nintelligible objects intelligible in potentiality, but they are\nactually such; for they first and principally understand immaterial\nthings, as will appear later (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 1). Therefore\nthere cannot be an active and a passive intellect in them, except\nequivocally.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the words themselves show, the Philosopher\nunderstands those two things to be in every nature in which there\nchances to be generation or making. Knowledge, however, is not\ngenerated in the angels, but is present naturally. Hence there is\nno need for admitting an active and a passive intellect in them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is the function of the active intellect to\nenlighten, not another intellect, but things which are intelligible\nin potentiality, in so far as by abstraction it makes them to be\nactually intelligible. It belongs to the passive intellect to be in\npotentiality with regard to things which are naturally capable of\nbeing known, and sometimes to apprehend them actually. Hence for one\nangel to enlighten another does not belong to the notion of an active\nintellect: neither does it belong to the passive intellect for the\nangel to be enlightened with regard to supernatural mysteries, to the\nknowledge of which he is sometimes in potentiality. But if anyone\nwishes to call these by the names of active and passive intellect, he\nwill then be speaking equivocally; and it is not about names that we\nneed trouble.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 54, Art. 5]\n\nWhether There Is Only Intellectual Knowledge in the Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of the angels is not\nexclusively intellectual. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei viii) that\nin the angels there is \"life which understands and feels.\" Therefore\nthere is a sensitive faculty in them as well.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Isidore says (De Summo Bono) that the angels have\nlearnt many things by experience. But experience comes of many\nremembrances, as stated in _Metaph._ i, 1. Consequently they have\nlikewise a power of memory.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that there is a sort\nof \"perverted phantasy\" in the demons. But phantasy belongs to the\nimaginative faculty. Therefore the power of the imagination is in the\ndemons; and for the same reason it is in the angels, since they are\nof the same nature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. 29 in Ev.), that \"man senses\nin common with the brutes, and understands with the angels.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In our soul there are certain powers whose operations\nare exercised by corporeal organs; such powers are acts of sundry\nparts of the body, as sight of the eye, and hearing of the ear. There\nare some other powers of the soul whose operations are not performed\nthrough bodily organs, as intellect and will: these are not acts of\nany parts of the body. Now the angels have no bodies naturally joined\nto them, as is manifest from what has been said already (Q. 51, A. 1).\nHence of the soul's powers only intellect and will can belong to them.\n\nThe Commentator (Metaph. xii) says the same thing, namely, that the\nseparated substances are divided into intellect and will. And it is in\nkeeping with the order of the universe for the highest intellectual\ncreature to be entirely intelligent; and not in part, as is our soul.\nFor this reason the angels are called \"intellects\" and \"minds,\" as was\nsaid above (A. 3, ad 1).\n\nA twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. First,\nit may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to\nthe opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have\nbodies naturally united to them. Augustine often makes use of this\nopinion in his books, although he does not mean to assert it; hence\nhe says (De Civ. Dei xxi) that \"such an inquiry does not call for\nmuch labor.\" Secondly, it may be said that such authorities and the\nlike are to be understood by way of similitude. Because, since sense\nhas a sure apprehension of its proper sensible object, it is a common\nusage of speech, when we understand something for certain, to say\nthat we \"sense it.\" And hence it is that we use the word \"sentence.\"\nExperience can be attributed to the angels according to the likeness\nof the things known, although not by likeness of the faculty knowing\nthem. We have experience when we know single objects through the\nsenses: the angels likewise know single objects, as we shall show (Q.\n57, A. 2), yet not through the senses. But memory can be allowed in\nthe angels, according as Augustine (De Trin. x) puts it in the mind;\nalthough it cannot belong to them in so far as it is a part of the\nsensitive soul. In like fashion 'a perverted phantasy' is attributed\nto demons, since they have a false practical estimate of what is the\ntrue good; while deception in us comes properly from the phantasy,\nwhereby we sometimes hold fast to images of things as to the things\nthemselves, as is manifest in sleepers and lunatics.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 55\n\nOF THE MEDIUM OF THE ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE\n(In Three Articles)\n\nNext in order, the question arises as to the medium of the angelic\nknowledge. Under this heading there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Do the angels know everything by their substance, or by some\nspecies?\n\n(2) If by species, is it by connatural species, or is it by such as\nthey have derived from things?\n\n(3) Do the higher angels know by more universal species than the\nlower angels?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 55, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Angels Know All Things by Their Substance?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels know all things by their\nsubstance. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that \"the angels,\naccording to the proper nature of a mind, know the things which are\nhappening upon earth.\" But the angel's nature is his essence.\nTherefore the angel knows things by his essence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, text. 51;\n_De Anima_ iii, text. 15), \"in things which are without matter, the\nintellect is the same as the object understood.\" But the object\nunderstood is the same as the one who understands it, as regards that\nwhereby it is understood. Therefore in things without matter, such as\nthe angels, the medium whereby the object is understood is the very\nsubstance of the one understanding it.\n\nObj. 3: Further, everything which is contained in another is there\naccording to the mode of the container. But an angel has an\nintellectual nature. Therefore whatever is in him is there in an\nintelligible mode. But all things are in him: because the lower\norders of beings are essentially in the higher, while the higher are\nin the lower participatively: and therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom.\niv) that God \"enfolds the whole in the whole,\" i.e. all in all.\nTherefore the angel knows all things in his substance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"the angels are\nenlightened by the forms of things.\" Therefore they know by the forms\nof things, and not by their own substance.\n\n_I answer that,_ The medium through which the intellect understands,\nis compared to the intellect understanding it as its form, because it\nis by the form that the agent acts. Now in order that the faculty may\nbe perfectly completed by the form, it is necessary for all things to\nwhich the faculty extends to be contained under the form. Hence it is\nthat in things which are corruptible, the form does not perfectly\ncomplete the potentiality of the matter: because the potentiality of\nthe matter extends to more things than are contained under this or\nthat form. But the intellective power of the angel extends to\nunderstanding all things: because the object of the intellect is\nuniversal being or universal truth. The angel's essence, however,\ndoes not comprise all things in itself, since it is an essence\nrestricted to a genus and species. This is proper to the Divine\nessence, which is infinite, simply and perfectly to comprise all\nthings in Itself. Therefore God alone knows all things by His\nessence. But an angel cannot know all things by his essence; and his\nintellect must be perfected by some species in order to know things.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When it is said that the angel knows things according\nto his own nature, the words \"according to\" do not determine the\nmedium of such knowledge, since the medium is the similitude of the\nthing known; but they denote the knowing power, which belongs to the\nangel of his own nature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the sense in act is the sensible in act, as stated\nin _De Anima_ ii, text. 53, not so that the sensitive power is the\nsensible object's likeness contained in the sense, but because one\nthing is made from both as from act and potentiality: so likewise the\nintellect in act is said to be the thing understood in act, not that\nthe substance of the intellect is itself the similitude by which it\nunderstands, but because that similitude is its form. Now, it is\nprecisely the same thing to say \"in things which are without matter,\nthe intellect is the same thing as the object understood,\" as to say\nthat \"the intellect in act is the thing understood in act\"; for a\nthing is actually understood, precisely because it is immaterial.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The things which are beneath the angel, and those which\nare above him, are in a measure in his substance, not indeed\nperfectly, nor according to their own proper formality--because the\nangel's essence, as being finite, is distinguished by its own\nformality from other things--but according to some common formality.\nYet all things are perfectly and according to their own formality in\nGod's essence, as in the first and universal operative power, from\nwhich proceeds whatever is proper or common to anything. Therefore\nGod has a proper knowledge of all things by His own essence: and this\nthe angel has not, but only a common knowledge.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 55, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Angels Understand by Species Drawn from Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by species drawn\nfrom things. For everything understood is apprehended by some likeness\nwithin him who understands it. But the likeness of the thing existing\nin another is there either by way of an exemplar, so that the likeness\nis the cause of the thing; or else by way of an image, so that it is\ncaused by such thing. All knowledge, then, of the person understanding\nmust either be the cause of the object understood, or else caused by\nit. Now the angel's knowledge is not the cause of existing things;\nthat belongs to the Divine knowledge alone. Therefore it is necessary\nfor the species, by which the angelic mind understands, to be derived\nfrom things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the angelic light is stronger than the light of the\nactive intellect of the soul. But the light of the active intellect\nabstracts intelligible species from phantasms. Therefore the light of\nthe angelic mind can also abstract species from sensible things. So\nthere is nothing to hinder us from saying that the angel understands\nthrough species drawn from things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the species in the intellect are indifferent to\nwhat is present or distant, except in so far as they are taken from\nsensible objects. Therefore, if the angel does not understand by\nspecies drawn from things, his knowledge would be indifferent as to\nthings present and distant; and so he would be moved locally to no\npurpose.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the \"angels do\nnot gather their Divine knowledge from things divisible or sensible.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The species whereby the angels understand are not\ndrawn from things, but are connatural to them. For we must observe that\nthere is a similarity between the distinction and order of spiritual\nsubstances and the distinction and order of corporeal substances. The\nhighest bodies have in their nature a potentiality which is fully\nperfected by the form; whereas in the lower bodies the potentiality of\nmatter is not entirely perfected by the form, but receives from some\nagent, now one form, now another. In like fashion also the lower\nintellectual substances --that is to say, human souls--have a power\nof understanding which is not naturally complete, but is successively\ncompleted in them by their drawing intelligible species from things.\nBut in the higher spiritual substances--that is, the angels--the\npower of understanding is naturally complete by intelligible species,\nin so far as they have such species connatural to them, so as to\nunderstand all things which they can know naturally.\n\nThe same is evident from the manner of existence of such substances.\nThe lower spiritual substances--that is, souls--have a nature akin to\na body, in so far as they are the forms of bodies: and consequently\nfrom their very mode of existence it behooves them to seek their\nintelligible perfection from bodies, and through bodies; otherwise\nthey would be united with bodies to no purpose. On the other hand,\nthe higher substances--that is, the angels--are utterly free from\nbodies, and subsist immaterially and in their own intelligible\nnature; consequently they attain their intelligible perfection\nthrough an intelligible outpouring, whereby they received from God\nthe species of things known, together with their intellectual nature.\nHence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8): \"The other things which\nare lower than the angels are so created that they first receive\nexistence in the knowledge of the rational creature, and then in\ntheir own nature.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: There are images of creatures in the angel's mind, not,\nindeed derived from creatures, but from God, Who is the cause of\ncreatures, and in Whom the likenesses of creatures first exist. Hence\nAugustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that, \"As the type, according to\nwhich the creature is fashioned, is in the Word of God before the\ncreature which is fashioned, so the knowledge of the same type exists\nfirst in the intellectual creature, and is afterwards the very\nfashioning of the creature.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: To go from one extreme to the other it is necessary to\npass through the middle. Now the nature of a form in the imagination,\nwhich form is without matter but not without material conditions,\nstands midway between the nature of a form which is in matter, and\nthe nature of a form which is in the intellect by abstraction from\nmatter and from material conditions. Consequently, however powerful\nthe angelic mind might be, it could not reduce material forms to an\nintelligible condition, except it were first to reduce them to the\nnature of imagined forms; which is impossible, since the angel has no\nimagination, as was said above (Q. 54, A. 5). Even granted that he\ncould abstract intelligible species from material things, yet he\nwould not do so; because he would not need them, for he has\nconnatural intelligible species.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The angel's knowledge is quite indifferent as to what\nis near or distant. Nevertheless his local movement is not\npurposeless on that account: for he is not moved to a place for the\npurpose of acquiring knowledge, but for the purpose of operation.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 55, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Higher Angels Understand by More Universal Species Than\nthe Lower Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the higher angels do not understand\nby more universal species than the lower angels. For the universal,\nseemingly, is what is abstracted from particulars. But angels do not\nunderstand by species abstracted from things. Therefore it cannot be\nsaid that the species of the angelic intellect are more or less\nuniversal.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is known in detail is more perfectly known\nthan what is known generically; because to know anything generically\nis, in a fashion, midway between potentiality and act. If, therefore,\nthe higher angels know by more universal species than the lower, it\nfollows that the higher have a more imperfect knowledge than the\nlower; which is not befitting.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the same cannot be the proper type of many. But if\nthe higher angel knows various things by one universal form, which\nthe lower angel knows by several special forms, it follows that the\nhigher angel uses one universal form for knowing various things.\nTherefore he will not be able to have a proper knowledge of each;\nwhich seems unbecoming.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii) that the higher\nangels have a more universal knowledge than the lower. And in _De\nCausis_ it is said that the higher angels have more universal forms.\n\n_I answer that,_ For this reason are some things of a more exalted\nnature, because they are nearer to and more like unto the first, which\nis God. Now in God the whole plenitude of intellectual knowledge is\ncontained in one thing, that is to say, in the Divine essence, by\nwhich God knows all things. This plenitude of knowledge is found in\ncreated intellects in a lower manner, and less simply. Consequently it\nis necessary for the lower intelligences to know by many forms what\nGod knows by one, and by so many forms the more according as the\nintellect is lower.\n\nThus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be\nable to apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects. Therefore\nhis forms must be more universal; each one of them, as it were,\nextending to more things. An example of this can in some measure be\nobserved in ourselves. For some people there are who cannot grasp an\nintelligible truth, unless it be explained to them in every part and\ndetail; this comes of their weakness of intellect: while there are\nothers of stronger intellect, who can grasp many things from few.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is accidental to the universal to be abstracted from\nparticulars, in so far as the intellect knowing it derives its\nknowledge from things. But if there be an intellect which does not\nderive its knowledge from things, the universal which it knows will\nnot be abstracted from things, but in a measure will be pre-existing\nto them; either according to the order of causality, as the universal\nideas of things are in the Word of God; or at least in the order of\nnature, as the universal ideas of things are in the angelic mind.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To know anything universally can be taken in two\nsenses. In one way, on the part of the thing known, namely, that only\nthe universal nature of the thing is known. To know a thing thus is\nsomething less perfect: for he would have but an imperfect knowledge\nof a man who only knew him to be an animal. In another way, on the\npart of the medium of such knowledge. In this way it is more perfect\nto know a thing in the universal; for the intellect, which by one\nuniversal medium can know each of the things which are properly\ncontained in it, is more perfect than one which cannot.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The same cannot be the proper and adequate type of\nseveral things. But if it be eminent, then it can be taken as the\nproper type and likeness of many. Just as in man, there is a\nuniversal prudence with respect to all the acts of the virtues; which\ncan be taken as the proper type and likeness of that prudence which\nin the lion leads to acts of magnanimity, and in the fox to acts of\nwariness; and so on of the rest. The Divine essence, on account of\nIts eminence, is in like fashion taken as the proper type of each\nthing contained therein: hence each one is likened to It according to\nits proper type. The same applies to the universal form which is in\nthe mind of the angel, so that, on account of its excellence, many\nthings can be known through it with a proper knowledge.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 56\n\nOF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF IMMATERIAL THINGS\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe now inquire into the knowledge of the angels with regard to the\nobjects known by them. We shall treat of their knowledge, first, of\nimmaterial things, secondly of things material. Under the first\nheading there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Does an angel know himself?\n\n(2) Does one angel know another?\n\n(3) Does the angel know God by his own natural principles?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 56, Art 1]\n\nWhether an Angel Knows Himself?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an angel does not know himself. For\nDionysius says that \"the angels do not know their own powers\" (Coel.\nHier. vi). But, when the substance is known, the power is known.\nTherefore an angel does not know his own essence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an angel is a single substance, otherwise he would\nnot act, since acts belong to single subsistences. But nothing single\nis intelligible. Therefore, since the angel possesses only knowledge\nwhich is intellectual, no angel can know himself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the intellect is moved by the intelligible object:\nbecause, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 4 understanding is a kind of\npassion. But nothing is moved by or is passive to itself; as appears\nin corporeal things. Therefore the angel cannot understand himself.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii) that \"the angel\nknew himself when he was established, that is, enlightened by truth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As is evident from what has been previously said\n(Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 54, A. 2), the object is on a different footing in\nan immanent, and in a transient, action. In a transient action the\nobject or matter into which the action passes is something separate\nfrom the agent, as the thing heated is from what gave it heat, and\nthe building from the builder; whereas in an immanent action, for the\naction to proceed, the object must be united with the agent; just as\nthe sensible object must be in contact with sense, in order that\nsense may actually perceive. And the object which is united to a\nfaculty bears the same relation to actions of this kind as does the\nform which is the principle of action in other agents: for, as heat\nis the formal principle of heating in the fire, so is the species of\nthe thing seen the formal principle of sight to the eye.\n\nIt must, however, be borne in mind that this image of the object\nexists sometimes only potentially in the knowing faculty; and then\nthere is only knowledge in potentiality; and in order that there may\nbe actual knowledge, it is required that the faculty of knowledge be\nactuated by the species. But if it always actually possesses the\nspecies, it can thereby have actual knowledge without any preceding\nchange or reception. From this it is evident that it is not of the\nnature of knower, as knowing, to be moved by the object, but as\nknowing in potentiality. Now, for the form to be the principle of the\naction, it makes no difference whether it be inherent in something\nelse, or self-subsisting; because heat would give forth heat none the\nless if it were self-subsisting, than it does by inhering in something\nelse. So therefore, if in the order of intelligible beings there be\nany subsisting intelligible form, it will understand itself. And since\nan angel is immaterial, he is a subsisting form; and, consequently, he\nis actually intelligible. Hence it follows that he understands himself\nby his form, which is his substance.\n\nReply Obj. 1: That is the text of the old translation, which is\namended in the new one, and runs thus: \"furthermore they,\" that is\nto say the angels, \"knew their own powers\": instead of which the\nold translation read--\"and furthermore they do not know their own\npowers.\" Although even the letter of the old translation might be\nkept in this respect, that the angels do not know their own power\nperfectly; according as it proceeds from the order of the Divine\nWisdom, Which to the angels is incomprehensible.\n\nReply Obj. 2: We have no knowledge of single corporeal things, not\nbecause of their particularity, but on account of the matter, which\nis their principle of individuation. Accordingly, if there be any\nsingle things subsisting without matter, as the angels are, there is\nnothing to prevent them from being actually intelligible.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It belongs to the intellect, in so far as it is in\npotentiality, to be moved and to be passive. Hence this does not\nhappen in the angelic intellect, especially as regards the fact that\nhe understands himself. Besides the action of the intellect is not of\nthe same nature as the action found in corporeal things, which passes\ninto some other matter.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 56, Art. 2]\n\nWhether One Angel Knows Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one angel does not know another. For\nthe Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 4), that if the human\nintellect were to have in itself any one of the sensible things, then\nsuch a nature existing within it would prevent it from apprehending\nexternal things; as likewise, if the pupil of the eye were colored\nwith some particular color, it could not see every color. But as the\nhuman intellect is disposed for understanding corporeal things, so is\nthe angelic mind for understanding immaterial things. Therefore, since\nthe angelic intellect has within itself some one determinate nature\nfrom the number of such natures, it would seem that it cannot\nunderstand other natures.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is stated in _De Causis_ that \"every intelligence\nknows what is above it, in so far as it is caused by it; and what is\nbeneath it, in so far as it is its cause.\" But one angel is not the\ncause of another. Therefore one angel does not know another.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one angel cannot be known to another angel by the\nessence of the one knowing; because all knowledge is effected by way\nof a likeness. But the essence of the angel knowing is not like the\nessence of the angel known, except generically; as is clear from what\nhas been said before (Q. 50, A. 4; Q. 55, A. 1, ad 3). Hence, it\nfollows that one angel would not have a particular knowledge of\nanother, but only a general knowledge. In like manner it cannot be\nsaid that one angel knows another by the essence of the angel known;\nbecause that whereby the intellect understands is something within\nthe intellect; whereas the Trinity alone can penetrate the mind.\nAgain, it cannot be said that one angel knows the other by a species;\nbecause that species would not differ from the angel understood,\nsince each is immaterial. Therefore in no way does it appear that one\nangel can understand another.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if one angel did understand another, this would be\neither by an innate species; and so it would follow that, if God were\nnow to create another angel, such an angel could not be known by the\nexisting angels; or else he would have to be known by a species drawn\nfrom things; and so it would follow that the higher angels could not\nknow the lower, from whom they receive nothing. Therefore in no way\ndoes it seem that one angel knows another.\n\n_On the contrary,_ We read in _De Causis_ that \"every intelligence\nknows the things which are not corrupted.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. lit. ii), such things\nas pre-existed from eternity in the Word of God, came forth from Him\nin two ways: first, into the angelic mind; and secondly, so as to\nsubsist in their own natures. They proceeded into the angelic mind in\nsuch a way, that God impressed upon the angelic mind the images of the\nthings which He produced in their own natural being. Now in the Word\nof God from eternity there existed not only the forms of corporeal\nthings, but likewise the forms of all spiritual creatures. So in every\none of these spiritual creatures, the forms of all things, both\ncorporeal and spiritual, were impressed by the Word of God; yet so\nthat in every angel there was impressed the form of his own species\naccording to both its natural and its intelligible condition, so that\nhe should subsist in the nature of his species, and understand himself\nby it; while the forms of other spiritual and corporeal natures were\nimpressed in him only according to their intelligible natures, so that\nby such impressed species he might know corporeal and spiritual\ncreatures.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The spiritual natures of the angels are distinguished\nfrom one another in a certain order, as was already observed (Q. 50,\nA. 4, ad 1, 2). So the nature of an angel does not hinder him from\nknowing the other angelic natures, since both the higher and lower\nbear affinity to his nature, the only difference being according to\ntheir various degrees of perfection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The nature of cause and effect does not lead one angel\nto know another, except on account of likeness, so far as cause and\neffect are alike. Therefore if likeness without causality be admitted\nin the angels, this will suffice for one to know another.\n\nReply Obj. 3: One angel knows another by the species of such angel\nexisting in his intellect, which differs from the angel whose image\nit is, not according to material and immaterial nature, but according\nto natural and intentional existence. The angel is himself a\nsubsisting form in his natural being; but his species in the\nintellect of another angel is not so, for there it possesses only\nan intelligible existence. As the form of color on the wall has a\nnatural existence; but, in the deferent medium, it has only\nintentional existence.\n\nReply Obj. 4: God made every creature proportionate to the universe\nwhich He determined to make. Therefore had God resolved to make more\nangels or more natures of things, He would have impressed more\nintelligible species in the angelic minds; as a builder who, if he\nhad intended to build a larger house, would have made larger\nfoundations. Hence, for God to add a new creature to the universe,\nmeans that He would add a new intelligible species to an angel.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 56, Art. 3]\n\nWhether an Angel Knows God by His Own Natural Principles?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels cannot know God by their\nnatural principles. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that God \"by His\nincomprehensible might is placed above all heavenly minds.\" Afterwards\nhe adds that, \"since He is above all substances, He is remote from all\nknowledge.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, God is infinitely above the intellect of an angel.\nBut what is infinitely beyond cannot be reached. Therefore it appears\nthat an angel cannot know God by his natural principles.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 13:12): \"We see now through a\nglass in a dark manner; but then face to face.\" From this it appears\nthat there is a twofold knowledge of God; the one, whereby He is seen\nin His essence, according to which He is said to be seen face to\nface; the other whereby He is seen in the mirror of creatures. As was\nalready shown (Q. 12, A. 4), an angel cannot have the former\nknowledge by his natural principles. Nor does vision through a mirror\nbelong to the angels, since they do not derive their knowledge of God\nfrom sensible things, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. vii).\nTherefore the angels cannot know God by their natural powers.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The angels are mightier in knowledge than men. Yet\nmen can know God through their natural principles; according to Rom.\n1:19: \"what is known of God is manifest in them.\" Therefore much more\nso can the angels.\n\n_I answer that,_ The angels can have some knowledge of God by their\nown principles. In evidence whereof it must be borne in mind that a\nthing is known in three ways: first, by the presence of its essence\nin the knower, as light can be seen in the eye; and so we have said\nthat an angel knows himself--secondly, by the presence of its\nsimilitude in the power which knows it, as a stone is seen by the eye\nfrom its image being in the eye--thirdly, when the image of the\nobject known is not drawn directly from the object itself, but from\nsomething else in which it is made to appear, as when we behold a man\nin a mirror.\n\nTo the first-named class that knowledge of God is likened by which He\nis seen through His essence; and knowledge such as this cannot accrue\nto any creature from its natural principles, as was said above\n(Q. 12, A. 4). The third class comprises the knowledge whereby we\nknow God while we are on earth, by His likeness reflected in\ncreatures, according to Rom. 1:20: \"The invisible things of God are\nclearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.\" Hence,\ntoo, we are said to see God in a mirror. But the knowledge, whereby\naccording to his natural principles the angel knows God, stands midway\nbetween these two; and is likened to that knowledge whereby a thing is\nseen through the species abstracted from it. For since God's image is\nimpressed on the very nature of the angel in his essence, the angel\nknows God in as much as he is the image of God. Yet he does not behold\nGod's essence; because no created likeness is sufficient to represent\nthe Divine essence. Such knowledge then approaches rather to the\nspecular kind; because the angelic nature is itself a kind of mirror\nrepresenting the Divine image.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Dionysius is speaking of the knowledge of\ncomprehension, as his words expressly state. In this way God is not\nknown by any created intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since an angel's intellect and essence are infinitely\nremote from God, it follows that he cannot comprehend Him; nor can he\nsee God's essence through his own nature. Yet it does not follow on\nthat account that he can have no knowledge of Him at all: because, as\nGod is infinitely remote from the angel, so the knowledge which God\nhas of Himself is infinitely above the knowledge which an angel has\nof Him.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The knowledge which an angel has of God is midway\nbetween these two kinds of knowledge; nevertheless it approaches more\nto one of them, as was said above.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 57\n\nOF THE ANGEL'S KNOWLEDGE OF MATERIAL THINGS\n(In Five Articles)\n\nWe next investigate the material objects which are known by the\nangels. Under this heading there are five points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the angels know the natures of material things?\n\n(2) Whether they know single things?\n\n(3) Whether they know the future?\n\n(4) Whether they know secret thoughts?\n\n(5) Whether they know all mysteries of grace?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Angels Know Material Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels do not know material\nthings. For the object understood is the perfection of him who\nunderstands it. But material things cannot be the perfections of\nangels, since they are beneath them. Therefore the angels do not\nknow material things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, intellectual vision is only of such things as exist\nwithin the soul by their essence, as is said in the gloss [*On 2 Cor.\n12:2, taken from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii. 28)]. But the material\nthings cannot enter by their essence into man's soul, nor into the\nangel's mind. Therefore they cannot be known by intellectual vision,\nbut only by imaginary vision, whereby the images of bodies are\napprehended, and by sensible vision, which regards bodies in\nthemselves. Now there is neither imaginary nor sensible vision in\nthe angels, but only intellectual. Therefore the angels cannot know\nmaterial things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, material things are not actually intelligible, but\nare knowable by apprehension of sense and of imagination, which does\nnot exist in angels. Therefore angels do not know material things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Whatever the lower power can do, the higher can do\nlikewise. But man's intellect, which in the order of nature is\ninferior to the angel's, can know material things. Therefore much\nmore can the mind of an angel.\n\n_I answer that,_ The established order of things is for the higher\nbeings to be more perfect than the lower; and for whatever is\ncontained deficiently, partially, and in manifold manner in the lower\nbeings, to be contained in the higher eminently, and in a certain\ndegree of fulness and simplicity. Therefore, in God, as in the highest\nsource of things, all things pre-exist supersubstantially in respect\nof His simple Being itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1). But among\nother creatures the angels are nearest to God, and resemble Him most;\nhence they share more fully and more perfectly in the Divine goodness,\nas Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Consequently, all material things\npre-exist in the angels more simply and less materially even than in\nthemselves, yet in a more manifold manner and less perfectly than in\nGod.\n\nNow whatever exists in any subject, is contained in it after the\nmanner of such subject. But the angels are intellectual beings of\ntheir own nature. Therefore, as God knows material things by His\nessence, so do the angels know them, forasmuch as they are in the\nangels by their intelligible species.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The thing understood is the perfection of the one who\nunderstands, by reason of the intelligible species which he has in\nhis intellect. And thus the intelligible species which are in the\nintellect of an angel are perfections and acts in regard to that\nintellect.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sense does not apprehend the essences of things, but\nonly their outward accidents. In like manner neither does the\nimagination; for it apprehends only the images of bodies. The\nintellect alone apprehends the essences of things. Hence it is said\n(De Anima iii, text. 26) that the object of the intellect is \"what a\nthing is,\" regarding which it does not err; as neither does sense\nregarding its proper sensible object. So therefore the essences of\nmaterial things are in the intellect of man and angels, as the thing\nunderstood is in him who understands, and not according to their real\nnatures. But some things are in an intellect or in the soul according\nto both natures; and in either case there is intellectual vision.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If an angel were to draw his knowledge of material\nthings from the material things themselves, he would require to make\nthem actually intelligible by a process of abstraction. But he does\nnot derive his knowledge of them from the material things themselves;\nhe has knowledge of material things by actually intelligible species\nof things, which species are connatural to him; just as our intellect\nhas, by species which it makes intelligible by abstraction.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 2]\n\nWhether an Angel Knows Singulars?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that angels do not know singulars. For the\nPhilosopher says (Poster. i, text. 22): \"The sense has for its object\nsingulars, but the intellect, universals.\" Now, in the angels there is\nno power of understanding save the intellectual power, as is evident\nfrom what was said above (Q. 54, A. 5). Consequently they do not\nknow singulars.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all knowledge comes about by some assimilation of\nthe knower to the object known. But it is not possible for any\nassimilation to exist between an angel and a singular object, in so\nfar as it is singular; because, as was observed above (Q. 50, A. 2),\nan angel is immaterial, while matter is the principle of singularity.\nTherefore the angel cannot know singulars.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if an angel does know singulars, it is either by\nsingular or by universal species. It is not by singular species;\nbecause in this way he would require to have an infinite number of\nspecies. Nor is it by universal species; since the universal is not\nthe sufficient principle for knowing the singular as such, because\nsingular things are not known in the universal except potentially.\nTherefore the angel does not know singulars.\n\n_On the contrary,_ No one can guard what he does not know. But angels\nguard individual men, according to Ps. 90:11: \"He hath given His\nangels charge over Thee.\" Consequently the angels know singulars.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have denied to the angels all knowledge of\nsingulars. In the first place this derogates from the Catholic faith,\nwhich asserts that these lower things are administered by angels,\naccording to Heb. 1:14: \"They are all ministering spirits.\" Now, if\nthey had no knowledge of singulars, they could exercise no provision\nover what is going on in this world; since acts belong to individuals:\nand this is against the text of Eccles. 5:5: \"Say not before the\nangel: There is no providence.\" Secondly, it is also contrary to the\nteachings of philosophy, according to which the angels are stated to\nbe the movers of the heavenly spheres, and to move them according to\ntheir knowledge and will.\n\nConsequently others have said that the angel possesses knowledge of\nsingulars, but in their universal causes, to which all particular\neffects are reduced; as if the astronomer were to foretell a coming\neclipse from the dispositions of the movements of the heavens. This\nopinion does not escape the aforesaid implications; because, to know\na singular, merely in its universal causes, is not to know it as\nsingular, that is, as it exists here and now. The astronomer, knowing\nfrom computation of the heavenly movements that an eclipse is about to\nhappen, knows it in the universal; yet he does not know it as taking\nplace now, except by the senses. But administration, providence and\nmovement are of singulars, as they are here and now existing.\n\nTherefore, it must be said differently, that, as man by his various\npowers of knowledge knows all classes of things, apprehending\nuniversals and immaterial things by his intellect, and things\nsingular and corporeal by the senses, so an angel knows both by his\none mental power. For the order of things runs in this way, that\nthe higher a thing is, so much the more is its power united and\nfar-reaching: thus in man himself it is manifest that the common\nsense which is higher than the proper sense, although it is but one\nfaculty, knows everything apprehended by the five outward senses,\nand some other things which no outer sense knows; for example, the\ndifference between white and sweet. The same is to be observed in\nother cases. Accordingly, since an angel is above man in the order of\nnature, it is unreasonable to say that a man knows by any one of his\npowers something which an angel by his one faculty of knowledge,\nnamely, the intellect, does not know. Hence Aristotle pronounces it\nridiculous to say that a discord, which is known to us, should be\nunknown to God (De Anima i, text. 80; _Metaph._ text. 15).\n\nThe manner in which an angel knows singular things can be considered\nfrom this, that, as things proceed from God in order that they may\nsubsist in their own natures, so likewise they proceed in order that\nthey may exist in the angelic mind. Now it is clear that there comes\nforth from God not only whatever belongs to their universal nature,\nbut likewise all that goes to make up their principles of\nindividuation; since He is the cause of the entire substance of the\nthing, as to both its matter and its form. And for as much as He\ncauses, does He know; for His knowledge is the cause of a thing, as\nwas shown above (Q. 14, A. 8). Therefore as by His essence, by which\nHe causes all things, God is the likeness of all things, and knows\nall things, not only as to their universal natures, but also as to\ntheir singularity; so through the species imparted to them do the\nangels know things, not only as to their universal nature, but\nlikewise in their individual conditions, in so far as they are the\nmanifold representations of that one simple essence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of our intellect, which\napprehends only by a process of abstraction; and by such abstraction\nfrom material conditions the thing abstracted becomes a universal.\nSuch a manner of understanding is not in keeping with the nature of\nthe angels, as was said above (Q. 55, A. 2, A. 3 ad 1), and\nconsequently there is no comparison.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is not according to their nature that the angels\nare likened to material things, as one thing resembles another by\nagreement in genus, species, or accident; but as the higher bears\nresemblance to the lower, as the sun does to fire. Even in this way\nthere is in God a resemblance of all things, as to both matter and\nform, in so far as there pre-exists in Him as in its cause whatever\nis to be found in things. For the same reason, the species in the\nangel's intellect, which are images drawn from the Divine essence,\nare the images of things not only as to their form, but also as to\ntheir matter.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Angels know singulars by universal forms, which\nnevertheless are the images of things both as to their universal, and\nas to their individuating principles. How many things can be known by\nthe same species, has been already stated above (Q. 55, A. 3, ad 3).\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Angels Know the Future?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels know future events. For\nangels are mightier in knowledge than men. But some men know many\nfuture events. Therefore much more do the angels.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the present and the future are differences of time.\nBut the angel's intellect is above time; because, as is said in _De\nCausis,_ \"an intelligence keeps pace with eternity,\" that is,\naeviternity. Therefore, to the angel's mind, past and future are not\ndifferent, but he knows each indifferently.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the angel does not understand by species derived\nfrom things, but by innate universal species. But universal species\nrefer equally to present, past, and future. Therefore it appears\nthat the angels know indifferently things past, present, and future.\n\nObj. 4: Further, as a thing is spoken of as distant by reason of\ntime, so is it by reason of place. But angels know things which are\ndistant according to place. Therefore they likewise know things\ndistant according to future time.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Whatever is the exclusive sign of the Divinity,\ndoes not belong to the angels. But to know future events is the\nexclusive sign of the Divinity, according to Isa. 41:23: \"Show the\nthings that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are\ngods.\" Therefore the angels do not know future events.\n\n_I answer that,_ The future can be known in two ways. First, it can be\nknown in its cause. And thus, future events which proceed necessarily\nfrom their causes, are known with sure knowledge; as that the sun will\nrise tomorrow. But events which proceed from their causes in the\nmajority of cases, are not known for certain, but conjecturally; thus\nthe doctor knows beforehand the health of the patient. This manner of\nknowing future events exists in the angels, and by so much the more\nthan it does in us, as they understand the causes of things both more\nuniversally and more perfectly; thus doctors who penetrate more deeply\ninto the causes of an ailment can pronounce a surer verdict on the\nfuture issue thereof. But events which proceed from their causes in\nthe minority of cases are quite unknown; such as casual and chance\nevents.\n\nIn another way future events are known in themselves. To know the\nfuture in this way belongs to God alone; and not merely to know those\nevents which happen of necessity, or in the majority of cases, but\neven casual and chance events; for God sees all things in His\neternity, which, being simple, is present to all time, and embraces\nall time. And therefore God's one glance is cast over all things\nwhich happen in all time as present before Him; and He beholds all\nthings as they are in themselves, as was said before when dealing\nwith God's knowledge (Q. 14, A. 13). But the mind of an angel, and\nevery created intellect, fall far short of God's eternity; hence the\nfuture as it is in itself cannot be known by any created intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Men cannot know future things except in their causes,\nor by God's revelation. The angels know the future in the same way,\nbut much more distinctly.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although the angel's intellect is above that time\naccording to which corporeal movements are reckoned, yet there is a\ntime in his mind according to the succession of intelligible\nconcepts; of which Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii) that \"God moves\nthe spiritual creature according to time.\" And thus, since there is\nsuccession in the angel's intellect, not all things that happen\nthrough all time, are present to the angelic mind.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the species in the intellect of an angel, in\nso far as they are species, refer equally to things present, past,\nand future; nevertheless the present, past, and future; nevertheless\nthe present, past, and future do not bear the same relations to the\nspecies. Present things have a nature according to which they\nresemble the species in the mind of an angel: and so they can be\nknown thereby. Things which are yet to come have not yet a nature\nwhereby they are likened to such species; consequently, they cannot\nbe known by those species.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Things distant according to place are already existing\nin nature; and share in some species, whose image is in the angel;\nwhereas this is not true of future things, as has been stated.\nConsequently there is no comparison.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Angels Know Secret Thoughts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels know secret thoughts. For\nGregory (Moral. xviii), explaining Job 28:17: \"Gold or crystal cannot\nequal it,\" says that \"then,\" namely in the bliss of those rising from\nthe dead, \"one shall be as evident to another as he is to himself, and\nwhen once the mind of each is seen, his conscience will at the same\ntime be penetrated.\" But those who rise shall be like the angels, as\nis stated (Matt. 22:30). Therefore an angel can see what is in\nanother's conscience.\n\nObj. 2: Further, intelligible species bear the same relation to the\nintellect as shapes do to bodies. But when the body is seen its shape\nis seen. Therefore, when an intellectual substance is seen, the\nintelligible species within it is also seen. Consequently, when one\nangel beholds another, or even a soul, it seems that he can see the\nthoughts of both.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the ideas of our intellect resemble the angel more\nthan do the images in our imagination; because the former are\nactually understood, while the latter are understood only\npotentially. But the images in our imagination can be known by an\nangel as corporeal things are known: because the imagination is a\ncorporeal faculty. Therefore it seems that an angel can know the\nthoughts of the intellect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ What is proper to God does not belong to the\nangels. But it is proper to God to read the secrets of hearts,\naccording to Jer. 17:9: \"The heart is perverse above all things, and\nunsearchable; who can know it? I am the Lord, Who search the heart.\"\nTherefore angels do not know the secrets of hearts.\n\n_I answer that,_ A secret thought can be known in two ways: first, in\nits effect. In this way it can be known not only by an angel, but also\nby man; and with so much the greater subtlety according as the effect\nis the more hidden. For thought is sometimes discovered not merely by\noutward act, but also by change of countenance; and doctors can tell\nsome passions of the soul by the mere pulse. Much more then can\nangels, or even demons, the more deeply they penetrate those occult\nbodily modifications. Hence Augustine says (De divin. daemon.) that\ndemons \"sometimes with the greatest faculty learn man's dispositions,\nnot only when expressed by speech, but even when conceived in thought,\nwhen the soul expresses them by certain signs in the body\"; although\n(Retract. ii, 30) he says \"it cannot be asserted how this is done.\"\n\nIn another way thoughts can be known as they are in the mind, and\naffections as they are in the will: and thus God alone can know the\nthoughts of hearts and affections of wills. The reason of this is,\nbecause the rational creature is subject to God only, and He alone\ncan work in it Who is its principal object and last end: this will be\ndeveloped later (Q. 63, A. 1; Q. 105, A. 5). Consequently all that is\nin the will, and all things that depend only on the will, are known\nto God alone. Now it is evident that it depends entirely on the will\nfor anyone actually to consider anything; because a man who has a\nhabit of knowledge, or any intelligible species, uses them at will.\nHence the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11): \"For what man knoweth the\nthings of a man, but the spirit of a man that is in him?\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the present life one man's thought is not known\nby another owing to a twofold hindrance; namely, on account of the\ngrossness of the body, and because the will shuts up its secrets.\nThe first obstacle will be removed at the Resurrection, and does not\nexist at all in the angels; while the second will remain, and is in\nthe angels now. Nevertheless the brightness of the body will show\nforth the quality of the soul; as to its amount of grace and of\nglory. In this way one will be able to see the mind of another.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although one angel sees the intelligible species of\nanother, by the fact that the species are proportioned to the rank of\nthese substances according to greater or lesser universality, yet it\ndoes not follow that one knows how far another makes use of them by\nactual consideration.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The appetite of the brute does not control its act, but\nfollows the impression of some other corporeal or spiritual cause.\nSince, therefore, the angels know corporeal things and their\ndispositions, they can thereby know what is passing in the appetite\nor in the imaginative apprehension of the brute beasts, and even of\nman, in so far as the sensitive appetite sometimes, through following\nsome bodily impression, influences his conduct, as always happens in\nbrutes. Yet the angels do not necessarily know the movement of the\nsensitive appetite and the imaginative apprehension of man in so far\nas these are moved by the will and reason; because, even the lower\npart of the soul has some share of reason, as obeying its ruler, as\nis said in _Ethics_ iii, 12. But it does not follow that, if the\nangel knows what is passing through man's sensitive appetite or\nimagination, he knows what is in the thought or will: because the\nintellect or will is not subject to the sensitive appetite or the\nimagination, but can make various uses of them.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Angels Know the Mysteries of Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels know mysteries of grace.\nFor, the mystery of the Incarnation is the most excellent of all\nmysteries. But the angels knew of it from the beginning; for Augustine\nsays (Gen. ad lit. v, 19): \"This mystery was hidden in God through the\nages, yet so that it was known to the princes and powers in heavenly\nplaces.\" And the Apostle says (1 Tim. 3:16): \"That great mystery of\ngodliness appeared unto angels*.\" [*Vulg.: 'Great is the mystery of\ngodliness, which . . . appeared unto angels.'] Therefore the angels\nknow the mysteries of grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the reasons of all mysteries of grace are contained\nin the Divine wisdom. But the angels behold God's wisdom, which is\nHis essence. Therefore they know the mysteries of grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the prophets are enlightened by the angels, as is\nclear from Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv). But the prophets knew\nmysteries of grace; for it is said (Amos 3:7): \"For the Lord God doth\nnothing without revealing His secret to His servants the prophets.\"\nTherefore angels know the mysteries of grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ No one learns what he knows already. Yet even the\nhighest angels seek out and learn mysteries of grace. For it is stated\n(Coel. Hier. vii) that \"Sacred Scripture describes some heavenly\nessences as questioning Jesus, and learning from Him the knowledge of\nHis Divine work for us; and Jesus as teaching them directly\": as is\nevident in Isa. 63:1, where, on the angels asking, \"Who is he who\ncometh up from Edom?\" Jesus answered, \"It is I, Who speak justice.\"\nTherefore the angels do not know mysteries of grace.\n\n_I answer that,_ There is a twofold knowledge in the angel. The first\nis his natural knowledge, according to which he knows things both by\nhis essence, and by innate species. By such knowledge the angels\ncannot know mysteries of grace. For these mysteries depend upon the\npure will of God: and if an angel cannot learn the thoughts of\nanother angel, which depend upon the will of such angel, much less\ncan he ascertain what depends entirely upon God's will. The Apostle\nreasons in this fashion (1 Cor. 2:11): \"No one knoweth the things of\na man [*Vulg.: 'What man knoweth the things of a man, but . . . ?'],\nbut the spirit of a man that is in him.\" So, \"the things also that\nare of God no man knoweth but the Spirit of God.\"\n\nThere is another knowledge of the angels, which renders them happy; it\nis the knowledge whereby they see the Word, and things in the Word. By\nsuch vision they know mysteries of grace, but not all mysteries: nor\ndo they all know them equally; but just as God wills them to learn by\nrevelation; as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:10): \"But to us God hath\nrevealed them through His Spirit\"; yet so that the higher angels\nbeholding the Divine wisdom more clearly, learn more and deeper\nmysteries in the vision of God, which mysteries they communicate to\nthe lower angels by enlightening them. Some of these mysteries they\nknew from the very beginning of their creation; others they are taught\nafterwards, as befits their ministrations.\n\nReply Obj. 1: One can speak in two ways of the mystery of the\nIncarnation. First of all, in general; and in this way it was\nrevealed to all from the commencement of their beatitude. The reason\nof this is, that this is a kind of general principle to which all\ntheir duties are ordered. For \"all are [*Vulg.: 'Are they not all.']\nministering spirits, sent to minister for them who shall receive the\ninheritance of salvation\" (Heb. 1:14); and this is brought about by\nthe mystery of the Incarnation. Hence it was necessary for all of\nthem to be instructed in this mystery from the very beginning.\n\nWe can speak of the mystery of the Incarnation in another way, as to\nits special conditions. Thus not all the angels were instructed on\nall points from the beginning; even the higher angels learned these\nafterwards, as appears from the passage of Dionysius already quoted.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although the angels in bliss behold the Divine wisdom,\nyet they do not comprehend it. So it is not necessary for them to\nknow everything hidden in it.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Whatever the prophets knew by revelation of the\nmysteries of grace, was revealed in a more excellent way to the\nangels. And although God revealed in general to the prophets what He\nwas one day to do regarding the salvation of the human race, still\nthe apostles knew some particulars of the same, which the prophets\ndid not know. Thus we read (Eph. 3:4, 5): \"As you reading, may\nunderstand my knowledge in the mystery of Christ, which in other\ngenerations was not known to the sons of men, as it is now revealed\nto His holy apostles.\" Among the prophets also, the later ones knew\nwhat the former did not know; according to Ps. 118:100: \"I have had\nunderstanding above ancients,\" and Gregory says: \"The knowledge of\nDivine things increased as time went on\" (Hom. xvi in Ezech.).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 58\n\nOF THE MODE OF ANGELIC KNOWLEDGE\n(In Seven Articles)\n\nAfter the foregoing we have now to treat of the mode of the angelic\nknowledge, concerning which there are seven points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the angel's intellect be sometimes in potentiality, and\nsometimes in act?\n\n(2) Whether the angel can understand many things at the same time?\n\n(3) Whether the angel's knowledge is discursive?\n\n(4) Whether he understands by composing and dividing?\n\n(5) Whether there can be error in the angel's intellect?\n\n(6) Whether his knowledge can be styled as morning and evening?\n\n(7) Whether the morning and evening knowledge are the same, or do\nthey differ?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Angel's Intellect Is Sometimes in Potentiality, Sometimes\nin Act?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angel's intellect is sometimes in\npotentiality and sometimes in act. For movement is the act of what is\nin potentiality, as stated in _Phys._ iii, 6. But the angels' minds\nare moved by understanding, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).\nTherefore the angelic minds are sometimes in potentiality.\n\nObj. 2: Further, since desire is of a thing not possessed but\npossible to have, whoever desires to know anything is in potentiality\nthereto. But it is said (1 Pet. 1:12): \"On Whom the angels desire to\nlook.\" Therefore the angel's intellect is sometimes in potentiality.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in the book _De Causis_ it is stated that \"an\nintelligence understands according to the mode of its substance.\"\nBut the angel's intelligence has some admixture of potentiality.\nTherefore it sometimes understands potentially.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii): \"Since the\nangels were created, in the eternity of the Word, they enjoy holy\nand devout contemplation.\" Now a contemplating intellect is not in\npotentiality, but in act. Therefore the intellect of an angel is not\nin potentiality.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (De Anima iii, text. 8;\nPhys. viii, 32), the intellect is in potentiality in two ways; first,\n\"as before learning or discovering,\" that is, before it has the habit\nof knowledge; secondly, as \"when it possesses the habit of knowledge,\nbut does not actually consider.\" In the first way an angel's\nintellect is never in potentiality with regard to the things to which\nhis natural knowledge extends. For, as the higher, namely, the\nheavenly, bodies have no potentiality to existence, which is not\nfully actuated, in the same way the heavenly intellects, the angels,\nhave no intelligible potentiality which is not fully completed by\nconnatural intelligible species. But with regard to things divinely\nrevealed to them, there is nothing to hinder them from being in\npotentiality: because even the heavenly bodies are at times in\npotentiality to being enlightened by the sun.\n\nIn the second way an angel's intellect can be in potentiality with\nregard to things learnt by natural knowledge; for he is not always\nactually considering everything that he knows by natural knowledge.\nBut as to the knowledge of the Word, and of the things he beholds\nin the Word, he is never in this way in potentiality; because he is\nalways actually beholding the Word, and the things he sees in the\nWord. For the bliss of the angels consists in such vision; and\nbeatitude does not consist in habit, but in act, as the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. i, 8).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Movement is taken there not as the act of something\nimperfect, that is, of something existing in potentiality, but as the\nact of something perfect, that is, of one actually existing. In this\nway understanding and feeling are termed movements, as stated in _De\nAnima_ iii, text. 28.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Such desire on the part of the angels does not exclude\nthe object desired, but weariness thereof. Or they are said to desire\nthe vision of God with regard to fresh revelations, which they\nreceive from God to fit them for the tasks which they have to perform.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the angel's substance there is no potentiality\ndivested of act. In the same way, the angel's intellect is never so\nin potentiality as to be without act.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 2]\n\nWhether an Angel Can Understand Many Things at the Same Time?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot understand many things\nat the same time. For the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 4) that \"it may\nhappen that we know many things, but understand only one.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing is understood unless the intellect be\ninformed by an intelligible species; just at the body is formed by\nshape. But one body cannot be formed into many shapes. Therefore\nneither can one intellect simultaneously understand various\nintelligible things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to understand is a kind of movement. But no movement\nterminates in various terms. Therefore many things cannot be\nunderstood altogether.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 32): \"The\nspiritual faculty of the angelic mind comprehends most easily at\nthe same time all things that it wills.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As unity of term is requisite for unity of movement,\nso is unity of object required for unity of operation. Now it happens\nthat several things may be taken as several or as one; like the parts\nof a continuous whole. For if each of the parts be considered\nseverally they are many: consequently neither by sense nor by\nintellect are they grasped by one operation, nor all at once. In\nanother way they are taken as forming one in the whole; and so they\nare grasped both by sense and intellect all at once and by one\noperation; as long as the entire continuous whole is considered, as\nis stated in _De Anima_ iii, text. 23. In this way our intellect\nunderstands together both the subject and the predicate, as forming\nparts of one proposition; and also two things compared together,\naccording as they agree in one point of comparison. From this it is\nevident that many things, in so far as they are distinct, cannot be\nunderstood at once; but in so far as they are comprised under one\nintelligible concept, they can be understood together. Now everything\nis actually intelligible according as its image is in the intellect.\nAll things, then, which can be known by one intelligible species, are\nknown as one intelligible object, and therefore are understood\nsimultaneously. But things known by various intelligible species, are\napprehended as different intelligible objects.\n\nConsequently, by such knowledge as the angels have of things through\nthe Word, they know all things under one intelligible species, which\nis the Divine essence. Therefore, as regards such knowledge, they know\nall things at once: just as in heaven \"our thoughts will not be\nfleeting, going and returning from one thing to another, but we shall\nsurvey all our knowledge at the same time by one glance,\" as Augustine\nsays (De Trin. xv, 16). But by that knowledge wherewith the angels\nknow things by innate species, they can at one time know all things\nwhich can be comprised under one species; but not such as are under\nvarious species.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To understand many things as one, is, so to\nspeak, to understand one thing.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The intellect is informed by the intelligible\nspecies which it has within it. So it can behold at the same time many\nintelligible objects under one species; as one body can by one shape\nbe likened to many bodies.\n\nTo the third objection the answer is the same as the first.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 3]\n\nWhether an Angel's Knowledge Is Discursive?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the knowledge of an angel is\ndiscursive. For the discursive movement of the mind comes from one\nthing being known through another. But the angels know one thing\nthrough another; for they know creatures through the Word. Therefore\nthe intellect of an angel knows by discursive method.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever a lower power can do, the higher can do.\nBut the human intellect can syllogize, and know causes in effects;\nall of which is the discursive method. Therefore the intellect of the\nangel, which is higher in the order of nature, can with greater\nreason do this.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Isidore (De sum. bono i, 10) says that \"demons learn\nmore things by experience.\" But experimental knowledge is discursive:\nfor, \"one experience comes of many remembrances, and one universal from\nmany experiences,\" as Aristotle observes (Poster. ii; _Metaph._ vii).\nTherefore an angel's knowledge is discursive.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that the \"angels do\nnot acquire Divine knowledge from separate discourses, nor are they\nled to something particular from something common.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As has often been stated (A. 1; Q. 55, A. 1), the\nangels hold that grade among spiritual substances which the heavenly\nbodies hold among corporeal substances: for Dionysius calls them\n\"heavenly minds\" (loc. cit.). Now, the difference between heavenly\nand earthly bodies is this, that earthly bodies obtain their last\nperfection by chance and movement: while the heavenly bodies have\ntheir last perfection at once from their very nature. So, likewise,\nthe lower, namely, the human, intellects obtain their perfection in\nthe knowledge of truth by a kind of movement and discursive\nintellectual operation; that is to say, as they advance from one\nknown thing to another. But, if from the knowledge of a known\nprinciple they were straightway to perceive as known all its\nconsequent conclusions, then there would be no discursive process at\nall. Such is the condition of the angels, because in the truths which\nthey know naturally, they at once behold all things whatsoever that\ncan be known in them.\n\nTherefore they are called \"intellectual beings\": because even with\nourselves the things which are instantly grasped by the mind are said\nto be understood [intelligi]; hence \"intellect\" is defined as the\nhabit of first principles. But human souls which acquire knowledge of\ntruth by the discursive method are called \"rational\"; and this comes\nof the feebleness of their intellectual light. For if they possessed\nthe fulness of intellectual light, like the angels, then in the first\naspect of principles they would at once comprehend their whole range,\nby perceiving whatever could be reasoned out from them.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Discursion expresses movement of a kind. Now all\nmovement is from something before to something after. Hence\ndiscursive knowledge comes about according as from something\npreviously known one attains to the knowledge of what is afterwards\nknown, and which was previously unknown. But if in the thing\nperceived something else be seen at the same time, as an object and\nits image are seen simultaneously in a mirror, it is not discursive\nknowledge. And in this way the angels know things in the Word.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The angels can syllogize, in the sense of knowing a\nsyllogism; and they see effects in causes, and causes in effects: yet\nthey do not acquire knowledge of an unknown truth in this way, by\nsyllogizing from causes to effect, or from effect to cause.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Experience is affirmed of angels and demons simply by\nway of similitude, forasmuch as they know sensible things which are\npresent, yet without any discursion withal.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Angels Understand by Composing and Dividing?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels understand by composing and\ndividing. For, where there is multiplicity of things understood, there\nis composition of the same, as is said in _De Anima_ iii, text. 21. But\nthere is a multitude of things understood in the angelic mind; because\nangels apprehend different things by various species, and not all at\none time. Therefore there is composition and division in the angel's\nmind.\n\nObj. 2: Further, negation is far more remote from affirmation than\nany two opposite natures are; because the first of distinctions is\nthat of affirmation and negation. But the angel knows certain distant\nnatures not by one, but by diverse species, as is evident from what\nwas said (A. 2). Therefore he must know affirmation and negation by\ndiverse species. And so it seems that he understands by composing and\ndividing.\n\nObj. 3: Further, speech is a sign of the intellect. But in speaking\nto men, angels use affirmative and negative expressions, which are\nsigns of composition and of division in the intellect; as is manifest\nfrom many passages of Sacred Scripture. Therefore it seems that the\nangel understands by composing and dividing.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that \"the\nintellectual power of the angel shines forth with the clear\nsimplicity of divine concepts.\" But a simple intelligence is without\ncomposition and division. Therefore the angel understands without\ncomposition or division.\n\n_I answer that,_ As in the intellect, when reasoning, the conclusion\nis compared with the principle, so in the intellect composing and\ndividing, the predicate is compared with the subject. For if our\nintellect were to see at once the truth of the conclusion in the\nprinciple, it would never understand by discursion and reasoning. In\nlike manner, if the intellect in apprehending the quiddity of the\nsubject were at once to have knowledge of all that can be attributed\nto, or removed from, the subject, it would never understand by\ncomposing and dividing, but only by understanding the essence. Thus it\nis evident that for the self-same reason our intellect understands by\ndiscursion, and by composing and dividing, namely, that in the first\napprehension of anything newly apprehended it does not at once grasp\nall that is virtually contained in it. And this comes from the\nweakness of the intellectual light within us, as has been said\n(A. 3). Hence, since the intellectual light is perfect in the\nangel, for he is a pure and most clear mirror, as Dionysius says\n(Div. Nom. iv), it follows that as the angel does not understand by\nreasoning, so neither does he by composing and dividing.\n\nNevertheless, he understands the composition and the division of\nenunciations, just as he apprehends the reasoning of syllogisms: for\nhe understands simply, such things as are composite, things movable\nimmovably, and material things immaterially.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Not every multitude of things understood causes\ncomposition, but a multitude of such things understood that one of\nthem is attributed to, or denied of, another. When an angel apprehends\nthe nature of anything, he at the same time understands whatever can\nbe either attributed to it, or denied of it. Hence, in apprehending a\nnature, he by one simple perception grasps all that we can learn by\ncomposing and dividing.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The various natures of things differ less as to their\nmode of existing than do affirmation and negation. Yet, as to the way\nin which they are known, affirmation and negation have something more\nin common; because directly the truth of an affirmation is known, the\nfalsehood of the opposite negation is known also.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The fact that angels use affirmative and negative forms\nof speech, shows that they know both composition and division: yet\nnot that they know by composing and dividing, but by knowing simply\nthe nature of a thing.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 5]\n\nWhether There Can Be Falsehood in the Intellect of an Angel?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there can be falsehood in the angel's\nintellect. For perversity appertains to falsehood. But, as Dionysius\nsays (Div. Nom. iv), there is \"a perverted fancy\" in the demons.\nTherefore it seems that there can be falsehood in the intellect of\nthe angels.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nescience is the cause of estimating falsely. But,\nas Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi), there can be nescience in the\nangels. Therefore it seems there can be falsehood in them.\n\nObj. 3: Further, everything which falls short of the truth of wisdom,\nand which has a depraved reason, has falsehood or error in its\nintellect. But Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii) affirms this of the demons.\nTherefore it seems that there can be error in the minds of the angels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 41) that\n\"the intelligence is always true.\" Augustine likewise says (QQ. 83,\nqu. 32) that \"nothing but what is true can be the object of\nintelligence\" Therefore there can be neither deception nor falsehood\nin the angel's knowledge.\n\n_I answer that,_ The truth of this question depends partly upon what\nhas gone before. For it has been said (A. 4) that an angel\nunderstands not by composing and dividing, but by understanding what\na thing is. Now the intellect is always true as regards what a thing\nis, just as the sense regarding its proper object, as is said in _De\nAnima_ iii, text. 26. But by accident, deception and falsehood creep\nin, when we understand the essence of a thing by some kind of\ncomposition, and this happens either when we take the definition of\none thing for another, or when the parts of a definition do not hang\ntogether, as if we were to accept as the definition of some creature,\n\"a four-footed flying beast,\" for there is no such animal. And this\ncomes about in things composite, the definition of which is drawn\nfrom diverse elements, one of which is as matter to the other. But\nthere is no room for error in understanding simple quiddities, as is\nstated in _Metaph._ ix, text. 22; for either they are not grasped at\nall, and so we know nothing respecting them; or else they are known\nprecisely as they exist.\n\nSo therefore, no falsehood, error, or deception can exist of itself in\nthe mind of any angel; yet it does so happen accidentally; but very\ndifferently from the way it befalls us. For we sometimes get at the\nquiddity of a thing by a composing and dividing process, as when, by\ndivision and demonstration, we seek out the truth of a definition.\nSuch is not the method of the angels; but through the (knowledge of\nthe) essence of a thing they know everything that can be said\nregarding it. Now it is quite evident that the quiddity of a thing can\nbe a source of knowledge with regard to everything belonging to such\nthing, or excluded from it; but not of what may be dependent on God's\nsupernatural ordinance. Consequently, owing to their upright will,\nfrom their knowing the nature of every creature, the good angels form\nno judgments as to the nature of the qualities therein, save under the\nDivine ordinance; hence there can be no error or falsehood in them.\nBut since the minds of demons are utterly perverted from the Divine\nwisdom, they at times form their opinions of things simply according\nto the natural conditions of the same. Nor are they ever deceived as\nto the natural properties of anything; but they can be misled with\nregard to supernatural matters; for example, on seeing a dead man,\nthey may suppose that he will not rise again, or, on beholding Christ,\nthey may judge Him not to be God.\n\nFrom all this the answers to the objections of both sides of the\nquestion are evident. For the perversity of the demons comes of their\nnot being subject to the Divine wisdom; while nescience is in the\nangels as regards things knowable, not naturally but supernaturally.\nIt is, furthermore, evident that their understanding of what a thing\nis, is always true, save accidentally, according as it is, in an\nundue manner, referred to some composition or division.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, A. 6]\n\nWhether There Is a \"Morning\" and an \"Evening\" Knowledge in the\nAngels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is neither an evening nor a\nmorning knowledge in the angels; because evening and morning have an\nadmixture of darkness. But there is no darkness in the knowledge of\nan angel; since there is no error nor falsehood. Therefore the\nangelic knowledge ought not to be termed morning and evening\nknowledge.\n\nObj. 2: Further, between evening and morning the night intervenes;\nwhile noonday falls between morning and evening. Consequently, if\nthere be a morning and an evening knowledge in the angels, for the\nsame reason it appears that there ought to be a noonday and a night\nknowledge.\n\nObj. 3: Further, knowledge is diversified according to the difference\nof the objects known: hence the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text.\n38), \"The sciences are divided just as things are.\" But there is a\nthreefold existence of things: to wit, in the Word; in their own\nnatures; and in the angelic knowledge, as Augustine observes (Gen. ad\nlit. ii, 8). If, therefore, a morning and an evening knowledge be\nadmitted in the angels, because of the existence of things in the\nWord, and in their own nature, then there ought to be admitted a\nthird class of knowledge, on account of the existence of things in\nthe angelic mind.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22, 31; De Civ. Dei\nxii, 7, 20) divides the knowledge of the angels into morning and\nevening knowledge.\n\n_I answer that,_ The expression \"morning\" and \"evening\" knowledge was\ndevised by Augustine; who interprets the six days wherein God made all\nthings, not as ordinary days measured by the solar circuit, since the\nsun was only made on the fourth day, but as one day, namely, the day\nof angelic knowledge as directed to six classes of things. As in the\nordinary day, morning is the beginning, and evening the close of day,\nso, their knowledge of the primordial being of things is called\nmorning knowledge; and this is according as things exist in the Word.\nBut their knowledge of the very being of the thing created, as it\nstands in its own nature, is termed evening knowledge; because the\nbeing of things flows from the Word, as from a kind of primordial\nprinciple; and this flow is terminated in the being which they have in\nthemselves.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Evening and morning knowledge in the angelic knowledge\nare not taken as compared to an admixture of darkness, but as\ncompared to beginning and end. Or else it can be said, as Augustine\nputs it (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23), that there is nothing to prevent us\nfrom calling something light in comparison with one thing, and\ndarkness with respect to another. In the same way the life of the\nfaithful and the just is called light in comparison with the wicked,\naccording to Eph. 5:8: \"You were heretofore darkness; but now, light\nin the Lord\": yet this very life of the faithful, when set in\ncontrast to the life of glory, is termed darkness, according to 2\nPet. 1:19: \"You have the firm prophetic word, whereunto you do well\nto attend, as to a light that shineth in a dark place.\" So the\nangel's knowledge by which he knows things in their own nature, is\nday in comparison with ignorance or error; yet it is dark in\ncomparison with the vision of the Word.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The morning and evening knowledge belong to the day,\nthat is, to the enlightened angels, who are quite apart from the\ndarkness, that is, from the evil spirits. The good angels, while\nknowing the creature, do not adhere to it, for that would be to turn\nto darkness and to night; but they refer this back to the praise of\nGod, in Whom, as in their principle, they know all things.\nConsequently after \"evening\" there is no night, but \"morning\"; so\nthat morning is the end of the preceding day, and the beginning of\nthe following, in so far as the angels refer to God's praise their\nknowledge of the preceding work. Noonday is comprised under the name\nof day, as the middle between the two extremes. Or else the noon can\nbe referred to their knowledge of God Himself, Who has neither\nbeginning nor end.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The angels themselves are also creatures. Accordingly\nthe existence of things in the angelic knowledge is comprised under\nevening knowledge, as also the existence of things in their own\nnature.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 58, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Morning and Evening Knowledge Are One?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the morning and the evening knowledge\nare one. For it is said (Gen. 1:5): \"There was evening and morning, one\nday.\" But by the expression \"day\" the knowledge of the angels is to be\nunderstood, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 23). Therefore the\nmorning and evening knowledge of the angels are one and the same.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is impossible for one faculty to have two\noperations at the same time. But the angels are always using their\nmorning knowledge; because they are always beholding God and things in\nGod, according to Matt. 18:10. Therefore, if the evening knowledge were\ndifferent from the morning, the angel could never exercise his evening\nknowledge.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10): \"When that which is\nperfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away.\" But,\nif the evening knowledge be different from the morning, it is\ncompared to it as the less perfect to the perfect. Therefore the\nevening knowledge cannot exist together with the morning knowledge.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24): \"There is a\nvast difference between knowing anything as it is in the Word of God,\nand as it is in its own nature; so that the former belongs to the day,\nand the latter to the evening.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As was observed (A. 6), the evening knowledge is\nthat by which the angels know things in their proper nature. This\ncannot be understood as if they drew their knowledge from the proper\nnature of things, so that the preposition \"in\" denotes the form of a\nprinciple; because, as has been already stated (Q. 55, A. 2), the\nangels do not draw their knowledge from things. It follows, then, that\nwhen we say \"in their proper nature\" we refer to the aspect of the\nthing known in so far as it is an object of knowledge; that is to say,\nthat the evening knowledge is in the angels in so far as they know the\nbeing of things which those things have in their own nature.\n\nNow they know this through a twofold medium, namely, by innate ideas,\nor by the forms of things existing in the Word. For by beholding the\nWord, they know not merely the being of things as existing in the\nWord, but the being as possessed by the things themselves; as God by\ncontemplating Himself sees that being which things have in their own\nnature. It, therefore, it be called evening knowledge, in so far as\nwhen the angels behold the Word, they know the being which things have\nin their proper nature, then the morning and the evening knowledge are\nessentially one and the same, and only differ as to the things known.\nIf it be called evening knowledge, in so far as through innate ideas\nthey know the being which things have in their own natures, then the\nmorning and the evening knowledge differ. Thus Augustine seems to\nunderstand it when he assigns one as inferior to the other.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The six days, as Augustine understands them, are taken\nas the six classes of things known by the angels; so that the day's\nunit is taken according to the unit of the thing understood; which,\nnevertheless, can be apprehended by various ways of knowing it.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There can be two operations of the same faculty at the\none time, one of which is referred to the other; as is evident when\nthe will at the same time wills the end and the means to the end; and\nthe intellect at the same instant perceives principles and\nconclusions through those principles, when it has already acquired\nknowledge. As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 24), the evening\nknowledge is referred to the morning knowledge in the angels; hence\nthere is nothing to hinder both from being at the same time in the\nangels.\n\nReply Obj. 3: On the coming of what is perfect, the opposite\nimperfect is done away: just as faith, which is of the things that\nare not seen, is made void when vision succeeds. But the imperfection\nof the evening knowledge is not opposed to the perfection of the\nmorning knowledge. For that a thing be known in itself, is not\nopposite to its being known in its cause. Nor, again, is there any\ninconsistency in knowing a thing through two mediums, one of which is\nmore perfect and the other less perfect; just as we can have a\ndemonstrative and a probable medium for reaching the same conclusion.\nIn like manner a thing can be known by the angel through the\nuncreated Word, and through an innate idea.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 59\n\nTHE WILL OF THE ANGELS (FOUR ARTICLES)\n\nIn the next place we must treat of things concerning the will of\nthe angels. In the first place we shall treat of the will itself;\nsecondly, of its movement, which is love. Under the first heading\nthere are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there is will in the angels?\n\n(2) Whether the will of the angel is his nature, or his intellect?\n\n(3) Is there free-will in the angels?\n\n(4) Is there an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in them?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Is Will in the Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no will in the angels. For\nas the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42), \"The will is in the\nreason.\" But there is no reason in the angels, but something higher\nthan reason. Therefore there is no will in the angels, but something\nhigher than the will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the will is comprised under the appetite, as is\nevident from the Philosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42). But the\nappetite argues something imperfect; because it is a desire of\nsomething not as yet possessed. Therefore, since there is no\nimperfection in the angels, especially in the blessed ones, it\nseems that there is no will in them.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, text. 54) that\nthe will is a mover which is moved; for it is moved by the appetible\nobject understood. Now the angels are immovable, since they are\nincorporeal. Therefore there is no will in the angels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11,12) that the\nimage of the Trinity is found in the soul according to memory,\nunderstanding, and will. But God's image is found not only in the\nsoul of man, but also in the angelic mind, since it also is capable\nof knowing God. Therefore there is will in the angels.\n\n_I answer that,_ We must necessarily place a will in the angels. In\nevidence thereof, it must be borne in mind that, since all things flow\nfrom the Divine will, all things in their own way are inclined by\nappetite towards good, but in different ways. Some are inclined to\ngood by their natural inclination, without knowledge, as plants and\ninanimate bodies. Such inclination towards good is called \"a natural\nappetite.\" Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with some\nknowledge; not that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they\napprehend some particular good; as in the sense, which knows the\nsweet, the white, and so on. The inclination which follows this\napprehension is called \"a sensitive appetite.\" Other things, again,\nhave an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge whereby they\nperceive the aspect of goodness; this belongs to the intellect. This\nis most perfectly inclined towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it\nwere merely guided by another towards some particular good only, like\nthings devoid of knowledge, nor towards some particular good only, as\nthings which have only sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards\ngood in general. Such inclination is termed \"will.\" Accordingly, since\nthe angels by their intellect know the universal aspect of goodness,\nit is manifest that there is a will in them.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Reason surpasses sense in a different way from that in\nwhich intellect surpasses reason. Reason surpasses sense according to\nthe diversity of the objects known; for sense judges of particular\nobjects, while reason judges of universals. Therefore there must be\none appetite tending towards good in the abstract, which appetite\nbelongs to reason; and another with a tendency towards particular\ngood, which appetite belongs to sense. But intellect and reason\ndiffer as to their manner of knowing; because the intellect knows by\nsimple intuition, while reason knows by a process of discursion from\none thing to another. Nevertheless by such discursion reason comes to\nknow what intellect learns without it, namely, the universal.\nConsequently the object presented to the appetitive faculty on the\npart of reason and on the part of intellect is the same. Therefore in\nthe angels, who are purely intellectual, there is no appetite higher\nthan the will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although the name of the appetitive part is derived\nfrom seeking things not yet possessed, yet the appetitive part\nreaches out not to these things only, but also to many other things;\nthus the name of a stone [lapis] is derived from injuring the foot\n[laesione pedis], though not this alone belongs to a stone. In the\nsame way the irascible faculty is so denominated from anger [ira];\nthough at the same time there are several other passions in it, as\nhope, daring, and the rest.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The will is called a mover which is moved, according as\nto will and to understand are termed movements of a kind; and there\nis nothing to prevent movement of this kind from existing in the\nangels, since such movement is the act of a perfect agent, as stated\nin _De Anima_ iii, text. 28.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 2]\n\nWhether in the Angels the Will Differs from the Intellect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in the angel the will does not differ\nfrom the intellect and from the nature. For an angel is more simple\nthan a natural body. But a natural body is inclined through its form\ntowards its end, which is its good. Therefore much more so is the\nangel. Now the angel's form is either the nature in which he subsists,\nor else it is some species within his intellect. Therefore the angel\ninclines towards the good through his own nature, or through an\nintelligible species. But such inclination towards the good belongs to\nthe will. Therefore the will of the angel does not differ from his\nnature or his intellect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the object of the intellect is the true, while the\nobject of the will is the good. Now the good and the true differ,\nnot really but only logically [*Cf. Q. 16, A. 4]. Therefore will\nand intellect are not really different.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the distinction of common and proper does not\ndifferentiate the faculties; for the same power of sight perceives\ncolor and whiteness. But the good and the true seem to be mutually\nrelated as common to particular; for the true is a particular good, to\nwit, of the intellect. Therefore the will, whose object is the good,\ndoes not differ from the intellect, whose object is the true.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The will in the angels regards good things only,\nwhile their intellect regards both good and bad things, for they know\nboth. Therefore the will of the angels is distinct from their\nintellect.\n\n_I answer that,_ In the angels the will is a special faculty or power,\nwhich is neither their nature nor their intellect. That it is not\ntheir nature is manifest from this, that the nature or essence of a\nthing is completely comprised within it: whatever, then, extends to\nanything beyond it, is not its essence. Hence we see in natural bodies\nthat the inclination to being does not come from anything superadded\nto the essence, but from the matter which desires being before\npossessing it, and from the form which keeps it in such being when\nonce it exists. But the inclination towards something extrinsic comes\nfrom something superadded to the essence; as tendency to a place comes\nfrom gravity or lightness, while the inclination to make something\nlike itself comes from the active qualities.\n\nNow the will has a natural tendency towards good. Consequently there\nalone are essence and will identified where all good is contained\nwithin the essence of him who wills; that is to say, in God, Who wills\nnothing beyond Himself except on account of His goodness. This cannot\nbe said of any creature, because infinite goodness is quite foreign to\nthe nature of any created thing. Accordingly, neither the will of the\nangel, nor that of any creature, can be the same thing as its essence.\n\nIn like manner neither can the will be the same thing as the intellect\nof angel or man. Because knowledge comes about in so far as the object\nknown is within the knower; consequently the intellect extends itself\nto what is outside it, according as what, in its essence, is outside\nit is disposed to be somehow within it. On the other hand, the will\ngoes out to what is beyond it, according as by a kind of inclination\nit tends, in a manner, to what is outside it. Now it belongs to one\nfaculty to have within itself something which is outside it, and to\nanother faculty to tend to what is outside it. Consequently intellect\nand will must necessarily be different powers in every creature. It is\nnot so with God, for He has within Himself universal being, and the\nuniversal good. Therefore both intellect and will are His nature.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A natural body is moved to its own being by its\nsubstantial form: while it is inclined to something outside by\nsomething additional, as has been said.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Faculties are not differentiated by any material\ndifference of their objects, but according to their formal\ndistinction, which is taken from the nature of the object as such.\nConsequently the diversity derived from the notion of good and true\nsuffices for the difference of intellect from will.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Because the good and the true are really convertible,\nit follows that the good is apprehended by the intellect as something\ntrue; while the true is desired by the will as something good.\nNevertheless, the diversity of their aspects is sufficient for\ndiversifying the faculties, as was said above (ad 2).\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Is Free-Will in the Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels.\nFor the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice\nwith the angels, because choice is \"the desire of something after\ntaking counsel,\" while counsel is \"a kind of inquiry,\" as stated in\n_Ethic._ iii, 3. But the angels' knowledge is not the result of\ninquiring, for this belongs to the discursiveness of reason.\nTherefore it appears that there is no free-will in the angels.\n\nObj. 2: Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives.\nBut in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such\nindifference; because, as was observed already (Q. 58, A. 5),\ntheir intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally\nintelligible to them. Therefore neither on the part of their\nappetitive faculty can there be free-will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong to them\naccording to degrees of more or less; because in the higher angels\nthe intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But the\nfree-will does not admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will\nin them.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Free-will is part of man's dignity. But the\nangels' dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will\nis in men, with much more reason is it in the angels.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some things there are which act, not from any\nprevious judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others;\njust as the arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others\nact from some kind of judgment; but not from free-will, such as\nirrational animals; for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of\njudgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself: such a\njudgment is not a free one, but implanted by nature. Only an agent\nendowed with an intellect can act with a judgment which is free, in\nso far as it apprehends the common note of goodness; from which it\ncan judge this or the other thing to be good. Consequently, wherever\nthere is intellect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest that\njust as there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and\nin a higher degree of perfection than in man.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is in man.\nAs a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an angel's in\nthis, that the one needs not to inquire, while the other does so\nneed; so is it in practical matters. Hence there is choice in the\nangels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by\nthe sudden acceptance of truth.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As was observed already (A. 2), knowledge is effected\nby the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a mark of\nimperfection in anything not to have within it what it should\nnaturally have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his\nnature, if his intellect were not determined to every truth which he\ncan know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty comes of\nthis, that the affection is directed to something outside. Yet the\nperfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is\ninclined, but only from something which is higher than it. Therefore\nit does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not\ndetermined with regard to things beneath him; but it would argue\nimperfection in him, were he to be indeterminate to what is above him.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher\nangels than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the\nintellect. Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of\ncompulsion is considered, is not susceptible of greater and less\ndegree; because privations and negations are not lessened nor\nincreased directly of themselves; but only by their cause, or\nthrough the addition of some qualification.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 59, Art. 4]\n\nWhether There Is an Irascible and a Concupiscible Appetite in the\nAngels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is an irascible and a\nconcupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom.\niv) that in the demons there is \"unreasonable fury and wild\nconcupiscence.\" But demons are of the same nature as angels; for sin\nhas not altered their nature. Therefore there is an irascible and a\nconcupiscible appetite in the angels.\n\nObj. 2: Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible; while anger,\nhope, and fear are in the irascible appetite. But in the Sacred\nScriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the\nwicked angels. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible\nappetite in the angels.\n\nObj. 3: Further, some virtues are said to reside in the irascible\nappetite and some in the concupiscible: thus charity and temperance\nappear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fortitude are in the\nirascible. But these virtues are in the angels. Therefore there is\nboth a concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that\nthe irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part, which does\nnot exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or\nconcupiscible appetite in the angels.\n\n_I answer that,_ The intellective appetite is not divided into\nirascible and concupiscible; only the sensitive appetite is so\ndivided. The reason of this is because, since the faculties are\ndistinguished from one another not according to the material but only\nby the formal distinction of objects, if to any faculty there respond\nan object according to some common idea, there will be no distinction\nof faculties according to the diversity of the particular things\ncontained under that common idea. Just as if the proper object of the\npower of sight be color as such, then there are not several powers of\nsight distinguished according to the difference of black and white:\nwhereas if the proper object of any faculty were white, as white,\nthen the faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the\nfaculty of seeing black.\n\nNow it is quite evident from what has been said (A. 1; Q. 16, A. 1),\nthat the object of the intellective appetite, otherwise known as the\nwill, is good according to the common aspect of goodness; nor can\nthere be any appetite except of what is good. Hence, in the\nintellective part, the appetite is not divided according to the\ndistinction of some particular good things, as the sensitive appetite\nis divided, which does not crave for what is good according to its\ncommon aspect, but for some particular good object. Accordingly,\nsince there exists in the angels only an intellective appetite, their\nappetite is not distinguished into irascible and concupiscible, but\nremains undivided; and it is called the will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to be in\nthe demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God;--on account of\nthe resemblance in the effect.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Love and joy, in so far as they are passions, are in\nthe concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they express a simple\nact of the will, they are in the intellective part: in this sense to\nlove is to wish well to anyone; and to be glad is for the will to\nrepose in some good possessed. Universally speaking, none of these\nthings is said of the angels, as by way of passions; as Augustine\nsays (De Civ. Dei ix).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible\nappetite, but in the will; because the object of the concupiscible\nappetite is the good as delectable to the senses. But the Divine\ngoodness, which is the object of charity, is not of any such kind.\nFor the same reason it must be said that hope does not exist in the\nirascible appetite; because the object of the irascible appetite is\nsomething arduous belonging to the sensible order, which the virtue\nof hope does not regard; since the object of hope is arduous and\ndivine. Temperance, however, considered as a human virtue, deals with\nthe desires of sensible pleasures, which belong to the concupiscible\nfaculty. Similarly, fortitude regulates daring and fear, which reside\nin the irascible part. Consequently temperance, in so far as it is a\nhuman virtue, resides in the concupiscible part, and fortitude in the\nirascible. But they do not exist in the angels in this manner. For in\nthem there are no passions of concupiscence, nor of fear and daring,\nto be regulated by temperance and fortitude. But temperance is\npredicated of them according as in moderation they display their will\nin conformity with the Divine will. Fortitude is likewise attributed\nto them, in so far as they firmly carry out the Divine will. All of\nthis is done by their will, and not by the irascible or concupiscible\nappetite.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 60\n\nOF THE LOVE OR DILECTION OF THE ANGELS\n(In Five Articles)\n\nThe next subject for our consideration is that act of the will which\nis love or dilection; because every act of the appetitive faculty\ncomes of love.\n\nUnder this heading there are five points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there is natural love in the angels?\n\n(2) Whether there is in them love of choice?\n\n(3) Whether the angel loves himself with natural love or with love\nof choice?\n\n(4) Whether one angel loves another with natural love as he loves\nhimself?\n\n(5) Whether the angel loves God more than self with natural love?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Is Natural Love or Dilection in an Angel?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no natural love or dilection\nin the angels. For, natural love is contradistinguished from\nintellectual love, as stated by Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv). But an\nangel's love is intellectual. Therefore it is not natural.\n\nObj. 2: Further, those who love with natural love are more acted\nupon than active in themselves; for nothing has control over its own\nnature. Now the angels are not acted upon, but act of themselves;\nbecause they possess free-will, as was shown above (Q. 59, A. 3).\nConsequently there is no natural love in them.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every love is either ordinate or inordinate. Now\nordinate love belongs to charity; while inordinate love belongs to\nwickedness. But neither of these belongs to nature; because charity is\nabove nature, while wickedness is against nature. Therefore there is\nno natural love in the angels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Love results from knowledge; for, nothing is loved\nexcept it be first known, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But\nthere is natural knowledge in the angels. Therefore there is also\nnatural love.\n\n_I answer that,_ We must necessarily place natural love in the angels.\nIn evidence of this we must bear in mind that what comes first is\nalways sustained in what comes after it. Now nature comes before\nintellect, because the nature of every subject is its essence.\nConsequently whatever belongs to nature must be preserved likewise in\nsuch subjects as have intellect. But it is common to every nature to\nhave some inclination; and this is its natural appetite or love. This\ninclination is found to exist differently in different natures; but in\neach according to its mode. Consequently, in the intellectual nature\nthere is to be found a natural inclination coming from the will; in\nthe sensitive nature, according to the sensitive appetite; but in a\nnature devoid of knowledge, only according to the tendency of the\nnature to something. Therefore, since an angel is an intellectual\nnature, there must be a natural love in his will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Intellectual love is contradistinguished from that\nnatural love, which is merely natural, in so far as it belongs to a\nnature which has not likewise the perfection of either sense or\nintellect.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All things in the world are moved to act by something\nelse except the First Agent, Who acts in such a manner that He is in\nno way moved to act by another; and in Whom nature and will are the\nsame. So there is nothing unfitting in an angel being moved to act in\nso far as such natural inclination is implanted in him by the Author\nof his nature. Yet he is not so moved to act that he does not act\nhimself, because he has free-will.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As natural knowledge is always true, so is natural love\nwell regulated; because natural love is nothing else than the\ninclination implanted in nature by its Author. To say that a natural\ninclination is not well regulated, is to derogate from the Author of\nnature. Yet the rectitude of natural love is different from the\nrectitude of charity and virtue: because the one rectitude perfects\nthe other; even so the truth of natural knowledge is of one kind, and\nthe truth of infused or acquired knowledge is of another.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Is Love of Choice in the Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no love of choice in the\nangels. For love of choice appears to be rational love; since choice\nfollows counsel, which lies in inquiry, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3.\nNow rational love is contrasted with intellectual, which is proper to\nangels, as is said (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of\nchoice in the angels.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the angels have only natural knowledge besides such\nas is infused: since they do not proceed from principles to acquire\nthe knowledge of conclusions. Hence they are disposed to everything\nthey can know, as our intellect is disposed towards first principles,\nwhich it can know naturally. Now love follows knowledge, as has been\nalready stated (A. 1; Q. 16, A. 1). Consequently, besides their\ninfused love, there is only natural love in the angels. Therefore\nthere is no love of choice in them.\n\n_On the contrary,_ We neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts.\nBut by their love the angels merit or demerit. Therefore there is\nlove of choice in them.\n\n_I answer that,_ There exists in the angels a natural love, and a\nlove of choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of\nchoice; because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the\nnature of a principle. Wherefore, since nature is first in\neverything, what belongs to nature must be a principle in everything.\n\nThis is clearly evident in man, with respect to both his intellect\nand his will. For the intellect knows principles naturally; and from\nsuch knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions, which are\nknown by him not naturally, but by discovery, or by teaching. In like\nmanner, the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle\ndoes in the intellect, as is laid down in _Phys._ ii, text. 89.\nConsequently the will tends naturally to its last end; for every man\nnaturally wills happiness: and all other desires are caused by this\nnatural desire; since whatever a man wills he wills on account of the\nend. Therefore the love of that good, which a man naturally wills as\nan end, is his natural love; but the love which comes of this, which\nis of something loved for the end's sake, is the love of choice.\n\nThere is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the\npart of the will. Because, as was stated already (Q. 59, A. 2), the\nmind's knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the known\nwithin the knower. It comes of the imperfection of man's intellectual\nnature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all things\ncapable of being understood, but only a few things from which he is\nmoved in a measure to grasp other things. The act of the appetitive\nfaculty, on the contrary, follows the inclination of man towards\nthings; some of which are good in themselves, and consequently are\nappetible in themselves; others being good only in relation to\nsomething else, and being appetible on account of something else.\nConsequently it does not argue imperfection in the person desiring,\nfor him to seek one thing naturally as his end, and something else\nfrom choice as ordained to such end. Therefore, since the\nintellectual nature of the angels is perfect, only natural and not\ndeductive knowledge is to be found in them, but there is to be found\nin them both natural love and love of choice.\n\nIn saying all this, we are passing over all that regards things which\nare above nature, since nature is not the sufficient principle\nthereof: but we shall speak of them later on (Q. 62).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Not all love of choice is rational love, according as\nrational is distinguished from intellectual love. For rational love\nis so called which follows deductive knowledge: but, as was said\nabove (Q. 59, A. 3, ad 1), when treating of free-will, every choice\ndoes not follow a discursive act of the reason; but only human\nchoice. Consequently the conclusion does not follow.\n\nThe reply to the second objection follows from what has been said.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Angel Loves Himself with Both Natural Love, and Love of\nChoice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love himself both\nwith natural love and a love of choice. For, as was said (A. 2),\nnatural love regards the end itself; while love of choice regards the\nmeans to the end. But the same thing, with regard to the same, cannot\nbe both the end and a means to the end. Therefore natural love and the\nlove of choice cannot have the same object.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv): \"Love is a\nuniting and a binding power.\" But uniting and binding imply various\nthings brought together. Therefore the angel cannot love himself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, love is a kind of movement. But every movement\ntends towards something else. Therefore it seems that an angel\ncannot love himself with either natural or elective love.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8): \"Love for\nothers comes of love for oneself.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since the object of love is good, and good is to be\nfound both in substance and in accident, as is clear from _Ethic._ i,\n6, a thing may be loved in two ways; first of all as a subsisting\ngood; and secondly as an accidental or inherent good. That is loved\nas a subsisting good, which is so loved that we wish well to it. But\nthat which we wish unto another, is loved as an accidental or\ninherent good: thus knowledge is loved, not that any good may come to\nit but that it may be possessed. This kind of love has been called by\nthe name \"concupiscence\" while the first is called \"friendship.\"\n\nNow it is manifest that in things devoid of knowledge, everything\nnaturally seeks to procure what is good for itself; as fire seeks to\nmount upwards. Consequently both angel and man naturally seek their\nown good and perfection. This is to love self. Hence angel and man\nnaturally love self, in so far as by natural appetite each desires\nwhat is good for self. On the other hand, each loves self with the\nlove of choice, in so far as from choice he wishes for something\nwhich will benefit himself.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is not under the same but under quite different\naspects that an angel or a man loves self with natural and with\nelective love, as was observed above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As to be one is better than to be united, so there is\nmore oneness in love which is directed to self than in love which\nunites one to others. Dionysius used the terms \"uniting\" and\n\"binding\" in order to show the derivation of love from self to things\noutside self; as uniting is derived from unity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As love is an action which remains within the agent, so\nalso is it a movement which abides within the lover, but does not of\nnecessity tend towards something else; yet it can be reflected back\nupon the lover so that he loves himself; just as knowledge is\nreflected back upon the knower, in such a way that he knows himself.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 4]\n\nWhether an Angel Loves Another with Natural Love As He Loves Himself?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an angel does not love another with\nnatural love as he loves himself. For love follows knowledge. But an\nangel does not know another as he knows himself: because he knows\nhimself by his essence, while he knows another by his similitude, as\nwas said above (Q. 56, AA. 1, 2). Therefore it seems that one angel\ndoes not love another with natural love as he loves himself.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than the effect; and the\nprinciple than what is derived from it. But love for another comes of\nlove for self, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 8). Therefore one\nangel does not love another as himself, but loves himself more.\n\nObj. 3: Further, natural love is of something as an end, and is\nunremovable. But no angel is the end of another; and again, such love\ncan be severed from him, as is the case with the demons, who have no\nlove for the good angels. Therefore an angel does not love another\nwith natural love as he loves himself.\n\n_On the contrary,_ That seems to be a natural property which is found\nin all, even in such as devoid of reason. But, \"every beast loves its\nlike,\" as is said, Ecclus. 13:19. Therefore an angel naturally loves\nanother as he loves himself.\n\n_I answer that,_ As was observed (A. 3), both angel and man naturally\nlove self. Now what is one with a thing, is that thing itself:\nconsequently every thing loves what is one with itself. So, if this\nbe one with it by natural union, it loves it with natural love; but\nif it be one with it by non-natural union, then it loves it with\nnon-natural love. Thus a man loves his fellow townsman with a social\nlove, while he loves a blood relation with natural affection, in so\nfar as he is one with him in the principle of natural generation.\n\nNow it is evident that what is generically or specifically one with\nanother, is the one according to nature. And so everything loves\nanother which is one with it in species, with a natural affection, in\nso far as it loves its own species. This is manifest even in things\ndevoid of knowledge: for fire has a natural inclination to communicate\nits form to another thing, wherein consists this other thing's good;\nas it is naturally inclined to seek its own good, namely, to be borne\nupwards.\n\nSo then, it must be said that one angel loves another with natural\naffection, in so far as he is one with him in nature. But so far as an\nangel has something else in common with another angel, or differs from\nhim in other respects, he does not love him with natural love.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The expression 'as himself' can in one way qualify the\nknowledge and the love on the part of the one known and loved: and\nthus one angel knows another as himself, because he knows the other\nto be even as he knows himself to be. In another way the expression\ncan qualify the knowledge and the love on the part of the knower and\nlover. And thus one angel does not know another as himself, because\nhe knows himself by his essence, and the other not by the other's\nessence. In like manner he does not love another as he loves himself,\nbecause he loves himself by his own will; but he does not love\nanother by the other's will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The expression \"as\" does not denote equality, but\nlikeness. For since natural affection rests upon natural unity, the\nangel naturally loves less what is less one with him. Consequently he\nloves more what is numerically one with himself, than what is one\nonly generically or specifically. But it is natural for him to have a\nlike love for another as for himself, in this respect, that as he\nloves self in wishing well to self, so he loves another in wishing\nwell to him.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Natural love is said to be of the end, not as of that\nend to which good is willed, but rather as of that good which one\nwills for oneself, and in consequence for another, as united to\noneself. Nor can such natural love be stripped from the wicked\nangels, without their still retaining a natural affection towards the\ngood angels, in so far as they share the same nature with them. But\nthey hate them, in so far as they are unlike them according to\nrighteousness and unrighteousness.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 60, Art. 5]\n\nWhether an angel by natural love loves God more than he loves himself?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angel does not love God by\nnatural love more than he loves himself. For, as was stated (A. 4),\nnatural love rests upon natural union. Now the Divine nature is far\nabove the angelic nature. Therefore, according to natural love, the\nangel loves God less than self, or even than another angel.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"That on account of which a thing is such, is yet\nmore so.\" But every one loves another with natural love for his own\nsake: because one thing loves another as good for itself. Therefore\nthe angel does not love God more than self with natural love.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nature is self-centered in its operation; for we\nbehold every agent acting naturally for its own preservation. But\nnature's operation would not be self-centered were it to tend towards\nanything else more than to nature itself. Therefore the angel does\nnot love God more than himself from natural love.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is proper to charity to love God more than self.\nBut to love from charity is not natural to the angels; for \"it is\npoured out upon their hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to\nthem,\" as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9). Therefore the angels\ndo not love God more than themselves by natural love.\n\nObj. 5: Further, natural love lasts while nature endures. But the\nlove of God more than self does not remain in the angel or man who\nsins; for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv), \"Two loves have made two\ncities; namely love of self unto the contempt of God has made the\nearthly city; while love of God unto the contempt of self has made\nthe heavenly city.\" Therefore it is not natural to love God more\nthan self.\n\n_On the contrary,_ All the moral precepts of the law come of the law\nof nature. But the precept of loving God more than self is a moral\nprecept of the law. Therefore, it is of the law of nature.\nConsequently from natural love the angel loves God more than himself.\n\n_I answer that,_ There have been some who maintained that an angel\nloves God more than himself with natural love, both as to the love of\nconcupiscence, through his seeking the Divine good for himself rather\nthan his own good; and, in a fashion, as to the love of friendship, in\nso far as he naturally desires a greater good to God than to himself;\nbecause he naturally wishes God to be God, while as for himself, he\nwills to have his own nature. But absolutely speaking, out of the\nnatural love he loves himself more than he does God, because he\nnaturally loves himself before God, and with greater intensity.\n\nThe falsity of such an opinion stands in evidence, if one but consider\nwhither natural movement tends in the natural order of things; because\nthe natural tendency of things devoid of reason shows the nature of\nthe natural inclination residing in the will of an intellectual\nnature. Now, in natural things, everything which, as such, naturally\nbelongs to another, is principally, and more strongly inclined to that\nother to which it belongs, than towards itself. Such a natural\ntendency is evidenced from things which are moved according to nature:\nbecause \"according as a thing is moved naturally, it has an inborn\naptitude to be thus moved,\" as stated in Phys. ii, text. 78. For we\nobserve that the part naturally exposes itself in order to safeguard\nthe whole; as, for instance, the hand is without deliberation exposed\nto the blow for the whole body's safety. And since reason copies\nnature, we find the same inclination among the social virtues; for it\nbehooves the virtuous citizen to expose himself to the danger of death\nfor the public weal of the state; and if man were a natural part of\nthe city, then such inclination would be natural to him.\n\nConsequently, since God is the universal good, and under this good\nboth man and angel and all creatures are comprised, because every\ncreature in regard to its entire being naturally belongs to God, it\nfollows that from natural love angel and man alike love God before\nthemselves and with a greater love. Otherwise, if either of them\nloved self more than God, it would follow that natural love would be\nperverse, and that it would not be perfected but destroyed by charity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Such reasoning holds good of things adequately divided\nwhereof one is not the cause of the existence and goodness of the\nother; for in such natures each loves itself naturally more than it\ndoes the other, inasmuch as it is more one with itself than it is\nwith the other. But where one is the whole cause of the existence and\ngoodness of the other, that one is naturally more loved than self;\nbecause, as we said above, each part naturally loves the whole more\nthan itself: and each individual naturally loves the good of the\nspecies more than its own individual good. Now God is not only the\ngood of one species, but is absolutely the universal good; hence\neverything in its own way naturally loves God more than itself.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When it is said that God is loved by an angel \"in so\nfar\" as He is good to the angel, if the expression \"in so far\"\ndenotes an end, then it is false; for he does not naturally love God\nfor his own good, but for God's sake. If it denotes the nature of\nlove on the lover's part, then it is true; for it would not be in the\nnature of anyone to love God, except from this--that everything is\ndependent on that good which is God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Nature's operation is self-centered not merely as to\ncertain particular details, but much more as to what is common; for\neverything is inclined to preserve not merely its individuality, but\nlikewise its species. And much more has everything a natural\ninclination towards what is the absolutely universal good.\n\nReply Obj. 4: God, in so far as He is the universal good, from Whom\nevery natural good depends, is loved by everything with natural love.\nSo far as He is the good which of its very nature beatifies all with\nsupernatural beatitude, He is love with the love of charity.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Since God's substance and universal goodness are one\nand the same, all who behold God's essence are by the same movement\nof love moved towards the Divine essence as it is distinct from other\nthings, and according as it is the universal good. And because He is\nnaturally loved by all so far as He is the universal good, it is\nimpossible that whoever sees Him in His essence should not love Him.\nBut such as do not behold His essence, know Him by some particular\neffects, which are sometimes opposed to their will. So in this way\nthey are said to hate God; yet nevertheless, so far as He is the\nuniversal good of all, every thing naturally loves God more than\nitself.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 61\n\nOF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING\n(In Four Articles)\n\nAfter dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will,\nit now remains for us to treat of their creation, or, speaking in a\ngeneral way, of their origin. Such consideration is threefold. In the\nfirst place we must see how they were brought into natural existence;\nsecondly, how they were made perfect in grace or glory; and thirdly,\nhow some of them became wicked.\n\nUnder the first heading there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the angel has a cause of his existence?\n\n(2) Whether he has existed from eternity?\n\n(3) Whether he was created before corporeal creatures?\n\n(4) Whether the angels were created in the empyrean heaven?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 61, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Angels Have a Cause of Their Existence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels have no cause of their\nexistence. For the first chapter of Genesis treats of things created\nby God. But there is no mention of angels. Therefore the angels were\nnot created by God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii, text. 16) that\nif any substance be a form without matter, \"straightway it has being\nand unity of itself, and has no cause of its being and unity.\" But\nthe angels are immaterial forms, as was shown above (Q. 50, A. 2).\nTherefore they have no cause of their being.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever is produced by any agent, from the very\nfact of its being produced, receives form from it. But since the\nangels are forms, they do not derive their form from any agent.\nTherefore the angels have no active cause.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 148:2): \"Praise ye Him, all His\nangels\"; and further on, verse 5: \"For He spoke and they were made.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It must be affirmed that angels and everything\nexisting, except God, were made by God. God alone is His own\nexistence; while in everything else the essence differs from the\nexistence, as was shown above (Q. 3, A. 4). From this it is clear\nthat God alone exists of His own essence: while all other things have\ntheir existence by participation. Now whatever exists by participation\nis caused by what exists essentially; as everything ignited is caused\nby fire. Consequently the angels, of necessity, were made by God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 50) that the angels\nwere not passed over in that account of the first creation of things,\nbut are designated by the name \"heavens\" or of \"light.\" And they were\neither passed over, or else designated by the names of corporeal\nthings, because Moses was addressing an uncultured people, as yet\nincapable of understanding an incorporeal nature; and if it had been\ndivulged that there were creatures existing beyond corporeal nature,\nit would have proved to them an occasion of idolatry, to which they\nwere inclined, and from which Moses especially meant to safeguard\nthem.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Substances that are subsisting forms have no 'formal'\ncause of their existence and unity, nor such active cause as produces\nits effect by changing the matter from a state of potentiality to\nactuality; but they have a cause productive of their entire substance.\n\nFrom this the solution of the third difficulty is manifest.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 61, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Angel Was Produced by God from Eternity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angel was produced by God from\neternity. For God is the cause of the angel by His being: for He does\nnot act through something besides His essence. But His being is\neternal. Therefore He produced the angels from eternity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, everything which exists at one period and not at\nanother, is subject to time. But the angel is above time, as is laid\ndown in the book _De Causis._ Therefore the angel is not at one time\nexisting and at another non-existing, but exists always.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. xiii) proves the soul's\nincorruptibility by the fact that the mind is capable of truth. But as\ntruth is incorruptible, so is it eternal. Therefore the intellectual\nnature of the soul and of the angel is not only incorruptible, but\nlikewise eternal.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Prov. 8:22), in the person of begotten\nWisdom: \"The Lord possessed me in the beginning of His ways, before He\nmade anything from the beginning.\" But, as was shown above (A. 1), the\nangels were made by God. Therefore at one time the angels were not.\n\n_I answer that,_ God alone, Father, Son and Holy Ghost, is from\neternity. Catholic Faith holds this without doubt; and everything to\nthe contrary must be rejected as heretical. For God so produced\ncreatures that He made them \"from nothing\"; that is, after they had\nnot been.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God's being is His will. So the fact that God produced\nthe angels and other creatures by His being does not exclude that He\nmade them also by His will. But, as was shown above (Q. 19, A. 3; Q.\n46, A. 1), God's will does not act by necessity in producing\ncreatures. Therefore He produced such as He willed, and when He\nwilled.\n\nReply Obj. 2: An angel is above that time which is the measure of the\nmovement of the heavens; because he is above every movement of a\ncorporeal nature. Nevertheless he is not above time which is the\nmeasure of the succession of his existence after his non-existence,\nand which is also the measure of the succession which is in his\noperations. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 20,21) that \"God\nmoves the spiritual creature according to time.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Angels and intelligent souls are incorruptible by the\nvery fact of their having a nature whereby they are capable of truth.\nBut they did not possess this nature from eternity; it was bestowed\nupon them when God Himself willed it. Consequently it does not follow\nthat the angels existed from eternity.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 61, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Angels Were Created Before the Corporeal World?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels were created before the\ncorporeal world. For Jerome says (In Ep. ad Tit. i, 2): \"Six thousand\nyears of our time have not yet elapsed; yet how shall we measure the\ntime, how shall we count the ages, in which the Angels, Thrones,\nDominations, and the other orders served God?\" Damascene also says\n(De Fide Orth. ii): \"Some say that the angels were begotten before\nall creation; as Gregory the Theologian declares, He first of all\ndevised the angelic and heavenly powers, and the devising was the\nmaking thereof.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, the angelic nature stands midway between the Divine\nand the corporeal natures. But the Divine nature is from eternity;\nwhile corporeal nature is from time. Therefore the angelic nature was\nproduced ere time was made, and after eternity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the angelic nature is more remote from the corporeal\nnature than one corporeal nature is from another. But one corporeal\nnature was made before another; hence the six days of the production\nof things are set forth in the opening of Genesis. Much more,\ntherefore, was the angelic nature made before every corporeal nature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): \"In the beginning God\ncreated heaven and earth.\" Now, this would not be true if anything\nhad been created previously. Consequently the angels were not created\nbefore corporeal nature.\n\n_I answer that,_ There is a twofold opinion on this point to be found\nin the writings of the Fathers. The more probable one holds that the\nangels were created at the same time as corporeal creatures. For the\nangels are part of the universe: they do not constitute a universe of\nthemselves; but both they and corporeal natures unite in constituting\none universe. This stands in evidence from the relationship of\ncreature to creature; because the mutual relationship of creatures\nmakes up the good of the universe. But no part is perfect if separate\nfrom the whole. Consequently it is improbable that God, Whose \"works\nare perfect,\" as it is said Deut. 32:4, should have created the\nangelic creature before other creatures. At the same time the\ncontrary is not to be deemed erroneous; especially on account of the\nopinion of Gregory Nazianzen, \"whose authority in Christian doctrine\nis of such weight that no one has ever raised objection to his\nteaching, as is also the case with the doctrine of Athanasius,\" as\nJerome says.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Jerome is speaking according to the teaching of the\nGreek Fathers; all of whom hold the creation of the angels to have\ntaken place previously to that of the corporeal world.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God is not a part of, but far above, the whole\nuniverse, possessing within Himself the entire perfection of the\nuniverse in a more eminent way. But an angel is a part of the\nuniverse. Hence the comparison does not hold.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All corporeal creatures are one in matter; while the\nangels do not agree with them in matter. Consequently the creation\nof the matter of the corporeal creature involves in a manner the\ncreation of all things; but the creation of the angels does not\ninvolve creation of the universe.\n\nIf the contrary view be held, then in the text of Gen. 1, \"In the\nbeginning God created heaven and earth,\" the words, \"In the\nbeginning,\" must be interpreted, \"In the Son,\" or \"In the beginning\nof time\": but not, \"In the beginning, before which there was\nnothing,\" unless we say \"Before which there was nothing of the\nnature of corporeal creatures.\"\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 61, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Angels Were Created in the Empyrean Heaven?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in the\nempyrean heaven. For the angels are incorporeal substances. Now a\nsubstance which is incorporeal is not dependent upon a body for its\nexistence; and as a consequence, neither is it for its creation.\nTherefore the angels were not created in any corporeal place.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that the\nangels were created in the upper atmosphere: therefore not in the\nempyrean heaven.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the empyrean heaven is said to be the highest\nheaven. If therefore the angels were created in the empyrean heaven,\nit would not beseem them to mount up to a still higher heaven. And\nthis is contrary to what is said in Isaias, speaking in the person of\nthe sinning angel: \"I will ascend into heaven\" (Isa. 14:13).\n\n_On the contrary,_ Strabus, commenting on the text \"In the beginning\nGod created heaven and earth,\" says: \"By heaven he does not mean the\nvisible firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or\nintellectual firmament, which is not so styled from its heat, but\nfrom its splendor; and which was filled with angels directly it was\nmade.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As was observed (A. 3), the universe is made up of\ncorporeal and spiritual creatures. Consequently spiritual creatures\nwere so created as to bear some relationship to the corporeal\ncreature, and to rule over every corporeal creature. Hence it was\nfitting for the angels to be created in the highest corporeal place,\nas presiding over all corporeal nature; whether it be styled the\nempyrean heaven, or whatever else it be called. So Isidore says that\nthe highest heaven is the heaven of the angels, explaining the passage\nof Deut. 10:14: \"Behold heaven is the Lord's thy God, and the heaven\nof heaven.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The angels were created in a corporeal place, not as\nif depending upon a body either as to their existence or as to their\nbeing made; because God could have created them before all corporeal\ncreation, as many holy Doctors hold. They were made in a corporeal\nplace in order to show their relationship to corporeal nature, and\nthat they are by their power in touch with bodies.\n\nReply Obj. 2: By the uppermost atmosphere Augustine possibly means\nthe highest part of heaven, to which the atmosphere has a kind of\naffinity owing to its subtlety and transparency. Or else he is not\nspeaking of all the angels; but only of such as sinned, who, in the\nopinion of some, belonged to the inferior orders. But there is\nnothing to hinder us from saying that the higher angels, as having an\nexalted and universal power over all corporeal things, were created\nin the highest place of the corporeal creature; while the other\nangels, as having more restricted powers, were created among the\ninferior bodies.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Isaias is not speaking there of any corporeal heaven,\nbut of the heaven of the Blessed Trinity; unto which the sinning\nangel wished to ascend, when he desired to be equal in some manner\nto God, as will appear later on (Q. 63, A. 3).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 62\n\nOF THE PERFECTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF GRACE AND OF GLORY\n(In Nine Articles)\n\nIn due sequence we have to inquire how the angels were made in the\norder of grace and of glory; under which heading there are nine\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Were the angels created in beatitude?\n\n(2) Did they need grace in order to turn to God?\n\n(3) Were they created in grace?\n\n(4) Did they merit their beatitude?\n\n(5) Did they at once enter into beatitude after merit?\n\n(6) Did they receive grace and glory according to their natural\ncapacities?\n\n(7) After entering glory, did their natural love and knowledge\nremain?\n\n(8) Could they have sinned afterwards?\n\n(9) After entering into glory, could they advance farther?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Angels Were Created in Beatitude?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels were created in beatitude.\nFor it is stated (De Eccl. Dogm. xxix) that \"the angels who continue\nin the beatitude wherein they were created, do not of their nature\npossess the excellence they have.\" Therefore the angels were created\nin beatitude.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the angelic nature is nobler than the corporeal\ncreature. But the corporeal creature straightway from its creation\nwas made perfect and complete; nor did its lack of form take\nprecedence in time, but only in nature, as Augustine says (Gen. ad\nlit. i, 15). Therefore neither did God create the angelic nature\nimperfect and incomplete. But its formation and perfection are\nderived from its beatitude, whereby it enjoys God. Therefore it was\ncreated in beatitude.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34; v, 5),\nthe things which we read of as being made in the works of the six\ndays, were made together at one time; and so all the six days must\nhave existed instantly from the beginning of creation. But, according\nto his exposition, in those six days, \"the morning\" was the angelic\nknowledge, according to which they knew the Word and things in the\nWord. Therefore straightway from their creation they knew the Word,\nand things in the Word. But the bliss of the angels comes of seeing\nthe Word. Consequently the angels were in beatitude straightway from\nthe very beginning of their creation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ To be established or confirmed in good is of the\nnature of beatitude. But the angels were not confirmed in good as\nsoon as they were created; the fall of some of them shows this.\nTherefore the angels were not in beatitude from their creation.\n\n_I answer that,_ By the name of beatitude is understood the ultimate\nperfection of rational or of intellectual nature; and hence it is that\nit is naturally desired, since everything naturally desires its\nultimate perfection. Now there is a twofold ultimate perfection of\nrational or of intellectual nature. The first is one which it can\nprocure of its own natural power; and this is in a measure called\nbeatitude or happiness. Hence Aristotle (Ethic. x) says that man's\nultimate happiness consists in his most perfect contemplation, whereby\nin this life he can behold the best intelligible object; and that is\nGod. Above this happiness there is still another, which we look\nforward to in the future, whereby \"we shall see God as He is.\" This is\nbeyond the nature of every created intellect, as was shown above\n(Q. 12, A. 4).\n\nSo, then, it remains to be said, that, as regards this first\nbeatitude, which the angel could procure by his natural power, he was\ncreated already blessed. Because the angel does not acquire such\nbeatitude by any progressive action, as man does, but, as was\nobserved above (Q. 58, AA. 3, 4), is straightway in possession\nthereof, owing to his natural dignity. But the angels did not have\nfrom the beginning of their creation that ultimate beatitude which is\nbeyond the power of nature; because such beatitude is no part of\ntheir nature, but its end; and consequently they ought not to have it\nimmediately from the beginning.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Beatitude is there taken for that natural perfection\nwhich the angel had in the state of innocence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The corporeal creature instantly in the beginning of\nits creation could not have the perfection to which it is brought by\nits operation; consequently, according to Augustine (Gen. ad. lit. v,\n4, 23; viii, 3), the growing of plants from the earth did not take\nplace at once among the first works, in which only the germinating\npower of the plants was bestowed upon the earth. In the same way, the\nangelic creature in the beginning of its existence had the perfection\nof its nature; but it did not have the perfection to which it had to\ncome by its operation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The angel has a twofold knowledge of the Word; the one\nwhich is natural, and the other according to glory. He has a natural\nknowledge whereby he knows the Word through a similitude thereof\nshining in his nature; and he has a knowledge of glory whereby he\nknows the Word through His essence. By both kinds of knowledge the\nangel knows things in the Word; imperfectly by his natural knowledge,\nand perfectly by his knowledge of glory. Therefore the first\nknowledge of things in the Word was present to the angel from the\noutset of his creation; while the second was not, but only when the\nangels became blessed by turning to the good. And this is properly\ntermed their morning knowledge.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 2]\n\nWhether an Angel Needs Grace in Order to Turn to God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angel had no need of grace in\norder to turn to God. For, we have no need of grace for what we can\naccomplish naturally. But the angel naturally turns to God: because\nhe loves God naturally, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 60,\nA. 5). Therefore an angel did not need grace in order to turn to God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, seemingly we need help only for difficult tasks. Now\nit was not a difficult task for the angel to turn to God; because\nthere was no obstacle in him to such turning. Therefore the angel had\nno need of grace in order to turn to God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to turn oneself to God is to dispose oneself for\ngrace; hence it is said (Zech. 1:3): \"Turn ye to Me, and I will turn\nto you.\" But we do not stand in need of grace in order to prepare\nourselves for grace: for thus we should go on to infinity. Therefore\nthe angel did not need grace to turn to God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It was by turning to God that the angel reached to\nbeatitude. If, then, he had needed no grace in order to turn to God,\nit would follow that he did not require grace in order to possess\neverlasting life. But this is contrary to the saying of the Apostle\n(Rom. 6:23): \"The grace of God is life everlasting.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The angels stood in need of grace in order to turn\nto God, as the object of beatitude. For, as was observed above\n(Q. 60, A. 2) the natural movement of the will is the principle\nof all things that we will. But the will's natural inclination is\ndirected towards what is in keeping with its nature. Therefore, if\nthere is anything which is above nature, the will cannot be inclined\ntowards it, unless helped by some other supernatural principle. Thus\nit is clear that fire has a natural tendency to give forth heat, and\nto generate fire; whereas to generate flesh is beyond the natural\npower of fire; consequently, fire has no tendency thereto, except in\nso far as it is moved instrumentally by the nutritive soul.\n\nNow it was shown above (Q. 12, AA. 4, 5), when we were treating of\nGod's knowledge, that to see God in His essence, wherein the ultimate\nbeatitude of the rational creature consists, is beyond the nature of\nevery created intellect. Consequently no rational creature can have\nthe movement of the will directed towards such beatitude, except it be\nmoved thereto by a supernatural agent. This is what we call the help\nof grace. Therefore it must be said that an angel could not of his own\nwill be turned to such beatitude, except by the help of grace.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The angel loves God naturally, so far as God is the\nauthor of his natural being. But here we are speaking of turning to\nGod, so far as God bestows beatitude by the vision of His essence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A thing is \"difficult\" which is beyond a power; and\nthis happens in two ways. First of all, because it is beyond the\nnatural capacity of the power. Thus, if it can be attained by some\nhelp, it is said to be \"difficult\"; but if it can in no way be\nattained, then it is \"impossible\"; thus it is impossible for a man to\nfly. In another way a thing may be beyond the power, not according to\nthe natural order of such power, but owing to some intervening\nhindrance; as to mount upwards is not contrary to the natural order\nof the motive power of the soul; because the soul, considered in\nitself, can be moved in any direction; but is hindered from so doing\nby the weight of the body; consequently it is difficult for a man to\nmount upwards. To be turned to his ultimate beatitude is difficult\nfor man, both because it is beyond his nature, and because he has a\nhindrance from the corruption of the body and infection of sin. But\nit is difficult for an angel, only because it is supernatural.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Every movement of the will towards God can be termed a\nconversion to God. And so there is a threefold turning to God. The\nfirst is by the perfect love of God; this belongs to the creature\nenjoying the possession of God; and for such conversion, consummate\ngrace is required. The next turning to God is that which merits\nbeatitude; and for this there is required habitual grace, which is\nthe principle of merit. The third conversion is that whereby a man\ndisposes himself so that he may have grace; for this no habitual\ngrace is required; but the operation of God, Who draws the soul\ntowards Himself, according to Lament. 5:21: \"Convert us, O Lord, to\nThee, and we shall be converted.\" Hence it is clear that there is no\nneed to go on to infinity.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Angels Were Created in Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels were not created in grace.\nFor Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 8) that the angelic nature was\nfirst made without form, and was called \"heaven\": but afterwards it\nreceived its form, and was then called \"light.\" But such formation\ncomes from grace. Therefore they were not created in grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, grace turns the rational creature towards God. If,\ntherefore, the angel had been created in grace, no angel would ever\nhave turned away from God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, grace comes midway between nature and glory. But the\nangels were not beatified in their creation. Therefore it seems that\nthey were not created in grace; but that they were first created in\nnature only, and then received grace, and that last of all they were\nbeatified.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9), \"Who wrought\nthe good will of the angels? Who, save Him Who created them with His\nwill, that is, with the pure love wherewith they cling to Him; at the\nsame time building up their nature and bestowing grace on them?\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Although there are conflicting opinions on this\npoint, some holding that the angels were created only in a natural\nstate, while others maintain that they were created in grace; yet it\nseems more probable, and more in keeping with the sayings of holy\nmen, that they were created in sanctifying grace. For we see that all\nthings which, in the process of time, being created by the work of\nDivine Providence, were produced by the operation of God, were\ncreated in the first fashioning of things according to seedlike\nforms, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 3), such as trees,\nanimals, and the rest. Now it is evident that sanctifying grace bears\nthe same relation to beatitude as the seedlike form in nature does to\nthe natural effect; hence (1 John 3:9) grace is called the \"seed\" of\nGod. As, then, in Augustine's opinion it is contended that the\nseedlike forms of all natural effects were implanted in the creature\nwhen corporeally created, so straightway from the beginning the\nangels were created in grace.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Such absence of form in the angels can be understood\neither by comparison with their formation in glory; and so the\nabsence of formation preceded formation by priority of time. Or else\nit can be understood of the formation according to grace: and so it\ndid not precede in the order of time, but in the order of nature; as\nAugustine holds with regard to the formation of corporeal things\n(Gen. ad lit. i, 15).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Every form inclines the subject after the mode of the\nsubject's nature. Now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to be\ninclined freely towards the objects it desires. Consequently the\nmovement of grace does not impose necessity; but he who has grace\ncan fail to make use of it, and can sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although in the order of nature grace comes midway\nbetween nature and glory, nevertheless, in the order of time, in\ncreated nature, glory is not simultaneous with nature; because glory\nis the end of the operation of nature helped by grace. But grace\nstands not as the end of operation, because it is not of works, but\nas the principle of right operation. Therefore it was fitting for\ngrace to be given straightway with nature.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 4]\n\nWhether an Angel Merits His Beatitude?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angel did not merit his beatitude.\nFor merit arises from the difficulty of the meritorious act. But the\nangel experienced no difficulty in acting rightly. Therefore righteous\naction was not meritorious for him.\n\nObj. 2: Further, we do not merit by merely natural operations. But it\nwas quite natural for the angel to turn to God. Therefore he did not\nthereby merit beatitude.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if a beatified angel merited his beatitude, he did\nso either before he had it, or else afterwards. But it was not\nbefore; because, in the opinion of many, he had no grace before\nwhereby to merit it. Nor did he merit it afterwards, because thus he\nwould be meriting it now; which is clearly false, because in that\ncase a lower angel could by meriting rise up to the rank of a higher,\nand the distinct degrees of grace would not be permanent; which is\nnot admissible. Consequently the angel did not merit his beatitude.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is stated (Apoc. 21:17) that the \"measure of\nthe angel\" in that heavenly Jerusalem is \"the measure of a man.\"\nTherefore the same is the case with the angel.\n\n_I answer that,_ Perfect beatitude is natural only to God, because\nexistence and beatitude are one and the same thing in Him. Beatitude,\nhowever, is not of the nature of the creature, but is its end. Now\neverything attains its last end by its operation. Such operation\nleading to the end is either productive of the end, when such end is\nnot beyond the power of the agent working for the end, as the healing\nart is productive of health; or else it is deserving of the end, when\nsuch end is beyond the capacity of the agent striving to attain it;\nwherefore it is looked for from another's bestowing. Now it is\nevident from what has gone before (AA. 1, 2; Q. 12, AA. 4, 5),\nultimate beatitude exceeds both the angelic and the human nature. It\nremains, then, that both man and angel merited their beatitude.\n\nAnd if the angel was created in grace, without which there is no\nmerit, there would be no difficulty in saying that he merited\nbeatitude: as also, if one were to say that he had grace in any way\nbefore he had glory.\n\nBut if he had no grace before entering upon beatitude, it would then\nhave to be said that he had beatitude without merit, even as we have\ngrace. This, however, is quite foreign to the idea of beatitude; which\nconveys the notion of an end, and is the reward of virtue, as even the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). Or else it will have to be said, as\nsome others have maintained, that the angels merit beatitude by their\npresent ministrations, while in beatitude. This is quite contrary,\nagain, to the notion of merit: since merit conveys the idea of a means\nto an end; while what is already in its end cannot, properly speaking,\nbe moved towards such end; and so no one merits to produce what he\nalready enjoys. Or else it will have to be said that one and the same\nact of turning to God, so far as it comes of free-will, is\nmeritorious; and so far as it attains the end, is the fruition of\nbeatitude. Even this view will not stand, because free-will is not the\nsufficient cause of merit; and, consequently, an act cannot be\nmeritorious as coming from free-will, except in so far as it is\ninformed by grace; but it cannot at the same time be informed by\nimperfect grace, which is the principle of meriting, and by perfect\ngrace, which is the principle of enjoying. Hence it does not appear to\nbe possible for anyone to enjoy beatitude, and at the same time to\nmerit it.\n\nConsequently it is better to say that the angel had grace ere he was\nadmitted to beatitude, and that by such grace he merited beatitude.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The angel's difficulty of working righteously does not\ncome from any contrariety or hindrance of natural powers; but from\nthe fact that the good work is beyond his natural capacity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: An angel did not merit beatitude by natural movement\ntowards God; but by the movement of charity, which comes of grace.\n\nThe answer to the Third Objection is evident from what we have said.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Angel Obtained Beatitude Immediately After One Act of\nMerit?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angel did not possess beatitude\ninstantly after one act of merit. For it is more difficult for a man\nto do well than for an angel. But man is not rewarded at once after\none act of merit. Therefore neither was the angel.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an angel could act at once, and in an instant, from\nthe very outset of his creation, for even natural bodies begin to be\nmoved in the very instant of their creation; and if the movement of a\nbody could be instantaneous, like operations of mind and will, it\nwould have movement in the first instant of its generation.\nConsequently, if the angel merited beatitude by one act of his will,\nhe merited it in the first instant of his creation; and so, if their\nbeatitude was not retarded, then the angels were in beatitude in the\nfirst instant.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there must be many intervals between things which\nare far apart. But the beatific state of the angels is very far\nremote from their natural condition: while merit comes midway\nbetween. Therefore the angel would have to pass through many stages\nof merit in order to reach beatitude.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Man's soul and an angel are ordained alike for\nbeatitude: consequently equality with angels is promised to the\nsaints. Now the soul separated from the body, if it has merit\ndeserving beatitude, enters at once into beatitude, unless there be\nsome obstacle. Therefore so does an angel. Now an angel instantly, in\nhis first act of charity, had the merit of beatitude. Therefore, since\nthere was no obstacle within him, he passed at once into beatitude by\nonly one meritorious act.\n\n_I answer that,_ The angel was beatified instantly after the first\nact of charity, whereby he merited beatitude. The reason whereof is\nbecause grace perfects nature according to the manner of the nature;\nas every perfection is received in the subject capable of perfection,\naccording to its mode. Now it is proper to the angelic nature to\nreceive its natural perfection not by passing from one stage to\nanother; but to have it at once naturally, as was shown above (A. 1;\nQ. 58, AA. 3, 4). But as the angel is of his nature inclined to\nnatural perfection, so is he by merit inclined to glory. Hence\ninstantly after merit the angel secured beatitude. Now the merit of\nbeatitude in angel and man alike can be from merely one act; because\nman merits beatitude by every act informed by charity. Hence it\nremains that an angel was beatified straightway after one act of\ncharity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man was not intended to secure his ultimate perfection\nat once, like the angel. Hence a longer way was assigned to man than\nto the angel for securing beatitude.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The angel is above the time of corporeal things; hence\nthe various instants regarding the angels are not to be taken except\nas reckoning the succession of their acts. Now their act which\nmerited beatitude could not be in them simultaneously with the act of\nbeatitude, which is fruition; since the one belongs to imperfect\ngrace, and the other to consummate grace. Consequently, it remains\nfor different instants to be conceived, in one of which the angel\nmerited beatitude, and in another was beatified.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is of the nature of an angel instantly to attain\nthe perfection unto which he is ordained. Consequently, only one\nmeritorious act is required; which act can so far be called an\ninterval as through it the angel is brought to beatitude.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Angels Receive Grace and Glory According to the Degree of\nTheir Natural Gifts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels did not receive grace and\nglory according to the degree of their natural gifts. For grace is\nbestowed of God's absolute will. Therefore the degree of grace\ndepends on God's will, and not on the degree of their natural gifts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a moral act seems to be more closely allied with\ngrace than nature is; because a moral act is preparatory to grace.\nBut grace does not come \"of works,\" as is said Rom. 11:6. Therefore\nmuch less does the degree of grace depend upon the degree of their\nnatural gifts.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man and angel are alike ordained for beatitude or\ngrace. But man does not receive more grace according to the degree of\nhis natural gifts. Therefore neither does the angel.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Is the saying of the Master of the Sentences\n(Sent. ii, D, 3) that \"those angels who were created with more subtle\nnatures and of keener intelligence in wisdom, were likewise endowed\nwith greater gifts of grace.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is reasonable to suppose that gifts of graces and\nperfection of beatitude were bestowed on the angels according to the\ndegree of their natural gifts. The reason for this can be drawn from\ntwo sources. First of all, on the part of God, Who, in the order of\nHis wisdom, established various degrees in the angelic nature. Now as\nthe angelic nature was made by God for attaining grace and beatitude,\nso likewise the grades of the angelic nature seem to be ordained for\nthe various degrees of grace and glory; just as when, for example, the\nbuilder chisels the stones for building a house, from the fact that he\nprepares some more artistically and more fittingly than others, it is\nclear that he is setting them apart for the more ornate part of the\nhouse. So it seems that God destined those angels for greater gifts of\ngrace and fuller beatitude, whom He made of a higher nature.\n\nSecondly, the same is evident on the part of the angel. The angel is\nnot a compound of different natures, so that the inclination of the\none thwarts or retards the tendency of the other; as happens in man,\nin whom the movement of his intellective part is either retarded or\nthwarted by the inclination of his sensitive part. But when there is\nnothing to retard or thwart it, nature is moved with its whole energy.\nSo it is reasonable to suppose that the angels who had a higher\nnature, were turned to God more mightily and efficaciously. The same\nthing happens in men, since greater grace and glory are bestowed\naccording to the greater earnestness of their turning to God. Hence it\nappears that the angels who had the greater natural powers, had the\nmore grace and glory.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As grace comes of God's will alone, so likewise does\nthe nature of the angel: and as God's will ordained nature for grace,\nso did it ordain the various degrees of nature to the various degrees\nof grace.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The acts of the rational creature are from the creature\nitself; whereas nature is immediately from God. Accordingly it seems\nrather that grace is bestowed according to degree of nature than\naccording to works.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Diversity of natural gifts is in one way in the angels,\nwho are themselves different specifically; and in quite another way\nin men, who differ only numerically. For specific difference is on\naccount of the end; while numerical difference is because of the\nmatter. Furthermore, there is something in man which can thwart or\nimpede the movement of his intellective nature; but not in the\nangels. Consequently the argument is not the same for both.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Natural Knowledge and Love Remain in the Beatified Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that natural knowledge and love do not\nremain in the beatified angels. For it is said (1 Cor. 13:10): \"When\nthat which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be\ndone away.\" But natural love and knowledge are imperfect in comparison\nwith beatified knowledge and love. Therefore, in beatitude, natural\nknowledge and love cease.\n\nObj. 2: Further, where one suffices, another is superfluous. But the\nknowledge and love of glory suffice for the beatified angels.\nTherefore it would be superfluous for their natural knowledge and\nlove to remain.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the same faculty has not two simultaneous acts, as\nthe same line cannot, at the same end, be terminated in two points.\nBut the beatified angels are always exercising their beatified\nknowledge and love; for, as is said _Ethic._ i, 8, happiness consists\nnot in habit, but in act. Therefore there can never be natural\nknowledge and love in the angels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ So long as a nature endures, its operation\nremains. But beatitude does not destroy nature, since it is its\nperfection. Therefore it does not take away natural knowledge and\nlove.\n\n_I answer that,_ Natural knowledge and love remain in the angels. For\nas principles of operations are mutually related, so are the operations\nthemselves. Now it is manifest that nature is to beatitude as first to\nsecond; because beatitude is superadded to nature. But the first must\never be preserved in the second. Consequently nature must be preserved\nin beatitude: and in like manner the act of nature must be preserved\nin the act of beatitude.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The advent of a perfection removes the opposite\nimperfection. Now the imperfection of nature is not opposed to the\nperfection of beatitude, but underlies it; as the imperfection of the\npower underlies the perfection of the form, and the power is not taken\naway by the form, but the privation which is opposed to the form. In\nthe same way, the imperfection of natural knowledge is not opposed to\nthe perfection of the knowledge in glory; for nothing hinders us from\nknowing a thing through various mediums, as a thing may be known at\nthe one time through a probable medium and through a demonstrative\none. In like manner, an angel can know God by His essence, and this\nappertains to his knowledge of glory; and at the same time he can know\nGod by his own essence, which belongs to his natural knowledge.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All things which make up beatitude are sufficient of\nthemselves. But in order for them to exist, they presuppose the\nnatural gifts; because no beatitude is self-subsisting, except the\nuncreated beatitude.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There cannot be two operations of the one faculty at\nthe one time, except the one be ordained to the other. But natural\nknowledge and love are ordained to the knowledge and love of glory.\nAccordingly there is nothing to hinder natural knowledge and love\nfrom existing in the angel conjointly with those of glory.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 8]\n\nWhether a Beatified Angel Can Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a beatified angel can sin. For, as\nas said above (A. 7), beatitude does not do away with nature. But it\nis of the very notion of created nature, that it can fail. Therefore\na beatified angel can sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the rational powers are referred to opposites, as\nthe Philosopher observes (Metaph. iv, text. 3). But the will of the\nangel in beatitude does not cease to be rational. Therefore it is\ninclined towards good and evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it belongs to the liberty of free-will for man to be\nable to choose good or evil. But the freedom of will is not lessened\nin the beatified angels. Therefore they can sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi) that \"there is\nin the holy angels that nature which cannot sin.\" Therefore the holy\nangels cannot sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ The beatified angels cannot sin. The reason for\nthis is, because their beatitude consists in seeing God through His\nessence. Now, God's essence is the very essence of goodness.\nConsequently the angel beholding God is disposed towards God in the\nsame way as anyone else not seeing God is to the common form of\ngoodness. Now it is impossible for any man either to will or to do\nanything except aiming at what is good; or for him to wish to turn\naway from good precisely as such. Therefore the beatified angel can\nneither will nor act, except as aiming towards God. Now whoever wills\nor acts in this manner cannot sin. Consequently the beatified angel\ncannot sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Created good, considered in itself, can fail.\nBut from its perfect union with the uncreated good, such as is the\nunion of beatitude, it is rendered unable to sin, for the reason\nalready alleged.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The rational powers are referred to opposites in\nthe things to which they are not inclined naturally; but as to the\nthings whereunto they have a natural tendency, they are not referred\nto opposites. For the intellect cannot but assent to naturally known\nprinciples; in the same way, the will cannot help clinging to good,\nformally as good; because the will is naturally ordained to good as to\nits proper object. Consequently the will of the angels is referred to\nopposites, as to doing many things, or not doing them. But they have\nno tendency to opposites with regard to God Himself, Whom they see to\nbe the very nature of goodness; but in all things their aim is towards\nGod, which ever alternative they choose, that is not sinful.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Free-will in its choice of means to an end is\ndisposed just as the intellect is to conclusions. Now it is evident\nthat it belongs to the power of the intellect to be able to proceed to\ndifferent conclusions, according to given principles; but for it to\nproceed to some conclusion by passing out of the order of the\nprinciples, comes of its own defect. Hence it belongs to the\nperfection of its liberty for the free-will to be able to choose\nbetween opposite things, keeping the order of the end in view; but it\ncomes of the defect of liberty for it to choose anything by turning\naway from the order of the end; and this is to sin. Hence there is\ngreater liberty of will in the angels, who cannot sin, than there is\nin ourselves, who can sin.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 62, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Beatified Angels Advance in Beatitude?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the beatified angels can advance in\nbeatitude. For charity is the principle of merit. But there is\nperfect charity in the angels. Therefore the beatified angels can\nmerit. Now, as merit increases, the reward of beatitude increases.\nTherefore the beatified angels can progress in beatitude.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i) that \"God\nmakes use of us for our own gain, and for His own goodness. The same\nthing happens to the angels, whom He uses for spiritual\nministrations\"; since \"they are all [*Vulg.: 'Are they not\nall . . . ?'] ministering spirits, sent to minister for them who\nshall receive the inheritance of salvation\" (Heb. 1:14). This would\nnot be for their profit were they not to merit thereby, nor to\nadvance to beatitude. It remains, then, that the beatified angels\ncan merit, and can advance in beatitude.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it argues imperfection for anyone not occupying\nthe foremost place not to be able to advance. But the angels are not\nin the highest degree of beatitude. Therefore if unable to ascend\nhigher, it would appear that there is imperfection and defect in\nthem; which is not admissible.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Merit and progress belong to this present\ncondition of life. But angels are not wayfarers travelling towards\nbeatitude, they are already in possession of beatitude. Consequently\nthe beatified angels can neither merit nor advance in beatitude.\n\n_I answer that,_ In every movement the mover's intention is centered\nupon one determined end, to which he intends to lead the movable\nsubject; because intention looks to the end, to which infinite\nprogress is repugnant. Now it is evident, since the rational creature\ncannot of its own power attain to its beatitude, which consists in\nthe vision of God, as is clear from what has gone before (Q. 12, A.\n4), that it needs to be moved by God towards its beatitude. Therefore\nthere must be some one determined thing to which every rational\ncreature is directed as to its last end.\n\nNow this one determinate object cannot, in the vision of God, consist\nprecisely in that which is seen; for the Supreme Truth is seen by all\nthe blessed in various degrees: but it is on the part of the mode of\nvision, that diverse terms are fixed beforehand by the intention of\nHim Who directs towards the end. For it is impossible that as the\nrational creature is led on to the vision of the Supreme Essence, it\nshould be led on in the same way to the supreme mode of vision, which\nis comprehension, for this belongs to God only; as is evident from\nwhat was said above (Q. 12, A. 7; Q. 14, A. 3). But since infinite\nefficacy is required for comprehending God, while the creature's\nefficacy in beholding is only finite; and since every finite being is\nin infinite degrees removed from the infinite; it comes to pass that\nthe rational creature understands God more or less clearly according\nto infinite degrees. And as beatitude consists in vision, so the\ndegree of vision lies in a determinate mode of the vision.\n\nTherefore every rational creature is so led by God to the end of its\nbeatitude, that from God's predestination it is brought even to a\ndeterminate degree of beatitude. Consequently, when that degree is\nonce secured, it cannot pass to a higher degree.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Merit belongs to a subject which is moving towards its\nend. Now the rational creature is moved towards its end, not merely\npassively, but also by working actively. If the end is within the\npower of the rational creature, then its action is said to procure\nthe end; as man acquires knowledge by reflection: but if the end be\nbeyond its power, and is looked for from another, then the action\nwill be meritorious of such end. But what is already in the ultimate\nterm is not said to be moved, but to have been moved. Consequently,\nto merit belongs to the imperfect charity of this life; whereas\nperfect charity does not merit but rather enjoys the reward. Even as\nin acquired habits, the operation preceding the habit is productive\nof the habit; but the operation from an acquired habit is both\nperfect and enjoyable. In the same way the act of perfect charity has\nno quality of merit, but belongs rather to the perfection of the\nreward.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A thing can be termed useful in two ways. First of all,\nas being on the way to an end; and so the merit of beatitude is\nuseful. Secondly, as the part is useful for the whole; as the wall\nfor a house. In this way the angelic ministerings are useful for the\nbeatified angels, inasmuch as they are a part of their beatitude; for\nto pour out acquired perfection upon others is of the nature of what\nis perfect, considered as perfect.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although a beatified angel is not absolutely in the\nhighest degree of beatitude, yet, in his own regard he is in the\nhighest degree, according to Divine predestination. Nevertheless the\njoy of the angels can be increased with regard to the salvation of\nsuch as are saved by their ministrations, according to Luke 15:10:\n\"There is [Vulg.'shall be'] joy before the angels of God upon one\nsinner doing penance.\" Such joy belongs to their accidental reward,\nwhich can be increased unto judgment day. Hence some writers say that\nthey can merit as to their accidental reward. But it is better to say\nthat the Blessed can in no wise merit without being at the same time\na wayfarer and a comprehensor; like Christ, Who alone was such. For\nthe Blessed acquire such joy from the virtue of their beatitude,\nrather than merit it.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 63\n\nTHE MALICE OF THE ANGELS WITH REGARD TO SIN\n(In Nine Articles)\n\nIn the next place we must consider how angels became evil: first of\nall with regard to the evil of fault; and secondly, as to the evil\nof punishment. Under the first heading there are nine points for\nconsideration:\n\n(1) Can there be evil of fault in the angels?\n\n(2) What kind of sins can be in them?\n\n(3) What did the angel seek in sinning?\n\n(4) Supposing that some became evil by a sin of their own choosing,\nare any of them naturally evil?\n\n(5) Supposing that it is not so, could any one of them become evil\nin the first instant of his creation by an act of his own will?\n\n(6) Supposing that he did not, was there any interval between his\ncreation and fall?\n\n(7) Was the highest of them who fell, absolutely the highest among\nthe angels?\n\n(8) Was the sin of the foremost angel the cause of the others\nsinning?\n\n(9) Did as many sin as remained steadfast?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Evil of Fault Can Be in the Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there can be no evil of fault in the\nangels. For there can be no evil except in things which are in\npotentiality, as is said by the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, text. 19),\nbecause the subject of privation is a being in potentiality. But the\nangels have not being in potentiality, since they are subsisting\nforms. Therefore there can be no evil in them.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the angels are higher than the heavenly bodies. But\nphilosophers say that there cannot be evil in the heavenly bodies.\nTherefore neither can there be in the angels.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is natural to a thing is always in it. But it\nis natural for the angels to be moved by the movement of love towards\nGod. Therefore such love cannot be withdrawn from them. But in loving\nGod they do not sin. Consequently the angels cannot sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, desire is only of what is good or apparently good.\nNow for the angels there can be no apparent good which is not a true\ngood; because in them either there can be no error at all, or at\nleast not before guilt. Therefore the angels can desire only what it\ntruly good. But no one sins by desiring what is truly good.\nConsequently the angel does not sin by desire.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Job 4:18): \"In His angels He found\nwickedness.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ An angel or any other rational creature considered in\nhis own nature, can sin; and to whatever creature it belongs not to\nsin, such creature has it as a gift of grace, and not from the\ncondition of nature. The reason of this is, because sinning is nothing\nelse than a deviation from that rectitude which an act ought to have;\nwhether we speak of sin in nature, art, or morals. That act alone, the\nrule of which is the very virtue of the agent, can never fall short of\nrectitude. Were the craftsman's hand the rule itself engraving, he\ncould not engrave the wood otherwise than rightly; but if the\nrightness of engraving be judged by another rule, then the engraving\nmay be right or faulty. Now the Divine will is the sole rule of God's\nact, because it is not referred to any higher end. But every created\nwill has rectitude of act so far only as it is regulated according to\nthe Divine will, to which the last end is to be referred: as every\ndesire of a subordinate ought to be regulated by the will of his\nsuperior; for instance, the soldier's will, according to the will of\nhis commanding officer. Thus only in the Divine will can there be no\nsin; whereas there can be sin in the will of every creature;\nconsidering the condition of its nature.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the angels there is no potentiality to natural\nexistence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellective part, as\nregards their being inclined to this or the other object. In this\nrespect there can be evil in them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The heavenly bodies have none but a natural operation.\nTherefore as there can be no evil of corruption in their nature; so\nneither can there be evil of disorder in their natural action. But\nbesides their natural action there is the action of free-will in the\nangels, by reason of which evil may be in them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is natural for the angel to turn to God by the\nmovement of love, according as God is the principle of his natural\nbeing. But for him to turn to God as the object of supernatural\nbeatitude, comes of infused love, from which he could be turned away\nby sinning.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Mortal sin occurs in two ways in the act of free-will.\nFirst, when something evil is chosen; as man sins by choosing\nadultery, which is evil of itself. Such sin always comes of ignorance\nor error; otherwise what is evil would never be chosen as good. The\nadulterer errs in the particular, choosing this delight of an\ninordinate act as something good to be performed now, from the\ninclination of passion or of habit; even though he does not err in\nhis universal judgment, but retains a right opinion in this respect.\nIn this way there can be no sin in the angel; because there are no\npassions in the angels to fetter reason or intellect, as is manifest\nfrom what has been said above (Q. 59, A. 4); nor, again, could any\nhabit inclining to sin precede their first sin. In another way sin\ncomes of free-will by choosing something good in itself, but not\naccording to proper measure or rule; so that the defect which induces\nsin is only on the part of the choice which is not properly\nregulated, but not on the part of the thing chosen; as if one were to\npray, without heeding the order established by the Church. Such a sin\ndoes not presuppose ignorance, but merely absence of consideration of\nthe things which ought to be considered. In this way the angel\nsinned, by seeking his own good, from his own free-will,\ninsubordinately to the rule of the Divine will.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Only the Sin of Pride and Envy Can Exist in an Angel?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there can be other sins in the angels\nbesides those of pride and envy. Because whosoever can delight in any\nkind of sin, can fall into the sin itself. But the demons delight even\nin the obscenities of carnal sins; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,\n3). Therefore there can also be carnal sins in the demons.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as pride and envy are spiritual sins, so are sloth,\navarice, and anger. But spiritual sins are concerned with the spirit,\njust as carnal sins are with the flesh. Therefore not only can there\nbe pride and envy in the angels; but likewise sloth and avarice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), many vices\nspring from pride; and in like manner from envy. But, if the cause is\ngranted, the effect follows. If, therefore, there can be pride and\nenvy in the angels, for the same reason there can likewise be other\nvices in them.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3) that the devil\n\"is not a fornicator nor a drunkard, nor anything of the like sort;\nyet he is proud and envious.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Sin can exist in a subject in two ways: first of all\nby actual guilt, and secondly by affection. As to guilt, all sins are\nin the demons; since by leading men to sin they incur the guilt of\nall sins. But as to affection only those sins can be in the demons\nwhich can belong to a spiritual nature. Now a spiritual nature cannot\nbe affected by such pleasures as appertain to bodies, but only by\nsuch as are in keeping with spiritual things; because nothing is\naffected except with regard to something which is in some way suited\nto its nature. But there can be no sin when anyone is incited to good\nof the spiritual order; unless in such affection the rule of the\nsuperior be not kept. Such is precisely the sin of pride--not to be\nsubject to a superior when subjection is due. Consequently the first\nsin of the angel can be none other than pride.\n\nYet, as a consequence, it was possible for envy also to be in them,\nsince for the appetite to tend to the desire of something involves on\nits part resistance to anything contrary. Now the envious man repines\nover the good possessed by another, inasmuch as he deems his\nneighbor's good to be a hindrance to his own. But another's good\ncould not be deemed a hindrance to the good coveted by the wicked\nangel, except inasmuch as he coveted a singular excellence, which\nwould cease to be singular because of the excellence of some other.\nSo, after the sin of pride, there followed the evil of envy in the\nsinning angel, whereby he grieved over man's good, and also over the\nDivine excellence, according as against the devil's will God makes\nuse of man for the Divine glory.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The demons do not delight in the obscenities of the\nsins of the flesh, as if they themselves were disposed to carnal\npleasures: it is wholly through envy that they take pleasure in all\nsorts of human sins, so far as these are hindrances to a man's good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Avarice, considered as a special kind of sin, is the\nimmoderate greed of temporal possessions which serve the use of human\nlife, and which can be estimated in value of money; to these demons\nare not at all inclined, any more than they are to carnal pleasures.\nConsequently avarice properly so called cannot be in them. But if\nevery immoderate greed of possessing any created good be termed\navarice, in this way avarice is contained under the pride which is in\nthe demons. Anger implies passion, and so does concupiscence;\nconsequently they can only exist metaphorically in the demons. Sloth\nis a kind of sadness, whereby a man becomes sluggish in spiritual\nexercises because they weary the body; which does not apply to the\ndemons. So it is evident that pride and envy are the only spiritual\nsins which can be found in demons; yet so that envy is not to be\ntaken for a passion, but for a will resisting the good of another.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Under envy and pride, as found in the demons, are\ncomprised all other sins derived from them.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Devil Desired to Be As God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the devil did not desire to be as\nGod. For what does not fall under apprehension, does not fall under\ndesire; because the good which is apprehended moves the appetite,\nwhether sensible, rational, or intellectual; and sin consists only\nin such desire. But for any creature to be God's equal does not fall\nunder apprehension, because it implies a contradiction; for it the\nfinite equals the infinite, then it would itself be infinite.\nTherefore an angel could not desire to be as God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the natural end can always be desired without sin.\nBut to be likened unto God is the end to which every creature\nnaturally tends. If, therefore, the angel desired to be as God, not\nby equality, but by likeness, it would seem that he did not thereby\nsin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the angel was created with greater fulness of wisdom\nthan man. But no man, save a fool, ever makes choice of being the\nequal of an angel, still less of God; because choice regards only\nthings which are possible, regarding which one takes deliberation.\nTherefore much less did the angel sin by desiring to be as God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said, in the person of the devil (Isa.\n14:13, 14), \"I will ascend into heaven . . . I will be like the Most\nHigh.\" And Augustine (De Qu. Vet. Test. cxiii) says that being\n\"inflated with pride, he wished to be called God.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Without doubt the angel sinned by seeking to be as\nGod. But this can be understood in two ways: first, by equality;\nsecondly, by likeness. He could not seek to be as God in the first\nway; because by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible:\nand there was no habit preceding his first sinful act, nor any\npassion fettering his mind, so as to lead him to choose what was\nimpossible by failing in some particular; as sometimes happens in\nourselves. And even supposing it were possible, it would be against\nthe natural desire; because there exists in everything the natural\ndesire of preserving its own nature; which would not be preserved\nwere it to be changed into another nature. Consequently, no creature\nof a lower order can ever covet the grade of a higher nature; just as\nan ass does not desire to be a horse: for were it to be so upraised,\nit would cease to be itself. But herein the imagination plays us\nfalse; for one is liable to think that, because a man seeks to occupy\na higher grade as to accidentals, which can increase without the\ndestruction of the subject, he can also seek a higher grade of\nnature, to which he could not attain without ceasing to exist. Now it\nis quite evident that God surpasses the angels, not merely in\naccidentals, but also in degree of nature; and one angel, another.\nConsequently it is impossible for one angel of lower degree to desire\nequality with a higher; and still more to covet equality with God.\n\nTo desire to be as God according to likeness can happen in two ways.\nIn one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is made to be\nlikened unto God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike,\nhe commits no sin; provided that he desires such likeness in proper\norder, that is to say, that he may obtain it of God. But he would sin\nwere he to desire to be like unto God even in the right way, as of his\nown, and not of God's power. In another way one may desire to be like\nunto God in some respect which is not natural to one; as if one were\nto desire to create heaven and earth, which is proper to God; in which\ndesire there would be sin. It was in this way that the devil desired\nto be as God. Not that he desired to resemble God by being subject to\nno one else absolutely; for so he would be desiring his own\n'not-being'; since no creature can exist except by holding its\nexistence under God. But he desired resemblance with God in this\nrespect--by desiring, as his last end of beatitude, something which\nhe could attain by the virtue of his own nature, turning his appetite\naway from supernatural beatitude, which is attained by God's grace.\nOr, if he desired as his last end that likeness of God which is\nbestowed by grace, he sought to have it by the power of his own\nnature; and not from Divine assistance according to God's ordering.\nThis harmonizes with Anselm's opinion, who says [*De casu diaboli,\niv.] that \"he sought that to which he would have come had he stood\nfast.\" These two views in a manner coincide; because according to\nboth, he sought to have final beatitude of his own power, whereas\nthis is proper to God alone.\n\nSince, then, what exists of itself is the cause of what exists of\nanother, it follows from this furthermore that he sought to have\ndominion over others; wherein he also perversely wished to be like\nunto God.\n\nFrom this we have the answer to all the objections.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Any Demons Are Naturally Wicked?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that some demons are naturally wicked. For\nPorphyry says, as quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11): \"There is\na class of demons of crafty nature, pretending that they are gods and\nthe souls of the dead.\" But to be deceitful is to be evil. Therefore\nsome demons are naturally wicked.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as the angels are created by God, so are men.\nBut some men are naturally wicked, of whom it is said (Wis. 12:10):\n\"Their malice is natural.\" Therefore some angels may be naturally\nwicked.\n\nObj. 3: Further, some irrational animals have wicked dispositions\nby nature: thus the fox is naturally sly, and the wolf naturally\nrapacious; yet they are God's creatures. Therefore, although the\ndemons are God's creatures, they may be naturally wicked.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"the demons\nare not naturally wicked.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Everything which exists, so far as it exists and\nhas a particular nature, tends naturally towards some good; since it\ncomes from a good principle; because the effect always reverts to\nits principle. Now a particular good may happen to have some evil\nconnected with it; thus fire has this evil connected with it that it\nconsumes other things: but with the universal good no evil can be\nconnected. If, then, there be anything whose nature is inclined\ntowards some particular good, it can tend naturally to some evil;\nnot as evil, but accidentally, as connected with some good. But if\nanything of its nature be inclined to good in general, then of its\nown nature it cannot be inclined to evil. Now it is manifest that\nevery intellectual nature is inclined towards good in general, which\nit can apprehend and which is the object of the will. Hence, since\nthe demons are intellectual substances, they can in no wise have a\nnatural inclination towards any evil whatsoever; consequently they\ncannot be naturally evil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine rebukes Porphyry for saying that the demons\nare naturally deceitful; himself maintaining that they are not\nnaturally so, but of their own will. Now the reason why Porphyry held\nthat they are naturally deceitful was that, as he contended, demons\nare animals with a sensitive nature. Now the sensitive nature is\ninclined towards some particular good, with which evil may be\nconnected. In this way, then, it can have a natural inclination to\nevil; yet only accidentally, inasmuch as evil is connected with good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The malice of some men can be called natural, either\nbecause of custom which is a second nature; or on account of the\nnatural proclivity on the part of the sensitive nature to some\ninordinate passion, as some people are said to be naturally wrathful\nor lustful; but not on the part of the intellectual nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Brute beasts have a natural inclination in their\nsensitive nature towards certain particular goods, with which certain\nevils are connected; thus the fox in seeking its food has a natural\ninclination to do so with a certain skill coupled with deceit.\nWherefore it is not evil in the fox to be sly, since it is natural to\nhim; as it is not evil in the dog to be fierce, as Dionysius observes\n(De Div. Nom. iv).\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Devil Was Wicked by the Fault of His Own Will in the\nFirst Instant of His Creation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the devil was wicked by the fault of\nhis own will in the first instant of his creation. For it is said of\nthe devil (John 8:44): \"He was a murderer from the beginning.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), the\nlack of form in the creature did not precede its formation in order\nof time, but merely in order of nature. Now according to him (Gen. ad\nlit. ii, 8), the \"heaven,\" which is said to have been created in the\nbeginning, signifies the angelic nature while as yet not fully formed:\nand when it is said that God said: \"Be light made: and light was\nmade,\" we are to understand the full formation of the angel by turning\nto the Word. Consequently, the nature of the angel was created, and\nlight was made, in the one instant. But at the same moment that light\nwas made, it was made distinct from \"darkness,\" whereby the angels who\nsinned are denoted. Therefore in the first instant of their creation\nsome of the angels were made blessed, and some sinned.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sin is opposed to merit. But some intellectual\nnature can merit in the first instant of its creation; as the soul of\nChrist, or also the good angels. Therefore the demons likewise could\nsin in the first instant of their creation.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the angelic nature is more powerful than the\ncorporeal nature. But a corporeal thing begins to have its operation\nin the first instant of its creation; as fire begins to move upwards\nin the first instant it is produced. Therefore the angel could also\nhave his operation in the first instant of his creation. Now this\noperation was either ordinate or inordinate. If ordinate, then, since\nhe had grace, he thereby merited beatitude. But with the angels the\nreward follows immediately upon merit; as was said above (Q. 62, A.\n5). Consequently they would have become blessed at once; and so would\nnever have sinned, which is false. It remains, then, that they sinned\nby inordinate action in their first instant.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:31): \"God saw all the things\nthat He had made, and they were very good.\" But among them were also\nthe demons. Therefore the demons were at some time good.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that the demons were wicked\nstraightway in the first instant of their creation; not by their\nnature, but by the sin of their own will; because, as soon as he was\nmade, the devil refused righteousness. To this opinion, as Augustine\nsays (De Civ. Dei xi, 13), if anyone subscribes, he does not agree\nwith those Manichean heretics who say that the devil's nature is evil\nof itself. Since this opinion, however, is in contradiction with the\nauthority of Scripture--for it is said of the devil under the figure\nof the prince of Babylon (Isa. 14:12): \"How art thou fallen . . . O\nLucifer, who didst rise in the morning!\" and it is said to the devil\nin the person of the King of Tyre (Ezech. 28:13): \"Thou wast in the\npleasures of the paradise of God,\"--consequently, this opinion was\nreasonably rejected by the masters as erroneous.\n\nHence others have said that the angels, in the first instant of their\ncreation, could have sinned, but did not. Yet this view also is\nrepudiated by some, because, when two operations follow one upon the\nother, it seems impossible for each operation to terminate in the one\ninstant. Now it is clear that the angel's sin was an act subsequent to\nhis creation. But the term of the creative act is the angel's very\nbeing, while the term of the sinful act is the being wicked. It seems,\nthen, an impossibility for the angel to have been wicked in the first\ninstant of his existence.\n\nThis argument, however, does not satisfy. For it holds good only in\nsuch movements as are measured by time, and take place successively;\nthus, if local movement follows a change, then the change and the\nlocal movement cannot be terminated in the same instant. But if the\nchanges are instantaneous, then all at once and in the same instant\nthere can be a term to the first and the second change; thus in the\nsame instant in which the moon is lit up by the sun, the atmosphere\nis lit up by the moon. Now, it is manifest that creation is\ninstantaneous; so also is the movement of free-will in the angels;\nfor, as has been already stated, they have no occasion for comparison\nor discursive reasoning (Q. 58, A. 3). Consequently, there is nothing\nto hinder the term of creation and of free-will from existing in the\nsame instant.\n\nWe must therefore reply that, on the contrary, it was impossible for\nthe angel to sin in the first instant by an inordinate act of\nfree-will. For although a thing can begin to act in the first instant\nof its existence, nevertheless, that operation which begins with the\nexistence comes of the agent from which it drew its nature; just as\nupward movement in fire comes of its productive cause. Therefore, if\nthere be anything which derives its nature from a defective cause,\nwhich can be the cause of a defective action, it can in the first\ninstant of its existence have a defective operation; just as the leg,\nwhich is defective from birth, through a defect in the principle of\ngeneration, begins at once to limp. But the agent which brought the\nangels into existence, namely, God, cannot be the cause of sin.\nConsequently it cannot be said that the devil was wicked in the\nfirst instant of his creation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), when it is\nstated that \"the devil sins from the beginning,\" \"he is not to be\nthought of as sinning from the beginning wherein he was created, but\nfrom the beginning of sin\": that is to say, because he never went\nback from his sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That distinction of light and darkness, whereby the\nsins of the demons are understood by the term darkness, must be taken\nas according to God's foreknowledge. Hence Augustine says (De Civ.\nDei xi, 15), that \"He alone could discern light and darkness, Who\nalso could foreknow, before they fell, those who would fall.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: All that is in merit is from God; and consequently an\nangel could merit in the first instant of his creation. The same\nreason does not hold good of sin; as has been said.\n\nReply Obj. 4: God did not distinguish between the angels before the\nturning away of some of them, and the turning of others to Himself,\nas Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15). Therefore, as all were\ncreated in grace, all merited in their first instant. But some of\nthem at once placed an impediment to their beatitude, thereby\ndestroying their preceding merit; and consequently they were\ndeprived of the beatitude which they had merited.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 6]\n\nWhether There Was Any Interval Between the Creation and the Fall of\nthe Angel?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there was some interval between the\nangel's creation and his fall. For, it is said (Ezech. 28:15): \"Thou\ndidst walk perfect [*Vulg.: 'Thou hast walked in the midst of the\nstones of fire; thou wast perfect . . .'] in thy ways from the day of\nthy creation until iniquity was found in thee.\" But since walking is\ncontinuous movement, it requires an interval. Therefore there was some\ninterval between the devil's creation and his fall.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Origen says (Hom. i in Ezech.) that \"the serpent\nof old did not from the first walk upon his breast and belly\"; which\nrefers to his sin. Therefore the devil did not sin at once after the\nfirst instant of his creation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, capability of sinning is common alike to man and\nangel. But there was some delay between man's formation and his sin.\nTherefore, for the like reason there was some interval between the\ndevil's formation and his sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the instant wherein the devil sinned was\ndistinct from the instant wherein he was created. But there is a\nmiddle time between every two instants. Therefore there was an\ninterval between his creation and his fall.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said of the devil (John 8:44): \"He stood not\nin the truth\": and, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 15), \"we must\nunderstand this in the sense, that he was in the truth, but did not\nremain in it.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ There is a twofold opinion on this point. But the\nmore probable one, which is also more in harmony with the teachings\nof the Saints, is that the devil sinned at once after the first\ninstant of his creation. This must be maintained if it be held that\nhe elicited an act of free-will in the first instant of his creation,\nand that he was created in grace; as we have said (Q. 62, A. 3). For\nsince the angels attain beatitude by one meritorious act, as was said\nabove (Q. 62, A. 5), if the devil, created in grace, merited in the\nfirst instant, he would at once have received beatitude after that\nfirst instant, if he had not placed an impediment by sinning.\n\nIf, however, it be contended that the angel was not created in grace,\nor that he could not elicit an act of free-will in the first instant,\nthen there is nothing to prevent some interval being interposed\nbetween his creation and fall.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sometimes in Holy Scripture spiritual instantaneous\nmovements are represented by corporeal movements which are measured\nby time. In this way by \"walking\" we are to understand the movement\nof free-will tending towards good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Origen says, \"The serpent of old did not from the first\nwalk upon his breast and belly,\" because of the first instant in\nwhich he was not wicked.\n\nReply Obj. 3: An angel has an inflexible free-will after once\nchoosing; consequently, if after the first instant, in which he had a\nnatural movement to good, he had not at once placed a barrier to\nbeatitude, he would have been confirmed in good. It is not so with\nman; and therefore the argument does not hold good.\n\nReply Obj. 4: It is true to say that there is a middle time between\nevery two instants, so far as time is continuous, as it is proved\n_Phys._ vi, text. 2. But in the angels, who are not subject to the\nheavenly movement, which is primarily measured by continuous time,\ntime is taken to mean the succession of their mental acts, or of\ntheir affections. So the first instant in the angels is understood to\nrespond to the operation of the angelic mind, whereby it introspects\nitself by its evening knowledge because on the first day evening is\nmentioned, but not morning. This operation was good in them all. From\nsuch operation some of them were converted to the praise of the Word\nby their morning knowledge while others, absorbed in themselves,\nbecame night, \"swelling up with pride,\" as Augustine says (Gen. ad\nlit. iv, 24). Hence the first act was common to them all; but in\ntheir second they were separated. Consequently they were all of them\ngood in the first instant; but in the second the good were set apart\nfrom the wicked.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Highest Angel Among Those Who Sinned Was the Highest of\nAll?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the highest among the angels who\nsinned was not the highest of all. For it is stated (Ezech. 28:14):\n\"Thou wast a cherub stretched out, and protecting, and I set thee in\nthe holy mountain of God.\" Now the order of the Cherubim is under\nthe order of the Seraphim, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vi, vii).\nTherefore, the highest angel among those who sinned was not the\nhighest of all.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God made intellectual nature in order that it\nmight attain to beatitude. If therefore the highest of the angels\nsinned, it follows that the Divine ordinance was frustrated in the\nnoblest creature which is unfitting.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the more a subject is inclined towards anything, so\nmuch the less can it fall away from it. But the higher an angel is,\nso much the more is he inclined towards God. Therefore so much the\nless can he turn away from God by sinning. And so it seems that the\nangel who sinned was not the highest of all, but one of the lower\nangels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.) says that the chief\nangel who sinned, \"being set over all the hosts of angels, surpassed\nthem in brightness, and was by comparison the most illustrious among\nthem.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things have to be considered in sin, namely, the\nproneness to sin, and the motive for sinning. If, then, in the angels\nwe consider the proneness to sin, it seems that the higher angels\nwere less likely to sin than the lower. On this account Damascene\nsays (De Fide Orth. ii), that the highest of those who sinned was set\nover the terrestrial order. This opinion seems to agree with the view\nof the Platonists, which Augustine quotes (De Civ. Dei vii, 6, 7; x,\n9, 10, 11). For they said that all the gods were good; whereas some\nof the demons were good, and some bad; naming as 'gods' the\nintellectual substances which are above the lunar sphere, and calling\nby the name of \"demons\" the intellectual substances which are beneath\nit, yet higher than men in the order of nature. Nor is this opinion\nto be rejected as contrary to faith; because the whole corporeal\ncreation is governed by God through the angels, as Augustine says (De\nTrin. iii, 4,5). Consequently there is nothing to prevent us from\nsaying that the lower angels were divinely set aside for presiding\nover the lower bodies, the higher over the higher bodies; and the\nhighest to stand before God. And in this sense Damascene says (De\nFide Orth. ii) that they who fell were of the lower grade of angels;\nyet in that order some of them remained good.\n\nBut if the motive for sinning be considered, we find that it existed\nin the higher angels more than in the lower. For, as has been said\n(A. 2), the demons' sin was pride; and the motive of pride is\nexcellence, which was greater in the higher spirits. Hence Gregory\nsays that he who sinned was the very highest of all. This seems to be\nthe more probable view: because the angels' sin did not come of any\nproneness, but of free choice alone. Consequently that argument seems\nto have the more weight which is drawn from the motive in sinning. Yet\nthis must not be prejudicial to the other view; because there might be\nsome motive for sinning in him also who was the chief of the lower\nangels.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Cherubim is interpreted \"fulness of knowledge,\" while\n\"Seraphim\" means \"those who are on fire,\" or \"who set on fire.\"\nConsequently Cherubim is derived from knowledge; which is compatible\nwith mortal sin; but Seraphim is derived from the heat of charity,\nwhich is incompatible with mortal sin. Therefore the first angel who\nsinned is called, not a Seraph, but a Cherub.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Divine intention is not frustrated either in those\nwho sin, or in those who are saved; for God knows beforehand the end\nof both; and He procures glory from both, saving these of His\ngoodness, and punishing those of His justice. But the intellectual\ncreature, when it sins, falls away from its due end. Nor is this\nunfitting in any exalted creature; because the intellectual creature\nwas so made by God, that it lies within its own will to act for its\nend.\n\nReply Obj. 3: However great was the inclination towards good in the\nhighest angel, there was no necessity imposed upon him: consequently\nit was in his power not to follow it.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Sin of the Highest Angel Was the Cause of the Others\nSinning?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the sin of the highest angel was not\nthe cause of the others sinning. For the cause precedes the effect.\nBut, as Damascene observes (De Fide Orth. ii), they all sinned at\none time. Therefore the sin of one was not the cause of the others'\nsinning.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an angel's first sin can only be pride, as was\nshown above (A. 2). But pride seeks excellence. Now it is more\ncontrary to excellence for anyone to be subject to an inferior than\nto a superior; and so it does not appear that the angels sinned by\ndesiring to be subject to a higher angel rather than to God. Yet the\nsin of one angel would have been the cause of the others sinning, if\nhe had induced them to be his subjects. Therefore it does not appear\nthat the sin of the highest angel was the cause of the others sinning.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is a greater sin to wish to be subject to\nanother against God, than to wish to be over another against God;\nbecause there is less motive for sinning. If, therefore, the sin of\nthe foremost angel was the cause of the others sinning, in that he\ninduced them to subject themselves to him, then the lower angels would\nhave sinned more deeply than the highest one; which is contrary to a\ngloss on Ps. 103:26: \"This dragon which Thou hast formed--He who was\nthe more excellent than the rest in nature, became the greater in\nmalice.\" Therefore the sin of the highest angel was not the cause of\nthe others sinning.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Apoc. 12:4) that the dragon \"drew\"\nwith him \"the third part of the stars of heaven.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The sin of the highest angel was the cause of the\nothers sinning; not as compelling them, but as inducing them by a kind\nof exhortation. A token thereof appears in this, that all the demons\nare subjects of that highest one; as is evident from our Lord's words:\n\"Go [Vulg. 'Depart from Me'], you cursed, into everlasting fire, which\nwas prepared for the devil and his angels\" (Matt. 25:41). For the order\nof Divine justice exacts that whosoever consents to another's evil\nsuggestion, shall be subjected to him in his punishment; according to\n(2 Pet. 2:19): \"By whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the\nslave.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the demons all sinned in the one instant, yet\nthe sin of one could be the cause of the rest sinning. For the angel\nneeds no delay of time for choice, exhortation, or consent, as man,\nwho requires deliberation in order to choose and consent, and vocal\nspeech in order to exhort; both of which are the work of time. And it\nis evident that even man begins to speak in the very instant when he\ntakes thought; and in the last instant of speech, another who catches\nhis meaning can assent to what is said; as is especially evident with\nregard to primary concepts, \"which everyone accepts directly they are\nheard\" [*Boethius, De Hebdom.].\n\nTaking away, then, the time for speech and deliberation which is\nrequired in us; in the same instant in which the highest angel\nexpressed his affection by intelligible speech, it was possible for\nthe others to consent thereto.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Other things being equal, the proud would rather be\nsubject to a superior than to an inferior. Yet he chooses rather to\nbe subject to an inferior than to a superior, if he can procure an\nadvantage under an inferior which he cannot under a superior.\nConsequently it was not against the demons' pride for them to wish to\nserve an inferior by yielding to his rule; for they wanted to have\nhim as their prince and leader, so that they might attain their\nultimate beatitude of their own natural powers; especially because in\nthe order of nature they were even then subject to the highest angel.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As was observed above (Q. 62, A. 6), an angel has\nnothing in him to retard his action, and with his whole might he is\nmoved to whatsoever he is moved, be it good or bad. Consequently\nsince the highest angel had greater natural energy than the lower\nangels, he fell into sin with intenser energy, and therefore he\nbecame the greater in malice.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 63, Art. 9]\n\nWhether Those Who Sinned Were As Many As Those Who Remained Firm?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that more angels sinned than stood firm.\nFor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6): \"Evil is in many, but\ngood is in few.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, justice and sin are to be found in the same way\nin men and in angels. But there are more wicked men to be found than\ngood; according to Eccles. 1:15: \"The number of fools is infinite.\"\nTherefore for the same reason it is so with the angels.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the angels are distinguished according to\npersons and orders. Therefore if more angelic persons stood firm, it\nwould appear that those who sinned were not from all the orders.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (4 Kings 6:16): \"There are more with us\nthan with them\": which is expounded of the good angels who are with us\nto aid us, and the wicked spirits who are our foes.\n\n_I answer that,_ More angels stood firm than sinned. Because sin is\ncontrary to the natural inclination; while that which is against the\nnatural order happens with less frequency; for nature procures its\neffects either always, or more often than not.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking with regard to men, in whom\nevil comes to pass from seeking after sensible pleasures, which are\nknown to most men, and from forsaking the good dictated by reason,\nwhich good is known to the few. In the angels there is only an\nintellectual nature; hence the argument does not hold.\n\nAnd from this we have the answer to the second difficulty.\n\nReply Obj. 3: According to those who hold that the chief devil\nbelonged to the lower order of the angels, who are set over earthly\naffairs, it is evident that some of every order did not fall, but\nonly those of the lowest order. According to those who maintain that\nthe chief devil was of the highest order, it is probable that some\nfell of every order; just as men are taken up into every order to\nsupply for the angelic ruin. In this view the liberty of free-will is\nmore established; which in every degree of creature can be turned to\nevil. In the Sacred Scripture, however, the names of some orders, as\nof Seraphim and Thrones, are not attributed to demons; since they are\nderived from the ardor of love and from God's indwelling, which are\nnot consistent with mortal sin. Yet the names of Cherubim, Powers,\nand Principalities are attributed to them; because these names are\nderived from knowledge and from power, which can be common to both\ngood and bad.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 64\n\nTHE PUNISHMENT OF THE DEMONS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nIt now remains as a sequel to deal with the punishment of the demons;\nunder which heading there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Of their darkness of intellect;\n\n(2) Of their obstinacy of will;\n\n(3) Of their grief;\n\n(4) Of their place of punishment.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 64, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Demons' Intellect Is Darkened by Privation of the\nKnowledge of All Truth?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the demons' intellect is darkened by\nbeing deprived of the knowledge of all truth. For if they knew any\ntruth at all, they would most of all know themselves; which is to\nknow separated substances. But this is not in keeping with their\nunhappiness: for this seems to belong to great happiness, insomuch as\nthat some writers have assigned as man's last happiness the knowledge\nof the separated substances. Therefore the demons are deprived of all\nknowledge of truth.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what is most manifest in its nature, seems to be\nspecially manifest to the angels, whether good or bad. That the same\nis not manifest with regard to ourselves, comes from the weakness of\nour intellect which draws its knowledge from phantasms; as it comes\nfrom the weakness of its eye that the owl cannot behold the light of\nthe sun. But the demons cannot know God, Who is most manifest of\nHimself, because He is the sovereign truth; and this is because they\nare not clean of heart, whereby alone can God be seen. Therefore\nneither can they know other things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22), the\nproper knowledge of the angels is twofold; namely, morning and\nevening. But the demons have no morning knowledge, because they do\nnot see things in the Word; nor have they the evening knowledge,\nbecause this evening knowledge refers the things known to the\nCreator's praise (hence, after \"evening\" comes \"morning\" [Gen. 1]).\nTherefore the demons can have no knowledge of things.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the angels at their creation knew the mystery of the\nkingdom of God, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. v, 19; De Civ. Dei\nxi). But the demons are deprived of such knowledge: \"for if they had\nknown it, they would never have crucified the Lord of glory,\" as is\nsaid 1 Cor. 2:8. Therefore, for the same reason, they are deprived of\nall other knowledge of truth.\n\nObj. 5: Further, whatever truth anyone knows is known either\nnaturally, as we know first principles; or by deriving it from\nsomeone else, as we know by learning; or by long experience, as the\nthings we learn by discovery. Now, the demons cannot know the truth\nby their own nature, because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 33),\nthe good angels are separated from them as light is from darkness;\nand every manifestation is made through light, as is said Eph. 5:13.\nIn like manner they cannot learn by revelation, nor by learning from\nthe good angels: because \"there is no fellowship of light with\ndarkness [*Vulg.: 'What fellowship hath . . . ?']\" (2 Cor. 6:14). Nor\ncan they learn by long experience: because experience comes of the\nsenses. Consequently there is no knowledge of truth in them.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that, \"certain gifts\nwere bestowed upon the demons which, we say, have not been changed at\nall, but remain entire and most brilliant.\" Now, the knowledge of\ntruth stands among those natural gifts. Consequently there is some\nknowledge of truth in them.\n\n_I answer that,_ The knowledge of truth is twofold: one which comes\nof nature, and one which comes of grace. The knowledge which comes of\ngrace is likewise twofold: the first is purely speculative, as when\nDivine secrets are imparted to an individual; the other is effective,\nand produces love for God; which knowledge properly belongs to the\ngift of wisdom.\n\nOf these three kinds of knowledge the first was neither taken away nor\nlessened in the demons. For it follows from the very nature of the\nangel, who, according to his nature, is an intellect or mind: since on\naccount of the simplicity of his substance, nothing can be withdrawn\nfrom his nature, so as to punish him by subtracting from his natural\npowers, as a man is punished by being deprived of a hand or a foot or\nof something else. Therefore Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the\nnatural gifts remain entire in them. Consequently their natural\nknowledge was not diminished. The second kind of knowledge, however,\nwhich comes of grace, and consists in speculation, has not been\nutterly taken away from them, but lessened; because, of these Divine\nsecrets only so much is revealed to them as is necessary; and that is\ndone either by means of the angels, or \"through some temporal workings\nof Divine power,\" as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 21); but not in\nthe same degree as to the holy angels, to whom many more things are\nrevealed, and more fully, in the Word Himself. But of the third\nknowledge, as likewise of charity, they are utterly deprived.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Happiness consists in self-application to something\nhigher. The separated substances are above us in the order of nature;\nhence man can have happiness of a kind by knowing the separated\nsubstances, although his perfect happiness consists in knowing the\nfirst substance, namely, God. But it is quite natural for one\nseparate substance to know another; as it is natural for us to know\nsensible natures. Hence, as man's happiness does not consist in\nknowing sensible natures; so neither does the angel's happiness\nconsist in knowing separated substances.\n\nReply Obj. 2: What is most manifest in its nature is hidden from us\nby its surpassing the bounds of our intellect; and not merely because\nour intellect draws knowledge from phantasms. Now the Divine\nsubstance surpasses the proportion not only of the human intellect,\nbut even of the angelic. Consequently, not even an angel can of his\nown nature know God's substance. Yet on account of the perfection of\nhis intellect he can of his nature have a higher knowledge of God\nthan man can have. Such knowledge of God remains also in the demons.\nAlthough they do not possess the purity which comes with grace,\nnevertheless they have purity of nature; and this suffices for the\nknowledge of God which belongs to them from their nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The creature is darkness in comparison with the\nexcellence of the Divine light; and therefore the creature's\nknowledge in its own nature is called \"evening\" knowledge. For the\nevening is akin to darkness, yet it possesses some light: but when\nthe light fails utterly, then it is night. So then the knowledge of\nthings in their own nature, when referred to the praise of the\nCreator, as it is in the good angels, has something of the Divine\nlight, and can be called evening knowledge; but if it be not referred\nto God, as is the case with the demons, it is not called evening, but\n\"nocturnal\" knowledge. Accordingly we read in Gen. 1:5 that the\ndarkness, which God separated from the light, \"He called night.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: All the angels had some knowledge from the very\nbeginning respecting the mystery of God's kingdom, which found its\ncompletion in Christ; and most of all from the moment when they were\nbeatified by the vision of the Word, which vision the demons never\nhad. Yet all the angels did not fully and equally apprehend it; hence\nthe demons much less fully understood the mystery of the Incarnation,\nwhen Christ was in the world. For, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei\nix, 21), \"It was not manifested to them as it was to the holy angels,\nwho enjoy a participated eternity of the Word; but it was made known\nby some temporal effects, so as to strike terror into them.\" For had\nthey fully and certainly known that He was the Son of God and the\neffect of His passion, they would never have procured the crucifixion\nof the Lord of glory.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The demons know a truth in three ways: first of all by\nthe subtlety of their nature; for although they are darkened by\nprivation of the light of grace, yet they are enlightened by the\nlight of their intellectual nature: secondly, by revelation from the\nholy angels; for while not agreeing with them in conformity of will,\nthey do agree, nevertheless, by their likeness of intellectual\nnature, according to which they can accept what is manifested by\nothers: thirdly, they know by long experience; not as deriving it\nfrom the senses; but when the similitude of their innate intelligible\nspecies is completed in individual things, they know some things as\npresent, which they previously did not know would come to pass, as we\nsaid when dealing with the knowledge of the angels (Q. 57, A. 3, ad\n3).\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 64, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Will of the Demons Is Obstinate in Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will of the demons is not\nobstinate in evil. For liberty of will belongs to the nature of an\nintellectual being, which nature remains in the demons, as we said\nabove (A. 1). But liberty of will is directly and firstly ordained\nto good rather than to evil. Therefore the demons' will is not so\nobstinate in evil as not to be able to return to what is good.\n\nObj. 2: Further, since God's mercy is infinite, it is greater than\nthe demons' malice, which is finite. But no one returns from the\nmalice of sin to the goodness of justice save through God's mercy.\nTherefore the demons can likewise return from their state of malice\nto the state of justice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the demons have a will obstinate in evil, then\ntheir will would be especially obstinate in the sin whereby they\nfell. But that sin, namely, pride, is in them no longer; because the\nmotive for the sin no longer endures, namely, excellence. Therefore\nthe demon is not obstinate in malice.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv) that man can be reinstated\nby another, since he fell through another. But, as was observed\nalready (Q. 63, A. 8), the lower demons fell through the highest one.\nTherefore their fall can be repaired by another. Consequently they\nare not obstinate in malice.\n\nObj. 5: Further, whoever is obstinate in malice, never performs any\ngood work. But the demon performs some good works: for he confesses\nthe truth, saying to Christ: \"I know Who Thou art, the holy one of\nGod\" (Mark 1:24). \"The demons\" also \"believe and tremble\" (James\n2:19). And Dionysius observes (Div. Nom. iv), that \"they desire what\nis good and best, which is, to be, to live, to understand.\" Therefore\nthey are not obstinate in malice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 73:23): \"The pride of them that\nhate Thee, ascendeth continually\"; and this is understood of the\ndemons. Therefore they remain ever obstinate in their malice.\n\n_I answer that,_ It was Origen's opinion [*Peri Archon i. 6] that\nevery will of the creature can by reason of free-will be inclined to\ngood and evil; with the exception of the soul of Christ on account of\nthe union of the Word. Such a statement deprives angels and saints of\ntrue beatitude, because everlasting stability is of the very nature\nof true beatitude; hence it is termed \"life everlasting.\" It is also\ncontrary to the authority of Sacred Scripture, which declares that\ndemons and wicked men shall be sent \"into everlasting punishment,\"\nand the good brought \"into everlasting life.\" Consequently such an\nopinion must be considered erroneous; while according to Catholic\nFaith, it must be held firmly both that the will of the good angels\nis confirmed in good, and that the will of the demons is obstinate\nin evil.\n\nWe must seek for the cause of this obstinacy, not in the gravity of\nthe sin, but in the condition of their nature or state. For as\nDamascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), \"death is to men, what the fall is\nto the angels.\" Now it is clear that all the mortal sins of men, grave\nor less grave, are pardonable before death; whereas after death they\nare without remission and endure for ever.\n\nTo find the cause, then, of this obstinacy, it must be borne in mind\nthat the appetitive power is in all things proportioned to the\napprehensive, whereby it is moved, as the movable by its mover. For\nthe sensitive appetite seeks a particular good; while the will seeks\nthe universal good, as was said above (Q. 59, A. 1); as also the\nsense apprehends particular objects, while the intellect considers\nuniversals. Now the angel's apprehension differs from man's in this\nrespect, that the angel by his intellect apprehends immovably, as we\napprehend immovably first principles which are the object of the habit\nof \"intelligence\"; whereas man by his reason apprehends movably,\npassing from one consideration to another; and having the way open by\nwhich he may proceed to either of two opposites. Consequently man's\nwill adheres to a thing movably, and with the power of forsaking it\nand of clinging to the opposite; whereas the angel's will adheres\nfixedly and immovably. Therefore, if his will be considered before its\nadhesion, it can freely adhere either to this or to its opposite\n(namely, in such things as he does not will naturally); but after he\nhas once adhered, he clings immovably. So it is customary to say that\nman's free-will is flexible to the opposite both before and after\nchoice; but the angel's free-will is flexible either opposite before\nthe choice, but not after. Therefore the good angels who adhered to\njustice, were confirmed therein; whereas the wicked ones, sinning, are\nobstinate in sin. Later on we shall treat of the obstinacy of men who\nare damned (Suppl., Q. 98, AA. 1, 2).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The good and wicked angels have free-will, but\naccording to the manner and condition of their state, as has been\nsaid.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God's mercy delivers from sin those who repent. But\nsuch as are not capable of repenting, cling immovably to sin, and\nare not delivered by the Divine mercy.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The devil's first sin still remains in him according to\ndesire; although not as to his believing that he can obtain what he\ndesired. Even so, if a man were to believe that he can commit murder,\nand wills to commit it, and afterwards the power is taken from him;\nnevertheless, the will to murder can stay with him, so that he would\nhe had done it, or still would do it if he could.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The fact that man sinned from another's suggestion, is\nnot the whole cause of man's sin being pardonable. Consequently the\nargument does not hold good.\n\nReply Obj. 5: A demon's act is twofold. One comes of deliberate will;\nand this is properly called his own act. Such an act on the demon's\npart is always wicked; because, although at times he does something\ngood, yet he does not do it well; as when he tells the truth in order\nto deceive; and when he believes and confesses, yet not willingly,\nbut compelled by the evidence of things. Another kind of act is\nnatural to the demon; this can be good and bears witness to the\ngoodness of nature. Yet he abuses even such good acts to evil purpose.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 64, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Is Sorrow in the Demons?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no sorrow in the demons. For\nsince sorrow and joy are opposites, they cannot be together in the\nsame subject. But there is joy in the demons: for Augustine writing\nagainst the Maniches (De Gen. Contra Manich. ii, 17) says: \"The devil\nhas power over them who despise God's commandments, and he rejoices\nover this sinister power.\" Therefore there is no sorrow in the demons.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sorrow is the cause of fear, for those things\ncause fear while they are future, which cause sorrow when they are\npresent. But there is no fear in the demons, according to Job 41:24,\n\"Who was made to fear no one.\" Therefore there is no grief in the\ndemons.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is a good thing to be sorry for evil. But the\ndemons can do no good action. Therefore they cannot be sorry, at least\nfor the evil of sin; which applies to the worm of conscience.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The demon's sin is greater than man's sin. But man\nis punished with sorrow on account of the pleasure taken in sin,\naccording to Apoc. 18:7, \"As much as she hath glorified herself, and\nlived in delicacies, so much torment and sorrow give ye to her.\"\nConsequently much more is the devil punished with the grief of sorrow,\nbecause he especially glorified himself.\n\n_I answer that,_ Fear, sorrow, joy, and the like, so far as they are\npassions, cannot exist in the demons; for thus they are proper to the\nsensitive appetite, which is a power in a corporeal organ. According,\nhowever, as they denote simple acts of the will, they can be in the\ndemons. And it must be said that there is sorrow in them; because\nsorrow, as denoting a simple act of the will, is nothing else than the\nresistance of the will to what is, or to what is not. Now it is\nevident that the demons would wish many things not to be, which are,\nand others to be, which are not: for, out of envy, they would wish\nothers to be damned, who are saved. Consequently, sorrow must be said\nto exist in them: and especially because it is of the very notion of\npunishment for it to be repugnant to the will. Moreover, they are\ndeprived of happiness, which they desire naturally; and their wicked\nwill is curbed in many respects.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Joy and sorrow about the same thing are opposites, but\nnot about different things. Hence there is nothing to hinder a man\nfrom being sorry for one thing, and joyful for another; especially so\nfar as sorrow and joy imply simple acts of the will; because, not\nmerely in different things, but even in one and the same thing, there\ncan be something that we will, and something that we will not.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As there is sorrow in the demons over present evil, so\nalso there is fear of future evil. Now when it is said, \"He was made\nto fear no one,\" this is to be understood of the fear of God which\nrestrains from sin. For it is written elsewhere that \"the devils\nbelieve and tremble\" (James 2:19).\n\nReply Obj. 3: To be sorry for the evil of sin on account of the sin\nbears witness to the goodness of the will, to which the evil of sin\nis opposed. But to be sorry for the evil of punishment, or for the\nevil of sin on account of the punishment, bears witness to the\ngoodness of nature, to which the evil of punishment is opposed. Hence\nAugustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 13), that \"sorrow for good lost by\npunishment, is the witness to a good nature.\" Consequently, since the\ndemon has a perverse and obstinate will, he is not sorry for the evil\nof sin.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 64, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Our Atmosphere Is the Demons' Place of Punishment?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that this atmosphere is not the demons'\nplace of punishment. For a demon is a spiritual nature. But a\nspiritual nature is not affected by place. Therefore there is no\nplace of punishment for demons.\n\nObj. 2: Further, man's sin is not graver than the demons'. But\nman's place of punishment is hell. Much more, therefore, is it the\ndemons' place of punishment; and consequently not the darksome\natmosphere.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the demons are punished with the pain of fire.\nBut there is no fire in the darksome atmosphere. Therefore the\ndarksome atmosphere is not the place of punishment for the demons.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 10), that \"the\ndarksome atmosphere is as a prison to the demons until the judgment\nday.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The angels in their own nature stand midway between\nGod and men. Now the order of Divine providence so disposes, that it\nprocures the welfare of the inferior orders through the superior. But\nman's welfare is disposed by Divine providence in two ways: first of\nall, directly, when a man is brought unto good and withheld from evil;\nand this is fittingly done through the good angels. In another way,\nindirectly, as when anyone assailed is exercised by fighting against\nopposition. It was fitting for this procuring of man's welfare to be\nbrought about through the wicked spirits, lest they should cease to be\nof service in the natural order. Consequently a twofold place of\npunishment is due to the demons: one, by reason of their sin, and this\nis hell; and another, in order that they may tempt men, and thus the\ndarksome atmosphere is their due place of punishment.\n\nNow the procuring of men's salvation is prolonged even to the judgment\nday: consequently, the ministry of the angels and wrestling with\ndemons endure until then. Hence until then the good angels are sent to\nus here; and the demons are in this dark atmosphere for our trial:\nalthough some of them are even now in hell, to torment those whom they\nhave led astray; just as some of the good angels are with the holy\nsouls in heaven. But after the judgment day all the wicked, both men\nand angels, will be in hell, and the good in heaven.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A place is not penal to angel or soul as if affecting\nthe nature by changing it, but as affecting the will by saddening it:\nbecause the angel or the soul apprehends that it is in a place not\nagreeable to its will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: One soul is not set over another in the order of\nnature, as the demons are over men in the order of nature;\nconsequently there is no parallel.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Some have maintained that the pain of sense for demons\nand souls is postponed until the judgment day: and that the beatitude\nof the saints is likewise postponed until the judgment day. But this\nis erroneous, and contrary to the teaching of the Apostle (2 Cor.\n5:1): \"If our earthly house of this habitation be dissolved, we have\na house in heaven.\" Others, again, while not admitting the same of\nsouls, admit it as to demons. But it is better to say that the same\njudgment is passed upon wicked souls and wicked angels, even as on\ngood souls and good angels.\n\nConsequently, it must be said that, although a heavenly place belongs\nto the glory of the angels, yet their glory is not lessened by their\ncoming to us, for they consider that place to be their own; in the\nsame way as we say that the bishop's honor is not lessened while he is\nnot actually sitting on his throne. In like manner it must be said,\nthat although the demons are not actually bound within the fire of\nhell while they are in this dark atmosphere, nevertheless their\npunishment is none the less; because they know that such confinement\nis their due. Hence it is said in a gloss upon James 3:6: \"They carry\nfire of hell with them wherever they go.\" Nor is this contrary to what\nis said (Luke 8:31), \"They besought the Lord not to cast them into the\nabyss\"; for they asked for this, deeming it to be a punishment for\nthem to be cast out of a place where they could injure men. Hence it\nis stated, \"They [Vulg. 'He'] besought Him that He would not expel\nthem [Vulg. 'him'] out of the country\" (Mark 5:10).\n_______________________\n\nTREATISE ON THE WORK OF THE SIX DAYS (QQ. 65-74)\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 65\n\nTHE WORK OF CREATION OF CORPOREAL CREATURES\n(In Four Articles)\n\nFrom the consideration of spiritual creatures we proceed to that of\ncorporeal creatures, in the production of which, as Holy Scripture\nmakes mention, three works are found, namely, the work of creation, as\ngiven in the words, \"In the beginning God created heaven and earth\";\nthe work of distinction as given in the words, \"He divided the light\nfrom the darkness, and the waters that are above the firmament from\nthe waters that are under the firmament\"; and the work of adornment,\nexpressed thus, \"Let there be lights in the firmament.\"\n\nFirst, then, we must consider the work of creation; secondly, the\nwork of distinction; and thirdly, the work of adornment. Under the\nfirst head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether corporeal creatures are from God?\n\n(2) Whether they were created on account of God's goodness?\n\n(3) Whether they were created by God through the medium of the\nangels?\n\n(4) Whether the forms of bodies are from the angels or immediately\nfrom God.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Corporeal Creatures Are from God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures are not from God.\nFor it is said (Eccles. 3:14): \"I have learned that all the works\nwhich God hath made, continue for ever.\" But visible bodies do not\ncontinue for ever, for it is said (2 Cor. 4:18): \"The things which are\nseen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal.\"\nTherefore God did not make visible bodies.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is said (Gen. 1:31): \"God saw all things that\nHe had made, and they were very good.\" But corporeal creatures are\nevil, since we find them harmful in many ways; as may be seen in\nserpents, in the sun's heat, and other things. Now a thing is called\nevil, in so far as it is harmful. Corporeal creatures, therefore,\nare not from God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is from God does not withdraw us from God,\nbut leads us to Him. But corporeal creatures withdraw us from God.\nHence the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:18): \"While we look not at the things\nwhich are seen.\" Corporeal creatures, therefore, are not from God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 145:6): \"Who made heaven and\nearth, the sea, and all things that are in them.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Certain heretics maintain that visible things are not\ncreated by the good God, but by an evil principle, and allege in proof\nof their error the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:4), \"The god of this\nworld hath blinded the minds of unbelievers.\" But this position is\naltogether untenable. For, if things that differ agree in some point,\nthere must be some cause for that agreement, since things diverse in\nnature cannot be united of themselves. Hence whenever in different\nthings some one thing common to all is found, it must be that these\ndifferent things receive that one thing from some one cause, as\ndifferent bodies that are hot receive their heat from fire. But being\nis found to be common to all things, however otherwise different.\nThere must, therefore, be one principle of being from which all things\nin whatever way existing have their being, whether they are invisible\nand spiritual, or visible and corporeal. But the devil is called the\ngod of this world, not as having created it, but because worldlings\nserve him, of whom also the Apostle says, speaking in the same sense,\n\"Whose god is their belly\" (Phil. 3:19).\n\nReply Obj. 1: All the creatures of God in some respects continue for\never, at least as to matter, since what is created will never be\nannihilated, even though it be corruptible. And the nearer a creature\napproaches God, Who is immovable, the more it also is immovable. For\ncorruptible creatures endure for ever as regards their matter, though\nthey change as regards their substantial form. But incorruptible\ncreatures endure with respect to their substance, though they are\nmutable in other respects, such as place, for instance, the heavenly\nbodies; or the affections, as spiritual creatures. But the Apostle's\nwords, \"The things which are seen are temporal,\" though true even as\nregards such things considered in themselves (in so far as every\nvisible creature is subject to time, either as to being or as to\nmovement), are intended to apply to visible things in so far as they\nare offered to man as rewards. For such rewards, as consist in these\nvisible things, are temporal; while those that are invisible endure\nfor ever. Hence he said before (2 Cor. 4:17): \"It worketh for us . .\n. an eternal weight of glory.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Corporeal creatures according to their nature are good,\nthough this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the\nconsequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities,\nthough each quality is good in itself. To those, however, who\nestimate things, not by the nature thereof, but by the good they\nthemselves can derive therefrom, everything which is harmful to\nthemselves seems simply evil. For they do not reflect that what is in\nsome way injurious to one person, to another is beneficial, and that\neven to themselves the same thing may be evil in some respects, but\ngood in others. And this could not be, if bodies were essentially\nevil and harmful.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Creatures of themselves do not withdraw us from God,\nbut lead us to Him; for \"the invisible things of God are clearly\nseen, being understood by the things that are made\" (Rom. 1:20). If,\nthen, they withdraw men from God, it is the fault of those who use\nthem foolishly. Thus it is said (Wis. 14:11): \"Creatures are turned\ninto a snare to the feet of the unwise.\" And the very fact that they\ncan thus withdraw us from God proves that they came from Him, for\nthey cannot lead the foolish away from God except by the allurements\nof some good that they have from Him.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Corporeal Things Were Made on Account of God's Goodness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were not made\non account of God's goodness. For it is said (Wis. 1:14) that God\n\"created all things that they might be.\" Therefore all things were\ncreated for their own being's sake, and not on account of God's\ngoodness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, good has the nature of an end; therefore the\ngreater good in things is the end of the lesser good. But spiritual\ncreatures are related to corporeal creatures, as the greater good to\nthe lesser. Corporeal creatures, therefore, are created for the sake\nof spiritual creatures, and not on account of God's goodness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, justice does not give unequal things except to the\nunequal. Now God is just: therefore inequality not created by God\nmust precede all inequality created by Him. But an inequality not\ncreated by God can only arise from free-will, and consequently all\ninequality results from the different movements of free-will. Now,\ncorporeal creatures are unequal to spiritual creatures. Therefore the\nformer were made on account of movements of free-will, and not on\naccount of God's goodness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Prov. 16:4): \"The Lord hath made all\nthings for Himself.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Origen laid down [*Peri Archon ii.] that corporeal\ncreatures were not made according to God's original purpose, but in\npunishment of the sin of spiritual creatures. For he maintained that\nGod in the beginning made spiritual creatures only, and all of equal\nnature; but that of these by the use of free-will some turned to God,\nand, according to the measure of their conversion, were given a\nhigher or a lower rank, retaining their simplicity; while others\nturned from God, and became bound to different kinds of bodies\naccording to the degree of their turning away. But this position is\nerroneous. In the first place, because it is contrary to Scripture,\nwhich, after narrating the production of each kind of corporeal\ncreatures, subjoins, \"God saw that it was good\" (Gen. 1), as if to\nsay that everything was brought into being for the reason that it was\ngood for it to be. But according to Origen's opinion, the corporeal\ncreature was made, not because it was good that it should be, but\nthat the evil in another might be punished. Secondly, because it\nwould follow that the arrangement, which now exists, of the corporeal\nworld would arise from mere chance. For it the sun's body was made\nwhat it is, that it might serve for a punishment suitable to some sin\nof a spiritual creature, it would follow, if other spiritual\ncreatures had sinned in the same way as the one to punish whom the\nsun had been created, that many suns would exist in the world; and so\nof other things. But such a consequence is altogether inadmissible.\nHence we must set aside this theory as false, and consider that the\nentire universe is constituted by all creatures, as a whole consists\nof its parts.\n\nNow if we wish to assign an end to any whole, and to the parts of that\nwhole, we shall find, first, that each and every part exists for the\nsake of its proper act, as the eye for the act of seeing; secondly,\nthat less honorable parts exist for the more honorable, as the senses\nfor the intellect, the lungs for the heart; and, thirdly, that all\nparts are for the perfection of the whole, as the matter for the form,\nsince the parts are, as it were, the matter of the whole. Furthermore,\nthe whole man is on account of an extrinsic end, that end being the\nfruition of God. So, therefore, in the parts of the universe also\nevery creature exists for its own proper act and perfection, and the\nless noble for the nobler, as those creatures that are less noble than\nman exist for the sake of man, whilst each and every creature exists\nfor the perfection of the entire universe. Furthermore, the entire\nuniverse, with all its parts, is ordained towards God as its end,\ninasmuch as it imitates, as it were, and shows forth the Divine\ngoodness, to the glory of God. Reasonable creatures, however, have in\nsome special and higher manner God as their end, since they can attain\nto Him by their own operations, by knowing and loving Him. Thus it is\nplain that the Divine goodness is the end of all corporeal things.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the very fact of any creature possessing being, it\nrepresents the Divine being and Its goodness. And, therefore, that\nGod created all things, that they might have being, does not exclude\nthat He created them for His own goodness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The proximate end does not exclude the ultimate end.\nTherefore that corporeal creatures were, in a manner, made for the\nsake of the spiritual, does not prevent their being made on account\nof God's goodness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Equality of justice has its place in retribution, since\nequal rewards or punishments are due to equal merit or demerit. But\nthis does not apply to things as at first instituted. For just as an\narchitect, without injustice, places stones of the same kind in\ndifferent parts of a building, not on account of any antecedent\ndifference in the stones, but with a view to securing that perfection\nof the entire building, which could not be obtained except by the\ndifferent positions of the stones; even so, God from the beginning,\nto secure perfection in the universe, has set therein creatures of\nvarious and unequal natures, according to His wisdom, and without\ninjustice, since no diversity of merit is presupposed.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Corporeal Creatures Were Produced by God Through the Medium\nof the Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that corporeal creatures were produced by\nGod through the medium of the angels. For, as all things are governed\nby the Divine wisdom, so by it were all things made, according to Ps.\n103:24: \"Thou hast made all things in wisdom.\" But \"it belongs to\nwisdom to ordain,\" as stated in the beginning of the _Metaphysics_\n(i, 2). Hence in the government of things the lower is ruled by the\nhigher in a certain fitting order, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii,\n4). Therefore in the production of things it was ordained that the\ncorporeal should be produced by the spiritual, as the lower by the\nhigher.\n\nObj. 2: Further, diversity of effects shows diversity of causes,\nsince like always produces like. If then all creatures, both\nspiritual and corporeal, were produced immediately by God, there\nwould be no diversity in creatures, for one would not be further\nremoved from God than another. But this is clearly false; for the\nPhilosopher says that some things are corruptible because they are\nfar removed from God (De Gen. et Corrup. ii, text. 59).\n\nObj. 3: Further, infinite power is not required to produce a finite\neffect. But every corporeal thing is finite. Therefore, it could be,\nand was, produced by the finite power of spiritual creatures: for in\nsuchlike beings there is no distinction between what is and what is\npossible: especially as no dignity befitting a nature is denied to\nthat nature, unless it be in punishment of a fault.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:1): \"In the beginning God\ncreated heaven and earth\"; by which are understood corporeal\ncreatures. These, therefore, were produced immediately by God.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that creatures proceeded from\nGod by degrees, in such a way that the first creature proceeded from\nHim immediately, and in its turn produced another, and so on until\nthe production of corporeal creatures. But this position is\nuntenable, since the first production of corporeal creatures is by\ncreation, by which matter itself is produced: for in the act of\ncoming into being the imperfect must be made before the perfect: and\nit is impossible that anything should be created, save by God alone.\n\nIn proof whereof it must be borne in mind that the higher the cause,\nthe more numerous the objects to which its causation extends. Now the\nunderlying principle in things is always more universal than that\nwhich informs and restricts it; thus, being is more universal than\nliving, living than understanding, matter than form. The more widely,\nthen, one thing underlies others, the more directly does that thing\nproceed from a higher cause. Thus the thing that underlies primarily\nall things, belongs properly to the causality of the supreme cause.\nTherefore no secondary cause can produce anything, unless there is\npresupposed in the thing produced something that is caused by a\nhigher cause. But creation is the production of a thing in its entire\nsubstance, nothing being presupposed either uncreated or created.\nHence it remains that nothing can create except God alone, Who is the\nfirst cause. Therefore, in order to show that all bodies were created\nimmediately by God, Moses said: \"In the beginning God created heaven\nand earth.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the production of things an order exists, but not\nsuch that one creature is created by another, for that is impossible;\nbut rather such that by the Divine wisdom diverse grades are\nconstituted in creatures.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God Himself, though one, has knowledge of many and\ndifferent things without detriment to the simplicity of His nature,\nas has been shown above (Q. 15, A. 2); so that by His wisdom He is\nthe cause of diverse things as known by Him, even as an artificer,\nby apprehending diverse forms, produces diverse works of art.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The amount of the power of an agent is measured not\nonly by the thing made, but also by the manner of making it; for one\nand the same thing is made in one way by a higher power, in another\nby a lower. But the production of finite things, where nothing is\npresupposed as existing, is the work of infinite power, and, as\nsuch, can belong to no creature.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 65, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Forms of Bodies Are from the Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the forms of bodies come from the\nangels. For Boethius says (De Trin. i): \"From forms that are without\nmatter come the forms that are in matter.\" But forms that are without\nmatter are spiritual substances, and forms that are in matter are the\nforms of bodies. Therefore, the forms of bodies are from spiritual\nsubstances.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all that is such by participation is reduced to that\nwhich is such by its essence. But spiritual substances are forms\nessentially, whereas corporeal creatures have forms by participation.\nTherefore the forms of corporeal things are derived from spiritual\nsubstances.\n\nObj. 3: Further, spiritual substances have more power of causation\nthan the heavenly bodies. But the heavenly bodies give form to things\nhere below, for which reason they are said to cause generation and\ncorruption. Much more, therefore, are material forms derived from\nspiritual substances.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): \"We must not\nsuppose that this corporeal matter serves the angels at their nod,\nbut rather that it obeys God thus.\" But corporeal matter may be said\nthus to serve that from which it receives its form. Corporeal forms,\nthen, are not from the angels, but from God.\n\n_I answer that,_ It was the opinion of some that all corporeal forms\nare derived from spiritual substances, which we call the angels. And\nthere are two ways in which this has been stated. For Plato held that\nthe forms of corporeal matter are derived from, and formed by, forms\nimmaterially subsisting, by a kind of participation. Thus he held\nthat there exists an immaterial man, and an immaterial horse, and so\nforth, and that from such the individual sensible things that we see\nare constituted, in so far as in corporeal matter there abides the\nimpression received from these separate forms, by a kind of\nassimilation, or as he calls it, \"participation\" (Phaedo xlix). And,\naccording to the Platonists, the order of forms corresponds to the\norder of those separate substances; for example, that there is a\nsingle separate substance, which is horse and the cause of all\nhorses, whilst above this is separate life, or _per se_ life, as they\nterm it, which is the cause of all life, and that above this again is\nthat which they call being itself, which is the cause of all being.\nAvicenna, however, and certain others, have maintained that the forms\nof corporeal things do not subsist _per se_ in matter, but in the\nintellect only. Thus they say that from forms existing in the\nintellect of spiritual creatures (called \"intelligences\" by them, but\n\"angels\" by us) proceed all the forms of corporeal matter, as the\nform of his handiwork proceeds from the forms in the mind of the\ncraftsman. This theory seems to be the same as that of certain\nheretics of modern times, who say that God indeed created all things,\nbut that the devil formed corporeal matter, and differentiated it\ninto species.\n\nBut all these opinions seem to have a common origin; they all, in\nfact, sought for a cause of forms as though the form were of itself\nbrought into being. Whereas, as Aristotle (Metaph. vii, text. 26, 27,\n28), proves, what is, properly speaking, made, is the \"composite.\"\nNow, such are the forms of corruptible things that at one time they\nexist and at another exist not, without being themselves generated or\ncorrupted, but by reason of the generation or corruption of the\n\"composite\"; since even forms have not being, but composites have\nbeing through forms: for, according to a thing's mode of being, is\nthe mode in which it is brought into being. Since, then, like is\nproduced from like, we must not look for the cause of corporeal forms\nin any immaterial form, but in something that is composite, as this\nfire is generated by that fire. Corporeal forms, therefore, are\ncaused, not as emanations from some immaterial form, but by matter\nbeing brought from potentiality into act by some composite agent. But\nsince the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created\nspiritual substance, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4, 5), it\nfollows further that even corporeal forms are derived from spiritual\nsubstances, not emanating from them, but as the term of their\nmovement. And, further still, the species of the angelic intellect,\nwhich are, as it were, the seminal types of corporeal forms, must be\nreferred to God as the first cause. But in the first production of\ncorporeal creatures no transmutation from potentiality to act can\nhave taken place, and accordingly, the corporeal forms that bodies\nhad when first produced came immediately form God, whose bidding\nalone matter obeys, as its own proper cause. To signify this, Moses\nprefaces each work with the words, \"God said, Let this thing be,\" or\n\"that,\" to denote the formation of all things by the Word of God,\nfrom Whom, according to Augustine [*Tract. i. in Joan. and Gen. ad\nlit. i. 4], is \"all form and fitness and concord of parts.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: By immaterial forms Boethius understands the types of\nthings in the mind of God. Thus the Apostle says (Heb. 11:3): \"By\nfaith we understand that the world was framed by the Word of God;\nthat from invisible things visible things might be made.\" But if by\nimmaterial forms he understands the angels, we say that from them\ncome material forms, not by emanation, but by motion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Forms received into matter are to be referred, not to\nself-subsisting forms of the same type, as the Platonists held, but\neither to intelligible forms of the angelic intellect, from which\nthey proceed by movement, or, still higher, to the types in the\nDivine intellect, by which the seeds of forms are implanted in\ncreated things, that they may be able to be brought by movement\ninto act.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The heavenly bodies inform earthly ones by movement,\nnot by emanation.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 66\n\nON THE ORDER OF CREATION TOWARDS DISTINCTION\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must next consider the work of distinction; first, the ordering\nof creation towards distinction; secondly, the distinction itself.\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether formlessness of created matter preceded in time its\nformation?\n\n(2) Whether the matter of all corporeal things is the same?\n\n(3) Whether the empyrean heaven was created contemporaneously with\nformless matter?\n\n(4) Whether time was created simultaneously with it?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 66, Art. 1]\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in\ntime its formation. For it is said (Gen. 1:2): \"The earth was void\nand empty,\" or \"invisible and shapeless,\" according to another\nversion [*Septuagint]; by which is understood the formlessness of\nmatter, as Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12). Therefore matter was\nformless until it received its form.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nature in its working imitates the working of God,\nas a secondary cause imitates a first cause. But in the working of\nnature formlessness precedes form in time. It does so, therefore, in\nthe Divine working.\n\nObj. 3: Further, matter is higher than accident, for matter is part\nof substance. But God can effect that accident exist without\nsubstance, as in the Sacrament of the Altar. He could, therefore,\ncause matter to exist without form.\n\n_On the contrary,_ An imperfect effect proves imperfection in the\nagent. But God is an agent absolutely perfect; wherefore it is said\nof Him (Deut. 32:4): \"The works of God are perfect.\" Therefore the\nwork of His creation was at no time formless. Further, the formation\nof corporeal creatures was effected by the work of distinction. But\nconfusion is opposed to distinction, as formlessness to form. If,\ntherefore, formlessness preceded in time the formation of matter,\nit follows that at the beginning confusion, called by the ancients\nchaos, existed in the corporeal creation.\n\n_I answer that,_ On this point holy men differ in opinion. Augustine\nfor instance (Gen. ad lit. i, 15), believes that the formlessness of\nmatter was not prior in time to its formation, but only in origin or\nthe order of nature, whereas others, as Basil (Hom. ii In Hexaem.),\nAmbrose (In Hexaem. i), and Chrysostom (Hom. ii In Gen.), hold that\nformlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. And although\nthese opinions seem mutually contradictory, in reality they differ but\nlittle; for Augustine takes the formlessness of matter in a different\nsense from the others. In his sense it means the absence of all form,\nand if we thus understand it we cannot say that the formlessness of\nmatter was prior in time either to its formation or to its\ndistinction. As to formation, the argument is clear. For if formless\nmatter preceded in duration, it already existed; for this is implied\nby duration, since the end of creation is being in act: and act itself\nis a form. To say, then, that matter preceded, but without form, is to\nsay that being existed actually, yet without act, which is a\ncontradiction in terms. Nor can it be said that it possessed some\ncommon form, on which afterwards supervened the different forms that\ndistinguish it. For this would be to hold the opinion of the ancient\nnatural philosophers, who maintained that primary matter was some\ncorporeal thing in act, as fire, air, water, or some intermediate\nsubstance. Hence, it followed that to be made means merely to be\nchanged; for since that preceding form bestowed actual substantial\nbeing, and made some particular thing to be, it would result that the\nsupervening form would not simply make an actual being, but 'this'\nactual being; which is the proper effect of an accidental form. Thus\nthe consequent forms would be merely accidents, implying not\ngeneration, but alteration. Hence we must assert that primary matter\nwas not created altogether formless, nor under any one common form,\nbut under distinct forms. And so, if the formlessness of matter be\ntaken as referring to the condition of primary matter, which in itself\nis formless, this formlessness did not precede in time its formation\nor distinction, but only in origin and nature, as Augustine says; in\nthe same way as potentiality is prior to act, and the part to the\nwhole. But the other holy writers understand by formlessness, not the\nexclusion of all form, but the absence of that beauty and comeliness\nwhich are now apparent in the corporeal creation. Accordingly they say\nthat the formlessness of corporeal matter preceded its form in\nduration. And so, when this is considered, it appears that Augustine\nagrees with them in some respects, and in others disagrees, as will be\nshown later (Q. 69, A. 1; Q. 74, A. 2).\n\nAs far as may be gathered from the text of Genesis a threefold beauty\nwas wanting to corporeal creatures, for which reason they are said to\nbe without form. For the beauty of light was wanting to all that\ntransparent body which we call the heavens, whence it is said that\n\"darkness was upon the fact of the deep.\" And the earth lacked beauty\nin two ways: first, that beauty which it acquired when its watery veil\nwas withdrawn, and so we read that \"the earth was void,\" or\n\"invisible,\" inasmuch as the waters covered and concealed it from\nview; secondly, that which it derives from being adorned by herbs and\nplants, for which reason it is called \"empty,\" or, according to\nanother reading [*Septuagint], \"shapeless\"--that is, unadorned. Thus\nafter mention of two created natures, the heaven and the earth, the\nformlessness of the heaven is indicated by the words, \"darkness was\nupon the face of the deep,\" since the air is included under heaven;\nand the formlessness of the earth, by the words, \"the earth was void\nand empty.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The word earth is taken differently in this passage by\nAugustine, and by other writers. Augustine holds that by the words\n\"earth\" and \"water,\" in this passage, primary matter itself is\nsignified on account of its being impossible for Moses to make the\nidea of such matter intelligible to an ignorant people, except under\nthe similitude of well-known objects. Hence he uses a variety of\nfigures in speaking of it, calling it not water only, nor earth only,\nlest they should think it to be in very truth water or earth. At the\nsame time it has so far a likeness to earth, in that it is\nsusceptible of form, and to water in its adaptability to a variety\nof forms. In this respect, then, the earth is said to be \"void and\nempty,\" or \"invisible and shapeless,\" that matter is known by means\nof form. Hence, considered in itself, it is called \"invisible\" or\n\"void,\" and its potentiality is completed by form; thus Plato says\nthat matter is \"place\" [*Timaeus, quoted by Aristotle, Phys. iv,\ntext. 15]. But other holy writers understand by earth the element of\nearth, and we have said (A. 1) how, in this sense, the earth was,\naccording to them, without form.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Nature produces effect in act from being in\npotentiality; and consequently in the operations of nature\npotentiality must precede act in time, and formlessness precede form.\nBut God produces being in act out of nothing, and can, therefore,\nproduce a perfect thing in an instant, according to the greatness of\nHis power.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Accident, inasmuch as it is a form, is a kind of act;\nwhereas matter, as such, is essentially being in potentiality. Hence\nit is more repugnant that matter should be in act without form, than\nfor accident to be without subject.\n\nIn reply to the first argument in the contrary sense, we say that if,\naccording to some holy writers, formlessness was prior in time to the\ninforming of matter, this arose, not from want of power on God's\npart, but from His wisdom, and from the design of preserving due\norder in the disposition of creatures by developing perfection from\nimperfection.\n\nIn reply to the second argument, we say that certain of the ancient\nnatural philosophers maintained confusion devoid of all distinction;\nexcept Anaxagoras, who taught that the intellect alone was distinct\nand without admixture. But previous to the work of distinction Holy\nScripture enumerates several kinds of differentiation, the first\nbeing that of the heaven from the earth, in which even a material\ndistinction is expressed, as will be shown later (A. 3; Q. 68, A. 1).\nThis is signified by the words, \"In the beginning God created heaven\nand earth.\" The second distinction mentioned is that of the elements\naccording to their forms, since both earth and water are named. That\nair and fire are not mentioned by name is due to the fact that the\ncorporeal nature of these would not be so evident as that of earth\nand water, to the ignorant people to whom Moses spoke. Plato (Timaeus\nxxvi), nevertheless, understood air to be signified by the words,\n\"Spirit of God,\" since spirit is another name for air, and considered\nthat by the word heaven is meant fire, for he held heaven to be\ncomposed of fire, as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei viii, 11). But\nRabbi Moses (Perplex. ii), though otherwise agreeing with Plato, says\nthat fire is signified by the word darkness, since, said he, fire\ndoes not shine in its own sphere. However, it seems more reasonable\nto hold to what we stated above; because by the words \"Spirit of God\"\nScripture usually means the Holy Ghost, Who is said to \"move over the\nwaters,\" not, indeed, in bodily shape, but as the craftsman's will\nmay be said to move over the material to which he intends to give a\nform. The third distinction is that of place; since the earth is said\nto be under the waters that rendered it invisible, whilst the air,\nthe subject of darkness, is described as being above the waters, in\nthe words: \"Darkness was upon the face of the deep.\" The remaining\ndistinctions will appear from what follows (Q. 71).\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 66, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Formless Matter of All Corporeal Things Is the Same?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the formless matter of all corporeal\nthings is the same. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): \"I find\ntwo things Thou hast made, one formed, the other formless,\" and he\nsays that the latter was the earth invisible and shapeless, whereby,\nhe says, the matter of all corporeal things is designated. Therefore\nthe matter of all corporeal things is the same.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 10): \"Things\nthat are one in genus are one in matter.\" But all corporeal things\nare in the same genus of body. Therefore the matter of all bodies is\nthe same.\n\nObj. 3: Further, different acts befit different potentialities, and\nthe same act befits the same potentiality. But all bodies have the\nsame form, corporeity. Therefore all bodies have the same matter.\n\nObj. 4: Further, matter, considered in itself, is only in\npotentiality. But distinction is due to form. Therefore matter\nconsidered in itself is the same in all corporeal things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Things of which the matter is the same are\nmutually interchangeable and mutually active or passive, as is said\n(De Gener. i, text. 50). But heavenly and earthly bodies do not act\nupon each other mutually. Therefore their matter is not the same.\n\n_I answer that,_ On this question the opinions of philosophers have\ndiffered. Plato and all who preceded Aristotle held that all bodies\nare of the nature of the four elements. Hence because the four\nelements have one common matter, as their mutual generation and\ncorruption prove, it followed that the matter of all bodies is the\nsame. But the fact of the incorruptibility of some bodies was ascribed\nby Plato, not to the condition of matter, but to the will of the\nartificer, God, Whom he represents as saying to the heavenly bodies:\n\"By your own nature you are subject to dissolution, but by My will you\nare indissoluble, for My will is more powerful than the link that\nbinds you together.\" But this theory Aristotle (De Caelo i, text. 5)\ndisproves by the natural movements of bodies. For since, he says, the\nheavenly bodies have a natural movement, different from that of the\nelements, it follows that they have a different nature from them. For\nmovement in a circle, which is proper to the heavenly bodies, is not\nby contraries, whereas the movements of the elements are mutually\nopposite, one tending upwards, another downwards: so, therefore, the\nheavenly body is without contrariety, whereas the elemental bodies\nhave contrariety in their nature. And as generation and corruption are\nfrom contraries, it follows that, whereas the elements are\ncorruptible, the heavenly bodies are incorruptible. But in spite of\nthis difference of natural corruption and incorruption, Avicebron\ntaught unity of matter in all bodies, arguing from their unity of\nform. And, indeed, if corporeity were one form in itself, on which the\nother forms that distinguish bodies from each other supervene, this\nargument would necessarily be true; for this form of corporeity would\ninhere in matter immutably and so far all bodies would be\nincorruptible. But corruption would then be merely accidental through\nthe disappearance of successive forms--that is to say, it would be\ncorruption, not pure and simple, but partial, since a being in act\nwould subsist under the transient form. Thus the ancient natural\nphilosophers taught that the substratum of bodies was some actual\nbeing, such as air or fire. But supposing that no form exists in\ncorruptible bodies which remains subsisting beneath generation and\ncorruption, it follows necessarily that the matter of corruptible and\nincorruptible bodies is not the same. For matter, as it is in itself,\nis in potentiality to form.\n\nConsidered in itself, then, it is in potentiality in respect to all\nthose forms to which it is common, and in receiving any one form it is\nin act only as regards that form. Hence it remains in potentiality to\nall other forms. And this is the case even where some forms are more\nperfect than others, and contain these others virtually in themselves.\nFor potentiality in itself is indifferent with respect to perfection\nand imperfection, so that under an imperfect form it is in\npotentiality to a perfect form, and _vice versa._ Matter, therefore,\nwhilst existing under the form of an incorruptible body, would be in\npotentiality to the form of a corruptible body; and as it does not\nactually possess the latter, it has both form and the privation of\nform; for want of a form in that which is in potentiality thereto is\nprivation. But this condition implies corruptibility. It is therefore\nimpossible that bodies by nature corruptible, and those by nature\nincorruptible, should possess the same matter.\n\nNeither can we say, as Averroes [*De Substantia Orbis ii.] imagines,\nthat a heavenly body itself is the matter of the heaven--being in\npotentiality with regard to place, though not to being, and that its\nform is a separate substance united to it as its motive force. For it\nis impossible to suppose any being in act, unless in its totality it\nbe act and form, or be something which has act or form. Setting aside,\nthen, in thought, the separate substance stated to be endowed with\nmotive power, if the heavenly body is not something having form--that\nis, something composed of a form and the subject of that form--it\nfollows that in its totality it is form and act. But every such thing\nis something actually understood, which the heavenly bodies are not,\nbeing sensible. It follows, then, that the matter of the heavenly\nbodies, considered in itself, is in potentiality to that form alone\nwhich it actually possesses. Nor does it concern the point at issue to\ninquire whether this is a soul or any other thing. Hence this form\nperfects this matter in such a way that there remains in it no\npotentiality with respect to being, but only to place, as Aristotle\n[*De Coelo i, text. 20] says. So, then, the matter of the heavenly\nbodies and of the elements is not the same, except by analogy, in so\nfar as they agree in the character of potentiality.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine follows in this the opinion of Plato,\nwho does not admit a fifth essence. Or we may say that formless matter\nis one with the unity of order, as all bodies are one in the order of\ncorporeal creatures.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If genus is taken in a physical sense,\ncorruptible and incorruptible things are not in the same genus, on\naccount of their different modes of potentiality, as is said in\n_Metaph._ x, text. 26. Logically considered, however, there is but one\ngenus of all bodies, since they are all included in the one notion of\ncorporeity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The form of corporeity is not one and the same\nin all bodies, being no other than the various forms by which bodies\nare distinguished, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As potentiality is directed towards act,\npotential beings are differentiated by their different acts, as sight\nis by color, hearing by sound. Therefore for this reason the matter of\nthe celestial bodies is different from that of the elemental, because\nthe matter of the celestial is not in potentiality to an elemental\nform.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 66, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Empyrean Heaven Was Created at the Same Time As Formless\nMatter?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the empyrean heaven was not created\nat the same time as formless matter. For the empyrean, if it is\nanything at all, must be a sensible body. But all sensible bodies are\nmovable, and the empyrean heaven is not movable. For if it were so,\nits movement would be ascertained by the movement of some visible\nbody, which is not the case. The empyrean heaven, then, was not\ncreated contemporaneously with formless matter.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that \"the lower\nbodies are governed by the higher in a certain order.\" If, therefore,\nthe empyrean heaven is the highest of bodies, it must necessarily\nexercise some influence on bodies below it. But this does not seem to\nbe the case, especially as it is presumed to be without movement; for\none body cannot move another unless itself also be moved. Therefore\nthe empyrean heaven was not created together with formless matter.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if it is held that the empyrean heaven is the place\nof contemplation, and not ordained to natural effects; on the\ncontrary, Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 20): \"In so far as we mentally\napprehend eternal things, so far are we not of this world\"; from\nwhich it is clear that contemplation lifts the mind above the things\nof this world. Corporeal place, therefore, cannot be the seat of\ncontemplation.\n\nObj. 4: Further, among the heavenly bodies exists a body, partly\ntransparent and partly luminous, which we call the sidereal heaven.\nThere exists also a heaven wholly transparent, called by some the\naqueous or crystalline heaven. If, then, there exists a still higher\nheaven, it must be wholly luminous. But this cannot be, for then the\nair would be constantly illuminated, and there would be no night.\nTherefore the empyrean heaven was not created together with formless\nmatter.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Strabus says that in the passage, \"In the\nbeginning God created heaven and earth,\" heaven denotes not the\nvisible firmament, but the empyrean or fiery heaven.\n\n_I answer that,_ The empyrean heaven rests only on the authority of\nStrabus and Bede, and also of Basil; all of whom agree in one respect,\nnamely, in holding it to be the place of the blessed. Strabus and Bede\nsay that as soon as created it was filled with angels; and Basil\n[*Hom. ii. in Hexaem.] says: \"Just as the lost are driven into the\nlowest darkness, so the reward for worthy deeds is laid up in the\nlight beyond this world, where the just shall obtain the abode of\nrest.\" But they differ in the reasons on which they base their\nstatement. Strabus and Bede teach that there is an empyrean heaven,\nbecause the firmament, which they take to mean the sidereal heaven, is\nsaid to have been made, not in the beginning, but on the second day:\nwhereas the reason given by Basil is that otherwise God would seem to\nhave made darkness His first work, as the Manicheans falsely assert,\nwhen they call the God of the Old Testament the God of darkness. These\nreasons, however, are not very cogent. For the question of the\nfirmament, said to have been made on the second day, is solved in one\nway by Augustine, and in another by other holy writers. But the\nquestion of the darkness is explained according to Augustine [*Gen. ad\nlit. i; vii.], by supposing that formlessness, signified by darkness,\npreceded form not by duration, but by origin. According to others,\nhowever, since darkness is no creature, but a privation of light, it\nis a proof of Divine wisdom, that the things it created from nothing\nit produced first of all in an imperfect state, and afterwards brought\nthem to perfection. But a better reason can be drawn from the state of\nglory itself. For in the reward to come a two-fold glory is looked\nfor, spiritual and corporeal, not only in the human body to be\nglorified, but in the whole world which is to be made new. Now the\nspiritual glory began with the beginning of the world, in the\nblessedness of the angels, equality with whom is promised to the\nsaints. It was fitting, then, that even from the beginning, there\nshould be made some beginning of bodily glory in something corporeal,\nfree at the very outset from the servitude of corruption and change,\nand wholly luminous, even as the whole bodily creation, after the\nResurrection, is expected to be. So, then, that heaven is called the\nempyrean, i.e. fiery, not from its heat, but from its brightness. It\nis to be noticed, however, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 9, 27) says\nthat Porphyry sets the demons apart from the angels by supposing that\nthe former inhabit the air, the latter the ether, or empyrean. But\nPorphyry, as a Platonist, held the heaven, known as sidereal, to be\nfiery, and therefore called it empyrean or ethereal, taking ethereal\nto denote the burning of flame, and not as Aristotle understands it,\nswiftness of movement (De Coel. i, text. 22). This much has been said\nto prevent anyone from supposing that Augustine maintained an empyrean\nheaven in the sense understood by modern writers.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sensible corporeal things are movable in the present\nstate of the world, for by the movement of corporeal creatures is\nsecured by the multiplication of the elements. But when glory is\nfinally consummated, the movement of bodies will cease. And such must\nhave been from the beginning the condition of the empyrean.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is sufficiently probable, as some assert, that the\nempyrean heaven, having the state of glory for its ordained end, does\nnot influence inferior bodies of another order--those, namely, that\nare directed only to natural ends. Yet it seems still more probable\nthat it does influence bodies that are moved, though itself\nmotionless, just as angels of the highest rank, who assist [*Infra,\nQ. 112, A. 3], influence those of lower degree who act as messengers,\nthough they themselves are not sent, as Dionysius teaches (Coel.\nHier. xii). For this reason it may be said that the influence of the\nempyrean upon that which is called the first heaven, and is moved,\nproduces therein not something that comes and goes as a result of\nmovement, but something of a fixed and stable nature, as the power of\nconservation or causation, or something of the kind pertaining to\ndignity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Corporeal place is assigned to contemplation, not as\nnecessary, but as congruous, that the splendor without may correspond\nto that which is within. Hence Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) says: \"The\nministering spirit could not live in darkness, but made his habitual\ndwelling in light and joy.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: As Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.): \"It is certain that\nthe heaven was created spherical in shape, of dense body, and\nsufficiently strong to separate what is outside it from what it\nencloses. On this account it darkens the region external to it, the\nlight by which itself is lit up being shut out from that region.\" But\nsince the body of the firmament, though solid, is transparent, for\nthat it does not exclude light (as is clear from the fact that we can\nsee the stars through the intervening heavens), we may also say that\nthe empyrean has light, not condensed so as to emit rays, as the sun\ndoes, but of a more subtle nature. Or it may have the brightness of\nglory which differs from mere natural brightness.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 66, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Time Was Created Simultaneously with Formless Matter?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that time was not created simultaneously\nwith formless matter. For Augustine says (Confess. xii, 12): \"I find\ntwo things that Thou didst create before time was, the primary\ncorporeal matter, and the angelic nature. \"Therefore time was not\ncreated with formless matter.\n\nObj. 2: Further, time is divided by day and night. But in the\nbeginning there was neither day nor night, for these began when \"God\ndivided the light from the darkness.\" Therefore in the beginning\ntime was not.\n\nObj. 3: Further, time is the measure of the firmament's movement;\nand the firmament is said to have been made on the second day.\nTherefore in the beginning time was not.\n\nObj. 4: Further, movement precedes time, and therefore should be\nreckoned among the first things created, rather than time.\n\nObj. 5: Further, as time is the extrinsic measure of created\nthings, so is place. Place, then, as truly as time, must be\nreckoned among the things first created.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 3): \"Both\nspiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of\ntime.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is commonly said that the first things created\nwere these four--the angelic nature, the empyrean heaven, formless\ncorporeal matter, and time. It must be observed, however, that this\nis not the opinion of Augustine. For he (Confess. xii, 12) specifies\nonly two things as first created--the angelic nature and corporeal\nmatter--making no mention of the empyrean heaven. But these two,\nnamely, the angelic nature and formless matter, precede the\nformation, by nature only, and not by duration; and therefore, as\nthey precede formation, so do they precede movement and time. Time,\ntherefore, cannot be included among them. But the enumeration above\ngiven is that of other holy writers, who hold that the formlessness\nof matter preceded by duration its form, and this view postulates the\nexistence of time as the measure of duration: for otherwise there\nwould be no such measure.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The teaching of Augustine rests on the opinion that the\nangelic nature and formless matter precede time by origin or nature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As in the opinion of some holy writers matter was in\nsome measure formless before it received its full form, so time was\nin a manner formless before it was fully formed and distinguished\ninto day and night.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If the movement of the firmament did not begin\nimmediately from the beginning, then the time that preceded was the\nmeasure, not of the firmament's movement, but of the first movement\nof whatsoever kind. For it is accidental to time to be the measure of\nthe firmament's movement, in so far as this is the first movement.\nBut if the first movement was another than this, time would have been\nits measure, for everything is measured by the first of its kind. And\nit must be granted that forthwith from the beginning, there was\nmovement of some kind, at least in the succession of concepts and\naffections in the angelic mind: while movement without time cannot be\nconceived, since time is nothing else than \"the measure of priority\nand succession in movement.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Among the first created things are to be reckoned those\nwhich have a general relationship to things. And, therefore, among\nthese time must be included, as having the nature of a common\nmeasure; but not movement, which is related only to the movable\nsubject.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Place is implied as existing in the empyrean heaven,\nthis being the boundary of the universe. And since place has\nreference to things permanent, it was created at once in its\ntotality. But time, as not being permanent, was created in its\nbeginning: even as actually we cannot lay hold of any part of\ntime save the \"now.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 67\n\nON THE WORK OF DISTINCTION IN ITSELF\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must consider next the work of distinction in itself. First, the\nwork of the first day; secondly, the work of the second day; thirdly\nthe work of the third day.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the word light is used in its proper sense in speaking\nof spiritual things?\n\n(2) Whether light, in corporeal things, is itself corporeal?\n\n(3) Whether light is a quality?\n\n(4) Whether light was fittingly made on the first day?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 67, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Word \"Light\" Is Used in Its Proper Sense in Speaking of\nSpiritual Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that \"light\" is used in its proper sense\nin spiritual things. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28) that\n\"in spiritual things light is better and surer: and that Christ is\nnot called Light in the same sense as He is called the Stone; the\nformer is to be taken literally, and the latter metaphorically.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) includes Light among the\nintellectual names of God. But such names are used in their proper\nsense in spiritual things. Therefore light is used in its proper\nsense in spiritual matters.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Eph. 5:13): \"All that is made\nmanifest is light.\" But to be made manifest belongs more properly\nto spiritual things than to corporeal. Therefore also does light.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Fide ii) that \"Splendor\" is\namong those things which are said of God metaphorically.\n\n_I answer that,_ Any word may be used in two ways--that is to say,\neither in its original application or in its more extended meaning.\nThis is clearly shown in the word \"sight,\" originally applied to the\nact of the sense, and then, as sight is the noblest and most\ntrustworthy of the senses, extended in common speech to all knowledge\nobtained through the other senses. Thus we say, \"Seeing how it\ntastes,\" or \"smells,\" or \"burns.\" Further, sight is applied to\nknowledge obtained through the intellect, as in those words: \"Blessed\nare the clean of heart, for they shall see God\" (Matt. 5:8). And thus\nit is with the word light. In its primary meaning it signifies that\nwhich makes manifest to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended\nto that which makes manifest to cognition of any kind. If, then, the\nword is taken in its strict and primary meaning, it is to be\nunderstood metaphorically when applied to spiritual things, as Ambrose\nsays (De Fide ii). But if taken in its common and extended use, as\napplied to manifestation of every kind, it may properly be applied to\nspiritual things.\n\nThe answer to the objections will sufficiently appear from what has\nbeen said.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 67, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Light Is a Body?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that light is a body. For Augustine says\n(De Lib. Arb. iii, 5) that \"light takes the first place among\nbodies.\"Therefore light is a body.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. v, 2) that \"light is a\nspecies of fire.\" But fire is a body, and therefore so is light.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the powers of movement, intersection, reflection,\nbelong properly to bodies; and all these are attributes of light and\nits rays. Moreover, different rays of light, as Dionysius says (Div.\nNom. ii) are united and separated, which seems impossible unless they\nare bodies. Therefore light is a body.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Two bodies cannot occupy the same place\nsimultaneously. But this is the case with light and air. Therefore\nlight is not a body.\n\n_I answer that,_ Light cannot be a body, for three evident reasons.\nFirst, on the part of place. For the place of any one body is\ndifferent from that of any other, nor is it possible, naturally\nspeaking, for any two bodies of whatever nature, to exist\nsimultaneously in the same place; since contiguity requires\ndistinction of place.\n\nThe second reason is from movement. For if light were a body, its\ndiffusion would be the local movement of a body. Now no local movement\nof a body can be instantaneous, as everything that moves from one\nplace to another must pass through the intervening space before\nreaching the end: whereas the diffusion of light is instantaneous. Nor\ncan it be argued that the time required is too short to be perceived;\nfor though this may be the case in short distances, it cannot be so in\ndistances so great as that which separates the East from the West. Yet\nas soon as the sun is at the horizon, the whole hemisphere is\nilluminated from end to end. It must also be borne in mind on the part\nof movement that whereas all bodies have their natural determinate\nmovement, that of light is indifferent as regards direction, working\nequally in a circle as in a straight line. Hence it appears that the\ndiffusion of light is not the local movement of a body.\n\nThe third reason is from generation and corruption. For if light were\na body, it would follow that whenever the air is darkened by the\nabsence of the luminary, the body of light would be corrupted, and\nits matter would receive a new form. But unless we are to say that\ndarkness is a body, this does not appear to be the case. Neither does\nit appear from what matter a body can be daily generated large enough\nto fill the intervening hemisphere. Also it would be absurd to say\nthat a body of so great a bulk is corrupted by the mere absence of the\nluminary. And should anyone reply that it is not corrupted, but\napproaches and moves around with the sun, we may ask why it is that\nwhen a lighted candle is obscured by the intervening object the whole\nroom is darkened? It is not that the light is condensed round the\ncandle when this is done, since it burns no more brightly then than\nit burned before.\n\nSince, therefore, these things are repugnant, not only to reason, but\nto common sense, we must conclude that light cannot be a body.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine takes light to be a luminous body in act--in\nother words, to be fire, the noblest of the four elements.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Aristotle pronounces light to be fire existing in its\nown proper matter: just as fire in aerial matter is \"flame,\" or in\nearthly matter is \"burning coal.\" Nor must too much attention be paid\nto the instances adduced by Aristotle in his works on logic, as he\nmerely mentions them as the more or less probable opinions of various\nwriters.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All these properties are assigned to light\nmetaphorically, and might in the same way be attributed to heat. For\nbecause movement from place to place is naturally first in the order\nof movement as is proved _Phys._ viii, text. 55, we use terms\nbelonging to local movement in speaking of alteration and movement of\nall kinds. For even the word distance is derived from the idea of\nremoteness of place, to that of all contraries, as is said _Metaph._\nx, text. 13.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 67, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Light Is a Quality?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that light is not a quality. For every\nquality remains in its subject, though the active cause of the\nquality be removed, as heat remains in water removed from the fire.\nBut light does not remain in the air when the source of light is\nwithdrawn. Therefore light is not a quality.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every sensible quality has its opposite, as cold is\nopposed to heat, blackness to whiteness. But this is not the case\nwith light since darkness is merely a privation of light. Light\ntherefore is not a sensible quality.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But the\nlight of the heavenly bodies is a cause of substantial forms of\nearthly bodies, and also gives to colors their immaterial being, by\nmaking them actually visible. Light, then, is not a sensible quality,\nbut rather a substantial or spiritual form.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. i) says that light is a\nspecies of quality.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some writers have said that the light in the air has\nnot a natural being such as the color on a wall has, but only an\nintentional being, as a similitude of color in the air. But this\ncannot be the case for two reasons. First, because light gives a name\nto the air, since by it the air becomes actually luminous. But color\ndoes not do this, for we do not speak of the air as colored. Secondly,\nbecause light produces natural effects, for by the rays of the sun\nbodies are warmed, and natural changes cannot be brought about by mere\nintentions. Others have said that light is the sun's substantial form,\nbut this also seems impossible for two reasons. First, because\nsubstantial forms are not of themselves objects of the senses; for the\nobject of the intellect is what a thing is, as is said _De Anima_ iii,\ntext. 26: whereas light is visible of itself. In the second place,\nbecause it is impossible that what is the substantial form of one\nthing should be the accidental form of another; since substantial\nforms of their very nature constitute species: wherefore the\nsubstantial form always and everywhere accompanies the species. But\nlight is not the substantial form of air, for if it were, the air\nwould be destroyed when light is withdrawn. Hence it cannot be the\nsubstantial form of the sun.\n\nWe must say, then, that as heat is an active quality consequent on the\nsubstantial form of fire, so light is an active quality consequent on\nthe substantial form of the sun, or of another body that is of itself\nluminous, if there is any such body. A proof of this is that the rays\nof different stars produce different effects according to the diverse\nnatures of bodies.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since quality is consequent upon substantial form, the\nmode in which the subject receives a quality differs as the mode\ndiffers in which a subject receives a substantial form. For when\nmatter receives its form perfectly, the qualities consequent upon the\nform are firm and enduring; as when, for instance, water is converted\ninto fire. When, however, substantial form is received imperfectly,\nso as to be, as it were, in process of being received, rather than\nfully impressed, the consequent quality lasts for a time but is not\npermanent; as may be seen when water which has been heated returns\nin time to its natural state. But light is not produced by the\ntransmutation of matter, as though matter were in receipt of a\nsubstantial form, and light were a certain inception of substantial\nform. For this reason light disappears on the disappearance of its\nactive cause.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is accidental to light not to have a contrary,\nforasmuch as it is the natural quality of the first corporeal cause\nof change, which is itself removed from contrariety.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As heat acts towards perfecting the form of fire, as an\ninstrumental cause, by virtue of the substantial form, so does light\nact instrumentally, by virtue of the heavenly bodies, towards\nproducing substantial forms; and towards rendering colors actually\nvisible, inasmuch as it is a quality of the first sensible body.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 67, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Production of Light Is Fittingly Assigned to the First\nDay?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the production of light is not\nfittingly assigned to the first day. For light, as stated above (A.\n3), is a quality. But qualities are accidents, and as such should\nhave, not the first, but a subordinate place. The production of\nlight, then, ought not to be assigned to the first day.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is light that distinguishes night from day, and\nthis is effected by the sun, which is recorded as having been made on\nthe fourth day. Therefore the production of light could not have been\non the first day.\n\nObj. 3: Further, night and day are brought about by the circular\nmovement of a luminous body. But movement of this kind is an\nattribute of the firmament, and we read that the firmament was made\non the second day. Therefore the production of light, dividing night\nfrom day, ought not to be assigned to the first day.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if it be said that spiritual light is here spoken\nof, it may be replied that the light made on the first day dispels\nthe darkness. But in the beginning spiritual darkness was not, for\neven the demons were in the beginning good, as has been shown (Q. 63,\nA. 5). Therefore the production of light ought not to be assigned to\nthe first day.\n\n_On the contrary,_ That without which there could not be day, must\nhave been made on the first day. But there can be no day without\nlight. Therefore light must have been made on the first day.\n\n_I answer that,_ There are two opinions as to the production of light.\nAugustine seems to say (De Civ. Dei xi, 9,33) that Moses could not\nhave fittingly passed over the production of the spiritual creature,\nand therefore when we read, \"In the beginning God created heaven and\nearth,\" a spiritual nature as yet formless is to be understood by the\nword \"heaven,\" and formless matter of the corporeal creature by the\nword \"earth.\" And spiritual nature was formed first, as being of\nhigher dignity than corporeal. The forming, therefore, of this\nspiritual nature is signified by the production of light, that is to\nsay, of spiritual light. For a spiritual nature receives its form by\nthe enlightenment whereby it is led to adhere to the Word of God.\n\nOther writers think that the production of spiritual creatures was\npurposely omitted by Moses, and give various reasons. Basil [*Hom. i\nin Hexaem.] says that Moses begins his narrative from the beginning\nof time which belongs to sensible things; but that the spiritual or\nangelic creation is passed over, as created beforehand.\n\nChrysostom [*Hom. ii in Genes.] gives as a reason for the omission\nthat Moses was addressing an ignorant people, to whom material things\nalone appealed, and whom he was endeavoring to withdraw from the\nservice of idols. It would have been to them a pretext for idolatry\nif he had spoken to them of natures spiritual in substance and nobler\nthan all corporeal creatures; for they would have paid them Divine\nworship, since they were prone to worship as gods even the sun, moon,\nand stars, which was forbidden them (Deut. 4).\n\nBut mention is made of several kinds of formlessness, in regard to the\ncorporeal creature. One is where we read that \"the earth was void and\nempty,\" and another where it is said that \"darkness was upon the face\nof the deep.\" Now it seems to be required, for two reasons, that the\nformlessness of darkness should be removed first of all by the\nproduction of light. In the first place because light is a quality of\nthe first body, as was stated (A. 3), and thus by means of light\nit was fitting that the world should first receive its form. The\nsecond reason is because light is a common quality. For light is\ncommon to terrestrial and celestial bodies. But as in knowledge we\nproceed from general principles, so do we in work of every kind. For\nthe living thing is generated before the animal, and the animal before\nthe man, as is shown in _De Gener. Anim._ ii, 3. It was fitting, then,\nas an evidence of the Divine wisdom, that among the works of\ndistinction the production of light should take first place, since\nlight is a form of the primary body, and because it is more common\nquality.\n\nBasil [*Hom. ii in Hexaem.], indeed, adds a third reason: that all\nother things are made manifest by light. And there is yet a fourth,\nalready touched upon in the objections; that day cannot be unless\nlight exists, which was made therefore on the first day.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to the opinion of those who hold that the\nformlessness of matter preceded its form in duration, matter must be\nheld to have been created at the beginning with substantial forms,\nafterwards receiving those that are accidental, among which light\nholds the first place.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In the opinion of some the light here spoken of was a\nkind of luminous nebula, and that on the making of the sun this\nreturned to the matter of which it had been formed. But this cannot\nwell be maintained, as in the beginning of Genesis Holy Scripture\nrecords the institution of that order of nature which henceforth is\nto endure. We cannot, then, say that what was made at that time\nafterwards ceased to exist.\n\nOthers, therefore, held that this luminous nebula continues in\nexistence, but so closely attached to the sun as to be\nindistinguishable. But this is as much as to say that it is\nsuperfluous, whereas none of God's works have been made in vain. On\nthis account it is held by some that the sun's body was made out of\nthis nebula. This, too, is impossible to those at least who believe\nthat the sun is different in its nature from the four elements, and\nnaturally incorruptible. For in that case its matter cannot take on\nanother form.\n\nI answer, then, with Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), that the light was the\nsun's light, formless as yet, being already the solar substance, and\npossessing illuminative power in a general way, to which was\nafterwards added the special and determinative power required to\nproduce determinate effects. Thus, then, in the production of this\nlight a triple distinction was made between light and darkness.\nFirst, as to the cause, forasmuch as in the substance of the sun we\nhave the cause of light, and in the opaque nature of the earth the\ncause of darkness. Secondly, as to place, for in one hemisphere there\nwas light, in the other darkness. Thirdly, as to time; because there\nwas light for one and darkness for another in the same hemisphere;\nand this is signified by the words, \"He called the light day, and the\ndarkness night.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Basil says (Hom. ii in Hexaem.) that day and night were\nthen caused by expansion and contraction of light, rather than by\nmovement. But Augustine objects to this (Gen. ad lit. i), that there\nwas no reason for this vicissitude of expansion and contraction since\nthere were neither men nor animals on the earth at that time, for\nwhose service this was required. Nor does the nature of a luminous\nbody seem to admit of the withdrawal of light, so long as the body is\nactually present; though this might be effected by a miracle. As to\nthis, however, Augustine remarks (Gen. ad lit. i) that in the first\nfounding of the order of nature we must not look for miracles, but\nfor what is in accordance with nature. We hold, then, that the\nmovement of the heavens is twofold. Of these movements, one is common\nto the entire heaven, and is the cause of day and night. This, as it\nseems, had its beginning on the first day. The other varies in\nproportion as it affects various bodies, and by its variations is the\ncause of the succession of days, months, and years. Thus it is, that\nin the account of the first day the distinction between day and night\nalone is mentioned; this distinction being brought about by the\ncommon movement of the heavens. The further distinction into\nsuccessive days, seasons, and years recorded as begun on the fourth\nday, in the words, \"let them be for seasons, and for days, and years\"\nis due to proper movements.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As Augustine teaches (Confess. xii; Gen. ad lit. 1,\n15), formlessness did not precede forms in duration; and so we must\nunderstand the production of light to signify the formation of\nspiritual creatures, not, indeed, with the perfection of glory, in\nwhich they were not created, but with the perfection of grace, which\nthey possessed from their creation as said above (Q. 62, A. 3). Thus\nthe division of light from darkness will denote the distinction of\nthe spiritual creature from other created things as yet without form.\nBut if all created things received their form at the same time, the\ndarkness must be held to mean the spiritual darkness of the wicked,\nnot as existing from the beginning but such as God foresaw would\nexist.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 68\n\nON THE WORK OF THE SECOND DAY\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must next consider the work of the second day. Under this head\nthere are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the firmament was made on the second day?\n\n(2) Whether there are waters above the firmament?\n\n(3) Whether the firmament divides waters from waters?\n\n(4) Whether there is more than one heaven?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 68, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Firmament Was Made on the Second Day?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the firmament was not made on the\nsecond day. For it is said (Gen. 1:8): \"God called the firmament\nheaven.\" But the heaven existed before days, as is clear from the\nwords, \"In the beginning God created heaven and earth.\" Therefore\nthe firmament was not made on the second day.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the work of the six days is ordered conformably to\nthe order of Divine wisdom. Now it would ill become the Divine wisdom\nto make afterwards that which is naturally first. But though the\nfirmament naturally precedes the earth and the waters, these are\nmentioned before the formation of light, which was on the first day.\nTherefore the firmament was not made on the second day.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all that was made in the six days was formed out of\nmatter created before days began. But the firmament cannot have been\nformed out of pre-existing matter, for if so it would be liable to\ngeneration and corruption. Therefore the firmament was not made on\nthe second day.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:6): \"God said: let there be\na firmament,\" and further on (verse 8); \"And the evening and morning\nwere the second day.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In discussing questions of this kind two rules are\nto be observed, as Augustine teaches (Gen. ad lit. i, 18). The first\nis, to hold the truth of Scripture without wavering. The second is\nthat since Holy Scripture can be explained in a multiplicity of\nsenses, one should adhere to a particular explanation, only in such\nmeasure as to be ready to abandon it, if it be proved with certainty\nto be false; lest Holy Scripture be exposed to the ridicule of\nunbelievers, and obstacles be placed to their believing.\n\nWe say, therefore, that the words which speak of the firmament as\nmade on the second day can be understood in two senses. They may be\nunderstood, first, of the starry firmament, on which point it is\nnecessary to set forth the different opinions of philosophers. Some\nof these believed it to be composed of the elements; and this was the\nopinion of Empedocles, who, however, held further that the body of the\nfirmament was not susceptible of dissolution, because its parts are,\nso to say, not in disunion, but in harmony. Others held the firmament\nto be of the nature of the four elements, not, indeed, compounded of\nthem, but being as it were a simple element. Such was the opinion of\nPlato, who held that element to be fire. Others, again, have held that\nthe heaven is not of the nature of the four elements, but is itself a\nfifth body, existing over and above these. This is the opinion of\nAristotle (De Coel. i, text. 6,32).\n\nAccording to the first opinion, it may, strictly speaking, be granted\nthat the firmament was made, even as to substance, on the second day.\nFor it is part of the work of creation to produce the substance of the\nelements, while it belongs to the work of distinction and adornment to\ngive forms to the elements that pre-exist.\n\nBut the belief that the firmament was made, as to its substance, on\nthe second day is incompatible with the opinion of Plato, according to\nwhom the making of the firmament implies the production of the element\nof fire. This production, however, belongs to the work of creation, at\nleast, according to those who hold that formlessness of matter\npreceded in time its formation, since the first form received by\nmatter is the elemental.\n\nStill less compatible with the belief that the substance of the\nfirmament was produced on the second day is the opinion of Aristotle,\nseeing that the mention of days denotes succession of time, whereas\nthe firmament, being naturally incorruptible, is of a matter not\nsusceptible of change of form; wherefore it could not be made out of\nmatter existing antecedently in time.\n\nHence to produce the substance of the firmament belongs to the work of\ncreation. But its formation, in some degree, belongs to the second\nday, according to both opinions: for as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv),\nthe light of the sun was without form during the first three days, and\nafterwards, on the fourth day, received its form.\n\nIf, however, we take these days to denote merely sequence in the\nnatural order, as Augustine holds (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22,24), and not\nsuccession in time, there is then nothing to prevent our saying,\nwhilst holding any one of the opinions given above, that the\nsubstantial formation of the firmament belongs to the second day.\n\nAnother possible explanation is to understand by the firmament that\nwas made on the second day, not that in which the stars are set, but\nthe part of the atmosphere where the clouds are collected, and which\nhas received the name firmament from the firmness and density of the\nair. \"For a body is called firm,\" that is dense and solid, \"thereby\ndiffering from a mathematical body\" as is remarked by Basil (Hom. iii\nin Hexaem.). If, then, this explanation is adopted none of these\nopinions will be found repugnant to reason. Augustine, in fact (Gen.\nad lit. ii, 4), recommends it thus: \"I consider this view of the\nquestion worthy of all commendation, as neither contrary to faith nor\ndifficult to be proved and believed.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to Chrysostom (Hom. iii in Genes.), Moses\nprefaces his record by speaking of the works of God collectively, in\nthe words, \"In the beginning God created heaven and earth,\" and then\nproceeds to explain them part by part; in somewhat the same way as\none might say: \"This house was constructed by that builder,\" and then\nadd: \"First, he laid the foundations, then built the walls, and\nthirdly, put on the roof.\" In accepting this explanation we are,\ntherefore, not bound to hold that a different heaven is spoken of in\nthe words: \"In the beginning God created heaven and earth,\" and when\nwe read that the firmament was made on the second day.\n\nWe may also say that the heaven recorded as created in the beginning\nis not the same as that made on the second day; and there are several\nsenses in which this may be understood. Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.\ni, 9) that the heaven recorded as made on the first day is the\nformless spiritual nature, and that the heaven of the second day is\nthe corporeal heaven. According to Bede (Hexaem. i) and Strabus, the\nheaven made on the first day is the empyrean, and the firmament made\non the second day, the starry heaven. According to Damascene (De Fide\nOrth. ii) that of the first day was spherical in form and without\nstars, the same, in fact, that the philosophers speak of, calling it\nthe ninth sphere, and the primary movable body that moves with diurnal\nmovement: while by the firmament made on the second day he understands\nthe starry heaven. According to another theory, touched upon by\nAugustine [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 1] the heaven made on the first day was\nthe starry heaven, and the firmament made on the second day was that\nregion of the air where the clouds are collected, which is also called\nheaven, but equivocally. And to show that the word is here used in an\nequivocal sense, it is expressly said that \"God called the firmament\nheaven\"; just as in a preceding verse it said that \"God called the\nlight day\" (since the word \"day\" is also used to denote a space of\ntwenty-four hours). Other instances of a similar use occur, as\npointed out by Rabbi Moses.\n\nThe second and third objections are sufficiently answered by what has\nbeen already said.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 68, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Are Waters Above the Firmament?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are not waters above the\nfirmament. For water is heavy by nature, and heavy things tend\nnaturally downwards, not upwards. Therefore there are not waters\nabove the firmament.\n\nObj. 2: Further, water is fluid by nature, and fluids cannot rest\non a sphere, as experience shows. Therefore, since the firmament is a\nsphere, there cannot be water above it.\n\nObj. 3: Further, water is an element, and appointed to the\ngeneration of composite bodies, according to the relation in which\nimperfect things stand towards perfect. But bodies of composite nature\nhave their place upon the earth, and not above the firmament, so that\nwater would be useless there. But none of God's works are useless.\nTherefore there are not waters above the firmament.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:7): \"(God) divided the\nwaters that were under the firmament, from those that were above the\nfirmament.\"\n\nI answer with Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that, \"These words of\nScripture have more authority than the most exalted human intellect.\nHence, whatever these waters are, and whatever their mode of\nexistence, we cannot for a moment doubt that they are there.\" As to\nthe nature of these waters, all are not agreed. Origen says (Hom. i in\nGen.) that the waters that are above the firmament are \"spiritual\nsubstances.\" Wherefore it is written (Ps. 148:4): \"Let the waters that\nare above the heavens praise the name of the Lord,\" and (Dan. 3:60):\n\"Ye waters that are above the heavens, bless the Lord.\"To this Basil\nanswers (Hom. iii in Hexaem.) that these words do not mean that these\nwaters are rational creatures, but that \"the thoughtful contemplation\nof them by those who understand fulfils the glory of the Creator.\"\nHence in the same context, fire, hail, and other like creatures, are\ninvoked in the same way, though no one would attribute reason to\nthese.\n\nWe must hold, then, these waters to be material, but their exact\nnature will be differently defined according as opinions on the\nfirmament differ. For if by the firmament we understand the starry\nheaven, and as being of the nature of the four elements, for the same\nreason it may be believed that the waters above the heaven are of the\nsame nature as the elemental waters. But if by the firmament we\nunderstand the starry heaven, not, however, as being of the nature of\nthe four elements, then the waters above the firmament will not be of\nthe same nature as the elemental waters, but just as, according to\nStrabus, one heaven is called empyrean, that is, fiery, solely on\naccount of its splendor: so this other heaven will be called aqueous\nsolely on account of its transparence; and this heaven is above the\nstarry heaven. Again, if the firmament is held to be of other nature\nthan the elements, it may still be said to divide the waters, if we\nunderstand by water not the element but formless matter. Augustine,\nin fact, says (Super Gen. cont. Manich. i, 5,7) that whatever divides\nbodies from bodies can be said to divide waters from waters.\n\nIf, however, we understand by the firmament that part of the air in\nwhich the clouds are collected, then the waters above the firmament\nmust rather be the vapors resolved from the waters which are raised\nabove a part of the atmosphere, and from which the rain falls. But to\nsay, as some writers alluded to by Augustine (Gen. ad lit. ii, 4),\nthat waters resolved into vapor may be lifted above the starry\nheaven, is a mere absurdity. The solid nature of the firmament, the\nintervening region of fire, wherein all vapor must be consumed, the\ntendency in light and rarefied bodies to drift to one spot beneath the\nvault of the moon, as well as the fact that vapors are perceived not\nto rise even to the tops of the higher mountains, all to go to show\nthe impossibility of this. Nor is it less absurd to say, in support of\nthis opinion, that bodies may be rarefied infinitely, since natural\nbodies cannot be infinitely rarefied or divided, but up to a certain\npoint only.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some have attempted to solve this difficulty by\nsupposing that in spite of the natural gravity of water, it is kept in\nits place above the firmament by the Divine power. Augustine (Gen. ad\nlit. ii, 1), however will not admit this solution, but says \"It is our\nbusiness here to inquire how God has constituted the natures of His\ncreatures, not how far it may have pleased Him to work on them by way\nof miracle.\" We leave this view, then, and answer that according to\nthe last two opinions on the firmament and the waters the solution\nappears from what has been said. According to the first opinion, an\norder of the elements must be supposed different from that given by\nAristotle, that is to say, that the waters surrounding the earth are\nof a dense consistency, and those around the firmament of a rarer\nconsistency, in proportion to the respective density of the earth\nand of the heaven.\n\nOr by the water, as stated, we may understand the matter of bodies to\nbe signified.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The solution is clear from what has been said,\naccording to the last two opinions. But according to the first\nopinion, Basil gives two replies (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). He answers\nfirst, that a body seen as concave beneath need not necessarily be\nrounded, or convex, above. Secondly, that the waters above the\nfirmament are not fluid, but exist outside it in a solid state, as a\nmass of ice, and that this is the crystalline heaven of some writers.\n\nReply Obj. 3: According to the third opinion given, the waters above\nthe firmament have been raised in the form of vapors, and serve to\ngive rain to the earth. But according to the second opinion, they\nare above the heaven that is wholly transparent and starless. This,\naccording to some, is the primary mobile, the cause of the daily\nrevolution of the entire heaven, whereby the continuance of\ngeneration is secured. In the same way the starry heaven, by the\nzodiacal movement, is the cause whereby different bodies are\ngenerated or corrupted, through the rising and setting of the stars,\nand their various influences. But according to the first opinion\nthese waters are set there to temper the heat of the celestial\nbodies, as Basil supposes (Hom. iii in Hexaem.). And Augustine says\n(Gen. ad lit. ii, 5) that some have considered this to be proved by\nthe extreme cold of Saturn owing to its nearness to the waters that\nare above the firmament.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 68, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Firmament Divides Waters from Waters?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the firmament does not divide waters\nfrom waters. For bodies that are of one and the same species have\nnaturally one and the same place. But the Philosopher says (Topic.\ni, 6): \"All water is the same species.\" Water therefore cannot be\ndistinct from water by place.\n\nObj. 2: Further, should it be said that the waters above the\nfirmament differ in species from those under the firmament, it may be\nargued, on the contrary, that things distinct in species need nothing\nelse to distinguish them. If then, these waters differ in species, it\nis not the firmament that distinguishes them.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it would appear that what distinguishes waters from\nwaters must be something which is in contact with them on either\nside, as a wall standing in the midst of a river. But it is evident\nthat the waters below do not reach up to the firmament. Therefore\nthe firmament does not divide the waters from the waters.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:6): \"Let there be a\nfirmament made amidst the waters; and let it divide the waters from\nthe waters.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The text of Genesis, considered superficially, might\nlead to the adoption of a theory similar to that held by certain\nphilosophers of antiquity, who taught that water was a body infinite\nin dimension, and the primary element of all bodies. Thus in the\nwords, \"Darkness was upon the face of the deep,\" the word \"deep\" might\nbe taken to mean the infinite mass of water, understood as the\nprinciple of all other bodies. These philosophers also taught that not\nall corporeal things are confined beneath the heaven perceived by our\nsenses, but that a body of water, infinite in extent, exists above\nthat heaven. On this view the firmament of heaven might be said to\ndivide the waters without from those within--that is to say, from all\nbodies under the heaven, since they took water to be the principle of\nthem all.\n\nAs, however, this theory can be shown to be false by solid reasons, it\ncannot be held to be the sense of Holy Scripture. It should rather be\nconsidered that Moses was speaking to ignorant people, and that out of\ncondescension to their weakness he put before them only such things as\nare apparent to sense. Now even the most uneducated can perceive by\ntheir senses that earth and water are corporeal, whereas it is not\nevident to all that air also is corporeal, for there have even been\nphilosophers who said that air is nothing, and called a space filled\nwith air a vacuum.\n\nMoses, then, while he expressly mentions water and earth, makes no\nexpress mention of air by name, to avoid setting before ignorant\npersons something beyond their knowledge. In order, however, to\nexpress the truth to those capable of understanding it, he implies in\nthe words: \"Darkness was upon the face of the deep,\" the existence of\nair as attendant, so to say, upon the water. For it may be understood\nfrom these words that over the face of the water a transparent body\nwas extended, the subject of light and darkness, which, in fact, is\nthe air.\n\nWhether, then, we understand by the firmament the starry heaven, or\nthe cloudy region of the air, it is true to say that it divides the\nwaters from the waters, according as we take water to denote formless\nmatter, or any kind of transparent body, as fittingly designated\nunder the name of waters. For the starry heaven divides the lower\ntransparent bodies from the higher, and the cloudy region divides\nthat higher part of the air, where the rain and similar things are\ngenerated, from the lower part, which is connected with the water\nand included under that name.\n\nReply Obj. 1: If by the firmament is understood the starry heaven,\nthe waters above are not of the same species as those beneath. But\nif by the firmament is understood the cloudy region of the air, both\nthese waters are of the same species, and two places are assigned to\nthem, though not for the same purpose, the higher being the place of\ntheir begetting, the lower, the place of their repose.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If the waters are held to differ in species, the\nfirmament cannot be said to divide the waters, as the cause of\ntheir destruction, but only as the boundary of each.\n\nReply Obj. 3: On account of the air and other similar bodies being\ninvisible, Moses includes all such bodies under the name of water,\nand thus it is evident that waters are found on each side of the\nfirmament, whatever be the sense in which the word is used.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 68, Art. 4]\n\nWhether There Is Only One Heaven?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is only one heaven. For the\nheaven is contrasted with the earth, in the words, \"In the beginning\nGod created heaven and earth.\" But there is only one earth. Therefore\nthere is only one heaven.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which consists of the entire sum of its own\nmatter, must be one; and such is the heaven, as the Philosopher\nproves (De Coel. i, text. 95). Therefore there is but one heaven.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever is predicated of many things univocally\nis predicated of them according to some common notion. But if there\nare more heavens than one, they are so called univocally, for if\nequivocally only, they could not properly be called many. If, then,\nthey are many, there must be some common notion by reason of which\neach is called heaven, but this common notion cannot be assigned.\nTherefore there cannot be more than one heaven.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Ps. 148:4): \"Praise Him, ye heavens\nof heavens.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ On this point there seems to be a diversity of\nopinion between Basil and Chrysostom. The latter says that there is\nonly one heaven (Hom. iv in Gen.), and that the words 'heavens of\nheavens' are merely the translation of the Hebrew idiom according to\nwhich the word is always used in the plural, just as in Latin there\nare many nouns that are wanting in the singular. On the other hand,\nBasil (Hom. iii in Hexaem.), whom Damascene follows (De Fide Orth.\nii), says that there are many heavens. The difference, however, is\nmore nominal than real. For Chrysostom means by the one heaven the\nwhole body that is above the earth and the water, for which reason\nthe birds that fly in the air are called birds of heaven [*Ps. 8:9].\nBut since in this body there are many distinct parts, Basil said\nthat there are more heavens than one.\n\nIn order, then, to understand the distinction of heavens, it must be\nborne in mind that Scripture speaks of heaven in a threefold sense.\nSometimes it uses the word in its proper and natural meaning, when it\ndenotes that body on high which is luminous actually or potentially,\nand incorruptible by nature. In this body there are three heavens; the\nfirst is the empyrean, which is wholly luminous; the second is the\naqueous or crystalline, wholly transparent; and the third is called\nthe starry heaven, in part transparent, and in part actually luminous,\nand divided into eight spheres. One of these is the sphere of the\nfixed stars; the other seven, which may be called the seven heavens,\nare the spheres of the planets.\n\nIn the second place, the name heaven is applied to a body that\nparticipates in any property of the heavenly body, as sublimity and\nluminosity, actual or potential. Thus Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii)\nholds as one heaven all the space between the waters and the moon's\norb, calling it the aerial. According to him, then, there are three\nheavens, the aerial, the starry, and one higher than both these, of\nwhich the Apostle is understood to speak when he says of himself\nthat he was \"rapt to the third heaven.\"\n\nBut since this space contains two elements, namely, fire and air, and\nin each of these there is what is called a higher and a lower region\nRabanus subdivides this space into four distinct heavens. The higher\nregion of fire he calls the fiery heaven; the lower, the Olympian\nheaven from a lofty mountain of that name: the higher region of air he\ncalls, from its brightness, the ethereal heaven; the lower, the\naerial. When, therefore, these four heavens are added to the three\nenumerated above, there are seven corporeal heavens in all, in the\nopinion of Rabanus.\n\nThirdly, there are metaphorical uses of the word heaven, as when this\nname is applied to the Blessed Trinity, Who is the Light and the Most\nHigh Spirit. It is explained by some, as thus applied, in the words,\n\"I will ascend into heaven\"; whereby the evil spirit is represented as\nseeking to make himself equal with God. Sometimes also spiritual\nblessings, the recompense of the Saints, from being the highest of all\ngood gifts, are signified by the word heaven, and, in fact, are so\nsignified, according to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte), in the\nwords, \"Your reward is very great in heaven\" (Matt. 5:12).\n\nAgain, three kinds of supernatural visions, bodily, imaginative, and\nintellectual, are called sometimes so many heavens, in reference to\nwhich Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii) expounds Paul's rapture \"to the\nthird heaven.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The earth stands in relation to the heaven as the\ncentre of a circle to its circumference. But as one center may have\nmany circumferences, so, though there is but one earth, there may be\nmany heavens.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The argument holds good as to the heaven, in so far as\nit denotes the entire sum of corporeal creation, for in that sense it\nis one.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All the heavens have in common sublimity and some\ndegree of luminosity, as appears from what has been said.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 69\n\nON THE WORK OF THE THIRD DAY\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe next consider the work of the third day. Under this head there are\ntwo points of inquiry:\n\n(1) About the gathering together of the waters.\n\n(2) About the production of plants.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 69, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Was Fitting That the Gathering Together of the Waters\nShould Take Place, As Recorded, on the Third Day?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the gathering\ntogether of the waters should take place on the third day. For what\nwas made on the first and second days is expressly said to have been\n\"made\" in the words, \"God said: Be light made,\" and \"Let there be a\nfirmament made.\"But the third day is contradistinguished from the\nfirst and the second days. Therefore the work of the third day\nshould have been described as a making not as a gathering together.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the earth hitherto had been completely covered by\nthe waters, wherefore it was described as \"invisible\" [* See Q. 66,\nA. 1, Obj. 1]. There was then no place on the earth to which the\nwaters could be gathered together.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things which are not in continuous contact cannot\noccupy one place. But not all the waters are in continuous contact,\nand therefore all were not gathered together into one place.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a gathering together is a mode of local movement.\nBut the waters flow naturally, and take their course towards the sea.\nIn their case, therefore, a Divine precept of this kind was\nunnecessary.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the earth is given its name at its first creation by\nthe words, \"In the beginning God created heaven and earth.\" Therefore\nthe imposition of its name on the third day seems to be recorded\nwithout necessity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The authority of Scripture suffices.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is necessary to reply differently to this\nquestion according to the different interpretations given by\nAugustine and other holy writers. In all these works, according to\nAugustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 15; iv, 22, 34; De Gen. Contr. Manich. i,\n5, 7), there is no order of duration, but only of origin and nature.\nHe says that the formless spiritual and formless corporeal natures\nwere created first of all, and that the latter are at first indicated\nby the words \"earth\" and \"water.\" Not that this formlessness preceded\nformation, in time, but only in origin; nor yet that one formation\npreceded another in duration, but merely in the order of nature.\nAgreeably, then, to this order, the formation of the highest or\nspiritual nature is recorded in the first place, where it is said\nthat light was made on the first day. For as the spiritual nature is\nhigher than the corporeal, so the higher bodies are nobler than the\nlower. Hence the formation of the higher bodies is indicated in the\nsecond place, by the words, \"Let there be made a firmament,\" by which\nis to be understood the impression of celestial forms on formless\nmatter, that preceded with priority not of time, but of origin only.\nBut in the third place the impression of elemental forms on formless\nmatter is recorded, also with a priority of origin only. Therefore\nthe words, \"Let the waters be gathered together, and the dry land\nappear,\" mean that corporeal matter was impressed with the\nsubstantial form of water, so as to have such movement, and with\nthe substantial form of earth, so as to have such an appearance.\n\nAccording, however, to other holy writers [* See Q. 66, A. 1], an\norder of duration in the works is to be understood, by which is meant\nthat the formlessness of matter precedes its formation, and one form\nanother, in order of time. Nevertheless, they do not hold that the\nformlessness of matter implies the total absence of form, since\nheaven, earth, and water already existed, since these three are named\nas already clearly perceptible to the senses; rather they understand\nby formlessness the want of due distinction and of perfect beauty,\nand in respect of these three Scripture mentions three kinds of\nformlessness. Heaven, the highest of them, was without form so long\nas \"darkness\" filled it, because it was the source of light. The\nformlessness of water, which holds the middle place, is called the\n\"deep,\" because, as Augustine says (Contr. Faust. xxii, 11), this\nword signifies the mass of waters without order. Thirdly, the\nformless state of the earth is touched upon when the earth is said to\nbe \"void\" or \"invisible,\" because it was covered by the waters. Thus,\nthen, the formation of the highest body took place on the first day.\nAnd since time results from the movement of the heaven, and is the\nnumerical measure of the movement of the highest body, from this\nformation, resulted the distinction of time, namely, that of night\nand day. On the second day the intermediate body, water, was formed,\nreceiving from the firmament a sort of distinction and order (so that\nwater be understood as including certain other things, as explained\nabove (Q. 68, A. 3)). On the third day the earth, the lowest body,\nreceived its form by the withdrawal of the waters, and there resulted\nthe distinction in the lowest body, namely, of land and sea. Hence\nScripture, having clearly expressed the formless state of the earth,\nby saying that it was \"invisible\" or \"void,\" expresses the manner in\nwhich it received its form by the equally suitable words, \"Let the\ndry land appear.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to Augustine [*Gen. ad lit. ii, 7, 8; iii,\n20], Scripture does not say of the work of the third day, that it was\nmade, as it says of those that precede, in order to show that higher\nand spiritual forms, such as the angels and the heavenly bodies, are\nperfect and stable in being, whereas inferior forms are imperfect and\nmutable. Hence the impression of such forms is signified by the\ngathering of the waters, and the appearing of the land. For \"water,\"\nto use Augustine's words, \"glides and flows away, the earth abides\"\n(Gen. ad lit. ii, 11). Others, again, hold that the work of the third\nday was perfected on that day only as regards movement from place to\nplace, and that for this reason Scripture had no reason to speak of\nit as made.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument is easily solved, according to\nAugustine's opinion (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i), because we need not\nsuppose that the earth was first covered by the waters, and that\nthese were afterwards gathered together, but that they were produced\nin this very gathering together. But according to the other writers\nthere are three solutions, which Augustine gives (Gen. ad lit. i,\n12). The first supposes that the waters are heaped up to a greater\nheight at the place where they were gathered together, for it has\nbeen proved in regard to the Red Sea, that the sea is higher than the\nland, as Basil remarks (Hom. iv in Hexaem.). The second explains the\nwater that covered the earth as being rarefied or nebulous, which was\nafterwards condensed when the waters were gathered together. The\nthird suggests the existence of hollows in the earth, to receive the\nconfluence of waters. Of the above the first seems the most probable.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All the waters have the sea as their goal, into which\nthey flow by channels hidden or apparent, and this may be the reason\nwhy they are said to be gathered together into one place. Or, \"one\nplace\" is to be understood not simply, but as contrasted with the\nplace of the dry land, so that the sense would be, \"Let the waters be\ngathered together in one place,\" that is, apart from the dry land.\nThat the waters occupied more places than one seems to be implied by\nthe words that follow, \"The gathering together of the waters He\ncalled Seas.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: The Divine command gives bodies their natural movement\nand by these natural movements they are said to \"fulfill His word.\"\nOr we may say that it was according to the nature of water completely\nto cover the earth, just as the air completely surrounds both water\nand earth; but as a necessary means towards an end, namely, that\nplants and animals might be on the earth, it was necessary for the\nwaters to be withdrawn from a portion of the earth. Some philosophers\nattribute this uncovering of the earth's surface to the action of the\nsun lifting up the vapors and thus drying the land. Scripture,\nhowever, attributes it to the Divine power, not only in the Book of\nGenesis, but also Job 38:10 where in the person of the Lord it is\nsaid, \"I set My bounds around the sea,\" and Jer. 5:22, where it is\nwritten: \"Will you not then fear Me, saith the Lord, who have set\nthe sand a bound for the sea?\"\n\nReply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (De Gen. Contr. Manich. i),\nprimary matter is meant by the word earth, where first mentioned,\nbut in the present passage it is to be taken for the element itself.\nAgain it may be said with Basil (Hom. iv in Hexaem.), that the earth\nis mentioned in the first passage in respect of its nature, but here\nin respect of its principal property, namely, dryness. Wherefore it\nis written: \"He called the dry land, Earth.\" It may also be said with\nRabbi Moses, that the expression, \"He called,\" denotes throughout an\nequivocal use of the name imposed. Thus we find it said at first that\n\"He called the light Day\": for the reason that later on a period of\ntwenty-four hours is also called day, where it is said that \"there\nwas evening and morning, one day.\" In like manner it is said that\n\"the firmament,\" that is, the air, \"He called heaven\": for that which\nwas first created was also called \"heaven.\" And here, again, it is\nsaid that \"the dry land,\" that is, the part from which the waters had\nwithdrawn, \"He called, Earth,\" as distinct from the sea; although the\nname earth is equally applied to that which is covered with waters or\nnot. So by the expression \"He called\" we are to understand throughout\nthat the nature or property He bestowed corresponded to the name He\ngave.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 69, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Was Fitting That the Production of Plants Should Take Place\non the Third Day?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it was not fitting that the production\nof plants should take place on the third day. For plants have life, as\nanimals have. But the production of animals belongs to the work, not\nof distinction, but of adornment. Therefore the production of plants,\nas also belonging to the work of adornment, ought not to be recorded\nas taking place on the third day, which is devoted to the work of\ndistinction.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a work by which the earth is accursed should have\nbeen recorded apart from the work by which it receives its form. But\nthe words of Gen. 3:17, \"Cursed is the earth in thy work, thorns and\nthistles shall it bring forth to thee,\" show that by the production\nof certain plants the earth was accursed. Therefore the production of\nplants in general should not have been recorded on the third day,\nwhich is concerned with the work of formation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as plants are firmly fixed to the earth, so are\nstones and metals, which are, nevertheless, not mentioned in the work\nof formation. Plants, therefore, ought not to have been made on the\nthird day.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 1:12): \"The earth brought forth\nthe green herb,\" after which there follows, \"The evening and the\nmorning were the third day.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ On the third day, as said (A. 1), the formless state\nof the earth comes to an end. But this state is described as twofold.\nOn the one hand, the earth was \"invisible\" or \"void,\" being covered\nby the waters; on the other hand, it was \"shapeless\" or \"empty,\" that\nis, without that comeliness which it owes to the plants that clothe\nit, as it were, with a garment. Thus, therefore, in either respect\nthis formless state ends on the third day: first, when \"the waters\nwere gathered together into one place and the dry land appeared\";\nsecondly, when \"the earth brought forth the green herb.\" But\nconcerning the production of plants, Augustine's opinion differs\nfrom that of others. For other commentators, in accordance with the\nsurface meaning of the text, consider that the plants were produced\nin act in their various species on this third day; whereas Augustine\n(Gen. ad lit. v, 5; viii, 3) says that the earth is said to have then\nproduced plants and trees in their causes, that is, it received then\nthe power to produce them. He supports this view by the authority of\nScripture, for it is said (Gen. 2:4, 5): \"These are the generations\nof the heaven and the earth, when they were created, in the day that\n. . . God made the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field\nbefore it sprung up in the earth, and every herb of the ground before\nit grew.\" Therefore, the production of plants in their causes, within\nthe earth, took place before they sprang up from the earth's surface.\nAnd this is confirmed by reason, as follows. In these first days God\ncreated all things in their origin or causes, and from this work He\nsubsequently rested. Yet afterwards, by governing His creatures, in\nthe work of propagation, \"He worketh until now.\" Now the production\nof plants from the earth is a work of propagation, and therefore they\nwere not produced in act on the third day, but in their causes only.\nHowever, in accordance with other writers, it may be said that the\nfirst constitution of species belongs to the work of the six days,\nbut the reproduction among them of like from like, to the government\nof the universe. And Scripture indicates this in the words, \"before\nit sprung up in the earth,\" and \"before it grew,\" that is, before\nlike was produced from like; just as now happens in the natural\ncourse by the production of seed. Wherefore Scripture says pointedly\n(Gen. 1:11): \"Let the earth bring forth the green herb, and such as\nmay seed,\" as indicating the production of perfect species, from\nwhich the seed of others should arise. Nor does the question where\nthe seminal power may reside, whether in root, stem, or fruit, affect\nthe argument.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Life in plants is hidden, since they lack sense and\nlocal movement, by which the animate and the inanimate are chiefly\ndiscernible. And therefore, since they are firmly fixed in the earth,\ntheir production is treated as a part of the earth's formation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even before the earth was accursed, thorns and thistles\nhad been produced, either virtually or actually. But they were not\nproduced in punishment of man; as though the earth, which he tilled\nto gain his food, produced unfruitful and noxious plants. Hence it is\nsaid: \"Shall it bring forth _to thee.\"_\n\nReply Obj. 3: Moses put before the people such things only as were\nmanifest to their senses, as we have said (Q. 67, A. 4; Q. 68, A. 3).\nBut minerals are generated in hidden ways within the bowels of the\nearth. Moreover they seem hardly specifically distinct from earth,\nand would seem to be species thereof. For this reason, therefore, he\nmakes no mention of them.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 70\n\nOF THE WORK OF ADORNMENT, AS REGARDS THE FOURTH DAY\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe must next consider the work of adornment, first as to each day by\nitself, secondly as to all seven days in general.\n\nIn the first place, then, we consider the work of the fourth day,\nsecondly, that of the fifth day, thirdly, that of the sixth day, and\nfourthly, such matters as belong to the seventh day.\n\nUnder the first head there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) As to the production of the lights;\n\n(2) As to the end of their production;\n\n(3) Whether they are living beings?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 70, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Lights Ought to Have Been Produced on the Fourth Day?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the lights ought not to have been\nproduced on the fourth day. For the heavenly luminaries are by nature\nincorruptible bodies: wherefore their matter cannot exist without\ntheir form. But as their matter was produced in the work of creation,\nbefore there was any day, so therefore were their forms. It follows,\nthen, that the lights were not produced on the fourth day.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the luminaries are, as it were, vessels of light.\nBut light was made on the first day. The luminaries, therefore,\nshould have been made on the first day, not on the fourth.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the lights are fixed in the firmament, as plants\nare fixed in the earth. For, the Scripture says: \"He set them in the\nfirmament.\" But plants are described as produced when the earth, to\nwhich they are attached, received its form. The lights, therefore,\nshould have been produced at the same time as the firmament, that is\nto say, on the second day.\n\nObj. 4: Further, plants are an effect of the sun, moon, and other\nheavenly bodies. Now, cause precedes effect in the order of nature.\nThe lights, therefore, ought not to have been produced on the fourth\nday, but on the third day.\n\nObj. 5: Further, as astronomers say, there are many stars larger than\nthe moon. Therefore the sun and the moon alone are not correctly\ndescribed as the \"two great lights.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ Suffices the authority of Scripture.\n\n_I answer that,_ In recapitulating the Divine works, Scripture says\n(Gen. 2:1): \"So the heavens and the earth were finished and all the\nfurniture of them,\" thereby indicating that the work was threefold.\nIn the first work, that of \"creation,\" the heaven and the earth were\nproduced, but as yet without form. In the second, or work of\n\"distinction,\" the heaven and the earth were perfected, either by\nadding substantial form to formless matter, as Augustine holds (Gen.\nad lit. ii, 11), or by giving them the order and beauty due to them,\nas other holy writers suppose. To these two works is added the work\nof adornment, which is distinct from perfect[ion]. For the perfection\nof the heaven and the earth regards, seemingly, those things that\nbelong to them intrinsically, but the adornment, those that are\nextrinsic, just as the perfection of a man lies in his proper parts\nand forms, and his adornment, in clothing or such like. Now just as\ndistinction of certain things is made most evident by their local\nmovement, as separating one from another; so the work of adornment is\nset forth by the production of things having movement in the heavens,\nand upon the earth. But it has been stated above (Q. 69, A. 1), that\nthree things are recorded as created, namely, the heaven, the water,\nand the earth; and these three received their form from the three\ndays' work of distinction, so that heaven was formed on the first\nday; on the second day the waters were separated; and on the third\nday, the earth was divided into sea and dry land. So also is it in\nthe work of adornment; on the first day of this work, which is the\nfourth of creation, are produced the lights, to adorn the heaven by\ntheir movements; on the second day, which is the fifth, birds and\nfishes are called into being, to make beautiful the intermediate\nelement, for they move in air and water, which are here taken as one;\nwhile on the third day, which is the sixth, animals are brought\nforth, to move upon the earth and adorn it. It must also here be\nnoted that Augustine's opinion (Gen. ad lit. v, 5) on the production\nof lights is not at variance with that of other holy writers, since\nhe says that they were made actually, and not merely virtually, for\nthe firmament has not the power of producing lights, as the earth has\nof producing plants. Wherefore Scripture does not say: \"Let the\nfirmament produce lights,\" though it says: \"Let the earth bring forth\nthe green herb.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: In Augustine's opinion there is no difficulty here; for\nhe does not hold a succession of time in these works, and so there\nwas no need for the matter of the lights to exist under another form.\nNor is there any difficulty in the opinion of those who hold the\nheavenly bodies to be of the nature of the four elements, for it may\nbe said that they were formed out of matter already existing, as\nanimals and plants were formed. For those, however, who hold the\nheavenly bodies to be of another nature from the elements, and\nnaturally incorruptible, the answer must be that the lights were\nsubstantially created at the beginning, but that their substance, at\nfirst formless, is formed on this day, by receiving not its\nsubstantial form, but a determination of power. As to the fact that\nthe lights are not mentioned as existing from the beginning, but only\nas made on the fourth day, Chrysostom (Hom. vi in Gen.) explains this\nby the need of guarding the people from the danger of idolatry: since\nthe lights are proved not to be gods, by the fact that they were not\nfrom the beginning.\n\nReply Obj. 2: No difficulty exists if we follow Augustine in holding\nthe light made on the first day to be spiritual, and that made on\nthis day to be corporeal. If, however, the light made on the first\nday is understood to be itself corporeal, then it must be held to\nhave been produced on that day merely as light in general; and that\non the fourth day the lights received a definite power to produce\ndeterminate effects. Thus we observe that the rays of the sun have\none effect, those of the moon another, and so forth. Hence, speaking\nof such a determination of power, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says that\nthe sun's light which previously was without form, was formed on the\nfourth day.\n\nReply Obj. 3: According to Ptolemy the heavenly luminaries are not\nfixed in the spheres, but have their own movement distinct from the\nmovement of the spheres. Wherefore Chrysostom says (Hom. vi in Gen.)\nthat He is said to have set them in the firmament, not because He\nfixed them there immovably, but because He bade them to be there,\neven as He placed man in Paradise, to be there. In the opinion of\nAristotle, however, the stars are fixed in their orbits, and in\nreality have no other movement but that of the spheres; and yet our\nsenses perceive the movement of the luminaries and not that of the\nspheres (De Coel. ii, text. 43). But Moses describes what is obvious\nto sense, out of condescension to popular ignorance, as we have\nalready said (Q. 67, A. 4; Q. 68, A. 3). The objection, however,\nfalls to the ground if we regard the firmament made on the second day\nas having a natural distinction from that in which the stars are\nplaced, even though the distinction is not apparent to the senses,\nthe testimony of which Moses follows, as stated above (De Coel. ii,\ntext. 43). For although to the senses there appears but one\nfirmament; if we admit a higher and a lower firmament, the lower will\nbe that which was made on the second day, and on the fourth the stars\nwere fixed in the higher firmament.\n\nReply Obj. 4: In the words of Basil (Hom. v in Hexaem.), plants were\nrecorded as produced before the sun and moon, to prevent idolatry,\nsince those who believe the heavenly bodies to be gods, hold that\nplants originate primarily from these bodies. Although as Chrysostom\nremarks (Hom. vi in Gen.), the sun, moon, and stars cooperate in the\nwork of production by their movements, as the husbandman cooperates\nby his labor.\n\nReply Obj. 5: As Chrysostom says, the two lights are called great,\nnot so much with regard to their dimensions as to their influence and\npower. For though the stars be of greater bulk than the moon, yet the\ninfluence of the moon is more perceptible to the senses in this lower\nworld. Moreover, as far as the senses are concerned, its apparent\nsize is greater.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 70, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Cause Assigned for the Production of the Lights Is\nReasonable?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the cause assigned for the production\nof the lights is not reasonable. For it is said (Jer. 10:2): \"Be not\nafraid of the signs of heaven, which the heathens fear.\" Therefore the\nheavenly lights were not made to be signs.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sign is contradistinguished from cause. But the\nlights are the cause of what takes place upon the earth. Therefore\nthey are not signs.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the distinction of seasons and days began from the\nfirst day. Therefore the lights were not made \"for seasons, and days,\nand years,\" that is, in order to distinguish them.\n\nObj. 4: Further, nothing is made for the sake of that which is\ninferior to itself, \"since the end is better than the means\" (Topic.\niii). But the lights are nobler than the earth. Therefore they were\nnot made \"to enlighten it.\"\n\nObj. 5: Further, the new moon cannot be said \"to rule the night.\" But\nsuch it probably did when first made; for men begin to count from the\nnew moon. The moon, therefore, was not made \"to rule the night.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ Suffices the authority of Scripture.\n\n_I answer that,_ As we have said above (Q. 65, A. 2), a corporeal\ncreature can be considered as made either for the sake of its proper\nact, or for other creatures, or for the whole universe, or for the\nglory of God. Of these reasons only that which points out the\nusefulness of these things to man, is touched upon by Moses, in order\nto withdraw his people from idolatry. Hence it is written (Deut. 4:19):\n\"Lest perhaps lifting up thy eyes to heaven, thou see the sun and the\nmoon and all the stars of heaven, and being deceived by error thou\nadore and serve them, which the Lord thy God created for the service\nof all nations.\" Now, he explains this service at the beginning of\nGenesis as threefold. First, the lights are of service to man, in\nregard to sight, which directs him in his works, and is most useful\nfor perceiving objects. In reference to this he says: \"Let them shine\nin the firmament and give life to the earth.\" Secondly, as regards the\nchanges of the seasons, which prevent weariness, preserve health, and\nprovide for the necessities of food; all of which things could not be\nsecured if it were always summer or winter. In reference to this he\nsays: \"Let them be for seasons, and for days, and years.\" Thirdly, as\nregards the convenience of business and work, in so far as the lights\nare set in the heavens to indicate fair or foul weather, as favorable\nto various occupations. And in this respect he says: \"Let them be for\nsigns.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The lights in the heaven are set for signs of changes\neffected in corporeal creatures, but not of those changes which\ndepend upon the free-will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: We are sometimes brought to the knowledge of hidden\neffects through their sensible causes, and conversely. Hence nothing\nprevents a sensible cause from being a sign. But he says \"signs,\"\nrather than \"causes,\" to guard against idolatry.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The general division of time into day and night took\nplace on the first day, as regards the diurnal movement, which is\ncommon to the whole heaven and may be understood to have begun on\nthat first day. But the particular distinctions of days and seasons\nand years, according as one day is hotter than another, one season\nthan another, and one year than another, are due to certain\nparticular movements of the stars: which movements may have had their\nbeginning on the fourth day.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Light was given to the earth for the service of man,\nwho, by reason of his soul, is nobler than the heavenly bodies. Nor\nis it untrue to say that a higher creature may be made for the sake\nof a lower, considered not in itself, but as ordained to the good of\nthe universe.\n\nReply Obj. 5: When the moon is at its perfection it rises in the\nevening and sets in the morning, and thus it rules the night, and it\nwas probably made in its full perfection as were plants yielding\nseed, as also were animals and man himself. For although the perfect\nis developed from the imperfect by natural processes, yet the perfect\nmust exist simply before the imperfect. Augustine, however (Gen. ad\nlit. ii), does not say this, for he says that it is not unfitting\nthat God made things imperfect, which He afterwards perfected.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 70, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Lights of Heaven Are Living Beings?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the lights of heaven are living\nbeings. For the nobler a body is, the more nobly it should be adorned.\nBut a body less noble than the heaven, is adorned with living beings,\nwith fish, birds, and the beasts of the field. Therefore the lights of\nheaven, as pertaining to its adornment, should be living beings also.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the nobler a body is, the nobler must be its form.\nBut the sun, moon, and stars are nobler bodies than plants or\nanimals, and must therefore have nobler forms. Now the noblest of all\nforms is the soul, as being the first principle of life. Hence\nAugustine (De Vera Relig. xxix) says: \"Every living substance stands\nhigher in the order of nature than one that has not life.\" The lights\nof heaven, therefore, are living beings.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a cause is nobler than its effect. But the sun,\nmoon, and stars are a cause of life, as is especially evidenced in\nthe case of animals generated from putrefaction, which receive life\nfrom the power of the sun and stars. Much more, therefore, have the\nheavenly bodies a living soul.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the movement of the heaven and the heavenly bodies\nare natural (De Coel. i, text. 7, 8): and natural movement is from an\nintrinsic principle. Now the principle of movement in the heavenly\nbodies is a substance capable of apprehension, and is moved as the\ndesirer is moved by the object desired (Metaph. xii, text. 36).\nTherefore, seemingly, the apprehending principle is intrinsic to the\nheavenly bodies: and consequently they are living beings.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the first of movables is the heaven. Now, of all\nthings that are endowed with movement the first moves itself, as is\nproved in _Phys._ viii, text. 34, because, what is such of itself\nprecedes that which is by another. But only beings that are living\nmove themselves, as is shown in the same book (text. 27). Therefore\nthe heavenly bodies are living beings.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii), \"Let no one\nesteem the heavens or the heavenly bodies to be living things, for\nthey have neither life nor sense.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Philosophers have differed on this question.\nAnaxagoras, for instance, as Augustine mentions (De Civ. Dei xviii,\n41), \"was condemned by the Athenians for teaching that the sun was a\nfiery mass of stone, and neither a god nor even a living being.\" On\nthe other hand, the Platonists held that the heavenly bodies have\nlife. Nor was there less diversity of opinion among the Doctors of the\nChurch. It was the belief of Origen (Peri Archon i) and Jerome that\nthese bodies were alive, and the latter seems to explain in that sense\nthe words (Eccles. 1:6), \"The spirit goeth forward, surveying all\nplaces round about.\" But Basil (Hom. iii, vi in Hexaem.) and Damascene\n(De Fide Orth. ii) maintain that the heavenly bodies are inanimate.\nAugustine leaves the matter in doubt, without committing himself to\neither theory, though he goes so far as to say that if the heavenly\nbodies are really living beings, their souls must be akin to the\nangelic nature (Gen. ad lit. ii, 18; Enchiridion lviii).\n\nIn examining the truth of this question, where such diversity of\nopinion exists, we shall do well to bear in mind that the union of\nsoul and body exists for the sake of the soul and not of the body;\nfor the form does not exist for the matter, but the matter for the\nform. Now the nature and power of the soul are apprehended through\nits operation, which is to a certain extent its end. Yet for some of\nthese operations, as sensation and nutrition, our body is a necessary\ninstrument. Hence it is clear that the sensitive and nutritive souls\nmust be united to a body in order to exercise their functions. There\nare, however, operations of the soul, which are not exercised through\nthe medium of the body, though the body ministers, as it were, to\ntheir production. The intellect, for example, makes use of the\nphantasms derived from the bodily senses, and thus far is dependent\non the body, although capable of existing apart from it. It is not,\nhowever, possible that the functions of nutrition, growth, and\ngeneration, through which the nutritive soul operates, can be\nexercised by the heavenly bodies, for such operations are\nincompatible with a body naturally incorruptible. Equally impossible\nis it that the functions of the sensitive soul can appertain to the\nheavenly body, since all the senses depend on the sense of touch,\nwhich perceives elemental qualities, and all the organs of the senses\nrequire a certain proportion in the admixture of elements, whereas\nthe nature of the heavenly bodies is not elemental. It follows, then,\nthat of the operations of the soul the only ones left to be\nattributed to the heavenly bodies are those of understanding and\nmoving; for appetite follows both sensitive and intellectual\nperception, and is in proportion thereto. But the operations of the\nintellect, which does not act through the body, do not need a body as\ntheir instrument, except to supply phantasms through the senses.\nMoreover, the operations of the sensitive soul, as we have seen,\ncannot be attributed to the heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the union\nof a soul to a heavenly body cannot be for the purpose of the\noperations of the intellect. It remains, then, only to consider\nwhether the movement of the heavenly bodies demands a soul as the\nmotive power, not that the soul, in order to move the heavenly body,\nneed be united to the latter as its form; but by contact of power, as\na mover is united to that which he moves. Wherefore Aristotle (Phys.\nviii, text. 42, 43), after showing that the first mover is made up of\ntwo parts, the moving and the moved, goes on to show the nature of\nthe union between these two parts. This, he says, is effected by\ncontact which is mutual if both are bodies; on the part of one only,\nif one is a body and the other not. The Platonists explain the union\nof soul and body in the same way, as a contact of a moving power with\nthe object moved, and since Plato holds the heavenly bodies to be\nliving beings, this means nothing else but that substances of\nspiritual nature are united to them, and act as their moving power. A\nproof that the heavenly bodies are moved by the direct influence and\ncontact of some spiritual substance, and not, like bodies of specific\ngravity, by nature, lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one\nfixed end which having attained, it rests; this does not appear in\nthe movement of heavenly bodies. Hence it follows that they are moved\nby some intellectual substances. Augustine appears to be of the same\nopinion when he expresses his belief that all corporeal things are\nruled by God through the spirit of life (De Trin. iii, 4).\n\nFrom what has been said, then, it is clear that the heavenly bodies\nare not living beings in the same sense as plants and animals, and\nthat if they are called so, it can only be equivocally. It will also\nbe seen that the difference of opinion between those who affirm, and\nthose who deny, that these bodies have life, is not a difference of\nthings but of words.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Certain things belong to the adornment of the universe\nby reason of their proper movement; and in this way the heavenly\nluminaries agree with others that conduce to that adornment, for they\nare moved by a living substance.\n\nReply Obj. 2: One being may be nobler than another absolutely, but\nnot in a particular respect. While, then, it is not conceded that the\nsouls of heavenly bodies are nobler than the souls of animals\nabsolutely it must be conceded that they are superior to them with\nregard to their respective forms, since their form perfects their\nmatter entirely, which is not in potentiality to other forms; whereas\na soul does not do this. Also as regards movement the power that\nmoves the heavenly bodies is of a nobler kind.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since the heavenly body is a mover moved, it is of the\nnature of an instrument, which acts in virtue of the agent: and\ntherefore since this agent is a living substance the heavenly body\ncan impart life in virtue of that agent.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The movements of the heavenly bodies are natural, not\non account of their active principle, but on account of their passive\nprinciple; that is to say, from a certain natural aptitude for being\nmoved by an intelligent power.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The heaven is said to move itself in as far as it is\ncompounded of mover and moved; not by the union of the mover, as the\nform, with the moved, as the matter, but by contact with the motive\npower, as we have said. So far, then, the principle that moves it may\nbe called intrinsic, and consequently its movement natural with\nrespect to that active principle; just as we say that voluntary\nmovement is natural to the animal as animal (Phys. viii, text. 27).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 71\n\nON THE WORK OF THE FIFTH DAY\n(In One Article)\n\nWe must next consider the work of the fifth day.\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described.\nFor the waters produce that which the power of water suffices to\nproduce. But the power of water does not suffice for the production\nof every kind of fishes and birds since we find that many of them are\ngenerated from seed. Therefore the words, \"Let the waters bring forth\nthe creeping creature having life, and the fowl that may fly over the\nearth,\" do not fittingly describe this work.\n\nObj. 2: Further, fishes and birds are not produced from water only,\nbut earth seems to predominate over water in their composition, as is\nshown by the fact that their bodies tend naturally to the earth and\nrest upon it. It is not, then, fittingly said that fishes and birds\nare produced from water.\n\nObj. 3: Further, fishes move in the waters, and birds in the air. If,\nthen, fishes are produced from the waters, birds ought to be produced\nfrom the air, and not from the waters.\n\nObj. 4: Further, not all fishes creep through the waters, for some,\nas seals, have feet and walk on land. Therefore the production of\nfishes is not sufficiently described by the words, \"Let the waters\nbring forth the creeping creature having life.\"\n\nObj. 5: Further, land animals are more perfect than birds and fishes\nwhich appears from the fact that they have more distinct limbs, and\ngeneration of a higher order. For they bring forth living beings,\nwhereas birds and fishes bring forth eggs. But the more perfect has\nprecedence in the order of nature. Therefore fishes and birds ought\nnot to have been produced on the fifth day, before land animals.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Suffices the authority of Scripture.\n\n_I answer that,_ As said above, (Q. 70, A. 1), the order of the work\nof adornment corresponds to the order of the work of distinction.\nHence, as among the three days assigned to the work of distinction,\nthe middle, or second, day is devoted to the work of distinction of\nwater, which is the intermediate body, so in the three days of the\nwork of adornment, the middle day, which is the fifth, is assigned to\nthe adornment of the intermediate body, by the production of birds\nand fishes. As, then, Moses makes mention of the lights and the light\non the fourth day, to show that the fourth day corresponds to the\nfirst day on which he had said that the light was made, so on this\nfifth day he mentions the waters and the firmament of heaven to show\nthat the fifth day corresponds to the second. It must, however, be\nobserved that Augustine differs from other writers in his opinion\nabout the production of fishes and birds, as he differs about the\nproduction of plants. For while others say that fishes and birds were\nproduced on the fifth day actually, he holds that the nature of the\nwaters produced them on that day potentially.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It was laid down by Avicenna that animals of all kinds\ncan be generated by various minglings of the elements, and naturally,\nwithout any kind of seed. This, however, seems repugnant to the fact\nthat nature produces its effects by determinate means, and\nconsequently, those things that are naturally generated from seed\ncannot be generated naturally in any other way. It ought, then,\nrather to be said that in the natural generation of all animals that\nare generated from seed, the active principle lies in the formative\npower of the seed, but that in the case of animals generated from\nputrefaction, the formative power of is the influence of the heavenly\nbodies. The material principle, however, in the generation of either\nkind of animals, is either some element, or something compounded of\nthe elements. But at the first beginning of the world the active\nprinciple was the Word of God, which produced animals from material\nelements, either in act, as some holy writers say, or virtually, as\nAugustine teaches. Not as though the power possessed by water or\nearth of producing all animals resides in the earth and the water\nthemselves, as Avicenna held, but in the power originally given to\nthe elements of producing them from elemental matter by the power of\nseed or the influence of the stars.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The bodies of birds and fishes may be considered from\ntwo points of view. If considered in themselves, it will be evident\nthat the earthly element must predominate, since the element that is\nleast active, namely, the earth, must be the most abundant in\nquantity in order that the mingling may be duly tempered in the body\nof the animal. But if considered as by nature constituted to move\nwith certain specific motions, thus they have some special affinity\nwith the bodies in which they move; and hence the words in which\ntheir generation is described.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The air, as not being so apparent to the senses, is not\nenumerated by itself, but with other things: partly with the water,\nbecause the lower region of the air is thickened by watery\nexhalations; partly with the heaven as to the higher region. But\nbirds move in the lower part of the air, and so are said to fly\n\"beneath the firmament,\" even if the firmament be taken to mean the\nregion of clouds. Hence the production of birds is ascribed to the\nwater.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Nature passes from one extreme to another through the\nmedium; and therefore there are creatures of intermediate type\nbetween the animals of the air and those of the water, having\nsomething in common with both; and they are reckoned as belonging to\nthat class to which they are most allied, through the characters\npossessed in common with that class, rather than with the other. But\nin order to include among fishes all such intermediate forms as have\nspecial characters like to theirs, the words, \"Let the waters bring\nforth the creeping creature having life,\" are followed by these: \"God\ncreated great whales,\" etc.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The order in which the production of these animals is\ngiven has reference to the order of those bodies which they are set\nto adorn, rather than to the superiority of the animals themselves.\nMoreover, in generation also the more perfect is reached through the\nless perfect.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 72\n\nON THE WORK OF THE SIXTH DAY\n(In One Article)\n\nWe must now consider the work of the sixth day.\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described.\nFor as birds and fishes have a living soul, so also have land animals.\nBut these animals are not themselves living souls. Therefore the\nwords, \"Let the earth bring forth the living creature,\" should rather\nhave been, \"Let the earth bring forth the living four-footed\ncreatures.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, a genus ought not to be opposed to its species. But\nbeasts and cattle are quadrupeds. Therefore quadrupeds ought not to\nbe enumerated as a class with beasts and cattle.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as animals belong to a determinate genus and\nspecies, so also does man. But in the making of man nothing is said\nof his genus and species, and therefore nothing ought to have been\nsaid about them in the production of other animals, whereas it is\nsaid \"according to its genus\" and \"in its species.\"\n\nObj. 4: Further, land animals are more like man, whom God is recorded\nto have blessed, than are birds and fishes. But as birds and fishes\nare said to be blessed, this should have been said, with much more\nreason, of the other animals as well.\n\nObj. 5: Further, certain animals are generated from putrefaction,\nwhich is a kind of corruption. But corruption is repugnant to the\nfirst founding of the world. Therefore such animals should not have\nbeen produced at that time.\n\nObj. 6: Further, certain animals are poisonous, and injurious to man.\nBut there ought to have been nothing injurious to man before man\nsinned. Therefore such animals ought not to have been made by God at\nall, since He is the Author of good; or at least not until man had\nsinned.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Suffices the authority of Scripture.\n\n_I answer that,_ As on the fifth day the intermediate body, namely, the\nwater, is adorned, and thus that day corresponds to the second day; so\nthe sixth day, on which the lowest body, or the earth, is adorned by\nthe production of land animals, corresponds to the third day. Hence\nthe earth is mentioned in both places. And here again Augustine says\n(Gen. ad lit. v) that the production was potential, and other holy\nwriters that it was actual.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The different grades of life which are found in\ndifferent living creatures can be discovered from the various ways in\nwhich Scripture speaks of them, as Basil says (Hom. viii in Hexaem.).\nThe life of plants, for instance, is very imperfect and difficult to\ndiscern, and hence, in speaking of their production, nothing is said\nof their life, but only their generation is mentioned, since only in\ngeneration is a vital act observed in them. For the powers of\nnutrition and growth are subordinate to the generative life, as will\nbe shown later on (Q. 78, A. 2). But amongst animals, those that\nlive on land are, generally speaking, more perfect than birds and\nfishes, not because the fish is devoid of memory, as Basil upholds\n(Hom. viii in Hexaem.) and Augustine rejects (Gen. ad lit. iii), but\nbecause their limbs are more distinct and their generation of a higher\norder, (yet some imperfect animals, such as bees and ants, are more\nintelligent in certain ways). Scripture, therefore, does not call\nfishes \"living creatures,\" but \"creeping creatures having life\";\nwhereas it does call land animals \"living creatures\" on account of\ntheir more perfect life, and seems to imply that fishes are merely\nbodies having in them something of a soul, whilst land animals, from\nthe higher perfection of their life, are, as it were, living souls\nwith bodies subject to them. But the life of man, as being the most\nperfect grade, is not said to be produced, like the life of other\nanimals, by earth or water, but immediately by God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: By \"cattle,\" domestic animals are signified, which in\nany way are of service to man: but by \"beasts,\" wild animals such as\nbears and lions are designated. By \"creeping things\" those animals\nare meant which either have no feet and cannot rise from the earth,\nas serpents, or those whose feet are too short to lift them far from\nthe ground, as the lizard and tortoise. But since certain animals, as\ndeer and goats, seem to fall under none of these classes, the word\n\"quadrupeds\" is added. Or perhaps the word \"quadruped\" is used first\nas being the genus, to which the others are added as species, for\neven some reptiles, such as lizards and tortoises, are four-footed.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In other animals, and in plants, mention is made of\ngenus and species, to denote the generation of like from like. But it\nwas unnecessary to do so in the case of man, as what had already been\nsaid of other creatures might be understood of him. Again, animals\nand plants may be said to be produced according to their kinds, to\nsignify their remoteness from the Divine image and likeness, whereas\nman is said to be made \"to the image and likeness of God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: The blessing of God gives power to multiply by\ngeneration, and, having been mentioned in the preceding account of\nthe making of birds and fishes, could be understood of the beasts of\nthe earth, without requiring to be repeated. The blessing, however,\nis repeated in the case of man, since in him generation of children\nhas a special relation to the number of the elect [*Cf. Augustine,\nGen. ad lit. iii, 12], and to prevent anyone from saying that there\nwas any sin whatever in the act of begetting children. As to plants,\nsince they experience neither desire of propagation, nor sensation\nin generating, they are deemed unworthy of a formal blessing.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Since the generation of one thing is the corruption of\nanother, it was not incompatible with the first formation of things,\nthat from the corruption of the less perfect the more perfect should\nbe generated. Hence animals generated from the corruption of\ninanimate things, or of plants, may have been generated then. But\nthose generated from corruption of animals could not have been\nproduced then otherwise than potentially.\n\nReply Obj. 6: In the words of Augustine (Super. Gen. contr. Manich.\ni): \"If an unskilled person enters the workshop of an artificer he\nsees in it many appliances of which he does not understand the use,\nand which, if he is a foolish fellow, he considers unnecessary.\nMoreover, should he carelessly fall into the fire, or wound himself\nwith a sharp-edged tool, he is under the impression that many of the\nthings there are hurtful; whereas the craftsman, knowing their use,\nlaughs at his folly. And thus some people presume to find fault with\nmany things in this world, through not seeing the reasons for their\nexistence. For though not required for the furnishing of our house,\nthese things are necessary for the perfection of the universe.\" And,\nsince man before he sinned would have used the things of this world\nconformably to the order designed, poisonous animals would not have\ninjured him.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 73\n\nON THE THINGS THAT BELONG TO THE SEVENTH DAY\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe must next consider the things that belong to the seventh day.\nUnder this head there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) About the completion of the works;\n\n(2) About the resting of God;\n\n(3) About the blessing and sanctifying of this day.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 73, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Completion of the Divine Works Ought to Be Ascribed to\nthe Seventh Day?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the completion of the Divine works\nought not to be ascribed to the seventh day. For all things that are\ndone in this world belong to the Divine works. But the consummation\nof the world will be at the end of the world (Matt. 13:39, 40).\nMoreover, the time of Christ's Incarnation is a time of completion,\nwherefore it is called \"the time of fulness [*Vulg.: 'the fulness of\ntime']\" (Gal. 4:4). And Christ Himself, at the moment of His death,\ncried out, \"It is consummated\" (John 19:30). Hence the completion of\nthe Divine works does not belong to the seventh day.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the completion of a work is an act in itself. But we\ndo not read that God acted at all on the seventh day, but rather that\nHe rested from all His work. Therefore the completion of the works\ndoes not belong to the seventh day.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nothing is said to be complete to which many things\nare added, unless they are merely superfluous, for a thing is called\nperfect to which nothing is wanting that it ought to possess. But\nmany things were made after the seventh day, as the production of\nmany individual beings, and even of certain new species that are\nfrequently appearing, especially in the case of animals generated\nfrom putrefaction. Also, God creates daily new souls. Again, the work\nof the Incarnation was a new work, of which it is said (Jer. 31:22):\n\"The Lord hath created a new thing upon the earth.\" Miracles also are\nnew works, of which it is said (Eccles. 36:6): \"Renew thy signs, and\nwork new miracles.\" Moreover, all things will be made new when the\nSaints are glorified, according to Apoc. 21:5: \"And He that sat on\nthe throne said: Behold I make all things new.\" Therefore the\ncompletion of the Divine works ought not to be attributed to the\nseventh day.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 2:2): \"On the seventh day God\nended His work which He had made.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The perfection of a thing is twofold, the first\nperfection and the second perfection. The _first_ perfection is\nthat according to which a thing is substantially perfect, and this\nperfection is the form of the whole; which form results from the\nwhole having its parts complete. But the _second_ perfection is the\nend, which is either an operation, as the end of the harpist is to\nplay the harp; or something that is attained by an operation, as the\nend of the builder is the house that he makes by building. But the\nfirst perfection is the cause of the second, because the form is the\nprinciple of operation. Now the final perfection, which is the end\nof the whole universe, is the perfect beatitude of the Saints at the\nconsummation of the world; and the first perfection is the\ncompleteness of the universe at its first founding, and this is what\nis ascribed to the seventh day.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The first perfection is the cause of the second, as\nabove said. Now for the attaining of beatitude two things are\nrequired, nature and grace. Therefore, as said above, the perfection\nof beatitude will be at the end of the world. But this consummation\nexisted previously in its causes, as to nature, at the first founding\nof the world, as to grace, in the Incarnation of Christ. For, \"Grace\nand truth came by Jesus Christ\" (John 1:17). So, then, on the seventh\nday was the consummation of nature, in Christ's Incarnation the\nconsummation of grace, and at the end of the world will be the\nconsummation of glory.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God did act on the seventh day, not by creating new\ncreatures, but by directing and moving His creatures to the work\nproper to them, and thus He made some beginning of the _second_\nperfection. So that, according to our version of the Scripture, the\ncompletion of the works is attributed to the seventh day, though\naccording to another it is assigned to the sixth. Either version,\nhowever, may stand, since the completion of the universe as to the\ncompleteness of its parts belongs to the sixth day, but its\ncompletion as regards their operation, to the seventh. It may also be\nadded that in continuous movement, so long as any movement further is\npossible, movement cannot be called completed till it comes to rest,\nfor rest denotes consummation of movement. Now God might have made\nmany other creatures besides those which He made in the six days, and\nhence, by the fact that He ceased making them on the seventh day, He\nis said on that day to have consummated His work.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God, but\nall things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the\nwork of the six days. Some things, indeed, had a previous experience\nmaterially, as the rib from the side of Adam out of which God formed\nEve; whilst others existed not only in matter but also in their\ncauses, as those individual creatures that are now generated existed\nin the first of their kind. Species, also, that are new, if any such\nappear, existed beforehand in various active powers; so that animals,\nand perhaps even new species of animals, are produced by putrefaction\nby the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning.\nAgain, animals of new kinds arise occasionally from the connection of\nindividuals belonging to different species, as the mule is the\noffspring of an ass and a mare; but even these existed previously in\ntheir causes, in the works of the six days. Some also existed\nbeforehand by way of similitude, as the souls now created. And the\nwork of the Incarnation itself was thus foreshadowed, for as we read\n(Phil. 2:7), The Son of God \"was made in the likeness of men.\" And\nagain, the glory that is spiritual was anticipated in the angels by\nway of similitude; and that of the body in the heaven, especially the\nempyrean. Hence it is written (Eccles. 1:10), \"Nothing under the sun\nis new, for it hath already gone before, in the ages that were before\nus.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 73, Art. 2]\n\nWhether God Rested on the Seventh Day from All His Work?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God did not rest on the seventh day\nfrom all His work. For it is said (John 5:17), \"My Father worketh until\nnow, and I work.\" God, then, did not rest on the seventh day from all\nHis work.\n\nObj. 2: Further, rest is opposed to movement, or to labor, which\nmovement causes. But, as God produced His work without movement and\nwithout labor, He cannot be said to have rested on the seventh day\nfrom His work.\n\nObj. 3: Further, should it be said that God rested on the seventh day\nby causing man to rest; against this it may be argued that rest is\nset down in contradistinction to His work; now the words \"God\ncreated\" or \"made\" this thing or the other cannot be explained to\nmean that He made man create or make these things. Therefore the\nresting of God cannot be explained as His making man to rest.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Gen. 2:2): \"God rested on the seventh\nday from all the work which He had done.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Rest is, properly speaking, opposed to movement, and\nconsequently to the labor that arises from movement. But although\nmovement, strictly speaking, is a quality of bodies, yet the word is\napplied also to spiritual things, and in a twofold sense. On the one\nhand, every operation may be called a movement, and thus the Divine\ngoodness is said to move and go forth to its object, in communicating\nitself to that object, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii). On the other\nhand, the desire that tends to an object outside itself, is said to\nmove towards it. Hence rest is taken in two senses, in one sense\nmeaning a cessation from work, in the other, the satisfying of desire.\nNow, in either sense God is said to have rested on the seventh day.\nFirst, because He ceased from creating new creatures on that day, for,\nas said above (A. 1, ad 3), He made nothing afterwards that had not\nexisted previously, in some degree, in the first works; secondly,\nbecause He Himself had no need of the things that He had made, but was\nhappy in the fruition of Himself. Hence, when all things were made He\nis not said to have rested \"in\" His works, as though needing them for\nHis own happiness, but to have rested \"from\" them, as in fact resting\nin Himself, as He suffices for Himself and fulfils His own desire. And\neven though from all eternity He rested in Himself, yet the rest in\nHimself, which He took after He had finished His works, is that rest\nwhich belongs to the seventh day. And this, says Augustine, is the\nmeaning of God's resting from His works on that day (Gen. ad lit. iv).\n\nReply Obj. 1: God indeed \"worketh until now\" by preserving and\nproviding for the creatures He has made, but not by the making of\nnew ones.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Rest is here not opposed to labor or to movement, but\nto the production of new creatures, and to the desire tending to an\nexternal object.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even as God rests in Himself alone and is happy in the\nenjoyment of Himself, so our own sole happiness lies in the enjoyment\nof God. Thus, also, He makes us find rest in Himself, both from His\nworks and our own. It is not, then, unreasonable to say that God\nrested in giving rest to us. Still, this explanation must not be set\ndown as the only one, and the other is the first and principal\nexplanation.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 73, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Blessing and Sanctifying Are Due to the Seventh Day?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that blessing and sanctifying are not due\nto the seventh day. For it is usual to call a time blessed or holy for\nthat some good thing has happened in it, or some evil been avoided.\nBut whether God works or ceases from work nothing accrues to Him or is\nlost to Him. Therefore no special blessing or sanctifying are due to\nthe seventh day.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Latin \"benedictio\" [blessing] is derived from\n\"bonitas\" [goodness]. But it is the nature of good to spread and\ncommunicate itself, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The days,\ntherefore, in which God produced creatures deserved a blessing rather\nthan the day on which He ceased producing them.\n\nObj. 3: Further, over each creature a blessing was pronounced, as\nupon each work it was said, \"God saw that it was good.\" Therefore it\nwas not necessary that after all had been produced, the seventh day\nshould be blessed.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:3), \"God blessed the seventh\nday and sanctified it, because in it He had rested from all His work.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As said above (A. 2), God's rest on the seventh day\nis understood in two ways. First, in that He ceased from producing\nnew works, though He still preserves and provides for the creatures\nHe has made. Secondly, in that after all His works He rested in\nHimself. According to the first meaning, then, a blessing befits the\nseventh day, since, as we explained (Q. 72, ad 4), the blessing\nreferred to the increase by multiplication; for which reason God said\nto the creatures which He blessed: \"Increase and multiply.\" Now, this\nincrease is effected through God's Providence over His creatures,\nsecuring the generation of like from like. And according to the\nsecond meaning, it is right that the seventh day should have been\nsanctified, since the special sanctification of every creature\nconsists in resting in God. For this reason things dedicated to God\nare said to be sanctified.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The seventh day is said to be sanctified not because\nanything can accrue to God, or be taken from Him, but because\nsomething is added to creatures by their multiplying, and by their\nresting in God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In the first six days creatures were produced in their\nfirst causes, but after being thus produced, they are multiplied and\npreserved, and this work also belongs to the Divine goodness. And the\nperfection of this goodness is made most clear by the knowledge that\nin it alone God finds His own rest, and we may find ours in its\nfruition.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The good mentioned in the works of each day belongs to\nthe first institution of nature; but the blessing attached to the\nseventh day, to its propagation.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 74\n\nON ALL THE SEVEN DAYS IN COMMON\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe next consider all the seven days in common: and there are three\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) As to the sufficiency of these days;\n\n(2) Whether they are all one day, or more than one?\n\n(3) As to certain modes of speaking which Scripture uses in narrating\nthe works of the six days.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 74, Art. 1]\n\nWhether these days are sufficiently enumerated?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that these days are not sufficiently\nenumerated. For the work of creation is no less distinct from the\nworks of distinction and adornment than these two works are from one\nanother. But separate days are assigned to distinction and to\nadornment, and therefore separate days should be assigned to creation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, air and fire are nobler elements than earth and\nwater. But one day is assigned to the distinction of water, and\nanother to the distinction of the land. Therefore, other days ought\nto be devoted to the distinction of fire and air.\n\nObj. 3: Further, fish differ from birds as much as birds differ from\nthe beasts of the earth, whereas man differs more from other animals\nthan all animals whatsoever differ from each other. But one day is\ndevoted to the production of fishes, and another to that of the beast\nof the earth. Another day, then, ought to be assigned to the\nproduction of birds and another to that of man.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it would seem, on the other hand, that some of these\ndays are superfluous. Light, for instance, stands to the luminaries\nin the relation of accident to subject. But the subject is produced\nat the same time as the accident proper to it. The light and the\nluminaries, therefore, ought not to have been produced on different\ndays.\n\nObj. 5: Further, these days are devoted to the first instituting of\nthe world. But as on the seventh day nothing was instituted, that day\nought not to be enumerated with the others.\n\n_I answer that,_ The reason of the distinction of these days is made\nclear by what has been said above (Q. 70, A. 1), namely, that the\nparts of the world had first to be distinguished, and then each part\nadorned and filled, as it were, by the beings that inhabit it. Now\nthe parts into which the corporeal creation is divided are three,\naccording to some holy writers, these parts being the heaven, or\nhighest part, the water, or middle part, and the earth, or the lowest\npart. Thus the Pythagoreans teach that perfection consists in three\nthings, the beginning, the middle, and the end. The first part, then,\nis distinguished on the first day, and adorned on the fourth, the\nmiddle part distinguished on the middle day, and adorned on the fifth,\nand the third part distinguished on the third day, and adorned on the\nsixth. But Augustine, while agreeing with the above writers as to the\nlast three days, differs as to the first three, for, according to him,\nspiritual creatures are formed on the first day, and corporeal on the\ntwo others, the higher bodies being formed on the first these two\ndays, and the lower on the second. Thus, then, the perfection of the\nDivine works corresponds to the perfection of the number six, which\nis the sum of its aliquot parts, one, two, three; since one day is\nassigned to the forming of spiritual creatures, two to that of\ncorporeal creatures, and three to the work of adornment.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to Augustine, the work of creation belongs\nto the production of formless matter, and of the formless spiritual\nnature, both of which are outside of time, as he himself says\n(Confess. xii, 12). Thus, then, the creation of either is set down\nbefore there was any day. But it may also be said, following other\nholy writers, that the works of distinction and adornment imply\ncertain changes in the creature which are measurable by time; whereas\nthe work of creation lies only in the Divine act producing the\nsubstance of beings instantaneously. For this reason, therefore,\nevery work of distinction and adornment is said to take place \"in a\nday,\" but creation \"in the beginning\" which denotes something\nindivisible.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Fire and air, as not distinctly known by the\nunlettered, are not expressly named by Moses among the parts of the\nworld, but reckoned with the intermediate part, or water, especially\nas regards the lowest part of the air; or with the heaven, to which\nthe higher region of air approaches, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.\nii, 13).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The production of animals is recorded with reference to\ntheir adorning the various parts of the world, and therefore the days\nof their production are separated or united according as the animals\nadorn the same parts of the world, or different parts.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The nature of light, as existing in a subject, was made\non the first day; and the making of the luminaries on the fourth day\ndoes not mean that their substance was produced anew, but that they\nthen received a form that they had not before, as said above (Q. 70,\n[A. 1] ad 2).\n\nReply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 15), after all\nthat has been recorded that is assigned to the six days, something\ndistinct is attributed to the seventh--namely, that on it God rested\nin Himself from His works: and for this reason it was right that the\nseventh day should be mentioned after the six. It may also be said,\nwith the other writers, that the world entered on the seventh day\nupon a new state, in that nothing new was to be added to it, and that\ntherefore the seventh day is mentioned after the six, from its being\ndevoted to cessation from work.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 74, Art. 2]\n\nWhether All These Days Are One Day?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all these days are one day. For it is\nwritten (Gen. 2:4, 5): \"These are the generations of the heaven and\nthe earth, when they were created, in the day that the Lord . . .\nmade the heaven and the earth, and every plant of the field, before\nit sprung up in the earth.\" Therefore the day in which God made \"the\nheaven and the earth, and every plant of the field,\" is one and the\nsame day. But He made the heaven and the earth on the first day, or\nrather before there was any day, but the plant of the field He made\non the third day. Therefore the first and third days are but one day,\nand for a like reason all the rest.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is said (Ecclus. 18:1): \"He that liveth for ever,\ncreated all things together.\" But this would not be the case if the\ndays of these works were more than one. Therefore they are not many\nbut one only.\n\nObj. 3: Further, on the seventh day God ceased from all new works.\nIf, then, the seventh day is distinct from the other days, it follows\nthat He did not make that day; which is not admissible.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the entire work ascribed to one day God perfected in\nan instant, for with each work are the words (God) \"said . . . . and\nit was . . . done.\" If, then, He had kept back His next work to\nanother day, it would follow that for the remainder of a day He would\nhave ceased from working and left it vacant, which would be\nsuperfluous. The day, therefore, of the preceding work is one with\nthe day of the work that follows.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1), \"The evening and the\nmorning were the second day . . . the third day,\" and so on. But\nwhere there is a second and third there are more than one. There was\nnot, therefore, only one day.\n\n_I answer that,_ On this question Augustine differs from other\nexpositors. His opinion is that all the days that are called seven,\nare one day represented in a sevenfold aspect (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22;\nDe Civ. Dei xi, 9; Ad Orosium xxvi); while others consider there were\nseven distinct days, not one only. Now, these two opinions, taken as\nexplaining the literal text of Genesis, are certainly widely\ndifferent. For Augustine understands by the word \"day,\" the knowledge\nin the mind of the angels, and hence, according to him, the first day\ndenotes their knowledge of the first of the Divine works, the second\nday their knowledge of the second work, and similarly with the rest.\nThus, then, each work is said to have been wrought in some one of\nthese days, inasmuch as God wrought nothing in the universe without\nimpressing the knowledge thereof on the angelic mind; which can know\nmany things at the same time, especially in the Word, in Whom all\nangelic knowledge is perfected and terminated. So the distinction of\ndays denotes the natural order of the things known, and not a\nsuccession in the knowledge acquired, or in the things produced.\nMoreover, angelic knowledge is appropriately called \"day,\" since\nlight, the cause of day, is to be found in spiritual things, as\nAugustine observes (Gen. ad lit. iv, 28). In the opinion of the\nothers, however, the days signify a succession both in time, and in\nthe things produced.\n\nIf, however, these two explanations are looked at as referring to the\nmode of production, they will be found not greatly to differ, if the\ndiversity of opinion existing on two points, as already shown (Q. 67,\nA. 1; Q. 69, A. 1), between Augustine and other writers is taken into\naccount. First, because Augustine takes the earth and the water as\nfirst created, to signify matter totally without form; but the making\nof the firmament, the gathering of the waters, and the appearing of\ndry land, to denote the impression of forms upon corporeal matter.\nBut other holy writers take the earth and the water, as first\ncreated, to signify the elements of the universe themselves existing\nunder the proper forms, and the works that follow to mean some sort\nof distinction in bodies previously existing, as also has been shown\n(Q. 67, AA. 1, 4; Q. 69, A. 1). Secondly, some writers hold that\nplants and animals were produced actually in the work of the six\ndays; Augustine, that they were produced potentially. Now the opinion\nof Augustine, that the works of the six days were simultaneous, is\nconsistent with either view of the mode of production. For the other\nwriters agree with him that in the first production of things matter\nexisted under the substantial form of the elements, and agree with\nhim also that in the first instituting of the world animals and\nplants did not exist actually. There remains, however, a difference\nas to four points; since, according to the latter, there was a time,\nafter the production of creatures, in which light did not exist, the\nfirmament had not been formed, and the earth was still covered by the\nwaters, nor had the heavenly bodies been formed, which is the fourth\ndifference; which are not consistent with Augustine's explanation. In\norder, therefore, to be impartial, we must meet the arguments of\neither side.\n\nReply Obj. 1: On the day on which God created the heaven and the\nearth, He created also every plant of the field, not, indeed,\nactually, but \"before it sprung up in the earth,\" that is,\npotentially. And this work Augustine ascribes to the third day,\nbut other writers to the first instituting of the world.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God created all things together so far as regards their\nsubstance in some measure formless. But He did not create all things\ntogether, so far as regards that formation of things which lies in\ndistinction and adornment. Hence the word \"creation\" is significant.\n\nReply Obj. 3: On the seventh day God ceased from making new things,\nbut not from providing for their increase, and to this latter work it\nbelongs that the first day is succeeded by other days.\n\nReply Obj. 4: All things were not distinguished and adorned together,\nnot from a want of power on God's part, as requiring time in which to\nwork, but that due order might be observed in the instituting of the\nworld. Hence it was fitting that different days should be assigned to\nthe different states of the world, as each succeeding work added to\nthe world a fresh state of perfection.\n\nReply Obj. 5: According to Augustine, the order of days refers to the\nnatural order of the works attributed to the days.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 74, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Scripture Uses Suitable Words to Express the Work of the Six\nDays?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem the Scripture does not use suitable words\nto express the works of the six days. For as light, the firmament,\nand other similar works were made by the Word of God, so were the\nheaven and the earth. For \"all things were made by Him\" (John 1:3).\nTherefore in the creation of heaven and earth, as in the other works,\nmention should have been made of the Word of God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the water was created by God, yet its creation is\nnot mentioned. Therefore the creation of the world is not\nsufficiently described.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is said (Gen. 1:31): \"God saw all the things that\nHe had made, and they were very good.\" It ought, then, to have been\nsaid of each work, \"God saw that it was good.\" The omission,\ntherefore, of these words in the work of creation and in that of the\nsecond day, is not fitting.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Spirit of God is God Himself. But it does not\nbefit God to move and to occupy place. Therefore the words, \"The\nSpirit of God moved over the waters,\" are unbecoming.\n\nObj. 5: Further, what is already made is not made over again.\nTherefore to the words, \"God said: Let the firmament be made . . .\nand it was so,\" it is superfluous to add, \"God made the firmament.\"\nAnd the like is to be said of other works.\n\nObj. 6: Further, evening and morning do not sufficiently divide the\nday, since the day has many parts. Therefore the words, \"The evening\nand morning were the second day\" or, \"the third day,\" are not\nsuitable.\n\nObj. 7: Further, \"first,\" not \"one,\" corresponds to \"second\" and\n\"third.\" It should therefore have been said that, \"The evening and\nthe morning were the first day,\" rather than \"one day.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 4), the person\nof the Son is mentioned both in the first creation of the world, and\nin its distinction and adornment, but differently in either place.\nFor distinction and adornment belong to the work by which the world\nreceives its form. But as the giving form to a work of art is by\nmeans of the form of the art in the mind of the artist, which may be\ncalled his intelligible word, so the giving form to every creature is\nby the word of God; and for this reason in the works of distinction\nand adornment the Word is mentioned. But in creation the Son is\nmentioned as the beginning, by the words, \"In the beginning God\ncreated,\" since by creation is understood the production of formless\nmatter. But according to those who hold that the elements were\ncreated from the first under their proper forms, another explanation\nmust be given; and therefore Basil says (Hom. ii, iii in Hexaem.)\nthat the words, \"God said,\" signify a Divine command. Such a command,\nhowever, could not have been given before creatures had been produced\nthat could obey it.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 33), by the\nheaven is understood the formless spiritual nature, and by the earth,\nthe formless matter of all corporeal things, and thus no creature is\nomitted. But, according to Basil (Hom. i in Hexaem.), the heaven and\nthe earth, as the two extremes, are alone mentioned, the intervening\nthings being left to be understood, since all these move heavenwards,\nif light, or earthwards, if heavy. And others say that under the\nword, \"earth,\" Scripture is accustomed to include all the four\nelements as (Ps. 148:7,8) after the words, \"Praise the Lord from the\nearth,\" is added, \"fire, hail, snow, and ice.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the account of the creation there is found something\nto correspond to the words, \"God saw that it was good,\" used in the\nwork of distinction and adornment, and this appears from the\nconsideration that the Holy Spirit is Love. Now, \"there are two\nthings,\" says Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8) which came from God's\nlove of His creatures, their existence and their permanence. That\nthey might then exist, and exist permanently, \"the Spirit of God,\" it\nis said, \"moved over the waters\"--that is to say, over that formless\nmatter, signified by water, even as the love of the artist moves over\nthe materials of his art, that out of them he may form his work. And\nthe words, \"God saw that it was good,\" signify that the things that\nHe had made were to endure, since they express a certain satisfaction\ntaken by God in His works, as of an artist in his art: not as though\nHe knew the creature otherwise, or that the creature was pleasing to\nHim otherwise, than before He made it. Thus in either work, of\ncreation and of formation, the Trinity of Persons is implied. In\ncreation the Person of the Father is indicated by God the Creator,\nthe Person of the Son by the beginning, in which He created, and the\nPerson of the Holy Ghost by the Spirit that moved over the waters.\nBut in the formation, the Person of the Father is indicated by God\nthat speaks, and the Person of the Son by the Word in which He\nspeaks, and the Person of the Holy Spirit by the satisfaction with\nwhich God saw that what was made was good. And if the words, \"God saw\nthat it was good,\" are not said of the work of the second day, this\nis because the work of distinguishing the waters was only begun on\nthat day, but perfected on the third. Hence these words, that are\nsaid of the third day, refer also to the second. Or it may be that\nScripture does not use these words of approval of the second day's\nwork, because this is concerned with the distinction of things not\nevident to the senses of mankind. Or, again, because by the firmament\nis simply understood the cloudy region of the air, which is not one\nof the permanent parts of the universe, nor of the principal\ndivisions of the world. The above three reasons are given by Rabbi\nMoses [*Perplex. ii.], and to these may be added a mystical one\nderived from numbers and assigned by some writers, according to whom\nthe work of the second day is not marked with approval because the\nsecond number is an imperfect number, as receding from the perfection\nof unity.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Rabbi Moses (Perplex. ii) understands by the \"Spirit of\nthe Lord,\" the air or the wind, as Plato also did, and says that it\nis so called according to the custom of Scripture, in which these\nthings are throughout attributed to God. But according to the holy\nwriters, the Spirit of the Lord signifies the Holy Ghost, Who is said\nto \"move over the water\"--that is to say, over what Augustine holds\nto mean formless matter, lest it should be supposed that God loved of\nnecessity the works He was to produce, as though He stood in need of\nthem. For love of that kind is subject to, not superior to, the\nobject of love. Moreover, it is fittingly implied that the Spirit\nmoved over that which was incomplete and unfinished, since that\nmovement is not one of place, but of pre-eminent power, as Augustine\nsays (Gen. ad lit. i, 7). It is the opinion, however, of Basil (Hom.\nii in Hexaem.) that the Spirit moved over the element of water,\n\"fostering and quickening its nature and impressing vital power, as\nthe hen broods over her chickens.\" For water has especially a\nlife-giving power, since many animals are generated in water, and the\nseed of all animals is liquid. Also the life of the soul is given by\nthe water of baptism, according to John 3:5: \"Unless a man be born\nagain of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom\nof God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. i, 8), these three\nphrases denote the threefold being of creatures; first, their being\nin the Word, denoted by the command \"Let . . . be made\"; secondly,\ntheir being in the angelic mind, signified by the words, \"It was . .\n. done\"; thirdly, their being in their proper nature, by the words,\n\"He made.\" And because the formation of the angels is recorded on the\nfirst day, it was not necessary there to add, \"He made.\" It may also\nbe said, following other writers, that the words, \"He said,\" and \"Let\n. . . be made,\" denote God's command, and the words, \"It was done,\"\nthe fulfilment of that command. But as it was necessary, for the sake\nof those especially who have asserted that all visible things were\nmade by the angels, to mention how things were made, it is added, in\norder to remove that error, that God Himself made them. Hence, in\neach work, after the words, \"It was done,\" some act of God is\nexpressed by some such words as, \"He made,\" or, \"He divided,\" or,\n\"He called.\"\n\nReply Obj. 6: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 22, 30), by\nthe \"evening\" and the \"morning\" are understood the evening and the\nmorning knowledge of the angels, which has been explained (Q. 58,\nA. 6, 7). But, according to Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.), the entire\nperiod takes its name, as is customary, from its more important part,\nthe day. An instance of this is found in the words of Jacob, \"The\ndays of my pilgrimage,\" where night is not mentioned at all. But the\nevening and the morning are mentioned as being the ends of the day,\nsince day begins with morning and ends with evening, or because\nevening denotes the beginning of night, and morning the beginning of\nday. It seems fitting, also, that where the first distinction of\ncreatures is described, divisions of time should be denoted only by\nwhat marks their beginning. And the reason for mentioning the evening\nfirst is that as the evening ends the day, which begins with the\nlight, the termination of the light at evening precedes the\ntermination of the darkness, which ends with the morning. But\nChrysostom's explanation is that thereby it is intended to show that\nthe natural day does not end with the evening, but with the morning\n(Hom. v in Gen.).\n\nReply Obj. 7: The words \"one day\" are used when day is first\ninstituted, to denote that one day is made up of twenty-four hours.\nHence, by mentioning \"one,\" the measure of a natural day is fixed.\nAnother reason may be to signify that a day is completed by the\nreturn of the sun to the point from which it commenced its course.\nAnd yet another, because at the completion of a week of seven days,\nthe first day returns which is one with the eighth day. The three\nreasons assigned above are those given by Basil (Hom. ii in Hexaem.).\n_______________________\n\nTREATISE ON MAN (QQ. 75-102)\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 75\n\nOF MAN WHO IS COMPOSED OF A SPIRITUAL AND A CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE: AND\nIN THE FIRST PLACE, CONCERNING WHAT BELONGS TO THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL\n(In Seven Articles)\n\nHaving treated of the spiritual and of the corporeal creature, we now\nproceed to treat of man, who is composed of a spiritual and corporeal\nsubstance. We shall treat first of the nature of man, and secondly of\nhis origin. Now the theologian considers the nature of man in relation\nto the soul; but not in relation to the body, except in so far as the\nbody has relation to the soul. Hence the first object of our\nconsideration will be the soul. And since Dionysius (Ang. Hier. xi)\nsays that three things are to be found in spiritual\nsubstances--essence, power, and operation--we shall treat first of\nwhat belongs to the essence of the soul; secondly, of what belongs to\nits power; thirdly, of what belongs to its operation.\n\nConcerning the first, two points have to be considered; the first is\nthe nature of the soul considered in itself; the second is the union\nof the soul with the body. Under the first head there are seven\npoints of inquiry.\n\n(1) Whether the soul is a body?\n\n(2) Whether the human soul is a subsistence?\n\n(3) Whether the souls of brute animals are subsistent?\n\n(4) Whether the soul is man, or is man composed of soul and body?\n\n(5) Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?\n\n(6) Whether the soul is incorruptible?\n\n(7) Whether the soul is of the same species as an angel?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Soul Is a Body?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is\nthe moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved.\nFirst, because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved,\nsince nothing gives what it has not; for instance, what is not hot\ndoes not give heat. Secondly, because if there be anything that moves\nand is not moved, it must be the cause of eternal, unchanging\nmovement, as we find proved Phys. viii, 6; and this does not appear to\nbe the case in the movement of an animal, which is caused by the soul.\nTherefore the soul is a mover moved. But every mover moved is a body.\nTherefore the soul is a body.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all knowledge is caused by means of a likeness.\nBut there can be no likeness of a body to an incorporeal thing. If,\ntherefore, the soul were not a body, it could not have knowledge of\ncorporeal things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, between the mover and the moved there must be\ncontact. But contact is only between bodies. Since, therefore, the\nsoul moves the body, it seems that the soul must be a body.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6) that the soul \"is\nsimple in comparison with the body, inasmuch as it does not occupy\nspace by its bulk.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that\nthe soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things\nwhich live: for we call living things \"animate,\" [*i.e. having a\nsoul] and those things which have no life, \"inanimate.\" Now life is\nshown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement. The\nphilosophers of old, not being able to rise above their imagination,\nsupposed that the principle of these actions was something corporeal:\nfor they asserted that only bodies were real things; and that what is\nnot corporeal is nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is\nsomething corporeal. This opinion can be proved to be false in many\nways; but we shall make use of only one proof, based on universal and\ncertain principles, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body.\n\nIt is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul,\nfor then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision; and\nthe same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but\nit is the _first_ principle of life, which we call the soul. Now,\nthough a body may be a principle of life, as the heart is a principle\nof life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first\nprinciple of life. For it is clear that to be a principle of life, or\nto be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such; since, if\nthat were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a\nprinciple of life. Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing\nor even a principle of life, as \"such\" a body. Now that it is\nactually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its\nact. Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not\na body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of\ncalefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As everything which is in motion must be moved by\nsomething else, a process which cannot be prolonged indefinitely, we\nmust allow that not every mover is moved. For, since to be moved is\nto pass from potentiality to actuality, the mover gives what it has\nto the thing moved, inasmuch as it causes it to be in act. But, as\nis shown in _Phys._ viii, 6, there is a mover which is altogether\nimmovable, and not moved either essentially, or accidentally; and\nsuch a mover can cause an invariable movement. There is, however,\nanother kind of mover, which, though not moved essentially, is moved\naccidentally; and for this reason it does not cause an invariable\nmovement; such a mover, is the soul. There is, again, another mover,\nwhich is moved essentially--namely, the body. And because the\nphilosophers of old believed that nothing existed but bodies, they\nmaintained that every mover is moved; and that the soul is moved\ndirectly, and is a body.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The likeness of a thing known is not of necessity\nactually in the nature of the knower; but given a thing which knows\npotentially, and afterwards knows actually, the likeness of the thing\nknown must be in the nature of the knower, not actually, but only\npotentially; thus color is not actually in the pupil of the eye, but\nonly potentially. Hence it is necessary, not that the likeness of\ncorporeal things should be actually in the nature of the soul, but\nthat there be a potentiality in the soul for such a likeness. But the\nancient philosophers omitted to distinguish between actuality and\npotentiality; and so they held that the soul must be a body in order\nto have knowledge of a body; and that it must be composed of the\nprinciples of which all bodies are formed in order to know all bodies.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There are two kinds of contact; of \"quantity,\" and of\n\"power.\" By the former a body can be touched only by a body; by the\nlatter a body can be touched by an incorporeal thing, which moves\nthat body.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Human Soul Is Something Subsistent?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the human soul is not something\nsubsistent. For that which subsists is said to be \"this particular\nthing.\" Now \"this particular thing\" is said not of the soul, but of\nthat which is composed of soul and body. Therefore the soul is not\nsomething subsistent.\n\nObj. 2: Further, everything subsistent operates. But the soul does\nnot operate; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), \"to say\nthat the soul feels or understands is like saying that the soul\nweaves or builds.\" Therefore the soul is not subsistent.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the soul were subsistent, it would have some\noperation apart from the body. But it has no operation apart from the\nbody, not even that of understanding: for the act of understanding\ndoes not take place without a phantasm, which cannot exist apart from\nthe body. Therefore the human soul is not something subsistent.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 7): \"Who understands\nthat the nature of the soul is that of a substance and not that of a\nbody, will see that those who maintain the corporeal nature of the\nsoul, are led astray through associating with the soul those things\nwithout which they are unable to think of any nature--i.e. imaginary\npictures of corporeal things.\" Therefore the nature of the human\nintellect is not only incorporeal, but it is also a substance, that\nis, something subsistent.\n\n_I answer that,_ It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of\nintellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both\nincorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the\nintellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever\nknows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature;\nbecause that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of\nanything else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated\nby a feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and\neverything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual\nprinciple contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know\nall bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore\nit is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is\nlikewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ;\nsince the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of\nall bodies; as when a certain determinate color is not only in the\npupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase\nseems to be of that same color.\n\nTherefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the\nintellect has an operation _per se_ apart from the body. Now only that\nwhich subsists can have an operation _per se._ For nothing can operate\nbut what is actual: for which reason we do not say that heat imparts\nheat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore,\nthat the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is\nsomething incorporeal and subsistent.\n\nReply Obj. 1: \"This particular thing\" can be taken in two senses.\nFirstly, for anything subsistent; secondly, for that which subsists,\nand is complete in a specific nature. The former sense excludes the\ninherence of an accident or of a material form; the latter excludes\nalso the imperfection of the part, so that a hand can be called \"this\nparticular thing\" in the first sense, but not in the second.\nTherefore, as the human soul is a part of human nature, it can indeed\nbe called \"this particular thing,\" in the first sense, as being\nsomething subsistent; but not in the second, for in this sense, what\nis composed of body and soul is said to be \"this particular thing.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Aristotle wrote those words as expressing not his own\nopinion, but the opinion of those who said that to understand is to\nbe moved, as is clear from the context. Or we may reply that to\noperate _per se_ belongs to what exists _per se._ But for a thing to\nexist _per se,_ it suffices sometimes that it be not inherent, as an\naccident or a material form; even though it be part of something.\nNevertheless, that is rightly said to subsist _per se,_ which is\nneither inherent in the above sense, nor part of anything else. In\nthis sense, the eye or the hand cannot be said to subsist _per se_;\nnor can it for that reason be said to operate _per se._ Hence the\noperation of the parts is through each part attributed to the whole.\nFor we say that man sees with the eye, and feels with the hand, and\nnot in the same sense as when we say that what is hot gives heat by\nits heat; for heat, strictly speaking, does not give heat. We may\ntherefore say that the soul understands, as the eye sees; but it is\nmore correct to say that man understands through the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The body is necessary for the action of the intellect,\nnot as its origin of action, but on the part of the object; for the\nphantasm is to the intellect what color is to the sight. Neither\ndoes such a dependence on the body prove the intellect to be\nnon-subsistent; otherwise it would follow that an animal is\nnon-subsistent, since it requires external objects of the senses\nin order to perform its act of perception.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Souls of Brute Animals Are Subsistent?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the souls of brute animals are\nsubsistent. For man is of the same genus as other animals; and,\nas we have just shown (A. 2), the soul of man is subsistent.\nTherefore the souls of other animals are subsistent.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the relation of the sensitive faculty to sensible\nobjects is like the relation of the intellectual faculty to\nintelligible objects. But the intellect, apart from the body,\napprehends intelligible objects. Therefore the sensitive faculty,\napart from the body, perceives sensible objects. Therefore, since\nthe souls of brute animals are sensitive, it follows that they are\nsubsistent; just as the human intellectual soul is subsistent.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the soul of brute animals moves the body. But the\nbody is not a mover, but is moved. Therefore the soul of brute\nanimals has an operation apart from the body.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Is what is written in the book De Eccl. Dogm. xvi,\nxvii: \"Man alone we believe to have a subsistent soul: whereas the\nsouls of animals are not subsistent.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The ancient philosophers made no distinction between\nsense and intellect, and referred both to a corporeal principle, as\nhas been said (A. 1). Plato, however, drew a distinction between\nintellect and sense; yet he referred both to an incorporeal\nprinciple, maintaining that sensing, just as understanding, belongs\nto the soul as such. From this it follows that even the souls of\nbrute animals are subsistent. But Aristotle held that of the\noperations of the soul, understanding alone is performed without a\ncorporeal organ. On the other hand, sensation and the consequent\noperations of the sensitive soul are evidently accompanied with\nchange in the body; thus in the act of vision, the pupil of the eye\nis affected by a reflection of color: and so with the other senses.\nHence it is clear that the sensitive soul has no _per se_ operation\nof its own, and that every operation of the sensitive soul belongs to\nthe composite. Wherefore we conclude that as the souls of brute\nanimals have no _per se_ operations they are not subsistent. For the\noperation of anything follows the mode of its being.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although man is of the same genus as other animals, he\nis of a different species. Specific difference is derived from the\ndifference of form; nor does every difference of form necessarily\nimply a diversity of genus.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The relation of the sensitive faculty to the sensible\nobject is in one way the same as that of the intellectual faculty to\nthe intelligible object, in so far as each is in potentiality to its\nobject. But in another way their relations differ, inasmuch as the\nimpression of the object on the sense is accompanied with change in\nthe body; so that excessive strength of the sensible corrupts sense;\na thing that never occurs in the case of the intellect. For an\nintellect that understands the highest of intelligible objects is\nmore able afterwards to understand those that are lower. If, however,\nin the process of intellectual operation the body is weary, this\nresult is accidental, inasmuch as the intellect requires the\noperation of the sensitive powers in the production of the phantasms.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Motive power is of two kinds. One, the appetitive\npower, commands motion. The operation of this power in the sensitive\nsoul is not apart from the body; for anger, joy, and passions of a\nlike nature are accompanied by a change in the body. The other motive\npower is that which executes motion in adapting the members for\nobeying the appetite; and the act of this power does not consist in\nmoving, but in being moved. Whence it is clear that to move is not an\nact of the sensitive soul without the body.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Soul Is Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the soul is man. For it is written (2\nCor. 4:16): \"Though our outward man is corrupted, yet the inward man\nis renewed day by day.\" But that which is within man is the soul.\nTherefore the soul is the inward man.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the human soul is a substance. But it is not a\nuniversal substance. Therefore it is a particular substance. Therefore\nit is a \"hypostasis\" or a person; and it can only be a human person.\nTherefore the soul is man; for a human person is a man.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Civ. Dei xix, 3) commends Varro as\nholding \"that man is not a mere soul, nor a mere body; but both soul\nand body.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The assertion \"the soul is man,\" can be taken in two\nsenses. First, that man is a soul; though this particular man,\nSocrates, for instance, is not a soul, but composed of soul and body.\nI say this, forasmuch as some held that the form alone belongs to the\nspecies; while matter is part of the individual, and not the species.\nThis cannot be true; for to the nature of the species belongs what the\ndefinition signifies; and in natural things the definition does not\nsignify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural\nthings the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter,\nwhich is the principle of individuality; but the common matter. For as\nit belongs to the notion of this particular man to be composed of this\nsoul, of this flesh, and of these bones; so it belongs to the notion\nof man to be composed of soul, flesh, and bones; for whatever belongs\nin common to the substance of all the individuals contained under a\ngiven species, must belong to the substance of the species.\n\nIt may also be understood in this sense, that this soul is this man;\nand this could be held if it were supposed that the operation of the\nsensitive soul were proper to it, apart from the body; because in\nthat case all the operations which are attributed to man would belong\nto the soul only; and whatever performs the operations proper to a\nthing, is that thing; wherefore that which performs the operations of\na man is man. But it has been shown above (A. 3) that sensation is\nnot the operation of the soul only. Since, then, sensation is an\noperation of man, but not proper to him, it is clear that man is not\na soul only, but something composed of soul and body. Plato, through\nsupposing that sensation was proper to the soul, could maintain man\nto be a soul making use of the body.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 8), a thing\nseems to be chiefly what is princip[al] in it; thus what the governor\nof a state does, the state is said to do. In this way sometimes what\nis princip[al] in man is said to be man; sometimes, indeed, the\nintellectual part which, in accordance with truth, is called the\n\"inward\" man; and sometimes the sensitive part with the body is\ncalled man in the opinion of those whose observation does not go\nbeyond the senses. And this is called the \"outward\" man.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a\nperson, but that which has the complete nature of its species. Hence\na hand, or a foot, is not called a hypostasis, or a person; nor,\nlikewise, is the soul alone so called, since it is a part of the\nhuman species.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Soul Is Composed of Matter and Form?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and\nform. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever\nthings are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God;\nby participation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and are\nliving things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom.\nv). Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate of\nthe first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter.\nTherefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality;\nwhich appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially\nunderstanding; it seems that the human soul must participate of\nprimary matter, as part of itself.\n\nObj. 2: Further, wherever the properties of matter are found, there\nmatter is. But the properties of matter are found in the\nsoul--namely, to be a subject, and to be changed, for it is a subject\nto science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge\nand from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of their\nexistence, as the Philosopher says _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 6). But\nthe soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God.\nTherefore the soul has matter.\n\nObj. 4: Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure\nact, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore the\nsoul has matter.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that\nthe soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual\nmatter.\n\n_I answer that,_ The soul has no matter. We may consider this question\nin two ways. First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it\nbelongs to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either\nit is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of\nsome part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it\nis impossible that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we\nunderstand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act;\nand that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since\npotentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If,\nhowever, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that\npart the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the\n\"primary animate.\"\n\nSecondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul\ninasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is\nreceived into something is received according to the condition of the\nrecipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the\nknower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature\nabsolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and\ntherefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal\nidea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul\nitself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and\nform. For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form,\nthe forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so\nit would only know the individual: just as it happens with the\nsensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since\nmatter is the principle by which forms are individualized. It follows,\ntherefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual\nsubstance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from\ncomposition of matter and form.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The First Act is the universal principle of all acts;\nbecause It is infinite, virtually \"precontaining all things,\" as\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things participate of It not\nas a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as\npotentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act.\nBut the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and\nare participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one\npotentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which\nall participated acts are derived; for then the receptive\npotentiality would equal the active potentiality of the First Act.\nNow the receptive potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than\nthe receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the\ndiversity of the things received by each. For primary matter receives\nindividual forms; whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms.\nHence the existence of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul\ndoes not prove that the soul is composed of matter and form.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by\nreason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality\nof the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary\nmatter another, so in each is there a different reason of subjection\nand change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is\nchanged from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in\npotentiality with regard to the intelligible species.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent;\nwherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it\nby transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however,\ndoes not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a\ncause transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words\nquoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of\nmatter and form \"there is no other cause but that which moves from\npotentiality to act; while whatsoever things have no matter are\nsimply beings at once.\" [*The Leonine edition has, \"simpliciter sunt\nquod vere entia aliquid.\" The Parma edition of St. Thomas's\nCommentary on Aristotle has, \"statim per se unum quiddam est . . .\net ens quiddam.\"]\n\nReply Obj. 4: Everything participated is compared to the participator\nas its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist \"per\nse,\" must have existence by participation; for \"even life,\" or\nanything of that sort, \"is a participator of existence,\" as Dionysius\nsays (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by the\ncapacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who is His own\nexistence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances\nthere is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of\nmatter and form, but of form and participated existence. Wherefore\nsome say that they are composed of that \"whereby they are\" and that\n\"which they are\"; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Human Soul Is Incorruptible?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the human soul is corruptible. For\nthose things that have a like beginning and process seemingly have a\nlike end. But the beginning, by generation, of men is like that of\nanimals, for they are made from the earth. And the process of life is\nalike in both; because \"all things breathe alike, and man hath nothing\nmore than the beast,\" as it is written (Eccles. 3:19). Therefore, as\nthe same text concludes, \"the death of man and beast is one, and the\ncondition of both is equal.\" But the souls of brute animals are\ncorruptible. Therefore, also, the human soul is corruptible.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is out of nothing can return to\nnothingness; because the end should correspond to the beginning. But\nas it is written (Wis. 2:2), \"We are born of nothing\"; which is true,\nnot only of the body, but also of the soul. Therefore, as is\nconcluded in the same passage, \"After this we shall be as if we had\nnot been,\" even as to our soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nothing is without its own proper operation. But the\noperation proper to the soul, which is to understand through a\nphantasm, cannot be without the body. For the soul understands\nnothing without a phantasm; and there is no phantasm without the body\nas the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1). Therefore the soul cannot\nsurvive the dissolution of the body.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that human souls owe\nto Divine goodness that they are \"intellectual,\" and that they have\n\"an incorruptible substantial life.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We must assert that the intellectual principle which\nwe call the human soul is incorruptible. For a thing may be corrupted\nin two ways--_per se,_ and accidentally. Now it is impossible for any\nsubstance to be generated or corrupted accidentally, that is, by the\ngeneration or corruption of something else. For generation and\ncorruption belong to a thing, just as existence belongs to it, which\nis acquired by generation and lost by corruption. Therefore, whatever\nhas existence _per se_ cannot be generated or corrupted except \"per\nse\"; while things which do not subsist, such as accidents and\nmaterial forms, acquire existence or lose it through the generation\nor corruption of composite things. Now it was shown above (AA. 2, 3)\nthat the souls of brutes are not self-subsistent, whereas the human\nsoul is; so that the souls of brutes are corrupted, when their bodies\nare corrupted; while the human soul could not be corrupted unless it\nwere corrupted _per se._ This, indeed, is impossible, not only as\nregards the human soul, but also as regards anything subsistent that\nis a form alone. For it is clear that what belongs to a thing by\nvirtue of itself is inseparable from it; but existence belongs to a\nform, which is an act, by virtue of itself. Wherefore matter acquires\nactual existence as it acquires the form; while it is corrupted so\nfar as the form is separated from it. But it is impossible for a form\nto be separated from itself; and therefore it is impossible for a\nsubsistent form to cease to exist.\n\nGranted even that the soul is composed of matter and form, as some\npretend, we should nevertheless have to maintain that it is\nincorruptible. For corruption is found only where there is\ncontrariety; since generation and corruption are from contraries and\ninto contraries. Wherefore the heavenly bodies, since they have no\nmatter subject to contrariety, are incorruptible. Now there can be no\ncontrariety in the intellectual soul; for it receives according to\nthe manner of its existence, and those things which it receives are\nwithout contrariety; for the notions even of contraries are not\nthemselves contrary, since contraries belong to the same knowledge.\nTherefore it is impossible for the intellectual soul to be\ncorruptible. Moreover we may take a sign of this from the fact that\neverything naturally aspires to existence after its own manner. Now,\nin things that have knowledge, desire ensues upon knowledge. The\nsenses indeed do not know existence, except under the conditions of\n\"here\" and \"now,\" whereas the intellect apprehends existence\nabsolutely, and for all time; so that everything that has an\nintellect naturally desires always to exist. But a natural desire\ncannot be in vain. Therefore every intellectual substance is\nincorruptible.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Solomon reasons thus in the person of the foolish, as\nexpressed in the words of Wisdom 2. Therefore the saying that man and\nanimals have a like beginning in generation is true of the body; for\nall animals alike are made of earth. But it is not true of the soul.\nFor the souls of brutes are produced by some power of the body;\nwhereas the human soul is produced by God. To signify this it is\nwritten as to other animals: \"Let the earth bring forth the living\nsoul\" (Gen. 1:24): while of man it is written (Gen. 2:7) that \"He\nbreathed into his face the breath of life.\" And so in the last\nchapter of Ecclesiastes (12:7) it is concluded: \"(Before) the dust\nreturn into its earth from whence it was; and the spirit return to\nGod Who gave it.\" Again the process of life is alike as to the body,\nconcerning which it is written (Eccles. 3:19): \"All things breathe\nalike,\" and (Wis. 2:2), \"The breath in our nostrils is smoke.\" But\nthe process is not alike of the soul; for man is intelligent, whereas\nanimals are not. Hence it is false to say: \"Man has nothing more than\nbeasts.\" Thus death comes to both alike as to the body, by not as to\nthe soul.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As a thing can be created by reason, not of a passive\npotentiality, but only of the active potentiality of the Creator, Who\ncan produce something out of nothing, so when we say that a thing can\nbe reduced to nothing, we do not imply in the creature a potentiality\nto non-existence, but in the Creator the power of ceasing to sustain\nexistence. But a thing is said to be corruptible because there is in\nit a potentiality to non-existence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To understand through a phantasm is the proper\noperation of the soul by virtue of its union with the body. After\nseparation from the body it will have another mode of understanding,\nsimilar to other substances separated from bodies, as will appear\nlater on (Q. 89, A. 1).\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 75, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Soul Is of the Same Species As an Angel?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the soul is of the same species as an\nangel. For each thing is ordained to its proper end by the nature of\nits species, whence is derived its inclination for that end. But the\nend of the soul is the same as that of an angel--namely, eternal\nhappiness. Therefore they are of the same species.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the ultimate specific difference is the noblest,\nbecause it completes the nature of the species. But there is nothing\nnobler either in an angel or in the soul than their intellectual\nnature. Therefore the soul and the angel agree in the ultimate\nspecific difference: therefore they belong to the same species.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it seems that the soul does not differ from an angel\nexcept in its union with the body. But as the body is outside the\nessence of the soul, it seems that it does not belong to its species.\nTherefore the soul and angel are of the same species.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Things which have different natural operations are\nof different species. But the natural operations of the soul and of\nan angel are different; since, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii),\n\"Angelic minds have simple and blessed intelligence, not gathering\ntheir knowledge of Divine things from visible things.\" Subsequently\nhe says the contrary to this of the soul. Therefore the soul and an\nangel are not of the same species.\n\n_I answer that,_ Origen (Peri Archon iii, 5) held that human souls\nand angels are all of the same species; and this because he supposed\nthat in these substances the difference of degree was accidental, as\nresulting from their free-will: as we have seen above (Q. 47, A. 2).\nBut this cannot be; for in incorporeal substances there cannot be\ndiversity of number without diversity of species and inequality of\nnature; because, as they are not composed of matter and form, but are\nsubsistent forms, it is clear that there is necessarily among them a\ndiversity of species. For a separate form cannot be understood\notherwise than as one of a single species; thus, supposing a separate\nwhiteness to exist, it could only be one; forasmuch as one whiteness\ndoes not differ from another except as in this or that subject. But\ndiversity of species is always accompanied with a diversity of\nnature; thus in species of colors one is more perfect than another;\nand the same applies to other species, because differences which\ndivide a genus are contrary to one another. Contraries, however, are\ncompared to one another as the perfect to the imperfect, since the\n\"principle of contrariety is habit, and privation thereof,\" as is\nwritten, _Metaph._ x (Did. ix, 4). The same would follow if the\naforesaid substances were composed of matter and form. For if the\nmatter of one be distinct from the matter of another, it follows that\neither the form is the principle of the distinction of matter--that\nis to say, that the matter is distinct on account of its relation to\ndivers forms; and even then there would result a difference of\nspecies and inequality of nature: or else the matter is the principle\nof the distinction of forms. But one matter cannot be distinct from\nanother, except by a distinction of quantity, which has no place in\nthese incorporeal substances, such as an angel and the soul. So that\nit is not possible for the angel and the soul to be of the same\nspecies. How it is that there can be many souls of one species will\nbe explained later (Q. 76, A. 2, ad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument proceeds from the proximate and natural\nend. Eternal happiness is the ultimate and supernatural end.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The ultimate specific difference is the noblest because\nit is the most determinate, in the same way as actuality is nobler\nthan potentiality. Thus, however, the intellectual faculty is not the\nnoblest, because it is indeterminate and common to many degrees of\nintellectuality; as the sensible faculty is common to many degrees in\nthe sensible nature. Hence, as all sensible things are not of one\nspecies, so neither are all intellectual things of one species.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The body is not of the essence of the soul; but the\nsoul by the nature of its essence can be united to the body, so that,\nproperly speaking, not the soul alone, but the \"composite,\" is the\nspecies. And the very fact that the soul in a certain way requires\nthe body for its operation, proves that the soul is endowed with a\ngrade of intellectuality inferior to that of an angel, who is not\nunited to a body.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 76\n\nOF THE UNION OF BODY AND SOUL\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe now consider the union of the soul with the body; and concerning\nthis there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the intellectual principle is united to the body as its\nform?\n\n(2) Whether the intellectual principle is multiplied numerically\naccording to the number of bodies; or is there one intelligence for\nall men?\n\n(3) Whether in the body the form of which is an intellectual\nprinciple, there is some other soul?\n\n(4) Whether in the body there is any other substantial form?\n\n(5) Of the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual\nprinciple is the form?\n\n(6) Whether it be united to such a body by means of another body?\n\n(7) Whether by means of an accident?\n\n(8) Whether the soul is wholly in each part of the body?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Intellectual Principle Is United to the Body As Its Form?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to\nthe body as its form. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that\nthe intellect is \"separate,\" and that it is not the act of any body.\nTherefore it is not united to the body as its form.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every form is determined according to the nature\nof the matter of which it is the form; otherwise no proportion would\nbe required between matter and form. Therefore if the intellect were\nunited to the body as its form, since every body has a determinate\nnature, it would follow that the intellect has a determinate nature;\nand thus, it would not be capable of knowing all things, as is clear\nfrom what has been said (Q. 75, A. 2); which is contrary to the\nnature of the intellect. Therefore the intellect is not united to\nthe body as its form.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever receptive power is an act of a body,\nreceives a form materially and individually; for what is received must\nbe received according to the condition of the receiver. But the form\nof the thing understood is not received into the intellect materially\nand individually, but rather immaterially and universally: otherwise\nthe intellect would not be capable of the knowledge of immaterial and\nuniversal objects, but only of individuals, like the senses. Therefore\nthe intellect is not united to the body as its form.\n\nObj. 4: Further, power and action have the same subject; for the same\nsubject is what can, and does, act. But the intellectual action is\nnot the action of a body, as appears from above (Q. 75, A. 2).\nTherefore neither is the intellectual faculty a power of the body.\nBut virtue or power cannot be more abstract or more simple than the\nessence from which the faculty or power is derived. Therefore neither\nis the substance of the intellect the form of a body.\n\nObj. 5: Further, whatever has _per se_ existence is not united to the\nbody as its form; because a form is that by which a thing exists: so\nthat the very existence of a form does not belong to the form by\nitself. But the intellectual principle has _per se_ existence and is\nsubsistent, as was said above (Q. 75, A. 2). Therefore it is not\nunited to the body as its form.\n\nObj. 6: Further, whatever exists in a thing by reason of its nature\nexists in it always. But to be united to matter belongs to the form\nby reason of its nature; because form is the act of matter, not by an\naccidental quality, but by its own essence; otherwise matter and form\nwould not make a thing substantially one, but only accidentally one.\nTherefore a form cannot be without its own proper matter. But the\nintellectual principle, since it is incorruptible, as was shown above\n(Q. 75, A. 6), remains separate from the body, after the dissolution\nof the body. Therefore the intellectual principle is not united to\nthe body as its form.\n\n_On the contrary,_ According to the Philosopher, _Metaph._ viii (Did.\nvii 2), difference is derived from the form. But the difference which\nconstitutes man is \"rational,\" which is applied to man on account of\nhis intellectual principle. Therefore the intellectual principle is\nthe form of man.\n\n_I answer that,_ We must assert that the intellect which is the\nprinciple of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For\nthat whereby primarily anything acts is a form of the thing to which\nthe act is to be attributed: for instance, that whereby a body is\nprimarily healed is health, and that whereby the soul knows primarily\nis knowledge; hence health is a form of the body, and knowledge is a\nform of the soul. The reason is because nothing acts except so far as\nit is in act; wherefore a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now\nit is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul.\nAnd as life appears through various operations in different degrees of\nliving things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these\nvital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of\nour nourishment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our\nunderstanding. Therefore this principle by which we primarily\nunderstand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual\nsoul, is the form of the body. This is the demonstration used by\nAristotle (De Anima ii, 2).\n\nBut if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the\nbody he must first explain how it is that this action of\nunderstanding is the action of this particular man; for each one is\nconscious that it is himself who understands. Now an action may be\nattributed to anyone in three ways, as is clear from the Philosopher\n(Phys. v, 1); for a thing is said to move or act, either by virtue of\nits whole self, for instance, as a physician heals; or by virtue of a\npart, as a man sees by his eye; or through an accidental quality, as\nwhen we say that something that is white builds, because it is\naccidental to the builder to be white. So when we say that Socrates\nor Plato understands, it is clear that this is not attributed to him\naccidentally; since it is ascribed to him as man, which is predicated\nof him essentially. We must therefore say either that Socrates\nunderstands by virtue of his whole self, as Plato maintained, holding\nthat man is an intellectual soul; or that intelligence is a part of\nSocrates. The first cannot stand, as was shown above (Q. 75, A. 4),\nfor this reason, that it is one and the same man who is conscious\nboth that he understands, and that he senses. But one cannot sense\nwithout a body: therefore the body must be some part of man. It\nfollows therefore that the intellect by which Socrates understands is\na part of Socrates, so that in some way it is united to the body of\nSocrates.\n\nThe Commentator held that this union is through the intelligible\nspecies, as having a double subject, in the possible intellect, and\nin the phantasms which are in the corporeal organs. Thus through the\nintelligible species the possible intellect is linked to the body of\nthis or that particular man. But this link or union does not\nsufficiently explain the fact, that the act of the intellect is the\nact of Socrates. This can be clearly seen from comparison with the\nsensitive faculty, from which Aristotle proceeds to consider things\nrelating to the intellect. For the relation of phantasms to the\nintellect is like the relation of colors to the sense of sight, as he\nsays _De Anima_ iii, 5,7. Therefore, as the species of colors are in\nthe sight, so are the species of phantasms in the possible intellect.\nNow it is clear that because the colors, the images of which are in\nthe sight, are on a wall, the action of seeing is not attributed to\nthe wall: for we do not say that the wall sees, but rather that it is\nseen. Therefore, from the fact that the species of phantasms are in\nthe possible intellect, it does not follow that Socrates, in whom are\nthe phantasms, understands, but that he or his phantasms are\nunderstood.\n\nSome, however, tried to maintain that the intellect is united to the\nbody as its motor; and hence that the intellect and body form one\nthing so that the act of the intellect could be attributed to the\nwhole. This is, however, absurd for many reasons. First, because the\nintellect does not move the body except through the appetite, the\nmovement of which presupposes the operation of the intellect. The\nreason therefore why Socrates understands is not because he is moved\nby his intellect, but rather, contrariwise, he is moved by his\nintellect because he understands. Secondly, because since Socrates is\nan individual in a nature of one essence composed of matter and form,\nif the intellect be not the form, it follows that it must be outside\nthe essence, and then the intellect is the whole Socrates as a motor\nto the thing moved. Whereas the act of intellect remains in the agent,\nand does not pass into something else, as does the action of heating.\nTherefore the action of understanding cannot be attributed to Socrates\nfor the reason that he is moved by his intellect. Thirdly, because the\naction of a motor is never attributed to the thing moved, except as to\nan instrument; as the action of a carpenter to a saw. Therefore if\nunderstanding is attributed to Socrates, as the action of what moves\nhim, it follows that it is attributed to him as to an instrument. This\nis contrary to the teaching of the Philosopher, who holds that\nunderstanding is not possible through a corporeal instrument (De Anima\niii, 4). Fourthly, because, although the action of a part be\nattributed to the whole, as the action of the eye is attributed to a\nman; yet it is never attributed to another part, except perhaps\nindirectly; for we do not say that the hand sees because the eye sees.\nTherefore if the intellect and Socrates are united in the above\nmanner, the action of the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates.\nIf, however, Socrates be a whole composed of a union of the intellect\nwith whatever else belongs to Socrates, and still the intellect be\nunited to those other things only as a motor, it follows that Socrates\nis not one absolutely, and consequently neither a being absolutely,\nfor a thing is a being according as it is one.\n\nThere remains, therefore, no other explanation than that given by\nAristotle--namely, that this particular man understands, because the\nintellectual principle is his form. Thus from the very operation of\nthe intellect it is made clear that the intellectual principle is\nunited to the body as its form.\n\nThe same can be clearly shown from the nature of the human species.\nFor the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. Now the proper\noperation of man as man is to understand; because he thereby surpasses\nall other animals. Whence Aristotle concludes (Ethic. x, 7) that the\nultimate happiness of man must consist in this operation as properly\nbelonging to him. Man must therefore derive his species from that\nwhich is the principle of this operation. But the species of anything\nis derived from its form. It follows therefore that the intellectual\nprinciple is the proper form of man.\n\nBut we must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above\ncorporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, and the more it\nexcels matter by its power and its operation; hence we find that the\nform of a mixed body has another operation not caused by its elemental\nqualities. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the\nmore we find that the power of the form excels the elementary matter;\nas the vegetative soul excels the form of the metal, and the sensitive\nsoul excels the vegetative soul. Now the human soul is the highest and\nnoblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by\nthe fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal\nmatter has no share whatever. This power is called the intellect.\n\nIt is well to remark that if anyone holds that the soul is composed of\nmatter and form, it would follow that in no way could the soul be the\nform of the body. For since the form is an act, and matter is only in\npotentiality, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the\nform of another by virtue of itself as a whole. But if it is a form by\nvirtue of some part of itself, then that part which is the form we\ncall the soul, and that of which it is the form we call the \"primary\nanimate,\" as was said above (Q. 75, A. 5).\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the ultimate\nnatural form to which the consideration of the natural philosopher is\ndirected is indeed separate; yet it exists in matter. He proves this\nfrom the fact that \"man and the sun generate man from matter.\" It is\nseparate indeed according to its intellectual power, because the\nintellectual power does not belong to a corporeal organ, as the power\nof seeing is the act of the eye; for understanding is an act which\ncannot be performed by a corporeal organ, like the act of seeing. But\nit exists in matter so far as the soul itself, to which this power\nbelongs, is the form of the body, and the term of human generation.\nAnd so the Philosopher says (De Anima iii) that the intellect is\nseparate, because it is not the faculty of a corporeal organ.\n\nFrom this it is clear how to answer the Second and Third objections:\nsince, in order that man may be able to understand all things by\nmeans of his intellect, and that his intellect may understand\nimmaterial things and universals, it is sufficient that the\nintellectual power be not the act of the body.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The human soul, by reason of its perfection, is not a\nform merged in matter, or entirely embraced by matter. Therefore\nthere is nothing to prevent some power thereof not being the act of\nthe body, although the soul is essentially the form of the body.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The soul communicates that existence in which it\nsubsists to the corporeal matter, out of which and the intellectual\nsoul there results unity of existence; so that the existence of the\nwhole composite is also the existence of the soul. This is not the\ncase with other non-subsistent forms. For this reason the human soul\nretains its own existence after the dissolution of the body; whereas\nit is not so with other forms.\n\nReply Obj. 6: To be united to the body belongs to the soul by reason\nof itself, as it belongs to a light body by reason of itself to be\nraised up. And as a light body remains light, when removed from its\nproper place, retaining meanwhile an aptitude and an inclination for\nits proper place; so the human soul retains its proper existence when\nseparated from the body, having an aptitude and a natural inclination\nto be united to the body.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Intellectual Principle Is Multiplied According to the\nNumber of Bodies?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intellectual principle is not\nmultiplied according to the number of bodies, but that there is one\nintellect in all men. For an immaterial substance is not multiplied\nin number within one species. But the human soul is an immaterial\nsubstance; since it is not composed of matter and form as was shown\nabove (Q. 75, A. 5). Therefore there are not many human souls in\none species. But all men are of one species. Therefore there is but\none intellect in all men.\n\nObj. 2: Further, when the cause is removed, the effect is also\nremoved. Therefore, if human souls were multiplied according to the\nnumber of bodies, it follows that the bodies being removed, the number\nof souls would not remain; but from all the souls there would be but a\nsingle remainder. This is heretical; for it would do away with the\ndistinction of rewards and punishments.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if my intellect is distinct from your intellect, my\nintellect is an individual, and so is yours; for individuals are\nthings which differ in number but agree in one species. Now whatever\nis received into anything must be received according to the condition\nof the receiver. Therefore the species of things would be received\nindividually into my intellect, and also into yours: which is\ncontrary to the nature of the intellect which knows universals.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the thing understood is in the intellect which\nunderstands. If, therefore, my intellect is distinct from yours, what\nis understood by me must be distinct from what is understood by you;\nand consequently it will be reckoned as something individual, and be\nonly potentially something understood; so that the common intention\nwill have to be abstracted from both; since from things diverse\nsomething intelligible common to them may be abstracted. But this is\ncontrary to the nature of the intellect; for then the intellect would\nseem not to be distinct from the imagination. It seems, therefore, to\nfollow that there is one intellect in all men.\n\nObj. 5: Further, when the disciple receives knowledge from the\nmaster, it cannot be said that the master's knowledge begets\nknowledge in the disciple, because then also knowledge would be an\nactive form, such as heat is, which is clearly false. It seems,\ntherefore, that the same individual knowledge which is in the master\nis communicated to the disciple; which cannot be, unless there is\none intellect in both. Seemingly, therefore, the intellect of the\ndisciple and master is but one; and, consequently, the same applies\nto all men.\n\nObj. 6: Further, Augustine (De Quant. Animae xxxii) says: \"If I were\nto say that there are many human souls, I should laugh at myself.\"\nBut the soul seems to be one chiefly on account of the intellect.\nTherefore there is one intellect of all men.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 3) that the\nrelation of universal causes to universals is like the relation of\nparticular causes to individuals. But it is impossible that a soul,\none in species, should belong to animals of different species.\nTherefore it is impossible that one individual intellectual soul\nshould belong to several individuals.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is absolutely impossible for one intellect to\nbelong to all men. This is clear if, as Plato maintained, man is the\nintellect itself. For it would follow that Socrates and Plato are\none man; and that they are not distinct from each other, except by\nsomething outside the essence of each. The distinction between\nSocrates and Plato would be no other than that of one man with a\ntunic and another with a cloak; which is quite absurd.\n\nIt is likewise clear that this is impossible if, according to the\nopinion of Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), it is supposed that the\nintellect is a part or a power of the soul which is the form of man.\nFor it is impossible for many distinct individuals to have one form,\nas it is impossible for them to have one existence, for the form is\nthe principle of existence.\n\nAgain, this is clearly impossible, whatever one may hold as to the\nmanner of the union of the intellect to this or that man. For it is\nmanifest that, supposing there is one principal agent, and two\ninstruments, we can say that there is one agent absolutely, but\nseveral actions; as when one man touches several things with his two\nhands, there will be one who touches, but two contacts. If, on the\ncontrary, we suppose one instrument and several principal agents, we\nmight say that there are several agents, but one act; for example, if\nthere be many drawing a ship by means of a rope; there will be many\ndrawing, but one pull. If, however, there is one principal agent, and\none instrument, we say that there is one agent and one action, as when\nthe smith strikes with one hammer, there is one striker and one\nstroke. Now it is clear that no matter how the intellect is united or\ncoupled to this or that man, the intellect has the precedence of all\nthe other things which appertain to man; for the sensitive powers obey\nthe intellect, and are at its service. Therefore, if we suppose two\nmen to have several intellects and one sense--for instance, if two\nmen had one eye--there would be several seers, but one sight. But if\nthere is one intellect, no matter how diverse may be all those things\nof which the intellect makes use as instruments, in no way is it\npossible to say that Socrates and Plato are otherwise than one\nunderstanding man. And if to this we add that to understand, which is\nthe act of the intellect, is not affected by any organ other than the\nintellect itself; it will further follow that there is but one agent\nand one action: that is to say that all men are but one\n\"understander,\" and have but one act of understanding, in regard,\nthat is, of one intelligible object.\n\nHowever, it would be possible to distinguish my intellectual action\nfrom yours by the distinction of the phantasms--that is to say, were\nthere one phantasm of a stone in me, and another in you--if the\nphantasm itself, as it is one thing in me and another in you, were a\nform of the possible intellect; since the same agent according to\ndivers forms produces divers actions; as, according to divers forms of\nthings with regard to the same eye, there are divers visions. But the\nphantasm itself is not a form of the possible intellect; it is the\nintelligible species abstracted from the phantasm that is a form. Now\nin one intellect, from different phantasms of the same species, only\none intelligible species is abstracted; as appears in one man, in whom\nthere may be different phantasms of a stone; yet from all of them only\none intelligible species of a stone is abstracted; by which the\nintellect of that one man, by one operation, understands the nature of\na stone, notwithstanding the diversity of phantasms. Therefore, if\nthere were one intellect for all men, the diversity of phantasms which\nare in this one and that one would not cause a diversity of\nintellectual operation in this man and that man. It follows,\ntherefore, that it is altogether impossible and unreasonable to\nmaintain that there exists one intellect for all men.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the intellectual soul, like an angel, has no\nmatter from which it is produced, yet it is the form of a certain\nmatter; in which it is unlike an angel. Therefore, according to the\ndivision of matter, there are many souls of one species; while it is\nquite impossible for many angels to be of one species.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Everything has unity in the same way that it has being;\nconsequently we must judge of the multiplicity of a thing as we judge\nof its being. Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue\nof its very being, is united to the body as its form; yet, after the\ndissolution of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being.\nIn like manner the multiplicity of souls is in proportion to the\nmultiplicity of the bodies; yet, after the dissolution of the bodies,\nthe souls retain their multiplied being.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Individuality of the intelligent being, or of the\nspecies whereby it understands, does not exclude the understanding\nof universals; otherwise, since separate intellects are subsistent\nsubstances, and consequently individual, they could not understand\nuniversals. But the materiality of the knower, and of the species\nwhereby it knows, impedes the knowledge of the universal. For as\nevery action is according to the mode of the form by which the agent\nacts, as heating is according to the mode of the heat; so knowledge\nis according to the mode of the species by which the knower knows.\nNow it is clear that common nature becomes distinct and multiplied by\nreason of the individuating principles which come from the matter.\nTherefore if the form, which is the means of knowledge, is\nmaterial--that is, not abstracted from material conditions--its\nlikeness to the nature of a species or genus will be according to the\ndistinction and multiplication of that nature by means of\nindividuating principles; so that knowledge of the nature of a thing\nin general will be impossible. But if the species be abstracted from\nthe conditions of individual matter, there will be a likeness of the\nnature without those things which make it distinct and multiplied;\nthus there will be knowledge of the universal. Nor does it matter,\nas to this particular point, whether there be one intellect or many;\nbecause, even if there were but one, it would necessarily be an\nindividual intellect, and the species whereby it understands, an\nindividual species.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Whether the intellect be one or many, what is\nunderstood is one; for what is understood is in the intellect, not\naccording to its own nature, but according to its likeness; for \"the\nstone is not in the soul, but its likeness is,\" as is said, _De\nAnima_ iii, 8. Yet it is the stone which is understood, not the\nlikeness of the stone; except by a reflection of the intellect on\nitself: otherwise, the objects of sciences would not be things, but\nonly intelligible species. Now it happens that different things,\naccording to different forms, are likened to the same thing. And\nsince knowledge is begotten according to the assimilation of the\nknower to the thing known, it follows that the same thing may happen\nto be known by several knowers; as is apparent in regard to the\nsenses; for several see the same color, according to different\nlikenesses. In the same way several intellects understand one object\nunderstood. But there is this difference, according to the opinion of\nAristotle, between the sense and the intelligence--that a thing is\nperceived by the sense according to the disposition which it has\noutside the soul--that is, in its individuality; whereas the nature\nof the thing understood is indeed outside the soul, but the mode\naccording to which it exists outside the soul is not the mode\naccording to which it is understood. For the common nature is\nunderstood as apart from the individuating principles; whereas such\nis not its mode of existence outside the soul. But, according to the\nopinion of Plato, the thing understood exists outside the soul in the\nsame condition as those under which it is understood; for he supposed\nthat the natures of things exist separate from matter.\n\nReply Obj. 5: One knowledge exists in the disciple and another in the\nmaster. How it is caused will be shown later on (Q. 117, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 6: Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would\ninvolve a plurality of species.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Besides the Intellectual Soul There Are in Man Other Souls\nEssentially Different from One Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that besides the intellectual soul there\nare in man other souls essentially different from one another, such\nas the sensitive soul and the nutritive soul. For corruptible and\nincorruptible are not of the same substance. But the intellectual\nsoul is incorruptible; whereas the other souls, as the sensitive and\nthe nutritive, are corruptible, as was shown above (Q. 75, A. 6).\nTherefore in man the essence of the intellectual soul, the sensitive\nsoul, and the nutritive soul, cannot be the same.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if it be said that the sensitive soul in man is\nincorruptible; on the contrary, \"corruptible and incorruptible differ\ngenerically,\" says the Philosopher, _Metaph._ x (Did. ix, 10). But\nthe sensitive soul in the horse, the lion, and other brute animals,\nis corruptible. If, therefore, in man it be incorruptible, the\nsensitive soul in man and brute animals will not be of the same\ngenus. Now an animal is so called from its having a sensitive soul;\nand, therefore, \"animal\" will not be one genus common to man and\nother animals, which is absurd.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says, _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 2),\nthat the genus is taken from the matter, and difference from the\nform. But \"rational,\" which is the difference constituting man, is\ntaken from the intellectual soul; while he is called \"animal\" by\nreason of his having a body animated by a sensitive soul. Therefore\nthe intellectual soul may be compared to the body animated by a\nsensitive soul, as form to matter. Therefore in man the intellectual\nsoul is not essentially the same as the sensitive soul, but\npresupposes it as a material subject.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said in the book _De Ecclesiasticis\nDogmatibus_ xv: \"Nor do we say that there are two souls in one man,\nas James and other Syrians write; one, animal, by which the body is\nanimated, and which is mingled with the blood; the other, spiritual,\nwhich obeys the reason; but we say that it is one and the same soul\nin man, that both gives life to the body by being united to it, and\norders itself by its own reasoning.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Plato held that there were several souls in one body,\ndistinct even as to organs, to which souls he referred the different\nvital actions, saying that the nutritive power is in the liver, the\nconcupiscible in the heart, and the power of knowledge in the brain.\nWhich opinion is rejected by Aristotle (De Anima ii, 2), with regard\nto those parts of the soul which use corporeal organs; for this\nreason, that in those animals which continue to live when they have\nbeen divided in each part are observed the operations of the soul, as\nsense and appetite. Now this would not be the case if the various\nprinciples of the soul's operations were essentially different, and\ndistributed in the various parts of the body. But with regard to the\nintellectual part, he seems to leave it in doubt whether it be \"only\nlogically\" distinct from the other parts of the soul, \"or also\nlocally.\"\n\nThe opinion of Plato might be maintained if, as he held, the soul was\nsupposed to be united to the body, not as its form, but as its motor.\nFor it involves nothing unreasonable that the same movable thing be\nmoved by several motors; and still less if it be moved according to\nits various parts. If we suppose, however, that the soul is united to\nthe body as its form, it is quite impossible for several essentially\ndifferent souls to be in one body. This can be made clear by three\ndifferent reasons.\n\nIn the first place, an animal would not be absolutely one, in which\nthere were several souls. For nothing is absolutely one except by one\nform, by which a thing has existence: because a thing has from the\nsame source both existence and unity; and therefore things which are\ndenominated by various forms are not absolutely one; as, for instance,\n\"a white man.\" If, therefore, man were _living_ by one form, the\nvegetative soul, and _animal_ by another form, the sensitive soul, and\n_man_ by another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man\nis not absolutely one. Thus Aristotle argues, _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii,\n6), against Plato, that if the idea of an animal is distinct from the\nidea of a biped, then a biped animal is not absolutely one. For this\nreason, against those who hold that there are several souls in the\nbody, he asks (De Anima i, 5), \"what contains them?\"--that is, what\nmakes them one? It cannot be said that they are united by the one\nbody; because rather does the soul contain the body and make it one,\nthan the reverse.\n\nSecondly, this is proved to be impossible by the manner in which one\nthing is predicated of another. Those things which are derived from\nvarious forms are predicated of one another, either accidentally, (if\nthe forms are not ordered to one another, as when we say that\nsomething white is sweet), or essentially, in the second manner of\nessential predication, (if the forms are ordered one to another, the\nsubject belonging to the definition of the predicate; as a surface is\npresupposed to color; so that if we say that a body with a surface is\ncolored, we have the second manner of essential predication.)\nTherefore, if we have one form by which a thing is an animal, and\nanother form by which it is a man, it follows either that one of these\ntwo things could not be predicated of the other, except accidentally,\nsupposing these two forms not to be ordered to one another--or that\none would be predicated of the other according to the second manner of\nessential predication, if one soul be presupposed to the other. But\nboth of these consequences are clearly false: because \"animal\" is\npredicated of man essentially and not accidentally; and man is not\npart of the definition of an animal, but the other way about.\nTherefore of necessity by the same form a thing is animal and man;\notherwise man would not really be the thing which is an animal, so\nthat animal can be essentially predicated of man.\n\nThirdly, this is shown to be impossible by the fact that when one\noperation of the soul is intense it impedes another, which could never\nbe the case unless the principle of action were essentially one.\n\nWe must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the\nintellectual soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul.\nThis can easily be explained, if we consider the differences of\nspecies and forms. For we observe that the species and forms of things\ndiffer from one another, as the perfect and imperfect; as in the order\nof things, the animate are more perfect than the inanimate, and\nanimals more perfect than plants, and man than brute animals; and in\neach of these genera there are various degrees. For this reason\nAristotle, _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 3), compares the species of things\nto numbers, which differ in species by the addition or subtraction of\nunity. And (De Anima ii, 3) he compares the various souls to the\nspecies of figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon\ncontains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intellectual soul contains\nvirtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and\nto the nutritive souls of plants. Therefore, as a surface which is of\na pentagonal shape, is not tetragonal by one shape, and pentagonal by\nanother--since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained\nin the pentagonal--so neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and\nanimal by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and\nman.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The sensitive soul is incorruptible, not by reason of\nits being sensitive, but by reason of its being intellectual. When,\ntherefore, a soul is sensitive only, it is corruptible; but when with\nsensibility it has also intellectuality, it is incorruptible. For\nalthough sensibility does not give incorruptibility, yet it cannot\ndeprive intellectuality of its incorruptibility.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not forms, but composites, are classified either\ngenerically or specifically. Now man is corruptible like other\nanimals. And so the difference of corruptible and incorruptible which\nis on the part of the forms does not involve a generic difference\nbetween man and the other animals.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The embryo has first of all a soul which is merely\nsensitive, and when this is removed, it is supplanted by a more\nperfect soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual: as will be\nshown further on (Q. 118, A. 2, ad 2).\n\nReply Obj. 4: We must not consider the diversity of natural things as\nproceeding from the various logical notions or intentions, which flow\nfrom our manner of understanding, because reason can apprehend one\nand the same thing in various ways. Therefore since, as we have said,\nthe intellectual soul contains virtually what belongs to the\nsensitive soul, and something more, reason can consider separately\nwhat belongs to the power of the sensitive soul, as something\nimperfect and material. And because it observes that this is\nsomething common to man and to other animals, it forms thence the\nnotion of the genus; while that wherein the intellectual soul\nexceeds the sensitive soul, it takes as formal and perfecting;\nthence it gathers the \"difference\" of man.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 4]\n\nWhether in Man There Is Another Form Besides the Intellectual Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in man there is another form besides\nthe intellectual soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that\n\"the soul is the act of a physical body which has life potentially.\"\nTherefore the soul is to the body as a form of matter. But the body\nhas a substantial form by which it is a body. Therefore some other\nsubstantial form in the body precedes the soul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, man moves himself as every animal does. Now\neverything that moves itself is divided into two parts, of which one\nmoves, and the other is moved, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii,\n5). But the part which moves is the soul. Therefore the other part\nmust be such that it can be moved. But primary matter cannot be moved\n(Phys. v, 1), since it is a being only potentially; indeed everything\nthat is moved is a body. Therefore in man and in every animal there\nmust be another substantial form, by which the body is constituted.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the order of forms depends on their relation to\nprimary matter; for \"before\" and \"after\" apply by comparison to some\nbeginning. Therefore if there were not in man some other substantial\nform besides the rational soul, and if this were to inhere immediately\nto primary matter; it would follow that it ranks among the most\nimperfect forms which inhere to matter immediately.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the human body is a mixed body. Now mingling does\nnot result from matter alone; for then we should have mere\ncorruption. Therefore the forms of the elements must remain in a\nmixed body; and these are substantial forms. Therefore in the human\nbody there are other substantial forms besides the intellectual soul.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Of one thing there is but one substantial being.\nBut the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one\nthing there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the\nsubstantial form of man. Therefore it is impossible for there to be\nin man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul.\n\n_I answer that,_ If we suppose that the intellectual soul is not\nunited to the body as its form, but only as its motor, as the\nPlatonists maintain, it would necessarily follow that in man there\nis another substantial form, by which the body is established in its\nbeing as movable by the soul. If, however, the intellectual soul be\nunited to the body as its substantial form, as we have said above\n(A. 1), it is impossible for another substantial form besides the\nintellectual soul to be found in man.\n\nIn order to make this evident, we must consider that the substantial\nform differs from the accidental form in this, that the accidental\nform does not make a thing to be \"simply,\" but to be \"such,\" as heat\ndoes not make a thing to be simply, but only to be hot. Therefore by\nthe coming of the accidental form a thing is not said to be made or\ngenerated simply, but to be made such, or to be in some particular\ncondition; and in like manner, when an accidental form is removed, a\nthing is said to be corrupted, not simply, but relatively. Now the\nsubstantial form gives being simply; therefore by its coming a thing\nis said to be generated simply; and by its removal to be corrupted\nsimply. For this reason, the old natural philosophers, who held that\nprimary matter was some actual being--for instance, fire or air, or\nsomething of that sort--maintained that nothing is generated simply,\nor corrupted simply; and stated that \"every becoming is nothing but an\nalteration,\" as we read, _Phys._ i, 4. Therefore, if besides the\nintellectual soul there pre-existed in matter another substantial form\nby which the subject of the soul were made an actual being, it would\nfollow that the soul does not give being simply; and consequently that\nit is not the substantial form: and so at the advent of the soul there\nwould not be simple generation; nor at its removal simple corruption,\nall of which is clearly false.\n\nWhence we must conclude, that there is no other substantial form in\nman besides the intellectual soul; and that the soul, as it virtually\ncontains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually\ncontain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the\nimperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the\nsensitive soul in brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants,\nand universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the\nimperfect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Aristotle does not say that the soul is the act of a\nbody only, but \"the act of a physical organic body which has life\npotentially\"; and that this potentiality \"does not reject the soul.\"\nWhence it is clear that when the soul is called the act, the soul\nitself is included; as when we say that heat is the act of what is\nhot, and light of what is lucid; not as though lucid and light were\ntwo separate things, but because a thing is made lucid by the light.\nIn like manner, the soul is said to be the \"act of a body,\" etc.,\nbecause by the soul it is a body, and is organic, and has life\npotentially. Yet the first act is said to be in potentiality to the\nsecond act, which is operation; for such a potentiality \"does not\nreject\"--that is, does not exclude--the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The soul does not move the body by its essence, as the\nform of the body, but by the motive power, the act of which\npresupposes the body to be already actualized by the soul: so that\nthe soul by its motive power is the part which moves; and the animate\nbody is the part moved.\n\nReply Obj. 3: We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as\nexistence, living, sensing, and understanding. Now what is added is\nalways more perfect. Therefore that form which gives matter only the\nfirst degree of perfection is the most imperfect; while that form\nwhich gives the first, second, and third degree, and so on, is the\nmost perfect: and yet it inheres to matter immediately.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Avicenna held that the substantial forms of the\nelements remain entire in the mixed body; and that the mixture is\nmade by the contrary qualities of the elements being reduced to an\naverage. But this is impossible, because the various forms of the\nelements must necessarily be in various parts of matter; for the\ndistinction of which we must suppose dimensions, without which matter\ncannot be divisible. Now matter subject to dimension is not to be\nfound except in a body. But various bodies cannot be in the same\nplace. Whence it follows that elements in the mixed body would be\ndistinct as to situation. And then there would not be a real mixture\nwhich is in respect of the whole; but only a mixture apparent to\nsense, by the juxtaposition of particles.\n\nAverroes maintained that the forms of elements, by reason of their\nimperfection, are a medium between accidental and substantial forms,\nand so can be \"more\" or \"less\"; and therefore in the mixture they are\nmodified and reduced to an average, so that one form emerges from\nthem. But this is even still more impossible. For the substantial\nbeing of each thing consists in something indivisible, and every\naddition and subtraction varies the species, as in numbers, as stated\nin _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 3); and consequently it is impossible for\nany substantial form to receive \"more\" or \"less.\" Nor is it less\nimpossible for anything to be a medium between substance and accident.\n\nTherefore we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (De Gener.\ni, 10), that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not\nactually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements\nremain, though modified; and in them is the power of the elementary\nforms. This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the\nsubstantial form of the mixed body; for instance, the form of a stone,\nor of any sort of soul.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Intellectual Soul Is Properly United to Such a Body?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is improperly\nunited to such a body. For matter must be proportionate to the form.\nBut the intellectual soul is incorruptible. Therefore it is not\nproperly united to a corruptible body.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the intellectual soul is a perfectly immaterial\nform; a proof whereof is its operation in which corporeal matter does\nnot share. But the more subtle is the body, the less has it of matter.\nTherefore the soul should be united to a most subtle body, to fire,\nfor instance, and not to a mixed body, still less to a terrestrial\nbody.\n\nObj. 3: Further, since the form is the principle of the species, one\nform cannot produce a variety of species. But the intellectual soul\nis one form. Therefore, it should not be united to a body which is\ncomposed of parts belonging to various species.\n\nObj. 4: Further, what is susceptible of a more perfect form should\nitself be more perfect. But the intellectual soul is the most perfect\nof souls. Therefore since the bodies of other animals are naturally\nprovided with a covering, for instance, with hair instead of clothes,\nand hoofs instead of shoes; and are, moreover, naturally provided\nwith arms, as claws, teeth, and horns; it seems that the intellectual\nsoul should not have been united to a body which is imperfect as\nbeing deprived of the above means of protection.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that \"the\nsoul is the act of a physical organic body having life potentially.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the\nmatter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the\nmatter is such as it is; and not conversely. Now the intellectual\nsoul, as we have seen above (Q. 55, A. 2) in the order of nature,\nholds the lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it\nis not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels\nare; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the\nsenses, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But nature never fails in\nnecessary things: therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed\nnot only with the power of understanding, but also with the power of\nfeeling. Now the action of the senses is not performed without a\ncorporeal instrument. Therefore it behooved the intellectual soul to\nbe united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense.\n\nNow all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. But the\norgan of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, such as hot\nand cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has\nthe perception; thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries,\nand is able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of touch is\nreduced to an equable complexion, the more sensitive will be the\ntouch. But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its\ncompleteness; because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists\nmore perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).\nTherefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be\na mixed body, above others reduced to the most equable complexion. For\nthis reason among animals, man has the best sense of touch. And among\nmen, those who have the best sense of touch have the best\nintelligence. A sign of which is that we observe \"those who are\nrefined in body are well endowed in mind,\" as stated in _De Anima_ ii,\n9.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Perhaps someone might attempt to answer this by saying\nthat before sin the human body was incorruptible. This answer does\nnot seem sufficient; because before sin the human body was immortal\nnot by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace; otherwise its\nimmortality would not be forfeited through sin, as neither was the\nimmortality of the devil.\n\nTherefore we answer otherwise by observing that in matter two\nconditions are to be found; one which is chosen in order that the\nmatter be suitable to the form; the other which follows by force of\nthe first disposition. The artisan, for instance, for the form of the\nsaw chooses iron adapted for cutting through hard material; but that\nthe teeth of the saw may become blunt and rusted, follows by force of\nthe matter itself. So the intellectual soul requires a body of equable\ncomplexion, which, however, is corruptible by force of its matter. If,\nhowever, it be said that God could avoid this, we answer that in the\nformation of natural things we do not consider what God might do; but\nwhat is suitable to the nature of things, as Augustine says (Gen. ad\nlit. ii, 1). God, however, provided in this case by applying a remedy\nagainst death in the gift of grace.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by\nreason of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on\naccount of the sensitive power, which requires an organ of equable\ntemperament. Therefore the intellectual soul had to be united to such\na body, and not to a simple element, or to a mixed body, in which\nfire was in excess; because otherwise there could not be an\nequability of temperament. And this body of an equable temperament\nhas a dignity of its own by reason of its being remote from\ncontraries, thereby resembling in a way a heavenly body.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The parts of an animal, for instance, the eye, hand,\nflesh, and bones, and so forth, do not make the species; but the\nwhole does, and therefore, properly speaking, we cannot say that\nthese are of different species, but that they are of various\ndispositions. This is suitable to the intellectual soul, which,\nalthough it be one in its essence, yet on account of its perfection,\nis manifold in power: and therefore, for its various operations it\nrequires various dispositions in the parts of the body to which it is\nunited. For this reason we observe that there is a greater variety of\nparts in perfect than in imperfect animals; and in these a greater\nvariety than in plants.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The intellectual soul as comprehending universals, has\na power extending to the infinite; therefore it cannot be limited by\nnature to certain fixed natural notions, or even to certain fixed\nmeans whether of defence or of clothing, as is the case with other\nanimals, the souls of which are endowed with knowledge and power in\nregard to fixed particular things. Instead of all these, man has by\nnature his reason and his hands, which are \"the organs of organs\" (De\nAnima iii), since by their means man can make for himself instruments\nof an infinite variety, and for any number of purposes.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Intellectual Soul Is United to the Body Through the Medium\nof Accidental Dispositions?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is united to the\nbody through the medium of accidental dispositions. For every form\nexists in its proper disposed matter. But dispositions to a form are\naccidents. Therefore we must presuppose accidents to be in matter\nbefore the substantial form; and therefore before the soul, since the\nsoul is a substantial form.\n\nObj. 2: Further, various forms of one species require various parts\nof matter. But various parts of matter are unintelligible without\ndivision in measurable quantities. Therefore we must suppose\ndimensions in matter before the substantial forms, which are many\nbelonging to one species.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is spiritual is connected with what is\ncorporeal by virtual contact. But the virtue of the soul is its\npower. Therefore it seems that the soul is united to the body by\nmeans of a power, which is an accident.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Accident is posterior to substance, both in the\norder of time and in the order of reason, as the Philosopher says,\n_Metaph._ vii (Did. vi, 1). Therefore it is unintelligible that any\naccidental form exist in matter before the soul, which is the\nsubstantial form.\n\n_I answer that,_ If the soul were united to the body, merely as a\nmotor, there would be nothing to prevent the existence of certain\ndispositions mediating between the soul and the body; on the\ncontrary, they would be necessary, for on the part of the soul would\nbe required the power to move the body; and on the part of the body,\na certain aptitude to be moved by the soul.\n\nIf, however, the intellectual soul is united to the body as the\nsubstantial form, as we have already said above (A. 1), it is\nimpossible for any accidental disposition to come between the body\nand the soul, or between any substantial form whatever and its\nmatter. The reason is because since matter is in potentiality to all\nmanner of acts in a certain order, what is absolutely first among the\nacts must be understood as being first in matter. Now the first among\nall acts is existence. Therefore, it is impossible for matter to be\napprehended as hot, or as having quantity, before it is actual. But\nmatter has actual existence by the substantial form, which makes it\nto exist absolutely, as we have said above (A. 4). Wherefore it is\nimpossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter\nbefore the substantial form, and consequently before the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As appears from what has been already said (A. 4), the\nmore perfect form virtually contains whatever belongs to the inferior\nforms; therefore while remaining one and the same, it perfects matter\naccording to the various degrees of perfection. For the same\nessential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living being, an\nanimal, and a man. Now it is clear that to every genus follow its own\nproper accidents. Therefore as matter is apprehended as perfected in\nits existence, before it is understood as corporeal, and so on; so\nthose accidents which belong to existence are understood to exist\nbefore corporeity; and thus dispositions are understood in matter\nbefore the form, not as regards all its effects, but as regards the\nsubsequent effect.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Dimensions of quantity are accidents consequent to the\ncorporeity which belongs to the whole matter. Wherefore matter, once\nunderstood as corporeal and measurable, can be understood as distinct\nin its various parts, and as receptive of different forms according\nto the further degrees of perfection. For although it is essentially\nthe same form which gives matter the various degrees of perfection,\nas we have said (ad 1), yet it is considered as different when\nbrought under the observation of reason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A spiritual substance which is united to a body as\nits motor only, is united thereto by power or virtue. But the\nintellectual soul is united by its very being to the body as a\nform; and yet it guides and moves the body by its power and virtue.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Soul Is United to the Animal Body by Means of a Body?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the soul is united to the animal body by\nmeans of a body. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 19), that \"the\nsoul administers the body by light,\" that is, by fire, \"and by air,\nwhich is most akin to a spirit.\" But fire and air are bodies.\nTherefore the soul is united to the human body by means of a body.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a link between two things seems to be that thing\nthe removal of which involves the cessation of their union. But when\nbreathing ceases, the soul is separated from the body. Therefore the\nbreath, which is a subtle body, is the means of union between soul\nand body.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things which are very distant from one another, are\nnot united except by something between them. But the intellectual\nsoul is very distant from the body, both because it is incorporeal,\nand because it is incorruptible. Therefore it seems to be united to\nthe body by means of an incorruptible body, and such would be some\nheavenly light, which would harmonize the elements, and unite them\ntogether.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1): \"We need\nnot ask if the soul and body are one, as neither do we ask if wax and\nits shape are one.\" But the shape is united to the wax without a body\nintervening. Therefore also the soul is thus united to the body.\n\n_I answer that,_ If the soul, according to the Platonists, were united\nto the body merely as a motor, it would be right to say that some\nother bodies must intervene between the soul and body of man, or any\nanimal whatever; for a motor naturally moves what is distant from it\nby means of something nearer.\n\nIf, however, the soul is united to the body as its form, as we have\nsaid (A. 1), it is impossible for it to be united by means of\nanother body. The reason of this is that a thing is one, according as\nit is a being. Now the form, through itself, makes a thing to be\nactual since it is itself essentially an act; nor does it give\nexistence by means of something else. Wherefore the unity of a thing\ncomposed of matter and form, is by virtue of the form itself, which by\nreason of its very nature is united to matter as its act. Nor is there\nany other cause of union except the agent, which causes matter to be\nin act, as the Philosopher says, _Metaph._ viii (Did. vii, 6).\n\nFrom this it is clear how false are the opinions of those who\nmaintained the existence of some mediate bodies between the soul and\nbody of man. Of these certain Platonists said that the intellectual\nsoul has an incorruptible body naturally united to it, from which it\nis never separated, and by means of which it is united to the\ncorruptible body of man. Others said that the soul is united to the\nbody by means of a corporeal spirit. Others said it is united to the\nbody by means of light, which, they say, is a body and of the nature\nof the fifth essence; so that the vegetative soul would be united to\nthe body by means of the light of the sidereal heaven; the sensible\nsoul, by means of the light of the crystal heaven; and the\nintellectual soul by means of the light of the empyrean heaven. Now\nall this is fictitious and ridiculous: for light is not a body; and\nthe fifth essence does not enter materially into the composition of a\nmixed body (since it is unchangeable), but only virtually: and lastly,\nbecause the soul is immediately united to the body as the form to\nmatter.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine speaks there of the soul as it moves the\nbody; whence he uses the word \"administration.\" It is true that it\nmoves the grosser parts of the body by the more subtle parts. And\nthe first instrument of the motive power is a kind of spirit, as the\nPhilosopher says in De causa motus animalium (De mot. animal. x).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The union of soul and body ceases at the cessation of\nbreath, not because this is the means of union, but because of the\nremoval of that disposition by which the body is disposed for such\na union. Nevertheless the breath is a means of moving, as the first\ninstrument of motion.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The soul is indeed very distant from the body, if we\nconsider the condition of each separately: so that if each had a\nseparate existence, many means of connection would have to intervene.\nBut inasmuch as the soul is the form of the body, it has not an\nexistence apart from the existence of the body, but by its own\nexistence is united to the body immediately. This is the case with\nevery form which, if considered as an act, is very distant from\nmatter, which is a being only in potentiality.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Soul Is in Each Part of the Body?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the whole soul is not in each part of\nthe body; for the Philosopher says in _De causa motus animalium_ (De\nmot. animal. x): \"It is not necessary for the soul to be in each part\nof the body; it suffices that it be in some principle of the body\ncausing the other parts to live, for each part has a natural movement\nof its own.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, the soul is in the body of which it is the act. But\nit is the act of an organic body. Therefore it exists only in an\norganic body. But each part of the human body is not an organic body.\nTherefore the whole soul is not in each part.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1) that the\nrelation of a part of the soul to a part of the body, such as the\nsight to the pupil of the eye, is the same as the relation of the\nsoul to the whole body of an animal. If, therefore, the whole soul is\nin each part of the body, it follows that each part of the body is an\nanimal.\n\nObj. 4: Further, all the powers of the soul are rooted in the essence\nof the soul. If, therefore, the whole soul be in each part of the\nbody, it follows that all the powers of the soul are in each part of\nthe body; thus the sight will be in the ear, and hearing in the eye,\nand this is absurd.\n\nObj. 5: Further, if the whole soul is in each part of the body, each\npart of the body is immediately dependent on the soul. Thus one part\nwould not depend on another; nor would one part be nobler than\nanother; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the soul is not in each\npart of the body.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 6), that \"in each\nbody the whole soul is in the whole body, and in each part is entire.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As we have said, if the soul were united to the body\nmerely as its motor, we might say that it is not in each part of the\nbody, but only in one part through which it would move the others. But\nsince the soul is united to the body as its form, it must necessarily\nbe in the whole body, and in each part thereof. For it is not an\naccidental form, but the substantial form of the body. Now the\nsubstantial form perfects not only the whole, but each part of the\nwhole. For since a whole consists of parts, a form of the whole which\ndoes not give existence to each of the parts of the body, is a form\nconsisting in composition and order, such as the form of a house; and\nsuch a form is accidental. But the soul is a substantial form; and\ntherefore it must be the form and the act, not only of the whole, but\nalso of each part. Therefore, on the withdrawal of the soul, as we do\nnot speak of an animal or a man unless equivocally, as we speak of a\npainted animal or a stone animal; so is it with the hand, the eye, the\nflesh and bones, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1). A proof of\nwhich is, that on the withdrawal of the soul, no part of the body\nretains its proper action; although that which retains its species,\nretains the action of the species. But act is in that which it\nactuates: wherefore the soul must be in the whole body, and in each\npart thereof.\n\nThat it is entire in each part thereof, may be concluded from this,\nthat since a whole is that which is divided into parts, there are\nthree kinds of totality, corresponding to three kinds of division.\nThere is a whole which is divided into parts of quantity, as a whole\nline, or a whole body. There is also a whole which is divided into\nlogical and essential parts: as a thing defined is divided into the\nparts of a definition, and a composite into matter and form. There\nis, further, a third kind of whole which is potential, divided into\nvirtual parts. The first kind of totality does not apply to forms,\nexcept perhaps accidentally; and then only to those forms, which have\nan indifferent relationship to a quantitative whole and its parts; as\nwhiteness, as far as its essence is concerned, is equally disposed to\nbe in the whole surface and in each part of the surface; and,\ntherefore, the surface being divided, the whiteness is accidentally\ndivided. But a form which requires variety in the parts, such as a\nsoul, and specially the soul of perfect animals, is not equally\nrelated to the whole and the parts: hence it is not divided\naccidentally when the whole is divided. So therefore quantitative\ntotality cannot be attributed to the soul, either essentially or\naccidentally. But the second kind of totality, which depends on\nlogical and essential perfection, properly and essentially belongs\nto forms: and likewise the virtual totality, because a form is the\nprinciple of operation.\n\nTherefore if it be asked whether the whole whiteness is in the whole\nsurface and in each part thereof, it is necessary to distinguish. If\nwe mean quantitative totality which whiteness has accidentally, then\nthe whole whiteness is not in each part of the surface. The same is to\nbe said of totality of power: since the whiteness which is in the\nwhole surface moves the sight more than the whiteness which is in a\nsmall part thereof. But if we mean totality of species and essence,\nthen the whole whiteness is in each part of a surface.\n\nSince, however, the soul has not quantitative totality, neither\nessentially, nor accidentally, as we have seen; it is enough to say\nthat the whole soul is in each part of the body, by totality of\nperfection and of essence, but not by totality of power. For it is not\nin each part of the body, with regard to each of its powers; but with\nregard to sight, it is in the eye; and with regard to hearing, it is\nin the ear; and so forth. We must observe, however, that since the\nsoul requires variety of parts, its relation to the whole is not the\nsame as its relation to the parts; for to the whole it is compared\nprimarily and essentially, as to its proper and proportionate\nperfectible; but to the parts, secondarily, inasmuch as they are\nordained to the whole.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of the motive power\nof the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The soul is the act of an organic body, as of its\nprimary and proportionate perfectible.\n\nReply Obj. 3: An animal is that which is composed of a soul and a\nwhole body, which is the soul's primary and proportionate\nperfectible. Thus the soul is not in a part. Whence it does not\nfollow that a part of an animal is an animal.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Some of the powers of the soul are in it according as\nit exceeds the entire capacity of the body, namely the intellect and\nthe will; whence these powers are not said to be in any part of the\nbody. Other powers are common to the soul and body; wherefore each of\nthese powers need not be wherever the soul is, but only in that part\nof the body, which is adapted to the operation of such a power.\n\nReply Obj. 5: One part of the body is said to be nobler than another,\non account of the various powers, of which the parts of the body are\nthe organs. For that part which is the organ of a nobler power, is a\nnobler part of the body: as also is that part which serves the same\npower in a nobler manner.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 77\n\nOF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe proceed to consider those things which belong to the powers of the\nsoul; first, in general, secondly, in particular. Under the first head\nthere are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the essence of the soul is its power?\n\n(2) Whether there is one power of the soul, or several?\n\n(3) How the powers of the soul are distinguished from one another?\n\n(4) Of the orders of the powers, one to another;\n\n(5) Whether the powers of the soul are in it as in their subject?\n\n(6) Whether the powers flow from the essence of the soul?\n\n(7) Whether one power rises from another?\n\n(8) Whether all the powers of the soul remain in the soul after death?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Essence of the Soul Is Its Power?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the essence of the soul is its power.\nFor Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4), that \"mind, knowledge, and love\nare in the soul substantially, or, which is the same thing,\nessentially\": and (De Trin. x, 11), that \"memory, understanding, and\nwill are one life, one mind, one essence.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, the soul is nobler than primary matter. But primary\nmatter is its own potentiality. Much more therefore is the soul its\nown power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the substantial form is simpler than the accidental\nform; a sign of which is that the substantial form is not intensified\nor relaxed, but is indivisible. But the accidental form is its own\npower. Much more therefore is that substantial form which is the soul.\n\nObj. 4: Further, we sense by the sensitive power and we understand by\nthe intellectual power. But \"that by which we first sense and\nunderstand\" is the soul, according to the Philosopher (De Anima ii,\n2). Therefore the soul is its own power.\n\nObj. 5: Further, whatever does not belong to the essence is an\naccident. Therefore if the power of the soul is something else\nbesides the essence thereof, it is an accident, which is contrary to\nAugustine, who says that the foregoing (see Obj. 1) \"are not in the\nsoul as in a subject as color or shape, or any other quality, or\nquantity, are in a body; for whatever is so, does not exceed the\nsubject in which it is: Whereas the mind can love and know other\nthings\" (De Trin. ix, 4).\n\nObj. 6: Further, \"a simple form cannot be a subject.\" But the soul is\na simple form; since it is not composed of matter and form, as we\nhave said above (Q. 75, A. 5). Therefore the power of the soul cannot\nbe in it as in a subject.\n\nObj. 7: Further, an accident is not the principle of a substantial\ndifference. But sensitive and rational are substantial differences;\nand they are taken from sense and reason, which are powers of the\nsoul. Therefore the powers of the soul are not accidents; and so it\nwould seem that the power of the soul is its own essence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xi) says that \"heavenly\nspirits are divided into essence, power, and operation.\" Much more,\nthen, in the soul is the essence distinct from the virtue or power.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible to admit that the power of the soul\nis its essence, although some have maintained it. For the present\npurpose this may be proved in two ways. First, because, since power\nand act divide being and every kind of being, we must refer a power\nand its act to the same genus. Therefore, if the act be not in the\ngenus of substance, the power directed to that act cannot be in the\ngenus of substance. Now the operation of the soul is not in the genus\nof substance; for this belongs to God alone, whose operation is His\nown substance. Wherefore the Divine power which is the principle of\nHis operation is the Divine Essence itself. This cannot be true\neither of the soul, or of any creature; as we have said above when\nspeaking of the angels (Q. 54, A. 3). Secondly, this may be also\nshown to be impossible in the soul. For the soul by its very essence\nis an act. Therefore if the very essence of the soul were the\nimmediate principle of operation, whatever has a soul would always\nhave actual vital actions, as that which has a soul is always an\nactually living thing. For as a form the soul is not an act ordained\nto a further act, but the ultimate term of generation. Wherefore,\nfor it to be in potentiality to another act, does not belong to it\naccording to its essence, as a form, but according to its power. So\nthe soul itself, as the subject of its power, is called the first\nact, with a further relation to the second act. Now we observe that\nwhat has a soul is not always actual with respect to its vital\noperations; whence also it is said in the definition of the soul,\nthat it is \"the act of a body having life potentially\"; which\npotentiality, however, \"does not exclude the soul.\" Therefore it\nfollows that the essence of the soul is not its power. For nothing\nis in potentiality by reason of an act, as act.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the mind as it knows and loves\nitself. Thus knowledge and love as referred to the soul as known and\nloved, are substantially or essentially in the soul, for the very\nsubstance or essence of the soul is known and loved. In the same way\nare we to understand what he says in the other passage, that those\nthings are \"one life, one mind, one essence.\" Or, as some say, this\npassage is true in the sense in which the potential whole is\npredicated of its parts, being midway between the universal whole,\nand the integral whole. For the universal whole is in each part\naccording to its entire essence and power; as animal in a man and in\na horse; and therefore it is properly predicated of each part. But\nthe integral whole is not in each part, neither according to its\nwhole essence, nor according to its whole power. Therefore in no way\ncan it be predicated of each part; yet in a way it is predicated,\nthough improperly, of all the parts together; as if we were to say\nthat the wall, roof, and foundations are a house. But the potential\nwhole is in each part according to its whole essence, not, however,\naccording to its whole power. Therefore in a way it can be predicated\nof each part, but not so properly as the universal whole. In this\nsense, Augustine says that the memory, understanding, and the will\nare the one essence of the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The act to which primary matter is in potentiality is\nthe substantial form. Therefore the potentiality of matter is nothing\nelse but its essence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Action belongs to the composite, as does existence;\nfor to act belongs to what exists. Now the composite has substantial\nexistence through the substantial form; and it operates by the power\nwhich results from the substantial form. Hence an active accidental\nform is to the substantial form of the agent (for instance, heat\ncompared to the form of fire) as the power of the soul is to the\nsoul.\n\nReply Obj. 4: That the accidental form is a principle of action is\ndue to the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form is the\nfirst principle of action; but not the proximate principle. In this\nsense the Philosopher says that \"the soul is that whereby we\nunderstand and sense.\"\n\nReply Obj. 5: If we take accident as meaning what is divided against\nsubstance, then there can be no medium between substance and\naccident; because they are divided by affirmation and negation, that\nis, according to existence in a subject, and non-existence in a\nsubject. In this sense, as the power of the soul is not its essence,\nit must be an accident; and it belongs to the second species of\naccident, that of quality. But if we take accident as one of the five\nuniversals, in this sense there is a medium between substance and\naccident. For the substance is all that belongs to the essence of a\nthing; whereas whatever is beyond the essence of a thing cannot be\ncalled accident in this sense; but only what is not caused by the\nessential principle of the species. For the 'proper' does not belong\nto the essence of a thing, but is caused by the essential principles\nof the species; wherefore it is a medium between the essence and\naccident thus understood. In this sense the powers of the soul may be\nsaid to be a medium between substance and accident, as being natural\nproperties of the soul. When Augustine says that knowledge and love\nare not in the soul as accidents in a subject, this must be\nunderstood in the sense given above, inasmuch as they are compared\nto the soul, not as loving and knowing, but as loved and known. His\nargument proceeds in this sense; for if love were in the soul loved\nas in a subject, it would follow that an accident transcends its\nsubject, since even other things are loved through the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 6: Although the soul is not composed of matter and form,\nyet it has an admixture of potentiality, as we have said above (Q.\n75, A. 5, ad 4); and for this reason it can be the subject of an\naccident. The statement quoted is verified in God, Who is the Pure\nAct; in treating of which subject Boethius employs that phrase (De\nTrin. i).\n\nReply Obj. 7: Rational and sensitive, as differences, are not taken\nfrom the powers of sense and reason, but from the sensitive and\nrational soul itself. But because substantial forms, which in\nthemselves are unknown to us, are known by their accidents; nothing\nprevents us from sometimes substituting accidents for substantial\ndifferences.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Are Several Powers of the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are not several powers of the\nsoul. For the intellectual soul approaches nearest to the likeness of\nGod. But in God there is one simple power: and therefore also in the\nintellectual soul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the higher a power is, the more unified it is. But\nthe intellectual soul excels all other forms in power. Therefore\nabove all others it has one virtue or power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to operate belongs to what is in act. But by the\none essence of the soul, man has actual existence in the different\ndegrees of perfection, as we have seen above (Q. 76, AA. 3, 4).\nTherefore by the one power of the soul he performs operations of\nvarious degrees.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher places several powers in the soul\n(De Anima ii, 2,3).\n\n_I answer that,_ Of necessity we must place several powers in the\nsoul. To make this evident, we observe that, as the Philosopher says\n(De Coelo ii, 12), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect\ngoodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by few\nmovements; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect\ngoodness by many movements; and those yet higher acquire perfect\ngoodness by few movements; and the highest perfection is found in\nthose things which acquire perfect goodness without any movement\nwhatever. Thus he is least of all disposed of health, who can only\nacquire imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better disposed\nis he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies; and\nbetter still, he who can by few remedies; best of all is he who has\nperfect health without any remedies. We conclude, therefore, that\nthings which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and\nso they have a few determinate operations and powers. But man can\nacquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire\nbeatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, according to his nature,\nof those to whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul\nrequires many and various operations and powers. But to angels a\nsmaller variety of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power\nor action beyond His own Essence.\n\nThere is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of\npowers--because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal\ncreatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The intellectual soul approaches to the Divine\nlikeness, more than inferior creatures, in being able to acquire\nperfect goodness; although by many and various means; and in this it\nfalls short of more perfect creatures.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A unified power is superior if it extends to equal\nthings: but a multiform power is superior to it, if it is over many\nthings.\n\nReply Obj. 3: One thing has one substantial existence, but may have\nseveral operations. So there is one essence of the soul, with several\npowers.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Powers Are Distinguished by Their Acts and Objects?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the powers of the soul are not\ndistinguished by acts and objects. For nothing is determined to its\nspecies by what is subsequent and extrinsic to it. But the act is\nsubsequent to the power; and the object is extrinsic to it. Therefore\nthe soul's powers are not specifically distinct by acts and objects.\n\nObj. 2: Further, contraries are what differ most from each other.\nTherefore if the powers are distinguished by their objects, it follows\nthat the same power could not have contrary objects. This is clearly\nfalse in almost all the powers; for the power of vision extends to\nwhite and black, and the power to taste to sweet and bitter.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the cause be removed, the effect is removed.\nHence if the difference of powers came from the difference of objects,\nthe same object would not come under different powers. This is clearly\nfalse; for the same thing is known by the cognitive power, and desired\nby the appetitive.\n\nObj. 4: Further, that which of itself is the cause of anything, is\nthe cause thereof, wherever it is. But various objects which belong\nto various powers, belong also to some one power; as sound and color\nbelong to sight and hearing, which are different powers, yet they\ncome under the one power of common sense. Therefore the powers are\nnot distinguished according to the difference of their objects.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Things that are subsequent are distinguished by\nwhat precedes. But the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) that \"acts\nand operations precede the powers according to reason; and these\nagain are preceded by their opposites,\" that is their objects.\nTherefore the powers are distinguished according to their acts and\nobjects.\n\n_I answer that,_ A power as such is directed to an act. Wherefore we\nseek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is\ndirected, and consequently the nature of a power is diversified, as\nthe nature of the act is diversified. Now the nature of an act is\ndiversified according to the various natures of the objects. For every\nact is either of an active power or of a passive power. Now, the\nobject is to the act of a passive power, as the principle and moving\ncause: for color is the principle of vision, inasmuch as it moves the\nsight. On the other hand, to the act of an active power the object is\na term and end; as the object of the power of growth is perfect\nquantity, which is the end of growth. Now, from these two things an\nact receives its species, namely, from its principle, or from its end\nor term; for the act of heating differs from the act of cooling, in\nthis, that the former proceeds from something hot, which is the active\nprinciple, to heat; the latter from something cold, which is the\nactive principle, to cold. Therefore the powers are of necessity\ndistinguished by their acts and objects.\n\nNevertheless, we must observe that things which are accidental do not\nchange the species. For since to be colored is accidental to an\nanimal, its species is not changed by a difference of color, but by a\ndifference in that which belongs to the nature of an animal, that is\nto say, by a difference in the sensitive soul, which is sometimes\nrational, and sometimes otherwise. Hence \"rational\" and \"irrational\"\nare differences dividing animal, constituting its various species. In\nlike manner therefore, not any variety of objects diversifies the\npowers of the soul, but a difference in that to which the power of its\nvery nature is directed. Thus the senses of their very nature are\ndirected to the passive quality which of itself is divided into color,\nsound, and the like, and therefore there is one sensitive power with\nregard to color, namely, the sight, and another with regard to sound,\nnamely, hearing. But it is accidental to a passive quality, for\ninstance, to something colored, to be a musician or a grammarian,\ngreat or small, a man or a stone. Therefore by reason of such\ndifferences the powers of the soul are not distinct.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Act, though subsequent in existence to power, is,\nnevertheless, prior to it in intention and logically; as the end is\nwith regard to the agent. And the object, although extrinsic, is,\nnevertheless, the principle or end of the action; and those\nconditions which are intrinsic to a thing, are proportionate to its\nprinciple and end.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If any power were to have one of two contraries as such\nfor its object, the other contrary would belong to another power. But\nthe power of the soul does not regard the nature of the contrary as\nsuch, but rather the common aspect of both contraries; as sight does\nnot regard white as such, but as color. This is because of two\ncontraries one, in a manner, includes the idea of the other, since\nthey are to one another as perfect and imperfect.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Nothing prevents things which coincide in subject, from\nbeing considered under different aspects; therefore they can belong\nto various powers of the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The higher power of itself regards a more universal\nformality of the object than the lower power; because the higher a\npower is, to a greater number of things does it extend. Therefore\nmany things are combined in the one formality of the object, which\nthe higher power considers of itself; while they differ in the\nformalities regarded by the lower powers of themselves. Thus it is\nthat various objects belong to various lower powers; which objects,\nhowever, are subject to one higher power.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Among the Powers of the Soul There Is Order?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no order among the powers of\nthe soul. For in those things which come under one division, there is\nno before and after, but all are naturally simultaneous. But the\npowers of the soul are contradistinguished from one another. Therefore\nthere is no order among them.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the powers of the soul are referred to their objects\nand to the soul itself. On the part of the soul, there is not order\namong them, because the soul is one. In like manner the objects are\nvarious and dissimilar, as color and sound. Therefore there is no\norder among the powers of the soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, where there is order among powers, we find that the\noperation of one depends on the operation of another. But the action\nof one power of the soul does not depend on that of another; for\nsight can act independently of hearing, and conversely. Therefore\nthere is no order among the powers of the soul.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (De Anima ii, 3) compares the parts\nor powers of the soul to figures. But figures have an order among\nthemselves. Therefore the powers of the soul have order.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since the soul is one, and the powers are many; and\nsince a number of things that proceed from one must proceed in a\ncertain order; there must be some order among the powers of the soul.\nAccordingly we may observe a triple order among them, two of which\ncorrespond to the dependence of one power on another; while the third\nis taken from the order of the objects. Now the dependence of one\npower on another can be taken in two ways; according to the order of\nnature, forasmuch as perfect things are by their nature prior to\nimperfect things; and according to the order of generation and time;\nforasmuch as from being imperfect, a thing comes to be perfect. Thus,\naccording to the first kind of order among the powers, the\nintellectual powers are prior to the sensitive powers; wherefore they\ndirect them and command them. Likewise the sensitive powers are prior\nin this order to the powers of the nutritive soul.\n\nIn the second kind of order, it is the other way about. For the powers\nof the nutritive soul are prior by way of generation to the powers of\nthe sensitive soul; for which, therefore, they prepare the body. The\nsame is to be said of the sensitive powers with regard to the\nintellectual. But in the third kind of order, certain sensitive powers\nare ordered among themselves, namely, sight, hearing, and smelling.\nFor the visible naturally comes first; since it is common to higher\nand lower bodies. But sound is audible in the air, which is naturally\nprior to the mingling of elements, of which smell is the result.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The species of a given genus are to one another as\nbefore and after, like numbers and figures, if considered in their\nnature; although they may be said to be simultaneous, according as\nthey receive the predication of the common genus.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This order among the powers of the soul is both on the\npart of the soul (which, though it be one according to its essence,\nhas a certain aptitude to various acts in a certain order) and on the\npart of the objects, and furthermore on the part of the acts, as we\nhave said above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument is verified as regards those powers among\nwhich order of the third kind exists. Those powers among which the\ntwo other kinds of order exist are such that the action of one\ndepends on another.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 5]\n\nWhether All the Powers of the Soul Are in the Soul As Their Subject?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul are in the\nsoul as their subject. For as the powers of the body are to the body;\nso are the powers of the soul to the soul. But the body is the subject\nof the corporeal powers. Therefore the soul is the subject of the\npowers of the soul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the operations of the powers of the soul are\nattributed to the body by reason of the soul; because, as the\nPhilosopher says (De Anima ii, 2), \"The soul is that by which we\nsense and understand primarily.\" But the natural principles of the\noperations of the soul are the powers. Therefore the powers are\nprimarily in the soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24) that the\nsoul senses certain things, not through the body, in fact, without\nthe body, as fear and such like; and some things through the body.\nBut if the sensitive powers were not in the soul alone as their\nsubject, the soul could not sense anything without the body.\nTherefore the soul is the subject of the sensitive powers; and for\na similar reason, of all the other powers.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigilia i) that\n\"sensation belongs neither to the soul, nor to the body, but to the\ncomposite.\" Therefore the sensitive power is in \"the composite\" as\nits subject. Therefore the soul alone is not the subject of all the\npowers.\n\n_I answer that,_ The subject of operative power is that which is able\nto operate, for every accident denominates its proper subject. Now\nthe same is that which is able to operate, and that which does\noperate. Wherefore the \"subject of power\" is of necessity \"the\nsubject of operation,\" as again the Philosopher says in the beginning\nof _De Somno et Vigilia._ Now, it is clear from what we have said\nabove (Q. 75, AA. 2, 3; Q. 76, A. 1, ad 1), that some operations of\nthe soul are performed without a corporeal organ, as understanding\nand will. Hence the powers of these operations are in the soul as\ntheir subject. But some operations of the soul are performed by means\nof corporeal organs; as sight by the eye, and hearing by the ear. And\nso it is with all the other operations of the nutritive and sensitive\nparts. Therefore the powers which are the principles of these\noperations have their subject in the composite, and not in the soul\nalone.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All the powers are said to belong to the soul, not as\ntheir subject, but as their principle; because it is by the soul that\nthe composite has the power to perform such operations.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All such powers are primarily in the soul, as compared\nto the composite; not as in their subject, but as in their principle.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Plato's opinion was that sensation is an operation\nproper to the soul, just as understanding is. Now in many things\nrelating to Philosophy Augustine makes use of the opinions of Plato,\nnot asserting them as true, but relating them. However, as far as the\npresent question is concerned, when it is said that the soul senses\nsome things with the body, and some without the body, this can be\ntaken in two ways. Firstly, the words \"with the body or without the\nbody\" may determine the act of sense in its mode of proceeding from\nthe sentient. Thus the soul senses nothing without the body, because\nthe action of sensation cannot proceed from the soul except by a\ncorporeal organ. Secondly, they may be understood as determining the\nact of sense on the part of the object sensed. Thus the soul senses\nsome things with the body, that is, things existing in the body, as\nwhen it feels a wound or something of that sort; while it senses some\nthings without the body, that is, which do not exist in the body, but\nonly in the apprehension of the soul, as when it feels sad or joyful\non hearing something.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Powers of the Soul Flow from Its Essence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the powers of the soul do not flow\nfrom its essence. For different things do not proceed from one\nsimple thing. But the essence of the soul is one and simple. Since,\ntherefore, the powers of the soul are many and various, they cannot\nproceed from its essence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that from which a thing proceeds is its cause.\nBut the essence of the soul cannot be said to be the cause of the\npowers; as is clear if one considers the different kinds of causes.\nTherefore the powers of the soul do not flow from its essence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, emanation involves some sort of movement. But\nnothing is moved by itself, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. vii,\n1,2); except, perhaps, by reason of a part of itself, as an animal\nis said to be moved by itself, because one part thereof moves and\nanother is moved. Neither is the soul moved, as the Philosopher\nproves (De Anima i, 4). Therefore the soul does not produce its\npowers within itself.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The powers of the soul are its natural properties.\nBut the subject is the cause of its proper accidents; whence also it\nis included in the definition of accident, as is clear from _Metaph._\nvii (Did. vi, 4). Therefore the powers of the soul proceed from its\nessence as their cause.\n\n_I answer that,_ The substantial and the accidental form partly agree\nand partly differ. They agree in this, that each is an act; and that\nby each of them something is after a manner actual. They differ,\nhowever, in two respects. First, because the substantial form makes\na thing to exist absolutely, and its subject is something purely\npotential. But the accidental form does not make a thing to exist\nabsolutely but to be such, or so great, or in some particular\ncondition; for its subject is an actual being. Hence it is clear that\nactuality is observed in the substantial form prior to its being\nobserved in the subject: and since that which is first in a genus is\nthe cause in that genus, the substantial form causes existence in its\nsubject. On the other hand, actuality is observed in the subject of\nthe accidental form prior to its being observed in the accidental\nform; wherefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the\nactuality of the subject. So the subject, forasmuch as it is in\npotentiality, is receptive of the accidental form: but forasmuch as\nit is in act, it produces it. This I say of the proper and _per se_\naccident; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is\nreceptive only, the accident being caused by an extrinsic agent.\nSecondly, substantial and accidental forms differ, because, since that\nwhich is the less principal exists for the sake of that which is the\nmore principal, matter therefore exists on account of the substantial\nform; while on the contrary, the accidental form exists on account of\nthe completeness of the subject.\n\nNow it is clear, from what has been said (A. 5), that either the\nsubject of the soul's powers is the soul itself alone, which can be\nthe subject of an accident, forasmuch as it has something of\npotentiality, as we have said above (A. 1, ad 6); or else this subject\nis the composite. Now the composite is actual by the soul. Whence it\nis clear that all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the\nsoul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul, as\nfrom their principle; because it has already been said that the\naccident is caused by the subject according as it is actual, and is\nreceived into it according as it is in potentiality.\n\nReply Obj. 1: From one simple thing many things may proceed\nnaturally, in a certain order; or again if there be diversity of\nrecipients. Thus, from the one essence of the soul many and various\npowers proceed; both because order exists among these powers; and\nalso by reason of the diversity of the corporeal organs.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The subject is both the final cause, and in a way the\nactive cause, of its proper accident. It is also as it were the\nmaterial cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accident. From\nthis we may gather that the essence of the soul is the cause of all\nits powers, as their end, and as their active principle; and of some\nas receptive thereof.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The emanation of proper accidents from their subject is\nnot by way of transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance;\nthus one thing results naturally from another, as color from light.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 7]\n\nWhether One Power of the Soul Arises from Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one power of the soul does not arise\nfrom another. For if several things arise together, one of them does\nnot arise from another. But all the powers of the soul are created at\nthe same time with the soul. Therefore one of them does not arise from\nanother.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the power of the soul arises from the soul as an\naccident from the subject. But one power of the soul cannot be the\nsubject of another; because nothing is the accident of an accident.\nTherefore one power does not arise from another.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one opposite does not arise from the other opposite;\nbut everything arises from that which is like it in species. Now the\npowers of the soul are oppositely divided, as various species.\nTherefore one of them does not proceed from another.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Powers are known by their actions. But the action\nof one power is caused by the action of another power, as the action\nof the imagination by the action of the senses. Therefore one power\nof the soul is caused by another.\n\n_I answer that,_ In those things which proceed from one according to\na natural order, as the first is the cause of all, so that which is\nnearer to the first is, in a way, the cause of those which are more\nremote. Now it has been shown above (A. 4) that among the powers of\nthe soul there are several kinds of order. Therefore one power of the\nsoul proceeds from the essence of the soul by the medium of another.\nBut since the essence of the soul is compared to the powers both as a\nprinciple active and final, and as a receptive principle, either\nseparately by itself, or together with the body; and since the agent\nand the end are more perfect, while the receptive principle, as such,\nis less perfect; it follows that those powers of the soul which\nprecede the others, in the order of perfection and nature, are the\nprinciples of the others, after the manner of the end and active\nprinciple. For we see that the senses are for the sake of the\nintelligence, and not the other way about. The senses, moreover, are\na certain imperfect participation of the intelligence; wherefore,\naccording to their natural origin, they proceed from the intelligence\nas the imperfect from the perfect. But considered as receptive\nprinciples, the more perfect powers are principles with regard to the\nothers; thus the soul, according as it has the sensitive power, is\nconsidered as the subject, and as something material with regard to\nthe intelligence. On this account, the more imperfect powers precede\nthe others in the order of generation, for the animal is generated\nbefore the man.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the power of the soul flows from the essence, not\nby a transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance, and is\nsimultaneous with the soul, so is it the case with one power as\nregards another.\n\nReply Obj. 2: An accident cannot of itself be the subject of an\naccident; but one accident is received prior to another into\nsubstance, as quantity prior to quality. In this sense one accident\nis said to be the subject of another; as surface is of color,\ninasmuch as substance receives an accident through the means of\nanother. The same thing may be said of the powers of the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The powers of the soul are opposed to one another, as\nperfect and imperfect; as also are the species of numbers and\nfigures. But this opposition does not prevent the origin of one from\nanother, because imperfect things naturally proceed from perfect\nthings.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 77, Art. 8]\n\nWhether All the Powers Remain in the Soul When Separated from the\nBody?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all the powers of the soul remain in\nthe soul separated from the body. For we read in the book _De Spiritu\net Anima_ that \"the soul withdraws from the body, taking with itself\nsense and imagination, reason and intelligence, concupiscibility and\nirascibility.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, the powers of the soul are its natural properties.\nBut properties are always in that to which they belong; and are never\nseparated from it. Therefore the powers of the soul are in it even\nafter death.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the powers even of the sensitive soul are not\nweakened when the body becomes weak; because, as the Philosopher says\n(De Anima i, 4), \"If an old man were given the eye of a young man, he\nwould see even as well as a young man.\" But weakness is the road to\ncorruption. Therefore the powers of the soul are not corrupted when\nthe body is corrupted, but remain in the separated soul.\n\nObj. 4: Further, memory is a power of the sensitive soul, as the\nPhilosopher proves (De Memor. et Remin. 1). But memory remains in the\nseparated soul; for it was said to the rich glutton whose soul was in\nhell: \"Remember that thou didst receive good things during thy\nlifetime\" (Luke 16:25). Therefore memory remains in the separated\nsoul; and consequently the other powers of the sensitive part.\n\nObj. 5: Further, joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part, which\nis a power of the sensitive soul. But it is clear that separate souls\ngrieve or rejoice at the pains or rewards which they receive.\nTherefore the concupiscible power remains in the separate soul.\n\nObj. 6: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 32) that, as the\nsoul, when the body lies senseless, yet not quite dead, sees some\nthings by imaginary vision; so also when by death the soul is quite\nseparate from the body. But the imagination is a power of the\nsensitive part. Therefore the power of the sensitive part remains in\nthe separate soul; and consequently all the other powers.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (De Eccl. Dogm. xix) that \"of two\nsubstances only does man consist; the soul with its reason, and the\nbody with its senses.\" Therefore the body being dead, the sensitive\npowers do not remain.\n\n_I answer that,_ As we have said already (AA. 5, 6, 7), all the\npowers of the soul belong to the soul alone as their principle. But\nsome powers belong to the soul alone as their subject; as the\nintelligence and the will. These powers must remain in the soul,\nafter the destruction of the body. But other powers are subjected\nin the composite; as all the powers of the sensitive and nutritive\nparts. Now accidents cannot remain after the destruction of the\nsubject. Wherefore, the composite being destroyed, such powers do not\nremain actually; but they remain virtually in the soul, as in their\nprinciple or root.\n\nSo it is false that, as some say, these powers remain in the soul even\nafter the corruption of the body. It is much more false that, as they\nsay also, the acts of these powers remain in the separate soul;\nbecause these powers have no act apart from the corporeal organ.\n\nReply Obj. 1: That book has no authority, and so what is there\nwritten can be despised with the same facility as it was said;\nalthough we may say that the soul takes with itself these powers,\nnot actually but virtually.\n\nReply Obj. 2: These powers, which we say do not actually remain in\nthe separate soul, are not the properties of the soul alone, but of\nthe composite.\n\nReply Obj. 3: These powers are said not to be weakened when the body\nbecomes weak, because the soul remains unchangeable, and is the\nvirtual principle of these powers.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The recollection spoken of there is to be taken in the\nsame way as Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xiv, 7) places memory in the\nmind; not as a part of the sensitive soul.\n\nReply Obj. 5: In the separate soul, sorrow and joy are not in the\nsensitive, but in the intellectual appetite, as in the angels.\n\nReply Obj. 6: Augustine in that passage is speaking as inquiring, not\nas asserting. Wherefore he retracted some things which he had said\nthere (Retrac. ii, 24).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 78\n\nOF THE SPECIFIC POWERS OF THE SOUL\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe next treat of the powers of the soul specifically. The theologian,\nhowever, has only to inquire specifically concerning the intellectual\nand appetitive powers, in which the virtues reside. And since the\nknowledge of these powers depends to a certain extent on the other\npowers, our consideration of the powers of the soul taken\nspecifically will be divided into three parts: first, we shall\nconsider those powers which are a preamble to the intellect;\nsecondly, the intellectual powers; thirdly, the appetitive powers.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) The powers of the soul considered generally;\n\n(2) The various species of the vegetative part;\n\n(3) The exterior senses;\n\n(4) The interior senses.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 78, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Are to Be Distinguished Five Genera of Powers in the\nSoul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are not to be distinguished\nfive genera of powers in the soul--namely, vegetative, sensitive,\nappetitive, locomotive, and intellectual. For the powers of the soul\nare called its parts. But only three parts of the soul are commonly\nassigned--namely, the vegetative soul, the sensitive soul, and the\nrational soul. Therefore there are only three genera of powers in\nthe soul, and not five.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the powers of the soul are the principles of its\nvital operations. Now, in four ways is a thing said to live. For the\nPhilosopher says (De Anima ii, 2): \"In several ways a thing is said\nto live, and even if only one of these is present, the thing is said\nto live; as intellect and sense, local movement and rest, and lastly,\nmovement of decrease and increase due to nourishment.\" Therefore\nthere are only four genera of powers of the soul, as the appetitive\nis excluded.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a special kind of soul ought not to be assigned as\nregards what is common to all the powers. Now desire is common to\neach power of the soul. For sight desires an appropriate visible\nobject; whence we read (Ecclus. 40:22): \"The eye desireth favor and\nbeauty, but more than these green sown fields.\" In the same way every\nother power desires its appropriate object. Therefore the appetitive\npower should not be made a special genus of the powers of the soul.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the moving principle in animals is sense,\nintellect or appetite, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10).\nTherefore the motive power should not be added to the above as a\nspecial genus of soul.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), \"The powers\nare the vegetative, the sensitive, the appetitive, the locomotion, and\nthe intellectual.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ There are five genera of powers of the soul, as above\nnumbered. Of these, three are called souls, and four are called modes\nof living. The reason of this diversity lies in the various souls\nbeing distinguished accordingly as the operation of the soul\ntranscends the operation of the corporeal nature in various ways; for\nthe whole corporeal nature is subject to the soul, and is related to\nit as its matter and instrument. There exists, therefore, an operation\nof the soul which so far exceeds the corporeal nature that it is not\neven performed by any corporeal organ; and such is the operation of\nthe _rational soul._ Below this, there is another operation of the\nsoul, which is indeed performed through a corporeal organ, but not\nthrough a corporeal quality, and this is the operation of the\n_sensitive soul;_ for though hot and cold, wet and dry, and other such\ncorporeal qualities are required for the work of the senses, yet they\nare not required in such a way that the operation of the senses takes\nplace by virtue of such qualities; but only for the proper disposition\nof the organ. The lowest of the operations of the soul is that which\nis performed by a corporeal organ, and by virtue of a corporeal\nquality. Yet this transcends the operation of the corporeal nature;\nbecause the movements of bodies are caused by an extrinsic principle,\nwhile these operations are from an intrinsic principle; for this is\ncommon to all the operations of the soul; since every animate thing,\nin some way, moves itself. Such is the operation of the _vegetative\nsoul;_ for digestion, and what follows, is caused instrumentally by\nthe action of heat, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4).\n\nNow the powers of the soul are distinguished generically by their\nobjects. For the higher a power is, the more universal is the object\nto which it extends, as we have said above (Q. 77, A. 3, ad 4). But\nthe object of the soul's operation may be considered in a triple\norder. For in the soul there is a power the object of which is only\nthe body that is united to that soul; the powers of this genus are\ncalled \"vegetative\" for the vegetative power acts only on the body to\nwhich the soul is united. There is another genus in the powers of the\nsoul, which genus regards a more universal object--namely, every\nsensible body, not only the body to which the soul is united. And\nthere is yet another genus in the powers of the soul, which genus\nregards a still more universal object--namely, not only the sensible\nbody, but all being in universal. Wherefore it is evident that the\nlatter two genera of the soul's powers have an operation in regard\nnot merely to that which is united to them, but also to something\nextrinsic. Now, since whatever operates must in some way be united to\nthe object about which it operates, it follows of necessity that this\nsomething extrinsic, which is the object of the soul's operation,\nmust be related to the soul in a twofold manner. First, inasmuch as\nthis something extrinsic has a natural aptitude to be united to the\nsoul, and to be by its likeness in the soul. In this way there are\ntwo kinds of powers--namely, the \"sensitive\" in regard to the less\ncommon object--the sensible body; and the \"intellectual,\" in regard\nto the most common object--universal being. Secondly, forasmuch as\nthe soul itself has an inclination and tendency to the something\nextrinsic. And in this way there are again two kinds of powers in the\nsoul: one--the \"appetitive\"--in respect of which the soul is referred\nto something extrinsic as to an end, which is first in the intention;\nthe other--the \"locomotive\" power--in respect of which the soul is\nreferred to something extrinsic as to the term of its operation and\nmovement; for every animal is moved for the purpose of realizing its\ndesires and intentions.\n\nThe modes of living are distinguished according to the degrees of\nliving things. There are some living things in which there exists only\nvegetative power, as the plants. There are others in which with the\nvegetative there exists also the sensitive, but not the locomotive\npower; such as immovable animals, as shellfish. There are others which\nbesides this have locomotive powers, as perfect animals, which require\nmany things for their life, and consequently movement to seek\nnecessaries of life from a distance. And there are some living things\nwhich with these have intellectual power--namely, men. But the\nappetitive power does not constitute a degree of living things;\nbecause wherever there is sense there is also appetite (De Anima ii,\n3).\n\nThus the first two objections are hereby solved.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The \"natural appetite\" is that inclination which each\nthing has, of its own nature, for something; wherefore by its natural\nappetite each power desires something suitable to itself. But the\n\"animal appetite\" results from the form apprehended; this sort of\nappetite requires a special power of the soul--mere apprehension does\nnot suffice. For a thing is desired as it exists in its own nature,\nwhereas in the apprehensive power it exists not according to its own\nnature, but according to its likeness. Whence it is clear that sight\ndesires naturally a visible object for the purpose of its act\nonly--namely, for the purpose of seeing; but the animal by the\nappetitive power desires the thing seen, not merely for the purpose\nof seeing it, but also for other purposes. But if the soul did not\nrequire things perceived by the senses, except on account of the\nactions of the senses, that is, for the purpose of sensing them;\nthere would be no need for a special genus of appetitive powers,\nsince the natural appetite of the powers would suffice.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Although sense and appetite are principles of movement\nin perfect animals, yet sense and appetite, as such, are not\nsufficient to cause movement, unless another power be added to them;\nfor immovable animals have sense and appetite, and yet they have not\nthe power of motion. Now this motive power is not only in the\nappetite and sense as commanding the movement, but also in the parts\nof the body, to make them obey the appetite of the soul which moves\nthem. Of this we have a sign in the fact that when the members are\ndeprived of their natural disposition, they do not move in obedience\nto the appetite.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 78, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Parts of the Vegetative Soul Are Fittingly Described As\nthe Nutritive, Augmentative, and Generative?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are\nnot fittingly described--namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and\ngenerative. For these are called \"natural\" forces. But the powers of\nthe soul are above the natural forces. Therefore we should not class\nthe above forces as powers of the soul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, we should not assign a particular power of the\nsoul to that which is common to living and non-living things. But\ngeneration is common to all things that can be generated and\ncorrupted, whether living or not living. Therefore the generative\nforce should not be classed as a power of the soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the soul is more powerful than the body. But the\nbody by the same force gives species and quantity; much more,\ntherefore, does the soul. Therefore the augmentative power of the\nsoul is not distinct from the generative power.\n\nObj. 4: Further, everything is preserved in being by that whereby it\nexists. But the generative power is that whereby a living thing\nexists. Therefore by the same power the living thing is preserved.\nNow the nutritive force is directed to the preservation of the living\nthing (De Anima ii, 4), being \"a power which is capable of preserving\nwhatever receives it.\" Therefore we should not distinguish the\nnutritive power from the generative.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 2,4) that the\noperations of this soul are \"generation, the use of food,\" and (cf.\n_De Anima_ iii, 9) \"growth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The vegetative part has three powers. For the\nvegetative part, as we have said (A. 1), has for its object the body\nitself, living by the soul; for which body a triple operation of the\nsoul is required. One is whereby it acquires existence, and to this\nis directed the _generative_ power. Another is whereby the living\nbody acquires its due quantity; to this is directed the\n_augmentative_ power. Another is whereby the body of a living thing\nis preserved in its existence and in its due quantity; to this is\ndirected the _nutritive_ power.\n\nWe must, however, observe a difference among these powers. The\nnutritive and the augmentative have their effect where they exist,\nsince the body itself united to the soul grows and is preserved by the\naugmentative and nutritive powers which exist in one and the same\nsoul. But the generative power has its effect, not in one and the same\nbody but in another; for a thing cannot generate itself. Therefore the\ngenerative power, in a way, approaches to the dignity of the sensitive\nsoul, which has an operation extending to extrinsic things, although\nin a more excellent and more universal manner; for that which is\nhighest in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest in\nthe higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius (Div. Nom. vii).\nTherefore, of these three powers, the generative has the greater\nfinality, nobility, and perfection, as the Philosopher says (De Anima\nii, 4), for it belongs to a thing which is already perfect to \"produce\nanother like unto itself.\" And the generative power is served by the\naugmentative and nutritive powers; and the augmentative power by the\nnutritive.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Such forces are called natural, both because they\nproduce an effect like that of nature, which also gives existence,\nquantity and preservation (although the above forces accomplish these\nthings in a more perfect way); and because those forces perform their\nactions instrumentally, through the active and passive qualities,\nwhich are the principles of natural actions.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Generation of inanimate things is entirely from an\nextrinsic source; whereas the generation of living things is in a\nhigher way, through something in the living thing itself, which is\nthe semen containing the principle productive of the body. Therefore\nthere must be in the living thing a power that prepares this semen;\nand this is the generative power.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since the generation of living things is from a semen,\nit is necessary that in the beginning an animal of small size be\ngenerated. For this reason it must have a power in the soul, whereby\nit is brought to its appropriate size. But the inanimate body is\ngenerated from determinate matter by an extrinsic agent; therefore\nit receives at once its nature and its quantity, according to the\ncondition of the matter.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As we have said above (A. 1), the operation of the\nvegetative principle is performed by means of heat, the property of\nwhich is to consume humidity. Therefore, in order to restore the\nhumidity thus lost, the nutritive power is required, whereby the food\nis changed into the substance of the body. This is also necessary for\nthe action of the augmentative and generative powers.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 78, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Five Exterior Senses Are Properly Distinguished?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem inaccurate to distinguish five exterior\nsenses. For sense can know accidents. But there are many kinds of\naccidents. Therefore, as powers are distinguished by their objects,\nit seems that the senses are multiplied according to the number of\nthe kinds of accidents.\n\nObj. 2: Further, magnitude and shape, and other things which are\ncalled \"common sensibles,\" are \"not sensibles by accident,\" but are\ncontradistinguished from them by the Philosopher (De Anima ii, 6).\nNow the diversity of objects, as such, diversifies the powers. Since,\ntherefore, magnitude and shape are further from color than sound is,\nit seems that there is much more need for another sensitive power\nthan can grasp magnitude or shape than for that which grasps color or\nsound.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one sense regards one contrariety; as sight regards\nwhite and black. But the sense of touch grasps several contraries;\nsuch as hot or cold, damp or dry, and suchlike. Therefore it is not a\nsingle sense but several. Therefore there are more than five senses.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a species is not divided against its genus. But\ntaste is a kind of touch. Therefore it should not be classed as a\ndistinct sense of touch.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 1): \"There is\nno other besides the five senses.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The reason of the distinction and number of the\nsenses has been assigned by some to the organs in which one or other\nof the elements preponderate, as water, air, or the like. By others\nit has been assigned to the medium, which is either in conjunction or\nextrinsic and is either water or air, or such like. Others have\nascribed it to the various natures of the sensible qualities,\naccording as such quality belongs to a simple body or results from\ncomplexity. But none of these explanations is apt. For the powers are\nnot for the organs, but the organs for the powers; wherefore there\nare not various powers for the reason that there are various organs;\non the contrary, for this has nature provided a variety of organs,\nthat they might be adapted to various powers. In the same way nature\nprovided various mediums for the various senses, according to the\nconvenience of the acts of the powers. And to be cognizant of the\nnatures of sensible qualities does not pertain to the senses, but to\nthe intellect.\n\nThe reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must\ntherefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and\n_per se._ Now, sense is a passive power, and is naturally immuted by\nthe exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such immutation\nis what is _per se_ perceived by the sense, and according to the\ndiversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified.\n\nNow, immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual.\nNatural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being\nreceived according to its natural existence, into the thing immuted,\nas heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual\nimmutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received,\naccording to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing immuted, as\nthe form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby\nbecome colored. Now, for the operation of the senses, a spiritual\nimmutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is\neffected in the sensile organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation\nalone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel\nwhen they undergo alteration.\n\nBut in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in _sight:_\nwhile in others we find not only spiritual but also a natural\nimmutation; either on the part of the object only, or likewise on the\npart of the organ. On the part of the object we find natural\nimmutation, as to place, in sound which is the object of _hearing;_\nfor sound is caused by percussion and commotion of air: and we find\nnatural immutation by alteration, in odor which is the object of\n_smelling;_ for in order to exhale an odor, a body must be in a\nmeasure affected by heat. On the part of an organ, natural immutation\ntakes place in _touch_ and _taste;_ for the hand that touches\nsomething hot becomes hot, while the tongue is moistened by the\nhumidity of the flavored morsel. But the organs of smelling and\nhearing are not affected in their respective operations by any\nnatural immutation unless indirectly.\n\nNow, the sight, which is without natural immutation either in its\norgan or in its object, is the most spiritual, the most perfect, and\nthe most universal of all the senses. After this comes the hearing and\nthen the smell, which require a natural immutation on the part of the\nobject; while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior\nto, the motion of alteration, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii,\n7). Touch and taste are the most material of all: of the distinction\nof which we shall speak later on (ad 3, 4). Hence it is that the three\nother senses are not exercised through a medium united to them, to\nobviate any natural immutation in their organ; as happens as regards\nthese two senses.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Not every accident has in itself a power of immutation\nbut only qualities of the third species, which are the principles of\nalteration: therefore only suchlike qualities are the objects of the\nsenses; because \"the senses are affected by the same things whereby\ninanimate bodies are affected,\" as stated in Phys. vii, 2.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Size, shape, and the like, which are called \"common\nsensibles,\" are midway between \"accidental sensibles\" and \"proper\nsensibles,\" which are the objects of the senses. For the proper\nsensibles first, and of their very nature, affect the senses; since\nthey are qualities that cause alteration. But the common sensibles\nare all reducible to quantity. As to size and number, it is clear\nthat they are species of quantity. Shape is a quality about quantity,\nsince the notion of shape consists of fixing the bounds of magnitude.\nMovement and rest are sensed according as the subject is affected in\none or more ways in the magnitude of the subject or of its local\ndistance, as in the movement of growth or of locomotion, or again,\naccording as it is affected in some sensible qualities, as in the\nmovement of alteration; and thus to sense movement and rest is, in a\nway, to sense one thing and many. Now quantity is the proximate\nsubject of the qualities that cause alteration, as surface is of\ncolor. Therefore the common sensibles do not move the senses first\nand of their own nature, but by reason of the sensible quality; as\nthe surface by reason of color. Yet they are not accidental\nsensibles, for they produce a certain variety in the immutation of\nthe senses. For sense is immuted differently by a large and by a\nsmall surface: since whiteness itself is said to be great or small,\nand therefore it is divided according to its proper subject.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher seems to say (De Anima ii, 11),\nthe sense of touch is generically one, but is divided into several\nspecific senses, and for this reason it extends to various\ncontrarieties; which senses, however, are not separate from one\nanother in their organ, but are spread throughout the whole body, so\nthat their distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives the\nsweet and the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue, but not in the\nwhole body; so it is easily distinguished from touch. We might also\nsay that all those contrarieties agree, each in some proximate genus,\nand all in a common genus, which is the common and formal object of\ntouch. Such common genus is, however, unnamed, just as the proximate\ngenus of hot and cold is unnamed.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The sense of taste, according to a saying of the\nPhilosopher (De Anima ii, 9), is a kind of touch existing in the\ntongue only. It is not distinct from touch in general, but only from\nthe species of touch distributed in the body. But if touch is one\nsense only, on account of the common formality of its object: we must\nsay that taste is distinguished from touch by reason of a different\nformality of immutation. For touch involves a natural, and not only a\nspiritual, immutation in its organ, by reason of the quality which is\nits proper object. But the organ of taste is not necessarily immuted\nby a natural immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper\nobject, so that the tongue itself becomes sweet and bitter: but by\nreason of a quality which is a preamble to, and on which is based,\nthe flavor, which quality is moisture, the object of touch.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 78, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Interior Senses Are Suitably Distinguished?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the interior senses are not suitably\ndistinguished. For the common is not divided against the proper.\nTherefore the common sense should not be numbered among the interior\nsensitive powers, in addition to the proper exterior senses.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there is no need to assign an interior power of\napprehension when the proper and exterior sense suffices. But the\nproper and exterior senses suffice for us to judge of sensible things;\nfor each sense judges of its proper object. In like manner they seem\nto suffice for the perception of their own actions; for since the\naction of the sense is, in a way, between the power and its object, it\nseems that sight must be much more able to perceive its own vision, as\nbeing nearer to it, than the color; and in like manner with the other\nsenses. Therefore for this there is no need to assign an interior\npower, called the common sense.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (De Memor. et Remin.\ni), the imagination and the memory are passions of the \"first\nsensitive.\" But passion is not divided against its subject. Therefore\nmemory and imagination should not be assigned as powers distinct from\nthe senses.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the intellect depends on the senses less than any\npower of the sensitive part. But the intellect knows nothing but what\nit receives from the senses; whence we read (Poster. i, 8), that\n\"those who lack one sense lack one kind of knowledge.\" Therefore much\nless should we assign to the sensitive part a power, which they call\nthe \"estimative\" power, for the perception of intentions which the\nsense does not perceive.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the action of the cogitative power, which consists\nin comparing, adding and dividing, and the action of the\nreminiscence, which consists in the use of a kind of syllogism for\nthe sake of inquiry, is not less distant from the actions of the\nestimative and memorative powers, than the action of the estimative\nis from the action of the imagination. Therefore either we must add\nthe cognitive and reminiscitive to the estimative and memorative\npowers, or the estimative and memorative powers should not be made\ndistinct from the imagination.\n\nObj. 6: Further, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 6, 7, 24) describes\nthree kinds of vision; namely, corporeal, which is the action of the\nsense; spiritual, which is an action of the imagination or phantasy;\nand intellectual, which is an action of the intellect. Therefore there\nis no interior power between the sense and intellect, besides the\nimagination.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Avicenna (De Anima iv, 1) assigns five interior\nsensitive powers; namely, \"common sense, phantasy, imagination, and\nthe estimative and memorative powers.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As nature does not fail in necessary things, there\nmust needs be as many actions of the sensitive soul as may suffice\nfor the life of a perfect animal. If any of these actions cannot be\nreduced to the same one principle, they must be assigned to diverse\npowers; since a power of the soul is nothing else than the proximate\nprinciple of the soul's operation.\n\nNow we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal, the animal\nshould apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of sensation, but\nalso when it is absent. Otherwise, since animal motion and action\nfollow apprehension, an animal would not be moved to seek something\nabsent: the contrary of which we may observe specially in perfect\nanimals, which are moved by progression, for they are moved towards\nsomething apprehended and absent. Therefore an animal through the\nsensitive soul must not only receive the species of sensible things,\nwhen it is actually affected by them, but it must also retain and\npreserve them. Now to receive and retain are, in corporeal things,\nreduced to diverse principles; for moist things are apt to receive,\nbut retain with difficulty, while it is the reverse with dry things.\nWherefore, since the sensitive power is the act of a corporeal organ,\nit follows that the power which receives the species of sensible\nthings must be distinct from the power which preserves them.\n\nAgain we must observe that if an animal were moved by pleasing and\ndisagreeable things only as affecting the sense, there would be no\nneed to suppose that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of\nthose forms which the senses perceive, and in which the animal takes\npleasure, or from which it shrinks with horror. But the animal needs\nto seek or to avoid certain things, not only because they are pleasing\nor otherwise to the senses, but also on account of other advantages\nand uses, or disadvantages: just as the sheep runs away when it sees a\nwolf, not on account of its color or shape, but as a natural enemy:\nand again a bird gathers together straws, not because they are\npleasant to the sense, but because they are useful for building its\nnest. Animals, therefore, need to perceive such intentions, which the\nexterior sense does not perceive. And some distinct principle is\nnecessary for this; since the perception of sensible forms comes by an\nimmutation caused by the sensible, which is not the case with the\nperception of those intentions.\n\nThus, therefore, for the reception of sensible forms, the \"proper\nsense\" and the _common sense_ are appointed, and of their distinction\nwe shall speak farther on (ad 1, 2). But for the retention and\npreservation of these forms, the \"phantasy\" or \"imagination\" is\nappointed; which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is as it\nwere a storehouse of forms received through the senses. Furthermore,\nfor the apprehension of intentions which are not received through the\nsenses, the \"estimative\" power is appointed: and for the preservation\nthereof, the \"memorative\" power, which is a storehouse of such-like\nintentions. A sign of which we have in the fact that the principle of\nmemory in animals is found in some such intention, for instance, that\nsomething is harmful or otherwise. And the very formality of the past,\nwhich memory observes, is to be reckoned among these intentions.\n\nNow, we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference\nbetween man and other animals; for they are similarly immuted by the\nextrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above\nintentions: for other animals perceive these intentions only by some\nnatural instinct, while man perceives them by means of coalition of\nideas. Therefore the power by which in other animals is called the\nnatural estimative, in man is called the \"cogitative,\" which by some\nsort of collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is also\ncalled the \"particular reason,\" to which medical men assign a certain\nparticular organ, namely, the middle part of the head: for it compares\nindividual intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares\nuniversal intentions. As to the memorative power, man has not only\nmemory, as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past;\nbut also \"reminiscence\" by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a\nrecollection of the past by the application of individual intentions.\nAvicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative,\na fifth power, which combines and divides imaginary forms: as when\nfrom the imaginary form of gold, and imaginary form of a mountain, we\ncompose the one form of a golden mountain, which we have never seen.\nBut this operation is not to be found in animals other than man, in\nwhom the imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes\nattribute this action in his book _De sensu et sensibilibus_ (viii).\nSo there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the\nsensitive part--namely, the common sense, the imagination, and the\nestimative and memorative powers.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The interior sense is called \"common\" not by\npredication, as if it were a genus; but as the common root and\nprinciple of the exterior senses.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The proper sense judges of the proper sensible by\ndiscerning it from other things which come under the same sense; for\ninstance, by discerning white from black or green. But neither sight\nnor taste can discern white from sweet: because what discerns between\ntwo things must know both. Wherefore the discerning judgment must be\nassigned to the common sense; to which, as to a common term, all\napprehensions of the senses must be referred: and by which, again,\nall the intentions of the senses are perceived; as when someone sees\nthat he sees. For this cannot be done by the proper sense, which only\nknows the form of the sensible by which it is immuted, in which\nimmutation the action of sight is completed, and from immutation\nfollows another in the common sense which perceives the act of vision.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As one power arises from the soul by means of another,\nas we have seen above (Q. 77, A. 7), so also the soul is the subject\nof one power through another. In this way the imagination and the\nmemory are called passions of the \"first sensitive.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Although the operation of the intellect has its origin\nin the senses: yet, in the thing apprehended through the senses, the\nintellect knows many things which the senses cannot perceive. In like\nmanner does the estimative power, though in a less perfect manner.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The cogitative and memorative powers in man owe their\nexcellence not to that which is proper to the sensitive part; but to\na certain affinity and proximity to the universal reason, which, so\nto speak, overflows into them. Therefore they are not distinct\npowers, but the same, yet more perfect than in other animals.\n\nReply Obj. 6: Augustine calls that vision spiritual which is effected\nby the images of bodies in the absence of bodies. Whence it is clear\nthat it is common to all interior apprehensions.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 79\n\nOF THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS\n(In Thirteen Articles)\n\nThe next question concerns the intellectual powers, under which head\nthere are thirteen points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the intellect is a power of the soul, or its essence?\n\n(2) If it be a power, whether it is a passive power?\n\n(3) If it is a passive power, whether there is an active intellect?\n\n(4) Whether it is something in the soul?\n\n(5) Whether the active intellect is one in all?\n\n(6) Whether memory is in the intellect?\n\n(7) Whether the memory be distinct from the intellect?\n\n(8) Whether the reason is a distinct power from the intellect?\n\n(9) Whether the superior and inferior reason are distinct powers?\n\n(10) Whether the intelligence is distinct from the intellect?\n\n(11) Whether the speculative and practical intellect are distinct\npowers?\n\n(12) Whether \"synderesis\" is a power of the intellectual part?\n\n(13) Whether the conscience is a power of the intellectual part?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Intellect Is a Power of the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a power of the\nsoul, but the essence of the soul. For the intellect seems to be the\nsame as the mind. Now the mind is not a power of the soul, but the\nessence; for Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 2): \"Mind and spirit are not\nrelative things, but denominate the essence.\" Therefore the intellect\nis the essence of the soul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, different genera of the soul's powers are not united\nin some one power, but only in the essence of the soul. Now the\nappetitive and the intellectual are different genera of the soul's\npowers as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 3), but they are united\nin the mind, for Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) places the intelligence\nand will in the mind. Therefore the mind and intellect of man is of\nthe very essence of the soul and not a power thereof.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Gregory, in a homily for the Ascension\n(xxix in Ev.), \"man understands with the angels.\" But angels are\ncalled \"minds\" and \"intellects.\" Therefore the mind and intellect of\nman are not a power of the soul, but the soul itself.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a substance is intellectual by the fact that it is\nimmaterial. But the soul is immaterial through its essence. Therefore\nit seems that the soul must be intellectual through its essence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher assigns the intellectual faculty\nas a power of the soul (De Anima ii, 3).\n\n_I answer that,_ In accordance with what has been already shown (Q.\n54, A. 3; Q. 77, A. 1) it is necessary to say that the intellect is\na power of the soul, and not the very essence of the soul. For then\nalone the essence of that which operates is the immediate principle\nof operation, when operation itself is its being: for as power is to\noperation as its act, so is the essence to being. But in God alone\nHis action of understanding is His very Being. Wherefore in God alone\nis His intellect His essence: while in other intellectual creatures,\nthe intellect is a power.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sense is sometimes taken for the power, and sometimes\nfor the sensitive soul; for the sensitive soul takes its name from\nits chief power, which is sense. And in like manner the intellectual\nsoul is sometimes called intellect, as from its chief power; and thus\nwe read (De Anima i, 4), that the \"intellect is a substance.\" And in\nthis sense also Augustine says that the mind is spirit and essence\n(De Trin. ix, 2; xiv, 16).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The appetitive and intellectual powers are different\ngenera of powers in the soul, by reason of the different formalities\nof their objects. But the appetitive power agrees partly with the\nintellectual power and partly with the sensitive in its mode of\noperation either through a corporeal organ or without it: for\nappetite follows apprehension. And in this way Augustine puts the\nwill in the mind; and the Philosopher, in the reason (De Anima iii,\n9).\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the angels there is no other power besides the\nintellect, and the will, which follows the intellect. And for this\nreason an angel is called a \"mind\" or an \"intellect\"; because his\nwhole power consists in this. But the soul has many other powers,\nsuch as the sensitive and nutritive powers, and therefore the\ncomparison fails.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The immateriality of the created intelligent substance\nis not its intellect; and through its immateriality it has the power\nof intelligence. Wherefore it follows not that the intellect is the\nsubstance of the soul, but that it is its virtue and power.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Intellect Is a Passive Power?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not a passive power.\nFor everything is passive by its matter, and acts by its form. But the\nintellectual power results from the immateriality of the intelligent\nsubstance. Therefore it seems that the intellect is not a passive\npower.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the intellectual power is incorruptible, as we have\nsaid above (Q. 79, A. 6). But \"if the intellect is passive, it is\ncorruptible\" (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore the intellectual power is\nnot passive.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the \"agent is nobler than the patient,\" as Augustine\n(Gen. ad lit. xii, 16) and Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) says. But all\nthe powers of the vegetative part are active; yet they are the lowest\namong the powers of the soul. Much more, therefore, all the\nintellectual powers, which are the highest, are active.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that \"to\nunderstand is in a way to be passive.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ To be passive may be taken in three ways. Firstly,\nin its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which\nbelongs to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper\ninclination: as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a\nman becomes ill or sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to\nbe passive, when something, whether suitable or unsuitable, is taken\naway from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be\npassive, but also he who is healed; not only he that is sad, but also\nhe that is joyful; or whatever way he be altered or moved. Thirdly,\nin a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact\nthat what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it\nwas in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And\naccordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act, may be said to\nbe passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand\nis to be passive. This is clear from the following reason. For the\nintellect, as we have seen above (Q. 78, A. 1), has an operation\nextending to universal being. We may therefore see whether the\nintellect be in act or potentiality by observing first of all the\nnature of the relation of the intellect to universal being. For we\nfind an intellect whose relation to universal being is that of the\nact of all being: and such is the Divine intellect, which is the\nEssence of God, in which originally and virtually, all being\npre-exists as in its first cause. And therefore the Divine intellect\nis not in potentiality, but is pure act. But no created intellect can\nbe an act in relation to the whole universal being; otherwise it\nwould needs be an infinite being. Wherefore every created intellect\nis not the act of all things intelligible, by reason of its very\nexistence; but is compared to these intelligible things as a\npotentiality to act.\n\nNow, potentiality has a double relation to act. There is a\npotentiality which is always perfected by its act: as the matter of\nthe heavenly bodies (Q. 58, A. 1). And there is another potentiality\nwhich is not always in act, but proceeds from potentiality to act; as\nwe observe in things that are corrupted and generated. Wherefore the\nangelic intellect is always in act as regards those things which it\ncan understand, by reason of its proximity to the first intellect,\nwhich is pure act, as we have said above. But the human intellect,\nwhich is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote\nfrom the perfection of the Divine intellect, is in potentiality with\nregard to things intelligible, and is at first \"like a clean tablet\non which nothing is written,\" as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,\n4). This is made clear from the fact, that at first we are only in\npotentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand\nactually. And so it is evident that with us to understand is \"in a\nway to be passive\"; taking passion in the third sense. And\nconsequently the intellect is a passive power.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This objection is verified of passion in the first and\nsecond senses, which belong to primary matter. But in the third sense\npassion is in anything which is reduced from potentiality to act.\n\nReply Obj. 2: \"Passive intellect\" is the name given by some to the\nsensitive appetite, in which are the passions of the soul; which\nappetite is also called \"rational by participation,\" because it\n\"obeys the reason\" (Ethic. i, 13). Others give the name of passive\nintellect to the cogitative power, which is called the \"particular\nreason.\" And in each case \"passive\" may be taken in the two first\nsenses; forasmuch as this so-called intellect is the act of a\ncorporeal organ. But the intellect which is in potentiality to things\nintelligible, and which for this reason Aristotle calls the\n\"possible\" intellect (De Anima iii, 4) is not passive except in the\nthird sense: for it is not an act of a corporeal organ. Hence it is\nincorruptible.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The agent is nobler than the patient, if the action and\nthe passion are referred to the same thing: but not always, if they\nrefer to different things. Now the intellect is a passive power in\nregard to the whole universal being: while the vegetative power is\nactive in regard to some particular thing, namely, the body as united\nto the soul. Wherefore nothing prevents such a passive force being\nnobler than such an active one.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Is an Active Intellect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no active intellect. For as\nthe senses are to things sensible, so is our intellect to things\nintelligible. But because sense is in potentiality to things sensible,\nthe sense is not said to be active, but only passive. Therefore, since\nour intellect is in potentiality to things intelligible, it seems that\nwe cannot say that the intellect is active, but only that it is\npassive.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if we say that also in the senses there is something\nactive, such as light: on the contrary, light is required for sight,\ninasmuch as it makes the medium to be actually luminous; for color of\nits own nature moves the luminous medium. But in the operation of the\nintellect there is no appointed medium that has to be brought into\nact. Therefore there is no necessity for an active intellect.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the\npatient according to the nature of the patient. But the passive\nintellect is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature\nsuffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now a form\nis intelligible in act from the very fact that it is immaterial.\nTherefore there is no need for an active intellect to make the\nspecies actually intelligible.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), \"As in\nevery nature, so in the soul is there something by which it becomes\nall things, and something by which it makes all things.\" Therefore we\nmust admit an active intellect.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the opinion of Plato, there is no\nneed for an active intellect in order to make things actually\nintelligible; but perhaps in order to provide intellectual light to\nthe intellect, as will be explained farther on (A. 4). For Plato\nsupposed that the forms of natural things subsisted apart from\nmatter, and consequently that they are intelligible: since a thing is\nactually intelligible from the very fact that it is immaterial. And\nhe called such forms \"species or ideas\"; from a participation of\nwhich, he said that even corporeal matter was formed, in order that\nindividuals might be naturally established in their proper genera and\nspecies: and that our intellect was formed by such participation in\norder to have knowledge of the genera and species of things. But\nsince Aristotle did not allow that forms of natural things exist\napart from matter, and as forms existing in matter are not actually\nintelligible; it follows that the natures or forms of the sensible\nthings which we understand are not actually intelligible. Now nothing\nis reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act; as\nthe senses as made actual by what is actually sensible. We must\ntherefore assign on the part of the intellect some power to make\nthings actually intelligible, by abstraction of the species from\nmaterial conditions. And such is the necessity for an active\nintellect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sensible things are found in act outside the soul; and\nhence there is no need for an active sense. Wherefore it is clear\nthat in the nutritive part all the powers are active, whereas in the\nsensitive part all are passive: but in the intellectual part, there\nis something active and something passive.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There are two opinions as to the effect of light. For\nsome say that light is required for sight, in order to make colors\nactually visible. And according to this the active intellect is\nrequired for understanding, in like manner and for the same reason as\nlight is required for seeing. But in the opinion of others, light is\nrequired for sight; not for the colors to become actually visible;\nbut in order that the medium may become actually luminous, as the\nCommentator says on _De Anima_ ii. And according to this, Aristotle's\ncomparison of the active intellect to light is verified in this, that\nas it is required for understanding, so is light required for seeing;\nbut not for the same reason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If the agent pre-exist, it may well happen that its\nlikeness is received variously into various things, on account of\ntheir dispositions. But if the agent does not pre-exist, the\ndisposition of the recipient has nothing to do with the matter. Now\nthe intelligible in act is not something existing in nature; if we\nconsider the nature of things sensible, which do not subsist apart\nfrom matter. And therefore in order to understand them, the\nimmaterial nature of the passive intellect would not suffice but for\nthe presence of the active intellect which makes things actually\nintelligible by way of abstraction.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Active Intellect Is Something in the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the active intellect is not something\nin the soul. For the effect of the active intellect is to give light\nfor the purpose of understanding. But this is done by something higher\nthan the soul: according to John 1:9, \"He was the true light that\nenlighteneth every man coming into this world.\" Therefore the active\nintellect is not something in the soul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says of the active\nintellect, \"that it does not sometimes understand and sometimes not\nunderstand.\" But our soul does not always understand: sometimes it\nunderstands, sometimes it does not understand. Therefore the active\nintellect is not something in our soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, agent and patient suffice for action. If, therefore,\nthe passive intellect, which is a passive power, is something\nbelonging to the soul; and also the active intellect, which is an\nactive power: it follows that a man would always be able to\nunderstand when he wished, which is clearly false. Therefore the\nactive intellect is not something in our soul.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5) says that the\nactive intellect is a \"substance in actual being.\" But nothing can\nbe in potentiality and in act with regard to the same thing. If,\ntherefore, the passive intellect, which is in potentiality to all\nthings intelligible, is something in the soul, it seems impossible\nfor the active intellect to be also something in our soul.\n\nObj. 5: Further, if the active intellect is something in the soul,\nit must be a power. For it is neither a passion nor a habit; since\nhabits and passions are not in the nature of agents in regard to the\npassivity of the soul; but rather passion is the very action of the\npassive power; while habit is something which results from acts. But\nevery power flows from the essence of the soul. It would therefore\nfollow that the active intellect flows from the essence of the soul.\nAnd thus it would not be in the soul by way of participation from\nsome higher intellect: which is unfitting. Therefore the active\nintellect is not something in our soul.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5), that \"it\nis necessary for these differences,\" namely, the passive and active\nintellect, \"to be in the soul.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The active intellect, of which the Philosopher\nspeaks, is something in the soul. In order to make this evident, we\nmust observe that above the intellectual soul of man we must needs\nsuppose a superior intellect, from which the soul acquires the power\nof understanding. For what is such by participation, and what is\nmobile, and what is imperfect always requires the pre-existence of\nsomething essentially such, immovable and perfect. Now the human soul\nis called intellectual by reason of a participation in intellectual\npower; a sign of which is that it is not wholly intellectual but only\nin part. Moreover it reaches to the understanding of truth by\narguing, with a certain amount of reasoning and movement. Again it\nhas an imperfect understanding; both because it does not understand\neverything, and because, in those things which it does understand, it\npasses from potentiality to act. Therefore there must needs be some\nhigher intellect, by which the soul is helped to understand.\n\nWherefore some held that this intellect, substantially separate, is\nthe active intellect, which by lighting up the phantasms as it were,\nmakes them to be actually intelligible. But, even supposing the\nexistence of such a separate active intellect, it would still be\nnecessary to assign to the human soul some power participating in\nthat superior intellect, by which power the human soul makes things\nactually intelligible. Just as in other perfect natural things,\nbesides the universal active causes, each one is endowed with its\nproper powers derived from those universal causes: for the sun alone\ndoes not generate man; but in man is the power of begetting man: and\nin like manner with other perfect animals. Now among these lower\nthings nothing is more perfect than the human soul. Wherefore we must\nsay that in the soul is some power derived from a higher intellect,\nwhereby it is able to light up the phantasms. And we know this by\nexperience, since we perceive that we abstract universal forms from\ntheir particular conditions, which is to make them actually\nintelligible. Now no action belongs to anything except through some\nprinciple formally inherent therein; as we have said above of the\npassive intellect (Q. 76, A. 1). Therefore the power which is the\nprinciple of this action must be something in the soul. For this\nreason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 5) compared the active intellect to\nlight, which is something received into the air: while Plato compared\nthe separate intellect impressing the soul to the sun, as Themistius\nsays in his commentary on _De Anima_ iii. But the separate intellect,\naccording to the teaching of our faith, is God Himself, Who is the\nsoul's Creator, and only beatitude; as will be shown later on (Q. 90,\nA. 3; I-II, Q. 3, A. 7). Wherefore the human soul derives its\nintellectual light from Him, according to Ps. 4:7, \"The light of Thy\ncountenance, O Lord, is signed upon us.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: That true light enlightens as a universal cause, from\nwhich the human soul derives a particular power, as we have explained.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Philosopher says those words not of the active\nintellect, but of the intellect in act: of which he had already said:\n\"Knowledge in act is the same as the thing.\" Or, if we refer those\nwords to the active intellect, then they are said because it is not\nowing to the active intellect that sometimes we do, and sometimes we\ndo not understand, but to the intellect which is in potentiality.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If the relation of the active intellect to the passive\nwere that of the active object to a power, as, for instance, of the\nvisible in act to the sight; it would follow that we could understand\nall things instantly, since the active intellect is that which makes\nall things (in act). But now the active intellect is not an object,\nrather is it that whereby the objects are made to be in act: for\nwhich, besides the presence of the active intellect, we require the\npresence of phantasms, the good disposition of the sensitive powers,\nand practice in this sort of operation; since through one thing\nunderstood, other things come to be understood, as from terms are\nmade propositions, and from first principles, conclusions. From this\npoint of view it matters not whether the active intellect is\nsomething belonging to the soul, or something separate from the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The intellectual soul is indeed actually immaterial,\nbut it is in potentiality to determinate species. On the contrary,\nphantasms are actual images of certain species, but are immaterial in\npotentiality. Wherefore nothing prevents one and the same soul,\ninasmuch as it is actually immaterial, having one power by which it\nmakes things actually immaterial, by abstraction from the conditions\nof individual matter: which power is called the \"active intellect\";\nand another power, receptive of such species, which is called the\n\"passive intellect\" by reason of its being in potentiality to such\nspecies.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Since the essence of the soul is immaterial, created by\nthe supreme intellect, nothing prevents that power which it derives\nfrom the supreme intellect, and whereby it abstracts from matter,\nflowing from the essence of the soul, in the same way as its other\npowers.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Active Intellect Is One in All?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is one active intellect in all.\nFor what is separate from the body is not multiplied according to the\nnumber of bodies. But the active intellect is \"separate,\" as the\nPhilosopher says (De Anima iii, 5). Therefore it is not multiplied in\nthe many human bodies, but is one for all men.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the active intellect is the cause of the universal,\nwhich is one in many. But that which is the cause of unity is still\nmore itself one. Therefore the active intellect is the same in all.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all men agree in the first intellectual concepts.\nBut to these they assent by the active intellect. Therefore all\nagree in one active intellect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) that the\nactive intellect is as a light. But light is not the same in the\nvarious things enlightened. Therefore the same active intellect is\nnot in various men.\n\n_I answer that,_ The truth about this question depends on what we\nhave already said (A. 4). For if the active intellect were not\nsomething belonging to the soul, but were some separate substance,\nthere would be one active intellect for all men. And this is what\nthey mean who hold that there is one active intellect for all. But if\nthe active intellect is something belonging to the soul, as one of\nits powers, we are bound to say that there are as many active\nintellects as there are souls, which are multiplied according to the\nnumber of men, as we have said above (Q. 76, A. 2). For it is\nimpossible that one same power belong to various substances.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher proves that the active intellect is\nseparate, by the fact that the passive intellect is separate:\nbecause, as he says (De Anima iii, 5), \"the agent is more noble than\nthe patient.\" Now the passive intellect is said to be separate,\nbecause it is not the act of any corporeal organ. And in the same\nsense the active intellect is also called \"separate\"; but not as a\nseparate substance.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The active intellect is the cause of the universal, by\nabstracting it from matter. But for this purpose it need not be the\nsame intellect in all intelligent beings; but it must be one in its\nrelationship to all those things from which it abstracts the\nuniversal, with respect to which things the universal is one. And\nthis befits the active intellect inasmuch as it is immaterial.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All things which are of one species enjoy in common the\naction which accompanies the nature of the species, and consequently\nthe power which is the principle of such action; but not so as that\npower be identical in all. Now to know the first intelligible\nprinciples is the action belonging to the human species. Wherefore\nall men enjoy in common the power which is the principle of this\naction: and this power is the active intellect. But there is no need\nfor it to be identical in all. Yet it must be derived by all from one\nprinciple. And thus the possession by all men in common of the first\nprinciples proves the unity of the separate intellect, which Plato\ncompares to the sun; but not the unity of the active intellect, which\nAristotle compares to light.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Memory Is in the Intellectual Part of the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that memory is not in the intellectual\npart of the soul. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 2,3,8) that to\nthe higher part of the soul belongs those things which are not\n\"common to man and beast.\" But memory is common to man and beast,\nfor he says (De Trin. xii, 2, 3, 8) that \"beasts can sense corporeal\nthings through the senses of the body, and commit them to memory.\"\nTherefore memory does not belong to the intellectual part of the\nsoul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, memory is of the past. But the past is said of\nsomething with regard to a fixed time. Memory, therefore, knows a\nthing under a condition of a fixed time; which involves knowledge\nunder the conditions of \"here\" and \"now.\" But this is not the\nprovince of the intellect, but of the sense. Therefore memory is\nnot in the intellectual part, but only in the sensitive.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in the memory are preserved the species of those\nthings of which we are not actually thinking. But this cannot happen\nin the intellect, because the intellect is reduced to act by the fact\nthat the intelligible species are received into it. Now the intellect\nin act implies understanding in act; and therefore the intellect\nactually understands all things of which it has the species.\nTherefore the memory is not in the intellectual part.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11) that \"memory,\nunderstanding, and will are one mind.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since it is of the nature of the memory to preserve\nthe species of those things which are not actually apprehended, we\nmust first of all consider whether the intelligible species can thus\nbe preserved in the intellect: because Avicenna held that this was\nimpossible. For he admitted that this could happen in the sensitive\npart, as to some powers, inasmuch as they are acts of corporeal\norgans, in which certain species may be preserved apart from actual\napprehension. But in the intellect, which has no corporeal organ,\nnothing but what is intelligible exists. Wherefore every thing of\nwhich the likeness exists in the intellect must be actually\nunderstood. Thus, therefore, according to him, as soon as we cease to\nunderstand something actually, the species of that thing ceases to be\nin our intellect, and if we wish to understand that thing anew, we\nmust turn to the active intellect, which he held to be a separate\nsubstance, in order that the intelligible species may thence flow\nagain into our passive intellect. And from the practice and habit of\nturning to the active intellect there is formed, according to him, a\ncertain aptitude in the passive intellect for turning to the active\nintellect; which aptitude he calls the habit of knowledge. According,\ntherefore, to this supposition, nothing is preserved in the\nintellectual part that is not actually understood: wherefore it would\nnot be possible to admit memory in the intellectual part.\n\nBut this opinion is clearly opposed to the teaching of Aristotle.\nFor he says (De Anima iii, 4) that, when the passive intellect \"is\nidentified with each thing as knowing it, it is said to be in act,\"\nand that \"this happens when it can operate of itself. And, even then,\nit is in potentiality, but not in the same way as before learning and\ndiscovering.\" Now, the passive intellect is said to be each thing,\ninasmuch as it receives the intelligible species of each thing. To\nthe fact, therefore, that it receives the species of intelligible\nthings it owes its being able to operate when it wills, but not so\nthat it be always operating: for even then is it in potentiality in\na certain sense, though otherwise than before the act of\nunderstanding--namely, in the sense that whoever has habitual\nknowledge is in potentiality to actual consideration.\n\nThe foregoing opinion is also opposed to reason. For what is received\ninto something is received according to the conditions of the\nrecipient. But the intellect is of a more stable nature, and is more\nimmovable than corporeal nature. If, therefore, corporeal matter\nholds the forms which it receives, not only while it actually does\nsomething through them, but also after ceasing to act through them,\nmuch more cogent reason is there for the intellect to receive the\nspecies unchangeably and lastingly, whether it receive them from\nthings sensible, or derive them from some superior intellect. Thus,\ntherefore, if we take memory only for the power of retaining species,\nwe must say that it is in the intellectual part. But if in the notion\nof memory we include its object as something past, then the memory is\nnot in the intellectual, but only in the sensitive part, which\napprehends individual things. For past, as past, since it signifies\nbeing under a condition of fixed time, is something individual.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Memory, if considered as retentive of species, is not\ncommon to us and other animals. For species are not retained in the\nsensitive part of the soul only, but rather in the body and soul\nunited: since the memorative power is the act of some organ. But the\nintellect in itself is retentive of species, without the association\nof any corporeal organ. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,\n4) that \"the soul is the seat of the species, not the whole soul, but\nthe intellect.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The condition of past may be referred to two\nthings--namely, to the object which is known, and to the act of\nknowledge. These two are found together in the sensitive part, which\napprehends something from the fact of its being immuted by a present\nsensible: wherefore at the same time an animal remembers to have\nsensed before in the past, and to have sensed some past sensible\nthing. But as concerns the intellectual part, the past is accidental,\nand is not in itself a part of the object of the intellect. For the\nintellect understands man, as man: and to man, as man, it is\naccidental that he exist in the present, past, or future. But on the\npart of the act, the condition of past, even as such, may be\nunderstood to be in the intellect, as well as in the senses. Because\nour soul's act of understanding is an individual act, existing in\nthis or that time, inasmuch as a man is said to understand now, or\nyesterday, or tomorrow. And this is not incompatible with the\nintellectual nature: for such an act of understanding, though\nsomething individual, is yet an immaterial act, as we have said above\nof the intellect (Q. 76, A. 1); and therefore, as the intellect\nunderstands itself, though it be itself an individual intellect, so\nalso it understands its act of understanding, which is an individual\nact, in the past, present, or future. In this way, then, the notion\nof memory, in as far as it regards past events, is preserved in the\nintellect, forasmuch as it understands that it previously understood:\nbut not in the sense that it understands the past as something \"here\"\nand \"now.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The intelligible species is sometimes in the intellect\nonly in potentiality, and then the intellect is said to be in\npotentiality. Sometimes the intelligible species is in the intellect\nas regards the ultimate completion of the act, and then it\nunderstands in act. And sometimes the intelligible species is in a\nmiddle state, between potentiality and act: and then we have habitual\nknowledge. In this way the intellect retains the species, even when\nit does not understand in act.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Intellectual Memory Is a Power Distinct from the Intellect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct\nfrom the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns to the soul\nmemory, understanding, and will. But it is clear that the memory is a\ndistinct power from the will. Therefore it is also distinct from the\nintellect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the reason of distinction among the powers in the\nsensitive part is the same as in the intellectual part. But memory in\nthe sensitive part is distinct from sense, as we have said (Q. 78, A.\n4). Therefore memory in the intellectual part is distinct from the\nintellect.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. x, 11; xi, 7),\nmemory, understanding, and will are equal to one another, and one\nflows from the other. But this could not be if memory and intellect\nwere the same power. Therefore they are not the same power.\n\n_On the contrary,_ From its nature the memory is the treasury or\nstorehouse of species. But the Philosopher (De Anima iii) attributes\nthis to the intellect, as we have said (A. 6, ad 1). Therefore the\nmemory is not another power from the intellect.\n\n_I answer that,_ As has been said above (Q. 77, A. 3), the powers of\nthe soul are distinguished by the different formal aspects of their\nobjects: since each power is defined in reference to that thing to\nwhich it is directed and which is its object. It has also been said\nabove (Q. 59, A. 4) that if any power by its nature be directed to an\nobject according to the common ratio of the object, that power will\nnot be differentiated according to the individual differences of that\nobject: just as the power of sight, which regards its object under\nthe common ratio of color, is not differentiated by differences of\nblack and white. Now, the intellect regards its object under the\ncommon ratio of being: since the passive intellect is that \"in which\nall are in potentiality.\" Wherefore the passive intellect is not\ndifferentiated by any difference of being. Nevertheless there is a\ndistinction between the power of the active intellect and of the\npassive intellect: because as regards the same object, the active\npower which makes the object to be in act must be distinct from the\npassive power, which is moved by the object existing in act. Thus the\nactive power is compared to its object as a being in act is to a\nbeing in potentiality; whereas the passive power, on the contrary, is\ncompared to its object as being in potentiality is to a being in act.\nTherefore there can be no other difference of powers in the\nintellect, but that of passive and active. Wherefore it is clear that\nmemory is not a distinct power from the intellect: for it belongs to\nthe nature of a passive power to retain as well as to receive.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although it is said (3 Sent. D, 1) that memory,\nintellect, and will are three powers, this is not in accordance with\nthe meaning of Augustine, who says expressly (De Trin. xiv) that \"if\nwe take memory, intelligence, and will as always present in the soul,\nwhether we actually attend to them or not, they seem to pertain to the\nmemory only. And by intelligence I mean that by which we understand\nwhen actually thinking; and by will I mean that love or affection\nwhich unites the child and its parent.\" Wherefore it is clear that\nAugustine does not take the above three for three powers; but by\nmemory he understands the soul's habit of retention; by intelligence,\nthe act of the intellect; and by will, the act of the will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Past and present may differentiate the sensitive\npowers, but not the intellectual powers, for the reason give above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Intelligence arises from memory, as act from\nhabit; and in this way it is equal to it, but not as a power to\na power.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Reason Is Distinct from the Intellect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the reason is a distinct power from\nthe intellect. For it is stated in _De Spiritu et Anima_ that \"when we\nwish to rise from lower things to higher, first the sense comes to our\naid, then imagination, then reason, then the intellect.\" Therefore the\nreason is distinct from the intellect, as imagination is from sense.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv, 6), that intellect is\ncompared to reason, as eternity to time. But it does not belong to\nthe same power to be in eternity and to be in time. Therefore reason\nand intellect are not the same power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man has intellect in common with the angels, and\nsense in common with the brutes. But reason, which is proper to man,\nwhence he is called a rational animal, is a power distinct from sense.\nTherefore is it equally true to say that it is distinct from the\nintellect, which properly belongs to the angel: whence they are called\nintellectual.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iii, 20) that \"that\nin which man excels irrational animals is reason, or mind, or\nintelligence or whatever appropriate name we like to give it.\"\nTherefore, reason, intellect and mind are one power.\n\n_I answer that,_ Reason and intellect in man cannot be distinct\npowers. We shall understand this clearly if we consider their\nrespective actions. For to understand is simply to apprehend\nintelligible truth: and to reason is to advance from one thing\nunderstood to another, so as to know an intelligible truth. And\ntherefore angels, who according to their nature, possess perfect\nknowledge of intelligible truth, have no need to advance from one\nthing to another; but apprehend the truth simply and without mental\ndiscussion, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But man arrives at\nthe knowledge of intelligible truth by advancing from one thing to\nanother; and therefore he is called rational. Reasoning, therefore,\nis compared to understanding, as movement is to rest, or acquisition\nto possession; of which one belongs to the perfect, the other to the\nimperfect. And since movement always proceeds from something\nimmovable, and ends in something at rest; hence it is that human\nreasoning, by way of inquiry and discovery, advances from certain\nthings simply understood--namely, the first principles; and, again,\nby way of judgment returns by analysis to first principles, in the\nlight of which it examines what it has found. Now it is clear that\nrest and movement are not to be referred to different powers, but to\none and the same, even in natural things: since by the same nature a\nthing is moved towards a certain place, and rests in that place. Much\nmore, therefore, by the same power do we understand and reason: and\nso it is clear that in man reason and intellect are the same power.\n\nReply Obj. 1: That enumeration is made according to the order of\nactions, not according to the distinction of powers. Moreover, that\nbook is not of great authority.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The answer is clear from what we have said. For\neternity is compared to time as immovable to movable. And thus\nBoethius compared the intellect to eternity, and reason to time.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Other animals are so much lower than man that they\ncannot attain to the knowledge of truth, which reason seeks. But\nman attains, although imperfectly, to the knowledge of intelligible\ntruth, which angels know. Therefore in the angels the power of\nknowledge is not of a different genus from that which is in the\nhuman reason, but is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 9]\n\nWhether the Higher and Lower Reason Are Distinct Powers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the higher and lower reason are\ndistinct powers. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4,7), that the\nimage of the Trinity is in the higher part of the reason, and not in\nthe lower. But the parts of the soul are its powers. Therefore the\nhigher and lower reason are two powers.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing flows from itself. Now, the lower reason\nflows from the higher, and is ruled and directed by it. Therefore the\nhigher reason is another power from the lower.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 1) that \"the\nscientific part\" of the soul, by which the soul knows necessary\nthings, is another principle, and another part from the \"opinionative\"\nand \"reasoning\" part by which it knows contingent things. And he\nproves this from the principle that for those things which are\n\"generically different, generically different parts of the soul are\nordained.\" Now contingent and necessary are generically different, as\ncorruptible and incorruptible. Since, therefore, necessary is the same\nas eternal, and temporal the same as contingent, it seems that what\nthe Philosopher calls the \"scientific\" part must be the same as the\nhigher reason, which, according to Augustine (De Trin. xii, 7) \"is\nintent on the consideration and consultation of things eternal\"; and\nthat what the Philosopher calls the \"reasoning\" or \"opinionative\" part\nis the same as the lower reason, which, according to Augustine, \"is\nintent on the disposal of temporal things.\" Therefore the higher\nreason is another power than the lower.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that \"opinion\nrises from the imagination: then the mind by judging of the truth or\nerror of the opinion discovers the truth: whence _mens_ (mind) is\nderived from _metiendo_ (measuring). And therefore the intellect\nregards those things which are already subject to judgment and true\ndecision.\" Therefore the opinionative power, which is the lower\nreason, is distinct from the mind and the intellect, by which we may\nunderstand the higher reason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that \"the higher\nand lower reason are only distinct by their functions.\" Therefore\nthey are not two powers.\n\n_I answer that,_ The higher and lower reason, as they are understood\nby Augustine, can in no way be two powers of the soul. For he says\nthat \"the higher reason is that which is intent on the contemplation\nand consultation of things eternal\": forasmuch as in contemplation it\nsees them in themselves, and in consultation it takes its rules of\naction from them. But he calls the lower reason that which \"is intent\non the disposal of temporal things.\" Now these two--namely, eternal\nand temporal--are related to our knowledge in this way, that one of\nthem is the means of knowing the other. For by way of discovery, we\ncome through knowledge of temporal things to that of things eternal,\naccording to the words of the Apostle (Rom. 1:20), \"The invisible\nthings of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that\nare made\": while by way of judgment, from eternal things already\nknown, we judge of temporal things, and according to laws of things\neternal we dispose of temporal things.\n\nBut it may happen that the medium and what is attained thereby belong\nto different habits: as the first indemonstrable principles belong to\nthe habit of the intellect; whereas the conclusions which we draw\nfrom them belong to the habit of science. And so it happens that from\nthe principles of geometry we draw a conclusion in another\nscience--for example, perspective. But the power of the reason is\nsuch that both medium and term belong to it. For the act of the\nreason is, as it were, a movement from one thing to another. But the\nsame movable thing passes through the medium and reaches the end.\nWherefore the higher and lower reasons are one and the same power.\nBut according to Augustine they are distinguished by the functions of\ntheir actions, and according to their various habits: for wisdom is\nattributed to the higher reason, science to the lower.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We speak of parts, in whatever way a thing is divided.\nAnd so far as reason is divided according to its various acts, the\nhigher and lower reason are called parts; but not because they are\ndifferent powers.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The lower reason is said to flow from the higher, or\nto be ruled by it, as far as the principles made use of by the lower\nreason are drawn from and directed by the principles of the higher\nreason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The \"scientific\" part, of which the Philosopher speaks,\nis not the same as the higher reason: for necessary truths are found\neven among temporal things, of which natural science and mathematics\ntreat. And the \"opinionative\" and \"ratiocinative\" part is more\nlimited than the lower reason; for it regards only things contingent.\nNeither must we say, without any qualification, that a power, by\nwhich the intellect knows necessary things, is distinct from a power\nby which it knows contingent things: because it knows both under the\nsame objective aspect--namely, under the aspect of being and truth.\nWherefore it perfectly knows necessary things which have perfect\nbeing in truth; since it penetrates to their very essence, from which\nit demonstrates their proper accidents. On the other hand, it knows\ncontingent things, but imperfectly; forasmuch as they have but\nimperfect being and truth. Now perfect and imperfect in the action do\nnot vary the power, but they vary the actions as to the mode of\nacting, and consequently the principles of the actions and the habits\nthemselves. And therefore the Philosopher postulates two lesser parts\nof the soul--namely, the \"scientific\" and the \"ratiocinative,\" not\nbecause they are two powers, but because they are distinct according\nto a different aptitude for receiving various habits, concerning the\nvariety of which he inquires. For contingent and necessary, though\ndiffering according to their proper genera, nevertheless agree in the\ncommon aspect of being, which the intellect considers, and to which\nthey are variously compared as perfect and imperfect.\n\nReply Obj. 4: That distinction given by Damascene is according to\nthe variety of acts, not according to the variety of powers. For\n\"opinion\" signifies an act of the intellect which leans to one side\nof a contradiction, whilst in fear of the other. While to \"judge\" or\n\"measure\" [mensurare] is an act of the intellect, applying certain\nprinciples to examine propositions. From this is taken the word\n\"mens\" [mind]. Lastly, to \"understand\" is to adhere to the formed\njudgment with approval.\n_______________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 10]\n\nWhether Intelligence Is a Power Distinct from Intellect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intelligence is another power than\nthe intellect. For we read in _De Spiritu et Anima_ that \"when we wish\nto rise from lower to higher things, first the sense comes to our aid,\nthen imagination, then reason, then intellect, and afterwards\nintelligence.\" But imagination and sense are distinct powers.\nTherefore also intellect and intelligence are distinct.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. v, 4) that \"sense\nconsiders man in one way, imagination in another, reason in another,\nintelligence in another.\" But intellect is the same power as reason.\nTherefore, seemingly, intelligence is a distinct power from\nintellect, as reason is a distinct power from imagination or sense.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"actions came before powers,\" as the Philosopher\nsays (De Anima ii, 4). But intelligence is an act separate from\nothers attributed to the intellect. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth.\nii) that \"the first movement is called intelligence; but that\nintelligence which is about a certain thing is called intention; that\nwhich remains and conforms the soul to that which is understood is\ncalled invention, and invention when it remains in the same man,\nexamining and judging of itself, is called phronesis (that is,\nwisdom), and phronesis if dilated makes thought, that is, orderly\ninternal speech; from which, they say, comes speech expressed by the\ntongue.\" Therefore it seems that intelligence is some special power.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 6) that\n\"intelligence is of indivisible things in which there is nothing\nfalse.\" But the knowledge of these things belongs to the intellect.\nTherefore intelligence is not another power than the intellect.\n\n_I answer that,_ This word \"intelligence\" properly signifies the\nintellect's very act, which is to understand. However, in some works\ntranslated from the Arabic, the separate substances which we call\nangels are called \"intelligences,\" and perhaps for this reason, that\nsuch substances are always actually understanding. But in works\ntranslated from the Greek, they are called \"intellects\" or \"minds.\"\nThus intelligence is not distinct from intellect, as power is from\npower; but as act is from power. And such a division is recognized\neven by the philosophers. For sometimes they assign four\nintellects--namely, the \"active\" and \"passive\" intellects, the\nintellect \"in habit,\" and the \"actual\" intellect. Of which four the\nactive and passive intellects are different powers; just as in all\nthings the active power is distinct from the passive. But three of\nthese are distinct, as three states of the passive intellect, which\nis sometimes in potentiality only, and thus it is called passive;\nsometimes it is in the first act, which is knowledge, and thus it is\ncalled intellect in habit; and sometimes it is in the second act,\nwhich is to consider, and thus it is called intellect in act, or\nactual intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: If this authority is accepted, intelligence there means\nthe act of the intellect. And thus it is divided against intellect as\nact against power.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the\nintellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also\nsays that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence\nalone belongs to God, for it belongs to God to understand all things\nwithout any investigation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All those acts which Damascene enumerates belong to one\npower--namely, the intellectual power. For this power first of all\nonly apprehends something; and this act is called \"intelligence.\"\nSecondly, it directs what it apprehends to the knowledge of something\nelse, or to some operation; and this is called \"intention.\" And when\nit goes on in search of what it \"intends,\" it is called \"invention.\"\nWhen, by reference to something known for certain, it examines what\nit has found, it is said to know or to be wise, which belongs to\n\"phronesis\" or \"wisdom\"; for \"it belongs to the wise man to judge,\"\nas the Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). And when once it has obtained\nsomething for certain, as being fully examined, it thinks about the\nmeans of making it known to others; and this is the ordering of\n\"interior speech,\" from which proceeds \"external speech.\" For every\ndifference of acts does not make the powers vary, but only what\ncannot be reduced to the one same principle, as we have said above\n(Q. 78, A. 4).\n_______________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 11]\n\nWhether the Speculative and Practical Intellects Are Distinct Powers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the speculative and practical\nintellects are distinct powers. For the apprehensive and motive are\ndifferent kinds of powers, as is clear from _De Anima_ ii, 3. But\nthe speculative intellect is merely an apprehensive power; while the\npractical intellect is a motive power. Therefore they are distinct\npowers.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the different nature of the object differentiates\nthe power. But the object of the speculative intellect is _truth,_\nand of the practical is _good;_ which differ in nature. Therefore the\nspeculative and practical intellect are distinct powers.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in the intellectual part, the practical intellect is\ncompared to the speculative, as the estimative is to the imaginative\npower in the sensitive part. But the estimative differs from the\nimaginative, as power form power, as we have said above (Q. 78, A.\n4). Therefore also the speculative intellect differs from the\npractical.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The speculative intellect by extension becomes\npractical (De Anima iii, 10). But one power is not changed into\nanother. Therefore the speculative and practical intellects are not\ndistinct powers.\n\n_I answer that,_ The speculative and practical intellects are not\ndistinct powers. The reason of which is that, as we have said above\n(Q. 77, A. 3), what is accidental to the nature of the object of\na power, does not differentiate that power; for it is accidental to a\nthing colored to be man, or to be great or small; hence all such\nthings are apprehended by the same power of sight. Now, to a thing\napprehended by the intellect, it is accidental whether it be directed\nto operation or not, and according to this the speculative and\npractical intellects differ. For it is the speculative intellect which\ndirects what it apprehends, not to operation, but to the consideration\nof truth; while the practical intellect is that which directs what it\napprehends to operation. And this is what the Philosopher says (De\nAnima iii, 10); that \"the speculative differs from the practical in\nits end.\" Whence each is named from its end: the one speculative, the\nother practical--i.e. operative.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The practical intellect is a motive power, not as\nexecuting movement, but as directing towards it; and this belongs to\nit according to its mode of apprehension.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Truth and good include one another; for truth is\nsomething good, otherwise it would not be desirable; and good is\nsomething true, otherwise it would not be intelligible. Therefore as\nthe object of the appetite may be something true, as having the\naspect of good, for example, when some one desires to know the truth;\nso the object of the practical intellect is good directed to the\noperation, and under the aspect of truth. For the practical intellect\nknows truth, just as the speculative, but it directs the known truth\nto operation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Many differences differentiate the sensitive powers,\nwhich do not differentiate the intellectual powers, as we have said\nabove (A. 7, ad 2; Q. 77, A. 3, ad 4).\n_______________________\n\nTWELFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 12]\n\nWhether Synderesis Is a Special Power of the Soul Distinct from the\nOthers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that \"synderesis\" is a special power,\ndistinct from the others. For those things which fall under one\ndivision, seem to be of the same genus. But in the gloss of Jerome\non Ezech. 1:6, \"synderesis\" is divided against the irascible, the\nconcupiscible, and the rational, which are powers. Therefore\n\"synderesis\" is a power.\n\nObj. 2: Further, opposite things are of the same genus. But\n\"synderesis\" and sensuality seem to be opposed to one another because\n\"synderesis\" always incites to good; while sensuality always incites\nto evil: whence it is signified by the serpent, as is clear from\nAugustine (De Trin. xii, 12,13). It seems, therefore, that\n\"synderesis\" is a power just as sensuality is.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 10) that in the\nnatural power of judgment there are certain \"rules and seeds of\nvirtue, both true and unchangeable.\" And this is what we call\nsynderesis. Since, therefore, the unchangeable rules which guide our\njudgment belong to the reason as to its higher part, as Augustine says\n(De Trin. xii, 2), it seems that \"synderesis\" is the same as reason:\nand thus it is a power.\n\n_On the contrary,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. viii, 2),\n\"rational powers regard opposite things.\" But \"synderesis\" does not\nregard opposites, but inclines to good only. Therefore \"synderesis\"\nis not a power. For if it were a power it would be a rational power,\nsince it is not found in brute animals.\n\n_I answer that,_ \"Synderesis\" is not a power but a habit; though\nsome held that it is a power higher than reason; while others [*Cf.\nAlexander of Hales, Sum. Theol. II, Q. 73] said that it is reason\nitself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear\nwe must observe that, as we have said above (A. 8), man's act of\nreasoning, since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the\nunderstanding of certain things--namely, those which are naturally\nknown without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an\nimmovable principle--and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as\nby means of those principles naturally known, we judge of those things\nwhich we have discovered by reasoning. Now it is clear that, as the\nspeculative reason argues about speculative things, so that practical\nreason argues about practical things. Therefore we must have, bestowed\non us by nature, not only speculative principles, but also practical\nprinciples. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by\nnature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit, which\nis called \"the understanding of principles,\" as the Philosopher\nexplains (Ethic. vi, 6). Wherefore the first practical principles,\nbestowed on us by nature, do not belong to a special power, but to a\nspecial natural habit, which we call \"synderesis.\" Whence \"synderesis\"\nis said to incite to good, and to murmur at evil, inasmuch as through\nfirst principles we proceed to discover, and judge of what we have\ndiscovered. It is therefore clear that \"synderesis\" is not a power,\nbut a natural habit.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The division given by Jerome is taken from the variety\nof acts, and not from the variety of powers; and various acts can\nbelong to one power.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In like manner, the opposition of sensuality to\n\"syneresis\" is an opposition of acts, and not of the different\nspecies of one genus.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Those unchangeable notions are the first practical\nprinciples, concerning which no one errs; and they are attributed to\nreason as to a power, and to \"synderesis\" as to a habit. Wherefore\nwe judge naturally both by our reason and by \"synderesis.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 13]\n\nWhether Conscience Be a Power?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that conscience is a power; for Origen\nsays [*Commentary on Rom. 2:15] that \"conscience is a correcting and\nguiding spirit accompanying the soul, by which it is led away from\nevil and made to cling to good.\" But in the soul, spirit designates a\npower--either the mind itself, according to the text (Eph. 4:13), \"Be\nye renewed in the spirit of your mind\"--or the imagination, whence\nimaginary vision is called spiritual, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.\nxii, 7,24). Therefore conscience is a power.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing is a subject of sin, except a power of the\nsoul. But conscience is a subject of sin; for it is said of some that\n\"their mind and conscience are defiled\" (Titus 1:15). Therefore it\nseems that conscience is a power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, conscience must of necessity be either an act, a\nhabit, or a power. But it is not an act; for thus it would not always\nexist in man. Nor is it a habit; for conscience is not one thing but\nmany, since we are directed in our actions by many habits of\nknowledge. Therefore conscience is a power.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Conscience can be laid aside. But a power cannot\nbe laid aside. Therefore conscience is not a power.\n\n_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, conscience is not a power, but an\nact. This is evident both from the very name and from those things\nwhich in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For\nconscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies the\nrelation of knowledge to something: for conscience may be resolved\ninto \"cum alio scientia,\" i.e. knowledge applied to an individual\ncase. But the application of knowledge to something is done by some\nact. Wherefore from this explanation of the name it is clear that\nconscience is an act.\n\nThe same is manifest from those things which are attributed to\nconscience. For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite,\nand also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. And all these follow the\napplication of knowledge or science to what we do: which application\nis made in three ways. One way in so far as we recognize that we have\ndone or not done something; \"Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast\noften spoken evil of others\" (Eccles. 7:23), and according to this,\nconscience is said to witness. In another way, so far as through the\nconscience we judge that something should be done or not done; and in\nthis sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way,\nso far as by conscience we judge that something done is well done or\nill done, and in this sense conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or\ntorment. Now, it is clear that all these things follow the actual\napplication of knowledge to what we do. Wherefore, properly speaking,\nconscience denominates an act. But since habit is a principle of act,\nsometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural\nhabit--namely, \"synderesis\": thus Jerome calls \"synderesis\"\nconscience (Gloss. Ezech. 1:6); Basil [*Hom. in princ. Proverb.], the\n\"natural power of judgment,\" and Damascene [*De Fide Orth. iv. 22]\nsays that it is the \"law of our intellect.\" For it is customary for\ncauses and effects to be called after one another.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Conscience is called a spirit, so far as spirit is the\nsame as mind; because conscience is a certain pronouncement of the\nmind.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The conscience is said to be defiled, not as a subject,\nbut as the thing known is in knowledge; so far as someone knows he is\ndefiled.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although an act does not always remain in itself, yet\nit always remains in its cause, which is power and habit. Now all the\nhabits by which conscience is formed, although many, nevertheless\nhave their efficacy from one first habit, the habit of first\nprinciples, which is called \"synderesis.\" And for this special\nreason, this habit is sometimes called conscience, as we have said\nabove.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 80\n\nOF THE APPETITIVE POWERS IN GENERAL\n(In Two Articles)\n\nNext we consider the appetitive powers, concerning which there are\nfour heads of consideration: first, the appetitive powers in general;\nsecond, sensuality; third, the will; fourth, the free-will. Under the\nfirst there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the appetite should be considered a special power of the\nsoul?\n\n(2) Whether the appetite should be divided into intellectual and\nsensitive as distinct powers?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 80, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Appetite Is a Special Power of the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the appetite is not a special power\nof the soul. For no power of the soul is to be assigned for those\nthings which are common to animate and to inanimate things. But\nappetite is common to animate and inanimate things: since \"all desire\ngood,\" as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore the appetite\nis not a special power of the soul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, powers are differentiated by their objects. But what\nwe desire is the same as what we know. Therefore the appetitive power\nis not distinct from the apprehensive power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the common is not divided from the proper. But each\npower of the soul desires some particular desirable thing--namely its\nown suitable object. Therefore, with regard to this object which is\nthe desirable in general, we should not assign some particular power\ndistinct from the others, called the appetitive power.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii, 3) the\nappetitive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide Orth. ii,\n22) distinguishes the appetitive from the cognitive powers.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the\nsoul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination\nfollows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to\nrise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to have a more\nperfect existence in those things which participate knowledge than in\nthose which lack knowledge. For in those which lack knowledge, the\nform is found to determine each thing only to its own being--that is,\nto its nature. Therefore this natural form is followed by a natural\ninclination, which is called the natural appetite. But in those things\nwhich have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being\nby its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless\nreceptive of the species of other things: for example, sense receives\nthe species of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things\nintelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by\nsense and intellect: and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in\na way, approach to a likeness to God, \"in Whom all things pre-exist,\"\nas Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).\n\nTherefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a\nhigher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be\nin them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is\ncalled the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to\nthe appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to\ndesire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined\nby its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive\npower to the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above\nthe common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have said\nabove. Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a particular\npower.\n\nReply Obj. 2: What is apprehended and what is desired are the same in\nreality, but differ in aspect: for a thing is apprehended as\nsomething sensible or intelligible, whereas it is desired as suitable\nor good. Now, it is diversity of aspect in the objects, and not\nmaterial diversity, which demands a diversity of powers.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Each power of the soul is a form or nature, and has a\nnatural inclination to something. Wherefore each power desires by the\nnatural appetite that object which is suitable to itself. Above which\nnatural appetite is the animal appetite, which follows the\napprehension, and by which something is desired not as suitable to\nthis or that power, such as sight for seeing, or sound for hearing;\nbut simply as suitable to the animal.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 80, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Sensitive and Intellectual Appetites Are Distinct Powers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the sensitive and intellectual\nappetites are not distinct powers. For powers are not differentiated\nby accidental differences, as we have seen above (Q. 77, A. 3). But\nit is accidental to the appetible object whether it be apprehended by\nthe sense or by the intellect. Therefore the sensitive and\nintellectual appetites are not distinct powers.\n\nObj. 2: Further, intellectual knowledge is of universals; and so it\nis distinct from sensitive knowledge, which is of individual things.\nBut there is no place for this distinction in the appetitive part:\nfor since the appetite is a movement of the soul to individual\nthings, seemingly every act of the appetite regards an individual\nthing. Therefore the intellectual appetite is not distinguished from\nthe sensitive.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as under the apprehensive power, the appetitive is\nsubordinate as a lower power, so also is the motive power. But the\nmotive power which in man follows the intellect is not distinct from\nthe motive power which in animals follows sense. Therefore, for a\nlike reason, neither is there distinction in the appetitive part.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 9) distinguishes a\ndouble appetite, and says (De Anima iii, 11) that the higher appetite\nmoves the lower.\n\n_I answer that,_ We must needs say that the intellectual appetite is a\ndistinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the appetitive power\nis a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended:\nwherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved,\nwhile the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in _De\nAnima_ iii, 10 and _Metaph._ xii (Did. xi, 7). Now things passive and\nmovable are differentiated according to the distinction of the\ncorresponding active and motive principles; because the motive must be\nproportionate to the movable, and the active to the passive: indeed,\nthe passive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its\nactive principle. Therefore, since what is apprehended by the\nintellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different;\nconsequently, the intellectual appetite is distinct from the\nsensitive.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is not accidental to the thing desired to be\napprehended by the sense or the intellect; on the contrary, this\nbelongs to it by its nature; for the appetible does not move the\nappetite except as it is apprehended. Wherefore differences in the\nthing apprehended are of themselves differences of the appetible. And\nso the appetitive powers are distinct according to the distinction of\nthe things apprehended, as their proper objects.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The intellectual appetite, though it tends to\nindividual things which exist outside the soul, yet tends to them as\nstanding under the universal; as when it desires something because it\nis good. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhetoric. ii, 4) that hatred\ncan regard a universal, as when \"we hate every kind of thief.\" In the\nsame way by the intellectual appetite we may desire the immaterial\ngood, which is not apprehended by sense, such as knowledge, virtue,\nand suchlike.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 81\n\nOF THE POWER OF SENSUALITY\n(In Three Articles)\n\nNext we have to consider the power of sensuality, concerning which\nthere are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether sensuality is only an appetitive power?\n\n(2) Whether it is divided into irascible and concupiscible as distinct\npowers?\n\n(3) Whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 81, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Sensuality Is Only Appetitive?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sensuality is not only appetitive,\nbut also cognitive. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that \"the\nsensual movement of the soul which is directed to the bodily senses\nis common to us and beasts.\" But the bodily senses belong to the\napprehensive powers. Therefore sensuality is a cognitive power.\n\nObj. 2: Further, things which come under one division seem to be\nof one genus. But Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) divides sensuality\nagainst the higher and lower reason, which belong to knowledge.\nTherefore sensuality also is apprehensive.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in man's temptations sensuality stands in the place\nof the \"serpent.\" But in the temptation of our first parents, the\nserpent presented himself as one giving information and proposing\nsin, which belong to the cognitive power. Therefore sensuality is a\ncognitive power.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Sensuality is defined as \"the appetite of things\nbelonging to the body.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The name sensuality seems to be taken from the\nsensual movement, of which Augustine speaks (De Trin. xii, 12, 13),\njust as the name of a power is taken from its act; for instance,\nsight from seeing. Now the sensual movement is an appetite following\nsensitive apprehension. For the act of the apprehensive power is not\nso properly called a movement as the act of the appetite: since the\noperation of the apprehensive power is completed in the very fact\nthat the thing apprehended is in the one that apprehends: while the\noperation of the appetitive power is completed in the fact that he\nwho desires is borne towards the thing desirable. Therefore the\noperation of the apprehensive power is likened to rest: whereas the\noperation of the appetitive power is rather likened to movement.\nWherefore by sensual movement we understand the operation of the\nappetitive power: so that sensuality is the name of the sensitive\nappetite.\n\nReply Obj. 1: By saying that the sensual movement of the soul is\ndirected to the bodily senses, Augustine does not give us to\nunderstand that the bodily senses are included in sensuality, but\nrather that the movement of sensuality is a certain inclination to\nthe bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended\nthrough the bodily senses. And thus the bodily senses appertain to\nsensuality as a preamble.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sensuality is divided against higher and lower\nreason, as having in common with them the act of movement: for the\napprehensive power, to which belong the higher and lower reason,\nis a motive power; as is appetite, to which appertains sensuality.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The serpent not only showed and proposed sin, but\nalso incited to the commission of sin. And in this, sensuality is\nsignified by the serpent.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 81, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Sensitive Appetite Is Divided into the Irascible and\nConcupiscible As Distinct Powers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the sensitive appetite is not divided\ninto the irascible and concupiscible as distinct powers. For the same\npower of the soul regards both sides of a contrariety, as sight\nregards both black and white, according to the Philosopher (De Anima\nii, 11). But suitable and harmful are contraries. Since, then, the\nconcupiscible power regards what is suitable, while the irascible is\nconcerned with what is harmful, it seems that irascible and\nconcupiscible are the same power in the soul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the sensitive appetite regards only what is suitable\naccording to the senses. But such is the object of the concupiscible\npower. Therefore there is no sensitive appetite differing from the\nconcupiscible.\n\nObj. 3: Further, hatred is in the irascible part: for Jerome says on\nMatt. 13:33: \"We ought to have the hatred of vice in the irascible\npower.\" But hatred is contrary to love, and is in the concupiscible\npart. Therefore the concupiscible and irascible are the same powers.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Natura Hominis) and\nDamascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) assign two parts to the sensitive\nappetite, the irascible and the concupiscible.\n\n_I answer that,_ The sensitive appetite is one generic power, and\nis called sensuality; but it is divided into two powers, which are\nspecies of the sensitive appetite--the irascible and the\nconcupiscible. In order to make this clear, we must observe that in\nnatural corruptible things there is needed an inclination not only to\nthe acquisition of what is suitable and to the avoiding of what is\nharmful, but also to resistance against corruptive and contrary\nagencies which are a hindrance to the acquisition of what is\nsuitable, and are productive of harm. For example, fire has a natural\ninclination, not only to rise from a lower position, which is\nunsuitable to it, towards a higher position which is suitable, but\nalso to resist whatever destroys or hinders its action. Therefore,\nsince the sensitive appetite is an inclination following sensitive\napprehension, as natural appetite is an inclination following the\nnatural form, there must needs be in the sensitive part two appetitive\npowers--one through which the soul is simply inclined to seek what is\nsuitable, according to the senses, and to fly from what is hurtful,\nand this is called the concupiscible: and another, whereby an animal\nresists these attacks that hinder what is suitable, and inflict harm,\nand this is called the irascible. Whence we say that its object is\nsomething arduous, because its tendency is to overcome and rise above\nobstacles. Now these two are not to be reduced to one principle: for\nsometimes the soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the\ninclination of the concupiscible appetite, in order that, following\nthe impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against obstacles.\nWherefore also the passions of the irascible appetite counteract the\npassions of the concupiscible appetite: since the concupiscence, on\nbeing aroused, diminishes anger; and anger being roused, diminishes\nconcupiscence in many cases. This is clear also from the fact that\nthe irascible is, as it were, the champion and defender of the\nconcupiscible when it rises up against what hinders the acquisition of\nthe suitable things which the concupiscible desires, or against what\ninflicts harm, from which the concupiscible flies. And for this reason\nall the passions of the irascible appetite rise from the passions of\nthe concupiscible appetite and terminate in them; for instance, anger\nrises from sadness, and having wrought vengeance, terminates in joy.\nFor this reason also the quarrels of animals are about things\nconcupiscible--namely, food and sex, as the Philosopher says [*De\nAnimal. Histor. viii.].\n\nReply Obj. 1: The concupiscible power regards both what is suitable\nand what is unsuitable. But the object of the irascible power is to\nresist the onslaught of the unsuitable.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As in the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part\nthere is an estimative power, which perceives those things which do\nnot impress the senses, as we have said above (Q. 78, A. 2); so also\nin the sensitive appetite there is a certain appetitive power which\nregards something as suitable, not because it pleases the senses, but\nbecause it is useful to the animal for self-defense: and this is the\nirascible power.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Hatred belongs simply to the concupiscible appetite:\nbut by reason of the strife which arises from hatred, it may belong\nto the irascible appetite.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 81, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the irascible and concupiscible appetites obey reason?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible\nappetites do not obey reason. For irascible and concupiscible are\nparts of sensuality. But sensuality does not obey reason, wherefore\nit is signified by the serpent, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii,\n12,13). Therefore the irascible and concupiscible appetites do not\nobey reason.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But\nthe irascible and concupiscible appetites resist reason: according to\nthe Apostle (Rom. 7:23): \"I see another law in my members fighting\nagainst the law of my mind.\" Therefore the irascible and\nconcupiscible appetites do not obey reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as the appetitive power is inferior to the rational\npart of the soul, so also is the sensitive power. But the sensitive\npart of the soul does not obey reason: for we neither hear nor see\njust when we wish. Therefore, in like manner, neither do the powers\nof the sensitive appetite, the irascible and concupiscible, obey\nreason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that \"the\npart of the soul which is obedient and amenable to reason is divided\ninto concupiscence and anger.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In two ways the irascible and concupiscible powers\nobey the higher part, in which are the intellect or reason, and the\nwill; first, as to reason, secondly as to the will. They obey the\nreason in their own acts, because in other animals the sensitive\nappetite is naturally moved by the estimative power; for instance,\na sheep, esteeming the wolf as an enemy, is afraid. In man the\nestimative power, as we have said above (Q. 78, A. 4), is replaced\nby the cogitative power, which is called by some \"the particular\nreason,\" because it compares individual intentions. Wherefore in man\nthe sensitive appetite is naturally moved by this particular reason.\nBut this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved\naccording to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters\nparticular conclusions are drawn from universal propositions.\nTherefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive\nappetite, which is divided into concupiscible and irascible; and this\nappetite obeys it. But because to draw particular conclusions from\nuniversal principles is not the work of the intellect, as such, but\nof the reason: hence it is that the irascible and concupiscible are\nsaid to obey the reason rather than to obey the intellect. Anyone\ncan experience this in himself: for by applying certain universal\nconsiderations, anger or fear or the like may be modified or excited.\n\nTo the will also is the sensitive appetite subject in execution,\nwhich is accomplished by the motive power. For in other animals\nmovement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible appetites:\nfor instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it\nhas no superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not\nmoved at once, according to the irascible and concupiscible\nappetites: but he awaits the command of the will, which is the\nsuperior appetite. For wherever there is order among a number of\nmotive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first:\nwherefore the lower appetite is not sufficient to cause movement,\nunless the higher appetite consents. And this is what the Philosopher\nsays (De Anima iii, 11), that \"the higher appetite moves the lower\nappetite, as the higher sphere moves the lower.\" In this way,\ntherefore, the irascible and concupiscible are subject to reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sensuality is signified by the serpent, in what is\nproper to it as a sensitive power. But the irascible and\nconcupiscible powers denominate the sensitive appetite rather on the\npart of the act, to which they are led by the reason, as we have said.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2): \"We observe in\nan animal a despotic and a politic principle: for the soul dominates\nthe body by a despotic power; but the intellect dominates the\nappetite by a politic and royal power.\" For a power is called\ndespotic whereby a man rules his slaves, who have not the right to\nresist in any way the orders of the one that commands them, since\nthey have nothing of their own. But that power is called politic and\nroyal by which a man rules over free subjects, who, though subject\nto the government of the ruler, have nevertheless something of their\nown, by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who\ncommands. And so, the soul is said to rule the body by a despotic\npower, because the members of the body cannot in any way resist the\nsway of the soul, but at the soul's command both hand and foot, and\nwhatever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved\nat once. But the intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible\nand concupiscible by a politic power: because the sensitive appetite\nhas something of its own, by virtue whereof it can resist the\ncommands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally moved,\nnot only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the\ncogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the\nimagination and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the\nirascible and concupiscible powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we\nsense or imagine something pleasant, which reason forbids, or\nunpleasant, which reason commands. And so from the fact that the\nirascible and concupiscible resist reason in something, we must not\nconclude that they do not obey.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The exterior senses require for action exterior\nsensible things, whereby they are affected, and the presence of which\nis not ruled by reason. But the interior powers, both appetitive and\napprehensive, do not require exterior things. Therefore they are\nsubject to the command of reason, which can not only incite or modify\nthe affections of the appetitive power, but can also form the\nphantasms of the imagination.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 82\n\nOF THE WILL\n(In Five Articles)\n\nWe next consider the will. Under this head there are five points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the will desires something of necessity?\n\n(2) Whether it desires everything of necessity?\n\n(3) Whether it is a higher power than the intellect?\n\n(4) Whether the will moves the intellect?\n\n(5) Whether the will is divided into irascible and concupiscible?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Will Desires Something of Necessity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will desires nothing of\nnecessity. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that it anything\nis necessary, it is not voluntary. But whatever the will desires is\nvoluntary. Therefore nothing that the will desires is desired of\nnecessity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the rational powers, according to the Philosopher\n(Metaph. viii, 2), extend to opposite things. But the will is a\nrational power, because, as he says (De Anima iii, 9), \"the will is\nin the reason.\" Therefore the will extends to opposite things, and\ntherefore it is determined to nothing of necessity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, by the will we are masters of our own actions. But\nwe are not masters of that which is of necessity. Therefore the act\nof the will cannot be necessitated.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 4) that \"all desire\nhappiness with one will.\" Now if this were not necessary, but\ncontingent, there would at least be a few exceptions. Therefore the\nwill desires something of necessity.\n\n_I answer that,_ The word \"necessity\" is employed in many ways. For\nthat which must be is necessary. Now that a thing must be may belong\nto it by an intrinsic principle--either material, as when we say that\neverything composed of contraries is of necessity corruptible--or\nformal, as when we say that it is necessary for the three angles of a\ntriangle to be equal to two right angles. And this is \"natural\" and\n\"absolute necessity.\" In another way, that a thing must be, belongs\nto it by reason of something extrinsic, which is either the end or\nthe agent. On the part of the end, as when without it the end is not\nto be attained or so well attained: for instance, food is said to be\nnecessary for life, and a horse is necessary for a journey. This is\ncalled \"necessity of end,\" and sometimes also \"utility.\" On the part\nof the agent, a thing must be, when someone is forced by some agent,\nso that he is not able to do the contrary. This is called \"necessity\nof coercion.\"\n\nNow this necessity of coercion is altogether repugnant to the will.\nFor we call that violent which is against the inclination of a thing.\nBut the very movement of the will is an inclination to something.\nTherefore, as a thing is called natural because it is according to the\ninclination of nature, so a thing is called voluntary because it is\naccording to the inclination of the will. Therefore, just as it is\nimpossible for a thing to be at the same time violent and natural, so\nit is impossible for a thing to be absolutely coerced or violent, and\nvoluntary.\n\nBut necessity of end is not repugnant to the will, when the end cannot\nbe attained except in one way: thus from the will to cross the sea,\narises in the will the necessity to wish for a ship.\n\nIn like manner neither is natural necessity repugnant to the will.\nIndeed, more than this, for as the intellect of necessity adheres to\nthe first principles, the will must of necessity adhere to the last\nend, which is happiness: since the end is in practical matters what\nthe principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing\nnaturally and immovably must be the root and principle of all else\nappertaining thereto, since the nature of a thing is the first in\neverything, and every movement arises from something immovable.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The words of Augustine are to be understood of the\nnecessity of coercion. But natural necessity \"does not take away\nthe liberty of the will,\" as he says himself (De Civ. Dei v, 10).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The will, so far as it desires a thing naturally,\ncorresponds rather to the intellect as regards natural principles\nthan to the reason, which extends to opposite things. Wherefore in\nthis respect it is rather an intellectual than a rational power.\n\nReply Obj. 3: We are masters of our own actions by reason of our\nbeing able to choose this or that. But choice regards not the end,\nbut \"the means to the end,\" as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 9).\nWherefore the desire of the ultimate end does not regard those\nactions of which we are masters.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Will Desires of Necessity, Whatever It Desires?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will desires all things of\nnecessity, whatever it desires. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)\nthat \"evil is outside the scope of the will.\" Therefore the will\ntends of necessity to the good which is proposed to it.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the object of the will is compared to the will as\nthe mover to the thing movable. But the movement of the movable\nnecessarily follows the mover. Therefore it seems that the will's\nobject moves it of necessity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as the thing apprehended by sense is the object of\nthe sensitive appetite, so the thing apprehended by the intellect is\nthe object of the intellectual appetite, which is called the will.\nBut what is apprehended by the sense moves the sensitive appetite of\nnecessity: for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that \"animals\nare moved by things seen.\" Therefore it seems that whatever is\napprehended by the intellect moves the will of necessity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that \"it is the\nwill by which we sin and live well,\" and so the will extends to\nopposite things. Therefore it does not desire of necessity all\nthings whatsoever it desires.\n\n_I answer that,_ The will does not desire of necessity whatsoever it\ndesires. In order to make this evident we must observe that as the\nintellect naturally and of necessity adheres to the first principles,\nso the will adheres to the last end, as we have said already (A. 1).\nNow there are some things intelligible which have not a necessary\nconnection with the first principles; such as contingent\npropositions, the denial of which does not involve a denial of the\nfirst principles. And to such the intellect does not assent of\nnecessity. But there are some propositions which have a necessary\nconnection with the first principles: such as demonstrable\nconclusions, a denial of which involves a denial of the first\nprinciples. And to these the intellect assents of necessity, when\nonce it is aware of the necessary connection of these conclusions\nwith the principles; but it does not assent of necessity until\nthrough the demonstration it recognizes the necessity of such\nconnection. It is the same with the will. For there are certain\nindividual goods which have not a necessary connection with\nhappiness, because without them a man can be happy: and to such the\nwill does not adhere of necessity. But there are some things which\nhave a necessary connection with happiness, by means of which things\nman adheres to God, in Whom alone true happiness consists.\nNevertheless, until through the certitude of the Divine Vision the\nnecessity of such connection be shown, the will does not adhere to\nGod of necessity, nor to those things which are of God. But the will\nof the man who sees God in His essence of necessity adheres to God,\njust as now we desire of necessity to be happy. It is therefore clear\nthat the will does not desire of necessity whatever it desires.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The will can tend to nothing except under the aspect of\ngood. But because good is of many kinds, for this reason the will is\nnot of necessity determined to one.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The mover, then, of necessity causes movement in the\nthing movable, when the power of the mover exceeds the thing movable,\nso that its entire capacity is subject to the mover. But as the\ncapacity of the will regards the universal and perfect good, its\ncapacity is not subjected to any individual good. And therefore it is\nnot of necessity moved by it.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The sensitive power does not compare different things\nwith each other, as reason does: but it simply apprehends some one\nthing. Therefore, according to that one thing, it moves the sensitive\nappetite in a determinate way. But the reason is a power that\ncompares several things together: therefore from several things the\nintellectual appetite--that is, the will--may be moved; but not of\nnecessity from one thing.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Will Is a Higher Power Than the Intellect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will is a higher power than the\nintellect. For the object of the will is good and the end. But the\nend is the first and highest cause. Therefore the will is the first\nand highest power.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in the order of natural things we observe a progress\nfrom imperfect things to perfect. And this also appears in the powers\nof the soul: for sense precedes the intellect, which is more noble.\nNow the act of the will, in the natural order, follows the act of the\nintellect. Therefore the will is a more noble and perfect power than\nthe intellect.\n\nObj. 3: Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as\nperfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects\nthe will--namely, charity--is more noble than the habits which\nperfect the intellect: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:2): \"If I should\nknow all mysteries, and if I should have all faith, and have not\ncharity, I am nothing.\" Therefore the will is a higher power than\nthe intellect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher holds the intellect to be the\nhigher power than the intellect.\n\n_I answer that,_ The superiority of one thing over another can be\nconsidered in two ways: \"absolutely\" and \"relatively.\" Now a thing is\nconsidered to be such absolutely which is considered such in itself:\nbut relatively as it is such with regard to something else. If\ntherefore the intellect and will be considered with regard to\nthemselves, then the intellect is the higher power. And this is clear\nif we compare their respective objects to one another. For the object\nof the intellect is more simple and more absolute than the object of\nthe will; since the object of the intellect is the very idea of\nappetible good; and the appetible good, the idea of which is in the\nintellect, is the object of the will. Now the more simple and the\nmore abstract a thing is, the nobler and higher it is in itself; and\ntherefore the object of the intellect is higher than the object of\nthe will. Therefore, since the proper nature of a power is in its\norder to its object, it follows that the intellect in itself and\nabsolutely is higher and nobler than the will. But relatively and by\ncomparison with something else, we find that the will is sometimes\nhigher than the intellect, from the fact that the object of the will\noccurs in something higher than that in which occurs the object of\nthe intellect. Thus, for instance, I might say that hearing is\nrelatively nobler than sight, inasmuch as something in which there is\nsound is nobler than something in which there is color, though color\nis nobler and simpler than sound. For as we have said above (Q. 16,\nA. 1; Q. 27, A. 4), the action of the intellect consists in\nthis--that the idea of the thing understood is in the one who\nunderstands; while the act of the will consists in this--that the\nwill is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself. And\ntherefore the Philosopher says in _Metaph._ vi (Did. v, 2) that \"good\nand evil,\" which are objects of the will, \"are in things,\" but \"truth\nand error,\" which are objects of the intellect, \"are in the mind.\"\nWhen, therefore, the thing in which there is good is nobler than the\nsoul itself, in which is the idea understood; by comparison with such\na thing, the will is higher than the intellect. But when the thing\nwhich is good is less noble than the soul, then even in comparison\nwith that thing the intellect is higher than the will. Wherefore the\nlove of God is better than the knowledge of God; but, on the\ncontrary, the knowledge of corporeal things is better than the love\nthereof. Absolutely, however, the intellect is nobler than the will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The aspect of causality is perceived by comparing one\nthing to another, and in such a comparison the idea of good is found\nto be nobler: but truth signifies something more absolute, and\nextends to the idea of good itself: wherefore even good is something\ntrue. But, again, truth is something good: forasmuch as the intellect\nis a thing, and truth its end. And among other ends this is the most\nexcellent: as also is the intellect among the other powers.\n\nReply Obj. 2: What precedes in order of generation and time is less\nperfect: for in one and in the same thing potentiality precedes act,\nand imperfection precedes perfection. But what precedes absolutely\nand in the order of nature is more perfect: for thus act precedes\npotentiality. And in this way the intellect precedes the will, as the\nmotive power precedes the thing movable, and as the active precedes\nthe passive; for good which is understood moves the will.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This reason is verified of the will as compared with\nwhat is above the soul. For charity is the virtue by which we love\nGod.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Will Moves the Intellect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will does not move the intellect.\nFor what moves excels and precedes what is moved, because what moves\nis an agent, and \"the agent is nobler than the patient,\" as Augustine\nsays (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16), and the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 5).\nBut the intellect excels and precedes the will, as we have said above\n(A. 3). Therefore the will does not move the intellect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what moves is not moved by what is moved, except\nperhaps accidentally. But the intellect moves the will, because the\ngood apprehended by the intellect moves without being moved; whereas\nthe appetite moves and is moved. Therefore the intellect is not moved\nby the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, we can will nothing but what we understand. If,\ntherefore, in order to understand, the will moves by willing to\nunderstand, that act of the will must be preceded by another act of\nthe intellect, and this act of the intellect by another act of the\nwill, and so on indefinitely, which is impossible. Therefore the will\ndoes not move the intellect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 26): \"It is in\nour power to learn an art or not, as we list.\" But a thing is in our\npower by the will, and we learn art by the intellect. Therefore the\nwill moves the intellect.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing is said to move in two ways: First, as an\nend; for instance, when we say that the end moves the agent. In this\nway the intellect moves the will, because the good understood is the\nobject of the will, and moves it as an end. Secondly, a thing is said\nto move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what\nimpels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the\nintellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De\nSimilitudinibus). The reason is, because wherever we have order among\na number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end\nmoves the powers which regard particular ends. And we may observe\nthis both in nature and in things politic. For the heaven, which aims\nat the universal preservation of things subject to generation and\ncorruption, moves all inferior bodies, each of which aims at the\npreservation of its own species or of the individual. The king also,\nwho aims at the common good of the whole kingdom, by his rule moves\nall the governors of cities, each of whom rules over his own\nparticular city. Now the object of the will is good and the end in\ngeneral, and each power is directed to some suitable good proper to\nit, as sight is directed to the perception of color, and the\nintellect to the knowledge of truth. Therefore the will as agent\nmoves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts, except the\nnatural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our\nwill.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The intellect may be considered in two ways: as\napprehensive of universal being and truth, and as a thing and a\nparticular power having a determinate act. In like manner also the\nwill may be considered in two ways: according to the common nature of\nits object--that is to say, as appetitive of universal good--and as\na determinate power of the soul having a determinate act. If,\ntherefore, the intellect and the will be compared with one another\naccording to the universality of their respective objects, then, as\nwe have said above (A. 3), the intellect is simply higher and nobler\nthan the will. If, however, we take the intellect as regards the\ncommon nature of its object and the will as a determinate power, then\nagain the intellect is higher and nobler than the will, because under\nthe notion of being and truth is contained both the will itself, and\nits act, and its object. Wherefore the intellect understands the will,\nand its act, and its object, just as it understands other species of\nthings, as stone or wood, which are contained in the common notion of\nbeing and truth. But if we consider the will as regards the common\nnature of its object, which is good, and the intellect as a thing and\na special power; then the intellect itself, and its act, and its\nobject, which is truth, each of which is some species of good, are\ncontained under the common notion of good. And in this way the will is\nhigher than the intellect, and can move it. From this we can easily\nunderstand why these powers include one another in their acts, because\nthe intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the\nintellect to understand. In the same way good is contained in truth,\ninasmuch as it is an understood truth, and truth in good, inasmuch as\nit is a desired good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The intellect moves the will in one sense, and the will\nmoves the intellect in another, as we have said above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is no need to go on indefinitely, but we must\nstop at the intellect as preceding all the rest. For every movement\nof the will must be preceded by apprehension, whereas every\napprehension is not preceded by an act of the will; but the principle\nof counselling and understanding is an intellectual principle higher\nthan our intellect--namely, God--as also Aristotle says (Eth.\nEudemic. vii, 14), and in this way he explains that there is no need\nto proceed indefinitely.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 82, Art. 5]\n\nWhether We Should Distinguish Irascible and Concupiscible Parts in\nthe Superior Appetite?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we ought to distinguish irascible and\nconcupiscible parts in the superior appetite, which is the will. For\nthe concupiscible power is so called from \"concupiscere\" (to desire),\nand the irascible part from \"irasci\" (to be angry). But there is a\nconcupiscence which cannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only\nto the intellectual, which is the will; as the concupiscence of\nwisdom, of which it is said (Wis. 6:21): \"The concupiscence of wisdom\nbringeth to the eternal kingdom.\" There is also a certain anger which\ncannot belong to the sensitive appetite, but only to the intellectual;\nas when our anger is directed against vice. Wherefore Jerome\ncommenting on Matt. 13:33 warns us \"to have the hatred of vice in the\nirascible part.\" Therefore we should distinguish irascible and\nconcupiscible parts of the intellectual soul as well as in the\nsensitive.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as is commonly said, charity is in the\nconcupiscible, and hope in the irascible part. But they cannot be in\nthe sensitive appetite, because their objects are not sensible, but\nintellectual. Therefore we must assign an irascible and concupiscible\npower to the intellectual part.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is said (De Spiritu et Anima) that \"the soul\nhas these powers\"--namely, the irascible, concupiscible, and\nrational--\"before it is united to the body.\" But no power of the\nsensitive part belongs to the soul alone, but to the soul and body\nunited, as we have said above (Q. 78, AA. 5, 8). Therefore the\nirascible and concupiscible powers are in the will, which is the\nintellectual appetite.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) says that\nthe irrational part of the soul is divided into the desiderative and\nirascible, and Damascene says the same (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). And the\nPhilosopher says (De Anima iii, 9) \"that the will is in reason, while\nin the irrational part of the soul are concupiscence and anger,\" or\n\"desire and animus.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The irascible and concupiscible are not parts of the\nintellectual appetite, which is called the will. Because, as was said\nabove (Q. 59, A. 4; Q. 79, A. 7), a power which is directed to an\nobject according to some common notion is not differentiated by\nspecial differences which are contained under that common notion. For\ninstance, because sight regards the visible thing under the common\nnotion of something colored, the visual power is not multiplied\naccording to the different kinds of color: but if there were a power\nregarding white as white, and not as something colored, it would be\ndistinct from a power regarding black as black.\n\nNow the sensitive appetite does not consider the common notion of\ngood, because neither do the senses apprehend the universal. And\ntherefore the parts of the sensitive appetite are differentiated by\nthe different notions of particular good: for the concupiscible\nregards as proper to it the notion of good, as something pleasant to\nthe senses and suitable to nature: whereas the irascible regards the\nnotion of good as something that wards off and repels what is\nhurtful. But the will regards good according to the common notion of\ngood, and therefore in the will, which is the intellectual appetite,\nthere is no differentiation of appetitive powers, so that there be in\nthe intellectual appetite an irascible power distinct from a\nconcupiscible power: just as neither on the part of the intellect are\nthe apprehensive powers multiplied, although they are on the part of\nthe senses.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in\ntwo ways. Sometimes they are taken as passions--arising, that is,\nwith a certain commotion of the soul. And thus they are commonly\nunderstood, and in this sense they are only in the sensitive\nappetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they\nare simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and\nthus they are acts of the will. And in this sense, too, they are\nattributed to the angels and to God. But if taken in this sense, they\ndo not belong to different powers, but only to one power, which is\ncalled the will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The will itself may be said to [be] irascible, as far\nas it wills to repel evil, not from any sudden movement of a passion,\nbut from a judgment of the reason. And in the same way the will may\nbe said to be concupiscible on account of its desire for good. And\nthus in the irascible and concupiscible are charity and hope--that\nis, in the will as ordered to such acts. And in this way, too, we may\nunderstand the words quoted (De Spiritu et Anima); that the irascible\nand concupiscible powers are in the soul before it is united to the\nbody (as long as we understand priority of nature, and not of time),\nalthough there is no need to have faith in what that book says.\nWhence the answer to the third objection is clear.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 83\n\nOF FREE-WILL\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe now inquire concerning free-will. Under this head there are four\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether man has free-will?\n\n(2) What is free-will--a power, an act, or a habit?\n\n(3) If it is a power, is it appetitive or cognitive?\n\n(4) If it is appetitive, is it the same power as the will, or\ndistinct?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Man Has Free-Will?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man has not free-will. For whoever\nhas free-will does what he wills. But man does not what he wills; for\nit is written (Rom. 7:19): \"For the good which I will I do not, but\nthe evil which I will not, that I do.\" Therefore man has not\nfree-will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whoever has free-will has in his power to will or\nnot to will, to do or not to do. But this is not in man's power: for\nit is written (Rom. 9:16): \"It is not of him that willeth\"--namely,\nto will--\"nor of him that runneth\"--namely, to run. Therefore man has\nnot free-will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is \"free is cause of itself,\" as the\nPhilosopher says (Metaph. i, 2). Therefore what is moved by another\nis not free. But God moves the will, for it is written (Prov. 21:1):\n\"The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He\nwill He shall turn it\" and (Phil. 2:13): \"It is God Who worketh in\nyou both to will and to accomplish.\" Therefore man has not free-will.\n\nObj. 4: Further, whoever has free-will is master of his own actions.\nBut man is not master of his own actions: for it is written (Jer.\n10:23): \"The way of a man is not his: neither is it in a man to\nwalk.\" Therefore man has not free-will.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): \"According as\neach one is, such does the end seem to him.\" But it is not in our\npower to be of one quality or another; for this comes to us from\nnature. Therefore it is natural to us to follow some particular end,\nand therefore we are not free in so doing.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): \"God made man from\nthe beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel\"; and the\ngloss adds: \"That is of his free-will.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Man has free-will: otherwise counsels, exhortations,\ncommands, prohibitions, rewards, and punishments would be in vain. In\norder to make this evident, we must observe that some things act\nwithout judgment; as a stone moves downwards; and in like manner all\nthings which lack knowledge. And some act from judgment, but not a\nfree judgment; as brute animals. For the sheep, seeing the wolf,\njudges it a thing to be shunned, from a natural and not a free\njudgment, because it judges, not from reason, but from natural\ninstinct. And the same thing is to be said of any judgment of brute\nanimals. But man acts from judgment, because by his apprehensive power\nhe judges that something should be avoided or sought. But because this\njudgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a natural\ninstinct, but from some act of comparison in the reason, therefore he\nacts from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to\nvarious things. For reason in contingent matters may follow opposite\ncourses, as we see in dialectic syllogisms and rhetorical arguments.\nNow particular operations are contingent, and therefore in such\nmatters the judgment of reason may follow opposite courses, and is not\ndeterminate to one. And forasmuch as man is rational is it necessary\nthat man have a free-will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 81, A. 3, ad 2), the\nsensitive appetite, though it obeys the reason, yet in a given case\ncan resist by desiring what the reason forbids. This is therefore\nthe good which man does not when he wishes--namely, \"not to desire\nagainst reason,\" as Augustine says.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those words of the Apostle are not to be taken as\nthough man does not wish or does not run of his free-will, but\nbecause the free-will is not sufficient thereto unless it be moved\nand helped by God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by\nhis free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity\nbelong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of\nitself, as neither for one thing to be cause of another need it be\nthe first cause. God, therefore, is the first cause, Who moves causes\nboth natural and voluntary. And just as by moving natural causes He\ndoes not prevent their acts being natural, so by moving voluntary\ncauses He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary: but\nrather is He the cause of this very thing in them; for He operates\nin each thing according to its own nature.\n\nReply Obj. 4: \"Man's way\" is said \"not to be his\" in the execution of\nhis choice, wherein he may be impeded, whether he will or not. The\nchoice itself, however, is in us, but presupposes the help of God.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Quality in man is of two kinds: natural and\nadventitious. Now the natural quality may be in the intellectual\npart, or in the body and its powers. From the very fact, therefore,\nthat man is such by virtue of a natural quality which is in the\nintellectual part, he naturally desires his last end, which is\nhappiness. Which desire, indeed, is a natural desire, and is not\nsubject to free-will, as is clear from what we have said above (Q.\n82, AA. 1, 2). But on the part of the body and its powers man may be\nsuch by virtue of a natural quality, inasmuch as he is of such a\ntemperament or disposition due to any impression whatever produced by\ncorporeal causes, which cannot affect the intellectual part, since it\nis not the act of a corporeal organ. And such as a man is by virtue\nof a corporeal quality, such also does his end seem to him, because\nfrom such a disposition a man is inclined to choose or reject\nsomething. But these inclinations are subject to the judgment of\nreason, which the lower appetite obeys, as we have said (Q. 81, A.\n3). Wherefore this is in no way prejudicial to free-will.\n\nThe adventitious qualities are habits and passions, by virtue of which\na man is inclined to one thing rather than to another. And yet even\nthese inclinations are subject to the judgment of reason. Such\nqualities, too, are subject to reason, as it is in our power either to\nacquire them, whether by causing them or disposing ourselves to them,\nor to reject them. And so there is nothing in this that is repugnant\nto free-will.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Free-Will Is a Power?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that free-will is not a power. For\nfree-will is nothing but a free judgment. But judgment denominates an\nact, not a power. Therefore free-will is not a power.\n\nObj. 2: Further, free-will is defined as \"the faculty of the will and\nreason.\" But faculty denominates a facility of power, which is due to\na habit. Therefore free-will is a habit. Moreover Bernard says (De\nGratia et Lib. Arb. 1,2) that free-will is \"the soul's habit of\ndisposing of itself.\" Therefore it is not a power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no natural power is forfeited through sin. But\nfree-will is forfeited through sin; for Augustine says that \"man, by\nabusing free-will, loses both it and himself.\" Therefore free-will is\nnot a power.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Nothing but a power, seemingly, is the subject of\na habit. But free-will is the subject of grace, by the help of which\nit chooses what is good. Therefore free-will is a power.\n\n_I answer that,_ Although free-will [*Liberum arbitrium--i.e. free\njudgment] in its strict sense denotes an act, in the common manner of\nspeaking we call free-will, that which is the principle of the act by\nwhich man judges freely. Now in us the principle of an act is both\npower and habit; for we say that we know something both by knowledge\nand by the intellectual power. Therefore free-will must be either a\npower or a habit, or a power with a habit. That it is neither a habit\nnor a power together with a habit, can be clearly proved in two ways.\nFirst of all, because, if it is a habit, it must be a natural habit;\nfor it is natural to man to have a free-will. But there is not\nnatural habit in us with respect to those things which come under\nfree-will: for we are naturally inclined to those things of which we\nhave natural habits--for instance, to assent to first principles:\nwhile those things to which we are naturally inclined are not subject\nto free-will, as we have said of the desire of happiness (Q. 82, AA.\n1, 2). Wherefore it is against the very notion of free-will that it\nshould be a natural habit. And that it should be a non-natural habit\nis against its nature. Therefore in no sense is it a habit.\n\nSecondly, this is clear because habits are defined as that \"by reason\nof which we are well or ill disposed with regard to actions and\npassions\" (Ethic. ii, 5); for by temperance we are well-disposed as\nregards concupiscences, and by intemperance ill-disposed: and by\nknowledge we are well-disposed to the act of the intellect when we\nknow the truth, and by the contrary ill-disposed. But the free-will\nis indifferent to good and evil choice: wherefore it is impossible\nfor free-will to be a habit. Therefore it is a power.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is not unusual for a power to be named from its act.\nAnd so from this act, which is a free judgment, is named the power\nwhich is the principle of this act. Otherwise, if free-will\ndenominated an act, it would not always remain in man.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Faculty sometimes denominates a power ready for\noperation, and in this sense faculty is used in the definition of\nfree-will. But Bernard takes habit, not as divided against power, but\nas signifying a certain aptitude by which a man has some sort of\nrelation to an act. And this may be both by a power and by a habit:\nfor by a power man is, as it were, empowered to do the action, and by\nthe habit he is apt to act well or ill.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man is said to have lost free-will by falling into sin,\nnot as to natural liberty, which is freedom from coercion, but as\nregards freedom from fault and unhappiness. Of this we shall treat\nlater in the treatise on Morals in the second part of this work\n(I-II, Q. 85, seqq.; Q. 109).\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Free-will Is an Appetitive Power?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that free-will is not an appetitive, but\na cognitive power. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 27) says that\n\"free-will straightway accompanies the rational nature.\" But reason\nis a cognitive power. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.\n\nObj. 2: Further, free-will is so called as though it were a free\njudgment. But to judge is an act of a cognitive power. Therefore\nfree-will is a cognitive power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the principal function of free-will is to choose.\nBut choice seems to belong to knowledge, because it implies a certain\ncomparison of one thing to another, which belongs to the cognitive\npower. Therefore free-will is a cognitive power.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice\nis \"the desire of those things which are in us.\" But desire is an act\nof the appetitive power: therefore choice is also. But free-will is\nthat by which we choose. Therefore free-will is an appetitive power.\n\n_I answer that,_ The proper act of free-will is choice: for we say\nthat we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing\nanother; and this is to choose. Therefore we must consider the nature\nof free-will, by considering the nature of choice. Now two things\nconcur in choice: one on the part of the cognitive power, the other\non the part of the appetitive power. On the part of the cognitive\npower, counsel is required, by which we judge one thing to be\npreferred to another: and on the part of the appetitive power, it is\nrequired that the appetite should accept the judgment of counsel.\nTherefore Aristotle (Ethic. vi, 2) leaves it in doubt whether choice\nbelongs principally to the appetitive or the cognitive power: since\nhe says that choice is either \"an appetitive intellect or an\nintellectual appetite.\" But (Ethic. iii, 3) he inclines to its being\nan intellectual appetite when he describes choice as \"a desire\nproceeding from counsel.\" And the reason of this is because the\nproper object of choice is the means to the end: and this, as such,\nis in the nature of that good which is called useful: wherefore since\ngood, as such, is the object of the appetite, it follows that choice\nis principally an act of the appetitive power. And thus free-will is\nan appetitive power.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The appetitive powers accompany the apprehensive, and\nin this sense Damascene says that free-will straightway accompanies\nthe rational power.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Judgment, as it were, concludes and terminates counsel.\nNow counsel is terminated, first, by the judgment of reason;\nsecondly, by the acceptation of the appetite: whence the Philosopher\n(Ethic. iii, 3) says that, \"having formed a judgment by counsel, we\ndesire in accordance with that counsel.\" And in this sense choice\nitself is a judgment from which free-will takes its name.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This comparison which is implied in the choice belongs\nto the preceding counsel, which is an act of reason. For though the\nappetite does not make comparisons, yet forasmuch as it is moved by\nthe apprehensive power which does compare, it has some likeness of\ncomparison by choosing one in preference to another.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 83, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Free-will Is a Power Distinct from the Will?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that free-will is a power distinct from the\nwill. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that _thelesis_ is one\nthing and _boulesis_ another. But _thelesis_ is the will, while\n_boulesis_ seems to be the free-will, because _boulesis,_ according to\nhim, is will as concerning an object by way of comparison between two\nthings. Therefore it seems that free-will is a distinct power from the\nwill.\n\nObj. 2: Further, powers are known by their acts. But choice, which is\nthe act of free-will, is distinct from the act of willing, because\n\"the act of the will regards the end, whereas choice regards the\nmeans to the end\" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore free-will is a distinct\npower from the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the will is the intellectual appetite. But in the\nintellect there are two powers--the active and the passive.\nTherefore, also on the part of the intellectual appetite, there must\nbe another power besides the will. And this, seemingly, can only be\nfree-will. Therefore free-will is a distinct power from the will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14) free-will\nis nothing else than the will.\n\n_I answer that,_ The appetitive powers must be proportionate to the\napprehensive powers, as we have said above (Q. 64, A. 2). Now, as on\nthe part of the intellectual apprehension we have intellect and\nreason, so on the part of the intellectual appetite we have will, and\nfree-will which is nothing else but the power of choice. And this is\nclear from their relations to their respective objects and acts. For\nthe act of _understanding_ implies the simple acceptation of\nsomething; whence we say that we understand first principles, which\nare known of themselves without any comparison. But to _reason,_\nproperly speaking, is to come from one thing to the knowledge of\nanother: wherefore, properly speaking, we reason about conclusions,\nwhich are known from the principles. In like manner on the part of\nthe appetite to \"will\" implies the simple appetite for something:\nwherefore the will is said to regard the end, which is desired for\nitself. But to \"choose\" is to desire something for the sake of\nobtaining something else: wherefore, properly speaking, it regards\nthe means to the end. Now, in matters of knowledge, the principles\nare related to the conclusion to which we assent on account of the\nprinciples: just as, in appetitive matters, the end is related to\nthe means, which is desired on account of the end. Wherefore it is\nevident that as the intellect is to reason, so is the will to the\npower of choice, which is free-will. But it has been shown above (Q.\n79, A. 8) that it belongs to the same power both to understand and to\nreason, even as it belongs to the same power to be at rest and to be\nin movement. Wherefore it belongs also to the same power to will and\nto choose: and on this account the will and the free-will are not two\npowers, but one.\n\nReply Obj. 1: _Boulesis_ is distinct from _thelesis_ on account of a\ndistinction, not of powers, but of acts.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Choice and will--that is, the act of willing--are\ndifferent acts: yet they belong to the same power, as also to\nunderstand and to reason, as we have said.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The intellect is compared to the will as moving the\nwill. And therefore there is no need to distinguish in the will an\nactive and a passive will.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 84\n\nHOW THE SOUL WHILE UNITED TO THE BODY UNDERSTANDS CORPOREAL THINGS\nBENEATH IT\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe now have to consider the acts of the soul in regard to the\nintellectual and the appetitive powers: for the other powers of the\nsoul do not come directly under the consideration of the theologian.\nFurthermore, the acts of the appetitive part of the soul come under\nthe consideration of the science of morals; wherefore we shall treat\nof them in the second part of this work, to which the consideration\nof moral matters belongs. But of the acts of the intellectual part\nwe shall treat now.\n\nIn treating of these acts we shall proceed in the following order:\nFirst, we shall inquire how the soul understands when united to the\nbody; secondly, how it understands when separated therefrom.\n\nThe former of these inquiries will be threefold:\n\n(1) How the soul understands bodies which are beneath it;\n\n(2) How it understands itself and things contained in itself;\n\n(3) How it understands immaterial substances, which are above it.\n\nIn treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are three\npoints to be considered:\n\n(1) Through what does the soul know them?\n\n(2) How and in what order does it know them?\n\n(3) What does it know in them?\n\nUnder the first head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the soul knows bodies through the intellect?\n\n(2) Whether it understands them through its essence, or through any\nspecies?\n\n(3) If through some species, whether the species of all things\nintelligible are naturally innate in the soul?\n\n(4) Whether these species are derived by the soul from certain\nseparate immaterial forms?\n\n(5) Whether our soul sees in the eternal ideas all that it\nunderstands?\n\n(6) Whether it acquires intellectual knowledge from the senses?\n\n(7) Whether the intellect can, through the species of which it is\npossessed, actually understand, without turning to the phantasms?\n\n(8) Whether the judgment of the intellect is hindered by an obstacle\nin the sensitive powers?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Soul Knows Bodies Through the Intellect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the soul does not know bodies through\nthe intellect. For Augustine says (Soliloq. ii, 4) that \"bodies cannot\nbe understood by the intellect; nor indeed anything corporeal unless\nit can be perceived by the senses.\" He says also (Gen. ad lit. xii,\n24) that intellectual vision is of those things that are in the soul\nby their essence. But such are not bodies. Therefore the soul cannot\nknow bodies through the intellect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as sense is to the intelligible, so is the intellect\nto the sensible. But the soul can by no means, through the senses,\nunderstand spiritual things, which are intelligible. Therefore by no\nmeans can it, through the intellect, know bodies, which are sensible.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the intellect is concerned with things that are\nnecessary and unchangeable. But all bodies are mobile and changeable.\nTherefore the soul cannot know bodies through the intellect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Science is in the intellect. If, therefore, the\nintellect does not know bodies, it follows that there is no science of\nbodies; and thus perishes natural science, which treats of mobile\nbodies.\n\n_I answer that,_ It should be said in order to elucidate this\nquestion, that the early philosophers, who inquired into the natures\nof things, thought there was nothing in the world save bodies. And\nbecause they observed that all bodies are mobile, and considered them\nto be ever in a state of flux, they were of opinion that we can have\nno certain knowledge of the true nature of things. For what is in a\ncontinual state of flux, cannot be grasped with any degree of\ncertitude, for it passes away ere the mind can form a judgment\nthereon: according to the saying of Heraclitus, that \"it is not\npossible twice to touch a drop of water in a passing torrent,\" as\nthe Philosopher relates (Metaph. iv, Did. iii, 5).\n\nAfter these came Plato, who, wishing to save the certitude of our\nknowledge of truth through the intellect, maintained that, besides\nthese things corporeal, there is another genus of beings, separate\nfrom matter and movement, which beings he called species or\n\"ideas,\" by participation of which each one of these singular and\nsensible things is said to be either a man, or a horse, or the like.\nWherefore he said that sciences and definitions, and whatever\nappertains to the act of the intellect, are not referred to these\nsensible bodies, but to those beings immaterial and separate: so\nthat according to this the soul does not understand these corporeal\nthings, but the separate species thereof.\n\nNow this may be shown to be false for two reasons. First, because,\nsince those species are immaterial and immovable, knowledge of\nmovement and matter would be excluded from science (which knowledge\nis proper to natural science), and likewise all demonstration through\nmoving and material causes. Secondly, because it seems ridiculous,\nwhen we seek for knowledge of things which are to us manifest, to\nintroduce other beings, which cannot be the substance of those\nothers, since they differ from them essentially: so that granted that\nwe have a knowledge of those separate substances, we cannot for that\nreason claim to form a judgment concerning these sensible things.\n\nNow it seems that Plato strayed from the truth because, having\nobserved that all knowledge takes place through some kind of\nsimilitude, he thought that the form of the thing known must of\nnecessity be in the knower in the same manner as in the thing known.\nThen he observed that the form of the thing understood is in the\nintellect under conditions of universality, immateriality, and\nimmobility: which is apparent from the very operation of the\nintellect, whose act of understanding has a universal extension, and\nis subject to a certain amount of necessity: for the mode of action\ncorresponds to the mode of the agent's form. Wherefore he concluded\nthat the things which we understand must have in themselves an\nexistence under the same conditions of immateriality and immobility.\n\nBut there is no necessity for this. For even in sensible things it is\nto be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible than in\nanother: for instance, whiteness may be of great intensity in one,\nand of a less intensity in another: in one we find whiteness with\nsweetness, in another without sweetness. In the same way the sensible\nform is conditioned differently in the thing which is external to the\nsoul, and in the senses which receive the forms of sensible things\nwithout receiving matter, such as the color of gold without receiving\ngold. So also the intellect, according to its own mode, receives\nunder conditions of immateriality and immobility, the species of\nmaterial and mobile bodies: for the received is in the receiver\naccording to the mode of the receiver. We must conclude, therefore,\nthat through the intellect the soul knows bodies by a knowledge which\nis immaterial, universal, and necessary.\n\nReply Obj. 1: These words of Augustine are to be understood as\nreferring to the medium of intellectual knowledge, and not to its\nobject. For the intellect knows bodies by understanding them, not\nindeed through bodies, nor through material and corporeal species;\nbut through immaterial and intelligible species, which can be in the\nsoul by their own essence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxii, 29), it is not\ncorrect to say that as the sense knows only bodies so the intellect\nknows only spiritual things; for it follows that God and the angels\nwould not know corporeal things. The reason of this diversity is that\nthe lower power does not extend to those things that belong to the\nhigher power; whereas the higher power operates in a more excellent\nmanner those things which belong to the lower power.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Every movement presupposes something immovable: for\nwhen a change of quality occurs, the substance remains unmoved; and\nwhen there is a change of substantial form, matter remains unmoved.\nMoreover the various conditions of mutable things are themselves\nimmovable; for instance, though Socrates be not always sitting, yet\nit is an immovable truth that whenever he does sit he remains in one\nplace. For this reason there is nothing to hinder our having an\nimmovable science of movable things.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Soul Understands Corporeal Things Through Its Essence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the soul understands corporeal things\nthrough its essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 5) that the soul\n\"collects and lays hold of the images of bodies which are formed in\nthe soul and of the soul: for in forming them it gives them something\nof its own substance.\" But the soul understands bodies by images of\nbodies. Therefore the soul knows bodies through its essence, which it\nemploys for the formation of such images, and from which it forms\nthem.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 8) that \"the\nsoul, after a fashion, is everything.\" Since, therefore, like is known\nby like, it seems that the soul knows corporeal things through itself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the soul is superior to corporeal creatures. Now\nlower things are in higher things in a more eminent way than in\nthemselves, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xii). Therefore all\ncorporeal creatures exist in a more excellent way in the soul than in\nthemselves. Therefore the soul can know corporeal creatures through\nits essence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3) that \"the mind\ngathers knowledge of corporeal things through the bodily senses.\" But\nthe soul itself cannot be known through the bodily senses. Therefore\nit does not know corporeal things through itself.\n\n_I answer that,_ The ancient philosophers held that the soul knows\nbodies through its essence. For it was universally admitted that\n\"like is known by like.\" But they thought that the form of the thing\nknown is in the knower in the same mode as in the thing known. The\nPlatonists however were of a contrary opinion. For Plato, having\nobserved that the intellectual soul has an immaterial nature, and an\nimmaterial mode of knowledge, held that the forms of things known\nsubsist immaterially. While the earlier natural philosophers,\nobserving that things known are corporeal and material, held that\nthings known must exist materially even in the soul that knows them.\nAnd therefore, in order to ascribe to the soul a knowledge of all\nthings, they held that it has the same nature in common with all. And\nbecause the nature of a result is determined by its principles, they\nascribed to the soul the nature of a principle; so that those who\nthought fire to be the principle of all, held that the soul had the\nnature of fire; and in like manner as to air and water. Lastly,\nEmpedocles, who held the existence of our four material elements and\ntwo principles of movement, said that the soul was composed of these.\nConsequently, since they held that things exist in the soul\nmaterially, they maintained that all the soul's knowledge is\nmaterial, thus failing to discern intellect from sense.\n\nBut this opinion will not hold. First, because in the material\nprinciple of which they spoke, the various results do not exist save\nin potentiality. But a thing is not known according as it is in\npotentiality, but only according as it is in act, as is shown\n_Metaph._ ix (Did. viii, 9): wherefore neither is a power known\nexcept through its act. It is therefore insufficient to ascribe to\nthe soul the nature of the principles in order to explain the fact\nthat it knows all, unless we further admit in the soul natures and\nforms of each individual result, for instance, of bone, flesh, and\nthe like; thus does Aristotle argue against Empedocles (De Anima i,\n5). Secondly, because if it were necessary for the thing known to\nexist materially in the knower, there would be no reason why things\nwhich have a material existence outside the soul should be devoid of\nknowledge; why, for instance, if by fire the soul knows fire, that\nfire also which is outside the soul should not have knowledge of fire.\n\nWe must conclude, therefore, that material things known must needs\nexist in the knower, not materially, but immaterially. The reason of\nthis is, because the act of knowledge extends to things outside the\nknower: for we know things even that are external to us. Now by\nmatter the form of a thing is determined to some one thing. Wherefore\nit is clear that knowledge is in inverse ratio of materiality. And\nconsequently things that are not receptive of forms save materially,\nhave no power of knowledge whatever--such as plants, as the\nPhilosopher says (De Anima ii, 12). But the more immaterially a thing\nreceives the form of the thing known, the more perfect is its\nknowledge. Therefore the intellect which abstracts the species not\nonly from matter, but also from the individuating conditions of\nmatter, has more perfect knowledge than the senses, which receive the\nform of the thing known, without matter indeed, but subject to\nmaterial conditions. Moreover, among the senses, sight has the most\nperfect knowledge, because it is the least material, as we have\nremarked above (Q. 78, A. 3): while among intellects the more perfect\nis the more immaterial.\n\nIt is therefore clear from the foregoing, that if there be an\nintellect which knows all things by its essence, then its essence\nmust needs have all things in itself immaterially; thus the early\nphilosophers held that the essence of the soul, that it may know all\nthings, must be actually composed of the principles of all material\nthings. Now this is proper to God, that His Essence comprise all\nthings immaterially as effects pre-exist virtually in their cause.\nGod alone, therefore, understands all things through His Essence:\nbut neither the human soul nor the angels can do so.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine in that passage is speaking of an imaginary\nvision, which takes place through the image of bodies. To the\nformation of such images the soul gives part of its substance, just\nas a subject is given in order to be informed by some form. In this\nway the soul makes such images from itself; not that the soul or some\npart of the soul be turned into this or that image; but just as we\nsay that a body is made into something colored because of its being\ninformed with color. That this is the sense, is clear from what\nfollows. For he says that the soul \"keeps something\"--namely, not\ninformed with such image--\"which is able freely to judge of the\nspecies of these images\": and that this is the \"mind\" or \"intellect.\"\nAnd he says that the part which is informed with these\nimages--namely, the imagination--is \"common to us and beasts.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Aristotle did not hold that the soul is actually\ncomposed of all things, as did the earlier philosophers; he said that\nthe soul is all things, \"after a fashion,\" forasmuch as it is in\npotentiality to all--through the senses, to all things\nsensible--through the intellect, to all things intelligible.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Every creature has a finite and determinate essence.\nWherefore although the essence of the higher creature has a certain\nlikeness to the lower creature, forasmuch as they have something in\ncommon generically, yet it has not a complete likeness thereof,\nbecause it is determined to a certain species other than the species\nof the lower creature. But the Divine Essence is a perfect likeness\nof all, whatsoever may be found to exist in things created, being the\nuniversal principle of all.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Soul Understands All Things Through Innate Species?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the soul understands all things\nthrough innate species. For Gregory says, in a homily for the\nAscension (xxix in Ev.), that \"man has understanding in common with\nthe angels.\" But angels understand all things through innate species:\nwherefore in the book _De Causis_ it is said that \"every intelligence\nis full of forms.\" Therefore the soul also has innate species of\nthings, by means of which it understands corporeal things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the intellectual soul is more excellent than\ncorporeal primary matter. But primary matter was created by God under\nthe forms to which it has potentiality. Therefore much more is the\nintellectual soul created by God under intelligible species. And so\nthe soul understands corporeal things through innate species.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no one can answer the truth except concerning what\nhe knows. But even a person untaught and devoid of acquired\nknowledge, answers the truth to every question if put to him in\norderly fashion, as we find related in the Meno (xv seqq.) of Plato,\nconcerning a certain individual. Therefore we have some knowledge of\nthings even before we acquire knowledge; which would not be the case\nunless we had innate species. Therefore the soul understands\ncorporeal things through innate species.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher, speaking of the intellect, says\n(De Anima iii, 4) that it is like \"a tablet on which nothing is\nwritten.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since form is the principle of action, a thing must\nbe related to the form which is the principle of an action, as it is\nto that action: for instance, if upward motion is from lightness,\nthen that which only potentially moves upwards must needs be only\npotentially light, but that which actually moves upwards must needs\nbe actually light. Now we observe that man sometimes is only a\npotential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. And he is\nreduced from such potentiality to act--through the action of sensible\nobjects on his senses, to the act of sensation--by instruction or\ndiscovery, to the act of understanding. Wherefore we must say that\nthe cognitive soul is in potentiality both to the images which are\nthe principles of sensing, and to those which are the principles of\nunderstanding. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 4) held that\nthe intellect by which the soul understands has no innate species,\nbut is at first in potentiality to all such species.\n\nBut since that which has a form actually, is sometimes unable to act\naccording to that form on account of some hindrance, as a light thing\nmay be hindered from moving upwards; for this reason did Plato hold\nthat naturally man's intellect is filled with all intelligible\nspecies, but that, by being united to the body, it is hindered from\nthe realization of its act. But this seems to be unreasonable. First,\nbecause, if the soul has a natural knowledge of all things, it seems\nimpossible for the soul so far to forget the existence of such\nknowledge as not to know itself to be possessed thereof: for no man\nforgets what he knows naturally; that, for instance, the whole is\nlarger than the part, and such like. And especially unreasonable does\nthis seem if we suppose that it is natural to the soul to be united\nto the body, as we have established above ([Q. 76] , A. 1): for it is\nunreasonable that the natural operation of a thing be totally\nhindered by that which belongs to it naturally. Secondly, the\nfalseness of this opinion is clearly proved from the fact that if a\nsense be wanting, the knowledge of what is apprehended through that\nsense is wanting also: for instance, a man who is born blind can have\nno knowledge of colors. This would not be the case if the soul had\ninnate images of all intelligible things. We must therefore conclude\nthat the soul does not know corporeal things through innate species.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man indeed has intelligence in common with the angels,\nbut not in the same degree of perfection: just as the lower grades of\nbodies, which merely exist, according to Gregory (Homily on\nAscension, xxix In Ev.), have not the same degree of perfection as\nthe higher bodies. For the matter of the lower bodies is not totally\ncompleted by its form, but is in potentiality to forms which it has\nnot: whereas the matter of heavenly bodies is totally completed by\nits form, so that it is not in potentiality to any other form, as we\nhave said above (Q. 66, A. 2). In the same way the angelic intellect\nis perfected by intelligible species, in accordance with its nature;\nwhereas the human intellect is in potentiality to such species.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Primary matter has substantial being through its form,\nconsequently it had need to be created under some form: else it would\nnot be in act. But when once it exists under one form it is in\npotentiality to others. On the other hand, the intellect does not\nreceive substantial being through the intelligible species; and\ntherefore there is no comparison.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If questions be put in an orderly fashion they proceed\nfrom universal self-evident principles to what is particular. Now by\nsuch a process knowledge is produced in the mind of the learner.\nWherefore when he answers the truth to a subsequent question, this is\nnot because he had knowledge previously, but because he thus learns\nfor the first time. For it matters not whether the teacher proceed\nfrom universal principles to conclusions by questioning or by\nasserting; for in either case the mind of the listener is assured of\nwhat follows by that which preceded.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Intelligible Species Are Derived by the Soul from Certain\nSeparate Forms?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intelligible species are derived\nby the soul from some separate forms. For whatever is such by\nparticipation is caused by what is such essentially; for instance,\nthat which is on fire is reduced to fire as the cause thereof. But\nthe intellectual soul forasmuch as it is actually understanding,\nparticipates the thing understood: for, in a way, the intellect in\nact is the thing understood in act. Therefore what in itself and in\nits essence is understood in act, is the cause that the intellectual\nsoul actually understands. Now that which in its essence is actually\nunderstood is a form existing without matter. Therefore the\nintelligible species, by which the soul understands, are caused by\nsome separate forms.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the intelligible is to the intellect, as the\nsensible is to the sense. But the sensible species which are in the\nsenses, and by which we sense, are caused by the sensible object\nwhich exists actually outside the soul. Therefore the intelligible\nspecies, by which our intellect understands, are caused by some\nthings actually intelligible, existing outside the soul. But these\ncan be nothing else than forms separate from matter. Therefore the\nintelligible forms of our intellect are derived from some separate\nsubstances.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever is in potentiality is reduced to act by\nsomething actual. If, therefore, our intellect, previously in\npotentiality, afterwards actually understands, this must needs be\ncaused by some intellect which is always in act. But this is a\nseparate intellect. Therefore the intelligible species, by which we\nactually understand, are caused by some separate substances.\n\n_On the contrary,_ If this were true we should not need the senses in\norder to understand. And this is proved to be false especially from\nthe fact that if a man be wanting in a sense, he cannot have any\nknowledge of the sensibles corresponding to that sense.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have held that the intelligible species of our\nintellect are derived from certain separate forms or substances. And\nthis in two ways. For Plato, as we have said (A. 1), held that the\nforms of sensible things subsist by themselves without matter; for\ninstance, the form of a man which he called _per se_ man, and the\nform or idea of a horse which is called _per se_ horse, and so forth.\nHe said therefore that these forms are participated both by our soul\nand by corporeal matter; by our soul, to the effect of knowledge\nthereof, and by corporeal matter to the effect of existence: so that,\njust as corporeal matter by participating the idea of a stone,\nbecomes an individuating stone, so our intellect, by participating\nthe idea of a stone, is made to understand a stone. Now participation\nof an idea takes place by some image of the idea in the participator,\njust as a model is participated by a copy. So just as he held that\nthe sensible forms, which are in corporeal matter, are derived from\nthe ideas as certain images thereof: so he held that the intelligible\nspecies of our intellect are images of the ideas, derived therefrom.\nAnd for this reason, as we have said above (A. 1), he referred\nsciences and definitions to those ideas.\n\nBut since it is contrary to the nature of sensible things that their\nforms should subsist without matter, as Aristotle proves in many ways\n(Metaph. vi), Avicenna (De Anima v) setting this opinion aside, held\nthat the intelligible species of all sensible things, instead of\nsubsisting in themselves without matter, pre-exist immaterially in the\nseparate intellects: from the first of which, said he, such species\nare derived by a second, and so on to the last separate intellect\nwhich he called the \"active intelligence,\" from which, according to\nhim, intelligible species flow into our souls, and sensible species\ninto corporeal matter. And so Avicenna agrees with Plato in this, that\nthe intelligible species of our intellect are derived from certain\nseparate forms; but these Plato held to subsist of themselves, while\nAvicenna placed them in the \"active intelligence.\" They differ, too,\nin this respect, that Avicenna held that the intelligible species do\nnot remain in our intellect after it has ceased actually to\nunderstand, and that it needs to turn (to the active intellect) in\norder to receive them anew. Consequently he does not hold that the\nsoul has innate knowledge, as Plato, who held that the participated\nideas remain immovably in the soul.\n\nBut in this opinion no sufficient reason can be assigned for the soul\nbeing united to the body. For it cannot be said that the intellectual\nsoul is united to the body for the sake of the body: for neither is\nform for the sake of matter, nor is the mover for the sake of the\nmoved, but rather the reverse. Especially does the body seem necessary\nto the intellectual soul, for the latter's proper operation which is\nto understand: since as to its being the soul does not depend on the\nbody. But if the soul by its very nature had an inborn aptitude for\nreceiving intelligible species through the influence of only certain\nseparate principles, and were not to receive them from the senses, it\nwould not need the body in order to understand: wherefore to no\npurpose would it be united to the body.\n\nBut if it be said that our soul needs the senses in order to\nunderstand, through being in some way awakened by them to the\nconsideration of those things, the intelligible species of which it\nreceives from the separate principles: even this seems an insufficient\nexplanation. For this awakening does not seem necessary to the soul,\nexcept in as far as it is overcome by sluggishness, as the Platonists\nexpressed it, and by forgetfulness, through its union with the body:\nand thus the senses would be of no use to the intellectual soul except\nfor the purpose of removing the obstacle which the soul encounters\nthrough its union with the body. Consequently the reason of the union\nof the soul with the body still remains to be sought.\n\nAnd if it be said with Avicenna, that the senses are necessary to\nthe soul, because by them it is aroused to turn to the \"active\nintelligence\" from which it receives the species: neither is this\na sufficient explanation. Because if it is natural for the soul to\nunderstand through species derived from the \"active intelligence,\"\nit follows that at times the soul of an individual wanting in one\nof the senses can turn to the active intelligence, either from the\ninclination of its very nature, or through being roused by another\nsense, to the effect of receiving the intelligible species of which\nthe corresponding sensible species are wanting. And thus a man born\nblind could have knowledge of colors; which is clearly untrue. We\nmust therefore conclude that the intelligible species, by which our\nsoul understands, are not derived from separate forms.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The intelligible species which are participated by our\nintellect are reduced, as to their first cause, to a first principle\nwhich is by its essence intelligible--namely, God. But they proceed\nfrom that principle by means of the sensible forms and material\nthings, from which we gather knowledge, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.\nvii).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Material things, as to the being which they have\noutside the soul, may be actually sensible, but not actually\nintelligible. Wherefore there is no comparison between sense and\nintellect.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Our passive intellect is reduced from potentiality to\nact by some being in act, that is, by the active intellect, which is\na power of the soul, as we have said (Q. 79, A. 4); and not by a\nseparate intelligence, as proximate cause, although perchance as\nremote cause.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Intellectual Soul Knows Material Things in the Eternal\nTypes?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul does not know\nmaterial things in the eternal types. For that in which anything is\nknown must itself be known more and previously. But the intellectual\nsoul of man, in the present state of life, does not know the eternal\ntypes: for it does not know God in Whom the eternal types exist, but\nis \"united to God as to the unknown,\" as Dionysius says (Myst.\nTheolog. i). Therefore the soul does not know all in the eternal\ntypes.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Rom. 1:20) that \"the invisible things\nof God are clearly seen . . . by the things that are made.\" But among\nthe invisible things of God are the eternal types. Therefore the\neternal types are known through creatures and not the converse.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the eternal types are nothing else but ideas, for\nAugustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 46) that \"ideas are permanent types\nexisting in the Divine mind.\" If therefore we say that the\nintellectual soul knows all things in the eternal types, we come back\nto the opinion of Plato who said that all knowledge is derived from\nthem.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. xii, 25): \"If we both see\nthat what you say is true, and if we both see that what I say is\ntrue, where do we see this, I pray? Neither do I see it in you, nor\ndo you see it in me: but we both see it in the unchangeable truth\nwhich is above our minds.\" Now the unchangeable truth is contained in\nthe eternal types. Therefore the intellectual soul knows all true\nthings in the eternal types.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii, 11): \"If\nthose who are called philosophers said by chance anything that was\ntrue and consistent with our faith, we must claim it from them as\nfrom unjust possessors. For some of the doctrines of the heathens are\nspurious imitations or superstitious inventions, which we must be\ncareful to avoid when we renounce the society of the heathens.\"\nConsequently whenever Augustine, who was imbued with the doctrines of\nthe Platonists, found in their teaching anything consistent with\nfaith, he adopted it: and those thing which he found contrary to\nfaith he amended. Now Plato held, as we have said above (A. 4), that\nthe forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter; and\nthese he called ideas, by participation of which he said that our\nintellect knows all things: so that just as corporeal matter by\nparticipating the idea of a stone becomes a stone, so our intellect,\nby participating the same idea, has knowledge of a stone. But since\nit seems contrary to faith that forms of things themselves, outside\nthe things themselves and apart from matter, as the Platonists held,\nasserting that _per se_ life or _per se_ wisdom are creative\nsubstances, as Dionysius relates (Div. Nom. xi); therefore Augustine\n(QQ. 83, qu. 46), for the ideas defended by Plato, substituted the\ntypes of all creatures existing in the Divine mind, according to\nwhich types all things are made in themselves, and are known to the\nhuman soul.\n\nWhen, therefore, the question is asked: Does the human soul know all\nthings in the eternal types? we must reply that one thing is said to\nbe known in another in two ways. First, as in an object itself known;\nas one may see in a mirror the images of things reflected therein. In\nthis way the soul, in the present state of life, cannot see all\nthings in the eternal types; but the blessed who see God, and all\nthings in Him, thus know all things in the eternal types. Secondly,\none thing is said to be known in another as in a principle of\nknowledge: thus we might say that we see in the sun what we see by\nthe sun. And thus we must needs say that the human soul knows all\nthings in the eternal types, since by participation of these types we\nknow all things. For the intellectual light itself which is in us, is\nnothing else than a participated likeness of the uncreated light, in\nwhich are contained the eternal types. Whence it is written (Ps. 4:6,\n7), \"Many say: Who showeth us good things?\" which question the\nPsalmist answers, \"The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed\nupon us,\" as though he were to say: By the seal of the Divine light\nin us, all things are made known to us.\n\nBut since besides the intellectual light which is in us, intelligible\nspecies, which are derived from things, are required in order for us\nto have knowledge of material things; therefore this same knowledge\nis not due merely to a participation of the eternal types, as the\nPlatonists held, maintaining that the mere participation of ideas\nsufficed for knowledge. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 16):\n\"Although the philosophers prove by convincing arguments that all\nthings occur in time according to the eternal types, were they able\nto see in the eternal types, or to find out from them how many kinds\nof animals there are and the origin of each? Did they not seek for\nthis information from the story of times and places?\"\n\nBut that Augustine did not understand all things to be known in their\n\"eternal types\" or in the \"unchangeable truth,\" as though the eternal\ntypes themselves were seen, is clear from what he says (QQ. 83, qu.\n46)--viz. that \"not each and every rational soul can be said to be\nworthy of that vision,\" namely, of the eternal types, \"but only those\nthat are holy and pure,\" such as the souls of the blessed.\n\nFrom what has been said the objections are easily solved.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Intellectual Knowledge Is Derived from Sensible Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that intellectual knowledge is not derived\nfrom sensible things. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 9) that \"we\ncannot expect to learn the fulness of truth from the senses of the\nbody.\" This he proves in two ways. First, because \"whatever the\nbodily senses reach, is continually being changed; and what is never\nthe same cannot be perceived.\" Secondly, because, \"whatever we\nperceive by the body, even when not present to the senses, may be\npresent to the imagination, as when we are asleep or angry: yet we\ncannot discern by the senses, whether what we perceive be the\nsensible object or the deceptive image thereof. Now nothing can be\nperceived which cannot be distinguished from its counterfeit.\" And so\nhe concludes that we cannot expect to learn the truth from the\nsenses. But intellectual knowledge apprehends the truth. Therefore\nintellectual knowledge cannot be conveyed by the senses.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16): \"We must not\nthink that the body can make any impression on the spirit, as though\nthe spirit were to supply the place of matter in regard to the body's\naction; for that which acts is in every way more excellent than that\nwhich it acts on.\" Whence he concludes that \"the body does not cause\nits image in the spirit, but the spirit causes it in itself.\"\nTherefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, an effect does not surpass the power of its cause.\nBut intellectual knowledge extends beyond sensible things: for we\nunderstand some things which cannot be perceived by the senses.\nTherefore intellectual knowledge is not derived from sensible things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Metaph. i, 1; Poster. ii,\n15) that the principle of knowledge is in the senses.\n\n_I answer that,_ On this point the philosophers held three opinions.\nFor Democritus held that \"all knowledge is caused by images issuing\nfrom the bodies we think of and entering into our souls,\" as\nAugustine says in his letter to Dioscorus (cxviii, 4). And Aristotle\nsays (De Somn. et Vigil.) that Democritus held that knowledge is\ncaused by a \"discharge of images.\" And the reason for this opinion\nwas that both Democritus and the other early philosophers did not\ndistinguish between intellect and sense, as Aristotle relates (De\nAnima iii, 3). Consequently, since the sense is affected by the\nsensible, they thought that all our knowledge is affected by this\nmere impression brought about by sensible things. Which impression\nDemocritus held to be caused by a discharge of images.\n\nPlato, on the other hand, held that the intellect is distinct from\nthe senses: and that it is an immaterial power not making use of a\ncorporeal organ for its action. And since the incorporeal cannot be\naffected by the corporeal, he held that intellectual knowledge is not\nbrought about by sensible things affecting the intellect, but by\nseparate intelligible forms being participated by the intellect, as\nwe have said above (AA. 4 ,5). Moreover he held that sense is a power\noperating of itself. Consequently neither is sense, since it is a\nspiritual power, affected by the sensible: but the sensible organs\nare affected by the sensible, the result being that the soul is in a\nway roused to form within itself the species of the sensible.\nAugustine seems to touch on this opinion (Gen. ad lit. xii, 24) where\nhe says that the \"body feels not, but the soul through the body,\nwhich it makes use of as a kind of messenger, for reproducing within\nitself what is announced from without.\" Thus according to Plato,\nneither does intellectual knowledge proceed from sensible knowledge,\nnor sensible knowledge exclusively from sensible things; but these\nrouse the sensible soul to the sentient act, while the senses rouse\nthe intellect to the act of understanding.\n\nAristotle chose a middle course. For with Plato he agreed that\nintellect and sense are different. But he held that the sense has not\nits proper operation without the cooperation of the body; so that to\nfeel is not an act of the soul alone, but of the \"composite.\" And he\nheld the same in regard to all the operations of the sensitive part.\nSince, therefore, it is not unreasonable that the sensible objects\nwhich are outside the soul should produce some effect in the\n\"composite,\" Aristotle agreed with Democritus in this, that the\noperations of the sensitive part are caused by the impression of the\nsensible on the sense: not by a discharge, as Democritus said, but by\nsome kind of operation. For Democritus maintained that every\noperation is by way of a discharge of atoms, as we gather from _De\nGener._ i, 8. But Aristotle held that the intellect has an operation\nwhich is independent of the body's cooperation. Now nothing corporeal\ncan make an impression on the incorporeal. And therefore in order to\ncause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the\nimpression caused by the sensible does not suffice, but something\nmore noble is required, for \"the agent is more noble than the\npatient,\" as he says (De Gener. i, 5). Not, indeed, in the sense that\nthe intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression\nof some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more\nnoble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which we have\nspoken above (Q. 79, AA. 3, 4) causes the phantasms received from the\nsenses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction.\n\nAccording to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms,\nintellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the\nphantasms cannot of themselves affect the passive intellect, and\nrequire to be made actually intelligible by the active intellect, it\ncannot be said that sensible knowledge is the total and perfect cause\nof intellectual knowledge, but rather that it is in a way the\nmaterial cause.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Those words of Augustine mean that we must not expect\nthe entire truth from the senses. For the light of the active\nintellect is needed, through which we achieve the unchangeable truth\nof changeable things, and discern things themselves from their\nlikeness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In this passage Augustine speaks not of intellectual\nbut of imaginary knowledge. And since, according to the opinion of\nPlato, the imagination has an operation which belongs to the soul\nonly, Augustine, in order to show that corporeal images are impressed\non the imagination, not by bodies but by the soul, uses the same\nargument as Aristotle does in proving that the active intellect must\nbe separate, namely, because \"the agent is more noble than the\npatient.\" And without doubt, according to the above opinion, in the\nimagination there must needs be not only a passive but also an active\npower. But if we hold, according to the opinion of Aristotle, that\nthe action of the imagination is an action of the \"composite,\" there\nis no difficulty; because the sensible body is more noble than the\norgan of the animal, in so far as it is compared to it as a being in\nact to a being in potentiality; even as the object actually colored\nis compared to the pupil which is potentially colored. It may,\nhowever, be said, although the first impression of the imagination is\nthrough the agency of the sensible, since \"fancy is movement produced\nin accordance with sensation\" (De Anima iii, 3), that nevertheless\nthere is in man an operation which by synthesis and analysis forms\nimages of various things, even of things not perceived by the senses.\nAnd Augustine's words may be taken in this sense.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of\nintellectual knowledge. And therefore it is not strange that\nintellectual knowledge should extend further than sensitive knowledge.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Intellect Can Actually Understand Through the\nIntelligible Species of Which It Is Possessed, Without Turning to\nthe Phantasms?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intellect can actually understand\nthrough the intelligible species of which it is possessed, without\nturning to the phantasms. For the intellect is made actual by the\nintelligible species by which it is informed. But if the intellect is\nin act, it understands. Therefore the intelligible species suffices\nfor the intellect to understand actually, without turning to the\nphantasms.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the imagination is more dependent on the senses\nthan the intellect on the imagination. But the imagination can\nactually imagine in the absence of the sensible. Therefore much more\ncan the intellect understand without turning to the phantasms.\n\nObj. 3: There are no phantasms of incorporeal things: for the\nimagination does not transcend time and space. If, therefore, our\nintellect cannot understand anything actually without turning to the\nphantasms, it follows that it cannot understand anything incorporeal.\nWhich is clearly false: for we understand truth, and God, and the\nangels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that \"the\nsoul understands nothing without a phantasm.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In the present state of life in which the soul is\nunited to a passible body, it is impossible for our intellect to\nunderstand anything actually, except by turning to the phantasms.\nFirst of all because the intellect, being a power that does not make\nuse of a corporeal organ, would in no way be hindered in its act\nthrough the lesion of a corporeal organ, if for its act there were\nnot required the act of some power that does make use of a corporeal\norgan. Now sense, imagination and the other powers belonging to the\nsensitive part, make use of a corporeal organ. Wherefore it is clear\nthat for the intellect to understand actually, not only when it\nacquires fresh knowledge, but also when it applies knowledge already\nacquired, there is need for the act of the imagination and of the\nother powers. For when the act of the imagination is hindered by a\nlesion of the corporeal organ, for instance in a case of frenzy; or\nwhen the act of the memory is hindered, as in the case of lethargy, we\nsee that a man is hindered from actually understanding things of which\nhe had a previous knowledge. Secondly, anyone can experience this of\nhimself, that when he tries to understand something, he forms certain\nphantasms to serve him by way of examples, in which as it were he\nexamines what he is desirous of understanding. For this reason it is\nthat when we wish to help someone to understand something, we lay\nexamples before him, from which he forms phantasms for the purpose of\nunderstanding.\n\nNow the reason of this is that the power of knowledge is proportioned\nto the thing known. Wherefore the proper object of the angelic\nintellect, which is entirely separate from a body, is an intelligible\nsubstance separate from a body. Whereas the proper object of the human\nintellect, which is united to a body, is a quiddity or nature existing\nin corporeal matter; and through such natures of visible things it\nrises to a certain knowledge of things invisible. Now it belongs to\nsuch a nature to exist in an individual, and this cannot be apart from\ncorporeal matter: for instance, it belongs to the nature of a stone to\nbe in an individual stone, and to the nature of a horse to be in an\nindividual horse, and so forth. Wherefore the nature of a stone or any\nmaterial thing cannot be known completely and truly, except in as much\nas it is known as existing in the individual. Now we apprehend the\nindividual through the senses and the imagination. And, therefore, for\nthe intellect to understand actually its proper object, it must of\nnecessity turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal\nnature existing in the individual. But if the proper object of our\nintellect were a separate form; or if, as the Platonists say, the\nnatures of sensible things subsisted apart from the individual; there\nwould be no need for the intellect to turn to the phantasms whenever\nit understands.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The species preserved in the passive intellect exist\nthere habitually when it does not understand them actually, as we\nhave said above (Q. 79, A. 6). Wherefore for us to understand\nactually, the fact that the species are preserved does not suffice;\nwe need further to make use of them in a manner befitting the things\nof which they are the species, which things are natures existing in\nindividuals.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even the phantasm is the likeness of an individual\nthing; wherefore the imagination does not need any further likeness\nof the individual, whereas the intellect does.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Incorporeal things, of which there are no phantasms,\nare known to us by comparison with sensible bodies of which there are\nphantasms. Thus we understand truth by considering a thing of which\nwe possess the truth; and God, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i), we\nknow as cause, by way of excess and by way of remotion. Other\nincorporeal substances we know, in the present state of life, only by\nway of remotion or by some comparison to corporeal things. And,\ntherefore, when we understand something about these things, we need\nto turn to phantasms of bodies, although there are no phantasms of\nthe things themselves.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 84, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Judgment of the Intellect Is Hindered Through Suspension\nof the Sensitive Powers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the judgment of the intellect is not\nhindered by suspension of the sensitive powers. For the superior does\nnot depend on the inferior. But the judgment of the intellect is\nhigher than the senses. Therefore the judgment of the intellect is\nnot hindered through suspension of the senses.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to syllogize is an act of the intellect. But during\nsleep the senses are suspended, as is said in _De Somn. et Vigil._ i\nand yet it sometimes happens to us to syllogize while asleep.\nTherefore the judgment of the intellect is not hindered through\nsuspension of the senses.\n\n_On the contrary,_ What a man does while asleep, against the moral\nlaw, is not imputed to him as a sin; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.\nxii, 15). But this would not be the case if man, while asleep, had\nfree use of his reason and intellect. Therefore the judgment of the\nintellect is hindered by suspension of the senses.\n\n_I answer that,_ As we have said above (A. 7), our intellect's proper\nand proportionate object is the nature of a sensible thing. Now a\nperfect judgment concerning anything cannot be formed, unless all\nthat pertains to that thing's nature be known; especially if that be\nignored which is the term and end of judgment. Now the Philosopher\nsays (De Coel. iii), that \"as the end of a practical science is\naction, so the end of natural science is that which is perceived\nprincipally through the senses\"; for the smith does not seek\nknowledge of a knife except for the purpose of action, in order that\nhe may produce a certain individual knife; and in like manner the\nnatural philosopher does not seek to know the nature of a stone and\nof a horse, save for the purpose of knowing the essential properties\nof those things which he perceives with his senses. Now it is clear\nthat a smith cannot judge perfectly of a knife unless he knows the\naction of the knife: and in like manner the natural philosopher\ncannot judge perfectly of natural things, unless he knows sensible\nthings. But in the present state of life whatever we understand, we\nknow by comparison to natural sensible things. Consequently it is not\npossible for our intellect to form a perfect judgment, while the\nsenses are suspended, through which sensible things are known to us.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the intellect is superior to the senses,\nnevertheless in a manner it receives from the senses, and its first\nand principal objects are founded in sensible things. And therefore\nsuspension of the senses necessarily involves a hindrance to the\njudgment of the intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The senses are suspended in the sleeper through certain\nevaporations and the escape of certain exhalations, as we read in _De\nSomn. et Vigil._ iii. And, therefore, according to the amount of such\nevaporation, the senses are more or less suspended. For when the\namount is considerable, not only are the senses suspended, but also\nthe imagination, so that there are no phantasms; thus does it happen,\nespecially when a man falls asleep after eating and drinking\ncopiously. If, however, the evaporation be somewhat less, phantasms\nappear, but distorted and without sequence; thus it happens in a case\nof fever. And if the evaporation be still more attenuated, the\nphantasms will have a certain sequence: thus especially does it\nhappen towards the end of sleep in sober men and those who are gifted\nwith a strong imagination. If the evaporation be very slight, not\nonly does the imagination retain its freedom, but also the common\nsense is partly freed; so that sometimes while asleep a man may judge\nthat what he sees is a dream, discerning, as it were, between things,\nand their images. Nevertheless, the common sense remains partly\nsuspended; and therefore, although it discriminates some images from\nthe reality, yet is it always deceived in some particular. Therefore,\nwhile man is asleep, according as sense and imagination are free, so\nis the judgment of his intellect unfettered, though not entirely.\nConsequently, if a man syllogizes while asleep, when he wakes up he\ninvariably recognizes a flaw in some respect.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 85\n\nOF THE MODE AND ORDER OF UNDERSTANDING\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe come now to consider the mode and order of understanding. Under\nthis head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether our intellect understands by abstracting the species from\nthe phantasms?\n\n(2) Whether the intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms are\nwhat our intellect understands, or that whereby it understands?\n\n(3) Whether our intellect naturally first understands the more\nuniversal?\n\n(4) Whether our intellect can know many things at the same time?\n\n(5) Whether our intellect understands by the process of composition\nand division?\n\n(6) Whether the intellect can err?\n\n(7) Whether one intellect can understand better than another?\n\n(8) Whether our intellect understands the indivisible before the\ndivisible?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Our Intellect Understands Corporeal and Material Things by\nAbstraction from Phantasms?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not understand\ncorporeal and material things by abstraction from the phantasms. For\nthe intellect is false if it understands an object otherwise than as\nit really is. Now the forms of material things do not exist as\nabstracted from the particular things represented by the phantasms.\nTherefore, if we understand material things by abstraction of the\nspecies from the phantasm, there will be error in the intellect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, material things are those natural things which\ninclude matter in their definition. But nothing can be understood\napart from that which enters into its definition. Therefore material\nthings cannot be understood apart from matter. Now matter is the\nprinciple of individualization. Therefore material things cannot be\nunderstood by abstraction of the universal from the particular, which\nis the process whereby the intelligible species is abstracted from the\nphantasm.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 7) that the\nphantasm is to the intellectual soul what color is to the sight. But\nseeing is not caused by abstraction of species from color, but by\ncolor impressing itself on the sight. Therefore neither does the act\nof understanding take place by abstraction of something from the\nphantasm, but by the phantasm impressing itself on the intellect.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 5) there are\ntwo things in the intellectual soul--the passive intellect and the\nactive intellect. But it does not belong to the passive intellect to\nabstract the intelligible species from the phantasm, but to receive\nthem when abstracted. Neither does it seem to be the function of the\nactive intellect, which is related to the phantasm, as light is to\ncolor; since light does not abstract anything from color, but rather\nstreams on to it. Therefore in no way do we understand by abstraction\nfrom phantasms.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 7) says that \"the\nintellect understands the species in the phantasm\"; and not,\ntherefore, by abstraction.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that \"things\nare intelligible in proportion as they are separate from matter.\"\nTherefore material things must needs be understood according as they\nare abstracted from matter and from material images, namely,\nphantasms.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 84, A. 7), the object of\nknowledge is proportionate to the power of knowledge. Now there are\nthree grades of the cognitive powers. For one cognitive power,\nnamely, the sense, is the act of a corporeal organ. And therefore the\nobject of every sensitive power is a form as existing in corporeal\nmatter. And since such matter is the principle of individuality,\ntherefore every power of the sensitive part can only have knowledge\nof the individual. There is another grade of cognitive power which is\nneither the act of a corporeal organ, nor in any way connected with\ncorporeal matter; such is the angelic intellect, the object of whose\ncognitive power is therefore a form existing apart from matter: for\nthough angels know material things, yet they do not know them save in\nsomething immaterial, namely, either in themselves or in God. But the\nhuman intellect holds a middle place: for it is not the act of an\norgan; yet it is a power of the soul which is the form of the body,\nas is clear from what we have said above (Q. 76, A. 1). And therefore\nit is proper to it to know a form existing individually in corporeal\nmatter, but not as existing in this individual matter. But to know\nwhat is in individual matter, not as existing in such matter, is to\nabstract the form from individual matter which is represented by the\nphantasms. Therefore we must needs say that our intellect understands\nmaterial things by abstracting from the phantasms; and through\nmaterial things thus considered we acquire some knowledge of\nimmaterial things, just as, on the contrary, angels know material\nthings through the immaterial.\n\nBut Plato, considering only the immateriality of the human intellect,\nand not its being in a way united to the body, held that the objects\nof the intellect are separate ideas; and that we understand not by\nabstraction, but by participating things abstract, as stated above\n(Q. 84, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Abstraction may occur in two ways: First, by way of\ncomposition and division; thus we may understand that one thing does\nnot exist in some other, or that it is separate therefrom. Secondly,\nby way of simple and absolute consideration; thus we understand one\nthing without considering the other. Thus for the intellect to\nabstract one from another things which are not really abstract from\none another, does, in the first mode of abstraction, imply falsehood.\nBut, in the second mode of abstraction, for the intellect to abstract\nthings which are not really abstract from one another, does not\ninvolve falsehood, as clearly appears in the case of the senses. For\nif we understood or said that color is not in a colored body, or that\nit is separate from it, there would be error in this opinion or\nassertion. But if we consider color and its properties, without\nreference to the apple which is colored; or if we express in word\nwhat we thus understand, there is no error in such an opinion or\nassertion, because an apple is not essential to color, and therefore\ncolor can be understood independently of the apple. Likewise, the\nthings which belong to the species of a material thing, such as a\nstone, or a man, or a horse, can be thought of apart from the\nindividualizing principles which do not belong to the notion of the\nspecies. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the\nparticular, or the intelligible species from the phantasm; that is,\nby considering the nature of the species apart from its individual\nqualities represented by the phantasms. If, therefore, the intellect\nis said to be false when it understands a thing otherwise than as it\nis, that is so, if the word \"otherwise\" refers to the thing\nunderstood; for the intellect is false when it understands a thing\notherwise than as it is; and so the intellect would be false if it\nabstracted the species of a stone from its matter in such a way as to\nregard the species as not existing in matter, as Plato held. But it\nis not so, if the word \"otherwise\" be taken as referring to the one\nwho understands. For it is quite true that the mode of understanding,\nin one who understands, is not the same as the mode of a thing in\nexisting: since the thing understood is immaterially in the one who\nunderstands, according to the mode of the intellect, and not\nmaterially, according to the mode of a material thing.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Some have thought that the species of a natural thing\nis a form only, and that matter is not part of the species. If that\nwere so, matter would not enter into the definition of natural\nthings. Therefore it must be said otherwise, that matter is twofold,\ncommon, and \"signate\" or individual; common, such as flesh and bone;\nand individual, as this flesh and these bones. The intellect\ntherefore abstracts the species of a natural thing from the\nindividual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter;\nfor example, it abstracts the species of man from \"this flesh and\nthese bones,\" which do not belong to the species as such, but to the\nindividual (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 10), and need not be considered in\nthe species: whereas the species of man cannot be abstracted by the\nintellect from \"flesh and bones.\"\n\nMathematical species, however, can be abstracted by the intellect\nfrom sensible matter, not only from individual, but also from common\nmatter; not from common intelligible matter, but only from individual\nmatter. For sensible matter is corporeal matter as subject to\nsensible qualities, such as being cold or hot, hard or soft, and the\nlike: while intelligible matter is substance as subject to quantity.\nNow it is manifest that quantity is in substance before other\nsensible qualities are. Hence quantities, such as number, dimension,\nand figures, which are the terminations of quantity, can be\nconsidered apart from sensible qualities; and this is to abstract\nthem from sensible matter; but they cannot be considered without\nunderstanding the substance which is subject to the quantity; for\nthat would be to abstract them from common intelligible matter. Yet\nthey can be considered apart from this or that substance; for that is\nto abstract them from individual intelligible matter. But some things\ncan be abstracted even from common intelligible matter, such as\n\"being,\" \"unity,\" \"power,\" \"act,\" and the like; all these can exist\nwithout matter, as is plain regarding immaterial things. Because\nPlato failed to consider the twofold kind of abstraction, as above\nexplained (ad 1), he held that all those things which we have stated\nto be abstracted by the intellect, are abstract in reality.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Colors, as being in individual corporeal matter, have\nthe same mode of existence as the power of sight: therefore they can\nimpress their own image on the eye. But phantasms, since they are\nimages of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, have not the\nsame mode of existence as the human intellect, and therefore have\nnot the power of themselves to make an impression on the passive\nintellect. This is done by the power of the active intellect which\nby turning towards the phantasm produces in the passive intellect a\ncertain likeness which represents, as to its specific conditions\nonly, the thing reflected in the phantasm. It is thus that the\nintelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasm;\nnot that the identical form which previously was in the phantasm is\nsubsequently in the passive intellect, as a body transferred from\none place to another.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Not only does the active intellect throw light on\nthe phantasm: it does more; by its own power it abstracts the\nintelligible species from the phantasm. It throws light on the\nphantasm, because, just as the sensitive part acquires a greater\npower by its conjunction with the intellectual part, so by the power\nof the active intellect the phantasms are made more fit for the\nabstraction therefrom of intelligible intentions. Furthermore, the\nactive intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the\nphantasm, forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are\nable to disregard the conditions of individuality, and to take into\nour consideration the specific nature, the image of which informs\nthe passive intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species\nfrom the phantasms, inasmuch as it considers the natures of things\nin universal, and, nevertheless, understands these natures in the\nphantasms since it cannot understand even the things of which it\nabstracts the species, without turning to the phantasms, as we have\nsaid above (Q. 84, A. 7).\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Intelligible Species Abstracted from the Phantasm Is\nRelated to Our Intellect As That Which Is Understood?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intelligible species abstracted\nfrom the phantasm is related to our intellect as that which is\nunderstood. For the understood in act is in the one who understands:\nsince the understood in act is the intellect itself in act. But\nnothing of what is understood is in the intellect actually\nunderstanding, save the abstracted intelligible species. Therefore\nthis species is what is actually understood.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what is actually understood must be in something;\nelse it would be nothing. But it is not in something outside the\nsoul: for, since what is outside the soul is material, nothing\ntherein can be actually understood. Therefore what is actually\nunderstood is in the intellect. Consequently it can be nothing else\nthan the aforesaid intelligible species.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (1 Peri Herm. i) that \"words\nare signs of the passions in the soul.\" But words signify the things\nunderstood, for we express by word what we understand. Therefore\nthese passions of the soul--viz. the intelligible species, are what\nis actually understood.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The intelligible species is to the intellect what\nthe sensible image is to the sense. But the sensible image is not\nwhat is perceived, but rather that by which sense perceives.\nTherefore the intelligible species is not what is actually\nunderstood, but that by which the intellect understands.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have asserted that our intellectual faculties\nknow only the impression made on them; as, for example, that sense is\ncognizant only of the impression made on its own organ. According to\nthis theory, the intellect understands only its own impression,\nnamely, the intelligible species which it has received, so that this\nspecies is what is understood.\n\nThis is, however, manifestly false for two reasons. First, because\nthe things we understand are the objects of science; therefore if\nwhat we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it\nwould follow that every science would not be concerned with objects\noutside the soul, but only with the intelligible species within the\nsoul; thus, according to the teaching of the Platonists all science\nis about ideas, which they held to be actually understood [*Q. 84, A.\n1]]. Secondly, it is untrue, because it would lead to the opinion of\nthe ancients who maintained that \"whatever seems, is true\"\n[*Aristotle, _Metaph._ iii. 5, and that consequently contradictories\nare true simultaneously. For if the faculty knows its own impression\nonly, it can judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the\nimpression made on the cognitive faculty. Consequently the cognitive\nfaculty will always judge of its own impression as such; and so every\njudgment will be true: for instance, if taste perceived only its own\nimpression, when anyone with a healthy taste perceives that honey is\nsweet, he would judge truly; and if anyone with a corrupt taste\nperceives that honey is bitter, this would be equally true; for each\nwould judge according to the impression on his taste. Thus every\nopinion would be equally true; in fact, every sort of apprehension.\n\nTherefore it must be said that the intelligible species is related to\nthe intellect as that by which it understands: which is proved thus.\nThere is a twofold action (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 8), one which\nremains in the agent; for instance, to see and to understand; and\nanother which passes into an external object; for instance, to heat\nand to cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some\nform. And as the form from which proceeds an act tending to something\nexternal is the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the\nheater is a likeness of the thing heated; so the form from which\nproceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the\nobject. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the\nvisible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the\nintelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands.\nBut since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it\nunderstands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by\nwhich it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is\nunderstood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the\nobject, of which the species is the likeness. This also appears from\nthe opinion of the ancient philosophers, who said that \"like is known\nby like.\" For they said that the soul knows the earth outside itself,\nby the earth within itself; and so of the rest. If, therefore, we\ntake the species of the earth instead of the earth, according to\nAristotle (De Anima iii, 8), who says \"that a stone is not in the\nsoul, but only the likeness of the stone\"; it follows that the soul\nknows external things by means of its intelligible species.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The thing understood is in the intellect by its own\nlikeness; and it is in this sense that we say that the thing actually\nunderstood is the intellect in act, because the likeness of the thing\nunderstood is the form of the intellect, as the likeness of a\nsensible thing is the form of the sense in act. Hence it does not\nfollow that the intelligible species abstracted is what is actually\nunderstood; but rather that it is the likeness thereof.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In these words \"the thing actually understood\" there\nis a double implication--the thing which is understood, and the fact\nthat it is understood. In like manner the words \"abstract universal\"\nimply two things, the nature of a thing and its abstraction or\nuniversality. Therefore the nature itself to which it occurs to be\nunderstood, abstracted or considered as universal is only in\nindividuals; but that it is understood, abstracted or considered as\nuniversal is in the intellect. We see something similar to this is in\nthe senses. For the sight sees the color of the apple apart from its\nsmell. If therefore it be asked where is the color which is seen\napart from the smell, it is quite clear that the color which is seen\nis only in the apple: but that it be perceived apart from the smell,\nthis is owing to the sight, forasmuch as the faculty of sight\nreceives the likeness of color and not of smell. In like manner\nhumanity understood is only in this or that man; but that humanity be\napprehended without conditions of individuality, that is, that it be\nabstracted and consequently considered as universal, occurs to\nhumanity inasmuch as it is brought under the consideration of the\nintellect, in which there is a likeness of the specific nature, but\nnot of the principles of individuality.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There are two operations in the sensitive part. One, in\nregard of impression only, and thus the operation of the senses takes\nplace by the senses being impressed by the sensible. The other is\nformation, inasmuch as the imagination forms for itself an image of\nan absent thing, or even of something never seen. Both of these\noperations are found in the intellect. For in the first place there\nis the passion of the passive intellect as informed by the\nintelligible species; and then the passive intellect thus informed\nforms a definition, or a division, or a composition, expressed by a\nword. Wherefore the concept conveyed by a word is its definition; and\na proposition conveys the intellect's division or composition. Words\ndo not therefore signify the intelligible species themselves; but\nthat which the intellect forms for itself for the purpose of judging\nof external things.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the More Universal Is First in Our Intellectual Cognition?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the more universal is not first in\nour intellectual cognition. For what is first and more known in its\nown nature, is secondarily and less known in relation to ourselves.\nBut universals come first as regards their nature, because \"that is\nfirst which does not involve the existence of its correlative\"\n(Categor. ix). Therefore the universals are secondarily known as\nregards our intellect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the composition precedes the simple in relation to\nus. But universals are the more simple. Therefore they are known\nsecondarily by us.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. i, 1), that the object\ndefined comes in our knowledge before the parts of its definition.\nBut the more universal is part of the definition of the less\nuniversal, as \"animal\" is part of the definition of \"man.\" Therefore\nthe universals are secondarily known by us.\n\nObj. 4: Further, we know causes and principles by their effects. But\nuniversals are principles. Therefore universals are secondarily known\nby us.\n\n_On the contrary,_ \"We must proceed from the universal to the\nsingular and individual\" (Phys. i, 1)\n\n_I answer that,_ In our knowledge there are two things to be\nconsidered. First, that intellectual knowledge in some degree arises\nfrom sensible knowledge: and, because sense has singular and\nindividual things for its object, and intellect has the universal for\nits object, it follows that our knowledge of the former comes before\nour knowledge of the latter. Secondly, we must consider that our\nintellect proceeds from a state of potentiality to a state of\nactuality; and every power thus proceeding from potentiality to\nactuality comes first to an incomplete act, which is the medium\nbetween potentiality and actuality, before accomplishing the perfect\nact. The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the\nobject is distinctly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete\nact is imperfect knowledge, when the object is known indistinctly,\nand as it were confusedly. A thing thus imperfectly known, is known\npartly in act and partly in potentiality, and hence the Philosopher\nsays (Phys. i, 1), that \"what is manifest and certain is known to us\nat first confusedly; afterwards we know it by distinguishing its\nprinciples and elements.\" Now it is evident that to know an object\nthat comprises many things, without proper knowledge of each thing\ncontained in it, is to know that thing confusedly. In this way we can\nhave knowledge not only of the universal whole, which contains parts\npotentially, but also of the integral whole; for each whole can be\nknown confusedly, without its parts being known. But to know\ndistinctly what is contained in the universal whole is to know the\nless common, as to \"animal\" indistinctly is to know it as \"animal\";\nwhereas to know \"animal\" distinctly is know it as \"rational\" or\n\"irrational animal,\" that is, to know a man or a lion: therefore our\nintellect knows \"animal\" before it knows man; and the same reason\nholds in comparing any more universal idea with the less universal.\n\nMoreover, as sense, like the intellect, proceeds from potentiality to\nact, the same order of knowledge appears in the senses. For by sense\nwe judge of the more common before the less common, in reference both\nto place and time; in reference to place, when a thing is seen afar\noff it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal; and to\nbe an animal before it is seen to be a man, and to be a man before it\nseen to be Socrates or Plato; and the same is true as regards time,\nfor a child can distinguish man from not man before he distinguishes\nthis man from that, and therefore \"children at first call men fathers,\nand later on distinguish each one from the others\" (Phys. i, 1). The\nreason of this is clear: because he who knows a thing indistinctly is\nin a state of potentiality as regards its principle of distinction; as\nhe who knows genus is in a state of potentiality as regards\n\"difference.\" Thus it is evident that indistinct knowledge is midway\nbetween potentiality and act.\n\nWe must therefore conclude that knowledge of the singular and\nindividual is prior, as regards us, to the knowledge of the universal;\nas sensible knowledge is prior to intellectual knowledge. But in both\nsense and intellect the knowledge of the more common precedes the\nknowledge of the less common.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The universal can be considered in two ways. First,\nthe universal nature may be considered together with the intention\nof universality. And since the intention of universality--viz. the\nrelation of one and the same to many--is due to intellectual\nabstraction, the universal thus considered is a secondary\nconsideration. Hence it is said (De Anima i, 1) that the \"universal\nanimal is either nothing or something secondary.\" But according to\nPlato, who held that universals are subsistent, the universal\nconsidered thus would be prior to the particular, for the latter,\naccording to him, are mere participations of the subsistent\nuniversals which he called ideas.\n\nSecondly, the universal can be considered in the nature itself--for\ninstance, animality or humanity as existing in the individual. And\nthus we must distinguish two orders of nature: one, by way of\ngeneration and time; and thus the imperfect and the potential come\nfirst. In this way the more common comes first in the order of nature;\nas appears clearly in the generation of man and animal; for \"the\nanimal is generated before man,\" as the Philosopher says (De Gener.\nAnimal ii, 3). The other order is the order of perfection or of the\nintention of nature: for instance, act considered absolutely is\nnaturally prior to potentiality, and the perfect to the imperfect:\nthus the less common comes naturally before the more common; as man\ncomes before animal. For the intention of nature does not stop at\nthe generation of animal but goes on to the generation of man.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The more common universal may be compared to the less\ncommon, as the whole, and as the part. As the whole, considering that\nin the more universal is potentially contained not only the less\nuniversal, but also other things, as in \"animal\" is contained not\nonly \"man\" but also \"horse.\" As part, considering that the less\ncommon contains in its idea not only the more common, but also more;\nas \"man\" contains not only \"animal\" but also \"rational.\" Therefore\n\"animal\" in itself comes into our knowledge before \"man\"; but \"man\"\ncomes before \"animal\" considered as part of the same idea.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A part can be known in two ways. First, absolutely\nconsidered in itself; and thus nothing prevents the parts being known\nbefore the whole, as stones are known before a house is known.\nSecondly as belonging to a certain whole; and thus we must needs know\nthe whole before its parts. For we know a house vaguely before we\nknow its different parts. So likewise principles of definition are\nknown before the thing defined is known; otherwise the thing defined\nwould not be known at all. But as parts of the definition they are\nknown after. For we know man vaguely as man before we know how to\ndistinguish all that belongs to human nature.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The universal, as understood with the intention of\nuniversality, is, indeed, in a way, a principle of knowledge, in so\nfar as the intention of universality results from the mode of\nunderstanding by way of abstraction. But what is a principle of\nknowledge is not of necessity a principle of existence, as Plato\nthought: since at times we know a cause through its effect, and\nsubstance through accidents. Wherefore the universal thus considered,\naccording to the opinion of Aristotle, is neither a principle of\nexistence, nor a substance, as he makes clear (Metaph. vii, Did. vi,\n13). But if we consider the generic or specific nature itself as\nexisting in the singular, thus in a way it is in the nature of a\nformal principle in regard to the singulars: for the singular is the\nresult of matter, while the idea of species is from the form. But the\ngeneric nature is compared to the specific nature rather after the\nfashion of a material principle, because the generic nature is taken\nfrom that which is material in a thing, while the idea of species is\ntaken from that which is formal: thus the notion of animal is taken\nfrom the sensitive part, whereas the notion of man is taken from the\nintellectual part. Thus it is that the ultimate intention of nature\nis to the species and not to the individual, or the genus: because\nthe form is the end of generation, while matter is for the sake of\nthe form. Neither is it necessary that, as regards us, knowledge of\nany cause or principle should be secondary: since at times through\nsensible causes we become acquainted with unknown effects, and\nsometimes conversely.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 4]\n\nWhether We Can Understand Many Things at the Same Time?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we can understand many things at the\nsame time. For intellect is above time, whereas the succession of\nbefore and after belongs to time. Therefore the intellect does not\nunderstand different things in succession, but at the same time.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there is nothing to prevent different forms not\nopposed to each other from actually being in the same subject, as,\nfor instance, color and smell are in the apple. But intelligible\nspecies are not opposed to each other. Therefore there is nothing to\nprevent the same intellect being in act as regards different\nintelligible species, and thus it can understand many things at the\nsame time.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the intellect understands a whole at the same time,\nsuch as a man or a house. But a whole contains many parts. Therefore\nthe intellect understands many things at the same time.\n\nObj. 4: Further, we cannot know the difference between two things\nunless we know both at the same time (De Anima iii, 2), and the same\nis to be said of any other comparison. But our intellect knows the\ndifference and comparison between one thing and another. Therefore\nit knows many things at the same time.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Topic. ii, 10) that \"understanding is\nof one thing only, knowledge is of many.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The intellect can, indeed, understand many things\nas one, but not as many: that is to say by _one_ but not by _many_\nintelligible species. For the mode of every action follows the form\nwhich is the principle of that action. Therefore whatever things the\nintellect can understand under one species, it can understand at the\nsame time: hence it is that God sees all things at the same time,\nbecause He sees all in one, that is, in His Essence. But whatever\nthings the intellect understands under different species, it does\nnot understand at the same time. The reason of this is that it is\nimpossible for one and the same subject to be perfected at the same\ntime by many forms of one genus and diverse species, just as it is\nimpossible for one and the same body at the same time to have\ndifferent colors or different shapes. Now all intelligible species\nbelong to one genus, because they are the perfections of one\nintellectual faculty: although the things which the species represent\nbelong to different genera. Therefore it is impossible for one and\nthe same intellect to be perfected at the same time by different\nintelligible species so as actually to understand different things.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The intellect is above that time, which is the measure\nof the movement of corporeal things. But the multitude itself of\nintelligible species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible\noperations, according as one operation succeeds another. And this\nvicissitude is called time by Augustine, who says (Gen. ad lit. viii,\n20, 22), that \"God moves the spiritual creature through time.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not only is it impossible for opposite forms to exist\nat the same time in the same subject, but neither can any forms\nbelonging to the same genus, although they be not opposed to one\nanother, as is clear from the examples of colors and shapes.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Parts can be understood in two ways. First, in a\nconfused way, as existing in the whole, and thus they are known\nthrough the one form of the whole, and so are known together. In\nanother way they are known distinctly: thus each is known by its\nspecies; and so they are not understood at the same time.\n\nReply Obj. 4: If the intellect sees the difference or comparison\nbetween one thing and another, it knows both in relation to their\ndifference or comparison; just, as we have said above (ad 3), as\nit knows the parts in the whole.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Our Intellect Understands by Composition and Division?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not understand by\ncomposition and division. For composition and division are only of\nmany; whereas the intellect cannot understand many things at the same\ntime. Therefore it cannot understand by composition and division.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every composition and division implies past,\npresent, or future time. But the intellect abstracts from time, as\nalso from other individual conditions. Therefore the intellect does\nnot understand by composition and division.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the intellect understands things by a process of\nassimilation to them. But composition and division are not in things,\nfor nothing is in things but what is signified by the predicate and\nthe subject, and which is one and the same, provided that the\ncomposition be true, for \"man\" is truly what \"animal\" is. Therefore\nthe intellect does not act by composition and division.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Words signify the conceptions of the intellect, as\nthe Philosopher says (Peri Herm. i). But in words we find composition\nand division, as appears in affirmative and negative propositions.\nTherefore the intellect acts by composition and division.\n\n_I answer that,_ The human intellect must of necessity understand by\ncomposition and division. For since the intellect passes from\npotentiality to act, it has a likeness to things which are generated,\nwhich do not attain to perfection all at once but acquire it by\ndegrees: so likewise the human intellect does not acquire perfect\nknowledge by the first act of apprehension; but it first apprehends\nsomething about its object, such as its quiddity, and this is its\nfirst and proper object; and then it understands the properties,\naccidents, and the various relations of the essence. Thus it\nnecessarily compares one thing with another by composition or\ndivision; and from one composition and division it proceeds to\nanother, which is the process of reasoning.\n\nBut the angelic and the Divine intellect, like all incorruptible\nthings, have their perfection at once from the beginning. Hence the\nangelic and the Divine intellect have the entire knowledge of a thing\nat once and perfectly; and hence also in knowing the quiddity of a\nthing they know at once whatever we can know by composition, division,\nand reasoning. Therefore the human intellect knows by composition,\ndivision and reasoning. But the Divine intellect and the angelic\nintellect know, indeed, composition, division, and reasoning, not by\nthe process itself, but by understanding the simple essence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Composition and division of the intellect are made by\ndifferentiating and comparing. Hence the intellect knows many things\nby composition and division, as by knowing the difference and\ncomparison of things.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although the intellect abstracts from the phantasms, it\ndoes not understand actually without turning to the phantasms, as we\nhave said (A. 1; Q. 84, A. 7). And forasmuch as it turns to the\nphantasms, composition and division of the intellect involve time.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The likeness of a thing is received into the intellect\naccording to the mode of the intellect, not according to the mode of\nthe thing. Wherefore something on the part of the thing corresponds\nto the composition and division of the intellect; but it does not\nexist in the same way in the intellect and in the thing. For the\nproper object of the human intellect is the quiddity of a material\nthing, which comes under the action of the senses and the\nimagination. Now in a material thing there is a twofold composition.\nFirst, there is the composition of form with matter; and to this\ncorresponds that composition of the intellect whereby the universal\nwhole is predicated of its part: for the genus is derived from common\nmatter, while the difference that completes the species is derived\nfrom the form, and the particular from individual matter. The second\ncomparison is of accident with subject: and to this real composition\ncorresponds that composition of the intellect, whereby accident is\npredicated of subject, as when we say \"the man is white.\"\nNevertheless composition of the intellect differs from composition of\nthings; for in the latter the things are diverse, whereas composition\nof the intellect is a sign of the identity of the components. For the\nabove composition of the intellect does not imply that \"man\" and\n\"whiteness\" are identical, but the assertion, \"the man is white,\"\nmeans that \"the man is something having whiteness\": and the subject,\nwhich is a man, is identified with a subject having whiteness. It is\nthe same with the composition of form and matter: for animal\nsignifies that which has a sensitive nature; rational, that which has\nan intellectual nature; man, that which has both; and Socrates that\nwhich has all these things together with individual matter; and\naccording to this kind of identity our intellect predicates the\ncomposition of one thing with another.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Intellect Can Be False?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intellect can be false; for the\nPhilosopher says (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 4) that \"truth and falsehood\nare in the mind.\" But the mind and intellect are the same, as is\nshown above (Q. 79, A. 1). Therefore falsehood may be in the mind.\n\nObj. 2: Further, opinion and reasoning belong to the intellect. But\nfalsehood exists in both. Therefore falsehood can be in the intellect.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sin is in the intellectual faculty. But sin involves\nfalsehood: for \"those err that work evil\" (Prov. 14:22). Therefore\nfalsehood can be in the intellect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 32), that \"everyone\nwho is deceived, does not rightly understand that wherein he is\ndeceived.\" And the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10), that \"the\nintellect is always true.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The Philosopher (De Anima iii, 6) compares intellect\nwith sense on this point. For sense is not deceived in its proper\nobject, as sight in regard to color; [unless] accidentally through\nsome hindrance occurring to the sensile organ--for example, the taste\nof a fever-stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through\nhis tongue being vitiated by ill humors. Sense, however, may be\ndeceived as regards common sensible objects, as size or figure; when,\nfor example, it judges the sun to be only a foot in diameter, whereas\nin reality it exceeds the earth in size. Much more is sense deceived\nconcerning accidental sensible objects, as when it judges that\nvinegar is honey by reason of the color being the same. The reason of\nthis is evident; for every faculty, as such, is _per se_ directed to\nits proper object; and things of this kind are always the same.\nHence, as long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning its own\nproper object does not fail. Now the proper object of the intellect\nis the \"quiddity\" of a material thing; and hence, properly speaking,\nthe intellect is not at fault concerning this quiddity; whereas it\nmay go astray as regards the surroundings of the thing in its essence\nor quiddity, in referring one thing to another, as regards\ncomposition or division, or also in the process of reasoning.\nTherefore, also in regard to those propositions, which are\nunderstood, the intellect cannot err, as in the case of first\nprinciples from which arises infallible truth in the certitude of\nscientific conclusions.\n\nThe intellect, however, may be accidentally deceived in the quiddity\nof composite things, not by the defect of its organ, for the\nintellect is a faculty that is independent of an organ; but on the\npart of the composition affecting the definition, when, for instance,\nthe definition of a thing is false in relation to something else, as\nthe definition of a circle applied to a triangle; or when a\ndefinition is false in itself as involving the composition of things\nincompatible; as, for instance, to describe anything as \"a rational\nwinged animal.\" Hence as regards simple objects not subject to\ncomposite definitions we cannot be deceived unless, indeed, we\nunderstand nothing whatever about them, as is said _Metaph._ ix, Did.\nviii, 10.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher says that falsehood is in the intellect\nin regard to composition and division. The same answer applies to the\nSecond Objection concerning opinion and reasoning, and to the Third\nObjection, concerning the error of the sinner, who errs in the\npractical judgment of the appetible object. But in the absolute\nconsideration of the quiddity of a thing, and of those things which\nare known thereby, the intellect is never deceived. In this sense are\nto be understood the authorities quoted in proof of the opposite\nconclusion.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 7]\n\nWhether One Person Can Understand One and the Same Thing Better Than\nAnother Can?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one person cannot understand one and\nthe same thing better than another can. For Augustine says (QQ. 83,\nqu. 32), \"Whoever understands a thing otherwise than as it is, does\nnot understand it at all. Hence it is clear that there is a perfect\nunderstanding, than which none other is more perfect: and therefore\nthere are not infinite degrees of understanding a thing: nor can one\nperson understand a thing better than another can.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, the intellect is true in its act of understanding.\nBut truth, being a certain equality between thought and thing, is not\nsubject to more or less; for a thing cannot be said to be more or\nless equal. Therefore a thing cannot be more or less understood.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the intellect is the most formal of all that is in\nman. But different forms cause different species. Therefore if one\nman understands better than another, it would seem that they do not\nbelong to the same species.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Experience shows that some understand more\nprofoundly than do others; as one who carries a conclusion to its\nfirst principles and ultimate causes understands it better than the\none who reduces it only to its proximate causes.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing being understood more by one than by another\nmay be taken in two senses. First, so that the word \"more\" be taken as\ndetermining the act of understanding as regards the thing understood;\nand thus, one cannot understand the same thing more than another,\nbecause to understand it otherwise than as it is, either better or\nworse, would entail being deceived, and such a one would not\nunderstand it, as Augustine argues (QQ. 83, qu. 32). In another sense\nthe word \"more\" can be taken as determining the act of understanding\non the part of him who understands; and so one may understand the same\nthing better than someone else, through having a greater power of\nunderstanding: just as a man may see a thing better with his bodily\nsight, whose power is greater, and whose sight is more perfect. The\nsame applies to the intellect in two ways. First, as regards the\nintellect itself, which is more perfect. For it is plain that the\nbetter the disposition of a body, the better the soul allotted to it;\nwhich clearly appears in things of different species: and the reason\nthereof is that act and form are received into matter according to\nmatter's capacity: thus because some men have bodies of better\ndisposition, their souls have a greater power of understanding,\nwherefore it is said (De Anima ii, 9), that \"it is to be observed that\nthose who have soft flesh are of apt mind.\" Secondly, this occurs in\nregard to the lower powers of which the intellect has need in its\noperation: for those in whom the imaginative, cogitative, and\nmemorative powers are of better disposition, are better disposed to\nunderstand.\n\nThe reply to the First Objection is clear from the above; likewise the\nreply to the Second, for the truth of the intellect consists in the\nintellect understanding a thing as it is.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The difference of form which is due only to the\ndifferent disposition of matter, causes not a specific but only a\nnumerical difference: for different individuals have different forms,\ndiversified according to the difference of matter.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 85, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Intellect Understands the Indivisible Before the\nDivisible?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intellect understands the\nindivisible before the divisible. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i,\n1) that \"we understand and know from the knowledge of principles and\nelements.\" But principles are indivisible, and elements are of\ndivisible things. Therefore the indivisible is known to us before the\ndivisible.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the definition of a thing contains what is known\npreviously, for a definition \"proceeds from the first and more\nknown,\" as is said _Topic._ vi, 4. But the indivisible is part of the\ndefinition of the divisible; as a point comes into the definition of\na line; for as Euclid says, \"a line is length without breadth, the\nextremities of which are points\"; also unity comes into the\ndefinition of number, for \"number is multitude measured by one,\" as\nis said _Metaph._ x, Did. ix, 6. Therefore our intellect understands\nthe indivisible before the divisible.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"Like is known by like.\" But the indivisible is more\nlike to the intellect than is the divisible; because \"the intellect\nis simple\" (De Anima iii, 4). Therefore our intellect first knows the\nindivisible.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (De Anima iii, 6) that \"the indivisible\nis expressed as a privation.\" But privation is known secondarily.\nTherefore likewise is the indivisible.\n\n_I answer that,_ The object of our intellect in its present state\nis the quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from the\nphantasms, as above stated (Q. 84, A. 7). And since that which is\nknown first and of itself by our cognitive power is its proper\nobject, we must consider its relationship to that quiddity in order\nto discover in what order the indivisible is known. Now the\nindivisible is threefold, as is said _De Anima_ iii, 6. First, the\ncontinuous is indivisible, since actually it is undivided, although\npotentially divisible: and this indivisible is known to us before its\ndivision, which is a division into parts: because confused knowledge\nis prior to distinct knowledge, as we have said above (A. 3).\nSecondly, the indivisible is so called in relation to species, as\nman's reason is something indivisible. This way, also, the\nindivisible is understood before its division into logical parts, as\nwe have said above (De Anima iii, 6); and again before the intellect\ndisposes and divides by affirmation and negation. The reason of this\nis that both these kinds of indivisible are understood by the\nintellect of itself, as being its proper object. The third kind of\nindivisible is what is altogether indivisible, as a point and unity,\nwhich cannot be divided either actually or potentially. And this\nindivisible is known secondarily, through the privation of\ndivisibility. Wherefore a point is defined by way of privation \"as\nthat which has no parts\"; and in like manner the notion of \"one\" is\nthat is \"indivisible,\" as stated in _Metaph._ x, Did. ix, 1. And the\nreason of this is that this indivisible has a certain opposition to\na corporeal being, the quiddity of which is the primary and proper\nobject of the intellect.\n\nBut if our intellect understood by participation of certain separate\nindivisible (forms), as the Platonists maintained, it would follow\nthat a like indivisible is understood primarily; for according to\nthe Platonists what is first is first participated by things.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the acquisition of knowledge, principles and\nelements are not always (known) first: for sometimes from sensible\neffects we arrive at the knowledge of principles and intelligible\ncauses. But in perfect knowledge, the knowledge of effects always\ndepends on the knowledge of principles and elements: for as the\nPhilosopher says in the same passage: \"Then do we consider that we\nknow, when we can resolve principles into their causes.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: A point is not included in the definition of a line in\ngeneral: for it is manifest that in a line of indefinite length, and\nin a circular line, there is no point, save potentially. Euclid\ndefines a finite straight line: and therefore he mentions a point in\nthe definition, as the limit in the definition of that which is\nlimited. Unity is the measure of number: wherefore it is included in\nthe definition of a measured number. But it is not included in the\ndefinition of the divisible, but rather conversely.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The likeness through which we understand is the species\nof the known in the knower; therefore a thing is known first, not on\naccount of its natural likeness to the cognitive power, but on\naccount of the power's aptitude for the object: otherwise sight would\nperceive hearing rather than color.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 86\n\nWHAT OUR INTELLECT KNOWS IN MATERIAL THINGS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe now have to consider what our intellect knows in material things.\nUnder this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it knows singulars?\n\n(2) Whether it knows the infinite?\n\n(3) Whether it knows contingent things?\n\n(4) Whether it knows future things?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 86, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Our Intellect Knows Singulars?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows singulars. For\nwhoever knows composition, knows the terms of composition. But our\nintellect knows this composition; \"Socrates is a man\": for it belongs\nto the intellect to form a proposition. Therefore our intellect knows\nthis singular, Socrates.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the practical intellect directs to action. But\naction has relation to singular things. Therefore the intellect knows\nthe singular.\n\nObj. 3: Further, our intellect understands itself. But in itself it\nis a singular, otherwise it would have no action of its own; for\nactions belong to singulars. Therefore our intellect knows singulars.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a superior power can do whatever is done by an\ninferior power. But sense knows the singular. Much more, therefore,\ncan the intellect know it.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Phys. i, 5), that \"the\nuniversal is known by reason; and the singular is known by sense.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Our intellect cannot know the singular in material\nthings directly and primarily. The reason of this is that the\nprinciple of singularity in material things is individual matter,\nwhereas our intellect, as have said above (Q. 85, A. 1), understands\nby abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Now what is\nabstracted from individual matter is the universal. Hence our\nintellect knows directly the universal only. But indirectly, and as\nit were by a kind of reflection, it can know the singular, because,\nas we have said above (Q. 85, A. 7), even after abstracting the\nintelligible species, the intellect, in order to understand, needs to\nturn to the phantasms in which it understands the species, as is said\n_De Anima_ iii, 7. Therefore it understands the universal directly\nthrough the intelligible species, and indirectly the singular\nrepresented by the phantasm. And thus it forms the proposition\n\"Socrates is a man.\" Wherefore the reply to the first objection is\nclear.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The choice of a particular thing to be done is as the\nconclusion of a syllogism formed by the practical intellect, as is\nsaid _Ethic._ vii, 3. But a singular proposition cannot be directly\nconcluded from a universal proposition, except through the medium of\na singular proposition. Therefore the universal principle of the\npractical intellect does not move save through the medium of the\nparticular apprehension of the sensitive part, as is said _De Anima_\niii, 11.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Intelligibility is incompatible with the singular not\nas such, but as material, for nothing can be understood otherwise\nthan immaterially. Therefore if there be an immaterial singular such\nas the intellect, there is no reason why it should not be\nintelligible.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The higher power can do what the lower power can, but\nin a more eminent way. Wherefore what the sense knows materially and\nconcretely, which is to know the singular directly, the intellect\nknows immaterially and in the abstract, which is to know the\nuniversal.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 86, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Our Intellect Can Know the Infinite?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that our intellect can know the infinite.\nFor God excels all infinite things. But our intellect can know God,\nas we have said above (Q. 12, A. 1). Much more, therefore, can our\nintellect know all other infinite things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, our intellect can naturally know genera and\nspecies. But there is an infinity of species in some genera, as in\nnumber, proportion, and figure. Therefore our intellect can know\nthe infinite.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if one body can coexist with another in the same\nplace, there is nothing to prevent an infinite number of bodies being\nin one place. But one intelligible species can exist with another in\nthe same intellect, for many things can be habitually known at the\nsame time. Therefore our intellect can have an habitual knowledge of\nan infinite number of things.\n\nObj. 4: Further, as the intellect is not a corporeal faculty, as we\nhave said (Q. 76, A. 1), it appears to be an infinite power. But an\ninfinite power has a capacity for an infinite object. Therefore our\nintellect can know the infinite.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (Phys. i, 4) that \"the infinite,\nconsidered as such, is unknown.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since a faculty and its object are proportional to\neach other, the intellect must be related to the infinite, as is its\nobject, which is the quiddity of a material thing. Now in material\nthings the infinite does not exist actually, but only potentially, in\nthe sense of one succeeding another, as is said Phys. iii, 6.\nTherefore infinity is potentially in our mind through its considering\nsuccessively one thing after another: because never does our\nintellect understand so many things, that it cannot understand more.\n\nOn the other hand, our intellect cannot understand the infinite\neither actually or habitually. Not actually, for our intellect cannot\nknow actually at the same time, except what it knows through one\nspecies. But the infinite is not represented by one species, for if\nit were it would be something whole and complete. Consequently it\ncannot be understood except by a successive consideration of one part\nafter another, as is clear from its definition (Phys. iii, 6): for\nthe infinite is that \"from which, however much we may take, there\nalways remains something to be taken.\" Thus the infinite could not be\nknown actually, unless all its parts were counted: which is\nimpossible.\n\nFor the same reason we cannot have habitual knowledge of the infinite:\nbecause in us habitual knowledge results from actual consideration:\nsince by understanding we acquire knowledge, as is said _Ethic._ ii, 1.\nWherefore it would not be possible for us to have a habit of an\ninfinity of things distinctly known, unless we had already considered\nthe entire infinity thereof, counting them according to the succession\nof our knowledge: which is impossible. And therefore neither actually\nnor habitually can our intellect know the infinite, but only\npotentially as explained above.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As we have said above (Q. 7, A. 1), God is called\ninfinite, because He is a form unlimited by matter; whereas in\nmaterial things, the term \"infinite\" is applied to that which is\ndeprived of any formal term. And form being known in itself, whereas\nmatter cannot be known without form, it follows that the material\ninfinite is in itself unknowable. But the formal infinite, God, is\nof Himself known; but He is unknown to us by reason of our feeble\nintellect, which in its present state has a natural aptitude for\nmaterial objects only. Therefore we cannot know God in our present\nlife except through material effects. In the future life this defect\nof intellect will be removed by the state of glory, when we shall be\nable to see the Essence of God Himself, but without being able to\ncomprehend Him.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The nature of our mind is to know species abstracted\nfrom phantasms; therefore it cannot know actually or habitually\nspecies of numbers or figures that are not in the imagination, except\nin a general way and in their universal principles; and this is to\nknow them potentially and confusedly.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If two or more bodies were in the same place, there\nwould be no need for them to occupy the place successively, in order\nfor the things placed to be counted according to this succession of\noccupation. On the other hand, the intelligible species enter into\nour intellect successively; since many things cannot be actually\nunderstood at the same time: and therefore there must be a definite\nand not an infinite number of species in our intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As our intellect is infinite in power, so does it know\nthe infinite. For its power is indeed infinite inasmuch as it is not\nterminated by corporeal matter. Moreover it can know the universal,\nwhich is abstracted from individual matter, and which consequently is\nnot limited to one individual, but, considered in itself, extends to\nan infinite number of individuals.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 86, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Our Intellect Can Know Contingent Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intellect cannot know contingent\nthings: because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 6), the objects\nof understanding, wisdom and knowledge are not contingent, but\nnecessary things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as stated in Phys. iv, 12, \"what sometimes is and\nsometimes is not, is measured by time.\" Now the intellect abstracts\nfrom time, and from other material conditions. Therefore, as it is\nproper to a contingent thing sometime to be and sometime not to be,\nit seems that contingent things are not known by the intellect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ All knowledge is in the intellect. But some\nsciences are of the contingent things, as the moral sciences, the\nobjects of which are human actions subject to free-will; and again,\nthe natural sciences in as far as they relate to things generated\nand corruptible. Therefore the intellect knows contingent things.\n\n_I answer that,_ Contingent things can be considered in two ways;\neither as contingent, or as containing some element of necessity,\nsince every contingent thing has in it something necessary: for\nexample, that Socrates runs, is in itself contingent; but the\nrelation of running to motion is necessary, for it is necessary that\nSocrates move if he runs. Now contingency arises from matter, for\ncontingency is a potentiality to be or not to be, and potentiality\nbelongs to matter; whereas necessity results from form, because\nwhatever is consequent on form is of necessity in the subject. But\nmatter is the individualizing principle: whereas the universal comes\nfrom the abstraction of the form from the particular matter. Moreover\nit was laid down above (A. 1) that the intellect of itself and\ndirectly has the universal for its object; while the object of sense\nis the singular, which in a certain way is the indirect object of the\nintellect, as we have said above (A. 1). Therefore the contingent,\nconsidered as such, is known directly by sense and indirectly by the\nintellect; while the universal and necessary principles of contingent\nthings are known only by the intellect. Hence if we consider the\nobjects of science in their universal principles, then all science is\nof necessary things. But if we consider the things themselves, thus\nsome sciences are of necessary things, some of contingent things.\n\nFrom which the replies to the objections are clear.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 86, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Our Intellect Can Know the Future?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the future. For\nour intellect knows by means of intelligible species abstracted from\nthe \"here\" and \"now,\" and related indifferently to all time. But it\ncan know the present. Therefore it can know the future.\n\nObj. 2: Further, man, while his senses are in suspense, can know\nsome future things, as in sleep, and in frenzy. But the intellect\nis freer and more vigorous when removed from sense. Therefore the\nintellect of its own nature can know the future.\n\nObj. 3: The intellectual knowledge of man is superior to any\nknowledge of brutes. But some animals know the future; thus crows\nby their frequent cawing foretell rain. Therefore much more can\nthe intellect know the future.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 8:6, 7), \"There is a great\naffliction for man, because he is ignorant of things past; and things\nto come he cannot know by any messenger.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We must apply the same distinction to future things,\nas we applied above (A. 3) to contingent things. For future things\nconsidered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect\nknows them by reflection only, as stated above (A. 1). But the\nprinciples of future things may be universal; and thus they may enter\nthe domain of the intellect and become the objects of science.\n\nSpeaking, however, of the knowledge of the future in a general way,\nwe must observe that the future may be known in two ways: either in\nitself, or in its cause. The future cannot be known in itself save by\nGod alone; to Whom even that is present which in the course of events\nis future, forasmuch as from eternity His glance embraces the whole\ncourse of time, as we have said above when treating of God's\nknowledge (Q. 14, A. 13). But forasmuch as it exists in its cause,\nthe future can be known by us also. And if, indeed, the cause be such\nas to have a necessary connection with its future result, then the\nfuture is known with scientific certitude, just as the astronomer\nforesees the future eclipse. If, however, the cause be such as to\nproduce a certain result more frequently than not, then can the\nfuture be known more or less conjecturally, according as its cause\nis more or less inclined to produce the effect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument considers that knowledge which is drawn\nfrom universal causal principles; from these the future may be known,\naccording to the order of the effects to the cause.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Confess. xii [*Gen. ad lit. xii.\n13]), the soul has a certain power of forecasting, so that by its very\nnature it can know the future; hence when withdrawn from corporeal\nsense, and, as it were, concentrated on itself, it shares in the\nknowledge of the future. Such an opinion would be reasonable if we\nwere to admit that the soul receives knowledge by participating the\nideas as the Platonists maintained, because in that case the soul by\nits nature would know the universal causes of all effects, and would\nonly be impeded in its knowledge by the body, and hence when\nwithdrawn from the corporeal senses it would know the future.\n\nBut since it is connatural to our intellect to know things, not thus,\nbut by receiving its knowledge from the senses; it is not natural for\nthe soul to know the future when withdrawn from the senses: rather\ndoes it know the future by the impression of superior spiritual and\ncorporeal causes; of spiritual causes, when by Divine power the human\nintellect is enlightened through the ministry of angels, and the\nphantasms are directed to the knowledge of future events; or, by the\ninfluence of demons, when the imagination is moved regarding the\nfuture known to the demons, as explained above (Q. 57, A. 3). The\nsoul is naturally more inclined to receive these impressions of\nspiritual causes when it is withdrawn from the senses, as it is then\nnearer to the spiritual world, and freer from external distractions.\nThe same may also come from superior corporeal causes. For it is\nclear that superior bodies influence inferior bodies. Hence, in\nconsequence of the sensitive faculties being acts of corporeal\norgans, the influence of the heavenly bodies causes the imagination\nto be affected, and so, as the heavenly bodies cause many future\nevents, the imagination receives certain images of some such events.\nThese images are perceived more at night and while we sleep than in\nthe daytime and while we are awake, because, as stated in _De Somn.\net Vigil._ ii [*De Divinat. per somn. ii], \"impressions made by day\nare evanescent. The night air is calmer, when silence reigns, hence\nbodily impressions are made in sleep, when slight internal movements\nare felt more than in wakefulness, and such movements produce in the\nimagination images from which the future may be foreseen.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Brute animals have no power above the imagination\nwherewith to regulate it, as man has his reason, and therefore their\nimagination follows entirely the influence of the heavenly bodies.\nThus from such animals' movements some future things, such as rain\nand the like, may be known rather than from human movements directed\nby reason. Hence the Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vig.), that \"some\nwho are most imprudent are most far-seeing; for their intelligence\nis not burdened with cares, but is as it were barren and bare of all\nanxiety moving at the caprice of whatever is brought to bear on it.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 87\n\nHOW THE INTELLECTUAL SOUL KNOWS ITSELF AND ALL WITHIN ITSELF\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe have now to consider how the intellectual soul knows itself and\nall within itself. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the soul knows itself by its own essence?\n\n(2) Whether it knows its own habits?\n\n(3) How does the intellect know its own act?\n\n(4) How does it know the act of the will?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 87, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Intellectual Soul Knows Itself by Its Essence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul knows itself by\nits own essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), that \"the mind\nknows itself, because it is incorporeal.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, both angels and human souls belong to the genus of\nintellectual substance. But an angel understands itself by its own\nessence. Therefore likewise does the human soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"in things void of matter, the intellect and that\nwhich is understood are the same\" (De Anima iii, 4). But the human\nmind is void of matter, not being the act of a body as stated above\n(Q. 76, A. 1). Therefore the intellect and its object are the same in\nthe human mind; and therefore the human mind understands itself by\nits own essence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (De Anima iii, 4) that \"the intellect\nunderstands itself in the same way as it understands other things.\"\nBut it understands other things, not by their essence, but by their\nsimilitudes. Therefore it does not understand itself by its own\nessence.\n\n_I answer that,_ Everything is knowable so far as it is in act, and\nnot, so far as it is in potentiality (Metaph. ix, Did. viii, 9): for\na thing is a being, and is true, and therefore knowable, according as\nit is actual. This is quite clear as regards sensible things, for the\neye does not see what is potentially, but what is actually colored.\nIn like manner it is clear that the intellect, so far as it knows\nmaterial things, does not know save what is in act: and hence it does\nnot know primary matter except as proportionate to form, as is stated\nPhys. i, 7. Consequently immaterial substances are intelligible by\ntheir own essence according as each one is actual by its own essence.\n\nTherefore it is that the Essence of God, the pure and perfect act, is\nsimply and perfectly in itself intelligible; and hence God by His own\nEssence knows Himself, and all other things also. The angelic essence\nbelongs, indeed, to the genus of intelligible things as _act,_ but\nnot as a _pure act,_ nor as a _complete act,_ and hence the angel's\nact of intelligence is not completed by his essence. For although an\nangel understands himself by his own essence, still he cannot\nunderstand all other things by his own essence; for he knows things\nother than himself by their likenesses. Now the human intellect is\nonly a potentiality in the genus of intelligible beings, just as\nprimary matter is a potentiality as regards sensible beings; and\nhence it is called \"possible\" [*Possibilis--elsewhere in this\ntranslation rendered \"passive\"--Ed.]. Therefore in its essence the\nhuman mind is potentially understanding. Hence it has in itself the\npower to understand, but not to be understood, except as it is made\nactual. For even the Platonists asserted that an order of\nintelligible beings existed above the order of intellects, forasmuch\nas the intellect understands only by participation of the\nintelligible; for they said that the participator is below what it\nparticipates. If, therefore, the human intellect, as the Platonists\nheld, became actual by participating separate intelligible forms, it\nwould understand itself by such participation of incorporeal beings.\nBut as in this life our intellect has material and sensible things\nfor its proper natural object, as stated above (Q. 84, A. 7), it\nunderstands itself according as it is made actual by the species\nabstracted from sensible things, through the light of the active\nintellect, which not only actuates the intelligible things\nthemselves, but also, by their instrumentality, actuates the passive\nintellect. Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence,\nbut by its act. This happens in two ways: In the first place,\nsingularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives that he has an\nintellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In the\nsecond place, universally, as when we consider the nature of the\nhuman mind from knowledge of the intellectual act. It is true,\nhowever, that the judgment and force of this knowledge, whereby we\nknow the nature of the soul, comes to us according to the derivation\nof our intellectual light from the Divine Truth which contains the\ntypes of all things as above stated (Q. 84, A. 5). Hence Augustine\nsays (De Trin. ix, 6): \"We gaze on the inviolable truth whence we can\nas perfectly as possible define, not what each man's mind is, but\nwhat it ought to be in the light of the eternal types.\" There is,\nhowever, a difference between these two kinds of knowledge, and it\nconsists in this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices for the\nfirst; the mind itself being the principle of action whereby it\nperceives itself, and hence it is said to know itself by its own\npresence. But as regards the second kind of knowledge, the mere\npresence of the mind does not suffice, and there is further required\na careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant of the soul's\nnature, and many have erred about it. So Augustine says (De Trin. x,\n9), concerning such mental inquiry: \"Let the mind strive not to see\nitself as if it were absent, but to discern itself as present\"--i.e.\nto know how it differs from other things; which is to know its\nessence and nature.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The mind knows itself by means of itself, because at\nlength it acquires knowledge of itself, though led thereto by its own\nact: because it is itself that it knows, since it loves itself, as he\nsays in the same passage. For a thing can be called self-evident in\ntwo ways, either because we can know it by nothing else except\nitself, as first principles are called self-evident; or because it is\nnot accidentally knowable, as color is visible of itself, whereas\nsubstance is visible by its accident.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The essence of an angel is an act in the genus of\nintelligible things, and therefore it is both intellect and the thing\nunderstood. Hence an angel apprehends his own essence through itself:\nnot so the human mind, which is either altogether in potentiality to\nintelligible things--as is the passive intellect--or is the act of\nintelligible things abstracted from the phantasms--as is the active\nintellect.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This saying of the Philosopher is universally true in\nevery kind of intellect. For as sense in act is the sensible in act,\nby reason of the sensible likeness which is the form of sense in act,\nso likewise the intellect in act is the object understood in act, by\nreason of the likeness of the thing understood, which is the form of\nthe intellect in act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual by\nthe species of the object understood, is itself understood by the\nsame species as by its own form. Now to say that in \"things without\nmatter the intellect and what is understood are the same,\" is equal\nto saying that \"as regards things actually understood the intellect\nand what is understood are the same.\" For a thing is actually\nunderstood in that it is immaterial. But a distinction must be drawn:\nsince the essences of some things are immaterial--as the separate\nsubstances called angels, each of which is understood and\nunderstands, whereas there are other things whose essences are not\nwholly immaterial, but only the abstract likenesses thereof. Hence\nthe Commentator says (De Anima iii) that the proposition quoted is\ntrue only of separate substances; because in a sense it is verified\nin their regard, and not in regard of other substances, as already\nstated (Reply Obj. 2).\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 87, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Our Intellect Knows the Habits of the Soul by Their Essence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that our intellect knows the habits of the\nsoul by their essence. For Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 1): \"Faith\nis not seen in the heart wherein it abides, as the soul of a man may\nbe seen by another from the movement of the body; but we know most\ncertainly that it is there, and conscience proclaims its existence\";\nand the same principle applies to the other habits of the soul.\nTherefore the habits of the soul are not known by their acts, but by\nthemselves.\n\nObj. 2: Further, material things outside the soul are known by their\nlikeness being present in the soul, and are said therefore to be\nknown by their likenesses. But the soul's habits are present by their\nessence in the soul. Therefore the habits of the soul are known by\ntheir essence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"whatever is the cause of a thing being such is\nstill more so.\" But habits and intelligible species cause things to\nbe known by the soul. Therefore they are still more known by the soul\nin themselves.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Habits like powers are the principles of acts. But\nas is said (De Anima ii, 4), \"acts and operations are logically prior\nto powers.\" Therefore in the same way they are prior to habits; and\nthus habits, like the powers, are known by their acts.\n\n_I answer that,_ A habit is a kind of medium between mere power and\nmere act. Now, it has been said (A. 1) that nothing is known but as\nit is actual: therefore so far as a habit fails in being a perfect\nact, it falls short in being of itself knowable, and can be known\nonly by its act; thus, for example, anyone knows he has a habit from\nthe fact that he can produce the act proper to that habit; or he may\ninquire into the nature and idea of the habit by considering the act.\nThe first kind of knowledge of the habit arises from its being\npresent, for the very fact of its presence causes the act whereby it\nis known. The second kind of knowledge of the habit arises from a\ncareful inquiry, as is explained above of the mind (A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although faith is not known by external movement of\nthe body, it is perceived by the subject wherein it resides, by the\ninterior act of the heart. For no one knows that he has faith unless\nhe knows that he believes.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Habits are present in our intellect, not as its object\nsince, in the present state of life, our intellect's object is the\nnature of a material thing as stated above (Q. 84, A. 7), but as that\nby which it understands.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The axiom, \"whatever is the cause of a thing being\nsuch, is still more so,\" is true of things that are of the same\norder, for instance, of the same kind of cause; for example, we may\nsay that health is desirable on account of life, and therefore life\nis more desirable still. But if we take things of different orders\nthe axiom is not true: for we may say that health is caused by\nmedicine, but it does not follow that medicine is more desirable than\nhealth, for health belongs to the order of final causes, whereas\nmedicine belongs to the order of efficient causes. So of two things\nbelonging essentially to the order of the objects of knowledge, the\none which is the cause of the other being known, is the more known,\nas principles are more known than conclusions. But habit as such does\nnot belong to the order of objects of knowledge; nor are things known\non account of the habit, as on account of an object known, but as on\naccount of a disposition or form whereby the subject knows: and\ntherefore the argument does not prove.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 87, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Our Intellect Knows Its Own Act?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that our intellect does not know its own\nact. For what is known is the object of the knowing faculty. But the\nact differs from the object. Therefore the intellect does not know\nits own act.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is known is known by some act. If, then,\nthe intellect knows its own act, it knows it by some act, and again\nit knows that act by some other act; this is to proceed indefinitely,\nwhich seems impossible.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the intellect has the same relation to its act as\nsense has to its act. But the proper sense does not feel its own act,\nfor this belongs to the common sense, as stated _De Anima_ iii, 2.\nTherefore neither does the intellect understand its own act.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), \"I understand\nthat I understand.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2) a thing is intelligible\naccording as it is in act. Now the ultimate perfection of the\nintellect consists in its own operation: for this is not an act\ntending to something else in which lies the perfection of the work\naccomplished, as building is the perfection of the thing built; but\nit remains in the agent as its perfection and act, as is said\n_Metaph._ ix, Did. viii, 8. Therefore the first thing understood of\nthe intellect is its own act of understanding. This occurs in\ndifferent ways with different intellects. For there is an intellect,\nnamely, the Divine, which is Its own act of intelligence, so that in\nGod the understanding of His intelligence, and the understanding of\nHis Essence, are one and the same act, because His Essence is His act\nof understanding. But there is another intellect, the angelic, which\nis not its own act of understanding, as we have said above (Q. 79,\nA. 1), and yet the first object of that act is the angelic essence.\nWherefore although there is a logical distinction between the act\nwhereby he understands that he understands, and that whereby he\nunderstands his essence, yet he understands both by one and the same\nact; because to understand his own essence is the proper perfection\nof his essence, and by one and the same act is a thing, together with\nits perfection, understood. And there is yet another, namely, the\nhuman intellect, which neither is its own act of understanding, nor\nis its own essence the first object of its act of understanding, for\nthis object is the nature of a material thing. And therefore that\nwhich is first known by the human intellect is an object of this\nkind, and that which is known secondarily is the act by which that\nobject is known; and through the act the intellect itself is known,\nthe perfection of which is this act of understanding. For this reason\ndid the Philosopher assert that objects are known before acts, and\nacts before powers (De Anima ii, 4).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The object of the intellect is something universal,\nnamely, _being_ and _the true,_ in which the act also of\nunderstanding is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand\nits own act. But not primarily, since the first object of our\nintellect, in this state of life, is not every being and everything\ntrue, but _being_ and _true,_ as considered in material things, as\nwe have said above (Q. 84, A. 7), from which it acquires knowledge\nof all other things.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The intelligent act of the human intellect is not the\nact and perfection of the material nature understood, as if the\nnature of the material thing and intelligent act could be understood\nby one act; just as a thing and its perfection are understood by one\nact. Hence the act whereby the intellect understands a stone is\ndistinct from the act whereby it understands that it understands a\nstone; and so on. Nor is there any difficulty in the intellect being\nthus potentially infinite, as explained above (Q. 86, A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The proper sense feels by reason of the immutation in\nthe material organ caused by the external sensible. A material\nobject, however, cannot immute itself; but one is immuted by another,\nand therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the common\nsense. The intellect, on the contrary, does not perform the act of\nunderstanding by the material immutation of an organ; and so there\nis no comparison.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 87, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Intellect Understands the Act of the Will?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intellect does not understand the\nact of the will. For nothing is known by the intellect, unless it be\nin some way present in the intellect. But the act of the will is not\nin the intellect; since the will and the intellect are distinct.\nTherefore the act of the will is not known by the intellect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the act is specified by the object. But the object\nof the will is not the same as the object of the intellect. Therefore\nthe act of the will is specifically distinct from the object of the\nintellect, and therefore the act of the will is not known by the\nintellect.\n\nObj. 3: Augustine (Confess. x, 17) says of the soul's affections that\n\"they are known neither by images as bodies are known; nor by their\npresence, like the arts; but by certain notions.\" Now it does not\nseem that there can be in the soul any other notions of things but\neither the essences of things known or the likenesses thereof.\nTherefore it seems impossible for the intellect to known such\naffections of the soul as the acts of the will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11), \"I understand\nthat I will.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 59, A. 1), the act of the will\nis nothing but an inclination consequent on the form understood; just\nas the natural appetite is an inclination consequent on the natural\nform. Now the inclination of a thing resides in it according to its\nmode of existence; and hence the natural inclination resides in a\nnatural thing naturally, and the inclination called the sensible\nappetite is in the sensible thing sensibly; and likewise the\nintelligible inclination, which is the act of the will, is in the\nintelligent subject intelligibly as in its principle and proper\nsubject. Hence the Philosopher expresses himself thus (De Anima iii,\n9)--that \"the will is in the reason.\" Now whatever is intelligibly in\nan intelligent subject, is understood by that subject. Therefore the\nact of the will is understood by the intellect, both inasmuch as one\nknows that one wills; and inasmuch as one knows the nature of this\nact, and consequently, the nature of its principle which is the habit\nor power.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument would hold good if the will and the\nintellect were in different subjects, as they are distinct powers;\nfor then whatever was in the will would not be in the intellect. But\nas both are rooted in the same substance of the soul, and since one\nis in a certain way the principle of the other, consequently what is\nin the will is, in a certain way, also in the intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The \"good\" and the \"true\" which are the objects of the\nwill and of the intellect, differ logically, but one is contained in\nthe other, as we have said above (Q. 82, A. 4, ad 1; Q. 16, A. 4, ad\n1); for the true is good and the good is true. Therefore the objects\nof the will fall under the intellect, and those of the intellect can\nfall under the will.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The affections of the soul are in the intellect not by\nsimilitude only, like bodies; nor by being present in their subject,\nas the arts; but as the thing caused is in its principle, which\ncontains some notion of the thing caused. And so Augustine says that\nthe soul's affections are in the memory by certain notions.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 88\n\nHOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS WHAT IS ABOVE ITSELF\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe must now consider how the human soul knows what is above itself,\nviz. immaterial substances. Under this head there are three points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the human soul in the present state of life can understand\nthe immaterial substances called angels, in themselves?\n\n(2) Whether it can arrive at the knowledge thereof by the knowledge of\nmaterial things?\n\n(3) Whether God is the first object of our knowledge?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 88, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Human Soul in the Present State of Life Can Understand\nImmaterial Substances in Themselves?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the human soul in the present state of\nlife can understand immaterial substances in themselves. For Augustine\n(De Trin. ix, 3) says: \"As the mind itself acquires the knowledge of\ncorporeal things by means of the corporeal senses, so it gains from\nitself the knowledge of incorporeal things.\" But these are the\nimmaterial substances. Therefore the human mind understands immaterial\nsubstances.\n\nObj. 2: Further, like is known by like. But the human mind is more\nakin to immaterial than to material things; since its own nature is\nimmaterial, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 76, A. 1).\nSince then our mind understands material things, much more is it able\nto understand immaterial things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the fact that objects which are in themselves most\nsensible are not most felt by us, comes from sense being corrupted by\ntheir very excellence. But the intellect is not subject to such a\ncorrupting influence from its object, as is stated _De Anima_ iii, 4.\nTherefore things which are in themselves in the highest degree of\nintelligibility, are likewise to us most intelligible. As material\nthings, however, are intelligible only so far as we make them\nactually so by abstracting them from material conditions, it is clear\nthat those substances are more intelligible in themselves whose\nnature is immaterial. Therefore they are much more known to us than\nare material things.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Commentator says (Metaph. ii) that \"nature would\nbe frustrated in its end\" were we unable to understand abstract\nsubstances, \"because it would have made what in itself is naturally\nintelligible not to be understood at all.\" But in nature nothing is\nidle or purposeless. Therefore immaterial substances can be\nunderstood by us.\n\nObj. 5: Further, as sense is to the sensible, so is intellect to the\nintelligible. But our sight can see all things corporeal, whether\nsuperior and incorruptible; or lower and corruptible. Therefore our\nintellect can understand all intelligible substances, even the\nsuperior and immaterial.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 9:16): \"The things that are in\nheaven, who shall search out?\" But these substances are said to be in\nheaven, according to Matt. 18:10, \"Their angels in heaven,\" etc.\nTherefore immaterial substances cannot be known by human\ninvestigation.\n\n_I answer that,_ In the opinion of Plato, immaterial substances are\nnot only understood by us, but are the objects we understand first\nof all. For Plato taught that immaterial subsisting forms, which he\ncalled \"Ideas,\" are the proper objects of our intellect, and thus\nfirst and _per se_ understood by us; and, further, that material\nobjects are known by the soul inasmuch as phantasy and sense are\nmixed up with the mind. Hence the purer the intellect is, so much the\nmore clearly does it perceive the intelligible truth of immaterial\nthings.\n\nBut in Aristotle's opinion, which experience corroborates, our\nintellect in its present state of life has a natural relationship to\nthe natures of material things; and therefore it can only understand\nby turning to the phantasms, as we have said above (Q. 84, A. 7).\nThus it clearly appears that immaterial substances which do not fall\nunder sense and imagination, cannot first and _per se_ be known by us,\naccording to the mode of knowledge which experience proves us to have.\n\nNevertheless Averroes (Comment. De Anima iii) teaches that in this\npresent life man can in the end arrive at the knowledge of separate\nsubstances by being coupled or united to some separate substance,\nwhich he calls the \"active intellect,\" and which, being a separate\nsubstance itself, can naturally understand separate substances. Hence,\nwhen it is perfectly united to us so that by its means we are able to\nunderstand perfectly, we also shall be able to understand separate\nsubstances, as in the present life through the medium of the passive\nintellect united to us, we can understand material things. Now he\nsaid that the active intellect is united to us, thus. For since we\nunderstand by means of both the active intellect and intelligible\nobjects, as, for instance, we understand conclusions by principles\nunderstood; it is clear that the active intellect must be compared to\nthe objects understood, either as the principal agent is to the\ninstrument, or as form to matter. For an action is ascribed to two\nprinciples in one of these two ways; to a principal agent and to an\ninstrument, as cutting to the workman and the saw; to a form and its\nsubject, as heating to heat and fire. In both these ways the active\nintellect can be compared to the intelligible object as perfection is\nto the perfectible, and as act is to potentiality. Now a subject is\nmade perfect and receives its perfection at one and the same time, as\nthe reception of what is actually visible synchronizes with the\nreception of light in the eye. Therefore the passive intellect\nreceives the intelligible object and the active intellect together;\nand the more numerous the intelligible objects received, so much the\nnearer do we come to the point of perfect union between ourselves and\nthe active intellect; so much so that when we understand all the\nintelligible objects, the active intellect becomes one with us, and\nby its instrumentality we can understand all things material and\nimmaterial. In this he makes the ultimate happiness of man to consist.\nNor, as regards the present inquiry, does it matter whether the\npassive intellect in that state of happiness understands separate\nsubstances by the instrumentality of the active intellect, as he\nhimself maintains, or whether (as he says Alexander holds) the passive\nintellect can never understand separate substances (because according\nto him it is corruptible), but man understands separate substances by\nmeans of the active intellect.\n\nThis opinion, however, is untrue. First, because, supposing the active\nintellect to be a separate substance, we could not formally understand\nby its instrumentality, for the medium of an agent's formal action\nconsists in its form and act, since every agent acts according to its\nactuality, as was said of the passive intellect (Q. 70, A. 1).\nSecondly, this opinion is untrue, because in the above explanation,\nthe active intellect, supposing it to be a separate substance, would\nnot be joined to us in its substance, but only in its light, as\nparticipated in things understood; and would not extend to the other\nacts of the active intellect so as to enable us to understand\nimmaterial substances; just as when we see colors set off by the sun,\nwe are not united to the substance of the sun so as to act like the\nsun, but its light only is united to us, that we may see the colors.\nThirdly, this opinion is untrue, because granted that, as above\nexplained, the active intellect were united to us in substance, still\nit is not said that it is wholly so united in regard to one\nintelligible object, or two; but rather in regard to all intelligible\nobjects. But all such objects together do not equal the force of the\nactive intellect, as it is a much greater thing to understand separate\nsubstances than to understand all material things. Hence it clearly\nfollows that the knowledge of all material things would not make the\nactive intellect to be so united to us as to enable us by its\ninstrumentality to understand separate substances.\n\nFourthly, this opinion is untrue, because it is hardly possible for\nanyone in this world to understand all material things: and thus no\none, or very few, could reach to perfect felicity; which is against\nwhat the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9), that happiness is a \"kind of\ncommon good, communicable to all capable of virtue.\" Further, it is\nunreasonable that only the few of any species attain to the end of\nthe species.\n\nFifthly, the Philosopher expressly says (Ethic. i, 10), that\nhappiness is \"an operation according to perfect virtue\"; and after\nenumerating many virtues in the tenth book, he concludes (Ethic. i,\n7) that ultimate happiness consisting in the knowledge of the highest\nthings intelligible is attained through the virtue of wisdom, which\nin the sixth chapter he had named as the chief of speculative\nsciences. Hence Aristotle clearly places the ultimate felicity of man\nin the knowledge of separate substances, obtainable by speculative\nscience; and not by being united to the active intellect as some\nimagined.\n\nSixthly, as was shown above (Q. 79, A. 4), the active intellect is\nnot a separate substance; but a faculty of the soul, extending itself\nactively to the same objects to which the passive intellect extends\nreceptively; because, as is stated (De Anima iii, 5), the passive\nintellect is \"all things potentially,\" and the active intellect is\n\"all things in act.\" Therefore both intellects, according to the\npresent state of life, extend to material things only, which are made\nactually intelligible by the active intellect, and are received in\nthe passive intellect. Hence in the present state of life we cannot\nunderstand separate immaterial substances in themselves, either by\nthe passive or by the active intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine may be taken to mean that the knowledge of\nincorporeal things in the mind can be gained by the mind itself. This\nis so true that philosophers also say that the knowledge concerning\nthe soul is a principle for the knowledge of separate substances. For\nby knowing itself, it attains to some knowledge of incorporeal\nsubstances, such as is within its compass; not that the knowledge of\nitself gives it a perfect and absolute knowledge of them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The likeness of nature is not a sufficient cause of\nknowledge; otherwise what Empedocles said would be true--that the\nsoul needs to have the nature of all in order to know all. But\nknowledge requires that the likeness of the thing known be in the\nknower, as a kind of form thereof. Now our passive intellect, in\nthe present state of life, is such that it can be informed with\nsimilitudes abstracted from phantasms: and therefore it knows\nmaterial things rather than immaterial substances.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There must needs be some proportion between the object\nand the faculty of knowledge; such as of the active to the passive,\nand of perfection to the perfectible. Hence that sensible objects of\ngreat power are not grasped by the senses, is due not merely to the\nfact that they corrupt the organ, but also to their being\nimproportionate to the sensitive power. And thus it is that\nimmaterial substances are improportionate to our intellect, in our\npresent state of life, so that it cannot understand them.\n\nReply Obj. 4: This argument of the Commentator fails in several ways.\nFirst, because if separate substances are not understood by us, it\ndoes not follow that they are not understood by any intellect; for\nthey are understood by themselves, and by one another.\n\nSecondly, to be understood by us is not the end of separate\nsubstances: while only that is vain and purposeless, which fails\nto attain its end. It does not follow, therefore, that immaterial\nsubstances are purposeless, even if they are not understood by us\nat all.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Sense knows bodies, whether superior or inferior, in\nthe same way, that is, by the sensible acting on the organ. But we do\nnot understand material and immaterial substances in the same way.\nThe former we understand by a process of abstraction, which is\nimpossible in the case of the latter, for there are no phantasms of\nwhat is immaterial.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 88, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Our Intellect Can Understand Immaterial Substances Through Its\nKnowledge of Material Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that our intellect can know immaterial\nsubstances through the knowledge of material things. For Dionysius\nsays (Coel. Hier. i) that \"the human mind cannot be raised up to\nimmaterial contemplation of the heavenly hierarchies, unless it is\nled thereto by material guidance according to its own nature.\"\nTherefore we can be led by material things to know immaterial\nsubstances.\n\nObj. 2: Further, science resides in the intellect. But there are\nsciences and definitions of immaterial substances; for Damascene\ndefines an angel (De Fide Orth. ii, 3); and we find angels treated of\nboth in theology and philosophy. Therefore immaterial substances can\nbe understood by us.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the human soul belongs to the genus of immaterial\nsubstances. But it can be understood by us through its act by which\nit understands material things. Therefore also other material\nsubstances can be understood by us, through their material effects.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the only cause which cannot be comprehended through\nits effects is that which is infinitely distant from them, and this\nbelongs to God alone. Therefore other created immaterial substances\ncan be understood by us through material things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. i) that \"intelligible\nthings cannot be understood through sensible things, nor composite\nthings through simple, nor incorporeal through corporeal.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Averroes says (De Anima iii) that a philosopher\nnamed Avempace [*Ibn-Badja, Arabian Philosopher; ob. 1183] taught\nthat by the understanding of natural substances we can be led,\naccording to true philosophical principles, to the knowledge of\nimmaterial substances. For since the nature of our intellect is to\nabstract the quiddity of material things from matter, anything\nmaterial residing in that abstracted quiddity can again be made\nsubject to abstraction; and as the process of abstraction cannot go\non forever, it must arrive at length at some immaterial quiddity,\nabsolutely without matter; and this would be the understanding of\nimmaterial substance.\n\nNow this opinion would be true, were immaterial substances the forms\nand species of these material things; as the Platonists supposed.\nBut supposing, on the contrary, that immaterial substances differ\naltogether from the quiddity of material things, it follows that\nhowever much our intellect abstract the quiddity of material things\nfrom matter, it could never arrive at anything akin to immaterial\nsubstance. Therefore we are not able perfectly to understand\nimmaterial substances through material substances.\n\nReply Obj. 1: From material things we can rise to some kind of\nknowledge of immaterial things, but not to the perfect knowledge\nthereof; for there is no proper and adequate proportion between\nmaterial and immaterial things, and the likenesses drawn from\nmaterial things for the understanding of immaterial things are\nvery dissimilar therefrom, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ii).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Science treats of higher things principally by way of\nnegation. Thus Aristotle (De Coel. i, 3) explains the heavenly bodies\nby denying to them inferior corporeal properties. Hence it follows\nthat much less can immaterial substances be known by us in such a way\nas to make us know their quiddity; but we may have a scientific\nknowledge of them by way of negation and by their relation to\nmaterial things.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The human soul understands itself through its own act\nof understanding, which is proper to it, showing perfectly its power\nand nature. But the power and nature of immaterial substances cannot\nbe perfectly known through such act, nor through any other material\nthing, because there is no proportion between the latter and the\npower of the former.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Created immaterial substances are not in the same\nnatural genus as material substances, for they do not agree in power\nor in matter; but they belong to the same logical genus, because even\nimmaterial substances are in the predicament of substance, as their\nessence is distinct from their existence. But God has no connection\nwith material things, as regards either natural genus or logical\ngenus; because God is in no genus, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 5).\nHence through the likeness derived from material things we can know\nsomething positive concerning the angels, according to some common\nnotion, though not according to the specific nature; whereas we\ncannot acquire any such knowledge at all about God.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 88, Art. 3]\n\nWhether God Is the First Object Known by the Human Mind?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God is the first object known by the\nhuman mind. For that object in which all others are known, and by\nwhich we judge others, is the first thing known to us; as light is to\nthe eye, and first principles to the intellect. But we know all things\nin the light of the first truth, and thereby judge of all things, as\nAugustine says (De Trin. xii, 2; De Vera Relig. xxxi); [*Confess. xii,\n25]. Therefore God is the first object known to us.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever causes a thing to be such is more so. But\nGod is the cause of all our knowledge; for He is \"the true light\nwhich enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world\" (John 1:9).\nTherefore God is our first and most known object.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is first known in the image is the exemplar to\nwhich it is made. But in our mind is the image of God, as Augustine\nsays (De Trin. xii, 4,7). Therefore God is the first object known to\nour mind.\n\n_On the contrary,_ \"No man hath seen God at any time\" (John 1:18).\n\n_I answer that,_ Since the human intellect in the present state of\nlife cannot understand even immaterial created substances (A. 1),\nmuch less can it understand the essence of the uncreated substance.\nHence it must be said simply that God is not the first object of our\nknowledge. Rather do we know God through creatures, according to the\nApostle (Rom. 1:20), \"the invisible things of God are clearly seen,\nbeing understood by the things that are made\": while the first object\nof our knowledge in this life is the \"quiddity of a material thing,\"\nwhich is the proper object of our intellect, as appears above in many\npassages (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 8; Q. 87, A. 2, ad 2)\n\nReply Obj. 1: We see and judge of all things in the light of the\nfirst truth, forasmuch as the light itself of our mind, whether\nnatural or gratuitous, is nothing else than the impression of the\nfirst truth upon it, as stated above (Q. 12, A. 2). Hence, as the\nlight itself of our intellect is not the object it understands, much\nless can it be said that God is the first object known by our\nintellect.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The axiom, \"Whatever causes a thing to be such is more\nso,\" must be understood of things belonging to one and the same\norder, as explained above (Q. 81, A. 2, ad 3). Other things than God\nare known because of God; not as if He were the first known object,\nbut because He is the first cause of our faculty of knowledge.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If there existed in our souls a perfect image of God,\nas the Son is the perfect image of the Father, our mind would know\nGod at once. But the image in our mind is imperfect; hence the\nargument does not prove.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 89\n\nOF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the knowledge of the separated soul. Under this\nhead there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the soul separated from the body can understand?\n\n(2) Whether it understands separate substances?\n\n(3) Whether it understands all natural things?\n\n(4) Whether it understands individuals and singulars?\n\n(5) Whether the habits of knowledge acquired in this life remain?\n\n(6) Whether the soul can use the habit of knowledge here acquired?\n\n(7) Whether local distance impedes the separated soul's knowledge?\n\n(8) Whether souls separated from the body know what happens here?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Separated Soul Can Understand Anything?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the soul separated from the body can\nunderstand nothing at all. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4)\nthat \"the understanding is corrupted together with its interior\nprinciple.\" But by death all human interior principles are corrupted.\nTherefore also the intellect itself is corrupted.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the human soul is hindered from understanding when\nthe senses are tied, and by a distracted imagination, as explained\nabove (Q. 84, AA. 7,8). But death destroys the senses and\nimagination, as we have shown above (Q. 77, A. 8). Therefore after\ndeath the soul understands nothing.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the separated soul can understand, this must be\nby means of some species. But it does not understand by means of\ninnate species, because it has none such; being at first \"like a\ntablet on which nothing is written\": nor does it understand by\nspecies abstracted from things, for it does not then possess organs\nof sense and imagination which are necessary for the abstraction of\nspecies: nor does it understand by means of species, formerly\nabstracted and retained in the soul; for if that were so, a child's\nsoul would have no means of understanding at all: nor does it\nunderstand by means of intelligible species divinely infused, for\nsuch knowledge would not be natural, such as we treat of now, but the\neffect of grace. Therefore the soul apart from the body understands\nnothing.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima i, 1), \"If the soul\nhad no proper operation, it could not be separated from the body.\"\nBut the soul is separated from the body; therefore it has a proper\noperation and above all, that which consists in intelligence.\nTherefore the soul can understand when it is apart from the body.\n\n_I answer that,_ The difficulty in solving this question arises from\nthe fact that the soul united to the body can understand only by\nturning to the phantasms, as experience shows. Did this not proceed\nfrom the soul's very nature, but accidentally through its being bound\nup with the body, as the Platonists said, the difficulty would\nvanish; for in that case when the body was once removed, the soul\nwould at once return to its own nature, and would understand\nintelligible things simply, without turning to the phantasms, as is\nexemplified in the case of other separate substances. In that case,\nhowever, the union of soul and body would not be for the soul's good,\nfor evidently it would understand worse in the body than out of it;\nbut for the good of the body, which would be unreasonable, since\nmatter exists on account of the form, and not the form for the sake\nof matter. But if we admit that the nature of the soul requires it\nto understand by turning to the phantasms, it will seem, since death\ndoes not change its nature, that it can then naturally understand\nnothing; as the phantasms are wanting to which it may turn.\n\nTo solve this difficulty we must consider that as nothing acts except\nso far as it is actual, the mode of action in every agent follows from\nits mode of existence. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the\nbody, and another when apart from it, its nature remaining always the\nsame; but this does not mean that its union with the body is an\naccidental thing, for, on the contrary, such union belongs to its very\nnature, just as the nature of a light object is not changed, when it\nis in its proper place, which is natural to it, and outside its proper\nplace, which is beside its nature. The soul, therefore, when united to\nthe body, consistently with that mode of existence, has a mode of\nunderstanding, by turning to corporeal phantasms, which are in\ncorporeal organs; but when it is separated from the body, it has a\nmode of understanding, by turning to simply intelligible objects, as\nis proper to other separate substances. Hence it is as natural for the\nsoul to understand by turning to the phantasms as it is for it to be\njoined to the body; but to be separated from the body is not in\naccordance with its nature, and likewise to understand without turning\nto the phantasms is not natural to it; and hence it is united to the\nbody in order that it may have an existence and an operation suitable\nto its nature. But here again a difficulty arises. For since nature is\nalways ordered to what is best, and since it is better to understand\nby turning to simply intelligible objects than by turning to the\nphantasms; God should have ordered the soul's nature so that the\nnobler way of understanding would have been natural to it, and it\nwould not have needed the body for that purpose.\n\nIn order to resolve this difficulty we must consider that while it is\ntrue that it is nobler in itself to understand by turning to something\nhigher than to understand by turning to phantasms, nevertheless such a\nmode of understanding was not so perfect as regards what was possible\nto the soul. This will appear if we consider that every intellectual\nsubstance possesses intellective power by the influence of the Divine\nlight, which is one and simple in its first principle, and the farther\noff intellectual creatures are from the first principle so much the\nmore is the light divided and diversified, as is the case with lines\nradiating from the centre of a circle. Hence it is that God by His one\nEssence understands all things; while the superior intellectual\nsubstances understand by means of a number of species, which\nnevertheless are fewer and more universal and bestow a deeper\ncomprehension of things, because of the efficaciousness of the\nintellectual power of such natures: whereas the inferior intellectual\nnatures possess a greater number of species, which are less universal,\nand bestow a lower degree of comprehension, in proportion as they\nrecede from the intellectual power of the higher natures. If,\ntherefore, the inferior substances received species in the same degree\nof universality as the superior substances, since they are not so\nstrong in understanding, the knowledge which they would derive through\nthem would be imperfect, and of a general and confused nature. We can\nsee this to a certain extent in man, for those who are of weaker\nintellect fail to acquire perfect knowledge through the universal\nconceptions of those who have a better understanding, unless things\nare explained to them singly and in detail. Now it is clear that in\nthe natural order human souls hold the lowest place among intellectual\nsubstances. But the perfection of the universe required various grades\nof being. If, therefore, God had willed souls to understand in the\nsame way as separate substances, it would follow that human knowledge,\nso far from being perfect, would be confused and general. Therefore to\nmake it possible for human souls to possess perfect and proper\nknowledge, they were so made that their nature required them to be\njoined to bodies, and thus to receive the proper and adequate\nknowledge of sensible things from the sensible things themselves; thus\nwe see in the case of uneducated men that they have to be taught by\nsensible examples.\n\nIt is clear then that it was for the soul's good that it was united\nto a body, and that it understands by turning to the phantasms.\nNevertheless it is possible for it to exist apart from the body, and\nalso to understand in another way.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher's words carefully examined will show\nthat he said this on the previous supposition that understanding is a\nmovement of body and soul as united, just as sensation is, for he had\nnot as yet explained the difference between intellect and sense. We\nmay also say that he is referring to the way of understanding by\nturning to phantasms. This is also the meaning of the second\nobjection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The separated soul does not understand by way of\ninnate species, nor by species abstracted then, nor only by species\nretained, and this the objection proves; but the soul in that state\nunderstands by means of participated species arising from the\ninfluence of the Divine light, shared by the soul as by other\nseparate substances; though in a lesser degree. Hence as soon as it\nceases to act by turning to corporeal (phantasms), the soul turns at\nonce to the superior things; nor is this way of knowledge unnatural,\nfor God is the author of the influx of both of the light of grace\nand of the light of nature.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Separated Soul Understands Separate Substances?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not\nunderstand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when\njoined to the body than when existing apart from it, being an\nessential part of human nature; and every part of a whole is more\nperfect when it exists in that whole. But the soul in the body does\nnot understand separate substances as shown above (Q. 88, A. 1).\nTherefore much less is it able to do so when apart from the body.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is known is known either by its presence or\nby its species. But separate substances cannot be known to the soul\nby their presence, for God alone can enter into the soul; nor by\nmeans of species abstracted by the soul from an angel, for an angel\nis more simple than a soul. Therefore the separated soul cannot at\nall understand separate substances.\n\nObj. 3: Further, some philosophers said that the ultimate happiness\nof man consists in the knowledge of separate substances. If,\ntherefore, the separated soul can understand separate substances, its\nhappiness would be secured by its separation alone; which cannot be\nreasonably be said.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Souls apart from the body know other separated\nsouls; as we see in the case of the rich man in hell, who saw Lazarus\nand Abraham (Luke 16:23). Therefore separated souls see the devils\nand the angels.\n\n_I answer that,_ Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 3), \"our mind acquires\nthe knowledge of incorporeal things by itself\"--i.e. by knowing\nitself (Q. 88, A. 1, ad 1). Therefore from the knowledge which the\nseparated soul has of itself, we can judge how it knows other\nseparate things. Now it was said above (A. 1), that as long as it is\nunited to the body the soul understands by turning to phantasms, and\ntherefore it does not understand itself save through becoming\nactually intelligent by means of ideas abstracted from phantasms;\nfor thus it understands itself through its own act, as shown above\n(Q. 87, A. 1). When, however, it is separated from the body, it\nunderstands no longer by turning to phantasms, but by turning to\nsimply intelligible objects; hence in that state it understands\nitself through itself. Now, every separate substance \"understands\nwhat is above itself and what is below itself, according to the mode\nof its substance\" (De Causis viii): for a thing is understood\naccording as it is in the one who understands; while one thing is in\nanother according to the nature of that in which it is. And the mode\nof existence of a separated soul is inferior to that of an angel, but\nis the same as that of other separated souls. Therefore the soul\napart from the body has perfect knowledge of other separated souls,\nbut it has an imperfect and defective knowledge of the angels so far\nas its natural knowledge is concerned. But the knowledge of glory is\notherwise.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The separated soul is, indeed, less perfect considering\nits nature in which it communicates with the nature of the body: but\nit has a greater freedom of intelligence, since the weight and care\nof the body is a clog upon the clearness of its intelligence in the\npresent life.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The separated soul understands the angels by means of\ndivinely impressed ideas; which, however, fail to give perfect\nknowledge of them, forasmuch as the nature of the soul is inferior to\nthat of an angel.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man's ultimate happiness consists not in the knowledge\nof any separate substances; but in the knowledge of God, Who is seen\nonly by grace. The knowledge of other separate substances if\nperfectly understood gives great happiness--not final and ultimate\nhappiness. But the separated soul does not understand them perfectly,\nas was shown above in this article.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Separated Soul Knows All Natural Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the separated soul knows all natural\nthings. For the types of all natural things exist in separate\nsubstances. Therefore, as separated souls know separate substances,\nthey also know all natural things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whoever understands the greater intelligible, will\nbe able much more to understand the lesser intelligible. But the\nseparated soul understands immaterial substances, which are in the\nhighest degree of intelligibility. Therefore much more can it\nunderstand all natural things which are in a lower degree of\nintelligibility.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The devils have greater natural knowledge than the\nseparated soul; yet they do not know all natural things, but have to\nlearn many things by long experience, as Isidore says (De Summo Bono\ni). Therefore neither can the separated soul know all natural things.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the separated soul, like the\nangels, understands by means of species, received from the influence\nof the Divine light. Nevertheless, as the soul by nature is inferior\nto an angel, to whom this kind of knowledge is natural, the soul\napart from the body through such species does not receive perfect\nknowledge, but only a general and confused kind of knowledge.\nSeparated souls, therefore, have the same relation through such\nspecies to imperfect and confused knowledge of natural things as the\nangels have to the perfect knowledge thereof. Now angels through such\nspecies know all natural things perfectly; because all that God has\nproduced in the respective natures of natural things has been\nproduced by Him in the angelic intelligence, as Augustine says (Gen.\nad lit. ii, 8). Hence it follows that separated souls know all\nnatural things not with a certain and proper knowledge, but in a\ngeneral and confused manner.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Even an angel does not understand all natural things\nthrough his substance, but through certain species, as stated above\n(Q. 87, A. 1). So it does not follow that the soul knows all natural\nthings because it knows separate substances after a fashion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the soul separated from the body does not perfectly\nunderstand separate substances, so neither does it know all natural\nthings perfectly; but it knows them confusedly, as above explained in\nthis article.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Isidore speaks of the knowledge of the future which\nneither angels, nor demons, nor separated souls, know except so far\nas future things pre-exist in their causes or are known by Divine\nrevelation. But we are here treating of the knowledge of natural\nthings.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Knowledge acquired here by study is proper and perfect;\nthe knowledge of which we speak is confused. Hence it does not follow\nthat to study in order to learn is useless.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Separated Soul Knows Singulars?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not know\nsingulars. For no cognitive power besides the intellect remains in\nthe separated soul, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 77,\nA. 8). But the intellect cannot know singulars, as we have shown (Q.\n86, A. 1). Therefore the separated soul cannot know singulars.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the knowledge of the singular is more determinate\nthan knowledge of the universal. But the separated soul has no\ndeterminate knowledge of the species of natural things, therefore\nmuch less can it know singulars.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if it knew the singulars, yet not by sense, for the\nsame reason it would know all singulars. But it does not know all\nsingulars. Therefore it knows none.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The rich man in hell said: \"I have five brethren\"\n(Luke 16:28).\n\n_I answer that,_ Separated souls know some singulars, but not all,\nnot even all present singulars. To understand this, we must consider\nthat there is a twofold way of knowing things, one by means of\nabstraction from phantasms, and in this way singulars cannot be\ndirectly known by the intellect, but only indirectly, as stated above\n(Q. 86, A. 1). The other way of understanding is by the infusion of\nspecies by God, and in that way it is possible for the intellect to\nknow singulars. For as God knows all things, universal and singular,\nby His Essence, as the cause of universal and individual principles\n(Q. 14, A. 2), so likewise separate substances can know singulars by\nspecies which are a kind of participated similitude of the Divine\nEssence. There is a difference, however, between angels and separated\nsouls in the fact that through these species the angels have a\nperfect and proper knowledge of things; whereas separated souls have\nonly a confused knowledge. Hence the angels, by reason of their\nperfect intellect, through these species, know not only the specific\nnatures of things, but also the singulars contained in those species;\nwhereas separated souls by these species know only those singulars to\nwhich they are determined by former knowledge in this life, or by\nsome affection, or by natural aptitude, or by the disposition of the\nDivine order; because whatever is received into anything is\nconditioned according to the mode of the recipient.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The intellect does not know the singular by way of\nabstraction; neither does the separated soul know it thus; but as\nexplained above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The knowledge of the separated soul is confined to\nthose species or individuals to which the soul has some kind of\ndeterminate relation, as we have said.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The separated soul has not the same relation to all\nsingulars, but one relation to some, and another to others. Therefore\nthere is not the same reason why it should know all singulars.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Habit of Knowledge Here Acquired Remains in the Separated\nSoul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the habit of knowledge acquired in\nthis life does not remain in the soul separated from the body: for\nthe Apostle says: \"Knowledge shall be destroyed\" (1 Cor. 13:8).\n\nObj. 2: Further, some in this world who are less good enjoy knowledge\ndenied to others who are better. If, therefore, the habit of\nknowledge remained in the soul after death, it would follow that some\nwho are less good would, even in the future life, excel some who are\nbetter; which seems unreasonable.\n\nObj. 3: Further, separated souls will possess knowledge by influence\nof the Divine light. Supposing, therefore, that knowledge here\nacquired remained in the separated soul, it would follow that two\nforms of the same species would co-exist in the same subject which\ncannot be.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Praedic. vi, 4, 5), that \"a\nhabit is a quality hard to remove: yet sometimes knowledge is\ndestroyed by sickness or the like.\" But in this life there is no\nchange so thorough as death. Therefore it seems that the habit of\nknowledge is destroyed by death.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (Ep. liii, ad Paulinum), \"Let us learn\non earth that kind of knowledge which will remain with us in heaven.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Some say that the habit of knowledge resides not in\nthe intellect itself, but in the sensitive powers, namely, the\nimaginative, cogitative, and memorative, and that the intelligible\nspecies are not kept in the passive intellect. If this were true, it\nwould follow that when the body is destroyed by death, knowledge here\nacquired would also be entirely destroyed.\n\nBut, since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is \"the abode\nof species,\" as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4), the habit of\nknowledge here acquired must be partly in the aforesaid sensitive\npowers and partly in the intellect. This can be seen by considering\nthe very actions from which knowledge arises. For \"habits are like the\nactions whereby they are acquired\" (Ethic. ii, 1). Now the actions of\nthe intellect, by which knowledge is here acquired, are performed by\nthe mind turning to the phantasms in the aforesaid sensitive powers.\nHence through such acts the passive intellect acquires a certain\nfacility in considering the species received: and the aforesaid\nsensitive powers acquire a certain aptitude in seconding the action\nof the intellect when it turns to them to consider the intelligible\nobject. But as the intellectual act resides chiefly and formally in\nthe intellect itself, whilst it resides materially and dispositively\nin the inferior powers, the same distinction is to be applied to\nhabit.\n\nKnowledge, therefore, acquired in the present life does not remain in\nthe separated soul, as regards what belongs to the sensitive powers;\nbut as regards what belongs to the intellect itself, it must remain;\nbecause, as the Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii), a form\nmay be corrupted in two ways; first, directly, when corrupted by its\ncontrary, as heat, by cold; and secondly, indirectly, when its\nsubject is corrupted. Now it is evident that human knowledge is not\ncorrupted through corruption of the subject, for the intellect is an\nincorruptible faculty, as above stated (Q. 79, A. 2, ad 2). Neither\ncan the intelligible species in the passive intellect be corrupted\nby their contrary; for there is no contrary to intelligible\n\"intentions,\" above all as regards simple intelligence of \"what a\nthing is.\" But contrariety may exist in the intellect as regards\nmental composition and division, or also reasoning; so far as what\nis false in statement or argument is contrary to truth. And thus\nknowledge may be corrupted by its contrary when a false argument\nseduces anyone from the knowledge of truth. For this reason the\nPhilosopher in the above work mentions two ways in which knowledge\nis corrupted directly: namely, \"forgetfulness\" on the part of the\nmemorative power, and \"deception\" on the part of a false argument.\nBut these have no place in the separated soul. Therefore we must\nconclude that the habit of knowledge, so far as it is in the\nintellect, remains in the separated soul.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Apostle is not speaking of knowledge as a habit,\nbut as to the act of knowing; and hence he says, in proof of the\nassertion quoted, \"Now, I know in part.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: As a less good man may exceed a better man in bodily\nstature, so the same kind of man may have a habit of knowledge in the\nfuture life which a better man may not have. Such knowledge, however,\ncannot be compared with the other prerogatives enjoyed by the better\nman.\n\nReply Obj. 3: These two kinds of knowledge are not of the same\nspecies, so there is no impossibility.\n\nReply Obj. 4: This objection considers the corruption of knowledge on\nthe part of the sensitive powers.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Act of Knowledge Acquired Here Remains in the Separated\nSoul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired\ndoes not remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (De\nAnima i, 4), that when the body is corrupted, \"the soul neither\nremembers nor loves.\" But to consider what is previously known is an\nact of memory. Therefore the separated soul cannot retain an act of\nknowledge here acquired.\n\nObj. 2: Further, intelligible species cannot have greater power in\nthe separated soul than they have in the soul united to the body. But\nin this life we cannot understand by intelligible species without\nturning to phantasms, as shown above (Q. 84, A. 7). Therefore the\nseparated soul cannot do so, and thus it cannot understand at all by\nintelligible species acquired in this life.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), that \"habits\nproduce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired.\" But the\nhabit of knowledge is acquired here by acts of the intellect turning\nto phantasms: therefore it cannot produce any other acts. These acts,\nhowever, are not adapted to the separated soul. Therefore the soul in\nthe state of separation cannot produce any act of knowledge acquired\nin this life.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It was said to Dives in hell (Luke 16:25):\n\"Remember thou didst receive good things in thy lifetime.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Action offers two things for our consideration--its\nspecies and its mode. Its species comes from the object, whereto the\nfaculty of knowledge is directed by the (intelligible) species, which\nis the object's similitude; whereas the mode is gathered from the\npower of the agent. Thus that a person see a stone is due to the\nspecies of the stone in his eye; but that he see it clearly, is due\nto the eye's visual power. Therefore as the intelligible species\nremain in the separated soul, as stated above (A. 5), and since the\nstate of the separated soul is not the same as it is in this life, it\nfollows that through the intelligible species acquired in this life\nthe soul apart from the body can understand what it understood\nformerly, but in a different way; not by turning to phantasms, but by\na mode suited to a soul existing apart from the body. Thus the act of\nknowledge here acquired remains in the separated soul, but in a\ndifferent way.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher speaks of remembrance, according as\nmemory belongs to the sensitive part, but not as belonging in a way\nto the intellect, as explained above (Q. 79, A. 6).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The different mode of intelligence is produced by the\ndifferent state of the intelligent soul; not by diversity of species.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The acts which produce a habit are like the acts caused\nby that habit, in species, but not in mode. For example, to do just\nthings, but not justly, that is, pleasurably, causes the habit of\npolitical justice, whereby we act pleasurably. (Cf. Aristotle, Ethic.\nv, 8: Magn. Moral. i, 34).\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Local Distance Impedes the Knowledge in the Separated Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that local distance impedes the separated\nsoul's knowledge. For Augustine says (De Cura pro Mort. xiii), that\n\"the souls of the dead are where they cannot know what is done here.\"\nBut they know what is done among themselves. Therefore local distance\nimpedes the knowledge in the separated soul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Divin. Daemon. iii), that \"the\ndemons' rapidity of movement enables them to tell things unknown to\nus.\" But agility of movement would be useless in that respect unless\ntheir knowledge was impeded by local distance; which, therefore, is a\nmuch greater hindrance to the knowledge of the separated soul, whose\nnature is inferior to the demon's.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as there is distance of place, so is there distance\nof time. But distance of time impedes knowledge in the separated\nsoul, for the soul is ignorant of the future. Therefore it seems that\ndistance of place also impedes its knowledge.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Luke 16:23), that Dives, \"lifting\nup his eyes when he was in torment, saw Abraham afar off.\" Therefore\nlocal distance does not impede knowledge in the separated soul.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have held that the separated soul knows the\nsingular by abstraction from the sensible. If that were so, it might\nbe that local distance would impede its knowledge; for either the\nsensible would need to act upon the soul, or the soul upon the\nsensible, and in either case a determinate distance would be\nnecessary. This is, however, impossible because abstraction of the\nspecies from the sensible is done through the senses and other\nsensible faculties which do not remain actually in the soul apart\nfrom the body. But the soul when separated understands singulars by\nspecies derived from the Divine light, which is indifferent to what\nis near or distant. Hence knowledge in the separated soul is not\nhindered by local distance.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine says that the souls of the departed cannot\nsee what is done here, not because they are \"there,\" as if impeded by\nlocal distance; but for some other cause, as we shall explain (A. 8).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Augustine speaks there in accordance with the opinion\nthat demons have bodies naturally united to them, and so have\nsensitive powers, which require local distance. In the same book he\nexpressly sets down this opinion, though apparently rather by way of\nnarration than of assertion, as we may gather from _De Civ. Dei_ xxi,\n10.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The future, which is distant in time, does not actually\nexist, and therefore is not knowable in itself, because so far as a\nthing falls short of being, so far does it fall short of being\nknowable. But what is locally distant exists actually, and is\nknowable in itself. Hence we cannot argue from distance of time to\ndistance of place.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Separated Souls Know What Takes Place on Earth?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that separated souls know what takes place\non earth; for otherwise they would have no care for it, as they have,\naccording to what Dives said (Luke 16:27, 28), \"I have five brethren\n. . . he may testify unto them, lest they also come into the place of\ntorments.\" Therefore separated souls know what passes on earth.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the dead often appear to the living, asleep or\nawake, and tell them of what takes place there; as Samuel appeared to\nSaul (1 Kings 28:11). But this could not be unless they knew what\ntakes place here. Therefore they know what takes place on earth.\n\nObj. 3: Further, separated souls know what happens among themselves.\nIf, therefore, they do not know what takes place among us, it must be\nby reason of local distance; which has been shown to be false (A. 7).\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 14:21): \"He will not understand\nwhether his children come to honor or dishonor.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ By natural knowledge, of which we are treating now,\nthe souls of the dead do not know what passes on earth. This follows\nfrom what has been laid down (A. 4), since the separated soul has\nknowledge of singulars, by being in a way determined to them, either\nby some vestige of previous knowledge or affection, or by the Divine\norder. Now the souls departed are in a state of separation from the\nliving, both by Divine order and by their mode of existence, whilst\nthey are joined to the world of incorporeal spiritual substances; and\nhence they are ignorant of what goes on among us. Whereof Gregory\ngives the reason thus: \"The dead do not know how the living act, for\nthe life of the spirit is far from the life of the flesh; and so, as\ncorporeal things differ from incorporeal in genus, so they are\ndistinct in knowledge\" (Moral. xii). Augustine seems to say the same\n(De Cura pro Mort. xiii), when he asserts that, \"the souls of the\ndead have no concern in the affairs of the living.\"\n\nGregory and Augustine, however, seem to be divided in opinion as\nregards the souls of the blessed in heaven, for Gregory continues the\npassage above quoted: \"The case of the holy souls is different, for\nsince they see the light of Almighty God, we cannot believe that\nexternal things are unknown to them.\" But Augustine (De Cura pro\nMort. xiii) expressly says: \"The dead, even the saints do not know\nwhat is done by the living or by their own children,\" as a gloss\nquotes on the text, \"Abraham hath not known us\" (Isa. 63:16). He\nconfirms this opinion by saying that he was not visited, nor consoled\nin sorrow by his mother, as when she was alive; and he could not\nthink it possible that she was less kind when in a happier state; and\nagain by the fact that the Lord promised to king Josias that he\nshould die, lest he should see his people's afflictions (4 Kings\n22:20). Yet Augustine says this in doubt; and premises, \"Let every\none take, as he pleases, what I say.\" Gregory, on the other hand, is\npositive, since he says, \"We cannot believe.\" His opinion, indeed,\nseems to be the more probable one--that the souls of the blessed who\nsee God do know all that passes here. For they are equal to the\nangels, of whom Augustine says that they know what happens among\nthose living on earth. But as the souls of the blessed are most\nperfectly united to Divine justice, they do not suffer from sorrow,\nnor do they interfere in mundane affairs, except in accordance with\nDivine justice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The souls of the departed may care for the living, even\nif ignorant of their state; just as we care for the dead by pouring\nforth prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of their state.\nMoreover, the affairs of the living can be made known to them not\nimmediately, but the souls who pass hence thither, or by angels and\ndemons, or even by \"the revelation of the Holy Ghost,\" as Augustine\nsays in the same book.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That the dead appear to the living in any way whatever\nis either by the special dispensation of God; in order that the souls\nof the dead may interfere in affairs of the living--and this is to be\naccounted as miraculous. Or else such apparitions occur through the\ninstrumentality of bad or good angels, without the knowledge of the\ndeparted; as may likewise happen when the living appear, without\ntheir own knowledge, to others living, as Augustine says in the same\nbook. And so it may be said of Samuel that he appeared through Divine\nrevelation; according to Ecclus. 46:23, \"he slept, and told the king\nthe end of his life.\" Or, again, this apparition was procured by the\ndemons; unless, indeed, the authority of Ecclesiasticus be set aside\nthrough not being received by the Jews as canonical Scripture.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This kind of ignorance does not proceed from the\nobstacle of local distance, but from the cause mentioned above.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 90\n\nOF THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF MAN'S SOUL\n(In Four Articles)\n\nAfter the foregoing we must consider the first production of man,\nconcerning which there are four subjects of treatment:\n\n(1) the production of man himself;\n\n(2) the end of this production;\n\n(3) the state and condition of the first man;\n\n(4) the place of his abode.\n\nConcerning the production of man, there are three things to be\nconsidered:\n\n(1) the production of man's soul;\n\n(2) the production of man's body;\n\n(3) the production of the woman.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether man's soul was something made, or was of the Divine\nsubstance?\n\n(2) Whether, if made, it was created?\n\n(3) Whether it was made by angelic instrumentality?\n\n(4) Whether it was made before the body?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 90, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Soul Was Made or Was of God's Substance?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the soul was not made, but was God's\nsubstance. For it is written (Gen. 2:7): \"God formed man of the slime\nof the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man\nwas made a living soul.\" But he who breathes sends forth something of\nhimself. Therefore the soul, whereby man lives, is of the Divine\nsubstance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as above explained (Q. 75, A. 5), the soul is a\nsimple form. But a form is an act. Therefore the soul is a pure act;\nwhich applies to God alone. Therefore the soul is of God's substance.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things that exist and do [not] differ are the same.\nBut God and the mind exist, and in no way differ, for they could only\nbe differentiated by certain differences, and thus would be\ncomposite. Therefore God and the human mind are the same.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Orig. Animae iii, 15) mentions\ncertain opinions which he calls \"exceedingly and evidently perverse,\nand contrary to the Catholic Faith,\" among which the first is the\nopinion that \"God made the soul not out of nothing, but from Himself.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ To say that the soul is of the Divine substance\ninvolves a manifest improbability. For, as is clear from what has\nbeen said (Q. 77, A. 2; Q. 79, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 6), the human soul\nis sometimes in a state of potentiality to the act of intelligence\n--acquires its knowledge somehow from things--and thus has various\npowers; all of which are incompatible with the Divine Nature, Which\nis a pure act--receives nothing from any other--and admits of no\nvariety in itself, as we have proved (Q. 3, AA. 1, 7; Q. 9, A. 1).\n\nThis error seems to have originated from two statements of the\nancients. For those who first began to observe the nature of things,\nbeing unable to rise above their imagination, supposed that nothing\nbut bodies existed. Therefore they said that God was a body, which\nthey considered to be the principle of other bodies. And since they\nheld that the soul was of the same nature as that body which they\nregarded as the first principle, as is stated _De Anima_ i, 2, it\nfollowed that the soul was of the nature of God Himself. According\nto this supposition, also, the Manichaeans, thinking that God was\ncorporeal light, held that the soul was part of that light bound up\nwith the body.\n\nThen a further step in advance was made, and some surmised the\nexistence of something incorporeal, not apart from the body, but the\nform of a body; so that Varro said, \"God is a soul governing the\nworld by movement and reason,\" as Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei vii,\n6 [*The words as quoted are to be found iv. 31.]). So some supposed\nman's soul to be part of that one soul, as man is a part of the whole\nworld; for they were unable to go so far as to understand the\ndifferent degrees of spiritual substance, except according to the\ndistinction of bodies.\n\nBut, all these theories are impossible, as proved above (Q. 3, AA. 1,\n8; and Q. 75, A. 1), wherefore it is evidently false that the soul is\nof the substance of God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The term \"breathe\" is not to be taken in the material\nsense; but as regards the act of God, to breathe (spirare), is the\nsame as to _make a spirit._ Moreover, in the material sense, man by\nbreathing does not send forth anything of his own substance, but an\nextraneous thing.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although the soul is a simple form in its essence, yet\nit is not its own existence, but is a being by participation, as\nabove explained (Q. 75, A. 5, ad 4). Therefore it is not a pure act\nlike God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That which differs, properly speaking, differs in\nsomething; wherefore we seek for difference where we find also\nresemblance. For this reason things which differ must in some way be\ncompound; since they differ in something, and in something resemble\neach other. In this sense, although all that differ are diverse, yet\nall things that are diverse do not differ. For simple things are\ndiverse; yet do not differ from one another by differences which\nenter into their composition. For instance, a man and a horse differ\nby the difference of rational and irrational; but we cannot say that\nthese again differ by some further difference.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 90, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Soul Was Produced by Creation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the soul was not produced by\ncreation. For that which has in itself something material is produced\nfrom matter. But the soul is in part material, since it is not a pure\nact. Therefore the soul was made of matter; and hence it was not\ncreated.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every actuality of matter is educed from the\npotentiality of that matter; for since matter is in potentiality to\nact, any act pre-exists in matter potentially. But the soul is the\nact of corporeal matter, as is clear from its definition. Therefore\nthe soul is educed from the potentiality of matter.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the soul is a form. Therefore, if the soul is\ncreated, all other forms also are created. Thus no forms would come\ninto existence by generation; which is not true.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:27): \"God created man to His\nown image.\" But man is like to God in his soul. Therefore the soul\nwas created.\n\n_I answer that,_ The rational soul can be made only by creation;\nwhich, however, is not true of other forms. The reason is because,\nsince to be made is the way to existence, a thing must be made in\nsuch a way as is suitable to its mode of existence. Now that properly\nexists which itself has existence; as it were, subsisting in its own\nexistence. Wherefore only substances are properly and truly called\nbeings; whereas an accident has not existence, but something is\n(modified) by it, and so far is it called a being; for instance,\nwhiteness is called a being, because by it something is white. Hence\nit is said _Metaph._ vii, Did. vi, 1 that an accident should be\ndescribed as \"of something rather than as something.\" The same is to\nbe said of all non-subsistent forms. Therefore, properly speaking,\nit does not belong to any non-existing form to be made; but such are\nsaid to be made through the composite substances being made. On the\nother hand, the rational soul is a subsistent form, as above\nexplained (Q. 75, A. 2). Wherefore it is competent to be and to be\nmade. And since it cannot be made of pre-existing matter--whether\ncorporeal, which would render it a corporeal being--or spiritual,\nwhich would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into\nanother, we must conclude that it cannot exist except by creation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The soul's simple essence is as the material element,\nwhile its participated existence is its formal element; which\nparticipated existence necessarily co-exists with the soul's essence,\nbecause existence naturally follows the form. The same reason holds\nif the soul is supposed to be composed of some spiritual matter, as\nsome maintain; because the said matter is not in potentiality to\nanother form, as neither is the matter of a celestial body; otherwise\nthe soul would be corruptible. Wherefore the soul cannot in any way\nbe made of pre-existent matter.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The production of act from the potentiality of matter\nis nothing else but something becoming actually that previously was\nin potentiality. But since the rational soul does not depend in its\nexistence on corporeal matter, and is subsistent, and exceeds the\ncapacity of corporeal matter, as we have seen (Q. 75, A. 2), it is\nnot educed from the potentiality of matter.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As we have said, there is no comparison between the\nrational soul and other forms.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 90, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Rational Soul Is Produced by God Immediately?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the rational soul is not immediately\nmade by God, but by the instrumentality of the angels. For spiritual\nthings have more order than corporeal things. But inferior bodies are\nproduced by means of the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).\nTherefore also the inferior spirits, who are the rational souls, are\nproduced by means of the superior spirits, the angels.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning of things; for\nGod is the beginning and end of all. Therefore the issue of things\nfrom their beginning corresponds to the forwarding of them to their\nend. But \"inferior things are forwarded by the higher,\" as Dionysius\nsays (Eccl. Hier. v); therefore also the inferior are produced into\nexistence by the higher, and souls by angels.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"perfect is that which can produce its like,\" as is\nstated _Metaph._ v. But spiritual substances are much more perfect\nthan corporeal. Therefore, since bodies produce their like in their\nown species, much more are angels able to produce something\nspecifically inferior to themselves; and such is the rational soul.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:7) that God Himself\n\"breathed into the face of man the breath of life.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have held that angels, acting by the power of\nGod, produce rational souls. But this is quite impossible, and is\nagainst faith. For it has been proved that the rational soul cannot\nbe produced except by creation. Now, God alone can create; for the\nfirst agent alone can act without presupposing the existence of\nanything; while the second cause always presupposes something derived\nfrom the first cause, as above explained (Q. 75, A. 3): and every\nagent, that presupposes something to its act, acts by making a change\ntherein. Therefore everything else acts by producing a change,\nwhereas God alone acts by creation. Since, therefore, the rational\nsoul cannot be produced by a change in matter, it cannot be produced,\nsave immediately by God.\n\nThus the replies to the objections are clear. For that bodies produce\ntheir like or something inferior to themselves, and that the higher\nthings lead forward the inferior--all these things are effected\nthrough a certain transmutation.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 90, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Human Soul Was Produced Before the Body?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the human soul was made before the\nbody. For the work of creation preceded the work of distinction and\nadornment, as shown above (Q. 66, A. 1; Q. 70, A. 1). But the soul\nwas made by creation; whereas the body was made at the end of the\nwork of adornment. Therefore the soul of man was made before the body.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the rational soul has more in common with the angels\nthan with the brute animals. But angels were created before bodies,\nor at least, at the beginning with corporeal matter; whereas the body\nof man was formed on the sixth day, when also the animals were made.\nTherefore the soul of man was created before the body.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the end is proportionate to the beginning. But in\nthe end the soul outlasts the body. Therefore in the beginning it was\ncreated before the body.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The proper act is produced in its proper\npotentiality. Therefore since the soul is the proper act of the body,\nthe soul was produced in the body.\n\n_I answer that,_ Origen (Peri Archon i, 7,8) held that not only the\nsoul of the first man, but also the souls of all men were created at\nthe same time as the angels, before their bodies: because he thought\nthat all spiritual substances, whether souls or angels, are equal in\ntheir natural condition, and differ only by merit; so that some of\nthem--namely, the souls of men or of heavenly bodies--are united to\nbodies while others remain in their different orders entirely free\nfrom matter. Of this opinion we have already spoken (Q. 47, A. 2);\nand so we need say nothing about it here.\n\nAugustine, however (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), says that the soul of the\nfirst man was created at the same time as the angels, before the\nbody, for another reason; because he supposes that the body of man,\nduring the work of the six days, was produced, not actually, but\nonly as to some \"causal virtues\"; which cannot be said of the soul,\nbecause neither was it made of any pre-existing corporeal or\nspiritual matter, nor could it be produced from any created virtue.\nTherefore it seems that the soul itself, during the work of the six\ndays, when all things were made, was created, together with the\nangels; and that afterwards, by its own will, was joined to the\nservice of the body. But he does not say this by way of assertion; as\nhis words prove. For he says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 29): \"We may believe,\nif neither Scripture nor reason forbid, that man was made on the\nsixth day, in the sense that his body was created as to its causal\nvirtue in the elements of the world, but that the soul was already\ncreated.\"\n\nNow this could be upheld by those who hold that the soul has of\nitself a complete species and nature, and that it is not united to\nthe body as its form, but as its administrator. But if the soul is\nunited to the body as its form, and is naturally a part of human\nnature, the above supposition is quite impossible. For it is clear\nthat God made the first things in their perfect natural state, as\ntheir species required. Now the soul, as a part of human nature, has\nits natural perfection only as united to the body. Therefore it would\nhave been unfitting for the soul to be created without the body.\n\nTherefore, if we admit the opinion of Augustine about the work of the\nsix days (Q. 74, A. 2), we may say that the human soul preceded in\nthe work of the six days by a certain generic similitude, so far as\nit has intellectual nature in common with the angels; but was itself\ncreated at the same time as the body. According to the other saints,\nboth the body and soul of the first man were produced in the work of\nthe six days.\n\nReply Obj. 1: If the soul by its nature were a complete species, so\nthat it might be created as to itself, this reason would prove that\nthe soul was created by itself in the beginning. But as the soul is\nnaturally the form of the body, it was necessarily created, not\nseparately, but in the body.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The same observation applies to the second objection.\nFor if the soul had a species of itself it would have something still\nmore in common with the angels. But, as the form of the body, it\nbelongs to the animal genus, as a formal principle.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That the soul remains after the body, is due to a\ndefect of the body, namely, death. Which defect was not due when the\nsoul was first created.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 91\n\nTHE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY (FOUR ARTICLES)\n\nWe have now to consider the production of the first man's body. Under\nthis head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) The matter from which it was produced;\n\n(2) The author by whom it was produced;\n\n(3) The disposition it received in its production;\n\n(4) The mode and order of its production.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 91, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Body of the First Man Was Made of the Slime of the Earth?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the body of the first man was not made\nof the slime of the earth. For it is an act of greater power to make\nsomething out of nothing than out of something; because \"not being\" is\nfarther off from actual existence than \"being in potentiality.\" But\nsince man is the most honorable of God's lower creatures, it was\nfitting that in the production of man's body, the power of God should\nbe most clearly shown. Therefore it should not have been made of the\nslime of the earth, but out of nothing.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the heavenly bodies are nobler than earthly bodies.\nBut the human body has the greatest nobility; since it is perfected\nby the noblest form, which is the rational soul. Therefore it should\nnot be made of an earthly body, but of a heavenly body.\n\nObj. 3: Further, fire and air are nobler than earth and water, as is\nclear from their subtlety. Therefore, since the human body is most\nnoble, it should rather have been made of fire and air than of the\nslime of the earth.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the human body is composed of the four elements.\nTherefore it was not made of the slime of the earth, but of the four\nelements.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:7): \"God made man of the\nslime of the earth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As God is perfect in His works, He bestowed\nperfection on all of them according to their capacity: \"God's works\nare perfect\" (Deut. 32:4). He Himself is simply perfect by the fact\nthat \"all things are pre-contained\" in Him, not as component parts,\nbut as \"united in one simple whole,\" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v);\nin the same way as various effects pre-exist in their cause,\naccording to its one virtue. This perfection is bestowed on the\nangels, inasmuch as all things which are produced by God in nature\nthrough various forms come under their knowledge. But on man this\nperfection is bestowed in an inferior way. For he does not possess a\nnatural knowledge of all natural things, but is in a manner composed\nof all things, since he has in himself a rational soul of the genus\nof spiritual substances, and in likeness to the heavenly bodies he is\nremoved from contraries by an equable temperament. As to the\nelements, he has them in their very substance, yet in such a way that\nthe higher elements, fire and air, predominate in him by their power;\nfor life is mostly found where there is heat, which is from fire; and\nwhere there is humor, which is of the air. But the inferior elements\nabound in man by their substance; otherwise the mingling of elements\nwould not be evenly balanced, unless the inferior elements, which\nhave the less power, predominated in quantity. Therefore the body of\nman is said to have been formed from the slime of the earth; because\nearth and water mingled are called slime, and for this reason man is\ncalled \"a little world,\" because all creatures of the world are in a\nway to be found in him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The power of the Divine Creator was manifested in man's\nbody when its matter was produced by creation. But it was fitting\nthat the human body should be made of the four elements, that man\nmight have something in common with the inferior bodies, as being\nsomething between spiritual and corporeal substances.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although the heavenly body is in itself nobler than the\nearthly body, yet for the acts of the rational soul the heavenly body\nis less adapted. For the rational soul receives the knowledge of\ntruth in a certain way through the senses, the organs of which cannot\nbe formed of a heavenly body which is impassible. Nor is it true that\nsomething of the fifth essence enters materially into the composition\nof the human body, as some say, who suppose that the soul is united\nto the body by means of light. For, first of all, what they say is\nfalse--that light is a body. Secondly, it is impossible for something\nto be taken from the fifth essence, or from a heavenly body, and to\nbe mingled with the elements, since a heavenly body is impassible;\nwherefore it does not enter into the composition of mixed bodies,\nexcept as in the effects of its power.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If fire and air, whose action is of greater power,\npredominated also in quantity in the human body, they would entirely\ndraw the rest into themselves, and there would be no equality in the\nmingling, such as is required in the composition of man, for the\nsense of touch, which is the foundation of the other senses. For the\norgan of any particular sense must not actually have the contraries\nof which that sense has the perception, but only potentially; either\nin such a way that it is entirely void of the whole genus of such\ncontraries--thus, for instance, the pupil of the eye is without\ncolor, so as to be in potentiality as regards all colors; which is\nnot possible in the organ of touch, since it is composed of the very\nelements, the qualities of which are perceived by that sense--or so\nthat the organ is a medium between two contraries, as much needs be\nthe case with regard to touch; for the medium is in potentiality to\nthe extremes.\n\nReply Obj. 4: In the slime of the earth are earth, and water binding\nthe earth together. Of the other elements, Scripture makes no\nmention, because they are less in quantity in the human body, as we\nhave said; and because also in the account of the Creation no mention\nis made of fire and air, which are not perceived by senses of\nuncultured men such as those to whom the Scripture was immediately\naddressed.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 91, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Human Body Was Immediately Produced by God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the human body was not produced by God\nimmediately. For Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4), that \"corporeal\nthings are disposed by God through the angels.\" But the human body was\nmade of corporeal matter, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it\nwas produced by the instrumentality of the angels, and not immediately\nby God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever can be made by a created power, is not\nnecessarily produced immediately by God. But the human body can be\nproduced by the created power of a heavenly body; for even certain\nanimals are produced from putrefaction by the active power of a\nheavenly body; and Albumazar says that man is not generated where heat\nand cold are extreme, but only in temperate regions. Therefore the\nhuman body was not necessarily produced immediately by God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nothing is made of corporeal matter except by some\nmaterial change. But all corporeal change is caused by a movement of\na heavenly body, which is the first movement. Therefore, since the\nhuman body was produced from corporeal matter, it seems that a\nheavenly body had part in its production.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24) that man's\nbody was made during the work of the six days, according to the\ncausal virtues which God inserted in corporeal creatures; and that\nafterwards it was actually produced. But what pre-exists in the\ncorporeal creature by reason of causal virtues can be produced by\nsome corporeal body. Therefore the human body was produced by some\ncreated power, and not immediately by God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 17:1): \"God created man out\nof the earth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The first formation of the human body could not be\nby the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from\nGod. Some, indeed, supposed that the forms which are in corporeal\nmatter are derived from some immaterial forms; but the Philosopher\nrefutes this opinion (Metaph. vii), for the reason that forms cannot\nbe made in themselves, but only in the composite, as we have\nexplained (Q. 65, A. 4); and because the agent must be like its\neffect, it is not fitting that a pure form, not existing in matter,\nshould produce a form which is in matter, and which form is only made\nby the fact that the composite is made. So a form which is in matter\ncan only be the cause of another form that is in matter, according as\ncomposite is made by composite. Now God, though He is absolutely\nimmaterial, can alone by His own power produce matter by creation:\nwherefore He alone can produce a form in matter, without the aid of\nany preceding material form. For this reason the angels cannot\ntransform a body except by making use of something in the nature of a\nseed, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 19). Therefore as no\npre-existing body has been formed whereby another body of the same\nspecies could be generated, the first human body was of necessity\nmade immediately by God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the angels are the ministers of God, as\nregards what He does in bodies, yet God does something in bodies\nbeyond the angels' power, as, for instance, raising the dead, or\ngiving sight to the blind: and by this power He formed the body of\nthe first man from the slime of the earth. Nevertheless the angels\ncould act as ministers in the formation of the body of the first man,\nin the same way as they will do at the last resurrection by\ncollecting the dust.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Perfect animals, produced from seed, cannot be made by\nthe sole power of a heavenly body, as Avicenna imagined; although the\npower of a heavenly body may assist by co-operation in the work of\nnatural generation, as the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 26), \"man and\nthe sun beget man from matter.\" For this reason, a place of moderate\ntemperature is required for the production of man and other animals.\nBut the power of heavenly bodies suffices for the production of some\nimperfect animals from properly disposed matter: for it is clear that\nmore conditions are required to produce a perfect than an imperfect\nthing.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The movement of the heavens causes natural changes; but\nnot changes that surpass the order of nature, and are caused by the\nDivine Power alone, as for the dead to be raised to life, or the\nblind to see: like to which also is the making of man from the slime\nof the earth.\n\nReply Obj. 4: An effect may be said to pre-exist in the causal\nvirtues of creatures, in two ways. First, both in active and in\npassive potentiality, so that not only can it be produced out of\npre-existing matter, but also that some pre-existing creature can\nproduce it. Secondly, in passive potentiality only; that is, that out\nof pre-existing matter it can be produced by God. In this sense,\naccording to Augustine, the human body pre-existed in the previous\nwork in their causal virtues.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 91, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Body of Man Was Given an Apt Disposition?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the body of man was not given an apt\ndisposition. For since man is the noblest of animals, his body ought\nto be the best disposed in what is proper to an animal, that is, in\nsense and movement. But some animals have sharper senses and quicker\nmovement than man; thus dogs have a keener smell, and birds a swifter\nflight. Therefore man's body was not aptly disposed.\n\nObj. 2: Further, perfect is what lacks nothing. But the human body\nlacks more than the body of other animals, for these are provided\nwith covering and natural arms of defense, in which man is lacking.\nTherefore the human body is very imperfectly disposed.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man is more distant from plants than he is from the\nbrutes. But plants are erect in stature, while brutes are prone in\nstature. Therefore man should not be of erect stature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 7:30): \"God made man right.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ All natural things were produced by the Divine art,\nand so may be called God's works of art. Now every artist intends to\ngive to his work the best disposition; not absolutely the best, but\nthe best as regards the proposed end; and even if this entails some\ndefect, the artist cares not: thus, for instance, when man makes\nhimself a saw for the purpose of cutting, he makes it of iron, which\nis suitable for the object in view; and he does not prefer to make it\nof glass, though this be a more beautiful material, because this very\nbeauty would be an obstacle to the end he has in view. Therefore God\ngave to each natural being the best disposition; not absolutely so,\nbut in the view of its proper end. This is what the Philosopher says\n(Phys. ii, 7): \"And because it is better so, not absolutely, but for\neach one's substance.\"\n\nNow the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul and its\noperations; since matter is for the sake of the form, and instruments\nare for the action of the agent. I say, therefore, that God fashioned\nthe human body in that disposition which was best, as most suited to\nsuch a form and to such operations. If defect exists in the\ndisposition of the human body, it is well to observe that such defect\narises as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions\nrequired in the body, in order to make it suitably proportioned to\nthe soul and its operations.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The sense of touch, which is the foundation of the\nother senses, is more perfect in man than in any other animal; and\nfor this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all\nanimals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior\nsensitive powers, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 78, A.\n4). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals\nin some of the exterior senses; thus of all animals he has the least\nsense of smell. For man needs the largest brain as compared to the\nbody; both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers\nrequired for the intellectual operations, as we have seen above (Q.\n84, A. 7); and in order that the low temperature of the brain may\nmodify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man for\nhim to be able to stand erect. So that size of the brain, by reason\nof its humidity, is an impediment to the smell, which requires\ndryness. In the same way, we may suggest a reason why some animals\nhave a keener sight, and a more acute hearing than man; namely, on\naccount of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the\nperfect equability of his temperament. The same reason suffices to\nexplain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man, since\nthis excellence of speed is inconsistent with the equability of the\nhuman temperament.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals,\nand toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are the\nclothing of animals, are signs of an abundance of the earthly\nelement; which does not agree with the equability and softness of the\nhuman temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of\nman. Instead of these, he has reason and hands whereby he can make\nhimself arms and clothes, and other necessaries of life, of infinite\nvariety. Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle (De Anima iii, 8),\n\"the organ of organs.\" Moreover this was more becoming to the\nrational nature, which is capable of conceiving an infinite number of\nthings, so as to make for itself an infinite number of instruments.\n\nReply Obj. 3: An upright stature was becoming to man for four\nreasons. First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the\npurpose of procuring the necessaries of life, which they are bestowed\non other animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence,\nwhereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses\nonly as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the\nbeauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses\nare situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned\nto the ground, as it were for the purpose of seeking food and\nprocuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect, in order that\nby the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and\npenetrates further into the differences of things, he may freely\nsurvey the sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly, so\nas to gather intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the\ngreater freedom of the acts of the interior powers; the brain,\nwherein these actions are, in a way, performed, not being low down,\nbut lifted up above other parts of the body. Thirdly, because if\nman's stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands\nas fore-feet; and thus their utility for other purposes would cease.\nFourthly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground, and he\nused his hands as fore-feet, he would be obliged to take hold of his\nfood with his mouth. Thus he would have a protruding mouth, with\nthick and hard lips, and also a hard tongue, so as to keep it from\nbeing hurt by exterior things; as we see in other animals. Moreover,\nsuch an attitude would quite hinder speech, which is reason's proper\noperation.\n\nNevertheless, though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For\nman's superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of\nthe world, and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior\nworld; and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general\nsituation of his body. Plants have the superior part turned towards\nthe lower world, since their roots correspond to the mouth; and their\ninferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals have a\nmiddle disposition, for the superior part of the animal is that by\nwhich it takes food, and the inferior part that by which it rids\nitself of the surplus.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 91, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Production of the Human Body Is Fittingly Described in\nScripture?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the production of the human body is\nnot fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made\nby God, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other\nworks it is written, \"God said; Let it be made, and it was made.\"\nTherefore the same should have been said of man.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the human body was made by God immediately, as\nexplained above (A. 2). Therefore it was not fittingly said, \"Let us\nmake man.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, the form of the human body is the soul itself which\nis the breath of life. Therefore, having said, \"God made man of the\nslime of the earth,\" he should not have added: \"And He breathed into\nhim the breath of life.\"\n\nObj. 4: Further, the soul, which is the breath of life, is in the\nwhole body, and chiefly in the heart. Therefore it was not fittingly\nsaid: \"He breathed into his face the breath of life.\"\n\nObj. 5: Further, the male and female sex belong to the body, while\nthe image of God belongs to the soul. But the soul, according to\nAugustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 24), was made before the body. Therefore\nhaving said: \"To His image He made them,\" he should not have added,\n\"male and female He created them.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ Is the authority of Scripture.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine observes (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12), man\nsurpasses other things, not in the fact that God Himself made man,\nas though He did not make other things; since it is written (Ps.\n101:26), \"The work of Thy hands is the heaven,\" and elsewhere (Ps.\n94:5), \"His hands laid down the dry land\"; but in this, that man is\nmade to God's image. Yet in describing man's production, Scripture\nuses a special way of speaking, to show that other things were made\nfor man's sake. For we are accustomed to do with more deliberation\nand care what we have chiefly in mind.\n\nReply Obj. 2: We must not imagine that when God said \"Let us make\nman,\" He spoke to the angels, as some were perverse enough to think.\nBut by these words is signified the plurality of the Divine Person,\nWhose image is more clearly expressed in man.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Some have thought that man's body was formed first in\npriority of time, and that afterwards the soul was infused into the\nformed body. But it is inconsistent with the perfection of the\nproduction of things, that God should have made either the body\nwithout the soul, or the soul without the body, since each is a part\nof human nature. This is especially unfitting as regards the body,\nfor the body depends on the soul, and not the soul on the body.\n\nTo remove the difficulty some have said that the words, \"God made\nman,\" must be understood of the production of the body with the soul;\nand that the subsequent words, \"and He breathed into his face the\nbreath of life,\" should be understood of the Holy Ghost; as the Lord\nbreathed on His Apostles, saying, \"Receive ye the Holy Ghost\" (John\n20:22). But this explanation, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii,\n24), is excluded by the very words of Scripture. For we read farther\non, \"And man was made a living soul\"; which words the Apostle (1 Cor.\n15:45) refers not to spiritual life, but to animal life. Therefore,\nby breath of life we must understand the soul, so that the words, \"He\nbreathed into his face the breath of life,\" are a sort of exposition\nof what goes before; for the soul is the form of the body.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Since vital operations are more clearly seen in man's\nface, on account of the senses which are there expressed; therefore\nScripture says that the breath of life was breathed into man's face.\n\nReply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iv, 34), the works\nof the six days were done all at one time; wherefore according to him\nman's soul, which he holds to have been made with the angels, was not\nmade before the sixth day; but on the sixth day both the soul of the\nfirst man was made actually, and his body in its causal elements. But\nother doctors hold that on the sixth day both body and soul of man\nwere actually made.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 92\n\nTHE PRODUCTION OF THE WOMAN\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must next consider the production of the woman. Under this head\nthere are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the woman should have been made in that first production\nof things?\n\n(2) Whether the woman should have been made from man?\n\n(3) Whether of man's rib?\n\n(4) Whether the woman was made immediately by God?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 92, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Woman Should Have Been Made in the First Production of\nThings?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been made\nin the first production of things. For the Philosopher says (De\nGener. ii, 3), that \"the female is a misbegotten male.\" But nothing\nmisbegotten or defective should have been in the first production of\nthings. Therefore woman should not have been made at that first\nproduction.\n\nObj. 2: Further, subjection and limitation were a result of sin, for\nto the woman was it said after sin (Gen. 3:16): \"Thou shalt be under\nthe man's power\"; and Gregory says that, \"Where there is no sin,\nthere is no inequality.\" But woman is naturally of less strength and\ndignity than man; \"for the agent is always more honorable than the\npatient,\" as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore woman\nshould not have been made in the first production of things before\nsin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, occasions of sin should be cut off. But God foresaw\nthat the woman would be an occasion of sin to man. Therefore He\nshould not have made woman.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:18): \"It is not good for man\nto be alone; let us make him a helper like to himself.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It was necessary for woman to be made, as the\nScripture says, as a _helper_ to man; not, indeed, as a helpmate in\nother works, as some say, since man can be more efficiently helped\nby another man in other works; but as a helper in the work of\ngeneration. This can be made clear if we observe the mode of\ngeneration carried out in various living things. Some living things\ndo not possess in themselves the power of generation, but are\ngenerated by some other specific agent, such as some plants and\nanimals by the influence of the heavenly bodies, from some fitting\nmatter and not from seed: others possess the active and passive\ngenerative power together; as we see in plants which are generated\nfrom seed; for the noblest vital function in plants is generation.\nWherefore we observe that in these the active power of generation\ninvariably accompanies the passive power. Among perfect animals the\nactive power of generation belongs to the male sex, and the passive\npower to the female. And as among animals there is a vital operation\nnobler than generation, to which their life is principally directed;\ntherefore the male sex is not found in continual union with the\nfemale in perfect animals, but only at the time of coition; so that\nwe may consider that by this means the male and female are one, as in\nplants they are always united; although in some cases one of them\npreponderates, and in some the other. But man is yet further ordered\nto a still nobler vital action, and that is intellectual operation.\nTherefore there was greater reason for the distinction of these two\nforces in man; so that the female should be produced separately from\nthe male; although they are carnally united for generation. Therefore\ndirectly after the formation of woman, it was said: \"And they shall\nbe two in one flesh\" (Gen. 2:24).\n\nReply Obj. 1: As regards the individual nature, woman is defective\nand misbegotten, for the active force in the male seed tends to the\nproduction of a perfect likeness in the masculine sex; while the\nproduction of woman comes from defect in the active force or from\nsome material indisposition, or even from some external influence;\nsuch as that of a south wind, which is moist, as the Philosopher\nobserves (De Gener. Animal. iv, 2). On the other hand, as regards\nhuman nature in general, woman is not misbegotten, but is included\nin nature's intention as directed to the work of generation. Now the\ngeneral intention of nature depends on God, Who is the universal\nAuthor of nature. Therefore, in producing nature, God formed not\nonly the male but also the female.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Subjection is twofold. One is servile, by virtue of\nwhich a superior makes use of a subject for his own benefit; and\nthis kind of subjection began after sin. There is another kind of\nsubjection which is called economic or civil, whereby the superior\nmakes use of his subjects for their own benefit and good; and this\nkind of subjection existed even before sin. For good order would have\nbeen wanting in the human family if some were not governed by others\nwiser than themselves. So by such a kind of subjection woman is\nnaturally subject to man, because in man the discretion of reason\npredominates. Nor is inequality among men excluded by the state of\ninnocence, as we shall prove (Q. 96, A. 3).\n\nReply Obj. 3: If God had deprived the world of all those things which\nproved an occasion of sin, the universe would have been imperfect.\nNor was it fitting for the common good to be destroyed in order that\nindividual evil might be avoided; especially as God is so powerful\nthat He can direct any evil to a good end.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 92, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Woman Should Have Been Made from Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that woman should not have been made from\nman. For sex belongs both to man and animals. But in the other animals\nthe female was not made from the male. Therefore neither should it\nhave been so with man.\n\nObj. 2: Further, things of the same species are of the same matter.\nBut male and female are of the same species. Therefore, as man was\nmade of the slime of the earth, so woman should have been made of the\nsame, and not from man.\n\nObj. 3: Further, woman was made to be a helpmate to man in the work\nof generation. But close relationship makes a person unfit for that\noffice; hence near relations are debarred from intermarriage, as is\nwritten (Lev. 18:6). Therefore woman should not have been made from\nman.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 17:5): \"He created of him,\"\nthat is, out of man, \"a helpmate like to himself,\" that is, woman.\n\n_I answer that,_ When all things were first formed, it was more\nsuitable for the woman to be made from man than (for the female to\nbe from the male) in other animals. First, in order thus to give the\nfirst man a certain dignity consisting in this, that as God is the\nprinciple of the whole universe, so the first man, in likeness to\nGod, was the principle of the whole human race. Wherefore Paul says\nthat \"God made the whole human race from one\" (Acts 17:26). Secondly,\nthat man might love woman all the more, and cleave to her more\nclosely, knowing her to be fashioned from himself. Hence it is\nwritten (Gen. 2:23, 24): \"She was taken out of man, wherefore a man\nshall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife.\" This\nwas most necessary as regards the human race, in which the male and\nfemale live together for life; which is not the case with other\nanimals. Thirdly, because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 12),\nthe human male and female are united, not only for generation, as\nwith other animals, but also for the purpose of domestic life, in\nwhich each has his or her particular duty, and in which the man is\nthe head of the woman. Wherefore it was suitable for the woman to be\nmade out of man, as out of her principle. Fourthly, there is a\nsacramental reason for this. For by this is signified that the Church\ntakes her origin from Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says (Eph. 5:32):\n\"This is a great sacrament; but I speak in Christ and in the Church.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1 is clear from the foregoing.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Matter is that from which something is made. Now\ncreated nature has a determinate principle; and since it is\ndetermined to one thing, it has also a determinate mode of\nproceeding. Wherefore from determinate matter it produces something\nin a determinate species. On the other hand, the Divine Power, being\ninfinite, can produce things of the same species out of any matter,\nsuch as a man from the slime of the earth, and a woman from out of\nman.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A certain affinity arises from natural generation, and\nthis is an impediment to matrimony. Woman, however, was not produced\nfrom man by natural generation, but by the Divine Power alone.\nWherefore Eve is not called the daughter of Adam; and so this\nargument does not prove.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 92, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Woman Was Fittingly Made from the Rib of Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the woman should not have been formed\nfrom the rib of man. For the rib was much smaller than the woman's\nbody. Now from a smaller thing a larger thing can be made\nonly--either by addition (and then the woman ought to have been\ndescribed as made out of that which was added, rather than out of the\nrib itself)--or by rarefaction, because, as Augustine says (Gen. ad\nlit. x): \"A body cannot increase in bulk except by rarefaction.\" But\nthe woman's body is not more rarefied than man's--at least, not in\nthe proportion of a rib to Eve's body. Therefore Eve was not formed\nfrom a rib of Adam.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in those things which were first created there was\nnothing superfluous. Therefore a rib of Adam belonged to the\nintegrity of his body. So, if a rib was removed, his body remained\nimperfect; which is unreasonable to suppose.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain. But\nthere was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for a rib\nto be taken from the man, that Eve might be made from it.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:22): \"God built the rib,\nwhich He took from Adam, into a woman.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It was right for the woman to be made from a rib of\nman. First, to signify the social union of man and woman, for the\nwoman should neither \"use authority over man,\" and so she was not\nmade from his head; nor was it right for her to be subject to man's\ncontempt as his slave, and so she was not made from his feet.\nSecondly, for the sacramental signification; for from the side of\nChrist sleeping on the Cross the Sacraments flowed--namely, blood\nand water--on which the Church was established.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some say that the woman's body was formed by a material\nincrease, without anything being added; in the same way as our Lord\nmultiplied the five loaves. But this is quite impossible. For such an\nincrease of matter would either be by a change of the very substance\nof the matter itself, or by a change of its dimensions. Not by change\nof the substance of the matter, both because matter, considered in\nitself, is quite unchangeable, since it has a potential existence,\nand has nothing but the nature of a subject, and because quantity and\nsize are extraneous to the essence of matter itself. Wherefore\nmultiplication of matter is quite unintelligible, as long as the\nmatter itself remains the same without anything added to it; unless\nit receives greater dimensions. This implies rarefaction, which is\nfor the same matter to receive greater dimensions, as the Philosopher\nsays (Phys. iv). To say, therefore, that the same matter is enlarged,\nwithout being rarefied, is to combine contradictories--viz. the\ndefinition with the absence of the thing defined.\n\nWherefore, as no rarefaction is apparent in such multiplication of\nmatter, we must admit an addition of matter: either by creation, or\nwhich is more probable, by conversion. Hence Augustine says (Tract.\nxxiv in Joan.) that \"Christ filled five thousand men with five\nloaves, in the same way as from a few seeds He produces the harvest\nof corn\"--that is, by transformation of the nourishment.\nNevertheless, we say that the crowds were fed with five loaves, or\nthat woman was made from the rib, because an addition was made to\nthe already existing matter of the loaves and of the rib.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The rib belonged to the integral perfection of Adam,\nnot as an individual, but as the principle of the human race; just as\nthe semen belongs to the perfection of the begetter, and is released\nby a natural and pleasurable operation. Much more, therefore, was it\npossible that by the Divine power the body of the woman should be\nproduced from the man's rib.\n\nFrom this it is clear how to answer the third objection.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 92, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Woman Was Formed Immediately by God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the woman was not formed immediately\nby God. For no individual is produced immediately by God from another\nindividual alike in species. But the woman was made from a man who is\nof the same species. Therefore she was not made immediately by God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) says that corporeal\nthings are governed by God through the angels. But the woman's body\nwas formed from corporeal matter. Therefore it was made through the\nministry of the angels, and not immediately by God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, those things which pre-exist in creatures as to\ntheir causal virtues are produced by the power of some creature, and\nnot immediately by God. But the woman's body was produced in its\ncausal virtues among the first created works, as Augustine says (Gen.\nad lit. ix, 15). Therefore it was not produced immediately by God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in the same work: \"God alone, to\nWhom all nature owes its existence, could form or build up the woman\nfrom the man's rib.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 2, ad 2), the natural\ngeneration of every species is from some determinate matter. Now the\nmatter whence man is naturally begotten is the human semen of man or\nwoman. Wherefore from any other matter an individual of the human\nspecies cannot naturally be generated. Now God alone, the Author of\nnature, can produce an effect into existence outside the ordinary\ncourse of nature. Therefore God alone could produce either a man\nfrom the slime of the earth, or a woman from the rib of man.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument is verified when an individual is\nbegotten, by natural generation, from that which is like it in the\nsame species.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 15), we do not\nknow whether the angels were employed by God in the formation of the\nwoman; but it is certain that, as the body of man was not formed by\nthe angels from the slime of the earth, so neither was the body of\nthe woman formed by them from the man's rib.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 18): \"The first\ncreation of things did not demand that woman should be made thus; it\nmade it possible for her to be thus made.\" Therefore the body of the\nwoman did indeed pre-exist in these causal virtues, in the things\nfirst created; not as regards active potentiality, but as regards a\npotentiality passive in relation to the active potentiality of the\nCreator.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 93\n\nTHE END OR TERM OF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN\n(In Nine Articles)\n\nWe now treat of the end or term of man's production, inasmuch as he is\nsaid to be made \"to the image and likeness of God.\" There are under\nthis head nine points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the image of God is in man?\n\n(2) Whether the image of God is in irrational creatures?\n\n(3) Whether the image of God is in the angels more than in man?\n\n(4) Whether the image of God is in every man?\n\n(5) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with the Essence,\nor with all the Divine Persons, or with one of them?\n\n(6) Whether the image of God is in man, as to his mind only?\n\n(7) Whether the image of God is in man's power or in his habits and\nacts?\n\n(8) Whether the image of God is in man by comparison with every\nobject?\n\n(9) Of the difference between \"image\" and \"likeness.\"\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Image of God Is in Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not in man. For it\nis written (Isa. 40:18): \"To whom have you likened God? or what image\nwill you make for Him?\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, to be the image of God is the property of the\nFirst-Begotten, of Whom the Apostle says (Col. 1:15): \"Who is the\nimage of the invisible God, the First-Born of every creature.\"\nTherefore the image of God is not to be found in man.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Hilary says (De Synod [*Super i can]. Synod.\nAncyr.) that \"an image is of the same species as that which it\nrepresents\"; and he also says that \"an image is the undivided and\nunited likeness of one thing adequately representing another.\" But\nthere is no species common to both God and man; nor can there be a\ncomparison of equality between God and man. Therefore there can be no\nimage of God in man.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:26): \"Let Us make man to Our\nown image and likeness.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): \"Where an image\nexists, there forthwith is likeness; but where there is likeness,\nthere is not necessarily an image.\" Hence it is clear that likeness\nis essential to an image; and that an image adds something to\nlikeness--namely, that it is copied from something else. For an\n\"image\" is so called because it is produced as an imitation of\nsomething else; wherefore, for instance, an egg, however much like\nand equal to another egg, is not called an image of the other egg,\nbecause it is not copied from it.\n\nBut equality does not belong to the essence of an image; for as\nAugustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74): \"Where there is an image there is\nnot necessarily equality,\" as we see in a person's image reflected in\na glass. Yet this is of the essence of a perfect image; for in a\nperfect image nothing is wanting that is to be found in that of which\nit is a copy. Now it is manifest that in man there is some likeness\nto God, copied from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not\none of equality, for such an exemplar infinitely excels its copy.\nTherefore there is in man a likeness to God; not, indeed, a perfect\nlikeness, but imperfect. And Scripture implies the same when it says\nthat man was made \"to\" God's likeness; for the preposition \"to\"\nsignifies a certain approach, as of something at a distance.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Prophet speaks of bodily images made by man.\nTherefore he says pointedly: \"What image will you make for Him?\" But\nGod made a spiritual image to Himself in man.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The First-Born of creatures is the perfect Image of\nGod, reflecting perfectly that of which He is the Image, and so He is\nsaid to be the \"Image,\" and never \"to the image.\" But man is said to\nbe both \"image\" by reason of the likeness; and \"to the image\" by\nreason of the imperfect likeness. And since the perfect likeness to\nGod cannot be except in an identical nature, the Image of God exists\nin His first-born Son; as the image of the king is in his son, who is\nof the same nature as himself: whereas it exists in man as in an\nalien nature, as the image of the king is in a silver coin, as\nAugustine says explains in _De decem Chordis_ (Serm. ix, al, xcvi, De\nTempore).\n\nReply Obj. 3: As unity means absence of division, a species is said\nto be the same as far as it is one. Now a thing is said to be one not\nonly numerically, specifically, or generically, but also according to\na certain analogy or proportion. In this sense a creature is one with\nGod, or like to Him; but when Hilary says \"of a thing which\nadequately represents another,\" this is to be understood of a perfect\nimage.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Image of God Is to Be Found in Irrational Creatures?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the image of God is to be found in\nirrational creatures. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): \"Effects are\ncontingent images of their causes.\" But God is the cause not only of\nrational, but also of irrational creatures. Therefore the image of\nGod is to be found in irrational creatures.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it\napproaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom.\niv) that \"the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine\ngoodness.\" Therefore it is made to the image of God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the more perfect anything is in goodness, the more\nit is like God. But the whole universe is more perfect in goodness\nthan man; for though each individual thing is good, all things\ntogether are called \"very good\" (Gen. 1:31). Therefore the whole\nuniverse is to the image of God, and not only man.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Boethius (De Consol. iii) says of God: \"Holding the\nworld in His mind, and forming it into His image.\" Therefore the\nwhole world is to the image of God, and not only the rational\ncreature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 12): \"Man's\nexcellence consists in the fact that God made him to His own image by\ngiving him an intellectual soul, which raises him above the beasts of\nthe field.\" Therefore things without intellect are not made to God's\nimage.\n\n_I answer that,_ Not every likeness, not even what is copied from\nsomething else, is sufficient to make an image; for if the likeness be\nonly generic, or existing by virtue of some common accident, this does\nnot suffice for one thing to be the image of another. For instance, a\nworm, though from man it may originate, cannot be called man's image,\nmerely because of the generic likeness. Nor, if anything is made white\nlike something else, can we say that it is the image of that thing;\nfor whiteness is an accident belonging to many species. But the nature\nof an image requires likeness in species; thus the image of the king\nexists in his son: or, at least, in some specific accident, and\nchiefly in the shape; thus, we speak of a man's image in copper.\nWhence Hilary says pointedly that \"an image is of the same species.\"\n\nNow it is manifest that specific likeness follows the ultimate\ndifference. But some things are like to God first and most commonly\nbecause they exist; secondly, because they live; and thirdly because\nthey know or understand; and these last, as Augustine says (QQ. 83,\nqu. 51) \"approach so near to God in likeness, that among all\ncreatures nothing comes nearer to Him.\" It is clear, therefore, that\nintellectual creatures alone, properly speaking, are made to God's\nimage.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Everything imperfect is a participation of what is\nperfect. Therefore even what falls short of the nature of an image,\nso far as it possesses any sort of likeness to God, participates in\nsome degree the nature of an image. So Dionysius says that effects\nare \"contingent images of their causes\"; that is, as much as they\nhappen (_contingit_) to be so, but not absolutely.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Dionysius compares the solar ray to Divine goodness, as\nregards its causality; not as regards its natural dignity which is\ninvolved in the idea of an image.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The universe is more perfect in goodness than the\nintellectual creature as regards extension and diffusion; but\nintensively and collectively the likeness to the Divine goodness is\nfound rather in the intellectual creature, which has a capacity for\nthe highest good. Or else we may say that a part is not rightly\ndivided against the whole, but only against another part. Wherefore,\nwhen we say that the intellectual nature alone is to the image of\nGod, we do not mean that the universe in any part is not to God's\nimage, but that the other parts are excluded.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Boethius here uses the word \"image\" to express the\nlikeness which the product of an art bears to the artistic species\nin the mind of the artist. Thus every creature is an image of the\nexemplar type thereof in the Divine mind. We are not, however, using\nthe word \"image\" in this sense; but as it implies a likeness in\nnature, that is, inasmuch as all things, as being, are like to the\nFirst Being; as living, like to the First Life; and as intelligent,\nlike to the Supreme Wisdom.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Angels Are More to the Image of God Than Man Is?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels are not more to the image\nof God than man is. For Augustine says in a sermon _de Imagine_ xliii\n(de verbis Apost. xxvii) that God granted to no other creature\nbesides man to be to His image. Therefore it is not true to say that\nthe angels are more than man to the image of God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (QQ. 83, qu. 51), \"man is so\nmuch to God's image that God did not make any creature to be between\nHim and man: and therefore nothing is more akin to Him.\" But a\ncreature is called God's image so far as it is akin to God. Therefore\nthe angels are not more to the image of God than man.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a creature is said to be to God's image so far as it\nis of an intellectual nature. But the intellectual nature does not\nadmit of intensity or remissness; for it is not an accidental thing,\nsince it is a substance. Therefore the angels are not more to the\nimage of God than man.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. in Evang. xxxiv): \"The angel is\ncalled a \"seal of resemblance\" (Ezech. 28:12) because in him the\nresemblance of the Divine image is wrought with greater expression.\n\n_I answer that,_ We may speak of God's image in two ways. First, we\nmay consider in it that in which the image chiefly consists, that is,\nthe intellectual nature. Thus the image of God is more perfect in the\nangels than in man, because their intellectual nature is more\nperfect, as is clear from what has been said (Q. 58, A. 3; Q. 79, A.\n8). Secondly, we may consider the image of God in man as regards its\naccidental qualities, so far as to observe in man a certain imitation\nof God, consisting in the fact that man proceeds from man, as God\nfrom God; and also in the fact that the whole human soul is in the\nwhole body, and again, in every part, as God is in regard to the\nwhole world. In these and the like things the image of God is more\nperfect in man than it is in the angels. But these do not of\nthemselves belong to the nature of the Divine image in man, unless we\npresuppose the first likeness, which is in the intellectual nature;\notherwise even brute animals would be to God's image. Therefore, as\nin their intellectual nature, the angels are more to the image of God\nthan man is, we must grant that, absolutely speaking, the angels are\nmore to the image of God than man is, but that in some respects man\nis more like to God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine excludes the inferior creatures bereft of\nreason from the image of God; but not the angels.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As fire is said to be specifically the most subtle of\nbodies, while, nevertheless, one kind of fire is more subtle than\nanother; so we say that nothing is more like to God than the human\nsoul in its generic and intellectual nature, because as Augustine had\nsaid previously, \"things which have knowledge, are so near to Him in\nlikeness that of all creatures none are nearer.\" Wherefore this does\nnot mean that the angels are not more to God's image.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When we say that substance does not admit of more or\nless, we do not mean that one species of substance is not more\nperfect than another; but that one and the same individual does not\nparticipate in its specific nature at one time more than at another;\nnor do we mean that a species of substance is shared among different\nindividuals in a greater or lesser degree.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Image of God Is Found in Every Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in every\nman. For the Apostle says that \"man is the image of God, but woman is\nthe image [Vulg. glory] of man\" (1 Cor. 11:7). Therefore, as woman is\nan individual of the human species, it is clear that every individual\nis not an image of God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:29): \"Whom God foreknew, He\nalso predestined to be made conformable to the image of His Son.\" But\nall men are not predestined. Therefore all men have not the\nconformity of image.\n\nObj. 3: Further, likeness belongs to the nature of the image, as\nabove explained (A. 1). But by sin man becomes unlike God. Therefore\nhe loses the image of God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 38:7): \"Surely man passeth as\nan image.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since man is said to be the image of God by reason\nof his intellectual nature, he is the most perfectly like God\naccording to that in which he can best imitate God in his\nintellectual nature. Now the intellectual nature imitates God chiefly\nin this, that God understands and loves Himself. Wherefore we see\nthat the image of God is in man in three ways. First, inasmuch as man\npossesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God; and\nthis aptitude consists in the very nature of the mind, which is\ncommon to all men. Secondly, inasmuch as man actually and habitually\nknows and loves God, though imperfectly; and this image consists in\nthe conformity of grace. Thirdly, inasmuch as man knows and loves God\nperfectly; and this image consists in the likeness of glory.\nWherefore on the words, \"The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is\nsigned upon us\" (Ps. 4:7), the gloss distinguishes a threefold image\nof \"creation,\" of \"re-creation,\" and of \"likeness.\" The first is\nfound in all men, the second only in the just, the third only in the\nblessed.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The image of God, in its principal signification,\nnamely the intellectual nature, is found both in man and in woman.\nHence after the words, \"To the image of God He created him,\" it is\nadded, \"Male and female He created them\" (Gen. 1:27). Moreover it is\nsaid \"them\" in the plural, as Augustine (Gen. ad lit. iii, 22)\nremarks, lest it should be thought that both sexes were united in one\nindividual. But in a secondary sense the image of God is found in\nman, and not in woman: for man is the beginning and end of woman; as\nGod is the beginning and end of every creature. So when the Apostle\nhad said that \"man is the image and glory of God, but woman is the\nglory of man,\" he adds his reason for saying this: \"For man is not of\nwoman, but woman of man; and man was not created for woman, but woman\nfor man.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2 and 3: These reasons refer to the image consisting in\nthe conformity of grace and glory.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Image of God Is in Man According to the Trinity of\nPersons?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the image of God does not exist in man\nas to the Trinity of Persons. For Augustine says (Fulgentius De Fide\nad Petrum i): \"One in essence is the Godhead of the Holy Trinity; and\none is the image to which man was made.\" And Hilary (De Trin. v) says:\n\"Man is made to the image of that which is common in the Trinity.\"\nTherefore the image of God in man is of the Divine Essence, and not of\nthe Trinity of Persons.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is said (De Eccl. Dogmat.) that the image of God\nin man is to be referred to eternity. Damascene also says (De Fide\nOrth. ii, 12) that the image of God in man belongs to him as \"an\nintelligent being endowed with free-will and self-movement.\" Gregory\nof Nyssa (De Homin. Opificio xvi) also asserts that, when Scripture\nsays that \"man was made to the image of God, it means that human\nnature was made a participator of all good: for the Godhead is the\nfulness of goodness.\" Now all these things belong more to the unity\nof the Essence than to the distinction of the Persons. Therefore the\nimage of God in man regards, not the Trinity of Persons, but the\nunity of the Essence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, an image leads to the knowledge of that of which it\nis the image. Therefore, if there is in man the image of God as to\nthe Trinity of Persons; since man can know himself by his natural\nreason, it follows that by his natural knowledge man could know the\nTrinity of the Divine Persons; which is untrue, as was shown above\n(Q. 32, A. 1).\n\nObj. 4: Further, the name of Image is not applicable to any of the\nThree Persons, but only to the Son; for Augustine says (De Trin. vi,\n2) that \"the Son alone is the image of the Father.\" Therefore, if in\nman there were an image of God as regards the Person, this would not\nbe an image of the Trinity, but only of the Son.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): \"The plurality of the\nDivine Persons is proved from the fact that man is said to have been\nmade to the image of God.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ as we have seen (Q. 40, A. 2), the distinction of\nthe Divine Persons is only according to origin, or, rather, relations\nof origin. Now the mode of origin is not the same in all things, but\nin each thing is adapted to the nature thereof; animated things being\nproduced in one way, and inanimate in another; animals in one way,\nand plants in another. Wherefore it is manifest that the distinction\nof the Divine Persons is suitable to the Divine Nature; and therefore\nto be to the image of God by imitation of the Divine Nature does not\nexclude being to the same image by the representation of the Divine\nPersons: but rather one follows from the other. We must, therefore,\nsay that in man there exists the image of God, both as regards the\nDivine Nature and as regards the Trinity of Persons; for also in God\nHimself there is one Nature in Three Persons.\n\nThus it is clear how to solve the first two objections.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument would avail if the image of God in man\nrepresented God in a perfect manner. But, as Augustine says (De Trin.\nxv, 6), there is a great difference between the trinity within\nourselves and the Divine Trinity. Therefore, as he there says: \"We\nsee, rather than believe, the trinity which is in ourselves; whereas\nwe believe rather than see that God is Trinity.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Some have said that in man there is an image of the Son\nonly. Augustine rejects this opinion (De Trin. xii, 5,6). First,\nbecause as the Son is like to the Father by a likeness of essence, it\nwould follow of necessity if man were made in likeness to the Son,\nthat he is made to the likeness of the Father. Secondly, because if\nman were made only to the image of the Son, the Father would not have\nsaid, \"Let Us make man to Our own image and likeness\"; but \"to Thy\nimage.\" When, therefore, it is written, \"He made him to the image of\nGod,\" the sense is not that the Father made man to the image of the\nSon only, Who is God, as some explained it, but that the Divine\nTrinity made man to Its image, that is, of the whole Trinity. When it\nis said that God \"made man to His image,\" this can be understood in\ntwo ways: first, so that this preposition \"to\" points to the term of\nthe making, and then the sense is, \"Let Us make man in such a way\nthat Our image may be in him.\" Secondly, this preposition 'to' may\npoint to the exemplar cause, as when we say, \"This book is made\n(like) to that one.\" Thus the image of God is the very Essence of\nGod, Which is incorrectly called an image forasmuch as image is put\nfor the exemplar. Or, as some say, the Divine Essence is called an\nimage because thereby one Person imitates another.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Image of God Is in Man As Regards the Mind Only?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not only in\nman's mind. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 11:7) that \"the man is the\nimage . . . of God.\" But man is not only mind. Therefore the image\nof God is to be observed not only in his mind.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Gen. 1:27): \"God created man to His\nown image; to the image of God He created him; male and female He\ncreated them.\" But the distinction of male and female is in the body.\nTherefore the image of God is also in the body, and not only in the\nmind.\n\nObj. 3: Further, an image seems to apply principally to the shape of\na thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of God\nis to be seen in man's body also, and not in his mind.\n\nObj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 7,24)\nthere is a threefold vision in us, \"corporeal,\" \"spiritual,\" or\nimaginary, and \"intellectual.\" Therefore, if in the intellectual\nvision that belongs to the mind there exists in us a trinity by\nreason of which we are made to the image of God, for the like\nreason there must be another trinity in the others.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 4:23,24): \"Be renewed in\nthe spirit of your mind, and put on the new man.\" Whence we are given\nto understand that our renewal which consists in putting on the new\nman, belongs to the mind. Now, he says (Col. 3:10): \"Putting on the\nnew\" man; \"him who is renewed unto knowledge\" of God, \"according to\nthe image of Him that created him,\" where the renewal which consists\nin putting on the new man is ascribed to the image of God. Therefore\nto be to the image of God belongs to the mind only.\n\n_I answer that,_ While in all creatures there is some kind of\nlikeness to God, in the rational creature alone we find a likeness\nof \"image\" as we have explained above (AA. 1,2); whereas in other\ncreatures we find a likeness by way of a \"trace.\" Now the intellect\nor mind is that whereby the rational creature excels other creatures;\nwherefore this image of God is not found even in the rational\ncreature except in the mind; while in the other parts, which the\nrational creature may happen to possess, we find the likeness of a\n\"trace,\" as in other creatures to which, in reference to such parts,\nthe rational creature can be likened. We may easily understand the\nreason of this if we consider the way in which a \"trace,\" and the\nway in which an \"image,\" represents anything. An \"image\" represents\nsomething by likeness in species, as we have said; while a \"trace\"\nrepresents something by way of an effect, which represents the cause\nin such a way as not to attain to the likeness of species. For\nimprints which are left by the movements of animals are called\n\"traces\": so also ashes are a trace of fire, and desolation of the\nland a trace of a hostile army.\n\nTherefore we may observe this difference between rational creatures\nand others, both as to the representation of the likeness of the\nDivine Nature in creatures, and as to the representation in them of\nthe uncreated Trinity. For as to the likeness of the Divine Nature,\nrational creatures seem to attain, after a fashion, to the\nrepresentation of the species, inasmuch as they imitate God, not only\nin being and life, but also in intelligence, as above explained (A.\n2); whereas other creatures do not understand, although we observe in\nthem a certain trace of the Intellect that created them, if we\nconsider their disposition. Likewise as the uncreated Trinity is\ndistinguished by the procession of the Word from the Speaker, and of\nLove from both of these, as we have seen (Q. 28, A. 3); so we may say\nthat in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of the word\nin the intellect, and a procession of the love in the will, there\nexists an image of the uncreated Trinity, by a certain representation\nof the species. In other creatures, however, we do not find the\nprinciple of the word, and the word and love; but we do see in them a\ncertain trace of the existence of these in the Cause that produced\nthem. For in the fact that a creature has a modified and finite\nnature, proves that it proceeds from a principle; while its species\npoints to the (mental) word of the maker, just as the shape of a\nhouse points to the idea of the architect; and order points to the\nmaker's love by reason of which he directs the effect to a good end;\nas also the use of the house points to the will of the architect. So\nwe find in man a likeness to God by way of an \"image\" in his mind;\nbut in the other parts of his being by way of a \"trace.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man is called to the image of God; not that he is\nessentially an image; but that the image of God is impressed on his\nmind; as a coin is an image of the king, as having the image of the\nking. Wherefore there is no need to consider the image of God as\nexisting in every part of man.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 5), some have thought\nthat the image of God was not in man individually, but severally.\nThey held that \"the man represents the Person of the Father; those\nborn of man denote the person of the Son; and that the woman is a\nthird person in likeness to the Holy Ghost, since she so proceeded\nfrom man as not to be his son or daughter.\" All of this is manifestly\nabsurd; first, because it would follow that the Holy Ghost is the\nprinciple of the Son, as the woman is the principle of the man's\noffspring; secondly, because one man would be only the image of one\nPerson; thirdly, because in that case Scripture should not have\nmentioned the image of God in man until after the birth of the\noffspring. Therefore we must understand that when Scripture had said,\n\"to the image of God He created him,\" it added, \"male and female He\ncreated them,\" not to imply that the image of God came through the\ndistinction of sex, but that the image of God belongs to both sexes,\nsince it is in the mind, wherein there is no sexual distinction.\nWherefore the Apostle (Col. 3:10), after saying, \"According to the\nimage of Him that created him,\" added, \"Where there is neither male\nnor female\" [*these words are in reality from Gal. 3:28] (Vulg.\n\"neither Gentile nor Jew\").\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the image of God in man is not to be found in\nhis bodily shape, yet because \"the body of man alone among\nterrestrial animals is not inclined prone to the ground, but is\nadapted to look upward to heaven, for this reason we may rightly say\nthat it is made to God's image and likeness, rather than the bodies\nof other animals,\" as Augustine remarks (QQ. 83, qu. 51). But this is\nnot to be understood as though the image of God were in man's body;\nbut in the sense that the very shape of the human body represents the\nimage of God in the soul by way of a trace.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Both in the corporeal and in the imaginary vision we\nmay find a trinity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 2). For in\ncorporeal vision there is first the species of the exterior body;\nsecondly, the act of vision, which occurs by the impression on the\nsight of a certain likeness of the said species; thirdly, the\nintention of the will applying the sight to see, and to rest on what\nis seen.\n\nLikewise, in the imaginary vision we find first the species kept in\nthe memory; secondly, the vision itself, which is caused by the\npenetrative power of the soul, that is, the faculty of imagination,\ninformed by the species; and thirdly, we find the intention of the\nwill joining both together. But each of these trinities falls short\nof the Divine image. For the species of the external body is\nextrinsic to the essence of the soul; while the species in the\nmemory, though not extrinsic to the soul, is adventitious to it; and\nthus in both cases the species falls short of representing the\nconnaturality and co-eternity of the Divine Persons. The corporeal\nvision, too, does not proceed only from the species of the external\nbody, but from this, and at the same time from the sense of the seer;\nin like manner imaginary vision is not from the species only which is\npreserved in the memory, but also from the imagination. For these\nreasons the procession of the Son from the Father alone is not\nsuitably represented. Lastly the intention of the will joining the\ntwo together, does not proceed from them either in corporeal or\nspiritual vision. Wherefore the procession of the Holy Ghost from\nthe Father and the Son is not thus properly represented.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Image of God Is to Be Found in the Acts of the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the image of God is not found in the\nacts of the soul. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xi, 26), that \"man\nwas made to God's image, inasmuch as we exist and know that we exist,\nand love this existence and knowledge.\" But to exist does not signify\nan act. Therefore the image of God is not to be found in the soul's\nacts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. ix, 4) assigns God's image in\nthe soul to these three things--mind, knowledge, and love. But mind\ndoes not signify an act, but rather the power or the essence of the\nintellectual soul. Therefore the image of God does not extend to the\nacts of the soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) assigns the image of the\nTrinity in the soul to \"memory, understanding, and will.\" But these\nthree are \"natural powers of the soul,\" as the Master of the\nSentences says (1 Sent. D iii). Therefore the image of God is in the\npowers, and does not extend to the acts of the soul.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the image of the Trinity always remains in the soul.\nBut an act does not always remain. Therefore the image of God does\nnot extend to the acts.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Trin. xi, 2 seqq.) assigns the\ntrinity in the lower part of the soul, in relation to the actual\nvision, whether sensible or imaginative. Therefore, also, the trinity\nin the mind, by reason of which man is like to God's image, must be\nreferred to actual vision.\n\n_I answer that,_ As above explained (A. 2), a certain representation\nof the species belongs to the nature of an image. Hence, if the image\nof the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, we must look for it\nwhere the soul approaches the nearest to a representation of the\nspecies of the Divine Persons. Now the Divine Persons are distinct\nfrom each other by reason of the procession of the Word from the\nSpeaker, and the procession of Love connecting Both. But in our soul\nword \"cannot exist without actual thought,\" as Augustine says (De\nTrin. xiv, 7). Therefore, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity\nis to be found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the\nknowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an internal\nword; and thence break forth into love. But, since the principles of\nacts are the habits and powers, and everything exists virtually in\nits principle, therefore, secondarily and consequently, the image of\nthe Trinity may be considered as existing in the powers, and still\nmore in the habits, forasmuch as the acts virtually exist therein.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our being bears the image of God so far as it is proper\nto us, and excels that of the other animals, that is to say, in so\nfar as we are endowed with a mind. Therefore, this trinity is the\nsame as that which Augustine mentions (De Trin. ix, 4), and which\nconsists in mind, knowledge, and love.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Augustine observed this trinity, first, as existing in\nthe mind. But because the mind, though it knows itself entirely in a\ncertain degree, yet also in a way does not know itself--namely, as\nbeing distinct from others (and thus also it searches itself, as\nAugustine subsequently proves--De Trin. x, 3,4); therefore, as though\nknowledge were not in equal proportion to mind, he takes three things\nin the soul which are proper to the mind, namely, memory,\nunderstanding, and will; which everyone is conscious of possessing;\nand assigns the image of the Trinity pre-eminently to these three, as\nthough the first assignation were in part deficient.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine proves (De Trin. xiv, 7), we may be said\nto understand, will, and to love certain things, both when we\nactually consider them, and when we do not think of them. When they\nare not under our actual consideration, they are objects of our\nmemory only, which, in his opinion, is nothing else than habitual\nretention of knowledge and love [*Cf. Q. 79, A. 7, ad 1]. \"But\nsince,\" as he says, \"a word cannot be there without actual thought\n(for we think everything that we say, even if we speak with that\ninterior word belonging to no nation's tongue), this image chiefly\nconsists in these three things, memory, understanding, and will. And\nby understanding I mean here that whereby we understand with actual\nthought; and by will, love, or dilection I mean that which unites\nthis child with its parent.\" From which it is clear that he places\nthe image of the Divine Trinity more in actual understanding and\nwill, than in these as existing in the habitual retention of the\nmemory; although even thus the image of the Trinity exists in the\nsoul in a certain degree, as he says in the same place. Thus it is\nclear that memory, understanding, and will are not three powers as\nstated in the Sentences.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Someone might answer by referring to Augustine's\nstatement (De Trin. xiv, 6), that \"the mind ever remembers itself,\never understands itself, ever loves itself\"; which some take to mean\nthat the soul ever actually understands, and loves itself. But he\nexcludes this interpretation by adding that \"it does not always think\nof itself as actually distinct from other things.\" Thus it is clear\nthat the soul always understands and loves itself, not actually but\nhabitually; though we might say that by perceiving its own act, it\nunderstands itself whenever it understands anything. But since it is\nnot always actually understanding, as in the case of sleep, we must\nsay that these acts, although not always actually existing, yet ever\nexist in their principles, the habits and powers. Wherefore,\nAugustine says (De Trin. xiv, 4): \"If the rational soul is made to\nthe image of God in the sense that it can make use of reason and\nintellect to understand and consider God, then the image of God was\nin the soul from the beginning of its existence.\"\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Image of the Divine Trinity Is in the Soul Only by\nComparison with God As Its Object?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the image of the Divine Trinity is in\nthe soul not only by comparison with God as its object. For the image\nof the Divine Trinity is to be found in the soul, as shown above (A.\n7), according as the word in us proceeds from the speaker; and love\nfrom both. But this is to be found in us as regards any object.\nTherefore the image of the Divine Trinity is in our mind as regards\nany object.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 4) that \"when we seek\ntrinity in the soul, we seek it in the whole of the soul, without\nseparating the process of reasoning in temporal matters from the\nconsideration of things eternal.\" Therefore the image of the Trinity\nis to be found in the soul, even as regards temporal objects.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is by grace that we can know and love God. If,\ntherefore, the image of the Trinity is found in the soul by reason of\nthe memory, understanding, and will or love of God, this image is not\nin man by nature but by grace, and thus is not common to all.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the saints in heaven are most perfectly conformed to\nthe image of God by the beatific vision; wherefore it is written (2\nCor. 3:18): \"We . . . are transformed into the same image from glory\nto glory.\" But temporal things are known by the beatific vision.\nTherefore the image of God exists in us even according to temporal\nthings.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 12): \"The image of\nGod exists in the mind, not because it has a remembrance of itself,\nloves itself, and understands itself; but because it can also\nremember, understand, and love God by Whom it was made.\" Much less,\ntherefore, is the image of God in the soul, in respect of other\nobjects.\n\n_I answer that,_ As above explained (AA. 2, 7), image means a\nlikeness which in some degree, however small, attains to a\nrepresentation of the species. Wherefore we need to seek in the image\nof the Divine Trinity in the soul some kind of representation of\nspecies of the Divine Persons, so far as this is possible to a\ncreature. Now the Divine Persons, as above stated (AA. 6, 7), are\ndistinguished from each other according to the procession of the word\nfrom the speaker, and the procession of love from both. Moreover the\nWord of God is born of God by the knowledge of Himself; and Love\nproceeds from God according as He loves Himself. But it is clear that\ndiversity of objects diversifies the species of word and love; for in\nthe human mind the species of a stone is specifically different from\nthat of a horse, which also the love regarding each of them is\nspecifically different. Hence we refer the Divine image in man to the\nverbal concept born of the knowledge of God, and to the love derived\ntherefrom. Thus the image of God is found in the soul according as\nthe soul turns to God, or possesses a nature that enables it to turn\nto God. Now the mind may turn towards an object in two ways: directly\nand immediately, or indirectly and mediately; as, for instance, when\nanyone sees a man reflected in a looking-glass he may be said to be\nturned towards that man. So Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 8), that\n\"the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself. If\nwe perceive this, we perceive a trinity, not, indeed, God, but,\nnevertheless, rightly called the image of God.\" But this is due to\nthe fact, not that the mind reflects on itself absolutely, but that\nthereby it can furthermore turn to God, as appears from the authority\nquoted above (Arg. On the contrary).\n\nReply Obj. 1: For the notion of an image it is not enough that\nsomething proceed from another, but it is also necessary to observe\nwhat proceeds and whence it proceeds; namely, that what is Word of\nGod proceeds from knowledge of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In all the soul we may see a kind of trinity,\nnot, however, as though besides the action of temporal things and the\ncontemplation of eternal things, \"any third thing should be required\nto make up the trinity,\" as he adds in the same passage. But in that\npart of the reason which is concerned with temporal things, \"although\na trinity may be found; yet the image of God is not to be seen there,\"\nas he says farther on; forasmuch as this knowledge of temporal things\nis adventitious to the soul. Moreover even the habits whereby temporal\nthings are known are not always present; but sometimes they are\nactually present, and sometimes present only in memory even after they\nbegin to exist in the soul. Such is clearly the case with faith, which\ncomes to us temporally for this present life; while in the future life\nfaith will no longer exist, but only the remembrance of faith.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The meritorious knowledge and love of God can be\nin us only by grace. Yet there is a certain natural knowledge and love\nas seen above (Q. 12, A. 12; Q. 56, A. 3; Q. 60, A. 5).\nThis, too, is natural that the mind, in order to understand God, can\nmake use of reason, in which sense we have already said that the image\nof God abides ever in the soul; \"whether this image of God be so\nobsolete,\" as it were clouded, \"as almost to amount to nothing,\" as in\nthose who have not the use of reason; \"or obscured and disfigured,\" as\nin sinners; or \"clear and beautiful,\" as in the just; as Augustine\nsays (De Trin. xiv, 6).\n\nReply Obj. 4: By the vision of glory temporal things will be\nseen in God Himself; and such a vision of things temporal will belong\nto the image of God. This is what Augustine means (De Trin. xiv, 6),\nwhen he says that \"in that nature to which the mind will blissfully\nadhere, whatever it sees it will see as unchangeable\"; for in the\nUncreated Word are the types of all creatures.\n_______________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 93, Art. 9]\n\nWhether \"Likeness\" Is Properly Distinguished from \"Image\"?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that \"likeness\" is not properly\ndistinguished from \"image.\" For genus is not properly distinguished\nfrom species. Now, \"likeness\" is to \"image\" as genus to species:\nbecause, \"where there is image, forthwith there is likeness, but not\nconversely\" as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 74). Therefore \"likeness\"\nis not properly to be distinguished from \"image.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, the nature of the image consists not only in the\nrepresentation of the Divine Persons, but also in the representation\nof the Divine Essence, to which representation belong immortality and\nindivisibility. So it is not true to say that the \"likeness is in the\nessence because it is immortal and indivisible; whereas the image is\nin other things\" (Sent. ii, D, xvi).\n\nObj. 3: Further, the image of God in man is threefold--the image of\nnature, of grace, and of glory, as above explained (A. 4). But\ninnocence and righteousness belong to grace. Therefore it is\nincorrectly said (Sent. ii, D, xvi) \"that the image is taken from the\nmemory, the understanding and the will, while the likeness is from\ninnocence and righteousness.\"\n\nObj. 4: Further, knowledge of truth belongs to the intellect, and\nlove of virtue to the will; which two things are parts of the image.\nTherefore it is incorrect to say (Sent. ii, D, xvi) that \"the image\nconsists in the knowledge of truth, and the likeness in the love of\nvirtue.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51): \"Some consider\nthat these two were mentioned not without reason, namely \"image\" and\n\"likeness,\" since, if they meant the same, one would have sufficed.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Likeness is a kind of unity, for oneness in quality\ncauses likeness, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, Did. iv, 15).\nNow, since \"one\" is a transcendental, it is both common to all, and\nadapted to each single thing, just as the good and the true.\nWherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both\nas its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some\nperfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of\ncomparison between \"likeness\" and \"image.\" For the good is a preamble\nto man, inasmuch as man is an individual good; and, again, the good\nis subsequent to man, inasmuch as we may say of a certain man that he\nis good, by reason of his perfect virtue. In like manner, likeness\nmay be considered in the light of a preamble to image, inasmuch as it\nis something more general than image, as we have said above (A. 1):\nand, again, it may be considered as subsequent to image, inasmuch as\nit signifies a certain perfection of image. For we say that an image\nis like or unlike what it represents, according as the representation\nis perfect or imperfect. Thus likeness may be distinguished from\nimage in two ways: first as its preamble and existing in more things,\nand in this sense likeness regards things which are more common than\nthe intellectual properties, wherein the image is properly to be\nseen. In this sense it is stated (QQ. 83, qu. 51) that \"the spirit\"\n(namely, the mind) without doubt was made to the image of God. \"But\nthe other parts of man,\" belonging to the soul's inferior faculties,\nor even to the body, \"are in the opinion of some made to God's\nlikeness.\" In this sense he says (De Quant. Animae ii) that the\nlikeness of God is found in the soul's incorruptibility; for\ncorruptible and incorruptible are differences of universal beings.\nBut likeness may be considered in another way, as signifying the\nexpression and perfection of the image. In this sense Damascene says\n(De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that the image implies \"an intelligent being,\nendowed with free-will and self-movement, whereas likeness implies a\nlikeness of power, as far as this may be possible in man.\" In the\nsame sense \"likeness\" is said to belong to \"the love of virtue\": for\nthere is no virtue without love of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: \"Likeness\" is not distinct from \"image\" in the general\nnotion of \"likeness\" (for thus it is included in \"image\"); but so far\nas any \"likeness\" falls short of \"image,\" or again, as it perfects\nthe idea of \"image.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The soul's essence belongs to the \"image,\" as\nrepresenting the Divine Essence in those things which belong to the\nintellectual nature; but not in those conditions subsequent to\ngeneral notions of being, such as simplicity and indissolubility.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even certain virtues are natural to the soul, at least,\nin their seeds, by reason of which we may say that a natural\n\"likeness\" exists in the soul. Nor it is unfitting to us the term\n\"image\" from one point of view and from another the term \"likeness.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Love of the word, which is knowledge loved, belongs to\nthe nature of \"image\"; but love of virtue belongs to \"likeness,\" as\nvirtue itself belongs to likeness.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 94\n\nOF THE STATE AND CONDITION OF THE FIRST MAN AS REGARDS HIS INTELLECT\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe next consider the state or condition of the first man; first, as\nregards his soul; secondly, as regards his body. Concerning the first\nthere are two things to be considered:\n\n(1) The condition of man as to his intellect;\n\n(2) the condition of man as to his will.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the first man saw the Essence of God?\n\n(2) Whether he could see the separate substances, that is, the angels?\n\n(3) Whether he possessed all knowledge?\n\n(4) Whether he could err or be deceived?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the First Man Saw God Through His Essence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the first man saw God through His\nEssence. For man's happiness consists in the vision of the Divine\nEssence. But the first man, \"while established in paradise, led a\nlife of happiness in the enjoyment of all things,\" as Damascene says\n(De Fide Orth. ii, 11). And Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): \"If\nman was gifted with the same tastes as now, how happy must he have\nbeen in paradise, that place of ineffable happiness!\" Therefore the\nfirst man in paradise saw God through His Essence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, loc. cit.) that\n\"the first man lacked nothing which his good-will might obtain.\" But\nour good-will can obtain nothing better than the vision of the Divine\nEssence. Therefore man saw God through His Essence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the vision of God in His Essence is whereby God is\nseen without a medium or enigma. But man in the state of innocence\n\"saw God immediately,\" as the Master of the Sentences asserts (Sent.\niv, D, i). He also saw without an enigma, for an enigma implies\nobscurity, as Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 9). Now, obscurity\nresulted from sin. Therefore man in the primitive state saw God\nthrough His Essence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): \"That was not\nfirst which is spiritual, but that which is natural.\" But to see God\nthrough His Essence is most spiritual. Therefore the first man in the\nprimitive state of his natural life did not see God through His\nEssence.\n\n_I answer that,_ The first man did not see God through His Essence if\nwe consider the ordinary state of that life; unless, perhaps, it be\nsaid that he saw God in a vision, when \"God cast a deep sleep upon\nAdam\" (Gen. 2:21). The reason is because, since in the Divine Essence\nis beatitude itself, the intellect of a man who sees the Divine\nEssence has the same relation to God as a man has to beatitude. Now\nit is clear that man cannot willingly be turned away from beatitude,\nsince naturally and necessarily he desires it, and shuns unhappiness.\nWherefore no one who sees the Essence of God can willingly turn away\nfrom God, which means to sin. Hence all who see God through His\nEssence are so firmly established in the love of God, that for\neternity they can never sin. Therefore, as Adam did sin, it is clear\nthat he did not see God through His Essence.\n\nNevertheless he knew God with a more perfect knowledge than we do now.\nThus in a sense his knowledge was midway between our knowledge in the\npresent state, and the knowledge we shall have in heaven, when we see\nGod through His Essence. To make this clear, we must consider that the\nvision of God through His Essence is contradistinguished from the\nvision of God through His creatures. Now the higher the creature is,\nand the more like it is to God, the more clearly is God seen in it;\nfor instance, a man is seen more clearly through a mirror in which his\nimage is the more clearly expressed. Thus God is seen in a much more\nperfect manner through His intelligible effects than through those\nwhich are only sensible or corporeal. But in his present state man is\nimpeded as regards the full and clear consideration of intelligible\ncreatures, because he is distracted by and occupied with sensible\nthings. Now, it is written (Eccles. 7:30): \"God made man right.\" And\nman was made right by God in this sense, that in him the lower powers\nwere subjected to the higher, and the higher nature was made so as not\nto be impeded by the lower. Wherefore the first man was not impeded by\nexterior things from a clear and steady contemplation of the\nintelligible effects which he perceived by the radiation of the first\ntruth, whether by a natural or by a gratuitous knowledge. Hence\nAugustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 33) that, \"perhaps God used to speak\nto the first man as He speaks to the angels; by shedding on his mind a\nray of the unchangeable truth, yet without bestowing on him the\nexperience of which the angels are capable in the participation of the\nDivine Essence.\" Therefore, through these intelligible effects of God,\nman knew God then more clearly than we know Him now.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man was happy in paradise, but not with that perfect\nhappiness to which he was destined, which consists in the vision of\nthe Divine Essence. He was, however, endowed with \"a life of\nhappiness in a certain measure,\" as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi,\n18), so far as he was gifted with natural integrity and perfection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A good will is a well-ordered will; but the will of the\nfirst man would have been ill-ordered had he wished to have, while in\nthe state of merit, what had been promised to him as a reward.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A medium (of knowledge) is twofold; one through which,\nand, at the same time, in which, something is seen, as, for example,\na man is seen through a mirror, and is seen with the mirror: another\nkind of medium is that whereby we attain to the knowledge of\nsomething unknown; such as the medium in a demonstration. God was\nseen without this second kind of medium, but not without the first\nkind. For there was no need for the first man to attain to the\nknowledge of God by demonstration drawn from an effect, such as we\nneed; since he knew God simultaneously in His effects, especially in\nthe intelligible effects, according to His capacity. Again, we must\nremark that the obscurity which is implied in the word enigma may be\nof two kinds: first, so far as every creature is something obscure\nwhen compared with the immensity of the Divine light; and thus Adam\nsaw God in an enigma, because he saw Him in a created effect:\nsecondly, we may take obscurity as an effect of sin, so far as man is\nimpeded in the consideration of intelligible things by being\npreoccupied with sensible things; in which sense Adam did not see God\nin an enigma.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Adam in the State of Innocence Saw the Angels Through Their\nEssence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that Adam, in the state of innocence, saw\nthe angels through their essence. For Gregory says (Dialog. iv, 1):\n\"In paradise man was accustomed to enjoy the words of God; and by\npurity of heart and loftiness of vision to have the company of the\ngood angels.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, the soul in the present state is impeded from the\nknowledge of separate substances by union with a corruptible body\nwhich \"is a load upon the soul,\" as is written Wis. 9:15. Wherefore\nthe separate soul can see separate substances, as above explained\n(Q. 89, A. 2). But the body of the first man was not a load upon his\nsoul; for the latter was not corruptible. Therefore he was able to\nsee separate substances.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one separate substance knows another separate\nsubstance, by knowing itself (De Causis xiii). But the soul of the\nfirst man knew itself. Therefore it knew separate substances.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The soul of Adam was of the same nature as ours.\nBut our souls cannot now understand separate substances. Therefore\nneither could Adam's soul.\n\n_I answer that,_ The state of the human soul may be distinguished in\ntwo ways. First, from a diversity of mode in its natural existence;\nand in this point the state of the separate soul is distinguished\nfrom the state of the soul joined to the body. Secondly, the state of\nthe soul is distinguished in relation to integrity and corruption,\nthe state of natural existence remaining the same: and thus the state\nof innocence is distinct from the state of man after sin. For man's\nsoul, in the state of innocence, was adapted to perfect and govern\nthe body; wherefore the first man is said to have been made into a\n\"living soul\"; that is, a soul giving life to the body--namely animal\nlife. But he was endowed with integrity as to this life, in that the\nbody was entirely subject to the soul, hindering it in no way, as we\nhave said above (A. 1). Now it is clear from what has been already\nsaid (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 1; Q. 89, A. 1) that since the soul is\nadapted to perfect and govern the body, as regards animal life, it is\nfitting that it should have that mode of understanding which is by\nturning to phantasms. Wherefore this mode of understanding was\nbecoming to the soul of the first man also.\n\nNow, in virtue of this mode of understanding, there are three degrees\nof movement in the soul, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). The first\nis by the soul \"passing from exterior things to concentrate its\npowers on itself\"; the second is by the soul ascending \"so as to be\nassociated with the united superior powers,\" namely the angels; the\nthird is when the soul is \"led on\" yet further \"to the supreme good,\"\nthat is, to God.\n\nIn virtue of the first movement of the soul from exterior things to\nitself, the soul's knowledge is perfected. This is because the\nintellectual operation of the soul has a natural order to external\nthings, as we have said above (Q. 87, A. 3): and so by the knowledge\nthereof, our intellectual operation can be known perfectly, as an act\nthrough its object. And through the intellectual operation itself,\nthe human intellect can be known perfectly, as a power through its\nproper act. But in the second movement we do not find perfect\nknowledge. Because, since the angel does not understand by turning to\nphantasms, but by a far more excellent process, as we have said above\n(Q. 55, A. 2); the above-mentioned mode of knowledge, by which the\nsoul knows itself, is not sufficient to lead it to the knowledge of\nan angel. Much less does the third movement lead to perfect\nknowledge: for even the angels themselves, by the fact that they know\nthemselves, are not able to arrive at the knowledge of the Divine\nSubstance, by reason of its surpassing excellence. Therefore the soul\nof the first man could not see the angels in their essence.\nNevertheless he had a more excellent mode of knowledge regarding the\nangels than we possess, because his knowledge of intelligible things\nwithin him was more certain and fixed than our knowledge. And it was\non account of this excellence of knowledge that Gregory says that \"he\nenjoyed the company of the angelic spirits.\"\n\nThis makes clear the reply to the first objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That the soul of the first man fell short of the\nknowledge regarding separate substances, was not owing to the fact\nthat the body was a load upon it; but to the fact that its connatural\nobject fell short of the excellence of separate substances. We, in\nour present state, fall short on account of both these reasons.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The soul of the first man was not able to arrive at\nknowledge of separate substances by means of its self-knowledge, as\nwe have shown above; for even each separate substance knows others\nin its own measure.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the First Man Knew All Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the first man did not know all\nthings. For if he had such knowledge it would be either by acquired\nspecies, or by connatural species, or by infused species. Not,\nhowever, by acquired species; for this kind of knowledge is acquired\nby experience, as stated in _Metaph._ i, 1; and the first man had not\nthen gained experience of all things. Nor through connatural species,\nbecause he was of the same nature as we are; and our soul, as\nAristotle says (De Anima iii, 4), is \"like a clean tablet on which\nnothing is written.\" And if his knowledge came by infused species, it\nwould have been of a different kind from ours, which we acquire from\nthings themselves.\n\nObj. 2: Further, individuals of the same species have the same way of\narriving at perfection. Now other men have not, from the beginning,\nknowledge of all things, but they acquire it in the course of time\naccording to their capacity. Therefore neither did Adam know all\nthings when he was first created.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the present state of life is given to man in order\nthat his soul may advance in knowledge and merit; indeed, the soul\nseems to be united to the body for that purpose. Now man would have\nadvanced in merit in that state of life; therefore also in knowledge.\nTherefore he was not endowed with knowledge of all things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Man named the animals (Gen. 2:20). But names\nshould be adapted to the nature of things. Therefore Adam knew the\nanimals' natures; and in like manner he was possessed of the\nknowledge of all other things.\n\n_I answer that,_ In the natural order, perfection comes before\nimperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in\npotentiality is made actual only by something actual. And since God\ncreated things not only for their own existence, but also that they\nmight be the principles of other things; so creatures were produced in\ntheir perfect state to be the principles as regards others. Now man\ncan be the principle of another man, not only by generation of the\nbody, but also by instruction and government. Hence, as the first man\nwas produced in his perfect state, as regards his body, for the work\nof generation, so also was his soul established in a perfect state to\ninstruct and govern others.\n\nNow no one can instruct others unless he has knowledge, and so the\nfirst man was established by God in such a manner as to have knowledge\nof all those things for which man has a natural aptitude. And such are\nwhatever are virtually contained in the first self-evident principles,\nthat is, whatever truths man is naturally able to know. Moreover, in\norder to direct his own life and that of others, man needs to know not\nonly those things which can be naturally known, but also things\nsurpassing natural knowledge; because the life of man is directed to a\nsupernatural end: just as it is necessary for us to know the truths of\nfaith in order to direct our own lives. Wherefore the first man was\nendowed with such a knowledge of these supernatural truths as was\nnecessary for the direction of human life in that state. But those\nthings which cannot be known by merely human effort, and which are not\nnecessary for the direction of human life, were not known by the first\nman; such as the thoughts of men, future contingent events, and some\nindividual facts, as for instance the number of pebbles in a stream;\nand the like.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The first man had knowledge of all things by divinely\ninfused species. Yet his knowledge was not different from ours; as\nthe eyes which Christ gave to the man born blind were not different\nfrom those given by nature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To Adam, as being the first man, was due a degree of\nperfection which was not due to other men, as is clear from what is\nabove explained.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Adam would have advanced in natural knowledge, not in\nthe number of things known, but in the manner of knowing; because\nwhat he knew speculatively he would subsequently have known by\nexperience. But as regards supernatural knowledge, he would also have\nadvanced as regards the number of things known, by further\nrevelation; as the angels advance by further enlightenment. Moreover\nthere is no comparison between advance in knowledge and advance in\nmerit; since one man cannot be a principle of merit to another,\nalthough he can be to another a principle of knowledge.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 94, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Man in His First State Could Be Deceived?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man in his primitive state could have\nbeen deceived. For the Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:14) that \"the woman\nbeing seduced was in the transgression.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxi) that, \"the woman\nwas not frightened at the serpent speaking, because she thought that\nhe had received the faculty of speech from God.\" But this was untrue.\nTherefore before sin the woman was deceived.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is natural that the farther off anything is from\nus, the smaller it seems to be. Now, the nature of the eyes is not\nchanged by sin. Therefore this would have been the case in the state\nof innocence. Wherefore man would have been deceived in the size of\nwhat he saw, just as he is deceived now.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 2) that, in sleep\nthe soul adheres to the images of things as if they were the things\nthemselves. But in the state of innocence man would have eaten and\nconsequently have slept and dreamed. Therefore he would have been\ndeceived, adhering to images as to realities.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the first man would have been ignorant of other\nmen's thoughts, and of future contingent events, as stated above\n(A. 3). So if anyone had told him what was false about these things,\nhe would have been deceived.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18): \"To regard\nwhat is true as false, is not natural to man as created; but is a\npunishment of man condemned.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ in the opinion of some, deception may mean two things;\nnamely, any slight surmise, in which one adheres to what is false, as\nthough it were true, but without the assent of belief--or it may mean\na firm belief. Thus before sin Adam could not be deceived in either of\nthese ways as regards those things to which his knowledge extended;\nbut as regards things to which his knowledge did not extend, he might\nhave been deceived, if we take deception in the wide sense of the term\nfor any surmise without assent of belief. This opinion was held with\nthe idea that it is not derogatory to man to entertain a false opinion\nin such matters, and that provided he does not assent rashly, he is\nnot to be blamed.\n\nSuch an opinion, however, is not fitting as regards the integrity of\nthe primitive state of life; because, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei\nxiv, 10), in that state of life \"sin was avoided without struggle, and\nwhile it remained so, no evil could exist.\" Now it is clear that as\ntruth is the good of the intellect, so falsehood is its evil, as the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). So that, as long as the state of\ninnocence continued, it was impossible for the human intellect to\nassent to falsehood as if it were truth. For as some perfections, such\nas clarity, were lacking in the bodily members of the first man,\nthough no evil could be therein; so there could be in his intellect\nthe absence of some knowledge, but no false opinion.\n\nThis is clear also from the very rectitude of the primitive state, by\nvirtue of which, while the soul remained subject to God, the lower\nfaculties in man were subject to the higher, and were no impediment\nto their action. And from what has preceded (Q. 85, A. 6), it is\nclear that as regards its proper object the intellect is ever true;\nand hence it is never deceived of itself; but whatever deception\noccurs must be ascribed to some lower faculty, such as the\nimagination or the like. Hence we see that when the natural power of\njudgment is free we are not deceived by such images, but only when it\nis not free, as is the case in sleep. Therefore it is clear that the\nrectitude of the primitive state was incompatible with deception of\nthe intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Though the woman was deceived before she sinned in\ndeed, still it was not till she had already sinned by interior pride.\nFor Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 30) that \"the woman could not\nhave believed the words of the serpent, had she not already\nacquiesced in the love of her own power, and in a presumption of\nself-conceit.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The woman thought that the serpent had received this\nfaculty, not as acting in accordance with nature, but by virtue of\nsome supernatural operation. We need not, however, follow the Master\nof the Sentences in this point.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Were anything presented to the imagination or sense of\nthe first man, not in accordance with the nature of things, he would\nnot have been deceived, for his reason would have enabled him to\njudge the truth.\n\nReply Obj. 4: A man is not accountable for what occurs during sleep;\nas he has not then the use of his reason, wherein consists man's\nproper action.\n\nReply Obj. 5: If anyone had said something untrue as regards future\ncontingencies, or as regards secret thoughts, man in the primitive\nstate would not have believed it was so: but he might have believed\nthat such a thing was possible; which would not have been to\nentertain a false opinion.\n\nIt might also be said that he would have been divinely guided from\nabove, so as not to be deceived in a matter to which his knowledge\ndid not extend.\n\nIf any object, as some do, that he was not guided, when tempted,\nthough he was then most in need of guidance, we reply that man had\nalready sinned in his heart, and that he failed to have recourse to\nthe Divine aid.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 95\n\nOF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE FIRST MAN'S WILL--NAMELY, GRACE AND\nRIGHTEOUSNESS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe next consider what belongs to the will of the first man; concerning\nwhich there are two points of treatment:\n\n(1) the grace and righteousness of the first man;\n\n(2) the use of righteousness as regards his dominion over other things.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the first man was created in grace?\n\n(2) Whether in the state of innocence he had passions of the soul?\n\n(3) Whether he had all virtues?\n\n(4) Whether what he did would have been as meritorious as now?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the First Man Was Created in Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the first man was not created in\ngrace. For the Apostle, distinguishing between Adam and Christ, says\n(1 Cor. 15:45): \"The first Adam was made into a living soul; the last\nAdam into a quickening spirit.\" But the spirit is quickened by grace.\nTherefore Christ alone was made in grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test., qu. 123)\n[*Work of an anonymous author, among the supposititious works of St.\nAugustine] that \"Adam did not possess the Holy Ghost.\" But whoever\npossesses grace has the Holy Ghost. Therefore Adam was not created in\ngrace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Correp. et Grat. x) that \"God so\nordered the life of the angels and men, as to show first what they\ncould do by free-will, then what they could do by His grace, and by\nthe discernment of righteousness.\" God thus first created men and\nangels in the state of natural free-will only; and afterwards\nbestowed grace on them.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii, D, xxiv): \"When man was\ncreated he was given sufficient help to stand, but not sufficient to\nadvance.\" But whoever has grace can advance by merit. Therefore the\nfirst man was not created in grace.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the reception of grace requires the consent of the\nrecipient, since thereby a kind of spiritual marriage takes place\nbetween God and the soul. But consent presupposes existence.\nTherefore man did not receive grace in the first moment of his\ncreation.\n\nObj. 6: Further, nature is more distant from grace than grace is from\nglory, which is but grace consummated. But in man grace precedes\nglory. Therefore much more did nature precede grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Man and angel are both ordained to grace. But the\nangels were created in grace, for Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii, 9):\n\"God at the same time fashioned their nature and endowed them with\ngrace.\" Therefore man also was created in grace.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some say that man was not created in grace; but that\nit was bestowed on him subsequently before sin: and many authorities of\nthe Saints declare that man possessed grace in the state of innocence.\n\nBut the very rectitude of the primitive state, wherewith man was\nendowed by God, seems to require that, as others say, he was created\nin grace, according to Eccles. 7:30, \"God made man right.\" For this\nrectitude consisted in his reason being subject to God, the lower\npowers to reason, and the body to the soul: and the first subjection\nwas the cause of both the second and the third; since while reason was\nsubject to God, the lower powers remained subject to reason, as\nAugustine says [*Cf. De Civ. Dei xiii, 13; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss.\ni, 16]. Now it is clear that such a subjection of the body to the soul\nand of the lower powers to reason, was not from nature; otherwise it\nwould have remained after sin; since even in the demons the natural\ngifts remained after sin, as Dionysius declared (Div. Nom. iv). Hence\nit is clear that also the primitive subjection by virtue of which\nreason was subject to God, was not a merely natural gift, but a\nsupernatural endowment of grace; for it is not possible that the\neffect should be of greater efficiency than the cause. Hence Augustine\nsays (De Civ. Dei xiii, 13) that, \"as soon as they disobeyed the\nDivine command, and forfeited Divine grace, they were ashamed of their\nnakedness, for they felt the impulse of disobedience in the flesh, as\nthough it were a punishment corresponding to their own disobedience.\"\nHence if the loss of grace dissolved the obedience of the flesh to the\nsoul, we may gather that the inferior powers were subjected to the\nsoul through grace existing therein.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Apostle in these words means to show that there\nis a spiritual body, if there is an animal body, inasmuch as the\nspiritual life of the body began in Christ, who is \"the firstborn\nof the dead,\" as the body's animal life began in Adam. From the\nApostle's words, therefore, we cannot gather that Adam had no\nspiritual life in his soul; but that he had not spiritual life as\nregards the body.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in the same passage, it is not\ndisputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted\nwith the Holy Ghost; but \"he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the\nfaithful possess Him now,\" who are admitted to eternal happiness\ndirectly after death.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This passage from Augustine does not assert that angels\nor men were created with natural free-will before they possessed\ngrace; but that God shows first what their free-will could do before\nbeing confirmed in grace, and what they acquired afterwards by being\nso confirmed.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The Master here speaks according to the opinion of\nthose who held that man was not created in grace, but only in a state\nof nature. We may also say that, though man was created in grace, yet\nit was not by virtue of the nature wherein he was created that he\ncould advance by merit, but by virtue of the grace which was added.\n\nReply Obj. 5: As the motion of the will is not continuous there is\nnothing against the first man having consented to grace even in the\nfirst moment of his existence.\n\nReply Obj. 6: We merit glory by an act of grace; but we do not merit\ngrace by an act of nature; hence the comparison fails.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Passions Existed in the Soul of the First Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions.\nFor by the passions of the soul \"the flesh lusteth against the spirit\"\n(Gal. 5:7). But this did not happen in the state of innocence.\nTherefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the\nsoul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body\nwas impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral\nvirtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore the\npassions were entirely excluded from him.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that \"in our\nfirst parents there was undisturbed love of God,\" and other passions\nof the soul.\n\n_I answer that,_ The passions of the soul are in the sensual\nappetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some\npassions of the soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy;\nothers to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the\nprimitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any\ngood wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as\nAugustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion\nwith evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither\nhad he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed\nthen, as burning concupiscence. But those passions which regard\npresent good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had\nat the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed\nin the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in\nourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is\nnot entirely subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall\nand hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's\njudgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some\nextent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was\nwholly subject to reason: so that in that state the passions of the\nsoul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of\nthe passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of\ninnocence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The human body was impassible in the state of innocence\nas regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as\nwill be explained later on (Q. 97, A. 2); likewise the soul was\nimpassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of\nreason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away\nthe passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he\nought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in _Ethic._\niii, 11.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Adam Had All the Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that Adam had not all the virtues. For\nsome virtues are directed to curb passions: thus immoderate\nconcupiscence is restrained by temperance, and immoderate fear by\nfortitude. But in the state of innocence no immoderation existed\nin the passions. Therefore neither did these virtues then exist.\n\nObj. 2: Further, some virtues are concerned with the passions which\nhave evil as their object; as meekness with anger; fortitude with\nfear. But these passions did not exist in the state of innocence, as\nstated above (A. 2). Therefore neither did those virtues exist then.\n\nObj. 3: Further, penance is a virtue that regards sin committed.\nMercy, too, is a virtue concerned with unhappiness. But in the state\nof innocence neither sin nor unhappiness existed. Therefore neither\ndid those virtues exist.\n\nObj. 4: Further, perseverance is a virtue. But Adam possessed it not;\nas proved by his subsequent sin. Therefore he possessed not every\nvirtue.\n\nObj. 5: Further, faith is a virtue. But it did not exist in the state\nof innocence; for it implies an obscurity of knowledge which seems to\nbe incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in a homily (Serm. contra\nJudaeos): \"The prince of sin overcame Adam who was made from the\nslime of the earth to the image of God, adorned with modesty,\nrestrained by temperance, refulgent with brightness.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ in the state of innocence man in a certain sense\npossessed all the virtues; and this can be proved from what precedes.\nFor it was shown above (A. 1) that such was the rectitude of the\nprimitive state, that reason was subject to God, and the lower powers\nto reason. Now the virtues are nothing but those perfections whereby\nreason is directed to God, and the inferior powers regulated according\nto the dictate of reason, as will be explained in the Treatise on the\nVirtues (I-II, Q. 63, A. 2). Wherefore the rectitude of the\nprimitive state required that man should in a sense possess every\nvirtue.\n\nIt must, however, be noted that some virtues of their very nature do\nnot involve imperfection, such as charity and justice; and these\nvirtues did exist in the primitive state absolutely, both in habit\nand in act. But other virtues are of such a nature as to imply\nimperfection either in their act, or on the part of the matter. If\nsuch imperfection be consistent with the perfection of the primitive\nstate, such virtues necessarily existed in that state; as faith, which\nis of things not seen, and hope which is of things not yet possessed.\nFor the perfection of that state did not extend to the vision of the\nDivine Essence, and the possession of God with the enjoyment of final\nbeatitude. Hence faith and hope could exist in the primitive state,\nboth as to habit and as to act. But any virtue which implies\nimperfection incompatible with the perfection of the primitive state,\ncould exist in that state as a habit, but not as to the act; for\ninstance, penance, which is sorrow for sin committed; and mercy, which\nis sorrow for others' unhappiness; because sorrow, guilt, and\nunhappiness are incompatible with the perfection of the primitive\nstate. Wherefore such virtues existed as habits in the first man, but\nnot as to their acts; for he was so disposed that he would repent, if\nthere had been a sin to repent for; and had he seen unhappiness in his\nneighbor, he would have done his best to remedy it. This is in\naccordance with what the Philosopher says, \"Shame, which regards what\nis ill done, may be found in a virtuous man, but only conditionally;\nas being so disposed that he would be ashamed if he did wrong\" (Ethic.\niv, 9).\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is accidental to temperance and fortitude to subdue\nsuperabundant passion, in so far as they are in a subject which\nhappens to have superabundant passions, and yet those virtues are\n_per se_ competent to moderate the passions.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Passions which have evil for their object were\nincompatible with the perfection of the primitive state, if that evil\nbe in the one affected by the passion; such as fear and sorrow. But\npassions which relate to evil in another are not incompatible with\nthe perfection of the primitive state; for in that state man could\nhate the demons' malice, as he could love God's goodness. Thus the\nvirtues which relate to such passions could exist in the primitive\nstate, in habit and in act. Virtues, however, relating to passions\nwhich regard evil in the same subject, if relating to such passions\nonly, could not exist in the primitive state in act, but only in\nhabit, as we have said above of penance and of mercy. But other\nvirtues there are which have relation not to such passions only, but\nto others; such as temperance, which relates not only to sorrow, but\nalso to joy; and fortitude, which relates not only to fear, but also\nto daring and hope. Thus the act of temperance could exist in the\nprimitive state, so far as it moderates pleasure; and in like manner,\nfortitude, as moderating daring and hope, but not as moderating\nsorrow and fear.\n\nReply Obj. 3: appears from what has been said above.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Perseverance may be taken in two ways: in one sense as\na particular virtue, signifying a habit whereby a man makes a choice\nof persevering in good; in that sense Adam possessed perseverance. In\nanother sense it is taken as a circumstance of virtue; signifying a\ncertain uninterrupted continuation of virtue; in which sense Adam did\nnot possess perseverance.\n\nReply Obj. 5: appears from what has been said above.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 95, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Actions of the First Man Were Less Meritorious Than Ours\nAre?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the actions of the first man were\nless meritorious than ours are. For grace is given to us through the\nmercy of God, Who succors most those who are most in need. Now we are\nmore in need of grace than was man in the state of innocence.\nTherefore grace is more copiously poured out upon us; and since grace\nis the source of merit, our actions are more meritorious.\n\nObj. 2: Further, struggle and difficulty are required for merit; for\nit is written (2 Tim. 2:5): \"He . . . is not crowned except he strive\nlawfully\" and the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3): \"The object of\nvirtue is the difficult and the good.\" But there is more strife and\ndifficulty now. Therefore there is greater efficacy for merit.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Master says (Sent. ii., D, xxiv) that \"man would\nnot have merited in resisting temptation; whereas he does merit now,\nwhen he resists.\" Therefore our actions are more meritorious than in\nthe primitive state.\n\n_On the contrary,_ if such were the case, man would be better off\nafter sinning.\n\n_I answer that,_ Merit as regards degree may be gauged in two ways.\nFirst, in its root, which is grace and charity. Merit thus measured\ncorresponds in degree to the essential reward, which consists in the\nenjoyment of God; for the greater the charity whence our actions\nproceed, the more perfectly shall we enjoy God. Secondly, the degree\nof merit is measured by the degree of the action itself. This degree\nis of two kinds, absolute and proportional. The widow who put two\nmites into the treasury performed a deed of absolutely less degree\nthan the others who put great sums therein. But in proportionate\ndegree the widow gave more, as Our Lord said; because she gave more in\nproportion to her means. In each of these cases the degree of merit\ncorresponds to the accidental reward, which consists in rejoicing for\ncreated good.\n\nWe conclude therefore that in the state of innocence man's works were\nmore meritorious than after sin was committed, if we consider the\ndegree of merit on the part of grace, which would have been more\ncopious as meeting with no obstacle in human nature: and in like\nmanner, if we consider the absolute degree of the work done; because,\nas man would have had greater virtue, he would have performed greater\nworks. But if we consider the proportionate degree, a greater reason\nfor merit exists after sin, on account of man's weakness; because a\nsmall deed is more beyond the capacity of one who works with\ndifficulty than a great deed is beyond one who performs it easily.\n\nReply Obj. 1: After sin man requires grace for more things than\nbefore sin; but he does not need grace more; forasmuch as man even\nbefore sin required grace to obtain eternal life, which is the chief\nreason for the need of grace. But after sin man required grace also\nfor the remission of sin, and for the support of his weakness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Difficulty and struggle belong to the degree of merit\naccording to the proportionate degree of the work done, as above\nexplained. It is also a sign of the will's promptitude striving after\nwhat is difficult to itself: and the promptitude of the will is\ncaused by the intensity of charity. Yet it may happen that a person\nperforms an easy deed with as prompt a will as another performs an\narduous deed; because he is ready to do even what may be difficult to\nhim. But the actual difficulty, by its penal character, enables the\ndeed to satisfy for sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The first man would not have gained merit in resisting\ntemptation, according to the opinion of those who say that he did not\npossess grace; even as now there is no merit to those who have not\ngrace. But in this point there is a difference, inasmuch as in the\nprimitive state there was no interior impulse to evil, as in our\npresent state. Hence man was more able then than now to resist\ntemptation even without grace.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 96\n\nOF THE MASTERSHIP BELONGING TO MAN IN THE STATE OF INNOCENCE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe next consider the mastership which belonged to man in the state of\ninnocence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals?\n\n(2) Whether he was master over all creatures?\n\n(3) Whether in the state of innocence all men were equal?\n\n(4) Whether in that state man would have been master over men?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 96, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Adam in the State of Innocence Had Mastership Over the\nAnimals?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence Adam had\nno mastership over the animals. For Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix,\n14), that the animals were brought to Adam, under the direction of\nthe angels, to receive their names from him. But the angels need not\nhave intervened thus, if man himself were master over the animals.\nTherefore in the state of innocence man had no mastership of the\nanimals.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is unfitting that elements hostile to one another\nshould be brought under the mastership of one. But many animals are\nhostile to one another, as the sheep and the wolf. Therefore all\nanimals were not brought under the mastership of man.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Jerome says [*The words quoted are not in St.\nJerome's works. St. Thomas may have had in mind Bede, Hexaem., as\nquoted in the Glossa ordinaria on Gen. 1:26]: \"God gave man\nmastership over the animals, although before sin he had no need of\nthem: for God foresaw that after sin animals would become useful to\nman.\" Therefore, at least before sin, it was unfitting for man to\nmake use of his mastership.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is proper to a master to command. But a command\nis not given rightly save to a rational being. Therefore man had no\nmastership over the irrational animals.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:26): \"Let him have dominion\nover the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and the beasts\nof the earth\" [Vulg.\"and the whole earth\"].\n\n_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 95, A. 1) for his disobedience\nto God, man was punished by the disobedience of those creatures which\nshould be subject to him. Therefore in the state of innocence, before\nman had disobeyed, nothing disobeyed him that was naturally subject\nto him. Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be\nproved in three ways. First, from the order observed by nature; for\njust as in the generation of things we perceive a certain order of\nprocession of the perfect from the imperfect (thus matter is for the\nsake of form; and the imperfect form, for the sake of the perfect),\nso also is there order in the use of natural things; thus the\nimperfect are for the use of the perfect; as the plants make use of\nthe earth for their nourishment, and animals make use of plants, and\nman makes use of both plants and animals. Therefore it is in keeping\nwith the order of nature, that man should be master over animals.\nHence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 5) that the hunting of wild\nanimals is just and natural, because man thereby exercises a natural\nright. Secondly, this is proved by the order of Divine Providence\nwhich always governs inferior things by the superior. Wherefore, as\nman, being made to the image of God, is above other animals, these\nare rightly subject to his government. Thirdly, this is proved from a\nproperty of man and of other animals. For we see in the latter a\ncertain participated prudence of natural instinct, in regard to\ncertain particular acts; whereas man possesses a universal prudence\nas regards all practical matters. Now whatever is participated is\nsubject to what is essential and universal. Therefore the subjection\nof other animals to man is proved to be natural.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A higher power can do many things that an inferior\npower cannot do to those which are subject to them. Now an angel is\nnaturally higher than man. Therefore certain things in regard to\nanimals could be done by angels, which could not be done by man; for\ninstance, the rapid gathering together of all the animals.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In the opinion of some, those animals which now are\nfierce and kill others, would, in that state, have been tame, not\nonly in regard to man, but also in regard to other animals. But this\nis quite unreasonable. For the nature of animals was not changed by\nman's sin, as if those whose nature now it is to devour the flesh of\nothers, would then have lived on herbs, as the lion and falcon. Nor\ndoes Bede's gloss on Gen. 1:30, say that trees and herbs were given\nas food to all animals and birds, but to some. Thus there would have\nbeen a natural antipathy between some animals. They would not,\nhowever, on this account have been excepted from the mastership of\nman: as neither at present are they for that reason excepted from the\nmastership of God, Whose Providence has ordained all this. Of this\nProvidence man would have been the executor, as appears even now in\nregard to domestic animals, since fowls are given by men as food to\nthe trained falcon.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the state of innocence man would not have had any\nbodily need of animals--neither for clothing, since then they were\nnaked and not ashamed, there being no inordinate motions of\nconcupiscence--nor for food, since they fed on the trees of\nparadise--nor to carry him about, his body being strong enough for\nthat purpose. But man needed animals in order to have experimental\nknowledge of their natures. This is signified by the fact that God\nled the animals to man, that he might give them names expressive of\ntheir respective natures.\n\nReply Obj. 4: All animals by their natural instinct have a certain\nparticipation of prudence and reason: which accounts for the fact\nthat cranes follow their leader, and bees obey their queen. So all\nanimals would have obeyed man of their own accord, as in the present\nstate some domestic animals obey him.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 96, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Man Had Mastership Over All Other Creatures?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would\nnot have had mastership over all other creatures. For an angel\nnaturally has a greater power than man. But, as Augustine says (De\nTrin. iii, 8), \"corporeal matter would not have obeyed even the holy\nangels.\" Much less therefore would it have obeyed man in the state\nof innocence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the only powers of the soul existing in plants are\nnutritive, augmentative, and generative. Now these do not naturally\nobey reason; as we can see in the case of any one man. Therefore,\nsince it is by his reason that man is competent to have mastership,\nit seems that in the state of innocence man had no dominion over\nplants.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whosoever is master of a thing, can change it. But\nman could not have changed the course of the heavenly bodies; for\nthis belongs to God alone, as Dionysius says (Ep. ad Polycarp. vii).\nTherefore man had no dominion over them.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:26): \"That he may have\ndominion over . . . every creature.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Man in a certain sense contains all things; and so\naccording as he is master of what is within himself, in the same way\nhe can have mastership over other things. Now we may consider four\nthings in man: his _reason,_ which makes him like to the angels; his\n_sensitive powers,_ whereby he is like the animals; his _natural\nforces,_ which liken him to the plants; and _the body itself,_ wherein\nhe is like to inanimate things. Now in man reason has the position of\na master and not of a subject. Wherefore man had no mastership over\nthe angels in the primitive state; so when we read \"all creatures,\" we\nmust understand the creatures which are not made to God's image. Over\nthe sensitive powers, as the irascible and concupiscible, which obey\nreason in some degree, the soul has mastership by commanding. So in\nthe state of innocence man had mastership over the animals by\ncommanding them. But of the natural powers and the body itself man is\nmaster not by commanding, but by using them. Thus also in the state of\ninnocence man's mastership over plants and inanimate things consisted\nnot in commanding or in changing them, but in making use of them\nwithout hindrance.\n\nThe answers to the objections appear from the above.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 96, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Men Were Equal in the State of Innocence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence all would\nhave been equal. For Gregory says (Moral. xxi): \"Where there is no\nsin, there is no inequality.\" But in the state of innocence there\nwas no sin. Therefore all were equal.\n\nObj. 2: Further, likeness and equality are the basis of mutual love,\naccording to Ecclus. 13:19, \"Every beast loveth its like; so also\nevery man him that is nearest to himself.\" Now in that state there\nwas among men an abundance of love, which is the bond of peace.\nTherefore all were equal in the state of innocence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the cause ceasing, the effect also ceases. But the\ncause of present inequality among men seems to arise, on the part of\nGod, from the fact that He rewards some and punishes others; and on\nthe part of nature, from the fact that some, through a defect of\nnature, are born weak and deficient, others strong and perfect, which\nwould not have been the case in the primitive state. Therefore, etc.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 13:1): \"The things which are\nof God, are well ordered\" [Vulg.\"Those that are, are ordained of\nGod\"]. But order chiefly consists in inequality; for Augustine says\n(De Civ. Dei xix, 13): \"Order disposes things equal and unequal in\ntheir proper place.\" Therefore in the primitive state, which was\nmost proper and orderly, inequality would have existed.\n\n_I answer that,_ We must needs admit that in the primitive state there\nwould have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because\ngeneration depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age;\nfor some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union have\nbeen sterile.\n\nMoreover, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to\nrighteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of necessity, but of\nhis own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or\nless, to action, desire, or knowledge; hence some would have made a\ngreater advance in virtue and knowledge than others.\n\nThere might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was\nnot entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from\nexterior sources more or less advantage and help: since indeed it was\ndependent on food wherewith to sustain life.\n\nSo we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the\nstars, some would have been born more robust in body than others, and\nalso greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed; so\nthat, however, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been\nno defect or fault either in soul or body.\n\nReply Obj. 1: By those words Gregory means to exclude such inequality\nas exists between virtue and vice; the result of which is that some\nare placed in subjection to others as a penalty.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Equality is the cause of equality in mutual love. Yet\nbetween those who are unequal there can be a greater love than\nbetween equals; although there be not an equal response: for a father\nnaturally loves his son more than a brother loves his brother;\nalthough the son does not love his father as much as he is loved by\nhim.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The cause of inequality could be on the part of God;\nnot indeed that He would punish some and reward others, but that He\nwould exalt some above others; so that the beauty of order would the\nmore shine forth among men. Inequality might also arise on the part\nof nature as above described, without any defect of nature.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 96, Art. 4]\n\nWhether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Master Over Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man would\nnot have been master over man. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix,\n15): \"God willed that man, who was endowed with reason and made to His\nimage, should rule over none but irrational creatures; not over men,\nbut over cattle.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, what came into the world as a penalty for sin would\nnot have existed in the state of innocence. But man was made subject\nto man as a penalty; for after sin it was said to the woman (Gen.\n3:16): \"Thou shalt be under thy husband's power.\" Therefore in the\nstate of innocence man would not have been subject to man.\n\nObj. 3: Further, subjection is opposed to liberty. But liberty is one\nof the chief blessings, and would not have been lacking in the state\nof innocence, \"where nothing was wanting that man's good-will could\ndesire,\" as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore man would\nnot have been master over man in the state of innocence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The condition of man in the state of innocence was\nnot more exalted than the condition of the angels. But among the\nangels some rule over others; and so one order is called that of\n\"Dominations.\" Therefore it was not beneath the dignity of the state\nof innocence that one man should be subject to another.\n\n_I answer that,_ Mastership has a twofold meaning. First, as opposed\nto slavery, in which sense a master means one to whom another is\nsubject as a slave. In another sense mastership is referred in a\ngeneral sense to any kind of subject; and in this sense even he who\nhas the office of governing and directing free men, can be called a\nmaster. In the state of innocence man could have been a master of\nmen, not in the former but in the latter sense. This distinction is\nfounded on the reason that a slave differs from a free man in that\nthe latter has the disposal of himself, as is stated in the beginning\nof the _Metaphysics,_ whereas a slave is ordered to another. So that\none man is master of another as his slave when he refers the one\nwhose master he is, to his own--namely the master's use. And since\nevery man's proper good is desirable to himself, and consequently it\nis a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another what ought to be\none's own, therefore such dominion implies of necessity a pain\ninflicted on the subject; and consequently in the state of innocence\nsuch a mastership could not have existed between man and man.\n\nBut a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either\ntowards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of\nmastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man\nand man, for two reasons. First, because man is naturally a social\nbeing, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social\nlife. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless\nunder the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many,\nas such, seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. Wherefore\nthe Philosopher says, in the beginning of the _Politics,_ that\nwherever many things are directed to one, we shall always find one at\nthe head directing them. Secondly, if one man surpassed another in\nknowledge and virtue, this would not have been fitting unless these\ngifts conduced to the benefit of others, according to 1 Pet. 4:10,\n\"As every man hath received grace, ministering the same one to\nanother.\" Wherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 14): \"Just men\ncommand not by the love of domineering, but by the service of\ncounsel\": and (De Civ. Dei xix, 15): \"The natural order of things\nrequires this; and thus did God make man.\"\n\nFrom this appear the replies to the objections which are founded on\nthe first-mentioned mode of mastership.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 97\n\nOF THE PRESERVATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE PRIMITIVE STATE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe next consider what belongs to the bodily state of the first man:\nfirst, as regards the preservation of the individual; secondly, as\nregards the preservation of the species.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether man in the state of innocence was immortal?\n\n(2) Whether he was impassible?\n\n(3) Whether he stood in need of food?\n\n(4) Whether he would have obtained immortality by the tree of life?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 1]\n\nWhether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Immortal?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was not\nimmortal. For the term \"mortal\" belongs to the definition of man. But\nif you take away the definition, you take away the thing defined.\nTherefore as long as man was man he could not be immortal.\n\nObj. 2: Further, corruptible and incorruptible are generically\ndistinct, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, Did. ix, 10). But there\ncan be no passing from one genus to another. Therefore if the first\nman was incorruptible, man could not be corruptible in the present\nstate.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if man were immortal in the state of innocence,\nthis would have been due either to nature or to grace. Not to nature,\nfor since nature does not change within the same species, he would\nalso have been immortal now. Likewise neither would this be owing to\ngrace; for the first man recovered grace by repentance, according to\nWis. 10:2: \"He brought him out of his sins.\" Hence he would have\nregained his immortality; which is clearly not the case. Therefore\nman was not immortal in the state of innocence.\n\nObj. 4: Further, immortality is promised to man as a reward,\naccording to Apoc. 21:4: \"Death shall be no more.\" But man was not\ncreated in the state of reward, but that he might deserve the reward.\nTherefore man was not immortal in the state of innocence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 5:12): \"By sin death came into\nthe world.\" Therefore man was immortal before sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing may be incorruptible in three ways. First,\non the part of matter--that is to say, either because it possesses\nno matter, like an angel; or because it possesses matter that is in\npotentiality to one form only, like the heavenly bodies. Such things\nas these are incorruptible by their very nature. Secondly, a thing is\nincorruptible in its form, inasmuch as being by nature corruptible,\nyet it has an inherent disposition which preserves it wholly from\ncorruption; and this is called incorruptibility of glory; because as\nAugustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.): \"God made man's soul of such a\npowerful nature, that from its fulness of beatitude, there redounds\nto the body a fulness of health, with the vigor of incorruption.\"\nThirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its efficient\ncause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state\nof innocence. For, as Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19\n[*Work of an anonymous author], among the supposititious works of St.\nAugustine): \"God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that\nhe might achieve for himself life or death.\" For man's body was\nindissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but\nby reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby\nit was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it\nremained itself subject to God. This entirely agrees with reason; for\nsince the rational soul surpasses the capacity of corporeal matter,\nas above explained (Q. 76, A. 1), it was most properly endowed at\nthe beginning with the power of preserving the body in a manner\nsurpassing the capacity of corporeal matter.\n\nReply Obj. 1 and 2: These objections are founded on natural\nincorruptibility and immortality.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This power of preserving the body was not natural to\nthe soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace\nas regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not\nrecover immortality, the loss of which was an effect of sin; for this\nwas reserved for Christ to accomplish, by Whom the defect of nature\nwas to be restored into something better, as we shall explain further\non (III, Q. 14, A. 4, ad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 4: The promised reward of the immortality of glory differs\nfrom the immortality which was bestowed on man in the state of\ninnocence.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 2]\n\nWhether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Been Passible?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man was\npassible. For \"sensation is a kind of passion.\" But in the state of\ninnocence man would have been sensitive. Therefore he would have been\npassible.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sleep is a kind of passion. Now, man slept in the\nstate of innocence, according to Gen. 2:21, \"God cast a deep sleep\nupon Adam.\" Therefore he would have been passible.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the same passage goes on to say that \"He took a rib\nout of Adam.\" Therefore he was passible even to the degree of the\ncutting out of part of his body.\n\nObj. 4: Further, man's body was soft. But a soft body is naturally\npassible as regards a hard body; therefore if a hard body had come in\ncontact with the soft body of the first man, the latter would have\nsuffered from the impact. Therefore the first man was passible.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Had man been passible, he would have been also\ncorruptible, because, as the Philosopher says (Top. vi, 3): \"Excessive\nsuffering wastes the very substance.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ \"Passion\" may be taken in two senses. First, in its\nproper sense, and thus a thing is said to suffer when changed from\nits natural disposition. For passion is the effect of action; and in\nnature contraries are mutually active or passive, according as one\nthing changes another from its natural disposition. Secondly,\n\"passion\" can be taken in a general sense for any kind of change,\neven if belonging to the perfecting process of nature. Thus\nunderstanding and sensation are said to be passions. In this second\nsense, man was passible in the state of innocence, and was passive\nboth in soul and body. In the first sense, man was impassible, both\nin soul and body, as he was likewise immortal; for he could curb his\npassion, as he could avoid death, so long as he refrained from sin.\n\nThus it is clear how to reply to the first two objections; since\nsensation and sleep do not remove from man his natural disposition,\nbut are ordered to his natural welfare.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As already explained (Q. 92, A. 3, ad 2), the rib was\nin Adam as the principle of the human race, as the semen in man, who\nis a principle through generation. Hence as man does not suffer any\nnatural deterioration by seminal issue; so neither did he through the\nseparation of the rib.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Man's body in the state of innocence could be preserved\nfrom suffering injury from a hard body; partly by the use of his\nreason, whereby he could avoid what was harmful; and partly also by\nDivine Providence, so preserving him, that nothing of a harmful\nnature could come upon him unawares.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 3]\n\nWhether in the State of Innocence Man Had Need of Food?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence man did not\nrequire food. For food is necessary for man to restore what he has\nlost. But Adam's body suffered no loss, as being incorruptible.\nTherefore he had no need of food.\n\nObj. 2: Further, food is needed for nourishment. But nourishment\ninvolves passibility. Since, then, man's body was impassible; it does\nnot appear how food could be needful to him.\n\nObj. 3: Further, we need food for the preservation of life. But Adam\ncould preserve his life otherwise; for had he not sinned, he would\nnot have died. Therefore he did not require food.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the consumption of food involves voiding of the\nsurplus, which seems unsuitable to the state of innocence. Therefore\nit seems that man did not take food in the primitive state.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:16): \"Of every tree in\nparadise ye shall [Vulg. 'thou shalt'] eat.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In the state of innocence man had an animal life\nrequiring food; but after the resurrection he will have a spiritual\nlife needing no food. In order to make this clear, we must observe\nthat the rational soul is both soul and spirit. It is called a soul\nby reason of what it possesses in common with other souls--that is,\nas giving life to the body; whence it is written (Gen. 2:7): \"Man was\nmade into a living soul\"; that is, a soul giving life to the body.\nBut the soul is called a spirit according to what properly belongs to\nitself, and not to other souls, as possessing an intellectual\nimmaterial power.\n\nThus in the primitive state, the rational soul communicated to the\nbody what belonged to itself as a soul; and so the body was called\n\"animal\" [*From 'anima', a soul; Cf. 1 Cor. 15:44 seqq.], through\nhaving its life from the soul. Now the first principle of life in\nthese inferior creatures as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4) is\nthe vegetative soul: the operations of which are the use of food,\ngeneration, and growth. Wherefore such operations befitted man in the\nstate of innocence. But in the final state, after the resurrection,\nthe soul will, to a certain extent, communicate to the body what\nproperly belongs to itself as a spirit; immortality to everyone,\nimpassibility, glory, and power to the good, whose bodies will be\ncalled \"spiritual.\" So, after the resurrection, man will not require\nfood; whereas he required it in the state of innocence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19\n[*Works of an anonymous author], among the supposititious works of St.\nAugustine): \"How could man have an immortal body, which was sustained\nby food? Since an immortal being needs neither food nor drink.\" For\nwe have explained (A. 1) that the immortality of the primitive state\nwas based on a supernatural force in the soul, and not on any\nintrinsic disposition of the body: so that by the action of heat, the\nbody might lose part of its humid qualities; and to prevent the\nentire consumption of the humor, man was obliged to take food.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A certain passion and alteration attends nutriment, on\nthe part of the food changed into the substance of the thing\nnourished. So we cannot thence conclude that man's body was passible,\nbut that the food taken was passible; although this kind of passion\nconduced to the perfection of the nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If man had not taken food he would have sinned; as he\nalso sinned by taking the forbidden fruit. For he was told at the\nsame time, to abstain from the tree of knowledge of good and evil,\nand to eat of every other tree of Paradise.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Some say that in the state of innocence man would not\nhave taken more than necessary food, so that there would have been\nnothing superfluous; which, however, is unreasonable to suppose, as\nimplying that there would have been no faecal matter. Wherefore there\nwas need for voiding the surplus, yet so disposed by God as to be\ndecorous and suitable to the state.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 4]\n\nWhether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Acquired Immortality\nby the Tree of Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the tree of life could not be the\ncause of immortality. For nothing can act beyond its own species; as\nan effect does not exceed its cause. But the tree of life was\ncorruptible, otherwise it could not be taken as food; since food is\nchanged into the substance of the thing nourished. Therefore the tree\nof life could not give incorruptibility or immortality.\n\nObj. 2: Further, effects caused by the forces of plants and other\nnatural agencies are natural. If therefore the tree of life caused\nimmortality, this would have been natural immortality.\n\nObj. 3: Further, this would seem to be reduced to the ancient fable,\nthat the gods, by eating a certain food, became immortal; which the\nPhilosopher ridicules (Metaph. iii, Did. ii, 4).\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 3:22): \"Lest perhaps he put\nforth his hand, and take of the tree of life, and eat, and live for\never.\" Further, Augustine says (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work\nof an anonymous author], among the supposititious works of St.\nAugustine): \"A taste of the tree of life warded off corruption of the\nbody; and even after sin man would have remained immortal, had he\nbeen allowed to eat of the tree of life.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The tree of life in a certain degree was the cause of\nimmortality, but not absolutely. To understand this, we must observe\nthat in the primitive state man possessed, for the preservation of\nlife, two remedies, against two defects. One of these defects was the\nlost of humidity by the action of natural heat, which acts as the\nsoul's instrument: as a remedy against such loss man was provided with\nfood, taken from the other trees of paradise, as now we are provided\nwith the food, which we take for the same purpose. The second defect,\nas the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), arises from the fact that\nthe humor which is caused from extraneous sources, being added to the\nhumor already existing, lessens the specific active power: as water\nadded to wine takes at first the taste of wine, then, as more water is\nadded, the strength of the wine is diminished, till the wine becomes\nwatery. In like manner, we may observe that at first the active force\nof the species is so strong that it is able to transform so much of\nthe food as is required to replace the lost tissue, as well as what\nsuffices for growth; later on, however, the assimilated food does not\nsuffice for growth, but only replaces what is lost. Last of all, in\nold age, it does not suffice even for this purpose; whereupon the body\ndeclines, and finally dies from natural causes. Against this defect\nman was provided with a remedy in the tree of life; for its effect was\nto strengthen the force of the species against the weakness resulting\nfrom the admixture of extraneous nutriment. Wherefore Augustine says\n(De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): \"Man had food to appease his hunger, drink to\nslake his thirst; and the tree of life to banish the breaking up of\nold age\"; and (QQ. Vet. et Nov. Test. qu. 19 [*Work of an anonymous\nauthor], among the supposititious works of St. Augustine) \"The tree of\nlife, like a drug, warded off all bodily corruption.\"\n\nYet it did not absolutely cause immortality; for neither was the\nsoul's intrinsic power of preserving the body due to the tree of life,\nnor was it of such efficiency as to give the body a disposition to\nimmortality, whereby it might become indissoluble; which is clear from\nthe fact that every bodily power is finite; so the power of the tree\nof life could not go so far as to give the body the prerogative of\nliving for an infinite time, but only for a definite time. For it is\nmanifest that the greater a force is, the more durable is its effect;\ntherefore, since the power of the tree of life was finite, man's life\nwas to be preserved for a definite time by partaking of it once; and\nwhen that time had elapsed, man was to be either transferred to a\nspiritual life, or had need to eat once more of the tree of life.\n\nFrom this the replies to the objections clearly appear. For the first\nproves that the tree of life did not absolutely cause immortality;\nwhile the others show that it caused incorruption by warding off\ncorruption, according to the explanation above given.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 98\n\nOF THE PRESERVATION OF THE SPECIES\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe next consider what belongs to the preservation of the species; and,\nfirst, of generation; secondly, of the state of the offspring. Under\nthe first head there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether in the state of innocence there would have been\ngeneration?\n\n(2) Whether generation would have been through coition?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [Q. 98, Art. 1]\n\nWhether in the State of Innocence Generation Existed?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem there would have been no generation in the\nstate of innocence. For, as stated in _Phys._ v, 5, \"corruption is\ncontrary to generation.\" But contraries affect the same subject: also\nthere would have been no corruption in the state of innocence.\nTherefore neither would there have been generation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the object of generation is the preservation in the\nspecies of that which is corruptible in the individual. Wherefore\nthere is no generation in those individual things which last for\never. But in the state of innocence man would have lived for ever.\nTherefore in the state of innocence there would have been no\ngeneration.\n\nObj. 3: Further, by generation man is multiplied. But the\nmultiplication of masters requires the division of property, to avoid\nconfusion of mastership. Therefore, since man was made master of the\nanimals, it would have been necessary to make a division of rights\nwhen the human race increased by generation. This is against the\nnatural law, according to which all things are in common, as Isidore\nsays (Etym. v, 4). Therefore there would have been no generation in\nthe state of innocence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:28): \"Increase and multiply,\nand fill the earth.\" But this increase could not come about save by\ngeneration, since the original number of mankind was two only.\nTherefore there would have been generation in the state of innocence.\n\n_I answer that,_ In the state of innocence there would have been\ngeneration of offspring for the multiplication of the human race;\notherwise man's sin would have been very necessary, for such a great\nblessing to be its result. We must, therefore, observe that man, by\nhis nature, is established, as it were, midway between corruptible and\nincorruptible creatures, his soul being naturally incorruptible, while\nhis body is naturally corruptible. We must also observe that nature's\npurpose appears to be different as regards corruptible and\nincorruptible things. For that seems to be the direct purpose of\nnature, which is invariable and perpetual; while what is only for a\ntime is seemingly not the chief purpose of nature, but as it were,\nsubordinate to something else; otherwise, when it ceased to exist,\nnature's purpose would become void.\n\nTherefore, since in things corruptible none is everlasting and\npermanent except the species, it follows that the chief purpose of\nnature is the good of the species; for the preservation of which\nnatural generation is ordained. On the other hand, incorruptible\nsubstances survive, not only in the species, but also in the\nindividual; wherefore even the individuals are included in the chief\npurpose of nature.\n\nHence it belongs to man to beget offspring, on the part of the\nnaturally corruptible body. But on the part of the soul, which is\nincorruptible, it is fitting that the multitude of individuals should\nbe the direct purpose of nature, or rather of the Author of nature,\nWho alone is the Creator of the human soul. Wherefore, to provide for\nthe multiplication of the human race, He established the begetting of\noffspring even in the state of innocence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the state of innocence the human body was in itself\ncorruptible, but it could be preserved from corruption by the soul.\nTherefore, since generation belongs to things corruptible, man was\nnot to be deprived thereof.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although generation in the state of innocence might not\nhave been required for the preservation of the species, yet it would\nhave been required for the multiplication of the individual.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In our present state a division of possessions is\nnecessary on account of the multiplicity of masters, inasmuch as\ncommunity of possession is a source of strife, as the Philosopher\nsays (Politic. ii, 5). In the state of innocence, however, the will\nof men would have been so ordered that without any danger of strife\nthey would have used in common, according to each one's need, those\nthings of which they were masters--a state of things to be observed\neven now among many good men.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 98, Art. 2]\n\nWhether in the State of Innocence There Would Have Been Generation by\nCoition?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that generation by coition would not have\nexisted in the state of innocence. For, as Damascene says (De Fide\nOrth. ii, 11; iv, 25), the first man in the terrestrial Paradise was\n\"like an angel.\" But in the future state of the resurrection, when men\nwill be like the angels, \"they shall neither marry nor be married,\" as\nis written Matt. 22:30. Therefore neither in paradise would there have\nbeen generation by coition.\n\nObj. 2: Further, our first parents were created at the age of perfect\ndevelopment. Therefore, if generation by coition had existed before\nsin, they would have had intercourse while still in paradise: which\nwas not the case according to Scripture (Gen. 4:1).\n\nObj. 3: Further, in carnal intercourse, more than at any other time,\nman becomes like the beasts, on account of the vehement delight which\nhe takes therein; whence contingency is praiseworthy, whereby man\nrefrains from such pleasures. But man is compared to beasts by reason\nof sin, according to Ps. 48:13: \"Man, when he was in honor, did not\nunderstand; he is compared to senseless beasts, and is become like to\nthem.\" Therefore, before sin, there would have been no such\nintercourse of man and woman.\n\nObj. 4: Further, in the state of innocence there would have been no\ncorruption. But virginal integrity is corrupted by intercourse.\nTherefore there would have been no such thing in the state of\ninnocence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ God made man and woman before sin (Gen. 1, 2). But\nnothing is void in God's works. Therefore, even if man had not sinned,\nthere would have been such intercourse, to which the distinction of\nsex is ordained. Moreover, we are told that woman was made to be a\nhelp to man (Gen. 2:18, 20). But she is not fitted to help man except\nin generation, because another man would have proved a more effective\nhelp in anything else. Therefore there would have been such generation\nalso in the state of innocence.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some of the earlier doctors, considering the\nnature of concupiscence as regards generation in our present state,\nconcluded that in the state of innocence generation would not have\nbeen effected in the same way. Thus Gregory of Nyssa says (De Hom.\nOpif. xvii) that in paradise the human race would have been\nmultiplied by some other means, as the angels were multiplied without\ncoition by the operation of the Divine Power. He adds that God made\nman male and female before sin, because He foreknew the mode of\ngeneration which would take place after sin, which He foresaw. But\nthis is unreasonable. For what is natural to man was neither acquired\nnor forfeited by sin. Now it is clear that generation by coition is\nnatural to man by reason of his animal life, which he possessed even\nbefore sin, as above explained (Q. 97, A. 3), just as it is natural\nto other perfect animals, as the corporeal members make it clear. So\nwe cannot allow that these members would not have had a natural use,\nas other members had, before sin.\n\nThus, as regards generation by coition, there are, in the present\nstate of life, two things to be considered. One, which comes from\nnature, is the union of man and woman; for in every act of generation\nthere is an active and a passive principle. Wherefore, since wherever\nthere is distinction of sex, the active principle is male and the\npassive is female; the order of nature demands that for the purpose\nof generation there should be concurrence of male and female. The\nsecond thing to be observed is a certain deformity of excessive\nconcupiscence, which in the state of innocence would not have\nexisted, when the lower powers were entirely subject to reason.\nWherefore Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): \"We must be far from\nsupposing that offspring could not be begotten without concupiscence.\nAll the bodily members would have been equally moved by the will,\nwithout ardent or wanton incentive, with calmness of soul and body.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: In paradise man would have been like an angel in his\nspirituality of mind, yet with an animal life in his body. After the\nresurrection man will be like an angel, spiritualized in soul and\nbody. Wherefore there is no parallel.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 4), our first\nparents did not come together in paradise, because on account of sin\nthey were ejected from paradise shortly after the creation of the\nwoman; or because, having received the general Divine command\nrelative to generation, they awaited the special command relative to\ntime.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Beasts are without reason. In this way man becomes, as\nit were, like them in coition, because he cannot moderate\nconcupiscence. In the state of innocence nothing of this kind would\nhave happened that was not regulated by reason, not because delight\nof sense was less, as some say (rather indeed would sensible delight\nhave been the greater in proportion to the greater purity of nature\nand the greater sensibility of the body), but because the force of\nconcupiscence would not have so inordinately thrown itself into such\npleasure, being curbed by reason, whose place it is not to lessen\nsensual pleasure, but to prevent the force of concupiscence from\ncleaving to it immoderately. By \"immoderately\" I mean going beyond\nthe bounds of reason, as a sober person does not take less pleasure\nin food taken in moderation than the glutton, but his concupiscence\nlingers less in such pleasures. This is what Augustine means by the\nwords quoted, which do not exclude intensity of pleasure from the\nstate of innocence, but ardor of desire and restlessness of the mind.\nTherefore continence would not have been praiseworthy in the state of\ninnocence, whereas it is praiseworthy in our present state, not\nbecause it removes fecundity, but because it excludes inordinate\ndesire. In that state fecundity would have been without lust.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 26): In that state\n\"intercourse would have been without prejudice to virginal integrity;\nthis would have remained intact, as it does in the menses. And just\nas in giving birth the mother was then relieved, not by groans of\npain, but by the instigations of maturity; so in conceiving, the\nunion was one, not of lustful desire, but of deliberate action.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 99\n\nOF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS TO THE BODY\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the condition of the offspring--first, as\nregards the body; secondly, as regards virtue; thirdly, in knowledge.\nUnder the first head there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full\npowers of the body immediately after birth?\n\n(2) Whether all infants would have been of the male sex?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 99, Art. 1]\n\nWhether in the State of Innocence Children Would Have Had Perfect\nStrength of Body As to the Use of Its Members Immediately After Birth?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children\nwould have had perfect strength of the body, as to the use of its\nmembers, immediately after birth. For Augustine says (De Pecc. Merit.\net Remiss. i, 38): \"This weakness of the body befits their weakness\nof mind.\" But in the state of innocence there would have been no\nweakness of mind. Therefore neither would there have been weakness of\nbody in infants.\n\nObj. 2: Further, some animals at birth have sufficient strength to\nuse their members. But man is nobler than other animals. Therefore\nmuch more is it natural to man to have strength to use his members at\nbirth; and thus it appears to be a punishment of sin that he has not\nthat strength.\n\nObj. 3: Further, inability to secure a proffered pleasure causes\naffliction. But if children had not full strength in the use of their\nlimbs, they would often have been unable to procure something\npleasurable offered to them; and so they would have been afflicted,\nwhich was not possible before sin. Therefore, in the state of\ninnocence, children would not have been deprived of the use of their\nlimbs.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the weakness of old age seems to correspond to that\nof infancy. But in the state of innocence there would have been no\nweakness of old age. Therefore neither would there have been such\nweakness in infancy.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Everything generated is first imperfect. But in\nthe state of innocence children would have been begotten by\ngeneration. Therefore from the first they would have been imperfect\nin bodily size and power.\n\n_I answer that,_ By faith alone do we hold truths which are above\nnature, and what we believe rests on authority. Wherefore, in making\nany assertion, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in\nthose things which are above nature, and are made known to us by\nDivine authority. Now it is clear that it is as natural as it is\nbefitting to the principles of human nature that children should not\nhave sufficient strength for the use of their limbs immediately after\nbirth. Because in proportion to other animals man has naturally a\nlarger brain. Wherefore it is natural, on account of the considerable\nhumidity of the brain in children, that the nerves which are\ninstruments of movement, should not be apt for moving the limbs. On\nthe other hand, no Catholic doubts it possible for a child to have, by\nDivine power, the use of its limbs immediately after birth.\n\nNow we have it on the authority of Scripture that \"God made man right\"\n(Eccles. 7:30), which rightness, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv,\n11), consists in the perfect subjection of the body to the soul. As,\ntherefore, in the primitive state it was impossible to find in the\nhuman limbs anything repugnant to man's well-ordered will, so was it\nimpossible for those limbs to fail in executing the will's commands.\nNow the human will is well ordered when it tends to acts which are\nbefitting to man. But the same acts are not befitting to man at every\nseason of life. We must, therefore, conclude that children would not\nhave had sufficient strength for the use of their limbs for the\npurpose of performing every kind of act; but only for the acts\nbefitting the state of infancy, such as suckling, and the like.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the weakness which we observe\nin children even as regards those acts which befit the state of\ninfancy; as is clear from his preceding remark that \"even when close\nto the breast, and longing for it, they are more apt to cry than to\nsuckle.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The fact that some animals have the use of their limbs\nimmediately after birth, is due, not to their superiority, since more\nperfect animals are not so endowed; but to the dryness of the brain,\nand to the operations proper to such animals being imperfect, so that\na small amount of strength suffices them.\n\nReply Obj. 3 is clear from what we have said above. We may add that\nthey would have desired nothing except with an ordinate will; and\nonly what was befitting to their state of life.\n\nReply Obj. 4: In the state of innocence man would have been born, yet\nnot subject to corruption. Therefore in that state there could have\nbeen certain infantile defects which result from birth; but not\nsenile defects leading to corruption.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 99, Art. 2]\n\nWhether, in the Primitive State, Women Would Have Been Born?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in the primitive state woman would\nnot have been born. For the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii,\n3) that woman is a \"misbegotten male,\" as though she were a product\noutside the purpose of nature. But in that state nothing would have\nbeen unnatural in human generation. Therefore in that state women\nwould not have been born.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every agent produces its like, unless prevented by\ninsufficient power or ineptness of matter: thus a small fire cannot\nburn green wood. But in generation the active force is in the male.\nSince, therefore, in the state of innocence man's active force was\nnot subject to defect, nor was there inept matter on the part of the\nwoman, it seems that males would always have been born.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in the state of innocence generation is ordered to\nthe multiplication of the human race. But the race would have been\nsufficiently multiplied by the first man and woman, from the fact\nthat they would have lived for ever. Therefore, in the state of\ninnocence, there was no need for women to be born.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Nature's process in generation would have been in\nharmony with the manner in which it was established by God. But God\nestablished male and female in human nature, as it is written (Gen.\n1, 2). Therefore also in the state of innocence male and female would\nhave been born.\n\n_I answer that,_ Nothing belonging to the completeness of human\nnature would have been lacking in the state of innocence. And as\ndifferent grades belong to the perfection of the universe, so also\ndiversity of sex belongs to the perfection of human nature. Therefore\nin the state of innocence, both sexes would have been begotten.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Woman is said to be a \"misbegotten male,\" as being a\nproduct outside the purpose of nature considered in the individual\ncase: but not against the purpose of universal nature, as above\nexplained (Q. 92, A. 1, ad 2).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The generation of woman is not occasioned either by a\ndefect of the active force or by inept matter, as the objection\nproposes; but sometimes by an extrinsic accidental cause; thus the\nPhilosopher says (De Animal. Histor. vi, 19): \"The northern wind\nfavors the generation of males, and the southern wind that of\nfemales\": sometimes also by some impression in the soul (of the\nparents), which may easily have some effect on the body (of the\nchild). Especially was this the case in the state of innocence, when\nthe body was more subject to the soul; so that by the mere will of\nthe parent the sex of the offspring might be diversified.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The offspring would have been begotten to an animal\nlife, as to the use of food and generation. Hence it was fitting that\nall should generate, and not only the first parents. From this it\nseems to follow that males and females would have been in equal\nnumber.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 100\n\nOF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS RIGHTEOUSNESS\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe now have to consider the condition of the offspring as to\nrighteousness. Under this head there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether men would have been born in a state of righteousness?\n\n(2) Whether they would have been born confirmed in righteousness?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 100, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Men Would Have Been Born in a State of Righteousness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence men would\nnot have been born in a state of righteousness. For Hugh of St.\nVictor says (De Sacram. i): \"Before sin the first man would have\nbegotten children sinless; but not heirs to their father's\nrighteousness.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, righteousness is effected by grace, as the Apostle\nsays (Rom. 5:16, 21). Now grace is not transfused from one to\nanother, for thus it would be natural; but is infused by God alone.\nTherefore children would not have been born righteous.\n\nObj. 3: Further, righteousness is in the soul. But the soul is not\ntransmitted from the parent. Therefore neither would righteousness\nhave been transmitted from parents, to the children.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Anselm says (De Concep. Virg. x): \"As long as man\ndid not sin, he would have begotten children endowed with\nrighteousness together with the rational soul.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Man naturally begets a specific likeness to himself.\nHence whatever accidental qualities result from the nature of the\nspecies, must be alike in parent and child, unless nature fails in\nits operation, which would not have occurred in the state of\ninnocence. But individual accidents do not necessarily exist alike in\nparent and child. Now original righteousness, in which the first man\nwas created, was an accident pertaining to the nature of the species,\nnot as caused by the principles of the species, but as a gift\nconferred by God on the entire human nature. This is clear from the\nfact that opposites are of the same genus; and original sin, which is\nopposed to original righteousness, is called the sin of nature,\nwherefore it is transmitted from the parent to the offspring; and for\nthis reason also, the children would have been assimilated to their\nparents as regards original righteousness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: These words of Hugh are to be understood as referring,\nnot to the habit of righteousness, but to the execution of the act\nthereof.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Some say that children would have been born, not with\nthe righteousness of grace, which is the principle of merit, but with\noriginal righteousness. But since the root of original righteousness,\nwhich conferred righteousness on the first man when he was made,\nconsists in the supernatural subjection of the reason to God, which\nsubjection results from sanctifying grace, as above explained (Q. 95,\nA. 1), we must conclude that if children were born in original\nrighteousness, they would also have been born in grace; thus we have\nsaid above that the first man was created in grace (Q. 95, A. 1).\nThis grace, however, would not have been natural, for it would not\nhave been transfused by virtue of the semen; but would have been\nconferred on man immediately on his receiving a rational soul. In the\nsame way the rational soul, which is not transmitted by the parent,\nis infused by God as soon as the human body is apt to receive it.\n\nFrom this the reply to the third objection is clear.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 100, Art. 2]\n\nWhether in the State of Innocence Children Would Have Been Born\nConfirmed in Righteousness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children\nwould have been born confirmed in righteousness. For Gregory says\n(Moral. iv) on the words of Job 3:13: \"For now I should have been\nasleep, etc.\": \"If no sinful corruption had infected our first parent,\nhe would not have begotten 'children of hell'; no children would have\nbeen born of him but such as were destined to be saved by the\nRedeemer.\" Therefore all would have been born confirmed in\nrighteousness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus Homo i, 18): \"If our first\nparents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have\nbeen confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have\nbeen unable to sin any more.\" Therefore the children would have been\nborn confirmed in righteousness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, good is stronger than evil. But by the sin of the\nfirst man there resulted, in those born of him, the necessity of sin.\nTherefore, if the first man had persevered in righteousness, his\ndescendants would have derived from him the necessity of preserving\nrighteousness.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the angels who remained faithful to God, while the\nothers sinned, were at once confirmed in grace, so as to be unable\nhenceforth to sin. In like manner, therefore, man would have been\nconfirmed in grace if he had persevered. But he would have begotten\nchildren like himself. Therefore they also would have been born\nconfirmed in righteousness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10): \"Happy would\nhave been the whole human race if neither they--that is our first\nparents--had committed any evil to be transmitted to their\ndescendants, nor any of their race had committed any sin for which\nthey would have been condemned.\" From which words we gather that even\nif our first parents had not sinned, any of their descendants might\nhave done evil; and therefore they would not have been born confirmed\nin righteousness.\n\n_I answer that,_ It does not seem possible that in the state of\ninnocence children would have been born confirmed in righteousness.\nFor it is clear that at their birth they would not have had greater\nperfection than their parents at the time of begetting. Now the\nparents, as long as they begot children, would not have been confirmed\nin righteousness. For the rational creature is confirmed in\nrighteousness through the beatitude given by the clear vision of God;\nand when once it has seen God, it cannot but cleave to Him Who is the\nessence of goodness, wherefrom no one can turn away, since nothing is\ndesired or loved but under the aspect of good. I say this according to\nthe general law; for it may be otherwise in the case of special\nprivilege, such as we believe was granted to the Virgin Mother of God.\nAnd as soon as Adam had attained to that happy state of seeing God in\nHis Essence, he would have become spiritual in soul and body; and his\nanimal life would have ceased, wherein alone there is generation.\nHence it is clear that children would not have been born confirmed in\nrighteousness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: If Adam had not sinned, he would not have begotten\n\"children of hell\" in the sense that they would contract from him sin\nwhich is the cause of hell: yet by sinning of their own free-will\nthey could have become \"children of hell.\" If, however, they did not\nbecome \"children of hell\" by falling into sin, this would not have\nbeen owing to their being confirmed in righteousness, but to Divine\nProvidence preserving them free from sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Anselm does not say this by way of assertion, but only\nas an opinion, which is clear from his mode of expression as follows:\n\"It seems that if they had lived, etc.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument is not conclusive, though Anselm seems to\nhave been influenced by it, as appears from his words above quoted.\nFor the necessity of sin incurred by the descendants would not have\nbeen such that they could not return to righteousness, which is the\ncase only with the damned. Wherefore neither would the parents have\ntransmitted to their descendants the necessity of not sinning, which\nis only in the blessed.\n\nReply Obj. 4: There is no comparison between man and the angels; for\nman's free-will is changeable, both before and after choice; whereas\nthe angel's is not changeable, as we have said above in treating of\nthe angels (Q. 64, A. 2).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 101\n\nOF THE CONDITION OF THE OFFSPRING AS REGARDS KNOWLEDGE\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe next consider the condition of the offspring as to knowledge.\nUnder this head there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have been born\nwith perfect knowledge?\n\n(2) Whether they would have had perfect use of reason at the moment\nof birth?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 101, Art. 1]\n\nWhether in the State of Innocence Children Would Have Been Born with\nPerfect Knowledge?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in the state of innocence children\nwould have been born with perfect knowledge. For Adam would have\nbegotten children like himself. But Adam was gifted with perfect\nknowledge (Q. 94, A. 3). Therefore children would have been born\nof him with perfect knowledge.\n\nObj. 2: Further, ignorance is a result of sin, as Bede says (Cf.\nI-II, Q. 85, A. 3). But ignorance is privation of knowledge.\nTherefore before sin children would have had perfect knowledge as\nsoon as they were born.\n\nObj. 3: Further, children would have been gifted with righteousness\nfrom birth. But knowledge is required for righteousness, since it\ndirects our actions. Therefore they would also have been gifted with\nknowledge.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The human soul is naturally \"like a blank tablet\non which nothing is written,\" as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii,\n4). But the nature of the soul is the same now as it would have been\nin the state of innocence. Therefore the souls of children would have\nbeen without knowledge at birth.\n\n_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 99, A. 1), as regards belief in\nmatters which are above nature, we rely on authority alone; and so,\nwhen authority is wanting, we must be guided by the ordinary course\nof nature. Now it is natural for man to acquire knowledge through the\nsenses, as above explained (Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 6); and for this\nreason is the soul united to the body, that it needs it for its\nproper operation; and this would not be so if the soul were endowed\nat birth with knowledge not acquired through the sensitive powers. We\nmust conclude then, that, in the state of innocence, children would\nnot have been born with perfect knowledge; but in course of time they\nwould have acquired knowledge without difficulty by discovery or\nlearning.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The perfection of knowledge was an individual accident\nof our first parent, so far as he was established as the father and\ninstructor of the whole human race. Therefore he begot children like\nhimself, not in that respect, but only in those accidents which were\nnatural or conferred gratuitously on the whole nature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Ignorance is privation of knowledge due at some\nparticular time; and this would not have been in children from their\nbirth, for they would have possessed the knowledge due to them at\nthat time. Hence, no ignorance would have been in them, but only\nnescience in regard to certain matters. Such nescience was even in\nthe holy angels, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Children would have had sufficient knowledge to direct\nthem to deeds of righteousness, in which men are guided by universal\nprinciples of right; and this knowledge of theirs would have been\nmuch more complete than what we have now by nature, as likewise\ntheir knowledge of other universal principles.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 101, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Children Would Have Had Perfect Use of Reason at Birth?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that children would have had perfect use\nof reason at birth. For that children have not perfect use of reason\nin our present state, is due to the soul being weighed down by the\nbody; which was not the case in paradise, because, as it is written,\n\"The corruptible body is a load upon the soul\" (Wis. 9:15).\nTherefore, before sin and the corruption which resulted therefrom,\nchildren would have had the perfect use of reason at birth.\n\nObj. 2: Further, some animals at birth have the use of their natural\npowers, as the lamb at once flees from the wolf. Much more,\ntherefore, would men in the state of innocence have had perfect use\nof reason at birth.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In all things produced by generation nature\nproceeds from the imperfect to the perfect. Therefore children would\nnot have had the perfect use of reason from the very outset.\n\n_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 84, A. 7), the use of reason\ndepends in a certain manner on the use of the sensitive powers;\nwherefore, while the senses are tired and the interior sensitive\npowers hampered, man has not the perfect use of reason, as we see in\nthose who are asleep or delirious. Now the sensitive powers are\nsituate in corporeal organs; and therefore, so long as the latter are\nhindered, the action of the former is of necessity hindered also; and\nlikewise, consequently, the use of reason. Now children are hindered\nin the use of these powers on account of the humidity of the brain;\nwherefore they have perfect use neither of these powers nor of\nreason. Therefore, in the state of innocence, children would not have\nhad the perfect use of reason, which they would have enjoyed later on\nin life. Yet they would have had a more perfect use than they have\nnow, as to matters regarding that particular state, as explained\nabove regarding the use of their limbs (Q. 99, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The corruptible body is a load upon the soul, because\nit hinders the use of reason even in those matters which belong to\nman at all ages.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even other animals have not at birth such a perfect use\nof their natural powers as they have later on. This is clear from the\nfact that birds teach their young to fly; and the like may be\nobserved in other animals. Moreover a special impediment exists in\nman from the humidity of the brain, as we have said above (Q. 99, A.\n1).\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 102\n\nOF MAN'S ABODE, WHICH IS PARADISE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe next consider man's abode, which is paradise. Under this head there\nare four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether paradise is a corporeal place?\n\n(2) Whether it is a place apt for human habitation?\n\n(3) For what purpose was man placed in paradise?\n\n(4) Whether he should have been created in paradise?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 102, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Paradise Is a Corporeal Place?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that paradise is not a corporeal place.\nFor Bede [*Strabus, Gloss on Gen. 2:8] says that \"paradise reaches to\nthe lunar circle.\" But no earthly place answers that description,\nboth because it is contrary to the nature of the earth to be raised\nup so high, and because beneath the moon is the region of fire, which\nwould consume the earth. Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise\n(Gen. 2:10). But the rivers there mentioned have visible sources\nelsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore\nparadise is not a corporeal place.\n\nObj. 3: Further, although men have explored the entire habitable\nworld, yet none have made mention of the place of paradise. Therefore\napparently it is not a corporeal place.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the tree of life is described as growing in\nparadise. But the tree of life is a spiritual thing, for it is\nwritten of Wisdom that \"She is a tree of life to them that lay hold\non her\" (Prov. 3:18). Therefore paradise also is not a corporeal, but\na spiritual place.\n\nObj. 5: Further, if paradise be a corporeal place, the trees also of\nparadise must be corporeal. But it seems they were not; for corporeal\ntrees were produced on the third day, while the planting of the trees\nof paradise is recorded after the work of the six days. Therefore\nparadise was not a corporeal place.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 1): \"Three\ngeneral opinions prevail about paradise. Some understand a place\nmerely corporeal; others a place entirely spiritual; while others,\nwhose opinion, I confess, pleases me, hold that paradise was both\ncorporeal and spiritual.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiii, 21): \"Nothing\nprevents us from holding, within proper limits, a spiritual paradise;\nso long as we believe in the truth of the events narrated as having\nthere occurred.\" For whatever Scripture tells us about paradise is set\ndown as matter of history; and wherever Scripture makes use of this\nmethod, we must hold to the historical truth of the narrative as a\nfoundation of whatever spiritual explanation we may offer. And so\nparadise, as Isidore says (Etym. xiv, 3), \"is a place situated in the\neast, its name being the Greek for garden.\" It was fitting that it\nshould be in the east; for it is to be believed that it was situated\nin the most excellent part of the earth. Now the east is the right\nhand on the heavens, as the Philosopher explains (De Coel. ii, 2); and\nthe right hand is nobler than the left: hence it was fitting that God\nshould place the earthly paradise in the east.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Bede's assertion is untrue, if taken in its obvious\nsense. It may, however, be explained to mean that paradise reaches to\nthe moon, not literally, but figuratively; because, as Isidore says\n(Etym. xiv, 3), the atmosphere there is \"a continually even\ntemperature\"; and in this respect it is like the heavenly bodies,\nwhich are devoid of opposing elements. Mention, however, is made of\nthe moon rather than of other bodies, because, of all the heavenly\nbodies, the moon is nearest to us, and is, moreover, the most akin to\nthe earth; hence it is observed to be overshadowed by clouds so as to\nbe almost obscured. Others say that paradise reached to the\nmoon--that is, to the middle space of the air, where rain, and wind,\nand the like arise; because the moon is said to have influence on\nsuch changes. But in this sense it would not be a fit place for human\ndwelling, through being uneven in temperature, and not attuned to the\nhuman temperament, as is the lower atmosphere in the neighborhood of\nthe earth.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 7): \"It is probable\nthat man has no idea where paradise was, and that the rivers, whose\nsources are said to be known, flowed for some distance underground,\nand then sprang up elsewhere. For who is not aware that such is the\ncase with some other streams?\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The situation of paradise is shut off from the\nhabitable world by mountains, or seas, or some torrid region, which\ncannot be crossed; and so people who have written about topography\nmake no mention of it.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The tree of life is a material tree, and so called\nbecause its fruit was endowed with a life-preserving power as above\nstated (Q. 97, A. 4). Yet it had a spiritual signification; as the\nrock in the desert was of a material nature, and yet signified\nChrist. In like manner the tree of the knowledge of good and evil was\na material tree, so called in view of future events; because, after\neating of it, man was to learn, by experience of the consequent\npunishment, the difference between the good of obedience and the evil\nof rebellion. It may also be said to signify spiritually the\nfree-will as some say.\n\nReply Obj. 5: According to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 5, viii, 3),\nthe plants were not actually produced on the third day, but in their\nseminal virtues; whereas, after the work of the six days, the plants,\nboth of paradise and others, were actually produced. According to\nother holy writers, we ought to say that all the plants were actually\nproduced on the third day, including the trees of paradise; and what\nis said of the trees of paradise being planted after the work of the\nsix days is to be understood, they say, by way of recapitulation.\nWhence our text reads: \"The Lord God had planted a paradise of\npleasure from the beginning\" (Gen. 2:8).\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 102, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Paradise Was a Place Adapted to Be the Abode of Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that paradise was not a place adapted to\nbe the abode of man. For man and angels are similarly ordered to\nbeatitude. But the angels from the very beginning of their existence\nwere made to dwell in the abode of the blessed--that is, the empyrean\nheaven. Therefore the place of man's habitation should have been\nthere also.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if some definite place were required for man's\nabode, this would be required on the part either of the soul or of\nthe body. If on the part of the soul, the place would be in heaven,\nwhich is adapted to the nature of the soul; since the desire of\nheaven is implanted in all. On the part of the body, there was no\nneed for any other place than the one provided for other animals.\nTherefore paradise was not at all adapted to be the abode of man.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a place which contains nothing is useless. But after\nsin, paradise was not occupied by man. Therefore if it were adapted\nas a dwelling-place for man, it seems that God made paradise to no\npurpose.\n\nObj. 4: Further, since man is of an even temperament, a fitting place\nfor him should be of even temperature. But paradise was not of an\neven temperature; for it is said to have been on the equator--a\nsituation of extreme heat, since twice in the year the sun passes\nvertically over the heads of its inhabitants. Therefore paradise was\nnot a fit dwelling-place for man.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 11): \"Paradise\nwas a divinely ordered region, and worthy of him who was made to\nGod's image.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As above stated (Q. 97, A. 1), Man was incorruptible\nand immortal, not because his body had a disposition to\nincorruptibility, but because in his soul there was a power\npreserving the body from corruption. Now the human body may be\ncorrupted from within or from without. From within, the body is\ncorrupted by the consumption of the humors, and by old age, as above\nexplained (Q. 97, A. 4), and man was able to ward off such corruption\nby food. Among those things which corrupt the body from without, the\nchief seems to be an atmosphere of unequal temperature; and to such\ncorruption a remedy is found in an atmosphere of equable nature. In\nparadise both conditions were found; because, as Damascene says (De\nFide Orth. ii, 11): \"Paradise was permeated with the all pervading\nbrightness of a temperate, pure, and exquisite atmosphere, and decked\nwith ever-flowering plants.\" Whence it is clear that paradise was\nmost fit to be a dwelling-place for man, and in keeping with his\noriginal state of immortality.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The empyrean heaven is the highest of corporeal places,\nand is outside the region of change. By the first of these two\nconditions, it is a fitting abode for the angelic nature: for, as\nAugustine says (De Trin. ii), \"God rules corporeal creatures through\nspiritual creatures.\" Hence it is fitting that the spiritual nature\nshould be established above the entire corporeal nature, as presiding\nover it. By the second condition, it is a fitting abode for the state\nof beatitude, which is endowed with the highest degree of stability.\nThus the abode of beatitude was suited to the very nature of the\nangel; therefore he was created there. But it is not suited to man's\nnature, since man is not set as a ruler over the entire corporeal\ncreation: it is a fitting abode for man in regard only to his\nbeatitude. Wherefore he was not placed from the beginning in the\nempyrean heaven, but was destined to be transferred thither in the\nstate of his final beatitude.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is ridiculous to assert that any particular place\nis natural to the soul or to any spiritual substances, though some\nparticular place may have a certain fitness in regard to spiritual\nsubstances. For the earthly paradise was a place adapted to man, as\nregards both his body and his soul--that is, inasmuch as in his soul\nwas the force which preserved the human body from corruption. This\ncould not be said of the other animals. Therefore, as Damascene says\n(De Fide Orth. ii, 11): \"No irrational animal inhabited paradise\";\nalthough, by a certain dispensation, the animals were brought thither\nby God to Adam; and the serpent was able to trespass therein by the\ncomplicity of the devil.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Paradise did not become useless through being\nunoccupied by man after sin, just as immortality was not conferred\non man in vain, though he was to lose it. For thereby we learn God's\nkindness to man, and what man lost by sin. Moreover, some say that\nEnoch and Elias still dwell in that paradise.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Those who say that paradise was on the equinoctial line\nare of opinion that such a situation is most temperate, on account of\nthe unvarying equality of day and night; that it is never too cold\nthere, because the sun is never too far off; and never too hot,\nbecause, although the sun passes over the heads of the inhabitants,\nit does not remain long in that position. However, Aristotle\ndistinctly says (Meteor. ii, 5) that such a region is uninhabitable\non account of the heat. This seems to be more probable; because, even\nthose regions where the sun does not pass vertically overhead, are\nextremely hot on account of the mere proximity of the sun. But\nwhatever be the truth of the matter, we must hold that paradise was\nsituated in a most temperate situation, whether on the equator or\nelsewhere.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 102, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Man Was Placed in Paradise to Dress It and Keep It?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man was not placed in paradise to\ndress and keep it. For what was brought on him as a punishment of sin\nwould not have existed in paradise in the state of innocence. But the\ncultivation of the soil was a punishment of sin (Gen. 3:17).\nTherefore man was not placed in paradise to dress and keep it.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there is no need of a keeper when there is no fear\nof trespass with violence. But in paradise there was no fear of\ntrespass with violence. Therefore there was no need for man to keep\nparadise.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if man was placed in paradise to dress and keep it,\nman would apparently have been made for the sake of paradise, and not\ncontrariwise; which seems to be false. Therefore man was not place in\nparadise to dress and keep it.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2: 15): \"The Lord God took man\nand placed in the paradise of pleasure, to dress and keep it.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 10), these\nwords in Genesis may be understood in two ways. First, in the sense\nthat God placed man in paradise that He might Himself work in man and\nkeep him, by sanctifying him (for if this work cease, man at once\nrelapses into darkness, as the air grows dark when the light ceases\nto shine); and by keeping man from all corruption and evil. Secondly,\nthat man might dress and keep paradise, which dressing would not have\ninvolved labor, as it did after sin; but would have been pleasant on\naccount of man's practical knowledge of the powers of nature. Nor\nwould man have kept paradise against a trespasser; but he would have\nstriven to keep paradise for himself lest he should lose it by sin.\nAll of which was for man's good; wherefore paradise was ordered to\nman's benefit, and not conversely.\n\nWhence the Replies to the Objections are made clear.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 102, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Man Was Created in Paradise?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man was created in paradise. For the\nangel was created in his dwelling-place--namely, the empyrean heaven.\nBut before sin paradise was a fitting abode for man. Therefore it\nseems that man was created in paradise.\n\nObj. 2: Further, other animals remain in the place where they are\nproduced, as the fish in the water, and walking animals on the earth\nfrom which they were made. Now man would have remained in paradise\nafter he was created (Q. 97, A. 4). Therefore he was created in\nparadise.\n\nObj. 3: Further, woman was made in paradise. But man is greater than\nwoman. Therefore much more should man have been made in paradise.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:15): \"God took man and\nplaced him in paradise.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Paradise was a fitting abode for man as regards the\nincorruptibility of the primitive state. Now this incorruptibility\nwas man's, not by nature, but by a supernatural gift of God.\nTherefore that this might be attributed to God, and not to human\nnature, God made man outside of paradise, and afterwards placed him\nthere to live there during the whole of his animal life; and, having\nattained to the spiritual life, to be transferred thence to heaven.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The empyrean heaven was a fitting abode for the angels\nas regards their nature, and therefore they were created there.\n\nIn the same way I reply to the second objection, for those places\nbefit those animals in their nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Woman was made in paradise, not by reason of her own\ndignity, but on account of the dignity of the principle from which\nher body was formed. For the same reason the children would have been\nborn in paradise, where their parents were already.\n_______________________\n\nTREATISE ON THE CONSERVATION AND GOVERNMENT OF CREATURES (QQ. 103-119)\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 103\n\nOF THE GOVERNMENT OF THINGS IN GENERAL\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nHaving considered the creation of things and their distinction, we\nnow consider in the third place the government thereof, and (1) the\ngovernment of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of\nthis government. Under the first head there are eight points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the world is governed by someone?\n\n(2) What is the end of this government?\n\n(3) Whether the world is governed by one?\n\n(4) Of the effects of this government?\n\n(5) Whether all things are subject to Divine government?\n\n(6) Whether all things are immediately governed by God?\n\n(7) Whether the Divine government is frustrated in anything?\n\n(8) Whether anything is contrary to the Divine Providence?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the World Is Governed by Anyone?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by anyone.\nFor it belongs to those things to be governed, which move or work for\nan end. But natural things which make up the greater part of the world\ndo not move, or work for an end; for they have no knowledge of their\nend. Therefore the world is not governed.\n\nObj. 2: Further, those things are governed which are moved towards\nan object. But the world does not appear to be so directed, but has\nstability in itself. Therefore it is not governed.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is necessarily determined by its own nature\nto one particular thing, does not require any external principle of\ngovernment. But the principal parts of the world are by a certain\nnecessity determined to something particular in their actions and\nmovements. Therefore the world does not require to be governed.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 14:3): \"But Thou, O Father,\ngovernest all things by Thy Providence.\" And Boethius says (De\nConsol. iii): \"Thou Who governest this universe by mandate eternal.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Certain ancient philosophers denied the government\nof the world, saying that all things happened by chance. But such an\nopinion can be refuted as impossible in two ways. First, by\nobservation of things themselves: for we observe that in nature\nthings happen always or nearly always for the best; which would not\nbe the case unless some sort of providence directed nature towards\ngood as an end; which is to govern. Wherefore the unfailing order we\nobserve in things is a sign of their being governed; for instance, if\nwe enter a well-ordered house we gather therefrom the intention of\nhim that put it in order, as Tullius says (De Nat. Deorum ii),\nquoting Aristotle [*Cleanthes]. Secondly, this is clear from a\nconsideration of Divine goodness, which, as we have said above (Q.\n44, A. 4; Q. 65, A. 2), was the cause of the production of things in\nexistence. For as \"it belongs to the best to produce the best,\" it is\nnot fitting that the supreme goodness of God should produce things\nwithout giving them their perfection. Now a thing's ultimate\nperfection consists in the attainment of its end. Therefore it\nbelongs to the Divine goodness, as it brought things into existence,\nso to lead them to their end: and this is to govern.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A thing moves or operates for an end in two\nways. First, in moving itself to the end, as man and other rational\ncreatures; and such things have knowledge of their end, and of the\nmeans to the end. Secondly, a thing is said to move or operate for an\nend, as though moved or directed by another thereto, as an arrow\ndirected to the target by the archer, who knows the end unknown to the\narrow. Wherefore, as the movement of the arrow towards a definite end\nshows clearly that it is directed by someone with knowledge, so the\nunvarying course of natural things which are without knowledge, shows\nclearly that the world is governed by some reason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In all created things there is a stable element,\nat least primary matter; and something belonging to movement, if under\nmovement we include operation. And things need governing as to both:\nbecause even that which is stable, since it is created from nothing,\nwould return to nothingness were it not sustained by a governing hand,\nas will be explained later (Q. 104, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The natural necessity inherent in those beings\nwhich are determined to a particular thing, is a kind of impression\nfrom God, directing them to their end; as the necessity whereby an\narrow is moved so as to fly towards a certain point is an impression\nfrom the archer, and not from the arrow. But there is a difference,\ninasmuch as that which creatures receive from God is their nature,\nwhile that which natural things receive from man in addition to their\nnature is somewhat violent. Wherefore, as the violent necessity in the\nmovement of the arrow shows the action of the archer, so the natural\nnecessity of things shows the government of Divine Providence.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the End of the Government of the World Is Something Outside\nthe World?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the end of the government of the\nworld is not something existing outside the world. For the end of the\ngovernment of a thing is that whereto the thing governed is brought.\nBut that whereto a thing is brought is some good in the thing itself;\nthus a sick man is brought back to health, which is something good in\nhim. Therefore the end of government of things is some good not\noutside, but within the things themselves.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1): \"Some ends are\nan operation; some are a work\"--i.e. produced by an operation. But\nnothing can be produced by the whole universe outside itself; and\noperation exists in the agent. Therefore nothing extrinsic can be the\nend of the government of things.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the good of the multitude seems to consist in order,\nand peace which is the \"tranquillity of order,\" as Augustine says (De\nCiv. Dei xix, 13). But the world is composed of a multitude of\nthings. Therefore the end of the government of the world is the\npeaceful order in things themselves. Therefore the end of the\ngovernment of the world is not an extrinsic good.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 16:4): \"The Lord hath made\nall things for Himself.\" But God is outside the entire order of the\nuniverse. Therefore the end of all things is something extrinsic to\nthem.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning,\nit is not possible to be ignorant of the end of things if we know\ntheir beginning. Therefore, since the beginning of all things is\nsomething outside the universe, namely, God, it is clear from what\nhas been expounded above (Q. 44, AA. 1, 2), that we must conclude\nthat the end of all things is some extrinsic good. This can be proved\nby reason. For it is clear that good has the nature of an end;\nwherefore, a particular end of anything consists in some particular\ngood; while the universal end of all things is the Universal Good;\nWhich is good of Itself by virtue of Its Essence, Which is the very\nessence of goodness; whereas a particular good is good by\nparticipation. Now it is manifest that in the whole created universe\nthere is not a good which is not such by participation. Wherefore\nthat good which is the end of the whole universe must be a good\noutside the universe.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We may acquire some good in many ways: first, as a form\nexisting in us, such as health or knowledge; secondly, as something\ndone by us, as a builder attains his end by building a house;\nthirdly, as something good possessed or acquired by us, as the buyer\nof a field attains his end when he enters into possession. Wherefore\nnothing prevents something outside the universe being the good to\nwhich it is directed.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking of the ends of various\narts; for the end of some arts consists in the operation itself, as\nthe end of a harpist is to play the harp; whereas the end of other\narts consists in something produced, as the end of a builder is not\nthe act of building, but the house he builds. Now it may happen that\nsomething extrinsic is the end not only as made, but also as\npossessed or acquired or even as represented, as if we were to say\nthat Hercules is the end of the statue made to represent him.\nTherefore we may say that some good outside the whole universe is the\nend of the government of the universe, as something possessed and\nrepresented; for each thing tends to a participation thereof, and to\nan assimilation thereto, as far as is possible.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A good existing in the universe, namely, the order of\nthe universe, is an end thereof; this, however, is not its ultimate\nend, but is ordered to the extrinsic good as to the end: thus the\norder in an army is ordered to the general, as stated in _Metaph._\nxii, Did. xi, 10.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the World Is Governed by One?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the world is not governed by one. For\nwe judge the cause by the effect. Now, we see in the government of the\nuniverse that things are not moved and do not operate uniformly, but\nsome contingently and some of necessity in variously different ways.\nTherefore the world is not governed by one.\n\nObj. 2: Further, things which are governed by one do not act against\neach other, except by the incapacity or unskillfulness of the ruler;\nwhich cannot apply to God. But created things agree not together, and\nact against each other; as is evident in the case of contraries.\nTherefore the world is not governed by one.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in nature we always find what is the better. But it\n\"is better that two should be together than one\" (Eccles. 4:9).\nTherefore the world is not governed by one, but by many.\n\n_On the contrary,_ We confess our belief in one God and one Lord,\naccording to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 8:6): \"To us there is\nbut one God, the Father . . . and one Lord\": and both of these pertain\nto government. For to the Lord belongs dominion over subjects; and the\nname of God is taken from Providence as stated above (Q. 13,\nA. 8). Therefore the world is governed by one.\n\n_I answer that,_ We must of necessity say that the world is governed\nby one. For since the end of the government of the world is that\nwhich is essentially good, which is the greatest good; the government\nof the world must be the best kind of government. Now the best\ngovernment is the government by one. The reason of this is that\ngovernment is nothing but the directing of the things governed to the\nend; which consists in some good. But unity belongs to the idea of\ngoodness, as Boethius proves (De Consol. iii, 11) from this, that, as\nall things desire good, so do they desire unity; without which they\nwould cease to exist. For a thing so far exists as it is one. Whence\nwe observe that things resist division, as far as they can; and the\ndissolution of a thing arises from defect therein. Therefore the\nintention of a ruler over a multitude is unity, or peace. Now the\nproper cause of unity is one. For it is clear that several cannot be\nthe cause of unity or concord, except so far as they are united.\nFurthermore, what is one in itself is a more apt and a better cause\nof unity than several things united. Therefore a multitude is better\ngoverned by one than by several. From this it follows that the\ngovernment of the world, being the best form of government, must be\nby one. This is expressed by the Philosopher (Metaph. xii, Did. xi,\n10): \"Things refuse to be ill governed; and multiplicity of\nauthorities is a bad thing, therefore there should be one ruler.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Movement is \"the act of a thing moved, caused by the\nmover.\" Wherefore dissimilarity of movements is caused by diversity\nof things moved, which diversity is essential to the perfection of\nthe universe (Q. 47, AA. 1,2; Q. 48, A. 2), and not by a diversity of\ngovernors.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although contraries do not agree with each other in\ntheir proximate ends, nevertheless they agree in the ultimate end, so\nfar as they are included in the one order of the universe.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If we consider individual goods, then two are better\nthan one. But if we consider the essential good, then no addition is\npossible.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Effect of Government Is One or Many?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is but one effect of the\ngovernment of the world and not many. For the effect of government is\nthat which is caused in the things governed. This is one, namely, the\ngood which consists in order; as may be seen in the example of an\narmy. Therefore the government of the world has but one effect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, from one there naturally proceeds but one. But the\nworld is governed by one as we have proved (A. 3). Therefore also the\neffect of this government is but one.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the effect of government is not one by reason of\nthe unity of the Governor, it must be many by reason of the many\nthings governed. But these are too numerous to be counted. Therefore\nwe cannot assign any definite number to the effects of government.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): \"God contains all\nand fills all by His providence and perfect goodness.\" But government\nbelongs to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of\nthe Divine government.\n\n_I answer that,_ The effect of any action may be judged from its end;\nbecause it is by action that the attainment of the end is effected.\nNow the end of the government of the world is the essential good, to\nthe participation and similarity of which all things tend.\nConsequently the effect of the government of the world may be taken\nin three ways. First, on the part of the end itself; and in this way\nthere is but one effect, that is, assimilation to the supreme good.\nSecondly, the effect of the government of the world may be considered\non the part of those things by means of which the creature is made\nlike to God. Thus there are, in general, two effects of the\ngovernment. For the creature is assimilated to God in two things;\nfirst, with regard to this, that God is good; and so the creature\nbecomes like Him by being good; and secondly, with regard to this,\nthat God is the cause of goodness in others; and so the creature\nbecomes like God by moving others to be good. Wherefore there are two\neffects of government, the preservation of things in their goodness,\nand the moving of things to good. Thirdly, we may consider in the\nindividual the effects of the government of the world; and in this\nway they are without number.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The order of the universe includes both the\npreservation of things created by God and their movement. As regards\nthese two things we find order among them, inasmuch as one is better\nthan another; and one is moved by another.\n\nFrom what has been said above, we can gather the replies to the other\ntwo objections.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 5]\n\nWhether All Things Are Subject to the Divine Government?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that not all things are subject to the\nDivine government. For it is written (Eccles. 9:11): \"I saw that\nunder the sun the race is not to the swift, nor the battle to the\nstrong, nor bread to the wise, nor riches to the learned, nor favor\nto the skillful, but time and chance in all.\" But things subject to\nthe Divine government are not ruled by chance. Therefore those things\nwhich are under the sun are not subject to the Divine government.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9): \"God hath no care\nfor oxen.\" But he that governs has care for the things he governs.\nTherefore all things are not subject to the Divine government.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what can govern itself needs not to be governed by\nanother. But the rational creature can govern itself; since it is\nmaster of its own act, and acts of itself; and is not made to act by\nanother, which seems proper to things which are governed. Therefore\nall things are not subject to the Divine government.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 11): \"Not only\nheaven and earth, not only man and angel, even the bowels of the\nlowest animal, even the wing of the bird, the flower of the plant,\nthe leaf of the tree, hath God endowed with every fitting detail of\ntheir nature.\" Therefore all things are subject to His government.\n\n_I answer that,_ For the same reason is God the ruler of things as He\nis their cause, because the same gives existence as gives perfection;\nand this belongs to government. Now God is the cause not indeed only\nof some particular kind of being, but of the whole universal being,\nas proved above (Q. 44, AA. 1, 2). Wherefore, as there can be nothing\nwhich is not created by God, so there can be nothing which is not\nsubject to His government. This can also be proved from the nature of\nthe end of government. For a man's government extends over all those\nthings which come under the end of his government. Now the end of the\nDivine government is the Divine goodness; as we have shown (A. 2).\nWherefore, as there can be nothing that is not ordered to the Divine\ngoodness as its end, as is clear from what we have said above (Q. 44,\nA. 4; Q. 65, A. 2), so it is impossible for anything to escape from\nthe Divine government.\n\nFoolish therefore was the opinion of those who said that the\ncorruptible lower world, or individual things, or that even human\naffairs, were not subject to the Divine government. These are\nrepresented as saying, \"God hath abandoned the earth\" (Ezech. 9:9).\n\nReply Obj. 1: These things are said to be under the sun which are\ngenerated and corrupted according to the sun's movement. In all such\nthings we find chance: not that everything is casual which occurs in\nsuch things; but that in each one there is an element of chance. And\nthe very fact that an element of chance is found in those things\nproves that they are subject to government of some kind. For unless\ncorruptible things were governed by a higher being, they would tend\nto nothing definite, especially those which possess no kind of\nknowledge. So nothing would happen unintentionally; which constitutes\nthe nature of chance. Wherefore to show how things happen by chance\nand yet according to the ordering of a higher cause, he does not say\nabsolutely that he observes chance in all things, but \"time and\nchance,\" that is to say, that defects may be found in these things\naccording to some order of time.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Government implies a certain change effected by the\ngovernor in the things governed. Now every movement is the act of a\nmovable thing, caused by the moving principle, as is laid down\n_Phys._ iii, 3. And every act is proportionate to that of which it is\nan act. Consequently, various movable things must be moved variously,\neven as regards movement by one and the same mover. Thus by the one\nart of the Divine governor, various things are variously governed\naccording to their variety. Some, according to their nature, act of\nthemselves, having dominion over their actions; and these are\ngoverned by God, not only in this, that they are moved by God\nHimself, Who works in them interiorly; but also in this, that they\nare induced by Him to do good and to fly from evil, by precepts and\nprohibitions, rewards and punishments. But irrational creatures which\ndo not act but are acted upon, are not thus governed by God. Hence,\nwhen the Apostle says that \"God hath no care for oxen,\" he does not\nwholly withdraw them from the Divine government, but only as regards\nthe way in which rational creatures are governed.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The rational creature governs itself by its intellect\nand will, both of which require to be governed and perfected by the\nDivine intellect and will. Therefore above the government whereby\nthe rational creature governs itself as master of its own act, it\nrequires to be governed by God.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 6]\n\nWhether all things are immediately governed by God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all things are governed by God\nimmediately. For Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.) reproves\nthe opinion of Plato who divides providence into three parts. The\nfirst he ascribes to the supreme god, who watches over heavenly\nthings and all universals; the second providence he attributes to\nthe secondary deities, who go the round of the heavens to watch over\ngeneration and corruption; while he ascribes a third providence to\ncertain spirits who are guardians on earth of human actions.\nTherefore it seems that all things are immediately governed by God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is better that a thing be done by one, if\npossible, than by many, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 6). But\nGod can by Himself govern all things without any intermediary cause.\nTherefore it seems that He governs all things immediately.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in God nothing is defective or imperfect. But it\nseems to be imperfect in a ruler to govern by means of others; thus\nan earthly king, by reason of his not being able to do everything\nhimself, and because he cannot be everywhere at the same time,\nrequires to govern by means of ministers. Therefore God governs all\nthings immediately.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): \"As the lower\nand grosser bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of\ngreater subtlety and power; so all bodies are ruled by the rational\nspirit of life; and the sinful and unfaithful spirit is ruled by the\ngood and just spirit of life; and this spirit by God Himself.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In government there are two things to be considered;\nthe design of government, which is providence itself; and the\nexecution of the design. As to the design of government, God governs\nall things immediately; whereas in its execution, He governs some\nthings by means of others.\n\nThe reason of this is that as God is the very essence of goodness,\nso everything must be attributed to God in its highest degree of\ngoodness. Now the highest degree of goodness in any practical order,\ndesign or knowledge (and such is the design of government) consists\nin knowing the individuals acted upon; as the best physician is not\nthe one who can only give his attention to general principles, but\nwho can consider the least details; and so on in other things.\nTherefore we must say that God has the design of the government of\nall things, even of the very least.\n\nBut since things which are governed should be brought to perfection\nby government, this government will be so much the better in the\ndegree the things governed are brought to perfection. Now it is a\ngreater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the\ncause of goodness in others, than only to be good in itself.\nTherefore God so governs things that He makes some of them to be\ncauses of others in government; as a master, who not only imparts\nknowledge to his pupils, but gives also the faculty of teaching\nothers.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Plato's opinion is to be rejected, because he held that\nGod did not govern all things immediately, even in the design of\ngovernment; this is clear from the fact that he divided providence,\nwhich is the design of government, into three parts.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If God governed alone, things would be deprived of the\nperfection of causality. Wherefore all that is effected by many would\nnot be accomplished by one.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That an earthly king should have ministers to execute\nhis laws is a sign not only of his being imperfect, but also of his\ndignity; because by the ordering of ministers the kingly power is\nbrought into greater evidence.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Anything Can Happen Outside the Order of the Divine\nGovernment?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem possible that something may occur outside\nthe order of the Divine government. For Boethius says (De Consol.\niii) that \"God disposes all for good.\" Therefore, if nothing happens\noutside the order of the Divine government, it would follow that no\nevil exists.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing that is in accordance with the\npre-ordination of a ruler occurs by chance. Therefore, if nothing\noccurs outside the order of the Divine government, it follows that\nthere is nothing fortuitous and casual.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the order of Divine Providence is certain and\nunchangeable; because it is in accordance with the eternal design.\nTherefore, if nothing happens outside the order of the Divine\ngovernment, it follows that all things happen by necessity, and\nnothing is contingent; which is false. Therefore it is possible for\nsomething to occur outside the order of the Divine government.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Esther 13:9): \"O Lord, Lord,\nalmighty King, all things are in Thy power, and there is none that\ncan resist Thy will.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is possible for an effect to result outside the\norder of some particular cause; but not outside the order of the\nuniversal cause. The reason of this is that no effect results outside\nthe order of a particular cause, except through some other impeding\ncause; which other cause must itself be reduced to the first\nuniversal cause; as indigestion may occur outside the order of the\nnutritive power by some such impediment as the coarseness of the\nfood, which again is to be ascribed to some other cause, and so on\ntill we come to the first universal cause. Therefore as God is the\nfirst universal cause, not of one genus only, but of all being in\ngeneral, it is impossible for anything to occur outside the order of\nthe Divine government; but from the very fact that from one point of\nview something seems to evade the order of Divine providence\nconsidered in regard to one particular cause, it must necessarily\ncome back to that order as regards some other cause.\n\nReply Obj. 1: There is nothing wholly evil in the world, for evil is\never founded on good, as shown above (Q. 48, A. 3). Therefore\nsomething is said to be evil through its escaping from the order of\nsome particular good. If it wholly escaped from the order of the\nDivine government, it would wholly cease to exist.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Things are said to be fortuitous as regards some\nparticular cause from the order of which they escape. But as to the\norder of Divine providence, \"nothing in the world happens by chance,\"\nas Augustine declares (QQ. 83, qu. 24).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Certain effects are said to be contingent as compared\nto their proximate causes, which may fail in their effects; and not\nas though anything could happen entirely outside the order of Divine\ngovernment. The very fact that something occurs outside the order of\nsome proximate cause, is owing to some other cause, itself subject to\nthe Divine government.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 103, Art. 8]\n\nWhether anything can resist the order of the Divine government?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem possible that some resistance can be made\nto the order of the Divine government. For it is written (Isa. 3:8):\n\"Their tongue and their devices are against the Lord.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, a king does not justly punish those who do not rebel\nagainst his commands. Therefore if no one rebelled against God's\ncommands, no one would be justly punished by God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, everything is subject to the order of the Divine\ngovernment. But some things oppose others. Therefore some things\nrebel against the order of the Divine government.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iii): \"There is nothing\nthat can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this\nsovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all\nsweetly,\" as is said (Wis. 8) of Divine wisdom.\n\n_I answer that,_ We may consider the order of Divine providence in\ntwo ways: in general, inasmuch as it proceeds from the governing\ncause of all; and in particular, inasmuch as it proceeds from some\nparticular cause which executes the order of the Divine government.\n\nConsidered in the first way, nothing can resist the order of the\nDivine government. This can be proved in two ways: firstly from the\nfact that the order of the Divine government is wholly directed to\ngood, and everything by its own operation and effort tends to good\nonly, \"for no one acts intending evil,\" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.\niv): secondly from the fact that, as we have said above (A. 1, ad 3;\nA. 5, ad 2), every inclination of anything, whether natural or\nvoluntary, is nothing but a kind of impression from the first mover;\nas the inclination of the arrow towards a fixed point is nothing but\nan impulse received from the archer. Wherefore every agent, whether\nnatural or free, attains to its divinely appointed end, as though of\nits own accord. For this reason God is said \"to order all things\nsweetly.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some are said to think or speak, or act against\nGod: not that they entirely resist the order of the Divine government;\nfor even the sinner intends the attainment of a certain good: but\nbecause they resist some particular good, which belongs to their\nnature or state. Therefore they are justly punished by God.\n\nReply Obj. 2 is clear from the above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: From the fact that one thing opposes another, it\nfollows that some one thing can resist the order of a particular\ncause; but not that order which depends on the universal cause of all\nthings.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 104\n\nTHE SPECIAL EFFECTS OF THE DIVINE GOVERNMENT\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe next consider the effects of the Divine government in particular;\nconcerning which four points of inquiry arise:\n\n(1) Whether creatures need to be kept in existence by God?\n\n(2) Whether they are immediately preserved by God?\n\n(3) Whether God can reduce anything to nothingness?\n\n(4) Whether anything is reduced to nothingness?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Creatures Need to Be Kept in Being by God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that creatures do not need to be kept in\nbeing by God. For what cannot not-be, does not need to be kept in\nbeing; just as that which cannot depart, does not need to be kept\nfrom departing. But some creatures by their very nature cannot\nnot-be. Therefore not all creatures need to be kept in being by God.\nThe middle proposition is proved thus. That which is included in the\nnature of a thing is necessarily in that thing, and its contrary\ncannot be in it; thus a multiple of two must necessarily be even, and\ncannot possibly be an odd number. Now form brings being with itself,\nbecause everything is actually in being, so far as it has form. But\nsome creatures are subsistent forms, as we have said of the angels\n(Q. 50, AA. 2, 5): and thus to be is in them of themselves. The same\nreasoning applies to those creatures whose matter is in potentiality\nto one form only, as above explained of heavenly bodies (Q. 66, A.\n2). Therefore such creatures as these have in their nature to be\nnecessarily, and cannot not-be; for there can be no potentiality to\nnot-being, either in the form which has being of itself, or in matter\nexisting under a form which it cannot lose, since it is not in\npotentiality to any other form.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God is more powerful than any created agent. But a\ncreated agent, even after ceasing to act, can cause its effect to be\npreserved in being; thus the house continues to stand after the\nbuilder has ceased to build; and water remains hot for some time\nafter the fire has ceased to heat. Much more, therefore, can God\ncause His creature to be kept in being, after He has ceased to create\nit.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nothing violent can occur, except there be some\nactive cause thereof. But tendency to not-being is unnatural and\nviolent to any creature, since all creatures naturally desire to be.\nTherefore no creature can tend to not-being, except through some\nactive cause of corruption. Now there are creatures of such a nature\nthat nothing can cause them to corrupt; such are spiritual substances\nand heavenly bodies. Therefore such creatures cannot tend to\nnot-being, even if God were to withdraw His action.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if God keeps creatures in being, this is done by\nsome action. Now every action of an agent, if that action be\nefficacious, produces something in the effect. Therefore the\npreserving power of God must produce something in the creature. But\nthis is not so; because this action does not give being to the\ncreature, since being is not given to that which already is: nor does\nit add anything new to the creature; because either God would not\nkeep the creature in being continually, or He would be continually\nadding something new to the creature; either of which is\nunreasonable. Therefore creatures are not kept in being by God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Heb. 1:3): \"Upholding all things by\nthe word of His power.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Both reason and faith bind us to say that creatures\nare kept in being by God. To make this clear, we must consider that a\nthing is preserved by another in two ways. First, indirectly, and\naccidentally; thus a person is said to preserve anything by removing\nthe cause of its corruption, as a man may be said to preserve a\nchild, whom he guards from falling into the fire. In this way God\npreserves some things, but not all, for there are some things of such\na nature that nothing can corrupt them, so that it is not necessary\nto keep them from corruption. Secondly, a thing is said to preserve\nanother _per se_ and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends\non the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In\nthis manner all creatures need to be preserved by God. For the being\nof every creature depends on God, so that not for a moment could it\nsubsist, but would fall into nothingness were it not kept in being by\nthe operation of the Divine power, as Gregory says (Moral. xvi).\n\nThis is made clear as follows: Every effect depends on its cause, so\nfar as it is its cause. But we must observe that an agent may be the\ncause of the _becoming_ of its effect, but not directly of its\n_being._ This may be seen both in artificial and in natural beings:\nfor the builder causes the house in its _becoming,_ but he is not the\ndirect cause of its _being._ For it is clear that the _being_ of the\nhouse is a result of its form, which consists in the putting together\nand arrangement of the materials, and results from the natural\nqualities of certain things. Thus a cook dresses the food by applying\nthe natural activity of fire; thus a builder constructs a house, by\nmaking use of cement, stones, and wood which are able to be put\ntogether in a certain order and to preserve it. Therefore the _being_\nof a house depends on the nature of these materials, just as its\n_becoming_ depends on the action of the builder. The same principle\napplies to natural things. For if an agent is not the cause of a form\nas such, neither will it be directly the cause of _being_ which\nresults from that form; but it will be the cause of the effect, in\nits _becoming_ only.\n\nNow it is clear that of two things in the same species one cannot\ndirectly cause the other's form as such, since it would then be the\ncause of its own form, which is essentially the same as the form of\nthe other; but it can be the cause of this form for as much as it is\nin matter--in other words, it may be the cause that \"this matter\"\nreceives _this form._ And this is to be the cause of _becoming,_ as\nwhen man begets man, and fire causes fire. Thus whenever a natural\neffect is such that it has an aptitude to receive from its active\ncause an impression specifically the same as in that active cause,\nthen the _becoming_ of the effect, but not its _being,_ depends on\nthe agent.\n\nSometimes, however, the effect has not this aptitude to receive the\nimpression of its cause, in the same way as it exists in the agent:\nas may be seen clearly in all agents which do not produce an effect\nof the same species as themselves: thus the heavenly bodies cause the\ngeneration of inferior bodies which differ from them in species. Such\nan agent can be the cause of a form as such, and not merely as\nexisting in this matter, consequently it is not merely the cause of\n_becoming_ but also the cause of _being._\n\nTherefore as the becoming of a thing cannot continue when that action\nof the agent ceases which causes the _becoming_ of the effect: so\nneither can the _being_ of a thing continue after that action of the\nagent has ceased, which is the cause of the effect not only in\n_becoming_ but also in _being._ This is why hot water retains heat\nafter the cessation of the fire's action; while, on the contrary, the\nair does not continue to be lit up, even for a moment, when the sun\nceases to act upon it, because water is a matter susceptive of the\nfire's heat in the same way as it exists in the fire. Wherefore if it\nwere to be reduced to the perfect form of fire, it would retain that\nform always; whereas if it has the form of fire imperfectly and\ninchoately, the heat will remain for a time only, by reason of the\nimperfect participation of the principle of heat. On the other hand,\nair is not of such a nature as to receive light in the same way as it\nexists in the sun, which is the principle of light. Therefore, since\nit has not root in the air, the light ceases with the action of the\nsun.\n\nNow every creature may be compared to God, as the air is to the sun\nwhich enlightens it. For as the sun possesses light by its nature, and\nas the air is enlightened by sharing the sun's nature; so God alone is\nBeing in virtue of His own Essence, since His Essence is His\nexistence; whereas every creature has being by participation, so that\nits essence is not its existence. Therefore, as Augustine says (Gen.\nad lit. iv, 12): \"If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from His\ncreatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would\ncollapse.\" In the same work (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) he says: \"As the\nair becomes light by the presence of the sun, so is man enlightened by\nthe presence of God, and in His absence returns at once to darkness.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: _Being_ naturally results from the form of a creature,\ngiven the influence of the Divine action; just as light results from\nthe diaphanous nature of the air, given the action of the sun.\nWherefore the potentiality to not-being in spiritual creatures and\nheavenly bodies is rather something in God, Who can withdraw His\ninfluence, than in the form or matter of those creatures.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God cannot grant to a creature to be preserved in being\nafter the cessation of the Divine influence: as neither can He make\nit not to have received its being from Himself. For the creature\nneeds to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an effect\ndepends on the cause of its being. So that there is no comparison\nwith an agent that is not the cause of _being_ but only of _becoming._\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument holds in regard to that preservation\nwhich consists in the removal of corruption: but all creatures do not\nneed to be preserved thus, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The preservation of things by God is a continuation of\nthat action whereby He gives existence, which action is without\neither motion or time; so also the preservation of light in the air\nis by the continual influence of the sun.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 2]\n\nWhether God Preserves Every Creature Immediately?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God preserves every creature\nimmediately. For God creates and preserves things by the same action,\nas above stated (A. 1, ad 4). But God created all things immediately.\nTherefore He preserves all things immediately.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a thing is nearer to itself than to another. But it\ncannot be given to a creature to preserve itself; much less therefore\ncan it be given to a creature to preserve another. Therefore God\npreserves all things without any intermediate cause preserving them.\n\nObj. 3: Further, an effect is kept in being by the cause, not only of\nits _becoming,_ but also of its being. But all created causes do not\nseem to cause their effects except in their _becoming,_ for they\ncause only by moving, as above stated (Q. 45, A. 3). Therefore they\ndo not cause so as to keep their effects in being.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A thing is kept in being by that which gives it\nbeing. But God gives being by means of certain intermediate causes.\nTherefore He also keeps things in being by means of certain causes.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a thing keeps another in\nbeing in two ways; first, indirectly and accidentally, by removing or\nhindering the action of a corrupting cause; secondly, directly and\n_per se,_ by the fact that that on it depends the other's being, as\nthe being of the effect depends on the cause. And in both ways a\ncreated thing keeps another in being. For it is clear that even in\ncorporeal things there are many causes which hinder the action of\ncorrupting agents, and for that reason are called preservatives; just\nas salt preserves meat from putrefaction; and in like manner with many\nother things. It happens also that an effect depends on a creature as\nto its being. For when we have a series of causes depending on one\nanother, it necessarily follows that, while the effect depends first\nand principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way\non all the middle causes. Therefore the first cause is the principal\ncause of the preservation of the effect which is to be referred to the\nmiddle causes in a secondary way; and all the more so, as the middle\ncause is higher and nearer to the first cause.\n\nFor this reason, even in things corporeal, the preservation and\ncontinuation of things is ascribed to the higher causes: thus the\nPhilosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 6), that the first, namely the\ndiurnal movement is the cause of the continuation of things generated;\nwhereas the second movement, which is from the zodiac, is the cause of\ndiversity owing to generation and corruption. In like manner\nastrologers ascribe to Saturn, the highest of the planets, those\nthings which are permanent and fixed. So we conclude that God keeps\ncertain things in being, by means of certain causes.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God created all things immediately, but in the\ncreation itself He established an order among things, so that some\ndepend on others, by which they are preserved in being, though He\nremains the principal cause of their preservation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since an effect is preserved by its proper cause\non which it depends; just as no effect can be its own cause, but can\nonly produce another effect, so no effect can be endowed with the\npower of self-preservation, but only with the power of preserving\nanother.\n\nReply Obj. 3: No created nature can be the cause of another,\nas regards the latter acquiring a new form, or disposition, except by\nvirtue of some change; for the created nature acts always on something\npresupposed. But after causing the form or disposition in the effect,\nwithout any fresh change in the effect, the cause preserves that form\nor disposition; as in the air, when it is lit up anew, we must allow\nsome change to have taken place, while the preservation of the light\nis without any further change in the air due to the presence of the\nsource of light.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 3]\n\nWhether God Can Annihilate Anything?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God cannot annihilate anything. For\nAugustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 21) that \"God is not the cause of anything\ntending to non-existence.\" But He would be such a cause if He were to\nannihilate anything. Therefore He cannot annihilate anything.\n\nObj. 2: Further, by His goodness God is the cause why things exist,\nsince, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): \"Because God is\ngood, we exist.\" But God cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot\ncause things to cease to exist; which would be the case were He to\nannihilate anything.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if God were to annihilate anything it would be by\nHis action. But this cannot be; because the term of every action is\nexistence. Hence even the action of a corrupting cause has its term\nin something generated; for when one thing is generated another\nundergoes corruption. Therefore God cannot annihilate anything.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 10:24): \"Correct me, O Lord,\nbut yet with judgment; and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me to\nnothing.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have held that God, in giving existence to\ncreatures, acted from natural necessity. Were this true, God could\nnot annihilate anything, since His nature cannot change. But, as we\nhave said above (Q. 19, A. 4), such an opinion is entirely false, and\nabsolutely contrary to the Catholic faith, which confesses that God\ncreated things of His own free-will, according to Ps. 134:6:\n\"Whatsoever the Lord pleased, He hath done.\" Therefore that God gives\nexistence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve\nthings in existence otherwise than by continually pouring out\nexistence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before\nthings existed, God was free not to give them existence, and not to\nmake them; so after they are made, He is free not to continue their\nexistence; and thus they would cease to exist; and this would be to\nannihilate them.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Non-existence has no direct cause; for nothing is a\ncause except inasmuch as it has existence, and a being essentially as\nsuch is a cause of something existing. Therefore God cannot cause a\nthing to tend to non-existence, whereas a creature has this tendency\nof itself, since it is produced from nothing. But indirectly God can\nbe the cause of things being reduced to non-existence, by withdrawing\nHis action therefrom.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God's goodness is the cause of things, not as though by\nnatural necessity, because the Divine goodness does not depend on\ncreatures; but by His free-will. Wherefore, as without prejudice to\nHis goodness, He might not have produced things into existence, so,\nwithout prejudice to His goodness, He might not preserve things in\nexistence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If God were to annihilate anything, this would not\nimply an action on God's part; but a mere cessation of His action.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 104, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Anything Is Annihilated?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that something is annihilated. For the end\ncorresponds to the beginning. But in the beginning there was nothing\nbut God. Therefore all things must tend to this end, that there shall\nbe nothing but God. Therefore creatures will be reduced to nothing.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every creature has a finite power. But no finite\npower extends to the infinite. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys.\nviii, 10) that, \"a finite power cannot move in infinite time.\"\nTherefore a creature cannot last for an infinite duration; and so at\nsome time it will be reduced to nothing.\n\nObj. 3: Further, forms and accidents have no matter as part of\nthemselves. But at some time they cease to exist. Therefore they are\nreduced to nothing.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 3:14): \"I have learned that\nall the works that God hath made continue for ever.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Some of those things which God does in creatures\noccur in accordance with the natural course of things; others happen\nmiraculously, and not in accordance with the natural order, as will\nbe explained (Q. 105, A. 6). Now whatever God wills to do according\nto the natural order of things may be observed from their nature; but\nthose things which occur miraculously, are ordered for the\nmanifestation of grace, according to the Apostle, \"To each one is\ngiven the manifestation of the Spirit, unto profit\" (1 Cor. 12:7);\nand subsequently he mentions, among others, the working of miracles.\n\nNow the nature of creatures shows that none of them is annihilated.\nFor, either they are immaterial, and therefore have no potentiality\nto non-existence; or they are material, and then they continue to\nexist, at least in matter, which is incorruptible, since it is the\nsubject of generation and corruption. Moreover, the annihilation of\nthings does not pertain to the manifestation of grace; since rather\nthe power and goodness of God are manifested by the preservation of\nthings in existence. Wherefore we must conclude by denying absolutely\nthat anything at all will be annihilated.\n\nReply Obj. 1: That things are brought into existence from a state of\nnon-existence, clearly shows the power of Him Who made them; but that\nthey should be reduced to nothing would hinder that manifestation,\nsince the power of God is conspicuously shown in His preserving all\nthings in existence, according to the Apostle: \"Upholding all things\nby the word of His power\" (Heb. 1:3).\n\nReply Obj. 2: A creature's potentiality to existence is merely\nreceptive; the active power belongs to God Himself, from Whom\nexistence is derived. Wherefore the infinite duration of things is a\nconsequence of the infinity of the Divine power. To some things,\nhowever, is given a determinate power of duration for a certain time,\nso far as they may be hindered by some contrary agent from receiving\nthe influx of existence which comes from Him Whom finite power cannot\nresist, for an infinite, but only for a fixed time. So things which\nhave no contrary, although they have a finite power, continue to\nexist for ever.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they\ndo not subsist: but each one of them is something \"of a being\"; for\nit is called a being, because something is by it. Yet so far as their\nmode of existence is concerned, they are not entirely reduced to\nnothingness; not that any part of them survives, but that they remain\nin the potentiality of the matter, or of the subject.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 105\n\nOF THE CHANGE OF CREATURES BY GOD\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe now consider the second effect of the Divine government, i.e. the\nchange of creatures; and first, the change of creatures by God;\nsecondly, the change of one creature by another.\n\nUnder the first head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether God can move immediately the matter to the form?\n\n(2) Whether He can immediately move a body?\n\n(3) Whether He can move the intellect?\n\n(4) Whether He can move the will?\n\n(5) Whether God works in every worker?\n\n(6) Whether He can do anything outside the order imposed on things?\n\n(7) Whether all that God does is miraculous?\n\n(8) Of the diversity of miracles.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 1]\n\nWhether God Can Move the Matter Immediately to the Form?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the matter immediately\nto receive the form. For as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did.\nvi, 8), nothing can bring a form into any particular matter, except\nthat form which is in matter; because, like begets like. But God is\nnot a form in matter. Therefore He cannot cause a form in matter.\n\nObj. 2: Further, any agent inclined to several effects will produce\nnone of them, unless it is determined to a particular one by some\nother cause; for, as the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11), a\ngeneral assertion does not move the mind, except by means of some\nparticular apprehension. But the Divine power is the universal cause\nof all things. Therefore it cannot produce any particular form,\nexcept by means of a particular agent.\n\nObj. 3: As universal being depends on the first universal cause, so\ndeterminate being depends on determinate particular causes; as we\nhave seen above (Q. 104, A. 2). But the determinate being of a\nparticular thing is from its own form. Therefore the forms of things\nare produced by God, only by means of particular causes.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:7): \"God formed man of the\nslime of the earth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ God can move matter immediately to form; because\nwhatever is in passive potentiality can be reduced to act by the\nactive power which extends over that potentiality. Therefore, since\nthe Divine power extends over matter, as produced by God, it can be\nreduced to act by the Divine power: and this is what is meant by\nmatter being moved to a form; for a form is nothing else but the\nact of matter.\n\nReply Obj. 1: An effect is assimilated to the active cause in two\nways. First, according to the same species; as man is generated by\nman, and fire by fire. Secondly, by being virtually contained in the\ncause; as the form of the effect is virtually contained in its cause:\nthus animals produced by putrefaction, and plants, and minerals are\nlike the sun and stars, by whose power they are produced. In this way\nthe effect is like its active cause as regards all that over which\nthe power of that cause extends. Now the power of God extends to both\nmatter and form; as we have said above (Q. 14, A. 2; Q. 44, A. 2);\nwherefore if a composite thing be produced, it is likened to God by\nway of a virtual inclusion; or it is likened to the composite\ngenerator by a likeness of species. Therefore just as the composite\ngenerator can move matter to a form by generating a composite thing\nlike itself; so also can God. But no other form not existing in\nmatter can do this; because the power of no other separate substance\nextends over matter. Hence angels and demons operate on visible\nmatter; not by imprinting forms in matter, but by making use of\ncorporeal seeds.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument would hold if God were to act of natural\nnecessity. But since He acts by His will and intellect, which knows\nthe particular and not only the universal natures of all forms, it\nfollows that He can determinately imprint this or that form on matter.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The fact that secondary causes are ordered to\ndeterminate effects is due to God; wherefore since God ordains other\ncauses to certain effects He can also produce certain effects by\nHimself without any other cause.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 2]\n\nWhether God Can Move a Body Immediately?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God cannot move a body immediately.\nFor as the mover and the moved must exist simultaneously, as the\nPhilosopher says (Phys. vii, 2), it follows that there must be some\ncontact between the mover and moved. But there can be no contact\nbetween God and a body; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. 1): \"There is\nno contact with God.\" Therefore God cannot move a body immediately.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God is the mover unmoved. But such also is the\ndesirable object when apprehended. Therefore God moves as the object\nof desire and apprehension. But He cannot be apprehended except by the\nintellect, which is neither a body nor a corporeal power. Therefore\nGod cannot move a body immediately.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 10) that an\ninfinite power moves instantaneously. But it is impossible for a body\nto be moved in one instant; for since every movement is between\nopposites, it follows that two opposites would exist at once in the\nsame subject, which is impossible. Therefore a body cannot be moved\nimmediately by an infinite power. But God's power is infinite, as we\nhave explained (Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore God cannot move a body\nimmediately.\n\n_On the contrary,_ God produced the works of the six days immediately\namong which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from Gen.\n1:9 \"Let the waters be gathered together into one place.\" Therefore\nGod alone can move a body immediately.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is erroneous to say that God cannot Himself\nproduce all the determinate effects which are produced by any created\ncause. Wherefore, since bodies are moved immediately by created\ncauses, we cannot possibly doubt that God can move immediately any\nbodies whatever. This indeed follows from what is above stated (A.\n1). For every movement of any body whatever, either results from a\nform, as the movements of things heavy and light result from the form\nwhich they have from their generating cause, for which reason the\ngenerator is called the mover; or else tends to a form, as heating\ntends to the form of heat. Now it belongs to the same cause, to\nimprint a form, to dispose to that form, and to give the movement\nwhich results from that form; for fire not only generates fire, but\nit also heats and moves things upwards. Therefore, as God can imprint\nform immediately in matter, it follows that He can move any body\nwhatever in respect of any movement whatever.\n\nReply Obj. 1: There are two kinds of contact; corporeal contact, when\ntwo bodies touch each other; and virtual contact, as the cause of\nsadness is said to touch the one made sad. According to the first\nkind of contact, God, as being incorporeal, neither touches, nor is\ntouched; but according to virtual contact He touches creatures by\nmoving them; but He is not touched, because the natural power of no\ncreature can reach up to Him. Thus did Dionysius understand the\nwords, \"There is no contact with God\"; that is, so that God Himself\nbe touched.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God moves as the object of desire and apprehension; but\nit does not follow that He always moves as being desired and\napprehended by that which is moved; but as being desired and known by\nHimself; for He does all things for His own goodness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Philosopher (Phys. viii, 10) intends to\nprove that the power of the first mover is not a power of the first\nmover _of bulk,_ by the following argument. The power of the first\nmover is infinite (which he proves from the fact that the first mover\ncan move in infinite time). Now an infinite power, if it were a power\n_of bulk,_ would move without time, which is impossible; therefore the\ninfinite power of the first mover must be in something which is not\nmeasured by its bulk. Whence it is clear that for a body to be moved\nwithout time can only be the result of an infinite power. The reason\nis that every power of bulk moves in its entirety; since it moves by\nthe necessity of its nature. But an infinite power surpasses out of\nall proportion any finite power. Now the greater the power of the\nmover, the greater is the velocity of the movement. Therefore, since a\nfinite power moves in a determinate time, it follows that an infinite\npower does not move in any time; for between one time and any other\ntime there is some proportion. On the other hand, a power which is not\nin bulk is the power of an intelligent being, which operates in its\neffects according to what is fitting to them; and therefore, since it\ncannot be fitting for a body to be moved without time, it does not\nfollow that it moves without time.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 3]\n\nWhether God Moves the Created Intellect Immediately?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God does not immediately move the\ncreated intellect. For the action of the intellect is governed by its\nown subject; since it does not pass into external matter; as stated\nin _Metaph._ ix, Did. viii, 8. But the action of what is moved by\nanother does not proceed from that wherein it is; but from the mover.\nTherefore the intellect is not moved by another; and so apparently\nGod cannot move the created intellect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, anything which in itself is a sufficient principle\nof movement, is not moved by another. But the movement of the\nintellect is its act of understanding; in the sense in which we say\nthat to understand or to feel is a kind of movement, as the\nPhilosopher says (De Anima iii, 7). But the intellectual light which\nis natural to the soul, is a sufficient principle of understanding.\nTherefore it is not moved by another.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as the senses are moved by the sensible, so the\nintellect is moved by the intelligible. But God is not intelligible\nto us, and exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Therefore God\ncannot move our intellect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The teacher moves the intellect of the one taught.\nBut it is written (Ps. 93:10) that God \"teaches man knowledge.\"\nTherefore God moves the human intellect.\n\n_I answer that,_ As in corporeal movement that is called the mover\nwhich gives the form that is the principle of movement, so that is\nsaid to move the intellect, which is the cause of the form that is\nthe principle of the intellectual operation, called the movement of\nthe intellect. Now there is a twofold principle of intellectual\noperation in the intelligent being; one which is the intellectual\npower itself, which principle exists in the one who understands in\npotentiality; while the other is the principle of actual\nunderstanding, namely, the likeness of the thing understood in the\none who understands. So a thing is said to move the intellect,\nwhether it gives to him who understands the power of understanding;\nor impresses on him the likeness of the thing understood.\n\nNow God moves the created intellect in both ways. For He is the First\nimmaterial Being; and as intellectuality is a result of immateriality,\nit follows that He is the First intelligent Being. Therefore since in\neach order the first is the cause of all that follows, we must\nconclude that from Him proceeds all intellectual power. In like\nmanner, since He is the First Being, and all other beings pre-exist in\nHim as in their First Cause, it follows that they exist intelligibly\nin Him, after the mode of His own Nature. For as the intelligible\ntypes of everything exist first of all in God, and are derived from\nHim by other intellects in order that these may actually understand;\nso also are they derived by creatures that they may subsist. Therefore\nGod so moves the created intellect, inasmuch as He gives it the\nintellectual power, whether natural, or superadded; and impresses on\nthe created intellect the intelligible species, and maintains and\npreserves both power and species in existence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The intellectual operation is performed by the\nintellect in which it exists, as by a secondary cause; but it proceeds\nfrom God as from its first cause. For by Him the power to understand\nis given to the one who understands.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The intellectual light together with the likeness of\nthe thing understood is a sufficient principle of understanding; but\nit is a secondary principle, and depends upon the First Principle.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The intelligible object moves our human intellect, so\nfar as, in a way, it impresses on it its own likeness, by means of\nwhich the intellect is able to understand it. But the likenesses\nwhich God impresses on the created intellect are not sufficient to\nenable the created intellect to understand Him through His Essence,\nas we have seen above (Q. 12, A. 2; Q. 56, A. 3). Hence He moves the\ncreated intellect, and yet He cannot be intelligible to it, as we\nhave explained (Q. 12, A. 4).\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 4]\n\nWhether God Can Move the Created Will?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God cannot move the created will. For\nwhatever is moved from without, is forced. But the will cannot be\nforced. Therefore it is not moved from without; and therefore cannot\nbe moved by God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God cannot make two contradictories to be true at\nthe same time. But this would follow if He moved the will; for to be\nvoluntarily moved means to be moved from within, and not by another.\nTherefore God cannot move the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, movement is attributed to the mover rather than to\nthe one moved; wherefore homicide is not ascribed to the stone, but\nto the thrower. Therefore, if God moves the will, it follows that\nvoluntary actions are not imputed to man for reward or blame. But\nthis is false. Therefore God does not move the will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:13): \"It is God who worketh\nin us [Vulgate--'you'] both to will and to accomplish.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As the intellect is moved by the object and by the\nGiver of the power of intelligence, as stated above (A. 3), so is the\nwill moved by its object, which is good, and by Him who creates the\npower of willing. Now the will can be moved by good as its object,\nbut by God alone sufficiently and efficaciously. For nothing can move\na movable thing sufficiently unless the active power of the mover\nsurpasses or at least equals the potentiality of the thing movable.\nNow the potentiality of the will extends to the universal good; for\nits object is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect\nis the universal being. But every created good is some particular\ngood; God alone is the universal good. Whereas He alone fills the\ncapacity of the will, and moves it sufficiently as its object. In\nlike manner the power of willing is caused by God alone. For to will\nis nothing but to be inclined towards the object of the will, which\nis universal good. But to incline towards the universal good belongs\nto the First Mover, to Whom the ultimate end is proportionate; just\nas in human affairs to him that presides over the community belongs\nthe directing of his subjects to the common weal. Wherefore in both\nways it belongs to God to move the will; but especially in the second\nway by an interior inclination of the will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A thing moved by another is forced if moved against its\nnatural inclination; but if it is moved by another giving to it the\nproper natural inclination, it is not forced; as when a heavy body is\nmade to move downwards by that which produced it, then it is not\nforced. In like manner God, while moving the will, does not force it,\nbecause He gives the will its own natural inclination.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To be moved voluntarily, is to be moved from within,\nthat is, by an interior principle: yet this interior principle may be\ncaused by an exterior principle; and so to be moved from within is\nnot repugnant to being moved by another.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If the will were so moved by another as in no way to be\nmoved from within itself, the act of the will would not be imputed\nfor reward or blame. But since its being moved by another does not\nprevent its being moved from within itself, as we have stated (ad 2),\nit does not thereby forfeit the motive for merit or demerit.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 5]\n\nWhether God Works in Every Agent?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God does not work in every agent. For\nwe must not attribute any insufficiency to God. If therefore God works\nin every agent, He works sufficiently in each one. Hence it would be\nsuperfluous for the created agent to work at all.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the same work cannot proceed at the same time from\ntwo sources; as neither can one and the same movement belong to two\nmovable things. Therefore if the creature's operation is from God\noperating in the creature, it cannot at the same time proceed from\nthe creature; and so no creature works at all.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the maker is the cause of the operation of the thing\nmade, as giving it the form whereby it operates. Therefore, if God is\nthe cause of the operation of things made by Him, this would be\ninasmuch as He gives them the power of operating. But this is in the\nbeginning, when He makes them. Thus it seems that God does not\noperate any further in the operating creature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 26:12): \"Lord, Thou hast\nwrought all our works in [Vulg.: 'for'] us.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have understood God to work in every agent in\nsuch a way that no created power has any effect in things, but that\nGod alone is the ultimate cause of everything wrought; for instance,\nthat it is not fire that gives heat, but God in the fire, and so\nforth. But this is impossible. First, because the order of cause and\neffect would be taken away from created things: and this would imply\nlack of power in the Creator: for it is due to the power of the\ncause, that it bestows active power on its effect. Secondly, because\nthe active powers which are seen to exist in things, would be\nbestowed on things to no purpose, if these wrought nothing through\nthem. Indeed, all things created would seem, in a way, to be\npurposeless, if they lacked an operation proper to them; since the\npurpose of everything is its operation. For the less perfect is\nalways for the sake of the more perfect: and consequently as the\nmatter is for the sake of the form, so the form which is the first\nact, is for the sake of its operation, which is the second act; and\nthus operation is the end of the creature. We must therefore\nunderstand that God works in things in such a manner that things have\ntheir proper operation.\n\nIn order to make this clear, we must observe that as there are few\nkinds of causes; matter is not a principle of action, but is the\nsubject that receives the effect of action. On the other hand, the\nend, the agent, and the form are principles of action, but in a\ncertain order. For the first principle of action is the end which\nmoves the agent; the second is the agent; the third is the form of\nthat which the agent applies to action (although the agent also acts\nthrough its own form); as may be clearly seen in things made by art.\nFor the craftsman is moved to action by the end, which is the thing\nwrought, for instance a chest or a bed; and applies to action the\naxe which cuts through its being sharp.\n\nThus then does God work in every worker, according to these three\nthings. First as an end. For since every operation is for the sake\nof some good, real or apparent; and nothing is good either really or\napparently, except in as far as it participates in a likeness to the\nSupreme Good, which is God; it follows that God Himself is the cause\nof every operation as its end. Again it is to be observed that where\nthere are several agents in order, the second always acts in virtue\nof the first; for the first agent moves the second to act. And thus\nall agents act in virtue of God Himself: and therefore He is the\ncause of action in every agent. Thirdly, we must observe that God not\nonly moves things to operate, as it were applying their forms and\npowers to operation, just as the workman applies the axe to cut, who\nnevertheless at times does not give the axe its form; but He also\ngives created agents their forms and preserves them in being.\nTherefore He is the cause of action not only by giving the form which\nis the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause\nof movement in things heavy and light; but also as preserving the\nforms and powers of things; just as the sun is said to be the cause\nof the manifestation of colors, inasmuch as it gives and preserves\nthe light by which colors are made manifest. And since the form of a\nthing is within the thing, and all the more, as it approaches nearer\nto the First and Universal Cause; and because in all things God\nHimself is properly the cause of universal being which is innermost\nin all things; it follows that in all things God works intimately.\nFor this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are\nattributed to God as operating in nature, according to Job 10:11:\n\"Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: Thou hast put me together\nwith bones and sinews.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: God works sufficiently in things as First Agent, but it\ndoes not follow from this that the operation of secondary agents is\nsuperfluous.\n\nReply Obj. 2: One action does not proceed from two agents of the same\norder. But nothing hinders the same action from proceeding from a\nprimary and a secondary agent.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God not only gives things their form, but He also\npreserves them in existence, and applies them to act, and is moreover\nthe end of every action, as above explained.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 6]\n\nWhether God Can Do Anything Outside the Established Order of Nature?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the\nestablished order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3)\nsays: \"God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against\nnature.\" But that which is outside the natural order seems to be\nagainst nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural\norder.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as the order of justice is from God, so is the order\nof nature. But God cannot do anything outside the order of justice;\nfor then He would do something unjust. Therefore He cannot do\nanything outside the order of nature.\n\nObj. 3: Further, God established the order of nature. Therefore it\nGod does anything outside the order of nature, it would seem that He\nis changeable; which cannot be said.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): \"God\nsometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of\nnature.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ From each cause there results a certain order to its\neffects, since every cause is a principle; and so, according to the\nmultiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders,\nsubjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. Wherefore\na higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but\nconversely. An example of this may be seen in human affairs. On the\nfather of a family depends the order of the household; which order is\ncontained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the\nruler of the city; while this last order depends on that of the king,\nby whom the whole kingdom is ordered.\n\nIf therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first\ncause, God cannot do anything against this order; for, if He did so,\nHe would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness.\nBut if we consider the order of things depending on any secondary\ncause, thus God can do something outside such order; for He is not\nsubject to the order of secondary causes; but, on the contrary, this\norder is subject to Him, as proceeding from Him, not by a natural\nnecessity, but by the choice of His own will; for He could have\ncreated another order of things. Wherefore God can do something\noutside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by\nproducing the effects of secondary causes without them, or by\nproducing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So\nAugustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): \"God acts against the wonted\ncourse of nature, but by no means does He act against the supreme\nlaw; because He does not act against Himself.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: In natural things something may happen outside this\nnatural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent\nwhich did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example,\nwhen a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to him its\nnatural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against\nnature. It may also happen by the action of the agent on whom the\nnatural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is\nclear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature;\nalthough it is against the natural movement of water in a downward\ndirection; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on\nwhich the natural inclination of lower bodies depends. Therefore\nsince the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does\nanything outside this order, it is not against nature. Wherefore\nAugustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): \"That is natural to each\nthing which is caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and\norder in nature.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The order of justice arises by relation to the First\nCause, Who is the rule of all justice; and therefore God can do\nnothing against such order.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God fixed a certain order in things in such a way that\nat the same time He reserved to Himself whatever he intended to do\notherwise than by a particular cause. So when He acts outside this\norder, He does not change.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Whatever God Does Outside the Natural Order Is Miraculous?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that not everything which God does outside\nthe natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of the\nworld, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are\ndone by God outside the natural order; as not being accomplished by\nthe action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called\nmiracles. Therefore not everything that God does outside the natural\norder is a miracle.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a miracle is \"something difficult, which seldom\noccurs, surpassing the faculty of nature, and going so far beyond our\nhopes as to compel our astonishment\" [*St. Augustine, De utilitate\ncredendi xvi.]. But some things outside the order of nature are not\narduous; for they occur in small things, such as the recovery and\nhealing of the sick. Nor are they of rare occurrence, since they\nhappen frequently; as when the sick were placed in the streets, to be\nhealed by the shadow of Peter (Acts 5:15). Nor do they surpass the\nfaculty of nature; as when people are cured of a fever. Nor are they\nbeyond our hopes, since we all hope for the resurrection of the dead,\nwhich nevertheless will be outside the course of nature. Therefore\nnot all things are outside the course of nature are miraculous.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the word miracle is derived from admiration. Now\nadmiration concerns things manifest to the senses. But sometimes\nthings happen outside the order of nature, which are not manifest to\nthe senses; as when the Apostles were endowed with knowledge without\nstudying or being taught. Therefore not everything that occurs\noutside the order of nature is miraculous.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): \"Where\nGod does anything against that order of nature which we know and are\naccustomed to observe, we call it a miracle.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The word miracle is derived from admiration, which\narises when an effect is manifest, whereas its cause is hidden; as\nwhen a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the\nPhilosopher says in the beginning of his _Metaphysics._ Now the cause\nof a manifest effect may be known to one, but unknown to others.\nWherefore a thing is wonderful to one man, and not at all to others:\nas an eclipse is to a rustic, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle\nis so called as being full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely\nhidden from all: and this cause is God. Wherefore those things which\nGod does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous,\nthough done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles,\nbecause they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so\nthey do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do not\nbelong to that order.\n\nReply Obj. 2: An arduous thing is called a miracle, not on account of\nthe excellence of the thing wherein it is done, but because it\nsurpasses the faculty of nature: likewise a thing is called unusual,\nnot because it does not often happen, but because it is outside the\nusual natural course of things. Furthermore, a thing is said to be\nabove the faculty of nature, not only by reason of the substance of\nthe thing done, but also on account of the manner and order in which\nit is done. Again, a miracle is said to go beyond the hope \"of\nnature,\" not above the hope \"of grace,\" which hope comes from faith,\nwhereby we believe in the future resurrection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The knowledge of the Apostles, although not manifest in\nitself, yet was made manifest in its effect, from which it was shown\nto be wonderful.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 105, Art. 8]\n\nWhether One Miracle Is Greater Than Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one miracle is not greater than\nanother. For Augustine says (Epist. ad Volusian. cxxxvii): \"In\nmiraculous deeds, the whole measure of the deed is the power of the\ndoer.\" But by the same power of God all miracles are done. Therefore\none miracle is not greater than another.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the power of God is infinite. But the infinite\nexceeds the finite beyond all proportion; and therefore no more\nreason exists to wonder at one effect thereof than at another.\nTherefore one miracle is not greater than another.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Lord says, speaking of miraculous works (John\n14:12): \"The works that I do, he also shall do, and greater than\nthese shall he do.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the\nDivine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the\npower of God, according to Isa. 40:15: \"Behold the Gentiles are as a\ndrop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a\nbalance.\" But a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the\npower of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature\nis surpassed, the greater the miracle. Now the power of nature is\nsurpassed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for\ninstance, if two bodies occupy the same place, or if the sun goes\nbackwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is\nabsolutely unable to do; and these hold the highest rank among\nmiracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the\ndeed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the dead, and\ngiving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life,\nbut not to the dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles.\nThirdly, a thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in\nwhich it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without\ntreatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air is\nsuddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural\ncause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias; and these hold\nthe lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has\nvarious degrees, according to the different ways in which the power\nof nature is surpassed.\n\nFrom this is clear how to reply to the objections, arguing as they do\nfrom the Divine power.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 106\n\nHOW ONE CREATURE MOVES ANOTHER\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe next consider how one creature moves another. This consideration\nwill be threefold:\n\n(1) How the angels move, who are purely spiritual creatures;\n\n(2) How bodies move;\n\n(3) How man moves, who is composed of a spiritual and a corporeal\nnature.\n\nConcerning the first point, there are three things to be considered:\n\n(1) How an angel acts on an angel;\n\n(2) How an angel acts on a corporeal nature;\n\n(3) How an angel acts on man.\n\nThe first of these raises the question of the enlightenment and\nspeech of the angels; and of their mutual coordination, both of the\ngood and of the bad angels.\n\nConcerning their enlightenment there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether one angel moves the intellect of another by enlightenment?\n\n(2) Whether one angel moves the will of another?\n\n(3) Whether an inferior angel can enlighten a superior angel?\n\n(4) Whether a superior angel enlightens an inferior angel in all that\nhe knows himself?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 106, Art. 1]\n\nWhether One Angel Enlightens Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one angel does not enlighten another.\nFor the angels possess now the same beatitude which we hope to obtain.\nBut one man will not then enlighten another, according to Jer. 31:34:\n\"They shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his\nbrother.\" Therefore neither does an angel enlighten another now.\n\nObj. 2: Further, light in the angels is threefold; of nature, of\ngrace, and of glory. But an angel is enlightened in the light of\nnature by the Creator; in the light of grace by the Justifier; in\nthe light of glory by the Beatifier; all of which comes from God.\nTherefore one angel does not enlighten another.\n\nObj. 3: Further, light is a form in the mind. But the rational\nmind is \"informed by God alone, without created intervention,\" as\nAugustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 51). Therefore one angel does not\nenlighten the mind of another.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that \"the angels\nof the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by\nthe angels of the first hierarchy.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ One angel enlightens another. To make this clear,\nwe must observe that intellectual light is nothing else than a\nmanifestation of truth, according to Eph. 5:13: \"All that is made\nmanifest is light.\" Hence to enlighten means nothing else but to\ncommunicate to others the manifestation of the known truth; according\nto the Apostle (Eph. 3:8): \"To me the least of all the saints is\ngiven this grace . . . to enlighten all men, that they may see what\nis the dispensation of the mystery which hath been hidden from\neternity in God.\" Therefore one angel is said to enlighten another by\nmanifesting the truth which he knows himself. Hence Dionysius says\n(Coel. Hier. vii): \"Theologians plainly show that the orders of the\nheavenly beings are taught Divine science by the higher minds.\"\n\nNow since two things concur in the intellectual operation, as we\nhave said (Q. 105, A. 3), namely, the intellectual power, and the\nlikeness of the thing understood; in both of these one angel can\nnotify the known truth to another. First, by strengthening his\nintellectual power; for just as the power of an imperfect body is\nstrengthened by the neighborhood of a more perfect body--for\ninstance, the less hot is made hotter by the presence of what is\nhotter; so the intellectual power of an inferior angel is strengthened\nby the superior angel turning to him: since in spiritual things, for\none thing to turn to another, corresponds to neighborhood in corporeal\nthings. Secondly, one angel manifests the truth to another as regards\nthe likeness of the thing understood. For the superior angel receives\nthe knowledge of truth by a kind of universal conception, to receive\nwhich the inferior angel's intellect is not sufficiently powerful, for\nit is natural to him to receive truth in a more particular manner.\nTherefore the superior angel distinguishes, in a way, the truth which\nhe conceives universally, so that it can be grasped by the inferior\nangel; and thus he proposes it to his knowledge. Thus it is with us\nthat the teacher, in order to adapt himself to others, divides into\nmany points the knowledge which he possesses in the universal. This\nis thus expressed by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xv): \"Every intellectual\nsubstance with provident power divides and multiplies the uniform\nknowledge bestowed on it by one nearer to God, so as to lead its\ninferiors upwards by analogy.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: All the angels, both inferior and superior, see the\nEssence of God immediately, and in this respect one does not teach\nanother. It is of this truth that the prophet speaks; wherefore he\nadds: \"They shall teach no more every man his brother, saying: 'Know\nthe Lord': for all shall know Me, from the least of them even to the\ngreatest.\" But all the types of the Divine works, which are known in\nGod as in their cause, God knows in Himself, because He comprehends\nHimself; but of others who see God, each one knows the more types,\nthe more perfectly he sees God. Hence a superior angel knows more\nabout the types of the Divine works than an inferior angel, and\nconcerning these the former enlightens the latter; and as to this\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the angels \"are enlightened by\nthe types of existing things.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: An angel does not enlighten another by giving him the\nlight of nature, grace, or glory; but by strengthening his natural\nlight, and by manifesting to him the truth concerning the state of\nnature, of grace, and of glory, as explained above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The rational mind is formed immediately by God, either\nas the image from the exemplar, forasmuch as it is made to the image\nof God alone; or as the subject by the ultimate perfecting form: for\nthe created mind is always considered to be unformed, except it\nadhere to the first truth; while the other kinds of enlightenment\nthat proceed from man or angel, are, as it were, dispositions to\nthis ultimate form.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 106, Art. 2]\n\nWhether one angel moves another angel's will?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one angel can move another angel's\nwill. Because, according to Dionysius quoted above (A. 1), as one\nangel enlightens another, so does he cleanse and perfect another. But\ncleansing and perfecting seem to belong to the will: for the former\nseems to point to the stain of sin which appertains to will; while to\nbe perfected is to obtain an end, which is the object of the will.\nTherefore an angel can move another angel's will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii): \"The names of\nthe angels designate their properties.\" Now the Seraphim are so\ncalled because they \"kindle\" or \"give heat\": and this is by love\nwhich belongs to the will. Therefore one angel moves another angel's\nwill.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 11) that the\nhigher appetite moves the lower. But as the intellect of the superior\nangel is higher, so also is his will. It seems, therefore, that the\nsuperior angel can change the will of another angel.\n\n_On the contrary,_ To him it belongs to change the will, to whom it\nbelongs to bestow righteousness: for righteousness is the rightness\nof the will. But God alone bestows righteousness. Therefore one angel\ncannot change another angel's will.\n\n_I answer that,_ As was said above (Q. 105, A. 4), the will is\nchanged in two ways; on the part of the object, and on the part of\nthe power. On the part of the object, both the good itself which is\nthe object of the will, moves the will, as the appetible moves the\nappetite; and he who points out the object, as, for instance, one\nwho proves something to be good. But as we have said above (Q. 105,\nA. 4), other goods in a measure incline the will, yet nothing\nsufficiently moves the will save the universal good, and that is God.\nAnd this good He alone shows, that it may be seen by the blessed,\nWho, when Moses asked: \"Show me Thy glory,\" answered: \"I will show\nthee all good\" (Ex. 33:18, 19). Therefore an angel does not move the\nwill sufficiently, either as the object or as showing the object. But\nhe inclines the will as something lovable, and as manifesting some\ncreated good ordered to God's goodness. And thus he can incline the\nwill to the love of the creature or of God, by way of persuasion.\n\nBut on the part of the power the will cannot be moved at all save by\nGod. For the operation of the will is a certain inclination of the\nwiller to the thing willed. And He alone can change this inclination,\nWho bestowed on the creature the power to will: just as that agent\nalone can change the natural inclination, which can give the power to\nwhich follows that natural inclination. Now God alone gave to the\ncreature the power to will, because He alone is the author of the\nintellectual nature. Therefore an angel cannot move another angel's\nwill.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Cleansing and perfecting are to be understood according\nto the mode of enlightenment. And since God enlightens by changing\nthe intellect and will, He cleanses by removing defects of intellect\nand will, and perfects unto the end of the intellect and will. But\nthe enlightenment caused by an angel concerns the intellect, as\nexplained above (A. 1); therefore an angel is to be understood as\ncleansing from the defect of nescience in the intellect; and as\nperfecting unto the consummate end of the intellect, and this is the\nknowledge of truth. Thus Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. vi): that \"in\nthe heavenly hierarchy the chastening of the inferior essence is an\nenlightening of things unknown, that leads them to more perfect\nknowledge.\" For instance, we might say that corporeal sight is\ncleansed by the removal of darkness; enlightened by the diffusion of\nlight; and perfected by being brought to the perception of the\ncolored object.\n\nReply Obj. 2: One angel can induce another to love God by persuasion\nas explained above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Philosopher speaks of the lower sensitive appetite\nwhich can be moved by the superior intellectual appetite, because it\nbelongs to the same nature of the soul, and because the inferior\nappetite is a power in a corporeal organ. But this does not apply to\nthe angels.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 106, Art. 3]\n\nWhether an Inferior Angel Can Enlighten a Superior Angel?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an inferior angel can enlighten a\nsuperior angel. For the ecclesiastical hierarchy is derived from, and\nrepresents the heavenly hierarchy; and hence the heavenly Jerusalem is\ncalled \"our mother\" (Gal. 4:26). But in the Church even superiors are\nenlightened and taught by their inferiors, as the Apostle says (1 Cor.\n14:31): \"You may all prophesy one by one, that all may learn and all\nmay be exhorted.\" Therefore, likewise in the heavenly hierarchy, the\nsuperiors can be enlightened by inferiors.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as the order of corporeal substances depends on the\nwill of God, so also does the order of spiritual substances. But, as\nwas said above (Q. 105, A. 6), God sometimes acts outside the order\nof corporeal substances. Therefore He also sometimes acts outside the\norder of spiritual substances, by enlightening inferior otherwise\nthan through their superiors. Therefore in that way the inferiors\nenlightened by God can enlighten superiors.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one angel enlightens the other to whom he turns, as\nwas above explained (A. 1). But since this turning to another is\nvoluntary, the highest angel can turn to the lowest passing over the\nothers. Therefore he can enlighten him immediately; and thus the\nlatter can enlighten his superiors.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says that \"this is the Divine\nunalterable law, that inferior things are led to God by the superior\"\n(Coel. Hier. iv; Eccl. Hier. v).\n\n_I answer that,_ The inferior angels never enlighten the superior,\nbut are always enlightened by them. The reason is, because, as above\nexplained (Q. 105, A. 6), one order is under another, as cause is\nunder cause; and hence as cause is ordered to cause, so is order to\norder. Therefore there is no incongruity if sometimes anything is\ndone outside the order of the inferior cause, to be ordered to the\nsuperior cause, as in human affairs the command of the president is\npassed over from obedience to the prince. So it happens that God\nworks miraculously outside the order of corporeal nature, that men\nmay be ordered to the knowledge of Him. But the passing over of the\norder that belongs to spiritual substances in no way belongs to the\nordering of men to God; since the angelic operations are not made\nknown to us; as are the operations of sensible bodies. Thus the order\nwhich belongs to spiritual substances is never passed over by God; so\nthat the inferiors are always moved by the superior, and not\nconversely.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The ecclesiastical hierarchy imitates the heavenly in\nsome degree, but not by a perfect likeness. For in the heavenly\nhierarchy the perfection of the order is in proportion to its\nnearness to God; so that those who are the nearer to God are the more\nsublime in grade, and more clear in knowledge; and on that account\nthe superiors are never enlightened by the inferiors, whereas in the\necclesiastical hierarchy, sometimes those who are the nearer to God\nin sanctity, are in the lowest grade, and are not conspicuous for\nscience; and some also are eminent in one kind of science, and fail\nin another; and on that account superiors may be taught by inferiors.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As above explained, there is no similarity between what\nGod does outside the order of corporeal nature, and that of spiritual\nnature. Hence the argument does not hold.\n\nReply Obj. 3: An angel turns voluntarily to enlighten another angel,\nbut the angel's will is ever regulated by the Divine law which made\nthe order in the angels.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 106, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Superior Angel Enlightens the Inferior As Regards All He\nHimself Knows?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the superior angel does not enlighten\nthe inferior concerning all he himself knows. For Dionysius says\n(Coel. Hier. xii) that the superior angels have a more universal\nknowledge; and the inferior a more particular and individual\nknowledge. But more is contained under a universal knowledge than\nunder a particular knowledge. Therefore not all that the superior\nangels know, is known by the inferior, through these being\nenlightened by the former.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Master of the Sentences (ii, D, 11) says that\nthe superior angels had long known the Mystery of the Incarnation,\nwhereas the inferior angels did not know it until it was\naccomplished. Thus we find that on some of the angels inquiring, as\nit were, in ignorance: \"Who is this King of glory?\" other angels, who\nknew, answered: \"The Lord of Hosts, He is the King of glory,\" as\nDionysius expounds (Coel. Hier. vii). But this would not apply if the\nsuperior angels enlightened the inferior concerning all they know\nthemselves. Therefore they do not do so.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the superior angels enlighten the inferior about\nall they know, nothing that the superior angels know would be unknown\nto the inferior angels. Therefore the superior angels could\ncommunicate nothing more to the inferior; which appears open to\nobjection. Therefore the superior angels enlighten the inferior in\nall things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory [*Peter Lombard, Sent. ii, D, ix; Cf.\nGregory, Hom. xxxiv, in Ev.] says: \"In that heavenly country, though\nthere are some excellent gifts, yet nothing is held individually.\"\nAnd Dionysius says: \"Each heavenly essence communicates to the\ninferior the gift derived from the superior\" (Coel. Hier. xv), as\nquoted above (A. 1).\n\n_I answer that,_ Every creature participates in the Divine goodness,\nso as to diffuse the good it possesses to others; for it is of the\nnature of good to communicate itself to others. Hence also corporeal\nagents give their likeness to others so far as they can. So the more\nan agent is established in the share of the Divine goodness, so much\nthe more does it strive to transmit its perfections to others as far\nas possible. Hence the Blessed Peter admonishes those who by grace\nshare in the Divine goodness; saying: \"As every man hath received\ngrace, ministering the same one to another; as good stewards of the\nmanifold grace of God\" (1 Pet. 4:10). Much more therefore do the holy\nangels, who enjoy the plenitude of participation of the Divine\ngoodness, impart the same to those below them.\n\nNevertheless this gift is not received so excellently by the inferior\nas by the superior angels; and therefore the superior ever remain in\na higher order, and have a more perfect knowledge; as the master\nunderstands the same thing better than the pupil who learns from him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The knowledge of the superior angels is said to be more\nuniversal as regards the more eminent mode of knowledge.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Master's words are not to be understood as if the\ninferior angels were entirely ignorant of the Mystery of the\nIncarnation but that they did not know it as fully as the superior\nangels; and that they progressed in the knowledge of it afterwards\nwhen the Mystery was accomplished.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Till the Judgment Day some new things are always being\nrevealed by God to the highest angels, concerning the course of the\nworld, and especially the salvation of the elect. Hence there is\nalways something for the superior angels to make known to the\ninferior.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 107\n\nTHE SPEECH OF THE ANGELS\n(In Five Articles)\n\nWe next consider the speech of the angels. Here there are five points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether one angel speaks to another?\n\n(2) Whether the inferior speaks to the superior?\n\n(3) Whether an angel speaks to God?\n\n(4) Whether the angelic speech is subject to local distance?\n\n(5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 1]\n\nWhether One Angel Speaks to Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one angel does not speak to another.\nFor Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that, in the state of the resurrection\n\"each one's body will not hide his mind from his fellows.\" Much less,\ntherefore, is one angel's mind hidden from another. But speech\nmanifests to another what lies hidden in the mind. Therefore it is not\nnecessary that one angel should speak to another.\n\nObj. 2: Further, speech is twofold; interior, whereby one speaks to\noneself; and exterior, whereby one speaks to another. But exterior\nspeech takes place by some sensible sign, as by voice, or gesture, or\nsome bodily member, as the tongue, or the fingers, and this cannot\napply to the angels. Therefore one angel does not speak to another.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the speaker incites the hearer to listen to what he\nsays. But it does not appear that one angel incites another to\nlisten; for this happens among us by some sensible sign. Therefore\none angel does not speak to another.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:1): \"If I speak with\nthe tongues of men and of angels.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The angels speak in a certain way. But, as Gregory\nsays (Moral. ii): \"It is fitting that our mind, rising above the\nproperties of bodily speech, should be lifted to the sublime and\nunknown methods of interior speech.\"\n\nTo understand how one angel speaks to another, we must consider that,\nas we explained above (Q. 82, A. 4), when treating of the actions and\npowers of the soul, the will moves the intellect to its operation.\nNow an intelligible object is present to the intellect in three ways;\nfirst, habitually, or in the memory, as Augustine says (De Trin. xiv,\n6, 7); secondly, as actually considered or conceived; thirdly, as\nrelated to something else. And it is clear that the intelligible\nobject passes from the first to the second stage by the command of\nthe will, and hence in the definition of habit these words occur,\n\"which anyone uses when he wills.\" So likewise the intelligible\nobject passes from the second to the third stage by the will; for by\nthe will the concept of the mind is ordered to something else, as,\nfor instance, either to the performing of an action, or to being made\nknown to another. Now when the mind turns itself to the actual\nconsideration of any habitual knowledge, then a person speaks to\nhimself; for the concept of the mind is called \"the interior word.\"\nAnd by the fact that the concept of the angelic mind is ordered to be\nmade known to another by the will of the angel himself, the concept\nof one angel is made known to another; and in this way one angel\nspeaks to another; for to speak to another only means to make known\nthe mental concept to another.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our mental concept is hidden by a twofold obstacle. The\nfirst is in the will, which can retain the mental concept within, or\ncan direct it externally. In this way God alone can see the mind of\nanother, according to 1 Cor. 2:11: \"What man knoweth the things of a\nman, but the spirit of a man that is in him?\" The other obstacle\nwhereby the mental concept is excluded from another one's knowledge,\ncomes from the body; and so it happens that even when the will\ndirects the concept of the mind to make itself known, it is not at\nonce make known to another; but some sensible sign must be used.\nGregory alludes to this fact when he says (Moral. ii): \"To other eyes\nwe seem to stand aloof as it were behind the wall of the body; and\nwhen we wish to make ourselves known, we go out as it were by the\ndoor of the tongue to show what we really are.\" But an angel is under\nno such obstacle, and so he can make his concept known to another at\nonce.\n\nReply Obj. 2: External speech, made by the voice, is a necessity for\nus on account of the obstacle of the body. Hence it does not befit an\nangel; but only interior speech belongs to him, and this includes not\nonly the interior speech by mental concept, but also its being\nordered to another's knowledge by the will. So the tongue of an angel\nis called metaphorically the angel's power, whereby he manifests his\nmental concept.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is no need to draw the attention of the good\nangels, inasmuch as they always see each other in the Word; for as\none ever sees the other, so he ever sees what is ordered to himself.\nBut because by their very nature they can speak to each other, and\neven now the bad angels speak to each other, we must say that the\nintellect is moved by the intelligible object just as sense is\naffected by the sensible object. Therefore, as sense is aroused by\nthe sensible object, so the mind of an angel can be aroused to\nattention by some intelligible power.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Inferior Angel Speaks to the Superior?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the inferior angel does not speak to\nthe superior. For on the text (1 Cor. 13:1), \"If I speak with the\ntongues of men and of angels,\" a gloss remarks that the speech of the\nangels is an enlightenment whereby the superior enlightens the\ninferior. But the inferior never enlightens the superior, as was\nabove explained (Q. 106, A. 3). Therefore neither do the inferior\nspeak to the superior.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as was said above (Q. 106, A. 1), to enlighten means\nmerely to acquaint one man of what is known to another; and this is\nto speak. Therefore to speak and to enlighten are the same; so the\nsame conclusion follows.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii): \"God speaks to the angels\nby the very fact that He shows to their hearts His hidden and\ninvisible things.\" But this is to enlighten them. Therefore, whenever\nGod speaks, He enlightens. In the same way every angelic speech is an\nenlightening. Therefore an inferior angel can in no way speak to a\nsuperior angel.\n\n_On the contrary,_ According to the exposition of Dionysius (Coel.\nHier. vii), the inferior angels said to the superior: \"Who is this\nKing of Glory?\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The inferior angels can speak to the superior. To\nmake this clear, we must consider that every angelic enlightening is\nan angelic speech; but on the other hand, not every speech is an\nenlightening; because, as we have said (A. 1), for one angel to speak\nto another angel means nothing else, but that by his own will he\ndirects his mental concept in such a way, that it becomes known to\nthe other. Now what the mind conceives may be reduced to a twofold\nprinciple; to God Himself, Who is the primal truth; and to the will\nof the one who understands, whereby we actually consider anything.\nBut because truth is the light of the intellect, and God Himself is\nthe rule of all truth; the manifestation of what is conceived by the\nmind, as depending on the primary truth, is both speech and\nenlightenment; for example, when one man says to another: \"Heaven was\ncreated by God\"; or, \"Man is an animal.\" The manifestation, however,\nof what depends on the will of the one who understands, cannot be\ncalled an enlightenment, but is only a speech; for instance, when one\nsays to another: \"I wish to learn this; I wish to do this or that.\"\nThe reason is that the created will is not a light, nor a rule of\ntruth; but participates of light. Hence to communicate what comes\nfrom the created will is not, as such, an enlightening. For to know\nwhat you may will, or what you may understand does not belong to the\nperfection of my intellect; but only to know the truth in reality.\n\nNow it is clear that the angels are called superior or inferior by\ncomparison with this principle, God; and therefore enlightenment,\nwhich depends on the principle which is God, is conveyed only by the\nsuperior angels to the inferior. But as regards the will as the\nprinciple, he who wills is first and supreme; and therefore the\nmanifestation of what belongs to the will, is conveyed to others by\nthe one who wills. In that manner both the superior angels speak to\nthe inferior, and the inferior speak to the superior.\n\nFrom this clearly appear the replies to the first and second\n   objections.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Every speech of God to the angels is an enlightening;\nbecause since the will of God is the rule of truth, it belongs to the\nperfection and enlightenment of the created mind to know even what\nGod wills. But the same does not apply to the will of the angels, as\nwas explained above.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 3]\n\nWhether an Angel Speaks to God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an angel does not speak to God. For\nspeech makes known something to another. But an angel cannot make\nknown anything to God, Who knows all things. Therefore an angel does\nnot speak to God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to speak is to order the mental concept in reference\nto another, as was shown above (A. 1). But an angel ever orders his\nmental concept to God. So if an angel speaks to God, he ever speaks\nto God; which in some ways appears to be unreasonable, since an angel\nsometimes speaks to another angel. Therefore it seems that an angel\nnever speaks to God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Zech. 1:12): \"The angel of the Lord\nanswered and said: O Lord of hosts, how long wilt Thou not have mercy\non Jerusalem.\" Therefore an angel speaks to God.\n\n_I answer that,_ As was said above (AA. 1, 2), the angel speaks by\nordering his mental concept to something else. Now one thing is\nordered to another in a twofold manner. In one way for the purpose of\ngiving one thing to another, as in natural things the agent is\nordered to the patient, and in human speech the teacher is ordered to\nthe learner; and in this sense an angel in no way speaks to God\neither of what concerns the truth, or of whatever depends on the\ncreated will; because God is the principle and source of all truth\nand of all will. In another way one thing is ordered to another to\nreceive something, as in natural things the passive is ordered to the\nagent, and in human speech the disciple to the master; and in this\nway an angel speaks to God, either by consulting the Divine will of\nwhat ought to be done, or by admiring the Divine excellence which he\ncan never comprehend; thus Gregory says (Moral. ii) that \"the angels\nspeak to God, when by contemplating what is above themselves they\nrise to emotions of admiration.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Speech is not always for the purpose of making\nsomething known to another; but is sometimes finally ordered to the\npurpose of manifesting something to the speaker himself; as when the\ndisciples ask instruction from the master.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The angels are ever speaking to God in the sense of\npraising and admiring Him and His works; but they speak to Him by\nconsulting Him about what ought to be done whenever they have to\nperform any new work, concerning which they desire enlightenment.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Local Distance Influences the Angelic Speech?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that local distance affects the angelic\nspeech. For as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 13): \"An angel works\nwhere he is.\" But speech is an angelic operation. Therefore, as an\nangel is in a determinate place, it seems that an angel's speech is\nlimited by the bounds of that place.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a speaker cries out on account of the distance of\nthe hearer. But it is said of the Seraphim that \"they cried one to\nanother\" (Isa. 6:3). Therefore in the angelic speech local distance\nhas some effect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said that the rich man in hell spoke to\nAbraham, notwithstanding the local distance (Luke 16:24). Much less\ntherefore does local distance impede the speech of one angel to\nanother.\n\n_I answer that,_ The angelic speech consists in an intellectual\noperation, as explained above (AA. 1, 2, 3). And the intellectual\noperation of an angel abstracts from the \"here and now.\" For even our\nown intellectual operation takes place by abstraction from the \"here\nand now,\" except accidentally on the part of the phantasms, which do\nnot exist at all in an angel. But as regards whatever is abstracted\nfrom \"here and now,\" neither difference of time nor local distance has\nany influence whatever. Hence in the angelic speech local distance is\nno impediment.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The angelic speech, as above explained (A. 1, ad 2), is\ninterior; perceived, nevertheless, by another; and therefore it\nexists in the angel who speaks, and consequently where the angel is\nwho speaks. But as local distance does not prevent one angel seeing\nanother, so neither does it prevent an angel perceiving what is\nordered to him on the part of another; and this is to perceive his\nspeech.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The cry mentioned is not a bodily voice raised by\nreason of the local distance; but is taken to signify the magnitude\nof what is said, or the intensity of the affection, according to what\nGregory says (Moral. ii): \"The less one desires, the less one cries\nout.\"\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 5]\n\nWhether All the Angels Know What One Speaks to Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all the angels know what one speaks\nto another. For unequal local distance is the reason why all men do\nnot know what one man says to another. But in the angelic speech\nlocal distance has no effect, as above explained (A. 4). Therefore\nall the angels know what one speaks to another.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all the angels have the intellectual power in\ncommon. So if the mental concept of one ordered to another is known\nby one, it is for the same reason known by all.\n\nObj. 3: Further, enlightenment is a kind of speech. But the\nenlightenment of one angel by another extends to all the angels,\nbecause, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv): \"Each one of the\nheavenly beings communicates what he learns to the others.\" Therefore\nthe speech of one angel to another extends to all.\n\n_On the contrary,_ One man can speak to another alone; much more can\nthis be the case among the angels.\n\n_I answer that,_ As above explained (AA. 1, 2), the mental concept of\none angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses\nthe concept refers it by his will to another. Now a thing can be\nordered through some cause to one thing and not to another;\nconsequently the concept of one (angel) may be known by one and not\nby another; and therefore an angel can perceive the speech of one\nangel to another; whereas others do not, not through the obstacle of\nlocal distance, but on account of the will so ordering, as explained\nabove.\n\nFrom this appear the replies to the first and second objections.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Enlightenment is of those truths that emanate from the\nfirst rule of truth, which is the principle common to all the angels;\nand in that way all enlightenments are common to all. But speech may\nbe of something ordered to the principle of the created will, which\nis proper to each angel; and in this way it is not necessary that\nthese speeches should be common to all.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 108\n\nOF THE ANGELIC DEGREES OF HIERARCHIES AND ORDERS\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe next consider the degrees of the angels in their hierarchies and\norders; for it was said above (Q. 106, A. 3), that the superior\nangels enlighten the inferior angels; and not conversely.\n\nUnder this head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether all the angels belong to one hierarchy?\n\n(2) Whether in one hierarchy there is only one order?\n\n(3) Whether in one order there are many angels?\n\n(4) Whether the distinction of hierarchies and orders is natural?\n\n(5) Of the names and properties of each order.\n\n(6) Of the comparison of the orders to one another.\n\n(7) Whether the orders will outlast the Day of Judgment?\n\n(8) Whether men are taken up into the angelic orders?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 1]\n\nWhether All the Angels Are of One Hierarchy?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all the angels belong to one\nhierarchy. For since the angels are supreme among creatures, it is\nevident that they are ordered for the best. But the best ordering of\na multitude is for it to be governed by one authority, as the\nPhilosopher shows (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10; Polit. iii, 4).\nTherefore as a hierarchy is nothing but a sacred principality, it\nseems that all the angels belong to one hierarchy.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii) that \"hierarchy is\norder, knowledge, and action.\" But all the angels agree in one order\ntowards God, Whom they know, and by Whom in their actions they are\nruled. Therefore all the angels belong to one hierarchy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the sacred principality called hierarchy is to be\nfound among men and angels. But all men are of one hierarchy.\nTherefore likewise all the angels are of one hierarchy.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vi) distinguishes three\nhierarchies of angels.\n\n_I answer that,_ Hierarchy means a \"sacred\" principality, as above\nexplained. Now principality includes two things: the prince himself\nand the multitude ordered under the prince. Therefore because there\nis one God, the Prince not only of all the angels but also of men and\nall creatures; so there is one hierarchy, not only of all the angels,\nbut also of all rational creatures, who can be participators of\nsacred things; according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xii, 1): \"There\nare two cities, that is, two societies, one of the good angels and\nmen, the other of the wicked.\" But if we consider the principality on\nthe part of the multitude ordered under the prince, then principality\nis said to be \"one\" accordingly as the multitude can be subject in\n_one_ way to the government of the prince. And those that cannot be\ngoverned in the same way by a prince belong to different\nprincipalities: thus, under one king there are different cities,\nwhich are governed by different laws and administrators. Now it is\nevident that men do not receive the Divine enlightenments in the same\nway as do the angels; for the angels receive them in their\nintelligible purity, whereas men receive them under sensible signs,\nas Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i). Therefore there must needs be a\ndistinction between the human and the angelic hierarchy. In the same\nmanner we distinguish three angelic hierarchies. For it was shown\nabove (Q. 55, A. 3), in treating of the angelic knowledge, that the\nsuperior angels have a more universal knowledge of the truth than the\ninferior angels. This universal knowledge has three grades among the\nangels. For the types of things, concerning which the angels are\nenlightened, can be considered in a threefold manner. First as\npreceding from God as the first universal principle, which mode of\nknowledge belongs to the first hierarchy, connected immediately with\nGod, and, \"as it were, placed in the vestibule of God,\" as Dionysius\nsays (Coel. Hier. vii). Secondly, forasmuch as these types depend on\nthe universal created causes which in some way are already\nmultiplied; which mode belongs to the second hierarchy. Thirdly,\nforasmuch as these types are applied to particular things as\ndepending on their causes; which mode belongs to the lowest\nhierarchy. All this will appear more clearly when we treat of each of\nthe orders (A. 6). In this way are the hierarchies distinguished on\nthe part of the multitude of subjects.\n\nHence it is clear that those err and speak against the opinion of\nDionysius who place a hierarchy in the Divine Persons, and call it\nthe \"supercelestial\" hierarchy. For in the Divine Persons there\nexists, indeed, a natural order, but there is no hierarchical order,\nfor as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iii): \"The hierarchical order is\nso directed that some be cleansed, enlightened, and perfected; and\nthat others cleanse, enlighten, and perfect\"; which far be it from\nus to apply to the Divine Persons.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This objection considers principality on the part of\nthe ruler, inasmuch as a multitude is best ruled by one ruler, as\nthe Philosopher asserts in those passages.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As regards knowing God Himself, Whom all see in one\nway--that is, in His essence--there is no hierarchical distinction\namong the angels; but there is such a distinction as regards the\ntypes of created things, as above explained.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All men are of one species, and have one connatural\nmode of understanding; which is not the case in the angels: and\nhence the same argument does not apply to both.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Are Several Orders in One Hierarchy?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in the one hierarchy there are not\nseveral orders. For when a definition is multiplied, the thing defined\nis also multiplied. But hierarchy is order, as Dionysius says (Coel.\nHier. iii). Therefore, if there are many orders, there is not one\nhierarchy only, but many.\n\nObj. 2: Further, different orders are different grades, and grades\namong spirits are constituted by different spiritual gifts. But among\nthe angels all the spiritual gifts are common to all, for \"nothing is\npossessed individually\" (Sent. ii, D, ix). Therefore there are not\ndifferent orders of angels.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy the orders are\ndistinguished according to the actions of \"cleansing,\"\n\"enlightening,\" and \"perfecting.\" For the order of deacons is\n\"cleansing,\" the order of priests, is \"enlightening,\" and of bishops\n\"perfecting,\" as Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v). But each of the\nangels cleanses, enlightens, and perfects. Therefore there is no\ndistinction of orders among the angels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 1:20,21) that \"God has set\nthe Man Christ above all principality and power, and virtue, and\ndominion\": which are the various orders of the angels, and some of\nthem belong to one hierarchy, as will be explained (A. 6).\n\n_I answer that,_ As explained above, one hierarchy is one\nprincipality--that is, one multitude ordered in one way under the\nrule of a prince. Now such a multitude would not be ordered, but\nconfused, if there were not in it different orders. So the nature of\na hierarchy requires diversity of orders.\n\nThis diversity of order arises from the diversity of offices and\nactions, as appears in one city where there are different orders\naccording to the different actions; for there is one order of those\nwho judge, and another of those who fight, and another of those who\nlabor in the fields, and so forth.\n\nBut although one city thus comprises several orders, all may be\nreduced to three, when we consider that every multitude has a\nbeginning, a middle, and an end. So in every city, a threefold order\nof men is to be seen, some of whom are supreme, as the nobles; others\nare the last, as the common people, while others hold a place between\nthese, as the middle-class [populus honorabilis]. In the same way we\nfind in each angelic hierarchy the orders distinguished according to\ntheir actions and offices, and all this diversity is reduced to\nthree--namely, to the summit, the middle, and the base; and so in\nevery hierarchy Dionysius places three orders (Coel. Hier. vi).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Order is twofold. In one way it is taken as the order\ncomprehending in itself different grades; and in that way a hierarchy\nis called an order. In another way one grade is called an order; and\nin that sense the several orders of one hierarchy are so called.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All things are possessed in common by the angelic\nsociety, some things, however, being held more excellently by some\nthan by others. Each gift is more perfectly possessed by the one who\ncan communicate it, than by the one who cannot communicate it; as the\nhot thing which can communicate heat is more perfect that what is\nunable to give heat. And the more perfectly anyone can communicate a\ngift, the higher grade he occupies, as he is in the more perfect\ngrade of mastership who can teach a higher science. By this\nsimilitude we can reckon the diversity of grades or orders among the\nangels, according to their different offices and actions.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The inferior angel is superior to the highest man of\nour hierarchy, according to the words, \"He that is the lesser in the\nkingdom of heaven, is greater than he\"--namely, John the Baptist,\nthan whom \"there hath not risen a greater among them that are born of\nwomen\" (Matt. 11:11). Hence the lesser angel of the heavenly\nhierarchy can not only cleanse, but also enlighten and perfect, and\nin a higher way than can the orders of our hierarchy. Thus the\nheavenly orders are not distinguished by reason of these, but by\nreason of other different acts.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Are Many Angels in One Order?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that there are not many angels in one order.\nFor it was shown above (Q. 50, A. 4), that all the angels are\nunequal. But equals belong to one order. Therefore there are not many\nangels in one order.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is superfluous for a thing to be done by many,\nwhich can be done sufficiently by one. But that which belongs to one\nangelic office can be done sufficiently by one angel; so much more\nsufficiently than the one sun does what belongs to the office of the\nsun, as the angel is more perfect than a heavenly body. If,\ntherefore, the orders are distinguished by their offices, as stated\nabove (A. 2), several angels in one order would be superfluous.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it was said above (Obj. 1) that all the angels are\nunequal. Therefore, if several angels (for instance, three or four),\nare of one order, the lowest one of the superior order will be more\nakin to the highest of the inferior order than with the highest of\nhis own order; and thus he does not seem to be more of one order with\nthe latter than with the former. Therefore there are not many angels\nof one order.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written: \"The Seraphim cried to one another\"\n(Isa. 6:3). Therefore there are many angels in the one order of the\nSeraphim.\n\n_I answer that,_ Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to\ndistinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest\ndetails, whereas he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only\ndistinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few points.\nThus, one who knows natural things imperfectly, can distinguish their\norders in a general way, placing the heavenly bodies in one order,\ninanimate inferior bodies in another, plants in another, and animals\nin another; whilst he who knows natural things perfectly, is able to\ndistinguish different orders in the heavenly bodies themselves, and\nin each of the other orders.\n\nNow our knowledge of the angels is imperfect, as Dionysius says (Coel.\nHier. vi). Hence we can only distinguish the angelic offices and\norders in a general way, so as to place many angels in one order. But\nif we knew the offices and distinctions of the angels perfectly, we\nshould know perfectly that each angel has his own office and his own\norder among things, and much more so than any star, though this be\nhidden from us.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All the angels of one order are in some way equal in a\ncommon similitude, whereby they are placed in that order; but\nabsolutely speaking they are not equal. Hence Dionysius says (Coel.\nHier. x) that in one and the same order of angels there are those who\nare first, middle, and last.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That special distinction of orders and offices wherein\neach angel has his own office and order, is hidden from us.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As in a surface which is partly white and partly black,\nthe two parts on the borders of white and black are more akin as\nregards their position than any other two white parts, but are less\nakin in quality; so two angels who are on the boundary of two orders\nare more akin in propinquity of nature than one of them is akin to\nthe others of its own order, but less akin in their fitness for\nsimilar offices, which fitness, indeed, extends to a definite limit.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Distinction of Hierarchies and Orders Comes from the\nAngelic Nature?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the distinction of hierarchies and of\norders is not from the nature of the angels. For hierarchy is \"a\nsacred principality,\" and Dionysius places in its definition that it\n\"approaches a resemblance to God, as far as may be\" (Coel. Hier. iii).\nBut sanctity and resemblance to God is in the angels by grace, and not\nby nature. Therefore the distinction of hierarchies and orders in the\nangels is by grace, and not by nature.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Seraphim are called \"burning\" or \"kindling,\" as\nDionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii). This belongs to charity which comes\nnot from nature but from grace; for \"it is poured forth in our hearts\nby the Holy Ghost Who is given to us\" (Rom. 5:5): \"which is said not\nonly of holy men, but also of the holy angels,\" as Augustine says (De\nCiv. Dei xii). Therefore the angelic orders are not from nature, but\nfrom grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the ecclesiastical hierarchy is copied from the\nheavenly. But the orders among men are not from nature, but by the\ngift of grace; for it is not a natural gift for one to be a bishop,\nand another a priest, and another a deacon. Therefore neither in the\nangels are the orders from nature, but from grace only.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Master says (ii, D. 9) that \"an angelic order\nis a multitude of heavenly spirits, who are likened to each other by\nsome gift of grace, just as they agree also in the participation of\nnatural gifts.\" Therefore the distinction of orders among the angels\nis not only by gifts of grace, but also by gifts of nature.\n\n_I answer that,_ The order of government, which is the order of a\nmultitude under authority, is derived from its end. Now the end of\nthe angels may be considered in two ways. First, according to the\nfaculty of nature, so that they may know and love God by natural\nknowledge and love; and according to their relation to this end the\norders of the angels are distinguished by natural gifts. Secondly,\nthe end of the angelic multitude can be taken from what is above\ntheir natural powers, which consists in the vision of the Divine\nEssence, and in the unchangeable fruition of His goodness; to which\nend they can reach only by grace; and hence as regards this end, the\norders in the angels are adequately distinguished by the gifts of\ngrace, but dispositively by natural gifts, forasmuch as to the angels\nare given gratuitous gifts according to the capacity of their natural\ngifts; which is not the case with men, as above explained (Q. 62, A.\n6). Hence among men the orders are distinguished according to the\ngratuitous gifts only, and not according to natural gifts.\n\nFrom the above the replies to the objections are evident.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Orders of the Angels Are Properly Named?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the orders of the angels are not\nproperly named. For all the heavenly spirits are called angels and\nheavenly virtues. But common names should not be appropriated to\nindividuals. Therefore the orders of the angels and virtues are\nineptly named.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it belongs to God alone to be Lord, according to the\nwords, \"Know ye that the Lord He is God\" (Ps. 99:3). Therefore one\norder of the heavenly spirits is not properly called \"Dominations.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, the name \"Domination\" seems to imply government and\nlikewise the names \"Principalities\" and \"Powers.\" Therefore these\nthree names do not seem to be properly applied to three orders.\n\nObj. 4: Further, archangels are as it were angel princes. Therefore\nthis name ought not to be given to any other order than to the\n\"Principalities.\"\n\nObj. 5: Further, the name \"Seraphim\" is derived from ardor, which\npertains to charity; and the name \"Cherubim\" from knowledge. But\ncharity and knowledge are gifts common to all the angels. Therefore\nthey ought not to be names of any particular orders.\n\nObj. 6: Further, Thrones are seats. But from the fact that God knows\nand loves the rational creature He is said to sit within it.\nTherefore there ought not to be any order of \"Thrones\" besides the\n\"Cherubim\" and \"Seraphim.\" Therefore it appears that the orders of\nangels are not properly styled.\n\nOn the contrary is the authority of Holy Scripture wherein they are\nso named. For the name \"Seraphim\" is found in Isa. 6:2; the name\n\"Cherubim\" in Ezech. 1 (Cf. 10:15,20); \"Thrones\" in Col. 1:16;\n\"Dominations,\" \"Virtues,\" \"Powers,\" and \"Principalities\" are\nmentioned in Eph. 1:21; the name \"Archangels\" in the canonical\nepistle of St. Jude (9), and the name \"Angels\" is found in many\nplaces of Scripture.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii), in the names of\nthe angelic orders it is necessary to observe that the proper name of\neach order expresses its property. Now to see what is the property of\neach order, we must consider that in coordinated things, something\nmay be found in a threefold manner: by way of property, by way of\nexcess, and by way of participation. A thing is said to be in another\nby way of property, if it is adequate and proportionate to its\nnature: by excess when an attribute is less than that to which it is\nattributed, but is possessed thereby in an eminent manner, as we have\nstated (Q. 13, A. 2) concerning all the names which are attributed to\nGod: by participation, when an attribute is possessed by something\nnot fully but partially; thus holy men are called gods by\nparticipation. Therefore, if anything is to be called by a name\ndesignating its property, it ought not to be named from what it\nparticipates imperfectly, nor from that which it possesses in excess,\nbut from that which is adequate thereto; as, for instance, when we\nwish properly to name a man, we should call him a \"rational\nsubstance,\" but not an \"intellectual substance,\" which latter is the\nproper name of an angel; because simple intelligence belongs to an\nangel as a property, and to man by participation; nor do we call him\na \"sensible substance,\" which is the proper name of a brute; because\nsense is less than the property of a man, and belongs to man in a\nmore excellent way than to other animals.\n\nSo we must consider that in the angelic orders all spiritual\nperfections are common to all the angels, and that they are all more\nexcellently in the superior than in the inferior angels. Further, as\nin these perfections there are grades, the superior perfection belongs\nto the superior order as its property, whereas it belongs to the\ninferior by participation; and conversely the inferior perfection\nbelongs to the inferior order as its property, and to the superior by\nway of excess; and thus the superior order is denominated from the\nsuperior perfection.\n\nSo in this way Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the names of the\norders accordingly as they befit the spiritual perfections they\nsignify. Gregory, on the other hand, in expounding these names (Hom.\nxxxiv in Evang.) seems to regard more the exterior ministrations; for\nhe says that \"angels are so called as announcing the least things; and\nthe archangels in the greatest; by the virtues miracles are wrought;\nby the powers hostile powers are repulsed; and the principalities\npreside over the good spirits themselves.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Angel means \"messenger.\" So all the heavenly spirits,\nso far as they make known Divine things, are called \"angels.\" But\nthe superior angels enjoy a certain excellence, as regards this\nmanifestation, from which the superior orders are denominated. The\nlowest order of angels possess no excellence above the common\nmanifestation; and therefore it is denominated from manifestation\nonly; and thus the common name remains as it were proper to the\nlowest order, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. v). Or we may say that\nthe lowest order can be specially called the order of \"angels,\"\nforasmuch as they announce things to us immediately.\n\n\"Virtue\" can be taken in two ways. First, commonly, considered as the\nmedium between the essence and the operation, and in that sense all\nthe heavenly spirits are called heavenly virtues, as also \"heavenly\nessences.\" Secondly, as meaning a certain excellence of strength; and\nthus it is the proper name of an angelic order. Hence Dionysius says\n(Coel. Hier. viii) that the \"name 'virtues' signifies a certain\nvirile and immovable strength\"; first, in regard of those Divine\noperations which befit them; secondly, in regard to receiving Divine\ngifts. Thus it signifies that they undertake fearlessly the Divine\nbehests appointed to them; and this seems to imply strength of mind.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): \"Dominion is\nattributed to God in a special manner, by way of excess: but the\nDivine word gives the more illustrious heavenly princes the name of\nLord by participation, through whom the inferior angels receive the\nDivine gifts.\" Hence Dionysius also states (Coel. Hier. viii) that\nthe name \"Domination\" means first \"a certain liberty, free from\nservile condition and common subjection, such as that of plebeians,\nand from tyrannical oppression,\" endured sometimes even by the great.\nSecondly, it signifies \"a certain rigid and inflexible supremacy\nwhich does not bend to any servile act, or to the act of those who\nare subject to or oppressed by tyrants.\" Thirdly, it signifies \"the\ndesire and participation of the true dominion which belongs to God.\"\nLikewise the name of each order signifies the participation of what\nbelongs to God; as the name \"Virtues\" signifies the participation of\nthe Divine virtue; and the same principle applies to the rest.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The names \"Domination,\" \"Power,\" and \"Principality\"\nbelong to government in different ways. The place of a lord is only\nto prescribe what is to be done. So Gregory says (Hom. xxiv in\nEvang.), that \"some companies of the angels, because others are\nsubject to obedience to them, are called dominations.\" The name\n\"Power\" points out a kind of order, according to what the Apostle\nsays, \"He that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordination of God\"\n(Rom. 13:2). And so Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the name\n\"Power\" signifies a kind of ordination both as regards the reception\nof Divine things, and as regards the Divine actions performed by\nsuperiors towards inferiors by leading them to things above.\nTherefore, to the order of \"Powers\" it belongs to regulate what is to\nbe done by those who are subject to them. To preside [principari] as\nGregory says (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) is \"to be first among others,\" as\nbeing first in carrying out what is ordered to be done. And so\nDionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that the name of \"Principalities\"\nsignifies \"one who leads in a sacred order.\" For those who lead\nothers, being first among them, are properly called \"princes,\"\naccording to the words, \"Princes went before joined with singers\"\n(Ps. 67:26).\n\nReply Obj. 4: The \"Archangels,\" according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier.\nix), are between the \"Principalities\" and the \"Angels.\" A medium\ncompared to one extreme seems like the other, as participating in the\nnature of both extremes; thus tepid seems cold compared to hot, and\nhot compared to cold. So the \"Archangels\" are called the \"angel\nprinces\"; forasmuch as they are princes as regards the \"Angels,\" and\nangels as regards the Principalities. But according to Gregory (Hom.\nxxiv in Ev.) they are called \"Archangels,\" because they preside over\nthe one order of the \"Angels\"; as it were, announcing greater things:\nand the \"Principalities\" are so called as presiding over all the\nheavenly \"Virtues\" who fulfil the Divine commands.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The name \"Seraphim\" does not come from charity only,\nbut from the excess of charity, expressed by the word ardor or fire.\nHence Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds the name \"Seraphim\"\naccording to the properties of fire, containing an excess of heat.\nNow in fire we may consider three things. First, the movement which\nis upwards and continuous. This signifies that they are borne\ninflexibly towards God. Secondly, the active force which is \"heat,\"\nwhich is not found in fire simply, but exists with a certain\nsharpness, as being of most penetrating action, and reaching even to\nthe smallest things, and as it were, with superabundant fervor;\nwhereby is signified the action of these angels, exercised powerfully\nupon those who are subject to them, rousing them to a like fervor,\nand cleansing them wholly by their heat. Thirdly we consider in fire\nthe quality of clarity, or brightness; which signifies that these\nangels have in themselves an inextinguishable light, and that they\nalso perfectly enlighten others.\n\nIn the same way the name \"Cherubim\" comes from a certain excess of\nknowledge; hence it is interpreted \"fulness of knowledge,\" which\nDionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) expounds in regard to four things: the\nperfect vision of God; the full reception of the Divine Light; their\ncontemplation in God of the beauty of the Divine order; and in regard\nto the fact that possessing this knowledge fully, they pour it forth\ncopiously upon others.\n\nReply Obj. 6: The order of the \"Thrones\" excels the inferior orders\nas having an immediate knowledge of the types of the Divine works;\nwhereas the \"Cherubim\" have the excellence of knowledge and the\n\"Seraphim\" the excellence of ardor. And although these two excellent\nattributes include the third, yet the gift belonging to the \"Thrones\"\ndoes not include the other two; and so the order of the \"Thrones\" is\ndistinguished from the orders of the \"Cherubim\" and the \"Seraphim.\"\nFor it is a common rule in all things that the excellence of the\ninferior is contained in the superior, but not conversely. But\nDionysius (Coel. Hier. vii) explains the name \"Thrones\" by its\nrelation to material seats, in which we may consider four things.\nFirst, the site; because seats are raised above the earth, and to\nthe angels who are called \"Thrones\" are raised up to the immediate\nknowledge of the types of things in God. Secondly, because in\nmaterial seats is displayed strength, forasmuch as a person sits\nfirmly on them. But here the reverse is the case; for the angels\nthemselves are made firm by God. Thirdly, because the seat receives\nhim who sits thereon, and he can be carried thereupon; and so the\nangels receive God in themselves, and in a certain way bear Him to\nthe inferior creatures. Fourthly, because in its shape, a seat is\nopen on one side to receive the sitter; and thus are the angels\npromptly open to receive God and to serve Him.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Grades of the Orders Are Properly Assigned?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the grades of the orders are not\nproperly assigned. For the order of prelates is the highest. But the\nnames of \"Dominations,\" \"Principalities,\" and \"Powers\" of themselves\nimply prelacy. Therefore these orders ought not to be supreme.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the nearer an order is to God, the higher it is. But\nthe order of \"Thrones\" is the nearest to God; for nothing is nearer\nto the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the \"Thrones\" is\nthe highest.\n\nObj. 3: Further, knowledge comes before love, and intellect is higher\nthan will. Therefore the order of \"Cherubim\" seems to be higher than\nthe \"Seraphim.\"\n\nObj. 4: Further, Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Evang.) places the\n\"Principalities\" above the \"Powers.\" These therefore are not placed\nimmediately above the Archangels, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix).\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), places in the highest\nhierarchy the \"Seraphim\" as the first, the \"Cherubim\" as the middle,\nthe \"Thrones\" as the last; in the middle hierarchy he places the\n\"Dominations,\" as the first, the \"Virtues\" in the middle, the\n\"Powers\" last; in the lowest hierarchy the \"Principalities\" first,\nthen the \"Archangels,\" and lastly the \"Angels.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The grades of the angelic orders are assigned by\nGregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.) and Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), who agree\nas regards all except the \"Principalities\" and \"Virtues.\" For\nDionysius places the \"Virtues\" beneath the \"Dominations,\" and above\nthe \"Powers\"; the \"Principalities\" beneath the \"Powers\" and above the\n\"Archangels.\" Gregory, however, places the \"Principalities\" between\nthe \"Dominations\" and the \"Powers\"; and the \"Virtues\" between the\n\"Powers\" and the \"Archangels.\" Each of these placings may claim\nauthority from the words of the Apostle, who (Eph. 1:20,21)\nenumerates the middle orders, beginning from the lowest saying that\n\"God set Him,\" i.e. Christ, \"on His right hand in the heavenly places\nabove all Principality and Power, and Virtue, and Dominion.\" Here he\nplaces \"Virtues\" between \"Powers\" and \"Dominations,\" according to the\nplacing of Dionysius. Writing however to the Colossians (1:16),\nnumbering the same orders from the highest, he says: \"Whether\nThrones, or Dominations, or Principalities, or Powers, all things\nwere created by Him and in Him.\" Here he places the \"Principalities\"\nbetween \"Dominations\" and \"Powers,\" as does also Gregory.\n\nLet us then first examine the reason for the ordering of Dionysius,\nin which we see, that, as said above (A. 1), the highest hierarchy\ncontemplates the ideas of things in God Himself; the second in the\nuniversal causes; and third in their application to particular\neffects. And because God is the end not only of the angelic\nministrations, but also of the whole creation, it belongs to the first\nhierarchy to consider the end; to the middle one belongs the universal\ndisposition of what is to be done; and to the last belongs the\napplication of this disposition to the effect, which is the carrying\nout of the work; for it is clear that these three things exist in\nevery kind of operation. So Dionysius, considering the properties of\nthe orders as derived from their names, places in the first hierarchy\nthose orders the names of which are taken from their relation to God,\nthe \"Seraphim,\" \"Cherubim,\" and \"Thrones\"; and he places in the middle\nhierarchy those orders whose names denote a certain kind of common\ngovernment or disposition--the \"Dominations,\" \"Virtues,\" and\n\"Powers\"; and he places in the third hierarchy the orders whose names\ndenote the execution of the work, the \"Principalities,\" \"Angels,\" and\n\"Archangels.\"\n\nAs regards the end, three things may be considered. For firstly we\nconsider the end; then we acquire perfect knowledge of the end;\nthirdly, we fix our intention on the end; of which the second is an\naddition to the first, and the third an addition to both. And because\nGod is the end of creatures, as the leader is the end of an army, as\nthe Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, Did. xi, 10); so a somewhat similar\norder may be seen in human affairs. For there are some who enjoy the\ndignity of being able with familiarity to approach the king or leader;\nothers in addition are privileged to know his secrets; and others\nabove these ever abide with him, in a close union. According to this\nsimilitude, we can understand the disposition in the orders of the\nfirst hierarchy; for the \"Thrones\" are raised up so as to be the\nfamiliar recipients of God in themselves, in the sense of knowing\nimmediately the types of things in Himself; and this is proper to the\nwhole of the first hierarchy. The \"Cherubim\" know the Divine secrets\nsupereminently; and the \"Seraphim\" excel in what is the supreme\nexcellence of all, in being united to God Himself; and all this in\nsuch a manner that the whole of this hierarchy can be called the\n\"Thrones\"; as, from what is common to all the heavenly spirits\ntogether, they are all called \"Angels.\"\n\nAs regards government, three things are comprised therein, the first\nof which is to appoint those things which are to be done, and this\nbelongs to the \"Dominations\"; the second is to give the power of\ncarrying out what is to be done, which belongs to the \"Virtues\"; the\nthird is to order how what has been commanded or decided to be done\ncan be carried out by others, which belongs to the \"Powers.\"\n\nThe execution of the angelic ministrations consists in announcing\nDivine things. Now in the execution of any action there are beginners\nand leaders; as in singing, the precentors; and in war, generals and\nofficers; this belongs to the \"Principalities.\" There are others who\nsimply execute what is to be done; and these are the \"Angels.\" Others\nhold a middle place; and these are the \"Archangels,\" as above\nexplained.\n\nThis explanation of the orders is quite a reasonable one. For the\nhighest in an inferior order always has affinity to the lowest in the\nhigher order; as the lowest animals are near to the plants. Now the\nfirst order is that of the Divine Persons, which terminates in the\nHoly Ghost, Who is Love proceeding, with Whom the highest order of the\nfirst hierarchy has affinity, denominated as it is from the fire of\nlove. The lowest order of the first hierarchy is that of the\n\"Thrones,\" who in their own order are akin to the \"Dominations\"; for\nthe \"Thrones,\" according to Gregory (Hom. xxiv in Ev.), are so called\n\"because through them God accomplishes His judgments,\" since they are\nenlightened by Him in a manner adapted to the immediate enlightening\nof the second hierarchy, to which belongs the disposition of the\nDivine ministrations. The order of the \"Powers\" is akin to the order\nof the \"Principalities\"; for as it belongs to the \"Powers\" to impose\norder on those subject to them, this ordering is plainly shown at once\nin the name of \"Principalities,\" who, as presiding over the government\nof peoples and kingdoms (which occupies the first and principal place\nin the Divine ministrations), are the first in the execution thereof;\n\"for the good of a nation is more divine than the good of one man\"\n(Ethic. i, 2); and hence it is written, \"The prince of the kingdom of\nthe Persians resisted me\" (Dan. 10:13).\n\nThe disposition of the orders which is mentioned by Gregory is also\nreasonable. For since the \"Dominations\" appoint and order what belongs\nto the Divine ministrations, the orders subject to them are arranged\naccording to the disposition of those things in which the Divine\nministrations are effected. Still, as Augustine says (De Trin. iii),\n\"bodies are ruled in a certain order; the inferior by the superior;\nand all of them by the spiritual creature, and the bad spirit by the\ngood spirit.\" So the first order after the \"Dominations\" is called\nthat of \"Principalities,\" who rule even over good spirits; then the\n\"Powers,\" who coerce the evil spirits; even as evil-doers are coerced\nby earthly powers, as it is written (Rom. 13:3,4). After these come\nthe \"Virtues,\" which have power over corporeal nature in the working\nof miracles; after these are the \"Angels\" and the \"Archangels,\" who\nannounce to men either great things above reason, or small things\nwithin the purview of reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The angels' subjection to God is greater than their\npresiding over inferior things; and the latter is derived from the\nformer. Thus the orders which derive their name from presiding are\nnot the first and highest; but rather the orders deriving their name\nfrom their nearness and relation to God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The nearness to God designated by the name of the\n\"Thrones,\" belongs also to the \"Cherubim\" and \"Seraphim,\" and in a\nmore excellent way, as above explained.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As above explained (Q. 27, A. 3), knowledge takes place\naccordingly as the thing known is in the knower; but love as the\nlover is united to the object loved. Now higher things are in a\nnobler way in themselves than in lower things; whereas lower things\nare in higher things in a nobler way than they are in themselves.\nTherefore to know lower things is better than to love them; and to\nlove the higher things, God above all, is better than to know them.\n\nReply Obj. 4: A careful comparison will show that little or no\ndifference exists in reality between the dispositions of the orders\naccording to Dionysius and Gregory. For Gregory expounds the name\n\"Principalities\" from their \"presiding over good spirits,\" which also\nagrees with the \"Virtues\" accordingly as this name expressed a\ncertain strength, giving efficacy to the inferior spirits in the\nexecution of the Divine ministrations. Again, according to Gregory,\nthe \"Virtues\" seem to be the same as \"Principalities\" of Dionysius.\nFor to work miracles holds the first place in the Divine\nministrations; since thereby the way is prepared for the\nannouncements of the \"Archangels\" and the \"Angels.\"\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Orders Will Outlast the Day of Judgment?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the orders of angels will not outlast\nthe Day of Judgment. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:24), that Christ\nwill \"bring to naught all principality and power, when He shall have\ndelivered up the kingdom to God and the Father,\" and this will be in\nthe final consummation. Therefore for the same reason all others will\nbe abolished in that state.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to the office of the angelic orders it belongs to\ncleanse, enlighten, and perfect. But after the Day of Judgment one\nangel will not cleanse, enlighten, or perfect another, because they\nwill not advance any more in knowledge. Therefore the angelic orders\nwould remain for no purpose.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Apostle says of the angels (Heb. 1:14), that\n\"they are all ministering spirits, sent to minister to them who shall\nreceive the inheritance of salvation\"; whence it appears that the\nangelic offices are ordered for the purpose of leading men to\nsalvation. But all the elect are in pursuit of salvation until the\nDay of Judgment. Therefore the angelic offices and orders will not\noutlast the Day of Judgment.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Judges 5:20): \"Stars remaining in\ntheir order and courses,\" which is applied to the angels. Therefore\nthe angels will ever remain in their orders.\n\n_I answer that,_ In the angelic orders we may consider two things;\nthe distinction of grades, and the execution of their offices. The\ndistinction of grades among the angels takes place according to the\ndifference of grace and nature, as above explained (A. 4); and these\ndifferences will ever remain in the angels; for these differences of\nnatures cannot be taken from them unless they themselves be\ncorrupted. The difference of glory will also ever remain in them\naccording to the difference of preceding merit. As to the execution\nof the angelic offices, it will to a certain degree remain after the\nDay of Judgment, and to a certain degree will cease. It will cease\naccordingly as their offices are directed towards leading others to\ntheir end; but it will remain, accordingly as it agrees with the\nattainment of the end. Thus also the various ranks of soldiers have\ndifferent duties to perform in battle and in triumph.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The principalities and powers will come to an end in\nthat final consummation as regards their office of leading others\nto their end; because when the end is attained, it is no longer\nnecessary to tend towards the end. This is clear from the words of\nthe Apostle, \"When He shall have delivered up the kingdom of God\nand the Father,\" i.e. when He shall have led the faithful to the\nenjoyment of God Himself.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The actions of angels over the other angels are to be\nconsidered according to a likeness to our own intellectual actions.\nIn ourselves we find many intellectual actions which are ordered\naccording to the order of cause and effect; as when we gradually\narrive at one conclusion by many middle terms. Now it is manifest\nthat the knowledge of a conclusion depends on all the preceding\nmiddle terms not only in the new acquisition of knowledge, but also\nas regards the keeping of the knowledge acquired. A proof of this is\nthat when anyone forgets any of the preceding middle terms he can\nhave opinion or belief about the conclusion, but not knowledge; as he\nis ignorant of the order of the causes. So, since the inferior angels\nknow the types of the Divine works by the light of the superior\nangels, their knowledge depends on the light of the superior angels\nnot only as regards the acquisition of knowledge, but also as regards\nthe preserving of the knowledge possessed. So, although after the\nJudgment the inferior angels will not progress in the knowledge of\nsome things, still this will not prevent their being enlightened by\nthe superior angels.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although after the Day of Judgment men will not be led\nany more to salvation by the ministry of the angels, still those who\nare already saved will be enlightened through the angelic ministry.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 108, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Men Are Taken Up into the Angelic Orders?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that men are not taken up into the orders\nof the angels. For the human hierarchy is stationed beneath the lowest\nheavenly hierarchy, as the lowest under the middle hierarchy and the\nmiddle beneath the first. But the angels of the lowest hierarchy are\nnever transferred into the middle, or the first. Therefore neither are\nmen transferred to the angelic orders.\n\nObj. 2: Further, certain offices belong to the orders of the angels,\nas to guard, to work miracles, to coerce the demons, and the like;\nwhich do not appear to belong to the souls of the saints. Therefore\nthey are not transferred to the angelic orders.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as the good angels lead on to good, so do the demons\nto what is evil. But it is erroneous to say that the souls of bad men\nare changed into demons; for Chrysostom rejects this (Hom. xxviii in\nMatt.). Therefore it does not seem that the souls of the saints will\nbe transferred to the orders of angels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Lord says of the saints that, \"they will be as\nthe angels of God\" (Matt. 22:30). _I answer that,_ As above explained\n(AA. 4,7), the orders of the angels are distinguished according to\nthe conditions of nature and according to the gifts of grace.\nConsidered only as regards the grade of nature, men can in no way be\nassumed into the angelic orders; for the natural distinction will\nalways remain. In view of this distinction, some asserted that men\ncan in no way be transferred to an equality with the angels; but this\nis erroneous, contradicting as it does the promise of Christ saying\nthat the children of the resurrection will be equal to the angels in\nheaven (Luke 20:36). For whatever belongs to nature is the material\npart of an order; whilst that which perfects is from grace which\ndepends on the liberality of God, and not on the order of nature.\nTherefore by the gift of grace men can merit glory in such a degree\nas to be equal to the angels, in each of the angelic grades; and this\nimplies that men are taken up into the orders of the angels. Some,\nhowever, say that not all who are saved are assumed into the angelic\norders, but only virgins or the perfect; and that the other will\nconstitute their own order, as it were, corresponding to the whole\nsociety of the angels. But this is against what Augustine says (De\nCiv. Dei xii, 9), that \"there will not be two societies of men and\nangels, but only one; because the beatitude of all is to cleave to\nGod alone.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Grace is given to the angels in proportion to their\nnatural gifts. This, however, does not apply to men, as above\nexplained (A. 4; Q. 62, A. 6). So, as the inferior angels cannot be\ntransferred to the natural grade of the superior, neither can they be\ntransferred to the superior grade of grace; whereas men can ascend to\nthe grade of grace, but not of nature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The angels according to the order of nature are between\nus and God; and therefore according to the common law not only human\naffairs are administered by them, but also all corporeal matters. But\nholy men even after this life are of the same nature with ourselves;\nand hence according to the common law they do not administer human\naffairs, \"nor do they interfere in the things of the living,\" as\nAugustine says (De cura pro mortuis xiii, xvi). Still, by a certain\nspecial dispensation it is sometimes granted to some of the saints to\nexercise these offices; by working miracles, by coercing the demons,\nor by doing something of that kind, as Augustine says (De cura pro\nmortuis xvi).\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is not erroneous to say that men are transferred to\nthe penalty of demons; but some erroneously stated that the demons\nare nothing but souls of the dead; and it is this that Chrysostom\nrejects.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 109\n\nTHE ORDERING OF THE BAD ANGELS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe now consider the ordering of the bad angels; concerning which there\nare four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there are orders among the demons?\n\n(2) Whether among them there is precedence?\n\n(3) Whether one enlightens another?\n\n(4) Whether they are subject to the precedence of the good angels?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Are Orders Among the Demons?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are no orders among the demons.\nFor order belongs to good, as also mode, and species, as Augustine\nsays (De Nat. Boni iii); and on the contrary, disorder belongs to\nevil. But there is nothing disorderly in the good angels. Therefore\nin the bad angels there are no orders.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy.\nBut the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a holy\nprincipality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the\ndemons there are no orders.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the demons fell from every one of the angelic\norders; as is commonly supposed. Therefore, if some demons are said\nto belong to an order, as falling from that order, it would seem\nnecessary to give them the names of each of those orders. But we\nnever find that they are called \"Seraphim,\" or \"Thrones,\" or\n\"Dominations.\" Therefore on the same ground they are not to be placed\nin any other order.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): \"Our wrestling . . .\nis against principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world\nof this darkness.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As explained above (Q. 108, AA. 4, 7, 8), order in\nthe angels is considered both according to the grade of nature; and\naccording to that of grace. Now grace has a twofold state, the\nimperfect, which is that of merit; and the perfect, which is that of\nconsummate glory.\n\nIf therefore we consider the angelic orders in the light of the\nperfection of glory, then the demons are not in the angelic orders,\nand never were. But if we consider them in relation to imperfect\ngrace, in that view the demons were at the time in the orders of\nangels, but fell away from them, according to what was said above\n(Q. 62, A. 3), that all the angels were created in grace. But if we\nconsider them in the light of nature, in that view they are still in\nthose orders; because they have not lost their natural gifts; as\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Good can exist without evil; whereas evil cannot exist\nwithout good (Q. 49, A. 3); so there is order in the demons, as\npossessing a good nature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If we consider the ordering of the demons on the part\nof God Who orders them, it is sacred; for He uses the demons for\nHimself; but on the part of the demons' will it is not a sacred\nthing, because they abuse their nature for evil.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The name \"Seraphim\" is given from the ardor of charity;\nand the name \"Thrones\" from the Divine indwelling; and the name\n\"Dominations\" imports a certain liberty; all of which are opposed to\nsin; and therefore these names are not given to the angels who sinned.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 2]\n\nWhether among the demons there is precedence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no precedence among the\ndemons. For every precedence is according to some order of justice.\nBut the demons are wholly fallen from justice. Therefore there is no\nprecedence among them.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there is no precedence where obedience and\nsubjection do not exist. But these cannot be without concord; which\nis not to be found among the demons, according to the text, \"Among\nthe proud there are always contentions\" (Prov. 13:10). Therefore\nthere is no precedence among the demons.\n\nObj. 3: If there be precedence among them it is either according to\nnature, or according to their sin or punishment. But it is not\naccording to their nature, for subjection and service do not come\nfrom nature but from subsequent sin; neither is it according to sin\nor punishment, because in that case the superior demons who have\nsinned the most grievously, would be subject to the inferior.\nTherefore there is no precedence among the demons.\n\n_On the contrary,_ On 1 Cor. 15:24 the gloss says: \"While the world\nlasts, angels will preside over angels, men over men, and demons over\ndemons.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since action follows the nature of a thing, where\nnatures are subordinate, actions also must be subordinate to each\nother. Thus it is in corporeal things, for as the inferior bodies by\nnatural order are below the heavenly bodies, their actions and\nmovements are subject to the actions and movements of the heavenly\nbodies. Now it is plain from what we have said (A. 1), that the\ndemons are by natural order subject to others; and hence their actions\nare subject to the action of those above them, and this is what we\nmean by precedence--that the action of the subject should be under\nthe action of the prelate. So the very natural disposition of the\ndemons requires that there should be authority among them. This agrees\ntoo with Divine wisdom, which leaves nothing inordinate, which\n\"reacheth from end to end mightily, and ordereth all things sweetly\"\n(Wis. 8:1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The authority of the demons is not founded on\ntheir justice, but on the justice of God ordering all things.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The concord of the demons, whereby some obey\nothers, does not arise from mutual friendships, but from their common\nwickedness whereby they hate men, and fight against God's justice. For\nit belongs to wicked men to be joined to and subject to those whom\nthey see to be stronger, in order to carry out their own wickedness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The demons are not equal in nature; and so among\nthem there exists a natural precedence; which is not the case with\nmen, who are naturally equal. That the inferior are subject to the\nsuperior, is not for the benefit of the superior, but rather to their\ndetriment; because since to do evil belongs in a pre-eminent degree to\nunhappiness, it follows that to preside in evil is to be more unhappy.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Is Enlightenment in the Demons?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that enlightenment is in the demons. For\nenlightenment means the manifestation of the truth. But one demon can\nmanifest truth to another, because the superior excel in natural\nknowledge. Therefore the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a body abounding in light can enlighten a body\ndeficient in light, as the sun enlightens the moon. But the superior\ndemons abound in the participation of natural light. Therefore it\nseems that the superior demons can enlighten the inferior.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Enlightenment is not without cleansing and\nperfecting, as stated above (Q. 106, A. 1). But to cleanse does\nnot befit the demons, according to the words: \"What can be made clean\nby the unclean?\" (Ecclus. 34:4). Therefore neither can they enlighten.\n\n_I answer that,_ There can be no enlightenment properly speaking among\nthe demons. For, as above explained (Q. 107, A. 2), enlightenment\nproperly speaking is the manifestation of the truth in reference to\nGod, Who enlightens every intellect. Another kind of manifestation of\nthe truth is speech, as when one angel manifests his concept to\nanother. Now the demon's perversity does not lead one to order another\nto God, but rather to lead away from the Divine order; and so one\ndemon does not enlighten another; but one can make known his mental\nconcept to another by way of speech.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Not every kind of manifestation of the truth is\nenlightenment, but only that which is above described.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to what belongs to natural knowledge, there\nis no necessary manifestation of the truth either in the angels, or\nin the demons, because, as above explained (Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 58, A. 2;\nQ. 79, A. 2), they know from the first all that belongs to their\nnatural knowledge. So the greater fulness of natural light in the\nsuperior demons does not prove that they can enlighten others.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Good Angels Have Precedence Over the Bad Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the good angels have no precedence\nover the bad angels. For the angels' precedence is especially\nconnected with enlightenment. But the bad angels, being darkness, are\nnot enlightened by the good angels. Therefore the good angels do not\nrule over the bad.\n\nObj. 2: Further, superiors are responsible as regards negligence\nfor the evil deeds of their subjects. But the demons do much evil.\nTherefore if they are subject to the good angels, it seems that\nnegligence is to be charged to the good angels; which cannot be\nadmitted.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the angels' precedence follows upon the order of\nnature, as above explained (A. 2). But if the demons fell from every\norder, as is commonly said, many of the demons are superior to many\ngood angels in the natural order. Therefore the good angels have no\nprecedence over all the bad angels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii), that \"the\ntreacherous and sinful spirit of life is ruled by the rational,\npious, and just spirit of life\"; and Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv) that\n\"the Powers are the angels to whose charge are subjected the hostile\npowers.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The whole order of precedence is first and\noriginally in God; and it is shared by creatures accordingly as they\nare the nearer to God. For those creatures, which are more perfect\nand nearer to God, have the power to act on others. Now the greatest\nperfection and that which brings them nearest to God belongs to the\ncreatures who enjoy God, as the holy angels; of which perfection the\ndemons are deprived; and therefore the good angels have precedence\nover the bad, and these are ruled by them.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Many things concerning Divine mysteries are made known\nby the holy angels to the bad angels, whenever the Divine justice\nrequires the demons to do anything for the punishment of the evil; or\nfor the trial of the good; as in human affairs the judge's assessors\nmake known his sentence to the executioners. This revelation, if\ncompared to the angelic revealers, can be called an enlightenment,\nforasmuch as they direct it to God; but it is not an enlightenment on\nthe part of the demons, for these do not direct it to God; but to the\nfulfilment of their own wickedness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The holy angels are the ministers of the Divine wisdom.\nHence as the Divine wisdom permits some evil to be done by bad angels\nor men, for the sake of the good that follows; so also the good\nangels do not entirely restrain the bad from inflicting harm.\n\nReply Obj. 3: An angel who is inferior in the natural order presides\nover demons, although these may be naturally superior; because the\npower of Divine justice to which the good angels cleave, is stronger\nthan the natural power of the angels. Hence likewise among men, \"the\nspiritual man judgeth all things\" (1 Cor. 2:15), and the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. iii, 4; x, 5) that \"the virtuous man is the rule and\nmeasure of all human acts.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 110\n\nHOW ANGELS ACT ON BODIES\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe now consider how the angels preside over the corporeal creatures.\nUnder this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the corporeal creature is governed by the angels?\n\n(2) Whether the corporeal creature obeys the mere will of the angels?\n\n(3) Whether the angels by their own power can immediately move bodies\nlocally?\n\n(4) Whether the good or bad angels can work miracles?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 110, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Corporeal Creature Is Governed by the Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the corporeal creature is not\ngoverned by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of\naction, needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we\nrequire to be governed lest we do what we ought not. But corporeal\nthings have their actions determined by the nature divinely bestowed\nupon them. Therefore they do not need the government of angels.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the lowest things are ruled by the superior. But\nsome corporeal things are inferior, and others are superior.\nTherefore they need not be governed by the angels.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the different orders of the angels are distinguished\nby different offices. But if corporeal creatures were ruled by the\nangels, there would be as many angelic offices as there are species\nof things. So also there would be as many orders of angels as there\nare species of things; which is against what is laid down above (Q.\n108, A. 2). Therefore the corporeal creature is not governed by\nangels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4) that \"all bodies\nare ruled by the rational spirit of life\"; and Gregory says (Dial.\niv, 6), that \"in this visible world nothing takes place without the\nagency of the invisible creature.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is generally found both in human affairs and in\nnatural things that every particular power is governed and ruled by\nthe universal power; as, for example, the bailiff's power is governed\nby the power of the king. Among the angels also, as explained above\n(Q. 55, A. 3; Q. 108, A. 1), the superior angels who preside over the\ninferior possess a more universal knowledge. Now it is manifest that\nthe power of any individual body is more particular than the power of\nany spiritual substance; for every corporeal form is a form\nindividualized by matter, and determined to the \"here and now\";\nwhereas immaterial forms are absolute and intelligible. Therefore, as\nthe inferior angels who have the less universal forms, are ruled by\nthe superior; so are all corporeal things ruled by the angels. This\nis not only laid down by the holy doctors, but also by all\nphilosophers who admit the existence of incorporeal substances.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Corporeal things have determinate actions; but they\nexercise such actions only according as they are moved; because it\nbelongs to a body not to act unless moved. Hence a corporeal creature\nmust be moved by a spiritual creature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The reason alleged is according to the opinion of\nAristotle who laid down (Metaph. xi, 8) that the heavenly bodies are\nmoved by spiritual substances; the number of which he endeavored to\nassign according to the number of motions apparent in the heavenly\nbodies. But he did not say that there were any spiritual substances\nwith immediate rule over the inferior bodies, except perhaps human\nsouls; and this was because he did not consider that any operations\nwere exercised in the inferior bodies except the natural ones for\nwhich the movement of the heavenly bodies sufficed. But because we\nassert that many things are done in the inferior bodies besides the\nnatural corporeal actions, for which the movements of the heavenly\nbodies are not sufficient; therefore in our opinion we must assert\nthat the angels possess an immediate presidency not only over the\nheavenly bodies, but also over the inferior bodies.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Philosophers have held different opinions about\nimmaterial substances. For Plato laid down that immaterial substances\nwere types and species of sensible bodies; and that some were more\nuniversal than others; and so he held that immaterial substances\npreside immediately over all sensible bodies, and different ones over\ndifferent bodies. But Aristotle held that immaterial substances are\nnot the species of sensible bodies, but something higher and more\nuniversal; and so he did not attribute to them any immediate\npresiding over single bodies, but only over the universal agents, the\nheavenly bodies. Avicenna followed a middle course. For he agreed\nwith Plato in supposing some spiritual substance to preside\nimmediately in the sphere of active and passive elements; because, as\nPlato also said, he held that the forms of these sensible things are\nderived from immaterial substances. But he differed from Plato\nbecause he supposed only one immaterial substance to preside over all\ninferior bodies, which he called the \"active intelligence.\"\n\nThe holy doctors held with the Platonists that different spiritual\nsubstances were placed over corporeal things. For Augustine says (QQ.\n83, qu. 79): \"Every visible thing in this world has an angelic power\nplaced over it\"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4): \"The devil\nwas one of the angelic powers who presided over the terrestrial\norder\"; and Origen says on the text, \"When the ass saw the angel\"\n(Num. 22:23), that \"the world has need of angels who preside over\nbeasts, and over the birth of animals, and trees, and plants, and\nover the increase of all other things\" (Hom. xiv in Num.). The reason\nof this, however, is not that an angel is more fitted by his nature\nto preside over animals than over plants; because each angel, even\nthe least, has a higher and more universal power than any kind of\ncorporeal things: the reason is to be sought in the order of Divine\nwisdom, Who places different rulers over different things. Nor does\nit follow that there are more than nine orders of angels, because, as\nabove expounded (Q. 108, A. 2), the orders are distinguished by their\ngeneral offices. Hence as according to Gregory all the angels whose\nproper office it is to preside over the demons are of the order of\nthe \"powers\"; so to the order of the \"virtues\" do those angels seem\nto belong who preside over purely corporeal creatures; for by their\nministration miracles are sometimes performed.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 110, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Corporeal Matter Obeys the Mere Will of an Angel?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will\nof an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul.\nBut corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of\nman is changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold,\nand sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much\nmore is corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be\ndone by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior to\ncorporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform\ncorporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much\nmore efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal\nmatter.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic\nadministration, as appears above (A. 1), and thus it appears that\nbodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is\nessentially a mover moved. Now in effects there is something that is\ndue to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due\nto the power of the instrument; and this it is that takes the\nprincipal place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to the\nforce of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul:\nbut that living flesh is thus generated is due to the power of the\nsoul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it\nassumes the length the form of a bed is from the design of the\n[joiner's] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the\nprincipal place in the corporeal effects, is due to the angelic\npower. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says \"It is not to be thought, that this\nvisible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The Platonists [*Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii,\np. 218] asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by\nimmaterial forms, because they said that the material forms are\nparticipations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this\nopinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in\nmatter proceed from the concept of the _intellect;_ and that\ncorporeal agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to\nhave been deceived on this point, through supposing a form to be\nsomething made _per se,_ so that it would be the effect of a formal\nprinciple. But, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8),\nwhat is made, properly speaking, is the _composite:_ for this\nproperly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is\ncalled a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something\nis; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for\nthat is made which is; since to be is nothing but the way to\nexistence.\n\nNow it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch\nas every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural things, has\na likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself,\nas when fire begets fire, or because the whole \"composite\" as to both\nmatter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone.\nTherefore every informing of matter is either immediately from God,\nor form some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it\nis not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's\nconcept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which\nis accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the\ncommand of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection\nwith natural bodies; and hence the argument does not hold.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior\npower can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for\nexample, the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way\nthan sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter in a\nmore excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the\ncorporeal agents themselves, as being the superior cause.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking\nplace by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would\nnot suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as\nneither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating\nthe fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish\nthat the fire could not have produced by itself); since to reduce\nmatter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the power\nof a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 110, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Bodies Obey the Angels As Regards Local Motion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that bodies do not obey the angels in local\nmotion. For the local motion of natural bodies follows on their forms.\nBut the angels do not cause the forms of natural bodies, as stated\nabove (A. 2). Therefore neither can they cause in them local\nmotion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 7) proves that local\nmotion is the first of all movements. But the angels cannot cause\nother movements by a formal change of the matter. Therefore neither\ncan they cause local motion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the corporeal members obey the concept of the soul\nas regards local movement, as having in themselves some principle of\nlife. In natural bodies, however, there is no vital principle.\nTherefore they do not obey the angels in local motion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8,9) that the angels\nuse corporeal seed to produce certain effects. But they cannot do\nthis without causing local movement. Therefore bodies obey them in\nlocal motion.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): \"Divine wisdom\nhas joined the ends of the first to the principles of the second.\"\nHence it is clear that the inferior nature at its highest point is in\nconjunction with superior nature. Now corporeal nature is below the\nspiritual nature. But among all corporeal movements the most perfect\nis local motion, as the Philosopher proves (Phys. viii, 7). The\nreason of this is that what is moved locally is not as such in\npotentiality to anything intrinsic, but only to something\nextrinsic--that is, to place. Therefore the corporeal nature has a\nnatural aptitude to be moved immediately by the spiritual nature as\nregards place. Hence also the philosophers asserted that the supreme\nbodies are moved locally by the spiritual substances; whence we see\nthat the soul moves the body first and chiefly by a local motion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: There are in bodies other local movements besides those\nwhich result from the forms; for instance, the ebb and flow of the\nsea does not follow from the substantial form of the water, but from\nthe influence of the moon; and much more can local movements result\nfrom the power of spiritual substances.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The angels, by causing local motion, as the first\nmotion, can thereby cause other movements; that is, by employing\ncorporeal agents to produce these effects, as a workman employs fire\nto soften iron.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The power of an angel is not so limited as is the power\nof the soul. Hence the motive power of the soul is limited to the\nbody united to it, which is vivified by it, and by which it can move\nother things. But an angel's power is not limited to any body; hence\nit can move locally bodies not joined to it.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 110, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Angels Can Work Miracles?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels can work miracles. For\nGregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): \"Those spirits are called virtues\nby whom signs and miracles are usually done.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79) that \"magicians work\nmiracles by private contracts; good Christians by public justice, bad\nChristians by the signs of public justice.\" But magicians work\nmiracles because they are \"heard by the demons,\" as he says elsewhere\nin the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi, Sentent., sent. 4: among the\nsupposititious works of St. Augustine]. Therefore the demons can work\nmiracles. Therefore much more can the good angels.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says in the same work [*Cf. Liber xxi,\nSentent., sent. 4: among the supposititious works of St. Augustine]\nthat \"it is not absurd to believe that all the things we see happen\nmay be brought about by the lower powers that dwell in our\natmosphere.\" But when an effect of natural causes is produced outside\nthe order of the natural cause, we call it a miracle, as, for\ninstance, when anyone is cured of a fever without the operation of\nnature. Therefore the angels and demons can work miracles.\n\nObj. 4: Further, superior power is not subject to the order of an\ninferior cause. But corporeal nature is inferior to an angel.\nTherefore an angel can work outside the order of corporeal agents;\nwhich is to work miracles.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written of God (Ps. 135:4): \"Who alone doth\ngreat wonders.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A miracle properly so called is when something is\ndone outside the order of nature. But it is not enough for a miracle\nif something is done outside the order of any particular nature; for\notherwise anyone would perform a miracle by throwing a stone upwards,\nas such a thing is outside the order of the stone's nature. So for a\nmiracle is required that it be against the order of the whole created\nnature. But God alone can do this, because, whatever an angel or any\nother creature does by its own power, is according to the order of\ncreated nature; and thus it is not a miracle. Hence God alone can\nwork miracles.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some angels are said to work miracles; either because\nGod works miracles at their request, in the same way as holy men are\nsaid to work miracles; or because they exercise a kind of ministry in\nthe miracles which take place; as in collecting the dust in the\ngeneral resurrection, or by doing something of that kind.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Properly speaking, as said above, miracles are those\nthings which are done outside the order of the whole created nature.\nBut as we do not know all the power of created nature, it follows\nthat when anything is done outside the order of created nature by a\npower unknown to us, it is called a miracle as regards ourselves. So\nwhen the demons do anything of their own natural power, these things\nare called \"miracles\" not in an absolute sense, but in reference to\nourselves. In this way the magicians work miracles through the\ndemons; and these are said to be done by \"private contracts,\"\nforasmuch as every power of the creature, in the universe, may be\ncompared to the power of a private person in a city. Hence when a\nmagician does anything by compact with the devil, this is done as it\nwere by private contract. On the other hand, the Divine justice is in\nthe whole universe as the public law is in the city. Therefore good\nChristians, so far as they work miracles by Divine justice, are said\nto work miracles by \"public justice\": but bad Christians by the\n\"signs of public justice,\" as by invoking the name of Christ, or by\nmaking use of other sacred signs.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in\nthis visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Although the angels can do something which is outside\nthe order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do anything outside\nthe whole created order, which is essential to a miracle, as above\nexplained.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 111\n\nTHE ACTION OF THE ANGELS ON MAN\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe now consider the action of the angels on man, and inquire:\n\n(1) How far they can change them by their own natural power;\n\n(2) How they are sent by God to the ministry of men;\n\n(3) How they guard and protect men.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether an angel can enlighten the human intellect?\n\n(2) Whether he can change man's will?\n\n(3) Whether he can change man's imagination?\n\n(4) Whether he can change man's senses?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 111, Art. 1]\n\nWhether an Angel Can Enlighten Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot enlighten man. For\nman is enlightened by faith; hence Dionysius (Eccl. Hier. iii)\nattributes enlightenment to baptism, as \"the sacrament of faith.\" But\nfaith is immediately from God, according to Eph. 2:8: \"By grace you\nare saved through faith, and that not of yourselves, for it is the\ngift of God.\" Therefore man is not enlightened by an angel; but\nimmediately by God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, on the words, \"God hath manifested it to them\" (Rom.\n1:19), the gloss observes that \"not only natural reason availed for\nthe manifestation of Divine truths to men, but God also revealed them\nby His work,\" that is, by His creature. But both are immediately from\nGod--that is, natural reason and the creature. Therefore God\nenlightens man immediately.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whoever is enlightened is conscious of being\nenlightened. But man is not conscious of being enlightened by angels.\nTherefore he is not enlightened by them.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv) that the\nrevelation of Divine things reaches men through the ministry of the\nangels. But such revelation is an enlightenment as we have stated\n(Q. 106, A. 1; Q. 107, A. 2). Therefore men are enlightened by the\nangels.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since the order of Divine Providence disposes that\nlower things be subject to the actions of higher, as explained above\n(Q. 109, A. 2); as the inferior angels are enlightened by the\nsuperior, so men, who are inferior to the angels, are enlightened by\nthem.\n\nThe modes of each of these kinds of enlightenment are in one way\nalike and in another way unlike. For, as was shown above (Q. 106, A.\n1), the enlightenment which consists in making known Divine truth has\ntwo functions; namely, according as the inferior intellect is\nstrengthened by the action of the superior intellect, and according\nas the intelligible species which are in the superior intellect are\nproposed to the inferior so as to be grasped thereby. This takes\nplace in the angels when the superior angel divides his universal\nconcept of the truth according to the capacity of the inferior angel,\nas explained above (Q. 106, A. 1).\n\nThe human intellect, however, cannot grasp the universal truth itself\nunveiled; because its nature requires it to understand by turning to\nthe phantasms, as above explained (Q. 84, A. 7). So the angels\npropose the intelligible truth to men under the similitudes of\nsensible things, according to what Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i),\nthat, \"It is impossible for the divine ray to shine on us, otherwise\nthan shrouded by the variety of the sacred veils.\" On the other hand,\nthe human intellect as the inferior, is strengthened by the action of\nthe angelic intellect. And in these two ways man is enlightened by an\nangel.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Two dispositions concur in the virtue of faith; first,\nthe habit of the intellect whereby it is disposed to obey the will\ntending to Divine truth. For the intellect assents to the truth of\nfaith, not as convinced by the reason, but as commanded by the will;\nhence Augustine says, \"No one believes except willingly.\" In this\nrespect faith comes from God alone. Secondly, faith requires that\nwhat is to be believed be proposed to the believer; which is\naccomplished by man, according to Rom. 10:17, \"Faith cometh by\nhearing\"; principally, however, by the angels, by whom Divine things\nare revealed to men. Hence the angels have some part in the\nenlightenment of faith. Moreover, men are enlightened by the angels\nnot only concerning what is to be believed; but also as regards what\nis to be done.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Natural reason, which is immediately from God, can be\nstrengthened by an angel, as we have said above. Again, the more the\nhuman intellect is strengthened, so much higher an intelligible truth\ncan be elicited from the species derived from creatures. Thus man is\nassisted by an angel so that he may obtain from creatures a more\nperfect knowledge of God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Intellectual operation and enlightenment can be\nunderstood in two ways. First, on the part of the object understood;\nthus whoever understands or is enlightened, knows that he understands\nor is enlightened, because he knows that the object is made known to\nhim. Secondly, on the part of the principle; and thus it does not\nfollow that whoever understands a truth, knows what the intellect is,\nwhich is the principle of the intellectual operation. In like manner\nnot everyone who is enlightened by an angel, knows that he is\nenlightened by him.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 111, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Angels Can Change the Will of Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels can change the will of\nman. For, upon the text, \"Who maketh His angels spirits and His\nministers a flame of fire\" (Heb. 1:7), the gloss notes that \"they are\nfire, as being spiritually fervent, and as burning away our vices.\"\nThis could not be, however, unless they changed the will. Therefore\nthe angels can change the will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Bede says (Super Matth. xv, 11), that, \"the devil\ndoes not send wicked thoughts, but kindles them.\" Damascene, however,\nsays that he also sends them; for he remarks that \"every malicious\nact and unclean passion is contrived by the demons and put into men\"\n(De Fide Orth. ii, 4); in like manner also the good angels introduce\nand kindle good thoughts. But this could only be if they changed the\nwill. Therefore the will is changed by them.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the angel, as above explained, enlightens the human\nintellect by means of the phantasms. But as the imagination which\nserves the intellect can be changed by an angel, so can the sensitive\nappetite which serves the will, because it also is a faculty using a\ncorporeal organ. Therefore as the angel enlightens the mind, so can\nhe change the will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ To change the will belongs to God alone, according\nto Prov. 21:1: \"The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord,\nwhithersoever He will He shall turn it.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The will can be changed in two ways. First, from\nwithin; in which way, since the movement of the will is nothing but\nthe inclination of the will to the thing willed, God alone can thus\nchange the will, because He gives the power of such an inclination to\nthe intellectual nature. For as the natural inclination is from God\nalone Who gives the nature, so the inclination of the will is from\nGod alone, Who causes the will.\n\nSecondly, the will is moved from without. As regards an angel, this\ncan be only in one way--by the good apprehended by the intellect.\nHence in as far as anyone may be the cause why anything be apprehended\nas an appetible good, so far does he move the will. In this way also\nGod alone can move the will efficaciously; but an angel and man move\nthe will by way of persuasion, as above explained (Q. 106, A. 2).\n\nIn addition to this mode the human will can be moved from without in\nanother way; namely, by the passion residing in the sensitive\nappetite: thus by concupiscence or anger the will is inclined to will\nsomething. In this manner the angels, as being able to rouse these\npassions, can move the will, not however by necessity, for the will\never remains free to consent to, or to resist, the passion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Those who act as God's ministers, either men or angels,\nare said to burn away vices, and to incite to virtue by way of\npersuasion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The demon cannot put thoughts in our minds by causing\nthem from within, since the act of the cogitative faculty is subject\nto the will; nevertheless the devil is called the kindler of\nthoughts, inasmuch as he incites to thought, by the desire of the\nthings thought of, by way of persuasion, or by rousing the passions.\nDamascene calls this kindling \"a putting in\" because such a work is\naccomplished within. But good thoughts are attributed to a higher\nprinciple, namely, God, though they may be procured by the ministry\nof the angels.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The human intellect in its present state can understand\nonly by turning to the phantasms; but the human will can will\nsomething following the judgment of reason rather than the passion of\nthe sensitive appetite. Hence the comparison does not hold.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 111, Art. 3]\n\nWhether an Angel Can Change Man's Imagination?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an angel cannot change man's\nimagination. For the phantasy, as is said _De Anima_ iii, is \"a motion\ncaused by the sense in act.\" But if this motion were caused by an\nangel, it would not be caused by the sense in act. Therefore it is\ncontrary to the nature of the phantasy, which is the act of the\nimaginative faculty, to be changed by an angel.\n\nObj. 2: Further, since the forms in the imagination are spiritual,\nthey are nobler than the forms existing in sensible matter. But an\nangel cannot impress forms upon sensible matter (Q. 110, A. 2).\nTherefore he cannot impress forms on the imagination, and so he\ncannot change it.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 12): \"One spirit\nby intermingling with another can communicate his knowledge to the\nother spirit by these images, so that the latter either understands\nit himself, or accepts it as understood by the other.\" But it does\nnot seem that an angel can be mingled with the human imagination, nor\nthat the imagination can receive the knowledge of an angel. Therefore\nit seems that an angel cannot change the imagination.\n\nObj. 4: Further, in the imaginative vision man cleaves to the\nsimilitudes of the things as to the things themselves. But in this\nthere is deception. So as a good angel cannot be the cause of\ndeception, it seems that he cannot cause the imaginative vision, by\nchanging the imagination.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Those things which are seen in dreams are seen by\nimaginative vision. But the angels reveal things in dreams, as\nappears from Matt. 1:20; 2:13, 19 in regard to the angel who appeared\nto Joseph in dreams. Therefore an angel can move the imagination.\n\n_I answer that,_ Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural\npower can move the human imagination. This may be explained as\nfollows. For it was said above (Q. 110, A. 3), that corporeal nature\nobeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatever can be\ncaused by the local movement of bodies is subject to the natural\npower of the angels. Now it is manifest that imaginative apparitions\nare sometimes caused in us by the local movement of animal spirits\nand humors. Hence Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.) [*De Insomniis\niii], when assigning the cause of visions in dreams, that \"when an\nanimal sleeps, the blood descends in abundance to the sensitive\nprinciple, and movements descend with it,\" that is, the impressions\nleft from the movements are preserved in the animal spirits, \"and\nmove the sensitive principle\"; so that a certain appearance ensues,\nas if the sensitive principle were being then changed by the external\nobjects themselves. Indeed, the commotion of the spirits and humors\nmay be so great that such appearances may even occur to those who are\nawake, as is seen in mad people, and the like. So, as this happens by\na natural disturbance of the humors, and sometimes also by the will\nof man who voluntarily imagines what he previously experienced, so\nalso the same may be done by the power of a good or a bad angel,\nsometimes with alienation from the bodily senses, sometimes without\nsuch alienation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The first principle of the imagination is from the\nsense in act. For we cannot imagine what we have never perceived by\nthe senses, either wholly or partly; as a man born blind cannot\nimagine color. Sometimes, however, the imagination is informed in\nsuch a way that the act of the imaginative movement arises from the\nimpressions preserved within.\n\nReply Obj. 2: An angel changes the imagination, not indeed by the\nimpression of an imaginative form in no way previously received from\nthe senses (for he cannot make a man born blind imagine color), but\nby local movement of the spirits and humors, as above explained.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The commingling of the angelic spirit with the human\nimagination is not a mingling of essences, but by reason of an effect\nwhich he produces in the imagination in the way above stated; so that\nhe shows man what he [the angel] knows, but not in the way he knows.\n\nReply Obj. 4: An angel causing an imaginative vision, sometimes\nenlightens the intellect at the same time, so that it knows what\nthese images signify; and then there is no deception. But sometimes\nby the angelic operation the similitudes of things only appear in the\nimagination; but neither then is deception caused by the angel, but\nby the defect in the intellect to whom such things appear. Thus\nneither was Christ a cause of deception when He spoke many things to\nthe people in parables, which He did not explain to them.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 111, Art. 4]\n\nWhether an Angel Can Change the Human Senses?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that an angel cannot change the human senses.\nFor the sensitive operation is a vital operation. But such an\noperation does not come from an extrinsic principle. Therefore the\nsensitive operation cannot be caused by an angel.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the sensitive operation is nobler than the\nnutritive. But the angel cannot change the nutritive power, nor other\nnatural forms. Therefore neither can he change the sensitive power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the senses are naturally moved by the sensible\nobjects. But an angel cannot change the order of nature (Q. 110, A.\n4). Therefore an angel cannot change the senses; but these are\nchanged always by the sensible object.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The angels who overturned Sodom, \"struck the\npeople of Sodom with blindness or _aorasia_, so that they could not\nfind the door\" (Gen. 19:11). [*It is worth noting that these are the\nonly two passages in the Greek version where the word _aorasia_\nappears. It expresses, in fact, the effect produced on the people of\nSodom--namely, dazzling (French version, \"eblouissement\"), which the\nLatin \"caecitas\" (blindness) does not necessarily imply.] The same is\nrecorded of the Syrians whom Eliseus led into Samaria (4 Kings 6:18).\n\n_I answer that,_ The senses may be changed in a twofold manner; from\nwithout, as when affected by the sensible object: and from within,\nfor we see that the senses are changed when the spirits and humors\nare disturbed; as for example, a sick man's tongue, charged with\ncholeric humor, tastes everything as bitter, and the like with the\nother senses. Now an angel, by his natural power, can work a change\nin the senses both ways. For an angel can offer the senses a sensible\nobject from without, formed by nature or by the angel himself, as\nwhen he assumes a body, as we have said above (Q. 51, A. 2). Likewise\nhe can move the spirits and humors from within, as above remarked,\nwhereby the senses are changed in various ways.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The principle of the sensitive operation cannot be\nwithout the interior principle which is the sensitive power; but this\ninterior principle can be moved in many ways by the exterior\nprinciple, as above explained.\n\nReply Obj. 2: By the interior movement of the spirits and humors an\nangel can do something towards changing the act of the nutritive\npower, and also of the appetitive and sensitive power, and of any\nother power using a corporeal organ.\n\nReply Obj. 3: An angel can do nothing outside the entire order of\ncreatures; but he can outside some particular order of nature, since\nhe is not subject to that order; thus in some special way an angel\ncan work a change in the senses outside the common mode of nature.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 112\n\nTHE MISSION OF THE ANGELS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe next consider the mission of the angels. Under this head arise\nfour points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether any angels are sent on works of ministry?\n\n(2) Whether all are sent?\n\n(3) Whether those who are sent, assist?\n\n(4) From what orders they are sent.\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 112, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Angels Are Sent on Works of Ministry?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels are not sent on works of\nministry. For every mission is to some determinate place. But\nintellectual actions do not determine a place, for intellect\nabstracts from the \"here\" and \"now.\" Since therefore the angelic\nactions are intellectual, it appears that the angels are not sent to\nperform their own actions.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the empyrean heaven is the place that beseems the\nangelic dignity. Therefore if they are sent to us in ministry, it\nseems that something of their dignity would be lost; which is\nunseemly.\n\nObj. 3: Further, external occupation hinders the contemplation of\nwisdom; hence it is said: \"He that is less in action, shall receive\nwisdom\" (Ecclus. 38:25). So if some angels are sent on external\nministrations, they would seemingly be hindered from contemplation.\nBut the whole of their beatitude consists in the contemplation of\nGod. So if they were sent, their beatitude would be lessened; which\nis unfitting.\n\nObj. 4: Further, to minister is the part of an inferior; hence it is\nwritten (Luke 22:27): \"Which is the greater, he that sitteth at\ntable, or he that serveth? is not he that sitteth at table?\" But the\nangels are naturally greater than we are. Therefore they are not sent\nto administer to us.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 23:20): \"Behold I will send My\nangels who shall go before thee.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ From what has been said above (Q. 108, A. 6), it may\nbe shown that some angels are sent in ministry by God. For, as we\nhave already stated (Q. 43, A. 1), in treating of the mission of the\nDivine Persons, he is said to be sent who in any way proceeds from\nanother so as to begin to be where he was not, or to be in another\nway, where he already was. Thus the Son, or the Holy Ghost is said to\nbe sent as proceeding from the Father by origin; and begins to be in\na new way, by grace or by the nature assumed, where He was before by\nthe presence of His Godhead; for it belongs to God to be present\neverywhere, because, since He is the universal agent, His power\nreaches to all being, and hence He exists in all things (Q. 8, A. 1).\nAn angel's power, however, as a particular agent, does not reach to\nthe whole universe, but reaches to one thing in such a way as not to\nreach another; and so he is \"here\" in such a manner as not to be\n\"there.\" But it is clear from what was above stated (Q. 110, A. 1),\nthat the corporeal creature is governed by the angels. Hence,\nwhenever an angel has to perform any work concerning a corporeal\ncreature, the angel applies himself anew to that body by his power;\nand in that way begins to be there afresh. Now all this takes place\nby Divine command. Hence it follows that an angel is sent by God.\n\nYet the action performed by the angel who is sent, proceeds from God\nas from its first principle, at Whose nod and by Whose authority the\nangels work; and is reduced to God as to its last end. Now this is\nwhat is meant by a minister: for a minister is an intelligent\ninstrument; while an instrument is moved by another, and its action\nis ordered to another. Hence angels' actions are called \"ministries\";\nand for this reason they are said to be sent in ministry.\n\nReply Obj. 1: An operation can be intellectual in two ways. In one\nway, as dwelling in the intellect itself, as contemplation; such an\noperation does not demand to occupy a place; indeed, as Augustine\nsays (De Trin. iv, 20): \"Even we ourselves as mentally tasting\nsomething eternal, are not in this world.\" In another sense an action\nis said to be intellectual because it is regulated and commanded by\nsome intellect; in that sense the intellectual operations evidently\nhave sometimes a determinate place.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The empyrean heaven belongs to the angelic dignity by\nway of congruity; forasmuch as it is congruous that the higher body\nshould be attributed to that nature which occupies a rank above\nbodies. Yet an angel does not derive his dignity from the empyrean\nheaven; so when he is not actually in the empyrean heaven, nothing of\nhis dignity is lost, as neither does a king lessen his dignity when\nnot actually sitting on his regal throne, which suits his dignity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In ourselves the purity of contemplation is obscured by\nexterior occupation; because we give ourselves to action through the\nsensitive faculties, the action of which when intense impedes the\naction of the intellectual powers. An angel, on the contrary,\nregulates his exterior actions by intellectual operation alone. Hence\nit follows that his external occupations in no respect impede his\ncontemplation; because given two actions, one of which is the rule\nand the reason of the other, one does not hinder but helps the other.\nWherefore Gregory says (Moral. ii) that \"the angels do not go abroad\nin such a manner as to lose the delights of inward contemplation.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: In their external actions the angels chiefly minister\nto God, and secondarily to us; not because we are superior to them,\nabsolutely speaking, but because, since every man or angel by\ncleaving to God is made one spirit with God, he is thereby superior\nto every creature. Hence the Apostle says (Phil. 2:3): \"Esteeming\nothers better than themselves.\"\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 112, Art. 2]\n\nWhether All the Angels Are Sent in Ministry?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all the angels are sent in ministry.\nFor the Apostle says (Heb. 1:14): \"All are ministering spirits, sent\nto minister\" [Vulg. 'Are they not all . . . ?'].\n\nObj. 2: Further, among the orders, the highest is that of the\nSeraphim, as stated above (Q. 108, A. 6). But a Seraph was sent to\npurify the lips of the prophet (Isa. 6:6, 7). Therefore much more are\nthe inferior orders sent.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Divine Persons infinitely excel all the angelic\norders. But the Divine Persons are sent. Therefore much more are even\nthe highest angels sent.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if the superior angels are not sent to the external\nministries, this can only be because the superior angels execute the\nDivine ministries by means of the inferior angels. But as all the\nangels are unequal, as stated above (Q. 50, A. 4), each angel has an\nangel inferior to himself except the last one. Therefore only the\nlast angel would be sent in ministry; which contradicts the words,\n\"Thousands of thousands ministered to Him\" (Dan. 7:10).\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.), quoting the\nstatement of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), that \"the higher ranks\nfulfil no exterior service.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As appears from what has been said above (Q. 106, A.\n3; Q. 110, A. 1), the order of Divine Providence has so disposed not\nonly among the angels, but also in the whole universe, that inferior\nthings are administered by the superior. But the Divine dispensation,\nhowever, this order is sometimes departed from as regards corporeal\nthings, for the sake of a higher order, that is, according as it is\nsuitable for the manifestation of grace. That the man born blind was\nenlightened, that Lazarus was raised from the dead, was accomplished\nimmediately by God without the action of the heavenly bodies.\nMoreover both good and bad angels can work some effect in these\nbodies independently of the heavenly bodies, by the condensation of\nthe clouds to rain, and by producing some such effects. Nor can\nanyone doubt that God can immediately reveal things to men without\nthe help of the angels, and the superior angels without the inferior.\nFrom this standpoint some have said that according to the general law\nthe superior angels are not sent, but only the inferior; yet that\nsometimes, by Divine dispensation, the superior angels also are sent.\n\nIt may also be said that the Apostle wishes to prove that Christ is\ngreater than the angels who were chosen as the messengers of the law;\nin order that He might show the excellence of the new over the old\nlaw. Hence there is no need to apply this to any other angels besides\nthose who were sent to give the law.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel\nwho was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior\norder; but was called a \"Seraph,\" that is, \"kindling \" in an\nequivocal sense, because he came to \"kindle\" the lips of the prophet.\nIt may also be said that the superior angels communicate their own\nproper gifts whereby they are denominated, through the ministry of\nthe inferior angels. Thus one of the Seraphim is described as\npurifying by fire the prophet's lips, not as if he did so\nimmediately, but because an inferior angel did so by his power; as\nthe Pope is said to absolve a man when he gives absolution by means\nof someone else.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Divine Persons are not sent in ministry, but are\nsaid to be sent in an equivocal sense, as appears from what has been\nsaid (Q. 43, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 4: A manifold grade exists in the Divine ministries. Hence\nthere is nothing to prevent angels though unequal from being sent\nimmediately in ministry, in such a manner however that the superior\nare sent to the higher ministries, and the lower to the inferior\nministries.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 112, Art. 3]\n\nWhether All the Angels Who Are Sent, Assist?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angels who are sent also assist.\nFor Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.): \"So the angels are sent, and\nassist; for, though the angelic spirit is limited, yet the supreme\nSpirit, God, is not limited.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, the angel was sent to administer to Tobias. Yet he\nsaid, \"I am the angel Raphael, one of the seven who stand before the\nLord\" (Tob. 12:15). Therefore the angels who are sent, assist.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every holy angel is nearer to God than Satan is. Yet\nSatan assisted God, according to Job 1:6: \"When the sons of God came\nto stand before the Lord, Satan also was present among them.\"\nTherefore much more do the angels, who are sent to minister, assist.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if the inferior angels do not assist, the reason is\nbecause they receive the Divine enlightenment, not immediately, but\nthrough the superior angels. But every angel receives the Divine\nenlightenment from a superior, except the one who is highest of all.\nTherefore only the highest angel would assist; which is contrary to\nthe text of Dan. 7:10: \"Ten thousand times a hundred thousand stood\nbefore Him.\" Therefore the angels who are sent also assist.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says, on Job 25:3: \"Is there any numbering\nof His soldiers?\" (Moral. xvii): \"Those powers assist, who do not go\nforth as messengers to men.\" Therefore those who are sent in ministry\ndo not assist.\n\n_I answer that,_ The angels are spoken of as \"assisting\" and\n\"administering,\" after the likeness of those who attend upon a king;\nsome of whom ever wait upon him, and hear his commands immediately;\nwhile others there are to whom the royal commands are conveyed by\nthose who are in attendance--for instance, those who are placed at\nthe head of the administration of various cities; these are said to\nadminister, not to assist.\n\nWe must therefore observe that all the angels gaze upon the Divine\nEssence immediately; in regard to which all, even those who minister,\nare said to assist. Hence Gregory says (Moral. ii) that \"those who\nare sent on the external ministry of our salvation can always assist\nand see the face of the Father.\" Yet not all the angels can perceive\nthe secrets of the Divine mysteries in the clearness itself of the\nDivine Essence; but only the superior angels who announce them to the\ninferior: and in that respect only the superior angels belonging to\nthe highest hierarchy are said to assist, whose special prerogative\nit is to be enlightened immediately by God.\n\nFrom this may be deduced the reply to the first and second\nobjections, which are based on the first mode of assisting.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Satan is not described as having assisted, but as\npresent among the assistants; for, as Gregory says (Moral. ii),\n\"though he has lost beatitude, still he has retained a nature like to\nthe angels.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: All the assistants see some things immediately in the\nglory of the Divine Essence; and so it may be said that it is the\nprerogative of the whole of the highest hierarchy to be immediately\nenlightened by God; while the higher ones among them see more than is\nseen by the inferior; some of whom enlighten others: as also among\nthose who assist the king, one knows more of the king's secrets than\nanother.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 112, Art. 4]\n\nWhether All the Angels of the Second Hierarchy Are Sent?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all the angels of the second\nhierarchy are sent. For all the angels either assist, or minister,\naccording to Dan. 7:10. But the angels of the second hierarchy do\nnot assist; for they are enlightened by the angels of the first\nhierarchy, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii). Therefore all the\nangels of the second hierarchy are sent in ministry.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory says (Moral. xvii) that \"there are more who\nminister than who assist.\" This would not be the case if the angels\nof the second hierarchy were not sent in ministry. Therefore all the\nangels of the second hierarchy are sent to minister.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that the\n\"Dominations are above all subjection.\" But to be sent implies\nsubjection. Therefore the dominations are not sent to minister.\n\n_I answer that,_ As above stated (A. 1), to be sent to external\nministry properly belongs to an angel according as he acts by Divine\ncommand in respect of any corporeal creature; which is part of the\nexecution of the Divine ministry. Now the angelic properties are\nmanifested by their names, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii); and\ntherefore the angels of those orders are sent to external ministry\nwhose names signify some kind of administration. But the name\n\"dominations\" does not signify any such administration, but only\ndisposition and command in administering. On the other hand, the\nnames of the inferior orders imply administration, for the \"Angels\"\nand \"Archangels\" are so called from \"announcing\"; the \"Virtues\" and\n\"Powers\" are so called in respect of some act; and it is right that\nthe \"Prince,\" according to what Gregory says (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.),\n\"be first among the workers.\" Hence it belongs to these five orders\nto be sent to external ministry; not to the four superior orders.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Dominations are reckoned among the ministering\nangels, not as exercising but as disposing and commanding what is to\nbe done by others; thus an architect does not put his hands to the\nproduction of his art, but only disposes and orders what others are\nto do.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A twofold reason may be given in assigning the number\nof the assisting and ministering angels. For Gregory says that those\nwho minister are more numerous than those who assist; because he\ntakes the words (Dan. 7:10) \"thousands of thousands ministered to\nHim,\" not in a multiple but in a partitive sense, to mean \"thousands\nout of thousands\"; thus the number of those who minister is\nindefinite, and signifies excess; while the number of assistants is\nfinite as in the words added, \"and ten thousand times a hundred\nthousand assisted Him.\" This explanation rests on the opinion of the\nPlatonists, who said that the nearer things are to the one first\nprinciple, the smaller they are in number; as the nearer a number is\nto unity, the lesser it is than multitude. This opinion is verified\nas regards the number of orders, as six administer and three assist.\n\nDionysius, however, (Coel. Hier. xiv) declares that the multitude of\nangels surpasses all the multitude of material things; so that, as the\nsuperior bodies exceed the inferior in magnitude to an immeasurable\ndegree, so the superior incorporeal natures surpass all corporeal\nnatures in multitude; because whatever is better is more intended and\nmore multiplied by God. Hence, as the assistants are superior to the\nministers there will be more assistants than ministers. In this way,\nthe words \"thousands of thousands\" are taken by way of multiplication,\nto signify \"a thousand times a thousand.\" And because ten times a\nhundred is a thousand, if it were said \"ten times a hundred thousand\"\nit would mean that there are as many assistants as ministers: but\nsince it is written \"ten thousand times a hundred thousand,\" we are\ngiven to understand that the assistants are much more numerous than\nthe ministers. Nor is this said to signify that this is the precise\nnumber of angels, but rather that it is much greater, in that it\nexceeds all material multitude. This is signified by the\nmultiplication together of all the greatest numbers, namely ten, a\nhundred, and a thousand, as Dionysius remarks in the same passage.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 113\n\nOF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF THE GOOD ANGELS\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe next consider the guardianship exercised by the good angels; and\ntheir warfare against the bad angels. Under the first head eight\npoints of inquiry arise:\n\n(1) Whether men are guarded by the angels?\n\n(2) Whether to each man is assigned a single guardian angel?\n\n(3) Whether the guardianship belongs only to the lowest order of\nangels?\n\n(4) Whether it is fitting for each man to have an angel guardian?\n\n(5) When does an angel's guardianship of a man begin?\n\n(6) Whether the angel guardians always watch over men?\n\n(7) Whether the angel grieves over the loss of the one guarded?\n\n(8) Whether rivalry exists among the angels as regards their\nguardianship?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Men Are Guarded by the Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that men are not guarded by the angels.\nFor guardians are deputed to some because they either know not how,\nor are not able, to guard themselves, as children and the sick. But\nman is able to guard himself by his free-will; and knows how by his\nnatural knowledge of natural law. Therefore man is not guarded by an\nangel.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a strong guard makes a weaker one superfluous. But\nmen are guarded by God, according to Ps. 120:4: \"He shall neither\nslumber nor sleep, that keepeth Israel.\" Therefore man does not need\nto be guarded by an angel.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the loss of the guarded redounds to the negligence\nof the guardian; hence it was said to a certain one: \"Keep this man;\nand if he shall slip away, thy life shall be for his life\" (3 Kings\n20:39). Now many perish daily through falling into sin; whom the\nangels could help by visible appearance, or by miracles, or in some\nsuch-like way. The angels would therefore be negligent if men are\ngiven to their guardianship. But that is clearly false. Therefore\nthe angels are not the guardians of men.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 90:11): \"He hath given His\nangels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the plan of Divine Providence, we find\nthat in all things the movable and variable are moved and regulated\nby the immovable and invariable; as all corporeal things by immovable\nspiritual substances, and the inferior bodies by the superior which\nare invariable in substance. We ourselves also are regulated as\nregards conclusions, about which we may have various opinions, by the\nprinciples which we hold in an invariable manner. It is moreover\nmanifest that as regards things to be done human knowledge and\naffection can vary and fail from good in many ways; and so it was\nnecessary that angels should be deputed for the guardianship of men,\nin order to regulate them and move them to good.\n\nReply Obj. 1: By free-will man can avoid evil to a certain degree,\nbut not in any sufficient degree; forasmuch as he is weak in\naffection towards good on account of the manifold passions of the\nsoul. Likewise universal natural knowledge of the law, which by\nnature belongs to man, to a certain degree directs man to good, but\nnot in a sufficient degree; because in the application of the\nuniversal principles of law to particular actions man happens to be\ndeficient in many ways. Hence it is written (Wis. 9:14): \"The\nthoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain.\"\nThus man needs to be guarded by the angels.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Two things are required for a good action; first, that\nthe affection be inclined to good, which is effected in us by the\nhabit of mortal virtue. Secondly, that reason should discover the\nproper methods to make perfect the good of virtue; this the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. vi) attributes to prudence. As regards the first,\nGod guards man immediately by infusing into him grace and virtues; as\nregards the second, God guards man as his universal instructor, Whose\nprecepts reach man by the medium of the angels, as above stated (Q.\n111, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: As men depart from the natural instinct of good by\nreason of a sinful passion, so also do they depart from the\ninstigation of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they\nenlighten man that he may do what is right. Hence that men perish is\nnot to be imputed to the negligence of the angels but to the malice\nof men. That they sometimes appear to men visibly outside the\nordinary course of nature comes from a special grace of God, as\nlikewise that miracles occur outside the order of nature.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Each Man Is Guarded by an Angel?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that each man is not guarded by an angel.\nFor an angel is stronger than a man. But one man suffices to guard\nmany men. Therefore much more can one angel guard many men.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the lower things are brought to God through the\nmedium of the higher, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv, xiii). But\nas all the angels are unequal (Q. 50, A. 4), there is only one angel\nbetween whom and men there is no medium. Therefore there is only one\nangel who immediately keeps men.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the greater angels are deputed to the greater\noffices. But it is not a greater office to keep one man more than\nanother; since all men are naturally equal. Since therefore of all\nthe angels one is greater than another, as Dionysius says (Coel.\nHier. x), it seems that different men are not guarded by different\nangels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ On the text, \"Their angels in heaven,\" etc. (Matt.\n8:10), Jerome says: \"Great is the dignity of souls, for each one to\nhave an angel deputed to guard it from its birth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Each man has an angel guardian appointed to him.\nThis rests upon the fact that the guardianship of angels belongs to\nthe execution of Divine providence concerning men. But God's\nprovidence acts differently as regards men and as regards other\ncorruptible creatures, for they are related differently to\nincorruptibility. For men are not only incorruptible in the common\nspecies, but also in the proper forms of each individual, which are\nthe rational souls, which cannot be said of other incorruptible\nthings. Now it is manifest that the providence of God is chiefly\nexercised towards what remains for ever; whereas as regards things\nwhich pass away, the providence of God acts so as to order their\nexistence to the things which are perpetual. Thus the providence of\nGod is related to each man as it is to every genus or species of\nthings corruptible. But, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.),\nthe different orders are deputed to the different genera of things,\nfor instance, the \"Powers\" to coerce the demons, the \"Virtues\" to\nwork miracles in things corporeal; while it is probable that the\ndifferent species are presided over by different angels of the same\norder. Hence it is also reasonable to suppose that different angels\nare appointed to the guardianship of different men.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A guardian may be assigned to a man for two reasons:\nfirst, inasmuch as a man is an individual, and thus to one man one\nguardian is due; and sometimes several are appointed to guard one.\nSecondly, inasmuch as a man is part of a community, and thus one man\nis appointed as guardian of a whole community; to whom it belongs to\nprovide what concerns one man in his relation to the whole community,\nsuch as external works, which are sources of strength or weakness to\nothers. But angel guardians are given to men also as regards\ninvisible and occult things, concerning the salvation of each one in\nhis own regard. Hence individual angels are appointed to guard\nindividual men.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As above stated (Q. 112, A. 3, ad 4), all the angels of\nthe first hierarchy are, as to some things, enlightened by God\ndirectly; but as to other things, only the superior are directly\nenlightened by God, and these reveal them to the inferior. And the\nsame also applies to the inferior orders: for a lower angel is\nenlightened in some respects by one of the highest, and in other\nrespects by the one immediately above him. Thus it is possible that\nsome one angel enlightens a man immediately, and yet has other angels\nbeneath him whom he enlightens.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although men are equal in nature, still inequality\nexists among them, according as Divine Providence orders some to the\ngreater, and others to the lesser things, according to Ecclus. 33:11,\n12: \"With much knowledge the Lord hath divided them, and diversified\ntheir ways: some of them hath He blessed and exalted, and some of\nthem hath He cursed and brought low.\" Thus it is a greater office to\nguard one man than another.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 3]\n\nWhether to Guard Men Belongs Only to the Lowest Order of Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the guardianship of men does not\nbelong only to the lowest order of the angels. For Chrysostom says\nthat the text (Matt. 18:10), \"Their angels in heaven,\" etc. is to be\nunderstood not of any angels but of the highest. Therefore the\nsuperior angels guard men.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says that angels \"are sent to\nminister for them who shall receive the inheritance of salvation\"\n(Heb. 1:14); and thus it seems that the mission of the angels is\ndirected to the guardianship of men. But five orders are sent in\nexternal ministry (Q. 112, A. 4). Therefore all the angels of the\nfive orders are deputed to the guardianship of men.\n\nObj. 3: Further, for the guardianship of men it seems especially\nnecessary to coerce the demons, which belongs most of all to the\nPowers, according to Gregory (Hom. xxxiv in Evang.); and to work\nmiracles, which belongs to the Virtues. Therefore these orders are\nalso deputed to the work of guardianship, and not only the lowest\norder.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In the Psalm (90) the guardianship of men is\nattributed to the angels; who belong to the lowest order, according\nto Dionysius (Coel. Hier. v, ix).\n\n_I answer that,_ As above stated (A. 2), man is guarded in two ways;\nin one way by particular guardianship, according as to each man an\nangel is appointed to guard him; and such guardianship belongs to the\nlowest order of the angels, whose place it is, according to Gregory,\nto announce the \"lesser things\"; for it seems to be the least of the\nangelic offices to procure what concerns the salvation of only one\nman. The other kind of guardianship is universal, multiplied\naccording to the different orders. For the more universal an agent\nis, the higher it is. Thus the guardianship of the human race belongs\nto the order of \"Principalities,\" or perhaps to the \"Archangels,\"\nwhom we call the angel princes. Hence, Michael, whom we call an\narchangel, is also styled \"one of the princes\" (Dan. 10:13). Moreover\nall corporeal creatures are guarded by the \"Virtues\"; and likewise\nthe demons by the \"Powers,\" and the good spirits by the\n\"Principalities,\" according to Gregory's opinion (Hom. xxxiv in Ev.).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Chrysostom can be taken to mean the highest in the\nlowest order of angels; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. x) in\neach order there are first, middle, and last. It is, however,\nprobable that the greater angels are deputed to keep those chosen by\nGod for the higher degree of glory.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not all the angels who are sent have guardianship of\nindividual men; but some orders have a universal guardianship,\ngreater or less, as above explained.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even inferior angels exercise the office of the\nsuperior, as they share in their gifts, and they are executors of the\nsuperiors' power; and in this way all the angels of the lowest order\ncan coerce the demons, and work miracles.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Angels Are Appointed to the Guardianship of All Men?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that angels are not appointed to the\nguardianship of all men. For it is written of Christ (Phil. 2:7) that\n\"He was made in the likeness of men, and in habit found as a man.\" If\ntherefore angels are appointed to the guardianship of all men, Christ\nalso would have had an angel guardian. But this is unseemly, for\nChrist is greater than all the angels. Therefore angels are not\nappointed to the guardianship of all men.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Adam was the first of all men. But it was not\nfitting that he should have an angel guardian, at least in the state\nof innocence: for then he was not beset by any dangers. Therefore\nangels are not appointed to the guardianship of all men.\n\nObj. 3: Further, angels are appointed to the guardianship of men,\nthat they may take them by the hand and guide them to eternal life,\nencourage them to good works, and protect them against the assaults\nof the demons. But men who are foreknown to damnation, never attain\nto eternal life. Infidels, also, though at times they perform good\nworks, do not perform them well, for they have not a right intention:\nfor \"faith directs the intention\" as Augustine says (Enarr. ii in Ps.\n31). Moreover, the coming of Antichrist will be \"according to the\nworking of Satan,\" as it is written (2 Thess. 2:9). Therefore angels\nare not deputed to the guardianship of all men.\n\n_On the contrary,_ is the authority of Jerome quoted above (A. 2),\nfor he says that \"each soul has an angel appointed to guard it.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Man while in this state of life, is, as it were, on\na road by which he should journey towards heaven. On this road man is\nthreatened by many dangers both from within and from without,\naccording to Ps. 159:4: \"In this way wherein I walked, they have\nhidden a snare for me.\" And therefore as guardians are appointed for\nmen who have to pass by an unsafe road, so an angel guardian is\nassigned to each man as long as he is a wayfarer. When, however, he\narrives at the end of life he no longer has a guardian angel; but in\nthe kingdom he will have an angel to reign with him, in hell a demon\nto punish him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Christ as man was guided immediately by the Word of\nGod: wherefore He needed not be guarded by an angel. Again as regards\nHis soul, He was a comprehensor, although in regard to His passible\nbody, He was a wayfarer. In this latter respect it was right that He\nshould have not a guardian angel as superior to Him, but a\nministering angel as inferior to Him. Whence it is written (Matt.\n4:11) that \"angels came and ministered to Him.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: In the state of innocence man was not threatened\nby any peril from within: because within him all was well ordered, as\nwe have said above (Q. 95, AA. 1, 3). But peril threatened from\nwithout on account of the snares of the demons; as was proved by the\nevent. For this reason he needed a guardian angel.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as the foreknown, the infidels, and even\nAntichrist, are not deprived of the interior help of natural reason;\nso neither are they deprived of that exterior help granted by God to\nthe whole human race--namely the guardianship of the angels. And\nalthough the help which they receive therefrom does not result in\ntheir deserving eternal life by good works, it does nevertheless\nconduce to their being protected from certain evils which would hurt\nboth themselves and others. For even the demons are held off by the\ngood angels, lest they hurt as much as they would. In like manner\nAntichrist will not do as much harm as he would wish.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 5]\n\nWhether an Angel Is Appointed to Guard a Man from His Birth?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an angel is not appointed to guard\na man from his birth. For angels are \"sent to minister for them who\nshall receive the inheritance of salvation,\" as the Apostle says\n(Heb. 1:14). But men begin to receive the inheritance of salvation,\nwhen they are baptized. Therefore an angel is appointed to guard a\nman from the time of his baptism, not of his birth.\n\nObj. 2: Further, men are guarded by angels in as far as angels\nenlighten and instruct them. But children are not capable of\ninstruction as soon as they are born, for they have not the use of\nreason. Therefore angels are not appointed to guard children as\nsoon as they are born.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a child has a rational soul for some time before\nbirth, just as well as after. But it does not appear that an angel is\nappointed to guard a child before its birth, for they are not then\nadmitted to the sacraments of the Church. Therefore angels are not\nappointed to guard men from the moment of their birth.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Jerome says (_vide_ A. 4) that \"each soul has an\nangel appointed to guard it from its birth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ as Origen observes (Tract. v, super Matt.) there\nare two opinions on this matter. For some have held that the angel\nguardian is appointed at the time of baptism, others, that he is\nappointed at the time of birth. The latter opinion Jerome approves\n(loc. cit.), and with reason. For those benefits which are conferred\nby God on man as a Christian, begin with his baptism; such as\nreceiving the Eucharist, and the like. But those which are conferred\nby God on man as a rational being, are bestowed on him at his birth,\nfor then it is that he receives that nature. Among the latter\nbenefits we must count the guardianship of angels, as we have said\nabove (AA. 1, 4). Wherefore from the very moment of his birth man\nhas an angel guardian appointed to him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Angels are sent to minister, and that efficaciously\nindeed, for those who shall receive the inheritance of salvation, if\nwe consider the ultimate effect of their guardianship, which is the\nrealizing of that inheritance. But for all that, the angelic\nministrations are not withdrawn for others although they are not so\nefficacious as to bring them to salvation: efficacious, nevertheless,\nthey are, inasmuch as they ward off many evils.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Guardianship is ordained to enlightenment by\ninstruction, as to its ultimate and principal effect. Nevertheless it\nhas many other effects consistent with childhood; for instance to\nward off the demons, and to prevent both bodily and spiritual harm.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As long as the child is in the mother's womb it is not\nentirely separate, but by reason of a certain intimate tie, is still\npart of her: just as the fruit while hanging on the tree is part of\nthe tree. And therefore it can be said with some degree of\nprobability, that the angel who guards the mother guards the child\nwhile in the womb. But at its birth, when it becomes separate from\nthe mother, an angel guardian is appointed to it; as Jerome, above\nquoted, says.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Angel Guardian Ever Forsakes a Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes\nthe man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said (Jer. 51:9) in\nthe person of the angels: \"We would have cured Babylon, but she is not\nhealed: let us forsake her.\" And (Isa. 5:5) it is written: \"I will\ntake away the hedge\"--that is, \"the guardianship of the angels\"\n[gloss]--\"and it shall be wasted.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, God's guardianship excels that of the angels. But\nGod forsakes man at times, according to Ps. 21:2: \"O God, my God,\nlook upon me: why hast Thou forsaken me?\" Much rather therefore does\nan angel guardian forsake man.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 3), \"When\nthe angels are here with us, they are not in heaven.\" But sometimes\nthey are in heaven. Therefore sometimes they forsake us.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The demons are ever assailing us, according to 1\nPet. 5:8: \"Your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, goeth about,\nseeking whom he may devour.\" Much more therefore do the good angels\never guard us.\n\n_I answer that,_ As appears above (A. 2), the guardianship of the\nangels is an effect of Divine providence in regard to man. Now it is\nevident that neither man, nor anything at all, is entirely withdrawn\nfrom the providence of God: for in as far as a thing participates\nbeing, so far is it subject to the providence that extends over all\nbeing. God indeed is said to forsake man, according to the ordering\nof His providence, but only in so far as He allows man to suffer some\ndefect of punishment or of fault. In like manner it must be said that\nthe angel guardian never forsakes a man entirely, but sometimes he\nleaves him in some particular, for instance by not preventing him\nfrom being subject to some trouble, or even from falling into sin,\naccording to the ordering of Divine judgments. In this sense Babylon\nand the House of Israel are said to have been forsaken by the angels,\nbecause their angel guardians did not prevent them from being subject\nto tribulation.\n\nFrom this the answers are clear to the first and second objections.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although an angel may forsake a man sometimes locally,\nhe does not for that reason forsake him as to the effect of his\nguardianship: for even when he is in heaven he knows what is\nhappening to man; nor does he need time for his local motion, for he\ncan be with man in an instant.\n_______________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Angels Grieve for the Ills of Those Whom They Guard?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that angels grieve for the ills of those\nwhom they guard. For it is written (Isa. 33:7): \"The angels of peace\nshall weep bitterly.\" But weeping is a sign of grief and sorrow.\nTherefore angels grieve for the ills of those whom they guard.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15),\n\"sorrow is for those things that happen against our will.\" But the\nloss of the man whom he has guarded is against the guardian angel's\nwill. Therefore angels grieve for the loss of men.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as sorrow is contrary to joy, so penance is contrary\nto sin. But angels rejoice about one sinner doing penance, as we are\ntold, Luke 15:7. Therefore they grieve for the just man who falls\ninto sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, on Numbers 18:12: \"Whatsoever first-fruits they\noffer,\" etc. the gloss of Origen says: \"The angels are brought to\njudgment as to whether men have fallen through their negligence or\nthrough their own fault.\" But it is reasonable for anyone to grieve\nfor the ills which have brought him to judgment. Therefore angels\ngrieve for men's sins.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Where there is grief and sorrow, there is not\nperfect happiness: wherefore it is written (Apoc. 21:4): \"Death shall\nbe no more, nor mourning, nor crying, nor sorrow.\" But the angels are\nperfectly happy. Therefore they have no cause for grief.\n\n_I answer that,_ Angels do not grieve, either for sins or for the\npains inflicted on men. For grief and sorrow, according to Augustine\n(De Civ. Dei xiv, 15) are for those things which occur against our\nwill. But nothing happens in the world contrary to the will of the\nangels and the other blessed, because their will cleaves entirely to\nthe ordering of Divine justice; while nothing happens in the world\nsave what is effected or permitted by Divine justice. Therefore\nsimply speaking, nothing occurs in the world against the will of the\nblessed. For as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 1) that is called\nsimply voluntary, which a man wills in a particular case, and at a\nparticular time, having considered all the circumstances; although\nuniversally speaking, such a thing would not be voluntary: thus the\nsailor does not will the casting of his cargo into the sea,\nconsidered universally and absolutely, but on account of the\nthreatened danger of his life, he wills it. Wherefore this is\nvoluntary rather than involuntary, as stated in the same passage.\nTherefore universally and absolutely speaking the angels do not will\nsin and the pains inflicted on its account: but they do will the\nfulfilment of the ordering of Divine justice in this matter, in\nrespect of which some are subjected to pains and are allowed to fall\ninto sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: These words of Isaias may be understood of the angels,\ni.e. the messengers, of Ezechias, who wept on account of the words of\nRabsaces, as related Isa. 37:2 seqq.: this would be the literal\nsense. According to the allegorical sense the \"angels of peace\" are\nthe apostles and preachers who weep for men's sins. If according to\nthe anagogical sense this passage be expounded of the blessed angels,\nthen the expression is metaphorical, and signifies that universally\nspeaking the angels will the salvation of mankind: for in this sense\nwe attribute passions to God and the angels.\n\nThe reply to the second objection appears from what has been said.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Both in man's repentance and in man's sin there is one\nreason for the angel's joy, namely the fulfilment of the ordering of\nthe Divine Providence.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The angels are brought into judgment for the sins of\nmen, not as guilty, but as witnesses to convict man of weakness.\n_______________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 113, Art. 8]\n\nWhether There Can Be Strife or Discord Among the Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there can be [no] strife or discord among\nthe angels. For it is written (Job 25:2): \"Who maketh peace in His\nhigh places.\" But strife is opposed to peace. Therefore among the high\nangels there is no strife.\n\nObj. 2: Further, where there is perfect charity and just\nauthority there can be no strife. But all this exists among the\nangels. Therefore there is no strife among the angels.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if we say that angels strive for those whom they\nguard, one angel must needs take one side, and another angel the\nopposite side. But if one side is in the right the other side is in\nthe wrong. It will follow therefore, that a good angel is a compounder\nof wrong; which is unseemly. Therefore there is no strife among good\nangels.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Dan. 10:13): \"The prince of the\nkingdom of the Persians resisted me one and twenty days.\" But this\nprince of the Persians was the angel deputed to the guardianship of\nthe kingdom of the Persians. Therefore one good angel resists the\nothers; and thus there is strife among them.\n\n_I answer that,_ The raising of this question is occasioned by this\npassage of Daniel. Jerome explains it by saying that the prince of the\nkingdom of the Persians is the angel who opposed the setting free of\nthe people of Israel, for whom Daniel was praying, his prayers being\noffered to God by Gabriel. And this resistance of his may have been\ncaused by some prince of the demons having led the Jewish captives in\nPersia into sin; which sin was an impediment to the efficacy of the\nprayer which Daniel put up for that same people.\n\nBut according to Gregory (Moral. xvii), the prince of the kingdom of\nPersia was a good angel appointed to the guardianship of that kingdom.\nTo see therefore how one angel can be said to resist another, we must\nnote that the Divine judgments in regard to various kingdoms and\nvarious men are executed by the angels. Now in their actions, the\nangels are ruled by the Divine decree. But it happens at times in\nvarious kingdoms or various men there are contrary merits or demerits,\nso that one of them is subject to or placed over another. As to what\nis the ordering of Divine wisdom on such matters, the angels cannot\nknow it unless God reveal it to them: and so they need to consult\nDivine wisdom thereupon. Wherefore forasmuch as they consult the\nDivine will concerning various contrary and opposing merits, they are\nsaid to resist one another: not that their wills are in opposition,\nsince they are all of one mind as to the fulfilment of the Divine\ndecree; but that the things about which they seek knowledge are in\nopposition.\n\nFrom this the answers to the objections are clear.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 114\n\nOF THE ASSAULTS OF THE DEMONS\n(In Five Articles)\n\nWe now consider the assaults of the demons. Under this head there are\nfive points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether men are assailed by the demons?\n\n(2) Whether to tempt is proper to the devil?\n\n(3) Whether all the sins of men are to be set down to the assaults or\ntemptations of the demons?\n\n(4) Whether they can work real miracles for the purpose of leading\nmen astray?\n\n(5) Whether the demons who are overcome by men, are hindered from\nmaking further assaults?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Men Are Assailed by the Demons?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that men are not assailed by the demons.\nFor angels are sent by God to guard man. But demons are not sent by\nGod: for the demons' intention is the loss of souls; whereas God's is\nthe salvation of souls. Therefore demons are not deputed to assail\nman.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is not a fair fight, for the weak to be set\nagainst the strong, and the ignorant against the astute. But men are\nweak and ignorant, whereas the demons are strong and astute. It is not\ntherefore to be permitted by God, the author of all justice, that men\nshould be assailed by demons.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the assaults of the flesh and the world are\nenough for man's exercise. But God permits His elect to be assailed\nthat they may be exercised. Therefore there is no need for them to be\nassailed by the demons.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 6:12): \"Our wrestling is\nnot against flesh and blood; but against Principalities and Powers,\nagainst the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits\nof wickedness in the high places.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in the assault of the\ndemons--the assault itself, and the ordering thereof. The assault\nitself is due to the malice of the demons, who through envy endeavor\nto hinder man's progress; and through pride usurp a semblance of\nDivine power, by deputing certain ministers to assail man, as the\nangels of God in their various offices minister to man's salvation.\nBut the ordering of the assault is from God, Who knows how to make\norderly use of evil by ordering it to good. On the other hand, in\nregard to the angels, both their guardianship and the ordering\nthereof are to be referred to God as their first author.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The wicked angels assail men in two ways. Firstly by\ninstigating them to sin; and thus they are not sent by God to assail\nus, but are sometimes permitted to do so according to God's just\njudgments. But sometimes their assault is a punishment to man: and\nthus they are sent by God; as the lying spirit was sent to punish\nAchab, King of Israel, as is related in 3 Kings 22:20. For punishment\nis referred to God as its first author. Nevertheless the demons who\nare sent to punish, do so with an intention other than that for which\nthey are sent; for they punish from hatred or envy; whereas they are\nsent by God on account of His justice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In order that the conditions of the fight be not\nunequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be\ngained principally through the grace of God, secondarily through the\nguardianship of the angels. Wherefore (4 Kings 6:16), Eliseus said to\nhis servant: \"Fear not, for there are more with us than with them.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The assault of the flesh and the world would suffice\nfor the exercise of human weakness: but it does not suffice for the\ndemon's malice, which makes use of both the above in assailing men.\nBut by the Divine ordinance this tends to the glory of the elect.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 2]\n\nWhether to Tempt Is Proper to the Devil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that to tempt is not proper to the devil.\nFor God is said to tempt, according to Gen. 22:1, \"God tempted\nAbraham.\" Moreover man is tempted by the flesh and the world. Again,\nman is said to tempt God, and to tempt man. Therefore it is not\nproper to the devil to tempt.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to tempt is a sign of ignorance. But the demons know\nwhat happens among men. Therefore the demons do not tempt.\n\nObj. 3: Further, temptation is the road to sin. Now sin dwells in the\nwill. Since therefore the demons cannot change man's will, as appears\nfrom what has been said above (Q. 111, A. 2), it seems that it is not\nin their province to tempt.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Thess. 3:5): \"Lest perhaps he\nthat tempteth should have tempted you\": to which the gloss adds,\n\"that is, the devil, whose office it is to tempt.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ To tempt is, properly speaking, to make trial of\nsomething. Now we make trial of something in order to know something\nabout it: hence the immediate end of every tempter is knowledge. But\nsometimes another end, either good or bad, is sought to be acquired\nthrough that knowledge; a good end, when, for instance, one desires\nto know of someone, what sort of a man he is as to knowledge, or\nvirtue, with a view to his promotion; a bad end, when that knowledge\nis sought with the purpose of deceiving or ruining him.\n\nFrom this we can gather how various beings are said to tempt in\nvarious ways. For man is said to tempt, sometimes indeed merely for\nthe sake of knowing something; and for this reason it is a sin to\ntempt God; for man, being uncertain as it were, presumes to make an\nexperiment of God's power. Sometimes too he tempts in order to help,\nsometimes in order to hurt. The devil, however, always tempts in\norder to hurt by urging man into sin. In this sense it is said to be\nhis proper office to tempt: for thought at times man tempts thus, he\ndoes this as minister of the devil. God is said to tempt that He may\nknow, in the same sense as that is said to know which makes others to\nknow. Hence it is written (Deut. 13:3): \"The Lord your God trieth\nyou, that it may appear whether you love him.\"\n\nThe flesh and the world are said to tempt as the instruments or\nmatter of temptations; inasmuch as one can know what sort of man\nsomeone is, according as he follows or resists the desires of the\nflesh, and according as he despises worldly advantages and adversity:\nof which things the devil also makes use in tempting.\n\nThus the reply to the first objection is clear.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The demons know what happens outwardly among men; but\nthe inward disposition of man God alone knows, Who is the \"weigher of\nspirits\" (Prov. 16:2). It is this disposition that makes man more\nprone to one vice than to another: hence the devil tempts, in order\nto explore this inward disposition of man, so that he may tempt him\nto that vice to which he is most prone.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although a demon cannot change the will, yet, as stated\nabove (Q. 111, A. 3), he can change the inferior powers of man, in a\ncertain degree: by which powers, though the will cannot be forced, it\ncan nevertheless be inclined.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 3]\n\nWhether All Sins Are Due to the Temptation of the Devil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all sins are due to the temptation of\nthe devil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"the multitude of\ndemons is the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others.\"\nAnd Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that \"all malice and all\nuncleanness have been devised by the devil.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, of every sinner can be said what the Lord said of\nthe Jews (John 8:44): \"You are of your father the devil.\" But this\nwas in as far as they sinned through the devil's instigation.\nTherefore every sin is due to the devil's instigation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as angels are deputed to guard men, so demons are\ndeputed to assail men. But every good thing we do is due to the\nsuggestion of the good angels: because the Divine gifts are borne\nto us by the angels. Therefore all the evil we do, is due to the\ninstigation of the devil.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (De Eccl. Dogmat. xlix): \"Not all\nour evil thoughts are stirred up by the devil, but sometimes they\narise from the movement of our free-will.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ One thing can be the cause of another in two ways;\ndirectly and indirectly. Indirectly as when an agent is the cause of\na disposition to a certain effect, it is said to be the occasional\nand indirect cause of that effect: for instance, we might say that he\nwho dries the wood is the cause of the wood burning. In this way we\nmust admit that the devil is the cause of all our sins; because he it\nwas who instigated the first man to sin, from whose sin there\nresulted a proneness to sin in the whole human race: and in this\nsense we must take the words of Damascene and Dionysius.\n\nBut a thing is said to be the direct cause of something, when its\naction tends directly thereunto. And in this way the devil is not the\ncause of every sin: for all sins are not committed at the devil's\ninstigation, but some are due to the free-will and the corruption of\nthe flesh. For, as Origen says (Peri Archon iii), even if there were\nno devil, men would have the desire for food and love and such like\npleasures; with regard to which many disorders may arise unless those\ndesires are curbed by reason, especially if we presuppose the\ncorruption of our natures. Now it is in the power of the free-will to\ncurb this appetite and keep it in order. Consequently there is no need\nfor all sins to be due to the instigation of the devil. But those sins\nwhich are due thereto man perpetrates \"through being deceived by the\nsame blandishments as were our first parents,\" as Isidore says (De\nSummo Bono ii).\n\nThus the answer to the first objection is clear.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When man commits sin without being thereto instigated\nby the devil, he nevertheless becomes a child of the devil thereby,\nin so far as he imitates him who was the first to sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man can of his own accord fall into sin: but he cannot\nadvance in merit without the Divine assistance, which is borne to man\nby the ministry of the angels. For this reason the angels take part\nin all our good works: whereas all our sins are not due to the\ndemons' instigation. Nevertheless there is no kind of sin which is\nnot sometimes due to the demons' suggestion.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Demons Can Lead Men Astray by Means of Real Miracles?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the demons cannot lead men astray by\nmeans of real miracles. For the activity of the demons will show\nitself especially in the works of Antichrist. But as the Apostle says\n(2 Thess. 2:9), his \"coming is according to the working of Satan, in\nall power, and signs, and lying wonders.\" Much more therefore at\nother times do the demons perform lying wonders.\n\nObj. 2: Further, true miracles are wrought by some corporeal change.\nBut demons are unable to change the nature of a body; for Augustine\nsays (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): \"I cannot believe that the human body\ncan receive the limbs of a beast by means of a demon's art or power.\"\nTherefore the demons cannot work real miracles.\n\nObj. 3: Further, an argument is useless which may prove both ways. If\ntherefore real miracles can be wrought by demons, to persuade one of\nwhat is false, they will be useless to confirm the teaching of the\nfaith. This is unfitting; for it is written (Mk. 16:20): \"The Lord\nworking withal, and confirming the word with signs that followed.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Q. 83) [*Lib. xxi, Sent. sent 4,\namong the supposititious works of St. Augustine]: \"Often by means of\nthe magic art miracles are wrought like those which are wrought by\nthe servants of God.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been said above (Q. 110,\nA. 4), if we take a miracle in the strict sense, the demons cannot\nwork miracles, nor can any creature, but God alone: since in the\nstrict sense a miracle is something done outside the order of the\nentire created nature, under which order every power of a creature is\ncontained. But sometimes miracle may be taken in a wide sense, for\nwhatever exceeds the human power and experience. And thus demons can\nwork miracles, that is, things which rouse man's astonishment, by\nreason of their being beyond his power and outside his sphere of\nknowledge. For even a man by doing what is beyond the power and\nknowledge of another, leads him to marvel at what he has done, so\nthat in a way he seems to that man to have worked a miracle.\n\nIt is to be noted, however, that although these works of demons which\nappear marvelous to us are not real miracles, they are sometimes\nnevertheless something real. Thus the magicians of Pharaoh by the\ndemons' power produced real serpents and frogs. And \"when fire came\ndown from heaven and at one blow consumed Job's servants and sheep;\nwhen the storm struck down his house and with it his children--these\nwere the work of Satan, not phantoms\"; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei\nxx, 19).\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says in the same place, the works of\nAntichrist may be called lying wonders, \"either because he will\ndeceive men's senses by means of phantoms, so that he will not really\ndo what he will seem to do; or because, if he work real prodigies,\nthey will lead those into falsehood who believe in him.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: As we have said above (Q. 110, A. 2), corporeal matter\ndoes not obey either good or bad angels at their will, so that demons\nbe able by their power to transmute matter from one form to another;\nbut they can employ certain seeds that exist in the elements of the\nworld, in order to produce these effects, as Augustine says (De Trin.\niii, 8, 9). Therefore it must be admitted that all the transformation\nof corporeal things which can be produced by certain natural powers,\nto which we must assign the seeds above mentioned, can alike be\nproduced by the operation of the demons, by the employment of these\nseeds; such as the transformation of certain things into serpents or\nfrogs, which can be produced by putrefaction. On the contrary, those\ntransformations which cannot be produced by the power of nature,\ncannot in reality be effected by the operation of the demons; for\ninstance, that the human body be changed into the body of a beast, or\nthat the body of a dead man return to life. And if at times something\nof this sort seems to be effected by the operation of demons, it is\nnot real but a mere semblance of reality.\n\nNow this may happen in two ways. Firstly, from within; in this way a\ndemon can work on man's imagination and even on his corporeal senses,\nso that something seems otherwise that it is, as explained above (Q.\n111, AA. 3,4). It is said indeed that this can be done sometimes by\nthe power of certain bodies. Secondly, from without: for just as he\ncan from the air form a body of any form and shape, and assume it so\nas to appear in it visibly: so, in the same way he can clothe any\ncorporeal thing with any corporeal form, so as to appear therein.\nThis is what Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xviii, 18): \"Man's\nimagination, which whether thinking or dreaming, takes the forms of\nan innumerable number of things, appears to other men's senses, as\nit were embodied in the semblance of some animal.\" This not to be\nunderstood as though the imagination itself or the images formed\ntherein were identified with that which appears embodied to the\nsenses of another man: but that the demon, who forms an image in a\nman's imagination, can offer the same picture to another man's\nsenses.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 79): \"When magicians do\nwhat holy men do, they do it for a different end and by a different\nright. The former do it for their own glory; the latter, for the\nglory of God: the former, by certain private compacts; the latter by\nthe evident assistance and command of God, to Whom every creature is\nsubject.\"\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 114, Art. 5]\n\nWhether a Demon Who Is Overcome by Man, Is for This Reason Hindered\nfrom Making Further Assaults?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a demon who is overcome by a man, is\nnot for that reason hindered from any further assault. For Christ\novercame the tempter most effectively. Yet afterwards the demon\nassailed Him by instigating the Jews to kill Him. Therefore it is\nnot true that the devil when conquered ceases his assaults.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to inflict punishment on one who has been worsted\nin a fight, is to incite him to a sharper attack. But this is not\nbefitting God's mercy. Therefore the conquered demons are not\nprevented from further assaults.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 4:11): \"Then the devil left\nHim,\" i.e. Christ Who overcame.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some say that when once a demon has been overcome he\ncan no more tempt any man at all, neither to the same nor to any\nother sin. And others say that he can tempt others, but not the same\nman. This seems more probable as long as we understand it to be so\nfor a certain definite time: wherefore (Luke 4:13) it is written:\n\"All temptation being ended, the devil departed from Him for a time.\"\nThere are two reasons for this. One is on the part of God's clemency;\nfor as Chrysostom says (Super Matt. Hom. v) [*In the Opus\nImperfectum, among his supposititious works], \"the devil does not\ntempt man for just as long as he likes, but for as long as God\nallows; for although He allows him to tempt for a short time, He\norders him off on account of our weakness.\" The other reason is taken\nfrom the astuteness of the devil. As to this, Ambrose says on Luke\n4:13: \"The devil is afraid of persisting, because he shrinks from\nfrequent defeat.\" That the devil does nevertheless sometimes return\nto the assault, is apparent from Matt. 12:44: \"I will return into my\nhouse from whence I came out.\"\n\nFrom what has been said, the objections can easily be solved.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 115\n\nOF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and\nfate, which is ascribed to certain bodies. Concerning corporeal\nactions there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether a body can be active?\n\n(2) Whether there exist in bodies certain seminal virtues?\n\n(3) Whether the heavenly bodies are the causes of what is done here\nby the inferior bodies?\n\n(4) Whether they are the cause of human acts?\n\n(5) Whether demons are subject to their influence?\n\n(6) Whether the heavenly bodies impose necessity on those things\nwhich are subject to their influence?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 1]\n\nWhether a Body Can Be Active?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no bodies are active. For Augustine\nsays (De Civ. Dei v, 9): \"There are things that are acted upon, but\ndo not act; such are bodies: there is one Who acts but is not acted\nupon; this is God: there are things that both act and are acted upon;\nthese are the spiritual substances.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, every agent except the first agent requires in its\nwork a subject susceptible of its action. But there is not substance\nbelow the corporeal substance which can be susceptible of the\nlatter's action; since it belongs to the lowest degree of beings.\nTherefore corporeal substance is not active.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every corporeal substance is limited by quantity.\nBut quantity hinders substance from movement and action, because it\nsurrounds it and penetrates it: just as a cloud hinders the air from\nreceiving light. A proof of this is that the more a body increases in\nquantity, the heavier it is and the more difficult to move. Therefore\nno corporeal substance is active.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the power of action in every agent is according to\nits propinquity to the first active cause. But bodies, being most\ncomposite, are most remote from the first active cause, which is most\nsimple. Therefore no bodies are active.\n\nObj. 5: Further, if a body is an agent, the term of its action is\neither a substantial, or an accidental form. But it is not a\nsubstantial form; for it is not possible to find in a body any\nprinciple of action, save an active quality, which is an accident;\nand an accident cannot be the cause of a substantial form, since the\ncause is always more excellent than the effect. Likewise, neither is\nit an accidental form, for \"an accident does not extend beyond its\nsubject,\" as Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 4). Therefore no bodies are\nactive.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. xv) that among other\nqualities of corporeal fire, \"it shows its greatness in its action\nand power on that of which it lays hold.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is apparent to the senses that some bodies are\nactive. But concerning the action of bodies there have been three\nerrors. For some denied all action to bodies. This is the opinion of\nAvicebron in his book on _The Fount of Life,_ where, by the arguments\nmentioned above, he endeavors to prove that no bodies act, but that\nall the actions which seem to be the actions of bodies, are the\nactions of some spiritual power that penetrates all bodies: so that,\naccording to him, it is not fire that heats, but a spiritual power\nwhich penetrates, by means of the fire. And this opinion seems to be\nderived from that of Plato. For Plato held that all forms existing in\ncorporeal matter are participated thereby, and determined and limited\nthereto; and that separate forms are absolute and as it were\nuniversal; wherefore he said that these separate forms are the causes\nof forms that exist in matter. Therefore inasmuch as the form which\nis in corporeal matter is determined to this matter individualized by\nquantity, Avicebron held that the corporeal form is held back and\nimprisoned by quantity, as the principle of individuality, so as to\nbe unable by action to extend to any other matter: and that the\nspiritual and immaterial form alone, which is not hedged in by\nquantity, can issue forth by acting on something else.\n\nBut this does not prove that the corporeal form is not an agent, but\nthat it is not a universal agent. For in proportion as a thing is\nparticipated, so, of necessity, must that be participated which is\nproper thereto; thus in proportion to the participation of light is\nthe participation of visibility. But to act, which is nothing else\nthan to make something to be in act, is essentially proper to an act\nas such; wherefore every agent produces its like. So therefore to the\nfact of its being a form not determined by matter subject to\nquantity, a thing owes its being an agent indeterminate and\nuniversal: but to the fact that it is determined to this matter, it\nowes its being an agent limited and particular. Wherefore if the form\nof fire were separate, as the Platonists supposed, it would be, in a\nfashion, the cause of every ignition. But this form of fire which is\nin this corporeal matter, is the cause of this ignition which passes\nfrom this body to that. Hence such an action is effected by the\ncontact of two bodies.\n\nBut this opinion of Avicebron goes further than that of Plato. For\nPlato held only substantial forms to be separate; while he referred\naccidents to the material principles which are \"the great\" and \"the\nsmall,\" which he considered to be the first contraries, by others\nconsidered to the \"the rare\" and \"the dense.\" Consequently both\nPlato and Avicenna, who follows him to a certain extent, held that\ncorporeal agents act through their accidental forms, by disposing\nmatter for the substantial form; but that the ultimate perfection\nattained by the introduction of the substantial form is due to an\nimmaterial principle. And this is the second opinion concerning the\naction of bodies; of which we have spoken above when treating of\nthe creation (Q. 45, A. 8).\n\nThe third opinion is that of Democritus, who held that action takes\nplace through the issue of atoms from the corporeal agent, while\npassion consists in the reception of the atoms in the pores of the\npassive body. This opinion is disproved by Aristotle (De Gener. i, 8,\n9). For it would follow that a body would not be passive as a whole,\nand the quantity of the active body would be diminished through its\naction; which things are manifestly untrue.\n\nWe must therefore say that a body acts forasmuch as it is in act, on\na body forasmuch as it is in potentiality.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This passage of Augustine is to be understood of the\nwhole corporeal nature considered as a whole, which thus has no\nnature inferior to it, on which it can act; as the spiritual nature\nacts on the corporeal, and the uncreated nature on the created.\nNevertheless one body is inferior to another, forasmuch as it is in\npotentiality to that which the other has in act.\n\nFrom this follows the solution of the second objection. But it must\nbe observed, when Avicebron argues thus, \"There is a mover who is not\nmoved, to wit, the first maker of all; therefore, on the other hand,\nthere exists something moved which is purely passive,\" that this is\nto be conceded. But this latter is primary matter, which is a pure\npotentiality, just as God is pure act. Now a body is composed of\npotentiality and act; and therefore it is both active and passive.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Quantity does not entirely hinder the corporeal form\nfrom action, as stated above; but from being a universal agent,\nforasmuch as a form is individualized through being in matter subject\nto quantity. The proof taken from the weight of bodies is not to the\npurpose. First, because addition of quantity does not cause weight;\nas is proved (De Coelo et Mundo iv, 2). Secondly, it is false that\nweight retards movement; on the contrary, the heavier a thing, the\ngreater its movement, if we consider the movement proper thereto.\nThirdly, because action is not effected by local movement, as\nDemocritus held: but by something being reduced from potentiality to\nact.\n\nReply Obj. 4: A body is not that which is most distant from God; for\nit participates something of a likeness to the Divine Being,\nforasmuch as it has a form. That which is most distant from God is\nprimary matter; which is in no way active, since it is a pure\npotentiality.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The term of a body's action is both an accidental form\nand a substantial form. For the active quality, such as heat,\nalthough itself an accident, acts nevertheless by virtue of the\nsubstantial form, as its instrument: wherefore its action can\nterminate in a substantial form; thus natural heat, as the instrument\nof the soul, has an action terminating in the generation of flesh.\nBut by its own virtue it produces an accident. Nor is it against the\nnature of an accident to surpass its subject in acting, but it is to\nsurpass it in being; unless indeed one were to imagine that an\naccident transfers its identical self from the agent to the patient;\nthus Democritus explained action by an issue of atoms.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Are Any Seminal Virtues in Corporeal Matter?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are no seminal virtues in\ncorporeal matter. For virtue (_ratio_) implies something of a\nspiritual order. But in corporeal matter nothing exists spiritually,\nbut only materially, that is, according to the mode of that in which\nit is. Therefore there are no seminal virtues in corporeal matter.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine (De Trin. iii, 8, 9) says that demons\nproduce certain results by employing with a hidden movement certain\nseeds, which they know to exist in matter. But bodies, not virtues,\ncan be employed with local movement. Therefore it is unreasonable to\nsay that there are seminal virtues in corporeal matter.\n\nObj. 3: Further, seeds are active principles. But there are no active\nprinciples in corporeal matter; since, as we have said above, matter\nis not competent to act (A. 1, ad 2, 4). Therefore there are no\nseminal virtues in corporeal matter.\n\nObj. 4: Further, there are said to be certain \"causal virtues\"\n(Augustine, De Gen. ad lit. v, 4) which seem to suffice for the\nproduction of things. But seminal virtues are not causal virtues: for\nmiracles are outside the scope of seminal virtues, but not of causal\nvirtues. Therefore it is unreasonable to say that there are seminal\nvirtues in corporeal matter.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): \"Of all the\nthings which are generated in a corporeal and visible fashion,\ncertain seeds lie hidden in the corporeal things of this world.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is customary to name things after what is more\nperfect, as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4). Now in the whole\ncorporeal nature, living bodies are the most perfect: wherefore the\nword \"nature\" has been transferred from living things to all natural\nthings. For the word itself, \"nature,\" as the Philosopher says\n(Metaph. v, Did. iv, 4), was first applied to signify the generation\nof living things, which is called \"nativity\": and because living\nthings are generated from a principle united to them, as fruit from a\ntree, and the offspring from the mother, to whom it is united,\nconsequently the word \"nature\" has been applied to every principle of\nmovement existing in that which is moved. Now it is manifest that the\nactive and passive principles of the generation of living things are\nthe seeds from which living things are generated. Therefore Augustine\nfittingly gave the name of \"seminal virtues\" [seminales rationes] to\nall those active and passive virtues which are the principles of\nnatural generation and movement.\n\nThese active and passive virtues may be considered in several orders.\nFor in the first place, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. vi, 10), they\nare principally and originally in the Word of God, as _typal ideas._\nSecondly, they are in the elements of the world, where they were\nproduced altogether at the beginning, as in _universal causes._\nThirdly, they are in those things which, in the succession of time,\nare produced by universal causes, for instance in this plant, and in\nthat animal, as in _particular causes._ Fourthly, they are in the\n_seeds_ produced from animals and plants. And these again are compared\nto further particular effects, as the primordial universal causes to\nthe first effects produced.\n\nReply Obj. 1: These active and passive virtues of natural things,\nthough not called \"virtues\" (rationes) by reason of their being in\ncorporeal matter, can nevertheless be so called in respect of their\norigin, forasmuch as they are the effect of the typal ideas [rationes\nideales].\n\nReply Obj. 2: These active and passive virtues are in certain parts\nof corporeal things: and when they are employed with local movement\nfor the production of certain results, we speak of the demons as\nemploying seeds.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The seed of the male is the active principle in the\ngeneration of an animal. But that can be called seed also which the\nfemale contributes as the passive principle. And thus the word \"seed\"\ncovers both active and passive principles.\n\nReply Obj. 4: From the words of Augustine when speaking of these\nseminal virtues, it is easy to gather that they are also causal\nvirtues, just as seed is a kind of cause: for he says (De Trin. iii,\n9) that, \"as a mother is pregnant with the unborn offspring, so is\nthe world itself pregnant with the causes of unborn things.\"\nNevertheless, the \"typal ideas\" can be called \"causal virtues,\" but\nnot, strictly speaking, \"seminal virtues,\" because seed is not a\nseparate principle; and because miracles are not wrought outside the\nscope of causal virtues. Likewise neither are miracles wrought\noutside the scope of the passive virtues so implanted in the\ncreature, that the latter can be used to any purpose that God\ncommands. But miracles are said to be wrought outside the scope of\nthe natural active virtues, and the passive potentialities which are\nordered to such active virtues, and this is what is meant when we\nsay that they are wrought outside the scope of seminal virtues.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Heavenly Bodies Are the Cause of What Is Produced in\nBodies Here Below?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are not the cause\nof what is produced in bodies here below. For Damascene says (De Fide\nOrth. ii, 7): \"We say that they\"--namely, the heavenly bodies--\"are\nnot the cause of generation or corruption: they are rather signs of\nstorms and atmospheric changes.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter\nsuffice. But in things here below there is passive matter; and there\nare contrary agents--heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the\nproduction of things here below, there is no need to ascribe\ncausality to the heavenly bodies.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the agent produces its like. Now it is to be\nobserved that everything which is produced here below is produced\nthrough the action of heat and cold, moisture and dryness, and other\nsuch qualities, which do not exist in heavenly bodies. Therefore the\nheavenly bodies are not the cause of what is produced here below.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 6): \"Nothing is more\ncorporeal than sex.\" But sex is not caused by the heavenly bodies: a\nsign of this is that of twins born under the same constellation, one\nmay be male, the other female. Therefore the heavenly bodies are not\nthe cause of things produced in bodies here below.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 4): \"Bodies of a\ngrosser and inferior nature are ruled in a certain order by those of\na more subtle and powerful nature.\" And Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) says\nthat \"the light of the sun conduces to the generation of sensible\nbodies, moves them to life, gives them nourishment, growth, and\nperfection.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since every multitude proceeds from unity; and since\nwhat is immovable is always in the same way of being, whereas what is\nmoved has many ways of being: it must be observed that throughout the\nwhole of nature, all movement proceeds from the immovable. Therefore\nthe more immovable certain things are, the more are they the cause of\nthose things which are most movable. Now the heavenly bodies are of\nall bodies the most immovable, for they are not moved save locally.\nTherefore the movements of bodies here below, which are various and\nmultiform, must be referred to the movement of the heavenly bodies,\nas to their cause.\n\nReply Obj. 1: These words of Damascene are to be understood as\ndenying that the heavenly bodies are the first cause of generation\nand corruption here below; for this was affirmed by those who held\nthat the heavenly bodies are gods.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The active principles of bodies here below are only the\nactive qualities of the elements, such as hot and cold and the like.\nIf therefore the substantial forms of inferior bodies were not\ndiversified save according to accidents of that kind, the principles\nof which the early natural philosophers held to be the \"rare\" and the\n\"dense\"; there would be no need to suppose some principle above these\ninferior bodies, for they would be of themselves sufficient to act.\nBut to anyone who considers the matter aright, it is clear that those\naccidents are merely material dispositions in regard to the\nsubstantial forms of natural bodies. Now matter is not of itself\nsufficient to act. And therefore it is necessary to suppose some\nactive principle above these material dispositions.\n\nThis is why the Platonists maintained the existence of separate\nspecies, by participation of which the inferior bodies receive their\nsubstantial forms. But this does not seem enough. For the separate\nspecies, since they are supposed to be immovable, would always have\nthe same mode of being: and consequently there would be no variety in\nthe generation and corruption of inferior bodies: which is clearly\nfalse.\n\nTherefore it is necessary, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. ii, 10),\nto suppose a movable principle, which by reason of its presence or\nabsence causes variety in the generation and corruption of inferior\nbodies. Such are the heavenly bodies. Consequently whatever generates\nhere below, moves to the production of the species, as the instrument\nof a heavenly body: thus the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2) that \"man\nand the sun generate man.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The heavenly bodies have not a specific likeness to the\nbodies here below. Their likeness consists in this, that by reason of\ntheir universal power, whatever is generated in inferior bodies, is\ncontained in them. In this way also we say that all things are like\nGod.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The actions of heavenly bodies are variously received\nin inferior bodies, according to the various dispositions of matter.\nNow it happens at times that the matter in the human conception is\nnot wholly disposed to the male sex; wherefore it is formed sometimes\ninto a male, sometimes into a female. Augustine quotes this as an\nargument against divination by stars: because the effects of the\nstars are varied even in corporeal things, according to the various\ndispositions of matter.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Heavenly Bodies Are the Cause of Human Actions?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the heavenly bodies are the cause of\nhuman actions. For since the heavenly bodies are moved by spiritual\nsubstances, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 3), they act by virtue\nthereof as their instruments. But those spiritual substances are\nsuperior to our souls. Therefore it seems that they can cause\nimpressions on our souls, and thereby cause human actions.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every multiform is reducible to a uniform principle.\nBut human actions are various and multiform. Therefore it seems that\nthey are reducible to the uniform movements of heavenly bodies, as to\ntheir principles.\n\nObj. 3: Further, astrologers often foretell the truth concerning the\noutcome of wars, and other human actions, of which the intellect and\nwill are the principles. But they could not do this by means of the\nheavenly bodies, unless these were the cause of human actions.\nTherefore the heavenly bodies are the cause of human actions.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that \"the\nheavenly bodies are by no means the cause of human actions.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The heavenly bodies can directly and of themselves\nact on bodies, as stated above (A. 3). They can act directly indeed\non those powers of the soul which are the acts of corporeal organs,\nbut accidentally: because the acts of such powers must needs be\nhindered by obstacles in the organs; thus an eye when disturbed cannot\nsee well. Wherefore if the intellect and will were powers affixed to\ncorporeal organs, as some maintained, holding that intellect does not\ndiffer from sense; it would follow of necessity that the heavenly\nbodies are the cause of human choice and action. It would also follow\nthat man is led by natural instinct to his actions, just as other\nanimals, in which there are powers other than those which are affixed\nto corporeal organs: for whatever is done here below in virtue of the\naction of heavenly bodies, is done naturally. It would therefore\nfollow that man has no free-will, and that he would have determinate\nactions, like other natural things. All of which is manifestly false,\nand contrary to human habit. It must be observed, however, that\nindirectly and accidentally, the impressions of heavenly bodies can\nreach the intellect and will, forasmuch, namely, as both intellect and\nwill receive something from the inferior powers which are affixed to\ncorporeal organs. But in this the intellect and will are differently\nsituated. For the intellect, of necessity, receives from the inferior\napprehensive powers: wherefore if the imaginative, cogitative, or\nmemorative powers be disturbed, the action of the intellect is, of\nnecessity, disturbed also. The will, on the contrary, does not, of\nnecessity, follow the inclination of the inferior appetite; for\nalthough the passions in the irascible and concupiscible have a\ncertain force in inclining the will; nevertheless the will retains\nthe power of following the passions or repressing them. Therefore the\nimpressions of the heavenly bodies, by virtue of which the inferior\npowers can be changed, has less influence on the will, which is the\nproximate cause of human actions, than on the intellect.\n\nTo maintain therefore that heavenly bodies are the cause of human\nactions is proper to those who hold that intellect does not differ\nfrom sense. Wherefore some of these said that \"such is the will of\nmen, as is the day which the father of men and of gods brings on\"\n(Odyssey xviii 135). Since, therefore, it is manifest that intellect\nand will are not acts of corporeal organs, it is impossible that\nheavenly bodies be the cause of human actions.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The spiritual substances, that move the heavenly\nbodies, do indeed act on corporeal things by means of the heavenly\nbodies; but they act immediately on the human intellect by\nenlightening it. On the other hand, they cannot compel the will,\nas stated above (Q. 111, A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as the multiformity of corporeal movements is\nreducible to the uniformity of the heavenly movement as to its cause:\nso the multiformity of actions proceeding from the intellect and the\nwill is reduced to a uniform principle which is the Divine intellect\nand will.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The majority of men follow their passions, which are\nmovements of the sensitive appetite, in which movements of the\nheavenly bodies can cooperate: but few are wise enough to resist\nthese passions. Consequently astrologers are able to foretell the\ntruth in the majority of cases, especially in a general way. But not\nin particular cases; for nothing prevents man resisting his passions\nby his free-will. Wherefore the astrologers themselves are wont to\nsay that \"the wise man is stronger than the stars\" [*Ptolemy,\nCentiloquium, prop. 5], forasmuch as, to wit, he conquers his passions.\n_______________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Heavenly Bodies Can Act on the Demons?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies can act on the demons.\nFor the demons, according to certain phases of the moon, can harass\nmen, who on that account are called lunatics, as appears from Matt.\n4:24 and 17:14. But this would not be if they were not subject to the\nheavenly bodies. Therefore the demons are subject to them.\n\nObj. 2: Further, necromancers observe certain constellations in order\nto invoke the demons. But these would not be invoked through the\nheavenly bodies unless they were subject to them. Therefore they are\nsubject to them.\n\nObj. 3: Further, heavenly bodies are more powerful than inferior\nbodies. But the demons are confined to certain inferior bodies,\nnamely, \"herbs, stones, animals, and to certain sounds and words,\nforms and figures,\" as Porphyry says, quoted by Augustine (De Civ.\nDei x, 11). Much more therefore are the demons subject to the action\nof heavenly bodies.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The demons are superior in the order of nature, to\nthe heavenly bodies. But the \"agent is superior to the patient,\" as\nAugustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). Therefore the demons are not\nsubject to the action of heavenly bodies.\n\n_I answer that,_ There have been three opinions about the demons. In\nthe first place the Peripatetics denied the existence of demons; and\nheld that what is ascribed to the demons, according to the\nnecromantic art, is effected by the power of the heavenly bodies.\nThis is what Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) relates as having been\nheld by Porphyry, namely, that \"on earth men fabricate certain powers\nuseful in producing certain effects of the stars.\" But this opinion\nis manifestly false. For we know by experience that many things are\ndone by demons, for which the power of heavenly bodies would in no\nway suffice: for instance, that a man in a state of delirium should\nspeak an unknown tongue, recite poetry and authors of whom he has no\nprevious knowledge; that necromancers make statues to speak and move,\nand other like things.\n\nFor this reason the Platonists were led to hold that demons are\n\"animals with an aerial body and a passive soul,\" as Apuleius says,\nquoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei viii, 16). And this is the second of\nthe opinions mentioned above: according to which it could be said\nthat demons are subject to heavenly bodies in the same way as we have\nsaid man is subject thereto (A. 4). But this opinion is proved to be\nfalse from what we have said above (Q. 51, A. 1): for we hold that\ndemons are spiritual substances not united to bodies. Hence it is\nclear that they are subject to the action of heavenly bodies neither\nessentially nor accidentally, neither directly nor indirectly.\n\nReply Obj. 1: That demons harass men, according to certain phases\nof the moon, happens in two ways. Firstly, they do so in order to\n\"defame God's creature,\" namely, the moon; as Jerome (In Matt. iv,\n24) and Chrysostom (Hom. lvii in Matt.) say. Secondly, because as\nthey are unable to effect anything save by means of the natural\nforces, as stated above (Q. 114, A. 4, ad 2) they take into account\nthe aptitude of bodies for the intended result. Now it is manifest\nthat \"the brain is the most moist of all the parts of the body,\" as\nAristotle says [*De Part. Animal. ii, 7: De Sens. et Sensato ii: De\nSomn. et Vigil. iii]: wherefore it is the most subject to the action\nof the moon, the property of which is to move what is moist. And it\nis precisely in the brain that animal forces culminate: wherefore\nthe demons, according to certain phases of the moon, disturb man's\nimagination, when they observe that the brain is thereto disposed.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Demons when summoned through certain constellations,\ncome for two reasons. Firstly, in order to lead man into the error\nof believing that there is some Divine power in the stars. Secondly,\nbecause they consider that under certain constellations corporeal\nmatter is better disposed for the result for which they are summoned.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 6), the \"demons are\nenticed through various kinds of stones, herbs, trees, animals,\nsongs, rites, not as an animal is enticed by food, but as a spirit by\nsigns\"; that is to say, forasmuch as these things are offered to them\nin token of the honor due to God, of which they are covetous.\n_______________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 115, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Heavenly Bodies Impose Necessity on Things Subject to Their\nAction?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that heavenly bodies impose necessity on\nthings subject to their action. For given a sufficient cause, the\neffect follows of necessity. But heavenly bodies are a sufficient\ncause of their effects. Since, therefore, heavenly bodies, with their\nmovements and dispositions, are necessary beings; it seems that their\neffects follow of necessity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an agent's effect results of necessity in matter,\nwhen the power of the agent is such that it can subject the matter to\nitself entirely. But the entire matter of inferior bodies is subject\nto the power of heavenly bodies, since this is a higher power than\ntheirs. Therefore the effect of the heavenly bodies is of necessity\nreceived in corporeal matter.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the effect of the heavenly body does not follow\nof necessity, this is due to some hindering cause. But any corporeal\ncause, that might possibly hinder the effect of a heavenly body, must\nof necessity be reducible to some heavenly principle: since the\nheavenly bodies are the causes of all that takes place here below.\nTherefore, since also that heavenly principle is necessary, it\nfollows that the effect of the heavenly body is necessarily hindered.\nConsequently it would follow that all that takes place here below\nhappens of necessity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Somn. et Vigil. [*De\nDivin. per Somn. ii]): \"It is not incongruous that many of the signs\nobserved in bodies, of occurrences in the heavens, such as rain and\nwind, should not be fulfilled.\" Therefore not all the effects of\nheavenly bodies take place of necessity.\n\n_I answer that,_ This question is partly solved by what was said\nabove (A. 4); and in part presents some difficulty. For it was shown\nthat although the action of heavenly bodies produces certain\ninclinations in corporeal nature, the will nevertheless does not of\nnecessity follow these inclinations. Therefore there is nothing to\nprevent the effect of heavenly bodies being hindered by the action of\nthe will, not only in man himself, but also in other things to which\nhuman action extends.\n\nBut in natural things there is no such principle, endowed with\nfreedom to follow or not to follow the impressions produced by\nheavenly agents. Wherefore it seems that in such things at least,\neverything happens of necessity; according to the reasoning of some\nof the ancients who supposing that everything that is, has a cause;\nand that, given the cause, the effect follows of necessity; concluded\nthat all things happen of necessity. This opinion is refuted by\nAristotle (Metaph. vi, Did. v, 3) as to this double supposition.\n\nFor in the first place it is not true that, given any cause whatever,\nthe effect must follow of necessity. For some causes are so ordered\nto their effects, as to produce them, not of necessity, but in the\nmajority of cases, and in the minority to fail in producing them. But\nthat such causes do fail in the minority of cases is due to some\nhindering cause; consequently the above-mentioned difficulty seems\nnot to be avoided, since the cause in question is hindered of\nnecessity.\n\nTherefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is\na being _per se,_ has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a\ncause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one.\nFor (that a thing is) \"white\" has a cause, likewise (that a man is)\n\"musical\" has not a cause, but (that a being is) \"white-musical\" has\nnot a cause, because it is not truly a being, nor truly one. Now it\nis manifest that a cause which hinders the action of a cause so\nordered to its effect as to produce it in the majority of cases,\nclashes sometimes with this cause by accident: and the clashing of\nthese two causes, inasmuch as it is accidental, has no cause.\nConsequently what results from this clashing of causes is not to be\nreduced to a further pre-existing cause, from which it follows of\nnecessity. For instance, that some terrestrial body take fire in the\nhigher regions of the air and fall to the earth, is caused by some\nheavenly power: again, that there be on the surface of the earth some\ncombustible matter, is reducible to some heavenly principle. But that\nthe burning body should alight on this matter and set fire to it, is\nnot caused by a heavenly body, but is accidental. Consequently not\nall the effects of heavenly bodies result of necessity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The heavenly bodies are causes of effects that take\nplace here below, through the means of particular inferior causes,\nwhich can fail in their effects in the minority of cases.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The power of a heavenly body is not infinite. Wherefore\nit requires a determinate disposition in matter, both as to local\ndistance and as to other conditions, in order to produce its effect.\nTherefore as local distance hinders the effect of a heavenly body\n(for the sun has not the same effect in heat in Dacia as in\nEthiopia); so the grossness of matter, its low or high temperature or\nother such disposition, can hinder the effect of a heavenly body.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the cause that hinders the effect of another\ncause can be reduced to a heavenly body as its cause; nevertheless\nthe clashing of two causes, being accidental, is not reduced to the\ncausality of a heavenly body, as stated above.\n_______________________\n\nON FATE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe come now to the consideration of fate. Under this head there are\nfour points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Is there such a thing as fate?\n\n(2) Where is it?\n\n(3) Is it unchangeable?\n\n(4) Are all things subject to fate?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Be Such a Thing As Fate?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fate is nothing. For Gregory says in a\nhomily for the Epiphany (Hom. x in Evang.): \"Far be it from the hearts\nof the faithful to think that fate is anything real.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, what happens by fate is not unforeseen, for as\nAugustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 4), \"fate is understood to be derived\nfrom the verb 'fari' which means to speak\"; as though things were said\nto happen by fate, which are \"fore-spoken\" by one who decrees them to\nhappen. Now what is foreseen is neither lucky nor chance-like. If\ntherefore things happen by fate, there will be neither luck nor chance\nin the world.\n\n_On the contrary,_ What does not exist cannot be defined. But Boethius\n(De Consol. iv) defines fate thus: \"Fate is a disposition inherent to\nchangeable things, by which Providence connects each one with its\nproper order.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In this world some things seem to happen by luck or\nchance. Now it happens sometimes that something is lucky or\nchance-like as compared to inferior causes, which, if compared to some\nhigher cause, is directly intended. For instance, if two servants are\nsent by their master to the same place; the meeting of the two\nservants in regard to themselves is by chance; but as compared to the\nmaster, who had ordered it, it is directly intended.\n\nSo there were some who refused to refer to a higher cause such events\nwhich by luck or chance take place here below. These denied the\nexistence of fate and Providence, as Augustine relates of Tully (De\nCiv. Dei v, 9). And this is contrary to what we have said above about\nProvidence (Q. 22, A. 2).\n\nOn the other hand, some have considered that everything that takes\nplace here below by luck or by chance, whether in natural things or\nin human affairs, is to be reduced to a superior cause, namely, the\nheavenly bodies. According to these fate is nothing else than \"a\ndisposition of the stars under which each one is begotten or born\"\n[*Cf. St. Augustine , loc. cit., v, 1, 8, 9]. But this will not hold.\nFirst, as to human affairs: because we have proved above (Q. 115, A.\n4) that human actions are not subject to the action of heavenly\nbodies, save accidentally and indirectly. Now the cause of fate,\nsince it has the ordering of things that happen by fate, must of\nnecessity be directly and of itself the cause of what takes place.\nSecondly, as to all things that happen accidentally: for it has been\nsaid (Q. 115, A. 6) that what is accidental, is properly speaking\nneither a being, nor a unity. But every action of nature terminates\nin some one thing. Wherefore it is impossible for that which is\naccidental to be the proper effect of an active natural principle. No\nnatural cause can therefore have for its proper effect that a man\nintending to dig a grave finds a treasure. Now it is manifest that a\nacts after the manner of a natural principle: wherefore its effects\nin this world are natural. It is therefore impossible that any active\npower of a heavenly body be the cause of what happens by accident\nhere below, whether by luck or by chance.\n\nWe must therefore say that what happens here by accident, both in\nnatural things and in human affairs, is reduced to a preordaining\ncause, which is Divine Providence. For nothing hinders that which\nhappens by accident being considered as one by an intellect:\notherwise the intellect could not form this proposition: \"The digger\nof a grave found a treasure.\" And just as an intellect can apprehend\nthis so can it effect it; for instance, someone who knows a place\nwhere a treasure is hidden, might instigate a rustic, ignorant of\nthis, to dig a grave there. Consequently, nothing hinders what\nhappens here by accident, by luck or by chance, being reduced to some\nordering cause which acts by the intellect, especially the Divine\nintellect. For God alone can change the will, as shown above (Q. 105,\nA. 4). Consequently the ordering of human actions, the principle of\nwhich is the will, must be ascribed to God alone.\n\nSo therefore inasmuch as all that happens here below is subject to\nDivine Providence, as being pre-ordained, and as it were\n\"fore-spoken,\" we can admit the existence of fate: although the holy\ndoctors avoided the use of this word, on account of those who twisted\nits application to a certain force in the position of the stars.\nHence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1): \"If anyone ascribes human\naffairs to fate, meaning thereby the will or power of God, let him\nkeep to his opinion, but hold his tongue.\" For this reason Gregory\ndenies the existence of fate: wherefore the first objection's\nsolution is manifest.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders certain things happening by luck or by\nchance, if compared to their proximate causes: but not if compared to\nDivine Providence, whereby \"nothing happens at random in the world,\"\nas Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 24).\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Fate Is in Created Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fate is not in created things. For\nAugustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that the \"Divine will or power is\ncalled fate.\" But the Divine will or power is not in creatures, but\nin God. Therefore fate is not in creatures but in God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, fate is compared to things that happen by fate, as\ntheir cause; as the very use of the word proves. But the universal\ncause that of itself effects what takes place by accident here below,\nis God alone, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore fate is in God, and\nnot in creatures.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if fate is in creatures, it is either a substance or\nan accident: and whichever it is it must be multiplied according to\nthe number of creatures. Since, therefore, fate seems to be one thing\nonly, it seems that fate is not in creatures, but in God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv): \"Fate is a\ndisposition inherent to changeable things.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been stated above (Q. 22,\nA. 3; Q. 103, A. 6), Divine Providence produces effects through\nmediate causes. We can therefore consider the ordering of the effects\nin two ways. Firstly, as being in God Himself: and thus the ordering\nof the effects is called Providence. But if we consider this ordering\nas being in the mediate causes ordered by God to the production of\ncertain effects, thus it has the nature of fate. This is what\nBoethius says (De Consol. iv): \"Fate is worked out when Divine\nProvidence is served by certain spirits; whether by the soul, or by\nall nature itself which obeys Him, whether by the heavenly movements\nof the stars, whether by the angelic power, or by the ingenuity of\nthe demons, whether by some of these, or by all, the chain of fate is\nforged.\" Of each of these things we have spoken above (A. 1; Q. 104,\nA. 2; Q. 110, A. 1; Q. 113; Q. 114). It is therefore manifest that\nfate is in the created causes themselves, as ordered by God to the\nproduction of their effects.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The ordering itself of second causes, which Augustine\n(De Civ. Dei v, 8) calls the \"series of causes,\" has not the nature\nof fate, except as dependent on God. Wherefore the Divine power or\nwill can be called fate, as being the cause of fate. But essentially\nfate is the very disposition or \"series,\" i.e. order, of second\ncauses.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Fate has the nature of a cause, just as much as the\nsecond causes themselves, the ordering of which is called fate.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Fate is called a disposition, not that disposition\nwhich is a species of quality, but in the sense in which it signifies\norder, which is not a substance, but a relation. And if this order be\nconsidered in relation to its principle, it is one; and thus fate is\none. But if it be considered in relation to its effects, or to the\nmediate causes, this fate is multiple. In this sense the poet wrote:\n\"Thy fate draws thee.\"\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Fate Is Unchangeable?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that fate is not unchangeable. For Boethius says\n(De Consol. iv): \"As reasoning is to the intellect, as the begotten is\nto that which is, as time to eternity, as the circle to its centre; so\nis the fickle chain of fate to the unwavering simplicity of\nProvidence.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7): \"If we be\nmoved, what is in us is moved.\" But fate is a \"disposition inherent\nto changeable things,\" as Boethius says (De Consol. iv). Therefore\nfate is changeable.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if fate is unchangeable, what is subject to fate\nhappens unchangeably and of necessity. But things ascribed to fate\nseem principally to be contingencies. Therefore there would be no\ncontingencies in the world, but all things would happen of necessity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate is an\nunchangeable disposition.\n\n_I answer that,_ The disposition of second causes which we call fate,\ncan be considered in two ways: firstly, in regard to the second\ncauses, which are thus disposed or ordered; secondly, in regard to\nthe first principle, namely, God, by Whom they are ordered. Some,\ntherefore, have held that the series itself o[f] dispositions of\ncauses is in itself necessary, so that all things would happen of\nnecessity; for this reason that each effect has a cause, and given a\ncause the effect must follow of necessity. But this is false, as\nproved above (Q. 115, A. 6).\n\nOthers, on the other hand, held that fate is changeable, even as\ndependent on Divine Providence. Wherefore the Egyptians said that\nfate could be changed by certain sacrifices, as Gregory of Nyssa says\n(Nemesius, De Homine). This too has been disproved above for the\nreason that it is repugnant to Divine Providence.\n\nWe must therefore say that fate, considered in regard to second\ncauses, is changeable; but as subject to Divine Providence, it\nderives a certain unchangeableness, not of absolute but of\nconditional necessity. In this sense we say that this conditional is\ntrue and necessary: \"If God foreknew that this would happen, it will\nhappen.\" Wherefore Boethius, having said that the chain of fate is\nfickle, shortly afterwards adds--\"which, since it is derived from an\nunchangeable Providence must also itself be unchangeable.\"\n\nFrom this the answers to the objections are clear.\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 116, Art. 4]\n\nWhether All Things Are Subject to Fate?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For\nBoethius says (De Consol. iv): \"The chain of fate moves the heaven\nand the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them\nby a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things that are born\ninto the world and perish are renewed in a uniform progression of\noffspring and seed.\" Nothing therefore seems to be excluded from\nthe domain of fate.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 1) that fate is\nsomething real, as referred to the Divine will and power. But the\nDivine will is cause of all things that happen, as Augustine says\n(De Trin. iii, 1 seqq.). Therefore all things are subject to fate.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that fate \"is a\ndisposition inherent to changeable things.\" But all creatures are\nchangeable, and God alone is truly unchangeable, as stated above\n(Q. 9, A. 2). Therefore fate is in all things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iv) that \"some things\nsubject to Providence are above the ordering of fate.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), fate is the ordering of\nsecond causes to effects foreseen by God. Whatever, therefore, is\nsubject to second causes, is subject also to fate. But whatever is\ndone immediately by God, since it is not subject to second causes,\nneither is it subject to fate; such are creation, the glorification\nof spiritual substances, and the like. And this is what Boethius says\n(De Consol. iv): viz. that \"those things which are nigh to God have a\nstate of immobility, and exceed the changeable order of fate.\" Hence\nit is clear that \"the further a thing is from the First Mind, the\nmore it is involved in the chain of fate\"; since so much the more it\nis bound up with second causes.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All the things mentioned in this passage are done by\nGod by means of second causes; for this reason they are contained in\nthe order of fate. But it is not the same with everything else, as\nstated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Fate is to be referred to the Divine will and power, as\nto its first principle. Consequently it does not follow that whatever\nis subject to the Divine will or power, is subject also to fate, as\nalready stated.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although all creatures are in some way changeable, yet\nsome of them do not proceed from changeable created causes. And\nthese, therefore, are not subject to fate, as stated above.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 117\n\nOF THINGS PERTAINING TO THE ACTION OF MAN\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe have next to consider those things which pertain to the action of\nman, who is composed of a created corporeal and spiritual nature. In\nthe first place we shall consider that action (in general) and\nsecondly in regard to the propagation of man from man. As to the\nfirst, there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether one man can teach another, as being the cause of his\nknowledge?\n\n(2) Whether man can teach an angel?\n\n(3) Whether by the power of his soul man can change corporeal matter?\n\n(4) Whether the separate soul of man can move bodies by local\nmovement?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 1]\n\nWhether One Man Can Teach Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one man cannot teach another. For the\nLord says (Matt. 22:8): \"Be not you called Rabbi\": on which the gloss\nof Jerome says, \"Lest you give to men the honor due to God.\"\nTherefore to be a master is properly an honor due to God. But it\nbelongs to a master to teach. Therefore man cannot teach, and this is\nproper to God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if one man teaches another this is only inasmuch as\nhe acts through his own knowledge, so as to cause knowledge in the\nother. But a quality through which anyone acts so as to produce his\nlike, is an active quality. Therefore it follows that knowledge is an\nactive quality just as heat is.\n\nObj. 3: Further, for knowledge we require intellectual light, and the\nspecies of the thing understood. But a man cannot cause either of\nthese in another man. Therefore a man cannot by teaching cause\nknowledge in another man.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the teacher does nothing in regard to a disciple\nsave to propose to him certain signs, so as to signify something by\nwords or gestures. But it is not possible to teach anyone so as to\ncause knowledge in him, by putting signs before him. For these are\nsigns either of things that he knows, or of things he does not know.\nIf of things that he knows, he to whom these signs are proposed is\nalready in the possession of knowledge, and does not acquire it from\nthe master. If they are signs of things that he does not know, he can\nlearn nothing therefrom: for instance, if one were to speak Greek to\na man who only knows Latin, he would learn nothing thereby. Therefore\nin no way can a man cause knowledge in another by teaching him.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 2:7): \"Whereunto I am\nappointed a preacher and an apostle . . . a doctor of the Gentiles\nin faith and truth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ On this question there have been various opinions.\nFor Averroes, commenting on _De Anima_ iii, maintains that all men\nhave one passive intellect in common, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2).\nFrom this it follows that the same intelligible species belong to all\nmen. Consequently he held that one man does not cause another to have\na knowledge distinct from that which he has himself; but that he\ncommunicates the identical knowledge which he has himself, by moving\nhim to order rightly the phantasms in his soul, so that they be\nrightly disposed for intelligible apprehension. This opinion is true\nso far as knowledge is the same in disciple and master, if we\nconsider the identity of the thing known: for the same objective\ntruth is known by both of them. But so far as he maintains that all\nmen have but one passive intellect, and the same intelligible\nspecies, differing only as to various phantasms, his opinion is\nfalse, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2).\n\nBesides this, there is the opinion of the Platonists, who held that\nour souls are possessed of knowledge from the very beginning, through\nthe participation of separate forms, as stated above (Q. 84, AA. 3,\n4); but that the soul is hindered, through its union with the body,\nfrom the free consideration of those things which it knows. According\nto this, the disciple does not acquire fresh knowledge from his\nmaster, but is roused by him to consider what he knows; so that to\nlearn would be nothing else than to remember. In the same way they\nheld that natural agents only dispose (matter) to receive forms,\nwhich matter acquires by a participation of separate substances. But\nagainst this we have proved above (Q. 79, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 3) that the\npassive intellect of the human soul is in pure potentiality to\nintelligible (species), as Aristotle says (De Anima iii, 4).\n\nWe must therefore decide the question differently, by saying that the\nteacher causes knowledge in the learner, by reducing him from\npotentiality to act, as the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4). In\norder to make this clear, we must observe that of effects proceeding\nfrom an exterior principle, some proceed from the exterior principle\nalone; as the form of a house is caused to be in matter by art alone:\nwhereas other effects proceed sometimes from an exterior principle,\nsometimes from an interior principle: thus health is caused in a sick\nman, sometimes by an exterior principle, namely by the medical art,\nsometimes by an interior principle as when a man is healed by the\nforce of nature. In these latter effects two things must be noticed.\nFirst, that art in its work imitates nature for just as nature heals\na man by alteration, digestion, rejection of the matter that caused\nthe sickness, so does art. Secondly, we must remark that the exterior\nprinciple, art, acts, not as principal agent, but as helping the\nprincipal agent, but as helping the principal agent, which is the\ninterior principle, by strengthening it, and by furnishing it with\ninstruments and assistance, of which the interior principle makes use\nin producing the effect. Thus the physician strengthens nature, and\nemploys food and medicine, of which nature makes use for the intended\nend.\n\nNow knowledge is acquired in man, both from an interior principle, as\nis clear in one who procures knowledge by his own research; and from\nan exterior principle, as is clear in one who learns (by\ninstruction). For in every man there is a certain principle of\nknowledge, namely the light of the active intellect, through which\ncertain universal principles of all the sciences are naturally\nunderstood as soon as proposed to the intellect. Now when anyone\napplies these universal principles to certain particular things, the\nmemory or experience of which he acquires through the senses; then by\nhis own research advancing from the known to the unknown, he obtains\nknowledge of what he knew not before. Wherefore anyone who teaches,\nleads the disciple from things known by the latter, to the knowledge\nof things previously unknown to him; according to what the\nPhilosopher says (Poster. i, 1): \"All teaching and all learning\nproceed from previous knowledge.\"\n\nNow the master leads the disciple from things known to knowledge of\nthe unknown, in a twofold manner. Firstly, by proposing to him\ncertain helps or means of instruction, which his intellect can use\nfor the acquisition of science: for instance, he may put before him\ncertain less universal propositions, of which nevertheless the\ndisciple is able to judge from previous knowledge: or he may propose\nto him some sensible examples, either by way of likeness or of\nopposition, or something of the sort, from which the intellect of the\nlearner is led to the knowledge of truth previously unknown.\nSecondly, by strengthening the intellect of the learner; not, indeed,\nby some active power as of a higher nature, as explained above (Q.\n106, A. 1; Q. 111, A. 1) of the angelic enlightenment, because all\nhuman intellects are of one grade in the natural order; but inasmuch\nas he proposes to the disciple the order of principles to\nconclusions, by reason of his not having sufficient collating power\nto be able to draw the conclusions from the principles. Hence the\nPhilosopher says (Poster. i, 2) that \"a demonstration is a syllogism\nthat causes knowledge.\" In this way a demonstrator causes his hearer\nto know.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above, the teacher only brings exterior help\nas the physician who heals: but just as the interior nature is the\nprincipal cause of the healing, so the interior light of the\nintellect is the principal cause of knowledge. But both of these are\nfrom God. Therefore as of God is it written: \"Who healeth all thy\ndiseases\" (Ps. 102:3); so of Him is it written: \"He that teacheth man\nknowledge\" (Ps. 93:10), inasmuch as \"the light of His countenance is\nsigned upon us\" (Ps. 4:7), through which light all things are shown\nto us.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Averroes argues, the teacher does not cause\nknowledge in the disciple after the manner of a natural active cause.\nWherefore knowledge need not be an active quality: but is the\nprinciple by which one is directed in teaching, just as art is the\nprinciple by which one is directed in working.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The master does not cause the intellectual light in the\ndisciple, nor does he cause the intelligible species directly: but he\nmoves the disciple by teaching, so that the latter, by the power of\nhis intellect, forms intelligible concepts, the signs of which are\nproposed to him from without.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The signs proposed by the master to the disciple are of\nthings known in a general and confused manner; but not known in\ndetail and distinctly. Therefore when anyone acquires knowledge by\nhimself, he cannot be called self-taught, or be said to have his own\nmaster because perfect knowledge did not precede in him, such as is\nrequired in a master.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Man Can Teach the Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that men teach angels. For the Apostle says\n(Eph. 3:10): \"That the manifold wisdom of God may be made known to the\nprincipalities and powers in the heavenly places through the Church.\"\nBut the Church is the union of all the faithful. Therefore some things\nare made known to angels through men.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the superior angels, who are enlightened immediately\nconcerning Divine things by God, can instruct the inferior angels, as\nstated above (Q. 116, A. 1; Q. 112, A. 3). But some men are\ninstructed immediately concerning Divine things by the Word of God;\nas appears principally of the apostles from Heb. 1:1, 2: \"Last of\nall, in these days (God) hath spoken to us by His Son.\" Therefore\nsome men have been able to teach the angels.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the inferior angels are instructed by the superior.\nBut some men are higher than some angels; since some men are taken up\nto the highest angelic orders, as Gregory says in a homily (Hom.\nxxxiv in Evang.). Therefore some of the inferior angels can be\ninstructed by men concerning Divine things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every Divine\nenlightenment is borne to men by the ministry of the angels.\nTherefore angels are not instructed by men concerning Divine things.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 107, A. 2), the inferior angels\ncan indeed speak to the superior angels, by making their thoughts\nknown to them; but concerning Divine things superior angels are never\nenlightened by inferior angels. Now it is manifest that in the same\nway as inferior angels are subject to the superior, the highest men\nare subject even to the lowest angels. This is clear from Our Lord's\nwords (Matt. 11:11): \"There hath not risen among them that are born\nof woman a greater than John the Baptist; yet he that is lesser in\nthe kingdom of heaven is greater than he.\" Therefore angels are never\nenlightened by men concerning Divine things. But men can by means of\nspeech make known to angels the thoughts of their hearts: because it\nbelongs to God alone to know the heart's secrets.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine (Gen. ad lit. v, 19) thus explains this\npassage of the Apostle, who in the preceding verses says: \"To me, the\nleast of all the saints, is given this grace . . . to enlighten all\nmen, that they may see what is the dispensation of the mystery which\nhath been hidden from eternity in God. Hidden, yet so that the\nmultiform wisdom of God was made known to the principalities and\npowers in the heavenly places--that is, through the Church.\" As\nthough he were to say: This mystery was hidden from men, but not from\nthe Church in heaven, which is contained in the principalities and\npowers who knew it \"from all ages, but not before all ages: because\nthe Church was at first there, where after the resurrection this\nChurch composed of men will be gathered together.\"\n\nIt can also be explained otherwise that \"what is hidden, is known by\nthe angels, not only in God, but also here where when it takes place\nand is made public,\" as Augustine says further on (Gen. ad lit. v,\n19). Thus when the mysteries of Christ and the Church were fulfilled\nby the apostles, some things concerning these mysteries became\napparent to the angels, which were hidden from them before. In this\nway we can understand what Jerome says (Comment. in Ep. ad\nEph.)--that from the preaching of the apostles the angels learned\ncertain mysteries; that is to say, through the preaching of the\napostles, the mysteries were realized in the things themselves: thus\nby the preaching of Paul the Gentiles were converted, of which\nmystery the Apostle is speaking in the passage quoted.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The apostles were instructed immediately by the Word of\nGod, not according to His Divinity, but according as He spoke in His\nhuman nature. Hence the argument does not prove.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Certain men in this state of life are greater than\ncertain angels, not actually, but virtually; forasmuch as they have\nsuch great charity that they can merit a higher degree of beatitude\nthan that possessed by certain angels. In the same way we might say\nthat the seed of a great tree is virtually greater than a small tree,\nthough actually it is much smaller.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Man by the Power of His Soul Can Change Corporeal Matter?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man by the power of his soul can\nchange corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): \"Saints\nwork miracles sometimes by prayer, sometimes by their power: thus\nPeter, by prayer, raised the dead Tabitha to life, and by his reproof\ndelivered to death the lying Ananias and Saphira.\" But in the working\nof miracles a change is wrought in corporeal matter. Therefore men,\nby the power of the soul, can change corporeal matter.\n\nObj. 2: Further, on these words (Gal. 3:1): \"Who hath bewitched you,\nthat you should not obey the truth?\" the gloss says that \"some have\nblazing eyes, who by a single look bewitch others, especially\nchildren.\" But this would not be unless the power of the soul could\nchange corporeal matter. Therefore man can change corporeal matter by\nthe power of his soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the human body is nobler than other inferior bodies.\nBut by the apprehension of the human soul the human body is changed\nto heat and cold, as appears when a man is angry or afraid: indeed\nthis change sometimes goes so far as to bring on sickness and death.\nMuch more, then, can the human soul by its power change corporeal\nmatter.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iii, 8): \"Corporeal\nmatter obeys God alone at will.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 110, A. 2), corporeal matter is\nnot changed to (the reception of) a form save either by some agent\ncomposed of matter and form, or by God Himself, in whom both matter\nand form pre-exist virtually, as in the primordial cause of both.\nWherefore of the angels also we have stated (Q. 110, A. 2) that they\ncannot change corporeal matter by their natural power, except by\nemploying corporeal agents for the production of certain effects.\nMuch less therefore can the soul, by its natural power, change\ncorporeal matter, except by means of bodies.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The saints are said to work miracles by the power of\ngrace, not of nature. This is clear from what Gregory says in the\nsame place: \"Those who are sons of God, in power, as John says--what\nwonder is there that they should work miracles by that power?\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Avicenna assigns the cause of bewitchment to the fact\nthat corporeal matter has a natural tendency to obey spiritual\nsubstance rather than natural contrary agents. Therefore when the\nsoul is of strong imagination, it can change corporeal matter. This\nhe says is the cause of the \"evil eye.\"\n\nBut it has been shown above (Q. 110, A. 2) that corporeal matter\ndoes not obey spiritual substances at will, but the Creator alone.\nTherefore it is better to say, that by a strong imagination the\n(corporeal) spirits of the body united to that soul are changed,\nwhich change in the spirits takes place especially in the eyes, to\nwhich the more subtle spirits can reach. And the eyes infect the air\nwhich is in contact with them to a certain distance: in the same way\nas a new and clear mirror contracts a tarnish from the look of a\n\"menstruata,\" as Aristotle says (De Somn. et Vigil.; [*De Insomniis\nii]).\n\nHence then when a soul is vehemently moved to wickedness, as occurs\nmostly in little old women, according to the above explanation, the\ncountenance becomes venomous and hurtful, especially to children, who\nhave a tender and most impressionable body. It is also possible that\nby God's permission, or from some hidden deed, the spiteful demons\nco-operate in this, as the witches may have some compact with them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The soul is united to the body as its form; and the\nsensitive appetite, which obeys the reason in a certain way, as\nstated above (Q. 81, A. 3), it is the act of a corporeal organ.\nTherefore at the apprehension of the human soul, the sensitive\nappetite must needs be moved with an accompanying corporeal\noperation. But the apprehension of the human soul does not suffice\nto work a change in exterior bodies, except by means of a change in\nthe body united to it, as stated above (ad 2).\n_______________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Separate Human Soul Can Move Bodies at Least Locally?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the separate human soul can move bodies at\nleast locally. For a body naturally obeys a spiritual substance as to\nlocal motion, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 5). But the separate\nsoul is a spiritual substance. Therefore it can move exterior bodies\nby its command.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in the Itinerary of Clement it is said in the\nnarrative of Nicetas to Peter, that Simon Magus, by sorcery retained\npower over the soul of a child that he had slain, and that through\nthis soul he worked magical wonders. But this could not have been\nwithout some corporeal change at least as to place. Therefore, the\nseparate soul has the power to move bodies locally.\n\n_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 3) that the soul\ncannot move any other body whatsoever but its own.\n\n_I answer that,_ The separate soul cannot by its natural power move a\nbody. For it is manifest that, even while the soul is united to the\nbody, it does not move the body except as endowed with life: so that\nif one of the members become lifeless, it does not obey the soul as\nto local motion. Now it is also manifest that no body is quickened by\nthe separate soul. Therefore within the limits of its natural power\nthe separate soul cannot command the obedience of a body; though, by\nthe power of God, it can exceed those limits.\n\nReply Obj. 1: There are certain spiritual substances whose powers are\nnot determinate to certain bodies; such are the angels who are\nnaturally unfettered by a body; consequently various bodies may obey\nthem as to movement. But if the motive power of a separate substance\nis naturally determinate to move a certain body, that substance will\nnot be able to move a body of higher degree, but only one of lower\ndegree: thus according to philosophers the mover of the lower heaven\ncannot move the higher heaven. Wherefore, since the soul is by its\nnature determinate to move the body of which it is the form, it\ncannot by its natural power move any other body.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine (De Civ. Dei x, 11) and Chrysostom (Hom.\nxxviii in Matt.) say, the demons often pretend to be the souls of the\ndead, in order to confirm the error of heathen superstition. It is\ntherefore credible that Simon Magus was deceived by some demon who\npretended to be the soul of the child whom the magician had slain.\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 118\n\nOF THE PRODUCTION OF MAN FROM MAN AS TO THE SOUL\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe next consider the production of man from man: first, as to the\nsoul; secondly, as to the body.\n\nUnder the first head there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the sensitive soul is transmitted with the semen?\n\n(2) Whether the intellectual soul is thus transmitted?\n\n(3) Whether all souls were created at the same time?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 118, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Sensitive Soul Is Transmitted with the Semen?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the sensitive soul is not transmitted\nwith the semen, but created by God. For every perfect substance, not\ncomposed of matter and form, that begins to exist, acquires existence\nnot by generation, but by creation: for nothing is generated save\nfrom matter. But the sensitive soul is a perfect substance, otherwise\nit could not move the body; and since it is the form of a body, it is\nnot composed of matter and form. Therefore it begins to exist not by\ngeneration but by creation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in living things the principle of generation is the\ngenerating power; which, since it is one of the powers of the\nvegetative soul, is of a lower order than the sensitive soul. Now\nnothing acts beyond its species. Therefore the sensitive soul cannot\nbe caused by the animal's generating power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the generator begets its like: so that the form of\nthe generator must be actually in the cause of generation. But\nneither the sensitive soul itself nor any part thereof is actually in\nthe semen, for no part of the sensitive soul is elsewhere than in\nsome part of the body; while in the semen there is not even a\nparticle of the body, because there is not a particle of the body\nwhich is not made from the semen and by the power thereof. Therefore\nthe sensitive soul is not produced through the semen.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if there be in the semen any principle productive of\nthe sensitive soul, this principle either remains after the animal is\nbegotten, or it does not remain. Now it cannot remain. For either it\nwould be identified with the sensitive soul of the begotten animal;\nwhich is impossible, for thus there would be identity between\nbegetter and begotten, maker and made: or it would be distinct\ntherefrom; and again this is impossible, for it has been proved above\n(Q. 76, A. 4) that in one animal there is but one formal principle,\nwhich is the soul. If on the other hand the aforesaid principle does\nnot remain, this again seems to be impossible: for thus an agent\nwould act to its own destruction, which cannot be. Therefore the\nsensitive soul cannot be generated from the semen.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The power in the semen is to the animal seminally\ngenerated, as the power in the elements of the world is to animals\nproduced from these elements--for instance by putrefaction. But in\nthe latter animals the soul is produced by the elemental power,\naccording to Gen. 1:20: \"Let the waters bring forth the creeping\ncreatures having life.\" Therefore also the souls of animals seminally\ngenerated are produced by the seminal power.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have held that the sensitive souls of animals\nare created by God (Q. 65, A. 4). This opinion would hold if the\nsensitive soul were subsistent, having being and operation of itself.\nFor thus, as having being and operation of itself, to be made would\nneeds be proper to it. And since a simple and subsistent thing cannot\nbe made except by creation, it would follow that the sensitive soul\nwould arrive at existence by creation.\n\nBut this principle is false--namely, that being and operation are\nproper to the sensitive soul, as has been made clear above (Q. 75,\nA. 3): for it would not cease to exist when the body perishes. Since,\ntherefore, it is not a subsistent form, its relation to existence is\nthat of the corporeal forms, to which existence does not belong as\nproper to them, but which are said to exist forasmuch as the\nsubsistent composites exist through them.\n\nWherefore to be made is proper to composites. And since the generator\nis like the generated, it follows of necessity that both the\nsensitive soul, and all other like forms are naturally brought into\nexistence by certain corporeal agents that reduce the matter from\npotentiality to act, through some corporeal power of which they are\npossessed.\n\nNow the more powerful an agent, the greater scope its action has: for\ninstance, the hotter a body, the greater the distance to which its\nheat carries. Therefore bodies not endowed with life, which are the\nlowest in the order of nature, generate their like, not through some\nmedium, but by themselves; thus fire by itself generates fire. But\nliving bodies, as being more powerful, act so as to generate their\nlike, both without and with a medium. Without a medium--in the work\nof nutrition, in which flesh generates flesh: with a medium--in the\nact of generation, because the semen of the animal or plant derives\na certain active force from the soul of the generator, just as the\ninstrument derives a certain motive power from the principal agent.\nAnd as it matters not whether we say that something is moved by the\ninstrument or by the principal agent, so neither does it matter\nwhether we say that the soul of the generated is caused by the soul\nof the generator, or by some seminal power derived therefrom.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The sensitive soul is not a perfect self-subsistent\nsubstance. We have said enough (Q. 25, A. 3) on this point, nor need\nwe repeat it here.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The generating power begets not only by its own virtue\nbut by that of the whole soul, of which it is a power. Therefore the\ngenerating power of a plant generates a plant, and that of an animal\nbegets an animal. For the more perfect the soul is, to so much a more\nperfect effect is its generating power ordained.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This active force which is in the semen, and which is\nderived from the soul of the generator, is, as it were, a certain\nmovement of this soul itself: nor is it the soul or a part of the\nsoul, save virtually; thus the form of a bed is not in the saw or the\naxe, but a certain movement towards that form. Consequently there is\nno need for this active force to have an actual organ; but it is\nbased on the (vital) spirit in the semen which is frothy, as is\nattested by its whiteness. In which spirit, moreover, there is a\ncertain heat derived from the power of the heavenly bodies, by virtue\nof which the inferior bodies also act towards the production of the\nspecies as stated above (Q. 115, A. 3, ad 2). And since in this\n(vital) spirit the power of the soul is concurrent with the power of\na heavenly body, it has been said that \"man and the sun generate\nman.\" Moreover, elemental heat is employed instrumentally by the\nsoul's power, as also by the nutritive power, as stated (De Anima ii,\n4).\n\nReply Obj. 4: In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active\nforce is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De Gener.\nAnimal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In\nthis matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not\nas to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul\nis in one who sleeps. But as soon as it begins to attract\nnourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore\nis transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until\nit is actually informed by the sensitive soul; not as though the\nforce itself which was in the semen becomes the sensitive soul; for\nthus, indeed, the generator and generated would be identical;\nmoreover, this would be more like nourishment and growth than\ngeneration, as the Philosopher says. And after the sensitive soul, by\nthe power of the active principle in the semen, has been produced in\none of the principal parts of the thing generated, then it is that\nthe sensitive soul of the offspring begins to work towards the\nperfection of its own body, by nourishment and growth. As to the\nactive power which was in the semen, it ceases to exist, when the\nsemen is dissolved and the (vital) spirit thereof vanishes. Nor is\nthere anything unreasonable in this, because this force is not the\nprincipal but the instrumental agent; and the movement of an\ninstrument ceases when once the effect has been produced.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 118, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Intellectual Soul Is Produced from the Semen?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced\nfrom the semen. For it is written (Gen. 46:26): \"All the souls that\ncame out of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six.\" But nothing is produced from\nthe thigh of a man, except from the semen. Therefore the intellectual\nsoul is produced from the semen.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as shown above (Q. 76, A. 3), the intellectual,\nsensitive, and nutritive souls are, in substance, one soul in man.\nBut the sensitive soul in man is generated from the semen, as in\nother animals; wherefore the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii,\n3) that the animal and the man are not made at the same time, but\nfirst of all the animal is made having a sensitive soul. Therefore\nalso the intellectual soul is produced from the semen.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is one and the same agent whose action is\ndirected to the matter and to the form: else from the matter and\nthe form there would not result something simply one. But the\nintellectual soul is the form of the human body, which is produced\nby the power of the semen. Therefore the intellectual soul also is\nproduced by the power of the semen.\n\nObj. 4: Further, man begets his like in species. But the human\nspecies is constituted by the rational soul. Therefore the rational\nsoul is from the begetter.\n\nObj. 5: Further, it cannot be said that God concurs in sin. But if\nthe rational soul be created by God, sometimes God concurs in the\nsin of adultery, since sometimes offspring is begotten of illicit\nintercourse. Therefore the rational soul is not created by God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written in De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv that \"the\nrational soul is not engendered by coition.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible for an active power existing in\nmatter to extend its action to the production of an immaterial\neffect. Now it is manifest that the intellectual principle in man\ntranscends matter; for it has an operation in which the body takes no\npart whatever. It is therefore impossible for the seminal power to\nproduce the intellectual principle.\n\nAgain, the seminal power acts by virtue of the soul of the begetter\naccording as the soul of the begetter is the act of the body, making\nuse of the body in its operation. Now the body has nothing whatever\nto do in the operation of the intellect. Therefore the power of the\nintellectual principle, as intellectual, cannot reach the semen.\nHence the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3): \"It follows\nthat the intellect alone comes from without.\"\n\nAgain, since the intellectual soul has an operation independent of\nthe body, it is subsistent, as proved above (Q. 75, A. 2): therefore\nto be and to be made are proper to it. Moreover, since it is an\nimmaterial substance it cannot be caused through generation, but only\nthrough creation by God. Therefore to hold that the intellectual soul\nis caused by the begetter, is nothing else than to hold the soul to\nbe non-subsistent and consequently to perish with the body. It is\ntherefore heretical to say that the intellectual soul is transmitted\nwith the semen.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the passage quoted, the part is put instead of the\nwhole, the soul for the whole man, by the figure of synecdoche.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Some say that the vital functions observed in the\nembryo are not from its soul, but from the soul of the mother; or\nfrom the formative power of the semen. Both of these explanations are\nfalse; for vital functions such as feeling, nourishment, and growth\ncannot be from an extrinsic principle. Consequently it must be said\nthat the soul is in the embryo; the nutritive soul from the\nbeginning, then the sensitive, lastly the intellectual soul.\n\nTherefore some say that in addition to the vegetative soul which\nexisted first, another, namely the sensitive, soul supervenes; and in\naddition to this, again another, namely the intellectual soul. Thus\nthere would be in man three souls of which one would be in\npotentiality to another. This has been disproved above (Q. 76,\nA. 3).\n\nTherefore others say that the same soul which was at first merely\nvegetative, afterwards through the action of the seminal power,\nbecomes a sensitive soul; and finally this same soul becomes\nintellectual, not indeed through the active seminal power, but by\nthe power of a higher agent, namely God enlightening (the soul) from\nwithout. For this reason the Philosopher says that the intellect\ncomes from without. But this will not hold. First, because no\nsubstantial form is susceptible of more or less; but addition of\ngreater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition\nof unity constitutes another species of number. Now it is not\npossible for the same identical form to belong to different species.\nSecondly, because it would follow that the generation of an animal\nwould be a continuous movement, proceeding gradually from the\nimperfect to the perfect, as happens in alteration. Thirdly, because\nit would follow that the generation of a man or an animal is not\ngeneration simply, because the subject thereof would be a being in\nact. For if the vegetative soul is from the beginning in the matter\nof offspring, and is subsequently gradually brought to perfection;\nthis will imply addition of further perfection without corruption of\nthe preceding perfection. And this is contrary to the nature of\ngeneration properly so called. Fourthly, because either that which is\ncaused by the action of God is something subsistent: and thus it must\nneeds be essentially distinct from the pre-existing form, which was\nnon-subsistent; and we shall then come back to the opinion of those\nwho held the existence of several souls in the body--or else it is\nnot subsistent, but a perfection of the pre-existing soul: and from\nthis it follows of necessity that the intellectual soul perishes with\nthe body, which cannot be admitted.\n\nThere is again another explanation, according to those who held that\nall men have but one intellect in common: but this has been disproved\nabove (Q. 76, A. 2).\n\nWe must therefore say that since the generation of one thing is the\ncorruption of another, it follows of necessity that both in men and\nin other animals, when a more perfect form supervenes the previous\nform is corrupted: yet so that the supervening form contains the\nperfection of the previous form, and something in addition. It is in\nthis way that through many generations and corruptions we arrive at\nthe ultimate substantial form, both in man and other animals. This\nindeed is apparent to the senses in animals generated from\nputrefaction. We conclude therefore that the intellectual soul is\ncreated by God at the end of human generation, and this soul is at\nthe same time sensitive and nutritive, the pre-existing forms being\ncorrupted.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument holds in the case of diverse agents not\nordered to one another. But where there are many agents ordered to\none another, nothing hinders the power of the higher agent from\nreaching to the ultimate form; while the powers of the inferior\nagents extend only to some disposition of matter: thus in the\ngeneration of an animal, the seminal power disposes the matter, but\nthe power of the soul gives the form. Now it is manifest from what\nhas been said above (Q. 105, A. 5; Q. 110, A. 1) that the whole of\ncorporeal nature acts as the instrument of a spiritual power,\nespecially of God. Therefore nothing hinders the formation of the\nbody from being due to a corporeal power, while the intellectual soul\nis from God alone.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Man begets his like, forasmuch as by his seminal power\nthe matter is disposed for the reception of a certain species of form.\n\nReply Obj. 5: In the action of the adulterer, what is of nature is\ngood; in this God concurs. But what there is of inordinate lust is\nevil; in this God does not concur.\n_______________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 118, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Human Souls Were Created Together at the Beginning of the\nWorld?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that human souls were created together at\nthe beginning of the world. For it is written (Gen. 2:2): \"God rested\nHim from all His work which He had done.\" This would not be true if He\ncreated new souls every day. Therefore all souls were created at the\nsame time.\n\nObj. 2: Further, spiritual substances before all others belong to the\nperfection of the universe. If therefore souls were created with the\nbodies, every day innumerable spiritual substances would be added to\nthe perfection of the universe: consequently at the beginning the\nuniverse would have been imperfect. This is contrary to Gen. 2:2,\nwhere it is said that \"God ended\" all \"His work.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, the end of a thing corresponds to its beginning. But\nthe intellectual soul remains, when the body perishes. Therefore it\nbegan to exist before the body.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said (De Eccl. Dogmat. xiv, xviii) that \"the\nsoul is created together with the body.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have maintained that it is accidental to the\nintellectual soul to be united to the body, asserting that the soul\nis of the same nature as those spiritual substances which are not\nunited to a body. These, therefore, stated that the souls of men were\ncreated together with the angels at the beginning. But this statement\nis false. Firstly, in the very principle on which it is based. For if\nit were accidental to the soul to be united to the body, it would\nfollow that man who results from this union is a being by accident;\nor that the soul is a man, which is false, as proved above (Q. 75, A.\n4). Moreover, that the human soul is not of the same nature as the\nangels, is proved from the different mode of understanding, as shown\nabove (Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 85, A. 1): for man understands through\nreceiving from the senses, and turning to phantasms, as stated above\n(Q. 84, AA. 6, 7; Q. 85, A. 1). For this reason the soul needs to be\nunited to the body, which is necessary to it for the operation of the\nsensitive part: whereas this cannot be said of an angel.\n\nSecondly, this statement can be proved to be false in itself. For if\nit is natural to the soul to be united to the body, it is unnatural\nto it to be without a body, and as long as it is without a body it is\ndeprived of its natural perfection. Now it was not fitting that God\nshould begin His work with things imperfect and unnatural, for He did\nnot make man without a hand or a foot, which are natural parts of a\nman. Much less, therefore, did He make the soul without a body.\n\nBut if someone say that it is not natural to the soul to be united to\nthe body, he must give the reason why it is united to a body. And the\nreason must be either because the soul so willed, or for some other\nreason. If because the soul willed it--this seems incongruous. First,\nbecause it would be unreasonable of the soul to wish to be united to\nthe body, if it did not need the body: for if it did need it, it would\nbe natural for it to be united to it, since \"nature does not fail in\nwhat is necessary.\" Secondly, because there would be no reason why,\nhaving been created from the beginning of the world, the soul should,\nafter such a long time, come to wish to be united to the body. For a\nspiritual substance is above time, and superior to the heavenly\nrevolutions. Thirdly, because it would seem that this body was united\nto this soul by chance: since for this union to take place two wills\nwould have to concur--to wit, that of the incoming soul, and that of\nthe begetter. If, however, this union be neither voluntary nor natural\non the part of the soul, then it must be the result of some violent\ncause, and to the soul would have something of a penal and afflicting\nnature. This is in keeping with the opinion of Origen, who held that\nsouls were embodied in punishment of sin. Since, therefore, all these\nopinions are unreasonable, we must simply confess that souls were not\ncreated before bodies, but are created at the same time as they are\ninfused into them.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God is said to have rested on the seventh day, not from\nall work, since we read (John 5:17): \"My Father worketh until now\";\nbut from the creation of any new genera and species, which may not\nhave already existed in the first works. For in this sense, the souls\nwhich are created now, existed already, as to the likeness of the\nspecies, in the first works, which included the creation of Adam's\nsoul.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Something can be added every day to the perfection of\nthe universe, as to the number of individuals, but not as to the\nnumber of species.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That the soul remains without the body is due to the\ncorruption of the body, which was a result of sin. Consequently it\nwas not fitting that God should make the soul without the body from\nthe beginning: for as it is written (Wis. 1:13, 16): \"God made not\ndeath . . . but the wicked with works and words have called it to\nthem.\"\n_______________________\n\nQUESTION 119\n\nOF THE PROPAGATION OF MAN AS TO THE BODY\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe now consider the propagation of man, as to the body. Concerning\nthis there are two points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether any part of the food is changed into true human nature?\n\n(2) Whether the semen, which is the principle of human generation,\nis produced from the surplus food?\n_______________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 119, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Some Part of the Food Is Changed into True Human Nature?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that none of the food is changed into true\nhuman nature. For it is written (Matt. 15:17): \"Whatsoever entereth\ninto the mouth, goeth into the belly, and is cast out into the privy.\"\nBut what is cast out is not changed into the reality of human nature.\nTherefore none of the food is changed into true human nature.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (De Gener. i, 5) distinguishes flesh\nbelonging to the species from flesh belonging to \"matter\"; and says\nthat the latter \"comes and goes.\" Now what is formed from food comes\nand goes. Therefore what is produced from food is flesh belonging to\nmatter, not to the species. But what belongs to true human nature\nbelongs to the species. Therefore the food is not changed into true\nhuman nature.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the \"radical humor\" seems to belong to the reality\nof human nature; and if it be lost, it cannot be recovered, according\nto physicians. But it could be recovered if the food were changed\ninto the humor. Therefore food is not changed into true human nature.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if the food were changed into true human nature,\nwhatever is lost in man could be restored. But man's death is due\nonly to the loss of something. Therefore man would be able by taking\nfood to insure himself against death in perpetuity.\n\nObj. 5: Further, if the food is changed into true human nature, there\nis nothing in man which may not recede or be repaired: for what is\ngenerated in a man from his food can both recede and be repaired. If\ntherefore a man lived long enough, it would follow that in the end\nnothing would be left in him of what belonged to him at the\nbeginning. Consequently he would not be numerically the same man\nthroughout his life; since for the thing to be numerically the same,\nidentity of matter is necessary. But this is incongruous. Therefore\nthe food is not changed into true human nature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xi): \"The bodily\nfood when corrupted, that is, having lost its form, is changed into\nthe texture of the members.\" But the texture of the members belongs\nto true human nature. Therefore the food is changed into the reality\nof human nature.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Metaph. ii), \"The\nrelation of a thing to truth is the same as its relation to being.\"\nTherefore that belongs to the true nature of any thing which enters\ninto the constitution of that nature. But nature can be considered in\ntwo ways: firstly, in general according to the species; secondly, as\nin the individual. And whereas the form and the common matter belong\nto a thing's true nature considered in general; individual signate\nmatter, and the form individualized by that matter belong to the true\nnature considered in this particular individual. Thus a soul and body\nbelong to the true human nature in general, but to the true human\nnature of Peter and Martin belong this soul and this body.\n\nNow there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one\nindividual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the\nmatter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that\nthe human form cannot exist but in a certain individual matter, which,\nthey said, was given that form at the very beginning in the first man.\nSo that whatever may have been added to that which was derived by\nposterity from the first parent, does not belong to the truth of human\nnature, as not receiving in truth the form of human nature.\n\nBut, said they, that matter which, in the first man, was the subject\nof the human form, was multiplied in itself: and in this way the\nmultitude of human bodies is derived from the body of the first man.\nAccording to these, the food is not changed into true human nature; we\ntake food, they stated, in order to help nature to resist the action\nof natural heat, and prevent the consumption of the \"radical humor\";\njust as lead or tin is mixed with silver to prevent its being consumed\nby fire.\n\nBut this is unreasonable in many ways. Firstly, because it comes to\nthe same that a form can be produced in another matter, or that it\ncan cease to be in its proper matter; wherefore all things that can\nbe generated are corruptible, and conversely. Now it is manifest that\nthe human form can cease to exist in this (particular) matter which\nis its subject: else the human body would not be corruptible.\nConsequently it can begin to exist in another matter, so that\nsomething else be changed into true human nature. Secondly, because\nin all beings whose entire matter is contained in one individual\nthere is only one individual in the species: as is clearly the case\nwith the sun, moon and such like. Thus there would only be one\nindividual of the human species. Thirdly, because multiplication of\nmatter cannot be understood otherwise than either in respect of\nquantity only, as in things which are rarefied, so that their matter\nincreases in dimensions; or in respect of the substance itself of the\nmatter. But as long as the substance alone of matter remains, it\ncannot be said to be multiplied; for multitude cannot consist in the\naddition of a thing to itself, since of necessity it can only result\nfrom division. Therefore some other substance must be added to\nmatter, either by creation, or by something else being changed into\nit. Consequently no matter can be multiplied save either by\nrarefaction as when air is made from water; or by the change of some\nother things, as fire is multiplied by the addition of wood; or\nlastly by creation. Now it is manifest that the multiplication of\nmatter in the human body does not occur by rarefaction: for thus the\nbody of a man of perfect age would be more imperfect than the body of\na child. Nor does it occur by creation of fresh matter: for,\naccording to Gregory (Moral. xxxii): \"All things were created\ntogether as to the substance of matter, but not as to the specific\nform.\" Consequently the multiplication of the human body can only be\nthe result of the food being changed into the true human nature.\nFourthly, because, since man does not differ from animals and plants\nin regard to the vegetative soul, it would follow that the bodies of\nanimals and plants do not increase through a change of nourishment\ninto the body so nourished, but through some kind of multiplication.\nWhich multiplication cannot be natural: since the matter cannot\nnaturally extend beyond a certain fixed quantity; nor again does\nanything increase naturally, save either by rarefaction or the change\nof something else into it. Consequently the whole process of\ngeneration and nourishment, which are called \"natural forces,\" would\nbe miraculous. Which is altogether inadmissible.\n\nWherefore others have said that the human form can indeed begin to\nexist in some other matter, if we consider the human nature in\ngeneral: but not if we consider it as in this individual. For in the\nindividual the form remains confined to a certain determinate matter,\non which it is first imprinted at the generation of that individual,\nso that it never leaves that matter until the ultimate dissolution of\nthe individual. And this matter, say they, principally belongs to the\ntrue human nature. But since this matter does not suffice for the\nrequisite quantity, some other matter must be added, through the\nchange of food into the substance of the individual partaking\nthereof, in such a quantity as suffices for the increase required.\nAnd this matter, they state, belongs secondarily to the true human\nnature: because it is not required for the primary existence of the\nindividual, but for the quantity due to him. And if anything further\nis produced from the food, this does not belong to true human nature,\nproperly speaking. However, this also is inadmissible. First, because\nthis opinion judges of living bodies as of inanimate bodies; in\nwhich, although there be a power of generating their like in species,\nthere is not the power of generating their like in the individual;\nwhich power in living bodies is the nutritive power. Nothing,\ntherefore, would be added to living bodies by their nutritive power,\nif their food were not changed into their true nature. Secondly,\nbecause the active seminal power is a certain impression derived from\nthe soul of the begetter, as stated above (Q. 118, A. 1). Hence it\ncannot have a greater power in acting, than the soul from which it is\nderived. If, therefore, by the seminal power a certain matter truly\nassumes the form of human nature, much more can the soul, by the\nnutritive power, imprint the true form of human nature on the food\nwhich is assimilated. Thirdly, because food is needed not only for\ngrowth, else at the term of growth, food would be needful no longer;\nbut also to renew that which is lost by the action of natural heat.\nBut there would be no renewal, unless what is formed from the food,\ntook the place of what is lost. Wherefore just as that which was\nthere previously belonged to true human nature, so also does that\nwhich is formed from the food.\n\nTherefore, according to others, it must be said that the food is\nreally changed into the true human nature by reason of its assuming\nthe specific form of flesh, bones and such like parts. This is what\nthe Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 4): \"Food nourishes inasmuch as\nit is potentially flesh.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our Lord does not say that the \"whole\" of what enters\ninto the mouth, but \"all\"--because something from every kind of food\nis cast out into the privy. It may also be said that whatever is\ngenerated from food, can be dissolved by natural heat, and be cast\naside through the pores, as Jerome expounds the passage.\n\nReply Obj. 2: By flesh belonging to the species, some have understood\nthat which first receives the human species, which is derived from\nthe begetter: this, they say, lasts as long as the individual does.\nBy flesh belonging to the matter these understand what is generated\nfrom food: and this, they say, does not always remain, but as it\ncomes so it goes. But this is contrary to the mind of Aristotle. For\nhe says there, that \"just as in things which have their species in\nmatter\"--for instance, wood or stone--\"so in flesh, there is\nsomething belonging to the species, and something belonging to\nmatter.\" Now it is clear that this distinction has no place in\ninanimate things, which are not generated seminally, or nourished.\nAgain, since what is generated from food is united to, by mixing\nwith, the body so nourished, just as water is mixed with wine, as the\nPhilosopher says there by way of example: that which is added, and\nthat to which it is added, cannot be different natures, since they\nare already made one by being mixed together. Therefore there is no\nreason for saying that one is destroyed by natural heat, while the\nother remains.\n\nIt must therefore be said that this distinction of the Philosopher is\nnot of different kinds of flesh, but of the same flesh considered\nfrom different points of view. For if we consider the flesh according\nto the species, that is, according to that which is formed therein,\nthus it remains always: because the nature of flesh always remains\ntogether with its natural disposition. But if we consider flesh\naccording to matter, then it does not remain, but is gradually\ndestroyed and renewed: thus in the fire of a furnace, the form of\nfire remains, but the matter is gradually consumed, and other matter\nis substituted in its place.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The \"radical humor\" is said to comprise whatever the\nvirtue of the species is founded on. If this be taken away it cannot\nbe renewed; as when a man's hand or foot is amputated. But the\n\"nutritive humor\" is that which has not yet received perfectly the\nspecific nature, but is on the way thereto; such is the blood, and\nthe like. Wherefore if such be taken away, the virtue of the species\nremains in its root, which is not destroyed.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Every virtue of a passible body is weakened by\ncontinuous action, because such agents are also patient. Therefore\nthe transforming virtue is strong at first so as to be able to\ntransform not only enough for the renewal of what is lost, but also\nfor growth. Later on it can only transform enough for the renewal of\nwhat is lost, and then growth ceases. At last it cannot even do this;\nand then begins decline. In fine, when this virtue fails altogether,\nthe animal dies. Thus the virtue of wine that transforms the water\nadded to it, is weakened by further additions of water, so as to\nbecome at length watery, as the Philosopher says by way of example\n(De Gener. i, 5).\n\nReply Obj. 5: As the Philosopher says (De Gener. i, 5), when a\ncertain matter is directly transformed into fire, then fire is said\nto be generated anew: but when matter is transformed into a fire\nalready existing, then fire is said to be fed. Wherefore if the\nentire matter together loses the form of fire, and another matter\ntransformed into fire, there will be another distinct fire. But if,\nwhile one piece of wood is burning, other wood is laid on, and so on\nuntil the first piece is entirely consumed, the same identical fire\nwill remain all the time: because that which is added passes into\nwhat pre-existed. It is the same with living bodies, in which by\nmeans of nourishment that is renewed which was consumed by natural\nheat.\n_______________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 119, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Semen Is Produced from Surplus Food?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the semen is not produced from the\nsurplus food, but from the substance of the begetter. For Damascene\nsays (De Fide Orth. i, 8) that \"generation is a work of nature,\nproducing, from the substance of the begetter, that which is\nbegotten.\" But that which is generated is produced from the semen.\nTherefore the semen is produced from the substance of the begetter.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the son is like his father, in respect of that which\nhe receives from him. But if the semen from which something is\ngenerated, is produced from the surplus food, a man would receive\nnothing from his grandfather and his ancestors in whom the food never\nexisted. Therefore a man would not be more like to his grandfather or\nancestors, than to any other men.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the food of the generator is sometimes the flesh of\ncows, pigs and suchlike. If therefore, the semen were produced from\nsurplus food, the man begotten of such semen would be more akin to\nthe cow and the pig, than to his father or other relations.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. x, 20) that we were in\nAdam \"not only by seminal virtue, but also in the very substance of\nthe body.\" But this would not be, if the semen were produced from\nsurplus food. Therefore the semen is not produced therefrom.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher proves in many ways (De Gener.\nAnimal. i, 18) that \"the semen is surplus food.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ This question depends in some way on what has been\nstated above (A. 1; Q. 118, A. 1). For if human nature has a virtue\nfor the communication of its form to alien matter not only in\nanother, but also in its own subject; it is clear that the food which\nat first is dissimilar, becomes at length similar through the form\ncommunicated to it. Now it belongs to the natural order that a thing\nshould be reduced from potentiality to act gradually: hence in things\ngenerated we observe that at first each is imperfect and is\nafterwards perfected. But it is clear that the common is to the\nproper and determinate, as imperfect is to perfect: therefore we see\nthat in the generation of an animal, the animal is generated first,\nthen the man or the horse. So therefore food first of all receives a\ncertain common virtue in regard to all the parts of the body, which\nvirtue is subsequently determinate to this or that part.\n\nNow it is not possible that the semen be a kind of solution from what\nis already transformed into the substance of the members. For this\nsolution, if it does not retain the nature of the member it is taken\nfrom, it would no longer be of the nature of the begetter, and would\nbe due to a process of corruption; and consequently it would not have\nthe power of transforming something else into the likeness of that\nnature. But if it retained the nature of the member it is taken from,\nthen, since it is limited to a certain part of the body, it would not\nhave the power of moving towards (the production of) the whole nature,\nbut only the nature of that part. Unless one were to say that the\nsolution is taken from all the parts of the body, and that it retains\nthe nature of each part. Thus the semen would be a small animal in\nact; and generation of animal from animal would be a mere division, as\nmud is generated from mud, and as animals which continue to live after\nbeing cut in two: which is inadmissible.\n\nIt remains to be said, therefore, that the semen is not something\nseparated from what was before the actual whole; rather is it the\nwhole, though potentially, having the power, derived from the soul of\nthe begetter, to produce the whole body, as stated above (A. 1; Q.\n108, A. 1). Now that which is in potentiality to the whole, is that\nwhich is generated from the food, before it is transformed into the\nsubstance of the members. Therefore the semen is taken from this. In\nthis sense the nutritive power is said to serve the generative power:\nbecause what is transformed by the nutritive power is employed as\nsemen by the generative power. A sign of this, according to the\nPhilosopher, is that animals of great size, which require much food,\nhave little semen in proportion to the size of their bodies, and\ngenerate seldom; in like manner fat men, and for the same reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Generation is from the substance of the begetter in\nanimals and plants, inasmuch as the semen owes its virtue to the\nform of the begetter, and inasmuch as it is in potentiality to the\nsubstance.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The likeness of the begetter to the begotten is on\naccount not of the matter, but of the form of the agent that\ngenerates its like. Wherefore in order for a man to be like his\ngrandfather, there is no need that the corporeal seminal matter\nshould have been in the grandfather; but that there be in the semen a\nvirtue derived from the soul of the grandfather through the father.\nIn like manner the third objection is answered. For kinship is not in\nrelation to matter, but rather to the derivation of the forms.\n\nReply Obj. 4: These words of Augustine are not to be understood as\nthough the immediate seminal virtue, or the corporeal substance from\nwhich this individual was formed were actually in Adam: but so that\nboth were in Adam as in principle. For even the corporeal matter,\nwhich is supplied by the mother, and which he calls the corporeal\nsubstance, is originally derived from Adam: and likewise the active\nseminal power of the father, which is the immediate seminal virtue\n(in the production) of this man.\n\nBut Christ is said to have been in Adam according to the \"corporeal\nsubstance,\" not according to the seminal virtue. Because the matter\nfrom which His Body was formed, and which was supplied by the Virgin\nMother, was derived from Adam; whereas the active virtue was not\nderived from Adam, because His Body was not formed by the seminal\nvirtue of a man, but by the operation of the Holy Ghost. For \"such a\nbirth was becoming to Him,\" [*Hymn for Vespers at Christmas; Breviary,\nO. P.], WHO IS ABOVE ALL GOD FOR EVER BLESSED. Amen.","title":"Summa Theologica, Part I (Prima Pars): From the Complete American Edition","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":501211}