{"collection":"myth-cosmogony","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_17802/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_17802","id":"gutenberg_17802","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/17802","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Essays, Letters & Speeches","Category: Mythology, Legends & Folklore","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Psychiatry/Psychology","Myth","Psychology, Religious","Religion -- Philosophy"],"text":"Produced by R. Cedron, Janet Blenkinship and the Online\nDistributed Proofreaders Europe at http://dp.rastko.net\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTHE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC SERIES.\n\nVOL. XXXVIII.\n\n\n\n\nMYTH AND SCIENCE\n\nAN ESSAY\n\nBY\n\nTITO VIGNOLI\n\n\n\n\nTHIRD EDITION\n\n\nLONDON\nKEGAN PAUL, TRENCH & CO., 1 PATERNOSTER SQU.\n1885\n\n\n\n\n  CONTENTS.\n\n\n  ON IDEAS AND SOURCES OF MYTH                                         1\n\n  ANIMAL SENSATION AND PERCEPTION                                     48\n\n  HUMAN SENSATION AND PERCEPTION                                      68\n\n  THE STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM                                       104\n\n  THE ANIMAL AND HUMAN EXERCISE OF THE INTELLECT\n  ON THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS                                        116\n\n  INTRINSIC LAW OF THE FACULTY OF APPREHENSION                       135\n\n  THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF MYTH AND SCIENCE                       155\n\n  ON DREAMS, ILLUSIONS, NORMAL AND ABNORMAL HALLUCINATIONS, DELIRIUM,\n  AND MADNESS--CONCLUSION                                            241\n\n\n\n\nMYTH AND SCIENCE.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER I.\n\nTHE IDEAS AND SOURCES OF MYTH.\n\n\nMyth, as it is understood by us, and as It will be developed and\nexplained in this work, cannot be defined in summary terms, since its\nmultiform and comprehensive nature embraces and includes all primitive\naction, as well as much which is consecutive and historical in the\nintelligence and feelings of man, with respect to the immediate and the\nreflex interpretation of the world, of the Individual, and of the\nsociety in which our common life is passed.\n\nWe hold that myth is, in its most general and comprehensive nature, the\nspontaneous and imaginative form in which the human intelligence and\nhuman emotions conceive and represent themselves and things in general;\nit is the psychical and physical mode in which man projects himself into\nall those phenomena which he is able to apprehend and perceive.[1]\n\nWe do not propose to consider in this treatise the myths peculiar to one\npeople, nor to one race; we do not seek to estimate the intrinsic value\nof myths at the time when they were already developed among various\npeoples, and constituted into an Olympus, or special religion; we do not\nwish to determine the special and historical cause of their\nmanifestations in the life of any one people, since we now refrain from\nentering on the field of comparative mythology. It is the scope and\nobject of our modest researches to trace the strictly primitive origin\nof the human myths as a whole; to reach the ultimate fact, and the\ncauses of this fact, whence myth, in its necessary and universal form,\nis evolved and has its origin.\n\nWe must therefore seek to discover whether, in addition to the various\ncauses assigned for myth in earlier ages, and still more in modern times\nby our great philologists, ethnologists, and philosophers of every\nschool--causes which are for the most part extrinsic--there be not a\nreason more deeply seated in our nature, which is first manifested as a\nnecessary and spontaneous function of the intelligence, and which is\ntherefore intrinsic and inevitable.\n\nIn this case myth will appear to us, not as an accident in the life of\nprimitive peoples varying in intensity and extent, not as a vague\nconception of things due to the erroneous interpretation of words and\nphrases, nor again as the fanciful creation of ignorant minds; but it\nwill appear to be a special faculty of the human mind, inspired by\nemotions which accompany and animate its products. Since this innate\nfaculty of myth is indigenous and common to all men, it will not only be\nthe portion of all peoples, but of each individual in every age, in\nevery race, whatever may be their respective conditions.\n\nMyth, therefore, will not be resolved by us into a manifestation of an\nobsolete age, or of peoples still in a barbarous and savage state, nor\nas part of the cycle through which nations and individuals have,\nrespectively passed, or have nearly passed; but it remains to this day,\nin spite of the prevailing civilisation which has greatly increased and\nis still increasing, it still persists as a mode of physical and\nintellectual force in the organic elements which constitute it.\n\nNor, let it be observed, do I say that such a mythical faculty persists\nas such only among the ignorant masses in town or country, in the form\nof those very ancient superstitions which have been collected with\nimmense labour by learned mythologists and ethnologists; on the\ncontrary, I maintain that the mythical faculty still exists in all men,\nindependently of this survival of old superstitions, to whatever people\nand class they may belong; and it will continue to exist as an innate\nfunction of the intelligence, if not with respect to the substance,\nwhich may alter, at any rate in the mode of its acts and proceedings.\n\nI fear that this opinion will appear at first sight to be paradoxical\nand chimerical, since it is well known that the mythical conception of\nthe world and its origin is gradually disappearing among civilized\nnations, and it is supposed to be altogether extinct among men of\nculture and intelligence. Yet I flatter myself, perhaps too rashly, that\nby the time he reaches the end of this work, the reader will be\nconvinced of the truth of my assertion, since it is proved by so many\nfacts, and the psychical law from, which it results is so clear.\n\nIt must not, however, be forgotten that, in addition to the mythical\nfaculty of our minds, there exists the scientific faculty, the other\nfactor of a perfect intellectual life; the latter is most powerful in\ncertain races, and must in time prevail over the former, which in its\nobjective form precedes it; yet they are subjectively combined in\npractice and are indissolubly united through life.\n\nUndoubtedly neither the mythical nor the scientific faculty is equal and\nidentical in all peoples, any more than they are equal and identical in\nindividuals; but they subsist together, while varying in intensity and\ndegree, since they are both necessary functions of the intelligence.\n\nWhether we content ourselves with studying the mental and social\nconditions in the lower types of modern peoples, or go back to the\nearliest times, we find men everywhere and always possessed of the power\nof speech, and holding mythical superstitions, it may be of the rudest\nand most elementary kind; so also do we find men possessed of rational\nideas, although they may be very simple and empirical. They have some\nknowledge of the causes of things, of periods in the phenomena of\nnature, which they know how to apply to the habits and necessities of\ntheir social and individual lives.\n\nNo one, for example, would deny that many mythical superstitions, and\nfanciful beliefs in invisible powers, existed among the now extinct\nTasmanians, and are now found among the Andaman islanders, the Fuegians,\nthe Australians, the Cingalese Veddahs, and other rude and uncultured\nsavages. On the other hand, those who are acquainted with their mode of\nlife find that savages are not absolutely devoid of intellectual\nactivity of an empirical kind, since they partly understand the natural\ncauses of some phenomena, and are able, in a rational, not an arbitrary\nmanner, to ascribe to laws and the necessities of things many facts\nrelating to the individual and to society. They are, therefore, not\nwithout the scientific as well as the mythical faculty making due\nallowance for their intellectual condition; and these primitive and\nnatural instincts are due to the physical and intellectual organism of\nhuman nature.\n\nIn order to pursue this important inquiry into the first and final cause\nof the origin of myth, it is evidently not enough to make a laborious\nand varied collection of myths, and of the primitive superstitions of\nall peoples, so as to exhaust the immense field of modern ethnography.\nNor is it enough to consider the various normal and abnormal conditions\nof psychical phenomena, nor to undertake the comparative study of\nlanguages, to ascertain how far their speech will reveal the primitive\nbeliefs of various races, and the obscure metaphorical sayings which\ngave birth to many myths. It is also necessary to subject to careful\nexamination the simplest elementary acts of the mind, in their physical\nand psychical complexity, in order to discover in their spontaneous\naction the transcendental fact which inevitably involves the genesis of\nthe same myth, the primary source whence it is diffused by subsequent\nreflex efforts in various times and varying forms.\n\nIn speaking of the transcendental fact, it must not be supposed that I\nallude to certain well-known _a priori_ speculations, which are opposed\nto my temper of mind and to my mode of teaching. I only use the term\ntranscendental because this is actually the primitive condition of the\nfact in its inevitable beginning, whatever form the mythical\nrepresentation may subsequently take. This fact is not peculiar to any\nindividual, people, or race, but it is manifested as an essential\norganism of the human character, which is in all cases universal,\npermanent, and uniform.\n\nIn order to give a clear explanation of my estimate of the _a priori_\nidea, which also takes its place as the factor of experimental and\npositive teaching, I must observe that for those who belong to the\nhistorical and evolutionary school, _a priori_, so far as respects any\norganism, habit, and psychological constitution in the whole animal\nkingdom, in which man is also included, signifies whatever in them is\nfixed and permanently organized; whatever is perpetuated by the\nindefinite repetition of habits, organs, and functions, by means of the\nheredity of ages. The whole history of organisms abounds with positive\nand repeated proofs of this fact, which no one can doubt who is not\nabsolutely ignorant of elementary science. Every day adds to the number\nof these proofs, demonstrating one of those truths which become the\ncommon property of nations.\n\n_A priori_ is therefore reduced by us to the modification of organs in\ntheir physical and psychical constitution, as it has ultimately taken\nplace in the organism by the successive evolutions of forms which have\ngradually become permanent, and are perpetuated by embryogenic\nreproduction. This reproduction is in its turn the absolute condition of\npsychical and organic facts, which are thus manifested as primitive\nfacts in the new life of the individual. By this law, the psychical\nfacts, whether elementary or complex, as they occur in the individual up\nto the point of their evolution, have the necessary conditions of\npossibility, and may therefore be termed a _priori_ with respect to the\nlaws of evolution, and to the hereditary permanence of acts performed in\nthe former environment of the organism at the time when they appeared.\n\nThis conception of a _priori_ is, it must be admitted, very different\nfrom that of transcendental philosophers, who seek to prove either that\nan independent artificer has not only produced the various organic forms\nin their present complexity, and has specially provided the spiritual\nsubject with its category of thought, independently of all experience;\nor else they assert the intrinsic existence of such forms in the spirit,\nfrom the beginning of time.\n\nIn this way, as we have already said, we must not only collect the facts\nwhich abound in history and ethnology respecting the general teaching of\nmyths, but we must also observe introspectively, and by pursuing the\nexperimental method, the primitive and fundamental psychical facts, so\nas to discover the a priori conditions of the myth itself. We must\nascertain, from a careful psychological examination, the absolutely\nprimitive origin of all mythical representations, and how these are in\ntheir turn the actual historical result of the same conditions, as they\nexisted prior to their manifestations.\n\nIt must not be supposed that in this primary fact, and in these _a\npriori_ psychical and organic conditions, we shall find the ulterior\ncause of the various and manifold forms, or of the successive evolution\nof myths. This would be a grave mistake, equal to that of\ntranscendentalists, who imagine that the laws which actually exist, and\nthe order of cosmic and historic phenomena may be determined from the\nindependent exercise of their own thoughts, although such laws and order\ncan only be traced and discovered by experience and the observation of\nfacts. In the _a priori_ conditions of the psychical and organic nature,\nand in the elementary acts which outwardly result from them, we shall\nonly trace the origin and necessary source of myth, not the variable\nforms of its successive evolution.\n\nThe ulterior form, so far as the substance of the myth and its various\nmodifications are concerned, is in great part the reflex work of man;\nits aspect changes in accordance with the attitude and force of the\nfaculties of individuals, peoples and races, and it depends on an energy\nto which the _a priori_ conditions, as we have just defined them, do not\nstrictly apply so far as the determinate form is concerned.\n\nIt is precisely in this ulterior work of the evolution of myth, which in\nthe elementary fact of its primitive essence had its origin in the\npredisposition of mind and body, that we may discern the interchangeable\ngerm and origin both of myth and science. If, therefore; the rationale\nof science cannot be found in the general form of mythical\nrepresentations, the matter which serves to exercise the mind; yet the\nmode of its exercise, and of the logical and psychical faculty, and the\nspontaneous method pursued, are identical: the two mythical and\nscientific faculties are, in fact, considered in themselves, fused into\none.\n\nAs far as the origin of myth is concerned, the mode of considering its\nevolution, and its organic connection with science, we differ from other\nmythologists as to the sources to which they trace this immense\nelaboration of the human intelligence. We may be mistaken, but we are in\nany case entering on unexplored ways, and if we go astray, the boldness\nof an enterprise which we undertake with diffidence pleads for\nindulgence.\n\nOmitting to notice the well-known opinions on the origin of myth which\nwere current in classic antiquity, in the Graeco-Latin world, or in\nIndia,[2] we restrict our inquiry to modern times subsequent to\nCreuzer's learned and extensive labours. In a more scientific method,\nand divested of prejudice, we propose to trace the sources of myth in\ngeneral, and among various peoples in particular.\n\nThe science of languages, or comparative philology, is the chief\ninstrument required in such researches, and much light has been acquired\nin our days, which has led to surprising results, at least within the\nsphere of the special races to which it has been applied. The names of\nKuhn, Weber, Sonne, Benfey, Grimm, Schwartz, Hanusch, Maury, Breal,\nPictet, l'Ascoli, De Gubernatis, and many others, are well known for\ntheir marvellous discoveries in this new and arduous field. They have\nnot only fused into one ancient and primitive image the various myths\nscattered in different forms among the Aryan races, but they have\nrevealed the original conception, as it existed in the earliest meaning\nof words before their dispersion. Hence came the multiplicity of myths,\ndeveloped in brilliant anthropomorphic groups in different theologies,\ngradually becoming more simple as time went on, then uniting in the\nvague primitive personification of the winds, the storms, the sun, the\ndawn; in short, of astral and meteorological phenomena.\n\nOn the other hand, Max Mueller, whose theory of original myths is\npeculiar to himself, has made use of this philological instrument to\nprove that the Aryan myths may at any rate be referred to a single\nsource, namely to metaphor, or to the double meaning of words, due to\nthe poverty of primitive languages. He calls this double meaning the\ninfirmity of speech.\n\nI do not deny that many conclusions to which some or other of the great\nauthorities just mentioned have arrived may be as true as they are\nsurprising. I also admit that this may be a certain method of\ndistinguishing the various mythical representations in their early\nbeginnings from their subsequent and complex forms. But in all the facts\nwhich have been ascertained, or which may hereafter be ascertained, from\nthe comparative study of the languages of different races, no\nexplanation is afforded of the fact that into the natural and primitive\nphenomena of myth, or, as Mueller holds, into its various metaphors, man\nhas so far infused his own life, that they have, like man himself, a\nsubjective and deliberate consciousness and force. It seems to me that\nthis problem has not yet been solved by scholars; they have stopped\nshort after establishing the primary fact, and are content to affirm\nthat such is human nature, which projects itself on external things.[3]\n\nThis explanation establishes a true and universal fact, but it is not\nthe explanation of the fact itself; yet it is not, as we shall see,\nincapable of solution, and it appears to me that the ultimate source\nwhence myths really proceed has not been reached.\n\nAgain, if such an opinion and such a method can give us the key to the\npolytheistic origin of the respective Olympuses of classic Greece and\nRome, it leaves unexplained the numerous and manifold superstitions\nwhich philology itself proves to have existed prior to the origin of\ncosmic myths. These superstitions can by no means be referred to a\ncommon source, to the astral and meteorological myths, some of which\nwere prior, while others were subsequent to these superstitions.\n\nTaking, therefore, the general and more important opinions which are now\ncurrent respecting the origin of myth, it may be said that in addition\nto the systems already mentioned, two others are presented to us with\nthe weight of authority and knowledge; these, while they do not renounce\nthe appliances and linguistic analyses of the former, try to unite all\nthe mythical sources of mankind in general into a single head, whence\nall myths, beliefs, superstitions, and religions have their origin.\nWhile France and Germany and some other nations have achieved\ndistinction in this field, England has been especially remarkable for\nthe nature of her attempts, and the vastness of her achievements in\nevery direction. We pass over many great minds which were first in the\nfield in order to dwell on the two men who, as it seems to me, have\nsummed up the knowledge of others, and have formulated a theory in great\nmeasure peculiar to themselves.\n\nTylor's well known name will at once suggest itself, and that of Herbert\nSpencer; the former, in his great work on the \"Early History of Mankind\nand of Civilization,\" and other writings, the latter, in the first\nvolume of his \"Sociology,\" and in his earlier works, have respectively\nestablished the doctrine of the universal origin of myths on the basis\nof ethnography, on the psychological examination of the primary facts of\nthe intelligence, and on the conception of the evolution of the general\nphenomena of nature.\n\nIt would, indeed, be difficult to excel the great mind, the acute\ngenius, and the universal learning of Herbert Spencer, who has been\ntermed the modern Aristotle by a learned writer; and this is high praise\nwhen we remember how much knowledge is necessary in our times, and in\nthe present conditions of science, before any one can be deemed worthy\nof such a comparison. But with due respect to so great a man, and with\nthe diffidence of one who is only his disciple, I venture to think that\nHerbert Spencer's attempt to revive, at any rate in part, Evemero's\ntheory of the origin of myths will not be successful, and it may prove\ninjurious to science. First, because all myths cannot be reduced, to\npersonal or historical facts; and next, because the primitive value of\nmany of them is so clear and distinct in their mode of expression that\nit is not possible to derive them from any source but the direct\npersonification of natural phenomena. Nor does it appear to me to be\nalways and altogether certain that the origin of myths, also caused by\nthe double personality discerned in the shadow of the body itself, in\nthe images reflected by liquid substances, in echoes and visions of the\nnight, can be all ascribed to the worship of the dead.\n\nThe worship of the dead is undoubtedly universal. There is no people,\nancient or modern, civilized or savage, by whom it has not been\npractised; the fact is proved by history, philology and ethnography. But\nif the worship of the dead is a constant form, manifested everywhere, it\nflourishes and is interwoven with a multitude of other mythical forms\nand superstitious beliefs which cannot in any way be reduced to this\nsingle form of worship, nor be derived from it. This worship is\nundoubtedly one of the most abundant sources of myth, and Spencer, with\nhis profound knowledge and keen discernment, was able to discuss the\nhypothesis as it deserves; whence his book, even from this point of\nview, is a masterpiece of analysis, like all those which issue from his\npowerful mind.\n\nYet even if the truth of this doctrine should be in great measure\nproved, the question must still be asked how it happens that man\nvivifies and personifies his own image in duplicate, or else the\napparitions of dreams or their reflections, and the echoes of nature,\nand ultimately the spirits of the dead.\n\nTylor developed his theory more distinctly and at greater length, and he\nbrought to bear upon it great genius, extraordinary knowledge, and a\nsound critical faculty, so that his work must be regarded as one of the\nmost remarkable in the history of human thought. He belongs to the\nschool of evolution, and his book strongly confirms the truths of that\ntheory; since from the primitive germs of myth, from the various and\nmost simple forms of fetishes among all races, he gradually evolves\nthese rude images into more, complex and anthropomorphic forms, until he\nattains the limits of natural and positive science. He admits that there\nare in mankind various normal and abnormal sources of myth, but he comes\nto the ultimate conclusion that they all depend on man's peculiar and\nspontaneous tendency to _animate_ all things, whence his general\nprinciple has taken the name of _animism_. It is unnecessary to say much\nin praise of this learned work, since it is known to all, and cannot be\ntoo much studied by those who wish for instruction on such subjects.\n\nBut while assenting to his general principle, which remains as the sole\nultimate source of all mythical representation, I repeat the usual\ninquiry; what causes man to animate all the objects which surround him,\nand what is the cause of this established and universal fact? The\nmarvellous ethnographic learning of the author, and his profound\nanalysis, do not answer this question, and the problem still remains\nunsolved.\n\nIt is evident from what we have said, that the theory of the origin of\nmyth has of late made real and important progress in different\ndirections; it has been constituted by fitting methods, and with\ndispassionate research, laying aside fanciful hypotheses and systems\nmore or less prompted by a desire to support or confute principles which\nhave no connection with science. We have now in great measure arrived at\nthe fundamental facts whence myth is derived, although, if I do not\ndeceive myself, the ultimate fact, and the cause of this fact, have not\nyet been ascertained; namely, for what reason man personifies all\nphenomena, first vaguely projecting himself into them, and then\nexercising a distinct purpose of anthropomorphism, until in this way he\nhas gradually modified the world according to his own image.\n\nIf we are able to solve this difficult problem, a fact most important to\nscience and to the advancement of these special studies must result from\nit: the assimilation and concentration of all the sources of myth into a\nsingle act, whether normal or abnormal to humanity. To say that animism\nis the general principle of myth does not reduce the different sources\nwhence it proceeds to a single psychical and organic act, since they\nremain distinct and separate in their respective orbits. To attain our\nobject, it is necessary that the direct personification of natural\nphenomena, as well as the indirect personification of metaphor; the\ninfusion of life into a man's own shadow, into reflex images and dreams;\nthe belief in the reality of normal illusions, as well as of the\nabnormal hallucinations of delirium, of madness, and of all forms of\nnervous affections; all these things must be resolved into a single\ngenerating act which explains and includes them. It must be shown how\nand why there is found in man the possibility of modifying all these\nmythical forms into an image supposed to be external to himself, living\nand personal. For if we are enabled to reply scientifically to such\ninquiries, we shall not only have concentrated in a single fact all the\nmost diverse normal and abnormal forms of myth peculiar to man, but we\nshall also have given an ulterior and analytic explanation of this fact.\n\nI certainly do not presume to declare myself competent to effect so\nmuch, and I am more conscious than my critics how far I fall short of my\nhigh aim; but the modest attempt, made with the resolution to accept all\ncriticism offered with courtesy and good faith, does not imply culpable\npresumption nor excessive vanity.\n\nI regret to say that it is not on this point only that my theory of myth\ndiffers from that of others; I shall not be satisfied if I only succeed\nin discovering in man the primitive act which issues the general\nanimism of things, which becomes the substance of the ulterior myths in\ntheir intellectual and historical evolution. It is evident, at least to\nthose who do not cling obstinately to old traditions, that man is\nevolved from the animal kingdom. The comparative anatomy, physiology,\nand psychology of man and other animals distinctly show their intimate\nconnection in conformation, tissues, organs, and functions, and above\nall, in consciousness and intelligence. This truth, deduced from simple\nobservation and experiment, must lead to the conviction that all issued\nfrom the same germ, and had the same genesis.\n\nFor those who do not cherish pedantic and sectarian prejudices, this\nhypothesis is changed into assurance by modern discoveries; it is shown\nin the transformations and transitions of paleontological forms; in the\nembryogenic evolution of so many animals, man included, which, according\nto their various species, reveals the lower types whence they issued; in\nthe successive forms taken by the foetus; in the powerful and\nindisputable laws of selection; in the modifications by adaptation of\nthe different organisms, and in the effects of isolation. This is the\nonly rational explanation, confirmed as it is by fresh facts every day,\nof the multiplicity and variety of organic forms in the lapse of time;\nunless, indeed, we ascribe such variety to a miracle, even more\ndifficult to accept than the difficulties of the opposite-theory.\n\nI admit that evidence for the complete demonstration of this theory is\nsometimes wanting; the gaps between the fossil fauna and flora and those\nof modern times are neither few nor unimportant; but on the other hand,\nsuch proofs are accumulating, and the gaps are filled up every day, so\nthat we may almost assert that in some way or other, by means somewhat\ndifferent from those on which we now rely, the great rational principle\nof evolution will be successfully and permanently established.\n\nIt is more than twenty years since, in ways and by study peculiar to\nourselves, we first devoted ourselves to this theory, and while we gave\na conscientious consideration to opposite theories, so as to estimate\nwith sincerity their importance and value, we could not relinquish our\nconviction that every advance in physical, biological, and social\nscience served to confirm the theory of evolution.\n\nIt must not be supposed that I make any dogmatic assertion, which might\npossibly be erroneous, when I say that the evidence of facts does not\ncontradict the assumptions of modern science. Sincere convictions should\noffend no one, nor do they indicate an a priori conflict with other\nbeliefs. Every one is justified in thinking his own thoughts when he\nspeaks with moderation and supports his peculiar opinions with a certain\namount of learning.\n\nIt is not denied, even by those who oppose modern theories respecting\nthe genesis of organisms, that there are, excluding some psychical\nelements, many and important points of resemblance between man and\nanimals in the exercise of their consciousness, intelligence, and\nemotions, if indeed they are not identically the same. The comparative\npsychology of man and animals plainly shows that the perceptions, both\nin their respective organs and in their mode of action, act in the same\nway, especially in the higher animals; and the origin, movements, and\nassociations of the imagination and the emotions are likewise identical.\nNor will it be disputed that we find in animals implicit memory,\njudgment, and reasoning, the inductions and deductions from one special\nfact to another, the passions, the physiological language of gestures,\nexpressive of internal emotions, and even, in the case of gregarious\nanimals, the combined action to effect certain purposes; so that, as far\nas their higher orders are concerned, animals may be regarded as a\nsimple and undeveloped form of man, while man, by his later psychical\nand organic evolution, has become a developed and complex animal.[4]\n\nIn my book on the fundamental law of intelligence in the animal kingdom,\nI attempted to show this great truth, and to formulate a principle\ncommon to all animals in the exercise of their psychical emotions, by\nsetting forth the essential elements as they are generally displayed. I\nthink I was not far from the truth in establishing a law which seems\nindubitable; although, while some men whose opinion is worthy of esteem\nhave accepted it, other very competent judges have objected to some\nparts of my theory, but without convincing me of error. I repeat my\nconclusions here, since they are necessary to the theory of the genesis\nof myth, which I propose to explain in this work. I hold the complete\nidentity between man and animals to be established by the adequate\nconsideration of the faculties, the psychical elements of consciousness\nand intelligence, and the mode of their spontaneous exercise; and I\nbelieve the superiority of man to consist not so much in new faculties\nas in the reflex effect upon themselves of those he possesses in common\nwith the animals. The old adage confirms this theory: _Homo duplex_.\n\nNo one now doubts that animals feel, hear, remember, and the like, while\nman is able to exercise his will, to feel, to remember, deliberately to\nconsider all his actions and functions, because he not only possesses\nthe direct and spontaneous intuition with respect to himself and things\nin general which he has in common with animals, but he has an intuitive\nknowledge of that intuition itself, and in this way he multiplies within\nhimself the exercise of his whole psychical life. We find the ultimate\ncause of this return upon himself, and his intuition of things, in his\ndeliberate will, which does not only immediately command his body and\nhis manifold relative functions, but also the complex range of his\npsychical acts. This fact, which as I believe has not been observed\nbefore, is of great importance. It is manifest that the difference\nbetween man and other animals does not consist in the diversity or\ndiscrepancy of the elements of the intelligence, but in its reflex\naction on itself; an action which certainly has its conditions fixed by\nthe organic and physiological composition of the brain.\n\nIf it should be said that the traditional opinion of science, as well as\nthe general sentence of mankind, have always regarded reflection as the\nbasis of the difference between animals and man, so that there is no\nnovelty in our principle, the assertion is erroneous. Reflection, as an\ninward psychical fact, has certainly been observed by psychologists and\nphilosophers in all civilized times, and instinctively by every one; nor\ncould it be otherwise, since reflection is one of the facts most evident\nto human consciousness. But although the fact, or the intrinsic and\ncharacteristic action of human thought has been observed, and has often\nbeen discussed and analyzed in some of its elements, yet its genesis has\nnot been declared, nor has its ultimate cause been discovered. We\npropose to discover this ultimate cause, and we refer it to the exercise\nof the will over all the elements and acts which constitute human\nintelligence; an intelligence only differing from that of animals by\nthis inward and deliberate fact, which enables man to consider and\nexamine all his acts, thus logically doubling their range. This\nintelligence has in animals a simple and direct influence on their\nbodies and on the external world, in proportion to their diverse forms\nand inherited instincts; while in man, owing to his commanding attitude,\nit falls back upon itself, and gives rise to the inquiring and\nreflective habit of science.\n\nWe do not, therefore, divide man from other animals, but rather assert\nthat many proofs and subtle analyses show the identity of their\nintelligence in its fundamental elements, while the difference is only\nthe result of a reaction of the same intelligence on itself. Such a\ntheory does not in any way interrupt the natural evolution and genesis\nof the animal kingdom, while the distinctive peculiarity of man is shown\nin an act which, as I believe, clearly explains the new faculty of\nreason acquired by him.\n\nI must admit that in speaking of the psychical faculty as a force which\npossesses laws peculiar to itself, it has appeared to a learned and\ncompetent judge that I have conceded a real existence to this faculty,\nindependently of the physiological conditions through which it manifests\nitself, which might be called a mythical personality in the constitution\nof the world. If I had really made such an assertion, it would be an\nerror which I am perhaps more ready than others to repudiate, as it\nwill appear in the present work. I am far from blaming the courteous\ncritics who allege such objections to my theory, and indeed I am\nhonoured by their notice. I must blame myself for not having, in my\ndesire to be brief, sufficiently defined my conception.\n\nI hold the psychical manifestation to be not only conditioned by the\norganism, to speak scientifically, and to be rendered physiologically\npossible by these conditions, but I consider it to be of the same nature\nas the other so-called forces of the universe; such, for example, as the\nmanifestations of light, of electricity, of magnetism, and the like.\nWhen physicists speak of these forces--if the necessities of language\nand the brevity of the explanation constrain us to adopt the term\nforces, as though they were real substances--they certainly do not\nbelieve, nor wish others to believe, that they are really such. It is\nwell known that such expressions are used to signify the appearance\nunder certain circumstances of some special phenomena which group\nthemselves by their mode and power of manifestation into one generic\nconception as a summary of the whole. They always take place, relatively\nto these circumstances, in the same mode and with the same power, so\nthat they may at once be experimentally distinguished from others which\nhave been grouped together in like manner.\n\nSuch manifestations do not imply a real cosmic entity of these forces,\nas if they were independent of the matter whence they issue; they are\nsimply determinate and determinate modes of motions, of actions, and\nreactions in the elements of the world. For if magnetism appears to\nreveal itself in determinate elements, its modes of manifestation are\npeculiar to itself, and its efficacy with respect to other forces is\nalso peculiar; yet it by no means follows that it possesses a\nsubstantial entity, or, as it were, displays personal activity among\nphenomena; it rather indicates that the elements of the world will,\nunder given circumstances, act reciprocally in such a manner that we\nperceive phenomena which group themselves together and which we call\nmagnetic or magnetism. And this explanation applies to other cases.\n\nI therefore, speaking of psychical force in general, used the same\nterms; I certainly did not wish to constitute it into a personal and\nmaterial entity of the universe, but I intended to assert that among the\nmanifestations of the various forces of the world, defined as above,\nthere is also this psychical force, characterized by phenomena and laws\npeculiar to itself, and which, as I have shown, is when exercised one of\nthe greatest factors of the world. I repeat that if this force varies\nwith the greater or less perfection of the organisms in which, it is\nmanifested, yet it possesses a law and fundamental elements by which it\nis so constituted that the same results will ensue in the simplest as\nin the most complex form. This is the case with all the other forces of\nnature; they may be modified by existing circumstances, and yet they\nhave laws and definite elements to distinguish them from all others.\nThese forces, however, while they are distinct in their peculiar\nmanifestations, and take effect through special qualities, quantities,\nand rhythmic movements, are all fused together in the infinite and\neternal unity which constitutes the life of the universe. Neither here\nnor in my former work is there any question of that most difficult\nproblem, the individual personality of man.[5]\n\nSince there is between man and animals a relationship and a psychical\nidentity, as well as a genetic continuity of evolution, it is impossible\nto deny that there is also in some degree a like continuity in the\nproducts and acts of the consciousness, the emotions, and the\nintelligence. This is asserted or admitted even by those who do not like\nto hear of the genetic continuity of evolution, nor is there now any\nschool of thought which impugns such a truth. If this be true, as it\nundoubtedly is, and since we are treating of the genesis of myth in its\nearliest beginning, we will endeavour, with daring prompted by the\ntheory of evolution, to discover if the first germ of these\nrepresentations may not have already existed in the animal kingdom\nbefore it was evolved in man in the fetishtic and anthropomorphic form.\nThis is an arduous but necessary inquiry, to which I am impelled by the\ndoctrine of evolution, as it is properly understood, as well as by the\nuniversal logic of nature.\n\nIf I were to consider myth as it has ultimately been developed in man,\nit would be a strange and absurd attempt to trace out any points of\nresemblance with animals, who are altogether devoid of the logical\nfaculty which leads to such development. But if, on the contrary, we\nendeavour to trace the earliest, spontaneous, and direct elements of\nmyth as a product of animal emotions and implicit intelligence, such\nresearch becomes not only legitimate but necessary; since the instrument\nis the same, the effects ought also to be the same.\n\nWe have already said that the fact has been observed and generally\nadmitted that the primary origin of myth in its essential elements\nconsists in the personification or animation of all extrinsic phenomena,\nas well as of the dreams, illusions, and hallucinations which are\nintrinsic. It is agreed that this animation is not the reflex and\ndeliberate act of man, but that it is the spontaneous and immediate act\nof the human intelligence in its elementary consciousness and emotions.\nIt must therefore be evident that this vague and continual animation of\nthings ought to be found also in animals, especially in those of the\nhigher types, in whom consciousness, the emotions, and the intelligence\nare implicitly identical with those of man. Consequently, that which is\nat first sight absurd becomes obvious and natural, and the fact is only\nstrange and inexplicable to those who have not carefully considered it.\n\nWe must, however, declare that this primary fact is not irreducible, and\nthat science ought not to be content to stop there, but should endeavour\nto explain and resolve it into its elements, so as to be able to say we\nhave reached the point at which the genesis of myth really begins. This\naim can only be attained by the decomposition by analysis of the\nprimitive fact. Since intelligence in its essential elements, and in its\ninnate and implicit exercise, appears to be the same in man and in\nanimals, it is necessary to reduce the analysis of animal nature to a\nprimary psychical fact, in order to see whether by this fact, which is\nidentical also in man, the generating element of myth is really\nrevealed.\n\nI propose to show that this research will reveal truths hitherto\nunattained, and explain the general law, not merely of the extrinsic\nprocess of science and of myth, but also of civilization.\n\nStarting from this wide basis, we must trace, step by step, the dawn,\ndevelopment, and gradual disappearance of myth. Since it is our\nbusiness to consider science as well as myth, and their respective\nrelations in the evolution common to both, we must, as briefly as\npossible in the present work, pause to consider these two factors of the\nhuman mind, observing the beginnings, conditions, and modes in which the\none arose and gradually disappeared, while the other advanced and\ntriumphed. We must not only regard the progress and transformation of\nreligions, but also of science, as it is revealed in the philosophic\nsystems of every age, in the partial or complete discoveries of genius,\nand in the great and stupendous achievements of modern experimental\nscience. It would require a long treatise to fill so wide a field, which\nwe must restrict to the limits of a few pages. Since our readers are now\ngenerally acquainted with the course pursued by human thought, and with\nthe progress of peoples, but few landmarks or formulas are necessary to\nenable them to clear away obscurity and estimate facts at their just\nvalue, so as to understand what civilization and science have to do with\nthe evolution of myth, and of science itself.\n\nA great corollary also ensues from studies undertaken with the aid of\nsociology, that is, the genesis, form, and gradual evolution of human\nsocieties. These vary in character, in attitude, in power, form and\nduration, with the different characters of races, and thus fulfil in\nvarious ways the cycle of myth and science of which they are capable. It\nwould indeed be difficult to attain to a clear and adequate conception\nof the universal evolution of myth and science, but for the existence of\na privileged race distinguished for its psychical and organic power,\nwhich from its beginning until now, although subject to many partial\neclipses, has on the whole maintained its position in the world so as to\npresent to us the long historical drama of its evolutions. Other races,\npeoples, or tribes have disappeared in the struggle for existence, or\nhave remained essentially incapable of further progress even in a\nrelatively inferior degree, so as to afford no aid in following the\nsuccessive development of myth and science; while the Aryan family, a\nrace to which I believe that the Semitic originally belonged,[6]\nfurnishes the unbroken sequence of events and the stages of such complex\nevolution. Nor certainly is there any signs of the disappearance of this\nrace, since every day its intellectual and territorial achievements,\nadded to the instruments of a powerful material civilization, invigorate\nits strength and presage its indefinite duration in forms we are not\nable to foresee, unless indeed fatal astral or telluric catastrophes\nshould hinder its progress or bring it to an end.\n\nIf we compare this race with itself at different epochs, and in the many\ndifferent peoples into which it was severed, and if at the same time we\nconfront it with the types of other peoples at various stages, from the\nrudest to the most civilized, it becomes possible to form a clear\nconception of the genesis and successive evolution of myth and science\nof which the human race is capable, and in this way we may understand\nthe general law which governs such evolutions. This study also teaches\nus that humanity, whether we agree with monogenists or poligenists, is\nphysically and psychically in all respects the same in its essential\nelements; in all peoples without distinction, as ethnography teaches us,\nthe origin and genesis of myth, the implicit exercise of reason and its\ndevelopment, are, at all events up to a given point, absolutely\nidentical. All start from the same manifestations and mythical\ncreations, and these are afterwards developed according to the logical\nor scientific canons of thought, which are applied to their\nclassification. Both among fetish-worshippers and polytheists there was\na tendency towards monotheism, although sometimes it could only be\ndiscerned in a vague and confused manner.\n\nIf myth is, as I have said, to be considered from another point of view,\nas the spontaneous effect of the intelligence, and a necessary function,\nrelatively to the primary act from which it begins, it might appear that\nmyth would never cease to be, and that humanity, even as it is\nrepresented by the elect and enduring race, must always remain in this\noriginal illusion; so that every man would have to begin again for\nhimself in his own peculiar cycle of myth. But history shows that this\nis not the case, and that the mythic faculty gradually wanes and becomes\nweaker, even if it does not altogether cease to exist, a result which\nwould not occur if myth were a necessary function of the intelligence.\n\nI shall presently reply to such an objection; in the meanwhile,\nregarding the question superficially, I need only say that if the mythic\nfaculty diminishes in one direction, and with respect to some forms and\ntheir corresponding substance, it has certainly not ceased to appear in\nanother, exerting itself, as we shall see, in other forms and other\nsubstance. The common people, both urban and rural, do for the most part\nadhere to primitive and very ancient superstitions, as every one may\nknow from his own experience, as well as from the writings of well known\nauthors of nearly all the civilized nations of Europe. In fact, every\nman in the early period of his life constructs a heaven for himself, as\nthose who study the ways of children are aware, and this has given rise\nto a new science of infantine psychology, set forth in the writings of\nTaine, Darwin, Perez, and others.\n\nWe also propose to show that the scientific faculty, which gathers\nstrength and is developed from the mythical faculty, is in the first\ninstance identical and confounded with it, but that science corrects and\ncontrols the primitive function, just as reason corrects and explains\nthe errors and illusions of the senses; so that the truly rational man\nissues, like the foetus from its embryonic covering, out of its\nprimitive mythical covering into the light of truth.\n\nEvery one must perceive that the study of the origin of myths has an\nimportant bearing on the clear and positive knowledge of mankind. In\nmodern times biological science, such as ethnography and anthropology,\nhave not only thrown much light on the genesis of organic bodies, of\nanimals and of man, but they have afforded very important aid to\npsychological research, on account of the close connection between\npsychology and the general physical laws of the world. The mythical\nfaculty in man, and its results, have received much light from these\nsciences, since the modifications induced in individuals and in peoples\nby many natural causes, organic or climatological, are based upon their\nphysiological conditions. In the first chapters of Herbert Spencer's\nbook on Sociology, there is a masterly investigation into the changes\nproduced by climate, with its accidents and organic products, on the\npeculiar temperament of different peoples and races, and we must refer\nour readers to his admirable summary.\n\nWe avail ourselves of the aid afforded by all these branches of science\nin order to comprehend the true nature of man, and the place which he\nreally occupies in the animal creation. Man should be estimated as all\nother products and phenomena of nature are estimated, according to his\nabsolute value, divested, as in the case of all other physical and\norganic sciences, of preconceived ideas or prejudices in favour of the\nsupernatural. He should be studied as in physics we study bodies and the\nlaws which govern them, or as the laws of their motions and combinations\nare studied in chemistry, allowance always being made for their\nreciprocal relations, and for their appearance as a whole. For if there\nbe in the universe a distinction of modes, there is no absolute\nseparation of laws and phenomena.\n\nThe various branches of science are only subjective necessities,\nconsequent on the successive and gradual order of our comprehension of\nthings; they are classifications of method, with no special reference to\nthe undivided personality of nature. All are parts of the whole, and so\nalso the whole is revealed in its several parts. They come to be in\nthought, as well as in reality, reciprocal conditions of each other; and\nhe who is able to solve the problem of the world correctly in a simple\nmovement of an atom, would be able to explain all laws and all\nphenomena, since every thing may ultimately be reduced to this movement.\nIt is precisely this which has been attained by certain laws, so that\nthe study of man must not be dissociated from this conception. It is\nnecessary to regard him as a product of the forces of nature, with which\nhe has certain properties in common. Although man may appear to be a\nspecial and peculiar subject, yet he is connected with the universal\nsystem in which he lives by the elements, phenomena, and forces of which\nhe consists.\n\nIt must not be supposed, as it is asserted with ever-increasing clamour,\nthat such a method and theory can ever destroy the civilized basis of\nsociety, and the morality and dignity with which it should be informed,\nas if we were again reducing man to the condition of a beast. Such an\noutcry is in itself a plain and striking proof that we have not yet\nemerged from the mythical age of thought, since it is precisely a\nmythical belief which prompts this angry protest against the noble and\nindependent research after truth.\n\nIt is impossible that the results of positive and rational science\nshould in any way destroy the necessary conditions of civilized life and\nof the high standard of goodness which should form, elevate, and bring\nit to perfection. We must, however, remember that it was not rational\nscience, nor the ethics of law, which established the _a priori_ rules\nof a just and free society, but the necessities of society itself led to\nthe _a posteriori_ formulation of laws. Theoretic science subsequently\nexplained these laws, and perfected their form and organism, infusing\ninto them a nobler purpose; but it was the necessities of nature which\nfirst dictated the balance, system, and harmony of the alliances and\nassociations of materials and phenomena as they now exist, which\nrendered possible the first nucleus of human society, and which, in\ncourse of time, brought the component parts into definite relations with\neach other. It was subsequently the reflex and fitting work of thought\nto raise upon the foundation laid by nature a rational system of\nsociety, and then to bring its rules and forms to perfection.\n\nHence it follows that it was not man, nor some extrinsic mythical power\nwhich arbitrarily dictated the code of private and social life, but this\npresented itself to man as a spontaneous result of the world's law,\nrelatively to the conditions possible for social life. For if, as in\nfact is the case, and as the progress of knowledge and, of human\ncivilization will abundantly show, the true and eternal laws which make\nsociety possible, and consequently its standard of righteousness, are\ninnate and genuine results of universal laws, it is impossible for\nscience to destroy the inevitable order of things, and to reduce mankind\nto a hideous chaos.\n\nIt must be allowed that great truths, not fully understood by incapable\npreachers, who sometimes from ignoble motives foment the turbid\ninstincts of the ignorant multitude, may bring about, as they have done\nof old, grave evils and even crimes in some places and for a short time.\nBut there is no one so foolish or so ignorant of history as to believe\nthat all things happen in the best possible way, and in a logical\nsequence. Such evils do not invalidate or destroy the force of our\nassertion that social order is derived from and is based upon the order\nof nature. Although savage passions, excited by an imperfect\nunderstanding of the truth, do from time to time cause the overthrow of\ngiven societies, and arouse the horror and alarm of pessimist votaries\nof myth, nature is not thereby overcome; she still triumphs, and\nrestores the order which has been interrupted, so far as the instinct of\nconservatism and the hereditary impulse to that special form of\nassociation to which each people are accustomed are opposed to the\nrevolutionary spirit, and in this way the balance which has been\ndisturbed is re-established.\n\nWhen men, having brought their intellectual, and consequently their\nmoral sense to perfection, are enabled to understand this natural order\nof laws and social facts, divested of extrinsic mythical beliefs, they\nwill find in it so much reciprocal benefit, and will have such a deep\nsense of their personal dignity, since they are intellectually their own\nartificers, that they will be able to understand how the highest good\nhas ensued and will ensue from the sacrifices or achievements made by a\nfew for the benefit of all. We are undoubtedly still a long way from\nsuch happy conditions, either socially or as individuals, but every day\nbrings them nearer, and it is to this end that our civilization plainly\ntends, in spite of all the complaints, the fears, and sometimes even the\nmalevolence of men.\n\nAs I have already said, the study of the beginnings and of, the\nanthropological conditions of the various myths is necessary to enable\nus to understand their psychical phenomena, together with the hidden\nlaws of the exercise of thought. The learned and illustrious Ribot has\njustly said that psychology, dissociated from physiology and cognate\nsciences, is extinct, and that in order to bring it to life it is\nnecessary to follow the progress and methods of all other contemporary\nsciences.[7] The genesis of myth, its development, the specification and\nintegration of its beliefs, as well as the several intrinsic and\nextrinsic sources whence it proceeds, will assign to it a clearer place\namong the obscure recesses of psychical facts; they will reveal to us\nthe connection between the facts of consciousness and their antecedents,\nbetween the world and our normal and abnormal physiological conditions;\nthey will show what a complex drama is performed by the action and\nreaction between ourselves and the things within us, and also will\ndeclare the nature of the laws which govern the various and manifold\ncreation of forms, imaginations, and ideas, and the artificial world of\nphantasms derived from these. In this way myth will appear to be not\nmerely due to the direct animation of things, varying in our waking\nstate with the nature of the exciting cause; but it also arises from the\nnormal images and illusions of dreams, and from the morbid\nhallucinations of madness, both subjectively in the case of the person\naffected by them, and objectively for those who observe the extrinsic\neffects in gesture and speech, and the whole bearing of the sufferer.\n\nEvery one must admit that all these phenomena, and the beliefs which\narise from them, must tend to make the observation of psychical life\nmore easy, just as morbid psychical phenomena often explain the natural\naction of such life under normal conditions. These phenomena, so closely\nconnected with physiological disturbances which are beyond the control\nof our personal will, will inform us of the biological relations between\nconsciousness and thought on the one side, and our organism on the\nother.\n\nThe mythical faculty, as we shall see in the following chapters,\ncombined with physiological excitements, both normal and abnormal,\ngenerally assumes constant forms in the various and manifold world of\nits creation; constant forms which conversely also reveal those of the\nscientific faculty. In this way the development, composition, and\nintegration of a myth, into which others are fused by assimilation, may\nbe said to explain to us the mode in which systems of philosophy are\nconstituted, and to manifest to us in a fanciful way the underlying mode\nin which human thought is exercised.\n\nNor do the effects and importance of these studies end here; they are\nalso the necessary foundation of true and rational sociology. In fact,\nthe relations of the individual to the world, the manifold conditions\ncaused by the relations of persons to each other, the constitution of\nall social order, and the various modifications of that order; all these\nare resolved into the primitive thought, and into the emotional impulses\nof mythical prejudices and fancies, and in these they have also their\nnatural sanction, and the cardinal point on which they rest and revolve.\nThere is no society, however rude and primitive, in which all these\nrelations, both to the individual and to society at large, are not\napparent, and these are based on superstitious and mythical beliefs.\nTake the Tasmanians, for example, one of the peoples which has recently\nbecome extinct, and regarded as one of the most debased in the social\nscale, and we have in a small compass a picture of the acts and beliefs\nto be found in their embryonic association.\n\nIn every society, however rudimentary, these are held to be important\nfacts: the birth of individuals, which is their entrance into the\nsociety itself, and into the possession of its privileges; marriages,\nfunerals, reciprocal obedience between persons and classes, or to the\nchief; public assemblies, and the existence of powers equal or superior\nto living men.\n\nAmong the Tasmanians, the placenta was religiously venerated, and they\ncarefully buried it, lest it should be injured or devoured by animals.\nIf the mother died in childbirth her offspring was buried alive with\nher. When a man attained puberty, he was bound to submit to certain\nceremonies, some of them painful, and dictated by phallic superstitions.\nFuneral rites were simple: the corpse was either burnt, with howls and\nsuperstitious functions, or it was placed in the hollow trunk of a tree\nin a sitting position, with the chin supported by the knees, as was the\ncustom with Peruvian mummies; and the belief in another world prompted\nthem to place the weapons and utensils used, during life beside the\ncorpse. Sometimes a wooden lance, with fragments of human bones affixed\nto it, was placed below the tumulus, as a defence for the dead during\nhis long sleep. It appears from these customs, and from others mentioned\nby Clarke, that they had a vague idea of another life, holding that the\nshades went up to inhabit the stars, or flew to a distant island where\nthey were born again as white men. These beliefs were necessarily\nconnected with the rites which they fulfilled when living, and served as\na kind of obscure sanction for them.\n\nMilligan and Nixon tell us that the Tasmanians believed in the existence\nof evil and sometimes of avenging spirits, destroyers of the guilty.\nThey supposed that the shades of their friends or enemies returned, and\ncaused good or evil to befal them; and according to Milligan there were\nfour kinds of spirits. Purely superstitious rites were used for\nmarriage. Old women and witches were often the arbiters of peace and war\nbetween the tribes, and they had the right of pardoning. Sorcerers\nintervened in many social acts, and before beginning their operations\nand incantations they revolved the mysterious _Mooyumkarr_, an oval\npiece of wood with a cord, which was certainly connected with phallic\nsuperstitions. Bonwick asserts that on many private and public\noccasions, the more skilled sorcerers called up spirits with appropriate\nceremonies and formulas. They were powerful, and produced diseases, and\nwere able to exert malign influence, and the urine of women, human\nblood, and ashes were superstitiously used as remedies against their\nspells.\n\nThe Tasmanian who wished to hurt or bewitch any one, procured something\nbelonging to his enemy, and especially his hair; this, was enveloped in\nfat and then exposed to the action of fire, and it was thought that as\nit melted, the man himself would waste away. They feared lest the evil\nspirit evoked by the enchantments of an enemy might creep behind them in\nthe night to steal away the renal fat, an organ with which various\nphysiological superstitions were connected. They believed that stones,\nespecially certain kinds of quartz crystals, were means of communication\nwith spirits, with the dead, and also with absent persons. A woman often\nwore round her neck the phallus extracted from the body of her dead\nhusband. The movements of the sun and moon, and some of their phases,\nhad a mythical bearing on various social acts, or on the date of their\nassemblies, since the sun was the object of great veneration; and the\nfull moon, the epoch of assemblies, was celebrated with feasting and\ndancing. Dances of many different kinds were connected with traditional\nmyths, astrological superstitions, and the phallic worship. Some remains\nof circular buildings and concentric compartments, discovered by Field\nand others, had reference to their feasts, assemblies, and dances. Among\ntheir cosmic myths, Milligan has preserved one relating to the double\nstars which perhaps refers to the invention of fire.\n\nFrom this cursory view of the conditions of society in its simplest\nform, and among the most savage peoples, and of the mythical beliefs\nwhich prevailed under such conditions, it clearly appears how myth,\ndating from the first beginnings of human association, has regarded,\ninvested, sanctioned, and generated all special acts and relations, and\nthe whole social order, both private and public. The exercise of thought\nin primitive times not only consisted of mythical beliefs and\nassociations, but this same condition of thought reacted on all the\nphenomena of nature, and on all social facts. For if, as we have already\nobserved, more rational empirical notions, and a certain rude form of\nscientific faculty made its appearance amid those mythical ideas which\nwere still persistent, its various forms were not animated, sustained,\nand preserved by myth. Hence it is evident that the basis of the genesis\nof sociology as a whole consists in myth, which sanctions its acts and\nestablishes their relations to each other. The immense importance of\nthese studies, even for the right understanding of the laws and\nhistorical evolution which guide and govern sociology, is evident from\nthis fact.\n\nIt must not be supposed that such a vast and profound incarnation of\nmyth in social facts is peculiar to the primitive ages; it persists and\nis maintained in all the historical phases of civilization, even of the\nhigher races, although sometimes in a dormant form. Even in our days,\nany one who considers our modes of society, the organism, customs,\nceremonies, and manifold and complex institutions of modern life, will\nreadily see that religious influences and their rites initiate,\nsanction, and accompany every individual and social fact, although civil\nand religious societies are becoming ever more distinct.\n\nSince, therefore, myth is a constant form of sociology, completely\ninvests it, and accompanies and animates its transmutations down to our\ndays, everyone must recognize the necessity of this study in order to\nunderstand and explain the true history of thought and of sociology.\n\nThe energy, the power, the physical and intellectual worth of a people\nare revealed as a whole in its mythical products, whether in the quality\nand greatness of their beliefs, in the greater or less definiteness of\ntheir system, or in their development into more rational notions; and\nfrom the complex whole we can estimate the worth of their civilization.\nSo that, where other extrinsic testimony is wanting, the study of these\nprimitive creations will reveal to us their psychological worth. This is\nthe origin of the comparative psychology of peoples, a most fruitful\nscience, which not only teaches us to rank the various families of\npeoples according to their relative value, but it is of great use in\nmaking man acquainted with himself, and with psychology in general.\n\nIn fact, modern psychology can only advance by means of observation and\nexperiment, which constitute it one of the natural sciences; and this is\nabundantly proved by the modern English schools, and the experimental\nschool in Germany. Yet observation of the states of consciousness taken\nalone is defective, unless it is enlarged by the comparative examination\nof a greater number of subjects; nor must ethnical peculiarities be\npassed over, and it is precisely these which are included in the\ncomparative psychology of peoples. The large amount of results, their\ninfinite variety, and at the same time a certain uniformity in their\nmodes of beginning, of their development, and of their place in the\nuniverse, give a splendid illustration of the innate exercise of human\nthought; the likenesses as well as the contrasts are instructive as to\nits real nature.\n\nThe comparative psychology of peoples, studied from this point of view,\ncertainly does not include the whole of psychological science, which\nrequires other instruments and other modes of experience, but it is a\ngreat help as a foundation. We believe that the study of myth, which\nthrows so much light on comparative psychology, is likewise of use for\nthe special psychology of man, since this can only arise from individual\nand ethnical observation, and from experiment, dissociated from every\nhindrance, and from metaphysical prejudice. And if by our humble essay\nwe can throw any light on this noble science, we shall be abundantly\nrewarded.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\n\nANIMAL SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.\n\n\nAll animals communicate with each other and with the external world\nthrough their senses, and by means of their perception, both internal\nand external, they possess knowledge and apprehension of one another. In\nthe vast organic series of the animal kingdom, some are better provided\nthan others with methods, instruments, and apparatus fit for effecting\nsuch communication. The senses of relation are not found in the same\ndegree in all animals, nor when such senses are the same in number are\nthey endowed with equal intensity, acuteness, and precision. But the\nfundamental fact remains the same in all cases; they communicate with\nthemselves and with the external world through their senses.\n\nWe must now inquire what value the external object of perception,\nconsidered in itself, has for the animal, what character it has and\nassumes with respect to his inner sense in the act of perception or\napprehension. Man, and especially man in our days, after so many ages\nof reflection, and through the influence of contemporary science, is so\nfar removed from the primitive and simple exercise of his psychical\nlife, that he finds it difficult to picture to himself the ancient and\nspontaneous conditions under which his senses communicated with the\nworld and with himself. And therefore, without further consideration, he\nthinks and believes that in primeval times everything took place in the\nsame way as it does at present, and, which is a still greater error, as\nit takes place in the lower animals.\n\nThis identification of the complex machinery of human perception with\nthat of animals must not be regarded as an absurd paradox, since, as we\nhave shown in an earlier work, they were originally and in themselves\nthe same.[8] By pursuing an easy mode of observation, divested of\nprejudice, we may revert to that primeval state of human nature, and may\nalso comprehend with truth and certainty the condition of animals. For\nthe animal nature has not ceased to exist in man, and it may be\ndiscerned by those who care to look for it; and careful study, with the\nconstant aid of observation and experiment, will reveal to us the hidden\nlife of sensation and intelligence in the lower animals.\n\nThere is a continual self-consciousness in all animals; it is\ninseparable from all their internal and external acts, from every fact,\npassion, and emotion; and this is clear and obvious. This fundamental\nand persistent self-consciousness--persistent in dreams, and even in the\ncalmest sleep, which is always accompanied by a vague sensation--is the\nconsciousness of a living subject, active, impressionable, exercising\nhis will, capable of emotions and passions. It is not the consciousness\nof an inert thing, passive, dead, or extrinsic; for animal life consists\nin sensation of greater or less intensity, but always of sensation.\nConsequently, such a consciousness signifies for the animal a constant\napprehension of an active faculty exercised intrinsically in himself,\nand it makes his life into a mobile drama, of which he is implicitly\nconscious, of acts and emotions, of impulses, desires, and suspicions.\n\nThis inward form of emotional life and psychical and organic action,\ninto which the whole value of personal existence is resolved, may be\nsaid to invest and modify all the animal's active relations to the\nexternal world, which it vivifies and modifies according to its own\nimage. The subsequent act of doubling the faculties which takes place in\nman does not occur in the animal; a process which modifies through the\nintellect the spontaneous and primitive act. Consequently, the active\nand inward sense which is peculiar to the animal is renewed in him by\nthe external things and phenomena of nature which stimulate and excite\nhim.\n\nTwo kinds of things present themselves to his perception: other animals,\nof whatever species, and the inanimate objects of the world. As far as\nthe other animals are concerned, which are obvious to his perception, it\nis perfectly evident that upon these he will project his whole internal\nlife of consciousness and emotions, and will feel their identity with\nhimself by his implicit and intuitive judgment. And in fact, the\nmovements, sounds, gestures, and forms of other animals necessarily\ncause this sense of inward psychical identity, whence arises the\nimplicit notion of an animated and personal subject. Any one who\nobserves, however superficially, the conduct of animals to each other\nwhen they first meet, cannot doubt this truth for an instant.\n\nAlthough the external form and character of the animal perceived are\nimportant factors of the implicit notion of an animated personal\nsubject, this belief is even more due to the animal's inward\nconsciousness of himself as a living subject which is reflected in the\nextrinsic form of the other and is identified with it. The spontaneous\nand personal psychical effort does not decompose the object perceived\ninto its proper elements by means of reflex attention, but it is\nimmediately projected on those phenomena which assume a form analogous\nto the sentient subject.\n\nThe fact of this law must never be forgotten in the analysis of animal\nintelligence and sensation. All those who do not keep clearly in view\nthe real and genuine character of the sentient and intelligent faculty\nin animals are liable to error.\n\nIn addition to the perceptions we have mentioned, animals have a\nperception of inanimate things, that is, of various bodies and phenomena\nof nature. Although the form, motion, and gestures of an analogous and\npersonal subject are wanting in these cases, so that they do not cause\nextrinsically the same implicit idea, neither do they remain, as with a\ncultivated and rational man, things and qualities of independent\nexistence, disconnected with the life of the animal which perceives\nthem, exerting no intentional efficacy, and governed by necessary laws\nby means of which they act and exist.\n\nA cultivated and rational man, by the reflex and calm examination of\nthings, can correctly distinguish these two classes of subjects and\nphenomena, and cannot as a rule be deceived as to their real and\nrelative value with respect to them and to himself. But when he forgets\nhis primary intellectual condition, and does not perfectly understand\nthe permanent condition of animals, he believes that their faculties are\nidentical, and that things, qualities, and phenomena present the same\nappearance to the human and the animal perception. Yet the actual nature\nof the thing, so far as it is estimated by our perception as an object\ndifferent from ourselves and from any other animal, cannot be so\napprehended by animals which lack the analytical faculty in the\nperennial flow of their perceptions; the actual and inanimate thing is\npresented to them only by the intrinsic, peculiar, personal, and\npsychical quality of the animal itself.\n\nIf form, and characteristic and deliberate action, are wanting to the\nsubstances and phenomena of inanimate nature, qualities which more\nreadily arouse in animals the idea of a subject resembling and analogous\nto themselves, yet there always remains the apprehension of some sort of\nform in which--not distinguished from the others by reflex action--the\ninward faculty of sensation and emotion is repeated and impersonated by\nthe perceiving animal. Thus every form, every object, every external\nphenomenon becomes vivified and animated by the intrinsic consciousness\nand personal psychical faculty of the animal itself. Every object, fact,\nand phenomenon of nature will not merely appear to him as the real\nobject which it is, but he will necessarily perceive it as a living and\ndeliberating power, capable of affecting him agreeably or injuriously.\n\nEvery one is aware of the jealous, suspicious nature of animals, and\nthat they are not only inquisitive about other animals, but about every\nmaterial object which they see unexpectedly, which moves in an unusual\nway, or which interferes with or injures them.\n\nIt must have been often observed how they turn against any object which\nhas chanced to hurt them, or which has annoyed them by regular and\nrepeated motions, how they start at the sudden appearance or oscillation\nof some unlooked-for thing, at an unusual light, a colour, a stone, a\nplant, at the fluttering of branches, of clothes, or weathercocks, at\nthe rush of water, at the slightest movement or sound in the twilight,\nor in the darkness of night. They look about, and consider all things\nand phenomena as subjects actuated by will, and as having an immediate\ninfluence on their lives, either beneficent or injurious.\n\nUndoubtedly they do, as a rule, by means of their implicit judgment,\ndistinguish animals as of a different type from other objects, but they\ntransfuse into everything their own personality and their intrinsic\nconsciousness. This is the case with the whole animal kingdom, at least\nwith those whose internal emotion can be gathered from their external\nmovements and gestures.\n\nAn animal is sometimes aware that an enemy which may lie in wait for and\ndestroy him has approached the neighbourhood of his haunts, or at any\nrate may interfere with the freedom of his ordinary life, and he\nwithdraws as far as he can from this new peril or injury, and seeks to\ndefend himself from the malice of his enemy by special arts. In this\ncase, the external subject or thing is what his own objective sense\nconceives it to be, and his inward perception corresponds to an actual\ncosmic reality.\n\nSuppose that instead of this, the neighbourhood of a fierce fire, or\nviolent rain and hail, or a stormy wind, or some other natural\nphenomenon, surprises or injures such creatures; these facts do not\naffect them as if they were merely occurrences in accordance with cosmic\nlaws, for such a simple conception of things is not grasped by them.\nSuch phenomena of nature are regarded by animals as living subjects,\nactuated by a concrete and deliberate purpose of ill-will towards them.\nAny one who has observed animals as I have done for many years, both in\na wild and domestic state, and under every variety of conditions and\ncircumstances, will readily admit the fact.\n\nThis truth, which clearly appears from an accurate analysis of facts,\nand from experiments, can also be demonstrated by the arguments of\nreason. Since animals have no conception of the purely cosmic reality of\nthe phenomena and laws which constitute nature, it follows that such a\nreality must appear to their inner consciousness in its various effects\nas a subject vaguely identical with their own psychical nature. Hence\nthey regard nature as if she were inspired with the same life, will, and\npurpose, as those which they themselves exercise, and of which they have\nan immediate and intrinsic consciousness.\n\nIt is true that after long experience animals become accustomed to\nregard as harmless the phenomena, objects, and forces by which they were\nat first sympathetically excited and terrified. Of this we have\ninnumerable examples both among wild and domestic animals; but although\nsuspicion and anxiety are subdued by habit and experience, yet these\nobjects and phenomena are not thereby transformed into pure and simple\nrealities. In the same way, if they are at first frightened by the sight\nand companionship of some other species or object, habit and experience\ngradually calm their fears and suspicions, and the association or\nneighbourhood may even become agreeable to them. I have often observed\nthat different species, both when at liberty and in confinement, are\naffected by the most lively surprise and perturbation when some new\nphenomenon has startled them; they act as if it were really a living and\ninsidious subject, and then they gradually become calm and quiet, and\nregard it as some indifferent or beneficent power.\n\nI must adduce some observations and experiments from the many I have\nmade on this subject. It may be objected that if animals in their\nspontaneous perception personify the object in question, they would give\nsigns of this fact with respect to all the objects with which they come\nin contact, and among which they live, and yet they remain indifferent\nto many of them, which is a proof that they distinguish the animate from\nthe inanimate. In fact it cannot be disputed that a vast number of the\nphenomena and objects of nature are regarded by animals with\nindifference; they are perceived by them, but it does not appear that\nthey suppose these things to be endowed with life. It is, however,\nnecessary in the first place to distinguish two modes and stages in this\nanimation of things, one of which we may term static, and the other\ndynamic. In the first instance, the sentient subject remains tranquil at\nthe very moment when he vivifies the phenomenon or the thing perceived;\nwhile the act is accomplished with so much animating force, and with an\nimplicit and fugitive consciousness, it exerts no immediate and sudden\ninfluence on the perceiving animal, and consequently he gives no\nexternal signs of the personifying character of his perception. In the\nsecond instance, which we have termed dynamic, that is, when the\nphenomenon or object has a direct and sudden effect on the animal\nhimself, he expresses by his movements; gestures, cries, and other\nsigns, how instantaneously he considers and feels the object in question\nto be alive, for he behaves in exactly the same way towards real\nanimals.\n\nAnimals are accustomed to show such indifference towards numerous\nobjects that it might be supposed that they have an accurate conception\nof what is inanimate; but this arises from habit, from long experience,\nand partly also from the hereditary disposition of the organism towards\nthis habit. But if the object should act in any unusual way, then the\nanimating process which, as we have just said, was rendered static by\nits habitual exercise, again becomes dynamic, and the special and\npermanent character of the act is at once revealed. We have experience\nof this fact in ourselves, although we are now capable of immediately\ndistinguishing between the animate and the inanimate, and man alone has,\nor can have, a rational conception of what are really cosmic objects or\nthings. Yet if we suddenly and unexpectedly see some object move in a\nstrange way, which we know from experience to be inanimate, the innate\ninclination to personify it takes effect, and for a moment we are\namazed, as if the phenomenon were produced by deliberate power proper to\nitself.\n\nI have kept various kinds of animals for several years, in order to\nobserve them and try experiments at my convenience. I have suddenly\ninserted an unfamiliar object in the various cages in which I have kept\nbirds, rabbits, moles, and other animals. At first sight the animal is\nalways surprised, timid, curious, or suspicious, and often retreats from\nit. By degrees his confidence returns, and after keeping out of the way\nfor some time, he becomes accustomed to it, and resumes his usual\nhabits. If then, by a simple arrangement of strings already prepared, I\nmove the object to and fro, without showing myself, the animal scuttles\nabout and is much less easily reconciled to its appearance. I have tried\nthis experiment with various animals, and the result is almost always\nthe same.\n\nIn the cage of a very tame thrush, I made a movable bottom to his\nfeeding trough, so arranged that by suddenly pulling a cord, the food\nwhich it contained could be raised or lowered. When everything remained\nstationary in its place the thrush ate with lively readiness, but as\nsoon as I raised the food he nearly always flew off in alarm. When the\nexperiment had been often repeated, he did not like to come near the\nfeeding trough, and--which is a still stronger proof that he imagined\nthe food itself to be endowed with life--he often refused to approach,\nor only approached in fear the sopped bread which was placed outside the\ntrough. I tried the same experiment with other birds, and nearly always\nwith the same result.\n\nOn another occasion I repeatedly waved a white handkerchief before a\nspirited horse, bringing it close to his eyes; at first he looked at it\nsuspiciously and shied a little, but without being much discomposed, and\nI continued the experiment until he became accustomed to its ordinary\nappearance. One day I and a friend went out driving with this horse, and\nI directed a man, while we were passing at a moderate pace, to wave the\nsame handkerchief, attached to a stick, in such a way that his person on\nthe other side of the hedge was invisible. The horse was scared and\nshied violently, and even in the stable he could not see the\nhandkerchief without trembling, and it was difficult to reconcile him to\nthe sight of it. I repeated the experiment with slight variations on\nother horses, and the issue was always more or less the same.\n\nAgain, I placed a scarecrow or bogey in a parti-coloured dress in the\nspacious kennel of a hound while he was absent from it. When the dog\nwished to return to his kennel, he drew back at the sight of it, and\nbarked for a long while. After going backwards and forwards, snuffing\nsuspiciously, he decided to enter, but he remained on the threshold of\nthe kennel, anxiously inspecting the bogey. In a few days, however, he\nbecame accustomed to it, and was indifferent to its presence. I ought to\nadd that I had taught him on the first day, by punishment and\nadmonition, that he must not destroy the bogey. One day when the dog was\nlying down I violently moved the puppet's arms by a cord, and he jumped\nup and ran barking out of the kennel, soon returning to bark as he had\ndone at first. Finally, he again became accustomed to it, but whenever I\nrepeated the movement with greater violence, it took a long while for\nhim to become reconciled to it.\n\nI put into a room various kinds of wild birds, which had been taken in\nnets after they were full grown. The window, which looked upon a garden,\nwas unglazed, and closed by a wire netting, through which the outer air\nentered and was constantly renewed. I placed in the middle of the room a\npot containing a shrub of some size, on which the birds used to perch.\nSince they had been reared in the open air they were certainly\naccustomed to the wind, and to the way in which it moves trees and\nbranches, so that they were not alarmed by a phenomenon which they\nrecognized from experience. I fastened a cord to the head of the shrub\nwhich I passed through a hole in the door, making another to look\nthrough, and in this way I moved it to and fro as the wind might have\ndone. One day when there was a high wind which could be heard in the\nroom, and when the current of air through the window was perceptible, I\ntried the experiment when the conditions of resemblance were perfect.\nAnd yet when the violent movement and oscillation of the shrub was\ncombined with the noise of the wind, the frightened birds all fluttered\nabout, and after repeating the movement, and then allowing it to\nsubside, they kept away from the shrub and did not dare to settle on it.\n\nAt another time, aided by an ingenious young friend, I constructed a toy\nwindmill, of which the vanes were moved by weights. I placed this toy in\na cage, so arranged that its motions could be regulated from the\noutside, and I put into the cage a sparrow, which had been taken from\nthe nest, and which consequently had no experience of the external\nworld. Much patience was needed, since the toy required careful\nadjustment and was easily thrown out of gear, but I managed it at last.\nThe sparrow pecked at the little mill as soon as he was put into the\ncage, and he grew up accustomed to its motions. I then took the sparrow\nout of the cage and put in a finch, which had also been taken from the\nnest, but was reared far from such a machine, and he was frightened and\ndid not reconcile himself to it for some time. I exchanged this bird for\na goldfinch which had been caught after he was full grown, and his alarm\nat the little mill was so great that he did not dare to move.\n\nIn a ground floor room which I used as my study, I hung an old sheet,\nwhich reached to the ground, on a long spear inserted in a heavy wooden\ndisk; I surmounted it with a ragged hunting cap, and so arranged the\nsheet as to give it some resemblance to the human form. When my dog came\nin as usual, he looked suspiciously at the object, snuffing about and\ngradually approaching to walk round and observe it. At last he was\nsatisfied, and curled himself up by the skirts of the bogey, where I had\nplaced the mat on which he was accustomed to lie when he was with me.\nOne evening when the moon shone doubtfully and there was just light\nenough to distinguish the outline of things, I carried the shapeless\nbogey into the garden near my room, and placed it among some shrubs and\nbushes. I went back to the house and called my dog, who followed me\nquietly until he reached the spot from which he could see the bogey\ndistinctly enough for him to recognize its identity with the one with\nwhich he was already familiar. As soon as he saw the apparition he\nstood still, growling furiously; he began to bark, and when I encouraged\nhim to come on, he turned round and ran back to the house. I shut up the\ndog in another room, brought back the bogey to its former place, and\nthrew a strong light upon it before recalling the dog. At the first\nsight of the bogey the dog paused suspiciously for an instant, but when\nI sat down to the table as usual, he hesitated a little and after\nsnuffing at it went back to his couch.\n\nI have made similar experiments with dogs, rabbits, birds, and other\nanimals. I took long wooden poles, and put them inside their cages or\nhutches in such a way that the animals got to know and feel reconciled\nto the sight of them. After some days had elapsed, I contrived, while\nscreened from sight, to take the poles from their usual place and to\nmake them touch and annoy the animals with more or less violence, thus\ncausing them to flutter or scamper about and to shrink away, as if from\nthe touch of a living person, although they were unable, as I have said,\nto see me or my hand. Those which were least agitated sprang forward\nwith little leaps and looked about them, doubtful and excited. I might\ngo on to describe many other experiments made with the same object, and\nalways with the same result, but these are enough to show that I went to\nwork cautiously and conscientiously, that the spontaneous and innate\npersonification of the objects perceived by animals is clearly\napparent, and also how we may account for their indifference to those to\nwhich they become accustomed.\n\nAmong animals the necessity of finding food is the great and unfailing\nstimulus towards the exercise of their vital functions; food which may,\nas we all know, be vegetable, animal, or a combination of both kinds. It\nis evident that in the case of carnivorous animals the object which\nsatisfies this desire is a living subject, of which it is necessary to\nbecome possessed by arts, wiles, sometimes by a fierce and cruel\nconflict. In these cases, animals are in constant communication with an\nanimal world resembling their own, and the objective reality is for the\nmost part resolved into living subjects, endowed with consciousness and\nwill. But neither is the vegetable food of herbivorous, frugivorous, and\ngraminivorous animals regarded by them, as it is by us, as a material\nand unconscious satisfaction of their wants; these grasses, grains, and\nleaves appear to animals to be living powers which it is necessary to\nconquer, animated subjects endowed with life, but for the most part\ninoffensive, and which, unlike the living prey of carnivora, offer no\nresistance.\n\nObserve the way in which an herbivorous or graminivorous animal becomes\nexcited and angry when the branch or the ear of corn obstinately adheres\nto the ground, or offers any other difficulty to his immediate desire of\nobtaining food; he acts like one who has to do with a resisting power.\nObserve how, when they are quietly stripping the bough, picking out the\ngrains, or eating the grass, they become suspicious, or fly away if\nthere should be any unusual movement in the bough, the ears of corn, or\nthe grass. In one way or another their food is regarded as a subject\nendowed with sympathetic and deliberate consciousness. And every one\nmust have observed that animals at play act towards inanimate objects as\nif they were conscious and endowed with will.\n\nEvery object of animal perception is therefore felt, or implicitly\nassumed, to be a living, conscious, acting subject. This is due to the\nexternal reflection and projection of the intrinsic and sentient\nfaculty, and therefore--since an animal has not the duplex faculty of\ndeliberate and reflex attention--he cannot attain to the conception of\nsimple external reality, of cosmic things and phenomena. Every object,\nevery phenomenon is for him a deliberating power, a living subject, in\nwhich consciousness and will act as they do in himself. There are\nundoubtedly in the vast series of beings which compose the order of\nnature, and which he is able to perceive, degrees, differences, and\nvarieties of energy, power, and efficacy with respect to himself and to\nthe normal exercise of his life. But he transfuses into all, in\nproportion to the effects which result from them, his own nature, and\nmodifies them in accordance with the intrinsic form of his\nconsciousness, his emotions, and his instincts.\n\nThe external world appears to animals to be a great and mighty movement\nand congeries of living, conscious, deliberating beings, and the value\nof the phenomenon or thing is great in proportion to its effect on the\nanimal itself. The objective and simple reality, as it appears to man,\nhas no existence for animals; from the nature of their intelligence they\ncannot attain to any explicit conception of it, so that this reality is\nresolved and modified into their own image. The eternal and infinite\nflux, by which all things come and go in obedience to laws which are\npermanent and enduring, appears to animals to be a vast and confused\ndramatic company in which the subjects, with or without organic form,\nare always active, working in and through themselves, with benign or\nmalignant, pleasing or hurtful influence. It is for this reason, and\nthis reason only, that their life of consciousness and of relation is so\ndeeply seated and so readily excited. Nor do animals ever believe\nthemselves to be alone among inanimate things; even when not surrounded\nby allied or different species, they have the sense of living amid the\nmanifold forms of conscious and deliberating life which the world\ncontains.\n\nThis constant and deliberate animation of all the objects and phenomena\nof nature is spontaneous and necessary owing to the psychical and\norganic constitution of the animal kingdom, and it resolves itself into\na universal personification of the phenomena themselves. In fact, the\nanimal's intrinsic psychical personality is infused and transformed\ninto each of them with more or less intensity and vigour; the phenomena\nare perceived by each individual just as far as he assimilates them, and\nhe is constantly assimilating himself to them. His communication with\nthe external world is in proportion with its internal reflection on\nhimself, and he understands just as much as his own nature enables him\nto grasp.\n\nA careful consideration therefore shows that the conditions of animal\nknowledge consist in endowing the phenomena and objects of nature with\nconsciousness and will. I think that this truth will prove a certain\nguide and beacon in the interpretation of the origin of myth and science\nin man.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\n\nHUMAN SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.\n\n\nIn man, as it has been clearly proved, sensations and perceptions occur\nboth physiologically and psychically just as they do in animals. If\nscience and the rational process of the interpretation of things have\ntheir origin and are evolved in us by the duplication of our faculties,\nsuch a function, which is due to this duplication, is very slowly\ndeveloped and exercised, and in its origin, as an effort of the\nintelligence, it does not differ from that of animals.\n\nIt is true that the internal act of the higher faculty of reflection has\nhardly taken place before man unconsciously enters on a new and vast\napprenticeship, which soon distinguishes him from and exalts him above\nthe animal kingdom; science has already put forth its first germ. But\nthe reasoning and simply animal faculties were so mingled, that for a\nlong while they were confounded together in their effects and results,\nas well as in their natural methods. We must therefore begin by\nconsidering the nature of this primitive human perception, in some\ndegree identical with that of animals, so that they may be estimated to\nbe of equal value, at any rate in their first results and arts.\n\nThe vivid self-consciousness, inseparable at all times from every act,\npassion, and emotion, actuates man and animals alike; he has this\nconsciousness in common with all other animals, and especially with\nthose superior orders which are nearest to himself. The further\nperception of extrinsic things and phenomena occurs after the same\nmanner and in accordance with the same physiological and psychical laws.\nBy the intrinsic law of animal nature, as it is adapted to his cosmic\nenvironment, we see the cause and necessity of the transfusion and\nprojection of himself into everything which he perceives; whence it\nfollows that he regards these things as living, conscious, and\ndeliberating subjects; and this is also the case with man, who animates\nand endows with life all which surrounds him and which he perceives.\n\nIn fact, in man's spontaneous and immediate perception and apprehension\nof any object or external phenomenon, especially in early life, the\ninnate effects are instantaneous, and correspond with the real\nconstitution of the function; analysis and reflex attention necessarily\nand slowly succeed to this primitive animal act in the course of human\ndevelopment. Consequently the true character and value of its effect on\nthe perception are the same in man and animals.\n\nIf in this psychical and organic fact of perception, man is at first\nabsolutely in the conditions of animals, identical effects must be\nproduced; and this was originally the case, as far as man himself and\nexternal things were concerned. The powerful self-consciousness which\nactuates man and animals alike is projected on the objects or phenomena\nperceived, and they see them transformed into living, deliberating\nsubjects. In this way the world and all which it contains appears to be\na congeries of beings, actuated by will and consciousness, and powerful\nfor good or evil, and in practice they seek to modify, to encourage, or\nto avoid such influence. The ultimate effect of this action, assumed to\nbe intentional in all and each of these subjects, will be their\npersonification, either vaguely or definitely, but always as a power\nactive for good or ill.\n\nIf we trace back the memories of historic and civilized peoples into the\ntwilight of their origin, at a time when they were still barbarous, and\nlittle removed from their primitive savage conditions, we shall find,\nthe further we go back, the more vivid, general, and multiform will the\nmythological interpretation and conception of the world and its various\nphenomena appear to be; everything was personified by these primitive\npeoples in a way common to the animal and human consciousness alike.\n\nOf this the testimony remaining in the most ancient verses of the first\nVeda is a sufficient proof. At the epoch of their composition the human\nrace had made some relative progress in morals and civilization; yet we\nfind that psychical human life was transfused and projected into\neverything: man personified each phenomenon and force of nature in\naccordance with his own image.\n\nFor example, fire in general was personified and identified with\nhumanity in _Agni_; even the shape taken by the flames, all which was\nrequired to light the fire, the whole process of the sacrifice, even the\ndoors of the altar-railing, the prayer and oblation to the god.[9]\n\nWe also learn from the solemn and ancient songs of the Rig-Veda that all\nterrestrial, meteorological, and celestial phenomena were more or less\nvaguely personified. These facts recur in all the earliest recollections\nof civilized peoples. If we turn from these to observe the savage races\nof modern times, and the most barbarous tribes still extant in\ncontinents and isles far removed from culture and science, we shall\nagain find the same beliefs. The range of absurd personifications,\ndegenerating into the most trivial and varied forms of fetish worship,\nbecomes wider, and its influence deeper, in proportion to the rude and\nbarbarous condition of the tribe or stock in which they appear.\n\nEven among ourselves, in the midst of the most civilized European\nnations of modern times, how much mythology still lingers in the lower\nclasses, both in cities and the country. It flourishes in proportion to\nthe ignorance and want of culture of the people, as those know who have\nreally studied the intellectual conditions of all classes in our\ntime.[10]\n\nIn the child just beginning to walk, to move freely, and to talk, and\neven at a later age, in cases in which the reflective faculty is weak,\nand when it approximates more to the psychical and organic conditions of\nanimals, such a projection of self and personification of surrounding\nobjects is evident to all. For this reason a child transforms all which\nit seizes or plays with into a person or animal, and when alone with\nthem it talks, shouts, and laughs, as if such objects could really feel,\nact, and obey; in short, as if they were real persons or animals. So\nstrong is the childish instinct, or, as I might say, the law of its\nbeing to project and transfuse itself into objects, that it is apt to\nspeak of itself in the third person. A child seldom says, \"I will,\" or\n\"I am hungry,\" but \"Louis wants,\" \"Louis is hungry,\" or whatever his\nname may be. This phenomenon reappears in the second childhood of old\nage, when the power of reflection is weakened, and there is a reversion\nto the primitive animal condition. The same phenomenon also occurs in\nidiots, in whom there is a morbid defect of reflective power.\n\nThis fact of the personification of the objects of perception is\ntherefore evident and constant in the primitive man of civilized races,\nin the barbarous condition of modern savages, in the ignorant multitude,\nand in children--intellectual conditions which approach most closely to\nthe condition of animals--and conversely it is plain that it belongs in\nthe highest degree to the intellectual life of animals, and that myth,\ninto which such a personification and animation of things must be\nresolved, has its original and innate necessity in animal life. We think\nthat this is a new scientific fact, which throws much light on the\nhistory of human thought.\n\nM'Lennan observes, \"Some explanation of the phenomena of life a man\n_must_ feign for himself; and to judge from the universality of it, the\nsimplest hypothesis, and the first to occur to men, seems to have been\nthat natural phenomena are ascribable to the presence in animals,\nplants, and things, and in the forces of nature, of such spirits\nprompting to action as men are conscious they themselves possess.\"[11]\nThis fact, indicated by M'Lennan and by all who have devoted themselves\nto anthropological researches with respect to the origin of religions,\nand of myth in general, is now recognized as certain; but it seems to me\nthat the interpretation and explanation of it are altogether implete.\nThey suppose it to be simply the effect of psychological laws as far as\nman is concerned, whereas we have shown that it forms, in the ultimate\ncauses by which it is produced, the very essence of animal perception.\nThey ascribe it to man as a rational hypothesis to explain the primitive\norder of things, whereas it is a spontaneous and primary intuition of\nthe animal intelligence.\n\nAlger, although he is also mistaken as to the true causes of myth in\ngeneral, expresses himself better when he asserts that the brain of a\nsavage is always dominated by the idea that all objects whatsoever have\na soul precisely similar to that of man. The custom of burning and\nburying various things with the dead body was, he thinks, in many cases\nprompted by the belief that every such object had its _manes_.[12]\n\nIn fact, the innate psychical and organic constitution of the\nintelligence, both animal and human, is such that it spontaneously and\nnecessarily projects itself into every object of nature and perception,\nanimating and personifying it by this special law, and not by a\nreflective hypothesis, such as would be the conscious and deliberate\nsolution of a given problem. Such a solution cannot be made by animals,\nsince as we have shown they are without the faculty of making a\ndeliberate research into any subject; nor can it be effected by the\nprimitive man, in whom the reasoning faculty with which he is endowed is\nstill undeveloped.\n\nThe real origin of reflection is not to be found in what may be called\nthe mythical creation of nature, which is the necessary result of the\nspontaneity of the intelligence, both in man and animals; it is\ndeveloped after long duration of barbarism and ignorance. M'Lennan and\nothers have shown how the era of reflection and hypothesis begins in the\nevolution of human intelligence. Sekesa, an intelligent Kaffir, said to\nArbrousset,[13] \"For twelve years I have shepherded my flock. It was\ndark, and I sat down upon a rock and asked myself such questions as\nthese, sad questions, since I was unable to answer them. Who made the\nstars? What supports them? Do the waters never grow weary of flowing\nfrom morning to evening, from evening to morning, and where do they find\nrest? Whence come the clouds, which pass and re-pass, and dissolve in\nrain? Who sends them? Our diviners certainly do not send rain, since\nthey have no means of making it, nor do I see them with my eyes going up\nto heaven to seek it. I cannot see the wind, and know not what it is.\nWho guides and causes it to blow, to rage, and overwhelm us? Nor do I\nknow how the corn grows. Yesterday there was not a blade of grass in my\nfield, and to-day it is green; who gave to the earth the wisdom and\npower to bring forth?\" Again, there is a passage in the Rig-Veda, in\nwhich it is said, \"Where do the fixed stars of heaven which we see by\nnight go by day?\"\n\nIt is in this intellectual condition that ignorant and savage man really\nbegins the spontaneous yet reflective research into the causes of\nthings, and it is in this condition only that he hypothetically\ninterprets the order of phenomena through myths, which have then become\n_secondary_, and are no longer _primitive_. The true origin of the\nprimitive myth which animates and personifies the universe is not to be\nfound in this condition; its origin is of much earlier date in the\nhistory of man, and indeed it has its roots, as we have shown, in animal\nlife.\n\nCertainly when we compare the two intellectual periods, there is a wide\ndifference between the age in which Sekesa could be perplexed by such\ninquiries, and that of more primitive peoples, which still believe\nwithout question in the soul and informing spirit or shade of stones,\nsticks, weapons, food, water, springs--in short, of every object and\nphenomenon. This is still the case with the Algonquins, the Fijians, the\nKarens, the Caribbees, the negroes of Guinea, the New Zealanders, the\nTongusians, the Greenlanders, the Esthonians, the Australians, the\nPeruvians, and a host of other savage and barbarous peoples. They not\nonly animate and personify material objects, but even diseases and their\nremedies.\n\nThe incubus, for example, termed _Mara_ in Northern mythology, was the\nspirit which tormented sleepers. This is the _Mar_ of the German\nproverb: _Dich hat greitten der Mar_. The word is derived from _Mar_, a\nhorse, and becomes _nightmare_ in English, _Cauchemar_ in French,\n[Greek: Ephialtes] in Greek, meaning one which rides upon another. So\nwith epilepsy, which signifies the act of being seized by any one; it\nwas, like all nervous diseases, held to be a sacred evil, and those\nafflicted by it were supposed to be possessed. Insanity was regarded in\nthe same way, as we see in the Bible where Saul's melancholy is said to\nbe an evil spirit sent from God. A furious madman was supposed to have\nbeen carried off by a demon, and in Persia the insane were said to be\nGod's fools. In Tahiti they were called _Eatooa_, that is, possessed by\na divine spirit; and in the Sandwich Isles they were worshipped as men\ninto whom a divinity had entered. In German the _plica polonica_ is\ncalled _Alpzopf_, or hobgoblin's tail. All nations believed that the\nmalign beings which animated diseases could, like men, be propitiated by\nceremonies and incantations. The Redskins are always in fear of the\nassaults of evil spirits, and have recourse to incantations, and to the\nmost absurd sacerdotal rites, or to the influence of their _manitu_, in\norder to be safe. Their devotions and sacrifices are prompted by fear\nrather than by gratitude.\n\nTanner mentions, in his \"Narrative of a Captivity among the Indians,\"\nthat he once heard a convalescent patient reproved for his imprudence in\nexposing himself to the air, since his shade had not altogether come\nback to abide within him. For this purpose, and in conformity with such\nideas, when the sorcerer _Malgaco_ wishes to cure a sick man, he makes a\nhole in a tomb to let out the spirit, which he then takes in his cap,\nand constrains it to enter the patient's head. The process of disease is\nsupposed to be a struggle between the sick person and the evil spirit of\nsickness. The Greek-word, _prophylake_ signifies the arrangements of\noutposts. _Agonia_ is the hottest moment of conflict, and _krisis_ the\ndecisive day of battle, as we see in Polybius, liii., c. 89. Medicine\nwas from the earliest times confounded with magic, which is only the\nprimitive form of the conception of nature. The Aryan rulers in India in\nancient times believed that the savage races were autochthonic workers\nof magic who were able to assume any form they pleased.[14] The negro\npriests of fetish worship believe that they can pronounce on the disease\nwithout seeing the patient, by the aid of his garments or of anything\nwhich belongs to him.[15] The superstition of the evil eye recurs in\nVedic India, as well as among many other peoples. In the Rig-Veda the\nwife is exhorted not to look upon her husband with an evil eye. There\nwas the same belief among the ancient Greeks, and it is also found in\nthe _oculus fascinus_ of the Romans, and the German _boeses Auge_. The\nearly German _Rito_, or fever, was a spirit (_Alb_) which rode upon the\nsick man. A passage in the Rig-Veda states that demons assume the form\nof an owl, cock, wolf, etc.[16] Such was the primitive attitude of the\ntransfusion of individual psychical life into things, and consequently\nof general metamorphosis. Kuhn identifies the Greek verb [Greek: iaomai]\nwith the Sanscrit _yavayami_, to avert, and in the Rig-Veda this verb is\nused in connection with _amivae_, disease; so that it was necessary to\ndrive away the demon, as the cause of sickness. A physician, according\nto the meaning of the old Sanscrit word, was the exorciser of disease,\nthe man who fought with its demon. We find the practice of incantations\nas a remedy for disease in use among the ancient Greeks, the Romans, and\nall European nations, as well as among savages in other parts of the\nworld.\n\nThe objects and phenomena obvious to perception are therefore supposed\nby primitive man, as well as by animals, to be conscious subjects in\nvirtue of their constitution, and of the innate character of sensation\nand intelligence. So that the universal personification of the things\nand phenomena of nature, either vaguely, or in an animal form, is a\nfundamental and necessary fact, both in animals and in man; it is a\nspontaneous effect of the psychical faculty in its relations to the\nworld. We think that this truth cannot be controverted, and it will be\nstill more clearly proved in the course of this work.\n\nSuch a fact, considered in its first manifestation and in the laws which\noriginally govern it in animals, and in man as far as his animal nature\nis concerned, assumes a fresh aspect, and is of two-fold force when it\nis studied in man after he has begun to reason, that is, when his\noriginal psychical faculty is doubled. The animation and personification\nof objects and phenomena by animals are always relative to those of the\nexternal world; that is, animals transfuse and project themselves into\nevery form which really excites, affects, alarms, allures, or threatens\nthem; and the spontaneous psychical faculty which such a vivifying\nprocess always produces necessarily remains within the sphere of their\nexternal perceptions and apprehensions. In a word, they live in the\nmidst of the objective nature, which they animate with consciousness and\nwill, and their internal power is altogether absorbed in this external\ntransformation.\n\nIn man, in addition to this animation of the things and phenomena of the\nexternal world, another more profound and vivid animation takes place,\nthe animation not merely of external forms, but of internal\nperceptions, ideas, sentiments, and all kinds of emotions. We know that\nman has not only the perception of external and internal things, but\nalso the perception of this perception. Hence the external form, or the\ninternal sentiment and emotion, may by the dominion of his will over all\nthe attributes of his intelligence be once more subjected to his\ndeliberate observation and intuition; by this process the external and\ninternal world are doubled in their intrinsic ideal, and give birth to\nanalysis and abstraction, that is, to the specification and\ngeneralization of the things observed.\n\nWhen this spontaneous faculty of man has been developed within him, his\nobservation of the similarities, analogies, differences, and identities\nwhich are to be found in all things and phenomena, in sentiments and\nemotions, necessarily induces him to collect and simplify them in\nspecial forms, to combine these various intuitions in a homologous type;\nthis type corresponds with an external or internal congeries of similar,\nidentical, or analogous images or ideas, out of which the species and\ngenera of the intellect are formed. In this way, for instance, arose the\nmental classification of trees, plants, flowers, rivers, springs,\nanimals, and the like, as well as that of love, hatred, sorrow, anger,\nbirth, and death, strength, weakness, rule, and obedience; in short, the\ngeneric conceptions of all natural phenomena, as well as of psychical\nsentiments and emotions.\n\nAnimals, for example, perceive a given plant or tree, as a thing\npresented at the moment to their individual consciousness, and by\ninfusing this consciousness into the object in question, they animate\nand personify it, especially if its fruits or leaves are attractive, or\nif it is moved by the wind. We have seen that all things are necessarily\npersonified by animals, for if they meet with any material obstacle,\nthey do not ascribe the sudden impediment to the impenetrability of\nmatter, or to superior force, but rather to an intentional opposition to\ntheir aim or progress. We often see that animals not only exert\nmechanical force to break through or destroy the material barriers\nintended to keep them in confinement, but they act in such a way as to\nshow rage and fury towards a hostile and malevolent subject.\n\nTo return to our example; if an animal vivifies and animates some\nspecial plant specially presented to him, he does not go beyond this\nvivifying act; when he goes on his way, and no longer perceives the\nconcrete phenomenon, the animation at the same time disappears and\nceases. Man, however, by means of the classifying faculty we have\nnoticed, after repeatedly perceiving various plants similar or analogous\nto the first, is able by spontaneous reflection, and by the automatic\nexercise of his intelligence, to refer them to a single type, and in\nthis way the specific idea of a tree is evolved in his mind and fixed in\nhis memory. The same thing gradually takes place with respect to\nflowers, animals, springs, rivers, and the like. These ideal types are\nnot wholly wanting even among the most barbarous peoples, in the most\nconcrete and dissimilar languages, since without them any language would\nbe impossible.\n\nThe same intrinsic and innate necessity which, both in man and animals,\nautomatically effects the animation and personification of consciousness\nand will in the case of external objects and phenomena, also impels man\nto vivify and personify the specific types which he has gradually\nformed, and they take an objective place in his memory as the objects of\nnature do in the case of animals. In this way man does not, like\nanimals, merely vivify the special oak or chestnut tree presented to him\nin a concrete form at a given moment, but he vivifies in the same way\nthe psychical type of trees, of flowers, etc., which has been evolved in\nhis mind, just as he vivifies the type of suffering, of disease, of\ndeath, of healing, or of any other force.\n\nFor this reason the process of necessary and spontaneous personification\nis at first two-fold; namely, the personification of individual and\nexternal objects and phenomena, and that of their specific inward types,\nwhether of the objects themselves or of their sensations and emotions.\nIt must be observed that at this early stage of man's history, specific\ntypes, or the classification of things, were not ordered and determined\nwith scientific precision; they were undefined and confused, running\nmore or less into each other, so as to be easily lost, or constantly\ndiverging more widely. This internal movement of images and undefined\nconceptions was a stimulus to active and mobile life, and an abundant\nsource of vivid or obscure myths, and of the sentiments corresponding to\nthem.\n\nThese specific primordial types were openly referred to external\nphenomena, and were based upon the life of nature, since rational or\nscientific ideas had not yet made their appearance, or only very\nsparsely. In any case, the reality of these types and their animation\nare facts, as all the earliest records attest, whether among civilized\nor savage races.\n\nThe personification of specific types, which are in general the most\nobvious--those, namely, which refer to animals, vegetables, minerals,\nand meteors, things useful or injurious to man--is the origin of the\nsubsequent belief in fetishes, genii, demons, and spirits, and these led\nto the vivification of the whole of nature, her laws, customs, and\nforces. Man's personification of himself, his projection of himself as a\nliving being into external things, was the result of reflection. In\nfact, the impersonation of the winds took place in very early times,\nsince they most frequently and universally excited the attention and\nanxiety of man and animals, whether beneficially or otherwise, and by\ntheir mechanical action, their whistling and other sounds, they readily\nstruck the mobile fancy of primitive men, and also of savage and\nignorant peoples in our day.\n\nJust as the act of respiration is a faint wind which goes on whether in\nsleep or wakefulness, and only ceases with death, so it was with the\nphenomenon of nature which attracted their attention, and it was\ninvested by them with life. Since the winds of nature had already been\nanimated and personified by a spontaneous act, so our inmost being was\ncertainly first considered as material, and impersonated as breath and\nair.\n\nThis appears from the roots and words of all languages; the Hebrew\n_nephesh, nshamah, ruach_--soul or spirit--are all derived from the idea\nof breathing. The Greek word [Greek: anemos], the Latin word _animus_,\nsignify breathing, wind, soul, and spirit. In the Sanscrit _atman_ we\nhave the successive meanings which show the evolution of the myth:\nbreathing, vital soul, intelligence, and then the individual, the _ego_.\nIn Polynesia we find the same process of things. _To think_, which in\nthe Aryan tongues comes from the root _c'i_, and originally meant to\ncollect, to comprehend, in German, _begreifen_, becomes in the\nPolynesian language, _to talk in the belly_. It is, therefore, an\nevident historical fact that man first personified natural phenomena,\nand then made use of these personifications to personify his inward\nacts, his psychical ideas and conceptions. This was the necessary\nprocess, since animals were prior to man, temporally and logically, and\nexternal idols were formed before those which were internal and peculiar\nto himself.[17]\n\nIt is true that man unconsciously, that is, without deliberation, not\nonly animates external things and their specific types, but he also, by\nan exercise of memory, animates the psychical image of these special\nperceptions. If, for example, the primitive man personifies a stream of\nwater which he has seen to issue from a fissure of the rocks, and\nascribes to it voluntary and intentional motion, he also animates the\nimage which reappears in his sphere of thought, and conceives it to\nhave a real existence. He does not merely believe it to be a psychical\nand what may be called a photographic repetition of the thing, but\nrather to have an actual, concrete existence. Thus, among all ancient\npeoples, and among many which are still in the condition of savages, the\n_shadow_ of a man's body is held to be substantial with it, and, as it\nwere, his inmost essence, and for this reason the spirits of the dead\nwere in several languages called shades.\n\nDoubtless it is difficult for us to picture to ourselves the psychical\nconditions of primitive men, at a time when the objects of perception\nand the apprehension of things were presented by an effort of memory to\nthe mind as if they were actual and living things, yet such conditions\nare not hypothetical but really existed, as any one may ascertain for\nhimself who is able to realize that primitive state of the mind, and we\nhave said enough to show that such was its necessary condition.\n\nThe fact becomes more intelligible when we consider man, and especially\nthe uneducated man, under the exciting influence of any passion, and how\nat such times he will, even when alone, gesticulate, speak aloud, and\nreply to internal questions which he imagines to be put to him by absent\npersons, against whom he is at the moment infuriated. The images of\nthese persons and things are as it were present and in agitation within\nhim; and these images, in the fervour of emotion and under the stimulus\nof excitement, appear to be actually alive, although only presented to\nthe inward psychical consciousness.\n\nIn the natural man, in whom the intellectual powers were very slowly\ndeveloped, the animation and personification effected by his mind and\nconsciousness were threefold: first, of the objects themselves as they\nreally existed, then of the idea or image corresponding to them in the\nmemory, and lastly of the specific types of these objects and images.\nThere was within him a vast and continuous drama, of which we are no\nlonger conscious, or only retain a faint and distant echo, but which is\npartly revealed by a consideration of the primitive value of words and\nof their roots in all languages. The meaning of these, which is now for\nthe most part lost and unintelligible, always expressed a material and\nconcrete fact, or some gesture. This is true of classic tongues, as is\nwell known to all educated people, and it recurs in the speech of all\nsavage and barbarous races.\n\n_Ia rau_ is used to express _all_ in the Marquesas Isles. _Rau_\nsignifies _leaves_, so that the term implies something as numerous as\nthe leaves of a tree. _Rau_ is also now used for _sound_, an expression\nwhich includes in itself the conception of _all_, but which originally\nsignified a fact, a real and concrete phenomenon, and it was felt as\nsuch in the ancient speech in which it was used in this sense. So again\nin Tahiti _huru, ten_, originally signified _hairs; rima, five_, was at\nfirst used for _hand; riri, anger_, literally means, _he shouts_. _Uku_\nin the Marquesas Isles means, _to lower the head_, and is now used for\n_to enter a house_. _Ruku_, which had the same original meaning in New\nZealand, now expresses the act of diving. The Polynesian word _toro_ at\nfirst indicated anything in the position of a hand with extended\nfingers, whence comes the Tahitian term for an ox, _puaatoro, stretching\npig_, in allusion to the way in which an ox carries his head. _Too_\n(Marquesas), to put forward the hand, is now used for _to take_. _Tongo_\n(Marquesas), to grope with extended arms, leads to _potongo tongo_,\ndarkness. In New Zealand, _wairua_, in Tahiti _varua_, signifies soul or\nspirit, from _vai_, to remain in a recumbent position, and _rua_, two;\nthat is, _to be in two places_, since they believed that in sickness or\nin dreams the soul left the body.[18] Throughout Polynesia _moe_ also\nsignifies a recumbent position or to sleep, and in Tahiti _moe pipiti_\nsignifies a double sleep or dream, from _moe_, to sleep, and _piti_,\ntwo. In New Zealand, _moenaku_ means, to try to grasp something during\nsleep; from _naku_, to take in the fingers.\n\nWe can understand something of the mysterious exercise of human\nintelligence in its earliest development from this habit of symbolizing\nand presenting in an outward form an abstract conception, thus giving a\nconcrete meaning and material expression to the external fact. We see\nhow everything assumed a concrete, living form, and can better\nunderstand the conditions we have established as necessary in the early\ndays of the development of human life. This attitude of the intelligence\nhas been often stated before, but in an incomplete way; the primitive\nand the subsequent myths have been confounded together, and it has been\nsupposed that myth was of exclusively human origin, whereas it has its\nroots lower down in the vast animal kingdom. We hope, therefore, that it\nwill be granted that we have given the true and full exposition of myth.\n\nAnthropomorphism, and the personification of the things and phenomena of\nnature, of their images and specific types, were the great source whence\nissued superstitions, mythologies, and religions, and also, as we shall\npresently see, the scientific errors to be found among all the families\nof the human race.\n\nFor the development of myth, which is in itself always a human\npersonification of natural objects and phenomena in some form or other,\nthe first and necessary foundation consists, as we have abundantly\nshown, in the conscious and deliberate vivification of objects by the\nperception and apprehension of animals. And since this is a condition of\nanimal perception, it is also the foundation of all human life, and of\nthe spontaneous and innate exercise of the intelligence. In fact, man,\nby a two-fold process, raises above his animal nature a world of images,\nideas, and conceptions from the types he has formed of various\nphenomena, and his attitude towards this internal world does not differ\nfrom his attitude towards that which is external. He personifies the\nimages, ideas, and conceptions by transforming them into living\nsubjects, just as he had originally personified cosmic objects and\nphenomena.\n\nIn myths, since they owe their origin to the reflex power which is\ngradually organized and developed, man carries on this faculty of\npersonification which had already been exerted in him as an animal. But\nthe object of myth became two-fold just as the animal nature became\nduplex in man, whether as a special image of special conception, or as\nan intellectual definition of the specific type already formed. The\nmyths are, therefore, from their very nature, either special, that is,\nderived from the psychical duplication of a personified image; or they\nare specific, and are derived, as we are about to explain, from the\npersonification of a type.\n\nThe deliberate intention to be beneficent or malign, useful or\ninjurious, which is ascribed to any external object, thus transforming\nit into an intelligent subject, is the first and simplest stage of myth,\nand the innate form of its genesis. In this case, it is always special,\nextrinsic, and concrete, and belongs implicitly to the animal kingdom,\nalthough more or less vividly in proportion to the mental and physical\nevolution of the species. It is for the same reason also proper to man,\nin whose case it first appears in the indefinite multiplication of\nfetishes, whatever may be the object venerated, and whatever the form,\naspect, and character ascribed to it. This constitutes the primordial\nimpulses, both of religious consciousness and of the spontaneous\nsolution of the problems of the world among all peoples.\n\nWhile the animation of special objects by animals generates actual\nmyths, yet it only occurs in the acts of momentary and transient\nperception; they are born and die, they arise and are dissolved in the\nvery act of production, and they neither have nor can have retrospective\nor future influence on the animal. The world, its laws and phenomena,\nform for him one universal and persistent myth, so far as he feels\nhimself constrained to vivify and transform them into subjects actuated\nby will. This consequently is the constant and normal condition of his\nconscious life with relation to things, and it leads to nothing further;\nhis mental attitude with respect to myth does not vary from his physical\nattitude towards the atmosphere, the food and water which nourish and\nsustain him, and the exercise of his functions are in conformity with\nit, as though it were his natural and necessary element.\n\nMan, on the contrary, since he has acquired the power of reflection,\nwhich enables him to reconsider past intuitions by an effort of memory,\nas well as the psychical image which corresponds to them, is not content\nwith this normal and fugitive effect of apprehending the personified\nobject presented to him. The psychical image of his actual perception,\nwhich he has ascertained from experience to be beneficent or malignant,\nor which has been interpreted as such by his fancy, recurs to the mind\neven when it is absent and remote, and it recurs in the vivid and\npersonified form in which it was first perceived.\n\nHence come the following psychical facts. On the one side the actual\nobject which he has assumed to be invested with the faculty of will\nstill remains to exert the same external influence; on the other, its\npersonified image is also present to his mind, so that he can regard it\nwith the vivid quickness of the fancy, and invest it, by its manifold\nrelations to other and various phenomena, with efficacy, force, and\nmysterious purposes. It follows from this inward action and emotion that\nwhile in the case of animals the beneficent or malignant object is only\ninvested with life at the moment of perception, and has no more efficacy\nafter its disappearance, man on the contrary retains the same\npersonified object in his memory, and recalls it at pleasure, so that\nits special efficacy persists, and it continues to be the object of\nhopes and fears either in the past or in the future. In a word, the\nnatural myth of animals is transformed by man into a fetish, whether\nthis object or its corresponding image in his mind be superstitiously\nregarded as good or evil, pleasing or terrible.\n\nThis was the source of primitive, confused, and inorganic fetishism\namong all peoples; namely, that they ascribed intentional and conscious\nlife to a host of natural objects and phenomena. Hence came the fears,\nthe adoration, the guardianship of, or abhorrence for some given species\nof stones, plants, animals, some strange forms or unusual natural\nobject. The subsequent adoration of idols and images, all sorts of\ntalismans, the virtue of relics, dreams, incantations, and exorcisms,\nhad the same origin and were all due to this primitive genesis of the\nfetish, the internal duplication of the external animation and\npersonification of objects.\n\nIt is evident that fetishism in its earliest and most primitive form was\nalways inspired by special objects, since the external perception of\nanimals and of man is special and concrete. But we have seen how our\nintelligence, by a spontaneous and innate process, was led to form types\nfrom the immense variety of special things and phenomena, and these\ntypes are the specific forms of such things as are alike, analogous, or\nidentical. We have also seen that by the same necessity of the psychical\nfaculty, which is not inconsistent with the fundamental process of\nanimal intelligence, man animates and personifies these specific types,\njust as he had animated the special perceptions whence they were\ngenerated in his mind.[19]\n\nThe second form of myth next occurs, if considered as it exists in man,\nbut the third form of myth, if regarded in his solidarity with the\nanimal kingdom. Instead of investing the special fetish of a given\nobject with superstitious fear, he now adores or fears all objects of\nthe same species, or which, in the imperfect classification of primitive\ntimes, he believes to be of the same species. Thus, to give a common\nexample, if some particular viper or other form of snake is the first\nform of fetish, in the second stage the whole species of vipers, and of\nthe snakes which resemble them, is regarded with the same dread. He next\nsupposes all the snakes which he comes across to emanate from a single\npower, manifesting itself in this shape in various times and places. In\nthe same way, according to the natural evolution of this law, the\nindividual, concrete plant will no longer be the fetish or object of\nmyth, but all those of the same species, or which nearly resemble it. It\nwill no longer be a given spring, but all springs, no longer one\nparticular grove, cave, or mountain, but all groves, caves, and\nmountains; in a word, the species will be substituted for the\nindividual, the type for the fact.[20]\n\nIn this second stage to which myth spontaneously attained, it must be\nobserved that all fetishes could not be reduced to a specific or typical\nimage, since in nature, and in ages and conditions when the intelligence\nwas still rude and uncultured, all phenomena or objects could not assume\na specific form, but were still regarded as individuals. In this class\nare the sun, the moon, certain stars and constellations, as well as some\nother natural phenomena, volcanoes, hot springs, and the like; since\nthese were unique within the range of country inhabited by the savage\nhordes, they could not become specific. Hence, while all other objects\nand their respective fetishes followed the natural evolution into a\nspecific type, and through these into the simplest form of polytheism,\nthe special fetish which referred to unique things or phenomena remained\nspecial, although it was modified, as we shall see, so as to harmonize\nwith the aspect commonly assumed by other typical images.\n\nIt must be observed that we have gradually ascended from the special to\nthe specific fetish, and to types which are resolved by the intelligence\ninto more ideal and less concrete images; precisely because they are\nideal and less bound to the form they had before, they are incarnated in\nan anthropomorphic and anthropopathic form. Released from the necessity\nof regarding them in a vague form, or one different from that of man,\nthe image becomes more human, and that not only as before in\nconsciousness and purpose, but also in aspect and structure.\n\nIn fact, in this stage man does not merely infuse his spiritual essence\ninto these types, but likewise his corporeal form, whence we have the\ntrue, human image of myth. This may be seen in the various primitive\nOlympuses of all historic races as well as among savage peoples, only\nvarying in the splendour of their imagery. They consist in the\ntransformation of the earlier fetish into an intelligent, corporeal\nperson, and result from the formation and personification of types.\n\nBeginning with the mysterious conception of some particular spring as a\nmalignant or beneficent fetish which, although personified, still\nretains its concrete form, the classifying action of the intelligence\ngradually constructs, from its points of resemblance to other springs, a\ngeneric type which includes them all. This typical conception,\npersonified in its turn, next represents a unique power, of which all\nthe individual and accidental springs are only manifestations. Thus it\nis clear that man, in the personification of this type or specific\nconception, is no longer bound to the actual form of the special object\nwhich first represented it, but he may be said to mould a more\nindefinite and plastic substance into which he can with spontaneous or\nfacile art incarnate his whole person. Hence this substance will assume\nan anthropomorphic form, and will issue, not in a mysterious being of\nextrinsic and indefinite form, but in a person with human features,\nobvious to human senses.\n\nIt was thus, when the fetish attained to a specific type, that mythical\nanthropomorphism was generated, and polytheism, properly so-called; a\npolytheism which represents in its figures and images the humanization\nand personification of specific types. These afterwards diverge into\nspecifications which vary with the number of phenomena that are united\nin a single idea or conception. The first polytheistic Olympus consisted\nof natural types, and at a much later period they became moral or\nabstract, in accordance with the spontaneous evolution of the\nintelligence itself.\n\nIt was in fact in this way that all the specific myths of the general\nphenomena of nature had their origin, and in our Aryan race we can,\nstarting from the Rig-Veda, follow their splendid development among\nGraeco-Latins, Celts, Germans, and Slavs; it may also be traced in the\nmemory and historic evolution of other races, and with less distinctness\namong those which are barbarous and savage.[21]\n\nTo take some example which may throw light upon our theory of the\nevolution of myth, let us consider that of _Holda_ in the German\nPantheon, since it is a generic type of the special primitive fetishes\nof sources, already in process of formation before the dispersion of the\nAryan tribes. Mannhardt (_Deutsche Mythologie_) has shown what was the\nprimitive form of the conception of _Holda_ and of the _Nornas_, that\nis, of the phenomenal appearances of water; Holda, the _lady of waters_,\nfirst watched over the heavenly sources, and then, by a subsequent\ninterweaving of myths and duplication of images, she kept and guarded\nthe souls of new-born infants. This early conception by progressive\nspecification gave birth to those of the _Nornas_, of _Valkuria,\nUndine,_ and others. The primitive fetish, or fetishes of waters out of\nwhich the specific type, afterwards personified, was evolved and formed,\nwere at first so bound to the concrete form of the phenomenon, that\nalthough animated, it could not assume a human aspect and form. But when\nthe specific type which ideally represented the power manifested in all\nthe various modes of special phenomena was evolved, then man was\nreleased from the concrete and individual forms of the fetish, and\nreadily moulded it in his own corporeal as well as in his moral image.\nSo Holda, changed from a heavenly to an earthly deity, was transformed\ninto the goddess of wells and lakes, and assumed a perfectly human and\neven artistic form. She loved to bathe at noon-day, and was often seen\nto issue from the water and then plunge anew into the waves, appearing\nas a very fair and lovely woman.\n\nAgain, we know that in the gradual mythical evolution which found its\nclimax in Apollo, the animation of this type, so fruitful in special\ninstances, extended even to the form of his arms, his bow and arrows,\nand to the place of his habitation at Delphos. He was armed, according\nto Schwartz, with the rainbow and with thunderbolts, and Delphos was\nesteemed to be the centre and navel of the world.\n\nThese mythical ideas have their special reproduction in the mythology of\nthe Finns. (Castren.) The god _Ukko_ with his great bow of fire sends\nforth trees as darts against his enemies; while fighting, he stands\nerect upon a cloud, called the _umbilicus_ of heaven. Thus we see that\nthe process of myth is similar, even in different races.\n\nBy the primitive personification of the special fetishes whence he was\nevolved, the _Indra_ of Vedic India is shepherd of the herd of heavenly\nkine. _Vritra_, a three-headed monster in the form of a serpent, steals\naway the herd and hides it in his cave. Indra pursues the robber, enters\nthe cave with fury, overwhelms the monster with his thunderbolt, and\nleads back the kine to heaven, their milk sprinkling the earth. This\nmyth gradually assumed in the Vedic hymns more splendid and artistic\nforms, and more amazing personifications. The original motive of the\nmyth, as it has been interpreted even by Indian commentators, was the\nstorm with all its alternations which bursts forth with more terrific\nviolence in hot climates. The luminous clouds which bring rain are the\npurple kine whom a black-demon tries to steal; the fruitfulness of the\nearth depends on the issue of the contest, and the thunderbolt disperses\nthe cloud, which falls on the earth in rain, while _Indra_, that is, the\nblue sky, appears in his splendour.[22]\n\nIt may be clearly seen from these examples how the specific myth was\ngradually developed. We have said that in addition to the myth which\nreferred to types constructed from special and manifold suggestions,\nalike or analogous in extrinsic circumstances, others were formed from\ndefinite natural objects, in their relations to men and to their\nacquaintance with cosmic facts in those very early times. These,\nhowever, although definite, assumed anthropomorphic forms, like those\nwhich were specific. The cause of this identity of construction is to be\nfound in the influence exerted upon them by the earlier myths. By a\nnecessary equilibrium and spontaneous symmetry of mental creations,\nthese were also modified by the gradual formation of contemporary\nimages. In this way the solar myths were elaborated and developed among\nthe Aryan peoples and other races; their aspects became much more\nanthropomorphic and anthropopathic in proportion as the typical myths\nassumed a human form.\n\nThe primitive myths of the secondary form were at first grouped round\nphysical and external phenomena, because these were originally the most\nobvious to man. But the specific moral types had their origin by\nreaction, and by a more strictly intellectual process, and these were\npersonified in the same way, although in this second stage they were not\nso numerous. Yet their appearance and creation were inevitable, since\nthe same faculty and classifying process had to be carried out in the\nintellectual and moral order as in that which was extrinsic and cosmic;\nsince the mind and consciousness and intrinsic faculty of the\nintelligence are identical. And when once these ultimate types were\nformed, the same necessity impelled their animation and personification\nin anthropomorphic images. Of this we have abundant instances in all the\ntraditions of nearly all the peoples of the world.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\n\nSTATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM.\n\n\nIn the preceding chapters we have considered and, as we hope,\ndemonstrated the origin and genesis of myth in general, an origin and\ngenesis which had their first impulses and causes in the animal kingdom\nas a whole, since these beginnings were the necessary result of the\npsychical exercise of the perception and intelligence. We next\ndiscovered in man, as he issued from a simply animal condition and\nattained the power of reflection, the origin of the special myth or\nfetish, which was a higher evolution of that which is proper to animals;\nhence the origin of the specific myth was altogether anthropomorphic,\nwhether physical or moral; and hence came also the development and\nramification of all mythologies, and of universal polytheism.\n\nIt may be seen from the reality and truth of this theory how much\nmistaken those men are who hold, owing to their religious prejudices or\nto their systems of logic and history, that monotheism was the first\nintuition of man, or at any rate of the privileged races. This is\naltogether impossible, since such an opinion is opposed to the genuine\ndevelopment of the intelligence, to its primitive constitution and\nprogress, and to the essential _solidarity_ of human and animal nature.\n\nIn the case of animals as well as of man the implicit act and psychical\nprocess of communication between the world and themselves consist in the\nindividual and concrete animation of the thing or phenomenon perceived;\nwhence they are resolved into conscious subjects, acting with a given\npurpose; the difference in man's case, due to his power of reflection,\nconsists in the fact that he ascribes to the fetish distinct mental\ncharacteristics, regarding it as a subject, actuated by will, and\ninvested with an external form. Hence it is impossible that man should\nhave had any primitive intuition of a perfectly rational and universal\n_Idea_, since his intelligence is so constituted that it is slowly\ndeveloped from the animal condition into a humanity which is mythically\nreflex, and he rises from the single to the specific, from phenomena to\nthe type which more or less exactly corresponds to them.\n\nWe are convinced that by these researches, we have eradicated the\nprevious misconception, which cannot be revived or maintained except\nwith the weapons of sophism, and by defying evidence and the very nature\nof things.\n\nWhile man has risen from the individual myth to that which is specific,\ninfusing anthropomorphic life into the whole of nature, and into his own\nsensations, emotions, and conceptions, he has pursued an art virtually\nthe same as that whence science is generated. The instrument, both with\nrespect to the formation of myths and to the formulation of science, is\nin fact identical, and the process also is the same. Science, like myth,\nobserves, analyzes, and classifies observations, and gradually rises to\na conception of the specific type, and hence to a unity which becomes\never more complete and universal.\n\nIn the composition and mythical animation of the world, whether by\nspecial personifications or by those which are typical, and by the\nsensations corresponding to them, man makes a fanciful classification of\nphenomena, he observes and studies their beneficial or injurious effects\non himself, and in this empirical way is able to estimate their value.\nOn the other hand, he rises in the social scale by means of his\nsuperstitious and religious feelings, which act as a stimulus and\nsymbol, so far as he subjects his animal and perverse instincts to the\ndeliberate precepts which he imagines to be expressed by these myths.\n\nIn so far as the empirical observation of things is irrational, and\nobedience is paid to the fanciful precepts of oracles, it is not the\nresult of an explicit moral law, yet there is on the one side some\nknowledge of the qualities, habits, and periods of things, and on the\nother a civil and human order which is gradually formed and developed.\nIn fact, in the case of the higher historical races it is important to\nmake a more explicit and accurate study of the fetish religion, that is,\nof the mythical animation of any special phenomenon or thing. Although\nthe scope of such religion is superstitious veneration, or abject fear,\nyet it is impossible that it should not induce a more precise and less\nconfused notion of the relative condition of things. In this way\nobservation becomes more accurate, and the intrinsic use of the thing is\noften recognized. By the gradual exercise of such analysis in the case\nof all or most phenomena, man obtains a clearer knowledge of his\nenvironment.\n\nWhile a juster estimate of the empiric value of special objects is\nobtained in this manner, the subsequent, though sometimes mistaken\nclassification of their specific types enables the mind to arrange his\nknowledge of natural things in a more synthetic and orderly way, and by\nsuch classification man is always tending towards a more universal\nunity: he places the general forms of phenomena in an ideal harmony,\nwhich fancifully symbolizes their laws.\n\nIn the succeeding chapters we shall see how this process is\naccomplished, and how it leads up to the explicit exercise of the\nreason. A more definite empiric knowledge, and the harmonious\nclassification of specific types with a view to unity, are a proof of a\nrelatively greater improvement, both in civilization and morality. This\nis abundantly shown in all those peoples who have attained to an\naltogether anthropomorphic polytheism, either among the Aryans, prior to\ntheir dispersion, in the Vedic period in India, among the Celts,\nGraeco-Latins, Germans, Slavs, or in the Finnish races, Mongols, Chinese,\nAssyrians, Egyptians, Mexicans, and Peruvians, as well as among the\nbarbarous peoples of modern times.\n\nThe imagination, the faculty which creates and excites phantasms in man,\nis not, as is erroneously supposed, the primary source of myths, but\nonly that which in a secondary degree elaborates and perfects their\nspontaneous forms; and precisely because it is near akin to this\nprimordial mythical faculty, it goes on to organize and classify these\npolytheistic myths. By a moral and necessary development an\napproximation is made, if not to truth itself, at any rate to its\nsymbols; whence reason is afterwards more easily infused into myth on\nthe one side, and on the other it is resolved into rational ideas and\ncosmic laws. It was in this way that poets perfected myth in its\ninfluence on virtue and civilization, and by them it was directed into\nthe paths of science and of truth.\n\nAs Dr. Zeller has well said in his lecture on the development of\nmonotheism in Greece herself, the great Greek poets were her first\nthinkers, her sages, as they were afterwards called. They sang of Zeus,\nand exalted him as the defender of righteousness, the representative of\nmoral order. Archilocus says that Zeus weighs and measures all the\nactions of good and evil men, as well as those of animals. He is, said\nTerpandros somewhat later, the source and ruler of all things. According\nto Simonides of Amorgos, the principle of all created things rests with\nhim, and he rules the universe by his will. Thus, as time went on, Zeus\nbecame, in the general conception, the personification of the world's\ngovernment, which was delivered from the fatality of destiny and from\nthe promptings of caprice. Destiny which, according to the early\nmythical representation, it was impossible to escape, is resolved into\nthe will of Zeus, and the other gods which were at first supposed to be\nable to oppose him, become his faithful ministers. Such is the teaching\nof Solon and of Epicharmos. \"Be assured that nothing escapes the eyes of\nthe divinity; God watches over us, and to him nothing is impossible.\"\n\nThis impulse of the imaginative faculty combined with the process of\nreason is most plainly seen in the conceptions of the three great poets\nof the fifth century, Pindar, AEschylus, and Sophocles. In the words of\nPindar: \"All things depend on God alone; all which befalls mortals,\nwhether it be good or evil fortune, is due to Zeus: he can draw light\nfrom darkness, and can veil the sweet light of day in obscurity. No\nhuman action escapes him: happiness is found only in the way which leads\nto him; virtue and wisdom flow from him alone.\"\n\nWe find the same order and manner of thought in AEschylus, although he\nremained faithful to the polytheistic creed, which indeed confirms the\ntruth of our theory. The moral law was gradually developed and purified\nby this long succession of poets, and it clearly appears from AEschylus\nand his successors how man reaps that which he has sown: he whose heart\nand hands are pure lives his life unmolested, while guilt sooner or\nlater brings its own punishment with it. The Erynnyes rule the fates of\nmen, and may be said to sap the vital forces of the guilty; they cleave\nto them, excite and stimulate them to madness until death comes. The\nancient and mysterious mythical tradition of the strife between the old\ngods and the new was astutely used by AEschylus to teach us how the\nterrible vengeance of the Eumenides gradually gave place to a gentler\nand more humane law; just as the primitive despotism of Zeus was\ngradually transformed into a providential and moral rule of the\nuniverse.\n\nSophocles attained to a higher degree of perfection in the paths of\ngentleness. No ancient poet has spoken more nobly of the Deity, although\nhis language is altogether polytheistic. He shows the highest reverence\nto the gods, whose power and laws rule all human life. On them all\nthings depend, both good and evil, nor could any one violate with\nimpunity the eternal order of things. No act or thought escapes the\ngods; they are the source of wisdom and happiness. Man must meekly\ncomply with their precepts, and must offer up his pains and sorrows to\nZeus.\n\nThese utterances of the ancient poets never go beyond the range of\npolytheism, yet they show how far intrinsic morality and truth were\ndeveloped, even by the imaginative and mythical faculty of the human\nmind, during the gradual historical evolution of the race. The plurality\nof gods appears to be the manifestation of the divine principle; their\naction on the world lost almost all trace of arbitrary power and of\ntheir former versatility and caprice. The superstition of polytheism\nremained, but it had an inward tendency to more rational conceptions and\nprinciples.\n\nFrom this brief notice, as well as from the remarks which preceded it,\nit appears how the evolution of myth, from its beginning and in its\nhistoric course, led to a more perfect, although empiric acquaintance\nwith the world, and with the moral principles and civilization of\npeoples. The logical faculty by which the development is gradually\neffected is the same by which from another point of view science becomes\npossible.\n\nWe have clearly demonstrated the indisputable fact that the absolute\ncondition of intrinsic animal perception, and consequently of the\nprimary perception of man, was the animation and vivification of the\nthings and phenomena perceived. This primary acquaintance with things\ndepended on their spontaneous resolution into active and personal\nsubjects. Nor could it be otherwise. Although the scientific idea or\nnotion of objective reality in itself could not be grasped by simple\nanimal intelligence, the impression of the thing perceived was\nnecessarily that of a subjectivity resembling that of the observer, not\nindeed in outward form and figure but in intrinsic power, whatever might\nbe the extrinsic form and figure of the object or phenomenon.\n\nThe original condition of animals, and of man himself in his primordial\nlife and consciousness, is and was the intrinsic personification of the\nthings perceived: from this source the human intellect slowly and with\ndifficulty attained to science, by virtue of that psychical\nreduplication which has been so often mentioned.\n\nThe motive or subject of myth may be external, cosmic, or it may be\ninternal, intellectual, and moral, but in each case the cause and\nfaculty at work are the same. Just as the primary condition of\nobservation, and consequently the motive principle of science, consists\nin the primitive exercise of the intelligence, which leads to empirical\nand rational knowledge, so myth and science have a common origin in the\nimmediate transformation of natural objects and phenomena into living\nsubjects, and they flow from the same deep source. The object in view is\ndifferent, but their constructive faculty is the same, and they are, up\nto a certain point in their long historic course, evolved in the same\nway. Science, therefore, from one point of view, is the gradual\nexhaustion and dissolution of myth into the objects which are\nscientifically investigated, and this will appear more clearly in the\nsequel.\n\nThe series of various phenomena, whether of light, of meteors, of water,\nof vegetable and animal forms, which were the first subjects of myths,\nbecame so interwoven as finally to be represented in an anthropomorphic\npersonality, and were thus gradually lost and evaporated in the ideal\nsymbol. As time went on, by the exercise of the intelligence, and by the\naid of the observations and collateral experiments naturally connected\nwith them, man ended where he had begun; released from myth, he only\nrecognized the facts and laws of the world. This clearly shows, not only\nthe formation of myths, but the process of evolution by which they pass\ninto science, in which they find their termination.\n\nIf, however, myth and science have the same origin, and start from a\ncommon fact, a fundamental principle is necessary, and an internal human\nact, which is at once the cause and genesis both of myth and science.\nAnd although the source is one, myth and science vary in their aspects\nand effects, and have different fields of historic activity, so that it\nis necessary to trace the cause of this diversity in their progress and\nresults, to enable us to make a scientific definition of the nature of\nmyth and science, their respective sources and objects.\n\nIf on the one side we continually see the birth of fresh myths, which\nramify into many fertile sources of superstitions, of religions, of\npoetry and aestheticism; on the other side we see almost simultaneously a\nmore or less distinct and lively manifestation of the scientific\nfaculty, although still in an empirical form. They are like two streams\nwhich issue from the same source and take a parallel course, sometimes\nmingling their waters, only to separate anew, and then again to become\nunited as they fall by a wide mouth into the sea.\n\nIn this manner we have ascertained the actual origin of science and of\nmyth, and have entered on a field perhaps never before attempted nor\ncontemplated; we have established a firm basis for such researches, and,\nwhich is perhaps still more important, have shown the continuity of the\nmythical faculty between man and the animal kingdom. We have\nascertained this fact, in its cosmic necessities, both physiological and\npsychical, but without considering the faculty on which it depends; we\nhave still to decompose the elements of which it consists, and to\nconsider their nature and number.\n\nThis inquiry forms the chief problem we have to solve, and it is\nprecisely what we have endeavoured to state in this chapter. In the\nnecessary order of things the fact has its physiological and cosmic\nconditions in man; it is therefore necessarily internal and psychical,\nand it is accomplished by the special and intrinsic exercise of the\nintelligence. We shall be convinced of this truth if we only consider\nthat science and myth have a common origin.\n\nIt is evident that there are great difficulties in such an inquiry; for,\nputting aside other extrinsic difficulties, we have to reduce to a\nsingle act or fact the origin of the two vast worlds of myth and\nscience; it is needful to gauge the inmost psychical faculty of the\nintelligence, and to discover the continuous yet rapid and delicate\nprocess of its exercise.\n\nIf we are able to attain our object and to tear away the veil which\nconceals this mysterious act, we shall have a noble recompense in the\nlaborious path on which we have entered, inasmuch as we shall reveal one\nof the most important laws of life, of the exercise of reflex\nintelligence and of the genesis of science. Yet we are very sensible how\nfar we are from being equal to the enormous difficulties of this\ninquiry.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\n\nTHE ANIMAL AND HUMAN EXERCISE OF THE INTELLECT IN THE PERCEPTION OF\nTHINGS.\n\n\nApprehension is the act, both in animals and in man, by which the\nspontaneous and immediate animation of things and of phenomena is\naccomplished. It is therefore necessary to pause and consider this act,\nsince it is, even in man, the source and foundation of the origin of\nmyth, and in it we shall find the causes, elements, and action by which\nsuch a genesis is effected. This fact is so evident that the necessity\nof making such an inquiry might almost be taken for granted, since the\ntruth can be ascertained in no other way.\n\nIn the case of animal perception, which we have already considered, the\nexternal perception of an object is composed of three elements: the\nphenomenon perceived, the living subject with which this phenomenon is\nanimated, and the vague yet real power involved in the life thus infused\ninto it by the animal. Supposing any other animal to be the object\nperceived, these three elements are self-evident; since the phenomenon\nperceived in a given form causes the immediate assumption that it is a\nsubject, actuated by a purpose of offence or defence, and hence follows\nthe apprehension of a power capable of affecting him, which has in this\ncase a real existence. Phenomenon, subject, effective power, follow in a\nrapid and inevitable sequence, and are instantly combined in the\nintegral image formed of the object apprehended by the senses.\n\nIn fact, an animal which fights with another, which seizes on his food\nas a prey, or which is in dread of some enemy or unfamiliar object,\nrecognizes either the species or the individual from its external form,\nand constitutes it into an animated subject, and ultimately into an\nactively offensive or defensive power, or into one which satisfies his\nappetites. Such a fact, and such elements of the fact, recur in the\nwhole animal kingdom, even among those which only apprehend external\nthings by the sense of touch. As we ascend higher in the scale of\nanimals to those who possess other senses and a more elaborate organism,\nwe find the same fact in a more perfect and distinct form.\n\nThose animals which, since they are without the sense of sight, have no\nperception of distance, wait until their prey touches their antennae,\nmouths, or claws, and yet the same distinct act is accomplished in these\nthree specified elements. They would not lie in wait for their prey,\nunless they had already formed a conception of its possible image,\nconsisting of a form, subject, and effective force, combined in a single\nintuition. When this external prey is presented to the senses, the\nphenomenon, subject, and effective power arise in rapid succession, and\nare united in one unique consciousness. This truth appears from the\nanimal's efforts not to let his prey escape destruction.\n\nFrom the reciprocal apprehension of animals, these three elements which\nconstitute it may be clearly seen. Although such a truth, precisely\nbecause it is evident, may appear simple to those who seek truth from\nthe clouds, or by means of logical or tortuous artifice, yet such are\nthe characteristics of true science. For the new facts which she\ninterprets and classifies appear old as soon as they are understood,\nalthough they have never before been explained.\n\nAlthough such a fact is manifest in the case of reciprocal animal\nperceptions, it may appear more difficult to verify it with respect to\nperceptions which do not refer to other animals, but to natural\nphenomena, or to inanimate, unconscious things. We have shown that all\nanimal perception is possible only so far as they are able to infuse\ntheir own consciousness and psychical power into every object of nature,\nsince they are unable to comprehend the thing or phenomenon except as an\nobjective reality, without reference to its real cosmic importance.\nSince this is necessarily the case, the object perceived, even when it\nis not an animal, is always transformed into a living subject, acting\ndeliberately. And although this is sometimes done in a vague way, when\nthe object in question has not the external form and movements of an\nanimal, yet it is always regarded as a real power.\n\nWhen a well broken horse, for example, goes on his way quietly,\nperceiving nothing which strongly attracts nor alarms him, the sudden\nflutter of a cloth, the flaring of a lamp, the rush of water, or some\nviolent noise will cause him to stop, to plunge and kick, or to bolt\naway. We have already shown, by experiment, the exciting cause of his\nalarm and suspicion. The sudden fluttering of the cloth in the wind was\na phenomenon perceived by the horse, and since he regarded this\nphenomenon as an animated subject, and consequently as a real power, it\nis evident that his fear was caused by the sudden appearance of a living\nform, and the direct apprehension of a subject which might possibly be\nhurtful or dangerous. In this way, the circle is completed and combined\nin one unique phantasm; a phenomenon, a living subject, and a real\npower.\n\nIn this instance, the psychical law is so clear that it can hardly be\ndisputed. But if we consider any other animal perceptions, we find that\nthe law still holds good, as we have already shown in various instances.\nIn all cases the apprehension takes place in the same way, and consists\nof the same elements, namely, of a phenomenon, a living subject, and a\nreal power. The exercise of animal apprehension is the rapid, necessary,\nand perpetual concentration into a single image of the phenomenon,\nsubject, and cause; that is, given the perception of a phenomenon, the\nanimal endows it, with respect to himself, with consciousness, and\nconsequently with real power.\n\nIn fact, the faculty of perception cannot be exercised in any other way,\nnor can it consist of any other elements. In nature, the sensible\nqualities of things are all resolved into general and special phenomena,\nappearances, and extrinsic forms, as far as animal and human intuition,\nand the character of the subject which perceives and feels them, are\nconcerned; and they are perceived just so far as we and as animals are\nable to communicate by means of our senses with the world and with\nourselves. A phenomenon and an intrinsic form signify, at the moment of\nperception, the thing, the object which the conditions of our senses\nenable us to perceive, and the intrinsic power of this phenomenon\nimplies a cause. Natural phenomena and beings are thus reciprocally\nlinked together as causes and effects, an effect becoming in its turn\nthe cause of a subsequent fact; that is, when we consider things in\nthemselves, and not relatively to the animal or man who apprehends them.\n\nIf, therefore, there are in animal consciousness and intelligence three\nelements of apprehension, afterwards fused into a single fact, it\nfollows that the extrinsic relations of beings and forces are\nsubjectively reciprocal; there is the given form of a phenomenon, and,\nintrinsically, it consists of an active power, eternally at work, since\nthere is no being nor form which stands still and is not reproduced in\nthe infinite evolution of the universe.\n\nSince, to the percipient, the extrinsic form, whatever it may be,\nremains the same as that which was first presented to him, the\nphenomenon is bounded by his faculty of perception, followed by the\nimmediate and implicit assumption of a subject, and consequently of a\npossible and indefinite causality. This internal and psychical process\nof the animal corresponds with the actual condition of things, as they\nappear and really are; a correspondence which is in itself a powerful\nconfirmation of the truth.\n\nSince an animal is devoid of the explicit and reflex process of the\nintellect, it has not and cannot have any conception of the thing in\nitself, the intrinsic essence of the phenomenon, nor yet of the\nobjective and cosmic cause; because it animates the phenomenon with its\nown personality, which has assumed the external form of this phenomenon,\nit is conscious of a cause, like itself, transfused into the object in\nquestion. We have shown that phenomena affect animals in this way, and\nthat they are conscious of being in a world of living subjects,\nconstantly actuated by the deliberate purpose of influencing them.\n\nThe faculty and elements of apprehension are precisely similar in man\nand animals, since extrinsic things present the same appearance to both\nalike, and the perceptive power acts in the same way. We cannot, indeed,\ngo back to our first beginnings, and it is difficult for those who are\nnot accustomed to such researches to discover the primitive facts of\ntheir own being, which have been so much modified by exercise and the\nintrinsic use of reflection for many ages; yet some certain signs\nremain, nor would it be now impossible to reproduce them. No one can\ndoubt that man also began to communicate with the world and with himself\nby his perception of a phenomenon, of some extrinsic quality or form.\nFrom this he directly apprehended the thing and its cause. No\nintelligent person can believe that man had any direct intuition of the\nthing in itself, independently of the extrinsic phenomenon by which it\nwas presented to his perceptions: he could not by the sudden\napprehension of all natural objects intuitively grasp the _Idea_. This\nwill be more fully shown in the following chapter.\n\nIn accordance with this statement, man, who still retains his animal\nnature, has exercised the same faculty of apprehension by the synthetic\nprocess of the three elements which compose it in the case of animals;\nhe attains therefore to the same results, that is, he animates the\nobject of perception, and considers it as an efficient cause. This\nidentical faculty of perception in man and animals was only\ndifferentiated when the reflex power of man subsequently enabled him to\nregard objects, as we do now, as inanimate, and subject to the universal\nlaws of nature.\n\nEven now, after all our scientific attainments, we are not wholly free\nfrom the former innate illusion; we often act towards things as if we\nlived in the early days of our race, and continue that primitive process\nof personification in the case of certain objects.\n\nWe have shown what was the origin of the fetish and of myth, and how it\narose from the impersonation of all natural objects and phenomena, which\nare transformed into living subjects. This shows that the faculty,\nelements, and results of the apprehension are identical in man and\nanimals. If man created the fetish which in process of differentiation\ngenerated all kinds of myths, he, like animals, was directly and\nimplicitly conscious of the living subject, and in it of an active\ncause. Although in man the fetish retains its personality in his memory,\nand becomes the cause of hopes and fears throughout his life, while its\neffect on the animal is only transitory, and at the actual moment of\nperception; yet this does not invalidate the truth of the principle, nor\nprove that their impulses and genesis are not identical. Thus the\nanalysis of the faculty of apprehension confirms and explains the proof\nbefore given of the origin of myths, and explains their causes.\n\nWe have all, however unaccustomed to give account of our acts and\nfunctions, found ourselves in circumstances which produced the\nmomentary personification of natural objects. The sight of some\nextraordinary phenomenon produces a vague sense of some one acting with\na given purpose, and hence of an actual fetish. A man will sometimes\naddress the things which surround him, and act towards them as if they\npossessed consciousness and will. Children, who are still without\nexperience and reflection, will often invest external objects with\nsolidity.\n\nA child, as soon as it can guide its own motions, will grasp anything\nwhich is pliant and yielding as firmly as if it were solid, thus\nimplicitly judging the thing from its appearance. In the same way, a\nchild confidently relies on any support, however weak and insufficient\nit may be, arguing as usual from the appearance to the thing itself. Nor\nmust it be said that experience is necessary to correct these errors.\nThe implicit faculty of apprehension is prior to experience, which only\nbecomes possible by means of this faculty. The elements of this faculty\nunconsciously fulfil and pursue their office in the child, aided by the\nreflex motions which are cerebro-spinal and peripheral, as they have\nbeen produced and organized in the species by evolution; but they, as\nwell as these reflex physiological motions, are prior to the same\ntemporary experience.[23]\n\nThus the new-born infant sucks the milk which serves for its nourishment\nfrom its mother's breast; it is impossible in this case that such a\nclass of elements should not be spontaneously developed; the child feels\nthe nipple and adapts its mouth and mode of breathing to it, while\npressing the breast with its hands to express the milk. If much in this\noperation might be ascribed to reflex movements, yet in association with\nthem, supplementing and rendering them possible, there is an implicit\nperception of the external phenomenon through the sense of touch, and he\nbecomes conscious of the object, and of its causative power; such power\nconsisting in this case of its capacity to satisfy his wants. In short,\nall animals, man included, in every act of communication with the world,\nexercise this faculty by means of the three elements which constitute\nit. If we consider the actions of infants, and still more of all young\nanimals, this truth will be vividly displayed.\n\nIn common speech, even to this day, all men, both learned and unlearned,\nspeak of inanimate things as if they had consciousness and intelligence.\nWhile this mode of expression bears witness to the extremely early\norigin of the general personification of natural objects, it also shows\nthat even now our intelligence is not emancipated from such a habit, and\nour speech unconsciously retains the old custom. Thus we call weather\ngood and bad, the wind mad (_pazzo_) or furious, the sea treacherous,\nthe waters insidious; a stone is obstinate, if we cannot easily move it,\nand we inveigh against all kinds of material obstacles as if they could\nhear us. We call the season inconstant or deceitful, the sun melancholy\nand unwilling to shine, and we say that the sky threatens snow. We say\nthat some plants are consumed by heat, that some soils are indomitable,\nthat well cultivated ground is no longer wild, that in a good season the\nwhole landscape smiles and leaps for joy. A river is called malevolent,\nand a lake swallows up men; the earth is thirsty and sucks up moisture,\nand plants fear the cold. The people of Pistoja say that some olive\ntrees will not feel a thrashing, that they are afraid of many things,\nand that they live on, despising the course of years. Again, they say\nthat olive trees are not afraid of the pruning knife, and that they\nrejoice in its use by a skilled hand. Thousands of such expressions\nmight be adduced, and we refer our readers to Giuliani's work,\n\"_Linguaggio vivente toscano._\"\n\nNor do we only ascribe our own feelings to inanimate things, but we also\ninvest them with the forms and members of the human body. We speak of\nthe head, shoulder, back, or foot of a mountain, of an arm of the sea, a\ntongue of land, the mouth of a sea-port, of a cave, or crater. So again\nwe ascribe teeth to mountains, a front (_fronte_, forehead) to a house;\nthere is the eye-brow (_ciglio_) of a ditch, the eye of heaven, a vein\nof metal, the entrails of a mountain. The Alps are bald or bare, the\nsoil is wrinkled, objects are sinister or the reverse (_sinistra,\ndestra_),[24] and a mountain is gigantic ox dwarfish.\n\nIn like manner we ascribe our own functions to nature. The river eats\ninto the land; the whirlpool swallows all which is thrown into it, and\nthe wind whistles, howls and moans; the torrent murmurs, the sun is born\nand dies, the heavens frown, the fields smile. This habit is also\ntransferred to moral questions; and we speak of the heart of the\nquestion, the leading idea, the body of doctrines, the members of a\nphilosophic system; we infuse new blood into thought. Truth becomes\npalpable, a theme is eviscerated, thought is lame, science is childish.\nHistory speaks clearly; there is an embryo of knowledge, a vacillating\nscience; the infancy, youth, maturity, and death of a theory; morality\nis crass, the spirit meagre or acute; the mind adapts itself, logic is\nmaimed; there is a conflict of ideas, the inspiration of science,\ntruncated thoughts. Again we talk of the head of the mob, of the foot of\nthe altar or the throne, of the heart of the riot, of the body of an\narmy, of a phalanx, of trampling under foot, duty, decency, and justice.\n\nFrom these examples, and indeed we might say from the whole of speech,\nespecially if we go back to the primitive value of words and to their\nroots, it appears to what a vast extent man originally projected\nhimself, his consciousness, emotions, and purposes into inanimate\nthings; and how, even under the historical conditions of civilization,\nhe still personifies the world, and ascribes to it the forms of his own\nbody and limbs.\n\nAgain, we have plainly shown that man, by the intrinsic reduplication of\nhis psychical faculty, spontaneously retains and personifies the inward\nphantasm generated by such a projection of special natural objects on\nhis perception. In the genesis of such fetishes, and also when, by an\neffort of will, he recalls them to his mind, this faculty with its\nconstituent elements is brought into action. In fact, when the image is\nrecalled to the mind, it is represented like the external phenomenon;\nand consequently it involves and generates the thing of which the\nphenomenon is the external vest, that is, its causative power; and in\nthis way the objective process of its formation is inwardly reproduced.\nSince the cosmic reality is thus ideally reproduced, the inward\nsubstance of the fetish assumes a really efficacious power, whether in\nits extrinsic form, or in its intrinsic image, and in this way primitive\nsuperstitions had their source.\n\nIn the case of savage and primitive man the inward image of the fetish\nwithout its bodily presence is, owing to the process already described,\nnot merely valid as a real entity, but it becomes a mysterious\napparition in the sphere of fancy, in a way analogous to our belief in\nthe reality of things seen in a dream or in moments of hallucination.\nThis appears in the history of all peoples past and present, whence it\nis certain that primitive man not only formed personifications of\nexternal objects and of his own emotions, but also of their images, as\nthey were retained in his memory. In both cases the sequence of the\nthree elements of apprehension, the phenomenon, subject, and cause, is\ndue to the same unique faculty; in a word, the inward perception is\nidentical in its genesis and laws with that which is external.\n\nThese are not the only results which follow from the exercise of this\nfaculty. By the spontaneous classifying action of our intelligence we\nrise from the perception of special and individual objects and phenomena\nto their various types, and hence to an inward and ideal world of\nspecific representations, as if these were causative powers, informing\nthe multitude of analogous and similar phenomena in which they are\nmanifested. These specific types, which are more strongly present to the\nfancy in the primitive exercise of the intelligence, also become\npersonified, and they generate what is called polytheism in all its\nforms, varying according to the races, times, places, and respective\nconditions of morality and civilization in which they are found.\n\nThe same psychical faculty and the same elements are necessary for the\npersonification of such types or idols. The three elements appear in\ntheir proper sequence even in the amorphous phantasms which these types\nfirst shadow forth, and which are subsequently perfected and embodied in\nhuman form. For the consciousness of the external form always exists in\nthe first vague and nebulous conception of the phantasm which gradually\nappears and formulates itself in the vivid imagination; and hence\nfollows the phenomenal vest, which, as usual, generates the\ncorresponding subject, informed with a causative power. This process\nclearly shows, and in fact constitutes, the essence of myth.\n\nSince the types vary very much, and are indeed unstable from their very\nnature, constantly becoming formed and again decomposed, the primitive\nmythologies of all people are in like manner very various, indefinite,\nand subject to constant change.\n\nIt appears in the Vedic mythology, and also in that of the ancient\nGreeks and Latins, how often the typical myths of Agni, Varuna, Indra,\nAsvini, and Maruti; and again, of Zeus, Here, Athene, and the rest, are\nchanged and reconstituted. This shows how the same human faculty, the\nsame elements which constitute the perception and primitive\npersonification of external phenomena, are those also of the specific\nand intrinsic phenomena. Just as man, in the primitive conditions of his\nexistence, by the psychical and physiological law of his perception,\nwhich he has in common with animals, transformed the world and its\nphenomena into subjects endowed with conscious life; so by his psychical\nfaculty of reduplication he personified the mental images of these same\nsubjects as fetishes and myths; and subsequently invested them with more\ndistinctly human forms, and also with specific types of humanity. The\nsame faculty and conditions of animal perception afterwards become the\ntrue and only causes of the superstitions, mythologies, and religions of\nmankind. The law of continuity is unbroken, and this is a certain\nconfirmation of the truth.\n\nThis faculty, inward function, and process of mythical and symbolic\nfacts led in course of time to the evolution and beginning of knowledge,\nwhich is first empirical and then rational. Therefore, we must repeat,\nthe extrinsic and intrinsic perception, the specification of types, and\ntheir modification into a unity which was always becoming more\ncomprehensive, are the conditions and method of science itself, which is\nonly developed by means of this faculty. Hence the elements and\nintrinsic logical form of science are identical with those through which\nmythical representations and the inward life of the human intelligence\nare developed.[25]\n\nBesides, as we have before remarked, the empirical knowledge of things\nbegins and is perfected in the superstitions of fetishes and myths.\nIdeas are modified and become purer as they converge into types, and the\nprinciple and method at once become more rational. Either in the faculty\nof perception and in its elements, or in the inward classification of\nspecific forms, or again in the more perfect empirical knowledge of\nphenomena, the progress of myth and science go on together, and they are\nnot only developed in a parallel direction, but the form becomes the\ncovering, involucre, matrix, or, as I might say, the _cotyledons_, by\nmeans of which the latter is developed and nourished. Even in more\nrational science this faculty, and these elements, necessarily recur,\nsince in every human conception we find the material aspect, or its\nmental image, the thing and its cause, and, as we shall see, some\nmythical personality is insensibly identified with it.\n\nThe act which produces myth is therefore the same from which science\nproceeds, so that their original source is identical. The same process\nwhich constitutes the fetish and myth also constitutes science in its\nconditions and form, and here we find the unique fact which generates\nthem both; science, like myth, would be impossible without apprehension,\nwithout the individuation of ideas, and the classification and\nspecification of types.\n\nBefore going further I must briefly recapitulate the order of ideas and\nfacts which we have observed, so that the process may be as strictly\nlogical as it is practical. Since, in the elements of apprehension,\nperception is absolutely identical in man and animals, its primitive\neffects in animating natural phenomena are the same. But man, by means\nof his reduplicative faculty, retains a mental image of the personified\nsubject which is only transitory in the case of animals, and it thus\nbecomes an inward fetish, by the same law, and consisting of the same\nelements as that which is only extrinsic. These phantasms are, moreover,\npersonified by the classifying process of types, they are transformed\ninto human images, and arranged in a hierarchy, and to this the various\nreligions and mythologies of the world owe their origin. Since such a\nprocess is also the condition and form of knowledge, the source of myth\nand science is fundamentally the same, for they are generated by the\nsame psychical fact. It is in this way that the progress of human\nintelligence was developed in the course of ages; its attitude varies in\nvarious races, but the impulses, the faculty, and its elements are\nidentical. I do not think that this unique fact in which myth and\nscience have their source has been observed before; still less has any\none defined the limits of human intelligence, and recognized in the\nsimple acts of animals the formal and absolute conditions of human\nscience, and the origin of myth.\n\nIf I am not deluded by a prejudice in favour of my own researches, this\ntheory is a contribution to truth. It is confirmed by the solidarity\nwhich it establishes between the acts and laws of the psychical human\nfaculty, and that of animals which necessarily preceded it. No science\ncan be constituted without such solidarity; this great truth was felt\nand, after their manner, demonstrated by scholastic philosophers, or, as\nit was afterwards scientifically expressed by the genius of Leibnitz:\n_Natura non facit saltum!_\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\n\nTHE INTRINSIC LAW OF THE FACULTY OF APPREHENSION.\n\n\nWe have now carefully considered the acts and dynamic activity of human\nthought. We have seen in what animal and human perception consists, and\nhow it acts; how the subjects developed in our imagination are gradually\nunited in specific forms or types, and are arranged in a system, whence\nfollow the first symbolic representations of science. But our task is\nnot yet accomplished, since much more is needed to display all that this\nfact involves, so that we may fully understand the inward evolution of\nmyth and science in history and in our race, and not merely in the\nindividual man.\n\nThe faculty and its effects, which could primarily be reduced to this\nunique and indivisible fact, do not exclusively belong to primordial\nages, but go on through all time, our own included, while assuming\ndivers forms and fresh aspects as the faculty of the intellect becomes\nmore developed. It is an indisputable truth that the influence of myth\non thought and fancy, a survival from prehistoric ages, still prevails\namong the common people both in town and country, among those who are\nuncultivated, and even in the higher classes conventionally called good\nsociety.\n\nIt is more difficult to trace the occasional existence of the same\ninfluence among those who think rationally and investigate the laws of\nthe universe while acquainted with the earlier mythical process; and\nyet, as we shall show, the greatest and most able men are not unfettered\nby it. Myth has hitherto been regarded as a secondary and fanciful\nproduct of the psychical human faculty, due to extrinsic impulses,\nrather than as the primitive and intrinsic necessity of the\nintelligence--a necessity which has its roots in animal intelligence\nitself; and the unique fact which generates both myth and science has\nnot been ascertained. If this fact and law had been discovered before,\nwe should have more readily understood religions, philosophic systems,\nand the successive forms of science, and pure reason would have made\nmore rapid progress. Our theory, besides giving a rational explanation\nof the different forms assumed by thought in the course of its historic\nevolution, will, I hope, also account for many psychological phenomena\nwhich have hitherto been imperfectly understood, such as dreams,\nhallucinations, the aberrations of insanity, and the like. The primitive\nfact and its effects reappear in these conditions, and this influence is\npersistent and enters into all our acts, conscious or unconscious,\nvoluntary or involuntary.\n\nIt follows from the innate necessity of the perception that objects and\ntheir extrinsic and intrinsic causes are resolved into living subjects,\nand are classified in a hierarchy of specific types, which are accepted\nby the primitive and ignorant mind as the universal mythical forms.[26]\nBut the necessities of human speech, which is however involved in\nmythical representations, from the very beginning essentially reflex,\nrequire other terms than those of individual and specific animations. It\nis clear that the simple personifying faculty of the intellect sufficed\nin its earliest emotions, but that after the slow development of\npsychical reduplication, and the enlargement of languages and ideas, it\nno longer satisfied the logical requirements of the mind.\n\nConsequently, explicit,--that is, rational--singular, and specific ideas\ngradually arose and assumed a definite form; they were interwoven and\nfused into these individual and specific types, and thus obtained a\nplace in the thoughts and language of primitive man. The gradual\nintrusion of specific rational ideas is natural to the human mind, since\nit is logically progressive, and the fact may be observed by those who\nwatch the mental growth of children, and of ignorant and untaught\nadults.\n\nWhile the mythical intelligence continues as before to give its habitual\nmythical interpretation of many natural phenomena, the use is gradually\nacquired of special and generic symbols which express special and\nspecific ideas, and these no longer include a personification of the\nindividual thing or idea. Without this intrusion of rational ideas any\nprogress would be impossible, as well as the power of expressing all\nwhich time and education present to the mind, and gradually enable it to\ncomprehend; the fanciful image is fused in a rational conception, which\nis, however, not yet definite and explicit.\n\nWhat are commonly termed abstract ideas arise from this necessity, as\nthe result of the perfection and development of speech, but these were\nnot at first abstract, although they made use of the abstract idea.\nUnconscious abstraction is certainly one of the primary acts of the\nintelligence, since abstraction follows from the consideration of a part\nor of some parts of a whole, which are themselves presented as a whole\nto the perception. But this primitive abstraction was so far a concrete\nfact for the perception, in that each act of the apprehension\nconstituted a phenomenon of which the apparent character was abstracted\nfrom the other parts which formed a whole, and was transformed into a\nliving subject, as we have already shown at length. The really explicit\nabstraction, to which man only attained after many ages, consisting in\nthe simple representation of a quality or part of a thing, could not at\nthat time be effected, although special and specific ideas gradually\nfound their way into thought and speech. All the terms for form and\nrelation in primitive speech, and also among modern savages, confirm\nthis assertion, as linguists are aware; the form and relation now\nexpressing an abstract reference to actions and passions in the verbs,\nnouns, and adverbs, originally referred to a concrete object.\n\nThree modes or degrees of abstract representations occur in the\nprogressive exercise of the intellectual faculty; these, combined with\nthe special apprehensions of the individual memory, and with imaginative\ntypes, constitute the life of human thought, and are the conditions by\nwhich we attain to rational knowledge. While the specific mythical type\nmay take the place of the general type in the logical exercise of\nthought, and may suffice for an imaginative comprehension of the system\nof the world, the abstract conception intervenes in the daily necessity\nfor communication between these general mythical types, and serves to\ncement them together, thus rendering the commerce of ideas among men and\nin the human mind more easy.\n\nThe abstract conceptions which are formed in this way may be divided\ninto three classes--physical, moral, and intellectual. To begin with the\nfirst; it is impossible for human speech to point out and define a\nsubject or phenomenon in the series to which it belongs by resemblance,\nidentity, or analogy, unless there is already in the mind a conception\nwhich includes the general qualities, or quality proper to the series of\nsimilar phenomena; this is essentially an abstract type, but it\nprimarily assumes a concrete form. I cannot say that anything is white\nor heavy, until by repetitions of the same sensation I have been able to\ncombine in a single conception the sensations diffused over an infinite\nnumber of objects. The genesis of these conceptions is found in the\ncomparative explicit judgment which depends on the memory for the\nnecessary conditions of its formation.\n\nThe typical and abstract idea of white has not merely a nominal value,\nas it is asserted in some schools of thought, for an empty term could\nexpress no idea, whereas this idea is perfectly clear. Neither is it a\nreal thing, but rather an ideal reality, not a pure abstraction of the\nspirit, extracted, so to speak, from the material substance. The\nconception of whiteness formed by the comparative judgment is limited by\nthe perception of the concrete, external fact perceived as one special\nquality among all other qualities in nature, and it is therefore a\nphysiological fact of inward consciousness.\n\nIn the abstract idea of white or whiteness we do not only picture to\nourselves a quality common to many things, but by this term, and by the\nidea which corresponds to it, the same sensation is actually present to\nour inward intuition, or the same quality of the sensation which was\npreviously generated by our external senses in a concrete form.\nAlthough, therefore, the idea is generic, the sensation itself is\nrepresented to the mind in the form of a concrete perception. It is not\nconcrete in the sense of belonging to a special object or definite form,\nas it is presented to the outward perception, but only so far as there\nis actually an inward and physiological sensation of whiteness, which\nthe word recalls to the memory. There can be no mental confusion with\nthe quality of red, or of any colour, when I speak or think of what is\nwhite.\n\nWhen I speak or think of any object as white, I and others perfectly\nunderstand what is meant, and a representation of this quality is\ninstantly formed in our minds, in the generic type which was gradually\nconstituted by primitive man by the combination of numerous special\nsensations, obvious to the sight, and subsequently expressed in speech.\n\nIn order that the word which corresponds to the quality may have a given\nsense, it is necessary to perceive the form of the concrete sensation\nwhich gave rise to it; for although the representation is indefinite or\ngeneric, that is, not obvious to the external senses, yet it is not\nphysiologically distinct from the sensation of the quality described;\nthe perception of that quality is present by the aid of memory to the\ninner consciousness.\n\nIt is therefore evident that the physiological elements of consciousness\nare actually contained in so-called abstract ideas, although it is\nsometimes asserted that they are purely spiritual and intellectual acts,\nremote from every physiological process of fact and sense. An actual\nphysiological fact (colour in this instance) corresponds to the idea in\nthe nervous centres, and reproduces the sensation due to the perception\nof special objects, whose physical quality of whiteness we have\nperceived, and this sensation makes part of the abstract, or rather\nindefinite conception.\n\nIn fact, all which is not actually present to the mind--and the present\nis an infinitesimal fraction of knowledge--is reproduced by the memory,\nand this is effected by the molecular movements of the human brain, and\nby what may be called the ethereal modifications which took place when\nthe sensations, perceptions, and acts first occurred. If the cells\nvibrate, and the organs of the brain are affected by the recollection of\npast ideas and acts, just as when they actually occurred (and this\nappears from Schiff's experiences as to the increase of the brain in\nheat and volume during dreams), this vibration will be still more marked\nwhen any quality which affects our senses is reproduced in the mind.\n\nThe particular _form_ of the quality as it appears in a definite object\nis certainly wanting in the abstract conception; it remains in the first\nstage of pure sensation, like a spontaneous act of observation, and it\nis transformed into apprehension by the mental faculty. But the inward\nconsciousness of the quality is actual, psychical, and physical. The\nabstract conception is a psychical symbol composed of idea and\nconsciousness, or rather of act and consciousness; both are fused into a\nlogical conception of indefinite form, yet consisting of real elements,\nthat is, of cerebral motions and of sensations.\n\nEstimated according to its genuine value, therefore, an abstract\nconception may be divided into three classes--physical, moral, and\nintellectual. Whiteness and colours in general, levity and weight,\nhardness, sound, and the like qualities, are all abstract types which\nbelong to the physical class. Goodness, virtue, love, hatred, and anger\nmust be assigned to the moral class; and equality, identity, number, and\nquantity, etc., to the intellectual class. Such abstract conceptions,\nwithout which human speech would be impossible, did not in the case of\nprimitive man take the explicit and reflex form in which they are\npresented by mature science, and it is expedient to inquire what\ncharacter they really assumed in the spontaneous exercise of thought and\nspeech.\n\nThere is certainly a difference between the mythical and specific types\nand the intrinsic value of these abstract conceptions. The former served\nfor the causative interpretation of the living system of the world, and\nhad a superstitious influence on the moral and social progress of\nmankind; the latter were merely the instrument of thought and speech,\nand were in spontaneous and daily use. But in spite of this difference,\nthere was no radical and substantial diversity in the genesis of such\nconceptions, and the fundamental elements of perception were common to\nboth. While the form varied, the primitive law and genesis remained the\nsame.\n\nWe have shown that the perception of the phenomenon, as it affects the\ninner and external consciousness, necessarily involves the form of the\nsubject, and the causative power which animates that form, and this\nbecomes the intellectual source of special and specific myths. These\nmyths, whether they are derived from physical or moral phenomena, are\nsubsequently so completely impersonated as to be resolved into a\nperfectly human form. In the case of the abstract conceptions necessary\nin speech, such anthropomorphism does not generally occur; yet we see\nthat sensation and a physiological genesis are inseparable from an\nabstract conception. Without such sensation of the phenomenon these\nconceptions would be unintelligible to the percipient himself and to\nothers. In direct sensation, the phenomenon is external, and when it is\nreproduced in the mind the same cerebral motions to which that sensation\nwas due are repeated.\n\nIt is an absolute law, not only of the human mind but of animal\nintelligence, that the phenomenon should generate the implicit idea of a\nthing and cause, and the necessity of this psychical law is also\napparent in the abstract conception of some given quality. If the effect\nis not identical, it is at any rate analogous. Primitive man did not\ntake whiteness, for example, considered in itself, to be an active\nsubject, like the specific natural myths which we have mentioned, but he\nregarded it as something which had a real existence, and he might under\ncertain circumstances invest it with deliberate power.\n\nIf we have fully grasped this deep faculty of the mind, and the\nspontaneous animation of all phenomena, both external and internal, it\nwill not be difficult to understand the reappearance of the same law in\nabstract conceptions. The sensation of the quality, and consequently of\nthe phenomenon, is reproduced, and the phenomenon generates the implicit\nidea of a subject, and therefore of a possible cause in given\ncircumstances. If such a law did not produce upon man the mythical\npersonification of his primitive abstract conceptions, at any rate it\ninvolved a belief in the objective reality of these conceptions, which\nwere implicitly held to possess an independent existence.\n\nAmong prehistoric and savage races, who were ignorant of the laws and\nnature of cosmic forces, the greater or less weight of a thing did not\ninvolve any examination of the mass of a phenomenon, its distance, and\nthe general laws of gravity; this differential weight was itself\nbelieved to be a thing which acted, and sometimes deliberately, acted in\ndifferent ways on the different objects which they were comparing at the\nmoment. In other words, gravity was regarded as something which existed\nindependently of the bodies in which its properties were manifested.\n\nThis estimate of gravity, as an abstract quality or property, might be\nrepeated of all other physical properties, as well as of those abstract\nconceptions which are moral and intellectual. Goodness came to be\nconsidered as a type, varying indeed in different peoples, according to\ntheir race, and their local, moral, and civil conditions, but as a type\nwhich corresponded to the mutual relations of men, and to their\nsuperstitions and religious beliefs as to the nature of things.\n\nIn this case also the abstract conception of the good, the fitting, the\nuseful, which constantly recur in popular speech are regarded, not as\nmythical powers personified in a human form, but as having a real\nexistence in nature, as something extrinsic to the person or thing in\nwhich they are manifested, and as acting upon them as a living and\ncausative power. The same may be said of all other abstract conceptions.\nHence, in addition to the formation of cosmic, moral, and intellectual\nmyths, fashioned after the pattern of humanity, logical conceptions\narose in the mind, necessary for the exercise of human speech and for a\nman's converse with himself, and these were regarded as having a real\nexistence, manifested in things and persons and in the system of nature.\nThese entities have their origin in the same faculty as the others; in\nevery conception presented to the mind and reproducing the primitive\nsensation or emotion, the external or internal phenomenon implicitly\ngenerates the subject, and with this the cause. These abstract\nconceptions did not and do not result in the anthropomorphism of\nphenomena or ideas, but are transformed into entities which have a real\nexistence.\n\nWe must also observe the mobility and interchangeableness of these\nfetishes, myths, and imaginary entities in the primitive times of the\nhuman race, and even in later ages; at one time the fetish acts as a\nmyth, at another the myth has a logical existence. Of this there are\nmany proofs in the traditions of ancient peoples, in the intellectual\nlife of modern savages, and in that of the civilized nations to which we\nourselves belong. The historic development does not always follow the\nregular course we have just described, although these are, in a strictly\nlogical sense, the necessary stages of intellectual evolution.\nHistorically they are often jostled and confounded together by the\nlively susceptibility and alacrity of the imagination of primitive man,\nand it is precisely this characteristic which makes these marvellous\nages so fertile in fanciful creations, and also in scientific\nintuitions.\n\nAny one who is sufficiently acquainted with the ancient literature of\ncivilized peoples, and with the legends of those which are rude and\nsavage; any one who has reflected on the spontaneous value of words and\nconceptions in modern speech, must often have observed how myth assumed\nthe form of a logical conception as time went on; and conversely how\nthe logical entity assumed the form of a myth, and how interchangeable\nthey are. It is well known that the myths have been so far adapted to\nthe necessities of speech as to be transmuted into verbs; _libare_ from\n_liber_, which perhaps came in its turn from _liba_, a propitiatory\ncake, while _Libra_ was the genius who in mythological ages presided\nover fruitfulness and plenty. So again _juvare_, from the root _jov_,\nafter it had already been used for the anthropomorphic _Jove_. We find\nin Plautus the verb _summanare_, from the god _Summanus_, the nocturnal\nsky. Not only verbs but adjectives were derived in common speech from\nthe mythical names of gods; from _Genius_, a multiform and universal\npower in ancient Latin mythology, we have _genialis_ and hence the\nexpressions _genialis lectus_, _genialis homo_, _genialis hiems_, and\npoets and philosophers apply the same epithet even to the elements and\nthe stars. On the other hand, Virtue, Faith, Piety, and other like moral\nconceptions, first regarded as real, yet impersonal entities, were\ntransformed into a perfect myth, and into human forms worthy of divine\nworship.\n\nEven in our own time, and not only among the uneducated people but among\nmen of high culture--when they do not pause to consider the real value\nof words in the familiarity of daily conversation--any one who seeks for\nthe direct meaning of the terms he uses will admit the truth of what I\nsay. We constantly ascribe a real existence to abstract conceptions and\nqualities, treating them as subjects which have a substantial being, and\nwhich act for the most part with deliberate purpose, although they are\nnot transformed as in the case of myths into human shapes.\n\nIn abstract, intellectual conceptions, such as those of equality,\ndistance, number, and the like, the same faculty and the same elements\nare at work as in those which express physical and moral qualities.\nThese conceptions, which as civilization advances ultimately become mere\nintellectual symbols necessary for logical speech, are at first formed\nby the actual comparison of things, and therefore by the aid of the\nsenses. Even if we were to assert with some schools of thought that they\nwere formed _a priori_ in the mind, sensation would still be necessary\nas the occasion of displaying them. When such conceptions are expressed\nin words there is a physiological recurrence to the mind of what may be\ntermed the shadow of previous sensations or perceptions, which are\nunited in an intellectual type to give rise to such conceptions. And in\nthe appearance of this phenomenal basis, thought unconsciously fulfils\nthe fundamental law of assuming, or I might say of actually _feeling_,\nthe reality of the subject.\n\nIt must be remembered that in speaking of these entities created by the\nintellect, I refer to the primitive ages of human thought, or to the\nnotions of ignorant people, and also to the spontaneous language of\neducated men, who in ordinary conversation do not pause to consider the\nsimple and logical value of their expressions. We are only giving the\nnatural history of the intelligence, which necessarily excludes the\nanalytic and refining processes of rational science. An educated man\nwill, for example, say or write that identity is a most important\nprinciple of logic as well as that of contradiction, although he is\nperfectly aware that such expressions only imply an abstract form of\ncognition; he follows the natural and primitive process of the\nintellect, and for the moment expresses these conceptions as if they\nwere real entities in the organism of science and of the world. Any one\nmay find a proof of this fact in himself, if he will consider the ideas\nimmediately at work in his mind at the moment of expressing similar\nconceptions. And if this is true of those who pursue a rational course\nof thought, it is true in a still more imaginative and mythical sense at\nthe dawn of intellectual life, both among modern savages and in the case\nof the ignorant common people.\n\nLet us briefly sum up the truth we have sought to establish. Special\nfetishes first had their origin by the innate exercise and historical\ndevelopment of the human intelligence, by the necessary conditions of\nthe perception, and of subsequent apprehension; these were only the\nanimation of each external or internal phenomenon, as it occurred, and\nthis was the primitive origin of myth, both in man and animals. In the\ncase of animals the fetish or special myth is transitory, appearing and\ndisappearing in accordance with his actual perceptions; while in man\nthere is a persistent image of the fetish in his mind, to which he\ntimidly ascribes the same power as to the thing itself. The specific\ntypes of these fetishes naturally arise from the mental combination of\nimages, emotions, and ideas into a whole, and these impersonations\ngenerate the various forms of anthropomorphic polytheism. As the\nsynthetic mental process goes on, these varied forms of polytheism are\ngradually united in one general but still anthropomorphic form, which is\ncommonly called monotheism.\n\nIn addition to these spontaneous and anthropomorphic myths, which serve\nfor the fanciful explanation of the system of the world, and the moral\nideas of social and individual life, other myths arise which are not\nanthropomorphic, but which ascribe a substantial existence to abstract\nconceptions of physical, moral, or intellectual matters; conceptions\nnecessary for the formulation of human speech. For although primitive\nlanguages, of which we have some examples remaining in the language of\nsavage peoples, are almost inconceivably concrete, yet speech is\nimpossible without expressions of form, or abstract conceptions which\nare moulded and adapted to that intuition of the relations of things\nwhich is always taking place in the mind.[27] The mythical human form\ndoes not indeed appear in these conceptions, but a substantial entity is\ninvolved in them which sometimes, as we have seen, may even assume the\naspect of a complete myth.\n\nA careful analysis of the process of our intelligence has shown that\nthis habitual personification of the phenomenon or abstract conception\nis due to the innate faculty of perception, since the appearance of any\nphenomenon necessarily produces the idea of a subject actuated by\ndeliberate purpose; this law is equally constant in the case of animals,\nin whom, however, it does not issue in a rational conception. The\nobjection of ourselves into nature, the personification of its phenomena\nand myths in general, are common to all, while they take a more fanciful\nform in the case of primitive man; they are the constant and necessary\nresult of the perception of external and internal phenomena. This\npersonification includes moral and intellectual as well as physical\nphenomena, and it always proceeds in the same way, from special\nphenomena to specific types, and hence to abstract perceptions.\n\nIn this way we have established the important fact that the primitive\npersonification of every external or internal phenomenon, the origin of\nall myths, religions, and superstitions, is accomplished by the same\nnecessary psychical and physical law as that which produces sensation.\nThat is, men, as well as animals, begin by thinking and feeling in a\nmythical way, owing to the intrinsic constitution of their intellectual\nlife; and while animals never emerge from these psychical conditions,\nmen are gradually emancipated from them, as they become able to think\nmore rationally, thus finding redemption, truth, and liberty by means of\nscience.\n\nWe now propose to unite in a single conception this necessity of our\nintellect, at once the product and the cause of perception, and of the\nspontaneous vivification of phenomena; since the law may be expressed in\na compendious form.\n\nBoth in physical, moral, and intellectual myths, and in the substantial\nentity infused into abstract conceptions, the external or internal\nphenomenon immediately generates the idea of a subject, since it is a\nfundamental law of our mind to _entify (entificare)_ every object of our\nperception, emotion, or consciousness. If any one should object to this\nneologism, in spite of its adequate expression of the original function\nof the intelligence, we reply that the use and necessity of the verb\n_identify_ have been accepted in the neo-Latin tongues, and therefore\n_entify_, which has the same root and form, can hardly be rejected,\nsince it, like the former, signifies an actual process of thought. We\ntherefore adopt the word without scruple, since new words have often\nbeen coined before when they were required to express new conceptions\nand theories.\n\nThe primitive and constant act of all animals, including man, when\nexternal or internal sensation has opened to them the immense field of\nnature, is that of _entifying_ the object of sensation, or, in a word,\nall phenomena. Such _entification_ is the result of spontaneous\nnecessity, by the law of the intrinsic faculty of perception; it is not\nthe result of reflection, but it is immediate, innate, and inevitable.\nIt is an eternal law of the evolution of the intelligence, like all\nthose which rule the order of the world.\n\nWe do not only proclaim in this fact a law of psychological importance,\nbut also the origin of myths, and in a certain sense of science, since\nmyth is developed by the same methods as science. These two streams flow\nfrom one and the same source, since the _entification_ of phenomena is\nproper both to myth and science; the former _entifies_ sensations, and\nthe latter ideas, since science by reversion to law and rational\nconception finally attains to the primitive entity. And finally, if an\nimaginative idea of a cause is active in myth from the first, the\nconception of a cause is equally necessary to science. It is her\nbusiness to explain the reason of things, and in what they rationally\nconsist:\n\n  \"Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas.\"\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\n\nTHE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF MYTH AND SCIENCE.\n\n\nIn the foregoing pages we have reached the primordial fact of our\npsychical and physical nature, in which, as it appears to us, both myth\nand science have their origin. After first considering the animal\nkingdom as a whole, we have seen that the interaction between external\nphenomena and the consciousness of an organism results in the\nspontaneous vivification of the phenomenon in question, so that the\norigin of the mythical representation of nature is found in the innate\nfaculty of animal perception.\n\nNor could it be otherwise. The internal activity and intrinsic sense of\nconscious and deliberate life which inspires animals and men, while the\nlatter are still ignorant of the rational order of things, is\nnecessarily reflected both in the external objects of perception and in\nthe internal emotions, as if they were operating causes independent of\nthe will of the percipient. It is impossible for an animal, which is\nunable by voluntary observation to make, any analytic distinction\nbetween the subject and the object, and their respective effects, to\nconsider such phenomena as mechanical entities, subject to necessary and\neternal laws. The animal therefore accepts the idea suggested by his\nspontaneous and subjective nature, that these phenomena are alive.\nGrass, fruits, plants, water, the movement of material bodies, ordinary\nand extraordinary meteors, all are implicitly apprehended by him as\nsubjects endowed with will and purpose after the manner of mankind. Nor\ncan the living subjectivity of the phenomenon ever be gauged by the\nanimal in whom the deliberate power of reflection is wanting. His life\nis consequently passed in a world of living subjects, not of phenomena\nand laws which mechanically act together; it is, so to speak, a\npermanent _metaphor_.\n\nMan himself, so far as his animal nature is concerned, acts in the same\nway, and although he subsequently attains to the exercise of reasoning\npowers in virtue of the psychical reduplication of himself, the\nprimitive faculty persists, and hence comes the mythical creation of a\npeculiar world of conceptions which give rise to all superstitions,\nmythologies, and religions. This is also the process of science itself,\nas far as the classifying method and intrinsic logical form are\nconcerned. The historical source of the two great streams of the\nintellect, the mythical and the scientific, is found in the primitive\nact of _entifying_ the phenomenon presented to the senses.\n\nWe must briefly describe the evolution of these two mythical and\nscientific faculties of the mind; we must investigate the mode and cause\nof their divergence from a common source, through what transformations\nthey pass, in order to see in what way the one is gradually dried up,\nwhile the other increases in volume and force. The reader must forgive\nus if we use some repetition in developing a subject on which we have\nalready touched, since without such repetition the present historical\nexplanation would be obscure.\n\nThe first stage of knowledge consists in the observation of the things\nwhich surround us, and this first stage, which is necessary also in\nscience, is the common property of animals. Their observation of\nthemselves and of external things is psychologically and physiologically\nthe same as that of man, and in both cases there is a subjective\nanimation of the phenomena themselves. The primitive source of science\nin its observation of phenomena was the same as that of myth and of the\nspecial fetish; without such observation it would have had no existence.\n\nIn immediate succession to this primitive fact, which is common to the\nwhole animal kingdom, there arose--if we consider the general process\nwithout the limitations of circumstances, places, time, and a thousand\naccidents--two kinds of faculties which were identical in form, although\nthey had different effects, and produced opposite results. For in the\ncase of mythical entification the tendency to impersonation was always\nincreasing and becoming more distinctly zoomorphic and anthropomorphic,\nand in this form it was crystallized or mummified, while science on the\nother hand was always enlarging its sphere and dissipating the first\nmythical form of its conception, until nothing was left but a purely\nrational idea.\n\nWhen this evolution takes place in peoples and races which are incapable\nof improvement, or have a limited capacity for advanced civilization,\nthe faculty of myth remains in the ascendant; and as past and present\nhistory shows, mythical stagnation and intellectual barrenness may\nfollow, until intellectual development is arrested and even destroyed.\nIf on the other hand the evolution takes place in peoples and races\ncapable of indefinite civilization, myth gradually disappears and\nscience shines forth victoriously.\n\nEven in historical and civilized races the two cycles go on together,\nsince while robust intellects throw off as they advance the mythical\nshell in which they were first inclosed, the ignorant masses continue\ntheir devotions to fetishes and myths, which they can infuse even into\nthe grandest religious teaching. They perhaps might also perish,\ncrystallized in their miserable superstitions, unless, in virtue of the\nrace to which they belong, the nobler minds were gradually to succeed in\nilluminating and raising them into a purer atmosphere. In our Aryan\nrace, and in our own country we have all seen the ideas of Christianity\ntransformed into the earlier fetishes and pagan myths; the saints are\nmerely substituted for the gods and demi-gods, for the deities of\ngroves, of the sea and of war, as they are found in ancient mythology.\nThe legends of the saints and of Christ himself are grafted on similar\nlegends of the ancient religions of Greece and Rome, and Paradise has\nassumed the appearance and form of Olympus. The paintings still extant\nin the catacombs of Rome, which mark the transformation of the old into\nthe new religion, speak plainly enough by their symbols and figures.\n\nMyth is logically identical with the scientific process in its intrinsic\ncharacter; starting from a vague subjectivity which gradually assumes a\nhuman shape, the first intellectual vitality is lost, unless it is\nrevived by a higher impulse. Science, on the other hand, which begins in\nmyth, gradually divests this subjectivity of its anthropomorphic\ncharacter, until pure reason is attained, and with this the power of\nindefinite progress.\n\nThe theory which has hitherto been generally accepted by mythologists,\neven by those who profess Comte's great principle of historical\nevolution, is that man began with special fetishes, that these were\ncombined in comprehensive types to form polytheistic hierarchies, and\nhence he rose by an analogous process to a more or less vague conception\nof monotheism.\n\nThis theory, true as to the principal forms which myth successively\nassumes, is not accurate with respect to the stages of development, and\nit is also erroneous in some particulars of the actual history of the\nvarious mythologies of different peoples.\n\nIn the early chapters of this work we have briefly touched on such a\ndevelopment, and the reader must pardon us for returning to the subject,\nnow that we have to give an historical account of the process of\nevolution. In fact, the fetish, in the general sense of the term, is not\nthe first form of myth which is revealed in the dawn of human life. In\norder to estimate its positive value, it is necessary to analyze such a\nconception with greater accuracy, and then to verify it historically\nwith the help of the science of ethnology.\n\nThe first manifestations of mythical ideas must be considered in man as\nan animal; that is, as the result of his spontaneous intercourse with\nthe world, independently of the psychical faculty peculiar to himself,\nafter he had acquired by subsequent evolution of mind and body the\nfaculty and habit of reflection. This first stage does not involve any\ndefinite fetish, that is, an immediate belief in a special object which\nexerts its influence on the human soul, even when it is remote and\nunseen: such a fetish is a secondary stage in human development. The\nfirst mythical representations of animals, and of man, so far as his\nanimal nature is concerned, are not confined to fixed objects, which\ncan be retained in the mind as operative under all circumstances; they\nare indefinite, and diffused through all the phenomena which are\nsuccessively perceived and vivified. The unseen wind which rises and\nfalls, the moving cloud, the flash of lightning and roar of thunder, the\ndawn, the rushing torrent--when any of these things are perceived by\nanimals and primitive men, they are endowed with subjective life and are\nsupposed to act with deliberate purpose; and this is the first form of\nmyth. But when they are not present (I here speak of the animal nature\nof man) they do not remain in the mind as persistent beings to which the\ntribute of worship inspired by hope or fear must be paid; these and\nother phenomena only inspire such sentiments when they are actually\npresent.\n\nIt is no vain distinction which I mate between the first vague and\nintermittent form of myth suggested by phenomena actually present, and\nthat of the first stage of fetish: this distinction marks the difference\nbetween the mythical representation of animals and the classifying and\nreflective process peculiar to man.\n\nComte was the first to remark, quite incidentally, that animals might\nsometimes attain to the idea of a fetish; Darwin gave the instance of a\ndog which was scared by the movement of an open umbrella in a meadow,\nalthough he remained quiet when it was unshaken by the wind; and Herbert\nSpencer, partly accepting these ideas, adduces two somewhat similar\ninstances of the behaviour of dogs. It seems to us that these great men\nare mistaken on the one hand in assuming that the first essential origin\nof myth is not to be found in the animal kingdom, and on the other in\nsupposing that these facts have only an _accidental_ value, and that\nanimals only occasionally acquire a vague consciousness of the fetish.\n\nThose readers who have gone with us so far will perceive that these were\nnot mere accidents of rare occurrence in animal life, but that they are\nthe necessary effect of mythical representation in its first stage,\nalthough they cannot in any way be supposed to be produced by fetishism,\nproperly so called. For if the dog were frightened and agitated by the\nmovement of the umbrella, or ran away, as Herbert Spencer tells us, from\nthe stick which had hurt him while he was playing with it, it was\nbecause an unusual movement or pain produced by an object to which habit\nhad rendered him indifferent, aroused in the animal the congenital sense\nof the intentional subjectivity of phenomena, and this is really the\nfirst stage of myth, and not of its subsequent form of fetishism.\n\nI must therefore repeat that the first form of myth which spontaneously\narises in man as an animal, is the vague but intentional subjectivity of\nthe phenomena presented to his senses. This subjectivity is sometimes\nquiescent and implicit, and sometimes active, in which case it may\narouse the fear of evil, or the hope of physical pleasures.\n\nAs in man the reflex power slowly and gradually grows--although at first\nin an exclusively empirical form--so he slowly and gradually accepts the\nfirst form of fetishism, which consists in the permanent and fixed\nindividuation of a phenomenon or object of nature, as a power which he\nreflectively believes to be the artificer of good or evil.\n\nIn this stage it is no longer the phenomenon actually present which\narouses the apprehension of an intentional subjectivity, while its image\nand efficacy disappear with the sensible object; the phenomenon, or the\ninanimate or animate form, is reflectively retained by the memory, in\nwhich it appears as a malignant or benignant power. In a word, the first\nstage of fetishism, which is the second form of the evolution of myth,\nis the universal and primitive sense of myth in nature, which man alone\nis capable of applying permanently to some given phenomenon, such as\nwind, rain, and the like, or lakes, volcanoes, and rocks, and these\nremain fixed in the mind as powers of good or evil. In the earlier stage\nof myth the scene is constantly changing, while in the latter, certain\nobjects or phenomena remain fixed in the memory, exciting the same\nemotions whether they are present or absent, and to this consciousness\nwe may trace the dawn of worship.\n\nEthnography affords plain proofs of the fetishism which preceded the\ncivilization of many peoples, and among those which still remain in the\nstage of fetishism we can trace the primitive form of a vague\nimpersonation of natural objects and phenomena.[28]\n\nAs we have already seen, every animal and unfamiliar object is in this\nfirst stage of fetishism regarded as the external covering of a\nspiritual power which has assumed what is believed to be the primordial\nform of the fetish; this fetish takes the place of the natural\nphenomenon, and is believed to be capable of exercising a direct\nsubjectivity which is vague but perfectly real.\n\nWe pass from this first form of fetish to the second, namely to the\nveneration of objects, animals, plants, and the like, in which an\nextrinsic power is supposed to be incarnated. Many ages elapsed before\nman attained to this second stage of fetishism, since it was necessarily\npreceded by a further and reflex elaboration of myth, namely, the\ngenesis of a belief in spirits.\n\nHerbert Spencer and Tylor are among the writers who have given a\nmasterly description of this phase of the human intellect, and history\nand ethnography have confirmed the accuracy of their researches and\nconclusions. The shadow cast by a man's own body, the reflection of\nimages in the water, natural echoes, the reappearance of images of the\ndeparted in dreams, the general instinct which leads man to vivify all\nhe sees, produced what may be called the reduplication of man in\nhimself, and the savage's primitive theory of the human soul. Originally\nthis soul was multiplied into all these natural phenomena, but it was\nafterwards distributed by the mythical faculty into three, four, five,\nor more powers, personifying the spirits. This belief in a multiplicity\nof souls in man is not only still extant among more or less rude peoples\nof the present day in Asia, Europe, Africa, America, and Polynesia, but\nit is also the foundation of the belief of more civilized nations on the\nsubject, including our own Aryan race. Birch and others observe that the\nEgyptians ascribed four spirits to man--Ba, Akba, Ka, and Khaba. The\nRomans give three:\n\n  \"Bis duo sunt homines, manes, caro, spiritus, umbra.\"\n\nThe same belief is found among nearly all savages. The Fijians\ndistinguish between the spirit which is buried with the dead man and\nthat more ethereal spirit which is reflected in the water and lingers\nnear the place where he died. The Malagasy believe in three souls, the\nAlgonquin in two, the Dakotan in three, the native of Orissa in four.\n\nSince a fetish, strictly so called, is the incarnation of a power in\nsome given object, it must be preceded by this rude belief in spirits\nand shades. Such a complex elaboration takes time, since it involves a\nprevious creation of powers, spirits or the shades of men; these lead to\nthe belief in independent spirits of various origin, which people the\nheavens and all parts of the world. Hence arose the belief in\ntransmigration, the necessary prelude to the theory of the incarnation,\nwhich was ultimately constituted by fetishism. The comparative study of\nlanguages shows that including the Aryan and Semitic races, the belief\nin spirits was developed in all peoples, and in all of them we also find\na belief in the transmigration of souls.\n\nThe transmigration of the human soul was first believed to take place in\nthe body of a new-born child, since at the moment of death the soul of\nthe dying person entered into the foetus. The Algonquins buried the\ncorpses of their children by the wayside, so that their souls might\neasily enter into the bodies of the pregnant women who passed that way.\nSome of the North American tribes believed that the mother saw in a\ndream the dead relation who was to imprint his likeness on her unborn\nchild. At Calabar, when the mother who has lost a child gives birth to\nanother, she believes that the dead child is restored to her. The\nnatives of New Guinea believe that a son who greatly resembles his dead\nfather has inherited his soul. Among the Yorubas the new-born child is\ngreeted with the words: \"Thou hast returned at last!\" The same ideas\nprevail among the Lapps and Tartars, as well as among the negroes of the\nWest Coast of Africa. Among the aborigines of Australia the belief is\nwidely diffused that those who die as black return as white men.\n\nPrimitive and ignorant peoples perceive no precise distinction between\nman and brutes, so that, as Tylor observes, they readily accept the\nbelief of the transmigration of the human soul into an animal, and then\ninto inanimate objects, and this belief culminates in the incarnation of\nthe true fetish. Among some of the North American tribes the spirits of\nthe dead are supposed to pass into bears. An Eskimo widow refused to eat\nseal's flesh because she supposed that her husband's soul had migrated\ninto that animal. Others have imagined that the souls of the dead passed\ninto birds, beetles, and other insects, according to their social rank\nwhen still alive. Some African tribes believe that the dead migrate into\ncertain species of apes.\n\nBy pursuing this theory, as we shall presently show more fully, the\ntransition was easy to the incarnation of a spirit, whether that of a\nman or of some other being, into any object whatever, which was thereby\ninvested with beneficent or malignant power. It is easy to show that in\nthis second stage of fetishism, which some have believed to be the\nprimitive form of myth, there would be no further progress in the\nmythical elaboration of spirits, their mode of life, their influence and\npossible transmigrations. This elaboration is indeed a product of the\nmythical faculty, but in a rational order; it is a logical process,\nmythical in substance, but purely reflective in form. For which reason\nit was impossible for animals to attain to this stage.\n\nSome peoples remained in this phase of belief, while others advanced to\nthe ulterior and polytheistic form. This may also be divided into two\nclasses; those who classify and ultimately reduce fetishes into a more\ngeneral conception, and those whose conception takes an anthropomorphic\nform. Let us examine the genesis of both classes.\n\nWhen the popular belief in spirits had free development, the number of\nspirits and powers was countless, as many examples show. To give a\nsingle instance--the Australians hold that there is an innumerable\nmultitude of spirits; the heavens, the earth, every nook, grove, bush,\nspring, crag, and stone are peopled with them. In the same way, some\nAmerican tribes suppose the visible and invisible world to be filled\nwith good and evil spirits; so do the Khonds, the Negroes of New Guinea,\nand, as Castren tells us, the Turanian tribes of Asia and Europe.\nConsequently, fetishes, which are the incarnation of these spirits in\nsome object, animate or inanimate, natural or artificial, are\ninnumerable, since primitive man and modern savages have created such\nfetishes, either at their own pleasure or with the aid of their priests,\nmagicians, and sorcerers.\n\nMan's co-ordinating faculty, in those races which are capable of\nprogressive evolution, does not stop short at this inorganic\ndisintegration of things; he begins a process of classification and, at\nthe same time, of reduction, by which the numerous fetishes are, by\ntheir natural points of likeness and unlikeness in character and form,\nreduced to types and classes, which, as we have already shown, comprise\nin themselves the qualities of all the particular objects of the same\nspecies which are diffused throughout nature.\n\nBy this spontaneous process of human thought, due to the innate power of\nreasoning, man has gradually reduced the chaos of special fetishes to a\ntolerably systematic order, and he then goes on to more precise\nsimplification. Let us try to trace in this historic fact the\nclassifying process at the moment when the first form of polytheism\nsucceeds to irregular and anarchical fetishism.\n\nIn the Samoan islands, a local god is wont to appear in the form of an\nowl, and the accidental discovery of a dead owl would be deplored, and\nits body would be buried with solemn rites. The death of this particular\nbird does not, however, imply the death of the god himself, since the\npeople believe him to be incarnated in the whole species. In this fact\nwe see that a special fetish is developed into a specific form; thus a\npermanent type is evolved from special appearances.\n\nAcosta has handed down to us another belief of the comparatively\ncivilized Peruvians, which recalls the primitive genesis of their\nmythical ideas. He says that the shepherds used to adore various stars,\nto which they assigned the names of animals; stars which protected men\nagainst the respective animals after whom they were called. They held\nthe general belief that all animals whatever had a representative in\nheaven, which watched over their reproduction, and of which they were,\nso to speak, the essence. This affords another example of the more\ngeneral extension and classification, and, at the same time, of the\nreduction of the original multitude of fetishes.\n\nSome of the North American Indians asserted that every species of animal\nhad an elder brother, who was the origin of all the individuals of the\nspecies. They said, for example, that the beaver, which was the elder\nbrother of this species of rodents, was as large as one of their cabins.\nOthers supposed that all kinds of animals had their type in the world of\nsouls, a _manitu_, which kept guard over them. Ralston, in his \"Songs of\nthe Russian People,\" tells us that Buyan, the island paradise of Russian\nmythology, contains a serpent older than all others, a larger raven, a\nfiner queen bee, and so of all other animals. Morgan, in his work upon\nthe Iroquois, observes that they believe in a spirit or god of every\nspecies of trees and plants.\n\nFrom these beliefs and facts, drawn from different peoples and different\nparts of the world, we can understand how a vague and inorganic\nfetishism gradually became classified into types which constitute the\nfirst phase of polytheism. The logical effort which transformed the\nmanifold beliefs into types goes on, but from their vague and indefinite\nnature, not only the power, but also the extrinsic form of man is easily\ninfused into them, so that they are invested with human faculties and\nsensations, and also with the anthropomorphic form and countenance of\nwhich we have spoken elsewhere. In fact, when the special fetishes which\nare naturally alike are united in a single type, the object, animal, or\nphenomenon which corresponds to it in this early stage of polytheism is\nno longer perceived, but a _numen_ is evolved from this type, which has\nnot only human power, but a human form; and hence follow the specific\nidols of serpents, birds, and all natural phenomena, in which the\nprimitive fetish has been incarnated.[29]\n\nIn this second stage of polytheism, anthropomorphism appears in an\nexternal form, and the specific type is transformed into the idol which\nrepresents and dominates over it, inspiring the commission of beneficent\nor hurtful acts. Of this it is unnecessary to adduce examples, since all\nthe mythologies which have reached this polytheistic stage are\nanthropomorphic, and in these the specific type, which serves as the\nfirst step to polytheism, subsequently becomes a completely human idol.\n\nAfter this anthropomorphic classification has been reached by logical\nelaboration, a new field is opened for the reduction of special types\ninto those which are more general, as had been previously the case in\nthe early stages of myth. By continually concentrating, and at the same\ntime by enlarging the value of the conception, it is united in a single\nform which constitutes the dawn and genesis of monotheism. This\nmethodical process, which is characteristic of human thought, may be\ntraced in all peoples which have really attained to the monotheistic\nidea, in the Aryan and Semitic races, in China, Japan, and Egypt, in\nPeru and Mexico; the belief may also be obscurely traced in an inchoate\nform among savage and inferior tribes, as, for example, among the\nIndians of Central and North America, and among some of the inhabitants\nof Africa and barbarous Asia.\n\nWhile this conception took a more or less definite form among the more\nadvanced peoples, the earlier and debased myths maintained their ground,\nand still continue to do so. Of this we have examples in Europe itself,\nand among its more civilized peoples which have been transplanted\nelsewhere; for while in one direction a capacity for classification\nleads to a purer monotheistic conception, and even to rational science,\nthe great majority of the common people, and even of those of higher\nculture, still hold many ideas which are polytheistic and\nanthropomorphic, and some which really belong to the debased stage of\nfetishism and vulgar superstition.\n\nOther causes contribute to produce the natural and intrinsic concurrence\nof the several stages of myth which are found existing together in the\nlife of a people. Such, for example, is the conquest effected by a more\ncivilized nation over another race, inferior by nature or retarded by\nother circumstances. The mythical ideas of the conquered people remain,\nand are even diffused through the lower classes of the conquering race;\nor they are ingrafted by a synthetic and assimilating process, so as to\nmodify other mythical and religious beliefs. This compound of various\nstages and various beliefs also occurs through the moral and\nintellectual diffusion of dogma, without the acquisition of really new\nmatter. Manifest proofs of these various stages of myth, co-existent\ntogether, may be traced in the development of the Vedic ideas among the\nearlier aboriginal nations, and conversely; as in the case of the Aztecs\nand Incas in Mexico and Peru, whose earlier beliefs were mixed with\nthose of their conquerors. The same thing may be observed in the\ndevelopment of Judaism during the Babylonish captivity, in the biblical\nand messianic doctrines which were grafted on pagan beliefs, and in the\nteaching of Islam, as it was adopted in the East and among the black\nraces of Africa.\n\nWe must make allowance for these extrinsic accidents if we are to\ndescribe correctly the natural course and logical evolution of myth.\nEven with respect to the special evolution of myth in a separate people,\nunmixed with others, while it is normal in what may be termed its\ngeneral form and categorical phases, yet like all natural objects and\nphenomena, and much more in all which concerns the human mind, there are\nvariations in its forms, and it attains its ends by many ways.\n\nIf we take a wider view of the general and reciprocal influences of\nethnic myths; as respects the historic results of mythologies, we shall\nsee that if every race evolved its sphere of myth in accordance with the\ncanons laid down by us, their effect upon each other would work together\nfor a common result more quickly than when each is taken apart. The\nreader must allow me to make my meaning clear by the following passage\nfrom my work on the \"Dottrina razionale del Progresso,\" which I\npublished in 1863, in the \"Politecnico,\" Milan, on the fusion of the\nmonotheistic conception of the Semitic race with the beliefs of Greece\nand Rome at the dawn of Christianity:--\n\n\"Christianity was originally based on the absolute idea of the divine\nfirst Principle, to which one portion of the Semitic race had attained\nby intellectual evolution, and by the acumen of the great men who\nbrought this idea to perfection. Either because of their clearer\nconsciousness, or from their environment and the physical circumstances\nof the race, the Semitic people passed from the primitive ideas of\nmythology to the conception of the absolute and infinite Being, while\nother races still adhered to altogether fanciful and anthropomorphic\nideas of this Being. Our race had an Olympus, like the others, and\nthroughout its history this Olympus was always assuming new forms,\nalthough a human conception was the basis of its religious ideas. The\nChinese and Semitic races were the first to rise to the conception of an\nabsolute first principle, but in both cases the conception was more or\nless unfruitful.\n\n\"The gradual transition from consciousness to conception, from the fact\nto the idea, from the idol to the law, from the symbol to the thought,\nfrom the finite to the infinite, is the characteristic and essential\ncourse taken by the human mind. But, practically, this process is more\ngradual or more rapid, is retarded or advanced, attains its aim or stops\nshort in its first rudiments, according to the race in which it occurs.\nSo it was that, as we have just said, the Chinese and Semitic races were\nthe first to reach the final goal of this psychological progress; other\npeoples, such as the Aryans and their offshoots, savages and partially\ncivilized races, remained in the early stages of this dialectic scale.\nUndoubtedly, in our own race, the early religious conceptions which\nconstituted a simple worship of nature in various forms were constantly\nbecoming of purer character, and they were not only exalted in their\nspiritual quality, but in the Greek and Roman religions they attained to\nsomething like scientific precision. Yet even in these higher\naspirations the race did not surrender its mythical faculty, to which it\nwas impelled by its physical and psychological constitution, and the\npure conception was unconsciously overshadowed by symbolic ideas. We can\nplainly see how far this symbolism, peculiar to the race, obscured the\nminds of Plato and Aristotle, and of almost all the subsequent\nphilosophers. In the Semitic and Chinese races this inner symbolism of\nthe mind, with reference to the interpretation of nature, was less\ntenacious, intense, and productive, and they soon freed themselves from\ntheir mental bonds in order to rise to the conception of the absolute\nBeing, distinct from the world. When this idea had been grasped by rude\nand popular intuition, men of the highest intellectual power perfected\nthe still confused conception, and founded upon it science, civil and\npolitical institutions, and national customs.\n\n\"The idea of Christianity arose in the midst of the Semitic people\nthrough him whose name it bears, and who perfected the religious idea\nof his nation. This idea, in its Semitic simplicity, consisted in a\nbelief in the existence of one, eternal, infinite God, the immediate\ncreator of all things; it included the tradition of man's loss of his\noriginal felicity, and the promise of a restoration of all peoples, and\nof the Israelites in particular, to their former condition of earthly\nhappiness. Christ appeared, and while he upheld the Mosaic law and its\noriginal idea, he declared himself to be the promised deliverer, sent of\nGod; the Son of God, which among the Semitic people was the term applied\nto their prophets. His moral teaching gave a more perfect form to the\nold law, and by his example he afforded a model of human virtue worthy\nof all veneration; the germs of a marvellous civilization were to be\nfound in his moral and partially new teaching. The same doctrine had\nbeen, to some extent, inculcated by the Jewish teachers, and the schools\nof Hillel and Gamaliel were certainly not morally inferior to his own,\nas we learn from the tradition of the Talmud, and from some passages in\nthe Acts of the Apostles. The origin, development, and teaching of\nprimitive Christianity were therefore essentially Semitic, since it had\nits origin in a people of that race, and in a man of that people. Yet\nthe Semitic race did not become Christian; and, after so many ages have\nelapsed, it still rejects Christianity. It was the Aryan race, to which\nwe Europeans belong, which adopted this teaching and became essentially\nChristian, although this race is psychologically the most idolatrous of\nthe world, as far as the aesthetic idol--not the common fetish--is\nconcerned. Let us inquire into the cause of this remarkable fact.\n\n\"As soon as the teaching of Christ was adopted by those familiar with\nAryan civilization and opinions, an idea repugnant to Semitic\nconceptions, and still unintelligible to that race, was evolved from\nit--I mean the idea that the human Christ, the Son of God, was God\nhimself. The Semite holds that God is so far exalted above all creation,\nso great and eternal in comparison with the littleness of the world and\nof man, that God incarnate is not merely a blasphemy but an unmeaning\nand absurd phrase. Such a dogma was therefore energetically repudiated,\nand the Semitic race submitted to persecution and dispersal rather than\naccept it. This is the real reason why Christianity has not been\nreceived and will never be received by the Semitic race. When Mahomet\nreorganized and perfected the Arab creed, he preserved intact the\nSemitic principle of the absolute and incommunicable nature of God: the\nSemitic religion has ever held that there is one God, and his prophet.\n\n\"On the other hand, Christianity was rapidly diffused among the Greek\nand Latin peoples, and in all parts of Europe inhabited by our race:\neven savages and barbarians accepted more or less frankly a doctrine\nrejected by the Semites in whom it had its origin. Many and various\ncauses have been assigned for this rapid diffusion of the new doctrine,\nand the old Greek and Latin fathers ascribed it to the fact that men's\nminds had been naturally and providentially prepared for it. It was\nattributed by others to the miseries and sufferings of the slave\npopulation, and of the poor, who found a sweet illusion and comfort in\nthe Christian hope of a world beyond the grave. Some, again, suggest the\nomnipotent will of a tyrant, or the extreme ignorance of the common and\nbarbarous people. Although all these causes had a partial effect, they\nwere secondary and accidental. The true and unique cause lay deeper, in\nthe intellectual constitution of the race to which Christianity was\npreached; just as physiological characteristics are reproduced in the\nspecies until they become permanent, so do intellectual inclinations\nbecome engrained in the nature.\n\n\"We have said that our race is aesthetically more mythological than all\nothers. If we consider the religious teaching of various Aryan peoples,\nfrom the most primitive Vedic idolatry to the successive religions of\nBrahma and Zend, of the Celts, Greeks, Latins, Germans, and Slavs, we\nshall see how widely they differ from the religious conceptions and\nideas of other races. The vein of fanciful creations is inexhaustible,\nand there is a wealth of symbolic combinations and a profusion of\ncelestial and semi-celestial dramas. The intrinsic habit of forming\nmythical representations of nature is due to a more vivid sense of her\npower, to a rapid succession of images, and to a constant projection of\nthe observer's own personality into phenomena. This peculiar\ncharacteristic of our race is never wholly overcome, and to it is added\na proud self-consciousness, an energy of thought and action, a constant\naspiration after grand achievements, and a haughty contempt for all\nother nations.\n\n\"The very name of Aryan, transmitted in a modified form to all\nsuccessive generations, denotes dominion and valour; the Brahmanic\ncosmogony, and the epithet of apes, given to all other races in the epic\nof Valmiki, bear witness to the same fact; it is shown in the slavery\nimposed on conquered peoples, in the hatred of foreigners felt by all\nthe Hellenic tribes; in the omnipotence of Rome, the haughtiness of the\nGermanic orders; in the feudal system, in the Crusades; and finally, in\nthe modern sense of our superiority to all other existing races. The\nquickness of perception, and the facile projection of human personality\ninto natural objects, led to the manifold creations of Olympus, and this\nwas an aesthetic obstacle to any nearer approach to the pure and absolute\nconception of God, while the innate pride of race was a hindrance to our\nhumiliation in the dust before God. The Semites declared that man was\ncreated in the image of God, and we created God in our own image; while\nconscious of the power of the _numina_ we confronted them boldly, and\nwere ready to resist them. The Indian legends, and those of the\nHellenes, the Scandinavians, and the whole Aryan race, are full of\nconflicts between gods and men. The demi-gods must be remembered,\nshowing that the Aryans believed themselves to be sufficiently noble and\ngreat for the gods to love them, and to intermarry with them. Thus the\nAryan made himself into a God, and often took a glorious place in\nOlympus, while he declared that God was made man.\n\n\"We might imagine that the doctrine of God incarnate would be as\nrepugnant to the ideas, feelings, and intellect of the Aryan as it was\nto the Semitic race. But the anthropomorphic side of Christianity was\nreadily embraced by the former as a mythical and aesthetic conception,\nand indeed it was they who made a metaphorical expression into an\nessential dogma: the pride natural to the Aryan race made them eager to\naccept a religion which placed man in a still higher Olympus: a belief\nin Christ was rapidly diffused, not as God but as the Man-God. These are\nthe true reasons, not only for the rapid spread of Christianity in\nEurope, but also for the philosophic systems of the Platonists and\nAlexandrines which preceded it. Although Philo was a Hebrew, and\nprobably knew nothing of Christ, he attained by means of Hellenism to\nthe idea of the Man-God; the Platonic Word, which was merely the\nprojection of God into human reason, was accepted for the same reason\nas the Christian dogma of the Word made man.\n\n\"Let us see what new principles, what higher morality and civilization\nwere added by the diffusion of Christianity to those principles which\nwere the spontaneous product of the race. We must first consider what\npart the pagan gods, as they were regarded by educated men, played in\nthe history of the European race, with respect to the individual and to\nthe commonwealth. The pagan Olympus, considered as a whole, and without\nreference to the various forms which it assumed in different peoples,\nwas not essentially distinct from human society. Although the gods\nformed a higher order of immortal beings, they were mixed up with men in\na thousand ways in practical life, and conformed to the ways of\nhumanity; they were constantly occupied in doing good or ill to mortals;\nthey were warmly interested in the disputes of men, taking part in the\nconflicts of persons, cities, and peoples; special divinities watched\nover men from the cradle to the grave, and they were loved or hated by\nthe gods by reason of their family and race. In short, the heavenly and\nearthly communities were so intermixed that the gods were only superior\nand immortal men.\n\n\"The people were accustomed to consider their deities as ever present,\ndistinct from, and yet inseparably joined with them; so that the\nindividual, the country, the tribes, were ever governed, guarded,\nfavoured, or opposed by special and peculiar gods. Olympus had a\nhistory, since the acts of the gods took place in time and were\ncoincident with the history of nations, so that every event in heaven\ncorresponded with one on earth; the idea of divine justice was\nexemplified in that of men, and both were perfected together. Among\npagans of the Aryan race there was a perpetual and repeated alliance\nbetween men and gods made in the image of man. This action of the gods\nboth for good and evil became in its turn the rule of life for the\nignorant multitude, and they acted in conformity with the supposed will\nand actions of the gods; the divine will was, however, nothing but an _a\npriori_ religious conception of an idol representing the forces of\nnature or some moral or religious idea. The moral perfection of nations,\nas time went on, also perfected the supreme justice of Olympus, and the\nmoral worth of the gods increased as men became better. So that it was\nnot the original theological idea, but man himself, who made heaven more\nperfect, and the gods morally better and more just.\n\n\"The explicit power of mental reasoning and of science was added to this\nspontaneous evolution of the religious idea, so far as the improved\nmorality of the race perfected the heavenly justice which was its own\ncreation. The pagan Olympus was gradually simplified by sages and\nphilosophers; the illicit passions of the gods were set aside, and it\nwas transformed into a providential government of individuals and of\nsociety, much more remote from direct contact with men. The conception\nof the immortal gods included one supreme power, formative, protecting\nor avenging, and this conception bordered on the Semitic idea of the\nabsolute Being, although without quite attaining to it. God was\nconfounded with the order of things, his laws were those of the\nuniverse, by which he was also bound, and the righteous man lived in\nconformity with these laws. When Christianity began, pagan rationalism\nhad arrived at the idea of a spiritual and directing power, organically\nidentical with the universe. It was neither the Olympus of the common\npeople, nor the Semitic Jehovah, but rather the conscious and inevitable\norder of nature. Although, either as an Olympus or as a dogma, the deity\nwas confounded with men or constrained them to follow a more rational\nrule of life, yet paganism clearly distinguished the gods from men in\ntheir concrete personality, and the action of humanity was therefore\ndistinct from that of the deity.\n\n\"When Christianity began, the peoples of the Aryan race in Europe, or at\nleast those of more advanced civilization, had constituted for\nthemselves a heavenly Pantheon, which contained nearly all the primitive\ndeities, but in a more human form and exercising a juster rule over the\nworld, while at the same time they were regarded as quite distinct from\nthe society of men. Although there was in this multiplicity of divine\nforms an hierarchical order of different ranks, there was no general\nconception to include the destinies of the whole human race, and to\nmanifest by its unity its providential and historical development. Each\npeople believed in their own special destiny, which should either raise\nthem to greater glory and power or bring them to a speedy and inevitable\nend; but there was no common fate, no common prosperity nor disaster.\nRome had, as far as possible, united these various peoples by the idea\nof her power, by the inforcement of her laws, and by the benefits of her\ncitizenship, yet the Roman unity was external, and did not spring from\nthe intimate sense of a common lineage. While the nations were so\nclosely united to Rome by brute force, the subject peoples were agitated\nby a desire for their ancient independence and self-government. Some of\nthese pagan multitudes advanced in civilization through their education\nin the learning of the Romans, and in morality through their spontaneous\nactivity, but they did not possess any deep sense of a general\nprovidence, and heaven and earth continued to be under the sway of an\nincomprehensible fate.\n\n\"If we now turn to consider the mental conditions of educated men at\nthat time, we shall see that they transformed the Olympus of personal\nand concrete gods into symbols of the forces of nature, and that they\nhad risen to a purer conception of the deity by making it agree with the\nprogress of reason; but this deity was so remote from earth as to have\nscarcely anything to do with the government of the world. According to\nthe teaching of the Stoics, which was very generally diffused, man was\nsupposed to be so far left to himself that he was the creator of his own\nvirtue, and had to struggle, not only against nature and his fellow-man,\nbut against fate, the underlying essence of every cosmic form and\nmotion. If this pagan rationalism gave rise to great theoretic morality,\nand produced amazing examples of private and public virtue, it had\nlittle effect on the multitudes, nor did it contain any guiding\nprinciple for the historical life of humanity as a whole.\n\n\"Christianity proclaimed the spiritual unity of God, the unity of the\nrace, the brotherhood of all peoples, the redemption of the world, and\nconsequently a providential influence on mankind. Christianity taught\nthat God himself was made man, and lived among men. Such teaching was\noffered to the people as a truth of consciousness rather than of dogma,\nalthough it was afterwards preserved in a theological form by the\npreaching of Paul, and the pagan mind was more affected by sentiment\nthan by reason. The unity of God was associated in their aesthetic\nimagination with the earlier conception of the supreme Zeus, which now\ntook a more Semitic form, and Olympus was gloriously transformed into a\ncompany of elect Christians and holy fathers of the new faith. A\nconfused sentiment as to the mystic union of peoples, who became\nbrothers in Christ, had a powerful effect on the imagination and the\nheart, since they had already learned to regard the world as the\ncreation of one eternal Being. In the ardour of proselytism and of the\ndiffusion of the new creed, they hailed the historical transformation of\nthe earthly endeavour after temporal acquisitions and pleasures into a\nprovidential preparation for the heavenly kingdom.\n\n\"In Christ, the incarnation of the supreme God, they beheld the\napotheosis of man, so acceptable to the Aryan race, since he thus became\nthe absolute ruler of the world and its fates. Ideas and sentiments, of\nwhich the Semitic mind was incapable, and which were opposed to their\nhistorical and intellectual development, moved and satisfied the Aryan\nmind, and became associated as far as possible with the dogma and belief\nto which the race had attained in their pagan civilization. Thus heaven,\ndogma, and Christian rites assumed from the first a pagan form; and\nwhile the original idols were repudiated in the zeal for new principles,\ntheir common likeness was maintained by the imaginative power of the\nrace.\n\n\"In this way Christianity became popular, and the Semitic idea was\ninvested with pagan forms, in order to carry on the gradual and more\nintimate spiritual transformation which is not yet terminated. Its\nteaching was at first decidedly rejected and opposed by cultivated\nminds, accustomed as the Greeks were with few exceptions to use their\nreason. Among philosophers, the popular belief in a personal Olympus had\ndisappeared, and a more rational study of mankind did not allow them to\nunderstand or comprehend a dogma which re-established anthropomorphism\nunder another aspect, so that this new and impious superstition became\nthe object of persecution. These were, however, mere exceptions, an\nanticipation of the opposition of reason to mythical ideas, which became\nmore vigorous in every successive age, until the time arrived when\nreason, educated by a long course of exercise, was able to renew the\neffort with greater authority and success. The common people gradually\nbecame Christian, and so also did educated men, who thus added the\nauthority of the schools to a teaching accepted by the feelings and\ninnate inclination of the race, and hence followed the theological\ndevelopment of Christian dogma.\n\n\"These new principles and beliefs, eventually accepted by all the\nnations of Europe, both barbarous and civilized, not only brought to\nperfection the religious intuition characteristic of the morality and\ncivilization of the race, but they produced a new and renovating power\nin historical and social life. This fresh virtue consisted in the belief\nin a power consubstantially divine and human. Although the pagan gods\nwere human in their extrinsic and intrinsic form, only differing from\nmortals by their mighty privileges, yet they were personally distinct\nfrom men, and while the acts of Olympus mingled with those of earth,\nthey had an habitation and destinies apart. But by the new dogma, the\none God who was a Spirit took on him the substance of man and was united\nwith humanity as a whole, according to the Pauline interpretation, which\nwas generally accepted by our race. The divine nature was continually\nimparted to man, the body and members in which the divine spirit was\nincarnated, since the Church or mystical community of Christians was the\ntemple of God. Through this lively sense of the divine incarnation, the\nChristian avatar with which the race had been acquainted under other\nforms, God was no longer essentially distinguished from mankind in the\nform of a number of concrete beings, but was spiritually infused into\nmen and acted through them. The Christian as man felt himself to be a\nparticipator with God himself by a mystic intercourse. Since, therefore,\nthe human faculty was historically identical with the divine, and shared\nin the spiritual work which was to effect the redemption of society,\nthis new and Christian civilization added daring, confidence, and virtue\nto the natural energy of the race.\n\n\"Not many years elapsed before men ceased to contemplate the immediate\nend of the world predicted by the first apostles and the Apocalypse;\nthey looked forward to a more distant future, and except in the case of\nsome particular sects, they applied the prophecies which referred to the\nfirst generation of Christians to the future history of the race. It\nwas therefore Christianity which introduced into the consciousness of\nour Aryan peoples the principles of a divine historic power acting on\nthe social economy of mankind, and in this way the natural dignity and\nenterprising pride of the race was increased. Through this fresh\nreligious intuition and spiritual exaltation, the purity and moral\nsweetness of the Semitic Nazarene became the law of society, and the\nchurch organization gradually assimilated everything to itself, and\nreceived divine worship in the person of the supreme Pontiff, who\ncontinued for many ages to be the temporal ruler of consciences, of\npublic institutions, and of civilization. Strange daring in a race which\nfrom its early beginnings down to our own days has been always true to\nits own character, and in one form or other has displayed vigour,\nenergy, ambition, transforming power, and great designs.\n\n\"This remarkable process could only go on in and through those peoples\nwhose vigour and pride equalled their physical strength; to whom it is\ndeath to sit still, and life to be always busy, to transform all things\nto their own image, to dominate over all--over God by the intellect,\nover the world by science, over other races by force of arms. After the\nanthropomorphic form was given to natural phenomena, which is done to\nsome extent by all races, the gods were made in the image of man; full\nof aesthetic imagination, of grand and vigorous conceptions, they\nmodified and transformed the truth of the Semitic idea, to suit their\nown genius and imagination, and in this way they produced the wonderful\nfabric of Christian civilization and of Catholicism. They alone accepted\na teaching which infused new spirit into social life and produced the\nrule of religion over the world, and the race still stands alone in the\nmaintenance of its beliefs, to which science has added the powerful\nsimplicity of the Semitic idea, and their vigorous influence has\nperpetuated and perfected human progress upon earth.[30] The Aryan race\nattained to the Semitic conception in its purity and cosmic reality by\nthe process of reason, and only because it was endowed with all the\ncivilizing and moral qualities which were acquired in so many ages of\nmoral and intellectual energy, has the old conception been so vigorous\nand productive.\n\n\"The Semitic race, on the other hand, adhered to their old faith,\nrejected Christianity, as it had been formulated by the Aryans, and had\nlittle influence on the world. The Israelites, indeed, dispersed among\nother nations, retained the idea of the one spiritual God in all its\npurity, and civilization would have been much indebted to them for this\nrational idea of God if they had more clearly understood its scientific\nbearing and the nature of man; many of them are indeed justly entitled\nto fame in every department of science. But taken by themselves and as a\npeople, they had little effect on civilization, since they lacked the\nenergy of purpose, courage, mental superiority, and imagination, which\ncreate a durable and powerful civilization.\n\n\"The Arabs, aroused for a time by Mahometan fanaticism, overran great\npart of Europe, Asia, and Africa, but without influencing civilization.\nWhile in possession of a great and productive idea, they remained a\nsterile and nomad people, or founded unproductive dynasties. For the\nSemitic race, the interval between God and man, and consequently between\nGod and civilization, was and is infinite, impassable. The Arabs\npossessed nothing but the devastating force of proselytism to fertilize\ntheir minds and social relations; and, with the exception of\narchitecture, geography, and cognate sciences, they were for the most\npart only the transmitters of the science of others. We, on the\ncontrary, filled up the gulf by placing the Man-God between God and man,\nand civilization has a power and vigour which has never flagged, and\nwhich, now that dogma is transformed into reason, will not flag while\nthe world lasts.\"[31]\n\nThis extract from a work published many years ago, seems to me to\nconfirm the theory of myths which I have explained; it shows how they\nare ultimately fused into a simple form, in conformity with the ideas of\ncivilized society, and it will also throw light on what is to follow.\n\nIf we consider the primitive genesis and evolution of myth, confirmed by\nall the facts of history and ethnography, it will appear that although\nthe matter on which thought was exercised was mythical and fanciful, the\nform and organizing method were the same as those of science. It is, in\nfact, a scientific process to observe, spontaneously at first, and then\ndeliberately, the points of likeness and unlikeness between special\nobjects of perception; we must rise from the particular to the general,\nfrom the individual to the species, thus ever enlarging the circle of\nobservation, in order to arrive at types, laws, and ultimate unity, or\nat least a unity supposed to be ultimate, to which everything is\nreduced. So that the mythical faculty of thought was scientific in its\nlogical form, and was exercised in the same way as the scientific\nfaculty.\n\nBut science does not merely consist in the systematic arrangement of\nfacts in which it begins, nor in their combination into general and\ncomprehensive laws; the sequence of causes and effects must also be\nunderstood, and it is not enough to classify the fact without explaining\nits genesis and cause. We have seen that the innate faculty of\nperception involved the idea of a cause in the supposition that the\nphenomenon was actuated by a subject, and while thought classified\nfetishes and idols in a mythical way, an inherent power for good or evil\nwas ascribed to them, not only in their relation to man, but in their\neffects on nature. What Vico has called \"the poetry of physics\"\nconsisted in the explanation of natural phenomena by the efficacy of\nmythical and supernatural agents. From this point of view again, myth\nand science pursue identically the same method and the same general form\nof cognition.\n\nNor is this all. Science is, in fact, the _de-personification_ of myth,\narriving at a rational idea of that which was originally a fantastic\ntype by divesting it of its wrappings and symbols. In the natural\nevolution of myth, man passes from the extrinsic mythical substance to\nthe intrinsic ideal by the same intellectual process, and when the types\nhave become ideas, he carries on intrinsically the _entifying_ process\nwhich he first applied to the material and external phenomena.\n\nIn this case also the process is gradual; by attempting a more rational\nexplanation of physical phenomena, man attains to ultimate conceptions\nwhich express direct cosmic laws, and he regards these laws as\nsubstantial entities, which in their originally polytheistic form were\nthe gods who directed all things. Here the scientific myth really\nbegins, since natural forces and phenomena are no longer personified in\nanthropomorphic beings; but the laws or general principles of physics\nare transformed into material subjects, which are still analogous to\nhuman consciousness and tendencies, although the idolatrous\nanthropomorphism has disappeared.\n\nThe combination of myth and science in the human mind does not stop\nhere, since, as I have said, it goes on to form ideal representations.\nWhen thought penetrates more deeply into the physical laws of the\nuniverse, and is also more rationally engaged in the psychical\nexamination of man's own nature, ideas are classified in more general\ntypes, as in the primitive construction of fetishes, anthropomorphic\nidols, and physical principles; and in this way an explicit and purely\nideal system is formed, in which the images correspond with the fanciful\nand physical types which were previously created.\n\nIt usually happens that thought, by the innate faculty of which we have\nso often spoken, regards the ideas produced by this complex mental\nlabour as material entities endowed with eternal and independent\nexistence; and this produced the Platonic teaching, the schools in\nGreece and Italy, and other brilliant illustrations of this phase of\nthought. Such teaching, the result of explicit reflection, is a rival of\nthe critical science which followed from it. It is always active, while\nconstantly varying and assuming fresh forms; and it not only flourishes\nin our time in the religions in which it finds a suitable soil, but\nalso, as we shall see, in science itself.\n\nIn addition to this complex evolution of myth as a whole, special myths\nfollow similar laws; since they are generated from the same facts, and\npass through the same phases, they culminate in a partial ideality, and\nthis involves a simple and comprehensive law of the phenomena in\nquestion, and even a moral or providential order. For example, we may\ntrace the Promethean myth to the end of the Hellenic era, and the\ndifferent phases and final extinction of this particular myth are quite\napparent.\n\nThe origin of the myth, which was directly connected with the perception\nof the natural phenomena of light and heat, was due to the same causes\nas all others, but we will consider it in its Vedic phase, as it may be\ngathered from tradition, and from the discoveries of comparative\nphilology, and we have a sure guide in this research in the great\nlinguist Kuhn, whose remarks have been enlarged and illustrated by\nBaudry.\n\nThe Sanscrit word for the act of producing fire by friction is\n_manthami_, to rub or agitate, and this appears from its derivative\n_mandala_, a circle; that is, circular friction. The pieces of wood\nused for the production of fire were called _pramantha_, that which\nrevolves, and _arani_ was the disc on which the friction was made. In\nthis phase, the fetishes are, according to our theory, in the second\nstage. The Greeks and Romans, and indeed almost all other peoples, knew\nno other way of kindling a fire, and in the sacred rites of the\nPeruvians the task was assigned to the Incas at the annual festival of\nfire. The wood of the oak was used in Germany, on account of the red\ncolour of its bark, which led to the supposition that the god of fire\nwas concealed in it. Tan is called _lohe_, or flame, in Germany. This\nprimitive mode of kindling a fire was known to the Aryans before their\ndispersion, and friction with this object was equivalent to the birth of\nthe fire-god, constraining him to come down to earth from the air, from\nthunder, etc.; indeed fire was also called _dueta_, the messenger between\nheaven and earth. The question arose who had drawn fire from heaven, and\ndeveloped it in the _arani_. A resemblance was also traced between the\ninstruments for kindling fire and the organs of generation, a reciprocal\ninterchange of various myths, as we have before observed. _Agni_ is\nconcealed in _arani_, like the embryo in the womb (Rig-Veda). Thus\n_pramantha_ is the masculine instrument, _arani_ the feminine, and the\nact of uniting them is copulation.\n\n_Agni_ had disappeared from earth and was concealed in a cavern, whence\nit was drawn by a divine person; that is, fire had disappeared and was\nconcealed within the _arani_, whence it was extracted by the _pramantha_\nand bestowed upon man. _Mataricvan_, the divine deliverer, is therefore\nonly the personification of the male organ.\n\nIn virtue of the idea that the soul is a spark, and that the production\nof fire resembles generation, _Bhrigu_, lightning, is a creator. The son\nof _Bhrigu_ marries the daughter of _Manu_, and they have a son who at\nhis birth breaks his mother's thigh, and therefore takes the name of\n_Aurva_ (from _uru_ a thigh). This is only the lightning which rends the\nclouds asunder.\n\nMany Graeco-Latin myths, beginning with that of Prometheus must be\nreferred to _Mataricvan_ and to the _Bhrigu_, and we can trace in the\nname of Prometheus the equivalent of a Sanscrit form _pramathyus_, one\nwho obtains fire by friction. Prometheus is, in fact, the ravisher of\ncelestial fire (a phase of the polytheistic myth in a perfectly human\nform); he is a divine _pramantha_. It is Prometheus who in one version\nof the myth cleaves open the head of Zeus, and causes Athene, the\ngoddess who uses the lightning as her spear, to issue from it. The\nGreeks afterwards carried on the evolution of myth in its transition\nfrom the physical to the moral phenomenon, and, forgetful of his origin,\nthey made Prometheus into a seer. As _Bhrigu_, he created man of earth\nand water, and breathed into him the spark of life. Villemarque tells us\nthat in Celtic antiquity there was an analogous myth, as we might\nnaturally expect, since the Celts belong to the Aryan stock; Gwenn-Aran\n(albus superus) was a supernatural being which issued like lightning\nfrom a cloud.\n\nThe more thoughtful Greeks did not limit the Promethean myth to the idol\nand to anthropomorphic fancies, but it passed into a moral conception,\nand we have a proof of this transition in AEschylus.\n\nIn fact, as Silvestro Centofonti observes in a lecture on the\ncharacteristics of Greek literature, the grand figure of the AEschylean\nPrometheus is a poetic personification of Thought, and of its mysterious\nfates in the sphere of life as a whole. First, in its eternal existence,\nas a primitive and organic force in the system of the world; then in the\norder of human things, fettered by the bonds of civilization, and\nsubject to the necessities, lusts, and evils which constantly, arise\nfrom the union of soul and matter in unsatisfied mortals. Thought is\nitself the source of tormenting cares in this earthly slavery, yet the\nsense of power makes it invincible, firm in its purpose to endure all\nsufferings, to be superior to all events; assured of future freedom, and\nalways on the way to achieve it by reverting to the grandeur of its\ninnate perfection; finally attaining to this happy state, by shaking off\nall the enslaving bonds and anxious cares of the kingdom of Zeus, and by\nobtaining a perfect life through the inspirations of wisdom, when the\nrevolutions of the heavens should fill the earth with divine power, and\nrestore the happiness of primeval times. It is evident that in this\nstupendous tragedy AEschylus is leading us to the truth in a threefold\nsense: aesthetic, morally political, and cosmic. The supreme idea which\nsums up the whole value of the composition is perhaps that of an\ninevitable reciprocity of action and reaction between mind and effective\nforce, between the primitive providence of nature and the subsequent\nlaws of art, both in the civilization of mankind and in the order and\nlife of the universe.\n\nIn this way the evolution of the special myth was transformed into\npoetry by the interweaving, collection, and fusion with other myths, and\nin the minds of a higher order it was resolved into an allegory or\nsymbol of the forces of nature, into providential laws or a moral\nconception.\n\nThis law of progressive transformation also occurs in the successive\nmodifications of the special meaning of words, so far as they indicate\nnot only the thing itself, but the image which gave rise to the\nprimitive roots. For a long while, those who heard the word were not\nonly conscious of the object which it represented, but of its image,\nwhich thus became a source of aesthetic enjoyment to them. As time went\non, this image was no longer reproduced, and the bare indication\nremained, until the word gradually lost all material representation, and\nbecame an algebraical sign, which merely recalled the object in question\nto the mind.\n\nWhen, for example, we now use the word (_coltello_), _coulter_, the\ninstrument indicated by this phonetic sign immediately recurs to the\nmind and nothing else; the intelligence would see no impropriety in the\nuse of some other sign if it were generally intelligible. But in the\ntimes of primitive speech, the inventors of this rude instrument were\nconscious of the material image which gave rise to it, and they were\nlikewise conscious of all the cognate images which diverged from the\nsame root, and in this way a brief but vivid drama was presented to the\nimagination.\n\nIf we examine this word with Pictet and others, we shall find that the\nname of the plough comes from the Sanscrit _krt, krnt, kart_, to cleave\nor divide. Hence _krntatra_, a plough or dividing instrument. The root\n_krt_ subsequently became _kut_ or _kutt_, to which we must refer _kuta,\nkutaka_, the body of the plough. This root _krt, kart_, is found in many\nEuropean languages in the general sense of cutting or breaking, as in\nthe old Slav word _kratiti_, to cut off. It is also applied to labour\nand its instruments: _kartoti_, to plough over again, _karta_, a line or\nfurrow, and in the Vedic Sanscrit, _karta_, a ditch or hole. Hence the\nLatin _culter_ a saw, _cultellus_, a coulter, and the Sanscrit\n_kartari_, a coulter. The Slav words for the mole which burrows in the\nearth are connected with the root _krt_, or the Slav _krat_. In very\nremote times, men not only understood the object indicated in the word\nfor a coulter, but they were sensible of the image of the primitive\n_krt_ and its affixes, which were likewise derived from the primitive\nimages, and with these they included the cognate images of the several\nderivatives from the root. In these days the word coulter and the\nSanscrit _kartari_ are simply signs or phonetic notations, insignificant\nin themselves, and everything else has disappeared. But in primitive\ntimes an image animated the word, which by the necessary faculty of\nperception so often described was transformed into a kind of subject\nwhich effected the action indicated by the root. As this personality\ngradually faded away, the actual representation of the image was lost,\nand even its remote echo finally vanished, while the phonetic notation\nremained, devoid of life and memory, and without the recurrence of\ncognate images which strengthened the original idea by association. All\nwords undergo the like evolution, and this may be called the mythical\nevolution of speech.\n\nThus the Sanscrit word for daughter is _duhitar_; in Persian it is\n_dochtar_, in Greek [Greek: Thugater], in Gothic _dauhtar_, in German\n_Tochter_. The word is derived from the root _duh_, to milk, since this\nwas the girl's business in a pastoral family. The sign still remains,\nbut it has lost its meaning, since the image and the drama have\nvanished. This analysis applies to all languages, and it may also be\ntraced in the words for numbers. The number _five_, for example, among\nthe Aryans and in many other tongues, signifies _hand_. This is the\ncase in Thibet, in Siam, and cognate languages, in the Indian\nArchipelago and in the whole of Oceania, in Africa, and in many of the\nAmerican peoples and tribes, where it is the origin of the decimal\nsystem. In Homer we find the verb [Greek: pempazein], to count in fives,\nand then for counting in general; in Lapland _lokket_, and in Finland\n_lukea_, to count, is derived from _lokke_, ten; and the Bambarese\n_adang_, to count, is the origin of _tank_, ten.\n\nWhen the numerical idea of five was first grasped, the conception was\naltogether material, and was expressed by the image of the five-fingered\nhand. In the mind of the earliest rude calculators, the number five was\npresented to them as a material hand, and the word involved a real\nimage, of which they became conscious in uttering it. The number and the\nhand were consequently fused together in their respective images, and\nsignified something actually combined together, which effected in a\nmaterial form the genesis of this numerical representation. But the\nmaterial entity gradually disappeared, the image faded and was divested\nof its personality, and only the phonetic notation five remained, which\nno longer recalls a hand, the origin of the several numerals, nor words\nconnected with it. It is now a mere sign, apart from any rational idea.\nThe same may be said of the other numerals.\n\nWe give these few examples, which apply to all words, since they all\nfollow the same course, beginning with the real and primitive image,\nsubjectively effecting their peculiar meaning. Hence we see how the\nintrinsic law of myth is evolved in every human act in diverse ways, but\nalways with the same results.\n\nIn fact, before articulate speech, for which man was adapted by his\norgans and physiological conditions, was formulated into words for\nthings and words for shape, man like animals thought in images; he\nassociated and dissociated, he composed and decomposed, he moved and\nremoved images, which sufficed for all individual and immediate\noperations of his mind. The relations of things were felt, or rather\nseen through his inward representation of them as in a picture,\nexpressing in a material form the respective positions of figures and\nobjects which, since they are remote from him, can only be expressed by\nsuch words as _nearer, lower_ or _higher, faint_ or _clear_, by more\nvivid or paler tints, such as we see in a running stream, in the forms\nof clouds, in the reciprocal relations of all objects represented in\npainting.\n\nIn order to understand the primeval process of thought by means of\nimages, it is necessary to conceive such a picture as living and mobile,\nand constantly forming a fresh combination of parts. Animals have not,\nand primeval man had not, the phonetic signs or words which give an\nindividual character to the images, and so represent them that by\ncombining these images in an articulate form, thought may be\nrepresented by signs; and in and through these a universal and objective\nmode of exercising the intellectual faculty of reasoning has been\ncreated.\n\nSpeech can, by means of reflex memory, produce at will the particular\nimages already classified in the mind, and this makes the process of\nreasoning possible; since such a process becomes more easy by the use of\nsigns to which the attention can revert. The relative size of objects,\nand the like qualities, which are at first regarded as so many different\nintuitions in space, are defined by words or gestures, and are thus\nsubjected to comparative analogy; but in the early stages of language\nthese relations were presented in an extrinsic form by phonetic signs,\nand became images which in some sort represented one particular state of\nconsciousness with respect to the two things compared. Galton, speaking\nof the Damaras, tells us that they find great difficulty in counting\nmore than five, since they have not another hand with which to grasp the\nfingers which represent the units. When they lose any of their cattle,\nthey do not discover the loss by the diminution of the number, but by\nmissing a familiar object. If two packets of tobacco are given to them\nas the regulation price of a sheep, they will be altogether at a loss to\nunderstand the receipt of four packets in exchange for two sheep. Such\nexamples might be multiplied to any extent.\n\nWe repeat that when not endowed with speech, or some analogous means,\nanimals and man think in images, and the relations between these images\nare observed in the simultaneousness and succession of their real\ndifferences; these images are combined, associated, and compared by the\ndevelopment of reflex power, and hence arises the estimate of their\nconcrete relations. Of this we have another proof, observed by Romanes\nin a lecture on the intelligence of animals, and confirmed by myself, in\nthe condition of deaf-mutes before they are educated, in whose case the\nextrinsic sign and figure takes the place of the phonetic and articulate\nsign. Where speech is wanting, it is still possible to follow a\nconscious and imaginative process of reasoning, but not to rise to the\nhigher abstract ideas which may be generated by such reasoning. The\nthought of deaf-mutes always assumes the most concrete form, and one who\nwas educated late in life informed Romanes that he had always before\nthought in images. I know no instance of a deaf-mute who has\nindependently attained to an advanced intellectual stage, or who has\nbeen able without education to form any conception of a supernatural\nworld. R.S. Smith asserts that one of his deaf-mute pupils believed,\nbefore his education, that the Bible had been printed in the heavens by\na printing press of enormous power; and Graham Bell speaks of a\ndeaf-mute who supposed that people went to church to do honour to the\nclergyman. In short, the intellectual condition of uneducated deaf-mutes\nis on a level with that of animals, as far as the possibility of\nforming abstract ideas is concerned, and they think in images. There is\na well-known instance in the deplorable condition of Laura Bridgman, who\nfrom the time she was two years old, was deaf and dumb, blind, and even\nwithout the sense of taste, so that the sense of touch was all that\nremained. By persevering and tender instruction, she attained to an\nintellectual condition which was relatively high. A careful study of her\ncase showed that she had been altogether without intuitive knowledge of\ncauses, of the absolute, and of God. Howe doubts whether she had any\nidea of space and time, but this was not absolutely proved, since as far\nas distance was concerned, she seemed to estimate it, by muscular\nsensation. Everything showed that she thought in images. Although\nwithout any sensation of light or sound, she made certain noises in her\nthroat to indicate different people when she was conscious of their\npresence or when she thought of them, so that she was naturally impelled\nto express every thought or sensation, not externally perceived, by a\nsign; and this shows the tendency of every idea and image towards an\nextrinsic form. She often conversed with herself, generally making signs\nwith one hand and replying with the other. It was evident that a\nmuscular sign or the motion of the fingers was substituted for the\nphonetic signs of speech, and in this way ideas and images received\ntheir necessarily extrinsic form. The image was embodied in a muscular\nact and motion, and in this way thought had its concrete representation.\nThe same results would, as far as we know, be obtained from others in\nthe same unhappy conditions as Laura Bridgman.\n\nIt is therefore clear that primitive language was only a vocal and\nindividual sign of material images, and it was for a long while\nrestricted to these concrete limits. Since the vocal signs of the\nrelations of things are less easily expressed, these relations were at\nfirst set forth by gestures, by a movement of the whole person, and\nespecially of the hands and face. This preliminary action is helped by\nthe imitative faculty with which children and uncultured peoples are\nmore especially endowed, of which we have also instances in the higher\nanimals nearest to man. The negroes imitate the gestures, clothing, and\ncustoms of white men in the most extraordinary and grotesque manner, and\nso do the natives of New Zealand. The Kamschatkans have a great power of\nimitating other men and animals, and this is also the case with the\ninhabitants of Vancouver. Herndon was astonished by the mimic arts of\nthe Brazilian Indians, and Wilkes made the same observation on the\nPatagonians. This faculty is still more apparent in the lower races.\nMany travellers have spoken of the extraordinary tendency to imitation\namong the Fuegians; and, according to Monat, the Andaman islanders are\nnot less disposed to mimicry and imitation. Mitchell states that the\nAustralians possess the same power.\n\nThis fact also applies to the languages of extremely rude and savage\npeoples. Some American Indians, for instance, help out their sentences\nand make them intelligible by contortion of their features and other\ngesticulations, and the same observation was made by Schweinwurth of an\nAfrican tribe. The language of the Bosjesmanns requires so many signs to\nmake the meaning of their words intelligible that it cannot be\nunderstood in the dark. These facts partly explain the natural genesis\nof human languages.\n\nWe have learned from our earlier observations that phenomena appear to\nthe perceptive faculty of primitive man as subjects endowed with power.\nThe subjectivity of these phenomena, their intrinsic conditions and\nactions are fused into speech, which is their living and conscious\nsymbol; and it is clear that the evolution of language from the concrete\nto the symbolical, and hence to the simple sign of the object, divested\nof its original power, is analogous to that of myth.\n\nThis law of evolution also applies to the art of writing, which is at\nfirst only the precise copy of the image; it is next transformed into an\nanalogous symbol, and then into an alphabetical sign, which serves as\nthe simple expression of the conception, divested of its originally\nrepresentative faculty. Hence it is apparent that the evolution of myth\nconforms to the general law of the evolution of human thought, of all\nits products and arts in their manifold ramifications. From the image,\nthe informing subject, from the conception and the myth, the necessary\ncycle is accomplished in regular phases, wherever the ethnic temperament\nand capacity and extrinsic circumstances permit it, until the rational\nidea is reached, the sign or cipher which becomes the powerful\ninstrument of the exercise and generalization of thought. In order to\nshow the efficacy of the mythical and scientific faculty of thought\ncomprised in the systems of ancient and modern philosophy, and its slow\nprogress towards positive and rational science, we will adduce an\ninstance from the people in whom such an evolution was accomplished,\naided by all the civilized peoples in reciprocal communication with\nthem. Let us see how this faculty was manifested in the Greeks at a time\nwhen they first attempted to reduce the earlier and scanty knowledge of\nnature to a system.\n\nIn Greece the historical course of this faculty ramified into two\nclasses of research, which were at that time objective, the Ionic and\nthe Pythagorean schools. In the former, the phenomenon and nature were\nassumed to be the direct object of knowledge, while in the latter the\nobject in view was the idea and harmony of things. Influenced by earlier\nand popular traditions, a mythical and philosophic system arose in the\nIonic school, which was exclusively devoted to physical speculations. In\nLower Italy, on the contrary, and in colonies which were for the most\npart Doric, a science was constituted which, although it included\nphysics and natural phenomena, did not only consider their material\nvalue, but sought to extract from their laws and harmony a criterion of\ngood and evil. Ritter observes that the intimate connection between the\nPythagorean philosophy and lyrical music--of which the origin was sought\nas a clue to explain the world--shows how far this philosophy was\nconsonant with Doric thought. This historic process is quite natural,\nsince the speculations of philosophy are first directed to physical\nphenomena, as they are displayed in inward and in external life, and\nthen rise to the consideration of specific types, in a word, to the\ngeneral and the universal.\n\nThroughout this philosophical evolution the consideration is mainly from\nthe objective point of view, and this is in conformity with the\nintellectual evolution of reason, since the mind is first occupied with\nthe knowledge of things. In accordance with tradition and the logic of\nthings, Ionic speculation was developed before the Doric. The Eleatic\nschool followed from the two former, although its development was\ncontemporary with the more perfect stage of these, and its influence\nupon them was to some extent reactionary.\n\nThales taught that everything was derived from one unique principle,\nnamely water. The ancients believed that the land was separated from the\nwater by a primitive and mythical process, a belief which had its source\nin the appearance of aqueous and meteorological phenomena; so that the\nteaching of Thales followed the earliest popular traditions, of which we\nfind traces in the Indies, in Egypt, in the book of Genesis, and in many\nlegends diffused through the world even in modern times. He said that\neverything was nourished by moisture, from which heat itself was\nderived, and that moisture was the seed of all things; that water is the\norigin of this moisture, and since all things are derived from it it is\nthe primitive principle of the world. We see how much this theory is\nconcerned with natural phenomena in their life, nutrition, and birth by\nmeans of seed. He regarded the world as a living being, which had been\nevolved from an imperfect germ of moisture. This mode of animating the\nworld, which consists in tracing the development of a germ already in\nexistence, reappears in other parts of his philosophy. He saw life in\nthe appearance of death, and held the loadstone and yellow amber to be\nanimate bodies, declaring generally that the world is alive, and filled\nwith demons and genii.[32]\n\nWe trace the basis of these ideas in traditions prior to Thales,\ndeclaring the world to be a living being, and that everything was\nderived from a primitive condition of germs. The same opinion was held\nby Hippo, by Diogenes of Apollonia, by Heraclitus, and by Anaxagoras.\nAristotle states that the theory of development by germs was extremely\nancient in his time. The other philosophers of the Ionic and successive\nschools mingled these fanciful ideas with the systematic arrangement of\ntheir theories as to the origin and constitution of the world, so that\nit is unnecessary to refer to them, since the method and conceptions are\nidentical.\n\nIt is evident from this sketch that while thought gradually evolved a\nmore rational system of general knowledge, the earlier idols and\nprimitive mythical interpretations were not abandoned, although they\nassumed a larger and more scientific form. Thales and others assigned a\nmechanical origin to things, such as water, fire, or the like, which was\ncontrary to anthropomorphic ideas; yet they still regarded the world as\na living being, developed and perfected by the same laws and functions\nas all plants and animals, and they peopled it with genii and demons,\nthus handing on the earliest and rudest traditions of the race.\n\nWhile the scientific faculty was gathering strength and leading the way\nto a more rational consideration of the world and natural phenomena,\nreally advancing beyond the earlier ideas which had been almost wholly\nmythical, myth was still the matrix of thought, although its\nenvelopment was partly rent asunder and was becoming transparent. From\nthis brief notice of the Ionic philosophy, sufficient for our purpose,\nlet us return to the Pythagorean school, in which, although the faculty\nat work is essentially objective, there is a closer consideration of the\nanalogies between thought and the world, and the ground is more often\nretraced, so that theory assumes a more intellectual form.\n\nThe Pythagoreans represented the origin of the world as the union of the\ntwo opposite principles of the illimitable and the limited, of the equal\nand the unequal. Yet they conceive this to be a primitive union, since\nthey formulated the supreme principle as equal--unequal (Arist. _Met_.\nxii. 7.) They held the infinite to be _the place of the one_. There was\nan attraction between the two principles, which was termed the _act of\nbreathing_; hence the void entered into the world and separated things\nfrom each other. Thus their conception of the world was that of a\nconcourse of opposite principles. They represented its limits as a unity\nand as the true beginning of multiplicity. They regarded the development\nof the world as a process of life regulated by the primitive principles\ncontained in the world; its breath or life depended on the breaking\nforth of the infinite void in Uranus, and the time which is termed the\n_interval_ of all nature penetrates at once and with the breath into the\nworld. All therefore emanates from one, and all is at the same time\ngoverned by one supreme power. Number is everything, and is the essence\nof things, but the _triad_ includes all number, since it contains the\nbeginning, middle, and end. Everything is derived from the primitive\n_one_ and from the principal number; and since this number in breathing\nits vital evolution into the void is divided into many units, everything\nis derived from the multiplicity of these units or numbers.\n\nSince, by his idea of the source of universal order, Pythagoras partly\naccepted the theocosmic monad as the final and necessary root of all\nlife, and of all that is knowable, he could not fail to see the\nconvertibility of the unit into the Being. But if the unit must always\nprecede the manifold, there is a first unit from which all the others\nproceed; if this first and eternal unit is at the same time the absolute\nbeing, it follows that number and the world have a common origin and a\ncommon essence, and that the intrinsic causes and possible combinations\nof number are virtually accomplished in the development of the world,\nand these causes and combinations are ideal forms of this development.\nThe monad is developed by these laws through all the generative\nprocesses of nature, while at the same time it remains eternal in the\nsystem of the universe; so that things not only have their origin and\nessence, their place and time according to numerical causes, but each is\nin effect a number as far as its individual properties and the\nuniversal process of cosmic life are concerned. The reason of the number\nmust depend upon the substance, by the configurations of which it is\ndefined, divided, added, and multiplied, and to this geometry is added,\nwhich measures all things in relation to themselves and others. This\neternal cause makes it intelligible that if immaterial principles\nprecede and govern the whole material world, it is also by means of\nthese that the classification of science is in intrinsic agreement with\nthat of nature. Numbers have their value in music, in gymnastics, in\nmedicine, in morals, in politics, in all branches of science. The\nPythagorean arithmetic is the bond and universal logic of the knowable.\nBut at the same time Pythagoras and his school peopled the world with\ndemons and genii, which were the causes of disease; they did not abandon\nthe old mythical ideas of the incarnation of spirits and the\ntransmigration of souls--theories and beliefs which recur in nearly all\nprimitive and savage peoples.\n\nIn this vast Pythagorean scheme, which contrasts with that of the Ionic\nschool of physics, thought is more explicitly freed from the ruder\nmythical ideas, and rises to a more intelligent and rational conception\nof the world, but the ancient popular traditions still persist, and\nthere is an evident _entification_ of number. The primitive monad,\nnumbers, their genesis and relations, are not regarded as abstract\nconceptions, necessary for understanding the order of nature, and a\nmerely logical function of the mind; they are the substantial essence\nwhich underlies all mythical representations. Although the essential\nlife of the world is considered from a more abstract point of view, yet\nthe mythical analogy of animal life evidently finds a place in the\nbreath of the void and of time, assumed to be independent entities. The\nsubsequent train of beliefs in spirits, of their incarnations and\ntransmigrations, are closely connected with the phantasmagoria of the\npast, and display their mythical genesis; yet by their deeper and more\nexplicit thought they may be said to infuse intellectual life into the\nworld and into science which relates to it. In this first rational\nclassification of science by the Greeks, both on its physical and its\nideal side, thought sometimes issues in the simple contemplation of\nmanifold nature, while it still continues mythical in its fundamental\nconceptions and spiritual corollaries; myth, however, instead of being\naltogether anthropomorphic, begins to become scientific.\n\nI must here be allowed to quote a hymn in the Rig-Veda, which was\nhistorically earlier than the primitive philosophy of Greece, but which\nreveals the same tendency, the same mythical and scientific teaching in\nits interpretation of the world. In this hymn, which has been translated\nand explained by Max Mueller, we see how boldly the problem of the origin\nof the world is stated (hymn 129, book x.)--\n\n  \"Nor Aught nor Nought existed; yon bright sky\n  Was not, nor heaven's broad woof outstretched above.\n  What covered all? what sheltered? what concealed?\n  Was it the water's fathomless abyss?\n  There was not death--yet was there nought immortal,\n  There was no confine betwixt day and night;\n  The only One breathed breathless by itself,\n  Other than It there nothing since has been.\n  Darkness there was, and all at first was veiled\n  In gloom profound--an ocean without light--\n  The germ that still lay covered in the husk\n  Burst forth, one nature, from the fervent heat.\n  Then first came love upon it, the new spring\n  Of mind--yea, poets in their hearts discerned,\n  Pondering, this bond between created things\n  And uncreated. Comes this spark from earth,\n  Piercing and all-pervading, or from heaven?\n  Then seeds were sown, and mighty powers arose--\n  Nature below, and power and will above--\n  Who knows the secret? who proclaimed it here,\n  Whence, whence this manifold creation sprang?\n  The gods themselves came later into being--\n  Who knows from whence this great creation sprang?\n  He from whom all this great creation came,\n  Whether his will created or was mute,\n  The Most High Seer that is in highest heaven,\n  He knows it--or perchance even He knows not.\"\n\nIt is evident that in this hymn, the expression of the moment when human\nthought was partly freed from the earlier anthropomorphic ideas, the\nscientific faculty which attempts a rational explanation of the world is\nshown; and although this is an isolated inspiration of the prophet, yet\nit shadows forth the conclusions to which the primitive Hellenic\nspeculation came when it was deliberately exerted to solve the problem\nof creation. In fact, there is here an intimation of the waters, of the\nvoid or deep abyss, as the beginnings of the world; of the breath of the\nOne, the hidden germ of things developed by means of heat; of\nproductive powers as a lower, and energy as a higher form of nature; of\nconceptions found in the Ionic, the Pythagorean, and the Eleatic\nphilosophies, which all converge into _the one_. All belong to the same\nAryan race.\n\nThe Vedic composition represents in _Dyavaprthivi_ the close connection\nbetween the two divinities, Heaven and Earth, the one considered as the\nactive and creative principle, the other as that which is passive and\nfertilized; the same ideas, more or less worked out, underlie not only\nthe first philosophies, but successive theories and systems. The worship\nof water, of fire, and of air involved their personification, and they\nthen became exciting principles, in accordance with the law of evolution\nwhich we have laid down. In the Rig-Veda, as well as in the Zendavesta,\nthe waters are collectively invoked by their special name _apas_, and\nthey are termed the _mothers_, the _divine_, which contain the _amrta_\nor ambrosia, and all healing powers. In _Agni_ and its Vedic\ntransformations we clearly trace the worship of fire, and its cosmic\nvalue. The Vedic worship of the air is Vayu, from _va_, to breathe, who\nis associated with the higher gods, and especially with _Indra_, ruler\nof the atmosphere: next comes _Rudra_, the god of storms, accompanied by\nthe _Maruti_, the winds; and in the Zendavesta the air is invoked as an\nelement. Hence we see that a more rational conception of the genesis of\nthe world succeeds to these earlier representations and\npersonifications of the elements; representations which in another form\nendure throughout the course of human thought.\n\nIt is now necessary to consider the other period of the mythical and\nscientific evolution which had its definitive conclusion in Plato and\nAristotle, teachers who even now to some extent influence the two great\ncurrents of speculative science. For us, however, it is more important\nto consider the Platonic teaching as that in which the mythical\nevolution of the earlier representations has full and clear expression;\nwhile in the Aristotelian philosophy an element of dissolution is\nalready at work which throws some light on the illusions of the Platonic\nschool.\n\nWe must bear in mind that the spontaneous and even the reflective\nintellectual faculty gradually assimilated special and independent myths\ninto comprehensive types, which referred to all natural objects. Next,\nthe incarnation of spirits produced the earliest forms of polytheism,\nand these were slowly classified into more concentric circles, and\nfinally into a single hierarchical system. Owing to the attitude and\nethnic temperament of the Greeks, the glorious anthropomorphism of their\nOlympus arose in a more vivid form than elsewhere, and it was\nimpersonated in the all-powerful and all-seeing Zeus, ruler of the\nworld, of gods and men. This process, modified in a thousand ways, was\ncarried on in all races. Hence it resulted that every object had a type,\nits god; everything was typically individuated in an anthropomorphic\nentity in such a way that there arose a natural dualism between the\nphenomena, facts, and cosmic orders on the one side, and on the other\nthe hierarchy of gods who represented them and over whom they presided.\nThe Hellenic philosophies prior to Plato, both physical and\nintellectual, and also the psychological morality of Socrates, had\nalready accomplished the first evolution of this typical stage of\nuniversal polytheism, substituting for anthropomorphic representations\nphysical and intellectual principles and powers. Thought was educated in\nits inward exercise, as well as in the observation of facts and ideal\nrepresentations. But--and this constituted the first evolution of\nanthropomorphism in general--these powers all expressed the thing in its\ngeneral and phenomenal form; it was endowed with merely zoomorphic\nforce, and the world was regarded as physiologically living.\n\nPlato, impelled by the foregoing evolution, and by the large and\nexquisitely aesthetic character of his genius, accomplished the second\nand altogether intellectual stage of evolution by inverting the problem;\nhe affirmed that the final and intrinsic result of the exercise of\nthought was its earlier and eternal essence, extrinsic and objective.\nThe types which were first fetishes and then polytheistic were\ntransformed into the physical and intellectual principles of the world,\ndivested of all mythical and extrinsic form as far as their material\norganization was concerned. Plato held that such types were really\nideal, as in fact they had unconsciously been from the first; that is,\nthat it was simply a logical conception of species and genera which is\nnatural to human thought; a conception necessary for the spontaneous as\nwell as for the reflex and scientific processes of thought. From the\ntype, the specific idea, the generalization into the idea of each\nspecial object was easy, since each object has its psychical\nrepresentation in the mind. Special and specific ideas were then\narranged in a certain order, and those which are more general in a\nconcentric and systematic classification; this had been also the case in\nthe earlier polytheistic system, since the process of the intelligence\nnaturally arranges all its representations. But he did not stop here,\nnor indeed was it possible for him to do so.\n\nWe know that the intelligence does not only understand objects, but\ntheir relations to each other, by means of its comparative faculty;\nthese relations were, as in the case of animals, at first intuitively\nperceived by direct observation and the alternate and reciprocal motion\nof the images, and they were first presented to the imagination and then\nembodied in speech. We have said in the foregoing chapters that in\nprimitive thought these relations involved an active entity, and were in\na word entified. Plato, pursuing his intellectual process of reasoning,\nand the reciprocal properties of ideas, noted the _ideality_ of these\nrelations so far as they are a psychical representation, and hence he\nwas constrained by the unconscious evolution of thought to affirm that\nan idea was present in every relation, and thus the great, the little,\nthe less, the more, had their ideal representatives in the general\nconstruction of his theory. But man is not only an intellectual, but an\nactive, sentient, living being, tending to an object as an individual\nand a social subject. So that he not only attains to the understanding\nof ideal truth, but also of the good and the beautiful. According to\nPlato, the Good and the Beautiful must also necessarily be Ideas of a\ngeneral character, like those which embrace all ideal relations\nwhatever. Since they are universal, and due to the innate impulse of\nthought towards concentric ascension, they must rank as the sum and apex\nof ideas, so that the Good is emphatically _the_ Idea, or God. On\nturning to the world of sensations, or of particular objects, ideas are\nthe eternal model (_paradigm_) according to which things are made; these\nare the images (_idoli_) of which the others are the imperfect copies\n(_mimesi_). The world of sense is itself only a symbol, an allegory, a\nfigure. As in the sensible world there is a scale of beings from the\nlowest to the most perfect, that is to the material universe, so in the\nsphere of intellect, the type of the world, ideas are combined together\nby higher ideas, and these again by others still higher, and so on to\nthe apex, the ultimate, supreme, omnipotent Idea, the Good which\nincludes and sums up the whole.\n\nPlato holds that matter is not the body, but that which may become the\nbody by the plastic action of the idea, as Weber well expresses it;\nmatter considered in itself is the indefinite (_apeiron_), the\nindefinable (_aoriston_), and the amorphous, and it is co-eternal with\nideas, and inert; from the union of ideas and matter the cosmos had its\norigin, the image of the invisible deity, God in power, the living\norganism (_Zoon_), possessing a body, sense, a definite object, a soul.\nThe body of the universe has the form of a sphere, the most beautiful\nwhich can be conceived; the circle described in revolving is also the\nmost perfect motion.\n\nThe stars first had their source in the Idea of Good; first the fixed\nstars, then the planets, then the earth, _created deities_; the earth\nproduced organized beings, beginning with man, the crowning work and\nobject of all the rest; the fruits of the earth were made to nourish\nhim, and animals were made to become the abode of fallen souls. Man, the\nmicrocosm, is reason within a soul, which is in its turn contained in a\nbody. The whole body is organized with a view to this reason. The head,\nthe seat of reason, is round because this is the most perfect form. The\nbreast is the seat of generous passions, while the bestial appetites are\nfound in the belly and intestines.\n\nThe human soul, like the soul of the world, contains immortal and mortal\nelements; the intelligence or reason, and sensuality. The immortality of\nthe soul is also proved by the memory. The subsequent union of life and\nmatter in the production of the universe is the work of an intermediate,\nequivocal being, the _demiurgos_. Thus Plato opposes the eternity of the\nintelligence to Ionic materialism, and the eternity of matter to the\nmonistic theory of the Eleatics.\n\nIn the genesis of nature we again find the synthetic conception of the\nelements, which he estimates to be four; to which geometrical forms\ncorrespond, and the world was finally organized after its human type. He\ndivides the soul into several distinct and independent powers, which are\never revolving between life and death: they inhabit the stars and depend\nupon them, since the soul which has been righteous on earth will be\nhappy after death in the star to which it was originally destined; but\nthose who on earth only desire here bodily pleasures will wander as\nshades round the tombs, or will migrate into the bodies of various\nanimals. He constitutes the stars into contingent and sensible gods:\nthey have beautiful and immortal bodies of a round form, and are made of\nfire. He asserts poetic inspiration and madness to be the result of\ndemoniac possession, and says with Socrates that those who deny demoniac\npowers are themselves demoniacs.\n\nWe see from this account the mythical origin of all that concerns the\norganization and genesis of the world, the destinies and nature of the\nsoul, since these are sublimated myths; the elements are first regarded\nas deities, and the world is made in the image of man, and considered to\nbe alive; the stars and the earth are endowed with life and\nintelligence; the fate of souls before and after death, their\nrecollection of a prior existence, their transmigrations and wanderings\naround the tombs, demoniac possession in inspiration and madness, are\nall very ancient mythical representations, which form a great part of\nthe theoretical and spiritual cosmogony of savages in all times and\nplaces. We have seen that not only relatively civilized peoples, but\nthose which are quite savage divide souls into distinct parts:\nthroughout Africa, America, and Asia, there is a belief in the\ntransmigration of souls into animals, plants, and other objects. The\nTasmanians believed that their souls would ascend to the stars and abide\nthere; and all savages hold the demoniac possession of inspired persons,\nof madmen, and of the sick, which has led to what may be called a\ndiabolic pathology. The general conception of the world as a living\nanimal, with all the tendencies ascribed to it by Plato, is only the\nprimeval fact of the animation and personification of phenomena applied\nto the general idea of the universe. Hence it is easy to see how much of\nPlato's physics and psychology are due to the necessary and historic\ncourse of myth, and to the schools into which myth had been modified\nbefore his time.\n\nWe must dwell more particularly on his theory of ideas, since in this\nthe advance made by Plato in the evolution of myth really consists, and\nit marks a very definite stage which had and still has a powerful\ninfluence on subsequent and modern thought.\n\nWe have already shown how, by the logical power of thought, this phase\nin the ideal evolution of myth was reached, and we have traced it in an\ninchoate form in various rude peoples, as well as in its ultimate\nmodification in Plato. In his writings it takes the form of a complete,\nvast, and organic theory. The logical conceptions and representative\nideas, idols peculiar to the mind, which were at first involved in\nfetishtic and anthropomorphic images, are now divested of their earlier\nwrappings, and are classified as the intellectual ideas which they\nreally are, and which they have become by the innate and reflex exercise\nof human thought. But on account of the faculty which ever governs our\nimmediate perception of internal and external things they could not in\nPlato's time, nor indeed in that of many subsequent philosophers, remain\nas simple intellectual signs of the process of reason. This faculty\ninfluenced these conceptions, these psychical forms, whether particular,\nspecific, or general, and they became living subjects, like phenomena,\nobjects, shades, images in dreams, normal and abnormal hallucinations.\nThus the Ideas in Plato became, reflectively and theoretically,\n_entities_ with an intrinsic existence, eternal, divine, and absolute\nessences. But the fetish, the anthropomorphic idol, was not only\nregarded as a living but as a causative subject; the same power was\nlikewise infused into the Ideas, and they were held to be causes of\nparticular things, of which they were the earlier and eternal type. Thus\nthe myth in the Platonic Ideas became scientific, but it continued to be\na myth; the substance varied, but the form was the same. The objective\nphenomena of the world had first been personified, or their fanciful\nimages were assumed to be objective; now the world of reason was\npersonified, and mythology became intellectual instead of cosmic.\n\nThose who opposed Plato's theory of ideas said that he realized\nabstractions, or personified ideas; but no one, as I think, perceived\nthe natural process which led him to do so, nor explained the faculty by\nwhich he was necessarily influenced. Plato's theory was only an ultimate\nphase of the evolution of the vague and primitive animation of the\nworld, which had passed through fetishism, polytheism, and the worship\nof the elements of nature, and had reached the entification and\nsubjectivity of ideas, which was also attained by natural science, after\npassing through its mythical envelopment. We have noted the causes,\nwhich in the case of the earlier philosophers happened to be objective,\nwhile they were in Plato's case subjective, owing to the character and\ntemperament of his mind; both conduced to the development and aesthetic\nsplendour of this teaching among the Greeks. The teaching of Plato,\nwhich had more or less influence on all the earlier civilized peoples,\nof his own and subsequent times, and which was also involved in the\nmythical representations of later savages, assumed an aspect which\nvaried with the special history, the ethnic temperament, the\ngeographical and extrinsic conditions of different peoples; but\nconsidered in itself, it is always the same, and is the necessary result\nof the evolution of myth and of thought. Since the evolution of myth\nleads to the gradual genesis of science, which becomes more rational as\nmyth is transformed from the material to the ideal, ideas are\nsubstituted for myths, and laws, as Vico well observes, for the canons\nof poetry.\n\nThis noble and more rational theory of eternal and causative Ideas\nresembles anthropomorphic polytheism in concentrating into one supreme\nIdea the intellectual Zeus, the Being of beings, according to another\nmythical and scientific representation by Aristotle, and it was\nafterwards combined with the Semitic idea of the Absolute. This was\nfused with the Logos, the Platonic demiurgos of Messianic ideas, and\nafterwards produced the universal philosophy and religion of\nCatholicism, which dominated and still dominates over thought with\nvigorous tenacity, and extends into all the civilized world inhabited by\nEuropean races. We do not only trace the same thought, modified,\nclassified, and perfected in the Fourth Gospel, in the Councils, the\nFathers, and the schoolmen, but also in independent philosophies. In\nour own time it has assumed new forms, derived from the rapid progress\nmade in cosmic and experimental sciences, even in those which are\napparently the most rationalizing. It is manifest in Hegel, Fichte, and\nSchelling, nor is it difficult to trace it in the latest and artificial\ntheories of the schools of Schopenhauer and Hartmann. In all these cases\nthe entification of logical conceptions is evident; in all there is an\narbitrary personification of a conception or of a fundamental Idea.\n\nIn order fully to understand the evolution of thought in myth and\nscience, it is necessary to consider the other schools which arose in\nGreece, prior to, and contemporaneously with, Plato, as we shall thus\nobtain a more comprehensive idea of the course of such a development. In\naddition to the natural and partly ideal schools, the Ionic, the\nEleatic, the Pythagorean and the Platonic, there arose those of\nLeucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, which might be called mechanical,\nand that of Aristotle, which takes a middle course between the idea and\nthe fact, between the dynamic and the mechanical explanation of the\nuniverse.\n\nIn an intellectual people like the Greeks there arose, in addition to\nthe speculative theories already mentioned, other opinions which were\nderived from minds singularly free from mythical ideas; the world was\nconsidered as a concourse of independent atoms; its genesis thus became\nmore conformable with abstract mathematical calculation, effected by\nthis combination of simple bodies and the evolution of elements. This\nwas what Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus undertook to teach, passing\nbeyond the natural and ideal myths, in order to take their stand on the\nmovement of isolated parts as the maker of the universe. Hence followed\nthe theory of atoms, and the mechanical construction of the world, of\nbodies and souls, their continual composition and decomposition. Since,\nhowever, these were mere speculations, not supported by experimental\nmethods and adequate instruments, mythical forms were confounded with\nthe mechanical explanation of the world, such as the altogether\nanthropomorphic conception of gods who were dissolved and formed again;\nthe sensible effluvium from images, an effluvium which revealed the\nancient belief in the normal and abnormal personification of imaginary\nforms, and of ideas. Yet the character of this teaching was progressive\nand rational in comparison with the mythical and ideal theory of Plato,\nand with the schools and religions which emanated from him, even up to\nour time, and thought was strongly stimulated in its opposition to the\ncontinuance of myth.\n\nThe influence of this school was confirmed by the Aristotelian teaching;\nif on the one side Aristotle inclined towards the mythical entities of\nPlato, and the old zoomorphic conception of the world, on the other his\ntheory of perception and of ideas, his amazing observations in\nphysiology and anatomy, and his natural classification of the animal\nkingdom, induced a positive tendency of thought, an _a posteriori_\nmethod of observation, which awakened the intelligence and predisposed\nit to a more rational and scientific evolution. His geocentric ideas of\ncosmogony, his logical forms, the human architecture of the world, his\nconception of the Being who was the end and cause of motion in all\nthings, were indeed obstinately maintained by the philosophy of\nCatholics and schoolmen, and served as an obstacle to the real progress\nof science; but on the other hand, his general method of observing\nnature, the discoveries which he made, and the tendency of his\nresearches, as well as the importance he assigned to consciousness in\nthe formation of ideas, did much to foster independent inquiry in the\nhistory of human thought; and coupled with the earlier mechanical\nschools, he prepared the way for the evolution of modern science. This\nis not the place for tracing the simultaneous course of the evolution of\nthe ideal and mechanical schools during the ages which separate us from\ntheir origin; and while the influence of the one gradually waned, the\nother gained strength, although in a sporadic way, first among\nprivileged minds, and then more generally.\n\nIt necessarily happened that as the evolution of thought went on,\nimpelled by its early tendencies, both mechanical and positive, the\nideal system was also modified, and gave place to sounder and truer\ntheories. This great fact, the ultimate evolution of our own time, was\neffected on the one side by psychological analysis, and on the other by\nthe direct and experimental observation of nature. Setting aside the\ngradual preparation which led up to this point, we can consider\nDescartes and Galileo as the representatives of these two great factors;\nsince the one by the analysis of thought, the other by natural\nexperiments, overthrew the mythical ideas, although without being aware\nthat the achievement would produce such grand results.\n\nThe Platonic Ideas were objective to the mind, and independent of it,\nsince they were regarded as a divine, concrete, absolute world in\nthemselves. The earlier evolution of myth and science relied upon this\nand were resolved into it. But we know that the process of thought is\ncontinuous in historic races, and that myth is gradually divested of its\npersonality and assumes a more intellectual form in the mind. Thus the\nmaterial Idea passed into an intellectual conception; that which first\nappeared in an objective and extrinsic form became subjective and\nintrinsic, a transition which was effected by the nominalists. This gave\nrise to a cognition which was altogether psychological; at first reality\nwas wholly objective, and the ideas were only a sublime intellectual\nmyth, but now the objective world disappeared, and the intellect which\nformulated the conception was the only real thing. In virtue of the\nfaculty of entification, only the mind and its ideas were real, the\nworld and all which it contained had a doubtful existence. This tendency\nhad its ultimate expression in Fichte, who created the universe by means\nof the Ego, thus transforming the earlier objective myth into one which\nwas wonderfully subjective. Descartes doubted about everything beyond\nthe range of his own thought, and was the first to overthrow the former\nideal realism, and to lead the way to science, and to more rational\nanalysis. To him the teaching of Spinoza and Kant was really due, as\nwell as the English schools which had so much to do with the destruction\nof the earlier mythical edifice of ideas.\n\nBut, as I have already observed, if this great rational progress were\nimportant on the one side, on the other it produced a more spiritualized\nform of myth, namely the subjective, which became still more powerful in\nthe philosophy of Kant. While some thinkers sought to resolve and\ndissolve the objective myth, they did it in such a way as to add\nstrength to the subjective form of myth and science, for which Descartes\nhad prepared the way; the theory of Spinoza and of the German school in\ngeneral fundamentally consists in the substitution of entified forms and\ndialectics of the mind for the earlier objective forms of ideas. A great\nerror was rectified, and the former phase of the intellectual evolution\nof myth disappeared, in favour of another which, although still\nerroneous, was more rational and independent.\n\nThe subjective and still mythical representations, either of the mind or\nof external objects, were afterwards reduced to true science by positive\nand experimental methods, aided by instruments, and confirmed by the\ndiscoveries of Galileo and of his disciples throughout the civilized\nworld. He was in modern times another great factor of the dissolution of\nmyth, so far as it is definitive. Nature was made subordinate to weight\nand measure, and to their mathematical and mechanical proportions in\nvarious phenomena; these were deduced from experiment and the use of\ninstruments, the factors which in the hands of Galileo and his great\nsuccessors in all civilized nations, destroyed and are still destroying\nthe old mythical conception of the world. In astronomy they overthrew\nthe catholic tenet of the geocentric constitution of the heavens; they\nshattered the spheres in which they were confined, opened infinite\nspace, and peopled it with an infinite number of stars, and in the\nattraction of gravity they discovered the universal law of motion in the\nfirmament. Thus all the mythical representations of the system of the\nworld, whether Aristotelian, Ptolemaic, or Biblical, vanished for ever,\nand the great zoomorphic body of the universe was dissolved; to be\nreplaced by worlds circulating in infinite space, subject to the laws of\nnumber and of geometry.\n\nMeasure, weight, and proportion were applied to all celestial and\nterrestrial phenomena, and physics, chemistry, and all the organic\nsciences became the manifestation of facts, of observed and calculated\nlaws, arranged in a natural order, and in this way an immense advance\nwas made in all branches of science. The history of mankind, first\nregarded as the arbitrary arrangement of a superior being, as it was\nformulated in the teaching of Judaism and Christianity, had its own laws\nin the facts of which it consisted, and thus the mythical conception\nwhich endowed it with personal life was dissolved. The origin of things\nwas explained by this method of observation, and by these positive\nconceptions; the records which had hitherto been regarded as a divine,\nextrinsic revelation came to be considered as simple documents, in which\ntruth was to be separated from the myth which obscured and encompassed\nit. So by degrees, from fact to fact, from analysis to analysis, by\nobservation, experiment, and decomposition, the rational, mechanical\nexplanation arose and gathered strength. The generation of things, the\nvariety of phenomena and their order, were derived from the primitive\nchemical atom, and from the various changes of form and rapidity of\nmotion to which they are subjected. The old conception of atoms, which\nhad never been forgotten, and which had unconsciously swayed and\ninfluenced the minds of men, reappears; but it reappears transformed by\nobservation, by weight and measure and experiment, and it has become a\nscience instead of a simple speculation. The atomistic evolution of the\nancients, accepted by one school of speculative thought, which sought to\noverthrow the mythical representation of the world, was only an isolated\nanticipation of a few philosophers; it has now become a scientific\nevolution, common to all modern civilization. The theory of descent,\ntransformation, and the general evolution of species, followed as a\nnecessary corollary and immediate result of the dissolution of Plato's\nmythical conception of specific ideas, and of all the generic but\nmaterial personifications with which nature had been peopled. When such\nconceptions of the ideal world were dissipated, those of the actual\nworld of nature soon followed, and this de-personification of natural,\nmythical species in the vast organic kingdom is one of the most splendid\nintellectual achievements of the age.\n\nThis victory of the natural sciences has reacted on those which are\npsychological, and on the theory of the mind, and has subjected them to\nthe necessities and form of this new phase of the evolution of thought.\nThe subjective had been substituted for the objective myth and had\ncreated the forms of mind, its logical laws and intrinsic process, the\nobjective synthesis of the world, and it was now influenced by the\nstupendous discoveries and analyses of other sciences, so that\npsychology was in its turn transformed into a science, not only of\nobservation, but of experiment. Measure, weight, numerical proportion,\nin short the experimental method, took possession of the facts, acts,\nand processes of the mind, as of every other object and subject of\nnature. In addition to the great names of modern psychologists in\nEngland, we may mention among other experimental psychologists in\nGermany, Fechner, Wundt, Lotze, Helmholtz, Weber, Kammler, etc.;\nillustrious men in France and elsewhere might also be cited to show what\nprogress has been made and is about to be made in this field. The\ndestruction of myth and of the subjective myths of psychology is always\ngoing on, and a positive science of mental phenomena has arisen, like\nthat of natural phenomena. The ultimate phase of myth is so near its end\nthat it has been possible to create a psychology implying the absence of\na soul. The scientific faculty has now indeed a complete ascendency over\nthe mythical representation with which it was originally coeval.\n\nYet we do not mean to say that myth is extinct. In the case of the great\nmajority of the human race, a small and elect portion excepted, myth and\nall the superstitions which proceed from it persist in an ideal, cosmic,\nspiritual, or religious form, and these are only slowly disappearing\namong the common people, and even among the educated classes. Owing to\nthe primordial and innate necessity which it is so difficult to\novercome, science itself still nourishes myths within its pale, although\nunconsciously and in their most rational form. Within our own\nrecollection _the imponderable_ was a tenet of physics, and this was\nindeed, in spite of all the enlightenment of science, a mythical\nentification of forces. The same mythical entifications were found in\nphysiology, in chemistry, in nearly all the sciences. Undoubtedly these\nscientific myths had no anthropomorphic value, yet they are\nnotwithstanding truly mythical entifications, inasmuch as they virtually\npersonify laws, or mere modes of motion.\n\nEther, according to our present conception of it, differing in its laws\nand influences from the atoms which constitute the world, and working\namong and above them, is perhaps only a grand myth like that of the\nimponderable, which has been exploded; that is, it is held to be a\nmaterial entity, while it may be only another modification of the\nelementary matter in a state differing from the three already known to\nus; some of Crooke's late experiments on one condition of extremely\ngaseous matter leads to this assumption. The divided forces of matter,\nand the dualism which still survives, are also mythical conceptions.\nAlthough so much progress has been made in a rational direction, and\ntruth is widely diffused, yet the old mythical instinct constantly\nreappears in some form or other. I must be permitted to say that this is\nan evident proof of the truth of my theory. Unless myth were due to an\nintrinsic psychical and organic law, it would not so persistently\nreappear. As soon as men are rationally conscious of this entifying\nfaculty and its immediate effects on knowledge, the illusion will cease.\nMyth will be destroyed in every kind of facts and phenomena, and\nscience, no longer the unconscious victim of this illusion, will advance\nwith caution and assurance.\n\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\n\nOF DREAMS, ILLUSIONS, NORMAL AND ABNORMAL HALLUCINATIONS, DELIRIUM, AND\nMADNESS--CONCLUSION.\n\n\nIn the preceding chapters, I have shown, as I believe, the genesis of\nmyth, the fundamental faculty in which it necessarily originates, and\nits evolution in man, particularly in the Aryan and Semitic races. We\nhave seen that the primitive and universal fact consists in the\nimmediate and spontaneous entification of natural phenomena and of the\nideas themselves; and we have resolved this fact into its elements, from\nwhich all the generating sources of myth issue, that is, from the\nimmediate effects of the perception. Putting man out of the question, we\nascertained that the same innate necessity was common to the animal\nkingdom.\n\nIn order to complete the theory, we must consider some other facts and\npsychical phenomena, both normal and abnormal, so as to ascertain\nwhether these are not due to the same cause, as far as respects their\nintrinsic forms; namely, the belief in the reality of images seen in\ndreams, as well as in those which appear in illusions, in normal\nhallucinations of the senses, and in those which are abnormal, in\necstasy, in delirium, in madness, in idiocy, and dementia. In all these\nmental conditions, we ascribe a body and material existence to images\nwhich for various causes appear to be really presented to our senses.\n\nIf we are able to show that all such appearances are believed to have a\nreal existence in virtue of the same law and faculty of perception which\ngenerated myth in its earliest manifestation, we shall have succeeded in\nestablishing a common genesis for all these various psychical phenomena,\nthus affording no contemptible contribution to psychology in general,\nand to the science of human thought.\n\nTo dream is not merely a normal act of man, but, as it appears from many\nwitnesses, it is common to all animals. In dreams the ordinary laws of\ntime and space are strangely modified, and images of all kinds appear,\nsometimes confusedly, sometimes in a rational order, often in accordance\nwith the laws of association, while the voluntary exercise of thought\nmay be said to be dormant. This is, speaking generally, the condition\nand nature of dreams, which we must presently consider adequately with\nmore subtle and exact analysis.\n\nBefore we trace the cause of the apparent reality of these images, and\nthe laws which govern it, let us consider man in his waking condition,\nso as to ascertain at once the likeness and the difference between\nthese two states. We must first inquire whether the waking is absolutely\ndistinct from the dreaming state as far as the appearance of the images,\ntheir nature, and mode of action are concerned. It has been observed by\nmany psychologists and physiologists that in the waking state, when\nimages do not arise from the immediate presence of objects, or are not\ndirected by the will to a definite aim, they appear, group themselves,\nand disperse by the immediate association of ideas, and the measurements\nof time and space are modified just as they are in dreams. These\nobservations are correct, and the phenomena may be verified by every one\nfor himself.\n\nIn this waking state, which really resembles that of dreams, only the\nanalogy of form has been perceived; the ideas of the objects present to\nthe mind have resembled those of images seen in dreams, but they have\ncontinued to be mere ideas, presented to the imagination, whereas in\ndreams the things seen have been supposed to have a real existence. In\nthis respect the analysis is partly true and partly false; it is not, as\nwe shall see, perfect and exact.\n\nIt sometimes happens, owing to special circumstances and conditions of\nmind, or to peculiar temperaments, that the ideas of things do not\nremain as mere _thoughts_ in the thinker's mind, but that they become so\nintense that they are for the moment held to be real, precisely as in a\ndream.\n\nI do not here speak of abnormal or pathological conditions, or of\nextraordinary phenomena, but of a normal and common condition. If there\nis any novelty in the assertion, it is owing to a want of observation\nand reflection, and to not attempting to trace the real nature of the\nphenomena in which we take part, and which occur every day. The habitual\ninaccuracy of observation has led to the use of many proverbs and\naphorisms in the interpretation of things which have been transmitted\nfrom one generation to another, and are now accepted as indubitable\naxioms. These are to be found in every branch of knowledge, and we have\nan instance in the popular and scientific aphorism that in dreams images\nappear to be real, and that in the waking state they always continue to\nbe mere thoughts and ideas.\n\nThis is not the fact, since, putting illusions and hallucinations out of\nthe question, thoughts and ideas sometimes assume the character and\nnature of real objects, just as they do in dreams. This fact constitutes\nthe link and gradual assimilation of the two states, since in no series\nof phenomena _natura facit saltum_.\n\nWhen, for instance, as often happens, we abandon ourselves to a train of\nthought, and our perception of surrounding objects is weakened by\ninattention, we become as it were unconscious, and are only intent on\nthe thoughts and ideas which move us. Since no definite object\nconstrains the will to rule and guide these thoughts and ideas, that\ncondition of mind is established which we have shown to be identical in\nform with the act of dreaming, for in this case also thoughts and ideas\nhave their origin in association alone. In this condition a phenomenon\npeculiar to dreams may also occur which may be termed the suggestive\nimpulse; a sound or some sudden sensation produces an immediate\ntransformation of the image itself, and a new dream arises in conformity\nwith the nature of the new impression. Every one must, consciously or\nunconsciously, have experienced such a phenomenon, and this special\ncharacteristic of dreams may also take place in the waking condition\nwhich I have described. I myself can bear witness to this fact, and will\nmention one among several instances: I was once reading inattentively,\nseated at my ease in a lounging chair, and my thoughts took quite\nanother direction, wandering vaguely from one thing to another. All at\nonce some people entered an adjoining room talking together; I heard\nwhat they said indistinctly, but the word Florence reached my ears, and\nI soon imagined myself to be in that city, and going on from one\nassociation to another I continued for some time to see again the\nplaces, monuments, and people I had known there. Yet I was fully awake,\nand from time to time I brushed the flies from my face and glanced at\nthe clock on the chimney-piece, since I had to go out at three o'clock.\n\nIt appears from this fact, which will be confirmed by many of my\nreaders, that some waking states resemble those of dreams in form, and\nmoreover they are sometimes even alike in substance. Ideas and thoughts\nin the conditions just indicated may not only be latent, active,\ncombined, or transformed by suggestive impulses, but ideas are\nrepresented by images in such vivid relief that, until the observer\nrecollects himself, they are seen and felt by him with the same sense of\nreality as in a dream. This mental transformation is however so\nhabitual, that the implicit conviction of being really awake, does not\nallow us to observe what the actual nature of the phenomenon is, since\nthere is an immediate transition from an implicit perception of the\nimage as real to the habitual form of simple thought, without\ndistinguishing the difference between these two states of consciousness.\nAny one who has long practised himself in the observation of such\ndistinctions will, however, be able to understand the psychical process\nand to estimate its value.\n\nIt has often occurred to myself, in circumstances analogous to the\nabove, when thinking of persons or places at a distance, to see them\nimaged before me in such vivid relief that I have been startled as if by\na morbid hallucination. Once, in passing through my chamber, my\nattention was so strongly fixed on an absent person that I was not only\nvividly conscious of his form, but also of his voice and gestures, so\nthat I was amazed by the lively image brought before me. I could adduce\nother instances from my own experience and that of others to show that\nin a waking and altogether normal state we may believe in the reality of\nthe image as we do in dreams.\n\nThis vivid and momentary realization of images is very common in the\nlower classes, who often talk to themselves, and use gestures which show\nthat they are conversing at the moment with imaginary persons, who stand\nbefore them, as if they were really there, in the same manner as in\ndreams. Indeed, every one has experienced this phenomenon for himself,\nespecially when strongly excited by anger, sorrow, or hope. If it were\npossible to reflect on the process of thought at the time we should\ndistinctly understand that we were dreaming while still awake.\n\nThe vivid imagination of artists is well known, so that they are able to\nsee and represent things and persons, either in words, with the pencil,\nor the chisel, just as if they were actually present. The image so\nvividly realized is a necessary condition of the exercise of their\nrespective arts. When great poets, such as Dante, Ariosto, Milton, and\nGoethe, conceived and idealized their thoughts with every detail of\ncircumstances, persons, actions, expressions, and movements, no one can\ndeny that the images were vividly present to their minds, and that while\nin the act of composition these were unconsciously regarded as having a\nreal existence. If these poetic descriptions are presented to the\nattentive reader in such a vivid form as to transport him into a real\nworld, much more must the authors of these marvellous creations have\nlooked upon them as real at the moment of composition. The impression of\ntruthfulness is indeed produced by the fact that the writers saw these\nthings as though they were real. I speak of states of consciousness, not\nof reflex observation, of intense moments of sensation and imagination,\nwhich are unnoticed by the man who experiences them in his waking\nmoments. Such is the reader of a poem, a romance, or history, the\nspectator of a picture, who is able for the time to abstract himself\nfrom surrounding objects, and who implicitly believes that he sees those\nplaces and persons, or whatever the book or painter has described or\nrepresented. If suddenly interrupted, he rouses himself, and may be said\nto awake to the present reality of things, as if startled from a dream.\n\nWigan relates that a celebrated portrait painter worked with such\nquickness and facility that he painted more than three hundred portraits\nin a year. When he was asked the secret of his rapid execution and of\nthe faithfulness of the likeness, he replied, \"When any one proposes to\nhave his portrait taken, I look at him attentively for half an hour,\nwhile sketching his features on the canvas; I then lay the canvas aside\nand pursue the same method with another portrait, and so on. When I wish\nto return to the first, I take his person into my mind and place it\nbefore me as distinctly as if he were actually present. I set to work,\nlooking at the sitter from time to time, since I am able to see him\nwhenever I look that way.\" Talma asserted that when he was on the stage,\nhe was able by mere force of will to transform his audience into\nskeletons, which affected him with such emotion as to add force and\nenergy to his action. Abercromby speaks of a man who had the faculty of\ncalling up visions with all the vividness of reality whenever he\npleased, by strongly fixing his attention on mental conceptions which\ncorresponded to them. Yet he was a sane man, in the prime of life,\nperfectly intelligent, and versed in practical affairs.\n\nA very slight withdrawal of the attention from surrounding objects is\nall that is necessary to enable artists and some other persons to call\nup these images with vivid distinctness, since even in the waking state\nthe image may for the moment appear to be actually before them. Any one\nmight attain to the same power of verification if the transition from\nthe real to the merely ideal image were not in the waking state so\ninstantaneous and easy; whereas in a dream the state of illusion is\nuninterrupted, and it is physiologically impossible for the mind to pass\nimmediately from the image, which is believed to be real, to the simply\nrepresentative idea of the thing.\n\nEven in the waking state, the image and representative idea of the thing\nnaturally tend to become, or to appear to be, actual realities, even in\na strictly normal condition of mind and body. Nor do they only\nimplicitly tend to become such by the innate impulse of the mind, but\nthey actually become so in fugitive moments of which man is scarcely\nconscious, and they appear to him exactly as they do in dreams. Hence it\nfollows that there is no hard and fast line between the sleeping and\nwaking states, so far as the nature of images, their source, action, and\ncombinations are concerned, when men are distracted in mind, and the\ncourse of their thoughts is not voluntarily directed to some definite\nobject; so that by a psychological process the phenomena of the waking\nstate may be partly transformed into those of dreams. The vivid\ncharacter of the image, presented to the senses as if actually there, is\ncommon to both phenomena. The way in which we begin to dream shows how,\nowing to our physiological conditions, we pass through regular stages\nfrom the waking state into that of sleep.\n\n  \"Nuovo pensiero dentro a me si mise,\n     Dal qual piu altri nacquero e diversi;\n     E tanto di uno in altro vaneggiai\n     Che gli occhi per vaghezza ricopersi,\n   E il pensamento in sogno trasmutai.\"[33]\n\nSo Dante writes in the \"Purgatorio\" with deep and subtle truth. Each man\ncan verify for himself the exactness of the great poet's description.\n\nI myself can readily study the phenomena of dreams, since I never sleep\nwithout dreaming so vividly that I remember all the circumstances in the\nmorning. I have used all sorts of artifices in order to trace the\nbeginning of sleep and dreams, and always with the same result, so that\nI am certain of the accuracy of experiments which have been repeated a\nhundred times. I have examined other persons who have made the same\nobservations, all of whom agree with me.\n\nWhen repose, the herald of sleep and dreams, begins, my thoughts wander\nin an irregular and somewhat confused manner. As they are gradually\nsubjected to the associations to which they successively give rise, they\nare transformed into more vivid images, a vividness which is always in\ninverse proportion to the attention. This gradually produces the state\nwhich has been described by Maury and others as hypnagogic\nhallucination; that is, the images seem to be real, although the subject\nis still partly awake, and the voluntary exercise of thought is lost\nfrom time to time in this species of incipient chaos. It is at this\npoint that images are really most intense, and that every idea assumes a\nbody and form, every image a reality: finally, when the body and the\nbrain have reached the physiological conditions of sleep, thoughts which\nhad been changed into hypnagogic images in the intermediate stage\nbetween sleep and waking, are altogether transformed into the real\nimages of dreams.\n\nBy an effort of will I have often been able to surprise myself in this\nintermediate stage, and the same thing has been done by others, and it\nalways appears that this is the real moment of transition from\nwakefulness to dreaming, I have been able to verify the fact that the\nfirst dream is only the continuation of our last waking thoughts, which\nhave now become dramatic and real I have also observed that this\nintermediate stage between waking and dreaming, during which the images\nare real and vivid, although we are still conscious of our real\ncondition, goes on for a long while, sometimes for a whole night, with\nbrief intervals of sleep. This has occurred to me when I was kept awake,\neither when travelling at night, or when I had taken a large draught of\nwater before lying down (other liquids or food does not produce the\nphenomenon) or if I have been looking during the day at objects\nilluminated by dazzling sunshine. In all these circumstances the bright\nand vivid images appear reduced to an almost microscopic scale, although\nvery distinct in form and colour; in ordinary cases, the images appear\nof the ordinary size, but not without a tendency to become smaller.\n\nI believe that there is a physical cause for the reduction and\nattenuation of the images in the excessive excitement of the retina, or\ncentral encephalic organ in which images are formed in conscious\nconcurrence with the cortical part of the hemispheres. Owing to the\nexcitement caused by wakefulness, by fatigue, by sunshine, or in some\ncases by the condition of the nerves of the stomach, the objective\nprojection on psychical space, partly transmitted by heredity and\ngradually formed by associations and local signs,[34] is arrested by the\ninnate force of the image on the organ, and it appears to be smaller and\nin proportion with the relative smallness of the image which is produced\nby minute vibrations and by the susceptibility of the cellule. This\nintermediate and persistent stage of hypnagogic images serves in every\nway to explain the physical genesis of involuntary hallucinations.\n\nAs a proof that the image physiologically assumes the form of a real\nappearance, I may mention the experience of myself and others. When\nsuddenly awakened from a vivid dream I have sometimes, even when I was\nfully awake, seen for an instant the figures of my dream still moving,\nand projected on the wall. This fact shows that even the images of our\nwaking state have, in the physiological conditions of the brain, a\ntendency to take real forms, so that they may be termed normal, or more\nproperly, inchoate hallucinations, corrected by the conscious efforts of\nour waking state and external consciousness. So that it might be said\nthat dreams are at first the transformation of our waking thoughts into\nnormal images and hallucinations, and afterwards into those of dreams,\nproperly so called.\n\nIf the hypnagogic phase actually affects the cerebral cellules in\nconnection with the various senses of which they are the organs, the\nphases of sleep and dreams, strictly so called, have more general\nconditions. The idea, converted into an image presented to the senses,\nmay thus be said to have three stages: that of the waking state, which\ndepends as we have said on the intensity and vividness with which it is\nreproduced, aided by a momentary detachment from the real environment;\nsecondly, the hypnagogic phase, in which there is the physiological\naction of the nervous centres, which produce the image, though still\nwith the implicit consciousness of the waking state; and finally, the\nactual dream, in which this implicit consciousness is almost always\nwanting, and the psychical exercise of thought is completely transformed\ninto visions and figures which are believed to be real. This in its turn\ndepends upon the other two causes, and on the physiological relaxation\nof the body, which is to a great extent isolated, so that the effectual\nimpulses of external nature are greatly attenuated.\n\nIn the waking state, the whole body and all its organs of relation and\nmovement are in tension. The cerebro-spinal axis virtually excites the\nwhole muscular and peripheral system in such a way that relaxation or\nrelative repose becomes impossible. But the brain, with all its\ndependencies and appendices, is not only the organ of thought, but it\nstimulates and directs our whole system, as numerous experiments have\nshown. In the waking state both these functions are exercised equally,\nas far as the impulses and functions of the body are concerned, and as\nlong as the psychical and organic characteristics of the waking state\ncontinue. But in sleep the exciting influence of the brain is\ndiminished, and the brain transmits much less of the normal excitement\nand normal tension to the spinal axis with its ramifications in the\nafferent and efferent nerves; in the waking state an external impression\nis promptly conveyed to the centres, whence it returns in corresponding\nmovements with the usual connection and rapidity, whether reflex or\ndeliberate. Since in sleep the relative condition is flaccid and torpid,\nthis action no longer takes place. For if the brain be affected by\nstrong impressions, and these are followed by corresponding movements\ndue to reflex action, as is often the case, even in sleep, the dreamer\nis only obscurely conscious of them, and they almost wholly depend on\nthe spinal axis, and the peripheral ganglia.\n\nAs we have said, the function of the brain is duplex; it stimulates and\ndirects, and it is also sentient and conscious, and this second function\nis persistent in dreams. Although the brain is no longer directed by a\npower which dictates psychical acts and phenomena, yet its automatic\naction is not destroyed, and to this the apparent reality of images\nseen is owing, since there is no longer any distraction from the\nexternal world, or, at all events, its impulses are so attenuated as to\nbe unobserved. In such conditions past images recur with an appearance\nof reality owing to the mnemonic and automatic action of the brain; such\na tendency exists in the waking state, and the images are associated and\ndissociated in a thousand ways, by means of analogies, resemblances,\nformer combinations of facts, and series of facts analogous to those of\nthe waking state, and are modified by suggestive impulses. We have\nexperimental proof, to which I can add my own irrefragable witness, that\nthe stimulating influence exerted by the brain in the waking state is\ndormant in sleep, and that only its automatic act of representation\nremains active, with the occasional exercise of an aroused and conscious\nwill.\n\nThe following strange and unpleasant phenomenon generally occurs to me\nonce or twice a year. All at once, in the midst of a deep sleep, I\nbecome wide awake; I am fully conscious of myself, of the place where I\nam, of my position and the like, and wish to move like a person who is\nfully awake. Yet for some time this is impossible; the psychical,\ncerebral faculty is perfectly awake, and master of itself, but not the\nstimulating faculty, so that the limbs do not respond to the first\nimpulse of the will. All my efforts are unsuccessful; I only succeed in\nescaping from this unpleasant situation by uttering with great\ndifficulty some inarticulate sound, which acts as a shock, and I thus\nobtain the mastery of my body, for the nerves of speech and the muscular\nmovements of articulation also fail to answer to my will. If this occurs\nwhen I am alone, the struggle is severe, and there is a violent shock to\nthe whole body before its equilibrium is restored and the motor function\nof the brain resumes its office.\n\nIt is therefore manifest that the stimulating function of the brain is\ndormant in sleep and dreams, but its automatic, psychical function\npersists; it sometimes happens that the stimulus of the will is awakened\nbefore the stimulus of motion, and that the brain may be aroused to\nconsciousness for some moments before it has resumed its normal\nfunctions as a stimulating organ, which were attenuated and relaxed in\nsleep. The abnormal condition of paralysis proves and confirms this\nfact.\n\nLet us now ascertain the cause of the various psychical and\nphysiological conditions which aim at and often succeed in presenting to\nthe mind a mere representative sign as a substantial and real image.\nWhat is the cause of the apparent reality of dreams? The image is\nclearly a psychical phenomenon, containing a sensible element of which\nwe are conscious; the fundamental faculty of the perception is exerted\non it as on a real object, and the immediate results are precisely\nidentical. The reader will remember that we have shown that a\nphenomenon involves the intuitive idea of an active subject, so that the\nimage also, in accordance with the innate faculty of perception, must\nnormally appear to the mind as such. When this is not the case, it is\nbecause the normal effect of natural phenomena, to which our attention\nis constantly directed, and our mental education and hereditary\ninfluence, have accustomed us to distinguish at once between the mere\nidea and the real object, and thus we discern the difference between the\nnormal action of thought and sense, and illusions, hallucinations, and\ndreams. But since these psychical and physiological conditions lose\ntheir force when the habit and actions of our waking state are dormant,\nthe primitive and innate entification of the image quickly recurs, as we\ncan plainly see from the previous analysis.\n\nThis is so much the case, that some savage peoples even now find it hard\nto distinguish real events from those of dreams, and this is owing to a\ndefect in their memory or to the imperfection of their language. In\nfact, all civilized and barbarous peoples in the world have without\nexception believed, and still believe, in the reality of images seen in\ndreams, and their personification has been the source of an immense\nnumber of myths. Even now, with all our civilization and advanced\nscience, not only the common people, but many of those in fashionable\nand tolerably cultivated society, believe in the reality of dreams and\nin their hallucinations, and derive from them fears, hopes, and warnings\nfor their future life.\n\nI will give one instance in a thousand to prove the innate tendency even\nin the act of dreaming to transform the image into a real object. It\nappeared to me that I was in a large room filled with acquaintances and\nstrangers, who discussed an event which had really occurred in the city\na few days before. All at once I raised my eyes to the wall of the room,\nand saw a large picture, representing a landscape with distant\nmountains, streams, cottages, and animals. As I looked, the picture was\ngradually transformed into a real object, and I found myself, together\nwith the company before mentioned, in the midst of the fields, on the\nbank of the river, and within one of the cottages.\n\nIn another dream, I appeared to be conversing with an old soldier on the\nshores of a lake; after some incoherent talk, he began to describe a\nbloody battle in which he had taken part; he had not gone far before the\nnarrative was changed for an actual occurrence, and I was in the midst\nof a real battle, such as the soldier had undertaken to describe.\nAnother night I dreamed that I was reading a tragic poem, relating\nterrible deeds of blood and rapine, and suddenly I seemed to have become\nan actor or real spectator of that which I had at first read in a book.\nIn another strange dream I was going over a difficult pass in a hired\ncarriage, and I seemed to see before me a friend from whom I had parted\non the previous day, when he got into an omnibus to return to the\ncountry. I soon saw in the distance a large coach-builder's\nestablishment, a vast enclosure with sheds and carriages, and in the\n_piazza_ I saw the manager, a man I knew, who had really some\nappointment in a carriage manufactory; the building recalled by\nassociation the familiar appearance of the high chimneys which rose\nabove the roof, and while thinking of those chimneys with my eyes fixed\non the manager, he appeared to me to be changed into a very high\nchimney, still bearing a human face. Finally, not to multiply examples,\nI remember a dream in which I was present at a popular disturbance,\nwhere one woman, more furious than the rest, came to blows with her\nhusband, and called him a dog. Suddenly the scene changed, and I was\ntransported to a courtyard in which there were poultry, pigs, and a fine\ndog of my acquaintance, called Lightning. Again the scene changed, and I\nfound myself in a country district with some friends, exposed to a\nviolent storm of thunder and lightning.\n\nWe clearly see from these facts that whatever may be presented to the\nimagination is transformed into a real object in the dream itself, so\nthat it might be called a dream within a dream, and in the last instance\nthe transmutation passes through three images and consecutive objects.\nThis transmutation not only consists in the transition from our waking\nthoughts to the image of our dreams, but it takes place in the act of\ndreaming; such is the power of the faculty of perception, in which we\nfind the first origin of myth in man, and its roots also in the animal\nkingdom. Thus the genesis of myth, as far as the entification of the\nimage is concerned, is the same as that of dreams.\n\nThe normal illusions of the senses, which are believed to be real by\nprimitive men, and by those ignorant of physical laws, have a similar\norigin. The objection of such phenomena as a mirage, or the tremulous\neffect produced in tropical regions by the refraction and reflection of\nlight on trees, rocks, and mountains, so well described by Humboldt, is\ndue to ignorance of the laws of nature, and this is in fact an\nentification of the phenomenon, occasioned by the innate tendency to\nanimation which is proper to the perception. In this it is easy to trace\nthe genesis both of myth and dreams. The fact of hallucination is more\ncomplex, even in its normal state, that is, in those general conditions\nof mind and body in which reason has complete command over us.\n\nWithout entering into any analysis of the various forms of hallucination\nof which many able psychologists and physicians of the insane have\ntreated, let us turn to the more ordinary cases in which an image of the\nmind is projected on the external world so as to appear real. The roots\nof such a phenomenon are strictly organic, and belong to the centres in\nwhich the image is formed, as we have already observed; this image\nsometimes stands out in such vivid relief on the psychical space that it\nseems to be an external, not, as it usually appears in less vivid form,\nan internal intuition. The hallucinations which Nicolai describes\nhimself to have experienced may be taken as a classical example. When\nAndral was returning from an autopsy, he clearly saw the corpse\nstretched before him as he entered his room. Goethe, Byron, and many\nothers, have been affected in the same way. I myself have occasionally\nhad hallucinations of the kind when in a perfectly healthy condition of\nmind and body; one, in particular, of a very vivid character, occurred\nwhen I awoke one morning and seemed to see a tall and venerable priest\nentering my chamber. It is needless to multiply examples; similar facts\nabound in classic books in English, French, German, and other languages.\nLet us rather study the phenomenon and trace its origin.\n\nIt is clear on the one side that the images of the hallucinations of\nsight or hearing appear to have a real existence, so that they may be\nobserved and studied with ease; and it is also certain that this image\nhas no external existence, and is simply a cerebral fact, due to the\norgans adapted for perception. Without considering the cause of the\nexternal projection, to which I have already alluded, since perhaps its\nphysiological and psychical genesis is not yet fully understood, we\nmust consider the image, so far as it is believed to be real.\n\nIn cases of normal hallucination the reason is intact, and the observer\nis conscious of the illusion, yet notwithstanding this positive judgment\nthe image has an appearance of complete reality. The cause of this\nillusion is evidently the same as that of the illusions of dreams, and\nof the origin of myth; namely, that everywhere and always the mental or\nnatural phenomenon and its image are respectively entified. In the\nnormal waking state, habit and other causes on which we have touched\nrender our ideas of things altogether immaterial, as merely psychical\nforms and representative signs, but when the excitement of the organs\nincreases, so as to present them to the consciousness as objective\nimages, then, owing to the interruption of the ordinary process, they\nare suddenly entified, and appear as an external phenomenon.\nHallucinations are therefore explained by our theory, and it is further\nconfirmed by the hallucinations of animals, and especially by the\ndelirium of dogs and other animals affected by hydrophobia, or by\ncerebral excitement artificially produced by alcoholic and exhilarating\ndrugs.\n\nIf a man is habitually subject to many and various hallucinations, and\nhis sane judgment esteems them to be such, they are undoubtedly unusual\nphenomena, but they do not in any way injure the rational exercise of\nthe mind. It is only when he believes the images to be real that the\nabnormal state begins, termed delirium if it is of short duration, and\nmadness if it is permanent. We must examine hallucination under these\nnew conditions.\n\nIn the delirium of fever, or in various forms of disease, the cerebral\nexcitement is so great that not only the deliberate exercise of reason,\nbut the power of estimating external objects is lost, and the organs of\nthe senses are so completely altered, that the perceptions themselves\nare exaggerated and confused. In this state hallucination reaches its\nhighest point, and the patient sees, hears, and feels, directly or\nindirectly, strange and terrible things: wild beasts, enemies of all\nkind, torments; or again, pleasing and agreeable images. Independently\nof the alteration in various sensations produced by the morbid\nalteration of the special organs which induce them, the real cause of\nthis phenomenon consists in the objection of mental sensations and\nimages. Such an objection of images or sensations, considered in the act\nwhich transforms them into a reality, depends on the same cause as all\nother acts of perception; there is always an entification of the\nphenomenon, which in this case is a vivid internal image, appearing to\nbe external and real.\n\nThe entification of images is still more direct and powerful because in\nthis morbid crisis the necessary corrections made by reason cannot take\nplace, since the sick man is for the time deprived of it, and he is in\nfact a dreamer, whose condition is intensified by abnormal excitement.\nEntification is now displayed in its nude and native state, and serves\nto explain the constant mental process, and the true nature of the\nrepresentations of the intellect. The transition is easy from delirium\nto madness, for although an insane person is not always delirious, but\nsometimes calm and composed, yet there is a fundamental resemblance to\ndelirium in the change in his states of consciousness and its relative\norgans, which imply a constant hallucination. The most famous and acute\nphysicians of the insane estimate that eighty out of a hundred insane\npersons are subject to hallucinations. The morbid condition which\ngenerates them is also produced by debility, by anaemia, and the senile\ndecay of the cerebral organs, since they occur in dementia, idiocy, and\nold age, and the physiological and mental causes are the same; the power\nof fixing the attention and governing the thoughts is diminished, owing\nto the weakening of the vivid consciousness of the external world,\nproduced by a torpidity of the afferent organs. In these cases the\nrecollections which are not altogether lost sometimes reappear as\nhallucinations. The hallucinations of madness, in its various forms of\ndementia, idiocy, and dotage, are all, apart from their morbid and\norganic conditions, derived from the same source which produces myths,\ndreams, and normal hallucinations; the objective entification of images\nis due to the innate faculty of the perception, which leads to the\nimmediate personification of any given phenomenon. We have shown that,\ngiven a sensation, there naturally arises the implicit notion of a\nsubject and a cause, and this natural impulse is further developed by\nthe influence of heredity; both in man and animals the constant and\npowerful sense of individual life is infused into the phenomenon\nperceived.\n\nThe various forms of madness throw a clearer light on this necessary and\nprimitive fact of human and animal perception. The act of sensation may\nthen be said to be under its own direction, and generates itself in the\nautomatic exercise of the brain, as in dreams, without the explicit,\ndisturbing, and modifying influence of reflection, and the habit of\nrational analysis. The act of sensation is spontaneously completed and\ndeveloped in and with its own constituents, and since it is isolated\nfrom other modes and exercises of thought, its real nature appears. The\nhallucinations of madness, produced by the mental realization of images,\neither detached or in association, prove that all our mental images or\nideas have a tendency in themselves to become real objects of\nconsciousness; with this difference, that a sane man recognizes these\nmental entifications by their mobility and incessant alterations, which\ncontrast with the fixity and permanence of external and cosmic\nphenomena.\n\nThe following considerations will confirm the truth of these facts. In\nour advanced state of civilization, thought may, after so many ages'\nexercise, almost be said to have become part of the organism by the\nindisputable effect of heredity; and the phenomenon of the recurrence to\nmemory of past facts and distant places is obvious and intelligible,\nsince our judgment of them is never subject to illusion, or only in rare\ninstances and in abnormal conditions. But this judgment is less obvious\nand easy in the case of primitive savages who have advanced little\nbeyond the innate exercise of the intelligence. The rational analysis of\nthe states of consciousness has not been made, and hence their special\nand general distinctions are seen with difficulty or not seen at all.\nConsequently the primitive and natural amazement of man must have been\ngreat, when by day, and still more in the lonely silence of night,\npersons, places, and his own past acts recurred to his mind, and he was\nable to contemplate them as if they were actually present. He was\nincapable of giving an explanation of this marvellous fact in the\nrational and reflective manner which is possible to psychologists and to\nall civilized men. This revival of the past appeared to him as a fact in\nits simple and spontaneous reality; he made no attempt to explain it,\nbut it was presented to his consciousness like all other natural facts.\nThe only explanation of the phenomenon appeared to him to be that these\nimages did not recur to the mind by the necessary action of the brain,\nbut that by their own spontaneous power they were recalled to take\ntheir part within his breast: he supposed the phenomenon to be\nobjective, not subjective.\n\nProphecy, for instance, was often supposed to be a recollection, and\nsome primitive accounts of the genesis of things, handed down by\ntradition, were reputed to be inspired, and objectively dictated to the\nmind. The Platonic theory of reminiscence relies on these conceptions.\nThe power which recalled the images to memory was supposed to be\nexternal, and identical with that which raises up the images of dreams;\nprimitive man traced a fanciful identity between the phenomena of memory\nand of dreams, and the distinction between them was not supposed to\nconsist in the actual images, but in the modes of their appearance in\nthe waking or sleeping state. The images assumed in the memory a\nrelative reality, somewhat resembling those of dreams. In fact, some\nsavages do not clearly distinguish between the images of these states,\nand see little difference between the spontaneous recollection of\nthings, the fancy, and dreaming. This also occurs in children, who at a\nvery early age often call by name absent persons and things which recur\nto their memory; and on the other hand they do not distinguish the facts\nof real life from those of dreams. I have observed this fact in several\nchildren.\n\nAmong primitive peoples it often happens that an object with which they\nare unfamiliar, but which has some analogy with those with which they\nare acquainted, becomes associated with the latter, and is constituted\ninto a compound being, endowed with life. The Esquimaux believed the\nvessels commanded by Ross to be alive, since they moved without oars.\nWhen Cook touched at New Zealand, the inhabitants supposed his ship to\nbe a whale with sails. The Bosjesmanns ascribed life to a waggon, and\nimagined that it required the nourishment of grass. When an Arauco saw a\ncompass, he believed that it was an animal; and the same belief has been\nheld by savages of musical instruments, such as grinding organs, which\nplay tunes mechanically. Herbert Spencer mentions similar behaviour in\nsome men belonging to one of the hill tribes in India; when they saw Dr.\nHooker pull out a spring measuring tape, which went back into its case\nof itself, they were terrified and ran away, convinced that it was a\nsnake. From these facts, which might be multiplied indefinitely, it not\nonly appears that everything is spontaneously animated by man, but also\nthat the images of his memory are fused with those which are actually\npresent, since their respective factors are esteemed to be equally real.\nThis primitive objection of the images of the memory also occurs in the\nmythical representations of dreams, which, as the images of absent\nobjects, have much in common with the images of the memory. In fact, all\npeoples, as we have seen, have believed in the reality of dreams.\n\nThe North American Indians believe in the existence of two souls, one of\nwhich remains in the body while the other wanders at pleasure during\nthe dream. The New Zealander supposes that the dreamer's soul leaves his\nbody, and that he meets the things of which he dreams in the course of\nhis wanderings. The Dyak also believes that the soul is absent during\nsleep, and that the things seen in dreams really occur. Garcilasso\nasserts that this was likewise the Peruvians' belief. A tribe in Java\nabstains from waking a sleeper, since his soul is absent in dreams. The\nKarens say that dreams are what the _la_ or soul sees during sleep. This\ntheory is also found among more civilized peoples, as for instance in\nthe Vedic philosophy and the Kabbala, and it has come down to our days\namong the common people, and even among those of some culture.\n\nOne belief connected with dreams, generally diffused among all savage\nand civilized peoples, is that of the appearance of dead men, or of\ntheir ghosts. Of this all the traditions and popular myths in the world\nare full. Such a belief, first excited by the vision of the dead in\ndreams, is easily aroused in the savage or uneducated mind, even when he\nrecalls to memory while he is alone, and especially at night, the image\nof one whom he loved in life. Affection, and the lively emotion of\nsorrow and desire give such a life-like appearance to these images that\nthey become objectively present to the mind, to console the mourner, or,\non the other hand, to threaten the murderer. I have more than once heard\npersons of all classes, after the death of children, of a husband or\nwife, whom they have injured or imagine that they have injured, either\nduring life or by not fulfilling their last wishes, declare in all good\nfaith that the form of the dead is often present to their memory and\nvisible while they are awake; thus implying that the dead mercifully\nappear to comfort their mourning friends, or else to reproach them for\nnot fulfilling their promises. In a word, these images did not seem to\nthem to be subjective, and an ordinary phenomenon of the memory, but\nobjective and personal apparitions within the soul. The cases are not\nrare in certain dispositions of mind, in which the projection of these\nimages on the memory gradually produces madness. We must not forget that\npsychical phenomena in general are very differently regarded by the\nsavage and the civilized man, since the latter is accustomed to\nanalysis, and to the real distinctions of things. If this canon is\nforgotten we shall fall into grave errors in the attempt to interpret\nthe evolution and primitive history of thought and of humanity.\n\nWe shall more readily understand the nature and genesis of all these\nhallucinations, and of normal and abnormal illusions, if we study\nanother phenomenon of frequent occurrence which I myself have often had\noccasion to observe. I mean the illusion or hallucination which does not\nconsist in the absolute projection of an internal image with an external\nsemblance of reality, but which presents it in the twilight as an\nobject of uncertain form, either in a room or out of doors. It often\nhappens, as I and others have experienced from childhood, that a dress\nor other object lying by chance on a chair, or on the ground, or hanging\non a piece of furniture or a peg, seen in connection with the other\nthings near it, is transformed into a person or animal, in a sitting or\nstanding posture or lying at full length, as if it had been a spectre or\nphantasm; somewhat like the figures which we all take pleasure in\ntracing in the strange and mobile forms of clouds. The fantastic figure\nsometimes appears instantaneously and at the first glance, sometimes it\nis only gradually made out; but in both cases, as we shall see, its\ngenesis is the same. Although in the former case that which in the\nlatter is gradually developed _appears_ to be developed all at once, yet\nin reality it passes through the same stages.\n\nLet us now consider the second mode; and in order to be perfectly\naccurate, I will describe one out of many apparitions which I saw so\nrecently that its gradual formation is retained distinctly in my memory.\nOn a small three-legged table beside my bed there was a little oval\nmirror, on which hung a woman's cap, which fell partly over the glass:\nthere was also an easy chair, on which I had thrown my shirt before\ngoing to bed, while my shoes were as usual on the floor. I awoke towards\nmorning, and as I chanced to look round the large room, in the uncertain\nlight of a night-light which was almost burnt out, my eyes fell upon\nthe easy chair. Immediately I seemed to see a head above it,\ncorresponding to the mirror, and a vague and confused image of a person\nseated there. As I am accustomed to do in similar cases, I closed my\neyes for a little, and on reopening them I looked at the appearance with\nattention and interest; this time the person or phantasm had a less\nconfused outline, although I did not see the form distinctly, nor the\nfeatures, nor its precise position. Yet in this second observation, I\nobtained an idea of it as a whole, and in details.\n\nOn further examination the face and person stood out more clearly, and\nthe features became more distinct, the longer I looked. Each accidental\nfold or shadow on the cap was transformed into bright eyes, strongly\nmarked eyebrows, into the nose, mouth, hair, beard, and neck; so that as\nI went on I had before me a perfectly chiselled face corresponding to\nthe type which had first flashed across my mind as the confused\nimpression of a face conveyed by the cap and mirror. The same process of\nevolution was pursued with respect to the limbs, the breast, arms, legs,\nand feet; parts of the body which at first appeared to be vague and\nindeterminate gradually, and as if by enchantment issued distinctly from\nevery fold of the shirt, from every shadow, angle, and line, so as to\ncompose what Dante would call _una persona certa_. Finally I saw before\nme a man dressed in white, of an athletic form, sitting in the easy\nchair and looking fixedly at me: the whole body was in harmony with the\nhead, which had first resulted from the rude resemblance to a human\nface. The image appeared to me so real and distinct that on rising from\nthe bed and gradually approaching it, its form did not vanish, even when\nI was near enough to touch the object which produced it. An analysis\nshowed that the features, limbs, and position corresponded in every\npoint with the folds and relative position of the articles of dress\nwhich had formed it. A similar process, issuing in such apparitions, is\na frequent cause of illusions, which in the case of ingenuous,\nsuperstitious, and primitive peoples, may lead to the firm conviction\nthat they have seen an apparition. This has certainly been the case in\nprimitive and even in civilized times, and has given occasion to myths,\nlegends, and the worship of tutelary deities and saints.\n\nIf we consider the causes of such a phenomenon, and analyze its elements\nand motives, we shall, I think, discover that it goes far to explain\nmany normal and abnormal hallucinations.\n\nIn the first place, there is in man a deep sense of the analogies of\nthings, partly developed by the organic tendency to regard any given\nobject of perception as subjective and causative, and to infuse into it\nour own animal life, a tendency confirmed by education and the practice\nof daily life. Such analogies, which find their expression in metaphor,\nare very vivid and persistent in the vulgar and in those persons who\napproximate most closely to the primitive ingenuousness of the\nintelligence. The most frequent analogies are between natural phenomena\nand objects and animal forms. Analogies are also found between the\nvarious forms of inanimate natural objects, but the former are more\nusual, and especially those which refer to the human form. There are\nnumerous and familiar instances of the names of men or women given to\nmountains, rocks, and crags, because they have some remote resemblance\nto some human feature or limb. Every day we may be called upon to see a\nface in some mountain, stone, or trunk of a tree, in the outline of the\nlandscape, a wreath of mist or cloud. We are told to observe the eyes,\nnose, mouth, the arms and legs, and so on.[35] Every one must remember\nto have often heard of such resemblances, even if he has not himself\nobserved them. All the facts and laws which we have observed explain why\nthe sudden appearance of some vague form in an uncertain light,\nreminding us in a confused way of the human figure, instantly causes us\nto trace a resemblance to man rather than to any thing else. It must be\nnoted, as my experiment has already proved, that in this first sketch\nof a phantasm in human form, a general, though indefinite type of the\nwhole figure has spontaneously arisen, to which it is made to\ncorrespond. This is the key to the ultimate perception of the\nphenomenon. What may be called the prophetic type of the figure which\nwill afterwards appear to us in all its details, although it may seem to\nbe produced by external resemblance, is in fact the product of the mind,\nwhich has been unconsciously exercised in its construction.\n\nIn fact, out of the immense variety in faces, and in the general form of\npersons, of gestures, fashions of dress, attitudes in rest and motion,\nwhich are indelibly impressed on the memory, every one constructs\ngeneral types for himself; types which are revealed in the allusions\nmade in our daily conversation to the resemblances which we are\ncontinually observing. These remain in the memory, with all the manifold\nresemblances, as well as the ideal of certain types in which the\nnumerous forms we have seen and compared are formulated. We know that\nwhen the memory has been dormant, which is often the case, it may be\nawakened by the stimulus of association, of analogy, or of will, so as\nto reproduce the forgotten ideas and sensations which are thus again\npresented to the consciousness. When, therefore, one or more objects are\nseen in an uncertain light, so as to present a confused appearance of\nthe human form, its general lineaments are unconsciously made by us to\ncorrespond with the human type already existing in the memory, and this\ntype presides in the subsequent composition of the reproducing artist\nwho observes the phantasm. The unconscious mental labour which is\naccomplished in the reproducing cellules of past impressions and ideas\nby the instantaneous creation of the type, gathers round this type the\nform and features corresponding with it, which had its earlier existence\nin our own experience. The external pose and indefinite modification of\nthe objects appear to correspond with the gradual mnemonic revival of\nthe typal form, and they reciprocally stimulate and react on each other.\nFor while a fold, shadow, or line of the objects seen appear to\ncorrespond with some feature of the mnemonic type, on the other hand, a\nfold, shadow, or outline of the object recalls a feature of the inward\nphantasm composed by the memory.\n\nIn this process the mnemonic details which are in accordance with the\npre-existing type, and sometimes also in accordance with some remarkable\nface or person which was the first to present itself to the mind, serve\nas a model for the accidental form of the external object or objects\nwhich correspond to it; this in its turn recalls features which remain\nin the memory, and in this way the external form of this particular\nphantasm is gradually chiselled into full relief. The more intently we\nregard the object which is modified to suit the mental image, the more\nperfectly they agree together, and the apparition stands out with more\nvivid distinctness. This will be the experience of every one to whom\nsuch a phenomenon appears, and a dispassionate analysis of all the\nphases of this fact must fully confirm our theory.\n\nSuch a fact, which is implicitly included in the general law we have\nlaid down for the origin of myth, will also as I think throw further\nlight on the origin of many hallucinations, both in normal conditions of\nmind and in the abnormal state of nervous disorders. The different\nappearances of objects, animals, and men, the voices, words, songs, and\nconversations seen and heard in these hallucinations, are produced, by\nan internal impulse as well as by a stimulus from without; they are\ninternal in the images and sensation already unconsciously impressed\nupon the memory, and they are external in the accidentally modified form\nin which they occur in sensible objects, so that they act reciprocally\nas an incentive and impulse to each other.\n\nIf in normal hallucinations the vividness of the internal image is in\ncertain physiological conditions projected outwardly, the configuration\nand accidental form of the external objects contribute to complete the\ncomposition in accordance with the nature and design of this internal\nimage. Sometimes the physiological conditions of hallucination are so\npowerful that it is at once produced by the appearance of an object\nwhich has some analogy with the mental image. Whatever may be the\ngenesis and primitive character of the idea of space, and its psychical\nand physiological relations to actual space--a question which has been\nthe theme of so much discussion in our time--it is certain that first\nhabit and then hereditary influence cause us to have the sensation and\napprehension of a psychical space, which may be termed artificial and\ncongenital, and upon which the various impressions of the senses are\nspontaneously projected. Of this there is an evident proof in the fact\nthat if we look at the sun or any bright object, such as the windows of\na room in the day time, and then close our eyes, so as to make the\nvision of external space impossible, the image of the sun, sometimes of\na different colour, or of the window, is projected into the darkness at\nsome distance from us, and moves about this psychical space. This\nphenomenon also occurs in the subjective sensations of hearing, since\nthe sounds do not appear to be close to the ear, but at a distance. We\nare not here called upon to discuss the causes which generate the\nappearance of this psychical space, but the fact is indisputable; so\nthat conversely it becomes intelligible how the internal image may be\nprojected in the same way, or may at least appear to be externally\nprojected in hallucinations. This surprising phenomenon is only a\nmodification of the ordinary exercise of the psychical and physiological\nfaculties in the projection of images; of which, after the idea of space\nhas been formed by primitive experience, habit and education are the\nchief factors.\n\nHallucinations, in the cases observed above, are due to an external\nimpulse; and this is especially the case in madness and other nervous\ndisorders; since a critical observation and clear discernment of things\nis wanting, some object of vision, a voice, phrases, or sounds are much\nmore apt to act as a stimulus to a vast field of visual hallucinations,\nor to a long succession of sentences and speeches. It is not, therefore,\nwonderful that in an ecstasy, for instance, in which all the faculties\nare concentrated on very few ideas and images, or perhaps on one only,\nevery external sign, whether obvious to sight or hearing, combined with\nthe mnemonic effort already explained, is modified to correspond with\nthese vivid and exalted images; thus constituting the wonderful\nphenomenon of ecstasy. In such a case the ecstatic phenomenon in persons\nsubject to these nervous affections is often invested with fresh wonders\nby the additional sensations of light and subjective colours; this is\nnot uncommon even in persons of a sane mind and body, but undoubtedly it\nis more frequently the case in those whose mental and physical\nconditions are abnormal. It is not rare to hear an ecstatic person\nrecount divine visions, suffused with extraordinary light and glory.\n\nIn order to contribute to the researches of others into the nature of\nthis phenomenon, I must be permitted--not from vanity, but from a\ndesire that my own imperfections may serve the cause of science however\nslightly--to relate some facts, personal to myself, which bear upon the\nquestion, facts of very general experience. From my childhood I have\nhad, both by day and night, various subjective sensations of light which\nI was, as a person of perfectly sane mind, able to observe\ndispassionately. After reading for a long while, or when fatigued by\nsleeplessness, mental excitement, or some temporary gastric derangement,\nI see clear flames circling before my eyes. These are in a small, oblong\nform, arranged at brief intervals in concentric curves, and composing a\nmoving garland projected upon space, tinged with a yellowish light,\nshading into vivid blue. Sometimes this figure is changed for stars,\ntwinkling in a vast and remote space, as in a firmament. In addition to\nthis phenomenon, I have about twenty times in the course of my life\nexperienced other subjective and more extraordinary sensations of light,\nnot unknown to others. This phenomenon occurs when I am in a normal\ncondition of health, and always begins with a confusion of sight, so\nthat I am unable to see objects and the faces of people distinctly;\nafter which everything within the range of vision becomes mobile and\ntremulous. This state continues for ten minutes, and then clear and\ndistinct vision returns. Next a lucid circle, zig-zagged in acute\nangles, appears close to the eyes, now on the right, now on the left.\nIt moves in a somewhat serpentine course, and is broken in the centre of\nthe lower half. It withdraws from the eye into subjective space, and the\nshining band of which it is composed gradually loses its sharp angles,\nand becomes wider and undulated, while still in motion.\n\nAnother remarkable sensation follows. The shining band, which has\ndilated until it is withdrawn from the eyes, whether closed or open, to\nan apparent distance of several yards, becomes tinted with all the\ncolours of the rainbow, standing out in such vivid splendour on the dark\nbackground that I have never seen them equalled in nature. Indeed the\nbeauty of this phenomena is amazing. The band, inlaid with various\ncolours, now occupies the whole space, maintaining an equal distance\nfrom the closed eyes, and moving continually with a rhythmic undulation,\nwhile it constantly becomes more vivid. The moving circle continues to\ndilate until it slowly fades, and at last completely disappears. From\nits beginning to the end, the vision occupies from twenty to twenty-five\nminutes.\n\nThroughout the phenomenon I continue to be perfectly collected and free\nin mind, so that I can observe it in all its details with perfect\ncalmness, and can also impart my observations to the persons with whom I\nhappen to be. Only when the subjective sensation has ceased, I feel an\nobscure pain in the brow of the eye in which the phenomenon occurred.\nThis is readily explained by the well-known interlacing of the nerves,\nand the action of the hemispheres.\n\nSupposing that such phenomena occur, as they more readily do, in persons\npredisposed to nervous affections, although not insane, in times and in\na society agitated by religious excitement, or in persons habitually\ncontemplative and occupied with spiritual images and thoughts; if in\nmoments of ecstatic emotion they should perceive, in addition to the\nimages proper to such conditions, these circling flames, which is very\nlikely to be the case, or the iridescent aureole we have described, they\nwould certainly accept and glorify the heavenly vision revealed to them.\nThe revolution of the bright stars or iridescent band, preceded by the\nobscurity of vision which accompanies the ordinary ecstatic\nhallucination, would certainly be ascribed to the saints or angels, and\nwould thus become more supernatural and consonant with the believer's\nidea of heaven; and these very subjective sensations might often produce\nthe ecstatic vision, so ready to appear in the morbid conditions which\nlead to hallucination.\n\nAccording to the process previously described, by which the phenomenon\nof natural hallucinations is produced by an external stimulus, these\nluminous phenomena would revive the memory of angelic and saintly forms,\nof which men were so profoundly conscious in times of religious\nexcitement, and would be regarded as their external signs, while they\nwould at the same time stimulate the appearance of such angelic\nvisions. Ultimately this would lead to the vast drama of celestial\nhallucinations described for us in the accounts of many ecstatic\nvisions. They do not only occur in modern religions, but in those of the\nold heathen, and in the rude and unformed beliefs of savages. The\nethnography of the most savage peoples of our time teaches us that the\norigin of very many myths is to be found in normal and abnormal\nhallucinations, and in the luminous visions which conform to their\nmental conditions. Persons subject to nervous affections, from simple\nepilepsy to madness and idiocy, were and still are supposed to be\ninspired, and endowed with the power of prophesying and working\nmiracles; they are also venerated for relating the strange visions\npresented to them in the crisis of their disorder. Africa, barbarous\nAsia, America, Oceania, and the ignorant and superstitious people in\nEurope itself, abound with such facts; they have occurred and are likely\nto recur in civilized peoples of all times, including our own, as we\nknow only too well.\n\nWe have thus reduced the primitive origin of myth, of dreams, of all\nillusions, of normal and abnormal hallucinations, to one unique fact and\ngenesis, to a fundamental principle; that is, to the primitive and\ninnate entification of the phenomenon, to whatever sensation it may be\nreferred. This fact is not exclusively human in its simple expression\nand genesis, since it occurs in the lower animals; evidently in those\nwhich are nearest to man, and by the necessary logic of induction in\nall others, according to their sensations and modes of perception. In\nthe vast historic drama of opinions, beliefs, religions, mythical and\nmytho-scientific theories which are developed in all peoples; and again,\nin the infinite variety of dreams, illusions, mystic and nervous\nhallucinations, all depend on the primitive and unique fact which is\nalso common to the animal kingdom, and identical with it; in man this is\nalso the condition of science and knowledge. I think that this\nconclusion is not unworthy of the consideration of wise men and honest\ncritics, and that it will contribute to establish the definitive unity\nof the general science of psychology, considered in the vast animal\nkingdom as a whole, and in connection with the great theory of\nevolution.\n\nThis primitive act of perception, the radical cause and genesis of all\nmythical representations, and the physical and intellectual condition of\nscience itself, is also one of the factors and the aesthetic germ of all\nthe arts. The constraining power which generates the intentional\nsubjectivity of the phenomenon, and the entification of images, ideas,\nand numerous normal and abnormal appearances, also unconsciously impels\nman to project the image into a design, a sculpture, or a monument.\nSince an idea or emotion naturally tends, as we have seen, to take an\nexternal form in speech, gesture, or some other outward fact; so also it\ntends to manifest itself materially and by means of various arts, and to\ntake the permanent form of some object. It is embodied in this way, as\nit was embodied in fetishes in the way described in the foregoing\nchapters. Owing to this innate cause, and by the instinct of imitation\nwhich results from it, children as well as savages always attempt some\nrude sketch of natural objects, or of the fanciful images to which they\nhave given rise. Drawings of animals and some other objects are found\namong the lowest savages, such as the Tasmanians and Australians. Nor is\nthis fact peculiar to the lower historic races, and to those which are\nstill in existence, but it is also to be found in the dwellings and\nremains of prehistoric man; carvings on stone of very ancient date have\nbeen found, coeval with extinct and fossil animals, prior to the age of\nour flora and fauna and to the present conformation of land and water.\nThere are many clear proofs of the extreme antiquity of the primitive\nimpulse to imitative arts. A stag's meta-tarsal bone, on which there was\na carving of two ruminants, was found in the cave of Savigny: in a cave\nat Eyzies there was a fragmentary carving of two animals on two slabs of\nschist; at La Madelaine there were found two so-called staves of office,\non which were representations of a horse, of reindeer, cattle, and other\nanimals; two outlines of men, one of a fore-arm, and one of a naked man\nin a stooping position, with a short staff on his shoulder; there is\nalso the outline of a mammoth on a sheet of ivory; a statuette of a thin\nwoman without arms, found by M. Vibraye at Laugerie-Basse, and known by\nthe name of the immodest Venus; a drawing representing a man, or\nso-called hunter, armed with a bow, and pursuing a male auroch, going\nwith its head down and of a fierce aspect; the man is perfectly naked,\nand wears a pointed beard. Other designs of the chase and of animals\nafford a clear proof of the remote period at which the primitive\ninstinct towards the imitative arts existed.\n\nIt is peculiar to man to portray things and animals, and to erect\nmonuments out of a superstitious feeling, or to glorify an individual or\nthe nation; the bower-birds and some cognate species may perhaps be\nregarded as an exception, since they show a certain sense of beauty, and\nan extrinsic satisfaction in gay colours, which indeed appears in many\nanimals. But art in the true sense and in its essential principle are\nthe act and product of man alone, of which I have demonstrated the cause\nand comparative reasons in another work, so that it is unnecessary to\nrepeat them here. Some rare cases indicate an artistic construction\nwhich is not an essential part of animal functions, and the sense of\nform and colour occurs in some species. But this only shows that there\nexist in the animal kingdom the roots of every art and sentiment\npeculiar to man, subsequently perfected by him in an exclusive and\nreflex manner, and this confirms the general truths of heredity and\nevolution.\n\nWhen primitive man draws or carves objects, he does not merely obey the\ninnate impulse to give an external form to the image already in his\nmind, but while satisfying the aesthetic sentiment which actuates him, he\nis conscious of some mysterious power and superstitious influence. This\nsentiment is not only apparent in our own children, but among nearly all\nsavages, of which many instances might be given; some of them are even\nafraid to look at a portrait, and shrink from it as from a living\nperson.\n\nAs time went on, a belief in spirits was developed from causes already\nmentioned, the rude theory of incarnation followed as its corollary, and\nthis sentiment was naturally confirmed by incised and sculptured images;\nfor since they supposed a spirit to be present in every object whatever,\nthis was much more the case with incised or sculptured figures of men\nand animals. In these figures the amulet, talisman, or _gris-gris_ of\nsavages especially consisted; portraits, however rude, of animals,\nmonsters, of the human form as a whole or in parts, as in the universal\nphallic superstitions. The belief in spirits, resulting from the\npersonification of shadows, or of the image of a man's own soul which\nwas supposed to return from the tomb, had a mythical influence on the\nmode and ceremonies of sepulture, on the position of corpses, on the\norientation of tombs, and their form. In fact, the mythical ideas of\nspirits, and the fanciful place they took in the primitive idea of the\nworld, produced the custom of burying corpses in an upright, stooping,\nor sitting position, and their situation with reference to the four\ncardinal points. In America the cross which was placed in very early\ntimes above the tombs is rightly supposed by Brinton to have been a\nsymbol of the four zones of the earth, relatively to the tomb itself and\nto the human remains enclosed in it. One Australian tribe buries its\ndead with their faces to the east; the Fijians are buried with the head\nand feet to the west, and many of the North American Indians follow the\nsame custom. Others in South America double up the corpse, turning the\nface to the east. The Peruvians place their mummies in a sitting\nposition, looking to the west; the natives of Jesso also turn the head\nto the west. The modern Siamese never sleep with their faces turned to\nthe west, because this is the attitude in which they place their dead\nbefore burning them on the funeral pile. Finally, the Greeks and all\nother peoples, both civilized and barbarous, including ourselves, had\nand continue to have special customs in burying their dead.\n\nAll the primitive artistic representations of the human form, the\norientation of tombs and temples and their peculiar form, were prompted\nby these spiritualist and superstitious ideas; they expressed a\nsymbolism derived from mythical ideas of the constitution of the world,\nof its organism, elements, and cosmic legends. This assertion might be\nverified by all funereal, religious, and civil monuments, among all\npeoples of the earth, in their most rudimentary form down to those of\nour times, and above all in India, China, Central Asia, in Africa, and\nparticularly in Egypt, in America, in Europe, beginning with the Greeks\nand passing through the Latins down to the Christianity of our day; nor\nneed we exclude the Oceanic races, and those of the two frigid zones.\n\nDoubtless the purest aesthetic sentiment was gratified in the productions\nof the plastic arts and of design in general when civilization was at\nits highest perfection, among people peculiarly alive to this sentiment.\nAt the same time, for the great majority of peoples in early and\nsubsequent ages down to our own time, there was and is the consciousness\nof a _numen_, in the proper meaning of the word, within the statue or\neffigy, and these were unconsciously entified by the same law which\nleads to the entification of natural phenomena; the august presence of\nthe gods and an artificial symbol of the living organism of the world\nwere contained in the material form. While this sentiment took a higher\ndevelopment in art, and was gradually emancipated from its mythical\nbonds, it never altogether disappeared in artistic creations; and there\nare still many who would, like some uncultured peoples of early and\nmodern times, cover up their images when they are about to commit some\naction which might be displeasing to these idols of the gods or saints.\nIf we were to gauge the sentiments which really animate a man of the\npeople, even when he; looks at the statue of a great man, we should\nfind that in addition to his aesthetic satisfaction, he unconsciously\nimagines that the spirit of the dead man is infused into the image and\nis able to enjoy the admiration of the observers.\n\nThe-worship of images in all times and places is essentially founded on\nthis belief in the incarnation of spirits and the _numen_ of fetishes.\nThere is indeed no real difference between the superstitious adoration\nof a savage, addressed to his fetish, and the worship of images in many\nreligions of modern civilization. Although people of culture, and the\nscholastic theory of religions, may distinguish indirect and respectful\nveneration from direct worship, yet it cannot be denied that the\nmajority of the faithful directly adore the image. The general belief in\nrelics, consisting of bones, hair, clothes, etc., is plainly an\nevolution of the amulets and _gris-gris_ of savages. This fetishtic and\nidolatrous sentiment has by a gradual and necessary development been\ninfused even into speech and writing, for written forms have been hung\non plants as fetishes and idols, or placed in the temples as the symbol\nof perpetual prayer, and the Buddhists even erect prayer-mills. We have\nanalogous instances among ourselves, when texts of Scripture or the\nwords of some saint are rolled up into a kind of amulet and worn round\nthe neck. The same sentiment is shown in the costly offering of lamps\nkept constantly burning before images as the means of obtaining help and\nfavour; and in the visits made to a given number of churches, thus\ntransforming number into a mysterious, entified, and efficacious power,\nin the same way that every ancient people, whether barbarous or\ncivilized, mythically venerated certain numbers; the Peruvians, for\ninstance, and some other American peoples regarded the number \"four\" as\nsacred.\n\nIn addition to the cherished remembrance always inspired by portraits of\nthose we love, a breathing of life, as if the dead or absent person were\ncommunicating with us in spirit, is perhaps unconsciously infused into\nthe picture while we look at it. These are transient states of\nconsciousness, of which we are scarcely aware, although they do not\nescape the notice of careful observers. Any dishonour or insult offered\nto images, whether sacred or profane, deeply moves both the learned and\nunlearned, both barbarous and civilized peoples, not merely as a base\nand sacrilegious act against the person represented, but from an\ninstinctive and spontaneous feeling that he is actually present in the\nimage. Any one who analyzes the matter will find it impossible to\nseparate these two sentiments, and many disgraceful and sanguinary\nscenes which have led to the gallows or the stake have actually resulted\nfrom the identification of the image with the thing represented.\n\nEven when a man of high culture and refined taste for beauty stands\nbefore the canvas or sculpture of some great ancient or modern artist,\nhis spiritual and aesthetic enjoyment of these wonderful works is, as he\nwill find from the observation of his inmost emotions, combined with the\nanimation and personification of what he sees; he is so far carried away\nby the beauty and truth of the representation that the passions\nrepresented affect him as if they were those of real persons. This\nrelative perfection of a work of art, either in the way the objects\nstand out, in the varied diffusion of light and shade, in the movement\nand expression of figures, in the effect of the whole in its details and\nbackground, is all heightened and confirmed by the underlying\nentification of images. The process we have before described by which a\nconfused group of objects appear to us as a human form or phantasm is\nalso effected in this case in a more subtle way and with less effort of\nmemory; it is all ultimately due to the primitive fact of animal\nperception. Our imagination can supply the resemblance, the limbs,\ncolour, and design in a picture in which a face, figure, or landscape\nare slightly sketched, or in a roughly chiselled statue. We often hear\nthe complaint that a work of art is too highly finished, and it wearies\nand displeases us because it leaves nothing for the imagination to\nsupply. The remark reveals the fact, of which we are all implicitly\nconscious, that we are ourselves in part the artificers of every\nexternal phenomenon.\n\nWe need not stop to prove a truth well-known to all, that architecture\nand all kinds of monuments lend themselves to a symbolism derived from\nancient and primitive popular ideas. This was the case in India,\nMesopotamia, Phoenicia, Egypt, Judaea, Greece, Ancient and Christian\nRome, and in the ancient remains found in savage countries and in\nAmerica. The freemasons of the Middle Ages united the earliest and most\nvaried traditions with the symbols of Christianity. We unconsciously\ncarry on the same traditions, preserving some of their forms, although\nthe meaning of the symbol is lost. Tombs in the open air which enclosed\na spirit, and round which the shades roamed, were the first sacred\nbuildings, from which by an easy and intelligible evolution of ideas,\ntemples, with a similar orientation, and other works of architecture,\nboth religious and civil, were derived. If we follow, step by step, the\ndevelopment of the tomb into the temple, the palace, and the triumphal\narch, we shall see how the outward form and the human and cosmic myth\nwere reciprocally enlarged. Ethnography, archaeology, and the history of\nall peoples indicate their gradual evolution, so that it is only\nnecessary to allude to it; proofs abound for any intelligent reader.\nEven in modern architecture the arrangement of parts, the general form,\nthe ornaments and symbols relating to mythical ideas, still persist,\nalthough we are no longer conscious of their meaning; just as human\nspeech now makes use of a simple phonetic sign as if it were an\nalgebraic notation, in which the philologist can trace the primitive and\nconcrete image whence it proceeded. The arts also, like other human\nproducts, follow the general evolution of myth in their historic course;\nthe primitive fetish is afterwards perfected by more explicit spiritual\nbeliefs, and is combined with cosmic myths; these are slowly transformed\ninto symbolic representations, which dissolve in their turn, and give\nplace to the expression of the truth and to forms which more fully\nsatisfy the natural sense of beauty and its adaptation to special ends.\n\nThe arts of singing and of instrumental music have the same origin and\nevolution as the others. Vico, Strabo, and others have asserted that\nprimitive men spoke in song, and there is great truth in the remark.\nSince gesture and pantomime help out the meaning of imperfect speech,\nwhich was at first poor in the number of words and their relative forms,\nand this is still the case among many peoples, so song, vocal\nmodulation, and the rhythmic expression of speech seem to stimulate\nemotion. In truth, the mental and physiological effort which tends by\nvocal enunciation to present the image or emotion in an external form,\nis on the one hand not yet fully disintegrated, and on the other the\ngreater or less intensity of feeling involved in primitive languages a\ncorresponding vocal modulation to supplement it, just as it required\ngesture and pantomime. Thus speech, gesture, and song, in the larger\nsense of the word, had their origin together. This is also true of many\nof the languages of modern savages, and of those of more civilized\npeoples, such as the Chinese, which have not quite attained inflection;\nin this case the frequent repetition of the same monosyllable conveys a\ndifferent meaning, not only from its relative position, but from the\nmodulation and tone in which it is uttered. The same thing may be\nobserved in children who are just beginning to talk.\n\nRhythm, or the graduated and alternate action and reaction with which a\nvibration begins and ends, is a universal law in the manifestation and\nmovements of all natural phenomena; a law which is revealed on a grand\nscale in all the recurring periods of nature, whether astral, telluric,\nor meteorological, as well as in the form and manifold phases of\norganisms and their modes of reproduction. This universal law also\napplies to the whole mental and organic system of animals and men,\nwhenever they become conscious of their own existence. The same\nuniversal rhythm constitutes the fundamental form of sound in the\nvibration of metallic bars, or of strings, and becomes perceptible to\nthe external senses by means of our organ of hearing, as also by the\nexternal and innate necessity slowly developed by our habits of\nconsciousness, which may be termed the external causes of its organic\nevolution and constitution.\n\nBy these organic and cosmic tendencies, and by the intrinsic impulse\ntowards modulation of sound already explained, speech first issued from\nthe human breast in harmonious accents and rhythmic form, and these\nbecame in their turn the causes and genesis of versification and metre.\nThe classic experiments of Helmholtz show that each note may be regarded\nas a harmonic whole, owing to the complementary sounds which accompany\nit in its complete development. With reference to our own race, the\ngenesis of the composition of verse and metre are shown by the\nresearches made by Westphal and others into the metrical system of the\nVedic Aryans, the Turanians, and the Greeks, since the fact that their\nmetres were the same implies a common origin. The demonstration is\ncomplete, if we compare the iambic metre of Archilochus with that of the\nVedic hymns. There are in both three series of iambuses--the dimeter,\nthe cataleptic trimeter, and the acataleptic.[36]\n\nThis observation applies to the physical and physiological conditions of\nthe phenomenon, since primitive men could not speak without rhythmic\nmodulation of words. We are not quite without hope of discovering by\ninduction the origin of wind or stringed instruments which accompanied\nthe songs, after the specification of the modes of speech was so far\nadvanced as to distinguish singing--which had already become an\nart--from the daily necessity of reciprocal communication in words. In\nthis research we must proceed step by step, aided by minute observation,\nlest we should accept an hypothesis which does not correspond with the\nfacts.\n\nNot only man, but some animals--among others a species of mouse found in\nSouth Africa--naturally uses his limbs to moderate or strengthen the\nlight of vision. This mouse was observed to shade its eyes with its\nforepaws in order to look at some distant object under a blazing sun, as\nwe should do in like conditions. In man, whose arms and hands are\nreadily adapted to this primitive art, the habit is common, even among\nthe rudest savages. Putting sight out of the question that we may\nconsider hearing, which is our present theme, reflex movements, either\ncasual or habitual, have certainly induced primitive men to place their\nhands on the mouth, either so as to suppress the sound or to augment it\nby using both hands as a kind of shell. It is easy to imagine the use of\nshells or other hollow objects as a vehicle of sound, either for\namusement or some other cause, and these rude instruments might serve as\nthe first step to the invention of wind instruments. Reflection on these\nspontaneous experiments would readily lead to the search for some mode\nof prolonging or imitating the voice. In these attempts men might be\nguided by their observation of the whistle and song of birds, whose\nbeaks may have served as a model for the construction of the flute and\nreed-pipe. Pott traces the word for sound to the root _svar_, and hence,\nafter some natural phonetic changes, we have in Lithuanian _szwilpti_\nfor the song of birds. Of all natural objects, different kinds of reeds\nand the hollow stalks of plants are, owing to their hollow and\ncylindrical form, best adapted for the imitation of a bird's beak and\nthe sonorous transmission of breath. In many languages the word for a\nflute is the same as that for a reed. In Sanscrit, _vanca_ and _venu_\nmean a flute and bamboo; in Persian, _na_ and _nay_ mean a flute and\nreed; in Greek [Greek: donas], and in Latin _calamus_, have the same\ndouble meaning, and many more examples might be given.\n\nStringed instruments are a more elaborate invention, and may have been\nsuggested by the vibration of a bow-string when it is twanged. The bow\nis common to all modern savages, and was also found among extinct\npeoples and those which are now civilized, as well as in prehistoric\ntimes. The Sanscrit word for a stringed instrument, _tata_ or _vitata_,\nis derived from the root _tan_, to stretch. Pictet observes that one\nname for a lute is _rudri_, from _rud_, to lament, that is, a plaintive\ninstrument; in Persian we have _rod_ for song, music, or a stringed\ninstrument. The etymology of _arcus_ is the same; the root _arc_ not\nonly means to hurl, but to sing or resound. Homer and Rannjana often\nallude to the sonorousness of the bow and its string. Homer says in\nspeaking of the bow of Pandarus, \"_stridit funis, et nervus valde\nsonuit_.\" And when Ulysses drew his avenging bow, the cord emitted a\nclear sound like the voice of a swallow. _Locaka_, another name for a\ncord, also means one who speaks, from _loc_, _loqui_; and the Persian\n_rud_, _roda_, a bow-string, also means a song. In the Veda the root\n_arc'_ is used in speaking of the roaring wind, or of a long echoing\nsound. Again _tavara_, a bow-string, is from _tan_, to stretch, to\nsound. The Greek [Greek: tonos] must be referred to the same root, and\nsignifies, a bow-string, a sound, an accent, a tone. Benfey traces the\nGreek [Greek: lura], in which this root is wanting, through [Greek:\nludra], or _rudra_. Kuhn confirms this transformation by the analogy\nbetween the Vedic god _Rudra_ and the Greek Apollo, both of whom are\narmed with a bow. Rudra, like Apollo, is a great physician; the former\nis called _kapardin_, from his mode of wearing his long hair, and\n_vanku_ from his tortuous gait as the god of storms; to the latter the\nepithets of [Greek: achers echomes] and [Greek: loxias] are applied; the\nmouse was sacred to Rudro, and Apollo had the surname of Smintheus, from\nthe mouse, [Greek: Smintha], which was his symbol.\n\nThese wind and stringed instruments were not, in their primitive forms,\nat once used as an accompaniment to song. Before such use was possible,\nthere must have been considerable progress in the specification of\nlanguage, and special songs must have been disintegrated from common\nspeech, which was at first an inchoate song. Possibly some rude\ninstruments were invented for amusement or some other purpose before\nthis specification had taken place. At any rate the use of various\ninstruments for accompaniment was preceded by gesticulation, or the\nspontaneous striking of some object which coincided with animated\nspeech, or which accompanied it in sonorous cadences.\n\nThe rhythm which stimulated primitive men to speak in song, also\nimpelled them to accompany it with gestures and movements of the body,\nand this was the origin of the dance, which, when the body moved in\ncorrespondence with cadenced utterances, was at first merely the\naccompaniment of song. Tradition, modern ethnography, and the primitive\nhabits of children bear witness to this fact. In addition to the\nrhythmic motion of all parts of the body, there is the practice of\nspontaneously beating time with the hands and feet, which were doubtless\nthe first instruments used by man as a musical accompaniment. Hence,\nowing to the facility of, construction, there arose percussion\ninstruments, which were at first made of stone or pieces of wood. So\nthat singing, dancing, accompaniment with the limbs or with some rudely\nfashioned object arose almost simultaneously, as soon as the process of\nspecification had established a distinction between song and ordinary\nspeech. The first simple instruments which we have described only made\nthe song, shout, war-dance, or religious ceremony more effective.\n\nWhen chanted speech was formulated in a fixed order by means of rhythm\nand the modulations of the voice, it became verse, and the melody\nitself, as the simple expression of the song which had been cast into\nverse, or even into an inarticulate chant, was naturally evolved from\nit. An artistic education is not needed in order to experience the\npleasure of rhythmic order in the succession of sound, for a\npredisposition of the nervous system will suffice. Savages, children,\nand even animals are sensible of rhythm, which is the order and symmetry\nof sensations. The dance, as Beauquier justly observes, is the practical\nform of rhythmic motion and the gesture of music. The motion impressed\nby sound on the internal organism tends to manifest itself in external\ngesture, and in fact, the rhythm of the music is repeated in dancing in\nthe limbs and in the whole body of the dancer. The rhythm, regarded in\nits material cause, need not be accompanied by any very musical sound.\nThe percussion instruments were at first only used to mark and intensify\nthe rhythm.\n\nMelody may be termed a fusion of rhythm and sounds of different pitches,\nunited in time, and assuming a regular and symmetrical form; melody, as\nothers also have observed, constitutes the whole of music, since\nwithout it harmony itself is vague and indefinite. Notwithstanding the\nnumerous elements which may be discerned in melody, and the labour\nimplied in its analysis, it is the facile and spontaneous creation of\nman, at any rate in its simplest expression; uneducated people, ignorant\nof music, are able to invent very tolerable melodies, of which we have\ninstances in popular and national songs, which are generated by the\nmusical fancy of those unconscious of the laws of music. Melody has an\nindependent existence, while harmony serves to accentuate its form, and\nconduces to its subsequent progress among peoples capable of developing\nit in all its power.[37]\n\nMusic has a powerful influence upon all the senses. It has at all times\nbeen supposed to have a healing power, and in the Middle Ages it was\nbelieved to cure epilepsy, madness, convulsions, hysteria, and all forms\nof nervous affections; while in our own time it is usefully employed in\ncerebral diseases, since it has both a stimulating and soothing effect.\nWomen, since they are generally more nervous and sensitive than men, are\nmore especially affected by music. Animals as well as man are influenced\nby it, as it has been shown by exact and numerous experiments. Every one\nknows that many birds can be taught airs, which they sing with taste and\nlively satisfaction. The major key, with its regular proportions, its\nfull and gradual sounds, arouses in man a sense of life and joy, while\nthe minor key excites languor and invincible sadness, and animals are\naffected in the same way.\n\nIt is evident that the formation of the scale, the essential foundation\nof music, varies with, the epoch, climate, habits, and physiological\nconditions of the different races which have successively adopted the\ndiatonic, the major, and minor scales. The music of the Chinese differs\nfrom our own, and while it is equally elaborate, it does not quite\nplease us, and the same may be said of the music of the Indians, of the\nancient Egyptians, and others. Undoubtedly our scale is more convenient\nand conformable to art, setting aside the physiological conditions of\nrace, since the notes separated by regular intervals form a more\nspiritual and independent, in short a more artistic system.\n\nSuch are briefly the characteristics of the genesis of song and of\nmusic, the actual conditions which make them possible, and their effect\non man and animals. We must now consider the subject from the mythical\npoint of view, as we have done in the case of the other arts. We know\nthat the image and emotions are mythically personified by us, and this\nfanciful reality is afterwards infused into the words used in its\nexpression. It follows from this that speech is not only spontaneously\nand unconsciously personified as the material covering of the idea or\nemotion enclosed in it, but that the same thing occurs in language as a\nwhole, at first vaguely, but afterwards in a definite and reflective\nmanner, in consequence of intellectual development. Among all civilized\npeoples, whether extinct or still in existence, speech is not only\npersonified in the complex idea or language, but it is deified. It is\nwell known that this is the case in all phases of Eastern Christianity,\nand that the other Christian churches have since identified the\nGraeco-Eastern idea of the Logos with the Messianic ideas engrafted upon\nit. If among the prehistoric peoples which most resemble modern savages,\nspeech was personified by the necessity of the perceptive faculty, a\nvague power was certainly ascribed to it, and even a simple murmur or\nwhisper was supposed to have a direct and personal influence on things,\nmen, and animals. Magic, which is the primitive expression of fetishtic\npower, embodied in a man, had its most efficacious form in the utterance\nof words, cries, whispers, or songs, referring to the malign or to the\nhealing and beneficent arts, and it was employed to arouse or to calm\nstorms, to destroy or improve the harvest, or for like purposes.\n\nBeginning with the traditions of our race, even prior to its dispersion,\nthere are plain proofs that words and songs were originally employed for\nexorcisms and magic in various diseases, and for incantations directed\nagainst men or things. _Kar_ means to bewitch, as in German we have\n_einem etwas anthun_, in low Latin _facturare_, in Italian\n_fattucchiere_, and from _Kar_ we have _carmen_, a song or magic\nformula. The goddess _Carmenta_, who was supposed to watch over\nchildbirth, derived her name from _carmen_, the magic formula which was\nused to aid the delivery. The name was also used for a prophetess, as\n_Carmenta_, the mother of Evander. Servio tells us that the augurs were\ntermed _carmentes_.[38] The Sanscrit _maya_, meaning magic or illusion\nand, in the Veda, wisdom, is derived from _man_, to think or know; from\n_man_ we have _mantra_, magic formula or incantation; in Zend, _manthra_\nis an incantation against disease, and hence we have the Erse _manadh_,\nincantation or juggling, and _moniti_ in Lithuanian. The linguistic\nresearches of Pictet, Pott, Benfey, Kuhn, and others show that in\nprimitive times singing, poetry, hymns, the celebration of rites, and\nthe relation of tales, were identical ideas, expressed in identical\nforms, and even the name for a nightingale had the same derivation. So\nalso the names of a singer, poet, a wise man, and a magician, came from\nthe same root.\n\nAmong all historic and savage peoples it was the general practice to use\nexorcism by means of magic formulas and incantations, combined with the\nnoise of rude instruments; this was part of the pathology, meteorology,\nand demonology which dated from the beginning of speech, and the first\nrude ideas of fetishes and spirits have persisted in various forms down\nto our days. We have a plain proof of this in a work dedicated to Pius\nIX. by M. Gaume, in which he sets forth the virtue of holy water against\nthe innumerable powers of evil which, as he declares, still people the\ncosmic spaces, and similar rites may be traced in the liturgies of all\nmodern religions. This belief is directly founded on the fanciful\npersonification and incarnation of a power in speech itself, in song,\nand in sound. David had similar ideas of dancing and its accessories,\nand the walls of Jericho are said to have fallen at the sound of the\ntrumpets, as if these contained the spirit of God. The Patagonians, to\nquote a single instance from among savages, drive away the evil spirits\nof diseases with magic songs, accompanied by drums on which demons are\npainted. To these mythical ideas we must refer the worship of trees,\nwhich involves that of birds, so far as they whistle and sing.\n\nThe worship of trees and groves is universal: peculiar trees, groves,\nand woods are worshipped in Tahiti, in the Fiji Islands, and throughout\nPolynesia; in barbarous Asia, in Europe, America, and the whole of\nAfrica. Cameron, Schweinfurth, Stanley, and other modern travellers in\nAfrica give many instances of this. Schweinfurth describes such a\nworship among the Niam-Niam, who hold that the forest is inhabited by\ninvisible beings. This worship is naturally combined with that of birds,\nwhich become the confidants of the forest, repeat the mysteries of\nmother earth, and sometimes become interpreters and prophets to man.\n\nBirds, by their power of moving through the air as lords of the aerial\nspace, by their arts of building, by the beauty of their plumage, their\nsecret haunts in the forests and rocks, by their frequent appearance\nboth by day and night, and by the variety of their songs, must\nnecessarily have excited the fetishtic fancy of primitive men. The\nworship of birds was therefore universal, in connection with that of\ntrees, meteors, and waters. They were supposed to cause storms; and the\neagle, the falcon, the magpie, and some other birds brought the\ncelestial fire on the earth. The worship of birds is also common in\nAmerica, and in Central America the bird voc is the messenger of\nHurakau, the god of storms. The magic-doctors of the Cri, of the\nArikari, and of the Indians of the Antilles, wore the feathers and\nimages of the owl as an emblem of the divine inspiration by which they\nwere animated. Similar beliefs are common in Africa and Polynesia.[39]\nIt is well known that the Egyptians worshipped the ibis, the hawk, and\nother birds, and that the Greeks worshipped birds and trees at Dodona,\nin consequence of a celebrated oracle. In Italy the lapwing and the\nmagpie became Pilumnus and Picus, who led the Sabines into Picenus.\nDivination by eagles and other birds was practised at Rome, and German,\nSlav, and Celtic traditions abound in similar myths.[40] Nor are they\nwanting in the Bible itself, in which we hear of the trees of knowledge\nand of life, of some celebrated trees in the times of the patriarchs, of\nthe raven and the dove sent out as messengers. The Old Testament speaks\nof the worship of groves at Ashtaroth in Canaan, of sacrifices under the\ngreen trees, and we know that such worship occurred in the Semitic races\nof Numidia and elsewhere.\n\nThe simultaneous elaboration of myths relating to trees and birds as\nobjects of worship, as beneficent or malign powers, and as the\ntransmitters of oracles, necessarily confirmed and extended the\npersonifications of speech and song, and were fused through many sources\ninto a whole, which represented a supernatural agent, endowed with the\npower of a mediator, of a good or evil spirit or idol. This ultimately\nled to a universal conception of the efficacy of sound, considered as\nthe manifestation of occult powers. In this mythically spiritual\natmosphere, all peoples formerly lived and in great part still continue\nto live.\n\nAs the innate impulse led to the entification of speech and of the\nsinging of men and animals, so it also led to the mythical\npersonification of dancing and instrumental music, in which nearly all\npeoples have recognized a demoniac and deliberate power. For this\nreason, dancing and the noise of rude instruments generally accompanied\nsolemn religious and civil ceremonies, and any remarkable cosmic,\nastral, or meteorological fact; and in polytheistic times the deities of\npoetry, dancing, and music served to accentuate and classify ideas.\n\nThe instrument became a fetish, and was invested with a mysterious power\nresembling that which was supposed to exist in all utterances of the\nanimal world. Indeed, instruments were, and still are among savages,\nregarded as sacred and as an integral part of public worship, so that\neach had its definite function and office. This need not surprise us,\nsince for such men every object is a fetish, which contains a soul. The\nKarens, a tribe in Burmah, believe that their arms, knives, utensils,\netc., have all a _kelap_ or soul, which is termed a _wong_ by the\nnegroes of West Africa. The same belief is found in a more explicit form\namong the Algonquins, the Fijians, and the aforesaid Karens, whose\nbeliefs are characteristic of all peoples which have reached this stage\nof mythical conceptions. The different objects belonging to a dead man,\nand his instruments, arms, and utensils, are laid in his tomb, or burnt\nwith his body, and this is owing to the belief that the souls of these\nobjects follow their possessor into another life. The same custom\nunfortunately extends to persons, and there are instances of this evil\npractice among relatively civilized nations; the massacre which takes\nplace at the death of a king of Dahomey is well known, and is revolting\nfrom the number of victims and from the mode of their sacrifice. It is\ntherefore easy to imagine the way in which musical instruments and the\nsounds produced by them were personified, since these manifestations\nseemed to approximate more closely to those of animals.\n\nFetishtic beliefs concerning magic songs or sounds were, as we have\nseen, confirmed by the influence naturally exerted on men and animals in\ntheir normal or abnormal state by rhythmic and musical sounds, however\nrude and unformed they may be. Theophrastus tells us that blowing a\nflute over the affected limb was supposed to cure gout; the Romans\nrecited _carmina_ to drive away disease and demons: the old Slav word\nfor physician, _vraci_, comes from a root which means to murmur; in\nServian, _vrac_ is a physician, and _balii_, an enchanter or physician.\nThe use of incantations as a remedy prevailed among the Greeks in\nHomer's time. The Atarva-Veda retains the old formula of imprecation\nagainst disease, and the Zendavesta divides physicians into three\nclasses, those which cure with the knife, with herbs, and with magic\nformulas. Kuhn believes that the Latin word _mederi_ refers to these\nproceedings, comparing with it the Sanscrit _meth_, _medh_, to oppose or\ncurse. Pictet traces the meaning of exorciser in another Sanscrit word\nfor a physician: _Bhisag_ from _sag_, _sang_, tojurbo gate.\n\nAs the civilization of the historic races advanced, poetry, singing, and\nmusical instruments became more perfect, and were classified as reflex\narts. Among the more intellectual classes the earlier fetishtic ideas\nconnected with them almost disappeared, while in the case of the common\npeople, the fetish was idealized, but not therefore lost; it persisted,\nand still persists, under other forms. Polytheism, modified to suit the\nplace, time, and race, and yet essentially the same, offers us a more\nideal form of the arts, each of which was personified as a god, and\ntaken together they formed a heavenly company, which generated and\npresided over the arts. The greatest poets and philosophers of antiquity\nretained a sincere belief in the inspiration of every creation of art;\nand this was only a more noble and intellectual form of the first rude\nand indefinite conception by which the arts were embodied in a material\nshape.\n\nOf all the Aryan peoples, Greece represented her Olympus in the most\nglorious mythical form, set forth by all the arts of description. From\nthe polytheistic point of view, nothing can be aesthetically more perfect\nthan the myths of Apollo and the Muses, which personify harmony in\ngeneral, and whatever is peculiar to the arts. Such conceptions, by\nwhich the arts of speech, song, vocal and instrumental music were\nembodied in myths, did not disappear as time went on, but were\nperpetuated in another form. Music, which was always becoming more\nelaborate, continued to be the highest inspiration, a divine power, an\nexternal and harmonious manifestation of celestial beings, of eternal\nlife, and the order of the world. This conception was shadowed forth in\nthe Pythagorean theory of the mythical harmony of the spheres: that\nschool regarded the world as a musical system, an harmonious dance of\nplanets.\n\nThe fetishtic and mythical origin common to all the arts is clearly\nshown by the fact that at a period relatively advanced, but still very\nremote, they were formulated in the temple, a symbolic representation of\ntheir deities, to be found even among the most primitive peoples. The\nevolution of the arts towards a more rational conception, divested of\nmythical and religious influence, took the form of releasing each art\nfrom bondage to the temple, and enabling it to assume a more distinct,\nfree, and secular personality, an evolution which was however somewhat\ndifficult and slow in the case of vocal and instrumental music. Although\nin our own time it has achieved a field for itself, yet in oratorios and\necclesiastical music the old conception remains.\n\nThe joys of the Elysian fields and of Paradise, as rewards of the good\nand faithful after death, varying in details with the moral and mythical\nbeliefs of various peoples, were heightened by concerts and musical\nsymphonies, as, owing to natural evolution and the introduction of\nOriental ideas, if appears even in the Christian conception of Paradise.\nFor the great majority of believers, earthly music is only an echo of\nthat celestial music, and participates in its divine efficacy. In the\nChristian Paradise there were saints to preside over the instruments,\nthe singing, and music; the visions of the ecstatic, the hallucinations\nof the mystic, and the precious memories and images of the dead, are\noften combined with sweet and heavenly music, and this completes the\nfetishtic idea which enters into every phenomenon with which man has to\ndo. For if inanimate objects and instruments were supposed by the\nprimitive savage to have a soul which followed the shade of the dead man\ninto the mythical abode beyond the grave, in modern religions the\nearthly instruments, the fanciful idols of the common people and of\nmystics, also resound in Elysium and the heavens, touched and inspired\nby choirs of angels and by seraphic powers.\n\nThe deep and sonorous music of bells, of organs, and other\necclesiastical instruments, the chants which resound through vaulted\nroofs amid the assembled worshippers, ecclesiastical lights, and the\nfumes of incense, inspire many Christians with a deep and aesthetic sense\nof the divine presence; and at such moments their vivid faith joins\nheaven and earth in the same harmonious emotion. The music, chants, and\nharmony, combined with other solemn rites, are unconsciously embodied\nby us, entering into our hearts as they circle round the church, and\nthey become the mysterious language of celestial powers. We are once\nmore immersed in the world of fancy and of myth, purified however by the\nevolution it has undergone. This exalted state of mind is also\nexperienced by those who listen to profane music, since the harmony and\nmodulation of sound, and the expression given to it by the combination\nof various instruments, immediately affect the soul of the listener as a\nwhole, without the aid of reflection, and a substantial entity which\ndeliberately fulfils its spontaneous cycle of development is thus\ncreated; in a word, the harmonies they hear are unconsciously\npersonified. Any one who makes a deep and careful analysis of his states\nof consciousness in these circumstances will admit the truth of this\nassertion.\n\nThe ordinary modes of expression respecting music, which are in use not\nonly among uneducated people, but among those who are educated and\ncivilized, display the earlier and innate belief in the mythical\nrepresentations of this art. The expressions may be often heard: What\ndivine music! What angelic harmony! This song is really seraphic! and\nthe like. Such expressions not only bear witness to the old mythical\nsentiment, and to the ultimate development of its form, but they also\nindicate the actual sentiments of the speaker. The personifying power of\nthe human intelligence is such as to recur spontaneously, even in one\nwho has abandoned these ancient illusions, if he surrenders himself for\na while to his natural instinct. It has often happened that a man who\nlistens to a melodious and beautiful piece of music is gradually aroused\nand excited by its sweet power, so as to be carried away into a world of\nnew sensations, in which all our sentiments and affections, our deepest,\ntenderest, and dearest aspirations blossom afresh in our memory, and are\nfused into and strengthened by these harmonies; we seem to be\ntransported into ethereal regions, and unconsciously surrender ourselves\nto their influence. This kind of natural ecstasy is not produced merely\nby the physiological effects of music on the organism, by the education\nof our sense of beauty, and of our reminiscences of earlier mythical\nemotions, but also by the innate impulse which still persists, leading\nus to idealize and vivify all natural phenomena, and also our own\nsensations.\n\nBut if among the common people, the devout, and occasionally also among\npeople of culture, this highest art is not divested of its mythical\nenvironment, which still persists, although in a more ideal form, yet it\nhas followed and still follows the general evolution of human ideas. The\nart of music was identified with song and with the mythical personality\nascribed to it, of which these instruments were the extrinsic and\nharmonious echo; at first, like the other arts, it, was a religious\nconception and entity pertaining to the Church, but it gradually\nassumed a character of its own, was dissociated from the Church, and\nbecame a secular art, diverging more and more from the mythical ideas\nwith which it had before been filled. When instruments increased in\nnumber, and became more perfect in quality; when harmony, strictly so\ncalled, was developed and became more efficient, instrumental music\nstill continued to be the servant of vocal music, and was employed to\ngive emphasis, relief, warmth, and colour to the art of song, which\ncontinued to be supreme. Song had its peculiar musical character, and\nthe human voice, alone or in a chorus, might be regarded as the type of\ninstrumental music, rendered more effective by the words which expressed\nthe ideas and sentiments of such songs by harmonizing the various vocal\ninstruments in accordance with their tones and varying _timbre_.\nInstrumental music, by the melodious harmony of artificial sounds, had\nhowever a vast field peculiar to itself, and an existence independent of\nthe human voice. This was and is, in addition to its release from the\nbonds of myth, the necessary result of the evolution of this highest\nart.\n\nInstrumental music, considered in itself, with the symphony as its\nhighest expression, has been declared by a learned writer to be the\ngrandest artistic creation, and the ultimate form of art in which the\nvast cycle of all things human will find its development. A symphony is\nan architectural construction of sounds, mobile in form, and not\nabsolutely devoid of a literary meaning. Yet we must not seek in\ninstrumental music for that which it cannot afford, such as the ideas\ncontained in words. Any one must admit the futility of the attempt to\ngive a dramatic interpretation or language to instrumental music, who\nreads the description attempted by Lenz and other writers of some of\nBeethoven's sonatas. Instrumental music does not lend itself to these\ninterpretations, since it is an art with an independent existence. We\nhave observed that in its first development it was used as an\naccompaniment to the voice, or associated with the movements of the\nbody, or with the dance, and consequently had not the independence which\nwas gradually achieved, until it culminated in the symphony.\nInstrumental music adds nothing to literature, nor to the expression of\nideas and sentiments, but in it pure music consists, and it is the very\nessence of the art. Literature and poetry belong to a definite order of\nideas and emotions; music is only able to afford musical ideas and\nsentiments. Instrumental music has its peculiar province as the supreme\nart which composes its own poems by means of the order, succession, and\nharmony of sounds; it delights, ravishes, and moves us by exciting the\nemotional part of our nature, and thus arouses a world of ideas which\nmay be modified at pleasure, and which may, by the powerful means at its\ndisposal, produce effects of which instruments merely used for\naccompanying the voice are incapable. When instrumental music was\nreleased from all servitude to other arts, as well as from all positive\nsense of religious emotions or mythical and symbolic prejudice, thought\nwas able to create the art of sounds, which contains in itself a special\naim and meaning.\n\nWe have thus reached the term of our arduous and fatiguing journey. We\nflatter ourselves that a truth has been gleaned from it, and this\nconviction is not, due to a presumptuous reliance on our powers, but on\nthe conscientious honesty of our researches, combined with a great yet\nhumble love of truth. Others, who are better endowed with genius and\nlearning will judge of our success, and we shall willingly submit to\ntheir criticism and correction, so long as they are fair and\nunprejudiced and only aim at the truth. From animal perception, and the\nmental and physical fact into which it is to be resolved, we have traced\nthe root which in man's case grows into a mighty tree; the first germ of\nall the mythical ideas of every people upon earth. The subjectivity of\nwhich animals and man are spontaneously conscious in every internal and\nexternal phenomenon, the subsequent entification of ideas, even after\nthought has attained to these more rational forms, are the great factors\nof myth in all its forms, of superstitions, of religions, and also of\nscience. We have reduced all the normal and abnormal sources of these\nfanciful ideas to that single source which we have just indicated.\nPenetrating below the kingdom of man into that of animals, we have there\ndiscovered where the germ was formed, and this completes the doctrine of\nevolution and bears witness to its truth. The evolution of myth went\nthrough the regular process, by which it was formulated and simplified,\nuntil it was resolved into all the sciences and rational arts, and was\nthus transformed into a positive science, passing through an ulterior\nstage of myth and science before it took the definitive form of a purely\nintellectual conception.\n\nWe have seen that the source of myth is the same as that of science,\nsince perception is the condition of both, and the process pursued is\nidentical, although the subject on which the faculty of thought is\nexercised is changed. Therefore the problem of myth, which includes\nevery achievement of the human understanding, and fills all sociology,\nis transformed into the problem of civilization. Thought has run its\ncourse in the vast evolution from myth to science, which is rendered\npossible by the permanence and duration of a powerful and vigorous race,\nand hence came the gradual transition from the illusions which involve\nthe ignorance and servitude of the majority of the people to truth and\nliberty, since these are released from their earlier wrappings, and the\nhuman race rises to a sense of its nobility and highest good. We have\nconsidered this evolution as a whole and in its details, and have seen\nthat every achievement of the human understanding passes through the\nsame phases, and reaches the same goal. We have adduced witnesses to\nconfirm our own observation from history and ethnography in general,\napart from any bias for a religious and scientific system. We believe\nthat in this way alone there can be any true progress in the science\nwhich we have undertaken to consider in this essay.\n\nThe result of the inquiry shows that by a slow yet inevitable evolution\nman rose from his primeval condition of error, illusion, and servitude\nto his fellow man, to that degree of truth and liberty of which he is\ncapable: he was so made that he necessarily advanced to the grand height\nwhich has been attained by the most laborious and intelligent of the\nhuman race. He rises higher, and is more sensible of his own dignity, in\nproportion as he becomes, within the limits of his nature, the artificer\nof his own greatness and civilization. While many peoples have become\nextinct, others have, owing to their natural incapacity, remained in a\nsavage and barbarous condition, while others again have attained to a\ncertain amount of civilization, but their mental evolution has stopped\nshort. Our own race, originally, as I believe, Aryo-Semitic, for it is\npossible that these two powerful branches were derived from a common\nstock, has persisted without interruption in spite of many adversities\nand revolutions, and has displayed in successive generations the\nprogress of general civilization, and the goal which man is able to\nreach in his highest perfection of mind and body, favoured by the\nphysical and biological conditions of climate. In this race, whether\nwith respect to myth and science or to civilization, the theory of\nevolution has practically been carried out in all its phases and\ndegrees.\n\nScience and freedom were the great factors of civilization, or of\nprogress in every kind of conceptions, sentiments, and social\nconditions: the first dissolved and destroyed the matrix of myth in\nwhich the intelligence was at first enveloped, and liberty, which was\nwholly due to science, made steady progress a matter of certainty. So\nthat it may be said that the whole web of human history, so far as it\nconsists in civilization or the progress of all good things, of the\narts, and of every intellectual and material achievement, was the\nconflict of science, and her offspring freedom, against ignorance, and\nthe despotism which results from ignorance, under all the social forms\nin which they are manifested. So that all good and wise men, sincere\nlovers of the dignity of mankind and of the welfare of society and of\nthe individual, ought to feel a deep reverence and love for these two\npowers, and to be ready to give up their lives to them. For if--which in\nthe present condition of the world is an impossible hypothesis--they\nwere to fail, the human race would be irretrievably lost, since these\nare our real liberators from barbarism, which have upheld mankind in the\nstruggle against it, under whatever name these principles have\nappeared.\n\nI am aware that my theory will meet with many obstinate and zealous\nopponents in Italy, since I use the simple terms of reason and science,\nunqualified by other arguments, and I maintain the absolute independence\nof free thought. Opposition is the more likely since science and freedom\nhave been held responsible for sectarian intemperance, for the\ndisturbances of the lower orders, for the inevitable disasters, the\nsocial and intellectual aberrations both of the learned and of the\ncommon peoples: science and freedom are held to have repeated the wiles\nof the serpent in Eden. But I am not uneasy at the thought of such\nopposition, since the progress of the human race has been owing to the\nfact that men convinced of the truth took no heed of the superstitious\nand interested war waged against them, sometimes from ignorance of\nthings in general and of the law which governs civilization, sometimes\nfrom honest conviction.\n\nThe falsity of the accusation so generally made against science and\nfreedom will appear if we consider that all the benefits we now enjoy,\ncivil, scientific, and material, and which are especially enjoyed by the\nmen who inveigh most strongly against these two factors, are solely\nderived from science and freedom. Without them we should be in the\ncivil, intellectual, and material condition of the kingdom of Dahomey,\nand in the savage and barbarous state of all primitive peoples. If the\nmisunderstanding of truth or an imperfect science is injurious, it must\nnot therefore be rejected. Science is the constant and vigilant\ngenerator of all social improvement, and the most formidable enemy of\nthe tyranny of a despot, of an oligarchy, or of the multitude, whether\nit take a religious or secular form. Since sharp instruments are\npowerful aids to civilization and material prosperity, they are not to\nbe altogether set aside because some persons die miserably by them. As I\nhave always maintained, and now repeat with still stronger conviction,\nscience and freedom, the ever watchful guardians of the human race, are\nand must always remain the sole remedies for the evils which threaten\nus. I do not dispute the beneficent influence of other factors combined\nwith these, but, taken alone, they would be powerless, and if science\nwere eclipsed they would be transformed into fresh causes of servitude\nand ignorance, as it has often appeared in past times when the laws of\nscience and of freedom have been set at nought. I therefore declare\nscience and freedom to be the portion of all, and they should be as\nwidely diffused as possible, since the way to knowledge and a worthy\nlife is open to all men. It is a blasphemy against heaven and earth to\npresume, in the so-called interest of civil order, to keep the majority\nof the people in the ignoble servitude of ignorance, and men do not\nperceive that they thus become ready for any disturbance, and the tools\nof rogues and agitators.\n\nI hope and pray that reverence for science and freedom may ever\nincrease in Italy. It will be an evil day for her if such reverence be\nlost, and she will become with every other people in like case a\nwretched spectacle, and will fall into such abject misery as to become\nthe laughing-stock of every civilized nation. It will be understood that\nI do not erect science and liberty into fetishes to be generally adored:\nthey are only sacred means to a more sacred end, namely, to enable men\nto practise and not merely to apprehend the truth, which in other words\nis goodness. Science and freedom are valuable only so far as they teach,\npersuade, and enable us to improve ourselves and others; to exercise\nevery private and public virtue; to claim only what is due to ourselves,\nwhile making the needful sacrifice to the common good; to have a respect\nfor humanity, and to venerate knowledge only so far as it is combined\nwith virtue; to attempt in every way to alleviate the miseries of\nothers, to deliver their minds from ignorance and error; to do right for\nits own sake without coveting rewards in heaven or on earth; to submit\nto no dictation but that of truth and goodness.\n\nWith these sacred objects in view, whatever may be said to the contrary,\nwe shall, in addition to the ineffable fruition of truth for its own\nsake, ever draw nearer to the ideal of the human race, and the time will\ncome when an apparent Utopia shall be actually realized, in accordance\nwith the mode and process of growing civilization. Not by excesses,\ntumults, and folly, but by unshaken firmness and tenacity we shall\npromote science and freedom. If this modest essay has done anything to\nshow the necessity of such culture, and in what way science and freedom,\nand these two factors only, have brought forth fruit throughout the\nhistory of the human race, my labour will be richly rewarded, and I may\nsay with satisfaction--_dies non perdidi!_\n\n\n\n\nFOOTNOTES.\n\n[1] Simrock wrote: \"Myth is the earliest form in which the mind of\nheathen peoples recognized the universe and things divine.\"\n\n[2] _Kumarila_, in reply to the opponents who inveighed against the\nimmorality of his gods, wrote that the fable relates how Prajapati, the\nlord of creation, violated his own daughter. But what does this signify?\nPrajapati is one name for the sun, so called because he is the lord of\nlight. His daughter Ushas is the dawn, and in declaring that he fell in\nlove with her, it is only meant that when the sun rises, it follows the\ndawn. So also, when it is said that Indra seduced Ahalya, we are not to\nsuppose that God committed such a crime, but Indra is the sun, and\nAhalya is the night; and so we may say that the night is seduced and\nconquered by the morning sun. This, and other instances may be found in\nMax Mueller's _History of Ancient Sanscrit Literature_. Other instances\nmight be given.\n\n[3] Vico writes: \"The human mind is naturally inclined to project itself\non the object of its external senses.\" And again, \"Common speech ought\nto bear witness to ancient popular customs, celebrated in times when the\nlanguage was formed.\" So again: \"Men ignorant of the natural causes of\nthings assign to them their own nature....\" In another place: \"The\nphysical science of ignorant men is a kind of common metaphysics, by\nwhich they assign the causes of things which they do not understand to\nthe will of the gods.\" Again: \"Ignorant and primitive men transform all\nnature into a vast living body, sentient of passions and affections.\"\n\n[4] See, among other authorities for the most important phenomena of\nanimals in their natural associations, the profoundly learned work by\nthe well-known A. Espinas: _Des societes animales: etude de Psychologie\ncomparee_, Paris, 2nd edit., 1879.\n\n[5] I stated in my former essay on the fundamental law of the\nintelligence in the animal kingdom that philosophy was only the research\ninto the psychical manifestations of the animal kingdom, and into those\npeculiar to man, in connection with the respective organisms in which\nthey act, and with the estimate of their power as cosmic factors in the\ngeneral harmony of the forces of the world.\n\n[6] See, with respect to the primitive unity of the Aryan and Semitic\nraces, the works of the great philologist, T.G. Ascoli, and others.\n\n[7] \"Although it (psychology), still makes some show, yet the old\npsychology is condemned. Its conditions of existence have disappeared in\nits new environment. Its methods no longer suffice for the increasing\ndifficulties of the task and the larger requirements of the scientific\nspirit. It is constrained to live upon its past. Its wisest\nrepresentatives have vainly attempted a compromise, loudly asserting\nthat facts must be observed, and that a large part should be assigned to\nexperience. Their concessions are unavailing, for however sincerely\nmeant, they are not actually carried out. As soon as they set to work\nthe taste for pure speculation again possesses them. Moreover, no reform\nof what is radically false can be effectual, and ancient psychology is a\nbastard conception, doomed to perish from the contradictions which it\ninvolves.\"--Ribot, _Psychologie Allemande Contemporaine_. Paris, 1879.\n\n[8] _Della legge fondamentale della intelligenza nel regno animale._\nMilano. Dumolard, 1877.\n\n[9] See, among other works on the subject, _Die Herabkunft des Feuers\nund des Gottertranks_, by Adalbert Kuhn; and _Croyances et Legendes de\nl'Antiquite_, by A. Maury.\n\n[10] See Wuttke, _Deutscher Volksaberglauber_; Tylor, _Primitive\nCulture_; Hanusch, Rochholz, and others.\n\n[11] _The Worship of Animals and Plants_, Part I. _Fortnightly Review_,\n1869. The same argument is generally used; see Tylor, _Early History of\nMankind_, 1865; Lubbock, _Origin of Civilization_, 1870; Herbert\nSpencer, _Fortnightly Review_, May, 1870; Waitz, _Anthropologie der\nNaturvoelker_; Bastian, _Mensch in der Geschichte_.\n\n[12] See Alger's _Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life_.\n\n[13] Arbrousset, _The Basutos_.\n\n[14] Muir, _Sanscrit Texts_.\n\n[15] Burton, _West Africa_; Tylor, _Primitive Culture_.\n\n[16] Pictet, Origines Indo-Eoropeennes.\n\n[17] The Hawaians, for example, have only one term for love, friendship,\nesteem, gratitude, benevolence, etc.--_aloha_; while they have distinct\nwords for different degrees in a single natural phenomenon. Thus\n_aneane_, gentle breeze; _matani_, wind; _pahi_, the act of breathing\nthrough the mouth; _hano_, breathing through the nose. See Hale's\n_Polynesian Dictionary_. All peoples have slowly attained to typical\nideas, and many are even now in process of formation. Thus, the Finns,\nLapps, Tartars, and Mongols, have no generic words for _river_, although\neven the smallest streams have their names. They have not a word to\nexpress _fingers_ in general, but special words for thumb, fore-finger,\netc. They have no word for tree, but special words for _pine_, _birch_,\n_ash_, etc. In the Finn language, the word first used for _thumb_ was\nafterwards applied to fingers generally, and the special word for the\nbay in which they lived came to be used for all bays. See Castren,\n_Vorlesungen ueber Finnische Mythologie_. This original confusion in the\ndefinition of scientific ideas, and the successive alternations by which\nthey were re-cast, may be gathered from the analysis of language, and\nfrom facts which still occur among uncultured and ignorant people. When\nthe inhabitants of Mallculo saw dogs for the first time, they called\nthem _brooas_, or pigs. The inhabitants of Tauna also call the dogs\nimported thither _buga_, or pigs. When the inhabitants of a small island\nin the Mediterranean saw oxen for the first time, they called them\n_horned asses_.\n\n[18] See Gaussin's _Langue Polynesienne_.\n\n[19] This process of the evolution of primitive myth and of fetishes,\nwill be more elaborately considered in Chapter VII., when we come to\nspeak generally of the historic evolution of science and of myth. The\nrepetition is not superfluous, since it is necessary for the complete\nunderstanding of my theory.\n\n[20] For example, in ancient Roman mythology the _Fons_ was first\nadored, then _Fontus_, the father of all sources, and finally _Janus_, a\nsolar myth, the father of Fontus. Janus, as the sun, was the producer of\nall water, which rose by evaporation and fell again in rain.\n\n[21] The Sanscrit word _Vayuna_, meaning light, was personified in\nAurora, and afterwards signified the intelligence, or inward light; a\nsymbolical evolution of myth towards a rational conception. The worship\nof heaven and earth, united in a common type, is found among all Aryan\npeoples, and among other races. The Germans worshipped _Hertha_, the\noriginal form of _Erde_, earth. The Letts worshipped _Mahte_, or\n_Mahmine_, mother earth. So did the Magyars, and the Ostiaks adored the\nearth under the Slavonic name of _Imlia_. In China sacrifices to the\ndivine earth _Heou-tou_ and to the heaven _Tien_ were fundamental rites.\nIn North America the Shawnees invoked earth as their great ancestress.\nThe Comanchi adored her as their common mother. In New Zealand heaven\nand earth are worshipped as _Rangi_ and _Papi_. (Grey: _Polynesian\nMythology_.) The myth of Apollo, light, sun, heat, combined also with\nserpent worship, is found modified in a thousand ways among all peoples,\nsavages included. See Schwartz, _Urspung der Mythologie_; J. Fergusson,\n_Tree and Serpent Worship_; Herbert Spencer, _The Origin of Animal\nWorship_; Maury, _Religions de la Grece Antique_. They also appeared\namong the Hebrew and kindred races. We find in the book of Job that God\n\"by His spirit had garnished the heavens; His hand has formed the\ncrooked serpent\" (Job xxvi. 13), expressions which are almost Vedic.\nFrom celestial phenomena the myth of the Apollo Serpent descended to\nimpersonate the phenomena of earth, of which we have examples in the\nGreek fable of the Python, and others. Apollo again appears as the god\nwhich agitates and dissolves the waters, and the serpent as the winding\ncourse of a river, and also as other sources of water. The sun causes\nthe river water to evaporate, which is symbolized by the dragon's\nconflict with Apollo, and the victory of the latter. The monster, as\nForchhammer observes, is formed during the childhood of Apollo, that is,\nat a time of year when the sun has not attained his full force. When the\nserpent's body begins to putrefy, the reptile, in mythical language,\ntakes the new name of Python, or he who becomes putrid. The serpent\nPython, in accordance with the continual transformations of myth,\nbecomes the Hydra of Lerna, and Hercules, another solar myth, is\nsubstituted for Apollo. This Hydra is transformed again into Typhon, a\nfresh personification of the forces of nature and of the atmosphere,\nconspiring against heaven. The seven-headed Hydra reappears in another\nform in the Rig-Veda, where the rain cloud is compared to the serpent\nwhom head rests on seven springs. I have Max Mueller's authority for the\nvigorous alternation of myths in those primitive ages, their extreme\nmobility, their resolution into vivified physical forms, and the slight\nconsistency of specific types. Aurora and Night are often substituted\nfor each other, and although in the original conception of the birth of\nApollo and Artemis they were certainly both considered to be children of\nthe night, Leto and Latona, yet even so the place or island where,\naccording to the fable, they were born is Ortygia or Delos, or sometimes\ncalled by both names at once. Delos means the land of light, but\nOrtygia, although the name is given to different places, is Aurora, or\nthe land of Aurora. (Gerhard, _Griechische Mythologie_.) Ortygia is\nderived from _Ortyx_, a quail. In Sanscrit the quail is called\n_Vartika_, the bird which returns, because it is one of the birds to\nreturn in spring. This name _Vartika_ is given in the Veda to one of the\nnumerous beings which are set free and brought to life by the _Ascini_,\nthat is, by day and night, and _Vartika_ is one of several names for the\ndawn. _Vartika's_ story is very short: she was swallowed, but delivered\nby the Asvini. She was drawn by them from the wolf's throat. Hence we\nhave Ortygia, the land of quails, the east; the isle which issued\nmiraculously from the floods, where Leto begot his solar twins, and also\nOrtygia, a name given to Artemis, the daughter of Leto, because she was\nborn in the east. The _Druh_, crimes and darkness may in their\nsubsequent development be contrasted with these ancient myths. Aurora is\nrepresented by them as driving away the odious gloom of the _Druh_. The\npowers of darkness, the _Druh_ and _Rakshas_ were called _Adeva_, and\nthe shining gods were called _Adruh_. Kuhn believes that the German\nwords _truegen_ and _luegen_ are derived from _Druh_.\n\n[22] Michel Breal: _Hercule et Cacus_.\n\n[23] We are not here concerned with _a priori_ metaphysics, but with the\npsychical and organic dispositions slowly produced by evolution and by\nconsciousness in its cosmic relations. The organic nature of these\nreflex phenomena is due to the fact that in the long course of ages\ntheir exercise has, through physiological evolution, first become\nvoluntary or spontaneous, and then unconscious.\n\n[24] The double meaning is projected into objects. The primitive meaning\nof _dexter_ was _fitting_, _capable_, and it was then applied to the\nside of the material body. Sansc. _dacs_, to hasten. Ascoli, _Studi\nlinquistici_.\n\n[25] A careful reader will not hold this repetition to be unnecessary,\nsince it explains from another point of view the fundamental fact of\nperception and its results. It is here considered with reference to the\nthree elements which constitute this fact.\n\n[26] This great truth was observed by Vico, the most advanced of modern\npsychologists, in his views of primitive psychology.\n\n[27] In Chinese, for example, and in many other languages, there are\nmany words to indicate the tail of a fish, a bird, etc., but no word for\na tail in general. Even an intelligent savage does not accurately\ndistinguish between the subjective and the objective, between the\nimaginary and the real; this is the most important result of a\nscientific education. Tylor, _Primitive Culture_; Steinhauser, _Religion\ndes Negres_; Brinton, _Myths of the World_. The objective form of\nconceptions and emotions, which are subsequently transformed into\nspirits, are found among the superior races of our day, in the Christian\nhierarchy of angels, in popular tradition, and in spiritualism.\n\n[28] Fetishism may be observed in the civilized Aryan races, but still\nmore plainly among the Chinese and cognate races, among the Peruvians,\nMexicans, etc. Castren, in his _Finnische Mythologie_ says that we find\nextraordinary instances of the lowest stage of fetishism among the\nSamoeides, who directly worship all natural objects in themselves. The\nFinns, who are comparatively civilized heathens, have attained to a\nhigher phase of belief. But numerous examples, in every part of the\nworld, will occur to the intelligent reader.\n\n[29] _Numen_ really means the manifestation of power, from _nuere_.\nVarro makes Attius say: \"Multis nomen vestrum numenque ciendo.\" In\nLucretius we have _mentis numen_, and also _Numen Augusti_. An\ninscription discovered by Mommsen runs as follows:\n\n     \"P. Florus, etc. Dianae numine jussu posuit.\"\n\n\n[30] The illustrious Du Bois Reymond delivered a lecture a few years\nago, in which he made it clear that the Semitic idea of one Almighty God\nled to the later and modern conception of the unity of forces and the\nrational interpretation of the system of the universe. This important\ntestimony of so able a man confirms the theory set forth some years ago\nin the work of which I have reproduced a part in the text.\n\n[31] Some Jewish Christians of the Semitic race took refuge in a\ndistrict of Syria, and retained their primitive faith without further\ndevelopment, under the name of Nazarenes or Ebionites. In the fourth\ncentury, Epiphanius and Jerome found these primitive Christians constant\nto the old dogma, while Aryan Christianity had made gigantic strides,\nboth in its ideas and social organization. Among the Semites, even when\nthey have partially accepted the dogma, it was and is unproductive.\n\n[32] Aristot., _De anima_; Cic., _De legibus_; Diog., Lae.\n\n[33] A new thought entered my mind, whence others, differing from the\nfirst, arose; and as I roamed from one to another I was tempted to close\nmy eyes, and thought was changed into a dream.\n\n[34] See the theory by Lotze of local signs in the formation of the idea\nof space, completed and modified by Wundt and others.\n\n[35] Sometimes the name of a person, or of some part of the human form,\nhas been bestowed on a natural object without reference to their\nanalogy, but in this case the epithet has the converse effect of leading\nus to imagine that it possesses the features or limbs of the human form.\nAnd this is of equal value for our present inquiry.\n\n[36] While these sheets were passing through the press, I was informed\nof Berg's work on the Enjoyment of Music. (\"_Die Lust an der Musik._\"\nBerlin, 1879.) Berg, who is a realist, inquires what is the source of\nthe pleasure we experience from the regular succession of sounds, which\nhe holds to be the primary essence of music. He finds the cause in some\nof Darwin's theories and researches. Darwin observes that the epoch of\nsong coincides with that of love in the case of singing animals, birds,\ninsects, and some mammals; and from this Berg concludes that primitive\nmen, or rather anthropoids, made use of the voice to attract the\nattention of females. Hence a relation was established between singing\nand the sentiments of love, rivalry, and pleasure; this relation was\nindissolubly fused into the nature by heredity, and it persisted even\nafter singing ceased to be excited by its primitive cause. This applies\nto the general sense of pleasure in music. We have next to inquire why\nthe ear prefers certain sounds to others, certain combinations to\nothers, etc. Berg holds that it depends on negative causes, that the ear\ndoes not select the most pleasing but the least painful sounds. He\nrelies on Helmholtz's fundamental theory of sounds. It seems to me that\nalthough Helmholtz's theory is true, that of Berg is erroneous, since he\nis quite unable to prove his assertion that the effect produced by music\nis a negative pleasure. Moreover, the Darwinian observations to which he\ntraces the origin of the enjoyment of music, not only rely on an\narbitrary hypothesis, but do not explain why males should derive any\nadvantage from their voice, nor what pleasure and satisfaction females\nfind in it. And this, as Reinach justly observes in the _Revue\nPhilosophique_, is the point on which the problem turns.\n\nClark has recently suggested in the American Naturalist another theory\nworthy of consideration. A musical sound is never simple but complex; it\nconsists of one fundamental sound, and of other harmonic sounds at close\nintervals; the first and most perceptible intervals are the 8th, 5th,\n4th, and 3rd major. Each of the simple sounds which, taken together,\nconstitute the whole sound, causes the vibration of a special group of\nfibres in the auditory nerve. This fact, often repeated, generates a\nkind of organic predisposition which is confirmed by heredity. If from\nany cause one of these groups is set in motion, the other groups will\nhave a tendency to vibrate. Therefore, if a singing animal, weary of\nalways repeating the same note, wishes to vary its height, he will\nnaturally choose one of the harmonic sounds of the first. The ultimate\norigin of the law of melody in organized beings is therefore only the\nsimultaneous harmony, realized in sounds, of inorganic nature. This\ntheory is confirmed by the analysis which has been often made of the\nsong of some birds: the intervals employed by these are generally the\nsame as those on which human melody is founded, the 8th, 5th, 4th, and\n3rd major. Reinach, however, observes that Beethoven, who in his\nPastoral Symphony has reproduced the song of the nightingale, the\ncuckoo, and the quail, makes their melodies to differ from those\nassigned to them by Clark.\n\nThe method and direction of the theories proposed by these authors are\nexcellent; but I do not believe that they have discovered the real\norigin of the sense of music and dancing. I think that the suggestion\ngiven in the text, although it requires development, is nearer the\ntruth. Consciousness of the great law by which things exist in a\nclassified form seems to me to be the cause of the sense of graduated\npleasure, which constitutes the essence of all the arts.\n\n[37] See Beauquier's \"_Philosophie de la Musique_.\"\n\n[38] Serv. on the AEneid. What the oracles sang was termed _carmentis_:\nthe seers used to be called _carmentes_, and the books in which their\nsayings were inscribed were termed _carmentorios_.\n\n[39] See Girard de Rialle: _Mythologie Comparee_. Vol. I. Paris, 1878. A\nvaluable and learned work.\n\n[40] The intense character of the worship of groves in Italy appears\nfrom Quintilianus, who says, in speaking of Ennius: \"_Ennium sicut\nsacros vetustate lucos adoremus_.\"\n\n\n\n\nINDEX.\n\n  A priori ideas, their definition, 7, 8;\n    the source of myth, 9\n  Abstraction, unconscious and explicit, 138;\n    its degrees, 139-150.\n  AEschylus, 110\n  Alger on the doctrine of a future life, 74\n  Animals and man, their intimate connection, 19;\n    their embryogenic evolution, 19;\n    their complete identity, 22;\n    their self-consciousness, 50;\n    the projection of themselves on other\n    animals and phenomena, 51, 53, 54, 55, 161;\n    experiments on, 60-64.\n  Animation of extrinsic phenomena, 28, 58-65, 111, 125-128\n  Anthropomorphism, 90, 97, 106, 181\n  Apprehension, act of, 116;\n    by animals, 118;\n    psychical law of, 119;\n    three elements of, 120;\n    by a man, 122-127\n  Arbrousset on the Basutos, 75\n  Aristotle, his teaching, 231\n  Aryan family, its primitive unity with the Semitic, 31;\n    its mythology, 179, 197, 219;\n    its conception of Christianity, 184-192\n\n  Bridgman, Laura, 207\n\n  Christ, the apotheosis of man, 187\n  Christianity, its diffusion, 178-192;\n    its anthropomorphism, 181\n\n  Dead, the worship of, 15\n  Demoniacal beliefs, 77, 78, 79\n  Descartes, 234\n  Doric school, 211\n  Dreams, 253, 259, 270\n\n  Entification, the term, 153;\n    of speech, 310\n  Eleatic school, 211\n  Epicarmos, 109\n  Evolution, of monotheism, 151;\n    of the faculties of myth and science, 157;\n    of language, 201-204;\n    of writing, 209;\n    of music, 295-303\n  Experiments on animals, 60-64\n\n  Fetish worship, 78, 94-97, 163, 168, 291, 311\n  Finns, their mythology, 101\n\n  Galileo, 235\n  Greece, her philosophy, 210-217;\n    her mythology, 99, 130\n\n  Hallucinations, 272, 281\n  Hawaians, their concrete language, 86\n\n  Ionic school, 210\n\n  Kant, 233\n\n  M'Lennan on the worship of plants and animals, 73\n  Man, his intimate connection with animals, 19-23;\n    his psychical force, 26;\n    estimated according to his absolute value, 35;\n    his power of reflection, 23, 52, 163;\n    his connection with the universal system, 36\n  Mannhardt, his _Deutsche Mythologie_, 100\n  Max Mueller, his theory of myth, 11, 99\n  Mara, incubus, 77\n  Monotheism, not the first intuition of man, 104\n    its evolution, 151\n  Multiplicity of souls, believed by various races, 165\n  Myth, the spontaneous form of human intelligence, 1;\n    its persistence, 3, 33, 136;\n    its germ interchangeable with that of science, 9, 131, 132;\n    its problem unsolved, 12;\n    its gradual disappearance, 33;\n    its constant forms, 40;\n    its origin in reflex power, 91;\n    its second form, 95;\n    its evolution into science, 113;\n    its various stages, 160-174\n  Mythology, Indian, 10;\n    Finnish, 101;\n    Vedic, Greek, and Latin, 130, 198;\n    its historic results, 175-192;\n    Aryan, 179, 196, 219;\n    Pagan, 184\n  Music, its evolution, 295-305\n\n  New Zealand, original meaning of words, 89\n\n  Perception, primitive human, 69;\n    identical in man and in animals, 133;\n    the product and cause of myth, 153\n  Personification, by animals, 66;\n    by man, 80;\n    of internal perceptions, 81;\n    of homologous types, 81;\n    of specific types, 84;\n  Pindar, 199\n  Platonic school, 220-230\n  Polynesian language, 89\n  Polytheism, its origin, 98\n  Pythagorean school, 214-217\n\n  Reflex power in man, 23, 52;\n    its slow growth, 163\n  Ribot, his _Psychologie Allemande_, 39\n  Roman mythology, 95\n\n  Sanscrit roots, 201\n  Science, a factor of intellectual life, 4;\n    its germ interchangeable with myth, 9, 131, 132;\n    as a whole, revealed in its several parts, 35;\n    its effect on myth, 112,194\n  Semitic idea, 177;\n    race, 191\n  Social life based on the order of nature, 38\n  Societies, the genesis of, 30\n  Sociology, its foundation in the study of myth, 41, 45\n  Sophocles, 110\n  Spencer, his Sociology, 14\n\n  Tahiti, 89\n  Tasmanians, their customs, 42-44\n  Thales, his teaching, 212\n  Transmigration of souls, 166\n  Tylor on Primitive Culture, 14, 16;\n    his theory of animism, 16\n\n  Veda, the personification of phenomena, 71;\n    Vedic mythology, 76, 98, 130, 219;\n    Vedic hymn, 217\n  Victory of the natural sciences, 237\n\n  Zeller on monotheism, 108\n\n  THE END.","title":"Myth and Science: An Essay","tradition":"myth-cosmogony","translated_text":null,"word_count":80697}