{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_17897/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_17897","id":"gutenberg_17897","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/17897","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Catholic Church -- Doctrines -- Early works to 1800","Christianity","God -- Attributes -- Early works to 1800","God -- Omnipresence -- Early works to 1800","Theology, Doctrinal -- Early works to 1800"],"text":"E-text prepared by Sandra K. Perry, with corrections and supplementation\nby David McClamrock\n\n\n\nSUMMA THEOLOGICA\n\nPART I-II (\"Prima Secundae\")\n\nTranslated by\nFathers of the English Dominican Province\n\nBENZIGER BROTHERS\nNEW YORK\n________________________\n\nDEDICATION\n\nTo the Blessed Virgin\nMary Immaculate\nSeat of Wisdom\n________________________\n\nNOTE TO THIS ELECTRONIC EDITION\n\nThe text of this electronic edition was originally produced by Sandra\nK. Perry, Perrysburg, Ohio, and made available through the Christian\nClassics Ethereal Library . I have eliminated\nunnecessary formatting in the text, corrected some errors in\ntranscription, and added the dedication, tables of contents,\nPrologue, and the numbers of the questions and articles, as they\nappeared in the printed translation published by Benziger Brothers.\nEach article is now designated by part, question number, and article\nnumber in brackets, like this:\n\n> SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 49, Art. 2]\n\n> Whether the Supreme Good, God, Is the Cause of Evil?\n\nIn a few places, where obvious errors appeared in the Benziger\nBrothers edition, I have corrected them by reference to a Latin text\nof the _Summa._ These corrections are indicated by English text in\nbrackets. For example, in Part I, Question 45, Article 2, the first\nsentence in the Benziger Brothers edition begins: \"Not only is it\nimpossible that anything should be created by God....\" By reference\nto the Latin, \"non solum _non_ est impossibile a Deo aliquid creari\"\n(emphasis added), this has been corrected to \"Not only is it [not]\nimpossible that anything should be created by God....\"\n\nThis electronic edition also differs from the Benziger Brothers\nedition in the following details (as well as the obvious lack of the\noriginal page numbers and headers):\n\n* The repetitive expression \"We proceed thus to the [next] Article\"\ndoes not appear directly below the title of each article.\n\n* Italics are represented by underscores at the beginning and end,\n_like this._ Quotations and other \"quotable\" matter, however, are\nordinarily set off by quotation marks with no underscores in this\nedition, in accordance with common English usage, even where they\nwere set in italics with no quotation marks in the Benziger Brothers\nedition. Titles of books are set off by underscores when they appear\nin the text with no parentheses, but not when the books are cited in\nparentheses.\n\n* Bible chapters and verses are cited with arabic numerals separated\nby colons, like this: \"Dan. 7:10\"--not like this: \"Dan. vii. 10.\"\nSmall roman numerals have been retained where they appear in\ncitations to books other than the Bible.\n\n* Any matter that appeared in a footnote in the Benziger Brothers\nedition is presented in brackets at the point in the text where the\nfootnote mark appeared.\n\n* Greek words are presented in Roman transliteration.\n\n* Paragraphs are not indented and are separated by blank lines.\n\n* Numbered topics, set forth at the beginning of each question and\nat certain other places, are ordinarily presented on a separate line\nfor each topic.\n\n* Titles of questions are in all caps.\n\nAnything else in this electronic edition that does not correspond to\nthe content of the Benziger Brothers edition may be regarded as a\ndefect in this edition and attributed to me (David McClamrock).\n\n________________________\n\nCONTENTS\n\nFIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART (QQ. 1-114)\n\nQuestion\n\n1. Of Man's Last End\n2. Of Those Things in Which Man's Happiness Consists\n3. What Is Happiness\n4. Of Those Things That Are Required for Happiness\n5. Of the Attainment of Happiness\n6. Of the Voluntary and the Involuntary\n7. Of the Circumstances of Human Acts\n8. Of the Will, in Regard to What It Wills\n9. Of That Which Moves the Will\n10. Of the Manner in Which the Will Is Moved\n11. Of Enjoyment, Which Is an Act of the Will\n12. Of Intention\n13. Of Choice, Which Is an Act of the Will with Regard to the Means\n14. Of Counsel, Which Precedes Choice\n15. Of Consent, Which Is an Act of the Will in Regard to the Means\n16. Of Use, Which Is an Act of the Will in Regard to the Means\n17. Of the Acts Commanded by the Will\n18. Of the Good and Evil of Human Acts, in General\n19. Of the Goodness and Malice of the Interior Act of the Will\n20. Of Goodness and Malice in External Human Actions\n21. Of the Consequences of Human Actions by Reason of Their Goodness\n and Malice\n22. Of the Subject of the Soul's Passions\n23. How the Passions Differ from One Another\n24. Of Good and Evil in the Passions of the Soul\n25. Of the Order of the Passions to One Another\n26. Of the Passions of the Soul in Particular: and First, of Love\n27. Of the Cause of Love\n28. Of the Effects of Love\n29. Of Hatred\n30. Of Concupiscence\n31. Of Delight Considered in Itself\n32. Of the Cause of Pleasure\n33. Of the Effects of Pleasure\n34. Of the Goodness and Malice of Pleasures\n35. Of Pain or Sorrow, in Itself\n36. Of the Causes of Sorrow or Pain\n37. Of the Effects of Pain or Sorrow\n38. Of the Remedies of Sorrow or Pain\n39. Of the Goodness and Malice of Sorrow or Pain\n40. Of the Irascible Passions, and First, of Hope and Despair\n41. Of Fear, in Itself\n42. Of the Object of Fear\n43. Of the Cause of Fear\n44. Of the Effects of Fear\n45. Of Daring\n46. Of Anger, in Itself\n47. Of the Cause That Provokes Anger, and of the Remedies of Anger\n48. Of the Effects of Anger\n\nTREATISE ON HABITS\n\n49. Of Habits in General, As to Their Substance\n50. Of the Subject of Habits\n51. Of the Cause of Habits, As to Their Formation\n52. Of the Increase of Habits\n53. How Habits Are Corrupted or Diminished\n54. Of the Distinction of Habits\n55. Of the Virtues, As to Their Essence\n56. Of the Subject of Virtue\n57. Of the Intellectual Virtues\n58. Of the Difference Between Moral and Intellectual Virtues\n59. Of the Moral Virtues in Relation to the Passions\n60. How the Moral Virtues Differ from One Another\n61. Of the Cardinal Virtues\n62. Of the Theological Virtues\n63. Of the Cause of Virtues\n64. Of the Mean of Virtue\n65. Of the Connection of Virtues\n66. Of Equality Among the Virtues\n67. Of the Duration of Virtues After This Life\n68. Of the Gifts\n69. Of the Beatitudes\n70. Of the Fruits of the Holy Ghost\n71. Of Vice and Sin Considered in Themselves\n72. Of the Distinction of Sins\n73. Of the Comparison of One Sin with Another\n74. Of the Subject of Sin\n75. Of the Causes of Sin, in General\n76. Of the Causes of Sin, in Particular\n77. Of the Cause of Sin, on the Part of the Sensitive Appetite\n78. Of That Cause of Sin Which Is Malice\n79. Of the External Causes of Sin\n80. Of the Cause of Sin, As Regards the Devil\n81. Of the Cause of Sin, on the Part of Man\n82. Of Original Sin, As to Its Essence\n83. Of the Subject of Original Sin\n84. Of the Cause of Sin, in Respect of One Sin Being the Cause\n of Another\n85. Of the Effects of Sin, and, First, of the Corruption of the\n Good of Nature\n86. Of the Stain of Sin\n87. Of the Debt of Punishment\n88. Of Venial and Mortal Sin\n89. Of Venial Sin in Itself\n\nTREATISE ON LAW\n\n90. Of the Essence of Law\n91. Of the Various Kinds of Law\n92. Of the Effects of Law\n93. Of the Eternal Law\n94. Of the Natural Law\n95. Of Human Law\n96. Of the Power of Human Law\n97. Of Change in Laws\n98. Of the Old Law\n99. Of the Precepts of the Old Law\n100. Of the Moral Precepts of the Old Law\n101. Of the Ceremonial Precepts in Themselves\n102. Of the Causes of the Ceremonial Precepts\n103. Of the Duration of the Ceremonial Precepts\n104. Of the Judicial Precepts\n105. Of the Reason for the Judicial Precepts\n106. Of the Law of the Gospel, Called the New Law, Considered in Itself\n107. Of the New Law As Compared with the Old\n108. Of Those Things That Are Contained in the New Law\n109. Of the Necessity of Grace\n110. Of the Grace of God as Regards Its Essence\n111. Of the Division of Grace\n112. Of the Cause of Grace\n113. Of the Effects of Grace\n114. Of Merit\n________________________\n\nFIRST PART OF THE SECOND PART\n[\"I-II,\" \"Prima Secundae\"]\n________________________\n\nTREATISE ON THE LAST END (QQ. 1-5)\n________________________\n\nPROLOGUE\n\nSince, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 12), man is said to be\nmade in God's image, in so far as the image implies \"an intelligent\nbeing endowed with free-will and self-movement\": now that we have\ntreated of the exemplar, i.e. God, and of those things which came\nforth from the power of God in accordance with His will; it remains\nfor us to treat of His image, i.e. man, inasmuch as he too is the\nprinciple of his actions, as having free-will and control of his\nactions.\n________________________\n\nOF MAN'S LAST END\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nIn this matter we shall consider first the last end of human life;\nand secondly, those things by means of which man may advance towards\nthis end, or stray from the path: for the end is the rule of whatever\nis ordained to the end. And since the last end of human life is\nstated to be happiness, we must consider (1) the last end in general;\n(2) happiness.\n\nUnder the first head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it belongs to man to act for an end?\n\n(2) Whether this is proper to the rational nature?\n\n(3) Whether a man's actions are specified by their end?\n\n(4) Whether there is any last end of human life?\n\n(5) Whether one man can have several last ends?\n\n(6) Whether man ordains all to the last end?\n\n(7) Whether all men have the same last end?\n\n(8) Whether all other creatures concur with man in that last end?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Belongs to Man to Act for an End?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for\nan end. For a cause is naturally first. But an end, in its very name,\nimplies something that is last. Therefore an end is not a cause. But\nthat for which a man acts, is the cause of his action; since this\npreposition \"for\" indicates a relation of causality. Therefore it\ndoes not belong to man to act for an end.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is itself the last end is not for an end.\nBut in some cases the last end is an action, as the Philosopher\nstates (Ethic. i, 1). Therefore man does not do everything for an end.\n\nObj. 3: Further, then does a man seem to act for an end, when he acts\ndeliberately. But man does many things without deliberation,\nsometimes not even thinking of what he is doing; for instance when\none moves one's foot or hand, or scratches one's beard, while intent\non something else. Therefore man does not do everything for an end.\n\n_On the contrary,_ All things contained in a genus are derived from\nthe principle of that genus. Now the end is the principle in human\noperations, as the Philosopher states (Phys. ii, 9). Therefore it\nbelongs to man to do everything for an end.\n\n_I answer that,_ Of actions done by man those alone are properly\ncalled \"human,\" which are proper to man as man. Now man differs from\nirrational animals in this, that he is master of his actions.\nWherefore those actions alone are properly called human, of which man\nis master. Now man is master of his actions through his reason and\nwill; whence, too, the free-will is defined as \"the faculty and will\nof reason.\" Therefore those actions are properly called human which\nproceed from a deliberate will. And if any other actions are found in\nman, they can be called actions \"of a man,\" but not properly \"human\"\nactions, since they are not proper to man as man. Now it is clear\nthat whatever actions proceed from a power, are caused by that power\nin accordance with the nature of its object. But the object of the\nwill is the end and the good. Therefore all human actions must be for\nan end.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the end be last in the order of execution, yet\nit is first in the order of the agent's intention. And it is this way\nthat it is a cause.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If any human action be the last end, it must be\nvoluntary, else it would not be human, as stated above. Now an action\nis voluntary in one of two ways: first, because it is commanded by\nthe will, e.g. to walk, or to speak; secondly, because it is elicited\nby the will, for instance the very act of willing. Now it is\nimpossible for the very act elicited by the will to be the last end.\nFor the object of the will is the end, just as the object of sight is\ncolor: wherefore just as the first visible cannot be the act of\nseeing, because every act of seeing is directed to a visible object;\nso the first appetible, i.e. the end, cannot be the very act of\nwilling. Consequently it follows that if a human action be the last\nend, it must be an action commanded by the will: so that there, some\naction of man, at least the act of willing, is for the end. Therefore\nwhatever a man does, it is true to say that man acts for an end, even\nwhen he does that action in which the last end consists.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Such like actions are not properly human actions; since\nthey do not proceed from deliberation of the reason, which is the\nproper principle of human actions. Therefore they have indeed an\nimaginary end, but not one that is fixed by reason.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Is Proper to the Rational Nature to Act for an End?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is proper to the rational nature\nto act for an end. For man, to whom it belongs to act for an end,\nnever acts for an unknown end. On the other hand, there are many\nthings that have no knowledge of an end; either because they are\naltogether without knowledge, as insensible creatures: or because\nthey do not apprehend the idea of an end as such, as irrational\nanimals. Therefore it seems proper to the rational nature to act for\nan end.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to act for an end is to order one's action to an\nend. But this is the work of reason. Therefore it does not belong to\nthings that lack reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But\n\"the will is in the reason\" (De Anima iii, 9). Therefore to act for\nan end belongs to none but a rational nature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher proves (Phys. ii, 5) that \"not\nonly mind but also nature acts for an end.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Every agent, of necessity, acts for an end. For if,\nin a number of causes ordained to one another, the first be removed,\nthe others must, of necessity, be removed also. Now the first of all\ncauses is the final cause. The reason of which is that matter does\nnot receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for\nnothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does\nnot move except out of intention for an end. For if the agent were\nnot determinate to some particular effect, it would not do one thing\nrather than another: consequently in order that it produce a\ndeterminate effect, it must, of necessity, be determined to some\ncertain one, which has the nature of an end. And just as this\ndetermination is effected, in the rational nature, by the \"rational\nappetite,\" which is called the will; so, in other things, it is\ncaused by their natural inclination, which is called the \"natural\nappetite.\"\n\nNevertheless it must be observed that a thing tends to an end, by its\naction or movement, in two ways: first, as a thing, moving itself to\nthe end, as man; secondly, as a thing moved by another to the end, as\nan arrow tends to a determinate end through being moved by the archer\nwho directs his action to the end. Therefore those things that are\npossessed of reason, move themselves to an end; because they have\ndominion over their actions through their free-will, which is the\n\"faculty of will and reason.\" But those things that lack reason tend\nto an end, by natural inclination, as being moved by another and not\nby themselves; since they do not know the nature of an end as such,\nand consequently cannot ordain anything to an end, but can be\nordained to an end only by another. For the entire irrational nature\nis in comparison to God as an instrument to the principal agent, as\nstated above (I, Q. 22, A. 2, ad 4; Q. 103, A. 1, ad 3). Consequently\nit is proper to the rational nature to tend to an end, as directing\n(_agens_) and leading itself to the end: whereas it is proper to the\nirrational nature to tend to an end, as directed or led by another,\nwhether it apprehend the end, as do irrational animals, or do not\napprehend it, as is the case of those things which are altogether\nvoid of knowledge.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When a man of himself acts for an end, he knows the\nend: but when he is directed or led by another, for instance, when\nhe acts at another's command, or when he is moved under another's\ncompulsion, it is not necessary that he should know the end. And it\nis thus with irrational creatures.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To ordain towards an end belongs to that which directs\nitself to an end: whereas to be ordained to an end belongs to that\nwhich is directed by another to an end. And this can belong to an\nirrational nature, but owing to some one possessed of reason.\nReply Obj. 3: The object of the will is the end and the good in\nuniversal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that\nlack reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal;\nbut they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate\nto some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are\nmoved by a universal cause: thus the governor of a city, who intends\nthe common good, moves, by his command, all the particular\ndepartments of the city. Consequently all things that lack reason\nare, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some rational\nwill which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Human Acts Are Specified by Their End?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that human acts are not specified by their\nend. For the end is an extrinsic cause. But everything is specified\nby an intrinsic principle. Therefore human acts are not specified by\ntheir end.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which gives a thing its species should exist\nbefore it. But the end comes into existence afterwards. Therefore a\nhuman act does not derive its species from the end.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one thing cannot be in more than one species. But\none and the same act may happen to be ordained to various ends.\nTherefore the end does not give the species to human acts.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Mor. Eccl. et Manich. ii, 13):\n\"According as their end is worthy of blame or praise so are our deeds\nworthy of blame or praise.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Each thing receives its species in respect of an act\nand not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of\nmatter and form are established in their respective species by their\nown forms. And this is also to be observed in proper movements. For\nsince movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, each\nof these receives its species from an act; action indeed from the act\nwhich is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is\nthe terminus of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is\nnothing else than a certain movement proceeding from heat, while\nheating as a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat:\nand it is the definition that shows the specific nature. And either\nway, human acts, whether they be considered as actions, or as\npassions, receive their species from the end. For human acts can be\nconsidered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is moved by\nhimself. Now it has been stated above (A. 1) that acts are called\nhuman, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the\nobject of the will is the good and the end. And hence it is clear\nthat the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the\nend. In like manner it is their terminus: for the human act\nterminates at that which the will intends as the end; thus in natural\nagents the form of the thing generated is conformed to the form of\nthe generator. And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog. super Luc.)\n\"morality is said properly of man,\" moral acts properly speaking\nreceive their species from the end, for moral acts are the same as\nhuman acts.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The end is not altogether extrinsic to the act, because\nit is related to the act as principle or terminus; and thus it just\nthis that is essential to an act, viz. to proceed from something,\nconsidered as action, and to proceed towards something, considered as\npassion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The end, in so far as it pre-exists in the intention,\npertains to the will, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). And it is thus\nthat it gives the species to the human or moral act.\n\nReply Obj. 3: One and the same act, in so far as it proceeds\nonce from the agent, is ordained to but one proximate end, from which\nit has its species: but it can be ordained to several remote ends, of\nwhich one is the end of the other. It is possible, however, that an\nact which is one in respect of its natural species, be ordained to\nseveral ends of the will: thus this act \"to kill a man,\" which is but\none act in respect of its natural species, can be ordained, as to an\nend, to the safeguarding of justice, and to the satisfying of anger:\nthe result being that there would be several acts in different species\nof morality: since in one way there will be an act of virtue, in\nanother, an act of vice. For a movement does not receive its species\nfrom that which is its terminus accidentally, but only from that which\nis its _per se_ terminus. Now moral ends are accidental to a natural\nthing, and conversely the relation to a natural end is accidental to\nmorality. Consequently there is no reason why acts which are the same\nconsidered in their natural species, should not be diverse, considered\nin their moral species, and conversely.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 4]\n\nWhether There Is One Last End of Human Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no last end of human life,\nbut that we proceed to infinity. For good is essentially diffusive, as\nDionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Consequently if that which proceeds\nfrom good is itself good, the latter must needs diffuse some other\ngood: so that the diffusion of good goes on indefinitely. But good has\nthe nature of an end. Therefore there is an indefinite series of ends.\n\nObj. 2: Further, things pertaining to the reason can be multiplied to\ninfinity: thus mathematical quantities have no limit. For the same\nreason the species of numbers are infinite, since, given any number,\nthe reason can think of one yet greater. But desire of the end is\nconsequent on the apprehension of the reason. Therefore it seems that\nthere is also an infinite series of ends.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the good and the end is the object of the will. But\nthe will can react on itself an infinite number of times: for I can\nwill something, and will to will it, and so on indefinitely.\nTherefore there is an infinite series of ends of the human will, and\nthere is no last end of the human will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Metaph. ii, 2) that \"to\nsuppose a thing to be indefinite is to deny that it is good.\" But the\ngood is that which has the nature of an end. Therefore it is contrary\nto the nature of an end to proceed indefinitely. Therefore it is\nnecessary to fix one last end.\n\n_I answer that,_ Absolutely speaking, it is not possible to proceed\nindefinitely in the matter of ends, from any point of view. For in\nwhatsoever things there is an essential order of one to another, if\nthe first be removed, those that are ordained to the first, must of\nnecessity be removed also. Wherefore the Philosopher proves (Phys.\nviii, 5) that we cannot proceed to infinitude in causes of movement,\nbecause then there would be no first mover, without which neither can\nthe others move, since they move only through being moved by the first\nmover. Now there is to be observed a twofold order in ends--the order\nof intention and the order of execution: and in either of these orders\nthere must be something first. For that which is first in the order of\nintention, is the principle, as it were, moving the appetite;\nconsequently, if you remove this principle, there will be nothing to\nmove the appetite. On the other hand, the principle in execution is\nthat wherein operation has its beginning; and if this principle be\ntaken away, no one will begin to work. Now the principle in the\nintention is the last end; while the principle in execution is the\nfirst of the things which are ordained to the end. Consequently, on\nneither side is it possible to go to infinity since if there were no\nlast end, nothing would be desired, nor would any action have its\nterm, nor would the intention of the agent be at rest; while if there\nis no first thing among those that are ordained to the end, none would\nbegin to work at anything, and counsel would have no term, but would\ncontinue indefinitely.\n\nOn the other hand, nothing hinders infinity from being in things that\nare ordained to one another not essentially but accidentally; for\naccidental causes are indeterminate. And in this way it happens that\nthere is an accidental infinity of ends, and of things ordained to the\nend.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The very nature of good is that something flows from\nit, but not that it flows from something else. Since, therefore, good\nhas the nature of end, and the first good is the last end, this\nargument does not prove that there is no last end; but that from the\nend, already supposed, we may proceed downwards indefinitely towards\nthose things that are ordained to the end. And this would be true if\nwe considered but the power of the First Good, which is infinite.\nBut, since the First Good diffuses itself according to the intellect,\nto which it is proper to flow forth into its effects according to a\ncertain fixed form; it follows that there is a certain measure to the\nflow of good things from the First Good from Which all other goods\nshare the power of diffusion. Consequently the diffusion of goods\ndoes not proceed indefinitely but, as it is written (Wis. 11:21), God\ndisposes all things \"in number, weight and measure.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: In things which are of themselves, reason begins from\nprinciples that are known naturally, and advances to some term.\nWherefore the Philosopher proves (Poster. i, 3) that there is no\ninfinite process in demonstrations, because there we find a process\nof things having an essential, not an accidental, connection with one\nanother. But in those things which are accidentally connected,\nnothing hinders the reason from proceeding indefinitely. Now it is\naccidental to a stated quantity or number, as such, that quantity or\nunity be added to it. Wherefore in such like things nothing hinders\nthe reason from an indefinite process.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This multiplication of acts of the will reacting on\nitself, is accidental to the order of ends. This is clear from the\nfact that in regard to one and the same end, the will reacts on\nitself indifferently once or several times.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 5]\n\nWhether One Man Can Have Several Last Ends?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem possible for one man's will to be directed\nat the same time to several things, as last ends. For Augustine says\n(De Civ. Dei xix, 1) that some held man's last end to consist in four\nthings, viz. \"in pleasure, repose, the gifts of nature, and virtue.\"\nBut these are clearly more than one thing. Therefore one man can place\nthe last end of his will in many things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, things not in opposition to one another do not\nexclude one another. Now there are many things which are not in\nopposition to one another. Therefore the supposition that one thing\nis the last end of the will does not exclude others.\n\nObj. 3: Further, by the fact that it places its last end in one\nthing, the will does not lose its freedom. But before it placed its\nlast end in that thing, e.g. pleasure, it could place it in something\nelse, e.g. riches. Therefore even after having placed his last end in\npleasure, a man can at the same time place his last end in riches.\nTherefore it is possible for one man's will to be directed at the\nsame time to several things, as last ends.\n\n_On the contrary,_ That in which a man rests as in his last end, is\nmaster of his affections, since he takes therefrom his entire rule of\nlife. Hence of gluttons it is written (Phil. 3:19): \"Whose god is\ntheir belly\": viz. because they place their last end in the pleasures\nof the belly. Now according to Matt. 6:24, \"No man can serve two\nmasters,\" such, namely, as are not ordained to one another. Therefore\nit is impossible for one man to have several last ends not ordained\nto one another.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible for one man's will to be directed\nat the same time to diverse things, as last ends. Three reasons may\nbe assigned for this. First, because, since everything desires its\nown perfection, a man desires for his ultimate end, that which he\ndesires as his perfect and crowning good. Hence Augustine (De Civ.\nDei xix, 1): \"In speaking of the end of good we mean now, not that it\npasses away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be\ncomplete.\" It is therefore necessary for the last end so to fill\nman's appetite, that nothing is left besides it for man to desire.\nWhich is not possible, if something else be required for his\nperfection. Consequently it is not possible for the appetite so to\ntend to two things, as though each were its perfect good.\n\nThe second reason is because, just as in the process of reasoning,\nthe principle is that which is naturally known, so in the process of\nthe rational appetite, i.e. the will, the principle needs to be that\nwhich is naturally desired. Now this must needs be one: since nature\ntends to one thing only. But the principle in the process of the\nrational appetite is the last end. Therefore that to which the will\ntends, as to its last end, is one.\n\nThe third reason is because, since voluntary actions receive their\nspecies from the end, as stated above (A. 3), they must needs receive\ntheir genus from the last end, which is common to them all: just as\nnatural things are placed in a genus according to a common form.\nSince, then, all things that can be desired by the will, belong, as\nsuch, to one genus, the last end must needs be one. And all the more\nbecause in every genus there is one first principle; and the last end\nhas the nature of a first principle, as stated above. Now as the last\nend of man, simply as man, is to the whole human race, so is the last\nend of any individual man to that individual. Therefore, just as of\nall men there is naturally one last end, so the will of an individual\nman must be fixed on one last end.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All these several objects were considered as one\nperfect good resulting therefrom, by those who placed in them the\nlast end.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although it is possible to find several things which\nare not in opposition to one another, yet it is contrary to a thing's\nperfect good, that anything besides be required for that thing's\nperfection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The power of the will does not extend to making\nopposites exist at the same time. Which would be the case were it to\ntend to several diverse objects as last ends, as has been shown above\n(ad 2).\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Man Wills All, Whatsoever He Wills, for the Last End?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man does not will all, whatsoever he\nwills, for the last end. For things ordained to the last end are said\nto be serious matter, as being useful. But jests are foreign to\nserious matter. Therefore what man does in jest, he ordains not to\nthe last end.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says at the beginning of his\nMetaphysics (i. 2) that speculative science is sought for its own sake.\nNow it cannot be said that each speculative science is the last end.\nTherefore man does not desire all, whatsoever he desires, for the last\nend.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whosoever ordains something to an end, thinks of\nthat end. But man does not always think of the last end in all that\nhe desires or does. Therefore man neither desires nor does all for\nthe last end.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 1): \"That is the\nend of our good, for the sake of which we love other things, whereas\nwe love it for its own sake.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Man must, of necessity, desire all, whatsoever he\ndesires, for the last end. This is evident for two reasons. First,\nbecause whatever man desires, he desires it under the aspect of good.\nAnd if he desire it, not as his perfect good, which is the last end,\nhe must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good,\nbecause the beginning of anything is always ordained to its\ncompletion; as is clearly the case in effects both of nature and of\nart. Wherefore every beginning of perfection is ordained to complete\nperfection which is achieved through the last end. Secondly, because\nthe last end stands in the same relation in moving the appetite, as\nthe first mover in other movements. Now it is clear that secondary\nmoving causes do not move save inasmuch as they are moved by the first\nmover. Therefore secondary objects of the appetite do not move the\nappetite, except as ordained to the first object of the appetite,\nwhich is the last end.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Actions done jestingly are not directed to any external\nend; but merely to the good of the jester, in so far as they afford\nhim pleasure or relaxation. But man's consummate good is his last end.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The same applies to speculative science; which is\ndesired as the scientist's good, included in complete and perfect\ngood, which is the ultimate end.\n\nReply Obj. 3: One need not always be thinking of the last end,\nwhenever one desires or does something: but the virtue of the first\nintention, which was in respect of the last end, remains in every\ndesire directed to any object whatever, even though one's thoughts be\nnot actually directed to the last end. Thus while walking along the\nroad one needs not to be thinking of the end at every step.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 7]\n\nWhether All Men Have the Same Last End?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all men have not the same last end.\nFor before all else the unchangeable good seems to be the last end of\nman. But some turn away from the unchangeable good, by sinning.\nTherefore all men have not the same last end.\n\nObj. 2: Further, man's entire life is ruled according to his last\nend. If, therefore, all men had the same last end, they would not\nhave various pursuits in life. Which is evidently false.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the end is the term of action. But actions are of\nindividuals. Now although men agree in their specific nature, yet\nthey differ in things pertaining to individuals. Therefore all men\nhave not the same last end.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3) that all men\nagree in desiring the last end, which is happiness.\n\n_I answer that,_ We can speak of the last end in two ways: first,\nconsidering only the aspect of last end; secondly, considering the\nthing in which the aspect of last end is realized. So, then, as to\nthe aspect of last end, all agree in desiring the last end: since all\ndesire the fulfilment of their perfection, and it is precisely this\nfulfilment in which the last end consists, as stated above (A. 5).\nBut as to the thing in which this aspect is realized, all men are not\nagreed as to their last end: since some desire riches as their\nconsummate good; some, pleasure; others, something else. Thus to\nevery taste the sweet is pleasant but to some, the sweetness of wine\nis most pleasant, to others, the sweetness of honey, or of something\nsimilar. Yet that sweet is absolutely the best of all pleasant\nthings, in which he who has the best taste takes most pleasure. In\nlike manner that good is most complete which the man with well\ndisposed affections desires for his last end.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Those who sin turn from that in which their last end\nreally consists: but they do not turn away from the intention of the\nlast end, which intention they mistakenly seek in other things.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Various pursuits in life are found among men by reason\nof the various things in which men seek to find their last end.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although actions are of individuals, yet their first\nprinciple of action is nature, which tends to one thing, as stated\nabove (A. 5).\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Other Creatures Concur in That Last End?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all other creatures concur in man's\nlast end. For the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's\nbeginning--i.e. God--is also the beginning of all else. Therefore\nall other things concur in man's last end.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"God turns all\nthings to Himself as to their last end.\" But He is also man's last\nend; because He alone is to be enjoyed by man, as Augustine says (De\nDoctr. Christ. i, 5, 22). Therefore other things, too, concur in man's\nlast end.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man's last end is the object of the will. But the\nobject of the will is the universal good, which is the end of all.\nTherefore other things, too, concur in man's last end.\n\n_On the contrary,_ man's last end is happiness; which all men desire,\nas Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3, 4). But \"happiness is not\npossible for animals bereft of reason,\" as Augustine says (QQ. 83,\nqu. 5). Therefore other things do not concur in man's last end.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is\ntwofold--the end \"for which\" and the end \"by which\"; viz. the thing\nitself in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or\nacquisition of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of\na weighty body is either a lower place as \"thing,\" or to be in a lower\nplace, as \"use\"; and the end of the miser is money as \"thing,\" or\npossession of money as \"use.\"\n\nIf, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the\nend, thus all other things concur in man's last end, since God is the\nlast end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of\nman's last end, as of the acquisition of the end, then irrational\ncreatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other\nrational creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving God:\nthis is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end,\nin so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are,\nor live, or even know.\n\nHence it is evident how the objections are solved: since happiness\nmeans the acquisition of the last end.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 2\n\nOF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2)\nwhat it is; (3) how we can obtain it.\n\nConcerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether happiness consists in wealth?\n\n(2) Whether in honor?\n\n(3) Whether in fame or glory?\n\n(4) Whether in power?\n\n(5) Whether in any good of the body?\n\n(6) Whether in pleasure?\n\n(7) Whether in any good of the soul?\n\n(8) Whether in any created good?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Man's Happiness Consists in Wealth?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in wealth.\nFor since happiness is man's last end, it must consist in that which\nhas the greatest hold on man's affections. Now this is wealth: for it\nis written (Eccles. 10:19): \"All things obey money.\" Therefore man's\nhappiness consists in wealth.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii), happiness is\n\"a state of life made perfect by the aggregate of all good things.\"\nNow money seems to be the means of possessing all things: for, as the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), money was invented, that it might be\na sort of guarantee for the acquisition of whatever man desires.\nTherefore happiness consists in wealth.\n\nObj. 3: Further, since the desire for the sovereign good never fails,\nit seems to be infinite. But this is the case with riches more than\nanything else; since \"a covetous man shall not be satisfied with\nriches\" (Eccles. 5:9). Therefore happiness consists in wealth.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Man's good consists in retaining happiness rather\nthan in spreading it. But as Boethius says (De Consol. ii), \"wealth\nshines in giving rather than in hoarding: for the miser is hateful,\nwhereas the generous man is applauded.\" Therefore man's happiness\ndoes not consist in wealth.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in\nwealth. For wealth is twofold, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3),\nviz. natural and artificial. Natural wealth is that which serves man\nas a remedy for his natural wants: such as food, drink, clothing,\ncars, dwellings, and such like, while artificial wealth is that which\nis not a direct help to nature, as money, but is invented by the art\nof man, for the convenience of exchange, and as a measure of things\nsalable.\n\nNow it is evident that man's happiness cannot consist in natural\nwealth. For wealth of this kind is sought for the sake of something\nelse, viz. as a support of human nature: consequently it cannot be\nman's last end, rather is it ordained to man as to its end. Wherefore\nin the order of nature, all such things are below man, and made for\nhim, according to Ps. 8:8: \"Thou hast subjected all things under his\nfeet.\"\n\nAnd as to artificial wealth, it is not sought save for the sake of\nnatural wealth; since man would not seek it except because, by its\nmeans, he procures for himself the necessaries of life. Consequently\nmuch less can it be considered in the light of the last end. Therefore\nit is impossible for happiness, which is the last end of man, to\nconsist in wealth.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All material things obey money, so far as the\nmultitude of fools is concerned, who know no other than material\ngoods, which can be obtained for money. But we should take our\nestimation of human goods not from the foolish but from the wise: just\nas it is for a person whose sense of taste is in good order, to judge\nwhether a thing is palatable.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All things salable can be had for money: not so\nspiritual things, which cannot be sold. Hence it is written (Prov.\n17:16): \"What doth it avail a fool to have riches, seeing he cannot\nbuy wisdom.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The desire for natural riches is not infinite:\nbecause they suffice for nature in a certain measure. But the desire\nfor artificial wealth is infinite, for it is the servant of disordered\nconcupiscence, which is not curbed, as the Philosopher makes clear\n(Polit. i, 3). Yet this desire for wealth is infinite otherwise than\nthe desire for the sovereign good. For the more perfectly the\nsovereign good is possessed, the more it is loved, and other things\ndespised: because the more we possess it, the more we know it. Hence\nit is written (Ecclus. 24:29): \"They that eat me shall yet hunger.\"\nWhereas in the desire for wealth and for whatsoever temporal goods,\nthe contrary is the case: for when we already possess them, we despise\nthem, and seek others: which is the sense of Our Lord's words (John\n4:13): \"Whosoever drinketh of this water,\" by which temporal goods are\nsignified, \"shall thirst again.\" The reason of this is that we realize\nmore their insufficiency when we possess them: and this very fact\nshows that they are imperfect, and the sovereign good does not consist\ntherein.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Man's Happiness Consists in Honors?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in honors.\nFor happiness or bliss is \"the reward of virtue,\" as the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. i, 9). But honor more than anything else seems to be that\nby which virtue is rewarded, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).\nTherefore happiness consists especially in honor.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which belongs to God and to persons of great\nexcellence seems especially to be happiness, which is the perfect\ngood. But that is honor, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3).\nMoreover, the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:17): \"To . . . the only God be\nhonor and glory.\" Therefore happiness consists in honor.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which man desires above all is happiness. But\nnothing seems more desirable to man than honor: since man suffers\nloss in all other things, lest he should suffer loss of honor.\nTherefore happiness consists in honor.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Happiness is in the happy. But honor is not in the\nhonored, but rather in him who honors, and who offers deference to\nthe person honored, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5). Therefore\nhappiness does not consist in honor.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible for happiness to consist in honor.\nFor honor is given to a man on account of some excellence in him; and\nconsequently it is a sign and attestation of the excellence that is\nin the person honored. Now a man's excellence is in proportion,\nespecially to his happiness, which is man's perfect good; and to its\nparts, i.e. those goods by which he has a certain share of happiness.\nAnd therefore honor can result from happiness, but happiness cannot\nprincipally consist therein.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 5), honor is not\nthat reward of virtue, for which the virtuous work: but they receive\nhonor from men by way of reward, \"as from those who have nothing\ngreater to offer.\" But virtue's true reward is happiness itself, for\nwhich the virtuous work: whereas if they worked for honor, it would\nno longer be a virtue, but ambition.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Honor is due to God and to persons of great excellence\nas a sign of attestation of excellence already existing: not that\nhonor makes them excellent.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That man desires honor above all else, arises from his\nnatural desire for happiness, from which honor results, as stated\nabove. Wherefore man seeks to be honored especially by the wise, on\nwhose judgment he believes himself to be excellent or happy.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Man's Happiness Consists in Fame or Glory?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in glory.\nFor happiness seems to consist in that which is paid to the saints\nfor the trials they have undergone in the world. But this is glory:\nfor the Apostle says (Rom. 8:18): \"The sufferings of this time are\nnot worthy to be compared with the glory to come, that shall be\nrevealed in us.\" Therefore happiness consists in glory.\n\nObj. 2: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as stated by Dionysius\n(Div. Nom. iv). But man's good is spread abroad in the knowledge of\nothers by glory more than by anything else: since, according to\nAmbrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii. 13], glory consists \"in\nbeing well known and praised.\" Therefore man's happiness consists in\nglory.\n\nObj. 3: Further, happiness is the most enduring good. Now this seems\nto be fame or glory; because by this men attain to eternity after a\nfashion. Hence Boethius says (De Consol. ii): \"You seem to beget unto\nyourselves eternity, when you think of your fame in future time.\"\nTherefore man's happiness consists in fame or glory.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Happiness is man's true good. But it happens that\nfame or glory is false: for as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), \"many\nowe their renown to the lying reports spread among the people. Can\nanything be more shameful? For those who receive false fame, must\nneeds blush at their own praise.\" Therefore man's happiness does not\nconsist in fame or glory.\n\n_I answer that,_ Man's happiness cannot consist in human fame or\nglory. For glory consists \"in being well known and praised,\" as\nAmbrose [*Augustine, Contra Maxim. Arian. ii, 13] says. Now the thing\nknown is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God's\nknowledge: for human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas\nGod's knowledge is the cause of the things known. Wherefore the\nperfection of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused\nby human knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another's happiness\nproceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness\nitself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently man's happiness cannot\nconsist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man's good depends on\nGod's knowledge as its cause. And therefore man's beatitude depends,\nas on its cause, on the glory which man has with God; according to\nPs. 90:15, 16: \"I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will\nfill him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation.\"\n\nFurthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails,\nespecially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this\nreason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be\ndeceived, His glory is always true; hence it is written (2 Cor.\n10:18): \"He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is\nwith men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence\nit is written (Mk. 8:38): \"The Son of Man shall confess him in the\nglory of His Father, before His angels\" [*St. Thomas joins Mk. 8:38\nwith Luke 12:8 owing to a possible variant in his text, or to the\nfact that he was quoting from memory].\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man's good which, through fame or glory, is in the\nknowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived\nfrom good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes\nperfect or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, it does\nnot harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who\nis looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make\nman happy.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by\nfalse report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But\nhappiness endures of itself, and for ever.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Man's Happiness Consists in Power?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all\nthings desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first\nbeginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the\nsimilarity of power, to be most like to God: hence also in Scripture\nthey are called \"gods\" (Ex. 22:28), \"Thou shalt not speak ill of the\ngods.\" Therefore happiness consists in power.\n\nObj. 2: Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest\nperfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to\nthose who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is\ncontrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than\naught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore\nhappiness consists in power.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most\nimperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), \"the power of man\ncannot relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path\nof anxiety\": and further on: \"Think you a man is powerful who is\nsurrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom\nhe fears still more?\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible for happiness to consist in power;\nand this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of\nprinciple, as is stated in _Metaph._ v, 12, whereas happiness has the\nnature of last end. Secondly, because power has relation to good and\nevil: whereas happiness is man's proper and perfect good. Wherefore\nsome happiness might consist in the good use of power, which is by\nvirtue, rather than in power itself.\n\nNow four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness\nconsists in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because,\nsince happiness is man's supreme good, it is incompatible with any\nevil. Now all the foregoing can be found both in good and in evil\nmen. Secondly, because, since it is the nature of happiness to\n\"satisfy of itself,\" as stated in _Ethic._ i, 7, having gained\nhappiness, man cannot lack any needful good. But after acquiring any\none of the foregoing, man may still lack many goods that are\nnecessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and such like.\nThirdly, because, since happiness is the perfect good, no evil can\naccrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for\nit is written (Eccles. 5:12) that \"riches\" are sometimes \"kept to the\nhurt of the owner\"; and the same may be said of the other three.\nFourthly, because man is ordained to happiness through principles\nthat are in him; since he is ordained thereto naturally. Now the four\ngoods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most\ncases to fortune; for which reason they are called goods of fortune.\nTherefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the\nforegoing.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God's power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His\npower otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it\nis not enough for man's happiness, that he become like God in power,\nunless he become like Him in goodness also.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good\nuse of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes a\nbad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power:\ntherefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man's supreme\ngood consists in power.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Man's Happiness Consists in Any Bodily Good?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in bodily\ngoods. For it is written (Ecclus. 30:16): \"There is no riches above\nthe riches of the health of the body.\" But happiness consists in that\nwhich is best. Therefore it consists in the health of the body.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that \"to be\" is better\nthan \"to live,\" and \"to live\" is better than all that follows. But\nfor man's being and living, the health of the body is necessary.\nSince, therefore, happiness is man's supreme good, it seems that\nhealth of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the\nprinciple from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the\ngreater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the\nefficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so the\ncausality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore,\njust as the First Cause is that which flows into all things, so the\nlast end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself\nis that which is most desired by all. Therefore man's happiness\nconsists most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the\nhealth of the body.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Man surpasses all other animals in regard to\nhappiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for\ninstance, by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by\nthe stag in fleetness. Therefore man's happiness does not consist in\ngoods of the body.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible for man's happiness to consist in\nthe goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a\nthing be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot\nconsist in the preservation of its being. Hence a captain does not\nintend as a last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him,\nsince a ship is ordained to something else as its end, viz. to\nnavigation. Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he\nmay steer its course, so man is given over to his will and reason;\naccording to Ecclus. 15:14: \"God made man from the beginning and left\nhim in the hand of his own counsel.\" Now it is evident that man is\nordained to something as his end: since man is not the supreme good.\nTherefore the last end of man's reason and will cannot be the\npreservation of man's being.\n\nSecondly, because, granted that the end of man's will and reason be\nthe preservation of man's being, it could not be said that the end of\nman is some good of the body. For man's being consists in soul and\nbody; and though the being of the body depends on the soul, yet the\nbeing of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (I,\nQ. 75, A. 2); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its\nform, and the instruments for the man that puts them into motion,\nthat by their means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the\nbody are ordained to the goods of the soul, as to their end.\nConsequently happiness, which is man's last end, cannot consist in\ngoods of the body.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end,\nso are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it\nis with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external\ngoods, which are signified by \"riches,\" just as the good of the soul\nis preferred to all bodily goods.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Being taken simply, as including all perfection of\nbeing, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself\nincludes all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we\nconsider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which\ndoes not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect\nbeing, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident that\nbeing itself together with an additional perfection is more\nexcellent. Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that things that\nlive are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than\nliving things.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this\nargument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in\nWhom every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their\nproportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living being,\nsome as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this\nbelongs to few.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Man's Happiness Consists in Pleasure?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure.\nFor since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something\nelse, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than\nto anything else: \"for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive\nin wishing to be pleased\" (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists\nprincipally in pleasure and delight.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"the first cause goes more deeply into the effect\nthan the second cause\" (De Causis i). Now the causality of the end\nconsists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that\nwhich moves most the appetite, answers to the notion of the last end.\nNow this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far\nabsorbs man's will and reason, that it causes him to despise other\ngoods. Therefore it seems that man's last end, which is happiness,\nconsists principally in pleasure.\n\nObj. 3: Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all\ndesire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, and\neven irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all.\nTherefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iii): \"Any one that\nchooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that\npleasures had a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there\nis no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy\ntoo.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Because bodily delights are more generally known,\n\"the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them\" (Ethic. vii,\n13), although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not\nconsist in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains to its\nessence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one\nthing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a\nrisible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a\nproper accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of\nhappiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has\nsome fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in\nmemory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good, is\nprecisely man's happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of\nhappiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent.\nTherefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from\nthe perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something\nresulting therefrom as its proper accident.\n\nBut bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that\nway. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, which is a power\nof the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to\nthe body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be man's perfect good. For\nsince the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that\npart of the soul which is independent of a corporeal organ, has a\ncertain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul\nwhich are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a\nway infinite as compared to material things, since a form is, after a\nfashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is\nindependent of matter is, in a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which\nis a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate\nthrough matter: whereas the intellect, which is a power independent of\nmatter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and\ncontains an infinite number of singulars. Consequently it is evident\nthat good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily\ndelight through being apprehended by sense, is not man's perfect good,\nbut is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence it\nis written (Wis. 7:9) that \"all gold in comparison of her, is as a\nlittle sand.\" And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness\nitself, nor a proper accident of happiness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire\ndelight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good: thus\nit is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne\ndownwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as good is\ndesired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for\nanything else, if the preposition \"for\" denote the final cause. But\nif it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight is\ndesirable for something else, i.e. for the good, which is the object\nof that delight, and consequently is its principle, and gives it its\nform: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in\nthe thing desired.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises\nfrom the fact that operations of the senses, through being the\nprinciples of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that\nsensible pleasures are desired by the majority.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All desire delight in the same way as they desire good:\nand yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely,\nas stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight\nis the supreme and essential good, but that every delight results\nfrom some good, and that some delight results from that which is the\nessential and supreme good.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Some Good of the Soul Constitutes Man's Happiness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes\nman's happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold:\nexternal goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But\nhappiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of the\nbody, as shown above (AA. 4, 5). Therefore it consists in goods\nof the soul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than\nthe good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we\ndesire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man\ndesires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more\nthan all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which\nis evident from the fact that for its sake all else is loved and\ndesired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself:\nnot, however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is\nperfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness\nis something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to\nthe body, as shown above (A. 5). Therefore it is something belonging\nto the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.\n\n_On the contrary,_ As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), \"that\nwhich constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own\nsake.\" But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is\nin man is to be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists in\nno good of the soul.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8), the end is twofold:\nnamely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use,\nnamely, the attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak\nof man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul\nitself or something belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in\nitself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes\nknowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually\nvirtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is\nfor the sake of act as for its fulfilment, that which in itself is in\npotentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot\nbe its own last end.\n\nIn like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power,\nhabit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect\ngood fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will,\nis for the universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a\nparticipated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none\nof them can be man's last end.\n\nBut if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession\nthereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an\nend, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his\nlast end: since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the\nthing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes\nhappiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is\ncalled happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something\nbelonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is\nsomething outside the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man\ncan desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or\nact, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in\nthis way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes\nhappiness is a good of the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As far as the proposed objection is concerned,\nhappiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend\nis loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves\nhimself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both cases.\nAs to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of\nfriendship there will be occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the\nsoul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes\nhappiness, viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul,\nas stated above.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 2, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Any Created Good Constitutes Man's Happiness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that some created good constitutes man's\nhappiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom\n\"unites the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things,\"\nfrom which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches\nthe base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is happiness.\nSince then the angel is above man in the order of nature, as stated\nin the First Part (Q. 111, A. 1), it seems that man's happiness\nconsists in man somehow reaching the angel.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in\nrelation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for\nits end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm,\nis compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as\nperfect to imperfect. Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole\nuniverse of creatures.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural\ndesire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good\nsurpassing his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include\nthat good which surpasses the limits of all creation, it seems that\nman can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created\ngood constitutes man's happiness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): \"As the soul\nis the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness: of Whom\nit is written: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord' (Ps.\n143:15).\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible for any created good to constitute\nman's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the\nappetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something\nyet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man's\nappetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect\nis the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's\nwill, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any\ncreature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by\nparticipation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man,\naccording to the words of Ps. 102:5: \"Who satisfieth thy desire with\ngood things.\" Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the\nangelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as\nin his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of\ngood, which is the common object of happiness of all the blessed, as\nbeing the infinite and perfect good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a\nfurther end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole\nitself, but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which\nman is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is\nordained to God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is\nnot the good of the universe, but God himself.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Created good is not less than that good of which man is\ncapable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is\nless than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which\nis infinite. And the participated good which is in an angel, and in\nthe whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 3\n\nWHAT IS HAPPINESS\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things\nare required for it.\n\nConcerning the first there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether happiness is something uncreated?\n\n(2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation?\n\n(3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the\nintellectual part?\n\n(4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an\noperation of the intellect, or of the will?\n\n(5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an\noperation of the speculative or of the practical intellect?\n\n(6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it\nconsists in the consideration of speculative sciences?\n\n(7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances\nviz. angels?\n\n(8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His\nEssence?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Happiness Is Something Uncreated?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For\nBoethius says (De Consol. iii): \"We must needs confess that God is\nhappiness itself.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God\nto be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several supreme\ngoods, it seems that happiness is the same as God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, happiness is the last end, to which man's will tends\nnaturally. But man's will should tend to nothing else as an end, but\nto God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr.\nChrist. i, 5, 22). Therefore happiness is the same as God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Nothing made is uncreated. But man's happiness is\nsomething made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i,\n3): \"Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy.\" Therefore\nhappiness is not something uncreated.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 2, A. 7), our end is\ntwofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain:\nthus for the miser, the end is money. Secondly there is the\nattainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired;\nthus we may say that the end of the miser is the possession of money;\nand the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable.\nIn the first sense, then, man's last end is the uncreated good,\nnamely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy\nman's will. But in the second way, man's last end is something\ncreated, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the\nattainment or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called\nhappiness. If, therefore, we consider man's happiness in its cause or\nobject, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to\nthe very essence of happiness, then it is something created.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God is happiness by His Essence: for He is happy not by\nacquisition or participation of something else, but by His Essence.\nOn the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii),\nby participation; just as they are called \"gods,\" by participation.\nAnd this participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said\nto be happy, is something created.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Happiness is called man's supreme good, because it is\nthe attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way\nas the attainment of the end is called the end.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Happiness Is an Operation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For\nthe Apostle says (Rom. 6:22): \"You have your fruit unto\nsanctification, and the end, life everlasting.\" But life is not an\noperation, but the very being of living things. Therefore the last\nend, which is happiness, is not an operation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is \"a\nstate made perfect by the aggregate of all good things.\" But state\ndoes not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy\none: since it is man's final perfection. But the meaning of operation\ndoes not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather\nsomething proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness is not an\noperation.\n\nObj. 4: Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation\ndoes not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation.\n\nObj. 5: Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations\nare many. Therefore happiness is not an operation.\n\nObj. 6: Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But\nhuman operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, or some\nother occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an\noperation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that\n\"happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In so far as man's happiness is something created,\nexisting in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For\nhappiness is man's supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect in\nso far as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect.\nConsequently happiness must consist in man's last act. But it is\nevident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the\nPhilosopher calls it \"second act\" (De Anima ii, 1): because that\nwhich has a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows\nis potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things,\ntoo, each one is said to be \"for its operation\" (De Coel ii, 3).\nTherefore man's happiness must of necessity consist in an operation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being\nof the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been\nshown (Q. 2, A. 5) that the being of a man, no matter in what it may\nconsist, is not that man's happiness; for of God alone is it true\nthat His Being is His Happiness. Secondly, life means the operation\nof the living, by which operation the principle of life is made\nactual: thus we speak of active and contemplative life, or of a life\nof pleasure. And in this sense eternal life is said to be the last\nend, as is clear from John 17:3: \"This is eternal life, that they may\nknow Thee, the only true God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness\nin general: for considered thus it is the perfect common good; and he\nsignified this by saying that happiness is \"a state made perfect by\nthe aggregate of all good things,\" thus implying that the state of a\nhappy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle\nexpressed the very essence of happiness, showing by what man is\nestablished in this state, and that it is by some kind of operation.\nAnd so it is that he proves happiness to be \"the perfect good\"\n(Ethic. i, 7).\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated in _Metaph._ ix, 7 action is twofold. One\nproceeds from the agent into outward matter, such as \"to burn\" and\n\"to cut.\" And such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an\noperation is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but rather\nof the patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an\naction that remains in the agent, such as to feel, to understand, and\nto will: and such an action is a perfection and an act of the agent.\nAnd such an operation can be happiness.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Since happiness signifies some final perfection;\naccording as various things capable of happiness can attain to\nvarious degrees of perfection, so must there be various meanings\napplied to happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially;\nsince His very Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other\nthan Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect\nof some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good:\nand this operation of theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men,\naccording to their present state of life, the final perfection is in\nrespect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this\noperation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one\nonly, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for\nthis reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be\nattained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man's\nhappiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), says that it is imperfect, and\nafter a long discussion, concludes: \"We call men happy, but only as\nmen.\" But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be \"as\nthe angels . . . in heaven\" (Matt. 22:30).\n\nConsequently in regard to this perfect happiness, the objection fails:\nbecause in that state of happiness, man's mind will be united to God\nby one, continual, everlasting operation. But in the present life, in\nas far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation\nso do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a\nparticipation of happiness: and so much the greater, as the operation\ncan be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life,\nwhich is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the\ncontemplative life, which is busied with one thing, i.e. the\ncontemplation of truth. And if at any time man is not actually engaged\nin this operation, yet since he can always easily turn to it, and\nsince he ordains the very cessation, by sleeping or occupying himself\notherwise, to the aforesaid occupation, the latter seems, as it were,\ncontinuous. From these remarks the replies to Objections 5 and 6 are\nevident.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Happiness Is an Operation of the Sensitive Part, or of the\nIntellective Part Only?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an operation of\nthe senses also. For there is no more excellent operation in man than\nthat of the senses, except the intellective operation. But in us the\nintellective operation depends on the sensitive: since \"we cannot\nunderstand without a phantasm\" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore happiness\nconsists in an operation of the senses also.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is \"a\nstate made perfect by the aggregate of all good things.\" But some\ngoods are sensible, which we attain by the operation of the senses.\nTherefore it seems that the operation of the senses is needed for\nhappiness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, happiness is the perfect good, as we find proved in\n_Ethic._ i, 7: which would not be true, were not man perfected thereby\nin all his parts. But some parts of the soul are perfected by\nsensitive operations. Therefore sensitive operation is required for\nhappiness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Irrational animals have the sensitive operation in\ncommon with us: but they have not happiness in common with us.\nTherefore happiness does not consist in a sensitive operation.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing may belong to happiness in three ways: (1)\nessentially, (2) antecedently, (3) consequently. Now the operation of\nsense cannot belong to happiness essentially. For man's happiness\nconsists essentially in his being united to the Uncreated Good, Which\nis his last end, as shown above (A. 1): to Which man cannot be united\nby an operation of his senses. Again, in like manner, because, as\nshown above (Q. 2, A. 5), man's happiness does not consist in goods\nof the body, which goods alone, however, we attain through the\noperation of the senses.\n\nNevertheless the operations of the senses can belong to happiness,\nboth antecedently and consequently: antecedently, in respect of\nimperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, since the\noperation of the intellect demands a previous operation of the sense;\nconsequently, in that perfect happiness which we await in heaven;\nbecause at the resurrection, \"from the very happiness of the soul,\"\nas Augustine says (Ep. ad Dioscor.) \"the body and the bodily senses\nwill receive a certain overflow, so as to be perfected in their\noperations\"; a point which will be explained further on when we treat\nof the resurrection (Suppl. QQ. 82-85). But then the operation\nwhereby man's mind is united to God will not depend on the senses.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This objection proves that the operation of the senses\nis required antecedently for imperfect happiness, such as can be had\nin this life.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Perfect happiness, such as the angels have, includes\nthe aggregate of all good things, by being united to the universal\nsource of all good; not that it requires each individual good. But in\nthis imperfect happiness, we need the aggregate of those goods that\nsuffice for the most perfect operation of this life.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in\nthe lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher. But in\nthe imperfect happiness of this life, it is otherwise; we advance\nfrom the perfection of the lower part to the perfection of the higher\npart.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 4]\n\nWhether, If Happiness Is in the Intellective Part, It Is an Operation\nof the Intellect or of the Will?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in an act of\nthe will. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 10, 11), that man's\nhappiness consists in peace; wherefore it is written (Ps. 147:3):\n\"Who hath placed peace in thy end [Douay: 'borders']\". But peace\npertains to the will. Therefore man's happiness is in the will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But good is the\nobject of the will. Therefore happiness consists in an operation of\nthe will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the last end corresponds to the first mover: thus\nthe last end of the whole army is victory, which is the end of the\ngeneral, who moves all the men. But the first mover in regard to\noperations is the will: because it moves the other powers, as we\nshall state further on (Q. 9, AA. 1, 3). Therefore happiness regards\nthe will.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if happiness be an operation, it must needs be man's\nmost excellent operation. But the love of God, which is an act of the\nwill, is a more excellent operation than knowledge, which is an\noperation of the intellect, as the Apostle declares (1 Cor. 13).\nTherefore it seems that happiness consists in an act of the will.\n\nObj. 5: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that \"happy is he\nwho has whatever he desires, and desires nothing amiss.\" And a little\nfurther on (6) he adds: \"He is most happy who desires well, whatever\nhe desires: for good things make a man happy, and such a man already\npossesses some good--i.e. a good will.\" Therefore happiness consists\nin an act of the will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (John 17:3): \"This is eternal life:\nthat they may know Thee, the only true God.\" Now eternal life is the\nlast end, as stated above (A. 2, ad 1). Therefore man's happiness\nconsists in the knowledge of God, which is an act of the intellect.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 2, A. 6) two things are needed\nfor happiness: one, which is the essence of happiness: the other,\nthat is, as it were, its proper accident, i.e. the delight connected\nwith it. I say, then, that as to the very essence of happiness, it is\nimpossible for it to consist in an act of the will. For it is evident\nfrom what has been said (AA. 1, 2; Q. 2, A. 7) that happiness is the\nattainment of the last end. But the attainment of the end does not\nconsist in the very act of the will. For the will is directed to the\nend, both absent, when it desires it; and present, when it is\ndelighted by resting therein. Now it is evident that the desire\nitself of the end is not the attainment of the end, but is a movement\ntowards the end: while delight comes to the will from the end being\npresent; and not conversely, is a thing made present, by the fact\nthat the will delights in it. Therefore, that the end be present to\nhim who desires it, must be due to something else than an act of the\nwill.\n\nThis is evidently the case in regard to sensible ends. For if the\nacquisition of money were through an act of the will, the covetous\nman would have it from the very moment that he wished for it. But at\nthe moment it is far from him; and he attains it, by grasping it in\nhis hand, or in some like manner; and then he delights in the money\ngot. And so it is with an intelligible end. For at first we desire to\nattain an intelligible end; we attain it, through its being made\npresent to us by an act of the intellect; and then the delighted will\nrests in the end when attained.\n\nSo, therefore, the essence of happiness consists in an act of the\nintellect: but the delight that results from happiness pertains to\nthe will. In this sense Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that\nhappiness is \"joy in truth,\" because, to wit, joy itself is the\nconsummation of happiness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Peace pertains to man's last end, not as though it were\nthe very essence of happiness; but because it is antecedent and\nconsequent thereto: antecedent, in so far as all those things are\nremoved which disturb and hinder man in attaining the last end:\nconsequent inasmuch as when man has attained his last end, he remains\nat peace, his desire being at rest.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The will's first object is not its act: just as neither\nis the first object of the sight, vision, but a visible thing.\nWherefore, from the very fact that happiness belongs to the will, as\nthe will's first object, it follows that it does not belong to it as\nits act.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The intellect apprehends the end before the will does:\nyet motion towards the end begins in the will. And therefore to the\nwill belongs that which last of all follows the attainment of the\nend, viz. delight or enjoyment.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge\nprecedes love in attaining: for \"naught is loved save what is known,\"\nas Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1). Consequently we first attain an\nintelligible end by an act of the intellect; just as we first attain\na sensible end by an act of sense.\n\nReply Obj. 5: He who has whatever he desires, is happy, because he\nhas what he desires: and this indeed is by something other than the\nact of his will. But to desire nothing amiss is needed for happiness,\nas a necessary disposition thereto. And a good will is reckoned among\nthe good things which make a man happy, forasmuch as it is an\ninclination of the will: just as a movement is reduced to the genus\nof its terminus, for instance, \"alteration\" to the genus \"quality.\"\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Happiness Is an Operation of the Speculative, or of the\nPractical Intellect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that happiness is an operation of the\npractical intellect. For the end of every creature consists in\nbecoming like God. But man is like God, by his practical intellect,\nwhich is the cause of things understood, rather than by his\nspeculative intellect, which derives its knowledge from things.\nTherefore man's happiness consists in an operation of the practical\nintellect rather than of the speculative.\n\nObj. 2: Further, happiness is man's perfect good. But the practical\nintellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative\nintellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be\ngood, in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect, but\nnot in reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect,\naccording to which we are said to be knowing or understanding.\nTherefore man's happiness consists in an act of the practical\nintellect rather than of the speculative.\n\nObj. 3: Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the\nspeculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man;\nwhereas the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to\nman himself, viz. his operations and passions. Therefore man's\nhappiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather\nthan of the speculative.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that \"contemplation\nis promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the\neverlasting perfection of our joys.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Happiness consists in an operation of the\nspeculative rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident\nfor three reasons. First because if man's happiness is an operation,\nit must needs be man's highest operation. Now man's highest operation\nis that of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and\nhis highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is the\nDivine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the\nspeculative intellect. Consequently happiness consists principally in\nsuch an operation, viz. in the contemplation of Divine things. And\nsince that \"seems to be each man's self, which is best in him,\"\naccording to _Ethic._ ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation is\nmost proper to man and most delightful to him.\n\nSecondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought\nprincipally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect\nis not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these\nvery actions are ordained to some end. Consequently it is evident that\nthe last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the\npractical intellect.\n\nThirdly, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative\nlife man has something in common with things above him, viz. with God\nand the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things\npertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in\ncommon with man, although imperfectly.\n\nTherefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life\nto come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness,\nsuch as can be had here, consists first and principally, in an\noperation of the practical intellect directing human actions and\npassions, as stated in _Ethic._ x, 7, 8.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The asserted likeness of the practical intellect to God\nis one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in\nrelation to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the\nlikeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union and\n\"information\"; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be\nanswered that, in regard to the principal thing known, which is His\nEssence, God has not practical but merely speculative knowledge.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The practical intellect is ordained to good which is\noutside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz.\nthe contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole\nman is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the practical\nintellect has not; but it directs man thereto.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument would hold, if man himself were his own\nlast end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and\npassions would be his happiness. But since man's last end is\nsomething outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an\noperation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man's happiness\nconsists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than of\nthe practical intellect.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Happiness Consists in the Consideration of Speculative Sciences?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the\nconsideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. i, 13) that \"happiness is an operation according to perfect\nvirtue.\" And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than\nthree speculative virtues--\"knowledge,\" \"wisdom\" and \"understanding,\"\nwhich all belong to the consideration of speculative sciences.\nTherefore man's final happiness consists in the consideration of\nspeculative sciences.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to be\nman's final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative\nsciences; because, as stated in _Metaph._ i, 1, \"all men naturally\ndesire to know\"; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated that\nspeculative sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore\nhappiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences.\n\nObj. 3: Further, happiness is man's final perfection. Now everything\nis perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to act.\nBut the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of\nspeculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the consideration of\nthese sciences, man's final happiness consists.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 9:23): \"Let not the wise man\nglory in his wisdom\": and this is said in reference to speculative\nsciences. Therefore man's final happiness does not consist in the\nconsideration of these.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2, ad 4), man's happiness is\ntwofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness\nwe are to understand that which attains to the true notion of\nhappiness; and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain\nthereto, but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus\nperfect prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to be\ndone; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who\nare possessed of certain particular instincts in respect of works\nsimilar to works of prudence.\n\nAccordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the\nconsideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we must observe\nthat the consideration of a speculative science does not extend\nbeyond the scope of the principles of that science: since the entire\nscience is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first\nprinciples of speculative sciences are received through the senses,\nas the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the\n_Metaphysics_ (i, 1), and at the end of the _Posterior Analytics_\n(ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences\ncannot extend farther than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man's\nfinal happiness, which is his final perfection cannot consist in the\nknowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something\nlower, except in so far as the lower partakes of something higher.\nNow it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is\nlower than man. Consequently the intellect is not perfected by the\nform of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain\nlikeness to that which is above the human intellect, viz. the\nintelligible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is by\nsomething else is reduced to that which is of itself. Therefore man's\nfinal perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above\nthe human intellect. But it has been shown (I, Q. 88, A. 2), that man\ncannot acquire through sensibles, the knowledge of separate\nsubstances, which are above the human intellect. Consequently it\nfollows that man's happiness cannot consist in the consideration of\nspeculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms there is a\nparticipation of the higher substances, so the consideration of\nspeculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect\nhappiness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of\nimperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above\n(A. 2, ad 4).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but\nalso any likeness or participation thereof.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the\nconsideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and\nperfect act.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Happiness Consists in the Knowledge of Separate Substances,\nNamely, Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man's happiness consists in the\nknowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in\na homily (xxvi in Evang.): \"It avails nothing to take part in the\nfeasts of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of angels\"; by\nwhich he means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of\nthe angels by contemplating them. Therefore it seems that man's final\nhappiness consists in contemplating the angels.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to be\nunited to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect\nfigure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of\nhuman knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, as\nDionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the\nhuman intellect consists in contemplating the angels.\n\nObj. 3: Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher\nnature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to the\nspiritual nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order,\nare the angels. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect\nis to be united to the angels by contemplation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 9:24): \"Let him that glorieth,\nglory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me.\" Therefore man's\nfinal glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of God.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), man's perfect happiness\nconsists not in that which perfects the intellect by some\nparticipation, but in that which is so by its essence. Now it is\nevident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so in so far as\nthe proper formal object of that power belongs to it. Now the proper\nobject of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of\nwhatever has participated truth, does not perfect the intellect with\nits final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the\nsame in being and in truth (Metaph. ii, 1); whatever are beings by\nparticipation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by\nparticipation: because in God alone is His Being His Essence, as\nshown in the First Part (Q. 44, A. 1). It follows that contemplation\nof Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we\nshould not admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation\nof the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of\nspeculative science.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We shall take part in the feasts of the angels, by\ncontemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God\nHimself.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to those that hold human souls to be created\nby the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man's happiness should\nconsist in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it were,\nof man with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as stated in the\nFirst Part (Q. 90, A. 3). Wherefore the final perfection of the human\nintellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of\nthe creation of the soul and of its enlightenment. Whereas the angel\nenlightens as a minister, as stated in the First Part (Q. 111, A. 2,\nad 2). Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to\nhappiness; but he is not the object of man's happiness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways.\nFirst, according to a degree of the participating power: and thus\nman's final perfection will consist in his attaining to a\ncontemplation such as that of the angels. Secondly, as the object is\nattained by the power: and thus the final perfection of each power is\nto attain that in which is found the fulness of its formal object.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 3, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Man's Happiness Consists in the Vision of the Divine Essence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man's happiness does not consist in\nthe vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i)\nthat by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God\nas to something altogether unknown. But that which is seen in its\nessence is not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of\nthe intellect, namely, happiness, does not consist in God being seen\nin His Essence.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher\nnature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the\nDivine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human\nintellect does not reach to this, but consists in something less.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 3:2): \"When He shall appear,\nwe shall be like to Him; and [Vulg.: 'because'] we shall see Him as\nHe is.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing\nelse than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two\npoints must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so\nlong as something remains for him to desire and seek: secondly, that\nthe perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its\nobject. Now the object of the intellect is \"what a thing is,\" i.e.\nthe essence of a thing, according to _De Anima_ iii, 6. Wherefore the\nintellect attains perfection, in so far as it knows the essence of a\nthing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of some effect,\nwhereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e. to\nknow of the cause \"what it is\"; that intellect cannot be said to\nreach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the\neffect the knowledge that the cause is. Consequently, when man knows\nan effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in\nthe man the desire to know about the cause, \"what it is.\" And this\ndesire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the\nbeginning of the _Metaphysics_ (i, 2). For instance, if a man,\nknowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some\ncause, and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from\nwondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he\narrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause.\n\nIf therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created\neffect, knows no more of God than \"that He is\"; the perfection of\nthat intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there\nremains in it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is\nnot yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the\nintellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And\nthus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that\nobject, in which alone man's happiness consists, as stated above (AA.\n1, 7; Q. 2, A. 8).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers\njourneying towards happiness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8), the end has a twofold\nacceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in\nthis way, the same thing is the end of the higher and of the lower\nnature, and indeed of all things, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8).\nSecondly, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the\nhigher nature is different from that of the lower, according to their\nrespective habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of God,\nWho, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than\nthat of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 4\n\nOF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE REQUIRED FOR HAPPINESS\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe have now to consider those things that are required for happiness:\nand concerning this there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether delight is required for happiness?\n\n(2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision?\n\n(3) Whether comprehension is required?\n\n(4) Whether rectitude of the will is required?\n\n(5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?\n\n(6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?\n\n(7) Whether any external goods are necessary?\n\n(8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Delight Is Required for Happiness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that delight is not required for happiness.\nFor Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that \"vision is the entire reward\nof faith.\" But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the\nPhilosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides\nvision is required for happiness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, happiness is \"the most self-sufficient of all\ngoods,\" as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which\nneeds something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence\nof happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 8);\nit seems that delight is not necessary for happiness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the \"operation of bliss or happiness should be\nunhindered\" (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of\nthe intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi,\n5). Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is\n\"joy in truth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ One thing may be necessary for another in four ways.\nFirst, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is\nnecessary for science. Secondly, as perfecting it: thus the soul is\nnecessary for the life of the body. Thirdly, as helping it from\nwithout: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourthly,\nas something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat is\nnecessary for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for\nhappiness. For it is caused by the appetite being at rest in the good\nattained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the\nattainment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant\ndelight.\n\nReply Obj. 1: From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone,\nthe will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists\ndelight. Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of\nreward.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he\nwho sees God cannot need delight.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the\nintellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in\n_Ethic._ x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care\nand perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is extraneous to\nthe operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the\nattention because, as already observed, we are more attentive to\nthose things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to one\nthing, we must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on\naccount of opposition; thus a sensual delight that is contrary to\nreason, hinders the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the\nestimate of the speculative intellect.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 2]\n\nWhether in Happiness Vision Ranks Before Delight?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before\nvision. For \"delight is the perfection of operation\" (Ethic. x, 4).\nBut perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight\nranks before the operation of the intellect, i.e. vision.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet\nmore desirable. But operations are desired on account of the delight\nthey afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those\noperations which are necessary for the preservation of the individual\nand of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations.\nTherefore, in happiness, delight ranks before the operation of the\nintellect, which is vision.\n\nObj. 3: Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or\nenjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, as\nthe Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks\nbefore vision.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The cause is greater than its effect. But vision\nis the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.\n\n_I answer that,_ The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x,\n4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully,\nthe operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank\nbefore delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will.\nNow that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of\nthe goodness of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will\nreposes in an operation, the will's repose is caused by the goodness\nof the operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose;\nfor thus the very act of the will would be the end, which has been\ndisproved above (Q. 1, A. 1, ad 2;Q. 3, A. 4): but it seeks to be at\nrest in the operation, because that operation is its good.\nConsequently it is evident that the operation in which the will\nreposes ranks before the resting of the will therein.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) \"delight perfects\noperation as vigor perfects youth,\" because it is a result of youth.\nConsequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a\nperfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own species.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the\nuniversal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And\nconsequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in\nanimals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the\nintellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which\nresults in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather\nthan to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the\nAuthor of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the\noperations. And we should form our estimate of things not simply\naccording to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather\naccording to the order of the intellectual appetite.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Charity does not seek the beloved good for the sake of\ndelight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good\ngained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its\nend, but vision does, whereby the end is first made present to\ncharity.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Comprehension Is Necessary for Happiness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for\nhappiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum; [*Cf.\nSerm. xxxciii De Verb. Dom.]): \"To reach God with the mind is\nhappiness, to comprehend Him is impossible.\" Therefore happiness is\nwithout comprehension.\n\nObj. 2: Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his\nintellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the\nintellect and will, as stated in the First Part (QQ. 79 and\nfollowing). But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by seeing\nGod, and the will by enjoying Him. Therefore there is no need for\ncomprehension as a third.\n\nObj. 3: Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations\nare determined by their objects: and there are two universal objects,\nthe true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and\ngood to delight. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a\nthird.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:24): \"So run that you\nmay comprehend [Douay: 'obtain'].\" But happiness is the goal of the\nspiritual race: hence he says (2 Tim. 4:7, 8): \"I have fought a good\nfight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith; as to the\nrest there is laid up for me a crown of justice.\" Therefore\ncomprehension is necessary for Happiness.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since Happiness consists in gaining the last end,\nthose things that are required for Happiness must be gathered from\nthe way in which man is ordered to an end. Now man is ordered to an\nintelligible end partly through his intellect, and partly through his\nwill: through his intellect, in so far as a certain imperfect\nknowledge of the end pre-exists in the intellect: through the will,\nfirst by love which is the will's first movement towards anything;\nsecondly, by a real relation of the lover to the thing beloved, which\nrelation may be threefold. For sometimes the thing beloved is present\nto the lover: and then it is no longer sought for. Sometimes it is\nnot present, and it is impossible to attain it: and then, too, it is\nnot sought for. But sometimes it is possible to attain it, yet it is\nraised above the capability of the attainer, so that he cannot have\nit forthwith; and this is the relation of one that hopes, to that\nwhich he hopes for, and this relation alone causes a search for the\nend. To these three, there are a corresponding three in Happiness\nitself. For perfect knowledge of the end corresponds to imperfect\nknowledge; presence of the end corresponds to the relation of hope;\nbut delight in the end now present results from love, as already\nstated (A. 2, ad 3). And therefore these three must concur with\nHappiness; to wit, vision, which is perfect knowledge of the\nintelligible end; comprehension, which implies presence of the end;\nand delight or enjoyment, which implies repose of the lover in the\nobject beloved.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Comprehension is twofold. First, inclusion of the\ncomprehended in the comprehensor; and thus whatever is comprehended\nby the finite, is itself finite. Wherefore God cannot be thus\ncomprehended by a created intellect. Secondly, comprehension means\nnothing but the holding of something already present and possessed:\nthus one who runs after another is said to comprehend [*In English we\nshould say 'catch.'] him when he lays hold on him. And in this sense\ncomprehension is necessary for Happiness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as hope and love pertain to the will, because it\nis the same one that loves a thing, and that tends towards it while\nnot possessed, so, too, comprehension and delight belong to the will,\nsince it is the same that possesses a thing and reposes therein.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Comprehension is not a distinct operation from vision;\nbut a certain relation to the end already gained. Wherefore even\nvision itself, or the thing seen, inasmuch as it is present, is the\nobject of comprehension.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Rectitude of the Will Is Necessary for Happiness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that rectitude of the will is not\nnecessary for Happiness. For Happiness consists essentially in an\noperation of the intellect, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 4). But\nrectitude of the will, by reason of which men are said to be clean of\nheart, is not necessary for the perfect operation of the intellect:\nfor Augustine says (Retract. i, 4) \"I do not approve of what I said\nin a prayer: O God, Who didst will none but the clean of heart to\nknow the truth. For it can be answered that many who are not clean of\nheart, know many truths.\" Therefore rectitude of the will is not\nnecessary for Happiness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what precedes does not depend on what follows. But\nthe operation of the intellect precedes the operation of the will.\nTherefore Happiness, which is the perfect operation of the intellect,\ndoes not depend on rectitude of the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is ordained to another as its end, is not\nnecessary, when the end is already gained; as a ship, for instance,\nafter arrival in port. But rectitude of will, which is by reason of\nvirtue, is ordained to Happiness as to its end. Therefore, Happiness\nonce obtained, rectitude of the will is no longer necessary.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 5:8): \"Blessed are the clean\nof heart; for they shall see God\": and (Heb. 12:14): \"Follow peace\nwith all men, and holiness; without which no man shall see God.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Rectitude of will is necessary for Happiness both\nantecedently and concomitantly. Antecedently, because rectitude of\nthe will consists in being duly ordered to the last end. Now the end\nin comparison to what is ordained to the end is as form compared to\nmatter. Wherefore, just as matter cannot receive a form, unless it be\nduly disposed thereto, so nothing gains an end, except it be duly\nordained thereto. And therefore none can obtain Happiness, without\nrectitude of the will. Concomitantly, because as stated above (Q. 3,\nA. 8), final Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence,\nWhich is the very essence of goodness. So that the will of him who\nsees the Essence of God, of necessity, loves, whatever he loves, in\nsubordination to God; just as the will of him who sees not God's\nEssence, of necessity, loves whatever he loves, under the common\nnotion of good which he knows. And this is precisely what makes the\nwill right. Wherefore it is evident that Happiness cannot be without\na right will.\n\n[Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of knowledge of truth that is\nnot the essence of goodness itself.]\n\nReply Obj. 2: Every act of the will is preceded by an act of the\nintellect: but a certain act of the will precedes a certain act of\nthe intellect. For the will tends to the final act of the intellect\nwhich is happiness. And consequently right inclination of the will is\nrequired antecedently for happiness, just as the arrow must take a\nright course in order to strike the target.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with\nthe getting of the end: but only that which involves imperfection,\nsuch as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer\nnecessary when the end has been gained: but the due order to the end\nis necessary.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Body Is Necessary for Man's Happiness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the body is necessary for Happiness.\nFor the perfection of virtue and grace presupposes the perfection of\nnature. But Happiness is the perfection of virtue and grace. Now the\nsoul, without the body, has not the perfection of nature; since it is\nnaturally a part of human nature, and every part is imperfect while\nseparated from its whole. Therefore the soul cannot be happy without\nthe body.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Happiness is a perfect operation, as stated above\n(Q. 3, AA. 2, 5). But perfect operation follows perfect being: since\nnothing operates except in so far as it is an actual being. Since,\ntherefore, the soul has not perfect being, while it is separated from\nthe body, just as neither has a part, while separate from its whole;\nit seems that the soul cannot be happy without the body.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Happiness is the perfection of man. But the soul,\nwithout the body, is not man. Therefore Happiness cannot be in the\nsoul separated from the body.\n\nObj. 4: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 13) \"the\noperation of bliss,\" in which operation happiness consists, is \"not\nhindered.\" But the operation of the separate soul is hindered;\nbecause, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), the soul \"has a\nnatural desire to rule the body, the result of which is that it is\nheld back, so to speak, from tending with all its might to the\nheavenward journey,\" i.e. to the vision of the Divine Essence.\nTherefore the soul cannot be happy without the body.\n\nObj. 5: Further, Happiness is the sufficient good and lulls desire.\nBut this cannot be said of the separated soul; for it yet desires to\nbe united to the body, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35).\nTherefore the soul is not happy while separated from the body.\n\nObj. 6: Further, in Happiness man is equal to the angels. But the\nsoul without the body is not equal to the angels, as Augustine says\n(Gen. ad lit. xii, 35). Therefore it is not happy.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Apoc. 14:13): \"Happy [Douay:\n'blessed'] are the dead who die in the Lord.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Happiness is twofold; the one is imperfect and is had\nin this life; the other is perfect, consisting in the vision of God.\nNow it is evident that the body is necessary for the happiness of this\nlife. For the happiness of this life consists in an operation of the\nintellect, either speculative or practical. And the operation of the\nintellect in this life cannot be without a phantasm, which is only in\na bodily organ, as was shown in the First Part (Q. 84, AA. 6, 7).\nConsequently that happiness which can be had in this life, depends, in\na way, on the body. But as to perfect Happiness, which consists in the\nvision of God, some have maintained that it is not possible to the\nsoul separated from the body; and have said that the souls of saints,\nwhen separated from their bodies, do not attain to that Happiness\nuntil the Day of Judgment, when they will receive their bodies back\nagain. And this is shown to be false, both by authority and by reason.\nBy authority, since the Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6): \"While we are in\nthe body, we are absent from the Lord\"; and he points out the reason\nof this absence, saying: \"For we walk by faith and not by sight.\" Now\nfrom this it is clear that so long as we walk by faith and not by\nsight, bereft of the vision of the Divine Essence, we are not present\nto the Lord. But the souls of the saints, separated from their bodies,\nare in God's presence; wherefore the text continues: \"But we are\nconfident and have a good will to be absent . . . from the body, and\nto be present with the Lord.\" Whence it is evident that the souls of\nthe saints, separated from their bodies, \"walk by sight,\" seeing the\nEssence of God, wherein is true Happiness.\n\nAgain this is made clear by reason. For the intellect needs not the\nbody, for its operation, save on account of the phantasms, wherein it\nlooks on the intelligible truth, as stated in the First Part (Q. 84,\nA. 7). Now it is evident that the Divine Essence cannot be seen by\nmeans of phantasms, as stated in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 3).\nWherefore, since man's perfect Happiness consists in the vision of\nthe Divine Essence, it does not depend on the body. Consequently,\nwithout the body the soul can be happy.\n\nWe must, however, notice that something may belong to a thing's\nperfection in two ways. First, as constituting the essence thereof;\nthus the soul is necessary for man's perfection. Secondly, as\nnecessary for its well-being: thus, beauty of body and keenness of\nperfection belong to man's perfection. Wherefore though the body does\nnot belong in the first way to the perfection of human Happiness, yet\nit does in the second way. For since operation depends on a thing's\nnature, the more perfect is the soul in its nature, the more\nperfectly it has its proper operation, wherein its happiness\nconsists. Hence, Augustine, after inquiring (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35)\n\"whether that perfect Happiness can be ascribed to the souls of the\ndead separated from their bodies,\" answers \"that they cannot see the\nUnchangeable Substance, as the blessed angels see It; either for some\nother more hidden reason, or because they have a natural desire to\nrule the body.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Happiness is the perfection of the soul on the part of\nthe intellect, in respect of which the soul transcends the organs of\nthe body; but not according as the soul is the natural form of the\nbody. Wherefore the soul retains that natural perfection in respect\nof which happiness is due to it, though it does not retain that\nnatural perfection in respect of which it is the form of the body.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The relation of the soul to being is not the same as\nthat of other parts: for the being of the whole is not that of any\nindividual part: wherefore, either the part ceases altogether to be,\nwhen the whole is destroyed, just as the parts of an animal, when the\nanimal is destroyed; or, if they remain, they have another actual\nbeing, just as a part of a line has another being from that of the\nwhole line. But the human soul retains the being of the composite\nafter the destruction of the body: and this because the being of the\nform is the same as that of its matter, and this is the being of the\ncomposite. Now the soul subsists in its own being, as stated in the\nFirst Part (Q. 75, A. 2). It follows, therefore, that after being\nseparated from the body it has perfect being and that consequently it\ncan have a perfect operation; although it has not the perfect\nspecific nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Happiness belongs to man in respect of his intellect:\nand, therefore, since the intellect remains, it can have Happiness.\nThus the teeth of an Ethiopian, in respect of which he is said to be\nwhite, can retain their whiteness, even after extraction.\n\nReply Obj. 4: One thing is hindered by another in two ways. First, by\nway of opposition; thus cold hinders the action of heat: and such a\nhindrance to operation is repugnant to Happiness. Secondly, by way of\nsome kind of defect, because, to wit, that which is hindered has not\nall that is necessary to make it perfect in every way: and such a\nhindrance to operation is not incompatible with Happiness, but\nprevents it from being perfect in every way. And thus it is that\nseparation from the body is said to hold the soul back from tending\nwith all its might to the vision of the Divine Essence. For the soul\ndesires to enjoy God in such a way that the enjoyment also may\noverflow into the body, as far as possible. And therefore, as long as\nit enjoys God, without the fellowship of the body, its appetite is at\nrest in that which it has, in such a way, that it would still wish\nthe body to attain to its share.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The desire of the separated soul is entirely at rest,\nas regards the thing desired; since, to wit, it has that which\nsuffices its appetite. But it is not wholly at rest, as regards the\ndesirer, since it does not possess that good in every way that it\nwould wish to possess it. Consequently, after the body has been\nresumed, Happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent.\n\nReply Obj. 6: The statement made (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35) to the effect\nthat \"the souls of the departed see not God as the angels do,\" is not\nto be understood as referring to inequality of quantity; because even\nnow some souls of the Blessed are raised to the higher orders of the\nangels, thus seeing God more clearly than the lower angels. But it\nrefers to inequality of proportion: because the angels, even the\nlowest, have every perfection of Happiness that they ever will have,\nwhereas the separated souls of the saints have not.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Perfection of the Body Is Necessary for Happiness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that perfection of the body is not\nnecessary for man's perfect Happiness. For perfection of the body is\na bodily good. But it has been shown above (Q. 2) that Happiness does\nnot consist in bodily goods. Therefore no perfect disposition of the\nbody is necessary for man's Happiness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, man's Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine\nEssence, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 8). But the body has no part in\nthis operation, as shown above (A. 5). Therefore no disposition of\nthe body is necessary for Happiness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the more the intellect is abstracted from the body,\nthe more perfectly it understands. But Happiness consists in the most\nperfect operation of the intellect. Therefore the soul should be\nabstracted from the body in every way. Therefore, in no way is a\ndisposition of the body necessary for Happiness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Happiness is the reward of virtue; wherefore it is\nwritten (John 13:17): \"You shall be blessed, if you do them.\" But the\nreward promised to the saints is not only that they shall see and\nenjoy God, but also that their bodies shall be well-disposed; for it\nis written (Isa. 66:14): \"You shall see and your heart shall rejoice,\nand your bones shall flourish like a herb.\" Therefore good\ndisposition of the body is necessary for Happiness.\n\n_I answer that,_ If we speak of that happiness which man can acquire\nin this life, it is evident that a well-disposed body is of necessity\nrequired for it. For this happiness consists, according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. i, 13) in \"an operation according to perfect\nvirtue\"; and it is clear that man can be hindered, by indisposition\nof the body, from every operation of virtue.\n\nBut speaking of perfect Happiness, some have maintained that no\ndisposition of body is necessary for Happiness; indeed, that it is\nnecessary for the soul to be entirely separated from the body. Hence\nAugustine (De Civ. Dei xxii, 26) quotes the words of Porphyry who said\nthat \"for the soul to be happy, it must be severed from everything\ncorporeal.\" But this is unreasonable. For since it is natural to the\nsoul to be united to the body; it is not possible for the perfection\nof the soul to exclude its natural perfection.\n\nConsequently, we must say that perfect disposition of the body is\nnecessary, both antecedently and consequently, for that Happiness\nwhich is in all ways perfect. Antecedently, because, as Augustine\nsays (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35), \"if the body be such, that the\ngovernance thereof is difficult and burdensome, like unto flesh which\nis corruptible and weighs upon the soul, the mind is turned away from\nthat vision of the highest heaven.\" Whence he concludes that, \"when\nthis body will no longer be 'natural,' but 'spiritual,' then will it\nbe equalled to the angels, and that will be its glory, which\nerstwhile was its burden.\" Consequently, because from the Happiness\nof the soul there will be an overflow on to the body, so that this\ntoo will obtain its perfection. Hence Augustine says (Ep. ad\nDioscor.) that \"God gave the soul such a powerful nature that from\nits exceeding fulness of happiness the vigor of incorruption\noverflows into the lower nature.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Happiness does not consist in bodily good as its\nobject: but bodily good can add a certain charm and perfection to\nHappiness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although the body has no part in that operation of the\nintellect whereby the Essence of God is seen, yet it might prove a\nhindrance thereto. Consequently, perfection of the body is necessary,\nlest it hinder the mind from being lifted up.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The perfect operation of the intellect requires indeed\nthat the intellect be abstracted from this corruptible body which\nweighs upon the soul; but not from the spiritual body, which will be\nwholly subject to the spirit. On this point we shall treat in the\nThird Part of this work (Suppl., Q. 82, seqq.).\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Any External Goods Are Necessary for Happiness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that external goods also are necessary for\nHappiness. For that which is promised the saints for reward, belongs\nto Happiness. But external goods are promised the saints; for\ninstance, food and drink, wealth and a kingdom: for it is said (Luke\n22:30): \"That you may eat and drink at My table in My kingdom\": and\n(Matt. 6:20): \"Lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven\": and (Matt.\n25:34): \"Come, ye blessed of My Father, possess you the kingdom.\"\nTherefore external goods are necessary for Happiness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Boethius (De Consol. iii): happiness is\n\"a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things.\" But some\nof man's goods are external, although they be of least account, as\nAugustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19). Therefore they too are\nnecessary for Happiness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Our Lord said (Matt. 5:12): \"Your reward is very\ngreat in heaven.\" But to be in heaven implies being in a place.\nTherefore at least external place is necessary for Happiness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 72:25): \"For what have I in\nheaven? and besides Thee what do I desire upon earth?\" As though to\nsay: \"I desire nothing but this, \"--\"It is good for me to adhere to my\nGod.\" Therefore nothing further external is necessary for Happiness.\n\n_I answer that,_ For imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this\nlife, external goods are necessary, not as belonging to the essence\nof happiness, but by serving as instruments to happiness, which\nconsists in an operation of virtue, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 13. For\nman needs in this life, the necessaries of the body, both for the\noperation of contemplative virtue, and for the operation of active\nvirtue, for which latter he needs also many other things by means of\nwhich to perform its operations.\n\nOn the other hand, such goods as these are nowise necessary for\nperfect Happiness, which consists in seeing God. The reason of this is\nthat all suchlike external goods are requisite either for the support\nof the animal body; or for certain operations which belong to human\nlife, which we perform by means of the animal body: whereas that\nperfect Happiness which consists in seeing God, will be either in the\nsoul separated from the body, or in the soul united to the body then\nno longer animal but spiritual. Consequently these external goods are\nnowise necessary for that Happiness, since they are ordained to the\nanimal life. And since, in this life, the felicity of contemplation,\nas being more Godlike, approaches nearer than that of action to the\nlikeness of that perfect Happiness, therefore it stands in less need\nof these goods of the body as stated in _Ethic._ x, 8.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All those material promises contained in Holy\nScripture, are to be understood metaphorically, inasmuch as Scripture\nis wont to express spiritual things under the form of things\ncorporeal, in order \"that from things we know, we may rise to the\ndesire of things unknown,\" as Gregory says (Hom. xi in Evang.). Thus\nfood and drink signify the delight of Happiness; wealth, the\nsufficiency of God for man; the kingdom, the lifting up of man to\nunion of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: These goods that serve for the animal life, are\nincompatible with that spiritual life wherein perfect Happiness\nconsists. Nevertheless in that Happiness there will be the aggregate\nof all good things, because whatever good there be in these things, we\nshall possess it all in the Supreme Fount of goodness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: According to Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte\ni, 5), it is not material heaven that is described as the reward of\nthe saints, but a heaven raised on the height of spiritual goods.\nNevertheless a bodily place, viz. the empyrean heaven, will be\nappointed to the Blessed, not as a need of Happiness, but by reason of\na certain fitness and adornment.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Fellowship of Friends Is Necessary for Happiness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness.\nFor future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under the\nname of \"glory.\" But glory consists in man's good being brought to the\nnotice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends is necessary for\nHappiness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Boethius [*Seneca, Ep. 6] says that \"there is no\ndelight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it\nwith us.\" But delight is necessary for Happiness. Therefore fellowship\nof friends is also necessary.\n\nObj. 3: Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity\nincludes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems that\nfellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 7:11): \"All good things came to\nme together with her,\" i.e. with divine wisdom, which consists in\ncontemplating God. Consequently nothing else is necessary for\nHappiness.\n\n_I answer that,_ If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy\nman needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not,\nindeed, to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to\ndelight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation\nof virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may\ndo good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do good; and\nagain that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order\nthat man may do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in\nthose of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends.\n\nBut if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our heavenly\nFatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential to Happiness;\nsince man has the entire fulness of his perfection in God. But the\nfellowship of friends conduces to the well-being of Happiness. Hence\nAugustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25) that \"the spiritual creatures\nreceive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity, truth,\nand charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from\nwithout, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and\nrejoice in God, at their fellowship.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: That glory which is essential to Happiness, is that\nwhich man has, not with man but with God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This saying is to be understood of the possession of\ngood that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the question\nunder consideration; because man possesses in God a sufficiency of\nevery good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Perfection of charity is essential to Happiness, as to\nthe love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore if\nthere were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though\nhaving no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor to be there,\nlove of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently,\nfriendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect Happiness.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 5\n\nOF THE ATTAINMENT OF HAPPINESS\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the attainment of Happiness. Under this heading\nthere are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether man can attain Happiness?\n\n(2) Whether one man can be happier than another?\n\n(3) Whether any man can be happy in this life?\n\n(4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost?\n\n(5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers?\n\n(6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher\ncreature?\n\n(7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may\nobtain Happiness of God?\n\n(8) Whether every man desires Happiness?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Man Can Attain Happiness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just\nas the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual is\nabove the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in\nseveral passages. But irrational animals that have the sensitive\nnature only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore\nneither can man, who is of rational nature, attain the end of the\nintellectual nature, which is Happiness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, True Happiness consists in seeing God, Who is pure\nTruth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material\nthings: wherefore \"he understands the intelligible species in the\nphantasm\" (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain Happiness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign Good.\nBut we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle.\nSince, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount\nis midway between God and human nature; it seems that he cannot\nattain Happiness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 93:12): \"Blessed is the man\nwhom Thou shalt instruct, O Lord.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good.\nWhoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain\nHappiness. Now, that man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved\nboth because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect\ngood, and because his will can desire it. And therefore man can\nattain Happiness. This can be proved again from the fact that man is\ncapable of seeing God, as stated in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 1): in\nwhich vision, as we stated above (Q. 3, A. 8) man's perfect Happiness\nconsists.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The rational exceeds the sensitive nature, otherwise\nthan the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the rational\nexceeds the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its\nknowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the\nuniversal, whereas the reason has knowledge thereof. But the\nintellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing\nthe same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps\nforthwith the truth which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry\nof reason, as was made clear in the First Part (Q. 58, A. 3; Q. 79,\nA. 8). Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which\nthe intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can attain\nHappiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but\notherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained it forthwith\nafter the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after a\ntime. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To man in the present state of life the natural way of\nknowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after this\nstate of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the First\nPart (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 89, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of nature\nso as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an\noperation of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the\nangels something that makes men happy; and when he has attained it,\nhe will be perfectly happy.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 2]\n\nWhether One Man Can Be Happier Than Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one man cannot be happier than\nanother. For Happiness is \"the reward of virtue,\" as the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of\nvirtue; because it is written (Matt. 20:10) that all who labor in the\nvineyard \"received every man a penny\"; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix\nin Evang.), \"each was equally rewarded with eternal life.\" Therefore\none man cannot be happier than another.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can\nsurpass the supreme. Therefore one man's Happiness cannot be\nsurpassed by another's.\n\nObj. 3: Further, since Happiness is \"the perfect and sufficient good\"\n(Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man's desire. But his desire is not\nat rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack\nnothing that he can get, there can be no still greater good.\nTherefore either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other\nHappiness can be greater.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 14:2): \"In My Father's house\nthere are many mansions\"; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii\nin Joan.) signify \"the diverse dignities of merits in the one eternal\nlife.\" But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to\nmerit, is Happiness itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of\nHappiness, and Happiness is not equally in all.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 2, A. 7), Happiness\nimplies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e. the Sovereign\nGood; and the attainment or enjoyment of that same Good. As to that\nGood itself, Which is the object and cause of Happiness, one\nHappiness cannot be greater than another, since there is but one\nSovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy.\nBut as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good, one man can be\nhappier than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the\nhappier he is. Now, that one man enjoys God more than another,\nhappens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment\nof Him. And in this sense one man can be happier than another.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The one penny signifies that Happiness is one in its\nobject. But the many mansions signify the manifold Happiness in the\ndivers degrees of enjoyment.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Happiness is said to be the supreme good, inasmuch as\nit is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme Good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good;\nsince they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is \"the good of all\ngood,\" as Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. 134). But one is said to be\nhappier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same\ngood. And the addition of other goods does not increase Happiness,\nsince Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): \"He who knows Thee, and others\nbesides, is not the happier for knowing them, but is happy for knowing\nThee alone.\"\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 3]\n\nWhether One Can Be Happy in This Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For\nit is written (Ps. 118:1): \"Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who\nwalk in the law of the Lord.\" But this happens in this life. Therefore\none can be happy in this life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good does\nnot destroy the nature of Happiness, otherwise one would not be\nhappier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good\nin this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly.\nTherefore man can be happy in this life.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false:\nsince what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature\ndoes not fail altogether. Now many say that Happiness can be had in\nthis life, as appears from Ps. 143:15: \"They have called the people\nhappy that hath these things,\" to wit, the good things in this life.\nTherefore one can be happy in this life.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 14:1): \"Man born of a woman,\nliving for a short time, is filled with many miseries.\" But Happiness\nexcludes misery. Therefore man cannot be happy in this life.\n\n_I answer that,_ A certain participation of Happiness can be had in\nthis life: but perfect and true Happiness cannot be had in this life.\nThis may be seen from a twofold consideration.\n\nFirst, from the general notion of happiness. For since happiness is a\n\"perfect and sufficient good,\" it excludes every evil, and fulfils\nevery desire. But in this life every evil cannot be excluded. For\nthis present life is subject to many unavoidable evils; to ignorance\non the part of the intellect; to inordinate affection on the part of\nthe appetite, and to many penalties on the part of the body; as\nAugustine sets forth in De Civ. Dei xix, 4. Likewise neither can the\ndesire for good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires\nthe good, which he has, to be abiding. Now the goods of the present\nlife pass away; since life itself passes away, which we naturally\ndesire to have, and would wish to hold abidingly, for man naturally\nshrinks from death. Wherefore it is impossible to have true Happiness\nin this life.\n\nSecondly, from a consideration of the specific nature of Happiness,\nviz. the vision of the Divine Essence, which man cannot obtain in\nthis life, as was shown in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 11). Hence it is\nevident that none can attain true and perfect Happiness in this life.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some are said to be happy in this life, either on\naccount of the hope of obtaining Happiness in the life to come,\naccording to Rom. 8:24: \"We are saved by hope\"; or on account of a\ncertain participation of Happiness, by reason of a kind of enjoyment\nof the Sovereign Good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The imperfection of participated Happiness is due to\none of two causes. First, on the part of the object of Happiness,\nwhich is not seen in Its Essence: and this imperfection destroys the\nnature of true Happiness. Secondly, the imperfection may be on the\npart of the participator, who indeed attains the object of Happiness,\nin itself, namely, God: imperfectly, however, in comparison with the\nway in which God enjoys Himself. This imperfection does not destroy\nthe true nature of Happiness; because, since Happiness is an\noperation, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 2), the true nature of Happiness\nis taken from the object, which specifies the act, and not from the\nsubject.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Men esteem that there is some kind of happiness to be\nhad in this life, on account of a certain likeness to true Happiness.\nAnd thus they do not fail altogether in their estimate.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Happiness Once Had Can Be Lost?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be lost. For Happiness\nis a perfection. But every perfection is in the thing perfected\naccording to the mode of the latter. Since then man is, by his\nnature, changeable, it seems that Happiness is participated by man in\na changeable manner. And consequently it seems that man can lose\nHappiness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Happiness consists in an act of the intellect; and\nthe intellect is subject to the will. But the will can be directed to\nopposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation\nwhereby man is made happy: and thus man will cease to be happy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the end corresponds to the beginning. But man's\nHappiness has a beginning, since man was not always happy. Therefore\nit seems that it has an end.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 25:46) of the righteous that\n\"they shall go . . . into life everlasting,\" which, as above stated\n(A. 2), is the Happiness of the saints. Now what is eternal ceases\nnot. Therefore Happiness cannot be lost.\n\n_I answer that,_ If we speak of imperfect happiness, such as can be\nhad in this life, in this sense it can be lost. This is clear of\ncontemplative happiness, which is lost either by forgetfulness, for\ninstance, when knowledge is lost through sickness; or again by\ncertain occupations, whereby a man is altogether withdrawn from\ncontemplation.\n\nThis is also clear of active happiness: since man's will can be\nchanged so as to fall to vice from the virtue, in whose act that\nhappiness principally consists. If, however, the virtue remain\nunimpaired, outward changes can indeed disturb such like happiness,\nin so far as they hinder many acts of virtue; but they cannot take it\naway altogether because there still remains an act of virtue, whereby\nman bears these trials in a praiseworthy manner. And since the\nhappiness of this life can be lost, a circumstance that appears to be\ncontrary to the nature of happiness, therefore did the Philosopher\nstate (Ethic. i, 10) that some are happy in this life, not simply,\nbut \"as men,\" whose nature is subject to change.\n\nBut if we speak of that perfect Happiness which we await after this\nlife, it must be observed that Origen (Peri Archon. ii, 3), following\nthe error of certain Platonists, held that man can become unhappy\nafter the final Happiness.\n\nThis, however, is evidently false, for two reasons. First, from the\ngeneral notion of happiness. For since happiness is the \"perfect and\nsufficient good,\" it must needs set man's desire at rest and exclude\nevery evil. Now man naturally desires to hold to the good that he\nhas, and to have the surety of his holding: else he must of necessity\nbe troubled with the fear of losing it, or with the sorrow of knowing\nthat he will lose it. Therefore it is necessary for true Happiness\nthat man have the assured opinion of never losing the good that he\npossesses. If this opinion be true, it follows that he never will\nlose happiness: but if it be false, it is in itself an evil that he\nshould have a false opinion: because the false is the evil of the\nintellect, just as the true is its good, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 2.\nConsequently he will no longer be truly happy, if evil be in him.\n\nSecondly, it is again evident if we consider the specific nature of\nHappiness. For it has been shown above (Q. 3, A. 8) that man's\nperfect Happiness consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now\nit is impossible for anyone seeing the Divine Essence, to wish not to\nsee It. Because every good that one possesses and yet wishes to be\nwithout, is either insufficient, something more sufficing being\ndesired in its stead; or else has some inconvenience attached to it,\nby reason of which it becomes wearisome. But the vision of the Divine\nEssence fills the soul with all good things, since it unites it to\nthe source of all goodness; hence it is written (Ps. 16:15): \"I shall\nbe satisfied when Thy glory shall appear\"; and (Wis. 7:11): \"All good\nthings came to me together with her,\" i.e. with the contemplation of\nwisdom. In like manner neither has it any inconvenience attached to\nit; because it is written of the contemplation of wisdom (Wis. 8:16):\n\"Her conversation hath no bitterness, nor her company any\ntediousness.\" It is thus evident that the happy man cannot forsake\nHappiness of his own accord. Moreover, neither can he lose Happiness,\nthrough God taking it away from him. Because, since the withdrawal of\nHappiness is a punishment, it cannot be enforced by God, the just\nJudge, except for some fault; and he that sees God cannot fall into a\nfault, since rectitude of the will, of necessity, results from that\nvision as was shown above (Q. 4, A. 4). Nor again can it be withdrawn\nby any other agent. Because the mind that is united to God is raised\nabove all other things: and consequently no other agent can sever the\nmind from that union. Therefore it seems unreasonable that as time\ngoes on, man should pass from happiness to misery, and vice versa;\nbecause such like vicissitudes of time can only be for such things as\nare subject to time and movement.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Happiness is consummate perfection, which excludes\nevery defect from the happy. And therefore whoever has happiness has\nit altogether unchangeably: this is done by the Divine power, which\nraises man to the participation of eternity which transcends all\nchange.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The will can be directed to opposites, in things which\nare ordained to the end; but it is ordained, of natural necessity, to\nthe last end. This is evident from the fact that man is unable not to\nwish to be happy.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Happiness has a beginning owing to the condition of the\nparticipator: but it has no end by reason of the condition of the\ngood, the participation of which makes man happy. Hence the beginning\nof happiness is from one cause, its endlessness is from another.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Man Can Attain Happiness by His Natural Powers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man can attain Happiness by his\nnatural powers. For nature does not fail in necessary things. But\nnothing is so necessary to man as that by which he attains the last\nend. Therefore this is not lacking to human nature. Therefore man\ncan attain Happiness by his natural powers.\n\nObj. 2: Further, since man is more noble than irrational creatures,\nit seems that he must be better equipped than they. But irrational\ncreatures can attain their end by their natural powers. Much more\ntherefore can man attain Happiness by his natural powers.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Happiness is a \"perfect operation,\" according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. vii, 13). Now the beginning of a thing belongs to\nthe same principle as the perfecting thereof. Since, therefore, the\nimperfect operation, which is as the beginning in human operations,\nis subject to man's natural power, whereby he is master of his own\nactions; it seems that he can attain to perfect operation, i.e.\nHappiness, by his natural powers.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Man is naturally the principle of his action, by\nhis intellect and will. But final Happiness prepared for the saints,\nsurpasses the intellect and will of man; for the Apostle says (1 Cor.\n2:9) \"Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither hath it entered into\nthe heart of man, what things God hath prepared for them that love\nHim.\" Therefore man cannot attain Happiness by his natural powers.\n\n_I answer that,_ Imperfect happiness that can be had in this life,\ncan be acquired by man by his natural powers, in the same way as\nvirtue, in whose operation it consists: on this point we shall speak\nfurther on (Q. 63). But man's perfect Happiness, as stated above (Q.\n3, A. 8), consists in the vision of the Divine Essence. Now the\nvision of God's Essence surpasses the nature not only of man, but\nalso of every creature, as was shown in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 4).\nFor the natural knowledge of every creature is in keeping with the\nmode of his substance: thus it is said of the intelligence (De\nCausis; Prop. viii) that \"it knows things that are above it, and\nthings that are below it, according to the mode of its substance.\"\nBut every knowledge that is according to the mode of created\nsubstance, falls short of the vision of the Divine Essence, which\ninfinitely surpasses all created substance. Consequently neither man,\nnor any creature, can attain final Happiness by his natural powers.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as nature does not fail man in necessaries,\nalthough it has not provided him with weapons and clothing, as it\nprovided other animals, because it gave him reason and hands, with\nwhich he is able to get these things for himself; so neither did it\nfail man in things necessary, although it gave him not the wherewithal\nto attain Happiness: since this it could not do. But it did give him\nfree-will, with which he can turn to God, that He may make him happy.\n\"For what we do by means of our friends, is done, in a sense, by\nourselves\" (Ethic. iii, 3).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The nature that can attain perfect good, although it\nneeds help from without in order to attain it, is of more noble\ncondition than a nature which cannot attain perfect good, but attains\nsome imperfect good, although it need no help from without in order\nto attain it, as the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 12). Thus he is\nbetter disposed to health who can attain perfect health, albeit by\nmeans of medicine, than he who can attain but imperfect health,\nwithout the help of medicine. And therefore the rational creature,\nwhich can attain the perfect good of happiness, but needs the Divine\nassistance for the purpose, is more perfect than the irrational\ncreature, which is not capable of attaining this good, but attains\nsome imperfect good by its natural powers.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When imperfect and perfect are of the same species,\nthey can be caused by the same power. But this does not follow of\nnecessity, if they be of different species: for not everything, that\ncan cause the disposition of matter, can produce the final\nperfection. Now the imperfect operation, which is subject to man's\nnatural power, is not of the same species as that perfect operation\nwhich is man's happiness: since operation takes its species from its\nobject. Consequently the argument does not prove.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Man Attains Happiness Through the Action of Some Higher\nCreature?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man can be made happy through the\naction of some higher creature, viz. an angel. For since we observe a\ntwofold order in things--one, of the parts of the universe to one\nanother, the other, of the whole universe to a good which is outside\nthe universe; the former order is ordained to the second as to its end\n(Metaph. xii, 10). Thus the mutual order of the parts of an army is\ndependent on the order of the parts of an army is dependent on the\norder of the whole army to the general. But the mutual order of the\nparts of the universe consists in the higher creatures acting on the\nlower, as stated in the First Part (Q. 109, A. 2): while happiness\nconsists in the order of man to a good which is outside the universe,\ni.e. God. Therefore man is made happy, through a higher creature, viz.\nan angel, acting on him.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is such in potentiality, can be reduced\nto act, by that which is such actually: thus what is potentially hot,\nis made actually hot, by something that is actually hot. But man is\npotentially happy. Therefore he can be made actually happy by an\nangel who is actually happy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Happiness consists in an operation of the intellect\nas stated above (Q. 3, A. 4). But an angel can enlighten man's\nintellect as shown in the First Part (Q. 111, A. 1). Therefore an\nangel can make a man happy.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 83:12): \"The Lord will give\ngrace and glory.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since every creature is subject to the laws of\nnature, from the very fact that its power and action are limited:\nthat which surpasses created nature, cannot be done by the power of\nany creature. Consequently if anything need to be done that is above\nnature, it is done by God immediately; such as raising the dead to\nlife, restoring sight to the blind, and such like. Now it has been\nshown above (A. 5) that Happiness is a good surpassing created\nnature. Therefore it is impossible that it be bestowed through the\naction of any creature: but by God alone is man made happy, if we\nspeak of perfect Happiness. If, however, we speak of imperfect\nhappiness, the same is to be said of it as of the virtue, in whose\nact it consists.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It often happens in the case of active powers ordained\nto one another, that it belongs to the highest power to reach the\nlast end, while the lower powers contribute to the attainment of that\nlast end, by causing a disposition thereto: thus to the art of\nsailing, which commands the art of shipbuilding, it belongs to use a\nship for the end for which it was made. Thus, too, in the order of\nthe universe, man is indeed helped by the angels in the attainment of\nhis last end, in respect of certain preliminary dispositions thereto:\nwhereas he attains the last end itself through the First Agent, which\nis God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When a form exists perfectly and naturally in\nsomething, it can be the principle of action on something else: for\ninstance a hot thing heats through heat. But if a form exist in\nsomething imperfectly, and not naturally, it cannot be the principle\nwhereby it is communicated to something else: thus the _intention_ of\ncolor which is in the pupil, cannot make a thing white; nor indeed\ncan everything enlightened or heated give heat or light to something\nelse; for if they could, enlightening and heating would go on to\ninfinity. But the light of glory, whereby God is seen, is in God\nperfectly and naturally; whereas in any creature, it is imperfectly\nand by likeness or participation. Consequently no creature can\ncommunicate its Happiness to another.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a\nlower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not as to\nthe vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the First Part (Q.\n106, A. 1): since in order to see this, all are immediately\nenlightened by God.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Any Good Works Are Necessary That Man May Receive Happiness\nfrom God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no works of man are necessary that he\nmay obtain Happiness from God. For since God is an agent of infinite\npower, He requires before acting, neither matter, nor disposition of\nmatter, but can forthwith produce the whole effect. But man's works,\nsince they are not required for Happiness, as the efficient cause\nthereof, as stated above (A. 6), can be required only as\ndispositions thereto. Therefore God who does not require dispositions\nbefore acting, bestows Happiness without any previous works.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as God is the immediate cause of Happiness, so\nis He the immediate cause of nature. But when God first established\nnature, He produced creatures without any previous disposition or\naction on the part of the creature, but made each one perfect\nforthwith in its species. Therefore it seems that He bestows\nHappiness on man without any previous works.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 4:6) that Happiness is of the\nman \"to whom God reputeth justice without works.\" Therefore no works\nof man are necessary for attaining Happiness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 13:17): \"If you know these\nthings, you shall be blessed if you do them.\" Therefore Happiness is\nobtained through works.\n\n_I answer that,_ Rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 4),\nis necessary for Happiness; since it is nothing else than the right\norder of the will to the last end; and it is therefore necessary for\nobtaining the end, just as the right disposition of matter, in order\nto receive the form. But this does not prove that any work of man\nneed precede his Happiness: for God could make a will having a right\ntendency to the end, and at the same time attaining the end; just as\nsometimes He disposes matter and at the same time introduces the\nform. But the order of Divine wisdom demands that it should not be\nthus; for as is stated in _De Coelo_ ii, 12, \"of those things that\nhave a natural capacity for the perfect good, one has it without\nmovement, some by one movement, some by several.\" Now to possess the\nperfect good without movement, belongs to that which has it\nnaturally: and to have Happiness naturally belongs to God alone.\nTherefore it belongs to God alone not to be moved towards Happiness\nby any previous operation. Now since Happiness surpasses every\ncreated nature, no pure creature can becomingly gain Happiness,\nwithout the movement of operation, whereby it tends thereto. But the\nangel, who is above man in the natural order, obtained it, according\nto the order of Divine wisdom, by one movement of a meritorious work,\nas was explained in the First Part (Q. 62, A. 5); whereas man obtains\nit by many movements of works which are called merits. Wherefore also\naccording to the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 9), happiness is the reward\nof works of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Works are necessary to man in order to gain Happiness;\nnot on account of the insufficiency of the Divine power which bestows\nHappiness, but that the order in things be observed.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God produced the first creatures so that they are\nperfect forthwith, without any previous disposition or operation of\nthe creature; because He instituted the first individuals of the\nvarious species, that through them nature might be propagated to\ntheir progeny. In like manner, because Happiness was to be bestowed\non others through Christ, who is God and Man, \"Who,\" according to\nHeb. 2:10, \"had brought many children into glory\"; therefore, from\nthe very beginning of His conception, His soul was happy, without any\nprevious meritorious operation. But this is peculiar to Him: for\nChrist's merit avails baptized children for the gaining of Happiness,\nthough they have no merits of their own; because by Baptism they are\nmade members of Christ.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Apostle is speaking of the Happiness of Hope, which\nis bestowed on us by sanctifying grace, which is not given on account\nof previous works. For grace is not a term of movement, as Happiness\nis; rather is it the principle of the movement that tends towards\nHappiness.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 5, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Every Man Desires Happiness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that not all desire Happiness. For no man\ncan desire what he knows not; since the apprehended good is the object\nof the appetite (De Anima iii, 10). But many know not what Happiness\nis. This is evident from the fact that, as Augustine says (De Trin.\nxiii, 4), \"some thought that Happiness consists in pleasures of the\nbody; some, in a virtue of the soul; some in other things.\" Therefore\nnot all desire Happiness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the essence of Happiness is the vision of the Divine\nEssence, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 8). But some consider it\nimpossible for man to see the Divine Essence; wherefore they desire\nit not. Therefore all men do not desire Happiness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 5) that \"happy is he\nwho has all he desires, and desires nothing amiss.\" But all do not\ndesire this; for some desire certain things amiss, and yet they wish\nto desire such things. Therefore all do not desire Happiness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xiii, 3): \"If that actor\nhad said: 'You all wish to be happy; you do not wish to be unhappy,'\nhe would have said that which none would have failed to acknowledge\nin his will.\" Therefore everyone desires to be happy.\n\n_I answer that,_ Happiness can be considered in two ways. First\naccording to the general notion of happiness: and thus, of necessity,\nevery man desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness\nconsists in the perfect good, as stated above (AA. 3, 4). But since\ngood is the object of the will, the perfect good of a man is that\nwhich entirely satisfies his will. Consequently to desire happiness\nis nothing else than to desire that one's will be satisfied. And this\neveryone desires. Secondly we may speak of Happiness according to its\nspecific notion, as to that in which it consists. And thus all do not\nknow Happiness; because they know not in what thing the general\nnotion of happiness is found. And consequently, in this respect, not\nall desire it. Wherefore the reply to the first Objection is clear.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since the will follows the apprehension of the\nintellect or reason; just as it happens that where there is no real\ndistinction, there may be a distinction according to the\nconsideration of reason; so does it happen that one and the same\nthing is desired in one way, and not desired in another. So that\nhappiness may be considered as the final and perfect good, which is\nthe general notion of happiness: and thus the will naturally and of\nnecessity tends thereto, as stated above. Again it can be considered\nunder other special aspects, either on the part of the operation\nitself, or on the part of the operating power, or on the part of the\nobject; and thus the will does not tend thereto of necessity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This definition of Happiness given by some--\"Happy is\nthe man that has all he desires,\" or, \"whose every wish is\nfulfilled,\" is a good and adequate definition, if it be understood in\na certain way; but an inadequate definition if understood in another.\nFor if we understand it simply of all that man desires by his natural\nappetite, thus it is true that he who has all that he desires, is\nhappy: since nothing satisfies man's natural desire, except the\nperfect good which is Happiness. But if we understand it of those\nthings that man desires according to the apprehension of the reason,\nthus it does not belong to Happiness, to have certain things that man\ndesires; rather does it belong to unhappiness, in so far as the\npossession of such things hinders man from having all that he desires\nnaturally; thus it is that reason sometimes accepts as true things\nthat are a hindrance to the knowledge of truth. And it was through\ntaking this into consideration that Augustine added so as to include\nperfect Happiness--that he \"desires nothing amiss\": although the\nfirst part suffices if rightly understood, to wit, that \"happy is he\nwho has all he desires.\"\n________________________\n\nTREATISE ON HUMAN ACTS: ACTS PECULIAR TO MAN (QQ. 6-21)\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 6\n\nOF THE VOLUNTARY AND THE INVOLUNTARY\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nSince therefore Happiness is to be gained by means of certain acts,\nwe must in due sequence consider human acts, in order to know by what\nacts we may obtain Happiness, and by what acts we are prevented from\nobtaining it. But because operations and acts are concerned with\nthings singular, consequently all practical knowledge is incomplete\nunless it take account of things in detail. The study of Morals,\ntherefore, since it treats of human acts, should consider first the\ngeneral principles; and secondly matters of detail.\n\nIn treating of the general principles, the points that offer\nthemselves for our consideration are (1) human acts themselves; (2)\ntheir principles. Now of human acts some are proper to man; others\nare common to man and animals. And since Happiness is man's proper\ngood, those acts which are proper to man have a closer connection\nwith Happiness than have those which are common to man and the other\nanimals. First, then, we must consider those acts which are proper to\nman; secondly, those acts which are common to man and the other\nanimals, and are called Passions. The first of these points offers a\ntwofold consideration: (1) What makes a human act? (2) What\ndistinguishes human acts?\n\nAnd since those acts are properly called human which are voluntary,\nbecause the will is the rational appetite, which is proper to man; we\nmust consider acts in so far as they are voluntary.\n\nFirst, then, we must consider the voluntary and involuntary in\ngeneral; secondly, those acts which are voluntary, as being elicited\nby the will, and as issuing from the will immediately; thirdly, those\nacts which are voluntary, as being commanded by the will, which issue\nfrom the will through the medium of the other powers.\n\nAnd because voluntary acts have certain circumstances, according to\nwhich we form our judgment concerning them, we must first consider\nthe voluntary and the involuntary, and afterwards, the circumstances\nof those acts which are found to be voluntary or involuntary. Under\nthe first head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there is anything voluntary in human acts?\n\n(2) Whether in irrational animals?\n\n(3) Whether there can be voluntariness without any action?\n\n(4) Whether violence can be done to the will?\n\n(5) Whether violence causes involuntariness?\n\n(6) Whether fear causes involuntariness?\n\n(7) Whether concupiscence causes involuntariness?\n\n(8) Whether ignorance causes involuntariness?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Is Anything Voluntary in Human Acts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in human\nacts. For that is voluntary \"which has its principle within itself.\"\nas Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Natura Hom. xxxii.], Damascene (De\nFide Orth. ii, 24), and Aristotle (Ethic. iii, 1) declare. But the\nprinciple of human acts is not in man himself, but outside him: since\nman's appetite is moved to act, by the appetible object which is\noutside him, and is as a \"mover unmoved\" (De Anima iii, 10).\nTherefore there is nothing voluntary in human acts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 2) proves that in\nanimals no new movement arises that is not preceded by a motion from\nwithout. But all human acts are new, since none is eternal.\nConsequently, the principle of all human acts is from without: and\ntherefore there is nothing voluntary in them.\n\nObj. 3: Further, he that acts voluntarily, can act of himself. But\nthis is not true of man; for it is written (John 15:5): \"Without Me\nyou can do nothing.\" Therefore there is nothing voluntary in human\nacts.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii) that \"the\nvoluntary is an act consisting in a rational operation.\" Now such are\nhuman acts. Therefore there is something voluntary in human acts.\n\n_I answer that,_ There must needs be something voluntary in human\nacts. In order to make this clear, we must take note that the\nprinciple of some acts or movements is within the agent, or that\nwhich is moved; whereas the principle of some movements or acts is\noutside. For when a stone is moved upwards, the principle of this\nmovement is outside the stone: whereas when it is moved downwards,\nthe principle of this movement is in the stone. Now of those things\nthat are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, some\nnot. For since every agent or thing moved, acts or is moved for an\nend, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 2); those are perfectly moved by an\nintrinsic principle, whose intrinsic principle is one not only of\nmovement but of movement for an end. Now in order for a thing to be\ndone for an end, some knowledge of the end is necessary. Therefore,\nwhatever so acts or is moved by an intrinsic principle, that it has\nsome knowledge of the end, has within itself the principle of its\nact, so that it not only acts, but acts for an end. On the other\nhand, if a thing has no knowledge of the end, even though it have an\nintrinsic principle of action or movement, nevertheless the principle\nof acting or being moved for an end is not in that thing, but in\nsomething else, by which the principle of its action towards an end\nis not in that thing, but in something else, by which the principle\nof its action towards an end is imprinted on it. Wherefore such like\nthings are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others.\nBut those things which have a knowledge of the end are said to move\nthemselves because there is in them a principle by which they not\nonly act but also act for an end. And consequently, since both are\nfrom an intrinsic principle, to wit, that they act and that they act\nfor an end, the movements of such things are said to be voluntary:\nfor the word \"voluntary\" implies that their movements and acts are\nfrom their own inclination. Hence it is that, according to the\ndefinitions of Aristotle, Gregory of Nyssa, and Damascene [*See\nObjection 1], the voluntary is defined not only as having \"a principle\nwithin\" the agent, but also as implying \"knowledge.\" Therefore, since\nman especially knows the end of his work, and moves himself, in his\nacts especially is the voluntary to be found.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Not every principle is a first principle. Therefore,\nalthough it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be\nwithin the agent, nevertheless it is not contrary to the nature of\nthe voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be caused or moved by\nan extrinsic principle: because it is not essential to the voluntary\nact that its intrinsic principle be a first principle. Yet again it\nmust be observed that a principle of movement may happen to be first\nin a genus, but not first simply: thus in the genus of things subject\nto alteration, the first principle of alteration is a heavenly body,\nwhich nevertheless is not the first mover simply, but is moved\nlocally by a higher mover. And so the intrinsic principle of the\nvoluntary act, i.e. the cognitive and appetitive power, is the first\nprinciple in the genus of appetitive movement, although it is moved\nby an extrinsic principle according to other species of movement.\n\nReply Obj. 2: New movements in animals are indeed preceded by a\nmotion from without; and this in two respects. First, in so far as by\nmeans of an extrinsic motion an animal's senses are confronted with\nsomething sensible, which, on being apprehended, moves the appetite.\nThus a lion, on seeing a stag in movement and coming towards him,\nbegins to be moved towards the stag. Secondly, in so far as some\nextrinsic motion produces a physical change in an animal's body, as\nin the case of cold or heat; and through the body being affected by\nthe motion of an outward body, the sensitive appetite which is the\npower of a bodily organ, is also moved indirectly; thus it happens\nthat through some alteration in the body the appetite is roused to\nthe desire of something. But this is not contrary to the nature of\nvoluntariness, as stated above (ad 1), for such movements caused by\nan extrinsic principle are of another genus of movement.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God moves man to act, not only by proposing the\nappetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but\nalso by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the\nwill or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as\nit is not incompatible with nature that the natural movement be from\nGod as the First Mover, inasmuch as nature is an instrument of God\nmoving it: so it is not contrary to the essence of a voluntary act,\nthat it proceed from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God.\nNevertheless both natural and voluntary movements have this in common,\nthat it is essential that they should proceed from a principle within\nthe agent.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Is Anything Voluntary in Irrational Animals?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is nothing voluntary in\nirrational animals. For a thing is called \"voluntary\" from _voluntas_\n(will). Now since the will is in the reason (De Anima iii, 9), it\ncannot be in irrational animals. Therefore neither is there anything\nvoluntary in them.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according as human acts are voluntary, man is said\nto be master of his actions. But irrational animals are not masters\nof their actions; for \"they act not; rather are they acted upon,\" as\nDamascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 27). Therefore there is no such\nthing as a voluntary act in irrational animals.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. 24) that \"voluntary\nacts lead to praise and blame.\" But neither praise nor blame is due\nto the acts of irrational minds. Therefore such acts are not\nvoluntary.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that \"both\nchildren and irrational animals participate in the voluntary.\" The\nsame is said by Damascene (De Fide Orth. 24) and Gregory of Nyssa\n[*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxii.].\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it is essential to the\nvoluntary act that its principle be within the agent, together with\nsome knowledge of the end. Now knowledge of the end is twofold;\nperfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not\nonly apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it\nunder the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that\nend. And such knowledge belongs to none but the rational nature. But\nimperfect knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the\nend, without knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship\nof an act to the end. Such knowledge of the end is exercised by\nirrational animals, through their senses and their natural estimative\npower.\n\nConsequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to the perfect\nvoluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man can, from\ndeliberating about the end and the means thereto, be moved, or not,\nto gain that end. But imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the\nimperfect voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but\ndoes not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once. Wherefore the\nvoluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature:\nwhereas the imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even\nirrational animals.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The will is the name of the rational appetite; and\nconsequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason. But the word\n\"voluntary\" is derived from \"voluntas\" (will), and can be extended to\nthose things in which there is some participation of will, by way of\nlikeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to\nirrational animals, in so far as they are moved to an end, through\nsome kind of knowledge.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The fact that man is master of his actions, is due to\nhis being able to deliberate about them: for since the deliberating\nreason is indifferently disposed to opposite things, the will can be\ninclined to either. But it is not thus that voluntariness is in\nirrational animals, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Praise and blame are the result of the voluntary act,\nwherein is the perfect voluntary; such as is not to be found in\nirrational animals.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Can Be Voluntariness Without Any Act?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any\nact. For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing\ncan proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act\nof the will. Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without act.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as one is said to wish by an act of the will,\nso when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to wish. But not\nto wish implies involuntariness, which is contrary to voluntariness.\nTherefore there can be nothing voluntary when the act of the will\nceases.\n\nObj. 3: Further, knowledge is essential to the voluntary, as stated\nabove (AA. 1, 2). But knowledge involves an act. Therefore\nvoluntariness cannot be without some act.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The word \"voluntary\" is applied to that of which\nwe are masters. Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to\nact, to will and not to will. Therefore just as to act and to will\nare voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will.\n\n_I answer that,_ Voluntary is what proceeds from the will. Now one\nthing proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly; in which\nsense something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts;\nfor instance, heating from heat. Secondly, indirectly; in which sense\nsomething proceeds from another through this other not acting; thus\nthe sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman, from his having\nceased to steer. But we must take note that the cause of what follows\nfrom want of action is not always the agent as not acting; but only\nthen when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman were\nunable to steer the ship or if the ship's helm be not entrusted to\nhim, the sinking of the ship would not be set down to him, although\nit might be due to his absence from the helm.\n\nSince, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes\nought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing and\nnot-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will. And\nthus it is that we can have the voluntary without an act; sometimes\nwithout outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one\nwills not to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as when\none does not will to act.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We apply the word \"voluntary\" not only to that which\nproceeds from the will directly, as from its action; but also to that\nwhich proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction.\n\nReply Obj. 2: \"Not to wish\" is said in two senses. First, as though\nit were one word, and the infinitive of \"I-do-not-wish.\" Consequently\njust as when I say \"I do not wish to read,\" the sense is, \"I wish not\nto read\"; so \"not to wish to read\" is the same as \"to wish not to\nread,\" and in this sense \"not to wish\" implies involuntariness.\nSecondly it is taken as a sentence: and then no act of the will is\naffirmed. And in this sense \"not to wish\" does not imply\ninvoluntariness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same\nway as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in\none's power to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just as not to\nwish, and not to act, when it is time to wish and to act, is\nvoluntary, so is it voluntary not to consider.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Violence Can Be Done to the Will?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For\neverything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But there\nis something, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will.\nTherefore it can be compelled, at least by Him.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active\nprinciple, when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive force:\nfor it is a \"mover moved\" (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore, since it is\nsometimes moved by its active principle, it seems that sometimes it\nis compelled.\n\nObj. 3: Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to\nnature. But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature;\nas is clear of the will's movement to sin, which is contrary to\nnature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20). Therefore the\nmovement of the will can be compelled.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that what is\ndone by the will is not done of necessity. Now, whatever is done under\ncompulsion is done of necessity: consequently what is done by the\nwill, cannot be compelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to\nact.\n\n_I answer that,_ The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate\nact, as it were, elicited by it, namely, \"to wish\"; the other is an\nact of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of\nsome other power, such as \"to walk\" and \"to speak,\" which are\ncommanded by the will to be executed by means of the motive power.\n\nAs regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer\nviolence, in so far as violence can prevent the exterior members from\nexecuting the will's command. But as to the will's own proper act,\nviolence cannot be done to the will.\n\nThe reason of this is that the act of the will is nothing else than\nan inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge:\njust as the natural appetite is an inclination proceeding from an\ninterior principle without knowledge. Now what is compelled or\nviolent is from an exterior principle. Consequently it is contrary to\nthe nature of the will's own act, that it should be subject to\ncompulsion and violence: just as it is also contrary to the nature of\na natural inclination or movement. For a stone may have an upward\nmovement from violence, but that this violent movement be from its\nnatural inclination is impossible. In like manner a man may be\ndragged by force: but it is contrary to the very notion of violence,\nthat he be dragged of his own will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God Who is more powerful than the human will, can move\nthe will of man, according to Prov. 21:1: \"The heart of the king is\nin the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it.\" But\nif this were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an act of the\nwill, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against\nthe will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is not always a violent movement, when a passive\nsubject is moved by its active principle; but only when this is done\nagainst the interior inclination of the passive subject. Otherwise\nevery alteration and generation of simple bodies would be unnatural\nand violent: whereas they are natural by reason of the natural\ninterior aptitude of the matter or subject to such a disposition. In\nlike manner when the will is moved, according to its own inclination,\nby the appetible object, this movement is not violent but voluntary.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That to which the will tends by sinning, although in\nreality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, nevertheless\nis apprehended as something good and suitable to nature, in so far as\nit is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some\nvicious habit.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Violence Causes Involuntariness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that violence does not cause\ninvoluntariness. For we speak of voluntariness and involuntariness\nin respect of the will. But violence cannot be done to the will, as\nshown above (A. 4). Therefore violence cannot cause involuntariness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is done involuntarily is done with grief,\nas Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii,\n5) say. But sometimes a man suffers compulsion without being grieved\nthereby. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is from the will cannot be involuntary. But\nsome violent actions proceed from the will: for instance, when a man\nwith a heavy body goes upwards; or when a man contorts his limbs in a\nway contrary to their natural flexibility. Therefore violence does\nnot cause involuntariness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) and Damascene (De\nFide Orth. ii, 24) say that \"things done under compulsion are\ninvoluntary.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as\nlikewise to the natural. For the voluntary and the natural have this\nin common, that both are from an intrinsic principle; whereas\nviolence is from an extrinsic principle. And for this reason, just as\nin things devoid of knowledge, violence effects something against\nnature: so in things endowed with knowledge, it effects something\nagainst the will. Now that which is against nature is said to be\n\"unnatural\"; and in like manner that which is against the will is\nsaid to be \"involuntary.\" Therefore violence causes involuntariness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Now it has\nbeen said (A. 4) that not only the act, which proceeds immediately\nfrom the will, is called voluntary, but also the act commanded by the\nwill. Consequently, as to the act which proceeds immediately from the\nwill, violence cannot be done to the will, as stated above (A. 4):\nwherefore violence cannot make that act involuntary. But as to the\ncommanded act, the will can suffer violence: and consequently in this\nrespect violence causes involuntariness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As that is said to be natural, which is according to\nthe inclination of nature; so that is said to be voluntary, which is\naccording to the inclination of the will. Now a thing is said to be\nnatural in two ways. First, because it is from nature as from an\nactive principle: thus it is natural for fire to produce heat.\nSecondly, according to a passive principle; because, to wit, there is\nin nature an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic\nprinciple: thus the movement of the heavens is said to be natural, by\nreason of the natural aptitude in a heavenly body to receive such\nmovement; although the cause of that movement is a voluntary agent.\nIn like manner an act is said to be voluntary in two ways. First, in\nregard to action, for instance, when one wishes to be passive to\nanother. Hence when action is brought to bear on something, by an\nextrinsic agent, as long as the will to suffer that action remains in\nthe passive subject, there is not violence simply: for although the\npatient does nothing by way of action, he does something by being\nwilling to suffer. Consequently this cannot be called involuntary.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. viii, 4) the movement of\nan animal, whereby at times an animal is moved against the natural\ninclination of the body, although it is not natural to the body, is\nnevertheless somewhat natural to the animal, to which it is natural\nto be moved according to its appetite. Accordingly this is violent,\nnot simply but in a certain respect. The same remark applies in the\ncase of one who contorts his limbs in a way that is contrary to their\nnatural disposition. For this is violent in a certain respect, i.e.\nas to that particular limb; but not simply, i.e. as to the man\nhimself.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Fear Causes Involuntariness Simply?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fear causes involuntariness simply.\nFor just as violence regards that which is contrary to the will at the\ntime, so fear regards a future evil which is repugnant to the will.\nBut violence causes involuntariness simply. Therefore fear too causes\ninvoluntariness simply.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is such of itself, remains such, whatever\nbe added to it: thus what is hot of itself, as long as it\nremains, is still hot, whatever be added to it. But that which is done\nthrough fear, is involuntary in itself. Therefore, even with the\naddition of fear, it is involuntary.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is such, subject to a condition, is\nsuch in a certain respect; whereas what is such, without any\ncondition, is such simply: thus what is necessary, subject to a\ncondition, is necessary in some respect: but what is necessary\nabsolutely, is necessary simply. But that which is done through\nfear, is absolutely involuntary; and is not voluntary, save under a\ncondition, namely, in order that the evil feared may be avoided.\nTherefore that which is done through fear, is involuntary simply.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx.] and\nthe Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that such things as are done\nthrough fear are \"voluntary rather than involuntary.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii) and likewise\nGregory of Nyssa in his book on Man (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxx), such\nthings are done through fear \"are of a mixed character,\" being partly\nvoluntary and partly involuntary. For that which is done through fear,\nconsidered in itself, is not voluntary; but it becomes voluntary in\nthis particular case, in order, namely, to avoid the evil feared.\n\nBut if the matter be considered aright, such things are voluntary\nrather than involuntary; for they are voluntary simply, but\ninvoluntary in a certain respect. For a thing is said to be simply,\naccording as it is in act; but according as it is only in\napprehension, it is not simply, but in a certain respect. Now that\nwhich is done through fear, is in act in so far as it is done. For,\nsince acts are concerned with singulars; and the singular, as such,\nis here and now; that which is done is in act, in so far as it is\nhere and now and under other individuating circumstances. And that\nwhich is done through fear is voluntary, inasmuch as it is here and\nnow, that is to say, in so far as, under the circumstances, it\nhinders a greater evil which was feared; thus the throwing of the\ncargo into the sea becomes voluntary during the storm, through fear\nof the danger: wherefore it is clear that it is voluntary simply. And\nhence it is that what is done out of fear is essentially voluntary,\nbecause its principle is within. But if we consider what is done\nthrough fear, as outside this particular case, and inasmuch as it is\nrepugnant to the will, this is merely a consideration of the mind.\nAnd consequently what is done through fear is involuntary, considered\nin that respect, that is to say, outside the actual circumstances of\nthe case.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Things done through fear and compulsion differ not only\naccording to present and future time, but also in this, that the will\ndoes not consent, but is moved entirely counter to that which is done\nthrough compulsion: whereas what is done through fear, becomes\nvoluntary, because the will is moved towards it, albeit not for its\nown sake, but on account of something else, that is, in order to\navoid an evil which is feared. For the conditions of a voluntary act\nare satisfied, if it be done on account of something else voluntary:\nsince the voluntary is not only what we wish, for its own sake, as an\nend, but also what we wish for the sake of something else, as an end.\nIt is clear therefore that in what is done from compulsion, the will\ndoes nothing inwardly; whereas in what is done through fear, the will\ndoes something. Accordingly, as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat.\nHom. xxx.] says, in order to exclude things done through fear, a\nviolent action is defined as not only one, \"the princip[le] whereof\nis from without,\" but with the addition, \"in which he that suffers\nviolence concurs not at all\"; because the will of him that is in\nfear, does concur somewhat in that which he does through fear.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Things that are such absolutely, remain such, whatever\nbe added to them; for instance, a cold thing, or a white thing: but\nthings that are such relatively, vary according as they are compared\nwith different things. For what is big in comparison with one thing,\nis small in comparison with another. Now a thing is said to be\nvoluntary, not only for its own sake, as it were absolutely; but also\nfor the sake of something else, as it were relatively. Accordingly,\nnothing prevents a thing which was not voluntary in comparison with\none thing, from becoming voluntary when compared with another.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That which is done through fear, is voluntary without\nany condition, that is to say, according as it is actually done: but\nit is involuntary, under a certain condition, that is to say, if such\na fear were not threatening. Consequently, this argument proves\nrather the opposite.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Concupiscence Causes Involuntariness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that concupiscence causes involuntariness.\nFor just as fear is a passion, so is concupiscence. But fear causes\ninvoluntariness to a certain extent. Therefore concupiscence does so\ntoo.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as the timid man through fear acts counter to\nthat which he proposed, so does the incontinent, through\nconcupiscence. But fear causes involuntariness to a certain extent.\nTherefore concupiscence does so also.\n\nObj. 3: Further, knowledge is necessary for voluntariness. But\nconcupiscence impairs knowledge; for the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi,\n5) that \"delight,\" or the lust of pleasure, \"destroys the judgment of\nprudence.\" Therefore concupiscence causes involuntariness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24): \"The\ninvoluntary act deserves mercy or indulgence, and is done with\nregret.\" But neither of these can be said of that which is done out\nof concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence does not cause\ninvoluntariness.\n\n_I answer that,_ Concupiscence does not cause involuntariness, but on\nthe contrary makes something to be voluntary. For a thing is said to\nbe voluntary, from the fact that the will is moved to it. Now\nconcupiscence inclines the will to desire the object of\nconcupiscence. Therefore the effect of concupiscence is to make\nsomething to be voluntary rather than involuntary.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Fear regards evil, but concupiscence regards good. Now\nevil of itself is counter to the will, whereas good harmonizes with\nthe will. Therefore fear has a greater tendency than concupiscence to\ncause involuntariness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: He who acts from fear retains the repugnance of the\nwill to that which he does, considered in itself. But he that acts\nfrom concupiscence, e.g. an incontinent man, does not retain his\nformer will whereby he repudiated the object of his concupiscence;\nfor his will is changed so that he desires that which previously he\nrepudiated. Accordingly, that which is done out of fear is\ninvoluntary, to a certain extent, but that which is done from\nconcupiscence is nowise involuntary. For the man who yields to\nconcupiscence acts counter to that which he purposed at first, but\nnot counter to that which he desires now; whereas the timid man acts\ncounter to that which in itself he desires now.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If concupiscence were to destroy knowledge altogether,\nas happens with those whom concupiscence has rendered mad, it would\nfollow that concupiscence would take away voluntariness. And yet\nproperly speaking it would not result in the act being involuntary,\nbecause in things bereft of reason, there is neither voluntary nor\ninvoluntary. But sometimes in those actions which are done from\nconcupiscence, knowledge is not completely destroyed, because the\npower of knowing is not taken away entirely, but only the actual\nconsideration in some particular possible act. Nevertheless, this\nitself is voluntary, according as by voluntary we mean that which is\nin the power of the will, for example \"not to act\" or \"not to will,\"\nand in like manner \"not to consider\"; for the will can resist the\npassion, as we shall state later on (Q. 10, A. 3; Q. 77, A.)\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 6, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Ignorance Causes Involuntariness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that ignorance does not cause\ninvoluntariness. For \"the involuntary act deserves pardon,\" as\nDamascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But sometimes that which is\ndone through ignorance does not deserve pardon, according to 1 Cor.\n14:38: \"If any man know not, he shall not be known.\" Therefore\nignorance does not cause involuntariness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every sin implies ignorance; according to Prov.\n14:22: \"They err, that work evil.\" If, therefore, ignorance causes\ninvoluntariness, it would follow that every sin is involuntary: which\nis opposed to the saying of Augustine, that \"every sin is voluntary\"\n(De Vera Relig. xiv).\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"involuntariness is not without sadness,\" as\nDamascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 24). But some things are done out\nof ignorance, but without sadness: for instance, a man may kill a\nfoe, whom he wishes to kill, thinking at the time that he is killing\na stag. Therefore ignorance does not cause involuntariness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) say that \"what is done through ignorance\nis involuntary.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ If ignorance causes involuntariness, it is in so far\nas it deprives one of knowledge, which is a necessary condition of\nvoluntariness, as was declared above (A. 1). But it is not every\nignorance that deprives one of this knowledge. Accordingly, we must\ntake note that ignorance has a threefold relationship to the act of\nthe will: in one way, \"concomitantly\"; in another, \"consequently\"; in\na third way, \"antecedently.\" \"Concomitantly,\" when there is ignorance\nof what is done; but, so that even if it were known, it would be\ndone. For then, ignorance does not induce one to wish this to be\ndone, but it just happens that a thing is at the same time done, and\nnot known: thus in the example given (Obj. 3) a man did indeed wish\nto kill his foe, but killed him in ignorance, thinking to kill a\nstag. And ignorance of this kind, as the Philosopher states (Ethic.\niii, 1), does not cause involuntariness, since it is not the cause\nof anything that is repugnant to the will: but it causes\n\"non-voluntariness,\" since that which is unknown cannot be actually\nwilled. Ignorance is \"consequent\" to the act of the will, in so far\nas ignorance itself is voluntary: and this happens in two ways, in\naccordance with the two aforesaid modes of voluntary (A. 3). First,\nbecause the act of the will is brought to bear on the ignorance: as\nwhen a man wishes not to know, that he may have an excuse for sin,\nor that he may not be withheld from sin; according to Job 21:14: \"We\ndesire not the knowledge of Thy ways.\" And this is called \"affected\nignorance.\" Secondly, ignorance is said to be voluntary, when it\nregards that which one can and ought to know: for in this sense \"not\nto act\" and \"not to will\" are said to be voluntary, as stated above\n(A. 3). And ignorance of this kind happens, either when one does not\nactually consider what one can and ought to consider; this is called\n\"ignorance of evil choice,\" and arises from some passion or habit: or\nwhen one does not take the trouble to acquire the knowledge which one\nought to have; in which sense, ignorance of the general principles of\nlaw, which one to know, is voluntary, as being due to negligence.\nAccordingly, if in either of these ways, ignorance is voluntary, it\ncannot cause involuntariness simply. Nevertheless it causes\ninvoluntariness in a certain respect, inasmuch as it precedes the\nmovement of the will towards the act, which movement would not be, if\nthere were knowledge. Ignorance is \"antecedent\" to the act of the\nwill, when it is not voluntary, and yet is the cause of man's willing\nwhat he would not will otherwise. Thus a man may be ignorant of some\ncircumstance of his act, which he was not bound to know, the result\nbeing that he does that which he would not do, if he knew of that\ncircumstance; for instance, a man, after taking proper precaution,\nmay not know that someone is coming along the road, so that he shoots\nan arrow and slays a passer-by. Such ignorance causes involuntariness\nsimply.\n\nFrom this may be gathered the solution of the objections. For the\nfirst objection deals with ignorance of what a man is bound to know.\nThe second, with ignorance of choice, which is voluntary to a certain\nextent, as stated above. The third, with that ignorance which is\nconcomitant with the act of the will.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 7\n\nOF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF HUMAN ACTS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the circumstances of human acts: under which head\nthere are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is a circumstance?\n\n(2) Whether a theologian should take note of the circumstances of\nhuman acts?\n\n(3) How many circumstances are there?\n\n(4) Which are the most important of them?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 7, Art. 1]\n\nWhether a Circumstance Is an Accident of a Human Act?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a circumstance is not an accident of\na human act. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhetor. i) that a\ncircumstance is that from \"which an orator adds authority and\nstrength to his argument.\" But oratorical arguments are derived\nprincipally from things pertaining to the essence of a thing, such as\nthe definition, the genus, the species, and the like, from which also\nTully declares that an orator should draw his arguments. Therefore a\ncircumstance is not an accident of a human act.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"to be in\" is proper to an accident. But that which\nsurrounds (_circumstat_) is rather out than in. Therefore the\ncircumstances are not accidents of human acts.\n\nObj. 3: Further, an accident has no accident. But human acts\nthemselves are accidents. Therefore the circumstances are not\naccidents of acts.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The particular conditions of any singular thing\nare called its individuating accidents. But the Philosopher (Ethic.\niii, 1) calls the circumstances particular things [*_ta kath'\nekasta_], i.e. the particular conditions of each act. Therefore the\ncircumstances are individual accidents of human acts.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i),\n\"words are the signs of what we understand,\" it must needs be that in\nnaming things we follow the process of intellectual knowledge. Now\nour intellectual knowledge proceeds from the better known to the less\nknown. Accordingly with us, names of more obvious things are\ntransferred so as to signify things less obvious: and hence it is\nthat, as stated in _Metaph._ x, 4, \"the notion of distance has been\ntransferred from things that are apart locally, to all kinds of\nopposition\": and in like manner words that signify local movement are\nemployed to designate all other movements, because bodies which are\ncircumscribed by place, are best known to us. And hence it is that\nthe word \"circumstance\" has passed from located things to human acts.\n\nNow in things located, that is said to surround something, which is\noutside it, but touches it, or is placed near it. Accordingly,\nwhatever conditions are outside the substance of an act, and yet in\nsome way touch the human act, are called circumstances. Now what is\noutside a thing's substance, while it belongs to that thing, is\ncalled its accident. Wherefore the circumstances of human acts should\nbe called their accidents.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The orator gives strength to his argument, in the first\nplace, from the substance of the act; and secondly, from the\ncircumstances of the act. Thus a man becomes indictable, first,\nthrough being guilty of murder; secondly, through having done it\nfraudulently, or from motives of greed or at a holy time or place,\nand so forth. And so in the passage quoted, it is said pointedly that\nthe orator \"adds strength to his argument,\" as though this were\nsomething secondary.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A thing is said to be an accident of something in two\nways. First, from being in that thing: thus, whiteness is said to be\nan accident of Socrates. Secondly, because it is together with that\nthing in the same subject: thus, whiteness is an accident of the art\nof music, inasmuch as they meet in the same subject, so as to touch\none another, as it were. And in this sense circumstances are said to\nbe the accidents of human acts.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (ad 2), an accident is said to\nbe the accident of an accident, from the fact that they meet in the\nsame subject. But this happens in two ways. First, in so far as two\naccidents are both related to the same subject, without any relation\nto one another; as whiteness and the art of music in Socrates.\nSecondly, when such accidents are related to one another; as when the\nsubject receives one accident by means of the other; for instance, a\nbody receives color by means of its surface. And thus also is one\naccident said to be in another; for we speak of color as being in the\nsurface.\n\nAccordingly, circumstances are related to acts in both these ways. For\nsome circumstances that have a relation to acts, belong to the agent\notherwise than through the act; as place and condition of person;\nwhereas others belong to the agent by reason of the act, as the manner\nin which the act is done.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 7, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Theologians Should Take Note of the Circumstances of Human\nActs?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that theologians should not take note of\nthe circumstances of human acts. Because theologians do not consider\nhuman acts otherwise than according to their quality of good or evil.\nBut it seems that circumstances cannot give quality to human acts; for\na thing is never qualified, formally speaking, by that which is\noutside it; but by that which is in it. Therefore theologians should\nnot take note of the circumstances of acts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, circumstances are the accidents of acts. But one\nthing may be subject to an infinity of accidents; hence the\nPhilosopher says (Metaph. vi, 2) that \"no art or science considers\naccidental being, except only the art of sophistry.\" Therefore the\ntheologian has not to consider circumstances.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the consideration of circumstances belongs to the\norator. But oratory is not a part of theology. Therefore it is not\na theologian's business to consider circumstances.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ignorance of circumstances causes an act to be\ninvoluntary, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and\nGregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.]. But involuntariness\nexcuses from sin, the consideration of which belongs to the\ntheologian. Therefore circumstances also should be considered by the\ntheologian.\n\n_I answer that,_ Circumstances come under the consideration of the\ntheologian, for a threefold reason. First, because the theologian\nconsiders human acts, inasmuch as man is thereby directed to\nHappiness. Now, everything that is directed to an end should be\nproportionate to that end. But acts are made proportionate to an end\nby means of a certain commensurateness, which results from the due\ncircumstances. Hence the theologian has to consider the\ncircumstances. Secondly, because the theologian considers human acts\naccording as they are found to be good or evil, better or worse: and\nthis diversity depends on circumstances, as we shall see further on\n(Q. 18, AA. 10, 11; Q. 73, A. 7). Thirdly, because the theologian\nconsiders human acts under the aspect of merit and demerit, which is\nproper to human acts; and for this it is requisite that they be\nvoluntary. Now a human act is deemed to be voluntary or involuntary,\naccording to knowledge or ignorance of circumstances, as stated above\n(Q. 6, A. 8). Therefore the theologian has to consider circumstances.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Good directed to the end is said to be useful; and this\nimplies some kind of relation: wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic.\ni, 6) that \"the good in the genus 'relation' is the useful.\" Now, in\nthe genus \"relation\" a thing is denominated not only according to\nthat which is inherent in the thing, but also according to that which\nis extrinsic to it: as may be seen in the expressions \"right\" and\n\"left,\" \"equal\" and \"unequal,\" and such like. Accordingly, since the\ngoodness of acts consists in their utility to the end, nothing\nhinders their being called good or bad according to their proportion\nto extrinsic things that are adjacent to them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Accidents which are altogether accidental are neglected\nby every art, by reason of their uncertainty and infinity. But such\nlike accidents are not what we call circumstances; because\ncircumstances although, as stated above (A. 1), they are extrinsic to\nthe act, nevertheless are in a kind of contact with it, by being\nrelated to it. Proper accidents, however, come under the\nconsideration of art.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The consideration of circumstances belongs to the\nmoralist, the politician, and the orator. To the moralist, in so far\nas with respect to circumstances we find or lose the mean of virtue\nin human acts and passions. To the politician and to the orator, in\nso far as circumstances make acts to be worthy of praise or blame, of\nexcuse or indictment. In different ways, however: because where the\norator persuades, the politician judges. To the theologian this\nconsideration belongs, in all the aforesaid ways: since to him all\nthe other arts are subservient: for he has to consider virtuous and\nvicious acts, just as the moralist does; and with the orator and\npolitician he considers acts according as they are deserving of\nreward or punishment.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 7, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Circumstances Are Properly Set Forth in the Third Book of\nEthics?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the circumstances are not properly\nset forth in _Ethic._ iii, 1. For a circumstance of an act is\ndescribed as something outside the act. Now time and place answer to\nthis description. Therefore there are only two circumstances, to wit,\n\"when\" and \"where.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, we judge from the circumstances whether a thing is\nwell or ill done. But this belongs to the mode of an act. Therefore\nall the circumstances are included under one, which is the \"mode of\nacting.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, circumstances are not part of the substance of an\nact. But the causes of an act seem to belong to its substance.\nTherefore no circumstance should be taken from the cause of the act\nitself. Accordingly, neither \"who,\" nor \"why,\" nor \"about what,\" are\ncircumstances: since \"who\" refers to the efficient cause, \"why\" to\nthe final cause, and \"about what\" to the material cause.\n\nOn the contrary is the authority of the Philosopher in _Ethic._ iii,\n1.\n\n_I answer that,_ Tully, in his Rhetoric (De Invent. Rhetor. i), gives\nseven circumstances, which are contained in this verse:\n\n\"Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando--\n\n\"Who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, and when.\"\n\nFor in acts we must take note of \"who\" did it, \"by what aids\" or\n\"instruments\" he did it, \"what\" he did, \"where\" he did it, \"why\" he\ndid it, \"how\" and \"when\" he did it. But Aristotle in _Ethic._ iii, 1\nadds yet another, to wit, \"about what,\" which Tully includes in the\ncircumstance \"what.\"\n\nThe reason of this enumeration may be set down as follows. For a\ncircumstance is described as something outside the substance of the\nact, and yet in a way touching it. Now this happens in three ways:\nfirst, inasmuch as it touches the act itself; secondly, inasmuch as\nit touches the cause of the act; thirdly, inasmuch as it touches the\neffect. It touches the act itself, either by way of measure, as\n\"time\" and \"place\"; or by qualifying the act as the \"mode of acting.\"\nIt touches the effect when we consider \"what\" is done. It touches the\ncause of the act, as to the final cause, by the circumstance \"why\";\nas to the material cause, or object, in the circumstance \"about\nwhat\"; as to the principal efficient cause, in the circumstance\n\"who\"; and as to the instrumental efficient cause, in the\ncircumstance \"by what aids.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Time and place surround (_circumstant_) the act by way of\nmeasure; but the others surround the act by touching it in any other\nway, while they are extrinsic to the substance of the act.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This mode \"well\" or \"ill\" is not a circumstance, but\nresults from all the circumstances. But the mode which refers to a\nquality of the act is a special circumstance; for instance, that a\nman walk fast or slowly; that he strike hard or gently, and so forth.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A condition of the cause, on which the substance of the\nact depends, is not a circumstance; it must be an additional\ncondition. Thus, in regard to the object, it is not a circumstance of\ntheft that the object is another's property, for this belongs to the\nsubstance of the act; but that it be great or small. And the same\napplies to the other circumstances which are considered in reference\nto the other causes. For the end that specifies the act is not a\ncircumstance, but some additional end. Thus, that a valiant man act\n_valiantly for the sake of_ the good of the virtue o[f] fortitude, is\nnot a circumstance; but if he act valiantly for the sake of the\ndelivery of the state, or of Christendom, or some such purpose. The\nsame is to be said with regard to the circumstance \"what\"; for that a\nman by pouring water on someone should happen to wash him, is not a\ncircumstance of the washing; but that in doing so he give him a\nchill, or scald him; heal him or harm him, these are circumstances.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 7, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Most Important Circumstances Are \"Why\" and \"In What the\nAct Consists\"?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that these are not the most important\ncircumstances, namely, \"why\" and those \"in which the act is, [*_hen ois\ne praxis_]\" as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 1. For those in which the act is\nseem to be place and time: and these do not seem to be the most\nimportant of the circumstances, since, of them all, they are the most\nextrinsic to the act. Therefore those things in which the act is are\nnot the most important circumstances.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the end of a thing is extrinsic to it. Therefore it\nis not the most important circumstance.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which holds the foremost place in regard to\neach thing, is its cause and its form. But the cause of an act is the\nperson that does it; while the form of an act is the manner in which\nit is done. Therefore these two circumstances seem to be of the\ngreatest importance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxi.]\nsays that \"the most important circumstances\" are \"why it is done\" and\n\"what is done.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 1, A. 1), acts are properly\ncalled human, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Now, the motive and\nobject of the will is the end. Therefore that circumstance is the\nmost important of all which touches the act on the part of the end,\nviz. the circumstance \"why\": and the second in importance, is that\nwhich touches the very substance of the act, viz. the circumstance\n\"what he did.\" As to the other circumstances, they are more or less\nimportant, according as they more or less approach to these.\n\nReply Obj. 1: By those things \"in which the act is\" the Philosopher\ndoes not mean time and place, but those circumstances that are\naffixed to the act itself. Wherefore Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De\nNat. Hom. xxxi], as though he were explaining the dictum of the\nPhilosopher, instead of the latter's term--\"in which the act\nis\"--said, \"what is done.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although the end is not part of the substance of the\nact, yet it is the most important cause of the act, inasmuch as it\nmoves the agent to act. Wherefore the moral act is specified chiefly\nby the end.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The person that does the act is the cause of\nthat act, inasmuch as he is moved thereto by the end; and it is\nchiefly in this respect that he is directed to the act; while other\nconditions of the person have not such an important relation to the\nact. As to the mode, it is not the substantial form of the act, for in\nan act the substantial form depends on the object and term or end; but\nit is, as it were, a certain accidental quality of the act.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 8\n\nOF THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the different acts of the will; and in the first\nplace, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately, as\nbeing elicited by the will; secondly, those acts which are commanded\nby the will.\n\nNow the will is moved to the end, and to the means to the end; we must\ntherefore consider: (1) those acts of the will whereby it is moved to\nthe end; and (2) those whereby it is moved to the means. And since it\nseems that there are three acts of the will in reference to the end;\nviz. \"volition,\" \"enjoyment,\" and \"intention\"; we must consider: (1)\nvolition; (2) enjoyment; (3) intention. Concerning the first, three\nthings must be considered:\n\n(1) Of what things is the will?\n\n(2) By what is the will moved?\n\n(3) How is it moved?\n\nUnder the first head there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the will is of good only?\n\n(2) Whether it is of the end only, or also of the means?\n\n(3) If in any way it be of the means, whether it be moved to the end\nand to the means, by the same movement?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 8, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Will Is of Good Only?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will is not of good only. For the\nsame power regards opposites; for instance, sight regards white and\nblack. But good and evil are opposites. Therefore the will is not only\nof good, but also of evil.\n\nObj. 2: Further, rational powers can be directed to opposite\npurposes, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2). But the will\nis a rational power, since it is \"in the reason,\" as is stated in _De\nAnima_ iii, 9. Therefore the will can be directed to opposites; and\nconsequently its volition is not confined to good, but extends to\nevil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, good and being are convertible. But volition is\ndirected not only to beings, but also to non-beings. For sometimes we\nwish \"not to walk,\" or \"not to speak\"; and again at times we wish for\nfuture things, which are not actual beings. Therefore the will is not\nof good only.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"evil is\noutside the scope of the will,\" and that \"all things desire good.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite\nis only of something good. The reason of this is that the appetite is\nnothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing\ntowards that thing. Now every inclination is to something like and\nsuitable to the thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything,\ninasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be\nthat every inclination is to something good. And hence it is that the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. i, 1) that \"the good is that which all\ndesire.\"\n\nBut it must be noted that, since every inclination results from a\nform, the natural appetite results from a form existing in the nature\nof things: while the sensitive appetite, as also the intellective or\nrational appetite, which we call the will, follows from an\napprehended form. Therefore, just as the natural appetite tends to\ngood existing in a thing; so the animal or voluntary appetite tends\nto a good which is apprehended. Consequently, in order that the will\ntend to anything, it is requisite, not that this be good in very\ntruth, but that it be apprehended as good. Wherefore the Philosopher\nsays (Phys. ii, 3) that \"the end is a good, or an apparent good.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The same power regards opposites, but it is not\nreferred to them in the same way. Accordingly, the will is referred\nboth to good and evil: but to good by desiring it: to evil, by\nshunning it. Wherefore the actual desire of good is called \"volition\"\n[*In Latin, 'voluntas'. To avoid confusion with \"voluntas\" (the will)\nSt. Thomas adds a word of explanation, which in the translation may\nappear superfluous.], meaning thereby the act of the will; for it is\nin this sense that we are now speaking of the will. On the other\nhand, the shunning of evil is better described as \"nolition\":\nwherefore, just as volition is of good, so nolition is of evil.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A rational power is not to be directed to all opposite\npurposes, but to those which are contained under its proper object;\nfor no power seeks other than its proper object. Now, the object of\nthe will is good. Wherefore the will can be directed to such opposite\npurposes as are contained under good, such as to be moved or to be at\nrest, to speak or to be silent, and such like: for the will can be\ndirected to either under the aspect of good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That which is not a being in nature, is considered as a\nbeing in the reason, wherefore negations and privations are said to\nbe \"beings of reason.\" In this way, too, future things, in so far as\nthey are apprehended, are beings. Accordingly, in so far as such like\nare beings, they are apprehended under the aspect of good; and it is\nthus that the will is directed to them. Wherefore the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. v, 1) that \"to lack evil is considered as a good.\"\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 8, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Volition Is of the End Only, or Also of the Means?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that volition is not of the means, but of\nthe end only. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that \"volition\nis of the end, while choice is of the means.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"For objects differing in genus there are\ncorresponding different powers of the soul\" (Ethic. vi, 1). Now, the\nend and the means are in different genera of good: because the end,\nwhich is a good either of rectitude or of pleasure, is in the genus\n\"quality,\" or \"action,\" or \"passion\"; whereas the good which is\nuseful, and is directed to and end, is in the genus \"relation\" (Ethic.\ni, 6). Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is not of the means.\n\nObj. 3: Further, habits are proportionate to powers, since they are\nperfections thereof. But in those habits which are called practical\narts, the end belongs to one, and the means to another art; thus the\nuse of a ship, which is its end, belongs to the (art of the)\nhelmsman; whereas the building of the ship, which is directed to the\nend, belongs to the art of the shipwright. Therefore, since volition\nis of the end, it is not of the means.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In natural things, it is by the same power that a\nthing passes through the middle space, and arrives at the terminus.\nBut the means are a kind of middle space, through which one arrives\nat the end or terminus. Therefore, if volition is of the end, it is\nalso of the means.\n\n_I answer that,_ The word \"voluntas\" sometimes designates the power\nof the will, sometimes its act [*See note to A. 1, Reply Obj. 1].\nAccordingly, if we speak of the will as a power, thus it extends both\nto the end and to the means. For every power extends to those things\nin which may be considered the aspect of the object of that power in\nany way whatever: thus the sight extends to all things whatsoever\nthat are in any way colored. Now the aspect of good, which is the\nobject of the power of the will, may be found not only in the end,\nbut also in the means.\n\nIf, however, we speak of the will in regard to its act, then, properly\nspeaking, volition is of the end only. Because every act denominated\nfrom a power, designates the simple act of that power: thus \"to\nunderstand\" designates the simple act of the understanding. Now the\nsimple act of a power is referred to that which is in itself the\nobject of that power. But that which is good and willed in itself is\nthe end. Wherefore volition, properly speaking, is of the end itself.\nOn the other hand, the means are good and willed, not in themselves,\nbut as referred to the end. Wherefore the will is directed to them,\nonly in so far as it is directed to the end: so that what it wills in\nthem, is the end. Thus, to understand, is properly directed to things\nthat are known in themselves, i.e. first principles: but we do not\nspeak of understanding with regard to things known through first\nprinciples, except in so far as we see the principles in those things.\nFor in morals the end is what principles are in speculative science\n(Ethic. viii, 8).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of the will in reference to\nthe simple act of the will; not in reference to the power of the will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There are different powers for objects that differ in\ngenus and are on an equality; for instance, sound and color are\ndifferent genera of sensibles, to which are referred hearing and\nsight. But the useful and the righteous are not on an equality, but\nare as that which is of itself, and that which is in relation to\nanother. Now such like objects are always referred to the same power;\nfor instance, the power of sight perceives both color and light by\nwhich color is seen.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Not everything that diversifies habits, diversifies the\npowers: since habits are certain determinations of powers to certain\nspecial acts. Moreover, every practical art considers both the end\nand the means. For the art of the helmsman does indeed consider the\nend, as that which it effects; and the means, as that which it\ncommands. On the other hand, the ship-building art considers the\nmeans as that which it effects; but it considers that which is the\nend, as that to which it refers what it effects. And again, in every\npractical art there is an end proper to it and means that belong\nproperly to that art.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 8, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Will Is Moved by the Same Act to the End and to the Means?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will is moved by the same act, to\nthe end and to the means. Because according to the Philosopher (Topic.\niii, 2) \"where one thing is on account of another there is only one.\"\nBut the will does not will the means save on account of the end.\nTherefore it is moved to both by the same act.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the end is the reason for willing the means, just as\nlight is the reason of seeing colors. But light and colors are seen\nby the same act. Therefore it is the same movement of the will,\nwhereby it wills the end and the means.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is one and the same natural movement which tends\nthrough the middle space to the terminus. But the means are in\ncomparison to the end, as the middle space is to the terminus.\nTherefore it is the same movement of the will whereby it is directed\nto the end and to the means.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Acts are diversified according to their objects.\nBut the end is a different species of good from the means, which are\na useful good. Therefore the will is not moved to both by the same\nact.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since the end is willed in itself, whereas the\nmeans, as such, are only willed for the end, it is evident that the\nwill can be moved to the end, without being moved to the means;\nwhereas it cannot be moved to the means, as such, unless it is moved\nto the end. Accordingly the will is moved to the end in two ways:\nfirst, to the end absolutely and in itself; secondly, as the reason\nfor willing the means. Hence it is evident that the will is moved by\none and the same movement, to the end, as the reason for willing the\nmeans; and to the means themselves. But it is another act whereby the\nwill is moved to the end absolutely. And sometimes this act precedes\nthe other in time; for example when a man first wills to have health,\nand afterwards deliberating by what means to be healed, wills to send\nfor the doctor to heal him. The same happens in regard to the\nintellect: for at first a man understands the principles in\nthemselves; but afterwards he understands them in the conclusions,\ninasmuch as he assents to the conclusions on account of the\nprinciples.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument holds in respect of the will being moved\nto the end as the reason for willing the means.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Whenever color is seen, by the same act the light is\nseen; but the light can be seen without the color being seen. In like\nmanner whenever a man wills the means, by the same act he wills the\nend; but not the conversely.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the execution of a work, the means are as the middle\nspace, and the end, as the terminus. Wherefore just as natural\nmovement sometimes stops in the middle and does not reach the\nterminus; so sometimes one is busy with the means, without gaining\nthe end. But in willing it is the reverse: the will through (willing)\nthe end comes to will the means; just as the intellect arrives at the\nconclusions through the principles which are called \"means.\" Hence it\nis that sometimes the intellect understands a mean, and does not\nproceed thence to the conclusion. And in like manner the will\nsometimes wills the end, and yet does not proceed to will the means.\n\nThe solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what\nhas been said above (A. 2, ad 2). For the useful and the righteous\nare not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is\nfor its own sake and that which is for the sake of something else:\nwherefore the act of the will can be directed to one and not to the\nother; but not conversely.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 9\n\nOF THAT WHICH MOVES THE WILL\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider what moves the will: and under this head there\nare six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the will is moved by the intellect?\n\n(2) Whether it is moved by the sensitive appetite?\n\n(3) Whether the will moves itself?\n\n(4) Whether it is moved by an extrinsic principle?\n\n(5) Whether it is moved by a heavenly body?\n\n(6) Whether the will is moved by God alone as by an extrinsic\nprinciple?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Will Is Moved by the Intellect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by the\nintellect. For Augustine says on Ps. 118:20: \"My soul hath coveted to\nlong for Thy justifications: The intellect flies ahead, the desire\nfollows sluggishly or not at all: we know what is good, but deeds\ndelight us not.\" But it would not be so, if the will were moved by\nthe intellect: because movement of the movable results from motion of\nthe mover. Therefore the intellect does not move the will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object to\nthe will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination in\nrepresenting the appetible object to the sensitive appetite. But the\nimagination, in presenting the appetible object, does not remove the\nsensitive appetite: indeed sometimes our imagination affects us no\nmore than what is set before us in a picture, and moves us not at all\n(De Anima ii, 3). Therefore neither does the intellect move the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the same is not mover and moved in respect of the\nsame thing. But the will moves the intellect; for we exercise the\nintellect when we will. Therefore the intellect does not move the\nwill.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 10) that \"the\nappetible object is a mover not moved, whereas the will is a mover\nmoved.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing requires to be moved by something in so far\nas it is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in\npotentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to\ndo this is to move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be in\npotentiality to different things in two ways: first, with regard to\nacting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action.\nThus the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and\nsometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a\nmover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and\nas to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part\nof the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting:\nwhile the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the\nact is specified.\n\nThe motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since\nevery agent acts for an end, as was shown above (Q. 1, A. 2), the\nprinciple of this motion lies in the end. And hence it is that the\nart which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art\nwhich is concerned with the means; just as the \"art of sailing\ncommands the art of shipbuilding\" (Phys. ii, 2). Now good in general,\nwhich has the nature of an end, is the object of the will.\nConsequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the\nsoul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will.\nFor the end and perfection of every other power, is included under\nthe object of the will as some particular good: and always the art or\npower to which the universal end belongs, moves to their acts the\narts or powers to which belong the particular ends included in the\nuniversal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common\ngood--i.e. the order of the whole army--by his command moves one of\nthe captains, who intends the order of one company.\n\nOn the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after\nthe manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions\nare specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is\nuniversal \"being\" and \"truth,\" which is the object of the intellect.\nAnd therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as\npresenting its object to it.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The passage quoted proves, not that the intellect does\nnot move, but that it does not move of necessity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of\nfitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive appetite; so\nneither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of\ngoodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect\nthat moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its\nact; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the\nintellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good.\nBut as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from\nthe object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is\napprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal\ntrue. It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in\nthe same respect.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Will Is Moved by the Sensitive Appetite?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be moved by the\nsensitive appetite. For \"to move and to act is more excellent than to\nbe passive,\" as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 16). But the\nsensitive appetite is less excellent than the will which is the\nintellectual appetite; just as sense is less excellent than intellect.\nTherefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no particular power can produce a universal effect.\nBut the sensitive appetite is a particular power, because it follows\nthe particular apprehension of sense. Therefore it cannot cause the\nmovement of the will, which movement is universal, as following the\nuniversal apprehension of the intellect.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as is proved in _Phys._ viii, 5, the mover is not\nmoved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal\nmotion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the\nsensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite\ndoes not move the will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 1:14): \"Every man is tempted\nby his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured.\" But man\nwould not be drawn away by his concupiscence, unless his will were\nmoved by the sensitive appetite, wherein concupiscence resides.\nTherefore the sensitive appetite moves the will.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), that which is apprehended as\ngood and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing\nappear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from\nthe condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it\nis proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it\ndepends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it\nis variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being\nfitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,\n5): \"According as a man is, such does the end seem to him.\"\n\nNow it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive\nappetite man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore according\nas man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting,\nwhich does not seem so when he is not so affected: thus that seems\ngood to a man when angered, which does not seem good when he is calm.\nAnd in this way, the sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part\nof the object.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders that which is better simply and in\nitself, from being less excellent in a certain respect. Accordingly\nthe will is simply more excellent than the sensitive appetite: but in\nrespect of the man in whom a passion is predominant, in so far as he\nis subject to that passion, the sensitive appetite is more excellent.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Men's acts and choices are in reference to singulars.\nWherefore from the very fact that the sensitive appetite is a\nparticular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that\nsomething seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in\nwhich resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and\nconcupiscible powers, not, indeed, \"by a despotic sovereignty,\" as a\nslave is moved by his master, but by a \"royal and politic\nsovereignty,\" as free men are ruled by their governor, and can\nnevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and\nconcupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing\nhinders the will from being moved by them at times.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Will Moves Itself?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will does not move itself. For\nevery mover, as such, is in act: whereas what is moved, is in\npotentiality; since \"movement is the act of that which is in\npotentiality, as such\" [*Aristotle, _Phys._ iii, 1]. Now the same is\nnot in potentiality and in act, in respect of the same. Therefore\nnothing moves itself. Neither, therefore, can the will move itself.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the movable is moved on the mover being present. But\nthe will is always present to itself. If, therefore, it moved itself,\nit would always be moving itself, which is clearly false.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the will is moved by the intellect, as stated above\n(A. 1). If, therefore, the will move itself, it would follow that the\nsame thing is at once moved immediately by two movers; which seems\nunreasonable. Therefore the will does not move itself.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The will is mistress of its own act, and to it\nbelongs to will and not to will. But this would not be so, had it not\nthe power to move itself to will. Therefore it moves itself.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), it belongs to the will to\nmove the other powers, by reason of the end which is the will's\nobject. Now, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 2), the end is in things\nappetible, what the principle is in things intelligible. But it is\nevident that the intellect, through its knowledge of the principle,\nreduces itself from potentiality to act, as to its knowledge of the\nconclusions; and thus it moves itself. And, in like manner, the will,\nthrough its volition of the end, moves itself to will the means.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is not in respect of the same that the will moves\nitself and is moved: wherefore neither is it in act and in\npotentiality in respect of the same. But forasmuch as it actually\nwills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to act, in respect\nof the means, so as, in a word, to will them actually.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The power of the will is always actually present to\nitself; but the act of the will, whereby it wills an end, is not\nalways in the will. But it is by this act that it moves itself.\nAccordingly it does not follow that it is always moving itself.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise than by\nitself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object:\nwhereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in\nrespect of the end.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Will Is Moved by an Exterior Principle?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by anything\nexterior. For the movement of the will is voluntary. But it is\nessential to the voluntary act that it be from an intrinsic principle,\njust as it is essential to the natural act. Therefore the movement of\nthe will is not from anything exterior.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the will cannot suffer violence, as was shown above\n(Q. 6, A. 4). But the violent act is one \"the principle of which is\noutside the agent\" [*Aristotle, _Ethic._ iii, 1]. Therefore the will\ncannot be moved by anything exterior.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is sufficiently moved by one mover, needs\nnot to be moved by another. But the will moves itself sufficiently.\nTherefore it is not moved by anything exterior.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The will is moved by the object, as stated above\n(A. 1). But the object of the will can be something exterior, offered\nto the sense. Therefore the will can be moved by something exterior.\n\n_I answer that,_ As far as the will is moved by the object, it is\nevident that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as\nit is moved in the exercise of its act, we must again hold it to be\nmoved by some exterior principle.\n\nFor everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another\ntime an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it\nis evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously\nit did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by\nsomething to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above\n(A. 3), in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the\nact of willing the means. Now it cannot do this without the aid of\ncounsel: for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how\nthis can be attained, and through this reflection he comes to the\nconclusion that he can be healed by a physician: and this he wills.\nBut since he did not always actually will to have health, he must, of\nnecessity, have begun, through something moving him, to will to be\nhealed. And if the will moved itself to will this, it must, of\nnecessity, have done this with the aid of counsel following some\nprevious volition. But this process could not go on to infinity.\nWherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to\nits first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior\nmover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics\n(vii, 14).\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is essential to the voluntary act that its principle\nbe within the agent: but it is not necessary that this inward\nprinciple be the first principle unmoved by another. Wherefore though\nthe voluntary act has an inward proximate principle, nevertheless its\nfirst principle is from without. Thus, too, the first principle of\nthe natural movement is from without, that, to wit, which moves\nnature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: For an act to be violent it is not enough that its\nprinciple be extrinsic, but we must add \"without the concurrence of\nhim that suffers violence.\" This does not happen when the will is\nmoved by an exterior principle: for it is the will that wills, though\nmoved by another. But this movement would be violent, if it were\ncounter to the movement of the will: which in the present case is\nimpossible; since then the will would will and not will the same\nthing.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The will moves itself sufficiently in one respect, and\nin its own order, that is to say as proximate agent; but it cannot\nmove itself in every respect, as we have shown. Wherefore it needs to\nbe moved by another as first mover.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Will Is Moved by a Heavenly Body?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the human will is moved by a heavenly\nbody. For all various and multiform movements are reduced, as to\ntheir cause, to a uniform movement which is that of the heavens, as\nis proved in _Phys._ viii, 9. But human movements are various and\nmultiform, since they begin to be, whereas previously they were not.\nTherefore they are reduced, as to their cause, to the movement of the\nheavens, which is uniform according to its nature.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Augustine (De Trin. iii, 4) \"the lower\nbodies are moved by the higher.\" But the movements of the human body,\nwhich are caused by the will, could not be reduced to the movement of\nthe heavens, as to their cause, unless the will too were moved by the\nheavens. Therefore the heavens move the human will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, by observing the heavenly bodies astrologers\nforetell the truth about future human acts, which are caused by the\nwill. But this would not be so, if the heavenly bodies could not move\nman's will. Therefore the human will is moved by a heavenly body.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 7) that \"the\nheavenly bodies are not the causes of our acts.\" But they would be,\nif the will, which is the principle of human acts, were moved by the\nheavenly bodies. Therefore the will is not moved by the heavenly\nbodies.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is evident that the will can be moved by the\nheavenly bodies in the same way as it is moved by its object; that is\nto say, in so far as exterior bodies, which move the will, through\nbeing offered to the senses, and also the organs themselves of the\nsensitive powers, are subject to the movements of the heavenly bodies.\n\nBut some have maintained that heavenly bodies have an influence on the\nhuman will, in the same way as some exterior agent moves the will, as\nto the exercise of its act. But this is impossible. For the \"will,\" as\nstated in _De Anima_ iii, 9, \"is in the reason.\" Now the reason is a\npower of the soul, not bound to a bodily organ: wherefore it follows\nthat the will is a power absolutely incorporeal and immaterial. But it\nis evident that no body can act on what is incorporeal, but rather the\nreverse: because things incorporeal and immaterial have a power more\nformal and more universal than any corporeal things whatever.\nTherefore it is impossible for a heavenly body to act directly on the\nintellect or will. For this reason Aristotle (De Anima iii, 3)\nascribed to those who held that intellect differs not from sense, the\ntheory that \"such is the will of men, as is the day which the father\nof men and of gods bring on\" [*Odyssey xviii. 135] (referring to\nJupiter, by whom they understand the entire heavens). For all the\nsensitive powers, since they are acts of bodily organs, can be moved\naccidentally, by the heavenly bodies, i.e. through those bodies being\nmoved, whose acts they are.\n\nBut since it has been stated (A. 2) that the intellectual appetite is\nmoved, in a fashion, by the sensitive appetite, the movements of the\nheavenly bodies have an indirect bearing on the will; in so far as\nthe will happens to be moved by the passions of the sensitive\nappetite.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The multiform movements of the human will are reduced\nto some uniform cause, which, however, is above the intellect and\nwill. This can be said, not of any body, but of some superior\nimmaterial substance. Therefore there is no need for the movement of\nthe will to be referred to the movement of the heavens, as to its\ncause.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The movements of the human body are reduced, as to\ntheir cause, to the movement of a heavenly body, in so far as the\ndisposition suitable to a particular movement, is somewhat due to the\ninfluence of heavenly bodies; also, in so far as the sensitive\nappetite is stirred by the influence of heavenly bodies; and again,\nin so far as exterior bodies are moved in accordance with the\nmovement of heavenly bodies, at whose presence, the will begins to\nwill or not to will something; for instance, when the body is\nchilled, we begin to wish to make the fire. But this movement of the\nwill is on the part of the object offered from without: not on the\npart of an inward instigation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Cf. I, Q. 84, AA. 6, 7), the sensitive\nappetite is the act of a bodily organ. Wherefore there is no reason\nwhy man should not be prone to anger or concupiscence, or some like\npassion, by reason of the influence of heavenly bodies, just as by\nreason of his natural complexion. But the majority of men are led by\nthe passions, which the wise alone resist. Consequently, in the\nmajority of cases predictions about human acts, gathered from the\nobservation of heavenly bodies, are fulfilled. Nevertheless, as\nPtolemy says (Centiloquium v), \"the wise man governs the stars\";\nwhich is a though to say that by resisting his passions, he opposes\nhis will, which is free and nowise subject to the movement of the\nheavens, to such like effects of the heavenly bodies.\n\nOr, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ii, 15): \"We must confess that\nwhen the truth is foretold by astrologers, this is due to some most\nhidden inspiration, to which the human mind is subject without\nknowing it. And since this is done in order to deceive man, it must\nbe the work of the lying spirits.\"\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 9, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Will Is Moved by God Alone, As Exterior Principle?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by God alone as\nexterior principle. For it is natural that the inferior be moved by\nits superior: thus the lower bodies are moved by the heavenly bodies.\nBut there is something which is higher than the will of man and below\nGod, namely, the angel. Therefore man's will can be moved by an angel\nalso, as exterior principle.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the act of the will follows the act of the\nintellect. But man's intellect is reduced to act, not by God alone,\nbut also by the angel who enlightens it, as Dionysius says (Coel.\nHier. iv). For the same reason, therefore, the will also is moved by\nan angel.\n\nObj. 3: Further, God is not the cause of other than good things,\naccording to Gen. 1:31: \"God saw all the things that He had made, and\nthey were very good.\" If, therefore man's will were moved by God\nalone, it would never be moved to evil: and yet it is the will whereby\n\"we sin and whereby we do right,\" as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9).\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Phil. 2:13): \"It is God Who worketh\nin us\" [Vulg.'you'] \"both to will and to accomplish.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The movement of the will is from within, as also is\nthe movement of nature. Now although it is possible for something to\nmove a natural thing, without being the cause of the thing moved, yet\nthat alone, which is in some way the cause of a thing's nature, can\ncause a natural movement in that thing. For a stone is moved upwards\nby a man, who is not the cause of the stone's nature, but this\nmovement is not natural to the stone; but the natural movement of the\nstone is caused by no other than the cause of its nature. Wherefore\nit is said in _Phys._ vii, 4, that the generator moves locally heavy\nand light things. Accordingly man endowed with a will is sometimes\nmoved by something that is not his cause; but that his voluntary\nmovement be from an exterior principle that is not the cause of his\nwill, is impossible.\n\nNow the cause of the will can be none other than God. And this is\nevident for two reasons. First, because the will is a power of the\nrational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was\nstated in the First Part (Q. 90, A. 2). Secondly, it is evident from\nthe fact that the will is ordained to the universal good. Wherefore\nnothing else can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is\nthe universal good: while every other good is good by participation,\nand is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a\nuniversal inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is\npotentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent.\n\nReply Obj. 1: An angel is not above man in such a way as to be the\ncause of his will, as the heavenly bodies are the causes of natural\nforms, from which result the natural movements of natural bodies.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Man's intellect is moved by an angel, on the part of\nthe object, which by the power of the angelic light is proposed to\nman's knowledge. And in this way the will also can be moved by a\ncreature from without, as stated above (A. 4).\n\nReply Obj. 3: God moves man's will, as the Universal Mover, to the\nuniversal object of the will, which is good. And without this\nuniversal motion, man cannot will anything. But man determines\nhimself by his reason to will this or that, which is true or apparent\ngood. Nevertheless, sometimes God moves some specially to the willing\nof something determinate, which is good; as in the case of those whom\nHe moves by grace, as we shall state later on (Q. 109, A. 2).\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 10\n\nOF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE WILL IS MOVED\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the manner in which the will is moved. Under\nthis head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the will is moved to anything naturally?\n\n(2) Whether it is moved of necessity by its object?\n\n(3) Whether it is moved of necessity by the lower appetite?\n\n(4) Whether it is moved of necessity by the exterior mover which is\nGod?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 10, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Will Is Moved to Anything Naturally?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved to anything\nnaturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary\nagent, as stated at the beginning of _Phys._ ii, 1. Therefore the will\nis not moved to anything naturally.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is natural is in a thing always: as\n\"being hot\" is in fire. But no movement is always in the will.\nTherefore no movement is natural to the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nature is determinate to one thing: whereas the will\nis referred to opposites. Therefore the will wills nothing naturally.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The movement of the will follows the movement of\nthe intellect. But the intellect understands some things naturally.\nTherefore the will, too, wills some things naturally.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Boethius says (De Duabus Nat.) and the\nPhilosopher also (Metaph. v, 4) the word \"nature\" is used in a\nmanifold sense. For sometimes it stands for the intrinsic principle\nin movable things. In this sense nature is either matter or the\nmaterial form, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 1. In another sense nature\nstands for any substance, or even for any being. And in this sense,\nthat is said to be natural to a thing which befits it in respect of\nits substance. And this is that which of itself is in a thing. Now\nall things that do not of themselves belong to the thing in which\nthey are, are reduced to something which belongs of itself to that\nthing, as to their principle. Wherefore, taking nature in this sense,\nit is necessary that the principle of whatever belongs to a thing, be\na natural principle. This is evident in regard to the intellect: for\nthe principles of intellectual knowledge are naturally known. In like\nmanner the principle of voluntary movements must be something\nnaturally willed.\n\nNow this is good in general, to which the will tends naturally, as\ndoes each power to its object; and again it is the last end, which\nstands in the same relation to things appetible, as the first\nprinciples of demonstrations to things intelligible: and, speaking\ngenerally, it is all those things which belong to the willer\naccording to his nature. For it is not only things pertaining to the\nwill that the will desires, but also that which pertains to each\npower, and to the entire man. Wherefore man wills naturally not only\nthe object of the will, but also other things that are appropriate to\nthe other powers; such as the knowledge of truth, which befits the\nintellect; and to be and to live and other like things which regard\nthe natural well-being; all of which are included in the object of\nthe will, as so many particular goods.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The will is distinguished from nature as one kind of\ncause from another; for some things happen naturally and some are\ndone voluntarily. There is, however, another manner of causing that\nis proper to the will, which is mistress of its act, besides the\nmanner proper to nature, which is determinate to one thing. But since\nthe will is founded on some nature, it is necessary that the movement\nproper to nature be shared by the will, to some extent: just as what\nbelongs to a previous cause is shared by a subsequent cause. Because\nin every thing, being itself, which is from nature, precedes\nvolition, which is from the will. And hence it is that the will wills\nsomething naturally.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In the case of natural things, that which is natural,\nas a result of the form only, is always in them actually, as heat is\nin fire. But that which is natural as a result of matter, is not\nalways in them actually, but sometimes only in potentiality: because\nform is act, whereas matter is potentiality. Now movement is \"the act\nof that which is in potentiality\" (Aristotle, _Phys._ iii, 1).\nWherefore that which belongs to, or results from, movement, in regard\nto natural things, is not always in them. Thus fire does not always\nmove upwards, but only when it is outside its own place. [*The\nAristotelian theory was that fire's proper place is the fiery heaven,\ni.e. the Empyrean.] And in like manner it is not necessary that the\nwill (which is reduced from potentiality to act, when it wills\nsomething), should always be in the act of volition; but only when it\nis in a certain determinate disposition. But God's will, which is\npure act, is always in the act of volition.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To every nature there is one thing corresponding,\nproportionate, however, to that nature. For to nature considered as a\ngenus, there corresponds something one generically; and to nature as\nspecies there corresponds something one specifically; and to the\nindividualized nature there corresponds some one individual. Since,\ntherefore, the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some\none general thing corresponds to it, naturally which is the good;\njust as to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing,\nwhich is the true, or being, or \"what a thing is.\" And under good in\ngeneral are included many particular goods, to none of which is the\nwill determined.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 10, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Will Is Moved, of Necessity, by Its Object?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the will is moved, of necessity, by its\nobject. For the object of the will is compared to the will as mover\nto movable, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 10. But a mover, if it be\nsufficient, moves the movable of necessity. Therefore the will can be\nmoved of necessity by its object.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as the will is an immaterial power, so is the\nintellect: and both powers are ordained to a universal object, as\nstated above (A. 1, ad 3). But the intellect is moved, of necessity,\nby its object: therefore the will also, by its object.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever one wills, is either the end, or something\nordained to an end. But, seemingly, one wills an end necessarily:\nbecause it is like the principle in speculative matters, to which\nprinciple one assents of necessity. Now the end is the reason for\nwilling the means; and so it seems that we will the means also\nnecessarily. Therefore the will is moved of necessity by its object.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The rational powers, according to the Philosopher\n(Metaph. ix, 2) are directed to opposites. But the will is a rational\npower, since it is in the reason, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 9.\nTherefore the will is directed to opposites. Therefore it is not\nmoved, of necessity, to either of the opposites.\n\n_I answer that,_ The will is moved in two ways: first, as to the\nexercise of its act; secondly, as to the specification of its act,\nderived from the object. As to the first way, no object moves the\nwill necessarily, for no matter what the object be, it is in man's\npower not to think of it, and consequently not to will it actually.\nBut as to the second manner of motion, the will is moved by one\nobject necessarily, by another not. For in the movement of a power by\nits object, we must consider under what aspect the object moves the\npower. For the visible moves the sight, under the aspect of color\nactually visible. Wherefore if color be offered to the sight, it\nmoves the sight necessarily: unless one turns one's eyes away; which\nbelongs to the exercise of the act. But if the sight were confronted\nwith something not in all respects colored actually, but only so in\nsome respects, and in other respects not, the sight would not of\nnecessity see such an object: for it might look at that part of the\nobject which is not actually colored, and thus it would not see it.\nNow just as the actually colored is the object of sight, so is good\nthe object of the will. Wherefore if the will be offered an object\nwhich is good universally and from every point of view, the will\ntends to it of necessity, if it wills anything at all; since it\ncannot will the opposite. If, on the other hand, the will is offered\nan object that is not good from every point of view, it will not tend\nto it of necessity. And since lack of any good whatever, is a\nnon-good, consequently, that good alone which is perfect and lacking\nin nothing, is such a good that the will cannot not-will it: and this\nis Happiness. Whereas any other particular goods, in so far as they\nare lacking in some good, can be regarded as non-goods: and from this\npoint of view, they can be set aside or approved by the will, which\ncan tend to one and the same thing from various points of view.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The sufficient mover of a power is none but that object\nthat in every respect presents the aspect of the mover of that power.\nIf, on the other hand, it is lacking in any respect, it will not move\nof necessity, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The intellect is moved, of necessity, by an object\nwhich is such as to be always and necessarily true: but not by that\nwhich may be either true or false--viz. by that which is contingent:\nas we have said of the good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The last end moves the will necessarily, because it is\nthe perfect good. In like manner whatever is ordained to that end,\nand without which the end cannot be attained, such as \"to be\" and \"to\nlive,\" and the like. But other things without which the end can be\ngained, are not necessarily willed by one who wills the end: just as\nhe who assents to the principle, does not necessarily assent to the\nconclusions, without which the principles can still be true.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 10, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Will Is Moved, of Necessity, by the Lower Appetite?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by a\npassion of the lower appetite. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:19): \"The\ngood which I will I do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do\":\nand this is said by reason of concupiscence, which is a passion.\nTherefore the will is moved of necessity by a passion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 5, \"according as a man is,\nsuch does the end seem to him.\" But it is not in man's power to cast\naside a passion at once. Therefore it is not in man's power not to\nwill that to which the passion inclines him.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a universal cause is not applied to a particular\neffect, except by means of a particular cause: wherefore the\nuniversal reason does not move save by means of a particular\nestimation, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 11. But as the universal\nreason is to the particular estimation, so is the will to the\nsensitive appetite. Therefore the will is not moved to will something\nparticular, except through the sensitive appetite. Therefore, if the\nsensitive appetite happen to be disposed to something, by reason of a\npassion, the will cannot be moved in a contrary sense.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 4:7): \"Thy lust [Vulg. 'The\nlust thereof'] shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over\nit.\" Therefore man's will is not moved of necessity by the lower\nappetite.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 9, A. 2), the passion of the\nsensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will is moved by\nits object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such\nand such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good,\nwhich he would not judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this\ninfluence of a passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his\nreason is wholly bound, so that he has not the use of reason: as\nhappens in those who through a violent access of anger or\nconcupiscence become furious or insane, just as they may from some\nother bodily disorder; since such like passions do not take place\nwithout some change in the body. And of such the same is to be said\nas of irrational animals, which follow, of necessity, the impulse of\ntheir passions: for in them there is neither movement of reason, nor,\nconsequently, of will.\n\nSometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the\npassion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent,\nits freedom: and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain\ndegree. Accordingly in so far as the reason remains free, and not\nsubject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does\nnot tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it.\nConsequently, either there is no movement of the will in that man,\nand the passion alone holds its sway: or if there be a movement of\nthe will, it does not necessarily follow the passion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the will cannot prevent the movement of\nconcupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says: \"The evil\nwhich I will not, that I do--i.e. I desire\"; yet it is in the power\nof the will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence.\nAnd thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since there is in man a twofold nature, intellectual\nand sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in respect of\nhis whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly subject\nto his reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason is entirely\nengrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although reason\nis clouded by passion, yet something of this reason remains free. And\nin respect of this, man can either repel the passion entirely, or at\nleast hold himself in check so as not to be led away by the passion.\nFor when thus disposed, since man is variously disposed according to\nthe various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise\naccording to his reason, than it does according to a passion.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The will is moved not only by the universal good\napprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense.\nWherefore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a\npassion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things\nwithout passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in\nthose cases wherein reason resists passion.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 10, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Will Is Moved of Necessity by the Exterior Mover Which Is\nGod?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will is moved of necessity by\nGod. For every agent that cannot be resisted moves of necessity. But\nGod cannot be resisted, because His power is infinite; wherefore it\nis written (Rom. 9:19): \"Who resisteth His will?\" Therefore God moves\nthe will of necessity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the will is moved of necessity to whatever it wills\nnaturally, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3). But \"whatever God does in a\nthing is natural to it,\" as Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3).\nTherefore the will wills of necessity everything to which God moves\nit.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a thing is possible, if nothing impossible follows\nfrom its being supposed. But something impossible follows from the\nsupposition that the will does not will that to which God moves it:\nbecause in that case God's operation would be ineffectual. Therefore\nit is not possible for the will not to will that to which God moves\nit. Therefore it wills it of necessity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 15:14): \"God made man from\nthe beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel.\"\nTherefore He does not of necessity move man's will.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) \"it belongs to\nDivine providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of\nthings.\" Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their\nconditions; so that from necessary causes through the Divine motion,\neffects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects\nfollow contingently. Since, therefore, the will is an active\nprinciple, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent\nrelation to many things, God so moves it, that He does not determine\nit of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and\nnot necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Divine will extends not only to the doing of\nsomething by the thing which He moves, but also to its being done in\na way which is fitting to the nature of that thing. And therefore it\nwould be more repugnant to the Divine motion, for the will to be\nmoved of necessity, which is not fitting to its nature; than for it\nto be moved freely, which is becoming to its nature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That is natural to a thing, which God so works in it\nthat it may be natural to it: for thus is something becoming to a\nthing, according as God wishes it to be becoming. Now He does not\nwish that whatever He works in things should be natural to them, for\ninstance, that the dead should rise again. But this He does wish to\nbe natural to each thing--that it be subject to the Divine power.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If God moves the will to anything, it is incompatible\nwith this supposition, that the will be not moved thereto. But it is\nnot impossible simply. Consequently it does not follow that the will\nis moved by God necessarily.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 11\n\nOF ENJOYMENT [*Or, Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider enjoyment: concerning which there are four\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power?\n\n(2) Whether it belongs to the rational creature alone, or also to\nirrational animals?\n\n(3) Whether enjoyment is only of the last end?\n\n(4) Whether it is only of the end possessed?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 11, Art. 1]\n\nWhether to Enjoy Is an Act of the Appetitive Power?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs not only to the\nappetitive power. For to enjoy seems nothing else than to receive the\nfruit. But it is the intellect, in whose act Happiness consists, as\nshown above (Q. 3, A. 4), that receives the fruit of human life,\nwhich is Happiness. Therefore to enjoy is not an act of the\nappetitive power, but of the intellect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, each power has its proper end, which is its\nperfection: thus the end of sight is to know the visible; of the\nhearing, to perceive sounds; and so forth. But the end of a thing is\nits fruit. Therefore to enjoy belongs to each power, and not only to\nthe appetite.\n\nObj. 3: Further, enjoyment implies a certain delight. But sensible\ndelight belongs to sense, which delights in its object: and for the\nsame reason, intellectual delight belongs to the intellect. Therefore\nenjoyment belongs to the apprehensive, and not to the appetitive\npower.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4; and De\nTrin. x, 10, 11): \"To enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for\nits own sake.\" But love belongs to the appetitive power. Therefore\nalso to enjoy is an act of the appetitive power.\n\n_I answer that,_ _Fruitio_ (enjoyment) and _fructus_ (fruit) seem to\nrefer to the same, one being derived from the other; which from\nwhich, matters not for our purpose; though it seems probable that the\none which is more clearly known, was first named. Now those things\nare most manifest to us which appeal most to the senses: wherefore it\nseems that the word \"fruition\" is derived from sensible fruits. But\nsensible fruit is that which we expect the tree to produce in the\nlast place, and in which a certain sweetness is to be perceived.\nHence fruition seems to have relation to love, or to the delight\nwhich one has in realizing the longed-for term, which is the end. Now\nthe end and the good is the object of the appetitive power. Wherefore\nit is evident that fruition is the act of the appetitive power.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders one and the same thing from belonging,\nunder different aspects, to different powers. Accordingly the vision\nof God, as vision, is an act of the intellect, but as a good and an\nend, is the object of the will. And as such is the fruition thereof:\nso that the intellect attains this end, as the executive power, but\nthe will as the motive power, moving (the powers) towards the end and\nenjoying the end attained.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The perfection and end of every other power is\ncontained in the object of the appetitive power, as the proper is\ncontained in the common, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1). Hence the\nperfection and end of each power, in so far as it is a good, belongs\nto the appetitive power. Wherefore the appetitive power moves the\nother powers to their ends; and itself realizes the end, when each of\nthem reaches the end.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In delight there are two things: perception of what is\nbecoming; and this belongs to the apprehensive power; and complacency\nin that which is offered as becoming: and this belongs to the\nappetitive power, in which power delight is formally completed.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 11, Art. 2]\n\nWhether to Enjoy Belongs to the Rational Creature Alone, or Also to\nIrrational Animals?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that to enjoy belongs to men alone. For\nAugustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22) that \"it is given to us men\nto enjoy and to use.\" Therefore other animals cannot enjoy.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to enjoy relates to the last end. But irrational\nanimals cannot obtain the last end. Therefore it is not for them to\nenjoy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is beneath the\nintellectual appetite, so is the natural appetite beneath the\nsensitive. If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sensitive appetite,\nit seems that for the same reason it can belong to the natural\nappetite. But this is evidently false, since the latter cannot\ndelight in anything. Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot enjoy:\nand accordingly enjoyment is not possible for irrational animals.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): \"It is not so\nabsurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy their food and any bodily\npleasure.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As was stated above (A. 1) to enjoy is not the act\nof the power that achieves the end as executor, but of the power that\ncommands the achievement; for it has been said to belong to the\nappetitive power. Now things void of reason have indeed a power of\nachieving an end by way of execution, as that by which a heavy body\nhas a downward tendency, whereas a light body has an upward tendency.\nYet the power of command in respect of the end is not in them, but in\nsome higher nature, which moves all nature by its command, just as in\nthings endowed with knowledge, the appetite moves the other powers to\ntheir acts. Wherefore it is clear that things void of knowledge,\nalthough they attain an end, have no enjoyment of the end: this is\nonly for those that are endowed with knowledge.\n\nNow knowledge of the end is twofold: perfect and imperfect. Perfect\nknowledge of the end, is that whereby not only is that known which is\nthe end and the good, but also the universal formality of the end and\nthe good; and such knowledge belongs to the rational nature alone. On\nthe other hand, imperfect knowledge is that by which the end and the\ngood are known in the particular. Such knowledge is in irrational\nanimals: whose appetitive powers do not command with freedom, but are\nmoved according to a natural instinct to whatever they apprehend.\nConsequently, enjoyment belongs to the rational nature, in a perfect\ndegree; to irrational animals, imperfectly; to other creatures, not\nat all.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there of perfect enjoyment.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Enjoyment need not be of the last end simply; but of\nthat which each one chooses for his last end.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The sensitive appetite follows some knowledge; not so\nthe natural appetite, especially in things void of knowledge.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Augustine is speaking there of imperfect enjoyment.\nThis is clear from his way of speaking: for he says that \"it is not\nso absurd to suppose that even beasts enjoy,\" that is, as it would\nbe, if one were to say that they \"use.\"\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 11, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Enjoyment Is Only of the Last End?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that enjoyment is not only of the last end.\nFor the Apostle says (Philem. 20): \"Yea, brother, may I enjoy thee in\nthe Lord.\" But it is evident that Paul had not placed his last end in\na man. Therefore to enjoy is not only of the last end.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what we enjoy is the fruit. But the Apostle says\n(Gal. 5:22): \"The fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace,\" and\nother like things, which are not in the nature of the last end.\nTherefore enjoyment is not only of the last end.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the acts of the will reflect on one another; for I\nwill to will, and I love to love. But to enjoy is an act of the will:\nsince \"it is the will with which we enjoy,\" as Augustine says (De\nTrin. x, 10). Therefore a man enjoys his enjoyment. But the last end\nof man is not enjoyment, but the uncreated good alone, which is God.\nTherefore enjoyment is not only of the last end.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): \"A man does not\nenjoy that which he desires for the sake of something else.\" But the\nlast end alone is that which man does not desire for the sake of\nsomething else. Therefore enjoyment is of the last end alone.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) the notion of fruit implies\ntwo things: first that it should come last; second, that it should\ncalm the appetite with a certain sweetness and delight. Now a thing\nis last either simply or relatively; simply, if it be referred to\nnothing else; relatively, if it is the last in a particular series.\nTherefore that which is last simply, and in which one delights as in\nthe last end, is properly called fruit; and this it is that one is\nproperly said to enjoy. But that which is delightful not in itself,\nbut is desired, only as referred to something else, e.g. a bitter\npotion for the sake of health, can nowise be called fruit. And that\nwhich has something delightful about it, to which a number of\npreceding things are referred, may indeed be called fruit in a\ncertain manner; but we cannot be said to enjoy it properly or as\nthough it answered perfectly to the notion of fruit. Hence Augustine\nsays (De Trin. x, 10) that \"we enjoy what we know, when the delighted\nwill is at rest therein.\" But its rest is not absolute save in the\npossession of the last end: for as long as something is looked for,\nthe movement of the will remains in suspense, although it has reached\nsomething. Thus in local movement, although any point between the two\nterms is a beginning and an end, yet it is not considered as an\nactual end, except when the movement stops there.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 33), \"if he had\nsaid, 'May I enjoy thee,' without adding 'in the Lord,' he would seem\nto have set the end of his love in him. But since he added that he\nset his end in the Lord, he implied his desire to enjoy Him\": as if\nwe were to say that he expressed his enjoyment of his brother not as\na term but as a means.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Fruit bears one relation to the tree that bore it, and\nanother to man that enjoys it. To the tree indeed that bore it, it is\ncompared as effect to cause; to the one enjoying it, as the final\nobject of his longing and the consummation of his delight.\nAccordingly these fruits mentioned by the Apostle are so called\nbecause they are certain effects of the Holy Ghost in us, wherefore\nthey are called \"fruits of the spirit\": but not as though we are to\nenjoy them as our last end. Or we may say with Ambrose that they are\ncalled fruits because \"we should desire them for their own sake\": not\nindeed as though they were not ordained to the last end; but because\nthey are such that we ought to find pleasure in them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 2, A. 7), we speak of\nan end in a twofold sense: first, as being the thing itself;\nsecondly, as the attainment thereof. These are not, of course, two\nends, but one end, considered in itself, and in its relation to\nsomething else. Accordingly God is the last end, as that which is\nultimately sought for: while the enjoyment is as the attainment of\nthis last end. And so, just as God is not one end, and the enjoyment\nof God, another: so it is the same enjoyment whereby we enjoy God,\nand whereby we enjoy our enjoyment of God. And the same applies to\ncreated happiness which consists in enjoyment.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 11, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Enjoyment Is Only of the End Possessed?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that enjoyment is only of the end\npossessed. For Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1) that \"to enjoy is to\nuse joyfully, with the joy, not of hope, but of possession.\" But so\nlong as a thing is not had, there is joy, not of possession, but of\nhope. Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 3), enjoyment is not properly\notherwise than of the last end: because this alone gives rest to the\nappetite. But the appetite has no rest save in the possession of the\nend. Therefore enjoyment, properly speaking, is only of the end\npossessed.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to enjoy is to lay hold of the fruit. But one does\nnot lay hold of the fruit until one is in possession of the end.\nTherefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed.\n\n_On the contrary,_ \"to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for\nits own sake,\" as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). But this\nis possible, even in regard to a thing which is not in our\npossession. Therefore it is possible to enjoy the end even though it\nbe not possessed.\n\n_I answer that,_ To enjoy implies a certain relation of the will to\nthe last end, according as the will has something by way of last end.\nNow an end is possessed in two ways; perfectly and imperfectly.\nPerfectly, when it is possessed not only in intention but also in\nreality; imperfectly, when it is possessed in intention only. Perfect\nenjoyment, therefore, is of the end already possessed: but imperfect\nenjoyment is also of the end possessed not really, but only in\nintention.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine speaks there of perfect enjoyment.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The will is hindered in two ways from being at rest.\nFirst on the part of the object; by reason of its not being the last\nend, but ordained to something else: secondly on the part of the one\nwho desires the end, by reason of his not being yet in possession of\nit. Now it is the object that specifies an act: but on the agent\ndepends the manner of acting, so that the act be perfect or\nimperfect, as compared with the actual circumstances of the agent.\nTherefore enjoyment of anything but the last end is not enjoyment\nproperly speaking, as falling short of the nature of enjoyment. But\nenjoyment of the last end, not yet possessed, is enjoyment properly\nspeaking, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect way in which it\nis possessed.\n\nReply Obj. 3: One is said to lay hold of or to have an end, not only\nin reality, but also in intention, as stated above.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 12\n\nOF INTENTION\n(In Five Articles)\n\nWe must now consider Intention: concerning which there are five\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether intention is an act of intellect or of the will?\n\n(2) Whether it is only of the last end?\n\n(3) Whether one can intend two things at the same time?\n\n(4) Whether intention of the end is the same act as volition of the\nmeans?\n\n(5) Whether intention is within the competency of irrational animals?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 12, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Intention Is an Act of the Intellect or of the Will?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that intention is an act of the intellect,\nand not of the will. For it is written (Matt. 6:22): \"If thy eye be\nsingle, thy whole body shall be lightsome\": where, according to\nAugustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) the eye signifies intention.\nBut since the eye is the organ of sight, it signifies the apprehensive\npower. Therefore intention is not an act of the appetitive but of the\napprehensive power.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13) that\nOur Lord spoke of intention as a light, when He said (Matt. 6:23):\n\"If the light that is in thee be darkness,\" etc. But light pertains\nto knowledge. Therefore intention does too.\n\nObj. 3: Further, intention implies a kind of ordaining to an end. But\nto ordain is an act of reason. Therefore intention belongs not to the\nwill but to the reason.\n\nObj. 4: Further, an act of the will is either of the end or of the\nmeans. But the act of the will in respect of the end is called\nvolition, or enjoyment; with regard to the means, it is choice, from\nwhich intention is distinct. Therefore it is not an act of the will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xi, 4, 8, 9) that \"the\nintention of the will unites the sight to the object seen; and the\nimages retained in the memory, to the penetrating gaze of the soul's\ninner thought.\" Therefore intention is an act of the will.\n\n_I answer that,_ Intention, as the very word denotes, signifies, \"to\ntend to something.\" Now both the action of the mover and the movement\nof thing moved, tend to something. But that the movement of the thing\nmoved tends to anything, is due to the action of the mover.\nConsequently intention belongs first and principally to that which\nmoves to the end: hence we say that an architect or anyone who is in\nauthority, by his command moves others to that which he intends. Now\nthe will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end, as shown\nabove (Q. 9, A. 1). Wherefore it is evident that intention, properly\nspeaking, is an act of the will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The eye designates intention figuratively, not because\nintention has reference to knowledge, but because it presupposes\nknowledge, which proposes to the will the end to which the latter\nmoves; thus we foresee with the eye whither we should tend with our\nbodies.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Intention is called a light because it is manifest to\nhim who intends. Wherefore works are called darkness because a man\nknows what he intends, but knows not what the result may be, as\nAugustine expounds (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 13).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The will does not ordain, but tends to something\naccording to the order of reason. Consequently this word \"intention\"\nindicates an act of the will, presupposing the act whereby the reason\norders something to the end.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Intention is an act of the will in regard to the end.\nNow the will stands in a threefold relation to the end. First,\nabsolutely; and thus we have \"volition,\" whereby we will absolutely\nto have health, and so forth. Secondly, it considers the end, as its\nplace of rest; and thus \"enjoyment\" regards the end. Thirdly, it\nconsiders the end as the term towards which something is ordained;\nand thus \"intention\" regards the end. For when we speak of intending\nto have health, we mean not only that we have it, but that we will\nhave it by means of something else.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 12, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Intention Is Only of the Last End?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that intention is only of the last end.\nFor it is said in the book of Prosper's Sentences (Sent. 100): \"The\nintention of the heart is a cry to God.\" But God is the last end of\nthe human heart. Therefore intention is always regards the last end.\n\nObj. 2: Further, intention regards the end as the terminus, as stated\nabove (A. 1, ad 4). But a terminus is something last. Therefore\nintention always regards the last end.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as intention regards the end, so does\nenjoyment. But enjoyment is always of the last end. Therefore\nintention is too.\n\n_On the contrary,_ There is but one last end of human wills, viz.\nHappiness, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 7). If, therefore, intentions\nwere only of the last end, men would not have different intentions:\nwhich is evidently false.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 4), intention regards the\nend as a terminus of the movement of the will. Now a terminus of\nmovement may be taken in two ways. First, the very last terminus,\nwhen the movement comes to a stop; this is the terminus of the whole\nmovement. Secondly, some point midway, which is the beginning of one\npart of the movement, and the end or terminus of the other. Thus in\nthe movement from A to C through B, C is the last terminus, while B\nis a terminus, but not the last. And intention can be both.\nConsequently though intention is always of the end, it need not be\nalways of the last end.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The intention of the heart is called a cry to God, not\nthat God is always the object of intention, but because He sees our\nintention. Or because, when we pray, we direct our intention to God,\nwhich intention has the force of a cry.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A terminus is something last, not always in respect of\nthe whole, but sometimes in respect of a part.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Enjoyment implies rest in the end; and this belongs to\nthe last end alone. But intention implies movement towards an end,\nnot rest. Wherefore the comparison proves nothing.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 12, Art. 3]\n\nWhether One Can Intend Two Things at the Same Time?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one cannot intend several things at\nthe same time. For Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 14, 16,\n17) that man's intention cannot be directed at the same time to God\nand to bodily benefits. Therefore, for the same reason, neither to\nany other two things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, intention designates a movement of the will towards\na terminus. Now there cannot be several termini in the same direction\nof one movement. Therefore the will cannot intend several things at\nthe same time.\n\nObj. 3: Further, intention presupposes an act of reason or of the\nintellect. But \"it is not possible to understand several things at\nthe same time,\" according to the Philosopher (Topic. ii, 10).\nTherefore neither is it possible to intend several things at the same\ntime.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Art imitates nature. Now nature intends two\npurposes by means of one instrument: thus \"the tongue is for the\npurpose of taste and speech\" (De Anima ii, 8). Therefore, for the\nsame reason, art or reason can at the same time direct one thing to\ntwo ends: so that one can intend several ends at the same time.\n\n_I answer that,_ The expression \"two things\" may be taken in two\nways: they may be ordained to one another or not so ordained. And if\nthey be ordained to one another, it is evident, from what has been\nsaid, that a man can intend several things at the same time. For\nintention is not only of the last end, as stated above (A. 2), but\nalso of an intermediary end. Now a man intends at the same time, both\nthe proximate and the last end; as the mixing of a medicine and the\ngiving of health.\n\nBut if we take two things that are not ordained to one another, thus\nalso a man can intend several things at the same time. This is\nevident from the fact that a man prefers one thing to another because\nit is the better of the two. Now one of the reasons for which one\nthing is better than another is that it is available for more\npurposes: wherefore one thing can be chosen in preference to another,\nbecause of the greater number of purposes for which it is available:\nso that evidently a man can intend several things at the same time.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine means to say that man cannot at the same time\ndirect his attention to God and to bodily benefits, as to two last\nends: since, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 5), one man cannot have\nseveral last ends.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There can be several termini ordained to one another,\nof the same movement and in the same direction; but not unless they\nbe ordained to one another. At the same time it must be observed that\nwhat is not one in reality may be taken as one by the reason. Now\nintention is a movement of the will to something already ordained by\nthe reason, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). Wherefore where we have\nmany things in reality, we may take them as one term of intention, in\nso far as the reason takes them as one: either because two things\nconcur in the integrity of one whole, as a proper measure of heat and\ncold conduce to health; or because two things are included in one\nwhich may be intended. For instance, the acquiring of wine and\nclothing is included in wealth, as in something common to both;\nwherefore nothing hinders the man who intends to acquire wealth, from\nintending both the others.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated in the First Part (Q. 12, A. 10; Q. 58, A. 2;\nQ. 85, A. 4), it is possible to understand several things at the same\ntime, in so far as, in some way, they are one.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 12, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Intention of the End Is the Same Act As the Volition of the\nMeans?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intention of the end and the\nvolition of the means are not one and the same movement. For\nAugustine says (De Trin. xi, 6) that \"the will to see the window, has\nfor its end the seeing of the window; and is another act from the\nwill to see, through the window, the passersby.\" But that I should\nwill to see the passersby, through the window, belongs to intention;\nwhereas that I will to see the window, belongs to the volition of the\nmeans. Therefore intention of the end and the willing of the means\nare distinct movements of the will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, acts are distinct according to their objects. But\nthe end and the means are distinct objects. Therefore the intention\nof the end and the willing of the means are distinct movements of the\nwill.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the willing of the means is called choice. But\nchoice and intention are not the same. Therefore intention of the end\nand the willing of the means are not the same movement of the will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The means in relation to the end, are as the\nmid-space to the terminus. Now it is all the same movement that\npasses through the mid-space to the terminus, in natural things.\nTherefore in things pertaining to the will, the intention of the end\nis the same movement as the willing of the means.\n\n_I answer that,_ The movement of the will to the end and to the means\ncan be considered in two ways. First, according as the will is moved\nto each of the aforesaid absolutely and in itself. And thus there are\nreally two movements of the will to them. Secondly, it may be\nconsidered accordingly as the will is moved to the means for the sake\nof the end: and thus the movement of the will to the end and its\nmovement to the means are one and the same thing. For when I say: \"I\nwish to take medicine for the sake of health,\" I signify no more than\none movement of my will. And this is because the end is the reason\nfor willing the means. Now the object, and that by reason of which it\nis an object, come under the same act; thus it is the same act of\nsight that perceives color and light, as stated above (Q. 8, A. 3, ad\n2). And the same applies to the intellect; for if it consider\nprinciple and conclusion absolutely, it considers each by a distinct\nact; but when it assents to the conclusion on account of the\nprinciples, there is but one act of the intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of seeing the window and of\nseeing, through the window, the passersby, according as the will is\nmoved to either absolutely.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The end, considered as a thing, and the means to that\nend, are distinct objects of the will. But in so far as the end is\nthe formal object in willing the means, they are one and the same\nobject.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A movement which is one as to the subject, may differ,\naccording to our way of looking at it, as to its beginning and end,\nas in the case of ascent and descent (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly, in\nso far as the movement of the will is to the means, as ordained to\nthe end, it is called \"choice\": but the movement of the will to the\nend as acquired by the means, is called \"intention.\" A sign of\nthis is that we can have intention of the end without having\ndetermined the means which are the object of choice.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 12, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Intention Is Within the Competency of Irrational Animals?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that irrational animals intend the end. For\nin things void of reason nature stands further apart from the rational\nnature, than does the sensitive nature in irrational animals. But\nnature intends the end even in things void of reason, as is proved in\n_Phys._ ii, 8. Much more, therefore, do irrational animals intend the\nend.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as intention is of the end, so is enjoyment.\nBut enjoyment is in irrational animals, as stated above (Q. 11, A.\n2). Therefore intention is too.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to intend an end belongs to one who acts for an end;\nsince to intend is nothing else than to tend to something. But\nirrational animals act for an end; for an animal is moved either to\nseek food, or to do something of the kind. Therefore irrational\nanimals intend an end.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Intention of an end implies ordaining something to\nan end: which belongs to reason. Since therefore irrational animals\nare void of reason, it seems that they do not intend an end.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), to intend is to tend to\nsomething; and this belongs to the mover and to the moved. According,\ntherefore, as that which is moved to an end by another is said to\nintend the end, thus nature is said to intend an end, as being moved\nto its end by God, as the arrow is moved by the archer. And in this\nway, irrational animals intend an end, inasmuch as they are moved to\nsomething by natural instinct. The other way of intending an end\nbelongs to the mover; according as he ordains the movement of\nsomething, either his own or another's, to an end. This belongs to\nreason alone. Wherefore irrational animals do not intend an end in\nthis way, which is to intend properly and principally, as stated\nabove (A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument takes intention in the sense of being\nmoved to an end.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Enjoyment does not imply the ordaining of one thing to\nanother, as intention does, but absolute repose in the end.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Irrational animals are moved to an end, not as though\nthey thought that they can gain the end by this movement; this\nbelongs to one that intends; but through desiring the end by natural\ninstinct, they are moved to an end, moved, as it were, by another,\nlike other things that are moved naturally.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 13\n\nOF CHOICE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL WITH REGARD TO THE MEANS\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the acts of the will with regard to the means.\nThere are three of them: to choose, to consent, and to use. And choice\nis preceded by counsel. First of all, then, we must consider choice:\nsecondly, counsel; thirdly, consent; fourthly, use.\n\nConcerning choice there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Of what power is it the act; of the will or of the reason?\n\n(2) Whether choice is to be found in irrational animals?\n\n(3) Whether choice is only the means, or sometimes also of the end?\n\n(4) Whether choice is only of things that we do ourselves?\n\n(5) Whether choice is only of possible things?\n\n(6) Whether man chooses of necessity or freely?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Choice Is an Act of Will or of Reason?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that choice is an act, not of will but of\nreason. For choice implies comparison, whereby one is given preference\nto another. But to compare is an act of reason. Therefore choice is an\nact of reason.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is for the same faculty to form a syllogism, and\nto draw the conclusion. But, in practical matters, it is the reason\nthat forms syllogisms. Since therefore choice is a kind of conclusion\nin practical matters, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 3, it seems that it\nis an act of reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, ignorance does not belong to the will but to the\ncognitive power. Now there is an \"ignorance of choice,\" as is stated\nin _Ethic._ iii, 1. Therefore it seems that choice does not belong to\nthe will but to the reason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that choice\nis \"the desire of things in our power.\" But desire is an act of will.\nTherefore choice is too.\n\n_I answer that,_ The word choice implies something belonging to the\nreason or intellect, and something belonging to the will: for the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice is either \"intellect\ninfluenced by appetite or appetite influenced by intellect.\" Now\nwhenever two things concur to make one, one of them is formal in\nregard to the other. Hence Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom.\nxxxiii.] says that choice \"is neither desire only, nor counsel only,\nbut a combination of the two. For just as we say that an animal is\ncomposed of soul and body, and that it is neither a mere body, nor a\nmere soul, but both; so is it with choice.\"\n\nNow we must observe, as regards the acts of the soul, that an act\nbelonging essentially to some power or habit, receives a form or\nspecies from a higher power or habit, according as an inferior is\nordained by a superior: for if a man were to perform an act of\nfortitude for the love of God, that act is materially an act of\nfortitude, but formally, an act of charity. Now it is evident that, in\na sense, reason precedes the will and ordains its act: in so far as\nthe will tends to its object, according to the order of reason, since\nthe apprehensive power presents the object to the appetite.\nAccordingly, that act whereby the will tends to something proposed to\nit as being good, through being ordained to the end by the reason, is\nmaterially an act of the will, but formally an act of the reason. Now\nin such like matters the substance of the act is as the matter in\ncomparison to the order imposed by the higher power. Wherefore choice\nis substantially not an act of the reason but of the will: for choice\nis accomplished in a certain movement of the soul towards the good\nwhich is chosen. Consequently it is evidently an act of the appetitive\npower.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Choice implies a previous comparison; not that it\nconsists in the comparison itself.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is quite true that it is for the reason to draw the\nconclusion of a practical syllogism; and it is called \"a decision\" or\n\"judgment,\" to be followed by \"choice.\" And for this reason the\nconclusion seems to belong to the act of choice, as to that which\nresults from it.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In speaking \"of ignorance of choice,\" we do not mean\nthat choice is a sort of knowledge, but that there is ignorance of\nwhat ought to be chosen.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Choice Is to Be Found in Irrational Animals?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that irrational animals are able to\nchoose. For choice \"is the desire of certain things on account of an\nend,\" as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 2, 3. But irrational animals desire\nsomething on account of an end: since they act for an end, and from\ndesire. Therefore choice is in irrational animals.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the very word _electio_ (choice) seems to signify\nthe taking of something in preference to others. But irrational\nanimals take something in preference to others: thus we can easily\nsee for ourselves that a sheep will eat one grass and refuse another.\nTherefore choice is in irrational animals.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to _Ethic._ vi, 12, \"it is from prudence\nthat a man makes a good choice of means.\" But prudence is found in\nirrational animals: hence it is said in the beginning of _Metaph._ i,\n1 that \"those animals which, like bees, cannot hear sounds, are\nprudent by instinct.\" We see this plainly, in wonderful cases of\nsagacity manifested in the works of various animals, such as bees,\nspiders, and dogs. For a hound in following a stag, on coming to a\ncrossroad, tries by scent whether the stag has passed by the first or\nthe second road: and if he find that the stag has not passed there,\nbeing thus assured, takes to the third road without trying the scent;\nas though he were reasoning by way of exclusion, arguing that the\nstag must have passed by this way, since he did not pass by the\nothers, and there is no other road. Therefore it seems that\nirrational animals are able to choose.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiii.]\nsays that \"children and irrational animals act willingly but not from\nchoice.\" Therefore choice is not in irrational animals.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since choice is the taking of one thing in preference\nto another it must of necessity be in respect of several things that\ncan be chosen. Consequently in those things which are altogether\ndeterminate to one there is no place for choice. Now the difference\nbetween the sensitive appetite and the will is that, as stated above\n(Q. 1, A. 2, ad 3), the sensitive appetite is determinate to one\nparticular thing, according to the order of nature; whereas the will,\nalthough determinate to one thing in general, viz. the good, according\nto the order of nature, is nevertheless indeterminate in respect of\nparticular goods. Consequently choice belongs properly to the will,\nand not to the sensitive appetite which is all that irrational animals\nhave. Wherefore irrational animals are not competent to choose.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Not every desire of one thing on account of an end is\ncalled choice: there must be a certain discrimination of one thing\nfrom another. And this cannot be except when the appetite can be\nmoved to several things.\n\nReply Obj. 2: An irrational animal takes one thing in preference to\nanother, because its appetite is naturally determinate to that thing.\nWherefore as soon as an animal, whether by its sense or by its\nimagination, is offered something to which its appetite is naturally\ninclined, it is moved to that alone, without making any choice. Just\nas fire is moved upwards and not downwards, without its making any\nchoice.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated in _Phys._ iii, 3 \"movement is the act of the\nmovable, caused by a mover.\" Wherefore the power of the mover appears\nin the movement of that which it moves. Accordingly, in all things\nmoved by reason, the order of reason which moves them is evident,\nalthough the things themselves are without reason: for an arrow\nthrough the motion of the archer goes straight towards the target, as\nthough it were endowed with reason to direct its course. The same may\nbe seen in the movements of clocks and all engines put together by\nthe art of man. Now as artificial things are in comparison to human\nart, so are all natural things in comparison to the Divine art. And\naccordingly order is to be seen in things moved by nature, just as in\nthings moved by reason, as is stated in _Phys._ ii. And thus it is\nthat in the works of irrational animals we notice certain marks of\nsagacity, in so far as they have a natural inclination to set about\ntheir actions in a most orderly manner through being ordained by the\nSupreme art. For which reason, too, certain animals are called\nprudent or sagacious; and not because they reason or exercise any\nchoice about things. This is clear from the fact that all that share\nin one nature, invariably act in the same way.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Choice Is Only of the Means, or Sometimes Also of the End?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that choice is not only of the means. For\nthe Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 12) that \"virtue makes us choose\naright; but it is not the part of virtue, but of some other power to\ndirect aright those things which are to be done for its sake.\" But\nthat for the sake of which something is done is the end. Therefore\nchoice is of the end.\n\nObj. 2: Further, choice implies preference of one thing to another.\nBut just as there can be preference of means, so can there be\npreference of ends. Therefore choice can be of ends, just as it can\nbe of means.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that\n\"volition is of the end, but choice of the means.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As already stated (A. 1, ad 2), choice results from\nthe decision or judgment which is, as it were, the conclusion of a\npractical syllogism. Hence that which is the conclusion of a\npractical syllogism, is the matter of choice. Now in practical things\nthe end stands in the position of a principle, not of a conclusion,\nas the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9). Wherefore the end, as such, is\nnot a matter of choice.\n\nBut just as in speculative knowledge nothing hinders the principle of\none demonstration or of one science, from being the conclusion of\nanother demonstration or science; while the first indemonstrable\nprinciple cannot be the conclusion of any demonstration or science;\nso too that which is the end in one operation, may be ordained to\nsomething as an end. And in this way it is a matter of choice. Thus\nin the work of a physician health is the end: wherefore it is not a\nmatter of choice for a physician, but a matter of principle. Now the\nhealth of the body is ordained to the good of the soul, consequently\nwith one who has charge of the soul's health, health or sickness may\nbe a matter of choice; for the Apostle says (2 Cor. 12:10): \"For when\nI am weak, then am I powerful.\" But the last end is nowise a matter\nof choice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The proper ends of virtues are ordained to Happiness as\nto their last end. And thus it is that they can be a matter of choice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 1, A. 5), there is but one last\nend. Accordingly wherever there are several ends, they can be the\nsubject of choice, in so far as they are ordained to a further end.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Choice Is of Those Things Only That Are Done by Us?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that choice is not only in respect of\nhuman acts. For choice regards the means. Now, not only acts, but\nalso the organs, are means (Phys. ii, 3). Therefore choice is not\nonly concerned with human acts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, action is distinct from contemplation. But choice\nhas a place even in contemplation; in so far as one opinion is\npreferred to another. Therefore choice is not concerned with human\nacts alone.\n\nObj. 3: Further, men are chosen for certain posts, whether secular or\necclesiastical, by those who exercise no action in their regard.\nTherefore choice is not concerned with human acts alone.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that \"no man\nchooses save what he can do himself.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as intention regards the end, so does choice\nregard the means. Now the end is either an action or a thing. And\nwhen the end is a thing, some human action must intervene; either in\nso far as man produces the thing which is the end, as the physician\nproduces health (wherefore the production of health is said to be the\nend of the physician); or in so far as man, in some fashion, uses or\nenjoys the thing which is the end; thus for the miser, money or the\npossession of money is the end. The same is to be said of the means.\nFor the means must needs be either an action; or a thing, with some\naction intervening whereby man either makes the thing which is the\nmeans, or puts it to some use. And thus it is that choice is always\nin regard to human acts.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The organs are ordained to the end, inasmuch as man\nmakes use of them for the sake of the end.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In contemplation itself there is the act of the\nintellect assenting to this or that opinion. It is exterior action\nthat is put in contradistinction to contemplation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When a man chooses someone for a bishopric or some high\nposition in the state, he chooses to name that man to that post.\nElse, if he had no right to act in the appointment of the bishop or\nofficial, he would have no right to choose. Likewise, whenever we\nspeak of one thing being chosen in preference to another, it is in\nconjunction with some action of the chooser.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Choice Is Only of Possible Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that choice is not only of possible\nthings. For choice is an act of the will, as stated above (A. 1). Now\nthere is \"a willing of impossibilities\" (Ethic. iii, 2). Therefore\nthere is also a choice of impossibilities.\n\nObj. 2: Further, choice is of things done by us, as stated above (A.\n4). Therefore it matters not, as far as the act of choosing is\nconcerned, whether one choose that which is impossible in itself, or\nthat which is impossible to the chooser. Now it often happens that we\nare unable to accomplish what we choose: so that this proves to be\nimpossible to us. Therefore choice is of the impossible.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to try to do a thing is to choose to do it. But the\nBlessed Benedict says (Regula lxviii) that if the superior command\nwhat is impossible, it should be attempted. Therefore choice can be\nof the impossible.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that \"there\nis no choice of impossibilities.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), our choice is always\nconcerned with our actions. Now whatever is done by us, is possible\nto us. Therefore we must needs say that choice is only of possible\nthings.\n\nMoreover, the reason for choosing a thing is that it conduces to an\nend. But what is impossible cannot conduce to an end. A sign of this\nis that when men in taking counsel together come to something that is\nimpossible to them, they depart, as being unable to proceed with the\nbusiness.\n\nAgain, this is evident if we examine the previous process of the\nreason. For the means, which are the object of choice, are to the\nend, as the conclusion is to the principle. Now it is clear that an\nimpossible conclusion does not follow from a possible principle.\nWherefore an end cannot be possible, unless the means be possible. Now\nno one is moved to the impossible. Consequently no one would tend to\nthe end, save for the fact that the means appear to be possible.\nTherefore the impossible is not the object of choice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The will stands between the intellect and the external\naction: for the intellect proposes to the will its object, and the\nwill causes the external action. Hence the principle of the movement\nin the will is to be found in the intellect, which apprehends\nsomething under the universal notion of good: but the term or\nperfection of the will's act is to be observed in its relation to the\naction whereby a man tends to the attainment of a thing; for the\nmovement of the will is from the soul to the thing. Consequently the\nperfect act of the will is in respect of something that is good for\none to do. Now this cannot be something impossible. Wherefore the\ncomplete act of the will is only in respect of what is possible and\ngood for him that wills. But the incomplete act of the will is in\nrespect of the impossible; and by some is called \"velleity,\" because,\nto wit, one would will (_vellet_) such a thing, were it possible. But\nchoice is an act of the will, fixed on something to be done by the\nchooser. And therefore it is by no means of anything but what is\npossible.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since the object of the will is the apprehended good,\nwe must judge of the object of the will according as it is\napprehended. And so, just as sometimes the will tends to something\nwhich is apprehended as good, and yet is not really good; so is\nchoice sometimes made of something apprehended as possible to the\nchooser, and yet impossible to him.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The reason for this is that the subject should not rely\non his own judgment to decide whether a certain thing is possible;\nbut in each case should stand by his superior's judgment.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Man Chooses of Necessity or Freely?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man chooses of necessity. For the end\nstands in relation to the object of choice, as the principle of that\nwhich follows from the principles, as declared in _Ethic._ vii, 8. But\nconclusions follow of necessity from their principles. Therefore man\nis moved of necessity from (willing) the end of the choice (of the\nmeans).\n\nObj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2), choice follows the\nreason's judgment of what is to be done. But reason judges of\nnecessity about some things: on account of the necessity of the\npremises. Therefore it seems that choice also follows of necessity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if two things are absolutely equal, man is not moved\nto one more than to the other; thus if a hungry man, as Plato says\n(Cf. De Coelo ii, 13), be confronted on either side with two portions\nof food equally appetizing and at an equal distance, he is not moved\ntowards one more than to the other; and he finds the reason of this\nin the immobility of the earth in the middle of the world. Now, if\nthat which is equally (eligible) with something else cannot be\nchosen, much less can that be chosen which appears as less\n(eligible). Therefore if two or more things are available, of which\none appears to be more (eligible), it is impossible to choose any of\nthe others. Therefore that which appears to hold the first place is\nchosen of necessity. But every act of choosing is in regard to\nsomething that seems in some way better. Therefore every choice is\nmade necessarily.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Choice is an act of a rational power; which\naccording to the Philosopher (Metaph. ix, 2) stands in relation to\nopposites.\n\n_I answer that,_ Man does not choose of necessity. And this is\nbecause that which is possible not to be, is not of necessity. Now\nthe reason why it is possible not to choose, or to choose, may be\ngathered from a twofold power in man. For man can will and not will,\nact and not act; again, he can will this or that, and do this or\nthat. The reason of this is seated in the very power of the reason.\nFor the will can tend to whatever the reason can apprehend as good.\nNow the reason can apprehend as good, not only this, viz. \"to will\"\nor \"to act,\" but also this, viz. \"not to will\" or \"not to act.\"\nAgain, in all particular goods, the reason can consider an aspect of\nsome good, and the lack of some good, which has the aspect of evil:\nand in this respect, it can apprehend any single one of such goods as\nto be chosen or to be avoided. The perfect good alone, which is\nHappiness, cannot be apprehended by the reason as an evil, or as\nlacking in any way. Consequently man wills Happiness of necessity,\nnor can he will not to be happy, or to be unhappy. Now since choice\nis not of the end, but of the means, as stated above (A. 3); it is\nnot of the perfect good, which is Happiness, but of other particular\ngoods. Therefore man chooses not of necessity, but freely.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The conclusion does not always of necessity follow from\nthe principles, but only when the principles cannot be true if the\nconclusion is not true. In like manner, the end does not always\nnecessitate in man the choosing of the means, because the means are\nnot always such that the end cannot be gained without them; or, if\nthey be such, they are not always considered in that light.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The reason's decision or judgment of what is to be done\nis about things that are contingent and possible to us. In such\nmatters the conclusions do not follow of necessity from principles\nthat are absolutely necessary, but from such as are so conditionally;\nas, for instance, \"If he runs, he is in motion.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: If two things be proposed as equal under one aspect,\nnothing hinders us from considering in one of them some particular\npoint of superiority, so that the will has a bent towards that one\nrather than towards the other.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 14\n\nOF COUNSEL, WHICH PRECEDES CHOICE\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider counsel; concerning which there are six points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether counsel is an inquiry?\n\n(2) Whether counsel is of the end or of the means?\n\n(3) Whether counsel is only of things that we do?\n\n(4) Whether counsel is of all things that we do?\n\n(5) Whether the process of counsel is one of analysis?\n\n(6) Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Counsel Is an Inquiry?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that counsel is not an inquiry. For\nDamascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is \"an act of\nthe appetite.\" But inquiry is not an act of the appetite. Therefore\ncounsel is not an inquiry.\n\nObj. 2: Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the intellect: for\nwhich reason it is not found in God, Whose knowledge is not\ndiscursive, as we have shown in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 7). But\ncounsel is ascribed to God: for it is written (Eph. 1:11) that \"He\nworketh all things according to the counsel of His will.\" Therefore\ncounsel is not inquiry.\n\nObj. 3: Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters. But counsel is given\nin matters that are certainly good; thus the Apostle says (1 Cor.\n7:25): \"Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord: but\nI give counsel.\" Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.]\nsays: \"Every counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry is a\ncounsel.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Choice, as stated above (Q. 13, A. 1, ad 2; A. 3),\nfollows the judgment of the reason about what is to be done. Now\nthere is much uncertainty in things that have to be done; because\nactions are concerned with contingent singulars, which by reason of\ntheir vicissitude, are uncertain. Now in things doubtful and\nuncertain the reason does not pronounce judgment, without previous\ninquiry: wherefore the reason must of necessity institute an inquiry\nbefore deciding on the objects of choice; and this inquiry is called\ncounsel. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is\nthe \"desire of what has been already counselled.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: When the acts of two powers are ordained to one\nanother, in each of them there is something belonging to the other\npower: consequently each act can be denominated from either power.\nNow it is evident that the act of the reason giving direction as to\nthe means, and the act of the will tending to these means according\nto the reason's direction, are ordained to one another. Consequently\nthere is to be found something of the reason, viz. order, in that act\nof the will, which is choice: and in counsel, which is an act of\nreason, something of the will--both as matter (since counsel is of\nwhat man wills to do)--and as motive (because it is from willing the\nend, that man is moved to take counsel in regard to the means). And\ntherefore, just as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice\n\"is intellect influenced by appetite,\" thus pointing out that both\nconcur in the act of choosing; so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii,\n22) that counsel is \"appetite based on inquiry,\" so as to show that\ncounsel belongs, in a way, both to the will, on whose behalf and by\nwhose impulsion the inquiry is made, and to the reason that executes\nthe inquiry.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The things that we say of God must be understood\nwithout any of the defects which are to be found in us: thus in us\nscience is of conclusions derived by reasoning from causes to\neffects: but science when said of God means sure knowledge of all\neffects in the First Cause, without any reasoning process. In like\nmanner we ascribe counsel to God, as to the certainty of His\nknowledge or judgment, which certainty in us arises from the inquiry\nof counsel. But such inquiry has no place in God; wherefore in this\nrespect it is not ascribed to God: in which sense Damascene says (De\nFide Orth. ii, 22): \"God takes not counsel: those only take counsel\nwho lack knowledge.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: It may happen that things which are most certainly good\nin the opinion of wise and spiritual men are not certainly good in\nthe opinion of many, or at least of carnal-minded men. Consequently\nin such things counsel may be given.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Counsel Is of the End, or Only of the Means?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that counsel is not only of the means but\nalso of the end. For whatever is doubtful, can be the subject of\ninquiry. Now in things to be done by man there happens sometimes a\ndoubt as to the end and not only as to the means. Since therefore\ninquiry as to what is to be done is counsel, it seems that counsel\ncan be of the end.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the matter of counsel is human actions. But some\nhuman actions are ends, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 1. Therefore counsel\ncan be of the end.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.]\nsays that \"counsel is not of the end, but of the means.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The end is the principle in practical matters:\nbecause the reason of the means is to be found in the end. Now the\nprinciple cannot be called in question, but must be presupposed in\nevery inquiry. Since therefore counsel is an inquiry, it is not of\nthe end, but only of the means. Nevertheless it may happen that what\nis the end in regard to some things, is ordained to something else;\njust as also what is the principle of one demonstration, is the\nconclusion of another: and consequently that which is looked upon as\nthe end in one inquiry, may be looked upon as the means in another;\nand thus it will become an object of counsel.\n\nReply Obj. 1: That which is looked upon as an end, is already fixed:\nconsequently as long as there is any doubt about it, it is not looked\nupon as an end. Wherefore if counsel is taken about it, it will be\ncounsel not about the end, but about the means.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Counsel is about operations, in so far as they are\nordained to some end. Consequently if any human act be an end, it\nwill not, as such, be the matter of counsel.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Counsel Is Only of Things That We Do?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that counsel is not only of things that we\ndo. For counsel implies some kind of conference. But it is possible\nfor many to confer about things that are not subject to movement, and\nare not the result of our actions, such as the nature of various\nthings. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.\n\nObj. 2: Further, men sometimes seek counsel about things that are\nlaid down by law; hence we speak of counsel at law. And yet those who\nseek counsel thus, have nothing to do in making the laws. Therefore\ncounsel is not only of things that we do.\n\nObj. 3: Further, some are said to take consultation about future\nevents; which, however, are not in our power. Therefore counsel is\nnot only of things that we do.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if counsel were only of things that we do, no one\nwould take counsel about what another does. But this is clearly\nuntrue. Therefore counsel is not only of things that we do.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.]\nsays: \"We take counsel of things that are within our competency and\nthat we are able to do.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Counsel properly implies a conference held between\nseveral; the very word (_consilium_) denotes this, for it means a\nsitting together (_considium_), from the fact that many sit together in\norder to confer with one another. Now we must take note that in\ncontingent particular cases, in order that anything be known for\ncertain, it is necessary to take several conditions or circumstances\ninto consideration, which it is not easy for one to consider, but are\nconsidered by several with greater certainty, since what one takes\nnote of, escapes the notice of another; whereas in necessary and\nuniversal things, our view is brought to bear on matters much more\nabsolute and simple, so that one man by himself may be sufficient to\nconsider these things. Wherefore the inquiry of counsel is concerned,\nproperly speaking, with contingent singulars. Now the knowledge of\nthe truth in such matters does not rank so high as to be desirable of\nitself, as is the knowledge of things universal and necessary; but it\nis desired as being useful towards action, because actions bear on\nthings singular and contingent. Consequently, properly speaking,\ncounsel is about things done by us.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Counsel implies conference, not of any kind, but about\nwhat is to be done, for the reason given above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although that which is laid down by the law is not due\nto the action of him who seeks counsel, nevertheless it directs him\nin his action: since the mandate of the law is one reason for doing\nsomething.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Counsel is not only about what is done, but also about\nwhatever has relation to what is done. And for this reason we speak\nof consulting about future events, in so far as man is induced to do\nor omit something, through the knowledge of future events.\n\nReply Obj. 4: We seek counsel about the actions of others, in so far\nas they are, in some way, one with us; either by union of\naffection--thus a man is solicitous about what concerns his friend,\nas though it concerned himself; or after the manner of an instrument,\nfor the principal agent and the instrument are, in a way, one cause,\nsince one acts through the other; thus the master takes counsel about\nwhat he would do through his servant.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Counsel Is About All Things That We Do?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that counsel is about all things that we\nhave to do. For choice is the \"desire of what is counselled\" as\nstated above (A. 1). But choice is about all things that we do.\nTherefore counsel is too.\n\nObj. 2: Further, counsel implies the reason's inquiry. But, whenever\nwe do not act through the impulse of passion, we act in virtue of the\nreason's inquiry. Therefore there is counsel about everything that we\ndo.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that \"if it\nappears that something can be done by more means than one, we take\ncounsel by inquiring whereby it may be done most easily and best; but\nif it can be accomplished by one means, how it can be done by this.\"\nBut whatever is done, is done by one means or by several. Therefore\ncounsel takes place in all things that we do.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxxiv.]\nsays that \"counsel has no place in things that are done according to\nscience or art.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Counsel is a kind of inquiry, as stated above\n(A. 1). But we are wont to inquire about things that admit of doubt;\nhence the process of inquiry, which is called an argument, \"is a\nreason that attests something that admitted of doubt\" [*Cicero,\n_Topic._ ad Trebat.]. Now, that something in relation to human acts\nadmits of no doubt, arises from a twofold source. First, because\ncertain determinate ends are gained by certain determinate means: as\nhappens in the arts which are governed by certain fixed rules of\naction; thus a writer does not take counsel how to form his letters,\nfor this is determined by art. Secondly, from the fact that it little\nmatters whether it is done this or that way; this occurs in minute\nmatters, which help or hinder but little with regard to the end aimed\nat; and reason looks upon small things as mere nothings. Consequently\nthere are two things of which we do not take counsel, although they\nconduce to the end, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3): namely,\nminute things, and those which have a fixed way of being done, as in\nworks produced by art, with the exception of those arts that admit of\nconjecture such as medicine, commerce, and the like, as Gregory of\nNyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxiv.].\n\nReply Obj. 1: Choice presupposes counsel by reason of its judgment or\ndecision. Consequently when the judgment or decision is evident\nwithout inquiry, there is no need for the inquiry of counsel.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In matters that are evident, the reason makes no\ninquiry, but judges at once. Consequently there is no need of counsel\nin all that is done by reason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When a thing can be accomplished by one means, but in\ndifferent ways, doubt may arise, just as when it can be accomplished\nby several means: hence the need of counsel. But when not only the\nmeans, but also the way of using the means, is fixed, then there is\nno need of counsel.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Process of Counsel Is One of Analysis?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is not one of\nanalysis. For counsel is about things that we do. But the process of\nour actions is not one of analysis, but rather one of synthesis, viz.\nfrom the simple to the composite. Therefore counsel does not always\nproceed by way of analysis.\n\nObj. 2: Further, counsel is an inquiry of the reason. But reason\nproceeds from things that precede to things that follow, according to\nthe more appropriate order. Since then, the past precedes the present,\nand the present precedes the future, it seems that in taking counsel\none should proceed from the past and present to the future: which is\nnot an analytical process. Therefore the process of counsel is not one\nof analysis.\n\nObj. 3: Further, counsel is only of such things as are possible to\nus, according to _Ethic._ iii, 3. But the question as to whether a\ncertain thing is possible to us, depends on what we are able or\nunable to do, in order to gain such and such an end. Therefore the\ninquiry of counsel should begin from things present.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 3) that \"he who\ntakes counsel seems to inquire and analyze.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ In every inquiry one must begin from some principle.\nAnd if this principle precedes both in knowledge and in being, the\nprocess is not analytic, but synthetic: because to proceed from cause\nto effect is to proceed synthetically, since causes are more simple\nthan effects. But if that which precedes in knowledge is later in the\norder of being, the process is one of analysis, as when our judgment\ndeals with effects, which by analysis we trace to their simple\ncauses. Now the principle in the inquiry of counsel is the end, which\nprecedes indeed in intention, but comes afterwards into execution.\nHence the inquiry of counsel must needs be one of analysis, beginning\nthat is to say, from that which is intended in the future, and\ncontinuing until it arrives at that which is to be done at once.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Counsel is indeed about action. But actions take their\nreason from the end; and consequently the order of reasoning about\nactions is contrary to the order of actions.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Reason begins with that which is first according to\nreason; but not always with that which is first in point of time.\n\nReply Obj. 3: We should not want to know whether something to be done\nfor an end be possible, if it were not suitable for gaining that end.\nHence we must first inquire whether it be conducive to the end,\nbefore considering whether it be possible.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Process of Counsel Is Indefinite?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the process of counsel is indefinite.\nFor counsel is an inquiry about the particular things with which\naction is concerned. But singulars are infinite. Therefore the\nprocess of counsel is indefinite.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the inquiry of counsel has to consider not only what\nis to be done, but how to avoid obstacles. But every human action can\nbe hindered, and an obstacle can be removed by some human reason.\nTherefore the inquiry about removing obstacles can go on indefinitely.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the inquiry of demonstrative science does not go on\nindefinitely, because one can come to principles that are\nself-evident, which are absolutely certain. But such like certainty\nis not to be had in contingent singulars, which are variable and\nuncertain. Therefore the inquiry of counsel goes on indefinitely.\n\n_On the contrary,_ \"No one is moved to that which he cannot possibly\nreach\" (De Coelo i, 7). But it is impossible to pass through the\ninfinite. If therefore the inquiry of counsel is infinite, no one\nwould begin to take counsel. Which is clearly untrue.\n\n_I answer that,_ The inquiry of counsel is actually finite on both\nsides, on that of its principle and on that of its term. For a\ntwofold principle is available in the inquiry of counsel. One is\nproper to it, and belongs to the very genus of things pertaining to\noperation: this is the end which is not the matter of counsel, but is\ntaken for granted as its principle, as stated above (A. 2). The other\nprinciple is taken from another genus, so to speak; thus in\ndemonstrative sciences one science postulates certain things from\nanother, without inquiring into them. Now these principles which are\ntaken for granted in the inquiry of counsel are any facts received\nthrough the senses--for instance, that this is bread or iron: and\nalso any general statements known either through speculative or\nthrough practical science; for instance, that adultery is forbidden\nby God, or that man cannot live without suitable nourishment. Of such\nthings counsel makes no inquiry. But the term of inquiry is that\nwhich we are able to do at once. For just as the end is considered in\nthe light of a principle, so the means are considered in the light of\na conclusion. Wherefore that which presents itself as to be done\nfirst, holds the position of an ultimate conclusion whereat the\ninquiry comes to an end. Nothing however prevents counsel from being\ninfinite potentially, for as much as an infinite number of things may\npresent themselves to be inquired into by means of counsel.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Singulars are infinite; not actually, but only\npotentially.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although human action can be hindered, the hindrance is\nnot always at hand. Consequently it is not always necessary to take\ncounsel about removing the obstacle.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In contingent singulars, something may be taken for\ncertain, not simply, indeed, but for the time being, and as far as it\nconcerns the work to be done. Thus that Socrates is sitting is not a\nnecessary statement; but that he is sitting, as long as he continues\nto sit, is necessary; and this can be taken for a certain fact.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 15\n\nOF CONSENT, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider consent; concerning which there are four points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether consent is an act of the appetitive or of the apprehensive\npower?\n\n(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?\n\n(3) Whether it is directed to the end or to the means?\n\n(4) Whether consent to an act belongs to the higher part of the soul\nonly?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 15, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Consent Is an Act of the Appetitive or of the Apprehensive\nPower?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that consent belongs only to the\napprehensive part of the soul. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12)\nascribes consent to the higher reason. But the reason is an\napprehensive power. Therefore consent belongs to an apprehensive\npower.\n\nObj. 2: Further, consent is \"co-sense.\" But sense is an apprehensive\npower. Therefore consent is the act of an apprehensive power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as assent is an application of the intellect to\nsomething, so is consent. But assent belongs to the intellect, which\nis an apprehensive power. Therefore consent also belongs to an\napprehensive power.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that \"if a\nman judge without affection for that of which he judges, there is no\nsentence,\" i.e. consent. But affection belongs to the appetitive\npower. Therefore consent does also.\n\n_I answer that,_ Consent implies application of sense to something.\nNow it is proper to sense to take cognizance of things present; for\nthe imagination apprehends the similitude of corporeal things, even\nin the absence of the things of which they bear the likeness; while\nthe intellect apprehends universal ideas, which it can apprehend\nindifferently, whether the singulars be present or absent. And since\nthe act of an appetitive power is a kind of inclination to the thing\nitself, the application of the appetitive power to the thing, in so\nfar as it cleaves to it, gets by a kind of similitude, the name of\nsense, since, as it were, it acquires direct knowledge of the thing\nto which it cleaves, in so far as it takes complacency in it. Hence\nit is written (Wis. 1:1): \"Think of (_Sentite_) the Lord in goodness.\"\nAnd on these grounds consent is an act of the appetitive power.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated in _De Anima_ iii, 9, \"the will is in the\nreason.\" Hence, when Augustine ascribes consent to the reason, he\ntakes reason as including the will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sense, properly speaking, belongs to the apprehensive\nfaculty; but by way of similitude, in so far as it implies seeking\nacquaintance, it belongs to the appetitive power, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: _Assentire_ (to assent) is, to speak, _ad aliud\nsentire_ (to feel towards something); and thus it implies a certain\ndistance from that to which assent is given. But _consentire_ (to\nconsent) is \"to feel with,\" and this implies a certain union to the\nobject of consent. Hence the will, to which it belongs to tend to the\nthing itself, is more properly said to consent: whereas the\nintellect, whose act does not consist in a movement towards the\nthing, but rather the reverse, as we have stated in the First Part\n(Q. 16, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 4; Q. 59, A. 2), is more properly said to\nassent: although one word is wont to be used for the other [*In Latin\nrather than in English.]. We may also say that the intellect assents,\nin so far as it is moved by the will.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 15, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Consent Is to Be Found in Irrational Animals?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that consent is to be found in irrational\nanimals. For consent implies a determination of the appetite to one\nthing. But the appetite of irrational animals is determinate to one\nthing. Therefore consent is to be found in irrational animals.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if you remove what is first, you remove what\nfollows. But consent precedes the accomplished act. If therefore\nthere were no consent in irrational animals, there would be no act\naccomplished; which is clearly false.\n\nObj. 3: Further, men are sometimes said to consent to do something,\nthrough some passion; desire, for instance, or anger. But irrational\nanimals act through passion. Therefore they consent.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that \"after\njudging, man approves and embraces the judgment of his counselling,\nand this is called the sentence,\" i.e. consent. But counsel is not in\nirrational animals. Therefore neither is consent.\n\n_I answer that,_ Consent, properly speaking, is not in irrational\nanimals. The reason of this is that consent implies an application of\nthe appetitive movement to something as to be done. Now to apply the\nappetitive movement to the doing of something, belongs to the subject\nin whose power it is to move the appetite: thus to touch a stone is\nan action suitable to a stick, but to apply the stick so that it\ntouch the stone, belongs to one who has the power of moving the\nstick. But irrational animals have not the command of the appetitive\nmovement; for this is in them through natural instinct. Hence in the\nirrational animal, there is indeed the movement of the appetite, but\nit does not apply that movement to some particular thing. And hence\nit is that the irrational animal is not properly said to consent:\nthis is proper to the rational nature, which has the command of the\nappetitive movement, and is able to apply or not to apply it to this\nor that thing.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In irrational animals the determination of the appetite\nto a particular thing is merely passive: whereas consent implies a\ndetermination of the appetite, which is active rather than merely\npassive.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If the first be removed, then what follows is removed,\nprovided that, properly speaking, it follow from that only. But if\nsomething can follow from several things, it is not removed by the\nfact that one of them is removed; thus if hardening is the effect of\nheat and of cold (since bricks are hardened by the fire, and frozen\nwater is hardened by the cold), then by removing heat it does not\nfollow that there is no hardening. Now the accomplishment of an act\nfollows not only from consent, but also from the impulse of the\nappetite, such as is found in irrational animals.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The man who acts through passion is able not to follow\nthe passion: whereas irrational animals have not that power. Hence\nthe comparison fails.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 15, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Consent Is Directed to the End or to the Means?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that consent is directed to the end.\nBecause that on account of which a thing is such is still more such.\nBut it is on account of the end that we consent to the means.\nTherefore, still more do we consent to the end.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the act of the intemperate man is his end, just as\nthe act of the virtuous man is his end. But the intemperate man\nconsents to his own act. Therefore consent can be directed to the end.\n\nObj. 3: Further, desire of the means is choice, as stated above (Q.\n13, A. 1). If therefore consent were only directed to the means it\nwould nowise differ from choice. And this is proved to be false by\nthe authority of Damascene who says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that\n\"after the approval\" which he calls \"the sentence,\" \"comes the\nchoice.\" Therefore consent is not only directed to the means.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that the\n\"sentence,\" i.e. the consent, takes place \"when a man approves and\nembraces the judgment of his counsel.\" But counsel is only about the\nmeans. Therefore the same applies to consent.\n\n_I answer that,_ Consent is the application of the appetitive movement\nto something that is already in the power of him who causes the\napplication. Now the order of action is this: First there is the\napprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel\nabout the means; then the desire of the means. Now the appetite tends\nto the last end naturally: wherefore the application of the appetitive\nmovement to the apprehended end has not the nature of consent, but of\nsimple volition. But as to those things which come under consideration\nafter the last end, in so far as they are directed to the end, they\ncome under counsel: and so counsel can be applied to them, in so far\nas the appetitive movement is applied to the judgment resulting from\ncounsel. But the appetitive movement to the end is not applied to\ncounsel: rather is counsel applied to it, because counsel presupposes\nthe desire of the end. On the other hand, the desire of the means\npresupposes the decision of counsel. And therefore the application of\nthe appetitive movement to counsel's decision is consent, properly\nspeaking. Consequently, since counsel is only about the means, consent,\nproperly speaking, is of nothing else but the means.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as the knowledge of conclusions through the\nprinciples is science, whereas the knowledge of the principles is not\nscience, but something higher, namely, understanding; so do we consent\nto the means on account of the end, in respect of which our act is not\nconsent but something greater, namely, volition.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Delight in his act, rather than the act itself, is the\nend of the intemperate man, and for sake of this delight he\nconsents to that act.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Choice includes something that consent has not, namely,\na certain relation to something to which something else is\npreferred: and therefore after consent there still remains a choice.\nFor it may happen that by aid of counsel several means have been found\nconducive to the end, and through each of these meeting with approval,\nconsent has been given to each: but after approving of many, we have\ngiven our preference to one by choosing it. But if only one meets with\napproval, then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only\nin our way of looking at them; so that we call it consent, according\nas we approve of doing that thing; but choice according as we prefer\nit to those that do not meet with our approval.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 15, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Consent to the Act Belongs Only to the Higher Part of the\nSoul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that consent to the act does not always\nbelong to the higher reason. For \"delight follows action, and\nperfects it, just as beauty perfects youth\" [*_oion tois akmaiois he\nhora_--as youthful vigor perfects a man in his prime] (Ethic. x, 4).\nBut consent to delight belongs to the lower reason, as Augustine says\n(De Trin. xii, 12). Therefore consent to the act does not belong only\nto the higher reason.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an act to which we consent is said to be voluntary.\nBut it belongs to many powers to produce voluntary acts. Therefore\nthe higher reason is not alone in consenting to the act.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"the higher reason is that which is intent on the\ncontemplation and consultation of things eternal,\" as Augustine says\n(De Trin. xii, 7). But man often consents to an act not for eternal,\nbut for temporal reasons, or even on account of some passion of the\nsoul. Therefore consent to an act does not belong to the higher\nreason alone.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): \"It is\nimpossible for man to make up his mind to commit a sin, unless that\nmental faculty which has the sovereign power of urging his members\nto, or restraining them from, act, yield to the evil deed and become\nits slave.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The final decision belongs to him who holds the\nhighest place, and to whom it belongs to judge of the others; for as\nlong as judgment about some matter remains to be pronounced, the\nfinal decision has not been given. Now it is evident that it belongs\nto the higher reason to judge of all: since it is by the reason that\nwe judge of sensible things; and of things pertaining to human\nprinciples we judge according to Divine principles, which is the\nfunction of the higher reason. Wherefore as long as a man is\nuncertain whether he resists or not, according to Divine principles,\nno judgment of the reason can be considered in the light of a final\ndecision. Now the final decision of what is to be done is consent to\nthe act. Therefore consent to the act belongs to the higher reason;\nbut in that sense in which the reason includes the will, as stated\nabove (A. 1, ad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Consent to delight in the work done belongs to the\nhigher reason, as also does consent to the work; but consent to\ndelight in thought belongs to the lower reason, just as to the lower\nreason it belongs to think. Nevertheless the higher reason exercises\njudgment on the fact of thinking or not thinking, considered as an\naction; and in like manner on the delight that results. But in so far\nas the act of thinking is considered as ordained to a further act, it\nbelongs to the lower reason. For that which is ordained to something\nelse, belongs to a lower art or power than does the end to which it\nis ordained: hence the art which is concerned with the end is called\nthe master or principal art.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since actions are called voluntary from the fact that\nwe consent to them, it does not follow that consent is an act of each\npower, but of the will which is in the reason, as stated above (A. 1,\nad 1), and from which the voluntary act is named.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The higher reason is said to consent not only because\nit always moves to act, according to the eternal reasons; but also\nbecause it fails to dissent according to those same reasons.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 16\n\nOF USE, WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL IN REGARD TO THE MEANS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider use; concerning which there are four points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether use is an act of the will?\n\n(2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?\n\n(3) Whether it regards the means only, or the end also?\n\n(4) Of the relation of use to choice.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 16, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Use Is an Act of the Will?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that use is not an act of the will. For\nAugustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4) that \"to use is to refer that\nwhich is the object of use to the obtaining of something else.\" But\n\"to refer\" something to another is an act of the reason to which it\nbelongs to compare and to direct. Therefore use is an act of the\nreason and not of the will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that man \"goes\nforward to the operation, and this is called impulse; then he makes\nuse (of the powers) and this is called use.\" But operation belongs to\nthe executive power; and the act of the will does not follow the act\nof the executive power, on the contrary execution comes last.\nTherefore use is not an act of the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): \"All things that\nwere made were made for man's use, because reason with which man is\nendowed uses all things by its judgment of them.\" But judgment of\nthings created by God belongs to the speculative reason; which seems\nto be altogether distinct from the will, which is the principle of\nhuman acts. Therefore use is not an act of the will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. x, 11): \"To use is to\napply to something to purpose of the will.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The use of a thing implies the application of that\nthing to an operation: hence the operation to which we apply a thing\nis called its use; thus the use of a horse is to ride, and the use of\na stick is to strike. Now we apply to an operation not only the\ninterior principles of action, viz. the powers of the soul or the\nmembers of the body; as the intellect, to understand; and the eye, to\nsee; but also external things, as a stick, to strike. But it is\nevident that we do not apply external things to an operation save\nthrough the interior principles which are either the powers of the\nsoul, or the habits of those powers, or the organs which are parts of\nthe body. Now it has been shown above (Q. 9, A. 1) that it is the\nwill which moves the soul's powers to their acts, and this is to\napply them to operation. Hence it is evident that first and\nprincipally use belongs to the will as first mover; to the reason, as\ndirecting; and to the other powers as executing the operation, which\npowers are compared to the will which applies them to act, as the\ninstruments are compared to the principal agent. Now action is\nproperly ascribed, not to the instrument, but to the principal agent,\nas building is ascribed to the builder, not to his tools. Hence it is\nevident that use is, properly speaking, an act of the will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Reason does indeed refer one thing to another; but the\nwill tends to that which is referred by the reason to something else.\nAnd in this sense to use is to refer one thing to another.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Damascene is speaking of use in so far as it belongs to\nthe executive powers.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even the speculative reason is applied by the will to\nthe act of understanding or judging. Consequently the speculative\nreason is said to use, in so far as it is moved by the will, in the\nsame way as the other powers.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 16, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Use Is to Be Found in Irrational Animals?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that use is to be found in irrational\nanimals. For it is better to enjoy than to use, because, as Augustine\nsays (De Trin. x, 10): \"We use things by referring them to something\nelse which we are to enjoy.\" But enjoyment is to be found in\nirrational animals, as stated above (Q. 11, A. 2). Much more,\ntherefore, is it possible for them to use.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to apply the members to action is to use them. But\nirrational animals apply their members to action; for instance, their\nfeet, to walk; their horns, to strike. Therefore it is possible for\nirrational animals to use.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): \"None but a\nrational animal can make use of a thing.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ as stated above (A. 1), to use is to apply an active\nprinciple to action: thus to consent is to apply the appetitive\nmovement to the desire of something, as stated above (Q. 15, AA. 1,\n2, 3). Now he alone who has the disposal of a thing, can apply it to\nsomething else; and this belongs to him alone who knows how to refer\nit to something else, which is an act of the reason. And therefore\nnone but a rational animal consents and uses.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To enjoy implies the absolute movement of the appetite\nto the appetible: whereas to use implies a movement of the appetite\nto something as directed to something else. If therefore we compare\nuse and enjoyment in respect of their objects, enjoyment is better\nthan use; because that which is appetible absolutely is better than\nthat which is appetible only as directed to something else. But if we\ncompare them in respect of the apprehensive power that precedes them,\ngreater excellence is required on the part of use: because to direct\none thing to another is an act of reason; whereas to apprehend\nsomething absolutely is within the competency even of sense.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Animals by means of their members do something from\nnatural instinct; not through knowing the relation of their members\nto these operations. Wherefore, properly speaking, they do not apply\ntheir members to action, nor do they use them.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 16, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Use Regards Also the Last End?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that use can regard also the last end. For\nAugustine says (De Trin. x, 11): \"Whoever enjoys, uses.\" But man\nenjoys the last end. Therefore he uses the last end.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"to use is to apply something to the purpose of the\nwill\" (De Trin. x, 11). But the last end, more than anything else, is\nthe object of the will's application. Therefore it can be the object\nof use.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Hilary says (De Trin. ii) that \"Eternity is in the\nFather, Likeness in the Image,\" i.e. in the Son, \"Use in the Gift,\"\ni.e. in the Holy Ghost. But the Holy Ghost, since He is God, is the\nlast end. Therefore the last end can be the object of use.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 30): \"No one rightly\nuses God, but one enjoys Him.\" But God alone is the last end.\nTherefore we cannot use the last end.\n\n_I answer that,_ Use, as stated above (A. 1), implies the application\nof one thing to another. Now that which is applied to another is\nregarded in the light of means to an end; and consequently use always\nregards the means. For this reason things that are adapted to a\ncertain end are said to be \"useful\"; in fact their very usefulness is\nsometimes called use.\n\nIt must, however, be observed that the last end may be taken in two\nways: first, simply; secondly, in respect of an individual. For\nsince the end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 2, A. 7), signifies\nsometimes the thing itself, and sometimes the attainment or\npossession of that thing (thus the miser's end is either money or\nthe possession of it); it is evident that, simply speaking, the last\nend is the thing itself; for the possession of money is good only\ninasmuch as there is some good in money. But in regard to the\nindividual, the obtaining of money is the last end; for the miser\nwould not seek for money, save that he might have it. Therefore,\nsimply and properly speaking, a man enjoys money, because he places\nhis last end therein; but in so far as he seeks to possess it, he\nis said to use it.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of use in general, in so far as\nit implies the relation of an end to the enjoyment which a man seeks\nin that end.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The end is applied to the purpose of the will, that\nthe will may find rest in it. Consequently this rest in the end,\nwhich is the enjoyment thereof, is in this sense called use of the\nend. But the means are applied to the will's purpose, not only in\nbeing used as means, but as ordained to something else in which the\nwill finds rest.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The words of Hilary refer to use as applicable\nto rest in the last end; just as, speaking in a general sense, one may\nbe said to use the end for the purpose of attaining it, as stated\nabove. Hence Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 10) that \"this love, delight,\nfelicity, or happiness, is called use by him.\"\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 16, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Use Precedes Choice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that use precedes choice. For nothing\nfollows after choice, except execution. But use, since it belongs to\nthe will, precedes execution. Therefore it precedes choice also.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the absolute precedes the relative. Therefore the\nless relative precedes the more relative. But choice implies two\nrelations: one, of the thing chosen, in relation to the end; the\nother, of the thing chosen, in respect of that to which it is\npreferred; whereas use implies relation to the end only. Therefore\nuse precedes choice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the will uses the other powers in so far as it\nremoves them. But the will moves itself, too, as stated above (Q. 9,\nA. 3). Therefore it uses itself, by applying itself to act. But it\ndoes this when it consents. Therefore there is use in consent. But\nconsent precedes choice as stated above (Q. 15, A. 3, ad 3).\nTherefore use does also.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that \"the\nwill after choosing has an impulse to the operation, and afterwards\nit uses (the powers).\" Therefore use follows choice.\n\n_I answer that,_ The will has a twofold relation to the thing willed.\nOne, according as the thing willed is, in a way, in the willing\nsubject, by a kind of proportion or order to the thing willed.\nWherefore those things that are naturally proportionate to a certain\nend, are said to desire that end naturally. Yet to have an end thus\nis to have it imperfectly. Now every imperfect thing tends to\nperfection. And therefore both the natural and the voluntary appetite\ntend to have the end in reality; and this is to have it perfectly.\nThis is the second relation of the will to the thing willed.\n\nNow the thing willed is not only the end, but also the means. And the\nlast act that belongs to the first relation of the will to the means,\nis choice; for there the will becomes fully proportionate, by willing\nthe means fully. Use, on the other hand, belongs to the second\nrelation of the will, in respect of which it tends to the realization\nof the thing willed. Wherefore it is evident that use follows choice;\nprovided that by use we mean the will's use of the executive power in\nmoving it. But since the will, in a way, moves the reason also, and\nuses it, we may take the use of the means, as consisting in the\nconsideration of the reason, whereby it refers the means to the end.\nIn this sense use precedes choice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The motion of the will to the execution of the\nwork, precedes execution, but follows choice. And so, since use\nbelongs to that very motion of the will, it stands between choice and\nexecution.\n\nReply Obj. 2: What is essentially relative is after the\nabsolute; but the thing to which relation is referred need not come\nafter. Indeed, the more a cause precedes, the more numerous the\neffects to which it has relation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Choice precedes use, if they be referred to the\nsame object. But nothing hinders the use of one thing preceding the\nchoice of another. And since the acts of the will react on one\nanother, in each act of the will we can find both consent and choice\nand use; so that we may say that the will consents to choose, and\nconsents to consent, and uses itself in consenting and choosing. And\nsuch acts as are ordained to that which precedes, precede also.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 17\n\nOF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (In Nine Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the acts commanded by the will; under which head\nthere are nine points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason?\n\n(2) Whether command belongs to irrational animals?\n\n(3) Of the order between command and use;\n\n(4) Whether command and the commanded act are one act or distinct?\n\n(5) Whether the act of the will is commanded?\n\n(6) Whether the act of the reason is commanded?\n\n(7) Whether the act of the sensitive appetite is commanded?\n\n(8) Whether the act of the vegetal soul is commanded?\n\n(9) Whether the acts of the external members are commanded?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Command Is an Act of the Reason or of the Will?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that command is not an act of the reason\nbut of the will. For command is a kind of motion; because Avicenna\nsays that there are four ways of moving, \"by perfecting, by\ndisposing, by commanding, and by counselling.\" But it belongs to the\nwill to move all the other powers of the soul, as stated above (Q. 9,\nA. 1). Therefore command is an act of the will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as to be commanded belongs to that which is\nsubject, so, seemingly, to command belongs to that which is most\nfree. But the root of liberty is especially in the will. Therefore\nto command belongs to the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, command is followed at once by act. But the act of\nthe reason is not followed at once by act: for he who judges that a\nthing should be done, does not do it at once. Therefore command is\nnot an act of the reason, but of the will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.]\nand the Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) say that \"the appetite obeys\nreason.\" Therefore command is an act of the reason.\n\n_I answer that,_ Command is an act of the reason presupposing,\nhowever, an act of the will. In proof of this, we must take note\nthat, since the acts of the reason and of the will can be brought to\nbear on one another, in so far as the reason reasons about willing,\nand the will wills to reason, the result is that the act of the\nreason precedes the act of the will, and conversely. And since the\npower of the preceding act continues in the act that follows, it\nhappens sometimes that there is an act of the will in so far as it\nretains in itself something of an act of the reason, as we have\nstated in reference to use and choice; and conversely, that there is\nan act of the reason in so far as it retains in itself something of\nan act of the will.\n\nNow, command is essentially indeed an act of the reason: for the\ncommander orders the one commanded to do something, by way of\nintimation or declaration; and to order thus by intimating or\ndeclaring is an act of the reason. Now the reason can intimate or\ndeclare something in two ways. First, absolutely: and this intimation\nis expressed by a verb in the indicative mood, as when one person\nsays to another: \"This is what you should do.\" Sometimes, however,\nthe reason intimates something to a man by moving him thereto; and\nthis intimation is expressed by a verb in the imperative mood; as\nwhen it is said to someone: \"Do this.\" Now the first mover, among the\npowers of the soul, to the doing of an act is the will, as stated\nabove (Q. 9, A. 1). Since therefore the second mover does not move,\nsave in virtue of the first mover, it follows that the very fact that\nthe reason moves by commanding, is due to the power of the will.\nConsequently it follows that command is an act of the reason,\npresupposing an act of the will, in virtue of which the reason, by\nits command, moves (the power) to the execution of the act.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To command is to move, not anyhow, but by intimating\nand declaring to another; and this is an act of the reason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The root of liberty is the will as the subject thereof;\nbut it is the reason as its cause. For the will can tend freely\ntowards various objects, precisely because the reason can have\nvarious perceptions of good. Hence philosophers define the free-will\nas being \"a free judgment arising from reason,\" implying that reason\nis the root of liberty.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument proves that command is an act of reason\nnot absolutely, but with a kind of motion as stated above.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Command Belongs to Irrational Animals?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that command belongs to irrational\nanimals. Because, according to Avicenna, \"the power that commands\nmovement is the appetite; and the power that executes movement is in\nthe muscles and nerves.\" But both powers are in irrational animals.\nTherefore command is to be found in irrational animals.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the condition of a slave is that of one who receives\ncommands. But the body is compared to the soul as a slave to his\nmaster, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2). Therefore the body is\ncommanded by the soul, even in irrational animals, since they are\ncomposed of soul and body.\n\nObj. 3: Further, by commanding, man has an impulse towards an action.\nBut impulse to action is to be found in irrational animals, as\nDamascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22). Therefore command is to be\nfound in irrational animals.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Command is an act of reason, as stated above (A.\n1). But in irrational animals there is no reason. Neither, therefore,\nis there command.\n\n_I answer that,_ To command is nothing else than to direct someone to\ndo something, by a certain motion of intimation. Now to direct is the\nproper act of reason. Wherefore it is impossible that irrational\nanimals should command in any way, since they are devoid of reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The appetitive power is said to command movement, in so\nfar as it moves the commanding reason. But this is only in man. In\nirrational animals the appetitive power is not, properly speaking, a\ncommanding faculty, unless command be taken loosely for motion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The body of the irrational animal is competent to obey;\nbut its soul is not competent to command, because it is not competent\nto direct. Consequently there is no ratio there of commander and\ncommanded; but only of mover and moved.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Impulse to action is in irrational animals otherwise\nthan in man. For the impulse of man to action arises from the\ndirecting reason; wherefore his impulse is one of command. On the\nother hand, the impulse of the irrational animal arises from natural\ninstinct; because as soon as they apprehend the fitting or the\nunfitting, their appetite is moved naturally to pursue or to avoid.\nWherefore they are directed by another to act; and they themselves do\nnot direct themselves to act. Consequently in them is impulse but not\ncommand.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Use Precedes Command?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that use precedes command. For command is\nan act of the reason presupposing an act of the will, as stated above\n(A. 1). But, as we have already shown (Q. 16, A. 1), use is an act of\nthe will. Therefore use precedes command.\n\nObj. 2: Further, command is one of those things that are ordained to\nthe end. But use is of those things that are ordained to the end.\nTherefore it seems that use precedes command.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every act of a power moved by the will is called\nuse; because the will uses the other powers, as stated above (Q. 16,\nA. 1). But command is an act of the reason as moved by the will, as\nstated above (A. 1). Therefore command is a kind of use. Now the\ncommon precedes the proper. Therefore use precedes command.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that impulse\nto action precedes use. But impulse to operation is given by command.\nTherefore command precedes use.\n\n_I answer that,_ use of that which is directed to the end, in so far\nas it is in the reason referring this to the end, precedes choice, as\nstated above (Q. 16, A. 4). Wherefore still more does it precede\ncommand. On the other hand, use of that which is directed to the end,\nin so far as it is subject to the executive power, follows command;\nbecause use in the user is united to the act of the thing used; for\none does not use a stick before doing something with the stick. But\ncommand is not simultaneous with the act of the thing to which the\ncommand is given: for it naturally precedes its fulfilment,\nsometimes, indeed, by priority of time. Consequently it is evident\nthat command precedes use.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Not every act of the will precedes this act of the\nreason which is command; but an act of the will precedes, viz.\nchoice; and an act of the will follows, viz. use. Because after\ncounsel's decision, which is reason's judgment, the will chooses; and\nafter choice, the reason commands that power which has to do what was\nchosen; and then, last of all, someone's will begins to use, by\nexecuting the command of reason; sometimes it is another's will, when\none commands another; sometimes the will of the one that commands,\nwhen he commands himself to do something.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as act ranks before power, so does the object rank\nbefore the act. Now the object of use is that which is directed to\nthe end. Consequently, from the fact that command [itself is directed\nto the end, it may be concluded that command] precedes, rather than\nthat it follows use.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as the act of the will in using the reason for the\npurpose of command, precedes the command; so also we may say that\nthis act whereby the will uses the reason, is preceded by a command\nof reason; since the acts of these powers react on one another.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Command and the Commanded Act Are One Act, or Distinct?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the commanded act is not one with the\ncommand itself. For the acts of different powers are themselves\ndistinct. But the commanded act belongs to one power, and the command\nto another; since one is the power that commands, and the other is\nthe power that receives the command. Therefore the commanded act is\nnot one with the command.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever things can be separate from one another,\nare distinct: for nothing is severed from itself. But sometimes the\ncommanded act is separate from the command: for sometimes the command\nis given, and the commanded act follows not. Therefore command is a\ndistinct act from the act commanded.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever things are related to one another as\nprecedent and consequent, are distinct. But command naturally\nprecedes the commanded act. Therefore they are distinct.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Topic. iii, 2) that \"where\none thing is by reason of another, there is but one.\" But there is no\ncommanded act unless by reason of the command. Therefore they are one.\n\n_I answer that,_ Nothing prevents certain things being distinct in\none respect, and one in another respect. Indeed, every multitude is\none in some respect, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xiii). But a\ndifference is to be observed in this, that some are simply many, and\none in a particular aspect: while with others it is the reverse. Now\n\"one\" is predicated in the same way as \"being.\" And substance is\nbeing simply, whereas accident or being \"of reason\" is a being only\nin a certain respect. Wherefore those things that are one in\nsubstance are one simply, though many in a certain respect. Thus, in\nthe genus substance, the whole composed of its integral or essential\nparts, is one simply: because the whole is being and substance\nsimply, and the parts are being and substances in the whole. But\nthose things which are distinct in substance, and one according to an\naccident, are distinct simply, and one in a certain respect: thus\nmany men are one people, and many stones are one heap; which is unity\nof composition or order. In like manner also many individuals that\nare one in genus or species are many simply, and one in a certain\nrespect: since to be one in genus or species is to be one according\nto the consideration of the reason.\n\nNow just as in the genus of natural things, a whole is composed of\nmatter and form (e.g. man, who is one natural being, though he has\nmany parts, is composed of soul and body); so, in human acts, the act\nof a lower power is in the position of matter in regard to the act of\na higher power, in so far as the lower power acts in virtue of the\nhigher power moving it: for thus also the act of the first mover is\nas the form in regard to the act of its instrument. Hence it is\nevident that command and the commanded act are one human act, just as\na whole is one, yet in its parts, many.\n\nReply Obj. 1: If the distinct powers are not ordained to one another,\ntheir acts are diverse simply. But when one power is the mover of the\nother, then their acts are, in a way, one: since \"the act of the\nmover and the act of the thing moved are one act\" (Phys. iii, 3).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The fact that command and the commanded act can be\nseparated from one another shows that they are different parts.\nBecause the parts of a man can be separated from one another, and yet\nthey form one whole.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In those things that are many in parts, but one as a\nwhole, nothing hinders one part from preceding another. Thus the\nsoul, in a way, precedes the body; and the heart, the other members.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Act of the Will Is Commanded?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the act of the will is not commanded.\nFor Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): \"The mind commands the mind to\nwill, and yet it does not.\" But to will is the act of the will.\nTherefore the act of the will is not commanded.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to receive a command belongs to one who can\nunderstand the command. But the will cannot understand the command;\nfor the will differs from the intellect, to which it belongs to\nunderstand. Therefore the act of the will is not commanded.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if one act of the will is commanded, for the same\nreason all are commanded. But if all the acts of the will are\ncommanded, we must needs proceed to infinity; because the act of the\nwill precedes the act of reason commanding, as stated above (A. 1);\nfor if that act of the will be also commanded, this command will be\npreceded by another act of the reason, and so on to infinity. But to\nproceed to infinity is not possible. Therefore the act of the will\nis not commanded.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Whatever is in our power, is subject to our\ncommand. But the acts of the will, most of all, are in our power;\nsince all our acts are said to be in our power, in so far as they are\nvoluntary. Therefore the acts of the will are commanded by us.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), command is nothing else than\nthe act of the reason directing, with a certain motion, something to\nact. Now it is evident that the reason can direct the act of the\nwill: for just as it can judge it to be good to will something, so it\ncan direct by commanding man to will. From this it is evident that an\nact of the will can be commanded.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9) when the mind\ncommands itself perfectly to will, then already it wills: but that\nsometimes it commands and wills not, is due to the fact that it\ncommands imperfectly. Now imperfect command arises from the fact that\nthe reason is moved by opposite motives to command or not to command:\nwherefore it fluctuates between the two, and fails to command\nperfectly.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as each of the members of the body works not for\nitself alone but for the whole body; thus it is for the whole body\nthat the eye sees; so is it with the powers of the soul. For the\nintellect understands, not for itself alone, but for all the powers;\nand the will wills not only for itself, but for all the powers too.\nWherefore man, in so far as he is endowed with intellect and will,\ncommands the act of the will for himself.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since command is an act of reason, that act is\ncommanded which is subject to reason. Now the first act of the will\nis not due to the direction of the reason but to the instigation of\nnature, or of a higher cause, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 4).\nTherefore there is no need to proceed to infinity.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Act of the Reason Is Commanded?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the act of the reason cannot be\ncommanded. For it seems impossible for a thing to command itself. But\nit is the reason that commands, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the\nact of the reason is not commanded.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is essential is different from that which\nis by participation. But the power whose act is commanded by reason,\nis rational by participation, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 13. Therefore\nthe act of that power, which is essentially rational, is not\ncommanded.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that act is commanded, which is in our power. But to\nknow and judge the truth, which is the act of reason, is not always\nin our power. Therefore the act of the reason cannot be commanded.\n\n_On the contrary,_ That which we do of our free-will, can be done by\nour command. But the acts of the reason are accomplished through the\nfree-will: for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that \"by his\nfree-will man inquires, considers, judges, approves.\" Therefore the\nacts of the reason can be commanded.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since the reason reacts on itself, just as it\ndirects the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act.\nConsequently its act can be commanded.\n\nBut we must take note that the act of the reason may be considered in\ntwo ways. First, as to the exercise of the act. And considered thus,\nthe act of the reason can always be commanded: as when one is told to\nbe attentive, and to use one's reason. Secondly, as to the object; in\nrespect of which two acts of the reason have to be noticed. One is\nthe act whereby it apprehends the truth about something. This act is\nnot in our power: because it happens in virtue of a natural or\nsupernatural light. Consequently in this respect, the act of the\nreason is not in our power, and cannot be commanded. The other act of\nthe reason is that whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If,\ntherefore, that which the reason apprehends is such that it naturally\nassents thereto, e.g. the first principles, it is not in our power to\nassent or dissent to the like: assent follows naturally, and\nconsequently, properly speaking, is not subject to our command. But\nsome things which are apprehended do not convince the intellect to\nsuch an extent as not to leave it free to assent or dissent, or at\nleast suspend its assent or dissent, on account of some cause or\nother; and in such things assent or dissent is in our power, and is\nsubject to our command.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Reason commands itself, just as the will moves itself,\nas stated above (Q. 9, A. 3), that is to say, in so far as each power\nreacts on its own acts, and from one thing tends to another.\n\nReply Obj. 2: On account of the diversity of objects subject to the\nact of the reason, nothing prevents the reason from participating in\nitself: thus the knowledge of principles is participated in the\nknowledge of the conclusions.\n\nThe reply to the third object is evident from what has been said.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Act of the Sensitive Appetite Is Commanded?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite is\nnot commanded. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:15): \"For I do not that\ngood which I will\": and a gloss explains this by saying that man\nlusts, although he wills not to lust. But to lust is an act of the\nsensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is\nnot subject to our command.\n\nObj. 2: Further, corporeal matter obeys God alone, to the effect of\nformal transmutation, as was shown in the First Part (Q. 65, A. 4; Q.\n91, A. 2; Q. 110, A. 2). But the act of the sensitive appetite is\naccompanied by a formal transmutation of the body, consisting in heat\nor cold. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject\nto man's command.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the proper motive principle of the sensitive\nappetite is something apprehended by sense or imagination. But it is\nnot always in our power to apprehend something by sense or\nimagination. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not\nsubject to our command.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.]\nsays: \"That which obeys reason is twofold, the concupiscible and the\nirascible,\" which belong to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act\nof the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason.\n\n_I answer that,_ An act is subject to our command, in so far as it is\nin our power, as stated above (A. 5). Consequently in order to\nunderstand in what manner the act of the sensitive appetite is\nsubject to the command of reason, we must consider in what manner it\nis in our power. Now it must be observed that the sensitive appetite\ndiffers from the intellective appetite, which is called the will, in\nthe fact that the sensitive appetite is a power of a corporeal organ,\nwhereas the will is not. Again, every act of a power that uses a\ncorporeal organ, depends not only on a power of the soul, but also on\nthe disposition of that corporeal organ: thus the act of vision\ndepends on the power of sight, and on the condition of the eye, which\ncondition is a help or a hindrance to that act. Consequently the act\nof the sensitive appetite depends not only on the appetitive power,\nbut also on the disposition of the body.\n\nNow whatever part the power of the soul takes in the act, follows\napprehension. And the apprehension of the imagination, being a\nparticular apprehension, is regulated by the apprehension of reason,\nwhich is universal; just as a particular active power is regulated by\na universal active power. Consequently in this respect the act of the\nsensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason. On the other\nhand, condition or disposition of the body is not subject to the\ncommand of reason: and consequently in this respect, the movement of\nthe sensitive appetite is hindered from being wholly subject to the\ncommand of reason.\n\nMoreover it happens sometimes that the movement of the sensitive\nappetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the\nimagination of sense. And then such movement occurs without the\ncommand of reason: although reason could have prevented it, had it\nforeseen. Hence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2) that the reason\ngoverns the irascible and concupiscible not by a \"despotic\nsupremacy,\" which is that of a master over his slave; but by a\n\"politic and royal supremacy,\" whereby the free are governed, who are\nnot wholly subject to command.\n\nReply Obj. 1: That man lusts, although he wills not to lust, is due\nto a disposition of the body, whereby the sensitive appetite is\nhindered from perfect compliance with the command of reason. Hence\nthe Apostle adds (Rom. 7:15): \"I see another law in my members,\nfighting against the law of my mind.\" This may also happen through a\nsudden movement of concupiscence, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The condition of the body stands in a twofold relation\nto the act of the sensitive appetite. First, as preceding it: thus a\nman may be disposed in one way or another, in respect of his body, to\nthis or that passion. Secondly, as consequent to it: thus a man\nbecomes heated through anger. Now the condition that precedes, is not\nsubject to the command of reason: since it is due either to nature,\nor to some previous movement, which cannot cease at once. But the\ncondition that is consequent, follows the command of reason: since it\nresults from the local movement of the heart, which has various\nmovements according to the various acts of the sensitive appetite.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since the external sensible is necessary for the\napprehension of the senses, it is not in our power to apprehend\nanything by the senses, unless the sensible be present; which\npresence of the sensible is not always in our power. For it is then\nthat man can use his senses if he will so to do; unless there be some\nobstacle on the part of the organ. On the other hand, the\napprehension of the imagination is subject to the ordering of reason,\nin proportion to the strength or weakness of the imaginative power.\nFor that man is unable to imagine the things that reason considers,\nis either because they cannot be imagined, such as incorporeal\nthings; or because of the weakness of the imaginative power, due to\nsome organic indisposition.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Act of the Vegetal Soul Is Commanded?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the acts of the vegetal soul are\nsubject to the command of reason. For the sensitive powers are of\nhigher rank than the vegetal powers. But the powers of the sensitive\nsoul are subject to the command of reason. Much more, therefore, are\nthe powers of the vegetal soul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, man is called a \"little world\" [*Aristotle,\n_Phys._ viii. 2], because the soul is in the body, as God is in the\nworld. But God is in the world in such a way, that everything in the\nworld obeys His command. Therefore all that is in man, even the\npowers of the vegetal soul, obey the command of reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, praise and blame are awarded only to such acts as\nare subject to the command of reason. But in the acts of the\nnutritive and generative power, there is room for praise and blame,\nvirtue and vice: as in the case of gluttony and lust, and their\ncontrary virtues. Therefore the acts of these powers are subject to\nthe command of reason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.]\nsays that \"the nutritive and generative power is one over which the\nreason has no control.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Some acts proceed from the natural appetite, others\nfrom the animal, or from the intellectual appetite: for every agent\ndesires an end in some way. Now the natural appetite does not follow\nfrom some apprehension, as [d]o the animal and the intellectual\nappetite. But the reason commands by way of apprehensive power.\nWherefore those acts that proceed from the intellective or the animal\nappetite, can be commanded by reason: but not those acts that proceed\nfrom the natural appetite. And such are the acts of the vegetal soul;\nwherefore Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii) says \"that\ngeneration and nutrition belong to what are called natural powers.\"\nConsequently the acts of the vegetal soul are not subject to the\ncommand of reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The more immaterial an act is, the more noble it is,\nand the more is it subject to the command of reason. Hence the very\nfact that the acts of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, shows that\nthey rank lowest.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The comparison holds in a certain respect: because, to\nwit, as God moves the world, so the soul moves the body. But it does\nnot hold in every respect: for the soul did not create the body out\nof nothing, as God created the world; for which reason the world is\nwholly subject to His command.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Virtue and vice, praise and blame do not affect the\nacts themselves of the nutritive and generative power, i.e.\ndigestion, and formation of the human body; but they affect the acts\nof the sensitive part, that are ordained to the acts of generation\nand nutrition; for example the desire for pleasure in the act of\ntaking food or in the act of generation, and the right or wrong use\nthereof. ________________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 9]\n\nWhether the Acts of the External Members Are Commanded?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the members of the body do not obey\nreason as to their acts. For it is evident that the members of the\nbody are more distant from the reason, than the powers of the vegetal\nsoul. But the powers of the vegetal soul do not obey reason, as\nstated above (A. 8). Therefore much less do the members of the body\nobey.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the heart is the principle of animal movement. But\nthe movement of the heart is not subject to the command of reason:\nfor Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxii.] says that \"the\npulse is not controlled by reason.\" Therefore the movement of the\nbodily members is not subject to the command of reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16) that \"the\nmovement of the genital members is sometimes inopportune and not\ndesired; sometimes when sought it fails, and whereas the heart is\nwarm with desire, the body remains cold.\" Therefore the movements of\nthe members are not obedient to reason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. viii, 9): \"The mind\ncommands a movement of the hand, and so ready is the hand to obey,\nthat scarcely can one discern obedience from command.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The members of the body are organs of the soul's\npowers. Consequently according as the powers of the soul stand in\nrespect of obedience to reason, so do the members of the body stand\nin respect thereof. Since then the sensitive powers are subject to\nthe command of reason, whereas the natural powers are not; therefore\nall movements of members, that are moved by the sensitive powers, are\nsubject to the command of reason; whereas those movements of members,\nthat arise from the natural powers, are not subject to the command of\nreason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The members do not move themselves, but are moved\nthrough the powers of the soul; of which powers, some are in closer\ncontact with the reason than are the powers of the vegetal soul.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In things pertaining to intellect and will, that which\nis according to nature stands first, whence all other things are\nderived: thus from the knowledge of principles that are naturally\nknown, is derived knowledge of the conclusions; and from volition of\nthe end naturally desired, is derived the choice of the means. So\nalso in bodily movements the principle is according to nature. Now\nthe principle of bodily movements begins with the movement of the\nheart. Consequently the movement of the heart is according to nature,\nand not according to the will: for like a proper accident, it results\nfrom life, which follows from the union of soul and body. Thus the\nmovement of heavy and light things results from their substantial\nform: for which reason they are said to be moved by their generator,\nas the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 4). Wherefore this movement is\ncalled \"vital.\" For which reason Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius, De Nat.\nHom. xxii) says that, just as the movement of generation and\nnutrition does not obey reason, so neither does the pulse which is a\nvital movement. By the pulse he means the movement of the heart which\nis indicated by the pulse veins.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 17, 20) it is in\npunishment of sin that the movement of these members does not obey\nreason: in this sense, that the soul is punished for its rebellion\nagainst God, by the insubmission of that member whereby original sin\nis transmitted to posterity.\n\nBut because, as we shall state later on, the effect of the sin of our\nfirst parent was that his nature was left to itself, through the\nwithdrawal of the supernatural gift which God had bestowed on man, we\nmust consider the natural cause of this particular member's\ninsubmission to reason. This is stated by Aristotle (De Causis Mot.\nAnimal.) who says that \"the movements of the heart and of the organs\nof generation are involuntary,\" and that the reason of this is as\nfollows. These members are stirred at the occasion of some\napprehension; in so far as the intellect and imagination represent\nsuch things as arouse the passions of the soul, of which passions\nthese movements are a consequence. But they are not moved at the\ncommand of the reason or intellect, because these movements are\nconditioned by a certain natural change of heat and cold, which\nchange is not subject to the command of reason. This is the case with\nthese two organs in particular, because each is as it were a separate\nanimal being, in so far as it is a principle of life; and the\nprinciple is virtually the whole. For the heart is the principle of\nthe senses; and from the organ of generation proceeds the seminal\nvirtue, which is virtually the entire animal. Consequently they have\ntheir proper movements naturally: because principles must needs be\nnatural, as stated above (Reply Obj. 2).\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 18\n\nOF THE GOOD AND EVIL OF HUMAN ACTS, IN GENERAL (In Eleven Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the good and evil of human acts. First, how a\nhuman act is good or evil; secondly, what results from the good or\nevil of a human act, as merit or demerit, sin and guilt.\n\nUnder the first head there will be a threefold consideration: the\nfirst will be of the good and evil of human acts, in general; the\nsecond, of the good and evil of internal acts; the third, of the good\nand evil of external acts.\n\nConcerning the first there are eleven points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether every human action is good, or are there evil actions?\n\n(2) Whether the good or evil of a human action is derived from its\nobject?\n\n(3) Whether it is derived from a circumstance?\n\n(4) Whether it is derived from the end?\n\n(5) Whether a human action is good or evil in its species?\n\n(6) Whether an action has the species of good or evil from its end?\n\n(7) Whether the species derived from the end is contained under the\nspecies derived from the object, as under its genus, or conversely?\n\n(8) Whether any action is indifferent in its species?\n\n(9) Whether an individual action can be indifferent?\n\n(10) Whether a circumstance places a moral action in the species of\ngood or evil?\n\n(11) Whether every circumstance that makes an action better or worse,\nplaces the moral action in the species of good or evil?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Every Human Action Is Good, or Are There Evil Actions?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that every human action is good, and that\nnone is evil. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil acts not,\nsave in virtue of the good. But no evil is done in virtue of the\ngood. Therefore no action is evil.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing acts except in so far as it is in act. Now a\nthing is evil, not according as it is in act, but according as its\npotentiality is void of act; whereas in so far as its potentiality is\nperfected by act, it is good, as stated in _Metaph._ ix, 9. Therefore\nnothing acts in so far as it is evil, but only according as it is\ngood. Therefore every action is good, and none is evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, evil cannot be a cause, save accidentally, as\nDionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv). But every action has some effect\nwhich is proper to it. Therefore no action is evil, but every action\nis good.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (John 3:20): \"Every one that doth\nevil, hateth the light.\" Therefore some actions of man are evil.\n\n_I answer that,_ We must speak of good and evil in actions as of good\nand evil in things: because such as everything is, such is the act\nthat it produces. Now in things, each one has so much good as it has\nbeing: since good and being are convertible, as was stated in the\nFirst Part (Q. 5, AA. 1, 3). But God alone has the whole plenitude of\nHis Being in a certain unity: whereas every other thing has its\nproper fulness of being in a certain multiplicity. Wherefore it\nhappens with some things, that they have being in some respect, and\nyet they are lacking in the fulness of being due to them. Thus the\nfulness of human being requires a compound of soul and body, having\nall the powers and instruments of knowledge and movement: wherefore\nif any man be lacking in any of these, he is lacking in something due\nto the fulness of his being. So that as much as he has of being, so\nmuch has he of goodness: while so far as he is lacking in goodness,\nand is said to be evil: thus a blind man is possessed of goodness\ninasmuch as he lives; and of evil, inasmuch as he lacks sight. That,\nhowever, which has nothing of being or goodness, could not be said to\nbe either evil or good. But since this same fulness of being is of\nthe very essence of good, if a thing be lacking in its due fulness of\nbeing, it is not said to be good simply, but in a certain respect,\ninasmuch as it is a being; although it can be called a being simply,\nand a non-being in a certain respect, as was stated in the First Part\n(Q. 5, A. 1, ad 1). We must therefore say that every action has\ngoodness, in so far as it has being; whereas it is lacking in\ngoodness, in so far as it is lacking in something that is due to its\nfulness of being; and thus it is said to be evil: for instance if it\nlacks the quantity determined by reason, or its due place, or\nsomething of the kind.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Evil acts in virtue of deficient goodness. For if there\nwere nothing of good there, there would be neither being nor\npossibility of action. On the other hand if good were not deficient,\nthere would be no evil. Consequently the action done is a deficient\ngood, which is good in a certain respect, but simply evil.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders a thing from being in act in a certain\nrespect, so that it can act; and in a certain respect deficient in\nact, so as to cause a deficient act. Thus a blind man has in act the\npower of walking, whereby he is able to walk; but inasmuch as he is\ndeprived of sight he suffers a defect in walking by stumbling when he\nwalks.\n\nReply Obj. 3: An evil action can have a proper effect, according to\nthe goodness and being that it has. Thus adultery is the cause of\nhuman generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and female,\nbut not inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Good or Evil of a Man's Action Is Derived from Its Object?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the good or evil of an action is not\nderived from its object. For the object of any action is a thing. But\n\"evil is not in things, but in the sinner's use of them,\" as\nAugustine says (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 12). Therefore the good or\nevil of a human action is not derived from their object.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the object is compared to the action as its matter.\nBut the goodness of a thing is not from its matter, but rather from\nthe form, which is an act. Therefore good and evil in actions is not\nderived from their object.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the object of an active power is compared to the\naction as effect to cause. But the goodness of a cause does not\ndepend on its effect; rather is it the reverse. Therefore good or\nevil in actions is not derived from their object.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Osee 9:10): \"They became abominable\nas those things which they loved.\" Now man becomes abominable to God\non account of the malice of his action. Therefore the malice of his\naction is according to the evil objects that man loves. And the same\napplies to the goodness of his action.\n\n_I answer that,_ as stated above (A. 1) the good or evil of an\naction, as of other things, depends on its fulness of being or its\nlack of that fulness. Now the first thing that belongs to the fulness\nof being seems to be that which gives a thing its species. And just\nas a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has\nits species from its object, as movement from its term. And therefore\njust as the primary goodness of a natural thing is derived from its\nform, which gives it its species, so the primary goodness of a moral\naction is derived from its suitable object: hence some call such an\naction \"good in its genus\"; for instance, \"to make use of what is\none's own.\" And just as, in natural things, the primary evil is when\na generated thing does not realize its specific form (for instance,\nif instead of a man, something else be generated); so the primary\nevil in moral actions is that which is from the object, for instance,\n\"to take what belongs to another.\" And this action is said to be\n\"evil in its genus,\" genus here standing for species, just as we\napply the term \"mankind\" to the whole human species.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although external things are good in themselves,\nnevertheless they have not always a due proportion to this or that\naction. And so, inasmuch as they are considered as objects of such\nactions, they have not the quality of goodness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The object is not the matter \"of which\" (a thing is\nmade), but the matter \"about which\" (something is done); and stands\nin relation to the act as its form, as it were, through giving it its\nspecies.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The object of the human action is not always the object\nof an active power. For the appetitive power is, in a way, passive;\nin so far as it is moved by the appetible object; and yet it is a\nprinciple of human actions. Nor again have the objects of the active\npowers always the nature of an effect, but only when they are already\ntransformed: thus food when transformed is the effect of the\nnutritive power; whereas food before being transformed stands in\nrelation to the nutritive power as the matter about which it\nexercises its operation. Now since the object is in some way the\neffect of the active power, it follows that it is the term of its\naction, and consequently that it gives it its form and species, since\nmovement derives its species from its term. Moreover, although the\ngoodness of an action is not caused by the goodness of its effect,\nyet an action is said to be good from the fact that it can produce a\ngood effect. Consequently the very proportion of an action to its\neffect is the measure of its goodness.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Man's Action Is Good or Evil from a Circumstance?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an action is not good or evil from a\ncircumstance. For circumstances stand around (_circumstant_) an action,\nas being outside it, as stated above (Q. 7, A. 1). But \"good and evil\nare in things themselves,\" as is stated in _Metaph._ vi, 4. Therefore\nan action does not derive goodness or malice from a circumstance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the goodness or malice of an action is considered\nprincipally in the doctrine of morals. But since circumstances are\naccidents of actions, it seems that they are outside the scope of\nart: because \"no art takes notice of what is accidental\" (Metaph. vi,\n2). Therefore the goodness or malice of an action is not taken from a\ncircumstance.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which belongs to a thing, in respect of its\nsubstance, is not ascribed to it in respect of an accident. But good\nand evil belong to an action in respect of its substance; because an\naction can be good or evil in its genus as stated above (A. 2).\nTherefore an action is not good or bad from a circumstance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that a\nvirtuous man acts as he should, and when he should, and so on in\nrespect of the other circumstances. Therefore, on the other hand, the\nvicious man, in the matter of each vice, acts when he should not, or\nwhere he should not, and so on with the other circumstances.\nTherefore human actions are good or evil according to circumstances.\n\n_I answer that,_ In natural things, it is to be noted that the whole\nfulness of perfection due to a thing, is not from the mere\nsubstantial form, that gives it its species; since a thing derives\nmuch from supervening accidents, as man does from shape, color, and\nthe like; and if any one of these accidents be out of due proportion,\nevil is the result. So it is with action. For the plenitude of its\ngoodness does not consist wholly in its species, but also in certain\nadditions which accrue to it by reason of certain accidents: and such\nare its due circumstances. Wherefore if something be wanting that is\nrequisite as a due circumstance the action will be evil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Circumstances are outside an action, inasmuch as they\nare not part of its essence; but they are in an action as accidents\nthereof. Thus, too, accidents in natural substances are outside the\nessence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Every accident is not accidentally in its subject; for\nsome are proper accidents; and of these every art takes notice. And\nthus it is that the circumstances of actions are considered in the\ndoctrine of morals.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since good and being are convertible; according as\nbeing is predicated of substance and of accident, so is good\npredicated of a thing both in respect of its essential being, and in\nrespect of its accidental being; and this, both in natural things and\nin moral actions.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Human Action Is Good or Evil from Its End?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the good and evil in human actions\nare not from the end. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"nothing\nacts with a view to evil.\" If therefore an action were good or evil\nfrom its end, no action would be evil. Which is clearly false.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the goodness of an action is something in the\naction. But the end is an extrinsic cause. Therefore an action is not\nsaid to be good or bad according to its end.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a good action may happen to be ordained to an evil\nend, as when a man gives an alms from vainglory; and conversely, an\nevil action may happen to be ordained to a good end, as a theft\ncommitted in order to give something to the poor. Therefore an action\nis not good or evil from its end.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Differ. _Topic._ ii) that \"if the\nend is good, the thing is good, and if the end be evil, the thing\nalso is evil.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The disposition of things as to goodness is the same\nas their disposition as to being. Now in some things the being does\nnot depend on another, and in these it suffices to consider their\nbeing absolutely. But there are things the being of which depends on\nsomething else, and hence in their regard we must consider their\nbeing in its relation to the cause on which it depends. Now just as\nthe being of a thing depends on the agent, and the form, so the\ngoodness of a thing depends on its end. Hence in the Divine Persons,\nWhose goodness does not depend on another, the measure of goodness is\nnot taken from the end. Whereas human actions, and other things, the\ngoodness of which depends on something else, have a measure of\ngoodness from the end on which they depend, besides that goodness\nwhich is in them absolutely.\n\nAccordingly a fourfold goodness may be considered in a human action.\nFirst, that which, as an action, it derives from its genus; because\nas much as it has of action and being so much has it of goodness, as\nstated above (A. 1). Secondly, it has goodness according to its\nspecies; which is derived from its suitable object. Thirdly, it has\ngoodness from its circumstances, in respect, as it were, of its\naccidents. Fourthly, it has goodness from its end, to which it is\ncompared as to the cause of its goodness.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The good in view of which one acts is not always a true\ngood; but sometimes it is a true good, sometimes an apparent good.\nAnd in the latter event, an evil action results from the end in view.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although the end is an extrinsic cause, nevertheless\ndue proportion to the end, and relation to the end, are inherent to\nthe action.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Nothing hinders an action that is good in one of the\nways mentioned above, from lacking goodness in another way. And thus\nit may happen that an action which is good in its species or in its\ncircumstances is ordained to an evil end, or vice versa. However, an\naction is not good simply, unless it is good in all those ways: since\n\"evil results from any single defect, but good from the complete\ncause,\" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 5]\n\nWhether a Human Action Is Good or Evil in Its Species?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that good and evil in moral actions do not\nmake a difference of species. For the existence of good and evil in\nactions is in conformity with their existence in things, as stated\nabove (A. 1). But good and evil do not make a specific difference in\nthings; for a good man is specifically the same as a bad man.\nTherefore neither do they make a specific difference in actions.\n\nObj. 2: Further, since evil is a privation, it is a non-being. But\nnon-being cannot be a difference, according to the Philosopher\n(Metaph. iii, 3). Since therefore the difference constitutes the\nspecies, it seems that an action is not constituted in a species\nthrough being evil. Consequently good and evil do not diversify the\nspecies of human actions.\n\nObj. 3: Further, acts that differ in species produce different\neffects. But the same specific effect results from a good and from an\nevil action: thus a man is born of adulterous or of lawful wedlock.\nTherefore good and evil actions do not differ in species.\n\nObj. 4: Further, actions are sometimes said to be good or bad from a\ncircumstance, as stated above (A. 3). But since a circumstance is an\naccident, it does not give an action its species. Therefore human\nactions do not differ in species on account of their goodness or\nmalice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic ii. 1) \"like\nhabits produce like actions.\" But a good and a bad habit differ in\nspecies, as liberality and prodigality. Therefore also good and bad\nactions differ in species.\n\n_I answer that,_ Every action derives its species from its object, as\nstated above (A. 2). Hence it follows that a difference of object\ncauses a difference of species in actions. Now, it must be observed\nthat a difference of objects causes a difference of species in\nactions, according as the latter are referred to one active\nprinciple, which does not cause a difference in actions, according as\nthey are referred to another active principle. Because nothing\naccidental constitutes a species, but only that which is essential;\nand a difference of object may be essential in reference to one\nactive principle, and accidental in reference to another. Thus to\nknow color and to know sound, differ essentially in reference to\nsense, but not in reference to the intellect.\n\nNow in human actions, good and evil are predicated in reference to\nthe reason; because as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), \"the good of\nman is to be in accordance with reason,\" and evil is \"to be against\nreason.\" For that is good for a thing which suits it in regard to its\nform; and evil, that which is against the order of its form. It is\ntherefore evident that the difference of good and evil considered in\nreference to the object is an essential difference in relation to\nreason; that is to say, according as the object is suitable or\nunsuitable to reason. Now certain actions are called human or moral,\ninasmuch as they proceed from the reason. Consequently it is evident\nthat good and evil diversify the species in human actions; since\nessential differences cause a difference of species.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Even in natural things, good and evil, inasmuch as\nsomething is according to nature, and something against nature,\ndiversify the natural species; for a dead body and a living body are\nnot of the same species. In like manner, good, inasmuch as it is in\naccord with reason, and evil, inasmuch as it is against\nreason, inasmuch as it is against reason, diversify the moral species.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Evil implies privation, not absolute, but affecting\nsome potentiality. For an action is said to be evil in its species,\nnot because it has no object at all; but because it has an object in\ndisaccord with reason, for instance, to appropriate another's\nproperty. Wherefore in so far as the object is something positive, it\ncan constitute the species of an evil act.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The conjugal act and adultery, as compared to reason,\ndiffer specifically and have effects specifically different; because\nthe other deserves praise and reward, the other, blame and\npunishment. But as compared to the generative power, they do not\ndiffer in species; and thus they have one specific effect.\n\nReply Obj. 4: A circumstance is sometimes taken as the essential\ndifference of the object, as compared to reason; and then it can\nspecify a moral act. And it must needs be so whenever a circumstance\ntransforms an action from good to evil; for a circumstance would not\nmake an action evil, except through being repugnant to reason.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 6]\n\nWhether an Action Has the Species of Good or Evil from Its End?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the good and evil which are from the\nend do not diversify the species of actions. For actions derive their\nspecies from the object. But the end is altogether apart from the\nobject. Therefore the good and evil which are from the end do not\ndiversify the species of an action.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is accidental does not constitute the\nspecies, as stated above (A. 5). But it is accidental to an action to\nbe ordained to some particular end; for instance, to give alms from\nvainglory. Therefore actions are not diversified as to species,\naccording to the good and evil which are from the end.\n\nObj. 3: Further, acts that differ in species, can be ordained to the\nsame end: thus to the end of vainglory, actions of various virtues\nand vices can be ordained. Therefore the good and evil which are\ntaken from the end, do not diversify the species of action.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It has been shown above (Q. 1, A. 3) that human\nactions derive their species from the end. Therefore good and evil in\nrespect of the end diversify the species of actions.\n\n_I answer that,_ Certain actions are called human, inasmuch as they\nare voluntary, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1). Now, in a voluntary\naction, there is a twofold action, viz. the interior action of the\nwill, and the external action: and each of these actions has its\nobject. The end is properly the object of the interior act of the\nwill: while the object of the external action, is that on which the\naction is brought to bear. Therefore just as the external action\ntakes its species from the object on which it bears; so the interior\nact of the will takes its species from the end, as from its own\nproper object.\n\nNow that which is on the part of the will is formal in regard to that\nwhich is on the part of the external action: because the will uses\nthe limbs to act as instruments; nor have external actions any\nmeasure of morality, save in so far as they are voluntary.\nConsequently the species of a human act is considered formally with\nregard to the end, but materially with regard to the object of the\nexternal action. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 2) that \"he\nwho steals that he may commit adultery, is strictly speaking, more\nadulterer than thief.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The end also has the character of an object, as stated\nabove.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although it is accidental to the external action to be\nordained to some particular end, it is not accidental to the interior\nact of the will, which act is compared to the external act, as form\nto matter.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When many actions, differing in species, are ordained\nto the same end, there is indeed a diversity of species on the part\nof the external actions; but unity of species on the part of the\ninternal action.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Species Derived from the End Is Contained Under the\nSpecies Derived from the Object, As Under Its Genus, or Conversely?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the species of goodness derived from\nthe end is contained under the species of goodness derived from the\nobject, as a species is contained under its genus; for instance, when\na man commits a theft in order to give alms. For an action takes its\nspecies from its object, as stated above (AA. 2, 6). But it is\nimpossible for a thing to be contained under another species, if this\nspecies be not contained under the proper species of that thing;\nbecause the same thing cannot be contained in different species that\nare not subordinate to one another. Therefore the species which is\ntaken from the end, is contained under the species which is taken\nfrom the object.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the last difference always constitutes the most\nspecific species. But the difference derived from the end seems to\ncome after the difference derived from the object: because the end is\nsomething last. Therefore the species derived from the end, is\ncontained under the species derived from the object, as its most\nspecific species.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the more formal a difference is, the more specific\nit is: because difference is compared to genus, as form to matter.\nBut the species derived from the end, is more formal than that which\nis derived from the object, as stated above (A. 6). Therefore the\nspecies derived from the end is contained under the species derived\nfrom the object, as the most specific species is contained under the\nsubaltern genus.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Each genus has its determinate differences. But an\naction of one same species on the part of its object, can be ordained\nto an infinite number of ends: for instance, theft can be ordained to\nan infinite number of good and bad ends. Therefore the species\nderived from the end is not contained under the species derived from\nthe object, as under its genus.\n\n_I answer that,_ The object of the external act can stand in a\ntwofold relation to the end of the will: first, as being of itself\nordained thereto; thus to fight well is of itself ordained to\nvictory; secondly, as being ordained thereto accidentally; thus to\ntake what belongs to another is ordained accidentally to the giving\nof alms. Now the differences that divide a genus, and constitute the\nspecies of that genus, must, as the Philosopher says (Metaph. vii,\n12), divide that genus essentially: and if they divide it\naccidentally, the division is incorrect: as, if one were to say:\n\"Animals are divided into rational and irrational; and the irrational\ninto animals with wings, and animals without wings\"; for \"winged\" and\n\"wingless\" are not essential determinations of the irrational being.\nBut the following division would be correct: \"Some animals have feet,\nsome have no feet: and of those that have feet, some have two feet,\nsome four, some many\": because the latter division is an essential\ndetermination of the former. Accordingly when the object is not of\nitself ordained to the end, the specific difference derived from the\nobject is not an essential determination of the species derived from\nthe end, nor is the reverse the case. Wherefore one of these species\nis not under the other; but then the moral action is contained under\ntwo species that are disparate, as it were. Consequently we say that\nhe that commits theft for the sake of adultery, is guilty of a\ntwofold malice in one action. On the other hand, if the object be of\nitself ordained to the end, one of these differences is an essential\ndetermination of the other. Wherefore one of these species will be\ncontained under the other.\n\nIt remains to be considered which of the two is contained under the\nother. In order to make this clear, we must first of all observe that\nthe more particular the form is from which a difference is taken, the\nmore specific is the difference. Secondly, that the more universal an\nagent is, the more universal a form does it cause. Thirdly, that the\nmore remote an end is, the more universal the agent to which it\ncorresponds; thus victory, which is the last end of the army, is the\nend intended by the commander in chief; while the right ordering of\nthis or that regiment is the end intended by one of the lower\nofficers. From all this it follows that the specific difference\nderived from the end, is more general; and that the difference\nderived from an object which of itself is ordained to that end, is a\nspecific difference in relation to the former. For the will, the\nproper object of which is the end, is the universal mover in respect\nof all the powers of the soul, the proper objects of which are the\nobjects of their particular acts.\n\nReply Obj. 1: One and the same thing, considered in its substance,\ncannot be in two species, one of which is not subordinate to the\nother. But in respect of those things which are superadded to the\nsubstance, one thing can be contained under different species. Thus\none and the same fruit, as to its color, is contained under one\nspecies, i.e. a white thing: and, as to its perfume, under the\nspecies of sweet-smelling things. In like manner an action which, as\nto its substance, is in one natural species, considered in respect to\nthe moral conditions that are added to it, can belong to two species,\nas stated above (Q. 1, A. 3, ad 3).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The end is last in execution; but first in the\nintention of the reason, in regard to which moral actions receive\ntheir species.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Difference is compared to genus as form to matter,\ninasmuch as it actualizes the genus. On the other hand, the genus is\nconsidered as more formal than the species, inasmuch as it is\nsomething more absolute and less contracted. Wherefore also the parts\nof a definition are reduced to the genus of formal cause, as is\nstated in _Phys._ ii, 3. And in this sense the genus is the formal\ncause of the species; and so much the more formal, as it is more\nuniversal.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Any Action Is Indifferent in Its Species?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no action is indifferent in its\nspecies. For evil is the privation of good, according to Augustine\n(Enchiridion xi). But privation and habit are immediate contraries,\naccording to the Philosopher (Categor. viii). Therefore there is not\nsuch thing as an action that is indifferent in its species, as though\nit were between good and evil.\n\nObj. 2: Further, human actions derive their species from their end or\nobject, as stated above (A. 6; Q. 1, A. 3). But every end and every\nobject is either good or bad. Therefore every human action is good or\nevil according to its species. None, therefore, is indifferent in its\nspecies.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as stated above (A. 1), an action is said to be\ngood, when it has its due complement of goodness; and evil, when it\nlacks that complement. But every action must needs either have the\nentire plenitude of its goodness, or lack it in some respect.\nTherefore every action must needs be either good or bad in its\nspecies, and none is indifferent.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte ii, 18)\nthat \"there are certain deeds of a middle kind, which can be done\nwith a good or evil mind, of which it is rash to form a judgment.\"\nTherefore some actions are indifferent according to their species.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 5), every action takes its\nspecies from its object; while human action, which is called moral,\ntakes its species from the object, in relation to the principle of\nhuman actions, which is the reason. Wherefore if the object of an\naction includes something in accord with the order of reason, it will\nbe a good action according to its species; for instance, to give alms\nto a person in want. On the other hand, if it includes something\nrepugnant to the order of reason, it will be an evil act according to\nits species; for instance, to steal, which is to appropriate what\nbelongs to another. But it may happen that the object of an action\ndoes not include something pertaining to the order of reason; for\ninstance, to pick up a straw from the ground, to walk in the fields,\nand the like: and such actions are indifferent according to their\nspecies.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Privation is twofold. One is privation \"as a result\"\n(_privatum esse_), and this leaves nothing, but takes all away: thus\nblindness takes away sight altogether; darkness, light; and death,\nlife. Between this privation and the contrary habit, there can be no\nmedium in respect of the proper subject. The other is privation \"in\nprocess\" (_privari_): thus sickness is privation of health; not that it\ntakes health away altogether, but that it is a kind of road to the\nentire loss of health, occasioned by death. And since this sort of\nprivation leaves something, it is not always the immediate contrary\nof the opposite habit. In this way evil is a privation of good, as\nSimplicius says in his commentary on the Categories: because it does\nnot take away all good, but leaves some. Consequently there can be\nsomething between good and evil.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Every object or end has some goodness or malice, at\nleast natural to it: but this does not imply moral goodness or\nmalice, which is considered in relation to the reason, as stated\nabove. And it is of this that we are here treating.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Not everything belonging to an action belongs also to\nits species. Wherefore although an action's specific nature may not\ncontain all that belongs to the full complement of its goodness, it\nis not therefore an action specifically bad; nor is it specifically\ngood. Thus a man in regard to his species is neither virtuous nor\nwicked.\n________________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 9]\n\nWhether an Individual Action Can Be Indifferent?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that an individual action can be\nindifferent. For there is no species that does not, or cannot,\ncontain an individual. But an action can be indifferent in its\nspecies, as stated above (A. 8). Therefore an individual action can\nbe indifferent.\n\nObj. 2: Further, individual actions cause like habits, as stated in\n_Ethic._ ii, 1. But a habit can be indifferent: for the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. iv, 1) that those who are of an even temper and prodigal\ndisposition are not evil; and yet it is evident that they are not\ngood, since they depart from virtue; and thus they are indifferent in\nrespect of a habit. Therefore some individual actions are indifferent.\n\nObj. 3: Further, moral good belongs to virtue, while moral evil\nbelongs to vice. But it happens sometimes that a man fails to ordain\na specifically indifferent action to a vicious or virtuous end.\nTherefore an individual action may happen to be indifferent.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says in a homily (vi in Evang.): \"An idle\nword is one that lacks either the usefulness of rectitude or the\nmotive of just necessity or pious utility.\" But an idle word is an\nevil, because \"men . . . shall render an account of it in the day of\njudgment\" (Matt. 12:36): while if it does not lack the motive of just\nnecessity or pious utility, it is good. Therefore every word is\neither good or bad. For the same reason every other action is either\ngood or bad. Therefore no individual action is indifferent.\n\n_I answer that,_ It sometimes happens that an action is indifferent\nin its species, but considered in the individual it is good or evil.\nAnd the reason of this is because a moral action, as stated above (A.\n3), derives its goodness not only from its object, whence it takes\nits species; but also from the circumstances, which are its\naccidents, as it were; just as something belongs to a man by reason\nof his individual accidents, which does not belong to him by reason\nof his species. And every individual action must needs have some\ncircumstance that makes it good or bad, at least in respect of the\nintention of the end. For since it belongs to the reason to direct;\nif an action that proceeds from deliberate reason be not directed to\nthe due end, it is, by that fact alone, repugnant to reason, and has\nthe character of evil. But if it be directed to a due end, it is in\naccord with reason; wherefore it has the character of good. Now it\nmust needs be either directed or not directed to a due end.\nConsequently every human action that proceeds from deliberate reason,\nif it be considered in the individual, must be good or bad.\n\nIf, however, it does not proceed from deliberate reason, but from\nsome act of the imagination, as when a man strokes his beard, or\nmoves his hand or foot; such an action, properly speaking, is not\nmoral or human; since this depends on the reason. Hence it will be\nindifferent, as standing apart from the genus of moral actions.\n\nReply Obj. 1: For an action to be indifferent in its species can be\nunderstood in several ways. First in such a way that its species\ndemands that it remain indifferent; and the objection proceeds along\nthis line. But no action can be specifically indifferent thus: since\nno object of human action is such that it cannot be directed to good\nor evil, either through its end or through a circumstance. Secondly,\nspecific indifference of an action may be due to the fact that as far\nas its species is concerned, it is neither good nor bad. Wherefore it\ncan be made good or bad by something else. Thus man, as far as his\nspecies is concerned, is neither white nor black; nor is it a\ncondition of his species that he should not be black or white; but\nblackness or whiteness is superadded to man by other principles than\nthose of his species.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Philosopher states that a man is evil, properly\nspeaking, if he be hurtful to others. And accordingly, he says that\nthe prodigal is not evil, because he hurts none save himself. And the\nsame applies to all others who are not hurtful to other men. But we\nsay here that evil, in general, is all that is repugnant to right\nreason. And in this sense every individual action is either good or\nbad, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Whenever an end is intended by deliberate reason, it\nbelongs either to the good of some virtue, or to the evil of some\nvice. Thus, if a man's action is directed to the support or repose\nof his body, it is also directed to the good of virtue, provided he\ndirect his body itself to the good of virtue. The same clearly\napplies to other actions.\n________________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 10]\n\nWhether a Circumstance Places a Moral Action in the Species of Good\nor Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a circumstance cannot place a moral\naction in the species of good or evil. For the species of an action\nis taken from its object. But circumstances differ from the object.\nTherefore circumstances do not give an action its species.\n\nObj. 2: Further, circumstances are as accidents in relation to the\nmoral action, as stated above (Q. 7, A. 1). But an accident does not\nconstitute the species. Therefore a circumstance does not constitute\na species of good or evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one thing is not in several species. But one action\nhas several circumstances. Therefore a circumstance does not place a\nmoral action in a species of good or evil.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Place is a circumstance. But place makes a moral\naction to be in a certain species of evil; for theft of a thing from\na holy place is a sacrilege. Therefore a circumstance makes a moral\naction to be specifically good or bad.\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as the species of natural things are\nconstituted by their natural forms, so the species of moral actions\nare constituted by forms as conceived by the reason, as is evident\nfrom what was said above (A. 5). But since nature is determinate to\none thing, nor can a process of nature go on to infinity, there must\nneeds be some ultimate form, giving a specific difference, after\nwhich no further specific difference is possible. Hence it is that in\nnatural things, that which is accidental to a thing, cannot be taken\nas a difference constituting the species. But the process of reason\nis not fixed to one particular term, for at any point it can still\nproceed further. And consequently that which, in one action, is taken\nas a circumstance added to the object that specifies the action, can\nagain be taken by the directing reason, as the principal condition of\nthe object that determines the action's species. Thus to appropriate\nanother's property is specified by reason of the property being\n\"another's,\" and in this respect it is placed in the species of\ntheft; and if we consider that action also in its bearing on place or\ntime, then this will be an additional circumstance. But since the\nreason can direct as to place, time, and the like, it may happen that\nthe condition as to place, in relation to the object, is considered\nas being in disaccord with reason: for instance, reason forbids\ndamage to be done to a holy place. Consequently to steal from a holy\nplace has an additional repugnance to the order of reason. And thus\nplace, which was first of all considered as a circumstance, is\nconsidered here as the principal condition of the object, and as\nitself repugnant to reason. And in this way, whenever a circumstance\nhas a special relation to reason, either for or against, it must\nneeds specify the moral action whether good or bad.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A circumstance, in so far as it specifies an action, is\nconsidered as a condition of the object, as stated above, and as\nbeing, as it were, a specific difference thereof.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A circumstance, so long as it is but a circumstance,\ndoes not specify an action, since thus it is a mere accident: but\nwhen it becomes a principal condition of the object, then it does\nspecify the action.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is not every circumstance that places the moral\naction in the species of good or evil; since not every circumstance\nimplies accord or disaccord with reason. Consequently, although one\naction may have many circumstances, it does not follow that it is in\nmany species. Nevertheless there is no reason why one action should\nnot be in several, even disparate, moral species, as said above (A.\n7, ad 1; Q. 1, A. 3, ad 3).\n________________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 11]\n\nWhether Every Circumstance That Makes an Action Better or Worse,\nPlaces a Moral Action in a Species of Good or Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that every circumstance relating to\ngood or evil, specifies an action. For good and evil are specific\ndifferences of moral actions. Therefore that which causes a\ndifference in the goodness or malice of a moral action, causes a\nspecific difference, which is the same as to make it differ in\nspecies. Now that which makes an action better or worse, makes it\ndiffer in goodness and malice. Therefore it causes it to differ in\nspecies. Therefore every circumstance that makes an action better\nor worse, constitutes a species.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an additional circumstance either has in itself the\ncharacter of goodness or malice, or it has not. If not, it cannot\nmake the action better or worse; because what is not good, cannot\nmake a greater good; and what is not evil, cannot make a greater\nevil. But if it has in itself the character of good or evil, for this\nvery reason it has a certain species of good or evil. Therefore every\ncircumstance that makes an action better or worse, constitutes a new\nspecies of good or evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv), \"evil is\ncaused by each single defect.\" Now every circumstance that increases\nmalice, has a special defect. Therefore every such circumstance adds\na new species of sin. And for the same reason, every circumstance\nthat increases goodness, seems to add a new species of goodness: just\nas every unity added to a number makes a new species of number; since\nthe good consists in \"number, weight, and measure\" (I, Q. 5, A. 5).\n\n_On the contrary,_ More and less do not change a species. But more\nand less is a circumstance of additional goodness or malice.\nTherefore not every circumstance that makes a moral action better or\nworse, places it in a species of good or evil.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 10), a circumstance gives the\nspecies of good or evil to a moral action, in so far as it regards a\nspecial order of reason. Now it happens sometimes that a circumstance\ndoes not regard a special order of reason in respect of good or evil,\nexcept on the supposition of another previous circumstance, from\nwhich the moral action takes its species of good or evil. Thus to\ntake something in a large or small quantity, does not regard the\norder of reason in respect of good or evil, except a certain other\ncondition be presupposed, from which the action takes its malice or\ngoodness; for instance, if what is taken belongs to another, which\nmakes the action to be discordant with reason. Wherefore to take what\nbelongs to another in a large or small quantity, does not change the\nspecies of the sin. Nevertheless it can aggravate or diminish the\nsin. The same applies to other evil or good actions. Consequently not\nevery circumstance that makes a moral action better or worse, changes\nits species.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In things which can be more or less intense, the\ndifference of more or less does not change the species: thus by\ndiffering in whiteness through being more or less white a thing is\nnot changed in regard to its species of color. In like manner that\nwhich makes an action to be more or less good or evil, does not make\nthe action differ in species.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A circumstance that aggravates a sin, or adds to the\ngoodness of an action, sometimes has no goodness or malice in itself,\nbut in regard to some other condition of the action, as stated above.\nConsequently it does not add a new species, but adds to the goodness\nor malice derived from this other condition of the action.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A circumstance does not always involve a distinct\ndefect of its own; sometimes it causes a defect in reference to\nsomething else. In like manner a circumstance does not always add\nfurther perfection, except in reference to something else. And, for\nas much as it does, although it may add to the goodness or malice,\nit does not always change the species of good or evil.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 19\n\nOF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF THE INTERIOR ACT OF THE WILL\n(In Ten Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the goodness of the interior act of the will;\nunder which head there are ten points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object?\n\n(2) Whether it depends on the object alone?\n\n(3) Whether it depends on reason?\n\n(4) Whether it depends on the eternal law?\n\n(5) Whether erring reason binds?\n\n(6) Whether the will is evil if it follows the erring reason against\nthe law of God?\n\n(7) Whether the goodness of the will in regard to the means, depends\non the intention of the end?\n\n(8) Whether the degree of goodness or malice in the will depends on\nthe degree of good or evil in the intention?\n\n(9) Whether the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the\nDivine Will?\n\n(10) Whether it is necessary for the human will, in order to be good,\nto be conformed to the Divine Will, as regards the thing willed?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Goodness of the Will Depends on the Object?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not\ndepend on the object. For the will cannot be directed otherwise than\nto what is good: since \"evil is outside the scope of the will,\" as\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). If therefore the goodness of the will\ndepended on the object, it would follow that every act of the will\nis good, and none bad.\n\nObj. 2: Further, good is first of all in the end: wherefore the\ngoodness of the end, as such, does not depend on any other. But,\naccording to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5), \"goodness of action is\nthe end, but goodness of making is never the end\": because the latter\nis always ordained to the thing made, as to its end. Therefore the\ngoodness of the act of the will does not depend on any object.\n\nObj. 3: Further, such as a thing is, such does it make a thing to be.\nBut the object of the will is good, by reason of the goodness of\nnature. Therefore it cannot give moral goodness to the will.\nTherefore the moral goodness of the will does not depend on the\nobject.\n\n_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that justice is\nthat habit \"from which men wish for just things\": and accordingly,\nvirtue is a habit from which men wish for good things. But a good\nwill is one which is in accordance with virtue. Therefore the\ngoodness of the will is from the fact that a man wills that which is\ngood.\n\n_I answer that,_ Good and evil are essential differences of the act\nof the will. Because good and evil of themselves regard the will;\njust as truth and falsehood regard reason; the act of which is\ndivided essentially by the difference of truth and falsehood, for as\nmuch as an opinion is said to be true or false. Consequently good and\nevil will are acts differing in species. Now the specific difference\nin acts is according to objects, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 5).\nTherefore good and evil in the acts of the will is derived properly\nfrom the objects.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The will is not always directed to what is truly good,\nbut sometimes to the apparent good; which has indeed some measure of\ngood, but not of a good that is simply suitable to be desired. Hence\nit is that the act of the will is not always good, but sometimes evil.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although an action can, in a certain way, be man's last\nend; nevertheless such action is not an act of the will, as stated\nabove (Q. 1, A. 1, ad 2).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Good is presented to the will as its object by the\nreason: and in so far as it is in accord with reason, it enters the\nmoral order, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will:\nbecause the reason is the principle of human and moral acts, as\nstated above (Q. 18, A. 5).\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not\ndepend on the object alone. For the end has a closer relationship to\nthe will than to any other power. But the acts of the other powers\nderive goodness not only from the object but also from the end, as\nwe have shown above (Q. 18, A. 4). Therefore the act also of the\nwill derives goodness not only from the object but also from the end.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the goodness of an action is derived not only from\nthe object but also from the circumstances, as stated above (Q. 18,\nA. 3). But according to the diversity of circumstances there may be\ndiversity of goodness and malice in the act of the will: for\ninstance, if a man will, when he ought, where he ought, as much as he\nought, and how he ought, or if he will as he ought not. Therefore the\ngoodness of the will depends not only on the object, but also on the\ncircumstances.\n\nObj. 3: Further, ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the\nwill, as stated above (Q. 6, A. 8). But it would not be so, unless\nthe goodness or malice of the will depended on the circumstances.\nTherefore the goodness and malice of the will depend on the\ncircumstances, and not only on the object.\n\n_On the contrary,_ An action does not take its species from the\ncircumstances as such, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 10, ad 2). But good\nand evil are specific differences of the act of the will, as stated\nabove (A. 1). Therefore the goodness and malice of the will depend,\nnot on the circumstances, but on the object alone.\n\n_I answer that,_ In every genus, the more a thing is first, the more\nsimple it is, and the fewer the principles of which it consists: thus\nprimary bodies are simple. Hence it is to be observed that the first\nthings in every genus, are, in some way, simple and consist of one\nprinciple. Now the principle of the goodness and malice of human\nactions is taken from the act of the will. Consequently the goodness\nand malice of the act of the will depend on some one thing; while the\ngoodness and malice of other acts may depend on several things.\n\nNow that one thing which is the principle in each genus, is not\nsomething accidental to that genus, but something essential thereto:\nbecause whatever is accidental is reduced to something essential, as\nto its principle. Therefore the goodness of the will's act depends on\nthat one thing alone, which of itself causes goodness in the act; and\nthat one thing is the object, and not the circumstances, which are\naccidents, as it were, of the act.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The end is the object of the will, but not of the other\npowers. Hence, in regard to the act of the will, the goodness derived\nfrom the object, does not differ from that which is derived from the\nend, as they differ in the acts of the other powers; except perhaps\naccidentally, in so far as one end depends on another, and one act of\nthe will on another.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Given that the act of the will is fixed on some good,\nno circumstances can make that act bad. Consequently when it is said\nthat a man wills a good when he ought not, or where he ought not,\nthis can be understood in two ways. First, so that this circumstance\nis referred to the thing willed. And thus the act of the will is not\nfixed on something good: since to will to do something when it ought\nnot to be done, is not to will something good. Secondly, so that the\ncircumstance is referred to the act of willing. And thus, it is\nimpossible to will something good when one ought not to, because one\nought always to will what is good: except, perhaps, accidentally, in\nso far as a man by willing some particular good, is prevented from\nwilling at the same time another good which he ought to will at that\ntime. And then evil results, not from his willing that particular\ngood, but from his not willing the other. The same applies to the\nother circumstances.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Ignorance of circumstances excuses malice of the will,\nin so far as the circumstance affects the thing willed: that is to\nsay, in so far as a man ignores the circumstances of the act which\nhe wills.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Goodness of the Will Depends on Reason?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not\ndepend on reason. For what comes first does not depend on what\nfollows. But the good belongs to the will before it belongs to\nreason, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 9, A. 1).\nTherefore the goodness of the will does not depend on reason.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that the\ngoodness of the practical intellect is \"a truth that is in conformity\nwith right desire.\" But right desire is a good will. Therefore the\ngoodness of the practical reason depends on the goodness of the will,\nrather than conversely.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the mover does not depend on that which is moved,\nbut vice versa. But the will moves the reason and the other powers,\nas stated above (Q. 9, A. 1). Therefore the goodness of the will\ndoes not depend on reason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. x): \"It is an unruly will\nthat persists in its desires in opposition to reason.\" But the\ngoodness of the will consists in not being unruly. Therefore the\ngoodness of the will depends on its being subject to reason.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the goodness of the will\ndepends properly on the object. Now the will's object is proposed to\nit by reason. Because the good understood is the proportionate object\nof the will; while sensitive or imaginary good is proportionate not\nto the will but to the sensitive appetite: since the will can tend to\nthe universal good, which reason apprehends; whereas the sensitive\nappetite tends only to the particular good, apprehended by the\nsensitive power. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on\nreason, in the same way as it depends on the object.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The good considered as such, i.e. as appetible,\npertains to the will before pertaining to the reason. But considered\nas true it pertains to the reason, before, under the aspect of\ngoodness, pertaining to the will: because the will cannot desire a\ngood that is not previously apprehended by reason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Philosopher speaks here of the practical intellect,\nin so far as it counsels and reasons about the means: for in this\nrespect it is perfected by prudence. Now in regard to the means, the\nrectitude of the reason depends on its conformity with the desire of\na due end: nevertheless the very desire of the due end presupposes on\nthe part of reason a right apprehension of the end.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The will moves the reason in one way: the reason moves\nthe will in another, viz. on the part of the object, as stated above\n(Q. 9, A. 1).\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Goodness of the Will Depends on the Eternal Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the human will does\nnot depend on the eternal law. Because to one thing there is one rule\nand one measure. But the rule of the human will, on which its\ngoodness depends, is right reason. Therefore the goodness of the will\ndoes not depend on the eternal law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"a measure is homogeneous with the thing measured\"\n(Metaph. x, 1). But the eternal law is not homogeneous with the human\nwill. Therefore the eternal law cannot be the measure on which the\ngoodness of the human will depends.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a measure should be most certain. But the eternal\nlaw is unknown to us. Therefore it cannot be the measure on which the\ngoodness of our will depends.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) that \"sin\nis a deed, word or desire against the eternal law.\" But malice of the\nwill is the root of sin. Therefore, since malice is contrary to\ngoodness, the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law.\n\n_I answer that,_ Wherever a number of causes are subordinate to one\nanother, the effect depends more on the first than on the second\ncause: since the second cause acts only in virtue of the first. Now\nit is from the eternal law, which is the Divine Reason, that human\nreason is the rule of the human will, from which the human derives\nits goodness. Hence it is written (Ps. 4:6, 7): \"Many say: Who\nshoweth us good things? The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is\nsigned upon us\": as though to say: \"The light of our reason is able\nto show us good things, and guide our will, in so far as it is the\nlight (i.e. derived from) Thy countenance.\" It is therefore evident\nthat the goodness of the human will depends on the eternal law much\nmore than on human reason: and when human reason fails we must have\nrecourse to the Eternal Reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To one thing there are not several proximate measures;\nbut there can be several measures if one is subordinate to the other.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A proximate measure is homogeneous with the thing\nmeasured; a remote measure is not.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the eternal law is unknown to us according as\nit is in the Divine Mind: nevertheless, it becomes known to us\nsomewhat, either by natural reason which is derived therefrom as its\nproper image; or by some sort of additional revelation.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Will Is Evil When It Is at Variance with Erring Reason?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will is not evil when it is at\nvariance with erring reason. Because the reason is the rule of the\nhuman will, in so far as it is derived from the eternal law, as\nstated above (A. 4). But erring reason is not derived from the\neternal law. Therefore erring reason is not the rule of the human\nwill. Therefore the will is not evil, if it be at variance with\nerring reason.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Augustine, the command of a lower\nauthority does not bind if it be contrary to the command of a higher\nauthority: for instance, if a provincial governor command something\nthat is forbidden by the emperor. But erring reason sometimes\nproposes what is against the command of a higher power, namely, God\nWhose power is supreme. Therefore the decision of an erring reason\ndoes not bind. Consequently the will is not evil if it be at variance\nwith erring reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every evil will is reducible to some species of\nmalice. But the will that is at variance with erring reason is not\nreducible to some species of malice. For instance, if a man's reason\nerr in telling him to commit fornication, his will in not willing to\ndo so, cannot be reduced to any species of malice. Therefore the will\nis not evil when it is at variance with erring reason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ As stated in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 13),\nconscience is nothing else than the application of knowledge to some\naction. Now knowledge is in the reason. Therefore when the will is at\nvariance with erring reason, it is against conscience. But every such\nwill is evil; for it is written (Rom. 14:23): \"All that is not of\nfaith\"--i.e. all that is against conscience--\"is sin.\" Therefore the\nwill is evil when it is at variance with erring reason.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since conscience is a kind of dictate of the reason,\nfor it is an application of knowledge to action, as was stated in\nthe First Part (Q. 19, A. 13), to inquire whether the will is evil\nwhen it is at variance with erring reason, is the same as to inquire\n\"whether an erring conscience binds.\" On this matter, some\ndistinguished three kinds of actions: for some are good generically;\nsome are indifferent; some are evil generically. And they say that if\nreason or conscience tell us to do something which is good\ngenerically, there is no error: and in like manner if it tell us not\nto do something which is evil generically; since it is the same\nreason that prescribes what is good and forbids what is evil. On the\nother hand if a man's reason or conscience tells him that he is bound\nby precept to do what is evil in itself; or that what is good in\nitself, is forbidden, then his reason or conscience errs. In like\nmanner if a man's reason or conscience tell him, that what is\nindifferent in itself, for instance to raise a straw from the ground,\nis forbidden or commanded, his reason or conscience errs. They say,\ntherefore, that reason or conscience when erring in matters of\nindifference, either by commanding or by forbidding them, binds: so\nthat the will which is at variance with that erring reason is evil\nand sinful. But they say that when reason or conscience errs in\ncommanding what is evil in itself, or in forbidding what is good in\nitself and necessary for salvation, it does not bind; wherefore in\nsuch cases the will which is at variance with erring reason or\nconscience is not evil.\n\nBut this is unreasonable. For in matters of indifference, the will\nthat is at variance with erring reason or conscience, is evil in some\nway on account of the object, on which the goodness or malice of the\nwill depends; not indeed on account of the object according as it is\nin its own nature; but according as it is accidentally apprehended by\nreason as something evil to do or to avoid. And since the object of\nthe will is that which is proposed by the reason, as stated above (A.\n3), from the very fact that a thing is proposed by the reason as\nbeing evil, the will by tending thereto becomes evil. And this is the\ncase not only in indifferent matters, but also in those that are good\nor evil in themselves. For not only indifferent matters can receive\nthe character of goodness or malice accidentally; but also that which\nis good, can receive the character of evil, or that which is evil,\ncan receive the character of goodness, on account of the reason\napprehending it as such. For instance, to refrain from fornication is\ngood: yet the will does not tend to this good except in so far as it\nis proposed by the reason. If, therefore, the erring reason propose\nit as an evil, the will tends to it as to something evil.\nConsequently the will is evil, because it wills evil, not indeed that\nwhich is evil in itself, but that which is evil accidentally, through\nbeing apprehended as such by the reason. In like manner, to believe\nin Christ is good in itself, and necessary for salvation: but the\nwill does not tend thereto, except inasmuch as it is proposed by the\nreason. Consequently if it be proposed by the reason as something\nevil, the will tends to it as to something evil: not as if it were\nevil in itself, but because it is evil accidentally, through the\napprehension of the reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii,\n9) that \"properly speaking the incontinent man is one who does not\nfollow right reason; but accidentally, he is also one who does not\nfollow false reason.\" We must therefore conclude that, absolutely\nspeaking, every will at variance with reason, whether right or\nerring, is always evil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the judgment of an erring reason is not\nderived from God, yet the erring reason puts forward its judgment as\nbeing true, and consequently as being derived from God, from Whom is\nall truth.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The saying of Augustine holds good when it is known\nthat the inferior authority prescribes something contrary to the\ncommand of the higher authority. But if a man were to believe the\ncommand of the proconsul to be the command of the emperor, in\nscorning the command of the proconsul he would scorn the command of\nthe emperor. In like manner if a man were to know that human reason\nwas dictating something contrary to God's commandment, he would not\nbe bound to abide by reason: but then reason would not be entirely\nerroneous. But when erring reason proposes something as being\ncommanded by God, then to scorn the dictate of reason is to scorn\nthe commandment of God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Whenever reason apprehends something as evil, it\napprehends it under some species of evil; for instance, as being\nsomething contrary to a divine precept, or as giving scandal, or for\nsome such like reason. And then that evil is reduced to that species\nof malice.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Will Is Good When It Abides by Erring Reason?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will is good when it abides by\nerring reason. For just as the will, when at variance with the reason,\ntends to that which reason judges to be evil; so, when in accord with\nreason, it tends to what reason judges to be good. But the will is\nevil when it is at variance with reason, even when erring. Therefore\neven when it abides by erring reason, the will is good.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the will is always good, when it abides by the\ncommandment of God and the eternal law. But the eternal law and God's\ncommandment are proposed to us by the apprehension of the reason,\neven when it errs. Therefore the will is good, even when it abides by\nerring reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the will is evil when it is at variance with erring\nreason. If, therefore, the will is evil also when it abides by erring\nreason, it seems that the will is always evil when in conjunction\nwith erring reason: so that in such a case a man would be in a\ndilemma, and, of necessity, would sin: which is unreasonable.\nTherefore the will is good when it abides by erring reason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The will of those who slew the apostles was evil.\nAnd yet it was in accord with the erring reason, according to John\n16:2: \"The hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you, will think that\nhe doth a service to God.\" Therefore the will can be evil, when it\nabides by erring reason.\n\n_I answer that,_ Whereas the previous question is the same as\ninquiring \"whether an erring conscience binds\"; so this question is\nthe same as inquiring \"whether an erring conscience excuses.\" Now\nthis question depends on what has been said above about ignorance.\nFor it was said (Q. 6, A. 8) that ignorance sometimes causes an act\nto be involuntary, and sometimes not. And since moral good and evil\nconsist in action in so far as it is voluntary, as was stated above\n(A. 2); it is evident that when ignorance causes an act to be\ninvoluntary, it takes away the character of moral good and evil; but\nnot, when it does not cause the act to be involuntary. Again, it has\nbeen stated above (Q. 6, A. 8) that when ignorance is in any way\nwilled, either directly or indirectly, it does not cause the act to\nbe involuntary. And I call that ignorance \"directly\" voluntary, to\nwhich the act of the will tends: and that, \"indirectly\" voluntary,\nwhich is due to negligence, by reason of a man not wishing to know\nwhat he ought to know, as stated above (Q. 6, A. 8).\n\nIf then reason or conscience err with an error that is voluntary,\neither directly, or through negligence, so that one errs about what\none ought to know; then such an error of reason or conscience does\nnot excuse the will, that abides by that erring reason or conscience,\nfrom being evil. But if the error arise from ignorance of some\ncircumstance, and without any negligence, so that it cause the act to\nbe involuntary, then that error of reason or conscience excuses the\nwill, that abides by that erring reason, from being evil. For\ninstance, if erring reason tell a man that he should go to another\nman's wife, the will that abides by that erring reason is evil; since\nthis error arises from ignorance of the Divine Law, which he is bound\nto know. But if a man's reason, errs in mistaking another for his\nwife, and if he wish to give her her right when she asks for it, his\nwill is excused from being evil: because this error arises from\nignorance of a circumstance, which ignorance excuses, and causes the\nact to be involuntary.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), \"good results from\nthe entire cause, evil from each particular defect.\" Consequently in\norder that the thing to which the will tends be called evil, it\nsuffices, either that it be evil in itself, or that it be apprehended\nas evil. But in order for it to be good, it must be good in both ways.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The eternal law cannot err, but human reason can.\nConsequently the will that abides by human reason, is not always\nright, nor is it always in accord with the eternal law.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as in syllogistic arguments, granted one\nabsurdity, others must needs follow; so in moral matters, given one\nabsurdity, others must follow too. Thus suppose a man to seek\nvainglory, he will sin, whether he does his duty for vainglory or\nwhether he omit to do it. Nor is he in a dilemma about the matter:\nbecause he can put aside his evil intention. In like manner, suppose\na man's reason or conscience to err through inexcusable ignorance,\nthen evil must needs result in the will. Nor is this man in a\ndilemma: because he can lay aside his error, since his ignorance is\nvincible and voluntary.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Goodness of the Will, As Regards the Means, Depends on\nthe Intention of the End?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not\ndepend on the intention of the end. For it has been stated above (A.\n2) that the goodness of the will depends on the object alone. But as\nregards the means, the object of the will is one thing, and the end\nintended is another. Therefore in such matters the goodness of the\nwill does not depend on the intention of the end.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to wish to keep God's commandment, belongs to a good\nwill. But this can be referred to an evil end, for instance, to\nvainglory or covetousness, by willing to obey God for the sake of\ntemporal gain. Therefore the goodness of the will does not depend on\nthe intention of the end.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as good and evil diversify the will, so do they\ndiversify the end. But malice of the will does not depend on the\nmalice of the end intended; since a man who wills to steal in order\nto give alms, has an evil will, although he intends a good end.\nTherefore neither does the goodness of the will depend on the\ngoodness of the end intended.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ix, 3) that God rewards\nthe intention. But God rewards a thing because it is good. Therefore\nthe goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end.\n\n_I answer that,_ The intention may stand in a twofold relation to the\nact of the will; first, as preceding it, secondly as following\n[*Leonine edn.: 'accompanying'] it. The intention precedes the act of\nthe will causally, when we will something because we intend a certain\nend. And then the order to the end is considered as the reason of the\ngoodness of the thing willed: for instance, when a man wills to fast\nfor God's sake; because the act of fasting is specifically good from\nthe very fact that it is done for God's sake. Wherefore, since the\ngoodness of the will depends on the goodness of the thing willed, as\nstated above (AA. 1, 2), it must, of necessity, depend on the\nintention of the end.\n\nOn the other hand, intention follows the act of the will, when it is\nadded to a preceding act of the will; for instance, a man may will to\ndo something, and may afterwards refer it to God. And then the\ngoodness of the previous act of the will does not depend on the\nsubsequent intention, except in so far as that act is repeated with\nthe subsequent intention.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When the intention is the cause of the act of willing,\nthe order to the end is considered as the reason of the goodness of\nthe object, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The act of the will cannot be said to be good, if an\nevil intention is the cause of willing. For when a man wills to give\nan alms for the sake of vainglory, he wills that which is good in\nitself, under a species of evil; and therefore, as willed by him, it\nis evil. Wherefore his will is evil. If, however, the intention is\nsubsequent to the act of the will, then the latter may be good: and\nthe intention does not spoil that act of the will which preceded, but\nthat which is repeated.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As we have already stated (A. 6, ad 1), \"evil results\nfrom each particular defect, but good from the whole and entire\ncause.\" Hence, whether the will tend to what is evil in itself, even\nunder the species of good; or to the good under the species of evil,\nit will be evil in either case. But in order for the will to be good,\nit must tend to the good under the species of good; in other words,\nit must will the good for the sake of the good.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Degree of Goodness or Malice in the Will Depends on the\nDegree of Good or Evil in the Intention?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the degree of goodness in the will\ndepends on the degree of good in the intention. Because on Matt.\n12:35, \"A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth\nforth that which is good,\" a gloss says: \"A man does as much good as\nhe intends.\" But the intention gives goodness not only to the\nexternal action, but also to the act of the will, as stated above (A.\n7). Therefore the goodness of a man's will is according to the\ngoodness of his intention.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if you add to the cause, you add to the effect. But\nthe goodness of the intention is the cause of the good will.\nTherefore a man's will is good, according as his intention is good.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in evil actions, a man sins in proportion to his\nintention: for if a man were to throw a stone with a murderous\nintention, he would be guilty of murder. Therefore, for the same\nreason, in good actions, the will is good in proportion to the good\nintended.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The intention can be good, while the will is evil.\nTherefore, for the same reason, the intention can be better, and the\nwill less good.\n\n_I answer that,_ In regard to both the act, and the intention of the\nend, we may consider a twofold quantity: one, on the part of the\nobject, by reason of a man willing or doing a good that is greater;\nthe other, taken from the intensity of the act, according as a man\nwills or acts intensely; and this is more on the part of the agent.\n\nIf then we speak of these respective quantities from the point of\nview of the object, it is evident that the quantity in the act does\nnot depend on the quantity in the intention. With regard to the\nexternal act this may happen in two ways. First, through the object\nthat is ordained to the intended end not being proportionate to that\nend; for instance, if a man were to give ten pounds, he could not\nrealize his intention, if he intended to buy a thing worth a hundred\npounds. Secondly, on account of the obstacles that may supervene in\nregard to the exterior action, which obstacles we are unable to\nremove: for instance, a man intends to go to Rome, and encounters\nobstacles, which prevent him from going. On the other hand, with\nregard to the interior act of the will, this happens in only one way:\nbecause the interior acts of the will are in our power, whereas the\nexternal actions are not. But the will can will an object that is not\nproportionate to the intended end: and thus the will that tends to\nthat object considered absolutely, is not so good as the intention.\nYet because the intention also belongs, in a way, to the act of the\nwill, inasmuch, to wit, as it is the reason thereof; it comes to pass\nthat the quantity of goodness in the intention redounds upon the act\nof the will; that is to say, in so far as the will wills some great\ngood for an end, although that by which it wills to gain so great a\ngood, is not proportionate to that good.\n\nBut if we consider the quantity in the intention and in the act,\naccording to their respective intensity, then the intensity of the\nintention redounds upon the interior act and the exterior act of the\nwill: since the intention stands in relation to them as a kind of\nform, as is clear from what has been said above (Q. 12, A. 4; Q. 18,\nA. 6). And yet considered materially, while the intention is intense,\nthe interior or exterior act may be not so intense, materially\nspeaking: for instance, when a man does not will with as much\nintensity to take medicine as he wills to regain health. Nevertheless\nthe very fact of intending health intensely, redounds, as a formal\nprinciple, upon the intense volition of medicine.\n\nWe must observe, however, that the intensity of the interior or\nexterior act, may be referred to the intention as its object: as when\na man intends to will intensely, or to do something intensely. And\nyet it does not follow that he wills or acts intensely; because the\nquantity of goodness in the interior or exterior act does not depend\non the quantity of the good intended, as is shown above. And hence it\nis that a man does not merit as much as he intends to merit: because\nthe quantity of merit is measured by the intensity of the act, as we\nshall show later on (Q. 20, A. 4; Q. 114, A. 4).\n\nReply Obj. 1: This gloss speaks of good as in the estimation of God,\nWho considers principally the intention of the end. Wherefore another\ngloss says on the same passage that \"the treasure of the heart is the\nintention, according to which God judges our works.\" For the goodness\nof the intention, as stated above, redounds, so to speak, upon the\ngoodness of the will, which makes even the external act to be\nmeritorious in God's sight.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The goodness of the intention is not the whole cause of\na good will. Hence the argument does not prove.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The mere malice of the intention suffices to make the\nwill evil: and therefore too, the will is as evil as the intention is\nevil. But the same reasoning does not apply to goodness, as stated\nabove (ad 2).\n________________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 9]\n\nWhether the Goodness of the Will Depends on Its Conformity to the\nDivine Will?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the human will does\nnot depend on its conformity to the Divine will. Because it is\nimpossible for man's will to be conformed to the Divine will; as\nappears from the word of Isa. 55:9: \"As the heavens are exalted above\nthe earth, so are My ways exalted above your ways, and My thoughts\nabove your thoughts.\" If therefore goodness of the will depended on\nits conformity to the Divine will, it would follow that it is\nimpossible for man's will to be good. Which is inadmissible.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as our wills arise from the Divine will, so\ndoes our knowledge flow from the Divine knowledge. But our knowledge\ndoes not require to be conformed to God's knowledge; since God knows\nmany things that we know not. Therefore there is no need for our will\nto be conformed to the Divine will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the will is a principle of action. But our action\ncannot be conformed to God's. Therefore neither can our will be\nconformed to His.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 26:39): \"Not as I will, but\nas Thou wilt\": which words He said, because \"He wishes man to be\nupright and to tend to God,\" as Augustine expounds in the Enchiridion\n[*Enarr. in Ps. 32, serm. i.]. But the rectitude of the will is its\ngoodness. Therefore the goodness of the will depends on its\nconformity to the Divine will.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 7), the goodness of the will\ndepends on the intention of the end. Now the last end of the human\nwill is the Sovereign Good, namely, God, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 8;\nQ. 3, A. 1). Therefore the goodness of the human will requires it to\nbe ordained to the Sovereign Good, that is, to God.\n\nNow this Good is primarily and essentially compared to the Divine\nwill, as its proper object. Again, that which is first in any genus\nis the measure and rule of all that belongs to that genus. Moreover,\neverything attains to rectitude and goodness, in so far as it is in\naccord with its proper measure. Therefore, in order that man's will\nbe good it needs to be conformed to the Divine will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The human will cannot be conformed to the will of God\nso as to equal it, but only so as to imitate it. In like manner human\nknowledge is conformed to the Divine knowledge, in so far as it knows\ntruth: and human action is conformed to the Divine, in so far as it\nis becoming to the agent: and this by way of imitation, not by way of\nequality.\n\nFrom the above may be gathered the replies to the Second and Third\nObjections.\n________________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 19, Art. 10]\n\nWhether It Is Necessary for the Human Will, in Order to Be Good, to\nBe Conformed to the Divine Will, As Regards the Thing Willed?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the human will need not always be\nconformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed. For we\ncannot will what we know not: since the apprehended good is the object\nof the will. But in many things we know not what God wills. Therefore\nthe human will cannot be conformed to the Divine will as to the thing\nwilled.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God wills to damn the man whom He foresees about\nto die in mortal sin. If therefore man were bound to conform his will\nto the Divine will, in the point of the thing willed, it would follow\nthat a man is bound to will his own damnation. Which is inadmissible.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no one is bound to will what is against filial\npiety. But if man were to will what God wills, this would sometimes\nbe contrary to filial piety: for instance, when God wills the death\nof a father: if his son were to will it also, it would be against\nfilial piety. Therefore man is not bound to conform his will to the\nDivine will, as to the thing willed.\n\n_On the contrary,_ (1) On Ps. 32:1, \"Praise becometh the upright,\" a\ngloss says: \"That man has an upright heart, who wills what God wills.\"\nBut everyone is bound to have an upright heart. Therefore everyone is\nbound to will what God wills.\n\n(2) Moreover, the will takes its form from the object, as does every\nact. If therefore man is bound to conform his will to the Divine will,\nit follows that he is bound to conform it, as to the thing willed.\n\n(3) Moreover, opposition of wills arises from men willing different\nthings. But whoever has a will in opposition to the Divine will, has\nan evil will. Therefore whoever does not conform his will to the\nDivine will, as to the thing willed, has an evil will.\n\n_I answer that,_ As is evident from what has been said above (AA. 3,\n5), the will tends to its object, according as it is proposed by the\nreason. Now a thing may be considered in various ways by the reason,\nso as to appear good from one point of view, and not good from\nanother point of view. And therefore if a man's will wills a thing to\nbe, according as it appears to be good, his will is good: and the\nwill of another man, who wills that thing not to be, according as it\nappears evil, is also good. Thus a judge has a good will, in willing\na thief to be put to death, because this is just: while the will of\nanother--e.g. the thief's wife or son, who wishes him not to be put\nto death, inasmuch as killing is a natural evil, is also good.\n\nNow since the will follows the apprehension of the reason or\nintellect; the more universal the aspect of the apprehended good, the\nmore universal the good to which the will tends. This is evident in\nthe example given above: because the judge has care of the common\ngood, which is justice, and therefore he wishes the thief's death,\nwhich has the aspect of good in relation to the common estate;\nwhereas the thief's wife has to consider the private good of the\nfamily, and from this point of view she wishes her husband, the\nthief, not to be put to death. Now the good of the whole universe is\nthat which is apprehended by God, Who is the Maker and Governor of\nall things: hence whatever He wills, He wills it under the aspect of\nthe common good; this is His own Goodness, which is the good of the\nwhole universe. On the other hand, the apprehension of a creature,\naccording to its nature, is of some particular good, proportionate to\nthat nature. Now a thing may happen to be good under a particular\naspect, and yet not good under a universal aspect, or vice versa, as\nstated above. And therefore it comes to pass that a certain will is\ngood from willing something considered under a particular aspect,\nwhich thing God wills not, under a universal aspect, and vice versa.\nAnd hence too it is, that various wills of various men can be good in\nrespect of opposite things, for as much as, under various aspects,\nthey wish a particular thing to be or not to be.\n\nBut a man's will is not right in willing a particular good, unless he\nrefer it to the common good as an end: since even the natural appetite\nof each part is ordained to the common good of the whole. Now it is\nthe end that supplies the formal reason, as it were, of willing\nwhatever is directed to the end. Consequently, in order that a man\nwill some particular good with a right will, he must will that\nparticular good materially, and the Divine and universal good,\nformally. Therefore the human will is bound to be conformed to the\nDivine will, as to that which is willed formally, for it is bound to\nwill the Divine and universal good; but not as to that which is willed\nmaterially, for the reason given above.\n\nAt the same time in both these respects, the human will is conformed\nto the Divine, in a certain degree. Because inasmuch as it is\nconformed to the Divine will in the common aspect of the thing willed,\nit is conformed thereto in the point of the last end. While, inasmuch\nas it is not conformed to the Divine will in the thing willed\nmaterially, it is conformed to that will considered as efficient\ncause; since the proper inclination consequent to nature, or to the\nparticular apprehension of some particular thing, comes to a thing\nfrom God as its efficient cause. Hence it is customary to say that a\nman's will, in this respect, is conformed to the Divine will, because\nit wills what God wishes him to will.\n\nThere is yet another kind of conformity in respect of the formal\ncause, consisting in man's willing something from charity, as God\nwills it. And this conformity is also reduced to the formal\nconformity, that is in respect of the last end, which is the proper\nobject of charity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We can know in a general way what God wills. For we\nknow that whatever God wills, He wills it under the aspect of good.\nConsequently whoever wills a thing under any aspect of good, has a\nwill conformed to the Divine will, as to the reason of the thing\nwilled. But we know not what God wills in particular: and in this\nrespect we are not bound to conform our will to the Divine will.\n\nBut in the state of glory, every one will see in each thing that he\nwills, the relation of that thing to what God wills in that\nparticular matter. Consequently he will conform his will to God in\nall things not only formally, but also materially.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God does not will the damnation of a man, considered\nprecisely as damnation, nor a man's death, considered precisely as\ndeath, because, \"He wills all men to be saved\" (1 Tim. 2:4); but He\nwills such things under the aspect of justice. Wherefore in regard to\nsuch things it suffices for man to will the upholding of God's\njustice and of the natural order.\n\nWherefore the reply to the Third Objection is evident.\n\nTo the first argument advanced in a contrary sense, it should be said\nthat a man who conforms his will to God's, in the aspect of reason of\nthe thing willed, wills what God wills, more than the man, who\nconforms his will to God's, in the point of the very thing willed;\nbecause the will tends more to the end, than to that which is on\naccount of the end.\n\nTo the second, it must be replied that the species and form of an act\nare taken from the object considered formally, rather than from the\nobject considered materially.\n\nTo the third, it must be said that there is no opposition of wills\nwhen several people desire different things, but not under the same\naspect: but there is opposition of wills, when under one and the same\naspect, one man wills a thing which another wills not. But there is\nno question of this here.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 20\n\nOF GOODNESS AND MALICE IN EXTERNAL HUMAN ACTIONS\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must next consider goodness and malice as to external actions:\nunder which head there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether goodness and malice is first in the act of the will, or\nin the external action?\n\n(2) Whether the whole goodness or malice of the external action\ndepends on the goodness of the will?\n\n(3) Whether the goodness and malice of the interior act are the same\nas those of the external action?\n\n(4) Whether the external action adds any goodness or malice to that\nof the interior act?\n\n(5) Whether the consequences of an external action increase its\ngoodness or malice?\n\n(6) Whether one and the same external action can be both good and\nevil?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Goodness or Malice Is First in the Action of the Will, or in\nthe External Action?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that good and evil are in the external\naction prior to being in the act of the will. For the will derives\ngoodness from its object, as stated above (Q. 19, AA. 1, 2). But the\nexternal action is the object of the interior act of the will: for a\nman is said to will to commit a theft, or to will to give an alms.\nTherefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in\nthe act of the will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the aspect of good belongs first to the end: since\nwhat is directed to the end receives the aspect of good from its\nrelation to the end. Now whereas the act of the will cannot be an\nend, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1, ad 2), the act of another power can\nbe an end. Therefore good is in the act of some other power prior to\nbeing in the act of the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the act of the will stands in a formal relation to\nthe external action, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 6). But that which is\nformal is subsequent; since form is something added to matter.\nTherefore good and evil are in the external action, prior to being in\nthe act of the will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that \"it is by the\nwill that we sin, and that we behave aright.\" Therefore moral good\nand evil are first in the will.\n\n_I answer that,_ External actions may be said to be good or bad in\ntwo ways. First, in regard to their genus, and the circumstances\nconnected with them: thus the giving of alms, if the required\nconditions be observed, is said to be good. Secondly, a thing is said\nto be good or evil, from its relation to the end: thus the giving of\nalms for vainglory is said to be evil. Now, since the end is the\nwill's proper object, it is evident that this aspect of good or evil,\nwhich the external action derives from its relation to the end, is to\nbe found first of all in the act of the will, whence it passes to the\nexternal action. On the other hand, the goodness or malice which the\nexternal action has of itself, on account of its being about due\nmatter and its being attended by due circumstances, is not derived\nfrom the will, but rather from the reason. Consequently, if we\nconsider the goodness of the external action, in so far as it comes\nfrom reason's ordination and apprehension, it is prior to the\ngoodness of the act of the will: but if we consider it in so far as\nit is in the execution of the action done, it is subsequent to the\ngoodness of the will, which is its principle.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The exterior action is the object of the will, inasmuch\nas it is proposed to the will by the reason, as good apprehended and\nordained by the reason: and thus it is prior to the good in the act\nof the will. But inasmuch as it is found in the execution of the\naction, it is an effect of the will, and is subsequent to the will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The end precedes in the order of intention, but follows\nin the order of execution.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A form as received into matter, is subsequent to matter\nin the order of generation, although it precedes it in the order of\nnature: but inasmuch as it is in the active cause, it precedes in\nevery way. Now the will is compared to the exterior action, as its\nefficient cause. Wherefore the goodness of the act of the will, as\nexisting in the active cause, is the form of the exterior action.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Whole Goodness and Malice of the External Action Depends\non the Goodness of the Will?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the whole goodness and malice of the\nexternal action depend on the goodness of the will. For it is written\n(Matt. 7:18): \"A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can\nan evil tree bring forth good fruit.\" But, according to the gloss,\nthe tree signifies the will, and fruit signifies works. Therefore, it\nis impossible for the interior act of the will to be good, and the\nexternal action evil, or vice versa.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that there is no sin\nwithout the will. If therefore there is no sin in the will, there\nwill be none in the external action. And so the whole goodness or\nmalice of the external action depends on the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the good and evil of which we are speaking now are\ndifferences of the moral act. Now differences make an essential\ndivision in a genus, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. vii, 12).\nSince therefore an act is moral from being voluntary, it seems that\ngoodness and malice in an act are derived from the will alone.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Mendac. vii), that \"there\nare some actions which neither a good end nor a good will can make\ngood.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), we may consider a twofold\ngoodness or malice in the external action: one in respect of due\nmatter and circumstances; the other in respect of the order to the\nend. And that which is in respect of the order to the end, depends\nentirely on the will: while that which is in respect of due matter or\ncircumstances, depends on the reason: and on this goodness depends\nthe goodness of the will, in so far as the will tends towards it.\n\nNow it must be observed, as was noted above (Q. 19, A. 6, ad 1), that\nfor a thing to be evil, one single defect suffices, whereas, for it\nto be good simply, it is not enough for it to be good in one point\nonly, it must be good in every respect. If therefore the will be\ngood, both from its proper object and from its end, if follows that\nthe external action is good. But if the will be good from its\nintention of the end, this is not enough to make the external action\ngood: and if the will be evil either by reason of its intention of\nthe end, or by reason of the act willed, it follows that the external\naction is evil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: If the good tree be taken to signify the good will, it\nmust be in so far as the will derives goodness from the act willed\nand from the end intended.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil\nend; but also when he wills an evil act.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Voluntariness applies not only to the interior act of\nthe will, but also to external actions, inasmuch as they proceed from\nthe will and the reason. Consequently the difference of good and evil\nis applicable to both the interior and external act.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Goodness and Malice of the External Action Are the Same\nAs Those of the Interior Act?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the goodness and malice of the\ninterior act of the will are not the same as those of the external\naction. For the principle of the interior act is the interior\napprehensive or appetitive power of the soul; whereas the principle\nof the external action is the power that accomplishes the movement.\nNow where the principles of action are different, the actions\nthemselves are different. Moreover, it is the action which is the\nsubject of goodness or malice: and the same accident cannot be in\ndifferent subjects. Therefore the goodness of the interior act cannot\nbe the same as that of the external action.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"A virtue makes that, which has it, good, and\nrenders its action good also\" (Ethic. ii, 6). But the intellective\nvirtue in the commanding power is distinct from the moral virtue in\nthe power commanded, as is declared in _Ethic._ i, 13. Therefore the\ngoodness of the interior act, which belongs to the commanding power,\nis distinct from the goodness of the external action, which belongs\nto the power commanded.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the same thing cannot be cause and effect; since\nnothing is its own cause. But the goodness of the interior act is the\ncause of the goodness of the external action, or vice versa, as\nstated above (AA. 1, 2). Therefore it is not the same goodness in\neach.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It was shown above (Q. 18, A. 6) that the act of\nthe will is the form, as it were, of the external action. Now that\nwhich results from the material and formal element is one thing.\nTherefore there is but one goodness of the internal and external act.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 17, A. 4), the interior act of\nthe will, and the external action, considered morally, are one act.\nNow it happens sometimes that one and the same individual act has\nseveral aspects of goodness or malice, and sometimes that it has but\none. Hence we must say that sometimes the goodness or malice of the\ninterior act is the same as that of the external action, and\nsometimes not. For as we have already said (AA. 1, 2), these two\ngoodnesses or malices, of the internal and external acts, are\nordained to one another. Now it may happen, in things that are\nsubordinate to something else, that a thing is good merely from being\nsubordinate; thus a bitter draught is good merely because it procures\nhealth. Wherefore there are not two goodnesses, one the goodness of\nhealth, and the other the goodness of the draught; but one and the\nsame. On the other hand it happens sometimes that that which is\nsubordinate to something else, has some aspect of goodness in itself,\nbesides the fact of its being subordinate to some other good: thus a\npalatable medicine can be considered in the light of a pleasurable\ngood, besides being conducive to health.\n\nWe must therefore say that when the external action derives goodness\nor malice from its relation to the end only, then there is but one\nand the same goodness of the act of the will which of itself regards\nthe end, and of the external action, which regards the end through\nthe medium of the act of the will. But when the external action has\ngoodness or malice of itself, i.e. in regard to its matter and\ncircumstances, then the goodness of the external action is distinct\nfrom the goodness of the will in regarding the end; yet so that the\ngoodness of the end passes into the external action, and the goodness\nof the matter and circumstances passes into the act of the will, as\nstated above (AA. 1, 2).\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument proves that the internal and external\nactions are different in the physical order: yet distinct as they are\nin that respect, they combine to form one thing in the moral order,\nas stated above (Q. 17, A. 4).\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated in _Ethic._ vi, 12, a moral virtue is\nordained to the act of that virtue, which act is the end, as it were,\nof that virtue; whereas prudence, which is in the reason, is ordained\nto things directed to the end. For this reason various virtues are\nnecessary. But right reason in regard to the very end of a virtue has\nno other goodness than the goodness of that virtue, in so far as the\ngoodness of the reason is participated in each virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When a thing is derived by one thing from another, as\nfrom a univocal efficient cause, then it is not the same in both:\nthus when a hot thing heats, the heat of the heater is distinct from\nthe heat of the thing heated, although it be the same specifically.\nBut when a thing is derived from one thing from another, according to\nanalogy or proportion, then it is one and the same in both: thus the\nhealthiness which is in medicine or urine is derived from the\nhealthiness of the animal's body; nor is health as applied to urine\nand medicine, distinct from health as applied to the body of an\nanimal, of which health medicine is the cause, and urine the sign. It\nis in this way that the goodness of the external action is derived\nfrom the goodness of the will, and vice versa; viz. according to the\norder of one to the other.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the External Action Adds Any Goodness or Malice to That of\nthe Interior Act?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the external action does not add any\ngoodness or malice to that of the interior action. For Chrysostom\nsays (Hom. xix in Matt.): \"It is the will that is rewarded for doing\ngood, or punished for doing evil.\" Now works are the witnesses of the\nwill. Therefore God seeks for works not on His own account, in order\nto know how to judge; but for the sake of others, that all may\nunderstand how just He is. But good or evil is to be estimated\naccording to God's judgment rather than according to the judgment of\nman. Therefore the external action adds no goodness or malice to that\nof the interior act.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the goodness and malice of the interior and external\nacts are one and the same, as stated above (A. 3). But increase is\nthe addition of one thing to another. Therefore the external action\ndoes not add to the goodness or malice of the interior act.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the entire goodness of created things does not add\nto the Divine Goodness, because it is entirely derived therefrom. But\nsometimes the entire goodness of the external action is derived from\nthe goodness of the interior act, and sometimes conversely, as stated\nabove (AA. 1, 2). Therefore neither of them adds to the goodness or\nmalice of the other.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Every agent intends to attain good and avoid evil.\nIf therefore by the external action no further goodness or malice be\nadded, it is to no purpose that he who has a good or an evil will,\ndoes a good deed or refrains from an evil deed. Which is unreasonable.\n\n_I answer that,_ If we speak of the goodness which the external\naction derives from the will tending to the end, then the external\naction adds nothing to this goodness, unless it happens that the will\nin itself is made better in good things, or worse in evil things.\nThis, seemingly, may happen in three ways. First in point of number;\nif, for instance, a man wishes to do something with a good or an evil\nend in view, and does not do it then, but afterwards wills and does\nit, the act of his will is doubled and a double good, or a double\nevil is the result. Secondly, in point of extension: when, for\ninstance, a man wishes to do something for a good or an evil end, and\nis hindered by some obstacle, whereas another man perseveres in the\nmovement of the will until he accomplish it in deed; it is evident\nthat the will of the latter is more lasting in good or evil, and in\nthis respect, is better or worse. Thirdly, in point of intensity: for\nthere are certain external actions, which, in so far as they are\npleasurable, or painful, are such as naturally to make the will more\nintense or more remiss; and it is evident that the more intensely the\nwill tends to good or evil, the better or worse it is.\n\nOn the other hand, if we speak of the goodness which the external\naction derives from its matter and due circumstances, thus it stands\nin relation to the will as its term and end. And in this way it adds\nto the goodness or malice of the will; because every inclination or\nmovement is perfected by attaining its end or reaching its term.\nWherefore the will is not perfect, unless it be such that, given the\nopportunity, it realizes the operation. But if this prove impossible,\nas long as the will is perfect, so as to realize the operation if it\ncould; the lack of perfection derived from the external action, is\nsimply involuntary. Now just as the involuntary deserves neither\npunishment nor reward in the accomplishment of good or evil deeds, so\nneither does it lessen reward or punishment, if a man through simple\ninvoluntariness fail to do good or evil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Chrysostom is speaking of the case where a man's will\nis complete, and does not refrain from the deed save through the\nimpossibility of achievement.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument applies to that goodness which the\nexternal action derives from the will as tending to the end. But\nthe goodness which the external action takes from its matter and\ncircumstances, is distinct from that which it derives from the end;\nbut it is not distinct from that which it has from the very act\nwilled, to which it stands in the relation of measure and cause,\nas stated above (AA. 1, 2).\n\nFrom this the reply to the Third Objection is evident.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Consequences of the External Action Increase Its Goodness\nor Malice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the consequences of the external\naction increase its goodness or malice. For the effect pre-exists\nvirtually in its cause. But the consequences result from the action\nas an effect from its cause. Therefore they pre-exist virtually in\nactions. Now a thing is judged to be good or bad according to its\nvirtue, since a virtue \"makes that which has it to be good\" (Ethic.\nii, 6). Therefore the consequences increase the goodness or malice of\nan action.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the good actions of his hearers are consequences\nresulting from the words of a preacher. But such goods as these\nredound to the merit of the preacher, as is evident from Phil. 4:1:\n\"My dearly beloved brethren, my joy and my crown.\" Therefore the\nconsequences of an action increase its goodness or malice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, punishment is not increased, unless the fault\nincreases: wherefore it is written (Deut. 25:2): \"According to the\nmeasure of the sin shall the measure also of the stripes be.\" But the\npunishment is increased on account of the consequences; for it is\nwritten (Ex. 21:29): \"But if the ox was wont to push with his horn\nyesterday and the day before, and they warned his master, and he did\nnot shut him up, and he shall kill a man or a woman, then the ox\nshall be stoned, and his owner also shall be put to death.\" But he\nwould not have been put to death, if the ox, although he had not been\nshut up, had not killed a man. Therefore the consequences increase\nthe goodness or malice of an action.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if a man do something which may cause death, by\nstriking, or by sentencing, and if death does not ensue, he does not\ncontract irregularity: but he would if death were to ensue. Therefore\nthe consequence of an action increase its goodness or malice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The consequences do not make an action that was\nevil, to be good; nor one that was good, to be evil. For instance, if\na man give an alms to a poor man who makes bad use of the alms by\ncommitting a sin, this does not undo the good done by the giver; and,\nin like manner, if a man bear patiently a wrong done to him, the\nwrongdoer is not thereby excused. Therefore the consequences of an\naction doe not increase its goodness or malice.\n\n_I answer that,_ The consequences of an action are either foreseen or\nnot. If they are foreseen, it is evident that they increase the\ngoodness or malice. For when a man foresees that many evils may\nfollow from his action, and yet does not therefore desist therefrom,\nthis shows his will to be all the more inordinate.\n\nBut if the consequences are not foreseen, we must make a distinction.\nBecause if they follow from the nature of the action and in the\nmajority of cases, in this respect, the consequences increase the\ngoodness or malice of that action: for it is evident that an action\nis specifically better, if better results can follow from it; and\nspecifically worse, if it is of a nature to produce worse results. On\nthe other hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom,\nthen they do not increase the goodness or malice of the action:\nbecause we do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to\nit by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of\nitself.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The virtue of a cause is measured by the effect that\nflows from the nature of the cause, not by that which results by\naccident.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The good actions done by the hearers, result from the\npreacher's words, as an effect that flows from their very nature.\nHence they redound to the merit of the preacher: especially when such\nis his intention.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The consequences for which that man is ordered to be\npunished, both follow from the nature of the cause, and are supposed\nto be foreseen. For this reason they are reckoned as punishable.\n\nReply Obj. 4: This argument would prove if irregularity were the\nresult of the fault. But it is not the result of the fault, but of\nthe fact, and of the obstacle to the reception of a sacrament.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 20, Art. 6]\n\nWhether One and the Same External Action Can Be Both Good and Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one and the same external action can\nbe both good and evil. For \"movement, if continuous, is one and the\nsame\" (Phys. v, 4). But one continuous movement can be both good and\nbad: for instance, a man may go to church continuously, intending at\nfirst vainglory, and afterwards the service of God. Therefore one and\nthe same action can be both good and bad.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to the Philosopher (Phys. iii, 3), action\nand passion are one act. But the passion may be good, as Christ's\nwas; and the action evil, as that of the Jews. Therefore one and the\nsame act can be both good and evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, since a servant is an instrument, as it were, of his\nmaster, the servant's action is his master's, just as the action of a\ntool is the workman's action. But it may happen that the servant's\naction result from his master's good will, and is therefore good: and\nfrom the evil will of the servant, and is therefore evil. Therefore\nthe same action can be both good and evil.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The same thing cannot be the subject of\ncontraries. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same\naction cannot be both good and evil.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The same thing cannot be the subject of\ncontraries. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same\naction cannot be both good and evil.\n\n_I answer that,_ Nothing hinders a thing from being one, in so far as\nit is in one genus, and manifold, in so far as it is referred to\nanother genus. Thus a continuous surface is one, considered as in the\ngenus of quantity; and yet it is manifold, considered as to the genus\nof color, if it be partly white, and partly black. And accordingly,\nnothing hinders an action from being one, considered in the natural\norder; whereas it is not one, considered in the moral order; and vice\nversa, as we have stated above (A. 3, ad 1; Q. 18, A. 7, ad 1). For\ncontinuous walking is one action, considered in the natural order:\nbut it may resolve itself into many actions, considered in the moral\norder, if a change take place in the walker's will, for the will is\nthe principle of moral actions. If therefore we consider one action\nin the moral order, it is impossible for it to be morally both good\nand evil. Whereas if it be one as to natural and not moral unity, it\ncan be both good and evil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This continual movement which proceeds from various\nintentions, although it is one in the natural order, is not one in\nthe point of moral unity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Action and passion belong to the moral order, in so far\nas they are voluntary. And therefore in so far as they are voluntary\nin respect of wills that differ, they are two distinct things, and\ngood can be in one of them while evil is in the other.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The action of the servant, in so far as it proceeds\nfrom the will of the servant, is not the master's action: but only in\nso far as it proceeds from the master's command. Wherefore the evil\nwill of the servant does not make the action evil in this respect.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 21\n\nOF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTIONS BY REASON OF THEIR GOODNESS\nAND MALICE (In Four Articles)\n\nWe have now to consider the consequences of human actions by reason\nof their goodness and malice: and under this head there are four\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether a human action is right or sinful by reason of its being\ngood or evil?\n\n(2) Whether it thereby deserves praise or blame?\n\n(3) Whether accordingly, it is meritorious or demeritorious?\n\n(4) Whether it is accordingly meritorious or demeritorious before God?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 21, Art. 1]\n\nWhether a Human Action Is Right or Sinful, in So Far As It Is Good or\nEvil?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that a human action is not right or sinful, in\nso far as it is good or evil. For \"monsters are the sins of nature\"\n(Phys. ii, 8). But monsters are not actions, but things engendered\noutside the order of nature. Now things that are produced according\nto art and reason imitate those that are produced according to nature\n(Phys. ii, 8). Therefore an action is not sinful by reason of its\nbeing inordinate and evil.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sin, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 8 occurs in nature and\nart, when the end intended by nature or art is not attained. But the\ngoodness or malice of a human action depends, before all, on the\nintention of the end, and on its achievement. Therefore it seems that\nthe malice of an action does not make it sinful.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the malice of an action makes it sinful, it\nfollows that wherever there is evil, there is sin. But this is false:\nsince punishment is not a sin, although it is an evil. Therefore an\naction is not sinful by reason of its being evil.\n\n_On the contrary,_ As shown above (Q. 19, A. 4), the goodness of a\nhuman action depends principally on the Eternal Law: and consequently\nits malice consists in its being in disaccord with the Eternal Law.\nBut this is the very nature of sin; for Augustine says (Contra Faust.\nxxii, 27) that \"sin is a word, deed, or desire, in opposition to the\nEternal Law.\" Therefore a human action is sinful by reason of its\nbeing evil.\n\n_I answer that,_ Evil is more comprehensive than sin, as also is good\nthan right. For every privation of good, in whatever subject, is an\nevil: whereas sin consists properly in an action done for a certain\nend, and lacking due order to that end. Now the due order to an end\nis measured by some rule. In things that act according to nature,\nthis rule is the natural force that inclines them to that end. When\ntherefore an action proceeds from a natural force, in accord with the\nnatural inclination to an end, then the action is said to be right:\nsince the mean does not exceed its limits, viz. the action does not\nswerve from the order of its active principle to the end. But when an\naction strays from this rectitude, it comes under the notion of sin.\n\nNow in those things that are done by the will, the proximate rule is\nthe human reason, while the supreme rule is the Eternal Law. When,\ntherefore, a human action tends to the end, according to the order of\nreason and of the Eternal Law, then that action is right: but when it\nturns aside from that rectitude, then it is said to be a sin. Now it\nis evident from what has been said (Q. 19, AA. 3, 4) that every\nvoluntary action that turns aside from the order of reason and of the\nEternal Law, is evil, and that every good action is in accord with\nreason and the Eternal Law. Hence it follows that a human action is\nright or sinful by reason of its being good or evil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Monsters are called sins, inasmuch as they result from\na sin in nature's action.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The end is twofold; the last end, and the proximate\nend. In the sin of nature, the action does indeed fail in respect of\nthe last end, which is the perfection of the thing generated; but it\ndoes not fail in respect of any proximate end whatever; since when\nnature works it forms something. In like manner, the sin of the will\nalways fails as regards the last end intended, because no voluntary\nevil action can be ordained to happiness, which is the last end: and\nyet it does not fail in respect of some proximate end: intended and\nachieved by the will. Wherefore also, since the very intention of\nthis end is ordained to the last end, this same intention may be\nright or sinful.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Each thing is ordained to its end by its action: and\ntherefore sin, which consists in straying from the order to the end,\nconsists properly in an action. On the other hand, punishment regards\nthe person of the sinner, as was stated in the First Part (Q. 48, A.\n5, ad 4; A. 6, ad 3).\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 21, Art. 2]\n\nWhether a Human Action Deserves Praise or Blame, by Reason of Its\nBeing Good or Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a human action does not deserve praise\nor blame by reason of its being good or evil. For \"sin happens even in\nthings done by nature\" (Phys. ii, 8). And yet natural things are not\ndeserving of praise or blame (Ethic. iii, 5). Therefore a human action\ndoes not deserve blame, by reason of its being evil or sinful; and,\nconsequently, neither does it deserve praise, by reason of its being\ngood.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as sin occurs in moral actions, so does it\nhappen in the productions of art: because as stated in _Phys._ ii, 8\n\"it is a sin in a grammarian to write badly, and in a doctor to give\nthe wrong medicine.\" But the artist is not blamed for making\nsomething bad: because the artist's work is such, that he can produce\na good or a bad thing, just as he lists. Therefore it seems that\nneither is there any reason for blaming a moral action, in the fact\nthat it is evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that evil is \"weak and\nincapable.\" But weakness or inability either takes away or diminishes\nguilt. Therefore a human action does not incur guilt from being evil.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Virt. et Vit. i) that\n\"virtuous deeds deserve praise, while deeds that are opposed to\nvirtue deserve censure and blame.\" But good actions are virtuous;\nbecause \"virtue makes that which has it, good, and makes its action\ngood\" (Ethic. ii, 6): wherefore actions opposed to virtue are evil.\nTherefore a human action deserves praise or blame, through being good\nor evil.\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as evil is more comprehensive than sin, so is\nsin more comprehensive than blame. For an action is said to deserve\npraise or blame, from its being imputed to the agent: since to praise\nor to blame means nothing else than to impute to someone the malice\nor goodness of his action. Now an action is imputed to an agent, when\nit is in his power, so that he has dominion over it: because it is\nthrough his will that man has dominion over his actions, as was made\nclear above (Q. 1, AA. 1, 2). Hence it follows that good or evil, in\nvoluntary actions alone, renders them worthy of praise or blame: and\nin such like actions, evil, sin and guilt are one and the same thing.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Natural actions are not in the power of the natural\nagent: since the action of nature is determinate. And, therefore,\nalthough there be sin in natural actions, there is no blame.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Reason stands in different relations to the productions\nof art, and to moral actions. In matters of art, reason is directed\nto a particular end, which is something devised by reason: whereas in\nmoral matters, it is directed to the general end of all human life.\nNow a particular end is subordinate to the general end. Since\ntherefore sin is a departure from the order to the end, as stated\nabove (A. 1), sin may occur in two ways, in a production of art.\nFirst, by a departure from the particular end intended by the artist:\nand this sin will be proper to the art; for instance, if an artist\nproduce a bad thing, while intending to produce something good; or\nproduce something good, while intending to produce something bad.\nSecondly, by a departure from the general end of human life: and then\nhe will be said to sin, if he intend to produce a bad work, and does\nso in effect, so that another is taken in thereby. But this sin is\nnot proper to the artist as such, but as man. Consequently for the\nformer sin the artist is blamed as an artist; while for the latter he\nis blamed as a man. On the other hand, in moral matters, where we\ntake into consideration the order of reason to the general end of\nhuman life, sin and evil are always due to a departure from the order\nof reason to the general end of human life. Wherefore man is blamed\nfor such a sin, both as man and as a moral being. Hence the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that \"in art, he who sins voluntarily\nis preferable; but in prudence, as in the moral virtues,\" which\nprudence directs, \"he is the reverse.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Weakness that occurs in voluntary evils, is subject to\nman's power: wherefore it neither takes away nor diminishes guilt.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 21, Art. 3]\n\nWhether a Human Action Is Meritorious or Demeritorious in So Far As\nIt Is Good or Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a human action is not meritorious or\ndemeritorious on account of its goodness or malice. For we speak of\nmerit or demerit in relation to retribution, which has no place save\nin matters relating to another person. But good or evil actions are\nnot all related to another person, for some are related to the person\nof the agent. Therefore not every good or evil human action is\nmeritorious or demeritorious.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no one deserves punishment or reward for doing as he\nchooses with that of which he is master: thus if a man destroys what\nbelongs to him, he is not punished, as if he had destroyed what\nbelongs to another. But man is master of his own actions. Therefore a\nman does not merit punishment or reward, through putting his action\nto a good or evil purpose.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if a man acquire some good for himself, he does not\non that account deserve to be benefited by another man: and the same\napplies to evil. Now a good action is itself a kind of good and\nperfection of the agent: while an inordinate action is his evil.\nTherefore a man does not merit or demerit, from the fact that he does\na good or an evil deed.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 3:10, 11): \"Say to the just\nman that it is well; for he shall eat the fruit of his doings. Woe to\nthe wicked unto evil; for the reward of his hands shall be given him.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We speak of merit and demerit, in relation to\nretribution, rendered according to justice. Now, retribution\naccording to justice is rendered to a man, by reason of his having\ndone something to another's advantage or hurt. It must, moreover, be\nobserved that every individual member of a society is, in a fashion,\na part and member of the whole society. Wherefore, any good or evil,\ndone to the member of a society, redounds on the whole society: thus,\nwho hurts the hand, hurts the man. When, therefore, anyone does good\nor evil to another individual, there is a twofold measure of merit or\ndemerit in his action: first, in respect of the retribution owed to\nhim by the individual to whom he has done good or harm; secondly, in\nrespect of the retribution owed to him by the whole of society. Now\nwhen a man ordains his action directly for the good or evil of the\nwhole society, retribution is owed to him, before and above all, by\nthe whole society; secondarily, by all the parts of society. Whereas\nwhen a man does that which conduces to his own benefit or\ndisadvantage, then again is retribution owed to him, in so far as\nthis too affects the community, forasmuch as he is a part of society:\nalthough retribution is not due to him, in so far as it conduces to\nthe good or harm of an individual, who is identical with the agent:\nunless, perchance, he owe retribution to himself, by a sort of\nresemblance, in so far as man is said to be just to himself.\n\nIt is therefore evident that a good or evil action deserves praise or\nblame, in so far as it is in the power of the will: that it is right\nor sinful, according as it is ordained to the end; and that its merit\nor demerit depends on the recompense for justice or injustice towards\nanother.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A man's good or evil actions, although not ordained to\nthe good or evil of another individual, are nevertheless ordained to\nthe good or evil of another, i.e. the community.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Man is master of his actions; and yet, in so far as he\nbelongs to another, i.e. the community, of which he forms part, he\nmerits or demerits, inasmuch as he disposes his actions well or ill:\njust as if he were to dispense well or ill other belongings of his,\nin respect of which he is bound to serve the community.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This very good or evil, which a man does to himself by\nhis action, redounds to the community, as stated above.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 21, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Human Action Is Meritorious or Demeritorious Before God,\nAccording As It Is Good or Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man's actions, good or evil, are not\nmeritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God. Because, as stated\nabove (A. 3), merit and demerit imply relation to retribution for\ngood or harm done to another. But a man's action, good or evil, does\nno good or harm to God; for it is written (Job 35:6, 7): \"If thou\nsin, what shalt thou hurt Him? . . . And if thou do justly, what\nshalt thou give Him?\" Therefore a human action, good or evil, is not\nmeritorious or demeritorious in the sight of God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an instrument acquires no merit or demerit in the\nsight of him that uses it; because the entire action of the\ninstrument belongs to the user. Now when man acts he is the\ninstrument of the Divine power which is the principal cause of his\naction; hence it is written (Isa. 10:15): \"Shall the axe boast itself\nagainst him that cutteth with it? Or shall the saw exalt itself\nagainst him by whom it is drawn?\" where man while acting is evidently\ncompared to an instrument. Therefore man merits or demerits nothing\nin God's sight, by good or evil deeds.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a human action acquires merit or demerit through\nbeing ordained to someone else. But not all human actions are\nordained to God. Therefore not every good or evil action acquires\nmerit or demerit in God's sight.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 12:14): \"All things that\nare done, God will bring into judgment . . . whether it be good or\nevil.\" Now judgment implies retribution, in respect of which we speak\nof merit and demerit. Therefore every human action, both good and\nevil, acquires merit or demerit in God's sight.\n\n_I answer that,_ A human action, as stated above (A. 3), acquires\nmerit or demerit, through being ordained to someone else, either by\nreason of himself, or by reason of the community: and in each way,\nour actions, good and evil, acquire merit or demerit, in the sight of\nGod. On the part of God Himself, inasmuch as He is man's last end;\nand it is our duty to refer all our actions to the last end, as\nstated above (Q. 19, A. 10). Consequently, whoever does an evil deed,\nnot referable to God, does not give God the honor due to Him as our\nlast end. On the part of the whole community of the universe, because\nin every community, he who governs the community, cares, first of\nall, for the common good; wherefore it is his business to award\nretribution for such things as are done well or ill in the community.\nNow God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, as stated in\nthe First Part (Q. 103, A. 5): and especially of rational creatures.\nConsequently it is evident that human actions acquire merit or\ndemerit in reference to Him: else it would follow that human actions\nare no business of God's.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God in Himself neither gains nor loses anything by the\naction of man: but man, for his part, takes something from God, or\noffers something to Him, when he observes or does not observe the\norder instituted by God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Man is so moved, as an instrument, by God, that, at the\nsame time, he moves himself by his free-will, as was explained above\n(Q. 9, A. 6, ad 3). Consequently, by his action, he acquires merit or\ndemerit in God's sight.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man is not ordained to the body politic, according to\nall that he is and has; and so it does not follow that every action\nof his acquires merit or demerit in relation to the body politic. But\nall that man is, and can, and has, must be referred to God: and\ntherefore every action of man, whether good or bad, acquires merit or\ndemerit in the sight of God, as far as the action itself is concerned.\n________________________\n\nTREATISE ON THE PASSIONS (QQ. 22-48)\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 22\n\nOF THE SUBJECT OF THE SOUL'S PASSIONS\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the passions of the soul: first, in general;\nsecondly, in particular. Taking them in general, there are four\nthings to be considered: (1) Their subject: (2) The difference\nbetween them: (3) Their mutual relationship: (4) Their malice and\ngoodness.\n\nUnder the first head there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there is any passion in the soul?\n\n(2) Whether passion is in the appetitive rather than in the\napprehensive part?\n\n(3) Whether passion is in the sensitive appetite rather than in the\nintellectual appetite, which is called the will?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 22, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Any Passion Is in the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no passion in the soul.\nBecause passivity belongs to matter. But the soul is not composed of\nmatter and form, as stated in the First Part (Q. 75, A. 5). Therefore\nthere is no passion in the soul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, passion is movement, as is stated in _Phys._ iii, 3.\nBut the soul is not moved, as is proved in _De Anima_ i, 3. Therefore\npassion is not in the soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, passion is the road to corruption; since \"every\npassion, when increased, alters the substance,\" as is stated in\n_Topic._ vi, 6. But the soul is incorruptible. Therefore no passion\nis in the soul.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 7:5): \"When we were in the\nflesh, the passions of sins which were by the law, did the work in\nour members.\" Now sins are, properly speaking, in the soul. Therefore\npassions also, which are described as being \"of sins,\" are in the\nsoul.\n\n_I answer that,_ The word \"passive\" is used in three ways. First, in\na general way, according as whatever receives something is passive,\nalthough nothing is taken from it: thus we may say that the air is\npassive when it is lit up. But this is to be perfected rather than to\nbe passive. Secondly, the word \"passive\" is employed in its proper\nsense, when something is received, while something else is taken\naway: and this happens in two ways. For sometimes that which is lost\nis unsuitable to the thing: thus when an animal's body is healed, and\nloses sickness. At other times the contrary occurs: thus to ail is to\nbe passive; because the ailment is received and health is lost. And\nhere we have passion in its most proper acceptation. For a thing is\nsaid to be passive from its being drawn to the agent: and when a\nthing recedes from what is suitable to it, then especially does it\nappear to be drawn to something else. Moreover in _De Generat._ i, 3\nit is stated that when a more excellent thing is generated from a\nless excellent, we have generation simply, and corruption in a\nparticular respect: whereas the reverse is the case, when from a more\nexcellent thing, a less excellent is generated. In these three ways\nit happens that passions are in the soul. For in the sense of mere\nreception, we speak of \"feeling and understanding as being a kind of\npassion\" (De Anima i, 5). But passion, accompanied by the loss of\nsomething, is only in respect of a bodily transmutation; wherefore\npassion properly so called cannot be in the soul, save accidentally,\nin so far, to wit, as the _composite_ is passive. But here again we\nfind a difference; because when this transmutation is for the worse,\nit has more of the nature of a passion, than when it is for the\nbetter: hence sorrow is more properly a passion than joy.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It belongs to matter to be passive in such a way as to\nlose something and to be transmuted: hence this happens only in those\nthings that are composed of matter and form. But passivity, as\nimplying mere reception, need not be in matter, but can be in\nanything that is in potentiality. Now, though the soul is not\ncomposed of matter and form, yet it has something of potentiality, in\nrespect of which it is competent to receive or to be passive,\naccording as the act of understanding is a kind of passion, as stated\nin _De Anima_ iii, 4.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although it does not belong to the soul in\nitself to be passive and to be moved, yet it belongs accidentally as\nstated in _De Anima_ i, 3.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument is true of passion accompanied by\ntransmutation to something worse. And passion, in this sense, is not\nfound in the soul, except accidentally: but the composite, which is\ncorruptible, admits of it by reason of its own nature.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 22, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Passion Is in the Appetitive Rather Than in the Apprehensive\nPart?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that passion is in the apprehensive part\nof the soul rather than in the appetitive. Because that which is\nfirst in any genus, seems to rank first among all things that are in\nthat genus, and to be their cause, as is stated in _Metaph._ ii, 1.\nNow passion is found to be in the apprehensive, before being in the\nappetitive part: for the appetitive part is not affected unless there\nbe a previous passion in the apprehensive part. Therefore passion is\nin the apprehensive part more than in the appetitive.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what is more active is less passive; for action is\ncontrary to passion. Now the appetitive part is more active than the\napprehensive part. Therefore it seems that passion is more in the\napprehensive part.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as the sensitive appetite is the power of a\ncorporeal organ, so is the power of sensitive apprehension. But\npassion in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily\ntransmutation. Therefore passion is not more in the sensitive\nappetitive than in the sensitive apprehensive part.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that \"the\nmovement of the soul, which the Greeks called _pathe_, are styled by\nsome of our writers, Cicero [*\"Those things which the Greeks call\n_pathe_, we prefer to call disturbances rather than diseases\" (Tusc.\niv. 5)] for instance, disturbances; by some, affections or emotions;\nwhile others rendering the Greek more accurately, call them\npassions.\" From this it is evident that the passions of the soul are\nthe same as affections. But affections manifestly belong to the\nappetitive, and not to the apprehensive part. Therefore the passions\nare in the appetitive rather than in the apprehensive part.\n\n_I answer that,_ As we have already stated (A. 1) the word \"passion\"\nimplies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent.\nNow the soul is drawn to a thing by the appetitive power rather than\nby the apprehensive power: because the soul has, through its\nappetitive power, an order to things as they are in themselves: hence\nthe Philosopher says (Metaph. vi, 4) that \"good and evil,\" i.e. the\nobjects of the appetitive power, \"are in things themselves.\" On the\nother hand the apprehensive power is not drawn to a thing, as it is\nin itself; but knows it by reason of an \"intention\" of the thing,\nwhich \"intention\" it has in itself, or receives in its own way. Hence\nwe find it stated (Metaph. vi, 4) that \"the true and the false,\"\nwhich pertain to knowledge, \"are not in things, but in the mind.\"\nConsequently it is evident that the nature of passion is consistent\nwith the appetitive, rather than with the apprehensive part.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In things relating to perfection the case is the\nopposite, in comparison to things that pertain to defect. Because in\nthings relating to perfection, intensity is in proportion to the\napproach to one first principle; to which the nearer a thing\napproaches, the more intense it is. Thus the intensity of a thing\npossessed of light depends on its approach to something endowed with\nlight in a supreme degree, to which the nearer a thing approaches the\nmore light it possesses. But in things that relate to defect,\nintensity depends, not on approach to something supreme, but [o]n\nreceding from that which is perfect; because therein consists the\nvery notion of privation and defect. Wherefore the less a thing\nrecedes from that which stands first, the less intense it is: and the\nresult is that at first we always find some small defect, which\nafterwards increases as it goes on. Now passion pertains to defect,\nbecause it belongs to a thing according as it is in potentiality.\nWherefore in those things that approach to the Supreme Perfection,\ni.e. to God, there is but little potentiality and passion: while in\nother things, consequently, there is more. Hence also, in the\nsupreme, i.e. the apprehensive, power of the soul, passion is found\nless than in the other powers.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The appetitive power is said to be more active, because\nit is, more than the apprehensive power, the principle of the\nexterior action: and this for the same reason that it is more\npassive, namely, its being related to things as existing in\nthemselves: since it is through the external action that we come into\ncontact with things.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated in the First Part (Q. 78, A. 3) the organs of\nthe soul can be changed in two ways. First, by a spiritual change, in\nrespect of which the organ receives an \"intention\" of the object. And\nthis is essential to the act of the sensitive apprehension: thus is\nthe eye changed by the object visible, not by being colored, but by\nreceiving an intention of color. But the organs are receptive of\nanother and natural change, which affects their natural disposition;\nfor instance, when they become hot or cold, or undergo some similar\nchange. And whereas this kind of change is accidental to the act of\nthe sensitive apprehension; for instance, if the eye be wearied\nthrough gazing intently at something or be overcome by the intensity\nof the object: on the other hand, it is essential to the act of the\nsensitive appetite; wherefore the material element in the definitions\nof the movements of the appetitive part, is the natural change of the\norgan; for instance, \"anger is\" said to be \"a kindling of the blood\nabout the heart.\" Hence it is evident that the notion of passion is\nmore consistent with the act of the sensitive appetite, than with\nthat of the sensitive apprehension, although both are actions of a\ncorporeal organ.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 22, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Passion Is in the Sensitive Appetite Rather Than in the\nIntellectual Appetite, Which Is Called the Will?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that passion is not more in the sensitive\nthan in the intellectual appetite. For Dionysius declares (Div. Nom.\nii) Hierotheus \"to be taught by a kind of yet more Godlike\ninstruction; not only by learning Divine things, but also by\nsuffering (_patiens_) them.\" But the sensitive appetite cannot \"suffer\"\nDivine things, since its object is the sensible good. Therefore\npassion is in the intellectual appetite, just as it is also in the\nsensitive appetite.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the more powerful the active force, the more intense\nthe passion. But the object of the intellectual appetite, which is\nthe universal good, is a more powerful active force than the object\nof the sensitive appetite, which is a particular good. Therefore\npassion is more consistent with the intellectual than with the\nsensitive appetite.\n\nObj. 3: Further, joy and love are said to be passions. But these are\nto be found in the intellectual and not only in the sensitive\nappetite: else they would not be ascribed by the Scriptures to God\nand the angels. Therefore the passions are not more in the sensitive\nthan in the intellectual appetite.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22), while\ndescribing the animal passions: \"Passion is a movement of the\nsensitive appetite when we imagine good or evil: in other words,\npassion is a movement of the irrational soul, when we think of good\nor evil.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) passion is properly to be\nfound where there is corporeal transmutation. This corporeal\ntransmutation is found in the act of the sensitive appetite, and is\nnot only spiritual, as in the sensitive apprehension, but also\nnatural. Now there is no need for corporeal transmutation in the act\nof the intellectual appetite: because this appetite is not exercised\nby means of a corporeal organ. It is therefore evident that passion\nis more properly in the act of the sensitive appetite, than in that\nof the intellectual appetite; and this is again evident from the\ndefinitions of Damascene quoted above.\n\nReply Obj. 1: By \"suffering\" Divine things is meant being well\naffected towards them, and united to them by love: and this takes\nplace without any alteration in the body.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Intensity of passion depends not only on the power of\nthe agent, but also on the passibility of the patient: because things\nthat are disposed to passion, suffer much even from petty agents.\nTherefore although the object of the intellectual appetite has\ngreater activity than the object of the sensitive appetite, yet the\nsensitive appetite is more passive.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When love and joy and the like are ascribed to God or\nthe angels, or to man in respect of his intellectual appetite, they\nsignify simple acts of the will having like effects, but without\npassion. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5): \"The holy angels\nfeel no anger while they punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery\nwhile they relieve the unhappy: and yet ordinary human speech is wont\nto ascribe to them also these passions by name, because, although\nthey have none of our weakness, their acts bear a certain resemblance\nto ours.\"\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 23\n\nHOW THE PASSIONS DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and\nunder this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from\nthose of the irascible part?\n\n(2) Whether the contrariety of passions in the irascible part is\nbased on the contrariety of good and evil?\n\n(3) Whether there is any passion that has no contrary?\n\n(4) Whether, in the same power, there are any passions, differing in\nspecies, but not contrary to one another?\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 23\n\nWhether the Passions of the Concupiscible Part Are Different from\nThose of the Irascible Part?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the same passions are in the\nirascible and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic.\nii, 5) that the passions of the soul are those emotions \"which are\nfollowed by joy or sorrow.\" But joy and sorrow are in the\nconcupiscible part. Therefore all the passions are in the\nconcupiscible part, and not some in the irascible, others in the\nconcupiscible part.\n\nObj. 2: Further, on the words of Matt. 13:33, \"The kingdom of heaven\nis like to leaven,\" etc., Jerome's gloss says: \"We should have\nprudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty;\ndesire of virtue, in the concupiscible part.\" But hatred is in the\nconcupiscible faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary,\nas is stated in _Topic._ ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the\nconcupiscible and irascible faculties.\n\nObj. 3: Further, passions and actions differ specifically according\nto their objects. But the objects of the irascible and concupiscible\npassions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the same\npassions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The acts of the different powers differ in\nspecies; for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the\nconcupiscible are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is\ndivided, as stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2). Therefore, since\nthe passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated above\n(Q. 22, A. 3), the passions of the irascible faculty are specifically\ndistinct from those of the concupiscible part.\n\n_I answer that,_ The passions of the irascible part differ in species\nfrom those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers\nhave different objects, as stated in the First Part (Q. 77, A. 3),\nthe passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to\ndifferent objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions of different\nfaculties differ in species; since a greater difference in the object\nis required to diversify the species of the powers, than to diversify\nthe species of passions or actions. For just as in the physical\norder, diversity of genus arises from diversity in the potentiality\nof matter, while diversity of species arises from diversity of form\nin the same matter; so in the acts of the soul, those that belong to\ndifferent powers, differ not only in species but also in genus, while\nacts and passions regarding different specific objects, included\nunder the one common object of a single power, differ as the species\nof that genus.\n\nIn order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible,\nand which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of each of\nthese powers. For we have stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2),\nthat the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil,\nsimply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since\nthe soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at\ntimes, in acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some such evil, in\nso far as such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily\nacquire or avoid; therefore this very good or evil, inasmuch as it is\nof an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible\nfaculty. Therefore whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely,\nbelong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love,\nhatred, and such like: whereas those passions which regard good or\nbad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to\nthe irascible faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2), the\nirascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the\nobstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from tending towards\nits object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by\nmaking some evil hard to avoid. The result is that all the irascible\npassions terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that\neven the passions which are in the irascible faculty are followed by\njoy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible\nfaculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible\npassion; but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the\nirascible power.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the\nconcupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this\nvery fact it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power:\nand hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same\napplies to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty.\nConsequently the concupiscible passions are specifically different\nfrom the irascible passions.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 23, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Contrariety of the Irascible Passions Is Based on the\nContrariety of Good and Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible\npassions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil.\nFor the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible\npassions, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). But the contrariety of the\nconcupiscible passions is no other than that of good and evil; take,\nfor instance, love and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore the same\napplies to the irascible passions.\n\nObj. 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects; just as\nmovements differ according to their termini. But there is no other\ncontrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is stated in\n_Phys._ v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety of passions,\nsave that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or\nevil. Therefore in no appetitive power can there be contrariety of\npassions other than that of good and evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"every passion of the soul is by way of approach and\nwithdrawal,\" as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of _Physics._\nNow approach results from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from\nthe apprehension of evil: since just as \"good is what all desire\"\n(Ethic. i, 1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions\nof the soul, there can be no other contrariety than that of good and\nevil.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as\nstated in _Ethic._ iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in\nrespect of good and evil: because each regards some kind of evil.\nTherefore not every contrariety of the irascible passions is that of\ngood and evil.\n\n_I answer that,_ Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in _Phys._\niii, 3. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of\nmovements or changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes\nand movements, as stated in _Phys._ v, 5. One is according to\napproach and withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this\ncontrariety belongs properly to changes, i.e. to generation, which is\na change _to being,_ and to corruption, which is a change _from\nbeing._ The other contrariety is according to opposition of termini,\nand belongs properly to movements: thus whitening, which is movement\nfrom black to white, is contrary to blackening, which is movement\nfrom white to black.\n\nAccordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the\nsoul: one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of good and\nevil; the other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of\nthe same term. In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety\nalone is to be found; viz. that which is based on the objects:\nwhereas in the irascible passions, we find both forms of contrariety.\nThe reason of this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty,\nas stated above (A. 1), is sensible good or evil considered\nabsolutely. Now good, as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a\nterm whereto, since nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all\nthings desire it. In like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but\nall things shun it: wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term\nwhereto, but only of a term wherefrom. Accordingly every\nconcupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it, as love,\ndesire and joy; while every concupiscible passion in respect of evil,\ntends from it, as hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow.\nWherefore, in the concupiscible passions, there can be no contrariety\nof approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object.\n\nOn the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible\ngood or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the aspect of\ndifficulty or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or\narduous, considered as good, is of such a nature as to produce in us\na tendency to it, which tendency pertains to the passion of _hope;_\nwhereas, considered as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from\nit; and this pertains to the passion of _despair._ In like manner the\narduous evil, considered as an evil, has the aspect of something to\nbe shunned; and this belongs to the passion of _fear:_ but it also\ncontains a reason for tending to it, as attempting something arduous,\nwhereby to escape being subject to evil; and this tendency is called\n_daring._ Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety\nin respect of good and evil (as between hope and fear): and also\ncontrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the\nsame term (as between daring and fear).\n\nFrom what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 23, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Any Passion of the Soul Has No Contrary?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that every passion of the soul has a\ncontrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or\nin the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (A. 1). But both kinds\nof passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore\nevery passion of the soul has its contrary.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil\nfor its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive\npart. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a\npassion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion has a\ncontrary.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of approach\nor withdrawal, as stated above (A. 2). But every approach has a\ncorresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa. Therefore every\npassion of the soul has a contrary.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is\nset down as being contrary to anger, as stated in _Ethic._ iv, 5.\nTherefore not every passion has a contrary.\n\n_I answer that,_ The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it\ncannot have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal,\nor according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused\nby a difficult evil already present: and when such an evil is\npresent, the appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not\ngo beyond the limits of _sadness,_ which is a concupiscible passion;\nor else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which\nmovement is that of _anger._ But it cannot have a movement of\nwithdrawal: because the evil is supposed to be already present or\npast. Thus no passion is contrary to anger according to contrariety\nof approach and withdrawal.\n\nIn like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good\nand evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained,\nwhich can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty.\nNor, when once good is obtained, does there remain any other\nmovement, except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which\nrepose belongs to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible\nfaculty.\n\nAccordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement\nof anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is\ncontrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that \"calm\nis contrary to anger,\" by opposition not of contrariety but of\nnegation or privation.\n\nFrom what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 23, Art. 4]\n\nWhether in the Same Power, There Are Any Passions, Specifically\nDifferent, but Not Contrary to One Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power,\nspecifically different passions that are not contrary to one another.\nFor the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now\nthe objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; and on this\ndistinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no\npassions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another,\ndiffer specifically.\n\nObj. 2: Further, difference of species implies a difference of form.\nBut every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety, as\nstated in _Metaph._ x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that\nare not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.\n\nObj. 3: Further, since every passion of the soul consists in approach\nor withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every\ndifference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the\ndifference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach and\nwithdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first\ntwo differences cause contrariety in the passions of the soul, as\nstated above (A. 2): whereas the third difference does not diversify\nthe species; else the species of the soul's passions would be\ninfinite. Therefore it is not possible for passions of the same power\nto differ in species, without being contrary to one another.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Love and joy differ in species, and are in the\nconcupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another;\nrather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power\nthere are passions that differ in species without being contrary to\none another.\n\n_I answer that,_ Passions differ in accordance with their active\ncauses, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their\nobjects. Now, the difference in active causes may be considered in\ntwo ways: first, from the point of view of their species or nature,\nas fire differs from water; secondly, from the point of view of the\ndifference in their active power. In the passions of the soul we can\ntreat the difference of their active or motive causes in respect of\ntheir motive power, as if they were natural agents. For every mover,\nin a fashion, either draws the patient to itself, or repels it from\nitself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does three things in the\npatient. Because, in the first place, it gives the patient an\ninclination or aptitude to tend to the mover: thus a light body,\nwhich is above, bestows lightness on the body generated, so that it\nhas an inclination or aptitude to be above. Secondly, if the\ngenerated body be outside its proper place, the mover gives it\nmovement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest, when it\nshall have come to its proper place: since to the same cause are due,\nboth rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same\napplies to the cause of repulsion.\n\nNow, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it\nwere, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In\nthe first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a\ncertain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good:\nand this belongs to the passion of _love:_ the corresponding contrary\nof which is _hatred_ in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not\nyet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the\nattainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of\n_desire_ or _concupiscence:_ and contrary to it, in respect of evil,\nis the passion of _aversion_ or _dislike._ Thirdly, when the good is\nobtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good\nobtained: and this belongs to the passion of _delight_ or _joy;_ the\ncontrary of which, in respect of evil, is _sorrow_ or _sadness._\n\nOn the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or\ninclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising\nfrom the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely.\nAnd in respect of good not yet obtained, we have _hope_ and _despair._\nIn respect of evil not yet present we have _fear_ and _daring._ But in\nrespect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it is\nno longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated\nabove (A. 3). But evil already present gives rise to the passion\nof _anger._\n\nAccordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are\nthree couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion,\njoy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the\nirascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger\nwhich has no contrary passion.\n\nConsequently there are altogether eleven passions differing\nspecifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the\nirascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained.\n\nFrom this the replies to the objections are evident.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 24\n\nOF GOOD AND EVIL IN THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and\nunder this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the\nsoul?\n\n(2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil?\n\n(3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness or\nmalice of an act?\n\n(4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Moral Good and Evil Can Be Found in the Passions of the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally\ngood or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since\n\"morals are properly predicated of man,\" as Ambrose says (Super Luc.\nProlog.). But passions are not proper to man, for he has them in\ncommon with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is\nmorally good or evil.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in \"being in\naccord, or in disaccord with reason,\" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.\niv). Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the\nsensitive appetite, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3). Therefore they\nhave no connection with human, i.e. moral, good or evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that \"we are\nneither praised nor blamed for our passions.\" But we are praised and\nblamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not\nmorally good or evil.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking\nof the passions of the soul: \"They are evil if our love is evil; good\nif our love is good.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We may consider the passions of the soul in two\nways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command\nof the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in\nthemselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus\nthere is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the\nreason, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 5). If, however, they be\nconsidered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then\nmoral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is\nnearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the\nmovements and actions of the outward members are morally good or\nevil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the\npassions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or\nevil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded\nby the will, or from not being checked by the will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: These passions, considered in themselves, are common to\nman and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they are\nproper to man.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even the lower appetitive powers are called rational,\nin so far as \"they partake of reason in some sort\" (Ethic. i, 13).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither praised nor\nblamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not\nexclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they\nare subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: \"For the man who fears\nor is angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry\nin a certain way, i.e. according to, or against reason.\"\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Every Passion of the Soul Is Evil Morally?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are\nmorally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that \"some call\nthe soul's passions diseases or disturbances of the soul\" [*Cf. Q.\n22, A. 2, footnote]. But every disease or disturbance of the soul is\nmorally evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is evil morally.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that \"movement\nin accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to nature\nis passion.\" But in movements of the soul, what is against nature is\nsinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide Orth. ii,\n4) that \"the devil turned from that which is in accord with nature to\nthat which is against nature.\" Therefore these passions are morally\nevil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But\nthese passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called \"the passions\nof sins\" (Rom. 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that \"all\nthese emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . .\nFor they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin,\nthey rejoice in good works.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed\nfrom that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions\nare evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions\nare good. This difference, although it appears great in words, is\nnevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider\nthe intent of either school. For the Stoics did not discern between\nsense and intellect; and consequently neither between the\nintellectual and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate\nthe passions of the soul from the movements of the will, in so far as\nthe passions of the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the\nsimple movements of the will are in the intellectual appetite: but\nevery rational movement of the appetitive part they call will, while\nthey called passion, a movement that exceeds the limits of reason.\nWherefore Cicero, following their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4)\ncalls all passions \"diseases of the soul\": whence he argues that\n\"those who are diseased are unsound; and those who are unsound are\nwanting in sense.\" Hence we speak of those who are wanting in sense\nof being \"unsound.\"\n\nOn the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of \"passions\" to\nall the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore they esteem\nthem good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are\nnot controlled by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong\nin disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory\nof a mean in the passions, when he says that \"every evil, though\nmoderate, should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be\nmoderately ailing, is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or\npassions of the soul, is not sound.\" For passions are not called\n\"diseases\" or \"disturbances\" of the soul, save when they are not\ncontrolled by reason.\n\nHence the reply to the First Objection is evident.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In every passion there is an increase or decrease in\nthe natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved\nmore or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it\nderives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion to\ndeviate always from the order of natural reason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The passions of the soul, in so far as they are\ncontrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but in so far as\nthey are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Passion Increases or Decreases the Goodness or Malice of an\nAct?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that every passion decreases the goodness\nof a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason,\non which depends the goodness of a moral act, consequently decreases\nthe goodness of the moral act. But every passion hinders the judgment\nof reason: for Sallust says (Catilin.): \"All those that take counsel\nabout matters of doubt, should be free from hatred, anger, friendship\nand pity.\" Therefore passion decreases the goodness of a moral act.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the more a man's action is like to God, the better\nit is: hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:1): \"Be ye followers of God, as\nmost dear children.\" But \"God and the holy angels feel no anger when\nthey punish . . . no fellow-feeling with misery when they relieve the\nunhappy,\" as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5). Therefore it is\nbetter to do such like deeds without than with a passion of the soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as moral evil depends on its relation to\nreason, so also does moral good. But moral evil is lessened by\npassion: for he sins less, who sins from passion, than he who sins\ndeliberately. Therefore he does a better deed, who does well without\npassion, than he who does with passion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that \"the\npassion of pity is obedient to reason, when pity is bestowed without\nviolating right, as when the poor are relieved, or the penitent\nforgiven.\" But nothing that is obedient to reason lessens the moral\ngood. Therefore a passion of the soul does not lessen moral good.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Stoics held that every passion of the soul is\nevil, they consequently held that every passion of the soul lessens\nthe goodness of an act; since the admixture of evil either destroys\ngood altogether, or makes it to be less good. And this is true\nindeed, if by passions we understand none but the inordinate\nmovements of the sensitive appetite, considered as disturbances or\nailments. But if we give the name of passions to all the movements of\nthe sensitive appetite, then it belongs to the perfection of man's\ngood that his passions be moderated by reason. For since man's good\nis founded on reason as its root, that good will be all the more\nperfect, according as it extends to more things pertaining to man.\nWherefore no one questions the fact that it belongs to the perfection\nof moral good, that the actions of the outward members be controlled\nby the law of reason. Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey\nreason, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 7), it belongs to the perfection\nof moral or human good, that the passions themselves also should be\ncontrolled by reason.\n\nAccordingly just as it is better that man should both will good and\ndo it in his external act; so also does it belong to the perfection\nof moral good, that man should be moved unto good, not only in\nrespect of his will, but also in respect of his sensitive appetite;\naccording to Ps. 83:3: \"My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the\nliving God\": where by \"heart\" we are to understand the intellectual\nappetite, and by \"flesh\" the sensitive appetite.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The passions of the soul may stand in a twofold\nrelation to the judgment of reason. First, antecedently: and thus,\nsince they obscure the judgment of reason, on which the goodness of\nthe moral act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act; for it\nis more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgment of\nreason than from the mere passion of pity. In the second place,\nconsequently: and this in two ways. First, by way of redundance:\nbecause, to wit, when the higher part of the soul is intensely moved\nto anything, the lower part also follows that movement: and thus the\npassion that results in consequence, in the sensitive appetite, is a\nsign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates greater moral\ngoodness. Secondly, by way of choice; when, to wit, a man, by the\njudgment of his reason, chooses to be affected by a passion in order\nto work more promptly with the co-operation of the sensitive\nappetite. And thus a passion of the soul increases the goodness of an\naction.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In God and the angels there is no sensitive appetite,\nnor again bodily members: and so in them good does not depend on the\nright ordering of passions or of bodily actions, as it does in us.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A passion that tends to evil, and precedes the judgment\nof reason, diminishes sin; but if it be consequent in either of the\nways mentioned above (Reply Obj. 1), it aggravates the sin, or else\nit is a sign of its being more grievous.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Any Passion Is Good or Evil in Its Species?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is good or\nevil morally according to its species. Because moral good and evil\ndepend on reason. But the passions are in the sensitive appetite; so\nthat accordance with reason is accidental to them. Since, therefore,\nnothing accidental belongs to a thing's species, it seems that no\npassion is good or evil according to its species.\n\nObj. 2: Further, acts and passions take their species from their\nobject. If, therefore, any passion were good or evil, according to\nits species, it would follow that those passions the object of which\nis good, are specifically good, such as love, desire and joy: and\nthat those passions, the object of which is evil, are specifically\nevil, as hatred, fear and sadness. But this is clearly false.\nTherefore no passion is good or evil according to its species.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there is no species of passion that is not to be\nfound in other animals. But moral good is in man alone. Therefore no\npassion of the soul is good or evil according to its species.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that \"pity is a\nkind of virtue.\" Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that\nmodesty is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good\nor evil according to their species.\n\n_I answer that,_ We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has\nbeen said in regard to acts (Q. 18, AA. 5, 6; Q. 20, A. 1)--viz. that\nthe species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered\nfrom two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and\nthus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an\nact or passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as\nit is voluntary and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and\nevil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object\nto which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord\nwith reason: as is clear in the case of _shame_ which is base fear;\nand of _envy_ which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions\nbelong to the same species as the external act.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument considers the passions in their natural\nspecies, in so far as the sensitive appetite is considered in itself.\nBut in so far as the sensitive appetite obeys reason, good and evil\nof reason are no longer accidentally in the passions of the appetite,\nbut essentially.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Passions having a tendency to good, are themselves\ngood, if they tend to that which is truly good, and in like manner,\nif they turn away from that which is truly evil. On the other hand,\nthose passions which consist in aversion from good, and a tendency to\nevil, are themselves evil.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In irrational animals the sensitive appetite does not\nobey reason. Nevertheless, in so far as they are led by a kind of\nestimative power, which is subject to a higher, i.e. the Divine\nreason, there is a certain likeness of moral good in them, in regard\nto the soul's passions.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 25\n\nOF THE ORDER OF THE PASSIONS TO ONE ANOTHER\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the order of the passions to one another: and\nunder this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) The relation of the irascible passions to the concupiscible\npassions;\n\n(2) The relation of the concupiscible passions to one another;\n\n(3) The relation of the irascible passions to one another;\n\n(4) The four principal passions.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Irascible Passions Precede the Concupiscible Passions, or\nVice Versa?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the irascible passions precede the\nconcupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of\ntheir objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the\ndifficult good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the\nirascible passions seem to precede the concupiscible passions.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the\nirascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to that\nwhich is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purpose of\nremoving the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from\nenjoying its object, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1, ad 1; I, Q. 81,\nA. 2). Now \"that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover\"\n(Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible passions precede the\nconcupiscible passions.\n\nObj. 3: Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But joy\nand sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. iv, 5) that \"retaliation causes anger to cease, because\nit produces pleasure instead of the previous pain.\" Therefore the\nconcupiscible passions follow the irascible passions.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The concupiscible passions regard the absolute\ngood, while the irascible passions regard a restricted, viz. the\ndifficult, good. Since, therefore, the absolute good precedes the\nrestricted good, it seems that the concupiscible passions precede\nthe irascible.\n\n_I answer that,_ In the concupiscible passions there is more\ndiversity than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the\nformer we find something relating to movement--e.g. desire; and\nsomething belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the\nirascible passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only\nthat which belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we\nfind rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as something\ndifficult or arduous; whereas such is the object of the irascible\nfaculty.\n\nNow since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of\nintention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, we\ncompare the passions of the irascible faculty with those\nconcupiscible passions that denote rest in good, it is evident that\nin the order of execution, the irascible passions take precedence of\nsuch like passions of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes\njoy, and hence causes it, according to the Apostle (Rom. 12:12):\n\"Rejoicing in hope.\" But the concupiscible passion which denotes rest\nin evil, viz. sadness, comes between two irascible passions: because\nit follows fear; since we become sad when we are confronted by the\nevil that we feared: while it precedes the movement of anger; since\nthe movement of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the\nmovement of anger. And because it is looked upon as a good thing to\npay back the evil done to us; when the angry man has achieved this\nhe rejoices. Thus it is evident that every passion of the irascible\nfaculty terminates in a concupiscible passion denoting rest, viz.\neither in joy or in sadness.\n\nBut if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible\npassions that denote movement, then it is clear that the latter take\nprecedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add\nsomething to those of the concupiscible faculty; just as the object\nof the irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the\nobject of the concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a\ncertain effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the\nrealization of the arduous good. In like manner fear adds to aversion\nor detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty\nin shunning the evil.\n\nAccordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those\nconcupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and\nthose concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it\nis therefore evident that the irascible passions both arise from and\nterminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument would prove, if the formal object of the\nconcupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous, just as\nthe formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous.\nBut because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good\nabsolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the\ncommon precedes the proper.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an\naccidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly\nrelated to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the\nobstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object.\nWherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those\nconcupiscible passions that connote rest. The third objection leads\nto the same conclusion.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Love Is the First of the Concupiscible Passions?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that love is not the first of the\nconcupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called\nfrom concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But \"things\nare named from their chief characteristic\" (De Anima ii, 4).\nTherefore desire takes precedence of love.\n\nObj. 2: Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a \"uniting\nand binding force,\" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But\nconcupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing\ncoveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is\nsometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure\n(Ethic. viii, 3, 4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and\nconsequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9) that all\nthe passions are caused by love: since \"love yearning for the beloved\nobject, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy.\" Therefore\nlove is the first of the concupiscible passions.\n\n_I answer that,_ Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible\nfaculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of\ngood. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are\nnaturally before those, the object of which is evil--that is to say,\neach precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is\nthe reason for shunning the opposite evil.\n\nNow good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the\norder of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently\nthe order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in\nthe order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of\nexecution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in\nthe thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever\ntends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion\nto that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly,\nit is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having\nattained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to\ngood is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards\ngood is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure.\nAccordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes\npleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because\nthe pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the\nenjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as\nthe good itself is, as stated above (Q. 11, A. 3, ad 3).\n\nReply Obj. 1: We name a thing as we understand it, for \"words are\nsigns of thoughts,\" as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now\nin most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love,\nwhen the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is not\npossessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De\nTrin. x, 12), \"we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which\nwe love.\" Consequently of all the concupiscible passions,\nconcupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named\nafter it.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is\nreal union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This\nunion belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also\nan affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so\nfar as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for\nand an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such\na union. This union precedes the movement of desire.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in\nthe order of intention.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Hope Is the First of the Irascible Passions?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that hope is not the first of the\nirascible passions. Because the irascible faculty is denominated from\nanger. Since, therefore, \"things are names from their chief\ncharacteristic\" (cf. A. 2, Obj. 1), it seems that anger precedes and\nsurpasses hope.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the object of the irascible faculty is something\narduous. Now it seems more arduous to strive to overcome a contrary\nevil that threatens soon to overtake us, which pertains to daring; or\nan evil actually present, which pertains to anger; than to strive\nsimply to obtain some good. Again, it seems more arduous to strive to\novercome a present evil, than a future evil. Therefore anger seems to\nbe a stronger passion than daring, and daring, than hope. And\nconsequently it seems that hope does not precede them.\n\nObj. 3: Further, when a thing is moved towards an end, the movement\nof withdrawal precedes the movement of approach. But fear and despair\nimply withdrawal from something; while daring and hope imply approach\ntowards something. Therefore fear and despair precede hope and daring.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The nearer a thing is to the first, the more it\nprecedes others. But hope is nearer to love, which is the first of\nthe passions. Therefore hope is the first of the passions in the\nirascible faculty.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1) all irascible passions imply\nmovement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible\nfaculty towards something may be due to two causes: one is the mere\naptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or\nhatred; [the other is the presence of good or evil itself,] and this\nbelongs to sadness or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good\nproduces no passion in the irascible, as stated above (Q. 23, AA. 3,\n4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger.\n\nSince then in the order of generation or execution, proportion or\naptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows\nthat, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order\nof generation. And among the other passions of the irascible faculty,\nwhich imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil,\nthose whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally\nprecede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that\nhope precedes despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such,\nwhich is essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good directly;\nwhereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is\nconsistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else,\nwherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like\nmanner fear, through being a movement from evil, precedes daring. And\nthat hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident\nfrom this--that as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding\nevil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring: because\ndaring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the\ndespair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one\nis angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself,\nas Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his _Physics._ Accordingly,\nit is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible passions.\n\nAnd if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of\ngeneration, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, second;\nhope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth\nand last, joy and sadness, which follow from all the passions, as\nstated in _Ethic._ ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire\nprecedes aversion; hope precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and\njoy precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated\nabove.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Because anger arises from the other passions, as an\neffect from the causes that precede it, it is from anger, as being\nmore manifest than the other passions, that the power takes its name.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is not the arduousness but the good that is the\nreason for approach or desire. Consequently hope, which regards good\nmore directly, takes precedence: although at times daring or even\nanger regards something more arduous.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The movement of the appetite is essentially and\ndirectly towards the good as towards its proper object; its movement\nfrom evil results from this. For the movement of the appetitive part\nis in proportion, not to natural movement, but to the intention of\nnature, which intends the end before intending the removal of a\ncontrary, which removal is desired only for the sake of obtaining\nthe end.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 25, Art. 4]\n\nWhether These Are the Four Principal Passions: Joy, Sadness, Hope and\nFear?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not\nthe four principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3, 7\nsqq.) omits hope and puts desire in its place.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there is a twofold order in the passions of the\nsoul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or\ngeneration. The principal passions should therefore be taken, either\nin the order of intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the\nfinal passions, will be the principal passions; or in the order of\nexecution or generation, and thus love will be the principal passion.\nTherefore joy and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called\nthe four principal passions.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused\nby despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be reckoned as\nprincipal passions, since they cause others: or hope and daring, from\nbeing akin to one another.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four\nprincipal passions, says:\n\n\"Banish joys: banish fears:\nAway with hope: away with tears.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ These four are commonly called the principal\npassions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal\nbecause in them all the other passions have their completion and end;\nwherefore they arise from all the other passions, as is stated in\n_Ethic._ ii, 5. Fear and hope are principal passions, not because\nthey complete the others simply, but because they complete them as\nregards the movement of the appetite towards something: for in\nrespect of good, movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and\nends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on\nto aversion, and ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish\nthese four passions in relation to the present and the future: for\nmovement regards the future, while rest is in something present: so\nthat joy relates to present good, sadness relates to present evil;\nhope regards future good, and fear, future evil.\n\nAs to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future,\nthey all culminate in these four. For this reason some have said that\nthese four are the principal passions, because they are general\npassions; and this is true, provided that by hope and fear we\nunderstand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope,\nin so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future\ngood.\n\nReply Obj. 2: These are called principal passions, in the order of\nintention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last\npassions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend\ntowards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed any\nfurther except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be\nreckoned a principal passion, because it is an effect of daring,\nwhich cannot be a principal passion, as we shall state further on\n(Reply Obj. 3).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Despair implies movement away from good; and this is,\nas it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil;\nand this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal\npassions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to be\nprincipal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion,\nbecause it arises from daring.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 26\n\nOF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR: AND FIRST, OF LOVE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe have now to consider the soul's passions in particular, and (1)\nthe passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions of the\nirascible faculty.\n\nThe first of these considerations will be threefold: since we shall\nconsider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; (3) Pleasure\nand sadness.\n\nConcerning love, three points must be considered: (1) Love itself;\n(2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love. Under the first\nhead there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?\n\n(2) Whether love is a passion?\n\n(3) Whether love is the same as dilection?\n\n(4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and\nlove of concupiscence?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 26, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Love Is in the Concupiscible Power?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible\npower. For it is written (Wis. 8:2): \"Her,\" namely wisdom, \"have I\nloved, and have sought her out from my youth.\" But the concupiscible\npower, being a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom,\nwhich is not apprehended by the senses. Therefore love is not in the\nconcupiscible power.\n\nObj. 2: Further, love seems to be identified with every passion: for\nAugustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7): \"Love, yearning for the object\nbeloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is\ncontrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary to it, is\nsadness.\" But not every passion is in the concupiscible power;\nindeed, fear, which is mentioned in this passage, is in the irascible\npower. Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the\nconcupiscible power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) mentions a \"natural love.\"\nBut natural love seems to pertain rather to the natural powers, which\nbelong to the vegetal soul. Therefore love is not simply in the\nconcupiscible power.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Topic. ii, 7) that \"love is\nin the concupiscible power.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Love is something pertaining to the appetite; since\ngood is the object of both. Wherefore love differs according to the\ndifference of appetites. For there is an appetite which arises from\nan apprehension existing, not in the subject of the appetite, but in\nsome other: and this is called the _natural appetite._ Because\nnatural things seek what is suitable to them according to their\nnature, by reason of an apprehension which is not in them, but in the\nAuthor of their nature, as stated in the First Part (Q. 6, A. 1, ad\n2; Q. 103, A. 1, ad 1, 3). And there is another appetite arising from\nan apprehension in the subject of the appetite, but from necessity\nand not from free-will. Such is, in irrational animals, the\n_sensitive appetite,_ which, however, in man, has a certain share of\nliberty, in so far as it obeys reason. Again, there is another\nappetite following freely from an apprehension in the subject of the\nappetite. And this is the rational or intellectual appetite, which is\ncalled the _will._\n\nNow in each of these appetites, the name \"love\" is given to the\nprinciple of movement towards the end loved. In the natural appetite\nthe principle of this movement is the appetitive subject's\nconnaturalness with the thing to which it tends, and may be called\n\"natural love\": thus the connaturalness of a heavy body for the\ncentre, is by reason of its weight and may be called \"natural love.\"\nIn like manner the aptitude of the sensitive appetite or of the will\nto some good, that is to say, its very complacency in good is called\n\"sensitive love,\" or \"intellectual\" or \"rational love.\" So that\nsensitive love is in the sensitive appetite, just as intellectual\nlove is in the intellectual appetite. And it belongs to the\nconcupiscible power, because it regards good absolutely, and not\nunder the aspect of difficulty, which is the object of the irascible\nfaculty.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The words quoted refer to intellectual or rational love.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Love is spoken of as being fear, joy, desire and\nsadness, not essentially but causally.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Natural love is not only in the powers of the\nvegetal soul, but in all the soul's powers, and also in all the parts\nof the body, and universally in all things: because, as Dionysius says\n(Div. Nom. iv), \"Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things\"; since\neach single thing has a connaturalness with that which is naturally\nsuitable to it.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 26, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Love Is a Passion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that love is not a passion. For no power\nis a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.\niv). Therefore love is not a passion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as Augustine says\n(De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a passion, but rather\na relation. Therefore love is not a passion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that passion\nis a movement. But love does not imply the movement of the appetite;\nfor this is desire, of which movement love is the principle.\nTherefore love is not a passion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that \"love\nis a passion.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient.\nNow a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in\nthe first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the\nmovement that results from the form. Thus the generator gives the\ngenerated body both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so\nthat weight, from being the principle of movement to the place, which\nis connatural to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be\ncalled \"natural love.\" In the same way the appetible object gives the\nappetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in\ncomplacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards\nthe appetible object. For \"the appetitive movement is circular,\" as\nstated in _De Anima_ iii, 10; because the appetible object moves the\nappetite, introducing itself, as it were, into its intention; while\nthe appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object,\nso that the movement ends where it began. Accordingly, the first\nchange wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called\n\"love,\" and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from\nthis complacency results a movement towards that same object, and\nthis movement is \"desire\"; and lastly, there is rest which is \"joy.\"\nSince, therefore, love consists in a change wrought in the appetite\nby the appetible object, it is evident that love is a passion:\nproperly so called, according as it is in the concupiscible faculty;\nin a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since power denotes a principle of movement or action,\nDionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of\nmovement in the appetite.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Union belongs to love in so far as by reason of the\ncomplacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that\nwhich he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence\nit is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that\nunion is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that \"love is a\nunitive force\" (Div. Nom. iv), and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii,\n1) that union is the work of love.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although love does not denote the movement of the\nappetite in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that\nmovement whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object, so\nas to have complacency therein.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 26, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Love Is the Same As Dilection?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that love is the same as dilection. For\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, \"as four is\nto twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of\nstraight lines.\" But these have the same meaning. Therefore love and\ndilection denote the same thing.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the movements of the appetite differ by reason of\ntheir objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the same.\nTherefore these are the same.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that it is\nchiefly in the fact that \"dilection refers to good things, love to\nevil things, as some have maintained,\" according to Augustine (De\nCiv. Dei xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because as Augustine\nsays (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in\nreference to either good or bad things. Therefore love and dilection\ndo not differ: thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7)\nthat \"it is not one thing to speak of love, and another to speak of\ndilection.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"some holy men\nhave held that love means something more Godlike than dilection does.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We find four words referring in a way, to the same\nthing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friendship. They differ,\nhowever, in this, that \"friendship,\" according to the Philosopher\n(Ethic. viii, 5), \"is like a habit,\" whereas \"love\" and \"dilection\"\nare expressed by way of act or passion; and \"charity\" can be taken\neither way.\n\nMoreover these three express act in different ways. For love has a\nwider signification than the others, since every dilection or charity\nis love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition\nto love, a choice (_electionem_) made beforehand, as the very word\ndenotes: and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power,\nbut only in the will, and only in the rational nature. Charity\ndenotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, in so far\nas that which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word\nitself implies [*Referring to the Latin \"carus\" (dear)].\n\nReply Obj. 1: Dionysius is speaking of love and dilection, in so far\nas they are in the intellectual appetite; for thus love is the same\nas dilection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The object of love is more general than the\nobject of dilection: because love extends to more than dilection does,\nas stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Love and dilection differ, not in respect of\ngood and evil, but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty love is\nthe same as dilection. And it is in this sense that Augustine speaks\nof love in the passage quoted: hence a little further on he adds that\n\"a right will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed\nlove.\" However, the fact that love, which is concupiscible passion,\ninclines many to evil, is the reason why some assigned the difference\nspoken of.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The reason why some held that, even when applied\nto the will itself, the word \"love\" signifies something more Godlike\nthan \"dilection,\" was because love denotes a passion, especially in so\nfar as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection presupposes\nthe judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend to God by\nlove, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can\npossibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the nature\nof dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike\nthan dilection.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 26, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Love Is Properly Divided into Love of Friendship and Love of\nConcupiscence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that love is not properly divided into\nlove of friendship and love of concupiscence. For \"love is a passion,\nwhile friendship is a habit,\" according to the Philosopher (Ethic.\nviii, 5). But habit cannot be the member of a division of passions.\nTherefore love is not properly divided into love of concupiscence and\nlove of friendship.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a thing cannot be divided by another member of the\nsame division; for man is not a member of the same division as\n\"animal.\" But concupiscence is a member of the same division as love,\nas a passion distinct from love. Therefore concupiscence is not a\ndivision of love.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3)\nfriendship is threefold, that which is founded on _usefulness,_ that\nwhich is founded on _pleasure,_ and that which is founded on\n_goodness._ But useful and pleasant friendship are not without\nconcupiscence. Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with\nfriendship.\n\n_On the contrary,_ We are said to love certain things, because we\ndesire them: thus \"a man is said to love wine, on account of its\nsweetness which he desires\"; as stated in _Topic._ ii, 3. But we have\nno friendship for wine and suchlike things, as stated in _Ethic._\nviii, 2. Therefore love of concupiscence is distinct from love of\nfriendship.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4), \"to love is\nto wish good to someone.\" Hence the movement of love has a twofold\ntendency: towards the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself\nor to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good.\nAccordingly, man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he\nwishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he\nwishes good.\n\nNow the members of this division are related as primary and\nsecondary: since that which is loved with the love of friendship is\nloved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the\nlove of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for\nsomething else. For just as that which has existence, is a being\nsimply, while that which exists in another is a relative being; so,\nbecause good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has\ngoodness, is good simply; but that which is another's good, is a\nrelative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved,\nthat it may have some good, is love simply; while the love, with\nwhich a thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is relative\nlove.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence,\nbut into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. For a friend\nis, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we are said to\ndesire, what we wish for ourselves.\n\nHence the Reply to the Second Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a\nman does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the\ncharacter of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good\nfurther to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of\nthe useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of\nconcupiscence, loses the character to true friendship.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 27\n\nOF THE CAUSE OF LOVE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the cause of love: and under this head there are\nfour points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether good is the only cause of love?\n\n(2) Whether knowledge is a cause of love?\n\n(3) Whether likeness is a cause of love?\n\n(4) Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 27, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Good Is the Only Cause of Love?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that good is not the only cause of love.\nFor good does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it\nhappens that evil also is loved, according to Ps. 10:6: \"He that\nloveth iniquity, hateth his own soul\": else, every love would be\ngood. Therefore good is not the only cause of love.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that \"we love\nthose who acknowledge their evils.\" Therefore it seems that evil is\nthe cause of love.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not \"the good\"\nonly but also \"the beautiful is beloved by all.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3): \"Assuredly the\ngood alone is beloved.\" Therefore good alone is the cause of love.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 26, A. 1), Love belongs to the\nappetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object\nstands in relation to it as the cause of its movement or act.\nTherefore the cause of love must needs be love's object. Now the\nproper object of love is the good; because, as stated above (Q. 26,\nAA. 1, 2), love implies a certain connaturalness or complacency of\nthe lover for the thing beloved, and to everything, that thing is a\ngood, which is akin and proportionate to it. It follows, therefore,\nthat good is the proper cause of love.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Evil is never loved except under the aspect of good,\nthat is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect, and is\nconsidered as being good simply. And thus a certain love is evil, in\nso far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good. It is in\nthis way that man \"loves iniquity,\" inasmuch as, by means of\niniquity, some good is gained; pleasure, for instance, or money, or\nsuch like.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those who acknowledge their evils, are beloved, not\nfor their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for it is a good\nthing to acknowledge one's faults, in so far as it excludes\ninsincerity or hypocrisy.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The beautiful is the same as the good, and they differ\nin aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good\nis that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is\nthat which calms the desire, by being seen or known. Consequently\nthose senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most\ncognitive, viz. sight and hearing, as ministering to reason; for we\nspeak of beautiful sights and beautiful sounds. But in reference to\nthe other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression\n\"beautiful,\" for we do not speak of beautiful tastes, and beautiful\nodors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation\nto the cognitive faculty: so that \"good\" means that which simply\npleases the appetite; while the \"beautiful\" is something pleasant\nto apprehend.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 27, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Knowledge Is a Cause of Love?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love. For\nit is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are sought\nwithout being known, for instance, the sciences; for since \"to have\nthem is the same as to know them,\" as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu.\n35), if we knew them we should have them, and should not seek them.\nTherefore knowledge is not the cause of love.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to love what we know not seems like loving something\nmore than we know it. But some things are loved more than they are\nknown: thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but cannot be\nknown in Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there would be\nno love, where there is no knowledge. But in all things there is\nlove, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not\nknowledge in all things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1, 2) that \"none can\nlove what he does not know.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), good is the cause of love,\nas being its object. But good is not the object of the appetite,\nexcept as apprehended. And therefore love demands some apprehension\nof the good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic.\nix, 5, 12) says that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love:\nand in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness\nis the beginning of spiritual love. Accordingly knowledge is the\ncause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only\nif known.\n\nReply Obj. 1: He who seeks science, is not entirely without knowledge\nthereof: but knows something about it already in some respect, either\nin a general way, or in some one of its effects, or from having heard\nit commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1, 2). But to have it is\nnot to know it thus, but to know it perfectly.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Something is required for the perfection of knowledge,\nthat is not requisite for the perfection of love. For knowledge\nbelongs to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish things\nwhich in reality are united, and to unite together, after a fashion,\nthings that are distinct, by comparing one with another. Consequently\nthe perfection of knowledge requires that man should know distinctly\nall that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers, and properties. On\nthe other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a\nthing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, for the perfection\nof love, that a thing be loved according as it is known in itself.\nHence it is, therefore, that a thing is loved more than it is known;\nsince it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known.\nThis is most evident in regard to the sciences, which some love\nthrough having a certain general knowledge of them: for instance,\nthey know that rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade\nothers; and this is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies to\nthe love of God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even natural love, which is in all things, is caused\nby a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things\nthemselves, but in Him Who created their nature, as stated above\n(Q. 26, A. 1; cf. I, Q. 6, A. 1, ad 2).\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 27, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Likeness Is a Cause of Love?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love. For\nthe same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the\ncause of hatred; for it is written (Prov. 13:10) that \"among the\nproud there are always contentions\"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic.\nviii, 1) that \"potters quarrel with one another.\" Therefore likeness\nis not a cause of love.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that \"a man loves\nin another that which he would not be himself: thus he loves an\nactor, but would not himself be an actor.\" But it would not be so, if\nlikeness were the proper cause of love; for in that case a man would\nlove in another, that which he possesses himself, or would like to\npossess. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.\n\nObj. 3: Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if he have\nit not: thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves riches.\nBut in so far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike them.\nTherefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause of love.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that \"we love\nthose who bestow money and health on us; and also those who retain\ntheir friendship for the dead.\" But all are not such. Therefore\nlikeness is not a cause of love.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 13:19): \"Every beast loveth\nits like.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love. But\nit must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One kind\nof likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually:\nfor example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness are said\nto be alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having\npotentially and by way of inclination, a quality which the other has\nactually: thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its\nproper place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper\nplace: or again, according as potentiality bears a resemblance to its\nact; since act is contained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself.\n\nAccordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or\nwell-being. For the very fact that two men are alike, having, as it\nwere, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: thus\ntwo men are one thing in the species of humanity, and two white men\nare one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the\nother, as being one with him; and he wishes good to him as to\nhimself. But the second kind of likeness causes love of\nconcupiscence, or friendship founded on usefulness or pleasure:\nbecause whatever is in potentiality, as such, has the desire for its\nact; and it takes pleasure in its realization, if it be a sentient\nand cognitive being.\n\nNow it has been stated above (Q. 26, A. 4), that in the love of\nconcupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in\nwilling the good that he desires. But a man loves himself more than\nanother: because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with\nanother he is one only in the likeness of some form. Consequently,\nif this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a\nform, hinders him from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes\nhateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from\ngaining his own good. This is why \"potters quarrel among themselves,\"\nbecause they hinder one another's gain: and why \"there are\ncontentions among the proud,\" because they hinder one another in\nattaining the position they covet.\n\nHence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even when a man loves in another what he loves not in\nhimself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as the\nlatter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that\nwhich he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer love a good\nwriter, we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has\nthat which is becoming to him in respect of his art.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to what\nhe loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, as stated\nabove.\n\nReply Obj. 4: According to the same likeness of potentiality to its\nact, the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as he\nexpects from him something which he desires. The same applies to the\nman who is constant in his friendship as compared to one who is\ninconstant. For in either case friendship seems to be based on\nusefulness. We might also say that although not all men have these\nvirtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according to\ncertain seminal principles in the reason, in force of which\nprinciples the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, as\nbeing in conformity with his own natural reason.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 27, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Any Other Passion of the Soul Is a Cause of Love?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that some other passion can be the cause\nof love. For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) says that some are\nloved for the sake of the pleasure they give. But pleasure is a\npassion. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.\n\nObj. 2: Further, desire is a passion. But we love some because we\ndesire to receive something from them: as happens in every friendship\nbased on usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1): \"When we have no\nhope of getting a thing, we love it but half-heartedly or not at all,\neven if we see how beautiful it is.\" Therefore hope too is a cause of\nlove.\n\n_On the contrary,_ All the other emotions of the soul are caused by\nlove, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9).\n\n_I answer that,_ There is no other passion of the soul that does not\npresuppose love of some kind. The reason is that every other passion\nof the soul implies either movement towards something, or rest in\nsomething. Now every movement towards something, or rest in\nsomething, arises from some kinship or aptness to that thing; and in\nthis does love consist. Therefore it is not possible for any other\npassion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it\nmay happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular\nlove: just as one good is the cause of another.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When a man loves a thing for the pleasure it affords,\nhis love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is\ncaused, in its turn, by another preceding love; for none takes\npleasure save in that which is loved in some way.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Desire for a thing always presupposes love for that\nthing. But desire of one thing can be the cause of another thing's\nbeing loved; thus he that desires money, for this reason loves him\nfrom whom he receives it.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Hope causes or increases love; both by reason of\npleasure, because it causes pleasure; and by reason of desire,\nbecause hope strengthens desire, since we do not desire so intensely\nthat which we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself is\nof a good that is loved.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 28\n\nOF THE EFFECTS OF LOVE\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe now have to consider the effects of love: under which head there\nare six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether union is an effect of love?\n\n(2) Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?\n\n(3) Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?\n\n(4) Whether zeal is an effect of love?\n\n(5) Whether love is a passion that is hurtful to the lover?\n\n(6) Whether love is cause of all that the lover does?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 28, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Union Is an Effect of Love?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that union is not an effect of love. For\nabsence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with\nabsence; for the Apostle says (Gal. 4:18): \"Be zealous for that which\nis good in a good thing always\" (speaking of himself, according to a\ngloss), \"and not only when I am present with you.\" Therefore union is\nnot an effect of love.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every union is either according to essence, thus\nform is united to matter, accident to subject, and a part to the\nwhole, or to another part in order to make up the whole: or according\nto likeness, in genus, species, or accident. But love does not cause\nunion of essence; else love could not be between things essentially\ndistinct. On the other hand, love does not cause union of likeness,\nbut rather is caused by it, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 3). Therefore\nunion is not an effect of love.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act, and the\nintellect in act is the thing actually understood. But the lover in\nact is not the beloved in act. Therefore union is the effect of\nknowledge rather than of love.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every love is a\n\"unitive love.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first\nis real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the\nlover. The second is union of affection: and this union must be\nconsidered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement\nof the appetite follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz.\nlove of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises\nfrom a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with\nthe lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it\nas belonging to our well-being. In like manner when a man loves\nanother with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he\nwills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends him as his other self,\nin so far, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself. Hence a\nfriend is called a man's \"other self\" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine\nsays (Confess. iv, 6), \"Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of\nmy soul.\"\n\nThe first of these unions is caused _effectively_ by love; because\nlove moves man to desire and seek the presence of the beloved, as of\nsomething suitable and belonging to him. The second union is caused\n_formally_ by love; because love itself is this union or bond. In\nthis sense Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10) that \"love is a vital\nprinciple uniting, or seeking to unite two together, the lover, to\nwit, and the beloved.\" For in describing it as \"uniting\" he refers to\nthe union of affection, without which there is no love: and in saying\nthat \"it seeks to unite,\" he refers to real union.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument is true of real union. That is necessary\nto pleasure as being its cause; desire implies the real absence of\nthe beloved: but love remains whether the beloved be absent or\npresent.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union\nwhich causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love\nwith which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one\nloves other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above (Q.\n27, A. 3). There is also a union which is essentially love itself.\nThis union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened to\nsubstantial union, inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his\nlove, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something\nbelonging to himself, if it be love of concupiscence. Again there is\na union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the\nlover seeks with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in\nkeeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates\n(Polit. ii, 1), \"Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be\nunited both into one,\" but since \"this would result in either one or\nboth being destroyed,\" they seek a suitable and becoming union--to\nlive together, speak together, and be united together in other like\nthings.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Knowledge is perfected by the thing known being\nunited, through its likeness, to the knower. But the effect of love is\nthat the thing itself which is loved, is, in a way, united to the\nlover, as stated above. Consequently the union caused by love is\ncloser than that which is caused by knowledge.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 28, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Mutual Indwelling Is an Effect of Love?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that love does not cause mutual\nindwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. For\nthat which is in another is contained in it. But the same cannot be\ncontainer and contents. Therefore love cannot cause mutual\nindwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing can penetrate within a whole, except by\nmeans of a division of the whole. But it is the function of the\nreason, not of the appetite where love resides, to divide things that\nare really united. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of\nlove.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if love involves the lover being in the beloved and\nvice versa, it follows that the beloved is united to the lover, in\nthe same way as the lover is united to the beloved. But the union\nitself is love, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it follows that the\nlover is always loved by the object of his love; which is evidently\nfalse. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 4:16): \"He that abideth in\ncharity abideth in God, and God in him.\" Now charity is the love of\nGod. Therefore, for the same reason, every love makes the beloved to\nbe in the lover, and vice versa.\n\n_I answer that,_ This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood\nas referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power.\nBecause, as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in\nthe lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the\nlover, according to Phil. 1:7, \"For that I have you in my heart\":\nwhile the lover is said to be in the beloved, according to\napprehension, inasmuch as the lover is not satisfied with a\nsuperficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an\nintimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to\npenetrate into his very soul. Thus it is written concerning the Holy\nGhost, Who is God's Love, that He \"searcheth all things, yea the deep\nthings of God\" (1 Cor. 2:10).\n\nAs the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover,\ninasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency:\ncausing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when\npresent; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to\ntend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good\nthat he wills to the beloved, with the love of friendship: not indeed\nfrom any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of\nanother, or wish good to another on account of something else), but\nbecause the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover's\nheart. For this reason we speak of love as being \"intimate\"; and \"of\nthe bowels of charity.\" On the other hand, the lover is in the\nbeloved, by the love of concupiscence and by the love of friendship,\nbut not in the same way. For the love of concupiscence is not\nsatisfied with any external or superficial possession or enjoyment of\nthe beloved; but seeks to possess the beloved perfectly, by\npenetrating into his heart, as it were. Whereas, in the love of\nfriendship, the lover is in the beloved, inasmuch as he reckons what\nis good or evil to his friend, as being so to himself; and his\nfriend's will as his own, so that it seems as though he felt the good\nor suffered the evil in the person of his friend. Hence it is proper\nto friends \"to desire the same things, and to grieve and rejoice at\nthe same,\" as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 3 and Rhet. ii, 4).\nConsequently in so far as he reckons what affects his friend as\naffecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he\nwere become one with him: but in so far as, on the other hand, he\nwills and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking on\nhis friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the\nlover.\n\nIn yet a third way, mutual indwelling in the love of friendship can\nbe understood in regard to reciprocal love: inasmuch as friends\nreturn love for love, and both desire and do good things for one\nanother.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The beloved is contained in the lover, by being\nimpressed on his heart and thus becoming the object of his\ncomplacency. On the other hand, the lover is contained in the\nbeloved, inasmuch as the lover penetrates, so to speak, into the\nbeloved. For nothing hinders a thing from being both container and\ncontents in different ways: just as a genus is contained in its\nspecies, and vice versa.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The apprehension of the reason precedes the movement of\nlove. Consequently, just as the reason divides, so does the movement\nof love penetrate into the beloved, as was explained above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument is true of the third kind of mutual\nindwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 28, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Ecstasy Is an Effect of Love?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love.\nFor ecstasy seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always\nresult in loss of reason: for lovers are masters of themselves at\ntimes. Therefore love does not cause ecstasy.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the lover desires the beloved to be united to him.\nTherefore he draws the beloved to himself, rather than betakes\nhimself into the beloved, going forth out from himself as it were.\n\nObj. 3: Further, love unites the beloved to the lover, as stated\nabove (A. 1). If, therefore, the lover goes out from himself, in\norder to betake himself into the beloved, it follows that the lover\nalways loves the beloved more than himself: which is evidently false.\nTherefore ecstasy is not an effect of love.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"the Divine\nlove produces ecstasy,\" and that \"God Himself suffered ecstasy\nthrough love.\" Since therefore according to the same author (Div.\nNom. iv), every love is a participated likeness of the Divine Love,\nit seems that every love causes ecstasy.\n\n_I answer that,_ To suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside\noneself. This happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the\nappetitive power. As to the apprehensive power, a man is said to be\nplaced outside himself, when he is placed outside the knowledge\nproper to him. This may be due to his being raised to a higher\nknowledge; thus, a man is said to suffer ecstasy, inasmuch as he is\nplaced outside the connatural apprehension of his sense and reason,\nwhen he is raised up so as to comprehend things that surpass sense\nand reason: or it may be due to his being cast down into a state of\ndebasement; thus a man may be said to suffer ecstasy, when he is\novercome by violent passion or madness. As to the appetitive power, a\nman is said to suffer ecstasy, when that power is borne towards\nsomething else, so that it goes forth out from itself, as it were.\n\nThe first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so\nfar, namely, as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved, as stated\nabove (A. 2), and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from\nother things. The second ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love\nof friendship, simply; by love of concupiscence not simply but in a\nrestricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the lover is\ncarried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as not\nbeing satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy\nsomething outside himself. But since he seeks to have this extrinsic\ngood for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this\nmovement remains finally within him. On the other hand, in the love\nof friendship, a man's affection goes out from itself simply; because\nhe wishes and does good to his friend, by caring and providing for\nhim, for his sake.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument is true of the first kind of ecstasy.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument applies to love of concupiscence, which,\nas stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as he\nwills the good of his friend and works for it. Yet he does not will\nthe good of his friend more than his own good: and so it does not\nfollow that he loves another more than himself.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 28, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Zeal Is an Effect of Love?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For\nzeal is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written (1 Cor.\n3:3): \"Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and\ncontention,\" etc. But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore\nzeal is not an effect of love.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the object of love is the good, which communicates\nitself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication; since it\nseems an effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the object of\nhis love with another: thus husbands are said to be jealous of\n(_zelare_) their wives, because they will not share them with others.\nTherefore zeal is not an effect of love.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is there\nwithout love: for it is written (Ps. 72:3): \"I had a zeal on occasion\nof the wicked.\" Therefore it should not be set down as an effect of\nlove any more than of hatred.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): \"God is said to be\na zealot, on account of his great love for all things.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the\nintensity of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power\ntends to anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or\nresistance. Since therefore love is \"a movement towards the object\nloved,\" as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to\nremove everything that opposes it.\n\nBut this happens in different ways according to love of\nconcupiscence, and love of friendship. For in love of concupiscence\nhe who desires something intensely, is moved against all that hinders\nhis gaining or quietly enjoying the object of his love. It is thus\nthat husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, lest association\nwith others prove a hindrance to their exclusive individual rights.\nIn like manner those who seek to excel, are moved against those who\nseem to excel, as though these were a hindrance to their excelling.\nAnd this is the zeal of envy, of which it is written (Ps. 36:1): \"Be\nnot emulous of evil doers, nor envy (_zelaveris_) them that work\niniquity.\"\n\nOn the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend's good:\nwherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved against\neverything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is\nsaid to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when he makes a point of\nrepelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good. In\nthis way, too, a man is said to be zealous on God's behalf, when he\nendeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to\nthe honor or will of God; according to 3 Kings 19:14: \"With zeal I\nhave been zealous for the Lord of hosts.\" Again on the words of John\n2:17: \"The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up,\" a gloss says that \"a\nman is eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy whatever evil\nhe perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and laments it.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the zeal of\nenvy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the object\nof love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated to the\nlover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this\ncommunication, becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good.\nBut through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods\ncannot, in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and\nfrom the love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it does not\narise, properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in their\nentirety, can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the\nknowledge of truth, which can be known entirely by many; except\nperhaps one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The very fact that a man hates whatever is opposed to\nthe object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is set down\nas an effect of love rather than of hatred.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 28, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Love Is a Passion That Wounds the Lover?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that love wounds the lover. For languor\ndenotes a hurt in the one that languishes. But love causes languor:\nfor it is written (Cant 2:5): \"Stay me up with flowers, compass me\nabout with apples; because I languish with love.\" Therefore love is\na wounding passion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, melting is a kind of dissolution. But love melts\nthat in which it is: for it is written (Cant 5:6): \"My soul melted\nwhen my beloved spoke.\" Therefore love is a dissolvent: therefore it\nis a corruptive and a wounding passion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, fervor denotes a certain excess of heat; which\nexcess has a corruptive effect. But love causes fervor: for Dionysius\n(Coel. Hier. vii) in reckoning the properties belonging to the\nSeraphim's love, includes \"hot\" and \"piercing\" and \"most fervent.\"\nMoreover it is said of love (Cant 8:6) that \"its lamps are fire and\nflames.\" Therefore love is a wounding and corruptive passion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"everything\nloves itself with a love that holds it together,\" i.e. that preserves\nit. Therefore love is not a wounding passion, but rather one that\npreserves and perfects.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 26, AA. 1, 2; Q. 27, A. 1), love\ndenotes a certain adapting of the appetitive power to some good. Now\nnothing is hurt by being adapted to that which is suitable to it;\nrather, if possible, it is perfected and bettered. But if a thing be\nadapted to that which is not suitable to it, it is hurt and made\nworse thereby. Consequently love of a suitable good perfects and\nbetters the lover; but love of a good which is unsuitable to the\nlover, wounds and worsens him. Wherefore man is perfected and\nbettered chiefly by the love of God: but is wounded and worsened by\nthe love of sin, according to Osee 9:10: \"They became abominable, as\nthose things which they loved.\"\n\nAnd let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its\nformal element, i.e. in regard to the appetite. But in respect of the\nmaterial element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain bodily\nchange, it happens that love is hurtful, by reason of this change\nbeing excessive: just as it happens in the senses, and in every act\nof a power of the soul that is exercised through the change of some\nbodily organ.\n\nIn reply to the objections, it is to be observed that four proximate\neffects may be ascribed to love: viz. melting, enjoyment, languor,\nand fervor. Of these the first is \"melting,\" which is opposed to\nfreezing. For things that are frozen, are closely bound together, so\nas to be hard to pierce. But it belongs to love that the appetite is\nfitted to receive the good which is loved, inasmuch as the object\nloved is in the lover, as stated above (A. 2). Consequently the\nfreezing or hardening of the heart is a disposition incompatible with\nlove: while melting denotes a softening of the heart, whereby the\nheart shows itself to be ready for the entrance of the beloved. If,\nthen, the beloved is present and possessed, pleasure or enjoyment\nensues. But if the beloved be absent, two passions arise; viz.\nsadness at its absence, which is denoted by \"languor\" (hence Cicero\nin _De Tusc. Quaest._ iii, 11 applies the term \"ailment\" chiefly to\nsadness); and an intense desire to possess the beloved, which is\nsignified by \"fervor.\" And these are the effects of love considered\nformally, according to the relation of the appetitive power to its\nobject. But in the passion of love, other effects ensue,\nproportionate to the above, in respect of a change in the organ.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 28, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Love Is Cause of All That the Lover Does?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the lover does not do everything from\nlove. For love is a passion, as stated above (Q. 26, A. 2). But man\ndoes not do everything from passion: but some things he does from\nchoice, and some things from ignorance, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 8.\nTherefore not everything that a man does, is done from love.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the appetite is a principle of movement and action\nin all animals, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 10. If, therefore,\nwhatever a man does is done from love, the other passions of the\nappetitive faculty are superfluous.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nothing is produced at one and the same time by\ncontrary causes. But some things are done from hatred. Therefore all\nthings are not done from love.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"all things,\nwhatever they do, they do for the love of good.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Every agent acts for an end, as stated above (Q. 1,\nA. 2). Now the end is the good desired and loved by each one.\nWherefore it is evident that every agent, whatever it be, does every\naction from love of some kind.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This objection takes love as a passion existing in the\nsensitive appetite. But here we are speaking of love in a general\nsense, inasmuch as it includes intellectual, rational, animal, and\nnatural love: for it is in this sense that Dionysius speaks of love\nin chapter iv of _De Divinis Nominibus._\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (A. 5; Q. 27, A. 4) desire, sadness and\npleasure, and consequently all the other passions of the soul, result\nfrom love. Wherefore every act that proceeds from any passion,\nproceeds also from love as from a first cause: and so the other\npassions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Hatred also is a result of love, as we shall state\nfurther on (Q. 29, A. 2).\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 29\n\nOF HATRED\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider hatred: concerning which there are six points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether evil is the cause and the object of hatred?\n\n(2) Whether love is the cause of hatred?\n\n(3) Whether hatred is stronger than love?\n\n(4) Whether a man can hate himself?\n\n(5) Whether a man can hate the truth?\n\n(6) Whether a thing can be the object of universal hatred?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Evil Is the Cause and Object of Hatred?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that evil is not the object and cause of\nhatred. For everything that exists, as such, is good. If therefore\nevil be the object of hatred, it follows that nothing but the lack\nof something can be the object of hatred: which is clearly untrue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, hatred of evil is praiseworthy; hence (2 Macc. 3:1)\nsome are praised for that \"the laws were very well kept, because of\nthe godliness of Onias the high-priest, and the hatred of their souls\n[Douay: 'his soul'] had no evil.\" If, therefore, nothing but evil be\nthe object of hatred, it would follow that all hatred is commendable:\nand this is clearly false.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the same thing is not at the same time both good and\nevil. But the same thing is lovable and hateful to different\nsubjects. Therefore hatred is not only of evil, but also of good.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Hatred is the opposite of love. But the object of\nlove is good, as stated above (Q. 26, A. 1; Q. 27, A. 1). Therefore\nthe object of hatred is evil.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since the natural appetite is the result of\napprehension (though this apprehension is not in the same subject as\nthe natural appetite), it seems that what applies to the inclination\nof the natural appetite, applies also to the animal appetite, which\ndoes result from an apprehension in the same subject, as stated above\n(Q. 26, A. 1). Now, with regard to the natural appetite, it is\nevident, that just as each thing is naturally attuned and adapted to\nthat which is suitable to it, wherein consists natural love; so has\nit a natural dissonance from that which opposes and destroys it; and\nthis is natural hatred. So, therefore, in the animal appetite, or in\nthe intellectual appetite, love is a certain harmony of the appetite\nwith that which is apprehended as suitable; while hatred is\ndissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as\nrepugnant and hurtful. Now, just as whatever is suitable, as such,\nbears the aspect of good; so whatever is repugnant, as such, bears\nthe aspect of evil. And therefore, just as good is the object of\nlove, so evil is the object of hatred.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Being, as such, has not the aspect of repugnance but\nonly of fittingness; because being is common to all things. But\nbeing, inasmuch as it is this determinate being, has an aspect of\nrepugnance to some determinate being. And in this way, one being is\nhateful to another, and is evil; though not in itself, but by\ncomparison with something else.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as a thing may be apprehended as good, when it is\nnot truly good; so a thing may be apprehended as evil, whereas it is\nnot truly evil. Hence it happens sometimes that neither hatred of\nevil nor love of good is good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To different things the same thing may be lovable or\nhateful: in respect of the natural appetite, owing to one and the\nsame thing being naturally suitable to one thing, and naturally\nunsuitable to another: thus heat is becoming to fire and unbecoming\nto water: and in respect of the animal appetite, owing to one and\nthe same thing being apprehended by one as good, by another as bad.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Love Is a Cause of Hatred?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that love is not a cause of hatred. For\n\"the opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous\"\n(Praedic. x). But love and hatred are opposite members of a division,\nsince they are contrary to one another. Therefore they are naturally\nsimultaneous. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred.\n\nObj. 2: Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of the\nother. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not the\ncause of hatred.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which follows is not the cause of that which\nprecedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly: since hatred implies a\nturning away from evil, whereas love implies a turning towards good.\nTherefore love is not the cause of hatred.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9) that all\nemotions are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since it is an\nemotion of the soul, is caused by love.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), love consists in a certain\nagreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred consists\nin a certain disagreement or dissonance. Now we should consider in\neach thing, what agrees with it, before that which disagrees: since a\nthing disagrees with another, through destroying or hindering that\nwhich agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede hatred;\nand nothing is hated, save through being contrary to a suitable thing\nwhich is loved. And hence it is that every hatred is caused by love.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The opposite members of a division are sometimes\nnaturally simultaneous, both really and logically; e.g. two species\nof animal, or two species of color. Sometimes they are simultaneous\nlogically, while, in reality, one precedes, and causes the other;\ne.g. the species of numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes they\nare not simultaneous either really or logically; e.g. substance and\naccident; for substance is in reality the cause of accident; and\nbeing is predicated of substance before it is predicated of accident,\nby a priority of reason, because it is not predicated of accident\nexcept inasmuch as the latter is in substance. Now love and hatred\nare naturally simultaneous, logically but not really. Wherefore\nnothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Love and hatred are contraries if considered in respect\nof the same thing. But if taken in respect of contraries, they are\nnot themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: for it\namounts to the same that one love a certain thing, or that one hate\nits contrary. Thus love of one thing is the cause of one's hating its\ncontrary.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the order of execution, the turning away from one\nterm precedes the turning towards the other. But the reverse is the\ncase in the order of intention: since approach to one term is the\nreason for turning away from the other. Now the appetitive movement\nbelongs rather to the order of intention than to that of execution.\nWherefore love precedes hatred: because each is an appetitive\nmovement.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Hatred Is Stronger Than Love?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For\nAugustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 36): \"There is no one who does not flee\nfrom pain, more than he desires pleasure.\" But flight from pain\npertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs to love.\nTherefore hatred is stronger than love.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But love is\novercome by hatred: when, that is to say, love is turned into hatred.\nTherefore hatred is stronger than love.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the emotions of the soul are shown by their effects.\nBut man insists more on repelling what is hateful, than on seeking\nwhat is pleasant: thus also irrational animals refrain from pleasure\nfor fear of the whip, as Augustine instances (QQ. 83, qu. 36).\nTherefore hatred is stronger than love.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Good is stronger than evil; because \"evil does\nnothing except in virtue of good,\" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).\nBut hatred and love differ according to the difference of good and\nevil. Therefore love is stronger than hatred.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than\nits cause. Now every hatred arises from some love as its cause, as\nabove stated (A. 2). Therefore it is impossible for hatred to be\nstronger than love absolutely.\n\nBut furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger\nthan hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more strongly than\nto the means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to\nthe gaining of good. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, the soul's\nmovement in respect of good is stronger than its movement in respect\nof evil.\n\nNevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love, for two\nreasons. First, because hatred is more keenly felt than love. For,\nsince the sensitive perception is accompanied by a certain\nimpression; when once the impression has been received it is not felt\nso keenly as in the moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a\nhectic fever, though greater, is nevertheless not felt so much as the\nheat of tertian fever; because the heat of the hectic fever is\nhabitual and like a second nature. For this reason, love is felt more\nkeenly in the absence of the object loved; thus Augustine says (De\nTrin. x, 12) that \"love is felt more keenly when we lack what we\nlove.\" And for the same reason, the unbecomingness of that which is\nhated is felt more keenly than the becomingness of that which is\nloved. Secondly, because comparison is made between a hatred and a\nlove which are not mutually corresponding. Because, according to\ndifferent degrees of good there are different degrees of love to\nwhich correspond different degrees of hatred. Wherefore a hatred that\ncorresponds to a greater love, moves us more than a lesser love.\n\nHence it is clear how to reply to the First Objection. For the love\nof pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation, to which\ncorresponds flight from pain. Wherefore we flee from pain more than\nwe love pleasure.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Hatred would never overcome love, were it not for the\ngreater love to which that hatred corresponds. Thus man loves\nhimself, more than he loves his friend: and because he loves himself,\nhis friend is hateful to him, if he oppose him.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The reason why we act with greater insistence in\nrepelling what is hateful, is because we feel hatred more keenly.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Man Can Hate Himself?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man can hate himself. For it is\nwritten (Ps. 10:6): \"He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul.\"\nBut many love iniquity. Therefore many hate themselves.\n\nObj. 2: Further, him we hate, to whom we wish and work evil. But\nsometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself, e.g. a man who\nkills himself. Therefore some men hate themselves.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that \"avarice makes a\nman hateful\"; whence we may conclude that everyone hates a miser. But\nsome men are misers. Therefore they hate themselves.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 5:29) that \"no man ever\nhated his own flesh.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to\nhate himself. For everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone\ndesire anything for himself, save under the aspect of good: for \"evil\nis outside the scope of the will,\" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).\nNow to love a man is to will good to him, as stated above (Q. 26, A.\n4). Consequently, a man must, of necessity, love himself; and it is\nimpossible for a man to hate himself, properly speaking.\n\nBut accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: and this in two\nways. First, on the part of the good which a man wills to himself.\nFor it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some\nparticular respect, is simply evil; and in this way, a man\naccidentally wills evil to himself; and thus hates himself. Secondly,\nin regard to himself, to whom he wills good. For each thing is that\nwhich is predominant in it; wherefore the state is said to do what\nthe king does, as if the king were the whole state. Now it is clear\nthat man is principally the mind of man. And it happens that some men\naccount themselves as being principally that which they are in their\nmaterial and sensitive nature. Wherefore they love themselves\naccording to what they take themselves to be, while they hate that\nwhich they really are, by desiring what is contrary to reason. And in\nboth these ways, \"he that loveth iniquity hateth\" not only \"his own\nsoul,\" but also himself.\n\nWherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident.\n\nReply Obj. 2: No man wills and works evil to himself, except he\napprehend it under the aspect of good. For even they who kill\nthemselves, apprehend death itself as a good, considered as putting\nan end to some unhappiness or pain.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The miser hates something accidental to himself, but\nnot for that reason does he hate himself: thus a sick man hates his\nsickness for the very reason that he loves himself. Or we may say\nthat avarice makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. In\nfact, it is caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which,\nman desires temporal goods for himself more than he should.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 5]\n\nWhether a Man Can Hate the Truth?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man cannot hate the truth. For\ngood, true, and being are convertible. But a man cannot hate good.\nNeither, therefore, can he hate the truth.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"All men have a natural desire for knowledge,\" as\nstated in the beginning of the _Metaphysics_ (i, 1). But knowledge is\nonly of truth. Therefore truth is naturally desired and loved. But\nthat which is in a thing naturally, is always in it. Therefore no man\ncan hate the truth.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that \"men love\nthose who are straightforward.\" But there can be no other motive for\nthis save truth. Therefore man loves the truth naturally. Therefore\nhe cannot hate it.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 4:16): \"Am I become your\nenemy because I tell you the truth?\" [*St. Thomas quotes the passage,\nprobably from memory, as though it were an assertion: \"I am become,\"\netc.]\n\n_I answer that,_ Good, true and being are the same in reality, but\ndiffer as considered by reason. For good is considered in the light\nof something desirable, while being and true are not so considered:\nbecause good is \"what all things seek.\" Wherefore good, as such,\ncannot be the object of hatred, neither in general nor in particular.\nBeing and truth in general cannot be the object of hatred: because\ndisagreement is the cause of hatred, and agreement is the cause of\nlove; while being and truth are common to all things. But nothing\nhinders some particular being or some particular truth being an\nobject of hatred, in so far as it is considered as hurtful and\nrepugnant; since hurtfulness and repugnance are not incompatible with\nthe notion of being and truth, as they are with the notion of good.\n\nNow it may happen in three ways that some particular truth is\nrepugnant or hurtful to the good we love. First, according as truth\nis in things as in its cause and origin. And thus man sometimes hates\na particular truth, when he wishes that what is true were not true.\nSecondly, according as truth is in man's knowledge, which hinders him\nfrom gaining the object loved: such is the case of those who wish not\nto know the truth of faith, that they may sin freely; in whose person\nit is said (Job 21:14): \"We desire not the knowledge of Thy ways.\"\nThirdly, a particular truth is hated, as being repugnant, inasmuch as\nit is in the intellect of another man: as, for instance, when a man\nwishes to remain hidden in his sin, he hates that anyone should know\nthe truth about his sin. In this respect, Augustine says (Confess. x,\n23) that men \"love truth when it enlightens, they hate it when it\nreproves.\" This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The knowledge of truth is lovable in itself: hence\nAugustine says that men love it when it enlightens. But accidentally,\nthe knowledge of truth may become hateful, in so far as it hinders\none from accomplishing one's desire.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The reason why we love those who are straightforward is\nthat they make known the truth, and the knowledge of the truth,\nconsidered in itself, is a desirable thing.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Anything Can Be an Object of Universal Hatred?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a thing cannot be an object of\nuniversal hatred. Because hatred is a passion of the sensitive\nappetite, which is moved by an apprehension in the senses. But the\nsenses cannot apprehend the universal. Therefore a thing cannot be an\nobject of universal hatred.\n\nObj. 2: Further, hatred is caused by disagreement; and where there is\ndisagreement, there is nothing in common. But the notion of\nuniversality implies something in common. Therefore nothing can be\nthe object of universal hatred.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the object of hatred is evil. But \"evil is in\nthings, and not in the mind\" (Metaph. vi, 4). Since therefore the\nuniversal is in the mind only, which abstracts the universal from the\nparticular, it would seem that hatred cannot have a universal object.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that \"anger is\ndirected to something singular, whereas hatred is also directed to a\nthing in general; for everybody hates the thief and the backbiter.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ There are two ways of speaking of the universal:\nfirst, as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as\nconsidered in the nature to which it is ascribed: for it is one thing\nto consider the universal man, and another to consider a man as man.\nIf, therefore, we take the universal, in the first way, no sensitive\npower, whether of apprehension or of appetite, can attain the\nuniversal: because the universal is obtained by abstraction from\nindividual matter, on which every sensitive power is based.\n\nNevertheless the sensitive powers, both of apprehension and of\nappetite, can tend to something universally. Thus we say that the\nobject of sight is color considered generically; not that the sight\nis cognizant of universal color, but because the fact that color is\ncognizant by the sight, is attributed to color, not as being this\nparticular color, but simply because it is color. Accordingly hatred\nin the sensitive faculty can regard something universally: because\nthis thing, by reason of its common nature, and not merely as an\nindividual, is hostile to the animal--for instance, a wolf in regard\nto a sheep. Hence a sheep hates the wolf universally. On the other\nhand, anger is always caused by something in particular: because it\nis caused by some action of the one that hurts us; and actions\nproceed from individuals. For this reason the Philosopher says (Rhet.\nii, 4) that \"anger is always directed to something singular, whereas\nhatred can be directed to a thing in general.\"\n\nBut according as hatred is in the intellectual part, since it arises\nfrom the universal apprehension of the intellect, it can regard the\nuniversal in both ways.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The senses do not apprehend the universal, as such: but\nthey apprehend something to which the character of universality is\ngiven by abstraction.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That which is common to all cannot be a reason of\nhatred. But nothing hinders a thing from being common to many, and at\nvariance with others, so as to be hateful to them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers the universal under the aspect\nof universality: and thus it does not come under the sensitive\napprehension or appetite.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 30\n\nOF CONCUPISCENCE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe have now to consider concupiscence: under which head there are\nfour points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether concupiscence is in the sensitive appetite only?\n\n(2) Whether concupiscence is a specific passion?\n\n(3) Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural?\n\n(4) Whether concupiscence is infinite?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 30, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Concupiscence Is in the Sensitive Appetite Only?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not only in the\nsensitive appetite. For there is a concupiscence of wisdom, according\nto Wis. 6:21: \"The concupiscence [Douay: 'desire'] of wisdom bringeth\nto the everlasting kingdom.\" But the sensitive appetite can have no\ntendency to wisdom. Therefore concupiscence is not only in the\nsensitive appetite.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the desire for the commandments of God is not in the\nsensitive appetite: in fact the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): \"There\ndwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is good.\"\nBut desire for God's commandments is an act of concupiscence,\naccording to Ps. 118:20: \"My soul hath coveted (_concupivit_) to long\nfor thy justifications.\" Therefore concupiscence is not only in the\nsensitive appetite.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to each power, its proper good is a matter of\nconcupiscence. Therefore concupiscence is in each power of the soul,\nand not only in the sensitive appetite.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that \"the\nirrational part which is subject and amenable to reason, is divided\ninto the faculties of concupiscence and anger. This is the irrational\npart of the soul, passive and appetitive.\" Therefore concupiscence is\nin the sensitive appetite.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11),\n\"concupiscence is a craving for that which is pleasant.\" Now pleasure\nis twofold, as we shall state later on (Q. 31, AA. 3, 4): one is in\nthe intelligible good, which is the good of reason; the other is in\ngood perceptible to the senses. The former pleasure seems to belong\nto soul alone: whereas the latter belongs to both soul and body:\nbecause the sense is a power seated in a bodily organ: wherefore\nsensible good is the good of the whole composite. Now concupiscence\nseems to be the craving for this latter pleasure, since it belongs to\nthe united soul and body, as is implied by the Latin word\n\"concupiscentia.\" Therefore, properly speaking, concupiscence is in\nthe sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible faculty, which takes\nits name from it.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual goods, is\nsometimes called concupiscence; either by reason of a certain\nlikeness; or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul\nbeing so vehement that it overflows into the lower appetite, so that\nthe latter also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good,\nfollowing the lead of the higher appetite, the result being that the\nbody itself renders its service in spiritual matters, according to\nPs. 83:3: \"My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Properly speaking, desire may be not only in the lower,\nbut also in the higher appetite. For it does not imply fellowship in\ncraving, as concupiscence does; but simply movement towards the thing\ndesired.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It belongs to each power of the soul to seek its proper\ngood by the natural appetite, which does not arise from apprehension.\nBut the craving for good, by the animal appetite, which arises from\napprehension, belongs to the appetitive power alone. And to crave a\nthing under the aspect of something delightful to the senses, wherein\nconcupiscence properly consists, belongs to the concupiscible power.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 30, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Concupiscence Is a Specific Passion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not a specific\npassion of the concupiscible power. For passions are distinguished by\ntheir objects. But the object of the concupiscible power is something\ndelightful to the senses; and this is also the object of\nconcupiscence, as the Philosopher declares (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore\nconcupiscence is not a specific passion of the concupiscible faculty.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that \"covetousness\nis the love of transitory things\": so that it is not distinct from\nlove. But all specific passions are distinct from one another.\nTherefore concupiscence is not a specific passion in the\nconcupiscible faculty.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to each passion of the concupiscible faculty there\nis a specific contrary passion in that faculty, as stated above (Q.\n23, A. 4). But no specific passion of the concupiscible faculty is\ncontrary to concupiscence. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12)\nthat \"good when desired gives rise to concupiscence; when present, it\ngives joy: in like manner, the evil we apprehend makes us fear, the\nevil that is present makes us sad\": from which we gather that as\nsadness is contrary to joy, so is fear contrary to concupiscence. But\nfear is not in the concupiscible, but in the irascible part.\nTherefore concupiscence is not a specific passion of the\nconcupiscible faculty.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Concupiscence is caused by love, and tends to\npleasure, both of which are passions of the concupiscible faculty.\nHence it is distinguished from the other concupiscible passions, as\na specific passion.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; Q. 23, A. 1), the good which\ngives pleasure to the senses is the common object of the\nconcupiscible faculty. Hence the various concupiscible passions are\ndistinguished according to the differences of that good. Now the\ndiversity of this object can arise from the very nature of the\nobject, or from a diversity in its active power. The diversity,\nderived from the nature of the active object, causes a material\ndifference of passions: while the difference in regard to its active\npower causes a formal diversity of passions, in respect of which the\npassions differ specifically.\n\nNow the nature of the motive power of the end or of the good, differs\naccording as it is really present, or absent: because, according as\nit is present, it causes the faculty to find rest in it; whereas,\naccording as it is absent, it causes the faculty to be moved towards\nit. Wherefore the object of sensible pleasure causes love, inasmuch\nas, so to speak, it attunes and conforms the appetite to itself; it\ncauses concupiscence, inasmuch as, when absent, it draws the faculty\nto itself; and it causes pleasure, inasmuch as, when present, it\nmakes the faculty to find rest in itself. Accordingly, concupiscence\nis a passion differing _in species_ from both love and pleasure. But\nconcupiscences of this or that pleasurable object differ _in number._\n\nReply Obj. 1: Pleasurable good is the object of concupiscence, not\nabsolutely, but considered as absent: just as the sensible,\nconsidered as past, is the object of memory. For these particular\nconditions diversify the species of passions, and even of the powers\nof the sensitive part, which regards particular things.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In the passage quoted we have causal, not essential\npredication: for covetousness is not essentially love, but an effect\nof love. We may also say that Augustine is taking covetousness in a\nwide sense, for any movement of the appetite in respect of good to\ncome: so that it includes both love and hope.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The passion which is directly contrary to concupiscence\nhas no name, and stands in relation to evil, as concupiscence in\nregard to good. But since, like fear, it regards the absent evil;\nsometimes it goes by the name of fear, just as hope is sometimes\ncalled covetousness. For a small good or evil is reckoned as though\nit were nothing: and consequently every movement of the appetite in\nfuture good or evil is called hope or fear, which regard good and\nevil as arduous.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 30, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Some Concupiscences Are Natural, and Some Not Natural?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that concupiscences are not divided into\nthose which are natural and those which are not. For concupiscence\nbelongs to the animal appetite, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). But the\nnatural appetite is contrasted with the animal appetite. Therefore no\nconcupiscence is natural.\n\nObj. 2: Further, material differences makes no difference of species,\nbut only numerical difference; a difference which is outside the\npurview of science. But if some concupiscences are natural, and some\nnot, they differ only in respect of their objects; which amounts to a\nmaterial difference, which is one of number only. Therefore\nconcupiscences should not be divided into those that are natural and\nthose that are not.\n\nObj. 3: Further, reason is contrasted with nature, as stated in\n_Phys._ ii, 5. If therefore in man there is a concupiscence which is\nnot natural, it must needs be rational. But this is impossible:\nbecause, since concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the\nsensitive appetite, and not to the will, which is the rational\nappetite. Therefore there are no concupiscences which are not natural.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11 and Rhetor. i, 11)\ndistinguishes natural concupiscences from those that are not natural.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), concupiscence is the craving\nfor pleasurable good. Now a thing is pleasurable in two ways. First,\nbecause it is suitable to the nature of the animal; for example,\nfood, drink, and the like: and concupiscence of such pleasurable\nthings is said to be natural. Secondly, a thing is pleasurable\nbecause it is apprehended as suitable to the animal: as when one\napprehends something as good and suitable, and consequently takes\npleasure in it: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said\nto be not natural, and is more wont to be called \"cupidity.\"\n\nAccordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or natural\nconcupiscences, are common to men and other animals: because to both\nis there something suitable and pleasurable according to nature: and\nin these all men agree; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11)\ncalls them \"common\" and \"necessary.\" But concupiscences of the second\nkind are proper to men, to whom it is proper to devise something as\ngood and suitable, beyond that which nature requires. Hence the\nPhilosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that the former concupiscences are\n\"irrational,\" but the latter, \"rational.\" And because different men\nreason differently, therefore the latter are also called (Ethic. iii,\n11) \"peculiar and acquired,\" i.e. in addition to those that are\nnatural.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The same thing that is the object of the natural\nappetite, may be the object of the animal appetite, once it is\napprehended. And in this way there may be an animal concupiscence of\nfood, drink, and the like, which are objects of the natural appetite.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The difference between those concupiscences that are\nnatural and those that are not, is not merely a material difference;\nit is also, in a way, formal, in so far as it arises from a\ndifference in the active object. Now the object of the appetite is\nthe apprehended good. Hence diversity of the active object follows\nfrom diversity of apprehension: according as a thing is apprehended\nas suitable, either by absolute apprehension, whence arise natural\nconcupiscences, which the Philosopher calls \"irrational\" (Rhet. i,\n11); or by apprehension together with deliberation, whence arise\nthose concupiscences that are not natural, and which for this very\nreason the Philosopher calls \"rational\" (Rhet. i, 11).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man has not only universal reason, pertaining to the\nintellectual faculty; but also particular reason pertaining to the\nsensitive faculty, as stated in the First Part (Q. 78, A. 4; Q. 81,\nA. 3): so that even rational concupiscence may pertain to the\nsensitive appetite. Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved by\nthe universal reason also, through the medium of the particular\nimagination.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 30, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Concupiscence Is Infinite?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not infinite. For\nthe object of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of an end.\nBut where there is infinity there is no end (Metaph. ii, 2).\nTherefore concupiscence cannot be infinite.\n\nObj. 2: Further, concupiscence is of the fitting good, since it\nproceeds from love. But the infinite is without proportion, and\ntherefore unfitting. Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there is no passing through infinite things: and\nthus there is no reaching an ultimate term in them. But the subject\nof concupiscence is not delighted until he attain the ultimate term.\nTherefore, if concupiscence were infinite, no delight would ever\nensue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that \"since\nconcupiscence is infinite, men desire an infinite number of things.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), concupiscence is twofold;\none is natural, the other is not natural. Natural concupiscence\ncannot be actually infinite: because it is of that which nature\nrequires; and nature ever tends to something finite and fixed. Hence\nman never desires infinite meat, or infinite drink. But just as in\nnature there is potential successive infinity, so can this kind of\nconcupiscence be infinite successively; so that, for instance, after\ngetting food, a man may desire food yet again; and so of anything\nelse that nature requires: because these bodily goods, when obtained,\ndo not last for ever, but fail. Hence Our Lord said to the woman of\nSamaria (John 4:13): \"Whosoever drinketh of this water, shall thirst\nagain.\"\n\nBut non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite. Because, as\nstated above (A. 3), it follows from the reason, and it belongs to\nthe reason to proceed to infinity. Hence he that desires riches, may\ndesire to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but to be simply as\nrich as possible.\n\nAnother reason may be assigned, according to the Philosopher (Polit.\ni, 3), why a certain concupiscence is finite, and another infinite.\nBecause concupiscence of the end is always infinite: since the end is\ndesired for its own sake, e.g. health: and thus greater health is\nmore desired, and so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of\nitself dilates the sight, that which is more white dilates yet more.\nOn the other hand, concupiscence of the means is not infinite,\nbecause the concupiscence of the means is in suitable proportion to\nthe end. Consequently those who place their end in riches have an\ninfinite concupiscence of riches; whereas those who desire riches, on\naccount of the necessities of life, desire a finite measure of\nriches, sufficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher\nsays (Polit. i, 3). The same applies to the concupiscence of any\nother things.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Every object of concupiscence is taken as something\nfinite: either because it is finite in reality, as being once\nactually desired; or because it is finite as apprehended. For it\ncannot be apprehended as infinite, since the infinite is that \"from\nwhich, however much we may take, there always remains something to be\ntaken\" (Phys. iii, 6).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The reason is possessed of infinite power, in a certain\nsense, in so far as it can consider a thing infinitely, as appears in\nthe addition of numbers and lines. Consequently, the infinite, taken\nin a certain way, is proportionate to reason. In fact the universal\nwhich the reason apprehends, is infinite in a sense, inasmuch as it\ncontains potentially an infinite number of singulars.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In order that a man be delighted, there is no need for\nhim to realize all that he desires: for he delights in the\nrealization of each object of his concupiscence.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 31\n\nOF DELIGHT [*Or, Pleasure] CONSIDERED IN ITSELF\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning delight four\nthings must be considered: (1) Delight in itself; (2) The causes of\ndelight; (3) Its effects; (4) Its goodness and malice.\n\nUnder the first head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether delight is a passion?\n\n(2) Whether delight is subject to time?\n\n(3) Whether it differs from joy?\n\n(4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite?\n\n(5) Of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight\nof the lower;\n\n(6) Of sensible delights compared with one another;\n\n(7) Whether any delight is non-natural?\n\n(8) Whether one delight can be contrary to another?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Delight Is a Passion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that delight is not a passion. For\nDamascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from\npassion, and says that \"operation is a movement in accord with\nnature, while passion is a movement contrary to nature.\" But delight\nis an operation, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5).\nTherefore delight is not a passion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"To be passive is to be moved,\" as stated in _Phys._\niii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in having\nbeen moved; for it arises from good already gained. Therefore delight\nis not a passion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who is\ndelighted; since it \"perfects operation,\" as stated in _Ethic._ x, 4,\n5. But to be perfected does not consist in being passive or in being\naltered, as stated in _Phys._ vii, 3 and _De Anima_ ii, 5. Therefore\ndelight is not a passion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons\ndelight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of the soul.\n\n_I answer that,_ The movements of the sensitive appetite, are\nproperly called passions, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3). Now every\nemotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the\nsensitive appetite: and this must needs be said of delight, since,\naccording to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) \"delight is a certain\nmovement of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once,\nin keeping with the nature of the thing.\"\n\nIn order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural\nthings some happen to attain to their natural perfections, so does\nthis happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does\nnot occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection does\noccur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and\nother natural things, that when these latter are established in the\nstate becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals\ndo. And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the\nsoul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight.\nAccordingly by saying that delight is \"a movement of the soul,\" we\ndesignate its genus. By saying that it is \"an establishing in keeping\nwith the thing's nature,\" i.e. with that which exists in the thing, we\nassign the cause of delight, viz. the presence of a becoming good. By\nsaying that this establishing is \"all at once,\" we mean that this\nestablishing is to be understood not as in the process of\nestablishment, but as in the fact of complete establishment, in the\nterm of the movement, as it were: for delight is not a \"becoming\" as\nPlato [*Phileb. 32, 33] maintained, but a \"complete fact,\" as stated\nin _Ethic._ vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this establishing is\n\"sensible,\" we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein\nthere is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since delight is a\nmovement of the animal appetite arising from an apprehension of sense,\nit is a passion of the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second\nperfection, as stated in _De Anima_ ii, 1: and therefore when a thing\nis established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation,\ndelight follows, which consists in a state of completion, as observed\nabove. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we\ndesignate, not its essence, but its cause.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one,\naccording to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the\nappetite; the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to\nthe external operation. And so, although in him who has already\ngained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution\nceases, by which he tends to the end; yet the movement of the\nappetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired\nthat which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is\npossesses. For though delight is a certain repose of the appetite, if\nwe consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the\nappetite, nevertheless there remains the impression made on the\nappetite by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of\nmovement.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the name of passion is more appropriate to\nthose passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as\nbodily ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some\npassions have a tendency to something good, as stated above (Q. 23,\nAA. 1, 4): and in this sense delight is called a passion.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Delight Is in Time?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that delight is in time. For \"delight is\na kind of movement,\" as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all\nmovement is in time. Therefore delight is in time.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in\nrespect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore\npleasure is in time.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus. But\nsome passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is too.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that \"no one\ntakes pleasure according to time.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by\nitself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as\nit were. For since time is the measure of successive things, those\nthings are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession or\nsomething pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement,\nrepose, speech and such like. On the other hand, those things are\nsaid to be in time, by reason of something else and not of\nthemselves, to which succession is not essential, but which are\nsubject to something successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not\nessentially something successive; since it is not a movement, but the\nterm of a movement or change, viz. of this being begotten: yet,\nbecause human being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect,\nto be a man is in time.\n\nAccordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in\ntime: for it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the\nterm of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to change,\nthe delight therein will be in time accidentally: whereas if it be\naltogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time,\neither by reason of itself or accidentally.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated in _De Anima_ iii, 7, movement is twofold.\nOne is \"the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in\npotentiality, as such\": this movement is successive and is in time.\nAnother movement is \"the act of something perfect, i.e. of something\nexisting in act,\" e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such\nlike, also to have delight. This movement is not successive, nor is\nit of itself in time.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according\nas it is accidentally in time.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Other passions have not for their object a good\nobtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of\nthe imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs\nmore to delight not to be in time.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Delight Differs from Joy?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that delight is altogether the same as\njoy. Because the passions of the soul differ according to their\nobjects. But delight and joy have the same object, namely, a good\nobtained. Therefore joy is altogether the same as delight.\n\nObj. 2: Further, one movement does not end in two terms. But one and\nthe same movement, that of desire, ends in joy and delight. Therefore\ndelight and joy are altogether the same.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if joy differs from delight, it seems that there is\nequal reason for distinguishing gladness, exultation, and\ncheerfulness from delight, so that they would all be various passions\nof the soul. But this seems to be untrue. Therefore joy does not\ndiffer from delight.\n\n_On the contrary,_ We do not speak of joy in irrational animals;\nwhereas we do speak of delight in them. Therefore joy is not the same\nas delight.\n\n_I answer that,_ Joy, as Avicenna states (De Anima iv), is a kind of\ndelight. For we must observe that, just as some concupiscences are\nnatural, and some not natural, but consequent to reason, as stated\nabove (Q. 30, A. 3), so also some delights are natural, and some are\nnot natural but rational. Or, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 13) and\nGregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.] put it, \"some\ndelights are of the body, some are of the soul\"; which amounts to the\nsame. For we take delight both in those things which we desire\nnaturally, when we get them, and in those things which we desire as a\nresult of reason. But we do not speak of joy except when delight\nfollows reason; and so we do not ascribe joy to irrational animals,\nbut only delight.\n\nNow whatever we desire naturally, can also be the object of reasoned\ndesire and delight, but not vice versa. Consequently whatever can be\nthe object of delight, can also be the object of joy in rational\nbeings. And yet everything is not always the object of joy; since\nsometimes one feels a certain delight in the body, without rejoicing\nthereat according to reason. And accordingly delight extends to more\nthings than does joy.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since the object of the appetite of the soul is an\napprehended good, diversity of apprehension pertains, in a way, to\ndiversity of the object. And so delights of the soul, which are also\ncalled joys, are distinct from bodily delights, which are not called\notherwise than delights: as we have observed above in regard to\nconcupiscences (Q. 30, A. 3, ad 2).\n\nReply Obj. 2: A like difference is to be observed in concupiscences\nalso: so that delight corresponds to concupiscence, while joy\ncorresponds to desire, which seems to pertain more to concupiscence\nof the soul. Hence there is a difference of repose corresponding to\nthe difference of movement.\n\nReply Obj. 3: These other names pertaining to delight are derived\nfrom the effects of delight; for _laetitia_ (gladness) is derived\nfrom the \"dilation\" of the heart, as if one were to say \"latitia\";\n\"exultation\" is derived from the exterior signs of inward delight,\nwhich appear outwardly in so far as the inward joy breaks forth from\nits bounds; and \"cheerfulness\" is so called from certain special\nsigns and effects of gladness. Yet all these names seem to belong to\njoy; for we do not employ them save in speaking of rational beings.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Delight Is in the Intellectual Appetite?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that delight is not in the intellectual\nappetite. Because the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that \"delight is\na sensible movement.\" But sensible movement is not in an intellectual\npower. Therefore delight is not in the intellectual appetite.\n\nObj. 2: Further, delight is a passion. But every passion is in the\nsensitive appetite. Therefore delight is only in the sensitive\nappetite.\n\nObj. 3: Further, delight is common to us and to the irrational\nanimals. Therefore it is not elsewhere than in that power which we\nhave in common with irrational animals.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 36:4): \"Delight in the Lord.\"\nBut the sensitive appetite cannot reach to God; only the intellectual\nappetite can. Therefore delight can be in the intellectual appetite.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), a certain delight arises\nfrom the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending\nsomething, not only the sensitive appetite is moved, as regards its\napplication to some particular thing, but also the intellectual\nappetite, which is called the will. And accordingly in the\nintellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called\njoy, but not bodily delight.\n\nHowever, there is this difference of delight in either power, that\ndelight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily\ntransmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is\nnothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De\nCiv. Dei xiv, 6) that \"desire and joy are nothing else but a volition\nof consent to the things we wish.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: In this definition of the Philosopher, he uses the word\n\"sensible\" in its wide acceptation for any kind of perception. For he\nsays (Ethic. x, 4) that \"delight is attendant upon every sense, as it\nis also upon every act of the intellect and contemplation.\" Or we may\nsay that he is defining delight of the sensitive appetite.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Delight has the character of passion, properly\nspeaking, when accompanied by bodily transmutation. It is not thus in\nthe intellectual appetite, but according to simple movement: for thus\nit is also in God and the angels. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.\nvii, 14) that \"God rejoices by one simple act\": and Dionysius says at\nthe end of _De Coel. Hier.,_ that \"the angels are not susceptible to\nour passible delight, but rejoice together with God with the gladness\nof incorruption.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: In us there is delight, not only in common with dumb\nanimals, but also in common with angels. Wherefore Dionysius says (De\nCoel. Hier.) that \"holy men often take part in the angelic delights.\"\nAccordingly we have delight, not only in the sensitive appetite,\nwhich we have in common with dumb animals, but also in the\nintellectual appetite, which we have in common with the angels.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Bodily and Sensible Pleasures Are Greater Than Spiritual and\nIntellectual Pleasures?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are\ngreater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek\nsome pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2, 4). But\nmore seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures.\nTherefore bodily pleasures are greater.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect. But\nbodily pleasures have greater effects; since \"they alter the state of\nthe body, and in some they cause madness\" (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore\nbodily pleasures are greater.\n\nObj. 3: Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked, by\nreason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check\nspiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 118:103): \"How sweet are Thy\nwords to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!\" And the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. x, 7) that \"the greatest pleasure is derived from the\noperation of wisdom.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), pleasure arises from union\nwith a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of\nthe soul, especially of the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must\nbe noted that, since they do not pass into outward matter, they are\nacts or perfections of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to\nwill and the like: because actions which pass into outward matter,\nare actions and perfections rather of the matter transformed; for\n\"movement is the act produced by the mover in the thing moved\" (Phys.\niii, 3). Accordingly the aforesaid actions of the sensitive and\nintellectual soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and\nare known by sense and intellect. Wherefore from them also does\npleasure arise, and not only from their objects.\n\nIf therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible\npleasures, according as we delight in the very actions, for instance\nin sensitive and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt\nintellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. For\nman takes much more delight in knowing something, by understanding\nit, than in knowing something by perceiving it with his sense.\nBecause intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and because it is\nbetter known, since the intellect reflects on its own act more than\nsense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is more beloved: for\nthere is no one who would not forfeit his bodily sight rather than\nhis intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as\nAugustine says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14).\n\nIf, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with\nsensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely\nspeaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the\nconsideration of the three things needed for pleasure, viz. the good\nwhich is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and\nthe conjunction itself. For spiritual good is both greater and more\nbeloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from\neven the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor\nwhich is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty is\nmuch more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the\nconjunction is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More\nintimate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a\nthing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence; for the\nobject of the intellect is \"what a thing is.\" More perfect, because\nthe conjunction of the sensible to the sense implies movement, which\nis an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived\nall at once, but some part of them is passing away, while some other\npart is looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in\npleasures of the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible\nthings are without movement: hence pleasures of this kind are\nrealized all at once. More firm; because the objects of bodily\npleasure are corruptible, and soon pass away; whereas spiritual goods\nare incorruptible.\n\nOn the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more\nvehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things are more\nknown to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible\npleasures, through being passions of the sensitive appetite, are\naccompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not\noccur in spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction of\nthe superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures\nare sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various\ngriefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their\nsucceeding griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently\nare welcomed more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary\ngriefs, as we shall state farther on (Q. 35, A. 5).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is\nbecause sensible goods are known better and more generally: and,\nagain, because men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow\nand sadness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures,\nwhich are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to\nseek those of the body.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily\npleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive\nfaculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be\ntempered and checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the\nmind, which is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both\nsober and moderate.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Pleasures of Touch Are Greater Than the Pleasures\nAfforded by the Other Senses?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the pleasures of touch are not\ngreater than the pleasures afforded by the other senses. Because the\ngreatest pleasure seems to be that without which all joy is at an\nend. But such is the pleasure afforded by the sight, according to the\nwords of Tob. 5:12: \"What manner of joy shall be to me, who sit in\ndarkness, and see not the light of heaven?\" Therefore the pleasure\nafforded by the sight is the greatest of sensible pleasures.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"every one finds treasure in what he loves,\" as the\nPhilosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But \"of all the senses the sight is\nloved most\" [*Metaph. i, 1]. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to\nbe afforded by sight.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the beginning of friendship which is for the sake of\nthe pleasant is principally sight. But pleasure is the cause of such\nfriendship. Therefore the greatest pleasure seems to be afforded by\nsight.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10), that the\ngreatest pleasures are those which are afforded by the touch.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 25, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 27, A. 4, ad\n1), everything gives pleasure according as it is loved. Now, as\nstated in _Metaph._ i, 1, the senses are loved for two reasons: for\nthe purpose of knowledge, and on account of their usefulness.\nWherefore the senses afford pleasure in both these ways. But because\nit is proper to man to apprehend knowledge itself as something good,\nit follows that the former pleasures of the senses, i.e. those which\narise from knowledge, are proper to man: whereas pleasures of the\nsenses, as loved for their usefulness, are common to all animals.\n\nIf therefore we speak of that sensible pleasure which is by reason of\nknowledge, it is evident that the sight affords greater pleasure than\nany other sense. On the other hand, if we speak of that sensible\npleasure which is by reason of usefulness, then the greatest pleasure\nis afforded by the touch. For the usefulness of sensible things is\ngauged by their relation to the preservation of the animal's nature.\nNow the sensible objects of touch bear the closest relation to this\nusefulness: for the touch takes cognizance of those things which are\nvital to an animal, namely, of things hot and cold and the like.\nWherefore in this respect, the pleasures of touch are greater as\nbeing more closely related to the end. For this reason, too, other\nanimals which do not experience sensible pleasure save by reason of\nusefulness, derive no pleasure from the other senses except as\nsubordinated to the sensible objects of the touch: \"for dogs do not\ntake delight in the smell of hares, but in eating them; . . . nor\ndoes the lion feel pleasure in the lowing of an ox, but in devouring\nit\" (Ethic. iii, 10).\n\nSince then the pleasure afforded by touch is the greatest in respect\nof usefulness, and the pleasure afforded by sight the greatest in\nrespect of knowledge; if anyone wish to compare these two, he will\nfind that the pleasure of touch is, absolutely speaking, greater than\nthe pleasure of sight, so far as the latter remains within the limits\nof sensible pleasure. Because it is evident that in everything, that\nwhich is natural is most powerful: and it is to these pleasures of\nthe touch that the natural concupiscences, such as those of food,\nsexual union, and the like, are ordained. If, however, we consider\nthe pleasures of sight, inasmuch sight is the handmaid of the mind,\nthen the pleasures of sight are greater, forasmuch as intellectual\npleasures are greater than sensible.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Joy, as stated above (A. 3), denotes pleasure of the\nsoul; and this belongs principally to the sight. But natural pleasure\nbelongs principally to the touch.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The sight is loved most, \"on account of knowledge,\nbecause it helps us to distinguish many things,\" as is stated in the\nsame passage (Metaph. i, 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Pleasure causes carnal love in one way; the sight, in\nanother. For pleasure, especially that which is afforded by the\ntouch, is the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake of\nthe pleasant: whereas the sight is a cause like that from which a\nmovement has its beginning, inasmuch as the beholder on seeing the\nlovable object receives an impression of its image, which entices him\nto love it and to seek its delight.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Any Pleasure Is Not Natural?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is not natural. For\npleasure is to the emotions of the soul what repose is to bodies. But\nthe appetite of a natural body does not repose save in a connatural\nplace. Neither, therefore, can the repose of the animal appetite,\nwhich is pleasure, be elsewhere than in something connatural.\nTherefore no pleasure is non-natural.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what is against nature is violent. But \"whatever is\nviolent causes grief\" (Metaph. v, 5). Therefore nothing which is\nunnatural can give pleasure.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the fact of being established in one's own nature,\nif perceived, gives rise to pleasure, as is evident from the\nPhilosopher's definition quoted above (A. 1). But it is natural to\nevery thing to be established in its nature; because natural movement\ntends to a natural end. Therefore every pleasure is natural.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 5, 6) that some\nthings are pleasant \"not from nature but from disease.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We speak of that as being natural, which is in\naccord with nature, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 1. Now, in man, nature\ncan be taken in two ways. First, inasmuch as intellect and reason is\nthe principal part of man's nature, since in respect thereof he has\nhis own specific nature. And in this sense, those pleasures may be\ncalled natural to man, which are derived from things pertaining to\nman in respect of his reason: for instance, it is natural to man to\ntake pleasure in contemplating the truth and in doing works of\nvirtue. Secondly, nature in man may be taken as contrasted with\nreason, and as denoting that which is common to man and other\nanimals, especially that part of man which does not obey reason. And\nin this sense, that which pertains to the preservation of the body,\neither as regards the individual, as food, drink, sleep, and the\nlike, or as regards the species, as sexual intercourse, are said to\nafford man natural pleasure. Under each kind of pleasures, we find\nsome that are _not natural_ speaking absolutely, and yet _connatural_\nin some respect. For it happens in an individual that some one of the\nnatural principles of the species is corrupted, so that something\nwhich is contrary to the specific nature, becomes accidentally\nnatural to this individual: thus it is natural to this hot water to\ngive heat. Consequently it happens that something which is not\nnatural to man, either in regard to reason, or in regard to the\npreservation of the body, becomes connatural to this individual man,\non account of there being some corruption of nature in him. And this\ncorruption may be either on the part of the body--from some ailment;\nthus to a man suffering from fever, sweet things seem bitter, and\nvice versa--or from an evil temperament; thus some take pleasure in\neating earth and coals and the like; or on the part of the soul; thus\nfrom custom some take pleasure in cannibalism or in the unnatural\nintercourse of man and beast, or other such things, which are not in\naccord with human nature.\n\nThis suffices for the answers to the objections.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 31, Art. 8]\n\nWhether One Pleasure Can Be Contrary to Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one pleasure cannot be contrary to\nanother. Because the passions of the soul derive their species and\ncontrariety from their objects. Now the object of pleasure is the\ngood. Since therefore good is not contrary to good, but \"good is\ncontrary to evil, and evil to good,\" as stated in Praedic. viii;\nit seems that one pleasure is not contrary to another.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary, as is proved in\n_Metaph._ x, 4. But sadness is contrary to pleasure. Therefore\npleasure is not contrary to pleasure.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if one pleasure is contrary to another, this is only\non account of the contrariety of the things which give pleasure. But\nthis difference is material: whereas contrariety is a difference of\nform, as stated in _Metaph._ x, 4. Therefore there is no contrariety\nbetween one pleasure and another.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Things of the same genus that impede one another\nare contraries, as the Philosopher states (Phys. viii, 8). But some\npleasures impede one another, as stated in _Ethic._ x, 5. Therefore\nsome pleasures are contrary to one another.\n\n_I answer that,_ Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to\nrepose in natural bodies, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). Now one\nrepose is said to be contrary to another when they are in contrary\ntermini; thus, \"repose in a high place is contrary to repose in a low\nplace\" (Phys. v, 6). Wherefore it happens in the emotions of the soul\nthat one pleasure is contrary to another.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of\ngood and evil as applied to virtues and vices: because one vice may\nbe contrary to another vice, whereas no virtue can be contrary to\nanother virtue. But in other things nothing prevents one good from\nbeing contrary to another, such as hot and cold, of which the former\nis good in relation to fire, the latter, in relation to water. And in\nthis way one pleasure can be contrary to another. That this is\nimpossible with regard to the good of virtue, is due to the fact that\nvirtue's good depends on fittingness in relation to some one\nthing--i.e. the reason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Pleasure, in the emotions of the soul, is likened to\nnatural repose in bodies: because its object is something suitable\nand connatural, so to speak. But sadness is like a violent repose;\nbecause its object is disagreeable to the animal appetite, just as\nthe place of violent repose is disagreeable to the natural appetite.\nNow natural repose is contrary both to violent repose of the same\nbody, and to the natural repose of another, as stated in _Phys._ v,\n6. Wherefore pleasure is contrary to both to another pleasure and to\nsadness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The things in which we take pleasure, since they are\nthe objects of pleasure, cause not only a material, but also a formal\ndifference, if the formality of pleasurableness be different. Because\ndifference in the formal object causes a specific difference in acts\nand passions, as stated above (Q. 23, AA. 1, 4; Q. 30, A. 2).\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 32\n\nOF THE CAUSE OF PLEASURE\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head\nthere are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?\n\n(2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?\n\n(3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure?\n\n(4) Whether sadness causes pleasure?\n\n(5) Whether the actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us?\n\n(6) Whether doing good to another is a cause of pleasure?\n\n(7) Whether likeness is a cause of pleasure?\n\n(8) Whether wonder is a cause of pleasure?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Operation Is the Proper Cause of Pleasure?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that operation is not the proper and first\ncause of pleasure. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11),\n\"pleasure consists in a perception of the senses,\" since knowledge is\nrequisite for pleasure, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1). But the\nobjects of operations are knowable before the operations themselves.\nTherefore operation is not the proper cause of pleasure.\n\nObj. 2: Further, pleasure consists especially in an end gained: since\nit is this that is chiefly desired. But the end is not always an\noperation, but is sometimes the effect of the operation. Therefore\noperation is not the proper and direct cause of pleasure.\n\nObj. 3: Further, leisure and rest consist in cessation from work: and\nthey are objects of pleasure (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore operation is\nnot the proper cause of pleasure.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12, 13; x, 4)\nthat \"pleasure is a connatural and uninterrupted operation.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 31, A. 1), two things are\nrequisite for pleasure: namely, the attainment of the suitable good,\nand knowledge of this attainment. Now each of these consists in a\nkind of operation: because actual knowledge is an operation; and the\nattainment of the suitable good is by means of an operation.\nMoreover, the proper operation itself is a suitable good. Wherefore\nevery pleasure must needs be the result of some operation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The objects of operations are not pleasurable save\ninasmuch as they are united to us; either by knowledge alone, as when\nwe take pleasure in thinking of or looking at certain things; or in\nsome other way in addition to knowledge; as when a man takes pleasure\nin knowing that he has something good--riches, honor, or the like;\nwhich would not be pleasurable unless they were apprehended as\npossessed. For as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 2) \"we take\ngreat pleasure in looking upon a thing as our own, by reason of the\nnatural love we have for ourselves.\" Now to have such like things is\nnothing else but to use them or to be able to use them: and this is\nthrough some operation. Wherefore it is evident that every pleasure\nis traced to some operation as its cause.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even when it is not an operation, but the effect of an\noperation, that is the end, this effect is pleasant in so far as\npossessed or effected: and this implies use or operation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Operations are pleasant, in so far as they are\nproportionate and connatural to the agent. Now, since human power is\nfinite, operation is proportionate thereto according to a certain\nmeasure. Wherefore if it exceed that measure, it will be no longer\nproportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome.\nAnd in this sense, leisure and play and other things pertaining to\nrepose, are pleasant, inasmuch as they banish sadness which results\nfrom labor.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Movement Is a Cause of Pleasure?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that movement is not a cause of pleasure.\nBecause, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1), the good which is obtained\nand is actually possessed, is the cause of pleasure: wherefore the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. vii, 12) that pleasure is not compared with\ngeneration, but with the operation of a thing already in existence.\nNow that which is being moved towards something has it not as yet;\nbut, so to speak, is being generated in its regard, forasmuch as\ngeneration or corruption are united to every movement, as stated in\n_Phys._ viii, 3. Therefore movement is not a cause of pleasure.\n\nObj. 2: Further, movement is the chief cause of toil and fatigue in\nour works. But operations through being toilsome and fatiguing are\nnot pleasant but disagreeable. Therefore movement is not a cause of\npleasure.\n\nObj. 3: Further, movement implies a certain innovation, which is the\nopposite of custom. But things \"which we are accustomed to, are\npleasant,\" as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore movement\nis not a cause of pleasure.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. viii, 3): \"What means\nthis, O Lord my God, whereas Thou art everlasting joy to Thyself, and\nsome things around Thee evermore rejoice in Thee? What means this,\nthat this portion of things ebbs and flows alternately displeased and\nreconciled?\" From these words we gather that man rejoices and takes\npleasure in some kind of alterations: and therefore movement seems to\ncause pleasure.\n\n_I answer that,_ Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i.e.\nthe one that is pleased and the pleasurable object conjoined to him;\nand a third, which is knowledge of this conjunction: and in respect\nof these three, movement is pleasant, as the Philosopher says (Ethic.\nvii, 14 and Rhetor. i, 11). For as far as we who feel pleasure are\nconcerned, change is pleasant to us because our nature is changeable:\nfor which reason that which is suitable to us at one time is not\nsuitable at another; thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to\nman in winter but not in summer. Again, on the part of the pleasing\ngood which is united to us, change is pleasant. Because the continued\naction of an agent increases its effect: thus the longer a person\nremains near the fire, the more he is warmed and dried. Now the\nnatural mode of being consists in a certain measure; and therefore\nwhen the continued presence of a pleasant object exceeds the measure\nof one's natural mode of being, the removal of that object becomes\npleasant. On the part of the knowledge itself (change becomes\npleasant), because man desires to know something whole and perfect:\nwhen therefore a thing cannot be apprehended all at once as a whole,\nchange in such a thing is pleasant, so that one part may pass and\nanother succeed, and thus the whole be perceived. Hence Augustine\nsays (Confess. iv, 11): \"Thou wouldst not have the syllables stay,\nbut fly away, that others may come, and thou hear the whole. And so\nwhenever any one thing is made up of many, all of which do not exist\ntogether, all would please collectively more than they do severally,\nif all could be perceived collectively.\"\n\nIf therefore there be any thing, whose nature is unchangeable; the\nnatural mode of whose being cannot be exceeded by the continuation of\nany pleasing object; and which can behold the whole object of its\ndelight at once--to such a one change will afford no delight. And the\nmore any pleasures approach to this, the more are they capable of\nbeing continual.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the subject of movement has not yet perfectly\nthat to which it is moved, nevertheless it is beginning to have\nsomething thereof: and in this respect movement itself has something\nof pleasure. But it falls short of the perfection of pleasure;\nbecause the more perfect pleasures regard things that are\nunchangeable. Moreover movement becomes the cause of pleasure, in so\nfar as thereby something which previously was unsuitable, becomes\nsuitable or ceases to be, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Movement causes toil and fatigue, when it exceeds our\nnatural aptitude. It is not thus that it causes pleasure, but by\nremoving the obstacles to our natural aptitude.\n\nReply Obj. 3: What is customary becomes pleasant, in so far as it\nbecomes natural: because custom is like a second nature. But the\nmovement which gives pleasure is not that which departs from custom,\nbut rather that which prevents the corruption of the natural mode of\nbeing, that might result from continued operation. And thus from the\nsame cause of connaturalness, both custom and movement become\npleasant.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Hope and Memory Cause Pleasure?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that memory and hope do not cause\npleasure. Because pleasure is caused by present good, as Damascene\nsays (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). But hope and memory regard what is\nabsent: since memory is of the past, and hope of the future.\nTherefore memory and hope do not cause pleasure.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But\nhope causes affliction, according to Prov. 13:12: \"Hope that is\ndeferred afflicteth the soul.\" Therefore hope does not cause pleasure.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as hope agrees with pleasure in regarding good,\nso also do desire and love. Therefore hope should not be assigned as\na cause of pleasure, any more than desire or love.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 12:12): \"Rejoicing in hope\";\nand (Ps. 76:4): \"I remembered God, and was delighted.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Pleasure is caused by the presence of suitable good,\nin so far as it is felt, or perceived in any way. Now a thing is\npresent to us in two ways. First, in knowledge--i.e. according as the\nthing known is in the knower by its likeness; secondly, in\nreality--i.e. according as one thing is in real conjunction of any\nkind with another, either actually or potentially. And since real\nconjunction is greater than conjunction by likeness, which is the\nconjunction of knowledge; and again, since actual is greater than\npotential conjunction: therefore the greatest pleasure is that which\narises from sensation which requires the presence of the sensible\nobject. The second place belongs to the pleasure of hope, wherein\nthere is pleasurable conjunction, not only in respect of\napprehension, but also in respect of the faculty or power of\nobtaining the pleasurable object. The third place belongs to the\npleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction of apprehension.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Hope and memory are indeed of things which, absolutely\nspeaking, are absent: and yet those are, after a fashion, present,\ni.e. either according to apprehension only; or according to\napprehension and possibility, at least supposed, of attainment.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Nothing prevents the same thing, in different ways,\nbeing the cause of contraries. And so hope, inasmuch as it implies a\npresent appraising of a future good, causes pleasure; whereas,\ninasmuch as it implies absence of that good, it causes affliction.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Love and concupiscence also cause pleasure. For\neverything that is loved becomes pleasing to the lover, since love is\na kind of union or connaturalness of lover and beloved. In like\nmanner every object of desire is pleasing to the one that desires,\nsince desire is chiefly a craving for pleasure. However hope, as\nimplying a certainty of the real presence of the pleasing good, that\nis not implied either by love or by concupiscence, is reckoned in\npreference to them as causing pleasure; and also in preference to\nmemory, which is of that which has already passed away.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 4]\n\nWhether sadness causes pleasure?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sadness does not cause pleasure. For\nnothing causes its own contrary. But sadness is contrary to pleasure.\nTherefore it does not cause it.\n\nObj. 2: Further, contraries have contrary effects. But pleasures,\nwhen called to mind, cause pleasure. Therefore sad things, when\nremembered, cause sorrow and not pleasure.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is hatred to love. But\nhatred does not cause love, but rather the other way about, as stated\nabove (Q. 29, A. 2). Therefore sadness does not cause pleasure.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 41:4): \"My tears have been my\nbread day and night\": where bread denotes the refreshment of\npleasure. Therefore tears, which arise from sadness, can give\npleasure.\n\n_I answer that,_ Sadness may be considered in two ways: as existing\nactually, and as existing in the memory: and in both ways sadness can\ncause pleasure. Because sadness, as actually existing, causes\npleasure, inasmuch as it brings to mind that which is loved, the\nabsence of which causes sadness; and yet the mere thought of it gives\npleasure. The recollection of sadness becomes a cause of pleasure, on\naccount of the deliverance which ensued: because absence of evil is\nlooked upon as something good; wherefore so far as a man thinks that\nhe has been delivered from that which caused him sorrow and pain, so\nmuch reason has he to rejoice. Hence Augustine says in _De Civ. Dei_\nxxii, 31 [*Gregory, Moral. iv.] that \"oftentimes in joy we call to\nmind sad things . . . and in the season of health we recall past\npains without feeling pain . . . and in proportion are the more\nfilled with joy and gladness\": and again (Confess. viii, 3) he says\nthat \"the more peril there was in the battle, so much the more joy\nwill there be in the triumph.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sometimes accidentally a thing is the cause of its\ncontrary: thus \"that which is cold sometimes causes heat,\" as stated\nin _Phys._ viii, 1. In like manner sadness is the accidental cause of\npleasure, in so far as it gives rise to the apprehension of something\npleasant.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sad things, called to mind, cause pleasure, not in so\nfar as they are sad and contrary to pleasant things; but in so far as\nman is delivered from them. In like manner the recollection of\npleasant things, by reason of these being lost, may cause sadness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Hatred also can be the accidental cause of love: i.e.\nso far as some love one another, inasmuch as they agree in hating one\nand the same thing.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Actions of Others Are a Cause of Pleasure to Us?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the actions of others are not a cause\nof pleasure to us. Because the cause of pleasure is our own good when\nconjoined to us. But the actions of others are not conjoined to us.\nTherefore they are not a cause of pleasure to us.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the action is the agent's own good. If, therefore,\nthe actions of others are a cause of pleasure to us, for the same\nreason all goods belonging to others will be pleasing to us: which is\nevidently untrue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, action is pleasant through proceeding from an innate\nhabit; hence it is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3 that \"we must reckon the\npleasure which follows after action, as being the sign of a habit\nexisting in us.\" But the actions of others do not proceed from habits\nexisting in us, but, sometimes, from habits existing in the agents.\nTherefore the actions of others are not pleasing to us, but to the\nagents themselves.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written in the second canonical epistle of\nJohn (verse 4): \"I was exceeding glad that I found thy children\nwalking in truth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; Q. 31, A. 1), two things are\nrequisite for pleasure, namely, the attainment of one's proper good,\nand the knowledge of having obtained it. Wherefore the action of\nanother may cause pleasure to us in three ways. First, from the fact\nthat we obtain some good through the action of another. And in this\nway, the actions of those who do some good to us, are pleasing to us:\nsince it is pleasant to be benefited by another. Secondly, from the\nfact that another's action makes us to know or appreciate our own\ngood: and for this reason men take pleasure in being praised or\nhonored by others, because, to wit, they thus become aware of some\ngood existing in themselves. And since this appreciation receives\ngreater weight from the testimony of good and wise men, hence men\ntake greater pleasure in being praised and honored by them. And\nbecause a flatterer appears to praise, therefore flattery is pleasing\nto some. And as love is for something good, while admiration is for\nsomething great, so it is pleasant to be loved and admired by others,\ninasmuch as a man thus becomes aware of his own goodness or\ngreatness, through their giving pleasure to others. Thirdly, from the\nfact that another's actions, if they be good, are reckoned as one's\nown good, by reason of the power of love, which makes a man to regard\nhis friend as one with himself. And on account of hatred, which makes\none to reckon another's good as being in opposition to oneself, the\nevil action of an enemy becomes an object of pleasure: whence it is\nwritten (1 Cor. 13:6) that charity \"rejoiceth not in iniquity, but\nrejoiceth with the truth.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Another's action may be conjoined to me, either by its\neffect, as in the first way, or by knowledge, as in the second way;\nor by affection, as in the third way.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument avails for the third mode, but not for\nthe first two.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the actions of another do not proceed from\nhabits that are in me, yet they either produce in me something that\ngives pleasure; or they make me appreciate or know a habit of mind;\nor they proceed from the habit of one who is united to me by love.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Doing Good to Another Is a Cause of Pleasure?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that doing good to another is not a cause\nof pleasure. Because pleasure is caused by one's obtaining one's\nproper good, as stated above (AA. 1, 5; Q. 31, A. 1). But doing good\npertains not to the obtaining but to the spending of one's proper\ngood. Therefore it seems to be the cause of sadness rather than of\npleasure.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 1) that\n\"illiberality is more connatural to man than prodigality.\" Now it is\na mark of prodigality to do good to others; while it is a mark of\nilliberality to desist from doing good. Since therefore everyone\ntakes pleasure in a connatural operation, as stated in _Ethic._ vii,\n14 and x, 4, it seems that doing good to others is not a cause of\npleasure.\n\nObj. 3: Further, contrary effects proceed from contrary causes. But\nman takes a natural pleasure in certain kinds of ill-doing, such as\novercoming, contradicting or scolding others, or, if he be angry, in\npunishing them, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). Therefore\ndoing good to others is a cause of sadness rather than pleasure.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that \"it is\nmost pleasant to give presents or assistance to friends and\nstrangers.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Doing good to another may give pleasure in three\nways. First, in consideration of the effect, which is the good\nconferred on another. In this respect, inasmuch as through being\nunited to others by love, we look upon their good as being our own,\nwe take pleasure in the good we do to others, especially to our\nfriends, as in our own good. Secondly, in consideration of the end;\nas when a man, from doing good to another, hopes to get some good for\nhimself, either from God or from man: for hope is a cause of\npleasure. Thirdly, in consideration of the principle: and thus, doing\ngood to another, can give pleasure in respect of a threefold\nprinciple. One is the faculty of doing good: and in this regard,\ndoing good to another becomes pleasant, in so far as it arouses in\nman an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof he is\nable to give others a share. Wherefore men take pleasure in their\nchildren, and in their own works, as being things on which they\nbestow a share of their own good. Another principle is man's habitual\ninclination to do good, by reason of which doing good becomes\nconnatural to him: for which reason the liberal man takes pleasure in\ngiving to others. The third principle is the motive: for instance\nwhen a man is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to someone: for\nwhatever we do or suffer for a friend is pleasant, because love is\nthe principal cause of pleasure.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Spending gives pleasure as showing forth one's good.\nBut in so far as it empties us of our own good it may be a cause of\nsadness; for instance when it is excessive.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Prodigality is an excessive spending, which is\nunnatural: wherefore prodigality is said to be contrary to nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To overcome, to contradict, and to punish, give\npleasure, not as tending to another's ill, but as pertaining to one's\nown good, which man loves more than he hates another's ill. For it is\nnaturally pleasant to overcome, inasmuch as it makes a man to\nappreciate his own superiority. Wherefore all those games in which\nthere is a striving for the mastery, and a possibility of winning it,\nafford the greatest pleasure: and speaking generally all contests, in\nso far as they admit hope of victory. To contradict and to scold can\ngive pleasure in two ways. First, as making man imagine himself to be\nwise and excellent; since it belongs to wise men and elders to\nreprove and to scold. Secondly, in so far as by scolding and\nreproving, one does good to another: for this gives one pleasure, as\nstated above. It is pleasant to an angry man to punish, in so far as\nhe thinks himself to be removing an apparent slight, which seems to\nbe due to a previous hurt: for when a man is hurt by another, he\nseems to be slighted thereby; and therefore he wishes to be quit of\nthis slight by paying back the hurt. And thus it is clear that doing\ngood to another may be of itself pleasant: whereas doing evil to\nanother is not pleasant, except in so far as it seems to affect one's\nown good.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Likeness Is a Cause of Pleasure?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that likeness is not a cause of pleasure.\nBecause ruling and presiding seem to imply a certain unlikeness. But\n\"it is natural to take pleasure in ruling and presiding,\" as stated\nin _Rhetor._ i, 11. Therefore unlikeness, rather than likeness, is a\ncause of pleasure.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing is more unlike pleasure than sorrow. But\nthose who are burdened by sorrow are most inclined to seek pleasures,\nas the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore unlikeness,\nrather than likeness, is a cause of pleasure.\n\nObj. 3: Further, those who are satiated with certain delights, derive\nnot pleasure but disgust from them; as when one is satiated with\nfood. Therefore likeness is not a cause of pleasure.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Likeness is a cause of love, as above stated (Q.\n27, A. 3): and love is the cause of pleasure. Therefore likeness is a\ncause of pleasure.\n\n_I answer that,_ Likeness is a kind of unity; hence that which is\nlike us, as being one with us, causes pleasure; just at it causes\nlove, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 3). And if that which is like us\ndoes not hurt our own good, but increase it, it is pleasurable\nsimply; for instance one man in respect of another, one youth in\nrelation to another. But if it be hurtful to our own good, thus\naccidentally it causes disgust or sadness, not as being like and one\nwith us, but as hurtful to that which is yet more one with us.\n\nNow it happens in two ways that something like is hurtful to our own\ngood. First, by destroying the measure of our own good, by a kind of\nexcess; because good, especially bodily good, as health, is\nconditioned by a certain measure: wherefore superfluous good or any\nbodily pleasure, causes disgust. Secondly, by being directly contrary\nto one's own good: thus a potter dislikes other potters, not because\nthey are potters, but because they deprive him of his own excellence\nor profits, which he seeks as his own good.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since ruler and subject are in communion with one\nanother, there is a certain likeness between them: but this likeness\nis conditioned by a certain superiority, since ruling and presiding\npertain to the excellence of a man's own good: because they belong to\nmen who are wise and better than others; the result being that they\ngive man an idea of his own excellence. Another reason is that by\nruling and presiding, a man does good to others, which is pleasant.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That which gives pleasure to the sorrowful man, though\nit be unlike sorrow, bears some likeness to the man that is\nsorrowful: because sorrows are contrary to his own good. Wherefore\nthe sorrowful man seeks pleasure as making for his own good, in so\nfar as it is a remedy for its contrary. And this is why bodily\npleasures, which are contrary to certain sorrows, are more sought\nthan intellectual pleasures, which have no contrary sorrow, as we\nshall state later on (Q. 35, A. 5). And this explains why all animals\nnaturally desire pleasure: because animals ever work through sense\nand movement. For this reason also young people are most inclined to\nseek pleasures; on account of the many changes to which they are\nsubject, while yet growing. Moreover this is why the melancholic has\na strong desire for pleasures, in order to drive away sorrow: because\nhis \"body is corroded by a base humor,\" as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 14.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Bodily goods are conditioned by a certain fixed\nmeasure: wherefore surfeit of such things destroys the proper good,\nand consequently gives rise to disgust and sorrow, through being\ncontrary to the proper good of man.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 32, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Wonder Is a Cause of Pleasure?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that wonder is not a cause of pleasure.\nBecause wonder is the act of one who is ignorant of the nature of\nsomething, as Damascene says. But knowledge, rather than ignorance,\nis a cause of pleasure. Therefore wonder is not a cause of pleasure.\n\nObj. 2: Further, wonder is the beginning of wisdom, being as it were,\nthe road to the search of truth, as stated in the beginning of\n_Metaph._ i, 2. But \"it is more pleasant to think of what we know,\nthan to seek what we know not,\" as the Philosopher says (Ethic. x,\n7): since in the latter case we encounter difficulties and\nhindrances, in the former not; while pleasure arises from an\noperation which is unhindered, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 12, 13.\nTherefore wonder hinders rather than causes pleasure.\n\nObj. 3: Further, everyone takes pleasure in what he is accustomed to:\nwherefore the actions of habits acquired by custom, are pleasant. But\n\"we wonder at what is unwonted,\" as Augustine says (Tract. xxiv in\nJoan.). Therefore wonder is contrary to the cause of pleasure.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that wonder is\nthe cause of pleasure.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is pleasant to get what one desires, as stated\nabove (Q. 23, A. 4): and therefore the greater the desire for the\nthing loved, the greater the pleasure when it is attained: indeed the\nvery increase of desire brings with it an increase of pleasure,\naccording as it gives rise to the hope of obtaining that which is\nloved, since it was stated above (A. 3, ad 3) that desire resulting\nfrom hope is a cause of pleasure. Now wonder is a kind of desire for\nknowledge; a desire which comes to man when he sees an effect of\nwhich the cause either is unknown to him, or surpasses his knowledge\nor faculty of understanding. Consequently wonder is a cause of\npleasure, in so far as it includes a hope of getting the knowledge\nwhich one desires to have. For this reason whatever is wonderful is\npleasing, for instance things that are scarce. Also, representations\nof things, even of those which are not pleasant in themselves, give\nrise to pleasure; for the soul rejoices in comparing one thing with\nanother, because comparison of one thing with another is the proper\nand connatural act of the reason, as the Philosopher says (Poet. iv).\nThis again is why \"it is more delightful to be delivered from great\ndanger, because it is something wonderful,\" as stated in _Rhetor._ i,\n11.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Wonder gives pleasure, not because it implies\nignorance, but in so far as it includes the desire of learning the\ncause, and in so far as the wonderer learns something new, i.e. that\nthe cause is other than he had thought it to be. [*According to\nanother reading:--that he is other than he thought himself to be.]\n\nReply Obj. 2: Pleasure includes two things; rest in the good, and\nperception of this rest. As to the former therefore, since it is more\nperfect to contemplate the known truth, than to seek for the unknown,\nthe contemplation of what we know, is in itself more pleasing than\nthe research of what we do not know. Nevertheless, as to the second,\nit happens that research is sometimes more pleasing accidentally, in\nso far as it proceeds from a greater desire: for greater desire is\nawakened when we are conscious of our ignorance. This is why man\ntakes the greatest pleasure in finding or learning things for the\nfirst time.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is pleasant to do what we are wont to do, inasmuch\nas this is connatural to us, as it were. And yet things that are of\nrare occurrence can be pleasant, either as regards knowledge, from\nthe fact that we desire to know something about them, in so far as\nthey are wonderful; or as regards action, from the fact that \"the\nmind is more inclined by desire to act intensely in things that are\nnew,\" as stated in _Ethic._ x, 4, since more perfect operation\ncauses more perfect pleasure.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 33\n\nOF THE EFFECTS OF PLEASURE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the effects of pleasure; and under this head\nthere are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether expansion is an effect of pleasure?\n\n(2) Whether pleasure causes thirst or desire for itself?\n\n(3) Whether pleasure hinders the use of reason?\n\n(4) Whether pleasure perfects operation?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 33, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Expansion Is an Effect of Pleasure?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that expansion is not an effect of\npleasure. For expansion seems to pertain more to love, according to\nthe Apostle (2 Cor. 6:11): \"Our heart is enlarged.\" Wherefore it is\nwritten (Ps. 118:96) concerning the precept of charity: \"Thy\ncommandment is exceeding broad.\" But pleasure is a distinct passion\nfrom love. Therefore expansion is not an effect of pleasure.\n\nObj. 2: Further, when a thing expands it is enabled to receive more.\nBut receiving pertains to desire, which is for something not yet\npossessed. Therefore expansion seems to belong to desire rather than\nto pleasure.\n\nObj. 3: Further, contraction is contrary to expansion. But\ncontraction seems to belong to pleasure, for the hand closes on that\nwhich we wish to grasp firmly: and such is the affection of appetite\nin regard to that which pleases it. Therefore expansion does not\npertain to pleasure.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In order to express joy, it is written (Isa.\n60:5): \"Thou shall see and abound, thy heart shall wonder and be\nenlarged.\" Moreover pleasure is called by the name of \"laetitia\" as\nbeing derived from \"dilatatio\" (expansion), as stated above (Q. 31,\nA. 3, ad 3).\n\n_I answer that,_ Breadth (_latitudo_)is a dimension of bodily\nmagnitude: hence it is not applied to the emotions of the soul, save\nmetaphorically. Now expansion denotes a kind of movement towards\nbreadth; and it belongs to pleasure in respect of the two things\nrequisite for pleasure. One of these is on the part of the\napprehensive power, which is cognizant of the conjunction with some\nsuitable good. As a result of this apprehension, man perceives that\nhe has attained a certain perfection, which is a magnitude of the\nspiritual order: and in this respect man's mind is said to be\nmagnified or expanded by pleasure. The other requisite for pleasure\nis on the part of the appetitive power, which acquiesces in the\npleasurable object, and rests therein, offering, as it were, to\nenfold it within itself. And thus man's affection is expanded by\npleasure, as though it surrendered itself to hold within itself the\nobject of its pleasure.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In metaphorical expressions nothing hinders one and the\nsame thing from being attributed to different things according to\ndifferent likenesses. And in this way expansion pertains to love by\nreason of a certain spreading out, in so far as the affection of the\nlover spreads out to others, so as to care, not only for his own\ninterests, but also for what concerns others. On the other hand\nexpansion pertains to pleasure, in so far as a thing becomes more\nample in itself so as to become more capacious.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Desire includes a certain expansion arising from the\nimagination of the thing desired; but this expansion increases at the\npresence of the pleasurable object: because the mind surrenders\nitself more to that object when it is already taking pleasure in it,\nthan when it desires it before possessing it; since pleasure is the\nend of desire.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He that takes pleasure in a thing holds it fast, by\nclinging to it with all his might: but he opens his heart to it that\nhe may enjoy it perfectly.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 33, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Pleasure Causes Thirst or Desire for Itself?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not cause desire for\nitself. Because all movement ceases when repose is reached. But\npleasure is, as it were, a certain repose of the movement of desire,\nas stated above (Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore the movement of\ndesire ceases when pleasure is reached. Therefore pleasure does not\ncause desire.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a thing does not cause its contrary. But pleasure\nis, in a way, contrary to desire, on the part of the object: since\ndesire regards a good which is not yet possessed, whereas pleasure\nregards the good that is possessed. Therefore pleasure does not cause\ndesire for itself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, distaste is incompatible with desire. But pleasure\noften causes distaste. Therefore it does not cause desire.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (John 4:13): \"Whosoever drinketh of\nthis water, shall thirst again\": where, according to Augustine\n(Tract. xv in Joan.), water denotes pleasures of the body.\n\n_I answer that,_ Pleasure can be considered in two ways; first, as\nexisting in reality; secondly, as existing in the memory. Again\nthirst, or desire, can be taken in two ways; first, properly, as\ndenoting a craving for something not possessed; secondly, in general,\nas excluding distaste.\n\nConsidered as existing in reality, pleasure does not of itself cause\nthirst or desire for itself, but only accidentally; provided we take\nthirst or desire as denoting a craving for some thing not possessed:\nbecause pleasure is an emotion of the appetite in respect of\nsomething actually present. But it may happen that what is actually\npresent is not perfectly possessed: and this may be on the part of\nthe thing possessed, or on the part of the possessor. On the part of\nthe thing possessed, this happens through the thing possessed not\nbeing a simultaneous whole; wherefore one obtains possession of it\nsuccessively, and while taking pleasure in what one has, one desires\nto possess the remainder: thus if a man is pleased with the first\npart of a verse, he desires to hear the second part, as Augustine\nsays (Confess. iv, 11). In this way nearly all bodily pleasures cause\nthirst for themselves, until they are fully realized, because\npleasures of this kind arise from some movement: as is evident in\npleasures of the table. On the part of the possessor, this happens\nwhen a man possesses a thing which is perfect in itself, yet does not\npossess it perfectly, but obtains possession of it little by little.\nThus in this life, a faint perception of Divine knowledge affords us\ndelight, and delight sets up a thirst or desire for perfect\nknowledge; in which sense we may understand the words of Ecclus.\n24:29: \"They that drink me shall yet thirst.\"\n\nOn the other hand, if by thirst or desire we understand the mere\nintensity of the emotion, that excludes distaste, thus more than all\nothers spiritual pleasures cause thirst or desire for themselves.\nBecause bodily pleasures become distasteful by reason of their\ncausing an excess in the natural mode of being, when they are\nincreased or even when they are protracted; as is evident in the case\nof pleasures of the table. This is why, when a man arrives at the\npoint of perfection in bodily pleasures, he wearies of them, and\nsometimes desires another kind. Spiritual pleasures, on the contrary,\ndo not exceed the natural mode of being, but perfect nature. Hence\nwhen their point of perfection is reached, then do they afford the\ngreatest delight: except, perchance, accidentally, in so far as the\nwork of contemplation is accompanied by some operation of the bodily\npowers, which tire from protracted activity. And in this sense also\nwe may understand those words of Ecclus. 24:29: \"They that drink me\nshall yet thirst\": for, even of the angels, who know God perfectly,\nand delight in Him, it is written (1 Pet. 1:12) that they \"desire to\nlook at Him.\"\n\nLastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as\nexisting in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural tendency to\ncause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that\ndisposition, in which he was when he experienced the pleasure that is\npast. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that\npleasure does not give him pleasure, but distaste: for instance, the\nmemory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When pleasure is perfect, then it includes complete\nrest; and the movement of desire, tending to what was not possessed,\nceases. But when it is imperfect, then the desire, tending to what\nwas not possessed, does not cease altogether.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That which is possessed imperfectly, is possessed in\none respect, and in another respect is not possessed. Consequently it\nmay be the object of desire and pleasure at the same time.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Pleasures cause distaste in one way, desire in another,\nas stated above.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 33, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Pleasure Hinders the Use of Reason?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not hinder the use of\nreason. Because repose facilitates very much the due use of reason:\nwherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, 3) that \"while we sit and\nrest, the soul is inclined to knowledge and prudence\"; and it is\nwritten (Wis. 8:16): \"When I go into my house, I shall repose myself\nwith her,\" i.e. wisdom. But pleasure is a kind of repose. Therefore\nit helps rather than hinders the use of reason.\n\nObj. 2: Further, things which are not in the same subject though they\nbe contraries, do not hinder one another. But pleasure is in the\nappetitive faculty, while the use of reason is in the apprehensive\npower. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is hindered by another, seems to be\nmoved, as it were, thereby. But the use of an apprehensive power\nmoves pleasure rather than is moved by it: because it is the cause of\npleasure. Therefore pleasure does not hinder the use of reason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5), that\n\"pleasure destroys the estimate of prudence.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As is stated in _Ethic._ x, 5, \"appropriate\npleasures increase activity . . . whereas pleasures arising from\nother sources are impediments to activity.\" Accordingly there is a\ncertain pleasure that is taken in the very act of reason, as when one\ntakes pleasure in contemplating or in reasoning: and such pleasure\ndoes not hinder the act of reason, but helps it; because we are more\nattentive in doing that which gives us pleasure, and attention\nfosters activity.\n\nOn the other hand bodily pleasures hinder the use of reason in three\nways. First, by distracting the reason. Because, as we have just\nobserved, we attend much to that which pleases us. Now when the\nattention is firmly fixed on one thing, it is either weakened in\nrespect of other things, or it is entirely withdrawn from them; and\nthus if the bodily pleasure be great, either it entirely hinders the\nuse of reason, by concentrating the mind's attention on itself; or\nelse it hinders it considerably. Secondly, by being contrary to\nreason. Because some pleasures, especially those that are in excess,\nare contrary to the order of reason: and in this sense the\nPhilosopher says that \"bodily pleasures destroy the estimate of\nprudence, but not the speculative estimate,\" to which they are not\nopposed, \"for instance that the three angles of a triangle are\ntogether equal to two right angles.\" In the first sense, however,\nthey hinder both estimates. Thirdly, by fettering the reason: in so\nfar as bodily pleasure is followed by a certain alteration in the\nbody, greater even than in the other passions, in proportion as the\nappetite is more vehemently affected towards a present than towards\nan absent thing. Now such bodily disturbances hinder the use of\nreason; as may be seen in the case of drunkards, in whom the use of\nreason is fettered or hindered.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Bodily pleasure implies indeed repose of the appetite\nin the object of pleasure; which repose is sometimes contrary to\nreason; but on the part of the body it always implies alteration.\nAnd in respect of both points, it hinders the use of reason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The powers of the appetite and of apprehension are\nindeed distinct parts, but belonging to the one soul. Consequently\nwhen the soul is very intent on the action of one part, it is\nhindered from attending to a contrary act of the other part.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The use of reason requires the due use of the\nimagination and of the other sensitive powers, which are exercised\nthrough a bodily organ. Consequently alteration in the body hinders\nthe use of reason, because it hinders the act of the imagination\nand of the other sensitive powers.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 33, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Pleasure Perfects Operation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not perfect operation.\nFor every human operation depends on the use of reason. But pleasure\nhinders the use of reason, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore\npleasure does not perfect, but weakens human operation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing perfects itself or its cause. But\npleasure is an operation (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 4), i.e. either in its\nessence or in its cause. Therefore pleasure does not perfect\noperation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if pleasure perfects operation, it does so\neither as end, or as form, or as agent. But not as end; because\noperation is not sought for the sake of pleasure, but rather the\nreverse, as stated above (Q. 4, A. 2): nor as agent, because\nrather is it the operation that causes pleasure: nor again as form,\nbecause, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 4), \"pleasure does\nnot perfect operation, as a habit does.\" Therefore pleasure does not\nperfect operation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that \"pleasure\nperfects operation.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. First, as an\nend: not indeed according as an end is that on \"account of which a\nthing is\"; but according as every good which is added to a thing and\ncompletes it, can be called its end. And in this sense the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. x, 4) that \"pleasure perfects operation . . . as some end\nadded to it\": that is to say, inasmuch as to this good, which is\noperation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, denoting\nthe repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed. Secondly, as\nagent; not indeed directly, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4)\nthat \"pleasure perfects operation, not as a physician makes a man\nhealthy, but as health does\": but it does so indirectly; inasmuch as\nthe agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly\nintent on it, and carries it out with greater care. And in this sense\nit is said in _Ethic._ x, 5 that \"pleasures increase their appropriate\nactivities, and hinder those that are not appropriate.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is not every pleasure that hinders the act of\nreason, but only bodily pleasure; for this arises, not from the act\nof reason, but from the act of the concupiscible faculty, which act\nis intensified by pleasure. _On the contrary,_ pleasure that arises\nfrom the act of reason, strengthens the use of reason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated in _Phys._ ii, 3 two things may be causes of\none another, if one be the efficient, the other the final cause. And\nin this way, operation is the efficient cause of pleasure, while\npleasure perfects operation by way of final cause, as stated above.\n\nThe Reply to the Third Objection is evident for what has been said.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 34\n\nOF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF PLEASURES\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the goodness and malice of pleasures: under\nwhich head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether every pleasure is evil?\n\n(2) If not, whether every pleasure is good?\n\n(3) Whether any pleasure is the greatest good?\n\n(4) Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of\nmoral good and evil?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 34, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Every Pleasure Is Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is evil. For that\nwhich destroys prudence and hinders the use of reason, seems to be\nevil in itself: since man's good is to be \"in accord with reason,\" as\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure destroys prudence and\nhinders the use of reason; and so much the more, as the pleasure is\ngreater: wherefore \"in sexual pleasures,\" which are the greatest of\nall, \"it is impossible to understand anything,\" as stated in _Ethic._\nvii, 11. Moreover, Jerome says in his commentary on Matthew [*Origen,\nHom. vi in Num.] that \"at the time of conjugal intercourse, the\npresence of the Holy Ghost is not vouchsafed, even if it be a prophet\nthat fulfils the conjugal duty.\" Therefore pleasure is evil in\nitself; and consequently every pleasure is evil.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which the virtuous man shuns, and the man\nlacking in virtue seeks, seems to be evil in itself, and should be\navoided; because, as stated in _Ethic._ x, 5 \"the virtuous man is a\nkind of measure and rule of human actions\"; and the Apostle says (1\nCor. 2:15): \"The spiritual man judgeth all things.\" But children and\ndumb animals, in whom there is no virtue, seek pleasure: whereas the\nman who is master of himself does not. Therefore pleasures are evil\nin themselves and should be avoided.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"virtue and art are concerned about the difficult\nand the good\" (Ethic. ii, 3). But no art is ordained to pleasure.\nTherefore pleasure is not something good.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 36:4): \"Delight in the Lord.\"\nSince, therefore, Divine authority leads to no evil, it seems that\nnot every pleasure is evil.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated in _Ethic._ x, 2, 3, some have maintained\nthat all pleasure is evil. The reason seems to have been that they\ntook account only of sensible and bodily pleasures which are more\nmanifest; since, also in other respects, the ancient philosophers did\nnot discriminate between the intelligible and the sensible, nor\nbetween intellect and sense (De Anima iii, 3). And they held that all\nbodily pleasures should be reckoned as bad, and thus that man, being\nprone to immoderate pleasures, arrives at the mean of virtue by\nabstaining from pleasure. But they were wrong in holding this\nopinion. Because, since none can live without some sensible and\nbodily pleasure, if they who teach that all pleasures are evil, are\nfound in the act of taking pleasure; men will be more inclined to\npleasure by following the example of their works instead of listening\nto the doctrine of their words: since, in human actions and passions,\nwherein experience is of great weight, example moves more than words.\n\nWe must therefore say that some pleasures are good, and that some are\nevil. For pleasure is a repose of the appetitive power in some loved\ngood, and resulting from some operation; wherefore we assign a\ntwofold reason for this assertion. The first is in respect of the\ngood in which a man reposes with pleasure. For good and evil in the\nmoral order depend on agreement or disagreement with reason, as\nstated above (Q. 18, A. 5): just as in the order of nature, a thing\nis said to be natural, if it agrees with nature, and unnatural, if\nit disagrees. Accordingly, just as in the natural order there is a\ncertain natural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which agrees\nwith its nature, for instance, when a heavy body rests down below;\nand again an unnatural repose, whereby a thing rests in that which\ndisagrees with its nature, as when a heavy body rests up aloft: so,\nin the moral order, there is a good pleasure, whereby the higher or\nlower appetite rests in that which is in accord with reason; and an\nevil pleasure, whereby the appetite rests in that which is discordant\nfrom reason and the law of God.\n\nThe second reason can be found by considering the actions, some of\nwhich are good, some evil. Now pleasures which are conjoined to\nactions are more akin to those actions, than desires, which precede\nthem in point of time. Wherefore, since the desires of good actions\nare good, and of evil actions, evil; much more are the pleasures of\ngood actions good, and those of evil actions evil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 33, A. 3), it is not the pleasures\nwhich result from an act of reason, that hinder the reason or destroy\nprudence, but extraneous pleasures, such as the pleasures of the\nbody. These indeed hinder the use of reason, as stated above (Q. 33,\nA. 3), either by contrariety of the appetite that rests in something\nrepugnant to reason, which makes the pleasure morally bad; or by\nfettering the reason: thus in conjugal intercourse, though the\npleasure be in accord with reason, yet it hinders the use of reason,\non account of the accompanying bodily change. But in this case the\npleasure is not morally evil; as neither is sleep, whereby the reason\nis fettered, morally evil, if it be taken according to reason: for\nreason itself demands that the use of reason be interrupted at times.\nWe must add, however, that although this fettering of the reason\nthrough the pleasure of conjugal intercourse has no moral malice,\nsince it is neither a mortal nor a venial sin; yet it proceeds from a\nkind of moral malice, namely, from the sin of our first parent;\nbecause, as stated in the First Part (Q. 98, A. 2) the case was\ndifferent in the state of innocence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The temperate man does not shun all pleasures, but\nthose that are immoderate, and contrary to reason. The fact that\nchildren and dumb animals seek pleasures, does not prove that all\npleasures are evil: because they have from God their natural\nappetite, which is moved to that which is naturally suitable to them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Art is not concerned with all kinds of good, but with\nthe making of external things, as we shall state further on (Q. 57,\nA. 3). But actions and passions, which are within us, are more the\nconcern of prudence and virtue than of art. Nevertheless there is an\nart of making pleasure, namely, \"the art of cookery and the art of\nmaking arguments,\" as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 12.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 34, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Every Pleasure Is Good?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that every pleasure is good. Because as\nstated in the First Part (Q. 5, A. 6) there are three kinds of good:\nthe virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant. But everything virtuous\nis good; and in like manner everything useful is good. Therefore also\nevery pleasure is good.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is not sought for the sake of something\nelse, is good in itself, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 6, 7. But pleasure\nis not sought for the sake of something else; for it seems absurd to\nask anyone why he seeks to be pleased. Therefore pleasure is good in\nitself. Now that which is predicated of a thing considered in itself,\nis predicated thereof universally. Therefore every pleasure is good.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is desired by all, seems to be good of\nitself: because good is \"what all things seek,\" as stated in _Ethic._\ni, 1. But everyone seeks some kind of pleasure, even children and\ndumb animals. Therefore pleasure is good in itself: and consequently\nall pleasure is good.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 2:14): \"Who are glad when\nthey have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ While some of the Stoics maintained that all\npleasures are evil, the Epicureans held that pleasure is good in\nitself, and that consequently all pleasures are good. They seem to\nhave thus erred through not discriminating between that which is good\nsimply, and that which is good in respect of a particular individual.\nThat which is good simply, is good in itself. Now that which is not\ngood in itself, may be good in respect of some individual in two\nways. In one way, because it is suitable to him by reason of a\ndisposition in which he is now, which disposition, however, is not\nnatural: thus it is sometimes good for a leper to eat things that are\npoisonous, which are not suitable simply to the human temperament. In\nanother way, through something unsuitable being esteemed suitable.\nAnd since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in some good, if the\nappetite reposes in that which is good simply, the pleasure will be\npleasure simply, and good simply. But if a man's appetite repose in\nthat which is good, not simply, but in respect of that particular\nman, then his pleasure will not be pleasure simply, but a pleasure to\nhim; neither will it be good simply, but in a certain respect, or an\napparent good.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The virtuous and the useful depend on accordance with\nreason, and consequently nothing is virtuous or useful, without being\ngood. But the pleasant depends on agreement with the appetite, which\ntends sometimes to that which is discordant from reason. Consequently\nnot every object of pleasure is good in the moral order which depends\non the order of reason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The reason why pleasure is not sought for the sake of\nsomething else is because it is repose in the end. Now the end may be\neither good or evil; although nothing can be an end except in so far\nas it is good in respect of such and such a man: and so too with\nregard to pleasure.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All things seek pleasure in the same way as they seek\ngood: since pleasure is the repose of the appetite in good. But, just\nas it happens that not every good which is desired, is of itself and\nverily good; so not every pleasure is of itself and verily good.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 34, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Any Pleasure Is the Greatest Good?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no pleasure is the greatest good.\nBecause nothing generated is the greatest good: since generation\ncannot be the last end. But pleasure is a consequence of generation:\nfor the fact that a thing takes pleasure is due to its being\nestablished in its own nature, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1).\nTherefore no pleasure is the greatest good.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is the greatest good cannot be made\nbetter by addition. But pleasure is made better by addition; since\npleasure together with virtue is better than pleasure without virtue.\nTherefore pleasure is not the greatest good.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is the greatest good is universally good,\nas being good of itself: since that which is such of itself is prior\nto and greater than that which is such accidentally. But pleasure is\nnot universally good, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore pleasure is\nnot the greatest good.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Happiness is the greatest good: since it is the\nend of man's life. But Happiness is not without pleasure: for it is\nwritten (Ps. 15:11): \"Thou shalt fill me with joy with Thy\ncountenance; at Thy right hand are delights even to the end.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Plato held neither with the Stoics, who asserted\nthat all pleasures are evil, nor with the Epicureans, who maintained\nthat all pleasures are good; but he said that some are good, and some\nevil; yet, so that no pleasure be the sovereign or greatest good.\nBut, judging from his arguments, he fails in two points. First,\nbecause, from observing that sensible and bodily pleasure consists in\na certain movement and \"becoming,\" as is evident in satiety from\neating and the like; he concluded that all pleasure arises from some\n\"becoming\" and movement: and from this, since \"becoming\" and movement\nare the acts of something imperfect, it would follow that pleasure is\nnot of the nature of ultimate perfection. But this is seen to be\nevidently false as regards intellectual pleasures: because one takes\npleasure, not only in the \"becoming\" of knowledge, for instance, when\none learns or wonders, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 8, ad 2); but also\nin the act of contemplation, by making use of knowledge already\nacquired.\n\nSecondly, because by greatest good he understood that which is the\nsupreme good simply, i.e. the good as existing apart from, and\nunparticipated by, all else, in which sense God is the Supreme Good;\nwhereas we are speaking of the greatest good in human things. Now the\ngreatest good of everything is its last end. And the end, as stated\nabove (Q. 1, A. 8; Q. 2, A. 7) is twofold; namely, the thing itself,\nand the use of that thing; thus the miser's end is either money or\nthe possession of money. Accordingly, man's last end may be said to\nbe either God Who is the Supreme Good simply; or the enjoyment of\nGod, which implies a certain pleasure in the last end. And in this\nsense a certain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among\nhuman goods.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Not every pleasure arises from a \"becoming\"; for some\npleasures result from perfect operations, as stated above.\nAccordingly nothing prevents some pleasure being the greatest good,\nalthough every pleasure is not such.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument is true of the greatest good simply, by\nparticipation of which all things are good; wherefore no addition can\nmake it better: whereas in regard to other goods, it is universally\ntrue that any good becomes better by the addition of another good.\nMoreover it might be said that pleasure is not something extraneous\nto the operation of virtue, but that it accompanies it, as stated in\n_Ethic._ i, 8.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That pleasure is the greatest good is due not to the\nmere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is perfect\nrepose in the perfect good. Hence it does not follow that every\npleasure is supremely good, or even good at all. Thus a certain\nscience is supremely good, but not every science is.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 34, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Pleasure Is the Measure or Rule by Which to Judge of Moral\nGood or Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule\nof moral good and evil. Because \"that which is first in a genus is\nthe measure of all the rest\" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the\nfirst thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by love and\ndesire. Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral\nmatters.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that\nmovement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all\nmovements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform:\nsince some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not\nthe measure and rule of morals.\n\nObj. 3: Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more\ncertain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice of\noperation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because\n\"those pleasures are good which result from good operations, and\nthose are evil which arise from evil operations,\" as stated in\n_Ethic._ x, 5. Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of\nmoral goodness and malice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine, commenting on Ps. 7:10 \"The searcher of\nhearts and reins is God,\" says: \"The end of care and thought is the\npleasure which each one aims at achieving.\" And the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. vii, 11) that \"pleasure is the architect,\" i.e. the\nprincipal, \"end [*St. Thomas took _finis_ as being the nominative,\nwhereas it is the genitive--_tou telous_; and the Greek reads \"He\"\n(i.e. the political philosopher), \"is the architect of the end.\"], in\nregard to which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the\nwill, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 1); and it is chiefly from the end\nthat we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is\ntaken to be that in which the will reposes: and the repose of the\nwill and of every appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man\nis reckoned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of\nthe human will; since that man is good and virtuous, who takes\npleasure in the works of virtue; and that man evil, who takes\npleasure in evil works.\n\nOn the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the\nrule of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally\npleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men.\nBut the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance\nwith reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of\ngeneration. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which\nserves a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is\nthe rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being\nthe repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect\npleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose\nwill rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in\nevil.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as stated\nabove (Q. 33, A. 4); an operation cannot be perfectly good, unless\nthere be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a thing\ndepends on its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure\nis the cause of goodness in the operation.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 35\n\nOF PAIN OR SORROW, IN ITSELF\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe have now to consider pain and sorrow: concerning which we must\nconsider: (1) Sorrow or pain in itself; (2) Its cause; (3) Its\neffects; (4) Its remedies; (5) Its goodness or malice.\n\nUnder the first head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether pain is a passion of the soul?\n\n(2) Whether sorrow is the same as pain?\n\n(3) Whether sorrow or pain is contrary [to] pleasure?\n\n(4) Whether all sorrow is contrary to all pleasure?\n\n(5) Whether there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of\ncontemplation?\n\n(6) Whether sorrow is to be shunned more than pleasure is to be\nsought?\n\n(7) Whether exterior pain is greater than interior?\n\n(8) Of the species of sorrow.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Pain Is a Passion of the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that pain is not a passion of the soul.\nBecause no passion of the soul is in the body. But pain can be in the\nbody, since Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii), that \"bodily pain is\na sudden corruption of the well-being of that thing which the soul,\nby making evil use of it, made subject to corruption.\" Therefore pain\nis not a passion of the soul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the appetitive\nfaculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but rather to\nthe apprehensive part: for Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that\n\"bodily pain is caused by the sense resisting a more powerful body.\"\nTherefore pain is not a passion of the soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every passion of the soul belongs to the animal\nappetite. But pain does not belong to the animal appetite, but rather\nto the natural appetite; for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14):\n\"Had not some good remained in nature, we should feel no pain in\nbeing punished by the loss of good.\" Therefore pain is not a passion\nof the soul.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8) reckons pain among\nthe passions of the soul; quoting Virgil (Aeneid, vi, 733):\n\n\"hence wild desires and grovelling fears\nAnd human laughter, human tears.\"\n[Translation: Conington.]\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as two things are requisite for pleasure;\nnamely, conjunction with good and perception of this conjunction; so\nalso two things are requisite for pain: namely, conjunction with some\nevil (which is in so far evil as it deprives one of some good), and\nperception of this conjunction. Now whatever is conjoined, if it have\nnot the aspect of good or evil in regard to the being to which it is\nconjoined, cannot cause pleasure or pain. Whence it is evident that\nsomething under the aspect of good or evil is the object of the\npleasure or pain. But good and evil, as such, are objects of the\nappetite. Consequently it is clear that pleasure and pain belong to\nthe appetite.\n\nNow every appetitive movement or inclination consequent to\napprehension, belongs to the intellective or sensitive appetite:\nsince the inclination of the natural appetite is not consequent to an\napprehension of the subject of that appetite, but to the apprehension\nof another, as stated in the First Part (Q. 103, AA. 1, 3). Since\nthen pleasure and pain presuppose some sense or apprehension in the\nsame subject, it is evident that pain, like pleasure, is in the\nintellective or sensitive appetite.\n\nAgain every movement of the sensitive appetite is called a passion,\nas stated above (Q. 22, AA. 1, 3): and especially those which tend to\nsome defect. Consequently pain, according as it is in the sensitive\nappetite, is most properly called a passion of the soul: just as\nbodily ailments are properly called passions of the body. Hence\nAugustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 8 [*Quoting Cicero]) reckons pain\nespecially as being a kind of ailment.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We speak of the body, because the cause of pain is in\nthe body: as when we suffer something hurtful to the body. But the\nmovement of pain is always in the soul; since \"the body cannot feel\npain unless the soul feel it,\" as Augustine says (Super Psalm. 87:4).\n\nReply Obj. 2: We speak of pain of the senses, not as though it were\nan act of the sensitive power; but because the senses are required\nfor bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Pain at the loss of good proves the goodness of the\nnature, not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but\nbecause nature desires something as good, the removal of which being\nperceived, there results the passion of pain in the sensitive\nappetite.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Sorrow Is the Same As Pain?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says\n(De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that \"pain is used to express bodily suffering.\"\nBut sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is\nnot pain.\n\nObj. 2: Further, pain is only in respect of present evil. But sorrow\ncan refer to both past and future evil: thus repentance is sorrow for\nthe past, and anxiety for the future. Therefore sorrow is quite\ndifferent from pain.\n\nObj. 3: Further, pain seems not to follow save from the sense of\ntouch. But sorrow can arise from all the senses. Therefore sorrow is\nnot pain, and extends to more objects.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 9:2): \"I have great sorrow\n[Douay: 'sadness'] and continual pain [Douay: 'sorrow'] in my heart,\"\nthus denoting the same thing by sorrow and pain.\n\n_I answer that,_ Pleasure and pain can arise from a twofold\napprehension, namely, from the apprehension of an exterior sense; and\nfrom the interior apprehension of the intellect or of the\nimagination. Now the interior apprehension extends to more objects\nthan the exterior apprehension: because whatever things come under\nthe exterior apprehension, come under the interior, but not\nconversely. Consequently that pleasure alone which is caused by an\ninterior apprehension is called joy, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 3):\nand in like manner that pain alone which is caused by an interior\napprehension, is called sorrow. And just as that pleasure which is\ncaused by an exterior apprehension, is called pleasure but not joy;\nso too that pain which is caused by an exterior apprehension, is\ncalled pain indeed but not sorrow. Accordingly sorrow is a species of\npain, as joy is a species of pleasure.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking there of the use of the word:\nbecause \"pain\" is more generally used in reference to bodily pains,\nwhich are better known, than in reference to spiritual pains.\n\nReply Obj. 2: External sense perceives only what is present; but the\ninterior cognitive power can perceive the present, past and future.\nConsequently sorrow can regard present, past and future: whereas\nbodily pain, which follows apprehension of the external sense, can\nonly regard something present.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in so far\nas they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also in\nso far as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the\nother senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive\npower, but they are not contrary to nature, save as they are\nsubordinate to the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone, who is\na perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the\nother senses for their own sake; whereas other animals take no\npleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles of touch, as\nstated in _Ethic._ iii, 10. Accordingly, in referring to the objects\nof the other senses, we do not speak of pain in so far as it is\ncontrary to natural pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary\nto joy. So then if pain be taken as denoting bodily pain, which is\nits more usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sorrow, according\nto the distinction of interior and exterior apprehension; although,\non the part of the objects, pleasure extends further than does bodily\npain. But if pain be taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of\nsorrow, as stated above.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Sorrow or Pain Is Contrary to Pleasure?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not contrary to pleasure.\nFor one of two contraries is not the cause of the other. But sorrow\ncan be the cause of pleasure; for it is written (Matt. 5:5): \"Blessed\nare they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.\" Therefore they are\nnot contrary to one another.\n\nObj. 2: Further, one contrary does not denominate the other. But to\nsome, pain or sorrow gives pleasure: thus Augustine says (Confess.\niii, 2) that in stage-plays sorrow itself gives pleasure: and\n(Confess. iv, 5) that \"weeping is a bitter thing, and yet it\nsometimes pleases us.\" Therefore pain is not contrary to pleasure.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one contrary is not the matter of the other; because\ncontraries cannot co-exist together. But sorrow can be the matter of\npleasure; for Augustine says (De Poenit. xiii): \"The penitent should\never sorrow, and rejoice in his sorrow.\" The Philosopher too says\n(Ethic. ix, 4) that, on the other hand, \"the evil man feels pain at\nhaving been pleased.\" Therefore pleasure and pain are not contrary to\none another.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that \"joy is\nthe volition of consent to the things we wish: and that sorrow is the\nvolition of dissent from the things we do not wish.\" But consent and\ndissent are contraries. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are contrary to\none another.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety\nis a difference in respect of a form. Now the form or species of a\npassion or movement is taken from the object or term. Consequently,\nsince the objects of pleasure and sorrow or pain, viz. present good\nand present evil, are contrary to one another, it follows that pain\nand pleasure are contrary to one another.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders one contrary causing the other\naccidentally: and thus sorrow can be the cause of pleasure. In one\nway, in so far as from sorrow at the absence of something, or at the\npresence of its contrary, one seeks the more eagerly for something\npleasant: thus a thirsty man seeks more eagerly the pleasure of a\ndrink, as a remedy for the pain he suffers. In another way, in so far\nas, from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink\nfrom undergoing pain, so as to obtain that pleasure. In each of these\nways, the sorrows of the present life lead us to the comfort of the\nfuture life. Because by the mere fact that man mourns for his sins,\nor for the delay of glory, he merits the consolation of eternity. In\nlike manner a man merits it when he shrinks not from hardships and\nstraits in order to obtain it.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Pain itself can be pleasurable accidentally in so far\nas it is accompanied by wonder, as in stage-plays; or in so far as it\nrecalls a beloved object to one's memory, and makes one feel one's\nlove for the thing, whose absence gives us pain. Consequently, since\nlove is pleasant, both pain and whatever else results from love,\nforasmuch as they remind us of our love, are pleasant. And, for this\nreason, we derive pleasure even from pains depicted on the stage: in\nso far as, in witnessing them, we perceive ourselves to conceive a\ncertain love for those who are there represented.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The will and the reason reflect on their own acts,\ninasmuch as the acts themselves of the will and reason are considered\nunder the aspect of good or evil. In this way sorrow can be the\nmatter of pleasure, or vice versa, not essentially but accidentally:\nthat is, in so far as either of them is considered under the aspect\nof good or evil.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 4]\n\nWhether All Sorrow Is Contrary to All Pleasure?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is contrary to all\npleasure. Because, just as whiteness and blackness are contrary\nspecies of color, so pleasure and sorrow are contrary species of the\nsoul's passions. But whiteness and blackness are universally contrary\nto one another. Therefore pleasure and sorrow are so too.\n\nObj. 2: Further, remedies are made of things contrary (to the evil).\nBut every pleasure is a remedy for all manner of sorrow, as the\nPhilosopher declares (Ethic. vii, 14). Therefore every pleasure is\ncontrary to every sorrow.\n\nObj. 3: Further, contraries are hindrances to one another. But every\nsorrow hinders any kind of pleasure: as is evident from _Ethic._\nx, 5. Therefore every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The same thing is not the cause of contraries. But\njoy for one thing, and sorrow for the opposite thing, proceed from\nthe same habit: thus from charity it happens that we \"rejoice with\nthem that rejoice,\" and \"weep with them that weep\" (Rom. 12:15).\nTherefore not every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Metaph. x, 4), contrariety\nis a difference in respect of a form. Now a form may be generic or\nspecific. Consequently things may be contraries in respect of a\ngeneric form, as virtue and vice; or in respect of a specific form,\nas justice and injustice.\n\nNow we must observe that some things are specified by absolute forms,\ne.g. substances and qualities; whereas other things are specified in\nrelation to something extrinsic, e.g. passions and movements, which\nderive their species from their terms or objects. Accordingly in\nthose things that are specified by absolute forms, it happens that\nspecies contained under contrary genera are not contrary as to their\nspecific nature: but it does not happen for them to have any affinity\nor fittingness to one another. For intemperance and justice, which\nare in the contrary genera of virtue and vice, are not contrary to\none another in respect of their specific nature; and yet they have no\naffinity or fittingness to one another. On the other hand, in those\nthings that are specified in relation to something extrinsic, it\nhappens that species belonging to contrary genera, are not only not\ncontrary to one another, but also that they have a certain mutual\naffinity or fittingness. The reason of this is that where there is\none same relation to two contraries, there is contrariety; e.g. to\napproach to a white thing, and to approach to a black thing, are\ncontraries; whereas contrary relations to contrary things, implies a\ncertain likeness, e.g. to recede from something white, and to\napproach to something black. This is most evident in the case of\ncontradiction, which is the principle of opposition: because\nopposition consists in affirming and denying the same thing, e.g.\n\"white\" and \"non-white\"; while there is fittingness and likeness in\nthe affirmation of one contrary and the denial of the other, as, if\nI were to say \"black\" and \"not white.\"\n\nNow sorrow and pleasure, being passions, are specified by their\nobjects. According to their respective genera, they are contrary to\none another: since one is a kind of _pursuit,_ the other a kind of\n_avoidance,_ which \"are to the appetite, what affirmation and denial\nare to the intellect\" (Ethic. vi, 2). Consequently sorrow and\npleasure in respect of the same object, are specifically contrary to\none another: whereas sorrow and pleasure in respect of objects that\nare not contrary but disparate, are not specifically contrary to one\nanother, but are also disparate; for instance, sorrow at the death of\na friend, and pleasure in contemplation. If, however, those diverse\nobjects be contrary to one another, then pleasure and sorrow are not\nonly specifically contrary, but they also have a certain mutual\nfittingness and affinity: for instance to rejoice in good and to\nsorrow for evil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Whiteness and blackness do not take their species from\ntheir relationship to something extrinsic, as pleasure and sorrow do:\nwherefore the comparison does not hold.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Genus is taken from matter, as is stated in _Metaph._\nviii, 2; and in accidents the subject takes the place of matter. Now\nit has been said above that pleasure and sorrow are generically\ncontrary to one another. Consequently in every sorrow the subject has\na disposition contrary to the disposition of the subject of pleasure:\nbecause in every pleasure the appetite is viewed as accepting what it\npossesses, and in every sorrow, as avoiding it. And therefore on the\npart of the subject every pleasure is a remedy for any kind of\nsorrow, and every sorrow is a hindrance of all manner of pleasure:\nbut chiefly when pleasure is opposed to sorrow specifically.\n\nWherefore the Reply to the Third Objection is evident. Or we may say\nthat, although not every sorrow is specifically contrary to every\npleasure, yet they are contrary to one another in regard to their\neffects: since one has the effect of strengthening the animal nature,\nwhile the other results in a kind of discomfort.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 5]\n\nWhether There Is Any Sorrow Contrary to the Pleasure of Contemplation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is a sorrow that is contrary to\nthe pleasure of contemplation. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:10):\n\"The sorrow that is according to God, worketh penance steadfast unto\nsalvation.\" Now to look at God belongs to the higher reason, whose act\nis to give itself to contemplation, according to Augustine (De Trin.\nxii, 3, 4). Therefore there is a sorrow contrary to the pleasure of\ncontemplation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, contrary things have contrary effects. If therefore\nthe contemplation of one contrary gives pleasure, the other contrary\nwill give sorrow: and so there will be a sorrow contrary to the\npleasure of contemplation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as the object of pleasure is good, so the object of\nsorrow is evil. But contemplation can be an evil: since the\nPhilosopher says (Metaph. xii, 9) that \"it is unfitting to think of\ncertain things.\" Therefore sorrow can be contrary to the pleasure of\ncontemplation.\n\nObj. 4: Further, any work, so far as it is unhindered, can be a cause\nof pleasure, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 12, 13; x, 4. But the work of\ncontemplation can be hindered in many ways, either so as to destroy\nit altogether, or as to make it difficult. Therefore in contemplation\nthere can be a sorrow contrary to the pleasure.\n\nObj. 5: Further, affliction of the flesh is a cause of sorrow. But,\nas it is written (Eccles. 12:12) \"much study is an affliction of the\nflesh.\" Therefore contemplation admits of sorrow contrary to its\npleasure.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 8:16): \"Her,\" i.e. wisdom's,\n\"conversation hath no bitterness nor her company any tediousness; but\njoy and gladness.\" Now the conversation and company of wisdom are\nfound in contemplation. Therefore there is no sorrow contrary to the\npleasure of contemplation.\n\n_I answer that,_ The pleasure of contemplation can be understood in\ntwo ways. In one way, so that contemplation is the cause, but not the\nobject of pleasure: and then pleasure is taken not in contemplating\nbut in the thing contemplated. Now it is possible to contemplate\nsomething harmful and sorrowful, just as to contemplate something\nsuitable and pleasant. Consequently if the pleasure of contemplation\nbe taken in this way, nothing hinders some sorrow being contrary to\nthe pleasure of contemplation.\n\nIn another way, the pleasure of contemplation is understood, so that\ncontemplation is its object and cause; as when one takes pleasure in\nthe very act of contemplating. And thus, according to Gregory of\nNyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xviii.], \"no sorrow is contrary to\nthat pleasure which is about contemplation\": and the Philosopher says\nthe same (Topic. i, 13; Ethic. x, 3). This, however, is to be\nunderstood as being the case properly speaking. The reason is because\nsorrow is of itself contrary to pleasure in a contrary object: thus\npleasure in heat is contrary to sorrow caused by cold. But there is\nno contrary to the object of contemplation: because contraries, as\napprehended by the mind, are not contrary, but one is the means of\nknowing the other. Wherefore, properly speaking, there cannot be a\nsorrow contrary to the pleasure of contemplation. Nor has it any\nsorrow annexed to it, as bodily pleasures have, which are like\nremedies against certain annoyances; thus a man takes pleasure in\ndrinking through being troubled with thirst, but when the thirst is\nquite driven out, the pleasure of drinking ceases also. Because the\npleasure of contemplation is not caused by one's being quit of an\nannoyance, but by the fact that contemplation is pleasant in itself:\nfor pleasure is not a \"becoming\" but a perfect operation, as stated\nabove (Q. 31, A. 1).\n\nAccidentally, however, sorrow is mingled with the pleasure of\ncontemplation; and this in two ways: first, on the part of an organ,\nsecondly, through some impediment in the apprehension. On the part of\nan organ, sorrow or pain is mingled with apprehension, directly, as\nregards the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part, which have a\nbodily organ; either from the sensible object disagreeing with the\nnormal condition of the organ, as the taste of something bitter, and\nthe smell of something foul; or from the sensible object, though\nagreeable, being so continuous in its action on the sense, that it\nexceeds the normal condition of the organ, as stated above (Q. 33, A.\n2), the result being that an apprehension which at first was pleasant\nbecomes tedious. But these two things cannot occur directly in the\ncontemplation of the mind; because the mind has no corporeal organ:\nwherefore it was said in the authority quoted above that intellectual\ncontemplation has neither \"bitterness,\" nor \"tediousness.\" Since,\nhowever, the human mind, in contemplation, makes use of the sensitive\npowers of apprehension, to whose acts weariness is incidental;\ntherefore some affliction or pain is indirectly mingled with\ncontemplation.\n\nNevertheless, in neither of these ways, is the pain thus accidentally\nmingled with contemplation, contrary to the pleasure thereof. Because\npain caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not contrary to the\npleasure of contemplation, but rather is in affinity and in harmony\nwith it, as is evident from what has been said above (A. 4): while\npain or sorrow caused by bodily weariness, does not belong to the\nsame genus, wherefore it is altogether disparate. Accordingly it is\nevident that no sorrow is contrary to pleasure taken in the very act\nof contemplation; nor is any sorrow connected with it save\naccidentally.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The \"sorrow which is according to God,\" is not caused\nby the very act of intellectual contemplation, but by something which\nthe mind contemplates: viz. by sin, which the mind considers as\ncontrary to the love of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Things which are contrary according to nature are not\ncontrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are\ncontrary in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed\nrather is one contrary the reason for knowing the other. Hence one\nand the same science considers contraries.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Contemplation, in itself, is never evil, since it is\nnothing else than the consideration of truth, which is the good of\nthe intellect: it can, however, be evil accidentally, i.e. in so far\nas the contemplation of a less noble object hinders the contemplation\nof a more noble object; or on the part of the object contemplated, to\nwhich the appetite is inordinately attached.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Sorrow caused by a hindrance to contemplation, is not\ncontrary to the pleasure of contemplation, but is in harmony with it,\nas stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Affliction of the flesh affects contemplation\naccidentally and indirectly, as stated above.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Sorrow Is to Be Shunned More Than Pleasure Is to Be Sought?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sorrow is to be shunned more than\npleasure is to be sought. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 63): \"There\nis nobody that does not shun sorrow more than he seeks pleasure.\" Now\nthat which all agree in doing, seems to be natural. Therefore it is\nnatural and right for sorrow to be shunned more than pleasure is\nsought.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the action of a contrary conduces to rapidity and\nintensity of movement: for \"hot water freezes quicker and harder,\" as\nthe Philosopher says (Meteor. i, 12). But the shunning of sorrow is\ndue to the contrariety of the cause of sorrow; whereas the desire for\npleasure does not arise from any contrariety, but rather from the\nsuitableness of the pleasant object. Therefore sorrow is shunned more\neagerly than pleasure is sought.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the stronger the passion which a man resists\naccording to reason, the more worthy is he of praise, and the more\nvirtuous: since \"virtue is concerned with the difficult and the good\"\n(Ethic. ii, 3). But the brave man who resists the movement of\nshunning sorrow, is more virtuous than the temperate man, who resists\nthe movement of desire for pleasure: since the Philosopher says\n(Rhet. ii, 4) that \"the brave and the just are chiefly praised.\"\nTherefore the movement of shunning sorrow is more eager than the\nmovement of seeking pleasure.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Good is stronger than evil, as Dionysius declares\n(Div. Nom. iv). But pleasure is desirable for the sake of the good\nwhich is its object; whereas the shunning of sorrow is on account of\nevil. Therefore the desire for pleasure is more eager than the\nshunning of sorrow.\n\n_I answer that,_ The desire for pleasure is of itself more eager than\nthe shunning of sorrow. The reason of this is that the cause of\npleasure is a suitable good; while the cause of pain or sorrow is an\nunsuitable evil. Now it happens that a certain good is suitable\nwithout any repugnance at all: but it is not possible for any evil to\nbe so unsuitable as not to be suitable in some way. Wherefore\npleasure can be entire and perfect: whereas sorrow is always partial.\nTherefore desire for pleasure is naturally greater than the shunning\nof sorrow. Another reason is because the good, which is the object of\npleasure, is sought for its own sake: whereas the evil, which is the\nobject of sorrow, is to be shunned as being a privation of good: and\nthat which is by reason of itself is stronger than that which is by\nreason of something else. Moreover we find a confirmation of this in\nnatural movements. For every natural movement is more intense in the\nend, when a thing approaches the term that is suitable to its nature,\nthan at the beginning, when it leaves the term that is unsuitable to\nits nature: as though nature were more eager in tending to what is\nsuitable to it, than in shunning what is unsuitable. Therefore the\ninclination of the appetitive power is, of itself, more eager in\ntending to pleasure than in shunning sorrow.\n\nBut it happens accidentally that a man shuns sorrow more eagerly than\nhe seeks pleasure: and this for three reasons. First, on the part of\nthe apprehension. Because, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), \"love\nis felt more keenly, when we lack that which we love.\" Now from the\nlack of what we love, sorrow results, which is caused either by the\nloss of some loved good, or by the presence of some contrary evil.\nBut pleasure suffers no lack of the good loved, for it rests in\npossession of it. Since then love is the cause of pleasure and\nsorrow, the latter is the more shunned, according as love is the more\nkeenly felt on account of that which is contrary to it. Secondly, on\nthe part of the cause of sorrow or pain, which cause is repugnant to\na good that is more loved than the good in which we take pleasure.\nFor we love the natural well-being of the body more than the pleasure\nof eating: and consequently we would leave the pleasure of eating and\nthe like, from fear of the pain occasioned by blows or other such\ncauses, which are contrary to the well-being of the body. Thirdly, on\nthe part of the effect: namely, in so far as sorrow hinders not only\none pleasure, but all.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The saying of Augustine that \"sorrow is shunned more\nthan pleasure is sought\" is true accidentally but not simply. And\nthis is clear from what he says after: \"Since we see that the most\nsavage animals are deterred from the greatest pleasures by fear of\npain,\" which pain is contrary to life which is loved above all.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is not the same with movement from within and\nmovement from without. For movement from within tends to what is\nsuitable more than it recedes from that which is unsuitable; as we\nremarked above in regard to natural movement. But movement from\nwithout is intensified by the very opposition: because each thing\nstrives in its own way to resist anything contrary to it, as aiming\nat its own preservation. Hence violent movement is intense at first,\nand slackens towards the end. Now the movement of the appetitive\nfaculty is from within: since it tends from the soul to the object.\nConsequently pleasure is, of itself, more to be sought than sorrow is\nto be shunned. But the movement of the sensitive faculty is from\nwithout, as it were from the object of the soul. Consequently the\nmore contrary a thing is the more it is felt. And then too,\naccidentally, in so far as the senses are requisite for pleasure and\npain, pain is shunned more than pleasure is sought.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A brave man is not praised because, in accordance with\nreason, he is not overcome by any kind of sorrow or pain whatever,\nbut because he is not overcome by that which is concerned with the\ndangers of death. And this kind of sorrow is more shunned, than\npleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse are sought, which\nlatter pleasures are the object of temperance: thus life is loved\nmore than food and sexual pleasure. But the temperate man is praised\nfor refraining from pleasures of touch, more than for not shunning\nthe pains which are contrary to them, as is stated in _Ethic._ iii,\n11.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Outward Pain Is Greater Than Interior Sorrow?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that outward pain is greater than interior\nsorrow of the heart. Because outward pain arises from a cause\nrepugnant to the well-being of the body in which is life: whereas\ninterior sorrow is caused by some evil in the imagination. Since,\ntherefore, life is loved more than an imagined good, it seems that,\naccording to what has been said above (A. 6), outward pain is greater\nthan interior sorrow.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the reality moves more than its likeness does. But\noutward pain arises from the real conjunction of some contrary;\nwhereas inward sorrow arises from the apprehended likeness of a\ncontrary. Therefore outward pain is greater than inward sorrow.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a cause is known by its effect. But outward pain has\nmore striking effects: since man dies sooner of outward pain than of\ninterior sorrow. Therefore outward pain is greater and is shunned\nmore than interior sorrow.\n\n_On the contrary,_ it is written (Ecclus. 25:17): \"The sadness of the\nheart is every wound [Douay: 'plague'], and the wickedness of a woman\nis all evil.\" Therefore, just as the wickedness of a woman surpasses\nall other wickedness, as the text implies; so sadness of the heart\nsurpasses every outward wound.\n\n_I answer that,_ Interior and exterior pain agree in one point and\ndiffer in two. They agree in this, that each is a movement of the\nappetitive power, as stated above (A. 1). But they differ in respect\nof those two things which are requisite for pain and pleasure;\nnamely, in respect of the cause, which is a conjoined good or evil;\nand in respect of the apprehension. For the cause of outward pain is\na conjoined evil repugnant to the body; while the cause of inward\npain is a conjoined evil repugnant to the appetite. Again, outward\npain arises from an apprehension of sense, chiefly of touch; while\ninward pain arises from an interior apprehension, of the imagination\nor of the reason.\n\nIf then we compare the cause of inward pain to the cause of outward\npain, the former belongs, of itself, to the appetite to which both\nthese pains belong: while the latter belongs to the appetite\ndirectly. Because inward pain arises from something being repugnant\nto the appetite itself, while outward pain arises from something\nbeing repugnant to the appetite, through being repugnant to the body.\nNow, that which is of itself is always prior to that which is by\nreason of another. Wherefore, from this point of view, inward pain\nsurpasses outward pain. In like manner also on the part of\napprehension: because the apprehension of reason and imagination is\nof a higher order than the apprehension of the sense of touch.\nConsequently inward pain is, simply and of itself, more keen than\noutward pain: a sign whereof is that one willingly undergoes outward\npain in order to avoid inward pain: and in so far as outward pain is\nnot repugnant to the interior appetite, it becomes in a manner\npleasant and agreeable by way of inward joy. Sometimes, however,\noutward pain is accompanied by inward pain, and then the pain is\nincreased. Because inward pain is not only greater than outward pain,\nit is also more universal: since whatever is repugnant to the body,\ncan be repugnant to the interior appetite; and whatever is\napprehended by sense may be apprehended by imagination and reason,\nbut not conversely. Hence in the passage quoted above it is said\nexpressively: \"Sadness of the heart is every wound,\" because even the\npains of outward wounds are comprised in the interior sorrows of the\nheart.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Inward pain can also arise from things that are\ndestructive of life. And then the comparison of inward to outward\npain must not be taken in reference to the various evils that cause\npain; but in regard to the various ways in which this cause of pain\nis compared to the appetite.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Inward pain is not caused by the apprehended likeness\nof a thing: for a man is not inwardly pained by the apprehended\nlikeness itself, but by the thing which the likeness represents. And\nthis thing is all the more perfectly apprehended by means of its\nlikeness, as this likeness is more immaterial and abstract.\nConsequently inward pain is, of itself, greater, as being caused by a\ngreater evil, forasmuch as evil is better known by an inward\napprehension.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Bodily changes are more liable to be caused by outward\npain, both from the fact that outward pain is caused by a corruptive\nconjoined corporally, which is a necessary condition of the sense of\ntouch; and from the fact that the outward sense is more material than\nthe inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more material\nthan the intellective. For this reason, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3;\nQ. 31, A. 5), the body undergoes a greater change from the movement\nof the sensitive appetite: and, in like manner, from outward than\nfrom inward pain.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 35, Art. 8]\n\nWhether There Are Only Four Species of Sorrow?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that Damascene's (De Fide Orth. ii, 14)\ndivision of sorrow into four species is incorrect; viz. into \"torpor,\ndistress,\" which Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.]\ncalls \"anxiety,\"--\"pity,\" and \"envy.\" For sorrow is contrary to\npleasure. But there are not several species of pleasure. Therefore it\nis incorrect to assign different species of sorrow.\n\nObj. 2: Further, _Repentance_ is a species of sorrow; and so are\n_indignation_ and _jealousy,_ as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 9,\n11). But these are not included in the above species. Therefore this\ndivision is insufficient.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the members of a division should be things that are\nopposed to one another. But these species are not opposed to one\nanother. For according to Gregory [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.]\n\"torpor is sorrow depriving of speech; anxiety is the sorrow that\nweighs down; envy is sorrow for another's good; pity is sorrow for\nanother's wrongs.\" But it is possible for one to sorrow for another's\nwrongs, and for another's good, and at the same time to be weighed\ndown inwardly, and outwardly to be speechless. Therefore this\ndivision is incorrect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the twofold authority of Gregory of Nyssa\n[*Nemesius] and of Damascene.\n\n_I answer that,_ It belongs to the notion of a species that it is\nsomething added to the genus. But a thing can be added to a genus in\ntwo ways. First, as something belonging of itself to the genus, and\nvirtually contained therein: thus \"rational\" is added to \"animal.\"\nSuch an addition makes true species of a genus: as the Philosopher\nsays (Metaph. vii, 12; viii, 2, 3). But, secondly, a thing may be\nadded to a genus, that is, as it were, foreign to the notion conveyed\nby that genus: thus \"white\" or something of the kind may be added to\n\"animal.\" Such an addition does not make true species of the genus,\naccording to the usual sense in which we speak of genera and species.\nBut sometimes a thing is said to be a species of a certain genus,\nthrough having something foreign to that genus indeed, but to which\nthe notion of that genus is applicable: thus a live coal or a flame\nis said to be a species of fire, because in each of them the nature\nof fire is applied to a foreign matter. In like manner we speak of\nastronomy and perspective as being species of mathematics, inasmuch\nas the principles of mathematics are applied to natural matter.\n\nIn accordance with this manner of speaking, the species of sorrow\nare reckoned by an application of the notion of sorrow to something\nforeign to it. This foreign matter may be taken on the part of the\ncause or the object, or of the effect. For the proper object of\nsorrow is _one's own evil._ Hence sorrow may be concerned for an\nobject foreign to it either through one's being sorry for an evil\nthat is not one's own; and thus we have _pity_ which is sorrow for\nanother's evil, considered, however, as one's own: or through one's\nbeing sorry for something that is neither evil nor one's own, but\nanother's good, considered, however, as one's own evil: and thus we\nhave _envy._ The proper effect of sorrow consists in a certain\n_flight of the appetite._ Wherefore the foreign element in the effect\nof sorrow, may be taken so as to affect the first part only, by\nexcluding flight: and thus we have _anxiety_ which weighs on the\nmind, so as to make escape seem impossible: hence it is also called\n_perplexity._ If, however, the mind be weighed down so much, that\neven the limbs become motionless, which belongs to _torpor,_ then we\nhave the foreign element affecting both, since there is neither\nflight, nor is the effect in the appetite. And the reason why torpor\nespecially is said to deprive one of speech is because of all the\nexternal movements the voice is the best expression of the inward\nthought and desire, not only in men, but also in other animals, as is\nstated in _Polit._ i, 1.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Pleasure is caused by good, which has only one meaning:\nand so pleasure is not divided into several species as sorrow is; for\nthe latter is caused by evil, which \"happens in many ways,\" as\nDionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Repentance is for one's own evil, which is the proper\nobject of sorrow: wherefore it does not belong to these species.\nJealousy and indignation are included in envy, as we shall explain\nlater (II-II, Q. 36, A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 3: This division is not according to opposite species; but\naccording to the diversity of foreign matter to which the notion of\nsorrow is applied, as stated above.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 36\n\nOF THE CAUSES OF SORROW OR PAIN\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the causes of sorrow: under which head there are\nfour points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether sorrow is caused by the loss of a good or rather by the\npresence of an evil?\n\n(2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?\n\n(3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?\n\n(4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 36, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Sorrow Is Caused by the Loss of Good or by the Presence of\nEvil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sorrow is caused by the loss of a\ngood rather than by the presence of an evil. For Augustine says (De\nviii QQ. Dulcit. qu. 1) that sorrow is caused by the loss of temporal\ngoods. Therefore, in like manner, every sorrow is caused by the loss\nof some good.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it was said above (Q. 35, A. 4) that the sorrow\nwhich is contrary to a pleasure, has the same object as that\npleasure. But the object of pleasure is good, as stated above (Q. 23,\nA. 4; Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35, A. 3). Therefore sorrow is caused chiefly\nby the loss of good.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), love\nis the cause of sorrow, as of the other emotions of the soul. But the\nobject of love is good. Therefore pain or sorrow is felt for the loss\nof good rather than for an evil that is present.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that \"the\ndreaded evil gives rise to fear, the present evil is the cause of\nsorrow.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ If privations, as considered by the mind, were what\nthey are in reality, this question would seem to be of no importance.\nFor, as stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 10; Q. 48, A. 3), evil is\nthe privation of good: and privation is in reality nothing else than\nthe lack of the contrary habit; so that, in this respect, to sorrow\nfor the loss of good, would be the same as to sorrow for the presence\nof evil. But sorrow is a movement of the appetite in consequence of\nan apprehension: and even a privation, as apprehended, has the aspect\nof a being, wherefore it is called \"a being of reason.\" And in this\nway evil, being a privation, is regarded as a \"contrary.\"\nAccordingly, so far as the movement of the appetite is concerned, it\nmakes a difference which of the two it regards chiefly, the present\nevil or the good which is lost.\n\nAgain, since the movement of the animal appetite holds the same place\nin the actions of the soul, as natural movement in natural things;\nthe truth of the matter is to be found by considering natural\nmovements. For if, in natural movements, we observe those of approach\nand withdrawal, approach is of itself directed to something suitable\nto nature; while withdrawal is of itself directed to something\ncontrary to nature; thus a heavy body, of itself, withdraws from a\nhigher place, and approaches naturally to a lower place. But if we\nconsider the cause of both these movements, viz. gravity, then\ngravity itself inclines towards the lower place more than it\nwithdraws from the higher place, since withdrawal from the latter is\nthe reason for its downward tendency.\n\nAccordingly, since, in the movements of the appetite, sorrow is a\nkind of flight or withdrawal, while pleasure is a kind of pursuit or\napproach; just as pleasure regards first the good possessed, as its\nproper object, so sorrow regards the evil that is present. On the\nother hand love, which is the cause of pleasure and sorrow, regards\ngood rather than evil: and therefore, forasmuch as the object is the\ncause of a passion, the present evil is more properly the cause of\nsorrow or pain, than the good which is lost.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The loss itself of good is apprehended as an evil, just\nas the loss of evil is apprehended as a good: and in this sense\nAugustine says that pain results from the loss of temporal goods.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Pleasure and its contrary pain have the same object,\nbut under contrary aspects: because if the presence of a particular\nthing be the object of pleasure, the absence of that same thing is\nthe object of sorrow. Now one contrary includes the privation of the\nother, as stated in _Metaph._ x, 4: and consequently sorrow in\nrespect of one contrary is, in a way, directed to the same thing\nunder a contrary aspect.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When many movements arise from one cause, it does not\nfollow that they all regard chiefly that which the cause regards\nchiefly, but only the first of them. And each of the others regards\nchiefly that which is suitable to it according to its own nature.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 36, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Desire Is a Cause of Sorrow?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that desire is not a cause of pain or\nsorrow. Because sorrow of itself regards evil, as stated above (A.\n1): whereas desire is a movement of the appetite towards good. Now\nmovement towards one contrary is not a cause of movement towards the\nother contrary. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.\n\nObj. 2: Further, pain, according to Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12),\nis caused by something present; whereas the object of desire is\nsomething future. Therefore desire is not a cause of pain.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is pleasant in itself is not a cause of\npain. But desire is pleasant in itself, as the Philosopher says\n(Rhet. i, 11). Therefore desire is not a cause of pain or sorrow.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion xxiv): \"When ignorance\nof things necessary to be done, and desire of things hurtful, found\ntheir way in: error and pain stole an entrance in their company.\" But\nignorance is the cause of error. Therefore desire is a cause of\nsorrow.\n\n_I answer that,_ Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now,\nas stated above (A. 1), the appetitive movement is likened to the\nnatural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold\ncause; one, on the part of the end, the other, on the part of the\nprinciple of movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a\nheavy body's downward movement is the lower place; while the\nprinciple of that movement is a natural inclination resulting from\ngravity.\n\nNow the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is\nthe object of that movement. And thus, it has been said above (A. 1)\nthat the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the other\nhand, the cause, by way of principle, of that movement, is the inward\ninclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of all,\nthe good, and in consequence, the rejection of a contrary evil. Hence\nthe first principle of this appetitive movement is love, which is the\nfirst inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good:\nwhile the second principle is hatred, which is the first inclination\nof the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since\nconcupiscence or desire is the first effect of love, which gives rise\nto the greatest pleasure, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 6); hence it is\nthat Augustine often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense\nof love, as was also stated (Q. 30, A. 2, ad 2): and in this sense he\nsays that desire is the universal cause of sorrow. Sometimes,\nhowever, desire taken in its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow.\nBecause whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary\nto that movement. Now that which is contrary to the movement of the\nappetite, is a cause of sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause\nof sorrow, in so far as we sorrow for the delay of a desired good, or\nfor its entire removal. But it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow:\nsince we sorrow more for the loss of present good, in which we have\nalready taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which\nwe desire to have.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The inclination of the appetite to the possession of\ngood causes the inclination of the appetite to fly from evil, as\nstated above. And hence it is that the appetitive movements that\nregard good, are reckoned as causing the appetitive movements that\nregard evil.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That which is desired, though really future, is,\nnevertheless, in a way, present, inasmuch as it is hoped for. Or we\nmay say that although the desired good itself is future, yet the\nhindrance is reckoned as present, and so gives rise to sorrow.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Desire gives pleasure, so long as there is hope of\nobtaining that which is desired. But, when hope is removed through\nthe presence of an obstacle, desire causes sorrow.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 36, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Craving for Unity Is a Cause of Sorrow?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the craving for unity is not a cause\nof sorrow. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 3) that \"this\nopinion,\" which held repletion to be the cause of pleasure, and\ndivision [*Aristotle wrote _endeian_, 'want'; St. Thomas, in the\nLatin version, read 'incisionem'; should he have read\n'indigentiam'?], the cause of sorrow, \"seems to have originated in\npains and pleasures connected with food.\" But not every pleasure or\nsorrow is of this kind. Therefore the craving for unity is not the\nuniversal cause of sorrow; since repletion pertains to unity, and\ndivision is the cause of multitude.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every separation is opposed to unity. If therefore\nsorrow were caused by a craving for unity, no separation would be\npleasant: and this is clearly untrue as regards the separation of\nwhatever is superfluous.\n\nObj. 3: Further, for the same reason we desire the conjunction of\ngood and the removal of evil. But as conjunction regards unity, since\nit is a kind of union; so separation is contrary to unity. Therefore\nthe craving for unity should not be reckoned, rather than the craving\nfor separation, as causing sorrow.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 23), that \"from\nthe pain that dumb animals feel, it is quite evident how their souls\ndesire unity, in ruling and quickening their bodies. For what else is\npain but a feeling of impatience of division or corruption?\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Forasmuch as the desire or craving for good is\nreckoned as a cause of sorrow, so must a craving for unity, and love,\nbe accounted as causing sorrow. Because the good of each thing\nconsists in a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, united in\nitself, the elements of which its perfection consists: wherefore the\nPlatonists held that _one_ is a principle, just as _good_ is. Hence\neverything naturally desires unity, just as it desires goodness: and\ntherefore, just as love or desire for good is a cause of sorrow, so\nalso is the love or craving for unity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Not every kind of union causes perfect goodness, but\nonly that on which the perfect being of a thing depends. Hence\nneither does the desire of any kind of unity cause pain or sorrow, as\nsome have maintained: whose opinion is refuted by the Philosopher\nfrom the fact that repletion is not always pleasant; for instance,\nwhen a man has eaten to repletion, he takes no further pleasure in\neating; because repletion or union of this kind, is repugnant rather\nthan conducive to perfect being. Consequently sorrow is caused by the\ncraving, not for any kind of unity, but for that unity in which the\nperfection of nature consists.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Separation can be pleasant, either because it removes\nsomething contrary to a thing's perfection, or because it has some\nunion connected with it, such as union of the sense to its object.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Separation from things hurtful and corruptive is\ndesired, in so far as they destroy the unity which is due. Wherefore\nthe desire for such like separation is not the first cause of sorrow,\nwhereas the craving for unity is.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 36, Art. 4]\n\nWhether an Irresistible Power Is a Cause of Sorrow?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a greater power should not be\nreckoned a cause of sorrow. For that which is in the power of the\nagent is not present but future. But sorrow is for present evil.\nTherefore a greater power is not a cause of sorrow.\n\nObj. 2: Further, hurt inflicted is the cause of sorrow. But hurt can\nbe inflicted even by a lesser power. Therefore a greater power should\nnot be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the interior inclinations of the soul are the causes\nof the movements of appetite. But a greater power is something\nexternal. Therefore it should not be reckoned as a cause of sorrow.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. Boni xx): \"Sorrow in the\nsoul is caused by the will resisting a stronger power: while pain in\nthe body is caused by sense resisting a stronger body.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a present evil, is cause of\nsorrow or pain, by way of object. Therefore that which is the cause\nof the evil being present, should be reckoned as causing pain or\nsorrow. Now it is evident that it is contrary to the inclination of\nthe appetite to be united with a present evil: and whatever is\ncontrary to a thing's inclination does not happen to it save by the\naction of something stronger. Wherefore Augustine reckons a greater\npower as being the cause of sorrow.\n\nBut it must be noted that if the stronger power goes so far as to\ntransform the contrary inclination into its own inclination there\nwill be no longer repugnance or violence: thus if a stronger agent,\nby its action on a heavy body, deprives it of its downward tendency,\nits consequent upward tendency is not violent but natural to it.\n\nAccordingly if some greater power prevail so far as to take away from\nthe will or the sensitive appetite, their respective inclinations,\npain or sorrow will not result therefrom; such is the result only\nwhen the contrary inclination of the appetite remains. And hence\nAugustine says (De Nat. Boni xx) that sorrow is caused by the will\n\"resisting a stronger power\": for were it not to resist, but to yield\nby consenting, the result would be not sorrow but pleasure.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A greater power causes sorrow, as acting not\npotentially but actually, i.e. by causing the actual presence of the\ncorruptive evil.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders a power which is not simply greater,\nfrom being greater in some respect: and accordingly it is able to\ninflict some harm. But if it be nowise stronger, it can do no harm at\nall: wherefore it cannot bring about that which causes sorrow.\n\nReply Obj. 3: External agents can be the causes of appetitive\nmovements, in so far as they cause the presence of the object: and it\nis thus that a greater power is reckoned to be the cause of sorrow.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 37\n\nOF THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the effects of pain or of sorrow: under which\nhead there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether pain deprives one of the power to learn?\n\n(2) Whether the effect of sorrow or pain is to burden the soul?\n\n(3) Whether sorrow or pain weakens all activity?\n\n(4) Whether sorrow is more harmful to the body than all the other\npassions of the soul?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 37, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Pain Deprives One of the Power to Learn?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that pain does not deprive one of the\npower to learn. For it is written (Isa. 26:9): \"When Thou shalt do\nThy judgments on the earth, the inhabitants of the world shall learn\njustice\": and further on (verse 16): \"In the tribulation of murmuring\nThy instruction was with them.\" But the judgments of God and\ntribulation cause sorrow in men's hearts. Therefore pain or sorrow,\nfar from destroying, increases the power of learning.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Isa. 28:9): \"Whom shall He teach\nknowledge? And whom shall He make to understand the hearing? Them\nthat are weaned from the milk, that are drawn away from the breasts,\"\ni.e. from pleasures. But pain and sorrow are most destructive of\npleasure; since sorrow hinders all pleasure, as stated in _Ethic._\nvii, 14: and (Ecclus. 11:29) it is stated that \"the affliction of an\nhour maketh one forget great delights.\" Therefore pain, instead of\ntaking away, increases the faculty of learning.\n\nObj. 3: Further, inward sorrow surpasses outward pain, as stated\nabove (Q. 35, A. 7). But man can learn while sorrowful. Much more,\ntherefore, can he learn while in bodily pain.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): \"Although during\nthose days I was tormented with a violent tooth-ache, I was not able\nto turn over in my mind other things than those I had already learnt;\nand as to learning anything, I was quite unequal to it, because it\nrequired undivided attention.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Since all the powers of the soul are rooted in the\none essence of the soul, it must needs happen, when the intention of\nthe soul is strongly drawn towards the action of one power, that it\nis withdrawn from the action of another power: because the soul,\nbeing one, can only have one intention. The result is that if one\nthing draws upon itself the entire intention of the soul, or a great\nportion thereof, anything else requiring considerable attention is\nincompatible therewith.\n\nNow it is evident that sensible pain above all draws the soul's\nattention to itself; because it is natural for each thing to tend\nwholly to repel whatever is contrary to it, as may be observed even\nin natural things. It is likewise evident that in order to learn\nanything new, we require study and effort with a strong intention,\nas is clearly stated in Prov. 2:4, 5: \"If thou shalt seek wisdom as\nmoney, and shall dig for her as for a treasure, then shalt thou\nunderstand learning\" [Vulg: 'the fear of the Lord']. Consequently if\nthe pain be acute, man is prevented at the time from learning\nanything: indeed it can be so acute, that, as long as it lasts, a man\nis unable to give his attention even to that which he knew already.\nHowever a difference is to be observed according to the difference of\nlove that a man has for learning or for considering: because the\ngreater his love, the more will he retain the intention of his mind\nso as to prevent it from turning entirely to the pain.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Moderate sorrow, that does not cause the mind to\nwander, can conduce to the acquisition of learning especially in\nregard to those things by which a man hopes to be freed from sorrow.\nAnd thus, \"in the tribulation of murmuring,\" men are more apt to be\ntaught by God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Both pleasure and pain, in so far as they draw upon\nthemselves the soul's intention, hinder the reason from the act of\nconsideration, wherefore it is stated in _Ethic._ vii, 11 that \"in\nthe moment of sexual pleasure, a man cannot understand anything.\"\nNevertheless pain attracts the soul's intention more than pleasure\ndoes: thus we observe in natural things that the action of a natural\nbody is more intense in regard to its contrary; for instance, hot\nwater is more accessible to the action of cold, and in consequence\nfreezes harder. If therefore pain or sorrow be moderate, it can\nconduce accidentally to the facility of learning, in so far as it\ntakes away an excess of pleasure. But, of itself, it is a hindrance;\nand if it be intense, it prevents it altogether.\n\nReply Obj. 3: External pain arises from hurt done to the body, so\nthat it involves bodily transmutation more than inward sorrow does:\nand yet the latter is greater in regard to the formal element of pain,\nwhich belongs to the soul. Consequently bodily pain is a greater\nhindrance to contemplation which requires complete repose, than inward\nsorrow is. Nevertheless if inward sorrow be very intense, it attracts\nthe intention, so that man is unable to learn anything for the first\ntime: wherefore on account of sorrow Gregory interrupted his\ncommentary on Ezechiel (Hom. xxii in Ezechiel).\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 37, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Effect of Sorrow or Pain Is to Burden the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not an effect of sorrow to\nburden the soul. For the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:11): \"Behold this\nself-same thing, that you were made sorrowful according to God, how\ngreat carefulness it worketh in you: yea, defence, yea indignation,\"\netc. Now carefulness and indignation imply that the soul is uplifted,\nwhich is contrary to being depressed. Therefore depression is not an\neffect of sorrow.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sorrow is contrary to pleasure. But the effect of\npleasure is expansion: the opposite of which is not depression but\ncontraction. Therefore depression should not be reckoned as an effect\nof sorrow.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sorrow consumes those who are inflicted therewith,\nas may be gathered from the words of the Apostle (2 Cor. 2:7): \"Lest\nperhaps such an one be swallowed up with overmuch sorrow.\" But that\nwhich is depressed is not consumed; nay, it is weighed down by\nsomething heavy, whereas that which is consumed enters within the\nconsumer. Therefore depression should not be reckoned an effect of\nsorrow.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.]\nand Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 14) speak of \"depressing sorrow.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The effects of the soul's passions are sometimes\nnamed metaphorically, from a likeness to sensible bodies: for the\nreason that the movements of the animal appetite are like the\ninclinations of the natural appetite. And in this way fervor is\nascribed to love, expansion to pleasure, and depression to sorrow.\nFor a man is said to be depressed, through being hindered in his own\nmovement by some weight. Now it is evident from what has been said\nabove (Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 25, A. 4; Q. 36, A. 1) that sorrow is caused\nby a present evil: and this evil, from the very fact that it is\nrepugnant to the movement of the will, depresses the soul, inasmuch\nas it hinders it from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy. And if\nthe evil which is the cause of sorrow be not so strong as to deprive\none of the hope of avoiding it, although the soul be depressed in so\nfar as, for the present, it fails to grasp that which it craves for;\nyet it retains the movement whereby to repulse that evil. If, on the\nother hand, the strength of the evil be such as to exclude the hope\nof evasion, then even the interior movement of the afflicted soul is\nabsolutely hindered, so that it cannot turn aside either this way or\nthat. Sometimes even the external movement of the body is paralyzed,\nso that a man becomes completely stupefied.\n\nReply Obj. 1: That uplifting of the soul ensues from the sorrow which\nis according to God, because it brings with it the hope of the\nforgiveness of sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As far as the movement of the appetite is concerned,\ncontraction and depression amount to the same: because the soul,\nthrough being depressed so as to be unable to attend freely to\noutward things, withdraws to itself, closing itself up as it were.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Sorrow is said to consume man, when the force of the\nafflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of evasion: and thus\nalso it both depresses and consumes at the same time. For certain\nthings, taken metaphorically, imply one another, which taken\nliterally, appear to exclude one another.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 37, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Sorrow or Pain Weakens All Activity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sorrow does not weaken all activity.\nBecause carefulness is caused by sorrow, as is clear from the passage\nof the Apostle quoted above (A. 2, Obj. 1). But carefulness conduces\nto good work: wherefore the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:15): \"Carefully\nstudy to present thyself . . . a workman that needeth not to be\nashamed.\" Therefore sorrow is not a hindrance to work, but helps one\nto work well.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sorrow causes desire in many cases, as stated in\n_Ethic._ vii, 14. But desire causes intensity of action. Therefore\nsorrow does too.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as some actions are proper to the joyful, so are\nothers proper to the sorrowful; for instance, to mourn. Now a thing\nis improved by that which is suitable to it. Therefore certain\nactions are not hindered but improved by reason of sorrow.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that \"pleasure\nperfects action,\" whereas on the other hand, \"sorrow hinders it\"\n(Ethic. x, 5).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), sorrow at times does not\ndepress or consume the soul, so as to shut out all movement, internal\nor external; but certain movements are sometimes caused by sorrow\nitself. Accordingly action stands in a twofold relation to sorrow.\nFirst, as being the object of sorrow: and thus sorrow hinders any\naction: for we never do that which we do with sorrow, so well as that\nwhich we do with pleasure, or without sorrow. The reason for this is\nthat the will is the cause of human actions: and consequently when we\ndo something that gives pain, the action must of necessity be\nweakened in consequence. Secondly, action stands in relation to\nsorrow, as to its principle and cause: and such action must needs be\nimproved by sorrow: thus the more one sorrows on account of a certain\nthing, the more one strives to shake off sorrow, provided there is a\nhope of shaking it off: otherwise no movement or action would result\nfrom that sorrow.\n\nFrom what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 37, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Sorrow Is More Harmful to the Body Than the Other Passions of\nthe Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not most harmful to the\nbody. For sorrow has a spiritual existence in the soul. But those\nthings which have only a spiritual existence do not cause a\ntransmutation in the body: as is evident with regard to the images of\ncolors, which images are in the air and do not give color to bodies.\nTherefore sorrow is not harmful to the body.\n\nObj. 2: Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due to\nits having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it. But bodily\ntransmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul, as stated\nabove (Q. 22, AA. 1, 3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the\nbody than the other passions of the soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that \"anger and\ndesire drive some to madness\": which seems to be a very great harm,\nsince reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair\nseems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the cause of sorrow.\nTherefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other\npassions of the soul.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 17:22): \"A joyful mind maketh\nage flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones\": and (Prov.\n25:20): \"As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the\nsadness of a man consumeth the heart\": and (Ecclus. 38:19): \"Of\nsadness cometh death.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful\nto the body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to\nman's life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely\nin respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with the other\npassions of the soul. For man's life consists in a certain movement,\nwhich flows from the heart to the other parts of the body: and this\nmovement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed\nmeasure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure,\nit will be repugnant to man's life in respect of the measure of\nquantity; but not in respect of its specific character: whereas if\nthis movement be hindered in its progress, it will be repugnant to\nlife in respect of its species.\n\nNow it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the\nbodily transmutation which is their material element, is in\nconformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which\nis the formal element: just as in everything matter is proportionate\nto form. Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the\nappetite in pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital\nmovement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as\nregards its measure: such are love, joy, desire and the like;\nwherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the body;\nthough, if they be excessive, they may be harmful to it. On the other\nhand, those passions which denote in the appetite a movement of\nflight or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only\nas regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore\nthey are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all\nsorrow which depresses the soul by reason of a present evil, which\nmakes a stronger impression than future evil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual\nmovement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily transmutation.\nNor is there any parallel with spiritual images, because they are not\nnaturally ordained to move such other bodies as are not naturally\nmoved by the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Other passions imply a bodily transmutation\nwhich is specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas\nsorrow implies a transmutation that is repugnant thereto, as stated\nabove.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of\nreason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments\ndeprive one of the use of reason, before depriving one of life.\nNevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body, by\nreason of the sorrow which they imply, and which arises from the\nabsence of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives\nman of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow\nbecome a prey to melancholy or madness.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 38\n\nOF THE REMEDIES OF SORROW OR PAIN\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the remedies of pain or sorrow: under which head\nthere are five points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether pain or sorrow is assuaged by every pleasure?\n\n(2) Whether it is assuaged by weeping?\n\n(3) Whether it is assuaged by the sympathy of friends?\n\n(4) Whether it is assuaged by contemplating the truth?\n\n(5) Whether it is assuaged by sleep and baths?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Pain or Sorrow Is Assuaged by Every Pleasure?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that not every pleasure assuages every\npain or sorrow. For pleasure does not assuage sorrow, save in so far\nas it is contrary to it: for \"remedies work by contraries\" (Ethic.\nii, 3). But not every pleasure is contrary to every sorrow; as stated\nabove (Q. 35, A. 4). Therefore not every pleasure assuages every\nsorrow.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which causes sorrow does not assuage it. But\nsome pleasures cause sorrow; since, as stated in _Ethic._ ix, 4, \"the\nwicked man feels pain at having been pleased.\" Therefore not every\npleasure assuages sorrow.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that he fled from\nhis country, where he had been wont to associate with his friend, now\ndead: \"for so should his eyes look for him less, where they were not\nwont to see him.\" Hence we may gather that those things which united\nus to our dead or absent friends, become burdensome to us when we\nmourn their death or absence. But nothing united us more than the\npleasures we enjoyed in common. Therefore these very pleasures become\nburdensome to us when we mourn. Therefore not every pleasure assuages\nevery sorrow.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14) that \"sorrow\nis driven forth by pleasure, both by a contrary pleasure and by any\nother, provided it be intense.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As is evident from what has been said above (Q. 23,\nA. 4), pleasure is a kind of repose of the appetite in a suitable\ngood; while sorrow arises from something unsuited to the appetite.\nConsequently in movements of the appetite pleasure is to sorrow,\nwhat, in bodies, repose is to weariness, which is due to a\nnon-natural transmutation; for sorrow itself implies a certain\nweariness or ailing of the appetitive faculty. Therefore just as all\nrepose of the body brings relief to any kind of weariness, ensuing\nfrom any non-natural cause; so every pleasure brings relief by\nassuaging any kind of sorrow, due to any cause whatever.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although not every pleasure is specifically contrary to\nevery sorrow, yet it is generically, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 4).\nAnd consequently, on the part of the disposition of the subject, any\nsorrow can be assuaged by any pleasure.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The pleasures of wicked men are not a cause of sorrow\nwhile they are enjoyed, but afterwards: that is to say, in so far as\nwicked men repent of those things in which they took pleasure. This\nsorrow is healed by contrary pleasures.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When there are two causes inclining to contrary\nmovements, each hinders the other; yet the one which is stronger and\nmore persistent, prevails in the end. Now when a man is made\nsorrowful by those things in which he took pleasure in common with a\ndeceased or absent friend, there are two causes producing contrary\nmovements. For the thought of the friend's death or absence, inclines\nhim to sorrow: whereas the present good inclines him to pleasure.\nConsequently each is modified by the other. And yet, since the\nperception of the present moves more strongly than the memory of the\npast, and since love of self is more persistent than love of another;\nhence it is that, in the end, the pleasure drives out the sorrow.\nWherefore a little further on (Confess. iv, 8) Augustine says that\nhis \"sorrow gave way to his former pleasures.\"\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Pain or Sorrow Is Assuaged by Tears?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that tears do not assuage sorrow. Because\nno effect diminishes its cause. But tears or groans are an effect of\nsorrow. Therefore they do not diminish sorrow.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as tears or groans are an effect of sorrow, so\nlaughter is an effect of joy. But laughter does not lessen joy.\nTherefore tears do not lessen sorrow.\n\nObj. 3: Further, when we weep, the evil that saddens us is present to\nthe imagination. But the image of that which saddens us increases\nsorrow, just as the image of a pleasant thing adds to joy. Therefore\nit seems that tears do not assuage sorrow.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. iv, 7) that when he\nmourned the death of his friend, \"in groans and in tears alone did he\nfind some little refreshment.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Tears and groans naturally assuage sorrow: and this\nfor two reasons. First, because a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we\nkeep it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it: whereas if it\nbe allowed to escape, the soul's intention is dispersed as it were on\noutward things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened. This is why\nmen, burdened with sorrow, make outward show of their sorrow, by\ntears or groans or even by words, their sorrow is assuaged. Secondly,\nbecause an action, that befits a man according to his actual\ndisposition, is always pleasant to him. Now tears and groans are\nactions befitting a man who is in sorrow or pain; and consequently\nthey become pleasant to him. Since then, as stated above (A. 1),\nevery pleasure assuages sorrow or pain somewhat, it follows that\nsorrow is assuaged by weeping and groans.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This relation of the cause to effect is opposed to the\nrelation existing between the cause of sorrow and the sorrowing man.\nFor every effect is suited to its cause, and consequently is pleasant\nto it; but the cause of sorrow is disagreeable to him that sorrows.\nHence the effect of sorrow is not related to him that sorrows in the\nsame way as the cause of sorrow is. For this reason sorrow is\nassuaged by its effect, on account of the aforesaid contrariety.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The relation of effect to cause is like the relation of\nthe object of pleasure to him that takes pleasure in it: because in\neach case the one agrees with the other. Now every like thing\nincreases its like. Therefore joy is increased by laughter and the\nother effects of joy: except they be excessive, in which case,\naccidentally, they lessen it.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The image of that which saddens us, considered in\nitself, has a natural tendency to increase sorrow: yet from the very\nfact that a man imagines himself to be doing that which is fitting\naccording to his actual state, he feels a certain amount of pleasure.\nFor the same reason if laughter escapes a man when he is so disposed\nthat he thinks he ought to weep, he is sorry for it, as having done\nsomething unbecoming to him, as Cicero says (De Tusc. Quaest. iii,\n27).\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Pain or Sorrow Are Assuaged by the Sympathy of Friends?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends\ndoes not assuage our own sorrow. For contraries have contrary\neffects. Now as Augustine says (Confess. viii, 4), \"when many rejoice\ntogether, each one has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled and\ninflamed one by the other.\" Therefore, in like manner, when many are\nsorrowful, it seems that their sorrow is greater.\n\nObj. 2: Further, friendship demands mutual love, as Augustine\ndeclares (Confess. iv, 9). But a sympathizing friend is pained at the\nsorrow of his friend with whom he sympathizes. Consequently the pain\nof a sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, a further\ncause of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to\nincrease.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend, as\nthough it affected oneself: since \"a friend is one's other self\"\n(Ethic. ix, 4, 9). But sorrow is an evil. Therefore the sorrow of the\nsympathizing friend increases the sorrow of the friend with whom he\nsympathizes.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those\nwho are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them.\n\n_I answer that,_ When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy\nof a friend should afford consolation: whereof the Philosopher\nindicates a twofold reason (Ethic. ix, 11). The first is because,\nsince sorrow has a depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof we\nstrive to unburden ourselves: so that when a man sees others saddened\nby his own sorrow, it seems as though others were bearing the burden\nwith him, striving, as it were, to lessen its weight; wherefore the\nload of sorrow becomes lighter for him: something like what occurs in\nthe carrying of bodily burdens. The second and better reason is\nbecause when a man's friends condole with him, he sees that he is\nloved by them, and this affords him pleasure, as stated above (Q. 32,\nA. 5). Consequently, since every pleasure assuages sorrow, as stated\nabove (A. 1), it follows that sorrow is mitigated by a sympathizing\nfriend.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In either case there is a proof of friendship, viz.\nwhen a man rejoices with the joyful, and when he sorrows with the\nsorrowful. Consequently each becomes an object of pleasure by reason\nof its cause.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The friend's sorrow itself would be a cause of sorrow:\nbut consideration of its cause, viz. his love, gives rise rather to\npleasure.\n\nAnd this suffices for the reply to the Third Objection.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Pain and Sorrow Are Assuaged by the Contemplation of Truth?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the contemplation of truth does not\nassuage sorrow. For it is written (Eccles. 1:18): \"He that addeth\nknowledge addeth also sorrow\" [Vulg.: 'labor']. But knowledge\npertains to the contemplation of truth. Therefore the contemplation\nof truth does not assuage sorrow.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the contemplation of truth belongs to the\nspeculative intellect. But \"the speculative intellect is not a\nprinciple of movement\"; as stated in _De Anima_ iii, 11. Therefore,\nsince joy and sorrow are movements of the soul, it seems that the\ncontemplation of truth does not help to assuage sorrow.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the remedy for an ailment should be applied to the\npart which ails. But contemplation of truth is in the intellect.\nTherefore it does not assuage bodily pain, which is in the senses.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): \"It seemed to me\nthat if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I\nshould not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing\nto me.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 3, A. 5), the greatest of all\npleasures consists in the contemplation of truth. Now every pleasure\nassuages pain as stated above (A. 1): hence the contemplation of\ntruth assuages pain or sorrow, and the more so, the more perfectly\none is a lover of wisdom. And therefore in the midst of tribulations\nmen rejoice in the contemplation of Divine things and of future\nHappiness, according to James 1:2: \"My brethren, count it all joy,\nwhen you shall fall into divers temptations\": and, what is more, even\nin the midst of bodily tortures this joy is found; as the \"martyr\nTiburtius, when he was walking barefoot on the burning coals, said:\nMethinks, I walk on roses, in the name of Jesus Christ.\" [*Cf.\nDominican Breviary, August 11th, commemoration of St. Tiburtius.]\n\nReply Obj. 1: \"He that addeth knowledge, addeth sorrow,\" either on\naccount of the difficulty and disappointment in the search for truth;\nor because knowledge makes man acquainted with many things that are\ncontrary to his will. Accordingly, on the part of the things known,\nknowledge causes sorrow: but on the part of the contemplation of\ntruth, it causes pleasure.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The speculative intellect does not move the mind on the\npart of the thing contemplated: but on the part of contemplation\nitself, which is man's good and naturally pleasant to him.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the\nhigher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of\ncontemplation, which is in the higher part, overflows so as to\nmitigate even that pain which is in the senses.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 38, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Pain and Sorrow Are Assuaged by Sleep and Baths?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sleep and baths do not assuage\nsorrow. For sorrow is in the soul: whereas sleep and baths regard the\nbody. Therefore they do not conduce to the assuaging of sorrow.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the same effect does not seem to ensue from contrary\ncauses. But these, being bodily things, are incompatible with the\ncontemplation of truth which is a cause of the assuaging of sorrow,\nas stated above (A. 4). Therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the like.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sorrow and pain, in so far as they affect the body,\ndenote a certain transmutation of the heart. But such remedies as\nthese seem to pertain to the outward senses and limbs, rather than to\nthe interior disposition of the heart. Therefore they do not assuage\nsorrow.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ix, 12): \"I had heard\nthat the bath had its name [*_Balneum,_ from the Greek _balaneion_]\n. . . from the fact of its driving sadness from the mind.\" And\nfurther on, he says: \"I slept, and woke up again, and found my grief\nnot a little assuaged\": and quotes the words from the hymn of Ambrose\n[*Cf. Sarum Breviary: First Sunday after the octave of the Epiphany,\nHymn for first Vespers], in which it is said that \"Sleep restores the\ntired limbs to labor, refreshes the weary mind, and banishes sorrow.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 37, A. 4), sorrow, by reason of\nits specific nature, is repugnant to the vital movement of the body;\nand consequently whatever restores the bodily nature to its due state\nof vital movement, is opposed to sorrow and assuages it. Moreover\nsuch remedies, from the very fact that they bring nature back to its\nnormal state, are causes of pleasure; for this is precisely in what\npleasure consists, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1). Therefore, since\nevery pleasure assuages sorrow, sorrow is assuaged by such like\nbodily remedies.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The normal disposition of the body, so far as it is\nfelt, is itself a cause of pleasure, and consequently assuages sorrow.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 31, A. 8), one pleasure hinders\nanother; and yet every pleasure assuages sorrow. Consequently it is\nnot unreasonable that sorrow should be assuaged by causes which\nhinder one another.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Every good disposition of the body reacts somewhat on\nthe heart, which is the beginning and end of bodily movements, as\nstated in _De Causa Mot. Animal._ xi.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 39\n\nOF THE GOODNESS AND MALICE OF SORROW OR PAIN\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the goodness and malice of pain or sorrow:\nunder which head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether all sorrow is evil?\n\n(2) Whether sorrow can be a virtuous good?\n\n(3) Whether it can be a useful good?\n\n(4) Whether bodily pain is the greatest evil?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 39, Art. 1]\n\nWhether All Sorrow Is Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all sorrow is evil. For Gregory of\nNyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xix.] says: \"All sorrow is evil, from\nits very nature.\" Now what is naturally evil, is evil always and\neverywhere. Therefore, all sorrow is evil.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which all, even the virtuous, avoid, is evil.\nBut all avoid sorrow, even the virtuous, since as stated in _Ethic._\nvii, 11, \"though the prudent man does not aim at pleasure, yet he\naims at avoiding sorrow.\" Therefore sorrow is evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as bodily evil is the object and cause of\nbodily pain, so spiritual evil is the object and cause of sorrow in\nthe soul. But every bodily pain is a bodily evil. Therefore every\nspiritual sorrow is an evil of the soul.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Sorrow for evil is contrary to pleasure in evil.\nBut pleasure in evil is evil: wherefore in condemnation of certain\nmen, it is written (Prov. 2:14), that \"they were glad when they had\ndone evil.\" Therefore sorrow for evil is good.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing may be good or evil in two ways: first\nconsidered simply and in itself; and thus all sorrow is an evil,\nbecause the mere fact of a man's appetite being uneasy about a\npresent evil, is itself an evil, because it hinders the response of\nthe appetite in good. Secondly, a thing is said to be good or evil,\non the supposition of something else: thus shame is said to be good,\non the supposition of a shameful deed done, as stated in _Ethic._ iv,\n9. Accordingly, supposing the presence of something saddening or\npainful, it is a sign of goodness if a man is in sorrow or pain on\naccount of this present evil. For if he were not to be in sorrow or\npain, this could only be either because he feels it not, or because\nhe does not reckon it as something unbecoming, both of which are\nmanifest evils. Consequently it is a condition of goodness, that,\nsupposing an evil to be present, sorrow or pain should ensue.\nWherefore Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 14): \"It is also a good\nthing that he sorrows for the good he has lost: for had not some good\nremained in his nature, he could not be punished by the loss of\ngood.\" Because, however, in the science of Morals, we consider things\nindividually--for actions are concerned about individuals--that which\nis good on some supposition, should be considered as good: just as\nthat which is voluntary on some supposition, is judged to be\nvoluntary, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 1, and likewise above (Q. 6, A.\n6).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] is speaking of sorrow on\nthe part of the evil that causes it, but not on the part of the\nsubject that feels and rejects the evil. And from this point of view,\nall shun sorrow, inasmuch as they shun evil: but they do not shun the\nperception and rejection of evil. The same also applies to bodily\npain: because the perception and rejection of bodily evil is the\nproof of the goodness of nature.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Second and Third Objections.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 39, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Sorrow Can Be a Virtuous Good?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not a virtuous good. For\nthat which leads to hell is not a virtuous good. But, as Augustine\nsays (Gen. ad lit. xii, 33), \"Jacob seems to have feared lest he\nshould be troubled overmuch by sorrow, and so, instead of entering\ninto the rest of the blessed, be consigned to the hell of sinners.\"\nTherefore sorrow is not a virtuous good.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the virtuous good is praiseworthy and meritorious.\nBut sorrow lessens praise or merit: for the Apostle says (2 Cor.\n9:7): \"Everyone, as he hath determined in his heart, not with\nsadness, or of necessity.\" Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 15), \"sorrow is\nconcerned about those things which happen against our will.\" But not\nto will those things which are actually taking place, is to have a\nwill opposed to the decree of God, to Whose providence whatever is\ndone is subject. Since, then, conformity of the human to the Divine\nwill is a condition of the rectitude of the will, as stated above (Q.\n19, A. 9), it seems that sorrow is incompatible with rectitude of the\nwill, and that consequently it is not virtuous.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Whatever merits the reward of eternal life is\nvirtuous. But such is sorrow; as is evident from Matt. 5:5: \"Blessed\nare they that mourn, for they shall be comforted.\" Therefore sorrow\nis a virtuous good.\n\n_I answer that,_ In so far as sorrow is good, it can be a virtuous\ngood. For it has been said above (A. 1) that sorrow is a good\ninasmuch as it denotes perception and rejection of evil. These two\nthings, as regards bodily pain, are a proof of the goodness of\nnature, to which it is due that the senses perceive, and that nature\nshuns, the harmful thing that causes pain. As regards interior\nsorrow, perception of the evil is sometimes due to a right judgment\nof reason; while the rejection of the evil is the act of the will,\nwell disposed and detesting that evil. Now every virtuous good\nresults from these two things, the rectitude of the reason and the\nwill. Wherefore it is evident that sorrow may be a virtuous good.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All the passions of the soul should be regulated\naccording to the rule of reason, which is the root of the virtuous\ngood; but excessive sorrow, of which Augustine is speaking, oversteps\nthis rule, and therefore it fails to be a virtuous good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as sorrow for an evil arises from a right will and\nreason, which detest the evil, so sorrow for a good is due to a\nperverse reason and will, which detest the good. Consequently such\nsorrow is an obstacle to the praise and merit of the virtuous good;\nfor instance, when a man gives an alms sorrowfully.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Some things do actually happen, not because God wills,\nbut because He permits them to happen--such as sins. Consequently a\nwill that is opposed to sin, whether in oneself or in another, is not\ndiscordant from the Divine will. Penal evils happen actually, even by\nGod's will. But it is not necessary for the rectitude of his will,\nthat man should will them in themselves: but only that he should not\nrevolt against the order of Divine justice, as stated above (Q. 19,\nA. 10).\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 39, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Sorrow Can Be a Useful Good?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sorrow cannot be a useful good. For\nit is written (Ecclus. 30:25): \"Sadness hath killed many, and there\nis no profit in it.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, choice is of that which is useful to an end. But\nsorrow is not an object of choice; in fact, \"a thing without sorrow\nis to be chosen rather than the same thing with sorrow\" (Topic. iii,\n2). Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"Everything is for the sake of its own operation,\"\nas stated in _De Coelo_ ii, 3. But \"sorrow hinders operation,\" as\nstated in _Ethic._ x, 5. Therefore sorrow is not a useful good.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The wise man seeks only that which is useful. But\naccording to Eccles. 7:5, \"the heart of the wise is where there is\nmourning, and the heart of fools where there is mirth.\" Therefore\nsorrow is useful.\n\n_I answer that,_ A twofold movement of the appetite ensues from a\npresent evil. One is that whereby the appetite is opposed to the\npresent evil; and, in this respect, sorrow is of no use; because that\nwhich is present, cannot be not present. The other movement arises in\nthe appetite to the effect of avoiding or expelling the saddening\nevil: and, in this respect, sorrow is of use, if it be for something\nwhich ought to be avoided. Because there are two reasons for which it\nmay be right to avoid a thing. First, because it should be avoided in\nitself, on account of its being contrary to good; for instance, sin.\nWherefore sorrow for sin is useful as inducing a man to avoid sin:\nhence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:9): \"I am glad: not because you were\nmade sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance.\"\nSecondly, a thing is to be avoided, not as though it were evil in\nitself, but because it is an occasion of evil; either through one's\nbeing attached to it, and loving it too much, or through one's being\nthrown headlong thereby into an evil, as is evident in the case of\ntemporal goods. And, in this respect, sorrow for temporal goods may\nbe useful; according to Eccles. 7:3: \"It is better to go to the house\nof mourning, than to the house of feasting: for in that we are put in\nmind of the end of all.\"\n\nMoreover, sorrow for that which ought to be avoided is always useful,\nsince it adds another motive for avoiding it. Because the very evil\nis in itself a thing to be avoided: while everyone avoids sorrow for\nits own sake, just as everyone seeks the good, and pleasure in the\ngood. Therefore just as pleasure in the good makes one seek the good\nmore earnestly, so sorrow for evil makes one avoid evil more eagerly.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This passage is to be taken as referring to excessive\nsorrow, which consumes the soul: for such sorrow paralyzes the soul,\nand hinders it from shunning evil, as stated above (Q. 37, A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as any object of choice becomes less eligible by\nreason of sorrow, so that which ought to be shunned is still more to\nbe shunned by reason of sorrow: and, in this respect, sorrow is\nuseful.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Sorrow caused by an action hinders that action: but\nsorrow for the cessation of an action, makes one do it more earnestly.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 39, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Bodily Pain Is the Greatest Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that pain is the greatest evil. Because\n\"the worst is contrary to the best\" (Ethic. viii, 10). But a certain\npleasure is the greatest good, viz. the pleasure of bliss. Therefore\na certain pain is the greatest evil.\n\nObj. 2: Further, happiness is man's greatest good, because it is his\nlast end. But man's Happiness consists in his \"having whatever he\nwill, and in willing naught amiss,\" as stated above (Q. 3, A. 4, Obj.\n5; Q. 5, A. 8, Obj. 3). Therefore man's greatest good consists in the\nfulfilment of his will. Now pain consists in something happening\ncontrary to the will, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6, 15).\nTherefore pain is man's greatest evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine argues thus (Soliloq. i, 12): \"We are\ncomposed of two parts, i.e. of a soul and a body, whereof the body is\nthe inferior. Now the sovereign good is the greatest good of the\nbetter part: while the supreme evil is the greatest evil of the\ninferior part. But wisdom is the greatest good of the soul; while the\nworst thing in the body is pain. Therefore man's greatest good is to\nbe wise: while his greatest evil is to suffer pain.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ Guilt is a greater evil than punishment, as was\nstated in the First Part (Q. 48, A. 6). But sorrow or pain belongs to\nthe punishment of sin, just as the enjoyment of changeable things is\nan evil of guilt. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xii): \"What is\npain of the soul, except for the soul to be deprived of that which it\nwas wont to enjoy, or had hoped to enjoy? And this is all that is\ncalled evil, i.e. sin, and the punishment of sin.\" Therefore sorrow\nor pain is not man's greatest evil.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's\ngreatest evil. For all sorrow or pain is either for something that is\ntruly evil, or for something that is apparently evil, but good in\nreality. Now pain or sorrow for that which is truly evil cannot be\nthe greatest evil: for there is something worse, namely, either not\nto reckon as evil that which is really evil, or not to reject it.\nAgain, sorrow or pain, for that which is apparently evil, but really\ngood, cannot be the greatest evil, for it would be worse to be\naltogether separated from that which is truly good. Hence it is\nimpossible for any sorrow or pain to be man's greatest evil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Pleasure and sorrow have two good points in common:\nnamely, a true judgment concerning good and evil; and the right order\nof the will in approving of good and rejecting evil. Thus it is clear\nthat in pain or sorrow there is a good, by the removal of which they\nbecome worse: and yet there is not an evil in every pleasure, by the\nremoval of which the pleasure is better. Consequently, a pleasure can\nbe man's highest good, in the way above stated (Q. 34, A. 3): whereas\nsorrow cannot be man's greatest evil.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The very fact of the will being opposed to evil is a\ngood. And for this reason, sorrow or pain cannot be the greatest\nevil; because it has an admixture of good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That which harms the better thing is worse than that\nwhich harms the worse. Now a thing is called evil \"because it harms,\"\nas Augustine says (Enchiridion xii). Therefore that which is an evil\nto the soul is a greater evil than that which is an evil to the body.\nTherefore this argument does not prove: nor does Augustine give it as\nhis own, but as taken from another [*Cornelius Celsus].\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 40\n\nOF THE IRASCIBLE PASSIONS, AND FIRST, OF HOPE AND DESPAIR\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the irascible passions: (1) Hope and despair;\n(2) Fear and daring; (3) Anger. Under first head there are eight\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity?\n\n(2) Whether hope is in the apprehensive, or in the appetitive\nfaculty?\n\n(3) Whether hope is in dumb animals?\n\n(4) Whether despair is contrary to hope?\n\n(5) Whether experience is a cause of hope?\n\n(6) Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards?\n\n(7) Concerning the order of hope to love;\n\n(8) Whether love conduces to action?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Hope Is the Same As Desire or Cupidity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that hope is the same as desire or\ncupidity. Because hope is reckoned as one of the four principal\npassions. But Augustine in setting down the four principal passions\nputs cupidity in the place of hope (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3, 7). Therefore\nhope is the same as cupidity or desire.\n\nObj. 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects. But the\nobject of hope is the same as the object of cupidity or desire, viz.\nthe future good. Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire.\n\nObj. 3: If it be said that hope, in addition to desire, denotes the\npossibility of obtaining the future good; on the contrary, whatever\nis accidental to the object does not make a different species of\npassion. But possibility of acquisition is accidental to a future\ngood, which is the object of cupidity or desire, and of hope.\nTherefore hope does not differ specifically from desire or cupidity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ To different powers belong different species of\npassions. But hope is in the irascible power; whereas desire or\ncupidity is in the concupiscible. Therefore hope differs specifically\nfrom desire or cupidity.\n\n_I answer that,_ The species of a passion is taken from the object.\nNow, in the object of hope, we may note four conditions. First, that\nit is something good; since, properly speaking, hope regards only the\ngood; in this respect, hope differs from fear, which regards evil.\nSecondly, that it is future; for hope does not regard that which is\npresent and already possessed: in this respect, hope differs from joy\nwhich regards a present good. Thirdly, that it must be something\narduous and difficult to obtain, for we do not speak of any one\nhoping for trifles, which are in one's power to have at any time: in\nthis respect, hope differs from desire or cupidity, which regards the\nfuture good absolutely: wherefore it belongs to the concupiscible,\nwhile hope belongs to the irascible faculty. Fourthly, that this\ndifficult thing is something possible to obtain: for one does not\nhope for that which one cannot get at all: and, in this respect, hope\ndiffers from despair. It is therefore evident that hope differs from\ndesire, as the irascible passions differ from the concupiscible. For\nthis reason, moreover, hope presupposes desire: just as all irascible\npassions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible faculty, as\nstated above (Q. 25, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine mentions desire instead of hope, because each\nregards future good; and because the good which is not arduous is\nreckoned as nothing: thus implying that desire seems to tend chiefly\nto the arduous good, to which hope tends likewise.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The object of hope is the future good considered, not\nabsolutely, but as arduous and difficult of attainment, as stated\nabove.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The object of hope adds not only possibility to the\nobject of desire, but also difficulty: and this makes hope belong to\nanother power, viz. the irascible, which regards something difficult,\nas stated in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2). Moreover, possibility and\nimpossibility are not altogether accidental to the object of the\nappetitive power: because the appetite is a principle of movement;\nand nothing is moved to anything except under the aspect of being\npossible; for no one is moved to that which he reckons impossible to\nget. Consequently hope differs from despair according to the\ndifference of possible and impossible.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Hope Is in the Apprehensive or in the Appetitive Power?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that hope belongs to the cognitive power.\nBecause hope, seemingly, is a kind of awaiting; for the Apostle says\n(Rom. 8:25): \"If we hope for that which we see not; we wait for it\nwith patience.\" But awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive power,\nwhich we exercise by _looking out._ Therefore hope belongs to the\ncognitive power.\n\nObj. 2: Further, apparently hope is the same as confidence; hence\nwhen a man hopes he is said to be confident, as though to hope and to\nbe confident were the same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems\nto belong to the cognitive power. Therefore hope does too.\n\nObj. 3: Further, certainty is a property of the cognitive power. But\ncertainty is ascribed to hope. Therefore hope belongs to the\ncognitive power.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Hope regards good, as stated above (A. 1). Now\ngood, as such, is not the object of the cognitive, but of the\nappetitive power. Therefore hope belongs, not to the cognitive, but\nto the appetitive power.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since hope denotes a certain stretching out of the\nappetite towards good, it evidently belongs to the appetitive power;\nsince movement towards things belongs properly to the appetite:\nwhereas the action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by the\nmovement of the knower towards things, but rather according as the\nthings known are in the knower. But since the cognitive power moves\nthe appetite, by presenting its object to it; there arise in the\nappetite various movements according to various aspects of the\napprehended object. For the apprehension of good gives rise to one\nkind of movement in the appetite, while the apprehension of evil\ngives rise to another: in like manner various movements arise from\nthe apprehension of something present and of something future; of\nsomething considered absolutely, and of something considered as\narduous; of something possible, and of something impossible. And\naccordingly hope is a movement of the appetitive power ensuing from\nthe apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to obtain;\nnamely, a stretching forth of the appetite to such a good.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since hope regards a possible good, there arises in man\na twofold movement of hope; for a thing may be possible to him in two\nways, viz. by his own power, or by another's. Accordingly when a man\nhopes to obtain something by his own power, he is not said to wait\nfor it, but simply to hope for it. But, properly speaking, he is said\nto await that which he hopes to get by another's help, as though to\nawait (_exspectare_) implied keeping one's eyes on another (_ex alio\nspectare_), in so far as the apprehensive power, by going ahead, not\nonly keeps its eye on the good which man intends to get, but also on\nthe thing by whose power he hopes to get it; according to Ecclus.\n51:10, \"I looked for the succor of men.\" Wherefore the movement of\nhope is sometimes called expectation, on account of the preceding\ninspection of the cognitive power.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When a man desires a thing and reckons that he can get\nit, he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it;\nand from this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the\nensuing movement in the appetite is called confidence. Because the\nmovement of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that\nprecedes it, as an effect from a cause which is better known; for the\napprehensive power knows its own act better than that of the appetite.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Certainty is ascribed to the movement, not only of the\nsensitive, but also of the natural appetite; thus we say that a stone\nis certain to tend downwards. This is owing to the inerrancy which\nthe movement of the sensitive or even natural appetite derives from\nthe certainty of the knowledge that precedes it.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Hope Is in Dumb Animals?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no hope in dumb animals.\nBecause hope is for some future good, as Damascene says (De Fide\nOrth. ii, 12). But knowledge of the future is not in the competency\nof dumb animals, whose knowledge is confined to the senses and does\nnot extend to the future. Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the object of hope is a future good, possible of\nattainment. But possible and impossible are differences of the true\nand the false, which are only in the mind, as the Philosopher states\n(Metaph. vi, 4). Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals, since\nthey have no mind.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. ix, 14) that \"animals\nare moved by the things that they see.\" But hope is of things unseen:\n\"for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for?\" (Rom. 8:24). Therefore\nthere is no hope in dumb animals.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Hope is an irascible passion. But the irascible\nfaculty is in dumb animals. Therefore hope is also.\n\n_I answer that,_ The internal passions of animals can be gathered\nfrom their outward movements: from which it is clear that hope is in\ndumb animals. For if a dog see a hare, or a hawk see a bird, too far\noff, it makes no movement towards it, as having no hope to catch it:\nwhereas, if it be near, it makes a movement towards it, as being in\nhopes of catching it. Because as stated above (Q. 1, A. 2; Q. 26, A.\n1; Q. 35, A. 1), the sensitive appetite of dumb animals, and\nlikewise the natural appetite of insensible things, result from the\napprehension of an intellect, just as the appetite of the\nintellectual nature, which is called the will. But there is a\ndifference, in that the will is moved by an apprehension of the\nintellect in the same subject; whereas the movement of the natural\nappetite results from the apprehension of the separate Intellect, Who\nis the Author of nature; as does also the sensitive appetite of dumb\nanimals, who act from a certain natural instinct. Consequently, in\nthe actions of irrational animals and of other natural things, we\nobserve a procedure which is similar to that which we observe in the\nactions of art: and in this way hope and despair are in dumb animals.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although dumb animals do not know the future, yet an\nanimal is moved by its natural instinct to something future, as\nthough it foresaw the future. Because this instinct is planted in\nthem by the Divine Intellect that foresees the future.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The object of hope is not the possible as\ndifferentiating the true, for thus the possible ensues from the\nrelation of a predicate to a subject. The object of hope is the\npossible as compared to a power. For such is the division of the\npossible given in _Metaph._ v, 12, i.e. into the two kinds we have\njust mentioned.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the thing which is future does not come under\nthe object of sight; nevertheless through seeing something present,\nan animal's appetite is moved to seek or avoid something future.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Despair Is Contrary to Hope?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that despair is not contrary to hope.\nBecause \"to one thing there is one contrary\" (Metaph. x, 5). But fear\nis contrary to hope. Therefore despair is not contrary to hope.\n\nObj. 2: Further, contraries seem to bear on the same thing. But hope\nand despair do not bear on the same thing: since hope regards the\ngood, whereas despair arises from some evil that is in the way of\nobtaining good. Therefore hope is not contrary to despair.\n\nObj. 3: Further, movement is contrary to movement: while repose is in\nopposition to movement as a privation thereof. But despair seems to\nimply immobility rather than movement. Therefore it is not contrary\nto hope, which implies movement of stretching out towards the\nhoped-for good.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The very name of despair (_desperatio_) implies that\nit is contrary to hope (_spes_).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, A. 2), there is a twofold\ncontrariety of movements. One is in respect of approach to contrary\nterms: and this contrariety alone is to be found in the concupiscible\npassions, for instance between love and hatred. The other is\naccording to approach and withdrawal with regard to the same term;\nand is to be found in the irascible passions, as stated above (Q. 23,\nA. 2). Now the object of hope, which is the arduous good, has the\ncharacter of a principle of attraction, if it be considered in the\nlight of something attainable; and thus hope tends thereto, for it\ndenotes a kind of approach. But in so far as it is considered as\nunobtainable, it has the character of a principle of repulsion,\nbecause, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3, \"when men come to an\nimpossibility they disperse.\" And this is how despair stands in\nregard to this object, wherefore it implies a movement of withdrawal:\nand consequently it is contrary to hope, as withdrawal is to approach.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Fear is contrary to hope, because their objects, i.e.\ngood and evil, are contrary: for this contrariety is found in the\nirascible passions, according as they ensue from the passions of the\nconcupiscible. But despair is contrary to hope, only by contrariety\nof approach and withdrawal.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Despair does not regard evil as such; sometimes however\nit regards evil accidentally, as making the difficult good impossible\nto obtain. But it can arise from the mere excess of good.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Despair implies not only privation of hope, but also a\nrecoil from the thing desired, by reason of its being esteemed\nimpossible to get. Hence despair, like hope, presupposes desire;\nbecause we neither hope for nor despair of that which we do not\ndesire to have. For this reason, too, each of them regards the good,\nwhich is the object of desire.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Experience Is a Cause of Hope?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that experience is not a cause of hope.\nBecause experience belongs to the cognitive power; wherefore the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that \"intellectual virtue needs\nexperience and time.\" But hope is not in the cognitive power, but in\nthe appetite, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore experience is not a\ncause of hope.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 13) that \"the old\nare slow to hope, on account of their experience\"; whence it seems to\nfollow that experience causes want of hope. But the same cause is not\nproductive of opposites. Therefore experience is not a cause of hope.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (De Coel. ii, 5) that \"to have\nsomething to say about everything, without leaving anything out, is\nsometimes a proof of folly.\" But to attempt everything seems to point\nto great hopes; while folly arises from inexperience. Therefore\ninexperience, rather than experience, seems to be a cause of hope.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) \"some are\nhopeful, through having been victorious often and over many\nopponents\": which seems to pertain to experience. Therefore\nexperience is a cause of hope.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the object of hope is a\nfuture good, difficult but possible to obtain. Consequently a thing\nmay be a cause of hope, either because it makes something possible to\na man: or because it makes him think something possible. In the first\nway hope is caused by everything that increases a man's power; e.g.\nriches, strength, and, among others, experience: since by experience\nman acquires the faculty of doing something easily, and the result of\nthis is hope. Wherefore Vegetius says (De Re Milit. i): \"No one fears\nto do that which he is sure of having learned well.\"\n\nIn the second way, hope is caused by everything that makes man think\nthat he can obtain something: and thus both teaching and persuasion\nmay be a cause of hope. And then again experience is a cause of hope,\nin so far as it makes him reckon something possible, which before his\nexperience he looked upon as impossible. However, in this way,\nexperience can cause a lack of hope: because just as it makes a man\nthink possible what he had previously thought impossible; so,\nconversely, experience makes a man consider as impossible that which\nhitherto he had thought possible. Accordingly experience causes hope\nin two ways, despair in one way: and for this reason we may say\nrather that it causes hope.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Experience in matters pertaining to action not only\nproduces knowledge; it also causes a certain habit, by reason of\ncustom, which renders the action easier. Moreover, the intellectual\nvirtue itself adds to the power of acting with ease: because it\nshows something to be possible; and thus is a cause of hope.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The old are wanting in hope because of their\nexperience, in so far as experience makes them think something\nimpossible. Hence he adds (Rhet. ii, 13) that \"many evils have\nbefallen them.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Folly and inexperience can be a cause of hope\naccidentally as it were, by removing the knowledge which would help\none to judge truly a thing to be impossible. Wherefore inexperience\nis a cause of hope, for the same reason as experience causes lack of\nhope.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Hope Abounds in Young Men and Drunkards?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that youth and drunkenness are not causes\nof hope. Because hope implies certainty and steadiness; so much so\nthat it is compared to an anchor (Heb. 6:19). But young men and\ndrunkards are wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily\nchanged. Therefore youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 5), the cause of hope is chiefly\nwhatever increases one's power. But youth and drunkenness are united\nto weakness. Therefore they are not causes of hope.\n\nObj. 3: Further, experience is a cause of hope, as stated above (A.\n5). But youth lacks experience. Therefore it is not a cause of hope.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that \"drunken\nmen are hopeful\": and (Rhet. ii, 12) that \"the young are full of\nhope.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Youth is a cause of hope for three reasons, as the\nPhilosopher states in _Rhet._ ii, 12: and these three reasons may be\ngathered from the three conditions of the good which is the object of\nhope--namely, that it is future, arduous and possible, as stated\nabove (A. 1). For youth has much of the future before it, and little\nof the past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope of\nthe future, it has little to remember and lives very much in hope.\nAgain, youths, on account of the heat of their nature, are full of\nspirit; so that their heart expands: and it is owing to the heart\nbeing expanded that one tends to that which is arduous; wherefore\nyouths are spirited and hopeful. Likewise they who have not suffered\ndefeat, nor had experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone\nto count a thing possible to them. Wherefore youths, through\ninexperience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, easily count\na thing possible; and consequently are of good hope. Two of these\ncauses are also in those who are in drink--viz. heat and high\nspirits, on account of wine, and heedlessness of dangers and\nshortcomings. For the same reason all foolish and thoughtless persons\nattempt everything and are full of hope.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although youths and men in drink lack steadiness in\nreality, yet they are steady in their own estimation, for they think\nthat they will steadily obtain that which they hope for.\n\nIn like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we must observe\nthat young people and men in drink are indeed unsteady in reality:\nbut, in their own estimation, they are capable, for they know not\ntheir shortcomings.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Not only experience, but also lack of experience, is,\nin some way, a cause of hope, as explained above (A. 5, ad 3).\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Hope Is a Cause of Love?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that hope is not a cause of love. Because,\naccording to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), love is the first of\nthe soul's emotions. But hope is an emotion of the soul. Therefore\nlove precedes hope, and consequently hope does not cause love.\n\nObj. 2: Further, desire precedes hope. But desire is caused by love,\nas stated above (Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore hope, too, follows love, and\nconsequently is not its cause.\n\nObj. 3: Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 3).\nBut pleasure is only of the good that is loved. Therefore love\nprecedes hope.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The gloss commenting on Matt. 1:2, \"Abraham begot\nIsaac, and Isaac begot Jacob,\" says, i.e. \"faith begets hope, and\nhope begets charity.\" But charity is love. Therefore love is caused\nby hope.\n\n_I answer that,_ Hope can regard two things. For it regards as its\nobject, the good which one hopes for. But since the good we hope for\nis something difficult but possible to obtain; and since it happens\nsometimes that what is difficult becomes possible to us, not through\nourselves but through others; hence it is that hope regards also that\nby which something becomes possible to us.\n\nIn so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is\ncaused by love: since we do not hope save for that which we desire\nand love. But in so far as hope regards one through whom something\nbecomes possible to us, love is caused by hope, and not vice versa.\nBecause by the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us\nthrough someone, we are moved towards him as to our own good; and\nthus we begin to love him. Whereas from the fact that we love someone\nwe do not hope in him, except accidentally, that is, in so far as we\nthink that he returns our love. Wherefore the fact of being loved by\nanother makes us hope in him; but our love for him is caused by the\nhope we have in him.\n\nWherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 40, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Hope Is a Help or a Hindrance to Action?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that hope is not a help but a hindrance to\naction. Because hope implies security. But security begets negligence\nwhich hinders action. Therefore hope is a hindrance to action.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated above (Q. 37, A.\n3). But hope sometimes causes sorrow: for it is written (Prov.\n13:12): \"Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul.\" Therefore hope\nhinders action.\n\nObj. 3: Further, despair is contrary to hope, as stated above (A. 4).\nBut despair, especially in matters of war, conduces to action; for it\nis written (2 Kings 2:26), that \"it is dangerous to drive people to\ndespair.\" Therefore hope has a contrary effect, namely, by hindering\naction.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Cor. 9:10) that \"he that\nplougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit\": and the same\napplies to all other actions.\n\n_I answer that,_ Hope of its very nature is a help to action by\nmaking it more intense: and this for two reasons. First, by reason of\nits object, which is a good, difficult but possible. For the thought\nof its being difficult arouses our attention; while the thought that\nit is possible is no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that by\nreason of hope man is intent on his action. Secondly, on account of\nits effect. Because hope, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 3), causes\npleasure; which is a help to action, as stated above (Q. 33, A. 4).\nTherefore hope is conducive to action.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Hope regards a good to be obtained; security regards an\nevil to be avoided. Wherefore security seems to be contrary to fear\nrather than to belong to hope. Yet security does not beget\nnegligence, save in so far as it lessens the idea of difficulty:\nwhereby it also lessens the character of hope: for the things in\nwhich a man fears no hindrance, are no longer looked upon as\ndifficult.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by accident that\nit causes sorrow, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 3, ad 2).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Despair threatens danger in war, on account of a\ncertain hope that attaches to it. For they who despair of flight,\nstrive less to fly, but hope to avenge their death: and therefore\nin this hope they fight the more bravely, and consequently prove\ndangerous to the foe.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 41\n\nOF FEAR, IN ITSELF\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, secondly, daring.\nWith regard to fear, four things must be considered: (1) Fear, in\nitself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first\nhead there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul?\n\n(2) Whether fear is a special passion?\n\n(3) Whether there is a natural fear?\n\n(4) Of the species of fear.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Fear Is a Passion of the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fear is not a passion of the soul.\nFor Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that \"fear is a power, by\nway of _systole_\"--i.e. of contraction--\"desirous of vindicating\nnature.\" But no virtue is a passion, as is proved in _Ethic._ ii, 5.\nTherefore fear is not a passion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every passion is an effect due to the presence of an\nagent. But fear is not of something present, but of something future,\nas Damascene declares (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is not a\npassion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every passion of the soul is a movement of the\nsensitive appetite, in consequence of an apprehension of the senses.\nBut sense apprehends, not the future but the present. Since, then,\nfear is of future evil, it seems that it is not a passion of the soul.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, seqq.) reckons fear\namong the other passions of the soul.\n\n_I answer that,_ Among the other passions of the soul, after sorrow,\nfear chiefly has the character of passion. For as we have stated\nabove (Q. 22), the notion of passion implies first of all a movement\nof a passive power--i.e. of a power whose object is compared to it as\nits active principle: since passion is the effect of an agent. In\nthis way, both _to feel_ and _to understand_ are passions. Secondly,\nmore properly speaking, passion is a movement of the appetitive\npower; and more properly still, it is a movement of an appetitive\npower that has a bodily organ, such movement being accompanied by a\nbodily transmutation. And, again, most properly those movements are\ncalled passions, which imply some deterioration. Now it is evident\nthat fear, since it regards evil, belongs to the appetitive power,\nwhich of itself regards good and evil. Moreover, it belongs to the\nsensitive appetite: for it is accompanied by a certain\ntransmutation--i.e. contraction--as Damascene says (Cf. Obj. 1).\nAgain, it implies relation to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some\nparticular good. Wherefore it has most properly the character of\npassion; less, however, than sorrow, which regards the present evil:\nbecause fear regards future evil, which is not so strong a motive as\npresent evil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Virtue denotes a principle of action: wherefore, in so\nfar as the interior movements of the appetitive faculty are\nprinciples of external action, they are called virtues. But the\nPhilosopher denies that passion is a virtue by way of habit.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as the passion of a natural body is due to the\nbodily presence of an agent, so is the passion of the soul due to the\nagent being present to the soul, although neither corporally nor\nreally present: that is to say, in so far as the evil which is really\nfuture, is present in the apprehension of the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The senses do not apprehend the future: but from\napprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to\nhope for a future good, or to fear a future evil.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Fear Is a Special Passion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fear is not a special passion. For\nAugustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that \"the man who is not distraught\nby fear, is neither harassed by desire, nor wounded by\nsickness\"--i.e. sorrow--\"nor tossed about in transports of empty\njoys.\" Wherefore it seems that, if fear be set aside, all the other\npassions are removed. Therefore fear is not a special but a general\npassion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that \"pursuit\nand avoidance in the appetite are what affirmation and denial are in\nthe intellect.\" But denial is nothing special in the intellect, as\nneither is affirmation, but something common to many. Therefore\nneither is avoidance anything special in the appetite. But fear is\nnothing but a kind of avoidance of evil. Therefore it is not a\nspecial passion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if fear were a special passion, it would be chiefly\nin the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible: since\nthe Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that \"fear is a kind of sorrow\";\nand Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that fear is \"a power of\ndesire\": and both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible faculty,\nas stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). Therefore fear is not a special\npassion, since it belongs to different powers.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Fear is condivided with the other passions of the\nsoul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12, 15).\n\n_I answer that,_ The passions of the soul derive their species from\ntheir objects: hence that is a special passion, which has a special\nobject. Now fear has a special object, as hope has. For just as the\nobject of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; so\nthe object of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible.\nConsequently fear is a special passion of the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All the passions of the soul arise from one source,\nviz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By reason of\nthis connection, when fear is put aside, the other passions of the\nsoul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general passion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear, but\navoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though avoidance\nbe something common, yet fear is a special passion.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it regards\nevil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost\nunavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the passions\nof the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated above\n(Q. 25, A. 1); hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is\nascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far as the object\nof fear causes sorrow when present: wherefore the Philosopher says\n(Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises \"from the representation of a future\nevil which is either corruptive or painful.\" In like manner desire is\nascribed by Damascene to fear, because just as hope arises from the\ndesire of good, so fear arises from avoidance of evil; while\navoidance of evil arises from the desire of good, as is evident from\nwhat has been said above (Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 29, A. 2; Q. 36, A. 2).\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Is a Natural Fear?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is a natural fear. For\nDamascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that \"there is a natural fear,\nthrough the soul refusing to be severed from the body.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, fear arises from love, as stated above (A. 2, ad 1).\nBut there is a natural love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).\nTherefore there is also a natural fear.\n\nObj. 3: Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above (Q. 40, A.\n4, ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is evident from Rom.\n4:18, where it is said of Abraham that \"against hope\" of nature, \"he\nbelieved in hope\" of grace. Therefore there is also a fear of nature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ That which is natural is common to things animate\nand inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate. Therefore there\nis no natural fear.\n\n_I answer that,_ A movement is said to be natural, because nature\ninclines thereto. Now this happens in two ways. First, so that it is\nentirely accomplished by nature, without any operation of the\napprehensive faculty: thus to have an upward movement is natural to\nfire, and to grow is the natural movement of animals and plants.\nSecondly, a movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines\nthereto, though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty alone:\nsince, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 1), the movements of the cognitive\nand appetitive faculties are reducible to nature as to their first\nprinciple. In this way, even the acts of the apprehensive power, such\nas understanding, feeling, and remembering, as well as the movements\nof the animal appetite, are sometimes said to be natural.\n\nAnd in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is\ndistinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the diversity of\nits object. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a\nfear of \"corruptive evil,\" which nature shrinks from on account of\nits natural desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural.\nAgain, there is a fear of \"painful evil,\" which is repugnant not to\nnature, but to the desire of the appetite; and such fear is not\nnatural. In this sense we have stated above (Q. 26, A. 1; Q. 30, A.\n3; Q. 31, A. 7) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into\nnatural and non-natural.\n\nBut in the first sense of the word \"natural,\" we must observe that\ncertain passions of the soul are sometimes said to be natural, as\nlove, desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called natural.\nThe reason of this is because love and hatred, desire and avoidance,\nimply a certain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what\nis evil; which inclination is to be found in the natural appetite\nalso. Consequently there is a natural love; while we may also speak\nof desire and hope as being even in natural things devoid of\nknowledge. On the other hand the other passions of the soul denote\ncertain movements, whereto the natural inclination is nowise\nsufficient. This is due either to the fact that perception or\nknowledge is essential to these passions (thus we have said, Q. 31,\nAA. 1, 3; Q. 35, A. 1, that apprehension is a necessary condition of\npleasure and sorrow), wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be\nsaid to take pleasure or to be sorrowful: or else it is because such\nlike movements are contrary to the very nature of natural\ninclination: for instance, despair flies from good on account of some\ndifficulty; and fear shrinks from repelling a contrary evil; both of\nwhich are contrary to the inclination of nature. Wherefore such like\npassions are in no way ascribed to inanimate beings.\n\nThus the Replies to the Objections are evident.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Species of Fear Are Suitably Assigned?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably\nassigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, \"laziness,\nshamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety.\" Because, as\nthe Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), \"fear regards a saddening evil.\"\nTherefore the species of fear should correspond to the species of\nsorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above (Q. 35,\nA. 8). Therefore there should only be four species of fear\ncorresponding to them.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in\nour power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power, as\nstated above (A. 2). Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame,\nwhich regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of\nfear.\n\nObj. 3: Further, fear is of the future, as stated above (AA. 1, 2).\nBut \"shame regards a disgraceful deed already done,\" as Gregory of\nNyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx.] says. Therefore shame is not a\nspecies of fear.\n\nObj. 4: Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor\nregard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore\namazement and stupor are not species of fear.\n\nObj. 5: Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the\ntruth, as stated in the beginning of _Metaph._ But fear leads to\nflight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of\nfear.\n\nOn the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of\nNyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. Obj. 1, 3).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), fear regards a future evil\nwhich surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is\nirresistible. Now man's evil, like his good, may be considered either\nin his action or in external things. In his action he has a twofold\nevil to fear. First, there is the toil that burdens his nature: and\nhence arises _laziness,_ as when a man shrinks from work for fear of\ntoo much toil. Secondly, there is the disgrace which damages him in\nthe opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that\nis yet to be done, there is _shamefacedness_; if, however, it be a\ndeed already done, there is _shame._\n\nOn the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may\nsurpass man's faculty of resistance in three ways. First by reason of\nits magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil\nthe outcome of which he is unable to gauge: and then there is\n_amazement._ Secondly, by reason of its being unwonted; because, to\nwit, some unwonted evil arises before us, and on that account is\ngreat in our estimation: and then there is _stupor,_ which is caused\nby the representation of something unwonted. Thirdly, by reason of\nits being unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and fear of\nthis kind is called _anxiety._\n\nReply Obj. 1: Those species of sorrow given above are not derived\nfrom the diversity of objects, but from the diversity of effects, and\nfor certain special reasons. Consequently there is no need for those\nspecies of sorrow to correspond with these species of fear, which are\nderived from the proper division of the object of fear itself.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A deed considered as being actually done, is in the\npower of the doer. But it is possible to take into consideration\nsomething connected with the deed, and surpassing the faculty of the\ndoer, for which reason he shrinks from the deed. It is in this sense\nthat laziness, shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species of\nfear.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The past deed may be the occasion of fear of future\nreproach or disgrace: and in this sense shame is a species of fear.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Not every amazement and stupor are species of fear, but\nthat amazement which is caused by a great evil, and that stupor which\narises from an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that, just as\nlaziness shrinks from the toil of external work, so amazement and\nstupor shrink from the difficulty of considering a great and unwonted\nthing, whether good or evil: so that amazement and stupor stand in\nrelation to the act of the intellect, as laziness does to external\nwork.\n\nReply Obj. 5: He who is amazed shrinks at present from forming a\njudgment of that which amazes him, fearing to fall short of the\ntruth, but inquires afterwards: whereas he who is overcome by stupor\nfears both to judge at present, and to inquire afterwards. Wherefore\namazement is a beginning of philosophical research: whereas stupor\nis a hindrance thereto.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 42\n\nOF THE OBJECT OF FEAR\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the object of fear: under which head there are\nsix points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear?\n\n(2) Whether evil of nature is the object of fear?\n\n(3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?\n\n(4) Whether fear itself can be feared?\n\n(5) Whether sudden things are especially feared?\n\n(6) Whether those things are more feared against which there is no\nremedy?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Object of Fear Is Good or Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that good is the object of fear. For\nAugustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that \"we fear nothing save to lose\nwhat we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for.\"\nBut that which we love is good. Therefore fear regards good as its\nproper object.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that \"power and\nto be above another is a thing to be feared.\" But this is a good\nthing. Therefore good is the object of fear.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there can be no evil in God. But we are commanded to\nfear God, according to Ps. 33:10: \"Fear the Lord, all ye saints.\"\nTherefore even the good is an object of fear.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is\nof future evil.\n\n_I answer that,_ Fear is a movement of the appetitive power. Now it\nbelongs to the appetitive power to pursue and to avoid, as stated in\n_Ethic._ vi, 2: and pursuit is of good, while avoidance is of evil.\nConsequently whatever movement of the appetitive power implies\npursuit, has some good for its object: and whatever movement implies\navoidance, has an evil for its object. Wherefore, since fear implies\nan avoidance, in the first place and of its very nature it regards\nevil as its proper object.\n\nIt can, however, regard good also, in so far as referable to evil.\nThis can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil causes\nprivation of good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is\na privation of some good. Wherefore, since evil is shunned because it\nis evil, it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the\ngood that one pursues through love thereof. And in this sense\nAugustine says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good\nwe love.\n\nIn another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: in so far\nas some good can by its power bring harm to the good we love: and so,\njust as hope, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 7), regards two things,\nnamely, the good to which it tends, and the thing through which there\nis a hope of obtaining the desired good; so also does fear regard two\nthings, namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that good which,\nby its power, can inflict that evil. In this way God is feared by\nman, inasmuch as He can inflict punishment, spiritual or corporal. In\nthis way, too, we fear the power of man; especially when it has been\nthwarted, or when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do\nus a harm.\n\nIn like manner one fears _to be over another,_ i.e. to lean on\nanother, so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus a man fears\nanother, who knows him to be guilty of a crime, lest he reveal it to\nothers.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Evil of Nature Is an Object of Fear?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that evil of nature is not an object of\nfear. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that \"fear makes us take\ncounsel.\" But we do not take counsel about things which happen\nnaturally, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature is\nnot an object of fear.\n\nObj. 2: Further, natural defects such as death and the like are\nalways threatening man. If therefore such like evils were an object\nof fear, man would needs be always in fear.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nature does not move to contraries. But evil of\nnature is an effect of nature. Therefore if a man shrinks from such\nlike evils through fear thereof, this is not an effect of nature.\nTherefore natural fear is not of the evil of nature; and yet it seems\nthat it should be.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that \"the\nmost terrible of all things is death,\" which is an evil of nature.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear is\ncaused by the \"imagination of a future evil which is either\ncorruptive or painful.\" Now just as a painful evil is that which is\ncontrary to the will, so a corruptive evil is that which is contrary\nto nature: and this is the evil of nature. Consequently evil of\nnature can be the object of fear.\n\nBut it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises from a\nnatural cause; and then it is called evil of nature, not merely from\nbeing a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an\neffect of nature; such are natural death and other like defects. But\nsometimes evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as\nviolent death inflicted by an assailant. In either case evil of\nnature is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent not.\nFor since fear arises \"from the imagination of future evil,\" as the\nPhilosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of\nthe future evil, removes fear also. Now it may happen in two ways\nthat an evil may not appear as about to be. First, through being\nremote and far off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is\nconsidered as though it were not to be. Hence we either do not fear\nit, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,\n5), \"we do not fear things that are very far off; since all know that\nthey shall die, but as death is not near, they heed it not.\"\nSecondly, a future evil is considered as though it were not to be, on\naccount of its being inevitable, wherefore we look upon it as already\npresent. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that \"those who are\nalready on the scaffold, are not afraid,\" seeing that they are on the\nvery point of a death from which there is no escape; \"but in order\nthat a man be afraid, there must be some hope of escape for him.\"\n\nConsequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as\nfuture: but if evil of nature, that is corruptive, be apprehended as\nnear at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be\nfeared.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The evil of nature sometimes is not an effect of\nnature, as stated above. But in so far as it is an effect of nature,\nalthough it may be impossible to avoid it entirely, yet it may be\npossible to delay it. And with this hope one may take counsel about\navoiding it.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it does not\nalways threaten from near at hand: and consequently it is not always\nfeared.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Death and other defects of nature are the effects of\nthe common nature; and yet the individual nature rebels against them\nas far as it can. Accordingly, from the inclination of the individual\nnature arise pain and sorrow for such like evils, when present; fear\nwhen threatening in the future.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Evil of Sin Is an Object of Fear?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of\nfear. For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract.\nix), that \"by chaste fear man fears to be severed from God.\" Now\nnothing but sin severs us from God; according to Isa. 59:2: \"Your\niniquities have divided between you and your God.\" Therefore the evil\nof sin can be an object of fear.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv, 4, 6) that \"we fear\nwhen they are yet to come, those things which give us pain when they\nare present.\" But it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on\naccount of the evil of sin. Therefore one can also fear the evil of\nsin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the good of virtue can\nbe the object of hope, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ix, 4):\nand the Apostle says (Gal. 5:10): \"I have confidence in you in the\nLord, that you will not be of another mind.\" Therefore fear can\nregard evil of sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above (Q. 41, A.\n4). But shame regards a disgraceful deed, which is an evil of sin.\nTherefore fear does so likewise.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that \"not all\nevils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 40, A. 1; Q. 41, A. 2), as the\nobject of hope is a future good difficult but possible to obtain, so\nthe object of fear is a future evil, arduous and not to be easily\navoided. From this we may gather that whatever is entirely subject to\nour power and will, is not an object of fear; and that nothing gives\nrise to fear save what is due to an external cause. Now human will is\nthe proper cause of the evil of sin: and consequently evil of sin,\nproperly speaking, is not an object of fear.\n\nBut since the human will may be inclined to sin by an extrinsic\ncause; if this cause have a strong power of inclination, in that\nrespect a man may fear the evil of sin, in so far as it arises from\nthat extrinsic cause: as when he fears to dwell in the company of\nwicked men, lest he be led by them to sin. But, properly speaking, a\nman thus disposed, fears the being led astray rather than the sin\nconsidered in its proper nature, i.e. as a voluntary act; for\nconsidered in this light it is not an object of fear to him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Separation from God is a punishment resulting from sin:\nand every punishment is, in some way, due to an extrinsic cause.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sorrow and fear agree in one point, since each regards\nevil: they differ, however, in two points. First, because sorrow is\nabout present evil, whereas fear is future evil. Secondly, because\nsorrow, being in the concupiscible faculty, regards evil absolutely;\nwherefore it can be about any evil, great or small; whereas fear,\nbeing in the irascible part, regards evil with the addition of a\ncertain arduousness or difficulty; which difficulty ceases in so far\nas a thing is subject to the will. Consequently not all things that\ngive us pain when they are present, make us fear when they are yet to\ncome, but only some things, namely, those that are difficult.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Hope is of good that is obtainable. Now one may obtain\na good either of oneself, or through another: and so, hope may be of\nan act of virtue, which lies within our own power. On the other hand,\nfear is of an evil that does not lie in our own power: and\nconsequently the evil which is feared is always from an extrinsic\ncause; while the good that is hoped for may be both from an intrinsic\nand from an extrinsic cause.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As stated above (Q. 41, A. 4, ad 2, 3), shame is not\nfear of the very act of sin, but of the disgrace or ignominy which\narises therefrom, and which is due to an extrinsic cause.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Fear Itself Can Be Feared?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fear cannot be feared. For whatever\nis feared, is prevented from being lost, through fear thereof: thus a\nman who fears to lose his health, keeps it, through fearing its loss.\nIf therefore a man be afraid of fear, he will keep himself from fear\nby being afraid: which seems absurd.\n\nObj. 2: Further, fear is a kind of flight. But nothing flies from\nitself. Therefore fear cannot be the object of fear.\n\nObj. 3: Further, fear is about the future. But fear is present to him\nthat fears. Therefore it cannot be the object of his fear.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A man can love his own love, and can grieve at his\nown sorrow. Therefore, in like manner, he can fear his own fear.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), nothing can be an object of\nfear, save what is due to an extrinsic cause; but not that which\nensues from our own will. Now fear partly arises from an extrinsic\ncause, and is partly subject to the will. It is due to an extrinsic\ncause, in so far as it is a passion resulting from the imagination of\nan imminent evil. In this sense it is possible for fear to be the\nobject of fear, i.e. a man may fear lest he should be threatened by\nthe necessity of fearing, through being assailed by some great evil.\nIt is subject to the will, in so far as the lower appetite obeys\nreason; wherefore man is able to drive fear away. In this sense fear\ncannot be the object of fear, as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33).\nLest, however, anyone make use of his arguments, in order to prove\nthat fear cannot be at all be the object of fear, we must add a\nsolution to the same.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Not every fear is identically the same; there are\nvarious fears according to the various objects of fear. Nothing,\nthen, prevents a man from keeping himself from fearing one thing, by\nfearing another, so that the fear which he has preserves him from the\nfear which he has not.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since fear of an imminent evil is not identical with\nthe fear of the fear of imminent evil; it does not follow that a\nthing flies from itself, or that it is the same flight in both cases.\n\nReply Obj. 3: On account of the various kinds of fear already alluded\nto (ad 2) a man's present fear may have a future fear for its object.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Sudden Things Are Especially Feared?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that unwonted and sudden things are not\nespecially feared. Because, as hope is about good things, so fear is\nabout evil things. But experience conduces to the increase of hope in\ngood things. Therefore it also adds to fear in evil things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that \"those are\nfeared most, not who are quick-tempered, but who are gentle and\ncunning.\" Now it is clear that those who are quick-tempered are more\nsubject to sudden emotions. Therefore sudden things are less to be\nfeared.\n\nObj. 3: Further, we think less about things that happen suddenly. But\nthe more we think about a thing, the more we fear it; hence the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that \"some appear to be courageous\nthrough ignorance, but as soon as they discover that the case is\ndifferent from what they expected, they run away.\" Therefore sudden\nthings are feared less.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6): \"Fear is startled\nat things unwonted and sudden, which endanger things beloved, and\ntakes forethought for their safety.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3; Q. 41, A. 2), the object of\nfear is an imminent evil, which can be repelled, but with difficulty.\nNow this is due to one of two causes: to the greatness of the evil,\nor to the weakness of him that fears; while unwontedness and\nsuddenness conduce to both of these causes. First, it helps an\nimminent evil to seem greater. Because all material things, whether\ngood or evil, the more we consider them, the smaller they seem.\nConsequently, just as sorrow for a present evil is mitigated in\ncourse of time, as Cicero states (De Quaest. Tusc. iii, 30); so, too,\nfear of a future evil is diminished by thinking about it beforehand.\nSecondly, unwontedness and suddenness increase the weakness of him\nthat fears, in so far as they deprive him of the remedies with which\nhe might otherwise provide himself to forestall the coming evil, were\nit not for the evil taking him by surprise.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The object of hope is a good that is possible to\nobtain. Consequently whatever increases a man's power, is of a nature\nto increase hope, and, for the same reason, to diminish fear, since\nfear is about an evil which cannot be easily repelled. Since,\ntherefore, experience increases a man's power of action, therefore,\nas it increases hope, so does it diminish fear.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger;\nwherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, as not to be\nforeseen. On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide\ntheir anger; wherefore the harm which may be impending from them,\ncannot be foreseen, but takes one by surprise. For this reason the\nPhilosopher says that such men are feared more than others.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Bodily good or evil, considered in itself, seems\ngreater at first. The reason for this is that a thing is more obvious\nwhen seen in juxtaposition with its contrary. Hence, when a man\npasses unexpectedly from penury to wealth, he thinks more of his\nwealth on account of his previous poverty: while, on the other hand,\nthe rich man who suddenly becomes poor, finds poverty all the more\ndisagreeable. For this reason sudden evil is feared more, because it\nseems more to be evil. However, it may happen through some accident\nthat the greatness of some evil is hidden; for instance if the foe\nhides himself in ambush: and then it is true that evil inspires\ngreater fear through being much thought about.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Those Things Are More Feared, for Which There Is No Remedy?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that those things are not more to be\nfeared, for which there is no remedy. Because it is a condition of\nfear, that there be some hope of safety, as stated above (A. 2). But\nan evil that cannot be remedied leaves no hope of escape. Therefore\nsuch things are not feared at all.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there is no remedy for the evil of death: since, in\nthe natural course of things, there is no return from death to life.\nAnd yet death is not the most feared of all things, as the\nPhilosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore those things are not feared\nmost, for which there is no remedy.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that \"a thing\nwhich lasts long is no better than that which lasts but one day: nor\nis that which lasts for ever any better than that which is not\neverlasting\": and the same applies to evil. But things that cannot be\nremedied seem to differ from other things, merely in the point of\ntheir lasting long or for ever. Consequently they are not therefore\nany worse or more to be feared.\n\n_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that \"those\nthings are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put\nright . . . or for which there is no help, or which are not easy.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The object of fear is evil: consequently whatever\ntends to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear. Now evil\nis increased not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of\ncircumstances, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 3). And of all the\ncircumstances, longlastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to\nhave the greatest bearing on the increase of evil. Because things\nthat exist in time are measured, in a way, according to the duration\nof time: wherefore if it be an evil to suffer something for a certain\nlength of time, we should reckon the evil doubled, if it be suffered\nfor twice that length of time. And accordingly, to suffer the same\nthing for an infinite length of time, i.e. for ever, implies, so to\nspeak, an infinite increase. Now those evils which, after they have\ncome, cannot be remedied at all, or at least not easily, are\nconsidered as lasting for ever or for a long time: for which reason\nthey inspire the greatest fear.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Remedy for an evil is twofold. One, by which a future\nevil is warded off from coming. If such a remedy be removed, there is\nan end to hope and consequently to fear; wherefore we do not speak\nnow of remedies of that kind. The other remedy is one by which an\nalready present evil is removed: and of such a remedy we speak now.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although death be an evil without remedy, yet, since it\nthreatens not from near, it is not feared, as stated above (A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Philosopher is speaking there of things that are\ngood in themselves, i.e., good specifically. And such like good is no\nbetter for lasting long or for ever: its goodness depends on its very\nnature.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 43\n\nOF THE CAUSE OF FEAR\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the cause of fear: under which head there are\ntwo points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether love is the cause of fear?\n\n(2) Whether defect is the cause of fear?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 43, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Love Is the Cause of Fear?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that love is not the cause of fear. For\nthat which leads to a thing is its cause. But \"fear leads to the love\nof charity\" as Augustine says on the canonical epistle of John\n(Tract. ix). Therefore fear is the cause of love, and not conversely.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that \"those are\nfeared most from whom we dread the advent of some evil.\" But the\ndread of evil being caused by someone, makes us hate rather than love\nhim. Therefore fear is caused by hate rather than by love.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it has been stated above (Q. 42, A. 3) that those\nthings which occur by our own doing are not fearful. But that which\nwe do from love, is done from our inmost heart. Therefore fear is not\ncaused by love.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33): \"There can be no\ndoubt that there is no cause for fear save the loss of what we love,\nwhen we possess it, or the failure to obtain what we hope for.\"\nTherefore all fear is caused by our loving something: and\nconsequently love is the cause of fear.\n\n_I answer that,_ The objects of the soul's passions stand in relation\nthereto as the forms to things natural or artificial: because the\npassions of the soul take their species from their objects, as the\naforesaid things do from their forms. Therefore, just as whatever is\na cause of the form, is a cause of the thing constituted by that\nform, so whatever is a cause, in any way whatever, of the object, is\na cause of the passion. Now a thing may be a cause of the object,\neither by way of efficient cause, or by way of material disposition.\nThus the object of pleasure is good apprehended as suitable and\nconjoined: and its efficient cause is that which causes the\nconjunction, or the suitableness, or goodness, or apprehension of\nthat good thing; while its cause by way of material disposition, is a\nhabit or any sort of disposition by reason of which this conjoined\ngood becomes suitable or is apprehended as such.\n\nAccordingly, as to the matter in question, the object of fear is\nsomething reckoned as an evil to come, near at hand and difficult to\navoid. Therefore that which can inflict such an evil, is the\nefficient cause of the object of fear, and, consequently, of fear\nitself. While that which renders a man so disposed that thing is such\nan evil to him, is a cause of fear and of its object, by way of\nmaterial disposition. And thus it is that love causes fear: since it\nis through his loving a certain good, that whatever deprives a man of\nthat good is an evil to him, and that consequently he fears it as an\nevil.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 42, A. 1), fear, of itself and in\nthe first place, regards the evil from which it recoils as being\ncontrary to some loved good: and thus fear, of itself, is born of\nlove. But, in the second place, it regards the cause from which that\nevil ensues: so that sometimes, accidentally, fear gives rise to\nlove; in so far as, for instance, through fear of God's punishments,\nman keeps His commandments, and thus begins to hope, while hope leads\nto love, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 7).\n\nReply Obj. 2: He, from whom evil is expected, is indeed hated at\nfirst; but afterwards, when once we begin to hope for good from him,\nwe begin to love him. But the good, the contrary evil of which is\nfeared, was loved from the beginning.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument is true of that which is the efficient\ncause of the evil to be feared: whereas love causes fear by way of\nmaterial disposition, as stated above.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 43, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Defect Is the Cause of Fear?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that defect is not a cause of fear.\nBecause those who are in power are very much feared. But defect is\ncontrary to power. Therefore defect is not a cause of fear.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the defect of those who are already being executed\nis extreme. But such like do not fear as stated in _Rhet._ ii, 5.\nTherefore defect is not a cause of fear.\n\nObj. 3: Further, contests arise from strength not from defect. But\n\"those who contend fear those who contend with them\" (Rhet. ii, 5).\nTherefore defect is not a cause of fear.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Contraries ensue from contrary causes. But\n\"wealth, strength, a multitude of friends, and power drive fear away\"\n(Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore fear is caused by lack of these.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), fear may be set down to a\ntwofold cause: one is by way of a material disposition, on the part\nof him that fears; the other is by way of efficient cause, on the\npart of the person feared. As to the first then, some defect is, of\nitself, the cause of fear: for it is owing to some lack of power that\none is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil. And yet, in order\nto cause fear, this defect must be according to a measure. For the\ndefect which causes fear of a future evil, is less than the defect\ncaused by evil present, which is the object of sorrow. And still\ngreater would be the defect, if perception of the evil, or love of\nthe good whose contrary is feared, were entirely absent.\n\nBut as to the second, power and strength are, of themselves, the\ncause of fear: because it is owing to the fact that the cause\napprehended as harmful is powerful, that its effect cannot be\nrepulsed. It may happen, however, in this respect, that some defect\ncauses fear accidentally, in so far as owing to some defect someone\nwishes to hurt another; for instance, by reason of injustice, either\nbecause that other has already done him a harm, or because he fears\nto be harmed by him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument is true of the cause of fear, on the part\nof the efficient cause.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those who are already being executed, are actually\nsuffering from a present evil; wherefore their defect exceeds the\nmeasure of fear.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Those who contend with one another are afraid, not on\naccount of the power which enables them to contend: but on account of\nthe lack of power, owing to which they are not confident of victory.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 44\n\nOF THE EFFECTS OF FEAR\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the effects of fear: under which head there are\nfour points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether fear causes contraction?\n\n(2) Whether it makes men suitable for counsel?\n\n(3) Whether it makes one tremble?\n\n(4) Whether it hinders action?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 44, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Fear Causes Contraction?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fear does not cause contraction. For\nwhen contraction takes place, the heat and vital spirits are\nwithdrawn inwardly. But accumulation of heat and vital spirits in the\ninterior parts of the body, dilates the heart unto endeavors of\ndaring, as may be seen in those who are angered: while the contrary\nhappens in those who are afraid. Therefore fear does not cause\ncontraction.\n\nObj. 2: Further, when, as a result of contraction, the vital spirits\nand heat are accumulated in the interior parts, man cries out, as may\nbe seen in those who are in pain. But those who fear utter nothing:\non the contrary they lose their speech. Therefore fear does not cause\ncontraction.\n\nObj. 3: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above (Q. 41, A.\n4). But \"those who are ashamed blush,\" as Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc.\niv, 8), and the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 9) observe. But blushing is\nan indication, not of contraction, but of the reverse. Therefore\ncontraction is not an effect of fear.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that \"fear\nis a power according to _systole_,\" i.e. contraction.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 28, A. 5), in the passions of\nthe soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power,\nwhile the bodily transmutation is the material element. Both of these\nare mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily transmutation\nassumes a resemblance to and the very nature of the appetitive\nmovement. Now, as to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear\nimplies a certain contraction: the reason of which is that fear\narises from the imagination of some threatening evil which is\ndifficult to repel, as stated above (Q. 41, A. 2). But that a thing\nbe difficult to repel is due to lack of power, as stated above (Q.\n43, A. 2): and the weaker a power is, the fewer the things to which\nit extends. Wherefore from the very imagination that causes fear\nthere ensues a certain contraction in the appetite. Thus we observe\nin one who is dying that nature withdraws inwardly, on account of the\nlack of power: and again we see the inhabitants of a city, when\nseized with fear, leave the outskirts, and, as far as possible, make\nfor the inner quarters. It is in resemblance to this contraction,\nwhich pertains to the appetite of the soul, that in fear a similar\ncontraction of heat and vital spirits towards the inner parts takes\nplace in regard to the body.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3),\nalthough in those who fear, the vital spirits recede from outer to\nthe inner parts of the body, yet the movement of vital spirits is not\nthe same in those who are angry and those who are afraid. For in\nthose who are angry, by reason of the heat and subtlety of the vital\nspirits, which result from the craving for vengeance, the inward\nmovement has an upward direction: wherefore the vital spirits and\nheat concentrate around the heart: the result being that an angry man\nis quick and brave in attacking. But in those who are afraid, on\naccount of the condensation caused by cold, the vital spirits have a\ndownward movement; the said cold being due to the imagined lack of\npower. Consequently the heat and vital spirits abandon the heart\ninstead of concentrating around it: the result being that a man who\nis afraid is not quick to attack, but is more inclined to run away.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To everyone that is in pain, whether man or animal, it\nis natural to use all possible means of repelling the harmful thing\nthat causes pain but its presence: thus we observe that animals, when\nin pain, attack with their jaws or with their horns. Now the greatest\nhelp for all purposes, in animals, is heat and vital spirits:\nwherefore when they are in pain, their nature stores up the heat and\nvital spirits within them, in order to make use thereof in repelling\nthe harmful object. Hence the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 9)\nwhen the vital spirits and heat are concentrated together within,\nthey require to find a vent in the voice: for which reason those who\nare in pain can scarcely refrain from crying aloud. On the other\nhand, in those who are afraid, the internal heat and vital spirits\nmove from the heart downwards, as stated above (ad 1): wherefore fear\nhinders speech which ensues from the emission of the vital spirits in\nan upward direction through the mouth: the result being that fear\nmakes its subject speechless. For this reason, too, fear \"makes its\nsubject tremble,\" as the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 1, 6,\n7).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Mortal perils are contrary not only to the appetite of\nthe soul, but also to nature. Consequently in such like fear, there\nis contraction not only in the appetite, but also in the corporeal\nnature: for when an animal is moved by the imagination of death, it\nexperiences a contraction of heat towards the inner parts of the\nbody, as though it were threatened by a natural death. Hence it is\nthat \"those who are in fear of death turn pale\" (Ethic. iv, 9). But\nthe evil that shame fears, is contrary, not to nature, but only to\nthe appetite of the soul. Consequently there results a contraction in\nthis appetite, but not in the corporeal nature; in fact, the soul, as\nthough contracted in itself, is free to set the vital spirits and\nheat in movement, so that they spread to the outward parts of the\nbody: the result being that those who are ashamed blush.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 44, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Fear Makes One Suitable for Counsel?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fear does not make one suitable for\ncounsel. For the same thing cannot be conducive to counsel, and a\nhindrance thereto. But fear hinders counsel: because every passion\ndisturbs repose, which is requisite for the good use of reason.\nTherefore fear does not make a man suitable for counsel.\n\nObj. 2: Further, counsel is an act of reason, in thinking and\ndeliberating about the future. But a certain fear \"drives away all\nthought, and dislocates the mind,\" as Cicero observes (De Quaest.\nTusc. iv, 8). Therefore fear does not conduce to counsel, but\nhinders it.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as we have recourse to counsel in order to\navoid evil, so do we, in order to attain good things. But whereas\nfear is of evil to be avoided, so is hope of good things to be\nobtained. Therefore fear is not more conducive to counsel, than hope\nis.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that \"fear\nmakes men of counsel.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A man of counsel may be taken in two ways. First,\nfrom his being willing or anxious to take counsel. And thus fear\nmakes men of counsel. Because, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii,\n3), \"we take counsel on great matters, because therein we distrust\nourselves.\" Now things which make us afraid, are not simply evil, but\nhave a certain magnitude, both because they seem difficult to repel,\nand because they are apprehended as near to us, as stated above (Q.\n42, A. 2). Wherefore men seek for counsel especially when they are\nafraid.\n\nSecondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good\ncounsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor any passion makes men of\ncounsel. Because when a man is affected by a passion, things seem to\nhim greater or smaller than they really are: thus to a lover, what he\nloves seems better; to him that fears, what he fears seems more\ndreadful. Consequently owing to the want of right judgment, every\npassion, considered in itself, hinders the faculty of giving good\ncounsel.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The stronger a passion is, the greater the hindrance is\nit to the man who is swayed by it. Consequently, when fear is\nintense, man does indeed wish to take counsel, but his thoughts are\nso disturbed, that he can find no counsel. If, however, the fear be\nslight, so as to make a man wish to take counsel, without gravely\ndisturbing the reason; it may even make it easier for him to take\ngood counsel, by reason of his ensuing carefulness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Hope also makes man a good counsellor: because, as the\nPhilosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), \"no man takes counsel in matters he\ndespairs of,\" nor about impossible things, as he says in _Ethic._\niii, 3. But fear incites to counsel more than hope does. Because hope\nis of good things, as being possible of attainment; whereas fear is\nof evil things, as being difficult to repel, so that fear regards the\naspect of difficulty more than hope does. And it is in matters of\ndifficulty, especially when we distrust ourselves, that we take\ncounsel, as stated above.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 44, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Fear Makes One Tremble?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that trembling is not an effect of fear.\nBecause trembling is occasioned by cold; thus we observe that a cold\nperson trembles. Now fear does not seem to make one cold, but rather\nto cause a parching heat: a sign whereof is that those who fear are\nthirsty, especially if their fear be very great, as in the case of\nthose who are being led to execution. Therefore fear does not cause\ntrembling.\n\nObj. 2: Further, faecal evacuation is occasioned by heat; hence\nlaxative medicines are generally warm. But these evacuations are\noften caused by fear. Therefore fear apparently causes heat; and\nconsequently does not cause trembling.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in fear, the heat is withdrawn from the outer to the\ninner parts of the body. If, therefore, man trembles in his outward\nparts, through the heat being withdrawn thus; it seems that fear\nshould cause this trembling in all the external members. But such is\nnot the case. Therefore trembling of the body is not caused by fear.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that \"fear is\nfollowed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), in fear there takes place a\ncertain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body,\nthe result being that the outer parts become cold; and for this\nreason trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack\nof power in controlling the members: which lack of power is due to\nthe want of heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves\nthose members, as stated in _De Anima_ ii, 4.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When the heat withdraws from the outer to the inner\nparts, the inward heat increases, especially in the inferior or\nnutritive parts. Consequently the humid element being spent, thirst\nensues; sometimes indeed the result is a loosening of the bowels, and\nurinary or even seminal evacuation. Or else such like evacuations are\ndue to contraction of the abdomen and testicles, as the Philosopher\nsays (De Problem. xxii, 11).\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In fear, heat abandons the heart, with a downward\nmovement: hence in those who are afraid the heart especially\ntrembles, as also those members which are connected with the breast\nwhere the heart resides. Hence those who fear tremble especially in\ntheir speech, on account of the tracheal artery being near the heart.\nThe lower lip, too, and the lower jaw tremble, through their\nconnection with the heart; which explains the chattering of the\nteeth. For the same reason the arms and hands tremble. Or else\nbecause the aforesaid members are more mobile. For which reason the\nknees tremble in those who are afraid, according to Isa. 35:3:\n\"Strengthen ye the feeble hands, and confirm the trembling [Vulg.:\n'weak'] knees.\"\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 44, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Fear Hinders Action?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that fear hinders action. For action is\nhindered chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs\naction. But fear disturbs reason, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore\nfear hinders action.\n\nObj. 2: Further, those who fear while doing anything, are more apt to\nfail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily falls\nthrough fear; whereas, if he were to walk on the same plank down\nbelow, he would not fall, through not being afraid. Therefore fear\nhinders action.\n\nObj. 3: Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. But laziness\nhinders action. Therefore fear does too.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Phil. 2:12): \"With fear and\ntrembling work out your salvation\": and he would not say this if fear\nwere a hindrance to a good work. Therefore fear does not hinder a\ngood action.\n\n_I answer that,_ Man's exterior actions are caused by the soul as\nfirst mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may\nbe hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the\nprincipal mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear,\nconsidered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, on\naccount of the outward members being deprived, through fear, of their\nheat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without\nmuch disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, in so\nfar as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take counsel\nand work with greater attention. If, however, fear increases so much\nas to disturb the reason, it hinders action even on the part of the\nsoul. But of such a fear the Apostle does not speak.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers a\ndisturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is\npictured to his imagination.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Everyone in fear shuns that which he fears: and\ntherefore, since laziness is a fear of work itself as being toilsome,\nit hinders work by withdrawing the will from it. But fear of other\nthings conduces to action, in so far as it inclines the will to do\nthat whereby a man escapes from what he fears.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 45\n\nOF DARING\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider daring: under which head there are four points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether daring is contrary to fear?\n\n(2) How is daring related to hope?\n\n(3) Of the cause of daring;\n\n(4) Of its effect.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 45, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Daring Is Contrary to Fear?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For\nAugustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 31) that \"daring is a vice.\" Now vice is\ncontrary to virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a\npassion, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is\ncontrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But fear\nexcludes safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that \"fear takes\nforethought for safety.\" Therefore safety is contrary to fear.\nTherefore daring is not contrary to fear.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that \"daring is\ncontrary to fear.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It is of the essence of contraries to be \"farthest\nremoved from one another,\" as stated in _Metaph._ x, 4. Now that\nwhich is farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away\nfrom the future hurt, on account of its victory over him that fears\nit; whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own\nvictory over that same danger. Consequently it is evident that daring\nis contrary to fear.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Anger, daring and all the names of the passions can be\ntaken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of the\nsensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus\nthey are names of passions. Secondly, as denoting besides this\nmovement, a straying from the order of reason: and thus they are\nnames of vices. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of daring:\nbut we are speaking of it in the first sense.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To one thing, in the same respect, there are not\nseveral contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one\nthing having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above\n(Q. 23, A. 2; Q. 40, A. 4) that the irascible passions admit of a\ntwofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and\nevil, and thus fear is contrary to hope: the other, according to the\nopposition of approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to\nfear, and despair contrary to hope.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Safety does not denote something contrary to fear, but\nmerely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who fears\nnot. Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while\ndaring is opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety implies\nprivation, so daring implies safety.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 45, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Daring Ensues from Hope?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope.\nBecause daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in _Ethic._\niii, 7. But hope regards good things, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 1).\nTherefore they have different objects and are not in the same order.\nTherefore daring does not ensue from hope.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair\ncontrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact,\ndespair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5).\nTherefore daring does not result from hope.\n\nObj. 3: Further, daring is intent on something good, viz. victory.\nBut it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult.\nTherefore daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not\nresult from it.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that \"those\nare hopeful are full of daring.\" Therefore it seems that daring\nensues from hope.\n\n_I answer that,_ As we have often stated (Q. 22, A. 2; Q. 35, A. 1;\nQ. 41, A. 1), all these passions belong to the appetitive power. Now\nevery movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either of\npursuit or of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something\neither by reason of itself or by reason of something else. By reason\nof itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the object of\navoidance: but by reason of something else, evil can be the object of\npursuit, through some good attaching to it; and good can be the\nobject of avoidance, through some evil attaching to it. Now that\nwhich is by reason of something else, follows that which is by reason\nof itself. Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and\navoidance of good follows avoidance of evil. Now these four things\nbelong to four passions, since pursuit of good belongs to hope,\navoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to\ndaring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows, therefore,\nthat daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming\nthe threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. But\ndespair results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is\nbecause he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope\nfor.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument would hold, if good and evil were not\nco-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to good,\nsince it comes after good, as privation comes after habit;\nconsequently daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which\npursues good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to evil,\nyet avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the pursuit\nof good precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope\nprecedes daring, so fear precedes despair. And just as fear does not\nalways lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not\nalways lead to daring, save only when it is strong.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in\nthe estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined;\nyet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good. In\nlike manner despair regards directly the good which it turns away\nfrom, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly\nspeaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect: just as\ndespair is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too,\ndaring cannot be a principal passion.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 45, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Some Defect Is a Cause of Daring?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that some defect is a cause of daring. For\nthe Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 4) that \"lovers of wine are\nstrong and daring.\" But from wine ensues the effect of drunkenness.\nTherefore daring is caused by a defect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that \"those who\nhave no experience of danger are bold.\" But want of experience is a\ndefect. Therefore daring is caused by a defect.\n\nObj. 3: Further, those who have suffered wrongs are wont to be\ndaring; \"like the beasts when beaten,\" as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 5.\nBut the suffering of wrongs pertains to defect. Therefore daring is\ncaused by a defect.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that the cause\nof daring \"is the presence in the imagination of the hope that the\nmeans of safety are nigh, and that the things to be feared are either\nnon-existent or far off.\" But anything pertaining to defect implies\neither the removal of the means of safety, or the proximity of\nsomething to be feared. Therefore nothing pertaining to defect is a\ncause of daring.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2) daring results from hope\nand is contrary to fear: wherefore whatever is naturally apt to cause\nhope or banish fear, is a cause of daring. Since, however, fear and\nhope, and also daring, being passions, consist in a movement of the\nappetite, and in a certain bodily transmutation; a thing may be\nconsidered as the cause of daring in two ways, whether by raising\nhope, or by banishing fear; in one way, in the part of the appetitive\nmovement; in another way, on the part of the bodily transmutation.\n\nOn the part of the appetitive movement which follows apprehension,\nhope that leads to daring is roused by those things that make us\nreckon victory as possible. Such things regard either our own power,\nas bodily strength, experience of dangers, abundance of wealth, and\nthe like; or they regard the powers of others, such as having a great\nnumber of friends or any other means of help, especially if a man\ntrust in the Divine assistance: wherefore \"those are more daring,\nwith whom it is well in regard to godlike things,\" as the Philosopher\nsays (Rhet. ii, 5). Fear is banished, in this way, by the removal of\nthreatening causes of fear; for instance, by the fact that a man has\nno enemies, through having harmed nobody, so that he is not aware of\nany imminent danger; since those especially appear to be threatened\nby danger, who have harmed others.\n\nOn the part of the bodily transmutation, daring is caused through the\nincitement of hope and the banishment of fear, by those things which\nraise the temperature about the heart. Wherefore the Philosopher says\n(De Part. Animal. iii, 4) that \"those whose heart is small in size,\nare more daring; while animals whose heart is large are timid;\nbecause the natural heat is unable to give the same degree of\ntemperature to a large as to a small heart; just as a fire does not\nheat a large house as well as it does a small house.\" He says also\n(De Problem. xxvii, 4), that \"those whose lungs contain much blood,\nare more daring, through the heat in the heart that results\ntherefrom.\" He says also in the same passage that \"lovers of wine are\nmore daring, on account of the heat of the wine\": hence it has been\nsaid above (Q. 40, A. 6) that drunkenness conduces to hope, since the\nheat in the heart banishes fear and raises hope, by reason of the\ndilatation and enlargement of the heart.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Drunkenness causes daring, not through being a defect,\nbut through dilating the heart: and again through making a man think\ngreatly of himself.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those who have no experience of dangers are more\ndaring, not on account of a defect, but accidentally, i.e. in so far\nas through being inexperienced they do not know their own failings,\nnor the dangers that threaten. Hence it is that the removal of the\ncause of fear gives rise to daring.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) \"those who have\nbeen wronged are courageous, because they think that God comes to the\nassistance of those who suffer unjustly.\"\n\nHence it is evident that no defect causes daring except accidentally,\ni.e. in so far as some excellence attaches thereto, real or\nimaginary, either in oneself or in another.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 45, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Brave Are More Eager at First Than in the Midst of Danger?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the daring are not more eager at\nfirst than in the midst of danger. Because trembling is caused by\nfear, which is contrary to daring, as stated above (A. 1; Q. 44, A.\n3). But the daring sometimes tremble at first, as the Philosopher\nsays (De Problem. xxvii, 3). Therefore they are not more eager at\nfirst than in the midst of danger.\n\nObj. 2: Further, passion is intensified by an increase in its object:\nthus since a good is lovable, what is better is yet more lovable. But\nthe object of daring is something difficult. Therefore the greater\nthe difficulty, the greater the daring. But danger is more arduous\nand difficult when present. It is then therefore that daring is\ngreatest.\n\nObj. 3: Further, anger is provoked by the infliction of wounds. But\nanger causes daring; for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that\n\"anger makes man bold.\" Therefore when man is in the midst of danger\nand when he is being beaten, then is he most daring.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said in _Ethic._ iii, 7 that \"the daring are\nprecipitate and full of eagerness before the danger, yet in the midst\nof dangers they stand aloof.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Daring, being a movement of the sensitive appetite,\nfollows an apprehension of the sensitive faculty. But the sensitive\nfaculty cannot make comparisons, nor can it inquire into\ncircumstances; its judgment is instantaneous. Now it happens\nsometimes that it is impossible for a man to take note in an instant\nof all the difficulties of a certain situation: hence there arises\nthe movement of daring to face the danger; so that when he comes to\nexperience the danger, he feels the difficulty to be greater than he\nexpected, and so gives way.\n\nOn the other hand, reason discusses all the difficulties of a\nsituation. Consequently men of fortitude who face danger according to\nthe judgment of reason, at first seem slack, because they face the\ndanger not from passion but with due deliberation. Yet when they are\nin the midst of danger, they experience nothing unforeseen, but\nsometimes the difficulty turns out to be less than they anticipated;\nwherefore they are more persevering. Moreover, it may be because they\nface the danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding\nobject of their will, however great the danger may prove: whereas men\nof daring face the danger on account of a mere thought giving rise to\nhope and banishing fear, as stated above (A. 3).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Trembling does occur in men of daring, on account of\nthe heat being withdrawn from the outer to the inner parts of the\nbody, as occurs also in those who are afraid. But in men of daring\nthe heat withdraws to the heart; whereas in those who are afraid, it\nwithdraws to the inferior parts.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The object of love is good simply, wherefore if it be\nincreased, love is increased simply. But the object of daring is a\ncompound of good and evil; and the movement of daring towards evil\npresupposes the movement of hope towards good. If, therefore, so much\ndifficulty be added to the danger that it overcomes hope, the\nmovement of daring does not ensue, but fails. But if the movement of\ndaring does ensue, the greater the danger, the greater is the daring\nconsidered to be.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Hurt does not give rise to anger unless there be some\nkind of hope, as we shall see later on (Q. 46, A. 1). Consequently if\nthe danger be so great as to banish all hope of victory, anger does\nnot ensue. It is true, however, that if anger does ensue, there will\nbe greater daring.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 46\n\nOF ANGER, IN ITSELF\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider anger: and (1) anger in itself; (2) the cause of\nanger and its remedy; (3) the effect of anger.\n\nUnder the first head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether anger is a special passion?\n\n(2) Whether the object of anger is good or evil?\n\n(3) Whether anger is in the concupiscible faculty?\n\n(4) Whether anger is accompanied by an act of reason?\n\n(5) Whether anger is more natural than desire?\n\n(6) Whether anger is more grievous than hatred?\n\n(7) Whether anger is only towards those with whom we have a relation\nof justice?\n\n(8) Of the species of anger.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Anger Is a Special Passion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that anger is not a special passion. For\nthe irascible power takes its name from anger (_ira_). But there are\nseveral passions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not\none special passion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, to every special passion there is a contrary\npassion; as is evident by going through them one by one. But no\npassion is contrary to anger, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 3).\nTherefore anger is not a special passion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one special passion does not include another. But\nanger includes several passions: since it accompanies sorrow,\npleasure, and hope, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 2).\nTherefore anger is not a special passion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) calls anger a\nspecial passion: and so does Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 7).\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing is said to be general in two ways. First,\nby predication; thus \"animal\" is general in respect of all animals.\nSecondly, by causality; thus the sun is the general cause of all\nthings generated here below, according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv).\nBecause just as a genus contains potentially many differences,\naccording to a likeness of matter; so an efficient cause contains\nmany effects according to its active power. Now it happens that an\neffect is produced by the concurrence of various causes; and since\nevery cause remains somewhat in its effect, we may say that, in yet\na third way, an effect which is due to the concurrence of several\ncauses, has a certain generality, inasmuch as several causes are,\nin a fashion, actually existing therein.\n\nAccordingly in the first way, anger is not a general passion but is\ncondivided with the other passions, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). In\nlike manner, neither is it in the second way: since it is not a cause\nof the other passions. But in this way, love may be called a general\npassion, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7, 9), because love\nis the primary root of all the other passions, as stated above (Q.\n27, A. 4). But, in a third way, anger may be called a general\npassion, inasmuch as it is caused by a concurrence of several\npassions. Because the movement of anger does not arise save on\naccount of some pain inflicted, and unless there be desire and hope\nof revenge: for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2), \"the angry\nman hopes to punish; since he craves for revenge as being possible.\"\nConsequently if the person, who inflicted the injury, excel very\nmuch, anger does not ensue, but only sorrow, as Avicenna states (De\nAnima iv, 6).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The irascible power takes its name from \"ira\" (anger),\nnot because every movement of that power is one of anger; but because\nall its movements terminate in anger; and because, of all these\nmovements, anger is the most patent.\n\nReply Obj. 2: From the very fact that anger is caused by contrary\npassions, i.e. by hope, which is of good, and by sorrow, which is of\nevil, it includes in itself contrariety: and consequently it has no\ncontrary outside itself. Thus also in mixed colors there is no\ncontrariety, except that of the simple colors from which they are\nmade.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Anger includes several passions, not indeed as a genus\nincludes several species; but rather according to the inclusion of\ncause and effect.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Object of Anger Is Good or Evil?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the object of anger is evil. For\nGregory of Nyssa says [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] that anger is\n\"the sword-bearer of desire,\" inasmuch, to wit, as it assails\nwhatever obstacle stands in the way of desire. But an obstacle has\nthe character of evil. Therefore anger regards evil as its object.\n\nObj. 2: Further, anger and hatred agree in their effect, since each\nseeks to inflict harm on another. But hatred regards evil as its\nobject, as stated above (Q. 29, A. 1). Therefore anger does also.\n\nObj. 3: Further, anger arises from sorrow; wherefore the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. viii, 6) that \"anger acts with sorrow.\" But evil is the\nobject of sorrow. Therefore it is also the object of anger.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that \"anger craves\nfor revenge.\" But the desire for revenge is a desire for something\ngood: since revenge belongs to justice. Therefore the object of anger\nis good.\n\nMoreover, anger is always accompanied by hope, wherefore it causes\npleasure, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2). But the object of\nhope and of pleasure is good. Therefore good is also the object of\nanger.\n\n_I answer that,_ The movement of the appetitive power follows an act\nof the apprehensive power. Now the apprehensive power apprehends a\nthing in two ways. First, by way of an incomplex object, as when we\nunderstand what a man is; secondly, by way of a complex object, as\nwhen we understand that whiteness is in a man. Consequently in each\nof these ways the appetitive power can tend to both good and evil: by\nway of a simple and incomplex object, when the appetite simply\nfollows and adheres to good, or recoils from evil: and such movements\nare desire, hope, pleasure, sorrow, and so forth: by way of a complex\nobject, as when the appetite is concerned with some good or evil\nbeing in, or being done to, another, either seeking this or recoiling\nfrom it. This is evident in the case of love and hatred: for we love\nsomeone, in so far as we wish some good to be in him; and we hate\nsomeone, in so far as we wish some evil to be in him. It is the same\nwith anger; for when a man is angry, he wishes to be avenged on\nsomeone. Hence the movement of anger has a twofold tendency: viz. to\nvengeance itself, which it desires and hopes for as being a good,\nwherefore it takes pleasure in it; and to the person on whom it seeks\nvengeance, as to something contrary and hurtful, which bears the\ncharacter of evil.\n\nWe must, however, observe a twofold difference in this respect,\nbetween anger on the one side, and hatred and love on the other. The\nfirst difference is that anger always regards two objects: whereas\nlove and hatred sometimes regard but one object, as when a man is\nsaid to love wine or something of the kind, or to hate it. The second\ndifference is, that both the objects of love are good: since the\nlover wishes good to someone, as to something agreeable to himself:\nwhile both the objects of hatred bear the character of evil: for the\nman who hates, wishes evil to someone, as to something disagreeable\nto him. Whereas anger regards one object under the aspect of evil,\nviz. the noxious person, on whom it seeks to be avenged. Consequently\nit is a passion somewhat made up of contrary passions.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Anger Is in the Concupiscible Faculty?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that anger is in the concupiscible\nfaculty. For Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that anger is a\nkind of \"desire.\" But desire is in the concupiscible faculty.\nTherefore anger is too.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says in his Rule, that \"anger grows into\nhatred\": and Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that \"hatred is\ninveterate anger.\" But hatred, like love, is a concupiscible passion.\nTherefore anger is in the concupiscible faculty.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) and Gregory of\nNyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.] say that \"anger is made up of\nsorrow and desire.\" Both of these are in the concupiscible faculty.\nTherefore anger is a concupiscible passion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The concupiscible is distinct from the irascible\nfaculty. If, therefore, anger were in the concupiscible power, the\nirascible would not take its name from it.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 23, A. 1), the passions of the\nirascible part differ from the passions of the concupiscible faculty,\nin that the objects of the concupiscible passions are good and evil\nabsolutely considered, whereas the objects of the irascible passions\nare good and evil in a certain elevation or arduousness. Now it has\nbeen stated (A. 2) that anger regards two objects: viz. the vengeance\nthat it seeks; and the person on whom it seeks vengeance; and in\nrespect of both, anger requires a certain arduousness: for the\nmovement of anger does not arise, unless there be some magnitude\nabout both these objects; since \"we make no ado about things that are\nnaught or very minute,\" as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 2). It\nis therefore evident that anger is not in the concupiscible, but in\nthe irascible faculty.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Cicero gives the name of desire to any kind of craving\nfor a future good, without discriminating between that which is\narduous and that which is not. Accordingly he reckons anger as a kind\nof desire, inasmuch as it is a desire of vengeance. In this sense,\nhowever, desire is common to the irascible and concupiscible\nfaculties.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Anger is said to grow into hatred, not as though the\nsame passion which at first was anger, afterwards becomes hatred by\nbecoming inveterate; but by a process of causality. For anger when it\nlasts a long time engenders hatred.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Anger is said to be composed of sorrow and desire, not\nas though they were its parts, but because they are its causes: and\nit has been said above (Q. 25, A. 2) that the concupiscible passions\nare the causes of the irascible passions.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Anger Requires an Act of Reason?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that anger does not require an act of\nreason. For, since anger is a passion, it is in the sensitive\nappetite. But the sensitive appetite follows an apprehension, not of\nreason, but of the sensitive faculty. Therefore anger does not\nrequire an act of reason.\n\nObj. 2: Further, dumb animals are devoid of reason: and yet they are\nseen to be angry. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, drunkenness fetters the reason; whereas it is\nconducive to anger. Therefore anger does not require an act of reason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that \"anger\nlistens to reason somewhat.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), anger is a desire for\nvengeance. Now vengeance implies a comparison between the punishment\nto be inflicted and the hurt done; wherefore the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. vii, 6) that \"anger, as if it had drawn the inference that it\nought to quarrel with such a person, is therefore immediately\nexasperated.\" Now to compare and to draw an inference is an act of\nreason. Therefore anger, in a fashion, requires an act of reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The movement of the appetitive power may follow an act\nof reason in two ways. In the first way, it follows the reason in so\nfar as the reason commands: and thus the will follows reason,\nwherefore it is called the rational appetite. In another way, it\nfollows reason in so far as the reason denounces, and thus anger\nfollows reason. For the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxviii, 3) that\n\"anger follows reason, not in obedience to reason's command, but as a\nresult of reason's denouncing the injury.\" Because the sensitive\nappetite is subject to the reason, not immediately but through the\nwill.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Dumb animals have a natural instinct imparted to them\nby the Divine Reason, in virtue of which they are gifted with\nmovements, both internal and external, like unto rational movements,\nas stated above (Q. 40, A. 3).\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated in _Ethic._ vii, 6, \"anger listens somewhat\nto reason\" in so far as reason denounces the injury inflicted, \"but\nlistens not perfectly,\" because it does not observe the rule of\nreason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an\nact of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason. Wherefore the\nPhilosopher says (De Problem. iii, 2, 27) that whose who are very\ndrunk, so as to be incapable of the use of reason, do not get angry:\nbut those who are slightly drunk, do get angry, through being still\nable, though hampered, to form a judgment of reason.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Anger Is More Natural Than Desire?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that anger is not more natural than\ndesire. Because it is proper to man to be by nature a gentle animal.\nBut \"gentleness is contrary to anger,\" as the Philosopher states\n(Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger is no more natural than desire, in\nfact it seems to be altogether unnatural to man.\n\nObj. 2: Further, reason is contrasted with nature: since those things\nthat act according to reason, are not said to act according to\nnature. Now \"anger requires an act of reason, but desire does not,\"\nas stated in _Ethic._ vii, 6. Therefore desire is more natural than\nanger.\n\nObj. 3: Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is a\ncraving for those things especially which are pleasant to the touch,\nviz. for pleasures of the table and for sexual pleasures. But these\nthings are more natural to man than vengeance. Therefore desire is\nmore natural than anger.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that \"anger\nis more natural than desire.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ By \"natural\" we mean that which is caused by nature,\nas stated in _Phys._ ii, 1. Consequently the question as to whether a\nparticular passion is more or less natural cannot be decided without\nreference to the cause of that passion. Now the cause of a passion,\nas stated above (Q. 36, A. 2), may be considered in two ways: first,\non the part of the object; secondly, on the part of the subject. If\nthen we consider the cause of anger and of desire, on the part of the\nobject, thus desire, especially of pleasures of the table, and of\nsexual pleasures, is more natural than anger; in so far as these\npleasures are more natural to man than vengeance.\n\nIf, however, we consider the cause of anger on the part of the\nsubject, thus anger, in a manner, is more natural; and, in a manner,\ndesire is more natural. Because the nature of an individual man may\nbe considered either as to the generic, or as to the specific nature,\nor again as to the particular temperament of the individual. If then\nwe consider the generic nature, i.e. the nature of this man\nconsidered as an animal; thus desire is more natural than anger;\nbecause it is from this very generic nature that man is inclined to\ndesire those things which tend to preserve in him the life both of\nthe species and of the individual. If, however, we consider the\nspecific nature, i.e. the nature of this man as a rational being;\nthen anger is more natural to man than desire, in so far as anger\nfollows reason more than desire does. Wherefore the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. iv, 5) that \"revenge\" which pertains to anger \"is more\nnatural to man than meekness\": for it is natural to everything to\nrise up against things contrary and hurtful. And if we consider the\nnature of the individual, in respect of his particular temperament,\nthus anger is more natural than desire; for the reason that anger is\nprone to ensue from the natural tendency to anger, more than desire,\nor any other passion, is to ensue from a natural tendency to desire,\nwhich tendencies result from a man's individual temperament. Because\ndisposition to anger is due to a bilious temperament; and of all the\nhumors, the bile moves quickest; for it is like fire. Consequently he\nthat is temperamentally disposed to anger is sooner incensed with\nanger, than he that is temperamentally disposed to desire, is\ninflamed with desire: and for this reason the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. vii, 6) that a disposition to anger is more liable to be\ntransmitted from parent to child, than a disposition to desire.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We may consider in man both the natural temperament on\nthe part of the body, and the reason. On the part of the bodily\ntemperament, a man, considered specifically, does not naturally excel\nothers either in anger or in any other passion, on account of the\nmoderation of his temperament. But other animals, for as much as\ntheir temperament recedes from this moderation and approaches to an\nextreme disposition, are naturally disposed to some excess of\npassion, such as the lion in daring, the hound in anger, the hare in\nfear, and so forth. On the part of reason, however, it is natural to\nman, both to be angry and to be gentle: in so far as reason somewhat\ncauses anger, by denouncing the injury which causes anger; and\nsomewhat appeases anger, in so far as the angry man \"does not listen\nperfectly to the command of reason,\" as stated above (A. 4, ad 3).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Reason itself belongs to the nature of man: wherefore\nfrom the very fact that anger requires an act of reason, it follows\nthat it is, in a manner, natural to man.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument regards anger and desire on the part of\nthe object.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Anger Is More Grievous Than Hatred?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that anger is more grievous than hatred.\nFor it is written (Prov. 27:4) that \"anger hath no mercy, nor fury\nwhen it breaketh forth.\" But hatred sometimes has mercy. Therefore\nanger is more grievous than hatred.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is worse to suffer evil and to grieve for it,\nthan merely to suffer it. But when a man hates, he is contented if\nthe object of his hatred suffer evil: whereas the angry man is not\nsatisfied unless the object of his anger know it and be aggrieved\nthereby, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4). Therefore, anger is\nmore grievous than hatred.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a thing seems to be so much the more firm according\nas more things concur to set it up: thus a habit is all the more\nsettled through being caused by several acts. But anger is caused by\nthe concurrence of several passions, as stated above (A. 1): whereas\nhatred is not. Therefore anger is more settled and more grievous than\nhatred.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine, in his Rule, compares hatred to \"a\nbeam,\" but anger to \"a mote.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The species and nature of a passion are taken from\nits object. Now the object of anger is the same in substance as the\nobject of hatred; since, just as the hater wishes evil to him whom he\nhates, so does the angry man wish evil to him with whom he is angry.\nBut there is a difference of aspect: for the hater wishes evil to his\nenemy, as evil, whereas the angry man wishes evil to him with whom he\nis angry, not as evil but in so far as it has an aspect of good, that\nis, in so far as he reckons it as just, since it is a means of\nvengeance. Wherefore also it has been said above (A. 2) that hatred\nimplies application of evil to evil, whereas anger denotes\napplication of good to evil. Now it is evident that to seek evil\nunder the aspect of justice, is a lesser evil, than simply to seek\nevil to someone. Because to wish evil to someone under the aspect of\njustice, may be according to the virtue of justice, if it be in\nconformity with the order of reason; and anger fails only in this,\nthat it does not obey the precept of reason in taking vengeance.\nConsequently it is evident that hatred is far worse and graver than\nanger.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In anger and hatred two points may be considered:\nnamely, the thing desired, and the intensity of the desire. As to the\nthing desired, anger has more mercy than hatred has. For since hatred\ndesires another's evil for evil's sake, it is satisfied with no\nparticular measure of evil: because those things that are desired for\ntheir own sake, are desired without measure, as the Philosopher\nstates (Polit. i, 3), instancing a miser with regard to riches. Hence\nit is written (Ecclus. 12:16): \"An enemy . . . if he find an\nopportunity, will not be satisfied with blood.\" Anger, on the other\nhand, seeks evil only under the aspect of a just means of vengeance.\nConsequently when the evil inflicted goes beyond the measure of\njustice according to the estimate of the angry man, then he has\nmercy. Wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that \"the angry\nman is appeased if many evils befall, whereas the hater is never\nappeased.\"\n\nAs to the intensity of the desire, anger excludes mercy more than\nhatred does; because the movement of anger is more impetuous, through\nthe heating of the bile. Hence the passage quoted continues: \"Who can\nbear the violence of one provoked?\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above, an angry man wishes evil to someone,\nin so far as this evil is a means of just vengeance. Now vengeance is\nwrought by the infliction of a punishment: and the nature of\npunishment consists in being contrary to the will, painful, and\ninflicted for some fault. Consequently an angry man desires this,\nthat the person whom he is hurting, may feel it and be in pain, and\nknow that this has befallen him on account of the harm he has done\nthe other. The hater, on the other hand, cares not for all this,\nsince he desires another's evil as such. It is not true, however,\nthat an evil is worse through giving pain: because \"injustice and\nimprudence, although evil,\" yet, being voluntary, \"do not grieve\nthose in whom they are,\" as the Philosopher observes (Rhet. ii, 4).\n\nReply Obj. 3: That which proceeds from several causes, is more\nsettled when these causes are of one kind: but it may be that one\ncause prevails over many others. Now hatred ensues from a more\nlasting cause than anger does. Because anger arises from an emotion\nof the soul due to the wrong inflicted; whereas hatred ensues from a\ndisposition in a man, by reason of which he considers that which he\nhates to be contrary and hurtful to him. Consequently, as passion is\nmore transitory than disposition or habit, so anger is less lasting\nthan hatred; although hatred itself is a passion ensuing from this\ndisposition. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that \"hatred\nis more incurable than anger.\"\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Anger Is Only Towards Those to Whom One Has an Obligation of\nJustice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that anger is not only towards those to\nwhom one has an obligation of justice. For there is no justice\nbetween man and irrational beings. And yet sometimes one is angry\nwith irrational beings; thus, out of anger, a writer throws away his\npen, or a rider strikes his horse. Therefore anger is not only\ntowards those to whom one has an obligation of justice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"there is no justice towards oneself . . . nor is\nthere justice towards one's own\" (Ethic. v, 6). But sometimes a man\nis angry with himself; for instance, a penitent, on account of his\nsin; hence it is written (Ps. 4:5): \"Be ye angry and sin not.\"\nTherefore anger is not only towards those with whom one has a\nrelation of justice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, justice and injustice can be of one man towards an\nentire class, or a whole community: for instance, when the state\ninjures an individual. But anger is not towards a class but only\ntowards an individual, as the Philosopher states (Rhet. ii, 4).\nTherefore properly speaking, anger is not towards those with whom one\nis in relation of justice or injustice.\n\nThe contrary, however, may be gathered from the Philosopher (Rhet.\nii, 2, 3).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 6), anger desires evil as being\na means of just vengeance. Consequently, anger is towards those to\nwhom we are just or unjust: since vengeance is an act of justice, and\nwrong-doing is an act of injustice. Therefore both on the part of the\ncause, viz. the harm done by another, and on the part of the\nvengeance sought by the angry man, it is evident that anger concerns\nthose to whom one is just or unjust.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 4, ad 2), anger, though it follows\nan act of reason, can nevertheless be in dumb animals that are devoid\nof reason, in so far as through their natural instinct they are moved\nby their imagination to something like rational action. Since then in\nman there is both reason and imagination, the movement of anger can\nbe aroused in man in two ways. First, when only his imagination\ndenounces the injury: and, in this way, man is aroused to a movement\nof anger even against irrational and inanimate beings, which movement\nis like that which occurs in animals against anything that injures\nthem. Secondly, by the reason denouncing the injury: and thus,\naccording to the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 3), \"it is impossible to be\nangry with insensible things, or with the dead\": both because they\nfeel no pain, which is, above all, what the angry man seeks in those\nwith whom he is angry: and because there is no question of vengeance\non them, since they can do us no harm.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 11), \"metaphorically\nspeaking there is a certain justice and injustice between a man and\nhimself,\" in so far as the reason rules the irascible and\nconcupiscible parts of the soul. And in this sense a man is said to\nbe avenged on himself, and consequently, to be angry with himself.\nBut properly, and in accordance with the nature of things, a man is\nnever angry with himself.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 4) assigns as one difference\nbetween hatred and anger, that \"hatred may be felt towards a class,\nas we hate the entire class of thieves; whereas anger is directed\nonly towards an individual.\" The reason is that hatred arises from\nour considering a quality as disagreeing with our disposition; and\nthis may refer to a thing in general or in particular. Anger, on the\nother hand, ensues from someone having injured us by his action. Now\nall actions are the deeds of individuals: and consequently anger is\nalways pointed at an individual. When the whole state hurts us, the\nwhole state is reckoned as one individual [*Cf. Q. 29, A. 6].\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 46, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Species of Anger Are Suitably Assigned?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 16)\nunsuitably assigns three species of anger--\"wrath,\" \"ill-will\" and\n\"rancor.\" For no genus derives its specific differences from\naccidents. But these three are diversified in respect of an accident:\nbecause \"the beginning of the movement of anger is called wrath\n(_cholos_), if anger continue it is called ill-will (_menis_); while\nrancor (_kotos_) is anger waiting for an opportunity of vengeance.\"\nTherefore these are not different species of anger.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 9) that\n\"_excandescentia_ (irascibility) is what the Greeks call _thymosis_,\nand is a kind of anger that arises and subsides intermittently\";\nwhile according to Damascene _thymosis_, is the same as _kotos_\n(rancor). Therefore _kotos_ does not bide its time for taking\nvengeance, but in course of time spends itself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory (Moral. xxi, 4) gives three degrees of\nanger, namely, \"anger without utterance, anger with utterance, and\nanger with perfection of speech,\" corresponding to the three degrees\nmentioned by Our Lord (Matt. 5:22): \"Whosoever is angry with his\nbrother\" (thus implying \"anger without utterance\"), and then,\n\"whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'\" (implying anger with\nutterance yet without full expression), and lastly, \"whosoever shall\nsay 'Thou fool'\" (where we have \"perfection of speech\"). Therefore\nDamascene's division is imperfect, since it takes no account of\nutterance.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Damascene (De Fide Orth.\nii, 16) and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xxi.].\n\n_I answer that,_ The species of anger given by Damascene and Gregory\nof Nyssa are taken from those things which give increase to anger.\nThis happens in three ways. First from facility of the movement\nitself, and he calls this kind of anger _cholos_ (bile) because it\nquickly aroused. Secondly, on the part of the grief that causes\nanger, and which dwells some time in the memory; this belongs to\n_menis_ (ill-will) which is derived from _menein_ (to dwell).\nThirdly, on the part of that which the angry man seeks, viz.\nvengeance; and this pertains to _kotos_ (rancor) which never rests\nuntil it is avenged [*Eph. 4:31: \"Let all bitterness and anger and\nindignation . . . be put away from you.\"]. Hence the Philosopher\n(Ethic. iv, 5) calls some angry persons _akrocholoi_ (choleric),\nbecause they are easily angered; some he calls _pikroi_ (bitter),\nbecause they retain their anger for a long time; and some he calls\n_chalepoi_ (ill-tempered), because they never rest until they have\nretaliated [*Cf. II-II, Q. 158, A. 5].\n\nReply Obj. 1: All those things which give anger some kind of\nperfection are not altogether accidental to anger; and consequently\nnothing prevents them from causing a certain specific difference\nthereof.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Irascibility, which Cicero mentions, seems to pertain\nto the first species of anger, which consists in a certain quickness\nof temper, rather than to rancor (_furor_). And there is no reason\nwhy the Greek _thymosis_, which is denoted by the Latin _furor,_\nshould not signify both quickness to anger, and firmness of purpose\nin being avenged.\n\nReply Obj. 3: These degrees are distinguished according to various\neffects of anger; and not according to degrees of perfection in the\nvery movement of anger.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 47\n\nOF THE CAUSE THAT PROVOKES ANGER, AND OF THE REMEDIES OF ANGER\n(In Four Articles)\n[*There is no further mention of these remedies in the text, except\nin A. 4].\n\nWe must now consider the cause that provokes anger, and its remedies.\nUnder this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the\none who is angry?\n\n(2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger?\n\n(3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person;\n\n(4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person with whom one is\nangry.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 47, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Motive of Anger Is Always Something Done Against the One\nWho Is Angry?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the motive of anger is not always\nsomething done against the one who is angry. Because man, by sinning,\ncan do nothing against God; since it is written (Job 35:6): \"If thy\niniquities be multiplied, what shalt thou do against Him?\" And yet\nGod is spoken of as being angry with man on account of sin, according\nto Ps. 105:40: \"The Lord was exceedingly angry with His people.\"\nTherefore it is not always on account of something done against him,\nthat a man is angry.\n\nObj. 2: Further, anger is a desire for vengeance. But one may desire\nvengeance for things done against others. Therefore we are not always\nangry on account of something done against us.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) man is angry\nespecially with those \"who despise what he takes a great interest in;\nthus men who study philosophy are angry with those who despise\nphilosophy,\" and so forth. But contempt of philosophy does not harm\nthe philosopher. Therefore it is not always a harm done to us that\nmakes us angry.\n\nObj. 4: Further, he that holds his tongue when another insults him,\nprovokes him to greater anger, as Chrysostom observes (Hom. xxii, in\nEp. ad Rom.). But by holding his tongue he does the other no harm.\nTherefore a man is not always provoked to anger by something done\nagainst him.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that \"anger is\nalways due to something done to oneself: whereas hatred may arise\nwithout anything being done to us, for we hate a man simply because\nwe think him such.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 46, A. 6), anger is the desire\nto hurt another for the purpose of just vengeance. Now unless some\ninjury has been done, there is no question of vengeance: nor does any\ninjury provoke one to vengeance, but only that which is done to the\nperson who seeks vengeance: for just as everything naturally seeks\nits own good, so does it naturally repel its own evil. But injury\ndone by anyone does not affect a man unless in some way it be\nsomething done against him. Consequently the motive of a man's anger\nis always something done against him.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the\nsoul but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take\nvengeance on sin. Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any\nactual harm: but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against\nGod in two ways. First, in so far as he despises God in His\ncommandments. Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another;\nwhich injury redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an\nobject of God's providence and protection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to\nbe avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in\nsome way to us: either by some kinship or friendship, or at least\nbecause of the nature we have in common.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look\nupon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as\nthough we ourselves were despised and injured.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks\nit is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted: and a\nslight is an action.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 47, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Sole Motive of Anger Is Slight or Contempt?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole\nmotive of anger. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we\nare angry \"when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an\ninjury.\" But one may suffer an injury without being despised or\nslighted. Therefore a slight is not the only motive of anger.\n\nObj. 2: Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to\nthe same subject. But dumb animals do not desire honor. Therefore\nthey are not grieved by being slighted. And yet \"they are roused to\nanger, when wounded,\" as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8).\nTherefore a slight is not the sole motive of anger.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other\ncauses of anger, for instance, \"being forgotten by others; that\nothers should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known\nour evils; being hindered from doing as we like.\" Therefore being\nslighted is not the only motive for being angry.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is\n\"a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight\ndone unbecomingly.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ All the causes of anger are reduced to slight. For\nslight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. \"contempt,\"\n \"despiteful treatment,\" i.e. hindering one from doing one's will,\nand \"insolence\": and all motives of anger are reduced to these three.\nTwo reasons may be assigned for this. First, because anger seeks\nanother's hurt as being a means of just vengeance: wherefore it seeks\nvengeance in so far as it seems just. Now just vengeance is taken\nonly for that which is done unjustly; hence that which provokes anger\nis always something considered in the light of an injustice.\nWherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that \"men are not\nangry,--if they think they have wronged some one and are suffering\njustly on that account; because there is no anger at what is just.\"\nNow injury is done to another in three ways: namely, through\nignorance, through passion, and through choice. Then, most of all, a\nman does an injustice, when he does an injury from choice, on\npurpose, or from deliberate malice, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 8.\nWherefore we are most of all angry with those who, in our opinion,\nhave hurt us on purpose. For if we think that some one has done us an\ninjury through ignorance or through passion, either we are not angry\nwith them at all, or very much less: since to do anything through\nignorance or through passion takes away from the notion of injury,\nand to a certain extent calls for mercy and forgiveness. Those, on\nthe other hand, who do an injury on purpose, seem to sin from\ncontempt; wherefore we are angry with them most of all. Hence the\nPhilosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that \"we are either not angry at all,\nor not very angry with those who have acted through anger, because\nthey do not seem to have acted slightingly.\"\n\nThe second reason is because a slight is opposed to a man's\nexcellence: because \"men think little of things that are not worth\nmuch ado\" (Rhet. ii, 2). Now we seek for some kind of excellence from\nall our goods. Consequently whatever injury is inflicted on us, in so\nfar as it is derogatory to our excellence, seems to savor of a slight.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Any other cause, besides contempt, through which a man\nsuffers an injury, takes away from the notion of injury: contempt or\nslight alone adds to the motive of anger, and consequently is of\nitself the cause of anger.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although a dumb animal does not seek honor as\nsuch, yet it naturally seeks a certain superiority, and is angry with\nanything derogatory thereto.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Each of those causes amounts to some kind of\nslight. Thus forgetfulness is a clear sign of slight esteem, for the\nmore we think of a thing the more is it fixed in our memory. Again if\na man does not hesitate by his remarks to give pain to another, this\nseems to show that he thinks little of him: and those too who show\nsigns of hilarity when another is in misfortune, seem to care little\nabout his good or evil. Again he that hinders another from carrying\nout his will, without deriving thereby any profit to himself, seems\nnot to care much for his friendship. Consequently all those things, in\nso far as they are signs of contempt, provoke anger.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 47, Art. 3]\n\nWhether a Man's Excellence Is the Cause of His Being Angry?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man's excellence is not the cause\nof his being more easily angry. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,\n2) that \"some are angry especially when they are grieved, for\ninstance, the sick, the poor, and those who are disappointed.\" But\nthese things seem to pertain to defect. Therefore defect rather than\nexcellence makes one prone to anger.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that \"some are\nvery much inclined to be angry when they are despised for some\nfailing or weakness of the existence of which there are grounds for\nsuspicion; but if they think they excel in those points, they do not\ntrouble.\" But a suspicion of this kind is due to some defect.\nTherefore defect rather than excellence is a cause of a man being\nangry.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever savors of excellence makes a man agreeable\nand hopeful. But the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that \"men are not\nangry when they play, make jokes, or take part in a feast, nor when\nthey are prosperous or successful, nor in moderate pleasures and\nwell-founded hope.\" Therefore excellence is not a cause of anger.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence\nmakes men prone to anger.\n\n_I answer that,_ The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be\ntaken in two ways. First in respect of the motive of anger: and thus\nexcellence is the cause of a man being easily angered. Because the\nmotive of anger is an unjust slight, as stated above (A. 2). Now it\nis evident that the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a\nslight offered him in the matter in which he excels. Consequently\nthose who excel in any matter, are most of all angry, if they be\nslighted in that matter; for instance, a wealthy man in his riches,\nor an orator in his eloquence, and so forth.\n\nSecondly, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be\nconsidered on the part of the disposition produced in him by the\nmotive aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger\nexcept a hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors of defect is\nabove all a cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are\nmore easily hurt. And this is why men who are weak, or subject to\nsome other defect, are more easily angered, since they are more\neasily grieved.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently\nexcels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and\ntherefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less angered. But\nin another respect, in so far as he is more undeservedly despised, he\nhas more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks that he is\nenvied or insulted not through contempt but through ignorance, or\nsome other like cause.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All these things hinder anger in so far as they hinder\nsorrow. But in another respect they are naturally apt to provoke\nanger, because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 47, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Person's Defect Is a Reason for Being More Easily Angry\nwith Him?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a person's defect is not a reason for\nbeing more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii,\n3) that \"we are not angry with those who confess and repent and\nhumble themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with them.\nWherefore dogs bite not those who sit down.\" But these things savor\nof littleness and defect. Therefore littleness of a person is a\nreason for being less angry with him.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there is no greater defect than death. But anger\nceases at the sight of death. Therefore defect of a person does not\nprovoke anger against him.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no one thinks little of a man through his being\nfriendly towards him. But we are more angry with friends, if they\noffend us or refuse to help us; hence it is written (Ps. 54:13): \"If\nmy enemy had reviled me I would verily have borne with it.\" Therefore\na person's defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with\nhim.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that \"the rich\nman is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in\nlike manner the prince is angry with his subject.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 3) unmerited contempt more\nthan anything else is a provocative of anger. Consequently deficiency\nor littleness in the person with whom we are angry, tends to increase\nour anger, in so far as it adds to the unmeritedness of being\ndespised. For just as the higher a man's position is, the more\nundeservedly he is despised; so the lower it is, the less reason he\nhas for despising. Thus a nobleman is angry if he be insulted by a\npeasant; a wise man, if by a fool; a master, if by a servant.\n\nIf, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited\ncontempt, then it does not increase but lessens anger. In this way\nthose who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done\nwrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon, mitigate anger,\naccording to Prov. 15:1: \"A mild answer breaketh wrath\": because, to\nwit, they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those\nbefore whom they humble themselves.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There are two reasons why anger ceases at the sight of\ndeath. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and sensation;\nand this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom they are\nangered. Another reason is because the dead seem to have attained to\nthe limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who are\ngrievously hurt, in so far as this hurt surpasses the measure of just\nretaliation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To be despised by one's friends seems also a greater\nindignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by failing\nto help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which we are\nangry with those who are beneath us.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 48\n\nOF THE EFFECTS OF ANGER\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are\nfour points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether anger causes pleasure?\n\n(2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart?\n\n(3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason?\n\n(4) Whether it causes taciturnity?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 48, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Anger Causes Pleasure?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure.\nBecause sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow,\nsince, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 6, \"everyone that acts from anger,\nacts with pain.\" Therefore anger does not cause pleasure.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that \"vengeance\nmakes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for pain\":\nwhence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from\nvengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on the\nadvent of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an\neffect united with pleasure.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is conformed\nto its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in _Rhet._ ii, 3.\nTherefore pleasure is not an effect of anger.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying\nthat anger is \"Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste\" (Iliad,\nxviii, 109, trl. Pope).\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures,\nchiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow:\nand therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible\nare we to the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in the case of\nthirst which increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from\nwhat has been said (Q. 47, AA. 1, 3), that the movement of anger\narises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which sorrow\nvengeance is sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon as vengeance is\npresent, pleasure ensues, and so much the greater according as the\nsorrow was greater. Therefore if vengeance be really present, perfect\npleasure ensues, entirely excluding sorrow, so that the movement of\nanger ceases. But before vengeance is really present, it becomes\npresent to the angry man in two ways: in one way, by hope; because\nnone is angry except he hopes for vengeance, as stated above (Q. 46,\nA. 1); in another way, by thinking of it continually, for to everyone\nthat desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought of what\nhe desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleasant.\nAccordingly an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much about\nvengeance. This pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish\nsorrow and consequently anger.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same\nthing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the\nthought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as its\nbeginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused by the\nreal presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from ensuing, and\nconsequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt in taking\nvengeance follows from anger.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 48, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Anger Above All Causes Fervor in the Heart?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that heat is not above all the effect of\nanger. For fervor, as stated above (Q. 28, A. 5; Q. 37, A. 2),\nbelongs to love. But love, as above stated, is the beginning and\ncause of all the passions. Since then the cause is more powerful than\nits effect, it seems that anger is not the chief cause of fervor.\n\nObj. 2: Further, those things which, of themselves, arouse fervor,\nincrease as time goes on; thus love grows stronger the longer it\nlasts. But in course of time anger grows weaker; for the Philosopher\nsays (Rhet. ii, 3) that \"time puts an end to anger.\" Therefore fervor\nis not the proper effect of anger.\n\nObj. 3: Further, fervor added to fervor produces greater fervor. But\n\"the addition of a greater anger banishes already existing anger,\" as\nthe Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3). Therefore anger does not cause\nfervor.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that \"anger\nis fervor of the blood around the heart, resulting from an exhalation\nof the bile.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 44, A. 1), the bodily\ntransmutation that occurs in the passions of the soul is\nproportionate to the movement of the appetite. Now it is evident that\nevery appetite, even the natural appetite, tends with greater force\nto repel that which is contrary to it, if it be present: hence we see\nthat hot water freezes harder, as though the cold acted with greater\nforce on the hot object. Since then the appetitive movement of anger\nis caused by some injury inflicted, as by a contrary that is present;\nit follows that the appetite tends with great force to repel the\ninjury by the desire of vengeance; and hence ensues great vehemence\nand impetuosity in the movement of anger. And because the movement of\nanger is not one of recoil, which corresponds to the action of cold,\nbut one of prosecution, which corresponds to the action of heat, the\nresult is that the movement of anger produces fervor of the blood and\nvital spirits around the heart, which is the instrument of the soul's\npassions. And hence it is that, on account of the heart being so\ndisturbed by anger, those chiefly who are angry betray signs thereof\nin their outer members. For, as Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) \"the\nheart that is inflamed with the stings of its own anger beats quick,\nthe body trembles, the tongue stammers, the countenance takes fire,\nthe eyes grow fierce, they that are well known are not recognized.\nWith the mouth indeed he shapes a sound, but the understanding knows\nnot what it says.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: \"Love itself is not felt so keenly as in the absence of\nthe beloved,\" as Augustine observes (De Trin. x, 12). Consequently\nwhen a man suffers from a hurt done to the excellence that he loves,\nhe feels his love thereof the more: the result being that his heart\nis moved with greater heat to remove the hindrance to the object of\nhis love; so that anger increases the fervor of love and makes it to\nbe felt more.\n\nNevertheless, the fervor arising from heat differs according as it is\nto be referred to love or to anger. Because the fervor of love has a\ncertain sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good that one\nloves: whence it is likened to the warmth of the air and of the\nblood. For this reason sanguine temperaments are more inclined to\nlove; and hence the saying that \"love springs from the liver,\"\nbecause of the blood being formed there. On the other hand, the\nfervor of anger has a certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy,\nfor it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil: whence it is likened\nto the heat of fire and of the bile, and for this reason Damascene\nsays (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that it \"results from an exhalation of\nthe bile whence it takes its name _chole_.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Time, of necessity, weakens all those things, the\ncauses of which are impaired by time. Now it is evident that memory\nis weakened by time; for things which happened long ago easily slip\nfrom our memory. But anger is caused by the memory of a wrong done.\nConsequently the cause of anger is impaired little by little as time\ngoes on, until at length it vanishes altogether. Moreover a wrong\nseems greater when it is first felt; and our estimate thereof is\ngradually lessened the further the sense of present wrong recedes\ninto the past. The same applies to love, so long as the cause of love\nis in the memory alone; wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii,\n5) that \"if a friend's absence lasts long, it seems to make men\nforget their friendship.\" But in the presence of a friend, the cause\nof friendship is continually being multiplied by time: wherefore the\nfriendship increases: and the same would apply to anger, were its\ncause continually multiplied.\n\nNevertheless the very fact that anger soon spends itself proves the\nstrength of its fervor: for as a great fire is soon spent having\nburnt up all the fuel; so too anger, by reason of its vehemence, soon\ndies away.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Every power that is divided in itself is weakened.\nConsequently if a man being already angry with one, becomes angry\nwith another, by this very fact his anger with the former is\nweakened. Especially is this so if his anger in the second case be\ngreater: because the wrong done which aroused his former anger, will,\nin comparison with the second wrong, which is reckoned greater, seem\nto be of little or no account.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 48, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Anger Above All Hinders the Use of Reason?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that anger does not hinder the use of\nreason. Because that which presupposes an act of reason, does not\nseem to hinder the use of reason. But \"anger listens to reason,\" as\nstated in _Ethic._ vii, 6. Therefore anger does not hinder reason.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the more the reason is hindered, the less does a man\nshow his thoughts. But the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 6) that \"an\nangry man is not cunning but is open.\" Therefore anger does not seem\nto hinder the use of reason, as desire does; for desire is cunning,\nas he also states (Ethic. vii, 6.).\n\nObj. 3: Further, the judgment of reason becomes more evident by\njuxtaposition of the contrary: because contraries stand out more\nclearly when placed beside one another. But this also increases\nanger: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that \"men are more\nangry if they receive unwonted treatment; for instance, honorable\nmen, if they be dishonored\": and so forth. Therefore the same cause\nincreases anger, and facilitates the judgment of reason. Therefore\nanger does not hinder the judgment of reason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that anger \"withdraws\nthe light of understanding, while by agitating it troubles the mind.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Although the mind or reason makes no use of a bodily\norgan in its proper act, yet, since it needs certain sensitive powers\nfor the execution of its act, the acts of which powers are hindered\nwhen the body is disturbed, it follows of necessity that any\ndisturbance in the body hinders even the judgment of reason; as is\nclear in the case of drunkenness or sleep. Now it has been stated (A.\n2) that anger, above all, causes a bodily disturbance in the region\nof the heart, so much as to effect even the outward members.\nConsequently, of all the passions, anger is the most manifest\nobstacle to the judgment of reason, according to Ps. 30:10: \"My eye\nis troubled with wrath.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The beginning of anger is in the reason, as regards the\nappetitive movement, which is the formal element of anger. But the\npassion of anger forestalls the perfect judgment of reason, as though\nit listened but imperfectly to reason, on account of the commotion of\nthe heat urging to instant action, which commotion is the material\nelement of anger. In this respect it hinders the judgment of reason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: An angry man is said to be open, not because it is\nclear to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly, without\nthought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason being\nhindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden and what done\nopenly, nor to devise the means of hiding; and partly to the\ndilatation of the heart which pertains to magnanimity which is an\neffect of anger: wherefore the Philosopher says of the magnanimous\nman (Ethic. iv, 3) that \"he is open in his hatreds and his\nfriendships . . . and speaks and acts openly.\" Desire, on the other\nhand, is said to lie low and to be cunning, because, in many cases,\nthe pleasurable things that are desired, savor of shame and\nvoluptuousness, wherein man wishes not to be seen. But in those\nthings that savor of manliness and excellence, such as matters of\nvengeance, man seeks to be in the open.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (ad 1), the movement of anger begins in\nthe reason, wherefore the juxtaposition of one contrary with another\nfacilitates the judgment of reason, on the same grounds as it\nincreases anger. For when a man who is possessed of honor or wealth,\nsuffers a loss therein, the loss seems all the greater, both on\naccount of the contrast, and because it was unforeseen. Consequently\nit causes greater grief: just as a great good, through being received\nunexpectedly, causes greater delight. And in proportion to the\nincrease of the grief that precedes, anger is increased also.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 48, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Anger Above All Causes Taciturnity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause taciturnity.\nBecause taciturnity is opposed to speech. But increase in anger\nconduces to speech; as is evident from the degrees of anger laid down\nby Our Lord (Matt. 5:22): where He says: \"Whosoever is angry with his\nbrother\"; and \" . . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Raca'\";\nand \" . . . whosoever shall say to his brother, 'Thou fool.'\"\nTherefore anger does not cause taciturnity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, through failing to obey reason, man sometimes breaks\nout into unbecoming words: hence it is written (Prov. 25:28): \"As a\ncity that lieth open and is not compassed with walls, so is a man\nthat cannot refrain his own spirit in speaking.\" But anger, above\nall, hinders the judgment of reason, as stated above (A. 3).\nConsequently above all it makes one break out into unbecoming words.\nTherefore it does not cause taciturnity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 12:34): \"Out of the abundance\nof the heart the mouth speaketh.\" But anger, above all, causes a\ndisturbance in the heart, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore above all\nit conduces to speech. Therefore it does not cause taciturnity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. v, 30) that \"when anger does\nnot vent itself outwardly by the lips, inwardly it burns the more\nfiercely.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3; Q. 46, A. 4), anger both\nfollows an act of reason, and hinders the reason: and in both\nrespects it may cause taciturnity. On the part of the reason, when\nthe judgment of reason prevails so far, that although it does not\ncurb the appetite in its inordinate desire for vengeance, yet it\ncurbs the tongue from unbridled speech. Wherefore Gregory says\n(Moral. v, 30): \"Sometimes when the mind is disturbed, anger, as if\nin judgment, commands silence.\" On the part of the impediment to\nreason because, as stated above (A. 2), the disturbance of anger\nreaches to the outward members, and chiefly to those members which\nreflect more distinctly the emotions of the heart, such as the eyes,\nface and tongue; wherefore, as observed above (A. 2), \"the tongue\nstammers, the countenance takes fire, the eyes grow fierce.\"\nConsequently anger may cause such a disturbance, that the tongue is\naltogether deprived of speech; and taciturnity is the result.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Anger sometimes goes so far as to hinder the reason\nfrom curbing the tongue: but sometimes it goes yet farther, so as to\nparalyze the tongue and other outward members.\n\nAnd this suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The disturbance of the heart may sometimes superabound\nto the extend that the movements of the outward members are hindered\nby the inordinate movement of the heart. Thence ensue taciturnity and\nimmobility of the outward members; and sometimes even death. If,\nhowever, the disturbance be not so great, then \"out of the abundance\nof the heart\" thus disturbed, the mouth proceeds to speak.\n________________________\n\nTREATISE ON HABITS (QQ. 49-54)\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 49\n\nOF HABITS IN GENERAL, AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nAfter treating of human acts and passions, we now pass on to the\nconsideration of the principles of human acts, and firstly of\nintrinsic principles, secondly of extrinsic principles. The intrinsic\nprinciple is power and habit; but as we have treated of powers in the\nFirst Part (Q. 77, seqq.), it remains for us to consider them in general:\nin the second place we shall consider virtues and vices and other like\nhabits, which are the principles of human acts.\n\nConcerning habits in general there are four points to consider: First,\nthe substance of habits; second, their subject; third, the cause of\ntheir generation, increase, and corruption; fourth, how they are\ndistinguished from one another.\n\nUnder the first head, there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether habit is a quality?\n\n(2) Whether it is a distinct species of quality?\n\n(3) Whether habit implies an order to an act?\n\n(4) Of the necessity of habit.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 49, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Habit Is a Quality?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that habit is not a quality. For Augustine\nsays (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 73): \"this word 'habit' is derived from the\nverb 'to have.'\" But \"to have\" belongs not only to quality, but also\nto the other categories: for we speak of ourselves as \"having\"\nquantity and money and other like things. Therefore habit is not a\nquality.\n\nObj. 2: Further, habit is reckoned as one of the predicaments; as may\nbe clearly seen in the _Book on the Predicaments_ (Categor. vi). But\none predicament is not contained under another. Therefore habit is\nnot a quality.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"every habit is a disposition,\" as is stated in the\n_Book of the Predicaments_ (Categor. vi). Now disposition is \"the\norder of that which has parts,\" as stated in _Metaph._ v, text. 24.\nBut this belongs to the predicament Position. Therefore habit is not\na quality.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says in the Book of Predicaments\n(Categor. vi) that \"habit is a quality which is difficult to change.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ This word _habitus_ (habit) is derived from _habere_\n(to have). Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way,\ninasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to \"have\" something; in\nanother way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation (_se\nhabet_) either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else.\n\nConcerning the first, we must observe that \"to have,\" as said in\nregard to anything that is \"had,\" is common to the various\npredicaments. And so the Philosopher puts \"to have\" among the\n\"post-predicaments,\" so called because they result from the various\npredicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and\nsuch like. Now among things which are had, there seems to be this\ndistinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between\nthe \"haver\" and that which is had: as, for instance, there is no\nmedium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are\nsome in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for\ninstance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And,\nfurther, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an\naction or passion, but something after the manner of action or\npassion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and\nsomething else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says\n(Metaph. v, text. 25) that \"a habit is said to be, as it were, an\naction or a passion of the haver and that which is had\"; as is the\ncase in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore\nthese constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under\nthe predicament of \"habit\": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v,\ntext. 25) that \"there is a habit between clothing and the man who is\nclothed.\"\n\nBut if \"to have\" be taken according as a thing has a relation in\nregard to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a\nquality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and\nof this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that \"habit is a\ndisposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill,\nand this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus\nhealth is a habit.\" And in this sense we speak of habit now.\nWherefore we must say that habit is a quality.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument takes \"to have\" in the general sense: for\nthus it is common to many predicaments, as we have said.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument takes habit in the sense in which we\nunderstand it to be a medium between the haver, and that which is\nhad: and in this sense it is a predicament, as we have said.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that\nwhich has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher\ngoes on at once to says (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, \"either as to\nplace, or as to power, or as to species.\" \"In saying this,\" as\nSimplicius observes in his _Commentary on the Predicaments,_ \"he\nincludes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to\nplace,'\" and this belongs to the predicament \"Position,\" which is the\norder of parts in a place: \"when he says 'as to power,' he includes\nall those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet\narrived at perfect usefulness,\" such as inchoate science and virtue:\n\"and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions,\nwhich are called habits,\" such as perfected science and virtue.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 49, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Habit Is a Distinct Species of Quality?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that habit is not a distinct species of\nquality. Because, as we have said (A. 1), habit, in so far as it is a\nquality, is \"a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed\nwell or ill.\" But this happens in regard to any quality: for a thing\nhappens to be well or ill disposed in regard also to shape, and in\nlike manner, in regard to heat and cold, and in regard to all such\nthings. Therefore habit is not a distinct species of quality.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says in the _Book of the\nPredicaments_ (Categor. vi), that heat and cold are dispositions or\nhabits, just as sickness and health. Therefore habit or disposition\nis not distinct from the other species of quality.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"difficult to change\" is not a difference belonging\nto the predicament of quality, but rather to movement or passion.\nNow, no genus should be contracted to a species by a difference of\nanother genus; but \"differences should be proper to a genus,\" as the\nPhilosopher says in _Metaph._ vii, text. 42. Therefore, since habit\nis \"a quality difficult to change,\" it seems not to be a distinct\nspecies of quality.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says in the _Book of the\nPredicaments_ (Categor. vi) that \"one species of quality is habit\nand disposition.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The Philosopher in the _Book of Predicaments_\n(Categor. vi) reckons disposition and habit as the first species of\nquality. Now Simplicius, in his _Commentary on the Predicaments,_\nexplains the difference of these species as follows. He says \"that\nsome qualities are natural, and are in their subject in virtue of its\nnature, and are always there: but some are adventitious, being caused\nfrom without, and these can be lost. Now the latter,\" i.e. those\nwhich are adventitious, \"are habits and dispositions, differing in\nthe point of being easily or difficultly lost. As to natural\nqualities, some regard a thing in the point of its being in a state\nof potentiality; and thus we have the second species of quality:\nwhile others regard a thing which is in act; and this either deeply\nrooted therein or only on its surface. If deeply rooted, we have the\nthird species of quality: if on the surface, we have the fourth\nspecies of quality, as shape, and form which is the shape of an\nanimated being.\" But this distinction of the species of quality seems\nunsuitable. For there are many shapes, and passion-like qualities,\nwhich are not natural but adventitious: and there are also many\ndispositions which are not adventitious but natural, as health,\nbeauty, and the like. Moreover, it does not suit the order of the\nspecies, since that which is the more natural is always first.\n\nTherefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions\nand habits from other qualities. For quality, properly speaking,\nimplies a certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says\n(Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), \"is that which a measure determines\": wherefore\nit implies a certain determination according to a certain measure.\nTherefore, just as that in accordance with which the material\npotentiality (_potentia materiae_) is determined to its substantial\nbeing, is called quality, which is a difference affecting the\nsubstance, so that, in accordance with the potentiality of the\nsubject is determined to its accidental being, is called an\naccidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear\nfrom the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 19).\n\nNow the mode o[r] determination of the subject to accidental being\nmay be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, or in\nregard to action, and passion resulting from its natural principles,\nwhich are matter and form; or again in regard to quantity. If we take\nthe mode or determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we\nshall then have the fourth species of quality. And because quantity,\nconsidered in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the\nnotion of good or evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of\nquality whether a thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or\nslowly transitory.\n\nBut the mode o[r] determination of the subject, in regard to action\nor passion, is considered in the second and third species of quality.\nAnd therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done\nwith ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory or lasting. But in\nthem, we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or\nevil: because movements and passions have not the aspect of an end,\nwhereas good and evil are said in respect of an end.\n\nOn the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in\nregard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species of\nquality, which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says\n(Phys. vii, text. 17), when speaking of habits of the soul and of the\nbody, that they are \"dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by\nperfect I mean that which is disposed in accordance with its nature.\"\nAnd since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and\nthe cause why a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the\nfirst species we consider both evil and good, and also\nchangeableness, whether easy or difficult; inasmuch as a certain\nnature is the end of generation and movement. And so the Philosopher\n(Metaph. v, text. 25) defines habit, a \"disposition whereby someone\nis disposed, well or ill\"; and in _Ethic._ ii, 4, he says that by\n\"habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions.\"\nFor when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature, it has the\naspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil.\nAnd since nature is the first object of consideration in anything,\nfor this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Disposition implies a certain order, as stated above\n(A. 1, ad 3). Wherefore a man is not said to be disposed by some\nquality except in relation to something else. And if we add \"well or\nill,\" which belongs to the essential notion of habit, we must\nconsider the quality's relation to the nature, which is the end. So\nin regard to shape, or heat, or cold, a man is not said to be well or\nill disposed, except by reason of a relation to the nature of a\nthing, with regard to its suitability or unsuitability. Consequently\neven shapes and passion-like qualities, in so far as they are\nconsidered to be suitable or unsuitable to the nature of a thing,\nbelong to habits or dispositions: for shape and color, according to\ntheir suitability to the nature of thing, concern beauty; while heat\nand cold, according to their suitability to the nature of a thing,\nconcern health. And in this way heat and cold are put, by the\nPhilosopher, in the first species of quality.\n\nWherefore it is clear how to answer the second objection: though some\ngive another solution, as Simplicius says in his _Commentary on the\nPredicaments._\n\nReply Obj. 3: This difference, \"difficult to change,\" does not\ndistinguish habit from the other species of quality, but from\ndisposition. Now disposition may be taken in two ways; in one way, as\nthe genus of habit, for disposition is included in the definition of\nhabit (Metaph. v, text. 25): in another way, according as it is\ndivided against habit. Again, disposition, properly so called, can be\ndivided against habit in two ways: first, as perfect and imperfect\nwithin the same species; and thus we call it a disposition, retaining\nthe name of the genus, when it is had imperfectly, so as to be easily\nlost: whereas we call it a habit, when it is had perfectly, so as not\nto be lost easily. And thus a disposition becomes a habit, just as a\nboy becomes a man. Secondly, they may be distinguished as diverse\nspecies of the one subaltern genus: so that we call dispositions,\nthose qualities of the first species, which by reason of their very\nnature are easily lost, because they have changeable causes; e.g.\nsickness and health: whereas we call habits those qualities which, by\nreason of their very nature, are not easily changed, in that they\nhave unchangeable causes, e.g. sciences and virtues. And in this\nsense, disposition does not become habit. The latter explanation\nseems more in keeping with the intention of Aristotle: for in order\nto confirm this distinction he adduces the common mode of speaking,\naccording to which, when a quality is, by reason of its nature,\neasily changeable, and, through some accident, becomes difficultly\nchangeable, then it is called a habit: while the contrary happens in\nregard to qualities, by reason of their nature, difficultly\nchangeable: for supposing a man to have a science imperfectly, so as\nto be liable to lose it easily, we say that he is disposed to that\nscience, rather than that he has the science. From this it is clear\nthat the word \"habit\" implies a certain lastingness: while the word\n\"disposition\" does not.\n\nNor does it matter that thus to be easy and difficult to change are\nspecific differences (of a quality), although they belong to passion\nand movement, and not the genus of quality. For these differences,\nthough apparently accidental to quality, nevertheless designate\ndifferences which are proper and essential to quality. In the same\nway, in the genus of substance we often take accidental instead of\nsubstantial differences, in so far as by the former, essential\nprinciples are designated.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 49, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Habit Implies Order to an Act?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that habit does not imply order to an act.\nFor everything acts according as it is in act. But the Philosopher\nsays (De Anima iii, text 8), that \"when one is become knowing by\nhabit, one is still in a state of potentiality, but otherwise than\nbefore learning.\" Therefore habit does not imply the relation of a\nprinciple to an act.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is put in the definition of a thing,\nbelongs to it essentially. But to be a principle of action, is put in\nthe definition of power, as we read in _Metaph._ v, text. 17.\nTherefore to be the principle of an act belongs to power essentially.\nNow that which is essential is first in every genus. If therefore,\nhabit also is a principle of act, it follows that it is posterior to\npower. And so habit and disposition will not be the first species of\nquality.\n\nObj. 3: Further, health is sometimes a habit, and so are leanness and\nbeauty. But these do not indicate relation to an act. Therefore it is\nnot essential to habit to be a principle of act.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that \"habit\nis that whereby something is done when necessary.\" And the\nCommentator says (De Anima iii) that \"habit is that whereby we act\nwhen we will.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ To have relation to an act may belong to habit, both\nin regard to the nature of habit, and in regard to the subject in\nwhich the habit is. In regard to the nature of habit, it belongs to\nevery habit to have relation to an act. For it is essential to habit\nto imply some relation to a thing's nature, in so far as it is\nsuitable or unsuitable thereto. But a thing's nature, which is the\nend of generation, is further ordained to another end, which is\neither an operation, or the product of an operation, to which one\nattains by means of operation. Wherefore habit implies relation not\nonly to the very nature of a thing, but also, consequently, to\noperation, inasmuch as this is the end of nature, or conducive to the\nend. Whence also it is stated (Metaph. v, text. 25) in the definition\nof habit, that it is a disposition whereby that which is disposed, is\nwell or ill disposed either in regard to itself, that is to its\nnature, or in regard to something else, that is to the end.\n\nBut there are some habits, which even on the part of the subject in\nwhich they are, imply primarily and principally relation to an act.\nFor, as we have said, habit primarily and of itself implies a\nrelation to the thing's nature. If therefore the nature of a thing,\nin which the habit is, consists in this very relation to an act, it\nfollows that the habit principally implies relation to an act. Now it\nis clear that the nature and the notion of power is that it should be\na principle of act. Wherefore every habit is subjected in a power,\nimplies principally relation to an act.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Habit is an act, in so far as it is a quality: and in\nthis respect it can be a principle of operation. It is, however, in a\nstate of potentiality in respect to operation. Wherefore habit is\ncalled first act, and operation, second act; as it is explained in\n_De Anima_ ii, text. 5.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is not the essence of habit to be related to power,\nbut to be related to nature. And as nature precedes action, to which\npower is related, therefore habit is put before power as a species of\nquality.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Health is said to be a habit, or a habitual\ndisposition, in relation to nature, as stated above. But in so far as\nnature is a principle of act, it consequently implies a relation to\nact. Wherefore the Philosopher says (De Hist. Animal. x, 1), that\nman, or one of his members, is called healthy, \"when he can perform\nthe operation of a healthy man.\" And the same applies to other habits.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 49, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Habits Are Necessary?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that habits are not necessary. For by\nhabits we are well or ill disposed in respect of something, as stated\nabove. But a thing is well or ill disposed by its form: for in\nrespect of its form a thing is good, even as it is a being. Therefore\nthere is no necessity for habits.\n\nObj. 2: Further, habit implies relation to an act. But power implies\nsufficiently a principle of act: for even the natural powers, without\nany habits, are principles of acts. Therefore there was no necessity\nfor habits.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as power is related to good and evil, so also is\nhabit: and as power does not always act, so neither does habit.\nGiven, therefore, the powers, habits become superfluous.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Habits are perfections (Phys. vii, text. 17). But\nperfection is of the greatest necessity to a thing: since it is in\nthe nature of an end. Therefore it is necessary that there should be\nhabits.\n\n_I answer that,_ As we have said above (AA. 2, 3), habit implies a\ndisposition in relation to a thing's nature, and to its operation or\nend, by reason of which disposition a thing is well or ill disposed\nthereto. Now for a thing to need to be disposed to something else,\nthree conditions are necessary. The first condition is that which is\ndisposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed; and\nso, that it should be related to it as potentiality is to act.\nWhence, if there is a being whose nature is not composed of\npotentiality and act, and whose substance is its own operation, which\nitself is for itself, there we can find no room for habit and\ndisposition, as is clearly the case in God.\n\nThe second condition is, that that which is in a state of\npotentiality in regard to something else, be capable of determination\nin several ways and to various things. Whence if something be in a\nstate of potentiality in regard to something else, but in regard to\nthat only, there we find no room for disposition and habit: for such\na subject from its own nature has the due relation to such an act.\nWherefore if a heavenly body be composed of matter and form, since\nthat matter is not in a state of potentiality to another form, as we\nsaid in the First Part (Q. 56, A. 2) there is no need for disposition\nor habit in respect of the form, or even in respect of operation,\nsince the nature of the heavenly body is not in a state of\npotentiality to more than one fixed movement.\n\nThe third condition is that in disposing the subject to one of those\nthings to which it is in potentiality, several things should occur,\ncapable of being adjusted in various ways: so as to dispose the\nsubject well or ill to its form or to its operation. Wherefore the\nsimple qualities of the elements which suit the natures of the\nelements in one single fixed way, are not called dispositions or\nhabits, but \"simple qualities\": but we call dispositions or habits,\nsuch things as health, beauty, and so forth, which imply the\nadjustment of several things which may vary in their relative\nadjustability. For this reason the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text.\n24, 25) that \"habit is a disposition\": and disposition is \"the order\nof that which has parts either as to place, or as to potentiality, or\nas to species,\" as we have said above (A. 1, ad 3). Wherefore, since\nthere are many things for whose natures and operations several things\nmust concur which may vary in their relative adjustability, it\nfollows that habit is necessary.\n\nReply Obj. 1: By the form the nature of a thing is perfected: yet the\nsubject needs to be disposed in regard to the form by some\ndisposition. But the form itself is further ordained to operation,\nwhich is either the end, or the means to the end. And if the form is\nlimited to one fixed operation, no further disposition, besides the\nform itself, is needed for the operation. But if the form be such\nthat it can operate in diverse ways, as the soul; it needs to be\ndisposed to its operations by means of habits.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Power sometimes has a relation to many things: and then\nit needs to be determined by something else. But if a power has not a\nrelation to many things, it does not need a habit to determine it, as\nwe have said. For this reason the natural forces do not perform their\noperations by means of habits: because they are of themselves\ndetermined to one mode of operation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The same habit has not a relation to good and evil, as\nwill be made clear further on (Q. 54, A. 3): whereas the same power\nhas a relation to good and evil. And, therefore, habits are necessary\nthat the powers be determined to good.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 50\n\nOF THE SUBJECT OF HABITS\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe consider next the subject of habits: and under this head there are\nsix points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there is a habit in the body?\n\n(2) Whether the soul is a subject of habit, in respect of its essence\nor in respect of its power?\n\n(3) Whether in the powers of the sensitive part there can be a habit?\n\n(4) Whether there is a habit in the intellect?\n\n(5) Whether there is a habit in the will?\n\n(6) Whether there is a habit in separate substances?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 50, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Is a Habit in the Body?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the body.\nFor, as the Commentator says (De Anima iii), \"a habit is that whereby\nwe act when we will.\" But bodily actions are not subject to the will,\nsince they are natural. Therefore there can be no habit in the body.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But\nhabit is a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily\ndisposition can be a habit.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change. But\nchange can only be in the third species of quality, which is divided\nagainst habit. Therefore there is no habit in the body.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says in the _Book of Predicaments_\n(De Categor. vi) that health of the body and incurable disease are\ncalled habits.\n\n_I answer that,_ As we have said above (Q. 49, AA. 2 seqq.), habit is\na disposition of a subject which is in a state of potentiality either\nto form or to operation. Therefore in so far as habit implies\ndisposition to operation, no habit is principally in the body as its\nsubject. For every operation of the body proceeds either from a\nnatural quality of the body or from the soul moving the body.\nConsequently, as to those operations which proceed from its nature,\nthe body is not disposed by a habit: because the natural forces are\ndetermined to one mode of operation; and we have already said (Q. 49,\nA. 4) that it is when the subject is in potentiality to many things\nthat a habitual disposition is required. As to the operations which\nproceed from the soul through the body, they belong principally to\nthe soul, and secondarily to the body. Now habits are in proportion\nto their operations: whence \"by like acts like habits are formed\"\n(Ethic. ii, 1, 2). And therefore the dispositions to such operations\nare principally in the soul. But they can be secondarily in the body:\nto wit, in so far as the body is disposed and enabled with\npromptitude to help in the operations of the soul.\n\nIf, however, we speak of the disposition of the subject to form, thus\na habitual disposition can be in the body, which is related to the\nsoul as a subject is to its form. And in this way health and beauty\nand such like are called habitual dispositions. Yet they have not the\nnature of habit perfectly: because their causes, of their very nature,\nare easily changeable.\n\nOn the other hand, as Simplicius reports in his _Commentary on the\nPredicaments,_ Alexander denied absolutely that habits or\ndispositions of the first species are in the body: and held that the\nfirst species of quality belonged to the soul alone. And he held that\nAristotle mentions health and sickness in the _Book on the\nPredicaments_ not as though they belonged to the first species of\nquality, but by way of example: so that he would mean that just as\nhealth and sickness may be easy or difficult to change, so also are\nall the qualities of the first species, which are called habits and\ndispositions. But this is clearly contrary to the intention of\nAristotle: both because he speaks in the same way of health and\nsickness as examples, as of virtue and science; and because in\n_Phys._ vii, text. 17, he expressly mentions beauty and health among\nhabits.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This objection runs in the sense of habit as a\ndisposition to operation, and of those actions of the body which are\nfrom nature: but not in the sense of those actions which proceed from\nthe soul, and the principle of which is the will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Bodily dispositions are not simply difficult to change\non account of the changeableness of their bodily causes. But they may\nbe difficult to change by comparison to such a subject, because, to\nwit, as long as such a subject endures, they cannot be removed; or\nbecause they are difficult to change, by comparison to other\ndispositions. But qualities of the soul are simply difficult to\nchange, on account of the unchangeableness of the subject. And\ntherefore he does not say that health which is difficult to change is\na habit simply: but that it is \"as a habit,\" as we read in the Greek\n[*_isos hexin_ (Categor. viii)]. On the other hand, the qualities of\nthe soul are called habits simply.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Bodily dispositions which are in the first species of\nquality, as some maintained, differ from qualities of the third\nspecies, in this, that the qualities of the third species consist in\nsome \"becoming\" and movement, as it were, wherefore they are called\npassions or passible qualities. But when they have attained to\nperfection (specific perfection, so to speak), they have then passed\ninto the first species of quality. But Simplicius in his _Commentary_\ndisapproves of this; for in this way heating would be in the third\nspecies, and heat in the first species of quality; whereas Aristotle\nputs heat in the third.\n\nWherefore Porphyrius, as Simplicius reports (Commentary), says that\npassion or passion-like quality, disposition and habit, differ in\nbodies by way of intensity and remissness. For when a thing receives\nheat in this only that it is being heated, and not so as to be able\nto give heat, then we have passion, if it is transitory; or\npassion-like quality if it is permanent. But when it has been brought\nto the point that it is able to heat something else, then it is a\ndisposition; and if it goes so far as to be firmly fixed and to\nbecome difficult to change, then it will be a habit: so that\ndisposition would be a certain intensity of passion or passion-like\nquality, and habit an intensity or disposition. But Simplicius\ndisapproves of this, for such intensity and remissness do not imply\ndiversity on the part of the form itself, but on the part of the\ndiverse participation thereof by the subject; so that there would be\nno diversity among the species of quality. And therefore we must say\notherwise that, as was explained above (Q. 49, A. 2, ad 1), the\nadjustment of the passion-like qualities themselves, according to\ntheir suitability to nature, implies the notion of disposition: and\nso, when a change takes place in these same passion-like qualities,\nwhich are heat and cold, moisture and dryness, there results a change\nas to sickness and health. But change does not occur in regard to\nlike habits and dispositions, primarily and of themselves.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 50, art. 2]\n\nWhether the Soul Is the Subject of Habit in Respect of Its Essence or\nin Respect of Its Power?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that habit is in the soul in respect of\nits essence rather than in respect of its powers. For we speak of\ndispositions and habits in relation to nature, as stated above (Q.\n49, A. 2). But nature regards the essence of the soul rather than the\npowers; because it is in respect of its essence that the soul is the\nnature of such a body and the form thereof. Therefore habits are in\nthe soul in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers.\n\nObj. 2: Further, accident is not the subject of accident. Now habit\nis an accident. But the powers of the soul are in the genus of\naccident, as we have said in the First Part (Q. 77, A. 1, ad 5).\nTherefore habit is not in the soul in respect of its powers.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the subject is prior to that which is in the\nsubject. But since habit belongs to the first species of quality, it\nis prior to power, which belongs to the second species. Therefore\nhabit is not in a power of the soul as its subject.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 13) puts various habits\nin the various powers of the soul.\n\n_I answer that,_ As we have said above (Q. 49, AA. 2, 3), habit\nimplies a certain disposition in relation to nature or to operation.\nIf therefore we take habit as having a relation to nature, it cannot\nbe in the soul--that is, if we speak of human nature: for the soul\nitself is the form completing the human nature; so that, regarded in\nthis way, habit or disposition is rather to be found in the body by\nreason of its relation to the soul, than in the soul by reason of its\nrelation to the body. But if we speak of a higher nature, of which\nman may become a partaker, according to 2 Pet. 1, \"that we may be\npartakers of the Divine Nature\": thus nothing hinders some habit,\nnamely, grace, from being in the soul in respect of its essence, as\nwe shall state later on (Q. 110, A. 4).\n\nOn the other hand, if we take habit in its relation to operation, it\nis chiefly thus that habits are found in the soul: in so far as the\nsoul is not determined to one operation, but is indifferent to many,\nwhich is a condition for a habit, as we have said above (Q. 49, A.\n4). And since the soul is the principle of operation through its\npowers, therefore, regarded in this sense, habits are in the soul in\nrespect of its powers.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The essence of the soul belongs to human nature, not as\na subject requiring to be disposed to something further, but as a\nform and nature to which someone is disposed.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Accident is not of itself the subject of accident. But\nsince among accidents themselves there is a certain order, the\nsubject, according as it is under one accident, is conceived as the\nsubject of a further accident. In this way we say that one accident\nis the subject of another; as superficies is the subject of color, in\nwhich sense power is the subject of habit.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Habit takes precedence of power, according as it\nimplies a disposition to nature: whereas power always implies a\nrelation to operation, which is posterior, since nature is the\nprinciple of operation. But the habit whose subject is a power, does\nnot imply relation to nature, but to operation. Wherefore it is\nposterior to power. Or, we may say that habit takes precedence of\npower, as the complete takes precedence of the incomplete, and as act\ntakes precedence of potentiality. For act is naturally prior to\npotentiality, though potentiality is prior in order of generation and\ntime, as stated in _Metaph._ vii, text. 17; ix, text. 13.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 50, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Can Be Any Habits in the Powers of the Sensitive Part?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there cannot be any habits in the\npowers of the sensitive part. For as the nutritive power is an\nirrational part, so is the sensitive power. But there can be no\nhabits in the powers of the nutritive part. Therefore we ought not to\nput any habit in the powers of the sensitive part.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the sensitive parts are common to us and the brutes.\nBut there are not any habits in brutes: for in them there is no will,\nwhich is put in the definition of habit, as we have said above (Q.\n49, A. 3). Therefore there are no habits in the sensitive powers.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the habits of the soul are sciences and virtues: and\njust as science is related to the apprehensive power, so it virtue\nrelated to the appetitive power. But in the sensitive powers there\nare no sciences: since science is of universals, which the sensitive\npowers cannot apprehend. Therefore, neither can there be habits of\nvirtue in the sensitive part.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10) that \"some\nvirtues,\" namely, temperance and fortitude, \"belong to the irrational\npart.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The sensitive powers can be considered in two ways:\nfirst, according as they act from natural instinct: secondly,\naccording as they act at the command of reason. According as they act\nfrom natural instinct, they are ordained to one thing, even as nature\nis; but according as they act at the command of reason, they can be\nordained to various things. And thus there can be habits in them, by\nwhich they are well or ill disposed in regard to something.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The powers of the nutritive part have not an inborn\naptitude to obey the command of reason, and therefore there are no\nhabits in them. But the sensitive powers have an inborn aptitude to\nobey the command of reason; and therefore habits can be in them: for\nin so far as they obey reason, in a certain sense they are said to be\nrational, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 13.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The sensitive powers of dumb animals do not act at the\ncommand of reason; but if they are left to themselves, such animals\nact from natural instinct: and so in them there are no habits\nordained to operations. There are in them, however, certain\ndispositions in relation to nature, as health and beauty. But whereas\nby man's reason brutes are disposed by a sort of custom to do things\nin this or that way, so in this sense, to a certain extent, we can\nadmit the existence of habits in dumb animals: wherefore Augustine\nsays (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 36): \"We find the most untamed beasts,\ndeterred by fear of pain, from that wherein they took the keenest\npleasure; and when this has become a custom in them, we say that they\nare tame and gentle.\" But the habit is incomplete, as to the use of\nthe will, for they have not that power of using or of refraining,\nwhich seems to belong to the notion of habit: and therefore, properly\nspeaking, there can be no habits in them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The sensitive appetite has an inborn aptitude to be\nmoved by the rational appetite, as stated in _De Anima_ iii, text.\n57: but the rational powers of apprehension have an inborn aptitude\nto receive from the sensitive powers. And therefore it is more\nsuitable that habits should be in the powers of sensitive appetite\nthan in the powers of sensitive apprehension, since in the powers of\nsensitive appetite habits do not exist except according as they act\nat the command of the reason. And yet even in the interior powers of\nsensitive apprehension, we may admit of certain habits whereby man\nhas a facility of memory, thought or imagination: wherefore also the\nPhilosopher says (De Memor. et Remin. ii) that \"custom conduces much\nto a good memory\": the reason of which is that these powers also are\nmoved to act at the command of the reason.\n\nOn the other hand the exterior apprehensive powers, as sight, hearing\nand the like, are not susceptible of habits, but are ordained to\ntheir fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature, just\nas the members of the body, for there are no habits in them, but\nrather in the powers which command their movements.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 50, Art. 4]\n\nWhether There Is Any Habit in the Intellect?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the intellect.\nFor habits are in conformity with operations, as stated above (A. 1).\nBut the operations of man are common to soul and body, as stated in\n_De Anima_ i, text. 64. Therefore also are habits. But the intellect\nis not an act of the body (De Anima iii, text. 6). Therefore the\nintellect is not the subject of a habit.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is in a thing, is there according to the\nmode of that in which it is. But that which is form without matter,\nis act only: whereas what is composed of form and matter, has\npotentiality and act at the same time. Therefore nothing at the same\ntime potential and actual can be in that which is form only, but only\nin that which is composed of matter and form. Now the intellect is\nform without matter. Therefore habit, which has potentiality at the\nsame time as act, being a sort of medium between the two, cannot be\nin the intellect; but only in the _conjunction,_ which is composed of\nsoul and body.\n\nObj. 3: Further, habit is a disposition whereby we are well or ill\ndisposed in regard to something, as is said (Metaph. v, text. 25).\nBut that anyone should be well or ill disposed to an act of the\nintellect is due to some disposition of the body: wherefore also it\nis stated (De Anima ii, text. 94) that \"we observe men with soft\nflesh to be quick witted.\" Therefore the habits of knowledge are not\nin the intellect, which is separate, but in some power which is the\nact of some part of the body.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 2, 3, 10) puts\nscience, wisdom and understanding, which is the habit of first\nprinciples, in the intellective part of the soul.\n\n_I answer that,_ concerning intellective habits there have been\nvarious opinions. Some, supposing that there was only one _possible_\n[*See First Part, Q. 79, A. 2, ad 2] intellect for all men, were\nbound to hold that habits of knowledge are not in the intellect\nitself, but in the interior sensitive powers. For it is manifest that\nmen differ in habits; and so it was impossible to put the habits of\nknowledge directly in that, which, being only one, would be common to\nall men. Wherefore if there were but one single \"possible\" intellect\nof all men, the habits of science, in which men differ from one\nanother, could not be in the \"possible\" intellect as their subject,\nbut would be in the interior sensitive powers, which differ in\nvarious men.\n\nNow, in the first place, this supposition is contrary to the mind of\nAristotle. For it is manifest that the sensitive powers are rational,\nnot by their essence, but only by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Now\nthe Philosopher puts the intellectual virtues, which are wisdom,\nscience and understanding, in that which is rational by its essence.\nWherefore they are not in the sensitive powers, but in the intellect\nitself. Moreover he says expressly (De Anima iii, text. 8, 18) that\nwhen the \"possible\" intellect \"is thus identified with each thing,\"\nthat is, when it is reduced to act in respect of singulars by the\nintelligible species, \"then it is said to be in act, as the knower is\nsaid to be in act; and this happens when the intellect can act of\nitself,\" i.e. by considering: \"and even then it is in potentiality in\na sense; but not in the same way as before learning and discovering.\"\nTherefore the \"possible\" intellect itself is the subject of the habit\nof science, by which the intellect, even though it be not actually\nconsidering, is able to consider. In the second place, this\nsupposition is contrary to the truth. For as to whom belongs the\noperation, belongs also the power to operate, belongs also the habit.\nBut to understand and to consider is the proper act of the intellect.\nTherefore also the habit whereby one considers is properly in the\nintellect itself.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some said, as Simplicius reports in his\n_Commentary on the Predicaments,_ that, since every operation of man is\nto a certain extent an operation of the _conjunctum,_ as the\nPhilosopher says (De Anima i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in the\nsoul only, but in the _conjunctum._ And from this it follows that no\nhabit is in the intellect, for the intellect is separate, as ran the\nargument, given above. But the argument is not cogent. For habit is not\na disposition of the object to the power, but rather a disposition of\nthe power to the object: wherefore the habit needs to be in that power\nwhich is principle of the act, and not in that which is compared to\nthe power as its object.\n\nNow the act of understanding is not said to be common to soul and\nbody, except in respect of the phantasm, as is stated in _De Anima_,\ntext. 66. But it is clear that the phantasm is compared as object to\nthe passive intellect (De Anima iii, text. 3, 39). Whence it follows\nthat the intellective habit is chiefly on the part of the intellect\nitself; and not on the part of the phantasm, which is common to soul\nand body. And therefore we must say that the \"possible\" intellect is\nthe subject of habit, which is in potentiality to many: and this\nbelongs, above all, to the \"possible\" intellect. Wherefore the\n\"possible\" intellect is the subject of intellectual habits.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As potentiality to sensible being belongs to\ncorporeal matter, so potentiality to intellectual being belongs to the\n\"possible\" intellect. Wherefore nothing forbids habit to be in the\n\"possible\" intellect, for it is midway between pure potentiality and\nperfect act.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Because the apprehensive powers inwardly prepare\ntheir proper objects for the _possible intellect,_ therefore it is by\nthe good disposition of these powers, to which the good disposition of\nthe body cooperates, that man is rendered apt to understand. And so in\na secondary way the intellective habit can be in these powers. But\nprincipally it is in the \"possible\" intellect.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 50, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Any Habit Is in the Will?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is not a habit in the will. For\nthe habit which is in the intellect is the intelligible species, by\nmeans of which the intellect actually understands. But the will does\nnot act by means of species. Therefore the will is not the subject of\nhabit.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no habit is allotted to the active intellect, as\nthere is to the \"possible\" intellect, because the former is an active\npower. But the will is above all an active power, because it moves\nall the powers to their acts, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1). Therefore\nthere is no habit in the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in the natural powers there is no habit, because, by\nreason of their nature, they are determinate to one thing. But the\nwill, by reason of its nature, is ordained to tend to the good which\nreason directs. Therefore there is no habit in the will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Justice is a habit. But justice is in the will;\nfor it is \"a habit whereby men will and do that which is just\"\n(Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the will is the subject of a habit.\n\n_I answer that,_ Every power which may be variously directed to act,\nneeds a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Now since the\nwill is a rational power, it may be variously directed to act. And\ntherefore in the will we must admit the presence of a habit whereby\nit is well disposed to its act. Moreover, from the very nature of\nhabit, it is clear that it is principally related to the will;\ninasmuch as habit \"is that which one uses when one wills,\" as stated\nabove (A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Even as in the intellect there is a species which is\nthe likeness of the object; so in the will, and in every appetitive\npower there must be something by which the power is inclined to its\nobject; for the act of the appetitive power is nothing but a certain\ninclination, as we have said above (Q. 6, A. 4; Q. 22, A. 2). And\ntherefore in respect of those things to which it is inclined\nsufficiently by the nature of the power itself, the power needs no\nquality to incline it. But since it is necessary, for the end of\nhuman life, that the appetitive power be inclined to something fixed,\nto which it is not inclined by the nature of the power, which has a\nrelation to many and various things, therefore it is necessary that,\nin the will and in the other appetitive powers, there be certain\nqualities to incline them, and these are called habits.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The active intellect is active only, and in no way\npassive. But the will, and every appetitive power, is both mover and\nmoved (De Anima iii, text. 54). And therefore the comparison between\nthem does not hold; for to be susceptible of habit belongs to that\nwhich is somehow in potentiality.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The will from the very nature of the power is inclined\nto the good of the reason. But because this good is varied in many\nways, the will needs to be inclined, by means of a habit, to some\nfixed good of the reason, in order that action may follow more\npromptly.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 50, Art. 6]\n\nWhether There Are Habits in the Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are no habits in the angels.\nFor Maximus, commentator of Dionysius (Coel. Hier. vii), says: \"It is\nnot proper to suppose that there are intellectual (i.e. spiritual)\npowers in the divine intelligences (i.e. in the angels) after the\nmanner of accidents, as in us: as though one were in the other as in\na subject: for accident of any kind is foreign to them.\" But every\nhabit is an accident. Therefore there are no habits in the angels.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): \"The holy\ndispositions of the heavenly essences participate, above all other\nthings, in God's goodness.\" But that which is of itself (_per se_) is\nprior to and more powerful than that which is by another (_per\naliud_). Therefore the angelic essences are perfected of themselves\nunto conformity with God, and therefore not by means of habits. And\nthis seems to have been the reasoning of Maximus, who in the same\npassage adds: \"For if this were the case, surely their essence would\nnot remain in itself, nor could it have been as far as possible\ndeified of itself.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, habit is a disposition (Metaph. v, text. 25). But\ndisposition, as is said in the same book, is \"the order of that which\nhas parts.\" Since, therefore, angels are simple substances, it seems\nthat there are no dispositions and habits in them.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that the angels\nof the first hierarchy are called: \"Fire-bearers and Thrones and\nOutpouring of Wisdom, by which is indicated the godlike nature of\ntheir habits.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have thought that there are no habits in the\nangels, and that whatever is said of them, is said essentially.\nWhence Maximus, after the words which we have quoted, says: \"Their\ndispositions, and the powers which are in them, are essential,\nthrough the absence of matter in them.\" And Simplicius says the same\nin his _Commentary on the Predicaments:_ \"Wisdom which is in the soul\nis its habit: but that which is in the intellect, is its substance.\nFor everything divine is sufficient of itself, and exists in itself.\"\n\nNow this opinion contains some truth, and some error. For it is\nmanifest from what we have said (Q. 49, A. 4) that only a being in\npotentiality is the subject of habit. So the above-mentioned\ncommentators considered that angels are immaterial substances, and\nthat there is no material potentiality in them, and on that account,\nexcluded from them habit and any kind of accident. Yet since though\nthere is no material potentiality in angels, there is still some\npotentiality in them (for to be pure act belongs to God alone),\ntherefore, as far as potentiality is found to be in them, so far may\nhabits be found in them. But because the potentiality of matter and\nthe potentiality of intellectual substance are not of the same kind.\nWhence, Simplicius says in his _Commentary on the Predicaments_ that:\n\"The habits of the intellectual substance are not like the habits\nhere below, but rather are they like simple and immaterial images\nwhich it contains in itself.\"\n\nHowever, the angelic intellect and the human intellect differ with\nregard to this habit. For the human intellect, being the lowest in\nthe intellectual order, is in potentiality as regards all\nintelligible things, just as primal matter is in respect of all\nsensible forms; and therefore for the understanding of all things, it\nneeds some habit. But the angelic intellect is not as a pure\npotentiality in the order of intelligible things, but as an act; not\nindeed as pure act (for this belongs to God alone), but with an\nadmixture of some potentiality: and the higher it is, the less\npotentiality it has. And therefore, as we said in the First Part (Q.\n55, A. 1), so far as it is in potentiality, so far is it in need of\nhabitual perfection by means of intelligible species in regard to its\nproper operation: but so far as it is in act, through its own essence\nit can understand some things, at least itself, and other things\naccording to the mode of its substance, as stated in _De Causis:_ and\nthe more perfect it is, the more perfectly will it understand.\n\nBut since no angel attains to the perfection of God, but all are\ninfinitely distant therefrom; for this reason, in order to attain to\nGod Himself, through intellect and will, the angels need some habits,\nbeing as it were in potentiality in regard to that Pure Act.\nWherefore Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that their habits are\n\"godlike,\" that is to say, that by them they are made like to God.\n\nBut those habits that are dispositions to the natural being are not\nin angels, since they are immaterial.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This saying of Maximus must be understood of material\nhabits and accidents.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As to that which belongs to angels by their essence,\nthey do not need a habit. But as they are not so far beings of\nthemselves, as not to partake of Divine wisdom and goodness,\ntherefore, so far as they need to partake of something from without,\nso far do they need to have habits.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In angels there are no essential parts: but\nthere are potential parts, in so far as their intellect is perfected\nby several species, and in so far as their will has a relation to\nseveral things.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 51\n\nOF THE CAUSE OF HABITS, AS TO THEIR FORMATION\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must next consider the cause of habits: and firstly, as to their\nformation; secondly, as to their increase; thirdly, as to their\ndiminution and corruption. Under the first head there are four points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether any habit is from nature?\n\n(2) Whether any habit is caused by acts?\n\n(3) Whether any habit can be caused by one act?\n\n(4) Whether any habits are infused in man by God?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 51, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Any Habit Is from Nature?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no habit is from nature. For the use\nof those things which are from nature does not depend on the will.\nBut habit \"is that which we use when we will,\" as the Commentator\nsays on _De Anima_ iii. Therefore habit is not from nature.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nature does not employ two where one is sufficient.\nBut the powers of the soul are from nature. If therefore the habits\nof the powers were from nature, habit and power would be one.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nature does not fail in necessaries. But habits are\nnecessary in order to act well, as we have stated above (Q. 49, A.\n4). If therefore any habits were from nature, it seems that nature\nwould not fail to cause all necessary habits: but this is clearly\nfalse. Therefore habits are not from nature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In _Ethic._ vi, 6, among other habits, place is\ngiven to understanding of first principles, which habit is from\nnature: wherefore also first principles are said to be known\nnaturally.\n\n_I answer that,_ One thing can be natural to another in two ways.\nFirst in respect of the specific nature, as the faculty of laughing\nis natural to man, and it is natural to fire to have an upward\ntendency. Secondly, in respect of the individual nature, as it is\nnatural to Socrates or Plato to be prone to sickness or inclined to\nhealth, in accordance with their respective temperaments. Again, in\nrespect of both natures, something may be called natural in two ways:\nfirst, because it entirely is from the nature; secondly, because it\nis partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic principle. For\ninstance, when a man is healed by himself, his health is entirely\nfrom nature; but when a man is healed by means of medicine, health\nis partly from nature, partly from an extrinsic principle.\n\nThus, then, if we speak of habit as a disposition of the subject in\nrelation to form or nature, it may be natural in either of the\nforegoing ways. For there is a certain natural disposition demanded\nby the human species, so that no man can be without it. And this\ndisposition is natural in respect of the specific nature. But since\nsuch a disposition has a certain latitude, it happens that different\ngrades of this disposition are becoming to different men in respect\nof the individual nature. And this disposition may be either entirely\nfrom nature, or partly from nature, and partly from an extrinsic\nprinciple, as we have said of those who are healed by means of art.\n\nBut the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject\nis a power of the soul, as stated above (Q. 50, A. 2), may be natural\nwhether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the\nindividual nature: in respect of the specific nature, on the part of\nthe soul itself, which, since it is the form of the body, is the\nspecific principle; but in respect of the individual nature, on the\npart of the body, which is the material principle. Yet in neither way\ndoes it happen that there are natural habits in man, so that they be\nentirely from nature. In the angels, indeed, this does happen, since\nthey have intelligible species naturally impressed on them, which\ncannot be said of the human soul, as we have said in the First Part\n(Q. 55, A. 2; Q. 84, A. 3).\n\nThere are, therefore, in man certain natural habits, owing their\nexistence, partly to nature, and partly to some extrinsic principle:\nin one way, indeed, in the apprehensive powers; in another way, in\nthe appetitive powers. For in the apprehensive powers there may be a\nnatural habit by way of a beginning, both in respect of the specific\nnature, and in respect of the individual nature. This happens with\nregard to the specific nature, on the part of the soul itself: thus\nthe understanding of first principles is called a natural habit. For\nit is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul that man,\nhaving once grasped what is a whole and what is a part, should at\nonce perceive that every whole is larger than its part: and in like\nmanner with regard to other such principles. Yet what is a whole, and\nwhat is a part--this he cannot know except through the intelligible\nspecies which he has received from phantasms: and for this reason,\nthe Philosopher at the end of the _Posterior Analytics_ shows that\nknowledge of principles comes to us from the senses.\n\nBut in respect of the individual nature, a habit of knowledge is\nnatural as to its beginning, in so far as one man, from the\ndisposition of his organs of sense, is more apt than another to\nunderstand well, since we need the sensitive powers for the operation\nof the intellect.\n\nIn the appetitive powers, however, no habit is natural in its\nbeginning, on the part of the soul itself, as to the substance of the\nhabit; but only as to certain principles thereof, as, for instance,\nthe principles of common law are called the \"nurseries of virtue.\"\nThe reason of this is because the inclination to its proper objects,\nwhich seems to be the beginning of a habit, does not belong to the\nhabit, but rather to the very nature of the powers.\n\nBut on the part of the body, in respect of the individual nature,\nthere are some appetitive habits by way of natural beginnings. For\nsome are disposed from their own bodily temperament to chastity or\nmeekness or such like.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This objection takes nature as divided against reason\nand will; whereas reason itself and will belong to the nature of man.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Something may be added even naturally to the nature of\na power, while it cannot belong to the power itself. For instance,\nwith regard to the angels, it cannot belong to the intellective power\nitself capable of knowing all things: for thus it would have to be\nthe act of all things, which belongs to God alone. Because that by\nwhich something is known, must needs be the actual likeness of the\nthing known: whence it would follow, if the power of the angel knew\nall things by itself, that it was the likeness and act of all things.\nWherefore there must needs be added to the angels' intellective\npower, some intelligible species, which are likenesses of things\nunderstood: for it is by participation of the Divine wisdom and not\nby their own essence, that their intellect can be actually those\nthings which they understand. And so it is clear that not everything\nbelonging to a natural habit can belong to the power.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Nature is not equally inclined to cause all the various\nkinds of habits: since some can be caused by nature, and some not, as\nwe have said above. And so it does not follow that because some\nhabits are natural, therefore all are natural.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 51, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Any Habit Is Caused by Acts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no habit is caused by acts. For habit\nis a quality, as we have said above (Q. 49, A. 1). Now every quality\nis caused in a subject, according to the latter's receptivity. Since\nthen the agent, inasmuch as it acts, does not receive but rather\ngives: it seems impossible for a habit to be caused in an agent by\nits own acts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the thing wherein a quality is caused is moved to\nthat quality, as may be clearly seen in that which is heated or\ncooled: whereas that which produces the act that causes the quality,\nmoves, as may be seen in that which heats or cools. If therefore\nhabits were caused in anything by its own act, it would follow that\nthe same would be mover and moved, active and passive: which is\nimpossible, as stated in Physics iii, 8.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the effect cannot be more noble than its cause. But\nhabit is more noble than the act which precedes the habit; as is\nclear from the fact that the latter produces more noble acts.\nTherefore habit cannot be caused by an act which precedes the habit.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 1, 2) teaches that\nhabits of virtue and vice are caused by acts.\n\n_I answer that,_ In the agent there is sometimes only the active\nprinciple of its act: for instance in fire there is only the active\nprinciple of heating. And in such an agent a habit cannot be caused\nby its own act: for which reason natural things cannot become\naccustomed or unaccustomed, as is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 1. But a\ncertain agent is to be found, in which there is both the active and\nthe passive principle of its act, as we see in human acts. For the\nacts of the appetitive power proceed from that same power according\nas it is moved by the apprehensive power presenting the object: and\nfurther, the intellective power, according as it reasons about\nconclusions, has, as it were, an active principle in a self-evident\nproposition. Wherefore by such acts habits can be caused in their\nagents; not indeed with regard to the first active principle, but\nwith regard to that principle of the act, which principle is a mover\nmoved. For everything that is passive and moved by another, is\ndisposed by the action of the agent; wherefore if the acts be\nmultiplied a certain quality is formed in the power which is passive\nand moved, which quality is called a habit: just as the habits of\nmoral virtue are caused in the appetitive powers, according as they\nare moved by the reason, and as the habits of science are caused in\nthe intellect, according as it is moved by first propositions.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The agent, as agent, does not receive anything. But\nin so far as it moves through being moved by another, it receives\nsomething from that which moves it: and thus is a habit caused.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The same thing, and in the same respect, cannot be\nmover and moved; but nothing prevents a thing from being moved by\nitself as to different respects, as is proved in Physics viii, text.\n28, 29.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The act which precedes the habit, in so far as\nit comes from an active principle, proceeds from a more excellent\nprinciple than is the habit caused thereby: just as the reason is a\nmore excellent principle than the habit of moral virtue produced in\nthe appetitive power by repeated acts, and as the understanding of\nfirst principles is a more excellent principle than the science of\nconclusions.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 51, Art. 3]\n\nWhether a Habit Can Be Caused by One Act?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a habit can be caused by one act. For\ndemonstration is an act of reason. But science, which is the habit of\none conclusion, is caused by one demonstration. Therefore habit can\nbe caused by one act.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as acts happen to increase by multiplication so do\nthey happen to increase by intensity. But a habit is caused by\nmultiplication of acts. Therefore also if an act be very intense, it\ncan be the generating cause of a habit.\n\nObj. 3: Further, health and sickness are habits. But it happens that\na man is healed or becomes ill, by one act. Therefore one act can\ncause a habit.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. i, 7): \"As neither does\none swallow nor one day make spring: so neither does one day nor a\nshort time make a man blessed and happy.\" But \"happiness is an\noperation in respect of a habit of perfect virtue\" (Ethic. i, 7, 10,\n13). Therefore a habit of virtue, and for the same reason, other\nhabits, is not caused by one act.\n\n_I answer that,_ As we have said already (A. 2), habit is caused by\nact, because a passive power is moved by an active principle. But in\norder that some quality be caused in that which is passive the active\nprinciple must entirely overcome the passive. Whence we see that\nbecause fire cannot at once overcome the combustible, it does not\nenkindle at once; but it gradually expels contrary dispositions, so\nthat by overcoming it entirely, it may impress its likeness on it.\nNow it is clear that the active principle which is reason, cannot\nentirely overcome the appetitive power in one act: because the\nappetitive power is inclined variously, and to many things; while the\nreason judges in a single act, what should be willed in regard to\nvarious aspects and circumstances. Wherefore the appetitive power is\nnot thereby entirely overcome, so as to be inclined like nature to\nthe same thing, in the majority of cases; which inclination belongs\nto the habit of virtue. Therefore a habit of virtue cannot be caused\nby one act, but only by many.\n\nBut in the apprehensive powers, we must observe that there are two\npassive principles: one is the _possible_ (See First Part, Q. 79, A.\n2, ad 2) intellect itself; the other is the intellect which Aristotle\n(De Anima iii, text. 20) calls \"passive,\" and is the \"particular\nreason,\" that is the cogitative power, with memory and imagination.\nWith regard then to the former passive principle, it is possible for\na certain active principle to entirely overcome, by one act, the\npower of its passive principle: thus one self-evident proposition\nconvinces the intellect, so that it gives a firm assent to the\nconclusion, but a probable proposition cannot do this. Wherefore a\nhabit of opinion needs to be caused by many acts of the reason, even\non the part of the \"possible\" intellect: whereas a habit of science\ncan be caused by a single act of the reason, so far as the _possible_\nintellect is concerned. But with regard to the lower apprehensive\npowers, the same acts need to be repeated many times for anything to\nbe firmly impressed on the memory. And so the Philosopher says (De\nMemor. et Remin. 1) that \"meditation strengthens memory.\" Bodily\nhabits, however, can be caused by one act, if the active principle is\nof great power: sometimes, for instance, a strong dose of medicine\nrestores health at once.\n\nHence the solutions to the objections are clear.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 51, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Any Habits Are Infused in Man by God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no habit is infused in man by God.\nFor God treats all equally. If therefore He infuses habits into some,\nHe would infuse them into all: which is clearly untrue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God works in all things according to the mode which\nis suitable to their nature: for \"it belongs to Divine providence to\npreserve nature,\" as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But habits are\nnaturally caused in man by acts, as we have said above (A. 2).\nTherefore God does not cause habits to be in man except by acts.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if any habit be infused into man by God, man can by\nthat habit perform many acts. But \"from those acts a like habit is\ncaused\" (Ethic. ii, 1, 2). Consequently there will be two habits of\nthe same species in the same man, one acquired, the other infused.\nNow this seems impossible: for the two forms of the same species\ncannot be in the same subject. Therefore a habit is not infused into\nman by God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ it is written (Ecclus. 15:5): \"God filled him with\nthe spirit of wisdom and understanding.\" Now wisdom and understanding\nare habits. Therefore some habits are infused into man by God.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some habits are infused by God into man, for two\nreasons.\n\nThe first reason is because there are some habits by which man is\ndisposed to an end which exceeds the proportion of human nature,\nnamely, the ultimate and perfect happiness of man, as stated above\n(Q. 5, A. 5). And since habits need to be in proportion with that to\nwhich man is disposed by them, therefore is it necessary that those\nhabits, which dispose to this end, exceed the proportion of human\nnature. Wherefore such habits can never be in man except by Divine\ninfusion, as is the case with all gratuitous virtues.\n\nThe other reason is, because God can produce the effects of second\ncauses, without these second causes, as we have said in the First\nPart (Q. 105, A. 6). Just as, therefore, sometimes, in order to show\nHis power, He causes health, without its natural cause, but which\nnature could have caused, so also, at times, for the manifestation of\nHis power, He infuses into man even those habits which can be caused\nby a natural power. Thus He gave to the apostles the science of the\nScriptures and of all tongues, which men can acquire by study or by\ncustom, but not so perfectly.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God, in respect of His Nature, is the same to all, but\nin respect of the order of His Wisdom, for some fixed motive, gives\ncertain things to some, which He does not give to others.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That God works in all according to their mode, does not\nhinder God from doing what nature cannot do: but it follows from this\nthat He does nothing contrary to that which is suitable to nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Acts produced by an infused habit, do not cause a\nhabit, but strengthen the already existing habit; just as the\nremedies of medicine given to a man who is naturally health, do not\ncause a kind of health, but give new strength to the health he had\nbefore.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 52\n\nOF THE INCREASE OF HABITS\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head\nthere are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether habits increase?\n\n(2) Whether they increase by addition?\n\n(3) Whether each act increases the habit?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 52, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Habits Increase?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase\nconcerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18). But habits are not in the\ngenus [of] quantity, but in that of quality. Therefore there can be\nno increase of habits.\n\nObj. 2: Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17, 18). But\nsince perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems that it\ncannot be more or less. Therefore a habit cannot increase.\n\nObj. 3: Further, those things which can be more or less are subject\nto alteration: for that which from being less hot becomes more hot,\nis said to be altered. But in habits there is no alteration, as is\nproved in _Phys._ vii, text. 15, 17. Therefore habits cannot increase.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Faith is a habit, and yet it increases: wherefore\nthe disciples said to our Lord (Luke 17:5): \"Lord, increase our\nfaith.\" Therefore habits increase.\n\n_I answer that,_ Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity,\nis transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual\nthings, on account of the natural connection of the intellect with\ncorporeal things, which come under the imagination. Now in corporeal\nquantities, a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the\nperfection of quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is\nreputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant. And\nso also in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect. And\nsince good has the nature of perfection, therefore \"in things which\nare great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be\nbetter,\" as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8).\n\nNow the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways: first, in\nrespect of the form itself: secondly, in respect of the participation\nof the form by its subject. In so far as we consider the perfections\nof a form in respect of the form itself, thus the form is said to be\n\"little\" or \"great\": for instance great or little health or science.\nBut in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in respect of\nthe participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be \"more\" or\n\"less\": for instance more or less white or healthy. Now this\ndistinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a\nbeing outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to\nconsider the form according to its specific nature, and another to\nconsider it in respect of its participation by a subject.\n\nIn this way, then, there were four opinions among philosophers\nconcerning intensity and remission of habits and forms, as Simplicius\nrelates in his _Commentary on the Predicaments._ For Plotinus and the\nother Platonists held that qualities and habits themselves were\nsusceptible of more or less, for the reason that they were material\nand so had a certain want of definiteness, on account of the infinity\nof matter. Others, on the contrary, held that qualities and habits of\nthemselves were not susceptible of more or less; but that the things\naffected by them (_qualia_) are said to be more or less, in respect\nof the participation of the subject: that, for instance, justice is\nnot more or less, but the just thing. Aristotle alludes to this\nopinion in the _Predicaments_ (Categor. vi). The third opinion was\nthat of the Stoics, and lies between the two preceding opinions. For\nthey held that some habits are of themselves susceptible of more and\nless, for instance, the arts; and that some are not, as the virtues.\nThe fourth opinion was held by some who said that qualities and\nimmaterial forms are not susceptible of more or less, but that\nmaterial forms are.\n\nIn order that the truth in this matter be made clear, we must observe\nthat [that], in respect of which a thing receives its species, must\nbe something fixed and stationary, and as it were indivisible: for\nwhatever attains to that thing, is contained under the species, and\nwhatever recedes from it more or less, belongs to another species,\nmore or less perfect. Wherefore, the Philosopher says (Metaph. viii,\ntext. 10) that species of things are like numbers, in which addition\nor subtraction changes the species. If, therefore, a form, or\nanything at all, receives its specific nature in respect of itself,\nor in respect of something belonging to it, it is necessary that,\nconsidered in itself, it be something of a definite nature, which can\nbe neither more nor less. Such are heat, whiteness or other like\nqualities which are not denominated from a relation to something\nelse: and much more so, substance, which is _per se_ being. But those\nthings which receive their species from something to which they are\nrelated, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to\nmore or less: and nonetheless they remain in the same species, on\naccount of the oneness of that to which they are related, and from\nwhich they receive their species. For example, movement is in itself\nmore intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in the same species,\non account of the oneness of the term by which it is specified. We\nmay observe the same thing in health; for a body attains to the\nnature of health, according as it has a disposition suitable to an\nanimal's nature, to which various dispositions may be suitable; which\ndisposition is therefore variable as regards more or less, and withal\nthe nature of health remains. Whence the Philosopher says (Ethic. x,\n2, 3): \"Health itself may be more or less: for the measure is not the\nsame in all, nor is it always the same in one individual; but down to\na certain point it may decrease and still remain health.\"\n\nNow these various dispositions and measures of health are by way of\nexcess and defect: wherefore if the name of health were given to the\nmost perfect measure, then we should not speak of health as greater\nor less. Thus therefore it is clear how a quality or form may\nincrease or decrease of itself, and how it cannot.\n\nBut if we consider a quality or form in respect of its participation\nby the subject, thus again we find that some qualities and forms are\nsusceptible of more or less, and some not. Now Simplicius assigns the\ncause of this diversity to the fact that substance in itself cannot\nbe susceptible of more or less, because it is _per se_ being. And\ntherefore every form which is participated substantially by its\nsubject, cannot vary in intensity and remission: wherefore in the\ngenus of substance nothing is said to be more or less. And because\nquantity is nigh to substance, and because shape follows on quantity,\ntherefore is it that neither in these can there be such a thing as\nmore or less. Whence the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 15) that\nwhen a thing receives form and shape, it is not said to be altered,\nbut to be made. But other qualities which are further removed from\nquantity, and are connected with passions and actions, are\nsusceptible of more or less, in respect of their participation by the\nsubject.\n\nNow it is possible to explain yet further the reason of this\ndiversity. For, as we have said, that from which a thing receives its\nspecies must remain indivisibly fixed and constant in something\nindivisible. Wherefore in two ways it may happen that a form cannot\nbe participated more or less. First because the participator has its\nspecies in respect of that form. And for this reason no substantial\nform is participated more or less. Wherefore the Philosopher says\n(Metaph. viii, text. 10) that, \"as a number cannot be more or less,\nso neither can that which is in the species of substance,\" that is,\nin respect of its participation of the specific form: \"but in so far\nas substance may be with matter,\" i.e. in respect of material\ndispositions, \"more or less are found in substance.\"\n\nSecondly this may happen from the fact that the form is essentially\nindivisible: wherefore if anything participate that form, it must\nneeds participate it in respect of its indivisibility. For this\nreason we do not speak of the species of number as varying in respect\nof more or less; because each species thereof is constituted by an\nindivisible unity. The same is to be said of the species of\ncontinuous quantity, which are denominated from numbers, as\ntwo-cubits-long, three-cubits-long, and of relations of quantity, as\ndouble and treble, and of figures of quantity, as triangle and\ntetragon.\n\nThis same explanation is given by Aristotle in the _Predicaments_\n(Categor. vi), where in explaining why figures are not susceptible of\nmore or less, he says: \"Things which are given the nature of a\ntriangle or a circle, are accordingly triangles and circles\": to wit,\nbecause indivisibility is essential to the motion of such, wherefore\nwhatever participates their nature must participate it in its\nindivisibility.\n\nIt is clear, therefore, since we speak of habits and dispositions in\nrespect of a relation to something (Phys. vii, text. 17), that in two\nways intensity and remission may be observed in habits and\ndispositions. First, in respect of the habit itself: thus, for\ninstance, we speak of greater or less health; greater or less\nscience, which extends to more or fewer things. Secondly, in respect\nof participation by the subject: in so far as equal science or health\nis participated more in one than in another, according to a diverse\naptitude arising either from nature, or from custom. For habit and\ndisposition do not give species to the subject: nor again do they\nessentially imply indivisibility.\n\nWe shall say further on (Q. 66, A. 1) how it is with the virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the word \"great\" is taken from corporeal quantities\nand applied to the intelligible perfections of forms; so also is the\nword \"growth,\" the term of which is something great.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Habit is indeed a perfection, but not a perfection\nwhich is the term of its subject; for instance, a term giving the\nsubject its specific being. Nor again does the nature of a habit\ninclude the notion of term, as do the species of numbers. Wherefore\nthere is nothing to hinder it from being susceptible of more or less.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Alteration is primarily indeed in the qualities of the\nthird species; but secondarily it may be in the qualities of the\nfirst species: for, supposing an alteration as to hot and cold, there\nfollows in an animal an alteration as to health and sickness. In like\nmanner, if an alteration take place in the passions of the sensitive\nappetite, or the sensitive powers of apprehension, an alteration\nfollows as to science and virtue (Phys. viii, text. 20).\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 52, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Habit Increases by Addition?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the increase of habits is by way of\naddition. For the word \"increase,\" as we have said, is transferred to\nforms, from corporeal quantities. But in corporeal quantities there\nis no increase without addition: wherefore (De Gener. i, text. 31) it\nis said that \"increase is an addition to a magnitude already\nexisting.\" Therefore in habits also there is no increase without\naddition.\n\nObj. 2: Further, habit is not increased except by means of some\nagent. But every agent does something in the passive subject: for\ninstance, that which heats, causes heat in that which is heated.\nTherefore there is no increase without addition.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as that which is not white, is in potentiality to be\nwhite: so that which is less white, is in potentiality to be more\nwhite. But that which is not white, is not made white except by the\naddition of whiteness. Therefore that which is less white, is not\nmade more white, except by an added whiteness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Phys. iv, text. 84): \"That\nwhich is hot is made hotter, without making, in the matter, something\nhot, that was not hot, when the thing was less hot.\" Therefore, in\nlike manner, neither is any addition made in other forms when they\nincrease.\n\n_I answer that,_ The solution of this question depends on what we\nhave said above (A. 1). For we said that increase and decrease in\nforms which are capable of intensity and remissness, happen in one\nway not on the part of the very form considered in itself, through\nthe diverse participation thereof by the subject. Wherefore such\nincrease of habits and other forms, is not caused by an addition of\nform to form; but by the subject participating more or less\nperfectly, one and the same form. And just as, by an agent which is\nin act, something is made actually hot, beginning, as it were, to\nparticipate a form, not as though the form itself were made, as is\nproved in _Metaph._ vii, text. 32, so, by an intense action of the\nagent, something is made more hot, as it were participating the form\nmore perfectly, not as though something were added to the form.\n\nFor if this increase in forms were understood to be by way of\naddition, this could only be either in the form itself or in the\nsubject. If it be understood of the form itself, it has already been\nstated (A. 1) that such an addition or subtraction would change the\nspecies; even as the species of color is changed when a thing from\nbeing pale becomes white. If, on the other hand, this addition be\nunderstood as applying to the subject, this could only be either\nbecause one part of the subject receives a form which it had not\npreviously (thus we may say cold increases in a man who, after being\ncold in one part of his body, is cold in several parts), or because\nsome other subject is added sharing in the same form (as when a hot\nthing is added to another, or one white thing to another). But in\neither of these two ways we have not a more white or a more hot\nthing, but a greater white or hot thing.\n\nSince, however, as stated above (A. 1), certain accidents are of\nthemselves susceptible of more or less, in some of these we may find\nincrease by addition. For movement increases by an addition either to\nthe time it lasts, or to the course it follows: and yet the species\nremains the same on account of the oneness of the term. Yet movement\nincreases the intensity as to participation in its subject: i.e. in\nso far as the same movement can be executed more or less speedily or\nreadily. In like manner, science can increase in itself by addition;\nthus when anyone learns several conclusions of geometry, the same\nspecific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man's science\nincreases, as to the subject's participation thereof, in intensity,\nin so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in\nconsidering the same conclusions.\n\nAs to bodily habits, it does not seem very probable that they receive\nincrease by way of addition. For an animal is not said to be simply\nhealthy or beautiful, unless it be such in all its parts. And if it\nbe brought to a more perfect measure, this is the result of a change\nin the simple qualities, which are not susceptible of increase save\nin intensity on the part of the subject partaking of them.\n\nHow this question affects virtues we shall state further on (Q. 66,\nA. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Even in bodily bulk increase is twofold. First, by\naddition of one subject to another; such is the increase of living\nthings. Secondly, by mere intensity, without any addition at all;\nsuch is the case with things subject to rarefaction, as is stated in\n_Phys._ iv, text. 63.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The cause that increases a habit, always effects\nsomething in the subject, but not a new form. But it causes the\nsubject to partake more perfectly of a pre-existing form, or it makes\nthe form to extend further.\n\nReply Obj. 3: What is not already white, is potentially white, as not\nyet possessing the form of whiteness: hence the agent causes a new\nform in the subject. But that which is less hot or white, is not in\npotentiality to those forms, since it has them already actually: but\nit is in potentiality to a perfect mode of participation; and this it\nreceives through the agent's action.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 52, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Every Act Increases Its Habit?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that every act increases its habit. For\nwhen the cause is increased the effect is increased. Now acts are\ncauses of habits, as stated above (Q. 51, A. 2). Therefore a habit\nincreases when its acts are multiplied.\n\nObj. 2: Further, of like things a like judgment should be formed. But\nall the acts proceeding from one and the same habit are alike (Ethic.\nii, 1, 2). Therefore if some acts increase a habit, every act should\nincrease it.\n\nObj. 3: Further, like is increased by like. But any act is like the\nhabit whence it proceeds. Therefore every act increases the habit.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Opposite effects do not result from the same\ncause. But according to _Ethic._ ii, 2, some acts lessen the habit\nwhence they proceed, for instance if they be done carelessly.\nTherefore it is not every act that increases a habit.\n\n_I answer that,_ \"Like acts cause like habits\" (Ethic. ii, 1, 2). Now\nthings are like or unlike not only in respect of their qualities\nbeing the same or various, but also in respect of the same or a\ndifferent mode of participation. For it is not only black that is\nunlike white, but also less white is unlike more white, since there\nis movement from less white to more white, even as from one opposite\nto another, as stated in _Phys._ v, text. 52.\n\nBut since use of habits depends on the will, as was shown above (Q.\n50, A. 5); just as one who has a habit may fail to use it or may act\ncontrary to it; so may he happen to use the habit by performing an\nact that is not in proportion to the intensity of the habit.\nAccordingly, if the intensity of the act correspond in proportion to\nthe intensity of the habit, or even surpass it, every such act either\nincreases the habit or disposes to an increase thereof, if we may\nspeak of the increase of habits as we do of the increase of an\nanimal. For not every morsel of food actually increases the animal's\nsize as neither does every drop of water hollow out the stone: but\nthe multiplication of food results at last in an increase of the\nbody. So, too, repeated acts cause a habit to grow. If, however, the\nact falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not\ndispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening\nthereof.\n\nFrom this it is clear how to solve the objections.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 53\n\nHOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED\n(In Three Articles)\n\nWe must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this\nhead there are three points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?\n\n(2) Whether it can be diminished?\n\n(3) How are habits corrupted or diminished?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 53, Art. 1]\n\nWhether a Habit Can Be Corrupted?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot be corrupted. For\nhabit is within its subject like a second nature; wherefore it is\npleasant to act from habit. Now so long as a thing is, its nature is\nnot corrupted. Therefore neither can a habit be corrupted so long as\nits subject remains.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whenever a form is corrupted, this is due either to\ncorruption of its subject, or to its contrary: thus sickness ceases\nthrough corruption of the animal, or through the advent of health.\nNow science, which is a habit, cannot be lost through corruption of\nits subject: since \"the intellect,\" which is its subject, \"is a\nsubstance that is incorruptible\" (De Anima i, text. 65). In like\nmanner, neither can it be lost through the action of its contrary:\nsince intelligible species are not contrary to one another (Metaph.\nvii, text. 52). Therefore the habit of science can nowise be lost.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all corruption results from some movement. But the\nhabit of science, which is in the soul, cannot be corrupted by a\ndirect movement of the soul itself, since the soul is not moved\ndirectly. It is, however, moved indirectly through the movement of\nthe body: and yet no bodily change seems capable of corrupting the\nintelligible species residing in the intellect: since the intellect\nindependently of the body is the proper abode of the species; for\nwhich reason it is held that habits are not lost either through old\nage or through death. Therefore science cannot be corrupted. For the\nsame reason neither can habits of virtue be corrupted, since they\nalso are in the rational soul, and, as the Philosopher declares\n(Ethic. i, 10), \"virtue is more lasting than learning.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii)\nthat \"forgetfulness and deception are the corruption of science.\"\nMoreover, by sinning a man loses a habit of virtue: and again,\nvirtues are engendered and corrupted by contrary acts (Ethic. ii, 2).\n\n_I answer that,_ A form is said to be corrupted directly by its\ncontrary; indirectly, through its subject being corrupted. When\ntherefore a habit has a corruptible subject, and a cause that has a\ncontrary, it can be corrupted both ways. This is clearly the case with\nbodily habits--for instance, health and sickness. But those habits\nthat have an incorruptible subject, cannot be corrupted indirectly.\nThere are, however, some habits which, while residing chiefly in an\nincorruptible subject, reside nevertheless secondarily in a\ncorruptible subject; such is the habit of science which is chiefly\nindeed in the \"possible\" intellect, but secondarily in the sensitive\npowers of apprehension, as stated above (Q. 50, A. 3, ad 3).\nConsequently the habit of science cannot be corrupted indirectly, on\nthe part of the \"possible\" intellect, but only on the part of the\nlower sensitive powers.\n\nWe must therefore inquire whether habits of this kind can be\ncorrupted directly. If then there be a habit having a contrary,\neither on the part of itself or on the part of its cause, it can be\ncorrupted directly: but if it has no contrary, it cannot be corrupted\ndirectly. Now it is evident that an intelligible species residing in\nthe \"possible\" intellect, has no contrary; nor can the active\nintellect, which is the cause of that species, have a contrary.\nWherefore if in the \"possible\" intellect there be a habit caused\nimmediately by the active intellect, such a habit is incorruptible\nboth directly and indirectly. Such are the habits of the first\nprinciples, both speculative and practical, which cannot be corrupted\nby any forgetfulness or deception whatever: even as the Philosopher\nsays about prudence (Ethic. vi, 5) that \"it cannot be lost by being\nforgotten.\" There is, however, in the \"possible\" intellect a habit\ncaused by the reason, to wit, the habit of conclusions, which is\ncalled science, to the cause of which something may be contrary in\ntwo ways. First, on the part of those very propositions which are the\nstarting point of the reason: for the assertion \"Good is not good\" is\ncontrary to the assertion \"Good is good\" (Peri Herm. ii). Secondly,\non the part of the process of reasoning; forasmuch as a sophistical\nsyllogism is contrary to a dialectic or demonstrative syllogism.\nWherefore it is clear that a false reason can corrupt the habit of a\ntrue opinion or even of science. Hence the Philosopher, as stated\nabove, says that \"deception is the corruption of science.\" As to\nvirtues, some of them are intellectual, residing in reason itself, as\nstated in _Ethic._ vi, 1: and to these applies what we have said of\nscience and opinion. Some, however, viz. the moral virtues, are in\nthe appetitive part of the soul; and the same may be said of the\ncontrary vices. Now the habits of the appetitive part are caused\ntherein because it is natural to it to be moved by the reason.\nTherefore a habit either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a\njudgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such vice or\nvirtue, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated in _Ethic._ vii, 10, a habit is like a second\nnature, and yet it falls short of it. And so it is that while the\nnature of a thing cannot in any way be taken away from a thing, a\nhabit is removed, though with difficulty.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although there is no contrary to intelligible species,\nyet there can be a contrary to assertions and to the process of\nreason, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Science is not taken away by movement of the body, if\nwe consider the root itself of the habit, but only as it may prove an\nobstacle to the act of science; in so far as the intellect, in its\nact, has need of the sensitive powers, which are impeded by corporal\ntransmutation. But the intellectual movement of the reason can\ncorrupt the habit of science, even as regards the very root of the\nhabit. In like manner a habit of virtue can be corrupted.\nNevertheless when it is said that \"virtue is more lasting than\nlearning,\" this must be understood in respect, not of the subject or\ncause, but of the act: because the use of virtue continues through\nthe whole of life, whereas the use of learning does not.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 53, Art. 2]\n\nWhether a Habit Can Diminish?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a habit cannot diminish. Because a\nhabit is a simple quality and form. Now a simple thing is possessed\neither wholly or not at all. Therefore although a habit can be lost\nit cannot diminish.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if a thing is befitting an accident, this is by\nreason either of the accident or of its subject. Now a habit does not\nbecome more or less intense by reason of itself; else it would follow\nthat a species might be predicated of its individuals more or less.\nAnd if it can become less intense as to its participation by its\nsubject, it would follow that something is accidental to a habit,\nproper thereto and not common to the habit and its subject. Now\nwhenever a form has something proper to it besides its subject, that\nform can be separate, as stated in _De Anima_ i, text. 13. Hence it\nfollows that a habit is a separable form; which is impossible.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the very notion and nature of a habit as of any\naccident, is inherence in a subject: wherefore any accident is\ndefined with reference to its subject. Therefore if a habit does not\nbecome more or less intense in itself, neither can it in its\ninherence in its subject: and consequently it will be nowise less\nintense.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is natural for contraries to be applicable to\nthe same thing. Now increase and decrease are contraries. Since\ntherefore a habit can increase, it seems that it can also diminish.\n\n_I answer that,_ Habits diminish, just as they increase, in two ways,\nas we have already explained (Q. 52, A. 1). And since they increase\nthrough the same cause as that which engenders them, so too they\ndiminish by the same cause as that which corrupts them: since the\ndiminishing of a habit is the road which leads to its corruption,\neven as, on the other hand, the engendering of a habit is a\nfoundation of its increase.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A habit, considered in itself, is a simple form. It is\nnot thus that it is subject to decrease; but according to the\ndifferent ways in which its subject participates in it. This is due\nto the fact that the subject's potentiality is indeterminate, through\nits being able to participate a form in various ways, or to extend to\na greater or a smaller number of things.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument would hold, if the essence itself of a\nhabit were nowise subject to decrease. This we do not say; but that a\ncertain decrease in the essence of a habit has its origin, not in the\nhabit, but in its subject.\n\nReply Obj. 3: No matter how we take an accident, its very notion\nimplies dependence on a subject, but in different ways. For if we\ntake an accident in the abstract, it implies relation to a subject,\nwhich relation begins in the accident and terminates in the subject:\nfor \"whiteness is that whereby a thing is white.\" Accordingly in\ndefining an accident in the abstract, we do not put the subject as\nthough it were the first part of the definition, viz. the genus; but\nwe give it the second place, which is that of the difference; thus we\nsay that _simitas_ is \"a curvature of the nose.\" But if we take\naccidents in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and\nterminates in the concrete, the relation begins in the subject and\nterminates at the accident: for \"a white thing\" is \"something that\nhas whiteness.\" Accordingly in defining this kind of accident, we\nplace the subject as the genus, which is the first part of a\ndefinition; for we say that a _simum_ is a \"snub-nose.\" Accordingly\nwhatever is befitting an accident on the part of the subject, but is\nnot of the very essence of the accident, is ascribed to that\naccident, not in the abstract, but in the concrete. Such are increase\nand decrease in certain accidents: wherefore to be more or less white\nis not ascribed to whiteness but to a white thing. The same applies\nto habits and other qualities; save that certain habits and other\nqualities; save that certain habits increase or diminish by a kind of\naddition, as we have already clearly explained (Q. 52, A. 2).\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 53, Art. 3]\n\nWhether a Habit Is Corrupted or Diminished Through Mere Cessation\nfrom Act?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a habit is not corrupted or\ndiminished through mere cessation from act. For habits are more\nlasting than passion-like qualities, as we have explained above (Q.\n49, A. 2, ad 3; Q. 50, A. 1). But passion-like qualities are neither\ncorrupted nor diminished by cessation from act: for whiteness is not\nlessened through not affecting the sight, nor heat through ceasing to\nmake something hot. Therefore neither are habits diminished or\ncorrupted through cessation from act.\n\nObj. 2: Further, corruption and diminution are changes. Now nothing\nis changed without a moving cause. Since therefore cessation from act\ndoes not imply a moving cause, it does not appear how a habit can be\ndiminished or corrupted through cessation from act.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the habits of science and virtue are in the\nintellectual soul which is above time. Now those things that are\nabove time are neither destroyed nor diminished by length of time.\nNeither, therefore, are such habits destroyed or diminished through\nlength of time, if one fails for long to exercise them.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii)\nthat not only \"deception,\" but also \"forgetfulness, is the corruption\nof science.\" Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that \"want of\nintercourse has dissolved many a friendship.\" In like manner other\nhabits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through cessation from\nact.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated in _Phys._ vii, text. 27, a thing is a\ncause of movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing\ncauses movement by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat.\nSecondly, indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle.\nIt is in this latter way that the destruction or diminution of a\nhabit results through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, as we\ncease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed\nor weakened that habit. For it has been stated (A. 1) that habits are\ndestroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency.\nConsequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary\nagencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those\nhabits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation\nfrom act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of\nvirtue. For it is evident that a habit of moral virtue makes a man\nready to choose the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails\nto make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own\npassions or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions and\ndeeds fail to observe the mode of virtue, by reason of the\ninclination of the sensitive appetite and of other external agencies.\nWherefore virtue is destroyed or lessened through cessation from act.\nThe same applies to the intellectual habits, which render man ready\nto judge aright of those things that are pictured by his imagination.\nHence when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange\nfancies, sometimes in opposition to them, arise in his imagination;\nso that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by\nfrequent use of his intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to\njudge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary,\nand thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly\ndestroyed by cessation from act.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Even heat would be destroyed through ceasing to give\nheat, if, for this same reason, cold which is destructive of heat\nwere to increase.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Cessation from act is a moving cause, conducive of\ncorruption or diminution, by removing the obstacles thereto, as\nexplained above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The intellectual part of the soul, considered in\nitself, is above time, but the sensitive part is subject to time, and\ntherefore in course of time it undergoes change as to the passions of\nthe sensitive part, and also as to the powers of apprehension. Hence\nthe Philosopher says (Phys. iv. text. 117) that time makes us forget.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 54\n\nOF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this\nhead there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether many habits can be in one power?\n\n(2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?\n\n(3) Whether habits are divided into good and bad?\n\n(4) Whether one habit may be made up of many habits?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 54, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Many Habits Can Be in One Power?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there cannot be many habits in one\npower. For when several things are distinguished in respect of the\nsame thing, if one of them be multiplied, the others are too. Now\nhabits and powers are distinguished in respect of the same thing,\nviz. their acts and objects. Therefore they are multiplied in like\nmanner. Therefore there cannot be many habits in one power.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a power is a simple force. Now in one simple subject\nthere cannot be diversity of accidents; for the subject is the cause\nof its accidents; and it does not appear how diverse effects can\nproceed from one simple cause. Therefore there cannot be many habits\nin one power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as the body is informed by its shape, so is a\npower informed by a habit. But one body cannot be informed at the\nsame time by various shapes. Therefore neither can a power be\ninformed at the same time by many habits. Therefore several habits\ncannot be at the same time in one power.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The intellect is one power; wherein, nevertheless,\nare the habits of various sciences.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 49, A. 4), habits are\ndispositions of a thing that is in potentiality to something, either\nto nature, or to operation, which is the end of nature. As to those\nhabits which are dispositions to nature, it is clear that several can\nbe in one same subject: since in one subject we may take parts in\nvarious ways, according to the various dispositions of which parts\nthere are various habits. Thus, if we take the humors as being parts\nof the human body, according to their disposition in respect of human\nnature, we have the habit or disposition of health: while, if we take\nlike parts, such as nerves, bones, and flesh, the disposition of\nthese in respect of nature is strength or weakness; whereas, if we\ntake the limbs, i.e. the hands, feet, and so on, the disposition of\nthese in proportion to nature, is beauty: and thus there are several\nhabits or dispositions in the same subject.\n\nIf, however, we speak of those habits that are dispositions to\noperation, and belong properly to the powers; thus, again, there may\nbe several habits in one power. The reason for this is that the\nsubject of a habit is a passive power, as stated above (Q. 51, A. 2):\nfor it is only an active power that cannot be the subject of a habit,\nas was clearly shown above (Q. 51, A. 2). Now a passive power is\ncompared to the determinate act of any species, as matter to form:\nbecause, just as matter is determinate to one form by one agent, so,\ntoo, is a passive power determined by the nature of one active object\nto an act specifically one. Wherefore, just as several objects can\nmove one passive power, so can one passive power be the subject of\nseveral acts or perfections specifically diverse. Now habits are\nqualities or forms adhering to a power, and inclining that power to\nacts of a determinate species. Consequently several habits, even as\nseveral specifically different acts, can belong to one power.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Even as in natural things, diversity of species is\naccording to the form, and diversity of genus, according to matter,\nas stated in _Metaph._ v, text. 33 (since things that differ in\nmatter belong to different genera): so, too, generic diversity of\nobjects entails a difference of powers (wherefore the Philosopher\nsays in _Ethic._ vi, 1, that \"those objects that differ generically\nbelong to different departments of the soul\"); while specific\ndifference of objects entails a specific difference of acts, and\nconsequently of habits also. Now things that differ in genus differ\nin species, but not vice versa. Wherefore the acts and habits of\ndifferent powers differ in species: but it does not follow that\ndifferent habits are in different powers, for several can be in one\npower. And even as several genera may be included in one genus, and\nseveral species be contained in one species; so does it happen that\nthere are several species of habits and powers.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although a power is simple as to its essence, it is\nmultiple virtually, inasmuch as it extends to many specifically\ndifferent acts. Consequently there is nothing to prevent many\nsuperficially different habits from being in one power.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A body is informed by its shape as by its own\nterminal boundaries: whereas a habit is not the terminal boundary of a\npower, but the disposition of a power to an act as to its ultimate\nterm. Consequently one same power cannot have several acts at the same\ntime, except in so far as perchance one act is comprised in another;\njust as neither can a body have several shapes, save in so far as one\nshape enters into another, as a three-sided in a four-sided figure.\nFor the intellect cannot understand several things at the same time\n_actually;_ and yet it can know several things at the same time\n_habitually._\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 54, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Habits Are Distinguished by Their Objects?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that habits are not distinguished by their\nobjects. For contraries differ in species. Now the same habit of\nscience regards contraries: thus medicine regards the healthy and the\nunhealthy. Therefore habits are not distinguished by objects\nspecifically distinct.\n\nObj. 2: Further, different sciences are different habits. But the\nsame scientific truth belongs to different sciences: thus both the\nphysicist and the astronomer prove the earth to be round, as stated\nin _Phys._ ii, text. 17. Therefore habits are not distinguished by\ntheir objects.\n\nObj. 3: Further, wherever the act is the same, the object is the\nsame. But the same act can belong to different habits of virtue, if\nit be directed to different ends; thus to give money to anyone, if it\nbe done for God's sake, is an act of charity; while, if it be done in\norder to pay a debt, it is an act of justice. Therefore the same\nobject can also belong to different habits. Therefore diversity of\nhabits does not follow diversity of objects.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Acts differ in species according to the diversity\nof their objects, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 5). But habits are\ndispositions to acts. Therefore habits also are distinguished\naccording to the diversity of objects.\n\n_I answer that,_ A habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the\nspecific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in\nwhich forms differ specifically; or according to that mode of\ndistinction which is proper to habits. Accordingly forms are\ndistinguished from one another in reference to the diversity of their\nactive principles, since every agent produces its like in species.\nHabits, however, imply order to something: and all things that imply\norder to something, are distinguished according to the distinction of\nthe things to which they are ordained. Now a habit is a disposition\nimplying a twofold order: viz. to nature and to an operation\nconsequent to nature.\n\nAccordingly habits are specifically distinct in respect of three\nthings. First, in respect of the active principles of such\ndispositions; secondly, in respect of nature; thirdly, in respect of\nspecifically different objects, as will appear from what follows.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In distinguishing powers, or also habits, we must\nconsider the object not in its material but in its formal aspect,\nwhich may differ in species or even in genus. And though the\ndistinction between specific contraries is a real distinction yet\nthey are both known under one aspect, since one is known through the\nother. And consequently in so far as they concur in the one aspect of\ncognoscibility, they belong to one cognitive habit.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The physicist proves the earth to be round by one\nmeans, the astronomer by another: for the latter proves this by means\nof mathematics, e.g. by the shapes of eclipses, or something of the\nsort; while the former proves it by means of physics, e.g. by the\nmovement of heavy bodies towards the center, and so forth. Now the\nwhole force of a demonstration, which is \"a syllogism producing\nscience,\" as stated in Poster. i, text. 5, depends on the mean. And\nconsequently various means are as so many active principles, in\nrespect of which the habits of science are distinguished.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, text. 89; Ethic.\nvii, 8), the end is, in practical matters, what the principle is in\nspeculative matters. Consequently diversity of ends demands a\ndiversity of virtues, even as diversity of active principles does.\nMoreover the ends are objects of the internal acts, with which, above\nall, the virtues are concerned, as is evident from what has been said\n(Q. 18, A. 6; Q. 19, A. 2, ad 1; Q. 34, A. 4).\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 54, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Habits Are Divided into Good and Bad?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that habits are not divided into good and\nbad. For good and bad are contraries. Now the same habit regards\ncontraries, as was stated above (A. 2, Obj. 1). Therefore habits are\nnot divided into good and bad.\n\nObj. 2: Further, good is convertible with being; so that, since it is\ncommon to all, it cannot be accounted a specific difference, as the\nPhilosopher declares (Topic. iv). Again, evil, since it is a\nprivation and a non-being, cannot differentiate any being. Therefore\nhabits cannot be specifically divided into good and evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there can be different evil habits about one same\nobject; for instance, intemperance and insensibility about matters of\nconcupiscence: and in like manner there can be several good habits;\nfor instance, human virtue and heroic or godlike virtue, as the\nPhilosopher clearly states (Ethic. vii, 1). Therefore, habits are not\ndivided into good and bad.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A good habit is contrary to a bad habit, as virtue\nto vice. Now contraries are divided specifically into good and bad\nhabits.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), habits are specifically\ndistinct not only in respect of their objects and active principles,\nbut also in their relation to nature. Now, this happens in two ways.\nFirst, by reason of their suitableness or unsuitableness to nature.\nIn this way a good habit is specifically distinct from a bad habit:\nsince a good habit is one which disposes to an act suitable to the\nagent's nature, while an evil habit is one which disposes to an act\nunsuitable to nature. Thus, acts of virtue are suitable to human\nnature, since they are according to reason, whereas acts of vice are\ndiscordant from human nature, since they are against reason. Hence it\nis clear that habits are distinguished specifically by the difference\nof good and bad.\n\nSecondly, habits are distinguished in relation to nature, from the\nfact that one habit disposes to an act that is suitable to a lower\nnature, while another habit disposes to an act befitting a higher\nnature. And thus human virtue, which disposes to an act befitting\nhuman nature, is distinct from godlike or heroic virtue, which\ndisposes to an act befitting some higher nature.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The same habit may be about contraries in so far as\ncontraries agree in one common aspect. Never, however, does it happen\nthat contrary habits are in one species: since contrariety of habits\nfollows contrariety of aspect. Accordingly habits are divided into\ngood and bad, namely, inasmuch as one habit is good, and another bad;\nbut not by reason of one habit being [about] something good, and\nanother about something bad.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is not the good which is common to every being, that\nis a difference constituting the species of a habit; but some\ndeterminate good by reason of suitability to some determinate, viz.\nthe human, nature. In like manner the evil that constitutes a\ndifference of habits is not a pure privation, but something\ndeterminate repugnant to a determinate nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Several good habits about one same specific thing are\ndistinct in reference to their suitability to various natures, as\nstated above. But several bad habits in respect of one action are\ndistinct in reference to their diverse repugnance to that which is in\nkeeping with nature: thus, various vices about one same matter are\ncontrary to one virtue.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 54, Art. 4]\n\nWhether One Habit Is Made Up of Many Habits?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one habit is made up of many habits.\nFor whatever is engendered, not at once, but little by little, seems\nto be made up of several parts. But a habit is engendered, not at\nonce, but little by little out of several acts, as stated above\n(Q. 51, A. 3). Therefore one habit is made up of several.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a whole is made up of its parts. Now many parts are\nassigned to one habit: thus Tully assigns many parts of fortitude,\ntemperance, and other virtues. Therefore one habit is made up of many.\n\nObj. 3: Further, one conclusion suffices both for an act and for a\nhabit of scientific knowledge. But many conclusions belong to but one\nscience, to geometry, for instance, or to arithmetic. Therefore one\nhabit is made up of many.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A habit, since it is a quality, is a simple form.\nBut nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not\nmade up of many.\n\n_I answer that,_ A habit directed to operation, such as we are\nchiefly concerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now\nevery perfection should be in proportion with that which it perfects.\nHence, just as a power, while it is one, extends to many things, in\nso far as they have something in common, i.e. some general objective\naspect, so also a habit extends to many things, in so far as they are\nrelated to one, for instance, to some specific objective aspect, or\nto one nature, or to one principle, as was clearly stated above (AA.\n2, 3).\n\nIf then we consider a habit as to the extent of its object, we shall\nfind a certain multiplicity therein. But since this multiplicity is\ndirected to one thing, on which the habit is chiefly intent, hence it\nis that a habit is a simple quality, not composed to several habits,\neven though it extend to many things. For a habit does not extend to\nmany things save in relation to one, whence it derives its unity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: That a habit is engendered little by little, is due,\nnot to one part being engendered after another, but to the fact that\nthe subject does not acquire all at once a firm and difficultly\nchangeable disposition; and also to the fact that it begins by being\nimperfectly in the subject, and is gradually perfected. The same\napplies to other qualities.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The parts which are assigned to each cardinal virtue,\nare not integral parts that combine to form a whole; but subjective\nor potential parts, as we shall explain further on (Q. 57, A. 6, ad\n4; II-II, Q. 48).\n\nReply Obj. 3: In any science, he who acquires, by demonstration,\nscientific knowledge of one conclusion, has the habit indeed, yet\nimperfectly. And when he obtains, by demonstration, the scientific\nknowledge of another conclusion, no additional habit is engendered in\nhim: but the habit which was in him previously is perfected,\nforasmuch as it has increased in extent; because the conclusions and\ndemonstrations of one science are coordinate, and one flows from\nanother.\n________________________\n\nTREATISE ON HABITS IN PARTICULAR (QQ. 55-89):\nGOOD HABITS, i.e., VIRTUES (QQ. 55-70)\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 55\n\nOF THE VIRTUES, AS TO THEIR ESSENCE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe come now to the consideration of habits specifically. And since\nhabits, as we have said (Q. 54, A. 3), are divided into good and bad,\nwe must speak in the first place of good habits, which are virtues,\nand of other matters connected with them, namely the Gifts,\nBeatitudes and Fruits; in the second place, of bad habits, namely of\nvices and sins. Now five things must be considered about virtues:\n(1) the essence of virtue; (2) its subject; (3) the division of\nvirtue; (4) the cause of virtue; (5) certain properties of virtue.\n\nUnder the first head, there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether human virtue is a habit?\n\n(2) Whether it is an operative habit?\n\n(3) Whether it is a good habit?\n\n(4) Of the definition of virtue.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 55, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Human Virtue Is a Habit?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that human virtue is not a habit: For\nvirtue is \"the limit of power\" (De Coelo i, text. 116). But the limit\nof anything is reducible to the genus of that of which it is the\nlimit; as a point is reducible to the genus of line. Therefore virtue\nis reducible to the genus of power, and not to the genus of habit.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii) [*Retract. ix; cf.\nDe Lib. Arb. ii, 19] that \"virtue is good use of free-will.\" But use\nof free-will is an act. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but an act.\n\nObj. 3: Further, we do not merit by our habits, but by our actions:\notherwise a man would merit continually, even while asleep. But we do\nmerit by our virtues. Therefore virtues are not habits, but acts.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that \"virtue is\nthe order of love,\" and (QQ. lxxxiii, qu. 30) that \"the ordering\nwhich is called virtue consists in enjoying what we ought to enjoy,\nand using what we ought to use.\" Now order, or ordering, denominates\neither an action or a relation. Therefore virtue is not a habit, but\nan action or a relation.\n\nObj. 5: Further, just as there are human virtues, so are there\nnatural virtues. But natural virtues are not habits, but powers.\nNeither therefore are human virtues habits.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that science\nand virtue are habits.\n\n_I answer that,_ Virtue denotes a certain perfection of a power. Now\na thing's perfection is considered chiefly in regard to its end. But\nthe end of power is act. Wherefore power is said to be perfect,\naccording as it is determinate to its act.\n\nNow there are some powers which of themselves are determinate to\ntheir acts; for instance, the active natural powers. And therefore\nthese natural powers are in themselves called virtues. But the\nrational powers, which are proper to man, are not determinate to one\nparticular action, but are inclined indifferently to many: and they\nare determinate to acts by means of habits, as is clear from what we\nhave said above (Q. 49, A. 4). Therefore human virtues are habits.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sometimes we give the name of a virtue to that to which\nthe virtue is directed, namely, either to its object, or to its act:\nfor instance, we give the name Faith, to that which we believe, or to\nthe act of believing, as also to the habit by which we believe. When\ntherefore we say that \"virtue is the limit of power,\" virtue is taken\nfor the object of virtue. For the furthest point to which a power can\nreach, is said to be its virtue; for instance, if a man can carry a\nhundredweight and not more, his virtue [*In English we should say\n'strength,' which is the original signification of the Latin\n'virtus': thus we speak of an engine being so many horse-power, to\nindicate its 'strength'] is put at a hundredweight, and not at sixty.\nBut the objection takes virtue as being essentially the limit of\npower.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Good use of free-will is said to be a virtue, in the\nsame sense as above (ad 1); that is to say, because it is that to\nwhich virtue is directed as to its proper act. For the act of virtue\nis nothing else than the good use of free-will.\n\nReply Obj. 3: We are said to merit by something in two ways. First,\nas by merit itself, just as we are said to run by running; and thus\nwe merit by acts. Secondly, we are said to merit by something as by\nthe principle whereby we merit, as we are said to run by the motive\npower; and thus are we said to merit by virtues and habits.\n\nReply Obj. 4: When we say that virtue is the order or ordering of\nlove, we refer to the end to which virtue is ordered: because in us\nlove is set in order by virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Natural powers are of themselves determinate to one\nact: not so the rational powers. And so there is no comparison, as we\nhave said.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 55, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Human Virtue Is an Operative Habit?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to human virtue\nto be an operative habit. For Tully says (Tuscul. iv) that as health\nand beauty belong to the body, so virtue belongs to the soul. But\nhealth and beauty are not operative habits. Therefore neither is\nvirtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in natural things we find virtue not only in\nreference to act, but also in reference to being: as is clear from\nthe Philosopher (De Coelo i), since some have a virtue to be always,\nwhile some have a virtue to be not always, but at some definite time.\nNow as natural virtue is in natural things, so is human virtue in\nrational beings. Therefore also human virtue is referred not only to\nact, but also to being.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that\nvirtue \"is the disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best.\"\nNow the best thing to which man needs to be disposed by virtue is God\nHimself, as Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. 3, 6, 14) to Whom the\nsoul is disposed by being made like to Him. Therefore it seems that\nvirtue is a quality of the soul in reference to God, likening it, as\nit were, to Him; and not in reference to operation. It is not,\ntherefore, an operative habit.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 6) says that \"virtue\nof a thing is that which makes its work good.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Virtue, from the very nature of the word, implies\nsome perfection of power, as we have said above (A. 1). Wherefore,\nsince power [*The one Latin word _potentia_ is rendered\n'potentiality' in the first case, and 'power' in the second] is of\ntwo kinds, namely, power in reference to being, and power in\nreference to act; the perfection of each of these is called virtue.\nBut power in reference to being is on the part of matter, which is\npotential being, whereas power in reference to act, is on the part of\nthe form, which is the principle of action, since everything acts in\nso far as it is in act.\n\nNow man is so constituted that the body holds the place of matter,\nthe soul that of form. The body, indeed, man has in common with other\nanimals; and the same is to be said of the forces which are common to\nthe soul and body: and only those forces which are proper to the\nsoul, namely, the rational forces, belong to man alone. And\ntherefore, human virtue, of which we are speaking now, cannot belong\nto the body, but belongs only to that which is proper to the soul.\nWherefore human virtue does not imply reference to being, but rather\nto act. Consequently it is essential to human virtue to be an\noperative habit.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Mode of action follows on the disposition of the agent:\nfor such as a thing is, such is its act. And therefore, since virtue\nis the principle of some kind of operation, there must needs\npre-exist in the operator in respect of virtue some corresponding\ndisposition. Now virtue causes an ordered operation. Therefore virtue\nitself is an ordered disposition of the soul, in so far as, to wit,\nthe powers of the soul are in some way ordered to one another, and to\nthat which is outside. Hence virtue, inasmuch as it is a suitable\ndisposition of the soul, is like health and beauty, which are\nsuitable dispositions of the body. But this does not hinder virtue\nfrom being a principle of operation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Virtue which is referred to being is not proper to man;\nbut only that virtue which is referred to works of reason, which are\nproper to man.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As God's substance is His act, the highest likeness of\nman to God is in respect of some operation. Wherefore, as we have\nsaid above (Q. 3, A. 2), happiness or bliss by which man is made most\nperfectly conformed to God, and which is the end of human life,\nconsists in an operation.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 55, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Human Virtue Is a Good Habit?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not essential to virtue that it\nshould be a good habit. For sin is always taken in a bad sense. But\nthere is a virtue even of sin; according to 1 Cor. 15:56: \"The virtue\n[Douay: 'strength'] of sin is the Law.\" Therefore virtue is not\nalways a good habit.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not only\nreferred to good, but also to evil: according to Isa. 5: \"Woe to you\nthat are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness.\"\nTherefore virtue also is referred to good and evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to the Apostle (2 Cor. 12:9): \"Virtue\n[Douay: 'power'] is made perfect in infirmity.\" But infirmity is an\nevil. Therefore virtue is referred not only to good, but also to evil.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi): \"No one can\ndoubt that virtue makes the soul exceeding good\": and the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. ii, 6): \"Virtue is that which makes its possessor good,\nand his work good likewise.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As we have said above (A. 1), virtue implies a\nperfection of power: wherefore the virtue of a thing is fixed by the\nlimit of its power (De Coelo i). Now the limit of any power must\nneeds be good: for all evil implies defect; wherefore Dionysius says\n(Div. Hom. ii) that every evil is a weakness. And for this reason the\nvirtue of a thing must be regarded in reference to good. Therefore\nhuman virtue which is an operative habit, is a good habit, productive\nof good works.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as bad things are said metaphorically to be\nperfect, so are they said to be good: for we speak of a perfect thief\nor robber; and of a good thief or robber, as the Philosopher explains\n(Metaph. v, text. 21). In this way therefore virtue is applied to\nevil things: so that the \"virtue\" of sin is said to be law, in so far\nas occasionally sin is aggravated through the law, so as to attain to\nthe limit of its possibility.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The evil of drunkenness and excessive drink, consists\nin a falling away from the order of reason. Now it happens that,\ntogether with this falling away from reason, some lower power is\nperfect in reference to that which belongs to its own kind, even in\ndirect opposition to reason, or with some falling away therefrom. But\nthe perfection of that power, since it is compatible with a falling\naway from reason, cannot be called a human virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Reason is shown to be so much the more perfect,\naccording as it is able to overcome or endure more easily the\nweakness of the body and of the lower powers. And therefore human\nvirtue, which is attributed to reason, is said to be \"made perfect\nin infirmity,\" not of the reason indeed, but of the body and of the\nlower powers.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 55, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Virtue Is Suitably Defined?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the definition, usually given, of\nvirtue, is not suitable, to wit: \"Virtue is a good quality of the\nmind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use,\nwhich God works in us, without us.\" For virtue is man's goodness,\nsince virtue it is that makes its subject good. But goodness does not\nseem to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is therefore\nunsuitable to describe virtue as a \"good quality.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since\nit is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than\nquality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore \"good\" should\nnot be put in the definition of virtue, as a difference of quality.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3): \"When we come\nacross anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the field,\nit is something appertaining to the mind.\" But there are virtues even\nof the irrational parts; as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10).\nEvery virtue, therefore, is not a good quality \"of the mind.\"\n\nObj. 4: Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the\nrighteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. It is\ntherefore unsuitable to put \"righteous\" in the definition of virtue,\nwhen we say that virtue is that \"by which we live righteously.\"\n\nObj. 5: Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it.\nBut many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule, that\n\"pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them.\" It is\nuntrue, therefore, \"that no one can make bad use of virtue.\"\n\nObj. 6: Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine commenting\non John 15:11: \"He shall do greater things than these,\" says [*Tract.\nxxvii in Joan.: Serm. xv de Verb. Ap. 11]: \"He who created thee\nwithout thee, will not justify thee without thee.\" It is therefore\nunsuitable to say that \"God works virtue in us, without us.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ We have the authority of Augustine from whose\nwords this definition is gathered, and principally in _De Libero\nArbitrio_ ii, 19.\n\n_I answer that,_ This definition comprises perfectly the whole\nessential notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of\nanything is gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition\ncomprises all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue,\nas of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it\nis defined as \"a good quality\": for \"quality\" is the genus of virtue,\nand the difference, \"good.\" But the definition would be more suitable\nif for \"quality\" we substitute \"habit,\" which is the proximate genus.\n\nNow virtue has no matter \"out of which\" it is formed, as neither has\nany other accident; but it has matter \"about which\" it is concerned,\nand matter \"in which\" it exists, namely, the subject. The matter\nabout which virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be\nincluded in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue\nto a certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue\nin general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is\nmentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality \"of the mind.\"\n\nThe end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But\nit must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to\nevil, as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good,\nsometimes to evil; for instance, opinion is referred both to the true\nand to the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred\nto good: and so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are\nalways referred to evil, is expressed in the words \"by which we live\nrighteously\": and its distinction from those habits which are\nsometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, \"of\nwhich no one makes bad use.\"\n\nLastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this\ndefinition applies; and this is expressed in the words \"which God\nworks in us without us.\" If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the\ndefinition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or\ninfused.\n\nReply Obj. 1: That which is first seized by the intellect is being:\nwherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and\nconsequently as one, and as good, which are convertible with being.\nWherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and\nthat oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness.\nBut this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and\nhealth; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the\nnotion of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as\naccidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they\nthemselves had being, but because things are by them; so also are\nthey called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness,\nbut because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue\ncalled good, because by it something is good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not\ngood in general which is convertible with being, and which extends\nfurther than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to\nwhich Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) \"that the good of the soul is to\nbe in accord with reason.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul,\nexcept in so far as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i, 13).\nAnd therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts\nthose outward things right which come into human use, and are the\nproper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (Q. 60, A. 2;\nII-II, Q. 58, A. 8). But the righteousness which denotes order to a\ndue end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will,\nas stated above (Q. 19, A. 4), is common to all virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 5: One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for\ninstance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g. by hating it,\nor by being proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as\nprinciple of action, so that an act of virtue be evil.\n\nReply Obj. 6: Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any\naction on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of\nthe words, \"which God works in us without us.\" As to those things\nwhich are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action\non our part, for He works in every will and in every nature.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 56\n\nOF THE SUBJECT OF VIRTUE\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are\nsix points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul?\n\n(2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers?\n\n(3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue?\n\n(4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the\nsubject of virtue?\n\n(5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of\nvirtue?\n\n(6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Subject of Virtue Is a Power of the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power\nof the soul. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that \"virtue is\nthat by which we live righteously.\" But we live by the essence of the\nsoul, and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue is not a\npower, but in the essence of the soul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that \"virtue is\nthat which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise.\" But\nas work is set up by power, so he that has a virtue is set up by the\nessence of the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong to the power,\nany more than to the essence of the soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, power is in the second species of quality. But\nvirtue is a quality, as we have said above (Q. 55, A. 4): and quality\nis not the subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is not\nthe subject of virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ \"Virtue is the limit of power\" (De Coelo ii). But\nthe limit is in that of which it is the limit. Therefore virtue is in\na power of the soul.\n\n_I answer that,_ It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs\nto a power of the soul. First, from the notion of the very essence of\nvirtue, which implies perfection of a power; for perfection is in\nthat which it perfects. Secondly, from the fact that virtue is an\noperative habit, as we have said above (Q. 55, A. 2): for all\noperation proceeds from the soul through a power. Thirdly, from the\nfact that virtue disposes to that which is best: for the best is the\nend, which is either a thing's operation, or something acquired by an\noperation proceeding from the thing's power. Therefore a power of the\nsoul is the subject of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: \"To live\" may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is\ntaken for the very existence of the living thing: in this way it\nbelongs to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of\nexistence in the living thing. But sometimes \"to live\" is taken for\nthe operation of the living thing: in this sense, by virtue we live\nrighteously, inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous actions.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Good is either the end, or something referred to the\nend. And therefore, since the good of the worker consists in the\nwork, this fact also, that virtue makes the worker good, is referred\nto the work, and consequently, to the power.\n\nReply Obj. 3: One accident is said to be the subject of another, not\nas though one accident could uphold another; but because one accident\ninheres to substance by means of another, as color to the body by\nmeans of the surface; so that surface is said to be the subject of\ncolor. In this way a power of the soul is said to be the subject of\nvirtue.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 2]\n\nWhether One Virtue Can Be in Several Powers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers.\nFor habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various\nway from several powers: thus walking proceeds from the reason as\ndirecting, from the will as moving, and from the motive power as\nexecuting. Therefore also one habit can be in several powers.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that three\nthings are required for virtue, namely: \"to know, to will, and to\nwork steadfastly.\" But \"to know\" belongs to the intellect, and \"to\nwill\" belongs to the will. Therefore virtue can be in several powers.\n\nObj. 3: Further, prudence is in the reason since it is \"the right\nreason of things to be done\" (Ethic. vi, 5). And it is also in the\nwill: for it cannot exist together with a perverse will (Ethic. vi,\n12). Therefore one virtue can be in two powers.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The subject of virtue is a power of the soul. But\nthe same accident cannot be in several subjects. Therefore one virtue\ncannot be in several powers of the soul.\n\n_I answer that,_ It happens in two ways that one thing is subjected\nin two. First, so that it is in both on an equal footing. In this way\nit is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers: since diversity\nof powers follows the generic conditions of the objects, while\ndiversity of habits follows the specific conditions thereof: and so\nwherever there is diversity of powers, there is diversity of habits;\nbut not vice versa. In another way one thing can be subjected in two\nor more, not on an equal footing, but in a certain order. And thus\none virtue can belong to several powers, so that it is in one\nchiefly, while it extends to others by a kind of diffusion, or by way\nof a disposition, in so far as one power is moved by another, and one\npower receives from another.\n\nReply Obj. 1: One act cannot belong to several powers equally, and in\nthe same degree; but only from different points of view, and in\nvarious degrees.\n\nReply Obj. 2: \"To know\" is a condition required for moral virtue,\ninasmuch as moral virtue works according to right reason. But moral\nvirtue is essentially in the appetite.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Prudence is really subjected in reason: but it\npresupposes as its principle the rectitude of the will, as we shall\nsee further on (A. 3; Q. 57, A. 4).\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Intellect Can Be the Subject of Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intellect is not the subject of\nvirtue. For Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xv) that all virtue is\nlove. But the subject of love is not the intellect, but the\nappetitive power alone. Therefore no virtue is in the intellect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, virtue is referred to good, as is clear from what\nhas been said above (Q. 55, A. 3). Now good is not the object of the\nintellect, but of the appetitive power. Therefore the subject of\nvirtue is not the intellect, but the appetitive power.\n\nObj. 3: Further, virtue is that \"which makes its possessor good,\" as\nthe Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6). But the habit which perfects the\nintellect does not make its possessor good: since a man is not said\nto be a good man on account of his science or his art. Therefore the\nintellect is not the subject of virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The mind is chiefly called the intellect. But the\nsubject of virtue is the mind, as is clear from the definition, above\ngiven, of virtue (Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore the intellect is the\nsubject of virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ As we have said above (Q. 55, A. 3), a virtue is a\nhabit by which we work well. Now a habit may be directed to a good\nact in two ways. First, in so far as by the habit a man acquires an\naptness to a good act; for instance, by the habit of grammar man has\nthe aptness to speak correctly. But grammar does not make a man\nalways speak correctly: for a grammarian may be guilty of a barbarism\nor make a solecism: and the case is the same with other sciences and\narts. Secondly, a habit may confer not only aptness to act, but also\nthe right use of that aptness: for instance, justice not only gives\nman the prompt will to do just actions, but also makes him act justly.\n\nAnd since good, and, in like manner, being, is said of a thing\nsimply, in respect, not of what it is potentially, but of what it is\nactually: therefore from having habits of the latter sort, man is\nsaid simply to do good, and to be good; for instance, because he is\njust, or temperate; and in like manner as regards other such virtues.\nAnd since virtue is that \"which makes its possessor good, and his\nwork good likewise,\" these latter habits are called virtuous simply:\nbecause they make the work to be actually good, and the subject good\nsimply. But the first kind of habits are not called virtues simply:\nbecause they do not make the work good except in regard to a certain\naptness, nor do they make their possessor good simply. For through\nbeing gifted in science or art, a man is said to be good, not simply,\nbut relatively; for instance, a good grammarian or a good smith. And\nfor this reason science and art are often divided against virtue;\nwhile at other times they are called virtues (Ethic. vi, 2).\n\nHence the subject of a habit which is called a virtue in a relative\nsense, can be the intellect, and not only the practical intellect,\nbut also the speculative, without any reference to the will: for thus\nthe Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3) holds that science, wisdom and\nunderstanding, and also art, are intellectual virtues. But the\nsubject of a habit which is called a virtue simply, can only be the\nwill, or some power in so far as it is moved by the will. And the\nreason of this is, that the will moves to their acts all those other\npowers that are in some way rational, as we have said above (Q. 9, A.\n1; Q. 17, AA. 1, 5; I, Q. 82, A. 4): and therefore if man do well\nactually, this is because he has a good will. Therefore the virtue\nwhich makes a man to do well actually, and not merely to have the\naptness to do well, must be either in the will itself; or in some\npower as moved by the will.\n\nNow it happens that the intellect is moved by the will, just as are\nthe other powers: for a man considers something actually, because he\nwills to do so. And therefore the intellect, in so far as it is\nsubordinate to the will, can be the subject of virtue absolutely so\ncalled. And in this way the speculative intellect, or the reason, is\nthe subject of Faith: for the intellect is moved by the command of\nthe will to assent to what is of faith: for \"no man believeth, unless\nhe will\" [*Augustine: Tract. xxvi in Joan.]. But the practical\nintellect is the subject of prudence. For since prudence is the right\nreason of things to be done, it is a condition thereof that man be\nrightly disposed in regard to the principles of this reason of things\nto be done, that is in regard to their ends, to which man is rightly\ndisposed by the rectitude of the will, just as to the principles of\nspeculative truth he is rightly disposed by the natural light of the\nactive intellect. And therefore as the subject of science, which is\nthe right reason of speculative truths, is the speculative intellect\nin its relation to the active intellect, so the subject of prudence\nis the practical intellect in its relation to the right will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The saying of Augustine is to be understood of virtue\nsimply so called: not that every virtue is love simply: but that it\ndepends in some way on love, in so far as it depends on the will,\nwhose first movement consists in love, as we have said above (Q. 25,\nAA. 1, 2, 3; Q. 27, A. 4; I, Q. 20, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The good of each thing is its end: and therefore, as\ntruth is the end of the intellect, so to know truth is the good act\nof the intellect. Whence the habit, which perfects the intellect in\nregard to the knowledge of truth, whether speculative or practical,\nis a virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This objection considers virtue simply so called.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Irascible and Concupiscible Powers Are the Subject of\nVirtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the irascible and concupiscible\npowers cannot be the subject of virtue. For these powers are common\nto us and dumb animals. But we are now speaking of virtue as proper\nto man, since for this reason it is called human virtue. It is\ntherefore impossible for human virtue to be in the irascible and\nconcupiscible powers which are parts of the sensitive appetite, as we\nhave said in the First Part (Q. 81, A. 2).\n\nObj. 2: Further, the sensitive appetite is a power which makes use of\na corporeal organ. But the good of virtue cannot be in man's body:\nfor the Apostle says (Rom. 7): \"I know that good does not dwell in my\nflesh.\" Therefore the sensitive appetite cannot be the subject of\nvirtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine proves (De Moribus Eccl. v) that virtue is\nnot in the body but in the soul, for the reason that the body is\nruled by the soul: wherefore it is entirely due to his soul that a\nman make good use of his body: \"For instance, if my coachman, through\nobedience to my orders, guides well the horses which he is driving;\nthis is all due to me.\" But just as the soul rules the body, so also\ndoes the reason rule the sensitive appetite. Therefore that the\nirascible and concupiscible powers are rightly ruled, is entirely due\nto the rational powers. Now \"virtue is that by which we live\nrightly,\" as we have said above (Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore virtue is\nnot in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but only in the\nrational powers.\n\nObj. 4: Further, \"the principal act of moral virtue is choice\"\n(Ethic. viii, 13). Now choice is not an act of the irascible and\nconcupiscible powers, but of the rational power, as we have said\nabove (Q. 13, A. 2). Therefore moral virtue is not in the irascible\nand concupiscible powers, but in the reason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Fortitude is assigned to the irascible power, and\ntemperance to the concupiscible power. Whence the Philosopher (Ethic.\niii, 10) says that \"these virtues belong to the irrational part of\nthe soul.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The irascible and concupiscible powers can be\nconsidered in two ways. First, in themselves, in so far as they are\nparts of the sensitive appetite: and in this way they are not\ncompetent to be the subject of virtue. Secondly, they can be\nconsidered as participating in the reason, from the fact that they\nhave a natural aptitude to obey reason. And thus the irascible or\nconcupiscible power can be the subject of human virtue: for, in so\nfar as it participates in the reason, it is the principle of a human\nact. And to these powers we must needs assign virtues.\n\nFor it is clear that there are some virtues in the irascible and\nconcupiscible powers. Because an act, which proceeds from one power\naccording as it is moved by another power, cannot be perfect, unless\nboth powers be well disposed to the act: for instance, the act of a\ncraftsman cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and his\ninstrument be well disposed to act. Therefore in the matter of the\noperations of the irascible and concupiscible powers, according as\nthey are moved by reason, there must needs be some habit perfecting\nin respect of acting well, not only the reason, but also the\nirascible and concupiscible powers. And since the good disposition of\nthe power which moves through being moved, depends on its conformity\nwith the power that moves it: therefore the virtue which is in the\nirascible and concupiscible powers is nothing else but a certain\nhabitual conformity of these powers to reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The irascible and concupiscible powers considered in\nthemselves, as parts of the sensitive appetite, are common to us and\ndumb animals. But in so far as they are rational by participation,\nand are obedient to the reason, they are proper to man. And in this\nway they can be the subject of human virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as human flesh has not of itself the good of\nvirtue, but is made the instrument of a virtuous act, inasmuch as\nbeing moved by reason, we \"yield our members to serve justice\"; so\nalso, the irascible and concupiscible powers, of themselves indeed,\nhave not the good of virtue, but rather the infection of the _fomes:_\nwhereas, inasmuch as they are in conformity with reason, the good of\nreason is begotten in them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The body is ruled by the soul, and the irascible and\nconcupiscible powers by the reason, but in different ways. For the\nbody obeys the soul blindly without any contradiction, in those\nthings in which it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the soul:\nwhence the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that the \"soul rules the\nbody with a despotic command\" as the master rules his slave:\nwherefore the entire movement of the body is referred to the soul.\nFor this reason virtue is not in the body, but in the soul. But the\nirascible and concupiscible powers do not obey the reason blindly; on\nthe contrary, they have their own proper movements, by which, at\ntimes, they go against reason, whence the Philosopher says (Polit. i,\n3) that the \"reason rules the irascible and concupiscible powers by a\npolitical command\" such as that by which free men are ruled, who have\nin some respects a will of their own. And for this reason also must\nthere be some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible powers, by\nwhich these powers are well disposed to act.\n\nReply Obj. 4: In choice there are two things, namely, the intention\nof the end, and this belongs to the moral virtue; and the\npreferential choice of that which is unto the end, and this belongs\nto prudence (Ethic. vi, 2, 5). But that the irascible and\nconcupiscible powers have a right intention of the end in regard to\nthe passions of the soul, is due to the good disposition of these\npowers. And therefore those moral virtues which are concerned with\nthe passions are in the irascible and concupiscible powers, but\nprudence is in the reason.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Sensitive Powers of Apprehension Are the Subject of\nVirtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is possible for virtue to be in\nthe interior sensitive powers of apprehension. For the sensitive\nappetite can be the subject of virtue, in so far as it obeys reason.\nBut the interior sensitive powers of apprehension obey reason: for\nthe powers of imagination, of cogitation, and of memory [*Cf. I, Q.\n78, A. 4] act at the command of reason. Therefore in these powers\nthere can be virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as the rational appetite, which is the will, can be\nhindered or helped in its act, by the sensitive appetite, so also can\nthe intellect or reason be hindered or helped by the powers mentioned\nabove. As, therefore, there can be virtue in the interior powers of\nappetite, so also can there be virtue in the interior powers of\napprehension.\n\nObj. 3: Further, prudence is a virtue, of which Cicero (De Invent.\nRhetor. ii) says that memory is a part. Therefore also in the power\nof memory there can be a virtue: and in like manner, in the other\ninterior sensitive powers of apprehension.\n\n_On the contrary,_ All virtues are either intellectual or moral\n(Ethic. ii, 1). Now all the moral virtues are in the appetite; while\nthe intellectual virtues are in the intellect or reason, as is clear\nfrom _Ethic._ vi, 1. Therefore there is no virtue in the interior\nsensitive powers of apprehension.\n\n_I answer that,_ In the interior sensitive powers of apprehension\nthere are some habits. And this is made clear principally from what\nthe Philosopher says (De Memoria ii), that \"in remembering one thing\nafter another, we become used to it; and use is a second nature.\" Now\na habit of use is nothing else than a habit acquired by use, which is\nlike unto nature. Wherefore Tully says of virtue in his _Rhetoric_\nthat \"it is a habit like a second nature in accord with reason.\" Yet,\nin man, that which he acquires by use, in his memory and other\nsensitive powers of apprehension, is not a habit properly so called,\nbut something annexed to the habits of the intellective faculty, as\nwe have said above (Q. 50, A. 4, ad 3).\n\nNevertheless even if there be habits in such powers, they cannot be\nvirtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never happens\nthat anything but good is done: and so virtue must needs be in that\npower which consummates the good act. But the knowledge of truth is\nnot consummated in the sensitive powers of apprehension: for such\npowers prepare the way to the intellective knowledge. And therefore\nin these powers there are none of the virtues, by which we know\ntruth: these are rather in the intellect or reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The sensitive appetite is related to the will, which is\nthe rational appetite, through being moved by it. And therefore the\nact of the appetitive power is consummated in the sensitive appetite:\nand for this reason the sensitive appetite is the subject of virtue.\nWhereas the sensitive powers of apprehension are related to the\nintellect rather through moving it; for the reason that the phantasms\nare related to the intellective soul, as colors to sight (De Anima\niii, text. 18). And therefore the act of knowledge is terminated in\nthe intellect; and for this reason the cognoscitive virtues are in\nthe intellect itself, or the reason.\n\nAnd thus is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Memory is not a part of prudence, as species is of a\ngenus, as though memory were a virtue properly so called: but one of\nthe conditions required for prudence is a good memory; so that, in a\nfashion, it is after the manner of an integral part.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Will Can Be the Subject of Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will is not the subject of\nvirtue. Because no habit is required for that which belongs to a\npower by reason of its very nature. But since the will is in the\nreason, it is of the very essence of the will, according to the\nPhilosopher (De Anima iii, text. 42), to tend to that which is good,\naccording to reason. And to this good every virtue is ordered, since\neverything naturally desires its own proper good; for virtue, as\nTully says in his Rhetoric, is a \"habit like a second nature in\naccord with reason.\" Therefore the will is not the subject of virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every virtue is either intellectual or moral (Ethic.\ni, 13; ii, 1). But intellectual virtue is subjected in the intellect\nand reason, and not in the will: while moral virtue is subjected in\nthe irascible and concupiscible powers which are rational by\nparticipation. Therefore no virtue is subjected in the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all human acts, to which virtues are ordained, are\nvoluntary. If therefore there be a virtue in the will in respect of\nsome human acts, in like manner there will be a virtue in the will in\nrespect of all human acts. Either, therefore, there will be no virtue\nin any other power, or there will be two virtues ordained to the same\nact, which seems unreasonable. Therefore the will cannot be the\nsubject of virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Greater perfection is required in the mover than\nin the moved. But the will moves the irascible and concupiscible\npowers. Much more therefore should there be virtue in the will than\nin the irascible and concupiscible powers.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since the habit perfects the power in reference to\nact, then does the power need a habit perfecting it unto doing well,\nwhich habit is a virtue, when the power's own proper nature does not\nsuffice for the purpose.\n\nNow the proper nature of a power is seen in its relation to its\nobject. Since, therefore, as we have said above (Q. 19, A. 3), the\nobject of the will is the good of reason proportionate to the will,\nin respect of this the will does not need a virtue perfecting it. But\nif man's will is confronted with a good that exceeds its capacity,\nwhether as regards the whole human species, such as Divine good,\nwhich transcends the limits of human nature, or as regards the\nindividual, such as the good of one's neighbor, then does the will\nneed virtue. And therefore such virtues as those which direct man's\naffections to God or to his neighbor are subjected in the will, as\ncharity, justice, and such like.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This objection is true of those virtues which are\nordained to the willer's own good; such as temperance and fortitude,\nwhich are concerned with the human passions, and the like, as is\nclear from what we have said (Q. 35, A. 6).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not only the irascible and concupiscible powers are\nrational by participation but \"the appetitive power altogether,\" i.e.\nin its entirety (Ethic. i, 13). Now the will is included in the\nappetitive power. And therefore whatever virtue is in the will must\nbe a moral virtue, unless it be theological, as we shall see later on\n(Q. 62, A. 3).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Some virtues are directed to the good of moderated\npassion, which is the proper good of this or that man: and in these\ncases there is no need for virtue in the will, for the nature of the\npower suffices for the purpose, as we have said. This need exists\nonly in the case of virtues which are directed to some extrinsic good.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 57\n\nOF THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe now have to consider the various kinds of virtue: and (1) the\nintellectual virtues; (2) the moral virtues; (3) the theological\nvirtues. Concerning the first there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether habits of the speculative intellect are virtues?\n\n(2) Whether they are three, namely, wisdom, science and understanding?\n\n(3) Whether the intellectual habit, which is art, is a virtue?\n\n(4) Whether prudence is a virtue distinct from art?\n\n(5) Whether prudence is a virtue necessary to man?\n\n(6) Whether \"eubulia,\" \"synesis\" and \"gnome\" are virtues annexed to\nprudence?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 57, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Habits of the Speculative Intellect Are Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the habits of the speculative\nintellect are not virtues. For virtue is an operative habit, as we\nhave said above (Q. 55, A. 2). But speculative habits are not\noperative: for speculative matter is distinct from practical, i.e.\noperative matter. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect\nare not virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, virtue is about those things by which man is made\nhappy or blessed: for \"happiness is the reward of virtue\" (Ethic. i,\n9). Now intellectual habits do not consider human acts or other human\ngoods, by which man acquires happiness, but rather things pertaining\nto nature or to God. Therefore such like habits cannot be called\nvirtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, science is a speculative habit. But science and\nvirtue are distinct from one another as genera which are not\nsubalternate, as the Philosopher proves in _Topic._ iv. Therefore\nspeculative habits are not virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The speculative habits alone consider necessary\nthings which cannot be otherwise than they are. Now the Philosopher\n(Ethic. vi, 1) places certain intellectual virtues in that part of\nthe soul which considers necessary things that cannot be otherwise\nthan they are. Therefore the habits of the speculative intellect are\nvirtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since every virtue is ordained to some good, as\nstated above (Q. 55, A. 3), a habit, as we have already observed (Q.\n56, A. 3), may be called a virtue for two reasons: first, because it\nconfers aptness in doing good; secondly, because besides aptness, it\nconfers the right use of it. The latter condition, as above stated\n(Q. 55, A. 3), belongs to those habits alone which affect the\nappetitive part of the soul: since it is the soul's appetitive power\nthat puts all the powers and habits to their respective uses.\n\nSince, then, the habits of the speculative intellect do not perfect\nthe appetitive part, nor affect it in any way, but only the\nintellective part; they may indeed be called virtues in so far as\nthey confer aptness for a good work, viz. the consideration of truth\n(since this is the good work of the intellect): yet they are not\ncalled virtues in the second way, as though they conferred the right\nuse of a power or habit. For if a man possess a habit of speculative\nscience, it does not follow that he is inclined to make use of it,\nbut he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which\nhe has scientific knowledge: that he make use of the knowledge which\nhe has, is due to the motion of his will. Consequently a virtue which\nperfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of\nthese speculative habits. And in this way too there can be merit in\nthe acts of these habits, if they be done out of charity: thus\nGregory says (Moral. vi) that the \"contemplative life has greater\nmerit than the active life.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Work is of two kinds, exterior and interior.\nAccordingly the practical or active faculty which is contrasted with\nthe speculative faculty, is concerned with exterior work, to which\nthe speculative habit is not ordained. Yet it is ordained to the\ninterior act of the intellect which is to consider the truth. And in\nthis way it is an operative habit.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Virtue is about certain things in two ways. In the\nfirst place a virtue is about its object. And thus these speculative\nvirtues are not about those things whereby man is made happy; except\nperhaps, in so far as the word \"whereby\" indicates the efficient\ncause or object of complete happiness, i.e. God, Who is the supreme\nobject of contemplation. Secondly, a virtue is said to be about its\nacts: and in this sense the intellectual virtues are about those\nthings whereby a man is made happy; both because the acts of these\nvirtues can be meritorious, as stated above, and because they are a\nkind of beginning of perfect bliss, which consists in the\ncontemplation of truth, as we have already stated (Q. 3, A. 7).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Science is contrasted with virtue taken in the second\nsense, wherein it belongs to the appetitive faculty.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 57, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Are Only Three Habits of the Speculative Intellect, Viz.\nWisdom, Science and Understanding?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem unfitting to distinguish three virtues of\nthe speculative intellect, viz. wisdom, science and understanding.\nBecause a species is a kind of science, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 7.\nTherefore wisdom should not be condivided with science among the\nintellectual virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in differentiating powers, habits and acts in\nrespect of their objects, we consider chiefly the formal aspect of\nthese objects, as we have already explained (I, Q. 77, A. 3).\nTherefore diversity of habits is taken, not from their material\nobjects, but from the formal aspect of those objects. Now the\nprinciple of a demonstration is the formal aspect under which the\nconclusion is known. Therefore the understanding of principles should\nnot be set down as a habit or virtue distinct from the knowledge of\nconclusions.\n\nObj. 3: Further, an intellectual virtue is one which resides in the\nessentially rational faculty. Now even the speculative reason employs\nthe dialectic syllogism for the sake of argument, just as it employs\nthe demonstrative syllogism. Therefore as science, which is the\nresult of a demonstrative syllogism, is set down as an intellectual\nvirtue, so also should opinion be.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 1) reckons these three\nalone as being intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, science and\nunderstanding.\n\n_I answer that,_ As already stated (A. 1), the virtues of the\nspeculative intellect are those which perfect the speculative\nintellect for the consideration of truth: for this is its good work.\nNow a truth is subject to a twofold consideration--as known in\nitself, and as known through another. What is known in itself, is as\na _principle,_ and is at once understood by the intellect: wherefore\nthe habit that perfects the intellect for the consideration of such\ntruth is called _understanding,_ which is the habit of principles.\n\nOn the other hand, a truth which is known through another, is\nunderstood by the intellect, not at once, but by means of the\nreason's inquiry, and is as a _term._ This may happen in two ways:\nfirst, so that it is the last in some particular genus; secondly, so\nthat it is the ultimate term of all human knowledge. And, since\n\"things that are knowable last from our standpoint, are knowable\nfirst and chiefly in their nature\" (Phys. i, text. 2, 3); hence that\nwhich is last with respect to all human knowledge, is that which is\nknowable first and chiefly in its nature. And about these is\n_wisdom,_ which considers the highest causes, as stated in _Metaph._\ni, 1, 2. Wherefore it rightly judges all things and sets them in\norder, because there can be no perfect and universal judgment that is\nnot based on the first causes. But in regard to that which is last in\nthis or that genus of knowable matter, it is _science_ which perfects\nthe intellect. Wherefore according to the different kinds of knowable\nmatter, there are different habits of scientific knowledge; whereas\nthere is but one wisdom.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that\nwhich is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions\nfrom principles. But since it has something proper to itself above\nthe other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them all, not only as to\ntheir conclusions, but also as to their first principles, therefore\nit is a more perfect virtue than science.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When the formal aspect of the object is referred to a\npower or habit by one same act, there is no distinction of habit or\npower in respect of the formal aspect and of the material object:\nthus it belongs to the same power of sight to see both color, and\nlight, which is the formal aspect under which color is seen, and is\nseen at the same time as the color. On the other hand, the principles\nof a demonstration can be considered apart, without the conclusion\nbeing considered at all. Again they can be considered together with\nthe conclusions, since the conclusions can be deduced from them.\nAccordingly, to consider the principles in this second way, belongs\nto science, which considers the conclusions also: while to consider\nthe principles in themselves belongs to understanding.\n\nConsequently, if we consider the point aright, these three virtues\nare distinct, not as being on a par with one another, but in a\ncertain order. The same is to be observed in potential wholes,\nwherein one part is more perfect than another; for instance, the\nrational soul is more perfect than the sensitive soul; and the\nsensitive, than the vegetal. For it is thus that science depends on\nunderstanding as on a virtue of higher degree: and both of these\ndepend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest place, and containing\nbeneath itself both understanding and science, by judging both of the\nconclusions of science, and of the principles on which they are based.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 55, AA. 3, 4), a virtuous habit has\na fixed relation to good, and is nowise referable to evil. Now the\ngood of the intellect is truth, and falsehood is its evil. Wherefore\nthose habits alone are called intellectual virtues, whereby we tell\nthe truth and never tell a falsehood. But opinion and suspicion can\nbe about both truth and falsehood: and so, as stated in _Ethic._ vi,\n3, they are not intellectual virtues.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 57, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Intellectual Habit, Art, Is a Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that art is not an intellectual virtue.\nFor Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 18, 19) that \"no one makes bad\nuse of virtue.\" But one may make bad use of art: for a craftsman can\nwork badly according to the knowledge of his art. Therefore art is\nnot a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there is no virtue of a virtue. But \"there is a\nvirtue of art,\" according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5).\nTherefore art is not a virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the liberal arts excel the mechanical arts. But just\nas the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are\nspeculative. Therefore, if art were an intellectual virtue, it would\nhave to be reckoned among the speculative virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3, 4) says that art is\na virtue; and yet he does not reckon it among the speculative\nvirtues, which, according to him, reside in the scientific part of\nthe soul.\n\n_I answer that,_ Art is nothing else but \"the right reason about\ncertain works to be made.\" And yet the good of these things depends,\nnot on man's appetitive faculty being affected in this or that way,\nbut on the goodness of the work done. For a craftsman, as such, is\ncommendable, not for the will with which he does a work, but for the\nquality of the work. Art, therefore, properly speaking, is an\noperative habit. And yet it has something in common with the\nspeculative habits: since the quality of the object considered by the\nlatter is a matter of concern to them also, but not how the human\nappetite may be affected towards that object. For as long as the\ngeometrician demonstrates the truth, it matters not how his\nappetitive faculty may be affected, whether he be joyful or angry:\neven as neither does this matter in a craftsman, as we have observed.\nAnd so art has the nature of a virtue in the same way as the\nspeculative habits, in so far, to wit, as neither art nor speculative\nhabit makes a good work as regards the use of the habit, which is the\nproperty of a virtue that perfects the appetite, but only as regards\nthe aptness to work well.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When anyone endowed with an art produces bad\nworkmanship, this is not the work of that art, in fact it is contrary\nto the art: even as when a man lies, while knowing the truth, his\nwords are not in accord with his knowledge, but contrary thereto.\nWherefore, just as science has always a relation to good, as stated\nabove (A. 2, ad 3), so it is with art: and it is for this reason that\nit is called a virtue. And yet it falls short of being a perfect\nvirtue, because it does not make its possessor to use it well; for\nwhich purpose something further is requisite: although there cannot\nbe a good use without the art.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In order that man may make good use of the art he has,\nhe needs a good will, which is perfected by moral virtue; and for\nthis reason the Philosopher says that there is a virtue of art;\nnamely, a moral virtue, in so far as the good use of art requires a\nmoral virtue. For it is evident that a craftsman is inclined by\njustice, which rectifies his will, to do his work faithfully.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even in speculative matters there is something by way\nof work: e.g. the making of a syllogism or of a fitting speech, or\nthe work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained\nto such like works of the speculative reason, are, by a kind of\ncomparison, called arts indeed, but \"liberal\" arts, in order to\ndistinguish them from those arts that are ordained to works done by\nthe body, which arts are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the body\nis in servile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul,\nis free (_liber_). On the other hand, those sciences which are not\nordained to any such like work, are called sciences simply, and not\narts. Nor, if the liberal arts be more excellent, does it follow that\nthe notion of art is more applicable to them.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 57, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Prudence Is a Distinct Virtue from Art?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a distinct virtue\nfrom art. For art is the right reason about certain works. But\ndiversity of works does not make a habit cease to be an art; since\nthere are various arts about works widely different. Since therefore\nprudence is also right reason about works, it seems that it too\nshould be reckoned a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, prudence has more in common with art than the\nspeculative habits have; for they are both \"about contingent matters\nthat may be otherwise than they are\" (Ethic. vi, 4, 5). Now some\nspeculative habits are called arts. Much more, therefore, should\nprudence be called an art.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it belongs to prudence, \"to be of good counsel\"\n(Ethic. vi, 5). But counselling takes place in certain arts also, as\nstated in _Ethic._ iii, 3, e.g. in the arts of warfare, of\nseamanship, and of medicine. Therefore prudence is not distinct from\nart.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher distinguishes prudence from art\n(Ethic. vi, 5).\n\n_I answer that,_ Where the nature of virtue differs, there is a\ndifferent kind of virtue. Now it has been stated above (A. 1; Q. 56,\nA. 3) that some habits have the nature of virtue, through merely\nconferring aptness for a good work: while some habits are virtues,\nnot only through conferring aptness for a good work, but also through\nconferring the use. But art confers the mere aptness for good work;\nsince it does not regard the appetite; whereas prudence confers not\nonly aptness for a good work, but also the use: for it regards the\nappetite, since it presupposes the rectitude thereof.\n\nThe reason for this difference is that art is the \"right reason of\nthings to be made\"; whereas prudence is the \"right reason of things\nto be done.\" Now \"making\" and \"doing\" differ, as stated in _Metaph._\nix, text. 16, in that \"making\" is an action passing into outward\nmatter, e.g. \"to build,\" \"to saw,\" and so forth; whereas \"doing\" is\nan action abiding in the agent, e.g. \"to see,\" \"to will,\" and the\nlike. Accordingly prudence stands in the same relation to such like\nhuman actions, consisting in the use of powers and habits, as art\ndoes to outward making: since each is the perfect reason about the\nthings with which it is concerned. But perfection and rectitude of\nreason in speculative matters, depend on the principles from which\nreason argues; just as we have said above (A. 2, ad 2) that science\ndepends on and presupposes understanding, which is the habit of\nprinciples. Now in human acts the end is what the principles are in\nspeculative matters, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 8. Consequently, it\nis requisite for prudence, which is right reason about things to be\ndone, that man be well disposed with regard to the ends: and this\ndepends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence\nthere is need of a moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite. On the\nother hand the good of things made by art is not the good of man's\nappetite, but the good of those things themselves: wherefore art does\nnot presuppose rectitude of the appetite. The consequence is that\nmore praise is given to a craftsman who is at fault willingly, than\nto one who is unwillingly; whereas it is more contrary to prudence to\nsin willingly than unwillingly, since rectitude of the will is\nessential to prudence, but not to art. Accordingly it is evident that\nprudence is a virtue distinct from art.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The various kinds of things made by art are all\nexternal to man: hence they do not cause a different kind of virtue.\nBut prudence is right reason about human acts themselves: hence it is\na distinct kind of virtue, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Prudence has more in common with art than a speculative\nhabit has, if we consider their subject and matter: for they are both\nin the thinking part of the soul, and about things that may be\notherwise than they are. But if we consider them as virtues, then art\nhas more in common with the speculative habits, as is clear from what\nhas been said.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding\nman's entire life, and the end of human life. But in some arts there\nis counsel about matters concerning the ends proper to those arts.\nHence some men, in so far as they are good counselors in matters of\nwarfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots,\nbut not simply prudent: only those are simply prudent who give good\ncounsel about all the concerns of life.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 57, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Prudence Is a Virtue Necessary to Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a virtue necessary to\nlead a good life. For as art is to things that are made, of which it\nis the right reason, so is prudence to things that are done, in\nrespect of which we judge of a man's life: for prudence is the right\nreason about these things, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 5. Now art is\nnot necessary in things that are made, save in order that they be\nmade, but not after they have been made. Neither, therefore is\nprudence necessary to man in order to lead a good life, after he has\nbecome virtuous; but perhaps only in order that he may become\nvirtuous.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"It is by prudence that we are of good counsel,\" as\nstated in _Ethic._ vi, 5. But man can act not only from his own, but\nalso from another's good counsel. Therefore man does not need\nprudence in order to lead a good life, but it is enough that he\nfollow the counsels of prudent men.\n\nObj. 3: Further, an intellectual virtue is one by which one always\ntells the truth, and never a falsehood. But this does not seem to be\nthe case with prudence: for it is not human never to err in taking\ncounsel about what is to be done; since human actions are about\nthings that may be otherwise than they are. Hence it is written (Wis.\n9:14): \"The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels\nuncertain.\" Therefore it seems that prudence should not be reckoned\nan intellectual virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned with other virtues necessary for\nhuman life, when it is written (Wis. 8:7) of Divine Wisdom: \"She\nteacheth temperance and prudence and justice and fortitude, which\nare such things as men can have nothing more profitable in life.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Prudence is a virtue most necessary for human life.\nFor a good life consists in good deeds. Now in order to do good\ndeeds, it matters not only what a man does, but also how he does it;\nto wit, that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse\nor passion. And, since choice is about things in reference to the\nend, rectitude of choice requires two things: namely, the due end,\nand something suitably ordained to that due end. Now man is suitably\ndirected to his due end by a virtue which perfects the soul in the\nappetitive part, the object of which is the good and the end. And to\nthat which is suitably ordained to the due end man needs to be\nrightly disposed by a habit in his reason, because counsel and\nchoice, which are about things ordained to the end, are acts of the\nreason. Consequently an intellectual virtue is needed in the reason,\nto perfect the reason, and make it suitably affected towards things\nordained to the end; and this virtue is prudence. Consequently\nprudence is a virtue necessary to lead a good life.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The good of an art is to be found, not in the\ncraftsman, but in the product of the art, since art is right reason\nabout things to be made: for since the making of a thing passes into\nexternal matter, it is a perfection not of the maker, but of the\nthing made, even as movement is the act of the thing moved: and art\nis concerned with the making of things. On the other hand, the good\nof prudence is in the active principle, whose activity is its\nperfection: for prudence is right reason about things to be done, as\nstated above (A. 4). Consequently art does not require of the\ncraftsman that his act be a good act, but that his work be good.\nRather would it be necessary for the thing made to act well (e.g.\nthat a knife should carve well, or that a saw should cut well), if it\nwere proper to such things to act, rather than to be acted on,\nbecause they have not dominion over their actions. Wherefore the\ncraftsman needs art, not that he may live well, but that he may\nproduce a good work of art, and have it in good keeping: whereas\nprudence is necessary to man, that he may lead a good life, and not\nmerely that he may be a good man.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When a man does a good deed, not of his own counsel,\nbut moved by that of another, his deed is not yet quite perfect, as\nregards his reason in directing him and his appetite in moving him.\nWherefore, if he do a good deed, he does not do well simply; and yet\nthis is required in order that he may lead a good life.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated in _Ethic._ vi, 2, truth is not the same for\nthe practical as for the speculative intellect. Because the truth of\nthe speculative intellect depends on conformity between the intellect\nand the thing. And since the intellect cannot be infallibly in\nconformity with things in contingent matters, but only in necessary\nmatters, therefore no speculative habit about contingent things is an\nintellectual virtue, but only such as is about necessary things. On\nthe other hand, the truth of the practical intellect depends on\nconformity with right appetite. This conformity has no place in\nnecessary matters, which are not affected by the human will; but only\nin contingent matters which can be effected by us, whether they be\nmatters of interior action, or the products of external work. Hence\nit is only about contingent matters that an intellectual virtue is\nassigned to the practical intellect, viz. art, as regards things to\nbe made, and prudence, as regards things to be done.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 57, Art. 6]\n\nWhether \"Eubulia,\" \"Synesis,\" and \"Gnome\" Are Virtues Annexed to\nPrudence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that \"_eubulia, synesis_, and _gnome_\" are\nunfittingly assigned as virtues annexed to prudence. For _eubulia_ is\n\"a habit whereby we take good counsel\" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now it\n\"belongs to prudence to take good counsel,\" as stated (Ethic. vi, 9).\nTherefore _eubulia_ is not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather\nis prudence itself.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it belongs to the higher to judge the lower. The\nhighest virtue would therefore seem to be the one whose act is\njudgment. Now _synesis_ enables us to judge well. Therefore _synesis_\nis not a virtue annexed to prudence, but rather is a principal virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as there are various matters to pass judgment\non, so are there different points on which one has to take counsel.\nBut there is one virtue referring to all matters of counsel.\nTherefore, in order to judge well of what has to be done, there is no\nneed, besides _synesis,_ of the virtue of _gnome_.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) mentions three other\nparts of prudence; viz. \"memory of the past, understanding of the\npresent, and foresight of the future.\" Moreover, Macrobius (Super\nSomn. Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. \"caution, docility,\" and the\nlike. Therefore it seems that the above are not the only virtues\nannexed to prudence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of the Philosopher (Ethic.\nvi, 9, 10, 11), who assigns these three virtues as being annexed to\nprudence.\n\n_I answer that,_ Wherever several powers are subordinate to one\nanother, that power is the highest which is ordained to the highest\nact. Now there are three acts of reason in respect of anything done\nby man: the first of these is counsel; the second, judgment; the\nthird, command. The first two correspond to those acts of the\nspeculative intellect, which are inquiry and judgment, for counsel is\na kind of inquiry: but the third is proper to the practical\nintellect, in so far as this is ordained to operation; for reason\ndoes not have to command in things that man cannot do. Now it is\nevident that in things done by man, the chief act is that of command,\nto which all the rest are subordinate. Consequently, that virtue\nwhich perfects the command, viz. prudence, as obtaining the highest\nplace, has other secondary virtues annexed to it, viz. _eustochia_,\nwhich perfects counsel; and _synesis_ and _gnome_, which are parts of\nprudence in relation to judgment, and of whose distinction we shall\nspeak further on (ad 3).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Prudence makes us be of good counsel, not as though its\nimmediate act consisted in being of good counsel, but because it\nperfects the latter act by means of a subordinate virtue, viz.\n_euboulia_.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Judgment about what is to be done is directed to\nsomething further: for it may happen in some matter of action that a\nman's judgment is sound, while his execution is wrong. The matter\ndoes not attain to its final complement until the reason has\ncommanded aright in the point of what has to be done.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Judgment of anything should be based on that thing's\nproper principles. But inquiry does not reach to the proper\nprinciples: because, if we were in possession of these, we should\nneed no more to inquire, the truth would be already discovered. Hence\nonly one virtue is directed to being of good counsel, wheres there\nare two virtues for good judgment: because difference is based not on\ncommon but on proper principles. Consequently, even in speculative\nmatters, there is one science of dialectics, which inquires about all\nmatters; whereas demonstrative sciences, which pronounce judgment,\ndiffer according to their different objects. _Synesis_ and _gnome_\ndiffer in respect of the different rules on which judgment is based:\nfor _synesis_ judges of actions according to the common law; while\n_gnome_ bases its judgment on the natural law, in those cases where\nthe common law fails to apply, as we shall explain further on (II-II,\nQ. 51, A. 4).\n\nReply Obj. 4: Memory, understanding and foresight, as also caution\nand docility and the like, are not virtues distinct from prudence:\nbut are, as it were, integral parts thereof, in so far as they are\nall requisite for perfect prudence. There are, moreover, subjective\nparts or species of prudence, e.g. domestic and political economy,\nand the like. But the three first names are, in a fashion, potential\nparts of prudence; because they are subordinate thereto, as secondary\nvirtues to a principal virtue: and we shall speak of them later\n(II-II, Q. 48, seqq.).\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 58\n\nOF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES\n(In Five Articles)\n\nWe must now consider moral virtues. We shall speak (1) of the\ndifference between them and intellectual virtues; (2) of their\ndistinction, one from another, in respect of their proper matter;\n(3) of the difference between the chief or cardinal virtues and\nthe others.\n\nUnder the first head there are five points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether every virtue is a moral virtue?\n\n(2) Whether moral virtue differs from intellectual virtue?\n\n(3) Whether virtue is adequately divided into moral and intellectual\nvirtue?\n\n(4) Whether there can be moral without intellectual virtue?\n\n(5) Whether, on the other hand, there can be intellectual without\nmoral virtue?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Every Virtue Is a Moral Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that every virtue is a moral virtue.\nBecause moral virtue is so called from the Latin _mos,_ i.e. custom.\nNow, we can accustom ourselves to the acts of all the virtues.\nTherefore every virtue is a moral virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that moral\nvirtue is \"a habit of choosing the rational mean.\" But every virtue\nis a habit of choosing: since the acts of any virtue can be done\nfrom choice. And, moreover, every virtue consists in following the\nrational mean in some way, as we shall explain further on (Q. 64,\nAA. 1, 2, 3). Therefore every virtue is a moral virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that \"virtue is a\nhabit like a second nature, in accord with reason.\" But since every\nhuman virtue is directed to man's good, it must be in accord with\nreason: since man's good \"consists in that which agrees with his\nreason,\" as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore every virtue\nis a moral virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher [says] (Ethic. i, 13): \"When we\nspeak of a man's morals, we do not say that he is wise or\nintelligent, but that he is gentle or sober.\" Accordingly, then,\nwisdom and understanding are not moral virtues: and yet they are\nvirtues, as stated above (Q. 57, A. 2). Therefore not every virtue\nis a moral virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ In order to answer this question clearly, we must\nconsider the meaning of the Latin word _mos;_ for thus we shall be\nable to discover what a _moral_ virtue is. Now _mos_ has a twofold\nmeaning. For sometimes it means custom, in which sense we read (Acts\n15:1): \"Except you be circumcised after the manner (_morem_) of\nMoses, you cannot be saved.\" Sometimes it means a natural or\nquasi-natural inclination to do some particular action, in which\nsense the word is applied to dumb animals. Thus we read (2 Macc. 1:2)\nthat \"rushing violently upon the enemy, like lions [*Leonum more,\ni.e. as lions are in the habit of doing], they slew them\": and the\nword is used in the same sense in Ps. 67:7, where we read: \"Who\nmaketh men of one manner (_moris_) to dwell in a house.\" For both\nthese significations there is but one word in Latin; but in the Greek\nthere is a distinct word for each, for the word _ethos_is written\nsometimes with a long, and sometimes a short _e._\n\nNow _moral_ virtue is so called from _mos_ in the sense of a natural\nor quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action. And the\nother meaning of _mos,_ i.e. _custom,_ is akin to this: because\ncustom becomes a second nature, and produces an inclination similar\nto a natural one. But it is evident that inclination to an action\nbelongs properly to the appetitive power, whose function it is to\nmove all the powers to their acts, as explained above (Q. 9, A. 1).\nTherefore not every virtue is a moral virtue, but only those that are\nin the appetitive faculty.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument takes _mos_ in the sense of _custom._\n\nReply Obj. 2: Every act of virtue can be done from choice: but no\nvirtue makes us choose aright, save that which is in the appetitive\npart of the soul: for it has been stated above that choice is an act\nof the appetitive faculty (Q. 13, A. 1). Wherefore a habit of\nchoosing, i.e. a habit which is the principle whereby we choose, is\nthat habit alone which perfects the appetitive faculty: although the\nacts of other habits also may be a matter of choice.\n\nReply Obj. 3: \"Nature is the principle of movement\" (Phys. ii, text.\n3). Now to move the faculties to act is the proper function of the\nappetitive power. Consequently to become as a second nature by\nconsenting to the reason, is proper to those virtues which are in the\nappetitive faculty.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Moral Virtue Differs from Intellectual Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not differ from\nintellectual virtue. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei iv, 21) \"that\nvirtue is the art of right conduct.\" But art is an intellectual\nvirtue. Therefore moral and intellectual virtue do not differ.\n\nObj. 2: Further, some authors put science in the definition of\nvirtues: thus some define perseverance as a \"science or habit\nregarding those things to which we should hold or not hold\"; and\nholiness as \"a science which makes man to be faithful and to do his\nduty to God.\" Now science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore moral\nvirtue should not be distinguished from intellectual virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 6) that \"virtue is the\nrectitude and perfection of reason.\" But this belongs to the\nintellectual virtues, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Therefore moral\nvirtue does not differ from intellectual.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a thing does not differ from that which is included\nin its definition. But intellectual virtue is included in the\ndefinition of moral virtue: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6)\nthat \"moral virtue is a habit of choosing the mean appointed by\nreason as a prudent man would appoint it.\" Now this right reason that\nfixes the mean of moral virtue, belongs to an intellectual virtue, as\nstated in _Ethic._ vi, 13. Therefore moral virtue does not differ\nfrom intellectual.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is stated in _Ethic._ i, 13 that \"there are two\nkinds of virtue: some we call intellectual; some moral.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Reason is the first principle of all human acts; and\nwhatever other principles of human acts may be found, they obey\nreason somewhat, but in various ways. For some obey reason blindly\nand without any contradiction whatever: such are the limbs of the\nbody, provided they be in a healthy condition, for as soon as reason\ncommands, the hand or the foot proceeds to action. Hence the\nPhilosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that \"the soul rules the body like a\ndespot,\" i.e. as a master rules his slave, who has no right to rebel.\nAccordingly some held that all the active principles in man are\nsubordinate to reason in this way. If this were true, for man to act\nwell it would suffice that his reason be perfect. Consequently, since\nvirtue is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good actions,\nit would follow that it is only in the reason, so that there would be\nnone but intellectual virtues. This was the opinion of Socrates, who\nsaid \"every virtue is a kind of prudence,\" as stated in _Ethic._ vi,\n13. Hence he maintained that as long as man is in possession of\nknowledge, he cannot sin; and that every one who sins, does so\nthrough ignorance.\n\nNow this is based on a false supposition. Because the appetitive\nfaculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain power of\nopposition; wherefore the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that \"reason\ncommands the appetitive faculty by a politic power,\" whereby a man\nrules over subjects that are free, having a certain right of\nopposition. Hence Augustine says on Ps. 118 (Serm. 8) that \"sometimes\nwe understand (what is right) while desire is slow, or follows not at\nall,\" in so far as the habits or passions of the appetitive faculty\ncause the use of reason to be impeded in some particular action. And\nin this way, there is some truth in the saying of Socrates that so\nlong as a man is in possession of knowledge he does not sin:\nprovided, however, that this knowledge is made to include the use of\nreason in this individual act of choice.\n\nAccordingly for a man to do a good deed, it is requisite not only\nthat his reason be well disposed by means of a habit of intellectual\nvirtue; but also that his appetite be well disposed by means of a\nhabit of moral virtue. And so moral differs from intellectual virtue,\neven as the appetite differs from the reason. Hence just as the\nappetite is the principle of human acts, in so far as it partakes of\nreason, so are moral habits to be considered virtues in so far as\nthey are in conformity with reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine usually applies the term \"art\" to any form of\nright reason; in which sense art includes prudence which is the right\nreason about things to be done, even as art is the right reason about\nthings to be made. Accordingly, when he says that \"virtue is the art\nof right conduct,\" this applies to prudence essentially; but to other\nvirtues, by participation, for as much as they are directed by\nprudence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All such definitions, by whomsoever given, were based\non the Socratic theory, and should be explained according to what we\nhave said about art (ad 1).\n\nThe same applies to the Third Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Right reason which is in accord with prudence is\nincluded in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its\nessence, but as something belonging by way of participation to all\nthe moral virtues, in so far as they are all under the direction of\nprudence.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Virtue Is Adequately Divided into Moral and Intellectual?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that virtue is not adequately divided into\nmoral and intellectual. For prudence seems to be a mean between moral\nand intellectual virtue, since it is reckoned among the intellectual\nvirtues (Ethic. vi, 3, 5); and again is placed by all among the four\ncardinal virtues, which are moral virtues, as we shall show further\non (Q. 61, A. 1). Therefore virtue is not adequately divided into\nintellectual and moral, as though there were no mean between them.\n\nObj. 2: Further, continency, perseverance, and patience are not\nreckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral\nvirtues; since they do not reduce the passions to a mean, and are\nconsistent with an abundance of passion. Therefore virtue is not\nadequately divided into intellectual and moral.\n\nObj. 3: Further, faith, hope, and charity are virtues. Yet they are\nnot intellectual virtues: for there are only five of these, viz.\nscience, wisdom, understanding, prudence, and art, as stated above\n(Q. 57, AA. 2, 3, 5). Neither are they moral virtues; since they are\nnot about the passions, which are the chief concern of moral virtue.\nTherefore virtue is not adequately divided into intellectual and\nmoral.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that \"virtue\nis twofold, intellectual and moral.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Human virtue is a habit perfecting man in view of\nhis doing good deeds. Now, in man there are but two principles of\nhuman actions, viz. the intellect or reason and the appetite: for\nthese are the two principles of movement in man as stated in _De\nAnima_ iii, text. 48. Consequently every human virtue must needs be a\nperfection of one of these principles. Accordingly if it perfects\nman's speculative or practical intellect in order that his deed may\nbe good, it will be an intellectual virtue: whereas if it perfects\nhis appetite, it will be a moral virtue. It follows therefore that\nevery human virtue is either intellectual or moral.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Prudence is essentially an intellectual virtue. But\nconsidered on the part of its matter, it has something in common with\nthe moral virtues: for it is right reason about things to be done, as\nstated above (Q. 57, A. 4). It is in this sense that it is reckoned\nwith the moral virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Continency and perseverance are not perfections of the\nsensitive appetite. This is clear from the fact that passions abound\nin the continent and persevering man, which would not be the case if\nhis sensitive appetite were perfected by a habit making it\nconformable to reason. Continency and perseverance are, however,\nperfections of the rational faculty, and withstand the passions lest\nreason be led astray. But they fall short of being virtues: since\nintellectual virtue, which makes reason to hold itself well in\nrespect of moral matters, presupposes a right appetite of the end, so\nthat it may hold itself aright in respect of principles, i.e. the\nends, on which it builds its argument: and this is wanting in the\ncontinent and persevering man. Nor again can an action proceeding\nfrom two principles be perfect, unless each principle be perfected by\nthe habit corresponding to that operation: thus, however perfect be\nthe principal agent employing an instrument, it will produce an\nimperfect effect, if the instrument be not well disposed also. Hence\nif the sensitive faculty, which is moved by the rational faculty, is\nnot perfect; however perfect the rational faculty may be, the\nresulting action will be imperfect: and consequently the principle of\nthat action will not be a virtue. And for this reason, continency,\ndesisting from pleasures, and perseverance in the midst of pains, are\nnot virtues, but something less than a virtue, as the Philosopher\nmaintains (Ethic. vii, 1, 9).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Faith, hope, and charity are superhuman virtues: for\nthey are virtues of man as sharing in the grace of God.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 4]\n\nWhether There Can Be Moral Without Intellectual Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that moral can be without intellectual\nvirtue. Because moral virtue, as Cicero says (De Invent. Rhet. ii) is\n\"a habit like a second nature in accord with reason.\" Now though\nnature may be in accord with some sovereign reason that moves it,\nthere is no need for that reason to be united to nature in the same\nsubject, as is evident of natural things devoid of knowledge.\nTherefore in a man there may be a moral virtue like a second nature,\ninclining him to consent to his reason, without his reason being\nperfected by an intellectual virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, by means of intellectual virtue man obtains perfect\nuse of reason. But it happens at times that men are virtuous and\nacceptable to God, without being vigorous in the use of reason.\nTherefore it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual.\n\nObj. 3: Further moral virtue makes us inclined to do good works. But\nsome, without depending on the judgment of reason, have a natural\ninclination to do good works. Therefore moral virtues can be without\nintellectual virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxii) that \"the other\nvirtues, unless we do prudently what we desire to do, cannot be real\nvirtues.\" But prudence is an intellectual virtue, as stated above (Q.\n57, A. 5). Therefore moral virtues cannot be without intellectual\nvirtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ Moral virtue can be without some of the intellectual\nvirtues, viz. wisdom, science, and art; but not without understanding\nand prudence. Moral virtue cannot be without prudence, because it is\na habit of choosing, i.e. making us choose well. Now in order that a\nchoice be good, two things are required. First, that the intention be\ndirected to a due end; and this is done by moral virtue, which\ninclines the appetitive faculty to the good that is in accord with\nreason, which is a due end. Secondly, that man take rightly those\nthings which have reference to the end: and this he cannot do unless\nhis reason counsel, judge and command aright, which is the function\nof prudence and the virtues annexed to it, as stated above (Q. 57,\nAA. 5, 6). Wherefore there can be no moral virtue without prudence:\nand consequently neither can there be without understanding. For it\nis by the virtue of understanding that we know self-evident\nprinciples both in speculative and in practical matters. Consequently\njust as right reason in speculative matters, in so far as it proceeds\nfrom naturally known principles, presupposes the understanding of\nthose principles, so also does prudence, which is the right reason\nabout things to be done.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The inclination of nature in things devoid of reason is\nwithout choice: wherefore such an inclination does not of necessity\nrequire reason. But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice:\nand consequently in order that it may be perfect it requires that\nreason be perfected by intellectual virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man may be virtuous without having full use of reason\nas to everything, provided he have it with regard to those things\nwhich have to be done virtuously. In this way all virtuous men have\nfull use of reason. Hence those who seem to be simple, through lack\nof worldly cunning, may possibly be prudent, according to Matt.\n10:16: \"Be ye therefore prudent (Douay: 'wise') as serpents, and\nsimple as doves.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind\nof beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger\nthis inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it\nbe accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting\nmeans towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the\nfaster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more grievously\nwill it be hurt. And consequently, although moral virtue be not right\nreason, as Socrates held, yet not only is it \"according to right\nreason,\" in so far as it inclines man to that which is, according to\nright reason, as the Platonists maintained [*Cf. Plato, Meno xli.];\nbut also it needs to be \"joined with right reason,\" as Aristotle\ndeclares (Ethic. vi, 13).\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 58, Art. 5]\n\nWhether There Can Be Intellectual Without Moral Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there can be intellectual without\nmoral virtue. Because perfection of what precedes does not depend on\nthe perfection of what follows. Now reason precedes and moves the\nsensitive appetite. Therefore intellectual virtue, which is a\nperfection of the reason, does not depend on moral virtue, which is a\nperfection of the appetitive faculty; and can be without it.\n\nObj. 2: Further, morals are the matter of prudence, even as things\nmakeable are the matter of art. Now art can be without its proper\nmatter, as a smith without iron. Therefore prudence can be without\nthe moral virtues, although of all the intellectual virtues, it seems\nmost akin to the moral virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, prudence is \"a virtue whereby we are of good\ncounsel\" (Ethic. vi, 9). Now many are of good counsel without having\nthe moral virtues. Therefore prudence can be without a moral virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ To wish to do evil is directly opposed to moral\nvirtue; and yet it is not opposed to anything that can be without\nmoral virtue. Now it is contrary to prudence \"to sin willingly\"\n(Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore prudence cannot be without moral virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ Other intellectual virtues can, but prudence cannot,\nbe without moral virtue. The reason for this is that prudence is the\nright reason about things to be done (and this, not merely in\ngeneral, but also in particular); about which things actions are. Now\nright reason demands principles from which reason proceeds to argue.\nAnd when reason argues about particular cases, it needs not only\nuniversal but also particular principles. As to universal principles\nof action, man is rightly disposed by the natural understanding of\nprinciples, whereby he understands that he should do no evil; or\nagain by some practical science. But this is not enough in order that\nman may reason aright about particular cases. For it happens\nsometimes that the aforesaid universal principle, known by means of\nunderstanding or science, is destroyed in a particular case by a\npassion: thus to one who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is\novercome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is\nopposed to the universal judgment of his reason. Consequently, as by\nthe habit of natural understanding or of science, man is made to be\nrightly disposed in regard to the universal principles of action; so,\nin order that he be rightly disposed with regard to the particular\nprinciples of action, viz. the ends, he needs to be perfected by\ncertain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to\njudge aright to the end. This is done by moral virtue: for the\nvirtuous man judges aright of the end of virtue, because \"such a man\nis, such does the end seem to him\" (Ethic. iii, 5). Consequently the\nright reason about things to be done, viz. prudence, requires man to\nhave moral virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Reason, as apprehending the end, precedes the appetite\nfor the end: but appetite for the end precedes the reason, as arguing\nabout the choice of the means, which is the concern of prudence. Even\nso, in speculative matters the understanding of principles is the\nfoundation on which the syllogism of the reason is based.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It does not depend on the disposition of our appetite\nwhether we judge well or ill of the principles of art, as it does,\nwhen we judge of the end which is the principle in moral matters: in\nthe former case our judgment depends on reason alone. Hence art does\nnot require a virtue perfecting the appetite, as prudence does.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Prudence not only helps us to be of good counsel, but\nalso to judge and command well. This is not possible unless the\nimpediment of the passions, destroying the judgment and command of\nprudence, be removed; and this is done by moral virtue.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 59\n\nOF MORAL VIRTUE IN RELATION TO THE PASSIONS\n(In Five Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the difference of one moral virtue from another.\nAnd since those moral virtues which are about the passions, differ\naccordingly to the difference of passions, we must consider (1) the\nrelation of virtue to passion; (2) the different kinds of moral\nvirtue in relation to the passions. Under the first head there are\nfive points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether moral virtue is a passion?\n\n(2) Whether there can be moral virtue with passion?\n\n(3) Whether sorrow is compatible with moral virtue?\n\n(4) Whether every moral virtue is about a passion?\n\n(5) Whether there can be moral virtue without passion?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Moral Virtue Is a Passion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that moral virtue is a passion. Because\nthe mean is of the same genus as the extremes. But moral virtue is a\nmean between two passions. Therefore moral virtue is a passion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, virtue and vice, being contrary to one another, are\nin the same genus. But some passions are reckoned to be vices, such\nas envy and anger. Therefore some passions are virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, pity is a passion, since it is sorrow for another's\nills, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 8). Now \"Cicero the renowned orator\ndid not hesitate to call pity a virtue,\" as Augustine states in _De\nCiv. Dei_ ix, 5. Therefore a passion may be a moral virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 5 that \"passions are\nneither virtues nor vices.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Moral virtue cannot be a passion. This is clear for\nthree reasons. First, because a passion is a movement of the sensitive\nappetite, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3): whereas moral virtue is not\na movement, but rather a principle of the movement of the appetite,\nbeing a kind of habit. Secondly, because passions are not in\nthemselves good or evil. For man's good or evil is something in\nreference to reason: wherefore the passions, considered in\nthemselves, are referable both to good and evil, for as much as they\nmay accord or disaccord with reason. Now nothing of this sort can be\na virtue: since virtue is referable to good alone, as stated above\n(Q. 55, A. 3). Thirdly, because, granted that some passions are, in\nsome way, referable to good only, or to evil only; even then the\nmovement of passion, as passion, begins in the appetite, and ends in\nthe reason, since the appetite tends to conformity with reason. On\nthe other hand, the movement of virtue is the reverse, for it begins\nin the reason and ends in the appetite, inasmuch as the latter is\nmoved by reason. Hence the definition of moral virtue (Ethic. ii, 6)\nstates that it is \"a habit of choosing the mean appointed by reason\nas a prudent man would appoint it.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Virtue is a mean between passions, not by reason of its\nessence, but on account of its effect; because, to wit, it\nestablishes the mean between passions.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil deeds,\nit is evident that no passion is a vice. But if vice is taken to mean\nsin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a passion from being a\nvice, or, on the other hand, from concurring in an act of virtue; in\nso far as a passion is either opposed to reason or in accordance with\nreason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Pity is said to be a virtue, i.e. an act of virtue, in\nso far as \"that movement of the soul is obedient to reason\"; viz.\n\"when pity is bestowed without violating right, as when the poor are\nrelieved, or the penitent forgiven,\" as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei\nix, 5). But if by pity we understand a habit perfecting man so that\nhe bestows pity reasonably, nothing hinders pity, in this sense, from\nbeing a virtue. The same applies to similar passions.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Can Be Moral Virtue with Passion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that moral virtue cannot be with passion.\nFor the Philosopher says (Topic. iv) that \"a gentle man is one who is\nnot passionate; but a patient man is one who is passionate but does\nnot give way.\" The same applies to all the moral virtues. Therefore\nall moral virtues are without passion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, virtue is a right affection of the soul, as health\nis to the body, as stated _Phys._ vii, text. 17: wherefore \"virtue is\na kind of health of the soul,\" as Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv). But\nthe soul's passions are \"the soul's diseases,\" as he says in the same\nbook. Now health is incompatible with disease. Therefore neither is\npassion compatible with virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, moral virtue requires perfect use of reason even in\nparticular matters. But the passions are an obstacle to this: for the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that \"pleasures destroy the judgment\nof prudence\": and Sallust says (Catilin.) that \"when they,\" i.e. the\nsoul's passions, \"interfere, it is not easy for the mind to grasp the\ntruth.\" Therefore passion is incompatible with moral virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6): \"If the will\nis perverse, these movements,\" viz. the passions, \"are perverse also:\nbut if it is upright, they are not only blameless, but even\npraiseworthy.\" But nothing praiseworthy is incompatible with moral\nvirtue. Therefore moral virtue does not exclude the passions, but is\nconsistent with them.\n\n_I answer that,_ The Stoics and Peripatetics disagreed on this point,\nas Augustine relates (De Civ. Dei ix, 4). For the Stoics held that\nthe soul's passions cannot be in a wise or virtuous man: whereas the\nPeripatetics, who were founded by Aristotle, as Augustine says (De\nCiv. Dei ix, 4), maintained that the passions are compatible with\nmoral virtue, if they be reduced to the mean.\n\nThis difference, as Augustine observes (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), was one\nof words rather than of opinions. Because the Stoics, through not\ndiscriminating between the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, and\nthe sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and\nconcupiscible, did not, as the Peripatetics did, distinguish the\npassions from the other affections of the human soul, in the point of\ntheir being movements of the sensitive appetite, whereas the other\nemotions of the soul, which are not passions, are movements of the\nintellective appetite or will; but only in the point of the passions\nbeing, as they maintained, any emotions in disaccord with reason.\nThese emotions could not be in a wise or virtuous man if they arose\ndeliberately: while it would be possible for them to be in a wise\nman, if they arose suddenly: because, in the words of Aulus Gellius\n[*Noct. Attic. xix, 1], quoted by Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 4), \"it\nis not in our power to call up the visions of the soul, known as its\nfancies; and when they arise from awesome things, they must needs\ndisturb the mind of a wise man, so that he is slightly startled by\nfear, or depressed with sorrow,\" in so far as \"these passions\nforestall the use of reason without his approving of such things or\nconsenting thereto.\"\n\nAccordingly, if the passions be taken for inordinate emotions, they\ncannot be in a virtuous man, so that he consent to them deliberately;\nas the Stoics maintained. But if the passions be taken for any\nmovements of the sensitive appetite, they can be in a virtuous man,\nin so far as they are subordinate to reason. Hence Aristotle says\n(Ethic. ii, 3) that \"some describe virtue as being a kind of freedom\nfrom passion and disturbance; this is incorrect, because the\nassertion should be qualified\": they should have said virtue is\nfreedom from those passions \"that are not as they should be as to\nmanner and time.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher quotes this, as well as many other\nexamples in his books on Logic, in order to illustrate, not his own\nmind, but that of others. It was the opinion of the Stoics that the\npassions of the soul were incompatible with virtue: and the\nPhilosopher rejects this opinion (Ethic. ii, 3), when he says that\nvirtue is not freedom from passion. It may be said, however, that\nwhen he says \"a gentle man is not passionate,\" we are to understand\nthis of inordinate passion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This and all similar arguments which Tully brings\nforward in _De Tusc. Quaest._ iv take the passions in the execution\nof reason's command.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When a passion forestalls the judgment of reason, so as\nto prevail on the mind to give its consent, it hinders counsel and\nthe judgment of reason. But when it follows that judgment, as through\nbeing commanded by reason, it helps towards the execution of reason's\ncommand.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Sorrow Is Compatible with Moral Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sorrow is incompatible with virtue.\nBecause the virtues are effects of wisdom, according to Wis. 8:7:\n\"She,\" i.e. Divine wisdom, \"teacheth temperance, and prudence, and\njustice, and fortitude.\" Now the \"conversation\" of wisdom \"hath no\nbitterness,\" as we read further on (verse 16). Therefore sorrow is\nincompatible with virtue also.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sorrow is a hindrance to work, as the Philosopher\nstates (Ethic. vii, 13; x, 5). But a hindrance to good works is\nincompatible with virtue. Therefore sorrow is incompatible with\nvirtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Tully calls sorrow a disease of the mind (De Tusc.\nQuaest. iv). But disease of the mind is incompatible with virtue,\nwhich is a good condition of the mind. Therefore sorrow is opposed to\nvirtue and is incompatible with it.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Christ was perfect in virtue. But there was sorrow\nin Him, for He said (Matt. 26:38): \"My soul is sorrowful even unto\ndeath.\" Therefore sorrow is compatible with virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 8), the Stoics\nheld that in the mind of the wise man there are three _eupatheiai_,\ni.e. \"three good passions,\" in place of the three disturbances: viz.\ninstead of covetousness, \"desire\"; instead of mirth, \"joy\"; instead\nof fear, \"caution.\" But they denied that anything corresponding to\nsorrow could be in the mind of a wise man, for two reasons.\n\nFirst, because sorrow is for an evil that is already present. Now\nthey held that no evil can happen to a wise man: for they thought\nthat, just as man's only good is virtue, and bodily goods are no good\nto man; so man's only evil is vice, which cannot be in a virtuous\nman. But this is unreasonable. For, since man is composed of soul and\nbody, whatever conduces to preserve the life of the body, is some\ngood to man; yet not his supreme good, because he can abuse it.\nConsequently the evil which is contrary to this good can be in a wise\nman, and can cause him moderate sorrow. Again, although a virtuous\nman can be without grave sin, yet no man is to be found to live\nwithout committing slight sins, according to 1 John 1:8: \"If we say\nthat we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.\" A third reason is because\na virtuous man, though not actually in a state of sin, may have been\nso in the past. And he is to be commended if he sorrow for that sin,\naccording to 2 Cor. 7:10: \"The sorrow that is according to God\nworketh penance steadfast unto salvation.\" Fourthly, because he may\npraiseworthily sorrow for another's sin. Therefore sorrow is\ncompatible with moral virtue in the same way as the other passions\nare when moderated by reason.\n\nTheir second reason for holding this opinion was that sorrow is about\nevil present, whereas fear is for evil to come: even as pleasure is\nabout a present good, while desire is for a future good. Now the\nenjoyment of a good possessed, or the desire to have good that one\npossesses not, may be consistent with virtue: but depression of the\nmind resulting from sorrow for a present evil, is altogether contrary\nto reason: wherefore it is incompatible with virtue. But this is\nunreasonable. For there is an evil which can be present to the\nvirtuous man, as we have just stated; which evil is rejected by\nreason. Wherefore the sensitive appetite follows reason's rejection\nby sorrowing for that evil; yet moderately, according as reason\ndictates. Now it pertains to virtue that the sensitive appetite be\nconformed to reason, as stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Wherefore\nmoderated sorrow for an object which ought to make us sorrowful, is a\nmark of virtue; as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6, 7).\nMoreover, this proves useful for avoiding evil: since, just as good\nis more readily sought for the sake of pleasure, so is evil more\nundauntedly shunned on account of sorrow.\n\nAccordingly we must allow that sorrow for things pertaining to virtue\nis incompatible with virtue: since virtue rejoices in its own. On the\nother hand, virtue sorrows moderately for all that thwarts virtue, no\nmatter how.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The passage quoted proves that the wise man is not made\nsorrowful by wisdom. Yet he sorrows for anything that hinders wisdom.\nConsequently there is no room for sorrow in the blessed, in whom\nthere can be no hindrance to wisdom.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sorrow hinders the work that makes us sorrowful: but it\nhelps us to do more readily whatever banishes sorrow.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Immoderate sorrow is a disease of the mind: but\nmoderate sorrow is the mark of a well-conditioned mind, according to\nthe present state of life.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 4]\n\nWhether All the Moral Virtues Are About the Passions?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all the moral virtues are about the\npassions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that \"moral virtue\nis about objects of pleasure and sorrow.\" But pleasure and sorrow are\npassions, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4; Q. 31, A. 1; Q. 35, AA. 1,\n2). Therefore all the moral virtues are about the passions.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the subject of the moral virtues is a faculty which\nis rational by participation, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. i,\n13). But the passions are in this part of the soul, as stated above\n(Q. 22, A. 3). Therefore every moral virtue is about the passions.\n\nObj. 3: Further, some passion is to be found in every moral virtue:\nand so either all are about the passions, or none are. But some are\nabout the passions, as fortitude and temperance, as stated in\n_Ethic._ iii, 6, 10. Therefore all the moral virtues are about the\npassions.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Justice, which is a moral virtue, is not about the\npassions; as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1, seqq.\n\n_I answer that,_ Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the\nsoul by directing it to good as defined by reason. Now good as\ndefined by reason is that which is moderated or directed by reason.\nConsequently there are moral virtues about all matters that are\nsubject to reason's direction and moderation. Now reason directs, not\nonly the passions of the sensitive appetite, but also the operations\nof the intellective appetite, i.e. the will, which is not the subject\nof a passion, as stated above (Q. 22, A. 3). Therefore not all the\nmoral virtues are about passions, but some are about passions, some\nabout operations.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The moral virtues are not all about pleasures and\nsorrows, as being their proper matter; but as being something\nresulting from their proper acts. For every virtuous man rejoices in\nacts of virtue, and sorrows for the contrary. Hence the Philosopher,\nafter the words quoted, adds, \"if virtues are about actions and\npassions; now every action and passion is followed by pleasure or\nsorrow, so that in this way virtue is about pleasures and sorrows,\"\nviz. as about something that results from virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not only the sensitive appetite which is the subject of\nthe passions, is rational by participation, but also the will, where\nthere are no passions, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Some virtues have passions as their proper matter, but\nsome virtues not. Hence the comparison does not hold for all cases.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 59, Art. 5]\n\nWhether There Can Be Moral Virtue Without Passion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion.\nFor the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the\npassions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is\naltogether without passion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from its\ncontrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the passions\nincline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence (Rom. 7:5) they\nare called \"passions of sins.\" Therefore perfect virtue is altogether\nwithout passion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as\nAugustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does all\nthings without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is\nwithout any passion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ \"No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds,\" as\nstated in _Ethic._ i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice\ncannot be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be.\n\n_I answer that,_ If we take the passions as being inordinate\nemotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect\nvirtue is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any\nmovement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues,\nwhich are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be\nwithout passions. The reason for this is that otherwise it would\nfollow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether\nidle: whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers\nsubordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them\nexecute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts.\nWherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due\nexternal acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper\nregulated movements.\n\nThose moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but\nabout operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue is justice:\nbecause it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a\npassion. Nevertheless, joy results from the act of justice; at least\nin the will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be\nincreased through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into\nthe sensitive appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the\nmovement of the higher, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 7; Q. 24, A. 3).\nWherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a\nvirtue is, the more does it cause passion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces\nordinate passion.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to\nsin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The good of anything depends on the condition of its\nnature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels, as\nthere is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels is\naltogether without passion, as it is without a body: whereas the good\noperation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the\nbody's help.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 60\n\nHOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)\n\nWe must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another:\nunder which head there are five points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?\n\n(2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are\ndistinct from those which are about passions?\n\n(3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?\n\n(4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different\npassions?\n\n(5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects\nof the passions?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Is Only One Moral Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is only one moral virtue.\nBecause just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason\nwhich is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their\ninclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral\nvirtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all\nmoral acts, viz. prudence. Therefore there is also but one moral\nvirtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations.\n\nObj. 2: Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material\nobjects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the\nformal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one\nthing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there\nis but one moral virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their\nend, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 3). Now there is but one common end of\nall moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate\nends are infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not\ninfinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.\n\n_On the contrary,_ One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated\nabove (Q. 56, A. 2). But the subject of the moral virtues is the\nappetitive part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as\nstated in the First Part (Q. 80, A. 2; Q. 81, A. 2). Therefore there\ncannot be only one moral virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 58, AA. 1, 2, 3), the moral\nvirtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ\nspecifically according to the specific differences of their objects,\nas stated above (Q. 54, A. 2). Again, the species of the object of\nappetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it\nreceives from the agent. But we must observe that the matter of the\npassive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For sometimes\nit receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as\nthe agent has that form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that\nif the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity\nreceive a form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is\nof necessity something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however,\nthe matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind\nspecifically as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal causes of\ngeneration: thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the\nforms received into matter are not of one species, but vary according\nto the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent:\nfor instance, we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals\nof various species are produced by putrefaction according to the\nvarious adaptability of matter.\n\nNow it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of\ncommander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and\nmoved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason\nunivocally so to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by\nparticipation (Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by\nthe direction of reason belong to various species, according to their\nvarious relations to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues\nare of various species and are not one only.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral\nmatters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one\nkind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all\nsuch matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of the\nappetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind\naccording to its various relations to reason, the directing power.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This formal element is one generically, on account of\nthe unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account of the\nvarious relations of the receiving matter, as explained above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Moral matters do not receive their species from the\nlast end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they be\ninfinite in number, are not infinite in species.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Moral Virtues About Operations Are Different from Those That\nAre About Passions?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into\nthose which are about operations and those which are about passions.\nFor the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is \"an\noperative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of pleasure or\nsorrow.\" Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (Q.\n31, A. 1; Q. 35, A. 1). Therefore the same virtue which is about\npassions is also about operations, since it is an operative habit.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the passions are principles of external action. If\ntherefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a\nconsequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral\nvirtues are about both passions and operations.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill towards\nevery external operation. Now movements of the sensitive appetite are\npassions. Therefore the same virtues that are about operations are\nalso about passions.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher reckons justice to be about\noperations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions\n(Ethic. ii, 3, 7; v, 1, seqq.).\n\n_I answer that,_ Operation and passion stand in a twofold relation to\nvirtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has\nsome good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow\nwhich are passions, as stated above (Q. 59, A. 4, ad 1).\n\nSecondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter\nabout which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral\nvirtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which\nare about passions. The reason for this is that good and evil, in\ncertain operations, are taken from the very nature of those\noperations, no matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. in\nso far as good and evil in them depend on their being commensurate\nwith someone else. In operations of this kind there needs to be some\npower to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and\nselling, and all such operations in which there is an element of\nsomething due or undue to another. For this reason justice and its\nparts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the\nother hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only on\ncommensuration with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these\noperations depend on the way in which man is affected to them. And\nfor this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly\nabout internal emotions which are called the passions of the soul, as\nis evidently the case with temperance, fortitude and the like.\n\nIt happens, however, in operations which are directed to another,\nthat the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some inordinate\npassion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as\nthe due measure of the external act is destroyed: while some other\nvirtue is destroyed in so far as the internal passions exceed their\ndue measure. Thus when through anger, one man strikes another,\njustice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed\nby the immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other\nvirtues.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first\nconsiders operations as the effect of virtue, while the other two\nconsider operation and passion as concurring in the same effect. But\nin some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about\npassions, for the reason given above.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Is Only One Moral Virtue About Operations?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about\noperations. Because the rectitude of all external operations seems to\nbelong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is\nbut one virtue about operations.\n\nObj. 2: Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are\ndirected on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the\nother to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause\ndiversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic.\nv, 1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common\ngood, does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which directs\na man's actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations\ndoes not cause a diversity of moral virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if there are various moral virtues about various\noperations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity\nof operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of\njustice to establish rectitude in various kinds of commutations, and\nagain in distributions, as is set down in _Ethic._ v, 2. Therefore\nthere are not different virtues about different operations.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety,\nboth of which are about operations.\n\n_I answer that,_ All the moral virtues that are about operations\nagree in one general notion of justice, which is in respect of\nsomething due to another: but they differ in respect of various\nspecial notions. The reason for this is that in external operations,\nthe order of reason is established, as we have stated (A. 2), not\naccording as how man is affected towards such operations, but\naccording to the becomingness of the thing itself; from which\nbecomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the\nformal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice that\na man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about\noperations, bear, in some way, the character of justice. But the\nthing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues: for something\nis due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in another way, to an\ninferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according\nas it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favor already\nconferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are\nvarious virtues: e.g. _Religion_ whereby we pay our debt to God;\n_Piety,_ whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country;\n_Gratitude,_ whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose\nobject is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent. But\nthe name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something\ndue is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That justice which seeks the common good is\nanother virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an\nindividual: wherefore common right differs from private right; and\nTully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs\nman to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to\nthe common good is a general virtue through its act of command: since\nit directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the common\ngood. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that\njustice, receive the name of justice: so that virtue does not differ,\nsave logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical\ndifference between a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue\nthat is active through the command of another virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is the same kind of due in all the\noperations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the\nsame virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it\nmay be that distributive justice is of another species from\ncommutative justice; but about this we shall inquire later on\n(II-II, Q. 61, A. 1).\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 4]\n\nWhether There Are Different Moral Virtues About Different Passions?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are not different moral virtues\nabout different passions. For there is but one habit about things\nthat concur in their source and end: as is evident especially in the\ncase of sciences. But the passions all concur in one source, viz.\nlove; and they all terminate in the same end, viz. joy or sorrow, as\nwe stated above (Q. 25, AA. 1, 2, 4; Q. 27, A. 4). Therefore there is\nbut one moral virtue about all the passions.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if there were different moral virtues about\ndifferent passions, it would follow that there are as many moral\nvirtues as passions. But this clearly is not the case: since there is\none moral virtue about contrary passions; namely, fortitude, about\nfear and daring; temperance, about pleasure and sorrow. Therefore\nthere is no need for different moral virtues about different passions.\n\nObj. 3: Further, love, desire, and pleasure are passions of different\nspecies, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). Now there is but one virtue\nabout all these three, viz. temperance. Therefore there are not\ndifferent moral virtues about different passions.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Fortitude is about fear and daring; temperance\nabout desire; meekness about anger; as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 6, 10;\niv, 5.\n\n_I answer that,_ It cannot be said that there is only one moral\nvirtue about all the passions: since some passions are not in the\nsame power as other passions; for some belong to the irascible,\nothers to the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1).\n\nOn the other hand, neither does every diversity of passions\nnecessarily suffice for a diversity of moral virtues. First, because\nsome passions are in contrary opposition to one another, such as joy\nand sorrow, fear and daring, and so on. About such passions as are\nthus in opposition to one another there must needs be one same\nvirtue. Because, since moral virtue consists in a kind of mean, the\nmean in contrary passions stands in the same ratio to both, even as\nin the natural order there is but one mean between contraries, e.g.\nbetween black and white. Secondly, because there are different\npassions contradicting reason in the same manner, e.g. by impelling\nto that which is contrary to reason, or by withdrawing from that\nwhich is in accord with reason. Wherefore the different passions of\nthe concupiscible faculty do not require different moral virtues,\nbecause their movements follow one another in a certain order, as\nbeing directed to the one same thing, viz. the attainment of some\ngood or the avoidance of some evil: thus from love proceeds desire,\nand from desire we arrive at pleasure; and it is the same with the\nopposite passions, for hatred leads to avoidance or dislike, and this\nleads to sorrow. On the other hand, the irascible passions are not\nall of one order, but are directed to different things: for daring\nand fear are about some great danger; hope and despair are about some\ndifficult good; while anger seeks to overcome something contrary\nwhich has wrought harm. Consequently there are different virtues\nabout such like passions: e.g. temperance, about the concupiscible\npassions; fortitude, about fear and daring; magnanimity, about hope\nand despair; meekness, about anger.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All the passions concur in one common principle and\nend; but not in one proper principle or end: and so this does not\nsuffice for the unity of moral virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as in the natural order the same principle causes\nmovement from one extreme and movement towards the other; and as in\nthe intellectual order contraries have one common ratio; so too\nbetween contrary passions there is but one moral virtue, which, like\na second nature, consents to reason's dictates.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Those three passions are directed to the same object in\na certain order, as stated above: and so they belong to the same\nvirtue.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Moral Virtues Differ in Point of the Various Objects of\nthe Passions?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not differ\naccording to the objects of the passions. For just as there are\nobjects of passions, so are there objects of operations. Now those\nmoral virtues that are about operations, do not differ according to\nthe objects of those operations: for the buying and selling either of\na house or of a horse belong to the one same virtue of justice.\nTherefore neither do those moral virtues that are about passions\ndiffer according to the objects of those passions.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the passions are acts or movements of the sensitive\nappetite. Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate habits\nthan acts. Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species\nof passions, do not diversify the species of moral virtue: so that\nthere is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the\nsame applies to the other passions.\n\nObj. 3: Further, more or less do not change a species. Now various\nobjects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less\npleasurable. Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species\nof virtue: and for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the\nsame applies to others. Therefore moral virtue is not diversified\naccording to the objects of the passions.\n\nObj. 4: Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good. But\nthere are various virtues about the desires for good things: thus\ntemperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and\n_eutrapelia_ about pleasures in games. Therefore there should be\ndifferent virtues about fears of evils.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence\nabout pleasures of the table, and _eutrapelia_ about pleasures in\ngames.\n\n_I answer that,_ The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason;\nwhereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive\nappetite. Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according\nto their relation to reason, but the passions according to their\nrelation to the appetite. Hence the objects of the passions,\naccording as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite,\ncause the different species of passions: while, according as they are\nrelated to reason, they cause the different species of virtues. Now\nthe movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensitive\nappetite. Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of objects from\ncausing diversity of passions, without causing diversity of virtues,\nas when one virtue is about several passions, as stated above (A. 4);\nand again, a difference of objects from causing different virtues,\nwithout causing a difference of passions, since several virtues are\ndirected about one passion, e.g. pleasure.\n\nAnd because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always\nbelong to diverse virtues, as stated above (A. 4); therefore a\ndifference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers\nalways causes a specific difference of virtues--for instance the\ndifference between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that\nwhich is good and difficult to obtain. Moreover since the reason\nrules man's lower powers in a certain order, and even extends to\noutward things; hence, one single object of the passions, according\nas it is apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason, and again,\naccording as it belongs to the soul, body, or external things, has\nvarious relations to reason, and consequently is of a nature to cause\na difference of virtues. Consequently man's good which is the object\nof love, desire and pleasure, may be taken as referred either to a\nbodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind: and this same\ngood may be directed to man's good in himself, either in his body or\nin his soul, or to man's good in relation to other men. And every\nsuch difference, being differently related to reason, differentiates\nvirtues.\n\nAccordingly, if we take a good, and it be something discerned by the\nsense of touch, and something pertaining to the upkeep of human life\neither in the individual or in the species, such as the pleasures of\nthe table or of sexual intercourse, it will belong to the virtue of\n_temperance._ As regards the pleasures of the other senses, they are\nnot intense, and so do not present much difficulty to the reason:\nhence there is no virtue corresponding to them; for virtue, \"like\nart, is about difficult things\" (Ethic. ii, 3).\n\nOn the other hand, good discerned not by the senses, but by an inner\npower, and belonging to man in himself, is like money and honor; the\nformer, by its very nature, being employable for the good of the\nbody, while the latter is based on the apprehension of the mind.\nThese goods again may be considered either absolutely, in which way\nthey concern the concupiscible faculty, or as being difficult to\nobtain, in which way they belong to the irascible part: which\ndistinction, however, has no place in pleasurable objects of touch;\nsince such are of base condition, and are becoming to man in so far\nas he has something in common with irrational animals. Accordingly in\nreference to money considered as a good absolutely, as an object of\ndesire, pleasure, or love, there is _liberality_: but if we consider\nthis good as difficult to get, and as being the object of our hope,\nthere is _magnificence_ [*_megaloprepeia_]. With regard to that good\nwhich we call honor, taken absolutely, as the object of love, we have\na virtue called _philotimia,_ i.e. _love of honor_: while if we\nconsider it as hard to attain, and as an object of hope, then we have\n_magnanimity._ Wherefore liberality and _philotimia_ seem to be in\nthe concupiscible part, while magnificence and magnanimity are in the\nirascible.\n\nAs regards man's good in relation to other men, it does not seem hard\nto obtain, but is considered absolutely, as the object of the\nconcupiscible passions. This good may be pleasurable to a man in his\nbehavior towards another either in some serious matter, in actions,\nto wit, that are directed by reason to a due end, or in playful\nactions, viz. that are done for mere pleasure, and which do not stand\nin the same relation to reason as the former. Now one man behaves\ntowards another in serious matters, in two ways. First, as being\npleasant in his regard, by becoming speech and deeds: and this\nbelongs to a virtue which Aristotle (Ethic. ii, 7) calls \"friendship\"\n[*_philia_], and may be rendered \"affability.\" Secondly, one man\nbehaves towards another by being frank with him, in words and deeds:\nthis belongs to another virtue which (Ethic. iv, 7) he calls\n\"truthfulness\" [*_aletheia_]. For frankness is more akin to the\nreason than pleasure, and serious matters than play. Hence there is\nanother virtue about the pleasures of games, which the Philosopher\ncalls _eutrapelia_ (Ethic. iv, 8).\n\nIt is therefore evident that, according to Aristotle, there are ten\nmoral virtues about the passions, viz. fortitude, temperance,\nliberality, magnificence, magnanimity, _philotimia,_ gentleness,\nfriendship, truthfulness, and _eutrapelia,_ all of which differ in\nrespect of their diverse matter, passions, or objects: so that if we\nadd _justice,_ which is about operations, there will be eleven in all.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All objects of the same specific operation have the\nsame relation to reason: not so all the objects of the same specific\npassion; because operations do not thwart reason as the passions do.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Passions are not differentiated by the same rule as\nvirtues are, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: More and less do not cause a difference of species,\nunless they bear different relations to reason.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Good is a more potent mover than evil: because evil\ndoes not cause movement save in virtue of good, as Dionysius states\n(Div. Nom. iv). Hence an evil does not prove an obstacle to reason,\nso as to require virtues unless that evil be great; there being,\nseemingly, one such evil corresponding to each kind of passion. Hence\nthere is but one virtue, meekness, for every form of anger; and,\nagain, but one virtue, fortitude, for all forms of daring. On the\nother hand, good involves difficulty, which requires virtue, even if\nit be not a great good in that particular kind of passion.\nConsequently there are various moral virtues about desires, as stated\nabove.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 61\n\nOF THE CARDINAL VIRTUES\n(In Five Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the cardinal virtues: under which head there are\nfive points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the moral virtues should be called cardinal or principal\nvirtues?\n\n(2) Of their number;\n\n(3) Which are they?\n\n(4) Whether they differ from one another?\n\n(5) Whether they are fittingly divided into social, perfecting,\nperfect, and exemplar virtues?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Moral Virtues Should Be Called Cardinal or Principal\nVirtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that moral virtues should not be called\ncardinal or principal virtues. For \"the opposite members of a\ndivision are by nature simultaneous\" (Categor. x), so that one is not\nprincipal rather than another. Now all the virtues are opposite\nmembers of the division of the genus \"virtue.\" Therefore none of them\nshould be called principal.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the end is principal as compared to the means. But\nthe theological virtues are about the end; while the moral virtues\nare about the means. Therefore the theological virtues, rather than\nthe moral virtues, should be called principal or cardinal.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is essentially so is principal in\ncomparison with that which is so by participation. But the\nintellectual virtues belong to that which is essentially rational:\nwhereas the moral virtues belong to that which is rational by\nparticipation, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 3). Therefore the\nintellectual virtues are principal, rather than the moral virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose in explaining the words, \"Blessed are the\npoor in spirit\" (Luke 6:20) says: \"We know that there are four\ncardinal virtues, viz. temperance, justice, prudence, and fortitude.\"\nBut these are moral virtues. Therefore the moral virtues are cardinal\nvirtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ When we speak of virtue simply, we are understood to\nspeak of human virtue. Now human virtue, as stated above (Q. 56, A.\n3), is one that answers to the perfect idea of virtue, which requires\nrectitude of the appetite: for such like virtue not only confers the\nfaculty of doing well, but also causes the good deed done. On the\nother hand, the name virtue is applied to one that answers\nimperfectly to the idea of virtue, and does not require rectitude of\nthe appetite: because it merely confers the faculty of doing well\nwithout causing the good deed to be done. Now it is evident that the\nperfect is principal as compared to the imperfect: and so those\nvirtues which imply rectitude of the appetite are called principal\nvirtues. Such are the moral virtues, and prudence alone, of the\nintellectual virtues, for it is also something of a moral virtue, as\nwas clearly shown above (Q. 57, A. 4). Consequently, those virtues\nwhich are called principal or cardinal are fittingly placed among the\nmoral virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the\nmembers of the division are on a par in the point of the generic\nidea; although considered in their nature as things, one species may\nsurpass another in rank and perfection, as man in respect of other\nanimals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is applied to\nseveral things, but to one before it is applied to another, nothing\nhinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of the\ngeneric idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance\nprincipally in relation to accident. Such is the division of virtue\ninto various kinds of virtue: since the good defined by reason is not\nfound in the same way in all things.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The theological virtues are above man, as stated above\n(Q. 58, A. 3, ad 3). Hence they should properly be called not human,\nbut \"super-human\" or godlike virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence,\nrank before the moral virtues, in the point of their subject, they do\nnot rank before them as virtues; for a virtue, as such, regards good,\nwhich is the object of the appetite.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 5]\n\nWhether There Are Four Cardinal Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are not four cardinal virtues.\nFor prudence is the directing principle of the other moral virtues,\nas is clear from what has been said above (Q. 58, A. 4). But that\nwhich directs other things ranks before them. Therefore prudence\nalone is a principal virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the principal virtues are, in a way, moral virtues.\nNow we are directed to moral works both by the practical reason, and\nby a right appetite, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 2. Therefore there are\nonly two cardinal virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, even among the other virtues one ranks higher than\nanother. But in order that a virtue be principal, it needs not to\nrank above all the others, but above some. Therefore it seems that\nthere are many more principal virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. ii): \"The entire structure of\ngood works is built on four virtues.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Things may be numbered either in respect of their\nformal principles, or according to the subjects in which they are:\nand either way we find that there are four cardinal virtues.\n\nFor the formal principle of the virtue of which we speak now is good\nas defined by reason; which good is considered in two ways. First, as\nexisting in the very act of reason: and thus we have one principal\nvirtue, called \"Prudence.\" Secondly, according as the reason puts its\norder into something else; either into operations, and then we have\n\"Justice\"; or into passions, and then we need two virtues. For the\nneed of putting the order of reason into the passions is due to their\nthwarting reason: and this occurs in two ways. First, by the passions\ninciting to something against reason, and then the passions need a\ncurb, which we call \"Temperance.\" Secondly, by the passions\nwithdrawing us from following the dictate of reason, e.g. through\nfear of danger or toil: and then man needs to be strengthened for\nthat which reason dictates, lest he turn back; and to this end there\nis \"Fortitude.\"\n\nIn like manner, we find the same number if we consider the subjects\nof virtue. For there are four subjects of the virtue we speak of now:\nviz. the power which is rational in its essence, and this is\nperfected by \"Prudence\"; and that which is rational by participation,\nand is threefold, the will, subject of \"Justice,\" the concupiscible\nfaculty, subject of \"Temperance,\" and the irascible faculty, subject\nof \"Fortitude.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Prudence is the principal of all the virtues simply.\nThe others are principal, each in its own genus.\n\nReply Obj. 2: That part of the soul which is rational by\nparticipation is threefold, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All the other virtues among which one ranks before\nanother, are reducible to the above four, both as to the subject and\nas to the formal principle.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Any Other Virtues Should Be Called Principal Rather Than These?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that other virtues should be called\nprincipal rather than these. For, seemingly, the greatest is the\nprincipal in any genus. Now \"magnanimity has a great influence on all\nthe virtues\" (Ethic. iv, 3). Therefore magnanimity should more than\nany be called a principal virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which strengthens the other virtues should\nabove all be called a principal virtue. But such is humility: for\nGregory says (Hom. iv in Ev.) that \"he who gathers the other virtues\nwithout humility is as one who carries straw against the wind.\"\nTherefore humility seems above all to be a principal virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is most perfect seems to be principal.\nBut this applies to patience, according to James 1:4: \"Patience hath\na perfect work.\" Therefore patience should be reckoned a principal\nvirtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Cicero reduces all other virtues to these four (De\nInvent. Rhet. ii).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), these four are reckoned as\ncardinal virtues, in respect of the four formal principles of virtue\nas we understand it now. These principles are found chiefly in\ncertain acts and passions. Thus the good which exists in the act of\nreason, is found chiefly in reason's command, but not in its counsel\nor its judgment, as stated above (Q. 57, A. 6). Again, good as\ndefined by reason and put into our operations as something right and\ndue, is found chiefly in commutations and distributions in respect of\nanother person, and on a basis of equality. The good of curbing the\npassions is found chiefly in those passions which are most difficult\nto curb, viz. in the pleasures of touch. The good of being firm in\nholding to the good defined by reason, against the impulse of\npassion, is found chiefly in perils of death, which are most\ndifficult to withstand.\n\nAccordingly the above four virtues may be considered in two ways.\nFirst, in respect of their common formal principles. In this way they\nare called principal, being general, as it were, in comparison with\nall the virtues: so that, for instance, any virtue that causes good\nin reason's act of consideration, may be called prudence; every\nvirtue that causes the good of right and due in operation, be called\njustice; every virtue that curbs and represses the passions, be\ncalled temperance; and every virtue that strengthens the mind against\nany passions whatever, be called fortitude. Many, both holy doctors,\nas also philosophers, speak about these virtues in this sense: and in\nthis way the other virtues are contained under them. Wherefore all\nthe objections fail.\n\nSecondly, they may be considered in point of their being denominated,\neach one from that which is foremost in its respective matter, and\nthus they are specific virtues, condivided with the others. Yet they\nare called principal in comparison with the other virtues, on account\nof the importance of their matter: so that prudence is the virtue\nwhich commands; justice, the virtue which is about due actions\nbetween equals; temperance, the virtue which suppresses desires for\nthe pleasures of touch; and fortitude, the virtue which strengthens\nagainst dangers of death. Thus again do the objections fail: because\nthe other virtues may be principal in some other way, but these are\ncalled principal by reason of their matter, as stated above.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Four Cardinal Virtues Differ from One Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the above four virtues are not\ndiverse and distinct from one another. For Gregory says (Moral. xxii,\n1): \"There is no true prudence, unless it be just, temperate and\nbrave; no perfect temperance, that is not brave, just and prudent; no\nsound fortitude, that is not prudent, temperate and just; no real\njustice, without prudence, fortitude and temperance.\" But this would\nnot be so, if the above virtues were distinct from one another: since\nthe different species of one genus do not qualify one another.\nTherefore the aforesaid virtues are not distinct from one another.\n\nObj. 2: Further, among things distinct from one another the function\nof one is not attributed to another. But the function of temperance\nis attributed to fortitude: for Ambrose says (De Offic. xxxvi):\n\"Rightly do we call it fortitude, when a man conquers himself, and is\nnot weakened and bent by any enticement.\" And of temperance he says\n(De Offic. xliii, xlv) that it \"safeguards the manner and order in\nall things that we decide to do and say.\" Therefore it seems that\nthese virtues are not distinct from one another.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 4) that the\nnecessary conditions of virtue are first of all \"that a man should\nhave knowledge; secondly, that he should exercise choice for a\nparticular end; thirdly, that he should possess the habit and act\nwith firmness and steadfastness.\" But the first of these seems to\nbelong to prudence which is rectitude of reason in things to be done;\nthe second, i.e. choice, belongs to temperance, whereby a man,\nholding his passions on the curb, acts, not from passion but from\nchoice; the third, that a man should act for the sake of a due end,\nimplies a certain rectitude, which seemingly belongs to justice;\nwhile the last, viz. firmness and steadfastness, belongs to\nfortitude. Therefore each of these virtues is general in comparison\nto other virtues. Therefore they are not distinct from one another.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. xi) that \"there\nare four virtues, corresponding to the various emotions of love,\" and\nhe applies this to the four virtues mentioned above. Therefore the\nsame four virtues are distinct from one another.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), these four virtues are\nunderstood differently by various writers. For some take them as\nsignifying certain general conditions of the human mind, to be found\nin all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain\nrectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice,\na certain rectitude of the mind, whereby a man does what he ought in\nany matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any\npassions or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and\nfortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that\nwhich is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions,\nor the toil involved by any operations. To distinguish these four\nvirtues in this way does not imply that justice, temperance and\nfortitude are distinct virtuous habits: because it is fitting that\nevery moral virtue, from the fact that it is a _habit,_ should be\naccompanied by a certain firmness so as not to be moved by its\ncontrary: and this, we have said, belongs to fortitude. Moreover,\ninasmuch as it is a _virtue,_ it is directed to good which involves\nthe notion of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to\njustice. Again, owing to the fact that it is a _moral virtue_\npartaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in all things,\nand does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to belong to\ntemperance. It is only in the point of having discretion, which we\nascribed to prudence, that there seems to be a distinction from the\nother three, inasmuch as discretion belongs essentially to reason;\nwhereas the other three imply a certain share of reason by way of a\nkind of application (of reason) to passions or operations. According\nto the above explanation, then, prudence would be distinct from the\nother three virtues: but these would not be distinct from one\nanother; for it is evident that one and the same virtue is both\nhabit, and virtue, and moral virtue.\n\nOthers, however, with better reason, take these four virtues,\naccording as they have their special determinate matter; each of its\nown matter, in which special commendation is given to that general\ncondition from which the virtue's name is taken as stated above (A.\n3). In this way it is clear that the aforesaid virtues are distinct\nhabits, differentiated in respect of their diverse objects.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Gregory is speaking of these four virtues in the first\nsense given above. It may also be said that these four virtues\nqualify one another by a kind of overflow. For the qualities of\nprudence overflow on to the other virtues in so far as they are\ndirected by prudence. And each of the others overflows on to the\nrest, for the reason that whoever can do what is harder, can do what\nis less difficult. Wherefore whoever can curb his desires for the\npleasures of touch, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very\nhard thing to do, for this very reason is more able to check his\ndaring in dangers of death, so as not to go too far, which is much\neasier; and in this sense fortitude is said to be temperate. Again,\ntemperance is said to be brave, by reason of fortitude overflowing\ninto temperance: in so far, to wit, as he whose mind is strengthened\nby fortitude against dangers of death, which is a matter of very\ngreat difficulty, is more able to remain firm against the onslaught\nof pleasures; for as Cicero says (De Offic. i), \"it would be\ninconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear, and yet vanquished by\ncupidity; or that he should be conquered by lust, after showing\nhimself to be unconquered by toil.\"\n\nFrom this the Reply to the Second Objection is clear. For temperance\nobserves the mean in all things, and fortitude keeps the mind unbent\nby the enticements of pleasures, either in so far as these virtues\nare taken to denote certain general conditions of virtue, or in the\nsense that they overflow on to one another, as explained above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: These four general conditions of virtue set down by the\nPhilosopher, are not proper to the aforesaid virtues. They may,\nhowever, be appropriated to them, in the way above stated.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 61, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Cardinal Virtues Are Fittingly Divided into Social\nVirtues, Perfecting, Perfect, and Exemplar Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that these four virtues are unfittingly\ndivided into exemplar virtues, perfecting virtues, perfect virtues,\nand social virtues. For as Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1), the\n\"exemplar virtues are such as exist in the mind of God.\" Now the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. x, 8) that \"it is absurd to ascribe justice,\nfortitude, temperance, and prudence to God.\" Therefore these virtues\ncannot be exemplar.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the _perfect_ virtues are those which are without\nany passion: for Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1) that \"in a soul\nthat is cleansed, temperance has not to check worldly desires, for it\nhas forgotten all about them: fortitude knows nothing about the\npassions; it does not have to conquer them.\" Now it was stated above\n(Q. 59, A. 5) that the aforesaid virtues cannot be without passions.\nTherefore there is no such thing as _perfect_ virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the\n\"perfecting\" virtues are those of the man \"who flies from human\naffairs and devotes himself exclusively to the things of God.\" But it\nseems wrong to do this, for Cicero says (De Offic. i): \"I reckon that\nit is not only unworthy of praise, but wicked for a man to say that\nhe despises what most men admire, viz. power and office.\" Therefore\nthere are no \"perfecting\" virtues.\n\nObj. 4: Further, he says (Macrobius: Super Somn. Scip. 1) that the\n\"social\" virtues are those \"whereby good men work for the good of\ntheir country and for the safety of the city.\" But it is only legal\njustice that is directed to the common weal, as the Philosopher states\n(Ethic. v, 1). Therefore other virtues should not be called \"social.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ Macrobius says (Super Somn. Scip. 1): \"Plotinus,\ntogether with Plato foremost among teachers of philosophy, says: 'The\nfour kinds of virtue are fourfold: In the first place there are\nsocial* virtues; secondly, there are perfecting virtues [*Virtutes\npurgatoriae: literally meaning, cleansing virtues]; thirdly, there\nare perfect [*Virtutes purgati animi: literally, virtues of the clean\nsoul] virtues; and fourthly, there are exemplar virtues.'\" [*Cf.\nChrysostom's fifteenth homily on St. Matthew, where he says: \"The\ngentle, the modest, the merciful, the just man does not shut up his\ngood deeds within himself . . . He that is clean of heart and\npeaceful, and suffers persecution for the sake of the truth, lives\nfor the common weal.\"]\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Moribus Eccl. vi), \"the soul\nneeds to follow something in order to give birth to virtue: this\nsomething is God: if we follow Him we shall live aright.\"\nConsequently the exemplar of human virtue must needs pre-exist in\nGod, just as in Him pre-exist the types of all things. Accordingly\nvirtue may be considered as existing originally in God, and thus we\nspeak of \"exemplar\" virtues: so that in God the Divine Mind itself\nmay be called prudence; while temperance is the turning of God's gaze\non Himself, even as in us it is that which conforms the appetite to\nreason. God's fortitude is His unchangeableness; His justice is the\nobservance of the Eternal Law in His works, as Plotinus states (Cf.\nMacrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1).\n\nAgain, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on\nChrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him\naccording to the condition of his nature, are called \"social\"\nvirtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves himself well\nin the conduct of human affairs. It is in this sense that we have\nbeen speaking of these virtues until now.\n\nBut since it behooves a man to do his utmost to strive onward even to\nDivine things, as even the Philosopher declares in _Ethic._ x, 7, and\nas Scripture often admonishes us--for instance: \"Be ye . . . perfect,\nas your heavenly Father is perfect\" (Matt. 5:48), we must needs place\nsome virtues between the social or human virtues, and the exemplar\nvirtues which are Divine. Now these virtues differ by reason of a\ndifference of movement and term: so that some are virtues of men who\nare on their way and tending towards the Divine similitude; and these\nare called \"perfecting\" virtues. Thus prudence, by contemplating the\nthings of God, counts as nothing all things of the world, and directs\nall the thoughts of the soul to God alone: temperance, so far as\nnature allows, neglects the needs of the body; fortitude prevents the\nsoul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly\nthings; and justice consists in the soul giving a whole-hearted\nconsent to follow the way thus proposed. Besides these there are the\nvirtues of those who have already attained to the Divine similitude:\nthese are called the \"perfect virtues.\" Thus prudence sees nought\nelse but the things of God; temperance knows no earthly desires;\nfortitude has no knowledge of passion; and justice, by imitating the\nDivine Mind, is united thereto by an everlasting covenant. Such as\nthe virtues attributed to the Blessed, or, in this life, to some who\nare at the summit of perfection.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of these virtues according\nas they relate to human affairs; for instance, justice, about buying\nand selling; fortitude, about fear; temperance, about desires; for in\nthis sense it is absurd to attribute them to God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Human virtues, that is to say, virtues of men living\ntogether in this world, are about the passions. But the virtues of\nthose who have attained to perfect bliss are without passions. Hence\nPlotinus says (Cf. Macrobius, Super Somn. Scip. 1) that \"the social\nvirtues check the passions,\" i.e. they bring them to the relative\nmean; \"the second kind,\" viz. the perfecting virtues, \"uproot them\";\n\"the third kind,\" viz. the perfect virtues, \"forget them; while it is\nimpious to mention them in connection with virtues of the fourth\nkind,\" viz. the exemplar virtues. It may also be said that here he is\nspeaking of passions as denoting inordinate emotions.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To neglect human affairs when necessity forbids is\nwicked; otherwise it is virtuous. Hence Cicero says a little earlier:\n\"Perhaps one should make allowances for those who by reason of their\nexceptional talents have devoted themselves to learning; as also to\nthose who have retired from public life on account of failing health,\nor for some other yet weightier motive; when such men yielded to\nothers the power and renown of authority.\" This agrees with what\nAugustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 19): \"The love of truth demands a\nhallowed leisure; charity necessitates good works. If no one lays\nthis burden on us we may devote ourselves to the study and\ncontemplation of truth; but if the burden is laid on us it is to be\ntaken up under the pressure of charity.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Legal justice alone regards the common weal directly:\nbut by commanding the other virtues it draws them all into the\nservice of the common weal, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v,\n1). For we must take note that it concerns the human virtues, as we\nunderstand them here, to do well not only towards the community, but\nalso towards the parts of the community, viz. towards the household,\nor even towards one individual.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 62\n\nOF THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the Theological Virtues: under which head there\nare four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there are any theological virtues?\n\n(2) Whether the theological virtues are distinct from the intellectual\nand moral virtues?\n\n(3) How many, and which are they?\n\n(4) Of their order.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 62, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Are Any Theological Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are not any theological\nvirtues. For according to _Phys._ vii, text. 17, \"virtue is the\ndisposition of a perfect thing to that which is best: and by perfect,\nI mean that which is disposed according to nature.\" But that which is\nDivine is above man's nature. Therefore the theological virtues are\nnot virtues of a man.\n\nObj. 2: Further, theological virtues are quasi-Divine virtues. But\nthe Divine virtues are exemplars, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 5),\nwhich are not in us but in God. Therefore the theological virtues are\nnot virtues of man.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the theological virtues are so called because they\ndirect us to God, Who is the first beginning and last end of all\nthings. But by the very nature of his reason and will, man is\ndirected to his first beginning and last end. Therefore there is no\nneed for any habits of theological virtue, to direct the reason and\nwill to God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue.\nNow the Divine Law contains precepts about the acts of faith, hope,\nand charity: for it is written (Ecclus. 2:8, seqq.): \"Ye that fear\nthe Lord believe Him,\" and again, \"hope in Him,\" and again, \"love\nHim.\" Therefore faith, hope, and charity are virtues directing us to\nGod. Therefore they are theological virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ Man is perfected by virtue, for those actions\nwhereby he is directed to happiness, as was explained above (Q. 5, A.\n7). Now man's happiness is twofold, as was also stated above (Q. 5,\nA. 5). One is proportionate to human nature, a happiness, to wit,\nwhich man can obtain by means of his natural principles. The other is\na happiness surpassing man's nature, and which man can obtain by the\npower of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about\nwhich it is written (2 Pet. 1:4) that by Christ we are made\n\"partakers of the Divine nature.\" And because such happiness\nsurpasses the capacity of human nature, man's natural principles\nwhich enable him to act well according to his capacity, do not\nsuffice to direct man to this same happiness. Hence it is necessary\nfor man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he\nmay be directed to supernatural happiness, even as he is directed to\nhis connatural end, by means of his natural principles, albeit not\nwithout Divine assistance. Such like principles are called\n\"theological virtues\": first, because their object is God, inasmuch\nas they direct us aright to God: secondly, because they are infused\nin us by God alone: thirdly, because these virtues are not made known\nto us, save by Divine revelation, contained in Holy Writ.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A certain nature may be ascribed to a certain thing in\ntwo ways. First, essentially: and thus these theological virtues\nsurpass the nature of man. Secondly, by participation, as kindled\nwood partakes of the nature of fire: and thus, after a fashion, man\nbecomes a partaker of the Divine Nature, as stated above: so that\nthese virtues are proportionate to man in respect of the Nature of\nwhich he is made a partaker.\n\nReply Obj. 2: These virtues are called Divine, not as though God were\nvirtuous by reason of them, but because of them God makes us\nvirtuous, and directs us to Himself. Hence they are not exemplar but\nexemplate virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The reason and will are naturally directed to\nGod, inasmuch as He is the beginning and end of nature, but in\nproportion to nature. But the reason and will, according to their\nnature, are not sufficiently directed to Him in so far as He is the\nobject of supernatural happiness.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 62, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Theological Virtues Are Distinct from the Intellectual\nand Moral Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the theological virtues are not\ndistinct from the moral and intellectual virtues. For the theological\nvirtues, if they be in a human soul, must needs perfect it, either as\nto the intellective, or as to the appetitive part. Now the virtues\nwhich perfect the intellective part are called intellectual; and the\nvirtues which perfect the appetitive part, are called moral.\nTherefore, the theological virtues are not distinct from the moral\nand intellectual virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the theological virtues are those which direct us to\nGod. Now, among the intellectual virtues there is one which directs\nus to God: this is wisdom, which is about Divine things, since it\nconsiders the highest cause. Therefore the theological virtues are\nnot distinct from the intellectual virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine (De Moribus Eccl. xv) shows how the four\ncardinal virtues are the \"order of love.\" Now love is charity, which\nis a theological virtue. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinct\nfrom the theological.\n\n_On the contrary,_ That which is above man's nature is distinct from\nthat which is according to his nature. But the theological virtues\nare above man's nature; while the intellectual and moral virtues are\nin proportion to his nature, as clearly shown above (Q. 58, A. 3).\nTherefore they are distinct from one another.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 54, A. 2, ad 1), habits are\nspecifically distinct from one another in respect of the formal\ndifference of their objects. Now the object of the theological\nvirtues is God Himself, Who is the last end of all, as surpassing the\nknowledge of our reason. On the other hand, the object of the\nintellectual and moral virtues is something comprehensible to human\nreason. Wherefore the theological virtues are specifically distinct\nfrom the moral and intellectual virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The intellectual and moral virtues perfect man's\nintellect and appetite according to the capacity of human nature; the\ntheological virtues, supernaturally.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The wisdom which the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 3, 7)\nreckons as an intellectual virtue, considers Divine things so far as\nthey are open to the research of human reason. Theological virtue, on\nthe other hand, is about those same things so far as they surpass\nhuman reason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Though charity is love, yet love is not always charity.\nWhen, then, it is stated that every virtue is the order of love, this\ncan be understood either of love in the general sense, or of the love\nof charity. If it be understood of love, commonly so called, then\neach virtue is stated to be the order of love, in so far as each\ncardinal virtue requires ordinate emotions; and love is the root and\ncause of every emotion, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 4; Q. 28, A. 6, ad\n2; Q. 41, A. 2, ad 1). If, however, it be understood of the love of\ncharity, it does not mean that every other virtue is charity\nessentially: but that all other virtues depend on charity in some\nway, as we shall show further on (Q. 65, AA. 2, 5; II-II, Q. 23, A.\n7).\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 62, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Faith, Hope, and Charity Are Fittingly Reckoned As\nTheological Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that faith, hope, and charity are not\nfittingly reckoned as three theological virtues. For the theological\nvirtues are in relation to Divine happiness, what the natural\ninclination is in relation to the connatural end. Now among the\nvirtues directed to the connatural end there is but one natural\nvirtue, viz. the understanding of principles. Therefore there should\nbe but one theological virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the theological virtues are more perfect than the\nintellectual and moral virtues. Now faith is not reckoned among the\nintellectual virtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it\nis imperfect knowledge. Likewise hope is not reckoned among the moral\nvirtues, but is something less than a virtue, since it is a passion.\nMuch less therefore should they be reckoned as theological virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the theological virtues direct man's soul to God.\nNow man's soul cannot be directed to God, save through the\nintellective part, wherein are the intellect and will. Therefore\nthere should be only two theological virtues, one perfecting the\nintellect, the other, the will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): \"Now there remain\nfaith, hope, charity, these three.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the theological virtues\ndirect man to supernatural happiness in the same way as by the\nnatural inclination man is directed to his connatural end. Now the\nlatter happens in respect of two things. First, in respect of the\nreason or intellect, in so far as it contains the first universal\nprinciples which are known to us by the natural light of the\nintellect, and which are reason's starting-point, both in speculative\nand in practical matters. Secondly, through the rectitude of the will\nwhich tends naturally to good as defined by reason.\n\nBut these two fall short of the order of supernatural happiness,\naccording to 1 Cor. 2:9: \"The eye hath not seen, nor ear heard,\nneither hath it entered into the heart of man, what things God hath\nprepared for them that love Him.\" Consequently in respect of both the\nabove things man needed to receive in addition something supernatural\nto direct him to a supernatural end. First, as regards the intellect,\nman receives certain supernatural principles, which are held by means\nof a Divine light: these are the articles of faith, about which is\nfaith. Secondly, the will is directed to this end, both as to that\nend as something attainable--and this pertains to hope--and as to a\ncertain spiritual union, whereby the will is, so to speak,\ntransformed into that end--and this belongs to charity. For the\nappetite of a thing is moved and tends towards its connatural end\nnaturally; and this movement is due to a certain conformity of the\nthing with its end.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The intellect requires intelligible species whereby to\nunderstand: consequently there is need of a natural habit in addition\nto the power. But the very nature of the will suffices for it to be\ndirected naturally to the end, both as to the intention of the end\nand as to its conformity with the end. But the nature of the power is\ninsufficient in either of these respects, for the will to be directed\nto things that are above its nature. Consequently there was need for\nan additional supernatural habit in both respects.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Faith and hope imply a certain imperfection: since\nfaith is of things unseen, and hope, of things not possessed. Hence\nfaith and hope, in things that are subject to human power, fall short\nof the notion of virtue. But faith and hope in things which are above\nthe capacity of human nature surpass all virtue that is in proportion\nto man, according to 1 Cor. 1:25: \"The weakness of God is stronger\nthan men.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Two things pertain to the appetite, viz. movement to\nthe end, and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there\nmust needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely,\nhope and charity.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 62, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Faith Precedes Hope, and Hope Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the order of the theological virtues\nis not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root\nprecedes that which grows from it. Now charity is the root of all the\nvirtues, according to Eph. 3:17: \"Being rooted and founded in\ncharity.\" Therefore charity precedes the others.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i): \"A man cannot\nlove what he does not believe to exist. But if he believes and loves,\nby doing good works he ends in hoping.\" Therefore it seems that faith\nprecedes charity, and charity hope.\n\nObj. 3: Further, love is the principle of all our emotions, as stated\nabove (A. 2, ad 3). Now hope is a kind of emotion, since it is a\npassion, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 2). Therefore charity, which is\nlove, precedes hope.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle enumerates them thus (1 Cor. 13:13):\n\"Now there remain faith, hope, charity.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Order is twofold: order of generation, and order of\nperfection. By order of generation, in respect of which matter\nprecedes form, and the imperfect precedes the perfect, in one same\nsubject faith precedes hope, and hope charity, as to their acts:\nbecause habits are all infused together. For the movement of the\nappetite cannot tend to anything, either by hoping or loving, unless\nthat thing be apprehended by the sense or by the intellect. Now it is\nby faith that the intellect apprehends the object of hope and love.\nHence in the order of generation, faith precedes hope and charity. In\nlike manner a man loves a thing because he apprehends it as his good.\nNow from the very fact that a man hopes to be able to obtain some\ngood through someone, he looks on the man in whom he hopes as a good\nof his own. Hence for the very reason that a man hopes in someone, he\nproceeds to love him: so that in the order of generation, hope\nprecedes charity as regards their respective acts.\n\nBut in the order of perfection, charity precedes faith and hope:\nbecause both faith and hope are quickened by charity, and receive\nfrom charity their full complement as virtues. For thus charity is\nthe mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the\nform of them all, as we shall state further on (II-II, Q. 23, A. 8).\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Augustine is speaking of that hope whereby a man hopes\nto obtain bliss through the merits which he has already: this belongs\nto hope quickened by and following charity. But it is possible for a\nman before having charity, to hope through merits not already\npossessed, but which he hopes to possess.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 40, A. 7), in treating of the\npassions, hope regards two things. One as its principal object, viz.\nthe good hoped for. With regard to this, love always precedes hope:\nfor good is never hoped for unless it be desired and loved. Hope also\nregards the person from whom a man hopes to be able to obtain some\ngood. With regard to this, hope precedes love at first; though\nafterwards hope is increased by love. Because from the fact that a\nman thinks that he can obtain a good through someone, he begins to\nlove him: and from the fact that he loves him, he then hopes all the\nmore in him.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 63\n\nOF THE CAUSE OF VIRTUES\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the cause of virtues; and under this head there\nare four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether virtue is in us by nature?\n\n(2) Whether any virtue is caused in us by habituation?\n\n(3) Whether any moral virtues are in us by infusion?\n\n(4) Whether virtue acquired by habituation, is of the same species\nas infused virtue?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 63, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Virtue Is in Us by Nature?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that virtue is in us by nature. For\nDamascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 14): \"Virtues are natural to us\nand are equally in all of us.\" And Antony says in his sermon to the\nmonks: \"If the will contradicts nature it is perverse, if it follow\nnature it is virtuous.\" Moreover, a gloss on Matt. 4:23, \"Jesus went\nabout,\" etc., says: \"He taught them natural virtues, i.e. chastity,\njustice, humility, which man possesses naturally.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, the virtuous good consists in accord with reason, as\nwas clearly shown above (Q. 55, A. 4, ad 2). But that which accords\nwith reason is natural to man; since reason is part of man's nature.\nTherefore virtue is in man by nature.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is in us from birth is said to be natural\nto us. Now virtues are in some from birth: for it is written (Job\n31:18): \"From my infancy mercy grew up with me; and it came out with\nme from my mother's womb.\" Therefore virtue is in man by nature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Whatever is in man by nature is common to all men,\nand is not taken away by sin, since even in the demons natural gifts\nremain, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). But virtue is not in all\nmen; and is cast out by sin. Therefore it is not in man by nature.\n\n_I answer that,_ With regard to corporeal forms, it has been\nmaintained by some that they are wholly from within, by those, for\ninstance, who upheld the theory of \"latent forms\" [*Anaxagoras; Cf.\nI, Q. 45, A. 8; Q. 65, A. 4]. Others held that forms are entirely\nfrom without, those, for instance, who thought that corporeal forms\noriginated from some separate cause. Others, however, esteemed that\nthey are partly from within, in so far as they pre-exist potentially\nin matter; and partly from without, in so far as they are brought\ninto act by the agent.\n\nIn like manner with regard to sciences and virtues, some held that\nthey are wholly from within, so that all virtues and sciences would\npre-exist in the soul naturally, but that the hindrances to science\nand virtue, which are due to the soul being weighed down by the body,\nare removed by study and practice, even as iron is made bright by\nbeing polished. This was the opinion of the Platonists. Others said\nthat they are wholly from without, being due to the inflow of the\nactive intellect, as Avicenna maintained. Others said that sciences\nand virtues are within us by nature, so far as we are adapted to\nthem, but not in their perfection: this is the teaching of the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. ii, 1), and is nearer the truth.\n\nTo make this clear, it must be observed that there are two ways in\nwhich something is said to be natural to a man; one is according to\nhis specific nature, the other according to his individual nature.\nAnd, since each thing derives its species from its form, and its\nindividuation from matter, and, again, since man's form is his\nrational soul, while his matter is his body, whatever belongs to him\nin respect of his rational soul, is natural to him in respect of his\nspecific nature; while whatever belongs to him in respect of the\nparticular temperament of his body, is natural to him in respect of\nhis individual nature. For whatever is natural to man in respect of\nhis body, considered as part of his species, is to be referred, in a\nway, to the soul, in so far as this particular body is adapted to\nthis particular soul.\n\nIn both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so\nin respect of the specific nature, in so far as in man's reason are\nto be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of\nboth knowledge and action, which are the nurseries of intellectual\nand moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural\nappetite for good in accordance with reason. Again, this is so in\nrespect of the individual nature, in so far as by reason of a\ndisposition in the body, some are disposed either well or ill to\ncertain virtues: because, to wit, certain sensitive powers are acts\nof certain parts of the body, according to the disposition of which\nthese powers are helped or hindered in the exercise of their acts,\nand, in consequence, the rational powers also, which the aforesaid\nsensitive powers assist. In this way one man has a natural aptitude\nfor science, another for fortitude, another for temperance: and in\nthese ways, both intellectual and moral virtues are in us by way of a\nnatural aptitude, inchoatively, but not perfectly, since nature is\ndetermined to one, while the perfection of these virtues does not\ndepend on one particular mode of action, but on various modes, in\nrespect of the various matters, which constitute the sphere of\nvirtue's action, and according to various circumstances.\n\nIt is therefore evident that all virtues are in us by nature,\naccording to aptitude and inchoation, but not according to\nperfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely from\nwithout.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two\nargue about the nurseries of virtue which are in us by nature,\ninasmuch as we are rational beings. The third objection must be taken\nin the sense that, owing to the natural disposition which the body\nhas from birth, one has an aptitude for pity, another for living\ntemperately, another for some other virtue.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 63, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Any Virtue Is Caused in Us by Habituation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that virtues can not be caused in us by\nhabituation. Because a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent.\nProsperi cvi.] commenting on Rom. 14:23, \"All that is not of faith is\nsin,\" says: \"The whole life of an unbeliever is a sin: and there is\nno good without the Sovereign Good. Where knowledge of the truth is\nlacking, virtue is a mockery even in the best behaved people.\" Now\nfaith cannot be acquired by means of works, but is caused in us by\nGod, according to Eph. 2:8: \"By grace you are saved through faith.\"\nTherefore no acquired virtue can be in us by habituation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are\nincompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God,\naccording to Wis. 8:21: \"I knew that I could not otherwise be\ncontinent, except God gave it.\" Therefore neither can any virtues be\ncaused in us by habituation, but only by the gift of God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, actions which lead toward virtue, lack the\nperfection of virtue. But an effect cannot be more perfect than its\ncause. Therefore a virtue cannot be caused by actions that precede it.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that good is more\nefficacious than evil. But vicious habits are caused by evil acts.\nMuch more, therefore, can virtuous habits be caused by good acts.\n\n_I answer that,_ We have spoken above (Q. 51, AA. 2, 3) in a general\nway about the production of habits from acts; and speaking now in a\nspecial way of this matter in relation to virtue, we must take note\nthat, as stated above (Q. 55, AA. 3, 4), man's virtue perfects him in\nrelation to good. Now since the notion of good consists in \"mode,\nspecies, and order,\" as Augustine states (De Nat. Boni. iii) or in\n\"number, weight, and measure,\" as expressed in Wis. 11:21, man's good\nmust needs be appraised with respect to some rule. Now this rule is\ntwofold, as stated above (Q. 19, AA. 3, 4), viz. human reason and\nDivine Law. And since Divine Law is the higher rule, it extends to\nmore things, so that whatever is ruled by human reason, is ruled by\nthe Divine Law too; but the converse does not hold.\n\nIt follows that human virtue directed to the good which is defined\naccording to the rule of human reason can be caused by human acts:\ninasmuch as such acts proceed from reason, by whose power and rule\nthe aforesaid good is established. On the other hand, virtue which\ndirects man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human\nreason, cannot be caused by human acts, the principle of which is\nreason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone. Hence\nAugustine in giving the definition of the latter virtue inserts the\nwords, \"which God works in us without us\" (Super Ps. 118, Serm.\nxxvi). It is also of these virtues that the First Objection holds\ngood.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused\nvirtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But\nactual sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue;\nbecause the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, as stated\nabove (Q. 49, A. 3): and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of\nacquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly\ncontrary to a habit. Wherefore, though man cannot avoid mortal sin\nwithout grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered\nfrom acquiring a habit of virtue, whereby he may abstain from evil in\nthe majority of cases, and chiefly in matters most opposed to reason.\nThere are also certain mortal sins which man can nowise avoid without\ngrace, those, namely, which are directly opposed to the theological\nvirtues, which are in us through the gift of grace. This, however,\nwill be more fully explained later (Q. 109, A. 4).\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (A. 1; Q. 51, A. 1), certain seeds or\nprinciples of acquired virtue pre-exist in us by nature. These\nprinciples are more excellent than the virtues acquired through them:\nthus the understanding of speculative principles is more excellent\nthan the science of conclusions, and the natural rectitude of the\nreason is more excellent than the rectification of the appetite which\nresults through the appetite partaking of reason, which rectification\nbelongs to moral virtue. Accordingly human acts, in so far as they\nproceed from higher principles, can cause acquired human virtues.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 63, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Any Moral Virtues Are in Us by Infusion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no virtues besides the theological\nvirtues are infused in us by God. Because God does not do by Himself,\nsave perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by\nsecond causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv), \"it is God's\nrule to bring about extremes through the mean.\" Now intellectual and\nmoral virtues can be caused in us by our acts, as stated above (A.\n2). Therefore it is not reasonable that they should be caused in us\nby infusion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, much less superfluity is found in God's works than\nin the works of nature. Now the theological virtues suffice to direct\nus to supernatural good. Therefore there are no other supernatural\nvirtues needing to be caused in us by God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nature does not employ two means where one suffices:\nmuch less does God. But God sowed the seeds of virtue in our souls,\naccording to a gloss on Heb. 1 [*Cf. Jerome on Gal. 1: 15, 16].\nTherefore it is unfitting for Him to cause in us other virtues by\nmeans of infusion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 8:7): \"She teacheth temperance\nand prudence and justice and fortitude.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Effects must needs be proportionate to their causes\nand principles. Now all virtues, intellectual and moral, that are\nacquired by our actions, arise from certain natural principles\npre-existing in us, as above stated (A. 1; Q. 51, A. 1): instead of\nwhich natural principles, God bestows on us the theological virtues,\nwhereby we are directed to a supernatural end, as stated (Q. 62, A.\n1). Wherefore we need to receive from God other habits corresponding,\nin due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to\nthe theological virtues, what the moral and intellectual virtues are\nto the natural principles of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some moral and intellectual virtues can indeed be\ncaused in us by our actions: but such are not proportionate to the\ntheological virtues. Therefore it was necessary for us to receive,\nfrom God immediately, others that are proportionate to these virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The theological virtues direct us sufficiently to our\nsupernatural end, inchoatively: i.e. to God Himself immediately. But\nthe soul needs further to be perfected by infused virtues in regard\nto other things, yet in relation to God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The power of those naturally instilled principles does\nnot extend beyond the capacity of nature. Consequently man needs in\naddition to be perfected by other principles in relation to his\nsupernatural end.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 63, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Virtue by Habituation Belongs to the Same Species As Infused\nVirtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that infused virtue does not differ in\nspecies from acquired virtue. Because acquired and infused virtues,\naccording to what has been said (A. 3), do not differ seemingly, save\nin relation to the last end. Now human habits and acts are specified,\nnot by their last, but by their proximate end. Therefore the infused\nmoral or intellectual virtue does not differ from the acquired virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, habits are known by their acts. But the act of\ninfused and acquired temperance is the same, viz. to moderate desires\nof touch. Therefore they do not differ in species.\n\nObj. 3: Further, acquired and infused virtue differ as that which is\nwrought by God immediately, from that which is wrought by a creature.\nBut the man whom God made, is of the same species as a man begotten\nnaturally; and the eye which He gave to the man born blind, as one\nproduced by the power of generation. Therefore it seems that acquired\nand infused virtue belong to the same species.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Any change introduced into the difference\nexpressed in a definition involves a difference of species. But the\ndefinition of infused virtue contains the words, \"which God works in\nus without us,\" as stated above (Q. 55, A. 4). Therefore acquired\nvirtue, to which these words cannot apply, is not of the same species\nas infused virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ There is a twofold specific difference among habits.\nThe first, as stated above (Q. 54, A. 2; Q. 56, A. 2; Q. 60, A. 1),\nis taken from the specific and formal aspects of their objects. Now\nthe object of every virtue is a good considered as in that virtue's\nproper matter: thus the object of temperance is a good in respect of\nthe pleasures connected with the concupiscence of touch. The formal\naspect of this object is from reason which fixes the mean in these\nconcupiscences: while the material element is something on the part\nof the concupiscences. Now it is evident that the mean that is\nappointed in such like concupiscences according to the rule of human\nreason, is seen under a different aspect from the mean which is fixed\naccording to Divine rule. For instance, in the consumption of food,\nthe mean fixed by human reason, is that food should not harm the\nhealth of the body, nor hinder the use of reason: whereas, according\nto the Divine rule, it behooves man to \"chastise his body, and bring\nit into subjection\" (1 Cor. 9:27), by abstinence in food, drink and\nthe like. It is therefore evident that infused and acquired\ntemperance differ in species; and the same applies to the other\nvirtues.\n\nThe other specific difference among habits is taken from the things\nto which they are directed: for a man's health and a horse's are not\nof the same species, on account of the difference between the natures\nto which their respective healths are directed. In the same sense,\nthe Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3) that citizens have diverse\nvirtues according as they are well directed to diverse forms of\ngovernment. In the same way, too, those infused moral virtues,\nwhereby men behave well in respect of their being \"fellow-citizens\nwith the saints, and of the household [Douay: 'domestics'] of God\"\n(Eph. 2:19), differ from the acquired virtues, whereby man behaves\nwell in respect of human affairs.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Infused and acquired virtue differ not only in relation\nto the ultimate end, but also in relation to their proper objects, as\nstated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Both acquired and infused temperance moderate desires\nfor pleasures of touch, but for different reasons, as stated:\nwherefore their respective acts are not identical.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God gave the man born blind an eye for the same act as\nthe act for which other eyes are formed naturally: consequently it\nwas of the same species. It would be the same if God wished to give a\nman miraculously virtues, such as those that are acquired by acts.\nBut the case is not so in the question before us, as stated.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 64\n\nOF THE MEAN OF VIRTUE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the properties of virtues: and (1) the mean of\nvirtue, (2) the connection between virtues, (3) equality of virtues,\n(4) the duration of virtues. Under the first head there are four\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether moral virtue observes the mean?\n\n(2) Whether the mean of moral virtue is the real mean or the rational\nmean?\n\n(3) Whether the intellectual virtues observe the mean?\n\n(4) Whether the theological virtues do?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 64, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Moral Virtues Observe the Mean?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that moral virtue does not observe the\nmean. For the nature of a mean is incompatible with that which is\nextreme. Now the nature of virtue is to be something extreme; for it\nis stated in _De Coelo_ i that \"virtue is the limit of power.\"\nTherefore moral virtue does not observe the mean.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the maximum is not a mean. Now some moral virtues\ntend to a maximum: for instance, magnanimity to very great honors,\nand magnificence to very large expenditure, as stated in _Ethic._ iv,\n2, 3. Therefore not every moral virtue observes the mean.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if it is essential to a moral virtue to observe the\nmean, it follows that a moral virtue is not perfected, but the\ncontrary corrupted, through tending to something extreme. Now some\nmoral virtues are perfected by tending to something extreme; thus\nvirginity, which abstains from all sexual pleasure, observes the\nextreme, and is the most perfect chastity: and to give all to the\npoor is the most perfect mercy or liberality. Therefore it seems that\nit is not essential to moral virtue that it should observe the mean.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that \"moral\nvirtue is a habit of choosing the mean.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As already explained (Q. 55, A. 3), the nature of\nvirtue is that it should direct man to good. Now moral virtue is\nproperly a perfection of the appetitive part of the soul in regard to\nsome determinate matter: and the measure or rule of the appetitive\nmovement in respect of appetible objects is the reason. But the good\nof that which is measured or ruled consists in its conformity with\nits rule: thus the good things made by art is that they follow the\nrule of art. Consequently, in things of this sort, evil consists in\ndiscordance from their rule or measure. Now this may happen either by\ntheir exceeding the measure or by their falling short of it; as is\nclearly the case in all things ruled or measured. Hence it is evident\nthat the good of moral virtue consists in conformity with the rule of\nreason. Now it is clear that between excess and deficiency the mean\nis equality or conformity. Therefore it is evident that moral virtue\nobserves the mean.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Moral virtue derives goodness from the rule of reason,\nwhile its matter consists in passions or operations. If therefore we\ncompare moral virtue to reason, then, if we look at that which it has\nof reason, it holds the position of one extreme, viz. conformity;\nwhile excess and defect take the position of the other extreme, viz.\ndeformity. But if we consider moral virtue in respect of its matter,\nthen it holds the position of mean, in so far as it makes the passion\nconform to the rule of reason. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii,\n6) that \"virtue, as to its essence, is a mean state,\" in so far as\nthe rule of virtue is imposed on its proper matter: \"but it is an\nextreme in reference to the 'best' and the 'excellent, '\" viz. as to\nits conformity with reason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In actions and passions the mean and the extremes\ndepend on various circumstances: hence nothing hinders something from\nbeing extreme in a particular virtue as to one circumstance, while\nthe same thing is a mean in respect of other circumstances, through\nbeing in conformity with reason. This is the case with magnanimity\nand magnificence. For if we look at the absolute quantity of the\nrespective objects of these virtues, we shall call it an extreme and\na maximum: but if we consider the quantity in relation to other\ncircumstances, then it has the character of a mean: since these\nvirtues tend to this maximum in accordance with the rule of reason,\ni.e. _where_ it is right, _when_ it is right, and for an _end_ that\nis right. There will be excess, if one tends to this maximum _when_\nit is not right, or _where_ it is not right, or for an undue _end;_\nand there will be deficiency if one fails to tend thereto _where_ one\nought, and _when_ one ought. This agrees with the saying of the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. iv, 3) that the \"magnanimous man observes the\nextreme in quantity, but the mean in the right mode of his action.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The same is to be said of virginity and poverty as of\nmagnanimity. For virginity abstains from all sexual matters, and\npoverty from all wealth, for a right end, and in a right manner, i.e.\naccording to God's word, and for the sake of eternal life. But if\nthis be done in an undue manner, i.e. out of unlawful superstition,\nor again for vainglory, it will be in excess. And if it be not done\nwhen it ought to be done, or as it ought to be done, it is a vice by\ndeficiency: for instance, in those who break their vows of virginity\nor poverty.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 64, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Mean of Moral Virtue Is the Real Mean, or the Rational\nMean?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the mean of moral virtue is not the\nrational mean, but the real mean. For the good of moral virtue\nconsists in its observing the mean. Now, good, as stated in _Metaph._\nii, text. 8, is in things themselves. Therefore the mean of moral\nvirtue is a real mean.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the reason is a power of apprehension. But moral\nvirtue does not observe a mean between apprehensions, but rather a\nmean between operations or passions. Therefore the mean of moral\nvirtue is not the rational, but the real mean.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a mean that is observed according to arithmetical or\ngeometrical proportion is a real mean. Now such is the mean of\njustice, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 3. Therefore the mean of moral\nvirtue is not the rational, but the real mean.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that \"moral\nvirtue observes the mean fixed, in our regard, by reason.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The rational mean can be understood in two ways.\nFirst, according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason,\nas though the very act of reason were made to observe the mean: in\nthis sense, since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason, but\nthe act of the appetitive power, the mean of moral virtue is not the\nrational mean. Secondly, the mean of reason may be considered as that\nwhich the reason puts into some particular matter. In this sense\nevery mean of moral virtue is a rational mean, since, as above stated\n(A. 1), moral virtue is said to observe the mean, through conformity\nwith right reason.\n\nBut it happens sometimes that the rational mean is also the real\nmean: in which case the mean of moral virtue is the real mean, for\ninstance, in justice. On the other hand, sometimes the rational mean\nis not the real mean, but is considered in relation to us: and such\nis the mean in all the other moral virtues. The reason for this is\nthat justice is about operations, which deal with external things,\nwherein the right has to be established simply and absolutely, as\nstated above (Q. 60, A. 2): wherefore the rational mean in justice is\nthe same as the real mean, in so far, to wit as justice gives to each\none his due, neither more nor less. But the other moral virtues deal\nwith interior passions wherein the right cannot be established in the\nsame way, since men are variously situated in relation to their\npassions; hence the rectitude of reason has to be established in the\npassions, with due regard to us, who are moved in respect of the\npassions.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first two\narguments take the rational mean as being in the very act of reason,\nwhile the third argues from the mean of justice.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 64, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Intellectual Virtues Observe the Mean?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not\nobserve the mean. Because moral virtue observes the mean by\nconforming to the rule of reason. But the intellectual virtues are in\nreason itself, so that they seem to have no higher rule. Therefore\nthe intellectual virtues do not observe the mean.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue is fixed by an intellectual\nvirtue: for it is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6, that \"virtue observes the\nmean appointed by reason, as a prudent man would appoint it.\" If\ntherefore intellectual virtue also observe the mean, this mean will\nhave to be appointed for them by another virtue, so that there would\nbe an indefinite series of virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a mean is, properly speaking, between contraries, as\nthe Philosopher explains (Metaph. x, text. 22, 23). But there seems\nto be no contrariety in the intellect; since contraries themselves,\nas they are in the intellect, are not in opposition to one another,\nbut are understood together, as white and black, healthy and sick.\nTherefore there is no mean in the intellectual virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Art is an intellectual virtue; and yet there is a\nmean in art (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore also intellectual virtue\nobserves the mean.\n\n_I answer that,_ The good of anything consists in its observing the\nmean, by conforming with a rule or measure in respect of which it may\nhappen to be excessive or deficient, as stated above (A. 1). Now\nintellectual virtue, like moral virtue, is directed to the good, as\nstated above (Q. 56, A. 3). Hence the good of an intellectual virtue\nconsists in observing the mean, in so far as it is subject to a\nmeasure. Now the good of intellectual virtue is the true; in the case\nof contemplative virtue, it is the true taken absolutely (Ethic. vi,\n2); in the case of practical virtue, it is the true in conformity\nwith a right appetite.\n\nNow truth apprehended by our intellect, if we consider it absolutely,\nis measured by things; since things are the measure of our intellect,\nas stated in _Metaph._ x, text. 5; because there is truth in what we\nthink or say, according as the thing is so or not. Accordingly the\ngood of speculative intellectual virtue consists in a certain mean,\nby way of conformity with things themselves, in so far as the\nintellect expresses them as being what they are, or as not being what\nthey are not: and it is in this that the nature of truth consists.\nThere will be excess if something false is affirmed, as though\nsomething were, which in reality it is not: and there will be\ndeficiency if something is falsely denied, and declared not to be,\nwhereas in reality it is.\n\nThe truth of practical intellectual virtue, if we consider it in\nrelation to things, is by way of that which is measured; so that both\nin practical and in speculative intellectual virtues, the mean\nconsists in conformity with things. But if we consider it in relation\nto the appetite, it has the character of a rule and measure.\nConsequently the rectitude of reason is the mean of moral virtue, and\nalso the mean of prudence--of prudence as ruling and measuring, of\nmoral virtue, as ruled and measured by that mean. In like manner the\ndifference between excess and deficiency is to be applied in both\ncases.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Intellectual virtues also have their measure, as\nstated, and they observe the mean according as they conform to that\nmeasure.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There is no need for an indefinite series of virtues:\nbecause the measure and rule of intellectual virtue is not another\nkind of virtue, but things themselves.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The things themselves that are contrary have no\ncontrariety in the mind, because one is the reason for knowing the\nother: nevertheless there is in the intellect contrariety of\naffirmation and negation, which are contraries, as stated at the end\nof _Peri Hermen[e]ias._ For though \"to be\" and \"not to be\" are not in\ncontrary, but in contradictory opposition to one another, so long as\nwe consider their signification in things themselves, for on the one\nhand we have \"being\" and on the other we have simply \"non-being\"; yet\nif we refer them to the act of the mind, there is something positive\nin both cases. Hence \"to be\" and \"not to be\" are contradictory: but\nthe opinion stating that \"good is good\" is contrary to the opinion\nstating that \"good is not good\": and between two such contraries\nintellectual virtue observes the mean.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 64, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Theological Virtues Observe the Mean?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that theological virtue observes the mean.\nFor the good of other virtues consists in their observing the mean.\nNow the theological virtues surpass the others in goodness. Therefore\nmuch more does theological virtue observe the mean.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the mean of moral virtue depends on the appetite\nbeing ruled by reason; while the mean of intellectual virtue consists\nin the intellect being measured by things. Now theological virtue\nperfects both intellect and appetite, as stated above (Q. 62, A. 3).\nTherefore theological virtue also observes the mean.\n\nObj. 3: Further, hope, which is a theological virtue, is a mean\nbetween despair and presumption. Likewise faith holds a middle course\nbetween contrary heresies, as Boethius states (De Duab. Natur. vii):\nthus, by confessing one Person and two natures in Christ, we observe\nthe mean between the heresy of Nestorius, who maintained the\nexistence of two persons and two natures, and the heresy of Eutyches,\nwho held to one person and one nature. Therefore theological virtue\nobserves the mean.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Wherever virtue observes the mean it is possible\nto sin by excess as well as by deficiency. But there is no sinning by\nexcess against God, Who is the object of theological virtue: for it\nis written (Ecclus. 43:33): \"Blessing the Lord, exalt Him as much as\nyou can: for He is above all praise.\" Therefore theological virtue\ndoes not observe the mean.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the mean of virtue depends\non conformity with virtue's rule or measure, in so far as one may\nexceed or fall short of that rule. Now the measure of theological\nvirtue may be twofold. One is taken from the very nature of virtue,\nand thus the measure and rule of theological virtue is God Himself:\nbecause our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity,\naccording to His goodness; hope, according to the immensity of His\nomnipotence and loving kindness. This measure surpasses all human\npower: so that never can we love God as much as He ought to be loved,\nnor believe and hope in Him as much as we should. Much less therefore\ncan there be excess in such things. Accordingly the good of such\nvirtues does not consist in a mean, but increases the more we\napproach to the summit.\n\nThe other rule or measure of theological virtue is by comparison with\nus: for although we cannot be borne towards God as much as we ought,\nyet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving,\naccording to the measure of our condition. Consequently it is\npossible to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue,\naccidentally and in reference to us.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The good of intellectual and moral virtues consists in\na mean of reason by conformity with a measure that may be exceeded:\nwhereas this is not so in the case of theological virtue, considered\nin itself, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Moral and intellectual virtues perfect our intellect\nand appetite in relation to a created measure and rule; whereas the\ntheological virtues perfect them in relation to an uncreated rule and\nmeasure. Wherefore the comparison fails.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Hope observes the mean between presumption and\ndespair, in relation to us, in so far, to wit, as a man is said to be\npresumptuous, through hoping to receive from God a good in excess of\nhis condition; or to despair through failing to hope for that which\naccording to his condition he might hope for. But there can be no\nexcess of hope in comparison with God, Whose goodness is infinite. In\nlike manner faith holds a middle course between contrary heresies, not\nby comparison with its object, which is God, in Whom we cannot believe\ntoo much; but in so far as human opinion itself takes a middle\nposition between contrary opinions, as was explained above.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 65\n\nOF THE CONNECTION OF VIRTUES\n(In Five Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the connection of virtues: under which head\nthere are five points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the moral virtues are connected with one another?\n\n(2) Whether the moral virtues can be without charity?\n\n(3) Whether charity can be without them?\n\n(4) Whether faith and hope can be without charity?\n\n(5) Whether charity can be without them?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 65, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Moral Virtues Are Connected with One Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are not connected\nwith one another. Because moral virtues are sometimes caused by the\nexercise of acts, as is proved in _Ethic._ ii, 1, 2. But man can\nexercise himself in the acts of one virtue, without exercising\nhimself in the acts of some other virtue. Therefore it is possible to\nhave one moral virtue without another.\n\nObj. 2: Further, magnificence and magnanimity are moral virtues. Now\na man may have other moral virtues without having magnificence or\nmagnanimity: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 2, 3) that \"a poor\nman cannot be magnificent,\" and yet he may have other virtues; and\n(Ethic. iv) that \"he who is worthy of small things, and so accounts\nhis worth, is modest, but not magnanimous.\" Therefore the moral\nvirtues are not connected with one another.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive part of\nthe soul, so do the intellectual virtues perfect the intellective\npart. But the intellectual virtues are not mutually connected: since\nwe may have one science, without having another. Neither, therefore,\nare the moral virtues connected with one another.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if the moral virtues are mutually connected, this\ncan only be because they are united together in prudence. But this\ndoes not suffice to connect the moral virtues together. For,\nseemingly, one may be prudent about things to be done in relation to\none virtue, without being prudent in those that concern another\nvirtue: even as one may have the art of making certain things,\nwithout the art of making certain others. Now prudence is right\nreason about things to be done. Therefore the moral virtues are not\nnecessarily connected with one another.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says on Luke 6:20: \"The virtues are\nconnected and linked together, so that whoever has one, is seen to\nhave several\": and Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that \"the virtues\nthat reside in the human mind are quite inseparable from one\nanother\": and Gregory says (Moral. xxii, 1) that \"one virtue without\nthe other is either of no account whatever, or very imperfect\": and\nCicero says (Quaest. Tusc. ii): \"If you confess to not having one\nparticular virtue, it must needs be that you have none at all.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Moral virtue may be considered either as perfect or\nas imperfect. An imperfect moral virtue, temperance for instance, or\nfortitude, is nothing but an inclination in us to do some kind of\ngood deed, whether such inclination be in us by nature or by\nhabituation. If we take the moral virtues in this way, they are not\nconnected: since we find men who, by natural temperament or by being\naccustomed, are prompt in doing deeds of liberality, but are not\nprompt in doing deeds of chastity.\n\nBut the perfect moral virtue is a habit that inclines us to do a good\ndeed well; and if we take moral virtues in this way, we must say that\nthey are connected, as nearly as all are agreed in saying. For this\ntwo reasons are given, corresponding to the different ways of\nassigning the distinction of the cardinal virtues. For, as we stated\nabove (Q. 61, AA. 3, 4), some distinguish them according to certain\ngeneral properties of the virtues: for instance, by saying that\ndiscretion belongs to prudence, rectitude to justice, moderation to\ntemperance, and strength of mind to fortitude, in whatever matter we\nconsider these properties to be. In this way the reason for the\nconnection is evident: for strength of mind is not commended as\nvirtuous, if it be without moderation or rectitude or discretion: and\nso forth. This, too, is the reason assigned for the connection by\nGregory, who says (Moral. xxii, 1) that \"a virtue cannot be perfect\"\nas a virtue, \"if isolated from the others: for there can be no true\nprudence without temperance, justice and fortitude\": and he continues\nto speak in like manner of the other virtues (cf. Q. 61, A. 4, Obj.\n1). Augustine also gives the same reason (De Trin. vi, 4).\n\nOthers, however, differentiate these virtues in respect of their\nmatters, and it is in this way that Aristotle assigns the reason for\ntheir connection (Ethic. vi, 13). Because, as stated above (Q. 58, A.\n4), no moral virtue can be without prudence; since it is proper to\nmoral virtue to make a right choice, for it is an elective habit. Now\nright choice requires not only the inclination to a due end, which\ninclination is the direct outcome of moral virtue, but also correct\nchoice of things conducive to the end, which choice is made by\nprudence, that counsels, judges, and commands in those things that\nare directed to the end. In like manner one cannot have prudence\nunless one has the moral virtues: since prudence is \"right reason\nabout things to be done,\" and the starting point of reason is the end\nof the thing to be done, to which end man is rightly disposed by\nmoral virtue. Hence, just as we cannot have speculative science\nunless we have the understanding of the principles, so neither can we\nhave prudence without the moral virtues: and from this it follows\nclearly that the moral virtues are connected with one another.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general\nstate, in other words, with regard to those things which have to be\ndone in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself\nat the same time in the matters of all moral virtues. And if he\nexercise himself, by good deeds, in all such matters, he will acquire\nthe habits of all the moral virtues. But if he exercise himself by\ngood deeds in regard to one matter, but not in regard to another, for\ninstance, by behaving well in matters of anger, but not in matters of\nconcupiscence; he will indeed acquire a certain habit of restraining\nhis anger; but this habit will lack the nature of virtue, through the\nabsence of prudence, which is wanting in matters of concupiscence. In\nthe same way, natural inclinations fail to have the complete\ncharacter of virtue, if prudence be lacking.\n\nBut there are some moral virtues which perfect man with regard to\nsome eminent state, such as magnificence and magnanimity; and since\nit does not happen to all in common to be exercised in the matter of\nsuch virtues, it is possible for a man to have the other moral\nvirtues, without actually having the habits of these\nvirtues--provided we speak of acquired virtue. Nevertheless, when\nonce a man has acquired those other virtues he possesses these in\nproximate potentiality. Because when, by practice, a man has acquired\nliberality in small gifts and expenditure, if he were to come in for\na large sum of money, he would acquire the habit of magnificence with\nbut little practice: even as a geometrician, by dint of little study,\nacquires scientific knowledge about some conclusion which had never\nbeen presented to his mind before. Now we speak of having a thing\nwhen we are on the point of having it, according to the saying of the\nPhilosopher (Phys. ii, text. 56): \"That which is scarcely lacking is\nnot lacking at all.\"\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The intellectual virtues are about divers matters\nhaving no relation to one another, as is clearly the case with the\nvarious sciences and arts. Hence we do not observe in them the\nconnection that is to be found among the moral virtues, which are\nabout passions and operations, that are clearly related to one\nanother. For all the passions have their rise in certain initial\npassions, viz. love and hatred, and terminate in certain others, viz.\npleasure and sorrow. In like manner all the operations that are the\nmatter of moral virtue are related to one another, and to the\npassions. Hence the whole matter of moral virtues falls under the one\nrule of prudence.\n\nNevertheless, all intelligible things are related to first\nprinciples. And in this way, all the intellectual virtues depend on\nthe understanding of principles; even as prudence depends on the\nmoral virtues, as stated. On the other hand, the universal principles\nwhich are the object of the virtue of understanding of principles, do\nnot depend on the conclusions, which are the objects of the other\nintellectual virtues, as do the moral virtues depend on prudence,\nbecause the appetite, in a fashion, moves the reason, and the reason\nthe appetite, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1; Q. 58, A. 5, ad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 4: Those things to which the moral virtues incline, are as\nthe principles of prudence: whereas the products of art are not the\nprinciples, but the matter of art. Now it is evident that, though\nreason may be right in one part of the matter, and not in another,\nyet in no way can it be called right reason, if it be deficient in\nany principle whatever. Thus, if a man be wrong about the principle,\n\"A whole is greater than its part,\" he cannot acquire the science of\ngeometry, because he must necessarily wander from the truth in his\nconclusion. Moreover, things _done_ are related to one another, but\nnot things _made,_ as stated above (ad 3). Consequently the lack of\nprudence in one department of things to be done, would result in a\ndeficiency affecting other things to be done: whereas this does not\noccur in things to be made.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 65, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Moral Virtues Can Be Without Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that moral virtues can be without charity.\nFor it is stated in the _Liber Sentent. Prosperi_ vii, that \"every\nvirtue save charity may be common to the good and bad.\" But \"charity\ncan be in none except the good,\" as stated in the same book.\nTherefore the other virtues can be had without charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, moral virtues can be acquired by means of human\nacts, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 1, 2, whereas charity cannot be had\notherwise than by infusion, according to Rom. 5:5: \"The charity of\nGod is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to\nus.\" Therefore it is possible to have the other virtues without\ncharity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the moral virtues are connected together, through\ndepending on prudence. But charity does not depend on prudence;\nindeed, it surpasses prudence, according to Eph. 3:19: \"The charity\nof Christ, which surpasseth all knowledge.\" Therefore the moral\nvirtues are not connected with charity, and can be without it.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 3:14): \"He that loveth not,\nabideth in death.\" Now the spiritual life is perfected by the\nvirtues, since it is \"by them\" that \"we lead a good life,\" as\nAugustine states (De Lib. Arb. ii, 17, 19). Therefore they cannot be\nwithout the love of charity.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 63, A. 2), it is possible by\nmeans of human works to acquire moral virtues, in so far as they\nproduce good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the\nnatural power of man: and when they are acquired thus, they can be\nwithout charity, even as they were in many of the Gentiles. But in so\nfar as they produce good works in proportion to a supernatural last\nend, thus they have the character of virtue, truly and perfectly; and\ncannot be acquired by human acts, but are infused by God. Such like\nmoral virtues cannot be without charity. For it has been stated above\n(A. 1; Q. 58, AA. 4, 5) that the other moral virtues cannot be\nwithout prudence; and that prudence cannot be without the moral\nvirtues, because these latter make man well disposed to certain ends,\nwhich are the starting-point of the procedure of prudence. Now for\nprudence to proceed aright, it is much more necessary that man be\nwell disposed towards his ultimate end, which is the effect of\ncharity, than that he be well disposed in respect of other ends,\nwhich is the effect of moral virtue: just as in speculative matters\nright reason has greatest need of the first indemonstrable principle,\nthat \"contradictories cannot both be true at the same time.\" It is\ntherefore evident that neither can infused prudence be without\ncharity; nor, consequently, the other moral virtues, since they\ncannot be without prudence.\n\nIt is therefore clear from what has been said that only the infused\nvirtues are perfect, and deserve to be called virtues simply: since\nthey direct man well to the ultimate end. But the other virtues,\nthose, namely, that are acquired, are virtues in a restricted sense,\nbut not simply: for they direct man well in respect of the last end\nin some particular genus of action, but not in respect of the last\nend simply. Hence a gloss of Augustine [*Cf. Lib. Sentent. Prosperi\ncvi.] on the words, \"All that is not of faith is sin\" (Rom. 14:23),\nsays: \"He that fails to acknowledge the truth, has no true virtue,\neven if his conduct be good.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Virtue, in the words quoted, denotes imperfect virtue.\nElse if we take moral virtue in its perfect state, \"it makes its\npossessor good,\" and consequently cannot be in the wicked.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument holds good of virtue in the sense of\nacquired virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Though charity surpasses science and prudence, yet\nprudence depends on charity, as stated: and consequently so do all\nthe infused moral virtues.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 65, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Charity Can Be Without Moral Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem possible to have charity without the moral\nvirtues. For when one thing suffices for a certain purpose, it is\nsuperfluous to employ others. Now charity alone suffices for the\nfulfilment of all the works of virtue, as is clear from 1 Cor. 13:4,\nseqq.: \"Charity is patient, is kind,\" etc. Therefore it seems that if\none has charity, other virtues are superfluous.\n\nObj. 2: Further, he that has a habit of virtue easily performs the\nworks of that virtue, and those works are pleasing to him for their\nown sake: hence \"pleasure taken in a work is a sign of habit\" (Ethic.\nii, 3). Now many have charity, being free from mortal sin, and yet\nthey find it difficult to do works of virtue; nor are these works\npleasing to them for their own sake, but only for the sake of\ncharity. Therefore many have charity without the other virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, charity is to be found in every saint: and yet there\nare some saints who are without certain virtues. For Bede says (on\nLuke 17:10) that the saints are more humbled on account of their not\nhaving certain virtues, than rejoiced at the virtues they have.\nTherefore, if a man has charity, it does not follow of necessity that\nhe has all the moral virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The whole Law is fulfilled through charity, for it\nis written (Rom. 13:8): \"He that loveth his neighbor, hath fulfilled\nthe Law.\" Now it is not possible to fulfil the whole Law, without\nhaving all the moral virtues: since the law contains precepts about\nall acts of virtue, as stated in _Ethic._ v, 1, 2. Therefore he that\nhas charity, has all the moral virtues. Moreover, Augustine says in a\nletter (Epis. clxvii) [*Cf. Serm. xxxix and xlvi de Temp.] that\ncharity contains all the cardinal virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ All the moral virtues are infused together with\ncharity. The reason for this is that God operates no less perfectly\nin works of grace than in works of nature. Now, in the works of\nnature, we find that whenever a thing contains a principle of certain\nworks, it has also whatever is necessary for their execution: thus\nanimals are provided with organs whereby to perform the actions that\ntheir souls empower them to do. Now it is evident that charity,\ninasmuch as it directs man to his last end, is the principle of all\nthe good works that are referable to his last end. Wherefore all the\nmoral virtues must needs be infused together with charity, since it\nis through them that man performs each different kind of good work.\n\nIt is therefore clear that the infused moral virtues are connected,\nnot only through prudence, but also on account of charity: and,\nagain, that whoever loses charity through mortal sin, forfeits all\nthe infused moral virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In order that the act of a lower power be perfect, not\nonly must there be perfection in the higher, but also in the lower\npower: for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action\nwould not follow, if the instrument also were not well disposed.\nConsequently, in order that man work well in things referred to the\nend, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well to the end, but\nalso those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is referred to\nthe end: for the virtue which regards the end is the chief and moving\nprinciple in respect of those things that are referred to the end.\nTherefore it is necessary to have the moral virtues together with\ncharity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds\nit difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently\nfeels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some\nimpediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a habit of\nscience, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or\nunwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of moral virtue\nexperience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain ordinary\ndispositions remaining from previous acts. This difficulty does not\noccur in respect of acquired moral virtue: because the repeated acts\nby which they are acquired, remove also the contrary dispositions.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Certain saints are said not to have certain virtues, in\nso far as they experience difficulty in the acts of those virtues,\nfor the reason stated; although they have the habits of all the\nvirtues.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 65, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Faith and Hope Can Be Without Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that faith and hope are never without\ncharity. Because, since they are theological virtues, they seem to be\nmore excellent than even the infused moral virtues. But the infused\nmoral virtues cannot be without charity. Neither therefore can faith\nand hope be without charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"no man believes unwillingly\" as Augustine says\n(Tract. xxvi in Joan.). But charity is in the will as a perfection\nthereof, as stated above (Q. 62, A. 3). Therefore faith cannot be\nwithout charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion viii) that \"there can be\nno hope without love.\" But love is charity: for it is of this love\nthat he speaks. Therefore hope cannot be without charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Matt. 1:2 says that \"faith begets hope,\nand hope, charity.\" Now the begetter precedes the begotten, and can\nbe without it. Therefore faith can be without hope; and hope, without\ncharity.\n\n_I answer that,_ Faith and hope, like the moral virtues, can be\nconsidered in two ways; first in an inchoate state; secondly, as\ncomplete virtues. For since virtue is directed to the doing of good\nworks, perfect virtue is that which gives the faculty of doing a\nperfectly good work, and this consists in not only doing what is\ngood, but also in doing it well. Else, if what is done is good, but\nnot well done, it will not be perfectly good; wherefore neither will\nthe habit that is the principle of such an act, have the perfect\ncharacter of virtue. For instance, if a man do what is just, what he\ndoes is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless\nhe do it well, i.e. by choosing rightly, which is the result of\nprudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without\nprudence.\n\nAccordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without\ncharity: but they have not the perfect character of virtue without\ncharity. For, since the act of faith is to believe in God; and since\nto believe is to assent to someone of one's own free will: to will\nnot as one ought, will not be a perfect act of faith. To will as one\nought is the outcome of charity which perfects the will: since every\nright movement of the will proceeds from a right love, as Augustine\nsays (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9). Hence faith may be without charity, but\nnot as a perfect virtue: just as temperance and fortitude can be\nwithout prudence. The same applies to hope. Because the act of hope\nconsists in looking to God for future bliss. This act is perfect, if\nit is based on the merits which we have; and this cannot be without\ncharity. But to expect future bliss through merits which one has not\nyet, but which one proposes to acquire at some future time, will be\nan imperfect act; and this is possible without charity. Consequently,\nfaith and hope can be without charity; yet, without charity, they are\nnot virtues properly so-called; because the nature of virtue requires\nthat by it, we should not only do what is good, but also that we\nshould do it well (Ethic. ii, 6).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Moral virtue depends on prudence: and not even infused\nprudence has the character of prudence without charity; for this\ninvolves the absence of due order to the first principle, viz. the\nultimate end. On the other hand faith and hope, as such, do not\ndepend either on prudence or charity; so that they can be without\ncharity, although they are not virtues without charity, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument is true of faith considered as a perfect\nvirtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Augustine is speaking here of that hope whereby we look\nto gain future bliss through merits which we have already; and this\nis not without charity.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 65, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Charity Can Be Without Faith and Hope?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity can be without faith and\nhope. For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to\nlove God naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future\nbliss. Therefore charity can be without faith and hope.\n\nObj. 2: Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to\nEph. 3:17: \"Rooted and founded in charity.\" Now the root is sometimes\nwithout branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without faith\nand hope, and the other virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He had\nneither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor, as we\nshall explain further on (III, Q. 7, AA. 3, 4). Therefore charity can\nbe without faith and hope.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:6): \"Without faith it is\nimpossible to please God\"; and this evidently belongs most to\ncharity, according to Prov. 8:17: \"I love them that love me.\" Again,\nit is by hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above (Q. 62,\nA. 4). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and\nhope.\n\n_I answer that,_ Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also\na certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain\nmutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in\n_Ethic._ viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident from 1 John\n4:16: \"He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him,\"\nand from 1 Cor. 1:9, where it is written: \"God is faithful, by Whom\nyou are called unto the fellowship of His Son.\" Now this fellowship\nof man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with\nHim, is begun here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in\nthe future life, by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and\nhope. Wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible,\nif one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility of their\nfellowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which\nis charity, is impossible without faith, so as to believe in this\nfellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this\nfellowship. Therefore charity is quite impossible without faith and\nhope.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love\nof God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object\nwe are directed by faith and hope.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Charity is the root of faith and hope, in so far as it\ngives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are\nthe precursors of charity, as stated above (Q. 62, A. 4), and so\ncharity is impossible without them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on account\nof their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had\nmanifest vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension [*See above,\nQ. 4, A. 3]: so that in Him was perfect charity.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 66\n\nOF EQUALITY AMONG THE VIRTUES\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head\nthere are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another?\n\n(2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are\nequal?\n\n(3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue;\n\n(4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another;\n\n(5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another;\n\n(6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 1]\n\nWhether One Virtue Can Be Greater or Less Than Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less\nthan another. For it is written (Apoc. 21:16) that the sides of the\ncity of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote\nthe virtues. Therefore all virtues are equal; and consequently one\ncannot be greater than another.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a maximum,\ncannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in a\nmaximum, for virtue is \"the limit of power,\" as the Philosopher\nstates (De Coelo i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii,\n19) that \"virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to\nevil purpose.\" Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater\nor less than another.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the power\nof the agent. But perfect, viz. infused virtues, are from God Whose\npower is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue\ncannot be greater than another.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Wherever there can be increase and greater\nabundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater\nabundance and increase: for it is written (Matt. 5:20): \"Unless your\njustice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall\nnot enter into the kingdom of heaven\": and (Prov. 15:5): \"In abundant\njustice there is the greatest strength (_virtus_).\" Therefore it\nseems that a virtue can be greater or less than another.\n\n_I answer that,_ When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater\nthan another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as\napplying to virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear\nthat one virtue is greater than another; since a cause is always more\nexcellent than its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the\ncause are the most excellent. Now it is clear from what has been said\n(Q. 18, A. 5; Q. 61, A. 2) that the cause and root of human good is\nthe reason. Hence prudence which perfects the reason, surpasses in\ngoodness the other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power,\nin so far as it partakes of reason. And among these, one is better\nthan another, according as it approaches nearer to the reason.\nConsequently justice, which is in the will, excels the remaining\nmoral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible part, stands\nbefore temperance, which is in the concupiscible, which has a smaller\nshare of reason, as stated in _Ethic._ vii, 6.\n\nThe question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of\nthe same species. In this way, according to what was said above (Q.\n52, A. 1), when we were treating of the intensity of habits, virtue\nmay be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself;\nsecondly with regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we\nconsider it in itself, we shall call it great or little, according to\nthe things to which it extends. Now whosoever has a virtue, e.g.\ntemperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to. But\nthis does not apply to science and art: for every grammarian does not\nknow everything relating to grammar. And in this sense the Stoics\nsaid rightly, as Simplicius states in his _Commentary on the\nPredicaments,_ that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art\ncan; because the nature of virtue consists in a maximum.\n\nIf, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may\nthen be greater or less, either in relation to different times, or in\ndifferent men. Because one man is better disposed than another to\nattain to the mean of virtue which is defined by right reason; and\nthis, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural\ndisposition, or a more discerning judgment of reason, or again a\ngreater gift of grace, which is given to each one \"according to the\nmeasure of the giving of Christ,\" as stated in Eph. 4:9. And here the\nStoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous,\nunless he were, in the highest degree, disposed to virtue. Because\nthe nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean\nof right reason as though it were an indivisible point, as the Stoics\nthought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as stated\nin _Ethic._ ii, 6. Moreover, one same indivisible mark is reached\nmore nearly and more readily by one than by another: as may be seen\nwhen several archers aim at a fixed target.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This equality is not one of absolute quantity, but of\nproportion: because all virtues grow in a man proportionately, as we\nshall see further on (A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 2: This \"limit\" which belongs to virtue, can have the\ncharacter of something _more_ or _less_ good, in the ways explained\nabove: since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God does not work by necessity of nature, but according\nto the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various\nmeasures of virtue, according to Eph. 4:7: \"To every one of you\n[Vulg.: 'us'] is given grace according to the measure of the giving\nof Christ.\"\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 2]\n\nWhether All the Virtues That Are Together in One Man, Are Equal?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the virtues in one same man are not\nall equally intense. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:7): \"Everyone\nhath his proper gift from God; one after this manner, and another\nafter that.\" Now one gift would not be more proper than another to a\nman, if God infused all the virtues equally into each man. Therefore\nit seems that the virtues are not all equal in one and the same man.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if all the virtues were equally intense in one and\nthe same man, it would follow that whoever surpasses another in one\nvirtue, would surpass him in all the others. But this is clearly not\nthe case: since various saints are specially praised for different\nvirtues; e.g. Abraham for faith (Rom. 4), Moses for his meekness\n(Num. 7:3), Job for his patience (Tob. 2:12). This is why of each\nConfessor the Church sings: \"There was not found his like in keeping\nthe law of the most High,\" [*See _Lesson_ in the Mass _Statuit_\n(Dominican Missal)], since each one was remarkable for some virtue or\nother. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same\nman.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the more intense a habit is, the greater one's\npleasure and readiness in making use of it. Now experience shows that\na man is more pleased and ready to make use of one virtue than of\nanother. Therefore the virtues are not all equal in one and the same\nman.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 4) that \"those who\nare equal in fortitude are equal in prudence and temperance,\" and so\non. Now it would not be so, unless all the virtues in one man were\nequal. Therefore all virtues are equal in one man.\n\n_I answer that,_ As explained above (A. 1), the comparative greatness\nof virtues can be understood in two ways. First, as referring to\ntheir specific nature: and in this way there is no doubt that in a\nman one virtue is greater than another, for example, charity, than\nfaith and hope. Secondly, it may be taken as referring to the degree\nof participation by the subject, according as a virtue becomes\nintense or remiss in its subject. In this sense all the virtues in\none man are equal with an equality of proportion, in so far as their\ngrowth in man is equal: thus the fingers are unequal in size, but\nequal in proportion, since they grow in proportion to one another.\n\nNow the nature of this equality is to be explained in the same way as\nthe connection of virtues; for equality among virtues is their\nconnection as to greatness. Now it has been stated above (Q. 65, A.\n1) that a twofold connection of virtues may be assigned. The first is\naccording to the opinion of those who understood these four virtues\nto be four general properties of virtues, each of which is found\ntogether with the other in any matter. In this way virtues cannot be\nsaid to be equal in any matter unless they have all these properties\nequal. Augustine alludes to this kind of equality (De Trin. vi, 4)\nwhen he says: \"If you say these men are equal in fortitude, but that\none is more prudent than the other; it follows that the fortitude of\nthe latter is less prudent. Consequently they are not really equal in\nfortitude, since the former's fortitude is more prudent. You will\nfind that this applies to the other virtues if you run over them all\nin the same way.\"\n\nThe other kind of connection among virtues followed the opinion of\nthose who hold these virtues to have their own proper respective\nmatters (Q. 65, AA. 1, 2). In this way the connection among moral\nvirtues results from prudence, and, as to the infused virtues, from\ncharity, and not from the inclination, which is on the part of the\nsubject, as stated above (Q. 65, A. 1). Accordingly the nature of the\nequality among virtues can also be considered on the part of\nprudence, in regard to that which is formal in all the moral virtues:\nfor in one and the same man, so long as his reason has the same\ndegree of perfection, the mean will be proportionately defined\naccording to right reason in each matter of virtue.\n\nBut in regard to that which is material in the moral virtues, viz.\nthe inclination to the virtuous act, one may be readier to perform\nthe act of one virtue, than the act of another virtue, and this\neither from nature, or from habituation, or again by the grace of God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This saying of the Apostle may be taken to refer to the\ngifts of gratuitous grace, which are not common to all, nor are all\nof them equal in the one same subject. We might also say that it\nrefers to the measure of sanctifying grace, by reason of which one\nman has all the virtues in greater abundance than another man, on\naccount of his greater abundance of prudence, or also of charity, in\nwhich all the infused virtues are connected.\n\nReply Obj. 2: One saint is praised chiefly for one virtue, another\nsaint for another virtue, on account of his more admirable readiness\nfor the act of one virtue than for the act of another virtue.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the Third Objection.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Moral Virtues Are Better Than the Intellectual Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues are better than the\nintellectual. Because that which is more necessary, and more lasting,\nis better. Now the moral virtues are \"more lasting even than the\nsciences\" (Ethic. i) which are intellectual virtues: and, moreover,\nthey are more necessary for human life. Therefore they are preferable\nto the intellectual virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, virtue is defined as \"that which makes its possessor\ngood.\" Now man is said to be good in respect of moral virtue, and art\nin respect of intellectual virtue, except perhaps in respect of\nprudence alone. Therefore moral is better than intellectual virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the end is more excellent than the means. But\naccording to _Ethic._ vi, 12, \"moral virtue gives right intention of\nthe end; whereas prudence gives right choice of the means.\" Therefore\nmoral virtue is more excellent than prudence, which is the\nintellectual virtue that regards moral matters.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Moral virtue is in that part of the soul which is\nrational by participation; while intellectual virtue is in the\nessentially rational part, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 13. Now rational\nby essence is more excellent than rational by participation.\nTherefore intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing may be said to be greater or less in two\nways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders\nsomething from being better simply, e.g. \"learning than riches,\" and\nyet not better relatively, i.e. \"for one who is in want\" [*Aristotle,\n_Topic._ iii.]. Now to consider a thing simply is to consider it in\nits proper specific nature. Accordingly, a virtue takes its species\nfrom its object, as explained above (Q. 54, A. 2; Q. 60, A. 1).\nHence, speaking simply, that virtue is more excellent, which has the\nmore excellent object. Now it is evident that the object of the\nreason is more excellent than the object of the appetite: since the\nreason apprehends things in the universal, while the appetite tends\nto things themselves, whose being is restricted to the particular.\nConsequently, speaking simply, the intellectual virtues, which\nperfect the reason, are more excellent than the moral virtues, which\nperfect the appetite.\n\nBut if we consider virtue in its relation to act, then moral virtue,\nwhich perfects the appetite, whose function it is to move the other\npowers to act, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1), is more excellent. And\nsince virtue is so called from its being a principle of action, for\nit is the perfection of a power, it follows again that the nature of\nvirtue agrees more with moral than with intellectual virtue, though\nthe intellectual virtues are more excellent habits, simply speaking.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The moral virtues are more lasting than the\nintellectual virtues, because they are practised in matters\npertaining to the life of the community. Yet it is evident that the\nobjects of the sciences, which are necessary and invariable, are more\nlasting than the objects of moral virtue, which are certain\nparticular matters of action. That the moral virtues are more\nnecessary for human life, proves that they are more excellent, not\nsimply, but relatively. Indeed, the speculative intellectual virtues,\nfrom the very fact that they are not referred to something else, as a\nuseful thing is referred to an end, are more excellent. The reason\nfor this is that in them we have a kind of beginning of that\nhappiness which consists in the knowledge of truth, as stated above\n(Q. 3, A. 6).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The reason why man is said to be good simply, in\nrespect of moral virtue, but not in respect of intellectual virtue,\nis because the appetite moves the other powers to their acts, as\nstated above (Q. 56, A. 3). Wherefore this argument, too, proves\nmerely that moral virtue is better relatively.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Prudence directs the moral virtues not only in the\nchoice of the means, but also in appointing the end. Now the end of\neach moral virtue is to attain the mean in the matter proper to that\nvirtue; which mean is appointed according to the right ruling of\nprudence, as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 6; vi, 13.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Justice Is the Chief of the Moral Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that justice is not the chief of the moral\nvirtues. For it is better to give of one's own than to pay what is\ndue. Now the former belongs to liberality, the latter to justice.\nTherefore liberality is apparently a greater virtue than justice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the chief quality of a thing is, seemingly, that in\nwhich it is most perfect. Now, according to Jam. 1:4, \"Patience hath\na perfect work.\" Therefore it would seem that patience is greater\nthan justice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"Magnanimity has a great influence on every virtue,\"\nas stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3. Therefore it magnifies even justice.\nTherefore it is greater than justice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that \"justice\nis the most excellent of the virtues.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A virtue considered in its species may be greater or\nless, either simply or relatively. A virtue is said to be greater\nsimply, whereby a greater rational good shines forth, as stated above\n(A. 1). In this way justice is the most excellent of all the moral\nvirtues, as being most akin to reason. This is made evident by\nconsidering its subject and its object: its subject, because this is\nthe will, and the will is the rational appetite, as stated above (Q.\n8, A. 1; Q. 26, A. 1): its object or matter, because it is about\noperations, whereby man is set in order not only in himself, but also\nin regard to another. Hence \"justice is the most excellent of\nvirtues\" (Ethic. v, 1). Among the other moral virtues, which are\nabout the passions, the more excellent the matter in which the\nappetitive movement is subjected to reason, so much the more does the\nrational good shine forth in each. Now in things touching man, the\nchief of all is life, on which all other things depend. Consequently\nfortitude which subjects the appetitive movement to reason in matters\nof life and death, holds the first place among those moral virtues\nthat are about the passions, but is subordinate to justice. Hence the\nPhilosopher says (Rhet. 1) that \"those virtues must needs be greatest\nwhich receive the most praise: since virtue is a power of doing good.\nHence the brave man and the just man are honored more than others;\nbecause the former,\" i.e. fortitude, \"is useful in war, and the\nlatter,\" i.e. justice, \"both in war and in peace.\" After fortitude\ncomes temperance, which subjects the appetite to reason in matters\ndirectly relating to life, in the one individual, or in the one\nspecies, viz. in matters of food and of sex. And so these three\nvirtues, together with prudence, are called principal virtues, in\nexcellence also.\n\nA virtue is said to be greater relatively, by reason of its helping\nor adorning a principal virtue: even as substance is more excellent\nsimply than accident: and yet relatively some particular accident is\nmore excellent than substance in so far as it perfects substance in\nsome accidental mode of being.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The act of liberality needs to be founded on an act of\njustice, for \"a man is not liberal in giving, unless he gives of his\nown\" (Polit. ii, 3). Hence there could be no liberality apart from\njustice, which discerns between \"meum\" and \"tuum\": whereas justice\ncan be without liberality. Hence justice is simply greater than\nliberality, as being more universal, and as being its foundation:\nwhile liberality is greater relatively since it is an ornament and an\naddition to justice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Patience is said to have \"a perfect work,\" by enduring\nevils, wherein it excludes not only unjust revenge, which is also\nexcluded by justice; not only hatred, which is also suppressed by\ncharity; nor only anger, which is calmed by gentleness; but also\ninordinate sorrow, which is the root of all the above. Wherefore it\nis more perfect and excellent through plucking up the root in this\nmatter. It is not, however, more perfect than all the other virtues\nsimply. Because fortitude not only endures trouble without being\ndisturbed, but also fights against it if necessary. Hence whoever is\nbrave is patient; but the converse does not hold, for patience is a\npart of fortitude.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There can be no magnanimity without the other virtues,\nas stated in _Ethic._ iv, 3. Hence it is compared to them as their\nornament, so that relatively it is greater than all the others, but\nnot simply.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Wisdom Is the Greatest of the Intellectual Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that wisdom is not the greatest of the\nintellectual virtues. Because the commander is greater than the one\ncommanded. Now prudence seems to command wisdom, for it is stated in\n_Ethic._ i, 2 that political science, which belongs to prudence\n(Ethic. vi, 8), \"orders that sciences should be cultivated in states,\nand to which of these each individual should devote himself, and to\nwhat extent.\" Since, then, wisdom is one of the sciences, it seems\nthat prudence is greater than wisdom.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it belongs to the nature of virtue to direct man to\nhappiness: because virtue is \"the disposition of a perfect thing to\nthat which is best,\" as stated in _Phys._ vii, text. 17. Now prudence\nis \"right reason about things to be done,\" whereby man is brought to\nhappiness: whereas wisdom takes no notice of human acts, whereby man\nattains happiness. Therefore prudence is a greater virtue than wisdom.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the more perfect knowledge is, the greater it seems\nto be. Now we can have more perfect knowledge of human affairs, which\nare the subject of science, than of Divine things, which are the\nobject of wisdom, which is the distinction given by Augustine (De\nTrin. xii, 14): because Divine things are incomprehensible, according\nto Job 26:26: \"Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge.\"\nTherefore science is a greater virtue than wisdom.\n\nObj. 4: Further, knowledge of principles is more excellent than\nknowledge of conclusions. But wisdom draws conclusions from\nindemonstrable principles which are the object of the virtue of\nunderstanding, even as other sciences do. Therefore understanding is\na greater virtue than wisdom.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that wisdom is\n\"the head\" among \"the intellectual virtues.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), the greatness of a virtue,\nas to its species, is taken from its object. Now the object of wisdom\nsurpasses the objects of all the intellectual virtues: because wisdom\nconsiders the Supreme Cause, which is God, as stated at the beginning\nof the _Metaphysics._ And since it is by the cause that we judge of\nan effect, and by the higher cause that we judge of the lower\neffects; hence it is that wisdom exercises judgment over all the\nother intellectual virtues, directs them all, and is the architect of\nthem all.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since prudence is about human affairs, and wisdom about\nthe Supreme Cause, it is impossible for prudence to be a greater\nvirtue than wisdom, \"unless,\" as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 7, \"man were\nthe greatest thing in the world.\" Wherefore we must say, as stated in\nthe same book (Ethic. vi), that prudence does not command wisdom, but\nvice versa: because \"the spiritual man judgeth all things; and he\nhimself is judged by no man\" (1 Cor. 2:15). For prudence has no\nbusiness with supreme matters which are the object of wisdom: but its\ncommand covers things directed to wisdom, viz. how men are to obtain\nwisdom. Wherefore prudence, or political science, is, in this way,\nthe servant of wisdom; for it leads to wisdom, preparing the way for\nher, as the doorkeeper for the king.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Prudence considers the means of acquiring happiness,\nbut wisdom considers the very object of happiness, viz. the Supreme\nIntelligible. And if indeed the consideration of wisdom were perfect\nin respect of its object, there would be perfect happiness in the act\nof wisdom: but as, in this life, the act of wisdom is imperfect in\nrespect of its principal object, which is God, it follows that the\nact of wisdom is a beginning or participation of future happiness, so\nthat wisdom is nearer than prudence to happiness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 1), \"one\nknowledge is preferable to another, either because it is about a\nhigher object, or because it is more certain.\" Hence if the objects\nbe equally good and sublime, that virtue will be greater which\npossesses more certain knowledge. But a virtue which is less certain\nabout a higher and better object, is preferable to that which is more\ncertain about an object of inferior degree. Wherefore the Philosopher\nsays (De Coelo ii, text. 60) that \"it is a great thing to be able to\nknow something about celestial beings, though it be based on weak and\nprobable reasoning\"; and again (De Part. Animal. i, 5) that \"it is\nbetter to know a little about sublime things, than much about mean\nthings.\" Accordingly wisdom, to which knowledge about God pertains,\nis beyond the reach of man, especially in this life, so as to be his\npossession: for this \"belongs to God alone\" (Metaph. i, 2): and yet\nthis little knowledge about God which we can have through wisdom is\npreferable to all other knowledge.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The truth and knowledge of indemonstrable principles\ndepends on the meaning of the terms: for as soon as we know what is a\nwhole, and what is a part, we know at once that every whole is\ngreater than its part. Now to know the meaning of being and\nnon-being, of whole and part, and of other things consequent to\nbeing, which are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles are\nconstituted, is the function of wisdom: since universal being is the\nproper effect of the Supreme Cause, which is God. And so wisdom makes\nuse of indemonstrable principles which are the object of\nunderstanding, not only by drawing conclusions from them, as other\nsciences do, but also by passing its judgment on them, and by\nvindicating them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that\nwisdom is a greater virtue than understanding.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 66, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Charity Is the Greatest of the Theological Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity is not the greatest of the\ntheological virtues. Because, since faith is in the intellect, while\nhope and charity are in the appetitive power, it seems that faith is\ncompared to hope and charity, as intellectual to moral virtue. Now\nintellectual virtue is greater than moral virtue, as was made evident\nabove (Q. 62, A. 3). Therefore faith is greater than hope and charity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, when two things are added together, the result is\ngreater than either one. Now hope results from something added to\ncharity; for it presupposes love, as Augustine says (Enchiridion\nviii), and it adds a certain movement of stretching forward to the\nbeloved. Therefore hope is greater than charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a cause is more noble than its effect. Now faith and\nhope are the cause of charity: for a gloss on Matt. 1:3 says that\n\"faith begets hope, and hope charity.\" Therefore faith and hope are\ngreater than charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:13): \"Now there remain\nfaith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is\ncharity.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), the greatness of a virtue,\nas to its species, is taken from its object. Now, since the three\ntheological virtues look at God as their proper object, it cannot be\nsaid that any one of them is greater than another by reason of its\nhaving a greater object, but only from the fact that it approaches\nnearer than another to that object; and in this way charity is\ngreater than the others. Because the others, in their very nature,\nimply a certain distance from the object: since faith is of what is\nnot seen, and hope is of what is not possessed. But the love of\ncharity is of that which is already possessed: since the beloved is,\nin a manner, in the lover, and, again, the lover is drawn by desire\nto union with the beloved; hence it is written (1 John 4:16): \"He\nthat abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Faith and hope are not related to charity in the same\nway as prudence to moral virtue; and for two reasons. First, because\nthe theological virtues have an object surpassing the human soul:\nwhereas prudence and the moral virtues are about things beneath man.\nNow in things that are above man, to love them is more excellent than\nto know them. Because knowledge is perfected by the known being in\nthe knower: whereas love is perfected by the lover being drawn to the\nbeloved. Now that which is above man is more excellent in itself than\nin man: since a thing is contained according to the mode of the\ncontainer. But it is the other way about in things beneath man.\nSecondly, because prudence moderates the appetitive movements\npertaining to the moral virtues, whereas faith does not moderate the\nappetitive movement tending to God, which movement belongs to the\ntheological virtues: it only shows the object. And this appetitive\nmovement towards its object surpasses human knowledge, according to\nEph. 3:19: \"The charity of Christ which surpasseth all knowledge.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Hope presupposes love of that which a man hopes to\nobtain; and such love is love of concupiscence, whereby he who\ndesires good, loves himself rather than something else. On the other\nhand, charity implies love of friendship, to which we are led by\nhope, as stated above (Q. 62, A. 4).\n\nReply Obj. 3: An efficient cause is more noble than its effect: but\nnot a disposing cause. For otherwise the heat of fire would be more\nnoble than the soul, to which the heat disposes the matter. It is in\nthis way that faith begets hope, and hope charity: in the sense, to\nwit, that one is a disposition to the other.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 67\n\nOF THE DURATION OF VIRTUES AFTER THIS LIFE\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the duration of virtues after this life, under\nwhich head there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the moral virtues remain after this life?\n\n(2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain?\n\n(3) Whether faith remains?\n\n(4) Whether hope remains?\n\n(5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope?\n\n(6) Whether charity remains?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 67, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Moral Virtues Remain After This Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the moral virtues do not remain after\nthis life. For in the future state of glory men will be like angels,\naccording to Matt. 22:30. But it is absurd to put moral virtues in\nthe angels [*\"Whatever relates to moral action is petty, and unworthy\nof the gods\" (Ethic. x, 8)], as stated in _Ethic._ x, 8. Therefore\nneither in man will there be moral virtues after this life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, moral virtues perfect man in the active life. But\nthe active life does not remain after this life: for Gregory says\n(Moral. iv, 18): \"The works of the active life pass away from the\nbody.\" Therefore moral virtues do not remain after this life.\n\nObj. 3: Further, temperance and fortitude, which are moral virtues,\nare in the irrational parts of the soul, as the Philosopher states\n(Ethic. iii, 10). Now the irrational parts of the soul are corrupted,\nwhen the body is corrupted: since they are acts of bodily organs.\nTherefore it seems that the moral virtues do not remain after this\nlife.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 1:15) that \"justice is\nperpetual and immortal.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), Cicero held\nthat the cardinal virtues do not remain after this life; and that, as\nAugustine says (De Trin. xiv, 9), \"in the other life men are made\nhappy by the mere knowledge of that nature, than which nothing is\nbetter or more lovable, that Nature, to wit, which created all\nothers.\" Afterwards he concludes that these four virtues remain in\nthe future life, but after a different manner.\n\nIn order to make this evident, we must note that in these virtues\nthere is a formal element, and a quasi-material element. The material\nelement in these virtues is a certain inclination of the appetitive\npart to the passions and operations according to a certain mode: and\nsince this mode is fixed by reason, the formal element is precisely\nthis order of reason.\n\nAccordingly we must say that these moral virtues do not remain in the\nfuture life, as regards their material element. For in the future\nlife there will be no concupiscences and pleasures in matters of food\nand sex; nor fear and daring about dangers of death; nor\ndistributions and commutations of things employed in this present\nlife. But, as regards the formal element, they will remain most\nperfect, after this life, in the Blessed, in as much as each one's\nreason will have most perfect rectitude in regard to things\nconcerning him in respect of that state of life: and his appetitive\npower will be moved entirely according to the order of reason, in\nthings pertaining to that same state. Hence Augustine says (De Trin.\nxiv, 9) that \"prudence will be there without any danger of error;\nfortitude, without the anxiety of bearing with evil; temperance,\nwithout the rebellion of the desires: so that prudence will neither\nprefer nor equal any good to God; fortitude will adhere to Him most\nsteadfastly; and temperance will delight in Him Who knows no\nimperfection.\" As to justice, it is yet more evident what will be its\nact in that life, viz. \"to be subject to God\": because even in this\nlife subjection to a superior is part of justice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking there of these moral\nvirtues, as to their material element; thus he speaks of justice, as\nregards \"commutations and distributions\"; of fortitude, as to\n\"matters of terror and danger\"; of temperance, in respect of \"lewd\ndesires.\"\n\nThe same applies to the Second Objection. For those things that\nconcern the active life, belong to the material element of the\nvirtues.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is a twofold state after this life; one before\nthe resurrection, during which the soul will be separate from the\nbody; the other, after the resurrection, when the souls will be\nreunited to their bodies. In this state of resurrection, the\nirrational powers will be in the bodily organs, just as they now are.\nHence it will be possible for fortitude to be in the irascible, and\ntemperance in the concupiscible part, in so far as each power will be\nperfectly disposed to obey the reason. But in the state preceding the\nresurrection, the irrational parts will not be in the soul actually,\nbut only radically in its essence, as stated in the First Part (Q.\n77, A. 8). Wherefore neither will these virtues be actually, but only\nin their root, i.e. in the reason and will, wherein are certain\nnurseries of these virtues, as stated above (Q. 63, A. 1). Justice,\nhowever, will remain because it is in the will. Hence of justice it\nis specially said that it is \"perpetual and immortal\"; both by reason\nof its subject, since the will is incorruptible; and because its act\nwill not change, as stated.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 67, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Intellectual Virtues Remain After This Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the intellectual virtues do not\nremain after this life. For the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:8, 9) that\n\"knowledge shall be destroyed,\" and he states the reason to be\nbecause \"we know in part.\" Now just as the knowledge of science is in\npart, i.e. imperfect; so also is the knowledge of the other\nintellectual virtues, as long as this life lasts. Therefore all the\nintellectual virtues will cease after this life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Categor. vi) that since\nscience is a habit, it is a quality difficult to remove: for it is\nnot easily lost, except by reason of some great change or sickness.\nBut no bodily change is so great as that of death. Therefore science\nand the other intellectual virtues do not remain after death.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the intellectual virtues perfect the intellect so\nthat it may perform its proper act well. Now there seems to be no act\nof the intellect after this life, since \"the soul understands nothing\nwithout a phantasm\" (De Anima iii, text. 30); and, after this life,\nthe phantasms do not remain, since their only subject is an organ of\nthe body. Therefore the intellectual virtues do not remain after this\nlife.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The knowledge of what is universal and necessary\nis more constant than that of particular and contingent things. Now\nthe knowledge of contingent particulars remains in man after this\nlife; for instance, the knowledge of what one has done or suffered,\naccording to Luke 16:25: \"Son, remember that thou didst receive good\nthings in thy life-time, and likewise Lazarus evil things.\" Much\nmore, therefore, does the knowledge of universal and necessary things\nremain, which belong to science and the other intellectual virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 6) some have\nheld that the intelligible species do not remain in the passive\nintellect except when it actually understands; and that so long as\nactual consideration ceases, the species are not preserved save in\nthe sensitive powers which are acts of bodily organs, viz. in the\npowers of imagination and memory. Now these powers cease when the\nbody is corrupted: and consequently, according to this opinion,\nneither science nor any other intellectual virtue will remain after\nthis life when once the body is corrupted.\n\nBut this opinion is contrary to the mind of Aristotle, who states (De\nAnima iii, text. 8) that \"the possible intellect is in act when it is\nidentified with each thing as knowing it; and yet, even then, it is\nin potentiality to consider it actually.\" It is also contrary to\nreason, because intelligible species are contained by the \"possible\"\nintellect immovably, according to the mode of their container. Hence\nthe \"possible\" intellect is called \"the abode of the species\" (De\nAnima iii) because it preserves the intelligible species.\n\nAnd yet the phantasms, by turning to which man understands in this\nlife, by applying the intelligible species to them as stated in the\nFirst Part (Q. 84, A. 7; Q. 85, A. 1, ad 5), cease as soon as the\nbody is corrupted. Hence, so far as the phantasms are concerned,\nwhich are the quasi-material element in the intellectual virtues,\nthese latter cease when the body is destroyed: but as regards the\nintelligible species, which are in the \"possible\" intellect, the\nintellectual virtues remain. Now the species are the quasi-formal\nelement of the intellectual virtues. Therefore these remain after\nthis life, as regards their formal element, just as we have stated\nconcerning the moral virtues (A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The saying of the Apostle is to be understood as\nreferring to the material element in science, and to the mode of\nunderstanding; because, to it, neither do the phantasms remain, when\nthe body is destroyed; nor will science be applied by turning to the\nphantasms.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sickness destroys the habit of science as to its\nmaterial element, viz. the phantasms, but not as to the intelligible\nspecies, which are in the \"possible\" intellect.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated in the First Part (Q. 89, A. 1), the\nseparated soul has a mode of understanding, other than by turning to\nthe phantasms. Consequently science remains, yet not as to the same\nmode of operation; as we have stated concerning the moral virtues\n(A. 1).\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 67, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Faith Remains After This Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that faith remains after this life.\nBecause faith is more excellent than science. Now science remains\nafter this life, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore faith remains also.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (1 Cor. 3:11): \"Other foundation no\nman can lay, but that which is laid; which is Christ Jesus,\" i.e.\nfaith in Jesus Christ. Now if the foundation is removed, that which\nis built upon it remains no more. Therefore, if faith remains not\nafter this life, no other virtue remains.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the knowledge of faith and the knowledge of glory\ndiffer as perfect from imperfect. Now imperfect knowledge is\ncompatible with perfect knowledge: thus in an angel there can be\n\"evening\" and \"morning\" knowledge [*Cf. I, Q. 58, A. 6]; and a man\ncan have science through a demonstrative syllogism, together with\nopinion through a probable syllogism, about one same conclusion.\nTherefore after this life faith also is compatible with the knowledge\nof glory.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 5:6, 7): \"While we are in\nthe body, we are absent from the Lord: for we walk by faith and not\nby sight.\" But those who are in glory are not absent from the Lord,\nbut present to Him. Therefore after this life faith does not remain\nin the life of glory.\n\n_I answer that,_ Opposition is of itself the proper cause of one\nthing being excluded from another, in so far, to wit, as wherever two\nthings are opposite to one another, we find opposition of affirmation\nand negation. Now in some things we find opposition in respect of\ncontrary forms; thus in colors we find white and black. In others we\nfind opposition in respect of perfection and imperfection: wherefore\nin alterations, more and less are considered to be contraries, as\nwhen a thing from being less hot is made more hot (Phys. v, text.\n19). And since perfect and imperfect are opposite to one another, it\nis impossible for perfection and imperfection to affect the same\nthing at the same time.\n\nNow we must take note that sometimes imperfection belongs to a\nthing's very nature, and belongs to its species: even as lack of\nreason belongs to the very specific nature of a horse and an ox. And\nsince a thing, so long as it remains the same identically, cannot\npass from one species to another, it follows that if such an\nimperfection be removed, the species of that thing is changed: even\nas it would no longer be an ox or a horse, were it to be rational.\nSometimes, however, the imperfection does not belong to the specific\nnature, but is accidental to the individual by reason of something\nelse; even as sometimes lack of reason is accidental to a man,\nbecause he is asleep, or because he is drunk, or for some like\nreason; and it is evident, that if such an imperfection be removed,\nthe thing remains substantially.\n\nNow it is clear that imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature\nof faith: for it is included in its definition; faith being defined\nas \"the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of things\nthat appear not\" (Heb. 11:1). Wherefore Augustine says (Tract. xl in\nJoan.): \"What is faith? Believing without seeing.\" But it is an\nimperfect knowledge that is of things unapparent or unseen.\nConsequently imperfect knowledge belongs to the very nature of faith:\ntherefore it is clear that the knowledge of faith cannot be perfect\nand remain identically the same.\n\nBut we must also consider whether it is compatible with perfect\nknowledge: for there is nothing to prevent some kind of imperfect\nknowledge from being sometimes with perfect knowledge. Accordingly we\nmust observe that knowledge can be imperfect in three ways: first, on\nthe part of the knowable object; secondly, on the part of the medium;\nthirdly, on the part of the subject. The difference of perfect and\nimperfect knowledge on the part of the knowable object is seen in the\n\"morning\" and \"evening\" knowledge of the angels: for the \"morning\"\nknowledge is about things according to the being which they have in\nthe Word, while the \"evening\" knowledge is about things according as\nthey have being in their own natures, which being is imperfect in\ncomparison with the First Being. On the part of the medium, perfect\nand imperfect knowledge are exemplified in the knowledge of a\nconclusion through a demonstrative medium, and through a probable\nmedium. On the part of the subject the difference of perfect and\nimperfect knowledge applies to opinion, faith, and science. For it is\nessential to opinion that we assent to one of two opposite assertions\nwith fear of the other, so that our adhesion is not firm: to science\nit is essential to have firm adhesion with intellectual vision, for\nscience possesses certitude which results from the understanding of\nprinciples: while faith holds a middle place, for it surpasses\nopinion in so far as its adhesion is firm, but falls short of science\nin so far as it lacks vision.\n\nNow it is evident that a thing cannot be perfect and imperfect in the\nsame respect; yet the things which differ as perfect and imperfect\ncan be together in the same respect in one and the same other thing.\nAccordingly, knowledge which is perfect on the part of the object is\nquite incompatible with imperfect knowledge about the same object;\nbut they are compatible with one another in respect of the same\nmedium or the same subject: for nothing hinders a man from having at\none and the same time, through one and the same medium, perfect and\nimperfect knowledge about two things, one perfect, the other\nimperfect, e.g. about health and sickness, good and evil. In like\nmanner knowledge that is perfect on the part of the medium is\nincompatible with imperfect knowledge through one and the same\nmedium: but nothing hinders them being about the same subject or in\nthe same subject: for one man can know the same conclusions through a\nprobable and through a demonstrative medium. Again, knowledge that is\nperfect on the part of the subject is incompatible with imperfect\nknowledge in the same subject. Now faith, of its very nature,\ncontains an imperfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the\nbeliever sees not what he believes: whereas bliss, of its very\nnature, implies perfection on the part of the subject, viz. that the\nBlessed see that which makes them happy, as stated above (Q. 3, A.\n8). Hence it is manifest that faith and bliss are incompatible in one\nand the same subject.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Faith is more excellent than science, on the part of\nthe object, because its object is the First Truth. Yet science has a\nmore perfect mode of knowing its object, which is not incompatible\nwith vision which is the perfection of happiness, as the mode of\nfaith is incompatible.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge:\nconsequently when this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will be\nperfected also.\n\nThe Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 67, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Hope Remains After Death, in the State of Glory?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that hope remains after death, in the\nstate of glory. Because hope perfects the human appetite in a more\nexcellent manner than the moral virtues. But the moral virtues remain\nafter this life, as Augustine clearly states (De Trin. xiv, 9). Much\nmore then does hope remain.\n\nObj. 2: Further, fear is opposed to hope. But fear remains after this\nlife: in the Blessed, filial fear, which abides for ever--in the\nlost, the fear of punishment. Therefore, in a like manner, hope can\nremain.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as hope is of future good, so is desire. Now in\nthe Blessed there is desire for future good; both for the glory of\nthe body, which the souls of the Blessed desire, as Augustine\ndeclares (Gen. ad lit. xii, 35); and for the glory of the soul,\naccording to Ecclus. 24:29: \"They that eat me, shall yet hunger, and\nthey that drink me, shall yet thirst,\" and 1 Pet. 1:12: \"On Whom the\nangels desire to look.\" Therefore it seems that there can be hope in\nthe Blessed after this life is past.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): \"What a man seeth,\nwhy doth he hope for?\" But the Blessed see that which is the object\nof hope, viz. God. Therefore they do not hope.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), that which, in its very\nnature, implies imperfection of its subject, is incompatible with the\nopposite perfection in that subject. Thus it is evident that movement\nof its very nature implies imperfection of its subject, since it is\n\"the act of that which is in potentiality as such\" (Phys. iii): so\nthat as soon as this potentiality is brought into act, the movement\nceases; for a thing does not continue to become white, when once it\nis made white. Now hope denotes a movement towards that which is not\npossessed, as is clear from what we have said above about the passion\nof hope (Q. 40, AA. 1, 2). Therefore when we possess that which we\nhope for, viz. the enjoyment of God, it will no longer be possible to\nhave hope.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Hope surpasses the moral virtues as to its object,\nwhich is God. But the acts of the moral virtues are not incompatible\nwith the perfection of happiness, as the act of hope is; except\nperhaps, as regards their matter, in respect of which they do not\nremain. For moral virtue perfects the appetite, not only in respect\nof what is not yet possessed, but also as regards something which is\nin our actual possession.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Fear is twofold, servile and filial, as we shall state\nfurther on (II-II, Q. 19, A. 2). Servile fear regards punishment, and\nwill be impossible in the life of glory, since there will no longer\nbe possibility of being punished. Filial fear has two acts: one is an\nact of reverence to God, and with regard to this act, it remains: the\nother is an act of fear lest we be separated from God, and as regards\nthis act, it does not remain. Because separation from God is in the\nnature of an evil: and no evil will be feared there, according to\nProv. 1:33: \"He . . . shall enjoy abundance without fear of evils.\"\nNow fear is opposed to hope by opposition of good and evil, as stated\nabove (Q. 23, A. 2; Q. 40, A. 1), and therefore the fear which will\nremain in glory is not opposed to hope. In the lost there can be fear\nof punishment, rather than hope of glory in the Blessed. Because in\nthe lost there will be a succession of punishments, so that the\nnotion of something future remains there, which is the object of\nfear: but the glory of the saints has no succession, by reason of its\nbeing a kind of participation of eternity, wherein there is neither\npast nor future, but only the present. And yet, properly speaking,\nneither in the lost is there fear. For, as stated above (Q. 42, A.\n2), fear is never without some hope of escape: and the lost have no\nsuch hope. Consequently neither will there be fear in them; except\nspeaking in a general way, in so far as any expectation of future\nevil is called fear.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As to the glory of the soul, there can be no desire in\nthe Blessed, in so far as desire looks for something future, for the\nreason already given (ad 2). Yet hunger and thirst are said to be in\nthem because they never weary, and for the same reason desire is said\nto be in the angels. With regard to the glory of the body, there can\nbe desire in the souls of the saints, but not hope, properly\nspeaking; neither as a theological virtue, for thus its object is\nGod, and not a created good; nor in its general signification.\nBecause the object of hope is something difficult, as stated above\n(Q. 40, A. 1): while a good whose unerring cause we already possess,\nis not compared to us as something difficult. Hence he that has money\nis not, properly speaking, said to hope for what he can buy at once.\nIn like manner those who have the glory of the soul are not, properly\nspeaking, said to hope for the glory of the body, but only to desire\nit.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 67, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Anything of Faith or Hope Remains in Glory?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that something of faith and hope remains\nin glory. For when that which is proper to a thing is removed, there\nremains what is common; thus it is stated in _De Causis_ that \"if you\ntake away rational, there remains living, and when you remove living,\nthere remains being.\" Now in faith there is something that it has in\ncommon with beatitude, viz. knowledge: and there is something proper\nto it, viz. darkness, for faith is knowledge in a dark manner.\nTherefore, the darkness of faith removed, the knowledge of faith\nstill remains.\n\nObj. 2: Further, faith is a spiritual light of the soul, according to\nEph. 1:17, 18: \"The eyes of your heart enlightened . . . in the\nknowledge of God\"; yet this light is imperfect in comparison with the\nlight of glory, of which it is written (Ps. 35:10): \"In Thy light we\nshall see light.\" Now an imperfect light remains when a perfect light\nsupervenes: for a candle is not extinguished when the sun's rays\nappear. Therefore it seems that the light of faith itself remains\nwith the light of glory.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the substance of a habit does not cease through the\nwithdrawal of its matter: for a man may retain the habit of\nliberality, though he have lost his money: yet he cannot exercise the\nact. Now the object of faith is the First Truth as unseen. Therefore\nwhen this ceases through being seen, the habit of faith can still\nremain.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Faith is a simple habit. Now a simple thing is\neither withdrawn entirely, or remains entirely. Since therefore faith\ndoes not remain entirely, but is taken away as stated above (A. 3),\nit seems that it is withdrawn entirely.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have held that hope is taken away entirely: but\nthat faith is taken away in part, viz. as to its obscurity, and\nremains in part, viz. as to the substance of its knowledge. And if\nthis be understood to mean that it remains the same, not identically\nbut generically, it is absolutely true; since faith is of the same\ngenus, viz. knowledge, as the beatific vision. On the other hand,\nhope is not of the same genus as heavenly bliss: because it is\ncompared to the enjoyment of bliss, as movement is to rest in the\nterm of movement.\n\nBut if it be understood to mean that in heaven the knowledge of faith\nremains identically the same, this is absolutely impossible. Because\nwhen you remove a specific difference, the substance of the genus\ndoes not remain identically the same: thus if you remove the\ndifference constituting whiteness, the substance of color does not\nremain identically the same, as though the identical color were at\none time whiteness, and, at another, blackness. The reason is that\ngenus is not related to difference as matter to form, so that the\nsubstance of the genus remains identically the same, when the\ndifference is removed, as the substance of matter remains identically\nthe same, when the form is changed: for genus and difference are not\nthe parts of a species, else they would not be predicated of the\nspecies. But even as the species denotes the whole, i.e. the compound\nof matter and form in material things, so does the difference, and\nlikewise the genus; the genus denotes the whole by signifying that\nwhich is material; the difference, by signifying that which is\nformal; the species, by signifying both. Thus, in man, the sensitive\nnature is as matter to the intellectual nature, and animal is\npredicated of that which has a sensitive nature, rational of that\nwhich has an intellectual nature, and man of that which has both. So\nthat the one same whole is denoted by these three, but not under the\nsame aspect.\n\nIt is therefore evident that, since the signification of the\ndifference is confined to the genus if the difference be removed, the\nsubstance of the genus cannot remain the same: for the same animal\nnature does not remain, if another kind of soul constitute the\nanimal. Hence it is impossible for the identical knowledge, which was\npreviously obscure, to become clear vision. It is therefore evident\nthat, in heaven, nothing remains of faith, either identically or\nspecifically the same, but only generically.\n\nReply Obj. 1: If \"rational\" be withdrawn, the remaining \"living\"\nthing is the same, not identically, but generically, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The imperfection of candlelight is not opposed to the\nperfection of sunlight, since they do not regard the same subject:\nwhereas the imperfection of faith and the perfection of glory are\nopposed to one another and regard the same subject. Consequently they\nare incompatible with one another, just as light and darkness in the\nair.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He that loses his money does not therefore lose the\npossibility of having money, and therefore it is reasonable for the\nhabit of liberality to remain. But in the state of glory not only is\nthe object of faith, which is the unseen, removed actually, but even\nits possibility, by reason of the unchangeableness of heavenly bliss:\nand so such a habit would remain to no purpose.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 67, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Charity Remains After This Life, in Glory?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that charity does not remain after this\nlife, in glory. Because according to 1 Cor. 13:10, \"when that which\nis perfect is come, that which is in part,\" i.e. that which is\nimperfect, \"shall be done away.\" Now the charity of the wayfarer is\nimperfect. Therefore it will be done away when the perfection of\nglory is attained.\n\nObj. 2: Further, habits and acts are differentiated by their objects.\nBut the object of love is good apprehended. Since therefore the\napprehension of the present life differs from the apprehension of the\nlife to come, it seems that charity is not the same in both cases.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things of the same kind can advance from\nimperfection to perfection by continuous increase. But the charity of\nthe wayfarer can never attain to equality with the charity of heaven,\nhowever much it be increased. Therefore it seems that the charity of\nthe wayfarer does not remain in heaven.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:8): \"Charity never\nfalleth away.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), when the imperfection of a\nthing does not belong to its specific nature, there is nothing to\nhinder the identical thing passing from imperfection to perfection,\neven as man is perfected by growth, and whiteness by intensity. Now\ncharity is love, the nature of which does not include imperfection,\nsince it may relate to an object either possessed or not possessed,\neither seen or not seen. Therefore charity is not done away by the\nperfection of glory, but remains identically the same.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The imperfection of charity is accidental to it;\nbecause imperfection is not included in the nature of love. Now\nalthough that which is accidental to a thing be withdrawn, the\nsubstance remains. Hence the imperfection of charity being done away,\ncharity itself is not done away.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The object of charity is not knowledge itself;\nif it were, the charity of the wayfarer would not be the same as the\ncharity of heaven: its object is the thing known, which remains the\nsame, viz. God Himself.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The reason why charity of the wayfarer cannot\nattain to the perfection of the charity of heaven, is a difference on\nthe part of the cause: for vision is a cause of love, as stated in\n_Ethic._ ix, 5: and the more perfectly we know God, the more perfectly\nwe love Him.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 68\n\nOF THE GIFTS\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe now come to consider the Gifts; under which head there are eight\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the Gifts differ from the virtues?\n\n(2) Of the necessity of the Gifts?\n\n(3) Whether the Gifts are habits?\n\n(4) Which, and how many are they?\n\n(5) Whether the Gifts are connected?\n\n(6) Whether they remain in heaven?\n\n(7) Of their comparison with one another;\n\n(8) Of their comparison with the virtues.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Gifts Differ from the Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the\nvirtues. For Gregory commenting on Job 1:2, \"There were born to him\nseven sons,\" says (Moral. i, 12): \"Seven sons were born to us, when\nthrough the conception of heavenly thought, the seven virtues of the\nHoly Ghost take birth in us\": and he quotes the words of Isa. 11:2,\n3: \"And the Spirit . . . of understanding . . . shall rest upon him,\"\netc. where the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are enumerated.\nTherefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine commenting on Matt. 12:45, \"Then he goeth\nand taketh with him seven other spirits,\" etc., says (De Quaest.\nEvang. i, qu. 8): \"The seven vices are opposed to the seven virtues\nof the Holy Ghost,\" i.e. to the seven gifts. Now the seven vices are\nopposed to the seven virtues, commonly so called. Therefore the gifts\ndo not differ from the virtues commonly so called.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things whose definitions are the same, are\nthemselves the same. But the definition of virtue applies to the\ngifts; for each gift is \"a good quality of the mind, whereby we lead\na good life,\" etc. [*Cf. Q. 55, A. 4]. Likewise the definition of a\ngift can apply to the infused virtues: for a gift is \"an unreturnable\ngiving,\" according to the Philosopher (Topic. iv, 4). Therefore the\nvirtues and gifts do not differ from one another.\n\nObj. 4: Several of the things mentioned among the gifts, are virtues:\nfor, as stated above (Q. 57, A. 2), wisdom, understanding, and\nknowledge are intellectual virtues, counsel pertains to prudence,\npiety to a kind of justice, and fortitude is a moral virtue.\nTherefore it seems that the gifts do not differ from the virtues.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. i, 12) distinguishes seven gifts,\nwhich he states to be denoted by the seven sons of Job, from the\nthree theological virtues, which, he says, are signified by Job's\nthree daughters. He also distinguishes (Moral. ii, 26) the same seven\ngifts from the four cardinal virtues, which he says were signified by\nthe four corners of the house.\n\n_I answer that,_ If we speak of gift and virtue with regard to the\nnotion conveyed by the words themselves, there is no opposition\nbetween them. Because the word \"virtue\" conveys the notion that it\nperfects man in relation to well-doing, while the word \"gift\" refers\nto the cause from which it proceeds. Now there is no reason why that\nwhich proceeds from one as a gift should not perfect another in\nwell-doing: especially as we have already stated (Q. 63, A. 3) that\nsome virtues are infused into us by God. Wherefore in this respect we\ncannot differentiate gifts from virtues. Consequently some have held\nthat the gifts are not to be distinguished from the virtues. But\nthere remains no less a difficulty for them to solve; for they must\nexplain why some virtues are called gifts and some not; and why among\nthe gifts there are some, fear, for instance, that are not reckoned\nvirtues.\n\nHence it is that others have said that the gifts should be held as\nbeing distinct from the virtues; yet they have not assigned a\nsuitable reason for this distinction, a reason, to wit, which would\napply either to all the virtues, and to none of the gifts, or vice\nversa. For, seeing that of the seven gifts, four belong to the\nreason, viz. wisdom, knowledge, understanding and counsel, and three\nto the appetite, viz. fortitude, piety and fear; they held that the\ngifts perfect the free-will according as it is a faculty of the\nreason, while the virtues perfect it as a faculty of the will: since\nthey observed only two virtues in the reason or intellect, viz. faith\nand prudence, the others being in the appetitive power or the\naffections. If this distinction were true, all the virtues would have\nto be in the appetite, and all the gifts in the reason.\n\nOthers observing that Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that \"the gift of\nthe Holy Ghost, by coming into the soul endows it with prudence,\ntemperance, justice, and fortitude, and at the same time strengthens\nit against every kind of temptation by His sevenfold gift,\" said that\nthe virtues are given us that we may do good works, and the gifts,\nthat we may resist temptation. But neither is this distinction\nsufficient. Because the virtues also resist those temptations which\nlead to the sins that are contrary to the virtues; for everything\nnaturally resists its contrary: which is especially clear with regard\nto charity, of which it is written (Cant. 8:7): \"Many waters cannot\nquench charity.\"\n\nOthers again, seeing that these gifts are set down in Holy Writ as\nhaving been in Christ, according to Isa. 11:2, 3, said that the\nvirtues are given simply that we may do good works, but the gifts, in\norder to conform us to Christ, chiefly with regard to His Passion,\nfor it was then that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor.\nYet neither does this appear to be a satisfactory distinction.\nBecause Our Lord Himself wished us to be conformed to Him, chiefly in\nhumility and meekness, according to Matt. 11:29: \"Learn of Me,\nbecause I am meek and humble of heart,\" and in charity, according to\nJohn 15:12: \"Love one another, as I have loved you.\" Moreover, these\nvirtues were especially resplendent in Christ's Passion.\n\nAccordingly, in order to differentiate the gifts from the virtues, we\nmust be guided by the way in which Scripture expresses itself, for we\nfind there that the term employed is \"spirit\" rather than \"gift.\" For\nthus it is written (Isa. 11:2, 3): \"The spirit . . . of wisdom and of\nunderstanding . . . shall rest upon him,\" etc.: from which words we\nare clearly given to understand that these seven are there set down\nas being in us by Divine inspiration. Now inspiration denotes motion\nfrom without. For it must be noted that in man there is a twofold\nprinciple of movement, one within him, viz. the reason; the other\nextrinsic to him, viz. God, as stated above (Q. 9, AA. 4, 6):\nmoreover the Philosopher says this in the chapter On Good Fortune\n(Ethic. Eudem. vii, 8).\n\nNow it is evident that whatever is moved must be proportionate to its\nmover: and the perfection of the mobile as such, consists in a\ndisposition whereby it is disposed to be well moved by its mover.\nHence the more exalted the mover, the more perfect must be the\ndisposition whereby the mobile is made proportionate to its mover:\nthus we see that a disciple needs a more perfect disposition in order\nto receive a higher teaching from his master. Now it is manifest that\nhuman virtues perfect man according as it is natural for him to be\nmoved by his reason in his interior and exterior actions.\nConsequently man needs yet higher perfections, whereby to be disposed\nto be moved by God. These perfections are called gifts, not only\nbecause they are infused by God, but also because by them man is\ndisposed to become amenable to the Divine inspiration, according to\nIsa. 50:5: \"The Lord . . . hath opened my ear, and I do not resist; I\nhave not gone back.\" Even the Philosopher says in the chapter On Good\nFortune (Ethic. Eudem., vii, 8) that for those who are moved by\nDivine instinct, there is no need to take counsel according to human\nreason, but only to follow their inner promptings, since they are\nmoved by a principle higher than human reason. This then is what some\nsay, viz. that the gifts perfect man for acts which are higher than\nacts of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sometimes these gifts are called virtues, in the broad\nsense of the word. Nevertheless, they have something over and above\nthe virtues understood in this broad way, in so far as they are\nDivine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God. Hence the Philosopher\n(Ethic. vii, 1) above virtue commonly so called, places a kind of\n\"heroic\" or \"divine virtue [*_arete heroike kai theia_],\" in respect\nof which some men are called \"divine.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The vices are opposed to the virtues, in so far as they\nare opposed to the good as appointed by reason; but they are opposed\nto the gifts, in as much as they are opposed to the Divine instinct.\nFor the same thing is opposed both to God and to reason, whose light\nflows from God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This definition applies to virtue taken in its general\nsense. Consequently, if we wish to restrict it to virtue as\ndistinguished from the gifts, we must explain the words, \"whereby we\nlead a good life\" as referring to the rectitude of life which is\nmeasured by the rule of reason. Likewise the gifts, as distinct from\ninfused virtue, may be defined as something given by God in relation\nto His motion; something, to wit, that makes man to follow well the\npromptings of God.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Wisdom is called an intellectual virtue, so far as it\nproceeds from the judgment of reason: but it is called a gift,\naccording as its work proceeds from the Divine prompting. The same\napplies to the other virtues.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Gifts Are Necessary to Man for Salvation?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not necessary to man\nfor salvation. Because the gifts are ordained to a perfection\nsurpassing the ordinary perfection of virtue. Now it is not necessary\nfor man's salvation that he should attain to a perfection surpassing\nthe ordinary standard of virtue; because such perfection falls, not\nunder the precept, but under a counsel. Therefore the gifts are not\nnecessary to man for salvation.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is enough, for man's salvation, that he behave\nwell in matters concerning God and matters concerning man. Now man's\nbehavior to God is sufficiently directed by the theological virtues;\nand his behavior towards men, by the moral virtues. Therefore gifts\nare not necessary to man for salvation.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that \"the Holy Ghost\ngives wisdom against folly, understanding against dullness, counsel\nagainst rashness, fortitude against fears, knowledge against\nignorance, piety against hardness of our heart, and fear against\npride.\" But a sufficient remedy for all these things is to be found\nin the virtues. Therefore the gifts are not necessary to man for\nsalvation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Of all the gifts, wisdom seems to be the highest,\nand fear the lowest. Now each of these is necessary for salvation:\nsince of wisdom it is written (Wis. 7:28): \"God loveth none but him\nthat dwelleth with wisdom\"; and of fear (Ecclus. 1:28): \"He that is\nwithout fear cannot be justified.\" Therefore the other gifts that are\nplaced between these are also necessary for salvation.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the gifts are perfections of\nman, whereby he is disposed so as to be amenable to the promptings of\nGod. Wherefore in those matters where the prompting of reason is not\nsufficient, and there is need for the prompting of the Holy Ghost,\nthere is, in consequence, need for a gift.\n\nNow man's reason is perfected by God in two ways: first, with its\nnatural perfection, to wit, the natural light of reason; secondly,\nwith a supernatural perfection, to wit, the theological virtues, as\nstated above (Q. 62, A. 1). And, though this latter perfection is\ngreater than the former, yet the former is possessed by man in a more\nperfect manner than the latter: because man has the former in his\nfull possession, whereas he possesses the latter imperfectly, since\nwe love and know God imperfectly. Now it is evident that anything\nthat has a nature or a form or a virtue perfectly, can of itself work\naccording to them: not, however, excluding the operation of God, Who\nworks inwardly in every nature and in every will. On the other hand,\nthat which has a nature, or form, or virtue imperfectly, cannot of\nitself work, unless it be moved by another. Thus the sun which\npossesses light perfectly, can shine by itself; whereas the moon\nwhich has the nature of light imperfectly, sheds only a borrowed\nlight. Again, a physician, who knows the medical art perfectly, can\nwork by himself; but his pupil, who is not yet fully instructed,\ncannot work by himself, but needs to receive instructions from him.\n\nAccordingly, in matters subject to human reason, and directed to\nman's connatural end, man can work through the judgment of his\nreason. If, however, even in these things man receive help in the\nshape of special promptings from God, this will be out of God's\nsuperabundant goodness: hence, according to the philosophers, not\nevery one that had the acquired moral virtues, had also the heroic or\ndivine virtues. But in matters directed to the supernatural end, to\nwhich man's reason moves him, according as it is, in a manner, and\nimperfectly, informed by the theological virtues, the motion of\nreason does not suffice, unless it receive in addition the prompting\nor motion of the Holy Ghost, according to Rom. 8:14, 17: \"Whosoever\nare led by the Spirit of God, they are sons of God . . . and if sons,\nheirs also\": and Ps. 142:10: \"Thy good Spirit shall lead me into the\nright land,\" because, to wit, none can receive the inheritance of\nthat land of the Blessed, except he be moved and led thither by the\nHoly Ghost. Therefore, in order to accomplish this end, it is\nnecessary for man to have the gift of the Holy Ghost.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The gifts surpass the ordinary perfection of the\nvirtues, not as regards the kind of works (as the counsels surpass\nthe commandments), but as regards the manner of working, in respect\nof man being moved by a higher principle.\n\nReply Obj. 2: By the theological and moral virtues, man is not so\nperfected in respect of his last end, as not to stand in continual\nneed of being moved by the yet higher promptings of the Holy Ghost,\nfor the reason already given.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Whether we consider human reason as perfected in its\nnatural perfection, or as perfected by the theological virtues, it\ndoes not know all things, nor all possible things. Consequently it is\nunable to avoid folly and other like things mentioned in the\nobjection. God, however, to Whose knowledge and power all things are\nsubject, by His motion safeguards us from all folly, ignorance,\ndullness of mind and hardness of heart, and the rest. Consequently\nthe gifts of the Holy Ghost, which make us amenable to His\npromptings, are said to be given as remedies to these defects.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Gifts of the Holy Ghost Are Habits?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not\nhabits. Because a habit is a quality abiding in man, being defined as\n\"a quality difficult to remove,\" as stated in the _Predicaments_\n(Categor. vi). Now it is proper to Christ that the gifts of the Holy\nGhost rest in Him, as stated in Isa. 11:2, 3: \"He upon Whom thou\nshalt see the Spirit descending and remaining upon Him, He it is that\nbaptizeth\"; on which words Gregory comments as follows (Moral. ii,\n27): \"The Holy Ghost comes upon all the faithful; but, in a singular\nway, He dwells always in the Mediator.\" Therefore the gifts of the\nHoly Ghost are not habits.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man according as\nhe is moved by the Spirit of God, as stated above (AA. 1, 2). But in\nso far as man is moved by the Spirit of God, he is somewhat like an\ninstrument in His regard. Now to be perfected by a habit is\nbefitting, not an instrument, but a principal agent. Therefore the\ngifts of the Holy Ghost are not habits.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as the gifts of the Holy Ghost are due to Divine\ninspiration, so is the gift of prophecy. Now prophecy is not a habit:\nfor \"the spirit of prophecy does not always reside in the prophets,\"\nas Gregory states (Hom. i in Ezechiel). Neither, therefore, are the\ngifts of the Holy Ghost.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord in speaking of the Holy Ghost said to His\ndisciples (John 14:17): \"He shall abide with you, and shall be in\nyou.\" Now the Holy Ghost is not in a man without His gifts. Therefore\nHis gifts abide in man. Therefore they are not merely acts or\npassions but abiding habits.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the gifts are perfections of\nman, whereby he becomes amenable to the promptings of the Holy Ghost.\nNow it is evident from what has been already said (Q. 56, A. 4; Q.\n58, A. 2), that the moral virtues perfect the appetitive power\naccording as it partakes somewhat of the reason, in so far, to wit,\nas it has a natural aptitude to be moved by the command of reason.\nAccordingly the gifts of the Holy Ghost, as compared with the Holy\nGhost Himself, are related to man, even as the moral virtues, in\ncomparison with the reason, are related to the appetitive power. Now\nthe moral virtues are habits, whereby the powers of appetite are\ndisposed to obey reason promptly. Therefore the gifts of the Holy\nGhost are habits whereby man is perfected to obey readily the Holy\nGhost.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Gregory solves this objection (Moral. ii, 27) by saying\nthat \"by those gifts without which one cannot obtain life, the Holy\nGhost ever abides in all the elect, but not by His other gifts.\" Now\nthe seven gifts are necessary for salvation, as stated above (A. 2).\nTherefore, with regard to them, the Holy Ghost ever abides in holy\nmen.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument holds, in the case of an instrument which\nhas no faculty of action, but only of being acted upon. But man is\nnot an instrument of that kind; for he is so acted upon, by the Holy\nGhost, that he also acts himself, in so far as he has a free-will.\nTherefore he needs a habit.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Prophecy is one of those gifts which are for the\nmanifestation of the Spirit, not for the necessity of salvation:\nhence the comparison fails.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost Are Suitably Enumerated?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are\nunsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down\ncorresponding to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom,\nunderstanding, knowledge, and counsel, which corresponds to prudence;\nwhereas nothing is set down corresponding to art, which is the fifth\nintellectual virtue. Moreover, something is included corresponding to\njustice, viz. piety, and something corresponding to fortitude, viz.\nthe gift of fortitude; while there is nothing to correspond to\ntemperance. Therefore the gifts are enumerated insufficiently.\n\nObj. 2: Further, piety is a part of justice. But no part of fortitude\nis assigned to correspond thereto, but fortitude itself. Therefore\njustice itself, and not piety, ought to have been set down.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the theological virtues, more than any, direct us to\nGod. Since, then, the gifts perfect man according as he is moved by\nGod, it seems that some gifts, corresponding to the theological\nvirtues, should have been included.\n\nObj. 4: Further, even as God is an object of fear, so is He of love,\nof hope, and of joy. Now love, hope, and joy are passions condivided\nwith fear. Therefore, as fear is set down as a gift, so ought the\nother three.\n\nObj. 5: Further, wisdom is added in order to direct understanding;\ncounsel, to direct fortitude; knowledge, to direct piety. Therefore,\nsome gift should have been added for the purpose of directing fear.\nTherefore the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Holy Writ (Isa. 11:2, 3).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), the gifts are habits\nperfecting man so that he is ready to follow the promptings of the\nHoly Ghost, even as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers\nso that they obey the reason. Now just as it is natural for the\nappetitive powers to be moved by the command of reason, so it is\nnatural for all the forces in man to be moved by the instinct of God,\nas by a superior power. Therefore whatever powers in man can be the\nprinciples of human actions, can also be the subjects of gifts, even\nas they are virtues; and such powers are the reason and appetite.\n\nNow the reason is speculative and practical: and in both we find the\napprehension of truth (which pertains to the discovery of truth), and\njudgment concerning the truth. Accordingly, for the apprehension of\ntruth, the speculative reason is perfected by _understanding;_ the\npractical reason, by _counsel._ In order to judge aright, the\nspeculative reason is perfected by _wisdom_; the practical reason by\n_knowledge._ The appetitive power, in matters touching a man's\nrelations to another, is perfected by _piety;_ in matters touching\nhimself, it is perfected by _fortitude_ against the fear of dangers;\nand against inordinate lust for pleasures, by _fear,_ according to\nProv. 15:27: \"By the fear of the Lord every one declineth from evil,\"\nand Ps. 118:120: \"Pierce Thou my flesh with Thy fear: for I am afraid\nof Thy judgments.\" Hence it is clear that these gifts extend to all\nthose things to which the virtues, both intellectual and moral,\nextend.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The gifts of the Holy Ghost perfect man in matters\nconcerning a good life: whereas art is not directed to such matters,\nbut to external things that can be made, since art is the right\nreason, not about things to be done, but about things to be made\n(Ethic. vi, 4). However, we may say that, as regards the infusion of\nthe gifts, the art is on the part of the Holy Ghost, Who is the\nprincipal mover, and not on the part of men, who are His organs when\nHe moves them. The gift of fear corresponds, in a manner, to\ntemperance: for just as it belongs to temperance, properly speaking,\nto restrain man from evil pleasures for the sake of the good\nappointed by reason, so does it belong to the gift of fear, to\nwithdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Justice is so called from the rectitude of the reason,\nand so it is more suitably called a virtue than a gift. But the name\nof piety denotes the reverence which we give to our father and to our\ncountry. And since God is the Father of all, the worship of God is\nalso called piety, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei x, 1). Therefore\nthe gift whereby a man, through reverence for God, works good to all,\nis fittingly called piety.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The mind of man is not moved by the Holy Ghost, unless\nin some way it be united to Him: even as the instrument is not moved\nby the craftsman, unless there by contact or some other kind of union\nbetween them. Now the primal union of man with God is by faith, hope\nand charity: and, consequently, these virtues are presupposed to the\ngifts, as being their roots. Therefore all the gifts correspond to\nthese three virtues, as being derived therefrom.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Love, hope and joy have good for their object. Now God\nis the Sovereign Good: wherefore the names of these passions are\ntransferred to the theological virtues which unite man to God. On the\nother hand, the object of fear is evil, which can nowise apply to\nGod: hence fear does not denote union with God, but withdrawal from\ncertain things through reverence for God. Hence it does not give its\nname to a theological virtue, but to a gift, which withdraws us from\nevil, for higher motives than moral virtue does.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Wisdom directs both the intellect and the affections of\nman. Hence two gifts are set down as corresponding to wisdom as their\ndirecting principle; on the part of the intellect, the gift of\nunderstanding; on the part of the affections, the gift of fear.\nBecause the principal reason for fearing God is taken from a\nconsideration of the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Gifts of the Holy Ghost Are Connected?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not connected, for the\nApostle says (1 Cor. 12:8): \"To one . . . by the Spirit, is given the\nword of wisdom, and to another, the word of knowledge, according to\nthe same Spirit.\" Now wisdom and knowledge are reckoned among the\ngifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are\ngiven to divers men, and are not connected together in the same man.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1) that \"many of the\nfaithful have not knowledge, though they have faith.\" But some of the\ngifts, at least the gift of fear, accompany faith. Therefore it seems\nthat the gifts are not necessarily connected together in one and the\nsame man.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. i) that wisdom \"is of small\naccount if it lack understanding, and understanding is wholly useless\nif it be not based upon wisdom . . . Counsel is worthless, when the\nstrength of fortitude is lacking thereto . . . and fortitude is very\nweak if it be not supported by counsel . . . Knowledge is nought if\nit hath not the use of piety . . . and piety is very useless if it\nlack the discernment of knowledge . . . and assuredly, unless it has\nthese virtues with it, fear itself rises up to the doing of no good\naction\": from which it seems that it is possible to have one gift\nwithout another. Therefore the gifts of the Holy Ghost are not\nconnected.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory prefaces the passage above quoted, with\nthe following remark: \"It is worthy of note in this feast of Job's\nsons, that by turns they fed one another.\" Now the sons of Job, of\nwhom he is speaking, denote the gifts of the Holy Ghost. Therefore\nthe gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together by strengthening\none another.\n\n_I answer that,_ The true answer to this question is easily gathered\nfrom what has been already set down. For it has been stated (A. 3)\nthat as the powers of the appetite are disposed by the moral virtues\nas regards the governance of reason, so all the powers of the soul\nare disposed by the gifts as regards the motion of the Holy Ghost.\nNow the Holy Ghost dwells in us by charity, according to Rom. 5:5:\n\"The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost,\nWho is given to us,\" even as our reason is perfected by prudence.\nWherefore, just as the moral virtues are united together in prudence,\nso the gifts of the Holy Ghost are connected together in charity: so\nthat whoever has charity has all the gifts of the Holy Ghost, none of\nwhich can one possess without charity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Wisdom and knowledge can be considered in one way as\ngratuitous graces, in so far, to wit, as man so far abounds in the\nknowledge of things Divine and human, that he is able both to\ninstruct the believer and confound the unbeliever. It is in this\nsense that the Apostle speaks, in this passage, about wisdom and\nknowledge: hence he mentions pointedly the \"word\" of wisdom and the\n\"word\" of knowledge. They may be taken in another way for the gifts\nof the Holy Ghost: and thus wisdom and knowledge are nothing else but\nperfections of the human mind, rendering it amenable to the\npromptings of the Holy Ghost in the knowledge of things Divine and\nhuman. Consequently it is clear that these gifts are in all who are\npossessed of charity.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Augustine is speaking there of knowledge, while\nexpounding the passage of the Apostle quoted above (Obj. 1): hence he\nis referring to knowledge, in the sense already explained, as a\ngratuitous grace. This is clear from the context which follows: \"For\nit is one thing to know only what a man must believe in order to gain\nthe blissful life, which is no other than eternal life; and another,\nto know how to impart this to godly souls, and to defend it against\nthe ungodly, which latter the Apostle seems to have styled by the\nproper name of knowledge.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as the connection of the cardinal virtues\nis proved in one way from the fact that one is, in a manner, perfected\nby another, as stated above (Q. 65, A. 1); so Gregory wishes to\nprove the connection of the gifts, in the same way, from the fact that\none cannot be perfect without the other. Hence he had already observed\nthat \"each particular virtue is to the last degree destitute, unless\none virtue lend its support to another.\" We are therefore not to\nunderstand that one gift can be without another; but that if\nunderstanding were without wisdom, it would not be a gift; even as\ntemperance, without justice, would not be a virtue.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Gifts of the Holy Ghost Remain in Heaven?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the gifts of the Holy Ghost do not\nremain in heaven. For Gregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that by means of\nHis sevenfold gift the \"Holy Ghost instructs the mind against all\ntemptations.\" Now there will be no temptations in heaven, according\nto Isa. 11:9: \"They shall not hurt, nor shall they kill in all My\nholy mountain.\" Therefore there will be no gifts of the Holy Ghost in\nheaven.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the gifts of the Holy Ghost are habits, as stated\nabove (A. 3). But habits are of no use, where their acts are\nimpossible. Now the acts of some gifts are not possible in heaven;\nfor Gregory says (Moral. i, 15) that \"understanding . . . penetrates\nthe truths heard . . . counsel . . . stays us from acting rashly . .\n. fortitude . . . has no fear of adversity . . . piety satisfies the\ninmost heart with deeds of mercy,\" all of which are incompatible with\nthe heavenly state. Therefore these gifts will not remain in the\nstate of glory.\n\nObj. 3: Further, some of the gifts perfect man in the contemplative\nlife, e.g. wisdom and understanding: and some in the active life,\ne.g. piety and fortitude. Now the active life ends with this as\nGregory states (Moral. vi). Therefore not all the gifts of the Holy\nGhost will be in the state of glory.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Spiritu Sancto i, 20): \"The city\nof God, the heavenly Jerusalem is not washed with the waters of an\nearthly river: it is the Holy Ghost, of Whose outpouring we but\ntaste, Who, proceeding from the Fount of life, seems to flow more\nabundantly in those celestial spirits, a seething torrent of\nsevenfold heavenly virtue.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We may speak of the gifts in two ways: first, as to\ntheir essence; and thus they will be most perfectly in heaven, as may\nbe gathered from the passage of Ambrose, just quoted. The reason for\nthis is that the gifts of the Holy Ghost render the human mind\namenable to the motion of the Holy Ghost: which will be especially\nrealized in heaven, where God will be \"all in all\" (1 Cor. 15:28),\nand man entirely subject unto Him. Secondly, they may be considered\nas regards the matter about which their operations are: and thus, in\nthe present life they have an operation about a matter, in respect of\nwhich they will have no operation in the state of glory. Considered\nin this way, they will not remain in the state of glory; just as we\nhave stated to be the case with regard to the cardinal virtues (Q.\n67, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Gregory is speaking there of the gifts according as\nthey are compatible with the present state: for it is thus that they\nafford us protection against evil temptations. But in the state of\nglory, where all evil will have ceased, we shall be perfected in good\nby the gifts of the Holy Ghost.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Gregory, in almost every gift, includes something that\npasses away with the present state, and something that remains in the\nfuture state. For he says that \"wisdom strengthens the mind with the\nhope and certainty of eternal things\"; of which two, hope passes, and\ncertainty remains. Of understanding, he says \"that it penetrates the\ntruths heard, refreshing the heart and enlightening its darkness,\" of\nwhich, hearing passes away, since \"they shall teach no more every man\n. . . his brother\" (Jer. 31:3, 4); but the enlightening of the mind\nremains. Of counsel he says that it \"prevents us from being\nimpetuous,\" which is necessary in the present life; and also that \"it\nmakes the mind full of reason,\" which is necessary even in the future\nstate. Of fortitude he says that it \"fears not adversity,\" which is\nnecessary in the present life; and further, that it \"sets before us\nthe viands of confidence,\" which remains also in the future life.\nWith regard to knowledge he mentions only one thing, viz. that \"she\novercomes the void of ignorance,\" which refers to the present state.\nWhen, however, he adds \"in the womb of the mind,\" this may refer\nfiguratively to the fulness of knowledge, which belongs to the future\nstate. Of piety he says that \"it satisfies the inmost heart with\ndeeds of mercy.\" These words taken literally refer only to the\npresent state: yet the inward regard for our neighbor, signified by\n\"the inmost heart,\" belongs also to the future state, when piety will\nachieve, not works of mercy, but fellowship of joy. Of fear he says\nthat \"it oppresses the mind, lest it pride itself in present things,\"\nwhich refers to the present state, and that \"it strengthens it with\nthe meat of hope for the future,\" which also belongs to the present\nstate, as regards hope, but may also refer to the future state, as\nregards being \"strengthened\" for things we hope are here, and obtain\nthere.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers the gifts as to their matter.\nFor the matter of the gifts will not be the works of the active life;\nbut all the gifts will have their respective acts about things\npertaining to the contemplative life, which is the life of heavenly\nbliss.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Gifts Are Set Down by Isaias in Their Order of Dignity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the gifts are not set down by Isaias\nin their order of dignity. For the principal gift is, seemingly, that\nwhich, more than the others, God requires of man. Now God requires of\nman fear, more than the other gifts: for it is written (Deut. 10:12):\n\"And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but\nthat thou fear the Lord thy God?\" and (Malachi 1:6): \"If . . . I be a\nmaster, where is My fear?\" Therefore it seems that fear, which is\nmentioned last, is not the lowest but the greatest of the gifts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, piety seems to be a kind of common good; since the\nApostle says (1 Tim. 4:8): \"Piety [Douay: 'Godliness'] is profitable\nto all things.\" Now a common good is preferable to particular goods.\nTherefore piety, which is given the last place but one, seems to be\nthe most excellent gift.\n\nObj. 3: Further, knowledge perfects man's judgment, while counsel\npertains to inquiry. But judgment is more excellent than inquiry.\nTherefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than counsel; and yet it\nis set down as being below it.\n\nObj. 4: Further, fortitude pertains to the appetitive power, while\nscience belongs to reason. But reason is a more excellent power than\nthe appetite. Therefore knowledge is a more excellent gift than\nfortitude; and yet the latter is given the precedence. Therefore the\ngifts are not set down in their order of dignity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4]: \"It\nseems to me that the sevenfold operation of the Holy Ghost, of which\nIsaias speaks, agrees in degrees and expression with these\" (of which\nwe read in Matt. 5:3): \"but there is a difference of order, for\nthere\" (viz. in Isaias) \"the enumeration begins with the more\nexcellent gifts, here, with the lower gifts.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The excellence of the gifts can be measured in two\nways: first, simply, viz. by comparison to their proper acts as\nproceeding from their principles; secondly, relatively, viz. by\ncomparison to their matter. If we consider the excellence of the\ngifts simply, they follow the same rule as the virtues, as to their\ncomparison one with another; because the gifts perfect man for all\nthe acts of the soul's powers, even as the virtues do, as stated\nabove (A. 4). Hence, as the intellectual virtues have the precedence\nof the moral virtues, and among the intellectual virtues, the\ncontemplative are preferable to the active, viz. wisdom,\nunderstanding and science to prudence and art (yet so that wisdom\nstands before understanding, and understanding before science, and\nprudence and synesis before eubulia): so also among the gifts,\nwisdom, understanding, knowledge, and counsel are more excellent than\npiety, fortitude, and fear; and among the latter, piety excels\nfortitude, and fortitude fear, even as justice surpasses fortitude,\nand fortitude temperance. But in regard to their matter, fortitude\nand counsel precede knowledge and piety: because fortitude and\ncounsel are concerned with difficult matters, whereas piety and\nknowledge regard ordinary matters. Consequently the excellence of the\ngifts corresponds with the order in which they are enumerated; but so\nfar as wisdom and understanding are given the preference to the\nothers, their excellence is considered simply, while, so far, as\ncounsel and fortitude are preferred to knowledge and piety, it is\nconsidered with regard to their matter.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation, so to\nspeak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for \"the fear of the\nLord is the beginning of wisdom\" (Ps. 110:10; Ecclus. 1:16), and not\nas though it were more excellent than the others. Because, in the\norder of generation, man departs from evil on account of fear (Prov.\n16:16), before doing good works, and which result from the other\ngifts.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In the words quoted from the Apostle, piety is not\ncompared with all God's gifts, but only with \"bodily exercise,\" of\nwhich he had said it \"is profitable to little.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although knowledge stands before counsel by reason of\nits judgment, yet counsel is more excellent by reason of its matter:\nfor counsel is only concerned with matters of difficulty (Ethic. iii,\n3), whereas the judgment of knowledge embraces all matters.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The directive gifts which pertain to the reason are\nmore excellent than the executive gifts, if we consider them in\nrelation to their acts as proceeding from their powers, because\nreason transcends the appetite as a rule transcends the thing ruled.\nBut on the part of the matter, counsel is united to fortitude as the\ndirective power to the executive, and so is knowledge united to\npiety: because counsel and fortitude are concerned with matters of\ndifficulty, while knowledge and piety are concerned with ordinary\nmatters. Hence counsel together with fortitude, by reason of their\nmatter, are given the preference to knowledge and piety.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Virtues Are More Excellent Than the Gifts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the virtues are more excellent than\nthe gifts. For Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 18) while speaking of\ncharity: \"No gift of God is more excellent than this. It is this\nalone which divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the\nchildren of eternal damnation. Other gifts are bestowed by the Holy\nGhost, but, without charity, they avail nothing.\" But charity is a\nvirtue. Therefore a virtue is more excellent than the gifts of the\nHoly Ghost.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is first naturally, seems to be more\nexcellent. Now the virtues precede the gifts of the Holy Ghost; for\nGregory says (Moral. ii, 26) that \"the gift of the Holy Ghost in the\nmind it works on, forms first of all justice, prudence, fortitude,\ntemperance . . . and doth afterwards give it a temper in the seven\nvirtues\" (viz. the gifts), so \"as against folly to bestow wisdom;\nagainst dullness, understanding; against rashness, counsel; against\nfear, fortitude; against ignorance, knowledge; against hardness of\nheart, piety; against piety, fear.\" Therefore the virtues are more\nexcellent than the gifts.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that \"the\nvirtues cannot be used to evil purpose.\" But it is possible to make\nevil use of the gifts, for Gregory says (Moral. i, 18): \"We offer up\nthe sacrifice of prayer . . . lest wisdom may uplift; or\nunderstanding, while it runs nimbly, deviate from the right path; or\ncounsel, while it multiplies itself, grow into confusion; that\nfortitude, while it gives confidence, may not make us rash; lest\nknowledge, while it knows and yet loves not, may swell the mind; lest\npiety, while it swerves from the right line, may become distorted;\nand lest fear, while it is unduly alarmed, may plunge us into the pit\nof despair.\" Therefore the virtues are more excellent than the gifts\nof the Holy Ghost.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The gifts are bestowed to assist the virtues and\nto remedy certain defects, as is shown in the passage quoted (Obj.\n2), so that, seemingly, they accomplish what the virtues cannot.\nTherefore the gifts are more excellent than the virtues.\n\n_I answer that,_ As was shown above (Q. 58, A. 3; Q. 62, A. 1), there\nare three kinds of virtues: for some are theological, some\nintellectual, and some moral. The theological virtues are those\nwhereby man's mind is united to God; the intellectual virtues are\nthose whereby reason itself is perfected; and the moral virtues are\nthose which perfect the powers of appetite in obedience to the\nreason. On the other hand the gifts of the Holy Ghost dispose all the\npowers of the soul to be amenable to the Divine motion.\n\nAccordingly the gifts seem to be compared to the theological virtues,\nby which man is united to the Holy Ghost his Mover, in the same way\nas the moral virtues are compared to the intellectual virtues, which\nperfect the reason, the moving principle of the moral virtues.\nWherefore as the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the\nmoral virtues and control them, so the theological virtues are more\nexcellent than the gifts of the Holy Ghost and regulate them. Hence\nGregory says (Moral. i, 12) that \"the seven sons,\" i.e. the seven\ngifts, \"never attain the perfection of the number ten, unless all\nthey do be done in faith, hope, and charity.\"\n\nBut if we compare the gifts to the other virtues, intellectual and\nmoral, then the gifts have the precedence of the virtues. Because the\ngifts perfect the soul's powers in relation to the Holy Ghost their\nMover; whereas the virtues perfect, either the reason itself, or the\nother powers in relation to reason: and it is evident that the more\nexalted the mover, the more excellent the disposition whereby the\nthing moved requires to be disposed. Therefore the gifts are more\nperfect than the virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Charity is a theological virtue; and such we grant to\nbe more perfect than the gifts.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There are two ways in which one thing precedes another.\nOne is in order of perfection and dignity, as love of God precedes\nlove of our neighbor: and in this way the gifts precede the\nintellectual and moral virtues, but follow the theological virtues.\nThe other is the order of generation or disposition: thus love of\none's neighbor precedes love of God, as regards the act: and in this\nway moral and intellectual virtues precede the gifts, since man,\nthrough being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be\nrightly subordinate to God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Wisdom and understanding and the like are gifts of the\nHoly Ghost, according as they are quickened by charity, which\n\"dealeth not perversely\" (1 Cor. 13:4). Consequently wisdom and\nunderstanding and the like cannot be used to evil purpose, in so far\nas they are gifts of the Holy Ghost. But, lest they depart from the\nperfection of charity, they assist one another. This is what Gregory\nmeans to say.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 69\n\nOF THE BEATITUDES\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the beatitudes: under which head there are four\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the beatitudes differ from the gifts and virtues?\n\n(2) Of the rewards of the beatitudes: whether they refer to this life?\n\n(3) Of the number of the beatitudes;\n\n(4) Of the fittingness of the rewards ascribed to the beatitudes.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 69, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Beatitudes Differ from the Virtues and Gifts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes do not differ from the\nvirtues and gifts. For Augustine (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4)\nassigns the beatitudes recited by Matthew (v 3, seqq.) to the gifts\nof the Holy Ghost; and Ambrose in his commentary on Luke 6:20, seqq.,\nascribes the beatitudes mentioned there, to the four cardinal\nvirtues. Therefore the beatitudes do not differ from the virtues and\ngifts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there are but two rules of the human will: the\nreason and the eternal law, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 3; Q. 21, A.\n1). Now the virtues perfect man in relation to reason; while the\ngifts perfect him in relation to the eternal law of the Holy Ghost,\nas is clear from what has been said (Q. 68, AA. 1, 3, seqq.).\nTherefore there cannot be anything else pertaining to the rectitude\nof the human will, besides the virtues and gifts. Therefore the\nbeatitudes do not differ from them.\n\nObj. 3: Further, among the beatitudes are included meekness, justice,\nand mercy, which are said to be virtues. Therefore the beatitudes do\nnot differ from the virtues and gifts.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Certain things are included among the beatitudes,\nthat are neither virtues nor gifts, e.g. poverty, mourning, and\npeace. Therefore the beatitudes differ from the virtues and gifts.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 2, A. 7; Q. 3, A. 1), happiness\nis the last end of human life. Now one is said to possess the end\nalready, when one hopes to possess it; wherefore the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. i, 9) that \"children are said to be happy because they are\nfull of hope\"; and the Apostle says (Rom. 8:24): \"We are saved by\nhope.\" Again, we hope to obtain an end, because we are suitably moved\ntowards that end, and approach thereto; and this implies some action.\nAnd a man is moved towards, and approaches the happy end by works of\nvirtue, and above all by the works of the gifts, if we speak of\neternal happiness, for which our reason is not sufficient, since we\nneed to be moved by the Holy Ghost, and to be perfected with His\ngifts that we may obey and follow him. Consequently the beatitudes\ndiffer from the virtues and gifts, not as habit from habit, but as\nact from habit.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine and Ambrose assign the beatitudes to the\ngifts and virtues, as acts are ascribed to habits. But the gifts are\nmore excellent than the cardinal virtues, as stated above (Q. 68, A.\n8). Wherefore Ambrose, in explaining the beatitudes propounded to the\nthrong, assigns them to the cardinal virtues, whereas Augustine, who\nis explaining the beatitudes delivered to the disciples on the\nmountain, and so to those who were more perfect, ascribes them to the\ngifts of the Holy Ghost.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument proves that no other habits, besides the\nvirtues and gifts, rectify human conduct.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Meekness is to be taken as denoting the act of\nmeekness: and the same applies to justice and mercy. And though these\nmight seem to be virtues, they are nevertheless ascribed to gifts,\nbecause the gifts perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues\nperfect him, as stated above (Q. 68, A. 2).\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 69, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Rewards Assigned to the Beatitudes Refer to This Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the rewards assigned to the\nbeatitudes do not refer to this life. Because some are said to be\nhappy because they hope for a reward, as stated above (A. 1). Now the\nobject of hope is future happiness. Therefore these rewards refer to\nthe life to come.\n\nObj. 2: Further, certain punishments are set down in opposition to\nthe beatitudes, Luke 6:25, where we read: \"Woe to you that are\nfilled; for you shall hunger. Woe to you that now laugh, for you\nshall mourn and weep.\" Now these punishments do not refer to this\nlife, because frequently men are not punished in this life, according\nto Job 21:13: \"They spend their days in wealth.\" Therefore neither do\nthe rewards of the beatitudes refer to this life.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the kingdom of heaven which is set down as the\nreward of poverty is the happiness of heaven, as Augustine says (De\nCiv. Dei xix) [*Cf. De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1]. Again, abundant\nfullness is not to be had save in the life to come, according to Ps.\n16:15: \"I shall be filled [Douay: 'satisfied'] when Thy glory shall\nappear.\" Again, it is only in the future life that we shall see God,\nand that our Divine sonship will be made manifest, according to 1\nJohn 3:2: \"We are now the sons of God; and it hath not yet appeared\nwhat we shall be. We know that, when He shall appear, we shall be\nlike to Him, because we shall see Him as He is.\" Therefore these\nrewards refer to the future life.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4):\n\"These promises can be fulfilled in this life, as we believe them to\nhave been fulfilled in the apostles. For no words can express that\ncomplete change into the likeness even of an angel, which is promised\nto us after this life.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Expounders of Holy Writ are not agreed in speaking\nof these rewards. For some, with Ambrose (Super Luc. v), hold that\nall these rewards refer to the life to come; while Augustine (De\nSerm. Dom. in Monte i, 4) holds them to refer to the present life;\nand Chrysostom in his homilies (In Matth. xv) says that some refer to\nthe future, and some to the present life.\n\nIn order to make the matter clear we must take note that hope of\nfuture happiness may be in us for two reasons. First, by reason of\nour having a preparation for, or a disposition to future happiness;\nand this is by way of merit; secondly, by a kind of imperfect\ninchoation of future happiness in holy men, even in this life. For it\nis one thing to hope that the tree will bear fruit, when the leaves\nbegin to appear, and another, when we see the first signs of the\nfruit.\n\nAccordingly, those things which are set down as merits in the\nbeatitudes, are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to\nhappiness, either perfect or inchoate: while those that are assigned\nas rewards, may be either perfect happiness, so as to refer to the\nfuture life, or some beginning of happiness, such as is found in\nthose who have attained perfection, in which case they refer to the\npresent life. Because when a man begins to make progress in the acts\nof the virtues and gifts, it is to be hoped that he will arrive at\nperfection, both as a wayfarer, and as a citizen of the heavenly\nkingdom.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Hope regards future happiness as the last end: yet it\nmay also regard the assistance of grace as that which leads to that\nend, according to Ps. 27:7: \"In Him hath my heart hoped, and I have\nbeen helped.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although sometimes the wicked do not undergo temporal\npunishment in this life, yet they suffer spiritual punishment. Hence\nAugustine says (Confess. i): \"Thou hast decreed, and it is so,\nLord--that the disordered mind should be its own punishment.\" The\nPhilosopher, too, says of the wicked (Ethic. ix, 4) that \"their soul\nis divided against itself . . . one part pulls this way, another\nthat\"; and afterwards he concludes, saying: \"If wickedness makes a\nman so miserable, he should strain every nerve to avoid vice.\" In\nlike manner, although, on the other hand, the good sometimes do not\nreceive material rewards in this life, yet they never lack spiritual\nrewards, even in this life, according to Matt. 19:29, and Mk. 10:30:\n\"Ye shall receive a hundred times as much\" even \"in this time.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: All these rewards will be fully consummated in the life\nto come: but meanwhile they are, in a manner, begun, even in this\nlife. Because the \"kingdom of heaven,\" as Augustine says (loc. cit.),\ncan denote the beginning of perfect wisdom, in so far as \"the spirit\"\nbegins to reign in men. The \"possession\" of the land denotes the\nwell-ordered affections of the soul that rests, by its desire, on the\nsolid foundation of the eternal inheritance, signified by \"the land.\"\nThey are \"comforted\" in this life, by receiving the Holy Ghost, Who\nis called the \"Paraclete,\" i.e. the Comforter. They \"have their\nfill,\" even in this life, of that food of which Our Lord said (John\n4:34): \"My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me.\" Again, in\nthis life, men \"obtain\" God's \"Mercy.\" Again, the eye being cleansed\nby the gift of understanding, we can, so to speak, \"see God.\"\nLikewise, in this life, those who are the \"peacemakers\" of their own\nmovements, approach to likeness to God, and are called \"the children\nof God.\" Nevertheless these things will be more perfectly fulfilled\nin heaven.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 69, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Beatitudes Are Suitably Enumerated?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the beatitudes are unsuitably\nenumerated. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated\nabove (A. 1, ad 1). Now some of the gifts, viz. wisdom and\nunderstanding, belong to the contemplative life: yet no beatitude is\nassigned to the act of contemplation, for all are assigned to matters\nconnected with the active life. Therefore the beatitudes are\ninsufficiently enumerated.\n\nObj. 2: Further, not only do the executive gifts belong to the active\nlife, but also some of the directive gifts, e.g. knowledge and\ncounsel: yet none of the beatitudes seems to be directly connected\nwith the acts of knowledge or counsel. Therefore the beatitudes are\ninsufficiently indicated.\n\nObj. 3: Further, among the executive gifts connected with the active\nlife, fear is said to be connected with poverty, while piety seems to\ncorrespond to the beatitude of mercy: yet nothing is included\ndirectly connected with justice. Therefore the beatitudes are\ninsufficiently enumerated.\n\nObj. 4: Further, many other beatitudes are mentioned in Holy Writ.\nThus, it is written (Job 5:17): \"Blessed is the man whom God\ncorrecteth\"; and (Ps. i, 1): \"Blessed is the man who hath not walked\nin the counsel of the ungodly\"; and (Prov. 3:13): \"Blessed is the man\nthat findeth wisdom.\" Therefore the beatitudes are insufficiently\nenumerated.\n\nObj. 5: On the other hand, it seems that too many are mentioned. For\nthere are seven gifts of the Holy Ghost: whereas eight beatitudes are\nindicated.\n\nObj. 6: Further, only four beatitudes are indicated in the sixth\nchapter of Luke. Therefore the seven or eight mentioned in Matthew 5\nare too many.\n\n_I answer that,_ These beatitudes are most suitably enumerated. To\nmake this evident it must be observed that beatitude has been held to\nconsist in one of three things: for some have ascribed it to a\nsensual life, some, to an active life, and some, to a contemplative\nlife [*See Q. 3]. Now these three kinds of happiness stand in\ndifferent relations to future beatitude, by hoping for which we are\nsaid to be happy. Because sensual happiness, being false and contrary\nto reason, is an obstacle to future beatitude; while happiness of the\nactive life is a disposition of future beatitude; and contemplative\nhappiness, if perfect, is the very essence of future beatitude, and,\nif imperfect, is a beginning thereof.\n\nAnd so Our Lord, in the first place, indicated certain beatitudes as\nremoving the obstacle of sensual happiness. For a life of pleasure\nconsists of two things. First, in the affluence of external goods,\nwhether riches or honors; from which man is withdrawn--by a virtue so\nthat he uses them in moderation--and by a gift, in a more excellent\nway, so that he despises them altogether. Hence the first beatitude\nis: \"Blessed are the poor in spirit,\" which may refer either to the\ncontempt of riches, or to the contempt of honors, which results from\nhumility. Secondly, the sensual life consists in following the bent\nof one's passions, whether irascible or concupiscible. From following\nthe irascible passions man is withdrawn--by a virtue, so that they\nare kept within the bounds appointed by the ruling of reason--and by\na gift, in a more excellent manner, so that man, according to God's\nwill, is altogether undisturbed by them: hence the second beatitude\nis: \"Blessed are the meek.\" From following the concupiscible\npassions, man is withdrawn--by a virtue, so that man uses these\npassions in moderation--and by a gift, so that, if necessary, he\ncasts them aside altogether; nay more, so that, if need be, he makes\na deliberate choice of sorrow [*Cf. Q. 35, A. 3]; hence the third\nbeatitude is: \"Blessed are they that mourn.\"\n\nActive life consists chiefly in man's relations with his neighbor,\neither by way of duty or by way of spontaneous gratuity. To the\nformer we are disposed--by a virtue, so that we do not refuse to do\nour duty to our neighbor, which pertains to justice--and by a gift,\nso that we do the same much more heartily, by accomplishing works of\njustice with an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty man eats\nand drinks with eager appetite. Hence the fourth beatitude is:\n\"Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after justice.\" With regard\nto spontaneous favors we are perfected--by a virtue, so that we give\nwhere reason dictates we should give, e.g. to our friends or others\nunited to us; which pertains to the virtue of liberality--and by a\ngift, so that, through reverence for God, we consider only the needs\nof those on whom we bestow our gratuitous bounty: hence it is written\n(Luke 14:12, 13): \"When thou makest a dinner or supper, call not thy\nfriends, nor thy brethren,\" etc . . . \"but . . . call the poor, the\nmaimed,\" etc.; which, properly, is to have mercy: hence the fifth\nbeatitude is: \"Blessed are the merciful.\"\n\nThose things which concern the contemplative life, are either final\nbeatitude itself, or some beginning thereof: wherefore they are\nincluded in the beatitudes, not as merits, but as rewards. Yet the\neffects of the active life, which dispose man for the contemplative\nlife, are included in the beatitudes. Now the effect of the active\nlife, as regards those virtues and gifts whereby man is perfected in\nhimself, is the cleansing of man's heart, so that it is not defiled\nby the passions: hence the sixth beatitude is: \"Blessed are the clean\nof heart.\" But as regards the virtues and gifts whereby man is\nperfected in relation to his neighbor, the effect of the active life\nis peace, according to Isa. 32:17: \"The work of justice shall be\npeace\": hence the seventh beatitude is \"Blessed are the peacemakers.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The acts of the gifts which belong to the active life\nare indicated in the merits: but the acts of the gifts pertaining to\nthe contemplative life are indicated in the rewards, for the reason\ngiven above. Because to \"see God\" corresponds to the gift of\nunderstanding; and to be like God by being adoptive \"children of\nGod,\" corresponds to the gift of wisdom.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In things pertaining to the active life, knowledge is\nnot sought for its own sake, but for the sake of operation, as even\nthe Philosopher states (Ethic. ii, 2). And therefore, since beatitude\nimplies something ultimate, the beatitudes do not include the acts of\nthose gifts which direct man in the active life, such acts, to wit,\nas are elicited by those gifts, as, e.g. to counsel is the act of\ncounsel, and to judge, the act of knowledge: but, on the other hand,\nthey include those operative acts of which the gifts have the\ndirection, as, e.g. mourning in respect of knowledge, and mercy in\nrespect of counsel.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In applying the beatitudes to the gifts we may consider\ntwo things. One is likeness of matter. In this way all the first five\nbeatitudes may be assigned to knowledge and counsel as to their\ndirecting principles: whereas they must be distributed among the\nexecutive gifts: so that, to wit, hunger and thirst for justice, and\nmercy too, correspond to piety, which perfects man in his relations\nto others; meekness to fortitude, for Ambrose says on Luke 6:22: \"It\nis the business of fortitude to conquer anger, and to curb\nindignation,\" fortitude being about the irascible passions:\npoverty and mourning to the gift of fear, whereby man withdraws from\nthe lusts and pleasures of the world.\n\nSecondly, we may consider the motives of the beatitudes: and, in this\nway, some of them will have to be assigned differently. Because the\nprincipal motive for meekness is reverence for God, which belongs to\npiety. The chief motive for mourning is knowledge, whereby man knows\nhis failings and those of worldly things, according to Eccles. 1:18:\n\"He that addeth knowledge, addeth also sorrow [Vulg: labor].\" The\nprincipal motive for hungering after the works of justice is\nfortitude of the soul: and the chief motive for being merciful is\nGod's counsel, according to Dan. 4:24: \"Let my counsel be acceptable\nto the king [Vulg: to thee, O king]: and redeem thou thy sins with\nalms, and thy iniquities with works of mercy to the poor.\" It is thus\nthat Augustine assigns them (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4).\n\nReply Obj. 4: All the beatitudes mentioned in Holy Writ must be\nreduced to these, either as to the merits or as to the rewards:\nbecause they must all belong either to the active or to the\ncontemplative life. Accordingly, when we read, \"Blessed is the man\nwhom the Lord correcteth,\" we must refer this to the beatitude of\nmourning: when we read, \"Blessed is the man that hath not walked in\nthe counsel of the ungodly,\" we must refer it to cleanness of heart:\nand when we read, \"Blessed is the man that findeth wisdom,\" this must\nbe referred to the reward of the seventh beatitude. The same applies\nto all others that can be adduced.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The eighth beatitude is a confirmation and declaration\nof all those that precede. Because from the very fact that a man is\nconfirmed in poverty of spirit, meekness, and the rest, it follows\nthat no persecution will induce him to renounce them. Hence the\neighth beatitude corresponds, in a way, to all the preceding seven.\n\nReply Obj. 6: Luke relates Our Lord's sermon as addressed to the\nmultitude (Luke 6:17). Hence he sets down the beatitudes according to\nthe capacity of the multitude, who know no other happiness than\npleasure, temporal and earthly: wherefore by these four beatitudes\nOur Lord excludes four things which seem to belong to such happiness.\nThe first of these is abundance of external goods, which he sets\naside by saying: \"Blessed are ye poor.\" The second is that man be\nwell off as to his body, in food and drink, and so forth; this he\nexcludes by saying in the second place: \"Blessed are ye that hunger.\"\nThe third is that it should be well with man as to joyfulness of\nheart, and this he puts aside by saying: \"Blessed are ye that weep\nnow.\" The fourth is the outward favor of man; and this he excludes,\nsaying, fourthly: \"Blessed shall you be, when men shall hate you.\"\nAnd as Ambrose says on Luke 6:20, \"poverty corresponds to temperance,\nwhich is unmoved by delights; hunger, to justice, since who hungers\nis compassionate and, through compassion gives; mourning, to\nprudence, which deplores perishable things; endurance of men's hatred\nbelongs to fortitude.\"\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 69, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Rewards of the Beatitudes Are Suitably Enumerated?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the rewards of the beatitudes are\nunsuitably enumerated. Because the kingdom of heaven, which is\neternal life, contains all good things. Therefore, once given the\nkingdom of heaven, no other rewards should be mentioned.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the kingdom of heaven is assigned as the reward,\nboth of the first and of the eighth beatitude. Therefore, on the same\nground it should have been assigned to all.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the beatitudes are arranged in the ascending order,\nas Augustine remarks (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 4): whereas the\nrewards seem to be placed in the descending order, since to \"possess\nthe land\" is less than to possess \"the kingdom of heaven.\" Therefore\nthese rewards are unsuitably enumerated.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Our Lord Who propounded\nthese rewards.\n\n_I answer that,_ These rewards are most suitably assigned,\nconsidering the nature of the beatitudes in relation to the three\nkinds of happiness indicated above (A. 3). For the first three\nbeatitudes concerned the withdrawal of man from those things in which\nsensual happiness consists: which happiness man desires by seeking\nthe object of his natural desire, not where he should seek it, viz.\nin God, but in temporal and perishable things. Wherefore the rewards\nof the first three beatitudes correspond to these things which some\nmen seek to find in earthly happiness. For men seek in external\nthings, viz. riches and honors, a certain excellence and abundance,\nboth of which are implied in the kingdom of heaven, whereby man\nattains to excellence and abundance of good things in God. Hence Our\nLord promised the kingdom of heaven to the poor in spirit. Again,\ncruel and pitiless men seek by wrangling and fighting to destroy\ntheir enemies so as to gain security for themselves. Hence Our Lord\npromised the meek a secure and peaceful possession of the land of the\nliving, whereby the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted. Again,\nmen seek consolation for the toils of the present life, in the lusts\nand pleasures of the world. Hence Our Lord promises comfort to those\nthat mourn.\n\nTwo other beatitudes belong to the works of active happiness, which\nare the works of virtues directing man in his relations to his\nneighbor: from which operations some men withdraw through inordinate\nlove of their own good. Hence Our Lord assigns to these beatitudes\nrewards in correspondence with the motives for which men recede from\nthem. For there are some who recede from acts of justice, and instead\nof rendering what is due, lay hands on what is not theirs, that they\nmay abound in temporal goods. Wherefore Our Lord promised those who\nhunger after justice, that they shall have their fill. Some, again,\nrecede from works of mercy, lest they be busied with other people's\nmisery. Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that they should obtain\nmercy, and be delivered from all misery.\n\nThe last two beatitudes belong to contemplative happiness or\nbeatitude: hence the rewards are assigned in correspondence with the\ndispositions included in the merit. For cleanness of the eye disposes\none to see clearly: hence the clean of heart are promised that they\nshall see God. Again, to make peace either in oneself or among\nothers, shows a man to be a follower of God, Who is the God of unity\nand peace. Hence, as a reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine\nsonship, consisting in perfect union with God through consummate\nwisdom.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xv in Matth.), all these\nrewards are one in reality, viz. eternal happiness, which the human\nintellect cannot grasp. Hence it was necessary to describe it by\nmeans of various boons known to us, while observing due proportion to\nthe merits to which those rewards are assigned.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as the eighth beatitude is a confirmation of all\nthe beatitudes, so it deserves all the rewards of the beatitudes.\nHence it returns to the first, that we may understand all the other\nrewards to be attributed to it in consequence. Or else, according to\nAmbrose (Super Luc. v), the kingdom of heaven is promised to the poor\nin spirit, as regards the glory of the soul; but to those who suffer\npersecution in their bodies, it is promised as regards the glory of\nthe body.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The rewards are also arranged in ascending order. For\nit is more to possess the land of the heavenly kingdom than simply to\nhave it: since we have many things without possessing them firmly and\npeacefully. Again, it is more to be comforted in the kingdom than to\nhave and possess it, for there are many things the possession of\nwhich is accompanied by sorrow. Again, it is more to have one's fill\nthan simply to be comforted, because fulness implies abundance of\ncomfort. And mercy surpasses satiety, for thereby man receives more\nthan he merited or was able to desire. And yet more is it to see God,\neven as he is a greater man who not only dines at court, but also\nsees the king's countenance. Lastly, the highest place in the royal\npalace belongs to the king's son.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 70\n\nOF THE FRUITS OF THE HOLY GHOST\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the Fruits of the Holy Ghost: under which head\nthere are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the fruits of the Holy Ghost are acts?\n\n(2) Whether they differ from the beatitudes?\n\n(3) Of their number?\n\n(4) Of their opposition to the works of the flesh.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 70, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Fruits of the Holy Ghost Which the Apostle Enumerates\n(Gal. 5) Are Acts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost,\nenumerated by the Apostle (Gal. 5:22, 23), are not acts. For that\nwhich bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we\nshould go on indefinitely. But our actions bear fruit: for it is\nwritten (Wis. 3:15): \"The fruit of good labor is glorious,\" and (John\n4:36): \"He that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto\nlife everlasting.\" Therefore our actions are not to be called fruits.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 10), \"we enjoy\n[*'Fruimur', from which verb we have the Latin 'fructus' and the\nEnglish 'fruit'] the things we know, when the will rests by rejoicing\nin them.\" But our will should not rest in our actions for their own\nsake. Therefore our actions should not be called fruits.\n\nObj. 3: Further, among the fruits of the Holy Ghost, the Apostle\nnumbers certain virtues, viz. charity, meekness, faith, and chastity.\nNow virtues are not actions but habits, as stated above (Q. 55, A.\n1). Therefore the fruits are not actions.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 12:33): \"By the fruit the\ntree is known\"; that is to say, man is known by his works, as holy\nmen explain the passage. Therefore human actions are called fruits.\n\n_I answer that,_ The word \"fruit\" has been transferred from the\nmaterial to the spiritual world. Now fruit, among material things, is\nthe product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain\nsweetness. This fruit has a twofold relation: to the tree that\nproduces it, and to the man who gathers the fruit from the tree.\nAccordingly, in spiritual matters, we may take the word \"fruit\" in\ntwo ways: first, so that the fruit of man, who is likened to the\ntree, is that which he produces; secondly, so that man's fruit is\nwhat he gathers.\n\nYet not all that man gathers is fruit, but only that which is last\nand gives pleasure. For a man has both a field and a tree, and yet\nthese are not called fruits; but that only which is last, to wit,\nthat which man intends to derive from the field and from the tree. In\nthis sense man's fruit is his last end which is intended for his\nenjoyment.\n\nIf, however, by man's fruit we understand a product of man, then\nhuman actions are called fruits: because operation is the second act\nof the operator, and gives pleasure if it is suitable to him. If then\nman's operation proceeds from man in virtue of his reason, it is said\nto be the fruit of his reason: but if it proceeds from him in respect\nof a higher power, which is the power of the Holy Ghost, then man's\noperation is said to be the fruit of the Holy Ghost, as of a Divine\nseed, for it is written (1 John 3:9): \"Whosoever is born of God,\ncommitteth no sin, for His seed abideth in him.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since fruit is something last and final, nothing\nhinders one fruit bearing another fruit, even as one end is\nsubordinate to another. And so our works, in so far as they are\nproduced by the Holy Ghost working in us, are fruits: but, in so far\nas they are referred to the end which is eternal life, they should\nrather be called flowers: hence it is written (Ecclus. 24:23): \"My\nflowers are the fruits of honor and riches.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: When the will is said to delight in a thing for its own\nsake, this may be understood in two ways. First, so that the\nexpression \"for the sake of\" be taken to designate the final cause;\nand in this way, man delights in nothing for its own sake, except the\nlast end. Secondly, so that it expresses the formal cause; and in\nthis way, a man may delight in anything that is delightful by reason\nof its form. Thus it is clear that a sick man delights in health, for\nits own sake, as in an end; in a nice medicine, not as in an end, but\nas in something tasty; and in a nasty medicine, nowise for its own\nsake, but only for the sake of something else. Accordingly we must\nsay that man must delight in God for His own sake, as being his last\nend, and in virtuous deeds, not as being his end, but for the sake of\ntheir inherent goodness which is delightful to the virtuous. Hence\nAmbrose says (De Parad. xiii) that virtuous deeds are called fruits\nbecause \"they refresh those that have them, with a holy and genuine\ndelight.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Sometimes the names of the virtues are applied to their\nactions: thus Augustine writes (Tract. xl in Joan.): \"Faith is to\nbelieve what thou seest not\"; and (De Doctr. Christ. iii, 10):\n\"Charity is the movement of the soul in loving God and our neighbor.\"\nIt is thus that the names of the virtues are used in reckoning the\nfruits.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 70, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Fruits Differ from the Beatitudes?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the fruits do not differ from the\nbeatitudes. For the beatitudes are assigned to the gifts, as stated\nabove (Q. 69, A. 1, ad 1). But the gifts perfect man in so far as he\nis moved by the Holy Ghost. Therefore the beatitudes themselves are\nfruits of the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as the fruit of eternal life is to future beatitude\nwhich is that of actual possession, so are the fruits of the present\nlife to the beatitudes of the present life, which are based on hope.\nNow the fruit of eternal life is identified with future beatitude.\nTherefore the fruits of the present life are the beatitudes.\n\nObj. 3: Further, fruit is essentially something ultimate and\ndelightful. Now this is the very nature of beatitude, as stated above\n(Q. 3, A. 1; Q. 4, A. 1). Therefore fruit and beatitude have the same\nnature, and consequently should not be distinguished from one another.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Things divided into different species, differ from\none another. But fruits and beatitudes are divided into different\nparts, as is clear from the way in which they are enumerated.\nTherefore the fruits differ from the beatitudes.\n\n_I answer that,_ More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit.\nBecause it is sufficient for a fruit to be something ultimate and\ndelightful; whereas for a beatitude, it must be something perfect and\nexcellent. Hence all the beatitudes may be called fruits, but not\nvice versa. For the fruits are any virtuous deeds in which one\ndelights: whereas the beatitudes are none but perfect works, and\nwhich, by reason of their perfection, are assigned to the gifts\nrather than to the virtues, as already stated (Q. 69, A. 1, ad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument proves the beatitudes to be fruits, but\nnot that all the fruits are beatitudes.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The fruit of eternal life is ultimate and perfect\nsimply: hence it nowise differs from future beatitude. On the other\nhand the fruits of the present life are not simply ultimate and\nperfect; wherefore not all the fruits are beatitudes.\n\nReply Obj. 3: More is required for a beatitude than for a fruit, as\nstated.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 70, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Fruits Are Suitably Enumerated by the Apostle?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the fruits are unsuitably enumerated\nby the Apostle (Gal. 5:22, 23). Because, elsewhere, he says that\nthere is only one fruit of the present life; according to Rom. 6:22:\n\"You have your fruit unto sanctification.\" Moreover it is written\n(Isa. 27:9): \"This is all the fruit . . . that the sin . . . be taken\naway.\" Therefore we should not reckon twelve fruits.\n\nObj. 2: Further, fruit is the product of spiritual seed, as stated\n(A. 1). But Our Lord mentions (Matt. 13:23) a threefold fruit as\ngrowing from a spiritual seed in a good ground, viz. \"hundredfold,\nsixtyfold,\" and \"thirtyfold.\" Therefore one should not reckon twelve\nfruits.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the very nature of fruit is to be something ultimate\nand delightful. But this does not apply to all the fruits mentioned\nby the Apostle: for patience and long-suffering seem to imply a\npainful object, while faith is not something ultimate, but rather\nsomething primary and fundamental. Therefore too many fruits are\nenumerated.\n\nObj. 4: On the other hand, It seems that they are enumerated\ninsufficiently and incompletely. For it has been stated (A. 2) that\nall the beatitudes may be called fruits; yet not all are mentioned\nhere. Nor is there anything corresponding to the acts of wisdom, and\nof many other virtues. Therefore it seems that the fruits are\ninsufficiently enumerated.\n\n_I answer that,_ The number of the twelve fruits enumerated by the\nApostle is suitable, and that there may be a reference to them in the\ntwelve fruits of which it is written (Apoc. 22:2): \"On both sides of\nthe river was the tree bearing twelve fruits.\" Since, however, a\nfruit is something that proceeds from a source as from a seed or\nroot, the difference between these fruits must be gathered from the\nvarious ways in which the Holy Ghost proceeds in us: which process\nconsists in this, that the mind of man is set in order, first of all,\nin regard to itself; secondly, in regard to things that are near it;\nthirdly, in regard to things that are below it.\n\nAccordingly man's mind is well disposed in regard to itself when it\nhas a good disposition towards good things and towards evil things.\nNow the first disposition of the human mind towards the good is\neffected by love, which is the first of our emotions and the root of\nthem all, as stated above (Q. 27, A. 4). Wherefore among the fruits\nof the Holy Ghost, we reckon \"charity,\" wherein the Holy Ghost is\ngiven in a special manner, as in His own likeness, since He Himself\nis love. Hence it is written (Rom. 5:5): \"The charity of God is\npoured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost, Who is given to us.\"\nThe necessary result of the love of charity is joy: because every\nlover rejoices at being united to the beloved. Now charity has always\nactual presence in God Whom it loves, according to 1 John 4:16: \"He\nthat abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in Him\": wherefore\nthe sequel of charity is \"joy.\" Now the perfection of joy is peace in\ntwo respects. First, as regards freedom from outward disturbance; for\nit is impossible to rejoice perfectly in the beloved good, if one is\ndisturbed in the enjoyment thereof; and again, if a man's heart is\nperfectly set at peace in one object, he cannot be disquieted by any\nother, since he accounts all others as nothing; hence it is written\n(Ps. 118:165): \"Much peace have they that love Thy Law, and to them\nthere is no stumbling-block,\" because, to wit, external things do not\ndisturb them in their enjoyment of God. Secondly, as regards the calm\nof the restless desire: for he does not perfectly rejoice, who is not\nsatisfied with the object of his joy. Now peace implies these two\nthings, namely, that we be not disturbed by external things, and that\nour desires rest altogether in one object. Wherefore after charity\nand joy, \"peace\" is given the third place. In evil things the mind\nhas a good disposition, in respect of two things. First, by not being\ndisturbed whenever evil threatens: which pertains to \"patience\";\nsecondly, by not being disturbed, whenever good things are delayed;\nwhich belongs to \"long suffering,\" since \"to lack good is a kind of\nevil\" (Ethic. v, 3).\n\nMan's mind is well disposed as regards what is near him, viz. his\nneighbor, first, as to the will to do good; and to this belongs\n_goodness._ Secondly, as to the execution of well-doing; and to this\nbelongs _benignity,_ for the benign are those in whom the salutary\nflame (_bonus ignis_) of love has enkindled the desire to be kind to\ntheir neighbor. Thirdly, as to his suffering with equanimity the\nevils his neighbor inflicts on him. To this belongs _meekness,_ which\ncurbs anger. Fourthly, in the point of our refraining from doing harm\nto our neighbor not only through anger, but also through fraud or\ndeceit. To this pertains _faith,_ if we take it as denoting fidelity.\nBut if we take it for the faith whereby we believe in God, then man\nis directed thereby to that which is above him, so that he subject\nhis intellect and, consequently, all that is his, to God.\n\nMan is well disposed in respect of that which is below him, as\nregards external action, by _modesty,_ whereby we observe the _mode_\nin all our words and deeds: as regards internal desires, by\n_continency_ and _chastity:_ whether these two differ because\nchastity withdraws man from unlawful desires, continency also from\nlawful desires: or because the continent man is subject to\nconcupiscence, but is not led away; whereas the chaste man is neither\nsubject to, nor led away from them.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sanctification is effected by all the virtues, by which\nalso sins are taken away. Consequently fruit is mentioned there in\nthe singular, on account of its being generically one, though divided\ninto many species which are spoken of as so many fruits.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The hundredfold, sixtyfold, and thirtyfold fruits do\nnot differ as various species of virtuous acts, but as various\ndegrees of perfection, even in the same virtue. Thus continency of\nthe married state is said to be signified by the thirtyfold fruit;\nthe continency of widowhood, by the sixtyfold; and virginal\ncontinency, by the hundredfold fruit. There are, moreover, other ways\nin which holy men distinguish three evangelical fruits according to\nthe three degrees of virtue: and they speak of three degrees, because\nthe perfection of anything is considered with respect to its\nbeginning, its middle, and its end.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The fact of not being disturbed by painful things is\nsomething to delight in. And as to faith, if we consider it as the\nfoundation, it has the aspect of being ultimate and delightful, in as\nmuch as it contains certainty: hence a gloss expounds thus: \"Faith,\nwhich is certainly about the unseen.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: As Augustine says on Gal. 5:22, 23, \"the Apostle had no\nintention of teaching us how many (either works of the flesh, or\nfruits of the Spirit) there are; but to show how the former should be\navoided, and the latter sought after.\" Hence either more or fewer\nfruits might have been mentioned. Nevertheless, all the acts of the\ngifts and virtues can be reduced to these by a certain kind of\nfittingness, in so far as all the virtues and gifts must needs direct\nthe mind in one of the above-mentioned ways. Wherefore the acts of\nwisdom and of any gifts directing to good, are reduced to charity,\njoy and peace. The reason why he mentions these rather than others,\nis that these imply either enjoyment of good things, or relief from\nevils, which things seem to belong to the notion of fruit.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 70, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Fruits of the Holy Ghost Are Contrary to the Works of the\nFlesh?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost are not\ncontrary to the works of the flesh, which the Apostle enumerates\n(Gal. 5:19, seqq.). Because contraries are in the same genus. But the\nworks of the flesh are not called fruits. Therefore the fruits of the\nSpirit are not contrary to them.\n\nObj. 2: Further, one thing has a contrary. Now the Apostle mentions\nmore works of the flesh than fruits of the Spirit. Therefore the\nfruits of the Spirit and the works of the flesh are not contrary to\none another.\n\nObj. 3: Further, among the fruits of the Spirit, the first place is\ngiven to charity, joy, and peace: to which, fornication, uncleanness,\nand immodesty, which are the first of the works of the flesh, are not\nopposed. Therefore the fruits of the Spirit are not contrary to the\nworks of the flesh.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 5:17) that \"the flesh\nlusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The works of the flesh and the fruits of the Spirit\nmay be taken in two ways. First, in general: and in this way the\nfruits of the Holy Ghost considered in general are contrary to the\nworks of the flesh. Because the Holy Ghost moves the human mind to\nthat which is in accord with reason, or rather to that which\nsurpasses reason: whereas the fleshly, viz. the sensitive, appetite\ndraws man to sensible goods which are beneath him. Wherefore, since\nupward and downward are contrary movements in the physical order, so\nin human actions the works of the flesh are contrary to the fruits of\nthe Spirit.\n\nSecondly, both fruits and fleshly works as enumerated may be\nconsidered singly, each according to its specific nature. And in this\nthey are not of necessity contrary each to each: because, as stated\nabove (A. 3, ad 4), the Apostle did not intend to enumerate all the\nworks, whether spiritual or carnal. However, by a kind of adaptation,\nAugustine, commenting on Gal. 5:22, 23, contrasts the fruits with the\ncarnal works, each to each. Thus \"to fornication, which is the love\nof satisfying lust outside lawful wedlock, we may contrast charity,\nwhereby the soul is wedded to God: wherein also is true chastity. By\nuncleanness we must understand whatever disturbances arise from\nfornication: and to these the joy of tranquillity is opposed.\nIdolatry, by reason of which war was waged against the Gospel of God,\nis opposed to peace. Against witchcrafts, enmities, contentions,\nemulations, wraths and quarrels, there is longsuffering, which helps\nus to bear the evils inflicted on us by those among whom we dwell;\nwhile kindness helps us to cure those evils; and goodness, to forgive\nthem. In contrast to heresy there is faith; to envy, mildness; to\ndrunkenness and revellings, contingency.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: That which proceeds from a tree against the tree's\nnature, is not called its fruit, but rather its corruption. And since\nworks of virtue are connatural to reason, while works of vice are\ncontrary to nature, therefore it is that works of virtue are called\nfruits, but not so works of vice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: \"Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of ways,\"\nas Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many vices\nare contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works of\nthe flesh are more numerous than the fruits of the spirit.\n\nThe Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.\n________________________\n\nEVIL HABITS, i.e. VICES AND SINS (QQ. 71-89)\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 71\n\nOF VICE AND SIN CONSIDERED IN THEMSELVES\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe have in the next place to consider vice and sin: about which six\npoints have to be considered: (1) Vice and sin considered in\nthemselves; (2) their distinction; (3) their comparison with one\nanother; (4) the subject of sin; (5) the cause of sin; (6) the effect\nof sin.\n\nUnder the first head there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether vice is contrary to virtue?\n\n(2) Whether vice is contrary to nature?\n\n(3) Which is worse, a vice or a vicious act?\n\n(4) Whether a vicious act is compatible with virtue?\n\n(5) Whether every sin includes action?\n\n(6) Of the definition of sin proposed by Augustine (Contra Faust.\nxxii): \"Sin is a word, deed, or desire against the eternal law.\"\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 71, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Vice Is Contrary to Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to virtue. For\none thing has one contrary, as proved in _Metaph._ x, text. 17. Now\nsin and malice are contrary to virtue. Therefore vice is not contrary\nto it: since vice applies also to undue disposition of bodily members\nor of any things whatever.\n\nObj. 2: Further, virtue denotes a certain perfection of power. But\nvice does not denote anything relative to power. Therefore vice is\nnot contrary to virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) says that \"virtue is\nthe soul's health.\" Now sickness or disease, rather than vice, is\nopposed to health. Therefore vice is not contrary to virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that \"vice\nis a quality in respect of which the soul is evil.\" But \"virtue is a\nquality which makes its subject good,\" as was shown above (Q. 55, AA.\n3, 4). Therefore vice is contrary to virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in virtue--the essence\nof virtue, and that to which virtue is ordained. In the essence of\nvirtue we may consider something directly, and we may consider\nsomething consequently. Virtue implies _directly_ a disposition\nwhereby the subject is well disposed according to the mode of its\nnature: wherefore the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17) that\n\"virtue is a disposition of a perfect thing to that which is best;\nand by perfect I mean that which is disposed according to its\nnature.\" That which virtue implies _consequently_ is that it is a\nkind of goodness: because the goodness of a thing consists in its\nbeing well disposed according to the mode of its nature. That to\nwhich virtue is directed is a good act, as was shown above (Q. 56,\nA. 3).\n\nAccordingly three things are found to be contrary to virtue. One of\nthese is _sin,_ which is opposed to virtue in respect of that to\nwhich virtue is ordained: since, properly speaking, sin denotes an\ninordinate act; even as an act of virtue is an ordinate and due act:\nin respect of that which virtue implies consequently, viz. that it is\na kind of goodness, the contrary of virtue is _malice_: while in\nrespect of that which belongs to the essence of virtue directly, its\ncontrary is _vice_: because the vice of a thing seems to consist in\nits not being disposed in a way befitting its nature: hence Augustine\nsays (De Lib. Arb. iii): \"Whatever is lacking for a thing's natural\nperfection may be called a vice.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: These three things are contrary to virtue, but not in\nthe same respect: for sin is opposed to virtue, according as the\nlatter is productive of a good work; malice, according as virtue is a\nkind of goodness; while vice is opposed to virtue properly as such.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Virtue implies not only perfection of power, the\nprinciple of action; but also the due disposition of its subject. The\nreason for this is because a thing operates according as it is in\nact: so that a thing needs to be well disposed if it has to produce a\ngood work. It is in this respect that vice is contrary to virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), \"disease and\nsickness are vicious qualities,\" for in speaking of the body he calls\nit disease \"when the whole body is infected,\" for instance, with\nfever or the like; he calls it sickness \"when the disease is attended\nwith weakness\"; and vice \"when the parts of the body are not well\ncompacted together.\" And although at times there may be disease in\nthe body without sickness, for instance, when a man has a hidden\ncomplaint without being hindered outwardly from his wonted\noccupations; \"yet, in the soul,\" as he says, \"these two things are\nindistinguishable, except in thought.\" For whenever a man is\nill-disposed inwardly, through some inordinate affection, he is\nrendered thereby unfit for fulfilling his duties: since \"a tree is\nknown by its fruit,\" i.e. man by his works, according to Matt. 12:33.\nBut \"vice of the soul,\" as Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv), \"is a\nhabit or affection of the soul discordant and inconsistent with\nitself through life\": and this is to be found even without disease\nand sickness, e.g. when a man sins from weakness or passion.\nConsequently vice is of wider extent than sickness or disease; even\nas virtue extends to more things than health; for health itself is\nreckoned a kind of virtue (Phys. vii, text. 17). Consequently vice is\nreckoned as contrary to virtue, more fittingly than sickness or\ndisease.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 71, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Vice Is Contrary to Nature?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that vice is not contrary to nature.\nBecause vice is contrary to virtue, as stated above (A. 1). Now\nvirtue is in us, not by nature but by infusion or habituation, as\nstated above (Q. 63, AA. 1, 2, 3). Therefore vice is not contrary to\nnature.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is impossible to become habituated to that which\nis contrary to nature: thus \"a stone never becomes habituated to\nupward movement\" (Ethic. ii, 1). But some men become habituated to\nvice. Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.\n\nObj. 3: Further, anything contrary to a nature, is not found in the\ngreater number of individuals possessed of that nature. Now vice is\nfound in the greater number of men; for it is written (Matt. 7:13):\n\"Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction, and many there are who\ngo in thereat.\" Therefore vice is not contrary to nature.\n\nObj. 4: Further, sin is compared to vice, as act to habit, as stated\nabove (A. 1). Now sin is defined as \"a word, deed, or desire,\ncontrary to the Law of God,\" as Augustine shows (Contra Faust. xxii,\n27). But the Law of God is above nature. Therefore we should say that\nvice is contrary to the Law, rather than to nature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 13): \"Every\nvice, simply because it is a vice, is contrary to nature.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), vice is contrary to virtue.\nNow the virtue of a thing consists in its being well disposed in a\nmanner befitting its nature, as stated above (A. 1). Hence the vice\nof any thing consists in its being disposed in a manner not befitting\nits nature, and for this reason is that thing \"vituperated,\" which\nword is derived from \"vice\" according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. iii,\n14).\n\nBut it must be observed that the nature of a thing is chiefly the\nform from which that thing derives its species. Now man derives his\nspecies from his rational soul: and consequently whatever is contrary\nto the order of reason is, properly speaking, contrary to the nature\nof man, as man; while whatever is in accord with reason, is in accord\nwith the nature of man, as man. Now \"man's good is to be in accord\nwith reason, and his evil is to be against reason,\" as Dionysius\nstates (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore human virtue, which makes a man\ngood, and his work good, is in accord with man's nature, for as much\nas it accords with his reason: while vice is contrary to man's\nnature, in so far as it is contrary to the order of reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the virtues are not caused by nature as\nregards their perfection of being, yet they incline us to that which\naccords with reason, i.e. with the order of reason. For Cicero says\n(De Inv. Rhet. ii) that \"virtue is a habit in accord with reason,\nlike a second nature\": and it is in this sense that virtue is said to\nbe in accord with nature, and on the other hand that vice is contrary\nto nature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking there of a thing being\nagainst nature, in so far as \"being against nature\" is contrary to\n\"being from nature\": and not in so far as \"being against nature\" is\ncontrary to \"being in accord with nature,\" in which latter sense\nvirtues are said to be in accord with nature, in as much as they\nincline us to that which is suitable to nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is a twofold nature in man, rational nature, and\nthe sensitive nature. And since it is through the operation of his\nsenses that man accomplishes acts of reason, hence there are more who\nfollow the inclinations of the sensitive nature, than who follow the\norder of reason: because more reach the beginning of a business than\nachieve its completion. Now the presence of vices and sins in man is\nowing to the fact that he follows the inclination of his sensitive\nnature against the order of his reason.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Whatever is irregular in a work of art, is unnatural to\nthe art which produced that work. Now the eternal law is compared to\nthe order of human reason, as art to a work of art. Therefore it\namounts to the same that vice and sin are against the order of human\nreason, and that they are contrary to the eternal law. Hence\nAugustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 6) that \"every nature, as such, is\nfrom God; and is a vicious nature, in so far as it fails from the\nDivine art whereby it was made.\"\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 71, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Vice Is Worse Than a Vicious Act?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that vice, i.e. a bad habit, is worse than\na sin, i.e. a bad act. For, as the more lasting a good is, the better\nit is, so the longer an evil lasts, the worse it is. Now a vicious\nhabit is more lasting than vicious acts, that pass forthwith.\nTherefore a vicious habit is worse than a vicious act.\n\nObj. 2: Further, several evils are more to be shunned than one. But a\nbad habit is virtually the cause of many bad acts. Therefore a\nvicious habit is worse than a vicious act.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a cause is more potent than its effect. But a habit\nproduces its actions both as to their goodness and as to their\nbadness. Therefore a habit is more potent than its act, both in\ngoodness and in badness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A man is justly punished for a vicious act; but\nnot for a vicious habit, so long as no act ensues. Therefore a\nvicious action is worse than a vicious habit.\n\n_I answer that,_ A habit stands midway between power and act. Now it\nis evident that both in good and in evil, act precedes power, as\nstated in _Metaph._ ix, 19. For it is better to do well than to be\nable to do well, and in like manner, it is more blameworthy to do\nevil, than to be able to do evil: whence it also follows that both in\ngoodness and in badness, habit stands midway between power and act,\nso that, to wit, even as a good or evil habit stands above the\ncorresponding power in goodness or in badness, so does it stand below\nthe corresponding act. This is also made clear from the fact that a\nhabit is not called good or bad, save in so far as it induces to a\ngood or bad act: wherefore a habit is called good or bad by reason of\nthe goodness or badness of its act: so that an act surpasses its\nhabit in goodness or badness, since \"the cause of a thing being such,\nis yet more so.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders one thing from standing above another\nsimply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed above\nanother simply if it surpasses it in a point which is proper to both;\nwhile it is deemed above it in a certain respect, if it surpasses it\nin something which is accidental to both. Now it has been shown from\nthe very nature of act and habit, that act surpasses habit both in\ngoodness and in badness. Whereas the fact that habit is more lasting\nthan act, is accidental to them, and is due to the fact that they are\nboth found in a nature such that it cannot always be in action, and\nwhose action consists in a transient movement. Consequently act\nsimply excels in goodness and badness, but habit excels in a certain\nrespect.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A habit is several acts, not simply, but in a certain\nrespect, i.e. virtually. Wherefore this does not prove that habit\nprecedes act simply, both in goodness and in badness.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Habit causes act by way of efficient causality: but act\ncauses habit, by way of final causality, in respect of which we\nconsider the nature of good and evil. Consequently act surpasses\nhabit both in goodness and in badness.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 71, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Sin Is Compatible with Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a vicious act, i.e. sin, is\nincompatible with virtue. For contraries cannot be together in the\nsame subject. Now sin is, in some way, contrary to virtue, as stated\nabove (A. 1). Therefore sin is incompatible with virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sin is worse than vice, i.e. evil act than evil\nhabit. But vice cannot be in the same subject with virtue: neither,\ntherefore, can sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sin occurs in natural things, even as in voluntary\nmatters (Phys. ii, text. 82). Now sin never happens in natural\nthings, except through some corruption of the natural power; thus\nmonsters are due to corruption of some elemental force in the seed,\nas stated in _Phys._ ii. Therefore no sin occurs in voluntary\nmatters, except through the corruption of some virtue in the soul: so\nthat sin and virtue cannot be together in the same subject.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 2, 3) that\n\"virtue is engendered and corrupted by contrary causes.\" Now one\nvirtuous act does not cause a virtue, as stated above (Q. 51, A. 3):\nand, consequently, one sinful act does not corrupt virtue. Therefore\nthey can be together in the same subject.\n\n_I answer that,_ Sin is compared to virtue, as evil act to good habit.\nNow the position of a habit in the soul is not the same as that of a\nform in a natural thing. For the form of a natural thing produces, of\nnecessity, an operation befitting itself; wherefore a natural form is\nincompatible with the act of a contrary form: thus heat is\nincompatible with the act of cooling, and lightness with downward\nmovement (except perhaps violence be used by some extrinsic mover):\nwhereas the habit that resides in the soul, does not, of necessity,\nproduce its operation, but is used by man when he wills. Consequently\nman, while possessing a habit, may either fail to use the habit, or\nproduce a contrary act; and so a man having a virtue may produce an\nact of sin. And this sinful act, so long as there is but one, cannot\ncorrupt virtue, if we compare the act to the virtue itself as a habit:\nsince, just as habit is not engendered by one act, so neither is it\ndestroyed by one act as stated above (Q. 63, A. 2, ad 2). But if\nwe compare the sinful act to the cause of the virtues, then it is\npossible for some virtues to be destroyed by one sinful act. For every\nmortal sin is contrary to charity, which is the root of all the\ninfused virtues, as virtues; and consequently, charity being banished\nby one act of mortal sin, it follows that all the infused virtues are\nexpelled _as virtues._ And I say [this] on account of faith and hope, whose\nhabits remain unquickened after mortal sin, so that they are no longer\nvirtues. On the other hand, since venial sin is neither contrary to\ncharity, nor banishes it, as a consequence, neither does it expel the\nother virtues. As to the acquired virtues, they are not destroyed by\none act of any kind of sin.\n\nAccordingly, mortal sin is incompatible with the infused virtues, but\nis consistent with acquired virtue: while venial sin is compatible\nwith virtues, whether infused or acquired.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sin is contrary to virtue, not by reason of\nitself, but by reason of its act. Hence sin is incompatible with the\nact, but not with the habit, of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Vice is directly contrary to virtue, even as sin\nto virtuous act: and so vice excludes virtue, just as sin excludes\nacts of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The natural powers act of necessity, and hence\nso long as the power is unimpaired, no sin can be found in the act. On\nthe other hand, the virtues of the soul do not produce their acts of\nnecessity; hence the comparison fails.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 71, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Every Sin Includes an Action?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that every sin includes an action. For as\nmerit is compared with virtue, even so is sin compared with vice. Now\nthere can be no merit without an action. Neither, therefore, can\nthere be sin without action.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera\nRelig. xiv.]: So \"true is it that every sin is voluntary, that,\nunless it be voluntary, it is no sin at all.\" Now nothing can be\nvoluntary, save through an act of the will. Therefore every sin\nimplies an act.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if sin could be without act, it would follow that a\nman sins as soon as he ceases doing what he ought. Now he who never\ndoes something that he ought to do, ceases continually doing what he\nought. Therefore it would follow that he sins continually; and this\nis untrue. Therefore there is no sin without an act.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (James 4:17): \"To him . . . who\nknoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin.\" Now \"not to\ndo\" does not imply an act. Therefore sin can be without act.\n\n_I answer that,_ The reason for urging this question has reference to\nthe sin of omission, about which there have been various opinions.\nFor some say that in every sin of omission there is some act, either\ninterior or exterior--interior, as when a man wills _not to go to\nchurch,_ when he is bound to go--exterior, as when a man, at the very\nhour that he is bound to go to church (or even before), occupies\nhimself in such a way that he is hindered from going. This seems, in\na way, to amount to the same as the first, for whoever wills one\nthing that is incompatible with this other, wills, consequently, to\ngo without this other: unless, perchance, it does not occur to him,\nthat what he wishes to do, will hinder him from that which he is\nbound to do, in which case he might be deemed guilty of negligence.\nOn the other hand, others say, that a sin of omission does not\nnecessarily suppose an act: for the mere fact of not doing what one\nis bound to do is a sin.\n\nNow each of these opinions has some truth in it. For if in the sin of\nomission we look merely at that in which the essence of the sin\nconsists, the sin of omission will be sometimes with an interior act,\nas when a man wills _not to go to church:_ while sometimes it will be\nwithout any act at all, whether interior or exterior, as when a man,\nat the time that he is bound to go to church, does not think of going\nor not going to church.\n\nIf, however, in the sin of omission, we consider also the causes, or\noccasions of the omission, then the sin of omission must of necessity\ninclude some act. For there is no sin of omission, unless we omit\nwhat we can do or not do: and that we turn aside so as not to do what\nwe can do or not do, must needs be due to some cause or occasion,\neither united with the omission or preceding it. Now if this cause be\nnot in man's power, the omission will not be sinful, as when anyone\nomits going to church on account of sickness: but if the cause or\noccasion be subject to the will, the omission is sinful; and such\ncause, in so far as it is voluntary, must needs always include some\nact, at least the interior act of the will: which act sometimes bears\ndirectly on the omission, as when a man wills _not to go to church,_\nbecause it is too much trouble; and in this case this act, of its\nvery nature, belongs to the omission, because the volition of any sin\nwhatever, pertains, of itself, to that sin, since voluntariness is\nessential to sin. Sometimes, however, the act of the will bears\ndirectly on something else which hinders man from doing what he\nought, whether this something else be united with the omission, as\nwhen a man wills to play at the time he ought to go to church--or,\nprecede the omission, as when a man wills to sit up late at night,\nthe result being that he does not go to church in the morning. In\nthis case the act, interior or exterior, is accidental to the\nomission, since the omission follows outside the intention, and that\nwhich is outside the intention is said to be accidental (Phys. ii,\ntext. 49, 50). Wherefore it is evident that then the sin of omission\nhas indeed an act united with, or preceding the omission, but that\nthis act is accidental to the sin of omission.\n\nNow in judging about things, we must be guided by that which is\nproper to them, and not by that which is accidental: and consequently\nit is truer to say that a sin can be without any act; else the\ncircumstantial acts and occasions would be essential to other actual\nsins.\n\nReply Obj. 1: More things are required for good than for evil, since\n\"good results from a whole and entire cause, whereas evil results\nfrom each single defect,\" as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv): so that\nsin may arise from a man doing what he ought not, or by his not doing\nwhat he ought; while there can be no merit, unless a man do willingly\nwhat he ought to do: wherefore there can be no merit without act,\nwhereas there can be sin without act.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The term \"voluntary\" is applied not only to that on\nwhich the act of the will is brought to bear, but also to that which\nwe have the power to do or not to do, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 5.\nHence even not to will may be called voluntary, in so far as man has\nit in his power to will, and not to will.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The sin of omission is contrary to an affirmative\nprecept which binds always, but not for always. Hence, by omitting to\nact, a man sins only for the time at which the affirmative precept\nbinds him to act.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 71, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Sin Is Fittingly Defined As a Word, Deed, or Desire Contrary\nto the Eternal Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly defined by saying:\n\"Sin is a word, deed, or desire, contrary to the eternal law.\"\nBecause \"word,\" \"deed,\" and \"desire\" imply an act; whereas not every\nsin implies an act, as stated above (A. 5). Therefore this definition\ndoes not include every sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Duab. Anim. xii): \"Sin is the\nwill to retain or obtain what justice forbids.\" Now will is comprised\nunder desire, in so far as desire denotes any act of the appetite.\nTherefore it was enough to say: \"Sin is a desire contrary to the\neternal law,\" nor was there need to add \"word\" or \"deed.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, sin apparently consists properly in aversion from\nthe end: because good and evil are measured chiefly with regard to\nthe end as explained above (Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 4, 6; Q. 20, AA.\n2, 3): wherefore Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i) defines sin in reference\nto the end, by saying that \"sin is nothing else than to neglect\neternal things, and seek after temporal things\": and again he says\n(Qq. lxxxii, qu. 30) that \"all human wickedness consists in using\nwhat we should enjoy, and in enjoying what we should use.\" Now the\ndefinition in question contains no mention of aversion from our due\nend: therefore it is an insufficient definition of sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a thing is said to be forbidden, because it is\ncontrary to the law. Now not all sins are evil through being\nforbidden, but some are forbidden because they are evil. Therefore\nsin in general should not be defined as being against the law of God.\n\nObj. 5: Further, a sin denotes a bad human act, as was explained\nabove (A. 1). Now man's evil is to be against reason, as Dionysius\nstates (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore it would have been better to say\nthat sin is against reason than to say that it is contrary to the\neternal law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ the authority of Augustine suffices (Contra Faust.\nxxii, 27).\n\n_I answer that,_ As was shown above (A. 1), sin is nothing else than\na bad human act. Now that an act is a human act is due to its being\nvoluntary, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1), whether it be voluntary, as\nbeing elicited by the will, e.g. to will or to choose, or as being\ncommanded by the will, e.g. the exterior actions of speech or\noperation. Again, a human act is evil through lacking conformity with\nits due measure: and conformity of measure in a thing depends on a\nrule, from which if that thing depart, it is incommensurate. Now\nthere are two rules of the human will: one is proximate and\nhomogeneous, viz. the human reason; the other is the first rule, viz.\nthe eternal law, which is God's reason, so to speak. Accordingly\nAugustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27) includes two things in the\ndefinition of sin; one, pertaining to the substance of a human act,\nand which is the matter, so to speak, of sin, when he says \"word,\ndeed, or desire\"; the other, pertaining to the nature of evil, and\nwhich is the form, as it were, of sin, when he says, \"contrary to the\neternal law.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Affirmation and negation are reduced to one same genus:\ne.g. in Divine things, begotten and unbegotten are reduced to the\ngenus \"relation,\" as Augustine states (De Trin. v, 6, 7): and so\n\"word\" and \"deed\" denote equally what is said and what is not said,\nwhat is done and what is not done.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The first cause of sin is in the will, which commands\nall voluntary acts, in which alone is sin to be found: and hence it\nis that Augustine sometimes defines sin in reference to the will\nalone. But since external acts also pertain to the substance of sin,\nthrough being evil of themselves, as stated, it was necessary in\ndefining sin to include something referring to external action.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The eternal law first and foremost directs man to his\nend, and in consequence, makes man to be well disposed in regard to\nthings which are directed to the end: hence when he says, \"contrary\nto the eternal law,\" he includes aversion from the end and all other\nforms of inordinateness.\n\nReply Obj. 4: When it is said that not every sin is evil through\nbeing forbidden, this must be understood of prohibition by positive\nlaw. If, however, the prohibition be referred to the natural law,\nwhich is contained primarily in the eternal law, but secondarily in\nthe natural code of the human reason, then every sin is evil through\nbeing prohibited: since it is contrary to natural law, precisely\nbecause it is inordinate.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The theologian considers sin chiefly as an offense\nagainst God; and the moral philosopher, as something contrary to\nreason. Hence Augustine defines sin with reference to its being\n\"contrary to the eternal law,\" more fittingly than with reference to\nits being contrary to reason; the more so, as the eternal law directs\nus in many things that surpass human reason, e.g. in matters of faith.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 72\n\nOF THE DISTINCTION OF SINS\n(In Nine Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which\nhead there are nine points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects?\n\n(2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins;\n\n(3) Whether sins differ in reference to their causes?\n\n(4) Whether they differ with respect to those who are sinned against?\n\n(5) Whether sins differ in relation to the debt of punishment?\n\n(6) Whether they differ in regard to omission and commission?\n\n(7) Whether they differ according to their various stages?\n\n(8) Whether they differ in respect of excess and deficiency?\n\n(9) Whether they differ according to their various circumstances?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Sins Differ in Species According to Their Objects?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sins do not differ in species,\naccording to their objects. For acts are said to be good or evil, in\nrelation, chiefly, to their end, as shown above (Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18,\nAA. 4, 6). Since then sin is nothing else than a bad human act, as\nstated above (Q. 71, A. 1), it seems that sins should differ\nspecifically according to their ends rather than according to their\nobjects.\n\nObj. 2: Further, evil, being a privation, differs specifically\naccording to the different species of opposites. Now sin is an evil\nin the genus of human acts. Therefore sins differ specifically\naccording to their opposites rather than according to their objects.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if sins differed specifically according to their\nobjects, it would be impossible to find the same specific sin with\ndiverse objects: and yet such sins are to be found. For pride is\nabout things spiritual and material as Gregory says (Moral. xxxiv,\n18); and avarice is about different kinds of things. Therefore sins\ndo not differ in species according to their objects.\n\n_On the contrary,_ \"Sin is a word, deed, or desire against God's\nlaw.\" Now words, deeds, and desires differ in species according to\ntheir various objects: since acts differ by their objects, as stated\nabove (Q. 18, A. 2). Therefore sins, also differ in species according\nto their objects.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 71, A. 6), two things concur in\nthe nature of sin, viz. the voluntary act, and its inordinateness,\nwhich consists in departing from God's law. Of these two, one is\nreferred essentially to the sinner, who intends such and such an act\nin such and such matter; while the other, viz. the inordinateness of\nthe act, is referred accidentally to the intention of the sinner, for\n\"no one acts intending evil,\" as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv).\nNow it is evident that a thing derives its species from that which is\nessential and not from that which is accidental: because what is\naccidental is outside the specific nature. Consequently sins differ\nspecifically on the part of the voluntary acts rather than of the\ninordinateness inherent to sin. Now voluntary acts differ in species\naccording to their objects, as was proved above (Q. 18, A. 2).\nTherefore it follows that sins are properly distinguished in species\nby their objects.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The aspect of good is found chiefly in the end: and\ntherefore the end stands in the relation of object to the act of the\nwill which is at the root of every sin. Consequently it amounts to\nthe same whether sins differ by their objects or by their ends.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sin is not a pure privation but an act deprived of its\ndue order: hence sins differ specifically according to the objects of\ntheir acts rather than according to their opposites, although, even\nif they were distinguished in reference to their opposite virtues, it\nwould come to the same: since virtues differ specifically according\nto their objects, as stated above (Q. 60, A. 5).\n\nReply Obj. 3: In various things, differing in species or genus,\nnothing hinders our finding one formal aspect of the object, from\nwhich aspect sin receives its species. It is thus that pride seeks\nexcellence in reference to various things; and avarice seeks\nabundance of things adapted to human use.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Spiritual Sins Are Fittingly Distinguished from Carnal Sins?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that spiritual sins are unfittingly\ndistinguished from carnal sins. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:19):\n\"The works of the flesh are manifest, which are fornication,\nuncleanness, immodesty, luxury, idolatry, witchcrafts,\" etc. from\nwhich it seems that all kinds of sins are works of the flesh. Now\ncarnal sins are called works of the flesh. Therefore carnal sins\nshould not be distinguished from spiritual sins.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whosoever sins, walks according to the flesh, as\nstated in Rom. 8:13: \"If you live according to the flesh, you shall\ndie. But if by the spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you\nshall live.\" Now to live or walk according to the flesh seems to\npertain to the nature of carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins should not\nbe distinguished from spiritual sins.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the higher part of the soul, which is the mind or\nreason, is called the spirit, according to Eph. 4:23: \"Be renewed in\nthe spirit of your mind,\" where spirit stands for reason, according\nto a gloss. Now every sin, which is committed in accordance with the\nflesh, flows from the reason by its consent; since consent in a\nsinful act belongs to the higher reason, as we shall state further on\n(Q. 74, A. 7). Therefore the same sins are both carnal and spiritual,\nand consequently they should not be distinguished from one another.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if some sins are carnal specifically, this,\nseemingly, should apply chiefly to those sins whereby man sins\nagainst his own body. But, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 6:18),\n\"every sin that a man doth, is without the body: but he that\ncommitteth fornication, sinneth against his own body.\" Therefore\nfornication would be the only carnal sin, whereas the Apostle (Eph.\n5:3) reckons covetousness with the carnal sins.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) says that \"of the seven\ncapital sins five are spiritual, and two carnal.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), sins take their species from\ntheir objects. Now every sin consists in the desire for some mutable\ngood, for which man has an inordinate desire, and the possession of\nwhich gives him inordinate pleasure. Now, as explained above (Q. 31,\nA. 3), pleasure is twofold. One belongs to the soul, and is\nconsummated in the mere apprehension of a thing possessed in\naccordance with desire; this can also be called spiritual pleasure,\ne.g. when one takes pleasure in human praise or the like. The other\npleasure is bodily or natural, and is realized in bodily touch, and\nthis can also be called carnal pleasure.\n\nAccordingly, those sins which consist in spiritual pleasure, are\ncalled spiritual sins; while those which consist in carnal pleasure,\nare called carnal sins, e.g. gluttony, which consists in the\npleasures of the table; and lust, which consists in sexual pleasures.\nHence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 7:1): \"Let us cleanse ourselves from\nall defilement of the flesh and of the spirit.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: As a gloss says on the same passage, these vices are\ncalled works of the flesh, not as though they consisted in carnal\npleasure; but flesh here denotes man, who is said to live according\nto the flesh, when he lives according to himself, as Augustine says\n(De Civ. Dei xiv, 2, 3). The reason of this is because every failing\nin the human reason is due in some way to the carnal sense.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even in the carnal sins there is a spiritual act, viz.\nthe act of reason: but the end of these sins, from which they are\nnamed, is carnal pleasure.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As the gloss says, \"in the sin of fornication the soul\nis the body's slave in a special sense, because at the moment of\nsinning it can think of nothing else\": whereas the pleasure of\ngluttony, although carnal, does not so utterly absorb the reason. It\nmay also be said that in this sin, an injury is done to the body\nalso, for it is defiled inordinately: wherefore by this sin alone is\nman said specifically to sin against his body. While covetousness,\nwhich is reckoned among the carnal sins, stands here for adultery,\nwhich is the unjust appropriation of another's wife. Again, it may be\nsaid that the thing in which the covetous man takes pleasure is\nsomething bodily, and in this respect covetousness is numbered with\nthe carnal sins: but the pleasure itself does not belong to the body,\nbut to the spirit, wherefore Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that it\nis a spiritual sin.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Sins Differ Specifically in Reference to Their Causes?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sins differ specifically in reference\nto their causes. For a thing takes its species from that whence it\nderives its being. Now sins derive their being from their causes.\nTherefore they take their species from them also. Therefore they\ndiffer specifically in reference to their causes.\n\nObj. 2: Further, of all the causes the material cause seems to have\nleast reference to the species. Now the object in a sin is like its\nmaterial cause. Since, therefore, sins differ specifically according\nto their objects, it seems that much more do they differ in reference\nto their other causes.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine, commenting on Ps. 79:17, \"Things set on\nfire and dug down,\" says that \"every sin is due either to fear\ninducing false humility, or to love enkindling us to undue ardor.\"\nFor it is written (1 John 2:16) that \"all that is in the world, is\nthe concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the concupiscence\nof the eyes, or [Vulg.: 'and'] the pride of life.\" Now a thing is\nsaid to be in the world on account of sin, in as much as the world\ndenotes lovers of the world, as Augustine observes (Tract. ii in\nJoan.). Gregory, too (Moral. xxxi, 17), distinguishes all sins\naccording to the seven capital vices. Now all these divisions refer\nto the causes of sins. Therefore, seemingly, sins differ specifically\naccording to the diversity of their causes.\n\n_On the contrary,_ If this were the case all sins would belong to one\nspecies, since they are due to one cause. For it is written (Ecclus.\n10:15) that \"pride is the beginning of all sin,\" and (1 Tim. 6:10)\nthat \"the desire of money is the root of all evils.\" Now it is\nevident that there are various species of sins. Therefore sins do not\ndiffer specifically according to their different causes.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since there are four kinds of causes, they are\nattributed to various things in various ways. Because the _formal_\nand the _material_ cause regard properly the substance of a thing;\nand consequently substances differ in respect of their matter and\nform, both in species and in genus. The _agent_ and the _end_ regard\ndirectly movement and operation: wherefore movements and operations\ndiffer specifically in respect of these causes; in different ways,\nhowever, because the natural active principles are always determined\nto the same acts; so that the different species of natural acts are\ntaken not only from the objects, which are the ends or terms of those\nacts, but also from their active principles: thus heating and cooling\nare specifically distinct with reference to hot and cold. On the\nother hand, the active principles in voluntary acts, such as the acts\nof sins, are not determined, of necessity, to one act, and\nconsequently from one active or motive principle, diverse species of\nsins can proceed: thus from fear engendering false humility man may\nproceed to theft, or murder, or to neglect the flock committed to his\ncare; and these same things may proceed from love enkindling to undue\nardor. Hence it is evident that sins do not differ specifically\naccording to their various active or motive causes, but only in\nrespect of diversity in the final cause, which is the end and object\nof the will. For it has been shown above (Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 4,\n6) that human acts take their species from the end.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The active principles in voluntary acts, not being\ndetermined to one act, do not suffice for the production of human\nacts, unless the will be determined to one by the intention of the\nend, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. ix, text. 15, 16), and\nconsequently sin derives both its being and its species from the end.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Objects, in relation to external acts, have the\ncharacter of matter \"about which\"; but, in relation to the interior\nact of the will, they have the character of end; and it is owing to\nthis that they give the act its species. Nevertheless, even\nconsidered as the matter \"about which,\" they have the character of\nterm, from which movement takes its species (Phys. v, text. 4;\n_Ethic._ x, 4); yet even terms of movement specify movements, in so\nfar as term has the character of end.\n\nReply Obj. 3: These distinctions of sins are given, not as distinct\nspecies of sins, but to show their various causes.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Sin Is Fittingly Divided into Sin Against God, Against\nOneself, and Against One's Neighbor?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin\nagainst God, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that\nwhich is common to all sins should not be reckoned as a part in the\ndivision of sin. But it is common to all sins to be against God: for\nit is stated in the definition of sin that it is \"against God's law,\"\nas stated above (Q. 66, A. 6). Therefore sin against God should not\nbe reckoned a part of the division of sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every division should consist of things in\nopposition to one another. But these three kinds of sin are not\nopposed to one another: for whoever sins against his neighbor, sins\nagainst himself and against God. Therefore sin is not fittingly\ndivided into these three.\n\nObj. 3: Further, specification is not taken from things external. But\nGod and our neighbor are external to us. Therefore sins are not\ndistinguished specifically with regard to them: and consequently sin\nis unfittingly divided according to these three.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore (De Summo Bono), in giving the division of\nsins, says that \"man is said to sin against himself, against God, and\nagainst his neighbor.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 71, AA. 1, 6), sin is an\ninordinate act. Now there should be a threefold order in man: one in\nrelation to the rule of reason, in so far as all our actions and\npassions should be commensurate with the rule of reason: another\norder is in relation to the rule of the Divine Law, whereby man\nshould be directed in all things: and if man were by nature a\nsolitary animal, this twofold order would suffice. But since man is\nnaturally a civic and social animal, as is proved in _Polit._ i, 2,\nhence a third order is necessary, whereby man is directed in relation\nto other men among whom he has to dwell. Of these orders the second\ncontains the first and surpasses it. For whatever things are\ncomprised under the order of reason, are comprised under the order of\nGod Himself. Yet some things are comprised under the order of God,\nwhich surpass the human reason, such as matters of faith, and things\ndue to God alone. Hence he that sins in such matters, for instance,\nby heresy, sacrilege, or blasphemy, is said to sin against God. In\nlike manner, the first order includes the third and surpasses it,\nbecause in all things wherein we are directed in reference to our\nneighbor, we need to be directed according to the order of reason.\nYet in some things we are directed according to reason, in relation\nto ourselves only, and not in reference to our neighbor; and when man\nsins in these matters, he is said to sin against himself, as is seen\nin the glutton, the lustful, and the prodigal. But when man sins in\nmatters concerning his neighbor, he is said to sin against his\nneighbor, as appears in the thief and murderer. Now the things\nwhereby man is directed to God, his neighbor, and himself are\ndiverse. Wherefore this distinction of sins is in respect of their\nobjects, according to which the species of sins are diversified: and\nconsequently this distinction of sins is properly one of different\nspecies of sins: because the virtues also, to which sins are opposed,\ndiffer specifically in respect of these three. For it is evident from\nwhat has been said (Q. 62, AA. 1, 2, 3) that by the theological\nvirtues man is directed to God; by temperance and fortitude, to\nhimself; and by justice to his neighbor.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To sin against God is common to all sins, in so far as\nthe order to God includes every human order; but in so far as order\nto God surpasses the other two orders, sin against God is a special\nkind of sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When several things, of which one includes another, are\ndistinct from one another, this distinction is understood to refer,\nnot to the part contained in another, but to that in which one goes\nbeyond another. This may be seen in the division of numbers and\nfigures: for a triangle is distinguished from a four-sided figure not\nin respect of its being contained thereby, but in respect of that in\nwhich it is surpassed thereby: and the same applies to the numbers\nthree and four.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although God and our neighbor are external to the\nsinner himself, they are not external to the act of sin, but are\nrelated to it as to its object.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Division of Sins According to Their Debt of Punishment\nDiversifies Their Species?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the division of sins according to\ntheir debt of punishment diversifies their species; for instance,\nwhen sin is divided into \"mortal\" and \"venial.\" For things which are\ninfinitely apart, cannot belong to the same species, nor even to the\nsame genus. But venial and mortal sin are infinitely apart, since\ntemporal punishment is due to venial sin, and eternal punishment to\nmortal sin; and the measure of the punishment corresponds to the\ngravity of the fault, according to Deut. 25:2: \"According to the\nmeasure of the sin shall the measure be also of the stripes be.\"\nTherefore venial and mortal sins are not of the same genus, nor can\nthey be said to belong to the same species.\n\nObj. 2: Further, some sins are mortal in virtue of their species\n[*_Ex genere,_ genus in this case denoting the species], as murder\nand adultery; and some are venial in virtue of their species, as in\nan idle word, and excessive laughter. Therefore venial and mortal\nsins differ specifically.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as a virtuous act stands in relation to its\nreward, so does sin stand in relation to punishment. But the reward\nis the end of the virtuous act. Therefore punishment is the end of\nsin. Now sins differ specifically in relation to their ends, as\nstated above (A. 1, ad 1). Therefore they are also specifically\ndistinct according to the debt of punishment.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Those things that constitute a species are prior\nto the species, e.g. specific differences. But punishment follows sin\nas the effect thereof. Therefore sins do not differ specifically\naccording to the debt of punishment.\n\n_I answer that,_ In things that differ specifically we find a twofold\ndifference: the first causes the diversity of species, and is not to\nbe found save in different species, e.g. \"rational\" and \"irrational,\"\n\"animate,\" and \"inanimate\": the other difference is consequent to\nspecific diversity; and though, in some cases, it may [follow from\nthe diversity of species], yet, in others, it may be found within the\nsame species; thus \"white\" and \"black\" are consequent to the specific\ndiversity of crow and swan, and yet this difference is found within\nthe one species of man.\n\nWe must therefore say that the difference between venial and mortal\nsin, or any other difference is respect of the debt of punishment,\ncannot be a difference constituting specific diversity. For what is\naccidental never constitutes a species; and what is outside the\nagent's intention is accidental (Phys. ii, text. 50). Now it is\nevident that punishment is outside the intention of the sinner,\nwherefore it is accidentally referred to sin on the part of the\nsinner. Nevertheless it is referred to sin by an extrinsic principle,\nviz. the justice of the judge, who imposes various punishments\naccording to the various manners of sin. Therefore the difference\nderived from the debt of punishment, may be consequent to the\nspecific diversity of sins, but cannot constitute it.\n\nNow the difference between venial and mortal sin is consequent to the\ndiversity of that inordinateness which constitutes the notion of sin.\nFor inordinateness is twofold, one that destroys the principle of\norder, and another which, without destroying the principle of order,\nimplies inordinateness in the things which follow the principle:\nthus, in an animal's body, the frame may be so out of order that the\nvital principle is destroyed; this is the inordinateness of death;\nwhile, on the other hand, saving the vital principle, there may be\ndisorder in the bodily humors; and then there is sickness. Now the\nprinciple of the entire moral order is the last end, which stands in\nthe same relation to matters of action, as the indemonstrable\nprinciple does to matters of speculation (Ethic. vii, 8). Therefore\nwhen the soul is so disordered by sin as to turn away from its last\nend, viz. God, to Whom it is united by charity, there is mortal sin;\nbut when it is disordered without turning away from God, there is\nvenial sin. For even as in the body, the disorder of death which\nresults from the destruction of the principle of life, is irreparable\naccording to nature, while the disorder of sickness can be repaired\nby reason of the vital principle being preserved, so it is in matters\nconcerning the soul. Because, in speculative matters, it is\nimpossible to convince one who errs in the principles, whereas one\nwho errs, but retains the principles, can be brought back to the\ntruth by means of the principles. Likewise in practical matters, he\nwho, by sinning, turns away from his last end, if we consider the\nnature of his sin, falls irreparably, and therefore is said to sin\nmortally and to deserve eternal punishment: whereas when a man sins\nwithout turning away from God, by the very nature of his sin, his\ndisorder can be repaired, because the principle of the order is not\ndestroyed; wherefore he is said to sin venially, because, to wit, he\ndoes not sin so as to deserve to be punished eternally.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Mortal and venial sins are infinitely apart as regards\nwhat they _turn away from,_ not as regards what they _turn to,_ viz.\nthe object which specifies them. Hence nothing hinders the same\nspecies from including mortal and venial sins; for instance, in the\nspecies \"adultery\" the first movement is a venial sin; while an idle\nword, which is, generally speaking, venial, may even be a mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: From the fact that one sin is mortal by reason of its\nspecies, and another venial by reason of its species, it follows that\nthis difference is consequent to the specific difference of sins, not\nthat it is the cause thereof. And this difference may be found even\nin things of the same species, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The reward is intended by him that merits or acts\nvirtu[ous]ly; whereas the punishment is not intended by the sinner,\nbut, on the contrary, is against his will. Hence the comparison fails.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Sins of Commission and Omission Differ Specifically?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sins of commission and omission\ndiffer specifically. For \"offense\" and \"sin\" are condivided with one\nanother (Eph. 2:1), where it is written: \"When you were dead in your\noffenses and sins,\" which words a gloss explains, saying:\n\"'Offenses,' by omitting to do what was commanded, and 'sins,' by\ndoing what was forbidden.\" Whence it is evident that \"offenses\" here\ndenotes sins of omission; while \"sin\" denotes sins of commission.\nTherefore they differ specifically, since they are contrasted with\none another as different species.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is essential to sin to be against God's law, for\nthis is part of its definition, as is clear from what has been said\n(Q. 71, A. 6). Now in God's law, the affirmative precepts, against\nwhich is the sin of omission, are different from the negative\nprecepts, against which is the sin of omission. Therefore sins of\nomission and commission differ specifically.\n\nObj. 3: Further, omission and commission differ as affirmation and\nnegation. Now affirmation and negation cannot be in the same species,\nsince negation has no species; for \"there is neither species nor\ndifference of non-being,\" as the Philosopher states (Phys. iv, text.\n67). Therefore omission and commission cannot belong to the same\nspecies.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Omission and commission are found in the same\nspecies of sin. For the covetous man both takes what belongs to\nothers, which is a sin of commission; and gives not of his own to\nwhom he should give, which is a sin of omission. Therefore omission\nand commission do not differ specifically.\n\n_I answer that,_ There is a twofold difference in sins; a material\ndifference and a formal difference: the material difference is to be\nobserved in the natural species of the sinful act; while the formal\ndifference is gathered from their relation to one proper end, which\nis also their proper object. Hence we find certain acts differing\nfrom one another in the material specific difference, which are\nnevertheless formally in the same species of sin, because they are\ndirected to the one same end: thus strangling, stoning, and stabbing\ncome under the one species of murder, although the actions themselves\ndiffer specifically according to the natural species. Accordingly, if\nwe refer to the material species in sins of omission and commission,\nthey differ specifically, using species in a broad sense, in so far\nas negation and privation may have a species. But if we refer to the\nformal species of sins of omission and commission, they do not differ\nspecifically, because they are directed to the same end, and proceed\nfrom the same motive. For the covetous man, in order to hoard money,\nboth robs, and omits to give what he ought, and in like manner, the\nglutton, to satiate his appetite, both eats too much and omits the\nprescribed fasts. The same applies to other sins: for in things,\nnegation is always founded on affirmation, which, in a manner, is its\ncause. Hence in the physical order it comes under the same head, that\nfire gives forth heat, and that it does not give forth cold.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This division in respect of commission and omission, is\nnot according to different formal species, but only according to\nmaterial species, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In God's law, the necessity for various affirmative and\nnegative precepts, was that men might be gradually led to virtue,\nfirst by abstaining from evil, being induced to this by the negative\nprecepts, and afterwards by doing good, to which we are induced by\nthe affirmative precepts. Wherefore the affirmative and negative\nprecepts do not belong to different virtues, but to different degrees\nof virtue; and consequently they are not, of necessity, opposed to\nsins of different species. Moreover sin is not specified by that from\nwhich it turns away, because in this respect it is a negation or\nprivation, but by that to which it turns, in so far as sin is an act.\nConsequently sins do not differ specifically according to the various\nprecepts of the Law.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This objection considers the material diversity of\nsins. It must be observed, however, that although, properly speaking,\nnegation is not in a species, yet it is allotted to a species by\nreduction to the affirmation on which it is based.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Sins Are Fittingly Divided into Sins of Thought, Word, and\nDeed?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sins are unfittingly divided into\nsins of thought, word, and deed. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12)\ndescribes three stages of sin, of which the first is \"when the carnal\nsense offers a bait,\" which is the sin of thought; the second stage\nis reached \"when one is satisfied with the mere pleasure of thought\";\nand the third stage, \"when consent is given to the deed.\" Now these\nthree belong to the sin of thought. Therefore it is unfitting to\nreckon sin of thought as one kind of sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons four degrees of sin;\nthe first of which is \"a fault hidden in the heart\"; the second,\n\"when it is done openly\"; the third, \"when it is formed into a\nhabit\"; and the fourth, \"when man goes so far as to presume on God's\nmercy or to give himself up to despair\": where no distinction is made\nbetween sins of deed and sins of word, and two other degrees of sin\nare added. Therefore the first division was unfitting.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there can be no sin of word or deed unless there\nprecede sin of thought. Therefore these sins do not differ\nspecifically. Therefore they should not be condivided with one\nanother.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Jerome in commenting on Ezech. 43:23, says: \"The\nhuman race is subject to three kinds of sin, for when we sin, it is\neither by thought, or word, or deed.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Things differ specifically in two ways: first, when\neach has the complete species; thus a horse and an ox differ\nspecifically: secondly, when the diversity of species is derived from\ndiversity of degree in generation or movement: thus the building is\nthe complete generation of a house, while the laying of the\nfoundations, and the setting up of the walls are incomplete species,\nas the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 4); and the same can apply to\nthe generation of animals. Accordingly sins are divided into these\nthree, viz. sins of thought, word, and deed, not as into various\ncomplete species: for the consummation of sin is in the deed,\nwherefore sins of deed have the complete species; but the first\nbeginning of sin is its foundation, as it were, in the sin of\nthought; the second degree is the sin of word, in so far as man is\nready to break out into a declaration of his thought; while the third\ndegree consists in the consummation of the deed. Consequently these\nthree differ in respect of the various degrees of sin. Nevertheless\nit is evident that these three belong to the one complete species of\nsin, since they proceed from the same motive. For the angry man,\nthrough desire of vengeance, is at first disturbed in thought, then\nhe breaks out into words of abuse, and lastly he goes on to wrongful\ndeeds; and the same applies to lust and to any other sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All sins of thought have the common note of secrecy, in\nrespect of which they form one degree, which is, however, divided\ninto three stages, viz. of cogitation, pleasure, and consent.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sins of words and deed are both done openly, and for\nthis reason Gregory (Moral. iv, 25) reckons them under one head:\nwhereas Jerome (in commenting on Ezech. 43:23) distinguishes between\nthem, because in sins of word there is nothing but manifestation\nwhich is intended principally; while in sins of deed, it is the\nconsummation of the inward thought which is principally intended, and\nthe outward manifestation is by way of sequel. Habit and despair are\nstages following the complete species of sin, even as boyhood and\nyouth follow the complete generation of a man.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Sin of thought and sin of word are not distinct from\nthe sin of deed when they are united together with it, but when each\nis found by itself: even as one part of a movement is not distinct\nfrom the whole movement, when the movement is continuous, but only\nwhen there is a break in the movement.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Excess and Deficiency Diversify the Species of Sins?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that excess and deficiency do not\ndiversify the species of sins. For excess and deficiency differ in\nrespect of more and less. Now \"more\" and \"less\" do not diversify a\nspecies. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species\nof sins.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to\nstraying from the rectitude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative\nmatters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the\nspecies of falsehood is not diversified by saying more or less than\nthe reality. Therefore neither is the species of sin diversified by\nstraying more or less from the rectitude of reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"one species cannot be made out of two,\" as Porphyry\ndeclares [*Isagog.; cf. Arist. _Metaph._ i]. Now excess and\ndeficiency are united in one sin; for some are at once illiberal and\nwasteful--illiberality being a sin of deficiency, and prodigality, by\nexcess. Therefore excess and deficiency do not diversify the species\nof sins.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Contraries differ specifically, for \"contrariety\nis a difference of form,\" as stated in _Metaph._ x, text. 13, 14. Now\nvices that differ according to excess and deficiency are contrary to\none another, as illiberality to wastefulness. Therefore they differ\nspecifically.\n\n_I answer that,_ While there are two things in sin, viz. the act\nitself and its inordinateness, in so far as sin is a departure from\nthe order of reason and the Divine law, the species of sin is\ngathered, not from its inordinateness, which is outside the sinner's\nintention, as stated above (A. 1), but one the contrary, from the act\nitself as terminating in the object to which the sinner's intention\nis directed. Consequently wherever we find a different motive\ninclining the intention to sin, there will be a different species of\nsin. Now it is evident that the motive for sinning, in sins by\nexcess, is not the same as the motive for sinning, in sins of\ndeficiency; in fact, they are contrary to one another, just as the\nmotive in the sin of intemperance is love for bodily pleasures, while\nthe motive in the sin of insensibility is hatred of the same.\nTherefore these sins not only differ specifically, but are contrary\nto one another.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although _more_ and _less_ do not cause diversity of\nspecies, yet they are sometimes consequent to specific difference, in\nso far as they are the result of diversity of form; thus we may say\nthat fire is lighter than air. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic.\nviii, 1) that \"those who held that there are no different species of\nfriendship, by reason of its admitting of degree, were led by\ninsufficient proof.\" In this way to exceed reason or to fall short\nthereof belongs to sins specifically different, in so far as they\nresult from different motives.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is not the sinner's intention to depart from reason;\nand so sins of excess and deficiency do not become of one kind\nthrough departing from the one rectitude of reason. On the other\nhand, sometimes he who utters a falsehood, intends to hide the truth,\nwherefore in this respect, it matters not whether he tells more or\nless. If, however, departure from the truth be not outside the\nintention, it is evident that then one is moved by different causes\nto tell more or less; and in this respect there are different kinds\nof falsehood, as is evident of the _boaster,_ who exceeds in telling\nuntruths for the sake of fame, and the _cheat,_ who tells less than\nthe truth, in order to escape from paying his debts. This also\nexplains how some false opinions are contrary to one another.\n\nReply Obj. 3: One may be prodigal and illiberal with regard to\ndifferent objects: for instance one may be illiberal [*Cf. II-II, Q.\n119, A. 1, ad 1] in taking what one ought not: and nothing hinders\ncontraries from being in the same subject, in different respects.\n________________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 72, Art. 9]\n\nWhether Sins Differ Specifically in Respect of Different Circumstances?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that vices and sins differ in respect of\ndifferent circumstances. For, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv), \"evil\nresults from each single defect.\" Now individual defects are\ncorruptions of individual circumstances. Therefore from the\ncorruption of each circumstance there results a corresponding species\nof sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sins are human acts. But human acts sometimes take\ntheir species from circumstances, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 10).\nTherefore sins differ specifically according as different\ncircumstances are corrupted.\n\nObj. 3: Further, diverse species are assigned to gluttony, according\nto the words contained in the following verse:\n\n\"Hastily, sumptuously, too much, greedily, daintily.\"\n\nNow these pertain to various circumstances, for \"hastily\" means\nsooner than is right; \"too much,\" more than is right, and so on with\nthe others. Therefore the species of sin is diversified according to\nthe various circumstances.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7; iv, 1) that\n\"every vice sins by doing more than one ought, and when one ought\nnot\"; and in like manner as to the other circumstances. Therefore the\nspecies of sins are not diversified in this respect.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 8), wherever there is a special\nmotive for sinning, there is a different species of sin, because the\nmotive for sinning is the end and object of sin. Now it happens\nsometimes that although different circumstances are corrupted, there\nis but one motive: thus the illiberal man, for the same motive, takes\nwhen he ought not, where he ought not, and more than he ought, and so\non with the circumstances, since he does this through an inordinate\ndesire of hoarding money: and in such cases the corruption of\ndifferent circumstances does not diversify the species of sins, but\nbelongs to one and the same species.\n\nSometimes, however, the corruption of different circumstances arises\nfrom different motives: for instance that a man eat hastily, may be\ndue to the fact that he cannot brook the delay in taking food, on\naccount of a rapid exhaustion of the digestive humors; and that he\ndesire too much food, may be due to a naturally strong digestion;\nthat he desire choice meats, is due to his desire for pleasure in\ntaking food. Hence in such matters, the corruption of different\ncircumstances entails different species of sins.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Evil, as such, is a privation, and so it has different\nspecies in respect of the thing which the subject is deprived, even\nas other privations. But sin does not take its species from the\nprivation or aversion, as stated above (A. 1), but from turning to\nthe object of the act.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A circumstance never transfers an act from one species\nto another, save when there is another motive.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the various species of gluttony there are various\nmotives, as stated.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 73\n\nOF THE COMPARISON OF ONE SIN WITH ANOTHER\n(In Ten Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the comparison of one sin with another: under\nwhich head there are ten points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether all sins and vices are connected with one another?\n\n(2) Whether all are equal?\n\n(3) Whether the gravity of sin depends on its object?\n\n(4) Whether it depends on the excellence of the virtue to which it is\nopposed?\n\n(5) Whether carnal sins are more grievous than spiritual sins?\n\n(6) Whether the gravity of sins depends on their causes?\n\n(7) Whether it depends on their circumstances?\n\n(8) Whether it depends on how much harm ensues?\n\n(9) Whether on the position of the person sinned against?\n\n(10) Whether sin is aggravated by reason of the excellence of the\nperson sinning?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 1]\n\nWhether All Sins Are Connected with One Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all sins are connected. For it is\nwritten (James 2:10): \"Whosoever shall keep the whole Law, but offend\nin one point, is become guilty of all.\" Now to be guilty of\ntransgressing all the precepts of Law, is the same as to commit all\nsins, because, as Ambrose says (De Parad. viii), \"sin is a\ntransgression of the Divine law, and disobedience of the heavenly\ncommandments.\" Therefore whoever commits one sin is guilty of all.\n\nObj. 2: Further, each sin banishes its opposite virtue. Now whoever\nlacks one virtue lacks them all, as was shown above (Q. 65, A. 1).\nTherefore whoever commits one sin, is deprived of all the virtues.\nTherefore whoever commits one sin, is guilty of all sins.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all virtues are connected, because they have a\nprinciple in common, as stated above (Q. 65, AA. 1, 2). Now as the\nvirtues have a common principle, so have sins, because, as the love\nof God, which builds the city of God, is the beginning and root of\nall the virtues, so self-love, which builds the city of Babylon, is\nthe root of all sins, as Augustine declares (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28).\nTherefore all vices and sins are also connected so that whoever has\none, has them all.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Some vices are contrary to one another, as the\nPhilosopher states (Ethic. ii, 8). But contraries cannot be together\nin the same subject. Therefore it is impossible for all sins and\nvices to be connected with one another.\n\n_I answer that,_ The intention of the man who acts according to\nvirtue in pursuance of his reason, is different from the intention of\nthe sinner in straying from the path of reason. For the intention of\nevery man acting according to virtue is to follow the rule of reason,\nwherefore the intention of all the virtues is directed to the same\nend, so that all the virtues are connected together in the right\nreason of things to be done, viz. prudence, as stated above (Q. 65,\nA. 1). But the intention of the sinner is not directed to the point\nof straying from the path of reason; rather is it directed to tend to\nsome appetible good whence it derives its species. Now these goods,\nto which the sinner's intention is directed when departing from\nreason, are of various kinds, having no mutual connection; in fact\nthey are sometimes contrary to one another. Since, therefore, vices\nand sins take their species from that to which they turn, it is\nevident that, in respect of that which completes a sin's species,\nsins are not connected with one another. For sin does not consist in\npassing from the many to the one, as is the case with virtues, which\nare connected, but rather in forsaking the one for the many.\n\nReply Obj. 1: James is speaking of sin, not as regards the thing to\nwhich it turns and which causes the distinction of sins, as stated\nabove (Q. 72, A. 1), but as regards that from which sin turns away,\nin as much as man, by sinning, departs from a commandment of the law.\nNow all the commandments of the law are from one and the same, as he\nalso says in the same passage, so that the same God is despised in\nevery sin; and in this sense he says that whoever \"offends in one\npoint, is become guilty of all,\" for as much as, by committing one\nsin, he incurs the debt of punishment through his contempt of God,\nwhich is the origin of all sins.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 71, A. 4), the opposite virtue is\nnot banished by every act of sin; because venial sin does not destroy\nvirtue; while mortal sin destroys infused virtue, by turning man away\nfrom God. Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit\nof acquired virtue; though if such acts be repeated so as to engender\na contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed, the\ndestruction of which entails the loss of prudence, since when man\nacts against any virtue whatever, he acts against prudence, without\nwhich no moral virtue is possible, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 4; Q.\n65, A. 1). Consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the\nperfect and formal being of virtue, which they have in so far as they\npartake of prudence, yet there remain the inclinations to virtuous\nacts, which inclinations, however, are not virtues. Nevertheless it\ndoes not follow that for this reason man contracts all vices of\nsins--first, because several vices are opposed to one virtue, so that\na virtue can be destroyed by one of them, without the others being\npresent; secondly, because sin is directly opposed to virtue, as\nregards the virtue's inclination to act, as stated above (Q. 71, A.\n1). Wherefore, as long as any virtuous inclinations remain, it cannot\nbe said that man has the opposite vices or sins.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The love of God is unitive, in as much as it draws\nman's affections from the many to the one; so that the virtues, which\nflow from the love of God, are connected together. But self-love\ndisunites man's affections among different things, in so far as man\nloves himself, by desiring for himself temporal goods, which are\nvarious and of many kinds: hence vices and sins, which arise from\nself-love, are not connected together.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 2]\n\nWhether All Sins Are Equal?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to\ndo what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one\nand the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reproved in one and\nthe same way. Therefore one sin is not graver than another.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every sin is a transgression of the rule of reason,\nwhich is to human acts what a linear rule is in corporeal things.\nTherefore to sin is the same as to pass over a line. But passing over\na line occurs equally and in the same way, even if one go a long way\nfrom it or stay near it, since privations do not admit of more or\nless. Therefore all sins are equal.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sins are opposed to virtues. But all virtues are\nequal, as Cicero states (Paradox. iii). Therefore all sins are equal.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said to Pilate (John 19:11): \"He that\nhath delivered me to thee, hath the greater sin,\" and yet it is\nevident that Pilate was guilty of some sin. Therefore one sin is\ngreater than another.\n\n_I answer that,_ The opinion of the Stoics, which Cicero adopts in\nthe book on _Paradoxes_ (Paradox. iii), was that all sins are equal:\nfrom which opinion arose the error of certain heretics, who not only\nhold all sins to be equal, but also maintain that all the pains of\nhell are equal. So far as can be gathered from the words of Cicero\nthe Stoics arrived at their conclusion through looking at sin on the\nside of the privation only, in so far, to wit, as it is a departure\nfrom reason; wherefore considering simply that no privation admits of\nmore or less, they held that all sins are equal. Yet, if we consider\nthe matter carefully, we shall see that there are two kinds of\nprivation. For there is a simple and pure privation, which consists,\nso to speak, in _being_ corrupted; thus death is privation of life,\nand darkness is privation of light. Such like privations do not admit\nof more or less, because nothing remains of the opposite habit; hence\na man is not less dead on the first day after his death, or on the\nthird or fourth days, than after a year, when his corpse is already\ndissolved; and, in like manner, a house is no darker if the light be\ncovered with several shades, than if it were covered by a single\nshade shutting out all the light. There is, however, another\nprivation which is not simple, but retains something of the opposite\nhabit; it consists in _becoming_ corrupted rather than in _being_\ncorrupted, like sickness which is a privation of the due\ncommensuration of the humors, yet so that something remains of that\ncommensuration, else the animal would cease to live: and the same\napplies to deformity and the like. Such privations admit of more or\nless on the part of what remains or the contrary habit. For it\nmatters much in sickness or deformity, whether one departs more or\nless from the due commensuration of humors or members. The same\napplies to vices and sins: because in them the privation of the due\ncommensuration of reason is such as not to destroy the order of\nreason altogether; else evil, if total, destroys itself, as stated in\n_Ethic._ iv, 5. For the substance of the act, or the affection of the\nagent could not remain, unless something remained of the order of\nreason. Therefore it matters much to the gravity of a sin whether one\ndeparts more or less from the rectitude of reason: and accordingly we\nmust say that sins are not all equal.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To commit sin is unlawful on account of some\ninordinateness therein: wherefore those which contain a greater\ninordinateness are more unlawful, and consequently graver sins.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument looks upon sin as though it were a pure\nprivation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Virtues are proportionately equal in one and the same\nsubject: yet one virtue surpasses another in excellence according to\nits species; and again, one man is more virtuous than another, in the\nsame species of virtue, as stated above (Q. 66, AA. 1, 2). Moreover,\neven if virtues were equal, it would not follow that vices are equal,\nsince virtues are connected, and vices or sins are not.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Gravity of Sins Varies According to Their Objects?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary\naccording to their objects. Because the gravity of a sin pertains to\nits mode or quality: whereas the object is the matter of the sin.\nTherefore the gravity of sins does not vary according to their\nvarious objects.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the gravity of a sin is the intensity of its malice.\nNow sin does not derive its malice from its proper object to which it\nturns, and which is some appetible good, but rather from that which\nit turns away from. Therefore the gravity of sins does not vary\naccording to their various objects.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sins that have different objects are of different\nkinds. But things of different kinds cannot be compared with one\nanother, as is proved in _Phys._ vii, text. 30, seqq. Therefore one\nsin is not graver than another by reason of the difference of objects.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Sins take their species from their objects, as was\nshown above (Q. 72, A. 1). But some sins are graver than others in\nrespect of their species, as murder is graver than theft. Therefore\nthe gravity of sins varies according to their objects.\n\n_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been said (Q. 71, A. 5),\nthe gravity of sins varies in the same way as one sickness is graver\nthan another: for just as the good of health consists in a certain\ncommensuration of the humors, in keeping with an animal's nature, so\nthe good of virtue consists in a certain commensuration of the human\nact in accord with the rule of reason. Now it is evident that the\nhigher the principle the disorder of which causes the disorder in the\nhumors, the graver is the sickness: thus a sickness which comes on\nthe human body from the heart, which is the principle of life, or\nfrom some neighboring part, is more dangerous. Wherefore a sin must\nneeds be so much the graver, as the disorder occurs in a principle\nwhich is higher in the order of reason. Now in matters of action the\nreason directs all things in view of the end: wherefore the higher\nthe end which attaches to sins in human acts, the graver the sin. Now\nthe object of an act is its end, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 3, ad 2);\nand consequently the difference of gravity in sins depends on their\nobjects. Thus it is clear that external things are directed to man as\ntheir end, while man is further directed to God as his end. Wherefore\na sin which is about the very substance of man, e.g. murder, is\ngraver than a sin which is about external things, e.g. theft; and\ngraver still is a sin committed directly against God, e.g. unbelief,\nblasphemy, and the like: and in each of these grades of sin, one sin\nwill be graver than another according as it is about a higher or\nlower principle. And forasmuch as sins take their species from their\nobjects, the difference of gravity which is derived from the objects\nis first and foremost, as resulting from the species.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the object is the matter about which an act is\nconcerned, yet it has the character of an end, in so far as the\nintention of the agent is fixed on it, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 3,\nad 2). Now the form of a moral act depends on the end, as was shown\nabove (Q. 72, A. 6; Q. 18, A. 6).\n\nReply Obj. 2: From the very fact that man turns unduly to some\nmutable good, it follows that he turns away from the immutable Good,\nwhich aversion completes the nature of evil. Hence the various\ndegrees of malice in sins must needs follow the diversity of those\nthings to which man turns.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All the objects of human acts are related to one\nanother, wherefore all human acts are somewhat of one kind, in so far\nas they are directed to the last end. Therefore nothing prevents all\nsins from being compared with one another.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Gravity of Sins Depends on the Excellence of the Virtues\nto Which They Are Opposed?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the gravity of sins does not vary\naccording to the excellence of the virtues to which they are opposed,\nso that, to wit, the graver sin is opposed to the greater virtue.\nFor, according to Prov. 15:5, \"In abundant justice there is the\ngreatest strength.\" Now, as Our Lord says (Matt. 5:20, seqq.)\nabundant justice restrains anger, which is a less grievous sin than\nmurder, which less abundant justice restrains. Therefore the least\ngrievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3 that \"virtue is about\nthe difficult and the good\": whence it seems to follow that the\ngreater virtue is about what is more difficult. But it is a less\ngrievous sin to fail in what is more difficult, than in what is less\ndifficult. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater\nvirtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, charity is a greater virtue than faith or hope (1\nCor. 13:13). Now hatred which is opposed to charity is a less\ngrievous sin than unbelief or despair which are opposed to faith and\nhope. Therefore the less grievous sin is opposed to the greater\nvirtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. 8:10) that the \"worst\nis opposed to the best.\" Now in morals the best is the greatest\nvirtue; and the worst is the most grievous sin. Therefore the most\ngrievous sin is opposed to the greatest virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ A sin is opposed to a virtue in two ways: first,\nprincipally and directly; that sin, to wit, which is about the same\nobject: because contraries are about the same thing. In this way, the\nmore grievous sin must needs be opposed to the greater virtue:\nbecause, just as the degrees of gravity in a sin depend on the\nobject, so also does the greatness of a virtue, since both sin and\nvirtue take their species from the object, as shown above (Q. 60, A.\n5; Q. 72, A. 1). Wherefore the greatest sin must needs be directly\nopposed to the greatest virtue, as being furthest removed from it in\nthe same genus. Secondly, the opposition of virtue to sin may be\nconsidered in respect of a certain extension of the virtue in\nchecking sin. For the greater a virtue is, the further it removes man\nfrom the contrary sin, so that it withdraws man not only from that\nsin, but also from whatever leads to it. And thus it is evident that\nthe greater a virtue is, the more it withdraws man also from less\ngrievous sins: even as the more perfect health is, the more does it\nward off even minor ailments. And in this way the less grievous sin\nis opposed to the greater virtue, on the part of the latter's effect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument considers the opposition which consists\nin restraining from sin; for thus abundant justice checks even minor\nsins.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The greater virtue that is about a more difficult good\nis opposed directly to the sin which is about a more difficult evil.\nFor in each case there is a certain superiority, in that the will is\nshown to be more intent on good or evil, through not being overcome\nby the difficulty.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Charity is not any kind of love, but the love of God:\nhence not any kind of hatred is opposed to it directly, but the\nhatred of God, which is the most grievous of all sins.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Carnal Sins Are of Less Guilt Than Spiritual Sins?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that carnal sins are not of less guilt\nthan spiritual sins. Because adultery is a more grievous sin than\ntheft: for it is written (Prov. 6:30, 32): \"The fault is not so great\nwhen a man has stolen . . . but he that is an adulterer, for the\nfolly of his heart shall destroy his own soul.\" Now theft belongs to\ncovetousness, which is a spiritual sin; while adultery pertains to\nlust, which is a carnal sin. Therefore carnal sins are of greater\nguilt than spiritual sins.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says in his commentary on Leviticus [*The\nquotation is from De Civ. Dei ii, 4 and iv, 31.] that \"the devil\nrejoices chiefly in lust and idolatry.\" But he rejoices more in the\ngreater sin. Therefore, since lust is a carnal sin, it seems that the\ncarnal sins are of most guilt.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher proves (Ethic. vii, 6) that \"it is\nmore shameful to be incontinent in lust than in anger.\" But anger is\na spiritual sin, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17); while lust\npertains to carnal sins. Therefore carnal sin is more grievous than\nspiritual sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Moral. xxxiii, 11) that carnal sins\nare of less guilt, but of more shame than spiritual sins.\n\n_I answer that,_ Spiritual sins are of greater guilt than carnal\nsins: yet this does not mean that each spiritual sin is of greater\nguilt than each carnal sin; but that, considering the sole difference\nbetween spiritual and carnal, spiritual sins are more grievous than\ncarnal sins, other things being equal. Three reasons may be assigned\nfor this. The first is on the part of the subject: because spiritual\nsins belong to the spirit, to which it is proper to turn to God, and\nto turn away from Him; whereas carnal sins are consummated in the\ncarnal pleasure of the appetite, to which it chiefly belongs to turn\nto goods of the body; so that carnal sin, as such, denotes more a\n_turning to_ something, and for that reason, implies a closer\ncleaving; whereas spiritual sin denotes more a _turning from_\nsomething, whence the notion of guilt arises; and for this reason it\ninvolves greater guilt. A second reason may be taken on the part of\nthe person against whom sin is committed: because carnal sin, as\nsuch, is against the sinner's own body, which he ought to love less,\nin the order of charity, than God and his neighbor, against whom he\ncommits spiritual sins, and consequently spiritual sins, as such, are\nof greater guilt. A third reason may be taken from the motive, since\nthe stronger the impulse to sin, the less grievous the sin, as we\nshall state further on (A. 6). Now carnal sins have a stronger\nimpulse, viz. our innate concupiscence of the flesh. Therefore\nspiritual sins, as such, are of greater guilt.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Adultery belongs not only to the sin of lust, but also\nto the sin of injustice, and in this respect may be brought under the\nhead of covetousness, as a gloss observes on Eph. 5:5. \"No\nfornicator, or unclean, or covetous person,\" etc.; so that adultery\nis so much more grievous than theft, as a man loves his wife more\nthan his chattels.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The devil is said to rejoice chiefly in the sin of\nlust, because it is of the greatest adhesion, and man can with\ndifficulty be withdrawn from it. \"For the desire of pleasure is\ninsatiable,\" as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 12).\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher himself says (Ethic. vii, 6), the\nreason why it is more shameful to be incontinent in lust than in\nanger, is that lust partakes less of reason; and in the same sense he\nsays (Ethic. iii, 10) that \"sins of intemperance are most worthy of\nreproach, because they are about those pleasures which are common to\nus and irrational animals\": hence, by these sins man is, so to speak,\nbrutalized; for which same reason Gregory says (Moral. xxxi, 17) that\nthey are more shameful.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Gravity of a Sin Depends on Its Cause?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the gravity of a sin does not depend\non its cause. Because the greater a sin's cause, the more forcibly it\nmoves to sin, and so the more difficult is it to resist. But sin is\nlessened by the fact that it is difficult to resist; for it denotes\nweakness in the sinner, if he cannot easily resist sin; and a sin\nthat is due to weakness is deemed less grievous. Therefore sin does\nnot derive its gravity from its cause.\n\nObj. 2: Further, concupiscence is a general cause of sin; wherefore\na gloss on Rom. 7:7, \"For I had not known concupiscence,\" says:\n\"The law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all\nevils.\" Now the greater the concupiscence by which man is overcome,\nthe less grievous his sin. Therefore the gravity of a sin is\ndiminished by the greatness of its cause.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as rectitude of the reason is the cause of a\nvirtuous act, so defect in the reason seems to be the cause of sin.\nNow the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin:\nso much so that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether excused\nfrom sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously.\nTherefore the gravity of a sin is not increased by the greatness of\nits cause.\n\n_On the contrary,_ If the cause be increased, the effect is\nincreased. Therefore the greater the cause of sin, the more grievous\nthe sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ In the genus of sin, as in every other genus, two\ncauses may be observed. The first is the direct and proper cause of\nsin, and is the will to sin: for it is compared to the sinful act, as\na tree to its fruit, as a gloss observes on Matt. 7:18, \"A good tree\ncannot bring forth evil fruit\": and the greater this cause is, the\nmore grievous will the sin be, since the greater the will to sin, the\nmore grievously does man sin.\n\nThe other causes of sin are extrinsic and remote, as it were, being\nthose whereby the will is inclined to sin. Among these causes we must\nmake a distinction; for some of them induce the will to sin in accord\nwith the very nature of the will: such is the end, which is the\nproper object of the will; and by a such like cause sin is made more\ngrievous, because a man sins more grievously if his will is induced\nto sin by the intention of a more evil end. Other causes incline the\nwill to sin, against the nature and order of the will, whose natural\ninclination is to be moved freely of itself in accord with the\njudgment of reason. Wherefore those causes which weaken the judgment\nof reason (e.g. ignorance), or which weaken the free movement of the\nwill, (e.g. weakness, violence, fear, or the like), diminish the\ngravity of sin, even as they diminish its voluntariness; and so much\nso, that if the act be altogether involuntary, it is no longer sinful.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument considers the extrinsic moving cause,\nwhich diminishes voluntariness. The increase of such a cause\ndiminishes the sin, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If concupiscence be understood to include the movement\nof the will, then, where there is greater concupiscence, there is a\ngreater sin. But if by concupiscence we understand a passion, which\nis a movement of the concupiscible power, then a greater\nconcupiscence, forestalling the judgment of reason and the movement\nof the will, diminishes the sin, because the man who sins, being\nstimulated by a greater concupiscence, falls through a more grievous\ntemptation, wherefore he is less to be blamed. On the other hand, if\nconcupiscence be taken in this sense follows the judgment of reason,\nand the movement of the will, then the greater concupiscence, the\ngraver the sin: because sometimes the movement of concupiscence is\nredoubled by the will tending unrestrainedly to its object.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers the cause which renders the act\ninvoluntary, and such a cause diminishes the gravity of sin, as\nstated.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 7]\n\nWhether a Circumstance Aggravates a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a circumstance does not aggravate a\nsin. Because sin takes its gravity from its species. Now a\ncircumstance does not specify a sin, for it is an accident thereof.\nTherefore the gravity of a sin is not taken from a circumstance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a circumstance is either evil or not: if it is evil,\nit causes, of itself, a species of evil; and if it is not evil, it\ncannot make a thing worse. Therefore a circumstance nowise aggravates\na sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the malice of a sin is derived from its turning away\n(from God). But circumstances affect sin on the part of the object to\nwhich it turns. Therefore they do not add to the sin's malice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ignorance of a circumstance diminishes sin: for he\nwho sins through ignorance of a circumstance, deserves to be forgiven\n(Ethic. iii, 1). Now this would not be the case unless a circumstance\naggravated a sin. Therefore a circumstance makes a sin more grievous.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says in speaking of habits of\nvirtue (Ethic. ii, 1, 2), \"it is natural for a thing to be increased\nby that which causes it.\" Now it is evident that a sin is caused by a\ndefect in some circumstance: because the fact that a man departs from\nthe order of reason is due to his not observing the due circumstances\nin his action. Wherefore it is evident that it is natural for a sin\nto be aggravated by reason of its circumstances. This happens in\nthree ways. First, in so far as a circumstance draws a sin from one\nkind to another: thus fornication is the intercourse of a man with\none who is not his wife: but if to this be added the circumstance\nthat the latter is the wife of another, the sin is drawn to another\nkind of sin, viz. injustice, in so far as he usurps another's\nproperty; and in this respect adultery is a more grievous sin than\nfornication. Secondly, a circumstance aggravates a sin, not by\ndrawing it into another genus, but only by multiplying the ratio of\nsin: thus if a wasteful man gives both when he ought not, and to whom\nhe ought not to give, he commits the same kind of sin in more ways\nthan if he were to merely to give to whom he ought not, and for that\nvery reason his sin is more grievous; even as that sickness is the\ngraver which affects more parts of the body. Hence Cicero says\n(Paradox. iii) that \"in taking his father's life a man commits many\nsins; for he outrages one who begot him, who fed him, who educated\nhim, to whom he owes his lands, his house, his position in the\nrepublic.\" Thirdly, a circumstance aggravates a sin by adding to the\ndeformity which the sin derives from another circumstance: thus,\ntaking another's property constitutes the sin of theft; but if to\nthis be added the circumstance that much is taken of another's\nproperty, the sin will be more grievous; although in itself, to take\nmore or less has not the character of a good or of an evil act.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Some circumstances do specify a moral act, as stated\nabove (Q. 18, A. 10). Nevertheless a circumstance which does not give\nthe species, may aggravate a sin; because, even as the goodness of a\nthing is weighed, not only in reference to its species, but also in\nreference to an accident, so the malice of an act is measured, not\nonly according to the species of that act, but also according to a\ncircumstance.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A circumstance may aggravate a sin either way. For if\nit is evil, it does not follow that it constitutes the sin's species;\nbecause it may multiply the ratio of evil within the same species, as\nstated above. And if it be not evil, it may aggravate a sin in\nrelation to the malice of another circumstance.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Reason should direct the action not only as regards the\nobject, but also as regards every circumstance. Therefore one may\nturn aside from the rule of reason through corruption of any single\ncircumstance; for instance, by doing something when one ought not or\nwhere one ought not; and to depart thus from the rule of reason\nsuffices to make the act evil. This turning aside from the rule of\nreason results from man's turning away from God, to Whom man ought\nto be united by right reason.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Sin Is Aggravated by Reason of Its Causing More Harm?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a sin is not aggravated by reason of\nits causing more harm. Because the harm done is an issue consequent\nto the sinful act. But the issue of an act does not add to its\ngoodness or malice, as stated above (Q. 20, A. 5). Therefore a sin is\nnot aggravated on account of its causing more harm.\n\nObj. 2: Further, harm is inflicted by sins against our neighbor.\nBecause no one wishes to harm himself: and no one can harm God,\naccording to Job 35:6, 8: \"If thy iniquities be multiplied, what\nshalt thou do against Him? . . . Thy wickedness may hurt a man that\nis like thee.\" If, therefore, sins were aggravated through causing\nmore harm, it would follow that sins against our neighbor are more\ngrievous than sins against God or oneself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, greater harm is inflicted on a man by depriving him\nof the life of grace, than by taking away his natural life; because\nthe life of grace is better than the life of nature, so far that man\nought to despise his natural life lest he lose the life of grace.\nNow, speaking absolutely, a man who leads a woman to commit\nfornication deprives her of the life of grace by leading her into\nmortal sin. If therefore a sin were more grievous on account of its\ncausing a greater harm, it would follow that fornication, absolutely\nspeaking, is a more grievous sin than murder, which is evidently\nuntrue. Therefore a sin is not more grievous on account of its\ncausing a greater harm.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 14): \"Since vice\nis contrary to nature, a vice is the more grievous according as it\ndiminishes the integrity of nature.\" Now the diminution of the\nintegrity of nature is a harm. Therefore a sin is graver according as\nit does more harm.\n\n_I answer that,_ Harm may bear a threefold relation to sin. Because\nsometimes the harm resulting from a sin is foreseen and intended, as\nwhen a man does something with a mind to harm another, e.g. a\nmurderer or a thief. In this case the quantity of harm aggravates the\nsin directly, because then the harm is the direct object of the sin.\nSometimes the harm is foreseen, but not intended; for instance, when\na man takes a short cut through a field, the result being that he\nknowingly injures the growing crops, although his intention is not to\ndo this harm, but to commit fornication. In this case again the\nquantity of the harm done aggravates the sin; indirectly, however, in\nso far, to wit, as it is owing to his will being strongly inclined to\nsin, that a man does not forbear from doing, to himself or to\nanother, a harm which he would not wish simply. Sometimes, however,\nthe harm is neither foreseen nor intended: and then if this harm is\nconnected with the sin accidentally, it does not aggravate the sin\ndirectly; but, on account of his neglecting to consider the harm that\nmight ensue, a man is deemed punishable for the evil results of his\naction if it be unlawful. If, on the other hand, the harm follow\ndirectly from the sinful act, although it be neither foreseen nor\nintended, it aggravates the sin directly, because whatever is\ndirectly consequent to a sin, belongs, in a manner, to the very\nspecies of that sin: for instance, if a man is a notorious\nfornicator, the result is that many are scandalized; and although\nsuch was not his intention, nor was it perhaps foreseen by him, yet\nit aggravates his sin directly.\n\nBut this does not seem to apply to penal harm, which the sinner\nhimself incurs. Such like harm, if accidentally connected with the\nsinful act, and if neither foreseen nor intended, does not aggravate\na sin, nor does it correspond with the gravity of the sin: for\ninstance, if a man in running to slay, slips and hurts his foot. If,\non the other hand, this harm is directly consequent to the sinful\nact, although perhaps it be neither foreseen nor intended, then\ngreater harm does not make greater sin, but, on the contrary, a\ngraver sin calls for the infliction of a greater harm. Thus, an\nunbeliever who has heard nothing about the pains of hell, would\nsuffer greater pain in hell for a sin of murder than for a sin of\ntheft: but his sin is not aggravated on account of his neither\nintending nor foreseeing this, as it would be in the case of a\nbeliever, who, seemingly, sins more grievously in the very fact that\nhe despises a greater punishment, that he may satisfy his desire to\nsin; but the gravity of this harm is caused by the sole gravity of\nsin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As we have already stated (Q. 20, A. 5), in treating of\nthe goodness and malice of external actions, the result of an action\nif foreseen and intended adds to the goodness and malice of an act.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although the harm done aggravates a sin, it does not\nfollow that this alone renders a sin more grievous: in fact, it is\ninordinateness which of itself aggravates a sin. Wherefore the harm\nitself that ensues aggravates a sin, in so far only as it renders the\nact more inordinate. Hence it does not follow, supposing harm to be\ninflicted chiefly by sins against our neighbor, that such sins are\nthe most grievous, since a much greater inordinateness is to be found\nin sins which man commits against God, and in some which he commits\nagainst himself. Moreover we might say that although no man can do\nGod any harm in His substance, yet he can endeavor to do so in things\nconcerning Him, e.g. by destroying faith, by outraging holy things,\nwhich are most grievous sins. Again, a man sometimes knowingly and\nfreely inflicts harm on himself, as in the case of suicide, though\nthis be referred finally to some apparent good, for example, delivery\nfrom some anxiety.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument does not prove, for two reasons: first,\nbecause the murderer intends directly to do harm to his neighbors;\nwhereas the fornicator who solicits the woman intends not harm but\npleasure; secondly, because murder is the direct and sufficient cause\nof bodily death; whereas no man can of himself be the sufficient\ncause of another's spiritual death, because no man dies spiritually\nexcept by sinning of his own will.\n________________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 9]\n\nWhether a Sin Is Aggravated by Reason of the Condition of the Person\nAgainst Whom It Is Committed?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sin is not aggravated by reason of\nthe condition of the person against whom it is committed. For if this\nwere the case a sin would be aggravated chiefly by being committed\nagainst a just and holy man. But this does not aggravate a sin:\nbecause a virtuous man who bears a wrong with equanimity is less\nharmed by the wrong done him, than others, who, through being\nscandalized, are also hurt inwardly. Therefore the condition of the\nperson against whom a sin is committed does not aggravate the sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if the condition of the person aggravated the sin,\nthis would be still more the case if the person be near of kin,\nbecause, as Cicero says (Paradox. iii): \"The man who kills his slave\nsins once: he that takes his father's life sins many times.\" But the\nkinship of a person sinned against does not apparently aggravate a\nsin, because every man is most akin to himself; and yet it is less\ngrievous to harm oneself than another, e.g. to kill one's own, than\nanother's horse, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. v, 11).\nTherefore kinship of the person sinned against does not aggravate\nthe sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the condition of the person who sins aggravates a\nsin chiefly on account of his position or knowledge, according to\nWis. 6:7: \"The mighty shall be mightily tormented,\" and Luke 12:47:\n\"The servant who knew the will of his lord . . . and did it not . . .\nshall be beaten with many stripes.\" Therefore, in like manner, on the\npart of the person sinned against, the sin is made more grievous by\nreason of his position and knowledge. But, apparently, it is not a\nmore grievous sin to inflict an injury on a rich and powerful person\nthan on a poor man, since \"there is no respect of persons with God\"\n(Col. 3:25), according to Whose judgment the gravity of a sin is\nmeasured. Therefore the condition of the person sinned against does\nnot aggravate the sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Holy Writ censures especially those sins that are\ncommitted against the servants of God. Thus it is written (3 Kings\n19:14): \"They have destroyed Thy altars, they have slain Thy prophets\nwith the sword.\" Moreover much blame is attached to the sin committed\nby a man against those who are akin to him, according to Micah 7:6:\n\"the son dishonoreth the father, and the daughter riseth up against\nher mother.\" Furthermore sins committed against persons of rank are\nexpressly condemned: thus it is written (Job 34:18): \"Who saith to\nthe king: 'Thou art an apostate'; who calleth rulers ungodly.\"\nTherefore the condition of the person sinned against aggravates the\nsin.\n\n_I answer that,_ The person sinned against is, in a manner, the\nobject of the sin. Now it has been stated above (A. 3) that the\nprimary gravity of a sin is derived from its object; so that a sin is\ndeemed to be so much the more grave, as its object is a more\nprincipal end. But the principal ends of human acts are God, man\nhimself, and his neighbor: for whatever we do, it is on account of\none of these that we do it; although one of them is subordinate to\nthe other. Therefore the greater or lesser gravity of a sin, in\nrespect of the person sinned against, may be considered on the part\nof these three.\n\nFirst, on the part of God, to Whom man is the more closely united, as\nhe is more virtuous or more sacred to God: so that an injury\ninflicted on such a person redounds on to God according to Zech. 2:8:\n\"He that toucheth you, toucheth the apple of My eye.\" Wherefore a sin\nis the more grievous, according as it is committed against a person\nmore closely united to God by reason of personal sanctity, or\nofficial station. On the part of man himself, it is evident that he\nsins all the more grievously, according as the person against whom he\nsins, is more united to him, either through natural affinity or\nkindness received or any other bond; because he seems to sin against\nhimself rather than the other, and, for this very reason, sins all\nthe more grievously, according to Ecclus. 14:5: \"He that is evil to\nhimself, to whom will he be good?\" On the part of his neighbor, a man\nsins the more grievously, according as his sin affects more persons:\nso that a sin committed against a public personage, e.g. a sovereign\nprince who stands in the place of the whole people, is more grievous\nthan a sin committed against a private person; hence it is expressly\nprohibited (Ex. 22:28): \"The prince of thy people thou shalt not\ncurse.\" In like manner it would seem that an injury done to a person\nof prominence, is all the more grave, on account of the scandal and\nthe disturbance it would cause among many people.\n\nReply Obj. 1: He who inflicts an injury on a virtuous person, so far\nas he is concerned, disturbs him internally and externally; but that\nthe latter is not disturbed internally is due to his goodness, which\ndoes not extenuate the sin of the injurer.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The injury which a man inflicts on himself in those\nthings which are subject to the dominion of his will, for instance\nhis possessions, is less sinful than if it were inflicted on another,\nbecause he does it of his own will; but in those things that are not\nsubject to the dominion of his will, such as natural and spiritual\ngoods, it is a graver sin to inflict an injury on oneself: for it is\nmore grievous for a man to kill himself than another. Since, however,\nthings belonging to our neighbor are not subject to the dominion of\nour will, the argument fails to prove, in respect of injuries done to\nsuch like things, that it is less grievous to sin in their regard,\nunless indeed our neighbor be willing, or give his approval.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is no respect for persons if God punishes more\nseverely those who sin against a person of higher rank; for this is\ndone because such an injury redounds to the harm of many.\n________________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 10]\n\nWhether the Excellence of the Person Sinning Aggravates the Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the excellence of the person sinning\ndoes not aggravate the sin. For man becomes great chiefly by cleaving\nto God, according to Ecclus. 25:13: \"How great is he that findeth\nwisdom and knowledge! but there is none above him that feareth the\nLord.\" Now the more a man cleaves to God, the less is a sin imputed\nto him: for it is written (2 Paral. 30: 18, 19): \"The Lord Who is\ngood will show mercy to all them, who with their whole heart seek the\nLord the God of their fathers; and will not impute it to them that\nthey are not sanctified.\" Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the\nexcellence of the person sinning.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"there is no respect of persons with God\" (Rom.\n2:11). Therefore He does not punish one man more than another, for\none and the same sin. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by the\nexcellence of the person sinning.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he\nwould, if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his\ngoodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the\nexcellence of the person sinning.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (De Summo Bono ii, 18): \"A sin is\ndeemed so much the more grievous as the sinner is held to be a more\nexcellent person.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Sin is twofold. There is a sin which takes us\nunawares on account of the weakness of human nature: and such like\nsins are less imputable to one who is more virtuous, because he is\nless negligent in checking those sins, which nevertheless human\nweakness does not allow us to escape altogether. But there are other\nsins which proceed from deliberation: and these sins are all the more\nimputed to man according as he is more excellent. Four reasons may be\nassigned for this. First, because a more excellent person, e.g. one\nwho excels in knowledge and virtue, can more easily resist sin; hence\nOur Lord said (Luke 12:47) that the \"servant who knew the will of his\nlord . . . and did it not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes.\"\nSecondly, on account of ingratitude, because every good in which a\nman excels, is a gift of God, to Whom man is ungrateful when he sins:\nand in this respect any excellence, even in temporal goods,\naggravates a sin, according to Wis. 6:7: \"The mighty shall be\nmightily tormented.\" Thirdly, on account of the sinful act being\nspecially inconsistent with the excellence of the person sinning: for\ninstance, if a prince were to violate justice, whereas he is set up\nas the guardian of justice, or if a priest were to be a fornicator,\nwhereas he has taken the vow of chastity. Fourthly, on account of the\nexample or scandal; because, as Gregory says (Pastor. i, 2): \"Sin\nbecomes much more scandalous, when the sinner is honored for his\nposition\": and the sins of the great are much more notorious and men\nare wont to bear them with more indignation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The passage quoted alludes to those things which are\ndone negligently when we are taken unawares through human weakness.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God does not respect persons in punishing the great\nmore severely, because their excellence conduces to the gravity of\ntheir sin, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The man who excels in anything reaps disadvantage, not\nfrom the good which he has, but from his abuse thereof.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 74\n\nOF THE SUBJECT OF SIN\n(In Ten Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the subject of vice or sin: under which head\nthere are ten points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the will can be the subject of sin?\n\n(2) Whether the will alone is the subject of sin?\n\n(3) Whether the sensuality can be the subject of sin?\n\n(4) Whether it can be the subject of mortal sin?\n\n(5) Whether the reason can be the subject of sin?\n\n(6) Whether morose delectation or non-morose delectation be subjected\nin the higher reason?\n\n(7) Whether the sin of consent in the act of sin is subjected in the\nhigher reason?\n\n(8) Whether the lower reason can be the subject of mortal sin?\n\n(9) Whether the higher reason can be the subject of venial sin?\n\n(10) Whether there can be in the higher reason a venial sin directed\nto its proper object?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Will Is a Subject of Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will cannot be a subject of sin.\nFor Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"evil is outside the will and\nthe intention.\" But sin has the character of evil. Therefore sin\ncannot be in the will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the will is directed either to the good or to what\nseems good. Now from the fact that will wishes the good, it does not\nsin: and that it wishes what seems good but is not truly good, points\nto a defect in the apprehensive power rather than in the will.\nTherefore sin is nowise in the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the same thing cannot be both subject and efficient\ncause of sin: because \"the efficient and the material cause do not\ncoincide\" (Phys. 2, text. 70). Now the will is the efficient cause of\nsin: because the first cause of sinning is the will, as Augustine\nstates (De Duabus Anim. x, 10, 11). Therefore it is not the subject\nof sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 9) that \"it is by the\nwill that we sin, and live righteously.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Sin is an act, as stated above (Q. 71, AA. 1, 6).\nNow some acts pass into external matter, e.g. _to cut_ and _to burn_:\nand such acts have for their matter and subject, the thing into which\nthe action passes: thus the Philosopher states (Phys. iii, text. 18)\nthat \"movement is the act of the thing moved, caused by a mover.\" On\nthe other hand, there are acts which do not pass into external\nmatter, but remain in the agent, e.g. _to desire_ and _to know_: and\nsuch are all moral acts, whether virtuous or sinful. Consequently the\nproper subject of sin must needs be the power which is the principle\nof the act. Now since it is proper to moral acts that they are\nvoluntary, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 1; Q. 18, A. 6), it follows that\nthe will, which is the principle of voluntary acts, both of good\nacts, and of evil acts or sins, is the principle of sins. Therefore\nit follows that sin is in the will as its subject.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Evil is said to be outside the will, because the will\ndoes not tend to it under the aspect of evil. But since some evil is\nan apparent good, the will sometimes desires an evil, and in this\nsense is in the will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If the defect in the apprehensive power were nowise\nsubject to the will, there would be no sin, either in the will, or in\nthe apprehensive power, as in the case of those whose ignorance is\ninvincible. It remains therefore that when there is in the\napprehensive power a defect that is subject to the will, this defect\nalso is deemed a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument applies to those efficient causes whose\nactions pass into external matter, and which do not move themselves,\nbut move other things; the contrary of which is to be observed in the\nwill; hence the argument does not prove.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Will Alone Is the Subject of Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will alone is the subject of sin.\nFor Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10) that \"no one sins except\nby the will.\" Now the subject of sin is the power by which we sin.\nTherefore the will alone is the subject of sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sin is an evil contrary to reason. Now good and evil\npertaining to reason are the object of the will alone. Therefore the\nwill alone is the subject of sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every sin is a voluntary act, because, as Augustine\nstates (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) [*Cf. De Vera Relig. xiv.], \"so true is\nit that every sin is voluntary, that unless it be voluntary, it is no\nsin at all.\" Now the acts of the other powers are not voluntary,\nexcept in so far as those powers are moved by the will; nor does this\nsuffice for them to be the subject of sin, because then even the\nexternal members of the body, which are moved by the will, would be a\nsubject of sin; which is clearly untrue. Therefore the will alone is\nthe subject of sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Sin is contrary to virtue: and contraries are\nabout one same thing. But the other powers of the soul, besides the\nwill, are the subject of virtues, as stated above (Q. 56). Therefore\nthe will is not the only subject of sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As was shown above (A. 1), whatever is the a\nprinciple of a voluntary act is a subject of sin. Now voluntary acts\nare not only those which are elicited by the will, but also those\nwhich are commanded by the will, as we stated above (Q. 6, A. 4) in\ntreating of voluntariness. Therefore not only the will can be a\nsubject of sin, but also all those powers which can be moved to their\nacts, or restrained from their acts, by the will; and these same\npowers are the subjects of good and evil moral habits, because act\nand habit belong to the same subject.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We do not sin except by the will as first mover; but we\nsin by the other powers as moved by the will.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Good and evil pertain to the will as its proper\nobjects; but the other powers have certain determinate goods and\nevils, by reason of which they can be the subject of virtue, vice,\nand sin, in so far as they partake of will and reason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The members of the body are not principles but merely\norgans of action: wherefore they are compared to the soul which moves\nthem, as a slave who is moved but moves no other. On the other hand,\nthe internal appetitive powers are compared to reason as free agents,\nbecause they both act and are acted upon, as is made clear in\n_Polit._i, 3. Moreover, the acts of the external members are actions\nthat pass into external matter, as may be seen in the blow that is\ninflicted in the sin of murder. Consequently there is no comparison.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Can Be Sin in the Sensuality?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there cannot be sin in the\nsensuality. For sin is proper to man who is praised or blamed for his\nactions. Now sensuality is common to us and irrational animals.\nTherefore sin cannot be in the sensuality.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"no man sins in what he cannot avoid,\" as Augustine\nstates (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18). But man cannot prevent the movement of\nthe sensuality from being inordinate, since \"the sensuality ever\nremains corrupt, so long as we abide in this mortal life; wherefore\nit is signified by the serpent,\" as Augustine declares (De Trin. xii,\n12, 13). Therefore the inordinate movement of the sensuality is not a\nsin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which man himself does not do is not imputed to\nhim as a sin. Now \"that alone do we seem to do ourselves, which we do\nwith the deliberation of reason,\" as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix,\n8). Therefore the movement of the sensuality, which is without the\ndeliberation of reason, is not imputed to a man as a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 7:19): \"The good which I will\nI do not; but the evil which I will not, that I do\": which words\nAugustine explains (Contra Julian. iii, 26; De Verb. Apost. xii, 2,\n3), as referring to the evil of concupiscence, which is clearly a\nmovement of the sensuality. Therefore there can be sin in the\nsensuality.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 3), sin may be found in any\npower whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the\nnature of sin. Now it is evident that the act of the sensuality, or\nsensitive appetite, is naturally inclined to be moved by the will.\nWherefore it follows that sin can be in the sensuality.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although some of the powers of the sensitive part are\ncommon to us and irrational animals, nevertheless, in us, they have a\ncertain excellence through being united to the reason; thus we\nsurpass other animals in the sensitive part for as much as we have\nthe powers of cogitation and reminiscence, as stated in the First\nPart (Q. 78, A. 4). In the same way our sensitive appetite surpasses\nthat of other animals by reason of a certain excellence consisting in\nits natural aptitude to obey the reason; and in this respect it can\nbe the principle of a voluntary action, and, consequently, the\nsubject of sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The continual corruption of the sensuality is to be\nunderstood as referring to the _fomes,_ which is never completely\ndestroyed in this life, since, though the stain of original sin\npasses, its effect remains. However, this corruption of the _fomes_\ndoes not hinder man from using his rational will to check individual\ninordinate movements, if he be presentient of them, for instance by\nturning his thoughts to other things. Yet while he is turning his\nthoughts to something else, an inordinate movement may arise about\nthis also: thus when a man, in order to avoid the movements of\nconcupiscence, turns his thoughts away from carnal pleasures, to the\nconsiderations of science, sometimes an unpremeditated movement of\nvainglory will arise. Consequently, a man cannot avoid all such\nmovements, on account of the aforesaid corruption: but it is enough,\nfor the conditions of a voluntary sin, that he be able to avoid each\nsingle one.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man does not do perfectly himself what he does without\nthe deliberation of reason, since the principal part of man does\nnothing therein: wherefore such is not perfectly a human act; and\nconsequently it cannot be a perfect act of virtue or of sin, but is\nsomething imperfect of that kind. Therefore such movement of the\nsensuality as forestalls the reason, is a venial sin, which is\nsomething imperfect in the genus of sin.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Mortal Sin Can Be in the Sensuality?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that mortal sin can be in the sensuality.\nBecause an act is discerned by its object. Now it is possible to\ncommit a mortal sin about the objects of the sensuality, e.g. about\ncarnal pleasures. Therefore the act of the sensuality can be a mortal\nsin, so that mortal sin can be found in the sensuality.\n\nObj. 2: Further, mortal sin is opposed to virtue. But virtue can be\nin the sensuality; for temperance and fortitude are virtues of the\nirrational parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. iii, 10).\nTherefore, since it is natural to contraries to be about the same\nsubject, sensuality can be the subject of mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Now\ndisposition and habit are in the same subject. Since therefore venial\nsin may be in the sensuality, as stated above (A. 3, ad 3), mortal\nsin can be there also.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 23): \"The inordinate\nmovement of concupiscence, which is the sin of the sensuality, can\neven be in those who are in a state of grace,\" in whom, however,\nmortal sin is not to be found. Therefore the inordinate movement of\nthe sensuality is not a mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as a disorder which destroys the principle of\nthe body's life causes the body's death, so too a disorder which\ndestroys the principle of spiritual life, viz. the last end, causes\nspiritual death, which is mortal sin, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 5).\nNow it belongs to the reason alone, and not to the sensuality, to\norder anything to the end: and disorder in respect of the end can\nonly belong to the power whose function it is to order others to the\nend. Wherefore mortal sin cannot be in the sensuality, but only in\nthe reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The act of the sensuality can concur towards a mortal\nsin: yet the fact of its being a mortal sin is due, not to its being\nan act of the sensuality, but to its being an act of reason, to whom\nthe ordering to the end belongs. Consequently mortal sin is imputed,\nnot to the sensuality, but to reason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: An act of virtue is perfected not only in that it is an\nact of the sensuality, but still more in the fact of its being an act\nof reason and will, whose function it is to choose: for the act of\nmoral virtue is not without the exercise of choice: wherefore the act\nof moral virtue, which perfects the appetitive power, is always\naccompanied by an act of prudence, which perfects the rational power;\nand the same applies to mortal sin, as stated (ad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: A disposition may be related in three ways to that to\nwhich it disposes: for sometimes it is the same thing and is in the\nsame subject; thus inchoate science is a disposition to perfect\nscience: sometimes it is in the same subject, but is not the same\nthing; thus heat is a disposition to the form of fire: sometimes it\nis neither the same thing, nor in the same subject, as in those\nthings which are subordinate to one another in such a way that we can\narrive at one through the other, e.g. goodness of the imagination is\na disposition to science which is in the intellect. In this way the\nvenial sin that is in the sensuality, may be a disposition to mortal\nsin, which is in the reason.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Sin Can Be in the Reason?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sin cannot be in the reason. For the\nsin of any power is a defect thereof. But the fault of the reason is\nnot a sin, on the contrary, it excuses sin: for a man is excused from\nsin on account of ignorance. Therefore sin cannot be in the reason.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the primary object of sin is the will, as stated\nabove (A. 1). Now reason precedes the will, since it directs it.\nTherefore sin cannot be in the reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there can be no sin except about things which are\nunder our control. Now perfection and defect of reason are not among\nthose things which are under our control: since by nature some are\nmentally deficient, and some shrewd-minded. Therefore no sin is in\nthe reason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that sin is in\nthe lower and in the higher reason.\n\n_I answer that,_ The sin of any power is an act of that power, as we\nhave clearly shown (AA. 1, 2, 3). Now reason has a twofold act: one\nis its proper act in respect of its proper object, and this is the\nact of knowing the truth; the other is the act of reason as directing\nthe other powers. Now in both of these ways there may be sin in the\nreason. First, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which\nerror is imputed to the reason as a sin, when it is in ignorance or\nerror about what it is able and ought to know: secondly, when it\neither commands the inordinate movements of the lower powers, or\ndeliberately fails to check them.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument considers the defect in the proper act of\nthe reason in respect of its proper object, and with regard to the\ncase when it is a defect of knowledge about something which one is\nunable to know: for then this defect of reason is not a sin, and\nexcuses from sin, as is evident with regard to the actions of madmen.\nIf, however, the defect of reason be about something which a man is\nable and ought to know, he is not altogether excused from sin, and\nthe defect is imputed to him as a sin. The defect which belongs only\nto the act of directing the other powers, is always imputed to reason\nas a sin, because it can always obviate this defect by means of its\nproper act.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 17, A. 1), when we were treating of\nthe acts of the will and reason, the will moves and precedes the\nreason, in one way, and the reason moves and precedes the will in\nanother: so that both the movement of the will can be called\nrational, and the act of the reason, voluntary. Accordingly sin is\nfound in the reason, either through being a voluntary defect of the\nreason, or through the reason being the principle of the will's act.\n\nThe Reply to the Third Objection is evident from what has been said\n(ad 1).\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Sin of Morose Delectation Is in the Reason?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the sin of morose delectation is not\nin the reason. For delectation denotes a movement of the appetitive\npower, as stated above (Q. 31, A. 1). But the appetitive power is\ndistinct from the reason, which is an apprehensive power. Therefore\nmorose delectation is not in the reason.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the object shows to which power an act belongs,\nsince it is through the act that the power is directed to its object.\nNow a morose delectation is sometimes about sensible goods, and not\nabout the goods of the reason. Therefore the sin of morose\ndelectation is not in the reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a thing is said to be morose [*From the Latin\n_mora_--delay] through taking a length of time. But length of time is\nno reason why an act should belong to a particular power. Therefore\nmorose delectation does not belong to the reason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12) that \"if the\nconsent to a sensual delectation goes no further than the mere\nthought of the pleasure, I deem this to be like as though the woman\nalone had partaken of the forbidden fruit.\" Now \"the woman\" denotes\nthe lower reason, as he himself explains (De Trin. xii, 12).\nTherefore the sin of morose delectation is in the reason.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated (A. 5), sin may be in the reason, not only\nin respect of reason's proper act, but sometimes in respect of its\ndirecting human actions. Now it is evident that reason directs not\nonly external acts, but also internal passions. Consequently when the\nreason fails in directing the internal passions, sin is said to be in\nthe reason, as also when it fails in directing external actions. Now\nit fails, in two ways, in directing internal passions: first, when it\ncommands unlawful passions; for instance, when a man deliberately\nprovokes himself to a movement of anger, or of lust: secondly, when\nit fails to check the unlawful movement of a passion; for instance,\nwhen a man, having deliberately considered that a rising movement of\npassion is inordinate, continues, notwithstanding, to dwell\n(_immoratur_) upon it, and fails to drive it away. And in this sense\nthe sin of morose delectation is said to be in the reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Delectation is indeed in the appetitive power as its\nproximate principle; but it is in the reason as its first mover, in\naccordance with what has been stated above (A. 1), viz. that actions\nwhich do not pass into external matter are subjected in their\nprinciples.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Reason has its proper elicited act about its proper\nobject; but it exercises the direction of all the objects of those\nlower powers that can be directed by the reason: and accordingly\ndelectation about sensible objects comes also under the direction of\nreason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Delectation is said to be morose not from a delay of\ntime, but because the reason in deliberating dwells (_immoratur_)\nthereon, and fails to drive it away, \"deliberately holding and\nturning over what should have been cast aside as soon as it touched\nthe mind,\" as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12).\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Sin of Consent to the Act Is in the Higher Reason?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the sin of consent to the act is not\nin the higher reason. For consent is an act of the appetitive power,\nas stated above (Q. 15, A. 1): whereas the reason is an apprehensive\npower. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not in the higher\nreason.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"the higher reason is intent on contemplating and\nconsulting the eternal law,\" as Augustine states (De Trin. xii, 7).\n[*_Rationes aeternae,_ cf. I, Q. 15, AA. 2, 3, where as in similar\npassages _ratio_ has been rendered by the English _type,_ because St.\nThomas was speaking of the Divine _idea_ as the archetype of the\ncreature. Hence the type or idea is a rule of conduct, and is\nidentified with the eternal law, (cf. A. 8, Obj. 1; A. 9)]. But\nsometimes consent is given to an act, without consulting the eternal\nlaw: since man does not always think about Divine things, whenever he\nconsents to an act. Therefore the sin of consent to the act is not\nalways in the higher reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as man can regulate his external actions\naccording to the eternal law, so can he regulate his internal\npleasures or other passions. But \"consent to a pleasure without\ndeciding to fulfil it by deed, belongs to the lower reason,\" as\nAugustine states (De Trin. xii, 2). Therefore the consent to a sinful\nact should also be sometimes ascribed to the lower reason.\n\nObj. 4: Further, just as the higher reason excels the lower, so does\nthe reason excel the imagination. Now sometimes man proceeds to act\nthrough the apprehension of the power of imagination, without any\ndeliberation of his reason, as when, without premeditation, he moves\nhis hand, or foot. Therefore sometimes also the lower reason may\nconsent to a sinful act, independently of the higher reason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 12): \"If the consent\nto the evil use of things that can be perceived by the bodily senses,\nso far approves of any sin, as to point, if possible, to its\nconsummation by deed, we are to understand that the woman has offered\nthe forbidden fruit to her husband.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Consent implies a judgment about the thing to which\nconsent is given. For just as the speculative reason judges and\ndelivers its sentence about intelligible matters, so the practical\nreason judges and pronounces sentence on matters of action. Now we\nmust observe that in every case brought up for judgment, the final\nsentence belongs to the supreme court, even as we see that in\nspeculative matters the final sentence touching any proposition is\ndelivered by referring it to the first principles; since, so long as\nthere remains a yet higher principle, the question can yet be\nsubmitted to it: wherefore the judgment is still in suspense, the\nfinal sentence not being as yet pronounced. But it is evident that\nhuman acts can be regulated by the rule of human reason, which rule\nis derived from the created things that man knows naturally; and\nfurther still, from the rule of the Divine law, as stated above (Q.\n19, A. 4). Consequently, since the rule of the Divine law is the\nhigher rule, it follows that the ultimate sentence, whereby the\njudgment is finally pronounced, belongs to the higher reason which is\nintent on the eternal types. Now when judgment has to be pronounced\non several points, the final judgment deals with that which comes\nlast; and, in human acts, the action itself comes last, and the\ndelectation which is the inducement to the action is a preamble\nthereto. Therefore the consent to an action belongs properly to the\nhigher reason, while the preliminary judgment which is about the\ndelectation belongs to the lower reason, which delivers judgment in a\nlower court: although the higher reason can also judge of the\ndelectation, since whatever is subject to the judgment of the lower\ncourt, is subject also to the judgment of the higher court, but not\nconversely.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Consent is an act of the appetitive power, not\nabsolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and\njudging, as stated above (Q. 15, A. 3). Because the fact that the\nconsent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact that the will\ntends to that upon which the reason has already passed its judgment.\nHence consent may be ascribed both to the will and to the reason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The higher reason is said to consent, from the very\nfact that it fails to direct the human act according to the Divine\nlaw, whether or not it advert to the eternal law. For if it thinks of\nGod's law, it holds it in actual contempt: and if not, it neglects it\nby a kind of omission. Therefore the consent to a sinful act always\nproceeds from the higher reason: because, as Augustine says (De Trin.\nxii, 12), \"the mind cannot effectively decide on the commission of a\nsin, unless by its consent, whereby it wields its sovereign power of\nmoving the members to action, or of restraining them from action, it\nbecome the servant or slave of the evil deed.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The higher reason, by considering the eternal law, can\ndirect or restrain the internal delectation, even as it can direct or\nrestrain the external action: nevertheless, before the judgment of\nthe higher reason is pronounced the lower reason, while deliberating\nthe matter in reference to temporal principles, sometimes approves of\nthis delectation: and then the consent to the delectation belongs to\nthe lower reason. If, however, after considering the eternal law, man\npersists in giving the same consent, such consent will then belong to\nthe higher reason.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The apprehension of the power of imagination is sudden\nand indeliberate: wherefore it can cause an act before the higher or\nlower reason has time to deliberate. But the judgment of the lower\nreason is deliberate, and so requires time, during which the higher\nreason can also deliberate; consequently, if by its deliberation it\ndoes not check the sinful act, this will deservedly be imputed to it.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Consent to Delectation Is a Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that consent to delectation is not a\nmortal sin, for consent to delectation belongs to the lower reason,\nwhich does not consider the eternal types, i.e. the eternal law, and\nconsequently does not turn away from them. Now every mortal sin\nconsists in turning away from the Divine law, as is evident from\nAugustine's definition of mortal sin, which was quoted above (Q. 71,\nA. 6). Therefore consent to delectation is not a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, consent to a thing is not evil, unless the thing to\nwhich consent is given be evil. Now \"the cause of anything being such\nis yet more so,\" or at any rate not less. Consequently the thing to\nwhich a man consents cannot be a lesser evil than his consent. But\ndelectation without deed is not a mortal sin, but only a venial sin.\nTherefore neither is the consent to the delectation a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, delectations differ in goodness and malice,\naccording to the difference of the deeds, as the Philosopher states\n(Ethic. x, 3, 5). Now the inward thought is one thing, and the\noutward deed, e.g. fornication, is another. Therefore the delectation\nconsequent to the act of inward thought, differs in goodness and\nmalice from the pleasure of fornication, as much as the inward\nthought differs from the outward deed; and consequently there is a\nlike difference of consent on either hand. But the inward thought is\nnot a mortal sin, nor is the consent to that thought: and therefore\nneither is the consent to the delectation.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the external act of fornication or adultery is a\nmortal sin, not by reason of the delectation, since this is found\nalso in the marriage act, but by reason of an inordinateness in the\nact itself. Now he that consents to the delectation does not, for\nthis reason, consent to the inordinateness of the act. Therefore he\nseems not to sin mortally.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the sin of murder is more grievous than simple\nfornication. Now it is not a mortal sin to consent to the delectation\nresulting from the thought of murder. Much less therefore is it a\nmortal sin to consent to the delectation resulting from the thought\nof fornication.\n\nObj. 6: Further, the Lord's prayer is recited every day for the\nremission of venial sins, as Augustine asserts (Enchiridion lxxviii).\nNow Augustine teaches that consent to delectation may be driven away\nby means of the Lord's Prayer: for he says (De Trin. xii, 12) that\n\"this sin is much less grievous than if it be decided to fulfil it by\ndeed: wherefore we ought to ask pardon for such thoughts also, and we\nshould strike our breasts and say: 'Forgive us our trespasses.'\"\nTherefore consent to delectation is a venial sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine adds after a few words: \"Man will be\naltogether lost unless, through the grace of the Mediator, he be\nforgiven those things which are deemed mere sins of thought, since\nwithout the will to do them, he desires nevertheless to enjoy them.\"\nBut no man is lost except through mortal sin. Therefore consent to\ndelectation is a mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ There have been various opinions on this point, for\nsome have held that consent to delectation is not a mortal sin, but\nonly a venial sin, while others have held it to be a mortal sin, and\nthis opinion is more common and more probable. For we must take note\nthat since every delectation results from some action, as stated in\n_Ethic._ x, 4, and again, that since every delectation may be\ncompared to two things, viz. to the operation from which it results,\nand to the object in which a person takes delight. Now it happens\nthat an action, just as a thing, is an object of delectation, because\nthe action itself can be considered as a good and an end, in which\nthe person who delights in it, rests. Sometimes the action itself,\nwhich results in delectation, is the object of delectation, in so far\nas the appetitive power, to which it belongs to take delight in\nanything, is brought to bear on the action itself as a good: for\ninstance, when a man thinks and delights in his thought, in so far as\nhis thought pleases him; while at other times the delight consequent\nto an action, e.g. a thought, has for its object another action, as\nbeing the object of his thought; and then his thought proceeds from\nthe inclination of the appetite, not indeed to the thought, but to\nthe action thought of. Accordingly a man who is thinking of\nfornication, may delight in either of two things: first, in the\nthought itself, secondly, in the fornication thought of. Now the\ndelectation in the thought itself results from the inclination of the\nappetite to the thought; and the thought itself is not in itself a\nmortal sin; sometimes indeed it is only a venial sin, as when a man\nthinks of such a thing for no purpose; and sometimes it is no sin at\nall, as when a man has a purpose in thinking of it; for instance, he\nmay wish to preach or dispute about it. Consequently such affection\nor delectation in respect of the thought of fornication is not a\nmortal sin in virtue of its genus, but is sometimes a venial sin and\nsometimes no sin at all: wherefore neither is it a mortal sin to\nconsent to such a thought. In this sense the first opinion is true.\n\nBut that a man in thinking of fornication takes pleasure in the act\nthought of, is due to his desire being inclined to this act.\nWherefore the fact that a man consents to such a delectation, amounts\nto nothing less than a consent to the inclination of his appetite to\nfornication: for no man takes pleasure except in that which is in\nconformity with his appetite. Now it is a mortal sin, if a man\ndeliberately chooses that his appetite be conformed to what is in\nitself a mortal sin. Wherefore such a consent to delectation in a\nmortal sin, is itself a mortal sin, as the second opinion maintains.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Consent to delectation may be not only in the lower\nreason, but also in the higher reason, as stated above (A. 7).\nNevertheless the lower reason may turn away from the eternal types,\nfor, though it is not intent on them, as regulating according to\nthem, which is proper to the higher reason, yet, it is intent on\nthem, as being regulated according to them: and by turning from them\nin this sense, it may sin mortally; since even the acts of the lower\npowers and of the external members may be mortal sins, in so far as\nthe direction of the higher reason fails in directing them according\nto the eternal types.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Consent to a sin that is venial in its genus, is itself\na venial sin, and accordingly one may conclude that the consent to\ntake pleasure in a useless thought about fornication, is a venial\nsin. But delectation in the act itself of fornication is, in its\ngenus, a mortal sin: and that it be a venial sin before the consent\nis given, is accidental, viz. on account of the incompleteness of the\nact: which incompleteness ceases when the deliberate consent has been\ngiven, so that therefore it has its complete nature and is a mortal\nsin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers the delectation which has the\nthought for its object.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The delectation which has an external act for its\nobject, cannot be without complacency in the external act as such,\neven though there be no decision to fulfil it, on account of the\nprohibition of some higher authority: wherefore the act is\ninordinate, and consequently the delectation will be inordinate also.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The consent to delectation, resulting from complacency\nin an act of murder thought of, is a mortal sin also: but not the\nconsent to delectation resulting from complacency in the thought of\nmurder.\n\nReply Obj. 6: The Lord's Prayer is to be said in order that we may\nbe preserved not only from venial sin, but also from mortal sin.\n________________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 9]\n\nWhether There Can Be Venial Sin in the Higher Reason As Directing\nthe Lower Powers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there cannot be venial sin in the\nhigher reason as directing the lower powers, i.e. as consenting to a\nsinful act. For Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7) that the \"higher\nreason is intent on considering and consulting the eternal law.\" But\nmortal sin consists in turning away from the eternal law. Therefore\nit seems that there can be no other than mortal sin in the higher\nreason.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the higher reason is the principle of the spiritual\nlife, as the heart is of the body's life. But the diseases of the\nheart are deadly. Therefore the sins of the higher reason are mortal.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a venial sin becomes a mortal sin if it be done out\nof contempt. But it would seem impossible to commit even a venial\nsin, deliberately, without contempt. Since then the consent of the\nhigher reason is always accompanied by deliberate consideration of\nthe eternal law, it seems that it cannot be without mortal sin, on\naccount of the contempt of the Divine law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Consent to a sinful act belongs to the higher\nreason, as stated above (A. 7). But consent to an act of venial sin\nis itself a venial sin. Therefore a venial sin can be in the higher\nreason.\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 7), the higher\nreason \"is intent on contemplating or consulting the eternal law\"; it\ncontemplates it by considering its truth; it consults it by judging\nand directing other things according to it: and to this pertains the\nfact that by deliberating through the eternal types, it consents to\nan act or dissents from it. Now it may happen that the inordinateness\nof the act to which it consents, is not contrary to the eternal law,\nin the same way as mortal sin is, because it does not imply aversion\nfrom the last end, but is beside that law, as an act of venial sin\nis. Therefore when the higher reason consents to the act of a venial\nsin, it does not turn away from the eternal law: wherefore it sins,\nnot mortally, but venially.\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Disease of the heart is twofold: one which is in the\nvery substance of the heart, and affects its natural consistency, and\nsuch a disease is always mortal: the other is a disease of the heart\nconsisting in some disorder either of the movement or of the parts\nsurrounding the heart, and such a disease is not always mortal. In\nlike manner there is mortal sin in the higher reason whenever the\norder itself of the higher reason to its proper object which is the\neternal law, is destroyed; but when the disorder leaves this\nuntouched, the sin is not mortal but venial.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Deliberate consent to a sin does not always amount to\ncontempt of the Divine law, but only when the sin is contrary to the\nDivine law.\n________________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 74, Art. 10]\n\nWhether Venial Sin Can Be in the Higher Reason As Such?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that venial sin cannot be in the higher\nreason as such, i.e. as considering the eternal law. For the act of a\npower is not found to fail except that power be inordinately disposed\nwith regard to its object. Now the object of the higher reason is the\neternal law, in respect of which there can be no disorder without\nmortal sin. Therefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason\nas such.\n\nObj. 2: Further, since the reason is a deliberative power, there can\nbe no act of reason without deliberation. Now every inordinate\nmovement in things concerning God, if it be deliberate, is a mortal\nsin. Therefore venial sin is never in the higher reason as such.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it happens sometimes that a sin which takes us\nunawares, is a venial sin. Now a deliberate sin is a mortal sin,\nthrough the reason, in deliberating, having recourse to some higher\ngood, by acting against which, man sins more grievously; just as when\nthe reason in deliberating about an inordinate pleasurable act,\nconsiders that it is contrary to the law of God, it sins more\ngrievously in consenting, than if it only considered that it is\ncontrary to moral virtue. But the higher reason cannot have recourse\nto any higher tribunal than its own object. Therefore if a movement\nthat takes us unawares is not a mortal sin, neither will the\nsubsequent deliberation make it a mortal sin; which is clearly false.\nTherefore there can be no venial sin in the higher reason as such.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A sudden movement of unbelief is a venial sin. But\nit belongs to the higher reason as such. Therefore there can be a\nvenial sin in the higher reason as such.\n\n_I answer that,_ The higher reason regards its own object otherwise\nthan the objects of the lower powers that are directed by the higher\nreason. For it does not regard the objects of the lower powers,\nexcept in so far as it consults the eternal law about them, and so it\ndoes not regard them save by way of deliberation. Now deliberate\nconsent to what is a mortal sin in its genus, is itself a mortal sin;\nand consequently the higher reason always sins mortally, if the acts\nof the lower powers to which it consents are mortal sins.\n\nWith regard to its own object it has a twofold act, viz. simple\n_intuition,_ and _deliberation,_ in respect of which it again\nconsults the eternal law about its own object. But in respect of\nsimple intuition, it can have an inordinate movement about Divine\nthings, as when a man suffers a sudden movement of unbelief. And\nalthough unbelief, in its genus, is a mortal sin, yet a sudden\nmovement of unbelief is a venial sin, because there is no mortal sin\nunless it be contrary to the law of God. Now it is possible for one\nof the articles of faith to present itself to the reason suddenly\nunder some other aspect, before the eternal law, i.e. the law of God,\nis consulted, or can be consulted, on the matter; as, for instance,\nwhen a man suddenly apprehends the resurrection of the dead as\nimpossible naturally, and rejects it, as soon as he had thus\napprehended it, before he has had time to deliberate and consider\nthat this is proposed to our belief in accordance with the Divine\nlaw. If, however, the movement of unbelief remains after this\ndeliberation, it is a mortal sin. Therefore, in sudden movements, the\nhigher reason may sin venially in respect of its proper object, even\nif it be a mortal sin in its genus; or it may sin mortally in giving\na deliberate consent; but in things pertaining to the lower powers,\nit always sins mortally, in things which are mortal sins in their\ngenus, but not in those which are venial sins in their genus.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A sin which is against the eternal law, though it be\nmortal in its genus, may nevertheless be venial, on account of the\nincompleteness of a sudden action, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In matters of action, the simple intuition of the\nprinciples from which deliberation proceeds, belongs to the reason,\nas well as the act of deliberation: even as in speculative matters it\nbelongs to the reason both to syllogize and to form propositions:\nconsequently the reason also can have a sudden movement.\n\nReply Obj. 3: One and the same thing may be the subject of different\nconsiderations, of which one is higher than the other; thus the\nexistence of God may be considered, either as possible to be known by\nthe human reason, or as delivered to us by Divine revelation, which\nis a higher consideration. And therefore, although the object of the\nhigher reason is, in its nature, something sublime, yet it is\nreducible to some yet higher consideration: and in this way, that\nwhich in the sudden movement was not a mortal sin, becomes a mortal\nsin in virtue of the deliberation which brought it into the light of\na higher consideration, as was explained above.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 75\n\nOF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN GENERAL\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in\nparticular. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether sin has a cause?\n\n(2) Whether it has an internal cause?\n\n(3) Whether it has an external cause?\n\n(4) Whether one sin is the cause of another?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 75, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Sin Has a Cause?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sin has no cause. For sin has the\nnature of evil, as stated above (Q. 71, A. 6). But evil has no cause,\nas Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore sin has no cause.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a cause is that from which something follows of\nnecessity. Now that which is of necessity, seems to be no sin, for\nevery sin is voluntary. Therefore sin has no cause.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if sin has a cause, this cause is either good or\nevil. It is not a good, because good produces nothing but good, for\n\"a good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit\" (Matt. 7:18). Likewise\nneither can evil be the cause of sin, because the evil of punishment\nis a sequel to sin, and the evil of guilt is the same as sin.\nTherefore sin has no cause.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Whatever is done has a cause, for, according to\nJob 5:6, \"nothing upon earth is done without a cause.\" But sin is\nsomething done; since it a \"word, deed, or desire contrary to the law\nof God.\" Therefore sin has a cause.\n\n_I answer that,_ A sin is an inordinate act. Accordingly, so far as\nit is an act, it can have a direct cause, even as any other act; but,\nso far as it is inordinate, it has a cause, in the same way as a\nnegation or privation can have a cause. Now two causes may be\nassigned to a negation: in the first place, absence of the cause of\naffirmation; i.e. the negation of the cause itself, is the cause of\nthe negation in itself; since the result of removing the cause is the\nremoval of the effect: thus the absence of the sun is the cause of\ndarkness. In the second place, the cause of an affirmation, of which\na negation is a sequel, is the accidental cause of the resulting\nnegation: thus fire by causing heat in virtue of its principal\ntendency, consequently causes a privation of cold. The first of these\nsuffices to cause a simple negation. But, since the inordinateness of\nsin and of every evil is not a simple negation, but the privation of\nthat which something ought naturally to have, such an inordinateness\nmust needs have an accidental efficient cause. For that which\nnaturally is and ought to be in a thing, is never lacking except on\naccount of some impeding cause. And accordingly we are wont to say\nthat evil, which consists in a certain privation, has a deficient\ncause, or an accidental efficient cause. Now every accidental cause\nis reducible to the direct cause. Since then sin, on the part of its\ninordinateness, has an accidental efficient cause, and on the part of\nthe act, a direct efficient cause, it follows that the inordinateness\nof sin is a result of the cause of the act. Accordingly then, the\nwill lacking the direction of the rule of reason and of the Divine\nlaw, and intent on some mutable good, causes the act of sin directly,\nand the inordinateness of the act, indirectly, and beside the\nintention: for the lack of order in the act results from the lack of\ndirection in the will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sin signifies not only the privation of good, which\nprivation is its inordinateness, but also the act which is the\nsubject of that privation, which has the nature of evil: and how this\nevil has a cause, has been explained.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If this definition is to be verified in all cases, it\nmust be understood as applying to a cause which is sufficient and not\nimpeded. For it happens that a thing is the sufficient cause of\nsomething else, and that the effect does not follow of necessity, on\naccount of some supervening impediment: else it would follow that all\nthings happen of necessity, as is proved in _Metaph._ vi, text. 5.\nAccordingly, though sin has a cause, it does not follow that this is\na necessary cause, since its effect can be impeded.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above, the will in failing to apply the rule\nof reason or of the Divine law, is the cause of sin. Now the fact of\nnot applying the rule of reason or of the Divine law, has not in\nitself the nature of evil, whether of punishment or of guilt, before\nit is applied to the act. Wherefore accordingly, evil is not the\ncause of the first sin, but some good lacking some other good.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 75, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Sin Has an Internal Cause?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sin has no internal cause. For that\nwhich is within a thing is always in it. If therefore sin had an\ninternal cause, man would always be sinning, since given the cause,\nthe effect follows.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a thing is not its own cause. But the internal\nmovements of a man are sins. Therefore they are not the cause of sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever is within man is either natural or\nvoluntary. Now that which is natural cannot be the cause of sin, for\nsin is contrary to nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 3;\niv, 21); while that which is voluntary, if it be inordinate, is\nalready a sin. Therefore nothing intrinsic can be the cause of the\nfirst sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Duabus Anim. x, 10, 11;\nRetract. i, 9) that \"the will is the cause of sin.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the direct cause of sin must\nbe considered on the part of the act. Now we may distinguish a\ntwofold internal cause of human acts, one remote, the other\nproximate. The proximate internal cause of the human act is the\nreason and will, in respect of which man has a free-will; while the\nremote cause is the apprehension of the sensitive part, and also the\nsensitive appetite. For just as it is due to the judgment of reason,\nthat the will is moved to something in accord with reason, so it is\ndue to an apprehension of the senses that the sensitive appetite is\ninclined to something; which inclination sometimes influences the\nwill and reason, as we shall explain further on (Q. 77, A. 1).\nAccordingly a double interior cause of sin may be assigned; one\nproximate, on the part of the reason and will; and the other remote,\non the part of the imagination or sensitive appetite.\n\nBut since we have said above (A. 1, ad 3) that the cause of sin is\nsome apparent good as motive, yet lacking the due motive, viz. the\nrule of reason or the Divine law, this motive which is an apparent\ngood, appertains to the apprehension of the senses and to the\nappetite; while the lack of the due rule appertains to the reason,\nwhose nature it is to consider this rule; and the completeness of the\nvoluntary sinful act appertains to the will, so that the act of the\nwill, given the conditions we have just mentioned, is already a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: That which is within a thing as its natural power, is\nalways in it: but that which is within it, as the internal act of the\nappetitive or apprehensive power, is not always in it. Now the power\nof the will is the potential cause of sin, but is made actual by the\npreceding movements, both of the sensitive part, in the first place,\nand afterwards, of the reason. For it is because a thing is proposed\nas appetible to the senses, and because the appetite is inclined,\nthat the reason sometimes fails to consider the due rule, so that the\nwill produces the act of sin. Since therefore the movements that\nprecede it are not always actual, neither is man always actually\nsinning.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is not true that all the internal acts belong to the\nsubstance of sin, for this consists principally in the act of the\nwill; but some precede and some follow the sin itself.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That which causes sin, as a power produces its act, is\nnatural; and again, the movement of the sensitive part, from which\nsin follows, is natural sometimes, as, for instance, when anyone sins\nthrough appetite for food. Yet sin results in being unnatural from\nthe very fact that the natural rule fails, which man, in accord with\nhis nature, ought to observe.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 75, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Sin Has an External Cause?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sin has no external cause. For sin is\na voluntary act. Now voluntary acts belong to principles that are\nwithin us, so that they have no external cause. Therefore sin has no\nexternal cause.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as nature is an internal principle, so is the will.\nNow in natural things sin can be due to no other than an internal\ncause; for instance, the birth of a monster is due to the corruption\nof some internal principle. Therefore in the moral order, sin can\narise from no other than an internal cause. Therefore it has no\nexternal cause.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the cause is multiplied, the effect is\nmultiplied. Now the more numerous and weighty the external\ninducements to sin are, the less is a man's inordinate act imputed\nto him as a sin. Therefore nothing external is a cause of sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Num. 21:16): \"Are not these they,\nthat deceived the children of Israel by the counsel of Balaam, and\nmade you transgress against the Lord by the sin of Phogor?\" Therefore\nsomething external can be a cause of sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the internal cause of sin is\nboth the will, as completing the sinful act, and the reason, as\nlacking the due rule, and the appetite, as inclining to sin.\nAccordingly something external might be a cause of sin in three ways,\neither by moving the will itself immediately, or by moving the\nreason, or by moving the sensitive appetite. Now, as stated above (Q.\n9, A. 6; Q. 10, A. 4), none can move the will inwardly save God\nalone, who cannot be a cause of sin, as we shall prove further on (Q.\n79, A. 1). Hence it follows that nothing external can be a cause of\nsin, except by moving the reason, as a man or devil by enticing to\nsin; or by moving the sensitive appetite, as certain external\nsensibles move it. Yet neither does external enticement move the\nreason, of necessity, in matters of action, nor do things proposed\nexternally, of necessity move the sensitive appetite, except perhaps\nit be disposed thereto in a certain way; and even the sensitive\nappetite does not, of necessity, move the reason and will. Therefore\nsomething external can be a cause moving to sin, but not so as to be\na sufficient cause thereof: and the will alone is the sufficient\ncompletive cause of sin being accomplished.\n\nReply Obj. 1: From the very fact that the external motive causes of\nsin do not lead to sin sufficiently and necessarily, it follows that\nit remains in our power to sin or not to sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The fact that sin has an internal cause does not\nprevent its having an external cause; for nothing external is a cause\nof sin, except through the medium of the internal cause, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If the external causes inclining to sin be multiplied,\nthe sinful acts are multiplied, because they incline to the sinful\nact in both greater numbers and greater frequency. Nevertheless the\ncharacter of guilt is lessened, since this depends on the act being\nvoluntary and in our power.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 75, Art. 4]\n\nWhether One Sin Is a Cause of Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one sin cannot be the cause of\nanother. For there are four kinds of cause, none of which will fit in\nwith one sin causing another. Because the end has the character of\ngood; which is inconsistent with sin, which has the character of evil.\nIn like manner neither can a sin be an efficient cause, since \"evil is\nnot an efficient cause, but is weak and powerless,\" as Dionysius\ndeclares (Div. Nom. iv). The material and formal cause seems to have\nno place except in natural bodies, which are composed of matter and\nform. Therefore sin cannot have either a material or a formal cause.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"to produce its like belongs to a perfect\nthing,\" as stated in _Meteor._ iv, 2 [*Cf. _De Anima_ ii.]. But sin is\nessentially something imperfect. Therefore one sin cannot be a cause\nof another.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if one sin is the cause of a second sin, in the\nsame way, yet another sin will be the cause of the first, and thus we\ngo on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore one sin is not the\ncause of another.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says on Ezechiel (Hom. xi): \"A sin that is\nnot quickly blotted out by repentance, is both a sin and a cause of\nsin.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Forasmuch as a sin has a cause on the part of the\nact of sin, it is possible for one sin to be the cause of another, in\nthe same way as one human act is the cause of another. Hence it\nhappens that one sin may be the cause of another in respect of the\nfour kinds of causes. First, after the manner of an efficient or\nmoving cause, both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, as that which\nremoves an impediment is called an indirect cause of movement: for\nwhen man, by one sinful act, loses grace, or charity, or shame, or\nanything else that withdraws him from sin, he thereby falls into\nanother sin, so that the first sin is the accidental cause of the\nsecond. Directly, as when, by one sinful act, man is disposed to\ncommit more readily another like act: because acts cause dispositions\nand habits inclining to like acts. Secondly, after the manner of a\nmaterial cause, one sin is the cause of another, by preparing its\nmatter: thus covetousness prepares the matter for strife, which is\noften about the wealth a man has amassed together. Thirdly, after the\nmanner of a final cause, one sin causes another, in so far as a man\ncommits one sin for the sake of another which is his end; as when a\nman is guilty of simony for the end of ambition, or fornication for\nthe purpose of theft. And since the end gives the form to moral\nmatters, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, AA. 4, 6), it follows\nthat one sin is also the formal cause of another: because in the act\nof fornication committed for the purpose of theft, the former is\nmaterial while the latter is formal.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sin, in so far as it is inordinate, has the character\nof evil; but, in so far as it is an act, it has some good, at least\napparent, for its end: so that, as an act, but not as being\ninordinate, it can be the cause, both final and efficient, of another\nsin. A sin has matter, not _of which_ but _about which_ it is: and it\nhas its form from its end. Consequently one sin can be the cause of\nanother, in respect of the four kinds of cause, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sin is something imperfect on account of its moral\nimperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as an\nact it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of\nanother sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Not every cause of one sin is another sin; so there is\nno need to go on indefinitely: for one may come to one sin which is\nnot caused by another sin.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 76\n\nOF THE CAUSES OF SIN, IN PARTICULAR\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the causes of sin, in particular, and (1) The\ninternal causes of sin; (2) its external causes; and (3) sins which\nare the causes of other sins. In view of what has been said above (A.\n2), the first consideration will be threefold: so that in the first\nplace we shall treat of ignorance, which is the cause of sin on the\npart of reason; secondly, of weakness or passion, which is the cause\nof sin on the part of the sensitive appetite; thirdly, of malice,\nwhich is the cause of sin on the part of the will.\n\nUnder the first head, there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether ignorance is a cause of sin?\n\n(2) Whether ignorance is a sin?\n\n(3) Whether it excuses from sin altogether?\n\n(4) Whether it diminishes sin?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 76, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Ignorance Can Be a Cause of Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that ignorance cannot be a cause of sin:\nbecause a non-being is not the cause of anything. Now ignorance is a\nnon-being, since it is a privation of knowledge. Therefore ignorance\nis not a cause of sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, causes of sin should be reckoned in respect of sin\nbeing a _turning to_ something, as was stated above (Q. 75, A. 1).\nNow ignorance seems to savor of _turning away_ from something.\nTherefore it should not be reckoned a cause of sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every sin is seated in the will. Now the will does\nnot turn to that which is not known, because its object is the good\napprehended. Therefore ignorance cannot be a cause of sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii) \"that some\nsin through ignorance.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Phys. viii, 27) a\nmoving cause is twofold, direct and indirect. A direct cause is one\nthat moves by its own power, as the generator is the moving cause of\nheavy and light things. An indirect cause, is either one that removes\nan impediment, or the removal itself of an impediment: and it is in\nthis way that ignorance can be the cause of a sinful act; because it\nis a privation of knowledge perfecting the reason that forbids the\nact of sin, in so far as it directs human acts.\n\nNow we must observe that the reason directs human acts in accordance\nwith a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: because in\nconferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the\nconclusion of which is an act of judgment, or of choice, or an\noperation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion\nof a practical syllogism is a singular proposition. But a singular\nproposition does not follow from a universal proposition, except\nthrough the medium of a particular proposition: thus a man is\nrestrained from an act of parricide, by the knowledge that it is\nwrong to kill one's father, and that this man is his father. Hence\nignorance about either of these two propositions, viz. of the\nuniversal principle which is a rule of reason, or of the particular\ncircumstance, could cause an act of parricide. Hence it is clear that\nnot every kind of ignorance is the cause of a sin, but that alone\nwhich removes the knowledge which would prevent the sinful act.\nConsequently if a man's will be so disposed that he would not be\nrestrained from the act of parricide, even though he recognized his\nfather, his ignorance about his father is not the cause of his\ncommitting the sin, but is concomitant with the sin: wherefore such a\nman sins, not \"through ignorance\" but \"in ignorance,\" as the\nPhilosopher states (Ethic. iii, 1).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Non-being cannot be the direct cause of anything: but\nit can be an accidental cause, as being the removal of an impediment.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, regards\nsin as turning towards something, so too, ignorance of this respect\nof a sin is the cause of that sin, as removing its impediment.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The will cannot turn to that which is absolutely\nunknown: but if something be known in one respect, and unknown in\nanother, the will can will it. It is thus that ignorance is the cause\nof sin: for instance, when a man knows that what he is killing is a\nman, but not that it is his own father; or when one knows that a\ncertain act is pleasurable, but not that it is a sin.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 76, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Ignorance Is a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that ignorance is not a sin. For sin is \"a\nword, deed or desire contrary to God's law,\" as stated above (Q. 71,\nA. 5). Now ignorance does not denote an act, either internal or\nexternal. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sin is more directly opposed to grace than to\nknowledge. Now privation of grace is not a sin, but a punishment\nresulting from sin. Therefore ignorance which is privation of\nknowledge is not a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if ignorance is a sin, this can only be in so far as\nit is voluntary. But if ignorance is a sin, through being voluntary,\nit seems that the sin will consist in the act itself of the will,\nrather than in the ignorance. Therefore the ignorance will not be a\nsin, but rather a result of sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, every sin is taken away by repentance, nor does any\nsin, except only original sin, pass as to guilt, yet remain in act.\nNow ignorance is not removed by repentance, but remains in act, all\nits guilt being removed by repentance. Therefore ignorance is not a\nsin, unless perchance it be original sin.\n\nObj. 5: Further, if ignorance be a sin, then a man will be sinning,\nas long as he remains in ignorance. But ignorance is continual in the\none who is ignorant. Therefore a person in ignorance would be\ncontinually sinning, which is clearly false, else ignorance would be\na most grievous sin. Therefore ignorance is not a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Nothing but sin deserves punishment. But ignorance\ndeserves punishment, according to 1 Cor. 14:38: \"If any man know not,\nhe shall not be known.\" Therefore ignorance is a sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Ignorance differs from nescience, in that nescience\ndenotes mere absence of knowledge; wherefore whoever lacks knowledge\nabout anything, can be said to be nescient about it: in which sense\nDionysius puts nescience in the angels (Coel. Hier. vii). On the\nother hand, ignorance denotes privation of knowledge, i.e. lack of\nknowledge of those things that one has a natural aptitude to know.\nSome of these we are under an obligation to know, those, to wit,\nwithout the knowledge of which we are unable to accomplish a due act\nrightly. Wherefore all are bound in common to know the articles of\nfaith, and the universal principles of right, and each individual is\nbound to know matters regarding his duty or state. Meanwhile there\nare other things which a man may have a natural aptitude to know, yet\nhe is not bound to know them, such as the geometrical theorems, and\ncontingent particulars, except in some individual case. Now it is\nevident that whoever neglects to have or do what he ought to have or\ndo, commits a sin of omission. Wherefore through negligence,\nignorance of what one is bound to know, is a sin; whereas it is not\nimputed as a sin to man, if he fails to know what he is unable to\nknow. Consequently ignorance of such like things is called\n\"invincible,\" because it cannot be overcome by study. For this reason\nsuch like ignorance, not being voluntary, since it is not in our\npower to be rid of it, is not a sin: wherefore it is evident that no\ninvincible ignorance is a sin. On the other hand, vincible ignorance\nis a sin, if it be about matters one is bound to know; but not, if it\nbe about things one is not bound to know.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 71, A. 6, ad 1), when we say that\nsin is a \"word, deed or desire,\" we include the opposite negations,\nby reason of which omissions have the character of sin; so that\nnegligence, in as much as ignorance is a sin, is comprised in the\nabove definition of sin; in so far as one omits to say what one\nought, or to do what one ought, or to desire what one ought, in order\nto acquire the knowledge which we ought to have.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although privation of grace is not a sin in itself, yet\nby reason of negligence in preparing oneself for grace, it may have\nthe character of sin, even as ignorance; nevertheless even here there\nis a difference, since man can acquire knowledge by his acts, whereas\ngrace is not acquired by acts, but by God's favor.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as in a sin of transgression, the sin consists not\nonly in the act of the will, but also in the act willed, which is\ncommanded by the will; so in a sin of omission not only the act of\nthe will is a sin, but also the omission, in so far as it is in some\nway voluntary; and accordingly, the neglect to know, or even lack of\nconsideration is a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Although when the guilt has passed away through\nrepentance, the ignorance remains, according as it is a privation of\nknowledge, nevertheless the negligence does not remain, by reason of\nwhich the ignorance is said to be a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Just as in other sins of omission, man sins actually\nonly at the time at which the affirmative precept is binding, so is\nit with the sin of ignorance. For the ignorant man sins actually\nindeed, not continually, but only at the time for acquiring the\nknowledge that he ought to have.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 76, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Ignorance Excuses from Sin Altogether?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that ignorance excuses from sin\naltogether. For as Augustine says (Retract. i, 9), every sin is\nvoluntary. Now ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above (Q.\n6, A. 8). Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which is done beside the intention, is done\naccidentally. Now the intention cannot be about what is unknown.\nTherefore what a man does through ignorance is accidental in human\nacts. But what is accidental does not give the species. Therefore\nnothing that is done through ignorance in human acts, should be\ndeemed sinful or virtuous.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man is the subject of virtue and sin, inasmuch as he\nis partaker of reason. Now ignorance excludes knowledge which\nperfects the reason. Therefore ignorance excuses from sin altogether.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. iii, 18) that \"some\nthings done through ignorance are rightly reproved.\" Now those things\nalone are rightly reproved which are sins. Therefore some things done\nthrough ignorance are sins. Therefore ignorance does not altogether\nexcuse from sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Ignorance, by its very nature, renders the act which\nit causes involuntary. Now it has already been stated (AA. 1, 2) that\nignorance is said to cause the act which the contrary knowledge would\nhave prevented; so that this act, if knowledge were to hand, would be\ncontrary to the will, which is the meaning of the word involuntary.\nIf, however, the knowledge, which is removed by ignorance, would not\nhave prevented the act, on account of the inclination of the will\nthereto, the lack of this knowledge does not make that man unwilling,\nbut not willing, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 1: and such like\nignorance which is not the cause of the sinful act, as already\nstated, since it does not make the act to be involuntary, does not\nexcuse from sin. The same applies to any ignorance that does not\ncause, but follows or accompanies the sinful act.\n\nOn the other hand, ignorance which is the cause of the act, since it\nmakes it to be involuntary, of its very nature excuses from sin,\nbecause voluntariness is essential to sin. But it may fail to excuse\naltogether from sin, and this for two reasons. First, on the part of\nthe thing itself which is not known. For ignorance excuses from sin,\nin so far as something is not known to be a sin. Now it may happen\nthat a person ignores some circumstance of a sin, the knowledge of\nwhich circumstance would prevent him from sinning, whether it belong\nto the substance of the sin, or not; and nevertheless his knowledge\nis sufficient for him to be aware that the act is sinful; for\ninstance, if a man strike someone, knowing that it is a man (which\nsuffices for it to be sinful) and yet be ignorant of the fact that it\nis his father, (which is a circumstance constituting another species\nof sin); or, suppose that he is unaware that this man will defend\nhimself and strike him back, and that if he had known this, he would\nnot have struck him (which does not affect the sinfulness of the\nact). Wherefore, though this man sins through ignorance, yet he is\nnot altogether excused, because, not withstanding, he has knowledge\nof the sin. Secondly, this may happen on the part of the ignorance\nitself, because, to wit, this ignorance is voluntary, either\ndirectly, as when a man wishes of set purpose to be ignorant of\ncertain things that he may sin the more freely; or indirectly, as\nwhen a man, through stress of work or other occupations, neglects to\nacquire the knowledge which would restrain him from sin. For such\nlike negligence renders the ignorance itself voluntary and sinful,\nprovided it be about matters one is bound and able to know.\nConsequently this ignorance does not altogether excuse from sin. If,\nhowever, the ignorance be such as to be entirely involuntary, either\nthrough being invincible, or through being of matters one is not\nbound to know, then such like ignorance excuses from sin altogether.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated\nabove (Q. 6, A. 8). Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin\naltogether.\n\nReply Obj. 2: So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person,\nthe intention of sin remains in him: so that, in this respect, his\nsin is not accidental.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If the ignorance be such as to exclude the use of\nreason entirely, it excuses from sin altogether, as is the case with\nmadmen and imbeciles: but such is not always the ignorance that\ncauses the sin; and so it does not always excuse from sin altogether.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 76, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Ignorance Diminishes a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that ignorance does not diminish a sin.\nFor that which is common to all sins does not diminish sin. Now\nignorance is common to all sins, for the Philosopher says (Ethic.\niii, 1) that \"every evil man is ignorant.\" Therefore ignorance does\nnot diminish sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, one sin added to another makes a greater sin. But\nignorance is itself a sin, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore it does\nnot diminish a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the same thing does not both aggravate and diminish\nsin. Now ignorance aggravates sin; for Ambrose commenting on Rom.\n2:4, \"Knowest thou not that the benignity of God leadeth thee to\npenance?\" says: \"Thy sin is most grievous if thou knowest not.\"\nTherefore ignorance does not diminish sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, if any kind of ignorance diminishes a sin, this\nwould seem to be chiefly the case as regards the ignorance which\nremoves the use of reason altogether. Now this kind of ignorance does\nnot diminish sin, but increases it: for the Philosopher says (Ethic.\niii, 5) that the \"punishment is doubled for a drunken man.\" Therefore\nignorance does not diminish sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Whatever is a reason for sin to be forgiven,\ndiminishes sin. Now such is ignorance, as is clear from 1 Tim. 1:13:\n\"I obtained . . . mercy . . . because I did it ignorantly.\" Therefore\nignorance diminishes or alleviates sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since every sin is voluntary, ignorance can diminish\nsin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness; and if it does not\nrender it less voluntary, it nowise alleviates the sin. Now it is\nevident that the ignorance which excuses from sin altogether (through\nmaking it altogether involuntary) does not diminish a sin, but does\naway with it altogether. On the other hand, ignorance which is not\nthe cause of the sin being committed, but is concomitant with it,\nneither diminishes nor increases the sin.\n\nTherefore sin cannot be alleviated by any ignorance, but only by such\nas is a cause of the sin being committed, and yet does not excuse\nfrom the sin altogether. Now it happens sometimes that such like\nignorance is directly and essentially voluntary, as when a man is\npurposely ignorant that he may sin more freely, and ignorance of this\nkind seems rather to make the act more voluntary and more sinful,\nsince it is through the will's intention to sin that he is willing to\nbear the hurt of ignorance, for the sake of freedom in sinning.\nSometimes, however, the ignorance which is the cause of a sin being\ncommitted, is not directly voluntary, but indirectly or accidentally,\nas when a man is unwilling to work hard at his studies, the result\nbeing that he is ignorant, or as when a man willfully drinks too much\nwine, the result being that he becomes drunk and indiscreet, and this\nignorance diminishes voluntariness and consequently alleviates the\nsin. For when a thing is not known to be a sin, the will cannot be\nsaid to consent to the sin directly, but only accidentally;\nwherefore, in that case there is less contempt, and therefore less\nsin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The ignorance whereby \"every evil man is ignorant,\" is\nnot the cause of sin being committed, but something resulting from\nthat cause, viz. of the passion or habit inclining to sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: One sin added to another makes more sins, but it does\nnot always make a sin greater, since, perchance, the two sins do not\ncoincide, but are separate. It may happen, if the first diminishes\nthe second, that the two together have not the same gravity as one of\nthem alone would have; thus murder is a more grievous sin if\ncommitted by a man when sober, than if committed by a man when drunk,\nalthough in the latter case there are two sins: because drunkenness\ndiminishes the sinfulness of the resulting sin more than its own\ngravity implies.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The words of Ambrose may be understood as referring to\nsimply affected ignorance; or they may have reference to a species of\nthe sin of ingratitude, the highest degree of which is that man even\nignores the benefits he has received; or again, they may be an\nallusion to the ignorance of unbelief, which undermines the\nfoundation of the spiritual edifice.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The drunken man deserves a \"double punishment\" for the\ntwo sins which he commits, viz. drunkenness, and the sin which\nresults from his drunkenness: and yet drunkenness, on account of the\nignorance connected therewith, diminishes the resulting sin, and\nmore, perhaps, than the gravity of the drunkenness implies, as stated\nabove (ad 2). It might also be said that the words quoted refer to an\nordinance of the legislator named Pittacus, who ordered drunkards to\nbe more severely punished if they assaulted anyone; having an eye,\nnot to the indulgence which the drunkard might claim, but to\nexpediency, since more harm is done by the drunk than by the sober,\nas the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii).\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 77\n\nOF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive\nappetite, as to whether a passion of the soul may be a cause of sin:\nand under this head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether a passion of the sensitive appetite can move or incline\nthe will?\n\n(2) Whether it can overcome the reason against the latter's knowledge?\n\n(3) Whether a sin resulting from a passion is a sin of weakness?\n\n(4) Whether the passion of self-love is the cause of every sin?\n\n(5) Of three causes mentioned in 1 John 2:16: \"Concupiscence of the\neyes, Concupiscence of the flesh,\" and \"Pride of life.\"\n\n(6) Whether the passion which causes a sin diminishes it?\n\n(7) Whether passion excuses from sin altogether?\n\n(8) Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Will Is Moved by a Passion of the Sensitive Appetite?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved by a passion of\nthe sensitive appetite. For no passive power is moved except by its\nobject. Now the will is a power both passive and active, inasmuch as\nit is mover and moved, as the Philosopher says of the appetitive\npower in general (De Anima iii, text. 54). Since therefore the object\nof the will is not a passion of the sensitive appetite, but good\ndefined by the reason, it seems that a passion of the sensitive\nappetite does not move the will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the\nsoul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational\nappetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to\na lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 57) that \"the\nrational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the\nheavenly bodies, one sphere moves another.\" Therefore the will cannot\nbe moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite.\n\nObj. 3: Further, nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is\nmaterial. Now the will is an immaterial power, because it does not\nuse a corporeal organ, since it is in the reason, as stated in _De\nAnima_ iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite is a material\nforce, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a\npassion of the sensitive appetite cannot move the intellective\nappetite.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Dan. 13:56): \"Lust hath perverted\nthy heart.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or\nmove the will directly; but it can do so indirectly, and this in two\nways. First, by a kind of distraction: because, since all the soul's\npowers are rooted in the one essence of the soul, it follows of\nnecessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power\nbecomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both\nbecause all energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the\ncontrary, through being centered on one thing, it is less able to be\ndirected to several; and because, in the operations of the soul, a\ncertain attention is requisite, and if this be closely fixed on one\nthing, less attention is given to another. In this way, by a kind of\ndistraction, when the movement of the sensitive appetite is enforced\nin respect of any passion whatever, the proper movement of the\nrational appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss or\naltogether impeded.\n\nSecondly, this may happen on the part of the will's object, which is\ngood apprehended by reason. Because the judgment and apprehension of\nreason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate\napprehension of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power,\nas appears in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that\nthe apprehension of the imagination and the judgment of the\nestimative power follow the passion of the sensitive appetite, even\nas the verdict of the taste follows the disposition of the tongue:\nfor which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of\npassion, do not easily turn their imagination away from the object of\ntheir emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason often\nfollows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and consequently the\nwill's movement follows it also, since it has a natural inclination\nalways to follow the judgment of the reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not\nthe direct object of the will, yet it occasions a certain change in\nthe judgment about the object of the will, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower;\nbut, in a manner, it can be moved by it indirectly, as stated.\n\nThe Third Objection is solved in like manner.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Reason Can Be Overcome by a Passion, Against Its\nKnowledge?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a\npassion, against its knowledge. For the stronger is not overcome by\nthe weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its certitude, is the\nstrongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a passion,\nwhich is weak and soon passes away.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the will is not directed save to the good or the\napparent good. Now when a passion draws the will to that which is\nreally good, it does not influence the reason against its knowledge;\nand when it draws it to that which is good apparently, but not\nreally, it draws it to that which appears good to the reason. But\nwhat appears to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason.\nTherefore a passion never influences the reason against its knowledge.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if it be said that it draws the reason from its\nknowledge of something in general, to form a contrary judgment about\na particular matter--on the contrary, if a universal and a particular\nproposition be opposed, they are opposed by contradiction, e.g.\n\"Every man,\" and \"Not every man.\" Now if two opinions contradict one\nanother, they are contrary to one another, as stated in _Peri Herm._\nii. If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to\npronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have\ntwo contrary opinions at the same time, which is impossible.\n\nObj. 4: Further, whoever knows the universal, knows also the\nparticular which he knows to be contained in the universal: thus who\nknows that every mule is sterile, knows that this particular animal\nis sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is clear from\n_Poster._ i, text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g.\nthat \"no fornication is lawful,\" knows this general proposition to\ncontain, for example, the particular proposition, \"This is an act of\nfornication.\" Therefore it seems that his knowledge extends to the\nparticular.\n\nObj. 5: Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), \"words\nexpress the thoughts of the mind.\" Now it often happens that man,\nwhile in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is an\nevil, even in that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even\nin particular.\n\nTherefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against\nits universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have\nuniversal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): \"I see another law\nin my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating\nme in the law of sin.\" Now the law that is in the members is\nconcupiscence, of which he had been speaking previously. Since then\nconcupiscence is a passion, it seems that a passion draws the reason\ncounter to its knowledge.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the\nopinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by\npassion; wherefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge,\nand every sin a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right,\nbecause, since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good,\nit is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear\ngood in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend\nto evil, unless there were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it\nis written (Prov. 14:22): \"They err that work evil.\"\n\nExperience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge\nthat they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, according\nto the words of Luke 12:47: \"The servant who knew that the will of\nhis lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes,\"\nand of James 4:17: \"To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it\nnot, to him it is a sin.\" Consequently he was not altogether right,\nand it is necessary, with the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a\ndistinction. Because, since man is directed to right action by a\ntwofold knowledge, viz. universal and particular, a defect in either\nof them suffices to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed,\nas stated above (Q. 76, A. 1). It may happen, then, that a man has\nsome knowledge in general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful, and\nyet he does not know in particular that this act, which is\nfornication, must not be done; and this suffices for the will not to\nfollow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, it must be\nobserved that nothing prevents a thing which is known habitually from\nnot being considered actually: so that it is possible for a man to\nhave correct knowledge not only in general but also in particular,\nand yet not to consider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it\ndoes not seem difficult for a man to act counter to what he does not\nactually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to consider in\nparticular what he knows habitually, may happen through mere lack of\nattention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not attend to\nthe consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to\nconsider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider actually what\nhe knows habitually, on account of some hindrance supervening, e.g.\nsome external occupation, or some bodily infirmity; and, in this way,\na man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider in particular\nwhat he knows in general, in so far as the passions hinder him from\nconsidering it. Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of\ndistraction, as explained above (A. 1). Secondly, by way of\nopposition, because a passion often inclines to something contrary to\nwhat man knows in general. Thirdly, by way of bodily transmutation,\nthe result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered so as not\nto exercise its act freely; even as sleep or drunkenness, on account\nof some change wrought on the body, fetters the use of reason. That\nthis takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that\nsometimes, when the passions are very intense, man loses the use of\nreason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through\nexcess of love or anger. It is in this way that passion draws the\nreason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in\ngeneral.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not\nhold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge,\nsince actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing\nthat, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal\nknowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The fact that something appears good in particular to\nthe reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion: and yet this\nparticular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the\nreason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge\nor true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition, and at the\nsame time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition, or\nvice versa: but it may well happen that a man has true habitual\nknowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and actually a\nfalse opinion about a particular negative: because an act is directly\nopposed, not to a habit, but to an act.\n\nReply Obj. 4: He that has knowledge in a universal, is hindered, on\naccount of a passion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to\ndraw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal\nproposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws\nhis conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii,\n3) that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions,\ntwo particular and two universal, of which one is of the son, e.g. No\nfornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to\nbe pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and hinders it from\narguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the\npassion lasts, the reason argues and concludes under the second.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to\nwords of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to\njudge, his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state\nof passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do so and\nso, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in\n_Ethic._ vii, 3.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 3]\n\nWhether a Sin Committed Through Passion, Should Be Called a Sin of\nWeakness?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a sin committed through passion\nshould not be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement\nmovement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (A. 1). Now\nvehemence of movements is evidence of strength rather than of\nweakness. Therefore a sin committed through passion, should not be\ncalled a sin of weakness.\n\nObj. 2: Further, weakness in man regards that which is most fragile\nin him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written (Ps. 77:39): \"He\nremembered that they are flesh.\" Therefore sins of weakness should be\nthose which result from bodily defects, rather than those which are\ndue to a passion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things\nwhich are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man's will,\nwhether he do or do not the things to which his passions incline him,\naccording to Gen. 4:7: \"Thy appetite shall be under thee [*Vulg.:\n'The lust thereof shall be under thee.'], and thou shalt have dominion\nover it.\" Therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of\nweakness.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls the passions\ndiseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease.\nTherefore a sin that arises from passion should be called a sin of\nweakness.\n\n_I answer that,_ The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in\nwhich, chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul\nby way of likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man's body\nis said to be weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution\nof its proper action, through some disorder of the body's parts, so\nthat the humors and members of the human body cease to be subject to\nits governing and motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak,\nwhen it cannot do the work of a healthy member, the eye, for\ninstance, when it cannot see clearly, as the Philosopher states (De\nHist. Animal. x, 1). Therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul\nis hindered from fulfilling its proper action on account of a\ndisorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the body are said to be\nout of order, when they fail to comply with the order of nature, so\ntoo the parts of the soul are said to be inordinate, when they are\nnot subject to the order of reason, for the reason is the ruling\npower of the soul's parts. Accordingly, when the concupiscible or\nirascible power is affected by any passion contrary to the order of\nreason, the result being that an impediment arises in the aforesaid\nmanner to the due action of man, it is said to be a sin of weakness.\nHence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the incontinent man to\nan epileptic, whose limbs move in a manner contrary to his intention.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as in the body the stronger the movement against\nthe order of nature, the greater the weakness, so likewise, the\nstronger the movement of passion against the order of reason, the\ngreater the weakness of the soul.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which is\nnot hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body may\nhave a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as\nstated above (A. 1). Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we\nrefer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness\nof soul is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to\na condition of the flesh that the passions of the soul arise in us\nthrough the sensitive appetite being a power using a corporeal organ.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is in the will's power to give or refuse its consent\nto what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that our\nappetite is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of\nthe will is hindered in the way already explained (A. 1).\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Self-love Is the Source of Every Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that self-love is not the source of every\nsin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper\ncause of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself:\nwherefore man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself (Lev.\n19:18). Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:8): \"Sin taking occasion by\nthe commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence\"; on which\nwords a gloss says that \"the law is good, since by forbidding\nconcupiscence, it forbids all evils,\" the reason for which is that\nconcupiscence is the cause of every sin. Now concupiscence is a\ndistinct passion from love, as stated above (Q. 3, A. 2; Q. 23, A.\n4). Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine in commenting on Ps. 79:17, \"Things set on\nfire and dug down,\" says that \"every sin is due either to love\narousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing false humility.\"\nTherefore self-love is not the only cause of sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of\nself, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor.\nTherefore self-love is not the cause of every sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that\n\"self-love, amounting to contempt of God, builds up the city of\nBabylon.\" Now every sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore\nself-love is the cause of every sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 75, A. 1), the proper and direct\ncause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a\nmutable good; in which respect every sinful act proceeds from\ninordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone\ndesires a temporal good inordinately, is due to the fact that he\nloves himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love\nhim. Therefore it is evident that inordinate love of self is the\ncause of every sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting\ngood for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate\nself-love, leading to contempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei\nxiv, 28) reckons to be the cause of sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself,\nis reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man is said to love both the good he desires for\nhimself, and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is\ndirected to the object of desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or\nmoney) admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance of\nevil: for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some\ngood, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But each of these is\nreduced to self-love, since it is through loving himself that man\neither desires good things, or avoids evil things.\n\nReply Obj. 4: A friend is like another self (Ethic. ix): wherefore\nthe sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems to be\ncommitted through self-love.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Concupiscence of the Flesh, Concupiscence of the Eyes, and\nPride of Life Are Fittingly Described As Causes of Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that \"concupiscence of the flesh,\nconcupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life\" are unfittingly\ndescribed as causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle (1 Tim.\n6:10), \"covetousness [*Douay: 'The desire of money'] is the root of\nall evils.\" Now pride of life is not included in covetousness.\nTherefore it should not be reckoned among the causes of sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by\nwhat is seen by the eyes, according to Dan. 13:56: \"Beauty hath\ndeceived thee.\" Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be\ncondivided with concupiscence of the flesh.\n\nObj. 3: Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated\nabove (Q. 30, A. 2). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not only\nby the sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore \"concupiscence\nof the hearing\" and of the other senses should also have been\nmentioned.\n\nObj. 4: Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate\ndesire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance of\nevil things, as stated above (A. 4, ad 3). But nothing is mentioned\nhere pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the causes of sin are\ninsufficiently described.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 John 2:16): \"All that is in the\nworld is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulg.: 'and'] pride of\nlife.\" Now a thing is said to be \"in the world\" by reason of sin:\nwherefore it is written (1 John 5:19): \"The whole world is seated in\nwickedness.\" Therefore these three are causes of sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), inordinate self-love is the\ncause of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of good:\nfor a man desires good for the one he loves. Hence it is evident that\ninordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in\ntwo ways, the object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the\npassions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as\nit is the object of the concupiscible part; secondly, under the\naspect of difficulty, according as it is the object of the irascible\npart, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 1). Again, concupiscence is twofold,\nas stated above (Q. 30, A. 3). One is natural, and is directed to\nthose things which sustain the nature of the body, whether as regards\nthe preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the\nlike, or as regards the preservation of the species, such as sexual\nmatters: and the inordinate appetite of such things is called\n\"concupiscence of the flesh.\" The other is spiritual concupiscence,\nand is directed to those things which do not afford sustentation or\npleasure in respect of the fleshly senses, but are delectable in\nrespect of the apprehension or imagination, or some similar mode of\nperception; such are money, apparel, and the like; and this spiritual\nconcupiscence is called \"concupiscence of the eyes,\" whether this be\ntaken as referring to the sight itself, of which the eyes are the\norgan, so as to denote curiosity according to Augustine's exposition\n(Confess. x); or to the concupiscence of things which are proposed\noutwardly to the eyes, so as to denote covetousness, according to the\nexplanation of others.\n\nThe inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the \"pride of\nlife\"; for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence, as we\nshall state further on (Q. 84, A. 2; II-II, Q. 162, A. 1).\n\nIt is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can\nbe reduced to these three: since all the passions of the\nconcupiscible part can be reduced to the first two, and all the\nirascible passions to the third, which is not divided into two\nbecause all the irascible passions conform to spiritual concupiscence.\n\nReply Obj. 1: \"Pride of life\" is included in covetousness according\nas the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of good. How\ncovetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of \"avarice,\"\nis the root of all sins, shall be explained further on (Q. 84, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 2: \"Concupiscence of the eyes\" does not mean here the\nconcupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but only\nfor such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of touch,\nbut in respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The sense of sight is the most excellent of all the\nsenses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in _Metaph._ i: and so\nits name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the\ninner apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm.\nxxxiii).\n\nReply Obj. 4: Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for good,\nas stated above (Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 39, A. 2); and so those passions\nalone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the causes of\nthose which cause inordinately the avoidance of evil.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Sin Is Alleviated on Account of a Passion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of\npassion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot\nthing causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now\npassion is a cause of sin, as stated (A. 5). Therefore the more\nintense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not\ndiminish sin, but increases it.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to merit,\nas an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases merit:\nfor a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a\ngreater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil passion also\nincreases rather than diminishes a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according as\nhe sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels the\nwill makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act.\nTherefore passion aggravates a sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The passion of concupiscence is called a\ntemptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that\novercomes a man, the less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De\nCiv. Dei iv, 12).\n\n_I answer that,_ Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will,\nwhich is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a\nmovement of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be\nrelated to the free-will, antecedently and consequently:\nantecedently, according as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws\nor inclines the reason or will, as stated above (AA. 1, 2; Q. 10, A.\n3); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the higher powers\nredound on to the lower, since it is not possible for the will to be\nmoved to anything intensely, without a passion being aroused in the\nsensitive appetite.\n\nAccordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must\nneeds diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so far as it is\nvoluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our\ncontrol, through the reason and will: and therefore the more the\nreason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the\nimpulse of a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our control.\nIn this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes\nits voluntariness.\n\nOn the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but\nincreases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, in so far, to\nwit, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act;\nand so it is true that the greater the pleasure or the concupiscence\nwith which anyone sins, the greater the sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that to\nwhich the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the\npart of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his\nturning to something else--accidentally, i.e. beside his intention.\nNow an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental\ncause, but of its direct cause.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A good passion consequent to the judgment of reason\nincreases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do\nwell, rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such\na passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the movement of the will incited by the\npassion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own\nmovement, as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Passion Excuses from Sin Altogether?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether.\nFor whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin\naltogether. But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes\nan act to be involuntary, according to Gal. 5:17: \"The flesh lusteth\nagainst the spirit . . . so that you do not the things that you\nwould.\" Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether.\n\nObj. 2: Further, passion causes a certain ignorance of a particular\nmatter, as stated above (A. 2; Q. 76, A. 3). But ignorance of a\nparticular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated above (Q. 6,\nA. 8). Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether.\n\nObj. 3: Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the\nbody. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the case\nof mad people. Much more, therefore, does passion, which is a disease\nof the soul.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (Rom. 7:5) speaks of the passions as\n\"passions of sins,\" for no other reason than that they cause sin:\nwhich would not be the case if they excused from sin altogether.\nTherefore passion does not excuse from sin altogether.\n\n_I answer that,_ An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be\nexcused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether\ninvoluntary. Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the\nsubsequent act wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin;\notherwise, it does not excuse entirely. In this matter two points\napparently should be observed: first, that a thing may be voluntary\neither _in itself,_ as when the will tends towards it directly; or\n_in its cause,_ when the will tends towards that cause and not\ntowards the effect; as is the case with one who wilfully gets drunk,\nfor in that case he is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does\nthrough being drunk. Secondly, we must observe that a thing is said\nto be voluntary \"directly\" or \"indirectly\"; directly, if the will\ntends towards it; indirectly, if the will could have prevented it,\nbut did not.\n\nAccordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion\nis sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason altogether,\nas in the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then\nif such a passion were voluntary from the beginning, the act is\nreckoned a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have\nstated with regard to drunkenness. If, however, the cause be not\nvoluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sickness or\nsome such cause fall into such a passion as deprives him of the use\nof reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, and he is entirely\nexcused from sin. Sometimes, however, the passion is not such as to\ntake away the use of reason altogether; and then reason can drive the\npassion away, by turning to other thoughts, or it can prevent it from\nhaving its full effect; since the members are not put to work, except\nby the consent of reason, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 9): wherefore\nsuch a passion does not excuse from sin altogether.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The words, \"So that you do not the things that you\nwould\" are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner\nmovement of concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil,\nin which sense we are to understand the words of Rom. 7:19: \"The evil\nwhich I will not, that I do.\" Or again they may be referred to the\nwill as preceding the passion, as is the case with the incontinent,\nwho act counter to their resolution on account of their concupiscence.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The particular ignorance which excuses altogether, is\nignorance of a circumstance, which a man is unable to know even after\ntaking due precautions. But passion causes ignorance of law in a\nparticular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being applied\nto a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive away,\nas stated.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a\ncomparison, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about\ndrunkenness, which is a kind of bodily disease.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 77, Art. 8]\n\nWhether a Sin Committed Through Passion Can Be Mortal?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot\nbe mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin. Now sin\ncommitted from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive\nfor pardon (_venia_). Since therefore sin committed through passion\nis a sin of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But\npassion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the\nsensuality, as stated above (Q. 74, A. 4). Therefore a sin committed\nthrough passion cannot be mortal.\n\nObj. 3: Further, passion is a hindrance to reason, as explained above\n(AA. 1, 2). Now it belongs to the reason to turn to God, or to turn\naway from Him, which is the essence of a mortal sin. Therefore a sin\ncommitted through passion cannot be mortal.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 7:5) that \"the passions of\nthe sins . . . work [Vulg.: 'did work'] in our members to bring forth\nfruit unto death.\" Now it is proper to mortal sin to bring forth\nfruit unto death. Therefore sin committed through passion may be\nmortal.\n\n_I answer that,_ Mortal sin, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 5), consists\nin turning away from our last end which is God, which aversion\npertains to the deliberating reason, whose function it is also to\ndirect towards the end. Therefore that which is contrary to the last\nend can happen not to be a mortal sin, only when the deliberating\nreason is unable to come to the rescue, which is the case in sudden\nmovements. Now when anyone proceeds from passion to a sinful act, or\nto a deliberate consent, this does not happen suddenly: and so the\ndeliberating reason can come to the rescue here, since it can drive\nthe passion away, or at least prevent it from having its effect, as\nstated above: wherefore if it does not come to the rescue, there is a\nmortal sin; and it is thus, as we see, that many murders and\nadulteries are committed through passion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through its\ncause, i.e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause lessens\nthe sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance\nis said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus every sin,\nthrough repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon (_veniam_).\nThirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This is the only kind of\nvenial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection\nregards the first kind.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to\nsomething. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which\nfollows accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (A. 6, ad\n1): hence the argument does not prove.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Passion does not always hinder the act of reason\naltogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its\nfree-will, so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however,\nthe use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer\neither mortal or venial.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 78\n\nOF THAT CAUSE OF SIN WHICH IS MALICE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the cause of sin on the part of the will, viz.\nmalice: and under this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether it is possible for anyone to sin through certain malice,\ni.e. purposely?\n\n(2) Whether everyone that sins through habit, sins through certain\nmalice?\n\n(3) Whether every one that sins through certain malice, sins through\nhabit?\n\n(4) Whether it is more grievous to sin through certain malice, than\nthrough passion?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 78, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Anyone Sins Through Certain Malice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no one sins purposely, or through\ncertain malice. Because ignorance is opposed to purpose or certain\nmalice. Now \"every evil man is ignorant,\" according to the\nPhilosopher (Ethic. iii, 1); and it is written (Prov. 14:22): \"They\nerr that work evil.\" Therefore no one sins through certain malice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that \"no one works\nintending evil.\" Now to sin through malice seems to denote the\nintention of doing evil [*Alluding to the derivation of _malitia_\n(malice) from _malum_ (evil)] in sinning, because an act is not\ndenominated from that which is unintentional and accidental.\nTherefore no one sins through malice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, malice itself is a sin. If therefore malice is a\ncause of sin, it follows that sin goes on causing sin indefinitely,\nwhich is absurd. Therefore no one sins through malice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 34:27): \"[Who] as it were on\npurpose have revolted from God [Vulg.: 'Him'], and would not\nunderstand all His ways.\" Now to revolt from God is to sin. Therefore\nsome sin purposely or through certain malice.\n\n_I answer that,_ Man like any other being has naturally an appetite\nfor the good; and so if his appetite incline away to evil, this is\ndue to corruption or disorder in some one of the principles of man:\nfor it is thus that sin occurs in the actions of natural things. Now\nthe principles of human acts are the intellect, and the appetite,\nboth rational (i.e. the will) and sensitive. Therefore even as sin\noccurs in human acts, sometimes through a defect of the intellect, as\nwhen anyone sins through ignorance, and sometimes through a defect in\nthe sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through passion, so too\ndoes it occur through a defect consisting in a disorder of the will.\nNow the will is out of order when it loves more the lesser good.\nAgain, the consequence of loving a thing less is that one chooses to\nsuffer some hurt in its regard, in order to obtain a good that one\nloves more: as when a man, even knowingly, suffers the loss of a\nlimb, that he may save his life which he loves more. Accordingly when\nan inordinate will loves some temporal good, e.g. riches or pleasure,\nmore than the order of reason or Divine law, or Divine charity, or\nsome such thing, it follows that it is willing to suffer the loss of\nsome spiritual good, so that it may obtain possession of some\ntemporal good. Now evil is merely the privation of some good; and so\na man wishes knowingly a spiritual evil, which is evil simply,\nwhereby he is deprived of a spiritual good, in order to possess a\ntemporal good: wherefore he is said to sin through certain malice or\non purpose, because he chooses evil knowingly.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Ignorance sometimes excludes the simple knowledge that\na particular action is evil, and then man is said to sin through\nignorance: sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular\naction is evil at this particular moment, as when he sins through\npassion: and sometimes it excludes the knowledge that a particular\nevil is not to be suffered for the sake of possessing a particular\ngood, but not the simple knowledge that it is an evil: it is thus\nthat a man is ignorant, when he sins through certain malice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Evil cannot be intended by anyone for its own sake; but\nit can be intended for the sake of avoiding another evil, or\nobtaining another good, as stated above: and in this case anyone\nwould choose to obtain a good intended for its own sake, without\nsuffering loss of the other good; even as a lustful man would wish to\nenjoy a pleasure without offending God; but with the two set before\nhim to choose from, he prefers sinning and thereby incurring God's\nanger, to being deprived of the pleasure.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The malice through which anyone sins, may be taken to\ndenote habitual malice, in the sense in which the Philosopher (Ethic.\nv, 1) calls an evil habit by the name of malice, just as a good habit\nis called virtue: and in this way anyone is said to sin through\nmalice when he sins through the inclination of a habit. It may also\ndenote actual malice, whether by malice we mean the choice itself of\nevil (and thus anyone is said to sin through malice, in so far as he\nsins through making a choice of evil), or whether by malice we mean\nsome previous fault that gives rise to a subsequent fault, as when\nanyone impugns the grace of his brother through envy. Nor does this\nimply that a thing is its own cause: for the interior act is the\ncause of the exterior act, and one sin is the cause of another; not\nindefinitely, however, since we can trace it back to some previous\nsin, which is not caused by any previous sin, as was explained above\n(Q. 75, A. 4, ad 3).\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 78, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Everyone That Sins Through Habit, Sins Through Certain\nMalice?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that not every one who sins through habit,\nsins through certain malice. Because sin committed through certain\nmalice, seems to be most grievous. Now it happens sometimes that a\nman commits a slight sin through habit, as when he utters an idle\nword. Therefore sin committed from habit is not always committed\nthrough certain malice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"Acts proceeding from habits are like the acts by\nwhich those habits were formed\" (Ethic. ii, 1, 2). But the acts which\nprecede a vicious habit are not committed through certain malice.\nTherefore the sins that arise from habit are not committed through\ncertain malice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, when a man commits a sin through certain malice, he\nis glad after having done it, according to Prov. 2:14: \"Who are glad\nwhen they have done evil, and rejoice in most wicked things\": and\nthis, because it is pleasant to obtain what we desire, and to do\nthose actions which are connatural to us by reason of habit. But\nthose who sin through habit, are sorrowful after committing a sin:\nbecause \"bad men,\" i.e. those who have a vicious habit, \"are full of\nremorse\" (Ethic. ix, 4). Therefore sins that arise from habit are not\ncommitted through certain malice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A sin committed through certain malice is one that\nis done through choice of evil. Now we make choice of those things to\nwhich we are inclined by habit, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 2 with\nregard to virtuous habits. Therefore a sin that arises from habit is\ncommitted through certain malice.\n\n_I answer that,_ There is a difference between a sin committed by one\nwho has the habit, and a sin committed by habit: for it is not\nnecessary to use a habit, since it is subject to the will of the\nperson who has that habit. Hence habit is defined as being \"something\nwe use when we will,\" as stated above (Q. 50, A. 1). And thus, even\nas it may happen that one who has a vicious habit may break forth\ninto a virtuous act, because a bad habit does not corrupt reason\naltogether, something of which remains unimpaired, the result being\nthat a sinner does some works which are generically good; so too it\nmay happen sometimes that one who has a vicious habit, acts, not from\nthat habit, but through the uprising of a passion, or again through\nignorance. But whenever he uses the vicious habit he must needs sin\nthrough certain malice: because to anyone that has a habit, whatever\nis befitting to him in respect of that habit, has the aspect of\nsomething lovable, since it thereby becomes, in a way, connatural to\nhim, according as custom and habit are a second nature. Now the very\nthing which befits a man in respect of a vicious habit, is something\nthat excludes a spiritual good: the result being that a man chooses a\nspiritual evil, that he may obtain possession of what befits him in\nrespect of that habit: and this is to sin through certain malice.\nWherefore it is evident that whoever sins through habit, sins through\ncertain malice.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Venial sin does not exclude spiritual good, consisting\nin the grace of God or charity. Wherefore it is an evil, not simply,\nbut in a relative sense: and for that reason the habit thereof is not\na simple but a relative evil.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Acts proceeding from habits are of like species as the\nacts from which those habits were formed: but they differ from them\nas perfect from imperfect. Such is the difference between sin\ncommitted through certain malice and sin committed through passion.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He that sins through habit is always glad for what he\ndoes through habit, as long as he uses the habit. But since he is\nable not to use the habit, and to think of something else, by means\nof his reason, which is not altogether corrupted, it may happen that\nwhile not using the habit he is sorry for what he has done through\nthe habit. And so it often happens that such a man is sorry for his\nsin not because sin in itself is displeasing to him, but on account\nof his reaping some disadvantage from the sin.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 78, Art. 3]\n\nWhether One Who Sins Through Certain Malice, Sins Through Habit?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that whoever sins through certain malice,\nsins through habit. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 9) that \"an\nunjust action is not done as an unjust man does it,\" i.e. through\nchoice, \"unless it be done through habit.\" Now to sin through certain\nmalice is to sin through making a choice of evil, as stated above (A.\n1). Therefore no one sins through certain malice, unless he has the\nhabit of sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Origen says (Peri Archon iii) that \"a man is not\nsuddenly ruined and lost, but must needs fall away little by little.\"\nBut the greatest fall seems to be that of the man who sins through\ncertain malice. Therefore a man comes to sin through certain malice,\nnot from the outset, but from inveterate custom, which may engender a\nhabit.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whenever a man sins through certain malice, his will\nmust needs be inclined of itself to the evil he chooses. But by the\nnature of that power man is inclined, not to evil but to good.\nTherefore if he chooses evil, this must be due to something\nsupervening, which is passion or habit. Now when a man sins through\npassion, he sins not through certain malice, but through weakness, as\nstated (Q. 77, A. 3). Therefore whenever anyone sins through certain\nmalice, he sins through habit.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The good habit stands in the same relation to the\nchoice of something good, as the bad habit to the choice of something\nevil. But it happens sometimes that a man, without having the habit\nof a virtue, chooses that which is good according to that virtue.\nTherefore sometimes also a man, without having the habit of a vice,\nmay choose evil, which is to sin through certain malice.\n\n_I answer that,_ The will is related differently to good and to evil.\nBecause from the very nature of the power, it is inclined to the\nrational good, as its proper object; wherefore every sin is said to\nbe contrary to nature. Hence, if a will be inclined, by its choice,\nto some evil, this must be occasioned by something else. Sometimes,\nin fact, this is occasioned through some defect in the reason, as\nwhen anyone sins through ignorance; and sometimes this arises through\nthe impulse of the sensitive appetite, as when anyone sins through\npassion. Yet neither of these amounts to a sin through certain\nmalice; for then alone does anyone sin through certain malice, when\nhis will is moved to evil of its own accord. This may happen in two\nways. First, through his having a corrupt disposition inclining him\nto evil, so that, in respect of that disposition, some evil is, as it\nwere, suitable and similar to him; and to this thing, by reason of\nits suitableness, the will tends, as to something good, because\neverything tends, of its own accord, to that which is suitable to it.\nMoreover this corrupt disposition is either a habit acquired by\ncustom, or a sickly condition on the part of the body, as in the case\nof a man who is naturally inclined to certain sins, by reason of some\nnatural corruption in himself. Secondly, the will, of its own accord,\nmay tend to an evil, through the removal of some obstacle: for\ninstance, if a man be prevented from sinning, not through sin being\nin itself displeasing to him, but through hope of eternal life, or\nfear of hell, if hope give place to despair, or fear to presumption,\nhe will end in sinning through certain malice, being freed from the\nbridle, as it were.\n\nIt is evident, therefore, that sin committed through certain malice,\nalways presupposes some inordinateness in man, which, however, is not\nalways a habit: so that it does not follow of necessity, if a man\nsins through certain malice, that he sins through habit.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To do an action as an unjust man does, may be not only\nto do unjust things through certain malice, but also to do them with\npleasure, and without any notable resistance on the part of reason,\nand this occurs only in one who has a habit.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is true that a man does not fall suddenly into sin\nfrom certain malice, and that something is presupposed; but this\nsomething is not always a habit, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That which inclines the will to evil, is not always a\nhabit or a passion, but at times is something else. Moreover, there\nis no comparison between choosing good and choosing evil: because\nevil is never without some good of nature, whereas good can be\nperfect without the evil of fault.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 78, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Is More Grievous to Sin Through Certain Malice Than\nThrough Passion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is not more grievous to sin\nthrough certain malice than through passion. Because ignorance\nexcuses from sin either altogether or in part. Now ignorance is\ngreater in one who sins through certain malice, than in one who sins\nthrough passion; since he that sins through certain malice suffers\nfrom the worst form of ignorance, which according to the Philosopher\n(Ethic. vii, 8) is ignorance of principle, for he has a false\nestimation of the end, which is the principle in matters of action.\nTherefore there is more excuse for one who sins through certain\nmalice, than for one who sins through passion.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the more a man is impelled to sin, the less grievous\nhis sin, as is clear with regard to a man who is thrown headlong into\nsin by a more impetuous passion. Now he that sins through certain\nmalice, is impelled by habit, the impulse of which is stronger than\nthat of passion. Therefore to sin through habit is less grievous than\nto sin through passion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to sin through certain malice is to sin through\nchoosing evil. Now he that sins through passion, also chooses evil.\nTherefore he does not sin less than the man who sins through certain\nmalice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A sin that is committed on purpose, for this very\nreason deserves heavier punishment, according to Job 34:26: \"He hath\nstruck them as being wicked, in open sight, who, as it were, on\npurpose, have revolted from Him.\" Now punishment is not increased\nexcept for a graver fault. Therefore a sin is aggravated through\nbeing done on purpose, i.e. through certain malice.\n\n_I answer that,_ A sin committed through malice is more grievous than\na sin committed through passion, for three reasons. First, because,\nas sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, it follows that, other\nthings being equal, a sin is all the more grievous, according as the\nmovement of the sin belongs more to the will. Now when a sin is\ncommitted through malice, the movement of sin belongs more to the\nwill, which is then moved to evil of its own accord, than when a sin\nis committed through passion, when the will is impelled to sin by\nsomething extrinsic, as it were. Wherefore a sin is aggravated by the\nvery fact that it is committed through certain malice, and so much\nthe more, as the malice is greater; whereas it is diminished by being\ncommitted through passion, and so much the more, as the passion is\nstronger. Secondly, because the passion which incites the will to\nsin, soon passes away, so that man repents of his sin, and soon\nreturns to his good intentions; whereas the habit, through which a\nman sins, is a permanent quality, so that he who sins through malice,\nabides longer in his sin. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic.\nvii, 8) compares the intemperate man, who sins through malice, to a\nsick man who suffers from a chronic disease, while he compares the\nincontinent man, who sins through passion, to one who suffers\nintermittently. Thirdly, because he who sins through certain malice\nis ill-disposed in respect of the end itself, which is the principle\nin matters of action; and so the defect is more dangerous than in the\ncase of the man who sins through passion, whose purpose tends to a\ngood end, although this purpose is interrupted on account of the\npassion, for the time being. Now the worst of all defects is defect\nof principle. Therefore it is evident that a sin committed through\nmalice is more grievous than one committed through passion.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Ignorance of choice, to which the objection refers,\nneither excuses nor diminishes a sin, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 4).\nTherefore neither does a greater ignorance of the kind make a sin to\nbe less grave.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The impulse due to passion, is, as it were, due to a\ndefect which is outside the will: whereas, by a habit, the will is\ninclined from within. Hence the comparison fails.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is one thing to sin while choosing, and another to\nsin through choosing. For he that sins through passion, sins while\nchoosing, but not through choosing, because his choosing is not for\nhim the first principle of his sin; for he is induced through the\npassion, to choose what he would not choose, were it not for the\npassion. On the other hand, he that sins through certain malice,\nchooses evil of his own accord, in the way already explained (AA. 2,\n3), so that his choosing, of which he has full control, is the\nprinciple of his sin: and for this reason he is said to sin \"through\"\nchoosing.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 79\n\nOF THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF SIN\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the external causes of sin, and (1) on the part\nof God; (2) on the part of the devil; (3) on the part of man.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether God is a cause of sin?\n\n(2) Whether the act of sin is from God?\n\n(3) Whether God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of\nheart?\n\n(4) Whether these things are directed to the salvation of those who\nare blinded or hardened?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 79, Art. 1]\n\nWhether God Is a Cause of Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God is a cause of sin. For the\nApostle says of certain ones (Rom. 1:28): \"God delivered them up to a\nreprobate sense, to do those things which are not right [Douay:\n'convenient'],\" and a gloss comments on this by saying that \"God works\nin men's hearts, by inclining their wills to whatever He wills,\nwhether to good or to evil.\" Now sin consists in doing what is not\nright, and in having a will inclined to evil. Therefore God is to man\na cause of sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Wis. 14:11): \"The creatures of God\nare turned to an abomination; and a temptation to the souls of men.\"\nBut a temptation usually denotes a provocation to sin. Since\ntherefore creatures were made by God alone, as was established in the\nFirst Part (Q. 44, A. 1), it seems that God is a cause of sin, by\nprovoking man to sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect.\nNow God is the cause of the free-will, which itself is the cause of\nsin. Therefore God is the cause of sin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, every evil is opposed to good. But it is not\ncontrary to God's goodness that He should cause the evil of\npunishment; since of this evil it is written (Isa. 45:7) that God\ncreates evil, and (Amos 3:6): \"Shall there be evil in the city which\nGod [Vulg.: 'the Lord'] hath not done?\" Therefore it is not\nincompatible with God's goodness that He should cause the evil of\nfault.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 11:25): \"Thou . . . hatest\nnone of the things which Thou hast made.\" Now God hates sin,\naccording to Wis. 14:9: \"To God the wicked and his wickedness are\nhateful.\" Therefore God is not a cause of sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Man is, in two ways, a cause either of his own or of\nanother's sin. First, directly, namely by inclining his or another's\nwill to sin; secondly, indirectly, namely by not preventing someone\nfrom sinning. Hence (Ezech. 3:18) it is said to the watchman: \"If\nthou say not to the wicked: 'Thou shalt surely die' [*Vulg.: \"If,\nwhen I say to the wicked, 'Thou shalt surely die,' thou declare it\nnot to him.\"] . . . I will require his blood at thy hand.\" Now God\ncannot be directly the cause of sin, either in Himself or in another,\nsince every sin is a departure from the order which is to God as the\nend: whereas God inclines and turns all things to Himself as to their\nlast end, as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. i): so that it is impossible\nthat He should be either to Himself or to another the cause of\ndeparting from the order which is to Himself. Therefore He cannot be\ndirectly the cause of sin. In like manner neither can He cause sin\nindirectly. For it happens that God does not give some the\nassistance, whereby they may avoid sin, which assistance were He to\ngive, they would not sin. But He does all this according to the order\nof His wisdom and justice, since He Himself is Wisdom and Justice: so\nthat if someone sin it is not imputable to Him as though He were the\ncause of that sin; even as a pilot is not said to cause the wrecking\nof the ship, through not steering the ship, unless he cease to steer\nwhile able and bound to steer. It is therefore evident that God is\nnowise a cause of sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As to the words of the Apostle, the solution is clear\nfrom the text. For if God delivered some up to a reprobate sense, it\nfollows that they already had a reprobate sense, so as to do what was\nnot right. Accordingly He is said to deliver them up to a reprobate\nsense, in so far as He does not hinder them from following that\nreprobate sense, even as we are said to expose a person to danger if\nwe do not protect him. The saying of Augustine (De Grat. et Lib. Arb.\nxxi, whence the gloss quoted is taken) to the effect that \"God\ninclines men's wills to good and evil,\" is to be understood as\nmeaning that He inclines the will directly to good; and to evil, in\nso far as He does not hinder it, as stated above. And yet even this\nis due as being deserved through a previous sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When it is said the \"creatures of God are turned 'to'\nan abomination, and a temptation to the souls of men,\" the\npreposition \"to\" does not denote causality but sequel [*This is made\nclear by the Douay Version: the Latin \"factae sunt in abominationem\"\nadmits of the translation \"were made to be an abomination,\" which\nmight imply causality.]; for God did not make the creatures that they\nmight be an evil to man; this was the result of man's folly,\nwherefore the text goes on to say, \"and a snare to the feet of the\nunwise,\" who, to wit, in their folly, use creatures for a purpose\nother than that for which they were made.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The effect which proceeds from the middle cause,\naccording as it is subordinate to the first cause, is reduced to that\nfirst cause; but if it proceed from the middle cause, according as it\ngoes outside the order of the first cause, it is not reduced to that\nfirst cause: thus if a servant do anything contrary to his master's\norders, it is not ascribed to the master as though he were the cause\nthereof. In like manner sin, which the free-will commits against the\ncommandment of God, is not attributed to God as being its cause.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Punishment is opposed to the good of the person\npunished, who is thereby deprived of some good or other: but fault is\nopposed to the good of subordination to God; and so it is directly\nopposed to the Divine goodness; consequently there is no comparison\nbetween fault and punishment.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 79, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Act of Sin Is from God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the act of sin is not from God. For\nAugustine says (De Perfect. Justit. ii) that \"the act of sin is not a\nthing.\" Now whatever is from God is a thing. Therefore the act of sin\nis not from God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, man is not said to be the cause of sin, except\nbecause he is the cause of the sinful act: for \"no one works,\nintending evil,\" as Dionysius states (Div. Nom. iv). Now God is not a\ncause of sin, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore God is not the cause\nof the act of sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, some actions are evil and sinful in their species,\nas was shown above (Q. 18, AA. 2, 8). Now whatever is the cause of a\nthing, causes whatever belongs to it in respect of its species. If\ntherefore God caused the act of sin, He would be the cause of sin,\nwhich is false, as was proved above (A. 1). Therefore God is not the\ncause of the act of sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The act of sin is a movement of the free-will. Now\n\"the will of God is the cause of every movement,\" as Augustine\ndeclares (De Trin. iii, 4, 9). Therefore God's will is the cause of\nthe act of sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ The act of sin is both a being and an act; and in\nboth respects it is from God. Because every being, whatever the mode\nof its being, must be derived from the First Being, as Dionysius\ndeclares (Div. Nom. v). Again every action is caused by something\nexisting in act, since nothing produces an action save in so far as\nit is in act; and every being in act is reduced to the First Act,\nviz. God, as to its cause, Who is act by His Essence. Therefore God\nis the cause of every action, in so far as it is an action. But sin\ndenotes a being and an action with a defect: and this defect is from\nthe created cause, viz. the free-will, as falling away from the order\nof the First Agent, viz. God. Consequently this defect is not reduced\nto God as its cause, but to the free-will: even as the defect of\nlimping is reduced to a crooked leg as its cause, but not to the\nmotive power, which nevertheless causes whatever there is of movement\nin the limping. Accordingly God is the cause of the act of sin: and\nyet He is not the cause of sin, because He does not cause the act to\nhave a defect.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In this passage Augustine calls by the name of \"thing,\"\nthat which is a thing simply, viz. substance; for in this sense the\nact of sin is not a thing.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Not only the act, but also the defect, is reduced to\nman as its cause, which defect consists in man not being subject to\nWhom he ought to be, although he does not intend this principally.\nWherefore man is the cause of the sin: while God is the cause of the\nact, in such a way, that nowise is He the cause of the defect\naccompanying the act, so that He is not the cause of the sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 72, A. 1), acts and habits do not\ntake their species from the privation itself, wherein consists the\nnature of evil, but from some object, to which that privation is\nunited: and so this defect which consists in not being from God,\nbelongs to the species of the act consequently, and not as a specific\ndifference.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 79, Art. 3]\n\nWhether God Is the Cause of Spiritual Blindness and Hardness of\nHeart?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God is not the cause of spiritual\nblindness and hardness of heart. For Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu.\n3) that God is not the cause of that which makes man worse. Now man\nis made worse by spiritual blindness and hardness of heart. Therefore\nGod is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Fulgentius says (De Dupl. Praedest. i, 19): \"God\ndoes not punish what He causes.\" Now God punishes the hardened heart,\naccording to Ecclus. 3:27: \"A hard heart shall fear evil at the\nlast.\" Therefore God is not the cause of hardness of heart.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the same effect is not put down to contrary causes.\nBut the cause of spiritual blindness is said to be the malice of man,\naccording to Wis. 2:21: \"For their own malice blinded them,\" and\nagain, according to 2 Cor. 4:4: \"The god of this world hath blinded\nthe minds of unbelievers\": which causes seem to be opposed to God.\nTherefore God is not the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of\nheart.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 6:10): \"Blind the heart of\nthis people, and make their ears heavy,\" and Rom. 9:18: \"He hath\nmercy on whom He will, and whom He will He hardeneth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Spiritual blindness and hardness of heart imply two\nthings. One is the movement of the human mind in cleaving to evil,\nand turning away from the Divine light; and as regards this, God is\nnot the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of heart, just as\nHe is not the cause of sin. The other thing is the withdrawal of\ngrace, the result of which is that the mind is not enlightened by God\nto see aright, and man's heart is not softened to live aright; and as\nregards this God is the cause of spiritual blindness and hardness of\nheart.\n\nNow we must consider that God is the universal cause of the\nenlightening of souls, according to John 1:9: \"That was the true\nlight which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world,\" even\nas the sun is the universal cause of the enlightening of bodies,\nthough not in the same way; for the sun enlightens by necessity of\nnature, whereas God works freely, through the order of His wisdom.\nNow although the sun, so far as it is concerned, enlightens all\nbodies, yet if it be encountered by an obstacle in a body, it leaves\nit in darkness, as happens to a house whose window-shutters are\nclosed, although the sun is in no way the cause of the house being\ndarkened, since it does not act of its own accord in failing to light\nup the interior of the house; and the cause of this is the person who\nclosed the shutters. On the other hand, God, of His own accord,\nwithholds His grace from those in whom He finds an obstacle: so that\nthe cause of grace being withheld is not only the man who raises an\nobstacle to grace; but God, Who, of His own accord, withholds His\ngrace. In this way, God is the cause of spiritual blindness, deafness\nof ear, and hardness of heart.\n\nThese differ from one another in respect of the effects of grace,\nwhich both perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, and softens\nthe affections by the fire of charity. And since two of the senses\nexcel in rendering service to the intellect, viz. sight and hearing,\nof which the former assists \"discovery,\" and the latter, \"teaching,\"\nhence it is that spiritual \"blindness\" corresponds to sight,\n\"heaviness of the ears\" to hearing, and \"hardness of heart\" to the\naffections.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Blindness and hardheartedness, as regards the\nwithholding of grace, are punishments, and therefore, in this\nrespect, they make man no worse. It is because he is already worsened\nby sin that he incurs them, even as other punishments.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument considers hardheartedness in so far as it\nis a sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Malice is the demeritorious cause of blindness, just as\nsin is the cause of punishment: and in this way too, the devil is\nsaid to blind, in so far as he induces man to sin.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 79, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Blindness and Hardness of Heart Are Directed to the Salvation\nof Those Who Are Blinded and Hardened?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that blindness and hardness of heart are\nalways directed to the salvation of those who are blinded and\nhardened. For Augustine says (Enchiridion xi) that \"as God is\nsupremely good, He would nowise allow evil to be done, unless He\ncould draw some good from every evil.\" Much more, therefore, does He\ndirect to some good, the evil of which He Himself is the cause. Now\nGod is the cause of blindness and hardness of heart, as stated above\n(A. 3). Therefore they are directed to the salvation of those who are\nblinded and hardened.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Wis. 1:13) that \"God hath no pleasure\nin the destruction of the ungodly [*Vulg.: 'God made not death,\nneither hath He pleasure in the destruction of the living.'].\" Now He\nwould seem to take pleasure in their destruction, if He did not turn\ntheir blindness to their profit: just as a physician would seem to\ntake pleasure in torturing the invalid, if he did not intend to heal\nthe invalid when he prescribes a bitter medicine for him. Therefore\nGod turns blindness to the profit of those who are blinded.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"God is not a respecter of persons\" (Acts 10:34).\nNow He directs the blinding of some, to their salvation, as in the\ncase of some of the Jews, who were blinded so as not to believe in\nChrist, and, through not believing, to slay Him, and afterwards were\nseized with compunction, and converted, as related by Augustine (De\nQuaest. Evang. iii). Therefore God turns all blindness to the\nspiritual welfare of those who are blinded.\n\nObj. 4: On the other hand, according to Rom. 3:8, evil should not be\ndone, that good may ensue. Now blindness is an evil. Therefore God\ndoes not blind some for the sake of their welfare.\n\n_I answer that,_ Blindness is a kind of preamble to sin. Now sin has\na twofold relation--to one thing directly, viz. to the sinner's\ndamnation--to another, by reason of God's mercy or providence, viz.\nthat the sinner may be healed, in so far as God permits some to fall\ninto sin, that by acknowledging their sin, they may be humbled and\nconverted, as Augustine states (De Nat. et Grat. xxii). Therefore\nblindness, of its very nature, is directed to the damnation of those\nwho are blinded; for which reason it is accounted an effect of\nreprobation. But, through God's mercy, temporary blindness is\ndirected medicinally to the spiritual welfare of those who are\nblinded. This mercy, however, is not vouchsafed to all those who are\nblinded, but only to the predestinated, to whom \"all things work\ntogether unto good\" (Rom. 8:28). Therefore as regards some, blindness\nis directed to their healing; but as regards others, to their\ndamnation; as Augustine says (De Quaest. Evang. iii).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Every evil that God does, or permits to be done, is\ndirected to some good; yet not always to the good of those in whom\nthe evil is, but sometimes to the good of others, or of the whole\nuniverse: thus He directs the sin of tyrants to the good of the\nmartyrs, and the punishment of the lost to the glory of His justice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God does not take pleasure in the loss of man, as\nregards the loss itself, but by reason of His justice, or of the good\nthat ensues from the loss.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That God directs the blindness of some to their\nspiritual welfare, is due to His mercy; but that the blindness of\nothers is directed to their loss is due to His justice: and that He\nvouchsafes His mercy to some, and not to all, does not make God a\nrespecter of persons, as explained in the First Part (Q. 23, A. 5, ad\n3).\n\nReply Obj. 4: Evil of fault must not be done, that good may ensue;\nbut evil of punishment must be inflicted for the sake of good.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 80\n\nOF THE CAUSE OF SIN, AS REGARDS THE DEVIL\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the cause of sin, as regards the devil; and\nunder this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the devil is directly the cause of sin?\n\n(2) Whether the devil induces us to sin, by persuading us inwardly?\n\n(3) Whether he can make us sin of necessity?\n\n(4) Whether all sins are due to the devil's suggestion?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 80, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Devil Is Directly the Cause of Man's Sinning?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the devil is directly the cause of\nman's sinning. For sin consists directly in an act of the appetite.\nNow Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 12) that \"the devil inspires his\nfriends with evil desires\"; and Bede, commenting on Acts 5:3, says\nthat the devil \"draws the mind to evil desires\"; and Isidore says (De\nSummo Bono ii, 41; iii, 5) that the devil \"fills men's hearts with\nsecret lusts.\" Therefore the devil is directly the cause of sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Jerome says (Contra Jovin. ii, 2) that \"as God is\nthe perfecter of good, so is the devil the perfecter of evil.\" But\nGod is directly the cause of our good. Therefore the devil is\ndirectly the cause of our sins.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says in a chapter of the _Eudeme[a]n\nEthics_ (vii, 18): \"There must needs be some extrinsic principle of\nhuman counsel.\" Now human counsel is not only about good things but\nalso about evil things. Therefore, as God moves man to take good\ncounsel, and so is the cause of good, so the devil moves him to take\nevil counsel, and consequently is directly the cause of sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine proves (De Lib. Arb. i, 11) that\n\"nothing else than his own will makes man's mind the slave of his\ndesire.\" Now man does not become a slave to his desires, except\nthrough sin. Therefore the cause of sin cannot be the devil, but\nman's own will alone.\n\n_I answer that,_ Sin is an action: so that a thing can be directly\nthe cause of sin, in the same way as anyone is directly the cause of\nan action; and this can only happen by moving that action's proper\nprinciple to act. Now the proper principle of a sinful action is the\nwill, since every sin is voluntary. Consequently nothing can be\ndirectly the cause of sin, except that which can move the will to act.\n\nNow the will, as stated above (Q. 9, AA. 3, 4, 6), can be moved by\ntwo things: first by its object, inasmuch as the apprehended\nappetible is said to move the appetite: secondly by that agent which\nmoves the will inwardly to will, and this is no other than the will\nitself, or God, as was shown above (Q. 9, AA. 3, 4, 6). Now God\ncannot be the cause of sin, as stated above (Q. 79, A. 1). Therefore\nit follows that in this respect, a man's will alone is directly the\ncause of his sin.\n\nAs regards the object, a thing may be understood as moving the will\nin three ways. First, the object itself which is proposed to the\nwill: thus we say that food arouses man's desire to eat. Secondly, he\nthat proposes or offers this object. Thirdly, he that persuades the\nwill that the object proposed has an aspect of good, because he also,\nin a fashion, offers the will its proper object, which is a real or\napparent good of reason. Accordingly, in the first way the sensible\nthings, which approach from without, move a man's will to sin. In the\nsecond and third ways, either the devil or a man may incite to sin,\neither by offering an object of appetite to the senses, or by\npersuading the reason. But in none of these three ways can anything\nbe the direct cause of sin, because the will is not, of necessity,\nmoved by any object except the last end, as stated above (Q. 10, AA.\n1, 2). Consequently neither the thing offered from without, nor he\nthat proposes it, nor he that persuades, is the sufficient cause of\nsin. Therefore it follows that the devil is a cause of sin, neither\ndirectly nor sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing\nthe object of appetite.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All these, and other like authorities, if we meet with\nthem, are to be understood as denoting that the devil induces man to\naffection for a sin, either by suggesting to him, or by offering him\nobjects of appetite.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This comparison is true in so far as the devil is\nsomewhat the cause of our sins, even as God is in a certain way the\ncause of our good actions, but does not extend to the mode of\ncausation: for God causes good things in us by moving the will\ninwardly, whereas the devil cannot move us in this way.\n\nReply Obj. 3: God is the universal principle of all inward movements\nof man; but that the human will be determined to an evil counsel, is\ndirectly due to the human will, and to the devil as persuading or\noffering the object of appetite.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 80, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Devil Can Induce Man to Sin, by Internal Instigations?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the devil cannot induce man to sin,\nby internal instigations. Because the internal movements of the soul\nare vital functions. Now no vital functions can be exercised except\nby an intrinsic principle, not even those of the vegetal soul, which\nare the lowest of vital functions. Therefore the devil cannot\ninstigate man to evil through his internal movements.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all the internal movements arise from the external\nsenses according to the order of nature. Now it belongs to God alone\nto do anything beside the order of nature, as was stated in the First\nPart (Q. 110, A. 4). Therefore the devil cannot effect anything in\nman's internal movements, except in respect of things which are\nperceived by the external senses.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the internal acts of the soul are to understand and\nto imagine. Now the devil can do nothing in connection with either of\nthese, because, as stated in the First Part (Q. 111, AA. 2, 3, ad 2),\nthe devil cannot impress species on the human intellect, nor does it\nseem possible for him to produce imaginary species, since imaginary\nforms, being more spiritual, are more excellent than those which are\nin sensible matter, which, nevertheless, the devil is unable to\nproduce, as is clear from what we have said in the First Part (Q.\n110, A. 2; Q. 111, AA. 2, 3, ad 2). Therefore the devil cannot\nthrough man's internal movements induce him to sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In that case, the devil would never tempt man,\nunless he appeared visibly; which is evidently false.\n\n_I answer that,_ The interior part of the soul is intellective and\nsensitive; and the intellective part contains the intellect and the\nwill. As regards the will, we have already stated (A. 1; I, Q. 111,\nA. 1) what is the devil's relation thereto. Now the intellect, of its\nvery nature, is moved by that which enlightens it in the knowledge of\ntruth, which the devil has no intention of doing in man's regard;\nrather does he darken man's reason so that it may consent to sin,\nwhich darkness is due to the imagination and sensitive appetite.\nConsequently the operation of the devil seems to be confined to the\nimagination and sensitive appetite, by moving either of which he can\ninduce man to sin. For his operation may result in presenting certain\nforms to the imagination; and he is able to incite the sensitive\nappetite to some passion or other.\n\nThe reason of this is, that as stated in the First Part (Q. 110, A.\n3), the corporeal nature has a natural aptitude to be moved locally\nby the spiritual nature: so that the devil can produce all those\neffects which can result from the local movement of bodies here\nbelow, except he be restrained by the Divine power. Now the\nrepresentation of forms to the imagination is due, sometimes, to\nlocal movement: for the Philosopher says (De Somno et Vigil.) [*De\nInsomn. iii, iv.] that \"when an animal sleeps, the blood descends in\nabundance to the sensitive principle, and the movements descend with\nit, viz. the impressions left by the action of sensible objects,\nwhich impressions are preserved by means of sensible species, and\ncontinue to move the apprehensive principle, so that they appear just\nas though the sensitive principles were being affected by them at the\ntime.\" Hence such a local movement of the vital spirits or humors can\nbe procured by the demons, whether man sleep or wake: and so it\nhappens that man's imagination is brought into play.\n\nIn like manner, the sensitive appetite is incited to certain passions\naccording to certain fixed movements of the heart and the vital\nspirits: wherefore the devil can cooperate in this also. And through\ncertain passions being aroused in the sensitive appetite, the result\nis that man more easily perceives the movement or sensible image\nwhich is brought in the manner explained, before the apprehensive\nprinciple, since, as the Philosopher observes (De Somno et Virgil.:\nDe Insomn. iii, iv), \"lovers are moved, by even a slight likeness, to\nan apprehension of the beloved.\" It also happens, through the rousing\nof a passion, that what is put before the imagination, is judged, as\nbeing something to be pursued, because, to him who is held by a\npassion, whatever the passion inclines him to, seems good. In this\nway the devil induces man inwardly to sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although vital functions are always from an intrinsic\nprinciple, yet an extrinsic agent can cooperate with them, even as\nexternal heat cooperates with the functions of the vegetal soul, that\nfood may be more easily digested.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This apparition of imaginary forms is not altogether\noutside the order of nature, nor is it due to a command alone, but\naccording to local movement, as explained above.\n\nConsequently the Reply to the Third Objection is clear, because these\nforms are received originally from the senses.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q, 80, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Devil Can Induce Man to Sin of Necessity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the devil can induce man to sin of\nnecessity. Because the greater can compel the lesser. Now it is said\nof the devil (Job 41:24) that \"there is no power on earth that can\ncompare with him.\" Therefore he can compel man to sin, while he\ndwells on the earth.\n\nObj. 2: Further, man's reason cannot be moved except in respect of\nthings that are offered outwardly to the senses, or are represented\nto the imagination: because \"all our knowledge arises from the\nsenses, and we cannot understand without a phantasm\" (De Anima iii,\ntext. 30. 39). Now the devil can move man's imagination, as stated\nabove (A. 2); and also the external senses, for Augustine says (Qq.\nlxxxiii, qu. 12) that \"this evil,\" of which, to wit, the devil is the\ncause, \"extends gradually through all the approaches to the senses,\nit adapts itself to shapes, blends with colors, mingles with sounds,\nseasons every flavor.\" Therefore it can incline man's reason to sin\nof necessity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 4) that \"there is\nsome sin when the flesh lusteth against the spirit.\" Now the devil\ncan cause concupiscence of the flesh, even as other passions, in the\nway explained above (A. 2). Therefore he can induce man to sin of\nnecessity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Pet. 5:8): \"Your adversary the\ndevil, as a roaring lion, goeth about seeking whom he may devour.\"\nNow it would be useless to admonish thus, if it were true that man\nwere under the necessity of succumbing to the devil. Therefore he\ncannot induce man to sin of necessity.\n\nFurther, it is likewise written (Jam. 4:7): \"Be subject . . . to God,\nbut resist the devil, and he will fly from you,\" which would be said\nneither rightly nor truly, if the devil were able to compel us, in\nany way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to\nresist him, nor would he fly from those who do. Therefore he does not\ncompel to sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained\nby God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin;\nbut he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. This is evident\nfrom the fact that man does not resist that which moves him to sin,\nexcept by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede\naltogether, by moving the imagination and the sensitive appetite; as\nis the case with one who is possessed. But then, the reason being\nthus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a\nsin. If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered, then, in so\nfar as it is free, it can resist sin, as stated above (Q. 77, A. 7).\nIt is consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to\nsin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Not every power that is greater than man, can move\nman's will; God alone can do this, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 6).\n\nReply Obj. 2: That which is apprehended by the senses or the\nimagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has\nthe use of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the\nreason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The lusting of the flesh against the spirit, when the\nreason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the\nexercise of virtue. That reason does not resist, is not in the\ndevil's power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of\nsinning.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 80, Art. 4]\n\nWhether All the Sins of Men Are Due to the Devil's Suggestion?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the\ndevil's suggestion. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the \"crowd\nof demons are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to\nothers.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the\ndevil, according to John 8:34: \"Whosoever committeth sin is the slave\n[Douay: 'servant'] of sin.\" Now \"by whom a man is overcome, of the\nsame also he is the slave\" (2 Pet. 2:19). Therefore whoever commits a\nsin, has been overcome by the devil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) the sin of the devil is\nirreparable, because he sinned at no other's suggestion. Therefore,\nif any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion\nfrom any other, their sin would be irremediable: which is clearly\nfalse. Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil's\nsuggestion.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (De Eccl. Dogm. lxxxii): \"Not all\nour evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to\na movement of the free-will.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ the devil is the occasional and indirect cause of\nall our sins, in so far as he induced the first man to sin, by reason\nof whose sin human nature is so infected, that we are all prone to\nsin: even as the burning of wood might be imputed to the man who\ndried the wood so as to make it easily inflammable. He is not,\nhowever, the direct cause of all the sins of men, as though each were\nthe result of his suggestion. Origen proves this (Peri Archon iii, 2)\nfrom the fact that even if the devil were no more, men would still\nhave the desire for food, sexual pleasures and the like; which desire\nmight be inordinate, unless it were subordinate to reason, a matter\nthat is subject to the free-will.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The crowd of demons are the cause of all our evils, as\nregards their original cause, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man becomes another's slave not only by being\novercome by him, but also by subjecting himself to him spontaneously:\nit is thus that one who sins of his own accord, becomes the slave of\nthe devil.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The devil's sin was irremediable, not only because he\nsinned without another's suggestion; but also because he was not\nalready prone to sin, on account of any previous sin; which can be\nsaid of no sin of man.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 81\n\nOF THE CAUSE OF SIN, ON THE PART OF MAN\n(In Five Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the cause of sin, on the part of man. Now, while\nman, like the devil, is the cause of another's sin, by outward\nsuggestion, he has a certain special manner of causing sin, by way of\norigin. Wherefore we must speak about original sin, the consideration\nof which will be three-fold: (1) Of its transmission; (2) of its\nessence; (3) of its subject.\n\nUnder the first head there are five points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether man's first sin is transmitted, by way of origin to his\ndescendants?\n\n(2) Whether all the other sins of our first parent, or of any other\nparents, are transmitted to their descendants, by way of origin?\n\n(3) Whether original sin is contracted by all those who are begotten\nof Adam by way of seminal generation?\n\n(4) Whether it would be contracted by anyone formed miraculously from\nsome part of the human body?\n\n(5) Whether original sin would have been contracted if the woman, and\nnot the man, had sinned?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 81, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the First Sin of Our First Parent Is Contracted by His\nDescendants, by Way of Origin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the first sin of our first parent is\nnot contracted by others, by way of origin. For it is written (Ezech.\n18:20): \"The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father.\" But he\nwould bear the iniquity if he contracted it from him. Therefore no\none contracts any sin from one of his parents by way of origin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an accident is not transmitted by way of origin,\nunless its subject be also transmitted, since accidents do not pass\nfrom one subject to another. Now the rational soul which is the\nsubject of sin, is not transmitted by way of origin, as was shown in\nthe First Part (Q. 118, A. 2). Therefore neither can any sin be\ntransmitted by way of origin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whatever is transmitted by way of human origin, is\ncaused by the semen. But the semen cannot cause sin, because it lacks\nthe rational part of the soul, which alone can be a cause of sin.\nTherefore no sin can be contracted by way of origin.\n\nObj. 4: Further, that which is more perfect in nature, is more\npowerful in action. Now perfect flesh cannot infect the soul united\nto it, else the soul could not be cleansed of original sin, so long\nas it is united to the body. Much less, therefore, can the semen\ninfect the soul.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): \"No one finds\nfault with those who are ugly by nature, but only those who are so\nthrough want of exercise and through carelessness.\" Now those are\nsaid to be \"naturally ugly,\" who are so from their origin. Therefore\nnothing which comes by way of origin is blameworthy or sinful.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): \"By one man sin\nentered into this world, and by sin death.\" Nor can this be\nunderstood as denoting imitation or suggestion, since it is written\n(Wis. 2:24): \"By the envy of the devil, death came into this world.\"\nIt follows therefore that through origin from the first man sin\nentered into the world.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Catholic Faith we are bound to hold\nthat the first sin of the first man is transmitted to his\ndescendants, by way of origin. For this reason children are taken to\nbe baptized soon after their birth, to show that they have to be\nwashed from some uncleanness. The contrary is part of the Pelagian\nheresy, as is clear from Augustine in many of his books [*For\ninstance, Retract. i, 9; De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. ix; Contra\nJulian. iii, 1; De Dono Persev. xi, xii.]\n\nIn endeavoring to explain how the sin of our first parent could be\ntransmitted by way of origin to his descendants, various writers have\ngone about it in various ways. For some, considering that the subject\nof sin is the rational soul, maintained that the rational soul is\ntransmitted with the semen, so that thus an infected soul would seem\nto produce other infected souls. Others, rejecting this as erroneous,\nendeavored to show how the guilt of the parent's soul can be\ntransmitted to the children, even though the soul be not transmitted,\nfrom the fact that defects of the body are transmitted from parent to\nchild--thus a leper may beget a leper, or a gouty man may be the\nfather of a gouty son, on account of some seminal corruption,\nalthough this corruption is not leprosy or gout. Now since the body\nis proportionate to the soul, and since the soul's defects redound\ninto the body, and vice versa, in like manner, say they, a culpable\ndefect of the soul is passed on to the child, through the\ntransmission of the semen, albeit the semen itself is not the subject\nof the guilt.\n\nBut all these explanations are insufficient. Because, granted that\nsome bodily defects are transmitted by way of origin from parent to\nchild, and granted that even some defects of the soul are transmitted\nin consequence, on account of a defect in the bodily habit, as in the\ncase of idiots begetting idiots; nevertheless the fact of having a\ndefect by the way of origin seems to exclude the notion of guilt,\nwhich is essentially something voluntary. Wherefore granted that the\nrational soul were transmitted, from the very fact that the stain on\nthe child's soul is not in its will, it would cease to be a guilty\nstain binding its subject to punishment; for, as the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. iii, 5), \"no one reproaches a man born blind; one rather\ntakes pity on him.\"\n\nTherefore we must explain the matter otherwise by saying that all men\nborn of Adam may be considered as one man, inasmuch as they have one\ncommon nature, which they receive from their first parents; even as\nin civil matters, all who are members of one community are reputed as\none body, and the whole community as one man. Indeed Porphyry says\n(Praedic., De Specie) that \"by sharing the same species, many men are\none man.\" Accordingly the multitude of men born of Adam, are as so\nmany members of one body. Now the action of one member of the body,\nof the hand for instance, is voluntary not by the will of that hand,\nbut by the will of the soul, the first mover of the members.\nWherefore a murder which the hand commits would not be imputed as a\nsin to the hand, considered by itself as apart from the body, but is\nimputed to it as something belonging to man and moved by man's first\nmoving principle. In this way, then, the disorder which is in this\nman born of Adam, is voluntary, not by his will, but by the will of\nhis first parent, who, by the movement of generation, moves all who\noriginate from him, even as the soul's will moves all the members to\ntheir actions. Hence the sin which is thus transmitted by the first\nparent to his descendants is called \"original,\" just as the sin which\nflows from the soul into the bodily members is called \"actual.\" And\njust as the actual sin that is committed by a member of the body, is\nnot the sin of that member, except inasmuch as that member is a part\nof the man, for which reason it is called a \"human sin\"; so original\nsin is not the sin of this person, except inasmuch as this person\nreceives his nature from his first parent, for which reason it is\ncalled the \"sin of nature,\" according to Eph. 2:3: \"We . . . were by\nnature children of wrath.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The son is said not to bear the iniquity of his father,\nbecause he is not punished for his father's sin, unless he share in\nhis guilt. It is thus in the case before us: because guilt is\ntransmitted by the way of origin from father to son, even as actual\nsin is transmitted through being imitated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although the soul is not transmitted, because the power\nin the semen is not able to cause the rational soul, nevertheless the\nmotion of the semen is a disposition to the transmission of the\nrational soul: so that the semen by its own power transmits the human\nnature from parent to child, and with that nature, the stain which\ninfects it: for he that is born is associated with his first parent\nin his guilt, through the fact that he inherits his nature from him\nby a kind of movement which is that of generation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the guilt is not actually in the semen, yet\nhuman nature is there virtually accompanied by that guilt.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The semen is the principle of generation, which is an\nact proper to nature, by helping it to propagate itself. Hence the\nsoul is more infected by the semen, than by the flesh which is\nalready perfect, and already affixed to a certain person.\n\nReply Obj. 5: A man is not blamed for that which he has from his\norigin, if we consider the man born, in himself. But it we consider\nhim as referred to a principle, then he may be reproached for it:\nthus a man may from his birth be under a family disgrace, on account\nof a crime committed by one of his forbears.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 81, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Also Other Sins of the First Parent or of Nearer Ancestors\nAre Transmitted to Their Descendants?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that also other sins, whether of the first\nparent or of nearer ancestors, are transmitted to their descendants.\nFor punishment is never due unless for fault. Now some are punished\nby the judgment of God for the sin of their immediate parents,\naccording to Ex. 20:5: \"I am . . . God . . . jealous, visiting the\niniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth\ngeneration.\" Furthermore, according to human law, the children of\nthose who are guilty of high treason are disinherited. Therefore the\nguilt of nearer ancestors is also transmitted to their descendants.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a man can better transmit to another, that which he\nhas of himself, than that which he has received from another: thus\nfire heats better than hot water does. Now a man transmits to his\nchildren, by the way, of origin, the sin which he has from Adam. Much\nmore therefore should he transmit the sin which he has contracted of\nhimself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the reason why we contract original sin from our\nfirst parent is because we were in him as in the principle of our\nnature, which he corrupted. But we were likewise in our nearer\nancestors, as in principles of our nature, which however it be\ncorrupt, can be corrupted yet more by sin, according to Apoc. 22:11:\n\"He that is filthy, let him be filthier still.\" Therefore children\ncontract, by the way of origin, the sins of their nearer ancestors,\neven as they contract the sin of their first parent.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Good is more self-diffusive than evil. But the\nmerits of the nearer ancestors are not transmitted to their\ndescendants. Much less therefore are their sins.\n\n_I answer that,_ Augustine puts this question in the _Enchiridion_\nxlvi, xlvii, and leaves it unsolved. Yet if we look into the matter\ncarefully we shall see that it is impossible for the sins of the\nnearer ancestors, or even any other but the first sin of our first\nparent to be transmitted by way of origin. The reason is that a man\nbegets his like in species but not in individual. Consequently those\nthings that pertain directly to the individual, such as personal\nactions and matters affecting them, are not transmitted by parents to\ntheir children: for a grammarian does not transmit to his son the\nknowledge of grammar that he has acquired by his own studies. On the\nother hand, those things that concern the nature of the species, are\ntransmitted by parents to their children, unless there be a defect of\nnature: thus a man with eyes begets a son having eyes, unless nature\nfails. And if nature be strong, even certain accidents of the\nindividual pertaining to natural disposition, are transmitted to the\nchildren, e.g. fleetness of body, acuteness of intellect, and so\nforth; but nowise those that are purely personal, as stated above.\n\nNow just as something may belong to the person as such, and also\nsomething through the gift of grace, so may something belong to the\nnature as such, viz. whatever is caused by the principles of nature,\nand something too through the gift of grace. In this way original\njustice, as stated in the First Part (Q. 100, A. 1), was a gift of\ngrace, conferred by God on all human nature in our first parent. This\ngift the first man lost by his first sin. Wherefore as that original\njustice together with the nature was to have been transmitted to his\nposterity, so also was its disorder. Other actual sins, however,\nwhether of the first parent or of others, do not corrupt the nature\nas nature, but only as the nature of that person, i.e. in respect of\nthe proneness to sin: and consequently other sins are not transmitted.\n\nReply Obj. 1: According to Augustine in his letter to Avitus [*Ep. ad\nAuxilium ccl.], children are never inflicted with spiritual punishment\non account of their parents, unless they share in their guilt, either\nin their origin, or by imitation, because every soul is God's\nimmediate property, as stated in Ezech. 18:4. Sometimes, however, by\nDivine or human judgment, children receive bodily punishment on their\nparents' account, inasmuch as the child, as to its body, is part of\nits father.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man can more easily transmit that which he has of\nhimself, provided it be transmissible. But the actual sins of our\nnearer ancestors are not transmissible, because they are purely\npersonal, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The first sin infects nature with a human corruption\npertaining to nature; whereas other sins infect it with a corruption\npertaining only to the person.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 81, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Sin of the First Parent Is Transmitted, by the Way of\nOrigin, to All Men?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the sin of the first parent is not\ntransmitted, by the way of origin, to all men. Because death is a\npunishment consequent upon original sin. But not all those, who are\nborn of the seed of Adam, will die: since those who will be still\nliving at the coming of our Lord, will never die, as, seemingly, may\nbe gathered from 1 Thess. 4:14: \"We who are alive . . . unto the\ncoming of the Lord, shall not prevent them who have slept.\" Therefore\nthey do not contract original sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no one gives another what he has not himself. Now a\nman who has been baptized has not original sin. Therefore he does not\ntransmit it to his children.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the gift of Christ is greater than the sin of Adam,\nas the Apostle declares (Rom. 5:15, seqq). But the gift of Christ is\nnot transmitted to all men: neither, therefore, is the sin of Adam.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): \"Death passed upon\nall men in whom all have sinned.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the Catholic Faith we must firmly\nbelieve that, Christ alone excepted, all men descended from Adam\ncontract original sin from him; else all would not need redemption\n[*Cf. Translator's note inserted before III, Q. 27] which is through\nChrist; and this is erroneous. The reason for this may be gathered\nfrom what has been stated (A. 1), viz. that original sin, in virtue\nof the sin of our first parent, is transmitted to his posterity, just\nas, from the soul's will, actual sin is transmitted to the members of\nthe body, through their being moved by the will. Now it is evident\nthat actual sin can be transmitted to all such members as have an\ninborn aptitude to be moved by the will. Therefore original sin is\ntransmitted to all those who are moved by Adam by the movement of\ngeneration.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It is held with greater probability and more commonly\nthat all those that are alive at the coming of our Lord, will die,\nand rise again shortly, as we shall state more fully in the Third\nPart (Suppl., Q. 78, A. 1, Obj. 1). If, however, it be true, as\nothers hold, that they will never die, (an opinion which Jerome\nmentions among others in a letter to Minerius, on the Resurrection of\nthe Body--Ep. cxix), then we must say in reply to the objection, that\nalthough they are not to die, the debt of death is none the less in\nthem, and that the punishment of death will be remitted by God, since\nHe can also forgive the punishment due for actual sins.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Original sin is taken away by Baptism as to the guilt,\nin so far as the soul recovers grace as regards the mind.\nNevertheless original sin remains in its effect as regards the\n_fomes,_ which is the disorder of the lower parts of the soul and of\nthe body itself, in respect of which, and not of the mind, man\nexercises his power of generation. Consequently those who are\nbaptized transmit original sin: since they do not beget as being\nrenewed in Baptism, but as still retaining something of the oldness\nof the first sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as Adam's sin is transmitted to all who are born\nof Adam corporally, so is the grace of Christ transmitted to all that\nare begotten of Him spiritually, by faith and Baptism: and this, not\nonly unto the removal of sin of their first parent, but also unto the\nremoval of actual sins, and the obtaining of glory.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 81, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Original Sin Would Be Contracted by a Person Formed\nMiraculously from Human Flesh?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that original sin would be contracted by a\nperson formed miraculously from human flesh. For a gloss on Gen. 4:1\nsays that \"Adam's entire posterity was corrupted in his loins,\nbecause they were not severed from him in the place of life, before\nhe sinned, but in the place of exile after he had sinned.\" But if a\nman were to be formed in the aforesaid manner, his flesh would be\nsevered in the place of exile. Therefore it would contract original\nsin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, original sin is caused in us by the soul being\ninfected through the flesh. But man's flesh is entirely corrupted.\nTherefore a man's soul would contract the infection of original sin,\nfrom whatever part of the flesh it was formed.\n\nObj. 3: Further, original sin comes upon all from our first parent,\nin so far as we were all in him when he sinned. But those who might\nbe formed out of human flesh, would have been in Adam. Therefore they\nwould contract original sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ They would not have been in Adam _according to\nseminal virtue,_ which alone is the cause of the transmission of\noriginal sin, as Augustine states (Gen. ad lit. x, 18, seqq.).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 3), original sin is\ntransmitted from the first parent to his posterity, inasmuch as they\nare moved by him through generation, even as the members are moved by\nthe soul to actual sin. Now there is no movement to generation except\nby the active power of generation: so that those alone contract\noriginal sin, who are descended from Adam through the active power of\ngeneration originally derived from Adam, i.e. who are descended from\nhim through seminal power; for the seminal power is nothing else than\nthe active power of generation. But if anyone were to be formed by\nGod out of human flesh, it is evident that the active power would not\nbe derived from Adam. Consequently he would not contract original\nsin: even as a hand would have no part in a human sin, if it were\nmoved, not by the man's will, but by some external power.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Adam was not in the place of exile until after his sin.\nConsequently it is not on account of the place of exile, but on\naccount of the sin, that original sin is transmitted to those to whom\nhis active generation extends.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The flesh does not corrupt the soul, except in so far\nas it is the active principle in generation, as we have stated.\n\nReply Obj. 3: If a man were to be formed from human flesh, he would\nhave been in Adam, \"by way of bodily substance\" [*The expression is\nSt. Augustine's (Gen. ad lit. x). Cf. Summa Theologica, III, Q. 31,\nA. 6, Reply to First Objection.], but not according to seminal\nvirtue, as stated above. Therefore he would not contract original sin.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 81, Art. 5]\n\nWhether If Eve, and Not Adam, Had Sinned, Their Children Would Have\nContracted Original Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned,\ntheir children would have contracted original sin. Because we\ncontract original sin from our parents, in so far as we were once in\nthem, according to the word of the Apostle (Rom. 5:12): \"In whom all\nhave sinned.\" Now a man pre-exists in his mother as well as in his\nfather. Therefore a man would have contracted original sin from his\nmother's sin as well as from his father's.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children\nwould have been born liable to suffering and death, since it is \"the\nmother\" that \"provides the matter in generation\" as the Philosopher\nstates (De Gener. Animal. ii, 1, 4), when death and liability to\nsuffering are the necessary results of matter. Now liability to\nsuffering and the necessity of dying are punishments of original sin.\nTherefore if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would\ncontract original sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 3) that \"the Holy\nGhost came upon the Virgin,\" (of whom Christ was to be born without\noriginal sin) \"purifying her.\" But this purification would not have\nbeen necessary, if the infection of original sin were not contracted\nfrom the mother. Therefore the infection of original sin is\ncontracted from the mother: so that if Eve had sinned, her children\nwould have contracted original sin, even if Adam had not sinned.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12): \"By one man sin\nentered into this world.\" Now if the woman would have transmitted\noriginal sin to her children, he should have said that it entered by\ntwo, since both of them sinned, or rather that it entered by a woman,\nsince she sinned first. Therefore original sin is transmitted to the\nchildren, not by the mother, but by the father.\n\n_I answer that,_ The solution of this question is made clear by what\nhas been said. For it has been stated (A. 1) that original sin is\ntransmitted by the first parent in so far as he is the mover in the\nbegetting of his children: wherefore it has been said (A. 4) that if\nanyone were begotten materially only, of human flesh, they would not\ncontract original sin. Now it is evident that in the opinion of\nphilosophers, the active principle of generation is from the father,\nwhile the mother provides the matter. Therefore original sin is\ncontracted, not from the mother, but from the father: so that,\naccordingly, if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their children would\nnot contract original sin: whereas, if Adam, and not Eve, had sinned,\nthey would contract it.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The child pre-exists in its father as in its active\nprinciple, and in its mother, as in its material and passive\nprinciple. Consequently the comparison fails.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Some hold that if Eve, and not Adam, had sinned, their\nchildren would be immune from the sin, but would have been subject to\nthe necessity of dying and to other forms of suffering that are a\nnecessary result of the matter which is provided by the mother, not\nas punishments, but as actual defects. This, however, seems\nunreasonable. Because, as stated in the First Part (Q. 97, AA. 1, 2,\nad 4), immortality and impassibility, in the original state, were a\nresult, not of the condition of matter, but of original justice,\nwhereby the body was subjected to the soul, so long as the soul\nremained subject to God. Now privation of original justice is\noriginal sin. If, therefore, supposing Adam had not sinned, original\nsin would not have been transmitted to posterity on account of Eve's\nsin; it is evident that the children would not have been deprived of\noriginal justice: and consequently they would not have been liable to\nsuffer and subject to the necessity of dying.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This prevenient purification in the Blessed Virgin was\nnot needed to hinder the transmission of original sin, but because it\nbehooved the Mother of God \"to shine with the greatest purity\" [*Cf.\nAnselm, De Concep. Virg. xviii.]. For nothing is worthy to receive\nGod unless it be pure, according to Ps. 92:5: \"Holiness becometh Thy\nHouse, O Lord.\"\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 82\n\nOF ORIGINAL SIN, AS TO ITS ESSENCE\n(Question 82)\n\nWe must now consider original sin as to its essence, and under this\nhead there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether original sin is a habit?\n\n(2) Whether there is but one original sin in each man?\n\n(3) Whether original sin is concupiscence?\n\n(4) Whether original sin is equally in all?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 82, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Original Sin Is a Habit?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that original sin is not a habit. For\noriginal sin is the absence of original justice, as Anselm states (De\nConcep. Virg. ii, iii, xxvi), so that original sin is a privation.\nBut privation is opposed to habit. Therefore original sin is not a\nhabit.\n\nObj. 2: Further, actual sin has the nature of fault more than\noriginal sin, in so far as it is more voluntary. Now the habit of\nactual sin has not the nature of a fault, else it would follow that a\nman while asleep, would be guilty of sin. Therefore no original habit\nhas the nature of a fault.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in wickedness act always precedes habit, because\nevil habits are not infused, but acquired. Now original sin is not\npreceded by an act. Therefore original sin is not a habit.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says in his book on the Baptism of\ninfants (De Pecc. Merit. et Remiss. i, 39) that on account of\noriginal sin little children have the aptitude of concupiscence\nthough they have not the act. Now aptitude denotes some kind of\nhabit. Therefore original sin is a habit.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 49, A. 4; Q. 50, A. 1), habit is\ntwofold. The first is a habit whereby power is inclined to an act:\nthus science and virtue are called habits. In this way original sin\nis not a habit. The second kind of habit is the disposition of a\ncomplex nature, whereby that nature is well or ill disposed to\nsomething, chiefly when such a disposition has become like a second\nnature, as in the case of sickness or health. In this sense original\nsin is a habit. For it is an inordinate disposition, arising from the\ndestruction of the harmony which was essential to original justice,\neven as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body, by\nreason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to\nhealth. Hence it is that original sin is called the \"languor of\nnature\" [*Cf. Augustine, In Ps. 118, serm. iii].\n\nReply Obj. 1: As bodily sickness is partly a privation, in so far as\nit denotes the destruction of the equilibrium of health, and partly\nsomething positive, viz. the very humors that are inordinately\ndisposed, so too original sin denotes the privation of original\njustice, and besides this, the inordinate disposition of the parts of\nthe soul. Consequently it is not a pure privation, but a corrupt\nhabit.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Actual sin is an inordinateness of an act: whereas\noriginal sin, being the sin of nature, is an inordinate disposition\nof nature, and has the character of fault through being transmitted\nfrom our first parent, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1). Now this\ninordinate disposition of nature is a kind of habit, whereas the\ninordinate disposition of an act is not: and for this reason original\nsin can be a habit, whereas actual sin cannot.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This objection considers the habit which inclines a\npower to an act: but original sin is not this kind of habit.\nNevertheless a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow\nfrom original sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal\nof the obstacle, i.e. original justice, which hindered inordinate\nmovements: just as an inclination to inordinate bodily movements\nresults indirectly from bodily sickness. Nor is it necessary to say\nthat original sin is a habit \"infused,\" or a habit \"acquired\" (except\nby the act of our first parent, but not by our own act): but it is a\nhabit \"inborn\" due to our corrupt origin.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 82, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Are Several Original Sins in One Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are many original sins in one\nman. For it is written (Ps. 1:7): \"Behold I was conceived in\niniquities, and in sins did my mother conceive me.\" But the sin in\nwhich a man is conceived is original sin. Therefore there are several\noriginal sins in man.\n\nObj. 2: Further, one and the same habit does not incline its subject\nto contraries: since the inclination of habit is like that of nature\nwhich tends to one thing. Now original sin, even in one man, inclines\nto various and contrary sins. Therefore original sin is not one\nhabit; but several.\n\nObj. 3: Further, original sin infects every part of the soul. Now the\ndifferent parts of the soul are different subjects of sin, as shown\nabove (Q. 74). Since then one sin cannot be in different subjects, it\nseems that original sin is not one but several.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 1:29): \"Behold the Lamb of\nGod, behold Him Who taketh away the sin of the world\": and the reason\nfor the employment of the singular is that the \"sin of the world\" is\noriginal sin, as a gloss expounds this passage.\n\n_I answer that,_ In one man there is one original sin. Two reasons\nmay be assigned for this. The first is on the part of the cause of\noriginal sin. For it has been stated (Q. 81, A. 2), that the first\nsin alone of our first parent was transmitted to his posterity.\nWherefore in one man original sin is one in number; and in all men,\nit is one in proportion, i.e. in relation to its first principle. The\nsecond reason may be taken from the very essence of original sin.\nBecause in every inordinate disposition, unity of species depends on\nthe cause, while the unity of number is derived from the subject. For\nexample, take bodily sickness: various species of sickness proceed\nfrom different causes, e.g. from excessive heat or cold, or from a\nlesion in the lung or liver; while one specific sickness in one man\nwill be one in number. Now the cause of this corrupt disposition that\nis called original sin, is one only, viz. the privation of original\njustice, removing the subjection of man's mind to God. Consequently\noriginal sin is specifically one, and, in one man, can be only one in\nnumber; while, in different men, it is one in species and in\nproportion, but is numerically many.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The employment of the plural--\"in sins\"--may be\nexplained by the custom of the Divine Scriptures in the frequent use\nof the plural for the singular, e.g. \"They are dead that sought the\nlife of the child\"; or by the fact that all actual sins virtually\npre-exist in original sin, as in a principle so that it is virtually\nmany; or by the fact of there being many deformities in the sin of\nour first parent, viz. pride, disobedience, gluttony, and so forth;\nor by several parts of the soul being infected by original sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Of itself and directly, i.e. by its own form, one habit\ncannot incline its subject to contraries. But there is no reason why\nit should not do so, indirectly and accidentally, i.e. by the removal\nof an obstacle: thus, when the harmony of a mixed body is destroyed,\nthe elements have contrary local tendencies. In like manner, when the\nharmony of original justice is destroyed, the various powers of the\nsoul have various opposite tendencies.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Original sin infects the different parts of the\nsoul, in so far as they are the parts of one whole; even as original\njustice held all the soul's parts together in one. Consequently there\nis but one original sin: just as there is but one fever in one man,\nalthough the various parts of the body are affected.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 82, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Original Sin Is Concupiscence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that original sin is not concupiscence.\nFor every sin is contrary to nature, according to Damascene (De Fide\nOrth. ii, 4, 30). But concupiscence is in accordance with nature,\nsince it is the proper act of the concupiscible faculty which is a\nnatural power. Therefore concupiscence is not original sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, through original sin \"the passions of sins\" are in\nus, according to the Apostle (Rom. 7:5). Now there are several other\npassions besides concupiscence, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4).\nTherefore original sin is not concupiscence any more than another\npassion.\n\nObj. 3: Further, by original sin, all the parts of the soul are\ndisordered, as stated above (A. 2, Obj. 3). But the intellect is the\nhighest of the soul's parts, as the Philosopher states (Ethic. x, 7).\nTherefore original sin is ignorance rather than concupiscence.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 15): \"Concupiscence is\nthe guilt of original sin.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Everything takes its species from its form: and it\nhas been stated (A. 2) that the species of original sin is taken from\nits cause. Consequently the formal element of original sin must be\nconsidered in respect of the cause of original sin. But contraries\nhave contrary causes. Therefore the cause of original sin must be\nconsidered with respect to the cause of original justice, which is\nopposed to it. Now the whole order of original justice consists in\nman's will being subject to God: which subjection, first and chiefly,\nwas in the will, whose function it is to move all the other parts to\nthe end, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 1), so that the will being turned\naway from God, all the other powers of the soul become inordinate.\nAccordingly the privation of original justice, whereby the will was\nmade subject to God, is the formal element in original sin; while\nevery other disorder of the soul's powers, is a kind of material\nelement in respect of original sin. Now the inordinateness of the\nother powers of the soul consists chiefly in their turning\ninordinately to mutable good; which inordinateness may be called by\nthe general name of concupiscence. Hence original sin is\nconcupiscence, materially, but privation of original justice,\nformally.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since, in man, the concupiscible power is naturally\ngoverned by reason, the act of concupiscence is so far natural to\nman, as it is in accord with the order of reason; while, in so far as\nit trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for a man, contrary\nto reason. Such is the concupiscence of original sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), all the irascible\npassions are reducible to concupiscible passions, as holding the\nprincip[al] place: and of these, concupiscence is the most impetuous\nin moving, and is felt most, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 2, ad 1).\nTherefore original sin is ascribed to concupiscence, as being the\nchief passion, and as including all the others, in a fashion.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As, in good things, the intellect and reason\nstand first, so conversely in evil things, the lower part of the soul\nis found to take precedence, for it clouds and draws the reason, as\nstated above (Q. 77, AA. 1, 2;Q. 80, A. 2). Hence original\nsin is called concupiscence rather than ignorance, although ignorance\nis comprised among the material defects of original sin.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 82, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Original Sin Is Equally in All?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that original sin is not equally in all.\nBecause original sin is inordinate concupiscence, as stated above\n(A. 3). Now all are not equally prone to acts of concupiscence.\nTherefore original sin is not equally in all.\n\nObj. 2: Further, original sin is an inordinate disposition of the\nsoul, just as sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body. But\nsickness is subject to degrees. Therefore original sin is subject to\ndegrees.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Nup. et Concep. i, 23) that \"lust\ntransmits original sin to the child.\" But the act of generation may\nbe more lustful in one than in another. Therefore original sin may be\ngreater in one than in another.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Original sin is the sin of nature, as stated above\n(Q. 81, A. 1). But nature is equally in all. Therefore original sin\nis too.\n\n_I answer that,_ There are two things in original sin: one is the\nprivation of original justice; the other is the relation of this\nprivation to the sin of our first parent, from whom it is transmitted\nto man through his corrupt origin. As to the first, original sin has\nno degrees, since the gift of original justice is taken away\nentirely; and privations that remove something entirely, such as\ndeath and darkness, cannot be more or less, as stated above (Q. 73,\nA. 2). In like manner, neither is this possible, as to the second:\nsince all are related equally to the first principle of our corrupt\norigin, from which principle original sin takes the nature of guilt;\nfor relations cannot be more or less. Consequently it is evident that\noriginal sin cannot be more in one than in another.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Through the bond of original justice being broken,\nwhich held together all the powers of the soul in a certain order,\neach power of the soul tends to its own proper movement, and the more\nimpetuously, as it is stronger. Now it happens that some of the\nsoul's powers are stronger in one man than in another, on account of\nthe different bodily temperaments. Consequently if one man is more\nprone than another to acts of concupiscence, this is not due to\noriginal sin, because the bond of original justice is equally broken\nin all, and the lower parts of the soul are, in all, left to\nthemselves equally; but it is due to the various dispositions of the\npowers, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sickness of the body, even sickness of the same\nspecies, has not an equal cause in all; for instance if a fever be\ncaused by corruption of the bile, the corruption may be greater or\nless, and nearer to, or further from a vital principle. But the cause\nof original sin is equal to all, so that there is no comparison.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is not the actual lust that transmits original sin:\nfor, supposing God were to grant to a man to feel no inordinate lust\nin the act of generation, he would still transmit original sin; we\nmust understand this to be habitual lust, whereby the sensitive\nappetite is not kept subject to reason by the bonds of original\njustice. This lust is equally in all.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 83\n\nOF THE SUBJECT OF ORIGINAL SIN\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the subject of original sin, under which head\nthere are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the subject of original sin is the flesh rather than the\nsoul?\n\n(2) If it be the soul, whether this be through its essence, or\nthrough its powers?\n\n(3) Whether the will prior to the other powers is the subject of\noriginal sin?\n\n(4) Whether certain powers of the soul are specially infected, viz.\nthe generative power, the concupiscible part, and the sense of touch?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 83, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Original Sin Is More in the Flesh Than in the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that original sin is more in the flesh\nthan in the soul. Because the rebellion of the flesh against the mind\narises from the corruption of original sin. Now the root of this\nrebellion is seated in the flesh: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23):\n\"I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my\nmind.\" Therefore original sin is seated chiefly in the flesh.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a thing is more in its cause than in its effect:\nthus heat is in the heating fire more than in the hot water. Now the\nsoul is infected with the corruption of original sin by the carnal\nsemen. Therefore original sin is in the flesh rather than in the soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, we contract original sin from our first parent, in\nso far as we were in him by reason of seminal virtue. Now our souls\nwere not in him thus, but only our flesh. Therefore original sin is\nnot in the soul, but in the flesh.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the rational soul created by God is infused into the\nbody. If therefore the soul were infected with original sin, it would\nfollow that it is corrupted in its creation or infusion: and thus God\nwould be the cause of sin, since He is the author of the soul's\ncreation and fusion.\n\nObj. 5: Further, no wise man pours a precious liquid into a vessel,\nknowing that the vessel will corrupt the liquid. But the rational\nsoul is more precious than any liquid. If therefore the soul, by\nbeing united with the body, could be corrupted with the infection of\noriginal sin, God, Who is wisdom itself, would never infuse the soul\ninto such a body. And yet He does; wherefore it is not corrupted by\nthe flesh. Therefore original sin is not in the soul but in the flesh.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The same is the subject of a virtue and of the\nvice or sin contrary to that virtue. But the flesh cannot be the\nsubject of virtue: for the Apostle says (Rom. 7:18): \"I know that\nthere dwelleth not in me, that is to say, in my flesh, that which is\ngood.\" Therefore the flesh cannot be the subject of original sin, but\nonly the soul.\n\n_I answer that,_ One thing can be in another in two ways. First, as\nin its cause, either principal, or instrumental; secondly, as in its\nsubject. Accordingly the original sin of all men was in Adam indeed,\nas in its principal cause, according to the words of the Apostle\n(Rom. 5:12): \"In whom all have sinned\": whereas it is in the bodily\nsemen, as in its instrumental cause, since it is by the active power\nof the semen that original sin together with human nature is\ntransmitted to the child. But original sin can nowise be in the flesh\nas its subject, but only in the soul.\n\nThe reason for this is that, as stated above (Q. 81, A. 1), original\nsin is transmitted from the will of our first parent to this\nposterity by a certain movement of generation, in the same way as\nactual sin is transmitted from any man's will to his other parts. Now\nin this transmission it is to be observed, that whatever accrues from\nthe motion of the will consenting to sin, to any part of man that can\nin any way share in that guilt, either as its subject or as its\ninstrument, has the character of sin. Thus from the will consenting\nto gluttony, concupiscence of food accrues to the concupiscible\nfaculty, and partaking of food accrues to the hand and the mouth,\nwhich, in so far as they are moved by the will to sin, are the\ninstruments of sin. But that further action is evoked in the\nnutritive power and the internal members, which have no natural\naptitude for being moved by the will, does not bear the character of\nguilt.\n\nAccordingly, since the soul can be the subject of guilt, while the\nflesh, of itself, cannot be the subject of guilt; whatever accrues to\nthe soul from the corruption of the first sin, has the character of\nguilt, while whatever accrues to the flesh, has the character, not of\nguilt but of punishment: so that, therefore, the soul is the subject\nof original sin, and not the flesh.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 27) [*Cf. QQ. lxxxiii,\nqu. 66], the Apostle is speaking, in that passage, of man already\nredeemed, who is delivered from guilt, but is still liable to\npunishment, by reason of which sin is stated to dwell \"in the flesh.\"\nConsequently it follows that the flesh is the subject, not of guilt,\nbut of punishment.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Original sin is caused by the semen as instrumental\ncause. Now there is no need for anything to be more in the\ninstrumental cause than in the effect; but only in the principal\ncause: and, in this way, original sin was in Adam more fully, since\nin him it had the nature of actual sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The soul of any individual man was in Adam, in respect\nof his seminal power, not indeed as in its effective principle, but\nas in a dispositive principle: because the bodily semen, which is\ntransmitted from Adam, does not of its own power produce the rational\nsoul, but disposes the matter for it.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The corruption of original sin is nowise caused by God,\nbut by the sin alone of our first parent through carnal generation.\nAnd so, since creation implies a relation in the soul to God alone,\nit cannot be said that the soul is tainted through being created. On\nthe other hand, infusion implies relation both to God infusing and to\nthe flesh into which the soul is infused. And so, with regard to God\ninfusing, it cannot be said that the soul is stained through being\ninfused; but only with regard to the body into which it is infused.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The common good takes precedence of private good.\nWherefore God, according to His wisdom, does not overlook the general\norder of things (which is that such a soul be infused into such a\nbody), lest this soul contract a singular corruption: all the more\nthat the nature of the soul demands that it should not exist prior to\nits infusion into the body, as stated in the First Part (Q. 90, A.\n4; Q. 118, A. 3). And it is better for the soul to be thus,\naccording to its nature, than not to be at all, especially since it\ncan avoid damnation, by means of grace.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 83, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Original Sin Is in the Essence of the Soul Rather Than in the\nPowers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that original sin is not in the essence of\nthe soul rather than in the powers. For the soul is naturally apt to\nbe the subject of sin, in respect of those parts which can be moved\nby the will. Now the soul is moved by the will, not as to its essence\nbut only as to the powers. Therefore original sin is in the soul, not\naccording to its essence, but only according to the powers.\n\nObj. 2: Further, original sin is opposed to original justice. Now\noriginal justice was in a power of the soul, because power is the\nsubject of virtue. Therefore original sin also is in a power of the\nsoul, rather than in its essence.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as original sin is derived from the soul as\nfrom the flesh, so is it derived by the powers from the essence. But\noriginal sin is more in the soul than in the flesh. Therefore it is\nmore in the powers than in the essence of the soul.\n\nObj. 4: Further, original sin is said to be concupiscence, as stated\n(Q. 82, A. 3). But concupiscence is in the powers of the soul.\nTherefore original sin is also.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Original sin is called the sin of nature, as\nstated above (Q. 81, A. 1). Now the soul is the form and nature of\nthe body, in respect of its essence and not in respect of its powers,\nas stated in the First Part (Q. 76, A. 6). Therefore the soul is the\nsubject of original sin chiefly in respect of its essence.\n\n_I answer that,_ The subject of a sin is chiefly that part of the\nsoul to which the motive cause of that sin primarily pertains: thus\nif the motive cause of a sin is sensual pleasure, which regards the\nconcupiscible power through being its proper object, it follows that\nthe concupiscible power is the proper subject of that sin. Now it is\nevident that original sin is caused through our origin. Consequently\nthat part of the soul which is first reached by man's origin, is the\nprimary subject of original sin. Now the origin reaches the soul as\nthe term of generation, according as it is the form of the body: and\nthis belongs to the soul in respect of its essence, as was proved in\nthe First Part (Q. 76, A. 6). Therefore the soul, in respect of its\nessence, is the primary subject of original sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the motion of the will of an individual reaches to\nthe soul's powers and not to its essence, so the motion of the will\nof the first generator, through the channel of generation, reaches\nfirst of all to the essence of the soul, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even original justice pertained radically to the\nessence of the soul, because it was God's gift to human nature, to\nwhich the essence of the soul is related before the powers. For the\npowers seem to regard the person, in as much as they are the\nprinciples of personal acts. Hence they are the proper subjects of\nactual sins, which are the sins of the person.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The body is related to the soul as matter to form,\nwhich though it comes second in order of generation, nevertheless\ncomes first in the order of perfection and nature. But the essence of\nthe soul is related to the powers, as a subject to its proper\naccidents, which follow their subject both in the order of generation\nand in that of perfection. Consequently the comparison fails.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Concupiscence, in relation to original sin, holds the\nposition of matter and effect, as stated above (Q. 82, A. 3).\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 83, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Original Sin Infects the Will Before the Other Powers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that original sin does not infect the will\nbefore the other powers. For every sin belongs chiefly to that power\nby whose act it was caused. Now original sin is caused by an act of\nthe generative power. Therefore it seems to belong to the generative\npower more than to the others.\n\nObj. 2: Further, original sin is transmitted through the carnal\nsemen. But the other powers of the soul are more akin to the flesh\nthan the will is, as is evident with regard to all the sensitive\npowers, which use a bodily organ. Therefore original sin is in them\nmore than in the will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the intellect precedes the will, for the object of\nthe will is only the good understood. If therefore original sin\ninfects all the powers of the soul, it seems that it must first of\nall infect the intellect, as preceding the others.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Original justice has a prior relation to the will,\nbecause it is \"rectitude of the will,\" as Anselm states (De Concep.\nVirg. iii). Therefore original sin, which is opposed to it, also has\na prior relation to the will.\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things must be considered in the infection of\noriginal sin. First, its inherence to its subject; and in this\nrespect it regards first the essence of the soul, as stated above (A.\n2). In the second place we must consider its inclination to act; and\nin this way it regards the powers of the soul. It must therefore\nregard first of all that power in which is seated the first\ninclination to commit a sin, and this is the will, as stated above\n(Q. 74, AA. 1, 2). Therefore original sin regards first of all the\nwill.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Original sin, in man, is not caused by the generative\npower of the child, but by the act of the parental generative power.\nConsequently, it does not follow that the child's generative power is\nthe subject of original sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Original sin spreads in two ways; from the flesh to the\nsoul, and from the essence of the soul to the powers. The former\nfollows the order of generation, the latter follows the order of\nperfection. Therefore, although the other, viz. the sensitive powers,\nare more akin to the flesh, yet, since the will, being the higher\npower, is more akin to the essence of the soul, the infection of\noriginal sin reaches it first.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The intellect precedes the will, in one way, by\nproposing its object to it. In another way, the will precedes the\nintellect, in the order of motion to act, which motion pertains to\nsin.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 83, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Aforesaid Powers Are More Infected Than the Others?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the aforesaid powers are not more\ninfected than the others. For the infection of original sin seems to\npertain more to that part of the soul which can be first the subject\nof sin. Now this is the rational part, and chiefly the will.\nTherefore that power is most infected by original sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no power of the soul is infected by guilt, except in\nso far as it can obey reason. Now the generative power cannot obey\nreason, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 13. Therefore the generative power\nis not the most infected by original sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, of all the senses the sight is the most spiritual\nand the nearest to reason, in so far \"as it shows us how a number of\nthings differ\" (Metaph. i). But the infection of guilt is first of\nall in the reason. Therefore the sight is more infected than touch.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 16, seqq., 24)\nthat the infection of original sin is most apparent in the movements\nof the members of generation, which are not subject to reason. Now\nthose members serve the generative power in the mingling of sexes,\nwherein there is the delectation of touch, which is the most powerful\nincentive to concupiscence. Therefore the infection of original sin\nregards these three chiefly, viz. the generative power, the\nconcupiscible faculty and the sense of touch.\n\n_I answer that,_ Those corruptions especially are said to be\ninfectious, which are of such a nature as to be transmitted from one\nsubject to another: hence contagious diseases, such as leprosy and\nmurrain and the like, are said to be infectious. Now the corruption\nof original sin is transmitted by the act of generation, as stated\nabove (Q. 81, A. 1). Therefore the powers which concur in this act,\nare chiefly said to be infected. Now this act serves the generative\npower, in as much as it is directed to generation; and it includes\ndelectation of the touch, which is the most powerful object of the\nconcupiscible faculty. Consequently, while all the parts of the soul\nare said to be corrupted by original sin, these three are said\nspecially to be corrupted and infected.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Original sin, in so far as it inclines to actual sins,\nbelongs chiefly to the will, as stated above (A. 3). But in so far as\nit is transmitted to the offspring, it belongs to the aforesaid\npowers proximately, and to the will, remotely.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The infection of actual sin belongs only to the powers\nwhich are moved by the will of the sinner. But the infection of\noriginal sin is not derived from the will of the contractor, but\nthrough his natural origin, which is effected by the generative\npower. Hence it is this power that is infected by original sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Sight is not related to the act of generation except in\nrespect of remote disposition, in so far as the concupiscible species\nis seen through the sight. But the delectation is completed in the\ntouch. Wherefore the aforesaid infection is ascribed to the touch\nrather than to the sight.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 84\n\nOF THE CAUSE OF SIN, IN RESPECT OF ONE SIN BEING THE CAUSE OF ANOTHER\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the cause of sin, in so far as one sin can be\nthe cause of another. Under this head there are four points of\ninquiry:\n\n(1) Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?\n\n(2) Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?\n\n(3) Whether other special sins should be called capital vices,\nbesides pride and covetousness?\n\n(4) How many capital vices there are, and which are they?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 84, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Covetousness Is the Root of All Sins?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that covetousness is not the root of all\nsins. For covetousness, which is immoderate desire for riches, is\nopposed to the virtue of liberality. But liberality is not the root\nof all virtues. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the desire for the means proceeds from desire for\nthe end. Now riches, the desire for which is called covetousness, are\nnot desired except as being useful for some end, as stated in\n_Ethic._ i, 5. Therefore covetousness is not the root of all sins,\nbut proceeds from some deeper root.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it often happens that avarice, which is another name\nfor covetousness, arises from other sins; as when a man desires money\nthrough ambition, or in order to sate his gluttony. Therefore it is\nnot the root of all sins.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Tim. 6:10): \"The desire of\nmoney is the root of all evil.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ According to some, covetousness may be understood in\ndifferent ways. First, as denoting inordinate desire for riches: and\nthus it is a special sin. Secondly, as denoting inordinate desire for\nany temporal good: and thus it is a genus comprising all sins,\nbecause every sin includes an inordinate turning to a mutable good,\nas stated above (Q. 72, A. 2). Thirdly, as denoting an inclination of\na corrupt nature to desire corruptible goods inordinately: and they\nsay that in this sense covetousness is the root of all sins,\ncomparing it to the root of a tree, which draws its sustenance from\nearth, just as every sin grows out of the love of temporal things.\n\nNow, though all this is true, it does not seem to explain the mind of\nthe Apostle when he states that covetousness is the root of all sins.\nFor in that passage he clearly speaks against those who, because they\n\"will become rich, fall into temptation, and into the snare of the\ndevil . . . for covetousness is the root of all evils.\" Hence it is\nevident that he is speaking of covetousness as denoting the\ninordinate desire for riches. Accordingly, we must say that\ncovetousness, as denoting a special sin, is called the root of all\nsins, in likeness to the root of a tree, in furnishing sustenance to\nthe whole tree. For we see that by riches man acquires the means of\ncommitting any sin whatever, and of sating his desire for any sin\nwhatever, since money helps man to obtain all manner of temporal\ngoods, according to Eccles. 10:19: \"All things obey money\": so that\nin this desire for riches is the root of all sins.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Virtue and sin do not arise from the same source. For\nsin arises from the desire of mutable good; and consequently the\ndesire of that good which helps one to obtain all temporal goods, is\ncalled the root of all sins. But virtue arises from the desire for\nthe immutable God; and consequently charity, which is the love of\nGod, is called the root of the virtues, according to Eph. 3:17:\n\"Rooted and founded in charity.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The desire of money is said to be the root of sins, not\nas though riches were sought for their own sake, as being the last\nend; but because they are much sought after as useful for any\ntemporal end. And since a universal good is more desirable than a\nparticular good, they move the appetite more than any individual\ngoods, which along with many others can be procured by means of money.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as in natural things we do not ask what\nalways happens, but what happens most frequently, for the reason that\nthe nature of corruptible things can be hindered, so as not always to\nact in the same way; so also in moral matters, we consider what\nhappens in the majority of cases, not what happens invariably, for the\nreason that the will does not act of necessity. So when we say that\ncovetousness is the root of all evils, we do not assert that no other\nevil can be its root, but that other evils more frequently arise\ntherefrom, for the reason given.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 84, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Pride Is the Beginning of Every Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that pride is not the beginning of every\nsin. For the root is a beginning of a tree, so that the beginning of\na sin seems to be the same as the root of sin. Now covetousness is\nthe root of every sin, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it is also\nthe beginning of every sin, and not pride.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 10:14): \"The beginning of the\npride of man is apostasy [Douay: 'to fall off'] from God.\" But\napostasy from God is a sin. Therefore another sin is the beginning of\npride, so that the latter is not the beginning of every sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the beginning of every sin would seem to be that\nwhich causes all sins. Now this is inordinate self-love, which,\naccording to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), \"builds up the city of\nBabylon.\" Therefore self-love and not pride, is the beginning of\nevery sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 10:15): \"Pride is the\nbeginning of all sin.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Some say pride is to be taken in three ways. First,\nas denoting inordinate desire to excel; and thus it is a special sin.\nSecondly, as denoting actual contempt of God, to the effect of not\nbeing subject to His commandment; and thus, they say, it is a generic\nsin. Thirdly, as denoting an inclination to this contempt, owing to\nthe corruption of nature; and in this sense they say that it is the\nbeginning of every sin, and that it differs from covetousness,\nbecause covetousness regards sin as turning towards the mutable good\nby which sin is, as it were, nourished and fostered, for which reason\ncovetousness is called the \"root\"; whereas pride regards sin as\nturning away from God, to Whose commandment man refuses to be\nsubject, for which reason it is called the \"beginning,\" because the\nbeginning of evil consists in turning away from God.\n\nNow though all this is true, nevertheless it does not explain the\nmind of the wise man who said (Ecclus. 10:15): \"Pride is the\nbeginning of all sin.\" For it is evident that he is speaking of pride\nas denoting inordinate desire to excel, as is clear from what follows\n(verse 17): \"God hath overturned the thrones of proud princes\";\nindeed this is the point of nearly the whole chapter. We must\ntherefore say that pride, even as denoting a special sin, is the\nbeginning of every sin. For we must take note that, in voluntary\nactions, such as sins, there is a twofold order, of intention, and of\nexecution. In the former order, the principle is the end, as we have\nstated many times before (Q. 1, A. 1, ad 1; Q. 18, A. 7, ad 2; Q. 15,\nA. 1, ad 2; Q. 25, A. 2). Now man's end in acquiring all temporal\ngoods is that, through their means, he may have some perfection and\nexcellence. Therefore, from this point of view, pride, which is the\ndesire to excel, is said to be the \"beginning\" of every sin. On the\nother hand, in the order of execution, the first place belongs to\nthat which by furnishing the opportunity of fulfilling all desires of\nsin, has the character of a root, and such are riches; so that, from\nthis point of view, covetousness is said to be the \"root\" of all\nevils, as stated above (A. 1).\n\nThis suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Apostasy from God is stated to be the beginning of\npride, in so far as it denotes a turning away from God, because from\nthe fact that man wishes not to be subject to God, it follows that he\ndesires inordinately his own excellence in temporal things.\nWherefore, in the passage quoted, apostasy from God does not denote\nthe special sin, but rather that general condition of every sin,\nconsisting in its turning away from God. It may also be said that\napostasy from God is said to be the beginning of pride, because it is\nthe first species of pride. For it is characteristic of pride to be\nunwilling to be subject to any superior, and especially to God; the\nresult being that a man is unduly lifted up, in respect of the other\nspecies of pride.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In desiring to excel, man loves himself, for to love\noneself is the same as to desire some good for oneself. Consequently\nit amounts to the same whether we reckon pride or self-love as the\nbeginning of every evil.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 84, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Any Other Special Sins, Besides Pride and Avarice, Should Be\nCalled Capital?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride\nand avarice, should be called capital. Because \"the head seems to be\nto an animal, what the root is to a plant,\" as stated in _De Anima_\nii, text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore\ncovetousness is called the \"root of all evils,\" it seems that it\nalone, and no other sin, should be called a capital vice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the\nother members, in so far as sensation and movement follow from the\nhead. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the\ncharacter of head: so that no sins should be called capital.\n\nObj. 3: Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital\npunishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished\nthus. Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumerates certain\nspecial vices under the name of capital.\n\n_I answer that,_ The word capital is derived from _caput_ (a head).\nNow the head, properly speaking, is that part of an animal's body,\nwhich is the principle and director of the whole animal. Hence,\nmetaphorically speaking, every principle is called a head, and even\nmen who direct and govern others are called heads. Accordingly a\ncapital vice is so called, in the first place, from \"head\" taken in\nthe proper sense, and thus the name \"capital\" is given to a sin for\nwhich capital punishment is inflicted. It is not in this sense that\nwe are now speaking of capital sins, but in another sense, in which\nthe term \"capital\" is derived from head, taken metaphorically for a\nprinciple or director of others. In this way a capital vice is one\nfrom which other vices arise, chiefly by being their final cause,\nwhich origin is formal, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 6). Wherefore a\ncapital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also their\ndirector and, in a way, their leader: because the art or habit, to\nwhich the end belongs, is always the principle and the commander in\nmatters concerning the means. Hence Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17)\ncompares these capital vices to the \"leaders of an army.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The term \"capital\" is taken from _caput_ and applied to\nsomething connected with, or partaking of the head, as having some\nproperty thereof, but not as being the head taken literally. And\ntherefore the capital vices are not only those which have the\ncharacter of primary origin, as covetousness which is called the\n\"root,\" and pride which is called the beginning, but also those which\nhave the character of proximate origin in respect of several sins.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Sin lacks order in so far as it turns away from God,\nfor in this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to Augustine\n(De Natura Boni iv), is \"the privation of mode, species and order.\"\nBut in so far as sin implies a turning to something, it regards some\ngood: wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This objection considers capital sin as so called from\nthe punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it here.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 84, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Seven Capital Vices Are Suitably Reckoned?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital\nvices, viz. vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony,\nlust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal\nvirtues, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 2). Therefore there are only four\nprincipal or capital vices.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as\nstated above (Q. 77). But there are four principal passions of the\nsoul; two of which, viz. hope and fear, are not mentioned among the\nabove sins, whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and\nsadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and\nsadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are\nunfittingly enumerated.\n\nObj. 3: Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it\nshould not be placed among the principal vices.\n\nObj. 4: Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin,\nso is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above (A. 2). But avarice\nis reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also\nshould be placed among the capital vices.\n\nObj. 5: Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused\nthrough any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through\nignorance, or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g.\nsteals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are\ninsufficiently enumerated.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates\nthem in this way (Moral. xxxi, 17).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), the capital vices are those\nwhich give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now this\nkind of origin may take place in two ways. First, on account of the\ncondition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong\ninclination for one particular end, the result being that he\nfrequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does\nnot come under the consideration of art, because man's particular\ndispositions are infinite in number. Secondly, on account of a\nnatural relationship of the ends to one another: and it is in this\nway that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this\nkind of origin can come under the consideration of art.\n\nAccordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends\nhave certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; and it is\nin respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are\ndifferentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite in two ways. First,\ndirectly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek\nit, while evil, for the same reason, moves the appetite to avoid it.\nSecondly, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were:\nthus one seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a\ngood on account of some attendant evil.\n\nAgain, man's good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a\ncertain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of appetibility,\nmerely through being apprehended, viz. the excellence of honor and\npraise, and this good is sought inordinately by _vainglory._\nSecondly, there is the good of the body, and this regards either the\npreservation of the individual, e.g. meat and drink, which good is\npursued inordinately by _gluttony,_ or the preservation of the\nspecies, e.g. sexual intercourse, which good is sought inordinately\nby _lust._ Thirdly, there is external good, viz. riches, to which\n_covetousness_ is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately\nthe contrary evils.\n\nOr again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some\nproperty of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now in the first\nplace happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect\ngood, to which belongs excellence or renown, which is desired by\n_pride_ or _vainglory._ Secondly, it implies satiety, which\n_covetousness_ seeks in riches that give promise thereof. Thirdly, it\nimplies pleasure, without which happiness is impossible, as stated in\n_Ethic._ i, 7; x, 6, 7, 8 and this _gluttony_ and _lust_ pursue.\n\nOn the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil\noccurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect of one's own\ngood, and thus we have _sloth,_ which is sadness about one's\nspiritual good, on account of the attendant bodily labor: or else it\nhappens in respect of another's good, and this, if it be without\nrecrimination, belongs to _envy,_ which is sadness about another's\ngood as being a hindrance to one's own excellence, while if it be\nwith recrimination with a view to vengeance, it is _anger._ Again,\nthese same vices seek the contrary evils.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way: since\nvirtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason, or\nto the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the\nappetite for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need for the\nprincipal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the\npassions of the irascible part arise from passions of the\nconcupiscible part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure\nor sorrow. Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among the\ncapital sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated\nabove (Q. 25, A. 4).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it has a\ndistinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a special\nkind of movement in the appetite, in so far as recrimination against\nanother's good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e. of the right\nto vengeance.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, in the\norder of the end, as stated above (A. 2): and it is in the same order\nthat we are to consider the capital sin as being principal. Wherefore\npride, like a universal vice, is not counted along with the others,\nbut is reckoned as the \"queen of them all,\" as Gregory states (Moral.\nxxxi, 27). But covetousness is said to be the root from another point\nof view, as stated above (AA. 1, 2).\n\nReply Obj. 5: These vices are called capital because others, most\nfrequently, arise from them: so that nothing prevents some sins from\narising out of other causes. Nevertheless we might say that all the\nsins which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, to which\npertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual\ngoods on account of the attendant labor; for the ignorance that can\ncause sin, is due to negligence, as stated above (Q. 76, A. 2). That\na man commit a sin with a good intention, seems to point to\nignorance, in so far as he knows not that evil should not be done\nthat good may come of it.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 85\n\nOF THE EFFECTS OF SIN, AND, FIRST, OF THE CORRUPTION OF THE GOOD OF\nNATURE\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the effects of sin; and (1) the corruption of\nthe good of nature; (2) the stain on the soul; (3) the debt of\npunishment.\n\nUnder the first head there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the good of nature is diminished by sin?\n\n(2) Whether it can be taken away altogether?\n\n(3) Of the four wounds, mentioned by Bede, with which human nature is\nstricken in consequence of sin.\n\n(4) Whether privation of mode, species and order is an effect of sin?\n\n(5) Whether death and other bodily defects are the result of sin?\n\n(6) Whether they are, in any way, natural to man?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Sin Diminishes the Good of Nature?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sin does not diminish the good of\nnature. For man's sin is no worse than the devil's. But natural good\nremains unimpaired in devils after sin, as Dionysius states (Div.\nNom. iv). Therefore neither does sin diminish the good of human\nnature.\n\nObj. 2: Further, when that which follows is changed, that which\nprecedes remains unchanged, since substance remains the same when its\naccidents are changed. But nature exists before the voluntary action.\nTherefore, when sin has caused a disorder in a voluntary act, nature\nis not changed on that account, so that the good of nature be\ndiminished.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sin is an action, while diminution is a passion. Now\nno agent is passive by the very reason of its acting, although it is\npossible for it to act on one thing, and to be passive as regards\nanother. Therefore he who sins, does not, by his sin, diminish the\ngood of his nature.\n\nObj. 4: Further, no accident acts on its subject: because that which\nis patient is a potential being, while that which is subjected to an\naccident, is already an actual being as regards that accident. But\nsin is in the good of nature as an accident in a subject. Therefore\nsin does not diminish the good of nature, since to diminish is to act.\n\n_On the contrary,_ \"A certain man going down from Jerusalem to\nJericho (Luke 10:30), i.e. to the corruption of sin, was stripped of\nhis gifts, and wounded in his nature,\" as Bede [*The quotation is\nfrom the _Glossa Ordinaria_ of Strabo] expounds the passage. Therefore\nsin diminishes the good of nature.\n\n_I answer that,_ The good of human nature is threefold. First, there\nare the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties\nthat flow from them, such as the powers of the soul, and so forth.\nSecondly, since man has from nature an inclination to virtue, as\nstated above (Q. 60, A. 1; Q. 63, A. 1), this inclination to virtue\nis a good of nature. Thirdly, the gift of original justice, conferred\non the whole of human nature in the person of the first man, may be\ncalled a good of nature.\n\nAccordingly, the first-mentioned good of nature is neither destroyed\nnor diminished by sin. The third good of nature was entirely\ndestroyed through the sin of our first parent. But the second good of\nnature, viz. the natural inclination to virtue, is diminished by sin.\nBecause human acts produce an inclination to like acts, as stated\nabove (Q. 50, A. 1). Now from the very fact that thing becomes\ninclined to one of two contraries, its inclination to the other\ncontrary must needs be diminished. Wherefore as sin is opposed to\nvirtue, from the very fact that a man sins, there results a\ndiminution of that good of nature, which is the inclination to virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Dionysius is speaking of the first-mentioned good of\nnature, which consists in \"being, living and understanding,\" as\nanyone may see who reads the context.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although nature precedes the voluntary action, it has\nan inclination to a certain voluntary action. Wherefore nature is not\nchanged in itself, through a change in the voluntary action: it is\nthe inclination that is changed in so far as it is directed to its\nterm.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A voluntary action proceeds from various powers, active\nand passive. The result is that through voluntary actions something\nis caused or taken away in the man who acts, as we have stated when\ntreating of the production of habits (Q. 51, A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 4: An accident does not act effectively on its subject,\nbut it acts on it formally, in the same sense as when we say that\nwhiteness makes a thing white. In this way there is nothing to hinder\nsin from diminishing the good of nature; but only in so far as sin is\nitself a diminution of the good of nature, through being an\ninordinateness of action. But as regards the inordinateness of the\nagent, we must say that such like inordinateness is caused by the\nfact that in the acts of the soul, there is an active, and a passive\nelement: thus the sensible object moves the sensitive appetite, and\nthe sensitive appetite inclines the reason and will, as stated above\n(Q. 77, AA. 1, 2). The result of this is the inordinateness, not as\nthough an accident acted on its own subject, but in so far as the\nobject acts on the power, and one power acts on another and puts it\nout of order.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Entire Good of Human Nature Can Be Destroyed by Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the entire good of human nature can\nbe destroyed by sin. For the good of human nature is finite, since\nhuman nature itself is finite. Now any finite thing is entirely taken\naway, if the subtraction be continuous. Since therefore the good of\nnature can be continually diminished by sin, it seems that in the end\nit can be entirely taken away.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in a thing of one nature, the whole and the parts\nare uniform, as is evidently the case with air, water, flesh and all\nbodies with similar parts. But the good of nature is wholly uniform.\nSince therefore a part thereof can be taken away by sin, it seems\nthat the whole can also be taken away by sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the good of nature, that is weakened by sin, is\naptitude for virtue. Now this aptitude is destroyed entirely in some\non account of sin: thus the lost cannot be restored to virtue any\nmore than the blind can to sight. Therefore sin can take away the\ngood of nature entirely.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Enchiridion xiv) that \"evil does\nnot exist except in some good.\" But the evil of sin cannot be in the\ngood of virtue or of grace, because they are contrary to it.\nTherefore it must be in the good of nature, and consequently it does\nnot destroy it entirely.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the good of nature, that is\ndiminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is\nbefitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being; for\nit is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason,\nwhich is to act virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from\nman the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer\nbe capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of\nnature to be destroyed entirely.\n\nSince, however, this same good of nature may be continually\ndiminished by sin, some, in order to illustrate this, have made use\nof the example of a finite thing being diminished indefinitely,\nwithout being entirely destroyed. For the Philosopher says (Phys. i,\ntext. 37) that if from a finite magnitude a continual subtraction be\nmade in the same quantity, it will at last be entirely destroyed, for\ninstance if from any finite length I continue to subtract the length\nof a span. If, however, the subtraction be made each time in the same\nproportion, and not in the same quantity, it may go on indefinitely,\nas, for instance, if a quantity be halved, and one half be diminished\nby half, it will be possible to go on thus indefinitely, provided\nthat what is subtracted in each case be less than what was subtracted\nbefore. But this does not apply to the question at issue, since a\nsubsequent sin does not diminish the good of nature less than a\nprevious sin, but perhaps more, if it be a more grievous sin.\n\nWe must, therefore, explain the matter otherwise by saying that the\naforesaid inclination is to be considered as a middle term between\ntwo others: for it is based on the rational nature as on its root,\nand tends to the good of virtue, as to its term and end. Consequently\nits diminution may be understood in two ways: first, on the part of\nits root, secondly, on the part of its term. In the first way, it is\nnot diminished by sin, because sin does not diminish nature, as\nstated above (A. 1). But it is diminished in the second way, in so\nfar as an obstacle is placed against its attaining its term. Now if\nit were diminished in the first way, it would needs be entirely\ndestroyed at last by the rational nature being entirely destroyed.\nSince, however, it is diminished on the part of the obstacle which is\nplaced against its attaining its term, it is evident that it can be\ndiminished indefinitely, because obstacles can be placed\nindefinitely, inasmuch as man can go on indefinitely adding sin to\nsin: and yet it cannot be destroyed entirely, because the root of\nthis inclination always remains. An example of this may be seen in a\ntransparent body, which has an inclination to receive light, from the\nvery fact that it is transparent; yet this inclination or aptitude is\ndiminished on the part of supervening clouds, although it always\nremains rooted in the nature of the body.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This objection avails when diminution is made by\nsubtraction. But here the diminution is made by raising obstacles,\nand this neither diminishes nor destroys the root of the inclination,\nas stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The natural inclination is indeed wholly uniform:\nnevertheless it stands in relation both to its principle and to its\nterm, in respect of which diversity of relation, it is diminished on\nthe one hand, and not on the other.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even in the lost the natural inclination to virtue\nremains, else they would have no remorse of conscience. That it is\nnot reduced to act is owing to their being deprived of grace by\nDivine justice. Thus even in a blind man the aptitude to see remains\nin the very root of his nature, inasmuch as he is an animal naturally\nendowed with sight: yet this aptitude is not reduced to act, for the\nlack of a cause capable of reducing it, by forming the organ\nrequisite for sight.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Weakness, Ignorance, Malice and Concupiscence Are Suitably\nReckoned As the Wounds of Nature Consequent Upon Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that weakness, ignorance, malice and\nconcupiscence are not suitably reckoned as the wounds of nature\nconsequent upon sin. For one same thing is not both effect and cause\nof the same thing. But these are reckoned to be causes of sin, as\nappears from what has been said above (Q. 76, A. 1; Q. 77, AA. 3, 5;\nQ. 78, A. 1). Therefore they should not be reckoned as effects of sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, malice is the name of a sin. Therefore it should\nhave no place among the effects of sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, concupiscence is something natural, since it is an\nact of the concupiscible power. But that which is natural should not\nbe reckoned a wound of nature. Therefore concupiscence should not be\nreckoned a wound of nature.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it has been stated (Q. 77, A. 3) that to sin from\nweakness is the same as to sin from passion. But concupiscence is a\npassion. Therefore it should not be condivided with weakness.\n\nObj. 5: Further, Augustine (De Nat. et Grat. lxvii, 67) reckons \"two\nthings to be punishments inflicted on the soul of the sinner, viz.\nignorance and difficulty,\" from which arise \"error and vexation,\"\nwhich four do not coincide with the four in question. Therefore it\nseems that one or the other reckoning is incomplete.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The authority of Bede suffices [*Reference not\nknown].\n\n_I answer that,_ As a result of original justice, the reason had\nperfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself\nwas perfected by God, and was subject to Him. Now this same original\njustice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent, as already\nstated (Q. 81, A. 2); so that all the powers of the soul are left, as\nit were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally\ndirected to virtue; which destitution is called a wounding of nature.\n\nAgain, there are four of the soul's powers that can be subject of\nvirtue, as stated above (Q. 61, A. 2), viz. the reason, where\nprudence resides, the will, where justice is, the irascible, the\nsubject of fortitude, and the concupiscible, the subject of\ntemperance. Therefore in so far as the reason is deprived of its\norder to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; in so far as the\nwill is deprived of its order of good, there is the wound of malice;\nin so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous,\nthere is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible is\ndeprived of its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there\nis the wound of concupiscence.\n\nAccordingly these are the four wounds inflicted on the whole of human\nnature as a result of our first parent's sin. But since the\ninclination to the good of virtue is diminished in each individual on\naccount of actual sin, as was explained above (AA. 1, 2), these four\nwounds are also the result of other sins, in so far as, through sin,\nthe reason is obscured, especially in practical matters, the will\nhardened to evil, good actions become more difficult and\nconcupiscence more impetuous.\n\nReply Obj. 1: There is no reason why the effect of one sin should not\nbe the cause of another: because the soul, through sinning once, is\nmore easily inclined to sin again.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Malice is not to be taken here as a sin, but as a\ncertain proneness of the will to evil, according to the words of Gen.\n8:21: \"Man's senses are prone to evil from his youth\" [*Vulgate: 'The\nimagination and thought of man's heart are prone to evil from his\nyouth.'].\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 82, A. 3, ad 1), concupiscence is\nnatural to man, in so far as it is subject to reason: whereas, in so\nfar as it is goes beyond the bounds of reason, it is unnatural to man.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Speaking in a general way, every passion can be called\na weakness, in so far as it weakens the soul's strength and clogs the\nreason. Bede, however, took weakness in the strict sense, as contrary\nto fortitude which pertains to the irascible.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The \"difficulty\" which is mentioned in this book of\nAugustine, includes the three wounds affecting the appetitive powers,\nviz. \"malice,\" \"weakness\" and \"concupiscence,\" for it is owing to\nthese three that a man finds it difficult to tend to the good.\n\"Error\" and \"vexation\" are consequent wounds, since a man is vexed\nthrough being weakened in respect of the objects of his concupiscence.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Privation of Mode, Species and Order Is the Effect of Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that privation of mode, species and order\nis not the effect of sin. For Augustine says (De Natura Boni iii)\nthat \"where these three abound, the good is great; where they are\nless, there is less good; where they are not, there is no good at\nall.\" But sin does not destroy the good of nature. Therefore it does\nnot destroy mode, species and order.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing is its own cause. But sin itself is the\n\"privation of mode, species and order,\" as Augustine states (De\nNatura Boni iv). Therefore privation of mode, species and order is\nnot the effect of sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, different effects result from different sins. Now\nsince mode, species and order are diverse, their corresponding\nprivations must be diverse also, and, consequently, must be the\nresult of different sins. Therefore privation of mode, species and\norder is not the effect of each sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Sin is to the soul what weakness is to the body,\naccording to Ps. 6:3, \"Have mercy on me, O Lord, for I am weak.\" Now\nweakness deprives the body of mode, species and order.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated in the First Part, Q. 5, A. 5, mode,\nspecies and order are consequent upon every created good, as such,\nand also upon every being. Because every being and every good as such\ndepends on its form from which it derives its species. Again, any\nkind of form, whether substantial or accidental, of anything\nwhatever, is according to some measure, wherefore it is stated in\n_Metaph._ viii, that \"the forms of things are like numbers,\" so that\na form has a certain _mode_ corresponding to its measure. Lastly\nowing to its form, each thing has a relation of _order_ to something\nelse.\n\nAccordingly there are different grades of mode, species and order,\ncorresponding to the different degrees of good. For there is a good\nbelonging to the very substance of nature, which good has its mode,\nspecies and order, and is neither destroyed nor diminished by sin.\nThere is again the good of the natural inclination, which also has\nits mode, species and order; and this is diminished by sin, as stated\nabove (AA. 1, 2), but is not entirely destroyed. Again, there is the\ngood of virtue and grace: this too has its mode, species and order,\nand is entirely taken away by sin. Lastly, there is a good consisting\nin the ordinate act itself, which also has its mode, species and\norder, the privation of which is essentially sin. Hence it is clear\nboth how sin is privation of mode, species and order, and how it\ndestroys or diminishes mode, species and order.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the first two Objections.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Mode, species and order follow one from the other, as\nexplained above: and so they are destroyed or diminished together.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Death and Other Bodily Defects Are the Result of Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that death and other bodily defects are\nnot the result of sin. Because equal causes have equal effects. Now\nthese defects are not equal in all, but abound in some more than in\nothers, whereas original sin, from which especially these defects\nseem to result, is equal in all, as stated above (Q. 82, A. 4).\nTherefore death and suchlike defects are not the result of sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if the cause is removed, the effect is removed. But\nthese defects are not removed, when all sin is removed by Baptism or\nPenance. Therefore they are not the effect of sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, actual sin has more of the character of guilt than\noriginal sin has. But actual sin does not change the nature of the\nbody by subjecting it to some defect. Much less, therefore, does\noriginal sin. Therefore death and other bodily defects are not the\nresult of sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 5:12), \"By one man sin\nentered into this world, and by sin death.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ One thing causes another in two ways: first, by\nreason of itself; secondly, accidentally. By reason of itself, one\nthing is the cause of another, if it produces its effect by reason of\nthe power of its nature or form, the result being that the effect is\ndirectly intended by the cause. Consequently, as death and such like\ndefects are beside the intention of the sinner, it is evident that\nsin is not, of itself, the cause of these defects. Accidentally, one\nthing is the cause of another if it causes it by removing an\nobstacle: thus it is stated in _Phys._ viii, text. 32, that \"by\ndisplacing a pillar a man moves accidentally the stone resting\nthereon.\" In this way the sin of our first parent is the cause of\ndeath and all such like defects in human nature, in so far as by the\nsin of our first parent original justice was taken away, whereby not\nonly were the lower powers of the soul held together under the\ncontrol of reason, without any disorder whatever, but also the whole\nbody was held together in subjection to the soul, without any defect,\nas stated in the First Part (Q. 97, A. 1). Wherefore, original\njustice being forfeited through the sin of our first parent; just as\nhuman nature was stricken in the soul by the disorder among the\npowers, as stated above (A. 3; Q. 82, A. 3), so also it became\nsubject to corruption, by reason of disorder in the body.\n\nNow the withdrawal of original justice has the character of\npunishment, even as the withdrawal of grace has. Consequently, death\nand all consequent bodily defects are punishments of original sin.\nAnd although the defects are not intended by the sinner, nevertheless\nthey are ordered according to the justice of God Who inflicts them as\npunishments.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Causes that produce their effects of themselves, if\nequal, produce equal effects: for if such causes be increased or\ndiminished, the effect is increased or diminished. But equal causes\nof an obstacle being removed, do not point to equal effects. For\nsupposing a man employs equal force in displacing two columns, it\ndoes not follow that the movements of the stones resting on them will\nbe equal; but that one will move with greater velocity, which has the\ngreater weight according to the property of its nature, to which it\nis left when the obstacle to its falling is removed. Accordingly,\nwhen original justice is removed, the nature of the human body is\nleft to itself, so that according to diverse natural temperaments,\nsome men's bodies are subject to more defects, some to fewer,\nalthough original sin is equal in all.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Both original and actual sin are removed by the same\ncause that removes these defects, according to the Apostle (Rom.\n8:11): \"He . . . shall quicken . . . your mortal bodies, because of\nHis Spirit that dwelleth in you\": but each is done according to the\norder of Divine wisdom, at a fitting time. Because it is right that\nwe should first of all be conformed to Christ's sufferings, before\nattaining to the immortality and impassibility of glory, which was\nbegun in Him, and by Him acquired for us. Hence it behooves that our\nbodies should remain, for a time, subject to suffering, in order that\nwe may merit the impassibility of glory, in conformity with Christ.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Two things may be considered in actual sin, the\nsubstance of the act, and the aspect of fault. As regards the\nsubstance of the act, actual sin can cause a bodily defect: thus some\nsicken and die through eating too much. But as regards the fault, it\ndeprives us of grace which is given to us that we may regulate the\nacts of the soul, but not that we may ward off defects of the body,\nas original justice did. Wherefore actual sin does not cause those\ndefects, as original sin does.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 85, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Death and Other Defects Are Natural to Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that death and such like defects are\nnatural to man. For \"the corruptible and the incorruptible differ\ngenerically\" (Metaph. x, text. 26). But man is of the same genus as\nother animals which are naturally corruptible. Therefore man is\nnaturally corruptible.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is composed of contraries is naturally\ncorruptible, as having within itself the cause of corruption. But\nsuch is the human body. Therefore it is naturally corruptible.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a hot thing naturally consumes moisture. Now human\nlife is preserved by hot and moist elements. Since therefore the\nvital functions are fulfilled by the action of natural heat, as\nstated in _De Anima_ ii, text. 50, it seems that death and such like\ndefects are natural to man.\n\n_On the contrary,_ (1) God made in man whatever is natural to him.\nNow \"God made not death\" (Wis. 1:13). Therefore death is not natural\nto man.\n\n(2) Further, that which is natural cannot be called either a\npunishment or an evil: since what is natural to a thing is suitable\nto it. But death and such like defects are the punishment of original\nsin, as stated above (A. 5). Therefore they are not natural to man.\n\n(3) Further, matter is proportionate to form, and everything to its\nend. Now man's end is everlasting happiness, as stated above (Q. 2,\nA. 7; Q. 5, AA. 3, 4): and the form of the human body is the rational\nsoul, as was proved in the First Part (Q. 75, A. 6). Therefore the\nhuman body is naturally incorruptible.\n\n_I answer that,_ We may speak of any corruptible thing in two ways;\nfirst, in respect of its universal nature, secondly, as regards its\nparticular nature. A thing's particular nature is its own power of\naction and self-preservation. And in respect of this nature, every\ncorruption and defect is contrary to nature, as stated in _De Coelo_\nii, text. 37, since this power tends to the being and preservation of\nthe thing to which it belongs.\n\nOn the other hand, the universal nature is an active force in some\nuniversal principle of nature, for instance in some heavenly body; or\nagain belonging to some superior substance, in which sense God is\nsaid by some to be \"the Nature Who makes nature.\" This force intends\nthe good and the preservation of the universe, for which alternate\ngeneration and corruption in things are requisite: and in this\nrespect corruption and defect in things are natural, not indeed as\nregards the inclination of the form which is the principle of being\nand perfection, but as regards the inclination of matter which is\nallotted proportionately to its particular form according to the\ndiscretion of the universal agent. And although every form intends\nperpetual being as far as it can, yet no form of a corruptible being\ncan achieve its own perpetuity, except the rational soul; for the\nreason that the latter is not entirely subject to matter, as other\nforms are; indeed it has an immaterial operation of its own, as\nstated in the First Part (Q. 75, A. 2). Consequently as regards his\nform, incorruption is more natural to man than to other corruptible\nthings. But since that very form has a matter composed of contraries,\nfrom the inclination of that matter there results corruptibility in\nthe whole. In this respect man is naturally corruptible as regards\nthe nature of his matter left to itself, but not as regards the\nnature of his form.\n\nThe first three objections argue on the side of the matter; while the\nother three argue on the side of the form. Wherefore in order to\nsolve them, we must observe that the form of man which is the\nrational soul, in respect of its incorruptibility is adapted to its\nend, which is everlasting happiness: whereas the human body, which is\ncorruptible, considered in respect of its nature, is, in a way,\nadapted to its form, and, in another way, it is not. For we may note\na twofold condition in any matter, one which the agent chooses, and\nanother which is not chosen by the agent, and is a natural condition\nof matter. Thus, a smith in order to make a knife, chooses a matter\nboth hard and flexible, which can be sharpened so as to be useful for\ncutting, and in respect of this condition iron is a matter adapted\nfor a knife: but that iron be breakable and inclined to rust, results\nfrom the natural disposition of iron, nor does the workman choose\nthis in the iron, indeed he would do without it if he could:\nwherefore this disposition of matter is not adapted to the workman's\nintention, nor to the purpose of his art. In like manner the human\nbody is the matter chosen by nature in respect of its being of a\nmixed temperament, in order that it may be most suitable as an organ\nof touch and of the other sensitive and motive powers. Whereas the\nfact that it is corruptible is due to a condition of matter, and is\nnot chosen by nature: indeed nature would choose an incorruptible\nmatter if it could. But God, to Whom every nature is subject, in\nforming man supplied the defect of nature, and by the gift of\noriginal justice, gave the body a certain incorruptibility, as was\nstated in the First Part (Q. 97, A. 1). It is in this sense that it\nis said that \"God made not death,\" and that death is the punishment\nof sin.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 86\n\nOF THE STAIN OF SIN\n(In Two Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the stain of sin; under which head there are two\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether an effect of sin is a stain on the soul?\n\n(2) Whether it remains in the soul after the act of sin?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 86, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Sin Causes a Stain on the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sin causes no stain on the soul. For\na higher nature cannot be defiled by contact with a lower nature:\nhence the sun's ray is not defiled by contact with tainted bodies, as\nAugustine says (Contra Quinque Haereses v). Now the human soul is of\na much higher nature than mutable things, to which it turns by\nsinning. Therefore it does not contract a stain from them by sinning.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sin is chiefly in the will, as stated above (Q. 74,\nAA. 1, 2). Now the will is in the reason, as stated in _De _Anima\niii, text. 42. But the reason or intellect is not stained by\nconsidering anything whatever; rather indeed is it perfected thereby.\nTherefore neither is the will stained by sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if sin causes a stain, this stain is either\nsomething positive, or a pure privation. If it be something positive,\nit can only be either a disposition or a habit: for it seems that\nnothing else can be caused by an act. But it is neither disposition\nnor habit: for it happens that a stain remains even after the removal\nof a disposition or habit; for instance, in a man who after\ncommitting a mortal sin of prodigality, is so changed as to fall into\na sin of the opposite vice. Therefore the stain does not denote\nanything positive in the soul. Again, neither is it a pure privation.\nBecause all sins agree on the part of aversion and privation of\ngrace: and so it would follow that there is but one stain caused by\nall sins. Therefore the stain is not the effect of sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It was said to Solomon (Ecclus. 47:22): \"Thou hast\nstained thy glory\": and it is written (Eph. 5:27): \"That He might\npresent it to Himself a glorious church not having spot or wrinkle\":\nand in each case it is question of the stain of sin. Therefore a\nstain is the effect of sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ A stain is properly ascribed to corporeal things,\nwhen a comely body loses its comeliness through contact with another\nbody, e.g. a garment, gold or silver, or the like. Accordingly a\nstain is ascribed to spiritual things in like manner. Now man's soul\nhas a twofold comeliness; one from the refulgence of the natural\nlight of reason, whereby he is directed in his actions; the other,\nfrom the refulgence of the Divine light, viz. of wisdom and grace,\nwhereby man is also perfected for the purpose of doing good and\nfitting actions. Now, when the soul cleaves to things by love, there\nis a kind of contact in the soul: and when man sins, he cleaves to\ncertain things, against the light of reason and of the Divine law, as\nshown above (Q. 71, A. 6). Wherefore the loss of comeliness\noccasioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the\nsoul.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The soul is not defiled by inferior things, by their\nown power, as though they acted on the soul: on the contrary, the\nsoul, by its own action, defiles itself, through cleaving to them\ninordinately, against the light of reason and of the Divine law.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The action of the intellect is accomplished by the\nintelligible thing being in the intellect, according to the mode of\nthe intellect, so that the intellect is not defiled, but perfected,\nby them. On the other hand, the act of the will consists in a\nmovement towards things themselves, so that love attaches the soul to\nthe thing loved. Thus it is that the soul is stained, when it cleaves\ninordinately, according to Osee 9:10: \"They . . . became abominable\nas those things were which they loved.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The stain is neither something positive in the soul,\nnor does it denote a pure privation: it denotes a privation of the\nsoul's brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin; wherefore\ndiverse sins occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which is\nthe privation of light through the interposition of a body, and which\nvaries according to the diversity of the interposed bodies.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 86, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Stain Remains in the Soul After the Act of Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the stain does not remain in the soul\nafter the act of sin. For after an action, nothing remains in the\nsoul except habit or disposition. But the stain is not a habit or\ndisposition, as stated above (A. 1, Obj. 3). Therefore the stain does\nnot remain in the soul after the act of sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the stain is to the sin what the shadow is to the\nbody, as stated above (A. 1, ad 3). But the shadow does not remain\nwhen the body has passed by. Therefore the stain does not remain in\nthe soul when the act of sin is past.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every effect depends on its cause. Now the cause of\nthe stain is the act of sin. Therefore when the act of sin is no\nlonger there, neither is the stain in the soul.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jos. 22:17): \"Is it a small thing\nto you that you sinned with Beelphegor, and the stain of that crime\nremaineth in you [Vulg.: 'us'] to this day?\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the\nact of sin is past. The reason for this is that the stain, as stated\nabove (A. 1), denotes a blemish in the brightness of the soul, on\naccount of its withdrawing from the light of reason or of the Divine\nlaw. And therefore so long as man remains out of this light, the\nstain of sin remains in him: but as soon as, moved by grace, he\nreturns to the Divine light and to the light of reason, the stain is\nremoved. For although the act of sin ceases, whereby man withdrew\nfrom the light of reason and of the Divine law, man does not at once\nreturn to the state in which he was before, and it is necessary that\nhis will should have a movement contrary to the previous movement.\nThus if one man be parted from another on account of some kind of\nmovement, he is not reunited to him as soon as the movement ceases,\nbut he needs to draw nigh to him and to return by a contrary movement.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Nothing positive remains in the soul after the act of\nsin, except the disposition or habit; but there does remain something\nprivative, viz. the privation of union with the Divine light.\n\nReply Obj. 2: After the interposed body has passed by, the\ntransparent body remains in the same position and relation as regards\nthe illuminating body, and so the shadow passes at once. But when the\nsin is past, the soul does not remain in the same relation to God:\nand so there is no comparison.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The act of sin parts man from God, which parting causes\nthe defect of brightness, just as local movement causes local\nparting. Wherefore, just as when movement ceases, local distance is\nnot removed, so neither, when the act of sin ceases, is the stain\nremoved.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 87\n\nOF THE DEBT OF PUNISHMENT\n(In Eight Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the debt of punishment. We shall consider (1)\nthe debt itself; (2) mortal and venial sin, which differ in respect\nof the punishment due to them.\n\nUnder the first head there are eight points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the debt of punishment is an effect of sin?\n\n(2) Whether one sin can be the punishment of another?\n\n(3) Whether any sin incurs a debt of eternal punishment?\n\n(4) Whether sin incurs a debt of punishment that is infinite in\nquantity?\n\n(5) Whether every sin incurs a debt of eternal and infinite\npunishment?\n\n(6) Whether the debt of punishment can remain after sin?\n\n(7) Whether every punishment is inflicted for a sin?\n\n(8) Whether one person can incur punishment for another's sin?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Debt of Punishment Is an Effect of Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the debt of punishment is not an\neffect of sin. For that which is accidentally related to a thing,\ndoes not seem to be its proper effect. Now the debt of punishment is\naccidentally related to sin, for it is beside the intention of the\nsinner. Therefore the debt of punishment is not an effect of sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, evil is not the cause of good. But punishment is\ngood, since it is just, and is from God. Therefore it is not an\neffect of sin, which is evil.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Confess. i) that \"every inordinate\naffection is its own punishment.\" But punishment does not incur a\nfurther debt of punishment, because then it would go on indefinitely.\nTherefore sin does not incur the debt of punishment.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 2:9): \"Tribulation and anguish\nupon every soul of man that worketh evil.\" But to work evil is to\nsin. Therefore sin incurs a punishment which is signified by the\nwords \"tribulation and anguish.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It has passed from natural things to human affairs\nthat whenever one thing rises up against another, it suffers some\ndetriment therefrom. For we observe in natural things that when one\ncontrary supervenes, the other acts with greater energy, for which\nreason \"hot water freezes more rapidly,\" as stated in _Meteor._ i,\n12. Wherefore we find that the natural inclination of man is to\nrepress those who rise up against him. Now it is evident that all\nthings contained in an order, are, in a manner, one, in relation to\nthe principle of that order. Consequently, whatever rises up against\nan order, is put down by that order or by the principle thereof. And\nbecause sin is an inordinate act, it is evident that whoever sins,\ncommits an offense against an order: wherefore he is put down, in\nconsequence, by that same order, which repression is punishment.\n\nAccordingly, man can be punished with a threefold punishment\ncorresponding to the three orders to which the human will is subject.\nIn the first place a man's nature is subjected to the order of his\nown reason; secondly, it is subjected to the order of another man who\ngoverns him either in spiritual or in temporal matters, as a member\neither of the state or of the household; thirdly, it is subjected to\nthe universal order of the Divine government. Now each of these\norders is disturbed by sin, for the sinner acts against his reason,\nand against human and Divine law. Wherefore he incurs a threefold\npunishment; one, inflicted by himself, viz. remorse of conscience;\nanother, inflicted by man; and a third, inflicted by God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Punishment follows sin, inasmuch as this is an evil by\nreason of its being inordinate. Wherefore just as evil is accidental\nto the sinner's act, being beside his intention, so also is the debt\nof punishment.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Further, a just punishment may be inflicted either by\nGod or by man: wherefore the punishment itself is the effect of sin,\nnot directly but dispositively. Sin, however, makes man deserving of\npunishment, and that is an evil: for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)\nthat \"punishment is not an evil, but to deserve punishment is.\"\nConsequently the debt of punishment is considered to be directly the\neffect of sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This punishment of the _inordinate affection_ is due to\nsin as overturning the order of reason. Nevertheless sin incurs a\nfurther punishment, through disturbing the order of the Divine or\nhuman law.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Sin Can Be the Punishment of Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sin cannot be the punishment of sin.\nFor the purpose of punishment is to bring man back to the good of\nvirtue, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. x, 9). Now sin does not\nbring man back to the good of virtue, but leads him in the opposite\ndirection. Therefore sin is not the punishment of sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just punishments are from God, as Augustine says\n(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 82). But sin is not from God, and is an injustice.\nTherefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the nature of punishment is to be something against\nthe will. But sin is something from the will, as shown above (Q. 74,\nAA. 1, 2). Therefore sin cannot be the punishment of sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory speaks (Hom. xi in Ezech.) that some sins\nare punishments of others.\n\n_I answer that,_ We may speak of sin in two ways: first, in its\nessence, as such; secondly, as to that which is accidental thereto.\nSin as such can nowise be the punishment of another. Because sin\nconsidered in its essence is something proceeding from the will, for\nit is from this that it derives the character of guilt. Whereas\npunishment is essentially something against the will, as stated in\nthe First Part (Q. 48, A. 5). Consequently it is evident that sin\nregarded in its essence can nowise be the punishment of sin.\n\nOn the other hand, sin can be the punishment of sin accidentally in\nthree ways. First, when one sin is the cause of another, by removing\nan impediment thereto. For passions, temptations of the devil, and\nthe like are causes of sin, but are impeded by the help of Divine\ngrace which is withdrawn on account of sin. Wherefore since the\nwithdrawal of grace is a punishment, and is from God, as stated above\n(Q. 79, A. 3), the result is that the sin which ensues from this is\nalso a punishment accidentally. It is in this sense that the Apostle\nspeaks (Rom. 1:24) when he says: \"Wherefore God gave them up to the\ndesires of their heart,\" i.e. to their passions; because, to wit,\nwhen men are deprived of the help of Divine grace, they are overcome\nby their passions. In this way sin is always said to be the\npunishment of a preceding sin. Secondly, by reason of the substance\nof the act, which is such as to cause pain, whether it be an interior\nact, as is clearly the case with anger or envy, or an exterior act,\nas is the case with one who endures considerable trouble and loss in\norder to achieve a sinful act, according to Wis. 5:7: \"We wearied\nourselves in the way of iniquity.\" Thirdly, on the part of the\neffect, so that one sin is said to be a punishment by reason of its\neffect. In the last two ways, a sin is a punishment not only in\nrespect of a preceding sin, but also with regard to itself.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Even when God punishes men by permitting them to fall\ninto sin, this is directed to the good of virtue. Sometimes indeed it\nis for the good of those who are punished, when, to wit, men arise\nfrom sin, more humble and more cautious. But it is always for the\namendment of others, who seeing some men fall from sin to sin, are\nthe more fearful of sinning. With regard to the other two ways, it is\nevident that the punishment is intended for the sinner's amendment,\nsince the very fact that man endures toil and loss in sinning, is of\na nature to withdraw man from sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This objection considers sin essentially as such: and\nthe same answer applies to the Third Objection.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Any Sin Incurs a Debt of Eternal Punishment?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no sin incurs a debt of eternal\npunishment. For a just punishment is equal to the fault, since\njustice is equality: wherefore it is written (Isa. 27:8): \"In measure\nagainst measure, when it shall be cast off, thou shalt judge it.\" Now\nsin is temporal. Therefore it does not incur a debt of eternal\npunishment.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"punishments are a kind of medicine\" (Ethic. ii, 3).\nBut no medicine should be infinite, because it is directed to an end,\nand \"what is directed to an end, is not infinite,\" as the Philosopher\nstates (Polit. i, 6). Therefore no punishment should be infinite.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no one does a thing always unless he delights in it\nfor its own sake. But \"God hath not pleasure in the destruction of\nmen\" [Vulg.: 'of the living']. Therefore He will not inflict eternal\npunishment on man.\n\nObj. 4: Further, nothing accidental is infinite. But punishment is\naccidental, for it is not natural to the one who is punished.\nTherefore it cannot be of infinite duration.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 25:46): \"These shall go into\neverlasting punishment\"; and (Mk. 3:29): \"He that shall blaspheme\nagainst the Holy Ghost, shall never have forgiveness, but shall be\nguilty of an everlasting sin.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), sin incurs a debt of\npunishment through disturbing an order. But the effect remains so\nlong as the cause remains. Wherefore so long as the disturbance of\nthe order remains the debt of punishment must needs remain also. Now\ndisturbance of an order is sometimes reparable, sometimes\nirreparable: because a defect which destroys the principle is\nirreparable, whereas if the principle be saved, defects can be\nrepaired by virtue of that principle. For instance, if the principle\nof sight be destroyed, sight cannot be restored except by Divine\npower; whereas, if the principle of sight be preserved, while there\narise certain impediments to the use of sight, these can be remedied\nby nature or by art. Now in every order there is a principle whereby\none takes part in that order. Consequently if a sin destroys the\nprinciple of the order whereby man's will is subject to God, the\ndisorder will be such as to be considered in itself, irreparable,\nalthough it is possible to repair it by the power of God. Now the\nprinciple of this order is the last end, to which man adheres by\ncharity. Therefore whatever sins turn man away from God, so as to\ndestroy charity, considered in themselves, incur a debt of eternal\npunishment.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Punishment is proportionate to sin in point of\nseverity, both in Divine and in human judgments. In no judgment,\nhowever, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11) is it requisite for\npunishment to equal fault in point of duration. For the fact that\nadultery or murder is committed in a moment does not call for a\nmomentary punishment: in fact they are punished sometimes by\nimprisonment or banishment for life--sometimes even by death; wherein\naccount is not taken of the time occupied in killing, but rather of\nthe expediency of removing the murderer from the fellowship of the\nliving, so that this punishment, in its own way, represents the\neternity of punishment inflicted by God. Now according to Gregory\n(Dial. iv, 44) it is just that he who has sinned against God in his\nown eternity should be punished in God's eternity. A man is said to\nhave sinned in his own eternity, not only as regards continual\nsinning throughout his whole life, but also because, from the very\nfact that he fixes his end in sin, he has the will to sin,\neverlastingly. Wherefore Gregory says (Dial. iv, 44) that the \"wicked\nwould wish to live without end, that they might abide in their sins\nfor ever.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Even the punishment that is inflicted according to\nhuman laws, is not always intended as a medicine for the one who is\npunished, but sometimes only for others: thus when a thief is hanged,\nthis is not for his own amendment, but for the sake of others, that\nat least they may be deterred from crime through fear of the\npunishment, according to Prov. 19:25: \"The wicked man being scourged,\nthe fool shall be wiser.\" Accordingly the eternal punishments\ninflicted by God on the reprobate, are medicinal punishments for\nthose who refrain from sin through the thought of those punishments,\naccording to Ps. 59:6: \"Thou hast given a warning to them that fear\nThee, that they may flee from before the bow, that Thy beloved may be\ndelivered.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: God does not delight in punishments for their own sake;\nbut He does delight in the order of His justice, which requires them.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Although punishment is related indirectly to nature,\nnevertheless it is essentially related to the disturbance of the\norder, and to God's justice. Wherefore, so long as the disturbance\nlasts, the punishment endures.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Sin Incurs a Debt of Punishment Infinite in Quantity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that sin incurs a debt of punishment\ninfinite in quantity. For it is written (Jer. 10:24): \"Correct me, O\nLord, but yet with judgment: and not in Thy fury, lest Thou bring me\nto nothing.\" Now God's anger or fury signifies metaphorically the\nvengeance of Divine justice: and to be brought to nothing is an\ninfinite punishment, even as to make a thing out of nothing denotes\ninfinite power. Therefore according to God's vengeance, sin is\nawarded a punishment infinite in quantity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, quantity of punishment corresponds to quantity of\nfault, according to Deut. 25:2: \"According to the measure of the sin\nshall the measure also of the stripes be.\" Now a sin which is\ncommitted against God, is infinite: because the gravity of a sin\nincreases according to the greatness of the person sinned against\n(thus it is a more grievous sin to strike the sovereign than a\nprivate individual), and God's greatness is infinite. Therefore an\ninfinite punishment is due for a sin committed against God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a thing may be infinite in two ways, in duration,\nand in quantity. Now the punishment is infinite in duration.\nTherefore it is infinite in quantity also.\n\n_On the contrary,_ If this were the case, the punishments of all\nmortal sins would be equal; because one infinite is not greater than\nanother.\n\n_I answer that,_ Punishment is proportionate to sin. Now sin\ncomprises two things. First, there is the turning away from the\nimmutable good, which is infinite, wherefore, in this respect, sin is\ninfinite. Secondly, there is the inordinate turning to mutable good.\nIn this respect sin is finite, both because the mutable good itself\nis finite, and because the movement of turning towards it is finite,\nsince the acts of a creature cannot be infinite. Accordingly, in so\nfar as sin consists in turning away from something, its corresponding\npunishment is the _pain of loss,_ which also is infinite, because it\nis the loss of the infinite good, i.e. God. But in so far as sin\nturns inordinately to something, its corresponding punishment is the\n_pain of sense,_ which is also finite.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It would be inconsistent with Divine justice for the\nsinner to be brought to nothing absolutely, because this would be\nincompatible with the perpetuity of punishment that Divine justice\nrequires, as stated above (A. 3). The expression \"to be brought to\nnothing\" is applied to one who is deprived of spiritual goods,\naccording to 1 Cor. 13:2: \"If I . . . have not charity, I am nothing.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument considers sin as turning away from\nsomething, for it is thus that man sins against God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Duration of punishment corresponds to duration of\nfault, not indeed as regards the act, but on the part of the stain,\nfor as long as this remains, the debt of punishment remains. But\npunishment corresponds to fault in the point of severity. And a fault\nwhich is irreparable, is such that, of itself, it lasts for ever;\nwherefore it incurs an everlasting punishment. But it is not infinite\nas regards the thing it turns to; wherefore, in this respect, it does\nnot incur punishment of infinite quantity.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Every Sin Incurs a Debt of Eternal Punishment?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that every sin incurs a debt of eternal\npunishment. Because punishment, as stated above (A. 4), is\nproportionate to the fault. Now eternal punishment differs infinitely\nfrom temporal punishment: whereas no sin, apparently, differs\ninfinitely from another, since every sin is a human act, which cannot\nbe infinite. Since therefore some sins incur a debt of everlasting\npunishment, as stated above (A. 4), it seems that no sin incurs a\ndebt of mere temporal punishment.\n\nObj. 2: Further, original sin is the least of all sins, wherefore\nAugustine says (Enchiridion xciii) that \"the lightest punishment is\nincurred by those who are punished for original sin alone.\" But\noriginal sin incurs everlasting punishment, since children who have\ndied in original sin through not being baptized, will never see the\nkingdom of God, as shown by our Lord's words (John 3:3): \"Unless a\nman be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God.\" Much more,\ntherefore, will the punishments of all other sins be everlasting.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a sin does not deserve greater punishment through\nbeing united to another sin; for Divine justice has allotted its\npunishment to each sin. Now a venial sin deserves eternal punishment\nif it be united to a mortal sin in a lost soul, because in hell there\nis no remission of sins. Therefore venial sin by itself deserves\neternal punishment. Therefore temporal punishment is not due for any\nsin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Gregory says (Dial. iv, 39), that certain slighter\nsins are remitted after this life. Therefore all sins are not\npunished eternally.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), a sin incurs a debt of\neternal punishment, in so far as it causes an irreparable disorder in\nthe order of Divine justice, through being contrary to the very\nprinciple of that order, viz. the last end. Now it is evident that in\nsome sins there is disorder indeed, but such as not to involve\ncontrariety in respect of the last end, but only in respect of things\nreferable to the end, in so far as one is too much or too little\nintent on them without prejudicing the order to the last end: as, for\ninstance, when a man is too fond of some temporal thing, yet would\nnot offend God for its sake, by breaking one of His commandments.\nConsequently such sins do not incur everlasting, but only temporal\npunishment.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sins do not differ infinitely from one another in\nrespect of their turning towards mutable good, which constitutes the\nsubstance of the sinful act; but they do differ infinitely in respect\nof their turning away from something. Because some sins consist in\nturning away from the last end, and some in a disorder affecting\nthings referable to the end: and the last end differs infinitely from\nthe things that are referred to it.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Original sin incurs everlasting punishment, not on\naccount of its gravity, but by reason of the condition of the\nsubject, viz. a human being deprived of grace, without which there is\nno remission of sin.\n\nThe same answer applies to the Third Objection about venial sin.\nBecause eternity of punishment does not correspond to the quantity of\nthe sin, but to its irremissibility, as stated above (A. 3).\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Debt of Punishment Remains After Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there remains no debt of punishment\nafter sin. For if the cause be removed the effect is removed. But sin\nis the cause of the debt of punishment. Therefore, when the sin is\nremoved, the debt of punishment ceases also.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sin is removed by man returning to virtue. Now a\nvirtuous man deserves, not punishment, but reward. Therefore, when\nsin is removed, the debt of punishment no longer remains.\n\nObj. 3: Further, \"Punishments are a kind of medicine\" (Ethic. ii, 3).\nBut a man is not given medicine after being cured of his disease.\nTherefore, when sin is removed the debt of punishment does not remain.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (2 Kings xii. 13, 14): \"David said\nto Nathan: I have sinned against the Lord. And Nathan said to David:\nThe Lord also hath taken away thy sin; thou shalt not die.\nNevertheless because thou hast given occasion to the enemies of the\nLord to blaspheme . . . the child that is born to thee shall die.\"\nTherefore a man is punished by God even after his sin is forgiven:\nand so the debt of punishment remains, when the sin has been removed.\n\n_I answer that,_ Two things may be considered in sin: the guilty act,\nand the consequent stain. Now it is evident that in all actual sins,\nwhen the act of sin has ceased, the guilt remains; because the act of\nsin makes man deserving of punishment, in so far as he transgresses\nthe order of Divine justice, to which he cannot return except he pay\nsome sort of penal compensation, which restores him to the equality\nof justice; so that, according to the order of Divine justice, he who\nhas been too indulgent to his will, by transgressing God's\ncommandments, suffers, either willingly or unwillingly, something\ncontrary to what he would wish. This restoration of the equality of\njustice by penal compensation is also to be observed in injuries done\nto one's fellow men. Consequently it is evident that when the sinful\nor injurious act has ceased there still remains the debt of\npunishment.\n\nBut if we speak of the removal of sin as to the stain, it is evident\nthat the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul, without the\nsoul being united to God, since it was through being separated from\nHim that it suffered the loss of its brightness, in which the stain\nconsists, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 1). Now man is united to God by\nhis will. Wherefore the stain of sin cannot be removed from man,\nunless his will accept the order of Divine justice, that is to say,\nunless either of his own accord he take upon himself the punishment\nof his past sin, or bear patiently the punishment which God inflicts\non him; and in both ways punishment avails for satisfaction. Now when\npunishment is satisfactory, it loses somewhat of the nature of\npunishment: for the nature of punishment is to be against the will;\nand although satisfactory punishment, absolutely speaking, is against\nthe will, nevertheless in this particular case and for this\nparticular purpose, it is voluntary. Consequently it is voluntary\nsimply, but involuntary in a certain respect, as we have explained\nwhen speaking of the voluntary and the involuntary (Q. 6, A. 6). We\nmust, therefore, say that, when the stain of sin has been removed,\nthere may remain a debt of punishment, not indeed of punishment\nsimply, but of satisfactory punishment.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as after the act of sin has ceased, the stain\nremains, as stated above (Q. 86, A. 2), so the debt of punishment\nalso can remain. But when the stain has been removed, the debt of\npunishment does not remain in the same way, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The virtuous man does not deserve punishment simply,\nbut he may deserve it as satisfactory: because his very virtue\ndemands that he should do satisfaction for his offenses against God\nor man.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed\nas regards the will. But punishment is still requisite in order that\nthe other powers of the soul be healed, since they were so disordered\nby the sin committed, so that, to wit, the disorder may be remedied\nby the contrary of that which caused it. Moreover punishment is\nrequisite in order to restore the equality of justice, and to remove\nthe scandal given to others, so that those who were scandalized at\nthe sin many be edified by the punishment, as may be seen in the\nexample of David quoted above.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Every Punishment Is Inflicted for a Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that not every punishment is inflicted for\na sin. For it is written (John 9:3, 2) about the man born blind:\n\"Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents . . . that he should\nbe born blind.\" In like manner we see that many children, those also\nwho have been baptized, suffer grievous punishments, fevers, for\ninstance, diabolical possession, and so forth, and yet there is no\nsin in them after they have been baptized. Moreover before they are\nbaptized, there is no more sin in them than in the other children who\ndo not suffer such things. Therefore not every punishment is\ninflicted for a sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that sinners should thrive and that the innocent\nshould be punished seem to come under the same head. Now each of\nthese is frequently observed in human affairs, for it is written\nabout the wicked (Ps. 72:5): \"They are not in the labor of men:\nneither shall they be scourged like other men\"; and (Job 21:7): \"[Why\nthen do] the wicked live, are [they] advanced, and strengthened with\nriches\" (?)[*The words in brackets show the readings of the Vulgate];\nand (Hab. 1:13): \"Why lookest Thou upon the contemptuous [Vulg.:\n'them that do unjust things'], and holdest Thy peace, when the wicked\nman oppresseth [Vulg.: 'devoureth'], the man that is more just than\nhimself?\" Therefore not every punishment is inflicted for a sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written of Christ (1 Pet. 2:22) that \"He did\nno sin, nor was guile found in His mouth.\" And yet it is said (1 Pet.\n2:21) that \"He suffered for us.\" Therefore punishment is not always\ninflicted by God for sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Job 4:7, seqq.): \"Who ever perished\ninnocent? Or when were the just destroyed? _On the contrary,_ I have\nseen those who work iniquity . . . perishing by the blast of God\";\nand Augustine writes (Retract. i) that \"all punishment is just, and\nis inflicted for a sin.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As already stated (A. 6), punishment can be\nconsidered in two ways--simply, and as being satisfactory. A\nsatisfactory punishment is, in a way, voluntary. And since those who\ndiffer as to the debt of punishment, may be one in will by the union\nof love, it happens that one who has not sinned, bears willingly the\npunishment for another: thus even in human affairs we see men take\nthe debts of another upon themselves. If, however, we speak of\npunishment simply, in respect of its being something penal, it has\nalways a relation to a sin in the one punished. Sometimes this is a\nrelation to actual sin, as when a man is punished by God or man for a\nsin committed by him. Sometimes it is a relation to original sin: and\nthis, either principally or consequently--principally, the punishment\nof original sin is that human nature is left to itself, and deprived\nof original justice: and consequently, all the penalties which result\nfrom this defect in human nature.\n\nNevertheless we must observe that sometimes a thing seems penal, and\nyet is not so simply. Because punishment is a species of evil, as\nstated in the First Part (Q. 48, A. 5). Now evil is privation of\ngood. And since man's good is manifold, viz. good of the soul, good\nof the body, and external goods, it happens sometimes that man\nsuffers the loss of a lesser good, that he may profit in a greater\ngood, as when he suffers loss of money for the sake of bodily health,\nor loss of both of these, for the sake of his soul's health and the\nglory of God. In such cases the loss is an evil to man, not simply\nbut relatively; wherefore it does not answer to the name of\npunishment simply, but of medicinal punishment, because a medical man\nprescribes bitter potions to his patients, that he may restore them\nto health. And since such like are not punishments properly speaking,\nthey are not referred to sin as their cause, except in a restricted\nsense: because the very fact that human nature needs a treatment of\npenal medicines, is due to the corruption of nature which is itself\nthe punishment of original sin. For there was no need, in the state\nof innocence, for penal exercises in order to make progress in\nvirtue; so that whatever is penal in the exercise of virtue, is\nreduced to original sin as its cause.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Such like defects of those who are born with them, or\nwhich children suffer from, are the effects and the punishments of\noriginal sin, as stated above (Q. 85, A. 5); and they remain even\nafter baptism, for the cause stated above (Q. 85, A. 5, ad 2): and\nthat they are not equally in all, is due to the diversity of nature,\nwhich is left to itself, as stated above (Q. 85, A. 5, ad 1).\nNevertheless, they are directed by Divine providence, to the\nsalvation of men, either of those who suffer, or of others who are\nadmonished by their means--and also to the glory of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Temporal and bodily goods are indeed goods of man, but\nthey are of small account: whereas spiritual goods are man's chief\ngoods. Consequently it belongs to Divine justice to give spiritual\ngoods to the virtuous, and to award them as much temporal goods or\nevils, as suffices for virtue: for, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom.\nviii), \"Divine justice does not enfeeble the fortitude of the\nvirtuous man, by material gifts.\" The very fact that others receive\ntemporal goods, is detrimental to their spiritual good; wherefore the\npsalm quoted concludes (verse 6): \"Therefore pride hath held them\nfast.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Christ bore a satisfactory punishment, not for His, but\nfor our sins.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 87, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Anyone Is Punished for Another's Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that one may be punished for another's\nsin. For it is written (Ex. 20:5): \"I am . . . God . . . jealous,\nvisiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, unto the\nthird and fourth generation of them that hate Me\"; and (Matt. 23:35):\n\"That upon you may come all the just blood that hath been shed upon\nthe earth.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, human justice springs from Divine justice. Now,\naccording to human justice, children are sometimes punished for their\nparents, as in the case of high treason. Therefore also according to\nDivine justice, one is punished for another's sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if it be replied that the son is punished, not for\nthe father's sin, but for his own, inasmuch as he imitates his\nfather's wickedness; this would not be said of the children rather\nthan of outsiders, who are punished in like manner as those whose\ncrimes they imitate. It seems, therefore, that children are punished,\nnot for their own sins, but for those of their parents.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ezech. 18:20): \"The son shall not\nbear the iniquity of the father.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ If we speak of that satisfactory punishment, which\none takes upon oneself voluntarily, one may bear another's\npunishment, in so far as they are, in some way, one, as stated above\n(A. 7). If, however, we speak of punishment inflicted on account of\nsin, inasmuch as it is penal, then each one is punished for his own\nsin only, because the sinful act is something personal. But if we\nspeak of a punishment that is medicinal, in this way it does happen\nthat one is punished for another's sin. For it has been stated (A. 7)\nthat ills sustained in bodily goods or even in the body itself, are\nmedicinal punishments intended for the health of the soul. Wherefore\nthere is no reason why one should not have such like punishments\ninflicted on one for another's sin, either by God or by man; e.g. on\nchildren for their parents, or on servants for their masters,\ninasmuch as they are their property so to speak; in such a way,\nhowever, that, if the children or the servants take part in the sin,\nthis penal ill has the character of punishment in regard to both the\none punished and the one he is punished for. But if they do not take\npart in the sin, it has the character of punishment in regard to the\none for whom the punishment is borne, while, in regard to the one who\nis punished, it is merely medicinal (except accidentally, if he\nconsent to the other's sin), since it is intended for the good of his\nsoul, if he bears it patiently.\n\nWith regard to spiritual punishments, these are not merely medicinal,\nbecause the good of the soul is not directed to a yet higher good.\nConsequently no one suffers loss in the goods of the soul without\nsome fault of his own. Wherefore Augustine says (Ep. ad Avit.) [*Ep.\nad Auxilium, ccl.], such like punishments are not inflicted on one\nfor another's sin, because, as regards the soul, the son is not the\nfather's property. Hence the Lord assigns the reason for this by\nsaying (Ezech. 18:4): \"All souls are Mine.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Both the passages quoted should, seemingly, be referred\nto temporal or bodily punishments, in so far as children are the\nproperty of their parents, and posterity, of their forefathers. Else,\nif they be referred to spiritual punishments, they must be understood\nin reference to the imitation of sin, wherefore in Exodus these words\nare added, \"Of them that hate Me,\" and in the chapter quoted from\nMatthew (verse 32) we read: \"Fill ye up then the measure of your\nfathers.\" The sins of the fathers are said to be punished in their\nchildren, because the latter are the more prone to sin through being\nbrought up amid their parents' crimes, both by becoming accustomed to\nthem, and by imitating their parents' example, conforming to their\nauthority as it were. Moreover they deserve heavier punishment if,\nseeing the punishment of their parents, they fail to mend their ways.\nThe text adds, \"to the third and fourth generation,\" because men are\nwont to live long enough to see the third and fourth generation, so\nthat both the children can witness their parents' sins so as to\nimitate them, and the parents can see their children's punishments so\nas to grieve for them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The punishments which human justice inflicts on one for\nanother's sin are bodily and temporal. They are also remedies or\nmedicines against future sins, in order that either they who are\npunished, or others may be restrained from similar faults.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Those who are near of kin are said to be punished,\nrather than outsiders, for the sins of others, both because the\npunishment of kindred redounds somewhat upon those who sinned, as\nstated above, in so far as the child is the father's property, and\nbecause the examples and the punishments that occur in one's own\nhousehold are more moving. Consequently when a man is brought up amid\nthe sins of his parents, he is more eager to imitate them, and if he\nis not deterred by their punishments, he would seem to be the more\nobstinate, and, therefore, to deserve more severe punishment.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 88\n\nOF VENIAL AND MORTAL SIN\n(In Six Articles)\n\nIn the next place, since venial and mortal sins differ in respect of\nthe debt of punishment, we must consider them. First, we shall\nconsider venial sin as compared with mortal sin; secondly, we shall\nconsider venial sin in itself.\n\nUnder the first head there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether venial sin is fittingly condivided with mortal sin?\n\n(2) Whether they differ generically?\n\n(3) Whether venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin?\n\n(4) Whether a venial sin can become mortal?\n\n(5) Whether a venial sin can become mortal by reason of an\naggravating circumstance?\n\n(6) Whether a mortal sin can become venial?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Venial Sin Is Fittingly Condivided with Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that venial sin is unfittingly condivided\nwith mortal sin. For Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 27): \"Sin is\na word, deed or desire contrary to the eternal law.\" But the fact of\nbeing against the eternal law makes a sin to be mortal. Consequently\nevery sin is mortal. Therefore venial sin is not condivided with\nmortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): \"Whether you eat or\ndrink, or whatever else you do; do all to the glory of God.\" Now\nwhoever sins breaks this commandment, because sin is not done for\nGod's glory. Consequently, since to break a commandment is to commit\na mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whoever cleaves to a thing by love, cleaves either\nas enjoying it, or as using it, as Augustine states (De Doctr.\nChrist. i, 3, 4). But no person, in sinning, cleaves to a mutable\ngood as using it: because he does not refer it to that good which\ngives us happiness, which, properly speaking, is to use, according to\nAugustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3, 4). Therefore whoever sins enjoys\na mutable good. Now \"to enjoy what we should use is human\nperverseness,\" as Augustine again says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 30).\nTherefore, since \"perverseness\" [*The Latin 'pervertere' means to\noverthrow, to destroy, hence 'perversion' of God's law is a mortal\nsin.] denotes a mortal sin, it seems that whoever sins, sins mortally.\n\nObj. 4: Further, whoever approaches one term, from that very fact\nturns away from the opposite. Now whoever sins, approaches a mutable\ngood, and, consequently turns away from the immutable good, so that\nhe sins mortally. Therefore venial sin is unfittingly condivided with\nmortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Tract. xli in Joan.), that \"a\ncrime is one that merits damnation, and a venial sin, one that does\nnot.\" But a crime denotes a mortal sin. Therefore venial sin is\nfittingly condivided with mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ Certain terms do not appear to be mutually opposed,\nif taken in their proper sense, whereas they are opposed if taken\nmetaphorically: thus \"to smile\" is not opposed to \"being dry\"; but if\nwe speak of the smiling meadows when they are decked with flowers and\nfresh with green hues this is opposed to drought. In like manner if\nmortal be taken literally as referring to the death of the body, it\ndoes not imply opposition to venial, nor belong to the same genus.\nBut if mortal be taken metaphorically, as applied to sin, it is\nopposed to that which is venial.\n\nFor sin, being a sickness of the soul, as stated above (Q. 71, A. 1,\nad 3; Q. 72, A. 5; Q. 74, A. 9, ad 2), is said to be mortal by\ncomparison with a disease, which is said to be mortal, through\ncausing an irreparable defect consisting in the corruption of a\nprinciple, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 5). Now the principle of the\nspiritual life, which is a life in accord with virtue, is the order\nto the last end, as stated above (Q. 72, A. 5; Q. 87, A. 3): and if\nthis order be corrupted, it cannot be repaired by any intrinsic\nprinciple, but by the power of God alone, as stated above (Q. 87, A.\n3), because disorders in things referred to the end, are repaired\nthrough the end, even as an error about conclusions can be repaired\nthrough the truth of the principles. Hence the defect of order to the\nlast end cannot be repaired through something else as a higher\nprinciple, as neither can an error about principles. Wherefore such\nsins are called mortal, as being irreparable. On the other hand, sins\nwhich imply a disorder in things referred to the end, the order to\nthe end itself being preserved, are reparable. These sins are called\nvenial: because a sin receives its acquittal (_veniam_) when the debt\nof punishment is taken away, and this ceases when the sin ceases, as\nexplained above (Q. 87, A. 6).\n\nAccordingly, mortal and venial are mutually opposed as reparable and\nirreparable: and I say this with reference to the intrinsic\nprinciple, but not to the Divine power, which can repair all\ndiseases, whether of the body or of the soul. Therefore venial sin is\nfittingly condivided with mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The division of sin into venial and mortal is not a\ndivision of a genus into its species which have an equal share of the\ngeneric nature: but it is the division of an analogous term into its\nparts, of which it is predicated, of the one first, and of the other\nafterwards. Consequently the perfect notion of sin, which Augustine\ngives, applies to mortal sin. On the other hand, venial sin is called\na sin, in reference to an imperfect notion of sin, and in relation to\nmortal sin: even as an accident is called a being, in relation to\nsubstance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being. For it is\nnot _against_ the law, since he who sins venially neither does what\nthe law forbids, nor omits what the law prescribes to be done; but he\nacts _beside_ the law, through not observing the mode of reason,\nwhich the law intends.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This precept of the Apostle is affirmative, and so it\ndoes not bind for all times. Consequently everyone who does not\nactually refer all his actions to the glory of God, does not\ntherefore act against this precept. In order, therefore, to avoid\nmortal sin each time that one fails actually to refer an action to\nGod's glory, it is enough to refer oneself and all that one has to\nGod habitually. Now venial sin excludes only actual reference of the\nhuman act to God's glory, and not habitual reference: because it does\nnot exclude charity, which refers man to God habitually. Therefore it\ndoes not follow that he who sins venially, sins mortally.\n\nReply Obj. 3: He that sins venially, cleaves to temporal good, not as\nenjoying it, because he does not fix his end in it, but as using it,\nby referring it to God, not actually but habitually.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Mutable good is not considered to be a term in\ncontraposition to the immutable good, unless one's end is fixed\ntherein: because what is referred to the end has not the character of\nfinality.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Mortal and Venial Sin Differ Generically?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that venial and mortal sin do not differ\ngenerically, so that some sins be generically mortal, and some\ngenerically venial. Because human acts are considered to be\ngenerically good or evil according to their matter or object, as\nstated above (Q. 18, A. 2). Now either mortal or venial sin may be\ncommitted in regard to any object or matter: since man can love any\nmutable good, either less than God, which may be a venial sin, or\nmore than God, which is a mortal sin. Therefore venial and mortal sin\ndo not differ generically.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as stated above (A. 1; Q. 72, A. 5; Q. 87, A. 3), a\nsin is called mortal when it is irreparable, venial when it can be\nrepaired. Now irreparability belongs to sin committed out of malice,\nwhich, according to some, is irremissible: whereas reparability\nbelongs to sins committed through weakness or ignorance, which are\nremissible. Therefore mortal and venial sin differ as sin committed\nthrough malice differs from sin committed through weakness or\nignorance. But, in this respect, sins differ not in genus but in\ncause, as stated above (Q. 77, A. 8, ad 1). Therefore venial and\nmortal sin do not differ generically.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it was stated above (Q. 74, A. 3, ad 3; A. 10) that\nsudden movements both of the sensuality and of the reason are venial\nsins. But sudden movements occur in every kind of sin. Therefore no\nsins are generically venial.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine, in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis,\nserm. xli), enumerates certain generic venial sins, and certain\ngeneric mortal sins.\n\n_I answer that,_ Venial sin is so called from _venia_ (pardon).\nConsequently a sin may be called venial, first of all, because it has\nbeen pardoned: thus Ambrose says that \"penance makes every sin\nvenial\": and this is called venial \"from the result.\" Secondly, a sin\nis called venial because it does not contain anything either\npartially or totally, to prevent its being pardoned: partially, as\nwhen a sin contains something diminishing its guilt, e.g. a sin\ncommitted through weakness or ignorance: and this is called venial\n\"from the cause\": totally, through not destroying the order to the\nlast end, wherefore it deserves temporal, but not everlasting\npunishment. It is of this venial sin that we wish to speak now.\n\nFor as regards the first two, it is evident that they have no\ndeterminate genus: whereas venial sin, taken in the third sense, can\nhave a determinate genus, so that one sin may be venial generically,\nand another generically mortal, according as the genus or species of\nan act is determined by its object. For, when the will is directed to\na thing that is in itself contrary to charity, whereby man is\ndirected to his last end, the sin is mortal by reason of its object.\nConsequently it is a mortal sin generically, whether it be contrary\nto the love of God, e.g. blasphemy, perjury, and the like, or against\nthe love of one's neighbor, e.g. murder, adultery, and such like:\nwherefore such sins are mortal by reason of their genus. Sometimes,\nhowever, the sinner's will is directed to a thing containing a\ncertain inordinateness, but which is not contrary to the love of God\nand one's neighbor, e.g. an idle word, excessive laughter, and so\nforth: and such sins are venial by reason of their genus.\n\nNevertheless, since moral acts derive their character of goodness and\nmalice, not only from their objects, but also from some disposition\nof the agent, as stated above (Q. 18, AA. 4, 6), it happens sometimes\nthat a sin which is venial generically by reason of its object,\nbecomes mortal on the part of the agent, either because he fixes his\nlast end therein, or because he directs it to something that is a\nmortal sin in its own genus; for example, if a man direct an idle\nword to the commission of adultery. In like manner it may happen, on\nthe part of the agent, that a sin generically mortal because venial,\nby reason of the act being imperfect, i.e. not deliberated by reason,\nwhich is the proper principle of an evil act, as we have said above\nin reference to sudden movements of unbelief.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The very fact that anyone chooses something that is\ncontrary to divine charity, proves that he prefers it to the love of\nGod, and consequently, that he loves it more than he loves God. Hence\nit belongs to the genus of some sins, which are of themselves\ncontrary to charity, that something is loved more than God; so that\nthey are mortal by reason of their genus.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument considers those sins which are venial\nfrom their cause.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers those sins which are venial by\nreason of the imperfection of the act.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Venial Sin Is a Disposition to Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that venial sin is not a disposition to\nmortal sin. For one contrary does not dispose to another. But venial\nand mortal sin are condivided as contrary to one another, as stated\nabove (A. 1). Therefore venial sin is not a disposition to mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an act disposes to something of like species,\nwherefore it is stated in _Ethic._ ii, 1, 2, that \"from like acts\nlike dispositions and habits are engendered.\" But mortal and venial\nsin differ in genus or species, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore\nvenial sin does not dispose to mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if a sin is called venial because it disposes to\nmortal sin, it follows that whatever disposes to mortal sin is a\nvenial sin. Now every good work disposes to mortal sin; wherefore\nAugustine says in his Rule (Ep. ccxi) that \"pride lies in wait for\ngood works that it may destroy them.\" Therefore even good works would\nbe venial sins, which is absurd.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 19:1): \"He that contemneth\nsmall things shall fall by little and little.\" Now he that sins\nvenially seems to contemn small things. Therefore by little and\nlittle he is disposed to fall away together into mortal sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ A disposition is a kind of cause; wherefore as there\nis a twofold manner of cause, so is there a twofold manner of\ndisposition. For there is a cause which moves directly to the\nproduction of the effect, as a hot thing heats: and there is a cause\nwhich moves indirectly, by removing an obstacle, as he who displaces\na pillar is said to displace the stone that rests on it. Accordingly\nan act of sin disposes to something in two ways. First, directly, and\nthus it disposes to an act of like species. In this way, a sin\ngenerically venial does not, primarily and of its nature, dispose to\na sin generically mortal, for they differ in species. Nevertheless,\nin this same way, a venial sin can dispose, by way of consequence, to\na sin which is mortal on the part of the agent: because the\ndisposition or habit may be so far strengthened by acts of venial\nsin, that the lust of sinning increases, and the sinner fixes his end\nin that venial sin: since the end for one who has a habit, as such,\nis to work according to that habit; and the consequence will be that,\nby sinning often venially, he becomes disposed to a mortal sin.\nSecondly, a human act disposes to something by removing an obstacle\nthereto. In this way a sin generically venial can dispose to a sin\ngenerically mortal. Because he that commits a sin generically venial,\nturns aside from some particular order; and through accustoming his\nwill not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, is\ndisposed not to subject his will even to the order of the last end,\nby choosing something that is a mortal sin in its genus.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Venial and mortal sin are not condivided in contrariety\nto one another, as though they were species of one genus, as stated\nabove (A. 1, ad 1), but as an accident is condivided with substance.\nWherefore an accident can be a disposition to a substantial form, so\ncan a venial sin dispose to mortal.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Venial sin is not like mortal sin in species; but it is\nin genus, inasmuch as they both imply a defect of due order, albeit\nin different ways, as stated (AA. 1, 2).\n\nReply Obj. 3: A good work is not, of itself, a disposition to mortal\nsin; but it can be the matter or occasion of mortal sin accidentally;\nwhereas a venial sin, of its very nature, disposes to mortal sin, as\nstated.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Venial Sin Can Become Mortal?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a venial sin can become a mortal sin.\nFor Augustine in explaining the words of John 3:36: \"He that\nbelieveth not the Son, shall not see life,\" says (Tract. xii in\nJoan.): \"The slightest,\" i.e. venial, \"sins kill if we make little of\nthem.\" Now a sin is called mortal through causing the spiritual death\nof the soul. Therefore a venial sin can become mortal.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a movement in the sensuality before the consent of\nreason, is a venial sin, but after consent, is a mortal sin, as\nstated above (Q. 74, A. 8, ad 2). Therefore a venial sin can become\nmortal.\n\nObj. 3: Further, venial and mortal sin differ as curable and\nincurable disease, as stated above (A. 1). But a curable disease may\nbecome incurable. Therefore a venial sin may become mortal.\n\nObj. 4: Further, a disposition may become a habit. Now venial sin is\na disposition to mortal, as stated (A. 3). Therefore a venial sin can\nbecome mortal.\n\n_I answer that,_ The fact of a venial sin becoming a mortal sin may\nbe understood in three ways. First, so that the same identical act be\nat first a venial, and then a mortal sin. This is impossible: because\na sin, like any moral act, consists chiefly in an act of the will: so\nthat an act is not one morally, if the will be changed, although the\nact be continuous physically. If, however, the will be not changed,\nit is not possible for a venial sin to become mortal.\n\nSecondly, this may be taken to mean that a sin generically venial,\nbecomes mortal. This is possible, in so far as one may fix one's end\nin that venial sin, or direct it to some mortal sin as end, as stated\nabove (A. 2).\n\nThirdly, this may be understood in the sense of many venial sins\nconstituting one mortal sin. If this be taken as meaning that many\nvenial sins added together make one mortal sin, it is false, because\nall the venial sins in the world cannot incur a debt of punishment\nequal to that of one mortal sin. This is evident as regards the\nduration of the punishment, since mortal sin incurs a debt of eternal\npunishment, while venial sin incurs a debt of temporal punishment, as\nstated above (Q. 87, AA. 3, 5). It is also evident as regards the\npain of loss, because mortal sins deserve to be punished by the\nprivation of seeing God, to which no other punishment is comparable,\nas Chrysostom states (Hom. xxiv in Matth.). It is also evident as\nregards the pain of sense, as to the remorse of conscience; although\nas to the pain of fire, the punishments may perhaps not be\nimproportionate to one another.\n\nIf, however, this be taken as meaning that many venial sins make one\nmortal sin dispositively, it is true, as was shown above (A. 3) with\nregard to the two different manners of disposition, whereby venial\nsin disposes to mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is referring to the fact of many venial sins\nmaking one mortal sin dispositively.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The same movement of the sensuality which preceded the\nconsent of reason can never become a mortal sin; but the movement of\nthe reason in consenting is a mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Disease of the body is not an act, but an abiding\ndisposition; wherefore, while remaining the same disease, it may\nundergo change. On the other hand, venial sin is a transient act,\nwhich cannot be taken up again: so that in this respect the\ncomparison fails.\n\nReply Obj. 4: A disposition that becomes a habit, is like an\nimperfect thing in the same species; thus imperfect science, by being\nperfected, becomes a habit. On the other hand, venial sin is a\ndisposition to something differing generically, even as an accident\nwhich disposes to a substantial form, into which it is never changed.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 5]\n\nWhether a Circumstance Can Make a Venial Sin to Be Mortal?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a circumstance can make a venial sin\nmortal. For Augustine says in a sermon on Purgatory (De Sanctis,\nserm. xli) that \"if anger continue for a long time, or if drunkenness\nbe frequent, they become mortal sins.\" But anger and drunkenness are\nnot mortal but venial sins generically, else they would always be\nmortal sins. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be mortal.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Master says (Sentent. ii, D, 24) that\ndelectation, if morose [*See Q. 74, A. 6], is a mortal sin, but that\nif it be not morose, it is a venial sin. Now moroseness is a\ncircumstance. Therefore a circumstance makes a venial sin to be\nmortal.\n\nObj. 3: Further, evil and good differ more than venial and mortal\nsin, both of which are generically evil. But a circumstance makes a\ngood act to be evil, as when a man gives an alms for vainglory. Much\nmore, therefore, can it make a venial sin to be mortal.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Since a circumstance is an accident, its quantity\ncannot exceed that of the act itself, derived from the act's genus,\nbecause the subject always excels its accident. If, therefore, an act\nbe venial by reason of its genus, it cannot become mortal by reason\nof an accident: since, in a way, mortal sin infinitely surpasses the\nquantity of venial sin, as is evident from what has been said (Q. 72,\nA. 5, ad 1; Q. 87, A. 5, ad 1).\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 7, A. 1; Q. 18, A. 5, ad 4; AA.\n10, 11), when we were treating of circumstances, a circumstance, as\nsuch, is an accident of the moral act: and yet a circumstance may\nhappen to be taken as the specific difference of a moral act, and\nthen it loses its nature of circumstance, and constitutes the species\nof the moral act. This happens in sins when a circumstance adds the\ndeformity of another genus; thus when a man has knowledge of another\nwoman than his wife, the deformity of his act is opposed to chastity;\nbut if this other be another man's wife, there is an additional\ndeformity opposed to justice which forbids one to take what belongs\nto another; and accordingly this circumstance constitutes a new\nspecies of sin known as adultery.\n\nIt is, however, impossible for a circumstance to make a venial sin\nbecome mortal, unless it adds the deformity of another species. For\nit has been stated above (A. 1) that the deformity of a venial sin\nconsists in a disorder affecting things that are referred to the end,\nwhereas the deformity of a mortal sin consists in a disorder about\nthe last end. Consequently it is evident that a circumstance cannot\nmake a venial sin to be mortal, so long as it remains a circumstance,\nbut only when it transfers the sin to another species, and becomes,\nas it were, the specific difference of the moral act.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Length of time is not a circumstance that draws a sin\nto another species, nor is frequency or custom, except perhaps by\nsomething accidental supervening. For an action does not acquire a\nnew species through being repeated or prolonged, unless by chance\nsomething supervene in the repeated or prolonged act to change its\nspecies, e.g. disobedience, contempt, or the like.\n\nWe must therefore reply to the objection by saying that since anger\nis a movement of the soul tending to the hurt of one's neighbor, if\nthe angry movement tend to a hurt which is a mortal sin generically,\nsuch as murder or robbery, that anger will be a mortal sin\ngenerically: and if it be a venial sin, this will be due to the\nimperfection of the act, in so far as it is a sudden movement of the\nsensuality: whereas, if it last a long time, it returns to its\ngeneric nature, through the consent of reason. If, on the other hand,\nthe hurt to which the angry movement tends, is a sin generically\nvenial, for instance, if a man be angry with someone, so as to wish\nto say some trifling word in jest that would hurt him a little, the\nanger will not be mortal sin, however long it last, unless perhaps\naccidentally; for instance, if it were to give rise to great scandal\nor something of the kind.\n\nWith regard to drunkenness we reply that it is a mortal sin by reason\nof its genus; for, that a man, without necessity, and through the\nmere lust of wine, make himself unable to use his reason, whereby he\nis directed to God and avoids committing many sins, is expressly\ncontrary to virtue. That it be a venial sin, is due some sort of\nignorance or weakness, as when a man is ignorant of the strength of\nthe wine, or of his own unfitness, so that he has no thought of\ngetting drunk, for in that case the drunkenness is not imputed to him\nas a sin, but only the excessive drink. If, however, he gets drunk\nfrequently, this ignorance no longer avails as an excuse, for his\nwill seems to choose to give way to drunkenness rather than to\nrefrain from excess of wine: wherefore the sin returns to its\nspecific nature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Morose delectation is not a mortal sin except in those\nmatters which are mortal sins generically. In such matters, if the\ndelectation be not morose, there is a venial sin through imperfection\nof the act, as we have said with regard to anger (ad 1): because\nanger is said to be lasting, and delectation to be morose, on account\nof the approval of the deliberating reason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A circumstance does not make a good act to be evil,\nunless it constitute the species of a sin, as we have stated above\n(Q. 18, A. 5, ad 4).\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 88, Art. 6]\n\nWhether a Mortal Sin Can Become Venial?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a mortal sin can become venial.\nBecause venial sin is equally distant from mortal, as mortal sin is\nfrom venial. But a venial sin can become mortal, as stated above (A.\n5). Therefore also a mortal sin can become venial.\n\nObj. 2: Further, venial and mortal sin are said to differ in this,\nthat he who sins mortally loves a creature more than God, while he\nwho sins venially loves the creature less than God. Now it may happen\nthat a person in committing a sin generically mortal, loves a\ncreature less than God; for instance, if anyone being ignorant that\nsimple fornication is a mortal sin, and contrary to the love of God,\ncommits the sin of fornication, yet so as to be ready, for the love\nof God, to refrain from that sin if he knew that by committing it he\nwas acting counter to the love of God. Therefore his will be a venial\nsin; and accordingly a mortal sin can become venial.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as stated above (A. 5, Obj. 3), good is more distant\nfrom evil, than venial from mortal sin. But an act which is evil in\nitself, can become good; thus to kill a man may be an act of justice,\nas when a judge condemns a thief to death. Much more therefore can a\nmortal sin become venial.\n\n_On the contrary,_ An eternal thing can never become temporal. But\nmortal sin deserves eternal punishment, whereas venial sin deserves\ntemporal punishment. Therefore a mortal sin can never become venial.\n\n_I answer that,_ Venial and mortal differ as perfect and imperfect in\nthe genus of sin, as stated above (A. 1, ad 1). Now the imperfect can\nbecome perfect, by some sort of addition: and, consequently, a venial\nsin can become mortal, by the addition of some deformity pertaining\nto the genus of mortal sin, as when a man utters an idle word for the\npurpose of fornication. On the other hand, the perfect cannot become\nimperfect, by addition; and so a mortal sin cannot become venial, by\nthe addition of a deformity pertaining to the genus of venial sin,\nfor the sin is not diminished if a man commit fornication in order to\nutter an idle word; rather is it aggravated by the additional\ndeformity.\n\nNevertheless a sin which is generically mortal, can become venial by\nreason of the imperfection of the act, because then it does not\ncompletely fulfil the conditions of a moral act, since it is not a\ndeliberate, but a sudden act, as is evident from what we have said\nabove (A. 2). This happens by a kind of subtraction, namely, of\ndeliberate reason. And since a moral act takes its species from\ndeliberate reason, the result is that by such a subtraction the\nspecies of the act is destroyed.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Venial differs from mortal as imperfect from\nperfect, even as a boy differs from a man. But the boy becomes a man\nand not vice versa. Hence the argument does not prove.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If the ignorance be such as to excuse sin\naltogether, as the ignorance of a madman or an imbecile, then he that\ncommits fornication in a state of such ignorance, commits no sin\neither mortal or venial. But if the ignorance be not invincible, then\nthe ignorance itself is a sin, and contains within itself the lack of\nthe love of God, in so far as a man neglects to learn those things\nwhereby he can safeguard himself in the love of God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Contra Mendacium vii), \"those\nthings which are evil in themselves, cannot be well done for any good\nend.\" Now murder is the slaying of the innocent, and this can nowise\nbe well done. But, as Augustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 4, 5), the\njudge who sentences a thief to death, or the soldier who slays the\nenemy of the common weal, are not murderers.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 89\n\nOF VENIAL SIN IN ITSELF\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider venial sin in itself, and under this head there\nare six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether venial sin causes a stain in the soul?\n\n(2) Of the different kinds of venial sin, as denoted by \"wood,\"\n\"hay,\" \"stubble\" (1 Cor. 3:12);\n\n(3) Whether man could sin venially in the state of innocence?\n\n(4) Whether a good or a wicked angel can sin venially?\n\n(5) Whether the movements of unbelievers are venial sins?\n\n(6) Whether venial sin can be in a man with original sin alone?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Venial Sin Causes a Stain on the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that venial sin causes a stain in the\nsoul. For Augustine says (De Poenit.) [*Hom. 50, inter. L., 2], that\nif venial sins be multiplied, they destroy the beauty of our souls so\nas to deprive us of the embraces of our heavenly spouse. But the\nstain of sin is nothing else but the loss of the soul's beauty.\nTherefore venial sins cause a stain in the soul.\n\nObj. 2: Further, mortal sin causes a stain in the soul, on account of\nthe inordinateness of the act and of the sinner's affections. But, in\nvenial sin, there is an inordinateness of the act and of the\naffections. Therefore venial sin causes a stain in the soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the stain on the soul is caused by contact with a\ntemporal thing, through love thereof as stated above (Q. 86, A. 1).\nBut, in venial sin, the soul is in contact with a temporal thing\nthrough inordinate love. therefore, venial sin brings a stain on the\nsoul.\n\n_On the contrary,_ it is written, (Eph. 5:27): \"That He might present\nit to Himself a glorious church, not having spot or wrinkle,\" on\nwhich the gloss says: \"i.e., some grievous sin.\" Therefore it seems\nproper to mortal sin to cause a stain on the soul.\n\nI answer that as stated above (Q. 86, A. 1), a stain denotes a loss\nof comeliness due to contact with something, as may be seen in\ncorporeal matters, from which the term has been transferred to the\nsoul, by way of similitude. Now, just as in the body there is a\ntwofold comeliness, one resulting from the inward disposition of the\nmembers and colors, the other resulting from outward refulgence\nsupervening, so too, in the soul, there is a twofold comeliness, one\nhabitual and, so to speak, intrinsic, the other actual like an\noutward flash of light. Now venial sin is a hindrance to actual\ncomeliness, but not to habitual comeliness, because it neither\ndestroys nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other\nvirtues, as we shall show further on (II-II, Q. 24, A. 10; Q. 133, A.\n1, ad 2), but only hinders their acts. On the other hand a stain\ndenotes something permanent in the thing stained, wherefore it seems\nin the nature of a loss of habitual rather than of actual comeliness.\nTherefore, properly speaking, venial sin does not cause a stain in\nthe soul. If, however, we find it stated anywhere that it does induce\na stain, this is in a restricted sense, in so far as it hinders the\ncomeliness that results from acts of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking of the case in which many venial\nsins lead to mortal sin dispositively: because otherwise they would\nnot sever the soul from its heavenly spouse.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In mortal sin the inordinateness of the act destroys\nthe habit of virtue, but not in venial sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In mortal sin the soul comes into contact with a\ntemporal thing as its end, so that the shedding of the light of\ngrace, which accrues to those who, by charity, cleave to God as their\nlast end, is entirely cut off. _On the contrary,_ in venial sin, man\ndoes not cleave to a creature as his last end: hence there is no\ncomparison.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Venial Sins Are Suitably Designated As \"Wood, Hay, and\nStubble\"?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that venial sins are unsuitably designated\nas \"wood, hay, and stubble.\" Because wood, hay, and stubble are said\n(1 Cor. 3:12) to be built on a spiritual foundation. Now venial sins\nare something outside a spiritual foundation, even as false opinions\nare outside the pale of science. Therefore, venial sins are not\nsuitably designated as wood, hay, and stubble.\n\nObj. 2: Further, he who builds wood, hay, and stubble, \"shall be\nsaved yet so as by fire\" (1 Cor. 3:15). But sometimes the man who\ncommits a venial sin, will not be saved, even by fire, e.g. when a\nman dies in mortal sin to which venial sins are attached. Therefore,\nvenial sins are unsuitably designated by wood, hay, and stubble.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to the Apostle (1 Cor. 3:12) those who\nbuild \"gold, silver, precious stones,\" i.e. love of God and our\nneighbor, and good works, are others from those who build wood, hay,\nand stubble. But those even who love God and their neighbor, and do\ngood works, commit venial sins: for it is written (1 John 1:8): \"If\nwe say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves.\" Therefore venial\nsins are not suitably designated by these three.\n\nObj. 4: Further, there are many more than three differences and\ndegrees of venial sins. Therefore they are unsuitably comprised under\nthese three.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:15) that the man who\nbuilds up wood, hay and stubble, \"shall be saved yet so as by fire,\"\nso that he will suffer punishment, but not everlasting. Now the debt\nof temporal punishment belongs properly to venial sin, as stated\nabove (Q. 87, A. 5). Therefore these three signify venial sins.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some have understood the \"foundation\" to be dead\nfaith, upon which some build good works, signified by gold, silver,\nand precious stones, while others build mortal sins, which according\nto them are designated by wood, hay and stubble. But Augustine\ndisapproves of this explanation (De Fide et Oper. xv), because, as\nthe Apostle says (Gal. 5:21), he who does the works of the flesh,\n\"shall not obtain the kingdom of God,\" which signifies to be saved;\nwhereas the Apostle says that he who builds wood, hay, and stubble\n\"shall be saved yet so as by fire.\" Consequently wood, hay, stubble\ncannot be understood to denote mortal sins.\n\nOthers say that wood, hay, stubble designate good works, which are\nindeed built upon the spiritual edifice, but are mixed with venial\nsins: as, when a man is charged with the care of a family, which is a\ngood thing, excessive love of his wife or of his children or of his\npossessions insinuates itself into his life, under God however, so\nthat, to wit, for the sake of these things he would be unwilling to\ndo anything in opposition to God. But neither does this seem to be\nreasonable. For it is evident that all good works are referred to the\nlove of God, and one's neighbor, wherefore they are designated by\n\"gold,\" \"silver,\" and \"precious stones,\" and consequently not by\n\"wood,\" \"hay,\" and \"stubble.\"\n\nWe must therefore say that the very venial sins that insinuate\nthemselves into those who have a care for earthly things, are\ndesignated by wood, hay, and stubble. For just as these are stored in\na house, without belonging to the substance of the house, and can be\nburnt, while the house is saved, so also venial sins are multiplied\nin a man, while the spiritual edifice remains, and for them, man\nsuffers fire, either of temporal trials in this life, or of purgatory\nafter this life, and yet he is saved for ever.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Venial sins are not said to be built upon the spiritual\nfoundation, as though they were laid directly upon it, but because\nthey are laid beside it; in the same sense as it is written (Ps.\n136:1): \"Upon the waters of Babylon,\" i.e. \"beside the waters\":\nbecause venial sins do not destroy the edifice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is not said that everyone who builds wood, hay and\nstubble, shall be saved as by fire, but only those who build \"upon\"\nthe \"foundation.\" And this foundation is not dead faith, as some have\nesteemed, but faith quickened by charity, according to Eph. 3:17:\n\"Rooted and founded in charity.\" Accordingly, he that dies in mortal\nsin with venial sins, has indeed wood, hay, and stubble, but not\nbuilt upon the spiritual edifice; and consequently he will not be\nsaved so as by fire.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although those who are withdrawn from the care of\ntemporal things, sin venially sometimes, yet they commit but slight\nvenial sins, and in most cases they are cleansed by the fervor of\ncharity: wherefore they do not build up venial sins, because these do\nnot remain long in them. But the venial sins of those who are busy\nabout earthly things remain longer, because they are unable to have\nsuch frequent recourse to the fervor of charity in order to remove\nthem.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (De Coelo i, text. 2), \"all\nthings are comprised under three, the beginning, the middle, the\nend.\" Accordingly all degrees of venial sins are reduced to three,\nviz. to \"wood,\" which remains longer in the fire; \"stubble,\" which is\nburnt up at once; and \"hay,\" which is between these two: because\nvenial sins are removed by fire, quickly or slowly, according as man\nis more or less attached to them.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Man Could Commit a Venial Sin in the State of Innocence?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man could commit a venial sin in the\nstate of innocence. Because on 1 Tim. 2:14, \"Adam was not seduced,\" a\ngloss says: \"Having had no experience of God's severity, it was\npossible for him to be so mistaken as to think that what he had done\nwas a venial sin.\" But he would not have thought this unless he could\nhave committed a venial sin. Therefore he could commit a venial sin\nwithout sinning mortally.\n\nObj. 2: Further Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xi, 5): \"We must not\nsuppose that the tempter would have overcome man, unless first of all\nthere had arisen in man's soul a movement of vainglory which should\nhave been checked.\" Now the vainglory which preceded man's defeat,\nwhich was accomplished through his falling into mortal sin, could be\nnothing more than a venial sin. In like manner, Augustine says (Gen.\nad lit. xi, 5) that \"man was allured by a certain desire of making\nthe experiment, when he saw that the woman did not die when she had\ntaken the forbidden fruit.\" Again there seems to have been a certain\nmovement of unbelief in Eve, since she doubted what the Lord had\nsaid, as appears from her saying (Gen. 3:3): \"Lest perhaps we die.\"\nNow these apparently were venial sins. Therefore man could commit a\nvenial sin before he committed a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, mortal sin is more opposed to the integrity of the\noriginal state, than venial sin is. Now man could sin mortally\nnotwithstanding the integrity of the original state. Therefore he\ncould also sin venially.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Every sin deserves some punishment. But nothing\npenal was possible in the state of innocence, as Augustine declares\n(De Civ. Dei xiv, 10). Therefore he could not commit a sin that would\nnot deprive him of that state of integrity. But venial sin does not\nchange man's state. Therefore he could not sin venially.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is generally admitted that man could not commit a\nvenial sin in the state of innocence. This, however, is not to be\nunderstood as though on account of the perfection of his state, the\nsin which is venial for us would have been mortal for him, if he had\ncommitted it. Because the dignity of a person is circumstance that\naggravates a sin, but it does not transfer it to another species,\nunless there be an additional deformity by reason of disobedience, or\nvow or the like, which does not apply to the question in point.\nConsequently what is venial in itself could not be changed into\nmortal by reason of the excellence of the original state. We must\ntherefore understand this to mean that he could not sin venially,\nbecause it was impossible for him to commit a sin which was venial in\nitself, before losing the integrity of the original state by sinning\nmortally.\n\nThe reason for this is because venial sin occurs in us, either\nthrough the imperfection of the act, as in the case of sudden\nmovements, in a genus of mortal sin or through some inordinateness in\nrespect of things referred to the end, the due order of the end being\nsafeguarded. Now each of these happens on account of some defect of\norder, by reason of the lower powers not being checked by the higher.\nBecause the sudden rising of a movement of the sensuality in us is\ndue to the sensuality not being perfectly subject to reason: and the\nsudden rising of a movement of reason itself is due, in us, to the\nfact that the execution of the act of reason is not subject to the\nact of deliberation which proceeds from a higher good, as stated\nabove (Q. 74, A. 10); and that the human mind be out of order as\nregards things directed to the end, the due order of the end being\nsafeguarded, is due to the fact that the things referred to the end\nare not infallibly directed under the end, which holds the highest\nplace, being the beginning, as it were, in matters concerning the\nappetite, as stated above (Q. 10, AA. 1, 2, ad 3; Q. 72, A. 5). Now,\nin the state of innocence, as stated in the First Part (Q. 95, A. 1),\nthere was an unerring stability of order, so that the lower powers\nwere always subjected to the higher, so long as man remained subject\nto God, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 13). Hence there can be\nno inordinateness in man, unless first of all the highest part of man\nwere not subject to God, which constitutes a mortal sin. From this it\nis evident that, in the state of innocence, man could not commit a\nvenial sin, before committing a mortal sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: In the passage quoted, venial is not taken in the same\nsense as we take it now; but by venial sin we mean that which is\neasily forgiven.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This vainglory which preceded man's downfall, was his\nfirst mortal sin, for it is stated to have preceded his downfall into\nthe outward act of sin. This vainglory was followed, in the man, by\nthe desire to make and experiment, and in the woman, by doubt, for\nshe gave way to vainglory, merely through hearing the serpent mention\nthe precept, as though she refused to be held in check by the precept.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Mortal sin is opposed to the integrity of the\noriginal state in the fact of its destroying that state: this a venial\nsin cannot do. And because the integrity of the primitive state is\nincompatible with any inordinateness whatever, the result is that the\nfirst man could not sin venially, before committing a mortal sin.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Good or a Wicked Angel Can Sin Venially?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that a good or wicked angel can sin venially.\nBecause man agrees with the angels in the higher part of his soul\nwhich is called the mind, according to Gregory, who says (Hom. xxix\nin Evang.) that \"man understands in common with the angels.\" But man\ncan commit a venial sin in the higher part of his soul. Therefore an\nangel can commit a venial sin also.\n\nObj. 2: Further, He that can do more can do less. But an angel could\nlove a created good more than God, and he did, by sinning mortally.\nTherefore he could also love a creature less than God inordinately,\nby sinning venially.\n\nObj. 3: Further, wicked angels seem to do things which are venial\nsins generically, by provoking men to laughter, and other like\nfrivolities. Now the circumstance of the person does not make a\nmortal sin to be venial as stated above (A. 3), unless there is a\nspecial prohibition, which is not the case in point. Therefore an\nangel can sin venially.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The perfection of an angel is greater than that of\nman in the primitive state. But man could not sin venially in the\nprimitive state, and much less, therefore, can an angel.\n\n_I answer that,_ An angel's intellect, as stated above in the First\nPart (Q. 58, A. 3; Q. 79, A. 8), is not discursive, i.e. it does not\nproceed from principles to conclusions, so as to understand both\nseparately, as we do. Consequently, whenever the angelic intellect\nconsiders a conclusion, it must, of necessity, consider it in its\nprinciples. Now in matters of appetite, as we have often stated (Q.\n8, A. 2; Q. 10, A. 1; Q. 72, A. 5), ends are like principles, while\nthe means are like conclusions. Wherefore, an angel's mind is not\ndirected to the means, except as they stand under the order to the\nend. Consequently, from their very nature, they can have no\ninordinateness in respect of the means, unless at the same time they\nhave an inordinateness in respect of the end, and this is a mortal\nsin. Now good angels are not moved to the means, except in\nsubordination to the due end which is God: wherefore all their acts\nare acts of charity, so that no venial sin can be in them. On the\nother hand, wicked angels are moved to nothing except in\nsubordination to the end which is their sin of pride. Therefore they\nsin mortally in everything that they do of their own will. This does\nnot apply to the appetite for the natural good, which appetite we\nhave stated to be in them (I, Q. 63, A. 4; Q. 64, A. 2, ad 5).\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man does indeed agree with the angels in the mind or\nintellect, but he differs in his mode of understanding, as stated\nabove.\n\nReply Obj. 2: An angel could not love a creature less than God,\nwithout, at the same time, either referring it to God, as the last\nend, or to some inordinate end, for the reason given above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The demons incite man to all such things which seem\nvenial, that he may become used to them, so as to lead him on to\nmortal sin. Consequently in all such things they sin mortally, on\naccount of the end they have in view.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the First Movements of the Sensuality in Unbelievers Are\nMortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the first movements of the sensuality\nin unbelievers are mortal sins. For the Apostle says (Rom. 8:1) that\n\"there is . . . no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus, who\nwalk not according to the flesh\": and he is speaking there of the\nconcupiscence of the sensuality, as appears from the context (Rom.\n7). Therefore the reason why concupiscence is not a matter of\ncondemnation to those who walk not according to the flesh, i.e. by\nconsenting to concupiscence, is because they are in Christ Jesus. But\nunbelievers are not in Christ Jesus. Therefore in unbelievers this is\na matter of condemnation. Therefore the first movements of\nunbelievers are mortal sins.\n\nObj. 2: Further Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): \"Those who\nare not in Christ, when they feel the sting of the flesh, follow the\nroad of damnation, even if they walk not according to the flesh.\" But\ndamnation is not due save to mortal sin. Therefore, since man feels\nthe sting of the flesh in the first movements of the concupiscence,\nit seems that the first movements of concupiscence in unbelievers are\nmortal sins.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Anselm says (De Gratia et Lib. Arb. vii): \"Man was\nso made that he was not liable to feel concupiscence.\" Now this\nliability seems to be remitted to man by the grace of Baptism, which\nthe unbeliever has not. Therefore every act of concupiscence in an\nunbeliever, even without his consent, is a mortal sin, because he\nacts against his duty.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is stated in Acts 10:34 that \"God is not a\nrespecter of persons.\" Therefore he does not impute to one unto\ncondemnation, what He does not impute to another. But he does not\nimpute first movements to believers, unto condemnation. Neither\ntherefore does He impute them to unbelievers.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is unreasonable to say that the first movements\nof unbelievers are mortal sins, when they do not consent to them.\nThis is evident for two reasons. First, because the sensuality itself\ncould not be the subject of mortal sin, as stated above (Q. 79, A.\n4). Now the sensuality has the same nature in unbelievers as in\nbelievers. Therefore it is not possible for the mere movements of the\nsensuality in unbelievers, to be mortal sins.\n\nSecondly, from the state of the sinner. Because excellence of the\nperson never diminishes sin, but, on the contrary, increases it, as\nstated above (Q. 73, A. 10). Therefore a sin is not less grievous in\na believer than in an unbeliever, but much more so. For the sins of\nan unbeliever are more deserving of forgiveness, on account of their\nignorance, according to 1 Tim. 1:13: \"I obtained the mercy of God,\nbecause I did it ignorantly in my unbelief\": whereas the sins of\nbelievers are more grievous on account of the sacraments of grace,\naccording to Heb. 10:29: \"How much more, do you think, he deserveth\nworse punishments . . . who hath esteemed the blood of the testament\nunclean, by which he was sanctified?\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking of the condemnation due to\noriginal sin, which condemnation is remitted by the grace of Jesus\nChrist, although the _fomes_ of concupiscence remain. Wherefore the\nfact that believers are subject to concupiscence is not in them a\nsign of the condemnation due to original sin, as it is in unbelievers.\n\nIn this way also is to be understood the saying of Anselm, wherefore\nthe Reply to the Second Objection is evident.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This freedom from liability to concupiscence was a\nresult of original justice. Wherefore that which is opposed to such\nliability pertains, not to actual but to original sin.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 89, Art. 6]\n\nWhether Venial Sin Can Be in Anyone with Original Sin Alone?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that venial sin can be in a man with\noriginal sin alone. For disposition precedes habit. Now venial sin is\na disposition to mortal sin, as stated above (Q. 88, A. 3). Therefore\nin an unbeliever, in whom original sin is not remitted, venial sin\nexists before mortal sin: and so sometimes unbelievers have venial\ntogether with original sin, and without mortal sins.\n\nObj. 2: Further, venial sin has less in common, and less connection\nwith mortal sin, than one mortal sin has with another. But an\nunbeliever in the state of original sin, can commit one mortal sin\nwithout committing another. Therefore he can also commit a venial sin\nwithout committing a mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is possible to fix the time at which a child is\nfirst able to commit an actual sin: and when the child comes to that\ntime, it can stay a short time at least, without committing a mortal\nsin, because this happens in the worst criminals. Now it is possible\nfor the child to sin venially during that space of time, however\nshort it may be. Therefore venial sin can be in anyone with original\nsin alone and without mortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Man is punished for original sin in the children's\nlimbo, where there is no pain of sense as we shall state further on\n(II-II, Q. 69, A. 6): whereas men are punished in hell for no other\nthan mortal sin. Therefore there will be no place where a man can be\npunished for venial sin with no other than original sin.\n\n_I answer that,_ It is impossible for venial sin to be in anyone with\noriginal sin alone, and without mortal sin. The reason for this is\nbecause before a man comes to the age of discretion, the lack of\nyears hinders the use of reason and excuses him from mortal sin,\nwherefore, much more does it excuse him from venial sin, if he does\nanything which is such generically. But when he begins to have the\nuse of reason, he is not entirely excused from the guilt of venial or\nmortal sin. Now the first thing that occurs to a man to think about\nthen, is to deliberate about himself. And if he then direct himself\nto the due end, he will, by means of grace, receive the remission of\noriginal sin: whereas if he does not then direct himself to the due\nend, as far as he is capable of discretion at that particular age, he\nwill sin mortally, through not doing that which is in his power to\ndo. Accordingly thenceforward there cannot be venial sin in him\nwithout mortal, until afterwards all sin shall have been remitted to\nhim through grace.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Venial sin always precedes mortal sin not as a\nnecessary, but as a contingent disposition, just as work sometimes\ndisposes to fever, but not as heat disposes to the form of fire.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Venial sin is prevented from being with original sin\nalone, not on account of its want of connection or likeness, but on\naccount of the lack of use of reason, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The child that is beginning to have the use of reason\ncan refrain from other mortal sins for a time, but it is not free\nfrom the aforesaid sin of omission, unless it turns to God as soon as\npossible. For the first thing that occurs to a man who has\ndiscretion, is to think of himself, and to direct other things to\nhimself as to their end, since the end is the first thing in the\nintention. Therefore this is the time when man is bound by God's\naffirmative precept, which the Lord expressed by saying (Zech. 1:3):\n\"Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you.\"\n________________________\n\nTREATISE ON LAW (QQ. 90-108)\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 90\n\nOF THE ESSENCE OF LAW\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe have now to consider the extrinsic principles of acts. Now the\nextrinsic principle inclining to evil is the devil, of whose\ntemptations we have spoken in the First Part (Q. 114). But the\nextrinsic principle moving to good is God, Who both instructs us by\nmeans of His Law, and assists us by His Grace: wherefore in the first\nplace we must speak of law; in the second place, of grace.\n\nConcerning law, we must consider: (1) Law itself in general; (2) its\nparts. Concerning law in general three points offer themselves for\nour consideration: (1) Its essence; (2) The different kinds of law;\n(3) The effects of law.\n\nUnder the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether law is something pertaining to reason?\n\n(2) Concerning the end of law;\n\n(3) Its cause;\n\n(4) The promulgation of law.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 90, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Law Is Something Pertaining to Reason?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that law is not something pertaining to\nreason. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): \"I see another law in my\nmembers,\" etc. But nothing pertaining to reason is in the members;\nsince the reason does not make use of a bodily organ. Therefore law\nis not something pertaining to reason.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in the reason there is nothing else but power,\nhabit, and act. But law is not the power itself of reason. In like\nmanner, neither is it a habit of reason: because the habits of reason\nare the intellectual virtues of which we have spoken above (Q. 57).\nNor again is it an act of reason: because then law would cease, when\nthe act of reason ceases, for instance, while we are asleep.\nTherefore law is nothing pertaining to reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the law moves those who are subject to it to act\naright. But it belongs properly to the will to move to act, as is\nevident from what has been said above (Q. 9, A. 1). Therefore law\npertains, not to the reason, but to the will; according to the words\nof the Jurist (Lib. i, ff., De Const. Prin. leg. i): \"Whatsoever\npleaseth the sovereign, has force of law.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ It belongs to the law to command and to forbid.\nBut it belongs to reason to command, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 1).\nTherefore law is something pertaining to reason.\n\n_I answer that,_ Law is a rule and measure of acts, whereby man is\ninduced to act or is restrained from acting: for _lex_ (law) is\nderived from _ligare_ (to bind), because it binds one to act. Now the\nrule and measure of human acts is the reason, which is the first\nprinciple of human acts, as is evident from what has been stated\nabove (Q. 1, A. 1, ad 3); since it belongs to the reason to direct to\nthe end, which is the first principle in all matters of action,\naccording to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is the\nprinciple in any genus, is the rule and measure of that genus: for\ninstance, unity in the genus of numbers, and the first movement in\nthe genus of movements. Consequently it follows that law is something\npertaining to reason.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Since law is a kind of rule and measure, it may be in\nsomething in two ways. First, as in that which measures and rules:\nand since this is proper to reason, it follows that, in this way, law\nis in the reason alone. Secondly, as in that which is measured and\nruled. In this way, law is in all those things that are inclined to\nsomething by reason of some law: so that any inclination arising from\na law, may be called a law, not essentially but by participation as\nit were. And thus the inclination of the members to concupiscence is\ncalled \"the law of the members.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as, in external action, we may consider the work\nand the work done, for instance the work of building and the house\nbuilt; so in the acts of reason, we may consider the act itself of\nreason, i.e. to understand and to reason, and something produced by\nthis act. With regard to the speculative reason, this is first of all\nthe definition; secondly, the proposition; thirdly, the syllogism or\nargument. And since also the practical reason makes use of a\nsyllogism in respect of the work to be done, as stated above (Q. 13,\nA. 3; Q. 76, A. 1) and since as the Philosopher teaches (Ethic. vii,\n3); hence we find in the practical reason something that holds the\nsame position in regard to operations, as, in the speculative\nintellect, the proposition holds in regard to conclusions. Such like\nuniversal propositions of the practical intellect that are directed\nto actions have the nature of law. And these propositions are\nsometimes under our actual consideration, while sometimes they are\nretained in the reason by means of a habit.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Reason has its power of moving from the will, as stated\nabove (Q. 17, A. 1): for it is due to the fact that one wills the\nend, that the reason issues its commands as regards things ordained\nto the end. But in order that the volition of what is commanded may\nhave the nature of law, it needs to be in accord with some rule of\nreason. And in this sense is to be understood the saying that the\nwill of the sovereign has the force of law; otherwise the sovereign's\nwill would savor of lawlessness rather than of law.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 90, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Law Is Always Something Directed to the Common Good?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the law is not always directed to the\ncommon good as to its end. For it belongs to law to command and to\nforbid. But commands are directed to certain individual goods.\nTherefore the end of the law is not always the common good.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the law directs man in his actions. But human\nactions are concerned with particular matters. Therefore the law is\ndirected to some particular good.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. v, 3): \"If the law is based on\nreason, whatever is based on reason will be a law.\" But reason is the\nfoundation not only of what is ordained to the common good, but also\nof that which is directed to private good. Therefore the law is not\nonly directed to the good of all, but also to the private good of an\nindividual.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 21) that \"laws are enacted\nfor no private profit, but for the common benefit of the citizens.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the law belongs to that\nwhich is a principle of human acts, because it is their rule and\nmeasure. Now as reason is a principle of human acts, so in reason\nitself there is something which is the principle in respect of all\nthe rest: wherefore to this principle chiefly and mainly law must\nneeds be referred. Now the first principle in practical matters,\nwhich are the object of the practical reason, is the last end: and\nthe last end of human life is bliss or happiness, as stated above (Q.\n2, A. 7; Q. 3, A. 1). Consequently the law must needs regard\nprincipally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every part\nis ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since one man\nis a part of the perfect community, the law must needs regard\nproperly the relationship to universal happiness. Wherefore the\nPhilosopher, in the above definition of legal matters mentions both\nhappiness and the body politic: for he says (Ethic. v, 1) that we\ncall those legal matters \"just, which are adapted to produce and\npreserve happiness and its parts for the body politic\": since the\nstate is a perfect community, as he says in _Polit._ i, 1.\n\nNow in every genus, that which belongs to it chiefly is the principle\nof the others, and the others belong to that genus in subordination\nto that thing: thus fire, which is chief among hot things, is the\ncause of heat in mixed bodies, and these are said to be hot in so far\nas they have a share of fire. Consequently, since the law is chiefly\nordained to the common good, any other precept in regard to some\nindividual work, must needs be devoid of the nature of a law, save in\nso far as it regards the common good. Therefore every law is ordained\nto the common good.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A command denotes an application of a law to matters\nregulated by the law. Now the order to the common good, at which the\nlaw aims, is applicable to particular ends. And in this way commands\nare given even concerning particular matters.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters:\nbut those particular matters are referable to the common good, not as\nto a common genus or species, but as to a common final cause,\naccording as the common good is said to be the common end.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Just as nothing stands firm with regard to the\nspeculative reason except that which is traced back to the first\nindemonstrable principles, so nothing stands firm with regard to the\npractical reason, unless it be directed to the last end which is the\ncommon good: and whatever stands to reason in this sense, has the\nnature of a law.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 90, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Reason of Any Man Is Competent to Make Laws?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the reason of any man is competent to\nmake laws. For the Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that \"when the Gentiles,\nwho have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law .\n. . they are a law to themselves.\" Now he says this of all in\ngeneral. Therefore anyone can make a law for himself.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1), \"the\nintention of the lawgiver is to lead men to virtue.\" But every man\ncan lead another to virtue. Therefore the reason of any man is\ncompetent to make laws.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as the sovereign of a state governs the state,\nso every father of a family governs his household. But the sovereign\nof a state can make laws for the state. Therefore every father of a\nfamily can make laws for his household.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 10): \"A law is an ordinance\nof the people, whereby something is sanctioned by the Elders together\nwith the Commonalty.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A law, properly speaking, regards first and foremost\nthe order to the common good. Now to order anything to the common\ngood, belongs either to the whole people, or to someone who is the\nviceregent of the whole people. And therefore the making of a law\nbelongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has\ncare of the whole people: since in all other matters the directing of\nanything to the end concerns him to whom the end belongs.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1, ad 1), a law is in a person not\nonly as in one that rules, but also by participation as in one that\nis ruled. In the latter way each one is a law to himself, in so far\nas he shares the direction that he receives from one who rules him.\nHence the same text goes on: \"Who show the work of the law written in\ntheir hearts.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: A private person cannot lead another to virtue\nefficaciously: for he can only advise, and if his advice be not\ntaken, it has no coercive power, such as the law should have, in\norder to prove an efficacious inducement to virtue, as the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. x, 9). But this coercive power is vested in\nthe whole people or in some public personage, to whom it belongs to\ninflict penalties, as we shall state further on (Q. 92, A. 2, ad 3;\nII-II, Q. 64, A. 3). Wherefore the framing of laws belongs to him\nalone.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As one man is a part of the household, so a household\nis a part of the state: and the state is a perfect community,\naccording to _Polit._ i, 1. And therefore, as the good of one man is\nnot the last end, but is ordained to the common good; so too the good\nof one household is ordained to the good of a single state, which is\na perfect community. Consequently he that governs a family, can\nindeed make certain commands or ordinances, but not such as to have\nproperly the force of law.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 90, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Promulgation Is Essential to a Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that promulgation is not essential to a\nlaw. For the natural law above all has the character of law. But the\nnatural law needs no promulgation. Therefore it is not essential to a\nlaw that it be promulgated.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it belongs properly to a law to bind one to do or\nnot to do something. But the obligation of fulfilling a law touches\nnot only those in whose presence it is promulgated, but also others.\nTherefore promulgation is not essential to a law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the binding force of a law extends even to the\nfuture, since \"laws are binding in matters of the future,\" as the\njurists say (Cod. 1, tit. De lege et constit. leg. vii). But\npromulgation concerns those who are present. Therefore it is not\nessential to a law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is laid down in the _Decretals,_ dist. 4, that\n\"laws are established when they are promulgated.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), a law is imposed on others\nby way of a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure is imposed by\nbeing applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by it.\nWherefore, in order that a law obtain the binding force which is\nproper to a law, it must needs be applied to the men who have to be\nruled by it. Such application is made by its being notified to them\nby promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is necessary for the law to\nobtain its force.\n\nThus from the four preceding articles, the definition of law may be\ngathered; and it is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the\ncommon good, made by him who has care of the community, and\npromulgated.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The natural law is promulgated by the very fact that\nGod instilled it into man's mind so as to be known by him naturally.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those who are not present when a law is promulgated,\nare bound to observe the law, in so far as it is notified or can be\nnotified to them by others, after it has been promulgated.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The promulgation that takes place now, extends to\nfuture time by reason of the durability of written characters, by\nwhich means it is continually promulgated. Hence Isidore says (Etym.\nv, 3; ii, 10) that \"_lex_ (law) is derived from _legere_ (to read)\nbecause it is written.\"\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 91\n\nOF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the various kinds of law: under which head there\nare six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there is an eternal law?\n\n(2) Whether there is a natural law?\n\n(3) Whether there is a human law?\n\n(4) Whether there is a Divine law?\n\n(5) Whether there is one Divine law, or several?\n\n(6) Whether there is a law of sin?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 91, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Is an Eternal Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no eternal law. Because\nevery law is imposed on someone. But there was not someone from\neternity on whom a law could be imposed: since God alone was from\neternity. Therefore no law is eternal.\n\nObj. 2: Further, promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation\ncould not be from eternity: because there was no one to whom it could\nbe promulgated from eternity. Therefore no law can be eternal.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a law implies order to an end. But nothing ordained\nto an end is eternal: for the last end alone is eternal. Therefore no\nlaw is eternal.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): \"That Law\nwhich is the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than\nunchangeable and eternal.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, A. 1, ad 2; AA. 3, 4), a law\nis nothing else but a dictate of practical reason emanating from the\nruler who governs a perfect community. Now it is evident, granted\nthat the world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the\nFirst Part (Q. 22, AA. 1, 2), that the whole community of the\nuniverse is governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the\ngovernment of things in God the Ruler of the universe, has the nature\nof a law. And since the Divine Reason's conception of things is not\nsubject to time but is eternal, according to Prov. 8:23, therefore it\nis that this kind of law must be called eternal.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Those things that are not in themselves, exist with\nGod, inasmuch as they are foreknown and preordained by Him, according\nto Rom. 4:17: \"Who calls those things that are not, as those that\nare.\" Accordingly the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the\ncharacter of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to\nthe government of things foreknown by Him.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing;\nand in both ways the eternal law is promulgated: because both the\nDivine Word and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the\npromulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that\nhears or reads.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The law implies order to the end actively, in so far as\nit directs certain things to the end; but not passively--that is to\nsay, the law itself is not ordained to the end--except accidentally,\nin a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which end his law\nmust needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine government is God\nHimself, and His law is not distinct from Himself. Wherefore the\neternal law is not ordained to another end.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 91, Art. 2]\n\nWhether There Is in Us a Natural Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no natural law in us.\nBecause man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law: for\nAugustine says (De Lib. Arb. i) that \"the eternal law is that by\nwhich it is right that all things should be most orderly.\" But nature\ndoes not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in\nnecessaries. Therefore no law is natural to man.\n\nObj. 2: Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end,\nas stated above (Q. 90, A. 2). But the directing of human acts to\ntheir end is not a function of nature, as is the case in irrational\ncreatures, which act for an end solely by their natural appetite;\nwhereas man acts for an end by his reason and will. Therefore no law\nis natural to man.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the\nlaw. But man is freer than all the animals, on account of his\nfree-will, with which he is endowed above all other animals. Since\ntherefore other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is\nman subject to a natural law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ A gloss on Rom. 2:14: \"When the Gentiles, who have\nnot the law, do by nature those things that are of the law,\" comments\nas follows: \"Although they have no written law, yet they have the\nnatural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is\ngood and what is evil.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, A. 1, ad 1), law, being a\nrule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in\nhim that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is\nruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as\nit partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things\nsubject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal\nlaw, as was stated above (A. 1); it is evident that all things\npartake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its\nbeing imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to\ntheir proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational\ncreature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way,\nin so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident\nboth for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the\nEternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper\nact and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the\nrational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after\nsaying (Ps. 4:6): \"Offer up the sacrifice of justice,\" as though\nsomeone asked what the works of justice are, adds: \"Many say, Who\nshoweth us good things?\" in answer to which question he says: \"The\nlight of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us\": thus implying\nthat the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and\nwhat is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing\nelse than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore\nevident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational\ncreature's participation of the eternal law.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument would hold, if the natural law were\nsomething different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a\nparticipation thereof, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Every act of reason and will in us is based on that\nwhich is according to nature, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 1): for\nevery act of reasoning is based on principles that are known\nnaturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the means is\nderived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end.\nAccordingly the first direction of our acts to their end must needs\nbe in virtue of the natural law.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the\nEternal Reason, just as the rational creature does. But because the\nrational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational\nmanner, therefore the participation of the eternal law in the\nrational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something\npertaining to reason, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 1). Irrational\ncreatures, however, do not partake thereof in a rational manner,\nwherefore there is no participation of the eternal law in them,\nexcept by way of similitude.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 91, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Is a Human Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is not a human law. For the\nnatural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above\n(A. 2). Now through the eternal law \"all things are most orderly,\" as\nAugustine states (De Lib. Arb. i, 6). Therefore the natural law\nsuffices for the ordering of all human affairs. Consequently there is\nno need for a human law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated\nabove (Q. 90, A. 1). But human reason is not a measure of things, but\nvice versa, as stated in _Metaph._ x, text. 5. Therefore no law can\nemanate from human reason.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in\n_Metaph._ x, text. 3. But the dictates of human reason in matters of\nconduct are uncertain, according to Wis. 9:14: \"The thoughts of\nmortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain.\" Therefore no law\ncan emanate from human reason.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) distinguishes two\nkinds of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls\nhuman.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, A. 1, ad 2), a law is a\ndictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the\nsame procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative\nreason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated\nabove (ibid.). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the\nspeculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles,\nwe draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of\nwhich is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of\nreason, so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from\ngeneral and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to\nproceed to the more particular determination of certain matters.\nThese particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called\nhuman laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be\nobserved, as stated above (Q. 90, AA. 2, 3, 4). Wherefore Tully says\nin his _Rhetoric_ (De Invent. Rhet. ii) that \"justice has its source\nin nature; thence certain things came into custom by reason of their\nutility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were\napproved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the\nlaw.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The human reason cannot have a full participation of\nthe dictate of the Divine Reason, but according to its own mode, and\nimperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative reason,\nby a natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is in us the\nknowledge of certain general principles, but not proper knowledge of\neach single truth, such as that contained in the Divine Wisdom; so\ntoo, on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural\nparticipation of the eternal law, according to certain general\nprinciples, but not as regards the particular determinations of\nindividual cases, which are, however, contained in the eternal law.\nHence the need for human reason to proceed further to sanction them\nby law.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but\nthe principles impressed on it by nature, are general rules and\nmeasures of all things relating to human conduct, whereof the natural\nreason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure of\nthings that are from nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The practical reason is concerned with practical\nmatters, which are singular and contingent: but not with necessary\nthings, with which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore\nhuman laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the\ndemonstrated conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for every\nmeasure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it\nis possible in its own particular genus.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 91, Art. 4]\n\nWhether There Was Any Need for a Divine Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there was no need for a Divine law.\nBecause, as stated above (A. 2), the natural law is a participation\nin us of the eternal law. But the eternal law is a Divine law, as\nstated above (A. 1). Therefore there was no need for a Divine law in\naddition to the natural law, and human laws derived therefrom.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:14) that \"God left man in\nthe hand of his own counsel.\" Now counsel is an act of reason, as\nstated above (Q. 14, A. 1). Therefore man was left to the direction\nof his reason. But a dictate of human reason is a human law as stated\nabove (A. 3). Therefore there is no need for man to be governed also\nby a Divine law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, human nature is more self-sufficing than irrational\ncreatures. But irrational creatures have no Divine law besides the\nnatural inclination impressed on them. Much less, therefore, should\nthe rational creature have a Divine law in addition to the natural\nlaw.\n\n_On the contrary,_ David prayed God to set His law before him, saying\n(Ps. 118:33): \"Set before me for a law the way of Thy justifications,\nO Lord.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Besides the natural and the human law it was\nnecessary for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law.\nAnd this for four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is\ndirected how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end. And\nindeed if man were ordained to no other end than that which is\nproportionate to his natural faculty, there would be no need for man\nto have any further direction of the part of his reason, besides the\nnatural law and human law which is derived from it. But since man is\nordained to an end of eternal happiness which is improportionate to\nman's natural faculty, as stated above (Q. 5, A. 5), therefore it was\nnecessary that, besides the natural and the human law, man should be\ndirected to his end by a law given by God.\n\nSecondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment,\nespecially on contingent and particular matters, different people\nform different judgments on human acts; whence also different and\ncontrary laws result. In order, therefore, that man may know without\nany doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was\nnecessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by\nGod, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.\n\nThirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is\ncompetent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of interior\nmovements, that are hidden, but only of exterior acts which appear:\nand yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to\nconduct himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law\ncould not sufficiently curb and direct interior acts; and it was\nnecessary for this purpose that a Divine law should supervene.\n\nFourthly, because, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5, 6), human\nlaw cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds: since while aiming at\ndoing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things,\nand would hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary\nfor human intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain\nunforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to\nsupervene, whereby all sins are forbidden.\n\nAnd these four causes are touched upon in Ps. 118:8, where it is\nsaid: \"The law of the Lord is unspotted,\" i.e. allowing no foulness\nof sin; \"converting souls,\" because it directs not only exterior, but\nalso interior acts; \"the testimony of the Lord is faithful,\" because\nof the certainty of what is true and right; \"giving wisdom to little\nones,\" by directing man to an end supernatural and Divine.\n\nReply Obj. 1: By the natural law the eternal law is participated\nproportionately to the capacity of human nature. But to his\nsupernatural end man needs to be directed in a yet higher way. Hence\nthe additional law given by God, whereby man shares more perfectly in\nthe eternal law.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Counsel is a kind of inquiry: hence it must proceed\nfrom some principles. Nor is it enough for it to proceed from\nprinciples imparted by nature, which are the precepts of the natural\nlaw, for the reasons given above: but there is need for certain\nadditional principles, namely, the precepts of the Divine law.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Irrational creatures are not ordained to an end higher\nthan that which is proportionate to their natural powers:\nconsequently the comparison fails.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 91, Art. 5]\n\nWhether There Is but One Divine Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is but one Divine law. Because,\nwhere there is one king in one kingdom there is but one law. Now the\nwhole of mankind is compared to God as to one king, according to Ps.\n46:8: \"God is the King of all the earth.\" Therefore there is but one\nDivine law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every law is directed to the end which the\nlawgiver intends for those for whom he makes the law. But God intends\none and the same thing for all men; since according to 1 Tim. 2:4: \"He\nwill have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the\ntruth.\" Therefore there is but one Divine law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Divine law seems to be more akin to the\neternal law, which is one, than the natural law, according as the\nrevelation of grace is of a higher order than natural knowledge.\nTherefore much more is the Divine law but one.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12): \"The priesthood being\ntranslated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the\nlaw.\" But the priesthood is twofold, as stated in the same passage,\nviz. the levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore\nthe Divine law is twofold, namely the Old Law and the New Law.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated in the First Part (Q. 30, A. 3),\ndistinction is the cause of number. Now things may be distinguished\nin two ways. First, as those things that are altogether specifically\ndifferent, e.g. a horse and an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect\nin the same species, e.g. a boy and a man: and in this way the Divine\nlaw is divided into Old and New. Hence the Apostle (Gal. 3:24, 25)\ncompares the state of man under the Old Law to that of a child \"under\na pedagogue\"; but the state under the New Law, to that of a full\ngrown man, who is \"no longer under a pedagogue.\"\n\nNow the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken\nin connection with the three conditions pertaining to law, as stated\nabove. For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to\nthe common good as to its end, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2). This\ngood may be twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to\nthis, man was directly ordained by the Old Law: wherefore, at the\nvery outset of the law, the people were invited to the earthly\nkingdom of the Chananaeans (Ex. 3:8, 17). Again it may be an\nintelligible and heavenly good: and to this, man is ordained by the\nNew Law. Wherefore, at the very beginning of His preaching, Christ\ninvited men to the kingdom of heaven, saying (Matt. 4:17): \"Do\npenance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.\" Hence Augustine says\n(Contra Faust. iv) that \"promises of temporal goods are contained in\nthe Old Testament, for which reason it is called old; but the promise\nof eternal life belongs to the New Testament.\"\n\nSecondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the\norder of righteousness (A. 4): wherein also the New Law surpasses the\nOld Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to Matt. 5:20:\n\"Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and\nPharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.\" Hence the\nsaying that \"the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls\nthe mind\" ( Sentent. iii, D, xl).\n\nThirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its\ncommandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of punishment: but the\nNew Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of\nChrist, bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed in the Old. Hence\nAugustine says (Contra Adimant. Manich. discip. xvii) that \"there is\nlittle difference [*The 'little difference' refers to the Latin words\n'timor' and 'amor'--'fear' and 'love.'] between the Law and the\nGospel--fear and love.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the father of a family issues different commands to\nthe children and to the adults, so also the one King, God, in His one\nkingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet imperfect, and\nanother more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, they had been\nled to a greater capacity for Divine things.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise\nthan through Christ, according to Acts 4:12: \"There is no other name\n. . . given to men, whereby we must be saved.\" Consequently the law\nthat brings all to salvation could not be given until after the\ncoming of Christ. But before His coming it was necessary to give to\nthe people, of whom Christ was to be born, a law containing certain\nrudiments of righteousness unto salvation, in order to prepare them\nto receive Him.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The natural law directs man by way of certain general\nprecepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect: wherefore it\nis one and the same for all. But the Divine law directs man also in\ncertain particular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect do not\nstand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for the Divine law to\nbe twofold, as already explained.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 91, Art. 6]\n\nWhether There Is a Law in the Fomes of Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there is no law of the _fomes_ of\nsin. For Isidore says (Etym. v) that the \"law is based on reason.\"\nBut the _fomes_ of sin is not based on reason, but deviates from it.\nTherefore the _fomes_ has not the nature of a law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every law is binding, so that those who do not obey\nit are called transgressors. But man is not called a transgressor,\nfrom not following the instigations of the _fomes;_ but rather from\nhis following them. Therefore the _fomes_ has not the nature of a law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the law is ordained to the common good, as stated\nabove (Q. 90, A. 2). But the _fomes_ inclines us, not to the common,\nbut to our own private good. Therefore the _fomes_ has not the nature\nof sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 7:23): \"I see another law\nin my members, fighting against the law of my mind.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2; Q. 90, A. 1, ad 1), the law,\nas to its essence, resides in him that rules and measures; but, by\nway of participation, in that which is ruled and measured; so that\nevery inclination or ordination which may be found in things subject\nto the law, is called a law by participation, as stated above (A. 2;\nQ. 90, A. 1, ad 1). Now those who are subject to a law may receive a\ntwofold inclination from the lawgiver. First, in so far as he\ndirectly inclines his subjects to something; sometimes indeed\ndifferent subjects to different acts; in this way we may say that\nthere is a military law and a mercantile law. Secondly, indirectly;\nthus by the very fact that a lawgiver deprives a subject of some\ndignity, the latter passes into another order, so as to be under\nanother law, as it were: thus if a soldier be turned out of the army,\nhe becomes a subject of rural or of mercantile legislation.\n\nAccordingly under the Divine Lawgiver various creatures have various\nnatural inclinations, so that what is, as it were, a law for one, is\nagainst the law for another: thus I might say that fierceness is, in\na way, the law of a dog, but against the law of a sheep or another\nmeek animal. And so the law of man, which, by the Divine ordinance,\nis allotted to him, according to his proper natural condition, is\nthat he should act in accordance with reason: and this law was so\neffective in the primitive state, that nothing either beside or\nagainst reason could take man unawares. But when man turned his back\non God, he fell under the influence of his sensual impulses: in fact\nthis happens to each one individually, the more he deviates from the\npath of reason, so that, after a fashion, he is likened to the beasts\nthat are led by the impulse of sensuality, according to Ps. 48:21:\n\"Man, when he was in honor, did not understand: he hath been compared\nto senseless beasts, and made like to them.\"\n\nSo, then, this very inclination of sensuality which is called the\n_fomes,_ in other animals has simply the nature of a law (yet only in\nso far as a law may be said to be in such things), by reason of a\ndirect inclination. But in man, it has not the nature of law in this\nway, rather is it a deviation from the law of reason. But since, by\nthe just sentence of God, man is destitute of original justice, and\nhis reason bereft of its vigor, this impulse of sensuality, whereby\nhe is led, in so far as it is a penalty following from the Divine law\ndepriving man of his proper dignity, has the nature of a law.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument considers the _fomes_ in itself, as an\nincentive to evil. It is not thus that it has the nature of a law, as\nstated above, but according as it results from the justice of the\nDivine law: it is as though we were to say that the law allows a\nnobleman to be condemned to hard labor for some misdeed.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument considers law in the light of a rule or\nmeasure: for it is in this sense that those who deviate from the law\nbecome transgressors. But the _fomes_ is not a law in this respect,\nbut by a kind of participation, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers the _fomes_ as to its proper\ninclination, and not as to its origin. And yet if the inclination of\nsensuality be considered as it is in other animals, thus it is\nordained to the common good, namely, to the preservation of nature in\nthe species or in the individual. And this is in man also, in so far\nas sensuality is subject to reason. But it is called _fomes_ in so\nfar as it strays from the order of reason.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 92\n\nOF THE EFFECTS OF LAW\n(In Two articles)\n\nWe must now consider the effects of law; under which head there are\ntwo points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether an effect of law is to make men good?\n\n(2) Whether the effects of law are to command, to forbid, to permit,\nand to punish, as the Jurist states?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 92, Art. 1]\n\nWhether an Effect of Law Is to Make Men Good?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that it is not an effect of law to make men\ngood. For men are good through virtue, since virtue, as stated in\n_Ethic._ ii, 6 is \"that which makes its subject good.\" But virtue is\nin man from God alone, because He it is Who \"works it in us without\nus,\" as we stated above (Q. 55, A. 4) in giving the definition of\nvirtue. Therefore the law does not make men good.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Law does not profit a man unless he obeys it. But\nthe very fact that a man obeys a law is due to his being good.\nTherefore in man goodness is presupposed to the law. Therefore the\nlaw does not make men good.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Law is ordained to the common good, as stated above\n(Q. 90, A. 2). But some behave well in things regarding the\ncommunity, who behave ill in things regarding themselves. Therefore\nit is not the business of the law to make men good.\n\nObj. 4: Further, some laws are tyrannical, as the Philosopher says\n(Polit. iii, 6). But a tyrant does not intend the good of his\nsubjects, but considers only his own profit. Therefore law does not\nmake men good.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 1) that the\n\"intention of every lawgiver is to make good citizens.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ as stated above (Q. 90, A. 1, ad 2; AA. 3, 4), a law\nis nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler by whom his\nsubjects are governed. Now the virtue of any subordinate thing\nconsists in its being well subordinated to that by which it is\nregulated: thus we see that the virtue of the irascible and\nconcupiscible faculties consists in their being obedient to reason;\nand accordingly \"the virtue of every subject consists in his being\nwell subjected to his ruler,\" as the Philosopher says (Polit. i). But\nevery law aims at being obeyed by those who are subject to it.\nConsequently it is evident that the proper effect of law is to lead\nits subjects to their proper virtue: and since virtue is \"that which\nmakes its subject good,\" it follows that the proper effect of law is\nto make those to whom it is given, good, either simply or in some\nparticular respect. For if the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on\ntrue good, which is the common good regulated according to Divine\njustice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good\nsimply. If, however, the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that\nwhich is not simply good, but useful or pleasurable to himself, or in\nopposition to Divine justice; then the law does not make men good\nsimply, but in respect to that particular government. In this way\ngood is found even in things that are bad of themselves: thus a man\nis called a good robber, because he works in a way that is adapted to\nhis end.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Virtue is twofold, as explained above (Q. 63, A. 2),\nviz. acquired and infused. Now the fact of being accustomed to an\naction contributes to both, but in different ways; for it causes the\nacquired virtue; while it disposes to infused virtue, and preserves\nand fosters it when it already exists. And since law is given for the\npurpose of directing human acts; as far as human acts conduce to\nvirtue, so far does law make men good. Wherefore the Philosopher says\nin the second book of the Politics (Ethic. ii) that \"lawgivers make\nmen good by habituating them to good works.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is not always through perfect goodness of virtue\nthat one obeys the law, but sometimes it is through fear of\npunishment, and sometimes from the mere dictates of reason, which is\na beginning of virtue, as stated above (Q. 63, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The goodness of any part is considered in comparison\nwith the whole; hence Augustine says (Confess. iii) that \"unseemly is\nthe part that harmonizes not with the whole.\" Since then every man is\na part of the state, it is impossible that a man be good, unless he\nbe well proportionate to the common good: nor can the whole be well\nconsistent unless its parts be proportionate to it. Consequently the\ncommon good of the state cannot flourish, unless the citizens be\nvirtuous, at least those whose business it is to govern. But it is\nenough for the good of the community, that the other citizens be so\nfar virtuous that they obey the commands of their rulers. Hence the\nPhilosopher says (Polit. ii, 2) that \"the virtue of a sovereign is\nthe same as that of a good man, but the virtue of any common citizen\nis not the same as that of a good man.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: A tyrannical law, through not being according to\nreason, is not a law, absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of\nlaw; and yet in so far as it is something in the nature of a law, it\naims at the citizens' being good. For all it has in the nature of a\nlaw consists in its being an ordinance made by a superior to his\nsubjects, and aims at being obeyed by them, which is to make them\ngood, not simply, but with respect to that particular government.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 92, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Acts of Law Are Suitably Assigned?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the acts of law are not suitably\nassigned as consisting in \"command, prohibition, permission, and\npunishment.\" For \"every law is a general precept,\" as the Jurist\nstates. But command and precept are the same. Therefore the other\nthree are superfluous.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the effect of a law is to induce its subjects to be\ngood, as stated above (A. 1). But counsel aims at a higher good than\na command does. Therefore it belongs to law to counsel rather than to\ncommand.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as punishment stirs a man to good deeds, so\ndoes reward. Therefore if to punish is reckoned an effect of law, so\nalso is to reward.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the intention of a lawgiver is to make men good, as\nstated above (A. 1). But he that obeys the law, merely through fear\nof being punished, is not good: because \"although a good deed may be\ndone through servile fear, i.e. fear of punishment, it is not done\nwell,\" as Augustine says (Contra duas Epist. Pelag. ii). Therefore\npunishment is not a proper effect of law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 19): \"Every law either\npermits something, as: 'A brave man may demand his reward'\": or\nforbids something, as: \"No man may ask a consecrated virgin in\nmarriage\": or punishes, as: \"Let him that commits a murder be put to\ndeath.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as an assertion is a dictate of reason\nasserting something, so is a law a dictate of reason, commanding\nsomething. Now it is proper to reason to lead from one thing to\nanother. Wherefore just as, in demonstrative sciences, the reason\nleads us from certain principles to assent to the conclusion, so it\ninduces us by some means to assent to the precept of the law.\n\nNow the precepts of law are concerned with human acts, in which the\nlaw directs, as stated above (Q. 90, AA. 1, 2; Q. 91, A. 4). Again\nthere are three kinds of human acts: for, as stated above (Q. 18, A.\n8), some acts are good generically, viz. acts of virtue; and in\nrespect of these the act of the law is a precept or command, for \"the\nlaw commands all acts of virtue\" (Ethic. v, 1). Some acts are evil\ngenerically, viz. acts of vice, and in respect of these the law\nforbids. Some acts are generically indifferent, and in respect of\nthese the law permits; and all acts that are either not distinctly\ngood or not distinctly bad may be called indifferent. And it is the\nfear of punishment that law makes use of in order to ensure\nobedience: in which respect punishment is an effect of law.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as to cease from evil is a kind of good, so a\nprohibition is a kind of precept: and accordingly, taking precept in\na wide sense, every law is a kind of precept.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To advise is not a proper act of law, but may be within\nthe competency even of a private person, who cannot make a law.\nWherefore too the Apostle, after giving a certain counsel (1 Cor.\n7:12) says: \"I speak, not the Lord.\" Consequently it is not reckoned\nas an effect of law.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To reward may also pertain to anyone: but to punish\npertains to none but the framer of the law, by whose authority the\npain is inflicted. Wherefore to reward is not reckoned an effect of\nlaw, but only to punish.\n\nReply Obj. 4: From becoming accustomed to avoid evil and fulfill what\nis good, through fear of punishment, one is sometimes led on to do so\nlikewise, with delight and of one's own accord. Accordingly, law,\neven by punishing, leads men on to being good.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 93\n\nOF THE ETERNAL LAW\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider each law by itself; and (1) The eternal law; (2)\nThe natural law; (3) The human law; (4) The old law; (5) The new law,\nwhich is the law of the Gospel. Of the sixth law which is the law of\nthe _fomes,_ suffice what we have said when treating of original sin.\n\nConcerning the first there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is the eternal law?\n\n(2) Whether it is known to all?\n\n(3) Whether every law is derived from it?\n\n(4) Whether necessary things are subject to the eternal law?\n\n(5) Whether natural contingencies are subject to the eternal law?\n\n(6) Whether all human things are subject to it?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Eternal Law Is a Sovereign Type [*Ratio] Existing in God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not a sovereign\ntype existing in God. For there is only one eternal law. But there\nare many types of things in the Divine mind; for Augustine says (Qq.\nlxxxiii, qu. 46) that God \"made each thing according to its type.\"\nTherefore the eternal law does not seem to be a type existing in the\nDivine mind.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is essential to a law that it be promulgated by\nword, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 4). But Word is a Personal name in\nGod, as stated in the First Part (Q. 34, A. 1): whereas type refers\nto the Essence. Therefore the eternal law is not the same as a Divine\ntype.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxx): \"We see a law\nabove our minds, which is called truth.\" But the law which is above\nour minds is the eternal law. Therefore truth is the eternal law. But\nthe idea of truth is not the same as the idea of a type. Therefore\nthe eternal law is not the same as the sovereign type.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that \"the\neternal law is the sovereign type, to which we must always conform.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as in every artificer there pre-exists a type\nof the things that are made by his art, so too in every governor\nthere must pre-exist the type of the order of those things that are\nto be done by those who are subject to his government. And just as\nthe type of the things yet to be made by an art is called the art or\nexemplar of the products of that art, so too the type in him who\ngoverns the acts of his subjects, bears the character of a law,\nprovided the other conditions be present which we have mentioned\nabove (Q. 90). Now God, by His wisdom, is the Creator of all things\nin relation to which He stands as the artificer to the products of\nhis art, as stated in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 8). Moreover He\ngoverns all the acts and movements that are to be found in each\nsingle creature, as was also stated in the First Part (Q. 103, A. 5).\nWherefore as the type of the Divine Wisdom, inasmuch as by It all\nthings are created, has the character of art, exemplar or idea; so\nthe type of Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end,\nbears the character of law. Accordingly the eternal law is nothing\nelse than the type of Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions and\nmovements.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking in that passage of the ideal\ntypes which regard the proper nature of each single thing; and\nconsequently in them there is a certain distinction and plurality,\naccording to their different relations to things, as stated in the\nFirst Part (Q. 15, A. 2). But law is said to direct human acts by\nordaining them to the common good, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2). And\nthings, which are in themselves different, may be considered as one,\naccording as they are ordained to one common thing. Wherefore the\neternal law is one since it is the type of this order.\n\nReply Obj. 2: With regard to any sort of word, two points may be\nconsidered: viz. the word itself, and that which is expressed by the\nword. For the spoken word is something uttered by the mouth of man,\nand expresses that which is signified by the human word. The same\napplies to the human mental word, which is nothing else than\nsomething conceived by the mind, by which man expresses his thoughts\nmentally. So then in God the Word conceived by the intellect of the\nFather is the name of a Person: but all things that are in the\nFather's knowledge, whether they refer to the Essence or to the\nPersons, or to the works of God, are expressed by this Word, as\nAugustine declares (De Trin. xv, 14). And among other things\nexpressed by this Word, the eternal law itself is expressed thereby.\nNor does it follow that the eternal law is a Personal name in God:\nyet it is appropriated to the Son, on account of the kinship between\ntype and word.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The types of the Divine intellect do not stand in the\nsame relation to things, as the types of the human intellect. For the\nhuman intellect is measured by things, so that a human concept is not\ntrue by reason of itself, but by reason of its being consonant with\nthings, since \"an opinion is true or false according as it answers to\nthe reality.\" But the Divine intellect is the measure of things:\nsince each thing has so far truth in it, as it represents the Divine\nintellect, as was stated in the First Part (Q. 16, A. 1).\nConsequently the Divine intellect is true in itself; and its type is\ntruth itself.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Eternal Law Is Known to All?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the eternal law is not known to all.\nBecause, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:11), \"the things that are of\nGod no man knoweth, but the Spirit of God.\" But the eternal law is a\ntype existing in the Divine mind. Therefore it is unknown to all save\nGod alone.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) \"the eternal\nlaw is that by which it is right that all things should be most\norderly.\" But all do not know how all things are most orderly.\nTherefore all do not know the eternal law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Vera Relig. xxxi) that \"the\neternal law is not subject to the judgment of man.\" But according to\n_Ethic._ i, \"any man can judge well of what he knows.\" Therefore the\neternal law is not known to us.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that \"knowledge\nof the eternal law is imprinted on us.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing may be known in two ways: first, in itself;\nsecondly, in its effect, wherein some likeness of that thing is\nfound: thus someone not seeing the sun in its substance, may know it\nby its rays. So then no one can know the eternal law, as it is in\nitself, except the blessed who see God in His Essence. But every\nrational creature knows it in its reflection, greater or less. For\nevery knowledge of truth is a kind of reflection and participation of\nthe eternal law, which is the unchangeable truth, as Augustine says\n(De Vera Relig. xxxi). Now all men know the truth to a certain\nextent, at least as to the common principles of the natural law: and\nas to the others, they partake of the knowledge of truth, some more,\nsome less; and in this respect are more or less cognizant of the\neternal law.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We cannot know the things that are of God, as they are\nin themselves; but they are made known to us in their effects,\naccording to Rom. 1:20: \"The invisible things of God . . . are\nclearly seen, being understood by the things that are made.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although each one knows the eternal law according to\nhis own capacity, in the way explained above, yet none can comprehend\nit: for it cannot be made perfectly known by its effects. Therefore\nit does not follow that anyone who knows the eternal law in the way\naforesaid, knows also the whole order of things, whereby they are\nmost orderly.\n\nReply Obj. 3: To judge a thing may be understood in two ways. First,\nas when a cognitive power judges of its proper object, according to\nJob 12:11: \"Doth not the ear discern words, and the palate of him\nthat eateth, the taste?\" It is to this kind of judgment that the\nPhilosopher alludes when he says that \"anyone can judge well of what\nhe knows,\" by judging, namely, whether what is put forward is true.\nIn another way we speak of a superior judging of a subordinate by a\nkind of practical judgment, as to whether he should be such and such\nor not. And thus none can judge of the eternal law.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Every Law Is Derived from the Eternal Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that not every law is derived from the\neternal law. For there is a law of the _fomes,_ as stated above (Q.\n91, A. 6), which is not derived from that Divine law which is the\neternal law, since thereunto pertains the \"prudence of the flesh,\" of\nwhich the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7), that \"it cannot be subject to the\nlaw of God.\" Therefore not every law is derived from the eternal law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing unjust can be derived from the eternal law,\nbecause, as stated above (A. 2, Obj. 2), \"the eternal law is that,\naccording to which it is right that all things should be most\norderly.\" But some laws are unjust, according to Isa. 10:1: \"Woe to\nthem that make wicked laws.\" Therefore not every law is derived from\nthe eternal law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) that \"the law\nwhich is framed for ruling the people, rightly permits many things\nwhich are punished by Divine providence.\" But the type of Divine\nprovidence is the eternal law, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore not\neven every good law is derived from the eternal law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Divine Wisdom says (Prov. 8:15): \"By Me kings\nreign, and lawgivers decree just things.\" But the type of Divine\nWisdom is the eternal law, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore all laws\nproceed from the eternal law.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, AA. 1, 2), the law denotes a\nkind of plan directing acts towards an end. Now wherever there are\nmovers ordained to one another, the power of the second mover must\nneeds be derived from the power of the first mover; since the second\nmover does not move except in so far as it is moved by the first.\nWherefore we observe the same in all those who govern, so that the\nplan of government is derived by secondary governors from the\ngovernor in chief; thus the plan of what is to be done in a state\nflows from the king's command to his inferior administrators: and\nagain in things of art the plan of whatever is to be done by art\nflows from the chief craftsman to the under-craftsmen, who work with\ntheir hands. Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in\nthe Chief Governor, all the plans of government in the inferior\ngovernors must be derived from the eternal law. But these plans of\ninferior governors are all other laws besides the eternal law.\nTherefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are\nderived from the eternal law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i,\n6) that \"in temporal law there is nothing just and lawful, but what\nman has drawn from the eternal law.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The _fomes_ has the nature of law in man, in so far as\nit is a punishment resulting from Divine justice; and in this respect\nit is evident that it is derived from the eternal law. But in so far\nas it denotes a proneness to sin, it is contrary to the Divine law,\nand has not the nature of law, as stated above (Q. 91, A. 6).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Human law has the nature of law in so far as it\npartakes of right reason; and it is clear that, in this respect, it\nis derived from the eternal law. But in so far as it deviates from\nreason, it is called an unjust law, and has the nature, not of law\nbut of violence. Nevertheless even an unjust law, in so far as it\nretains some appearance of law, though being framed by one who is in\npower, is derived from the eternal law; since all power is from the\nLord God, according to Rom. 13:1.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Human law is said to permit certain things, not as\napproving them, but as being unable to direct them. And many things\nare directed by the Divine law, which human law is unable to direct,\nbecause more things are subject to a higher than to a lower cause.\nHence the very fact that human law does not meddle with matters it\ncannot direct, comes under the ordination of the eternal law. It\nwould be different, were human law to sanction what the eternal law\ncondemns. Consequently it does not follow that human law is not\nderived from the eternal law, but that it is not on a perfect\nequality with it.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Necessary and Eternal Things Are Subject to the Eternal Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that necessary and eternal things are\nsubject to the eternal law. For whatever is reasonable is subject to\nreason. But the Divine will is reasonable, for it is just. Therefore\nit is subject to (the Divine) reason. But the eternal law is the\nDivine reason. Therefore God's will is subject to the eternal law.\nBut God's will is eternal. Therefore eternal and necessary things are\nsubject to the eternal law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is subject to the King, is subject to the\nKing's law. Now the Son, according to 1 Cor. 15:28, 24, \"shall be\nsubject . . . to God and the Father . . . when He shall have\ndelivered up the Kingdom to Him.\" Therefore the Son, Who is eternal,\nis subject to the eternal law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the eternal law is Divine providence as a type. But\nmany necessary things are subject to Divine providence: for instance,\nthe stability of incorporeal substances and of the heavenly bodies.\nTherefore even necessary things are subject to the eternal law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Things that are necessary cannot be otherwise, and\nconsequently need no restraining. But laws are imposed on men, in\norder to restrain them from evil, as explained above (Q. 92, A. 2).\nTherefore necessary things are not subject to the eternal law.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the eternal law is the type\nof the Divine government. Consequently whatever is subject to the\nDivine government, is subject to the eternal law: while if anything\nis not subject to the Divine government, neither is it subject to the\neternal law. The application of this distinction may be gathered by\nlooking around us. For those things are subject to human government,\nwhich can be done by man; but what pertains to the nature of man is\nnot subject to human government; for instance, that he should have a\nsoul, hands, or feet. Accordingly all that is in things created by\nGod, whether it be contingent or necessary, is subject to the eternal\nlaw: while things pertaining to the Divine Nature or Essence are not\nsubject to the eternal law, but are the eternal law itself.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We may speak of God's will in two ways. First, as to\nthe will itself: and thus, since God's will is His very Essence, it\nis subject neither to the Divine government, nor to the eternal law,\nbut is the same thing as the eternal law. Secondly, we may speak of\nGod's will, as to the things themselves that God wills about\ncreatures; which things are subject to the eternal law, in so far as\nthey are planned by Divine Wisdom. In reference to these things God's\nwill is said to be reasonable (_rationalis_): though regarded in\nitself it should rather be called their type (_ratio_).\n\nReply Obj. 2: God the Son was not made by God, but was naturally born\nof God. Consequently He is not subject to Divine providence or to the\neternal law: but rather is Himself the eternal law by a kind of\nappropriation, as Augustine explains (De Vera Relig. xxxi). But He is\nsaid to be subject to the Father by reason of His human nature, in\nrespect of which also the Father is said to be greater than He.\n\nThe third objection we grant, because it deals with those necessary\nthings that are created.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 6), some\nnecessary things have a cause of their necessity: and thus they\nderive from something else the fact that they cannot be otherwise.\nAnd this is in itself a most effective restraint; for whatever is\nrestrained, is said to be restrained in so far as it cannot do\notherwise than it is allowed to.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Natural Contingents Are Subject to the Eternal Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that natural contingents are not subject\nto the eternal law. Because promulgation is essential to law, as\nstated above (Q. 90, A. 4). But a law cannot be promulgated except to\nrational creatures, to whom it is possible to make an announcement.\nTherefore none but rational creatures are subject to the eternal law;\nand consequently natural contingents are not.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"Whatever obeys reason partakes somewhat of reason,\"\nas stated in _Ethic._ i. But the eternal law is the supreme type, as\nstated above (A. 1). Since then natural contingents do not partake of\nreason in any way, but are altogether void of reason, it seems that\nthey are not subject to the eternal law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the eternal law is most efficient. But in natural\ncontingents defects occur. Therefore they are not subject to the\neternal law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Prov. 8:29): \"When He compassed the\nsea with its bounds, and set a law to the waters, that they should\nnot pass their limits.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We must speak otherwise of the law of man, than of\nthe eternal law which is the law of God. For the law of man extends\nonly to rational creatures subject to man. The reason of this is\nbecause law directs the actions of those that are subject to the\ngovernment of someone: wherefore, properly speaking, none imposes a\nlaw on his own actions. Now whatever is done regarding the use of\nirrational things subject to man, is done by the act of man himself\nmoving those things, for these irrational creatures do not move\nthemselves, but are moved by others, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 2).\nConsequently man cannot impose laws on irrational beings, however\nmuch they may be subject to him. But he can impose laws on rational\nbeings subject to him, in so far as by his command or pronouncement\nof any kind, he imprints on their minds a rule which is a principle\nof action.\n\nNow just as man, by such pronouncement, impresses a kind of inward\nprinciple of action on the man that is subject to him, so God\nimprints on the whole of nature the principles of its proper actions.\nAnd so, in this way, God is said to command the whole of nature,\naccording to Ps. 148:6: \"He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass\naway.\" And thus all actions and movements of the whole of nature are\nsubject to the eternal law. Consequently irrational creatures are\nsubject to the eternal law, through being moved by Divine providence;\nbut not, as rational creatures are, through understanding the Divine\ncommandment.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The impression of an inward active principle is to\nnatural things, what the promulgation of law is to men: because law,\nby being promulgated, imprints on man a directive principle of human\nactions, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Irrational creatures neither partake of nor are\nobedient to human reason: whereas they do partake of the Divine\nReason by obeying it; because the power of Divine Reason extends over\nmore things than human reason does. And as the members of the human\nbody are moved at the command of reason, and yet do not partake of\nreason, since they have no apprehension subordinate to reason; so too\nirrational creatures are moved by God, without, on that account,\nbeing rational.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the defects which occur in natural things are\noutside the order of particular causes, they are not outside the\norder of universal causes, especially of the First Cause, i.e. God,\nfrom Whose providence nothing can escape, as stated in the First Part\n(Q. 22, A. 2). And since the eternal law is the type of Divine\nprovidence, as stated above (A. 1), hence the defects of natural\nthings are subject to the eternal law.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 93, Art. 6]\n\nWhether All Human Affairs Are Subject to the Eternal Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that not all human affairs are subject to\nthe eternal law. For the Apostle says (Gal. 5:18): \"If you are led by\nthe spirit you are not under the law.\" But the righteous who are the\nsons of God by adoption, are led by the spirit of God, according to\nRom. 8:14: \"Whosoever are led by the spirit of God, they are the sons\nof God.\" Therefore not all men are under the eternal law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 8:7): \"The prudence [Vulg.:\n'wisdom'] of the flesh is an enemy to God: for it is not subject to\nthe law of God.\" But many are those in whom the prudence of the flesh\ndominates. Therefore all men are not subject to the eternal law which\nis the law of God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6) that \"the eternal\nlaw is that by which the wicked deserve misery, the good, a life of\nblessedness.\" But those who are already blessed, and those who are\nalready lost, are not in the state of merit. Therefore they are not\nunder the eternal law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 12): \"Nothing\nevades the laws of the most high Creator and Governor, for by Him the\npeace of the universe is administered.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ There are two ways in which a thing is subject to\nthe eternal law, as explained above (A. 5): first, by partaking of\nthe eternal law by way of knowledge; secondly, by way of action and\npassion, i.e. by partaking of the eternal law by way of an inward\nmotive principle: and in this second way, irrational creatures are\nsubject to the eternal law, as stated above (A. 5). But since the\nrational nature, together with that which it has in common with all\ncreatures, has something proper to itself inasmuch as it is rational,\nconsequently it is subject to the eternal law in both ways; because\nwhile each rational creature has some knowledge of the eternal law,\nas stated above (A. 2), it also has a natural inclination to that\nwhich is in harmony with the eternal law; for \"we are naturally\nadapted to the recipients of virtue\" (Ethic. ii, 1).\n\nBoth ways, however, are imperfect, and to a certain extent destroyed,\nin the wicked; because in them the natural inclination to virtue is\ncorrupted by vicious habits, and, moreover, the natural knowledge of\ngood is darkened by passions and habits of sin. But in the good both\nways are found more perfect: because in them, besides the natural\nknowledge of good, there is the added knowledge of faith and wisdom;\nand again, besides the natural inclination to good, there is the\nadded motive of grace and virtue.\n\nAccordingly, the good are perfectly subject to the eternal law, as\nalways acting according to it: whereas the wicked are subject to the\neternal law, imperfectly as to their actions, indeed, since both\ntheir knowledge of good, and their inclination thereto, are\nimperfect; but this imperfection on the part of action is supplied on\nthe part of passion, in so far as they suffer what the eternal law\ndecrees concerning them, according as they fail to act in harmony\nwith that law. Hence Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 15): \"I esteem\nthat the righteous act according to the eternal law; and (De Catech.\nRud. xviii): Out of the just misery of the souls which deserted Him,\nGod knew how to furnish the inferior parts of His creation with most\nsuitable laws.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: This saying of the Apostle may be understood in two\nways. First, so that a man is said to be under the law, through being\npinned down thereby, against his will, as by a load. Hence, on the\nsame passage a gloss says that \"he is under the law, who refrains\nfrom evil deeds, through fear of punishment threatened by the law,\nand not from love of virtue.\" In this way the spiritual man is not\nunder the law, because he fulfils the law willingly, through charity\nwhich is poured into his heart by the Holy Ghost. Secondly, it can be\nunderstood as meaning that the works of a man, who is led by the Holy\nGhost, are the works of the Holy Ghost rather than his own.\nTherefore, since the Holy Ghost is not under the law, as neither is\nthe Son, as stated above (A. 4, ad 2); it follows that such works, in\nso far as they are of the Holy Ghost, are not under the law. The\nApostle witnesses to this when he says (2 Cor. 3:17): \"Where the\nSpirit of the Lord is, there is liberty.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The prudence of the flesh cannot be subject to the law\nof God as regards action; since it inclines to actions contrary to\nthe Divine law: yet it is subject to the law of God, as regards\npassion; since it deserves to suffer punishment according to the law\nof Divine justice. Nevertheless in no man does the prudence of the\nflesh dominate so far as to destroy the whole good of his nature: and\nconsequently there remains in man the inclination to act in\naccordance with the eternal law. For we have seen above (Q. 85, A. 2)\nthat sin does not destroy entirely the good of nature.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A thing is maintained in the end and moved towards the\nend by one and the same cause: thus gravity which makes a heavy body\nrest in the lower place is also the cause of its being moved thither.\nWe therefore reply that as it is according to the eternal law that\nsome deserve happiness, others unhappiness, so is it by the eternal\nlaw that some are maintained in a happy state, others in an unhappy\nstate. Accordingly both the blessed and the damned are under the\neternal law.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 94\n\nOF THE NATURAL LAW\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the natural law; concerning which there are six\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is the natural law?\n\n(2) What are the precepts of the natural law?\n\n(3) Whether all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law?\n\n(4) Whether the natural law is the same in all?\n\n(5) Whether it is changeable?\n\n(6) Whether it can be abolished from the heart of man?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 94, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Natural Law Is a Habit?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the natural law is a habit. Because,\nas the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5), \"there are three things in\nthe soul: power, habit, and passion.\" But the natural law is not one\nof the soul's powers: nor is it one of the passions; as we may see by\ngoing through them one by one. Therefore the natural law is a habit.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Basil [*Damascene, De Fide Orth. iv, 22] says that\nthe conscience or _synderesis_ \"is the law of our mind\"; which can\nonly apply to the natural law. But the \"synderesis\" is a habit, as\nwas shown in the First Part (Q. 79, A. 12). Therefore the natural law\nis a habit.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the natural law abides in man always, as will be\nshown further on (A. 6). But man's reason, which the law regards,\ndoes not always think about the natural law. Therefore the natural\nlaw is not an act, but a habit.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Bono Conjug. xxi) that \"a habit\nis that whereby something is done when necessary.\" But such is not\nthe natural law: since it is in infants and in the damned who cannot\nact by it. Therefore the natural law is not a habit.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing may be called a habit in two ways. First,\nproperly and essentially: and thus the natural law is not a habit.\nFor it has been stated above (Q. 90, A. 1, ad 2) that the natural law\nis something appointed by reason, just as a proposition is a work of\nreason. Now that which a man does is not the same as that whereby he\ndoes it: for he makes a becoming speech by the habit of grammar.\nSince then a habit is that by which we act, a law cannot be a habit\nproperly and essentially.\n\nSecondly, the term habit may be applied to that which we hold by a\nhabit: thus faith may mean that which we hold by faith. And\naccordingly, since the precepts of the natural law are sometimes\nconsidered by reason actually, while sometimes they are in the reason\nonly habitually, in this way the natural law may be called a habit.\nThus, in speculative matters, the indemonstrable principles are not\nthe habit itself whereby we hold those principles, but are the\nprinciples the habit of which we possess.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher proposes there to discover the genus of\nvirtue; and since it is evident that virtue is a principle of action,\nhe mentions only those things which are principles of human acts,\nviz. powers, habits and passions. But there are other things in the\nsoul besides these three: there are acts; thus _to will_ is in the\none that wills; again, things known are in the knower; moreover its\nown natural properties are in the soul, such as immortality and the\nlike.\n\nReply Obj. 2: _Synderesis_ is said to be the law of our mind, because\nit is a habit containing the precepts of the natural law, which are\nthe first principles of human actions.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument proves that the natural law is held\nhabitually; and this is granted.\n\nTo the argument advanced in the contrary sense we reply that\nsometimes a man is unable to make use of that which is in him\nhabitually, on account of some impediment: thus, on account of sleep,\na man is unable to use the habit of science. In like manner, through\nthe deficiency of his age, a child cannot use the habit of\nunderstanding of principles, or the natural law, which is in him\nhabitually.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 94, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Natural Law Contains Several Precepts, or Only One?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the natural law contains, not several\nprecepts, but one only. For law is a kind of precept, as stated above\n(Q. 92, A. 2). If therefore there were many precepts of the natural\nlaw, it would follow that there are also many natural laws.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the natural law is consequent to human nature. But\nhuman nature, as a whole, is one; though, as to its parts, it is\nmanifold. Therefore, either there is but one precept of the law of\nnature, on account of the unity of nature as a whole; or there are\nmany, by reason of the number of parts of human nature. The result\nwould be that even things relating to the inclination of the\nconcupiscible faculty belong to the natural law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, law is something pertaining to reason, as stated\nabove (Q. 90, A. 1). Now reason is but one in man. Therefore there is\nonly one precept of the natural law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The precepts of the natural law in man stand in\nrelation to practical matters, as the first principles to matters of\ndemonstration. But there are several first indemonstrable principles.\nTherefore there are also several precepts of the natural law.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 91, A. 3), the precepts of the\nnatural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of\ndemonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are\nself-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in\ntwo ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any\nproposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is\ncontained in the notion of the subject: although, to one who knows\nnot the definition of the subject, it happens that such a proposition\nis not self-evident. For instance, this proposition, \"Man is a\nrational being,\" is, in its very nature, self-evident, since who says\n\"man,\" says \"a rational being\": and yet to one who knows not what a\nman is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence it is that, as\nBoethius says (De Hebdom.), certain axioms or propositions are\nuniversally self-evident to all; and such are those propositions\nwhose terms are known to all, as, \"Every whole is greater than its\npart,\" and, \"Things equal to one and the same are equal to one\nanother.\" But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise,\nwho understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions: thus to\none who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident\nthat an angel is not circumscriptively in a place: but this is not\nevident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.\n\nNow a certain order is to be found in those things that are\napprehended universally. For that which, before aught else, falls\nunder apprehension, is _being_, the notion of which is included in\nall things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first\nindemonstrable principle is that \"the same thing cannot be affirmed\nand denied at the same time,\" which is based on the notion of _being_\nand _not-being:_ and on this principle all others are based, as is\nstated in _Metaph._ iv, text. 9. Now as _being_ is the first thing\nthat falls under the apprehension simply, so _good_ is the first\nthing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason,\nwhich is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under\nthe aspect of good. Consequently the first principle of practical\nreason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that \"good is that\nwhich all things seek after.\" Hence this is the first precept of law,\nthat \"good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.\" All\nother precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that\nwhatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or\nevil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be\ndone or avoided.\n\nSince, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature\nof a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a\nnatural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being\ngood, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as\nevil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of\nnatural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural\nlaw. Because in man there is first of all an inclination to good in\naccordance with the nature which he has in common with all\nsubstances: inasmuch as every substance seeks the preservation of its\nown being, according to its nature: and by reason of this\ninclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of\nwarding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly,\nthere is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more\nspecially, according to that nature which he has in common with other\nanimals: and in virtue of this inclination, those things are said to\nbelong to the natural law, \"which nature has taught to all animals\"\n[*Pandect. Just. I, tit. i], such as sexual intercourse, education of\noffspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to\ngood, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper\nto him: thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about\nGod, and to live in society: and in this respect, whatever pertains\nto this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun\nignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and\nother such things regarding the above inclination.\n\nReply Obj. 1: All these precepts of the law of nature have the\ncharacter of one natural law, inasmuch as they flow from one first\nprecept.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All the inclinations of any parts whatsoever of human\nnature, e.g. of the concupiscible and irascible parts, in so far as\nthey are ruled by reason, belong to the natural law, and are reduced\nto one first precept, as stated above: so that the precepts of the\nnatural law are many in themselves, but are based on one common\nfoundation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although reason is one in itself, yet it directs all\nthings regarding man; so that whatever can be ruled by reason, is\ncontained under the law of reason.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 94, Art. 3]\n\nWhether All Acts of Virtue Are Prescribed by the Natural Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that not all acts of virtue are prescribed\nby the natural law. Because, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2) it is\nessential to a law that it be ordained to the common good. But some\nacts of virtue are ordained to the private good of the individual, as\nis evident especially in regards to acts of temperance. Therefore not\nall acts of virtue are the subject of natural law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, every sin is opposed to some virtuous act. If\ntherefore all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law, it\nseems to follow that all sins are against nature: whereas this\napplies to certain special sins.\n\nObj. 3: Further, those things which are according to nature are\ncommon to all. But acts of virtue are not common to all: since a\nthing is virtuous in one, and vicious in another. Therefore not all\nacts of virtue are prescribed by the natural law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 4) that\n\"virtues are natural.\" Therefore virtuous acts also are a subject of\nthe natural law.\n\n_I answer that,_ We may speak of virtuous acts in two ways: first,\nunder the aspect of virtuous; secondly, as such and such acts\nconsidered in their proper species. If then we speak of acts of\nvirtue, considered as virtuous, thus all virtuous acts belong to the\nnatural law. For it has been stated (A. 2) that to the natural law\nbelongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his\nnature. Now each thing is inclined naturally to an operation that is\nsuitable to it according to its form: thus fire is inclined to give\nheat. Wherefore, since the rational soul is the proper form of man,\nthere is in every man a natural inclination to act according to\nreason: and this is to act according to virtue. Consequently,\nconsidered thus, all acts of virtue are prescribed by the natural\nlaw: since each one's reason naturally dictates to him to act\nvirtuously. But if we speak of virtuous acts, considered in\nthemselves, i.e. in their proper species, thus not all virtuous acts\nare prescribed by the natural law: for many things are done\nvirtuously, to which nature does not incline at first; but which,\nthrough the inquiry of reason, have been found by men to be conducive\nto well-living.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Temperance is about the natural concupiscences of food,\ndrink and sexual matters, which are indeed ordained to the natural\ncommon good, just as other matters of law are ordained to the moral\ncommon good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: By human nature we may mean either that which is proper\nto man--and in this sense all sins, as being against reason, are also\nagainst nature, as Damascene states (De Fide Orth. ii, 30): or we may\nmean that nature which is common to man and other animals; and in\nthis sense, certain special sins are said to be against nature; thus\ncontrary to sexual intercourse, which is natural to all animals, is\nunisexual lust, which has received the special name of the unnatural\ncrime.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument considers acts in themselves. For it is\nowing to the various conditions of men, that certain acts are\nvirtuous for some, as being proportionate and becoming to them, while\nthey are vicious for others, as being out of proportion to them.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 94, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Natural Law Is the Same in All Men?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the natural law is not the same in\nall. For it is stated in the Decretals (Dist. i) that \"the natural\nlaw is that which is contained in the Law and the Gospel.\" But this\nis not common to all men; because, as it is written (Rom. 10:16),\n\"all do not obey the gospel.\" Therefore the natural law is not the\nsame in all men.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"Things which are according to the law are said to\nbe just,\" as stated in _Ethic._ v. But it is stated in the same book\nthat nothing is so universally just as not to be subject to change in\nregard to some men. Therefore even the natural law is not the same in\nall men.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as stated above (AA. 2, 3), to the natural law\nbelongs everything to which a man is inclined according to his\nnature. Now different men are naturally inclined to different things;\nsome to the desire of pleasures, others to the desire of honors, and\nother men to other things. Therefore there is not one natural law for\nall.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 4): \"The natural law is\ncommon to all nations.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 3), to the natural law\nbelong those things to which a man is inclined naturally: and among\nthese it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason.\nNow the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated\nin _Phys._ i. The speculative reason, however, is differently\nsituated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the\nspeculative reason is busied chiefly with necessary things, which\ncannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the\nuniversal principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical\nreason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about\nwhich human actions are concerned: and consequently, although there\nis necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to\nmatters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects.\nAccordingly then in speculative matters truth is the same in all men,\nboth as to principles and as to conclusions: although the truth is\nnot known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the\nprinciples which are called common notions. But in matters of action,\ntruth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters\nof detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is\nthe same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to\nall.\n\nIt is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles\nwhether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rectitude is\nthe same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper\nconclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all,\nbut is not equally known to all: thus it is true for all that the\nthree angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles,\nalthough it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of\nthe practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for\nall, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it\nis right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this\nprinciple it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to\nanother should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the\nmajority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case that it\nwould be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held\nin trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of\nfighting against one's country. And this principle will be found to\nfail the more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if\none were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such\nand such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater\nthe number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in\nwhich the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or\nnot to restore.\n\nConsequently we must say that the natural law, as to general\nprinciples, is the same for all, both as to rectitude and as to\nknowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are\nconclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the same\nfor all in the majority of cases, both as to rectitude and as to\nknowledge; and yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to\nrectitude, by reason of certain obstacles (just as natures subject to\ngeneration and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some\nobstacle), and as to knowledge, since in some the reason is perverted\nby passion, or evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature; thus\nformerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural\nlaw, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar\nrelates (De Bello Gall. vi).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The meaning of the sentence quoted is not that whatever\nis contained in the Law and the Gospel belongs to the natural law,\nsince they contain many things that are above nature; but that\nwhatever belongs to the natural law is fully contained in them.\nWherefore Gratian, after saying that \"the natural law is what is\ncontained in the Law and the Gospel,\" adds at once, by way of\nexample, \"by which everyone is commanded to do to others as he would\nbe done by.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The saying of the Philosopher is to be understood of\nthings that are naturally just, not as general principles, but as\nconclusions drawn from them, having rectitude in the majority of\ncases, but failing in a few.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As, in man, reason rules and commands the other powers,\nso all the natural inclinations belonging to the other powers must\nneeds be directed according to reason. Wherefore it is universally\nright for all men, that all their inclinations should be directed\naccording to reason.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 94, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Natural Law Can Be Changed?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be changed.\nBecause on Ecclus. 17:9, \"He gave them instructions, and the law of\nlife,\" the gloss says: \"He wished the law of the letter to be\nwritten, in order to correct the law of nature.\" But that which is\ncorrected is changed. Therefore the natural law can be changed.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the slaying of the innocent, adultery, and theft are\nagainst the natural law. But we find these things changed by God: as\nwhen God commanded Abraham to slay his innocent son (Gen. 22:2); and\nwhen he ordered the Jews to borrow and purloin the vessels of the\nEgyptians (Ex. 12:35); and when He commanded Osee to take to himself\n\"a wife of fornications\" (Osee 1:2). Therefore the natural law can be\nchanged.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Isidore says (Etym. 5:4) that \"the possession of all\nthings in common, and universal freedom, are matters of natural law.\"\nBut these things are seen to be changed by human laws. Therefore it\nseems that the natural law is subject to change.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is said in the Decretals (Dist. v): \"The\nnatural law dates from the creation of the rational creature. It does\nnot vary according to time, but remains unchangeable.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A change in the natural law may be understood in two\nways. First, by way of addition. In this sense nothing hinders the\nnatural law from being changed: since many things for the benefit of\nhuman life have been added over and above the natural law, both by\nthe Divine law and by human laws.\n\nSecondly, a change in the natural law may be understood by way of\nsubtraction, so that what previously was according to the natural\nlaw, ceases to be so. In this sense, the natural law is altogether\nunchangeable in its first principles: but in its secondary\nprinciples, which, as we have said (A. 4), are certain detailed\nproximate conclusions drawn from the first principles, the natural\nlaw is not changed so that what it prescribes be not right in most\ncases. But it may be changed in some particular cases of rare\noccurrence, through some special causes hindering the observance of\nsuch precepts, as stated above (A. 4).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The written law is said to be given for the correction\nof the natural law, either because it supplies what was wanting to\nthe natural law; or because the natural law was perverted in the\nhearts of some men, as to certain matters, so that they esteemed\nthose things good which are naturally evil; which perversion stood in\nneed of correction.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All men alike, both guilty and innocent, die the death\nof nature: which death of nature is inflicted by the power of God on\naccount of original sin, according to 1 Kings 2:6: \"The Lord killeth\nand maketh alive.\" Consequently, by the command of God, death can be\ninflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice\nwhatever. In like manner adultery is intercourse with another's wife;\nwho is allotted to him by the law emanating from God. Consequently\nintercourse with any woman, by the command of God, is neither\nadultery nor fornication. The same applies to theft, which is the\ntaking of another's property. For whatever is taken by the command of\nGod, to Whom all things belong, is not taken against the will of its\nowner, whereas it is in this that theft consists. Nor is it only in\nhuman things, that whatever is commanded by God is right; but also in\nnatural things, whatever is done by God, is, in some way, natural, as\nstated in the First Part, Q. 105, A. 6, ad 1.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A thing is said to belong to the natural law in two\nways. First, because nature inclines thereto: e.g. that one should\nnot do harm to another. Secondly, because nature did not bring in the\ncontrary: thus we might say that for man to be naked is of the\nnatural law, because nature did not give him clothes, but art\ninvented them. In this sense, \"the possession of all things in common\nand universal freedom\" are said to be of the natural law, because, to\nwit, the distinction of possessions and slavery were not brought in\nby nature, but devised by human reason for the benefit of human life.\nAccordingly the law of nature was not changed in this respect, except\nby addition.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 94, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Law of Nature Can Be Abolished from the Heart of Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the natural law can be abolished from\nthe heart of man. Because on Rom. 2:14, \"When the Gentiles who have\nnot the law,\" etc. a gloss says that \"the law of righteousness, which\nsin had blotted out, is graven on the heart of man when he is\nrestored by grace.\" But the law of righteousness is the law of\nnature. Therefore the law of nature can be blotted out.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the law of grace is more efficacious than the law of\nnature. But the law of grace is blotted out by sin. Much more\ntherefore can the law of nature be blotted out.\n\nObj. 3: Further, that which is established by law is made just. But\nmany things are enacted by men, which are contrary to the law of\nnature. Therefore the law of nature can be abolished from the heart\nof man.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Confess. ii): \"Thy law is written\nin the hearts of men, which iniquity itself effaces not.\" But the law\nwhich is written in men's hearts is the natural law. Therefore the\nnatural law cannot be blotted out.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 4, 5), there belong to the\nnatural law, first, certain most general precepts, that are known to\nall; and secondly, certain secondary and more detailed precepts,\nwhich are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first\nprinciples. As to those general principles, the natural law, in the\nabstract, can nowise be blotted out from men's hearts. But it is\nblotted out in the case of a particular action, in so far as reason\nis hindered from applying the general principle to a particular point\nof practice, on account of concupiscence or some other passion, as\nstated above (Q. 77, A. 2). But as to the other, i.e. the secondary\nprecepts, the natural law can be blotted out from the human heart,\neither by evil persuasions, just as in speculative matters errors\noccur in respect of necessary conclusions; or by vicious customs and\ncorrupt habits, as among some men, theft, and even unnatural vices,\nas the Apostle states (Rom. i), were not esteemed sinful.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Sin blots out the law of nature in particular cases,\nnot universally, except perchance in regard to the secondary precepts\nof the natural law, in the way stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although grace is more efficacious than nature, yet\nnature is more essential to man, and therefore more enduring.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument is true of the secondary precepts of the\nnatural law, against which some legislators have framed certain\nenactments which are unjust.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 95\n\nOF HUMAN LAW\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider human law; and (1) this law considered in\nitself; (2) its power; (3) its mutability. Under the first head\nthere are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Its utility.\n\n(2) Its origin.\n\n(3) Its quality.\n\n(4) Its division.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 95, Art. 1]\n\nWhether It Was Useful for Laws to Be Framed by Men?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it was not useful for laws to be\nframed by men. Because the purpose of every law is that man be made\ngood thereby, as stated above (Q. 92, A. 1). But men are more to be\ninduced to be good willingly by means of admonitions, than against\ntheir will, by means of laws. Therefore there was no need to frame\nlaws.\n\nObj. 2: Further, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), \"men have\nrecourse to a judge as to animate justice.\" But animate justice is\nbetter than inanimate justice, which contained in laws. Therefore it\nwould have been better for the execution of justice to be entrusted\nto the decision of judges, than to frame laws in addition.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every law is framed for the direction of human\nactions, as is evident from what has been stated above (Q. 90, AA. 1,\n2). But since human actions are about singulars, which are infinite\nin number, matter pertaining to the direction of human actions cannot\nbe taken into sufficient consideration except by a wise man, who\nlooks into each one of them. Therefore it would have been better for\nhuman acts to be directed by the judgment of wise men, than by the\nframing of laws. Therefore there was no need of human laws.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Isidore says (Etym. v, 20): \"Laws were made that\nin fear thereof human audacity might be held in check, that innocence\nmight be safeguarded in the midst of wickedness, and that the dread\nof punishment might prevent the wicked from doing harm.\" But these\nthings are most necessary to mankind. Therefore it was necessary that\nhuman laws should be made.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 63, A. 1; Q. 94, A. 3), man has\na natural aptitude for virtue; but the perfection of virtue must be\nacquired by man by means of some kind of training. Thus we observe\nthat man is helped by industry in his necessities, for instance, in\nfood and clothing. Certain beginnings of these he has from nature,\nviz. his reason and his hands; but he has not the full complement, as\nother animals have, to whom nature has given sufficiency of clothing\nand food. Now it is difficult to see how man could suffice for\nhimself in the matter of this training: since the perfection of\nvirtue consists chiefly in withdrawing man from undue pleasures, to\nwhich above all man is inclined, and especially the young, who are\nmore capable of being trained. Consequently a man needs to receive\nthis training from another, whereby to arrive at the perfection of\nvirtue. And as to those young people who are inclined to acts of\nvirtue, by their good natural disposition, or by custom, or rather by\nthe gift of God, paternal training suffices, which is by admonitions.\nBut since some are found to be depraved, and prone to vice, and not\neasily amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained\nfrom evil by force and fear, in order that, at least, they might\ndesist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace, and that they\nthemselves, by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do\nwillingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous.\nNow this kind of training, which compels through fear of punishment,\nis the discipline of laws. Therefore in order that man might have\npeace and virtue, it was necessary for laws to be framed: for, as the\nPhilosopher says (Polit. i, 2), \"as man is the most noble of animals\nif he be perfect in virtue, so is he the lowest of all, if he be\nsevered from law and righteousness\"; because man can use his reason\nto devise means of satisfying his lusts and evil passions, which\nother animals are unable to do.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Men who are well disposed are led willingly to virtue\nby being admonished better than by coercion: but men who are evilly\ndisposed are not led to virtue unless they are compelled.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 1), \"it is better\nthat all things be regulated by law, than left to be decided by\njudges\": and this for three reasons. First, because it is easier to\nfind a few wise men competent to frame right laws, than to find the\nmany who would be necessary to judge aright of each single case.\nSecondly, because those who make laws consider long beforehand what\nlaws to make; whereas judgment on each single case has to be\npronounced as soon as it arises: and it is easier for man to see what\nis right, by taking many instances into consideration, than by\nconsidering one solitary fact. Thirdly, because lawgivers judge in\nthe abstract and of future events; whereas those who sit in judgment\njudge of things present, towards which they are affected by love,\nhatred, or some kind of cupidity; wherefore their judgment is\nperverted.\n\nSince then the animated justice of the judge is not found in every\nman, and since it can be deflected, therefore it was necessary,\nwhenever possible, for the law to determine how to judge, and for\nvery few matters to be left to the decision of men.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Certain individual facts which cannot be covered by the\nlaw \"have necessarily to be committed to judges,\" as the Philosopher\nsays in the same passage: for instance, \"concerning something that\nhas happened or not happened,\" and the like.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 95, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Every Human Law Is Derived from the Natural Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that not every human law is derived from\nthe natural law. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that \"the\nlegal just is that which originally was a matter of indifference.\"\nBut those things which arise from the natural law are not matters of\nindifference. Therefore the enactments of human laws are not derived\nfrom the natural law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, positive law is contrasted with natural law, as\nstated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4) and the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7). But\nthose things which flow as conclusions from the general principles of\nthe natural law belong to the natural law, as stated above (Q. 94, A.\n4). Therefore that which is established by human law does not belong\nto the natural law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the law of nature is the same for all; since the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. v, 7) that \"the natural just is that which\nis equally valid everywhere.\" If therefore human laws were derived\nfrom the natural law, it would follow that they too are the same for\nall: which is clearly false.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is possible to give a reason for things which are\nderived from the natural law. But \"it is not possible to give the\nreason for all the legal enactments of the lawgivers,\" as the jurist\nsays [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff, tit. iii, v; De Leg. et Senat.].\nTherefore not all human laws are derived from the natural law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Tully says (Rhet. ii): \"Things which emanated from\nnature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and\nreverence for the laws.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 5) \"that which is\nnot just seems to be no law at all\": wherefore the force of a law\ndepends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is\nsaid to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason.\nBut the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from\nwhat has been stated above (Q. 91, A. 2, ad 2). Consequently every\nhuman law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived\nfrom the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law\nof nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.\n\nBut it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural\nlaw in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by\nway of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like\nto that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn\nfrom the principles: while the second mode is likened to that\nwhereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details:\nthus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to\nsome particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the\ngeneral principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions; e.g.\nthat \"one must not kill\" may be derived as a conclusion from the\nprinciple that \"one should do harm to no man\": while some are derived\ntherefrom by way of determination; e.g. the law of nature has it that\nthe evil-doer should be punished; but that he be punished in this or\nthat way, is a determination of the law of nature.\n\nAccordingly both modes of derivation are found in the human law. But\nthose things which are derived in the first way, are contained in\nhuman law not as emanating therefrom exclusively, but have some force\nfrom the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the\nsecond way, have no other force than that of human law.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is speaking of those enactments which\nare by way of determination or specification of the precepts of the\nnatural law.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument avails for those things that are derived\nfrom the natural law, by way of conclusions.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The general principles of the natural law cannot be\napplied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of\nhuman affairs: and hence arises the diversity of positive laws among\nvarious people.\n\nReply Obj. 4: These words of the Jurist are to be understood as\nreferring to decisions of rulers in determining particular points of\nthe natural law: on which determinations the judgment of expert and\nprudent men is based as on its principles; in so far, to wit, as they\nsee at once what is the best thing to decide.\n\nHence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 11) that in such matters, \"we\nought to pay as much attention to the undemonstrated sayings and\nopinions of persons who surpass us in experience, age and prudence,\nas to their demonstrations.\"\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 95, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Isidore's Description of the Quality of Positive Law Is\nAppropriate?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that Isidore's description of the quality\nof positive law is not appropriate, when he says (Etym. v, 21): \"Law\nshall be virtuous, just, possible to nature, according to the custom\nof the country, suitable to place and time, necessary, useful;\nclearly expressed, lest by its obscurity it lead to misunderstanding;\nframed for no private benefit, but for the common good.\" Because he\nhad previously expressed the quality of law in three conditions,\nsaying that \"law is anything founded on reason, provided that it\nfoster religion, be helpful to discipline, and further the common\nweal.\" Therefore it was needless to add any further conditions to\nthese.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Justice is included in honesty, as Tully says (De\nOffic. vii). Therefore after saying \"honest\" it was superfluous to\nadd \"just.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, written law is condivided with custom, according to\nIsidore (Etym. ii, 10). Therefore it should not be stated in the\ndefinition of law that it is \"according to the custom of the country.\"\n\nObj. 4: Further, a thing may be necessary in two ways. It may be\nnecessary simply, because it cannot be otherwise: and that which is\nnecessary in this way, is not subject to human judgment, wherefore\nhuman law is not concerned with necessity of this kind. Again a thing\nmay be necessary for an end: and this necessity is the same as\nusefulness. Therefore it is superfluous to say both \"necessary\" and\n\"useful.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Isidore.\n\n_I answer that,_ Whenever a thing is for an end, its form must be\ndetermined proportionately to that end; as the form of a saw is such\nas to be suitable for cutting (Phys. ii, text. 88). Again, everything\nthat is ruled and measured must have a form proportionate to its rule\nand measure. Now both these conditions are verified of human law:\nsince it is both something ordained to an end; and is a rule or\nmeasure ruled or measured by a higher measure. And this higher\nmeasure is twofold, viz. the Divine law and the natural law, as\nexplained above (A. 2; Q. 93, A. 3). Now the end of human law is to\nbe useful to man, as the Jurist states [*Pandect. Justin. lib. xxv,\nff., tit. iii; De Leg. et Senat.]. Wherefore Isidore in determining\nthe nature of law, lays down, at first, three conditions; viz. that\nit \"foster religion,\" inasmuch as it is proportionate to the Divine\nlaw; that it be \"helpful to discipline,\" inasmuch as it is\nproportionate to the nature law; and that it \"further the common\nweal,\" inasmuch as it is proportionate to the utility of mankind.\n\nAll the other conditions mentioned by him are reduced to these three.\nFor it is called virtuous because it fosters religion. And when he\ngoes on to say that it should be \"just, possible to nature, according\nto the customs of the country, adapted to place and time,\" he implies\nthat it should be helpful to discipline. For human discipline depends\nfirst on the order of reason, to which he refers by saying \"just\":\nsecondly, it depends on the ability of the agent; because discipline\nshould be adapted to each one according to his ability, taking also\ninto account the ability of nature (for the same burdens should not\nbe laid on children as adults); and should be according to human\ncustoms; since man cannot live alone in society, paying no heed to\nothers: thirdly, it depends on certain circumstances, in respect of\nwhich he says, \"adapted to place and time.\" The remaining words,\n\"necessary, useful,\" etc. mean that law should further the common\nweal: so that \"necessity\" refers to the removal of evils;\n\"usefulness\" to the attainment of good; \"clearness of expression,\" to\nthe need of preventing any harm ensuing from the law itself. And\nsince, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2), law is ordained to the common\ngood, this is expressed in the last part of the description.\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 95, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Isidore's Division of Human Laws Is Appropriate?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that Isidore wrongly divided human\nstatutes or human law (Etym. v, 4, seqq.). For under this law he\nincludes the \"law of nations,\" so called, because, as he says,\n\"nearly all nations use it.\" But as he says, \"natural law is that\nwhich is common to all nations.\" Therefore the law of nations is not\ncontained under positive human law, but rather under natural law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, those laws which have the same force, seem to differ\nnot formally but only materially. But \"statutes, decrees of the\ncommonalty, senatorial decrees,\" and the like which he mentions\n(Etym. v, 9), all have the same force. Therefore they do not differ,\nexcept materially. But art takes no notice of such a distinction:\nsince it may go on to infinity. Therefore this division of human laws\nis not appropriate.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as, in the state, there are princes, priests\nand soldiers, so are there other human offices. Therefore it seems\nthat, as this division includes _military law,_ and _public law,_\nreferring to priests and magistrates; so also it should include other\nlaws pertaining to other offices of the state.\n\nObj. 4: Further, those things that are accidental should be passed\nover. But it is accidental to law that it be framed by this or that\nman. Therefore it is unreasonable to divide laws according to the\nnames of lawgivers, so that one be called the \"Cornelian\" law,\nanother the \"Falcidian\" law, etc.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The authority of Isidore (Obj. 1) suffices.\n\n_I answer that,_ A thing can of itself be divided in respect of\nsomething contained in the notion of that thing. Thus a soul either\nrational or irrational is contained in the notion of animal: and\ntherefore animal is divided properly and of itself in respect of its\nbeing rational or irrational; but not in the point of its being white\nor black, which are entirely beside the notion of animal. Now, in the\nnotion of human law, many things are contained, in respect of any of\nwhich human law can be divided properly and of itself. For in the\nfirst place it belongs to the notion of human law, to be derived from\nthe law of nature, as explained above (A. 2). In this respect\npositive law is divided into the _law of nations_ and _civil law,_\naccording to the two ways in which something may be derived from the\nlaw of nature, as stated above (A. 2). Because, to the law of nations\nbelong those things which are derived from the law of nature, as\nconclusions from premises, e.g. just buyings and sellings, and the\nlike, without which men cannot live together, which is a point of the\nlaw of nature, since man is by nature a social animal, as is proved\nin _Polit._ i, 2. But those things which are derived from the law of\nnature by way of particular determination, belong to the civil law,\naccording as each state decides on what is best for itself.\n\nSecondly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be ordained to\nthe common good of the state. In this respect human law may be\ndivided according to the different kinds of men who work in a special\nway for the common good: e.g. priests, by praying to God for the\npeople; princes, by governing the people; soldiers, by fighting for\nthe safety of the people. Wherefore certain special kinds of law are\nadapted to these men.\n\nThirdly, it belongs to the notion of human law, to be framed by that\none who governs the community of the state, as shown above (Q. 90, A.\n3). In this respect, there are various human laws according to the\nvarious forms of government. Of these, according to the Philosopher\n(Polit. iii, 10) one is _monarchy,_ i.e. when the state is governed\nby one; and then we have _Royal Ordinances._ Another form is\n_aristocracy,_ i.e. government by the best men or men of highest\nrank; and then we have the _Authoritative legal opinions_ (_Responsa\nPrudentum_) and _Decrees of the Senate_ (_Senatus consulta_). Another\nform is _oligarchy,_ i.e. government by a few rich and powerful men;\nand then we have _Praetorian,_ also called _Honorary,_ law. Another\nform of government is that of the people, which is called\n_democracy,_ and there we have _Decrees of the commonalty_\n(_Plebiscita_). There is also tyrannical government, which is\naltogether corrupt, which, therefore, has no corresponding law.\nFinally, there is a form of government made up of all these, and\nwhich is the best: and in this respect we have law sanctioned by the\n_Lords and Commons,_ as stated by Isidore (Etym. v, 4, seqq.).\n\nFourthly, it belongs to the notion of human law to direct human\nactions. In this respect, according to the various matters of which\nthe law treats, there are various kinds of laws, which are sometimes\nnamed after their authors: thus we have the _Lex Julia_ about\nadultery, the _Lex Cornelia_ concerning assassins, and so on,\ndifferentiated in this way, not on account of the authors, but on\naccount of the matters to which they refer.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The law of nations is indeed, in some way, natural to\nman, in so far as he is a reasonable being, because it is derived\nfrom the natural law by way of a conclusion that is not very remote\nfrom its premises. Wherefore men easily agreed thereto. Nevertheless\nit is distinct from the natural law, especially it is distinct from\nthe natural law which is common to all animals.\n\nThe Replies to the other Objections are evident from what has been\nsaid.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 96\n\nOF THE POWER OF HUMAN LAW\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the power of human law. Under this head there\nare six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether human law should be framed for the community?\n\n(2) Whether human law should repress all vices?\n\n(3) Whether human law is competent to direct all acts of virtue?\n\n(4) Whether it binds man in conscience?\n\n(5) Whether all men are subject to human law?\n\n(6) Whether those who are under the law may act beside the letter\nof the law?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 96, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Human Law Should Be Framed for the Community Rather Than for\nthe Individual?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that human law should be framed not for\nthe community, but rather for the individual. For the Philosopher\nsays (Ethic. v, 7) that \"the legal just . . . includes all particular\nacts of legislation . . . and all those matters which are the subject\nof decrees,\" which are also individual matters, since decrees are\nframed about individual actions. Therefore law is framed not only for\nthe community, but also for the individual.\n\nObj. 2: Further, law is the director of human acts, as stated above\n(Q. 90, AA. 1, 2). But human acts are about individual matters.\nTherefore human laws should be framed, not for the community, but\nrather for the individual.\n\nObj. 3: Further, law is a rule and measure of human acts, as stated\nabove (Q. 90, AA. 1, 2). But a measure should be most certain, as\nstated in _Metaph._ x. Since therefore in human acts no general\nproposition can be so certain as not to fail in some individual\ncases, it seems that laws should be framed not in general but for\nindividual cases.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Jurist says (Pandect. Justin. lib. i, tit.\niii, art. ii; De legibus, etc.) that \"laws should be made to suit the\nmajority of instances; and they are not framed according to what may\npossibly happen in an individual case.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Whatever is for an end should be proportionate to\nthat end. Now the end of law is the common good; because, as Isidore\nsays (Etym. v, 21) that \"law should be framed, not for any private\nbenefit, but for the common good of all the citizens.\" Hence human\nlaws should be proportionate to the common good. Now the common good\ncomprises many things. Wherefore law should take account of many\nthings, as to persons, as to matters, and as to times. Because the\ncommunity of the state is composed of many persons; and its good is\nprocured by many actions; nor is it established to endure for only a\nshort time, but to last for all time by the citizens succeeding one\nanother, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21; xxii, 6).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher (Ethic. v, 7) divides the legal just,\ni.e. positive law, into three parts. For some things are laid down\nsimply in a general way: and these are the general laws. Of these he\nsays that \"the legal is that which originally was a matter of\nindifference, but which, when enacted, is so no longer\": as the\nfixing of the ransom of a captive. Some things affect the community\nin one respect, and individuals in another. These are called\n\"privileges,\" i.e. \"private laws,\" as it were, because they regard\nprivate persons, although their power extends to many matters; and in\nregard to these, he adds, \"and further, all particular acts of\nlegislation.\" Other matters are legal, not through being laws, but\nthrough being applications of general laws to particular cases: such\nare decrees which have the force of law; and in regard to these, he\nadds \"all matters subject to decrees.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: A principle of direction should be applicable to many;\nwherefore (Metaph. x, text. 4) the Philosopher says that all things\nbelonging to one genus, are measured by one, which is the principle\nin that genus. For if there were as many rules or measures as there\nare things measured or ruled, they would cease to be of use, since\ntheir use consists in being applicable to many things. Hence law\nwould be of no use, if it did not extend further than to one single\nact. Because the decrees of prudent men are made for the purpose of\ndirecting individual actions; whereas law is a general precept, as\nstated above (Q. 92, A. 2, Obj. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 3: \"We must not seek the same degree of certainty in all\nthings\" (Ethic. i, 3). Consequently in contingent matters, such as\nnatural and human things, it is enough for a thing to be certain, as\nbeing true in the greater number of instances, though at times and\nless frequently it fail.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 96, Art. 2]\n\nWhether It Belongs to the Human Law to Repress All Vices?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it belongs to human law to repress\nall vices. For Isidore says (Etym. v, 20) that \"laws were made in\norder that, in fear thereof, man's audacity might be held in check.\"\nBut it would not be held in check sufficiently, unless all evils were\nrepressed by law. Therefore human laws should repress all evils.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the intention of the lawgiver is to make the\ncitizens virtuous. But a man cannot be virtuous unless he forbear\nfrom all kinds of vice. Therefore it belongs to human law to repress\nall vices.\n\nObj. 3: Further, human law is derived from the natural law, as stated\nabove (Q. 95, A. 2). But all vices are contrary to the law of nature.\nTherefore human law should repress all vices.\n\n_On the contrary,_ We read in _De Lib. Arb._ i, 5: \"It seems to me\nthat the law which is written for the governing of the people rightly\npermits these things, and that Divine providence punishes them.\" But\nDivine providence punishes nothing but vices. Therefore human law\nrightly allows some vices, by not repressing them.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, AA. 1, 2), law is framed as\na rule or measure of human acts. Now a measure should be homogeneous\nwith that which it measures, as stated in _Metaph._ x, text. 3, 4,\nsince different things are measured by different measures. Wherefore\nlaws imposed on men should also be in keeping with their condition,\nfor, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21), law should be \"possible both\naccording to nature, and according to the customs of the country.\"\nNow possibility or faculty of action is due to an interior habit or\ndisposition: since the same thing is not possible to one who has not\na virtuous habit, as is possible to one who has. Thus the same is not\npossible to a child as to a full-grown man: for which reason the law\nfor children is not the same as for adults, since many things are\npermitted to children, which in an adult are punished by law or at\nany rate are open to blame. In like manner many things are\npermissible to men not perfect in virtue, which would be intolerable\nin a virtuous man.\n\nNow human law is framed for a number of human beings, the majority of\nwhom are not perfect in virtue. Wherefore human laws do not forbid\nall vices, from which the virtuous abstain, but only the more\ngrievous vices, from which it is possible for the majority to\nabstain; and chiefly those that are to the hurt of others, without\nthe prohibition of which human society could not be maintained: thus\nhuman law prohibits murder, theft and such like.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Audacity seems to refer to the assailing of others.\nConsequently it belongs to those sins chiefly whereby one's neighbor\nis injured: and these sins are forbidden by human law, as stated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not\nsuddenly, but gradually. Wherefore it does not lay upon the multitude\nof imperfect men the burdens of those who are already virtuous, viz.\nthat they should abstain from all evil. Otherwise these imperfect\nones, being unable to bear such precepts, would break out into yet\ngreater evils: thus it is written (Ps. 30:33): \"He that violently\nbloweth his nose, bringeth out blood\"; and (Matt. 9:17) that if \"new\nwine,\" i.e. precepts of a perfect life, \"is put into old bottles,\"\ni.e. into imperfect men, \"the bottles break, and the wine runneth\nout,\" i.e. the precepts are despised, and those men, from contempt,\nbreak into evils worse still.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The natural law is a participation in us of the eternal\nlaw: while human law falls short of the eternal law. Now Augustine\nsays (De Lib. Arb. i, 5): \"The law which is framed for the government\nof states, allows and leaves unpunished many things that are punished\nby Divine providence. Nor, if this law does not attempt to do\neverything, is this a reason why it should be blamed for what it\ndoes.\" Wherefore, too, human law does not prohibit everything that is\nforbidden by the natural law.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 96, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Human Law Prescribes Acts of All the Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that human law does not prescribe acts of\nall the virtues. For vicious acts are contrary to acts of virtue. But\nhuman law does not prohibit all vices, as stated above (A. 2).\nTherefore neither does it prescribe all acts of virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a virtuous act proceeds from a virtue. But virtue is\nthe end of law; so that whatever is from a virtue, cannot come under\na precept of law. Therefore human law does not prescribe all acts of\nvirtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, law is ordained to the common good, as stated above\n(Q. 90, A. 2). But some acts of virtue are ordained, not to the\ncommon good, but to private good. Therefore the law does not\nprescribe all acts of virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) that the law\n\"prescribes the performance of the acts of a brave man . . . and the\nacts of the temperate man . . . and the acts of the meek man: and in\nlike manner as regards the other virtues and vices, prescribing the\nformer, forbidding the latter.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The species of virtues are distinguished by their\nobjects, as explained above (Q. 54, A. 2; Q. 60, A. 1; Q. 62, A. 2).\nNow all the objects of virtues can be referred either to the private\ngood of an individual, or to the common good of the multitude: thus\nmatters of fortitude may be achieved either for the safety of the\nstate, or for upholding the rights of a friend, and in like manner\nwith the other virtues. But law, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2) is\nordained to the common good. Wherefore there is no virtue whose acts\ncannot be prescribed by the law. Nevertheless human law does not\nprescribe concerning all the acts of every virtue: but only in regard\nto those that are ordainable to the common good--either immediately,\nas when certain things are done directly for the common good--or\nmediately, as when a lawgiver prescribes certain things pertaining to\ngood order, whereby the citizens are directed in the upholding of the\ncommon good of justice and peace.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Human law does not forbid all vicious acts, by the\nobligation of a precept, as neither does it prescribe all acts of\nvirtue. But it forbids certain acts of each vice, just as it\nprescribes some acts of each virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: An act is said to be an act of virtue in two ways.\nFirst, from the fact that a man does something virtuous; thus the act\nof justice is to do what is right, and an act of fortitude is to do\nbrave things: and in this way law prescribes certain acts of virtue.\nSecondly an act of virtue is when a man does a virtuous thing in a\nway in which a virtuous man does it. Such an act always proceeds from\nvirtue: and it does not come under a precept of law, but is the end\nat which every lawgiver aims.\n\nReply Obj. 3: There is no virtue whose act is not ordainable to the\ncommon good, as stated above, either mediately or immediately.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 96, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Human Law Binds a Man in Conscience?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that human law does not bind man in\nconscience. For an inferior power has no jurisdiction in a court of\nhigher power. But the power of man, which frames human law, is\nbeneath the Divine power. Therefore human law cannot impose its\nprecept in a Divine court, such as is the court of conscience.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the judgment of conscience depends chiefly on the\ncommandments of God. But sometimes God's commandments are made void\nby human laws, according to Matt. 15:6: \"You have made void the\ncommandment of God for your tradition.\" Therefore human law does not\nbind a man in conscience.\n\nObj. 3: Further, human laws often bring loss of character and injury\non man, according to Isa. 10:1 et seqq.: \"Woe to them that make\nwicked laws, and when they write, write injustice; to oppress the\npoor in judgment, and do violence to the cause of the humble of My\npeople.\" But it is lawful for anyone to avoid oppression and\nviolence. Therefore human laws do not bind man in conscience.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (1 Pet. 2:19): \"This is thankworthy,\nif for conscience . . . a man endure sorrows, suffering wrongfully.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Laws framed by man are either just or unjust. If\nthey be just, they have the power of binding in conscience, from the\neternal law whence they are derived, according to Prov. 8:15: \"By Me\nkings reign, and lawgivers decree just things.\" Now laws are said to\nbe just, both from the end, when, to wit, they are ordained to the\ncommon good--and from their author, that is to say, when the law that\nis made does not exceed the power of the lawgiver--and from their\nform, when, to wit, burdens are laid on the subjects, according to an\nequality of proportion and with a view to the common good. For, since\none man is a part of the community, each man in all that he is and\nhas, belongs to the community; just as a part, in all that it is,\nbelongs to the whole; wherefore nature inflicts a loss on the part,\nin order to save the whole: so that on this account, such laws as\nthese, which impose proportionate burdens, are just and binding in\nconscience, and are legal laws.\n\nOn the other hand laws may be unjust in two ways: first, by being\ncontrary to human good, through being opposed to the things mentioned\nabove--either in respect of the end, as when an authority imposes on\nhis subjects burdensome laws, conducive, not to the common good, but\nrather to his own cupidity or vainglory--or in respect of the author,\nas when a man makes a law that goes beyond the power committed to\nhim--or in respect of the form, as when burdens are imposed unequally\non the community, although with a view to the common good. The like\nare acts of violence rather than laws; because, as Augustine says (De\nLib. Arb. i, 5), \"a law that is not just, seems to be no law at all.\"\nWherefore such laws do not bind in conscience, except perhaps in\norder to avoid scandal or disturbance, for which cause a man should\neven yield his right, according to Matt. 5:40, 41: \"If a man . . .\ntake away thy coat, let go thy cloak also unto him; and whosoever\nwill force thee one mile, go with him other two.\"\n\nSecondly, laws may be unjust through being opposed to the Divine\ngood: such are the laws of tyrants inducing to idolatry, or to\nanything else contrary to the Divine law: and laws of this kind must\nnowise be observed, because, as stated in Acts 5:29, \"we ought to\nobey God rather than man.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1, 2), all human power is\nfrom God . . . \"therefore he that resisteth the power,\" in matters\nthat are within its scope, \"resisteth the ordinance of God\"; so that\nhe becomes guilty according to his conscience.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument is true of laws that are contrary to the\ncommandments of God, which is beyond the scope of (human) power.\nWherefore in such matters human law should not be obeyed.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument is true of a law that inflicts unjust\nhurt on its subjects. The power that man holds from God does not\nextend to this: wherefore neither in such matters is man bound to\nobey the law, provided he avoid giving scandal or inflicting a more\ngrievous hurt.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 96, Art. 5]\n\nWhether All Are Subject to the Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that not all are subject to the law. For\nthose alone are subject to a law for whom a law is made. But the\nApostle says (1 Tim. 1:9): \"The law is not made for the just man.\"\nTherefore the just are not subject to the law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Pope Urban says [*Decretals. caus. xix, qu. 2]: \"He\nthat is guided by a private law need not for any reason be bound by\nthe public law.\" Now all spiritual men are led by the private law of\nthe Holy Ghost, for they are the sons of God, of whom it is said\n(Rom. 8:14): \"Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the\nsons of God.\" Therefore not all men are subject to human law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. i, ff., tit. 3,\nDe Leg. et Senat.] that \"the sovereign is exempt from the laws.\" But\nhe that is exempt from the law is not bound thereby. Therefore not\nall are subject to the law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): \"Let every soul be\nsubject to the higher powers.\" But subjection to a power seems to\nimply subjection to the laws framed by that power. Therefore all men\nshould be subject to human law.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, AA. 1, 2; A. 3, ad 2), the\nnotion of law contains two things: first, that it is a rule of human\nacts; secondly, that it has coercive power. Wherefore a man may be\nsubject to law in two ways. First, as the regulated is subject to the\nregulator: and, in this way, whoever is subject to a power, is\nsubject to the law framed by that power. But it may happen in two\nways that one is not subject to a power. In one way, by being\naltogether free from its authority: hence the subjects of one city or\nkingdom are not bound by the laws of the sovereign of another city or\nkingdom, since they are not subject to his authority. In another way,\nby being under a yet higher law; thus the subject of a proconsul\nshould be ruled by his command, but not in those matters in which the\nsubject receives his orders from the emperor: for in these matters,\nhe is not bound by the mandate of the lower authority, since he is\ndirected by that of a higher. In this way, one who is simply subject\nto a law, may not be subject thereto in certain matters, in respect\nof which he is ruled by a higher law.\n\nSecondly, a man is said to be subject to a law as the coerced is\nsubject to the coercer. In this way the virtuous and righteous are\nnot subject to the law, but only the wicked. Because coercion and\nviolence are contrary to the will: but the will of the good is in\nharmony with the law, whereas the will of the wicked is discordant\nfrom it. Wherefore in this sense the good are not subject to the law,\nbut only the wicked.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument is true of subjection by way of coercion:\nfor, in this way, \"the law is not made for the just men\": because\n\"they are a law to themselves,\" since they \"show the work of the law\nwritten in their hearts,\" as the Apostle says (Rom. 2:14, 15).\nConsequently the law does not enforce itself upon them as it does on\nthe wicked.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The law of the Holy Ghost is above all law framed by\nman: and therefore spiritual men, in so far as they are led by the\nlaw of the Holy Ghost, are not subject to the law in those matters\nthat are inconsistent with the guidance of the Holy Ghost.\nNevertheless the very fact that spiritual men are subject to law, is\ndue to the leading of the Holy Ghost, according to 1 Pet. 2:13: \"Be\nye subject . . . to every human creature for God's sake.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The sovereign is said to be \"exempt from the law,\" as\nto its coercive power; since, properly speaking, no man is coerced by\nhimself, and law has no coercive power save from the authority of the\nsovereign. Thus then is the sovereign said to be exempt from the law,\nbecause none is competent to pass sentence on him, if he acts against\nthe law. Wherefore on Ps. 50:6: \"To Thee only have I sinned,\" a gloss\nsays that \"there is no man who can judge the deeds of a king.\" But as\nto the directive force of law, the sovereign is subject to the law by\nhis own will, according to the statement (Extra, De Constit. cap. Cum\nomnes) that \"whatever law a man makes for another, he should keep\nhimself. And a wise authority [*Dionysius Cato, Dist. de Moribus]\nsays: 'Obey the law that thou makest thyself.'\" Moreover the Lord\nreproaches those who \"say and do not\"; and who \"bind heavy burdens\nand lay them on men's shoulders, but with a finger of their own they\nwill not move them\" (Matt. 23:3, 4). Hence, in the judgment of God,\nthe sovereign is not exempt from the law, as to its directive force;\nbut he should fulfil it to his own free-will and not of constraint.\nAgain the sovereign is above the law, in so far as, when it is\nexpedient, he can change the law, and dispense in it according to\ntime and place.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 96, Art. 6]\n\nWhether He Who Is Under a Law May Act Beside the Letter of the Law?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that he who is subject to a law may not act\nbeside the letter of the law. For Augustine says (De Vera Relig. 31):\n\"Although men judge about temporal laws when they make them, yet when\nonce they are made they must pass judgment not on them, but according\nto them.\" But if anyone disregard the letter of the law, saying that\nhe observes the intention of the lawgiver, he seems to pass judgment\non the law. Therefore it is not right for one who is under the law to\ndisregard the letter of the law, in order to observe the intention of\nthe lawgiver.\n\nObj. 2: Further, he alone is competent to interpret the law who can\nmake the law. But those who are subject to the law cannot make the\nlaw. Therefore they have no right to interpret the intention of the\nlawgiver, but should always act according to the letter of the law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every wise man knows how to explain his intention by\nwords. But those who framed the laws should be reckoned wise: for\nWisdom says (Prov. 8:15): \"By Me kings reign, and lawgivers decree\njust things.\" Therefore we should not judge of the intention of the\nlawgiver otherwise than by the words of the law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Hilary says (De Trin. iv): \"The meaning of what is\nsaid is according to the motive for saying it: because things are not\nsubject to speech, but speech to things.\" Therefore we should take\naccount of the motive of the lawgiver, rather than of his very words.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4), every law is directed to the\ncommon weal of men, and derives the force and nature of law\naccordingly. Hence the jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff.,\ntit. 3, De Leg. et Senat.]: \"By no reason of law, or favor of equity,\nis it allowable for us to interpret harshly, and render burdensome,\nthose useful measures which have been enacted for the welfare of\nman.\" Now it happens often that the observance of some point of law\nconduces to the common weal in the majority of instances, and yet, in\nsome cases, is very hurtful. Since then the lawgiver cannot have in\nview every single case, he shapes the law according to what happens\nmost frequently, by directing his attention to the common good.\nWherefore if a case arise wherein the observance of that law would be\nhurtful to the general welfare, it should not be observed. For\ninstance, suppose that in a besieged city it be an established law\nthat the gates of the city are to be kept closed, this is good for\npublic welfare as a general rule: but, it were to happen that the\nenemy are in pursuit of certain citizens, who are defenders of the\ncity, it would be a great loss to the city, if the gates were not\nopened to them: and so in that case the gates ought to be opened,\ncontrary to the letter of the law, in order to maintain the common\nweal, which the lawgiver had in view.\n\nNevertheless it must be noted, that if the observance of the law\naccording to the letter does not involve any sudden risk needing\ninstant remedy, it is not competent for everyone to expound what is\nuseful and what is not useful to the state: those alone can do this\nwho are in authority, and who, on account of such like cases, have\nthe power to dispense from the laws. If, however, the peril be so\nsudden as not to allow of the delay involved by referring the matter\nto authority, the mere necessity brings with it a dispensation, since\nnecessity knows no law.\n\nReply Obj. 1: He who in a case of necessity acts beside the letter of\nthe law, does not judge the law; but of a particular case in which he\nsees that the letter of the law is not to be observed.\n\nReply Obj. 2: He who follows the intention of the lawgiver, does not\ninterpret the law simply; but in a case in which it is evident, by\nreason of the manifest harm, that the lawgiver intended otherwise.\nFor if it be a matter of doubt, he must either act according to the\nletter of the law, or consult those in power.\n\nReply Obj. 3: No man is so wise as to be able to take account of\nevery single case; wherefore he is not able sufficiently to express\nin words all those things that are suitable for the end he has in\nview. And even if a lawgiver were able to take all the cases into\nconsideration, he ought not to mention them all, in order to avoid\nconfusion: but should frame the law according to that which is of\nmost common occurrence.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 97\n\nOF CHANGE IN LAWS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider change in laws: under which head there are four\npoints of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether human law is changeable?\n\n(2) Whether it should be always changed, whenever anything better\noccurs?\n\n(3) Whether it is abolished by custom, and whether custom obtains the\nforce of law?\n\n(4) Whether the application of human law should be changed by\ndispensation of those in authority?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 97, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Human Law Should Be Changed in Any Way?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that human law should not be changed in\nany way at all. Because human law is derived from the natural law, as\nstated above (Q. 95, A. 2). But the natural law endures unchangeably.\nTherefore human law should also remain without any change.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 5), a measure\nshould be absolutely stable. But human law is the measure of human\nacts, as stated above (Q. 90, AA. 1, 2). Therefore it should remain\nwithout change.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is of the essence of law to be just and right, as\nstated above (Q. 95, A. 2). But that which is right once is right\nalways. Therefore that which is law once, should be always law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. i, 6): \"A temporal\nlaw, however just, may be justly changed in course of time.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 91, A. 3), human law is a\ndictate of reason, whereby human acts are directed. Thus there may be\ntwo causes for the just change of human law: one on the part of\nreason; the other on the part of man whose acts are regulated by law.\nThe cause on the part of reason is that it seems natural to human\nreason to advance gradually from the imperfect to the perfect. Hence,\nin speculative sciences, we see that the teaching of the early\nphilosophers was imperfect, and that it was afterwards perfected by\nthose who succeeded them. So also in practical matters: for those who\nfirst endeavored to discover something useful for the human\ncommunity, not being able by themselves to take everything into\nconsideration, set up certain institutions which were deficient in\nmany ways; and these were changed by subsequent lawgivers who made\ninstitutions that might prove less frequently deficient in respect of\nthe common weal.\n\nOn the part of man, whose acts are regulated by law, the law can be\nrightly changed on account of the changed condition of man, to whom\ndifferent things are expedient according to the difference of his\ncondition. An example is proposed by Augustine (De Lib. Arb. i, 6):\n\"If the people have a sense of moderation and responsibility, and are\nmost careful guardians of the common weal, it is right to enact a law\nallowing such a people to choose their own magistrates for the\ngovernment of the commonwealth. But if, as time goes on, the same\npeople become so corrupt as to sell their votes, and entrust the\ngovernment to scoundrels and criminals; then the right of appointing\ntheir public officials is rightly forfeit to such a people, and the\nchoice devolves to a few good men.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The natural law is a participation of the eternal law,\nas stated above (Q. 91, A. 2), and therefore endures without change,\nowing to the unchangeableness and perfection of the Divine Reason,\nthe Author of nature. But the reason of man is changeable and\nimperfect: wherefore his law is subject to change. Moreover the\nnatural law contains certain universal precepts, which are\neverlasting: whereas human law contains certain particular precepts,\naccording to various emergencies.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A measure should be as enduring as possible. But\nnothing can be absolutely unchangeable in things that are subject to\nchange. And therefore human law cannot be altogether unchangeable.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In corporal things, right is predicated absolutely: and\ntherefore, as far as itself is concerned, always remains right. But\nright is predicated of law with reference to the common weal, to\nwhich one and the same thing is not always adapted, as stated above:\nwherefore rectitude of this kind is subject to change.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 97, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Human Law Should Always Be Changed, Whenever Something Better\nOccurs?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that human law should be changed, whenever\nsomething better occurs. Because human laws are devised by human\nreason, like other arts. But in the other arts, the tenets of former\ntimes give place to others, if something better occurs. Therefore the\nsame should apply to human laws.\n\nObj. 2: Further, by taking note of the past we can provide for the\nfuture. Now unless human laws had been changed when it was found\npossible to improve them, considerable inconvenience would have\nensued; because the laws of old were crude in many points. Therefore\nit seems that laws should be changed, whenever anything better occurs\nto be enacted.\n\nObj. 3: Further, human laws are enacted about single acts of man. But\nwe cannot acquire perfect knowledge in singular matters, except by\nexperience, which \"requires time,\" as stated in _Ethic._ ii.\nTherefore it seems that as time goes on it is possible for something\nbetter to occur for legislation.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is stated in the Decretals (Dist. xii, 5): \"It\nis absurd, and a detestable shame, that we should suffer those\ntraditions to be changed which we have received from the fathers of\nold.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), human law is rightly\nchanged, in so far as such change is conducive to the common weal.\nBut, to a certain extent, the mere change of law is of itself\nprejudicial to the common good: because custom avails much for the\nobservance of laws, seeing that what is done contrary to general\ncustom, even in slight matters, is looked upon as grave.\nConsequently, when a law is changed, the binding power of the law is\ndiminished, in so far as custom is abolished. Wherefore human law\nshould never be changed, unless, in some way or other, the common\nweal be compensated according to the extent of the harm done in this\nrespect. Such compensation may arise either from some very great and\nevery evident benefit conferred by the new enactment; or from the\nextreme urgency of the case, due to the fact that either the existing\nlaw is clearly unjust, or its observance extremely harmful. Wherefore\nthe Jurist says [*Pandect. Justin. lib. i, ff., tit. 4, De Constit.\nPrincip.] that \"in establishing new laws, there should be evidence of\nthe benefit to be derived, before departing from a law which has long\nbeen considered just.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Rules of art derive their force from reason alone: and\ntherefore whenever something better occurs, the rule followed\nhitherto should be changed. But \"laws derive very great force from\ncustom,\" as the Philosopher states (Polit. ii, 5): consequently they\nshould not be quickly changed.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument proves that laws ought to be changed: not\nin view of any improvement, but for the sake of a great benefit or in\na case of great urgency, as stated above. This answer applies also to\nthe Third Objection.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 97, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Custom Can Obtain Force of Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that custom cannot obtain force of law,\nnor abolish a law. Because human law is derived from the natural law\nand from the Divine law, as stated above (Q. 93, A. 3; Q. 95, A. 2).\nBut human custom cannot change either the law of nature or the Divine\nlaw. Therefore neither can it change human law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, many evils cannot make one good. But he who first\nacted against the law, did evil. Therefore by multiplying such acts,\nnothing good is the result. Now a law is something good; since it is\na rule of human acts. Therefore law is not abolished by custom, so\nthat the mere custom should obtain force of law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the framing of laws belongs to those public men\nwhose business it is to govern the community; wherefore private\nindividuals cannot make laws. But custom grows by the acts of private\nindividuals. Therefore custom cannot obtain force of law, so as to\nabolish the law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Ep. ad Casulan. xxxvi): \"The\ncustoms of God's people and the institutions of our ancestors are to\nbe considered as laws. And those who throw contempt on the customs of\nthe Church ought to be punished as those who disobey the law of God.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ All law proceeds from the reason and will of the\nlawgiver; the Divine and natural laws from the reasonable will of\nGod; the human law from the will of man, regulated by reason. Now\njust as human reason and will, in practical matters, may be made\nmanifest by speech, so may they be made known by deeds: since\nseemingly a man chooses as good that which he carries into execution.\nBut it is evident that by human speech, law can be both changed and\nexpounded, in so far as it manifests the interior movement and\nthought of human reason. Wherefore by actions also, especially if\nthey be repeated, so as to make a custom, law can be changed and\nexpounded; and also something can be established which obtains force\nof law, in so far as by repeated external actions, the inward\nmovement of the will, and concepts of reason are most effectually\ndeclared; for when a thing is done again and again, it seems to\nproceed from a deliberate judgment of reason. Accordingly, custom has\nthe force of a law, abolishes law, and is the interpreter of law.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The natural and Divine laws proceed from the Divine\nwill, as stated above. Wherefore they cannot be changed by a custom\nproceeding from the will of man, but only by Divine authority. Hence\nit is that no custom can prevail over the Divine or natural laws: for\nIsidore says (Synon. ii, 16): \"Let custom yield to authority: evil\ncustoms should be eradicated by law and reason.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 96, A. 6), human laws fail in some\ncases: wherefore it is possible sometimes to act beside the law;\nnamely, in a case where the law fails; yet the act will not be evil.\nAnd when such cases are multiplied, by reason of some change in man,\nthen custom shows that the law is no longer useful: just as it might\nbe declared by the verbal promulgation of a law to the contrary. If,\nhowever, the same reason remains, for which the law was useful\nhitherto, then it is not the custom that prevails against the law,\nbut the law that overcomes the custom: unless perhaps the sole reason\nfor the law seeming useless, be that it is not \"possible according to\nthe custom of the country\" [*Q. 95, A. 3], which has been stated to\nbe one of the conditions of law. For it is not easy to set aside the\ncustom of a whole people.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The people among whom a custom is introduced may be of\ntwo conditions. For if they are free, and able to make their own\nlaws, the consent of the whole people expressed by a custom counts\nfar more in favor of a particular observance, that does the authority\nof the sovereign, who has not the power to frame laws, except as\nrepresenting the people. Wherefore although each individual cannot\nmake laws, yet the whole people can. If however the people have not\nthe free power to make their own laws, or to abolish a law made by a\nhigher authority; nevertheless with such a people a prevailing custom\nobtains force of law, in so far as it is tolerated by those to whom\nit belongs to make laws for that people: because by the very fact\nthat they tolerate it they seem to approve of that which is\nintroduced by custom.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 97, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Rulers of the People Can Dispense from Human Laws?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the rulers of the people cannot\ndispense from human laws. For the law is established for the \"common\nweal,\" as Isidore says (Etym. v, 21). But the common good should not\nbe set aside for the private convenience of an individual: because,\nas the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2), \"the good of the nation is\nmore godlike than the good of one man.\" Therefore it seems that a man\nshould not be dispensed from acting in compliance with the general\nlaw.\n\nObj. 2: Further, those who are placed over others are commanded as\nfollows (Deut. 1:17): \"You shall hear the little as well as the\ngreat; neither shall you respect any man's person, because it is the\njudgment of God.\" But to allow one man to do that which is equally\nforbidden to all, seems to be respect of persons. Therefore the\nrulers of a community cannot grant such dispensations, since this is\nagainst a precept of the Divine law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, human law, in order to be just, should accord with\nthe natural and Divine laws: else it would not \"foster religion,\" nor\nbe \"helpful to discipline,\" which is requisite to the nature of law,\nas laid down by Isidore (Etym. v, 3). But no man can dispense from\nthe Divine and natural laws. Neither, therefore, can he dispense from\nthe human law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:17): \"A dispensation is\ncommitted to me.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Dispensation, properly speaking, denotes a measuring\nout to individuals of some common goods: thus the head of a household\nis called a dispenser, because to each member of the household he\ndistributes work and necessaries of life in due weight and measure.\nAccordingly in every community a man is said to dispense, from the\nvery fact that he directs how some general precept is to be fulfilled\nby each individual. Now it happens at times that a precept, which is\nconducive to the common weal as a general rule, is not good for a\nparticular individual, or in some particular case, either because it\nwould hinder some greater good, or because it would be the occasion\nof some evil, as explained above (Q. 96, A. 6). But it would be\ndangerous to leave this to the discretion of each individual, except\nperhaps by reason of an evident and sudden emergency, as stated above\n(Q. 96, A. 6). Consequently he who is placed over a community is\nempowered to dispense in a human law that rests upon his authority,\nso that, when the law fails in its application to persons or\ncircumstances, he may allow the precept of the law not to be\nobserved. If however he grant this permission without any such\nreason, and of his mere will, he will be an unfaithful or an\nimprudent dispenser: unfaithful, if he has not the common good in\nview; imprudent, if he ignores the reasons for granting\ndispensations. Hence Our Lord says (Luke 12:42): \"Who, thinkest thou,\nis the faithful and wise dispenser [Douay: steward], whom his lord\nsetteth over his family?\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: When a person is dispensed from observing the general\nlaw, this should not be done to the prejudice of, but with the\nintention of benefiting, the common good.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is not respect of persons if unequal measures are\nserved out to those who are themselves unequal. Wherefore when the\ncondition of any person requires that he should reasonably receive\nspecial treatment, it is not respect of persons if he be the object\nof special favor.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Natural law, so far as it contains general precepts,\nwhich never fail, does not allow of dispensations. In other precepts,\nhowever, which are as conclusions of the general precepts, man\nsometimes grants a dispensation: for instance, that a loan should not\nbe paid back to the betrayer of his country, or something similar.\nBut to the Divine law each man stands as a private person to the\npublic law to which he is subject. Wherefore just as none can\ndispense from public human law, except the man from whom the law\nderives its authority, or his delegate; so, in the precepts of the\nDivine law, which are from God, none can dispense but God, or the man\nto whom He may give special power for that purpose.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 98\n\nOF THE OLD LAW\n(In Six Articles)\n\nIn due sequence we must now consider the Old Law; and (1) The Law\nitself; (2) Its precepts. Under the first head there are six points\nof inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the Old Law was good?\n\n(2) Whether it was from God?\n\n(3) Whether it came from Him through the angels?\n\n(4) Whether it was given to all?\n\n(5) Whether it was binding on all?\n\n(6) Whether it was given at a suitable time?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 98, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Old Law Was Good?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not good. For it is\nwritten (Ezech. 20:25): \"I gave them statutes that were not good, and\njudgments in which they shall not live.\" But a law is not said to be\ngood except on account of the goodness of the precepts that it\ncontains. Therefore the Old Law was not good.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it belongs to the goodness of a law that it conduce\nto the common welfare, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3). But the Old Law\nwas not salutary; rather was it deadly and hurtful. For the Apostle\nsays (Rom. 7:8, seqq.): \"Without the law sin was dead. And I lived\nsome time without the law. But when the commandment came sin revived;\nand I died.\" Again he says (Rom. 5:20): \"Law entered in that sin\nmight abound.\" Therefore the Old Law was not good.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it belongs to the goodness of the law that it should\nbe possible to obey it, both according to nature, and according to\nhuman custom. But such the Old Law was not: since Peter said (Acts\n15:10): \"Why tempt you (God) to put a yoke on the necks of the\ndisciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?\"\nTherefore it seems that the Old Law was not good.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 7:12): \"Wherefore the law\nindeed is holy, and the commandment holy, and just, and good.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Without any doubt, the Old Law was good. For just as\na doctrine is shown to be good by the fact that it accords with right\nreason, so is a law proved to be good if it accords with reason. Now\nthe Old Law was in accordance with reason. Because it repressed\nconcupiscence which is in conflict with reason, as evidenced by the\ncommandment, \"Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods\" (Ex. 20:17).\nMoreover the same law forbade all kinds of sin; and these too are\ncontrary to reason. Consequently it is evident that it was a good\nlaw. The Apostle argues in the same way (Rom. 7): \"I am delighted,\"\nsays he (verse 22), \"with the law of God, according to the inward\nman\": and again (verse 16): \"I consent to the law, that is good.\"\n\nBut it must be noted that the good has various degrees, as Dionysius\nstates (Div. Nom. iv): for there is a perfect good, and an imperfect\ngood. In things ordained to an end, there is perfect goodness when a\nthing is such that it is sufficient in itself to conduce to the end:\nwhile there is imperfect goodness when a thing is of some assistance\nin attaining the end, but is not sufficient for the realization\nthereof. Thus a medicine is perfectly good, if it gives health to a\nman; but it is imperfect, if it helps to cure him, without being able\nto bring him back to health. Again it must be observed that the end\nof human law is different from the end of Divine law. For the end of\nhuman law is the temporal tranquillity of the state, which end law\neffects by directing external actions, as regards those evils which\nmight disturb the peaceful condition of the state. On the other hand,\nthe end of the Divine law is to bring man to that end which is\neverlasting happiness; which end is hindered by any sin, not only of\nexternal, but also of internal action. Consequently that which\nsuffices for the perfection of human law, viz. the prohibition and\npunishment of sin, does not suffice for the perfection of the Divine\nlaw: but it is requisite that it should make man altogether fit to\npartake of everlasting happiness. Now this cannot be done save by the\ngrace of the Holy Ghost, whereby \"charity\" which fulfilleth the law\n. . . \"is spread abroad in our hearts\" (Rom. 5:5): since \"the grace of\nGod is life everlasting\" (Rom. 6:23). But the Old Law could not\nconfer this grace, for this was reserved to Christ; because, as it is\nwritten (John 1:17), the law was given \"by Moses, grace and truth\ncame by Jesus Christ.\" Consequently the Old Law was good indeed, but\nimperfect, according to Heb. 7:19: \"The law brought nothing to\nperfection.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Lord refers there to the ceremonial precepts; which\nare said not to be good, because they did not confer grace unto the\nremission of sins, although by fulfilling these precepts man\nconfessed himself a sinner. Hence it is said pointedly, \"and\njudgments in which they shall not live\"; i.e. whereby they are unable\nto obtain life; and so the text goes on: \"And I polluted them,\" i.e.\nshowed them to be polluted, \"in their own gifts, when they offered\nall that opened the womb, for their offenses.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The law is said to have been deadly, as being not the\ncause, but the occasion of death, on account of its imperfection: in\nso far as it did not confer grace enabling man to fulfil what is\nprescribed, and to avoid what it forbade. Hence this occasion was not\ngiven to men, but taken by them. Wherefore the Apostle says (Rom.\n5:11): \"Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, seduced me, and by\nit killed me.\" In the same sense when it is said that \"the law\nentered in that sin might abound,\" the conjunction \"that\" must be\ntaken as consecutive and not final: in so far as men, taking occasion\nfrom the law, sinned all the more, both because a sin became more\ngrievous after law had forbidden it, and because concupiscence\nincreased, since we desire a thing the more from its being forbidden.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The yoke of the law could not be borne without the help\nof grace, which the law did not confer: for it is written (Rom.\n9:16): \"It is not him that willeth, nor of him that runneth,\" viz.\nthat he wills and runs in the commandments of God, \"but of God that\nshoweth mercy.\" Wherefore it is written (Ps. 118:32): \"I have run the\nway of Thy commandments, when Thou didst enlarge my heart,\" i.e. by\ngiving me grace and charity.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 98, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Old Law Was from God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not from God. For it\nis written (Deut. 32:4): \"The works of God are perfect.\" But the Law\nwas imperfect, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the Old Law was not\nfrom God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Eccles. 3:14): \"I have learned that\nall the works which God hath made continue for ever.\" But the Old Law\ndoes not continue for ever: since the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18):\n\"There is indeed a setting aside of the former commandment, because\nof the weakness and unprofitableness thereof.\" Therefore the Old Law\nwas not from God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a wise lawgiver should remove, not only evil, but\nalso the occasions of evil. But the Old Law was an occasion of sin,\nas stated above (A. 1, ad 2). Therefore the giving of such a law does\nnot pertain to God, to Whom \"none is like among the lawgivers\" (Job\n36:22).\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is written (1 Tim. 2:4) that God \"will have all\nmen to be saved.\" But the Old Law did not suffice to save man, as\nstated above (A. 1). Therefore the giving of such a law did not\nappertain to God. Therefore the Old Law was not from God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 15:6) while speaking to the\nJews, to whom the Law was given: \"You have made void the commandment\nof God for your tradition.\" And shortly before (verse 4) He had said:\n\"Honor thy father and mother,\" which is contained expressly in the\nOld Law (Ex. 20:12; Deut. 5:16). Therefore the Old Law was from God.\n\n_I answer that,_ The Old Law was given by the good God, Who is the\nFather of Our Lord Jesus Christ. For the Old Law ordained men to\nChrist in two ways. First by bearing witness to Christ; wherefore He\nHimself says (Luke 24:44): \"All things must needs be fulfilled, which\nare written in the law . . . and in the prophets, and in the psalms,\nconcerning Me\": and (John 5:46): \"If you did believe Moses, you would\nperhaps believe Me also; for he wrote of Me.\" Secondly, as a kind of\ndisposition, since by withdrawing men from idolatrous worship, it\nenclosed (_concludebat_) them in the worship of one God, by Whom the\nhuman race was to be saved through Christ. Wherefore the Apostle says\n(Gal. 3:23): \"Before the faith came, we were kept under the law shut\nup (_conclusi_), unto that faith which was to be revealed.\" Now it is\nevident that the same thing it is, which gives a disposition to the\nend, and which brings to the end; and when I say \"the same,\" I mean\nthat it does so either by itself or through its subjects. For the\ndevil would not make a law whereby men would be led to Christ, Who\nwas to cast him out, according to Matt. 12:26: \"If Satan cast out\nSatan, his kingdom is divided\" [Vulg.: 'he is divided against\nhimself']. Therefore the Old Law was given by the same God, from Whom\ncame salvation to man, through the grace of Christ.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Nothing prevents a thing being not perfect simply, and\nyet perfect in respect of time: thus a boy is said to be perfect, not\nsimply, but with regard to the condition of time. So, too, precepts\nthat are given to children are perfect in comparison with the\ncondition of those to whom they are given, although they are not\nperfect simply. Hence the Apostle says (Gal. 3:24): \"The law was our\npedagogue in Christ.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Those works of God endure for ever which God so made\nthat they would endure for ever; and these are His perfect works. But\nthe Old Law was set aside when there came the perfection of grace;\nnot as though it were evil, but as being weak and useless for this\ntime; because, as the Apostle goes on to say, \"the law brought\nnothing to perfection\": hence he says (Gal. 3:25): \"After the faith\nis come, we are no longer under a pedagogue.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 79, A. 4), God sometimes permits\ncertain ones to fall into sin, that they may thereby be humbled. So\nalso did He wish to give such a law as men by their own forces could\nnot fulfill, so that, while presuming on their own powers, they might\nfind themselves to be sinners, and being humbled might have recourse\nto the help of grace.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Although the Old Law did not suffice to save man, yet\nanother help from God besides the Law was available for man, viz.\nfaith in the Mediator, by which the fathers of old were justified\neven as we were. Accordingly God did not fail man by giving him\ninsufficient aids to salvation.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 98, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Old Law Was Given Through the Angels?\n\nObjection 1: It seems that the Old Law was not given through the\nangels, but immediately by God. For an angel means a \"messenger\"; so\nthat the word \"angel\" denotes ministry, not lordship, according to\nPs. 102:20, 21: \"Bless the Lord, all ye His Angels . . . you\nministers of His.\" But the Old Law is related to have been given by\nthe Lord: for it is written (Ex. 20:1): \"And the Lord spoke . . .\nthese words,\" and further on: \"I am the Lord Thy God.\" Moreover the\nsame expression is often repeated in Exodus, and the later books of\nthe Law. Therefore the Law was given by God immediately.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to John 1:17, \"the Law was given by\nMoses.\" But Moses received it from God immediately: for it is written\n(Ex. 33:11): \"The Lord spoke to Moses face to face, as a man is wont\nto speak to his friend.\" Therefore the Old Law was given by God\nimmediately.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it belongs to the sovereign alone to make a law, as\nstated above (Q. 90, A. 3). But God alone is Sovereign as regards the\nsalvation of souls: while the angels are the \"ministering spirits,\"\nas stated in Heb. 1:14. Therefore it was not meet for the Law to be\ngiven through the angels, since it is ordained to the salvation of\nsouls.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle said (Gal. 3:19) that the Law was\n\"given [Vulg.: 'ordained'] by angels in the hand of a Mediator.\" And\nStephen said (Acts 7:53): \"(Who) have received the Law by the\ndisposition of angels.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The Law was given by God through the angels. And\nbesides the general reason given by Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iv), viz.\nthat \"the gifts of God should be brought to men by means of the\nangels,\" there is a special reason why the Old Law should have been\ngiven through them. For it has been stated (AA. 1, 2) that the Old\nLaw was imperfect, and yet disposed man to that perfect salvation of\nthe human race, which was to come through Christ. Now it is to be\nobserved that wherever there is an order of powers or arts, he that\nholds the highest place, himself exercises the principal and perfect\nacts; while those things which dispose to the ultimate perfection are\neffected by him through his subordinates: thus the ship-builder\nhimself rivets the planks together, but prepares the material by\nmeans of the workmen who assist him under his direction. Consequently\nit was fitting that the perfect law of the New Testament should be\ngiven by the incarnate God immediately; but that the Old Law should\nbe given to men by the ministers of God, i.e. by the angels. It is\nthus that the Apostle at the beginning of his epistle to the Hebrews\n(1:2) proves the excellence of the New Law over the Old; because in\nthe New Testament \"God . . . hath spoken to us by His Son,\" whereas\nin the Old Testament \"the word was spoken by angels\" (Heb. 2:2).\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Gregory says at the beginning of his Morals (Praef.\nchap. i), \"the angel who is described to have appeared to Moses, is\nsometimes mentioned as an angel, sometimes as the Lord: an angel, in\ntruth, in respect of that which was subservient to the external\ndelivery; and the Lord, because He was the Director within, Who\nsupported the effectual power of speaking.\" Hence also it is that the\nangel spoke as personating the Lord.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii, 27), it is stated\nin Exodus that \"the Lord spoke to Moses face to face\"; and shortly\nafterwards we read, \"'Show me Thy glory.' Therefore He perceived what\nhe saw and he desired what he saw not.\" Hence he did not see the very\nEssence of God; and consequently he was not taught by Him\nimmediately. Accordingly when Scripture states that \"He spoke to him\nface to face,\" this is to be understood as expressing the opinion of\nthe people, who thought that Moses was speaking with God mouth to\nmouth, when God spoke and appeared to him, by means of a subordinate\ncreature, i.e. an angel and a cloud. Again we may say that this\nvision \"face to face\" means some kind of sublime and familiar\ncontemplation, inferior to the vision of the Divine Essence.\n\nReply Obj. 3: It is for the sovereign alone to make a law by his own\nauthority; but sometimes after making a law, he promulgates it\nthrough others. Thus God made the Law by His own authority, but He\npromulgated it through the angels.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q, 98, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Old Law Should Have Been Given to the Jews Alone?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have been\ngiven to the Jews alone. For the Old Law disposed men for the\nsalvation which was to come through Christ, as stated above (AA. 2,\n3). But that salvation was to come not to the Jews alone but to all\nnations, according to Isa. 49:6: \"It is a small thing that thou\nshouldst be my servant to raise up the tribes of Jacob, and to\nconvert the dregs of Israel. Behold I have given thee to be the light\nof the Gentiles, that thou mayest be My salvation, even to the\nfarthest part of the earth.\" Therefore the Old Law should have been\ngiven to all nations, and not to one people only.\n\nObj. 2: Further, according to Acts 10:34, 35, \"God is not a respecter\nof persons: but in every nation, he that feareth Him, and worketh\njustice, is acceptable to Him.\" Therefore the way of salvation should\nnot have been opened to one people more than to another.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the law was given through the angels, as stated\nabove (A. 3). But God always vouchsafed the ministrations of the\nangels not to the Jews alone, but to all nations: for it is written\n(Ecclus. 17:14): \"Over every nation He set a ruler.\" Also on all\nnations He bestows temporal goods, which are of less account with God\nthan spiritual goods. Therefore He should have given the Law also to\nall peoples.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 3:1, 2): \"What advantage then\nhath the Jew? . . . Much every way. First indeed, because the words\nof God were committed to them\": and (Ps. 147:9): \"He hath not done in\nlike manner to every nation: and His judgments He hath not made\nmanifest unto them.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ It might be assigned as a reason for the Law being\ngiven to the Jews rather than to other peoples, that the Jewish\npeople alone remained faithful to the worship of one God, while the\nothers turned away to idolatry; wherefore the latter were unworthy to\nreceive the Law, lest a holy thing should be given to dogs.\n\nBut this reason does not seem fitting: because that people turned to\nidolatry, even after the Law had been made, which was more grievous,\nas is clear from Ex. 32 and from Amos 5:25, 26: \"Did you offer\nvictims and sacrifices to Me in the desert for forty years, O house\nof Israel? But you carried a tabernacle for your Moloch, and the\nimage of your idols, the star of your god, which you made to\nyourselves.\" Moreover it is stated expressly (Deut. 9:6): \"Know\ntherefore that the Lord thy God giveth thee not this excellent land\nin possession for thy justices, for thou art a very stiff-necked\npeople\": but the real reason is given in the preceding verse: \"That\nthe Lord might accomplish His word, which He promised by oath to thy\nfathers Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.\"\n\nWhat this promise was is shown by the Apostle, who says (Gal. 3:16)\nthat \"to Abraham were the promises made and to his seed. He saith\nnot, 'And to his seeds,' as of many: but as of one, 'And to thy\nseed,' which is Christ.\" And so God vouchsafed both the Law and other\nspecial boons to that people, on account of the promised made to\ntheir fathers that Christ should be born of them. For it was fitting\nthat the people, of whom Christ was to be born, should be signalized\nby a special sanctification, according to the words of Lev. 19:2: \"Be\nye holy, because I . . . am holy.\" Nor again was it on account of the\nmerit of Abraham himself that this promise was made to him, viz. that\nChrist should be born of his seed: but of gratuitous election and\nvocation. Hence it is written (Isa. 41:2): \"Who hath raised up the\njust one form the east, hath called him to follow him?\"\n\nIt is therefore evident that it was merely from gratuitous election\nthat the patriarchs received the promise, and that the people sprung\nfrom them received the law; according to Deut. 4:36, 37: \"Ye did\n[Vulg.: 'Thou didst'] hear His words out of the midst of the fire,\nbecause He loved thy fathers, and chose their seed after them.\" And\nif again it asked why He chose this people, and not another, that\nChrist might be born thereof; a fitting answer is given by Augustine\n(Tract. super Joan. xxvi): \"Why He draweth one and draweth not\nanother, seek not thou to judge, if thou wish not to err.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although the salvation, which was to come through\nChrist, was prepared for all nations, yet it was necessary that\nChrist should be born of one people, which, for this reason, was\nprivileged above other peoples; according to Rom. 9:4: \"To whom,\"\nnamely the Jews, \"belongeth the adoption as of children (of God)\n. . . and the testament, and the giving of the Law . . . whose are\nthe fathers, and of whom is Christ according to the flesh.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Respect of persons takes place in those things which\nare given according to due; but it has no place in those things which\nare bestowed gratuitously. Because he who, out of generosity, gives\nof his own to one and not to another, is not a respecter of persons:\nbut if he were a dispenser of goods held in common, and were not to\ndistribute them according to personal merits, he would be a respecter\nof persons. Now God bestows the benefits of salvation on the human\nrace gratuitously: wherefore He is not a respecter of persons, if He\ngives them to some rather than to others. Hence Augustine says (De\nPraedest. Sanct. viii): \"All whom God teaches, he teaches out of\npity; but whom He teaches not, out of justice He teaches not\": for\nthis is due to the condemnation of the human race for the sin of the\nfirst parent.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The benefits of grace are forfeited by man on account\nof sin: but not the benefits of nature. Among the latter are the\nministries of the angels, which the very order of various natures\ndemands, viz. that the lowest beings be governed through the\nintermediate beings: and also bodily aids, which God vouchsafes not\nonly to men, but also to beasts, according to Ps. 35:7: \"Men and\nbeasts Thou wilt preserve, O Lord.\"\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 98, Art. 5]\n\nWhether All Men Were Bound to Observe the Old Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that all men were bound to observe the Old\nLaw. Because whoever is subject to the king, must needs be subject to\nhis law. But the Old Law was given by God, Who is \"King of all the\nearth\" (Ps. 46:8). Therefore all the inhabitants of the earth were\nbound to observe the Law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Jews could not be saved without observing the\nOld Law: for it is written (Deut. 27:26): \"Cursed be he that abideth\nnot in the words of this law, and fulfilleth them not in work.\" If\ntherefore other men could be saved without the observance of the Old\nLaw, the Jews would be in a worse plight than other men.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Gentiles were admitted to the Jewish ritual and\nto the observances of the Law: for it is written (Ex. 12:48): \"If any\nstranger be willing to dwell among you, and to keep the Phase of the\nLord, all his males shall first be circumcised, and then shall he\ncelebrate it according to the manner; and he shall be as he that is\nborn in the land.\" But it would have been useless to admit strangers\nto the legal observances according to Divine ordinance, if they could\nhave been saved without the observance of the Law. Therefore none\ncould be saved without observing the Law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. ix) that many of the\nGentiles were brought back to God by the angels. But it is clear that\nthe Gentiles did not observe the Law. Therefore some could be saved\nwithout observing the Law.\n\n_I answer that,_ The Old Law showed forth the precepts of the natural\nlaw, and added certain precepts of its own. Accordingly, as to those\nprecepts of the natural law contained in the Old Law, all were bound\nto observe the Old Law; not because they belonged to the Old Law, but\nbecause they belonged to the natural law. But as to those precepts\nwhich were added by the Old Law, they were not binding on any save\nthe Jewish people alone.\n\nThe reason of this is because the Old Law, as stated above (A. 4),\nwas given to the Jewish people, that it might receive a prerogative\nof holiness, in reverence for Christ Who was to be born of that\npeople. Now whatever laws are enacted for the special sanctification\nof certain ones, are binding on them alone: thus clerics who are set\naside for the service of God are bound to certain obligations to\nwhich the laity are not bound; likewise religious are bound by their\nprofession to certain works of perfection, to which people living in\nthe world are not bound. In like manner this people was bound to\ncertain special observances, to which other peoples were not bound.\nWherefore it is written (Deut. 18:13): \"Thou shalt be perfect and\nwithout spot before the Lord thy God\": and for this reason they used\na kind of form of profession, as appears from Deut. 26:3: \"I profess\nthis day before the Lord thy God,\" etc.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Whoever are subject to a king, are bound to observe his\nlaw which he makes for all in general. But if he orders certain\nthings to be observed by the servants of his household, others are\nnot bound thereto.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The more a man is united to God, the better his state\nbecomes: wherefore the more the Jewish people were bound to the\nworship of God, the greater their excellence over other peoples.\nHence it is written (Deut. 4:8): \"What other nation is there so\nrenowned that hath ceremonies and just judgments, and all the law?\"\nIn like manner, from this point of view, the state of clerics is\nbetter than that of the laity, and the state of religious than that\nof folk living in the world.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Gentiles obtained salvation more perfectly and more\nsecurely under the observances of the Law than under the mere natural\nlaw: and for this reason they were admitted to them. So too the laity\nare now admitted to the ranks of the clergy, and secular persons to\nthose of the religious, although they can be saved without this.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 98, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Old Law Was Suitably Given at the Time of Moses?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Old Law was not suitably given at\nthe time of Moses. Because the Old Law disposed man for the salvation\nwhich was to come through Christ, as stated above (AA. 2, 3). But man\nneeded this salutary remedy immediately after he had sinned.\nTherefore the Law should have been given immediately after sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Old Law was given for the sanctification of\nthose from whom Christ was to be born. Now the promise concerning the\n\"seed, which is Christ\" (Gal. 3:16) was first made to Abraham, as\nrelated in Gen. 12:7. Therefore the Law should have been given at\nonce at the time of Abraham.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as Christ was born of those alone who descended from\nNoe through Abraham, to whom the promise was made; so was He born of\nno other of the descendants of Abraham but David, to whom the promise\nwas renewed, according to 2 Kings 23:1: \"The man to whom it was\nappointed concerning the Christ of the God of Jacob . . . said.\"\nTherefore the Old Law should have been given after David, just as it\nwas given after Abraham.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 3:19) that the Law \"was set\nbecause of transgressions, until the seed should come, to whom He\nmade the promise, being ordained by angels in the hand of a\nMediator\": ordained, i.e. \"given in orderly fashion,\" as the gloss\nexplains. Therefore it was fitting that the Old Law should be given\nin this order of time.\n\n_I answer that,_ It was most fitting for the Law to be given at the\ntime of Moses. The reason for this may be taken from two things in\nrespect of which every law is imposed on two kinds of men. Because it\nis imposed on some men who are hard-hearted and proud, whom the law\nrestrains and tames: and it is imposed on good men, who, through\nbeing instructed by the law, are helped to fulfil what they desire to\ndo. Hence it was fitting that the Law should be given at such a time\nas would be appropriate for the overcoming of man's pride. For man\nwas proud of two things, viz. of knowledge and of power. He was proud\nof his knowledge, as though his natural reason could suffice him for\nsalvation: and accordingly, in order that his pride might be overcome\nin this matter, man was left to the guidance of his reason without\nthe help of a written law: and man was able to learn from experience\nthat his reason was deficient, since about the time of Abraham man\nhad fallen headlong into idolatry and the most shameful vices.\nWherefore, after those times, it was necessary for a written law to\nbe given as a remedy for human ignorance: because \"by the Law is the\nknowledge of sin\" (Rom. 3:20). But, after man had been instructed by\nthe Law, his pride was convinced of his weakness, through his being\nunable to fulfil what he knew. Hence, as the Apostle concludes (Rom.\n8:3, 4), \"what the Law could not do in that it was weak through the\nflesh, God sent [Vulg.: 'sending'] His own Son . . . that the\njustification of the Law might be fulfilled in us.\"\n\nWith regard to good men, the Law was given to them as a help; which\nwas most needed by the people, at the time when the natural law began\nto be obscured on account of the exuberance of sin: for it was\nfitting that this help should be bestowed on men in an orderly\nmanner, so that they might be led from imperfection to perfection;\nwherefore it was becoming that the Old Law should be given between\nthe law of nature and the law of grace.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It was not fitting for the Old Law to be given at once\nafter the sin of the first man: both because man was so confident in\nhis own reason, that he did not acknowledge his need of the Old Law;\nbecause as yet the dictate of the natural law was not darkened by\nhabitual sinning.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A law should not be given save to the people, since it\nis a general precept, as stated above (Q. 90, AA. 2, 3); wherefore at\nthe time of Abraham God gave men certain familiar, and, as it were,\nhousehold precepts: but when Abraham's descendants had multiplied, so\nas to form a people, and when they had been freed from slavery, it\nwas fitting that they should be given a law; for \"slaves are not that\npart of the people or state to which it is fitting for the law to be\ndirected,\" as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 2, 4, 5).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since the Law had to be given to the people, not only\nthose, of whom Christ was born, received the Law, but the whole\npeople, who were marked with the seal of circumcision, which was the\nsign of the promise made to Abraham, and in which he believed,\naccording to Rom. 4:11: hence even before David, the Law had to be\ngiven to that people as soon as they were collected together.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 99\n\nOF THE PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the precepts of the Old Law; and (1) how they\nare distinguished from one another; (2) each kind of precept. Under\nthe first head there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the Old Law contains several precepts or only one?\n\n(2) Whether the Old Law contains any moral precepts?\n\n(3) Whether it contains ceremonial precepts in addition to the moral\nprecepts?\n\n(4) Whether besides these it contains judicial precepts?\n\n(5) Whether it contains any others besides these?\n\n(6) How the Old Law induced men to keep its precepts.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 99, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Old Law Contains Only One Precept?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains but one precept.\nBecause a law is nothing else than a precept, as stated above (Q. 90,\nAA. 2, 3). Now there is but one Old Law. Therefore it contains but\none precept.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 13:9): \"If there be any other\ncommandment, it is comprised in this word: Thou shalt love thy\nneighbor as thyself.\" But this is only one commandment. Therefore the\nOld Law contained but one commandment.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Matt. 7:12): \"All things . . .\nwhatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them.\nFor this is the Law and the prophets.\" But the whole of the Old Law\nis comprised in the Law and the prophets. Therefore the whole of the\nOld Law contains but one commandment.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Eph. 2:15): \"Making void the Law\nof commandments contained in decrees\": where he is referring to the\nOld Law, as the gloss comments, on the passage. Therefore the Old Law\ncomprises many commandments.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since a precept of law is binding, it is about\nsomething which must be done: and, that a thing must be done, arises\nfrom the necessity of some end. Hence it is evident that a precept\nimplies, in its very idea, relation to an end, in so far as a thing\nis commanded as being necessary or expedient to an end. Now many\nthings may happen to be necessary or expedient to an end; and,\naccordingly, precepts may be given about various things as being\nordained to one end. Consequently we must say that all the precepts\nof the Old Law are one in respect of their relation to one end: and\nyet they are many in respect of the diversity of those things that\nare ordained to that end.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Old Law is said to be one as being ordained to one\nend: yet it comprises various precepts, according to the diversity of\nthe things which it directs to the end. Thus also the art of building\nis one according to the unity of its end, because it aims at the\nbuilding of a house: and yet it contains various rules, according to\nthe variety of acts ordained thereto.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the Apostle says (1 Tim. 1:5), \"the end of the\ncommandment is charity\"; since every law aims at establishing\nfriendship, either between man and man, or between man and God.\nWherefore the whole Law is comprised in this one commandment, \"Thou\nshalt love thy neighbor as thyself,\" as expressing the end of all\ncommandments: because love of one's neighbor includes love of God,\nwhen we love our neighbor for God's sake. Hence the Apostle put this\ncommandment in place of the two which are about the love of God and\nof one's neighbor, and of which Our Lord said (Matt. 22:40): \"On\nthese two commandments dependeth the whole Law and the prophets.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated in _Ethic._ ix, 8, \"friendship towards\nanother arises from friendship towards oneself,\" in so far as man\nlooks on another as on himself. Hence when it is said, \"All things\nwhatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them,\"\nthis is an explanation of the rule of neighborly love contained\nimplicitly in the words, \"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself\":\nso that it is an explanation of this commandment.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 99, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Old Law Contains Moral Precepts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains no moral\nprecepts. For the Old Law is distinct from the law of nature, as\nstated above (Q. 91, AA. 4, 5; Q. 98, A. 5). But the moral precepts\nbelong to the law of nature. Therefore they do not belong to the Old\nLaw.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Divine Law should have come to man's assistance\nwhere human reason fails him: as is evident in regard to things that\nare of faith, which are above reason. But man's reason seems to\nsuffice for the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts do not\nbelong to the Old Law, which is a Divine law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Old Law is said to be \"the letter that killeth\"\n(2 Cor. 3:6). But the moral precepts do not kill, but quicken,\naccording to Ps. 118:93: \"Thy justifications I will never forget, for\nby them Thou hast given me life.\" Therefore the moral precepts do not\nbelong to the Old Law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ecclus. 17:9): \"Moreover, He gave\nthem discipline [Douay: 'instructions'] and the law of life for an\ninheritance.\" Now discipline belongs to morals; for this gloss on\nHeb. 12:11: \"Now all chastisement (_disciplina_),\" etc., says:\n\"Discipline is an exercise in morals by means of difficulties.\"\nTherefore the Law which was given by God comprised moral precepts.\n\n_I answer that,_ The Old Law contained some moral precepts; as is\nevident from Ex. 20:13, 15: \"Thou shalt not kill,\" \"Thou shalt not\nsteal.\" This was reasonable: because, just as the principal intention\nof human law is to create friendship between man and man; so the\nchief intention of the Divine law is to establish man in friendship\nwith God. Now since likeness is the reason of love, according to\nEcclus. 13:19: \"Every beast loveth its like\"; there cannot possibly\nbe any friendship of man to God, Who is supremely good, unless man\nbecome good: wherefore it is written (Lev. 19:2; 11:45): \"You shall\nbe holy, for I am holy.\" But the goodness of man is virtue, which\n\"makes its possessor good\" (Ethic. ii, 6). Therefore it was necessary\nfor the Old Law to include precepts about acts of virtue: and these\nare the moral precepts of the Law.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Old Law is distinct from the natural law, not as\nbeing altogether different from it, but as something added thereto.\nFor just as grace presupposes nature, so must the Divine law\npresuppose the natural law.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It was fitting that the Divine law should come to man's\nassistance not only in those things for which reason is insufficient,\nbut also in those things in which human reason may happen to be\nimpeded. Now human reason could not go astray in the abstract, as to\nthe universal principles of the natural law; but through being\nhabituated to sin, it became obscured in the point of things to be\ndone in detail. But with regard to the other moral precepts, which\nare like conclusions drawn from the universal principles of the\nnatural law, the reason of many men went astray, to the extend of\njudging to be lawful, things that are evil in themselves. Hence there\nwas need for the authority of the Divine law to rescue man from both\nthese defects. Thus among the articles of faith not only are those\nthings set forth to which reason cannot reach, such as the Trinity of\nthe Godhead; but also those to which right reason can attain, such as\nthe Unity of the Godhead; in order to remove the manifold errors to\nwhich reason is liable.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine proves (De Spiritu et Litera xiv), even\nthe letter of the law is said to be the occasion of death, as to the\nmoral precepts; in so far as, to wit, it prescribes what is good,\nwithout furnishing the aid of grace for its fulfilment.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 99, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Old Law Comprises Ceremonial, Besides Moral, Precepts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Old Law does not comprise\nceremonial, besides moral, precepts. For every law that is given to\nman is for the purpose of directing human actions. Now human actions\nare called moral, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 3). Therefore it seems\nthat the Old Law given to men should not comprise other than moral\nprecepts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, those precepts that are styled ceremonial seem to\nrefer to the Divine worship. But Divine worship is the act of a\nvirtue, viz. religion, which, as Tully says (De Invent. ii) \"offers\nworship and ceremony to the Godhead.\" Since, then, the moral precepts\nare about acts of virtue, as stated above (A. 2), it seems that the\nceremonial precepts should not be distinct from the moral.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts seem to be those which\nsignify something figuratively. But, as Augustine observes (De Doctr.\nChrist. ii, 3, 4), \"of all signs employed by men words hold the first\nplace.\" Therefore there is no need for the Law to contain ceremonial\nprecepts about certain figurative actions.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 4:13, 14): \"Ten words . . .\nHe wrote in two tables of stone; and He commanded me at that time\nthat I should teach you the ceremonies and judgments which you shall\ndo.\" But the ten commandments of the Law are moral precepts.\nTherefore besides the moral precepts there are others which are\nceremonial.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the Divine law is instituted\nchiefly in order to direct men to God; while human law is instituted\nchiefly in order to direct men in relation to one another. Hence\nhuman laws have not concerned themselves with the institution of\nanything relating to Divine worship except as affecting the common\ngood of mankind: and for this reason they have devised many\ninstitutions relating to Divine matters, according as it seemed\nexpedient for the formation of human morals; as may be seen in the\nrites of the Gentiles. On the other hand the Divine law directed men\nto one another according to the demands of that order whereby man is\ndirected to God, which order was the chief aim of that law. Now man\nis directed to God not only by the interior acts of the mind, which\nare faith, hope, and love, but also by certain external works,\nwhereby man makes profession of his subjection to God: and it is\nthese works that are said to belong to the Divine worship. This\nworship is called \"ceremony,\"--the _munia,_ i.e. gifts, of Ceres (who\nwas the goddess of fruits), as some say: because, at first, offerings\nwere made to God from the fruits: or because, as Valerius Maximus\nstates [*Fact. et Dict. Memor. i, 1], the word \"ceremony\" was\nintroduced among the Latins, to signify the Divine worship, being\nderived from a town near Rome called \"Caere\": since, when Rome was\ntaken by the Gauls, the sacred chattels of the Romans were taken\nthither and most carefully preserved. Accordingly those precepts of\nthe Law which refer to the Divine worship are specially called\nceremonial.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Human acts extend also to the Divine worship: and\ntherefore the Old Law given to man contains precepts about these\nmatters also.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q. 91, A. 3), the precepts of the\nnatural law are general, and require to be determined: and they are\ndetermined both by human law and by Divine law. And just as these\nvery determinations which are made by human law are said to be, not\nof natural, but of positive law; so the determinations of the\nprecepts of the natural law, effected by the Divine law, are distinct\nfrom the moral precepts which belong to the natural law. Wherefore to\nworship God, since it is an act of virtue, belongs to a moral\nprecept; but the determination of this precept, namely that He is to\nbe worshipped by such and such sacrifices, and such and such\nofferings, belongs to the ceremonial precepts. Consequently the\nceremonial precepts are distinct from the moral precepts.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. i), the things of God\ncannot be manifested to men except by means of sensible similitudes.\nNow these similitudes move the soul more when they are not only\nexpressed in words, but also offered to the senses. Wherefore the\nthings of God are set forth in the Scriptures not only by similitudes\nexpressed in words, as in the case of metaphorical expressions; but\nalso by similitudes of things set before the eyes, which pertains to\nthe ceremonial precepts.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 99, Art. 4]\n\nWhether, Besides the Moral and Ceremonial Precepts, There Are Also\nJudicial Precepts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there are no judicial precepts in\naddition to the moral and ceremonial precepts in the Old Law. For\nAugustine says (Contra Faust. vi, 2) that in the Old Law there are\n\"precepts concerning the life we have to lead, and precepts regarding\nthe life that is foreshadowed.\" Now the precepts of the life we have\nto lead are moral precepts; and the precepts of the life that is\nforeshadowed are ceremonial. Therefore besides these two kinds of\nprecepts we should not put any judicial precepts in the Law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a gloss on Ps. 118:102, \"I have not declined from\nThy judgments,\" says, i.e. \"from the rule of life Thou hast set for\nme.\" But a rule of life belongs to the moral precepts. Therefore the\njudicial precepts should not be considered as distinct from the moral\nprecepts.\n\nObj. 3: Further, judgment seems to be an act of justice, according to\nPs. 93:15: \"Until justice be turned into judgment.\" But acts of\njustice, like the acts of other virtues, belong to the moral\nprecepts. Therefore the moral precepts include the judicial precepts,\nand consequently should not be held as distinct from them.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:1): \"These are the precepts\nand ceremonies, and judgments\": where \"precepts\" stands for \"moral\nprecepts\" antonomastically. Therefore there are judicial precepts\nbesides moral and ceremonial precepts.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 3), it belongs to the Divine\nlaw to direct men to one another and to God. Now each of these\nbelongs in the abstract to the dictates of the natural law, to which\ndictates the moral precepts are to be referred: yet each of them has\nto be determined by Divine or human law, because naturally known\nprinciples are universal, both in speculative and in practical\nmatters. Accordingly just as the determination of the universal\nprinciple about Divine worship is effected by the ceremonial\nprecepts, so the determination of the general precepts of that\njustice which is to be observed among men is effected by the judicial\nprecepts.\n\nWe must therefore distinguish three kinds of precept in the Old Law;\nviz. _moral_ precepts, which are dictated by the natural law;\n_ceremonial_ precepts, which are determinations of the Divine\nworship; and _judicial_ precepts, which are determinations of the\njustice to be maintained among men. Wherefore the Apostle (Rom. 7:12)\nafter saying that the \"Law is holy,\" adds that \"the commandment is\njust, and holy, and good\": \"just,\" in respect of the judicial\nprecepts; \"holy,\" with regard to the ceremonial precepts (since the\nword \"sanctus\"--\"holy\"--is applied to that which is consecrated to\nGod); and \"good,\" i.e. conducive to virtue, as to the moral precepts.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Both the moral and the judicial precepts aim at the\nordering of human life: and consequently they are both comprised\nunder one of the heads mentioned by Augustine, viz. under the\nprecepts of the life we have to lead.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Judgment denotes execution of justice, by an\napplication of the reason to individual cases in a determinate way.\nHence the judicial precepts have something in common with the moral\nprecepts, in that they are derived from reason; and something in\ncommon with the ceremonial precepts, in that they are determinations\nof general precepts. This explains why sometimes \"judgments\" comprise\nboth judicial and moral precepts, as in Deut. 5:1: \"Hear, O Israel,\nthe ceremonies and judgments\"; and sometimes judicial and ceremonial\nprecepts, as in Lev. 18:4: \"You shall do My judgments, and shall\nobserve My precepts,\" where \"precepts\" denotes moral precepts, while\n\"judgments\" refers to judicial and ceremonial precepts.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The act of justice, in general, belongs to the moral\nprecepts; but its determination to some special kind of act belongs\nto the judicial precepts.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 99, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Old Law Contains Any Others Besides the Moral, Judicial,\nand Ceremonial Precepts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Old Law contains others besides\nthe moral, judicial, and ceremonial precepts. Because the judicial\nprecepts belong to the act of justice, which is between man and man;\nwhile the ceremonial precepts belong to the act of religion, whereby\nGod is worshipped. Now besides these there are many other virtues,\nviz. temperance, fortitude, liberality, and several others, as stated\nabove (Q. 60, A. 5). Therefore besides the aforesaid precepts, the\nOld Law should comprise others.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Deut. 11:1): \"Love the Lord thy God,\nand observe His precepts and ceremonies, His judgments and\ncommandments.\" Now precepts concern moral matters, as stated above\n(A. 4). Therefore besides the moral, judicial and ceremonial\nprecepts, the Law contains others which are called \"commandments.\"\n[*The \"commandments\" (mandata) spoken of here and in the body of this\narticle are not to be confused with the Commandments (praecepta) in\nthe ordinary acceptance of the word.]\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Deut. 6:17): \"Keep the precepts of\nthe Lord thy God, and the testimonies and ceremonies which I have\n[Vulg.: 'He hath'] commanded thee.\" Therefore in addition to the\nabove, the Law comprises \"testimonies.\"\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is written (Ps. 118:93): \"Thy justifications\n(i.e. \"Thy Law,\" according to a gloss) I will never forget.\"\nTherefore in the Old Law there are not only moral, ceremonial and\njudicial precepts, but also others, called \"justifications.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:1): \"These are the precepts\nand ceremonies and judgments which the Lord your God commanded . . .\nyou.\" And these words are placed at the beginning of the Law.\nTherefore all the precepts of the Law are included under them.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some things are included in the Law by way of\nprecept; other things, as being ordained to the fulfilment of the\nprecepts. Now the precepts refer to things which have to be done: and\nto their fulfilment man is induced by two considerations, viz. the\nauthority of the lawgiver, and the benefit derived from the\nfulfilment, which benefit consists in the attainment of some good,\nuseful, pleasurable or virtuous, or in the avoidance of some contrary\nevil. Hence it was necessary that in the Old Law certain things\nshould be set forth to indicate the authority of God the lawgiver:\ne.g. Deut. 6:4: \"Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord\"; and\nGen. 1:1: \"In the beginning God created heaven and earth\": and these\nare called \"testimonies.\" Again it was necessary that in the Law\ncertain rewards should be appointed for those who observe the Law,\nand punishments for those who transgress; as it may be seen in Deut.\n28: \"If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy God . . . He will\nmake thee higher than all the nations,\" etc.: and these are called\n\"justifications,\" according as God punishes or rewards certain ones\njustly.\n\nThe things that have to be done do not come under the precept except\nin so far as they have the character of a duty. Now a duty is\ntwofold: one according to the rule of reason; the other according to\nthe rule of a law which prescribes that duty: thus the Philosopher\ndistinguishes a twofold just--moral and legal (Ethic. v, 7).\n\nMoral duty is twofold: because reason dictates that something must be\ndone, either as being so necessary that without it the order of\nvirtue would be destroyed; or as being useful for the better\nmaintaining of the order of virtue. And in this sense some of the\nmoral precepts are expressed by way of absolute command or\nprohibition, as \"Thou shalt not kill,\" \"Thou shalt not steal\": and\nthese are properly called \"precepts.\" Other things are prescribed or\nforbidden, not as an absolute duty, but as something better to be\ndone. These may be called \"commandments\"; because they are expressed\nby way of inducement and persuasion: an example whereof is seen in\nEx. 22:26: \"If thou take of thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou\nshalt give it him again before sunset\"; and in other like cases.\nWherefore Jerome (Praefat. in Comment. super Marc.) says that\n\"justice is in the precepts, charity in the commandments.\" Duty as\nfixed by the Law, belongs to the judicial precepts, as regards human\naffairs; to the ceremonial precepts, as regards Divine matters.\n\nNevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and\nrewards may be called \"testimonies,\" in so far as they testify to the\nDivine justice. Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled\n\"justifications,\" as being executions of legal justice. Furthermore\nthe commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that\nthose things be called \"precepts\" which God Himself prescribed; and\nthose things \"commandments\" which He enjoined (_mandavit_) through\nothers, as the very word seems to denote.\n\nFrom this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either\nmoral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances have not\nthe character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the\nprecepts, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion\nof duty. Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in so far\nas they belong to justice: of which virtue religion is a part, as\nTully says (De Invent. ii). Wherefore the legal just cannot be\nanything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts.\n\nThe Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 99, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Old Law Should Have Induced Men to the Observance of Its\nPrecepts, by Means of Temporal Promises and Threats?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced\nmen to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises\nand threats. For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to\nGod by fear and love: hence it is written (Deut. 10:12): \"And now,\nIsrael, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou\nfear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him?\" But the\ndesire for temporal goods leads man away from God: for Augustine says\n(Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36), that \"covetousness is the bane of charity.\"\nTherefore temporal promises and threats seem to be contrary to the\nintention of a lawgiver: and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as\nthe Philosopher declares (Polit. ii, 6).\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law.\nNow, in sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher\nthe means of persuasion that it employs. Therefore, since human law\nemploys temporal threats and promises, as means of persuading man,\nthe Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the reward of righteousness and the punishment of\nguilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked.\nBut as stated in Eccles. 9:2, \"all\" temporal \"things equally happen\nto the just and to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean\nand to the unclean, to him that offereth victims, and to him that\ndespiseth sacrifices.\" Therefore temporal goods or evils are not\nsuitably set forth as punishments or rewards of the commandments of\nthe Divine law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Isa. 1:19, 20): \"If you be willing,\nand will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land.\nBut if you will not, and will provoke Me to wrath: the sword shall\ndevour you.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As in speculative sciences men are persuaded to\nassent to the conclusions by means of syllogistic arguments, so too\nin every law, men are persuaded to observe its precepts by means of\npunishments and rewards. Now it is to be observed that, in\nspeculative sciences, the means of persuasion are adapted to the\nconditions of the pupil: wherefore the process of argument in\nsciences should be ordered becomingly, so that the instruction is\nbased on principles more generally known. And thus also he who would\npersuade a man to the observance of any precepts, needs to move him\nat first by things for which he has an affection; just as children\nare induced to do something, by means of little childish gifts. Now\nit has been said above (Q. 98, AA. 1, 2, 3) that the Old Law disposed\nmen to (the coming of) Christ, as the imperfect in comparison\ndisposes to the perfect, wherefore it was given to a people as yet\nimperfect in comparison to the perfection which was to result from\nChrist's coming: and for this reason, that people is compared to a\nchild that is still under a pedagogue (Gal. 3:24). But the perfection\nof man consists in his despising temporal things and cleaving to\nthings spiritual, as is clear from the words of the Apostle (Phil.\n3:13, 15): \"Forgetting the things that are behind, I stretch [Vulg.:\n'and stretching'] forth myself to those that are before . . . Let us\ntherefore, as many as are perfect, be thus minded.\" Those who are yet\nimperfect desire temporal goods, albeit in subordination to God:\nwhereas the perverse place their end in temporalities. It was\ntherefore fitting that the Old Law should conduct men to God by means\nof temporal goods for which the imperfect have an affection.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Covetousness whereby man places his end in\ntemporalities, is the bane of charity. But the attainment of temporal\ngoods which man desires in subordination to God is a road leading the\nimperfect to the love of God, according to Ps. 48:19: \"He will praise\nThee, when Thou shalt do well to him.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Human law persuades men by means of temporal rewards or\npunishments to be inflicted by men: whereas the Divine law persuades\nmen by means of rewards or punishments to be received from God. In\nthis respect it employs higher means.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As any one can see, who reads carefully the story of\nthe Old Testament, the common weal of the people prospered under the\nLaw as long as they obeyed it; and as soon as they departed from the\nprecepts of the Law they were overtaken by many calamities. But\ncertain individuals, although they observed the justice of the Law,\nmet with misfortunes--either because they had already become\nspiritual (so that misfortune might withdraw them all the more from\nattachment to temporal things, and that their virtue might be\ntried)--or because, while outwardly fulfilling the works of the Law,\ntheir heart was altogether fixed on temporal goods, and far removed\nfrom God, according to Isa. 29:13 (Matt. 15:8): \"This people honoreth\nMe with their lips; but their hearts is far from Me.\"\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 100\n\nOF THE MORAL PRECEPTS OF THE OLD LAW\n(In Twelve Articles)\n\nWe must now consider each kind of precept of the Old Law: and (1) the\nmoral precepts, (2) the ceremonial precepts, (3) the judicial\nprecepts. Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law belong to the law\nof nature?\n\n(2) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law are about the acts of\nall the virtues?\n\n(3) Whether all the moral precepts of the Old Law are reducible to\nthe ten precepts of the decalogue?\n\n(4) How the precepts of the decalogue are distinguished from one\nanother?\n\n(5) Their number;\n\n(6) Their order;\n\n(7) The manner in which they were given;\n\n(8) Whether they are dispensable?\n\n(9) Whether the mode of observing a virtue comes under the precept\nof the Law?\n\n(10) Whether the mode of charity comes under the precept?\n\n(11) The distinction of other moral precepts;\n\n(12) Whether the moral precepts of the Old Law justified man?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 1]\n\nWhether All the Moral Precepts of the Old Law Belong to the Law of\nNature?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts belong to\nthe law of nature. For it is written (Ecclus. 17:9): \"Moreover He\ngave them instructions, and the law of life for an inheritance.\" But\ninstruction is in contradistinction to the law of nature; since the\nlaw of nature is not learnt, but instilled by natural instinct.\nTherefore not all the moral precepts belong to the natural law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Divine law is more perfect than human law. But\nhuman law adds certain things concerning good morals, to those that\nbelong to the law of nature: as is evidenced by the fact that the\nnatural law is the same in all men, while these moral institutions\nare various for various people. Much more reason therefore was there\nwhy the Divine law should add to the law of nature, ordinances\npertaining to good morals.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as natural reason leads to good morals in\ncertain matters, so does faith: hence it is written (Gal. 5:6) that\nfaith \"worketh by charity.\" But faith is not included in the law of\nnature; since that which is of faith is above nature. Therefore not\nall the moral precepts of the Divine law belong to the law of nature.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 2:14) that \"the Gentiles,\nwho have not the Law, do by nature those things that are of the Law\":\nwhich must be understood of things pertaining to good morals.\nTherefore all the moral precepts of the Law belong to the law of\nnature.\n\n_I answer that,_ The moral precepts, distinct from the ceremonial and\njudicial precepts, are about things pertaining of their very nature\nto good morals. Now since human morals depend on their relation to\nreason, which is the proper principle of human acts, those morals are\ncalled good which accord with reason, and those are called bad which\nare discordant from reason. And as every judgment of speculative\nreason proceeds from the natural knowledge of first principles, so\nevery judgment of practical reason proceeds from principles known\nnaturally, as stated above (Q. 94, AA. 2, 4): from which principles\none may proceed in various ways to judge of various matters. For some\nmatters connected with human actions are so evident, that after very\nlittle consideration one is able at once to approve or disapprove of\nthem by means of these general first principles: while some matters\ncannot be the subject of judgment without much consideration of the\nvarious circumstances, which all are not competent to do carefully,\nbut only those who are wise: just as it is not possible for all to\nconsider the particular conclusions of sciences, but only for those\nwho are versed in philosophy: and lastly there are some matters of\nwhich man cannot judge unless he be helped by Divine instruction;\nsuch as the articles of faith.\n\nIt is therefore evident that since the moral precepts are about\nmatters which concern good morals; and since good morals are those\nwhich are in accord with reason; and since also every judgment of\nhuman reason must needs by derived in some way from natural reason;\nit follows, of necessity, that all the moral precepts belong to the\nlaw of nature; but not all in the same way. For there are certain\nthings which the natural reason of every man, of its own accord and\nat once, judges to be done or not to be done: e.g. \"Honor thy father\nand thy mother,\" and \"Thou shalt not kill,\" \"Thou shalt not steal\":\nand these belong to the law of nature absolutely. And there are\ncertain things which, after a more careful consideration, wise men\ndeem obligatory. Such belong to the law of nature, yet so that they\nneed to be inculcated, the wiser teaching the less wise: e.g. \"Rise\nup before the hoary head, and honor the person of the aged man,\" and\nthe like. And there are some things, to judge of which, human reason\nneeds Divine instruction, whereby we are taught about the things of\nGod: e.g. \"Thou shalt not make to thyself a graven thing, nor the\nlikeness of anything\"; \"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy\nGod in vain.\"\n\nThis suffices for the Replies to the Objections.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Moral Precepts of the Law Are About All the Acts of\nVirtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Law are not\nabout all the acts of virtue. For observance of the precepts of the\nOld Law is called justification, according to Ps. 118:8: \"I will keep\nThy justifications.\" But justification is the execution of justice.\nTherefore the moral precepts are only about acts of justice.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which comes under a precept has the character\nof a duty. But the character of duty belongs to justice alone and to\nnone of the other virtues, for the proper act of justice consists in\nrendering to each one his due. Therefore the precepts of the moral\nlaw are not about the acts of the other virtues, but only about the\nacts of justice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every law is made for the common good, as Isidore\nsays (Etym. v, 21). But of all the virtues justice alone regards the\ncommon good, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 1). Therefore the\nmoral precepts are only about the acts of justice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Ambrose says (De Paradiso viii) that \"a sin is a\ntransgression of the Divine law, and a disobedience to the\ncommandments of heaven.\" But there are sins contrary to all the acts\nof virtue. Therefore it belongs to Divine law to direct all the acts\nof virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since the precepts of the Law are ordained to the\ncommon good, as stated above (Q. 90, A. 2), the precepts of the Law\nmust needs be diversified according to the various kinds of\ncommunity: hence the Philosopher (Polit. iv, 1) teaches that the laws\nwhich are made in a state which is ruled by a king must be different\nfrom the laws of a state which is ruled by the people, or by a few\npowerful men in the state. Now human law is ordained for one kind of\ncommunity, and the Divine law for another kind. Because human law is\nordained for the civil community, implying mutual duties of man and\nhis fellows: and men are ordained to one another by outward acts,\nwhereby men live in communion with one another. This life in common\nof man with man pertains to justice, whose proper function consists\nin directing the human community. Wherefore human law makes precepts\nonly about acts of justice; and if it commands acts of other virtues,\nthis is only in so far as they assume the nature of justice, as the\nPhilosopher explains (Ethic. v, 1).\n\nBut the community for which the Divine law is ordained, is that of\nmen in relation to God, either in this life or in the life to come.\nAnd therefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those\nmatters whereby men are well ordered in their relations to God. Now\nman is united to God by his reason or mind, in which is God's image.\nWherefore the Divine law proposes precepts about all those matters\nwhereby human reason is well ordered. But this is effected by the\nacts of all the virtues: since the intellectual virtues set in good\norder the acts of the reason in themselves: while the moral virtues\nset in good order the acts of the reason in reference to the interior\npassions and exterior actions. It is therefore evident that the\nDivine law fittingly proposes precepts about the acts of all the\nvirtues: yet so that certain matters, without which the order of\nvirtue, which is the order of reason, cannot even exist, come under\nan obligation of precept; while other matters, which pertain to the\nwell-being of perfect virtue, come under an admonition of counsel.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The fulfilment of the commandments of the Law, even of\nthose which are about the acts of the other virtues, has the\ncharacter of justification, inasmuch as it is just that man should\nobey God: or again, inasmuch as it is just that all that belongs to\nman should be subject to reason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Justice properly so called regards the duty of one man\nto another: but all the other virtues regard the duty of the lower\npowers to reason. It is in relation to this latter duty that the\nPhilosopher speaks (Ethic. v, 11) of a kind of metaphorical justice.\n\nThe Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said\nabout the different kinds of community.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 3]\n\nWhether All the Moral Precepts of the Old Law Are Reducible to the\nTen Precepts of the Decalogue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that not all the moral precepts of the Old\nLaw are reducible to the ten precepts of the decalogue. For the first\nand principal precepts of the Law are, \"Thou shalt love the Lord thy\nGod,\" and \"Thou shalt love thy neighbor,\" as stated in Matt. 22:37,\n39. But these two are not contained in the precepts of the decalogue.\nTherefore not all the moral precepts are contained in the precepts of\nthe decalogue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the moral precepts are not reducible to the\nceremonial precepts, but rather vice versa. But among the precepts of\nthe decalogue, one is ceremonial, viz. \"Remember that thou keep holy\nthe Sabbath-day.\" Therefore the moral precepts are not reducible to\nall the precepts of the decalogue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the moral precepts are about all the acts of virtue.\nBut among the precepts of the decalogue are only such as regard acts\nof justice; as may be seen by going through them all. Therefore the\nprecepts of the decalogue do not include all the moral precepts.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The gloss on Matt. 5:11: \"Blessed are ye when they\nshall revile you,\" etc. says that \"Moses, after propounding the ten\nprecepts, set them out in detail.\" Therefore all the precepts of the\nLaw are so many parts of the precepts of the decalogue.\n\n_I answer that,_ The precepts of the decalogue differ from the other\nprecepts of the Law, in the fact that God Himself is said to have\ngiven the precepts of the decalogue; whereas He gave the other\nprecepts to the people through Moses. Wherefore the decalogue\nincludes those precepts the knowledge of which man has immediately\nfrom God. Such are those which with but slight reflection can be\ngathered at once from the first general principles: and those also\nwhich become known to man immediately through divinely infused faith.\nConsequently two kinds of precepts are not reckoned among the\nprecepts of the decalogue: viz. first general principles, for they\nneed no further promulgation after being once imprinted on the\nnatural reason to which they are self-evident; as, for instance, that\none should do evil to no man, and other similar principles: and again\nthose which the careful reflection of wise men shows to be in accord\nwith reason; since the people receive these principles from God,\nthrough being taught by wise men. Nevertheless both kinds of precepts\nare contained in the precepts of the decalogue; yet in different\nways. For the first general principles are contained in them, as\nprinciples in their proximate conclusions; while those which are\nknown through wise men are contained, conversely, as conclusions in\ntheir principles.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Those two principles are the first general principles\nof the natural law, and are self-evident to human reason, either\nthrough nature or through faith. Wherefore all the precepts of the\ndecalogue are referred to these, as conclusions to general principles.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The precept of the Sabbath observance is moral in one\nrespect, in so far as it commands man to give some time to the things\nof God, according to Ps. 45:11: \"Be still and see that I am God.\" In\nthis respect it is placed among the precepts of the decalogue: but\nnot as to the fixing of the time, in which respect it is a ceremonial\nprecept.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The notion of duty is not so patent in the other\nvirtues as it is in justice. Hence the precepts about the acts of the\nother virtues are not so well known to the people as are the precepts\nabout acts of justice. Wherefore the acts of justice especially come\nunder the precepts of the decalogue, which are the primary elements\nof the Law.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Suitably Distinguished from\nOne Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are\nunsuitably distinguished from one another. For worship is a virtue\ndistinct from faith. Now the precepts are about acts of virtue. But\nthat which is said at the beginning of the decalogue, \"Thou shalt not\nhave strange gods before Me,\" belongs to faith: and that which is\nadded, \"Thou shalt not make . . . any graven thing,\" etc. belongs to\nworship. Therefore these are not one precept, as Augustine asserts\n(Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), but two.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the affirmative precepts in the Law are distinct\nfrom the negative precepts; e.g. \"Honor thy father and thy mother,\"\nand, \"Thou shalt not kill.\" But this, \"I am the Lord thy God,\" is\naffirmative: and that which follows, \"Thou shalt not have strange\ngods before Me,\" is negative. Therefore these are two precepts, and\ndo not, as Augustine says (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi), make one.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Rom. 7:7): \"I had not known\nconcupiscence, if the Law did not say: 'Thou shalt not covet.'\" Hence\nit seems that this precept, \"Thou shalt not covet,\" is one precept;\nand, therefore, should not be divided into two.\n\n_On the contrary,_ stands the authority of Augustine who, in\ncommenting on Exodus (Qq. in Exod. qu. lxxi) distinguishes three\nprecepts as referring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor.\n\n_I answer that,_ The precepts of the decalogue are differently\ndivided by different authorities. For Hesychius commenting on Lev.\n26:26, \"Ten women shall bake your bread in one oven,\" says that the\nprecept of the Sabbath-day observance is not one of the ten precepts,\nbecause its observance, in the letter, is not binding for all time.\nBut he distinguishes four precepts pertaining to God, the first\nbeing, \"I am the Lord thy God\"; the second, \"Thou shalt not have\nstrange gods before Me,\" (thus also Jerome distinguishes these two\nprecepts, in his commentary on Osee 10:10, \"On thy\" [Vulg.: \"their\"]\n\"two iniquities\"); the third precept according to him is, \"Thou shalt\nnot make to thyself any graven thing\"; and the fourth, \"Thou shalt\nnot take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.\" He states that there\nare six precepts pertaining to our neighbor; the first, \"Honor thy\nfather and thy mother\"; the second, \"Thou shalt not kill\"; the third,\n\"Thou shalt not commit adultery\"; the fourth, \"Thou shalt not steal\";\nthe fifth, \"Thou shalt not bear false witness\"; the sixth, \"Thou\nshalt not covet.\"\n\nBut, in the first place, it seems unbecoming for the precept of the\nSabbath-day observance to be put among the precepts of the decalogue,\nif it nowise belonged to the decalogue. Secondly, because, since it\nis written (Matt. 6:24), \"No man can serve two masters,\" the two\nstatements, \"I am the Lord thy God,\" and, \"Thou shalt not have\nstrange gods before Me\" seem to be of the same nature and to form one\nprecept. Hence Origen (Hom. viii in Exod.) who also distinguishes\nfour precepts as referring to God, unites these two under one\nprecept; and reckons in the second place, \"Thou shalt not make . . .\nany graven thing\"; as third, \"Thou shalt not take the name of the\nLord thy God in vain\"; and as fourth, \"Remember that thou keep holy\nthe Sabbath-day.\" The other six he reckons in the same way as\nHesychius.\n\nSince, however, the making of graven things or the likeness of\nanything is not forbidden except as to the point of their being\nworshipped as gods--for God commanded an image of the Seraphim\n[Vulg.: Cherubim] to be made and placed in the tabernacle, as related\nin Ex. 25:18--Augustine more fittingly unites these two, \"Thou shalt\nnot have strange gods before Me,\" and, \"Thou shalt not make . . . any\ngraven thing,\" into one precept. Likewise to covet another's wife,\nfor the purpose of carnal knowledge, belongs to the concupiscence of\nthe flesh; whereas, to covet other things, which are desired for the\npurpose of possession, belongs to the concupiscence of the eyes;\nwherefore Augustine reckons as distinct precepts, that which forbids\nthe coveting of another's goods, and that which prohibits the\ncoveting of another's wife. Thus he distinguishes three precepts as\nreferring to God, and seven as referring to our neighbor. And this is\nbetter.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Worship is merely a declaration of faith: wherefore the\nprecepts about worship should not be reckoned as distinct from those\nabout faith. Nevertheless precepts should be given about worship\nrather than about faith, because the precept about faith is\npresupposed to the precepts of the decalogue, as is also the precept\nof charity. For just as the first general principles of the natural\nlaw are self-evident to a subject having natural reason, and need no\npromulgation; so also to believe in God is a first and self-evident\nprinciple to a subject possessed of faith: \"for he that cometh to\nGod, must believe that He is\" (Heb. 11:6). Hence it needs no other\npromulgation that the infusion of faith.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The affirmative precepts are distinct from the\nnegative, when one is not comprised in the other: thus that man\nshould honor his parents does not include that he should not kill\nanother man; nor does the latter include the former. But when an\naffirmative precept is included in a negative, or vice versa, we do\nnot find that two distinct precepts are given: thus there is not one\nprecept saying that \"Thou shalt not steal,\" and another binding one\nto keep another's property intact, or to give it back to its owner.\nIn the same way there are not different precepts about believing in\nGod, and about not believing in strange gods.\n\nReply Obj. 3: All covetousness has one common ratio: and therefore\nthe Apostle speaks of the commandment about covetousness as though it\nwere one. But because there are various special kinds of\ncovetousness, therefore Augustine distinguishes different\nprohibitions against coveting: for covetousness differs specifically\nin respect of the diversity of actions or things coveted, as the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. x, 5).\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 5]\n\nWhether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Suitably Set Forth?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are\nunsuitably set forth. Because sin, as stated by Ambrose (De Paradiso\nviii), is \"a transgression of the Divine law and a disobedience to\nthe commandments of heaven.\" But sins are distinguished according as\nman sins against God, or his neighbor, or himself. Since, then, the\ndecalogue does not include any precepts directing man in his\nrelations to himself, but only such as direct him in his relations to\nGod and himself, it seems that the precepts of the decalogue are\ninsufficiently enumerated.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as the Sabbath-day observance pertained to the\nworship of God, so also did the observance of other solemnities, and\nthe offering of sacrifices. But the decalogue contains a precept\nabout the Sabbath-day observance. Therefore it should contain others\nalso, pertaining to the other solemnities, and to the sacrificial\nrite.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as sins against God include the sin of perjury, so\nalso do they include blasphemy, or other ways of lying against the\nteaching of God. But there is a precept forbidding perjury, \"Thou\nshalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.\" Therefore there\nshould be also a precept of the decalogue forbidding blasphemy and\nfalse doctrine.\n\nObj. 4: Further, just as man has a natural affection for his parents,\nso has he also for his children. Moreover the commandment of charity\nextends to all our neighbors. Now the precepts of the decalogue are\nordained unto charity, according to 1 Tim. 1:5: \"The end of the\ncommandment is charity.\" Therefore as there is a precept referring to\nparents, so should there have been some precepts referring to\nchildren and other neighbors.\n\nObj. 5: Further, in every kind of sin, it is possible to sin in\nthought or in deed. But in some kinds of sin, namely in theft and\nadultery, the prohibition of sins of deed, when it is said, \"Thou\nshalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal,\" is distinct from\nthe prohibition of the sin of thought, when it is said, \"Thou shalt\nnot covet thy neighbor's goods,\" and, \"Thou shalt not covet thy\nneighbor's wife.\" Therefore the same should have been done in regard\nto the sins of homicide and false witness.\n\nObj. 6: Further, just as sin happens through disorder of the\nconcupiscible faculty, so does it arise through disorder of the\nirascible part. But some precepts forbid inordinate concupiscence,\nwhen it is said, \"Thou shalt not covet.\" Therefore the decalogue\nshould have included some precepts forbidding the disorders of the\nirascible faculty. Therefore it seems that the ten precepts of the\ndecalogue are unfittingly enumerated.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 4:13): \"He shewed you His\ncovenant, which He commanded you to do, and the ten words that He\nwrote in two tablets of stone.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), just as the precepts of\nhuman law direct man in his relations to the human community, so the\nprecepts of the Divine law direct man in his relations to a community\nor commonwealth of men under God. Now in order that any man may dwell\naright in a community, two things are required: the first is that he\nbehave well to the head of the community; the other is that he behave\nwell to those who are his fellows and partners in the community. It\nis therefore necessary that the Divine law should contain in the\nfirst place precepts ordering man in his relations to God; and in the\nsecond place, other precepts ordering man in his relations to other\nmen who are his neighbors and live with him under God.\n\nNow man owes three things to the head of the community: first,\nfidelity; secondly, reverence; thirdly, service. Fidelity to his\nmaster consists in his not giving sovereign honor to another: and\nthis is the sense of the first commandment, in the words \"Thou shalt\nnot have strange gods.\" Reverence to his master requires that he\nshould do nothing injurious to him: and this is conveyed by the\nsecond commandment, \"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God\nin vain.\" Service is due to the master in return for the benefits\nwhich his subjects receive from him: and to this belongs the third\ncommandment of the sanctification of the Sabbath in memory of the\ncreation of all things.\n\nTo his neighbors a man behaves himself well both in particular and in\ngeneral. In particular, as to those to whom he is indebted, by paying\nhis debts: and in this sense is to be taken the commandment about\nhonoring one's parents. In general, as to all men, by doing harm to\nnone, either by deed, or by word, or by thought. By deed, harm is\ndone to one's neighbor--sometimes in his person, i.e. as to his\npersonal existence; and this is forbidden by the words, \"Thou shalt\nnot kill\": sometimes in a person united to him, as to the propagation\nof offspring; and this is prohibited by the words, \"Thou shalt not\ncommit adultery\": sometimes in his possessions, which are directed to\nboth the aforesaid; and with this regard to this it is said, \"Thou\nshalt not steal.\" Harm done by word is forbidden when it is said,\n\"Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor\": harm done\nby thought is forbidden in the words, \"Thou shalt not covet.\"\n\nThe three precepts that direct man in his behavior towards God may\nalso be differentiated in this same way. For the first refers to\ndeeds; wherefore it is said, \"Thou shalt not make . . . a graven\nthing\": the second, to words; wherefore it is said, \"Thou shalt not\ntake the name of the Lord thy God in vain\": the third, to thoughts;\nbecause the sanctification of the Sabbath, as the subject of a moral\nprecept, requires repose of the heart in God. Or, according to\nAugustine (In Ps. 32: Conc. 1), by the first commandment we reverence\nthe unity of the First Principle; by the second, the Divine truth; by\nthe third, His goodness whereby we are sanctified, and wherein we\nrest as in our last end.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This objection may be answered in two ways. First,\nbecause the precepts of the decalogue can be reduced to the precepts\nof charity. Now there was need for man to receive a precept about\nloving God and his neighbor, because in this respect the natural law\nhad become obscured on account of sin: but not about the duty of\nloving oneself, because in this respect the natural law retained its\nvigor: or again, because love of oneself is contained in the love of\nGod and of one's neighbor: since true self-love consists in directing\noneself to God. And for this reason the decalogue includes those\nprecepts only which refer to our neighbor and to God.\n\nSecondly, it may be answered that the precepts of the decalogue are\nthose which the people received from God immediately; wherefore it is\nwritten (Deut. 10:4): \"He wrote in the tables, according as He had\nwritten before, the ten words, which the Lord spoke to you.\" Hence\nthe precepts of the decalogue need to be such as the people can\nunderstand at once. Now a precept implies the notion of duty. But it\nis easy for a man, especially for a believer, to understand that, of\nnecessity, he owes certain duties to God and to his neighbor. But\nthat, in matters which regard himself and not another, man has, of\nnecessity, certain duties to himself, is not so evident: for, at the\nfirst glance, it seems that everyone is free in matters that concern\nhimself. And therefore the precepts which prohibit disorders of a man\nwith regard to himself, reach the people through the instruction of\nmen who are versed in such matters; and, consequently, they are not\ncontained in the decalogue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All the solemnities of the Old Law were instituted in\ncelebration of some Divine favor, either in memory of past favors, or\nin sign of some favor to come: in like manner all the sacrifices were\noffered up with the same purpose. Now of all the Divine favors to be\ncommemorated the chief was that of the Creation, which was called to\nmind by the sanctification of the Sabbath; wherefore the reason for\nthis precept is given in Ex. 20:11: \"In six days the Lord made heaven\nand earth,\" etc. And of all future blessings, the chief and final was\nthe repose of the mind in God, either, in the present life, by grace,\nor, in the future life, by glory; which repose was also foreshadowed\nin the Sabbath-day observance: wherefore it is written (Isa. 58:13):\n\"If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy own will\nin My holy day, and call the Sabbath delightful, and the holy of the\nLord glorious.\" Because these favors first and chiefly are borne in\nmind by men, especially by the faithful. But other solemnities were\ncelebrated on account of certain particular favors temporal and\ntransitory, such as the celebration of the Passover in memory of the\npast favor of the delivery from Egypt, and as a sign of the future\nPassion of Christ, which though temporal and transitory, brought us\nto the repose of the spiritual Sabbath. Consequently, the Sabbath\nalone, and none of the other solemnities and sacrifices, is mentioned\nin the precepts of the decalogue.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the Apostle says (Heb. 6:16), \"men swear by one\ngreater than themselves; and an oath for confirmation is the end of\nall their controversy.\" Hence, since oaths are common to all,\ninordinate swearing is the matter of a special prohibition by a\nprecept of the decalogue. According to one interpretation, however,\nthe words, \"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in\nvain,\" are a prohibition of false doctrine, for one gloss expounds\nthem thus: \"Thou shalt not say that Christ is a creature.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: That a man should not do harm to anyone is an immediate\ndictate of his natural reason: and therefore the precepts that forbid\nthe doing of harm are binding on all men. But it is not an immediate\ndictate of natural reason that a man should do one thing in return\nfor another, unless he happen to be indebted to someone. Now a son's\ndebt to his father is so evident that one cannot get away from it by\ndenying it: since the father is the principle of generation and\nbeing, and also of upbringing and teaching. Wherefore the decalogue\ndoes not prescribe deeds of kindness or service to be done to anyone\nexcept to one's parents. On the other hand parents do not seem to be\nindebted to their children for any favors received, but rather the\nreverse is the case. Again, a child is a part of his father; and\n\"parents love their children as being a part of themselves,\" as the\nPhilosopher states (Ethic. viii, 12). Hence, just as the decalogue\ncontains no ordinance as to man's behavior towards himself, so, for\nthe same reason, it includes no precept about loving one's children.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The pleasure of adultery and the usefulness of wealth,\nin so far as they have the character of pleasurable or useful good,\nare of themselves, objects of appetite: and for this reason they\nneeded to be forbidden not only in the deed but also in the desire.\nBut murder and falsehood are, of themselves, objects of repulsion\n(since it is natural for man to love his neighbor and the truth): and\nare desired only for the sake of something else. Consequently with\nregard to sins of murder and false witness, it was necessary to\nproscribe, not sins of thought, but only sins of deed.\n\nReply Obj. 6: As stated above (Q. 25, A. 1), all the passions of the\nirascible faculty arise from the passions of the concupiscible part.\nHence, as the precepts of the decalogue are, as it were, the first\nelements of the Law, there was no need for mention of the irascible\npassions, but only of the concupiscible passions.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Ten Precepts of the Decalogue Are Set in Proper Order?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the ten precepts of the decalogue are\nnot set in proper order. Because love of one's neighbor is seemingly\nprevious to love of God, since our neighbor is better known to us\nthan God is; according to 1 John 4:20: \"He that loveth not his\nbrother, whom he seeth, how can he love God, Whom he seeth not?\" But\nthe first three precepts belong to the love of God, while the other\nseven pertain to the love of our neighbor. Therefore the precepts of\nthe decalogue are not set in proper order.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the acts of virtue are prescribed by the affirmative\nprecepts, and acts of vice are forbidden by the negative precepts.\nBut according to Boethius in his commentary on the _Categories_\n[*Lib. iv, cap. De Oppos.], vices should be uprooted before virtues\nare sown. Therefore among the precepts concerning our neighbor, the\nnegative precepts should have preceded the affirmative.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the precepts of the Law are about men's actions. But\nactions of thought precede actions of word or outward deed. Therefore\nthe precepts about not coveting, which regard our thoughts, are\nunsuitably placed last in order.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 13:1): \"The things that are\nof God, are well ordered\" [Vulg.: 'Those that are, are ordained of\nGod']. But the precepts of the decalogue were given immediately by\nGod, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore they are arranged in becoming\norder.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 3, 5, ad 1), the precepts of\nthe decalogue are such as the mind of man is ready to grasp at once.\nNow it is evident that a thing is so much the more easily grasped by\nthe reason, as its contrary is more grievous and repugnant to reason.\nMoreover, it is clear, since the order of reason begins with the end,\nthat, for a man to be inordinately disposed towards his end, is\nsupremely contrary to reason. Now the end of human life and society\nis God. Consequently it was necessary for the precepts of the\ndecalogue, first of all, to direct man to God; since the contrary to\nthis is most grievous. Thus also, in an army, which is ordained to\nthe commander as to its end, it is requisite first that the soldier\nshould be subject to the commander, and the opposite of this is most\ngrievous; and secondly it is requisite that he should be in\ncoordination with the other soldiers.\n\nNow among those things whereby we are ordained to God, the first is\nthat man should be subjected to Him faithfully, by having nothing in\ncommon with His enemies. The second is that he should show Him\nreverence: the third that he should offer Him service. Thus, in an\narmy, it is a greater sin for a soldier to act treacherously and make\na compact with the foe, than to be insolent to his commander: and\nthis last is more grievous than if he be found wanting in some point\nof service to him.\n\nAs to the precepts that direct man in his behavior towards his\nneighbor, it is evident that it is more repugnant to reason, and a\nmore grievous sin, if man does not observe the due order as to those\npersons to whom he is most indebted. Consequently, among those\nprecepts that direct man in his relations to his neighbor, the first\nplace is given to that one which regards his parents. Among the other\nprecepts we again find the order to be according to the gravity of\nsin. For it is more grave and more repugnant to reason, to sin by\ndeed than by word; and by word than by thought. And among sins of\ndeed, murder which destroys life in one already living is more\ngrievous than adultery, which imperils the life of the unborn child;\nand adultery is more grave than theft, which regards external goods.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Although our neighbor is better known than God by the\nway of the senses, nevertheless the love of God is the reason for the\nlove of our neighbor, as shall be declared later on (II-II, Q. 25, A.\n1; Q. 26, A. 2). Hence the precepts ordaining man to God demanded\nprecedence of the others.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as God is the universal principle of being in\nrespect of all things, so is a father a principle of being in respect\nof his son. Therefore the precept regarding parents was fittingly\nplaced after the precepts regarding God. This argument holds in\nrespect of affirmative and negative precepts about the same kind of\ndeed: although even then it is not altogether cogent. For although in\nthe order of execution, vices should be uprooted before virtues are\nsown, according to Ps. 33:15: \"Turn away from evil, and do good,\" and\nIsa. 1:16, 17: \"Cease to do perversely; learn to do well\"; yet, in\nthe order of knowledge, virtue precedes vice, because \"the crooked\nline is known by the straight\" (De Anima i): and \"by the law is the\nknowledge of sin\" (Rom. 3:20). Wherefore the affirmative precept\ndemanded the first place. However, this is not the reason for the\norder, but that which is given above. Because in the precepts\nregarding God, which belongs to the first table, an affirmative\nprecept is placed last, since its transgression implies a less\ngrievous sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although sin of thought stands first in the order of\nexecution, yet its prohibition holds a later position in the order of\nreason.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Suitably Formulated?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are\nunsuitably formulated. Because the affirmative precepts direct man to\nacts of virtue, while the negative precepts withdraw him from acts of\nvice. But in every matter there are virtues and vices opposed to one\nanother. Therefore in whatever matter there is an ordinance of a\nprecept of the decalogue, there should have been an affirmative and a\nnegative precept. Therefore it was unfitting that affirmative\nprecepts should be framed in some matters, and negative precepts in\nothers.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Isidore says (Etym. ii, 10) that every law is based\non reason. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Divine\nlaw. Therefore the reason should have been pointed out in each\nprecept, and not only in the first and third.\n\nObj. 3: Further, by observing the precepts man deserves to be\nrewarded by God. But the Divine promises concern the rewards of the\nprecepts. Therefore the promise should have been included in each\nprecept, and not only in the second and fourth.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Old Law is called \"the law of fear,\" in so far\nas it induced men to observe the precepts, by means of the threat of\npunishments. But all the precepts of the decalogue belong to the Old\nLaw. Therefore a threat of punishment should have been included in\neach, and not only in the first and second.\n\nObj. 5: Further, all the commandments of God should be retained in\nthe memory: for it is written (Prov. 3:3): \"Write them in the tables\nof thy heart.\" Therefore it was not fitting that mention of the\nmemory should be made in the third commandment only. Consequently it\nseems that the precepts of the decalogue are unsuitably formulated.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Wis. 11:21) that \"God made all\nthings, in measure, number and weight.\" Much more therefore did He\nobserve a suitable manner in formulating His Law.\n\n_I answer that,_ The highest wisdom is contained in the precepts of\nthe Divine law: wherefore it is written (Deut. 4:6): \"This is your\nwisdom and understanding in the sight of nations.\" Now it belongs to\nwisdom to arrange all things in due manner and order. Therefore it\nmust be evident that the precepts of the Law are suitably set forth.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Affirmation of one thing always leads to the denial of\nits opposite: but the denial of one opposite does not always lead to\nthe affirmation of the other. For it follows that if a thing is\nwhite, it is not black: but it does not follow that if it is not\nblack, it is white: because negation extends further than\naffirmation. And hence too, that one ought not to do harm to another,\nwhich pertains to the negative precepts, extends to more persons, as\na primary dictate of reason, than that one ought to do someone a\nservice or kindness. Nevertheless it is a primary dictate of reason\nthat man is a debtor in the point of rendering a service or kindness\nto those from whom he has received kindness, if he has not yet repaid\nthe debt. Now there are two whose favors no man can sufficiently\nrepay, viz. God and man's father, as stated in _Ethic._ viii, 14.\nTherefore it is that there are only two affirmative precepts; one\nabout the honor due to parents, the other about the celebration of\nthe Sabbath in memory of the Divine favor.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The reasons for the purely moral precepts are manifest;\nhence there was no need to add the reason. But some of the precepts\ninclude ceremonial matter, or a determination of a general moral\nprecept; thus the first precept includes the determination, \"Thou\nshalt not make a graven thing\"; and in the third precept the\nSabbath-day is fixed. Consequently there was need to state the reason\nin each case.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Generally speaking, men direct their actions to some\npoint of utility. Consequently in those precepts in which it seemed\nthat there would be no useful result, or that some utility might be\nhindered, it was necessary to add a promise of reward. And since\nparents are already on the way to depart from us, no benefit is\nexpected from them: wherefore a promise of reward is added to the\nprecept about honoring one's parents. The same applies to the precept\nforbidding idolatry: since thereby it seemed that men were hindered\nfrom receiving the apparent benefit which they think they can get by\nentering into a compact with the demons.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Punishments are necessary against those who are prone\nto evil, as stated in _Ethic._ x, 9. Wherefore a threat of punishment\nis only affixed to those precepts of the law which forbade evils to\nwhich men were prone. Now men were prone to idolatry by reason of the\ngeneral custom of the nations. Likewise men are prone to perjury on\naccount of the frequent use of oaths. Hence it is that a threat is\naffixed to the first two precepts.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The commandment about the Sabbath was made in memory of\na past blessing. Wherefore special mention of the memory is made\ntherein. Or again, the commandment about the Sabbath has a\ndetermination affixed to it that does not belong to the natural law,\nwherefore this precept needed a special admonition.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Precepts of the Decalogue Are Dispensable?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the precepts of the decalogue are\ndispensable. For the precepts of the decalogue belong to the natural\nlaw. But the natural law fails in some cases and is changeable, like\nhuman nature, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 7). Now the failure\nof law to apply in certain particular cases is a reason for\ndispensation, as stated above (Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97, A. 4). Therefore a\ndispensation can be granted in the precepts of the decalogue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, man stands in the same relation to human law as God\ndoes to Divine law. But man can dispense with the precepts of a law\nmade by man. Therefore, since the precepts of the decalogue are\nordained by God, it seems that God can dispense with them. Now our\nsuperiors are God's viceregents on earth; for the Apostle says (2\nCor. 2:10): \"For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything,\nfor your sakes have I done it in the person of Christ.\" Therefore\nsuperiors can dispense with the precepts of the decalogue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, among the precepts of the decalogue is one\nforbidding murder. But it seems that a dispensation is given by men\nin this precept: for instance, when according to the prescription of\nhuman law, such as evil-doers or enemies are lawfully slain.\nTherefore the precepts of the decalogue are dispensable.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the observance of the Sabbath is ordained by a\nprecept of the decalogue. But a dispensation was granted in this\nprecept; for it is written (1 Macc. 2:4): \"And they determined in\nthat day, saying: Whosoever shall come up to fight against us on the\nSabbath-day, we will fight against him.\" Therefore the precepts of\nthe decalogue are dispensable.\n\n_On the contrary,_ are the words of Isa. 24:5, where some are\nreproved for that \"they have changed the ordinance, they have broken\nthe everlasting covenant\"; which, seemingly, apply principally to the\nprecepts of the decalogue. Therefore the precepts of the decalogue\ncannot be changed by dispensation.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 96, A. 6; Q. 97, A. 4), precepts\nadmit of dispensation, when there occurs a particular case in which,\nif the letter of the law be observed, the intention of the lawgiver\nis frustrated. Now the intention of every lawgiver is directed first\nand chiefly to the common good; secondly, to the order of justice and\nvirtue, whereby the common good is preserved and attained. If\ntherefore there be any precepts which contain the very preservation\nof the common good, or the very order of justice and virtue, such\nprecepts contain the intention of the lawgiver, and therefore are\nindispensable. For instance, if in some community a law were enacted,\nsuch as this--that no man should work for the destruction of the\ncommonwealth, or betray the state to its enemies, or that no man\nshould do anything unjust or evil, such precepts would not admit of\ndispensation. But if other precepts were enacted, subordinate to the\nabove, and determining certain special modes of procedure, these\nlatter precepts would admit of dispensation, in so far as the\nomission of these precepts in certain cases would not be prejudicial\nto the former precepts which contain the intention of the lawgiver.\nFor instance if, for the safeguarding of the commonwealth, it were\nenacted in some city that from each ward some men should keep watch\nas sentries in case of siege, some might be dispensed from this on\naccount of some greater utility.\n\nNow the precepts of the decalogue contain the very intention of the\nlawgiver, who is God. For the precepts of the first table, which\ndirect us to God, contain the very order to the common and final\ngood, which is God; while the precepts of the second table contain\nthe order of justice to be observed among men, that nothing undue be\ndone to anyone, and that each one be given his due; for it is in this\nsense that we are to take the precepts of the decalogue. Consequently\nthe precepts of the decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Philosopher is not speaking of the natural law\nwhich contains the very order of justice: for it is a never-failing\nprinciple that \"justice should be preserved.\" But he is speaking in\nreference to certain fixed modes of observing justice, which fail to\napply in certain cases.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the Apostle says (2 Tim. 2:13), \"God continueth\nfaithful, He cannot deny Himself.\" But He would deny Himself if He\nwere to do away with the very order of His own justice, since He is\njustice itself. Wherefore God cannot dispense a man so that it be\nlawful for him not to direct himself to God, or not to be subject to\nHis justice, even in those matters in which men are directed to one\nanother.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The slaying of a man is forbidden in the decalogue, in\nso far as it bears the character of something undue: for in this\nsense the precept contains the very essence of justice. Human law\ncannot make it lawful for a man to be slain unduly. But it is not\nundue for evil-doers or foes of the common weal to be slain: hence\nthis is not contrary to the precept of the decalogue; and such a\nkilling is no murder as forbidden by that precept, as Augustine\nobserves (De Lib. Arb. i, 4). In like manner when a man's property is\ntaken from him, if it be due that he should lose it, this is not\ntheft or robbery as forbidden by the decalogue.\n\nConsequently when the children of Israel, by God's command, took away\nthe spoils of the Egyptians, this was not theft; since it was due to\nthem by the sentence of God. Likewise when Abraham consented to slay\nhis son, he did not consent to murder, because his son was due to be\nslain by the command of God, Who is Lord of life and death: for He it\nis Who inflicts the punishment of death on all men, both godly and\nungodly, on account of the sin of our first parent, and if a man be\nthe executor of that sentence by Divine authority, he will be no\nmurderer any more than God would be. Again Osee, by taking unto\nhimself a wife of fornications, or an adulterous woman, was not\nguilty either of adultery or of fornication: because he took unto\nhimself one who was his by command of God, Who is the Author of the\ninstitution of marriage.\n\nAccordingly, therefore, the precepts of the decalogue, as to the\nessence of justice which they contain, are unchangeable: but as to\nany determination by application to individual actions--for instance,\nthat this or that be murder, theft or adultery, or not--in this point\nthey admit of change; sometimes by Divine authority alone, namely, in\nsuch matters as are exclusively of Divine institution, as marriage\nand the like; sometimes also by human authority, namely in such\nmatters as are subject to human jurisdiction: for in this respect men\nstand in the place of God: and yet not in all respects.\n\nReply Obj. 4: This determination was an interpretation rather than a\ndispensation. For a man is not taken to break the Sabbath, if he does\nsomething necessary for human welfare; as Our Lord proves (Matt.\n12:3, seqq.).\n________________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 9]\n\nWhether the Mode of Virtue Falls Under the Precept of the Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the mode of virtue falls under the\nprecept of the law. For the mode of virtue is that deeds of justice\nshould be done justly, that deeds of fortitude should be done\nbravely, and in like manner as to the other virtues. But it is\ncommanded (Deut. 26:20) that \"thou shalt follow justly after that\nwhich is just.\" Therefore the mode of virtue falls under the precept.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that which belongs to the intention of the lawgiver\ncomes chiefly under the precept. But the intention of the lawgiver is\ndirected chiefly to make men virtuous, as stated in _Ethic._ ii: and\nit belongs to a virtuous man to act virtuously. Therefore the mode of\nvirtue falls under the precept.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the mode of virtue seems to consist properly in\nworking willingly and with pleasure. But this falls under a precept\nof the Divine law, for it is written (Ps. 99:2): \"Serve ye the Lord\nwith gladness\"; and (2 Cor. 9:7): \"Not with sadness or necessity: for\nGod loveth a cheerful giver\"; whereupon the gloss says: \"Whatever ye\ndo, do gladly; and then you will do it well; whereas if you do it\nsorrowfully, it is done in thee, not by thee.\" Therefore the mode of\nvirtue falls under the precept of the law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ No man can act as a virtuous man acts unless he\nhas the habit of virtue, as the Philosopher explains (Ethic. ii, 4;\nv, 8). Now whoever transgresses a precept of the law, deserves to be\npunished. Hence it would follow that a man who has not the habit of\nvirtue, would deserve to be punished, whatever he does. But this is\ncontrary to the intention of the law, which aims at leading man to\nvirtue, by habituating him to good works. Therefore the mode of\nvirtue does not fall under the precept.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, A. 3, ad 2), a precept of\nlaw has compulsory power. Hence that on which the compulsion of the\nlaw is brought to bear, falls directly under the precept of the law.\nNow the law compels through fear of punishment, as stated in _Ethic._\nx, 9, because that properly falls under the precept of the law, for\nwhich the penalty of the law is inflicted. But Divine law and human\nlaw are differently situated as to the appointment of penalties;\nsince the penalty of the law is inflicted only for those things which\ncome under the judgment of the lawgiver; for the law punishes in\naccordance with the verdict given. Now man, the framer of human law,\nis competent to judge only of outward acts; because \"man seeth those\nthings that appear,\" according to 1 Kings 16:7: while God alone, the\nframer of the Divine law, is competent to judge of the inward\nmovements of wills, according to Ps. 7:10: \"The searcher of hearts\nand reins is God.\"\n\nAccordingly, therefore, we must say that the mode of virtue is in\nsome sort regarded both by human and by Divine law; in some respect\nit is regarded by the Divine, but not by the human law; and in\nanother way, it is regarded neither by the human nor by the Divine\nlaw. Now the mode of virtue consists in three things, as the\nPhilosopher states in _Ethic._ ii. The first is that man should act\n\"knowingly\": and this is subject to the judgment of both Divine and\nhuman law; because what a man does in ignorance, he does\naccidentally. Hence according to both human and Divine law, certain\nthings are judged in respect of ignorance to be punishable or\npardonable.\n\nThe second point is that a man should act \"deliberately,\" i.e. \"from\nchoice, choosing that particular action for its own sake\"; wherein a\ntwofold internal movement is implied, of volition and of intention,\nabout which we have spoken above (QQ. 8, 12): and concerning these\ntwo, Divine law alone, and not human law, is competent to judge. For\nhuman law does not punish the man who wishes to slay, and slays not:\nwhereas the Divine law does, according to Matt. 5:22: \"Whosoever is\nangry with his brother, shall be in danger of the judgment.\"\n\nThe third point is that he should \"act from a firm and immovable\nprinciple\": which firmness belongs properly to a habit, and implies\nthat the action proceeds from a rooted habit. In this respect, the\nmode of virtue does not fall under the precept either of Divine or of\nhuman law, since neither by man nor by God is he punished as breaking\nthe law, who gives due honor to his parents and yet has not the habit\nof filial piety.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The mode of doing acts of justice, which falls under\nthe precept, is that they be done in accordance with right; but not\nthat they be done from the habit of justice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The intention of the lawgiver is twofold. His aim, in\nthe first place, is to lead men to something by the precepts of the\nlaw: and this is virtue. Secondly, his intention is brought to bear\non the matter itself of the precept: and this is something leading or\ndisposing to virtue, viz. an act of virtue. For the end of the\nprecept and the matter of the precept are not the same: just as\nneither in other things is the end the same as that which conduces to\nthe end.\n\nReply Obj. 3: That works of virtue should be done without sadness,\nfalls under the precept of the Divine law; for whoever works with\nsadness works unwillingly. But to work with pleasure, i.e. joyfully\nor cheerfully, in one respect falls under the precept, viz. in so far\nas pleasure ensues from the love of God and one's neighbor (which\nlove falls under the precept), and love causes pleasure: and in\nanother respect does not fall under the precept, in so far as\npleasure ensues from a habit; for \"pleasure taken in a work proves\nthe existence of a habit,\" as stated in _Ethic._ ii, 3. For an act\nmay give pleasure either on account of its end, or through its\nproceeding from a becoming habit.\n________________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 10]\n\nWhether the Mode of Charity Falls Under the Precept of the Divine Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the mode of charity falls under the\nprecept of the Divine law. For it is written (Matt. 19:17): \"If thou\nwilt enter into life, keep the commandments\": whence it seems to\nfollow that the observance of the commandments suffices for entrance\ninto life. But good works do not suffice for entrance into life,\nexcept they be done from charity: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:3):\n\"If I should distribute all my goods to feed the poor, and if I\nshould deliver my body to be burned, and have not charity, it\nprofiteth me nothing.\" Therefore the mode of charity is included in\nthe commandment.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the mode of charity consists properly speaking in\ndoing all things for God. But this falls under the precept; for the\nApostle says (1 Cor. 10:31): \"Do all to the glory of God.\" Therefore\nthe mode of charity falls under the precept.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the mode of charity does not fall under the\nprecept, it follows that one can fulfil the precepts of the law\nwithout having charity. Now what can be done without charity can be\ndone without grace, which is always united to charity. Therefore one\ncan fulfil the precepts of the law without grace. But this is the\nerror of Pelagius, as Augustine declares (De Haeres. lxxxviii).\nTherefore the mode of charity is included in the commandment.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Whoever breaks a commandment sins mortally. If\ntherefore the mode of charity falls under the precept, it follows\nthat whoever acts otherwise than from charity sins mortally. But\nwhoever has not charity, acts otherwise than from charity. Therefore\nit follows that whoever has not charity, sins mortally in whatever he\ndoes, however good this may be in itself: which is absurd.\n\n_I answer that,_ Opinions have been contrary on this question. For\nsome have said absolutely that the mode of charity comes under the\nprecept; and yet that it is possible for one not having charity to\nfulfil this precept: because he can dispose himself to receive\ncharity from God. Nor (say they) does it follow that a man not having\ncharity sins mortally whenever he does something good of its kind:\nbecause it is an affirmative precept that binds one to act from\ncharity, and is binding not for all time, but only for such time as\none is in a state of charity. On the other hand, some have said that\nthe mode of charity is altogether outside the precept.\n\nBoth these opinions are true up to a certain point. Because the act\nof charity can be considered in two ways. First, as an act by itself:\nand thus it falls under the precept of the law which specially\nprescribes it, viz. \"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God,\" and \"Thou\nshalt love thy neighbor.\" In this sense, the first opinion is true.\nBecause it is not impossible to observe this precept which regards\nthe act of charity; since man can dispose himself to possess charity,\nand when he possesses it, he can use it. Secondly, the act of charity\ncan be considered as being the mode of the acts of the other virtues,\ni.e. inasmuch as the acts of the other virtues are ordained to\ncharity, which is \"the end of the commandment,\" as stated in 1 Tim.\ni, 5: for it has been said above (Q. 12, A. 4) that the intention of\nthe end is a formal mode of the act ordained to that end. In this\nsense the second opinion is true in saying that the mode of charity\ndoes not fall under the precept, that is to say that this\ncommandment, \"Honor thy father,\" does not mean that a man must honor\nhis father from charity, but merely that he must honor him. Wherefore\nhe that honors his father, yet has not charity, does not break this\nprecept: although he does break the precept concerning the act of\ncharity, for which reason he deserves to be punished.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our Lord did not say, \"If thou wilt enter into life,\nkeep one commandment\"; but \"keep\" all \"the commandments\": among which\nis included the commandment concerning the love of God and our\nneighbor.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The precept of charity contains the injunction that God\nshould be loved from our whole heart, which means that all things\nwould be referred to God. Consequently man cannot fulfil the precept\nof charity, unless he also refer all things to God. Wherefore he that\nhonors his father and mother, is bound to honor them from charity,\nnot in virtue of the precept, \"Honor thy father and mother,\" but in\nvirtue of the precept, \"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy\nwhole heart.\" And since these are two affirmative precepts, not\nbinding for all times, they can be binding, each one at a different\ntime: so that it may happen that a man fulfils the precept of\nhonoring his father and mother, without at the same time breaking the\nprecept concerning the omission of the mode of charity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man cannot fulfil all the precepts of the law, unless\nhe fulfil the precept of charity, which is impossible without\ncharity. Consequently it is not possible, as Pelagius maintained, for\nman to fulfil the law without grace.\n________________________\n\nELEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 11]\n\nWhether It Is Right to Distinguish Other Moral Precepts of the Law\nBesides the Decalogue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is wrong to distinguish other\nmoral precepts of the law besides the decalogue. Because, as Our Lord\ndeclared (Matt. 22:40), \"on these two commandments\" of charity\n\"dependeth the whole law and the prophets.\" But these two\ncommandments are explained by the ten commandments of the decalogue.\nTherefore there is no need for other moral precepts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the moral precepts are distinct from the judicial\nand ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q. 99, AA. 3, 4). But the\ndeterminations of the general moral precepts belong to the judicial\nand ceremonial precepts: and the general moral precepts are contained\nin the decalogue, or are even presupposed to the decalogue, as stated\nabove (A. 3). Therefore it was unsuitable to lay down other moral\nprecepts besides the decalogue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the moral precepts are about the acts of all the\nvirtues, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore, as the Law contains,\nbesides the decalogue, moral precepts pertaining to religion,\nliberality, mercy, and chastity; so there should have been added some\nprecepts pertaining to the other virtues, for instance, fortitude,\nsobriety, and so forth. And yet such is not the case. It is therefore\nunbecoming to distinguish other moral precepts in the Law besides\nthose of the decalogue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 18:8): \"The law of the Lord is\nunspotted, converting souls.\" But man is preserved from the stain of\nsin, and his soul is converted to God by other moral precepts besides\nthose of the decalogue. Therefore it was right for the Law to include\nother moral precepts.\n\n_I answer that,_ As is evident from what has been stated (Q. 99, AA.\n3, 4), the judicial and ceremonial precepts derive their force from\ntheir institution alone: since before they were instituted, it seemed\nof no consequence whether things were done in this or that way. But\nthe moral precepts derive their efficacy from the very dictate of\nnatural reason, even if they were never included in the Law. Now of\nthese there are three grades: for some are most certain, and so\nevident as to need no promulgation; such as the commandments of the\nlove of God and our neighbor, and others like these, as stated above\n(A. 3), which are, as it were, the ends of the commandments;\nwherefore no man can have an erroneous judgment about them. Some\nprecepts are more detailed, the reason of which even an uneducated\nman can easily grasp; and yet they need to be promulgated, because\nhuman judgment, in a few instances, happens to be led astray\nconcerning them: these are the precepts of the decalogue. Again,\nthere are some precepts the reason of which is not so evident to\neveryone, but only the wise; these are moral precepts added to the\ndecalogue, and given to the people by God through Moses and Aaron.\n\nBut since the things that are evident are the principles whereby we\nknow those that are not evident, these other moral precepts added to\nthe decalogue are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue, as so\nmany corollaries. Thus the first commandment of the decalogue forbids\nthe worship of strange gods: and to this are added other precepts\nforbidding things relating to worship of idols: thus it is written\n(Deut. 18:10, 11): \"Neither let there be found among you anyone that\nshall expiate his son or daughter, making them to pass through the\nfire: . . . neither let there by any wizard nor charmer, nor anyone\nthat consulteth pythonic spirits, or fortune-tellers, or that seeketh\nthe truth from the dead.\" The second commandment forbids perjury. To\nthis is added the prohibition of blasphemy (Lev. 24:15, seqq) and the\nprohibition of false doctrine (Deut. 13). To the third commandment\nare added all the ceremonial precepts. To the fourth commandment\nprescribing the honor due to parents, is added the precept about\nhonoring the aged, according to Lev. 19:32: \"Rise up before the hoary\nhead, and honor the person of the aged man\"; and likewise all the\nprecepts prescribing the reverence to be observed towards our\nbetters, or kindliness towards our equals or inferiors. To the fifth\ncommandment, which forbids murder, is added the prohibition of hatred\nand of any kind of violence inflicted on our neighbor, according to\nLev. 19:16: \"Thou shalt not stand against the blood of thy neighbor\":\nlikewise the prohibition against hating one's brother (Lev. 19:17):\n\"Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart.\" To the sixth\ncommandment which forbids adultery, is added the prohibition about\nwhoredom, according to Deut. 23:17: \"There shall be no whore among\nthe daughters of Israel, nor whoremonger among the sons of Israel\";\nand the prohibition against unnatural sins, according to Lev. 28:22,\n23: \"Thou shalt not lie with mankind . . . thou shalt not copulate\nwith any beast.\" To the seventh commandment which prohibits theft, is\nadded the precept forbidding usury, according to Deut. 23:19: \"Thou\nshalt not lend to thy brother money to usury\"; and the prohibition\nagainst fraud, according to Deut. 25:13: \"Thou shalt not have divers\nweights in thy bag\"; and universally all prohibitions relating to\npeculations and larceny. To the eighth commandment, forbidding false\ntestimony, is added the prohibition against false judgment, according\nto Ex. 23:2: \"Neither shalt thou yield in judgment, to the opinion of\nthe most part, to stray from the truth\"; and the prohibition against\nlying (Ex. 23:7): \"Thou shalt fly lying,\" and the prohibition against\ndetraction, according to Lev. 19:16: \"Thou shalt not be a detractor,\nnor a whisperer among the people.\" To the other two commandments no\nfurther precepts are added, because thereby are forbidden all kinds\nof evil desires.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The precepts of the decalogue are ordained to the love\nof God and our neighbor as pertaining evidently to our duty towards\nthem; but the other precepts are so ordained as pertaining thereto\nless evidently.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is in virtue of their institution that the\nceremonial and judicial precepts are determinations of the precepts\nof the decalogue, not by reason of a natural instinct, as in the case\nof the superadded moral precepts.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The precepts of a law are ordained for the common good,\nas stated above (Q. 90, A. 2). And since those virtues which direct\nour conduct towards others pertain directly to the common good, as\nalso does the virtue of chastity, in so far as the generative act\nconduces to the common good of the species; hence precepts bearing\ndirectly on these virtues are given, both in the decalogue and in\naddition thereto. As to the act of fortitude there are the order to\nbe given by the commanders in the war, which is undertaken for the\ncommon good: as is clear from Deut. 20:3, where the priest is\ncommanded (to speak thus): \"Be not afraid, do not give back.\" In like\nmanner the prohibition of acts of gluttony is left to paternal\nadmonition, since it is contrary to the good of the household; hence\nit is said (Deut. 21:20) in the person of parents: \"He slighteth\nhearing our admonitions, he giveth himself to revelling, and to\ndebauchery and banquetings.\"\n________________________\n\nTWELFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 100, Art. 12]\n\nWhether the Moral Precepts of the Old Law Justified Man?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the moral precepts of the Old Law\njustified man. Because the Apostle says (Rom. 2:13): \"For not the\nhearers of the Law are justified before God, but the doers of the Law\nshall be justified.\" But the doers of the Law are those who fulfil\nthe precepts of the Law. Therefore the fulfilling of the precepts of\nthe Law was a cause of justification.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is written (Lev. 18:5): \"Keep My laws and My\njudgments, which if a man do, he shall live in them.\" But the\nspiritual life of man is through justice. Therefore the fulfilling of\nthe precepts of the Law was a cause of justification.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Divine law is more efficacious than human law.\nBut human law justifies man; since there is a kind of justice\nconsisting in fulfilling the precepts of law. Therefore the precepts\nof the Law justified man.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6): \"The letter\nkilleth\": which, according to Augustine (De Spir. et Lit. xiv),\nrefers even to the moral precepts. Therefore the moral precepts did\nnot cause justice.\n\n_I answer that,_ Just as \"healthy\" is said properly and first of that\nwhich is possessed of health, and secondarily of that which is a sign\nor a safeguard of health; so justification means first and properly\nthe causing of justice; while secondarily and improperly, as it were,\nit may denote a sign of justice or a disposition thereto. If justice\nbe taken in the last two ways, it is evident that it was conferred by\nthe precepts of the Law; in so far, to wit, as they disposed men to\nthe justifying grace of Christ, which they also signified, because as\nAugustine says (Contra Faust. xxii, 24), \"even the life of that\npeople foretold and foreshadowed Christ.\"\n\nBut if we speak of justification properly so called, then we must\nnotice that it can be considered as in the habit or as in the act: so\nthat accordingly justification may be taken in two ways. First,\naccording as man is made just, by becoming possessed of the habit of\njustice: secondly, according as he does works of justice, so that in\nthis sense justification is nothing else than the execution of\njustice. Now justice, like the other virtues, may denote either the\nacquired or the infused virtue, as is clear from what has been stated\n(Q. 63, A. 4). The acquired virtue is caused by works; but the\ninfused virtue is caused by God Himself through His grace. The latter\nis true justice, of which we are speaking now, and in this respect of\nwhich a man is said to be just before God, according to Rom. 4:2: \"If\nAbraham were justified by works, he hath whereof to glory, but not\nbefore God.\" Hence this justice could not be caused by moral\nprecepts, which are about human actions: wherefore the moral precepts\ncould not justify man by causing justice.\n\nIf, on the other hand, by justification we understand the execution\nof justice, thus all the precepts of the Law justified man, but in\nvarious ways. Because the ceremonial precepts taken as a whole\ncontained something just in itself, in so far as they aimed at\noffering worship to God; whereas taken individually they contained\nthat which is just, not in itself, but by being a determination of\nthe Divine law. Hence it is said of these precepts that they did not\njustify man save through the devotion and obedience of those who\ncomplied with them. On the other hand the moral and judicial\nprecepts, either in general or also in particular, contained that\nwhich is just in itself: but the moral precepts contained that which\nis just in itself according to that \"general justice\" which is \"every\nvirtue\" according to _Ethic._ v, 1: whereas the judicial precepts\nbelonged to \"special justice,\" which is about contracts connected\nwith the human mode of life, between one man and another.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Apostle takes justification for the execution of\njustice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The man who fulfilled the precepts of the Law is said\nto live in them, because he did not incur the penalty of death, which\nthe Law inflicted on its transgressors: in this sense the Apostle\nquotes this passage (Gal. 3:12).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The precepts of human law justify man by acquired\njustice: it is not about this that we are inquiring now, but only\nabout that justice which is before God.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 101\n\nOF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS IN THEMSELVES\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the ceremonial precepts: and first we must\nconsider them in themselves; secondly, their cause; thirdly, their\nduration. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) The nature of the ceremonial precepts;\n\n(2) Whether they are figurative?\n\n(3) Whether there should have been many of them?\n\n(4) Of their various kinds.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 101, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Nature of the Ceremonial Precepts Consists in Their\nPertaining to the Worship of God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the nature of the ceremonial precepts\ndoes not consist in their pertaining to the worship of God. Because,\nin the Old Law, the Jews were given certain precepts about abstinence\nfrom food (Lev. 11); and about refraining from certain kinds of\nclothes, e.g. (Lev. 19:19): \"Thou shalt not wear a garment that is\nwoven of two sorts\"; and again (Num. 15:38): \"To make to themselves\nfringes in the corners of their garments.\" But these are not moral\nprecepts; since they do not remain in the New Law. Nor are they\njudicial precepts; since they do not pertain to the pronouncing of\njudgment between man and man. Therefore they are ceremonial precepts.\nYet they seem in no way to pertain to the worship of God. Therefore\nthe nature of the ceremonial precepts does not consist in their\npertaining to Divine worship.\n\nObj. 2: Further, some state that the ceremonial precepts are those\nwhich pertain to solemnities; as though they were so called from the\n_cerei_ (candles) which are lit up on those occasions. But many other\nthings besides solemnities pertain to the worship of God. Therefore\nit does not seem that the ceremonial precepts are so called from\ntheir pertaining to the Divine worship.\n\nObj. 3: Further, some say that the ceremonial precepts are patterns,\ni.e. rules, of salvation: because the Greek _chaire_ is the same as\nthe Latin \"salve.\" But all the precepts of the Law are rules of\nsalvation, and not only those that pertain to the worship of God.\nTherefore not only those precepts which pertain to Divine worship are\ncalled ceremonial.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Rabbi Moses says (Doct. Perplex. iii) that the\nceremonial precepts are those for which there is no evident reason.\nBut there is evident reason for many things pertaining to the worship\nof God; such as the observance of the Sabbath, the feasts of the\nPassover and of the Tabernacles, and many other things, the reason\nfor which is set down in the Law. Therefore the ceremonial precepts\nare not those which pertain to the worship of God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ex. 18:19, 20): \"Be thou to the\npeople in those things that pertain to God . . . and . . . shew the\npeople the ceremonies and the manner of worshipping.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 99, A. 4), the ceremonial\nprecepts are determinations of the moral precepts whereby man is\ndirected to God, just as the judicial precepts are determinations of\nthe moral precepts whereby he is directed to his neighbor. Now man is\ndirected to God by the worship due to Him. Wherefore those precepts\nare properly called ceremonial, which pertain to the Divine worship.\nThe reason for their being so called was given above (Q. 99, A. 3),\nwhen we established the distinction between the ceremonial and the\nother precepts.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Divine worship includes not only sacrifices and the\nlike, which seem to be directed to God immediately, but also those\nthings whereby His worshippers are duly prepared to worship Him: thus\ntoo in other matters, whatever is preparatory to the end comes under\nthe science whose object is the end. Accordingly those precepts of\nthe Law which regard the clothing and food of God's worshippers, and\nother such matters, pertain to a certain preparation of the\nministers, with the view of fitting them for the Divine worship: just\nas those who administer to a king make use of certain special\nobservances. Consequently such are contained under the ceremonial\nprecepts.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The alleged explanation of the name does not seem very\nprobable: especially as the Law does not contain many instances of\nthe lighting of candles in solemnities; since, even the lamps of the\nCandlestick were furnished with \"oil of olives,\" as stated in Lev.\n24:2. Nevertheless we may say that all things pertaining to the\nDivine worship were more carefully observed on solemn festivals: so\nthat all ceremonial precepts may be included under the observance of\nsolemnities.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Neither does this explanation of the name appear to be\nvery much to the point, since the word \"ceremony\" is not Greek but\nLatin. We may say, however, that, since man's salvation is from God,\nthose precepts above all seem to be rules of salvation, which direct\nman to God: and accordingly those which refer to Divine worship are\ncalled ceremonial precepts.\n\nReply Obj. 4: This explanation of the ceremonial precepts has a\ncertain amount of probability: not that they are called ceremonial\nprecisely because there is no evident reason for them; this is a kind\nof consequence. For, since the precepts referring to the Divine\nworship must needs be figurative, as we shall state further on (A.\n2), the consequence is that the reason for them is not so very\nevident.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 101, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Ceremonial Precepts Are Figurative?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts are not\nfigurative. For it is the duty of every teacher to express himself in\nsuch a way as to be easily understood, as Augustine states (De Doctr.\nChrist. iv, 4, 10) and this seems very necessary in the framing of a\nlaw: because precepts of law are proposed to the populace; for which\nreason a law should be manifest, as Isidore declares (Etym. v, 21).\nIf therefore the precepts of the Law were given as figures of\nsomething, it seems unbecoming that Moses should have delivered these\nprecepts without explaining what they signified.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is done for the worship of God, should be\nentirely free from unfittingness. But the performance of actions in\nrepresentation of others, seems to savor of the theatre or of the\ndrama: because formerly the actions performed in theatres were done\nto represent the actions of others. Therefore it seems that such\nthings should not be done for the worship of God. But the ceremonial\nprecepts are ordained to the Divine worship, as stated above (A. 1).\nTherefore they should not be figurative.\n\nObj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Enchiridion iii, iv) that \"God is\nworshipped chiefly by faith, hope, and charity.\" But the precepts of\nfaith, hope, and charity are not figurative. Therefore the ceremonial\nprecepts should not be figurative.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Our Lord said (John 4:24): \"God is a spirit, and\nthey that adore Him, must adore Him in spirit and in truth.\" But a\nfigure is not the very truth: in fact one is condivided with the\nother. Therefore the ceremonial precepts, which refer to the Divine\nworship, should not be figurative.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Col. 2:16, 17): \"Let no man . .\n. judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or\nof the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to\ncome.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1; Q. 99, AA. 3, 4), the\nceremonial precepts are those which refer to the worship of God. Now\nthe Divine worship is twofold: internal, and external. For since man\nis composed of soul and body, each of these should be applied to the\nworship of God; the soul by an interior worship; the body by an\noutward worship: hence it is written (Ps. 83:3): \"My heart and my\nflesh have rejoiced in the living God.\" And as the body is ordained\nto God through the soul, so the outward worship is ordained to the\ninternal worship. Now interior worship consists in the soul being\nunited to God by the intellect and affections. Wherefore according to\nthe various ways in which the intellect and affections of the man who\nworships God are rightly united to God, his external actions are\napplied in various ways to the Divine worship.\n\nFor in the state of future bliss, the human intellect will gaze on\nthe Divine Truth in Itself. Wherefore the external worship will not\nconsist in anything figurative, but solely in the praise of God,\nproceeding from the inward knowledge and affection, according to Isa.\n51:3: \"Joy and gladness shall be found therein, thanksgiving and the\nvoice of praise.\"\n\nBut in the present state of life, we are unable to gaze on the Divine\nTruth in Itself, and we need the ray of Divine light to shine upon us\nunder the form of certain sensible figures, as Dionysius states\n(Coel. Hier. i); in various ways, however, according to the various\nstates of human knowledge. For under the Old Law, neither was the\nDivine Truth manifest in Itself, nor was the way leading to that\nmanifestation as yet opened out, as the Apostle declares (Heb. 9:8).\nHence the external worship of the Old Law needed to be figurative not\nonly of the future truth to be manifested in our heavenly country,\nbut also of Christ, Who is the way leading to that heavenly\nmanifestation. But under the New Law this way is already revealed:\nand therefore it needs no longer to be foreshadowed as something\nfuture, but to be brought to our minds as something past or present:\nand the truth of the glory to come, which is not yet revealed, alone\nneeds to be foreshadowed. This is what the Apostle says (Heb. 11:1):\n\"The Law has [Vulg.: 'having'] a shadow of the good things to come,\nnot the very image of the things\": for a shadow is less than an\nimage; so that the image belongs to the New Law, but the shadow to\nthe Old.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The things of God are not to be revealed to man except\nin proportion to his capacity: else he would be in danger of\ndownfall, were he to despise what he cannot grasp. Hence it was more\nbeneficial that the Divine mysteries should be revealed to uncultured\npeople under a veil of figures, that thus they might know them at\nleast implicitly by using those figures to the honor of God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Just as human reason fails to grasp poetical\nexpressions on account of their being lacking in truth, so does it\nfail to grasp Divine things perfectly, on account of the sublimity of\nthe truth they contain: and therefore in both cases there is need of\nsigns by means of sensible figures.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Augustine is speaking there of internal worship; to\nwhich, however, external worship should be ordained, as stated above.\n\nThe same answer applies to the Fourth Objection: because men were\ntaught by Him to practice more perfectly the spiritual worship of\nGod.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 101, Art. 3]\n\nWhether There Should Have Been Many Ceremonial Precepts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there should not have been many\nceremonial precepts. For those things which conduce to an end should\nbe proportionate to that end. But the ceremonial precepts, as stated\nabove (AA. 1, 2), are ordained to the worship of God, and to the\nforeshadowing of Christ. Now \"there is but one God, of Whom are all\nthings . . . and one Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom are all things\" (1\nCor. 8:6). Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial\nprecepts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the great number of the ceremonial precepts was an\noccasion of transgression, according to the words of Peter (Acts\n15:10): \"Why tempt you God, to put a yoke upon the necks of the\ndisciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?\"\nNow the transgression of the Divine precepts is an obstacle to man's\nsalvation. Since, therefore, every law should conduce to man's\nsalvation, as Isidore says (Etym. v, 3), it seems that the ceremonial\nprecepts should not have been given in great number.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the ceremonial precepts referred to the outward and\nbodily worship of God, as stated above (A. 2). But the Law should\nhave lessened this bodily worship: since it directed men to Christ,\nWho taught them to worship God \"in spirit and in truth,\" as stated in\nJohn 4:23. Therefore there should not have been many ceremonial\nprecepts.\n\n_On the contrary,_ (Osee 8:12): \"I shall write to them [Vulg.: 'him']\nMy manifold laws\"; and (Job 11:6): \"That He might show thee the\nsecrets of His wisdom, and that His Law is manifold.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 96, A. 1), every law is given to\na people. Now a people contains two kinds of men: some, prone to\nevil, who have to be coerced by the precepts of the law, as stated\nabove (Q. 95, A. 1); some, inclined to good, either from nature or\nfrom custom, or rather from grace; and the like have to be taught and\nimproved by means of the precepts of the law. Accordingly, with\nregard to both kinds of men it was expedient that the Old Law should\ncontain many ceremonial precepts. For in that people there were many\nprone to idolatry; wherefore it was necessary to recall them by means\nof ceremonial precepts from the worship of idols to the worship of\nGod. And since men served idols in many ways, it was necessary on the\nother hand to devise many means of repressing every single one: and\nagain, to lay many obligations on such like men, in order that being\nburdened, as it were, by their duties to the Divine worship, they\nmight have no time for the service of idols. As to those who were\ninclined to good, it was again necessary that there should be many\nceremonial precepts; both because thus their mind turned to God in\nmany ways, and more continually; and because the mystery of Christ,\nwhich was foreshadowed by these ceremonial precepts, brought many\nboons to the world, and afforded men many considerations, which\nneeded to be signified by various ceremonies.\n\nReply Obj. 1: When that which conduces to an end is sufficient to\nconduce thereto, then one such thing suffices for one end: thus one\nremedy, if it be efficacious, suffices sometimes to restore men to\nhealth, and then the remedy needs not to be repeated. But when that\nwhich conduces to an end is weak and imperfect, it needs to be\nmultiplied: thus many remedies are given to a sick man, when one is\nnot enough to heal him. Now the ceremonies of the Old Law were weak\nand imperfect, both for representing the mystery of Christ, on\naccount of its surpassing excellence; and for subjugating men's minds\nto God. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18, 19): \"There is a setting\naside of the former commandment because of the weakness and\nunprofitableness thereof, for the law brought nothing to perfection.\"\nConsequently these ceremonies needed to be in great number.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A wise lawgiver should suffer lesser transgressions,\nthat the greater may be avoided. And therefore, in order to avoid the\nsin of idolatry, and the pride which would arise in the hearts of the\nJews, were they to fulfil all the precepts of the Law, the fact that\nthey would in consequence find many occasions of disobedience did not\nprevent God from giving them many ceremonial precepts.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Old Law lessened bodily worship in many ways. Thus\nit forbade sacrifices to be offered in every place and by any person.\nMany such like things did it enact for the lessening of bodily\nworship; as Rabbi Moses, the Egyptian testifies (Doct. Perplex. iii).\nNevertheless it behooved not to attenuate the bodily worship of God\nso much as to allow men to fall away into the worship of idols.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 101, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Ceremonies of the Old Law Are Suitably Divided into\nSacrifices, Sacred Things, Sacraments, and Observances?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law are\nunsuitably divided into \"sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments, and\nobservances.\" For the ceremonies of the Old Law foreshadowed Christ.\nBut this was done only by the sacrifices, which foreshadowed the\nsacrifice in which Christ \"delivered Himself an oblation and a\nsacrifice to God\" (Eph. 5:2). Therefore none but the sacrifices were\nceremonies.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Old Law was ordained to the New. But in the New\nLaw the sacrifice is the Sacrament of the Altar. Therefore in the Old\nLaw there should be no distinction between \"sacrifices\" and\n\"sacraments.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, a \"sacred thing\" is something dedicated to God: in\nwhich sense the tabernacle and its vessels were said to be\nconsecrated. But all the ceremonial precepts were ordained to the\nworship of God, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore all ceremonies were\nsacred things. Therefore \"sacred things\" should not be taken as a\npart of the ceremonies.\n\nObj. 4: Further, \"observances\" are so called from having to be\nobserved. But all the precepts of the Law had to be observed: for it\nis written (Deut. 8:11): \"Observe [Douay: 'Take heed'] and beware\nlest at any time thou forget the Lord thy God, and neglect His\ncommandments and judgments and ceremonies.\" Therefore the\n\"observances\" should not be considered as a part of the ceremonies.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the solemn festivals are reckoned as part of the\nceremonial: since they were a shadow of things to come (Col. 2:16,\n17): and the same may be said of the oblations and gifts, as appears\nfrom the words of the Apostle (Heb. 9:9): and yet these do not seem\nto be inclined in any of those mentioned above. Therefore the above\ndivision of ceremonies is unsuitable.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In the Old Law each of the above is called a\nceremony. For the sacrifices are called ceremonies (Num. 15:24):\n\"They shall offer a calf . . . and the sacrifices and libations\nthereof, as the ceremonies require.\" Of the sacrament of Order it is\nwritten (Lev. 7:35): \"This is the anointing of Aaron and his sons in\nthe ceremonies.\" Of sacred things also it is written (Ex. 38:21):\n\"These are the instruments of the tabernacle of the testimony . . .\nin the ceremonies of the Levites.\" And again of the observances it is\nwritten (3 Kings 9:6): \"If you . . . shall turn away from following\nMe, and will not observe [Douay: 'keep'] My . . . ceremonies which I\nhave set before you.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 1, 2), the ceremonial precepts\nare ordained to the Divine worship. Now in this worship we may\nconsider the worship itself, the worshippers, and the instruments of\nworship. The worship consists specially in _sacrifices,_ which are\noffered up in honor of God. The instruments of worship refer to the\n_sacred things,_ such as the tabernacle, the vessels and so forth.\nWith regard to the worshippers two points may be considered. The\nfirst point is their preparation for Divine worship, which is\neffected by a sort of consecration either of the people or of the\nministers; and to this the _sacraments_ refer. The second point is\ntheir particular mode of life, whereby they are distinguished from\nthose who do not worship God: and to this pertain the _observances,_\nfor instance, in matters of food, clothing, and so forth.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It was necessary for the sacrifices to be offered both\nin some certain place and by some certain men: and all this pertained\nto the worship of God. Wherefore just as their sacrifices signified\nChrist the victim, so too their sacraments and sacred things\nforeshadowed the sacraments and sacred things of the New Law; while\ntheir observances foreshadowed the mode of life of the people under\nthe New Law: all of which things pertain to Christ.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The sacrifice of the New Law, viz. the Eucharist,\ncontains Christ Himself, the Author of our Sanctification: for He\nsanctified \"the people by His own blood\" (Heb. 13:12). Hence this\nSacrifice is also a sacrament. But the sacrifices of the Old Law did\nnot contain Christ, but foreshadowed Him; hence they are not called\nsacraments. In order to signify this there were certain sacraments\napart from the sacrifices of the Old Law, which sacraments were\nfigures of the sanctification to come. Nevertheless to certain\nconsecrations certain sacrifices were united.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The sacrifices and sacraments were of course sacred\nthings. But certain things were sacred, through being dedicated to\nthe Divine worship, and yet were not sacrifices or sacraments:\nwherefore they retained the common designation of sacred things.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Those things which pertained to the mode of life of the\npeople who worshipped God, retained the common designation of\nobservances, in so far as they fell short of the above. For they were\nnot called sacred things, because they had no immediate connection\nwith the worship of God, such as the tabernacle and its vessels had.\nBut by a sort of consequence they were matters of ceremony, in so far\nas they affected the fitness of the people who worshipped God.\n\nReply Obj. 5: Just as the sacrifices were offered in a fixed place,\nso were they offered at fixed times: for which reason the solemn\nfestivals seem to be reckoned among the sacred things. The oblations\nand gifts are counted together with the sacrifices; hence the Apostle\nsays (Heb. 5:1): \"Every high-priest taken from among men, is ordained\nfor men in things that appertain to God, that he may offer up gifts\nand sacrifices.\"\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 102\n\nOF THE CAUSES OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS\n(In Six Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the causes of the ceremonial precepts: under\nwhich head there are six points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether there was any cause for the ceremonial precepts?\n\n(2) Whether the cause of the ceremonial precepts was literal or\nfigurative?\n\n(3) The causes of the sacrifices;\n\n(4) The causes of the sacrifices;\n\n(5) The causes of the sacred things;\n\n(6) The causes of the observances.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 102, Art. 1]\n\nWhether There Was Any Cause for the Ceremonial Precepts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there was no cause for the ceremonial\nprecepts. Because on Eph. 2:15, \"Making void the law of the\ncommandments,\" the gloss says, (i.e.) \"making void the Old Law as to\nthe carnal observances, by substituting decrees, i.e. evangelical\nprecepts, which are based on reason.\" But if the observances of the\nOld Law were based on reason, it would have been useless to void them\nby the reasonable decrees of the New Law. Therefore there was no\nreason for the ceremonial observances of the Old Law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Old Law succeeded the law of nature. But in the\nlaw of nature there was a precept for which there was no reason save\nthat man's obedience might be tested; as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit.\nviii, 6, 13), concerning the prohibition about the tree of life.\nTherefore in the Old Law there should have been some precepts for the\npurpose of testing man's obedience, having no reason in themselves.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man's works are called moral according as they\nproceed from reason. If therefore there is any reason for the\nceremonial precepts, they would not differ from the moral precepts.\nIt seems therefore that there was no cause for the ceremonial\nprecepts: for the reason of a precept is taken from some cause.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 18:9): \"The commandment of the\nLord is lightsome, enlightening the eyes.\" But the ceremonial\nprecepts are commandments of God. Therefore they are lightsome: and\nyet they would not be so, if they had no reasonable cause. Therefore\nthe ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2),\nit is the function of a \"wise man to do everything in order,\" those\nthings which proceed from the Divine wisdom must needs be well\nordered, as the Apostle states (Rom. 13:1). Now there are two\nconditions required for things to be well ordered. First, that they\nbe ordained to their due end, which is the principle of the whole\norder in matters of action: since those things that happen by chance\noutside the intention of the end, or which are not done seriously but\nfor fun, are said to be inordinate. Secondly, that which is done in\nview of the end should be proportionate to the end. From this it\nfollows that the reason for whatever conduces to the end is taken\nfrom the end: thus the reason for the disposition of a saw is taken\nfrom cutting, which is its end, as stated in _Phys._ ii, 9. Now it is\nevident that the ceremonial precepts, like all the other precepts of\nthe Law, were institutions of Divine wisdom: hence it is written\n(Deut. 4:6): \"This is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of\nnations.\" Consequently we must needs say that the ceremonial precepts\nwere ordained to a certain end, wherefrom their reasonable causes can\nbe gathered.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It may be said there was no reason for the observances\nof the Old Law, in the sense that there was no reason in the very\nnature of the thing done: for instance that a garment should not be\nmade of wool and linen. But there could be a reason for them in\nrelation to something else: namely, in so far as something was\nsignified or excluded thereby. On the other hand, the decrees of the\nNew Law, which refer chiefly to faith and the love of God, are\nreasonable from the very nature of the act.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The reason for the prohibition concerning the tree of\nknowledge of good and evil was not that this tree was naturally evil:\nand yet this prohibition was reasonable in its relation to something\nelse, in as much as it signified something. And so also the\nceremonial precepts of the Old Law were reasonable on account of\ntheir relation to something else.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The moral precepts in their very nature have reasonable\ncauses: as for instance, \"Thou shalt not kill,\" \"Thou shalt not\nsteal.\" But the ceremonial precepts have a reasonable cause in their\nrelation to something else, as stated above.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 102, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Ceremonial Precepts Have a Literal Cause or Merely a\nFigurative Cause?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the ceremonial precepts have not a\nliteral, but merely a figurative cause. For among the ceremonial\nprecepts, the chief was circumcision and the sacrifice of the paschal\nlamb. But neither of these had any but a figurative cause: because\neach was given as a sign. For it is written (Gen. 17:11): \"You shall\ncircumcise the flesh of your foreskin, that it may be a sign of the\ncovenant between Me and you\": and of the celebration of the Passover\nit is written (Ex. 13:9): \"It shall be as a sign in thy hand, and as\na memorial before thy eyes.\" Therefore much more did the other\nceremonial precepts have none but a figurative reason.\n\nObj. 2: Further, an effect is proportionate to its cause. But all the\nceremonial precepts are figurative, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 2).\nTherefore they have no other than a figurative cause.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if it be a matter of indifference whether a certain\nthing, considered in itself, be done in a particular way or not, it\nseems that it has not a literal cause. Now there are certain points\nin the ceremonial precepts, which appear to be a matter of\nindifference, as to whether they be done in one way or in another:\nfor instance, the number of animals to be offered, and other such\nparticular circumstances. Therefore there is no literal cause for the\nprecepts of the Old Law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Just as the ceremonial precepts foreshadowed\nChrist, so did the stories of the Old Testament: for it is written (1\nCor. 10:11) that \"all (these things) happened to them in figure.\" Now\nin the stories of the Old Testament, besides the mystical or\nfigurative, there is the literal sense. Therefore the ceremonial\nprecepts had also literal, besides their figurative causes.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the reason for whatever\nconduces to an end must be taken from that end. Now the end of the\nceremonial precepts was twofold: for they were ordained to the Divine\nworship, for that particular time, and to the foreshadowing of\nChrist; just as the words of the prophets regarded the time being in\nsuch a way as to be utterances figurative of the time to come, as\nJerome says on Osee 1:3. Accordingly the reasons for the ceremonial\nprecepts of the Old Law can be taken in two ways. First, in respect\nof the Divine worship which was to be observed for that particular\ntime: and these reasons are literal: whether they refer to the\nshunning of idolatry; or recall certain Divine benefits; or remind\nmen of the Divine excellence; or point out the disposition of mind\nwhich was then required in those who worshipped God. Secondly, their\nreasons can be gathered from the point of view of their being\nordained to foreshadow Christ: and thus their reasons are figurative\nand mystical: whether they be taken from Christ Himself and the\nChurch, which pertains to the allegorical sense; or to the morals of\nthe Christian people, which pertains to the moral sense; or to the\nstate of future glory, in as much as we are brought thereto by\nChrist, which refers to the anagogical sense.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Just as the use of metaphorical expressions in\nScripture belongs to the literal sense, because the words are\nemployed in order to convey that particular meaning; so also the\nmeaning of those legal ceremonies which commemorated certain Divine\nbenefits, on account of which they were instituted, and of others\nsimilar which belonged to that time, does not go beyond the order of\nliteral causes. Consequently when we assert that the cause of the\ncelebration of the Passover was its signification of the delivery\nfrom Egypt, or that circumcision was a sign of God's covenant with\nAbraham, we assign the literal cause.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument would avail if the ceremonial precepts\nhad been given merely as figures of things to come, and not for the\npurpose of worshipping God then and there.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As we have stated when speaking of human laws (Q. 96,\nAA. 1, 6), there is a reason for them in the abstract, but not in\nregard to particular conditions, which depend on the judgment of\nthose who frame them; so also many particular determinations in the\nceremonies of the Old Law have no literal cause, but only a\nfigurative cause; whereas in the abstract they have a literal cause.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 102, Art. 3]\n\nWhether a Suitable Cause Can Be Assigned for the Ceremonies Which\nPertained to Sacrifices?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no suitable cause can be assigned for\nthe ceremonies pertaining to sacrifices. For those things which were\noffered in sacrifice, are those which are necessary for sustaining\nhuman life: such as certain animals and certain loaves. But God needs\nno such sustenance; according to Ps. 49:13: \"Shall I eat the flesh of\nbullocks? Or shall I drink the blood of goats?\" Therefore such\nsacrifices were unfittingly offered to God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, only three kinds of quadrupeds were offered in\nsacrifice to God, viz. oxen, sheep and goats; of birds, generally the\nturtledove and the dove; but specially, in the cleansing of a leper,\nan offering was made of sparrows. Now many other animals are more\nnoble than these. Since therefore whatever is best should be offered\nto God, it seems that not only of these three should sacrifices have\nbeen offered to Him.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as man has received from God the dominion over\nbirds and beasts, so also has he received dominion over fishes.\nConsequently it was unfitting for fishes to be excluded from the\ndivine sacrifices.\n\nObj. 4: Further, turtledoves and doves indifferently are commanded to\nbe offered up. Since then the young of the dove are commanded to be\noffered, so also should the young of the turtledove.\n\nObj. 5: Further, God is the Author of life, not only of men, but also\nof animals, as is clear from Gen. 1:20, seqq. Now death is opposed to\nlife. Therefore it was fitting that living animals rather than slain\nanimals should be offered to God, especially as the Apostle\nadmonishes us (Rom. 12:1), to present our bodies \"a living sacrifice,\nholy, pleasing unto God.\"\n\nObj. 6: Further, if none but slain animals were offered in sacrifice\nto God, it seems that it mattered not how they were slain. Therefore\nit was unfitting that the manner of immolation should be determined,\nespecially as regards birds (Lev. 1:15, seqq.).\n\nObj. 7: Further, every defect in an animal is a step towards\ncorruption and death. If therefore slain animals were offered to God,\nit was unreasonable to forbid the offering of an imperfect animal,\ne.g. a lame, or a blind, or otherwise defective animal.\n\nObj. 8: Further, those who offer victims to God should partake\nthereof, according to the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. 10:18): \"Are\nnot they that eat of the sacrifices partakers of the altar?\" It was\ntherefore unbecoming for the offerers to be denied certain parts of\nthe victims, namely, the blood, the fat, the breastbone and the right\nshoulder.\n\nObjection 9: Further, just as holocausts were offered up in honor of\nGod, so also were the peace-offerings and sin-offerings. But no\nfemale animals was offered up to God as a holocaust, although\nholocausts were offered of both quadrupeds and birds. Therefore it\nwas inconsistent that female animals should be offered up in\npeace-offerings and sin-offerings, and that nevertheless birds should\nnot be offered up in peace-offerings.\n\nObjection 10: Further, all the peace-offerings seem to be of one\nkind. Therefore it was unfitting to make a distinction among them, so\nthat it was forbidden to eat the flesh of certain peace-offerings on\nthe following day, while it was allowed to eat the flesh of other\npeace-offerings, as laid down in Lev. 7:15, seqq.\n\nObjection 11: Further, all sins agree in turning us from God.\nTherefore, in order to reconcile us to God, one kind of sacrifice\nshould have been offered up for all sins.\n\nObjection 12: Further, all animals that were offered up in sacrifice,\nwere offered up in one way, viz. slain. Therefore it does not seem to\nbe suitable that products of the soil should be offered up in various\nways; for sometimes an offering was made of ears of corn, sometimes\nof flour, sometimes of bread, this being baked sometimes in an oven,\nsometimes in a pan, sometimes on a gridiron.\n\nObjection 13: Further, whatever things are serviceable to us should\nbe recognized as coming from God. It was therefore unbecoming that\nbesides animals, nothing but bread, wine, oil, incense, and salt\nshould be offered to God.\n\nObjection 14: Further, bodily sacrifices denote the inward sacrifice\nof the heart, whereby man offers his soul to God. But in the inward\nsacrifice, the sweetness, which is denoted by honey, surpasses the\npungency which salt represents; for it is written (Ecclus. 24:27):\n\"My spirit is sweet above honey.\" Therefore it was unbecoming that\nthe use of honey, and of leaven which makes bread savory, should be\nforbidden in a sacrifice; while the use was prescribed, of salt which\nis pungent, and of incense which has a bitter taste. Consequently it\nseems that things pertaining to the ceremonies of the sacrifices have\nno reasonable cause.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 1:13): \"The priest shall offer\nit all and burn it all upon the altar, for a holocaust, and most\nsweet savor to the Lord.\" Now according to Wis. 7:28, \"God loveth\nnone but him that dwelleth with wisdom\": whence it seems to follow\nthat whatever is acceptable to God is wisely done. Therefore these\nceremonies of the sacrifices were wisely done, as having reasonable\ncauses.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), the ceremonies of the Old\nLaw had a twofold cause, viz. a literal cause, according as they were\nintended for Divine worship; and a figurative or mystical cause,\naccording as they were intended to foreshadow Christ: and on either\nhand the ceremonies pertaining to the sacrifices can be assigned to a\nfitting cause.\n\nFor, according as the ceremonies of the sacrifices were intended for\nthe divine worship, the causes of the sacrifices can be taken in two\nways. First, in so far as the sacrifice represented the directing of\nthe mind to God, to which the offerer of the sacrifice was\nstimulated. Now in order to direct his mind to God aright, man must\nrecognize that whatever he has is from God as from its first\nprinciple, and direct it to God as its last end. This was denoted in\nthe offerings and sacrifices, by the fact that man offered some of\nhis own belongings in honor of God, as though in recognition of his\nhaving received them from God, according to the saying of David (1\nParal. xxix, 14): \"All things are Thine: and we have given Thee what\nwe received of Thy hand.\" Wherefore in offering up sacrifices man\nmade protestation that God is the first principle of the creation of\nall things, and their last end, to which all things must be directed.\nAnd since, for the human mind to be directed to God aright, it must\nrecognize no first author of things other than God, nor place its end\nin any other; for this reason it was forbidden in the Law to offer\nsacrifice to any other but God, according to Ex. 22:20: \"He that\nsacrificeth to gods, shall be put to death, save only to the Lord.\"\nWherefore another reasonable cause may be assigned to the ceremonies\nof the sacrifices, from the fact that thereby men were withdrawn from\noffering sacrifices to idols. Hence too it is that the precepts about\nthe sacrifices were not given to the Jewish people until after they\nhad fallen into idolatry, by worshipping the molten calf: as though\nthose sacrifices were instituted, that the people, being ready to\noffer sacrifices, might offer those sacrifices to God rather than to\nidols. Thus it is written (Jer. 7:22): \"I spake not to your fathers\nand I commanded them not, in the day that I brought them out of the\nland of Egypt, concerning the matter of burnt-offerings and\nsacrifices.\"\n\nNow of all the gifts which God vouchsafed to mankind after they had\nfallen away by sin, the chief is that He gave His Son; wherefore it\nis written (John 3:16): \"God so loved the world, as to give His\nonly-begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in Him, may not perish,\nbut may have life everlasting.\" Consequently the chief sacrifice is\nthat whereby Christ Himself \"delivered Himself . . . to God for an\nodor of sweetness\" (Eph. 5:2). And for this reason all the other\nsacrifices of the Old Law were offered up in order to foreshadow this\none individual and paramount sacrifice--the imperfect forecasting the\nperfect. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 10:11) that the priest of the\nOld Law \"often\" offered \"the same sacrifices, which can never take\naway sins: but\" Christ offered \"one sacrifice for sins, for ever.\"\nAnd since the reason of the figure is taken from that which the\nfigure represents, therefore the reasons of the figurative sacrifices\nof the Old Law should be taken from the true sacrifice of Christ.\n\nReply Obj. 1: God did not wish these sacrifices to be offered to Him\non account of the things themselves that were offered, as though He\nstood in need of them: wherefore it is written (Isa. 1:11): \"I desire\nnot holocausts of rams, and fat of fatlings, and blood of calves and\nlambs and buckgoats.\" But, as stated above, He wished them to be\noffered to Him, in order to prevent idolatry; in order to signify the\nright ordering of man's mind to God; and in order to represent the\nmystery of the Redemption of man by Christ.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In all the respects mentioned above (ad 1), there was a\nsuitable reason for these animals, rather than others, being offered\nin sacrifice to God. First, in order to prevent idolatry. Because\nidolaters offered all other animals to their gods, or made use of\nthem in their sorceries: while the Egyptians (among whom the people\nhad been dwelling) considered it abominable to slay these animals,\nwherefore they used not to offer them in sacrifice to their gods.\nHence it is written (Ex. 8:26): \"We shall sacrifice the abominations\nof the Egyptians to the Lord our God.\" For they worshipped the sheep;\nthey reverenced the ram (because demons appeared under the form\nthereof); while they employed oxen for agriculture, which was\nreckoned by them as something sacred.\n\nSecondly, this was suitable for the aforesaid right ordering of man's\nmind to God: and in two ways. First, because it is chiefly by means\nof these animals that human life is sustained: and moreover they are\nmost clean, and partake of a most clean food: whereas other animals\nare either wild, and not deputed to ordinary use among men: or, if\nthey be tame, they have unclean food, as pigs and geese: and nothing\nbut what is clean should be offered to God. These birds especially\nwere offered in sacrifice because there were plenty of them in the\nland of promise. Secondly, because the sacrificing of these animals\nrepresented purity of heart. Because as the gloss says on Lev. 1, \"We\noffer a calf, when we overcome the pride of the flesh; a lamb, when\nwe restrain our unreasonable motions; a goat, when we conquer\nwantonness; a turtledove, when we keep chaste; unleavened bread, when\nwe feast on the unleavened bread of sincerity.\" And it is evident\nthat the dove denotes charity and simplicity of heart.\n\nThirdly, it was fitting that these animals should be offered, that\nthey might foreshadow Christ. Because, as the gloss observes, \"Christ\nis offered in the calf, to denote the strength of the cross; in the\nlamb, to signify His innocence; in the ram, to foreshadow His\nheadship; and in the goat, to signify the likeness of 'sinful flesh'\n[*An allusion to Col. 2:11 (Textus Receptus)]. The turtledove and\ndove denoted the union of the two natures\"; or else the turtledove\nsignified chastity; while the dove was a figure of charity. \"The\nwheat-flour foreshadowed the sprinkling of believers with the water\nof Baptism.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Fish through living in water are further removed from\nman than other animals, which, like man, live in the air. Again, fish\ndie as soon as they are taken out of water; hence they could not be\noffered in the temple like other animals.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Among turtledoves the older ones are better than the\nyoung; while with doves the case is the reverse. Wherefore, as Rabbi\nMoses observes (Doct. Perplex. iii), turtledoves and young doves are\ncommanded to be offered, because nothing should be offered to God but\nwhat is best.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The animals which were offered in sacrifice were slain,\nbecause it is by being killed that they become useful to man,\nforasmuch as God gave them to man for food. Wherefore also they were\nburnt with fire: because it is by being cooked that they are made fit\nfor human consumption. Moreover the slaying of the animals signified\nthe destruction of sins: and also that man deserved death on account\nof his sins; as though those animals were slain in man's stead, in\norder to betoken the expiation of sins. Again the slaying of these\nanimals signified the slaying of Christ.\n\nReply Obj. 6: The Law fixed the special manner of slaying the\nsacrificial animals in order to exclude other ways of killing,\nwhereby idolaters sacrificed animals to idols. Or again, as Rabbi\nMoses says (Doct. Perplex. iii), \"the Law chose that manner of\nslaying which was least painful to the slain animal.\" This excluded\ncruelty on the part of the offerers, and any mangling of the animals\nslain.\n\nReply Obj. 7: It is because unclean animals are wont to be held in\ncontempt among men, that it was forbidden to offer them in sacrifice\nto God: and for this reason too they were forbidden (Deut. 23:18) to\noffer \"the hire of a strumpet or the price of a dog in the house of\n. . . God.\" For the same reason they did not offer animals before the\nseventh day, because such were abortive as it were, the flesh being\nnot yet firm on account of its exceeding softness.\n\nReply Obj. 8: There were three kinds of sacrifices. There was one in\nwhich the victim was entirely consumed by fire: this was called \"a\nholocaust, i.e. all burnt.\" For this kind of sacrifice was offered to\nGod specially to show reverence to His majesty, and love of His\ngoodness: and typified the state of perfection as regards the\nfulfilment of the counsels. Wherefore the whole was burnt up: so that\nas the whole animal by being dissolved into vapor soared aloft, so it\nmight denote that the whole man, and whatever belongs to him, are\nsubject to the authority of God, and should be offered to Him.\n\nAnother sacrifice was the \"sin-offering,\" which was offered to God on\naccount of man's need for the forgiveness of sin: and this typifies\nthe state of penitents in satisfying for sins. It was divided into\ntwo parts: for one part was burnt; while the other was granted to the\nuse of the priests to signify that remission of sins is granted by\nGod through the ministry of His priests. When, however, this\nsacrifice was offered for the sins of the whole people, or specially\nfor the sin of the priest, the whole victim was burnt up. For it was\nnot fitting that the priests should have the use of that which was\noffered for their own sins, to signify that nothing sinful should\nremain in them. Moreover, this would not be satisfaction for sin: for\nif the offering were granted to the use of those for whose sins it\nwas offered, it would seem to be the same as if it had not been\noffered.\n\nThe third kind of sacrifice was called the \"peace-offering,\" which\nwas offered to God, either in thanksgiving, or for the welfare and\nprosperity of the offerers, in acknowledgment of benefits already\nreceived or yet to be received: and this typifies the state of those\nwho are proficient in the observance of the commandments. These\nsacrifices were divided into three parts: for one part was burnt in\nhonor of God; another part was allotted to the use of the priests;\nand the third part to the use of the offerers; in order to signify\nthat man's salvation is from God, by the direction of God's\nministers, and through the cooperation of those who are saved.\n\nBut it was the universal rule that the blood and fat were not\nallotted to the use either of the priests or of the offerers: the\nblood being poured out at the foot of the altar, in honor of God,\nwhile the fat was burnt upon the altar (Lev. 9:9, 10). The reason for\nthis was, first, in order to prevent idolatry: because idolaters used\nto drink the blood and eat the fat of the victims, according to Deut.\n32:38: \"Of whose victims they eat the fat, and drank the wine of\ntheir drink-offerings.\" Secondly, in order to form them to a right\nway of living. For they were forbidden the use of the blood that they\nmight abhor the shedding of human blood; wherefore it is written\n(Gen. 9:4, 5): \"Flesh with blood you shall not eat: for I will\nrequire the blood of your lives\": and they were forbidden to eat the\nfat, in order to withdraw them from lasciviousness; hence it is\nwritten (Ezech. 34:3): \"You have killed that which was fat.\" Thirdly,\non account of the reverence due to God: because blood is most\nnecessary for life, for which reason \"life\" is said to be \"in the\nblood\" (Lev. 17:11, 14): while fat is a sign of abundant nourishment.\nWherefore, in order to show that to God we owe both life and a\nsufficiency of all good things, the blood was poured out, and the fat\nburnt up in His honor. Fourthly, in order to foreshadow the shedding\nof Christ's blood, and the abundance of His charity, whereby He\noffered Himself to God for us.\n\nIn the peace-offerings, the breast-bone and the right shoulder were\nallotted to the use of the priest, in order to prevent a certain kind\nof divination which is known as \"spatulamantia,\" so called because it\nwas customary in divining to use the shoulder-blade (_spatula_), and\nthe breast-bone of the animals offered in sacrifice; wherefore these\nthings were taken away from the offerers. This is also denoted the\npriest's need of wisdom in the heart, to instruct the people--this\nwas signified by the breast-bone, which covers the heart; and his\nneed of fortitude, in order to bear with human frailty--and this was\nsignified by the right shoulder.\n\nReply Obj. 9: Because the holocaust was the most perfect kind of\nsacrifice, therefore none but a male was offered for a holocaust:\nbecause the female is an imperfect animal. The offering of\nturtledoves and doves was on account of the poverty of the offerers,\nwho were unable to offer bigger animals. And since peace-victims were\noffered freely, and no one was bound to offer them against his will,\nhence these birds were offered not among the peace-victims, but among\nthe holocausts and victims for sin, which man was obliged to offer at\ntimes. Moreover these birds, on account of their lofty flight, were\nbefitting the perfection of the holocausts: and were suitable for\nsin-offerings because their song is doleful.\n\nReply Obj. 10: The holocaust was the chief of all the sacrifices:\nbecause all was burnt in honor of God, and nothing of it was eaten.\nThe second place in holiness, belongs to the sacrifice for sins,\nwhich was eaten in the court only, and on the very day of the\nsacrifice (Lev. 7:6, 15). The third place must be given to the\npeace-offerings of thanksgiving, which were eaten on the same day,\nbut anywhere in Jerusalem. Fourth in order were the \"ex-voto\"\npeace-offerings, the flesh of which could be eaten even on the\nmorrow. The reason for this order is that man is bound to God,\nchiefly on account of His majesty; secondly, on account of the sins\nhe has committed; thirdly, because of the benefits he has already\nreceived from Him; fourthly, by reason of the benefits he hopes to\nreceive from Him.\n\nReply Obj. 11: Sins are more grievous by reason of the state of the\nsinner, as stated above (Q. 73, A. 10): wherefore different victims\nare commanded to be offered for the sin of a priest, or of a prince,\nor of some other private individual. \"But,\" as Rabbi Moses says\n(Doct. Perplex. iii), \"we must take note that the more grievous the\nsin, the lower the species of animals offered for it. Wherefore the\ngoat, which is a very base animal, was offered for idolatry; while a\ncalf was offered for a priest's ignorance, and a ram for the\nnegligence of a prince.\"\n\nReply Obj. 12: In the matter of sacrifices the Law had in view the\npoverty of the offerers; so that those who could not have a\nfour-footed animal at their disposal, might at least offer a bird;\nand that he who could not have a bird might at least offer bread; and\nthat if a man had not even bread he might offer flour or ears of corn.\n\nThe figurative cause is that the bread signifies Christ Who is the\n\"living bread\" (John 6:41, 51). He was indeed an ear of corn, as it\nwere, during the state of the law of nature, in the faith of the\npatriarchs; He was like flour in the doctrine of the Law of the\nprophets; and He was like perfect bread after He had taken human\nnature; baked in the fire, i.e. formed by the Holy Ghost in the oven\nof the virginal womb; baked again in a pan by the toils which He\nsuffered in the world; and consumed by fire on the cross as on a\ngridiron.\n\nReply Obj. 13: The products of the soil are useful to man, either as\nfood, and of these bread was offered; or as drink, and of these wine\nwas offered; or as seasoning, and of these oil and salt were offered;\nor as healing, and of these they offered incense, which both smells\nsweetly and binds easily together.\n\nNow the bread foreshadowed the flesh of Christ; and the wine, His\nblood, whereby we were redeemed; oil betokens the grace of Christ;\nsalt, His knowledge; incense, His prayer.\n\nReply Obj. 14: Honey was not offered in the sacrifices to God, both\nbecause it was wont to be offered in the sacrifices to idols; and in\norder to denote the absence of all carnal sweetness and pleasure from\nthose who intend to sacrifice to God. Leaven was not offered, to\ndenote the exclusion of corruption. Perhaps too, it was wont to be\noffered in the sacrifices to idols.\n\nSalt, however, was offered, because it wards off the corruption of\nputrefaction: for sacrifices offered to God should be incorrupt.\nMoreover, salt signifies the discretion of wisdom, or again,\nmortification of the flesh.\n\nIncense was offered to denote devotion of the heart, which is\nnecessary in the offerer; and again, to signify the odor of a good\nname: for incense is composed of matter, both rich and fragrant. And\nsince the sacrifice \"of jealousy\" did not proceed from devotion, but\nrather from suspicion, therefore incense was not offered therein\n(Num. 5:15).\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 102, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Sufficient Reason Can Be Assigned for the Ceremonies\nPertaining to Holy Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no sufficient reason can be assigned\nfor the ceremonies of the Old Law that pertain to holy things. For\nPaul said (Acts 17:24): \"God Who made the world and all things\ntherein; He being Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples\nmade by hands.\" It was therefore unfitting that in the Old Law a\ntabernacle or temple should be set up for the worship of God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the state of the Old Law was not changed except by\nChrist. But the tabernacle denoted the state of the Old Law.\nTherefore it should not have been changed by the building of a temple.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Divine Law, more than any other indeed, should\nlead man to the worship of God. But an increase of divine worship\nrequires multiplication of altars and temples; as is evident in\nregard to the New Law. Therefore it seems that also under the Old Law\nthere should have been not only one tabernacle or temple, but many.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the tabernacle or temple was ordained to the worship\nof God. But in God we should worship above all His unity and\nsimplicity. Therefore it seems unbecoming for the tabernacle or\ntemple to be divided by means of veils.\n\nObj. 5: Further, the power of the First Mover, i.e. God, appears\nfirst of all in the east, for it is in that quarter that the first\nmovement begins. But the tabernacle was set up for the worship of\nGod. Therefore it should have been built so as to point to the east\nrather than the west.\n\nObj. 6: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 20:4) that they should \"not\nmake . . . a graven thing, nor the likeness of anything.\" It was\ntherefore unfitting for graven images of the cherubim to be set up in\nthe tabernacle or temple. In like manner, the ark, the propitiatory,\nthe candlestick, the table, the two altars, seem to have been placed\nthere without reasonable cause.\n\nObj. 7: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 20:24): \"You shall make an\naltar of earth unto Me\": and again (Ex. 20:26): \"Thou shalt not go up\nby steps unto My altar.\" It was therefore unfitting that subsequently\nthey should be commanded to make an altar of wood laid over with gold\nor brass; and of such a height that it was impossible to go up to it\nexcept by steps. For it is written (Ex. 27:1, 2): \"Thou shalt make\nalso an altar of setim wood, which shall be five cubits long, and as\nmany broad . . . and three cubits high . . . and thou shalt cover it\nwith brass\": and (Ex. 30:1, 3): \"Thou shalt make . . . an altar to\nburn incense, of setim wood . . . and thou shalt overlay it with the\npurest gold.\"\n\nObj. 8: Further, in God's works nothing should be superfluous; for\nnot even in the works of nature is anything superfluous to be found.\nBut one cover suffices for one tabernacle or house. Therefore it was\nunbecoming to furnish the tabernacle with many coverings, viz.\ncurtains, curtains of goats' hair, rams' skins dyed red, and\nviolet-colored skins (Ex. 26).\n\nObjection 9: Further, exterior consecration signifies interior\nholiness, the subject of which is the soul. It was therefore\nunsuitable for the tabernacle and its vessels to be consecrated,\nsince they were inanimate things.\n\nObjection 10: Further, it is written (Ps. 33:2): \"I will bless the\nLord at all times, His praise shall always be in my mouth.\" But the\nsolemn festivals were instituted for the praise of God. Therefore it\nwas not fitting that certain days should be fixed for keeping solemn\nfestivals; so that it seems that there was no suitable cause for the\nceremonies relating to holy things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 8:4) that those who \"offer\ngifts according to the law . . . serve unto the example and shadow of\nheavenly things. As it was answered to Moses, when he was to finish\nthe tabernacle: See, says He, that thou make all things according to\nthe pattern which was shown thee on the mount.\" But that is most\nreasonable, which presents a likeness to heavenly things. Therefore\nthe ceremonies relating to holy things had a reasonable cause.\n\n_I answer that,_ The chief purpose of the whole external worship is\nthat man may give worship to God. Now man's tendency is to reverence\nless those things which are common, and indistinct from other things;\nwhereas he admires and reveres those things which are distinct from\nothers in some point of excellence. Hence too it is customary among\nmen for kings and princes, who ought to be reverenced by their\nsubjects, to be clothed in more precious garments, and to possess\nvaster and more beautiful abodes. And for this reason it behooved\nspecial times, a special abode, special vessels, and special\nministers to be appointed for the divine worship, so that thereby the\nsoul of man might be brought to greater reverence for God.\n\nIn like manner the state of the Old Law, as observed above (A. 2; Q.\n100, A. 12; Q. 101, A. 2), was instituted that it might foreshadow\nthe mystery of Christ. Now that which foreshadows something should be\ndeterminate, so that it may present some likeness thereto.\nConsequently, certain special points had to be observed in matters\npertaining to the worship of God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The divine worship regards two things: namely, God Who\nis worshipped; and men, who worship Him. Accordingly God, Who is\nworshipped, is confined to no bodily place: wherefore there was no\nneed, on His part, for a tabernacle or temple to be set up. But men,\nwho worship Him, are corporeal beings: and for their sake there was\nneed for a special tabernacle or temple to be set up for the worship\nof God, for two reasons. First, that through coming together with the\nthought that the place was set aside for the worship of God, they\nmight approach thither with greater reverence. Secondly, that certain\nthings relating to the excellence of Christ's Divine or human nature\nmight be signified by the arrangement of various details in such\ntemple or tabernacle.\n\nTo this Solomon refers (3 Kings 8:27) when he says: \"If heaven and\nthe heavens of heavens cannot contain Thee, how much less this house\nwhich I have built\" for Thee? And further on (3 Kings 8:29, 20) he\nadds: \"That Thy eyes may be open upon this house . . . of which Thou\nhast said: My name shall be there; . . . that Thou mayest hearken to\nthe supplication of Thy servant and of Thy people Israel.\" From this\nit is evident that the house of the sanctuary was set up, not in\norder to contain God, as abiding therein locally, but that God might\nbe made known there by means of things done and said there; and that\nthose who prayed there might, through reverence for the place, pray\nmore devoutly, so as to be heard more readily.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Before the coming of Christ, the state of the Old Law\nwas not changed as regards the fulfilment of the Law, which was\neffected in Christ alone: but it was changed as regards the condition\nof the people that were under the Law. Because, at first, the people\nwere in the desert, having no fixed abode: afterwards they were\nengaged in various wars with the neighboring nations; and lastly, at\nthe time of David and Solomon, the state of that people was one of\ngreat peace. And then for the first time the temple was built in the\nplace which Abraham, instructed by God, had chosen for the purpose of\nsacrifice. For it is written (Gen. 22:2) that the Lord commanded\nAbraham to \"offer\" his son \"for a holocaust upon one of the mountains\nwhich I will show thee\": and it is related further on (Gen. 22:14)\nthat \"he calleth the name of that place, The Lord seeth,\" as though,\naccording to the Divine prevision, that place were chosen for the\nworship of God. Hence it is written (Deut. 12:5, 6): \"You shall come\nto the place which the Lord your God shall choose . . . and you shall\noffer . . . your holocausts and victims.\"\n\nNow it was not meet for that place to be pointed out by the building\nof the temple before the aforesaid time; for three reasons assigned\nby Rabbi Moses. First, lest the Gentiles might seize hold of that\nplace. Secondly, lest the Gentiles might destroy it. The third reason\nis lest each tribe might wish that place to fall to their lot, and\nstrifes and quarrels be the result. Hence the temple was not built\nuntil they had a king who would be able to quell such quarrels. Until\nthat time a portable tabernacle was employed for divine worship, no\nplace being as yet fixed for the worship of God. This is the literal\nreason for the distinction between the tabernacle and the temple.\n\nThe figurative reason may be assigned to the fact that they signify a\ntwofold state. For the tabernacle, which was changeable, signifies\nthe state of the present changeable life: whereas the temple, which\nwas fixed and stable, signifies the state of future life which is\naltogether unchangeable. For this reason it is said that in the\nbuilding of the temple no sound was heard of hammer or saw, to\nsignify that all movements of disturbance will be far removed from\nthe future state. Or else the tabernacle signifies the state of the\nOld Law; while the temple built by Solomon betokens the state of the\nNew Law. Hence the Jews alone worked at the building of the\ntabernacle; whereas the temple was built with the cooperation of the\nGentiles, viz. the Tyrians and Sidonians.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The reason for the unity of the temple or tabernacle\nmay be either literal or figurative. The literal reason was the\nexclusion of idolatry. For the Gentiles put up various temples to\nvarious gods: and so, to strengthen in the minds of men their belief\nin the unity of the Godhead, God wished sacrifices to be offered to\nHim in one place only. Another reason was in order to show that\nbodily worship is not acceptable of itself: and so they restrained\nfrom offering sacrifices anywhere and everywhere. But the worship of\nthe New Law, in the sacrifice whereof spiritual grace is contained,\nis of itself acceptable to God; and consequently the multiplication\nof altars and temples is permitted in the New Law.\n\nAs to those matters that regarded the spiritual worship of God,\nconsisting in the teaching of the Law and the Prophets, there were,\neven under the Old Law, various places, called synagogues, appointed\nfor the people to gather together for the praise of God; just as now\nthere are places called churches in which the Christian people gather\ntogether for the divine worship. Thus our church takes the place of\nboth temple and synagogue: since the very sacrifice of the Church is\nspiritual; wherefore with us the place of sacrifice is not distinct\nfrom the place of teaching. The figurative reason may be that hereby\nis signified the unity of the Church, whether militant or triumphant.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Just as the unity of the temple or tabernacle betokened\nthe unity of God, or the unity of the Church, so also the division of\nthe tabernacle or temple signified the distinction of those things\nthat are subject to God, and from which we arise to the worship of\nGod. Now the tabernacle was divided into two parts: one was called\nthe \"Holy of Holies,\" and was placed to the west; the other was\ncalled the \"Holy Place\" [*Or 'Sanctuary'. The Douay version uses both\nexpressions], which was situated to the east. Moreover there was a\ncourt facing the tabernacle. Accordingly there are two reasons for\nthis distinction. One is in respect of the tabernacle being ordained\nto the worship of God. Because the different parts of the world are\nthus betokened by the division of the tabernacle. For that part which\nwas called the Holy of Holies signified the higher world, which is\nthat of spiritual substances: while that part which is called the\nHoly Place signified the corporeal world. Hence the Holy Place was\nseparated from the Holy of Holies by a veil, which was of four\ndifferent colors (denoting the four elements), viz. of linen,\nsignifying earth, because linen, i.e. flax, grows out of the earth;\npurple, signifying water, because the purple tint was made from\ncertain shells found in the sea; violet, signifying air, because it\nhas the color of the air; and scarlet twice dyed, signifying fire:\nand this because matter composed of the four elements is a veil\nbetween us and incorporeal substances. Hence the high-priest alone,\nand that once a year, entered into the inner tabernacle, i.e. the\nHoly of Holies: whereby we are taught that man's final perfection\nconsists in his entering into that (higher) world: whereas into the\noutward tabernacle, i.e. the Holy Place, the priests entered every\nday: whereas the people were only admitted to the court; because the\npeople were able to perceived material things, the inner nature of\nwhich only wise men by dint of study are able to discover.\n\nBut with regard to the figurative reason, the outward tabernacle,\nwhich was called the Holy Place, betokened the state of the Old Law,\nas the Apostle says (Heb. 9:6, seqq.): because into that tabernacle\n\"the priests always entered accomplishing the offices of sacrifices.\"\nBut the inner tabernacle, which was called the Holy of Holies,\nsignified either the glory of heaven or the spiritual state of the\nNew Law to come. To the latter state Christ brought us; and this was\nsignified by the high-priest entering alone, once a year, into the\nHoly of Holies. The veil betokened the concealing of the spiritual\nsacrifices under the sacrifices of old. This veil was adorned with\nfour colors: viz. that of linen, to designate purity of the flesh;\npurple, to denote the sufferings which the saints underwent for God;\nscarlet twice dyed, signifying the twofold love of God and our\nneighbor; and violet, in token of heavenly contemplation. With regard\nto the state of the Old Law the people and the priests were situated\ndifferently from one another. For the people saw the mere corporeal\nsacrifices which were offered in the court: whereas the priests were\nintent on the inner meaning of the sacrifices, because their faith in\nthe mysteries of Christ was more explicit. Hence they entered into\nthe outer tabernacle. This outer tabernacle was divided from the\ncourt by a veil; because some matters relating to the mystery of\nChrist were hidden from the people, while they were known to the\npriests: though they were not fully revealed to them, as they were\nsubsequently in the New Testament (cf. Eph. 3:5).\n\nReply Obj. 5: Worship towards the west was introduced in the Law to\nthe exclusion of idolatry: because all the Gentiles, in reverence to\nthe sun, worshipped towards the east; hence it is written (Ezech.\n8:16) that certain men \"had their backs towards the temple of the\nLord, and their faces to the east, and they adored towards the rising\nof the sun.\" Accordingly, in order to prevent this, the tabernacle\nhad the Holy of Holies to westward, that they might adore toward the\nwest. A figurative reason may also be found in the fact that the\nwhole state of the first tabernacle was ordained to foreshadow the\ndeath of Christ, which is signified by the west, according to Ps.\n67:5: \"Who ascendeth unto the west; the Lord is His name.\"\n\nReply Obj. 6: Both literal and figurative reasons may be assigned for\nthe things contained in the tabernacle. The literal reason is in\nconnection with the divine worship. And because, as already observed\n(ad 4), the inner tabernacle, called the Holy of Holies, signified\nthe higher world of spiritual substances, hence that tabernacle\ncontained three things, viz. \"the ark of the testament in which was a\ngolden pot that had manna, and the rod of Aaron that had blossomed,\nand the tables\" (Heb. 9:4) on which were written the ten commandments\nof the Law. Now the ark stood between two \"cherubim\" that looked one\ntowards the other: and over the ark was a table, called the\n\"propitiatory,\" raised above the wings of the cherubim, as though it\nwere held up by them; and appearing, to the imagination, to be the\nvery seat of God. For this reason it was called the \"propitiatory,\"\nas though the people received propitiation thence at the prayers of\nthe high-priest. And so it was held up, so to speak, by the cherubim,\nin obedience, as it were, to God: while the ark of the testament was\nlike the foot-stool to Him that sat on the propitiatory. These three\nthings denote three things in that higher world: namely, God Who is\nabove all, and incomprehensible to any creature. Hence no likeness of\nHim was set up; to denote His invisibility. But there was something\nto represent his seat; since, to wit, the creature, which is beneath\nGod, as the seat under the sitter, is comprehensible. Again in that\nhigher world there are spiritual substances called angels. These are\nsignified by the two cherubim, looking one towards the other, to show\nthat they are at peace with one another, according to Job 25:2: \"Who\nmaketh peace in . . . high places.\" For this reason, too, there was\nmore than one cherub, to betoken the multitude of heavenly spirits,\nand to prevent their receiving worship from those who had been\ncommanded to worship but one God. Moreover there are, enclosed as it\nwere in that spiritual world, the intelligible types of whatsoever\ntakes place in this world, just as in every cause are enclosed the\ntypes of its effects, and in the craftsman the types of the works of\nhis craft. This was betokened by the ark, which represented, by means\nof the three things it contained, the three things of greatest import\nin human affairs. These are wisdom, signified by the tables of the\ntestament; the power of governing, betokened by the rod of Aaron; and\nlife, betokened by the manna which was the means of sustenance. Or\nelse these three things signified the three Divine attributes, viz.\nwisdom, in the tables; power, in the rod; goodness, in the\nmanna--both by reason of its sweetness, and because it was through\nthe goodness of God that it was granted to man, wherefore it was\npreserved as a memorial of the Divine mercy. Again, these three\nthings were represented in Isaias' vision. For he \"saw the Lord\nsitting upon a throne high and elevated\"; and the seraphim standing\nby; and that the house was filled with the glory of the Lord;\nwherefrom the seraphim cried out: \"All the earth is full of His\nglory\" (Isa. 6:1, 3). And so the images of the seraphim were set up,\nnot to be worshipped, for this was forbidden by the first\ncommandment; but as a sign of their function, as stated above.\n\nThe outer tabernacle, which denotes this present world, also contained\nthree things, viz. the \"altar of incense,\" which was directly opposite\nthe ark; the \"table of proposition,\" with the twelve loaves of\nproposition on it, which stood on the northern side; and the\n\"candlestick,\" which was placed towards the south. These three things\nseem to correspond to the three which were enclosed in the ark; and\nthey represented the same things as the latter, but more clearly:\nbecause, in order that wise men, denoted by the priests entering the\ntemple, might grasp the meaning of these types, it was necessary to\nexpress them more manifestly than they are in the Divine or angelic\nmind. Accordingly the candlestick betokened, as a sensible sign\nthereof, the wisdom which was expressed on the tables (of the Law) in\nintelligible words. The altar of incense signified the office of the\npriest, whose duty it was to bring the people to God: and this was\nsignified also by the rod: because on that altar the sweet-smelling\nincense was burnt, signifying the holiness of the people acceptable to\nGod: for it is written (Apoc. 8:3) that the smoke of the\nsweet-smelling spices signifies the \"justifications of the saints\"\n(cf. Apoc. 19:8). Moreover it was fitting that the dignity of the\npriesthood should be denoted, in the ark, by the rod, and, in the\nouter tabernacle, by the altar of incense: because the priest is the\nmediator between God and the people, governing the people by Divine\npower, denoted by the rod; and offering to God the fruit of His\ngovernment, i.e. the holiness of the people, on the altar of incense,\nso to speak. The table signified the sustenance of life, just as the\nmanna did: but the former, a more general and a coarser kind of\nnourishment; the latter, a sweeter and more delicate. Again, the\ncandlestick was fittingly placed on the southern side, while the table\nwas placed to the north: because the south is the right-hand side of\nthe world, while the north is the left-hand side, as stated in _De\nCoelo et Mundo_ ii; and wisdom, like other spiritual goods, belongs to\nthe right hand, while temporal nourishment belongs on the left,\naccording to Prov. 3:16: \"In her left hand (are) riches and glory.\"\nAnd the priestly power is midway between temporal goods and spiritual\nwisdom; because thereby both spiritual wisdom and temporal goods are\ndispensed.\n\nAnother literal signification may be assigned. For the ark contained\nthe tables of the Law, in order to prevent forgetfulness of the Law,\nwherefore it is written (Ex. 24:12): \"I will give thee two tables of\nstone, and the Law, and the commandments which I have written: that\nthou mayest teach them\" to the children of Israel. The rod of Aaron\nwas placed there to restrain the people from insubordination to the\npriesthood of Aaron; wherefore it is written (Num. 17:10): \"Carry\nback the rod of Aaron into the tabernacle of the testimony, that it\nmay be kept there for a token of the rebellious children of Israel.\"\nThe manna was kept in the ark to remind them of the benefit conferred\nby God on the children of Israel in the desert; wherefore it is\nwritten (Ex. 16:32): \"Fill a gomor of it, and let it be kept unto\ngenerations to come hereafter, that they may know the bread wherewith\nI fed you in the wilderness.\" The candlestick was set up to enhance\nthe beauty of the temple, for the magnificence of a house depends on\nits being well lighted. Now the candlestick had seven branches, as\nJosephus observes (Antiquit. iii, 7, 8), to signify the seven\nplanets, wherewith the whole world is illuminated. Hence the\ncandlestick was placed towards the south; because for us the course\nof the planets is from that quarter. The altar of incense was\ninstituted that there might always be in the tabernacle a\nsweet-smelling smoke; both through respect for the tabernacle, and as\na remedy for the stenches arising from the shedding of blood and the\nslaying of animals. For men despise evil-smelling things as being\nvile, whereas sweet-smelling things are much appreciated. The table\nwas placed there to signify that the priests who served the temple\nshould take their food in the temple: wherefore, as stated in Matt.\n12:4, it was lawful for none but the priests to eat the twelve loaves\nwhich were put on the table in memory of the twelve tribes. And the\ntable was not placed in the middle directly in front of the\npropitiatory, in order to exclude an idolatrous rite: for the\nGentiles, on the feasts of the moon, set up a table in front of the\nidol of the moon, wherefore it is written (Jer. 7:18): \"The women\nknead the dough, to make cakes to the queen of heaven.\"\n\nIn the court outside the tabernacle was the altar of holocausts, on\nwhich sacrifices of those things which the people possessed were\noffered to God: and consequently the people who offered these\nsacrifices to God by the hands of the priest could be present in the\ncourt. But the priests alone, whose function it was to offer the\npeople to God, could approach the inner altar, whereon the very\ndevotion and holiness of the people was offered to God. And this\naltar was put up outside the tabernacle and in the court, to the\nexclusion of idolatrous worship: for the Gentiles placed altars\ninside the temples to offer up sacrifices thereon to idols.\n\nThe figurative reason for all these things may be taken from the\nrelation of the tabernacle to Christ, who was foreshadowed therein.\nNow it must be observed that to show the imperfection of the figures\nof the Law, various figures were instituted in the temple to betoken\nChrist. For He was foreshadowed by the \"propitiatory,\" since He is \"a\npropitiation for our sins\" (1 John 2:2). This propitiatory was\nfittingly carried by cherubim, since of Him it is written (Heb. 1:6):\n\"Let all the angels of God adore Him.\" He is also signified by the\nark: because just as the ark was made of setim-wood, so was Christ's\nbody composed of most pure members. More over it was gilded: for\nChrist was full of wisdom and charity, which are betokened by gold.\nAnd in the ark was a golden pot, i.e. His holy soul, having manna,\ni.e. \"all the fulness of the Godhead\" (Col. 2:9). Also there was a\nrod in the ark, i.e. His priestly power: for \"He was made a . . .\npriest for ever\" (Heb. 6:20). And therein were the tables of the\nTestament, to denote that Christ Himself is a lawgiver. Again, Christ\nwas signified by the candlestick, for He said Himself (John 8:12): \"I\nam the Light of the world\"; while the seven lamps denoted the seven\ngifts of the Holy Ghost. He is also betokened in the table, because\nHe is our spiritual food, according to John 6:41, 51: \"I am the\nliving bread\": and the twelve loaves signified the twelve apostles,\nor their teaching. Or again, the candlestick and table may signify\nthe Church's teaching, and faith, which also enlightens and\nrefreshes. Again, Christ is signified by the two altars of holocausts\nand incense. Because all works of virtue must be offered to us to God\nthrough Him; both those whereby we afflict the body, which are\noffered, as it were, on the altar of holocausts; and those which,\nwith greater perfection of mind, are offered to God in Christ, by the\nspiritual desires of the perfect, on the altar of incense, as it\nwere, according to Heb. 13:15: \"By Him therefore let us offer the\nsacrifice of praise always to God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 7: The Lord commanded an altar to be made for the offering\nof sacrifices and gifts, in honor of God, and for the upkeep of the\nministers who served the tabernacle. Now concerning the construction\nof the altar the Lord issued a twofold precept. One was at the\nbeginning of the Law (Ex. 20:24, seqq.) when the Lord commanded them\nto make \"an altar of earth,\" or at least \"not of hewn stones\"; and\nagain, not to make the altar high, so as to make it necessary to \"go\nup\" to it \"by steps.\" This was in detestation of idolatrous worship:\nfor the Gentiles made their altars ornate and high, thinking that\nthere was something holy and divine in such things. For this reason,\ntoo, the Lord commanded (Deut. 16:21): \"Thou shalt plant no grove,\nnor any tree near the altar of the Lord thy God\": since idolaters\nwere wont to offer sacrifices beneath trees, on account of the\npleasantness and shade afforded by them. There was also a figurative\nreason for these precepts. Because we must confess that in Christ,\nWho is our altar, there is the true nature of flesh, as regards His\nhumanity--and this is to make an altar of earth; and again, in regard\nto His Godhead, we must confess His equality with the Father--and\nthis is \"not to go up\" to the altar by steps. Moreover we should not\ncouple the doctrine of Christ to that of the Gentiles, which provokes\nmen to lewdness.\n\nBut when once the tabernacle had been constructed to the honor of\nGod, there was no longer reason to fear these occasions of idolatry.\nWherefore the Lord commanded the altar of holocausts to be made of\nbrass, and to be conspicuous to all the people; and the altar of\nincense, which was visible to none but the priests. Nor was brass so\nprecious as to give the people an occasion for idolatry.\n\nSince, however, the reason for the precept, \"Thou shalt not go up by\nsteps unto My altar\" (Ex. 20:26) is stated to have been \"lest thy\nnakedness be discovered,\" it should be observed that this too was\ninstituted with the purpose of preventing idolatry, for in the feasts\nof Priapus the Gentiles uncovered their nakedness before the people.\nBut later on the priests were prescribed the use of loin-cloths for\nthe sake of decency: so that without any danger the altar could be\nplaced so high that the priests when offering sacrifices would go up\nby steps of wood, not fixed but movable.\n\nReply Obj. 8: The body of the tabernacle consisted of boards placed\non end, and covered on the inside with curtains of four different\ncolors, viz. twisted linen, violet, purple, and scarlet twice dyed.\nThese curtains, however, covered the sides only of the tabernacle;\nand the roof of the tabernacle was covered with violet-colored skins;\nand over this there was another covering of rams' skins dyed red; and\nover this there was a third curtain made of goats' hair, which\ncovered not only the roof of the tabernacle, but also reached to the\nground and covered the boards of the tabernacle on the outside. The\nliteral reason of these coverings taken altogether was the adornment\nand protection of the tabernacle, that it might be an object of\nrespect. Taken singly, according to some, the curtains denoted the\nstarry heaven, which is adorned with various stars; the curtain (of\ngoats' skin) signified the waters which are above the firmament; the\nskins dyed red denoted the empyrean heaven, where the angels are; the\nviolet skins, the heaven of the Blessed Trinity.\n\nThe figurative meaning of these things is that the boards of which\nthe tabernacle was constructed signify the faithful of Christ, who\ncompose the Church. The boards were covered on the inner side by\ncurtains of four colors: because the faithful are inwardly adorned\nwith the four virtues: for \"the twisted linen,\" as the gloss\nobserves, \"signifies the flesh refulgent with purity; violet\nsignifies the mind desirous of heavenly things; purple denotes the\nflesh subject to passions; the twice dyed scarlet betokens the mind\nin the midst of the passions enlightened by the love of God and our\nneighbor.\" The coverings of the building designate prelates and\ndoctors, who ought to be conspicuous for their heavenly manner of\nlife, signified by the violet colored skins: and who should also be\nready to suffer martyrdom, denoted by the skins dyed red; and austere\nof life and patient in adversity, betokened by the curtains of goats'\nhair, which were exposed to wind and rain, as the gloss observes.\n\nReply Obj. 9: The literal reason for the sanctification of the\ntabernacle and vessels was that they might be treated with greater\nreverence, being deputed, as it were, to the divine worship by this\nconsecration. The figurative reason is that this sanctification\nsignified the sanctification of the living tabernacle, i.e. the\nfaithful of whom the Church of Christ is composed.\n\nReply Obj. 10: Under the Old Law there were seven temporal\nsolemnities, and one continual solemnity, as may be gathered from\nNum. 28, 29. There was a continual feast, since the lamb was\nsacrificed every day, morning and evening: and this continual feast\nof an abiding sacrifice signified the perpetuity of Divine bliss. Of\nthe temporal feasts the first was that which was repeated every week.\nThis was the solemnity of the \"Sabbath,\" celebrated in memory of the\nwork of the creation of the universe. Another solemnity, viz. the\n\"New Moon,\" was repeated every month, and was observed in memory of\nthe work of the Divine government. For the things of this lower world\nowe their variety chiefly to the movement of the moon; wherefore this\nfeast was kept at the new moon: and not at the full moon, to avoid\nthe worship of idolaters who used to offer sacrifices to the moon at\nthat particular time. And these two blessings are bestowed in common\non the whole human race; and hence they were repeated more frequently.\n\nThe other five feasts were celebrated once a year: and they\ncommemorated the benefits which had been conferred especially on that\npeople. For there was the feast of the \"Passover\" in the first month\nto commemorate the blessing of being delivered out of Egypt. The\nfeast of \"Pentecost\" was celebrated fifty days later, to recall the\nblessing of the giving of the Law. The other three feasts were kept\nin the seventh month, nearly the whole of which was solemnized by\nthem, just as the seventh day. For on the first of the seventh month\nwas the feast of \"Trumpets,\" in memory of the delivery of Isaac, when\nAbraham found the ram caught by its horns, which they represented by\nthe horns which they blew. The feast of Trumpets was a kind of\ninvitation whereby they prepared themselves to keep the following\nfeast which was kept on the tenth day. This was the feast of\n\"Expiation,\" in memory of the blessing whereby, at the prayer of\nMoses, God forgave the people's sin of worshipping the calf. After\nthis was the feast of \"Scenopegia\" or of \"Tents,\" which was kept for\nseven days, to commemorate the blessing of being protected and led by\nGod through the desert, where they lived in tents. Hence during this\nfeast they had to take \"the fruits of the fairest tree,\" i.e. the\ncitron, \"and the trees of dense foliage\" [*Douay and A. V. and R. V.\nread: 'Boughs of thick trees'], i.e. the myrtle, which is fragrant,\n\"and the branches of palm-trees, and willows of the brook,\" which\nretain their greenness a long time; and these are to be found in the\nLand of promise; to signify that God had brought them through the\narid land of the wilderness to a land of delights. On the eighth day\nanother feast was observed, of \"Assembly and Congregation,\" on which\nthe people collected the expenses necessary for the divine worship:\nand it signified the uniting of the people and the peace granted to\nthem in the Land of promise.\n\nThe figurative reason for these feasts was that the continual\nsacrifice of the lamb foreshadowed the perpetuity of Christ, Who is\nthe \"Lamb of God,\" according to Heb. 13:8: \"Jesus Christ yesterday\nand today, and the same for ever.\" The Sabbath signified the\nspiritual rest bestowed by Christ, as stated in Heb. 4. The Neomenia,\nwhich is the beginning of the new moon, signified the enlightening of\nthe primitive Church by Christ's preaching and miracles. The feast of\nPentecost signified the Descent of the Holy Ghost on the apostles.\nThe feast of Trumpets signified the preaching of the apostles. The\nfeast of Expiation signified the cleansing of the Christian people\nfrom sins: and the feast of Tabernacles signified their pilgrimage in\nthis world, wherein they walk by advancing in virtue. The feast of\nAssembly or Congregation foreshadowed the assembly of the faithful in\nthe kingdom of heaven: wherefore this feast is described as \"most\nholy\" (Lev. 23:36). These three feasts followed immediately on one\nanother, because those who expiate their vices should advance in\nvirtue, until they come to see God, as stated in Ps. 83:8.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 102, Art. 5]\n\nWhether There Can Be Any Suitable Cause for the Sacraments of the Old\nLaw?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there can be no suitable cause for\nthe sacraments of the Old Law. Because those things that are done for\nthe purpose of divine worship should not be like the observances of\nidolaters: since it is written (Deut. 12:31): \"Thou shalt not do in\nlike manner to the Lord thy God: for they have done to their gods all\nthe abominations which the Lord abhorreth.\" Now worshippers of idols\nused to knive themselves to the shedding of blood: for it is related\n(3 Kings 18:28) that they \"cut themselves after their manner with\nknives and lancets, till they were all covered with blood.\" For this\nreason the Lord commanded (Deut. 14:1): \"You shall not cut yourselves\nnor make any baldness for the dead.\" Therefore it was unfitting for\ncircumcision to be prescribed by the Law (Lev. 12:3).\n\nObj. 2: Further, those things which are done for the worship of God\nshould be marked with decorum and gravity; according to Ps. 34:18: \"I\nwill praise Thee in a grave [Douay: 'strong'] people.\" But it seems\nto savor of levity for a man to eat with haste. Therefore it was\nunfittingly commanded (Ex. 12:11) that they should eat the Paschal\nlamb \"in haste.\" Other things too relative to the eating of the lamb\nwere prescribed, which seem altogether unreasonable.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the sacraments of the Old Law were figures of the\nsacraments of the New Law. Now the Paschal lamb signified the\nsacrament of the Eucharist, according to 1 Cor. 5:7: \"Christ our\nPasch is sacrificed.\" Therefore there should also have been some\nsacraments of the Old Law to foreshadow the other sacraments of the\nNew Law, such as Confirmation, Extreme Unction, and Matrimony, and so\nforth.\n\nObj. 4: Further, purification can scarcely be done except by removing\nsomething impure. But as far as God is concerned, no bodily thing is\nreputed impure, because all bodies are God's creatures; and \"every\ncreature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is received\nwith thanksgiving\" (1 Tim. 4:4). It was therefore unfitting for them\nto be purified after contact with a corpse, or any similar corporeal\ninfection.\n\nObj. 5: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 34:4): \"What can be made\nclean by the unclean?\" But the ashes of the red heifer [*Cf. Heb.\n9:13] which was burnt, were unclean, since they made a man unclean:\nfor it is stated (Num. 19:7, seqq.) that the priest who immolated her\nwas rendered unclean \"until the evening\"; likewise he that burnt her;\nand he that gathered up her ashes. Therefore it was unfittingly\nprescribed there that the unclean should be purified by being\nsprinkled with those cinders.\n\nObj. 6: Further, sins are not something corporeal that can be carried\nfrom one place to another: nor can man be cleansed from sin by means\nof something unclean. It was therefore unfitting for the purpose of\nexpiating the sins of the people that the priest should confess the\nsins of the children of Israel on one of the buck-goats, that it\nmight carry them away into the wilderness: while they were rendered\nunclean by the other, which they used for the purpose of\npurification, by burning it together with the calf outside the camp;\nso that they had to wash their clothes and their bodies with water\n(Lev. 16).\n\nObj. 7: Further, what is already cleansed should not be cleansed\nagain. It was therefore unfitting to apply a second purification to a\nman cleansed from leprosy, or to a house; as laid down in Lev. 14.\n\nObj. 8: Further, spiritual uncleanness cannot be cleansed by material\nwater or by shaving the hair. Therefore it seems unreasonable that\nthe Lord ordered (Ex. 30:18, seqq.) the making of a brazen laver with\nits foot, that the priests might wash their hands and feet before\nentering the temple; and that He commanded (Num. 8:7) the Levites to\nbe sprinkled with the water of purification, and to shave all the\nhairs of their flesh.\n\nObjection 9: Further, that which is greater cannot be cleansed by\nthat which is less. Therefore it was unfitting that, in the Law, the\nhigher and lower priests, as stated in Lev. 8 [*Cf. Ex. 29], and the\nLevites, according to Num. 8, should be consecrated with any bodily\nanointing, bodily sacrifices, and bodily oblations.\n\nObjection 10: Further, as stated in 1 Kings 16:7, \"Man seeth those\nthings that appear, but the Lord beholdeth the heart.\" But those\nthings that appear outwardly in man are the dispositions of his body\nand his clothes. Therefore it was unfitting for certain special\ngarments to be appointed to the higher and lower priests, as related\nin Ex. 28 [*Cf. Lev. 8:7, seqq.]. It seems, moreover, unreasonable\nthat anyone should be debarred from the priesthood on account of\ndefects in the body, as stated in Lev. 21:17, seqq.: \"Whosoever of\nthy seed throughout their families, hath a blemish, he shall not\noffer bread to his God . . . if he be blind, if he be lame,\" etc. It\nseems, therefore, that the sacraments of the Old Law were\nunreasonable.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Lev. 20:8): \"I am the Lord that\nsanctify you.\" But nothing unreasonable is done by God, for it is\nwritten (Ps. 103:24): \"Thou hast made all things in wisdom.\"\nTherefore there was nothing without a reasonable cause in the\nsacraments of the Old Law, which were ordained to the sanctification\nof man.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 101, A. 4), the sacraments are,\nproperly speaking, things applied to the worshippers of God for their\nconsecration so as, in some way, to depute them to the worship of\nGod. Now the worship of God belonged in a general way to the whole\npeople; but in a special way, it belonged to the priests and Levites,\nwho were the ministers of divine worship. Consequently, in these\nsacraments of the Old Law, certain things concerned the whole people\nin general; while others belonged to the ministers.\n\nIn regard to both, three things were necessary. The first was to be\nestablished in the state of worshipping God: and this institution was\nbrought about--for all in general, by circumcision, without which no\none was admitted to any of the legal observances--and for the\npriests, by their consecration. The second thing required was the use\nof those things that pertain to divine worship. And thus, as to the\npeople, there was the partaking of the paschal banquet, to which no\nuncircumcised man was admitted, as is clear from Ex. 12:43, seqq.:\nand, as to the priests, the offering of the victims, and the eating\nof the loaves of proposition and of other things that were allotted\nto the use of the priests. The third thing required was the removal\nof all impediments to divine worship, viz. of uncleannesses. And\nthen, as to the people, certain purifications were instituted for the\nremoval of certain external uncleannesses; and also expiations from\nsins; while, as to the priests and Levites, the washing of hands and\nfeet and the shaving of the hair were instituted.\n\nAnd all these things had reasonable causes, both literal, in so far\nas they were ordained to the worship of God for the time being, and\nfigurative, in so far as they were ordained to foreshadow Christ: as\nwe shall see by taking them one by one.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The chief literal reason for circumcision was in order\nthat man might profess his belief in one God. And because Abraham was\nthe first to sever himself from the infidels, by going out from his\nhouse and kindred, for this reason he was the first to receive\ncircumcision. This reason is set forth by the Apostle (Rom. 4:9,\nseqq.) thus: \"He received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the\njustice of the faith which he had, being uncircumcised\"; because, to\nwit, we are told that \"unto Abraham faith was reputed to justice,\"\nfor the reason that \"against hope he believed in hope,\" i.e. against\nthe hope that is of nature he believed in the hope that is of grace,\n\"that he might be made the father of many nations,\" when he was an\nold man, and his wife an old and barren woman. And in order that this\ndeclaration, and imitation of Abraham's faith, might be fixed firmly\nin the hearts of the Jews, they received in their flesh such a sign\nas they could not forget, wherefore it is written (Gen. 17:13): \"My\ncovenant shall be in your flesh for a perpetual covenant.\" This was\ndone on the eighth day, because until then a child is very tender,\nand so might be seriously injured; and is considered as something not\nyet consolidated: wherefore neither are animals offered before the\neighth day. And it was not delayed after that time, lest some might\nrefuse the sign of circumcision on account of the pain: and also lest\nthe parents, whose love for their children increases as they become\nused to their presence and as they grow older, should withdraw their\nchildren from circumcision. A second reason may have been the\nweakening of concupiscence in that member. A third motive may have\nbeen to revile the worship of Venus and Priapus, which gave honor to\nthat part of the body. The Lord's prohibition extended only to the\ncutting of oneself in honor of idols: and such was not the\ncircumcision of which we have been speaking.\n\nThe figurative reason for circumcision was that it foreshadowed the\nremoval of corruption, which was to be brought about by Christ, and\nwill be perfectly fulfilled in the eighth age, which is the age of\nthose who rise from the dead. And since all corruption of guilt and\npunishment comes to us through our carnal origin, from the sin of our\nfirst parent, therefore circumcision was applied to the generative\nmember. Hence the Apostle says (Col. 2:11): \"You are circumcised\" in\nChrist \"with circumcision not made by hand in despoiling of the body\nof the flesh, but in the circumcision of\" Our Lord Jesus \"Christ.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The literal reason of the paschal banquet was to\ncommemorate the blessing of being led by God out of Egypt. Hence by\ncelebrating this banquet they declared that they belonged to that\npeople which God had taken to Himself out of Egypt. For when they\nwere delivered from Egypt, they were commanded to sprinkle the lamb's\nblood on the transoms of their house doors, as though declaring that\nthey were averse to the rites of the Egyptians who worshipped the\nram. Wherefore they were delivered by the sprinkling or rubbing of\nthe blood of the lamb on the door-posts, from the danger of\nextermination which threatened the Egyptians.\n\nNow two things are to be observed in their departure from Egypt:\nnamely, their haste in going, for the Egyptians pressed them to go\nforth speedily, as related in Ex. 12:33; and there was danger that\nanyone who did not hasten to go with the crowd might be slain by the\nEgyptians. Their haste was shown in two ways. First by what they ate.\nFor they were commanded to eat unleavened bread, as a sign \"that it\ncould not be leavened, the Egyptians pressing them to depart\"; and to\neat roast meat, for this took less time to prepare; and that they\nshould not break a bone thereof, because in their haste there was no\ntime to break bones. Secondly, as to the manner of eating. For it is\nwritten: \"You shall gird your reins, and you shall have shoes on your\nfeet, holding staves in your hands, and you shall eat in haste\":\nwhich clearly designates men at the point of starting on a journey.\nTo this also is to be referred the command: \"In one house shall it be\neaten, neither shall you carry forth of the flesh thereof out of the\nhouse\": because, to wit, on account of their haste, they could not\nsend any gifts of it.\n\nThe stress they suffered while in Egypt was denoted by the wild\nlettuces. The figurative reason is evident, because the sacrifice of\nthe paschal lamb signified the sacrifice of Christ according to 1\nCor. 5:7: \"Christ our pasch is sacrificed.\" The blood of the lamb,\nwhich ensured deliverance from the destroyer, by being sprinkled on\nthe ransoms, signified faith in Christ's Passion, in the hearts and\non the lips of the faithful, by which same Passion we are delivered\nfrom sin and death, according to 1 Pet. 1:18: \"You were . . .\nredeemed . . . with the precious blood . . . of a lamb unspotted.\"\nThe partaking of its flesh signified the eating of Christ's body in\nthe Sacrament; and the flesh was roasted at the fire to signify\nChrist's Passion or charity. And it was eaten with unleavened bread\nto signify the blameless life of the faithful who partake of Christ's\nbody, according to 1 Cor. 5:8: \"Let us feast . . . with the\nunleavened bread of sincerity and truth.\" The wild lettuces were\nadded to denote repentance for sins, which is required of those who\nreceive the body of Christ. Their loins were girt in sign of\nchastity: and the shoes of their feet are the examples of our dead\nancestors. The staves they were to hold in their hands denoted\npastoral authority: and it was commanded that the paschal lamb should\nbe eaten in one house, i.e. in a catholic church, and not in the\nconventicles of heretics.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Some of the sacraments of the New Law had corresponding\nfigurative sacraments in the Old Law. For Baptism, which is the\nsacrament of Faith, corresponds to circumcision. Hence it is written\n(Col. 2:11, 12): \"You are circumcised . . . in the circumcision of\"\nOur Lord Jesus \"Christ: buried with Him in Baptism.\" In the New Law\nthe sacrament of the Eucharist corresponds to the banquet of the\npaschal lamb. The sacrament of Penance in the New Law corresponds to\nall the purifications of the Old Law. The sacrament of Orders\ncorresponds to the consecration of the pontiff and of the priests. To\nthe sacrament of Confirmation, which is the sacrament of the fulness\nof grace, there would be no corresponding sacrament of the Old Law,\nbecause the time of fulness had not yet come, since \"the Law brought\nno man [Vulg.: 'nothing'] to perfection\" (Heb. 7:19). The same\napplies to the sacrament of Extreme Unction, which is an immediate\npreparation for entrance into glory, to which the way was not yet\nopened out in the Old Law, since the price had not yet been paid.\nMatrimony did indeed exist under the Old Law, as a function of\nnature, but not as the sacrament of the union of Christ with the\nChurch, for that union was not as yet brought about. Hence under the\nOld Law it was allowable to give a bill of divorce, which is contrary\nto the nature of the sacrament.\n\nReply Obj. 4: As already stated, the purifications of the Old Law\nwere ordained for the removal of impediments to the divine worship:\nwhich worship is twofold; viz. spiritual, consisting in devotion of\nthe mind to God; and corporal, consisting in sacrifices, oblations,\nand so forth. Now men are hindered in the spiritual worship by sins,\nwhereby men were said to be polluted, for instance, by idolatry,\nmurder, adultery, or incest. From such pollutions men were purified\nby certain sacrifices, offered either for the whole community in\ngeneral, or also for the sins of individuals; not that those carnal\nsacrifices had of themselves the power of expiating sin; but that\nthey signified that expiation of sins which was to be effected by\nChrist, and of which those of old became partakers by protesting\ntheir faith in the Redeemer, while taking part in the figurative\nsacrifices.\n\nThe impediments to external worship consisted in certain bodily\nuncleannesses; which were considered in the first place as existing\nin man, and consequently in other animals also, and in man's clothes,\ndwelling-place, and vessels. In man himself uncleanness was\nconsidered as arising partly from himself and partly from contact\nwith unclean things. Anything proceeding from man was reputed unclean\nthat was already subject to corruption, or exposed thereto: and\nconsequently since death is a kind of corruption, the human corpse\nwas considered unclean. In like manner, since leprosy arises from\ncorruption of the humors, which break out externally and infect other\npersons, therefore were lepers also considered unclean; and, again,\nwomen suffering from a flow of blood, whether from weakness, or from\nnature (either at the monthly course or at the time of conception);\nand, for the same reason, men were reputed unclean if they suffered\nfrom a flow of seed, whether due to weakness, to nocturnal pollution,\nor to sexual intercourse. Because every humor issuing from man in the\naforesaid ways involves some unclean infection. Again, man contracted\nuncleanness by touching any unclean thing whatever.\n\nNow there was both a literal and a figurative reason for these\nuncleannesses. The literal reason was taken from the reverence due to\nthose things that belong to the divine worship: both because men are\nnot wont, when unclean, to touch precious things: and in order that\nby rarely approaching sacred things they might have greater respect\nfor them. For since man could seldom avoid all the aforesaid\nuncleannesses, the result was that men could seldom approach to touch\nthings belonging to the worship of God, so that when they did\napproach, they did so with greater reverence and humility. Moreover,\nin some of these the literal reason was that men should not be kept\naway from worshipping God through fear of coming in contact with\nlepers and others similarly afflicted with loathsome and contagious\ndiseases. In others, again, the reason was to avoid idolatrous\nworship: because in their sacrificial rites the Gentiles sometimes\nemployed human blood and seed. All these bodily uncleannesses were\npurified either by the mere sprinkling of water, or, in the case of\nthose which were more grievous, by some sacrifice of expiation for\nthe sin which was the occasion of the uncleanness in question.\n\nThe figurative reason for these uncleannesses was that they were\nfigures of various sins. For the uncleanness of any corpse signifies\nthe uncleanness of sin, which is the death of the soul. The\nuncleanness of leprosy betokened the uncleanness of heretical\ndoctrine: both because heretical doctrine is contagious just as\nleprosy is, and because no doctrine is so false as not to have some\ntruth mingled with error, just as on the surface of a leprous body\none may distinguish the healthy parts from those that are infected.\nThe uncleanness of a woman suffering from a flow of blood denotes the\nuncleanness of idolatry, on account of the blood which is offered up.\nThe uncleanness of the man who has suffered seminal loss signifies\nthe uncleanness of empty words, for \"the seed is the word of God.\"\nThe uncleanness of sexual intercourse and of the woman in child-birth\nsignifies the uncleanness of original sin. The uncleanness of the\nwoman in her periods signifies the uncleanness of a mind that is\nsensualized by pleasure. Speaking generally, the uncleanness\ncontracted by touching an unclean thing denotes the uncleanness\narising from consent in another's sin, according to 2 Cor. 6:17: \"Go\nout from among them, and be ye separate . . . and touch not the\nunclean thing.\"\n\nMoreover, this uncleanness arising from the touch was contracted even\nby inanimate objects; for whatever was touched in any way by an\nunclean man, became itself unclean. Wherein the Law attenuated the\nsuperstition of the Gentiles, who held that uncleanness was\ncontracted not only by touch, but also by speech or looks, as Rabbi\nMoses states (Doct. Perplex. iii) of a woman in her periods. The\nmystical sense of this was that \"to God the wicked and his wickedness\nare hateful alike\" (Wis. 14:9).\n\nThere was also an uncleanness of inanimate things considered in\nthemselves, such as the uncleanness of leprosy in a house or in\nclothes. For just as leprosy occurs in men through a corrupt humor\ncausing putrefaction and corruption in the flesh; so, too, through\nsome corruption and excess of humidity or dryness, there arises\nsometimes a kind of corruption in the stones with which a house is\nbuilt, or in clothes. Hence the Law called this corruption by the\nname of leprosy, whereby a house or a garment was deemed to be\nunclean: both because all corruption savored of uncleanness, as\nstated above, and because the Gentiles worshipped their household\ngods as a preservative against this corruption. Hence the Law\nprescribed such houses, where this kind of corruption was of a\nlasting nature, to be destroyed; and such garments to be burnt, in\norder to avoid all occasion of idolatry. There was also an\nuncleanness of vessels, of which it is written (Num. 19:15): \"The\nvessel that hath no cover, and binding over it, shall be unclean.\"\nThe cause of this uncleanness was that anything unclean might easily\ndrop into such vessels, so as to render them unclean. Moreover, this\ncommand aimed at the prevention of idolatry. For idolaters believed\nthat if mice, lizards, or the like, which they used to sacrifice to\nthe idols, fell into the vessels or into the water, these became more\npleasing to the gods. Even now some women let down uncovered vessels\nin honor of the nocturnal deities which they call \"Janae.\"\n\nThe figurative reason of these uncleannesses is that the leprosy of a\nhouse signified the uncleanness of the assembly of heretics; the\nleprosy of a linen garment signified an evil life arising from\nbitterness of mind; the leprosy of a woolen garment denoted the\nwickedness of flatterers; leprosy in the warp signified the vices of\nthe soul; leprosy on the woof denoted sins of the flesh, for as the\nwarp is in the woof, so is the soul in the body. The vessel that has\nneither cover nor binding, betokens a man who lacks the veil of\ntaciturnity, and who is unrestrained by any severity of discipline.\n\nReply Obj. 5: As stated above (ad 4), there was a twofold uncleanness\nin the Law; one by way of corruption in the mind or in the body; and\nthis was the graver uncleanness; the other was by mere contact with\nan unclean thing, and this was less grave, and was more easily\nexpiated. Because the former uncleanness was expiated by sacrifices\nfor sins, since all corruption is due to sin, and signifies sin:\nwhereas the latter uncleanness was expiated by the mere sprinkling of\na certain water, of which water we read in Num. 19. For there God\ncommanded them to take a red cow in memory of the sin they had\ncommitted in worshipping a calf. And a cow is mentioned rather than a\ncalf, because it was thus that the Lord was wont to designate the\nsynagogue, according to Osee 4:16: \"Israel hath gone astray like a\nwanton heifer\": and this was, perhaps, because they worshipped\nheifers after the custom of Egypt, according to Osee 10:5: \"(They)\nhave worshipped the kine of Bethaven.\" And in detestation of the sin\nof idolatry it was sacrificed outside the camp; in fact, whenever\nsacrifice was offered up in expiation of the multitude of sins, it\nwas all burnt outside the camp. Moreover, in order to show that this\nsacrifice cleansed the people from all their sins, \"the priest\"\ndipped \"his finger in her blood,\" and sprinkled \"it over against the\ndoor of the tabernacle seven times\"; for the number seven signified\nuniversality. Further, the very sprinkling of blood pertained to the\ndetestation of idolatry, in which the blood that was offered up was\nnot poured out, but was collected together, and men gathered round it\nto eat in honor of the idols. Likewise it was burnt by fire, either\nbecause God appeared to Moses in a fire, and the Law was given from\nthe midst of fire; or to denote that idolatry, together with all that\nwas connected therewith, was to be extirpated altogether; just as the\ncow was burnt \"with her skin and her flesh, her blood and dung being\ndelivered to the flames.\" To this burning were added \"cedar-wood, and\nhyssop, and scarlet twice dyed,\" to signify that just as cedar-wood\nis not liable to putrefaction, and scarlet twice dyed does not easily\nlose its color, and hyssop retains its odor after it has been dried;\nso also was this sacrifice for the preservation of the whole people,\nand for their good behavior and devotion. Hence it is said of the\nashes of the cow: \"That they may be reserved for the multitude of the\nchildren of Israel.\" Or, according to Josephus (Antiq. iii, 8, 9,\n10), the four elements are indicated here: for \"cedar-wood\" was added\nto the fire, to signify the earth, on account of its earthiness;\n\"hyssop,\" to signify the air, on account of its smell; \"scarlet twice\ndyed,\" to signify water, for the same reason as purple, on account of\nthe dyes which are taken out of the water: thus denoting the fact\nthat this sacrifice was offered to the Creator of the four elements.\nAnd since this sacrifice was offered for the sin of idolatry, both\n\"he that burned her,\" and \"he that gathered up the ashes,\" and \"he\nthat sprinkled the water\" in which the ashes were placed, were deemed\nunclean in detestation of that sin, in order to show that whatever\nwas in any way connected with idolatry should be cast aside as being\nunclean. From this uncleanness they were purified by the mere washing\nof their clothes; nor did they need to be sprinkled with the water on\naccount of this kind of uncleanness, because otherwise the process\nwould have been unending, since he that sprinkled the water became\nunclean, so that if he were to sprinkle himself he would remain\nunclean; and if another were to sprinkle him, that one would have\nbecome unclean, and in like manner, whoever might sprinkle him, and\nso on indefinitely.\n\nThe figurative reason of this sacrifice was that the red cow\nsignified Christ in respect of his assumed weakness, denoted by the\nfemale sex; while the color of the cow designated the blood of His\nPassion. And the \"red cow was of full age,\" because all Christ's\nworks are perfect, \"in which there\" was \"no blemish\"; \"and which\" had\n\"not carried the yoke,\" because Christ was innocent, nor did He carry\nthe yoke of sin. It was commanded to be taken to Moses, because they\nblamed Him for transgressing the law of Moses by breaking the\nSabbath. And it was commanded to be delivered \"to Eleazar the\npriest,\" because Christ was delivered into the hands of the priests\nto be slain. It was immolated \"without the camp,\" because Christ\n\"suffered outside the gate\" (Heb. 13:12). And the priest dipped \"his\nfinger in her blood,\" because the mystery of Christ's Passion should\nbe considered and imitated.\n\nIt was sprinkled \"over against . . . the tabernacle,\" which denotes\nthe synagogue, to signify either the condemnation of the unbelieving\nJews, or the purification of believers; and this \"seven times,\" in\ntoken either of the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, or of the seven\ndays wherein all time is comprised. Again, all things that pertain to\nthe Incarnation of Christ should be burnt with fire, i.e. they should\nbe understood spiritually; for the \"skin\" and \"flesh\" signified\nChrist's outward works; the \"blood\" denoted the subtle inward force\nwhich quickened His external deeds; the \"dung\" betokened His\nweariness, His thirst, and all such like things pertaining to His\nweakness. Three things were added, viz. \"cedar-wood,\" which denotes\nthe height of hope or contemplation; \"hyssop,\" in token of humility\nor faith; \"scarlet twice dyed,\" which denotes twofold charity; for it\nis by these three that we should cling to Christ suffering. The ashes\nof this burning were gathered by \"a man that is clean,\" because the\nrelics of the Passion came into the possession of the Gentiles, who\nwere not guilty of Christ's death. The ashes were put into water for\nthe purpose of expiation, because Baptism receives from Christ's\nPassion the power of washing away sins. The priest who immolated and\nburned the cow, and he who burned, and he who gathered together the\nashes, were unclean, as also he that sprinkled the water: either\nbecause the Jews became unclean through putting Christ to death,\nwhereby our sins are expiated; and this, until the evening, i.e.\nuntil the end of the world, when the remnants of Israel will be\nconverted; or else because they who handle sacred things with a view\nto the cleansing of others contract certain uncleannesses, as Gregory\nsays (Pastor. ii, 5); and this until the evening, i.e. until the end\nof this life.\n\nReply Obj. 6: As stated above (ad 5), an uncleanness which was caused\nby corruption either of mind or of body was expiated by\nsin-offerings. Now special sacrifices were wont to be offered for the\nsins of individuals: but since some were neglectful about expiating\nsuch sins and uncleannesses; or, through ignorance, failed to offer\nthis expiation; it was laid down that once a year, on the tenth day\nof the seventh month, a sacrifice of expiation should be offered for\nthe whole people. And because, as the Apostle says (Heb. 7:28), \"the\nLaw maketh men priests, who have infirmity,\" it behooved the priest\nfirst of all to offer a calf for his own sins, in memory of Aaron's\nsin in fashioning the molten calf; and besides, to offer a ram for a\nholocaust, which signified that the priestly sovereignty denoted by\nthe ram, who is the head of the flock, was to be ordained to the\nglory of God. Then he offered two he-goats for the people: one of\nwhich was offered in expiation of the sins of the multitude. For the\nhe-goat is an evil-smelling animal; and from its skin clothes are\nmade having a pungent odor; to signify the stench, uncleanness and\nthe sting of sin. After this he-goat had been immolated, its blood\nwas taken, together with the blood of the calf, into the Holy of\nHolies, and the entire sanctuary was sprinkled with it; to signify\nthat the tabernacle was cleansed from the uncleanness of the children\nof Israel. But the corpses of the he-goat and calf which had been\noffered up for sin had to be burnt, to denote the destruction of\nsins. They were not, however, burnt on the altar: since none but\nholocausts were burnt thereon; but it was prescribed that they should\nbe burnt without the camp, in detestation of sin: for this was done\nwhenever sacrifice was offered for a grievous sin, or for the\nmultitude of sins. The other goat was let loose into the wilderness:\nnot indeed to offer it to the demons, whom the Gentiles worshipped in\ndesert places, because it was unlawful to offer aught to them; but in\norder to point out the effect of the sacrifice which had been offered\nup. Hence the priest put his hand on its head, while confessing the\nsins of the children of Israel: as though that goat were to carry\nthem away into the wilderness, where it would be devoured by wild\nbeasts, because it bore the punishment of the people's sins. And it\nwas said to bear the sins of the people, either because the\nforgiveness of the people's sins was signified by its being let\nloose, or because on its head written lists of sins were fastened.\n\nThe figurative reason of these things was that Christ was\nforeshadowed both by the calf, on account of His power; and by the\nram, because He is the Head of the faithful; and by the he-goat, on\naccount of \"the likeness of sinful flesh\" (Rom. 8:3). Moreover,\nChrist was sacrificed for the sins of both priests and people: since\nboth those of high and those of low degree are cleansed from sin by\nHis Passion. The blood of the calf and of the goat was brought into\nthe Holies by the priest, because the entrance to the kingdom of\nheaven was opened to us by the blood of Christ's Passion. Their\nbodies were burnt without the camp, because \"Christ suffered without\nthe gate,\" as the Apostle declares (Heb. 13:12). The scape-goat may\ndenote either Christ's Godhead Which went away into solitude when the\nMan Christ suffered, not by going to another place, but by\nrestraining His power: or it may signify the base concupiscence which\nwe ought to cast away from ourselves, while we offer up to Our Lord\nacts of virtue.\n\nWith regard to the uncleanness contracted by those who burnt these\nsacrifices, the reason is the same as that which we assigned (ad 5)\nto the sacrifice of the red heifer.\n\nReply Obj. 7: The legal rite did not cleanse the leper of his\ndeformity, but declared him to be cleansed. This is shown by the\nwords of Lev. 14:3, seqq., where it was said that the priest, \"when\nhe shall find that the leprosy is cleansed,\" shall command \"him that\nis to be purified\": consequently, the leper was already healed: but\nhe was said to be purified in so far as the verdict of the priest\nrestored him to the society of men and to the worship of God. It\nhappened sometimes, however, that bodily leprosy was miraculously\ncured by the legal rite, when the priest erred in his judgment.\n\nNow this purification of a leper was twofold: for, in the first\nplace, he was declared to be clean; and, secondly, he was restored,\nas clean, to the society of men and to the worship of God, to wit,\nafter seven days. At the first purification the leper who sought to\nbe cleansed offered for himself \"two living sparrows . . .\ncedar-wood, and scarlet, and hyssop,\" in such wise that a sparrow and\nthe hyssop should be tied to the cedar-wood with a scarlet thread, so\nthat the cedar-wood was like the handle of an aspersory: while the\nhyssop and sparrow were that part of the aspersory which was dipped\ninto the blood of the other sparrow which was \"immolated . . . over\nliving waters.\" These things he offered as an antidote to the four\ndefects of leprosy: for cedar-wood, which is not subject to\nputrefaction, was offered against the putrefaction; hyssop, which is\na sweet-smelling herb, was offered up against the stench; a living\nsparrow was offered up against numbness; and scarlet, which has a\nvivid color, was offered up against the repulsive color of leprosy.\nThe living sparrow was let loose to fly away into the plain, because\nthe leper was restored to his former liberty.\n\nOn the eighth day he was admitted to divine worship, and was restored\nto the society of men; but only after having shaved all the hair of\nhis body, and washed his clothes, because leprosy rots the hair,\ninfects the clothes, and gives them an evil smell. Afterwards a\nsacrifice was offered for his sin, since leprosy was frequently a\nresult of sin: and some of the blood of the sacrifice was put on the\ntip of the ear of the man that was to be cleansed, \"and on the thumb\nof his right hand, and the great toe of his right foot\"; because it\nis in these parts that leprosy is first diagnosed and felt. In this\nrite, moreover, three liquids were employed: viz. blood, against the\ncorruption of the blood; oil, to denote the healing of the disease;\nand living waters, to wash away the filth.\n\nThe figurative reason was that the Divine and human natures in Christ\nwere denoted by the two sparrows, one of which, in likeness of His\nhuman nature, was offered up in an earthen vessel over living waters,\nbecause the waters of Baptism are sanctified by Christ's Passion. The\nother sparrow, in token of His impassible Godhead, remained living,\nbecause the Godhead cannot die: hence it flew away, for the Godhead\ncould not be encompassed by the Passion. Now this living sparrow,\ntogether with the cedar-wood and scarlet or cochineal, and hyssop,\ni.e. faith, hope and charity, as stated above (ad 5), was put into\nthe water for the purpose of sprinkling, because we are baptized in\nthe faith of the God-Man. By the waters of Baptism or of his tears\nman washes his clothes, i.e. his works, and all his hair, i.e. his\nthoughts. The tip of the right ear of the man to be cleansed is\nmoistened with some the blood and oil, in order to strengthen his\nhearing against harmful words; and the thumb and toe of his right\nhand and foot are moistened that his deeds may be holy. Other matters\npertaining to this purification, or to that also of any other\nuncleannesses, call for no special remark, beyond what applies to\nother sacrifices, whether for sins or for trespasses.\n\nReply Obj. 8 and 9: Just as the people were initiated by circumcision\nto the divine worship, so were the ministers by some special\npurification or consecration: wherefore they are commanded to be\nseparated from other men, as being specially deputed, rather than\nothers, to the ministry of the divine worship. And all that was done\ntouching them in their consecration or institution, was with a view\nto show that they were in possession of a prerogative of purity,\npower and dignity. Hence three things were done in the institution of\nministers: for first, they were purified; secondly, they were adorned\n[*'Ornabantur.' Some editions have 'ordinabantur'--'were ordained':\nthe former reading is a reference to Lev. 8:7-9] and consecrated;\nthirdly, they were employed in the ministry. All in general used to\nbe purified by washing in water, and by certain sacrifices; but the\nLevites in particular shaved all the hair of their bodies, as stated\nin Lev. 8 (cf. Num. 8).\n\nWith regard to the high-priests and priests the consecration was\nperformed as follows. First, when they had been washed, they were\nclothed with certain special garments in designation of their\ndignity. In particular, the high-priest was anointed on the head with\nthe oil of unction: to denote that the power of consecration was\npoured forth by him on to others, just as oil flows from the head on\nto the lower parts of the body; according to Ps. 132:2: \"Like the\nprecious ointment on the head that ran down upon the beard, the beard\nof Aaron.\" But the Levites received no other consecration besides\nbeing offered to the Lord by the children of Israel through the hands\nof the high-priest, who prayed for them. The lesser priests were\nconsecrated on the hands only, which were to be employed in the\nsacrifices. The tip of their right ear and the thumb of their right\nhand, and the great toe of their right foot were tinged with the\nblood of the sacrificial animal, to denote that they should be\nobedient to God's law in offering the sacrifices (this is denoted by\ntouching their right ear); and that they should be careful and ready\nin performing the sacrifices (this is signified by the moistening of\nthe right foot and hand). They themselves and their garments were\nsprinkled with the blood of the animal that had been sacrificed, in\nmemory of the blood of the lamb by which they had been delivered in\nEgypt. At their consecration the following sacrifices were offered: a\ncalf, for sin, in memory of Aaron's sin in fashioning the molten\ncalf; a ram, for a holocaust, in memory of the sacrifice of Abraham,\nwhose obedience it behooved the high-priest to imitate; again, a ram\nof consecration, which was a peace-offering, in memory of the\ndelivery from Egypt through the blood of the lamb; and a basket of\nbread, in memory of the manna vouchsafed to the people.\n\nIn reference to their being destined to the ministry, the fat of the\nram, one roll of bread, and the right shoulder were placed on their\nhands, to show that they received the power of offering these things\nto the Lord: while the Levites were initiated to the ministry by\nbeing brought into the tabernacle of the covenant, as being destined\nto the ministry touching the vessels of the sanctuary.\n\nThe figurative reason of these things was that those who are to be\nconsecrated to the spiritual ministry of Christ, should be first of\nall purified by the waters of Baptism, and by the waters of tears, in\ntheir faith in Christ's Passion, which is a sacrifice both of\nexpiation and of purification. They have also to shave all the hair\nof their body, i.e. all evil thoughts. They should, moreover, be\ndecked with virtues, and be consecrated with the oil of the Holy\nGhost, and with the sprinkling of Christ's blood. And thus they\nshould be intent on the fulfilment of their spiritual ministry.\n\nReply Obj. 10: As already stated (A. 4), the purpose of the Law was\nto induce men to have reverence for the divine worship: and this in\ntwo ways; first, by excluding from the worship of God whatever might\nbe an object of contempt; secondly, by introducing into the divine\nworship all that seemed to savor of reverence. And, indeed, if this\nwas observed in regard to the tabernacle and its vessels, and in the\nanimals to be sacrificed, much more was it to be observed in the very\nministers. Wherefore, in order to obviate contempt for the ministers,\nit was prescribed that they should have no bodily stain or defect:\nsince men so deformed are wont to be despised by others. For the same\nreason it was also commanded that the choice of those who were to be\ndestined to the service of God was not to be made in a broadcast\nmanner from any family, but according to their descent from one\nparticular stock, thus giving them distinction and nobility.\n\nIn order that they might be revered, special ornate vestments were\nappointed for their use, and a special form of consecration. This\nindeed is the general reason of ornate garments. But the high-priest\nin particular had eight vestments. First, he had a linen tunic.\nSecondly, he had a purple tunic; round the bottom of which were\nplaced \"little bells\" and \"pomegranates of violet, and purple, and\nscarlet twice dyed.\" Thirdly, he had the ephod, which covered his\nshoulders and his breast down to the girdle; and it was made of gold,\nand violet and purple, and scarlet twice dyed and twisted linen: and\non his shoulders he bore two onyx stones, on which were graven the\nnames of the children of Israel. Fourthly, he had the rational, made\nof the same material; it was square in shape, and was worn on the\nbreast, and was fastened to the ephod. On this rational there were\ntwelve precious stones set in four rows, on which also were graven\nthe names of the children of Israel, in token that the priest bore\nthe burden of the whole people, since he bore their names on his\nshoulders; and that it was his duty ever to think of their welfare,\nsince he wore them on his breast, bearing them in his heart, so to\nspeak. And the Lord commanded the \"Doctrine and Truth\" to be put in\nthe rational: for certain matters regarding moral and dogmatic truth\nwere written on it. The Jews indeed pretend that on the rational was\nplaced a stone which changed color according to the various things\nwhich were about to happen to the children of Israel: and this they\ncall the \"Truth and Doctrine.\" Fifthly, he wore a belt or girdle made\nof the four colors mentioned above. Sixthly, there was the tiara or\nmitre which was made of linen. Seventhly, there was the golden plate\nwhich hung over his forehead; on it was inscribed the Lord's name.\nEighthly, there were \"the linen breeches to cover the flesh of their\nnakedness,\" when they went up to the sanctuary or altar. Of these\neight vestments the lesser priests had four, viz. the linen tunic and\nbreeches, the belt and the tiara.\n\nAccording to some, the literal reason for these vestments was that\nthey denoted the disposition of the terrestrial globe; as though the\nhigh-priest confessed himself to be the minister of the Creator of\nthe world, wherefore it is written (Wis. 18:24): \"In the robe\" of\nAaron \"was the whole world\" described. For the linen breeches\nsignified the earth out of which the flax grows. The surrounding belt\nsignified the ocean which surrounds the earth. The violet tunic\ndenoted the air by its color: its little bells betoken the thunder;\nthe pomegranates, the lightning. The ephod, by its many colors,\nsignified the starry heaven; the two onyx stones denoted the two\nhemispheres, or the sun and moon. The twelve precious stones on the\nbreast are the twelve signs of the zodiac: and they are said to have\nbeen placed on the rational because in heaven are the types\n(_rationes_) of earthly things, according to Job 38:33: \"Dost thou\nknow the order of heaven, and canst thou set down the reason\n(_rationem_) thereof on the earth?\" The turban or tiara signified the\nempyrean: the golden plate was a token of God, the governor of the\nuniverse.\n\nThe figurative reason is evident. Because bodily stains or defects\nwherefrom the priests had to be immune, signify the various vices and\nsins from which they should be free. Thus it is forbidden that he\nshould be blind, i.e. he ought not to be ignorant: he must not be\nlame, i.e. vacillating and uncertain of purpose: that he must have \"a\nlittle, or a great, or a crooked nose,\" i.e. that he should not, from\nlack of discretion, exceed in one direction or in another, or even\nexercise some base occupation: for the nose signifies discretion,\nbecause it discerns odors. It is forbidden that he should have \"a\nbroken foot\" or \"hand,\" i.e. he should not lose the power of doing\ngood works or of advancing in virtue. He is rejected, too, if he have\na swelling either in front or behind [Vulg.: 'if he be\ncrook-backed']: by which is signified too much love of earthly\nthings: if he be blear-eyed, i.e. if his mind is darkened by carnal\naffections: for running of the eyes is caused by a flow of matter. He\nis also rejected if he had \"a pearl in his eye,\" i.e. if he presumes\nin his own estimation that he is clothed in the white robe of\nrighteousness. Again, he is rejected \"if he have a continued scab,\"\ni.e. lustfulness of the flesh: also, if he have \"a dry scurf,\" which\ncovers the body without giving pain, and is a blemish on the\ncomeliness of the members; which denotes avarice. Lastly, he is\nrejected \"if he have a rupture\" or hernia; through baseness rending\nhis heart, though it appear not in his deeds.\n\nThe vestments denote the virtues of God's ministers. Now there are\nfour things that are necessary to all His ministers, viz. chastity\ndenoted by the breeches; a pure life, signified by the linen tunic;\nthe moderation of discretion, betokened by the girdle; and rectitude\nof purpose, denoted by the mitre covering the head. But the\nhigh-priests needed four other things in addition to these. First, a\ncontinual recollection of God in their thoughts; and this was\nsignified by the golden plate worn over the forehead, with the name\nof God engraved thereon. Secondly, they had to bear with the\nshortcomings of the people: this was denoted by the ephod which they\nbore on their shoulders. Thirdly, they had to carry the people in\ntheir mind and heart by the solicitude of charity, in token of which\nthey wore the rational. Fourthly, they had to lead a godly life by\nperforming works of perfection; and this was signified by the violet\ntunic. Hence little golden bells were fixed to the bottom of the\nviolet tunic, which bells signified the teaching of divine things\nunited in the high-priest to his godly mode of life. In addition to\nthese were the pomegranates, signifying unity of faith and concord in\ngood morals: because his doctrine should hold together in such a way\nthat it should not rend asunder the unity of faith and peace.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 102, Art. 6]\n\nWhether There Was Any Reasonable Cause for the Ceremonial Observances?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that there was no reasonable cause for the\nceremonial observances. Because, as the Apostle says (1 Tim. 4:4),\n\"every creature of God is good, and nothing to be rejected that is\nreceived with thanksgiving.\" It was therefore unfitting that they\nshould be forbidden to eat certain foods, as being unclean according\nto Lev. 11 [*Cf. Deut. 14].\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as animals are given to man for food, so also\nare herbs: wherefore it is written (Gen. 9:3): \"As the green herbs\nhave I delivered all\" flesh \"to you.\" But the Law did not distinguish\nany herbs from the rest as being unclean, although some are most\nharmful, for instance, those that are poisonous. Therefore it seems\nthat neither should any animals have been prohibited as being unclean.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the matter from which a thing is generated be\nunclean, it seems that likewise the thing generated therefrom is\nunclean. But flesh is generated from blood. Since therefore all flesh\nwas not prohibited as unclean, it seems that in like manner neither\nshould blood have been forbidden as unclean; nor the fat which is\nengendered from blood.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Our Lord said (Matt. 10:28; cf. Luke 12:4), that\nthose should not be feared \"that kill the body,\" since after death\nthey \"have no more that they can do\": which would not be true if\nafter death harm might come to man through anything done with his\nbody. Much less therefore does it matter to an animal already dead\nhow its flesh be cooked. Consequently there seems to be no reason in\nwhat is said, Ex. 23:19: \"Thou shalt not boil a kid in the milk of\nits dam.\"\n\nObj. 5: Further, all that is first brought forth of man and beast, as\nbeing most perfect, is commanded to be offered to the Lord (Ex. 13).\nTherefore it is an unfitting command that is set forth in Lev. 19:23:\n\"when you shall be come into the land, and shall have planted in it\nfruit trees, you shall take away the uncircumcision [*'Praeputia,'\nwhich Douay version renders 'first fruits'] of them,\" i.e. the first\ncrops, and they \"shall be unclean to you, neither shall you eat of\nthem.\"\n\nObj. 6: Further, clothing is something extraneous to man's body.\nTherefore certain kinds of garments should not have been forbidden to\nthe Jews: for instance (Lev. 19:19): \"Thou shalt not wear a garment\nthat is woven of two sorts\": and (Deut. 22:5): \"A woman shall not be\nclothed with man's apparel, neither shall a man use woman's apparel\":\nand further on (Deut. 22:11): \"Thou shalt not wear a garment that is\nwoven of woolen and linen together.\"\n\nObj. 7: Further, to be mindful of God's commandments concerns not the\nbody but the heart. Therefore it is unsuitably prescribed (Deut. 6:8,\nseqq.) that they should \"bind\" the commandments of God \"as a sign\" on\ntheir hands; and that they should \"write them in the entry\"; and\n(Num. 15:38, seqq.) that they should \"make to themselves fringes in\nthe corners of their garments, putting in them ribands of blue . . .\nthey may remember . . . the commandments of the Lord.\"\n\nObj. 8: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 9:9) that God does not\n\"take care for oxen,\" and, therefore, neither of other irrational\nanimals. Therefore without reason is it commanded (Deut. 22:6): \"If\nthou find, as thou walkest by the way, a bird's nest in a tree . . .\nthou shalt not take the dam with her young\"; and (Deut. 25:4): \"Thou\nshalt not muzzle the ox that treadeth out thy corn\"; and (Lev.\n19:19): \"Thou shalt not make thy cattle to gender with beasts of any\nother kind.\"\n\nObjection 9: Further, no distinction was made between clean and\nunclean plants. Much less therefore should any distinction have been\nmade about the cultivation of plants. Therefore it was unfittingly\nprescribed (Lev. 19:19): \"Thou shalt not sow thy field with different\nseeds\"; and (Deut. 22:9, seqq.): \"Thou shalt sow thy vineyard with\ndivers seeds\"; and: \"Thou shalt not plough with an ox and an ass\ntogether.\"\n\nObjection 10: Further, it is apparent that inanimate things are most\nof all subject to the power of man. Therefore it was unfitting to\ndebar man from taking silver and gold of which idols were made, or\nanything they found in the houses of idols, as expressed in the\ncommandment of the Law (Deut. 7:25, seqq.). It also seems an absurd\ncommandment set forth in Deut. 23:13, that they should \"dig round\nabout and . . . cover with earth that which they were eased of.\"\n\nObjection 11: Further, piety is required especially in priests. But\nit seems to be an act of piety to assist at the burial of one's\nfriends: wherefore Tobias is commended for so doing (Tob. 1:20,\nseqq.). In like manner it is sometimes an act of piety to marry a\nloose woman, because she is thereby delivered from sin and infamy.\nTherefore it seems inconsistent for these things to be forbidden to\npriests (Lev. 21).\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 18:14): \"But thou art\notherwise instructed by the Lord thy God\": from which words we may\ngather that these observances were instituted by God to be a special\nprerogative of that people. Therefore they are not without reason or\ncause.\n\n_I answer that,_ The Jewish people, as stated above (A. 5), were\nspecially chosen for the worship of God, and among them the priests\nthemselves were specially set apart for that purpose. And just as\nother things that are applied to the divine worship, need to be\nmarked in some particular way so that they be worthy of the worship\nof God; so too in that people's, and especially the priests', mode of\nlife, there needed to be certain special things befitting the divine\nworship, whether spiritual or corporal. Now the worship prescribed by\nthe Law foreshadowed the mystery of Christ: so that whatever they did\nwas a figure of things pertaining to Christ, according to 1 Cor.\n10:11: \"All these things happened to them in figures.\" Consequently\nthe reasons for these observances may be taken in two ways, first\naccording to their fittingness to the worship of God; secondly,\naccording as they foreshadow something touching the Christian mode of\nlife.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 5, ad 4, 5), the Law distinguished\na twofold pollution or uncleanness; one, that of sin, whereby the\nsoul was defiled; and another consisting in some kind of corruption,\nwhereby the body was in some way infected. Speaking then of the\nfirst-mentioned uncleanness, no kind of food is unclean, or can\ndefile a man, by reason of its nature; wherefore we read (Matt.\n15:11): \"Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man; but what\ncometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man\": which words are\nexplained (Matt. 15:17) as referring to sins. Yet certain foods can\ndefile the soul accidentally; in so far as man partakes of them\nagainst obedience or a vow, or from excessive concupiscence; or\nthrough their being an incentive to lust, for which reason some\nrefrain from wine and flesh-meat.\n\nIf, however, we speak of bodily uncleanness, consisting in some kind\nof corruption, the flesh of certain animals is unclean, either\nbecause like the pig they feed on unclean things; or because their\nlife is among unclean surroundings: thus certain animals, like moles\nand mice and such like, live underground, whence they contract a\ncertain unpleasant smell; or because their flesh, through being too\nmoist or too dry, engenders corrupt humors in the human body. Hence\nthey were forbidden to eat the flesh of flat-footed animals, i.e.\nanimals having an uncloven hoof, on account of their earthiness; and\nin like manner they were forbidden to eat the flesh of animals that\nhave many clefts in their feet, because such are very fierce and\ntheir flesh is very dry, such as the flesh of lions and the like. For\nthe same reason they were forbidden to eat certain birds of prey the\nflesh of which is very dry, and certain water-fowl on account of\ntheir exceeding humidity. In like manner certain fish lacking fins\nand scales were prohibited on account of their excessive moisture;\nsuch as eels and the like. They were, however, allowed to eat\nruminants and animals with a divided hoof, because in such animals\nthe humors are well absorbed, and their nature well balanced: for\nneither are they too moist, as is indicated by the hoof; nor are they\ntoo earthy, which is shown by their having not a flat but a cloven\nhoof. Of fishes they were allowed to partake of the drier kinds, of\nwhich the fins and scales are an indication, because thereby the\nmoist nature of the fish is tempered. Of birds they were allowed to\neat the tamer kinds, such as hens, partridges, and the like. Another\nreason was detestation of idolatry: because the Gentiles, and\nespecially the Egyptians, among whom they had grown up, offered up\nthese forbidden animals to their idols, or employed them for the\npurpose of sorcery: whereas they did not eat those animals which the\nJews were allowed to eat, but worshipped them as gods, or abstained,\nfor some other motive, from eating them, as stated above (A. 3, ad\n2). The third reason was to prevent excessive care about food:\nwherefore they were allowed to eat those animals which could be\nprocured easily and promptly.\n\nWith regard to blood and fat, they were forbidden to partake of those\nof any animals whatever without exception. Blood was forbidden, both\nin order to avoid cruelty, that they might abhor the shedding of\nhuman blood, as stated above (A. 3, ad 8); and in order to shun\nidolatrous rites whereby it was customary for men to collect the\nblood and to gather together around it for a banquet in honor of the\nidols, to whom they held the blood to be most acceptable. Hence the\nLord commanded the blood to be poured out and to be covered with\nearth (Lev. 17:13). For the same reason they were forbidden to eat\nanimals that had been suffocated or strangled: because the blood of\nthese animals would not be separated from the body: or because this\nform of death is very painful to the victim; and the Lord wished to\nwithdraw them from cruelty even in regard to irrational animals, so\nas to be less inclined to be cruel to other men, through being used\nto be kind to beasts. They were forbidden to eat the fat: both\nbecause idolaters ate it in honor of their gods; and because it used\nto be burnt in honor of God; and, again, because blood and fat are\nnot nutritious, which is the cause assigned by Rabbi Moses (Doct.\nPerplex. iii). The reason why they were forbidden to eat the sinews\nis given in Gen. 32:32, where it is stated that \"the children of\nIsrael . . . eat not the sinew . . . because he touched the sinew of\"\nJacob's \"thigh and it shrank.\"\n\nThe figurative reason for these things is that all these animals\nsignified certain sins, in token of which those animals were\nprohibited. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faustum iv, 7): \"If the\nswine and lamb be called in question, both are clean by nature,\nbecause all God's creatures are good: yet the lamb is clean, and the\npig is unclean in a certain signification. Thus if you speak of a\nfoolish, and of a wise man, each of these expressions is clean\nconsidered in the nature of the sound, letters and syllables of which\nit is composed: but in signification, the one is clean, the other\nunclean.\" The animal that chews the cud and has a divided hoof, is\nclean in signification. Because division of the hoof is a figure of\nthe two Testaments: or of the Father and Son: or of the two natures\nin Christ: of the distinction of good and evil. While chewing the cud\nsignifies meditation on the Scriptures and a sound understanding\nthereof; and whoever lacks either of these is spiritually unclean. In\nlike manner those fish that have scales and fins are clean in\nsignification. Because fins signify the heavenly or contemplative\nlife; while scales signify a life of trials, each of which is\nrequired for spiritual cleanness. Of birds certain kinds were\nforbidden. In the eagle which flies at a great height, pride is\nforbidden: in the griffon which is hostile to horses and men, cruelty\nof powerful men is prohibited. The osprey, which feeds on very small\nbirds, signifies those who oppress the poor. The kite, which is full\nof cunning, denotes those who are fraudulent in their dealings. The\nvulture, which follows an army, expecting to feed on the carcases of\nthe slain, signifies those who like others to die or to fight among\nthemselves that they may gain thereby. Birds of the raven kind\nsignify those who are blackened by their lusts; or those who lack\nkindly feelings, for the raven did not return when once it had been\nlet loose from the ark. The ostrich which, though a bird, cannot fly,\nand is always on the ground, signifies those who fight for God's\ncause, and at the same time are taken up with worldly business. The\nowl, which sees clearly at night, but cannot see in the daytime,\ndenotes those who are clever in temporal affairs, but dull in\nspiritual matters. The gull, which both flies in the air and swims in\nthe water, signifies those who are partial both to Circumcision and\nto Baptism: or else it denotes those who would fly by contemplation,\nyet dwell in the waters of sensual delights. The hawk, which helps\nmen to seize the prey, is a figure of those who assist the strong to\nprey on the poor. The screech-owl, which seeks its food by night but\nhides by day, signifies the lustful man who seeks to lie hidden in\nhis deeds of darkness. The cormorant, so constituted that it can stay\na long time under water, denotes the glutton who plunges into the\nwaters of pleasure. The ibis is an African bird with a long beak, and\nfeeds on snakes; and perhaps it is the same as the stork: it\nsignifies the envious man, who refreshes himself with the ills of\nothers, as with snakes. The swan is bright in color, and by the aid\nof its long neck extracts its food from deep places on land or water:\nit may denote those who seek earthly profit though an external\nbrightness of virtue. The bittern is a bird of the East: it has a\nlong beak, and its jaws are furnished with follicules, wherein it\nstores its food at first, after a time proceeding to digest it: it is\na figure of the miser, who is excessively careful in hoarding up the\nnecessaries of life. The coot [*Douay: _porphyrion._ St. Thomas'\ndescription tallies with the coot or moorhen: though of course he is\nmistaken about the feet differing from one another.] has this\npeculiarity apart from other birds, that it has a webbed foot for\nswimming, and a cloven foot for walking: for it swims like a duck in\nthe water, and walks like a partridge on land: it drinks only when it\nbites, since it dips all its food in water: it is a figure of a man\nwho will not take advice, and does nothing but what is soaked in the\nwater of his own will. The heron [*Vulg.: _herodionem_], commonly\ncalled a falcon, signifies those whose \"feet are swift to shed blood\"\n(Ps. 13:3). The plover [*Here, again, the Douay translators\ntranscribed from the Vulgate: _charadrion;_ _charadrius_ is the\ngeneric name for all plovers.], which is a garrulous bird, signifies\nthe gossip. The hoopoe, which builds its nest on dung, feeds on\nfoetid ordure, and whose song is like a groan, denotes worldly grief\nwhich works death in those who are unclean. The bat, which flies near\nthe ground, signifies those who being gifted with worldly knowledge,\nseek none but earthly things. Of fowls and quadrupeds those alone\nwere permitted which have the hind-legs longer than the forelegs, so\nthat they can leap: whereas those were forbidden which cling rather\nto the earth: because those who abuse the doctrine of the four\nEvangelists, so that they are not lifted up thereby, are reputed\nunclean. By the prohibition of blood, fat and nerves, we are to\nunderstand the forbidding of cruelty, lust, and bravery in committing\nsin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Men were wont to eat plants and other products of the\nsoil even before the deluge: but the eating of flesh seems to have\nbeen introduced after the deluge; for it is written (Gen. 9:3): \"Even\nas the green herbs have I delivered . . . all\" flesh \"to you.\" The\nreason for this was that the eating of the products of the soil\nsavors rather of a simple life; whereas the eating of flesh savors of\ndelicate and over-careful living. For the soil gives birth to the\nherb of its own accord; and such like products of the earth may be\nhad in great quantities with very little effort: whereas no small\ntrouble is necessary either to rear or to catch an animal.\nConsequently God being wishful to bring His people back to a more\nsimple way of living, forbade them to eat many kinds of animals, but\nnot those things that are produced by the soil. Another reason may be\nthat animals were offered to idols, while the products of the soil\nwere not.\n\nThe Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said (ad\n1).\n\nReply Obj. 4: Although the kid that is slain has no perception of the\nmanner in which its flesh is cooked, yet it would seem to savor of\nheartlessness if the dam's milk, which was intended for the\nnourishment of her offspring, were served up on the same dish. It\nmight also be said that the Gentiles in celebrating the feasts of\ntheir idols prepared the flesh of kids in this manner, for the\npurpose of sacrifice or banquet: hence (Ex. 23) after the solemnities\nto be celebrated under the Law had been foretold, it is added: \"Thou\nshalt not boil a kid in the milk of its dam.\" The figurative reason\nfor this prohibition is this: the kid, signifying Christ, on account\nof \"the likeness of sinful flesh\" (Rom. 8:3), was not to be seethed,\ni.e. slain, by the Jews, \"in the milk of its dam,\" i.e. during His\ninfancy. Or else it signifies that the kid, i.e. the sinner, should\nnot be boiled in the milk of its dam, i.e. should not be cajoled by\nflattery.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The Gentiles offered their gods the first-fruits, which\nthey held to bring them good luck: or they burnt them for the purpose\nof secrecy. Consequently (the Israelites) were commanded to look upon\nthe fruits of the first three years as unclean: for in that country\nnearly all the trees bear fruit in three years' time; those trees, to\nwit, that are cultivated either from seed, or from a graft, or from a\ncutting: but it seldom happens that the fruit-stones or seeds encased\nin a pod are sown: since it would take a longer time for these to\nbear fruit: and the Law considered what happened most frequently. The\nfruits, however, of the fourth year, as being the firstlings of clean\nfruits, were offered to God: and from the fifth year onward they were\neaten.\n\nThe figurative reason was that this foreshadowed the fact that after\nthe three states of the Law (the first lasting from Abraham to David,\nthe second, until they were carried away to Babylon, the third until\nthe time of Christ), the Fruit of the Law, i.e. Christ, was to be\noffered to God. Or again, that we must mistrust our first efforts, on\naccount of their imperfection.\n\nReply Obj. 6: It is said of a man in Ecclus. 19:27, that \"the attire\nof the body . . . \" shows \"what he is.\" Hence the Lord wished His\npeople to be distinguished from other nations, not only by the sign\nof the circumcision, which was in the flesh, but also by a certain\ndifference of attire. Wherefore they were forbidden to wear garments\nwoven of woolen and linen together, and for a woman to be clothed\nwith man's apparel, or vice versa, for two reasons. First, to avoid\nidolatrous worship. Because the Gentiles, in their religious rites,\nused garments of this sort, made of various materials. Moreover in\nthe worship of Mars, women put on men's armor; while, conversely, in\nthe worship of Venus men donned women's attire. The second reason was\nto preserve them from lust: because the employment of various\nmaterials in the making of garments signified inordinate union of\nsexes, while the use of male attire by a woman, or vice versa, has an\nincentive to evil desires, and offers an occasion of lust. The\nfigurative reason is that the prohibition of wearing a garment woven\nof woolen and linen signified that it was forbidden to unite the\nsimplicity of innocence, denoted by wool, with the duplicity of\nmalice, betokened by linen. It also signifies that woman is forbidden\nto presume to teach, or perform other duties of men: or that man\nshould not adopt the effeminate manners of a woman.\n\nReply Obj. 7: As Jerome says on Matt. 23:6, \"the Lord commanded them\nto make violet-colored fringes in the four corners of their garments,\nso that the Israelites might be distinguished from other nations.\"\nHence, in this way, they professed to be Jews: and consequently the\nvery sight of this sign reminded them of their law.\n\nWhen we read: \"Thou shalt bind them on thy hand, and they shall be\never before thy eyes [Vulg.: 'they shall be and shall move between\nthy eyes'], the Pharisees gave a false interpretation to these words,\nand wrote the decalogue of Moses on a parchment, and tied it on their\nforeheads like a wreath, so that it moved in front of their eyes\":\nwhereas the intention of the Lord in giving this commandment was that\nthey should be bound in their hands, i.e. in their works; and that\nthey should be before their eyes, i.e. in their thoughts. The\nviolet-colored fillets which were inserted in their cloaks signify\nthe godly intention which should accompany our every deed. It may,\nhowever, be said that, because they were a carnal-minded and\nstiff-necked people, it was necessary for them to be stirred by these\nsensible things to the observance of the Law.\n\nReply Obj. 8: Affection in man is twofold: it may be an affection of\nreason, or it may be an affection of passion. If a man's affection be\none of reason, it matters not how man behaves to animals, because God\nhas subjected all things to man's power, according to Ps. 8:8: \"Thou\nhast subjected all things under his feet\": and it is in this sense\nthat the Apostle says that \"God has no care for oxen\"; because God\ndoes not ask of man what he does with oxen or other animals.\n\nBut if man's affection be one of passion, then it is moved also in\nregard to other animals: for since the passion of pity is caused by\nthe afflictions of others; and since it happens that even irrational\nanimals are sensible to pain, it is possible for the affection of\npity to arise in a man with regard to the sufferings of animals. Now\nit is evident that if a man practice a pitiful affection for animals,\nhe is all the more disposed to take pity on his fellow-men: wherefore\nit is written (Prov. 11:10): \"The just regardeth the lives of his\nbeasts: but the bowels of the wicked are cruel.\" Consequently the\nLord, in order to inculcate pity to the Jewish people, who were prone\nto cruelty, wished them to practice pity even with regard to dumb\nanimals, and forbade them to do certain things savoring of cruelty to\nanimals. Hence He prohibited them to \"boil a kid in the milk of its\ndam\"; and to \"muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn\"; and to slay\n\"the dam with her young.\" It may, nevertheless, be also said that\nthese prohibitions were made in hatred of idolatry. For the Egyptians\nheld it to be wicked to allow the ox to eat of the grain while\nthreshing the corn. Moreover certain sorcerers were wont to ensnare\nthe mother bird with her young during incubation, and to employ them\nfor the purpose of securing fruitfulness and good luck in bringing up\nchildren: also because it was held to be a good omen to find the\nmother sitting on her young.\n\nAs to the mingling of animals of divers species, the literal reason\nmay have been threefold. The first was to show detestation for the\nidolatry of the Egyptians, who employed various mixtures in\nworshipping the planets, which produce various effects, and on\nvarious kinds of things according to their various conjunctions. The\nsecond reason was in condemnation of unnatural sins. The third reason\nwas the entire removal of all occasions of concupiscence. Because\nanimals of different species do not easily breed, unless this be\nbrought about by man; and movements of lust are aroused by seeing\nsuch things. Wherefore in the Jewish traditions we find it prescribed\nas stated by Rabbi Moses that men shall turn away their eyes from\nsuch sights.\n\nThe figurative reason for these things is that the necessities of\nlife should not be withdrawn from the ox that treadeth the corn, i.e.\nfrom the preacher bearing the sheaves of doctrine, as the Apostle\nstates (1 Cor. 9:4, seqq.). Again, we should not take the dam with\nher young: because in certain things we have to keep the spiritual\nsenses, i.e. the offspring, and set aside the observance of the\nletter, i.e. the mother, for instance, in all the ceremonies of the\nLaw. It is also forbidden that a beast of burden, i.e. any of the\ncommon people, should be allowed to engender, i.e. to have any\nconnection, with animals of another kind, i.e. with Gentiles or Jews.\n\nReply Obj. 9: All these minglings were forbidden in agriculture;\nliterally, in detestation of idolatry. For the Egyptians in\nworshipping the stars employed various combinations of seeds, animals\nand garments, in order to represent the various connections of the\nstars. Or else all these minglings were forbidden in detestation of\nthe unnatural vice.\n\nThey have, however, a figurative reason. For the prohibition: \"Thou\nshalt not sow thy field with different seeds,\" is to be understood,\nin the spiritual sense, of the prohibition to sow strange doctrine in\nthe Church, which is a spiritual vineyard. Likewise \"the field,\" i.e.\nthe Church, must not be sown \"with different seeds,\" i.e. with\nCatholic and heretical doctrines. Neither is it allowed to plough\n\"with an ox and an ass together\"; thus a fool should not accompany a\nwise man in preaching, for one would hinder the other.\n\nReply Obj. 10: [*The Reply to the Tenth Objection is lacking in the\ncodices. The solution given here is found in some editions, and was\nsupplied by Nicolai.] Silver and gold were reasonably forbidden\n(Deut. 7) not as though they were not subject to the power of man,\nbut because, like the idols themselves, all materials out of which\nidols were made, were anathematized as hateful in God's sight. This\nis clear from the same chapter, where we read further on (Deut.\n7:26): \"Neither shalt thou bring anything of the idol into thy house,\nlest thou become an anathema like it.\" Another reason was lest, by\ntaking silver and gold, they should be led by avarice into idolatry\nto which the Jews were inclined. The other precept (Deut. 23) about\ncovering up excretions, was just and becoming, both for the sake of\nbodily cleanliness; and in order to keep the air wholesome; and by\nreason of the respect due to the tabernacle of the covenant which\nstood in the midst of the camp, wherein the Lord was said to dwell;\nas is clearly set forth in the same passage, where after expressing\nthe command, the reason thereof is at once added, to wit: \"For the\nLord thy God walketh in the midst of thy camp, to deliver thee, and\nto give up thy enemies to thee, and let thy camp be holy (i.e. clean),\nand let no uncleanness appear therein.\" The figurative reason for\nthis precept, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi), is that sins which\nare the fetid excretions of the mind should be covered over by\nrepentance, that we may become acceptable to God, according to Ps.\n31:1: \"Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins\nare covered.\" Or else according to a gloss, that we should recognize\nthe unhappy condition of human nature, and humbly cover and purify\nthe stains of a puffed-up and proud spirit in the deep furrow of\nself-examination.\n\nReply Obj. 11: Sorcerers and idolatrous priests made use, in their\nrites, of the bones and flesh of dead men. Wherefore, in order to\nextirpate the customs of idolatrous worship, the Lord commanded that\nthe priests of inferior degree, who at fixed times served in the\ntemple, should not \"incur an uncleanness at the death\" of anyone\nexcept of those who were closely related to them, viz. their father\nor mother, and others thus near of kin to them. But the high-priest\nhad always to be ready for the service of the sanctuary; wherefore he\nwas absolutely forbidden to approach the dead, however nearly related\nto him. They were also forbidden to marry a \"harlot\" or \"one that has\nbeen put away,\" or any other than a virgin: both on account of the\nreverence due to the priesthood, the honor of which would seem to be\ntarnished by such a marriage: and for the sake of the children who\nwould be disgraced by the mother's shame: which was most of all to be\navoided when the priestly dignity was passed on from father to son.\nAgain, they were commanded to shave neither head nor beard, and not\nto make incisions in their flesh, in order to exclude the rites of\nidolatry. For the priests of the Gentiles shaved both head and beard,\nwherefore it is written (Bar 6:30): \"Priests sit in their temples\nhaving their garments rent, and their heads and beards shaven.\"\nMoreover, in worshipping their idols \"they cut themselves with knives\nand lancets\" (3 Kings 18:28). For this reason the priests of the Old\nLaw were commanded to do the contrary.\n\nThe spiritual reason for these things is that priests should be\nentirely free from dead works, i.e. sins. And they should not shave\ntheir heads, i.e. set wisdom aside; nor should they shave their\nbeards, i.e. set aside the perfection of wisdom; nor rend their\ngarments or cut their flesh, i.e. they should not incur the sin of\nschism.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 103\n\nOF THE DURATION OF THE CEREMONIAL PRECEPTS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the duration of the ceremonial precepts: under\nwhich head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the ceremonial precepts were in existence before the Law?\n\n(2) Whether at the time of the Law the ceremonies of the Old Law had\nany power of justification?\n\n(3) Whether they ceased at the coming of Christ?\n\n(4) Whether it is a mortal sin to observe them after the coming of\nChrist?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 103, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Ceremonies of the Law Were in Existence Before the Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Law were in\nexistence before the Law. For sacrifices and holocausts were\nceremonies of the Old Law, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 4). But\nsacrifices and holocausts preceded the Law: for it is written (Gen.\n4:3, 4) that \"Cain offered, of the fruits of the earth, gifts to the\nLord,\" and that \"Abel offered of the firstlings of his flock, and of\ntheir fat.\" Noe also \"offered holocausts\" to the Lord (Gen. 18:20),\nand Abraham did in like manner (Gen. 22:13). Therefore the ceremonies\nof the Old Law preceded the Law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the erecting and consecrating of the altar were part\nof the ceremonies relating to holy things. But these preceded the\nLaw. For we read (Gen. 13:18) that \"Abraham . . . built . . . an\naltar the Lord\"; and (Gen. 28:18) that \"Jacob . . . took the stone\n. . . and set it up for a title, pouring oil upon the top of it.\"\nTherefore the legal ceremonies preceded the Law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the first of the legal sacraments seems to have been\ncircumcision. But circumcision preceded the Law, as appears from Gen.\n17. In like manner the priesthood preceded the Law; for it is written\n(Gen. 14:18) that \"Melchisedech . . . was the priest of the most high\nGod.\" Therefore the sacramental ceremonies preceded the Law.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the distinction of clean from unclean animals\nbelongs to the ceremonies of observances, as stated above (Q. 100, 2,\nA. 6, ad 1). But this distinction preceded the Law; for it is written\n(Gen. 7:2, 3): \"Of all clean beasts take seven and seven . . . but of\nthe beasts that are unclean, two and two.\" Therefore the legal\nceremonies preceded the Law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Deut. 6:1): \"These are the precepts\nand ceremonies . . . which the Lord your God commanded that I should\nteach you.\" But they would not have needed to be taught about these\nthings, if the aforesaid ceremonies had been already in existence.\nTherefore the legal ceremonies did not precede the Law.\n\n_I answer that,_ As is clear from what has been said (Q. 101, A. 2;\nQ. 102, A. 2), the legal ceremonies were ordained for a double\npurpose; the worship of God, and the foreshadowing of Christ. Now\nwhoever worships God must needs worship Him by means of certain fixed\nthings pertaining to external worship. But the fixing of the divine\nworship belongs to the ceremonies; just as the determining of our\nrelations with our neighbor is a matter determined by the judicial\nprecepts, as stated above (Q. 99, A. 4). Consequently, as among men\nin general there were certain judicial precepts, not indeed\nestablished by Divine authority, but ordained by human reason; so\nalso there were some ceremonies fixed, not by the authority of any\nlaw, but according to the will and devotion of those that worship\nGod. Since, however, even before the Law some of the leading men were\ngifted with the spirit of prophecy, it is to be believed that a\nheavenly instinct, like a private law, prompted them to worship God\nin a certain definite way, which would be both in keeping with the\ninterior worship, and a suitable token of Christ's mysteries, which\nwere foreshadowed also by other things that they did, according to 1\nCor. 10:11: \"All . . . things happened to them in figure.\" Therefore\nthere were some ceremonies before the Law, but they were not legal\nceremonies, because they were not as yet established by legislation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The patriarchs offered up these oblations, sacrifices\nand holocausts previously to the Law, out of a certain devotion of\ntheir own will, according as it seemed proper to them to offer up in\nhonor of God those things which they had received from Him, and thus\nto testify that they worshipped God Who is the beginning and end of\nall.\n\nReply Obj. 2: They also established certain sacred things, because\nthey thought that the honor due to God demanded that certain places\nshould be set apart from others for the purpose of divine worship.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The sacrament of circumcision was established by\ncommand of God before the Law. Hence it cannot be called a sacrament\nof the Law as though it were an institution of the Law, but only as\nan observance included in the Law. Hence Our Lord said (John 7:20)\nthat circumcision was \"not of Moses, but of his fathers.\" Again,\namong those who worshipped God, the priesthood was in existence\nbefore the Law by human appointment, for the Law allotted the\npriestly dignity to the firstborn.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The distinction of clean from unclean animals was in\nvogue before the Law, not with regard to eating them, since it is\nwritten (Gen. 9:3): \"Everything that moveth and liveth shall be meat\nfor you\": but only as to the offering of sacrifices because they used\nonly certain animals for that purpose. If, however, they did make any\ndistinction in regard to eating; it was not that it was considered\nillegal to eat such animals, since this was not forbidden by any law,\nbut from dislike or custom: thus even now we see that certain foods\nare looked upon with disgust in some countries, while people partake\nof them in others.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 103, Art. 2]\n\nWhether, at the Time of the Law, the Ceremonies of the Old Law Had\nAny Power of Justification?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law had the\npower of justification at the time of the Law. Because expiation from\nsin and consecration pertains to justification. But it is written\n(Ex. 39:21) that the priests and their apparel were consecrated by\nthe sprinkling of blood and the anointing of oil; and (Lev. 16:16)\nthat, by sprinkling the blood of the calf, the priest expiated \"the\nsanctuary from the uncleanness of the children of Israel, and from\ntheir transgressions and . . . their sins.\" Therefore the ceremonies\nof the Old Law had the power of justification.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that by which man pleases God pertains to\njustification, according to Ps. 10:8: \"The Lord is just and hath\nloved justice.\" But some pleased God by means of ceremonies,\naccording to Lev. 10:19: \"How could I . . . please the Lord in the\nceremonies, having a sorrowful heart?\" Therefore the ceremonies of\nthe Old Law had the power of justification.\n\nObj. 3: Further, things relating to the divine worship regard the\nsoul rather than the body, according to Ps. 18:8: \"The Law of the\nLord is unspotted, converting souls.\" But the leper was cleansed by\nmeans of the ceremonies of the Old Law, as stated in Lev. 14. Much\nmore therefore could the ceremonies of the Old Law cleanse the soul\nby justifying it.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 2) [*The first words of the\nquotation are from 3:21: St. Thomas probably quoting from memory,\nsubstituted them for 2:21, which runs thus: 'If justice be by the\nLaw, then Christ died in vain.']: \"If there had been a law given\nwhich could justify [Vulg.: 'give life'], Christ died in vain,\" i.e.\nwithout cause. But this is inadmissible. Therefore the ceremonies of\nthe Old Law did not confer justice.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 102, A. 5, ad 4), a twofold\nuncleanness was distinguished in the Old Law. One was spiritual and\nis the uncleanness of sin. The other was corporal, which rendered a\nman unfit for divine worship; thus a leper, or anyone that touched\ncarrion, was said to be unclean: and thus uncleanness was nothing but\na kind of irregularity. From this uncleanness, then, the ceremonies\nof the Old Law had the power to cleanse: because they were ordered by\nthe Law to be employed as remedies for the removal of the aforesaid\nuncleannesses which were contracted in consequence of the\nprescription of the Law. Hence the Apostle says (Heb. 9:13) that \"the\nblood of goats and of oxen, and the ashes of a heifer, being\nsprinkled, sanctify such as are defiled, to the cleansing of the\nflesh.\" And just as this uncleanness which was washed away by such\nlike ceremonies, affected the flesh rather than the soul, so also the\nceremonies themselves are called by the Apostle shortly before (Heb.\n9:10) justices of the flesh: \"justices of the flesh,\" says he, \"being\nlaid on them until the time of correction.\"\n\nOn the other hand, they had no power of cleansing from uncleanness of\nthe soul, i.e. from the uncleanness of sin. The reason of this was\nthat at no time could there be expiation from sin, except through\nChrist, \"Who taketh away the sins [Vulg.: 'sin'] of the world\" (John\n1:29). And since the mystery of Christ's Incarnation and Passion had\nnot yet really taken place, those ceremonies of the Old Law could not\nreally contain in themselves a power flowing from Christ already\nincarnate and crucified, such as the sacraments of the New Law\ncontain. Consequently they could not cleanse from sin: thus the\nApostle says (Heb. 10:4) that \"it is impossible that with the blood\nof oxen and goats sin should be taken away\"; and for this reason he\ncalls them (Gal. 4:9) \"weak and needy elements\": weak indeed, because\nthey cannot take away sin; but this weakness results from their being\nneedy, i.e. from the fact that they do not contain grace within\nthemselves.\n\nHowever, it was possible at the time of the Law, for the minds of the\nfaithful, to be united by faith to Christ incarnate and crucified; so\nthat they were justified by faith in Christ: of which faith the\nobservance of these ceremonies was a sort of profession, inasmuch as\nthey foreshadowed Christ. Hence in the Old Law certain sacrifices\nwere offered up for sins, not as though the sacrifices themselves\nwashed sins away, but because they were professions of faith which\ncleansed from sin. In fact, the Law itself implies this in the terms\nemployed: for it is written (Lev. 4:26; 5:16) that in offering the\nsacrifice for sin \"the priest shall pray for him . . . and it shall\nbe forgiven him,\" as though the sin were forgiven, not in virtue of\nthe sacrifices, but through the faith and devotion of those who\noffered them. It must be observed, however, that the very fact that\nthe ceremonies of the Old Law washed away uncleanness of the body,\nwas a figure of that expiation from sins which was effected by Christ.\n\nIt is therefore evident that under the state of the Old Law the\nceremonies had no power of justification.\n\nReply Obj. 1: That sanctification of priests and their sons, and of\ntheir apparel or of anything else belonging to them, by sprinkling\nthem with blood, had no other effect but to appoint them to the\ndivine worship, and to remove impediments from them, \"to the\ncleansing of the flesh,\" as the Apostle states (Heb. 9:13) in token\nof that sanctification whereby \"Jesus\" sanctified \"the people by His\nown blood\" (Heb. 13:12). Moreover, the expiation must be understood\nas referring to the removal of these bodily uncleannesses, not to the\nforgiveness of sin. Hence even the sanctuary which could not be the\nsubject of sin is stated to be expiated.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The priests pleased God in the ceremonies by their\nobedience and devotion, and by their faith in the reality\nforeshadowed; not by reason of the things considered in themselves.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Those ceremonies which were prescribed in the cleansing\nof a leper, were not ordained for the purpose of taking away the\ndefilement of leprosy. This is clear from the fact that these\nceremonies were not applied to a man until he was already healed:\nhence it is written (Lev. 14:3, 4) that the priest, \"going out of the\ncamp, when he shall find that the leprosy is cleansed, shall command\nhim that is to be purified to offer,\" etc.; whence it is evident that\nthe priest was appointed the judge of leprosy, not before, but after\ncleansing. But these ceremonies were employed for the purpose of\ntaking away the uncleanness of irregularity. They do say, however,\nthat if a priest were to err in his judgment, the leper would be\ncleansed miraculously by the power of God, but not in virtue of the\nsacrifice. Thus also it was by miracle that the thigh of the\nadulterous woman rotted, when she had drunk the water \"on which\" the\npriest had \"heaped curses,\" as stated in Num. 5:19-27.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 103, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Ceremonies of the Old Law Ceased at the Coming of Christ?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the ceremonies of the Old Law did not\ncease at the coming of Christ. For it is written (Bar. 4:1): \"This is\nthe book of the commandments of God, and the law that is for ever.\"\nBut the legal ceremonies were part of the Law. Therefore the legal\nceremonies were to last for ever.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the offering made by a leper after being cleansed\nwas a ceremony of the Law. But the Gospel commands the leper, who has\nbeen cleansed, to make this offering (Matt. 8:4). Therefore the\nceremonies of the Old Law did not cease at Christ's coming.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as long as the cause remains, the effect remains.\nBut the ceremonies of the Old Law had certain reasonable causes,\ninasmuch as they were ordained to the worship of God, besides the\nfact that they were intended to be figures of Christ. Therefore the\nceremonies of the Old Law should not have ceased.\n\nObj. 4: Further, circumcision was instituted as a sign of Abraham's\nfaith: the observance of the sabbath, to recall the blessing of\ncreation: and other solemnities, in memory of other Divine favors, as\nstated above (Q. 102, A. 4, ad 10; A. 5, ad 1). But Abraham's faith\nis ever to be imitated even by us: and the blessing of creation and\nother Divine favors should never be forgotten. Therefore at least\ncircumcision and the other legal solemnities should not have ceased.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Col. 2:16, 17): \"Let no man . .\n. judge you in meat or in drink, or in respect of a festival day, or\nof the new moon, or of the sabbaths, which are a shadow of things to\ncome\": and (Heb. 8:13): \"In saying a new (testament), he hath made\nthe former old: and that which decayeth and groweth old, is near its\nend.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ All the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law were\nordained to the worship of God as stated above (Q. 101, AA. 1, 2).\nNow external worship should be in proportion to the internal worship,\nwhich consists in faith, hope and charity. Consequently exterior\nworship had to be subject to variations according to the variations\nin the internal worship, in which a threefold state may be\ndistinguished. One state was in respect of faith and hope, both in\nheavenly goods, and in the means of obtaining them--in both of these\nconsidered as things to come. Such was the state of faith and hope in\nthe Old Law. Another state of interior worship is that in which we\nhave faith and hope in heavenly goods as things to come; but in the\nmeans of obtaining heavenly goods, as in things present or past. Such\nis the state of the New Law. The third state is that in which both\nare possessed as present; wherein nothing is believed in as lacking,\nnothing hoped for as being yet to come. Such is the state of the\nBlessed.\n\nIn this state of the Blessed, then, nothing in regard to worship of\nGod will be figurative; there will be naught but \"thanksgiving and\nvoice of praise\" (Isa. 51:3). Hence it is written concerning the city\nof the Blessed (Apoc. 21:22): \"I saw no temple therein: for the Lord\nGod Almighty is the temple thereof, and the Lamb.\" Proportionately,\ntherefore, the ceremonies of the first-mentioned state which\nforeshadowed the second and third states, had need to cease at the\nadvent of the second state; and other ceremonies had to be introduced\nwhich would be in keeping with the state of divine worship for that\nparticular time, wherein heavenly goods are a thing of the future,\nbut the Divine favors whereby we obtain the heavenly boons are a\nthing of the present.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Old Law is said to be \"for ever\" simply and\nabsolutely, as regards its moral precepts; but as regards the\nceremonial precepts it lasts for even in respect of the reality which\nthose ceremonies foreshadowed.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The mystery of the redemption of the human race was\nfulfilled in Christ's Passion: hence Our Lord said then: \"It is\nconsummated\" (John 19:30). Consequently the prescriptions of the Law\nmust have ceased then altogether through their reality being\nfulfilled. As a sign of this, we read that at the Passion of Christ\n\"the veil of the temple was rent\" (Matt. 27:51). Hence, before\nChrist's Passion, while Christ was preaching and working miracles,\nthe Law and the Gospel were concurrent, since the mystery of Christ\nhad already begun, but was not as yet consummated. And for this\nreason Our Lord, before His Passion, commanded the leper to observe\nthe legal ceremonies.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The literal reasons already given (Q. 102) for the\nceremonies refer to the divine worship, which was founded on faith in\nthat which was to come. Hence, at the advent of Him Who was to come,\nboth that worship ceased, and all the reasons referring thereto.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The faith of Abraham was commended in that he believed\nin God's promise concerning his seed to come, in which all nations\nwere to blessed. Wherefore, as long as this seed was yet to come, it\nwas necessary to make profession of Abraham's faith by means of\ncircumcision. But now that it is consummated, the same thing needs to\nbe declared by means of another sign, viz. Baptism, which, in this\nrespect, took the place of circumcision, according to the saying of\nthe Apostle (Col. 2:11, 12): \"You are circumcised with circumcision\nnot made by hand, in despoiling of the body of the flesh, but in the\ncircumcision of Christ, buried with Him in Baptism.\"\n\nAs to the sabbath, which was a sign recalling the first creation, its\nplace is taken by the \"Lord's Day,\" which recalls the beginning of\nthe new creature in the Resurrection of Christ. In like manner other\nsolemnities of the Old Law are supplanted by new solemnities: because\nthe blessings vouchsafed to that people, foreshadowed the favors\ngranted us by Christ. Hence the feast of the Passover gave place to\nthe feast of Christ's Passion and Resurrection: the feast of\nPentecost when the Old Law was given, to the feast of Pentecost on\nwhich was given the Law of the living spirit: the feast of the New\nMoon, to Lady Day, when appeared the first rays of the sun, i.e.\nChrist, by the fulness of grace: the feast of Trumpets, to the feasts\nof the Apostles: the feast of Expiation, to the feasts of Martyrs and\nConfessors: the feast of Tabernacles, to the feast of the Church\nDedication: the feast of the Assembly and Collection, to feast of the\nAngels, or else to the feast of All Hallows.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 103, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Since Christ's Passion the Legal Ceremonies Can Be Observed\nWithout Committing Mortal Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that since Christ's Passion the legal\nceremonies can be observed without committing mortal sin. For we must\nnot believe that the apostles committed mortal sin after receiving\nthe Holy Ghost: since by His fulness they were \"endued with power\nfrom on high\" (Luke 24:49). But the apostles observed the legal\nceremonies after the coming of the Holy Ghost: for it is stated (Acts\n16:3) that Paul circumcised Timothy: and (Acts 21:26) that Paul, at\nthe advice of James, \"took the men, and . . . being purified with\nthem, entered into the temple, giving notice of the accomplishment of\nthe days of purification, until an oblation should be offered for\nevery one of them.\" Therefore the legal ceremonies can be observed\nsince the Passion of Christ without mortal sin.\n\nObj. 2: Further, one of the legal ceremonies consisted in shunning\nthe fellowship of Gentiles. But the first Pastor of the Church\ncomplied with this observance; for it is stated (Gal. 2:12) that,\n\"when\" certain men \"had come\" to Antioch, Peter \"withdrew and\nseparated himself\" from the Gentiles. Therefore the legal ceremonies\ncan be observed since Christ's Passion without committing mortal sin.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the commands of the apostles did not lead men into\nsin. But it was commanded by apostolic decree that the Gentiles\nshould observe certain ceremonies of the Law: for it is written (Acts\n15:28, 29): \"It hath seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, to lay\nno further burden upon you than these necessary things: that you\nabstain from things sacrificed to idols, and from blood, and from\nthings strangled, and from fornication.\" Therefore the legal\nceremonies can be observed since Christ's Passion without committing\nmortal sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 5:2): \"If you be\ncircumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing.\" But nothing save\nmortal sin hinders us from receiving Christ's fruit. Therefore since\nChrist's Passion it is a mortal sin to be circumcised, or to observe\nthe other legal ceremonies.\n\n_I answer that,_ All ceremonies are professions of faith, in which\nthe interior worship of God consists. Now man can make profession of\nhis inward faith, by deeds as well as by words: and in either\nprofession, if he make a false declaration, he sins mortally. Now,\nthough our faith in Christ is the same as that of the fathers of old;\nyet, since they came before Christ, whereas we come after Him, the\nsame faith is expressed in different words, by us and by them. For by\nthem was it said: \"Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son,\"\nwhere the verbs are in the future tense: whereas we express the same\nby means of verbs in the past tense, and say that she \"conceived and\nbore.\" In like manner the ceremonies of the Old Law betokened Christ\nas having yet to be born and to suffer: whereas our sacraments\nsignify Him as already born and having suffered. Consequently, just\nas it would be a mortal sin now for anyone, in making a profession of\nfaith, to say that Christ is yet to be born, which the fathers of old\nsaid devoutly and truthfully; so too it would be a mortal sin now to\nobserve those ceremonies which the fathers of old fulfilled with\ndevotion and fidelity. Such is the teaching of Augustine (Contra\nFaust. xix, 16), who says: \"It is no longer promised that He shall be\nborn, shall suffer and rise again, truths of which their sacraments\nwere a kind of image: but it is declared that He is already born, has\nsuffered and risen again; of which our sacraments, in which\nChristians share, are the actual representation.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: On this point there seems to have been a difference of\nopinion between Jerome and Augustine. For Jerome (Super Galat. ii,\n11, seqq.) distinguished two periods of time. One was the time\nprevious to Christ's Passion, during which the legal ceremonies were\nneither dead, since they were obligatory, and did expiate in their\nown fashion; nor deadly, because it was not sinful to observe them.\nBut immediately after Christ's Passion they began to be not only\ndead, so as no longer to be either effectual or binding; but also\ndeadly, so that whoever observed them was guilty of mortal sin. Hence\nhe maintained that after the Passion the apostles never observed the\nlegal ceremonies in real earnest; but only by a kind of pious\npretense, lest, to wit, they should scandalize the Jews and hinder\ntheir conversion. This pretense, however, is to be understood, not as\nthough they did not in reality perform those actions, but in the\nsense that they performed them without the mind to observe the\nceremonies of the Law: thus a man might cut away his foreskin for\nhealth's sake, not with the intention of observing legal circumcision.\n\nBut since it seems unbecoming that the apostles, in order to avoid\nscandal, should have hidden things pertaining to the truth of life\nand doctrine, and that they should have made use of pretense, in\nthings pertaining to the salvation of the faithful; therefore\nAugustine (Epist. lxxxii) more fittingly distinguished three periods\nof time. One was the time that preceded the Passion of Christ, during\nwhich the legal ceremonies were neither deadly nor dead: another\nperiod was after the publication of the Gospel, during which the\nlegal ceremonies are both dead and deadly. The third is a middle\nperiod, viz. from the Passion of Christ until the publication of the\nGospel, during which the legal ceremonies were dead indeed, because\nthey had neither effect nor binding force; but were not deadly,\nbecause it was lawful for the Jewish converts to Christianity to\nobserve them, provided they did not put their trust in them so as to\nhold them to be necessary unto salvation, as though faith in Christ\ncould not justify without the legal observances. On the other hand,\nthere was no reason why those who were converted from heathendom to\nChristianity should observe them. Hence Paul circumcised Timothy, who\nwas born of a Jewish mother; but was unwilling to circumcise Titus,\nwho was of heathen nationality.\n\nThe reason why the Holy Ghost did not wish the converted Jews to be\ndebarred at once from observing the legal ceremonies, while converted\nheathens were forbidden to observe the rites of heathendom, was in\norder to show that there is a difference between these rites. For\nheathenish ceremonial was rejected as absolutely unlawful, and as\nprohibited by God for all time; whereas the legal ceremonial ceased\nas being fulfilled through Christ's Passion, being instituted by God\nas a figure of Christ.\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to Jerome, Peter withdrew himself from the\nGentiles by pretense, in order to avoid giving scandal to the Jews,\nof whom he was the Apostle. Hence he did not sin at all in acting\nthus. On the other hand, Paul in like manner made a pretense of\nblaming him, in order to avoid scandalizing the Gentiles, whose\nApostle he was. But Augustine disapproves of this solution: because\nin the canonical Scripture (viz. Gal. 2:11), wherein we must not hold\nanything to be false, Paul says that Peter \"was to be blamed.\"\nConsequently it is true that Peter was at fault: and Paul blamed him\nin very truth and not with pretense. Peter, however, did not sin, by\nobserving the legal ceremonial for the time being; because this was\nlawful for him who was a converted Jew. But he did sin by excessive\nminuteness in the observance of the legal rites lest he should\nscandalize the Jews, the result being that he gave scandal to the\nGentiles.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Some have held that this prohibition of the apostles is\nnot to be taken literally, but spiritually: namely, that the\nprohibition of blood signifies the prohibition of murder; the\nprohibition of things strangled, that of violence and rapine; the\nprohibition of things offered to idols, that of idolatry; while\nfornication is forbidden as being evil in itself: which opinion they\ngathered from certain glosses, which expound these prohibitions in a\nmystical sense. Since, however, murder and rapine were held to be\nunlawful even by the Gentiles, there would have been no need to give\nthis special commandment to those who were converted to Christ from\nheathendom. Hence others maintain that those foods were forbidden\nliterally, not to prevent the observance of legal ceremonies, but in\norder to prevent gluttony. Thus Jerome says on Ezech. 44:31 (\"The\npriest shall not eat of anything that is dead\"): \"He condemns those\npriests who from gluttony did not keep these precepts.\"\n\nBut since certain foods are more delicate than these and more\nconducive to gluttony, there seems no reason why these should have\nbeen forbidden more than the others.\n\nWe must therefore follow the third opinion, and hold that these foods\nwere forbidden literally, not with the purpose of enforcing\ncompliance with the legal ceremonies, but in order to further the\nunion of Gentiles and Jews living side by side. Because blood and\nthings strangled were loathsome to the Jews by ancient custom; while\nthe Jews might have suspected the Gentiles of relapse into idolatry\nif the latter had partaken of things offered to idols. Hence these\nthings were prohibited for the time being, during which the Gentiles\nand Jews were to become united together. But as time went on, with\nthe lapse of the cause, the effect lapsed also, when the truth of the\nGospel teaching was divulged, wherein Our Lord taught that \"not that\nwhich entereth into the mouth defileth a man\" (Matt. 15:11); and that\n\"nothing is to be rejected that is received with thanksgiving\" (1\nTim. 4:4). With regard to fornication a special prohibition was made,\nbecause the Gentiles did not hold it to be sinful.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 104\n\nOF THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the judicial precepts: and first of all we shall\nconsider them in general; in the second place we shall consider their\nreasons. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is meant by the judicial precepts?\n\n(2) Whether they are figurative?\n\n(3) Their duration;\n\n(4) Their division.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 104, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Judicial Precepts Were Those Which Directed Man in\nRelation to His Neighbor?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not those\nwhich directed man in his relations to his neighbor. For judicial\nprecepts take their name from _judgment._ But there are many things\nthat direct man as to his neighbor, which are not subordinate to\njudgment. Therefore the judicial precepts were not those which\ndirected man in his relations to his neighbor.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the judicial precepts are distinct from the moral\nprecepts, as stated above (Q. 99, A. 4). But there are many moral\nprecepts which direct man as to his neighbor: as is evidently the\ncase with the seven precepts of the second table. Therefore the\njudicial precepts are not so called from directing man as to his\nneighbor.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as the ceremonial precepts relate to God, so do the\njudicial precepts relate to one's neighbor, as stated above (Q. 99,\nA. 4; Q. 101, A. 1). But among the ceremonial precepts there are some\nwhich concern man himself, such as observances in matter of food and\napparel, of which we have already spoken (Q. 102, A. 6, ad 1, 6).\nTherefore the judicial precepts are not so called from directing man\nas to his neighbor.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is reckoned (Ezech. 18:8) among other works of\na good and just man, that \"he hath executed true judgment between man\nand man.\" But judicial precepts are so called from \"judgment.\"\nTherefore it seems that the judicial precepts were those which\ndirected the relations between man and man.\n\n_I answer that,_ As is evident from what we have stated above (Q. 95,\nA. 2; Q. 99, A. 4), in every law, some precepts derive their binding\nforce from the dictate of reason itself, because natural reason\ndictates that something ought to be done or to be avoided. These are\ncalled \"moral\" precepts: since human morals are based on reason. At\nthe same time there are other precepts which derive their binding\nforce, not from the very dictate of reason (because, considered in\nthemselves, they do not imply an obligation of something due or\nundue); but from some institution, Divine or human: and such are\ncertain determinations of the moral precepts. When therefore the\nmoral precepts are fixed by Divine institution in matters relating to\nman's subordination to God, they are called \"ceremonial\" precepts:\nbut when they refer to man's relations to other men, they are called\n\"judicial\" precepts. Hence there are two conditions attached to the\njudicial precepts: viz. first, that they refer to man's relations to\nother men; secondly, that they derive their binding force not from\nreason alone, but in virtue of their institution.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Judgments emanate through the official pronouncement of\ncertain men who are at the head of affairs, and in whom the judicial\npower is vested. Now it belongs to those who are at the head of\naffairs to regulate not only litigious matters, but also voluntary\ncontracts which are concluded between man and man, and whatever\nmatters concern the community at large and the government thereof.\nConsequently the judicial precepts are not only those which concern\nactions at law; but also all those that are directed to the ordering\nof one man in relation to another, which ordering is subject to the\ndirection of the sovereign as supreme judge.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This argument holds in respect of those precepts which\ndirect man in his relations to his neighbor, and derive their binding\nforce from the mere dictate of reason.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even in those precepts which direct us to God, some are\nmoral precepts, which the reason itself dictates when it is quickened\nby faith; such as that God is to be loved and worshipped. There are\nalso ceremonial precepts, which have no binding force except in\nvirtue of their Divine institution. Now God is concerned not only\nwith the sacrifices that are offered to Him, but also with whatever\nrelates to the fitness of those who offer sacrifices to Him and\nworship Him. Because men are ordained to God as to their end;\nwherefore it concerns God and, consequently, is a matter of\nceremonial precept, that man should show some fitness for the divine\nworship. On the other hand, man is not ordained to his neighbor as to\nhis end, so as to need to be disposed in himself with regard to his\nneighbor, for such is the relationship of a slave to his master,\nsince a slave \"is his master's in all that he is,\" as the Philosopher\nsays (Polit. i, 2). Hence there are no judicial precepts ordaining\nman in himself; all such precepts are moral: because the reason,\nwhich is the princip[le] in moral matters, holds the same position,\nin man, with regard to things that concern him, as a prince or judge\nholds in the state. Nevertheless we must take note that, since the\nrelations of man to his neighbor are more subject to reason than the\nrelations of man to God, there are more precepts whereby man is\ndirected in his relations to his neighbor, than whereby he is\ndirected to God. For the same reason there had to be more ceremonial\nthan judicial precepts in the Law.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 104, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Judicial Precepts Were Figurative?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not\nfigurative. Because it seems proper to the ceremonial precepts to be\ninstituted as figures of something else. Therefore, if the judicial\nprecepts are figurative, there will be no difference between the\njudicial and ceremonial precepts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, just as certain judicial precepts were given to the\nJewish people, so also were some given to other heathen peoples. But\nthe judicial precepts given to other peoples were not figurative, but\nstated what had to be done. Therefore it seems that neither were the\njudicial precepts of the Old Law figures of anything.\n\nObj. 3: Further, those things which relate to the divine worship had\nto be taught under certain figures, because the things of God are\nabove our reason, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 2, ad 2). But things\nconcerning our neighbor are not above our reason. Therefore the\njudicial precepts which direct us in relation to our neighbor should\nnot have been figurative.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The judicial precepts are expounded both in the\nallegorical and in the moral sense (Ex. 21).\n\n_I answer that,_ A precept may be figurative in two ways. First,\nprimarily and in itself: because, to wit, it is instituted\nprincipally that it may be the figure of something. In this way the\nceremonial precepts are figurative; since they were instituted for\nthe very purpose that they might foreshadow something relating to the\nworship of God and the mystery of Christ. But some precepts are\nfigurative, not primarily and in themselves, but consequently. In\nthis way the judicial precepts of the Old Law are figurative. For\nthey were not instituted for the purpose of being figurative, but in\norder that they might regulate the state of that people according to\njustice and equity. Nevertheless they did foreshadow something\nconsequently: since, to wit, the entire state of that people, who\nwere directed by these precepts, was figurative, according to 1 Cor.\n10:11: \"All . . . things happened to them in figure.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The ceremonial precepts are not figurative in the same\nway as the judicial precepts, as explained above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Jewish people were chosen by God that Christ might\nbe born of them. Consequently the entire state of that people had to\nbe prophetic and figurative, as Augustine states (Contra Faust. xxii,\n24). For this reason even the judicial precepts that were given to\nthis people were more figurative that those which were given to other\nnations. Thus, too, the wars and deeds of this people are expounded\nin the mystical sense: but not the wars and deeds of the Assyrians or\nRomans, although the latter are more famous in the eyes of men.\n\nReply Obj. 3: In this people the direction of man in regard to his\nneighbor, considered in itself, was subject to reason. But in so far\nas it was referred to the worship of God, it was above reason: and in\nthis respect it was figurative.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 104, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Judicial Precepts of the Old Law Bind for Ever?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts of the Old Law\nbind for ever. Because the judicial precepts relate to the virtue of\njustice: since a judgment is an execution of the virtue of justice.\nNow \"justice is perpetual and immortal\" (Wis. 1:15). Therefore the\njudicial precepts bind for ever.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Divine institutions are more enduring than human\ninstitutions. But the judicial precepts of human laws bind for ever.\nTherefore much more do the judicial precepts of the Divine Law.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Apostle says (Heb. 7:18) that \"there is a\nsetting aside of the former commandment, because of the weakness and\nunprofitableness thereof.\" Now this is true of the ceremonial\nprecept, which \"could [Vulg.: 'can'] not, as to the conscience, make\nhim perfect that serveth only in meats and in drinks, and divers\nwashings and justices of the flesh,\" as the Apostle declares (Heb.\n9:9, 10). On the other hand, the judicial precepts were useful and\nefficacious in respect of the purpose for which they were instituted,\nviz. to establish justice and equity among men. Therefore the\njudicial precepts of the Old Law are not set aside, but still retain\ntheir efficacy.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 7:12) that \"the priesthood\nbeing translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of\nthe Law.\" But the priesthood was transferred from Aaron to Christ.\nTherefore the entire Law was also transferred. Therefore the judicial\nprecepts are no longer in force.\n\n_I answer that,_ The judicial precepts did not bind for ever, but\nwere annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the\nceremonial precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far\nas to be not only \"dead,\" but also deadly to those who observe them\nsince the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the\nGospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts are dead indeed,\nbecause they have no binding force: but they are not deadly. For if a\nsovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his\nkingdom, he would not sin: unless perchance they were observed, or\nordered to be observed, as though they derived their binding force\nthrough being institutions of the Old Law: for it would be a deadly\nsin to intend to observe them thus.\n\nThe reason for this difference may be gathered from what has been\nsaid above (A. 2). For it has been stated that the ceremonial\nprecepts are figurative primarily and in themselves, as being\ninstituted chiefly for the purpose of foreshadowing the mysteries of\nChrist to come. On the other hand, the judicial precepts were not\ninstituted that they might be figures, but that they might shape the\nstate of that people who were directed to Christ. Consequently, when\nthe state of that people changed with the coming of Christ, the\njudicial precepts lost their binding force: for the Law was a\npedagogue, leading men to Christ, as stated in Gal. 3:24. Since,\nhowever, these judicial precepts are instituted, not for the purpose\nof being figures, but for the performance of certain deeds, the\nobservance thereof is not prejudicial to the truth of faith. But the\nintention of observing them, as though one were bound by the Law, is\nprejudicial to the truth of faith: because it would follow that the\nformer state of the people still lasts, and that Christ has not yet\ncome.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The obligation of observing justice is indeed\nperpetual. But the determination of those things that are just,\naccording to human or Divine institution, must needs be different,\naccording to the different states of mankind.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The judicial precepts established by men retain their\nbinding force for ever, so long as the state of government remains\nthe same. But if the state or nation pass to another form of\ngovernment, the laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which is\ngovernment by the people, demands different laws from those of\noligarchy, which is government by the rich, as the Philosopher shows\n(Polit. iv, 1). Consequently when the state of that people changed,\nthe judicial precepts had to be changed also.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Those judicial precepts directed the people to justice\nand equity, in keeping with the demands of that state. But after the\ncoming of Christ, there had to be a change in the state of that\npeople, so that in Christ there was no distinction between Gentile\nand Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial\nprecepts needed to be changed also.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 104, Art. 4]\n\nWhether It Is Possible to Assign a Distinct Division of the Judicial\nPrecepts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that it is impossible to assign a distinct\ndivision of the judicial precepts. Because the judicial precepts\ndirect men in their relations to one another. But those things which\nneed to be directed, as pertaining to the relationship between man\nand man, and which are made use of by men, are not subject to\ndivision, since they are infinite in number. Therefore it is not\npossible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the judicial precepts are decisions on moral\nmatters. But moral precepts do not seem to be capable of division,\nexcept in so far as they are reducible to the precepts of the\ndecalogue. Therefore there is no distinct division of the judicial\nprecepts.\n\nObj. 3: Further, because there is a distinct division of the\nceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this division, by describing\nsome as \"sacrifices,\" others as \"observances.\" But the Law contains\nno allusion to a division of the judicial precepts. Therefore it\nseems that they have no distinct division.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Wherever there is order there must needs be\ndivision. But the notion of order is chiefly applicable to the\njudicial precepts, since thereby that people was ordained. Therefore\nit is most necessary that they should have a distinct division.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since law is the art, as it were, of directing or\nordering the life of man, as in every art there is a distinct\ndivision in the rules of art, so, in every law, there must be a\ndistinct division of precepts: else the law would be rendered useless\nby confusion. We must therefore say that the judicial precepts of the\nOld Law, whereby men were directed in their relations to one another,\nare subject to division according to the divers ways in which man is\ndirected.\n\nNow in every people a fourfold order is to be found: one, of the\npeople's sovereign to his subjects; a second of the subjects among\nthemselves; a third, of the citizens to foreigners; a fourth, of\nmembers of the same household, such as the order of the father to his\nson; of the wife to her husband; of the master to his servant: and\naccording to these four orders we may distinguish different kinds of\njudicial precepts in the Old Law. For certain precepts are laid down\nconcerning the institution of the sovereign and relating to his\noffice, and about the respect due to him: this is one part of the\njudicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are given in respect of a\nman to his fellow citizens: for instance, about buying and selling,\njudgments and penalties: this is the second part of the judicial\nprecepts. Again, certain precepts are enjoined with regard to\nforeigners: for instance, about wars waged against their foes, and\nabout the way to receive travelers and strangers: this is the third\npart of the judicial precepts. Lastly, certain precepts are given\nrelating to home life: for instance, about servants, wives and\nchildren: this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Things pertaining to the ordering of relations between\none man and another are indeed infinite in number: yet they are\nreducible to certain distinct heads, according to the different\nrelations in which one man stands to another, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The precepts of the decalogue held the first place in\nthe moral order, as stated above (Q. 100, A. 3): and consequently it\nis fitting that other moral precepts should be distinguished in\nrelation to them. But the judicial and ceremonial precepts have a\ndifferent binding force, derived, not from natural reason, but from\ntheir institution alone. Hence there is a distinct reason for\ndistinguishing them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Law alludes to the division of the judicial\nprecepts in the very things themselves which are prescribed by the\njudicial precepts of the Law.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 105\n\nOF THE REASON FOR THE JUDICIAL PRECEPTS\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the reason for the judicial precepts: under\nwhich head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Concerning the reason for the judicial precepts relating to the\nrulers;\n\n(2) Concerning the fellowship of one man with another;\n\n(3) Concerning matters relating to foreigners;\n\n(4) Concerning things relating to domestic matters.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 105, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Old Law Enjoined Fitting Precepts Concerning Rulers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Old Law made unfitting precepts\nconcerning rulers. Because, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 4),\n\"the ordering of the people depends mostly on the chief ruler.\" But\nthe Law contains no precept relating to the institution of the chief\nruler; and yet we find therein prescriptions concerning the inferior\nrulers: firstly (Ex. 18:21): \"Provide out of all the people wise\n[Vulg.: 'able'] men,\" etc.; again (Num. 11:16): \"Gather unto Me\nseventy men of the ancients of Israel\"; and again (Deut. 1:13): \"Let\nMe have from among you wise and understanding men,\" etc. Therefore\nthe Law provided insufficiently in regard to the rulers of the people.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"The best gives of the best,\" as Plato states (Tim.\nii). Now the best ordering of a state or of any nation is to be ruled\nby a king: because this kind of government approaches nearest in\nresemblance to the Divine government, whereby God rules the world\nfrom the beginning. Therefore the Law should have set a king over the\npeople, and they should not have been allowed a choice in the matter,\nas indeed they were allowed (Deut. 17:14, 15): \"When thou . . . shalt\nsay: I will set a king over me . . . thou shalt set him,\" etc.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Matt. 12:25: \"Every kingdom divided\nagainst itself shall be made desolate\": a saying which was verified\nin the Jewish people, whose destruction was brought about by the\ndivision of the kingdom. But the Law should aim chiefly at things\npertaining to the general well-being of the people. Therefore it\nshould have forbidden the kingdom to be divided under two kings: nor\nshould this have been introduced even by Divine authority; as we read\nof its being introduced by the authority of the prophet Ahias the\nSilonite (3 Kings 11:29, seqq.).\n\nObj. 4: Further, just as priests are instituted for the benefit of\nthe people in things concerning God, as stated in Heb. 5:1; so are\nrulers set up for the benefit of the people in human affairs. But\ncertain things were allotted as a means of livelihood for the priests\nand Levites of the Law: such as the tithes and first-fruits, and many\nlike things. Therefore in like manner certain things should have been\ndetermined for the livelihood of the rulers of the people: the more\nthat they were forbidden to accept presents, as is clearly stated in\nEx. 23:8: \"You shall not [Vulg.: 'Neither shalt thou'] take bribes,\nwhich even blind the wise, and pervert the words of the just.\"\n\nObj. 5: Further, as a kingdom is the best form of government, so is\ntyranny the most corrupt. But when the Lord appointed the king, He\nestablished a tyrannical law; for it is written (1 Kings 8:11): \"This\nwill be the right of the king, that shall reign over you: He will\ntake your sons,\" etc. Therefore the Law made unfitting provision with\nregard to the institution of rulers.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The people of Israel is commended for the beauty\nof its order (Num. 24:5): \"How beautiful are thy tabernacles, O\nJacob, and thy tents.\" But the beautiful ordering of a people depends\non the right establishment of its rulers. Therefore the Law made\nright provision for the people with regard to its rulers.\n\n_I answer that,_ Two points are to be observed concerning the right\nordering of rulers in a state or nation. One is that all should take\nsome share in the government: for this form of constitution ensures\npeace among the people, commends itself to all, and is most enduring,\nas stated in _Polit._ ii, 6. The other point is to be observed in\nrespect of the kinds of government, or the different ways in which\nthe constitutions are established. For whereas these differ in kind,\nas the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5), nevertheless the first\nplace is held by the _kingdom,_ where the power of government is\nvested in one; and _aristocracy,_ which signifies government by the\nbest, where the power of government is vested in a few. Accordingly,\nthe best form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is\ngiven the power to preside over all; while under him are others\nhaving governing powers: and yet a government of this kind is shared\nby all, both because all are eligible to govern, and because the\nrules are chosen by all. For this is the best form of polity, being\npartly kingdom, since there is one at the head of all; partly\naristocracy, in so far as a number of persons are set in authority;\npartly democracy, i.e. government by the people, in so far as the\nrulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right\nto choose their rulers.\n\nSuch was the form of government established by the Divine Law. For\nMoses and his successors governed the people in such a way that each\nof them was ruler over all; so that there was a kind of kingdom.\nMoreover, seventy-two men were chosen, who were elders in virtue: for\nit is written (Deut. 1:15): \"I took out of your tribes wise and\nhonorable, and appointed them rulers\": so that there was an element\nof aristocracy. But it was a democratical government in so far as the\nrulers were chosen from all the people; for it is written (Ex.\n18:21): \"Provide out of all the people wise [Vulg.: 'able'] men,\"\netc.; and, again, in so far as they were chosen by the people;\nwherefore it is written (Deut. 1:13): \"Let me have from among you\nwise [Vulg.: 'able'] men,\" etc. Consequently it is evident that the\nordering of the rulers was well provided for by the Law.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This people was governed under the special care of God:\nwherefore it is written (Deut. 7:6): \"The Lord thy God hath chosen\nthee to be His peculiar people\": and this is why the Lord reserved to\nHimself the institution of the chief ruler. For this too did Moses\npray (Num. 27:16): \"May the Lord the God of the spirits of all the\nflesh provide a man, that may be over this multitude.\" Thus by God's\norders Josue was set at the head in place of Moses; and we read about\neach of the judges who succeeded Josue that God \"raised . . . up a\nsaviour\" for the people, and that \"the spirit of the Lord was\" in\nthem (Judges 3:9, 10, 15). Hence the Lord did not leave the choice of\na king to the people; but reserved this to Himself, as appears from\nDeut. 17:15: \"Thou shalt set him whom the Lord thy God shall choose.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: A kingdom is the best form of government of the people,\nso long as it is not corrupt. But since the power granted to a king\nis so great, it easily degenerates into tyranny, unless he to whom\nthis power is given be a very virtuous man: for it is only the\nvirtuous man that conducts himself well in the midst of prosperity,\nas the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 3). Now perfect virtue is to\nbe found in few: and especially were the Jews inclined to cruelty and\navarice, which vices above all turn men into tyrants. Hence from the\nvery first the Lord did not set up the kingly authority with full\npower, but gave them judges and governors to rule them. But\nafterwards when the people asked Him to do so, being indignant with\nthem, so to speak, He granted them a king, as is clear from His words\nto Samuel (1 Kings 8:7): \"They have not rejected thee, but Me, that I\nshould not reign over them.\"\n\nNevertheless, as regards the appointment of a king, He did establish\nthe manner of election from the very beginning (Deut. 17:14, seqq.):\nand then He determined two points: first, that in choosing a king\nthey should wait for the Lord's decision; and that they should not\nmake a man of another nation king, because such kings are wont to\ntake little interest in the people they are set over, and\nconsequently to have no care for their welfare: secondly, He\nprescribed how the king after his appointment should behave, in\nregard to himself; namely, that he should not accumulate chariots and\nhorses, nor wives, nor immense wealth: because through craving for\nsuch things princes become tyrants and forsake justice. He also\nappointed the manner in which they were to conduct themselves towards\nGod: namely, that they should continually read and ponder on God's\nLaw, and should ever fear and obey God. Moreover, He decided how they\nshould behave towards their subjects: namely, that they should not\nproudly despise them, or ill-treat them, and that they should not\ndepart from the paths of justice.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The division of the kingdom, and a number of kings, was\nrather a punishment inflicted on that people for their many\ndissensions, specially against the just rule of David, than a benefit\nconferred on them for their profit. Hence it is written (Osee 13:11):\n\"I will give thee a king in My wrath\"; and (Osee 8:4): \"They have\nreigned, but not by Me: they have been princes, and I knew not.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: The priestly office was bequeathed by succession from\nfather to son: and this, in order that it might be held in greater\nrespect, if not any man from the people could become a priest: since\nhonor was given to them out of reverence for the divine worship.\nHence it was necessary to put aside certain things for them both as\nto tithes and as to first-fruits, and, again, as to oblations and\nsacrifices, that they might be afforded a means of livelihood. On the\nother hand, the rulers, as stated above, were chosen from the whole\npeople; wherefore they had their own possessions, from which to\nderive a living: and so much the more, since the Lord forbade even a\nking to have superabundant wealth to make too much show of\nmagnificence: both because he could scarcely avoid the excesses of\npride and tyranny, arising from such things, and because, if the\nrulers were not very rich, and if their office involved much work and\nanxiety, it would not tempt the ambition of the common people; and\nwould not become an occasion of sedition.\n\nReply Obj. 5: That right was not given to the king by Divine\ninstitution: rather was it foretold that kings would usurp that\nright, by framing unjust laws, and by degenerating into tyrants who\npreyed on their subjects. This is clear from the context that\nfollows: \"And you shall be his slaves [Douay: 'servants']\": which is\nsignificative of tyranny, since a tyrant rules is subjects as though\nthey were his slaves. Hence Samuel spoke these words to deter them\nfrom asking for a king; since the narrative continues: \"But the\npeople would not hear the voice of Samuel.\" It may happen, however,\nthat even a good king, without being a tyrant, may take away the\nsons, and make them tribunes and centurions; and may take many things\nfrom his subjects in order to secure the common weal.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 105, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Judicial Precepts Were Suitably Framed As to the\nRelations of One Man with Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts were not\nsuitably framed as regards the relations of one man with another.\nBecause men cannot live together in peace, if one man takes what\nbelongs to another. But this seems to have been approved by the Law:\nsince it is written (Deut. 23:24): \"Going into thy neighbor's\nvineyard, thou mayest eat as many grapes as thou pleasest.\" Therefore\nthe Old Law did not make suitable provisions for man's peace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, one of the chief causes of the downfall of states\nhas been the holding of property by women, as the Philosopher says\n(Polit. ii, 6). But this was introduced by the Old Law; for it is\nwritten (Num. 27:8): \"When a man dieth without a son, his inheritance\nshall pass to his daughter.\" Therefore the Law made unsuitable\nprovision for the welfare of the people.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is most conducive to the preservation of human\nsociety that men may provide themselves with necessaries by buying\nand selling, as stated in _Polit._ i. But the Old Law took away the\nforce of sales; since it prescribes that in the 50th year of the\njubilee all that is sold shall return to the vendor (Lev. 25:28).\nTherefore in this matter the Law gave the people an unfitting command.\n\nObj. 4: Further, man's needs require that men should be ready to\nlend: which readiness ceases if the creditors do not return the\npledges: hence it is written (Ecclus. 29:10): \"Many have refused to\nlend, not out of wickedness, but they were afraid to be defrauded\nwithout cause.\" And yet this was encouraged by the Law. First,\nbecause it prescribed (Deut. 15:2): \"He to whom any thing is owing\nfrom his friend or neighbor or brother, cannot demand it again,\nbecause it is the year of remission of the Lord\"; and (Ex. 22:15) it\nis stated that if a borrowed animal should die while the owner is\npresent, the borrower is not bound to make restitution. Secondly,\nbecause the security acquired through the pledge is lost: for it is\nwritten (Deut. 24:10): \"When thou shalt demand of thy neighbor any\nthing that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his house to take\naway a pledge\"; and again (Deut. 24:12, 13): \"The pledge shall not\nlodge with thee that night, but thou shalt restore it to him\npresently.\" Therefore the Law made insufficient provision in the\nmatter of loans.\n\nObj. 5: Further, considerable risk attaches to goods deposited with a\nfraudulent depositary: wherefore great caution should be observed in\nsuch matters: hence it is stated in 2 Mac. 3:15 that \"the priests . .\n. called upon Him from heaven, Who made the law concerning things\ngiven to be kept, that He would preserve them safe, for them that had\ndeposited them.\" But the precepts of the Old Law observed little\ncaution in regard to deposits: since it is prescribed (Ex. 22:10, 11)\nthat when goods deposited are lost, the owner is to stand by the oath\nof the depositary. Therefore the Law made unsuitable provision in\nthis matter.\n\nObj. 6: Further, just as a workman offers his work for hire, so do\nmen let houses and so forth. But there is no need for the tenant to\npay his rent as soon as he takes a house. Therefore it seems an\nunnecessarily hard prescription (Lev. 19:13) that \"the wages of him\nthat hath been hired by thee shall not abide with thee until morning.\"\n\nObj. 7: Further, since there is often pressing need for a judge, it\nshould be easy to gain access to one. It was therefore unfitting that\nthe Law (Deut. 17:8, 9) should command them to go to a fixed place to\nask for judgment on doubtful matters.\n\nObj. 8: Further, it is possible that not only two, but three or more,\nshould agree to tell a lie. Therefore it is unreasonably stated\n(Deut. 19:15) that \"in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word\nshall stand.\"\n\nObjection 9: Further, punishment should be fixed according to the\ngravity of the fault: for which reason also it is written (Deut.\n25:2): \"According to the measure of the sin, shall the measure also\nof the stripes be.\" Yet the Law fixed unequal punishments for certain\nfaults: for it is written (Ex. 22:1) that the thief \"shall restore\nfive oxen for one ox, and four sheep for one sheep.\" Moreover,\ncertain slight offenses are severely punished: thus (Num. 15:32,\nseqq.) a man is stoned for gathering sticks on the sabbath day: and\n(Deut. 21:18, seqq.) the unruly son is commanded to be stoned on\naccount of certain small transgressions, viz. because \"he gave\nhimself to revelling . . . and banquetings.\" Therefore the Law\nprescribed punishments in an unreasonable manner.\n\nObjection 10: Further, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xxi, 11),\n\"Tully writes that the laws recognize eight forms of punishment,\nindemnity, prison, stripes, retaliation, public disgrace, exile,\ndeath, slavery.\" Now some of these were prescribed by the Law.\n\"Indemnity,\" as when a thief was condemned to make restitution\nfivefold or fourfold. \"Prison,\" as when (Num. 15:34) a certain man is\nordered to be imprisoned. \"Stripes\"; thus (Deut. 25:2), \"if they see\nthat the offender be worthy of stripes; they shall lay him down, and\nshall cause him to be beaten before them.\" \"Public disgrace\" was\nbrought on to him who refused to take to himself the wife of his\ndeceased brother, for she took \"off his shoe from his foot, and\" did\n\"spit in his face\" (Deut. 25:9). It prescribed the \"death\" penalty,\nas is clear from (Lev. 20:9): \"He that curseth his father, or mother,\ndying let him die.\" The Law also recognized the \"lex talionis,\" by\nprescribing (Ex. 21:24): \"Eye for eye, tooth for tooth.\" Therefore it\nseems unreasonable that the Law should not have inflicted the two\nother punishments, viz. \"exile\" and \"slavery.\"\n\nObjection 11: Further, no punishment is due except for a fault. But\ndumb animals cannot commit a fault. Therefore the Law is unreasonable\nin punishing them (Ex. 21:29): \"If the ox . . . shall kill a man or a\nwoman,\" it \"shall be stoned\": and (Lev. 20:16): \"The woman that shall\nlie under any beast, shall be killed together with the same.\"\nTherefore it seems that matters pertaining to the relations of one\nman with another were unsuitably regulated by the Law.\n\nObjection 12: Further, the Lord commanded (Ex. 21:12) a murderer to\nbe punished with death. But the death of a dumb animal is reckoned of\nmuch less account than the slaying of a man. Hence murder cannot be\nsufficiently punished by the slaying of a dumb animal. Therefore it\nis unfittingly prescribed (Deut. 21:1, 4) that \"when there shall be\nfound . . . the corpse of a man slain, and it is not known who is\nguilty of the murder . . . the ancients\" of the nearest city \"shall\ntake a heifer of the herd, that hath not drawn in the yoke, nor\nploughed the ground, and they shall bring her into a rough and stony\nvalley, that never was ploughed, nor sown; and there they shall\nstrike off the head of the heifer.\"\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is recalled as a special blessing (Ps. 147:20)\nthat \"He hath not done in like manner to every nation; and His\njudgments He hath not made manifest to them.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ii, 21), quoting\nTully, \"a nation is a body of men united together by consent to the\nlaw and by community of welfare.\" Consequently it is of the essence\nof a nation that the mutual relations of the citizens be ordered by\njust laws. Now the relations of one man with another are twofold:\nsome are effected under the guidance of those in authority: others\nare effected by the will of private individuals. And since whatever\nis subject to the power of an individual can be disposed of according\nto his will, hence it is that the decision of matters between one man\nand another, and the punishment of evildoers, depend on the direction\nof those in authority, to whom men are subject. On the other hand,\nthe power of private persons is exercised over the things they\npossess: and consequently their dealings with one another, as regards\nsuch things, depend on their own will, for instance in buying,\nselling, giving, and so forth. Now the Law provided sufficiently in\nrespect of each of these relations between one man and another. For\nit established judges, as is clearly indicated in Deut. 16:18: \"Thou\nshalt appoint judges and magistrates in all its [Vulg.: 'thy'] gates\n. . . that they may judge the people with just judgment.\" It is also\ndirected the manner of pronouncing just judgments, according to Deut.\n1:16, 17: \"Judge that which is just, whether he be one of your own\ncountry or a stranger: there shall be no difference of persons.\" It\nalso removed an occasion of pronouncing unjust judgment, by\nforbidding judges to accept bribes (Ex. 23:8; Deut. 16:19). It\nprescribed the number of witnesses, viz. two or three: and it\nappointed certain punishments to certain crimes, as we shall state\nfarther on (ad 10).\n\nBut with regard to possessions, it is a very good thing, says the\nPhilosopher (Polit. ii, 2) that the things possessed should be\ndistinct, and the use thereof should be partly common, and partly\ngranted to others by the will of the possessors. These three points\nwere provided for by the Law. Because, in the first place, the\npossessions themselves were divided among individuals: for it is\nwritten (Num. 33:53, 54): \"I have given you\" the land \"for a\npossession: and you shall divide it among you by lot.\" And since many\nstates have been ruined through want of regulations in the matter of\npossessions, as the Philosopher observes (Polit. ii, 6); therefore\nthe Law provided a threefold remedy against the irregularity of\npossessions. The first was that they should be divided equally,\nwherefore it is written (Num. 33:54): \"To the more you shall give a\nlarger part, and to the fewer, a lesser.\" A second remedy was that\npossessions could not be alienated for ever, but after a certain\nlapse of time should return to their former owner, so as to avoid\nconfusion of possessions (cf. ad 3). The third remedy aimed at the\nremoval of this confusion, and provided that the dead should be\nsucceeded by their next of kin: in the first place, the son;\nsecondly, the daughter; thirdly, the brother; fourthly, the father's\nbrother; fifthly, any other next of kin. Furthermore, in order to\npreserve the distinction of property, the Law enacted that heiresses\nshould marry within their own tribe, as recorded in Num. 36:6.\n\nSecondly, the Law commanded that, in some respects, the use of things\nshould belong to all in common. Firstly, as regards the care of them;\nfor it was prescribed (Deut. 22:1-4): \"Thou shalt not pass by, if\nthou seest thy brother's ox or his sheep go astray; but thou shalt\nbring them back to thy brother,\" and in like manner as to other\nthings. Secondly, as regards fruits. For all alike were allowed on\nentering a friend's vineyard to eat of the fruit, but not to take any\naway. And, specially, with respect to the poor, it was prescribed\nthat the forgotten sheaves, and the bunches of grapes and fruit,\nshould be left behind for them (Lev. 19:9; Deut. 24:19). Moreover,\nwhatever grew in the seventh year was common property, as stated in\nEx. 23:11 and Lev. 25:4.\n\nThirdly, the law recognized the transference of goods by the owner.\nThere was a purely gratuitous transfer: thus it is written (Deut.\n14:28, 29): \"The third day thou shalt separate another tithe . . .\nand the Levite . . . and the stranger, and the fatherless, and the\nwidow . . . shall come and shall eat and be filled.\" And there was a\ntransfer for a consideration, for instance, by selling and buying, by\nletting out and hiring, by loan and also by deposit, concerning all\nof which we find that the Law made ample provision. Consequently it\nis clear that the Old Law provided sufficiently concerning the mutual\nrelations of one man with another.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:8), \"he that loveth his\nneighbor hath fulfilled the Law\": because, to wit, all the precepts\nof the Law, chiefly those concerning our neighbor, seem to aim at the\nend that men should love one another. Now it is an effect of love\nthat men give their own goods to others: because, as stated in 1 John\n3:17: \"He that . . . shall see his brother in need, and shall shut up\nhis bowels from him: how doth the charity of God abide in him?\" Hence\nthe purpose of the Law was to accustom men to give of their own to\nothers readily: thus the Apostle (1 Tim. 6:18) commands the rich \"to\ngive easily and to communicate to others.\" Now a man does not give\neasily to others if he will not suffer another man to take some\nlittle thing from him without any great injury to him. And so the Law\nlaid down that it should be lawful for a man, on entering his\nneighbor's vineyard, to eat of the fruit there: but not to carry any\naway, lest this should lead to the infliction of a grievous harm, and\ncause a disturbance of the peace: for among well-behaved people, the\ntaking of a little does not disturb the peace; in fact, it rather\nstrengthens friendship and accustoms men to give things to one\nanother.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Law did not prescribe that women should succeed to\ntheir father's estate except in default of male issue: failing which\nit was necessary that succession should be granted to the female line\nin order to comfort the father, who would have been sad to think that\nhis estate would pass to strangers. Nevertheless the Law observed due\ncaution in the matter, by providing that those women who succeeded to\ntheir father's estate, should marry within their own tribe, in order\nto avoid confusion of tribal possessions, as stated in Num. 36:7, 8.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 4), the regulation\nof possessions conduces much to the preservation of a state or\nnation. Consequently, as he himself observes, it was forbidden by the\nlaw in some of the heathen states, \"that anyone should sell his\npossessions, except to avoid a manifest loss.\" For if possessions\nwere to be sold indiscriminately, they might happen to come into the\nhands of a few: so that it might become necessary for a state or\ncountry to become void of inhabitants. Hence the Old Law, in order to\nremove this danger, ordered things in such a way that while provision\nwas made for men's needs, by allowing the sale of possessions to\navail for a certain period, at the same time the said danger was\nremoved, by prescribing the return of those possessions after that\nperiod had elapsed. The reason for this law was to prevent confusion\nof possessions, and to ensure the continuance of a definite\ndistinction among the tribes.\n\nBut as the town houses were not allotted to distinct estates,\ntherefore the Law allowed them to be sold in perpetuity, like movable\ngoods. Because the number of houses in a town was not fixed, whereas\nthere was a fixed limit to the amount of estates, which could not be\nexceeded, while the number of houses in a town could be increased. On\nthe other hand, houses situated not in a town, but \"in a village that\nhath no walls,\" could not be sold in perpetuity: because such houses\nare built merely with a view to the cultivation and care of\npossessions; wherefore the Law rightly made the same prescription in\nregard to both (Lev. 25).\n\nReply Obj. 4: As stated above (ad 1), the purpose of the Law was to\naccustom men to its precepts, so as to be ready to come to one\nanother's assistance: because this is a very great incentive to\nfriendship. The Law granted these facilities for helping others in\nthe matter not only of gratuitous and absolute donations, but also of\nmutual transfers: because the latter kind of succor is more frequent\nand benefits the greater number: and it granted facilities for this\npurpose in many ways. First of all by prescribing that men should be\nready to lend, and that they should not be less inclined to do so as\nthe year of remission drew nigh, as stated in Deut. 15:7, seqq.\nSecondly, by forbidding them to burden a man to whom they might grant\na loan, either by exacting usury, or by accepting necessities of life\nin security; and by prescribing that when this had been done they\nshould be restored at once. For it is written (Deut. 23:19): \"Thou\nshalt not lend to thy brother money to usury\": and (Deut. 24:6):\n\"Thou shalt not take the nether nor the upper millstone to pledge;\nfor he hath pledged his life to thee\": and (Ex. 22:26): \"If thou take\nof thy neighbor a garment in pledge, thou shalt give it him again\nbefore sunset.\" Thirdly, by forbidding them to be importunate in\nexacting payment. Hence it is written (Ex. 22:25): \"If thou lend\nmoney to any of my people that is poor that dwelleth with thee, thou\nshalt not be hard upon them as an extortioner.\" For this reason, too,\nit is enacted (Deut. 24:10, 11): \"When thou shalt demand of thy\nneighbor anything that he oweth thee, thou shalt not go into his\nhouse to take away a pledge, but thou shalt stand without, and he\nshall bring out to thee what he hath\": both because a man's house is\nhis surest refuge, wherefore it is offensive to a man to be set upon\nin his own house; and because the Law does not allow the creditor to\ntake away whatever he likes in security, but rather permits the\ndebtor to give what he needs least. Fourthly, the Law prescribed that\ndebts should cease together after the lapse of seven years. For it\nwas probable that those who could conveniently pay their debts, would\ndo so before the seventh year, and would not defraud the lender\nwithout cause. But if they were altogether insolvent, there was the\nsame reason for remitting the debt from love for them, as there was\nfor renewing the loan on account of their need.\n\nAs regards animals granted in loan, the Law enacted that if, through\nthe neglect of the person to whom they were lent, they perished or\ndeteriorated in his absence, he was bound to make restitution. But if\nthey perished or deteriorated while he was present and taking proper\ncare of them, he was not bound to make restitution, especially if\nthey were hired for a consideration: because they might have died or\ndeteriorated in the same way if they had remained in possession of\nthe lender, so that if the animal had been saved through being lent,\nthe lender would have gained something by the loan which would no\nlonger have been gratuitous. And especially was this to be observed\nwhen animals were hired for a consideration: because then the owner\nreceived a certain price for the use of the animals; wherefore he had\nno right to any profit, by receiving indemnity for the animal, unless\nthe person who had charge of it were negligent. In the case, however,\nof animals not hired for a consideration, equity demanded that he\nshould receive something by way of restitution at least to the value\nof the hire of the animal that had perished or deteriorated.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The difference between a loan and a deposit is that a\nloan is in respect of goods transferred for the use of the person to\nwhom they are transferred, whereas a deposit is for the benefit of\nthe depositor. Hence in certain cases there was a stricter obligation\nof returning a loan than of restoring goods held in deposit. Because\nthe latter might be lost in two ways. First, unavoidably: i.e. either\nthrough a natural cause, for instance if an animal held in deposit\nwere to die or depreciate in value; or through an extrinsic cause,\nfor instance, if it were taken by an enemy, or devoured by a beast\n(in which case, however, a man was bound to restore to the owner what\nwas left of the animal thus slain): whereas in the other cases\nmentioned above, he was not bound to make restitution; but only to\ntake an oath in order to clear himself of suspicion. Secondly, the\ngoods deposited might be lost through an avoidable cause, for\ninstance by theft: and then the depositary was bound to restitution\non account of his neglect. But, as stated above (ad 4), he who held\nan animal on loan, was bound to restitution, even if he were absent\nwhen it depreciated or died: because he was held responsible for less\nnegligence than a depositary, who was only held responsible in case\nof theft.\n\nReply Obj. 6: Workmen who offer their labor for hire, are poor men\nwho toil for their daily bread: and therefore the Law commanded\nwisely that they should be paid at once, lest they should lack food.\nBut they who offer other commodities for hire, are wont to be rich:\nnor are they in such need of their price in order to gain a\nlivelihood: and consequently the comparison does not hold.\n\nReply Obj. 7: The purpose for which judges are appointed among men,\nis that they may decide doubtful points in matters of justice. Now a\nmatter may be doubtful in two ways. First, among simple-minded\npeople: and in order to remove doubts of this kind, it was prescribed\n(Deut. 16:18) that \"judges and magistrates\" should be appointed in\neach tribe, \"to judge the people with just judgment.\" Secondly, a\nmatter may be doubtful even among experts: and therefore, in order to\nremove doubts of this kind, the Law prescribed that all should\nforegather in some chief place chosen by God, where there would be\nboth the high-priest, who would decide doubtful matters relating to\nthe ceremonies of divine worship; and the chief judge of the people,\nwho would decide matters relating to the judgments of men: just as\neven now cases are taken from a lower to a higher court either by\nappeal or by consultation. Hence it is written (Deut. 17:8, 9): \"If\nthou perceive that there be among you a hard and doubtful matter in\njudgment . . . and thou see that the words of the judges within thy\ngates do vary; arise and go up to the place, which the Lord thy God\nshall choose; and thou shalt come to the priests of the Levitical\nrace, and to the judge that shall be at that time.\" But such like\ndoubtful matters did not often occur for judgment: wherefore the\npeople were not burdened on this account.\n\nReply Obj. 8: In the business affairs of men, there is no such thing\nas demonstrative and infallible proof, and we must be content with a\ncertain conjectural probability, such as that which an orator employs\nto persuade. Consequently, although it is quite possible for two or\nthree witnesses to agree to a falsehood, yet it is neither easy nor\nprobable that they succeed in so doing: wherefore their testimony is\ntaken as being true, especially if they do not waver in giving it, or\nare not otherwise suspect. Moreover, in order that witnesses might\nnot easily depart from the truth, the Law commanded that they should\nbe most carefully examined, and that those who were found untruthful\nshould be severely punished, as stated in Deut. 19:16, seqq.\n\nThere was, however, a reason for fixing on this particular number, in\ntoken of the unerring truth of the Divine Persons, Who are sometimes\nmentioned as two, because the Holy Ghost is the bond of the other two\nPersons; and sometimes as three: as Augustine observes on John 8:17:\n\"In your law it is written that the testimony of two men is true.\"\n\nReply Obj. 9: A severe punishment is inflicted not only on account of\nthe gravity of a fault, but also for other reasons. First, on account\nof the greatness of the sin, because a greater sin, other things\nbeing equal, deserves a greater punishment. Secondly, on account of a\nhabitual sin, since men are not easily cured of habitual sin except\nby severe punishments. Thirdly, on account of a great desire for or a\ngreat pleasure in the sin: for men are not easily deterred from such\nsins unless they be severely punished. Fourthly, on account of the\nfacility of committing a sin and of concealing it: for such like\nsins, when discovered, should be more severely punished in order to\ndeter others from committing them.\n\nAgain, with regard to the greatness of a sin, four degrees may be\nobserved, even in respect of one single deed. The first is when a sin\nis committed unwillingly; because then, if the sin be altogether\ninvoluntary, man is altogether excused from punishment; for it is\nwritten (Deut. 22:25, seqq.) that a damsel who suffers violence in a\nfield is not guilty of death, because \"she cried, and there was no\nman to help her.\" But if a man sinned in any way voluntarily, and yet\nthrough weakness, as for instance when a man sins from passion, the\nsin is diminished: and the punishment, according to true judgment,\nshould be diminished also; unless perchance the common weal requires\nthat the sin be severely punished in order to deter others from\ncommitting such sins, as stated above. The second degree is when a\nman sins through ignorance: and then he was held to be guilty to a\ncertain extent, on account of his negligence in acquiring knowledge:\nyet he was not punished by the judges but expiated his sin by\nsacrifices. Hence it is written (Lev. 4:2): \"The soul that sinneth\nthrough ignorance,\" etc. This is, however, to be taken as applying to\nignorance of fact; and not to ignorance of the Divine precept, which\nall were bound to know. The third degree was when a man sinned from\npride, i.e. through deliberate choice or malice: and then he was\npunished according to the greatness of the sin [*Cf. Deut. 25:2]. The\nfourth degree was when a man sinned from stubbornness or obstinacy:\nand then he was to be utterly cut off as a rebel and a destroyer of\nthe commandment of the Law [*Cf. Num. 15:30, 31].\n\nAccordingly we must say that, in appointing the punishment for theft,\nthe Law considered what would be likely to happen most frequently\n(Ex. 22:1-9): wherefore, as regards theft of other things which can\neasily be safeguarded from a thief, the thief restored only twice\ntheir value. But sheep cannot be easily safeguarded from a thief,\nbecause they graze in the fields: wherefore it happened more\nfrequently that sheep were stolen in the fields. Consequently the Law\ninflicted a heavier penalty, by ordering four sheep to be restored\nfor the theft of one. As to cattle, they were yet more difficult to\nsafeguard, because they are kept in the fields, and do not graze in\nflocks as sheep do; wherefore a yet more heavy penalty was inflicted\nin their regard, so that five oxen were to be restored for one ox.\nAnd this I say, unless perchance the animal itself were discovered in\nthe thief's possession: because in that case he had to restore only\ntwice the number, as in the case of other thefts: for there was\nreason to presume that he intended to restore the animal, since he\nkept it alive. Again, we might say, according to a gloss, that \"a cow\nis useful in five ways: it may be used for sacrifice, for ploughing,\nfor food, for milk, and its hide is employed for various purposes\":\nand therefore for one cow five had to be restored. But the sheep was\nuseful in four ways: \"for sacrifice, for meat, for milk, and for its\nwool.\" The unruly son was slain, not because he ate and drank: but on\naccount of his stubbornness and rebellion, which was always punished\nby death, as stated above. As to the man who gathered sticks on the\nsabbath, he was stoned as a breaker of the Law, which commanded the\nsabbath to be observed, to testify the belief in the newness of the\nworld, as stated above (Q. 100, A. 5): wherefore he was slain as an\nunbeliever.\n\nReply Obj. 10: The Old Law inflicted the death penalty for the more\ngrievous crimes, viz. for those which are committed against God, and\nfor murder, for stealing a man, irreverence towards one's parents,\nadultery and incest. In the case of thief of other things it\ninflicted punishment by indemnification: while in the case of blows\nand mutilation it authorized punishment by retaliation; and likewise\nfor the sin of bearing false witness. In other faults of less degree\nit prescribed the punishment of stripes or of public disgrace.\n\nThe punishment of slavery was prescribed by the Law in two cases.\nFirst, in the case of a slave who was unwilling to avail himself of\nthe privilege granted by the Law, whereby he was free to depart in\nthe seventh year of remission: wherefore he was punished by remaining\na slave for ever. Secondly, in the case of a thief, who had not\nwherewith to make restitution, as stated in Ex. 22:3.\n\nThe punishment of absolute exile was not prescribed by the Law:\nbecause God was worshipped by that people alone, whereas all other\nnations were given to idolatry: wherefore if any man were exiled from\nthat people absolutely, he would be in danger of falling into\nidolatry. For this reason it is related (1 Kings 26:19) that David\nsaid to Saul: \"They are cursed in the sight of the Lord, who have\ncast me out this day, that I should not dwell in the inheritance of\nthe Lord, saying: Go, serve strange gods.\" There was, however, a\nrestricted sort of exile: for it is written in Deut. 19:4 [*Cf. Num.\n35:25] that \"he that striketh [Vulg.: 'killeth'] his neighbor\nignorantly, and is proved to have had no hatred against him, shall\nflee to one of the cities\" of refuge and \"abide there until the death\nof the high-priest.\" For then it became lawful for him to return\nhome, because when the whole people thus suffered a loss they forgot\ntheir private quarrels, so that the next of kin of the slain were not\nso eager to kill the slayer.\n\nReply Obj. 11: Dumb animals were ordered to be slain, not on account\nof any fault of theirs; but as a punishment to their owners, who had\nnot safeguarded their beasts from these offenses. Hence the owner was\nmore severely punished if his ox had butted anyone \"yesterday or the\nday before\" (in which case steps might have been taken to avoid the\ndanger) than if it had taken to butting suddenly.--Or again, the\nanimal was slain in detestation of the sin; and lest men should be\nhorrified at the sight thereof.\n\nReply Obj. 12: The literal reason for this commandment, as Rabbi\nMoses declares (Doct. Perplex. iii), was because the slayer was\nfrequently from the nearest city: wherefore the slaying of the calf\nwas a means of investigating the hidden murder. This was brought\nabout in three ways. In the first place the elders of the city swore\nthat they had taken every measure for safeguarding the roads.\nSecondly, the owner of the heifer was indemnified for the slaying of\nhis beast, and if the murder was previously discovered, the beast was\nnot slain. Thirdly, the place, where the heifer was slain, remained\nuncultivated. Wherefore, in order to avoid this twofold loss, the men\nof the city would readily make known the murderer, if they knew who\nhe was: and it would seldom happen but that some word or sign would\nescape about the matter. Or again, this was done in order to frighten\npeople, in detestation of murder. Because the slaying of a heifer,\nwhich is a useful animal and full of strength, especially before it\nhas been put under the yoke, signified that whoever committed murder,\nhowever useful and strong he might be, was to forfeit his life; and\nthat, by a cruel death, which was implied by the striking off of its\nhead; and that the murderer, as vile and abject, was to be cut off\nfrom the fellowship of men, which was betokened by the fact that the\nheifer after being slain was left to rot in a rough and uncultivated\nplace.\n\nMystically, the heifer taken from the herd signifies the flesh of\nChrist; which had not drawn a yoke, since it had done no sin; nor did\nit plough the ground, i.e. it never knew the stain of revolt. The\nfact of the heifer being killed in an uncultivated valley signified\nthe despised death of Christ, whereby all sins are washed away, and\nthe devil is shown to be the arch-murderer.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 105, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the Judicial Precepts Regarding Foreigners Were Framed in a\nSuitable Manner?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the judicial precepts regarding\nforeigners were not suitably framed. For Peter said (Acts 10:34, 35):\n\"In very deed I perceive that God is not a respecter of persons, but\nin every nation, he that feareth Him and worketh justice is\nacceptable to Him.\" But those who are acceptable to God should not be\nexcluded from the Church of God. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded\n(Deut. 23:3) that \"the Ammonite and the Moabite, even after the tenth\ngeneration, shall not enter into the church of the Lord for ever\":\nwhereas, on the other hand, it is prescribed (Deut. 23:7) to be\nobserved with regard to certain other nations: \"Thou shalt not abhor\nthe Edomite, because he is thy brother; nor the Egyptian because thou\nwast a stranger in his land.\"\n\nObj. 2: Further, we do not deserve to be punished for those things\nwhich are not in our power. But it is not in man's power to be an\neunuch, or born of a prostitute. Therefore it is unsuitably commanded\n(Deut. 23:1, 2) that \"an eunuch and one born of a prostitute shalt\nnot enter into the church of the Lord.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Old Law mercifully forbade strangers to be\nmolested: for it is written (Ex. 22:21): \"Thou shalt not molest a\nstranger, nor afflict him; for yourselves also were strangers in the\nland of Egypt\": and (Ex. 23:9): \"Thou shalt not molest a stranger,\nfor you know the hearts of strangers, for you also were strangers in\nthe land of Egypt.\" But it is an affliction to be burdened with\nusury. Therefore the Law unsuitably permitted them (Deut. 23:19, 20)\nto lend money to the stranger for usury.\n\nObj. 4: Further, men are much more akin to us than trees. But we\nshould show greater care and love for those things that are nearest\nto us, according to Ecclus. 13:19: \"Every beast loveth its like: so\nalso every man him that is nearest to himself.\" Therefore the Lord\nunsuitably commanded (Deut. 20:13-19) that all the inhabitants of a\ncaptured hostile city were to be slain, but that the fruit-trees\nshould not be cut down.\n\nObj. 5: Further, every one should prefer the common good of virtue to\nthe good of the individual. But the common good is sought in a war\nwhich men fight against their enemies. Therefore it is unsuitably\ncommanded (Deut. 20:5-7) that certain men should be sent home, for\ninstance a man that had built a new house, or who had planted a\nvineyard, or who had married a wife.\n\nObj. 6: Further, no man should profit by his own fault. But it is a\nman's fault if he be timid or faint-hearted: since this is contrary\nto the virtue of fortitude. Therefore the timid and faint-hearted are\nunfittingly excused from the toil of battle (Deut. 20:8).\n\n_On the contrary,_ Divine Wisdom declares (Prov. 8:8): \"All my words\nare just, there is nothing wicked nor perverse in them.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Man's relations with foreigners are twofold:\npeaceful, and hostile: and in directing both kinds of relation the\nLaw contained suitable precepts. For the Jews were offered three\nopportunities of peaceful relations with foreigners. First, when\nforeigners passed through their land as travelers. Secondly, when\nthey came to dwell in their land as newcomers. And in both these\nrespects the Law made kind provision in its precepts: for it is\nwritten (Ex. 22:21): \"Thou shalt not molest a stranger (_advenam_)\";\nand again (Ex. 22:9): \"Thou shalt not molest a stranger\n(_peregrino_).\" Thirdly, when any foreigners wished to be admitted\nentirely to their fellowship and mode of worship. With regard to\nthese a certain order was observed. For they were not at once\nadmitted to citizenship: just as it was law with some nations that no\none was deemed a citizen except after two or three generations, as\nthe Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 1). The reason for this was that if\nforeigners were allowed to meddle with the affairs of a nation as\nsoon as they settled down in its midst, many dangers might occur,\nsince the foreigners not yet having the common good firmly at heart\nmight attempt something hurtful to the people. Hence it was that the\nLaw prescribed in respect of certain nations that had close relations\nwith the Jews (viz., the Egyptians among whom they were born and\neducated, and the Idumeans, the children of Esau, Jacob's brother),\nthat they should be admitted to the fellowship of the people after\nthe third generation; whereas others (with whom their relations had\nbeen hostile, such as the Ammonites and Moabites) were never to be\nadmitted to citizenship; while the Amalekites, who were yet more\nhostile to them, and had no fellowship of kindred with them, were to\nbe held as foes in perpetuity: for it is written (Ex. 17:16): \"The war\nof the Lord shall be against Amalec from generation to generation.\"\n\nIn like manner with regard to hostile relations with foreigners, the\nLaw contained suitable precepts. For, in the first place, it\ncommanded that war should be declared for a just cause: thus it is\ncommanded (Deut. 20:10) that when they advanced to besiege a city,\nthey should at first make an offer of peace. Secondly, it enjoined\nthat when once they had entered on a war they should undauntedly\npersevere in it, putting their trust in God. And in order that they\nmight be the more heedful of this command, it ordered that on the\napproach of battle the priest should hearten them by promising them\nGod's aid. Thirdly, it prescribed the removal of whatever might prove\nan obstacle to the fight, and that certain men, who might be in the\nway, should be sent home. Fourthly, it enjoined that they should use\nmoderation in pursuing the advantage of victory, by sparing women and\nchildren, and by not cutting down fruit-trees of that country.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Law excluded the men of no nation from the worship\nof God and from things pertaining to the welfare of the soul: for it\nis written (Ex. 12:48): \"If any stranger be willing to dwell among\nyou, and to keep the Phase of the Lord; all his males shall first be\ncircumcised, and then shall he celebrate it according to the manner,\nand he shall be as that which is born in the land.\" But in temporal\nmatters concerning the public life of the people, admission was not\ngranted to everyone at once, for the reason given above: but to some,\ni.e. the Egyptians and Idumeans, in the third generation; while\nothers were excluded in perpetuity, in detestation of their past\noffense, i.e. the peoples of Moab, Ammon, and Amalec. For just as one\nman is punished for a sin committed by him, in order that others\nseeing this may be deterred and refrain from sinning; so too may one\nnation or city be punished for a crime, that others may refrain from\nsimilar crimes.\n\nNevertheless it was possible by dispensation for a man to be admitted\nto citizenship on account of some act of virtue: thus it is related\n(Judith 14:6) that Achior, the captain of the children of Ammon, \"was\njoined to the people of Israel, with all the succession of his\nkindred.\" The same applies to Ruth the Moabite who was \"a virtuous\nwoman\" (Ruth 3:11): although it may be said that this prohibition\nregarded men and not women, who are not competent to be citizens\nabsolutely speaking.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 3), a man is said\nto be a citizen in two ways: first, simply; secondly, in a restricted\nsense. A man is a citizen simply if he has all the rights of\ncitizenship, for instance, the right of debating or voting in the\npopular assembly. On the other hand, any man may be called citizen,\nonly in a restricted sense, if he dwells within the state, even\ncommon people or children or old men, who are not fit to enjoy power\nin matters pertaining to the common weal. For this reason bastards,\nby reason of their base origin, were excluded from the _ecclesia,_\ni.e. from the popular assembly, down to the tenth generation. The\nsame applies to eunuchs, who were not competent to receive the honor\ndue to a father, especially among the Jews, where the divine worship\nwas continued through carnal generation: for even among the heathens,\nthose who had many children were marked with special honor, as the\nPhilosopher remarks (Polit. ii, 6). Nevertheless, in matters\npertaining to the grace of God, eunuchs were not discriminated from\nothers, as neither were strangers, as already stated: for it is\nwritten (Isa. 56:3): \"Let not the son of the stranger that adhereth\nto the Lord speak, saying: The Lord will divide and separate me from\nHis people. And let not the eunuch say: Behold I am a dry tree.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: It was not the intention of the Law to sanction the\nacceptance of usury from strangers, but only to tolerate it on\naccount of the proneness of the Jews to avarice; and in order to\npromote an amicable feeling towards those out of whom they made a\nprofit.\n\nReply Obj. 4: A distinction was observed with regard to hostile\ncities. For some of them were far distant, and were not among those\nwhich had been promised to them. When they had taken these cities,\nthey killed all the men who had fought against God's people; whereas\nthe women and children were spared. But in the neighboring cities\nwhich had been promised to them, all were ordered to be slain, on\naccount of their former crimes, to punish which God sent the\nIsraelites as executor of Divine justice: for it is written (Deut.\n9:5) \"because they have done wickedly, they are destroyed at thy\ncoming in.\" The fruit-trees were commanded to be left untouched, for\nthe use of the people themselves, to whom the city with its territory\nwas destined to be subjected.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The builder of a new house, the planter of a vineyard,\nthe newly married husband, were excluded from fighting, for two\nreasons. First, because man is wont to give all his affection to\nthose things which he has lately acquired, or is on the point of\nhaving, and consequently he is apt to dread the loss of these above\nother things. Wherefore it was likely enough that on account of this\naffection they would fear death all the more, and be so much the less\nbrave in battle. Secondly, because, as the Philosopher says (Phys.\nii, 5), \"it is a misfortune for a man if he is prevented from\nobtaining something good when it is within his grasp.\" And so lest\nthe surviving relations should be the more grieved at the death of\nthese men who had not entered into the possession of the good things\nprepared for them; and also lest the people should be horror-stricken\nat the sight of their misfortune: these men were taken away from the\ndanger of death by being removed from the battle.\n\nReply Obj. 6: The timid were sent back home, not that they might be\nthe gainers thereby; but lest the people might be the losers by their\npresence, since their timidity and flight might cause others to be\nafraid and run away.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 105, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the Old Law Set Forth Suitable Precepts About the Members of\nthe Household?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the Old Law set forth unsuitable\nprecepts about the members of the household. For a slave \"is in every\nrespect his master's property,\" as the Philosopher states (Polit. i,\n2). But that which is a man's property should be his always.\nTherefore it was unfitting for the Law to command (Ex. 21:2) that\nslaves should \"go out free\" in the seventh year.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a slave is his master's property, just as an animal,\ne.g. an ass or an ox. But it is commanded (Deut. 22:1-3) with regard\nto animals, that they should be brought back to the owner if they be\nfound going astray. Therefore it was unsuitably commanded (Deut.\n23:15): \"Thou shalt not deliver to his master the servant that is\nfled to thee.\"\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Divine Law should encourage mercy more even than\nthe human law. But according to human laws those who ill-treat their\nservants and maidservants are severely punished: and the worse\ntreatment of all seems to be that which results in death. Therefore\nit is unfittingly commanded (Ex. 21:20, 21) that \"he that striketh\nhis bondman or bondwoman with a rod, and they die under his hands\n. . . if the party remain alive a day . . . he shall not be subject\nto the punishment, because it is his money.\"\n\nObj. 4: Further, the dominion of a master over his slave differs from\nthat of the father over his son (Polit. i, 3). But the dominion of\nmaster over slave gives the former the right to sell his servant or\nmaidservant. Therefore it was unfitting for the Law to allow a man to\nsell his daughter to be a servant or handmaid (Ex. 21:7).\n\nObj. 5: Further, a father has power over his son. But he who has\npower over the sinner has the right to punish him for his offenses.\nTherefore it is unfittingly commanded (Deut. 21:18, seqq.) that a\nfather should bring his son to the ancients of the city for\npunishment.\n\nObj. 6: Further, the Lord forbade them (Deut. 7:3, seqq.) to make\nmarriages with strange nations; and commanded the dissolution of such\nas had been contracted (1 Esdras 10). Therefore it was unfitting to\nallow them to marry captive women from strange nations (Deut. 21:10,\nseqq.).\n\nObj. 7: Further, the Lord forbade them to marry within certain\ndegrees of consanguinity and affinity, according to Lev. 18.\nTherefore it was unsuitably commanded (Deut. 25:5) that if any man\ndied without issue, his brother should marry his wife.\n\nObj. 8: Further, as there is the greatest familiarity between man and\nwife, so should there be the staunchest fidelity. But this is\nimpossible if the marriage bond can be sundered. Therefore it was\nunfitting for the Lord to allow (Deut. 24:1-4) a man to put his wife\naway, by writing a bill of divorce; and besides, that he could not\ntake her again to wife.\n\nObjection 9: Further, just as a wife can be faithless to her husband,\nso can a slave be to his master, and a son to his father. But the Law\ndid not command any sacrifice to be offered in order to investigate\nthe injury done by a servant to his master, or by a son to his\nfather. Therefore it seems to have been superfluous for the Law to\nprescribe the \"sacrifice of jealousy\" in order to investigate a\nwife's adultery (Num. 5:12, seqq.). Consequently it seems that the\nLaw put forth unsuitable judicial precepts about the members of the\nhousehold.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 18:10): \"The judgments of the\nLord are true, justified in themselves.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ The mutual relations of the members of a household\nregard everyday actions directed to the necessities of life, as the\nPhilosopher states (Polit. i, 1). Now the preservation of man's life\nmay be considered from two points of view. First, from the point of\nview of the individual, i.e. in so far as man preserves his\nindividuality: and for the purpose of the preservation of life,\nconsidered from this standpoint, man has at his service external\ngoods, by means of which he provides himself with food and clothing\nand other such necessaries of life: in the handling of which he has\nneed of servants. Secondly man's life is preserved from the point of\nview of the species, by means of generation, for which purpose man\nneeds a wife, that she may bear him children. Accordingly the mutual\nrelations of the members of a household admit of a threefold\ncombination: viz. those of master and servant, those of husband and\nwife, and those of father and son: and in respect of all these\nrelationships the Old Law contained fitting precepts. Thus, with\nregard to servants, it commanded them to be treated with\nmoderation--both as to their work, lest, to wit, they should be\nburdened with excessive labor, wherefore the Lord commanded (Deut.\n5:14) that on the Sabbath day \"thy manservant and thy maidservant\"\nshould \"rest even as thyself\"--and also as to the infliction of\npunishment, for it ordered those who maimed their servants, to set\nthem free (Ex. 21:26, 27). Similar provision was made in favor of a\nmaidservant when married to anyone (Ex. 21:7, seqq.). Moreover, with\nregard to those servants in particular who were taken from among the\npeople, the Law prescribed that they should go out free in the\nseventh year taking whatever they brought with them, even their\nclothes (Ex. 21:2, seqq.): and furthermore it was commanded (Deut.\n15:13) that they should be given provision for the journey.\n\nWith regard to wives the Law made certain prescriptions as to those\nwho were to be taken in marriage: for instance, that they should\nmarry a wife from their own tribe (Num. 36:6): and this lest\nconfusion should ensue in the property of various tribes. Also that a\nman should marry the wife of his deceased brother when the latter\ndied without issue, as prescribed in Deut. 25:5, 6: and this in order\nthat he who could not have successors according to carnal origin,\nmight at least have them by a kind of adoption, and that thus the\ndeceased might not be entirely forgotten. It also forbade them to\nmarry certain women; to wit, women of strange nations, through fear\nof their losing their faith; and those of their near kindred, on\naccount of the natural respect due to them. Furthermore it prescribed\nin what way wives were to be treated after marriage. To wit, that\nthey should not be slandered without grave reason: wherefore it\nordered punishment to be inflicted on the man who falsely accused his\nwife of a crime (Deut. 22:13, seqq.). Also that a man's hatred of his\nwife should not be detrimental to his son (Deut. 21:15, seqq.).\nAgain, that a man should not ill-use his wife through hatred of her,\nbut rather that he should write a bill of divorce and send her away\n(Deut. 24:1). Furthermore, in order to foster conjugal love from the\nvery outset, it was prescribed that no public duties should be laid\non a recently married man, so that he might be free to rejoice with\nhis wife.\n\nWith regard to children, the Law commanded parents to educate them by\ninstructing them in the faith: hence it is written (Ex. 12:26,\nseqq.): \"When your children shall say to you: What is the meaning of\nthis service? You shall say to them: It is the victim of the passage\nof the Lord.\" Moreover, they are commanded to teach them the rules of\nright conduct: wherefore it is written (Deut. 21:20) that the parents\nhad to say: \"He slighteth hearing our admonitions, he giveth himself\nto revelling and to debauchery.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the children of Israel had been delivered by the\nLord from slavery, and for this reason were bound to the service of\nGod, He did not wish them to be slaves in perpetuity. Hence it is\nwritten (Lev. 25:39, seqq.): \"If thy brother, constrained by poverty,\nsell himself to thee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of\nbondservants: but he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner . . . for\nthey are My servants, and I brought them out of the land of Egypt:\nlet them not be sold as bondmen\": and consequently, since they were\nslaves, not absolutely but in a restricted sense, after a lapse of\ntime they were set free.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This commandment is to be understood as referring to a\nservant whom his master seeks to kill, or to help him in committing\nsome sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: With regard to the ill-treatment of servants, the Law\nseems to have taken into consideration whether it was certain or not:\nsince if it were certain, the Law fixed a penalty: for maiming, the\npenalty was forfeiture of the servant, who was ordered to be given\nhis liberty: while for slaying, the punishment was that of a\nmurderer, when the slave died under the blow of his master. If,\nhowever, the hurt was not certain, but only probable, the Law did not\nimpose any penalty as regards a man's own servant: for instance if\nthe servant did not die at once after being struck, but after some\ndays: for it would be uncertain whether he died as a result of the\nblows he received. For when a man struck a free man, yet so that he\ndid not die at once, but \"walked abroad again upon his staff,\" he\nthat struck him was quit of murder, even though afterwards he died.\nNevertheless he was bound to pay the doctor's fees incurred by the\nvictim of his assault. But this was not the case if a man killed his\nown servant: because whatever the servant had, even his very person,\nwas the property of his master. Hence the reason for his not being\nsubject to a pecuniary penalty is set down as being \"because it is\nhis money.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: As stated above (ad 1), no Jew could own a Jew as a\nslave absolutely: but only in a restricted sense, as a hireling for a\nfixed time. And in this way the Law permitted that through stress of\npoverty a man might sell his son or daughter. This is shown by the\nvery words of the Law, where we read: \"If any man sell his daughter\nto be a servant, she shall not go out as bondwomen are wont to go\nout.\" Moreover, in this way a man might sell not only his son, but\neven himself, rather as a hireling than as a slave, according to Lev.\n25:39, 40: \"If thy brother, constrained by poverty, sell himself to\nthee, thou shalt not oppress him with the service of bondservants:\nbut he shall be as a hireling and a sojourner.\"\n\nReply Obj. 5: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 9), the paternal\nauthority has the power only of admonition; but not that of coercion,\nwhereby rebellious and headstrong persons can be compelled. Hence in\nthis case the Lord commanded the stubborn son to be punished by the\nrulers of the city.\n\nReply Obj. 6: The Lord forbade them to marry strange women on account\nof the danger of seduction, lest they should be led astray into\nidolatry. And specially did this prohibition apply with respect to\nthose nations who dwelt near them, because it was more probable that\nthey would adopt their religious practices. When, however, the woman\nwas willing to renounce idolatry, and become an adherent of the Law,\nit was lawful to take her in marriage: as was the case with Ruth whom\nBooz married. Wherefore she said to her mother-in-law (Ruth 1:16):\n\"Thy people shall be my people, and thy God my God.\" Accordingly it\nwas not permitted to marry a captive woman unless she first shaved\nher hair, and pared her nails, and put off the raiment wherein she\nwas taken, and mourned for her father and mother, in token that she\nrenounced idolatry for ever.\n\nReply Obj. 7: As Chrysostom says (Hom. xlviii super Matth.), \"because\ndeath was an unmitigated evil for the Jews, who did everything with a\nview to the present life, it was ordained that children should be\nborn to the dead man through his brother: thus affording a certain\nmitigation to his death. It was not, however, ordained that any other\nthan his brother or one next of kin should marry the wife of the\ndeceased, because\" the offspring of this union \"would not be looked\nupon as that of the deceased: and moreover, a stranger would not be\nunder the obligation to support the household of the deceased, as his\nbrother would be bound to do from motives of justice on account of\nhis relationship.\" Hence it is evident that in marrying the wife of\nhis dead brother, he took his dead brother's place.\n\nReply Obj. 8: The Law permitted a wife to be divorced, not as though\nit were just absolutely speaking, but on account of the Jews'\nhardness of heart, as Our Lord declared (Matt. 19:8). Of this,\nhowever, we must speak more fully in the treatise on Matrimony\n(Supp., Q. 67).\n\nReply Obj. 9: Wives break their conjugal faith by adultery, both\neasily, for motives of pleasure, and hiddenly, since \"the eye of the\nadulterer observeth darkness\" (Job 24:15). But this does not apply to\na son in respect of his father, or to a servant in respect of his\nmaster: because the latter infidelity is not the result of the lust\nof pleasure, but rather of malice: nor can it remain hidden like the\ninfidelity of an adulterous woman.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 106\n\nOF THE LAW OF THE GOSPEL, CALLED THE NEW LAW, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF\n(In Four Articles)\n\nIn proper sequence we have to consider now the Law of the Gospel\nwhich is called the New Law: and in the first place we must consider\nit in itself; secondly, in comparison with the Old Law; thirdly, we\nshall treat of those things that are contained in the New Law. Under\nthe first head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) What kind of law is it? i.e. Is it a written law or is it\ninstilled in the heart?\n\n(2) Of its efficacy, i.e. does it justify?\n\n(3) Of its beginning: should it have been given at the beginning of\nthe world?\n\n(4) Of its end: i.e. whether it will last until the end, or will\nanother law take its place?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 106, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the New Law Is a Written Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the New Law is a written law. For the\nNew Law is just the same as the Gospel. But the Gospel is set forth\nin writing, according to John 20:31: \"But these are written that you\nmay believe.\" Therefore the New Law is a written law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the law that is instilled in the heart is the\nnatural law, according to Rom. 2:14, 15: \"(The Gentiles) do by nature\nthose things that are of the law . . . who have [Vulg.: 'show'] the\nwork of the law written in their hearts.\" If therefore the law of the\nGospel were instilled in our hearts, it would not be distinct from\nthe law of nature.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the law of the Gospel is proper to those who are in\nthe state of the New Testament. But the law that is instilled in the\nheart is common to those who are in the New Testament and to those\nwho are in the Old Testament: for it is written (Wis. 7:27) that\nDivine Wisdom \"through nations conveyeth herself into holy souls, she\nmaketh the friends of God and prophets.\" Therefore the New Law is not\ninstilled in our hearts.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The New Law is the law of the New Testament. But\nthe law of the New Testament is instilled in our hearts. For the\nApostle, quoting the authority of Jeremiah 31:31, 33: \"Behold the\ndays shall come, saith the Lord; and I will perfect unto the house of\nIsrael, and unto the house of Judah, a new testament,\" says,\nexplaining what this statement is (Heb. 8:8, 10): \"For this is the\ntestament which I will make to the house of Israel . . . by giving\n[Vulg.: 'I will give'] My laws into their mind, and in their heart\nwill I write them.\" Therefore the New Law is instilled in our hearts.\n\n_I answer that,_ \"Each thing appears to be that which preponderates\nin it,\" as the Philosopher states (Ethic. ix, 8). Now that which is\npreponderant in the law of the New Testament, and whereon all its\nefficacy is based, is the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is given\nthrough faith in Christ. Consequently the New Law is chiefly the\ngrace itself of the Holy Ghost, which is given to those who believe\nin Christ. This is manifestly stated by the Apostle who says (Rom.\n3:27): \"Where is . . . thy boasting? It is excluded. By what law? Of\nworks? No, but by the law of faith\": for he calls the grace itself of\nfaith \"a law.\" And still more clearly it is written (Rom. 8:2): \"The\nlaw of the spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath delivered me from\nthe law of sin and of death.\" Hence Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit.\nxxiv) that \"as the law of deeds was written on tables of stone, so is\nthe law of faith inscribed on the hearts of the faithful\": and\nelsewhere, in the same book (xxi): \"What else are the Divine laws\nwritten by God Himself on our hearts, but the very presence of His\nHoly Spirit?\"\n\nNevertheless the New Law contains certain things that dispose us to\nreceive the grace of the Holy Ghost, and pertaining to the use of\nthat grace: such things are of secondary importance, so to speak, in\nthe New Law; and the faithful need to be instructed concerning them,\nboth by word and writing, both as to what they should believe and as\nto what they should do. Consequently we must say that the New Law is\nin the first place a law that is inscribed on our hearts, but that\nsecondarily it is a written law.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Gospel writings contain only such things as pertain\nto the grace of the Holy Ghost, either by disposing us thereto, or by\ndirecting us to the use thereof. Thus with regard to the intellect,\nthe Gospel contains certain matters pertaining to the manifestation\nof Christ's Godhead or humanity, which dispose us by means of faith\nthrough which we receive the grace of the Holy Ghost: and with regard\nto the affections, it contains matters touching the contempt of the\nworld, whereby man is rendered fit to receive the grace of the Holy\nGhost: for \"the world,\" i.e. worldly men, \"cannot receive\" the Holy\nGhost (John 14:17). As to the use of spiritual grace, this consists\nin works of virtue to which the writings of the New Testament exhort\nmen in divers ways.\n\nReply Obj. 2: There are two ways in which a thing may be instilled\ninto man. First, through being part of his nature, and thus the\nnatural law is instilled into man. Secondly, a thing is instilled\ninto man by being, as it were, added on to his nature by a gift of\ngrace. In this way the New Law is instilled into man, not only by\nindicating to him what he should do, but also by helping him to\naccomplish it.\n\nReply Obj. 3: No man ever had the grace of the Holy Ghost except\nthrough faith in Christ either explicit or implicit: and by faith in\nChrist man belongs to the New Testament. Consequently whoever had the\nlaw of grace instilled into them belonged to the New Testament.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 106, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the New Law Justifies?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the New Law does not justify. For no\nman is justified unless he obeys God's law, according to Heb. 5:9:\n\"He,\" i.e. Christ, \"became to all that obey Him the cause of eternal\nsalvation.\" But the Gospel does not always cause men to believe in\nit: for it is written (Rom. 10:16): \"All do not obey the Gospel.\"\nTherefore the New Law does not justify.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle proves in his epistle to the Romans that\nthe Old Law did not justify, because transgression increased at its\nadvent: for it is stated (Rom. 4:15): \"The Law worketh wrath: for\nwhere there is no law, neither is there transgression.\" But much more\ndid the New Law increase transgression: since he who sins after the\ngiving of the New Law deserves greater punishment, according to Heb.\n10:28, 29: \"A man making void the Law of Moses dieth without any\nmercy under two or three witnesses. How much more, do you think, he\ndeserveth worse punishments, who hath trodden underfoot the Son of\nGod,\" etc.? Therefore the New Law, like the Old Law, does not justify.\n\nObj. 3: Further, justification is an effect proper to God, according\nto Rom. 8:33: \"God that justifieth.\" But the Old Law was from God\njust as the New Law. Therefore the New Law does not justify any more\nthan the Old Law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 1:16): \"I am not ashamed of\nthe Gospel: for it is the power of God unto salvation to everyone\nthat believeth.\" But there is no salvation but to those who are\njustified. Therefore the Law of the Gospel justifies.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), there is a twofold element\nin the Law of the Gospel. There is the chief element, viz. the grace\nof the Holy Ghost bestowed inwardly. And as to this, the New Law\njustifies. Hence Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xvii): \"There,\"\ni.e. in the Old Testament, \"the Law was set forth in an outward\nfashion, that the ungodly might be afraid\"; \"here,\" i.e. in the New\nTestament, \"it is given in an inward manner, that they may be\njustified.\" The other element of the Evangelical Law is secondary:\nnamely, the teachings of faith, and those commandments which direct\nhuman affections and human actions. And as to this, the New Law does\nnot justify. Hence the Apostle says (2 Cor. 3:6) \"The letter killeth,\nbut the spirit quickeneth\": and Augustine explains this (De Spir. et\nLit. xiv, xvii) by saying that the letter denotes any writing\nexternal to man, even that of the moral precepts such as are\ncontained in the Gospel. Wherefore the letter, even of the Gospel\nwould kill, unless there were the inward presence of the healing\ngrace of faith.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This argument holds true of the New Law, not as to its\nprincipal, but as to its secondary element: i.e. as to the dogmas and\nprecepts outwardly put before man either in words or in writing.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Although the grace of the New Testament helps man to\navoid sin, yet it does not so confirm man in good that he cannot sin:\nfor this belongs to the state of glory. Hence if a man sin after\nreceiving the grace of the New Testament, he deserves greater\npunishment, as being ungrateful for greater benefits, and as not\nusing the help given to him. And this is why the New Law is not said\nto \"work wrath\": because as far as it is concerned it gives man\nsufficient help to avoid sin.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The same God gave both the New and the Old Law, but in\ndifferent ways. For He gave the Old Law written on tables of stone:\nwhereas He gave the New Law written \"in the fleshly tables of the\nheart,\" as the Apostle expresses it (2 Cor. 3:3). Wherefore, as\nAugustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xviii), \"the Apostle calls this\nletter which is written outside man, a ministration of death and a\nministration of condemnation: whereas he calls the other letter, i.e.\nthe Law of the New Testament, the ministration of the spirit and the\nministration of justice: because through the gift of the Spirit we\nwork justice, and are delivered from the condemnation due to\ntransgression.\"\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 106, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the New Law Should Have Been Given from the Beginning of the\nWorld?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the New Law should have been given\nfrom the beginning of the world. \"For there is no respect of persons\nwith God\" (Rom. 2:11). But \"all\" men \"have sinned and do need the\nglory of God\" (Rom. 3:23). Therefore the Law of the Gospel should\nhave been given from the beginning of the world, in order that it\nmight bring succor to all.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as men dwell in various places, so do they live in\nvarious times. But God, \"Who will have all men to be saved\" (1 Tim.\n2:4), commanded the Gospel to be preached in all places, as may be\nseen in the last chapters of Matthew and Mark. Therefore the Law of\nthe Gospel should have been at hand for all times, so as to be given\nfrom the beginning of the world.\n\nObj. 3: Further, man needs to save his soul, which is for all\neternity, more than to save his body, which is a temporal matter. But\nGod provided man from the beginning of the world with things that are\nnecessary for the health of his body, by subjecting to his power\nwhatever was created for the sake of man (Gen. 1:26-29). Therefore\nthe New Law also, which is very necessary for the health of the soul,\nshould have been given to man from the beginning of the world.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 15:46): \"That was not\nfirst which is spiritual, but that which is natural.\" But the New Law\nis highly spiritual. Therefore it was not fitting for it to be given\nfrom the beginning of the world.\n\n_I answer that,_ Three reasons may be assigned why it was not fitting\nfor the New Law to be given from the beginning of the world. The\nfirst is because the New Law, as stated above (A. 1), consists\nchiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost: which it behoved not to be\ngiven abundantly until sin, which is an obstacle to grace, had been\ncast out of man through the accomplishment of his redemption by\nChrist: wherefore it is written (John 7:39): \"As yet the Spirit was\nnot given, because Jesus was not yet glorified.\" This reason the\nApostle states clearly (Rom. 8:2, seqq.) where, after speaking of\n\"the Law of the Spirit of life,\" he adds: \"God sending His own Son,\nin the likeness of sinful flesh, of sin* hath condemned sin in the\nflesh, that the justification of the Law might be fulfilled in us.\"\n[*St. Thomas, quoting perhaps from memory, omits the \"et\" (and),\nafter \"sinful flesh.\" The text quoted should read thus: \"in the\nlikeness of sinful flesh, and a sin offering (_peri hamartias_),\nhath,\" etc.]\n\nA second reason may be taken from the perfection of the New Law.\nBecause a thing is not brought to perfection at once from the outset,\nbut through an orderly succession of time; thus one is at first a\nboy, and then a man. And this reason is stated by the Apostle (Gal.\n3:24, 25): \"The Law was our pedagogue in Christ that we might be\njustified by faith. But after the faith is come, we are no longer\nunder a pedagogue.\"\n\nThe third reason is found in the fact that the New Law is the law of\ngrace: wherefore it behoved man first of all to be left to himself\nunder the state of the Old Law, so that through falling into sin, he\nmight realize his weakness, and acknowledge his need of grace. This\nreason is set down by the Apostle (Rom. 5:20): \"The Law entered in,\nthat sin might abound: and when sin abounded grace did more abound.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Mankind on account of the sin of our first parents\ndeserved to be deprived of the aid of grace: and so \"from whom it is\nwithheld it is justly withheld, and to whom it is given, it is\nmercifully given,\" as Augustine states (De Perfect. Justit. iv) [*Cf.\nEp. ccvii; De Pecc. Mer. et Rem. ii, 19]. Consequently it does not\nfollow that there is respect of persons with God, from the fact that\nHe did not offer the Law of grace to all from the beginning of the\nworld, which Law was to be published in due course of time, as stated\nabove.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The state of mankind does not vary according to\ndiversity of place, but according to succession of time. Hence the\nNew Law avails for all places, but not for all times: although at all\ntimes there have been some persons belonging to the New Testament, as\nstated above (A. 1, ad 3).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Things pertaining to the health of the body are of\nservice to man as regards his nature, which sin does not destroy:\nwhereas things pertaining to the health of the soul are ordained to\ngrace, which is forfeit through sin. Consequently the comparison will\nnot hold.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 106, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the New Law Will Last Till the End of the World?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the New Law will not last until the\nend of the world. Because, as the Apostle says (1 Cor. 13:10), \"when\nthat which is perfect is come, that which is in part shall be done\naway.\" But the New Law is \"in part,\" since the Apostle says (1 Cor.\n13:9): \"We know in part and we prophesy in part.\" Therefore the New\nLaw is to be done away, and will be succeeded by a more perfect state.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Our Lord (John 16:13) promised His disciples the\nknowledge of all truth when the Holy Ghost, the Comforter, should\ncome. But the Church knows not yet all truth in the state of the New\nTestament. Therefore we must look forward to another state, wherein\nall truth will be revealed by the Holy Ghost.\n\nObj. 3: Further, just as the Father is distinct from the Son and the\nSon from the Father, so is the Holy Ghost distinct from the Father\nand the Son. But there was a state corresponding with the Person of\nthe Father, viz. the state of the Old Law, wherein men were intent on\nbegetting children: and likewise there is a state corresponding to\nthe Person of the Son: viz. the state of the New Law, wherein the\nclergy who are intent on wisdom (which is appropriated to the Son)\nhold a prominent place. Therefore there will be a third state\ncorresponding to the Holy Ghost, wherein spiritual men will hold the\nfirst place.\n\nObj. 4: Further, Our Lord said (Matt. 24:14): \"This Gospel of the\nkingdom shall be preached in the whole world . . . and then shall the\nconsummation come.\" But the Gospel of Christ is already preached\nthroughout the whole world: and yet the consummation has not yet\ncome. Therefore the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the\nkingdom, but another Gospel, that of the Holy Ghost, is to come yet,\nlike unto another Law.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 24:34): \"I say to you that\nthis generation shall not pass till all (these) things be done\":\nwhich passage Chrysostom (Hom. lxxvii) explains as referring to \"the\ngeneration of those that believe in Christ.\" Therefore the state of\nthose who believe in Christ will last until the consummation of the\nworld.\n\n_I answer that,_ The state of the world may change in two ways. In\none way, according to a change of law: and thus no other state will\nsucceed this state of the New Law. Because the state of the New Law\nsucceeded the state of the Old Law, as a more perfect law a less\nperfect one. Now no state of the present life can be more perfect\nthat the state of the New Law: since nothing can approach nearer to\nthe last end than that which is the immediate cause of our being\nbrought to the last end. But the New Law does this: wherefore the\nApostle says (Heb. 10:19-22): \"Having therefore, brethren, a\nconfidence in the entering into the Holies by the blood of Christ, a\nnew . . . way which He hath dedicated for us . . . let us draw near.\"\nTherefore no state of the present life can be more perfect than that\nof the New Law, since the nearer a thing is to the last end the more\nperfect it is.\n\nIn another way the state of mankind may change according as man\nstands in relation to one and the same law more or less perfectly.\nAnd thus the state of the Old Law underwent frequent changes, since\nat times the laws were very well kept, and at other times were\naltogether unheeded. Thus, too, the state of the New Law is subject\nto change with regard to various places, times, and persons,\naccording as the grace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man more or less\nperfectly. Nevertheless we are not to look forward to a state wherein\nman is to possess the grace of the Holy Ghost more perfectly than he\nhas possessed it hitherto, especially the apostles who \"received the\nfirstfruits of the Spirit, i.e. sooner and more abundantly than\nothers,\" as a gloss expounds on Rom. 8:23.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Dionysius says (Eccl. Hier. v), there is a threefold\nstate of mankind; the first was under the Old Law; the second is that\nof the New Law; the third will take place not in this life, but in\nheaven. But as the first state is figurative and imperfect in\ncomparison with the state of the Gospel; so is the present state\nfigurative and imperfect in comparison with the heavenly state, with\nthe advent of which the present state will be done away as expressed\nin that very passage (1 Cor. 13:12): \"We see now through a glass in a\ndark manner; but then face to face.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 31), Montanus and\nPriscilla pretended that Our Lord's promise to give the Holy Ghost\nwas fulfilled, not in the apostles, but in themselves. In like manner\nthe Manicheans maintained that it was fulfilled in Manes whom they\nheld to be the Paraclete. Hence none of the above received the Acts\nof the Apostles, where it is clearly shown that the aforesaid promise\nwas fulfilled in the apostles: just as Our Lord promised them a\nsecond time (Acts 1:5): \"You shall be baptized with the Holy Ghost,\nnot many days hence\": which we read as having been fulfilled in Acts\n2. However, these foolish notions are refuted by the statement (John\n7:39) that \"as yet the Spirit was not given, because Jesus was not\nyet glorified\"; from which we gather that the Holy Ghost was given as\nsoon as Christ was glorified in His Resurrection and Ascension.\nMoreover, this puts out of court the senseless idea that the Holy\nGhost is to be expected to come at some other time.\n\nNow the Holy Ghost taught the apostles all truth in respect of\nmatters necessary for salvation; those things, to wit, that we are\nbound to believe and to do. But He did not teach them about all\nfuture events: for this did not regard them according to Acts 1:7:\n\"It is not for you to know the times or moments which the Father hath\nput in His own power.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The Old Law corresponded not only to the Father, but\nalso to the Son: because Christ was foreshadowed in the Old Law.\nHence Our Lord said (John 5:46): \"If you did believe Moses, you would\nperhaps believe me also; for he wrote of Me.\" In like manner the New\nLaw corresponds not only to Christ, but also to the Holy Ghost;\naccording to Rom. 8:2: \"The Law of the Spirit of life in Christ\nJesus,\" etc. Hence we are not to look forward to another law\ncorresponding to the Holy Ghost.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Since Christ said at the very outset of the preaching\nof the Gospel: \"The kingdom of heaven is at hand\" (Matt. 4:17), it is\nmost absurd to say that the Gospel of Christ is not the Gospel of the\nkingdom. But the preaching of the Gospel of Christ may be understood\nin two ways. First, as denoting the spreading abroad of the knowledge\nof Christ: and thus the Gospel was preached throughout the world even\nat the time of the apostles, as Chrysostom states (Hom. lxxv in\nMatth.). And in this sense the words that follow--\"and then shall the\nconsummation come,\" refer to the destruction of Jerusalem, of which\nHe was speaking literally. Secondly, the preaching of the Gospel may\nbe understood as extending throughout the world and producing its\nfull effect, so that, to wit, the Church would be founded in every\nnation. And in these sense, as Augustine writes to Hesychius (Epist.\ncxcix), the Gospel is not preached to the whole world yet, but, when\nit is, the consummation of the world will come.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 107\n\nOF THE NEW LAW AS COMPARED WITH THE OLD\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the New Law as compared with the Old: under\nwhich head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the New Law is distinct from the Old Law?\n\n(2) Whether the New Law fulfils the Old?\n\n(3) Whether the New Law is contained in the Old?\n\n(4) Which is the more burdensome, the New or the Old Law?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 107, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the New Law Is Distinct from the Old Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the New Law is not distinct from the\nOld. Because both these laws were given to those who believe in God:\nsince \"without faith it is impossible to please God,\" according to\nHeb. 11:6. But the faith of olden times and of nowadays is the same,\nas the gloss says on Matt. 21:9. Therefore the law is the same also.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Contra Adamant. Manich. discip.\nxvii) that \"there is little difference between the Law and Gospel\"\n[*The 'little difference' refers to the Latin words 'timor' and\n'amor']--\"fear and love.\" But the New and Old Laws cannot be\ndifferentiated in respect of these two things: since even the Old Law\ncomprised precepts of charity: \"Thou shalt love thy neighbor\" (Lev.\n19:18), and: \"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God\" (Deut. 6:5). In like\nmanner neither can they differ according to the other difference\nwhich Augustine assigns (Contra Faust. iv, 2), viz. that \"the Old\nTestament contained temporal promises, whereas the New Testament\ncontains spiritual and eternal promises\": since even the New\nTestament contains temporal promises, according to Mk. 10:30: He\nshall receive \"a hundred times as much . . . in this time, houses and\nbrethren,\" etc.: while in the Old Testament they hoped in promises\nspiritual and eternal, according to Heb. 11:16: \"But now they desire\na better, that is to say, a heavenly country,\" which is said of the\npatriarchs. Therefore it seems that the New Law is not distinct from\nthe Old.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the Apostle seems to distinguish both laws by\ncalling the Old Law \"a law of works,\" and the New Law \"a law of\nfaith\" (Rom. 3:27). But the Old Law was also a law of faith,\naccording to Heb. 11:39: \"All were [Vulg.: 'All these being']\napproved by the testimony of faith,\" which he says of the fathers of\nthe Old Testament. In like manner the New Law is a law of works:\nsince it is written (Matt. 5:44): \"Do good to them that hate you\";\nand (Luke 22:19): \"Do this for a commemoration of Me.\" Therefore the\nNew Law is not distinct from the Old.\n\n_On the contrary,_ the Apostle says (Heb. 7:12): \"The priesthood\nbeing translated it is necessary that a translation also be made of\nthe Law.\" But the priesthood of the New Testament is distinct from\nthat of the Old, as the Apostle shows in the same place. Therefore\nthe Law is also distinct.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 90, A. 2; Q. 91, A. 4), every\nlaw ordains human conduct to some end. Now things ordained to an end\nmay be divided in two ways, considered from the point of view of the\nend. First, through being ordained to different ends: and this\ndifference will be specific, especially if such ends are proximate.\nSecondly, by reason of being closely or remotely connected with the\nend. Thus it is clear that movements differ in species through being\ndirected to different terms: while according as one part of a\nmovement is nearer to the term than another part, the difference of\nperfect and imperfect movement is assessed.\n\nAccordingly then two laws may be distinguished from one another in\ntwo ways. First, through being altogether diverse, from the fact that\nthey are ordained to diverse ends: thus a state-law ordained to\ndemocratic government, would differ specifically from a law ordained\nto government by the aristocracy. Secondly, two laws may be\ndistinguished from one another, through one of them being more\nclosely connected with the end, and the other more remotely: thus in\none and the same state there is one law enjoined on men of mature\nage, who can forthwith accomplish that which pertains to the common\ngood; and another law regulating the education of children who need\nto be taught how they are to achieve manly deeds later on.\n\nWe must therefore say that, according to the first way, the New Law\nis not distinct from the Old Law: because they both have the same\nend, namely, man's subjection to God; and there is but one God of the\nNew and of the Old Testament, according to Rom. 3:30: \"It is one God\nthat justifieth circumcision by faith, and uncircumcision through\nfaith.\" According to the second way, the New Law is distinct from the\nOld Law: because the Old Law is like a pedagogue of children, as the\nApostle says (Gal. 3:24), whereas the New Law is the law of\nperfection, since it is the law of charity, of which the Apostle says\n(Col. 3:14) that it is \"the bond of perfection.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The unity of faith under both Testaments witnesses to\nthe unity of end: for it has been stated above (Q. 62, A. 2) that the\nobject of the theological virtues, among which is faith, is the last\nend. Yet faith had a different state in the Old and in the New Law:\nsince what they believed as future, we believe as fact.\n\nReply Obj. 2: All the differences assigned between the Old and New\nLaws are gathered from their relative perfection and imperfection.\nFor the precepts of every law prescribe acts of virtue. Now the\nimperfect, who as yet are not possessed of a virtuous habit, are\ndirected in one way to perform virtuous acts, while those who are\nperfected by the possession of virtuous habits are directed in\nanother way. For those who as yet are not endowed with virtuous\nhabits, are directed to the performance of virtuous acts by reason of\nsome outward cause: for instance, by the threat of punishment, or the\npromise of some extrinsic rewards, such as honor, riches, or the\nlike. Hence the Old Law, which was given to men who were imperfect,\nthat is, who had not yet received spiritual grace, was called the\n\"law of fear,\" inasmuch as it induced men to observe its commandments\nby threatening them with penalties; and is spoken of as containing\ntemporal promises. On the other hand, those who are possessed of\nvirtue, are inclined to do virtuous deeds through love of virtue, not\non account of some extrinsic punishment or reward. Hence the New Law\nwhich derives its pre-eminence from the spiritual grace instilled\ninto our hearts, is called the \"Law of love\": and it is described as\ncontaining spiritual and eternal promises, which are objects of the\nvirtues, chiefly of charity. Accordingly such persons are inclined of\nthemselves to those objects, not as to something foreign but as to\nsomething of their own. For this reason, too, the Old Law is\ndescribed as \"restraining the hand, not the will\" [*Peter Lombard,\nSent. iii, D, 40]; since when a man refrains from some sins through\nfear of being punished, his will does not shrink simply from sin, as\ndoes the will of a man who refrains from sin through love of\nrighteousness: and hence the New Law, which is the Law of love, is\nsaid to restrain the will.\n\nNevertheless there were some in the state of the Old Testament who,\nhaving charity and the grace of the Holy Ghost, looked chiefly to\nspiritual and eternal promises: and in this respect they belonged to\nthe New Law. In like manner in the New Testament there are some\ncarnal men who have not yet attained to the perfection of the New\nLaw; and these it was necessary, even under the New Testament, to\nlead to virtuous action by the fear of punishment and by temporal\npromises.\n\nBut although the Old Law contained precepts of charity, nevertheless\nit did not confer the Holy Ghost by Whom \"charity . . . is spread\nabroad in our hearts\" (Rom. 5:5).\n\nReply Obj. 3: As stated above (Q. 106, AA. 1, 2), the New Law is\ncalled the law of faith, in so far as its pre-eminence is derived\nfrom that very grace which is given inwardly to believers, and for\nthis reason is called the grace of faith. Nevertheless it consists\nsecondarily in certain deeds, moral and sacramental: but the New Law\ndoes not consist chiefly in these latter things, as did the Old Law.\nAs to those under the Old Testament who through faith were acceptable\nto God, in this respect they belonged to the New Testament: for they\nwere not justified except through faith in Christ, Who is the Author\nof the New Testament. Hence of Moses the Apostle says (Heb. 11:26)\nthat he esteemed \"the reproach of Christ greater riches than the\ntreasure of the Egyptians.\"\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 107, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the New Law Fulfils the Old?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the New Law does not fulfil the Old.\nBecause to fulfil and to void are contrary. But the New Law voids or\nexcludes the observances of the Old Law: for the Apostle says (Gal.\n5:2): \"If you be circumcised, Christ shall profit you nothing.\"\nTherefore the New Law is not a fulfilment of the Old.\n\nObj. 2: Further, one contrary is not the fulfilment of another. But\nOur Lord propounded in the New Law precepts that were contrary to\nprecepts of the Old Law. For we read (Matt. 5:27-32): \"You have heard\nthat it was said to them of old: . . . 'Whosoever shall put away his\nwife, let him give her a bill of divorce. But I say to you that\nwhosoever shall put away his wife . . . maketh her to commit\nadultery.'\" Furthermore, the same evidently applies to the\nprohibition against swearing, against retaliation, and against hating\none's enemies. In like manner Our Lord seems to have done away with\nthe precepts of the Old Law relating to the different kinds of foods\n(Matt. 15:11): \"Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth the man:\nbut what cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man.\" Therefore the\nNew Law is not a fulfilment of the Old.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whoever acts against a law does not fulfil the law.\nBut Christ in certain cases acted against the Law. For He touched the\nleper (Matt. 8:3), which was contrary to the Law. Likewise He seems\nto have frequently broken the sabbath; since the Jews used to say of\nHim (John 9:16): \"This man is not of God, who keepeth not the\nsabbath.\" Therefore Christ did not fulfil the Law: and so the New Law\ngiven by Christ is not a fulfilment of the Old.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Old Law contained precepts, moral, ceremonial,\nand judicial, as stated above (Q. 99, A. 4). But Our Lord (Matt. 5)\nfulfilled the Law in some respects, but without mentioning the\njudicial and ceremonial precepts. Therefore it seems that the New Law\nis not a complete fulfilment of the Old.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 5:17): \"I am not come to\ndestroy, but to fulfil\": and went on to say (Matt. 5:18): \"One jot or\none tittle shall not pass of the Law till all be fulfilled.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the New Law is compared to\nthe Old as the perfect to the imperfect. Now everything perfect\nfulfils that which is lacking in the imperfect. And accordingly the\nNew Law fulfils the Old by supplying that which was lacking in the\nOld Law.\n\nNow two things in the Old Law offer themselves to our consideration:\nviz., the end, and the precepts contained in the Law.\n\nNow the end of every law is to make men righteous and virtuous, as\nwas stated above (Q. 92, A. 1): and consequently the end of the Old\nLaw was the justification of men. The Law, however, could not\naccomplish this: but foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial actions,\nand promised it in words. And in this respect, the New Law fulfils\nthe Old by justifying men through the power of Christ's Passion. This\nis what the Apostle says (Rom. 8:3, 4): \"What the Law could not do\n. . . God sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh . . .\nhath condemned sin in the flesh, that the justification of the Law\nmight be fulfilled in us.\" And in this respect, the New Law gives\nwhat the Old Law promised, according to 2 Cor. 1:20: \"Whatever are\nthe promises of God, in Him,\" i.e. in Christ, \"they are 'Yea'.\" [*The\nDouay version reads thus: \"All the promises of God are in Him, 'It\nis'.\"] Again, in this respect, it also fulfils what the Old Law\nforeshadowed. Hence it is written (Col. 2:17) concerning the\nceremonial precepts that they were \"a shadow of things to come, but\nthe body is of Christ\"; in other words, the reality is found in\nChrist. Wherefore the New Law is called the law of reality; whereas\nthe Old Law is called the law of shadow or of figure.\n\nNow Christ fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law both in His works\nand in His doctrine. In His works, because He was willing to be\ncircumcised and to fulfil the other legal observances, which were\nbinding for the time being; according to Gal. 4:4: \"Made under the\nLaw.\" In His doctrine He fulfilled the precepts of the Law in three\nways. First, by explaining the true sense of the Law. This is clear\nin the case of murder and adultery, the prohibition of which the\nScribes and Pharisees thought to refer only to the exterior act:\nwherefore Our Lord fulfilled the Law by showing that the prohibition\nextended also to the interior acts of sins. Secondly, Our Lord\nfulfilled the precepts of the Law by prescribing the safest way of\ncomplying with the statutes of the Old Law. Thus the Old Law forbade\nperjury: and this is more safely avoided, by abstaining altogether\nfrom swearing, save in cases of urgency. Thirdly, Our Lord fulfilled\nthe precepts of the Law, by adding some counsels of perfection: this\nis clearly seen in Matt. 19:21, where Our Lord said to the man who\naffirmed that he had kept all the precepts of the Old Law: \"One thing\nis wanting to thee: If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell whatsoever thou\nhast,\" etc. [*St. Thomas combines Matt. 19:21 with Mk. 10:21].\n\nReply Obj. 1: The New Law does not void observance of the Old Law\nexcept in the point of ceremonial precepts, as stated above (Q. 103,\nAA. 3, 4). Now the latter were figurative of something to come.\nWherefore from the very fact that the ceremonial precepts were\nfulfilled when those things were accomplished which they\nforeshadowed, it follows that they are no longer to be observed: for\nif they were to be observed, this would mean that something is still\nto be accomplished and is not yet fulfilled. Thus the promise of a\nfuture gift holds no longer when it has been fulfilled by the\npresentation of the gift. In this way the legal ceremonies are\nabolished by being fulfilled.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. xix, 26), those\nprecepts of Our Lord are not contrary to the precepts of the Old Law.\nFor what Our Lord commanded about a man not putting away his wife, is\nnot contrary to what the Law prescribed. \"For the Law did not say:\n'Let him that wills, put his wife away': the contrary of which would\nbe not to put her away. _On the contrary,_ the Law was unwilling that\na man should put away his wife, since it prescribed a delay, so that\nexcessive eagerness for divorce might cease through being weakened\nduring the writing of the bill. Hence Our Lord, in order to impress\nthe fact that a wife ought not easily to be put away, allowed no\nexception save in the case of fornication.\" The same applies to the\nprohibition about swearing, as stated above. The same is also clear\nwith respect to the prohibition of retaliation. For the Law fixed a\nlimit to revenge, by forbidding men to seek vengeance unreasonably:\nwhereas Our Lord deprived them of vengeance more completely by\ncommanding them to abstain from it altogether. With regard to the\nhatred of one's enemies, He dispelled the false interpretation of the\nPharisees, by admonishing us to hate, not the person, but his sin. As\nto discriminating between various foods, which was a ceremonial\nmatter, Our Lord did not forbid this to be observed: but He showed\nthat no foods are naturally unclean, but only in token of something\nelse, as stated above (Q. 102, A. 6, ad 1).\n\nReply Obj. 3: It was forbidden by the Law to touch a leper; because\nby doing so, man incurred a certain uncleanness of irregularity, as\nalso by touching the dead, as stated above (Q. 102, A. 5, ad 4). But\nOur Lord, Who healed the leper, could not contract an uncleanness. By\nthose things which He did on the sabbath, He did not break the\nsabbath in reality, as the Master Himself shows in the Gospel: both\nbecause He worked miracles by His Divine power, which is ever active\namong things; and because His works were concerned with the salvation\nof man, while the Pharisees were concerned for the well-being of\nanimals even on the sabbath; and again because on account of urgency\nHe excused His disciples for gathering the ears of corn on the\nsabbath. But He did seem to break the sabbath according to the\nsuperstitious interpretation of the Pharisees, who thought that man\nought to abstain from doing even works of kindness on the sabbath;\nwhich was contrary to the intention of the Law.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The reason why the ceremonial precepts of the Law are\nnot mentioned in Matt. 5 is because, as stated above (ad 1), their\nobservance was abolished by their fulfilment. But of the judicial\nprecepts He mentioned that of retaliation: so that what He said about\nit should refer to all the others. With regard to this precept, He\ntaught that the intention of the Law was that retaliation should be\nsought out of love of justice, and not as a punishment out of\nrevengeful spite, which He forbade, admonishing man to be ready to\nsuffer yet greater insults; and this remains still in the New Law.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 107, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the New Law Is Contained in the Old?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the New Law is not contained in the\nOld. Because the New Law consists chiefly in faith: wherefore it is\ncalled the \"law of faith\" (Rom. 3:27). But many points of faith are\nset forth in the New Law, which are not contained in the Old.\nTherefore the New Law is not contained in the Old.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a gloss says on Matt. 5:19, \"He that shall break one\nof these least commandments,\" that the lesser commandments are those\nof the Law, and the greater commandments, those contained in the\nGospel. Now the greater cannot be contained in the lesser. Therefore\nthe New Law is not contained in the Old.\n\nObj. 3: Further, who holds the container holds the contents. If,\ntherefore, the New Law is contained in the Old, it follows that\nwhoever had the Old Law had the New: so that it was superfluous to\ngive men a New Law when once they had the Old. Therefore the New Law\nis not contained in the Old.\n\n_On the contrary,_ As expressed in Ezech. 1:16, there was \"a wheel in\nthe midst of a wheel,\" i.e. \"the New Testament within the Old,\"\naccording to Gregory's exposition.\n\n_I answer that,_ One thing may be contained in another in two ways.\nFirst, actually; as a located thing is in a place. Secondly,\nvirtually; as an effect in its cause, or as the complement in that\nwhich is incomplete; thus a genus contains its species, and a seed\ncontains the whole tree, virtually. It is in this way that the New\nLaw is contained in the Old: for it has been stated (A. 1) that the\nNew Law is compared to the Old as perfect to imperfect. Hence\nChrysostom, expounding Mk. 4:28, \"The earth of itself bringeth forth\nfruit, first the blade, then the ear, afterwards the full corn in the\near,\" expresses himself as follows: \"He brought forth first the\nblade, i.e. the Law of Nature; then the ear, i.e. the Law of Moses;\nlastly, the full corn, i.e. the Law of the Gospel.\" Hence then the\nNew Law is in the Old as the corn in the ear.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Whatsoever is set down in the New Testament explicitly\nand openly as a point of faith, is contained in the Old Testament as\na matter of belief, but implicitly, under a figure. And accordingly,\neven as to those things which we are bound to believe, the New Law is\ncontained in the Old.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The precepts of the New Law are said to be greater than\nthose of the Old Law, in the point of their being set forth\nexplicitly. But as to the substance itself of the precepts of the New\nTestament, they are all contained in the Old. Hence Augustine says\n(Contra Faust. xix, 23, 28) that \"nearly all Our Lord's admonitions\nor precepts, where He expressed Himself by saying: 'But I say unto\nyou,' are to be found also in those ancient books. Yet, since they\nthought that murder was only the slaying of the human body, Our Lord\ndeclared to them that every wicked impulse to hurt our brother is to\nbe looked on as a kind of murder.\" And it is in the point of\ndeclarations of this kind that the precepts of the New Law are said\nto be greater than those of the Old. Nothing, however, prevents the\ngreater from being contained in the lesser virtually; just as a tree\nis contained in the seed.\n\nReply Obj. 3: What is set forth implicitly needs to be declared\nexplicitly. Hence after the publishing of the Old Law, a New Law also\nhad to be given.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 107, Art. 4]\n\nWhether the New Law Is More Burdensome Than the Old?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the New Law is more burdensome than\nthe Old. For Chrysostom (Opus Imp. in Matth., Hom. x [*The work of an\nunknown author]) say: \"The commandments given to Moses are easy to\nobey: Thou shalt not kill; Thou shalt not commit adultery: but the\ncommandments of Christ are difficult to accomplish, for instance:\nThou shalt not give way to anger, or to lust.\" Therefore the New Law\nis more burdensome than the Old.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is easier to make use of earthly prosperity than\nto suffer tribulations. But in the Old Testament observance of the\nLaw was followed by temporal prosperity, as may be gathered from\nDeut. 28:1-14; whereas many kinds of trouble ensue to those who\nobserve the New Law, as stated in 2 Cor. 6:4-10: \"Let us exhibit\nourselves as the ministers of God, in much patience, in tribulation,\nin necessities, in distresses,\" etc. Therefore the New Law is more\nburdensome than the Old.\n\nObj. 3: The more one has to do, the more difficult it is. But the New\nLaw is something added to the Old. For the Old Law forbade perjury,\nwhile the New Law proscribed even swearing: the Old Law forbade a man\nto cast off his wife without a bill of divorce, while the New Law\nforbade divorce altogether; as is clearly stated in Matt. 5:31,\nseqq., according to Augustine's expounding. Therefore the New Law is\nmore burdensome than the Old.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 11:28): \"Come to Me, all you\nthat labor and are burdened\": which words are expounded by Hilary\nthus: \"He calls to Himself all those that labor under the difficulty\nof observing the Law, and are burdened with the sins of this world.\"\nAnd further on He says of the yoke of the Gospel: \"For My yoke is\nsweet and My burden light.\" Therefore the New Law is a lighter burden\nthan the Old.\n\n_I answer that,_ A twofold difficulty may attach to works of virtue\nwith which the precepts of the Law are concerned. One is on the part\nof the outward works, which of themselves are, in a way, difficult\nand burdensome. And in this respect the Old Law is a much heavier\nburden than the New: since the Old Law by its numerous ceremonies\nprescribed many more outward acts than the New Law, which, in the\nteaching of Christ and the apostles, added very few precepts to those\nof the natural law; although afterwards some were added, through\nbeing instituted by the holy Fathers. Even in these Augustine says\nthat moderation should be observed, lest good conduct should become a\nburden to the faithful. For he says in reply to the queries of\nJanuarius (Ep. lv) that, \"whereas God in His mercy wished religion to\nbe a free service rendered by the public solemnization of a small\nnumber of most manifest sacraments, certain persons make it a slave's\nburden; so much so that the state of the Jews who were subject to the\nsacraments of the Law, and not to the presumptuous devices of man,\nwas more tolerable.\"\n\nThe other difficulty attaches to works of virtue as to interior acts:\nfor instance, that a virtuous deed be done with promptitude and\npleasure. It is this difficulty that virtue solves: because to act\nthus is difficult for a man without virtue: but through virtue it\nbecomes easy for him. In this respect the precepts of the New Law are\nmore burdensome than those of the Old; because the New Law prohibits\ncertain interior movements of the soul, which were not expressly\nforbidden in the Old Law in all cases, although they were forbidden\nin some, without, however, any punishment being attached to the\nprohibition. Now this is very difficult to a man without virtue: thus\neven the Philosopher states (Ethic. v, 9) that it is easy to do what\na righteous man does; but that to do it in the same way, viz. with\npleasure and promptitude, is difficult to a man who is not righteous.\nAccordingly we read also (1 John 5:3) that \"His commandments are not\nheavy\": which words Augustine expounds by saying that \"they are not\nheavy to the man that loveth; whereas they are a burden to him that\nloveth not.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The passage quoted speaks expressly of the difficulty\nof the New Law as to the deliberate curbing of interior movements.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The tribulations suffered by those who observe the New\nLaw are not imposed by the Law itself. Moreover they are easily\nborne, on account of the love in which the same Law consists: since,\nas Augustine says (De Verb. Dom., Serm. lxx), \"love makes light and\nnothing of things that seem arduous and beyond our power.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The object of these additions to the precepts of the\nOld Law was to render it easier to do what it prescribed, as\nAugustine states [*De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 17, 21; xix, 23, 26].\nAccordingly this does not prove that the New Law is more burdensome,\nbut rather that it is a lighter burden.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 108\n\nOF THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE NEW LAW\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider those things that are contained in the New Law:\nunder which head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether the New Law ought to prescribe or to forbid any outward\nworks?\n\n(2) Whether the New Law makes sufficient provision in prescribing\nand forbidding external acts?\n\n(3) Whether in the matter of internal acts it directs man\nsufficiently?\n\n(4) Whether it fittingly adds counsels to precepts?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 108, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the New Law Ought to Prescribe or Prohibit Any External Acts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the New Law should not prescribe or\nprohibit any external acts. For the New Law is the Gospel of the\nkingdom, according to Matt. 24:14: \"This Gospel of the kingdom shall\nbe preached in the whole world.\" But the kingdom of God consists not\nin exterior, but only in interior acts, according to Luke 17:21: \"The\nkingdom of God is within you\"; and Rom. 14:17: \"The kingdom of God is\nnot meat and drink; but justice and peace and joy in the Holy Ghost.\"\nTherefore the New Law should not prescribe or forbid any external\nacts.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the New Law is \"the law of the Spirit\" (Rom. 8:2).\nBut \"where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty\" (2 Cor.\n3:17). Now there is no liberty when man is bound to do or avoid\ncertain external acts. Therefore the New Law does not prescribe or\nforbid any external acts.\n\nObj. 3: Further, all external acts are understood as referable to the\nhand, just as interior acts belong to the mind. But this is assigned\nas the difference between the New and Old Laws that the \"Old Law\nrestrains the hand, whereas the New Law curbs the will\" [*Peter\nLombard, Sent. iii, D, 40]. Therefore the New Law should not contain\nprohibitions and commands about exterior deeds, but only about\ninterior acts.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Through the New Law, men are made \"children of\nlight\": wherefore it is written (John 12:36): \"Believe in the light\nthat you may be the children of light.\" Now it is becoming that\nchildren of the light should do deeds of light and cast aside deeds\nof darkness, according to Eph. 5:8: \"You were heretofore darkness,\nbut now light in the Lord. Walk . . . as children of the light.\"\nTherefore the New Law had to forbid certain external acts and\nprescribe others.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 106, AA. 1, 2), the New Law\nconsists chiefly in the grace of the Holy Ghost, which is shown forth\nby faith that worketh through love. Now men become receivers of this\ngrace through God's Son made man, Whose humanity grace filled first,\nand thence flowed forth to us. Hence it is written (John 1:14): \"The\nWord was made flesh,\" and afterwards: \"full of grace and truth\"; and\nfurther on: \"Of His fulness we all have received, and grace for\ngrace.\" Hence it is added that \"grace and truth came by Jesus\nChrist.\" Consequently it was becoming that the grace which flows from\nthe incarnate Word should be given to us by means of certain external\nsensible objects; and that from this inward grace, whereby the flesh\nis subjected to the Spirit, certain external works should ensue.\n\nAccordingly external acts may have a twofold connection with grace.\nIn the first place, as leading in some way to grace. Such are the\nsacramental acts which are instituted in the New Law, e.g. Baptism,\nthe Eucharist, and the like.\n\nIn the second place there are those external acts which ensue from\nthe promptings of grace: and herein we must observe a difference. For\nthere are some which are necessarily in keeping with, or in\nopposition to inward grace consisting in faith that worketh through\nlove. Such external works are prescribed or forbidden in the New Law;\nthus confession of faith is prescribed, and denial of faith is\nforbidden; for it is written (Matt. 10:32, 33) \"(Every one) that\nshall confess Me before men, I will also confess him before My Father\n. . . But he that shall deny Me before men, I will also deny him\nbefore My Father.\" On the other hand, there are works which are not\nnecessarily opposed to, or in keeping with faith that worketh through\nlove. Such works are not prescribed or forbidden in the New Law, by\nvirtue of its primitive institution; but have been left by the\nLawgiver, i.e. Christ, to the discretion of each individual. And so\nto each one it is free to decide what he should do or avoid; and to\neach superior, to direct his subjects in such matters as regards what\nthey must do or avoid. Wherefore also in this respect the Gospel is\ncalled the \"law of liberty\" [*Cf. Reply Obj. 2]: since the Old Law\ndecided many points and left few to man to decide as he chose.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The kingdom of God consists chiefly in internal acts:\nbut as a consequence all things that are essential to internal acts\nbelong also to the kingdom of God. Thus if the kingdom of God is\ninternal righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy, all external acts\nthat are incompatible with righteousness, peace, and spiritual joy,\nare in opposition to the kingdom of God; and consequently should be\nforbidden in the Gospel of the kingdom. On the other hand, those\nthings that are indifferent as regards the aforesaid, for instance,\nto eat of this or that food, are not part of the kingdom of God;\nwherefore the Apostle says before the words quoted: \"The kingdom of\nGod is not meat and drink.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher (Metaph. i, 2), what is\n\"free is cause of itself.\" Therefore he acts freely, who acts of his\nown accord. Now man does of his own accord that which he does from a\nhabit that is suitable to his nature: since a habit inclines one as a\nsecond nature. If, however, a habit be in opposition to nature, man\nwould not act according to his nature, but according to some\ncorruption affecting that nature. Since then the grace of the Holy\nGhost is like an interior habit bestowed on us and inclining us to\nact aright, it makes us do freely those things that are becoming to\ngrace, and shun what is opposed to it.\n\nAccordingly the New Law is called the law of liberty in two respects.\nFirst, because it does not bind us to do or avoid certain things,\nexcept such as are of themselves necessary or opposed to salvation,\nand come under the prescription or prohibition of the law. Secondly,\nbecause it also makes us comply freely with these precepts and\nprohibitions, inasmuch as we do so through the promptings of grace.\nIt is for these two reasons that the New Law is called \"the law of\nperfect liberty\" (James 1:25).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The New Law, by restraining the mind from inordinate\nmovements, must needs also restrain the hand from inordinate acts,\nwhich ensue from inward movements.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 108, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the New Law Made Sufficient Ordinations About External Acts?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the New Law made insufficient\nordinations about external acts. Because faith that worketh through\ncharity seems chiefly to belong to the New Law, according to Gal.\n5:6: \"In Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything, nor\nuncircumcision: but faith that worketh through charity.\" But the New\nLaw declared explicitly certain points of faith which were not set\nforth explicitly in the Old Law; for instance, belief in the Trinity.\nTherefore it should also have added certain outward moral deeds,\nwhich were not fixed in the Old Law.\n\nObj. 2: Further, in the Old Law not only were sacraments instituted,\nbut also certain sacred things, as stated above (Q. 101, A. 4; Q.\n102, A. 4). But in the New Law, although certain sacraments are\ninstituted by Our Lord; for instance, pertaining either to the\nsanctification of a temple or of the vessels, or to the celebration\nof some particular feast. Therefore the New Law made insufficient\nordinations about external matters.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in the Old Law, just as there were certain\nobservances pertaining to God's ministers, so also were there certain\nobservances pertaining to the people: as was stated above when we\nwere treating of the ceremonial of the Old Law (Q. 101, A. 4; Q. 102,\nA. 6). Now in the New Law certain observances seem to have been\nprescribed to the ministers of God; as may be gathered from Matt.\n10:9: \"Do not possess gold, nor silver, nor money in your purses,\"\nnor other things which are mentioned here and Luke 9, 10. Therefore\ncertain observances pertaining to the faithful should also have been\ninstituted in the New Law.\n\nObj. 4: Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and ceremonial\nprecepts, there were certain judicial precepts. But in the New Law\nthere are no judicial precepts. Therefore the New Law made\ninsufficient ordinations about external works.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 7:24): \"Every one . . . that\nheareth these My words, and doth them, shall be likened to a wise man\nthat built his house upon a rock.\" But a wise builder leaves out\nnothing that is necessary to the building. Therefore Christ's words\ncontain all things necessary for man's salvation.\n\n_I answer that,_ as stated above (A. 1), the New Law had to make such\nprescriptions or prohibitions alone as are essential for the\nreception or right use of grace. And since we cannot of ourselves\nobtain grace, but through Christ alone, hence Christ of Himself\ninstituted the sacraments whereby we obtain grace: viz. Baptism,\nEucharist, Orders of the ministers of the New Law, by the institution\nof the apostles and seventy-two disciples, Penance, and indissoluble\nMatrimony. He promised Confirmation through the sending of the Holy\nGhost: and we read that by His institution the apostles healed the\nsick by anointing them with oil (Mk. 6:13). These are the sacraments\nof the New Law.\n\nThe right use of grace is by means of works of charity. These, in so\nfar as they are essential to virtue, pertain to the moral precepts,\nwhich also formed part of the Old Law. Hence, in this respect, the\nNew Law had nothing to add as regards external action. The\ndetermination of these works in their relation to the divine worship,\nbelongs to the ceremonial precepts of the Law; and, in relation to\nour neighbor, to the judicial precepts, as stated above (Q. 99, A.\n4). And therefore, since these determinations are not in themselves\nnecessarily connected with inward grace wherein the Law consists,\nthey do not come under a precept of the New Law, but are left to the\ndecision of man; some relating to inferiors--as when a precept is\ngiven to an individual; others, relating to superiors, temporal or\nspiritual, referring, namely, to the common good.\n\nAccordingly the New Law had no other external works to determine, by\nprescribing or forbidding, except the sacraments, and those moral\nprecepts which have a necessary connection with virtue, for instance,\nthat one must not kill, or steal, and so forth.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Matters of faith are above human reason, and so we\ncannot attain to them except through grace. Consequently, when grace\ncame to be bestowed more abundantly, the result was an increase in\nthe number of explicit points of faith. On the other hand, it is\nthrough human reason that we are directed to works of virtue, for it\nis the rule of human action, as stated above (Q. 19, A. 3; Q. 63, A.\n2). Wherefore in such matters as these there was no need for any\nprecepts to be given besides the moral precepts of the Law, which\nproceed from the dictate of reason.\n\nReply Obj. 2: In the sacraments of the New Law grace is bestowed,\nwhich cannot be received except through Christ: consequently they had\nto be instituted by Him. But in the sacred things no grace is given:\nfor instance, in the consecration of a temple, an altar or the like,\nor, again, in the celebration of feasts. Wherefore Our Lord left the\ninstitution of such things to the discretion of the faithful, since\nthey have not of themselves any necessary connection with inward\ngrace.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Our Lord gave the apostles those precepts not as\nceremonial observances, but as moral statutes: and they can be\nunderstood in two ways. First, following Augustine (De Consensu\nEvang. 30), as being not commands but permissions. For He permitted\nthem to set forth to preach without scrip or stick, and so on, since\nthey were empowered to accept their livelihood from those to whom\nthey preached: wherefore He goes on to say: \"For the laborer is\nworthy of his hire.\" Nor is it a sin, but a work of supererogation\nfor a preacher to take means of livelihood with him, without\naccepting supplies from those to whom he preaches; as Paul did (1\nCor. 9:4, seqq.).\n\nSecondly, according to the explanation of other holy men, they may be\nconsidered as temporal commands laid upon the apostles for the time\nduring which they were sent to preach in Judea before Christ's\nPassion. For the disciples, being yet as little children under\nChrist's care, needed to receive some special commands from Christ,\nsuch as all subjects receive from their superiors: and especially so,\nsince they were to be accustomed little by little to renounce the\ncare of temporalities, so as to become fitted for the preaching of\nthe Gospel throughout the whole world. Nor must we wonder if He\nestablished certain fixed modes of life, as long as the state of the\nOld Law endured and the people had not as yet achieved the perfect\nliberty of the Spirit. These statutes He abolished shortly before His\nPassion, as though the disciples had by their means become\nsufficiently practiced. Hence He said (Luke 22:35, 36) \"When I sent\nyou without purse and scrip and shoes, did you want anything? But\nthey said: Nothing. Then said He unto them: But now, he that hath a\npurse, let him take it, and likewise a scrip.\" Because the time of\nperfect liberty was already at hand, when they would be left entirely\nto their own judgment in matters not necessarily connected with\nvirtue.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Judicial precepts also, are not essential to virtue in\nrespect of any particular determination, but only in regard to the\ncommon notion of justice. Consequently Our Lord left the judicial\nprecepts to the discretion of those who were to have spiritual or\ntemporal charge of others. But as regards the judicial precepts of\nthe Old Law, some of them He explained, because they were\nmisunderstood by the Pharisees, as we shall state later on (A. 3, ad\n2).\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 108, Art. 3]\n\nWhether the New Law Directed Man Sufficiently As Regards Interior\nActions?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the New Law directed man\ninsufficiently as regards interior actions. For there are ten\ncommandments of the decalogue directing man to God and his neighbor.\nBut Our Lord partly fulfilled only three of them: as regards, namely,\nthe prohibition of murder, of adultery, and of perjury. Therefore it\nseems that, by omitting to fulfil the other precepts, He directed man\ninsufficiently.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as regards the judicial precepts, Our Lord ordained\nnothing in the Gospel, except in the matter of divorcing a wife, of\npunishment by retaliation, and of persecuting one's enemies. But\nthere are many other judicial precepts of the Old Law, as stated\nabove (Q. 104, A. 4; Q. 105). Therefore, in this respect, He directed\nhuman life insufficiently.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in the Old Law, besides moral and judicial, there\nwere ceremonial precepts about which Our Lord made no ordination.\nTherefore it seems that He ordained insufficiently.\n\nObj. 4: Further, in order that the mind be inwardly well disposed,\nman should do no good deed for any temporal end whatever. But there\nare many other temporal goods besides the favor of man: and there are\nmany other good works besides fasting, alms-deeds, and prayer.\nTherefore Our Lord unbecomingly taught that only in respect of these\nthree works, and of no other earthly goods ought we to shun the glory\nof human favor.\n\nObj. 5: Further, solicitude for the necessary means of livelihood is\nby nature instilled into man, and this solicitude even other animals\nshare with man: wherefore it is written (Prov. 6:6, 8): \"Go to the\nant, O sluggard, and consider her ways . . . she provideth her meat\nfor herself in the summer, and gathereth her food in the harvest.\"\nBut every command issued against the inclination of nature is an\nunjust command, forasmuch as it is contrary to the law of nature.\nTherefore it seems that Our Lord unbecomingly forbade solicitude\nabout food and raiment.\n\nObj. 6: Further, no act of virtue should be the subject of a\nprohibition. Now judgment is an act of justice, according to Ps.\n18:15: \"Until justice be turned into judgment.\" Therefore it seems\nthat Our Lord unbecomingly forbade judgment: and consequently that\nthe New Law directed man insufficiently in the matter of interior\nacts.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 1): We\nshould take note that, when He said: \"'He that heareth these My\nwords,' He indicates clearly that this sermon of the Lord is replete\nwith all the precepts whereby a Christian's life is formed.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As is evident from Augustine's words just quoted,\nthe sermon, which Our Lord delivered on the mountain, contains the\nwhole process of forming the life of a Christian. Therein man's\ninterior movements are ordered. Because after declaring that his end\nis Beatitude; and after commending the authority of the apostles,\nthrough whom the teaching of the Gospel was to be promulgated, He\norders man's interior movements, first in regard to man himself,\nsecondly in regard to his neighbor.\n\nThis he does in regard to man himself, in two ways, corresponding to\nman's two interior movements in respect of any prospective action,\nviz. volition of what has to be done, and intention of the end.\nWherefore, in the first place, He directs man's will in respect of\nthe various precepts of the Law: by prescribing that man should\nrefrain not merely from those external works that are evil in\nthemselves, but also from internal acts, and from the occasions of\nevil deeds. In the second place He directs man's intention, by\nteaching that in our good works, we should seek neither human praise,\nnor worldly riches, which is to lay up treasures on earth.\n\nAfterwards He directs man's interior movement in respect of his\nneighbor, by forbidding us, on the one hand, to judge him rashly,\nunjustly, or presumptuously; and, on the other, to entrust him too\nreadily with sacred things if he be unworthy.\n\nLastly, He teaches us how to fulfil the teaching of the Gospel; viz.\nby imploring the help of God; by striving to enter by the narrow door\nof perfect virtue; and by being wary lest we be led astray by evil\ninfluences. Moreover, He declares that we must observe His\ncommandments, and that it is not enough to make profession of faith,\nor to work miracles, or merely to hear His words.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Our Lord explained the manner of fulfilling those\nprecepts which the Scribes and Pharisees did not rightly understand:\nand this affected chiefly those precepts of the decalogue. For they\nthought that the prohibition of adultery and murder covered the\nexternal act only, and not the internal desire. And they held this\nopinion about murder and adultery rather than about theft and false\nwitness, because the movement of anger tending to murder, and the\nmovement of desire tending to adultery, seem to be in us from nature\nsomewhat, but not the desire of stealing or bearing false witness.\nThey held a false opinion about perjury, for they thought that\nperjury indeed was a sin; but that oaths were of themselves to be\ndesired and to be taken frequently, since they seem to proceed from\nreverence to God. Hence Our Lord shows that an oath is not desirable\nas a good thing; and that it is better to speak without oaths, unless\nnecessity forces us to have recourse to them.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The Scribes and Pharisees erred about the judicial\nprecepts in two ways. First, because they considered certain matters\ncontained in the Law of Moses by way of permission, to be right in\nthemselves: namely, divorce of a wife, and the taking of usury from\nstrangers. Wherefore Our Lord forbade a man to divorce his wife\n(Matt. 5:32); and to receive usury (Luke 6:35), when He said: \"Lend,\nhoping for nothing thereby.\"\n\nIn another way they erred by thinking that certain things which the\nOld Law commanded to be done for justice's sake, should be done out\nof desire for revenge, or out of lust for temporal goods, or out of\nhatred of one's enemies; and this in respect of three precepts. For\nthey thought that desire for revenge was lawful, on account of the\nprecept concerning punishment by retaliation: whereas this precept\nwas given that justice might be safeguarded, not that man might seek\nrevenge. Wherefore, in order to do away with this, Our Lord teaches\nthat man should be prepared in his mind to suffer yet more if\nnecessary. They thought that movements of covetousness were lawful on\naccount of those judicial precepts which prescribed restitution of\nwhat had been purloined, together with something added thereto, as\nstated above (Q. 105, A. 2, ad 9); whereas the Law commanded this to\nbe done in order to safeguard justice, not to encourage covetousness.\nWherefore Our Lord teaches that we should not demand our goods from\nmotives of cupidity, and that we should be ready to give yet more if\nnecessary. They thought that the movement of hatred was lawful, on\naccount of the commandments of the Law about the slaying of one's\nenemies: whereas the Law ordered this for the fulfilment of justice,\nas stated above (Q. 105, A. 3, ad 4), not to satisfy hatred.\nWherefore Our Lord teaches us that we ought to love our enemies, and\nto be ready to do good to them if necessary. For these precepts are\nto be taken as binding \"the mind to be prepared to fulfil them,\" as\nAugustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 19).\n\nReply Obj. 3: The moral precepts necessarily retained their force\nunder the New Law, because they are of themselves essential to\nvirtue: whereas the judicial precepts did not necessarily continue to\nbind in exactly the same way as had been fixed by the Law: this was\nleft to man to decide in one way or another. Hence Our Lord directed\nus becomingly with regard to these two kinds of precepts. On the\nother hand, the observance of the ceremonial precepts was totally\nabolished by the advent of the reality; wherefore in regard to these\nprecepts He commanded nothing on this occasion when He was giving the\ngeneral points of His doctrine. Elsewhere, however, He makes it clear\nthat the entire bodily worship which was fixed by the Law, was to be\nchanged into spiritual worship: as is evident from John 4:21, 23,\nwhere He says: \"The hour cometh when you shall neither on this\nmountain, nor in Jerusalem adore the Father . . . but . . . the true\nadorers shall adore the Father in spirit and in truth.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: All worldly goods may be reduced to three--honors,\nriches, and pleasures; according to 1 John 2:16: \"All that is in the\nworld is the concupiscence of the flesh,\" which refers to pleasures\nof the flesh, \"and the concupiscence of the eyes,\" which refers to\nriches, \"and the pride of life,\" which refers to ambition for renown\nand honor. Now the Law did not promise an abundance of carnal\npleasures; on the contrary, it forbade them. But it did promise\nexalted honors and abundant riches; for it is written in reference to\nthe former (Deut. 28:1): \"If thou wilt hear the voice of the Lord thy\nGod . . . He will make thee higher than all the nations\"; and in\nreference to the latter, we read a little further on (Deut. 28:11):\n\"He will make thee abound with all goods.\" But the Jews so distorted\nthe true meaning of these promises, as to think that we ought to\nserve God, with these things as the end in view. Wherefore Our Lord\nset this aside by teaching, first of all, that works of virtue should\nnot be done for human glory. And He mentions three works, to which\nall others may be reduced: since whatever a man does in order to curb\nhis desires, comes under the head of fasting; and whatever a man does\nfor the love of his neighbor, comes under the head of alms-deeds; and\nwhatever a man does for the worship of God, comes under the head of\nprayer. And He mentions these three specifically, as they hold the\nprincipal place, and are most often used by men in order to gain\nglory. In the second place He taught us that we must not place our\nend in riches, when He said: \"Lay not up to yourselves treasures on\nearth\" (Matt. 6:19).\n\nReply Obj. 5: Our Lord forbade, not necessary, but inordinate\nsolicitude. Now there is a fourfold solicitude to be avoided in\ntemporal matters. First, we must not place our end in them, nor serve\nGod for the sake of the necessities of food and raiment. Wherefore He\nsays: \"Lay not up for yourselves,\" etc. Secondly, we must not be so\nanxious about temporal things, as to despair of God's help: wherefore\nOur Lord says (Matt. 6:32): \"Your Father knoweth that you have need\nof all these things.\" Thirdly, we must not add presumption to our\nsolicitude; in other words, we must not be confident of getting the\nnecessaries of life by our own efforts without God's help: such\nsolicitude Our Lord sets aside by saying that a man cannot add\nanything to his stature (Matt. 6:27). We must not anticipate the time\nfor anxiety; namely, by being solicitous now, for the needs, not of\nthe present, but of a future time: wherefore He says (Matt. 6:34):\n\"Be not . . . solicitous for tomorrow.\"\n\nReply Obj. 6: Our Lord did not forbid the judgment of justice,\nwithout which holy things could not be withdrawn from the unworthy.\nBut he forbade inordinate judgment, as stated above.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 108, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Certain Definite Counsels Are Fittingly Proposed in the New\nLaw?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that certain definite counsels are not\nfittingly proposed in the New Law. For counsels are given about that\nwhich is expedient for an end, as we stated above, when treating of\ncounsel (Q. 14, A. 2). But the same things are not expedient for all.\nTherefore certain definite counsels should not be proposed to all.\n\nObj. 2: Further, counsels regard a greater good. But there are no\ndefinite degrees to the greater good. Therefore definite counsels\nshould not be given.\n\nObj. 3: Further, counsels pertain to the life of perfection. But\nobedience pertains to the life of perfection. Therefore it was\nunfitting that no counsel of obedience should be contained in the\nGospel.\n\nObj. 4: Further, many matters pertaining to the life of perfection\nare found among the commandments, as, for instance, \"Love your\nenemies\" (Matt. 5:44), and those precepts which Our Lord gave His\napostles (Matt. 10). Therefore the counsels are unfittingly given in\nthe New Law: both because they are not all mentioned; and because\nthey are not distinguished from the commandments.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The counsels of a wise friend are of great use,\naccording to Prov. (27:9): \"Ointment and perfumes rejoice the heart:\nand the good counsels of a friend rejoice the soul.\" But Christ is\nour wisest and greatest friend. Therefore His counsels are supremely\nuseful and becoming.\n\n_I answer that,_ The difference between a counsel and a commandment\nis that a commandment implies obligation, whereas a counsel is left\nto the option of the one to whom it is given. Consequently in the New\nLaw, which is the law of liberty, counsels are added to the\ncommandments, and not in the Old Law, which is the law of bondage. We\nmust therefore understand the commandments of the New Law to have\nbeen given about matters that are necessary to gain the end of\neternal bliss, to which end the New Law brings us forthwith: but that\nthe counsels are about matters that render the gaining of this end\nmore assured and expeditious.\n\nNow man is placed between the things of this world, and spiritual\ngoods wherein eternal happiness consists: so that the more he cleaves\nto the one, the more he withdraws from the other, and conversely.\nWherefore he that cleaves wholly to the things of this world, so as\nto make them his end, and to look upon them as the reason and rule of\nall he does, falls away altogether from spiritual goods. Hence this\ndisorder is removed by the commandments. Nevertheless, for man to\ngain the end aforesaid, he does not need to renounce the things of\nthe world altogether: since he can, while using the things of this\nworld, attain to eternal happiness, provided he does not place his\nend in them: but he will attain more speedily thereto by giving up\nthe goods of this world entirely: wherefore the evangelical counsels\nare given for this purpose.\n\nNow the goods of this world which come into use in human life,\nconsist in three things: viz. in external wealth pertaining to the\n\"concupiscence of the eyes\"; carnal pleasures pertaining to the\n\"concupiscence of the flesh\"; and honors, which pertain to the \"pride\nof life,\" according to 1 John 2:16: and it is in renouncing these\naltogether, as far as possible, that the evangelical counsels\nconsist. Moreover, every form of the religious life that professes\nthe state of perfection is based on these three: since riches are\nrenounced by poverty; carnal pleasures by perpetual chastity; and the\npride of life by the bondage of obedience.\n\nNow if a man observe these absolutely, this is in accordance with the\ncounsels as they stand. But if a man observe any one of them in a\nparticular case, this is taking that counsel in a restricted sense,\nnamely, as applying to that particular case. For instance, when\nanyone gives an alms to a poor man, not being bound so to do, he\nfollows the counsels in that particular case. In like manner, when a\nman for some fixed time refrains from carnal pleasures that he may\ngive himself to prayer, he follows the counsel for that particular\ntime. And again, when a man follows not his will as to some deed\nwhich he might do lawfully, he follows the counsel in that particular\ncase: for instance, if he do good to his enemies when he is not bound\nto, or if he forgive an injury of which he might justly seek to be\navenged. In this way, too, all particular counsels may be reduced to\nthese three general and perfect counsels.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The aforesaid counsels, considered in themselves, are\nexpedient to all; but owing to some people being ill-disposed, it\nhappens that some of them are inexpedient, because their disposition\nis not inclined to such things. Hence Our Lord, in proposing the\nevangelical counsels, always makes mention of man's fitness for\nobserving the counsels. For in giving the counsel of perpetual\npoverty (Matt. 19:21), He begins with the words: \"If thou wilt be\nperfect,\" and then He adds: \"Go, sell all [Vulg.: 'what'] thou hast.\"\nIn like manner when He gave the counsel of perpetual chastity, saying\n(Matt. 19:12): \"There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs\nfor the kingdom of heaven,\" He adds straightway: \"He that can take,\nlet him take it.\" And again, the Apostle (1 Cor. 7:35), after giving\nthe counsel of virginity, says: \"And this I speak for your profit;\nnot to cast a snare upon you.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: The greater goods are not definitely fixed in the\nindividual; but those which are simply and absolutely the greater\ngood in general are fixed: and to these all the above particular\ngoods may be reduced, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even the counsel of obedience is understood to have\nbeen given by Our Lord in the words: \"And [let him] follow Me.\" For\nwe follow Him not only by imitating His works, but also by obeying\nHis commandments, according to John 10:27: \"My sheep hear My voice\n. . . and they follow Me.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: Those things which Our Lord prescribed about the true\nlove of our enemies, and other similar sayings (Matt. 5; Luke 6), may\nbe referred to the preparation of the mind, and then they are\nnecessary for salvation; for instance, that man be prepared to do\ngood to his enemies, and other similar actions, when there is need.\nHence these things are placed among the precepts. But that anyone\nshould actually and promptly behave thus towards an enemy when there\nis no special need, is to be referred to the particular counsels, as\nstated above. As to those matters which are set down in Matt. 10 and\nLuke 9 and 10, they were either disciplinary commands for that\nparticular time, or concessions, as stated above (A. 2, ad 3). Hence\nthey are not set down among the counsels.\n________________________\n\nTREATISE ON GRACE (QQ. 109-114)\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 109\n\nOF THE NECESSITY OF GRACE\n(In Ten Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the exterior principle of human acts, i.e. God,\nin so far as, through grace, we are helped by Him to do right: and,\nfirst, we must consider the grace of God; secondly, its cause;\nthirdly, its effects.\n\nThe first point of consideration will be threefold: for we shall\nconsider (1) The necessity of grace; (2) grace itself, as to its\nessence; (3) its division.\n\nUnder the first head there are ten points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether without grace man can know anything?\n\n(2) Whether without God's grace man can do or wish any good?\n\n(3) Whether without grace man can love God above all things?\n\n(4) Whether without grace man can keep the commandments of the Law?\n\n(5) Whether without grace he can merit eternal life?\n\n(6) Whether without grace man can prepare himself for grace?\n\n(7) Whether without grace he can rise from sin?\n\n(8) Whether without grace man can avoid sin?\n\n(9) Whether man having received grace can do good and avoid sin\nwithout any further Divine help?\n\n(10) Whether he can of himself persevere in good?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Without Grace Man Can Know Any Truth?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that without grace man can know no truth.\nFor, on 1 Cor. 12:3: \"No man can say, the Lord Jesus, but by the Holy\nGhost,\" a gloss says: \"Every truth, by whomsoever spoken is from the\nHoly Ghost.\" Now the Holy Ghost dwells in us by grace. Therefore we\ncannot know truth without grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Augustine says (Solil. i, 6) that \"the most certain\nsciences are like things lit up by the sun so as to be seen. Now God\nHimself is He Who sheds the light. And reason is in the mind as sight\nis in the eye. And the eyes of the mind are the senses of the soul.\"\nNow the bodily senses, however pure, cannot see any visible object,\nwithout the sun's light. Therefore the human mind, however perfect,\ncannot, by reasoning, know any truth without Divine light: and this\npertains to the aid of grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the human mind can only understand truth by\nthinking, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7). But the\nApostle says (2 Cor. 3:5): \"Not that we are sufficient to think\nanything of ourselves, as of ourselves; but our sufficiency is from\nGod.\" Therefore man cannot, of himself, know truth without the help\nof grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Retract. i, 4): \"I do not approve\nhaving said in the prayer, O God, Who dost wish the sinless alone to\nknow the truth; for it may be answered that many who are not sinless\nknow many truths.\" Now man is cleansed from sin by grace, according\nto Ps. 50:12: \"Create a clean heart in me, O God, and renew a right\nspirit within my bowels.\" Therefore without grace man of himself can\nknow truth.\n\n_I answer that,_ To know truth is a use or act of intellectual light,\nsince, according to the Apostle (Eph. 5:13): \"All that is made\nmanifest is light.\" Now every use implies movement, taking movement\nbroadly, so as to call thinking and willing movements, as is clear\nfrom the Philosopher (De Anima iii, 4). Now in corporeal things we\nsee that for movement there is required not merely the form which is\nthe principle of the movement or action, but there is also required\nthe motion of the first mover. Now the first mover in the order of\ncorporeal things is the heavenly body. Hence no matter how perfectly\nfire has heat, it would not bring about alteration, except by the\nmotion of the heavenly body. But it is clear that as all corporeal\nmovements are reduced to the motion of the heavenly body as to the\nfirst corporeal mover, so all movements, both corporeal and\nspiritual, are reduced to the simple First Mover, Who is God. And\nhence no matter how perfect a corporeal or spiritual nature is\nsupposed to be, it cannot proceed to its act unless it be moved by\nGod; but this motion is according to the plan of His providence, and\nnot by necessity of nature, as the motion of the heavenly body. Now\nnot only is every motion from God as from the First Mover, but all\nformal perfection is from Him as from the First Act. And thus the act\nof the intellect or of any created being whatsoever depends upon God\nin two ways: first, inasmuch as it is from Him that it has the form\nwhereby it acts; secondly, inasmuch as it is moved by Him to act.\n\nNow every form bestowed on created things by God has power for a\ndetermined act, which it can bring about in proportion to its own\nproper endowment; and beyond which it is powerless, except by a\nsuperadded form, as water can only heat when heated by the fire. And\nthus the human understanding has a form, viz. intelligible light,\nwhich of itself is sufficient for knowing certain intelligible\nthings, viz. those we can come to know through the senses. Higher\nintelligible things the human intellect cannot know, unless it be\nperfected by a stronger light, viz. the light of faith or prophecy\nwhich is called the \"light of grace,\" inasmuch as it is added to\nnature.\n\nHence we must say that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man\nneeds Divine help, that the intellect may be moved by God to its act.\nBut he does not need a new light added to his natural light, in order\nto know the truth in all things, but only in some that surpass his\nnatural knowledge. And yet at times God miraculously instructs some\nby His grace in things that can be known by natural reason, even as\nHe sometimes brings about miraculously what nature can do.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Every truth by whomsoever spoken is from the Holy Ghost\nas bestowing the natural light, and moving us to understand and speak\nthe truth, but not as dwelling in us by sanctifying grace, or as\nbestowing any habitual gift superadded to nature. For this only takes\nplace with regard to certain truths that are known and spoken, and\nespecially in regard to such as pertain to faith, of which the\nApostle speaks.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The material sun sheds its light outside us; but the\nintelligible Sun, Who is God, shines within us. Hence the natural\nlight bestowed upon the soul is God's enlightenment, whereby we are\nenlightened to see what pertains to natural knowledge; and for this\nthere is required no further knowledge, but only for such things as\nsurpass natural knowledge.\n\nReply Obj. 3: We always need God's help for every thought, inasmuch\nas He moves the understanding to act; for actually to understand\nanything is to think, as is clear from Augustine (De Trin. xiv, 7).\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Man Can Wish or Do Any Good Without Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man can wish and do good without\ngrace. For that is in man's power, whereof he is master. Now man is\nmaster of his acts, and especially of his willing, as stated above\n(Q. 1, A. 1; Q. 13, A. 6). Hence man, of himself, can wish and do\ngood without the help of grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, man has more power over what is according to his\nnature than over what is beyond his nature. Now sin is against his\nnature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 30); whereas deeds of\nvirtue are according to his nature, as stated above (Q. 71, A. 1).\nTherefore since man can sin of himself he can wish and do good.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the understanding's good is truth, as the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2). Now the intellect can of itself know\ntruth, even as every other thing can work its own operation of\nitself. Therefore, much more can man, of himself, do and wish good.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 9:16): \"It is not of him\nthat willeth,\" namely, to will, \"nor of him that runneth,\" namely to\nrun, \"but of God that showeth mercy.\" And Augustine says (De Corrept.\net Gratia ii) that \"without grace men do nothing good when they\neither think or wish or love or act.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Man's nature may be looked at in two ways: first, in\nits integrity, as it was in our first parent before sin; secondly, as\nit is corrupted in us after the sin of our first parent. Now in both\nstates human nature needs the help of God as First Mover, to do or\nwish any good whatsoever, as stated above (A. 1). But in the state of\nintegrity, as regards the sufficiency of the operative power, man by\nhis natural endowments could wish and do the good proportionate to\nhis nature, such as the good of acquired virtue; but not surpassing\ngood, as the good of infused virtue. But in the state of corrupt\nnature, man falls short of what he could do by his nature, so that he\nis unable to fulfil it by his own natural powers. Yet because human\nnature is not altogether corrupted by sin, so as to be shorn of every\nnatural good, even in the state of corrupted nature it can, by virtue\nof its natural endowments, work some particular good, as to build\ndwellings, plant vineyards, and the like; yet it cannot do all the\ngood natural to it, so as to fall short in nothing; just as a sick\nman can of himself make some movements, yet he cannot be perfectly\nmoved with the movements of one in health, unless by the help of\nmedicine he be cured.\n\nAnd thus in the state of perfect nature man needs a gratuitous\nstrength superadded to natural strength for one reason, viz. in order\nto do and wish supernatural good; but for two reasons, in the state\nof corrupt nature, viz. in order to be healed, and furthermore in\norder to carry out works of supernatural virtue, which are\nmeritorious. Beyond this, in both states man needs the Divine help,\nthat he may be moved to act well.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man is master of his acts and of his willing or not\nwilling, because of his deliberate reason, which can be bent to one\nside or another. And although he is master of his deliberating or not\ndeliberating, yet this can only be by a previous deliberation; and\nsince it cannot go on to infinity, we must come at length to this,\nthat man's free-will is moved by an extrinsic principle, which is\nabove the human mind, to wit by God, as the Philosopher proves in the\nchapter \"On Good Fortune\" (Ethic. Eudem. vii). Hence the mind of man\nstill unweakened is not so much master of its act that it does not\nneed to be moved by God; and much more the free-will of man weakened\nby sin, whereby it is hindered from good by the corruption of the\nnature.\n\nReply Obj. 2: To sin is nothing else than to fail in the good which\nbelongs to any being according to its nature. Now as every created\nthing has its being from another, and, considered in itself, is\nnothing, so does it need to be preserved by another in the good which\npertains to its nature. For it can of itself fail in good, even as of\nitself it can fall into non-existence, unless it is upheld by God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man cannot even know truth without Divine help, as\nstated above (A. 1). And yet human nature is more corrupt by sin in\nregard to the desire for good, than in regard to the knowledge of\ntruth.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 3]\n\nWhether by His Own Natural Powers and Without Grace Man Can Love God\nAbove All Things?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that without grace man cannot love God\nabove all things by his own natural powers. For to love God above all\nthings is the proper and principal act of charity. Now man cannot of\nhimself possess charity, since the \"charity of God is poured forth in\nour hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is given to us,\" as is said Rom.\n5:5. Therefore man by his natural powers alone cannot love God above\nall things.\n\nObj. 2: Further, no nature can rise above itself. But to love God\nabove all things is to tend above oneself. Therefore without the help\nof grace no created nature can love God above itself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to God, Who is the Highest Good, is due the best\nlove, which is that He be loved above all things. Now without grace\nman is not capable of giving God the best love, which is His due;\notherwise it would be useless to add grace. Hence man, without grace\nand with his natural powers alone, cannot love God above all things.\n\n_On the contrary,_ As some maintain, man was first made with only\nnatural endowments; and in this state it is manifest that he loved\nGod to some extent. But he did not love God equally with himself, or\nless than himself, otherwise he would have sinned. Therefore he loved\nGod above himself. Therefore man, by his natural powers alone, can\nlove God more than himself and above all things.\n\n_I answer that,_ As was said above (I, Q. 60, A. 5), where the\nvarious opinions concerning the natural love of the angels were set\nforth, man in a state of perfect nature, could by his natural power,\ndo the good natural to him without the addition of any gratuitous\ngift, though not without the help of God moving him. Now to love God\nabove all things is natural to man and to every nature, not only\nrational but irrational, and even to inanimate nature according to\nthe manner of love which can belong to each creature. And the reason\nof this is that it is natural to all to seek and love things\naccording as they are naturally fit (to be sought and loved) since\n\"all things act according as they are naturally fit\" as stated in\n_Phys._ ii, 8. Now it is manifest that the good of the part is for\nthe good of the whole; hence everything, by its natural appetite and\nlove, loves its own proper good on account of the common good of the\nwhole universe, which is God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)\nthat \"God leads everything to love of Himself.\" Hence in the state of\nperfect nature man referred the love of himself and of all other\nthings to the love of God as to its end; and thus he loved God more\nthan himself and above all things. But in the state of corrupt nature\nman falls short of this in the appetite of his rational will, which,\nunless it is cured by God's grace, follows its private good, on\naccount of the corruption of nature. And hence we must say that in\nthe state of perfect nature man did not need the gift of grace added\nto his natural endowments, in order to love God above all things\nnaturally, although he needed God's help to move him to it; but in\nthe state of corrupt nature man needs, even for this, the help of\ngrace to heal his nature.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Charity loves God above all things in a higher way than\nnature does. For nature loves God above all things inasmuch as He is\nthe beginning and the end of natural good; whereas charity loves Him,\nas He is the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has a spiritual\nfellowship with God. Moreover charity adds to natural love of God a\ncertain quickness and joy, in the same way that every habit of virtue\nadds to the good act which is done merely by the natural reason of a\nman who has not the habit of virtue.\n\nReply Obj. 2: When it is said that nature cannot rise above itself,\nwe must not understand this as if it could not be drawn to any object\nabove itself, for it is clear that our intellect by its natural\nknowledge can know things above itself, as is shown in our natural\nknowledge of God. But we are to understand that nature cannot rise to\nan act exceeding the proportion of its strength. Now to love God\nabove all things is not such an act; for it is natural to every\ncreature, as was said above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Love is said to be best, both with respect to degree of\nlove, and with regard to the motive of loving, and the mode of love.\nAnd thus the highest degree of love is that whereby charity loves God\nas the giver of beatitude, as was said above.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Man Without Grace and by His Own Natural Powers Can Fulfil\nthe Commandments of the Law?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man without grace, and by his own\nnatural powers, can fulfil the commandments of the Law. For the\nApostle says (Rom. 2:14) that \"the Gentiles who have not the law, do\nby nature those things that are of the Law.\" Now what a man does\nnaturally he can do of himself without grace. Hence a man can fulfil\nthe commandments of the Law without grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Jerome says (Expos. Cathol. Fide [*Symboli\nExplanatio ad Damasum, among the supposititious works of St. Jerome:\nnow ascribed to Pelagius]) that \"they are anathema who say God has\nlaid impossibilities upon man.\" Now what a man cannot fulfil by\nhimself is impossible to him. Therefore a man can fulfil all the\ncommandments of himself.\n\nObj. 3: Further, of all the commandments of the Law, the greatest is\nthis, \"Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart\" (Matt.\n27:37). Now man with his natural endowments can fulfil this command\nby loving God above all things, as stated above (A. 3). Therefore man\ncan fulfil all the commandments of the Law without grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Haeres. lxxxviii) that it is\npart of the Pelagian heresy that \"they believe that without grace man\ncan fulfil all the Divine commandments.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ There are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of\nthe Law. The first regards the substance of the works, as when a man\ndoes works of justice, fortitude, and of other virtues. And in this\nway man in the state of perfect nature could fulfil all the\ncommandments of the Law; otherwise he would have been unable to sin\nin that state, since to sin is nothing else than to transgress the\nDivine commandments. But in the state of corrupted nature man cannot\nfulfil all the Divine commandments without healing grace. Secondly,\nthe commandments of the law can be fulfilled, not merely as regards\nthe substance of the act, but also as regards the mode of acting,\ni.e. their being done out of charity. And in this way, neither in the\nstate of perfect nature, nor in the state of corrupt nature can man\nfulfil the commandments of the law without grace. Hence, Augustine\n(De Corrept. et Grat. ii) having stated that \"without grace men can\ndo no good whatever,\" adds: \"Not only do they know by its light what\nto do, but by its help they do lovingly what they know.\" Beyond this,\nin both states they need the help of God's motion in order to fulfil\nthe commandments, as stated above (AA. 2, 3).\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xxvii), \"do not be\ndisturbed at his saying that they do by nature those things that are\nof the Law; for the Spirit of grace works this, in order to restore\nin us the image of God, after which we were naturally made.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: What we can do with the Divine assistance is not\naltogether impossible to us; according to the Philosopher (Ethic.\niii, 3): \"What we can do through our friends, we can do, in some\nsense, by ourselves.\" Hence Jerome [*Symboli Explanatio ad Damasum,\namong the supposititious works of St. Jerome: now ascribed to\nPelagius] concedes that \"our will is in such a way free that we must\nconfess we still require God's help.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man cannot, with his purely natural endowments, fulfil\nthe precept of the love of God, as stated above (A. 3).\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Man Can Merit Everlasting Life Without Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man can merit everlasting life\nwithout grace. For Our Lord says (Matt. 19:17): \"If thou wilt enter\ninto life, keep the commandments\"; from which it would seem that to\nenter into everlasting life rests with man's will. But what rests\nwith our will, we can do of ourselves. Hence it seems that man can\nmerit everlasting life of himself.\n\nObj. 2: Further, eternal life is the wage of reward bestowed by God\non men, according to Matt. 5:12: \"Your reward is very great in\nheaven.\" But wage or reward is meted by God to everyone according to\nhis works, according to Ps. 61:12: \"Thou wilt render to every man\naccording to his works.\" Hence, since man is master of his works, it\nseems that it is within his power to reach everlasting life.\n\nObj. 3: Further, everlasting life is the last end of human life. Now\nevery natural thing by its natural endowments can attain its end.\nMuch more, therefore, may man attain to life everlasting by his\nnatural endowments, without grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 6:23): \"The grace of God is\nlife everlasting.\" And as a gloss says, this is said \"that we may\nunderstand that God, of His own mercy, leads us to everlasting life.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Acts conducing to an end must be proportioned to the\nend. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle; and\nhence we see in natural things, that nothing can by its operation\nbring about an effect which exceeds its active force, but only such\nas is proportionate to its power. Now everlasting life is an end\nexceeding the proportion of human nature, as is clear from what we\nhave said above (Q. 5, A. 5). Hence man, by his natural endowments,\ncannot produce meritorious works proportionate to everlasting life;\nand for this a higher force is needed, viz. the force of grace. And\nthus without grace man cannot merit everlasting life; yet he can\nperform works conducing to a good which is natural to man, as \"to\ntoil in the fields, to drink, to eat, or to have friends,\" and the\nlike, as Augustine says in his third Reply to the Pelagians\n[*Hypognosticon iii, among the spurious works of St. Augustine].\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man, by his will, does works meritorious of everlasting\nlife; but as Augustine says, in the same book, for this it is\nnecessary that the will of man should be prepared with grace by God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As the gloss upon Rom. 6:23, \"The grace of God is life\neverlasting,\" says, \"It is certain that everlasting life is meted to\ngood works; but the works to which it is meted, belong to God's\ngrace.\" And it has been said (A. 4), that to fulfil the commandments\nof the Law, in their due way, whereby their fulfilment may be\nmeritorious, requires grace.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This objection has to do with the natural end of man.\nNow human nature, since it is nobler, can be raised by the help of\ngrace to a higher end, which lower natures can nowise reach; even as\na man who can recover his health by the help of medicines is better\ndisposed to health than one who can nowise recover it, as the\nPhilosopher observes (De Coelo ii, 12).\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 109, Art. 6]\n\nWhether a Man, by Himself and Without the External Aid of Grace, Can\nPrepare Himself for Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man, by himself and without the\nexternal help of grace, can prepare himself for grace. For nothing\nimpossible is laid upon man, as stated above (A. 4, ad 1). But it is\nwritten (Zech. 1:3): \"Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you.\"\nNow to prepare for grace is nothing more than to turn to God.\nTherefore it seems that man of himself, and without the external help\nof grace, can prepare himself for grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, man prepares himself for grace by doing what is in\nhim to do, since if man does what is in him to do, God will not deny\nhim grace, for it is written (Matt. 7:11) that God gives His good\nSpirit \"to them that ask Him.\" But what is in our power is in us to\ndo. Therefore it seems to be in our power to prepare ourselves for\ngrace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if a man needs grace in order to prepare for grace,\nwith equal reason will he need grace to prepare himself for the first\ngrace; and thus to infinity, which is impossible. Hence it seems that\nwe must not go beyond what was said first, viz. that man, of himself\nand without grace, can prepare himself for grace.\n\nObj. 4: Further, it is written (Prov. 16:1) that \"it is the part of\nman to prepare the soul.\" Now an action is said to be part of a man,\nwhen he can do it by himself. Hence it seems that man by himself can\nprepare himself for grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 6:44): \"No man can come to Me\nexcept the Father, Who hath sent Me, draw him.\" But if man could\nprepare himself, he would not need to be drawn by another. Hence man\ncannot prepare himself without the help of grace.\n\n_I answer that,_ The preparation of the human will for good is\ntwofold: the first, whereby it is prepared to operate rightly and to\nenjoy God; and this preparation of the will cannot take place without\nthe habitual gift of grace, which is the principle of meritorious\nworks, as stated above (A. 5). There is a second way in which the\nhuman will may be taken to be prepared for the gift of habitual grace\nitself. Now in order that man prepare himself to receive this gift,\nit is not necessary to presuppose any further habitual gift in the\nsoul, otherwise we should go on to infinity. But we must presuppose a\ngratuitous gift of God, Who moves the soul inwardly or inspires the\ngood wish. For in these two ways do we need the Divine assistance, as\nstated above (AA. 2, 3). Now that we need the help of God to move us,\nis manifest. For since every agent acts for an end, every cause must\ndirect is effect to its end, and hence since the order of ends is\naccording to the order of agents or movers, man must be directed to\nthe last end by the motion of the first mover, and to the proximate\nend by the motion of any of the subordinate movers; as the spirit of\nthe soldier is bent towards seeking the victory by the motion of the\nleader of the army--and towards following the standard of a regiment\nby the motion of the standard-bearer. And thus since God is the First\nMover, simply, it is by His motion that everything seeks to be\nlikened to God in its own way. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)\nthat \"God turns all to Himself.\" But He directs righteous men to\nHimself as to a special end, which they seek, and to which they wish\nto cling, according to Ps. 72:28, \"it is good for Me to adhere to my\nGod.\" And that they are \"turned\" to God can only spring from God's\nhaving \"turned\" them. Now to prepare oneself for grace is, as it were,\nto be turned to God; just as, whoever has his eyes turned away from\nthe light of the sun, prepares himself to receive the sun's light, by\nturning his eyes towards the sun. Hence it is clear that man cannot\nprepare himself to receive the light of grace except by the\ngratuitous help of God moving him inwardly.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man's turning to God is by free-will; and thus man is\nbidden to turn himself to God. But free-will can only be turned to\nGod, when God turns it, according to Jer. 31:18: \"Convert me and I\nshall be converted, for Thou art the Lord, my God\"; and Lam. 5:21:\n\"Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Man can do nothing unless moved by God, according to\nJohn 15:5: \"Without Me, you can do nothing.\" Hence when a man is said\nto do what is in him to do, this is said to be in his power according\nas he is moved by God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This objection regards habitual grace, for which some\npreparation is required, since every form requires a disposition in\nthat which is to be its subject. But in order that man should be\nmoved by God, no further motion is presupposed since God is the First\nMover. Hence we need not go to infinity.\n\nReply Obj. 4: It is the part of man to prepare his soul, since he\ndoes this by his free-will. And yet he does not do this without the\nhelp of God moving him, and drawing him to Himself, as was said above.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 7]\n\nWhether Man Can Rise from Sin Without the Help of Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man can rise from sin without the\nhelp of grace. For what is presupposed to grace, takes place without\ngrace. But to rise from sin is presupposed to the enlightenment of\ngrace; since it is written (Eph. 5:14): \"Arise from the dead and\nChrist shall enlighten thee.\" Therefore man can rise from sin without\ngrace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, sin is opposed to virtue as illness to health, as\nstated above (Q. 71, A. 1, ad 3). Now, man, by force of his nature,\ncan rise from illness to health, without the external help of\nmedicine, since there still remains in him the principle of life,\nfrom which the natural operation proceeds. Hence it seems that, with\nequal reason, man may be restored by himself, and return from the\nstate of sin to the state of justice without the help of external\ngrace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, every natural thing can return by itself to the act\nbefitting its nature, as hot water returns by itself to its natural\ncoldness, and a stone cast upwards returns by itself to its natural\nmovement. Now a sin is an act against nature, as is clear from\nDamascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 30). Hence it seems that man by himself\ncan return from sin to the state of justice.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Gal. 2:21; Cf. Gal. 3:21): \"For\nif there had been a law given which could give life--then Christ died\nin vain,\" i.e. to no purpose. Hence with equal reason, if man has a\nnature, whereby he can he justified, \"Christ died in vain,\" i.e. to\nno purpose. But this cannot fittingly be said. Therefore by himself\nhe cannot be justified, i.e. he cannot return from a state of sin to\na state of justice.\n\n_I answer that,_ Man by himself can no wise rise from sin without the\nhelp of grace. For since sin is transient as to the act and abiding\nin its guilt, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 6), to rise from sin is not\nthe same as to cease the act of sin; but to rise from sin means that\nman has restored to him what he lost by sinning. Now man incurs a\ntriple loss by sinning, as was clearly shown above (Q. 85, A. 1; Q.\n86, A. 1; Q. 87, A. 1), viz. stain, corruption of natural good, and\ndebt of punishment. He incurs a stain, inasmuch as he forfeits the\nlustre of grace through the deformity of sin. Natural good is\ncorrupted, inasmuch as man's nature is disordered by man's will not\nbeing subject to God's; and this order being overthrown, the\nconsequence is that the whole nature of sinful man remains\ndisordered. Lastly, there is the debt of punishment, inasmuch as by\nsinning man deserves everlasting damnation.\n\nNow it is manifest that none of these three can be restored except by\nGod. For since the lustre of grace springs from the shedding of\nDivine light, this lustre cannot be brought back, except God sheds\nHis light anew: hence a habitual gift is necessary, and this is the\nlight of grace. Likewise, the order of nature can only be restored,\ni.e. man's will can only be subject to God when God draws man's will\nto Himself, as stated above (A. 6). So, too, the guilt of eternal\npunishment can be remitted by God alone, against Whom the offense was\ncommitted and Who is man's Judge. And thus in order that man rise\nfrom sin there is required the help of grace, both as regards a\nhabitual gift, and as regards the internal motion of God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: To man is bidden that which pertains to the act of\nfree-will, as this act is required in order that man should rise from\nsin. Hence when it is said, \"Arise, and Christ shall enlighten thee,\"\nwe are not to think that the complete rising from sin precedes the\nenlightenment of grace; but that when man by his free-will, moved by\nGod, strives to rise from sin, he receives the light of justifying\ngrace.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The natural reason is not the sufficient principle of\nthe health that is in man by justifying grace. This principle is\ngrace which is taken away by sin. Hence man cannot be restored by\nhimself; but he requires the light of grace to be poured upon him\nanew, as if the soul were infused into a dead body for its\nresurrection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: When nature is perfect, it can be restored by itself to\nits befitting and proportionate condition; but without exterior help\nit cannot be restored to what surpasses its measure. And thus human\nnature undone by reason of the act of sin, remains no longer perfect,\nbut corrupted, as stated above (Q. 85); nor can it be restored, by\nitself, to its connatural good, much less to the supernatural good of\njustice.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 8]\n\nWhether Man Without Grace Can Avoid Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that without grace man can avoid sin.\nBecause \"no one sins in what he cannot avoid,\" as Augustine says (De\nDuab. Anim. x, xi; De Libero Arbit. iii, 18). Hence if a man in\nmortal sin cannot avoid sin, it would seem that in sinning he does\nnot sin, which is impossible.\n\nObj. 2: Further, men are corrected that they may not sin. If\ntherefore a man in mortal sin cannot avoid sin, correction would seem\nto be given to no purpose; which is absurd.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Ecclus. 15:18): \"Before man is life\nand death, good and evil; that which he shall choose shall be given\nhim.\" But by sinning no one ceases to be a man. Hence it is still in\nhis power to choose good or evil; and thus man can avoid sin without\ngrace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Perfect Just. xxi): \"Whoever\ndenies that we ought to say the prayer 'Lead us not into temptation'\n(and they deny it who maintain that the help of God's grace is not\nnecessary to man for salvation, but that the gift of the law is\nenough for the human will) ought without doubt to be removed beyond\nall hearing, and to be anathematized by the tongues of all.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ We may speak of man in two ways: first, in the state\nof perfect nature; secondly, in the state of corrupted nature. Now in\nthe state of perfect nature, man, without habitual grace, could avoid\nsinning either mortally or venially; since to sin is nothing else\nthan to stray from what is according to our nature--and in the state\nof perfect nature man could avoid this. Nevertheless he could not\nhave done it without God's help to uphold him in good, since if this\nhad been withdrawn, even his nature would have fallen back into\nnothingness.\n\nBut in the state of corrupt nature man needs grace to heal his nature\nin order that he may entirely abstain from sin. And in the present\nlife this healing is wrought in the mind--the carnal appetite being\nnot yet restored. Hence the Apostle (Rom. 7:25) says in the person of\none who is restored: \"I myself, with the mind, serve the law of God,\nbut with the flesh, the law of sin.\" And in this state man can\nabstain from all mortal sin, which takes its stand in his reason, as\nstated above (Q. 74, A. 5); but man cannot abstain from all venial\nsin on account of the corruption of his lower appetite of sensuality.\nFor man can, indeed, repress each of its movements (and hence they\nare sinful and voluntary), but not all, because whilst he is\nresisting one, another may arise, and also because the reason is not\nalways alert to avoid these movements, as was said above (Q. 74, A.\n3, ad 2).\n\nSo, too, before man's reason, wherein is mortal sin, is restored by\njustifying grace, he can avoid each mortal sin, and for a time, since\nit is not necessary that he should be always actually sinning. But it\ncannot be that he remains for a long time without mortal sin. Hence\nGregory says (Super Ezech. Hom. xi) that \"a sin not at once taken\naway by repentance, by its weight drags us down to other sins\": and\nthis because, as the lower appetite ought to be subject to the\nreason, so should the reason be subject to God, and should place in\nHim the end of its will. Now it is by the end that all human acts\nought to be regulated, even as it is by the judgment of the reason\nthat the movements of the lower appetite should be regulated. And\nthus, even as inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite cannot\nhelp occurring since the lower appetite is not subject to reason, so\nlikewise, since man's reason is not entirely subject to God, the\nconsequence is that many disorders occur in the reason. For when\nman's heart is not so fixed on God as to be unwilling to be parted\nfrom Him for the sake of finding any good or avoiding any evil, many\nthings happen for the achieving or avoiding of which a man strays\nfrom God and breaks His commandments, and thus sins mortally:\nespecially since, when surprised, a man acts according to his\npreconceived end and his pre-existing habits, as the Philosopher says\n(Ethic. iii); although with premeditation of his reason a man may do\nsomething outside the order of his preconceived end and the\ninclination of his habit. But because a man cannot always have this\npremeditation, it cannot help occurring that he acts in accordance\nwith his will turned aside from God, unless, by grace, he is quickly\nbrought back to the due order.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man can avoid each but not every act of sin, except by\ngrace, as stated above. Nevertheless, since it is by his own\nshortcoming that he does not prepare himself to have grace, the fact\nthat he cannot avoid sin without grace does not excuse him from sin.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Correction is useful \"in order that out of the sorrow\nof correction may spring the wish to be regenerate; if indeed he who\nis corrected is a son of promise, in such sort that whilst the noise\nof correction is outwardly resounding and punishing, God by hidden\ninspirations is inwardly causing to will,\" as Augustine says (De\nCorr. et Gratia vi). Correction is therefore necessary, from the fact\nthat man's will is required in order to abstain from sin; yet it is\nnot sufficient without God's help. Hence it is written (Eccles.\n7:14): \"Consider the works of God that no man can correct whom He\nhath despised.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (Hypognosticon iii [*Among the\nspurious works of St. Augustine]), this saying is to be understood of\nman in the state of perfect nature, when as yet he was not a slave of\nsin. Hence he was able to sin and not to sin. Now, too, whatever a\nman wills, is given to him; but his willing good, he has by God's\nassistance.\n________________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 9]\n\nWhether One Who Has Already Obtained Grace, Can, of Himself and\nWithout Further Help of Grace, Do Good and Avoid Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that whoever has already obtained grace,\ncan by himself and without further help of grace, do good and avoid\nsin. For a thing is useless or imperfect, if it does not fulfil what\nit was given for. Now grace is given to us that we may do good and\nkeep from sin. Hence if with grace man cannot do this, it seems that\ngrace is either useless or imperfect.\n\nObj. 2: Further, by grace the Holy Spirit dwells in us, according to\n1 Cor. 3:16: \"Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that\nthe Spirit of God dwelleth in you?\" Now since the Spirit of God is\nomnipotent, He is sufficient to ensure our doing good and to keep us\nfrom sin. Hence a man who has obtained grace can do the above two\nthings without any further assistance of grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if a man who has obtained grace needs further aid of\ngrace in order to live righteously and to keep free from sin, with\nequal reason, will he need yet another grace, even though he has\nobtained this first help of grace. Therefore we must go on to\ninfinity; which is impossible. Hence whoever is in grace needs no\nfurther help of grace in order to do righteously and to keep free\nfrom sin.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxvi) that \"as\nthe eye of the body though most healthy cannot see unless it is\nhelped by the brightness of light, so, neither can a man, even if he\nis most righteous, live righteously unless he be helped by the\neternal light of justice.\" But justification is by grace, according\nto Rom. 3:24: \"Being justified freely by His grace.\" Hence even a man\nwho already possesses grace needs a further assistance of grace in\norder to live righteously.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 5), in order to live righteously\na man needs a twofold help of God--first, a habitual gift whereby\ncorrupted human nature is healed, and after being healed is lifted up\nso as to work deeds meritorious of everlasting life, which exceed the\ncapability of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace in order\nto be moved by God to act.\n\nNow with regard to the first kind of help, man does not need a\nfurther help of grace, e.g. a further infused habit. Yet he needs the\nhelp of grace in another way, i.e. in order to be moved by God to act\nrighteously, and this for two reasons: first, for the general reason\nthat no created thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the\nDivine motion. Secondly, for this special reason--the condition of\nthe state of human nature. For although healed by grace as to the\nmind, yet it remains corrupted and poisoned in the flesh, whereby it\nserves \"the law of sin,\" Rom. 7:25. In the intellect, too, there\nremains the darkness of ignorance, whereby, as is written (Rom.\n8:26): \"We know not what we should pray for as we ought\"; since on\naccount of the various turns of circumstances, and because we do not\nknow ourselves perfectly, we cannot fully know what is for our good,\naccording to Wis. 9:14: \"For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful\nand our counsels uncertain.\" Hence we must be guided and guarded by\nGod, Who knows and can do all things. For which reason also it is\nbecoming in those who have been born again as sons of God, to say:\n\"Lead us not into temptation,\" and \"Thy Will be done on earth as it\nis in heaven,\" and whatever else is contained in the Lord's Prayer\npertaining to this.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The gift of habitual grace is not therefore given to us\nthat we may no longer need the Divine help; for every creature needs\nto be preserved in the good received from Him. Hence if after having\nreceived grace man still needs the Divine help, it cannot be\nconcluded that grace is given to no purpose, or that it is imperfect,\nsince man will need the Divine help even in the state of glory, when\ngrace shall be fully perfected. But here grace is to some extent\nimperfect, inasmuch as it does not completely heal man, as stated\nabove.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The operation of the Holy Ghost, which moves and\nprotects, is not circumscribed by the effect of habitual grace which\nit causes in us; but beyond this effect He, together with the Father\nand the Son, moves and protects us.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This argument merely proves that man needs no further\nhabitual grace.\n________________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 109, Art. 10]\n\nWhether Man Possessed of Grace Needs the Help of Grace in Order to\nPersevere?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man possessed of grace needs no help\nto persevere. For perseverance is something less than virtue, even as\ncontinence is, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 7, 9).\nNow since man is justified by grace, he needs no further help of\ngrace in order to have the virtues. Much less, therefore, does he\nneed the help of grace to have perseverance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, all the virtues are infused at once. But\nperseverance is put down as a virtue. Hence it seems that, together\nwith grace, perseverance is given to the other infused virtues.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as the Apostle says (Rom. 5:20) more was restored to\nman by Christ's gift, than he had lost by Adam's sin. But Adam\nreceived what enabled him to persevere; and thus man does not need\ngrace in order to persevere.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Persev. ii): \"Why is\nperseverance besought of God, if it is not bestowed by God? For is it\nnot a mocking request to seek what we know He does not give, and what\nis in our power without His giving it?\" Now perseverance is besought\nby even those who are hallowed by grace; and this is seen, when we\nsay \"Hallowed be Thy name,\" which Augustine confirms by the words of\nCyprian (De Correp. et Grat. xii). Hence man, even when possessed of\ngrace, needs perseverance to be given to him by God.\n\n_I answer that,_ Perseverance is taken in three ways. First, to\nsignify a habit of the mind whereby a man stands steadfastly, lest he\nbe moved by the assault of sadness from what is virtuous. And thus\nperseverance is to sadness as continence is to concupiscence and\npleasure, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 7). Secondly,\nperseverance may be called a habit, whereby a man has the purpose of\npersevering in good unto the end. And in both these ways perseverance\nis infused together with grace, even as continence and the other\nvirtues are. Thirdly, perseverance is called the abiding in good to\nthe end of life. And in order to have this perseverance man does not,\nindeed, need another habitual grace, but he needs the Divine\nassistance guiding and guarding him against the attacks of the\npassions, as appears from the preceding article. And hence after\nanyone has been justified by grace, he still needs to beseech God for\nthe aforesaid gift of perseverance, that he may be kept from evil\ntill the end of his life. For to many grace is given to whom\nperseverance in grace is not given.\n\nReply Obj. 1: This objection regards the first mode of perseverance,\nas the second objection regards the second.\n\nHence the solution of the second objection is clear.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Natura et Gratia xliii) [*Cf. De\nCorrep. et Grat. xii]: \"in the original state man received a gift\nwhereby he could persevere, but to persevere was not given him. But\nnow, by the grace of Christ, many receive both the gift of grace\nwhereby they may persevere, and the further gift of persevering,\" and\nthus Christ's gift is greater than Adam's fault. Nevertheless it was\neasier for man to persevere, with the gift of grace in the state of\ninnocence in which the flesh was not rebellious against the spirit,\nthan it is now. For the restoration by Christ's grace, although it is\nalready begun in the mind, is not yet completed in the flesh, as it\nwill be in heaven, where man will not merely be able to persevere but\nwill be unable to sin.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 110\n\nOF THE GRACE OF GOD AS REGARDS ITS ESSENCE\n(In Four Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the grace of God as regards its essence; and\nunder this head there are four points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether grace implies something in the soul?\n\n(2) Whether grace is a quality?\n\n(3) Whether grace differs from infused virtue?\n\n(4) Of the subject of grace.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 110, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Grace Implies Anything in the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that grace does not imply anything in the\nsoul. For man is said to have the grace of God even as the grace of\nman. Hence it is written (Gen. 39:21) that the Lord gave to Joseph\n\"grace [Douay: 'favor'] in the sight of the chief keeper of the\nprison.\" Now when we say that a man has the favor of another, nothing\nis implied in him who has the favor of the other, but an acceptance\nis implied in him whose favor he has. Hence when we say that a man\nhas the grace of God, nothing is implied in his soul; but we merely\nsignify the Divine acceptance.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as the soul quickens the body so does God quicken\nthe soul; hence it is written (Deut. 30:20): \"He is thy life.\" Now\nthe soul quickens the body immediately. Therefore nothing can come as\na medium between God and the soul. Hence grace implies nothing\ncreated in the soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, on Rom. 1:7, \"Grace to you and peace,\" the gloss\nsays: \"Grace, i.e. the remission of sins.\" Now the remission of sin\nimplies nothing in the soul, but only in God, Who does not impute the\nsin, according to Ps. 31:2: \"Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath\nnot imputed sin.\" Hence neither does grace imply anything in the soul.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Light implies something in what is enlightened.\nBut grace is a light of the soul; hence Augustine says (De Natura et\nGratia xxii): \"The light of truth rightly deserts the prevaricator of\nthe law, and those who have been thus deserted become blind.\"\nTherefore grace implies something in the soul.\n\n_I answer that,_ According to the common manner of speech, grace is\nusually taken in three ways. First, for anyone's love, as we are\naccustomed to say that the soldier is in the good graces of the king,\ni.e. the king looks on him with favor. Secondly, it is taken for any\ngift freely bestowed, as we are accustomed to say: I do you this act\nof grace. Thirdly, it is taken for the recompense of a gift given\n\"gratis,\" inasmuch as we are said to be \"grateful\" for benefits. Of\nthese three the second depends on the first, since one bestows\nsomething on another \"gratis\" from the love wherewith he receives him\ninto his good \"graces.\" And from the second proceeds the third, since\nfrom benefits bestowed \"gratis\" arises \"gratitude.\"\n\nNow as regards the last two, it is clear that grace implies something\nin him who receives grace: first, the gift given gratis; secondly,\nthe acknowledgment of the gift. But as regards the first, a\ndifference must be noted between the grace of God and the grace of\nman; for since the creature's good springs from the Divine will, some\ngood in the creature flows from God's love, whereby He wishes the\ngood of the creature. On the other hand, the will of man is moved by\nthe good pre-existing in things; and hence man's love does not wholly\ncause the good of the thing, but pre-supposes it either in part or\nwholly. Therefore it is clear that every love of God is followed at\nsome time by a good caused in the creature, but not co-eternal with\nthe eternal love. And according to this difference of good the love\nof God to the creature is looked at differently. For one is common,\nwhereby He loves \"all things that are\" (Wis. 11:25), and thereby\ngives things their natural being. But the second is a special love,\nwhereby He draws the rational creature above the condition of its\nnature to a participation of the Divine good; and according to this\nlove He is said to love anyone simply, since it is by this love that\nGod simply wishes the eternal good, which is Himself, for the\ncreature.\n\nAccordingly when a man is said to have the grace of God, there is\nsignified something bestowed on man by God. Nevertheless the grace of\nGod sometimes signifies God's eternal love, as we say the grace of\npredestination, inasmuch as God gratuitously and not from merits\npredestines or elects some; for it is written (Eph. 1:5): \"He hath\npredestinated us into the adoption of children . . . unto the praise\nof the glory of His grace.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Even when a man is said to be in another's good graces,\nit is understood that there is something in him pleasing to the\nother; even as anyone is said to have God's grace--with this\ndifference, that what is pleasing to a man in another is presupposed\nto his love, but whatever is pleasing to God in a man is caused by\nthe Divine love, as was said above.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God is the life of the soul after the manner of an\nefficient cause; but the soul is the life of the body after the\nmanner of a formal cause. Now there is no medium between form and\nmatter, since the form, of itself, _informs_ the matter or subject;\nwhereas the agent _informs_ the subject, not by its substance, but by\nthe form, which it causes in the matter.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Augustine says (Retract. i, 25): \"When I said that\ngrace was for the remission of sins, and peace for our reconciliation\nwith God, you must not take it to mean that peace and reconciliation\ndo not pertain to general peace, but that the special name of grace\nsignifies the remission of sins.\" Not only grace, therefore, but many\nother of God's gifts pertain to grace. And hence the remission of\nsins does not take place without some effect divinely caused in us,\nas will appear later (Q. 113, A. 2).\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 110, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Grace Is a Quality of the Soul?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that grace is not a quality of the soul.\nFor no quality acts on its subject, since the action of a quality is\nnot without the action of its subject, and thus the subject would\nnecessarily act upon itself. But grace acts upon the soul, by\njustifying it. Therefore grace is not a quality.\n\nObj. 2: Furthermore, substance is nobler than quality. But grace is\nnobler than the nature of the soul, since we can do many things by\ngrace, to which nature is not equal, as stated above (Q. 109, AA. 1,\n2, 3). Therefore grace is not a quality.\n\nObj. 3: Furthermore, no quality remains after it has ceased to be in\nits subject. But grace remains; since it is not corrupted, for thus\nit would be reduced to nothing, since it was created from nothing;\nhence it is called a \"new creature\"(Gal. 6:15).\n\n_On the contrary,_ on Ps. 103:15: \"That he may make the face cheerful\nwith oil\"; the gloss says: \"Grace is a certain beauty of soul, which\nwins the Divine love.\" But beauty of soul is a quality, even as\nbeauty of body. Therefore grace is a quality.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), there is understood to be an\neffect of God's gratuitous will in whoever is said to have God's\ngrace. Now it was stated (Q. 109, A. 1) that man is aided by God's\ngratuitous will in two ways: first, inasmuch as man's soul is moved\nby God to know or will or do something, and in this way the\ngratuitous effect in man is not a quality, but a movement of the\nsoul; for \"motion is the act of the mover in the moved.\" Secondly,\nman is helped by God's gratuitous will, inasmuch as a habitual gift\nis infused by God into the soul; and for this reason, that it is not\nfitting that God should provide less for those He loves, that they\nmay acquire supernatural good, than for creatures, whom He loves that\nthey may acquire natural good. Now He so provides for natural\ncreatures, that not merely does He move them to their natural acts,\nbut He bestows upon them certain forms and powers, which are the\nprinciples of acts, in order that they may of themselves be inclined\nto these movements, and thus the movements whereby they are moved by\nGod become natural and easy to creatures, according to Wis. 8:1: \"she\n. . . ordereth all things sweetly.\" Much more therefore does He\ninfuse into such as He moves towards the acquisition of supernatural\ngood, certain forms or supernatural qualities, whereby they may be\nmoved by Him sweetly and promptly to acquire eternal good; and thus\nthe gift of grace is a quality.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Grace, as a quality, is said to act upon the soul, not\nafter the manner of an efficient cause, but after the manner of a\nformal cause, as whiteness makes a thing white, and justice, just.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Every substance is either the nature of the thing\nwhereof it is the substance or is a part of the nature, even as\nmatter and form are called substance. And because grace is above\nhuman nature, it cannot be a substance or a substantial form, but is\nan accidental form of the soul. Now what is substantially in God,\nbecomes accidental in the soul participating the Divine goodness, as\nis clear in the case of knowledge. And thus because the soul\nparticipates in the Divine goodness imperfectly, the participation of\nthe Divine goodness, which is grace, has its being in the soul in a\nless perfect way than the soul subsists in itself. Nevertheless,\ninasmuch as it is the expression or participation of the Divine\ngoodness, it is nobler than the nature of the soul, though not in its\nmode of being.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Boethius [*Pseudo-Bede, Sent. Phil. ex Artist.]\nsays, the \"being of an accident is to inhere.\" Hence no accident is\ncalled being as if it had being, but because by it something is;\nhence it is said to belong to a being rather to be a being (Metaph.\nvii, text. 2). And because to become and to be corrupted belong to\nwhat is, properly speaking, no accident comes into being or is\ncorrupted, but is said to come into being and to be corrupted\ninasmuch as its subject begins or ceases to be in act with this\naccident. And thus grace is said to be created inasmuch as men are\ncreated with reference to it, i.e. are given a new being out of\nnothing, i.e. not from merits, according to Eph. 2:10, \"created in\nJesus Christ in good works.\"\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 110, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Grace Is the Same As Virtue?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that grace is the same as virtue. For\nAugustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xiv) that \"operating grace is faith\nthat worketh by charity.\" But faith that worketh by charity is a\nvirtue. Therefore grace is a virtue.\n\nObj. 2: Further, what fits the definition, fits the defined. But the\ndefinitions of virtue given by saints and philosophers fit grace,\nsince \"it makes its subject good, and his work good,\" and \"it is a\ngood quality of the mind, whereby we live righteously,\" etc.\nTherefore grace is virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, grace is a quality. Now it is clearly not in the\n_fourth_ species of quality; viz. _form_ which is the \"abiding figure\nof things,\" since it does not belong to bodies. Nor is it in the\n_third,_ since it is not a \"passion nor a passion-like quality,\"\nwhich is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in _Physic._\nviii; and grace is principally in the mind. Nor is it in the _second_\nspecies, which is \"natural power\" or \"impotence\"; since grace is\nabove nature and does not regard good and evil, as does natural\npower. Therefore it must be in the _first_ species which is \"habit\"\nor \"disposition.\" Now habits of the mind are virtues; since even\nknowledge itself is a virtue after a manner, as stated above (Q. 57,\nAA. 1, 2). Therefore grace is the same as virtue.\n\n_On the contrary,_ If grace is a virtue, it would seem before all to\nbe one of the three theological virtues. But grace is neither faith\nnor hope, for these can be without sanctifying grace. Nor is it\ncharity, since \"grace foreruns charity,\" as Augustine says in his\nbook on the _Predestination of the Saints_ (De Dono Persev. xvi).\nTherefore grace is not virtue.\n\n_I answer that,_ Some held that grace and virtue were identical in\nessence, and differed only logically--in the sense that we speak of\ngrace inasmuch as it makes man pleasing to God, or is given\ngratuitously--and of virtue inasmuch as it empowers us to act\nrightly. And the Master seems to have thought this (Sent. ii, D 27).\n\nBut if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue, this cannot\nhold, since, as the Philosopher says (Physic. vii, text. 17), \"virtue\nis disposition of what is perfect--and I call perfect what is\ndisposed according to its nature.\" Now from this it is clear that the\nvirtue of a thing has reference to some pre-existing nature, from the\nfact that everything is disposed with reference to what befits its\nnature. But it is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts of\nwhich we spoke above (Q. 55, seqq.) are dispositions, whereby a man\nis fittingly disposed with reference to the nature whereby he is a\nman; whereas infused virtues dispose man in a higher manner and\ntowards a higher end, and consequently in relation to some higher\nnature, i.e. in relation to a participation of the Divine Nature,\naccording to 2 Pet. 1:4: \"He hath given us most great and most\nprecious promises; that by these you may be made partakers of the\nDivine Nature.\" And it is in respect of receiving this nature that we\nare said to be born again sons of God.\n\nAnd thus, even as the natural light of reason is something besides\nthe acquired virtues, which are ordained to this natural light, so\nalso the light of grace which is a participation of the Divine Nature\nis something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and\nare ordained to this light, hence the Apostle says (Eph. 5:8): \"For\nyou were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk then as\nchildren of the light.\" For as the acquired virtues enable a man to\nwalk, in accordance with the natural light of reason, so do the\ninfused virtues enable a man to walk as befits the light of grace.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Augustine calls \"faith that worketh by charity\" grace,\nsince the act of faith of him that worketh by charity is the first\nact by which sanctifying grace is manifested.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Good is placed in the definition of virtue with\nreference to its fitness with some pre-existing nature essential or\nparticipated. Now good is not attributed to grace in this manner, but\nas to the root of goodness in man, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Grace is reduced to the first species of quality; and\nyet it is not the same as virtue, but is a certain disposition which\nis presupposed to the infused virtues, as their principle and root.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 110, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Grace Is in the Essence of the Soul As in a Subject, or in\nOne of the Powers?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that grace is not in the essence of the\nsoul, as in a subject, but in one of the powers. For Augustine says\n(Hypognosticon iii [*Among the spurious works of St. Augustine]) that\ngrace is related to the will or to the free will \"as a rider to his\nhorse.\" Now the will or the free will is a power, as stated above (I,\nQ. 83, A. 2). Hence grace is in a power of the soul, as in a subject.\n\nObj. 2: Further, \"Man's merit springs from grace\" as Augustine says\n(De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. vi). Now merit consists in acts, which\nproceed from a power. Hence it seems that grace is a perfection of a\npower of the soul.\n\nObj. 3: Further, if the essence of the soul is the proper subject of\ngrace, the soul, inasmuch as it has an essence, must be capable of\ngrace. But this is false; since it would follow that every soul would\nbe capable of grace. Therefore the essence of the soul is not the\nproper subject of grace.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the essence of the soul is prior to its powers. Now\nwhat is prior may be understood without what is posterior. Hence it\nfollows that grace may be taken to be in the soul, although we\nsuppose no part or power of the soul--viz. neither the will, nor the\nintellect, nor anything else; which is impossible.\n\n_On the contrary,_ By grace we are born again sons of God. But\ngeneration terminates at the essence prior to the powers. Therefore\ngrace is in the soul's essence prior to being in the powers.\n\n_I answer that,_ This question depends on the preceding. For if grace\nis the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in the powers of the\nsoul as in a subject; since the soul's powers are the proper subject\nof virtue, as stated above (Q. 56, A. 1). But if grace differs from\nvirtue, it cannot be said that a power of the soul is the subject of\ngrace, since every perfection of the soul's powers has the nature of\nvirtue, as stated above (Q. 55, A. 1; Q. 56, A. 1). Hence it remains\nthat grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject prior to the\npowers of the soul, so that it is in the essence of the soul. For as\nman in his intellective powers participates in the Divine knowledge\nthrough the virtue of faith, and in his power of will participates in\nthe Divine love through the virtue of charity, so also in the nature\nof the soul does he participate in the Divine Nature, after the\nmanner of a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As from the essence of the soul flows its powers, which\nare the principles of deeds, so likewise the virtues, whereby the\npowers are moved to act, flow into the powers of the soul from grace.\nAnd thus grace is compared to the will as the mover to the moved,\nwhich is the same comparison as that of a horseman to the horse--but\nnot as an accident to a subject.\n\nAnd thereby is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection. For\ngrace is the principle of meritorious works through the medium of\nvirtues, as the essence of the soul is the principal of vital deeds\nthrough the medium of the powers.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The soul is the subject of grace, as being in the\nspecies of intellectual or rational nature. But the soul is not\nclassed in a species by any of its powers, since the powers are\nnatural properties of the soul following upon the species. Hence the\nsoul differs specifically in its essence from other souls, viz. of\ndumb animals, and of plants. Consequently it does not follow that, if\nthe essence of the human soul is the subject of grace, every soul may\nbe the subject of grace; since it belongs to the essence of the soul,\ninasmuch as it is of such a species.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Since the powers of the soul are natural properties\nfollowing upon the species, the soul cannot be without them. Yet,\ngranted that it was without them, the soul would still be called\nintellectual or rational in its species, not that it would actually\nhave these powers, but on account of the essence of such a species,\nfrom which these powers naturally flow.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 111\n\nOF THE DIVISION OF GRACE\n(In Five Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the division of grace; under which head there\nare five points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether grace is fittingly divided into gratuitous grace and\nsanctifying grace?\n\n(2) Of the division into operating and cooperating grace;\n\n(3) Of the division of it into prevenient and subsequent grace;\n\n(4) Of the division of gratuitous grace;\n\n(5) Of the comparison between sanctifying and gratuitous grace.\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 1]\n\nWhether Grace Is Fittingly Divided into Sanctifying Grace and\nGratuitous Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into\nsanctifying grace and gratuitous grace. For grace is a gift of God,\nas is clear from what has been already stated (Q. 110, A. 1). But man\nis not therefore pleasing to God because something is given him by\nGod, but rather on the contrary; since something is freely given by\nGod, because man is pleasing to Him. Hence there is no sanctifying\ngrace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is not given on account of preceding merits\nis given gratis. Now even natural good is given to man without\npreceding merit, since nature is presupposed to merit. Therefore\nnature itself is given gratuitously by God. But nature is condivided\nwith grace. Therefore to be gratuitously given is not fittingly set\ndown as a difference of grace, since it is found outside the genus of\ngrace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, members of a division are mutually opposed. But even\nsanctifying grace, whereby we are justified, is given to us\ngratuitously, according to Rom. 3:24: \"Being justified freely\n(_gratis_) by His grace.\" Hence sanctifying grace ought not to be\ndivided against gratuitous grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle attributes both to grace, viz. to\nsanctify and to be gratuitously given. For with regard to the first\nhe says (Eph. 1:6): \"He hath graced us in His beloved son.\" And with\nregard to the second (Rom. 2:6): \"And if by grace, it is not now by\nworks, otherwise grace is no more grace.\" Therefore grace can be\ndistinguished by its having one only or both.\n\n_I answer that,_ As the Apostle says (Rom. 13:1), \"those things that\nare of God are well ordered [Vulg.: 'those that are, are ordained by\nGod].\" Now the order of things consists in this, that things are led\nto God by other things, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). And hence\nsince grace is ordained to lead men to God, this takes place in a\ncertain order, so that some are led to God by others.\n\nAnd thus there is a twofold grace: one whereby man himself is united\nto God, and this is called \"sanctifying grace\"; the other is that\nwhereby one man cooperates with another in leading him to God, and\nthis gift is called \"gratuitous grace,\" since it is bestowed on a man\nbeyond the capability of nature, and beyond the merit of the person.\nBut whereas it is bestowed on a man, not to justify him, but rather\nthat he may cooperate in the justification of another, it is not\ncalled sanctifying grace. And it is of this that the Apostle says (1\nCor. 12:7): \"And the manifestation of the Spirit is given to every\nman unto utility,\" i.e. of others.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Grace is said to make pleasing, not efficiently but\nformally, i.e. because thereby a man is justified, and is made worthy\nto be called pleasing to God, according to Col. 1:21: \"He hath made\nus worthy to be made partakers of the lot of the saints in light.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: Grace, inasmuch as it is gratuitously given, excludes\nthe notion of debt. Now debt may be taken in two ways: first, as\narising from merit; and this regards the person whose it is to do\nmeritorious works, according to Rom. 4:4: \"Now to him that worketh,\nthe reward is not reckoned according to grace, but according to\ndebt.\" The second debt regards the condition of nature. Thus we say\nit is due to a man to have reason, and whatever else belongs to human\nnature. Yet in neither way is debt taken to mean that God is under an\nobligation to His creature, but rather that the creature ought to be\nsubject to God, that the Divine ordination may be fulfilled in it,\nwhich is that a certain nature should have certain conditions or\nproperties, and that by doing certain works it should attain to\nsomething further. And hence natural endowments are not a debt in the\nfirst sense but in the second. But supernatural gifts are due in\nneither sense. Hence they especially merit the name of grace.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Sanctifying grace adds to the notion of gratuitous\ngrace something pertaining to the nature of grace, since it makes man\npleasing to God. And hence gratuitous grace which does not do this\nkeeps the common name, as happens in many other cases; and thus the\ntwo parts of the division are opposed as sanctifying and\nnon-sanctifying grace.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Grace Is Fittingly Divided into Operating and Cooperating\nGrace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into\noperating and cooperating grace. For grace is an accident, as stated\nabove (Q. 110, A. 2). Now no accident can act upon its subject.\nTherefore no grace can be called operating.\n\nObj. 2: Further, if grace operates anything in us it assuredly brings\nabout justification. But not only grace works this. For Augustine\nsays, on John 14:12, \"the works that I do he also shall do,\" says\n(Serm. clxix): \"He Who created thee without thyself, will not justify\nthee without thyself.\" Therefore no grace ought to be called simply\noperating.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to cooperate seems to pertain to the inferior agent,\nand not to the principal agent. But grace works in us more than\nfree-will, according to Rom. 9:16: \"It is not of him that willeth,\nnor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.\" Therefore no\ngrace ought to be called cooperating.\n\nObj. 4: Further, division ought to rest on opposition. But to operate\nand to cooperate are not opposed; for one and the same thing can both\noperate and cooperate. Therefore grace is not fittingly divided into\noperating and cooperating.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. xvii):\n\"God by cooperating with us, perfects what He began by operating in\nus, since He who perfects by cooperation with such as are willing,\nbegins by operating that they may will.\" But the operations of God\nwhereby He moves us to good pertain to grace. Therefore grace is\nfittingly divided into operating and cooperating.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 110, A. 2) grace may be taken in\ntwo ways; first, as a Divine help, whereby God moves us to will and\nto act; secondly, as a habitual gift divinely bestowed on us.\n\nNow in both these ways grace is fittingly divided into operating and\ncooperating. For the operation of an effect is not attributed to the\nthing moved but to the mover. Hence in that effect in which our mind\nis moved and does not move, but in which God is the sole mover, the\noperation is attributed to God, and it is with reference to this that\nwe speak of \"operating grace.\" But in that effect in which our mind\nboth moves and is moved, the operation is not only attributed to God,\nbut also to the soul; and it is with reference to this that we speak\nof \"cooperating grace.\" Now there is a double act in us. First, there\nis the interior act of the will, and with regard to this act the will\nis a thing moved, and God is the mover; and especially when the will,\nwhich hitherto willed evil, begins to will good. And hence, inasmuch\nas God moves the human mind to this act, we speak of operating grace.\nBut there is another, exterior act; and since it is commanded by the\nwill, as was shown above (Q. 17, A. 9) the operation of this act is\nattributed to the will. And because God assists us in this act, both\nby strengthening our will interiorly so as to attain to the act, and\nby granting outwardly the capability of operating, it is with respect\nto this that we speak of cooperating grace. Hence after the aforesaid\nwords Augustine subjoins: \"He operates that we may will; and when we\nwill, He cooperates that we may perfect.\" And thus if grace is taken\nfor God's gratuitous motion whereby He moves us to meritorious good,\nit is fittingly divided into operating and cooperating grace.\n\nBut if grace is taken for the habitual gift, then again there is a\ndouble effect of grace, even as of every other form; the first of\nwhich is _being,_ and the second, _operation;_ thus the work of heat\nis to make its subject hot, and to give heat outwardly. And thus\nhabitual grace, inasmuch as it heals and justifies the soul, or makes\nit pleasing to God, is called operating grace; but inasmuch as it is\nthe principle of meritorious works, which spring from the free-will,\nit is called cooperating grace.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Inasmuch as grace is a certain accidental quality, it\ndoes not act upon the soul efficiently, but formally, as whiteness\nmakes a surface white.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God does not justify us without ourselves, because\nwhilst we are being justified we consent to God's justification\n(_justitiae_) by a movement of our free-will. Nevertheless this\nmovement is not the cause of grace, but the effect; hence the whole\noperation pertains to grace.\n\nReply Obj. 3: One thing is said to cooperate with another not merely\nwhen it is a secondary agent under a principal agent, but when it\nhelps to the end intended. Now man is helped by God to will the good,\nthrough the means of operating grace. And hence, the end being\nalready intended, grace cooperates with us.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Operating and cooperating grace are the same grace; but\nare distinguished by their different effects, as is plain from what\nhas been said.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Grace Is Fittingly Divided into Prevenient and Subsequent\nGrace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that grace is not fittingly divided into\nprevenient and subsequent. For grace is an effect of the Divine love.\nBut God's love is never subsequent, but always prevenient, according\nto 1 John 4:10: \"Not as though we had loved God, but because He hath\nfirst loved us.\" Therefore grace ought not to be divided into\nprevenient and subsequent.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there is but one sanctifying grace in man, since it\nis sufficient, according to 2 Cor. 12:9: \"My grace is sufficient for\nthee.\" But the same thing cannot be before and after. Therefore grace\nis not fittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.\n\nObj. 3: Further, grace is known by its effects. Now there are an\ninfinite number of effects--one preceding another. Hence if with\nregard to these, grace must be divided into prevenient and\nsubsequent, it would seem that there are infinite species of grace.\nNow no art takes note of the infinite in number. Hence grace is not\nfittingly divided into prevenient and subsequent.\n\n_On the contrary,_ God's grace is the outcome of His mercy. Now both\nare said in Ps. 58:11: \"His mercy shall prevent me,\" and again, Ps.\n22:6: \"Thy mercy will follow me.\" Therefore grace is fittingly\ndivided into prevenient and subsequent.\n\n_I answer that,_ As grace is divided into operating and cooperating,\nwith regard to its diverse effects, so also is it divided into\nprevenient and subsequent, howsoever we consider grace. Now there are\nfive effects of grace in us: of these, the first is, to heal the\nsoul; the second, to desire good; the third, to carry into effect the\ngood proposed; the fourth, to persevere in good; the fifth, to reach\nglory. And hence grace, inasmuch as it causes the first effect in us,\nis called prevenient with respect to the second, and inasmuch as it\ncauses the second, it is called subsequent with respect to the first\neffect. And as one effect is posterior to this effect, and prior to\nthat, so may grace be called prevenient and subsequent on account of\nthe same effect viewed relatively to divers others. And this is what\nAugustine says (De Natura et Gratia xxxi): \"It is prevenient,\ninasmuch as it heals, and subsequent, inasmuch as, being healed, we\nare strengthened; it is prevenient, inasmuch as we are called, and\nsubsequent, inasmuch as we are glorified.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: God's love signifies something eternal; and hence can\nnever be called anything but prevenient. But grace signifies a\ntemporal effect, which can precede and follow another; and thus grace\nmay be both prevenient and subsequent.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The division into prevenient and subsequent grace does\nnot divide grace in its essence, but only in its effects, as was\nalready said of operating and cooperating grace. For subsequent\ngrace, inasmuch as it pertains to glory, is not numerically distinct\nfrom prevenient grace whereby we are at present justified. For even\nas the charity of the earth is not voided in heaven, so must the same\nbe said of the light of grace, since the notion of neither implies\nimperfection.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Although the effects of grace may be infinite in\nnumber, even as human acts are infinite, nevertheless all are reduced\nto some of a determinate species, and moreover all coincide in\nthis--that one precedes another.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Gratuitous Grace Is Rightly Divided by the Apostle?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that gratuitous grace is not rightly\ndivided by the Apostle. For every gift vouchsafed to us by God, may\nbe called a gratuitous grace. Now there are an infinite number of\ngifts freely bestowed on us by God as regards both the good of the\nsoul and the good of the body--and yet they do not make us pleasing\nto God. Hence gratuitous graces cannot be contained under any certain\ndivision.\n\nObj. 2: Further, gratuitous grace is distinguished from sanctifying\ngrace. But faith pertains to sanctifying grace, since we are\njustified by it, according to Rom. 5:1: \"Being justified therefore by\nfaith.\" Hence it is not right to place faith amongst the gratuitous\ngraces, especially since the other virtues are not so placed, as hope\nand charity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the operation of healing, and speaking divers\ntongues are miracles. Again, the interpretation of speeches pertains\neither to wisdom or to knowledge, according to Dan. 1:17: \"And to\nthese children God gave knowledge and understanding in every book and\nwisdom.\" Hence it is not correct to divide the grace of healing and\nkinds of tongues against the working of miracles; and the\ninterpretation of speeches against the word of wisdom and knowledge.\n\nObj. 4: Further, as wisdom and knowledge are gifts of the Holy Ghost,\nso also are understanding, counsel, piety, fortitude, and fear, as\nstated above (Q. 68, A. 4). Therefore these also ought to be placed\namongst the gratuitous gifts.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (1 Cor. 12:8, 9, 10): \"To one\nindeed by the Spirit is given the word of wisdom; and to another the\nword of knowledge, according to the same Spirit; to another, the\nworking of miracles; to another, prophecy; to another, the discerning\nof spirits; to another divers kinds of tongues; to another\ninterpretation of speeches.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As was said above (A. 1), gratuitous grace is\nordained to this, viz. that a man may help another to be led to God.\nNow no man can help in this by moving interiorly (for this belongs to\nGod alone), but only exteriorly by teaching or persuading. Hence\ngratuitous grace embraces whatever a man needs in order to instruct\nanother in Divine things which are above reason. Now for this three\nthings are required: first, a man must possess the fullness of\nknowledge of Divine things, so as to be capable of teaching others.\nSecondly, he must be able to confirm or prove what he says, otherwise\nhis words would have no weight. Thirdly, he must be capable of\nfittingly presenting to his hearers what he knows.\n\nNow as regards the first, three things are necessary, as may be seen\nin human teaching. For whoever would teach another in any science\nmust first be certain of the principles of the science, and with\nregard to this there is _faith,_ which is certitude of invisible\nthings, the principles of Catholic doctrine. Secondly, it behooves\nthe teacher to know the principal conclusions of the science, and\nhence we have the word of _wisdom,_ which is the knowledge of Divine\nthings. Thirdly, he ought to abound with examples and a knowledge of\neffects, whereby at times he needs to manifest causes; and thus we\nhave the word of _knowledge,_ which is the knowledge of human things,\nsince \"the invisible things of Him . . . are clearly seen, being\nunderstood by the things that are made\" (Rom. 1:20).\n\nNow the confirmation of such things as are within reason rests upon\narguments; but the confirmation of what is above reason rests on what\nis proper to the Divine power, and this in two ways: first, when the\nteacher of sacred doctrine does what God alone can do, in miraculous\ndeeds, whether with respect to bodily health--and thus there is the\n_grace of healing,_ or merely for the purpose of manifesting the\nDivine power; for instance, that the sun should stand still or\ndarken, or that the sea should be divided--and thus there is the\n_working of miracles._ Secondly, when he can manifest what God alone\ncan know, and these are either future contingents--and thus there is\n_prophecy,_ or also the secrets of hearts--and thus there is the\n_discerning of spirits._\n\nBut the capability of speaking can regard either the idiom in which a\nperson can be understood, and thus there is _kinds of tongues_; or it\ncan regard the sense of what is said, and thus there is the\n_interpretation of speeches._\n\nReply Obj. 1: As stated above (A. 1), not all the benefits divinely\nconferred upon us are called gratuitous graces, but only those that\nsurpass the power of nature--e.g. that a fisherman should be replete\nwith the word of wisdom and of knowledge and the like; and such as\nthese are here set down as gratuitous graces.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Faith is enumerated here under the gratuitous graces,\nnot as a virtue justifying man in himself, but as implying a\nsuper-eminent certitude of faith, whereby a man is fitted for\ninstructing others concerning such things as belong to the faith.\nWith regard to hope and charity, they belong to the appetitive power,\naccording as man is ordained thereby to God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The grace of healing is distinguished from the general\nworking of miracles because it has a special reason for inducing one\nto the faith, since a man is all the more ready to believe when he\nhas received the gift of bodily health through the virtue of faith.\nSo, too, to speak with divers tongues and to interpret speeches have\nspecial efficacy in bestowing faith. Hence they are set down as\nspecial gratuitous graces.\n\nReply Obj. 4: Wisdom and knowledge are not numbered among the\ngratuitous graces in the same way as they are reckoned among the\ngifts of the Holy Ghost, i.e. inasmuch as man's mind is rendered\neasily movable by the Holy Ghost to the things of wisdom and\nknowledge; for thus they are gifts of the Holy Ghost, as stated above\n(Q. 68, AA. 1, 4). But they are numbered amongst the gratuitous\ngraces, inasmuch as they imply such a fullness of knowledge and\nwisdom that a man may not merely think aright of Divine things, but\nmay instruct others and overpower adversaries. Hence it is\nsignificant that it is the \"word\" of wisdom and the \"word\" of\nknowledge that are placed in the gratuitous graces, since, as\nAugustine says (De Trin. xiv, 1), \"It is one thing merely to know\nwhat a man must believe in order to reach everlasting life, and\nanother thing to know how this may benefit the godly and may be\ndefended against the ungodly.\"\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 111, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Gratuitous Grace Is Nobler Than Sanctifying Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that gratuitous grace is nobler than\nsanctifying grace. For \"the people's good is better than the\nindividual good,\" as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 2). Now\nsanctifying grace is ordained to the good of one man alone, whereas\ngratuitous grace is ordained to the common good of the whole Church,\nas stated above (AA. 1, 4). Hence gratuitous grace is nobler than\nsanctifying grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is a greater power that is able to act upon\nanother, than that which is confined to itself, even as greater is\nthe brightness of the body that can illuminate other bodies, than of\nthat which can only shine but cannot illuminate; and hence the\nPhilosopher says (Ethic. v, 1) \"that justice is the most excellent of\nthe virtues,\" since by it a man bears himself rightly towards others.\nBut by sanctifying grace a man is perfected only in himself; whereas\nby gratuitous grace a man works for the perfection of others. Hence\ngratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what is proper to the best is nobler than what is\ncommon to all; thus to reason, which is proper to man, is nobler than\nto feel, which is common to all animals. Now sanctifying grace is\ncommon to all members of the Church, but gratuitous grace is the\nproper gift of the more exalted members of the Church. Hence\ngratuitous grace is nobler than sanctifying grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle (1 Cor. 12:31), having enumerated the\ngratuitous graces, adds: \"And I shew unto you yet a more excellent\nway\"; and as the sequel proves he is speaking of charity, which\npertains to sanctifying grace. Hence sanctifying grace is more noble\nthan gratuitous grace.\n\n_I answer that,_ The higher the good to which a virtue is ordained,\nthe more excellent is the virtue. Now the end is always greater than\nthe means. But sanctifying grace ordains a man immediately to a union\nwith his last end, whereas gratuitous grace ordains a man to what is\npreparatory to the end; i.e. by prophecy and miracles and so forth,\nmen are induced to unite themselves to their last end. And hence\nsanctifying grace is nobler than gratuitous grace.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Metaph. xii, text. 52), a\nmultitude, as an army, has a double good; the first is in the\nmultitude itself, viz. the order of the army; the second is separate\nfrom the multitude, viz. the good of the leader--and this is better\ngood, since the other is ordained to it. Now gratuitous grace is\nordained to the common good of the Church, which is ecclesiastical\norder, whereas sanctifying grace is ordained to the separate common\ngood, which is God. Hence sanctifying grace is the nobler.\n\nReply Obj. 2: If gratuitous grace could cause a man to have\nsanctifying grace, it would follow that the gratuitous grace was the\nnobler; even as the brightness of the sun that enlightens is more\nexcellent than that of an object that is lit up. But by gratuitous\ngrace a man cannot cause another to have union with God, which he\nhimself has by sanctifying grace; but he causes certain dispositions\ntowards it. Hence gratuitous grace needs not to be the more\nexcellent, even as in fire, the heat, which manifests its species\nwhereby it produces heat in other things, is not more noble than its\nsubstantial form.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Feeling is ordained to reason, as to an end; and thus,\nto reason is nobler. But here it is the contrary; for what is proper\nis ordained to what is common as to an end. Hence there is no\ncomparison.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 112\n\nOF THE CAUSE OF GRACE\n(In Five Articles)\n\nWe must now consider the cause of grace; and under this head there\nare five points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether God alone is the efficient cause of grace?\n\n(2) Whether any disposition towards grace is needed on the part of\nthe recipient, by an act of free-will?\n\n(3) Whether such a disposition can make grace follow of necessity?\n\n(4) Whether grace is equal in all?\n\n(5) Whether anyone may know that he has grace?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 112, Art. 1]\n\nWhether God Alone Is the Cause of Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that God alone is not the cause of grace.\nFor it is written (John 1:17): \"Grace and truth came by Jesus\nChrist.\" Now, by the name of Jesus Christ is understood not merely\nthe Divine Nature assuming, but the created nature assumed. Therefore\na creature may be the cause of grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, there is this difference between the sacraments of\nthe New Law and those of the Old, that the sacraments of the New Law\ncause grace, whereas the sacraments of the Old Law merely signify it.\nNow the sacraments of the New Law are certain visible elements.\nTherefore God is not the only cause of grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, according to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. iii, iv, vii,\nviii), \"Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect both lesser angels and\nmen.\" Now the rational creature is cleansed, enlightened, and\nperfected by grace. Therefore God is not the only cause of grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 83:12): \"The Lord will give\ngrace and glory.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Nothing can act beyond its species, since the cause\nmust always be more powerful than its effect. Now the gift of grace\nsurpasses every capability of created nature, since it is nothing\nshort of a partaking of the Divine Nature, which exceeds every other\nnature. And thus it is impossible that any creature should cause\ngrace. For it is as necessary that God alone should deify, bestowing\na partaking of the Divine Nature by a participated likeness, as it is\nimpossible that anything save fire should enkindle.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Christ's humanity is an \"organ of His Godhead,\" as\nDamascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 19). Now an instrument does not\nbring forth the action of the principal agent by its own power, but\nin virtue of the principal agent. Hence Christ's humanity does not\ncause grace by its own power, but by virtue of the Divine Nature\njoined to it, whereby the actions of Christ's humanity are saving\nactions.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As in the person of Christ the humanity causes our\nsalvation by grace, the Divine power being the principal agent, so\nlikewise in the sacraments of the New Law, which are derived from\nChrist, grace is instrumentally caused by the sacraments, and\nprincipally by the power of the Holy Ghost working in the sacraments,\naccording to John 3:5: \"Unless a man be born again of water and the\nHoly Ghost he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Angels cleanse, enlighten, and perfect angels or men,\nby instruction, and not by justifying them through grace. Hence\nDionysius says (Coel. Hier. vii) that \"this cleansing and\nenlightenment and perfecting is nothing else than the assumption of\nDivine knowledge.\"\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 112, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Any Preparation and Disposition for Grace Is Required on\nMan's Part?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no preparation or disposition for\ngrace is required on man's part, since, as the Apostle says (Rom.\n4:4), \"To him that worketh, the reward is not reckoned according to\ngrace, but according to debt.\" Now a man's preparation by free-will\ncan only be through some operation. Hence it would do away with the\nnotion of grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whoever is going on sinning, is not preparing\nhimself to have grace. But to some who are going on sinning grace is\ngiven, as is clear in the case of Paul, who received grace whilst he\nwas \"breathing out threatenings and slaughter against the disciples\nof the Lord\" (Act 9:1). Hence no preparation for grace is required on\nman's part.\n\nObj. 3: Further, an agent of infinite power needs no disposition in\nmatter, since it does not even require matter, as appears in\ncreation, to which grace is compared, which is called \"a new\ncreature\" (Gal. 6:15). But only God, Who has infinite power, causes\ngrace, as stated above (A. 1). Hence no preparation is required on\nman's part to obtain grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Amos 4:12): \"Be prepared to meet\nthy God, O Israel,\" and (1 Kings 7:3): \"Prepare your hearts unto the\nLord.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 111, A. 2), grace is taken in\ntwo ways: first, as a habitual gift of God. Secondly, as a help from\nGod, Who moves the soul to good. Now taking grace in the first sense,\na certain preparation of grace is required for it, since a form can\nonly be in disposed matter. But if we speak of grace as it signifies\na help from God to move us to good, no preparation is required on\nman's part, that, as it were, anticipates the Divine help, but\nrather, every preparation in man must be by the help of God moving\nthe soul to good. And thus even the good movement of the free-will,\nwhereby anyone is prepared for receiving the gift of grace, is an act\nof the free-will moved by God. And thus man is said to prepare\nhimself, according to Prov. 16:1: \"It is the part of man to prepare\nthe soul\"; yet it is principally from God, Who moves the free-will.\nHence it is said that man's will is prepared by God, and that man's\nsteps are guided by God.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A certain preparation of man for grace is simultaneous\nwith the infusion of grace; and this operation is meritorious, not\nindeed of grace, which is already possessed--but of glory which is\nnot yet possessed. But there is another imperfect preparation, which\nsometimes precedes the gift of sanctifying grace, and yet it is from\nGod's motion. But it does not suffice for merit, since man is not yet\njustified by grace, and merit can only arise from grace, as will be\nseen further on (Q. 114, A. 2).\n\nReply Obj. 2: Since a man cannot prepare himself for grace unless God\nprevent and move him to good, it is of no account whether anyone\narrive at perfect preparation instantaneously, or step by step. For\nit is written (Ecclus. 11:23): \"It is easy in the eyes of God on a\nsudden to make the poor man rich.\" Now it sometimes happens that God\nmoves a man to good, but not perfect good, and this preparation\nprecedes grace. But He sometimes moves him suddenly and perfectly to\ngood, and man receives grace suddenly, according to John 6:45: \"Every\none that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me.\"\nAnd thus it happened to Paul, since, suddenly when he was in the\nmidst of sin, his heart was perfectly moved by God to hear, to learn,\nto come; and hence he received grace suddenly.\n\nReply Obj. 3: An agent of infinite power needs no matter or\ndisposition of matter, brought about by the action of something else;\nand yet, looking to the condition of the thing caused, it must cause,\nin the thing caused, both the matter and the due disposition for the\nform. So likewise, when God infuses grace into a soul, no preparation\nis required which He Himself does not bring about.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 112, Art. 3]\n\nWhether Grace Is Necessarily Given to Whoever Prepares Himself for\nIt, or to Whoever Does What He Can?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that grace is necessarily given to whoever\nprepares himself for grace, or to whoever does what he can, because,\non Rom. 5:1, \"Being justified . . . by faith, let us have peace,\"\netc. the gloss says: \"God welcomes whoever flies to Him, otherwise\nthere would be injustice with Him.\" But it is impossible for\ninjustice to be with God. Therefore it is impossible for God not to\nwelcome whoever flies to Him. Hence he receives grace of necessity.\n\nObj. 2: Further, Anselm says (De Casu Diaboli. iii) that the reason\nwhy God does not bestow grace on the devil, is that he did not wish,\nnor was he prepared, to receive it. But if the cause be removed, the\neffect must needs be removed also. Therefore, if anyone is willing to\nreceive grace it is bestowed on them of necessity.\n\nObj. 3: Further, good is diffusive of itself, as appears from\nDionysius (Div. Nom. iv). Now the good of grace is better than the\ngood of nature. Hence, since natural forms necessarily come to\ndisposed matter, much more does it seem that grace is necessarily\nbestowed on whoever prepares himself for grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Man is compared to God as clay to the potter,\naccording to Jer. 18:6: \"As clay is in the hand of the potter, so are\nyou in My hand.\" But however much the clay is prepared, it does not\nnecessarily receive its shape from the potter. Hence, however much a\nman prepares himself, he does not necessarily receive grace from God.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), man's preparation for grace\nis from God, as Mover, and from the free-will, as moved. Hence the\npreparation may be looked at in two ways: first, as it is from\nfree-will, and thus there is no necessity that it should obtain\ngrace, since the gift of grace exceeds every preparation of human\npower. But it may be considered, secondly, as it is from God the\nMover, and thus it has a necessity--not indeed of coercion, but of\ninfallibility--as regards what it is ordained to by God, since God's\nintention cannot fail, according to the saying of Augustine in his\nbook on the _Predestination of the Saints_ (De Dono Persev. xiv) that\n\"by God's good gifts whoever is liberated, is most certainly\nliberated.\" Hence if God intends, while moving, that the one whose\nheart He moves should attain to grace, he will infallibly attain to\nit, according to John 6:45: \"Every one that hath heard of the Father,\nand hath learned, cometh to Me.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: This gloss is speaking of such as fly to God by a\nmeritorious act of their free-will, already _informed_ with grace;\nfor if they did not receive grace, it would be against the justice\nwhich He Himself established. Or if it refers to the movement of\nfree-will before grace, it is speaking in the sense that man's flight\nto God is by a Divine motion, which ought not, in justice, to fail.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The first cause of the defect of grace is on our part;\nbut the first cause of the bestowal of grace is on God's according to\nOsee 13:9: \"Destruction is thy own, O Israel; thy help is only in Me.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: Even in natural things, the form does not necessarily\nensue the disposition of the matter, except by the power of the agent\nthat causes the disposition.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 112, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Grace Is Greater in One Than in Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that grace is not greater in one than in\nanother. For grace is caused in us by the Divine love, as stated\nabove (Q. 110, A. 1). Now it is written (Wis. 6:8): \"He made the\nlittle and the great and He hath equally care of all.\" Therefore all\nobtain grace from Him equally.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whatever is the greatest possible, cannot be more or\nless. But grace is the greatest possible, since it joins us with our\nlast end. Therefore there is no greater or less in it. Hence it is\nnot greater in one than in another.\n\nObj. 3: Further, grace is the soul's life, as stated above (Q. 110,\nA. 1, ad 2). But there is no greater or less in life. Hence, neither\nis there in grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eph. 4:7): \"But to every one of us\nis given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ.\" Now\nwhat is given in measure, is not given to all equally. Hence all have\nnot an equal grace.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 52, AA. 1, 2; Q. 56, AA. 1, 2),\nhabits can have a double magnitude: one, as regards the end or\nobject, as when a virtue is said to be more noble through being\nordained to a greater good; the other on the part of the subject,\nwhich more or less participates in the habit inhering to it.\n\nNow as regards the first magnitude, sanctifying grace cannot be\ngreater or less, since, of its nature, grace joins man to the Highest\nGood, which is God. But as regards the subject, grace can receive\nmore or less, inasmuch as one may be more perfectly enlightened by\ngrace than another. And a certain reason for this is on the part of\nhim who prepares himself for grace; since he who is better prepared\nfor grace, receives more grace. Yet it is not here that we must seek\nthe first cause of this diversity, since man prepares himself, only\ninasmuch as his free-will is prepared by God. Hence the first cause\nof this diversity is to be sought on the part of God, Who dispenses\nHis gifts of grace variously, in order that the beauty and perfection\nof the Church may result from these various degrees; even as He\ninstituted the various conditions of things, that the universe might\nbe perfect. Hence after the Apostle had said (Eph. 4:7): \"To every\none of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of\nChrist,\" having enumerated the various graces, he adds (Eph. 4:12):\n\"For the perfecting of the saints . . . for the edifying of the body\nof Christ.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Divine care may be looked at in two ways: first, as\nregards the Divine act, which is simple and uniform; and thus His\ncare looks equally to all, since by one simple act He administers\ngreat things and little. But, secondly, it may be considered in those\nthings which come to be considered by the Divine care; and thus,\ninequality is found, inasmuch as God by His care provides greater\ngifts to some, and lesser gifts for others.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This objection is based on the first kind of magnitude\nof grace; since grace cannot be greater by ordaining to a greater\ngood, but inasmuch as it more or less ordains to a greater or less\nparticipation of the same good. For there may be diversity of\nintensity and remissness, both in grace and in final glory as regards\nthe subjects' participation.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Natural life pertains to man's substance, and hence\ncannot be more or less; but man partakes of the life of grace\naccidentally, and hence man may possess it more or less.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 112, Art. 5]\n\nWhether Man Can Know That He Has Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that man can know that he has grace. For\ngrace by its physical reality is in the soul. Now the soul has most\ncertain knowledge of those things that are in it by their physical\nreality, as appears from Augustine (Gen. ad lit. xii, 31). Hence\ngrace may be known most certainly by one who has grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, as knowledge is a gift of God, so is grace. But\nwhoever receives knowledge from God, knows that he has knowledge,\naccording to Wis. 7:17: The Lord \"hath given me the true knowledge of\nthe things that are.\" Hence, with equal reason, whoever receives\ngrace from God, knows that he has grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, light is more knowable than darkness, since,\naccording to the Apostle (Eph. 5:13), \"all that is made manifest is\nlight.\" Now sin, which is spiritual darkness, may be known with\ncertainty by one that is in sin. Much more, therefore, may grace,\nwhich is spiritual light, be known.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 2:12): \"Now we have\nreceived not the Spirit of this world, but the Spirit that is of God;\nthat we may know the things that are given us from God.\" Now grace is\nGod's first gift. Hence, the man who receives grace by the Holy\nSpirit, by the same Holy Spirit knows the grace given to him.\n\nObj. 5: Further, it was said by the Lord to Abraham (Gen. 22:12):\n\"Now I know that thou fearest God,\" i.e. \"I have made thee know.\" Now\nHe is speaking there of chaste fear, which is not apart from grace.\nHence a man may know that he has grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Eccles. 9:1): \"Man knoweth not\nwhether he be worthy of love or hatred.\" Now sanctifying grace maketh\na man worthy of God's love. Therefore no one can know whether he has\nsanctifying grace.\n\n_I answer that,_ There are three ways of knowing a thing: first, by\nrevelation, and thus anyone may know that he has grace, for God by a\nspecial privilege reveals this at times to some, in order that the\njoy of safety may begin in them even in this life, and that they may\ncarry on toilsome works with greater trust and greater energy, and\nmay bear the evils of this present life, as when it was said to Paul\n(2 Cor. 12:9): \"My grace is sufficient for thee.\"\n\nSecondly, a man may, of himself, know something, and with certainty;\nand in this way no one can know that he has grace. For certitude\nabout a thing can only be had when we may judge of it by its proper\nprinciple. Thus it is by undemonstrable universal principles that\ncertitude is obtained concerning demonstrative conclusions. Now no\none can know he has the knowledge of a conclusion if he does not know\nits principle. But the principle of grace and its object is God, Who\nby reason of His very excellence is unknown to us, according to Job\n36:26: \"Behold God is great, exceeding our knowledge.\" And hence His\npresence in us and His absence cannot be known with certainty,\naccording to Job 9:11: \"If He come to me, I shall not see Him; if He\ndepart I shall not understand.\" And hence man cannot judge with\ncertainty that he has grace, according to 1 Cor. 4:3, 4: \"But neither\ndo I judge my own self . . . but He that judgeth me is the Lord.\"\n\nThirdly, things are known conjecturally by signs; and thus anyone may\nknow he has grace, when he is conscious of delighting in God, and of\ndespising worldly things, and inasmuch as a man is not conscious of\nany mortal sin. And thus it is written (Apoc. 2:17): \"To him that\novercometh I will give the hidden manna . . . which no man knoweth,\nbut he that receiveth it,\" because whoever receives it knows, by\nexperiencing a certain sweetness, which he who does not receive it,\ndoes not experience. Yet this knowledge is imperfect; hence the\nApostle says (1 Cor. 4:4): \"I am not conscious to myself of anything,\nyet am I not hereby justified,\" since, according to Ps. 18:13: \"Who\ncan understand sins? From my secret ones cleanse me, O Lord, and from\nthose of others spare Thy servant.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Those things which are in the soul by their physical\nreality, are known through experimental knowledge; in so far as\nthrough acts man has experience of their inward principles: thus when\nwe wish, we perceive that we have a will; and when we exercise the\nfunctions of life, we observe that there is life in us.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is an essential condition of knowledge that a man\nshould have certitude of the objects of knowledge; and again, it is\nan essential condition of faith that a man should be certain of the\nthings of faith, and this, because certitude belongs to the\nperfection of the intellect, wherein these gifts exist. Hence,\nwhoever has knowledge or faith is certain that he has them. But it is\notherwise with grace and charity and such like, which perfect the\nappetitive faculty.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Sin has for its principal object commutable good, which\nis known to us. But the object or end of grace is unknown to us on\naccount of the greatness of its light, according to 1 Tim. 6:16: \"Who\n. . . inhabiteth light inaccessible.\"\n\nReply Obj. 4: The Apostle is here speaking of the gifts of glory,\nwhich have been given to us in hope, and these we know most certainly\nby faith, although we do not know for certain that we have grace to\nenable us to merit them. Or it may be said that he is speaking of the\nprivileged knowledge, which comes of revelation. Hence he adds (1\nCor. 2:10): \"But to us God hath revealed them by His Spirit.\"\n\nReply Obj. 5: What was said to Abraham may refer to experimental\nknowledge which springs from deeds of which we are cognizant. For in\nthe deed that Abraham had just wrought, he could know experimentally\nthat he had the fear of God. Or it may refer to a revelation.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 113\n\nOF THE EFFECTS OF GRACE\n(In Ten Articles)\n\nWe have now to consider the effect of grace; (1) the justification of\nthe ungodly, which is the effect of operating grace; and (2) merit,\nwhich is the effect of cooperating grace. Under the first head there\nare ten points of inquiry:\n\n(1) What is the justification of the ungodly?\n\n(2) Whether grace is required for it?\n\n(3) Whether any movement of the free-will is required?\n\n(4) Whether a movement of faith is required?\n\n(5) Whether a movement of the free-will against sin is required?\n\n(6) Whether the remission of sins is to be reckoned with the\nforegoing?\n\n(7) Whether the justification of the ungodly is a work of time or is\nsudden?\n\n(8) Of the natural order of the things concurring to justification;\n\n(9) Whether the justification of the ungodly is God's greatest work?\n\n(10) Whether the justification of the ungodly is miraculous?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 1]\n\nWhether the Justification of the Ungodly Is the Remission of Sins?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is\nnot the remission of sins. For sin is opposed not only to justice,\nbut to all the other virtues, as stated above (Q. 71, A. 1). Now\njustification signifies a certain movement towards justice. Therefore\nnot even remission of sin is justification, since movement is from\none contrary to the other.\n\nObj. 2: Further, everything ought to be named from what is\npredominant in it, according to _De Anima_ ii, text. 49. Now the\nremission of sins is brought about chiefly by faith, according to\nActs 15:9: \"Purifying their hearts by faith\"; and by charity,\naccording to Prov. 10:12: \"Charity covereth all sins.\" Therefore the\nremission of sins ought to be named after faith or charity rather\nthan justice.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the remission of sins seems to be the same as being\ncalled, for whoever is called is afar off, and we are afar off from\nGod by sin. But one is called before being justified according to\nRom. 8:30: \"And whom He called, them He also justified.\" Therefore\njustification is not the remission of sins.\n\n_On the contrary,_ On Rom. 8:30, \"Whom He called, them He also\njustified,\" the gloss says i.e. \"by the remission of sins.\" Therefore\nthe remission of sins is justification.\n\n_I answer that,_ Justification taken passively implies a movement\ntowards justice, as heating implies a movement towards heat. But\nsince justice, by its nature, implies a certain rectitude of order,\nit may be taken in two ways: first, inasmuch as it implies a right\norder in man's act, and thus justice is placed amongst the\nvirtues--either as particular justice, which directs a man's acts by\nregulating them in relation to his fellowman--or as legal justice,\nwhich directs a man's acts by regulating them in their relation to\nthe common good of society, as appears from _Ethic._ v, 1.\n\nSecondly, justice is so-called inasmuch as it implies a certain\nrectitude of order in the interior disposition of a man, in so far as\nwhat is highest in man is subject to God, and the inferior powers of\nthe soul are subject to the superior, i.e. to the reason; and this\ndisposition the Philosopher calls \"justice metaphorically speaking\"\n(Ethic. v, 11). Now this justice may be in man in two ways: first, by\nsimple generation, which is from privation to form; and thus\njustification may belong even to such as are not in sin, when they\nreceive this justice from God, as Adam is said to have received\noriginal justice. Secondly, this justice may be brought about in man\nby a movement from one contrary to the other, and thus justification\nimplies a transmutation from the state of injustice to the aforesaid\nstate of justice. And it is thus we are now speaking of the\njustification of the ungodly, according to the Apostle (Rom. 4:5):\n\"But to him that worketh not, yet believeth in Him that justifieth\nthe ungodly,\" etc. And because movement is named after its term\n_whereto_ rather than from its term _whence,_ the transmutation\nwhereby anyone is changed by the remission of sins from the state of\nungodliness to the state of justice, borrows its name from its term\n_whereto,_ and is called \"justification of the ungodly.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: Every sin, inasmuch as it implies the disorder of a\nmind not subject to God, may be called injustice, as being contrary\nto the aforesaid justice, according to 1 John 3:4: \"Whosoever\ncommitteth sin, committeth also iniquity; and sin is iniquity.\" And\nthus the removal of any sin is called the justification of the\nungodly.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Faith and charity imply a special directing of the\nhuman mind to God by the intellect and will; whereas justice implies\na general rectitude of order. Hence this transmutation is named after\njustice rather than after charity or faith.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Being called refers to God's help moving and exciting\nour mind to give up sin, and this motion of God is not the remission\nof sins, but its cause.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 2]\n\nWhether the Infusion of Grace Is Required for the Remission of Guilt,\ni.e., for the Justification of the Ungodly?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that for the remission of guilt, which is\nthe justification of the ungodly, no infusion of grace is required.\nFor anyone may be moved from one contrary without being led to the\nother, if the contraries are not immediate. Now the state of guilt\nand the state of grace are not immediate contraries; for there is the\nmiddle state of innocence wherein a man has neither grace nor guilt.\nHence a man may be pardoned his guilt without his being brought to a\nstate of grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the remission of guilt consists in the Divine\nimputation, according to Ps. 31:2: \"Blessed is the man to whom the\nLord hath not imputed sin.\" Now the infusion of grace puts something\ninto our soul, as stated above (Q. 110, A. 1). Hence the infusion of\ngrace is not required for the remission of guilt.\n\nObj. 3: Further, no one can be subject to two contraries at once. Now\nsome sins are contraries, as wastefulness and miserliness. Hence\nwhoever is subject to the sin of wastefulness is not simultaneously\nsubject to the sin of miserliness, yet it may happen that he has been\nsubject to it hitherto. Hence by sinning with the vice of\nwastefulness he is freed from the sin of miserliness. And thus a sin\nis remitted without grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 3:24): \"Justified freely by\nHis grace.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ by sinning a man offends God as stated above (Q. 71,\nA. 5). Now an offense is remitted to anyone, only when the soul of\nthe offender is at peace with the offended. Hence sin is remitted to\nus, when God is at peace with us, and this peace consists in the love\nwhereby God loves us. Now God's love, considered on the part of the\nDivine act, is eternal and unchangeable; whereas, as regards the\neffect it imprints on us, it is sometimes interrupted, inasmuch as we\nsometimes fall short of it and once more require it. Now the effect\nof the Divine love in us, which is taken away by sin, is grace,\nwhereby a man is made worthy of eternal life, from which sin shuts\nhim out. Hence we could not conceive the remission of guilt, without\nthe infusion of grace.\n\nReply Obj. 1: More is required for an offender to pardon an offense,\nthan for one who has committed no offense, not to be hated. For it\nmay happen amongst men that one man neither hates nor loves another.\nBut if the other offends him, then the forgiveness of the offense can\nonly spring from a special goodwill. Now God's goodwill is said to be\nrestored to man by the gift of grace; and hence although a man before\nsinning may be without grace and without guilt, yet that he is\nwithout guilt after sinning can only be because he has grace.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As God's love consists not merely in the act of the\nDivine will but also implies a certain effect of grace, as stated\nabove (Q. 110, A. 1), so likewise, when God does not impute sin to a\nman, there is implied a certain effect in him to whom the sin is not\nimputed; for it proceeds from the Divine love, that sin is not\nimputed to a man by God.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i, 26), if to\nleave off sinning was the same as to have no sin, it would be enough\nif Scripture warned us thus: \"'My son, hast thou sinned? do so no\nmore?' Now this is not enough, but it is added: 'But for thy former\nsins also pray that they may be forgiven thee.'\" For the act of sin\npasses, but the guilt remains, as stated above (Q. 87, A. 6). Hence\nwhen anyone passes from the sin of one vice to the sin of a contrary\nvice, he ceases to have the act of the former sin, but he does not\ncease to have the guilt, hence he may have the guilt of both sins at\nonce. For sins are not contrary to each other on the part of their\nturning from God, wherein sin has its guilt.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 3]\n\nWhether for the Justification of the Ungodly Is Required a Movement\nof the Free-will?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no movement of the free-will is\nrequired for the justification of the ungodly. For we see that by the\nsacrament of Baptism, infants and sometimes adults are justified\nwithout a movement of their free-will: hence Augustine says (Confess.\niv) that when one of his friends was taken with a fever, \"he lay for\na long time senseless and in a deadly sweat, and when he was\ndespaired of, he was baptized without his knowing, and was\nregenerated\"; which is effected by sanctifying grace. Now God does\nnot confine His power to the sacraments. Hence He can justify a man\nwithout the sacraments, and without any movement of the free-will.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a man has not the use of reason when asleep, and\nwithout it there can be no movement of the free-will. But Solomon\nreceived from God the gift of wisdom when asleep, as related in 3\nKings 3 and 2 Paral 1. Hence with equal reason the gift of\nsanctifying grace is sometimes bestowed by God on man without the\nmovement of his free-will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, grace is preserved by the same cause as brings it\ninto being, for Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 12) that \"so ought\nman to turn to God as he is ever made just by Him.\" Now grace is\npreserved in man without a movement of his free-will. Hence it can be\ninfused in the beginning without a movement of the free-will.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (John 6:45): \"Every one that hath\nheard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me.\" Now to learn\ncannot be without a movement of the free-will, since the learner\nassents to the teacher. Hence, no one comes to the Father by\njustifying grace without a movement of the free-will.\n\n_I answer that,_ The justification of the ungodly is brought about by\nGod moving man to justice. For He it is \"that justifieth the ungodly\"\naccording to Rom. 4:5. Now God moves everything in its own manner,\njust as we see that in natural things, what is heavy and what is\nlight are moved differently, on account of their diverse natures.\nHence He moves man to justice according to the condition of his human\nnature. But it is man's proper nature to have free-will. Hence in him\nwho has the use of reason, God's motion to justice does not take\nplace without a movement of the free-will; but He so infuses the gift\nof justifying grace that at the same time He moves the free-will to\naccept the gift of grace, in such as are capable of being moved thus.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Infants are not capable of the movement of their\nfree-will; hence it is by the mere infusion of their souls that God\nmoves them to justice. Now this cannot be brought about without a\nsacrament; because as original sin, from which they are justified,\ndoes not come to them from their own will, but by carnal generation,\nso also is grace given them by Christ through spiritual regeneration.\nAnd the same reason holds good with madmen and idiots that have never\nhad the use of their free-will. But in the case of one who has had\nthe use of his free-will and afterwards has lost it either through\nsickness or sleep, he does not obtain justifying grace by the\nexterior rite of Baptism, or of any other sacrament, unless he\nintended to make use of this sacrament, and this can only be by the\nuse of his free-will. And it was in this way that he of whom\nAugustine speaks was regenerated, because both previously and\nafterwards he assented to the Baptism.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Solomon neither merited nor received wisdom whilst\nasleep; but it was declared to him in his sleep that on account of\nhis previous desire wisdom would be infused into him by God. Hence it\nis said in his person (Wis. 7:7): \"I wished, and understanding was\ngiven unto me.\"\n\nOr it may be said that his sleep was not natural, but was the sleep\nof prophecy, according to Num. 12:6: \"If there be among you a prophet\nof the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him\nin a dream.\" In such cases the use of free-will remains.\n\nAnd yet it must be observed that the comparison between the gift of\nwisdom and the gift of justifying grace does not hold. For the gift\nof justifying grace especially ordains a man to good, which is the\nobject of the will; and hence a man is moved to it by a movement of\nthe will which is a movement of free-will. But wisdom perfects the\nintellect which precedes the will; hence without any complete\nmovement of the free-will, the intellect can be enlightened with the\ngift of wisdom, even as we see that things are revealed to men in\nsleep, according to Job 33:15, 16: \"When deep sleep falleth upon men\nand they are sleeping in their beds, then He openeth the ears of men,\nand teaching, instructeth them in what they are to learn.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: In the infusion of justifying grace there is a certain\ntransmutation of the human soul, and hence a proper movement of the\nhuman soul is required in order that the soul may be moved in its own\nmanner. But the conservation of grace is without transmutation: no\nmovement on the part of the soul is required but only a continuation\nof the Divine influx.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 4]\n\nWhether a Movement of Faith Is Required for the Justification of the\nUngodly?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no movement of faith is required for\nthe justification of the ungodly. For as a man is justified by faith,\nso also by other things, viz. by fear, of which it is written\n(Ecclus. 1:27): \"The fear of the Lord driveth out sin, for he that is\nwithout fear cannot be justified\"; and again by charity, according to\nLuke 7:47: \"Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much\";\nand again by humility, according to James 4:6: \"God resisteth the\nproud and giveth grace to the humble\"; and again by mercy, according\nto Prov. 15:27: \"By mercy and faith sins are purged away.\" Hence the\nmovement of faith is no more required for the justification of the\nungodly, than the movements of the aforesaid virtues.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the act of faith is required for justification only\ninasmuch as a man knows God by faith. But a man may know God in other\nways, viz. by natural knowledge, and by the gift of wisdom. Hence no\nact of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly.\n\nObj. 3: Further, there are several articles of faith. Therefore if\nthe act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly, it\nwould seem that a man ought to think on every article of faith when\nhe is first justified. But this seems inconvenient, since such\nthought would require a long delay of time. Hence it seems that an\nact of faith is not required for the justification of the ungodly.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Rom. 5:1): \"Being justified\ntherefore by faith, let us have peace with God.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3) a movement of free-will is\nrequired for the justification of the ungodly, inasmuch as man's mind\nis moved by God. Now God moves man's soul by turning it to Himself\naccording to Ps. 84:7 (Septuagint): \"Thou wilt turn us, O God, and\nbring us to life.\" Hence for the justification of the ungodly a\nmovement of the mind is required, by which it is turned to God. Now\nthe first turning to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: \"He\nthat cometh to God must believe that He is.\" Hence a movement of\nfaith is required for the justification of the ungodly.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The movement of faith is not perfect unless it is\nquickened by charity; hence in the justification of the ungodly, a\nmovement of charity is infused together with the movement of faith.\nNow free-will is moved to God by being subject to Him; hence an act\nof filial fear and an act of humility also concur. For it may happen\nthat one and the same act of free-will springs from different\nvirtues, when one commands and another is commanded, inasmuch as the\nact may be ordained to various ends. But the act of mercy counteracts\nsin either by way of satisfying for it, and thus it follows\njustification; or by way of preparation, inasmuch as the merciful\nobtain mercy; and thus it can either precede justification, or concur\nwith the other virtues towards justification, inasmuch as mercy is\nincluded in the love of our neighbor.\n\nReply Obj. 2: By natural knowledge a man is not turned to God,\naccording as He is the object of beatitude and the cause of\njustification. Hence such knowledge does not suffice for\njustification. But the gift of wisdom presupposes the knowledge of\nfaith, as stated above (Q. 68, A. 4, ad 3).\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the Apostle says (Rom. 4:5), \"to him that . . .\nbelieveth in Him that justifieth the ungodly his faith is reputed to\njustice, according to the purpose of the grace of God.\" Hence it is\nclear that in the justification of the ungodly an act of faith is\nrequired in order that a man may believe that God justifies man\nthrough the mystery of Christ.\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 5]\n\nWhether for the Justification of the Ungodly There Is Required a\nMovement of the Free-will Towards Sin?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that no movement of the free-will towards\nsin is required for the justification of the ungodly. For charity\nalone suffices to take away sin, according to Prov. 10:12: \"Charity\ncovereth all sins.\" Now the object of charity is not sin. Therefore\nfor this justification of the ungodly no movement of the free-will\ntowards sin is required.\n\nObj. 2: Further, whoever is tending onward, ought not to look back,\naccording to Phil. 3:13, 14: \"Forgetting the things that are behind,\nand stretching forth myself to those that are before, I press towards\nthe mark, to the prize of the supernal vocation.\" But whoever is\nstretching forth to righteousness has his sins behind him. Hence he\nought to forget them, and not stretch forth to them by a movement of\nhis free-will.\n\nObj. 3: Further, in the justification of the ungodly one sin is not\nremitted without another, for \"it is irreverent to expect half a\npardon from God\" [*Cap., Sunt. plures: Dist. iii, De Poenit.]. Hence,\nin the justification of the ungodly, if man's free-will must move\nagainst sin, he ought to think of all his sins. But this is unseemly,\nboth because a great space of time would be required for such\nthought, and because a man could not obtain the forgiveness of such\nsins as he had forgotten. Hence for the justification of the ungodly\nno movement of the free-will is required.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 31:5): \"I will confess against\nmyself my injustice to the Lord; and Thou hast forgiven the\nwickedness of my sin.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), the justification of the\nungodly is a certain movement whereby the human mind is moved by God\nfrom the state of sin to the state of justice. Hence it is necessary\nfor the human mind to regard both extremes by an act of free-will, as\na body in local movement is related to both terms of the movement.\nNow it is clear that in local movement the moving body leaves the\nterm _whence_ and nears the term _whereto._ Hence the human mind\nwhilst it is being justified, must, by a movement of its free-will\nwithdraw from sin and draw near to justice.\n\nNow to withdraw from sin and to draw near to justice, in an act of\nfree-will, means detestation and desire. For Augustine says on the\nwords \"the hireling fleeth,\" etc. (John 10:12): \"Our emotions are the\nmovements of our soul; joy is the soul's outpouring; fear is the\nsoul's flight; your soul goes forward when you seek; your soul flees,\nwhen you are afraid.\" Hence in the justification of the ungodly there\nmust be two acts of the free-will--one, whereby it tends to God's\njustice; the other whereby it hates sin.\n\nReply Obj. 1: It belongs to the same virtue to seek one contrary and\nto avoid the other; and hence, as it belongs to charity to love God,\nso likewise, to detest sin whereby the soul is separated from God.\n\nReply Obj. 2: A man ought not to return to those things that are\nbehind, by loving them; but, for that matter, he ought to forget\nthem, lest he be drawn to them. Yet he ought to recall them to mind,\nin order to detest them; for this is to fly from them.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Previous to justification a man must detest each sin he\nremembers to have committed, and from this remembrance the soul goes\non to have a general movement of detestation with regard to all sins\ncommitted, in which are included such sins as have been forgotten.\nFor a man is then in such a frame of mind that he would be sorry even\nfor those he does not remember, if they were present to his memory;\nand this movement cooperates in his justification.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 6]\n\nWhether the Remission of Sins Ought to Be Reckoned Amongst the Things\nRequired for Justification?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the remission of sins ought not to be\nreckoned amongst the things required for justification. For the\nsubstance of a thing is not reckoned together with those that are\nrequired for a thing; thus a man is not reckoned together with his\nbody and soul. But the justification of the ungodly is itself the\nremission of sins, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the remission of\nsins ought not to be reckoned among the things required for the\njustification of the ungodly.\n\nObj. 2: Further, infusion of grace and remission of sins are the\nsame; as illumination and expulsion of darkness are the same. But a\nthing ought not to be reckoned together with itself; for unity is\nopposed to multitude. Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be\nreckoned with the infusion of grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the remission of sin follows as effect from cause,\nfrom the free-will's movement towards God and sin; since it is by\nfaith and contrition that sin is forgiven. But an effect ought not to\nbe reckoned with its cause; since things thus enumerated together,\nand, as it were, condivided, are by nature simultaneous. Hence the\nremission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the things required\nfor the justification of the ungodly.\n\n_On the contrary,_ In reckoning what is required for a thing we ought\nnot to pass over the end, which is the chief part of everything. Now\nthe remission of sins is the end of the justification of the ungodly;\nfor it is written (Isa. 27:9): \"This is all the fruit, that the sin\nthereof should be taken away.\" Hence the remission of sins ought to\nbe reckoned amongst the things required for justification.\n\n_I answer that,_ There are four things which are accounted to be\nnecessary for the justification of the ungodly, viz. the infusion of\ngrace, the movement of the free-will towards God by faith, the\nmovement of the free-will towards sin, and the remission of sins. The\nreason for this is that, as stated above (A. 1), the\njustification of the ungodly is a movement whereby the soul is moved\nby God from a state of sin to a state of justice. Now in the movement\nwhereby one thing is moved by another, three things are required:\nfirst, the motion of the mover; secondly, the movement of the moved;\nthirdly, the consummation of the movement, or the attainment of the\nend. On the part of the Divine motion, there is the infusion of grace;\non the part of the free-will which is moved, there are two\nmovements--of departure from the term _whence,_ and of approach to\nthe term _whereto_; but the consummation of the movement or the\nattainment of the end of the movement is implied in the remission of\nsins; for in this is the justification of the ungodly completed.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The justification of the ungodly is called the\nremission of sins, even as every movement has its species from its\nterm. Nevertheless, many other things are required in order to reach\nthe term, as stated above (A. 5).\n\nReply Obj. 2: The infusion of grace and the remission of sin\nmay be considered in two ways: first, with respect to the substance of\nthe act, and thus they are the same; for by the same act God bestows\ngrace and remits sin. Secondly, they may be considered on the part of\nthe objects; and thus they differ by the difference between guilt,\nwhich is taken away, and grace, which is infused; just as in natural\nthings generation and corruption differ, although the generation of\none thing is the corruption of another.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This enumeration is not the division of a genus\ninto its species, in which the things enumerated must be simultaneous;\nbut it is division of the things required for the completion of\nanything; and in this enumeration we may have what precedes and what\nfollows, since some of the principles and parts of a composite thing\nmay precede and some follow.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 7]\n\nWhether the Justification of the Ungodly Takes Place in an Instant or\nSuccessively?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly does\nnot take place in an instant, but successively, since, as already\nstated (A. 3), for the justification of the ungodly, there is\nrequired a movement of free-will. Now the act of the free-will is\nchoice, which requires the deliberation of counsel, as stated above\n(Q. 13, A. 1). Hence, since deliberation implies a certain reasoning\nprocess, and this implies succession, the justification of the\nungodly would seem to be successive.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the free-will's movement is not without actual\nconsideration. But it is impossible to understand many things\nactually and at once, as stated above (I, Q. 85, A. 4). Hence, since\nfor the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of\nthe free-will towards several things, viz. towards God and towards\nsin, it would seem impossible for the justification of the ungodly to\nbe in an instant.\n\nObj. 3: Further, a form that may be greater or less, e.g. blackness\nor whiteness, is received successively by its subject. Now grace may\nbe greater or less, as stated above (Q. 112, A. 4). Hence it is not\nreceived suddenly by its subject. Therefore, seeing that the infusion\nof grace is required for the justification of the ungodly, it would\nseem that the justification of the ungodly cannot be in an instant.\n\nObj. 4: Further, the free-will's movement, which cooperates in\njustification, is meritorious; and hence it must proceed from grace,\nwithout which there is no merit, as we shall state further on (Q.\n114, A. 2). Now a thing receives its form before operating by this\nform. Hence grace is first infused, and then the free-will is moved\ntowards God and to detest sin. Hence justification is not all at once.\n\nObj. 5: Further, if grace is infused into the soul, there must be an\ninstant when it first dwells in the soul; so, too, if sin is forgiven\nthere must be a last instant that man is in sin. But it cannot be the\nsame instant, otherwise opposites would be in the same\nsimultaneously. Hence they must be two successive instants; between\nwhich there must be time, as the Philosopher says (Phys. vi, 1).\nTherefore the justification of the ungodly takes place not all at\nonce, but successively.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The justification of the ungodly is caused by the\njustifying grace of the Holy Spirit. Now the Holy Spirit comes to\nmen's minds suddenly, according to Acts 2:2: \"And suddenly there came\na sound from heaven as of a mighty wind coming,\" upon which the gloss\nsays that \"the grace of the Holy Ghost knows no tardy efforts.\" Hence\nthe justification of the ungodly is not successive, but instantaneous.\n\n_I answer that,_ The entire justification of the ungodly consists as\nto its origin in the infusion of grace. For it is by grace that\nfree-will is moved and sin is remitted. Now the infusion of grace\ntakes place in an instant and without succession. And the reason of\nthis is that if a form be not suddenly impressed upon its subject, it\nis either because that subject is not disposed, or because the agent\nneeds time to dispose the subject. Hence we see that immediately the\nmatter is disposed by a preceding alteration, the substantial form\naccrues to the matter; thus because the atmosphere of itself is\ndisposed to receive light, it is suddenly illuminated by a body\nactually luminous. Now it was stated (Q. 112, A. 2) that God, in\norder to infuse grace into the soul, needs no disposition, save what\nHe Himself has made. And sometimes this sufficient disposition for\nthe reception of grace He makes suddenly, sometimes gradually and\nsuccessively, as stated above (Q. 112, A. 2, ad 2). For the reason\nwhy a natural agent cannot suddenly dispose matter is that in the\nmatter there is a resistant which has some disproportion with the\npower of the agent; and hence we see that the stronger the agent, the\nmore speedily is the matter disposed. Therefore, since the Divine\npower is infinite, it can suddenly dispose any matter whatsoever to\nits form; and much more man's free-will, whose movement is by nature\ninstantaneous. Therefore the justification of the ungodly by God\ntakes place in an instant.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The movement of the free-will, which concurs in the\njustification of the ungodly, is a consent to detest sin, and to draw\nnear to God; and this consent takes place suddenly. Sometimes,\nindeed, it happens that deliberation precedes, yet this is not of the\nsubstance of justification, but a way of justification; as local\nmovement is a way of illumination, and alteration to generation.\n\nReply Obj. 2: As stated above (I, Q. 85, A. 5), there is nothing to\nprevent two things being understood at once, in so far as they are\nsomehow one; thus we understand the subject and predicate together,\ninasmuch as they are united in the order of one affirmation. And in\nthe same manner can the free-will be moved to two things at once in\nso far as one is ordained to the other. Now the free-will's movement\ntowards sin is ordained to the free-will's movement towards God,\nsince a man detests sin, as contrary to God, to Whom he wishes to\ncling. Hence in the justification of the ungodly the free-will\nsimultaneously detests sin and turns to God, even as a body\napproaches one point and withdraws from another simultaneously.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The reason why a form is not received instantaneously\nin the matter is not the fact that it can inhere more or less; for\nthus the light would not be suddenly received in the air, which can\nbe illumined more or less. But the reason is to be sought on the part\nof the disposition of the matter or subject, as stated above.\n\nReply Obj. 4: The same instant the form is acquired, the thing begins\nto operate with the form; as fire, the instant it is generated moves\nupwards, and if its movement was instantaneous, it would be\nterminated in the same instant. Now to will and not to will--the\nmovements of the free-will--are not successive, but instantaneous.\nHence the justification of the ungodly must not be successive.\n\nReply Obj. 5: The succession of opposites in the same subject must be\nlooked at differently in the things that are subject to time and in\nthose that are above time. For in those that are in time, there is no\nlast instant in which the previous form inheres in the subject; but\nthere is the last time, and the first instant that the subsequent\nform inheres in the matter or subject; and this for the reason, that\nin time we are not to consider one instant, since neither do instants\nsucceed each other immediately in time, nor points in a line, as is\nproved in _Physic._ vi, 1. But time is terminated by an instant.\nHence in the whole of the previous time wherein anything is moving\ntowards its form, it is under the opposite form; but in the last\ninstant of this time, which is the first instant of the subsequent\ntime, it has the form which is the term of the movement.\n\nBut in those that are above time, it is otherwise. For if there be\nany succession of affections or intellectual conceptions in them (as\nin the angels), such succession is not measured by continuous time,\nbut by discrete time, even as the things measured are not continuous,\nas stated above (I, Q. 53, AA. 2, 3). In these, therefore, there is a\nlast instant in which the preceding is, and a first instant in which\nthe subsequent is. Nor must there be time in between, since there is\nno continuity of time, which this would necessitate.\n\nNow the human mind, which is justified, is, in itself, above time,\nbut is subject to time accidentally, inasmuch as it understands with\ncontinuity and time, with respect to the phantasms in which it\nconsiders the intelligible species, as stated above (I, Q. 85, AA. 1,\n2). We must, therefore, decide from this about its change as regards\nthe condition of temporal movements, i.e. we must say that there is\nno last instant that sin inheres, but a last time; whereas there is a\nfirst instant that grace inheres; and in all the time previous sin\ninhered.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 8]\n\nWhether the Infusion of Grace Is Naturally the First of the Things\nRequired for the Justification of the Ungodly?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the infusion of grace is not what is\nnaturally required first for the justification of the ungodly. For we\nwithdraw from evil before drawing near to good, according to Ps.\n33:15: \"Turn away from evil, and do good.\" Now the remission of sins\nregards the turning away from evil, and the infusion of grace regards\nthe turning to good. Hence the remission of sin is naturally before\nthe infusion of grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the disposition naturally precedes the form to which\nit disposes. Now the free-will's movement is a disposition for the\nreception of grace. Therefore it naturally precedes the infusion of\ngrace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, sin hinders the soul from tending freely to God. Now\na hindrance to movement must be removed before the movement takes\nplace. Hence the remission of sin and the free-will's movement\ntowards sin are naturally before the infusion of grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The cause is naturally prior to its effect. Now\nthe infusion of grace is the cause of whatever is required for the\njustification of the ungodly, as stated above (A. 7). Therefore it is\nnaturally prior to it.\n\n_I answer that,_ The aforesaid four things required for the\njustification of the ungodly are simultaneous in time, since the\njustification of the ungodly is not successive, as stated above (A.\n7); but in the order of nature, one is prior to another; and in their\nnatural order the first is the infusion of grace; the second, the\nfree-will's movement towards God; the third, the free-will's movement\ntowards sin; the fourth, the remission of sin.\n\nThe reason for this is that in every movement the motion of the mover\nis naturally first; the disposition of the matter, or the movement of\nthe moved, is second; the end or term of the movement in which the\nmotion of the mover rests, is last. Now the motion of God the Mover\nis the infusion of grace, as stated above (A. 6); the movement or\ndisposition of the moved is the free-will's double movement; and the\nterm or end of the movement is the remission of sin, as stated above\n(A. 6). Hence in their natural order the first in the justification\nof the ungodly is the infusion of grace; the second is the\nfree-will's movement towards God; the third is the free-will's\nmovement towards sin, for he who is being justified detests sin\nbecause it is against God, and thus the free-will's movement towards\nGod naturally precedes the free-will's movement towards sin, since it\nis its cause and reason; the fourth and last is the remission of sin,\nto which this transmutation is ordained as to an end, as stated above\n(AA. 1, 6).\n\nReply Obj. 1: The withdrawal from one term and approach to another\nmay be looked at in two ways: first, on the part of the thing moved,\nand thus the withdrawal from a term naturally precedes the approach\nto a term, since in the subject of movement the opposite which is put\naway is prior to the opposite which the subject moved attains to by\nits movement. But on the part of the agent it is the other way about,\nsince the agent, by the form pre-existing in it, acts for the removal\nof the opposite form; as the sun by its light acts for the removal of\ndarkness, and hence on the part of the sun, illumination is prior to\nthe removal of darkness; but on the part of the atmosphere to be\nilluminated, to be freed from darkness is, in the order of nature,\nprior to being illuminated, although both are simultaneous in time.\nAnd since the infusion of grace and the remission of sin regard God\nWho justifies, hence in the order of nature the infusion of grace is\nprior to the freeing from sin. But if we look at what is on the part\nof the man justified, it is the other way about, since in the order\nof nature the being freed from sin is prior to the obtaining of\njustifying grace. Or it may be said that the term _whence_ of\njustification is sin; and the term _whereto_ is justice; and that\ngrace is the cause of the forgiveness of sin and of obtaining of\njustice.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The disposition of the subject precedes the reception\nof the form, in the order of nature; yet it follows the action of the\nagent, whereby the subject is disposed. And hence the free-will's\nmovement precedes the reception of grace in the order of nature, and\nfollows the infusion of grace.\n\nReply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 9), in movements of\nthe soul the movement toward the speculative principle or the\npractical end is the very first, but in exterior movements the\nremoval of the impediment precedes the attainment of the end. And as\nthe free-will's movement is a movement of the soul, in the order of\nnature it moves towards God as to its end, before removing the\nimpediment of sin.\n________________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 9]\n\nWhether the Justification of the Ungodly Is God's Greatest Work?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is\nnot God's greatest work. For it is by the justification of the\nungodly that we attain the grace of a wayfarer. Now by glorification\nwe receive heavenly grace, which is greater. Hence the glorification\nof angels and men is a greater work than the justification of the\nungodly.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the justification of the ungodly is ordained to the\nparticular good of one man. But the good of the universe is greater\nthan the good of one man, as is plain from _Ethic._ i, 2. Hence the\ncreation of heaven and earth is a greater work than the justification\nof the ungodly.\n\nObj. 3: Further, to make something from nothing, where there is\nnought to cooperate with the agent, is greater than to make something\nwith the cooperation of the recipient. Now in the work of creation\nsomething is made from nothing, and hence nothing can cooperate with\nthe agent; but in the justification of the ungodly God makes\nsomething from something, i.e. a just man from a sinner, and there is\na cooperation on man's part, since there is a movement of the\nfree-will, as stated above (A. 3). Hence the justification of the\nungodly is not God's greatest work.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 144:9): \"His tender mercies are\nover all His works,\" and in a collect [*Tenth Sunday after Pentecost]\nwe say: \"O God, Who dost show forth Thine all-mightiness most by\npardoning and having mercy,\" and Augustine, expounding the words,\n\"greater than these shall he do\" (John 14:12) says that \"for a just\nman to be made from a sinner, is greater than to create heaven and\nearth.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ A work may be called great in two ways: first, on the\npart of the mode of action, and thus the work of creation is the\ngreatest work, wherein something is made from nothing; secondly, a\nwork may be called great on account of what is made, and thus the\njustification of the ungodly, which terminates at the eternal good of\na share in the Godhead, is greater than the creation of heaven and\nearth, which terminates at the good of mutable nature. Hence,\nAugustine, after saying that \"for a just man to be made from a sinner\nis greater than to create heaven and earth,\" adds, \"for heaven and\nearth shall pass away, but the justification of the ungodly shall\nendure.\"\n\nAgain, we must bear in mind that a thing is called great in two ways:\nfirst, in an absolute quantity, and thus the gift of glory is greater\nthan the gift of grace that sanctifies the ungodly; and in this\nrespect the glorification of the just is greater than the\njustification of the ungodly. Secondly, a thing may be said to be\ngreat in proportionate quantity, and thus the gift of grace that\njustifies the ungodly is greater than the gift of glory that beatifies\nthe just, for the gift of grace exceeds the worthiness of the ungodly,\nwho are worthy of punishment, more than the gift of glory exceeds the\nworthiness of the just, who by the fact of their justification are\nworthy of glory. Hence Augustine says: \"Let him that can, judge\nwhether it is greater to create the angels just, than to justify the\nungodly. Certainly, if they both betoken equal power, one betokens\ngreater mercy.\"\n\nAnd thus the reply to the first [objection] is clear.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The good of the universe is greater than the\nparticular good of one, if we consider both in the same genus. But the\ngood of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole\nuniverse.\n\nReply Obj. 3: This objection rests on the manner of acting, in\nwhich way creation is God's greatest work.\n________________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 113, Art. 10]\n\nWhether the Justification of the Ungodly Is a Miraculous Work?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is a\nmiraculous work. For miraculous works are greater than\nnon-miraculous. Now the justification of the ungodly is greater than\nthe other miraculous works, as is clear from the quotation from\nAugustine (A. 9). Hence the justification of the ungodly is a\nmiraculous work.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the movement of the will in the soul is like the\nnatural inclination in natural things. But when God works in natural\nthings against their inclination of their nature, it is a miraculous\nwork, as when He gave sight to the blind or raised the dead. Now the\nwill of the ungodly is bent on evil. Hence, since God in justifying a\nman moves him to good, it would seem that the justification of the\nungodly is miraculous.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as wisdom is a gift of God, so also is justice. Now\nit is miraculous that anyone should suddenly obtain wisdom from God\nwithout study. Therefore it is miraculous that the ungodly should be\njustified by God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Miraculous works are beyond natural power. Now the\njustification of the ungodly is not beyond natural power; for\nAugustine says (De Praed. Sanct. v) that \"to be capable of having\nfaith and to be capable of having charity belongs to man's nature;\nbut to have faith and charity belongs to the grace of the faithful.\"\nTherefore the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous.\n\n_I answer that,_ In miraculous works it is usual to find three\nthings: the first is on the part of the active power, because they\ncan only be performed by Divine power; and they are simply wondrous,\nsince their cause is hidden, as stated above (I, Q. 105, A. 7). And\nthus both the justification of the ungodly and the creation of the\nworld, and, generally speaking, every work that can be done by God\nalone, is miraculous.\n\nSecondly, in certain miraculous works it is found that the form\nintroduced is beyond the natural power of such matter, as in the\nresurrection of the dead, life is above the natural power of such a\nbody. And thus the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous,\nbecause the soul is naturally capable of grace; since from its having\nbeen made to the likeness of God, it is fit to receive God by grace,\nas Augustine says, in the above quotation.\n\nThirdly, in miraculous works something is found besides the usual and\ncustomary order of causing an effect, as when a sick man suddenly and\nbeyond the wonted course of healing by nature or art, receives\nperfect health; and thus the justification of the ungodly is\nsometimes miraculous and sometimes not. For the common and wonted\ncourse of justification is that God moves the soul interiorly and\nthat man is converted to God, first by an imperfect conversion, that\nit may afterwards become perfect; because \"charity begun merits\nincrease, and when increased merits perfection,\" as Augustine says\n(In Epist. Joan. Tract. v). Yet God sometimes moves the soul so\nvehemently that it reaches the perfection of justice at once, as took\nplace in the conversion of Paul, which was accompanied at the same\ntime by a miraculous external prostration. Hence the conversion of\nPaul is commemorated in the Church as miraculous.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Certain miraculous works, although they are less than\nthe justification of the ungodly, as regards the good caused, are\nbeyond the wonted order of such effects, and thus have more of the\nnature of a miracle.\n\nReply Obj. 2: It is not a miraculous work, whenever a natural thing\nis moved contrary to its inclination, otherwise it would be\nmiraculous for water to be heated, or for a stone to be thrown\nupwards; but only whenever this takes place beyond the order of the\nproper cause, which naturally does this. Now no other cause save God\ncan justify the ungodly, even as nothing save fire can heat water.\nHence the justification of the ungodly by God is not miraculous in\nthis respect.\n\nReply Obj. 3: A man naturally acquires wisdom and knowledge\nfrom God by his own talent and study. Hence it is miraculous when a\nman is made wise or learned outside this order. But a man does not\nnaturally acquire justifying grace by his own action, but by God's.\nHence there is no parity.\n________________________\n\nQUESTION 114\n\nOF MERIT\n(In Ten Articles)\n\nWe must now consider merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace;\nand under this head there are ten points of inquiry:\n\n(1) Whether a man can merit anything from God?\n\n(2) Whether without grace anyone can merit eternal life?\n\n(3) Whether anyone with grace may merit eternal life condignly?\n\n(4) Whether it is chiefly through the instrumentality of charity that\ngrace is the principle of merit?\n\n(5) Whether a man may merit the first grace for himself?\n\n(6) Whether he may merit it for someone else?\n\n(7) Whether anyone can merit restoration after sin?\n\n(8) Whether he can merit for himself an increase of grace or charity?\n\n(9) Whether he can merit final perseverance?\n\n(10) Whether temporal goods fall under merit?\n________________________\n\nFIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 1]\n\nWhether a Man May Merit Anything from God?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man can merit nothing from God. For\nno one, it would seem, merits by giving another his due. But by all\nthe good we do, we cannot make sufficient return to God, since yet\nmore is His due, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14).\nHence it is written (Luke 17:10): \"When you have done all these\nthings that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we\nhave done that which we ought to do.\" Therefore a man can merit\nnothing from God.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it would seem that a man merits nothing from God, by\nwhat profits himself only, and profits God nothing. Now by acting\nwell, a man profits himself or another man, but not God, for it is\nwritten (Job 35:7): \"If thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him, or\nwhat shall He receive of thy hand.\" Hence a man can merit nothing\nfrom God.\n\nObj. 3: Further, whoever merits anything from another makes him his\ndebtor; for a man's wage is a debt due to him. Now God is no one's\ndebtor; hence it is written (Rom. 11:35): \"Who hath first given to\nHim, and recompense shall be made to him?\" Hence no one can merit\nanything from God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 31:16): \"There is a reward for\nthy work.\" Now a reward means something bestowed by reason of merit.\nHence it would seem that a man may merit from God.\n\n_I answer that,_ Merit and reward refer to the same, for a reward\nmeans something given anyone in return for work or toil, as a price\nfor it. Hence, as it is an act of justice to give a just price for\nanything received from another, so also is it an act of justice to\nmake a return for work or toil. Now justice is a kind of equality, as\nis clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3), and hence justice is\nsimply between those that are simply equal; but where there is no\nabsolute equality between them, neither is there absolute justice,\nbut there may be a certain manner of justice, as when we speak of a\nfather's or a master's right (Ethic. v, 6), as the Philosopher says.\nAnd hence where there is justice simply, there is the character of\nmerit and reward simply. But where there is no simple right, but only\nrelative, there is no character of merit simply, but only relatively,\nin so far as the character of justice is found there, since the child\nmerits something from his father and the slave from his lord.\n\nNow it is clear that between God and man there is the greatest\ninequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all man's good is from\nGod. Hence there can be no justice of absolute equality between man\nand God, but only of a certain proportion, inasmuch as both operate\nafter their own manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue is\nin man from God. Hence man's merit with God only exists on the\npresupposition of the Divine ordination, so that man obtains from\nGod, as a reward of his operation, what God gave him the power of\noperation for, even as natural things by their proper movements and\noperations obtain that to which they were ordained by God;\ndifferently, indeed, since the rational creature moves itself to act\nby its free-will, hence its action has the character of merit, which\nis not so in other creatures.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Man merits, inasmuch as he does what he ought, by his\nfree-will; otherwise the act of justice whereby anyone discharges a\ndebt would not be meritorious.\n\nReply Obj. 2: God seeks from our goods not profit, but glory, i.e.\nthe manifestation of His goodness; even as He seeks it also in\nHis own works. Now nothing accrues to Him, but only to ourselves, by\nour worship of Him. Hence we merit from God, not that by our works\nanything accrues to Him, but inasmuch as we work for His glory.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Since our action has the character of merit, only on\nthe presupposition of the Divine ordination, it does not follow\nthat God is made our debtor simply, but His own, inasmuch as it\nis right that His will should be carried out.\n________________________\n\nSECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 2]\n\nWhether Anyone Without Grace Can Merit Eternal Life?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that without grace anyone can merit\neternal life. For man merits from God what he is divinely ordained\nto, as stated above (A. 1). Now man by his nature is ordained to\nbeatitude as his end; hence, too, he naturally wishes to be blessed.\nHence man by his natural endowments and without grace can merit\nbeatitude which is eternal life.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the less a work is due, the more meritorious it is.\nNow, less due is that work which is done by one who has received\nfewer benefits. Hence, since he who has only natural endowments has\nreceived fewer gifts from God, than he who has gratuitous gifts as\nwell as nature, it would seem that his works are more meritorious\nwith God. And thus if he who has grace can merit eternal life to some\nextent, much more may he who has no grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, God's mercy and liberality infinitely surpass human\nmercy and liberality. Now a man may merit from another, even though\nhe has not hitherto had his grace. Much more, therefore, would it\nseem that a man without grace may merit eternal life.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Rom. 6:23): \"The grace of God,\nlife everlasting.\"\n\n_I answer that,_ Man without grace may be looked at in two states, as\nwas said above (Q. 109, A. 2): the first, a state of perfect nature,\nin which Adam was before his sin; the second, a state of corrupt\nnature, in which we are before being restored by grace. Therefore, if\nwe speak of man in the first state, there is only one reason why man\ncannot merit eternal life without grace, by his purely natural\nendowments, viz. because man's merit depends on the Divine\npre-ordination. Now no act of anything whatsoever is divinely\nordained to anything exceeding the proportion of the powers which are\nthe principles of its act; for it is a law of Divine providence that\nnothing shall act beyond its powers. Now everlasting life is a good\nexceeding the proportion of created nature; since it exceeds its\nknowledge and desire, according to 1 Cor. 2:9: \"Eye hath not seen,\nnor ear heard, neither hath it entered into the heart of man.\" And\nhence it is that no created nature is a sufficient principle of an\nact meritorious of eternal life, unless there is added a supernatural\ngift, which we call grace. But if we speak of man as existing in sin,\na second reason is added to this, viz. the impediment of sin. For\nsince sin is an offense against God, excluding us from eternal life,\nas is clear from what has been said above (Q. 71, A. 6; Q. 113, A.\n2), no one existing in a state of mortal sin can merit eternal life\nunless first he be reconciled to God, through his sin being forgiven,\nwhich is brought about by grace. For the sinner deserves not life,\nbut death, according to Rom. 6:23: \"The wages of sin is death.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: God ordained human nature to attain the end of eternal\nlife, not by its own strength, but by the help of grace; and in this\nway its act can be meritorious of eternal life.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Without grace a man cannot have a work equal to a work\nproceeding from grace, since the more perfect the principle, the more\nperfect the action. But the objection would hold good, if we supposed\nthe operations equal in both cases.\n\nReply Obj. 3: With regard to the first reason adduced, the case is\ndifferent in God and in man. For a man receives all his power of\nwell-doing from God, and not from man. Hence a man can merit nothing\nfrom God except by His gift, which the Apostle expresses aptly saying\n(Rom. 11:35): \"Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be\nmade to him?\" But man may merit from man, before he has received\nanything from him, by what he has received from God.\n\nBut as regards the second proof taken from the impediment of sin, the\ncase is similar with man and God, since one man cannot merit from\nanother whom he has offended, unless he makes satisfaction to him and\nis reconciled.\n________________________\n\nTHIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 3]\n\nWhether a Man in Grace Can Merit Eternal Life Condignly?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man in grace cannot merit eternal\nlife condignly, for the Apostle says (Rom. 8:18): \"The sufferings of\nthis time are not worthy (_condignae_) to be compared with the glory\nto come, that shall be revealed in us.\" But of all meritorious works,\nthe sufferings of the saints would seem the most meritorious.\nTherefore no works of men are meritorious of eternal life condignly.\n\nObj. 2: Further, on Rom. 6:23, \"The grace of God, life everlasting,\"\na gloss says: \"He might have truly said: 'The wages of justice, life\neverlasting'; but He preferred to say 'The grace of God, life\neverlasting,' that we may know that God leads us to life everlasting\nof His own mercy and not by our merits.\" Now when anyone merits\nsomething condignly he receives it not from mercy, but from merit.\nHence it would seem that a man with grace cannot merit life\neverlasting condignly.\n\nObj. 3: Further, merit that equals the reward, would seem to be\ncondign. Now no act of the present life can equal everlasting life,\nwhich surpasses our knowledge and our desire, and moreover, surpasses\nthe charity or love of the wayfarer, even as it exceeds nature.\nTherefore with grace a man cannot merit eternal life condignly.\n\n_On the contrary,_ What is granted in accordance with a fair\njudgment, would seem a condign reward. But life everlasting is\ngranted by God, in accordance with the judgment of justice, according\nto 2 Tim. 4:8: \"As to the rest, there is laid up for me a crown of\njustice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render to me in that\nday.\" Therefore man merits everlasting life condignly.\n\n_I answer that,_ Man's meritorious work may be considered in two\nways: first, as it proceeds from free-will; secondly, as it proceeds\nfrom the grace of the Holy Ghost. If it is considered as regards the\nsubstance of the work, and inasmuch as it springs from the free-will,\nthere can be no condignity because of the very great inequality. But\nthere is congruity, on account of an equality of proportion: for it\nwould seem congruous that, if a man does what he can, God should\nreward him according to the excellence of his power.\n\nIf, however, we speak of a meritorious work, inasmuch as it proceeds\nfrom the grace of the Holy Ghost moving us to life everlasting, it is\nmeritorious of life everlasting condignly. For thus the value of its\nmerit depends upon the power of the Holy Ghost moving us to life\neverlasting according to John 4:14: \"Shall become in him a fount of\nwater springing up into life everlasting.\" And the worth of the work\ndepends on the dignity of grace, whereby a man, being made a partaker\nof the Divine Nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom the\ninheritance is due by right of adoption, according to Rom. 8:17: \"If\nsons, heirs also.\"\n\nReply Obj. 1: The Apostle is speaking of the substance of these\nsufferings.\n\nReply Obj. 2: This saying is to be understood of the first cause of\nour reaching everlasting life, viz. God's mercy. But our merit is a\nsubsequent cause.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The grace of the Holy Ghost which we have at present,\nalthough unequal to glory in act, is equal to it virtually as the\nseed of a tree, wherein the whole tree is virtually. So likewise by\ngrace of the Holy Ghost dwells in man; and He is a sufficient cause\nof life everlasting; hence, 2 Cor. 1:22, He is called the \"pledge\" of\nour inheritance.\n________________________\n\nFOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 4]\n\nWhether Grace Is the Principle of Merit Through Charity Rather Than\nthe Other Virtues?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that grace is not the principle of merit\nthrough charity rather than the other virtues. For wages are due to\nwork, according to Matt. 20:8: \"Call the laborers and pay them their\nhire.\" Now every virtue is a principle of some operation, since\nvirtue is an operative habit, as stated above (Q. 55, A. 2). Hence\nevery virtue is equally a principle of merit.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the Apostle says (1 Cor. 3:8): \"Every man shall\nreceive his own reward according to his labor.\" Now charity lessens\nrather than increases the labor, because as Augustine says (De Verbis\nDom., Serm. lxx), \"love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and\nnext to nothing.\" Hence charity is no greater principle of merit than\nany other virtue.\n\nObj. 3: Further, the greatest principle of merit would seem to be the\none whose acts are most meritorious. But the acts of faith and\npatience or fortitude would seem to be the most meritorious, as\nappears in the martyrs, who strove for the faith patiently and\nbravely even till death. Hence other virtues are a greater principle\nof merit than charity.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (John 14:21): \"He that loveth Me,\nshall be loved of My Father; and I will love him and will manifest\nMyself to him.\" Now everlasting life consists in the manifest\nknowledge of God, according to John 17:3: \"This is eternal life: that\nthey may know Thee, the only true\" and living \"God.\" Hence the merit\nof eternal life rests chiefly with charity.\n\n_I answer that,_ As we may gather from what has been stated above (A.\n1), human acts have the nature of merit from two causes: first and\nchiefly from the Divine ordination, inasmuch as acts are said to\nmerit that good to which man is divinely ordained. Secondly, on the\npart of free-will, inasmuch as man, more than other creatures, has\nthe power of voluntary acts by acting by himself. And in both these\nways does merit chiefly rest with charity. For we must bear in mind\nthat everlasting life consists in the enjoyment of God. Now the human\nmind's movement to the fruition of the Divine good is the proper act\nof charity, whereby all the acts of the other virtues are ordained to\nthis end, since all the other virtues are commanded by charity. Hence\nthe merit of life everlasting pertains first to charity, and\nsecondly, to the other virtues, inasmuch as their acts are commanded\nby charity. So, likewise, is it manifest that what we do out of love\nwe do most willingly. Hence, even inasmuch as merit depends on\nvoluntariness, merit is chiefly attributed to charity.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Charity, inasmuch as it has the last end for object,\nmoves the other virtues to act. For the habit to which the end\npertains always commands the habits to which the means pertain, as\nwas said above (Q. 9, A. 1).\n\nReply Obj. 2: A work can be toilsome and difficult in two ways:\nfirst, from the greatness of the work, and thus the greatness of the\nwork pertains to the increase of merit; and thus charity does not\nlessen the toil--rather, it makes us undertake the greatest toils,\n\"for it does great things, if it exists,\" as Gregory says (Hom. in\nEvang. xxx). Secondly, from the defect of the operator; for what is\nnot done with a ready will is hard and difficult to all of us, and\nthis toil lessens merit and is removed by charity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: The act of faith is not meritorious unless \"faith . . .\nworketh by charity\" (Gal. 5:6). So, too, the acts of patience and\nfortitude are not meritorious unless a man does them out of charity,\naccording to 1 Cor. 13:3: \"If I should deliver my body to be burned,\nand have not charity, it profiteth me nothing.\"\n________________________\n\nFIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 5]\n\nWhether a Man May Merit for Himself the First Grace?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man may merit for himself the first\ngrace, because, as Augustine says (Ep. clxxxvi), \"faith merits\njustification.\" Now a man is justified by the first grace. Therefore\na man may merit the first grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, God gives grace only to the worthy. Now, no one is\nsaid to be worthy of some good, unless he has merited it condignly.\nTherefore we may merit the first grace condignly.\n\nObj. 3: Further, with men we may merit a gift already received. Thus\nif a man receives a horse from his master, he merits it by a good use\nof it in his master's service. Now God is much more bountiful than\nman. Much more, therefore, may a man, by subsequent works, merit the\nfirst grace already received from God.\n\n_On the contrary,_ The nature of grace is repugnant to reward of\nworks, according to Rom. 4:4: \"Now to him that worketh, the reward is\nnot reckoned according to grace but according to debt.\" Now a man\nmerits what is reckoned to him according to debt, as the reward of\nhis works. Hence a man may not merit the first grace.\n\n_I answer that,_ The gift of grace may be considered in two ways:\nfirst in the nature of a gratuitous gift, and thus it is manifest\nthat all merit is repugnant to grace, since as the Apostle says (Rom.\n11:6), \"if by grace, it is not now by works.\" Secondly, it may be\nconsidered as regards the nature of the thing given, and thus, also,\nit cannot come under the merit of him who has not grace, both because\nit exceeds the proportion of nature, and because previous to grace a\nman in the state of sin has an obstacle to his meriting grace, viz.\nsin. But when anyone has grace, the grace already possessed cannot\ncome under merit, since reward is the term of the work, but grace is\nthe principle of all our good works, as stated above (Q. 109). But of\nanyone merits a further gratuitous gift by virtue of the preceding\ngrace, it would not be the first grace. Hence it is manifest that no\none can merit for himself the first grace.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Retract. i, 23), he was deceived on\nthis point for a time, believing the beginning of faith to be from\nus, and its consummation to be granted us by God; and this he here\nretracts. And seemingly it is in this sense that he speaks of faith\nas meriting justification. But if we suppose, as indeed it is a truth\nof faith, that the beginning of faith is in us from God, the first\nact must flow from grace; and thus it cannot be meritorious of the\nfirst grace. Therefore man is justified by faith, not as though man,\nby believing, were to merit justification, but that, he believes,\nwhilst he is being justified; inasmuch as a movement of faith is\nrequired for the justification of the ungodly, as stated above (Q.\n113, A. 4).\n\nReply Obj. 2: God gives grace to none but to the worthy, not that\nthey were previously worthy, but that by His grace He makes them\nworthy, Who alone \"can make him clean that is conceived of unclean\nseed\" (Job 14:4).\n\nReply Obj. 3: Man's every good work proceeds from the first grace as\nfrom its principle; but not from any gift of man. Consequently, there\nis no comparison between gifts of grace and gifts of men.\n________________________\n\nSIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 6]\n\nWhether a Man Can Merit the First Grace for Another?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man can merit the first grace for\nanother. Because on Matt. 9:2: \"Jesus seeing their faith,\" etc. a\ngloss says: \"How much is our personal faith worth with God, Who set\nsuch a price on another's faith, as to heal the man both inwardly and\noutwardly!\" Now inward healing is brought about by grace. Hence a man\ncan merit the first grace for another.\n\nObj. 2: Further, the prayers of the just are not void, but\nefficacious, according to James 5:16: \"The continued prayer of a just\nman availeth much.\" Now he had previously said: \"Pray one for\nanother, that you may be saved.\" Hence, since man's salvation can\nonly be brought about by grace, it seems that one man may merit for\nanother his first grace.\n\nObj. 3: Further, it is written (Luke 16:9): \"Make unto you friends of\nthe mammon of iniquity, that when you shall fail they may receive you\ninto everlasting dwellings.\" Now it is through grace alone that\nanyone is received into everlasting dwellings, for by it alone does\nanyone merit everlasting life as stated above (A. 2; Q. 109, A. 5).\nHence one man may by merit obtain for another his first grace.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Jer. 15:1): \"If Moses and Samuel\nshall stand before Me, My soul is not towards this people\"--yet they\nhad great merit with God. Hence it seems that no one can merit the\nfirst grace for another.\n\n_I answer that,_ As shown above (AA. 1, 3, 4), our works are\nmeritorious from two causes: first, by virtue of the Divine motion;\nand thus we merit condignly; secondly, according as they proceed from\nfree-will in so far as we do them willingly, and thus they have\ncongruous merit, since it is congruous that when a man makes good use\nof his power God should by His super-excellent power work still\nhigher things. And therefore it is clear that no one can merit\ncondignly for another his first grace, save Christ alone; since each\none of us is moved by God to reach life everlasting through the gift\nof grace; hence condign merit does not reach beyond this motion. But\nChrist's soul is moved by God through grace, not only so as to reach\nthe glory of life everlasting, but so as to lead others to it,\ninasmuch as He is the Head of the Church, and the Author of human\nsalvation, according to Heb. 2:10: \"Who hath brought many children\ninto glory [to perfect] the Author of their salvation.\"\n\nBut one may merit the first grace for another congruously; because a\nman in grace fulfils God's will, and it is congruous and in harmony\nwith friendship that God should fulfil man's desire for the salvation\nof another, although sometimes there may be an impediment on the part\nof him whose salvation the just man desires. And it is in this sense\nthat the passage from Jeremias speaks.\n\nReply Obj. 1: A man's faith avails for another's salvation by\ncongruous and not by condign merit.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The impetration of prayer rests on mercy, whereas\ncondign merit rests on justice; hence a man may impetrate many things\nfrom the Divine mercy in prayer, which he does not merit in justice,\naccording to Dan. 9:18: \"For it is not for our justifications that we\npresent our prayers before Thy face, but for the multitude of Thy\ntender mercies.\"\n\nReply Obj. 3: The poor who receive alms are said to receive others\ninto everlasting dwellings, either by impetrating their forgiveness\nin prayer, or by meriting congruously by other good works, or\nmaterially speaking, inasmuch as by these good works of mercy,\nexercised towards the poor, we merit to be received into everlasting\ndwellings.\n________________________\n\nSEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 7]\n\nWhether a Man May Merit Restoration After a Fall?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit for himself\nrestoration after a fall. For what a man may justly ask of God, he\nmay justly merit. Now nothing may more justly be besought of God than\nto be restored after a fall, as Augustine says [*Cf. Ennar. i super\nPs. lxx.], according to Ps. 70:9: \"When my strength shall fail, do\nnot Thou forsake me.\" Hence a man may merit to be restored after a\nfall.\n\nObj. 2: Further, a man's works benefit himself more than another. Now\na man may, to some extent, merit for another his restoration after a\nfall, even as his first grace. Much more, therefore, may he merit for\nhimself restoration after a fall.\n\nObj. 3: Further, when a man is once in grace he merits life\neverlasting by the good works he does, as was shown above (A. 2; Q.\n109, A. 5). Now no one can attain life everlasting unless he is\nrestored by grace. Hence it would seem that he merits for himself\nrestoration.\n\n_On the contrary,_ It is written (Ezech. 18:24): \"If the just man\nturn himself away from his justice and do iniquity . . . all his\njustices which he hath done shall not be remembered.\" Therefore his\nprevious merits will nowise help him to rise again. Hence no one can\nmerit for himself restoration after a fall.\n\n_I answer that,_ No one can merit for himself restoration after a\nfuture fall, either condignly or congruously. He cannot merit for\nhimself condignly, since the reason of this merit depends on the\nmotion of Divine grace, and this motion is interrupted by the\nsubsequent sin; hence all benefits which he afterwards obtains from\nGod, whereby he is restored, do not fall under merit--the motion of\nthe preceding grace not extending to them. Again, congruous merit,\nwhereby one merits the first grace for another, is prevented from\nhaving its effect on account of the impediment of sin in the one for\nwhom it is merited. Much more, therefore, is the efficacy of such\nmerit impeded by the obstacle which is in him who merits, and in him\nfor whom it is merited; for both these are in the same person. And\ntherefore a man can nowise merit for himself restoration after a fall.\n\nReply Obj. 1: The desire whereby we seek for restoration after a fall\nis called just, and likewise the prayer whereby this restoration is\nbesought is called just, because it tends to justice; and not that it\ndepends on justice by way of merit, but only on mercy.\n\nReply Obj. 2: Anyone may congruously merit for another his first\ngrace, because there is no impediment (at least, on the part of him\nwho merits), such as is found when anyone recedes from justice after\nthe merit of grace.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Some have said that no one _absolutely_ merits life\neverlasting except by the act of final grace, but only\n_conditionally,_ i.e. if he perseveres. But it is unreasonable to say\nthis, for sometimes the act of the last grace is not more, but less\nmeritorious than preceding acts, on account of the prostration of\nillness. Hence it must be said that every act of charity merits\neternal life absolutely; but by subsequent sin, there arises an\nimpediment to the preceding merit, so that it does not obtain its\neffect; just as natural causes fail of their effects on account of a\nsupervening impediment.\n________________________\n\nEIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 8]\n\nWhether a Man May Merit the Increase of Grace or Charity?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that a man cannot merit an increase of\ngrace or charity. For when anyone receives the reward he merited no\nother reward is due to him; thus it was said of some (Matt. 6:2):\n\"They have received their reward.\" Hence, if anyone were to merit the\nincrease of charity or grace, it would follow that, when his grace\nhas been increased, he could not expect any further reward, which is\nunfitting.\n\nObj. 2: Further, nothing acts beyond its species. But the principle\nof merit is grace or charity, as was shown above (AA. 2, 4).\nTherefore no one can merit greater grace or charity than he has.\n\nObj. 3: Further, what falls under merit a man merits by every act\nflowing from grace or charity, as by every such act a man merits life\neverlasting. If, therefore, the increase of grace or charity falls\nunder merit, it would seem that by every act quickened by charity a\nman would merit an increase of charity. But what a man merits, he\ninfallibly receives from God, unless hindered by subsequent sin; for\nit is written (2 Tim. 1:12): \"I know Whom I have believed, and I am\ncertain that He is able to keep that which I have committed unto\nHim.\" Hence it would follow that grace or charity is increased by\nevery meritorious act; and this would seem impossible since at times\nmeritorious acts are not very fervent, and would not suffice for the\nincrease of charity. Therefore the increase of charity does not come\nunder merit.\n\n_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (super Ep. Joan.; cf. Ep. clxxxvi)\nthat \"charity merits increase, and being increased merits to be\nperfected.\" Hence the increase of grace or charity falls under merit.\n\n_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 6, 7), whatever the motion of\ngrace reaches to, falls under condign merit. Now the motion of a\nmover extends not merely to the last term of the movement, but to the\nwhole progress of the movement. But the term of the movement of grace\nis eternal life; and progress in this movement is by the increase of\ncharity or grace according to Prov. 4:18: \"But the path of the just\nas a shining light, goeth forward and increaseth even to perfect\nday,\" which is the day of glory. And thus the increase of grace falls\nunder condign merit.\n\nReply Obj. 1: Reward is the term of merit. But there is a double term\nof movement, viz. the last, and the intermediate, which is both\nbeginning and term; and this term is the reward of increase. Now the\nreward of human favor is as the last end to those who place their end\nin it; hence such as these receive no other reward.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The increase of grace is not above the virtuality of\nthe pre-existing grace, although it is above its quantity, even as a\ntree is not above the virtuality of the seed, although above its\nquantity.\n\nReply Obj. 3: By every meritorious act a man merits the increase of\ngrace, equally with the consummation of grace which is eternal life.\nBut just as eternal life is not given at once, but in its own time,\nso neither is grace increased at once, but in its own time, viz. when\na man is sufficiently disposed for the increase of grace.\n________________________\n\nNINTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 9]\n\nWhether a Man May Merit Perseverance?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that anyone may merit perseverance. For\nwhat a man obtains by asking, can come under the merit of anyone that\nis in grace. Now men obtain perseverance by asking it of God;\notherwise it would be useless to ask it of God in the petitions of\nthe Lord's Prayer, as Augustine says (De Dono Persev. ii). Therefore\nperseverance may come under the merit of whoever has grace.\n\nObj. 2: Further, it is more not to be able to sin than not to sin.\nBut not to be able to sin comes under merit, for we merit eternal\nlife, of which impeccability is an essential part. Much more,\ntherefore, may we merit not to sin, i.e. to persevere.\n\nObj. 3: Further, increase of grace is greater than perseverance in\nthe grace we already possess. But a man may merit an increase of\ngrace, as was stated above (A. 8). Much more, therefore, may he merit\nperseverance in the grace he has already.\n\n_On the contrary,_ What we merit, we obtain from God, unless it is\nhindered by sin. Now many have meritorious works, who do not obtain\nperseverance; nor can it be urged that this takes place because of\nthe impediment of sin, since sin itself is opposed to perseverance;\nand thus if anyone were to merit perseverance, God would not permit\nhim to fall into sin. Hence perseverance does not come under merit.\n\n_I answer that,_ Since man's free-will is naturally flexible towards\ngood and evil, there are two ways of obtaining from God perseverance\nin good: first, inasmuch as free-will is determined to good by\nconsummate grace, which will be in glory; secondly, on the part of\nthe Divine motion, which inclines man to good unto the end. Now as\nexplained above (AA. 6, 7, 8), that which is related as a term to the\nfree-will's movement directed to God the mover, falls under human\nmerit; and not what is related to the aforesaid movement as\nprinciple. Hence it is clear that the perseverance of glory which is\nthe term of the aforesaid movement falls under merit; but\nperseverance of the wayfarer does not fall under merit, since it\ndepends solely on the Divine motion, which is the principle of all\nmerit. Now God freely bestows the good of perseverance, on whomsoever\nHe bestows it.\n\nReply Obj. 1: We impetrate in prayer things that we do not merit,\nsince God hears sinners who beseech the pardon of their sins, which\nthey do not merit, as appears from Augustine [*Tract. xliv in Joan.]\non John 11:31, \"Now we know that God doth not hear sinners,\"\notherwise it would have been useless for the publican to say: \"O God,\nbe merciful to me a sinner,\" Luke 18:13. So too may we impetrate of\nGod in prayer the grace of perseverance either for ourselves or for\nothers, although it does not fall under merit.\n\nReply Obj. 2: The perseverance which is in heaven is compared as term\nto the free-will's movement; not so, the perseverance of the\nwayfarer, for the reason given in the body of the article.\n\nIn the same way may we answer the third objection which concerns the\nincrease of grace, as was explained above.\n________________________\n\nTENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 114, Art. 10]\n\nWhether Temporal Goods Fall Under Merit?\n\nObjection 1: It would seem that temporal goods fall under merit. For\nwhat is promised to some as a reward of justice, falls under merit.\nNow, temporal goods were promised in the Old Law as the reward of\njustice, as appears from Deut. 28. Hence it seems that temporal goods\nfall under merit.\n\nObj. 2: Further, that would seem to fall under merit, which God\nbestows on anyone for a service done. But God sometimes bestows\ntemporal goods on men for services done for Him. For it is written\n(Ex. 1:21): \"And because the midwives feared God, He built them\nhouses\"; on which a gloss of Gregory (Moral. xviii, 4) says that\n\"life everlasting might have been awarded them as the fruit of their\ngoodwill, but on account of their sin of falsehood they received an\nearthly reward.\" And it is written (Ezech. 29:18): \"The King of\nBabylon hath made his army to undergo hard service against Tyre . . .\nand there hath been no reward given him,\" and further on: \"And it\nshall be wages for his army . . . I have given him the land of Egypt\nbecause he hath labored for me.\" Therefore temporal goods fall under\nmerit.\n\nObj. 3: Further, as good is to merit so is evil to demerit. But on\naccount of the demerit of sin some are punished by God with temporal\npunishments, as appears from the Sodomites, Gen. 19. Hence temporal\ngoods fall under merit.\n\nObj. 4: _On the contrary,_ What falls under merit does not come upon\nall alike. But temporal goods regard the good and the wicked alike;\naccording to Eccles. 9:2: \"All things equally happen to the just and\nthe wicked, to the good and to the evil, to the clean and to the\nunclean, to him that offereth victims and to him that despiseth\nsacrifices.\" Therefore temporal goods do not fall under merit.\n\n_I answer that,_ What falls under merit is the reward or wage, which\nis a kind of good. Now man's good is twofold: the first, simply; the\nsecond, relatively. Now man's good simply is his last end (according\nto Ps. 72:27: \"But it is good for men to adhere to my God\") and\nconsequently what is ordained and leads to this end; and these fall\nsimply under merit. But the relative, not the simple, good of man is\nwhat is good to him now, or what is a good to him relatively; and\nthis does not fall under merit simply, but relatively.\n\nHence we must say that if temporal goods are considered as they are\nuseful for virtuous works, whereby we are led to heaven, they fall\ndirectly and simply under merit, even as increase of grace, and\neverything whereby a man is helped to attain beatitude after the\nfirst grace. For God gives men, both just and wicked, enough temporal\ngoods to enable them to attain to everlasting life; and thus these\ntemporal goods are simply good. Hence it is written (Ps. 33:10): \"For\nthere is no want to them that fear Him,\" and again, Ps. 36:25: \"I\nhave not seen the just forsaken,\" etc.\n\nBut if these temporal goods are considered in themselves, they are\nnot man's good simply, but relatively, and thus they do not fall\nunder merit simply, but relatively, inasmuch as men are moved by God\nto do temporal works, in which with God's help they reach their\npurpose. And thus as life everlasting is simply the reward of the\nworks of justice in relation to the Divine motion, as stated above\n(AA. 3, 6), so have temporal goods, considered in themselves, the\nnature of reward, with respect to the Divine motion, whereby men's\nwills are moved to undertake these works, even though, sometimes, men\nhave not a right intention in them.\n\nReply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (Contra Faust. iv, 2), \"in these\ntemporal promises were figures of spiritual things to come. For the\ncarnal people were adhering to the promises of the present life; and\nnot merely their speech but even their life was prophetic.\"\n\nReply Obj. 2: These rewards are said to have been divinely brought\nabout in relation to the Divine motion, and not in relation to the\nmalice of their wills, especially as regards the King of Babylon,\nsince he did not besiege Tyre as if wishing to serve God, but rather\nin order to usurp dominion. So, too, although the midwives had a good\nwill with regard to saving the children, yet their will was not\nright, inasmuch as they framed falsehoods.\n\nReply Obj. 3: Temporal evils are imposed as a punishment on the\nwicked, inasmuch as they are not thereby helped to reach life\neverlasting. But to the just who are aided by these evils they are\nnot punishments but medicines as stated above (Q. 87, A. 8).\n\nReply Obj. 4: All things happen equally to the good and the wicked,\nas regards the substance of temporal good or evil; but not as regards\nthe end, since the good and not the wicked are led to beatitude by\nthem.\n\nAnd now enough has been said regarding morals in general.","title":"Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae): From the Complete American Edition","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":503541}