{"collection":"philosophy-ethics","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_18168/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_18168","id":"gutenberg_18168","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18168","summary":null,"tags":["Atheism","Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","God -- Proof"],"text":"Produced by Dave Maddock, Martin Pettit and the Online\nDistributed Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTHE HEAVENLY FATHER.\n\nLectures on Modern Atheism.\n\nBY\n\nERNEST NAVILLE,\n\nCORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE INSTITUTE OF FRANCE (ACADEMY OF THE MORAL\nAND POLITICAL SCIENCES), LATE PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY\nOF GENEVA.\n\n\nTRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH\n\nBY HENRY DOWNTON, M.A.,\n\nENGLISH CHAPLAIN AT GENEVA.\n\n\n     --\"To this deplorable error I desire to oppose faith in GOD as it\n     has been given to the world by the Gospel--faith in the HEAVENLY\n     FATHER.\"\n                _Author's Letter to Professor Faraday_ (v. p. 193).\n\n\nBOSTON:\n\nWILLIAM V. SPENCER\n\n1867.\n\nCAMBRIDGE:\n\nPRESS OF JOHN WILSON AND SON.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE.\n\n\nThese Lectures, in their original form, were delivered at Geneva, and\nafterwards at Lausanne, before two auditories which together numbered\nabout two thousand five hundred men. A Swiss Review published\nconsiderable portions of them, which had been taken down in short-hand,\nand on reading these portions, several persons, belonging to different\ncountries, conceived the idea of translating the work when completed by\nthe Author, and corrected for publication. Proof-sheets were accordingly\nsent to the translators as they came from the press: and thus this\nvolume will appear pretty nearly at the same time in several of the\nlanguages of Europe.\n\nThe hearty kindness with which my fellow-countrymen received my words\nhas been to me both a delight and an encouragement. The expressions of\nsympathy which have reached me from abroad allow me to hope that these\npages, notwithstanding the deficiencies and imperfections of which I am\nkeenly sensible, reflect some few of the rays of the truth which God has\ndeposited on the earth, thereby to unite in the same faith and hope men\nof every tongue and every nation.\n\n                                                    ERNEST NAVILLE.\n\nGENEVA, _May, 1865_.\n\n\n\n\nNOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR.\n\n\nThe appearance of this translation so long after that of the original\nwork is in contradiction to the foregoing statement of the Author, that\nit would appear at nearly the same time with it. The delay has been due\nto causes beyond the translator's control--in part to the difficulty of\nrevising the press at so great a distance from the place of publication,\nthe translator being resident at Geneva. This latter circumstance causes\nan exception in another particular as regards this translation, the\nproposal to translate the Lectures having been made to the Author, and\nkindly accepted by him, during the course of their delivery at Geneva.\n\nThe mere statement by the Author of the numbers, large as they were, of\nthose who formed the auditories, can give but a small idea of the\nenthusiasm with which they were received by the crowds which thronged to\nhear them, and which were composed of all classes of persons, from the\nmost distinguished savant to the intelligent artisan.\n\nIt is not to be expected that the Lectures when read, even in the\noriginal, and still less in a translation, can produce the vivid\nimpression which they made on those, who, with the translator, had the\nprivilege of hearing them delivered,--the Author having few rivals, on\nthe Continent or elsewhere, in the graces of polished eloquence; but the\nsubjects treated are, it is to be feared, of increasing importance, not\nabroad only, but in England; and in fact one Lecture, the fourth, is in\na large measure occupied with forms of atheism which owe their chief\nsupport to English authors. In that Lecture the Author shows that the\nspiritual origin of man cannot \"be put out of sight beneath details of\nphysiology and researches of natural history,\" and that these not only\n\"cannot settle,\" but \"cannot so much as touch the question.\"\n\nThe same Lecture is occupied in part by a practical refutation of the\nprejudice against religion drawn from the irreligious character of many\nmen of science. The Author's subject has led him in the present work to\nconfine his illustrations on this head to the question of natural\nreligion: but the translator will avow that a main motive with him to\nundertake the labor of this translation has been the wish to prove, in\nthe instance of the distinguished Author himself, that men of\nincontestable eminence as metaphysical philosophers may hold and profess\nboldly their faith in doctrines, which many who affect to guide the\nreligious opinions of our youth would teach them to despise as the\nheritage of narrow minds, and to cast away as incompatible with the\nhighest intellectual cultivation. Such doctrines are those of the fall\nand ruin of man by nature, the necessity for Divine agency in his\nrecovery, his need of propitiation by the sacrifice of the\nGod-Man--_l'Homme-Dieu_. These truths are explicitly stated by the\nAuthor in his former course of lectures--_La Vie Eternelle_,[1] in\nwhich, while discoursing eloquently on that eternal life which is the\nportion of the righteous, he does not shrink from declaring his belief\nin its awful counterpart, the eternal condemnation of the wicked.\n\n\"The offence of the Cross\" has not \"ceased,\" and many finding that these\nare the opinions of this Author, will perhaps lay down his book as\nunworthy of their attention: yet the editor, biographer, and expositor\nof the great French thinker, Maine de Biran, will not need introduction\nto the intellectual magnates of our own or of any country. The\ntranslator will be thankful, if some of those,--the youth more\nespecially,--of his own country, who have been dazzled by the glare of\nfalse science, shall find in this work a help to the reassuring of their\nfaith, while they learn in a fresh example that there are men quite\ncompetent to deal with the profoundest problems which can exercise our\nthoughts, who at the same time have come to a conviction,--compatible as\nthey believe with principles of the clearest reason,--of the truth of\nthose very doctrines which form the substance of evangelical\nChristianity. In saying this, the translator is far from claiming the\nAuthor as belonging to the same school of theology with himself: but\ndiffering with him on some important points, he has yet believed that\nthis volume is calculated to be of much use in the present condition of\nreligious thought in England, and in this hope and prayer he commends it\nto the blessing of Him, whose being and attributes, as our God and\nFather in Jesus Christ, are therein asserted and defended.\n\nGENEVA, _November, 1865_.\n\nFOOTNOTE:\n\n[1] A translation of this work, by an English lady, has been published\nby Mr. Dalton, 28, Cockspur street.\n\n\n\n\nCONTENTS.\n\n\nLECTURE I.\n                             PAGE\nOUR IDEA OF GOD                 1\n\n\nLECTURE II.\n\nLIFE WITHOUT GOD               43\n  PART I.--THE INDIVIDUAL      45\n  PART II.--SOCIETY            72\n\n\nLECTURE III.\n\nTHE REVIVAL OF ATHEISM        117\n\n\nLECTURE IV.\n\nNATURE                        175\n\n\nLECTURE V.\n\nHUMANITY                      245\n\n\nLECTURE VI.\n\nTHE CREATOR                   297\n\n\nLECTURE VII.\n\nTHE FATHER                    340\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE I.\n\n_OUR IDEA OF GOD._\n\n(At Geneva, 17th Nov. 1863.--At Lausanne, 11th Jan. 1864.)\n\n\nGENTLEMEN,\n\nSome five-and-twenty or thirty years ago, a German writer published a\npiece of verse which began in this way: \"Our hearts are oppressed with\nthe emotions of a pious sadness, at the thought of the ancient Jehovah\nwho is preparing to die.\" The verses were a dirge upon the death of the\nliving God; and the author, like a well educated son of the nineteenth\ncentury, bestowed a few poetic tears upon the obsequies of the Eternal.\n\nI was young when these strange words met my eyes, and they produced in\nme a kind of painful bewilderment, which has, I think, for ever engraven\nthem in my memory. Since then, I have had occasion to learn by many\ntokens that this fact was not at all an exceptional one, but that men\nof influence, famous schools, important tendencies of the modern mind,\nare agreed in proclaiming that the time of religion is over, of religion\nin all its forms, of religion in the largest sense of the word. Beneath\nthe social disturbances of the day, beneath the discussions of science,\nbeneath the anxiety of some and the sadness of others, beneath the\nironical and more or less insulting joy of a few, we read at the\nfoundation of many intellectual manifestations of our time these gloomy\nwords: \"Henceforth no more God for humanity!\" What may well send a\nshudder of fright through society--more than threatening war, more than\npossible revolution, more than the plots which may be hatching in the\ndark against the security of persons or of property--is, the number, the\nimportance, and the extent of the efforts which are making in our days\nto extinguish in men's souls their faith in the living God.\n\nThis fear, Gentlemen, I should wish to communicate to you, but I should\nwish also to confine it within its just limits. Religion (I take this\nterm in its most general acceptation) is not, as many say that it is,\neither dead or dying. I want no other proof of this than the pains which\nso many people are taking to kill it. It is often those who say that it\nis dead, or falling rapidly into dissolution, who apply themselves to\nthis work. They are too generous, no doubt, to make a violent attack\nupon a corpse; and it is easy to understand, judging by the intensity of\ntheir exertions, that in their own opinion they have something else to\ndo than to give a finishing stroke to the dying.\n\nPresent circumstances are serious, not for religion itself, which cannot\nbe imperilled, but for minds which run the risk of losing their balance\nand their support. Let it be observed, however, that when it is said\nthat we are living in extraordinary times, that we are passing through\nan unequalled crisis, that the like of what we see was never seen\nbefore, and so on, we must always regard conclusions of this nature with\ndistrust. Our personal interest in the circumstances which immediately\nsurround us produces on them for us the magnifying effect of a\nmicroscope: and our principal reason for thinking that our epoch is more\nextraordinary than others, is for the most part that we are living in\nour own epoch, and have not lived in others. A mind attentive to this\nfact, and so placed upon its guard against all tendency to\nexaggeration, will easily perceive that religious thought has in former\ntimes passed through shocks as profound and as dangerous as those of\nwhich we are witnesses. Still the crisis is a real one. Taking into\naccount its extent in our days, we may say that it is new for the\ngeneration to which we belong; and it is worthy of close consideration.\nTo-day, as an introduction to this grave subject, I should wish first to\ndetermine as precisely as possible what is our idea of God; to inquire\nnext from what sources we derive it; and lastly to point out, as clearly\nas I may, the limits and the nature of the discussion to which I invite\nyou.\n\nIn asking what sense we must give to the word \"God,\" I am not going to\npropose to you a metaphysical definition, or any system of my own: I am\ninquiring what is in fact the idea of God in the bosom of modern\nsociety, in the souls which live by this idea, in the hearts of which it\nconstitutes the joy, in the consciences of which it is the support.\n\nWhen our thoughts rise above nature and humanity to that invisible Being\nwhom we speak of as God, what is it which passes in our souls? They\nfear, they hope, they pray, they offer thanksgiving. If a man finds\nhimself in one of those desperate positions in which all human help\nfails, he turns towards Heaven, and says, My God! If we are witnesses of\none of those instances of revolting injustice which stir the conscience\nin its profoundest depths, and which could not on earth meet with\nadequate punishment, we think within ourselves,--There is a Judge on\nhigh! If we are reproved by our own conscience, the voice of that\nconscience, which disturbs and sometimes torments us, reminds us that\nthough we may be shut out from all human view, there is no less an Eye\nwhich sees us, and a just award awaiting us. Thus it is (I am seeking to\nestablish facts) that the thought of God operates, so to speak, in the\nsouls of those who believe in Him. If you look for the meaning common to\nall these manifestations of man's heart, what do you find? Fear, hope,\nthanksgiving, prayer. To whom is all this addressed? To a Power\nintelligent and free, which knows us, and is able to act upon our\ndestinies. This is the idea which is found at the basis of all\nreligions; not only of the religion of the only God, but of the most\ndegraded forms of idolatrous worship. All religion rests upon the\nsentiment of one or more invisible Powers, superior to nature and to\nhumanity.\n\nWhen philosophical curiosity is awakened, it disengages from the general\nsentiment of power the definite idea of the cause which becomes the\nexplanation of the phenomena. The reason of man, by virtue of its very\nconstitution, finds a need of conceiving of an absolute cause which\nescapes by its eternity the lapse of time, and by its infinite character\nthe bounds of limited existences; a principle, the necessary being of\nwhich depends on no other; in a word a unique cause, establishing by its\nunity the universal harmony. So, when reason meets with the idea of the\nsole and Almighty Creator, it attaches itself to it as the only thought\nwhich accounts to it for the world and for itself.\n\nThe Creator is, first of all, He whose glory the heavens declare, while\nthe earth makes known the work of His hands. He is the Mighty One and\nthe Wise, whose will has given being to nature, and who directs at once\nthe chorus of stars in the depths of the heavens, and the drop of vital\nmoisture in the herb which we tread under foot.\n\nIf, after having looked around, we turn our regard in upon ourselves, we\nthen discover other heavens, spiritual heavens, in which shine, like\nstars of the first magnitude, those objects which cause the heart of man\nto beat, so long as he is not self-degraded: truth, goodness, beauty.\nNow we feel that we are made for this higher world. Material enjoyments\nmay enchain our will; we may, in the indulgence of unworthy passions,\npursue what in its essence is only evil, error, and deformity; but, if\nall the rays of our true nature are not extinguished, a voice issues\nfrom the depth of our souls and protests against our debasement. Our\naspirations toward these spiritual excellences are unlimited. Our\nthought sets out on its course: have we solved one question? immediately\nnew questions arise, which press, no less than the former, for an\nanswer. Our conscience speaks: have we come in a certain degree to\nrealize what is right and good? immediately conscience demands of us\nstill more. Is our feeling for beauty awakened? Well, sirs, when an\nartist is satisfied with the work of his hands, do you not know at once\nwhat to think of him? Do you not know that that man will never do any\nthing great, who does not see shining in his horizon an ideal which\nstamps as imperfect all that he has been able to realize? The voice\nwhich urges us on through life from the cradle to the grave, and which,\nwithout allowing us a moment's pause, is ever crying--Forward! forward!\nthis voice is not more imperious than the noble instinct which, in the\nview of beauty, of truth, of good, is also saying to us--Forward!\nforward! and, with the American poet, _Excelsior!_ higher, ever higher!\nMany of you know that instinct familiar to the _climbers of the\nAlps_,[2] as they are called, who, arrived at one summit, have no rest\nso long as there remains a loftier height in view. Such is our destiny;\nbut the last peak is veiled in shining clouds which conceal it from our\nsight. Perfection,--this is the point to which our nature aspires; but\nit is the ladder of Jacob: we see the foot which rests upon the earth;\nthe summit hides itself from our feeble view amidst the splendors of the\ninfinite.\n\nThese objects of our highest desires--beauty in its supreme\nmanifestation, absolute holiness, infinite truth--are united in one and\nthe same thought--God! The attributes of the spiritual are never in us\nbut as borrowed attributes; they dwell naturally in Him who is their\nsource. God is the truth, not only because He knows all things, but\nbecause He is the very object of our thoughts; because, when we study\nthe universe, we do but spell out some few of the laws which He has\nimposed on things; because, to know truth is never any thing else than\nto know the creation or the Creator, the world or its eternal Cause. God\nit is who must be Himself the satisfaction of that craving of the\nconscience which urges us towards holiness. If we had arrived at the\nhighest degree of virtue, what should we have done? We should have\nrealized the plan which He has proposed to spiritual creatures in their\nfreedom, at the same time that He is directing the stars in their\ncourses by that other word which they accomplish without having heard\nit. God is the eternal source of beauty. He it is who has shed grace\nupon our valleys, and majesty upon our mountains; and He, again, it is\n(I quote St. Augustine) who acts within the souls of artists, those\ngreat artists, who, urged unceasingly towards the regions of the ideal,\nfeel themselves drawn onwards towards a divine world.\n\nGod then above all is He who _is_,--the Absolute, the Infinite, the\nEternal,--in the ever mysterious depths of His own essence. In His\nrelation to the world, He is the cause; in His relation to the lofty\naspirations of the soul, He is the ideal. He is the ideal, because being\nthe absolute cause, He is the unique source, at the same time that He is\nthe object, of our aspirations: He is the absolute cause, because being\nHe who _is_, in His supreme unity, nothing could have existence except\nby the act of His power. We are able already to recognize here, in\npassing, the source at which are fed the most serious aberrations of\nreligious thought. Are truth, holiness, beauty considered separately\nfrom the real and infinite Spirit in which is found their reason for\nexisting? We see thus appear philosophies noble in their commencement,\nbut which soon descend a fatal slope. The divine, so-called, is spoken\nof still; but the divine is an abstraction, and apart from God has no\nreal existence. If truth, beauty, holiness are not the attributes of an\neternal mind, but the simple expression of the tendencies of our soul,\nman may render at first a sort of worship to these lofty manifestations\nof his own nature; but logic, inexorable logic, forces him soon to\ndismiss the divine to the region of chimeras. These rays are\nextinguished together with their luminous centre; the soul loses the\nsecret of its destinies, and, in the measureless grief which possesses\nit, it proclaims at length that all is vanity. We shall have, in the\nsequel, to be witnesses together of this sorrowful spectacle.\n\nSuch is the basis of our idea of God: we must now discover its summit.\nBefore the thought of this Sovereign Being, by whose Will are all\nthings, and who is without cause and without beginning, our soul is\noverwhelmed. We are so feeble! the thought of absolute power crushes us.\nCreatures of a day, how should we understand the Eternal? Frail as we\nare, and evil, we tremble at the idea of holiness. But milder accents,\nas you know, have been heard upon the earth: This Sovereign God--He\nloves us. In proportion as this idea gains possession of our\nunderstanding, in the same proportion our soul has glimpses of the paths\nof peace. He loves us, and we take courage. He hears us, and prayer\nrises to Him with the hope of being heard. He governs all, and we\nconfide in His Providence. When your gaze is directed towards the depths\nof the sky, does it never happen to you to remain in a manner terrified,\nas you contemplate those worlds which without end are added to other\nworlds? As you fix your thoughts upon the immeasurable abysses of the\nfirmament,--as you say to yourselves that how far soever you put back\nthe boundary of the skies, if the universe ended there, then the\nuniverse, with its suns and its groups of stars, would still be but a\nsolitary lamp, shining as a point in the midst of the limitless\ndarkness,--have you never experienced a sort of mysterious fright and\ngiddiness? At such a time turn your eyes upon nearer objects. He who has\nmade the heavens with their immensity, is He who makes the corn to\nspring forth for your sustenance, who clothes the fields with the\nflowers which rejoice your sight, who gives you the fresh breath of\nmorning, and the calm of a lovely evening: it is He, without whose\npermission nothing occurs, who watches over you and over those you love.\nPossess yourselves thoroughly with this thought of love, then lift once\nmore your eyes to the sky, and from every star, and from the worlds\nwhich are lost in the furthest depths of space, shall fall upon your\nbrow, no longer clouded, a ray of love and of peace. Then with a feeling\nof sweet affiance you will adopt as your own those words of an ancient\nprophet: \"Whither shall I go from Thy Spirit, or whither shall I flee\nfrom Thy Presence? If I ascend up into heaven, Thou art there: if I make\nmy bed in hell, behold, Thou art there. If I take the wings of the\nmorning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there shall\nThy hand lead me, and Thy right hand shall hold me:\"[3] then you will\nunderstand those grand and sweet words of Saint Augustine, some of the\nmost beautiful that ever fell from the lips of a man: \"Are you afraid of\nGod? Run to His arms!\"\n\nThus our idea of God is completed,--the idea of Him whom, in a feeling\nof filial confidence, we name the Father, and whom we call the\n_Heavenly_ Father, while we adore that absolute holiness, of which the\npure brightness of the firmament is for us the visible and magnificent\nsymbol. Goodness is the secret of the universe; goodness it is which has\ndirected power, and placed wisdom at its service.\n\nMy object is not to teach this idea, but to defend it: it is not, I say,\nto teach it, for we all possess it. There is no one here who has not\nreceived his portion of the sacred deposit. This sacred idea may be\nveiled by our sorrows, perverted by our errors, obscured by our faults;\nbut, however thick be the layer of ashes heaped together in the depth of\nour souls--look closely: the sacred spark is not extinguished, and a\nfavorable breath may still rekindle the flame.\n\nWe have considered the essential elements of which our idea of God is\ncomposed. And whence comes this idea? What is its historical origin? I\ndo not ask what is the historical origin of religion, for religion does\nnot take its rise in history; it is met with everywhere and always in\nhumanity. Those who deny this are compelled to \"search in the darkness\nfor some obscure example known only to themselves, as if all natural\ninclinations were destroyed by the corruption of a people, and as if, as\nsoon as there are any monsters, the species were no longer any\nthing.\"[4] The consciousness of a world superior to the domain of\nexperience is one of the attributes characteristic of our nature. \"If\nthere had ever been, or if there still anywhere existed, a people\nentirely destitute of religion, it would be in consequence of an\nexceptional downfall which would be tantamount to a lapse into\nanimality.\"[5] I am not therefore inquiring after the origin of the\nidea and sentiment of the Deity, in a general sense, but after the\norigin of the idea of the only and Almighty Creator as we possess it. In\nfact, if religion is universal, distinct knowledge of the Creator is not\nso.\n\nOur own past strikes its roots into the historic soil which, in the\nmatter of creeds, is known by the name of paganism or idolatry. At first\nsight what do we find in the opinions of that ancient world? No trace of\nthe divine unity. Adoration is dispersed over a thousand different\nbeings. Not only are the heavenly bodies adored and the powers of\nnature, but men, animals, and inanimate objects. The feeling of the\nholiness of God is not less wanting, it would seem, than the idea of His\nunity. Religion serves as a pretext for the unchaining of human\npassions. This is the case unfortunately with religion in general, and\nthe true religion is no exception to the rule: but what characterizes\npaganism is that in its case religion, by its own proper nature, favors\nthe development of immorality. Celebrated shrines become the dens of a\nprostitution which forms part of the homage rendered to the gods; the\nreligious rites of ancient Asia, and those of Greece which fell under\ntheir influence, are notorious for their lewdness. The temples of false\ndeities, too often defiled by debauchery, are too often also dishonored\nby frightful sacrifices. The ancient civilization of Mexico was elegant\nand even refined in some respects; but the altars were stained, every\nyear, with the blood of thousands of human beings; and the votaries of\nthis sanguinary worship devoured, in solemn banquets, the quivering\nlimbs of the victims. Let us not look for examples too far removed from\nthe civilization which has produced our own. In the Greek and Roman\nworld, the stories of the gods were not very edifying, as every one\nknows: the worship of Bacchus gave no encouragement to temperance, and\nthe festivals of Venus were not a school of chastity. It would be easy,\nby bringing together facts of this sort, to form a picture full of\nsombre coloring, and to conclude that our idea of God, the idea of the\nonly and holy God, does not proceed from the impure sources of idolatry.\nThe proceeding would be brief and convenient; but such an estimation of\nthe facts, false because incomplete, would destroy the value of the\nconclusion. In pagan antiquity, in fact, the abominations of which I\nhave just reminded you did not by themselves make up religious\ntradition. Side by side with a current of darkness and impurity, we meet\nwith a current of pure ideas and of strong gleams of the day.\n\nAlmost all the pagans seem to have had a glimpse of the Divine unity\nover the multiplicity of their idols, and of the rays of the Divine\nholiness across the saturnalia of their Olympi. It was a Greek who wrote\nthese words: \"Nothing is accomplished on the earth without Thee, O God,\nsave the deeds which the wicked perpetrate in their folly.\"[6] It was in\na theatre at Athens that the chorus of a tragedy sang, more than two\nthousand years ago: \"May destiny aid me to preserve unsullied the purity\nof my words and of all my actions, according to those sublime laws\nwhich, brought forth in the celestial heights, have Heaven alone for\ntheir father, to which the race of mortal men did not give birth, and\nwhich oblivion shall never entomb. In them is a supreme God, and one who\nwaxes not old.\"[7] It would be easy to multiply quotations of this\norder, and to show you in the documents of Grecian and Roman\ncivilization numerous traces of the knowledge of the only and holy God.\nListen now to a voice which has come forth actually from the recesses of\nthe sepulchre: it reaches us from ancient Egypt.\n\nIn Egypt, as you know, the degradation of the religious idea was in\npopular practice complete. But, under the confused accents of\nsuperstition, the science of our age is succeeding in catching from afar\nthe vibrations of a sublime utterance. In the coffins of a large number\nof mummies have been discovered rolls of papyrus containing a sacred\ntext which is called the _Book of the Dead_. Here is the translation of\nsome fragments which appear to date from a very remote epoch. It is God\nwho speaks: \"I am the Most Holy, the Creator of all that replenishes the\nearth, and of the earth itself, the habitation of mortals. I am the\nPrince of the infinite ages. I am the great and mighty God, the Most\nHigh, shining in the midst of the careering stars and of the armies\nwhich praise me above thy head.... It is I who chastise and who judge\nthe evil-doers, and the persecutors of godly men. I discover and\nconfound the liars.... I am the all-seeing Judge and Avenger ... the\nguardian of my laws in the land of righteousness.\"[8]\n\nThese words are found mingled, in the text from which I extract them,\nwith allusions to inferior deities; and it must be acknowledged that the\ntranslation of the ancient documents of Egypt is still uncertain enough.\nStill this uncertainty does not appear to extend to the general sense\nand bearing of the recent discoveries of our savants. Myself a simple\nlearner from the masters of the science, I can only point out to you the\nresult of their studies. Now, this is what the masters tell us as to the\nactual state of mythological studies. Traces are found almost\neverywhere, in the midst of idolatrous superstitions, of a religion\ncomparatively pure, and often stamped with a lofty morality. Paganism is\nnot a simple fact: it offers to view in the same bed two currents, the\none pure and the other impure. What is the relation between these two\ncurrents? A passage in a writer of the Latin Church throws a vivid light\nupon their actual relation in practical life. It is thus that Lactantius\nexpresses himself: \"When man (the pagan) finds himself in adversity,\nthen it is that he has recourse to God (to the only God). If the horrors\nof war threaten him, if there appear a contagious disease, a drought, a\ntempest, then he has recourse to God.... If he is overtaken by a storm\nat sea, and is in danger of perishing, immediately he calls upon God; if\nhe finds himself in any urgent peril, he has recourse to God.... Thus\nmen bethink themselves of God when they are in trouble; but as soon as\nthe danger is past, and they are no longer in any fear, we see them\nreturn with joy to the temples of the false gods, make to them\nlibations, and offer sacrifices to them.\"[9] This is a striking picture\nof the workings of man's heart in all ages; for, as our author observes,\n\"God is never so much forgotten of men as when they are quietly enjoying\nthe favors and blessings which He sends them.\"[10] As regards our\nspecial object, this page reveals in a very instructive manner the\nreligious condition of heathen antiquity. The thought of the sovereign\nGod was stifled without being extinguished; it awoke beneath the\npressure of anguish; but ordinary life, the life of every day, belonged\nto the easy worship of idols.\n\nIt may now be asked what is the historical relation between the two\ncurrents of paganism of which we have just established the actual\nrelation in practical life. Did humanity begin with a coarse fetichism,\nand thence rise by slow degrees to higher conceptions? Do the traces of\na comparatively pure monotheism first show themselves in the most recent\nperiods of idolatry? Contemporary science inclines more and more to\nanswer in the negative. It is in the most ancient historical ground\n(allow me these geological terms) that the laborious investigators of\nthe past meet with the most elevated ideas of religion. Cut to the\nground a young and vigorous beech-tree, and come back a few years\nafterwards: in place of the tree cut down you will find coppice-wood;\nthe sap which nourished a single trunk has been divided amongst a\nmultitude of shoots. This comparison expresses well enough the opinion\nwhich tends to prevail amongst our savants on the subject of the\nhistorical development of religions. The idea of the only God is at the\nroot,--it is primitive; polytheism is derivative. A forgotten, and as it\nwere slumbering, monotheism exists beneath the worship of idols; it is\nthe concealed trunk which supports them, but the idols have absorbed all\nthe sap. The ancient God (allow me once more a comparison) is like a\nsovereign confined in the interior of his palace: he is but seldom\nthought of, and only on great occasions; his ministers alone act,\nentertain requests, and receive the real homage.\n\nThe proposition of the historical priority of monotheism is very\nimportant, and is not universally admitted. It will therefore be\nnecessary to show you, by a few quotations at least, that I am not\nspeaking rashly. One of the most accredited mythologists of our time,\nProfessor Grimm, of Berlin, writes as follows: \"The monotheistic form\nappears to be the more ancient, and that out of which antiquity in its\ninfancy formed polytheism.... All mythologies lead us to this\nconclusion.\"[11] Among the French savants devoted to the study of\nancient Egypt, the Vicomte de Ronge stands in the foremost rank. This is\nwhat he tells us: \"In Egypt the supreme God was called the one God,\nliving indeed, He who made all that exists, who created other beings. He\nis the Generator existing alone who made the heaven and created the\nearth.\" The writer informs us that these ideas are often found\nreproduced \"in writings the date of which is anterior to Moses, and many\nof which formed part of the most ancient sacred hymns;\" then he comes\nto this conclusion: \"Egypt, in possession of an admirable fund of\ndoctrines respecting the essence of God, and the immortality of the\nsoul, did not for all that defile herself the less by the most degrading\nsuperstitions; we have in her, sufficiently summed up, the religious\nhistory of all antiquity.\"[12] As regards the civilization which\nflourished in India, M. Adolphe Pictet, in his learned researches on the\nsubject of the primitive Aryas, arrives, in what concerns the religious\nidea, at the following conclusion: \"To sum up: primitive monotheism of a\ncharacter more or less vague, passing gradually into a polytheism still\nsimple, such appears to have been the religion of the ancient\nAryas.\"[13] One of our fellow-countrymen, who cultivates with equal\nmodesty and perseverance the study of religious antiquities, has\nprocured the greater part of the recent works published on these\nsubjects in France, Germany, and England. He has read them, pen in hand,\nand, at my urgent request, he has kindly allowed me to look over his\nnotes which have been long accumulating. I find the following sentence\nin the manuscripts which he has shown me: \"The general impression of\nall the most distinguished mythologists of the present day is, that\nmonotheism is at the foundation of all pagan mythology.\"\n\nThe savants, I repeat, do not unanimously accept these conclusions:\nsavants, like other men, are rarely unanimous. It is enough for my\npurpose to have shown that it is not merely the grand tradition\nguaranteed by the Christian faith, but also the most distinctly marked\ncurrent of contemporary science, which tells us that God shone upon the\ncradle of our species. The august Form was veiled, and idolatry with its\ntrain of shameful rites shows itself in history as the result of a fall\nwhich calls for a restoration, rather than as the point of departure of\na continued progress.\n\nThe august Form was veiled. Who has lifted the veil? Not the priests of\nthe idols. We meet in the history of paganism with movements of\nreformation, or, at the very least, of religious transformation:\nBuddhism is a memorable example of this; but it is not a return towards\nthe pure traditions of India or of Egypt which has caused us to know the\nGod whom we adore. Has the veil been lifted by reflection, that is to\nsay by the labors of philosophers? Philosophy has rendered splendid\nservices to the world. It has combated the abominations of idolatry; it\nhas recognized in nature the proofs of an intelligent design; it has\ndiscerned in the reason the deeply felt need of unity; it has indicated\nin the conscience the sense of good, and shown its characteristics; it\nhas contemplated the radiant image of the supreme beauty--still it is\nnot philosophy which has restored for humanity the idea of God. Its\nlights mingled with darkness remained widely scattered, and without any\nfocus powerful enough to give them strength for enlightening the world.\nTo seek God, and consequently to know Him already in a certain measure;\nbut to remain always before the altar of a God glimpsed only by an\n_elite_ of sages, and continuing for the multitudes the unknown God:\nsuch was the wisdom of the ancients. It prepared the soil; but it did\nnot deposit in it the germ from which the idea of the Creator was to\nspring forth living and strong, to overshadow with its branches all the\nnations of the earth. And when this idea appeared in all its splendor,\nand began the conquest of the universe, the ancient philosophy, which\nhad separated itself from heathen forms of worship, and had covered\nthem with its contempt, contracted an alliance with its old adversaries.\nIt accepted the wildest interpretations of the common superstitions, in\norder to be able to league itself with the crowd in one and the same\nconflict with the new power which had just appeared in the world. And\nthis sums up in brief compass the whole history of philosophy in the\nfirst period of our era.\n\nThe monotheism of the moderns does not proceed historically from\npaganism; it was prepared by the ancient philosophy, without being\nproduced by it. Whence comes it then? On this head there exists no\nserious difference of opinion. Our knowledge of God is the result of a\ntraditional idea, handed down from generation to generation in a\nwell-defined current of history. Much obscurity still rests upon man's\nearliest religious history, but the truth which I am pointing out to you\nis solidly and clearly established. Pass, in thought, over the\nterrestrial globe. All the superstitions of which history preserves the\nremembrance are practised at this day, either in Asia or in Africa, or\nin the isles of the Ocean. The most ridiculous and ferocious rites are\npractised still in the light of the same sun which gilds, as he sets,\nthe spires and domes of our churches. At this very day, there are\nnations upon the earth which prostrate themselves before animals, or\nwhich adore sacred trees. At this very day, perhaps at this hour in\nwhich I am addressing you, human victims are bound by the priests of\nidols; before you have left this room, their blood will have defiled the\naltars of false deities. At this very day, numerous nations, which have\nneither wanted time for self-development, nor any of the resources of\ncivilization, nor clever poets, nor profound philosophers, belong to the\nreligion of the Brahmins, or are instructed in the legends which serve\nas a mask to the pernicious doctrines of Buddha. Where do we meet with\nthe clear idea of the Creator? In a unique tradition which proceeds from\nthe Jews, which Christians have diffused, and which Mahomet corrupted.\nGod is known, with that solid and general knowledge which founds a\nsettled doctrine and a form of worship, under the influence of this\ntradition and nowhere else. We assert this as a simple fact of\ncontemporary history; and there is scarcely any fact in history better\nestablished.\n\nThe light comes to us from the Gospel. This light did not appear as a\nsudden and absolutely new illumination. It had cast pale gleams on the\nsoul of the heathen in their search after the unknown God; it had shone\napart upon that strange and glorious people which bears the name of\nIsrael. Israel had preserved the primitive light encompassed by\ntemporary safe-guards. It was the flame of a lamp, too feeble to live in\nthe open air, and which remained shut up in a vase, until the moment\nwhen it should have become strong enough to shine forth from its\nshattered envelope upon the world. The worship of Jehovah is a local\nworship; but this worship, localized for a time, is addressed to the\nonly and sovereign God. To every nation which says to Israel as Athaliah\nto Joash:\n\n\n     I have my God to serve--serve thou thine own,[14]\n\n\nIsrael replies with Joash:\n\n\n     Nay, Madam, but my God is God alone;\n     Him must thou fear: thy God is nought--a dream![15]\n\n\nIsrael does not affirm merely that the God of Israel is the only true\nGod, but affirms moreover that the time will come when all the earth\nwill acknowledge Him for the only and universal Lord. A grand thought, a\ngrand hope, is in the soul of this people, and assures it that all\nnations shall one day look to Jerusalem. Its prophets threaten, warn,\ndenounce chastisements, predict terrible catastrophes; but in the midst\nof their severer utterances breaks forth ever and again the song of\nfuture triumph:\n\n\n     Uplift, Jerusalem, thy queenly brow:\n     Light of the nations, and their glory, thou![16]\n\n\nThus is preserved in the ancient world the knowledge of God amongst an\nexceptional people, amidst the darkness of idolatry and the glimmerings\nof an imperfect wisdom. And not only is it preserved, but it shines with\na brightness more and more vivid and pure. The conception of sovereignty\nwhich constitutes its foundation, is crowned as it advances by the\nconception of love. At length He appears by whom the universal Father\nwas to be known of all.\n\nHave you not remarked the surprising simplicity with which Jesus speaks\nof His work? He speaks of the universe and of the future as a lawful\nproprietor speaks of his property. The field in which the Word shall be\nsown is the world. He introduces that worship in spirit and in truth\nbefore which all barriers shall fall. He knows that humanity belongs to\nHim; and when He foretells His peaceful conquest, one knows not which\npredominates in His words, simplicity or grandeur. Now this predicted\nwork has been done, is being done, and will be done. No one entertains\nany serious doubt of this. The idea of God, as it exists amongst\nChristian peoples, bears on its brow the certain sign of victory.\n\nIn many respects, we are passing through the world in times which are\nnot extraordinary, and among things little worthy of lasting record.\nStill great events are being accomplished before our eyes. The ancient\nEast is shaken to its foundations. The work of foreign missions is taken\nup again with fresh energy. Ships, as they leave the shores of Europe,\ncarry with them,--together with those who travel for purposes of\ncommerce, or from curiosity, or as soldiers,--those new crusaders who\nexclaim: God wills it! and are ready to march to their death in order\nto proclaim the God of life to nations plunged in darkness. The advances\nof industry, the developments of commerce, the calculations of ambition,\nall conspire to diffuse spiritual light over the globe. These are noble\nspectacles, revealing clearly the traces of a superior design, which the\nmighty of this world are accomplishing, even by the craft and violence\nof their policy: they are the manifest instruments of a Will to which\noftentimes they are insensible. The knowledge of God is extending; and\nwhile it is extending, it is enriching itself with its own conquests.\nJust as it absorbed the living sap of the doctrines of the Greeks, so it\nis strengthening itself with the doctrines of the ancient East and of\nold Egypt, which an indefatigable science is bringing again to light.\nChristian thought is growing, not by receiving any foreign impulse from\nwithout, but like a vigorous tree, whose roots traverse new layers of a\nfertile soil. All truth comes naturally to the centre of truth as to its\nrallying-point; and to the universal prayer must be gathered all the\npure accents gone astray in the superstitious invocations which rise\nfrom the banks of the Ganges or from the burning regions of Africa. The\nday will come, when our planet, in its revolutions about the sun, shall\nreceive on no point of its surface the rays of the orb of day, without\nsending back, over the ruins of idol-temples for ever overthrown, a song\nof thanksgiving to the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, become through\nJesus Christ the God of all mankind.\n\nWe know now whence comes our idea of God: it is Christian in its origin.\nIt proceeds from this source, not only for those who call themselves\nChristians, but for all those who, in the bosom of modern society,\nbelieve sincerely and seriously in God. But little study and reflection\nis required for the acknowledgment that the doctrines of our deists are\nthe product of a reason which has been _evangelized_ without their own\nknowledge. They have not invented, but have received the thought, which\nconstitutes the support of their life. A mind of ordinary cultivation is\nfree henceforward from all danger of falling into the artless error of\nJ.J. Rousseau, when he pretended that even though he had been born in a\ndesert island and had never known a human being, he would have been able\nto draw up the confession of faith of the _Vicaire Savoyard_. The habit\nof historical research has dispelled these illusions. A French writer,\ndistinguished for solid erudition, wrote not long ago: \"The civilized\nworld has received from Judea the foundations of its faith. It has\nlearned of it these two things which pagan antiquity never\nknew--holiness and charity; for all holiness is derived from belief in a\npersonal, spiritual God, Creator of the universe; and all charity from\nthe doctrine of human brotherhood!\"[17] Religion, in its most general\nsense, is found wherever there are men; but distinct knowledge of the\nHeavenly Father is the fruit of that word which comes to us from the\nborders of the Jordan,--a word in which all the true elements of ancient\nwisdom are found to have mutually drawn together, and strengthened each\nother. In the very heart of our civilization, those men of mind who\nsucceed in freeing themselves in good earnest from the influence of this\nword come, oftener than not, to throw off all belief in the real and\ntrue God, if they have strength of mind enough properly to understand\nthemselves.\n\nHow is it that the full idea of the Creator,--an idea which true\nphilosophers have sought after in all periods of history, and of which\nthey have had, so to speak, glimpses and presentiments,--how is it that\nthis idea is a living one only under the influence of the tradition\nwhich, proceeding originally from Abraham and Moses, has been continued\nby Jesus Christ? It is not impossible to point out the spiritual causes\nof this great historical phenomenon. Faith in God, in order to maintain\nitself in presence of the difficulties which rise in our minds, and--to\ncome at once to the core of the question--the idea of the love of God,\nin order to maintain itself in presence of evil and of the power of evil\non the earth, has need of resources which the Christian belief alone\npossesses. The knowledge of the Heavenly Father is essentially connected\nwith the Gospel: this is the historical fact. This fact is accounted for\nby the existence of an organic bond between all the great Christian\ndoctrines: this is my deliberate conviction. I frankly declare here my\nown opinions: to do so is for me a matter almost of honor and good\nfaith; but I declare them, without desiring to lay any stress upon them\nin these lectures. My present object is to consider the idea of God by\nitself. I isolate it for my own purposes from Christian truth taken as a\nwhole, but without making the separation in my thoughts. The thesis\nwhich I propose to maintain is common to all Christians, that is quite\nclear; but further; in a perfectly general sense, and in a merely\nabstract point of view, it is a proposition maintained equally by the\ndisciples of Mahomet; it is maintained by J.J. Rousseau and the\nspiritualist philosophers who reproduce his thoughts. It is clear in\nfact that just as Jesus Christ is the corner-stone of all Christian\ndoctrine, so God is the foundation common to all religions.\n\nBefore concluding this lecture I desire to answer a question which may\nhave suggested itself to some amongst you. What are we about when we\ntake up a Christian idea in order to defend it by reasoning? Are we\noccupied about religion or philosophy? Are we treading upon the ground\nof faith, or on the ground of reason? Are we in the domain of tradition,\nor in that of free inquiry? I have no great love, Gentlemen, for hedges\nand enclosures. I know very well, better, perhaps, than many amongst\nyou, because I have longer reflected on the subject, what are the\ndifferences which separate studies specially religious, from\nphilosophical inquiries. But when the question relates to God, to the\nuniversal cause, we find ourselves at the common root of religion and\nphilosophy, and distinctions, which exist elsewhere, disappear. Besides,\nthese distinctions are never so absolute as they are thought to be. You\nwill understand this if you pay attention to these two considerations:\nthere is no such thing as pure thought disengaged from every traditional\nelement: there is no such thing as tradition received in a manner purely\npassive, and disengaged from all exercise of the reflective faculties.\n\nYou think you are employed about philosophy when you shut yourself up in\nyour own individual thoughts. A mistake! The most powerful genius of\nmodern times failed in this enterprise. Descartes conceived the project\nof forgetting all that he had known, and of producing a system of\ndoctrine which should come forth from his brain as Minerva sprang all\narmed from the brain of Jupiter. Now-a-days a mere schoolboy, if he has\nbeen well taught, ought to be able to prove that Descartes was mistaken,\nbecause the current of tradition entered his mind together with the\nwords of the language. It is not so easy as we may suppose to break the\nties by which God has bound us all together in mutual dependence. Man\nspeaks, he only thinks by means of speech, and speech is a river which\ntakes its rise in the very beginnings of history, and brings down to the\nexisting generation the tribute of all the waters of the past. No one\ncan isolate himself from the current, and place himself outside the\nintellectual society of his fellows. We have more light than we had on\nthis subject, and the attempt of Descartes, which was of old the happy\naudacity of genius, could in our days be nothing but the foolish\npresumption of ignorance.\n\nAs for the purely passive reception of tradition, this may be conceived\nwhen only unimportant legends are in question, or doctrines which occupy\nthe mind only as matters of curiosity; but when life is at stake, and\nthe interests of our whole existence, the mind labors upon the ideas\nwhich it receives. Religion is only living in any soul when all the\nfaculties have come into exercise; and faith, by its own proper nature,\nseeks to understand. The distinction between traditional data therefore\nand pure philosophy is far from being so real or so extensive as it is\ncommonly thought to be. But for lack of time, I might undertake to prove\nto you more at length that the labor of individual thought upon the\ncommon tradition is the absolute and permanent law of development for\nthe human mind.\n\nWe have to steer between two extreme and contrary pretensions. What\nshall we say to those theologians who deny all power to man's reason,\nand consider the understanding as a receiver which does nothing but\nreceive the liquid which is poured into it? to those theologians who,\nnot content with despising Aristotle and Plato, think themselves obliged\nto vilify Socrates and calumniate Regulus? We will tell them that they\ndepart from the grand Christian tradition, of which they believe\nthemselves _par excellence_ the representatives. We will add that they\noutrage their Master by seeming to believe that in order to exalt Him it\nis necessary to calumniate humanity. Again, what shall we say to those\nphilosophers, who do not wish for truth except when they have succeeded\nin educing it by themselves? to those philosophers who draw a little\ncircle about their own personal thought, and say: If truth discovers\nitself outside this circle we have no wish to see it; and who boast that\nthey only are free, because they have abandoned the common beliefs? We\nwill tell them that they are deceiving themselves by taking for their\nown personal thought the _debris_ of the tradition of the human race.\nWe will add that their pretended independence is a veritable slavery. A\nstrange sort of liberty that, which should forbid those who affect it to\naccept a faith which appeared to them to be true, because they were not\nthe inventors of it. Listen to this wise reflection of a contemporary\nwriter: \"Philosophy allows us to range ourselves on the side of\nPlatonism: why should it not also allow us to range ourselves on the\nside of the Christian faith, if there it is that we find wisdom and\nimmutable truth? The choice ought to seem as free and as worthy of\nrespect on the one side as on the other; and philosophy which claims\nliberty for itself, is least of all warranted in refusing it to\nothers.\"[18] To be free, is to look for truth wherever it may be found,\nand it is to obey truth wherever we meet with it. When the question\ntherefore relates to God, or to the soul and its eternal destinies,--to\nthe man who asks me, Are you occupied with religion or philosophy? I\nhave only one answer to give: I am a man, and I am seeking truth.\n\nA final consideration will perhaps put these thoughts in a more\nstriking light. If you think the most important of the discussions of\nour day to be that between natural and revealed religion, between deism\nand the Gospel, you have not well discerned the signs of the times. The\nfundamental discussion is now between men who believe in God, in the\nsoul, and in truth, and men, who, denying truth, deny at the same time\nthe soul and God. When these high problems are in question, periodicals\nand other publications, which have the widest circulation, and which\ngain admission into every household, bring us too often the works of\nwriters without convictions, eager to spread amongst others the doubt\nwhich has devoured their own beliefs. They have received entire, and\nwithout losing an obole of it, the heritage of the Greek Sophists. They\ninvolve in fact in the same proscription Socrates and Jesus Christ, Paul\nof Tarsus and Plato of Athens: they have no more respect for the\nopinions of Descartes and Leibnitz than for those of Pascal and Bossuet.\nThe great question of the day is to know whether our desire of truth is\na chimaera; whether our effort to reach the divine world is a spring into\nthe empty void. When the question relates to God, inasmuch as He is the\nbasis of reason no less than the object of faith, all the barriers which\nexist elsewhere disappear: to defend faith is to defend reason; to\ndefend reason is to defend faith. The unbridled audacity of those who\ndeny fundamental truths is bringing ancient adversaries, for a moment at\nleast, to fight beneath the same flag. What they would rob us of, is not\nmerely this or that article of a definite creed, but all faith whatever\nin Divine Providence, every hope which goes beyond the tomb, every look\ndirected towards a world superior to our present destinies. But take\ncourage. This flame lighted on the earth, and which is evermore directed\ntowards heaven, has passed safely through rougher storms than those\nwhich now threaten it; it has shone brightly in thicker darkness than\nthat in which men are laboring so hard to enshroud it. It is not going\nto be extinguished, be very sure, before the affected indifference of a\nfew wits of our day, and the haughty disdain of a few contemporary\njournalists.\n\nIn a word, Gentlemen,--to take the idea of God as it has been handed\ndown to us, and to study its relation to the reason, the heart, and the\nconscience of man,--this is my proposed method of proceeding. To show\nyou that this idea is truth, because it satisfies the conscience, the\nheart, and the reason--this is the object I have in view. Of this object\nI am sure you feel the importance: nevertheless, and that we may be more\nalive to it still, I propose to you to sound with me the abysses of\nsorrow and darkness which are involved in those terrible words--\"without\nGod in the world.\"\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[2] Aux _grimpeurs des Alpes_.\n\n[3] Psalm cxxxix. 7-10.\n\n[4] J.J. Rousseau.\n\n[5] _Les Origines Indo-Europeennes_, by Adolphe Pictet, ii. 651.\n\n[6] Cleanthes, _Hymn to Jupiter_.\n\n[7] Sophocles, _OEdipus R._\n\n[8] _Handbuch der gesammten aegyptischen Alterthumskunde_, von Dr. Max\nUhlemann. Leipzig, 1857.\n\n[9] _Institutions divines_, ii. 1.\n\n[10] Id.\n\n[11] _Deutsche Mythol._ Third edition, page lxiv.\n\n[12] _Annales de philosophie chretienne_, t. 59, p. 228._r_.\n\n[13] _Les Origines Indo-Europeennes_, ii. 720.\n\n[14] J'ai mon Dieu que je sers, vous servirez le votre.\n\n[15]\n\n                          Il faut craindre le mien;\n     Lui seul est Dieu, Madame, et le votre n'est rien.\n\n[16]\n\n     Leve, Jerusalem, leve ta tete altiere!\n     Les peuples a l'envi marchent a ta lumiere.\n\n[17] _Etudes Orientales_, par Adolphe Franck, p. 427.\n\n[18] Barthelemy St. Hilaire, in the _Seances et travaux de l'Academie\ndes sciences morales et politiques_, LXX., p. 134.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE II.\n\n_LIFE WITHOUT GOD._\n\n(At Geneva, 20th Nov. 1863.--At Lausanne, 13th Jan. 1864.)\n\n\nGENTLEMEN,\n\nI propose to examine to-day what are the consequences for human life of\nthe total suppression of the idea of God. This suppression is the result\nof atheism properly so called: it is also the result of scepticism\nraised into a system. The soul which doubts, but which seeks, regrets,\nhopes, is not wholly separated from God. It gives Him a large share in\nits life, inasmuch as the desire which it feels to meet with Him, and\nthe sadness which it experiences at not contemplating Him in a full\nlight, become the principal facts of its existence. But doubt adopted as\na doctrine realizes in its own way, equally with atheism properly so\ncalled, life without God, the mournful subject of our present study.\n\nHaving God, the spiritual life has a firm base and an invincible hope.\nThe vapors of earth may indeed for a moment obscure the sky. One while\nfogs hang about the ground; another while clouds send forth the\nthunder-bolt; but, above the regions of darkness and of tempest, the eye\nof faith contemplates the eternal azure in its unchanging calm. Life has\nits sorrows for all; but it is not only endurable, it is blessed, when\nin view of the instability of all things, in view of evil, of injustice,\nand of suffering, there can breathe from the depths of the soul to the\neternal, the Holy One, the Comforter, those words of patience in life\nand of joy in death: _My God!_ Take God away, and life is decapitated.\nEven this comparison is not sufficient; life, rather, becomes like to a\nman who should have lost at once both his head and his heart. The\nimmense subject which opens before us falls into an easy and natural\ndivision: we will fix our attention successively upon the individual and\nupon society.\n\n\n\n\nPART I.\n\n_THE INDIVIDUAL._\n\n\nMan thinks, he feels, and he wills: these are the three great functions\nof the spiritual life. Let us inquire what, without God, would become,\nfirst, of thought, which is the instrument of all knowledge; next; of\nthe conscience, which is the law of the will; then of the heart, which\nis the organ of the feelings. We will begin with thought.\n\nLet us go back to the origin of modern philosophy. The labors of\nDescartes will make us acquainted, under the form clearest for us, with\na current of lofty thoughts which does honor to ancient civilization,\nand which has come down to us through the writings of Plato and St.\nAugustine. We have seen that Descartes deceived himself, when he thought\nto separate himself altogether from tradition, and forgot the while how\nintimately men's minds are bound together in a common possession of\ntruth. He was mistaken, because he confounded the idea, natural to the\nhuman mind, of an infinite reason, with the full idea of the Creator; so\nattributing to the efforts of his own philosophy that gift of truth\nwhich he had received from the Christian tradition. But, having so far\nrecognized his error, listen now to this great man, and judge if he were\nagain mistaken in those thoughts of his which I am about to reproduce to\nyou.\n\nDescartes strives hard to doubt of all things, persuaded that truth will\nresist his efforts, and come forth triumphant from the trial. He doubts\nof what he has heard in the schools: his masters may have led him into\nerror. He doubts of the evidence of his senses: his senses deceive him\nin the visions of the night; what if he were always dreaming, and if his\nwaking hours were but another sleep with other dreams! He will doubt\neven of the certainty of reason: what if the reason were a warped and\nbroken instrument? Reason is only worth what its cause may be worth. If\nman is the child of chance, his thoughts may be vain. If man is the\ncreature of a wicked and cunning being, the light of reason may be only\nan _ignis fatuus_ kindled by a malicious and mocking spirit. Here is a\nsoul plunged in the lowest abysses of doubt; but it is a manly soul\nwhich seeks in doubt a trial for truth, and not a comfortable pillow on\nwhich slothfully to repose. How does Descartes upraise himself? By a\nthought known to every one, and which was already found in St.\nAugustine: \"_Cogito, ergo sum_. I think, therefore I am.\" Deceive me who\nwill; if I am deceived, I exist. Here is a certainty protected from all\nassault: I am. But what a poor certainty is this! What does it avail me\nto have rescued my existence from the abysses of universal doubt, if\nabove the deep waters which have swallowed up all belief floats only\nthis naked and mortifying truth: I am; but I exist only perhaps to be\nthe sport of errors without end. The first step therefore taken by the\nphilosopher would be a fruitless one if it were not followed by a\nsecond. An eye is open, and says: I see; but it must have a warrant that\nthe light by which it sees is not a fantastic brightness. No, replies\nDescartes; reason sees a true light; and this is how he proves it: I am,\nI know myself; that is certain. I know myself as a limited and imperfect\nbeing; that again is certain. I conceive then infinity and perfection;\nthat is not less certain; for I should not have the idea of a limit if I\ndid not conceive of infinity, and the word _imperfect_ would have no\nmeaning for me, if I could not imagine perfection, of which imperfection\nis but the negation. Starting from this point, the philosopher proves by\na series of reasonings that the conception of perfection by our minds\ndemonstrates the real existence of that perfection: God is. He adds,\nthat the existence of God is more certain than the most certain of all\nthe theorems of geometry. You will observe, Gentlemen, that the man who\nspeaks in this way is one of the greatest geometricians that ever lived.\nHe has found God, he has found the light. Reason does not deceive, when\nit is faithful to its own laws: the senses do not deceive, when they are\nexercised according to the rules of the understanding. Error is a\nmalady; it is not the radical condition of our nature; it is not without\nlimits and without remedy, for the final cause of our being is God, that\nis to say truth and goodness.\n\n\n     From everlasting God was true,\n     For ever good and just will be,\n\n\nsays one of our old psalms. Faith in the veracity of God--such is the\nground of the assurance of believers; such is also the foundation on\nwhich has been raised the greatest of modern philosophies. Without the\nknowledge of God and faith in his goodness, man remains plunged in\nirremediable doubt, possessing only this single, poor, and frightful\ncertainty: I am; and I exist perhaps only to be eternally deceived.\n\nBut, it has been said, and it needed no great cleverness to say it--What\na strange way is this of reasoning! Here is a man who first proves that\nGod is, by means of his reason; and then proves that his reason is good\nbecause God is. His reason demonstrates God to him, and God demonstrates\nhis reason to him: it is an argument of which any schoolboy can at once\nsee the fallacy; it is manifestly a vicious circle. This has been said\nagain and again by persons who have neglected a sufficiently simple\nconsideration. The error is apparently a gross one; is it not likely\nthat the argument has been misunderstood? Ought we not to look very\nclosely at it, before declaring that one of the most lucid minds that\nhave ever appeared in the world left at the basis of his doctrine a\nfault of logic which any schoolboy can discover? Self-sufficient levity\nof spirit is not the best means of penetrating the thought of leading\nminds; and it very often happens to us to fail of understanding because\nwe have failed in respect.\n\nLet us examine with serious attention, not the very words of Descartes,\nas an historian might do, but the course of thought of which Descartes\nis one of the most illustrious representatives.\n\nTo recognize in the reason traces of God, and to show that in faith in\nGod consists the only warrant of the reason, is not to argue in a\nvicious circle, because, in this way of proceeding, what we are employed\nin is not reasoning, but analysis; we are establishing a fact in order\nto ascertain what that fact implies and supposes. This fact is the\nnatural faith which man has in his own reason, when his reason reveals\nto him the immediate light of evidence, or the mediate light of\ncertainty. Now, when man confides in his reason, it is not in his\nindividual reason that he confides, for he has no doubt that what is\nevident for him is so also for others. If, tossed by a tempest, he were\nthrown upon an island of savages, he would not think that those savages,\nwhen they came to reflect, would be able to discover that the axioms of\nour geometry are false, or to make elements of logic which would\ncontradict our own. We believe in a general reason, everywhere and\nalways the same, and in which the reason of each individual\nparticipates. We believe therefore that there is a principle of truth\nwhich exists in itself, a reason which is eternal and everywhere\npresent; in other words, we believe in God considered as the source of\nthe universal intelligence. To believe in one's reason, is to believe in\nGod, in this sense: the fact of the confidence which we place in our own\nfaculty of thought, supposes a concealed faith in eternal truth. This is\nthe analysis of which I was speaking. It is a circle if you please, but\nit is a circle of light, outside of which there is, as we shall see by\nand by, nothing but darkness and hard contradictions.\n\nYou deny the existence of God. On what ground do you rest this denial?\nOn the ground of your reason. You believe then that your reason is good,\nyou believe it very good, since you do not hesitate to trust it, while\nyou undertake to prove false the fundamental instincts of human nature.\nBut you would not venture to say that this reason which you believe in\nwith a faith so firm is your own separate reason merely, your personal\nand exclusive property. You believe in the universal reason; you believe\nin God, considered at least as the source of the understanding. The man\ntherefore who denies God, affirms Him in a certain sense at the same\ntime that he denies Him. He denies Him in his words, in the external\nform of his thought; he affirms Him in reality, as the Supreme\nIntelligence, by the very trust which he places in his own thought. Our\nunderstanding is only the reflected ray of the Divine verity. Therefore\nit is that Descartes, as soon as he has laid the first foundations of\nhis system, interrupts the chain of his reasonings to trace these lines:\n\"Here I think it highly meet to pause for a while in contemplation of\nthis all-perfect God, to ponder deliberately his marvellous attributes,\nto consider, admire, and adore the incomparable beauty of that immense\nlight, at least so far as the strength of my mind, which remains in a\nmanner dazzled by it, shall allow me to do so.\"[19] Thus it is that\nwhile descending into the depths of the understanding, the philosopher\nwho is supposed to be absorbed in pure abstractions, discovers all at\nonce a sublime brightness, and exclaims with the ancient patriarch: \"The\nLORD is in this place, and I knew it not!\"[20] God is everywhere; He is\nin the heights of heaven, He is in the depths of thought. Remember\nthose celebrated words of Lord Chancellor Bacon: \"A little knowledge\ninclineth the mind to atheism, but a further acquaintance therewith\nbringeth it back to religion.\"\n\nGod is not demonstrated, in the ordinary sense which we attach to the\nword demonstrate;[21] He is pointed out[22] as the source of all light.\nThe attempt to demonstrate God as anything else is demonstrated, by\ndescending, that is, from higher principles until the object in view is\narrived at--this attempt implies a contradiction. God is in fact the\nfirst principle, the foundation of all principles, the principle beyond\nwhich there is nothing. We may describe the process by which the human\nmind rises to this supreme idea; but to wish to demonstrate God by\nmounting higher than Himself in order to look for a point of\ndeparture--this is literally to wish to light up the sun. If the sun of\nintelligences is extinguished, reason sets out on its way vaguely\nenlightened still with the remains of the light which it has reflected;\nbut it is not long ere it is stumbling in darkness. Then it is that--be\nnot deceived about it!--the doubts which Descartes called up by an act\nof his own will do in good earnest invade the soul. We possess a\nnatural certainty, which does not suppose a clear view of God; we reason\nwithout thinking distinctly of the principles on which we reason, just\nas, when we are in a hurry, we take the shortest cut without thinking of\nthe axiom of geometry which prescribes the straight line. But if we pass\nfrom the natural order of our thoughts into the domain of science, if we\nask--what is it which guarantees to me the value of my reason? then the\nquestion is put, and many perish in the passage which separates natural\nfaith from the domain of science,--that dangerous passage where doubt\nspreads out its perfidious fogs and its deceitful marshes. The moment\nthe question is started of the worth of reason, and all the schools of\nscepticism do start it, our answer must be--_God_; and we must find\nlight in this answer, or see thought invaded in its totality by an\nirremediable doubt. Then men come to ask themselves if all be not a lie;\nand they speak of the universal vanity, without making the reserve of\nEcclesiastes.[23] There are more souls ill of this malady than are\nsupposed to be so. Many begin by setting up proudly against God what\nthey call the rights of reason, and by and by we see this reason, which\nhas revolted against its Principle, vacillate, doubt of itself, and at\nlast, losing itself in a bitter irony, wrap itself, with all beside, in\nthe shroud of a universal scorn.\n\nWithout God reason is extinguished. What, in like case, will happen to\nthe conscience? The conscience is a reality. I will say willingly in the\nstyle of the prophets: Let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, ere\nI deny conscience, and disparage the sacred name of duty! Yes,\nconscience is a reality; but God is in it: He it is who gives to it its\nnecessary basis and its indispensable support. The conscience is the\naugust voice of the Master of the universe. God has given us the light\nof the understanding that we may see and comprehend some portions of the\nworks which He has created without us: a work there is for which He\nwould have us to be fellow-workers with Him. The heaven of stars is a\nspectacle for the eyes of the body, a grander spectacle still for the\ncontemplation of the mind which has understood their wondrous mechanism.\nWe admire them; but if the stars failed to attract our admiration, no\none of them on that account would cease to trace its orbit. There is\nanother heaven, a heaven of loving stars and free, the sight of which is\none day to fill us with rapture, and the realization of which is to be\nthe work of our love and of our will. Before we contemplate it we must\nmake it; this is our high and awful privilege. The plan of the spiritual\nheavens is deposited in the soul, and the utterances of the conscience\nreveal it to the will. It is a law of justice and of love. This law is\nevermore violated, because it is proposed to liberty, and liberty\nrebels: it subsists evermore, because it is the work of the Almighty.\nHumanity, in its strange destiny, has never ceased to outrage the rule\nwhich it acknowledges, and to pronounce upon its own acts a ceaseless\ncondemnation. The laws which are investigated by the physical sciences\nare the plan of the Creator realized in nature: the law proposed to\nliberty is the plan of the Creator to be realized by the community of\nminds. Such is the explanation of the conscience: God is its solid\nfoundation.\n\nDuty and God, morality and religion, are inseparable principles; all the\nefforts of a false philosophy have never succeeded, and never will\nsucceed, in disjoining them. Men will never be prevented from believing\nthat God is holy, and that His will is binding upon them: they will\nnever be prevented from believing that holiness is divine, and that the\nwill of God reveals itself in the admonitions of the conscience.\nTherefore the progress of religion and the progress of morality are\nclosely united; the morality of a people depends above all on the idea\nwhich it forms to itself of God. The conscience, in fact, at the same\ntime that it is real and permanent in its bases, is variable in the\ndegrees of its light. It is enlightened or obscured, according as the\nman's religious conceptions are pure or corrupted; and, on the other\nhand, when the religious worship is degraded beyond a certain limit by\nerror and the passions, the conscience protests, and by its protest\npurifies the religious conceptions. It has often been said, that in the\nonward march of humanity, morality is separated from faith, and comes at\nlast to rest upon its own bases. It is a notion of the eighteenth\ncentury, which, although its root has been cut, is still throwing out\nshoots in our time. The attempt has been made to support this theory by\nthe great name of Socrates. It is affirmed that the sage of Athens,\nbreaking the bond which connects the earth with heaven, separated duty\nfrom its primitive source. Listen: Placed in the alternative of either\nrenouncing his mission or dying, it is thus that Socrates addresses his\njudges: \"Athenians, I honor you and I love you, but I will obey the\nDeity rather than you. My whole occupation is to persuade you, young and\nold, that before the care of the body and of riches, before every other\ncare, is that of the soul and of its improvement. Know that this it is\nwhich the Deity prescribes to me, and I am persuaded that there can be\nnothing more advantageous to the republic than my zeal to fulfil the\nbehest of the Deity.\"[24] Does the man who speaks in this way appear to\nyou to have wished to break the link which connects morality with\nreligion? He separates himself from the established religion; he pursues\nwith his biting raillery shameful objects of worship; his conscience\nprotests. But, while it protests, it attaches itself immediately to a\nhigher and holier idea of that God, of whose perfections the sage of\nAthens had succeeded in obtaining a glimpse.\n\nGod then is the explanation of the conscience: He is moreover its\nsupport. It has need in sooth to be supported,--that voice which speaks\nwithin us; because it is unceasingly contradicted and denied. The\nspectacle which the world presents is not an edifying one; the facts\nwhich are taking place on the earth are not all of a nature to maintain\nthe steadfastness of the moral feeling. Let us imagine an example, a\nstriking example, such as it would be easy to find realized on a small\nscale in more commonplace events. A peaceable population, menaced in its\nmost sacred rights, has taken up arms in the simplest and most\nlegitimate self-defence. I do not allow my thoughts to rest upon the\nsoldiers who are advancing to oppress it--mere instruments as they are\nin the hands of their leaders--but upon the leaders themselves. One of\nthese, without the least necessity, with a calculating coolness, to\nwhich he sacrifices all the feelings of a man, or under the sway of one\nof those ferocious instincts which at times gain the mastery over the\nsoul, gives up a town, a village, to all the horrors of slaughter,\npillage, and fire. The blood of the victims will scarcely, perhaps, have\ngrown cold, the last gleams of the fire will not yet be extinct, when\nthis man shall be receiving the praises of his superiors. Men will laud\nthe bravery and daring of his exploit; his sovereign will place upon\nhis breast a brilliant cross, the august sign of the world's redemption;\nhe will return to his country amidst the acclamations of the multitude,\nand drink in with delight the shouts of triumph which greet him as he\nmoves on his way. For such things as these, is there to be no penalty\nbut troublesome recollections which may sometimes be banished, and a few\ntimid protests soon hushed by the loud voice of success? Verily there\nare perpetrated beneath the sun acts which cry aloud for vengeance. Have\nyou never felt it--that mighty cry--rising from your own bosom, at the\nsight of some odious crime, or on reading such and such a page of\nhistory? And it must be so; it must be that the cry for vengeance will\nrise, until the soul has learnt to transform imprecation into prayer,\nand the desire for justice into supplication for the guilty. But if, in\nthe presence of crime, we were forced to believe that there will never\nbe either vengeance or pardon, the mainspring of the moral life would be\nbroken, and humanity would at length exclaim, like Brutus in the plains\nof Philippi:--\"Virtue! thou art but a name!\"\n\nThe conscience is a reality; but its voice is troublesome, and the\ncaptious arguments which go to deny its value find support in the evil\ntendencies of our nature. If it has no faith in eternal justice it runs\nthe risk of being blunted by contact with the world. So doubt takes\nplace, doubt still deeper and more agonizing than that which bears upon\nthe processes of the understanding. The questions which arise are such\nas these:--\"This voice of duty--whence comes it? and what would it have?\nMay not conscience be a prejudice, the result of education and of habit?\nIt has little power, it seems, for it is braved with impunity. Many say\nthat it is a factitious power from which one comes at last to deliver\none's self by resisting it. Am I not the dupe of an illusion? I am\nlosing joys which others allow themselves. Barriers encompass me on\nevery hand, for there are for me prohibited actions, unwholesome\nbeauties, culpable feelings. Others are free, and make a larger use of\nlife in all directions. What if I too made trial of liberty!\" Here lies\nthe temptation. When the soul aspires to become larger than conscience\nand more tolerant than duty, it is not far from a fall. The honest woman\nwill be tempted to repine at the liberty of the courtesan, and the man\nwho is bound by his word will become capable of looking with envy on\nthe liberty of the liar. Then come terrible experiences which teach at\nlength that the unbinding of the passions is the hardest of slaveries,\nand that, in the struggle between inclination and duty, it is liberty\nwhich oppresses and law which sets free. Happy then is he who, feeling\nhimself to be sinking in gloomy waters, cries to that God who is able to\nrescue him from the abyss, and strengthens his shaken conscience by\nreplacing it on its solid foundation. \"God speaks and reigns. All\nrebellion is transient in its nature; justice will at length be done.\nJustice may be slow in the eyes of the creature of a day, seeing that He\nwho shall dispense it has eternity at his disposal.\" But if God be not a\nrefuge for us from men and from the world, if, when we see all that is\npassing around us, we cannot cast a look beyond and above the earth, men\nmay lose their faith in duty. And this faith is lost in fact. If there\nare not dead consciences, there are consciences at any rate singularly\nsunk in sleep. There are men for whom goodness, truth, justice, honor,\nseem to be a coinage of which they make use because it is current, but\nwithout for themselves attaching to it any value. These pieces of money\nhave no longer in their eyes any visible impression, because the\nconception of the almighty and just God is the impression which\ndetermines duty and guarantees its value.\n\nWhen the necessary alliance of moral order with religious thought is\ndenied, the reality of conscience is opposed to what are called\ntheological hypotheses always open to discussion. It is seen well enough\nthat men may doubt of God, but it is supposed to be impossible to doubt\nof conscience. This is an illusion of generous minds. Those who would\nkeep this illusion must not open the pages of the history of philosophy\nwhere the negation of duty does not occupy less space than the negation\nof God; they must not cast their eyes too much about them; they must\nalso take care not to open the most widely circulated books, and the\nmost fashionable periodicals: otherwise, as we shall see, they would not\nbe long in finding out that this morality which they would fain have\nsuperior to all attacks, is perhaps what of all things is most attacked\nnow-a-days, and that that conscience which it is impossible to deny is\nin fact the object of denials the most audacious on the part of a few of\nthe present favorites of fame. The voice of duty is heard no doubt even\nwhen God does not come distinctly into mind; but when the questions are\nclearly put, if God is denied, conscience grows dim, and comes at last\nto be extinguished. This obscuration does not take place all at once:\nthe potter's wheel goes on turning for a while, says an old Hindoo poem,\nafter that the foot of the artisan is withdrawn from it. But the\ndarkening takes place gradually with time: such at least is the general\nrule. There are exceptional men who seem to escape this law, and to bear\nin their bosom a God veiled from their own consciousness. Such men may\nbe found, and even in considerable numbers, in a time like ours, when\ndoubt is, in many cases, a prejudice which current opinion deposits on\nthe surface of minds without penetrating them deeply. There are men all\nwhose convictions have fallen into ruins, while their conscience\ncontinues standing like an isolated column, sole remaining witness of a\ndemolished building. The meeting with these heroes of virtue inspires a\nmingled feeling of astonishment and respect. They are verily miracles of\nthat divine goodness of which they are unable to pronounce the name. If\nthere is a man on earth who ought to fall on both knees and shed burning\ntears of gratitude, it is the man who believes himself an atheist, and\nwho has received from Providence so keen a taste for what is noble and\npure, so strong an aversion for evil, that his sense of duty remains\nfirm even when it has lost all its supports. But the exception does not\nmake the rule; and that which is realized in the case of a few is not\nrealized long, and for all. You know those crusts of snow which are\nformed over the _crevasses_ of our glaciers. These slight bridges are\nable to bear one person who remains suspended over the abyss, but let\nseveral attempt to pass together,--the frail support gives way, and the\nrash adventurers fall together into the gulf. Such is the destiny of\nthose schools of philosophy in which the notion of God disappears, and\nof those civilizations in which the sense of God is extinguished; they\nfall into dark regions where the light of goodness shines no longer.\n\nAfter the mind and conscience, it remains for us to speak of the heart.\nMan, an intelligent and free being, has in his reason an instrument of\nknowledge, and in his conscience a rule for his will. But man is not\nsufficient for himself, and cannot live upon his own resources. If you\ninquire what the word heart expresses, in its most general acceptation,\nyou will find that it always expresses a tendency of the soul to look,\nout of itself, in things or persons, for the support and nourishment of\nits individual life. Does the question concern the relations of man with\nhis fellows? The heart is the organ of communication of one soul with\nanother, for receiving, or for giving, or for giving and receiving at\nthe same time, in the enjoyment of the blessing of a mutual affection.\nThe heart is in each of us what those marks are upon the scattered\nstones of a building in course of construction which indicate that they\nare to be united one to another. The philosopher suffices for himself,\nthe stoics used to say; the heart is the negation of this haughty maxim.\nFrom the heart proceeds love, that son of abundance and of poverty, to\nspeak with Plato, that needy one ever on the search for his lost\nheritage. Love has wings, said again the wisdom of the Greeks, wings\nwhich essay to carry him ever higher. Let us extricate the thought which\nis involved in these graceful figures: Our desires have no limits, and\nindefinite desires can be satisfied only by meeting with an infinite\nBeing who can be an inexhaustible source of happiness, an eternal object\nof love. \"Our heart is made for love,\" said Saint Augustine, the great\nChristian disciple of Plato: \"therefore it is unquiet till it finds\nrepose in God.\" From this unrest proceed all our miseries. Men do not\nalways succeed in contenting themselves with a petty prosaic happiness,\na dull and paltry well-being, and in stifling the while the grand\ninstincts of our nature. If then the heart lives, and fails of its due\nobject; if it does not meet with the supreme term of its repose, its\nindefinite aspirations attach themselves to objects which cannot satisfy\nthem, and thence arise stupendous aberrations. With some, it is the\npursuit of sensual gratifications; they rush with a kind of fury into\nthe passions of their lower nature. With others it is the ardent pursuit\nof riches, power, fame,--feelings which are always crying more: More!\nand never: Enough. And the after-taste from the fruitless search after\nhappiness in the paths of ambition and vanity is not less bitter perhaps\nthan the after-taste from sensual enjoyments. Listen to the confession\nof a man whose works, full as they are of beauties, are disfigured by so\nmany impure allusions, that the author appears to have indulged, more\nthan most others, in the giddy follies and culpable pleasures of life:\n\n\n     If, tired of mocking dreams, my restless heart\n       Returns to take its fill of waking joy,\n     Full soon I loathe the pleasures which impart\n       No true delight, but kill me, while they cloy.[25]\n\n\nHere are the accents of a true confession. These are moreover truths of\ndaily experience. I have seen--and which of you could not render similar\ntestimony?--I have seen the sick man, deprived of all the ordinary\navocations and amusements of life, and with pain for his constant\ncompanion, I have seen him find joy in the thought of his God, and\nfeeding, without satiety, on this bread of contentment. I have seen the\nface of the blind lighted up by a living faith, and radiant with a light\nof peace, for him sweeter and brighter than the rays of the sun. But\nwhere God is wanting, and all connection is broken with the source of\njoy, there you shall see the richest of the rich, the most prosperous\namong the ambitious, the man of fame whose renown is most widely\nextended,--you shall see these men carrying the heavy burden of\ndiscontent. Their brow, unillumined by the celestial ray, is furrowed by\nthe lines of sadness. If you meet them in a moment of candor, these\nrich, ambitious, and famous men will tell you with a sigh: \"All this\ndoes not satisfy; we are but pursuing chimeras.\" Still they continue to\nrun after these chimeras. They cry Vanity! Vanity! and they do not cease\nto pursue vanity. They flee from themselves: if they retired within\nthemselves, they would find there ennui, inexorable ennui, which is but\nthe sense of that place which God should fill left void in the depth of\nthe soul. For the deceived heart, life becomes a bitter comedy. Those\nwho do not succeed in blinding themselves by the dust of thoughtless\nfolly, end oftentimes by wrapping themselves in disdain as with a cloak;\nthey seek a sad and solitary satisfaction in the greatness of their\ncontempt for life. But neither does this satisfy: disdain is not a\nbeverage, and contempt is not food.\n\nSuch are the destinies of the heart, to which God is wanting. But I\nhope, Gentlemen, that you have here some remonstrances to offer. I have\njust spoken of the pleasures of sense, of pride, of vanity, and I have\nmade no allusion to those affections in which the heart manifests its\nhighest qualities. Shall we forget the joys of pure love? the domestic\nhearth? friendship? country? Do not fear that, having given myself up\nto a fit of misanthropy, I am come hither to blaspheme the true\nhappinesses of life. But do the affections of earth offer us sufficient\nguarantees? We have need of the infinite to answer to the immensity of\nour desires; in the presence of those we love, have we no need of the\nEternal that we may lean our hearts on Him? Will not all human love\nbecome a source of torment, if we have no faith in the love of Him who\nwill stamp holy affections with the seal of His own eternity?\n\nA single question will suffice to enlighten us on this head. Do you know\nthe feeling of anxiety? We all know it, though in different degrees.\nEpidemical disease may appear. The cholera has started on its course; it\nhas left the interior of Asia, and is approaching. The report is current\nthat neighboring cities have begun to feel its ravages. Those we\nlove--in a month, in a week, where will they be? War is declared. We\nhear of preparations for death; the sovereigns of Europe apply\nthemselves to calculations which seem to portend torrents of blood. If\nwar breaks out, that brother, that son, who will have to take up arms,\nthat daughter who will one day perhaps find herself at the mercy of an\nunbridled soldiery----. But let us not look for examples so far away.\nHave you no dear one in a distant land of whom you are expecting\ntidings? And those who are near you! To-morrow, to-day, now perhaps,\nwhile you are listening to me, a fatal malady is discovering its first\nsymptoms----. Have you received the hard lessons of death? If you see\nchildren playing, full of ruddy and joyous health, does it happen to\nnone of you to think of another child, once the joy of your fireside,\nnow lying beneath the sod? Does it never happen to you, by a sinister\npresentiment, to see features you love to gaze on convulsed with agony\nor pale in death? And yet you must either see the death of your beloved\nones, or they must lay you in the earth; for every life ends with the\ntomb, and we do but walk over graves. When the soul has been thus\nwounded by anxiety, for this poisoned wound there is one remedy, but\nonly one: \"God reigns!\" Nothing happens without the permission of His\ngoodness. And of all those who are dear to us, we can say: \"Father, to\nThy hands I commit them.\" If we are without this trust, we shall only\nescape torment by levity. Without God our mind is sick; our conscience\nand our heart are sick also, and in a way more grievous still.\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[19] _Meditation troisieme_, at the end.\n\n[20] Gen. xxviii. 16.\n\n[21] _Demontrer_.\n\n[22] \"_On le montre_.\"\n\n[23] \"Vanity of vanities; all is vanity.... Let us hear the conclusion\nof the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his commandments: for this is\nthe whole duty of man.\" (Eccles. i. and xii.)\n\n[24] Apology.\n\n[25]\n\n     Si mon coeur, fatigue du reve qui l'obsede,\n     A la realite revient pour s'assouvir,\n     Au fond des vains plaisirs que j'appelle a mon aide,\n     Je trouve un tel degout que je me sens mourir.\n\n\n\n\nPART II.\n\n_SOCIETY._\n\n\nWe have just studied what life without God would be for the individual.\nLet us now direct our attention to those collections of human beings\nwhich form societies. We shall not speak here of the relations of civil\nwith ecclesiastical authorities,--a complex question, the solution of\nwhich must vary with times, places, and circumstances. Let us only\nremark that the distinction between the temporal and spiritual order of\nthings is one of the foundations of modern civilization. This\ndistinction is based upon those great words which, eighteen hundred\nyears ago, separated the domain of God from the domain of Caesar.\nReligion considered as a function of civil life; dogma supported by the\nword of a monarch or the vote of a body politic; the formula of that\ndogma imposed forcibly by a government on the lips of the\ngoverned--these are _debris_ of paganism which have been struggling for\ncenturies against the restraints of Christian thought.[26] The\nreligious convictions of individuals do not belong to the State;\nreligious sentiments are not amenable to human tribunals; and it would\nbe hard to say whether it is the spiritual or the temporal order of\nthings which suffers most from the confusion of these distinct domains.\nReligion should have its own proper life, and its special\nrepresentatives; civil life ought to be set free from all tyranny\nexercised in the name of dogma; but religion is not the less on that\naccount, by the influence which it exerts over the consciences of men,\nthe necessary bond and strength of human society.\n\n\"You would sooner build a city in the air,\" said Plutarch, \"than cause a\nState to subsist without religion.\" Some have contested in modern times\nthis opinion of ancient wisdom. The philosophy of the last century, as\nwe have said already, wished to separate duty from the idea of God. It\npretended to give as the only foundation for society a civil morality,\nthe rules and sanction of which were to be found upon earth. The men of\nblood who for a short time governed France, gave once as the order of\nthe day--_Terror and all the virtues_: this was a terrible application\nof this theory. Virtue rested on a decree of political power, and, for\nwant of the judgment of God, the guillotine was the sanction of its\nprecepts. Healthier views begin now to prevail in the schools of\nphilosophy. One of the members of the _Institut de France_, M. Franck,\nhas lately published a volume on the history of ancient\ncivilization,[27] with the express intention of showing that the\nconception which a people has of God is the true root of its social\norganization. According to the worth of the religious idea is that of\nthe civil constitution. Before M. Franck, twenty years ago, a man of the\nvery highest distinction as a public lecturer, indicated this movement\nof modern thought. M. Edgard Quinet, in his Lyons course, taught that\nthe religious idea is the very substance of civilization, and the\ngenerating principle of political constitutions. He announced \"a history\nof civilization by the monuments of human thought,\" and added: \"Religion\nabove all is the pillar of fire which goes before the nations in their\nmarch across the ages; it shall serve us as a guide.\"[28] Benjamin\nConstant exhibits in the variation of his opinions the transition from\nthe stand-point of the last century to that of the present. He had at\nfirst conceived of his work upon religion as a monument raised to\natheism, he ends by seeking in religious sentiments the condition\nnecessary to the existence of civilized societies.[29] Here is a real\nprogress; and this progress brings us back to the thought above quoted\nfrom Plutarch. In fact, take away the idea of God, and the first\nconsequence will be that you will sacrifice all the conquests of modern\ncivilization; the next, that you will soon have rendered impossible the\nexistence of any society whatever. I am going to ask your close\nattention to these two points successively.\n\nHistory does not offer to our view an uninterrupted progress, as certain\noptimists suppose; still less does it present the spectacle of an\never-increasing deterioration, as misanthropes affirm; and lastly, it is\nnot true, as we hear it said sometimes, that all epochs are alike, as\ngood one as another. There are times better than those which follow\nthem; and there are epochs less degraded than those which precede them.\nHuman societies fall and rise again; their march exhibits windings and\nretrograde steps, because that march is under the influence of created\nliberty; but when their destinies are regarded at one view, it is\nclearly seen that they are advancing to a determined end, because while\nman is in restless agitation, God is leading him on. The conquests of\nmodern civilization are great and sacred realities. What are these\nconquests? Let us not stay at the surface of things, but go to the\nfoundation. Societies fallen into a condition of barbarism have for\ntheir motto the famous saying of a Gallic chief: Woe to the vanquished!\nIn institutions, as in manners, the triumph of force characterizes\nbarbarous times. The right of the strongest is the twofold negation of\njustice and of love; and what characterizes civilization, issuing from\nthe barbarous condition, the fragments of which it so long trails after\nit, is the establishment of that justice which founds States, and, upon\nthe basis of justice, the development of the benevolence which renders\ncommunities happy. These are the two essential conditions of social\nprogress. These conditions are necessary even to the progress of\nindustry and of material welfare.\n\nModern civilization,--that, namely, which we so designate, while we\nrelegate, so to speak, into the past the contemporaneous societies of\nthe vast East,--modern civilization possesses a power unknown to\nantiquity. Justice has a foundation in the conscience, benevolence has\nnatural roots in the heart; but a moment has been when justice and love\nappeared in the world with new brightness, like rays disengaged from\nclouds. Modern civilization was then deposited on the earth in a\npowerful germ, of which nothing was any more to arrest the growth. That\nmoment was when the idea of God appeared in its fulness: modern\ncivilization was born of the Gospel. The knowledge of God strengthens\njustice, and the thought of the common Father develops benevolence.\nThese theses are well known; let us confine ourselves to a few rapid\nillustrations.\n\nThere exists an institution in which has been embodied the negation of\nsocial justice--Slavery. Slavery is at length disappearing before our\neyes from the bosom of Christendom; and its final retreat is doing honor\nto Russia, and bathing America in blood. This is perhaps the greatest of\nthe events which the annals of history will inscribe on the page of the\nnineteenth century. Now slavery was, in the past, an almost universal\ninstitution. The finest intellects of Greece devoted a portion of their\nlabors to its justification. Rome, at the most brilliant period of its\ncivilization, caused slaves to kill one another, in savage spectacles\nintended to delight the populace, or during sumptuous banquets for the\namusement of wealthy debauchees![30] How has slavery disappeared little\nby little! How has man been rediscovered beneath that living _thing_ of\nwhich was made, one while an instrument of labor, and another while the\nsport of execrable passions? Inquire into this history. You will find\nthe reason and the heart making their protests heard in antiquity, but\nwithout becoming efficacious. One day all is changed, and the\nfoundations of slavery begin to shake. At that memorable epoch you will\nmeet with a written document, the first in which is shown in its germ\nthe great social fact which was about to have birth. It is not an\nemperor's decree, it is not the vote of a body politic, it is a letter a\nfew lines long written by a prisoner to one of his friends. The\nsubstance of this letter was: \"I send thee back thy slave; but in the\nname of God I beg of thee to receive him as thy brother; think of the\ncommon Master who is in heaven.\" This letter was addressed--\"To\nPhilemon;\" the name of the writer was Paul. It is the first charter of\nslave emancipation. Ponder this fact, Gentlemen: contemplate the ancient\ninstitution of slavery shaken to its foundations, without being the\nobject of any direct attack, by the breath of a new spirit. You will\nthen understand how historians can tell us that the relations of states,\nbelligerent rights, civil laws, political institutions, all these things\nof which the Gospel has never spoken, have been, and are being still,\nevery day transformed by the slow action of the Gospel. God has\nappeared; justice is marching in His train.\n\nJustice is the foundation of society; but without the spirit of love,\njustice remains crippled, and never reaches its perfection. Justice\nmaintains the rights of each; love seeks to realize the communication of\nadvantages among all. Justice overthrows the artificial barriers raised\nbetween men by force and guile; love softens natural inequalities and\ncauses them to turn to the general good. Need I tell you that the\nknowledge of God is a light of which the brightest ray is love to men?\nBenevolence, that feeling natural to our hearts, is strengthened,\nextended, transfigured, by becoming charity;--charity, that union of\nthe soul with the Heavenly Father, which descends again to earth in\nloving communion between all His children. The soul separated from God\nmay be conscious of strong affections: but study well the character of a\nvirtue which is nourished from purely human sources; you will see that\nit may for the most part be expressed in these terms--\"To love one's\nfriends heartily, and to hate one's enemies with a generous hatred; to\nesteem the honest and to despise the vicious.\" But that virtue which\nloves the vicious while it hates the vice, that virtue which will avenge\nitself only by overcoming evil with good, that virtue which, while it\ndraws closer the bonds of private affections, makes a friend of every\nman, that virtue which we call divine, by a natural impulse of our\nheart--what is the source from which it flows? The following fact will\nsufficiently answer the question. On the facade of one the hospitals of\nthe Christian world, are read these Latin words, the brief energy of\nwhich our language cannot render: _Deo in pauperibus_, \"This edifice is\nconsecrated to God in the person of the poor.\" Here is the secret of\ncharity: it discerns the Divine image deposited in every human soul.\nBut do not mistake here: we cannot love, with a love natural and direct,\nthe rags of squalid poverty, the brands of vice, the languors and sores\nof sickness; but let God manifest Himself, and our eyes are opened. The\nbeauty of souls breaks forth to our view beneath the wasting of the\nhaggard frame, and from under the filth of vice. We love those immortal\ncreatures fallen and degraded; a sacred desire possesses us to restore\nthem to their true destination. Has an artist discovered in a mass of\nrubbish, under vulgar appearances, a product of the marvellous chisel of\nthe Greeks? He sets himself, with a zeal full of respect, to free the\nnoble statue from the impurities which defile it. Every soul of man is\nthe work of art Divine, and every charitable heart is an artist who\ndesires to labor at its restoration. Henceforward we can understand that\nlove of suffering and of poverty, that passion for the galleys and the\nhospital, which have at times thrown Christians into extravagances which\nour age has no reason to dread. God in the poor man, God in the sick\nman, God in the vicious man and the criminal; this, I repeat, is the\ngrand secret of charity. Charity passes from the heart of men and from\nindividual practice into social customs and institutions. Charity it is\nwhich, by degrees, takes from law its needless rigors, and from justice\nits useless tortures; which substitutes the prison in which it is sought\nto reform the guilty for the galley, which completes the corruption of\nthe criminal; it is charity that opens public asylums for all forms of\nsuffering; and that will realize, up to the limits of what is possible,\nall the hopes of philanthropy. If God ceases to be present to the mind\nand conscience of men, justice and love lose their power. Without the\npowerful action of justice and of love, society would descend again, by\nthe ways of corruption, towards the struggles of barbarism. Observe,\nstudy well, all that is going on around us. Does our civilization appear\nto you sufficiently solid to give you the idea that it can henceforth\ndispense with the foundations on which it has reposed hitherto?\n\nThe sentiments of justice and of benevolence which form the double basis\nof the progress of society, suppose a more general sentiment which is\ntheir common support--the sentiment of humanity. The idea that man has a\nvalue in himself, that he is, in virtue of his quality as man,\nindependently of the places which he inhabits and of the position which\nhe occupies in the world, an object of justice and of love;--this idea\nincludes in itself all the moral part of civilization. Social progress\nis only the recognition, ever more and more explicit, of the value of\none soul, of the rights of one conscience. Now, the idea of humanity has\nthe closest possible connection with the knowledge of God, considered as\nthe Father of the human race. Ancient wisdom, superior to the worship of\nidols, had gained a glimpse of the fact that the philosopher is a\ncitizen of the universe; and that famous line of Terence: \"I am a man,\nand I reckon nothing human foreign to me,\" excited, it is said, the\napplause of the Roman spectators. But these were mere gleams,\nextinguished soon by the general current of thought. It was the pale\ndawn of the idea of humanity. Whence came the day?\n\nI will limit the question by defining it. The idea of humanity is the\nidea of the worth and consequently of the rights of each individual man.\nIt is the idea of liberty; not of liberty interpreted by passion and\nselfishness as the inauguration of the license which violates right, but\nof liberty interpreted by reason and conscience as the limit which the\naction of each man encounters in the right of his neighbor. We are not\nspeaking here of the equality of political rights, which is not always\na guarantee of veritable liberty. We are speaking of a social condition\nsuch that man, in the exercise of his faculties, in the manifestation of\nhis thoughts, in his efforts for the causes which he loves, so long as\nhe does not violate the rights of others, does not meet with an\narbitrary power to arrest him. Still farther to limit our subject, we\nshall speak of the most important manifestation of that liberty--liberty\nof conscience, of which religious liberty is the most ordinary and most\ncomplete manifestation. This is only one of the points of the subject,\nbut it is a point which in reality supposes and includes all the rest.\nThis liberty--whence does it come?\n\nIt does not come from paganism. Paganism, with its national religions,\ncould only produce fanaticism or doubt. Each people having its own\nparticular religion, to exterminate the foreigner was to serve the cause\nof the gods of the country. A war-cry descended from the Olympus of each\nseveral nation--that Olympus which the gods quitted, in case of need, to\ntake part in the quarrels of men. Did reason perceive the nothingness of\nthese national divinities? Then scepticism appeared. The idea of the\nsupreme God being unsettled with all, and wholly obscured for the\ncrowd, when men ceased to believe in the gods of the nation, they lost\nall belief whatsoever. For this cause doubt prevailed so widely at the\ndecline of the ancient world. Those pantheons in which all religions\nwere received, welcomed, protected, are the ever-memorable temples of\nscepticism. Now you know what voice made itself heard, when the ancient\ncivilization was enfeebled by the spirit of doubt: \"Henceforth there is\nneither Greek nor barbarian, bond nor free. Ye are all brethren, and for\nall there is one God, and one truth:\" here behold the root of scepticism\nsevered. And the same voice added: \"This only God is the lawful Owner of\nHis creatures; and when you presume to do violence to the consciences\nwhich belong to Him, you know not by what spirit you are animated:\" here\nbehold the fountain of fanaticism dried up. God is acknowledged; He is\nthe Master of souls: faith founds liberty.\n\nThe Witness to universal truth appears before Rome as represented by a\ndeputy of Caesar. He is a fanatic, says the Roman; then he goes his way,\nand leaves Him to be put to death. But ere long, a dull hoarse murmur of\nthe nations, extending through all the length and breadth of the mighty\nempire, gives token that He who was dead is alive again, and is speaking\nto the general conscience. Then Rome starts from her sleep; Rome; the\npolitic tolerant Rome, sheds rivers of blood. Her tolerance allowed men\nto believe everything, but on condition that they believed seriously in\nnothing. Rome was directed by the sure instinct of despotism. She did\nnot fear the gods of the Pantheon, because she could always place above\nthem the statue of the Emperor: whereas what was now in question was,\nwhile leaving to Caesar the things which were Caesar's, to place a\nSovereign above the Emperor, and to raise a legislation above the\nlegislation of the empire. Therefore the Roman city determined to give a\ndeath-blow to Christianity,--to the idea of universal truth, because if\nthat idea gained entrance into the understanding, the cause of the\nliberty of souls was gained. So it was that indifference became\nferocious, and that doubt led back to fanaticism.\n\nI have told you whence liberty does not come; but whence comes it?\nWhence comes liberty? Ask any scholar of the Lyceums of France; he will\nanswer you, without hesitation: Liberty comes from the French\nrevolution!--No doubt, whispers an older comrade in his ear; but do not\nforget the philosophy of the eighteenth century which developed the\nprinciples which the revolution put in practice.--That is all very well,\na Protestant will say; but let us consider the grand fact of the\nReformation: it is from the sixteenth century that liberty has its\ndate.--Well and good, adds an historian; but do you not know that the\nGermans were they who poured a generous and free blood into the\nimpoverished blood of the men who had been fashioned by the slavery of\nthe empire? I contest nothing, and I am not sufficiently well-informed\nto pronounce with confidence upon the action of all these historic\ncauses. But this I venture to affirm,--that if any one thinks to fix\ndefinitely the hour when liberty was born in history, he is mistaken:\nfor it has no other date than that of the human conscience, and I will\nsay with M. Lamartine:\n\n\n     Give me the freedom which that hour had birth,\n     With the free soul, when first in conscious worth\n     The just man braved the stronger![31]\n\n\nLiberty had birth the first time that, urged by his fellow men to acts\nwhich wounded his conscience, a man, relying upon God, felt himself\nstronger than the world. That Socrates had not studied, I fancy, in the\nschool of the Encyclopedists, and was no German either, that I know of,\nwho said to the judges of Athens, with death in prospect: \"It is better\nto obey God than men.\" And when those words were repeated by the\nApostles of the universal truth, the death of Socrates, that noble death\nwhich has justly gained for him the admiration of the universe, was\nreproduced in thousands and thousands of instances. Children, women,\nyoung girls, old men, perished in tortures to attest the rights of\nconscience; and the blood of martyrs, that seed of Christians, as a\nfather of the Church called it,[32] was not less a seed of liberty.\nLiberty was not born in history; but if you wish to fix a date to its\ngrandest outburst, you have it here; there is no other which can be\ncompared with it.\n\nSome of you are thinking perhaps, without saying so, that I am\nmaintaining a hard paradox. To look for the source of liberty of\nconscience in religion, is not this to forget that the Christian Church\nhas often marked its passage in history by a long track of blood\nrendered visible by the funereal light of the stake? I forget nothing,\nSirs, and I beg of you not to forget anything either. There are three\nremarks which I commend to your attention.\n\nIt must not be forgotten that the Gospel first obtained extensive\nsuccess when Roman society was in the lowest state of corruption, and\nthat its representatives were but too much affected by the evils which\nit was their mission to combat.\n\nIt must not be forgotten that there came afterwards hordes of barbarians\nwho in a certain sense renovated the worn-out society, but who poured\nover the new leaven a coarse paste hard to penetrate.\n\nIt must not be forgotten, lastly, that if a cause might legitimately be\ncondemned for the faults of its defenders, there are none, no, not a\nsingle one, which could remain erect before the tribunal which so should\ngive judgment. Every cause in this world is more or less compromised by\nits representatives; but there are bad principles, which produce evil by\ntheir own development, and there are good principles which man abuses,\nbut which by their very nature always end by raising a protest against\nthe abuse. It is in the light of this indisputable truth that we are\nabout to enter upon a discussion of which you will appreciate the full\nimportance.\n\nSceptical writers affirm that toleration has its origin in the weakening\nof faith; and, drawing the consequence of their affirmation, they\nrecommend the diffusion of the spirit of doubt as the best means of\npromoting liberty of conscience. We have here the old argument which\nwould suppress the use to get rid of the abuse. Persecutions are made in\nthe name of religion; let us get rid of faith, and we shall have peace.\nPrisons have been built and the stake has been set up in the name of\nGod: let us get rid of God, and we shall have toleration. Observe well\nthe bearing of this mode of argument. Let us get rid of fire, and we\nshall have no more conflagrations; let us get rid of water, and no more\npeople will be drowned. No doubt,--but humanity will perish of drought\nand of cold.\n\nLet us examine this subject seriously: it is well worth our while. If\ntoleration proceeds from the enfeebling of religious belief, we ought\namong various nations to meet with toleration in an inverse proportion\nto the degree of their faith. This is a question then of history. Let us\nstudy facts. Recollecting first of all that ancient Rome did not draw\nforth a germ of liberty from its scepticism, let us throw a glance over\nexisting communities.\n\nSweden is far behind England in regard to liberty of conscience. Is it\nthat religious convictions are weaker in England than in Sweden? Has the\nreligious liberty which Great Britain practises sprung from\nindifference? Is it not rather that that land produces an energetic\nrace, and that it has been so often drenched with the blood of the\nfollowers of different forms of worship, that that blood cried at length\nto heaven, and that the conscience of the people heard it? There is more\nreligious liberty in France than in Spain. Is it the case that the true\ncause of the intolerance of the Spanish people is a more lively and more\ngeneral faith than that of the French? That is not so certain.\n\nSwitzerland is one of the countries in which is enjoyed the greatest\nliberty of opinion. Is Switzerland a land of indifference? Was not the\ncomparative firmness of its citizens' convictions remarked during the\nconflicts of the last century? Do not the United States bear in large\ncharacters upon their banner this inscription: LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE?\nAmerica is not distinguished as a country without religion; on the\ncontrary, it is blamed for the excursiveness of its faith, for the\nmultiplicity and sometimes for the extravagance of its sects. Was it a\nsceptic that taught the inhabitants of the New World to respect\nreligious convictions? Assuredly not! William Penn was shut up in the\nTower of London for the crime of free thought. Set free from prison, he\ncrossed the ocean. While intolerance was reigning still on both shores\nof the Atlantic, he founded in Pennsylvania a place of refuge for all\nproscribed opinions; and the germ has been fruitful. In vain I pass from\nold Europe to young America; I look, I observe, and I do not see that\nliberty is developed in proportion to the scepticism and the incredulity\nof nations. I seem, on the contrary, to see that there is perhaps most\nliberty where there is most real faith.\n\nSome may dispute the validity of these conclusions by remarking that the\ncondition of communities is a complex phenomenon depending upon divers\ncauses. Let us simplify the question. Is it not, it will be said, the\nliterary representatives of the spirit of doubt who have demanded and\nfounded toleration? Is it not.... But it is not necessary for my\nsupposed questioner to go on. If he is a Frenchman, he will name\nVoltaire. No doubt, freedom of opinion has been claimed by sceptics.\nThey have served a good cause; let us know how to rejoice in the fact,\nand not to be unmindful of what there may have been in their work of\nnoble impulses and generous inspirations. Let us remark however that\nevery proscribed opinion puts forth a natural claim to the liberty of\nwhich it is deprived. But it is one thing to claim for one's-self a\nliberty one would gladly make use of to oppress others, and it is\nanother thing to demand liberty seriously and for all. There was, as I\nam glad to believe, a certain natural generosity in the motives which\nled Voltaire to consecrate to noble causes a pen so often sold to evil.\nStill it is impossible not to suspect that if that apostle of toleration\nhad had a principality under his own sway, the fact of thinking\ndifferently from the master would very soon have figured among the\nnumber of delinquencies.\n\nThe patriarch of Ferney wrote in favor of toleration; some friends of\nreligious indifference have pleaded the cause of liberty of conscience:\nthe fact is certain. But other writers, animated by a living faith, have\nalso demanded liberty for all: the fact is not less certain. Some years\nago, at nearly the same epoch, the Pere Lacordaire and our own\nAlexander Vinet consecrated to this noble cause, the former the\nattractive brilliancy of his eloquence, the latter all the fineness of\nhis delicate analyses. The friends of Lacordaire are gathering up the\nvibrations of that striking utterance which proclaimed: \"Liberty slays\nnot God.\"[33] Let us gather up also the good words, which, uttered on\nthe borders of our lake, have gained entrance far and near into many\nhearts. I should like to take such and such a Parisian journalist, bring\nhim into our midst, and get him to acquaint himself thoroughly with the\nresults of our experience; I should like to conduct him to the cemetery\nof Clarens, place him by the tomb of Vinet, and tell him what that man\nwas.--If, as he returned to his home, my journalist did not leave behind\nhim at the French frontier, as contraband merchandise, all that he would\nhave seen and learnt in our country, he would perhaps understand that\nthe surest road by which to arrive at respect for the consciences of\nothers is not indifference, but firmness of faith, in humility of heart,\nand largeness of thought. All the writers who have devoted their pen to\nthe defence of the rights of the human soul have not therefore been\nsceptics. Without continuing this discussion of proper names, let us\nsettle what is here the true place of writers. Before there are men who\ndemand liberty and digest the theory of it, there must be other men who\ntake it, and who suffer for having taken it. If liberty is consolidated\nwith speech and pen, it is founded with tears and blood; and the\nsceptical apostles of toleration conveniently usurp the place of the\nmartyrs of conviction. \"What we want,\" rightly observes a revolutionary\nwriter, \"is free men, rather than liberators of humanity.\"[34]\n\nIn fact, liberty comes to us above all from those who have suffered for\nit. Its living springs are in the spirit of faith, and not, as they\nteach us, in the spirit of indifference. It is easy to understand, that\nwhere no one believes, the liberty to believe would not be claimed by\nany one.\n\nLet us now endeavor to penetrate below facts, in order to bring back the\ndiscussion to sure principles. Let us ask what, in regard to liberty of\nconscience, are the natural consequences of faith, and the natural\nconsequences of scepticism.\n\nFaith does appear, at first sight, a source of intolerance. The man who\nbelieves, reckons himself in possession of the right in regard to truth,\nand to God; he has nothing to respect in error. Thus it is that belief\nnaturally engenders persecution. This reasoning is specious, all the\nmore as it is supported by numerous and terrible examples; but let us\nlook at things more closely. Place yourselves face to face with any one\nof your convictions, no matter which; I hope there is no one of you so\nunfortunate as not to have any. Suppose that it were desired to impose\nupon you by force even the conviction which you have. Suppose that an\nofficer of police came to say to you, pronouncing at the same time the\nwords which best expressed your own thoughts: \"you are commanded so to\nbelieve.\" What would happen? If you had never had a doubt of your faith,\nyou would be tempted to doubt it, the moment any human power presumed to\nimpose it upon you. The feeling of oppression would produce in your\nconscience a strong inclination to revolt. Let us analyze this feeling.\nYou feel that it is words, not convictions, which are imposed by force;\nyou feel that declarations extorted by fear from lying lips are an\noutrage to truth. You feel, in a word, that your belief is the right of\nGod over you, and not the right of your neighbor. Men respect God's\nright over the souls of their fellow-men, in proportion as they are\nintelligent in their own faith. The fanaticism which would impose words\nby force is not an ardent but a blind faith. In order to bring it back\ninto the paths of liberty, it is enough to restore to it its sight.\n\nThe establishment of the Christian religion furnishes a great example in\nsupport of our thesis. The Christians, when persecuted by the empire,\nhad never allowed themselves to reply to the violence of power by the\nviolence of rebellion. There came, however, and soon enough, a time when\nthey were sufficiently numerous to defend themselves, and had withal the\nconsciousness of their strength; but they had no will to conquer the\nworld, except by the arms of martyrdom, and heroism, and obedience. This\nwas not the case during a few years only, it is the history of three\ncenturies, an ever-memorable page of human annals, in which all ages\nwill be able to learn what are the true weapons of truth. Christendom,\ntoo often forgetful of its origin, has in later times allowed the fury\nof persecution to cloak itself under a pretended regard for sacred\ninterests; but the remedy has proceeded from the very evil. The\nChristian conscience has protested, in the name of the Gospel, against\nthe crimes of which the Gospel was the pretext, and the passions of men\nthe cause. \"We must bewail the misery and error of our time,\" already\nSt. Hilary was exclaiming, in the fourth century. \"Men are thinking that\nGod has need of the protection of men.... The Church is uttering threats\nof banishment and imprisonment, and desiring to compel belief by\nforce,--the Church, which itself acquired strength in exile and in\nprisons!\"\n\nTrue faith, then, possesses a principle by which it protests against\nabuses which it is sought to cloak under its name, and this protest\ncomes at last to make itself heard. Faith suppressed, the passions will\nremain, for in order to be a saint, it is not enough to be a sceptic.\nThe passions will look for other pretexts. Will not the spirit of doubt\noffer them such pretexts?\n\nIt seems at first sight that doubt must promote toleration, since it\ndoes not allow any importance to be attached to opinions. This is a\nspecious conclusion, similar to that which placed in belief the source\nof intolerant passions. Let us once more reflect a little. The first\neffect of doubt is certainly to dispose the mind to leave a free course\nto all opinions; but disdain is not the way to respect, and only respect\ncan give solid bases to the spirit of liberty. Believers are in the eyes\nof the sceptic weak-minded persons, whom he treats at first with a\ngentle and patronizing compassion. But these weak minds grow obstinate;\nthe sceptic perceives that they do not bend before his superiority, and\ndare perhaps to consider themselves as his equals. Then irritation\narises, and, beneath the velvet paw, one feels the piercing of the claw.\nThe sceptic has in fact a dogma; he has but one, but one he has after\nall--the negation of truth. The faith of others is a protest against\nthat single dogma on which he has concentrated all the powers of his\nconviction. He is passionately in earnest for this negation; he feels\nhimself the representative of an idea, of which he must secure the\ntriumph. Now come such surmisings as these: \"Here are men who think\nthemselves the depositaries of truth! These pretended believers--may\nthey not be hypocrites?\" Place men so disposed in positions of power;\nlet them be the masters of society; what will follow? Beliefs are a\ncause of disturbances: what seemed at first an innocent weakness, takes\nthen the character of a dangerous madness. For the politician, the\ntemptation to extirpate this madness is not far off. \"What if we were to\nget rid of this troublesome source of agitation! If we declared that the\nconscience of individuals belongs to the sovereign, what repose we\nshould have in the State! If we proclaimed the true modern dogma,\nnamely, that there is no dogma; if silencing, in short, fanatics who are\nbehind their age, we decreed that every belief is a crime and every\nmanifestation of faith a revolt, what quiet in society!\" The incline is\nslippery, and what shall hold back the sceptic who is descending it?\n\nFaith carries with it the remedy for fanaticism, but where shall be\nfound the remedy for the fanaticism of doubt? In the claims of God? God\nis but a word, or a worthless hypothesis. In respect for the convictions\nof others? All conviction is but weakness and folly. All this, be well\nassured, gives much matter for reflection. When I hear some men who call\nthemselves liberal, tracing the ideal of the society which they desire,\nthe bare imagination of their triumph frightens me, for I can understand\nthat that society would enjoy the liberty of the Roman empire, and the\ntoleration of the Caesars.\n\nSuch are the consequences of scepticism for the leaders of a people.\nWhat will those consequences be for the people themselves? The spirit of\nindifference paralyzes the sources of generous sentiments, and ends in\nthe same results as the spirit of cowardice. And do you not know the\npart which cowardice has played in history? If I may venture to call up\nhere the most mournful recollections of modern times, do you not know\nthat during the Reign of Terror, two or three hundred scoundrels\ninstituted public massacres in the Capital of France, in the midst of a\npopulation shuddering with fright, but who let things go? Now the\ncharacteristic of indifference is the letting things go. If fanaticism\nhas something to do with persecution, indifference has a great deal to\ndo with it. The crimes which minds paralyzed by doubt allow to be\nperpetrated have besides a sadder character than those which are\nperpetrated by passions, which, wild and erring though they be, have a\ncertain nobleness in their origin. If I must be bound to the stake, I\nhad rather burn with the blind assent of a fanatical crowd, than in the\npresence of an indifferent populace who came to look on. For just as\nsceptics find all doctrines equally good, so they find all spectacles\nequally instructive and curious.[35]\n\nI have felt it necessary to insist on these considerations. Direct\nattacks upon religious truth are perhaps less dangerous than the efforts\nby which modern infidelity endeavors to estrange us from God, by\npersuading us that doubt is the guarantee of liberty, and that belief\nrivets the chains of bondage. Many consciences are disturbed by these\naffirmations. It concerns us therefore to know that God is the great\nLiberator of souls, and that forgetfulness of God is the road to\nslavery. The faith which seeks to propagate itself by force inflicts\nupon itself the harshest of contradictions. The spirit of doubt, in\norder to become the spirit of violence, has only to transform itself\naccording to the laws of its proper nature.\n\nAnd now to sum up. One of the noblest spectacles that earth can show,\nis that of a community animated with a true and profound faith, in which\neach man, using his best efforts to communicate his convictions to his\nbrethren, respects the while that which belongs to God in the inviolable\nasylum of the conscience of others. But woe to the society formed by\nsophists, in which opinion, benumbed by doubt and indifference, arouses\nitself only to devote to hatred or to contempt every firm and noble\nconviction!\n\nTo unsettle the idea of God, is to dry up its source the stream of the\nveritable progress of modern society; it is to attack the foundations of\nliberty, justice, and love. The material conquests of civilization would\nserve thenceforward only to hasten the decomposition of the social body.\nThe pure idea of God is the true cause of the great progress of the\nmodern era; religion, in its generality, is, as Plutarch has told us,\nthe necessary condition to the very existence of society. This is what\nremains for us to prove.\n\n\"How sacred is the society of citizens,\" said Cicero, \"when the immortal\ngods are interposed between them as judges and as witnesses.\"[36] Let us\nraise still higher this lofty thought, and say: \"How sacred is human\nsociety, when, beneath the eye of the common Father, the inequalities of\nlife are accepted with patience and softened by love; when the poor and\nthe rich, as they meet together, remember that the Lord is the Maker of\nthem both; when a hope of immortality alleviates present evils, and when\nthe consciousness of a common dignity reduces to their true value the\npassing differences of life!\" Take away from human society God as\nmediator, and the hopes founded in God as a source of consolation, and\nwhat would you have remaining? The struggle of the poor against the\nrich, the envy of the ignorant directed against the man who has\nknowledge, the dullard's low jealousy of superior intelligence, hatred\nof all superiority, and, by an almost inevitable reaction, the obstinate\ndefence of all abuses,--in one word, war--war admitting neither of\nremedy nor truce. Such is the most apparent danger which now threatens\nsociety.\n\nWhen I consider these facts with attention, I am astonished every day\nthat society subsists at all, that the burning lava of unruly passions\ndoes not oftener make large fissures in the social soil, and overflow in\ndevastating torrents, bearing away at once palace and cottage, field and\nworkshop. This standing danger is drawing anxious attention, and we\nhear the old adage repeated: \"There must be a religion for the people.\"\nThere are men who wish to give the people a religion which they\nthemselves do not possess, acting like a man who, at once poor and\nostentatious, should give alms with counterfeit money. And what result\ndo they attain? We must have a religion for the people, say the\npoliticians, that they may secure the ends they have in view, and\nconduct at their own pleasure the herds at their disposal. We must have\na religion for the people, say the rich, in order to keep peaceably\ntheir property and their incomes. We must have a religion for the\npeople, say the _savants_, in order to remain quiet in their studies, or\nin their academic chairs. What are they doing--these men without God,\nwho wish to preserve a faith for the use of the people? These\n_savants_,--they say, and print it, that religion is an error necessary\nfor the multitudes who are incapable of rising to philosophy. Where is\nit that they say it, and print it? Is it in drawing-rooms with closed\ndoors? Is it within the walls of Universities, or in scientific\npublications which are out of the reach of the masses? No. They say it\nin political journals, in reviews read by all the world; they print it\nat full in books which are sold by thousands of copies. Their words are\nspreading like a deleterious miasma through all classes of society.\nThoughtless men! (I am unwilling to suppose a cool calculation on their\npart of money or of fame which should oblige me to say--heartless men),\nthoughtless men! they do not see the inevitable consequences of their\nown proceeding. The people hear and understand. The intellectual\nbarriers between the different classes of society are gradually becoming\nlower: this is one of the clearest of the ways of Providence in our\ntime. Do you believe that the people will long consent to hear it said\nthat they only live on errors, but that those errors are necessary for\nthem? Do you not see that they are about to rise, and answer, in the\nsentiment of their own dignity, that they will no longer be deceived,\nand that they intend to deliver themselves also from superstition? Then,\nall restraining barriers removed, passions will have free course; and\nbelieve me, the rising floods will not respect those quiet haunts of\nstudy in which they will have had one of their springs. The proof of\nthis has been seen before. Some men of the last century wished to\ndestroy religion amongst decent folk, but not for the rabble: they are\nVoltaire's words, who had too much good sense to be an atheist, but\nwhose pale deism is sometimes scarcely distinguishable from the negation\nof God. \"Your Majesty,\" thus he wrote to his friend the King of Prussia,\nin January, 1757, \"will render an eternal service to the human race, by\ndestroying that infamous superstition, I do not say amongst the rabble,\nwhich is not worthy to be enlightened, and to which all yokes are\nsuitable, but amongst honest people.\" A religion was necessary for the\npeople; but Voltaire and the King of Prussia, the German barons, the\nFrench marquises, and the ladies who received their homage, could do\nwithout it.\n\nVoltaire died before eating of the fruit of his works; and Alfred de\nMusset could only address to him his vengeful apostrophe at his tomb:\n\n\n     Sleep'st thou content, and does thy hideous smile\n     Still flit, Voltaire, above thy fleshless bones?[37]\n\n\nVoltaire was dead; but many of his friends and disciples were able to\nmeditate, in the prisons of the Terror and as they mounted the steps of\nthe scaffold, on the nature of the terrible game which they had\nplayed--and lost.\n\nSo it fares with men of letters who have no God, but who would have a\nreligion for the people. Other men there are who would have a religion\nfor the people, being themselves the while without restraint, because\nthey are without religious convictions. They abandon themselves to the\nardent pursuit of riches, excitements, worldly pleasures. These are they\nwho have made a fortune by disgraceful means, perhaps the public sale of\ntheir consciences, and who by their luxurious extravagance overwhelm the\nhonest and economical working-man. These are the courtesans who parade\nin broad daylight the splendid rewards of their own infamy. Let not such\ndeceive themselves! The people see these things; they form their\njudgment of them, and if they give way to the bad instincts which are in\nus all, where God is not in the heart to restrain them, to their hatred\nis added contempt. If they are forcibly kept back from realizing their\ncherished hopes, they adjourn them, but without renouncing them.\n\nPut away all belief in God, and you will see the action and reaction of\nhuman passions forming, as it were, a mass of opposite electricities,\nand preparing the thunder-peal and the furies of the tempest. Then\nappear those disorganized societies which are terrified at their own\ndissolution, until a strong man comes, and, taking advantage of this\nvery terror, takes and chastises these societies, as one chastises an\nunruly child. It is a story at once old and new, because, in proportion\nas God withdraws from human society, in that same proportion the power\nof the sword replaces the empire of the conscience. There must be a\nreligion for the people! Yes, Sirs, but for that people, wide as\nhumanity, which includes us all.\n\nIf the existence of God is denied, man falls into despair, and society\ninto dissolution. What then is my inference? That atheism is false. Such\na mode of arguing produces an outcry. \"A matter of sentiment!\" men\nexclaim. \"You would build up a doctrine according to your own fancy! You\ndo not discuss the question calmly, but appeal to interests and\nprejudices: you quit the domain of science, which takes cognizance only\nof facts and reasoning.\" Such expressions are common enough to make it\nworth while to study their value. Of course, science must not be an\ninstrument of our caprice. We are bound to search for truth; and we are\nunfaithful to our obligations if we try to establish doctrines which\nserve our passions, or favor our interests, or flatter our tastes and\nour prejudices. But the conscience, the heart, the conditions of the\nexistence of human society, are neither prejudices nor personal\ninterests; they are eternal and living realities. We speak of the\nconscience, of the heart, of society, and they answer us: \"We do not\nbelieve that there are true sciences in that domain; we only wish for\nfacts.\" Occasionally we hear naturalists speak in this way. We only wish\nfor facts! Then our thoughts, our feelings, our conscience are not\nfacts! The man who will give the closest observation to the steps of a\nfly, or to a caterpillar's method of crawling, has not a moment's\nattention to give to the impulses of the heart, to the rules of duty, to\nthe struggles of the will; and when addressed on the subject of these\nrealities of the soul, the most certain of all realities, he will reply:\n\"That is no business of mine, I want nothing but facts.\" Let us pass\nfrom this aberration, and listen for a moment to other objectors.\n\nWe do not deny, it is often said, the reality of our feelings. Man\ndesires happiness, and seeks it in religious belief; but this is an\norder of things which science cannot take account of. Science has only\ntruth for its object, and owes its own existence wholly to the reason.\nIf it happens to science to give pain to the heart or to the conscience,\nno conclusion can thence be drawn against the certainty of its results.\n\"There is no commoner, and at the same time faultier, way of reasoning,\nthan that of objecting to a philosophical hypothesis the injury it may\ndo to morals and to religion. When an opinion leads to absurdity, it is\ncertainly false; but it is not certain that it is false because it\nentails dangerous consequences.\"[38] So wrote the patriarch of modern\nsceptics, the Scotchman Hume. The lesson has been well learnt; it is\nrepeated to us, without end, in the columns of the leading journals of\nFrance, and in the pages of the _Revue des deux Mondes_. The adversaries\nof spiritual beliefs have changed their tactics. In the last century,\nthey replied to minds alarmed for the consequences of their work: \"Truth\ncan never do harm.\"--\"Truth can never do harm,\" retorted J.J. Rousseau:\n\"I believe it as you do, and this it is that proves to me that your\ndoctrines are not truth.\" The argument is conclusive. So the adversary\nhas taken up another position; and he says at this day:--\"Our doctrines\ndo perhaps pain the heart, and wound the conscience, but this is no\nreason why they should be false: moral goodness, utility, happiness, are\nnot signs by which we may know what is true.\"\n\nPhilosophy, Gentlemen, has always assumed to be the universal\nexplanation of things, and you will agree that it is on her part a\nhumiliating avowal, that she is enclosed, namely, in a circle of pure\nreason, and leaves out of view, as being unable to give any account of\nthem, the great realities which are called moral goodness and happiness.\nOne might ask what are the bases of that science which disavows, without\nemotion, the most active powers of human nature. One might ask whether\nthose who so speak, understand well the meaning of their own words; and\ninquire also what is the method which they employ, and the result at\nwhich they aim. One might ask whether these philosophers are not like\nastronomers who should say: \"Here are our calculations. It matters\nnothing to us whether the stars in their observed course do or do not\nagree with them. Science is sovereign; it is amenable only to its own\nlaws, and visible realities cannot be objections in the way of its\ncalculations.\" Let us leave these preliminary remarks, and let us come\nto the core of the controversy.\n\nThey set the reason on one side, the conscience and heart upon the\nother, as an anatomist separates the organic portions of a corpse, and\nthey say: Truth belongs only to the reason; the conscience and the heart\nhave no admission into science. Listen to the following express\ndeclaration of the weightiest, perhaps, of French contemporary\nphilosophers: \"The God of the pure reason is the only true God; the God\nof the imagination, the God of the feelings, the God of the conscience,\nare only idols!\"[39] It is impossible to accept this arbitrary division\nof the divine attributes. There is but one and the same God, the\nSubstance of truth, the inexhaustible Source of beauty, the supreme Law\nof the wills created to accomplish the designs of His mercy. The\nconscience, the heart, the reason rise equally towards Him, following\nthe triple ray which descends from His eternity upon our transitory\nexistence. We cannot therefore seriously admit that God of the pure\nreason, separated from the God of the conscience and of the heart. Still\nlet us endeavor to make this concession, for argument's sake, to our\nphilosopher. Let us suppose that the reason has a God to itself, a God\nfor the metaphysicians who is not the God of the vulgar. Before we\nimmolate upon His altar the conscience and the heart, it is worth our\nwhile to examine whether the statue of the God of the reason rests upon\na solid pedestal. Here are the theses which are proposed to us: \"It is\nimpossible for our feelings to supply any light for science. Truth may\nbe gloomy, and despair may gain its cause. Virtue may be wrong, and\nimmorality may be the true. Reason alone judges of that which is.\" I\nanswer: Human nature has always eagerly followed after happiness. Human\nnature has always acknowledged, even while violating it, a rule of duty.\nThe heart is not an accident, the conscience is not a prejudice: they\nare, and by the same right as the reason, constituent elements of our\nspiritual existence. If there exist an irreconcilable antagonism between\nscience and life; if the heart, in its fundamental and universal\naspirations, is the victim of an illusion, if the conscience in its\nclearest admonitions is only a teacher of error, what is our position?\nIn what I am now saying, Gentlemen, I am not appealing to your feelings;\nthe business is to follow, with calm attention, a piece of exact\nreasoning. If the heart deceives us, if the voice of duty leads us\nastray, the disorder is at the very core of our being; our nature is ill\nconstructed. If our nature is ill constructed, what warrants to us our\nreason? Nothing. What assures us that our axioms are good, and that our\nreasonings have any value? Nothing. The life of the soul cannot be\narbitrarily cloven in twain; it must be held for good in all its\nconstituent elements, or enveloped wholly and entirely in the shades of\ndoubt. If the heart and conscience deceive us, then reason may lead us\nastray, and the very idea of truth disappears. God is the light of the\nspiritual world. We prove His existence by showing that without Him all\nreturns to darkness. This demonstration is as good as another.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[26] Christian States have given the force of law to institutions, such,\nfor instance, as monogamy, which date their origin from the Gospel\nrecords. Here we have the normal development of civilization: religious\nfaith enlightens the general conscience, and reveals to it the true\nconditions of social progress. In this order of things, it is not a\nquestion of _beliefs_, but of _acts_ imposed in the name of the\ninterests of society. The state may take account of the religious\nbeliefs of its subjects, and enter into such relations as may seem to it\nconvenient with the ecclesiastical authorities: this is the basis of the\nsystem of concordats, a system which has nothing in it contrary to first\nprinciples, so long as liberty is maintained. But the establishment of\n_national_ religions, decreed by the temporal power and varying in\ndifferent states, manifestly supposes a foundation of scepticism. For\nthe idea of truth, one and universal in itself, is substituted the idea\nof decisions obligatory for those only who are under the jurisdiction of\na definite political body. If the State, without pretending to decree\ndogma, receives it from the hands of the Church, and imposes it upon its\nsubjects, it seems at first that the temporal power has placed itself at\nthe service of the Church, but that the idea of truth is preserved. But\nwhen the question is studied more closely, it is seen that this is not\nthe case, and that the state usurps in fact, in this combination, the\nattributes of the spiritual power. In fact, before protecting _the true\nreligion_, it is necessary to ascertain which it is; and in order to\nascertain the true religion, the political power must constitute itself\njudge of religious truth. So we come back, by a _detour_, to the\nconception of national religions. The Emperor of Russia and the Emperor\nof Austria will inquire respectively which is the only true religion, to\nthe exclusive maintenance of which they are to consecrate their temporal\npower. To the same question they will give two different replies; and\neach nation will have its own form of worship, just as each nation has\nits own ruler.\n\n[27] _Etudes orientales_, 1861.\n\n[28] _Unite morale des peuples modernes_,--a lecture delivered at Lyons,\n10 April, 1839. This lecture is inserted after the _Genie des Religions_\nin the complete works of the author.\n\n[29] Franck, _Philosophie du droit ecclesiastique_, pages 117 and 118.\n\n[30] Schmidt, _Essai historique sur la Societe civile dans le monde\nromain_. Bk. 1. ch. 3.\n\n[31]\n\n     La liberte que j'aime est nee avec notre ame\n     Le jour ou le plus juste a brave le plus fort.\n\n[32] Tertullian.\n\n[33] _Le Pere Lacordaire_, by the Comte de Montalembert, p. 25.\n\n[34] _De l'autre rive_, by Iscander (in Russian). Iscander is the\npseudonyme of M. Herzen.\n\n[35] \"The man of thought knows that the world only belongs to him as a\nsubject of study, and, even if he could reform it, perhaps he would find\nit so curious as it is that he would not have the courage to do\nso.\"--Ernest Renan, preface to _Etudes d'histoire religieuse_, 1857. The\nauthor has manifested better sentiments in 1859, in the preface to his\n_Essais de morale et de critique._\n\n[36] _De Legibus_, ii. 7.\n\n[37]\n\n     Dors-tu content, Voltaire, et ton hideux sourire\n     Voltige-t-il encor sur tes os decharnes?\n\n[38] Hume, Essay VIII. On liberty and necessity. [Not having access to\nthe original, I re-translate the French translation.--TR.]\n\n[39] Vacherot, _La metaphysique et la science_. Preface, p. xxix.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE III.\n\n_THE REVIVAL OF ATHEISM._\n\n(At Geneva, 24th Nov. 1863.--At Lausanne, 18th Jan. 1864.)\n\n\nGENTLEMEN,\n\nThe subject of the present Lecture will be--The revival of Atheism. And\nI do not employ the word 'atheism'--a term which has been so greatly\nabused--without mature reflection. When Socrates opposed the idea of the\nholy God to the impure idols of paganism; when he dethroned Jupiter and\nhis train in order to celebrate \"the supreme God, who made and who\nguides the world, who maintains the works of creation in the flower of\nyouth, and in a vigor always new,\"[40] they accused Socrates of being an\natheist. Descartes, the great geometrician who proclaimed the existence\nof God more certain than any theorem of geometry, has been denounced as\nan atheist. When men began to forsake the temples of idols in order to\nworship the unknown God who had just manifested Himself to the world,\nthe Christians were accused of atheism because they refused to bow down\nto wood and stone. Such abuses might dispose one to renounce the use of\nthe word. Besides, when a word has been for a long time the signal of\npersecution and the forerunner of death, one hesitates to employ it. In\nan age when atheists were burned, generous minds would use their best\nefforts to prove that men suspected of atheism had not denied God,\nbecause they would not have been understood had they attempted to\nsay--\"They have denied God perhaps, but that is no reason for killing\nthem.\" Thence arose the sophistical apologies for certain doctrines,\napologies made with a good intention, but which trouble the sincerity of\nhistory. These are the brands of servitude, which must disappear where\nliberty prevails. We are able now to call things by their proper names,\nfor there exist no longer for atheism either stakes or prisons. In\naffirming that certain writers, some of whom are just now the favorites\nof fame, are shaking the foundations of all religion, one exposes no\none to severities which have disappeared from our manners, one only\nexposes oneself to the being taxed with intolerance and fanaticism. But\ncandor is here a duty. If this duty were not fulfilled, liberty of\nthought would no longer be anything else than liberty of negation; and,\nwhile truth was oppressed, error alone would be set free.\n\nLet us settle clearly the terms of this discussion. It is often asserted\nthat an atheist does not exist. Does this mean that the lips which deny\nGod, always in some way contradict themselves? Does it mean that every\nsoul bears witness to God, perhaps unconsciously to itself, either by a\nsecret hope, or by a secret dread? This is true, as I think; but we are\nspeaking here of doctrines and not of men. It is true again that the\nnegation of the Creator allows of the existence, in certain\nphilosophies, of generous ideas and elevated conceptions. Such men,\nwhile they put God out of existence, desire to keep the true, the\nbeautiful, the good; they hope to preserve the rays, while they\nextinguish the luminous centre from which they proceed. Such systems\nalways tend to produce the deadly fruits pointed out in my last lecture;\nbut men devoted to the severe labors of the intellect often escape, by\na noble inconsistency, the natural results of their theories. Therefore,\nin the inquiry on which we are about to enter, the term 'atheism'\nimplies, with regard to persons, neither reproach nor contempt. It\nsimply indicates a doctrine, the doctrine which denies God. This denial\ntakes place in two ways: It is affirmed that nature, that is to say\nmatter, force devoid of intelligence and of will, is the sole origin of\nthings; or, the reality is acknowledged of those marks which raise mind\nabove nature, but it is affirmed that humanity is the highest point of\nthe universe, and that above it there is nothing. Such are the two forms\nof atheism.\n\nPerhaps you expect here the explanation of a doctrine which is often\ndescribed as holding a sort of middle place between the negation and the\naffirmation of God, namely, pantheism. Pantheism, in the true sense of\nthat word, is a system according to which God is all, and the universe\nnothing. This extraordinary thesis is met with in India. A Greek,\nParmenides, has vigorously sustained it. We have in it a kind of sublime\ninfatuation. In presence of the one and eternal Being thought collapses\nin bewilderment; and thenceforward it experiences for all that is\nmanifold and transitory a disdain which passes into negation. In the\ndomain of experience, all is limited, temporary, imperfect; and reason\nseeks the perfect, the eternal, the infinite. The doctrine of creation\nalone explains how the universe subsists in presence of its first cause.\nIn ignorance of this doctrine, some bold thinkers have cut the knot\nwhich they could not untie. They have declared that reason alone is\nright, and that experience is wrong: the world does not exist, it is but\nan illusion of the mind. Whence proceeds this illusion? If perfection\nalone exists, how comes that imperfect mind to exist which deceives\nitself in believing in the reality of the world? To this question the\nsystem has no answer. Such is true pantheism; but it is not to dangers\nso noble that most minds run the risk of succumbing. What is commonly\nunderstood by pantheism is the deification of the universe. The idea of\nGod is not directly denied, but it undergoes a transformation which\ndestroys it. God is no longer the eternal and Almighty Spirit, the\nCreator; but the unconscious principle, the substance of things, the\nwhole. The universe alone exists; above it there is nothing; but the\nuniverse is infinite, eternal, divine. The higher wants of the reason,\nmingling with the data derived from experience, form an imposing and\nconfused image, which, while it beguiles the imagination, perverts the\nunderstanding, deceives the heart, and places the conscience in peril.\nIn a philosophical point of view, it is a contradiction of thought,\nwhich seeks the Infinite Being, and, being unable to discover Him, gives\nthe character of infinity to realities bounded by experience. In a\nreligious point of view, it is an aberration of the heart, which\npreserves the sentiment of adoration, but perverts it by dispersing it\nover the universe. \"Pantheism,\" says M. Jules Simon, \"is only the\nlearned form of atheism; the universe deified is a universe without\nGod.\"[41] From the moment that the reason endeavors to see distinctly,\npantheism vanishes like a deceitful glare. Atheism disengages itself\nfrom the cloak which was concealing its true nature, and the mind\nremains in presence of nature only, or of humanity only. We will proceed\nto take a rapid glance at some few of the countries of Europe, in order\nto discover and point out in them the traces of this melancholy\ndoctrine. Let us begin with France.\n\nIn the year 1844, just twenty years ago, some French writers,\nrepresenting the philosophy, in some measure official, of the time,\nunited to publish a _Dictionnaire des sciences philosophiques_. M.\nFranck, the director of this useful and laborious enterprise, said in\nthe preface to the work: \"Atheism has well nigh completely disappeared\nfrom philosophy; the progress of a sound psychology will render its\nreturn for ever impossible.\" In speaking thus, he expressed the thoughts\nand hopes of the school of which he remains one of the most estimable\nrepresentatives. A generous impulse was animating a group of intelligent\nand learned young men. Their hope was to translate Christianity into a\npurely rational doctrine, to purify religious notions without destroying\nthem, and, while endowing humanity with a vigorous scientific culture,\nto leave to it its lofty hopes. The object in view was to establish a\nphilosophy founded upon a serious faith in God; and to this philosophy\nwas promised the progressive and pacific conquest of the human race.[42]\nTwenty years have passed, and things bear quite another aspect. To\nlanguage expressive of security have succeeded the accents of anxiety\nand words of alarm. The cause which was proclaimed victorious is\ndefended at this day like a besieged city. You will remark\nhowever,--that I may not leave you beyond measure discouraged by the\nfacts of which I have to tell you,--you will remark, I say, that it is\nthe efforts attempted in the cause of good which have helped to set me\non the track of evil; it has often been the defence which has fixed my\nattention upon the attack.\n\nThe materialism of the last century seems to have maintained a strong\nhold upon one part of the Paris school of medicine. We do find in France\na good many physicians who, like Boerhave, render homage to religion,\nand a good many physiologists who, like the great Haller, are ready to\ndefend beliefs of the spiritual order;[43] but, among men specially\ndevoted to the study of matter, many succumb to the temptation of\nrefusing to recognize anything as real which does not come under the\nexperience of the senses. This however is not one of the points which\noffer themselves most strikingly for our examination. The atheistic\nmanifestations of the socialist schools have more novelty, and perhaps\nmore importance.\n\nMan is naturally a social being. Good and evil have their primitive seat\nin the heart of individuals, but good and evil are transferred into\ninstitutions of which the influence is morally beneficial or pernicious.\nIf socialism consists in recognizing the importance of social\ninstitutions, in cherishing ideas of progress and hopes of reform, I\ntrust that we are all socialists. Do we desire progress by the ever\nwider diffusion of justice and love? From the moment that, across the\nconscience whereon divine rays are falling, we have descried the eternal\ncentre of light, we understand that God is the most implacable enemy of\nabuses. How is it then that atheism sometimes manifests itself in\nattempts at social reform? We may explain it, without so much as\npointing out the influence, but too real, of the faults committed by the\nrepresentatives of religion. Faith is a principle of action; it is, as\nhistory testifies, the grand source of the progress of human society;\nbut faith is also a principle of patience. The brow of every believer is\nmore or less illumined by the rays of His peace who is patient because\nHe is eternal. Eager to effect good to the utmost extent of his ability,\nhe accomplishes his work with that calm activity to which are reserved\ndurable victories. In the impossible (for if the word impossible is not\nFrench, it is human) the believer recognizes one of the manifestations\nof the supreme Will, and immortal hope enables him to support the evils\nwhich he does not succeed in destroying. But this is not enough for\nimpatient reformers. Ignorant of the profound sources of evil, they\nthink that institutions can do everything, and that a change of laws\nwould suffice to reform men's hearts; they believe that the organization\nof society alone hinders the realization of good and of happiness. The\nresignation of believers appears to them a stupid lethargy, and in their\npatient expectation of a judgment to come they see only an obstacle to\nthe immediate triumph of justice on the earth. What if the nations were\npersuaded that there is nothing to be looked for beyond the present\nlife, so that all that is to be done is to make to ourselves a paradise\nas soon as may be here below! If they were persuaded that all appeal to\nthe Judge in heaven is a chimerical hope, with what ardor would they\nthrow themselves into schemes of revolution! Thus it is that certain\npolitical innovators are led to seek in the negation of God one of their\nmeans of action.\n\nTwo views, therefore, essentially diverse, govern the labors of the\nrenovators of society. The one class desire to realize, in an ever\nlarger measure, justice and love; religious convictions are the\nstrongest support of their work. The other class would uproot from men's\nminds every principle of faith, in order the more readily to obtain the\nrealization of their theories. These two classes of men seem at times to\nbe fighting all together in the _melee_ of opinions. They meet, as, in\nthe doubtful glimmer of the dawn, might meet together laborious workmen\nwho are anticipating the daylight, and evil-doers who are fleeing from\nthe sun.\n\nIn order to form a just estimate of the labors of the socialist schools,\nit would be necessary to make a bold and straightforward inquiry into\nthe object of their studies, and to discern, in the midst of mad-brained\nand guilty dreams, whatever flashes of light might disclose some\nprophetic vision of the future. This is no task of ours. It is enough\nfor us to remark that in France, as also in the other countries of\nEurope, the negation of God discovers itself in this order of ideas. It\ndiscovers itself at one time by an idolatry of humanity, at another by a\nmaterialistic enthusiasm for corporeal indulgences. Disregarding the\nsensual imaginations which disgrace the works of Fourrier, let us turn\nour attention elsewhere.\n\nM. Vacherot, a sober philosopher, of high intellectual power and\nelevated sentiment, has lately published, unhappily, twelve hundred\npages destined to maintain the thesis that God does not exist.[44] Man\nconceives the idea of perfection, and not finding that perfection\nrealized either in the world or in himself, he rises to the conception\nof a real and perfect being: such is the usual process of metaphysical\nreasoning. For M. Vacherot, reality and perfection mutually exclude one\nanother; this is one of his fundamental theses. This thesis does but\ninterpret the result of our experience, by refusing us the right to\nraise ourselves higher. The world with which we are acquainted is\nimperfect; therefore--say Plato, Saint Augustine, and Descartes--the\nperfection of which we have the idea is realized in a Being superior to\nthe world. The world with which we are acquainted is imperfect,\ntherefore there is a contradiction between the ideal and the real, says\nM. Vacherot, who makes thus of the general result of experience the\nabsolute rule of truth. To say therefore of God that He is perfect, is\nto affirm that He does not exist, inasmuch as the ideal is never\nrealized. Thought thus finds itself placed in a situation at once odd\nand violent. If God is perfect, He does not exist. If God exists, He is\nnot perfect. The respect which we owe to the Being of beings forbids us\nto believe in Him; to affirm His existence would be to do outrage to His\nperfection. The author of this theory renders a worship to that ideal\nwhich does not exist, and towards which he affirms nevertheless that the\nworld is gravitating by the law of progress. This worship is of too\nabstract a nature to secure many adherents; it can only become popular\nby taking another shape, and it does so in this way: We conceive of that\nperfection which in itself does not exist; it exists therefore in our\nthought. Since the world, by the law of progress, is tending towards\nperfection, the world has for its end and law a thought of the human\nmind. The human mind therefore is the summit of the universe, and it is\nit that we must adore. We are here out of the region of pure\nabstraction, and arrive at the doctrines of the Positivist school.\n\nThe Positive philosophy, so called because it wishes to have done with\nchimeras, was founded in France, a few years ago, by Auguste Comte. M.\nLittre is at present one of its principal representatives. This writer,\nsays M. Sainte-Beuve, is one of those who are endeavoring \"to set\nhumanity free from illusions, from vague disputes, from vain solutions,\nfrom deceitful idols and powers.\"[45] Let us say the same thing in\nsimpler terms: M. Littre professes the doctrines of a school which\nignores the Creator in nature, and Providence in history. To ascertain\nphenomena, and acquaint ourselves with the law which governs them, such,\nsay the positivists, is the limit of all our knowledge. As for the\norigin of things and their destination, that is an affair of individual\nfancy. \"Each one may be allowed to represent such matters to himself as\nhe likes; there is nothing to hinder the man who finds a pleasure in\ndoing so from dreaming upon that past and that future.\"[46]\n\n\"In spite of some appearances to the contrary,\" says M. Littre, \"the\npositive philosophy does not accept atheism.\"[47] Why? Because atheism\npretends to give an explanation of the universe, and that after a\nfashion is still theology. Minds \"veritably emancipated\" profess to know\nnothing whatever on questions which go beyond actual experience. They do\nnot deny God, they eliminate Him from the thoughts. The attempt is a\nbold one, but it fails; men do not succeed in emancipating themselves\nfrom the laws of reason. The very writer whom I have just quoted is\nhimself a proof of this, for he absolutely proscribes every statement of\na metaphysical nature, and then, three pages farther on, in the very\ntreatise in which he makes this proscription, he speaks of the\n\"_eternal_ motive powers of a _boundless_ universe.\"[48] Boundless!\neternal! What thoughts are these? Behold the instincts of the reason\ncoming to light! behold all the divine attributes appearing! Adoration\nis withdrawn from God, and it is given to the universe at large. What is\nit which, in the universe regarded as a whole, will become the direct\nobject of worship? Another positivist, M. de Lombrail, will tell us, in\na work reviewed by Auguste Comte: \"Man,\" he says, \"has always adored\nhumanity.\" Here, we learn, is the true foundation of all religions, and\nthe brief summary of their history. This humanity-god has been long\nadored under a veil which disguised it from the eyes of its worshippers;\nbut the time is come when the sage ought to recognize the object of his\nworship and give it its true name.[49]\n\nThe positivist school, then, professes a complete scepticism with regard\nto whatever is not included in the domain of experience. But its foot\nslips, and it falls into the negation of God, from which it rises again\nby means of a humanitarian atheism. All these marks are met with again\nin the works of the critical school.\n\nThe critics group themselves about M. Renan. The praises which they\nlavished a while ago on a bad book by that author seem at least to allow\nus to point him out as their chief. They derive their name from studies\nin history and archaeology, with which we here have nothing to do. They\nare regarded as forming a philosophical and religious school, and it is\nin that connection that they claim our attention. Their influence is\nincontestable, and still, notwithstanding, their doctrinal value is\nnothing. They form merely a literary branch of the positivist school\nengrafted upon the eclecticism of M. Cousin. We find in their writings\nthe pretension to limit science to the experimental study of nature and\nto humanity. We afterwards find there the pretension to understand and\nto accept all doctrines alike. Beyond this, nothing. The critics bestow\nparticular attention on the phenomena of religion, of art, and of\nphilosophy; but this interest is purely historical. Nothing is more\ncurious than the successive forms of human beliefs; but the period of\nbeliefs is over. Religious faith no longer subsists except in minds\nwhich are behind the age; and philosophy, upheld in a final swoon by\nHegel and Hamilton, has just yielded its last breath in the arms of M.\nCousin: so M. Renan informs us.[50] To choose a side between the\ndefenders of the idea of God and its opponents; to choose between Plato\nand Epicurus, between Origen and Celsus, between Descartes and Hobbes,\nbetween Leibnitz and Spinoza, would be to make one's self the Don\nQuixote of thought. An honest man may find amusement in reading the\nAmadis of Gaul; the Knight of _la Manche_ went mad through putting\nfaith in the adventures of that hero. A like fate befalls those minds\nwhich are simple enough to believe still, in the midst of the nineteenth\ncentury, in the brave chimeras of former days. Let us study history, let\nus study nature; beyond that we do not know, and we never shall know,\nanything. Our fashionable men of letters develop their thesis with so\nmuch assurance; they lavish upon believers so many expressions of\namiable disdain; they appear so sure of being the interpreters of the\nmind of the age, that they seem ready to repeat to young people dazzled\nby their success, the lesson which Gilbert had expressed in these terms:\n\n\n     Between ourselves--you own a God, I fear!\n     Beware lest in your verse the fact appear:\n     Dread the wits' laughter, friend, and know your betters:\n     Our grandsires might have worn those old-world fetters;\n     But in our days! Come, you must learn respect,--\n     Content _your age to follow_, not direct.[51]\n\n\nTo believe in God would be vulgar; to deny the existence of God would be\na want of taste; the divine world must remain as a subject for poetry.\nSo our critics speak. Their direct affirmation is scepticism. But they\nfollow the destinies of the positivist school; they do not succeed in\nmaintaining their balance between the affirmation and negation of God.\nAlfred de Musset has described this position of the soul, and its\ninevitable issue. Must I hope in God? Must I reject all faith and all\nhope?\n\n\n     Between these paths how difficult the choice!\n       Ah! might I find some smoother, easier way.\n     \"None such exists,\" whispers a secret voice,\n       \"God _is_, or _is not_--own, or slight, His sway.\"\n     In sooth, I think so: troubled souls in turn\n       By each extreme are tossed and harassed sore:\n     They are but atheists, who feel no concern;\n       If once they doubted they would sleep no more.[52]\n\n\nThe indifference of the critical philosophers is in fact only a\ntransparent veil to atheistical doctrines. Faith in God the Creator is\nin their eyes a superstition; this is their only settled dogma. In other\nrespects they indulge in theses the most contradictory. Most generally\nthey deify man, declaring that there is no other God than the idea of\nhumanity, no other infinite than the indefinite character of the\naspirations of our own soul. At other times they proclaim an undisguised\nmaterialism, and look for the explanation of all things in atoms and in\nthe law which governs them. They make to themselves a two-faced idol,\none of these faces being called nature, and the other humanity. What\nstrangely increases the confusion is that all the terms of language\nchange meaning as employed by their pen. They speak of God, of duty, of\nreligion, of immortality; their pages seem sometimes to be extracted\nfrom mystical writings; but these sacred words have for them a totally\ndifferent meaning than for the ordinary run of their readers. Their God\nis not a Being, their religion is not a worship, their duty is not a\nlaw, their immortality is not the hope of a world to come. Amidst these\nequivocations and contradictions thought is blunted, and the sinews of\nthe intellect are unstrung. The public, bewitched by talent and\ncaptivated by success, is deluged with writings which have the same\neffect as the talk of a frivolous man, or the showy tattle of a woman of\nthe world. They give an agreeable exercise to the mind, without ever\nallowing it to form either a precise idea or a settled judgment.\n\nMany are the clouds then on the intellectual horizon of France. Glance\nover the recent productions of French philosophy, and you will have no\ndifficulty in recognizing the gravity of the situation. Works are\nmultiplying with the object of defending the existence of God,\nProvidence, the immortality of the soul: dams are being raised against\nthe rising flood of atheism.[53] And here is a fact still more\nsignificant, namely, that the historians of ideas, whether they are\nrecurring to the most remote antiquity, or are passing in review the\nworst errors of modern days, cannot meet with the negation of God,\nwithout having their eyes thus turned to Paris, and their attention\ndirected to contemporary productions.[54]\n\nI hence infer, that atheism is raising its head in France, and there\npresenting itself under two forms. Materialism is appearing principally\nas an heritage from the last century. The new, or rather renewed,\ndoctrine is the adoration of man by man. We are now going to cross the\nRhine.\n\nA powerful thinker, Hegel, had supreme sway in the last movement of\nspeculative thought in Germany. Hegel's system of doctrine is enveloped\nin clouds. It is so ambiguous in regard to the questions which most\ndirectly concern the conscience and human interests, that it has been\npretended to deduce from it, on the one hand a Christian theology, and\non the other a sheer atheism. There is a story, whether a true one or\nnot I cannot say, that this philosopher when near his end uttered the\nfollowing words: \"I have only had one disciple who has understood\nme--and he has misunderstood me.\" A man distinguished in metaphysical\nresearch by taste, genius, and science, and who has, in that respect,\ndevoted particular attention to Germany, M. Charles Secretan, writes\nwith reference to the fundamental principle of the entire Hegelian\nsystem: \"If you ask me how I understand the matter, I will give you no\nanswer; I do not understand it at all, and I do not believe that any one\nhas ever understood it.\"[55] You will excuse me, Gentlemen, from here\nundertaking the scientific study of so difficult a system. It will be\nenough for us to render the darkness visible, that is to say, to\nunderstand well what it is which the doctrine of the Berlin Professor,\nin a certain sense, renders incomprehensible.\n\nThe foundation of his theory is that the universe is explained by an\neternal idea, an idea which exists by itself, without appertaining to\nany mind. The Hegelians say that the existence of an infinite Mind is an\ninadmissible conception. They reject this mystery, and prefer to it the\npalpable absurdity of an idea which exists in itself, without being the\nact of an intelligence. This idea-God we have already encountered in the\nwritings of M. Vacherot. We shall find it again more than once as we go\non. In Germany, as in France, the theory only becomes popular by\nundergoing a transformation. The eternal idea manifests itself in the\nmind of man, and exists nowhere else. Above this idea there is nothing.\nMan is therefore the summit of things; it is he who must be adored. And\nthus it is in fact that Hegel has been understood. In the spring of\n1850, Henri Heine wrote as follows in the _Gazette d'Augsbourg_: \"I\nbegin to feel that I am not precisely a biped deity, as Professor Hegel\ndeclared to me that I was twenty-five years ago.\" The deification of\nman: such is the popular translation of the philosophy of the idea.\nWould you have a further proof of this? The following anecdote was\ncurrent in my youth, when German idealism was at the height of its\npopularity. A student going to call on one of his fellow-students, found\nhim stretched on his bed, or his sofa, and exhibiting all the signs of\nan ecstatic contemplation. \"Why, what are you doing there?\" inquired the\nvisitor. \"I am adoring myself,\" replied the young adept in philosophy.\n\nI am not examining the doctrines of Hegel with reference to the history\nof metaphysics, and within the precincts of the school in which it\noccupies a large place and demands the most serious attention; I am\ntracing the influence of those doctrines on the public mind at large.\nThis influence is visible in the most disastrous consequences of\natheism. \"It certainly is not the Hegelian school alone,\" says M.\nSaint-Rene Taillandier, \"which has produced all the moral miseries of\nthe nineteenth century, all those unbridled desires, all those revolts\nof matter in a fury;[56] but it sums them all up in its formulae, it\ngives them, by its scientific way of representing them, a pernicious\nauthority, it multiplies them by an execrable propaganda.\"[57]\n\nIt was through Feuerbach principally that the evolution was to be\nbrought about which has led the Hegelian system, severely idealistic in\nits commencement, to favor at length _the revolts of matter run mad_.\nAnd this evolution is only natural after all. If the universe is the\ndevelopment of an idea, and not the work of an intelligent Will, all is\nnecessary in the world, for the development of an idea is a matter of\ndestiny. Where all is necessary, all is legitimate: the desires of the\nflesh as well as the laws of thought and of conscience. But, from the\nmoment that the flesh is emancipated, it aims at absolute empire, and\nends by obtaining it: this is matter of fact. Feuerbach has put atheism\ninto a definite shape, and disengaged it from all obscurity. There\nexists no other infinite than the infinite in our thoughts; above us\nthere exists nothing; no law which binds us, no power which governs us:\nthe work of modern science is to set man free from God, for God is an\nidol. But man thus set free from all bonds and from all duty is not, for\nFeuerbach, the individual, but humanity. The individual owes himself to\nhis species; \"the true sage will make no more silly and fantastic\nsacrifices, but he will never refuse sacrifices which are really\nserviceable to humanity.\"[58]\n\nHere then is still a bond, a religion, and sacrifices; the emancipation\nis incomplete. What is this humanity to which man owes himself? An\nabstraction, an idol still, an idol to be overthrown if he would obtain\nperfect independence. Listen to the German Stirmer, deducing from the\ndoctrine its extreme consequences: \"Perish the people,\" he exclaims,\n\"perish Germany, perish all the nations of Europe; and let man, rid of\nall bonds, delivered from the last phantoms of religion, recover at\nlength his full independence!\"[59] All the mists of abstraction have now\ndisappeared: here we are on ground which is hideously clear. Humanity is\nno longer in question, but the worship of _self_; it is the complete\nenfranchisement of selfishness.\n\nWhile the proud idealism of the Germans was thus, by its own weight,\ndescending into the level flats of thought, a political movement was\nagitating Germany. Simple-minded poets were celebrating atheism with an\nenthusiasm which seemed sincere; and, at the same time, men who are not\nsimple-minded, journalists and demagogues, were laying hold of the\nirreligion as a lever with which to make a breach in the social edifice.\nIn the year 1845, the attention of the Swiss authorities was drawn to\ncertain secret societies, composed of Germans, and having for their\nobject a revolution in Germany, but which had established their basis of\noperations on the Swiss territory. The inquiries of the police issued in\nthe discovery of twenty-seven clubs bound together by secret\ncorrespondence. Working-men were induced on various pretexts to attend\nmeetings, of which the real object was only gradually disclosed to\nthem. If they were reckoned worthy, they were initiated into the plan of\na social reform, the basis of which was atheism.[60] One of the\nprincipal agents in this work of proselytism, Guillaume Marr, exclaimed:\n\"Faith in a personal and living God is the origin and the fundamental\ncause of our miserable social condition.\" And he deduced as follows the\npractical consequence of his theory: \"The idea of God is the key-stone\nof the arch of a tottering civilization; let us destroy it. The true\nroad to liberty, to equality, and to happiness, is atheism. No safety on\nearth, so long as man holds on by a thread to heaven.--Let nothing\nhenceforward shackle the spontaneity of the human mind. Let us teach man\nthat there is no other God than himself, that he is the Alpha and the\nOmega of all things, the superior being, and the most real reality.\" We\nhave still to explain the nature of this spontaneity, free from every\nshackle. One of the editors of the journal conducted by Marr discloses\nit by quoting some verses in which Henri Heine expresses the wish to\nsee _great vices, bloody and colossal crimes_, provided he may be\ndelivered from a _worthy-citizen virtue_, and an _honest-merchant\nmorality_![61] A little later, a journal of German Switzerland asserted,\nthat in order to set free man's natural instincts and propensities, it\nis indispensable to destroy the idea of God.[62]\n\nThese, I am well aware, are the screams of a savage madness. But after\nall, and be this as it may, Marr was publishing his journal at Lausanne\nin 1845, and in 1848 he was named representative of the people, by a\nconsiderable majority, in one of the largest cities of Germany. And this\nwas by no means an isolated fact. Atheism showed itself in the ephemeral\nparliament of Frankfort as a sort of party, of which M. Vogt, says the\n_Revue des Deux Mondes_, was the great orator.[63]\n\nThe German revolution was put down by the bayonet, but the doctrines of\nwhich it had revealed the existence, left vestiges for a long time in\nthe country of the terror which they had inspired. Alarm was felt for\nthe various interests threatened, and noble souls were stirred with\ncompassion by the conviction forced upon them of the spiritual miseries\nof their brethren. A powerful reaction took place, as well in the\nreligious as the philosophical world. This reaction has produced\nsalutary results; but the object is not fully attained. Open the\njournals and the reviews, and you will learn that Germany is, in these\ndays, the principal centre of materialism. It is unhappily so rich in\nthis respect, that it can afford to engage in exportation, and to\nfurnish professors of the school to other countries of Europe.\n\nDoctor Buechner has published, under the title of _Force and Matter_, a\nsmall volume which has rapidly reached a seventh edition, and has lately\nbeen translated into French.[64] Materialism is there set forth with\nperfect arrogance, or, to speak more moderately, with perfect audacity.\nThe author pretends to confine himself strictly within the domain of\nexperience, and it is wonderful with what haughtiness he proscribes the\nresearches of philosophy. It would seem therefore that the question of\nthe nature of things ought to remain outside the circle of his studies.\nNevertheless, he declares matter to be eternal and the universe\ninfinite. I ask you how long it would be necessary to have lived in\norder to pronounce matter eternal in the name of experience; and what\njourneys it would have been necessary to make, before ascertaining by\nmeans of observation that the universe is infinite. We shall have\noccasion to recur to this subject. Meanwhile we may be very sure that\nexperience supplies no system of metaphysics, and that materialism is a\nmetaphysical system as strongly marked as any. When its adepts cry out,\nAway with philosophy! they mean by that simply: We will have no good\nphilosophy, that we may be free to make bad philosophy of our own\nwithout rivalry. A proceeding which reminds one of certain demagogues\nwho cry with all their might, Down with tyrants! and who thus succeed in\nmaking out of the fear of the tyranny of others the solid foundation of\ntheir own despotism.\n\nWe find then in Germany, first of all the doctrine of the idea set forth\nwith _eclat_ by Hegel, then atheism mixed up with political notions and\nprojects, and lastly materialism. The elements are the same as in\nFrance, but exhibit themselves in a different order. This diversity\nsuggests some observations worth your attention.\n\nFrance, setting out with the materialism of the eighteenth century, rose\nto that adoration of man which characterizes at the present day the\ngreater part of its atheistical manifestations. German atheism, having\nas its starting-point an abstract idealism of which the adoration of man\nwas the result, has descended to the levels of materialism.[65] We may\ninquire into the theory of these facts, and say why materialism rises to\nthe adoration of man by a natural movement; and why, also by a natural\nmovement, the adoration of man descends again to materialism.\n\nMaterialism infers from its principles the denial of any future to man,\nand not only any future, but any true value, any real existence. We are\nnothing but an agglomeration of molecules, ready to separate without\nleaving any trace of ever having been together. Is not this a thing to\nbe said sadly, as the saddest thing in the world? Why then are the\napostles of matter nearly always assuming the loftiest tone, and\nuttering shouts of triumph? It is that they feel themselves free,\nemancipated from that terror which has made the gods,\n\n\n                            ... that brood of idle fear\n     Fine nothings worshipped,--_why_, doth not appear;\n     The gods--whom man made, and who made not man.[66]\n\n\nEmancipation! Such is the watchword of materialism. Listen, for example,\nto the conclusion of Baron d'Holbach's _System of Nature_: \"Break the\nchains,\" says he, \"which are binding men. Send back those gods who are\nafflicting them to those imaginary regions from whence fear first drew\nthem forth. Inspire with courage the intelligent being; give him energy;\nlet him dare at length to love himself, to esteem himself, to feel his\nown dignity; let him dare to emancipate himself, let him be happy and\nfree.\" Strange accents these, at the close of a large philosophical\ntreatise intended to prove that there is nothing in the universe but\nmatter. Whence proceeds the dignity of that fragment of matter which\ncalls itself man? Understand well what passes in the mind of these\nphilosophers. In proportion as man lowers his own origin, in the same\nproportion,--if he does not wish to make himself a brute, in order to\nlive as do the animals,--he exalts himself in an inevitable sentiment of\npride. In vain does he give out that the material frame is everything;\nhe feels that thought is more than the material frame; and he accords to\nhimself the first place in the universe. The materialist ignores the\nEternal Mind in order to emancipate himself; and whatever he may say,\nhis real deity is not the atom, but himself. The encyclopedists, sons of\nan age which yielded at once to noble influences and to guilty\nseductions, united the worship of progress to a degrading philosophy.\nConsider with what a feeling of pride they lowered man, and you will\nunderstand why eternal nature gave place to sacred humanity. When\nFrance had fallen into the delirium of irreligion, it was not a little\ndust in an earthen vase which was offered for public adoration, but they\nled in procession through the streets of Paris a woman who was called\nthe goddess Reason.\n\nSo it was that materialism ended in the adoration of man. Let us\nendeavor to understand how the adoration of man turns again to\nmaterialism. The mind endowed with intelligence and will is more\nelevated in the scale of being than inert bodies. This is for us an\nevident truth. Could one demonstrate it by reasoning? I do not know; but\nin contesting it, we should contradict the plainest evidence. Reason is\nsuperior to matter. If, with the school which extends from Pythagoras to\nSaint Augustine, and from Saint Augustine to Descartes, we connect\nreason with God as its principle, the grand science of metaphysics is\nfounded. But if reason does not rise to God, what will happen? This\nreason, which proclaims itself superior to matter, is not, as we have\nsaid already, the individual thought of Francis, Peter, or John. If an\nindividual presented himself as being reason itself, the absolute\nreason, and said, \"I am the truth,\" it would be necessary to take one of\nthree courses. If we thought that he spoke truly, and if we received\nhis testimony, it would be necessary to worship him, for he would be\nGod. If it were feared that he spoke truly, and those who so feared were\nunwilling to acknowledge his rule, it would be necessary for them to\nkill him in order to endeavor to kill the truth. If it were thought that\nhe spoke falsely, it would be necessary to watch him, and the moment he\ncommitted an act dangerous for society, to shut him up, for he would be\na madman. But the philosophers make no such pretension. The reason of\nwhich they speak is the reason common to all, a reason which is not that\nof an individual, but that of which all rational individuals partake.\nThis common, universal, eternal reason,--where and how does it exist?\nReason manifests itself by ideas, and ideas are the acts of minds. To\nimagine an idea without a mind of which it is the act, is the same thing\nas to imagine a movement without a body of which it is also the act, in\na different sense. Take away bodies, and there is no more movement. Take\naway intelligences, and there are no more ideas. The philosopher who\nspeaks of an idea which is not the idea of an intelligence, utters words\nwhich have no meaning. The reason which is not that of any created\nindividual remains therefore absolutely inconceivable without the\neternal Spirit, or God. Idealism is based upon this impossible\nconception. Thus it is that thought, trying in vain to maintain itself\nin this abstract domain, ends by holding as chimerical the world of\nideas in which it has met with nothing to which to cling. It is seized\nwith giddiness and falls. Whither does it fall? To the ground. It is\nalways thither one falls. Wearied with its efforts to find footing on\nshifting clouds, the human mind comes back to the _positive_ by a\nviolent reaction. Here is the secret of that haughty and derisive\nmaterialism of certain modern Germans, who jeer and scoff at the lofty\npretensions of philosophy. So it was that Hegel brought upon the scene\nDoctor Buechner and his fellows.\n\nThe great conflict of the spiritual world is not, as it is often said to\nbe, the combat of idealism against materialism. Idealism begins well,\nand we must not refuse to acknowledge the services which it has rendered\nto the cause of truth. But philosophy must follow the road traced out in\nan ancient adage: _Ab exterioribus ad interiora, ab interioribus ad\nsuperiora_.[67] If the mind does not go to the end of this royal road;\nif idealism, having surmounted the fascinations of the senses, remains\nin ideas, without ascending to the supreme Mind, the worship of matter\nand the worship of the idea call mutually one to another, and revolve in\na fatal circle. The struggle between these two forms of atheism reminds\none of those duels, in which, after having satisfied honor, the\nadversaries breakfast together, and gather strength to combat, in case\nof need, a common enemy. The great combat which forms the main subject\nof the history of ideas is the combat between belief in God and an\natheistical philosophy. Whether atheism admits for its first principle\nan atom without a Creator, or a reason without an Eternal Mind, is a\nfact very important for the history of philosophy, but the importance of\nwhich is small enough in regard to the interests of humanity.\n\nWe passed the Rhine in order to penetrate into Germany, let us now cross\nthe British Channel, and observe what is going on in England.\n\nEngland, at the close of the seventeenth and the beginning of the\neighteenth century, was the principal centre of irreligion. France gave\nthe patent of European circulation to ideas which proceeded in part\nfrom this foreign source. An active propaganda for the diffusion of\nimpious and immoral writings had been established in Great Britain. A\nstrong reaction set in, and, dating from the year 1698, we see formed\nvarious societies having for their object the diffusion of good books\nand respectable journals.[68] These efforts were crowned with success.\nEngland, by its zeal in the work of Missions, by its sacrifices for the\ndiffusion of the Holy Scriptures, and by its respect for the\nLord's-day,[69] assumed[70] the characteristic marks of a Christian\nnation. Grand measures adopted in the interests of liberty and humanity,\nplaced it at the same time at the head of a seriously philanthropic\ncivilization; but as Pere Gratry has remarked, \"more than in any other\npeople, there are in the English people the old man and the new.\"[71]\nThe strange contrasts which are presented by the political action of\nthis double-people are found also in the productions of its thought, in\nwhich, while the spirit of piety is displayed full of life, the spirit\nof irreligion is also manifested with terrible energy. A book is\ninstanced, of materialistic tendency,[72] published in 1828, of which a\npopular edition was printed with a view to extend the opinions which it\nadvocated. There was sold of this edition, in a short time, more than\neighty thousand copies. A thoughtful writer, Mr. Pearson, mentions a\nstatistical statement, according to which English publications, openly\natheistical, reached, in the year 1851, a total of six hundred and forty\nthousand copies.[73]\n\nIf we pass from the current literature to scientific publications, we\nshall meet with facts of the same order. The Hegelianism and the\nscepticism of the critical school are creeping into the works of some\ntheologians. The theories of positivism, reduced to shape in France,\nhave passed the channel, and have obtained in England more attention\nperhaps than in the country of their origin. They have been adopted by\na distinguished author, Mr. Stuart Mill; and a female writer, Miss\nMartineau, has set them forth, in her mother-tongue, for the use of her\nfellow-countrymen.[74] Positivism is even in vogue, and has become\n\"_fashionable_\" amongst certain literary and intellectual circles in\nGreat Britain.[75]\n\nIn less elevated regions of the intellectual world of England, an\norganized sect commends itself to our attention. This sect has given to\nits system of doctrine the name of _Secularism_. It has a social\nobject--the destruction of the Established Church and the existing\npolitical order. It has a philosophy, the purport and bearing of which\nwe will inquire of Mr. Holyoake. The following is the answer of the\nchief of the secularists:--\"All that concerns the origin and end of\nthings, God and the immortal soul, is absolutely impenetrable for the\nhuman mind. The existence of God, in particular, must be referred to\nthe number of abstract questions, with the ticket _not determined_. It\nis probable, however, that the nature which we know, must be the God\nwhom we inquire after. What is called atheism is found _in suspension_\nin our theory.\"[76] The practical consequence of these views is, that\nall day-dreams relating to another world must be put aside, and we must\nmanage so as to live to the best advantage possible in the present\nlife.[77] Hence the name of the system. _Secularism_ teaches its\ndisciples to have nothing to do with religion in any shape, that they\nmay confine themselves strictly to the present life. It is an attempt of\nwhich the express object is to realize life without God.\n\nThese doctrines formed the subject of public discussions, in London in\n1853, and at Glasgow in 1854. The meeting at Glasgow numbered, it is\nsaid, more than three thousand persons.[78] The sect employs as its\nmeans of action open-air speeches, the publication of books and\njournals,[79] and assemblies for giving information and holding debates\nin lecture-rooms. There are five of these lecture-rooms in London. I\nhave seen the programme, for 1864, of the meetings held at No. 12,\nCleveland Street, under the direction of Messrs. Holyoake and J. Clark.\nThere are, every Sunday,--a discourse at eleven o'clock, a discussion at\nthree o'clock, a lecture at seven o'clock. The programme invites all\nfree-thinkers to attend these meetings. Some of the assemblies are\npublic; for others a small entrance fee is demanded. London is the\nprincipal centre of the association; but it has branches all over the\ncountry, and it numbers in Great Britain twenty-one lecture-rooms,\nparticularly at Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, Glasgow, and\nEdinburgh.[80] Secularism naturally seeks to magnify, as much as may be,\nits own importance; and it is not to the declarations of its apostles\nthat we must refer in order to estimate the extent and influence of its\naction. At the same time the existence of a society, the avowed object\nof which is the diffusion of practical atheism, cannot be regarded with\nindifference. At the present moment the affairs of the sect would not\nappear to be flourishing. A year ago a secularist orator had delivered a\nvehement speech in favor of virtue. Just as he had resumed his seat, a\npoliceman entered the room and took him into custody. A few days\nafterwards the _Times_ informed its readers that the orator of virtue\nhad just been condemned for theft to twelve months' hard labor.[81] In\nthe _Secular World_ of the 1st January, 1864, Mr. Holyoake complains\nthat a great many _mauvais sujets_ seem to seek in secularism a kind of\ncheap religion. He declares that he is going to use energetic efforts to\npurify the sect, and seems to intimate that he shall retire if his\nefforts fail. Let us leave him to wrestle against the invasion of the\norators of virtue, and let us pass from England into Italy.\n\nWhile Italy is seeking to deliver itself from the bayonets of Austria,\nit is threatened with subjection to the influence of the most pernicious\nGerman doctrines. After having bent, like nearly all Europe, in the\neighteenth century, beneath the blast of sensualism, Italy made a noble\neffort to renew more generous traditions. Two eminent men, Rosmini and\nGioberti, the second especially, succeeded in exciting in the youth of\nItaly a passionate interest in doctrines in which liberty and vigor of\nthought were united with the confidence of faith. This intellectual\nmovement preceded and prepared a national movement, the course of which\nhas been precipitated by the intrigues of politics and the intervention\nof the arms of the foreigner. At the present time the influence of\nRosmini and of Gioberti is on the decline. Hegelianism is being\ninstalled with a certain _eclat_ in the university of Naples. Nothing\nwarrants us in hoping that this system will not produce upon the shores\nof the Mediterranean the same depravation of philosophic thought which\nit has produced in Germany. In the ancient university of Pisa, M.\nAuguste Conti, a brave defender of Christian philosophy, steadfastly\nmaintains the union of religion and of speculative inquiry,[82] and the\ncentre of Italy is less affected perhaps than the extremities of the\nPeninsula by the spirit of infidelity. But as we go further north, we\nencounter in the writings of Ferrari the utterance of a gloomy\nscepticism, and in those of Ausonio Franchi, formerly a journalist at\nTurin, and now a Professor at Milan, the manifestations of an almost\nundisguised atheism. Ausonio Franchi, or rather the man who assumes that\npseudonyme, is an ex-priest, who, \"while maintaining severely the rule\nof good morals and the dignity of life,\"[83] has turned with violent\nanimosity against his former faith. He exerts some influence over the\nyouth of Italy, and has met with warm admirers in England and Germany.\nFranchi's profession of faith reduces itself to these very simple\nterms:--\"The world is what it is, and it is _because it is_; any other\nreason whatever of its essence and of its existence can be nothing but a\nsophism or an illusion.\"[84] All inquiry into the origin of things is a\npure chimera, and we must therefore limit ourselves to the experience of\nthe present life, and look for nothing beyond it. The author treats with\nsufficient disdain arguments which satisfied Descartes, Newton, and\nLeibnitz. It has seemed to me that his understanding, a little obscured\nby passion, misconceives the true purport of the reasonings which it\nrejects, and by thus impairing their force, assumes to itself the right\nto despise them.\n\nThe religious negations of Ausonio Franchi do not stop at Christian\ndogma. He denies all value to those higher aspirations of the human soul\nwhich constitute _reason_, in the philosophical meaning of the term.\nNow, this radical negation of the reason is what those Italians who do\nnot scruple to practise it denominate _Rationalism_. And this very\nunwarrantable use of a word is in fact only a particular case of a\ngeneral phenomenon. To criticise, means to examine the thoughts which\npresent themselves to the mind in order to distinguish error from truth.\nThe Frenchmen, who call themselves the _critics_, are men who require\nthat the intellect shall make itself the impartial mirror of ideas, but\nshall renounce the while all discrimination between truth and error. The\nterm scepticism, in its primary signification, contains the idea of\ninquiring, of examining; and they give the name of _sceptics_ to the\nphilosophers who declare that there is nothing to discover, and\nconsequently nothing to examine, or to search for! One is a\n_free-thinker_ only on the express condition of renouncing all such\nfree exercise of thought as might lead to the acceptance of beliefs\ngenerally received. This is verily the carnival of language, and the\n_bal masque_ of words. These corruptions of the meaning of terms are\nhighly instructive. Doctrines contrary to the laws of human nature bear\nwitness in this way to a secret shame in producing themselves under\ntheir true colors. Just as hypocrisy is an homage which vice pays to\nvirtue, so these barbarisms are an homage which error pays to truth.\n\nTo return to Italy: that beautiful and noble country has not escaped the\nrevival of atheism. The intoxication of a new liberty, and the political\nstruggles in which the Papacy is at present engaged, will favor for a\ntime, it may be feared, the development of evil doctrines.[85] But the\nlively genius of the Italians will not be long in attaching itself\nagain to the grand traditions of its past history; and the inhabitants\nof the land, whose soil was trodden by Pythagoras and Saint Augustine,\nwill not link themselves with doctrines which always run those who hold\nthem aground sooner or later upon the sad and gloomy shores of a vulgar\nempiricism.\n\nWe have not leisure, Gentlemen, to extend our study to all parts of the\nglobe, and besides, there are countries with regard to which information\nwould fail me. Therefore I say nothing of Holland, where we should have,\nas I know, distressing facts to record. The silence imposed on Spain\nupon the subjects which we are discussing would render the study of that\ncountry a difficult one. I am wanting in data regarding America. Let us\nconclude our survey by a few words about Russia.\n\nIf we are warranted in making general assertions in speaking of that\nimmense empire, we may say that the Russian people, taken as a whole, is\ngood and pious, badly instructed, and often the victim of ignorance or\nof superstition, but disposed to open its heart to elevated and pure\ninfluences. The clergy is ignorant, though with honorable and even\nbrilliant exceptions. It is too much cut off from general society, and\nconsigned to a sort of caste, of which it would be most desirable to\nbreak down the barriers, in order to allow the influence of the\nrepresentatives of religion to extend itself more freely. The young\nnobles, and the university students in general, are, in too large a\nproportion, imbued with irreligious principles. Various atheistical\nwritings, those of Feuerbach amongst others, have been translated into\nRussian, printed abroad, and furtively introduced into the empire. M.\nHerzen, a well-known writer, has published, under the pseudonyme of\nIscander, a work full of talent, but in which come plainly into view the\nworst tendencies of our time.[86] In his eyes, life is itself its own\nend and cause. Faith in God is the portion of the ignorant crowd, and\natheism, like all the high truths of science, like the differential\ncalculus and the laws of physics, is the exclusive possession of the\nphilosophical few. When Robespierre declared atheism aristocratic, he\nwas right in this sense, for atheism is above the reach of the vulgar;\nbut when he concluded that atheism was false, he made a great mistake.\nThis error, which led him to establish the worship of the Supreme Being,\nwas one of the causes of his fall. When he began to follow in the wake\nof the _conservatives_, as a necessary consequence he would lose his\npower.[87] The writings of Iscander have exerted a veritable influence\nin Russia. M. Herzen appears to have lost much of his repute, by the\nexaggerated and outrageous course he has taken in politics; but it is to\nbe feared that the traces of his action are not altogether effaced.\n\nThe Russian Empire has been for a long time, in the eyes of the West,\nonly an immense garrison; but now for some years past it has been taking\nrank among the number of intellectual powers, and nowhere in Europe is\nthe ascending march of civilization displaying itself by signs so\nstriking. The summons to liberty of so many millions of men, which has\njust been accomplished by the generous initiative of the ruling power,\nand with the consent of the nation, testifies that that vast social body\nis animated by the spirit of life and of progress. But in the solemn\nphase through which she is passing, Russia is exposed to a great danger.\nShe is running the risk of substituting for a national development,\ndrawn from the grand springs of human nature, a factitious civilization,\nin which would figure together the fashions of Paris, the morals of the\n_coulisses_ of the Opera, and the most irreligious doctrines of the\nWest. May God preserve her!\n\nWe have passed in review some of the symptoms of the revival of atheism,\nand it is impossible not to acknowledge the gravity of the facts which\nwe have established. What must especially awaken solicitude is, that the\nirreligious manifestations of thought have assumed such a character of\ngenerality, that the sorrowful astonishment which they ought to produce\nin us is blunted by habit. Fashionable reviews, (I allude especially to\nthe French-speaking public), widely-circulated journals which take good\ncare not to violate propriety, and which could not with impunity offend\nthe interests or prejudices of the social class from which their\nsubscribers are recruited, are able to entertain without danger, and\nwithout exciting energetic protestations, the productions of an open, or\nscarcely disguised, atheism. Here are ample reasons for thoughtfulness;\nbut this thoughtfulness must not be mingled with fear. We have to do\nwith a challenge the very audacity of which inspires me with confidence,\nrather than with dread. In fact all the productions of irreligious\nphilosophy rest on one and the same thought, the common watchword, of\nthe secularism of the English, of the rationalism of the Italians, of\nthe positivism of the French, and which may even be recognized, with a\nlittle attention, under the haughty formulas which bear the name of\nHegel. And the thought is this: The earth is enough for us, away with\nheaven; man suffices for himself, away with God; reality suffices for\nus, away with chimeras! Wisdom consists in contenting ourselves with the\nworld as it is. It is attempted ridiculously enough to place this wisdom\nunder the patronage of the luminaries of our age. We are bidden,\nforsooth, to see in the negation of the real and living God, a conflict\nof progress with routine, of science with a blind tradition, of the\nmodern mind with superannuated ideas.[88] We know of old this defiance\nhurled against the aspirations of the heart, the conscience, and the\nreason. We know the destined issue of this ancient revolt of the\nintellect against the laws of its own nature. There were atheists in\nPalestine in the days when the Psalmist exclaimed, \"The fool hath said\nin his heart, There is no God.\"[89] There were atheists at Rome when\nCicero wrote,[90] that the opinion which recognizes gods appeared to him\nto come nearest to the resemblance of truth. A poet of the thirteenth\ncentury has expressed in a Latin verse the thoughts which are in vogue\namong a great many of our contemporaries: \"He dares nothing great, who\nbelieves that there are gods.\"[91] There were atheists in the\nseventeenth century, when Descartes exerted himself to confound them,\nand they reckoned themselves the fine spirits of their time.[92] And\nwho, again, does not know that in the eighteenth century atheism\nmarched with head aloft, and filled the world with its clamors. The\nattempt to do without God has nothing modern about it, it is met with at\nall epochs. The means employed now-a-days to attain this end have\nnothing new about them. Atheism exhibits itself in history with the\ncharacters of a chronic malady, the outbreaks of which are transient\ncrises. The moment the negation is blazoned openly, humanity protests.\nWhy? Because man will never be persuaded to content himself with the\nearth, and with what the earth can give him: his nature absolutely\nforbids it. When we compare the reality with the desires of our souls,\nwe can all say with the aged patriarch Jacob: \"Few and evil have been\nthe days of my pilgrimage;\"[93] we can all say with Lamartine:\n\n\n     Though all the good desired of man\n       In one sole heart should overflow,\n     Death, bounding still his mortal span,\n       Would turn the cup of joy to woe.[94]\n\n\nAnd it is not the heart only which is concerned here; without God man\nremains inexplicable to his own reason. The spiritual creature of the\nAlmighty, free by the act of creation, and capable of falling into\nslavery by rebellion,--he understands his nature and his destiny; but it\nis in vain that the apostles of matter and the worshippers of humanity\nharangue him in turn to explain to him his own existence. Man is too\ngreat to be the child of the dust; man is too miserable to be the divine\nsummit of the universe. \"If he exalts himself, I abase him; if he abases\nhimself, I exalt him; and I contradict him continually, until he\nunderstands at last that he is an incomprehensible monster.\"[95]\n\n\"The proper study of mankind is man;\" and man remains an enigma for man,\nif he do not rise to God. So it is that our very nature is a living\nprotest against atheism, and never allows its triumphs to be either\ngeneral, or of long duration. A solid limit is thus set to our\nwanderings; and, to the errors of the understanding, as to the tides of\nthe ocean, the Master of things has said, \"Ye shall go no further.\"\nTherefore atheists may become famous, but, destitute of the ray which\nrenders truly illustrious, humanity refuses them the aureole with which\nit encircles the brows of its benefactors. This aureole it reserves for\nthe sages which lead it to God, for the artists which reveal to it some\nof the rays of the immortal light, for all those who remind it of the\ntitles of its dignity, the pledges of its future, the sacred laws of the\nrealm of spirits. Humanity desires to live; and to live it must believe;\nfor it must believe in order to love and to act. Atheism is a crisis in\na disease, a passing swoon over which the vital forces of nature\ntriumph. Now the vital forces of humanity are neither extinct nor\nstupefied in our time. The world of literature is sick, and grievously\nsick in some of its departments; but even there again are manifesting\nthemselves noble and powerful reactions. Then look in other directions.\nContemplate the religious movement of society at large, the wide efforts\nmaking in the domain of active beneficence, the progressive conquests of\ncivilization, the awakening of conscience on many subjects:--I could\neasily instance numerous facts in proof of what I advance, and say to\nyou:\n\n\n     Know, by these speaking signs, a God to-day\n     As yesterday the same--the same for aye:\n     Veiling, revealing, at His sovereign will,\n     His glory,--and His people guarding still.[96]\n\n\nWrestle then against the invasion of deadly doctrines, wrestle and do\nnot fear. If men rise against God in the name of the modern mind, of the\nscience of the age, of the progress of civilization, do not suffer\nyourselves to be stunned by these clamors. Let the past be to you the\npledge of the future! To make of atheism a novelty, is an error. To make\nof it, in a general way, the characteristic of our epoch, is a calumny.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[40] Xenophon, _Memorab. of Socrates_, Bk. iv. 10.\n\n[41] _La Religion naturelle_. Preface.\n\n[42] Emile Saisset, in the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, of March, 1845.\n\n[43] See the _Lettres sur les verites, les plus importantes de la\nrevelation_, by Albert de Haller, translated into French by one of his\ngrandsons. Lausanne, Bridel, 1846.\n\n[44] _La Metaphysique et la Science_, 2 tom. Oct. 1858.\n\n[45] _Notice sur M. Littre_, page 57.\n\n[46] _Paroles de philosophie positive_, page 33.\n\n[47] _Idem_, page 30.\n\n[48] _Paroles de philosophie positive_, page 34.\n\n[49] _Apercus generaux sur la doctrine positiviste_, par M. de Lombrail,\nancien eleve de l'ecole polytechnique. The author says in his preface:\n\"Auguste Comte examined this work with the conscientious attention which\nhe was accustomed to give to the simplest task. He desired by his useful\ncounsels to render it worthy of publication.\"\n\n[50] _Revue des Deux Mondes_, of 15th Jan. 1860, page 367.\n\n[51]\n\n     Je soupconne entre nous que vous croyez en Dieu.\n     N'allez pas dans vos vers en consigner l'aveu;\n     Craignez le ridicule, et respectez vos maitres.\n     Croire en Dieu fut un tort permis a nos ancetres.\n     Mais dans notre age! Allons, il faut vous corriger\n     _Et suivre votre siecle_, au lieu de le juger.\n\n[52]\n\n     Entre ces deux chemins j'hesite et je m'arrete.\n     Je voudrais a l'ecart suivre un plus doux sentier.\n     Il n'en existe pas, dit une voix secrete:\n     En presence du Ciel, il faut croire ou nier.\n     Je le pense, en effet: les ames tourmentees\n     Vers l'un et l'autre exces se portent tour a tour;\n     Mais les indifferents ne sont que des athees;\n     Ils ne dormiraient plus, s'ils doutaient un seul jour.\n\n[53] See, for example, _La Religion naturelle_, by Jules Simon; _Essai\nde philosophie religieuse_, by Emile Saisset; _De la connaissance de\nDieu_, by A. Gratry; _La raison et la christianisme, douze lectures sur\nl'existence de Dieu_, by Charles Secretan; _Essai sur la Providence_, by\nErnest Bersot; _De la Providence_, by M. Damiron; _L'Idee de Dieu_, by\nM. Caro; _Theodicee, Etudes sur Dieu, la Creation et la Providence_, par\nAmedee de Magerie.\n\n[54] See, for example, the _Etudes orientales_ of M. Franck, the\n_Bouddha_ of M. Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire; _L'Histoire de la philosophie\nau XVIIIe siecle_, of M. Damiron.\n\n[55] _Philosophie de la liberte_, vol. i. p. 225.\n\n[56] _Toutes ces revoltes de la matiere en furie._\n\n[57] _Revue des Deux Mondes_, April, 1850.\n\n[58] _Qu'est-ce la religion?_ page 586 of the translation of Ewerbeck.\n\n[59] _Revue des Deux Mondes_ of 15th April, 1850, p. 288.\n\n[60] General Report addressed to the _Conseil d'Etat_ of Neuchatel on\nthe secret German propaganda, and on the clubs of Young Germany in\nSwitzerland, by Lardy, Doctor of law. Neuchatel, 1845.\n\n[61] _Pourvu qu'on le delivre d'une vertu bourgeoise et d'une morale\nd'honnetes negociants_. Blaetter der Gegenwart fuer sociales Leben.\n\n[62] See the _Chroniqueur Suisse_ of 19 Jan. 1865.\n\n[63] April, 1850, p. 292.\n\n[64] _Force et Matiere_, by Louis Buechner, Doctor in medicine:\ntranslated into French from the seventh edition of the German work, by\nGamper, Leipzig, 1863.\n\n[65] My object is to point out the atheistical systems which are being\nproduced in various parts of Europe, and not to estimate, in a general\nway, the tendency of contemporary philosophies. The reader, who would\nunderstand the position occupied by materialism in relation to German\nthought in general, may consult with advantage, _Le Materialisme\ncontemporain_, by Paul Janet, Paris, 1864; and the review of this work\nby M. Reichlin-Meldegg (_Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie_,\nSechsundvierzigster Band). A Swiss writer, M. Boehner, has lately\npublished a learned work on the subject entitled: _Le Materialisme au\npoint de vue des sciences naturelles et des progres de l'esprit humain_,\nby Nath. Boehner, member of the _Societe helvetique des sciences\nnaturelles_, translated from the German, by O. Bourrit, 1 vol. 8vo.\n(_Geneve, imprimerie Fick_), 1861.\n\n[66]\n\n                         ... Ces enfants de l'effroi,\n     Ces beaux riens qu'on adore, et sans savoir pourquoi,\n     Ces dieux que l'homme a faits et qui n'ont pas fait l'homme.\n                                           CYRANO DE BERGERAC.\n\n[67] From outer to inner things, and from inner to higher.\n\n[68] See the Report of Mr. H. Roberts, in the _Comptes rendus du Congres\ninternational de bienfaisance de Londres_, vol. ii. page 95, and the\n23rd _Bulletin de la Societe genevoise d'utilite publique_, 1863.\n\n[69] Par son respect pour le jour du Dimanche.\n\n[70] revetit.\n\n[71] _La Paix meditations historiques et religieuses_, par A. Gratry,\npretre de l'Oratoire.--Septieme meditation: l'Angleterre.\n\n[72] _The Constitution of Man_, by G. Combe. The popular edition was\nprinted at the expense of Mr. Henderson.\n\n[73] _Infidelity: its aspects, causes, and agencies_, by Thomas Pearson.\nPeople's edition, 1854, page 263.\n\n[74] _Auguste Comte et la Philosophie positive_, par E. Littre, page\n276.\n\n[75] \"Positivism, within the last quarter of a century, has become an\nactive, and even fashionable mode of thought, and nowhere more so than\namongst certain literary and intellectual circles in England.\" _The\nChrist of the Gospels and the Christ of modern Criticism, Lectures on M.\nRenan's 'Vie de Jesus,'_--by John Tulloch, D.D., Principal of the\nCollege of St. Mary in the University of St. Andrew. Macmillan and Co.,\n1864.\n\n[76] See Pearson: _Infidelity_, particularly page 316, and _Christianity\nand Secularism, the public discussion_--, particularly page 8.\n\n[77]--_dans le siecle_.\n\n[78] Vapereau's _Dictionnaire des contemporains_--Art. HOLYOAKE.\n\n[79] I have had in view here the first numbers of _The Secular World_,\nand of _The National Reformer, Secular Advocate_, for 1864.\n\n[80] _The National Reformer_ of 2nd Jan. 1864.\n\n[81] MS. information.\n\n[82] Readers unacquainted with the Italian language will find a\ncompendious exposition of M. Conti's philosophy, in a small volume\npublished, in 1863, under the title of _Le Camposanto de Pise ou le\nScepticisme_. (Paris, librairies Joel Cherbuliez et Auguste Durand; I\nvol. in-18.)\n\n[83] Such is the testimony rendered to him by M. Aug. Conti in his work,\n_La Philosophie italienne_. (Paris, Joel Cherbuliez et Auguste Durand;\none small vol. 18mo.)\n\n[84] _Le Rationalisme_ (in French), published with an introduction, by\nM. D. Bancel, Brussels, 1858, page 27.\n\n[85] The learned author appears to intimate that the distractions of the\nPapacy, consequent on its political struggles for temporal power, hinder\nthe salutary influence which it might otherwise exercise in the\nsuppression of evil doctrines. The Translator feels it due to himself to\nstate here, once for all, that he has no sympathy whatever with such a\nview of the influence of the Papacy. On the contrary, he is disposed to\nattribute to the Church of Rome most of the evils which afflict, not\nItaly only, but all the countries over which she has any power. Perhaps,\nhaving \"felt the weight of too much liberty\" in his own Church, the\nexcellent author, fundamentally sound in his own views of Christian\ndoctrine, as is proved abundantly by his writings, has been led by a\nnatural reaction to give too much weight to the opposite principle of\nauthority. The concluding pages of his former work, _La Vie Eternelle_,\nindicate a mind too painfully and sensitively averse to all controversy\nwith a corrupt Church, in consideration of the acknowledged excellences\nof many of her individual members,--her Pascals, Fenelons, Martin Boos,\nGirards, Gratrys, and Lacordaires.--_Translator_.\n\n[86] _De l'autre rive_ (in Russian).\n\n[87] _De l'autre rive_. v. Consolatio.--This chapter is a dialogue\nbetween a lady and a doctor. I have considered the doctor as expressing\nthe thoughts of the writer. The form of dialogue, however, always allows\nan author to express his thoughts, while declining, if need be, the\nresponsibility of them.\n\n[88] _Le Rationalisme_, par Ausonio Franchi, page 19.--_Force et\nmatiere_, par le docteur Buechner, page 262.--_Paroles de philosophie\npositive_, par Littre, page 36.--_La Metaphysique et la Science_, par\nVacherot, page xiv. (Premiere edition.)\n\n[89] Ps. xiv. 1.\n\n[90] De Natura Deorum.\n\n[91] Nil audet magnum qui putat esse Deos.\n\n[92] See Bossuet: _Sermon sur la dignite de la religion_.\n\n[93] Gen. xlvii. 9.\n\n[94]\n\n     Quand tous les biens que l'homme envie\n     Deborderaient dans un seul coeur,\n     La mort seule au bout de la vie\n     Fait un supplice du bonheur.\n\n[95] Pascal.\n\n[96]\n\n     Reconnaissez, _Messieurs_, a ces traits eclatants,\n     Un Dieu tel aujourd'hui qu'il fut dans tous les temps.\n     Il sait, quand il lui plait, faire eclater sa gloire,\n     Et son peuple est toujours present a sa memoire.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE IV.\n\n_NATURE._\n\n(At Geneva, 27th Nov. 1863.--At Lausanne, 25th Jan. 1864.)\n\n\nGENTLEMEN,\n\nThe thoughts of man are numberless; and still, in their indefinite\nvariety, they never relate but to one or another of these three objects:\nnature, or the world of material substances, which are revealed to our\nsenses; created spirits, similar or superior to that spirit which is\nourselves; and finally God, the Infinite Being, the universal Creator.\nTherefore there are two sorts of atheism, and there are only two. The\nmind stops at nature, and endeavors to find in material substances the\nuniversal principle of existence; or, rising above nature, the mind\nstops at humanity, without ascending to the Infinite Mind, to the\nCreator. We have seen how clearly these two doctrines appear in\ncontemporary literature. We have now to enter upon the examination of\nthem, and this will afford us matter for two lectures.\n\nThe word nature has various meanings; we employ it here to designate\nmatter, and the forces which set it in motion, those forces being\nconceived as blind and fatal, in opposition to the conscious and free\nforce which constitutes mind. Matter and the laws of motion are the\nobject of mechanics, of chemistry, and of physics. Do these sciences\nsuffice for resolving the universal enigma? Such is precisely the\nquestion which offers itself to our examination.\n\nLet us first of all determine what, in presence of the spectacle of the\nuniverse, is the natural movement of human thought, when human thought\npossesses the idea of God. I open a book trivial enough in its form, but\noccasionally profound in its contents: the _Journey round my room_, of\nXavier de Maistre. The author is relating how he had undertaken to make\nan artificial dove which was to sustain itself in the air by means of an\ningenious mechanism. I read:\n\n\"I had wrought unceasingly at its construction for more than three\nmonths. The day was come for the trial. I placed it on the edge of a\ntable, after having carefully closed the door, in order to keep the\ndiscovery secret, and to give my friends a pleasing surprise. A thread\nheld the mechanism motionless. Who can conceive the palpitations of my\nheart, and the agonies of my self-love, when I brought the scissors near\nto cut the fatal bond?--Zest!--the spring of the dove starts, and begins\nto unroll itself with a noise. I lift my eyes to see the bird pass; but,\nafter making a few turns over and over, it falls, and goes off to hide\nitself under the table. Rosine (my dog), who was sleeping there, moves\nruefully away. Rosine, who never sees a chicken, or a pigeon, or the\nsmallest bird, without attacking and pursuing it, did not deign even to\nlook at my dove which was floundering on the floor. This gave the\nfinishing stroke to my self-esteem. I went to take an airing on the\nramparts.\n\n\"I was walking up and down, sad and out of spirits as one always is\nafter a great hope disappointed, when, raising my eyes, I perceived a\nflight of cranes passing over my head. I stopped to have a good look at\nthem. They were advancing in triangular order, like the English column\nat the battle of Fontenoy. I saw them traverse the sky from cloud to\ncloud.--Ah! how well they fly, said I to myself. With what assurance\nthey seem to glide along the viewless path which they follow.--Shall I\nconfess it? alas! may I be forgiven! the horrible feeling of envy for\nonce, once only, entered my heart, and it was for the cranes. I pursued\nthem, with jealous gaze, to the boundaries of the horizon. For a long\nwhile afterwards, motionless in the midst of the crowd which was moving\nabout me, I kept observing the rapid movement of the swallows, and I was\nastonished to see them suspended in the air, just as if I had never\nbefore seen that phenomenon. A feeling of profound admiration, unknown\nto me till then, lighted up my soul. I seemed to myself to be looking\nupon nature for the first time. I heard with surprise the buzzing of the\nflies, the song of the birds, and that mysterious and confused noise of\nthe living creation which involuntarily celebrates its Author. Ineffable\nconcert, to which man alone has the sublime privilege of adding the\naccents of gratitude! Who is the author of this brilliant mechanism? I\nexclaimed in the transport which animated me. Who is He that, opening\nhis creative hand, let fly the first swallow into the air? It is He who\ngave commandment to these trees to come forth from the ground, and to\nlift their branches toward the sky!\"\n\nHere is a charming page, and containing, though apparently trivial in\nstyle, a good and sound philosophy. Let us translate this delightful\ndescription into the heavier language of science.\n\nThe intellect is one of the things with which we are best acquainted;\nlogic is the science of thought, and logic is perhaps, among all the\nsciences, the one best settled on its bases. The intellect discovers\nitself to us in the exercise of our activity. We pursue an object, we\ncombine the means for attaining it, and it is the intellect which\noperates this combination. What happens if we compare the results of our\nactivity with the results of the power manifested in the world? When we\nconsider in their vast _ensemble_ the means of which nature disposes,\nwhen we remark the infinite number of the relations of things, the\nmarvellous harmony of which universal life is the produce, we are\ndazzled by the splendor of a wisdom which surpasses our own as much as\nboundless space surpasses the imperceptible spot which we occupy upon\nthe earth. Think of this: the science of nature is so vast that the\nleast of its departments suffices to absorb one human lifetime. All our\nsciences are only in their very beginning; they are spelling out the\nfirst lines of an immense book. The elements of the universe are\nnumberless; and yet, notwithstanding, all hangs together; all things are\nlinked one to another in the closest connection. The _savants_ therefore\nfind themselves in a strange embarrassment. They are obliged to\ncircumscribe more and more the field of their researches, on pain of\nlosing themselves in an endless study; and, on the other hand, in\nproportion as science advances, the mutual relation of all its branches\nbecomes so manifest that it is ever more and more clearly seen that, in\norder to know any one thing thoroughly, it would be necessary to know\nall. It needs not that we seek very high or very far away for occasions\nof astonishment: the least of the objects which nature presents to our\nview contains abysses of wisdom.\n\nThe acquired results of science appear simple through the effect of\nhabit. The sun rises every day; who is still surprised at its rising?\nThe solar system has been known a long while; it is taught in the\nhumblest schools, and no longer surprises any one. But those who found\nout, after long efforts, what we learn without trouble, the discoverers,\nreckoned their discoveries very surprising. Kepler, one of the founders\nof modern astronomy, in the book to which he consigned his immortal\ndiscoveries, exclaims:[97] \"The wisdom of the Lord is infinite, as are\nalso His glory and His power. Ye heavens! sing His praises. Sun, moon,\nand planets, glorify Him in your ineffable language! Praise Him,\ncelestial harmonies, and all ye who can comprehend them! And thou, my\nsoul, praise thy Creator! It is by Him, and in Him, that all exists.\nWhat we know not is contained in Him as well as our vain science. To Him\nbe praise, honor, and glory for ever and ever!\" These words, Gentlemen,\nhave not been copied from a book of the Church; they are read in a work\nwhich, as all allow, is one of the foundations of modern science.\n\nI pass on to another example, and I continue to keep you in good and\nhigh company. Newton set forth his discoveries in a large volume all\nbristling with figures and calculations.[98] The work of the\nmathematician ended, the author rises, by the consideration of the\nmutual interchange of the light of all the stars, to the idea of the\nunity of the creation; then he adds, and it is the conclusion of his\nentire work: \"The Master of the heavens governs all things, not as being\nthe soul of the world, but as being the Sovereign of the universe. It is\non account of His sovereignty that we call Him the Sovereign God. He\ngoverns all things, those which are, and those which may be. He is the\none God, and the same God, everywhere and always. We admire Him because\nof His perfections, we reverence and adore Him because of His\nsovereignty. A God without sovereignty, without providence, and without\nobject in His works, would be only destiny or nature. Now, from a blind\nmetaphysical necessity, everywhere and always the same, could arise no\nvariety; all that diversity of created things according to places and\ntimes (which constitutes the order and life of the universe) could only\nhave been produced by the thought and will of a Being who is _the\nBeing_, existing by Himself, and necessarily.\"\n\nHere, Sirs, are noble thoughts, expressed in noble style. I recommend\nyou to read throughout the pages from which I have quoted a few\nfragments. Let us now analyze the ideas of this great astronomer as thus\nexpounded. We may note these three affirmations:\n\n1. The universe displays an admirable order which reveals the wisdom of\nthe Power which governs it.\n\n2. The universe lives; it is not fixed, and its variations suppose an\nintelligent Power which directs it.\n\n3. The variable existence of the universe shows that it is not\nnecessary; it must have its cause in a Being who is _the_ Being,\nnecessarily, by His proper nature.\n\nSuch are the views of Newton. Examine this course of thought, and see if\nit is not natural. Observation reveals to us facts. Facts in themselves,\nisolated facts, are nothing for the mind; but in the facts of nature,\nhuman reason discovers an order, and in that order it recognizes its own\nproper laws. To keep within the domain of astronomy--there is harmony\nbetween our mind and the course of the stars. If you have any doubt\nabout this, I appeal to the almanac. We there find it stated that in\nsuch a month, on such a day, at such an hour, there will be an eclipse\nof the sun or of the moon. How comes the editor of the almanac to know\nthat? He has learnt it from the savants who have succeeded in explaining\nthe phenomena of the skies. The savant therefore can in his study meet\nwith the intelligence which directs the universe. If he makes no mistake\nin his calculations, the eclipse begins at the precise hour which he has\nindicated. If the eclipse did not take place at the instant foreseen, no\none would suspect Nature of not following the course prescribed by the\ndirecting intelligence; the inference would be that there had been a\nfault in observation, or an error of figures on the part of the\nastronomer.\n\nWhen science, then, does its part well, the mind of man encounters\nanother mind which is governing the world and maintaining it in order.\nThe special science of nature stops there, as we shall explain further\non; but this is not all that man requires, when he makes use of all his\nfaculties. All is passing and changing in the domain of experience; and\nreason seeks instinctively the cause of changeable facts in an\nunchangeable Being, the cause of transient phenomena in an eternal\nBeing. Nature, therefore, does not suffice to account to us for itself.\nIt demands a power to direct it, an intelligence to regulate it; an\nabsolute eternal Being as its cause. This is what reason imperatively\nrequires; and when we possess the idea of God, nature reveals to us His\npower and His wisdom.\n\nThis is an old argument, and they call it commonplace. It is\ncommonplace, in fact; it has appeared over and over again in the\ndiscourses of Socrates, in the writings of Galen, of Kepler, of Newton,\nof Linnaeus. Yes, this argument has fallen so low as to be public\nproperty, if we can say that truth falls when it shines with a splendor\nvivid enough to enlighten the masses. If I desired to bring together\nhere the testimony of all the savants who have seen God in nature, the\nsong of all the poets who have celebrated the glory of the Eternal as\nmanifested by the creation, the enumeration would be long, and I should\nsoon tire out your patience. You can understand therefore that if there\nare, as the misanthrope Rousseau says there are, philosophers who hold\nin such contempt vulgar opinions that they prefer error of their own\ndiscovery to truth found out by other people, then the ancient argument,\nwhich infers the wisdom of the Creator from the order of the creation,\nmust be the object of but small esteem with them. Still I for my part\ntake this old argument for a good one, and I mean to defend it.\n\nNature is verily and indeed a marvel placed before the observation of\nour minds. The growth of a blade of grass, the habits of an ant, contain\nfor an attentive observer prodigies of wisdom. A drop of dew reflecting\nthe beams of morning, the play of light among the leaves of a tree,\nreveal to the poet and the artist treasures of poetry. But too often,\nblinded by habit, we are unable to see; and when our mind is asleep, it\nseems to us that the universe slumbers. A sudden flash of light can\nsometimes arouse us from this lethargy. If science all at once delivers\nup to us some one of those grand laws which reveal in thousands of\nphenomena the traces of one and the same mind, the astonishment of our\nintellect excites in our soul an emotion of adoration. When the first\nrays of morning light up with a pure brightness the lofty summits of our\nAlps; when the sun at his setting stretches a path of fire along the\nwaters of our lake, who does not feel impelled to render glory to the\nsupreme Artist? When dark cold fogs rest upon our valleys at the decline\nof autumn, it only needs sometimes to climb the mountain-side, in order\nto issue all at once from the gloomy region, and see the chain of high\npeaks, resplendent with light, mark themselves out upon a sky of\nincomparable blue. Often have I given myself the delight of this grand\nspectacle, and always at such a time my heart has uttered spontaneously\nfrom its depths that hymn of adoration:\n\n\n     Tout l'univers est plein de sa magnificence.\n     Qu'on l'adore, ce Dieu, qu'on l'invoque a jamais![99]\n\n\nSuch is, in the presence of nature, the spontaneous movement of the\nheart and of the reason. But a false wisdom obscures these clear\nverities by clouds of sophisms. When your heart feels impelled to render\nglory to God, there is danger lest importunate thoughts rise in your\nmind and counteract the impulse of your adoration. Perhaps you have\nheard it said, perhaps you have read, that the accents of spiritual\nsong, those echoes, growing ever weaker, of by-gone ages, are no longer\nheard by a mind enlightened by modern science. I should wish to deliver\nyou from this painful doubt. I should wish to protect you from the\nfascinations of a false science. I should wish that in the view of\nnature, even those who have as yet no wish to adore, with St. Paul, Him\nwhose invisible perfections are clearly seen when we contemplate His\nworks, may at least feel themselves free to admire, with Socrates, \"the\nsupreme God who maintains the works of creation in the flower of youth\nand in a vigor ever new.\" Let us examine a few of the prejudices which\nit is sought to disseminate, in order to deprive of their force the\nreasonings of Newton, and to turn us from the opinions of Kepler.\n\nIt is said that science leads away from God, and that faith continues to\nbe the lot only of the ignorant. Listen on this head first of all to the\nItalian Franchi. \"The class of society in which infidels and sceptics\nespecially abound is that of savants and men of letters,--men, in short,\nwho have gone through studies, in the course of which they have\ncertainly become acquainted with the famous demonstrations of the\nexistence of God. But no sooner have they examined them with their own\neyes, and submitted them to the criterion of their own judgment, than\nthese demonstrations no longer demonstrate anything; these reasonings\nturn out to be only paralogisms.\"[100] Here we have the thesis in its\ngeneral form: to become an infidel or a sceptic, it is enough to be a\nwell educated man. The German Buechner will now show us the application\nof this notion to the special study of nature. \"At this day, our hardest\nlaborers in the sciences, our most indefatigable students of nature,\nprofess materialistic sentiments.\"[101] The same tendencies are often\nmanifested among French writers. The author of a recent astronomical\ntreatise, for example, draws a veil of deceitful words over the profound\nfaith of Kepler, and takes evident pleasure in throwing into relief the\ntokens of sympathy bestowed unfortunately by the learned Laplace upon\natheism.[102] Here then we have open attempts to found a prejudice\nagainst religion on the authority of science; and these attempts disturb\nthe minds of not a few. I ask two questions on this head. Is it true, in\nfact, that modern naturalists are generally irreligious? Is it possible\nthat the science of nature, rightly considered, should lead to\natheism?[103]\n\nLet us begin with the question of fact; and first of all let us settle\nclearly the bearing and object of this discussion. I wish to destroy a\nprejudice, and not to create one. I am not proposing to you to take the\nvotes of savants, in order to know whether God exists. No. Though all\nthe universities in Europe should unite to vote it dark at mid-day, I\nshould not cease on that account to believe in the sun, and that,\nGentlemen, in common with you all, and with the mass of my fellow-men. I\nhave instituted a sort of inquiry in order to ascertain whether modern\nnaturalists have in general been led to atheistical sentiments, as some\nwould have us believe. In appealing to the recollections of my own\nearlier studies and subsequent reading, I have marked the names of the\nmen best known in the various sciences, and I have inquired what\nreligious opinions they may have publicly manifested. I will now give\nyou briefly the result of my labor.\n\nI have left astronomy out of the question, considering that,\nnotwithstanding the great notoriety of Laplace, we have in Kepler and\nNewton a weight of authority sufficient to counterbalance that which it\nis desired to connect with his name. Descending to the earth, we\nencounter first of all the general science of our globe, or geography.\nIn this order of studies a German, Ritter, enjoys an incontestable\npreeminence. He is called, even in France, the \"creator of scientific\ngeography.\" Scientific geography rests for support on nearly all the\nsciences: it proceeds from the general results of chemistry, physics,\nand geology. Had then the vast knowledge of Ritter turned him away from\nGod? I had read somewhere[104] that he was one of those savants who have\nbest realized the union of science and faith. One of my friends who was\npersonally acquainted with him has described him to me, not only as a\nman who adored the Creator in the view of the creation, but as an\namiable and zealous Christian, who exerted himself to communicate to\nothers his own convictions.\n\nFrom the general study of the globe, let us pass to that of the\norganized beings which people its surface. Does botany teach the human\nmind to dispense with God? Let us listen to Linnaeus. I open the _System\nof Nature_,[105] and on the reverse of the title-page I read: \"O Lord,\nhow manifold are Thy works! in wisdom hast Thou made them all: the earth\nis full of Thy riches.\"[106] I turn over a few leaves, and I meet with a\ntable which comprises, under the title, _Empire of Nature_, the general\nclassification of beings. The commencement is as follows: \"Eternal God,\nall-wise and almighty! I have seen Him as it were pass before me, and I\nremained confounded. I have discovered some traces of His footsteps in\nthe works of the creation; and in those works, even in the least, even\nin those which seem most insignificant, what might! what wisdom! what\ninexplicable perfection!--If thou call Him _Destiny_, thou art not\nmistaken, it is He upon whom all depends. If thou call Him _Nature_,\nthou art not mistaken, it is He from whom all takes its origin. If thou\ncall Him _Providence_, thou speakest truly; it is by His counsel that\nthe universe subsists.\" Another great naturalist, George Cuvier, takes\ncare to point out that \"Linnaeus used to seize with marked pleasure the\nnumerous occasions which natural history offered him of making known the\nwisdom of Providence.\"[107] Thus modern botany was founded in a spirit\nof piety. Has it, at a later period, made any discoveries calculated to\nefface from the life of vegetables the marks of Divine intelligence?\nAllow me to introduce here a personal _souvenir_. I received lessons in\nmy youth from an old man, who, having once been the teacher of De\nCandolle, remained his friend.[108] By a rather strange academical\narrangement, M. Vaucher found himself set to teach us--not botany, for\nwhich he possessed both taste and genius,[109] but a science of which he\nknew but little, and which he liked still less. So it came to pass that\na good part of the hour of lecture was often filled up with familiar\nconversations. These conversations took us far away from church history,\nwhich we were supposed to be learning. The misplaced botanist reverted,\nby a natural impulse, to his much-loved science; and I have seen him\nshed tears of tender emotion, in his Professor's chair, as he spoke to\nus of the God who made the primrose of the spring, and concealed the\nviolet under the hedge by the wayside. Therefore is the recollection of\nthat old man not only living in my memory, but also dear to my heart.\nStill he was a savant, an enthusiastic naturalist; and, in the broad\nlight of the nineteenth century, he felt and spoke like Linnaeus.\n\nLet us pass to the study of animals. I had the wish, some years ago, to\nprocure the best of modern treatises upon physiology. I was directed to\nthe work of Professor Mueller, of Berlin. This book has not lost its\nvalue,--for, this very morning, a student of our faculty of sciences\ncame to me to borrow it, by the advice of his masters. Mueller was a\ngreat physiologist, and he made an open profession of the Christian\nreligion. Have we not the right to conclude that he believed in God? In\nFrance, I could cite more than one name in support of my thesis; I\nconfine myself to a single fact. The attention of the scientific world\nhas very recently been occupied with the discoveries of M. Pasteur. M.\nPasteur has ascertained that the decomposition of organized bodies,\nafter death, is effected by the action of small animals almost\nimperceptible, the germs of which the larger animals carry in\nthemselves, as living preparatives for their interment. The design of\nProvidence reveals itself to his understanding, and he writes: \"The\nimmediate elements of living bodies would be in a manner indestructible,\nif from the beings which God has created were taken away the smallest,\nand, in appearance, the most useless. Life would thus become impossible,\nbecause the return to the atmosphere and to the mineral kingdom of all\nthat has ceased to live would be all at once suspended.\"[110] In other\nwords: I have studied facts hitherto incompletely observed, and my study\nhas revealed to me a new manifestation of that Divine wisdom of which\nthe universe bears the impression.\n\nEngland possesses a naturalist of the first order, whom his\nfellow-countrymen take a pleasure in comparing to George\nCuvier--Professor Owen. This savant lectured, a few months ago, before a\nnumerous auditory, on the relations of religion and natural\nscience.[111] He is fully possessed of all the information which the\ntimes afford,--is not ignorant of modern discoveries,--is, in fact, one\nof the princes of contemporary science. Well, Gentlemen, Mr. Owen\nrepeats, with reference to animals, what Newton was led to say by his\ncontemplation of the heavens, and Linnaeus by his study of the plants. He\nis not afraid to admire with Galen the marvellous wisdom which presided\nover the organization of living bodies. His discourse is entitled, _The\nPower of God in His Animal Creation_. The more we understand, he says,\nthe more we admire, the more we adore. He pauses in view of the\nmarvellous productions of nature, beside which the most delicate works\nof human industry appear, beneath the microscope, but coarse, rough\nhewings; he compares our most highly finished machines to the living\nmachines made by the hand of God, and infers that, not to discern\nintelligence in the relation of means to ends, necessarily implies in\nthe mind a defect similar to that of eyes which are unable to\ndistinguish colors. Mr. Owen declares that such a state of mind and\nfeeling in a naturalist may provoke blame from some and pity from\nothers, and remains for him, so far as he is concerned, absolutely\nincomprehensible.\n\nAgain, do the most learned chemists find in the study of the elements of\nmatter a revelation of atheism? M. Liebig, I have been told, is one of\nthe first chemists of our epoch. He believed he had discovered an\napplication of chemistry to agriculture, the effect of which would be to\nfurnish a remedy to the exhaustion of the soil. His discovery turned out\nfalse, and a more attentive study of his subject led him to ascertain\nthat the object which he was pursuing was actually realized by Divine\nProvidence in a way of which he had had no suspicion. The following is\nhis own account of this, published in 1862: \"After having submitted all\nthe facts to a new and very searching examination, I discovered the\ncause of my error. I had sinned against the wisdom of the Creator, and I\nhad received my just punishment. I was wishing to perfect His work, and,\nin my blindness, I thought that in the admirable chain of laws which\npreside over life at the surface of the earth, and maintain it ever in\nfreshness, there was wanting a link which I, feeble and impotent worm,\nwas to supply. Provision had been made for this beforehand, but in a way\nso wonderful, that the possibility of such a law had not so much as\ndawned upon the human understanding.\"[112] Here is a confession very\nnoble in its humility; and to this chemist, who thus renders glory to\nGod, no one of his colleagues could say: \"If you had as much science as\nwe, you would say no more about the wisdom of the Creator.\"\n\nLet us pass on to natural philosophers. I have taken a special interest\nin this part of my inquiry, because I had read in the productions of a\nliterary man of Paris, that modern physics have placed those at fault\nwho defend the doctrine of the living and true God. I inquired\naccordingly of a man, very well able to give me the information, whether\nthere exists in Europe a natural philosopher holding a position of quite\nexceptional distinction. I received for reply: \"You may say boldly that,\nby the unanimous consent of men of science, Mr. Faraday, in regard both\nto the greatness and range of his discoveries, is the first natural\nphilosopher living.\" After having thus made myself sure, therefore, on\nthis point, I took the liberty of writing to Mr. Faraday the following\nletter:\n\n\n                                       \"GENEVA, 30th October, 1863.\n\n     \"SIR,\n\n     \"I have the intention of commencing shortly, at Geneva, and for an\n     auditory of men, a course of lectures designed to combat the\n     manifestations of contemporary atheism. To this deplorable error I\n     desire to oppose faith in God, as it has been given to the world by\n     the Gospel, faith in the Heavenly Father.\n\n     \"One of my lectures will be specially devoted to the removal of\n     prejudices against religion which have their origin in natural\n     science. It is said very often, and very boldly, that modern\n     physics and modern chemistry demonstrate the unfounded character of\n     religious beliefs. These theses are maintained at Geneva as\n     elsewhere. I should wish to reply that natural science does not of\n     itself turn men from God, and that without being able to give\n     faith, it confirms the faith of those who believe: this I should\n     wish to establish by citing names invested, in science, with an\n     incontestable and solid renown. Will you, Sir, authorize me to make\n     use of your name?\"\n\n\nMr. Faraday, in reply, sent me the following letter, dated 6th Nov.\n1863.\n\n\n     \"SIR,\n\n     ....\"You have a full right to make use of my name: for although I\n     generally avoid mixing up things sacred and things profane, I have,\n     on one occasion, written and published a passage which accords to\n     you this right, and which I maintain. I send you a copy of it. I\n     hope you will find nothing in any other part of my researches, to\n     contradict or weaken in any way whatever the sense of this passage.\n\n     \"I beg you to transmit my best remembrances to my friend M. de la\n     Rive....\"\n\n\nThe passage thus indicated establishes a line of demarcation, very\nstrongly (perhaps too strongly) drawn between researches of the reason\nand the domain of religious truth, and contains a profession of positive\nfaith in Revelation. The author affirms that he has never recognized any\nincompatibility between science and faith, and makes the following\ndeclaration: \"Even in earthly matters I reckon that 'the invisible\nthings of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being\nunderstood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and\nGodhead.'\"\n\nA literary man of Paris declares to us that natural science leads away\nfrom God: one of the first savants of our time informs us that the\nscientific contemplation of nature renders the wisdom of God manifest.\nThe question is one of fact. To whom shall we give our confidence? For\nmy part, since it is natural philosophy which is in question, I rank\nmyself on the side of the Natural Philosopher.\n\nWe will here terminate this review. It is time, however, which fails us,\nnot subject-matter, for continuing it. You may have noticed that the\nname of no one of the savants of Switzerland figures in this inquiry.\nNevertheless our country would have furnished a rich mine for my\npurpose. It contains (and it is one of its best privileges) a goodly\nnumber of savants, whom the observation of the facts of matter have not\ncaused to forget the claims of mind, and who know how to raise their\nsouls to the Author of the marvels which they study. You will understand\ntherefore that it has not been from anxiety for my cause, but from a\nmotive of discretion, that I have forborne to bring into this discussion\nthe names of men in whom we have a near interest, and many of whom\nperhaps are present in this assembly. I will take advantage of Mr.\nFaraday's letter to make a single exception, by naming M. de la Rive.\nMore than once, and in public, we have heard him distinctly point out\nthe place occupied by the sciences of mind in relation to the natural\nsciences, and render glory to the Creator. And I do not think that any\none, in Switzerland or elsewhere, can claim to speak with disdain, in\nthe name of the physical sciences, of the religious convictions boldly\nprofessed by our learned fellow-countryman.[113]\n\nRecollect, Gentlemen, that I have not undertaken to prove the existence\nof God, by making appeal to the authority of men of science. All I have\nsought to do has been to destroy a prejudice. They tell us, and scream\nit at us, that the best naturalists become atheists. This is not true,\nas I think I have shown. There do exist atheists who cultivate the\nnatural sciences,--no doubt of the fact. But even though half the whole\nnumber of naturalists were atheists, inasmuch as other naturalists, and\nthose some of the greatest, find in their studies new motives to\nadoration, we are forced to the conclusion, that the true cause why\nthese savants repudiate religion has nothing to do with their science.\nWe shall come to be more strongly confirmed in this opinion, if we pass\nnow from the question of fact to considerations of sound reason.\n\nThe weakness of the human mind leads it to forget the facts with which\nit is not occupied. All special culture of the intellect risks\nconsequently the paralyzing a part of our faculties. Hegel, lost in\nabstractions, persuades himself that he will be able to construct by\npure reasoning the history of nature and that of the human race. A\ngeometrician, who no longer saw in the world anything but theorems and\ndemonstrations, asked, after the representation of a dramatic\nmasterpiece, \"And what does that prove?\" A physiologist absorbed in the\nstudy of sensible phenomena says: \"Where is that soul they talk of? I\nhave never seen it.\" These are phenomena of the same order. This\ninfirmity of the mind, which leads certain savants to think that the\nordinary subject of their studies is everything, must not be imputed to\nscience. A man accustomed to the exclusive observation of material\nphenomena, may become a materialist by the effect of his mental habits,\nand this really happens, in fact, in too many instances; but the study\nin itself is not responsible for this result. Let us endeavor to prove\nthis, by clearly defining the object of the natural sciences.\n\nWhen the matter of a phenomenon is given to us, the understanding\nproposes to itself three questions:\n\n1. How does the fact manifest itself? what is the mode of its existence?\nThe answer gives us the law of the phenomenon. Bodies fall to the ground\nat a determined rate of speed: the determination of this rate is the law\nof their fall.\n\n2. What is the real effective power which produces the phenomenon? This\nis the inquiry after the cause.\n\n3. What is the intention which presided at the production of the\nphenomenon? This is the search after the object, which philosophers call\nthe final cause.\n\nWhat we call understanding or explaining a fact, is answering these\nthree questions; it is finding the law, the cause, the end. This\nanalysis was made by Aristotle, and seems to have been well made. The\nscience of nature, as it is conceived by the moderns, does not undertake\nto satisfy entirely the desires of the human mind. It confines itself\nto the first question; it classes phenomena; it then seeks their law;\narrived at this, it stops. The cause and design of things remain out of\nthe sphere of its investigations; the question of God therefore\ncontinues foreign to it.\n\nA story is told that when Buonaparte expressed his astonishment that the\nMarquis de la Place could have written a large book on the system of the\nuniverse, without making any mention of the Creator, the learned\nastronomer replied to his sovereign: \"Sire, I had no need of that\nhypothesis.\" The answer is admissible if we regard only the science of\nnature. An astronomer has no need of God in order to follow out the\nseries of his calculations, and compare their results with the course of\nthe stars; a chemist has no need of God in order to ascertain the simple\nelements combined in composite bodies; a natural philosopher has no need\nof God in order to determine the laws of waves of sound or of electric\ncurrents. The science of nature does not demonstrate the existence of\nGod; still less can it deny His existence. To deny God, it would be\nnecessary for science to demonstrate that there is no order, and\nconsequently no cause of the order to discover; for when we point out\nthe harmony of the universe, we manifestly prepare a basis for the\nargument which, from the intelligence recognized in the phenomena, will\ninfer the intelligence of the Power which governs them. To prove that\nthere is no order would be to prove that there is no science. For any\none who well understands the value of terms, the words _atheistical\nscience_ contain a contradiction; they signify science which proves that\nthere is no science.\n\nSuch, Gentlemen, is the real state of the question. Our savants, when\nthey remain faithful to their method, seek to determine the laws of\nphenomena, and do not occupy themselves either with the First Cause of\nnature, or with its general object; they leave the question of God on\none side. Whence come then the negations of naturalists? They arise in\nthis way: those savants who succeed in strictly confining themselves\nwithin the limits of their science are rare exceptions. Almost always\nthe _man_ introduces his thoughts into the work of the savant, and the\nresults of his study appear to him religious or irreligious, according\nto his views of religion. Newton ends his book with a hymn to the\nCreator; but it is not the _mathematical principles_ of nature which\nhave revealed to him the Sovereign God. He perceives the rays of His\nglory because he believes in Him. In the same way, the atheist thinks\nthat his researches disprove the existence of God, because God is veiled\nfrom his soul. In both cases it is a doctrine foreign to pure natural\nscience which gives a color to its results. Self-deception is very\ncommon in this matter, and in both directions. The religious mind does\nnot understand how it is possible to contemplate the universe, and not\nsee inscribed upon it distinctly the name of its Author; and the\nintrusion of atheism into the sciences of observation is veiled beneath\nconfusions of ideas which it is of importance for us to dissipate.\n\nModern science, as we have said, stops at laws, without troubling itself\nwith causes. The laws which determine the series of facts as they offer\nthemselves to observation express the mode of the action of the causes.\nThere are here two ideas absolutely distinct: the power which acts, and\nthe manner in which it acts. If the naturalist thinks that his science\nis everything, he must conclude that we can know nothing beyond the\nlaws, and that an insuperable ignorance hides from our view the power of\nwhich they express the action. But he rarely succeeds in keeping this\nposition, and deceives his reason by confounding the laws which he\ndiscovers with the causes with which his mind is not able to dispense.\nHe says first of all with Franchi, \"the universe is what it is\"; this is\nthe general formula of all the truths of experience; then he adds with\nthe same author, \"it is because it is.\" This _because_ means nothing, or\nmeans that laws are their own causes. If it is asked, What is the cause\nof the motion of the stars? they will give for answer the astronomical\nformulae which express this motion, and will think that they have\nexplained the phenomena by stating in what way they present themselves\nto observation. This is a curious example of that confusion of ideas\nwhich opens the door to atheism.\n\nAn English naturalist, Mr. Darwin, has shown that in the successive life\nof animal generations, the favorable variations which are produced in\nthe organization of a being are transmitted to its descendants and\ninsure the perpetuity of its race, while the unpropitious variations\ndisappear because they entail the destruction of the races in which they\nare produced. He tells us: \"This preservation of favorable variations\nand the rejection of injurious variations, I call Natural\nSelection.\"[114] What does the author understand by law? He answers:\n\"the series of facts as it is known to us.\"[115] Here we have the true\ndefinition of law: it is the simple expression of the series of the\nfacts; the cause remains to be sought for. I open the book in another\npart. The author is speaking of the eye; and his doctrine is that the\neye of the eagle was formed by the slow transformations of an extremely\nsimple visual apparatus. There will have been then, in the development\nof animal existence, first of all a rudimentary eye, then an eye\nmoderately well formed, and then the eye of the eagle, because the\nfavorable modifications of the organ of sight will have been preserved\nand increased in the course of ages. Such is the series of facts, such\nis the law; suppose we grant it. What is the cause? The optician makes\nour spectacles; who made the eye of the eagle, by directing the slow\ntransformations which at length produced it? Let us listen to the\nauthor: \"There exists an intelligent power, and that intelligent power\nis natural selection, constantly on the watch for every alteration\naccidentally produced in the transparent layers, in order carefully to\nchoose such of those alterations as may tend to produce a more distinct\nimage.... Natural selection will choose with infallible skill each new\nimprovement effected.\"[116] Natural selection is a law; a law is the\nseries of facts; it seems that we must seek for the power which directs\nthis series of facts; but, lo, the series of facts itself is transformed\ninto a power--into an intelligent power--into a power which chooses with\ninfallible skill! The confusion of ideas is complete. The mind is on a\nwrong scent; it concludes that the law explains everything, and has\nitself no need of explanation. The idea of the cause disappears, and, as\nAuguste Comte expresses it, \"science conducts God with honor to its\nfrontiers, thanking Him for His provisional services.\"[117] This is not\nperhaps the idea of Mr. Darwin, but it is at any rate the idea of some\nof his disciples, as we shall see by-and-by.\n\nThus the idea of the cause is kept out of sight. Let us now see the fate\nto which are consigned those other requirements of the reason--the\neternal and the infinite. I take up Dr. Buechner's book, and I read: \"We\nare incapable of forming an idea, even approximately, of the _eternal_\nand the _infinite_, because our mind, shut up within the limits of the\nsenses, in what regards space and time, is quite unable to pass these\nbounds so as to rise to the height of these ideas.\" I follow the text,\nand thirteen lines further on, in the same page, I read, \"Therefore\nmatter and space must be eternal.\"[118] Observe well the use which this\nwriter makes of the great ideas of the reason. Is it desired to employ\nthem to prove the existence of God? He will have nothing to do with\nthem. Is the object in question to deny God's existence? He makes use of\nthem; and all in the same page. This is coarse work, no doubt, and Dr.\nBuechner damages his cause; but, under forms, often more subtle and more\nintelligent, the same sophism turns up in all systems of\nmaterialism.[119] It is affirmed that we have no real idea of the\ninfinite, and it is sought at the same time to beguile the need which\nreason feels of this idea by applying it to matter.\n\nPray do not suppose that I am here attacking the natural sciences, in\nthe interest of metaphysics. I am not attacking but defending them. I am\nendeavoring, as far as in me lies, to avenge them from the outrages\nwhich are offered to them by materialism, while it seeks to cover with\ntheir noble mantle its own shameful nakedness. Naturalists on the one\nhand, and theologians and philosophers on the other, are too often at\nwar. They are men, and as nothing human is foreign to them, they are not\nunacquainted either with proud prepossessions, or with jealous\nrivalries, or with the miserable struggles of envy: with these things\nthe passions are chargeable. But never render the sciences responsible\nfor the errors of their representatives. Take away human frailties, and\nyou shall see harmony established; the study of matter will thus agree\nwith the study of mind, and the idea of nature with the idea of God. You\nwill see all the sciences rise together in a majestic harmony. I say\nrise, and I say it advisedly; for the sciences also form a part of that\ngolden chain which should unite the earth to heaven.\n\nThe assertion that the science of nature leads away from God, expresses\nnothing but a prejudice. It is not true in fact, and on principles of\nright reason it is impossible: the demonstration is complete. Atheism is\na philosophy for which the natural sciences are in no degree\nresponsible. We shall not undertake here the general discussion of this\nphilosophy. Let us confine ourselves to the examination of the pretence\nwhich it puts forward to find a new support in the results of modern\nscience.\n\nThe nineteenth century bestows particular attention upon history, and it\nis not only to the annals of the human race that it directs its\ninvestigations. Geology and palaeontology dive into the bowels of the\nearth in order to ask of the ground which carries us testimony as to\nwhat it carried of old. Astronomy goes yet further. It endeavors to\nconjecture what was the condition of our planet before the appearance of\nthe first living being. It remarks that the sun is not fixed in the\nheavens, and that our earth does not twice travel over the same line in\nits annual revolutions. It appears that stars are seen in course of\nformation; it is suspected that some have wholly disappeared. Nature is\nnot fixed, but is undergoing modifications--lives, in fact. The actual\nstate of the universe is but a momentary phase in a development which\nsupposes thousands of ages in the past, and seems to presage thousands\nmore in the future. These conceptions are the result of solid and\nincontestable discoveries. They have disturbed men's minds, but what is\ntheir legitimate import? Why, Newton's argument receives new force from\nthem. From a blind metaphysical necessity, everywhere and always the\nsame, said this great man, no variation could spring. The more it is\ndemonstrated that the universe is in course of development and\nmodification, the more clearly comes into view the necessity of the\nsupreme Power which is the cause of its modifications, and of the\nInfinite intelligence which is directing them to their end. This appears\nto be solid reasoning, and nevertheless atheism has endeavored to strike\nits roots in the ground of modern discoveries. It does this in the\nfollowing way.\n\nIf the universe as it is, with the infinite variety of beings which\npeople it and the marvellous relations which connect these beings\nmutually together, could be shown to have sprung all at once from\nnothing, or to have emerged from chaos at a given instant, in its full\nharmony, the boldest mind would not venture to regard this miracle of\nintelligence as the product of chance. But modern science, it is said,\nno longer admits of this simple explanation of things: \"God created the\nheavens and the earth.\" This phrase is henceforward admissible only in\nthe catechism. We know that all has been produced by slow degrees,\nstarting from weak and shapeless rudiments. This grand marvel of the\nuniverse was not made all of one piece. Man is of recent date;\nquadrupeds at a certain epoch did not exist; animals had a beginning,\nand plants also. The earth was once bare. Formerly, it was perhaps only\na gaseous mass revolving in space. In course of time, matter was\ncondensed; in time it was organized in living cellules; in time these\ncellules became shapeless animals; in time these animals were perfected.\nTime appears therefore to be the \"universal factor\"; and for the ancient\nformula, \"the universe is the creation of God,\" we are able to\nsubstitute this other formula, the result, most assuredly, of modern\nscience, \"the universe is the work of time.\"\n\nIn all this, Gentlemen, I have invented nothing. All I have done has\nbeen to put into form the theory, the elements of which I have met with\nin various contemporary productions.[120] They bewilder us by heaping\nages upon ages, and in order to explain nature they substitute the idea\nof time for the ideas of power and intelligence. They seem to suppose\nthat what is produced little by little is sufficiently explained by the\nslowness of its formation.\n\nThese aberrations of thought have recently been manifested in a striking\nmanner on the occasion of the publication of Mr. Darwin's book. This\nnaturalist has given his attention to the transformation of organized\ntypes. He has discovered that types vary more than is generally\nsupposed; and that we probably take simple varieties for distinct\nspecies. His discoveries will, I suppose, leave traces strongly marked\nenough in the history of science. But Mr. Darwin is not merely an\nobserver; he is a theorist, dominated evidently by a disposition to\nsystematize. Now minds of this character, which render, no doubt, signal\nservices to the sciences of observation, are all like Pyrrhus, who,\ngazing on Andromache as he walked by her side,\n\n\n     Still quaffed bewildering pleasure from the view.[121]\n\n\nTheir theory is their lady-love; they love it passionately, and\npassionate love always strongly excites the imagination. Mr. Darwin then\nhas put forth the hypothesis, that not only all animals, but all\nvegetables too, might have come from one and the same primitive type,\nfrom one and the same living cellule. This supposes that there was at\nthe beginning but one single species, an elementary and very slightly\ndefined organization, from which all that lives descended in the way of\nregular generation. The oak and the wild boar which eats its acorn, the\ncat and the flea which lodges in its fur, have common ancestors. The\nfamily, originally one, has been divided under the influence of soil,\nclimate, food, moisture, mode of life, and by virtue of the natural\nselection which has preserved and accumulated the favorable\nmodifications which have occurred in the organism. Mr. Darwin, I repeat,\nappears to me a man strongly disposed to systematize, but I do not on\nthis account conclude that he is mistaken. The question is, what opinion\nwe must form of his doctrine on principles of experimental science?\nProfessor Owen[122] does not appear to allow it any value; M. Agassiz\ndoes not admit it at all;[123] and, without crossing the ocean, we\nmight consult M. Pictet,[124] who would reply, that judging by the\nexperimental data which we have at present, this doctrine is an\nhypothesis not confirmed by the observation of facts. We will leave this\ncontroversy to naturalists. What will remain eventually in their science\nof the system under discussion? The answer belongs to the future\nenlightened by experience and by the employment of a sage induction.\nWhat is the relation existing between these systematic views and the\nquestion of the Creator? This is the sole object of our study.\n\nThe opinions of the English naturalist are very dubious as to the vital\nquestions of religious philosophy. I have pointed out to you the\nconfusion of his ideas in the use which he makes of natural selection.\nIn the text of his book, he admits, in the special case of life, the\nintervention of the Creator for the production of the first living\nbeing, and he does not speak of man, except in an incidental sentence,\nwhich only attentive readers will take any notice of. If we do not take\nthe liberty to look a little below the surface, we must say that Mr.\nDarwin remains on the ground of natural history. Therefore I spoke to\nyou of the aberrations of philosophic thought which have been produced\n_on the occasion_ of his book. These aberrations are the following:\n\nFirst of all, natural selection has been taken for a cause, or rather as\ndispensing with the necessity for a cause, by means of a confusion of\nideas for which the author is responsible. The system has therefore been\nunderstood as implying, that organized beings were formed without plan,\nwithout design, by the mere action of material causes, and as the result\nof modifications casual at first, and slowly accumulated. Divine\nintelligence and creative power thus seemed to be disappearing from the\norganization of the universe, and to disappear especially before the\nlapse of time and the infinitely slow action of physical causes. But\nwhile the system was taking wing, and soaring aloft, lo! the Creator at\nthe commencement of things, and man conceived as a distinct being at the\nhighest point of nature, have risen up as two idols and paralyzed its\nflight. To Mr. Darwin, however, have speedily succeeded disciples\ncompromising their master's authority, and addressing him in some such\nlanguage as this: \"You, our master, do not fully follow out your own\nopinions; you strain off gnats,[125] and swallow camels. It is not more\ndifficult to see in the living cellule a transformation of matter, and\nin man a transformation of the monkey, than to point out in a sponge the\nancestor of the horse. Cast down your idols, and confess that matter\ndeveloped in course of time, under favorable circumstances, is the\norigin of all that is.\" Matter, time, circumstances--these things have\ntaken the place of God.\n\nThis, Gentlemen, is a philosophy, properly so called, which vainly\npretends to find a support in the observation of facts. Geoffroy\nSaint-Hilaire, the rival of Cuvier, set forth views analogous to those\nwhich Mr. Darwin has lately reproduced. But in his replies to the\nattacks which were made upon his system, he affirmed that his theory\noffered \"one of the most glorious manifestations of creative power, and\nan additional motive for admiration, gratitude, and love.\"[126] Two\ndifferent interpretations may therefore be given to the system. I wish\nto show you that these interpretations proceed in all cases from\nconsiderations external to the system. The system in itself, as a theory\nof natural history, could not in any way affect injuriously the great\ninterests of spiritual truth.\n\nIn order solidly to establish this assertion, I will suppose the\nhypotheses of the most advanced disciples of Mr. Darwin to have been\nverified by experimental science. I take for granted that it has been\nproved that all plants and all animals have descended, by way of regular\ngeneration, from living cellules originally similar; and that the\nmaterial particles of the globe, at a given moment, drew together to\nform these cellules. And now where do we stand? Will God henceforward be\na superfluous hypothesis? Do the atheistical consequences which it is\ndesired to draw from this doctrine proceed logically from it? Most\ncertainly not!\n\nI observe first of all that there exists a great question relative to\nthe beginning of things. Matter is perfected and organized in process of\ntime--but whence comes matter itself? Is it also formed little by little\nin process of time? Does non-existence become existence little by\nlittle? So it is said in the preface to the French translation of Mr.\nDarwin's book. But this appertains to high metaphysics; and I pass on.\n\nIf time is the factor of all progress by a necessary law, this necessity\nmust be everywhere the same. Have the elements of matter all the same\nage? If so, why have some followed the law of progress, and others not?\nWhy has this mud and this coal remained mud and coal, age after age,\nwhile these other molecules have risen, in the hierarchy of the\nuniverse, to the dignity of life? Why have these mollusks remained\nmollusks throughout the succession of their generations, while others,\nhappily transformed, have gradually mounted the steps of the ladder up\nto man? Whence comes this aristocracy of nature? Are the beings which we\ncall inferior only the cadets of the universe, and are they too in their\nturn to mount all the steps of the ladder? Must we admit that there is\ngoing on the continual production, not only of living cellules which are\nbeginning new series of generations, but also of new matter, which,\nsetting out from the most rudimentary condition, is beginning the\nevolution which is to raise it into life? They do not venture to put\nforth theses of this nature, and, in order to account for the diversity\nof things, recourse is had to circumstances. The diversity of\ncircumstances explains the diversity of developments. But whence can\ncome the variety of circumstances in a world where all is produced in\nthe way of fatal necessity, and without the intervention of a will and\nan intelligence? This is the remark of Newton. Study carefully the\nsystems of materialism: their authors declare that to have recourse to\nGod in order to account for the universe is a puerile conception\nunworthy of science, because all explanation must be referred to fixed\nand immutable laws; and then you will be for ever surprising them in the\nvery act of the adoration of _circumstances_. Convenient deities these,\nwhich they summon to their aid in cases which they find embarrassing.\n\nBut we will not insist on these preliminary considerations. We have\nallowed, for argument's sake, that all organized beings have proceeded\nby means of generation from cellules presenting to sensible observation\nsimilar appearances. Natural history cannot prove, nor even attempt to\nprove, more. Let us transport ourselves, in thought, to the moment at\nwhich the highest points of the continents were for the first time\nemerging from the primitive ocean. We see, on the parts of the soil\nwhich are half-dried, and in certain conditions of heat and electricity,\nparticles of matter draw together and form those rudiments of organism\nwhich are called living cellules. These cellules have the marvellous\nfaculty of self-propagation, and the faculty, not less marvellous, of\ntransmitting to their posterity the favorable modifications which they\nhave undergone. Generations succeed one another; gradually they form\nseparate branches. New characteristics show themselves; the organisms\nbecome complicated, and becoming complicated they separate. The\nvegetable is distinguished from the animal; the plant which will become\nthe palm-tree is distinguished from the oak which is in course of\nformation, and the ancestor of the future bird is already different from\nthat of the fish. We follow up this great spectacle. The ages pass, they\npass by thousands and by millions, they pass by tens of millions. We\nneed not be stinting in our allowance of time; our imagination will be\ntired of conceiving of it sooner than thought of supplying it. And at\nwhat shall we have arrived at last? At the universe as it has been for\nsome few thousands of years past; at the world with its vegetables of a\nthousand forms, grouped by classes and series, with the families of\nanimals, with the relations of animals to plants, with the unnumbered\nharmonies of nature. Let us choose out one particular, on which to fix\nour attention. Shall it be a she-goat--\n\n\n     Upstretched on fragrant cytisus to browse?\n\n\nThis will suit our purpose, although the cytisus, unless I am mistaken,\nhas no perfume except in M. de Lamartine's verses. Let us fix our\nattention on a cytisus with its yellow clusters hanging down, and the\ngoat bending its pliant branches as it browses on the foliage. Here is a\nvery small detail in the ample lap of nature. Let us come closer, and to\nhelp our ignorance, let us provide ourselves with a naturalist who will\nanswer for us the questions suggested by this simple spectacle. And what\nhave we now before us? The various relations of the animal's\norganization to the vegetables on which it feeds. In the organization\nand functions of these two living beings, in the equilibrium and\nmovements of their frames, in the circulation of sap and of blood, we\nhave the application of the most secret laws of mechanism, of physics,\nand of chemistry. Then again, in the relations which the animal and the\nplant sustain with the ground which bears them, with the air they\nbreathe, with the sun which enlightens them, with heat and light, with\nthe moisture of the air and its electricity--in all this we see the\nuniversal relations which connect all the various parts of the wide\nuniverse with each one of its minutest details. In this simple spectacle\nwe have, in fact, reciprocal relations, the balance of things, the\nharmony which maintains the universal life--intelligence, in short, in\nthe organization of beings, in the characteristics which divide them, in\nthe classes which unite them, in the relations of these classes amongst\nthemselves;--wonders of intelligent design, of which the sciences we are\nso proud of are spelling out, letter by letter, line after line, the\ninexhaustible abysses: this is what we find everywhere. Let us now come\nback to our primitive cellules.\n\nAll the living beings which people the surface of the globe are composed\nmaterially of some of the elements of the earth's substance. The birth\ntherefore of the first living beings could only offer to the view the\nbringing together of some of the elements of the soil; this is not the\nmatter in question. The primitive cellules were to all appearance\nalike. Weighed in scales, opened by the scalpel, placed beneath the\nmicroscope, they would have offered no appreciable difference; I grant\nit: it is the supposition we have agreed to make. Therefore they were\nidentical, say you. I deny it, and here is my proof: If the cellules had\nbeen identical, they would not have given, in the successive development\nof their generations, the diverse beings which people the world, and the\nrelations which unite them. Alike to your eyes, the cellules differed\ntherefore by a concealed property which their development brought to\nlight. You have told me as a matter of history how the organization of\nthe world was manifested by slow degrees; you have given me no account\nof the cause of that organization.\n\nIt is said in reply: \"We do know the origin of those developments which\nyou refer to a supposed intelligence. The living beings are transformed\nby the action of food, climate, soil, mode of life. They experience\nslight variations in the first instance; but these variations are\nestablished, and increase; and where you see a plan, types, and species,\nthere is really only the result of modifications slowly accumulated.\nNature disposes of periods which have no limit, and everything has come\nat its proper time, in the course of ages.\" They are always proposing to\nus to accept of time as the substitute for intelligence. I am tempted to\nsay with Alcestis:\n\n\n     Time in this matter, Sirs, has nought to do.[127]\n\n\nYou know what intelligence is; you know it by knowing yourself. Is\nthere, or is there not, intelligence in the universe? Allow me to\nreproduce some old questions: If a machine implies intelligence, does\nthe universe imply none? If a telescope implies intelligence in the\noptician, does the eye imply none in its author? The production of a\nvariety of the camelia, or of a new breed of swine, demands of the\ngardener and the breeder the patient and prolonged employment of the\nunderstanding; and are our entire flora and fauna to be explained\nwithout any intervention of mind? And if there is intelligence in the\nuniverse, is this intelligence a chemical result of the combination of\nmolecules? is it a physical result of caloric or of electricity? It is\nin vain that you give to material agents an unlimited time; what has\ntime to do here? Whether the world as it now exists arose out of\nnothing, or whether it was slowly formed during thousands of ages, the\nquestion remains the same. With matter and time, you will not succeed in\ncreating intelligence; this were an operation of transcendent alchemy\nutterly beyond our power. In the theory of _slow causes_, the adjective\nends by devouring the substantive; it seems that by dint of becoming\nslow the causes become superfluous. A breath of reason upsets, like a\nhouse of cards, the structures of this erring and misnamed science. Time\nhas a relative meaning and value. We reckon duration as long or short,\nby taking human life as our measure. But they tell of insects which are\nborn in the morning, arrive at mature age at mid-day, and only reach the\nevening if they are patriarchs of their race. Is it not easy to conceive\nof beings organized for an existence such that our centuries would be\nmoments with them, and centuries heaped together one of our hours?\nSuppose one of these beings to be contemplating our geological periods,\nand slow causes will to him appear rapid causes, and the question of\nintelligence will be the same for him as for us.\n\nIt is manifest that the attempt is being made to restore the worship of\nthe old _Chronos_, to whom the ancients had erected temples. Let us\nlook the idol in the face. Time appears at first to our imagination as\nthe great destroyer. He is armed with a scythe, and passes gaunt and\nbald over the ruins of all that has lived. When he lifts up his great\nvoice and cries--\n\n\n     Mighty nations famed in story\n       Into darkness I have hurled,--\n     Gone their myriads and their glory\n       (Lo! ye follow) from the world:\n     My dark shade for ever covers\n       Stars I quenched as on they rolled:--\n\n\nthe beautiful, and frightened girl in the song is not singular as she\nexclaims in her terror:\n\n\n     Ah! we're young, and we are lovers,\n       Spare us, Reaper gaunt and old![128]\n\n\nSuch is the first impression which time makes upon us. But birth\nsucceeds to death. From an inexhaustible spring, nature sends gushing\nforth new products and new developments. Youth full of hope trips\nlightly over the ground, without a thought that the ground it treads on\nis the vast cemetery of all past generations. If we fix our thoughts on\nthe permanence of life and the manifestations of progress, time appears\nto us as the great producer. Destroyer of all that is, producer of all\nthat is to be, time has thus a double form. It is a mysterious tide,\never rising and ever receding; it is the power of death, and it is the\npower of life. All this, Gentlemen, is for the imagination. In the view\nof a calm reason, time is the simply negative condition of all\ndevelopment, as space is the negative condition of all motion. Just as\nwithout bodies and forces infinite space could not produce any motion;\nso, without the action of causes, ages heaped on ages could neither\nproduce nor destroy a single atom of matter, or a single element of\nintelligence. Time is the scene of life and of death; it neither causes\nto be born, nor to die.\n\nThe struggle which we are now maintaining against the philosophers of\nmatter is as ancient as science, and was going on, nearly in the same\nterms, more than two thousand three hundred years ago. About five\nhundred years before the Christian era was born at Clazomenae, a city of\nIonia, the son of Eubulus, who was to become famous by the name of\nAnaxagoras. He fixed his abode at Athens, and the Athenian people gave\nhim a glorious surname,--they called him _Intelligence_. On what\naccount? There were taught at that time doctrines which explained the\nworld by the transformations of matter rising progressively to life and\nthought, without the intervention of a mind. The philosopher Anaximander\ngave out that the first animals had their origin in the watery element,\nand became modified by living in drier regions, so that man was only a\nfish slowly transformed. \"I am quite willing to grant it,\" replied\nAnaxagoras; \"but for your transformations there must be a transforming\nprinciple. Matter is the material of the world, no doubt; but it could\nnot produce universal order except as ruled by intelligence.\" The\nAthenians admired this discovery. For us, Gentlemen, the discovery has\nbeen made a long while. Let us not then be talking in this discussion\nabout modern science and the lights of the age. Our natural history is\nmuch advanced as compared with that of the Greeks; but the vital\nquestion has not varied. Does nature manifest the intervention of a\ndirecting mind, or do we see in it only a fortuitous aggregation of\natoms?\n\nIntelligence radiates from the face of nature, and it is in vain that\nmen endeavor to veil its splendor. Nevertheless I consent to forget all\nthat has just been said, in order to intrench myself in an argument,\nwhich of itself is sufficient for the object we have in view to-day. Our\nobject is to prove that material science does not contain the\nexplanation of all the realities of the universe. Even though they had\nsucceeded in persuading us that there is no intelligence in nature, it\nwould still be necessary to explain the origin of that intelligence\nwhich is in us, and the existence of which cannot be disputed. Whence\nproceeds the mind which is in ourselves?\n\nLet us first of all give our attention to a strange contradiction. Those\nsavants who make of the human soul a simple manifestation of matter, are\nthe same who wish to explain nature without the intervention of the\nDivine intelligence. In order to keep out of view the design which is\ndisplayed in the organization of the world, they take a pleasure in\nfinding nature at fault, and in pointing out its imperfections. Still,\nthey do not pretend to be able to do better than nature; they would not\nundertake the responsibility of correcting the laws of life, and\nregulating the course of the seasons. They do not say, \"We could make a\nbetter world,\" but \"We can imagine a world more perfect than our own.\"\nNow what is our answer? Simply this: \"You are right.\" Nature is not the\nsupreme perfection, and therefore we will not worship it. How admirable\nsoever be the visible universe, we have the faculty of conceiving more\nand better. We understand that the atmosphere might be purified, so that\nthe tempest should not engulf the ships, nor the thunderbolt produce the\nconflagration. We dream of mountain-heights more majestic than the\nloftiest summits of our Alps, of waters more transparent than the pure\ncrystal of our lakes, of valleys fresher and more peaceful than the\nloveliest which hide among our hills. The spectacle of nature awakens in\nus the powers of thought, and the sentiment of beauty draws us on to the\npursuit of an ideal which surpasses all realities. Nature is not\nperfect: let us be forward to acknowledge it, and let us draw from the\nfact its legitimate consequence. The stream cannot rise higher than its\nsource. If man conceives an ideal superior to nature, he is not himself\nthe mere product of nature. By what strange contradiction is it affirmed\nat once that our spirit overpasses the bounds of all the realities\nwhich encompass it, and that it has not a source more elevated than\nthose realities? Listen to a thought of that weighty writer\nMontesquieu:[129] \"Those who have said that a blind fatality has\nproduced all the effects which we see in the world, have said a great\nabsurdity; for what greater absurdity than a blind fatality which should\nhave produced intelligent beings?\" Without restricting ourselves to this\nsimple and solid argument, let us see how they will explain man by\nnature. For this end, we must examine the theory of the perfected\nmonkey, which, introduced to us by the lectures of Professor Vogt and\nthe spirited rejoinders of M. de Rougemont, made a great noise as it\ndescended a short time ago from the mountains of Neuchatel.[130] A\ncelebrated orator said one day to an assembly of Frenchmen: \"I am long,\nGentlemen; but it is your own fault: it is your glory that I am\nrecounting.\" Have not I the right to say to you: \"I am long, Gentlemen,\nbut it is worth while to be so; it is our own dignity which is in\nquestion.\"\n\nMan is a perfected monkey! I have three preliminary observations to make\nbefore I proceed to the direct examination of this theory.\n\nIn the first place, this definition transgresses the first and most\nessential rules of logic. We must always define what is unknown by what\nis known. This is an elementary principle. What a man is, I know. To\nthink, to will, to enjoy, to hope, to fear, are functions of the mental\nlife. These words answer to clear ideas, because those ideas result\ndirectly from our personal consciousness. But what is the soul of a\nmonkey? The nature of animals is a mystery, one which is perhaps\nincapable of solution, and which, in all cases is wrapped in profound\ndarkness, because the animal appears to us an intermediate link between\nthe mechanism of nature and the functions of the spiritual life, which\nare the only two conceptions we have that are really clear and distinct.\nIn taking the monkey therefore as our point of departure for the\ndefinition of man, we are defining what is clear by what is obscure.\n\nMy second remark is this: If it is affirmed that there is but one\nspecies, including all the animals and man, so that man is only a monkey\nmodified, and the monkey, in its turn, an inferior animal modified;\nwhen once we have established the reality of man we arrive at this\nresult: all animals whatsoever are only inferior developments of\nhumanity, living foetuses which, without having come to their full\nterm, have nevertheless the faculty of living and reproducing\nthemselves. The animal then is an incomplete man; a theory which raises\ngreat difficulties, but which is more serious and more easy to\nunderstand than the doctrine which would have man to be a consummation\nof the monkey.\n\nIn fact,--and this is my third observation,--when the theory which I am\nexamining is adopted, it must be carried out to its consequences, and\nthe bearing of it clearly seen. Man, it is said, is the consummation of\nthe monkey. The monkey is an improvement upon some quadruped or other,\nand this quadruped is an improvement upon another, and so on. We must\ndescend, in an inevitable logical series, to the most elementary\nmanifestations of life, and thence, finally, to matter. If it is not\nadmitted that pure matter is a man in a state of torpor, it must be\nadmitted that man is a _melange_ of carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, azote,\nphosphorus--a _melange_ which has been brought little by little to\nperfection. Such is the final inference from the doctrine which we are\nexamining; and there are theorists who deduce it clearly. Now what is it\nthat goes on in the minds of these savants? When the object is to banish\nGod from nature, the creative Intelligence is resolved into thousands of\nages. When it is desired to get rid in man of the reality of mind, they\nseek to resolve the human intelligence into a long series of\nmodifications which have caused life to spring from matter, superior\nanimals from simpler organisms, and man from the animal. Do not allow\nyourselves to be caught in this trap. Maintain firmly, that, whatever\nthe degree of intelligence, of will, of spiritual essence, which may\nexist in animals, if that element is really found in them, it demands a\ncause, and cannot, without an enormous confusion of ideas, be regarded\nas a mere perfecting of matter. In fact, a thing in perfecting itself,\nrealizes continually more fully its own proper idea, and does not become\nanother thing. A perfect monkey would be of all monkeys the one which is\nmost a monkey, and would not be a man. But let us leave the animals in\nthe darkness in which they abide for our minds, and let us speak of what\nfor us is less obscure.\n\nOur spiritual existence is a fact; it is of all facts the one which is\nbest known to us; it is the fact without which no other fact would exist\nfor us. And whence proceeds our spirit? To this question, natural\nhistory has no answer. It is easy to see this, though we grant once\nagain to natural history, when made the most of by our adversaries, all\nthat it can pretend to claim. Suppose it proved, that in the historical\ndevelopment of nature, man has a monkey for his mother. I will grant it,\nand grant it quite seriously in order to ascertain what will be the\ninfluence of this hypothesis upon the problem on which we are engaged.\n\nIf all monkeys were fossils, and if we had a natural history, also\nfossil, setting forth to us the customs and habits of these animals; if\nthe savages that are said to be the nearest neighbors to monkeys were\nall fossils; we should find ourselves in presence of a progressive and\ncontinued development of beings, and, for an inattentive mind, all would\nbe easily explained by the slow and continued action of time. But this\nis not the case. All the elements of nature are before our eyes, from\ninorganic matter up to man. We do not see that time suffices for savages\nto become civilized, and still less for monkeys to become men. I was,\nin the spring of this year, in the _Jardin des plantes_ at Paris, musing\non the question which we are discussing, and I took a good look at the\nmonkeys. Come now, I said to myself, canst thou recognize them as thine\nancestors? The question was badly put. The monkeys are not our\nancestors, inasmuch as they are living at the same time with us; they\ncan only be our cousins, and it would seem that they are the eldest\nbranch, as they have best preserved the primitive type. But let us speak\nmore seriously. The races of monkeys have lived as long or longer than\nwe: it is neither time nor climate which has made men of them.\nRecollect, I pray you, that the words 'time' and 'progress' explain\nnothing. There must have occurred favorable circumstances to transform\nthe earth's substance into living cellules, and the living cellules into\nplants clearly marked, and into animals properly so called; and in the\nsame way there must have been a propitious circumstance to transform the\nmonkey into man. I think so, in fact; and this propitious circumstance\nwell deserves to be studied with attention.\n\nMan presents characteristics which distinguish him profoundly from the\nanimal races: no one disputes it. He possesses speech; he is capable of\nreligion; he exhibits the varied phenomena of civilization, while the\nanimals succeed one another generations after generations in the\nunrecorded obscurity of a life for ever the same. Suppose we admit that\nhuman phenomena presented themselves at first in a very elementary form;\nin rudiments of language and rudiments of religion,--although the\nhistorical sciences do not quite give this result:--still suppose the\ncase that at a given moment a branch of the monkey species presented the\ngerm, as little developed as you please, but real, of new phenomena. One\nvariety of the monkey species has been endowed with speech, has become\nreligious, capable of civilization, and the other varieties of the\nspecies have not offered the same characteristics, although they have\nhad the same number of ages in which to develop themselves. Observe well\nnow my process of reasoning. Remark attentively whether I oppose\ntheories to facts, whether I substitute oratorical declamations for\narguments. I grant the hypotheses best calculated, as commonly thought,\nto contradict my theses. I assume that natural history demonstrates by\nsolid proofs that the first man was carried in the bosom of a monkey;\nand I ask: What is the circumstance which set apart in the animal\nspecies a branch which presented new phenomena? What is the cause? That\nmonkey-author of our race which one day began to speak in the midst of\nhis brother-monkeys, amongst whom thenceforward he had no fellow; that\nmonkey, that stood erect in the sense of his dignity; that, looking up\nto heaven, said, My God! and that, retiring into himself, said: I!--that\nmonkey which, while the female monkeys continued to give birth to their\nyoung, had sons by the partner of his life and pressed them to his\nheart; that monkey--what shall we say of it? What climate, what soil,\nwhat regimen, what food, what heat, what moisture, what drought, what\nlight, what combination of phosphorus, what disengagement of\nelectricity, separated from the animal races, not only man, but human\nsociety? humanity with its combats, its falls, its risings again, its\nsorrows and its joys, its tears and its smiles; humanity with its arts,\nits sciences, its religion, its history in short, its history and its\nhopes of immortality? That monkey, what shall we say of it? Do you not\nsee that the breath of the Spirit passed over it, and that God said unto\nit: Behold, thou art made in mine image: remember now thy Father who is\nin heaven? Do you not see that though we grant everything to the extreme\npretensions of naturalists, the question comes up again whole and\nentire? When by dint of confusions and sophisms such theorists imagine\nthat they have extinguished the intelligence which radiates from nature,\nthat intelligence again confronts them in man, and there, as in an\nimpregnable fortress, sets all attacks at defiance. Mark then where lies\nthe real problem. Whether the eternal God formed the body of the first\nman directly from the dust of the earth; or whether, in the slow series\nof ages, He formed the body of the first man of the dust of the earth,\nby making it pass through the long series of animality--the question is\na grave one, but it is of secondary importance. The first question is to\nknow whether we are merely the ephemeral product of the encounter of\natoms, or whether there is in us an essence, a nature, a soul, a reality\nin short, with which may connect itself another future than the\ndissolution of the sepulchre; whether there remains another hope than\nannihilation as the term of our latest sorrows, or, for the aspirants\nafter fame, only that evanescent memory which time bears away with\neverything beside.\n\nThis is the question. Do not allow it to be put out of sight beneath\ndetails of physiology and researches of natural history, which can\nneither settle, nor so much as touch the problem. If therefore you fall\nin with any one of these philosophers of matter, bid him take this for\nall your answer: \"There is one fact which stands out against your theory\nand suffices to overthrow it: that fact is--myself!\" And since, to have\nthe better of materialism, it is sufficient to understand well what is\none thought of the mind, one throb of the spiritual heart, one utterance\nof the conscience,--add boldly with Corneille's Medea:\n\n\n     I,--I say,--and it is enough.\n\n\nIn fact, nature does not explain man, and to this conclusion has tended\nall that I have said to you to-day.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[97] _Harmonices mundi, libri quinque._\n\n[98] _Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica._\n\n[99]\n\n     The whole universe is full of His magnificence.\n     May this God be adored and invoked for ever!\n\n[100] _Le Rationalisme_, page 19.\n\n[101] _Force et Matiere_, page 262.\n\n[102] _Les Mondes Causeries astronomiques_ by Guillemin; see p. 122 (3rd\nedition), where Kepler is described as an intelligence \"penetrated by a\nprofound faith in nature and exalted by a noble pride.\" See also pages\n327 and 336.\n\n[103] The question discussed in these pages must not be confounded with\nthat of the relations between the science of nature and the documents of\nrevelation. Whether nature can be explained without God is one question.\nWhether geology is in accordance with the language of the book of\nGenesis is another question, as regards both its nature and its\nimportance. This latter subject does not come within the scope of these\nlectures. I will merely call attention to the fact, that if nature and\nthe sacred text are fixed elements, this is not the case with the\ninterpretations of theologians, and the results of geology. It is\ndifficult to pronounce upon the exact relation of two quantities more or\nless indeterminate.\n\n[104] In the writings of M. de Rougemont, if I am not mistaken.\n\n[105] _Systema naturae._\n\n[106] Ps. civ. 24.\n\n[107] _Biographie universelle._\n\n[108] _A. P. de Candolle_, by A. de la Rive, pp. 12 and 13.\n\n[109] M. Vaucher's principal title to scientific distinction is his\n_Histoire des conferves d'eau douce_, Geneve, an XI (1803), 4 deg..\n\n[110] _Comptes rendus de l'Academie des Sciences_ of 20 April, 1863,\npage 738.\n\n[111] Exeter Hall Lectures--_The Power of God in His Animal Creation_,\npamphlet in 12mo. This remarkable lecture contains a twofold\nprotest--against the blindness of those savants who fail to recognize\nthe presence of God in nature; and against the pretensions of those\ntheologians who attack the certain results of the study of nature,\nrelying upon texts more or less accurately interpreted.\n\n[112] _Chemistry applied to Agriculture and to Physiology_ (in German).\nSeventh edition. Introd. page 69.\n\n[113] Since these words were spoken, M. de la Rive has been named an\nassociated member of the Institute of France (Academy of Sciences), and\nthus elevated to the first of scientific dignities. It might be shown, I\nbelieve, that the greater number of the eight associates of the Academy\nof Sciences to be found in the world, make profession of their faith in\nGod the Creator, the Almighty and Holy One. The silence which others may\nhave preserved on the subject would, moreover, be no authority for\nconcluding that they do not share in beliefs and sentiments which they\nhave not had the occasion perhaps of publicly expressing.\n\n[114] _On the Origin of Species_, page 81. Fifth edition.\n\n[115] _On the Origin of Species_. The text is--\"the _necessary_ series\nof facts;\" but it would be to do the writer wrong to impute to him the\nidea that observation reveals to us what is _necessary_, in the\nphilosophical import of the word.\n\n[116] _On the Origin of Species._\n\n[117] Caro, _L'Idee de Dieu_, page 47.\n\n[118] _Force et Matiere_, page 181.\n\n[119] The Buechner proceeding is found again pretty exactly in _Les\nMondes_ of M. Amedee Guillemin. This writer affirms (page 60 of the\nthird edition) that science does not approach metaphysical questions;\nand asserts in the same page, ten lines further on, that astronomical\nexperience leads our reason to the idea of _the eternity of the\nuniverse_. After that, he may laugh, if he will, at _lovers of the\nabsolute_.\n\n[120] See in particular the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, passim.\n\n[121] S'enivrait en marchant du plaisir de la voir.\n\n[122] See the lecture above mentioned.\n\n[123] _Lettres sur les Etats-Unis d'Amerique_, by Lieutenant-Colonel\nFerri Pisani, page 400.--Letter of 25 Sept. 1861.\n\n[124] On the origin of species, in the _Archives des sciences de la\nBibliotheque universelle_, March, 1860.\n\n[125] Vous coulez des moucherons.\n\n[126] In his _Principes de philosophie zoologique_, a collection of\nanswers made by Geoffroy, in the discussions of the _Academie des\nSciences_, in 1830.\n\n[127] Voyons, Messieurs, le temps ne fait rien a l'affaire.\n\n[128]\n\n     Sur cent premiers peuples celebres,\n       J'ai plonge cent peuples fameux,\n     Dans un abime de tenebres\n       Ou vous disparaitrez comme eux.\n     J'ai couvert d'une ombre eternelle\n       Des astres eteints dans leur cours.\n     --Ah! par pitie, lui dit ma belle,\n       Vieillard, epargnez nos amours!\n\n[129] _Esprit des Lois_, Bk. I. chap. 1.\n\n[130] _Lecons sur l'homme_, by Carl Vogt (lectures delivered during the\nwinter of 1862-1863, at Neuchatel and at Chaux-de-Fonds), 1 vol. 8vo.\nParis, 1865.--_L'Homme et le Singe_, by Frederic de Rougemont, pamphlet,\n12mo. Neuchatel, 1863.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE V.\n\n_HUMANITY._\n\n(At Geneva, 1st. Dec., 1863.)\n\n\nGENTLEMEN,\n\nMan has need of God. If he be not fallen into the most abject\ndegradation, he does not succeed in extinguishing the instinct which\nleads him to inquire after his Creator. A false wisdom labors to still\nthe cravings which the truth alone can satisfy; but false wisdom remains\npowerless, and betrays itself continually by some outrageous\ncontradiction. Here is a curious example of this:\n\nIn a book which was famous in the last century, and which was called the\ngospel of atheism,[131] the Baron d'Holbach explains as follows the\nexistence of the universe: \"The universe, that vast assemblage of all\nthat exists, everywhere presents to our view only matter and\nmotion.--Nature is the grand whole which results from the assemblage of\ndifferent material substances, from their different combinations, and\nfrom the different motions which we see in the universe.\"[132] Here is a\nclear doctrine: all that exists, the soul included, is nothing but\nmatter in motion. I pass from the beginning to the end of the work, and\nI arrive at this conclusion: \"O nature! sovereign of all beings! and ye,\nher adorable daughters, virtue, reason, truth! be ye for ever our sole\ndivinities; to you it is that the incense and the homage of the earth\nare due.\"[133] If we try to translate this sort of hymn in accordance\nwith the express definitions of the author, we shall obtain the\nfollowing result: \"O matter in motion! sovereign of all material\nsubstances in motion! and ye, virtue, reason, truth, who are various\nnames of matter which moves, be ye the only divinities of that moving\nmatter which is ourselves.\" Yet this author was no blockhead. What then\npassed in his mind? He laid down the thesis of materialism: bodies in\nmotion are the only reality. But he is all the while a man. The need\nfor adoration is not destroyed in his soul, and he deceives himself. He\ndefines nature as consisting wholly of matter, and when he sets himself\nto worship it, he entirely forgets his definition. This is not on his\npart a piece of philosophical jugglery, but the manifestation of the\nreal condition of our nature, which is always giving the lie, in one\ndirection or another, to erroneous systems. The power of wholly\nmaintaining himself in error has not been granted to man. He who denies\nGod is always deifying something; and all worship which is not that of\nthe Eternal and Infinite Mind is stultified by glaring contradictions.\nHere is a recent example of this: We were not a little surprised a short\ntime since to see M. Ernest Renan deny clearly enough the immortality of\nour persons, and, in the opening of the very book in which this negation\nappears, to find him invoking the soul of his sister at rest with\nGod.[134] Elsewhere, the same writer says that the Infinite Being does\nnot exist, that absolute reason and absolute justice exist only in\nhumanity, and he concludes his exposition of these views by an\ninvocation of the Heavenly Father.[135] The Baron d'Holbach had put\neight hundred and thirty-nine pages between his materialistic definition\nof the universe and his invocation of nature. Now-a-days everything goes\nfaster; and M. Renan places but a few pages of the _Revue des Deux\nMondes_ between his denial of God and his prayer to the Heavenly Father.\nWith this difference, which is to the advantage of the writer of the\neighteenth century, the process is absolutely the same. The philosopher\ndeclares God to be an imaginary being, and the future life an illusion;\nbut the man protests, and, by a touching illusion of the heart, the man\nwho in his system of doctrine has neither God nor hope, finds that he\nhas a sister in the realms eternal, and a Father in the heavens. It is\nimpossible not to see, especially in literary works destined to a\nsuccess of fashion, the seductive influence of art, the precautions of\nprudence, the concessions made to public opinion; but we cannot wholly\nexplain the incredible contradictions of the Holbachs and Renans,\nwithout allowing full weight to that need for God which shows itself\neven in the farthest wanderings of human thought by sudden and abrupt\nreturns.\n\nThe illusion which deifies matter in motion is gross enough. It belongs\nonly to minds which Cicero called, in the aristocratic pride of a Roman\ngentleman, the plebeians of philosophy.[136] It requires, in fact, no\ngreat reflection to understand that truth, beauty, and goodness are\nneither atoms nor a certain movement of atoms. The attempt, which is to\nform the subject of our study to-day, that of deifying man, is a far\nmore subtle one. Let us first of all inquire into the origin of the\nstrange worship which humanity accords to itself.\n\nNature, considered separately from the beings which receive sensible\nimpressions from it, has neither heat nor light. In a world peopled by\nthe blind, light would have no name. If all men were entirely paralyzed\nas to their sensations, the idea of heat would not exist. Light and\nheat, regarded as existing in matter itself, without reference to\nsensitive organizations, are, in the opinion of our natural\nphilosophers, only determinate movements. In the same way, if nature\nwere without any spectator whatever, beauty would not exist; if there\nwere nowhere any intelligence, truth would no longer be. In the same way\nagain, if there were no wills, goodness, which is nothing else than the\nlaw of the will, would be a word deprived of all meaning. Beauty\nexpresses the object of the perceptions of the soul. Truth denotes the\nquality of the judgments of intelligences. Goodness (I speak of moral\ngoodness) expresses a certain direction of the free will. There exists\nno means of causing to proceed from nature, or from matter, the\nattributes of the spiritual being. This is only done by imaginary\ntransformations, by a course of arrant juggling. The flame does not feel\nits own heat, light does not see itself, the planets know nothing of the\nlaws of Kepler. Materialism is the result of a modesty wholly misplaced\nwhich leads man to forget himself, in order to attribute gratuitously to\nnature realities which exist only in spiritual beings connected with\nnature by a marvellous harmony. In order therefore to account for the\nuniverse, we must raise ourselves above the atom in motion, and\npenetrate into a higher world where truth, beauty, goodness become the\nobjects of thought. Truth, beauty, goodness conduct the mind to God,\ntheir eternal source. But there is a philosophy which endeavors to stop\nmidway in the ascent of the Divine ladder, and thinks to satisfy itself\nin the contemplation of the true, the beautiful, the good, without\nconnecting them with their cause. This philosophy considers the true,\nthe beautiful, the good, as ideas which exist by themselves, without a\nsupreme Spirit of which they are the manifestation. It has received, in\nconsequence, the name of idealism.\n\nTo conceive of ideas without a mind, ideas having an existence by\nthemselves, is a thing impossible; such a conception is expressed by\nwords which give back a hollow sound, because they contain nothing. We\nhave already stated this thesis; let us now confirm it by an example. A\nliterary Frenchman, M. Taine, would make us understand in what manner\nthe universe may be explained without reference to God, and by means of\na pure idea. Listen well, not to understand, but to make sure that you\ndo not understand: \"The universe forms a unique being, indivisible, of\nwhich all the beings are members. At the supreme summit of things, at\nthe highest point of the luminous and inaccessible ether, pronounces\nitself the eternal axiom; and the prolonged resounding of this creative\nformula composes, by its inexhaustible undulations, the immensity of the\nuniverse. Every form, every change, every movement, every idea is one of\nits acts.\"[137]\n\nM. Taine is a man of humor, and the burlesque has a place in his\nphilosophical writings; but in the words which I have just read to you\nhe seems to have intended seriously to expound the system which replaces\nGod by an idea. Try now to form a definite conception of this universe\ncomposed of the undulations of an axiom. Do you understand how an axiom\nundulates, and how the heavens and the earth are only the undulations of\nan axiom? Making all allowance for rhetoric and figures, do you\nunderstand what can be the acts of an axiom, and how an axiom\n_pronounces itself_ without being pronounced? You do not understand it,\nas neither do I. Such doctrines, then, as we have said, can only be the\nportion of a small number of thinkers who have lost, by dint of\nabstraction, the sentiment of reality. The ideas--truth, beauty,\ngood--will only exist for the common order of men, under such a system,\nin the human mind, where we have cognizance of them; and thenceforward,\nthe ideal, or God, is nothing else than the image of humanity which\ncontemplates itself in a sort of mirage. Thus it is that the adoration\nof man by man is disengaged from the high theories of idealism. Let us\nproceed to the examination of this worship, which is cried up\nnow-a-days in divers parts of the intellectual globe.\n\nI open the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, of the 15th February, 1861. As the\nauthor of the article I refer to[138] appears to admit \"that one\nassertion is not more true than another opposed to it,\"[139] we will not\nbe so simple as to ask whether he adopts the opinions which he\npropounds. He presents to us, in a rapid sketch, the principal\ntendencies of the modern mind. The modern mind is here characterized by\none of its declared partisans; you will not take therefore for a wicked\ncaricature the picture which he puts before us. Here then are the\nthoughts of the modern mind: \"There is only one infinite, that of our\ndesires and our aspirations, that of our needs and our efforts.[140] The\ntrue, the beautiful, the just are perpetually occurring; they are for\never in course of self-formation, because they are nothing else than the\nhuman mind, which, in unfolding itself, finds and knows itself\nagain.\"[141] This is only the French translation of a saying celebrated\nin Germany: \"God is not: He becomes.\" What we call God is the human\nmind. What was there at the beginning of things? The human mind, which\ndid not know itself. What will there be in the end? The human mind,\nwhich, in unfolding itself, will have come to know itself, and will\nadore itself as the supreme God. If this be indeed the final object of\nthe universe, it appears that, in the opinion of these philosophers, the\nconsummation of all things must be near. Once that humanity, faithful to\ntheir doctrine, shall have pronounced the lofty utterance, \"I am God,\nand there is none else,\" the world will no longer have any reason for\nexisting.\n\nSuch is the system of which we have to follow out the consequences. Let\nus take as our point of comparison the old ideas which we are urged to\nabandon.\n\nWe usually explain human destinies by the concurrence of two causes,\ninfinitely distinct, since the one is creative and the other created,\nbut both of which we hold for real: man, and God. Humanity has received\nfrom its Author the free power which we call will, and the law of that\nwill which we name conscience. The law proceeds from God, the liberty\nproceeds from God; but the acts of the created will, when it violates\nits law and revolts against its Author, are the creation of the\ncreature. God is the eternal source of good, and liberty is a good; but\nGod is not the source of evil, which is distinctly a revolt against Him,\nthe abuse of the first of His gifts. Together with will, man has\nreceived understanding, and gives himself to the search after truth.\nTruth is the object of the understanding, its Divine law. Error is a\ndeviation from the law of the understanding, as evil is a deviation from\nthe law of the will. Lastly, with will and understanding, man has\nreceived the faculty of feeling. This faculty applies itself to the\nworld of bodies, from which we receive pain or pleasure. But our faculty\nof feeling does not stop there. Above the animal life, the mind has\nenjoyments which are proper to it, and the object of which is beauty.\nBeauty is not only in nature and in works of art, it is everywhere, in\nwhatever attracts our love. The sciences are beautiful, and the harmony\nof the truths which are discovered in their order and mutual dependence\ncauses us to experience a feeling similar to that produced by the most\ndelightful music. Virtue is beautiful; it shines in the view of the\nconscience with the purest brightness, and, as was said by one of the\nancients, if it could reveal itself to our eyes in a sensible form, it\nwould excite in our souls feelings of inexpressible love. Vice is ugly\nwhen once stripped of the delusive fascination of the passions; the\nvicious excesses of the lower nature are ugly and repulsive as soon as\nthe intoxication is over. Error is ugly too; there are no beautiful\nerrors but those which contain a larger portion of truth than the\nprosaic verities, which are nothing else than falsehoods put in a\nspecious way. Beauty therefore is the law of our feelings, as truth is\nthe law of our thought, and good the law of our will. We will not\ninquire now what secret relations shall one day bring together in an\nindissoluble unity of light, the good, the true, and the beautiful, and\nin a unity of darkness, evil, deformity, and falsehood. Let it suffice\nto have pointed out how a threefold aspiration leads man to God, under\nthe guidance of the conscience, the understanding, and the feelings; and\nthat a threefold rebellion estranges him from God, by sinking him into\nthe dark regions of deformity, error, and evil. Humanity has therefore a\nlaw; it has been endowed with liberty, but that a liberty of which the\nlegitimate end is determined. It advances towards this end, or it\nswerves from it. There is a rule above its acts. The thing as it is may\nnot be the thing as it ought to be; rebellion is not obedience, and\ngood is not evil.\n\nAll these consequences are included in the idea of creation. The\nstruggle between two opposite principles, a struggle which sums up human\ndestiny, is a fact of which each one of us can easily assure himself in\nhis own person. What will happen when man, sensible of the law of his\nnature, and conscious of this struggle, proceeds to encounter humanity?\nEach one of us carries humanity in his own bosom. But humanity, the\ncharacter of man which is common to us, and which makes the spiritual\nunity of our species, is found to be altered by the influence of places,\ntimes, and circumstances. Our reason is encumbered by prejudices of\nbirth and education, and by such as we have ourselves created in our\nminds in the exercise of our will. Our sense of beauty is vitiated and\nnarrowed by local influences and habits. Our conscience is likewise\nsubjected to influences which impair its free manifestation. Every one\nneeds to enlarge his horizon. By seeking occasions of intercourse with\nour fellows, we shall learn to discriminate true and eternal beauty in\nthe diversity of its manifestations; we shall distinguish the truth from\nthe individual prepossessions of our own minds; good and evil,\ndisengaged from the narrownesses of habit, will appear to us in their\nreal and enduring nature. Our taste will be formed, our conscience\npurified, our mind enlarged; we shall more and more become men, in the\nhigh and full acceptation of the term. In order that the meeting\ntogether of the individual and of humanity may produce such fruits, God\nmust dwell continually in the sanctuary of the conscience. The inner\nlight is kindled in the intercourse of the soul with its Creator; it is\nafterwards brightened and nurtured by the soul's intercourse with the\ntraces of God which humanity reveals. But this light makes manifest\nwithin us, and without us, great darkness. We have no right to abandon\nourselves to every spectacle which strikes our view. If, in presence of\nwhat is passing in the world, we are tempted to regard the prosperity of\nthe wicked with cowardly envy; if we would fill up, for the satisfaction\nof our evil desires, the abyss which separates the holy from the impure,\nthe inner voice lifts itself up and cries to us: \"Woe! woe to them who\ncall evil good, and good evil.\"[142] God is our Master, even as He is\nour good and our hope. The fact of the revolts of humanity can have no\neffect against His sovereign will. Soldiers in the service of the\nAlmighty, life is for us a conflict, and duty imposes on us a combat.\n\nSuch, Sirs, is the explanation of our destinies, an old, and, if you\nlike, a vulgar one. Let us now give our attention to the doctrine which\ndeifies humanity, and follow out its consequences. Humanity carries\nwithin its bosom the idea of truth, the love of beauty, the sense of\ngood. What does it need more? These noble aspirations mark for it the\nend of its efforts. What will be wanting to a life regulated by duty,\nenlightened by truth, ennobled by art? What will be wanting to such a\nlife? Nothing, or everything. Nothing, if the search after good, truth,\nand beauty leads to God. Everything, if it be sought to carry it on\nwithout any reference to God, because from the moment that man desires\nto be the source of light to himself, the light will be changed into\ndarkness, as we said at the beginning of this lecture. Put God out of\nview, and good, beauty, and truth will disappear; while you will see\nproduced the decline of art, the dissolution of thought in scepticism,\nthe absolute negation of morality. Let us consider with the attention\nit deserves, and in contemporary examples, this sad and curious\nspectacle.\n\nI open a treatise by M. Taine. The English historian Macaulay speaks of\nliterary men who \"have taken pains to strip vice of its odiousness, to\nrender virtue ridiculous, to rank adultery among the elegant fashions\nand obligatory achievements of a man of taste.\" The honest Englishman\ntakes the liberty to judge and to condemn men who have made so\npernicious a use of their talents. This pretension to make the\nconscience speak is in the eyes of the French man of letters a gothic\nprejudice. Listen how he expresses himself on the subject: \"Criticism in\nFrance has freer methods.--When we try to give an account of the life,\nor to describe the character, of a man, we are quite willing to consider\nhim simply as an object of painting or of science.... We do not judge\nhim, we only wish to represent him to the eyes and to set him\nintelligibly before the reason. We are curious inquirers and nothing\nmore. That Peter or Paul was a knave matters little to us, that was the\nbusiness of his contemporaries, who suffered from his vices--At this day\nwe are out of his reach, and hatred has disappeared with the danger--I\nexperience neither aversion nor disgust; I have left these feelings at\nthe gate of history, and I taste the very deep and very pure pleasure of\nseeing a soul act according to a definite law--.\"[143] You understand,\nGentlemen: the distinction between good and evil, as that between error\nand truth; these are old sandals which must be put off before entering\ninto the temple of history; and the man of the nineteenth century, if he\nhas taste and information, is merely an historian, and nothing more. The\nsacred emotion which generous actions produce in us, the indignation\nstirred in us by baseness and cruelty, are childish emotions which are\nto disappear in order that we may be free to contemplate vice and virtue\nwith a pleasure always equal, very deep, and very pure. We have not here\nthe aberration of a young and ill-regulated mind, but the doctrine of a\nschool. I open again the _Revue des Deux Mondes_, and there I encounter\nthe theory of which M. Taine has made the application: \"We no longer\nknow anything of morals, but of manners; of principles, but of facts. We\nexplain everything, and, as has been said, the mind ends _by approving\nof all that it explains_. Modern virtue is summed up in\ntoleration.[144]--Immense novelty! That which is, has for us the right\nto be.[145]--In the eyes of the modern savant, all is true, all is right\nin its own place. The place of each thing constitutes its truth.\"[146]\n\nI cut short the enumeration of these enormities. All rule has\ndisappeared, all morality is destroyed; there is no longer any\ndifference between right and fact, between what is and what ought to be.\nAnd what is the real account to give of all this? It is as follows:\nHumanity is the highest point of the universe; above it there is\nnothing; humanity is God, if we consent to take that sacred name in a\nnew sense. How then is it to be judged? In the name of what rule? since\nthere is no rule: in the name of what law? since there is no law. All\njudgment is a personal prejudice, the act of a narrow mind. We do not\njudge God, we simply recount His dealings; we accept all His acts, and\nrecord them with equal veneration. All science is only a history, and\nthe first requisite in a historian is to reduce to silence his\nconscience and his reason, as sorry and deceitful exhibitions of his\npetty personality, in order to accept all the acts of the\nhumanity-deity, and establish their mutual connection. The deification\nof the human mind is the justification of all its acts, and, by a direct\nconsequence, the annihilation of all morality. Let us look more in\ndetail at the origin and development of these notions.\n\nThe individual placing himself before humanity is to accept everything:\nthis is the disposition recommended to us, in the name of the modern\nmind. Good and evil are narrow measures which minds behind the age\npersist, ridiculously enough, in wishing to apply to things. \"We no\nlonger transform the world to our image by bringing it to our standard;\n_on the contrary, we allow ourselves to be modified and fashioned by\nit_.\"[147] The individual goes therefore to meet humanity without any\ninner rule: he gives himself up, he abandons himself to the spectacle of\nfacts. But the world is large, and history is long. Even those who spend\ntheir whole life in nothing else than in satisfying their curiosity,\ncannot see and know everything. To what then shall be directed that\nvague look, equally attracted to all points for want of any fixed rule?\nAt what shall it stop? It will rest on that which shines most\nbrilliantly, like a moth attracted by light. Now, nothing shines more\nbrightly than success; nothing more solicits the attention. The\nglorification of success is the first and most infallible consequence of\nmoral indifference. In leaving ourselves to be fashioned by the world\ninstead of bringing it to our standard, we shall begin by according our\nesteem to victory. This philosophy is come to us from Germany. It was\nset forth on one occasion, in France, with great _eclat_, by the\nbrilliant eloquence of a man who has rendered signal services to\nphilosophy, and whose entire works must not be judged of by the single\nparticular which I am about to mention. In the year 1829, M. Cousin was\ndeveloping at the Sorbonne the meaning of these verses of La Fontaine,\nwhich introduce the fable of the Wolf and the Lamb:\n\n\n     La raison du plus fort est toujours la meilleure:\n         Je vais le montrer tout a l'heure.\n\n\nHe had written as the programme of one of his lectures: _Morality of\nVictory_. Now see how he justified this surprising title: \"I have\nabsolved victory as necessary and useful; I now undertake to absolve it\nas just in the strictest sense of the word. Men do not usually see in\nsuccess anything else than the triumph of strength, and an honorable\nsympathy draws us to the side of the vanquished; I hope I have shown\nthat since there must always be a vanquished side, and since the\nvanquished side is always that which ought to be so, to accuse the\nconqueror is to take part against humanity, and to complain of the\nprogress of civilization. We must go farther; we must prove that the\nvanquished deserved to be so, that the conqueror not only serves the\ninterests of civilization, but that he is better, more moral than the\nvanquished, and that it is on that account he is the conqueror.... It is\ntime that the philosophy of history should place at its feet the\ndeclamations of philanthropy.\"[148]\n\nThese words are worth considering. When Brennus the Gaul was having the\ngold weighed which he exacted from the vanquished Romans, he threw his\nheavy sword into the balance, exclaiming, _Vae Victis!_ Woe to the\nconquered! He simply meant to say that he was the stronger, and did not\nforesee that a Gaul of the nineteenth century, availing himself of the\nlabors of learned Germany, would demonstrate that being the stronger he\nwas on that very account the more just. But we must not wander too far\nfrom our subject.\n\nWhen the spectacle of the world is freely indulged in without any\napplication to it of the measure of the conscience, what first strikes\nthe view is success. It is necessary therefore to begin with rendering\nglory to success by declaring victory good. Now, mark well here the\nconflict of the old notions with the so-called modern mind. From the old\npoint of view, victory in the issue belongs to good, because while man\nis tossed in strife and tumult, God is leading him on; but the success\nof good is realized by conflict, and the victory is often reached only\nafter a long series of defeats. There are bad triumphs and impious\nsuccesses. What is proposed to us is, to put aside the rule of our own\njudgments, and to declare that victory is good in itself. The old point\nof view, that of the conscience, does not surrender without an energetic\nresistance; and that resistance shows itself in the very words of M.\nCousin. His thesis is, that all victory is just. His intention is\ntherefore to _approve_ victory. Why does he say _absolve_? it is the\nterm which he employs. Since the matter in question is to absolve\nvictory, it is placed on trial. It is accused of being, like fortune\nand fame, at one time on the side of good and justice, at another on the\nside of injustice and evil. Which then is the party accused? Victory.\nWho is the advocate? An eloquent professor. Who finally is the accuser?\nDo you not see? It is the human conscience; the conscience which\nprotests in the soul of the orator against the theory of which he is\nenamoured, and which forces him to say _absolve_ when he should say\n_glorify_. And in fact the choice must be made: either to glorify\nvictory, by treading under foot that narrow conscience which sometimes\nranks itself with Cato on the side of the vanquished; or to glorify\nconscience by impeaching the victories which outrage it.\n\nIt is not sufficient, however, to sacrifice the conscience in order to\nrescue from embarrassment the philosophy of success. It strikes on other\nrocks also. The same causes are by turns victorious and vanquished, and\nit is hard to make men understand that, in conflicts in which their\ndearest affections are engaged, they must beforehand, and in all cases,\ntake part with the strongest. It will be in vain for the philosopher to\nsay that the Swiss of Morgarten were right, for that they beat the\nAustrians; but that the heroes of Rotenthurm were greatly in the wrong,\nbecause, crushed without being vanquished, they were obliged to yield to\nnumbers, and leave at last their country's soil to be trodden by the\nstranger;--the children of old Switzerland will find it hard to admit\nthis doctrine. Even in France, in that nation so accustomed to encircle\nits soldiers' brows with laurel, this difficulty has risen up in the way\nof M. Cousin. Beranger, when asked for a souvenir of Waterloo,\n\n\n     Replied, with drooping eyelid, tear-bedewed:\n     Never that name shall sadden verse of mine.[149]\n\n\nBut philosophy would be worth little if it had not at its disposal more\nextensive resources than those of a song-writer. M. Cousin therefore\nlooked the difficulty in the face. Victory is always good. But how shall\nyoung Frenchmen be made to hear this with regard to that signal defeat\nof the armies of France? Listen: \"It is not populations which appear on\nbattle-fields, but ideas and causes. So at Leipzig and at Waterloo two\ncauses came to the encounter, the cause of paternal monarchy and that of\nmilitary democracy. Which of them carried the day, Gentlemen? Neither\nthe one nor the other. Who was the conqueror and who the conquered at\nWaterloo? Gentlemen, there were none conquered. (_Applause._) No, I\nprotest that there were none: the only conquerors were European\ncivilization and the map. (_Unanimous and prolonged applause._)\"[150]\n\nTo make the youth of Paris applaud at the remembrance of Waterloo is\nperhaps one of the most brilliant triumphs of eloquence which the annals\nof history record. But this rhetorical success is not a triumph of\ntruth. There were those who were conquered at Waterloo; and, to judge by\nwhat has been going on for some time past in Europe, it would seem that\nthose who were conquered are bent on taking their revenge. We may infer\nfrom these facts that all triumphs are not good, since truth may be for\na moment overcome by a false philosophy tricked out in the deceitful\nadornments of eloquence.\n\nBut let us admit, whatever our opinion on the subject, that the Waterloo\nrock has been passed successfully; we have not yet pointed out the main\ndifficulty which rises up in the way of this system. If victory is\ngood, it seems at first sight that defeat is bad. But defeat is the\nnecessary condition of victory; and being the condition of good, it\nseems therefore that it also is good; and the mind comes logically to\nthis conclusion: \"Victory is good;--defeat is good, since it is the\ncondition of victory;--all is good.\" We set out with the glorification\nof victory, and, lo! we are arrived at the glorification of fact. All\nthat is, has the right to be; in the eyes of the modern savant whatever\nis, is right. M. Cousin laid down the principle; he laid it down in a\ngeneral manner in his philosophical eclecticism, of which it was easy to\nmake use, as has in fact been done, in a sense contrary to his real\nintentions. Our young critics, wasting an inheritance of which they do\nnot appear always to recognize the origin, are doing nothing else, very\noften, than catching as they die away the last vibrations of that\nsurpassing eloquence.\n\nIn the eyes of the modern savant, everything is right and good: such is\nthe axiom for which the labors of more than one modern historian had\nprepared us. We are to seek for the relation of facts one to another,\nthat is to explain; and all that we explain, we must approve. Let us\nfollow out this thought in a few examples.\n\nIt was necessary that Louis XVI should be beheaded and the guillotine\npermanently set up, in order to manifest the result of the disorders of\nLouis XIV, of the shameful excesses of Louis XV, and of the licentious\nimmorality of French society. It was necessary for Louis XIV to be an\nadulterer, Louis XV a debauchee, the clergy corrupt, and the nobility\ndepraved, to bring about the shocks of the revolution. The facts\nmutually correspond; I explain, and I approve. In the eyes of the modern\nsavant everything is right.\n\nIt was necessary that Buonaparte should throw the _Corps legislatif_ out\nof the window, that he should let loose his armies upon Europe, and\nleave thousands of dead bodies in the snows of Russia, in order to end\nthe revolution, and extinguish the restless ardor of the French. It\nneeded the massacres of September, the gloomy days of the Terror, the\nanarchy of the period of the Directory, to throw dismayed France into\nthe arms of the crowned soldier who was to carry to so high a pitch her\nglory and her influence. The facts correspond; I explain, and I approve.\nIn the eyes of the modern savant, everything is right.\n\nI consider the character of Nero. I take him at the commencement of his\nreign, when, being forced to sign the death-warrant of a criminal, he\nexclaimed--\"Would I were unable to write!\" And then again I regard him\nafter he has perpetrated acts such that to apply his name in future ages\nto the cruellest of tyrants shall appear to them a cruel injury. What\nhas taken place in the interval? The development of his natural\ncharacter, Agrippina, Narcissus ... I understand the play of all the\nsprings which have made a monster. As I am out of his clutches, my\ndetestation vanishes with the danger. \"I taste the very deep and very\npure pleasure of seeing a mind act according to a definite law.\" I\nunderstand, I explain, I approve. In the eyes of the modern savant,\neverything is right.\n\nIt would be impossible, Gentlemen, to pursue this reasoning to its\nextreme limits without offending against the commonest decency. We\nshould have to descend into blood and mire, continuing to declare the\nwhile that everything is right. I pause therefore, and leave the rest to\nyour imaginations. Open the most dismal pages of history. Choose out the\nacts which inspire the most vivid horror and disgust, the blackest\nexamples of ingratitude, the meanest instances of cowardice, the cases\nof most refined cruelty, and the most hideous debaucheries: thence let\nyour thoughts pass to facts which bedew the eyelid with the tear of\ntenderest emotion, to the cases of most heroic self-devotion, to\nsacrifices the most humble in their greatness; and then try to apply the\nrule of the modern savant, and to say that all this is equally right and\ngood, and that whatever is has the right to be. Open the book of your\nown heart. Think of one of those base temptations which assault the best\nof us, one of those thoughts which raise a blush in solitude; then think\nof the best, the purest, the most disinterested of the feelings which\nhave ever been given to your soul; and try again to apply the rule of\nthe modern savant, and to affirm that all this is equally good, and that\nall that is has the right to be. I know very well that in general these\ndoctrines are applied to things looked at in the mass, and to the\nfar-off past of history; but this is a poor subterfuge for the defenders\nof these monstrous theses. Things viewed in the mass are only the\nassemblage of things viewed in detail. If the distinction of good and\nevil do not exist for general facts, how should it exist for particular\nfacts? And how can we apply to the past a rule which we refuse to apply\nto the present, seeing that the present is nothing else than the past\nof the future, and that the facts of our own time are matter for history\nto our posterity? These, I repeat, are but vain subterfuges. If humanity\nis always adorable, it is so in the faults of the meanest of men as in\nthe splendid sins of the magnates of the earth; it is so to-day as it\nwas thirty centuries ago; the god in growing old does not cease to be\nthe same.\n\nWhen the mind is engaged in these pernicious ways, the spring of the\nmoral life is broken, and the practical consequence is not long in\nappearing. The philosophers of success, having become the philosophers\nof the _fait accompli_, accept all and endure all; but in another sense\nthan that in which charity accepts all, that it may transform all by the\npower of love. It is the morality of Philinte:\n\n\n     I take men quietly, and as they are:\n     And what they do I train my soul to bear.[151]\n\n\nThese instructions are not very necessary. There will always be people\nenough found ready to applaud victory, and to fall in with the _fait\naccompli_. But is it not sad to see men of mind, men of heart too,\nperhaps, making themselves the theorists of baseness, and the\nphilosophers of cowardice?\n\nThere is still more to be said. From the glorification of success the\nmind passes necessarily, as we have just seen, to the glorification\nalike of all that is. It would appear at first sight that the adept in\nthe doctrine must find himself in a condition of indifference with\nregard to what prejudiced men continue to call good and evil. This\nindifference however is only apparent. When it is granted that nothing\nis evil, the part of good disappears in the end. There had been formed\nin ancient Rome, under pretence of religion, a secret society, which had\nas its fundamental dogma the aphorism that _nothing is evil_.[152] The\nmembers of the society did not practise good and evil, it appears, with\nequal indifference, for the magistrates of the republic took alarm, and\nsmothered, by a free employment of death and imprisonment, a focus of\nmurders, violations, false witness, and forged signatures. This fact\nreveals, with ominous clearness, a movement of thought on the nature of\nwhich it is easy to speculate.\n\nWhen man casts a vague glance over the world, extinguishing the while\nthe inner light of conscience; when he resigns himself to the things he\ncontemplates without applying to them any standard, what first strikes\nhis attention, as we have said before, is success. And what next?\nScandal. Nothing comes more into view than scandal. In a vast city,\nthousands of young men gain their livelihood laboriously, and devote\nthemselves to the good of their families: no one speaks of them. A\nlibertine loses other men's money at play, and blows out his brains: all\nthe city knows it. Honest women live in retirement; the king's\nmistresses form the subject of general conversation. Crime and baseness\nhide themselves; but up to the limits of what the world calls infamy,\nevil delights in putting itself forward, because _eclat_ and noise\nsupply the means of deadening the conscience; while, as regards the\ngrand instincts of charity, it has been well said that--\"the obscure\nacts of devotedness are the most magnificent.\" The poor and wretched\nshed tears in obscurity over benefits done secretly, while folly loves\nto display its glittering spangles, and shakes its bells in the public\nsquares. There is in each one of us more evil than we think; but there\nis in the world more good than is commonly known. There are concealed\nvirtues which only show themselves to the eye of the faith which looks\nfor them, and of the attention which discovers them. Bethink you,\nespecially, how the laws of morality set at defiance appear again\ntriumphant in the sorrows of repentance; those laws have their hour, and\nthat hour is usually a silent one. Let a poet of genius defile his works\nby the impure traces of a life spent in dissipation, and his brow shall\nshine in the sight of all with the twofold splendor of success and of\nscandal. But if, stretched on a bed of pain, he renders a tardy but\nsincere homage to the law which he has violated, to the truth which he\nhas ignored, his voice will often be confined to the sick chamber; his\ncompanions in debauchery and infidelity will mount guard perhaps around\nhis dwelling, in order to prevent the public from learning that their\nfriend is a _defaulter_. The ball and the theatre make a noise and\nattract observation; but men turn their eyes from hospitals, those\nabodes in which, in the silence of sickness, or amidst the dull cries of\npain, there germinate so many seeds of immortality. Yes, Sirs, evil is\nmore apparent than good. The violations of the divine law have more\n_eclat_ than penitence. And what is the consequence? The man who\nabandons himself to the spectacle of the world, and who takes that\nspectacle for the rule of his thoughts, will see the world under a false\naspect, and, in his estimation, evil will have more advantage over good\nthan it has in reality. It will appear to him altogether dominant, and\nwill thenceforward become his rule. From the glorification of success,\nwe passed to the glorification of fact; from the glorification of fact,\nwe arrive at last at the glorification of evil. We have seen how is\nillustrated the morality of victory. In the same current of ideas, a\nbook famous now-a-days, and quite full of outrages to the conscience,\nsupplies us with illustrations of the morality of falsehood. M. Ernest\nRenan, in his explanation of Christianity, has applied, point after\npoint, the theory which I have just set forth to you. In order to\nestimate the grand movements of the human mind, he frees himself from\nthe vulgar prejudices which make up the ordinary morals, and abandons\nhimself to the impression of the spectacle which he contemplates. Jesus\nhad a success without parallel. This success was based on charlatanism;\nand it is habitually so. To lead the nations by deceiving them is the\nlesson of history, and the good rule to follow. We find falsehood\nfortunate as matter of fact, we explain it, we approve it.\n\nWhither then are we bound, under the guidance of modern science? An\nirresistible current is drawing us on, and causing us to leave the\nmorals of Philinthe in our rear. We are coming to those which Racine has\nengraven in immortal traits in the person of Mathan. When once\nconscience is put aside, all means are good in order to succeed; and the\nexperience of the world teaches us that, to succeed, the worst means are\noften the best.\n\nIt is not only at the theatre that such lessons are received; they come\nout but too commonly from the ordinary dealings of life. Set a young man\nface to face with the world as it exhibits itself, and tell him to give\nhimself up to what he sees, to let himself be fashioned by life. He will\nsoon come to know that strict probity is a virtue of the olden times,\nchastity a fantastic excellence, and conscientious scruples an honorable\nsimplicity. Evil will become in his eyes the ordinary rule of life. When\nthe socialist Proudhon wrote that celebrated sentence, \"Property is\nrobbery,\" there arose an immense outcry. Ought there not to arise a\nlouder outcry around a theory which arrives by a fatal necessity at this\nconsequence: \"Evil is good\"?\n\nBut do these doctrines exercise any influence for the perversion of\npublic morals? Much; their influence is disastrous. And do the men who\nprofess them believe them, taking the word 'believe' in its real and\ndeep meaning? No; they often do mischief which they do not mean to do,\nand do not see that they do. They are intoxicated with a bad philosophy,\nand intoxication renders blind. It is easy to prove that these\noptimists, who in theory find that everything is right, are perpetually\ncontradicting themselves in practice. Address yourselves to one of them,\nand say to him: \"Your doctrine is big with immorality. You do not\nyourself believe it; and when you pretend to believe it, you lie.\" This\nman who tolerates everything will not tolerate your freedom of speech.\nHe will get angry, and, according to the old doctrines, he will have the\nright to be so, for insult is an evil. Then say to him: \"Here you are,\nit seems to me, in contradiction with your system. Everything is right;\nthe vivacity of my speech therefore is good. All that is has the right\nto be; my indignation is therefore a legitimate fact, and it appears to\nme that yours cannot be so unless you allow (an admission which would be\ncontrary to your system) that mine is not so.\" If you have to do with a\nsensible man, he will begin to laugh. If you have met with a blockhead,\nhe will be more angry than ever. This contradiction comes out in every\npage, and in a more serious manner, in the writings of our optimists.\nOne cannot read them with attention, without meeting incessantly with\nthe protest of their moral nature against the despotism of a false mode\nof reasoning. The man is at every moment making himself heard, the man\nwho has a heart, a conscience, a reason, and who contradicts the\nphilosopher without being aware of it. Contradictions these, honorable\nto the writer, but dangerous for the reader, because they serve to\ninvest with brilliant colors doctrines which in themselves are hideous.\n\nNo, Gentlemen, it is impossible to succeed in adoring humanity,\npreserving the while the least consistency of reasoning. In vain men\nwish to accept everything, to tolerate everything; in vain they wish to\nimpose silence on the inner voice: that voice rebels against the\noutrage, and its revolt declares itself in the most manifest\ncontradictions. The Humanity-God is divided, and the affirmation--\n\"Everything is right\"--will continue false as long as there shall be\nupon the earth a single conscience unsilenced, as long as there shall be\nin a single heart\n\n\n               . . . . . that mighty hate\n     Which in pure souls vice ever must create;[153]\n\n\nthat hatred which is nothing else than the indirect manifestation of the\nsacred love of goodness.\n\nThe doctrine that all is equally good, equally divine, in the\ndevelopment of humanity, explains nothing, because humanity, torn by a\nprofound struggle, condemns its own acts, and protests against its\ndegradations. It cries aloud to itself that there are principles above\nfacts, a moral law superior to the acts of the will; and all the petty\nclamors of a deceitful and deceived philosophy cannot stifle that clear\nvoice. Not only do these doctrines explain nothing, they do not even\nsucceed in expressing themselves; language fails them. \"Everything is\nright and good.\" What will these words mean, from the time there is no\nlonger any rule of right? How is it possible to approve, when we have\nno power to blame? The idea of good implies the idea of evil; the\nopposition of good and evil supposes a standard applied to things, a law\nsuperior to fact. He who approves of everything may just as well despise\neverything. But contempt itself has no longer any meaning, if esteem is\na word void of signification. We must say simply that all is as it is,\nand abandon those terms of speech which conscience has stamped with its\nown superscription. We must purify the dictionary, and consign to the\nhistory of obsolete expressions such terms as good, evil, esteem,\ncontempt, vice, virtue, honor, infamy, and the like. The doctrine which,\nto be consistent with itself, ought to reduce us to a kind of stupid\nindifference, does such violence to human nature that its advocates are\nincapable of enunciating it without contradicting themselves by the very\nwords they make use of.\n\nAll these extravagances are the inevitable consequence of the adoration\nof humanity. The Humanity-God has no rule superior to itself. Whatever\nit does must be put on record merely, and not judged: it is the\nimmolation of the conscience. But on what altar shall we stretch this\ngreat victim? Shall we sacrifice it to pure reason, to reason\ndisengaged from all prejudice? Allow me to claim your attention yet a\nfew minutes longer.\n\nThe Humanity-God in all its acts escapes the judgment of the conscience.\nWhat measure shall we be able to apply to its thoughts? None. The God\nwhich cannot do evil, cannot be mistaken either. For the modern savant\nall is true, for exactly the same reason that all is right. The human\nmind unfolds itself in all directions; all these unfoldings are\nlegitimate; all are to be accepted equally by a mind truly emancipated.\nFurnished with this rule, I make progress in the history of philosophy.\nThe Greek Democritus affirms that the universe is only an infinite\nnumber of atoms moving as chance directs in the immensity of space: I\nrecord with veneration this unfolding of the human mind. The Greek Plato\naffirms that truth, beauty, good, like three eternal rays, penetrate the\nuniverse and constitute the only veritable realities: I record with\nequal veneration this other unfolding of the human mind. I pass to\nmodern times. Descartes tells me that thought is the essence of man, and\nthat reason alone is the organ of truth. Helvetius tells me that man is\na mass of organized matter which receives its ideas only from the\nsenses. These two theses are equally legitimate, and I admit them both.\nI quit now philosophers by profession to address myself to those\nliterary journalists who deal out philosophy in crumbs for the use of\n_feuilletons_ and reviews. There I find all possible notions in the most\nastounding of jumbles. \"The villain has his apologist; the good man his\ncalumniator.... Marriage is honorable, so is adultery. Order is preached\nup, so is riot, so is assassination, provided it be politic.\"[154] I\ncontemplate with a calm satisfaction, with a very deep and very pure\npleasure, these various unfoldings of the human mind; I place them all,\nwith the same feelings of devotion, in the pantheon of the intelligence.\nI cannot do otherwise, inasmuch as there is no rule of truth superior to\nthe thoughts of men, and because the human mind is the supreme,\nuniversal, and infallible intelligence.\n\nBut will our mind be able to entertain together two directly opposite\nassertions? Will contradiction no longer be the sign of error? We must\ncome to this; we must acknowledge that the modern mind, breaking with\nsuperannuated traditions, has proclaimed the principle \"that one\nassertion is not more true than an opposite assertion.\" We must proclaim\nthat the thinker has not to disquiet himself \"about the _real_\ncontradictions into which he may fall; and that a true philosopher has\nabsolutely nothing to do with consistency.\"[155] The fear of\nself-contradiction may be excused in Aristotle and Plato, in St. Anselm\nand St. Thomas, in Descartes and Leibnitz. These writers were still\nwrapped in the swaddling clothes of old errors; the light of the\nnineteenth century had not shone upon their cradles; but the epoch of\nenfranchisement is come. These things, Gentlemen, are printed\nnow-a-days; they are printed at Paris, one of the metropolises of\nthought!\n\nMark well whereabouts we are. We must admit--what? that all is true.\nBut, if all is true, there is nothing true, just as if all is good,\nthere is nothing good. There are thoughts in men's heads; to make\nhistory of them is an agreeable pastime; but there is no truth. We must\nnot say that two contradictory propositions are equally true; that\nwould be to make use of the old notion of truth; we must say that they\nare, and that is all about it. The night is approaching, the sun of\nintelligence is sinking towards the horizon, and thick vapors are\nobscuring its setting. But wait!\n\nIf the Humanity-God is always right, it must be that two contradictory\npropositions can be true at the same time, since contradictions abound\nin the history of human thoughts. If two contradictory propositions can\nbe true, there is no more truth. What then is our reason, of which truth\nis the object? We are seized with giddiness. Might not everything in the\nworld be illusion? and myself--? Listen to a voice which reaches us,\nacross the ages, from the countries crowned by the Himalayas. \"Nothing\nexists.... By the study of first principles, one acquires this\nknowledge, absolute, incontestable, comprehensible to the intelligence\nalone: I neither am, nor does anything which is mine, nor do I myself,\nexist.\"[156] What is there beneath these strange lines? The feeling of\ngiddiness, which seeks to steady itself by language. Here is now the\nmodern echo of these ancient words. One of those writers who accept all,\nin the hope of understanding all, describes himself as having come at\nlast to be aware that he is \"only one of the most fugitive illusions in\nthe bosom of the infinite illusion.\" One of his colleagues expresses\nhimself on this subject as follows: \"Is this the last word of all?--And\nwhy not?--The illusion which knows itself--is it in fact an illusion?\nDoes it not in some sort triumph over itself? Does it not attain to _the\nsovereign reality_, that of the thought which thinks itself, that of the\ndream which knows itself a dream, that _of nothingness which ceases to\nbe so_, in order to recognize itself and to assert itself?\"[157] We are\ngone back to ancient India. You will remark here three stages of\nthought. The fugitive illusion is man. The infinite illusion is the\nuniverse. The universal principle of the appearances which compose the\nuniverse is nothingness. Here is the explanation of the universe!\nNothingness takes life; nothingness takes life only to know itself to be\nnothingness; and the nothingness which says to itself, \"I am\nnothingness,\" is the reason of existence of all that is. I said just now\nthat the sun was declining to the horizon. Now the last glimmer of\ntwilight has disappeared; night has closed in--a dark and starless\nnight. Yes, Sirs, but there is never on the earth a night so dark as to\nwarrant us in despairing of the return of the dawn. If the modern mind\nis such as it is described to us, it has lost all the rays of light; but\nthe sun is not dead.\n\nThe doctrine of non-existence and of illusion is entirely\nincomprehensible, in the sense in which to comprehend signifies to have\na clear idea, and one capable of being directly apprehended. But, if one\nfollows the chain of ideas as logically unrolled, in the way that a\nmathematician follows the transformations of an algebraical formula,\nwithout considering its real contents, it is easy to account for the\norigin of this theory. If the human mind has no rule superior to itself,\nif it is the absolute mind, God, all its thoughts are equally true,\nsince we cannot point out error without having recourse to a rule of\ntruth. If all doctrines are equally true, propositions directly and\nabsolutely contradictory are equally true. If all is true, there is no\ntruth; for truth is not conceived except in opposition to at least\npossible error. If there is no truth, the human reason, which seeks\ntruth by a natural impulse belonging to its very essence, as the\nmagnetized needle seeks the pole,--reason, I say, is a chimera. The\ntruth which reason seeks is an exact relation of human thought to the\nreality of the world. If the search for this relation is chimerical, the\ntwo terms, mind, and the world, may be illusions. A fugitive illusion in\npresence of an infinite illusion: there is all. You see that these\nthoughts hang together with rigorous precision. The darkness is becoming\nvisible to us, or, in other words, we are acquiring a perfect\nunderstanding of the origin and developments of the absurdity. Put God\naside, the law of our will, the warrant of our thought; deify human\nnature; and a fatal current will run you aground twice over--on the\nshores of moral absurdity, and on those of intellectual absurdity. These\nsad shipwrecks are set before our eyes in striking examples; it has been\neasy to indicate their cause.\n\nThe consideration of the beautiful would give occasion to analogous\nobservations. The human mind becoming the object of our adoration, we\nmust give up judging it in every particular, and suppress the rules of\nthe ideal in art, as those of morals in the conduct, and truth in the\nintellect. We must form a system of aesthetics which accepts all, and\nfinds equally legitimate whatever affords recreation to the\nHumanity-God, in the great variety of its tastes. Then high aspirations\nare extinguished, the beautiful gives place to the agreeable; and since\nthe ugly and misshapen please a vicious taste, room must be made for the\nugly in the Pantheon of beauty. Art despoiled of its crown becomes the\nsad, and often the ignoble slave of the tastes and caprices of the\npublic. I do not insist further. The pretension of the worshippers of\nhumanity is to make their conscience wide enough to accept all, and to\nhave their intellect broad enough to understand all. They explain all,\nexcept these three small particulars--the conscience, the heart, and the\nreason. Goodness and truth avenge themselves in the end for the long\ncontempt cast upon them; and the first punishment those suffer who\naccept all, in the hope of understanding all, is no longer to understand\nwhat constitutes the life of humanity.\n\nLet us not, Sirs, be setting up altars to the human mind; for an\nadulterous incense stupefies it, and ends by destroying it. Man is\ngreat, he is sublime, with immortal hope in his heart, and the divine\naureole around his brow; but that he may preserve his greatness, let us\nleave him in his proper place. Let us leave to him the struggles which\nmake his glory, that condemnation of his own miseries which does him\nhonor, the tears shed over his faults which are the most unexceptionable\ntestimony to his dignity. Let us leave him tears, repentance, conflict,\nand hope; but let us not deify him; for, no sooner shall he have said,\n\"I am God,\" than, deprived that instant of all his blessings, he shall\nfind himself naked and spoiled.\n\nBefore they deified man, the pagans at least transfigured him by placing\nhim in Olympus. At this day, it is humanity as it is upon earth that is\nproposed to our adoration, humanity with its profound miseries and its\nfearful defilements. They seek to throw a veil over the mad audacity of\nthis attempt, by telling us of the progress which is to bring about, by\nlittle and little, the realization of our divinity. But, alas! our\nhistory is long already, and no reasonable induction justifies the vague\nhopes of heated imaginations. Great progress is being effected, but none\nwhich gives any promise that the profound needs of our nature can ever\nbe satisfied in this life. Charity has appeared on the earth; but there\nare still poor amongst us, and it seems that there always will be. A\nbreath of justice and humanity has penetrated social institutions; still\npolitics have not become the domain of perfect truth and of absolute\njustice, and there seems small likelihood that they ever will. Industry\nhas given birth to marvels; we devour space in these days, but we shall\nnever go so fast that suffering and death will not succeed in overtaking\nus. The great sources of grief are not dried up; the song of our poets\ncauses still the chords of sorrow to vibrate as in the days of yore.\nProgress is being accomplished, sure witness of a beneficent Hand which\nis guiding humanity in its destinies; but everything tells us that the\nsoil of our planet will be always steeped in tears, that the atmosphere\nwhich envelops us will always resound with the vibrations of sorrow. Far\nas our view can stretch itself, we foresee a suffering humanity, which\nwill not be able to find peace, joy, and hope, except in the expectation\nof new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness.\n\nIf there be no God above humanity, no eternity above time, no divine\nworld higher than our present place of sojourn; if our profoundest\ndesires are to be for ever deceived; if the cries we raise to heaven are\nnever to be heard; if all our hope is a future in which we shall be no\nmore; if humanity as we know it is the perfection of the universe; if\nall this is so, then indeed the answer to the universal enigma is\nillusion and falsehood. Then, before the monster of destiny which brings\nus into being only to destroy us, which creates in our breast the desire\nof happiness only to deride our miseries; in view of that starry vault\nwhich speaks to us of the infinite, while yet there is no infinite; in\npresence of that lying nature which adorns itself with a thousand\nsymbols of immortality, while yet there is no immortality; in presence\nof all these deceptions, man may be allowed to curse the day of his\nbirth, or to abandon himself to the intoxication of thoughtless\npleasure. But, a secret instinct tells us that wretchedness is a\ndisorder, and thoughtless pleasure a degradation. Let us have confidence\nin this deep utterance of our nature. Good, truth, beauty descend as\nrays of streaming light into the shadows of our existence; let us follow\nthem with the eye of faith to the divine focus from whence they\nproceed. All is fleeting, all is disappearing incessantly beneath our\nsteps; but our soul is not staggered at this swift lapse of all things,\nonly because she carries in herself the pledges of a changeless\neternity. \"The ephemeral spectator of an eternal spectacle, man raises\nfor a moment his eyes to heaven, and closes them again for ever; but\nduring the fleeting instant which is granted to him, from all points of\nthe sky and from the bounds of the universe, sets forth from every world\na consoling ray and strikes his upward gaze, announcing to him that\nbetween that measureless space and himself there exists a close\nrelation, and that he is allied to eternity.\"[158]\n\nAnd are these sublime _pressentiments_ only dreams after all? Dreams!\nKnow you not that our dreams create nothing, and that they are never\nanything else than confused reminiscences and fantastic combinations of\nthe realities of our waking consciousness? What then is that mysterious\nwaking during which we have seen the eternal, the infinite, the\nperfection of goodness, the fulness of joy, all those sublime images\nwhich come to haunt our spirit during the dream of life? Recollections\nof our origin! foreshadowings of our destinies! While then all below is\ntransitory, and is escaping from us in a ceaseless flight, let us\nabandon ourselves without fear to these instincts of the soul--\n\n\n     As a bird, if it light on a sprig too slight\n         The feathery freight to bear,\n     Yet, conscious of wings, tosses fearless, and sings,\n         Then drops--on the buoyant air.[159]\n\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[131] _Systeme de la Nature_, published under the pseudonyme of\nMirabaud.\n\n[132] _Systeme de la Nature_, Part I. chap. 1.\n\n[133] _Ibid._ Part II. chap. 14.\n\n[134] _Vie de Jesus._ Dedication.\n\n[135] _Revue des Deux Mondes_ of 15 January, 1860.\n\n[136] Plebeii philosophi qui a Platone et Socrate et ab ea familia\ndissident.\n\n[137] _Les philosophes francais du XIXe siecle_, chap. XIV.\n\n[138] _Hegel et l'Hegelianisme_ par M. Ed. Scherer.\n\n[139] Page 854.\n\n[140] Page 852.\n\n[141] Page 856.\n\n[142] Isa. xx. 20.\n\n[143] _Essais de critique et d'histoire_, pp. 8 and 9.\n\n[144] _Revue des Deux Mondes_, 15 Feb. 1861, page 855.\n\n[145] Page 853.\n\n[146] Page 854.\n\n[147] _Revue des Deux Mondes_ of the 15th Feb. 1861, page 854.\n\n[148] _Introduction a l'histoire de la philosophie_. Neuvieme lecon.\n\n[149]\n\n     Il repondit, baissant un oeil humide:\n     Jamais ce nom n'attristera mes vers.\n\n[150] _Introduction a l'histoire de la philosophie._ Treizieme lecon.\n\n[151]\n\n     Je prends tout doucement les hommes comme ils sont,\n     J'accoutume mon ame a souffrir ce qu'ils font.\n\n[152] _Nihil nefas ducere, hanc summam inter eos religionem esse._ (Tit.\nLiv. lib. xxxix. c. 13.)\n\n[153]\n\n             . . . . . . Ces haines vigoureuses\n     Que doit donner le vice aux ames vertueuses.\n\n[154] _Melanges de Toepffer._ De la mauvaise presse consideree comme\nexcellente.\n\n[155] _Revue des Deux Mondes_ of 15 Feb. 1861, page 854.--_Etudes\ncritiques sur la litterature contemporaine_, par Edmond Scherer, page x.\net xi.\n\n[156] Sa'nkya--ka'rika', 61 and 64. The text 61 in which occur the words\n\"Nothing exists\" is hard to understand, but there appears to be no doubt\nof the meaning of No. 64. _Non sum, non est meum, nec sum ego._\n\n[157] _Etudes critiques sur la litterature contemporaine_, par Edmond\nScherer.--M. Sainte-Beuve, p. 354.\n\n[158] Xavier de Maistre.\n\n[159]\n\n     Soyons comme l'oiseau pose pour un instant\n         Sur des rameaux trop freles,\n     Qui sent ployer la branche et qui chante pourtant,\n         Sachant qu'il a des ailes.--VICTOR HUGO.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE VI.\n\n_THE CREATOR._\n\n(At Geneva, 4th Dec. 1863.--At Lausanne, 27th Jan. 1864.)\n\n\nGENTLEMEN,\n\nMan is not a simple product of nature; in vain does he labor to degrade\nhimself by desiring to find the explanation of his spiritual being in\nmatter brought gradually to perfection. Man is not the summit and\nprinciple of the universe; in vain does he labor to deify himself. He is\ngreat only by reason of the divine rays which inform his heart, his\nconscience, and his reason. From the moment that he believes himself to\nbe the source of light, he passes into night. When thought has risen\nfrom nature up to man, it must needs fall again, if its impetus be not\nstrong enough to carry it on to God. These assertions do but translate\nthe great facts of man's intellectual history. \"There is no nation so\nbarbarous,\" said Cicero,[160] \"there are no men so savage as not to\nhave some tincture of religion. Many there are who form false notions of\nthe gods; ... but all admit the existence of a divine power and\nnature.... Now, in any matter whatever, the consent of all nations is to\nbe reckoned a law of nature.\" No discovery has diminished the value of\nthese words of the Roman orator. In the most degraded portions of human\nsociety, there remains always some vestige of the religious sentiment.\nThe knowledge of the Creator comes to us from the Christian tradition;\nbut the idea, more or less vague, of a divine world is found wherever\nthere are men.\n\nCicero brings forward this universal consent as a very strong proof of\nthe existence of the gods. The supporters of atheism dispute the value\nof this argument. They say: \"General opinion proves nothing. How many\nfabulous legends have been set up by the common belief into historic\nverities! All mankind believed for a long time that the sun revolved\nabout the earth. Truth makes way in the world only by contradicting\nopinions generally received. The faith of the greater number is rather a\nmark of error than a sign of truth.\" This objection rests upon a\nconfusion of ideas. Humanity has no testimony to render upon scientific\nquestions, the solution of which is reserved for patient study; but\nhumanity bears witness to its own nature. The universality of religion\nproves that the search after the divine is, as said the Roman orator, a\nlaw of nature. When therefore we rise from matter to man, and from man\nto God, we are not going in an arbitrary road, but are advancing\naccording to the law of nature ascertained by the testimony of humanity.\nIt needs a mind at once very daring and very frivolous not to feel the\nimportance of this consideration.\n\nIn our days atheism is being revived. In going over in your memory the\nsymptoms of this revival, as we have pointed them out to you, you will\nperceive that the direct and primitive negation of God is comparatively\nrare; but that what is frequently attempted is, if I may venture so to\nspeak, to effect the subtraction of God. Any religious theory whatever\nis put aside as inadmissible, and with some such remarks as these: \"How\nis it that real sciences are formed? By observation on the one hand, and\nby reasoning on the other. By observation, and reasoning applied to\nobservation, we obtain the science of nature and the science of\nhumanity. But do we wish to rise above nature and humanity? We fail of\nall basis of observation; and reason works in a vacuum. There is\ntherefore no possible way of reaching to God. Is God an object of\nexperience? No. Can God be demonstrated _a priori_ by syllogisms? No.\nThe idea of God therefore cannot be established, as answering to a\nreality, either by the way of experience or by the way of reasoning; it\nis a mere hypothesis. We do not, however, it is added, in our view of\nthe matter, pretend (Heaven forbid!) to exclude the sentiment of the\nDivine from the soul, nor the word _God_ from fine poetry. We accept\nreligious thoughts as dreams full of charm. But is it a question of\nreality? then God is an hypothesis, and hypothesis has no admission into\nthe science of realities.\"\n\nThese ideas place those who accept them in a position which is not\nwithout its advantages. When a man of practical mind says with a smile,\n\"Do you happen to believe in God?\" one may reply to him, smiling in\nturn, \"Have I said that God is a real Being?\" And if a religious man\nasks, \"Are you falling then into atheism?\" one may assume an indignant\ntone, and say: \"We have never denied God: whoever says we have is a\nslanderer!\" So God remains, for the necessities of poetry and art. But\nas we cannot know either what He is, or whether He is, real life goes on\nin complete and entire independence of Him. The taking up of this\nposition with regard to religion may, in certain cases, be a literary\nartifice. In other cases it is seriously done. There are certain natures\nof extreme delicacy, which, touched by the breath of modern scepticism,\nhave lost all positive faith; but their better aspirations, and an\ninstinctive love of purity, guard and direct them, in the absence of all\nbelief, and they do not deny that which they believe no longer. Such a\nmind is in an exceptional position. Is it yours? and would you preserve\nit? Keep a solitary path, and do not seek to communicate your ideas to\nothers. Contact with the public, and such an unfolding even of your own\nthoughts as would be required in carrying on a work of proselytism,\nwould place you under the empire of those laws which govern the human\nmind in these matters. Now what are these laws? A poet has already\nanswered for us this question:\n\n\n     En presence du Ciel, il faut croire ou nier.[161]\n\n\nA famous writer expands the same thought as follows: \"Doubt about things\nwhich it highly concerns us to know,\" says Jean-Jacques Rousseau, \"is a\ncondition which does too great violence to the human mind; nor does it\nlong bear up against it, but in spite of itself comes to a decision one\nway or another, and likes better to be mistaken than to believe\nnothing.\"[162] Such is the law. We have met with the pretension to\nmaintain the mind independent of God, without either denying or\nasserting His existence, and we have seen how completely this pretension\nfails in the presence of facts. The sceptic makes vain efforts to\ncontinue in a state of doubt, but the ground fails him, and he slips\ninto negation: he affirms that humanity has been mistaken, and that God\nis not. But neither does this negation succeed any the more in keeping\nits ground; it strikes too violently against all the instincts of our\nnature. The human mind is under an imperious necessity to worship\nsomething; if God fails it, it sets itself to adore nature or humanity;\natheism is transformed into idolatry. Recollect the destinies of the\ncritical school and of the positive philosophy! Let us now examine, with\nserious attention, that attempt to _eliminate_ God which is the\nstarting-point in this course along which the mind is hurried so\nfatally.\n\nGod is not, I grant, an object of experience. I grant it at least in\nthis sense, that God is not an object of sensible experience. The\nexperience of God (if I may be allowed the expression), the feeling of\nHis action upon the soul, is not a phenomenon open to the observation of\nall, and apart from determined spiritual conditions. In order to be\nsensible of the action of God, we must draw near to Him. In order to\ndraw near to Him, we must, if not believe with firm faith in His\nexistence, at least not deny Him. The captives of Plato's cavern can\nhave no experience of light, so long as they heap their raillery on\nthose who speak to them of the sun. I grant again that God cannot\npossibly be the object of a demonstration such as the science of\ngeometry requires; I grant it fully, I have already said so. Every man\nwho reasons, affirms God in one sense; and the foundation of all\nreasoning cannot be the conclusion of a demonstration. God therefore, in\nthe view of science formed according to our ordinary methods, is, I\ngrant, an hypothesis. And here, Gentlemen, allow me a passing word of\nexplanation.\n\nWhen I say that God is an hypothesis, I run the risk of exciting, in\nmany of you, feelings of astonishment not unmixed with pain. But I must\nbeg you to remember the nature of these lectures. We are here far from\nthe calm retirement of the sanctuary, and from such words of solemn\nexhortation as flow from the lips of the religious teacher. I have\nintroduced you to the ardent conflicts of contemporary thought, and into\nthe midst of the clamors of the schools. The soul which is seeking to\nhold communion with God, and so from their fountain-head to be filled\nwith strength and joy, has something better to do than to be listening\nto such discourses as these. Solitude, prayer, a calm activity pursued\nunder the guidance of the conscience,--these are the best paths for such\na soul, and the discussions in which we are now engaged are not perhaps\naltogether free from danger for one who has remained hitherto\nundisturbed in the first simplicity of his faith. But we are not masters\nof our own ways, and the circumstances of the present times impose upon\nus special duties. The barriers which separate the school and the world\nare everywhere thrown down. Everywhere shreds of philosophy, and very\noften of bad philosophy,--scattered fragments of theological science,\nand very often of a deplorable theological science,--are insinuating\nthemselves into the current literature. There is not a literary review,\nthere is scarcely a political journal, which does not speak on occasion,\nor without occasion, of the problems relating to our eternal interests.\nThe most sacred beliefs are attacked every day in the organs of public\nopinion. At such a juncture, can men who preserve faith in their own\nsoul remain like dumb dogs, or keep themselves shut up in the narrow\nlimits of the schools? Assuredly not. We must descend to the common\nground, and fight with equal weapons the great battles of thought. For\nthis purpose it is necessary to make use of terms which may alarm some\nconsciences, and to state questions which run the risk of startling\nsincerely religious persons. But there is no help for it, if we are to\ncombat the adversaries on their own ground; and because it is thus only\nthat, while we startle a few, we can prove to all that the torrent of\nnegations is but a passing rush of waters, which, fret as they may in\ntheir channel, shall be found to have left not so much as a trace of\ntheir passage upon the Rock of Ages.\n\nI now therefore resume my course of argument. God is neither an object\nof experience, nor yet of demonstration properly so called. In the view\nof science, as it is commonly understood, of science which follows out\nthe chain of its deductions, without giving attention to the very\nfoundations of all the work of the reason,--God, that chief of all\nrealities for a believing heart, that experience of every hour, that\nevidence superior to all proof, God is an hypothesis. I grant it. Hence\nit is inferred that God has no place in science, for that hypothesis has\nno place in a science worthy of the name. But this I deny; and in\nsupport of this denial I proceed to show that the hypothesis which it is\npretended to get quit of, is the generating principle of all human\nknowledge.\n\nWhence does science proceed? Does it result from mere experience? No.\nWhat does experience teach us when quite alone? Nothing. Experience,\nseparated from all element of reason, only reveals to us our own\nsensations. This, a Scotch philosopher, Hume, has proved to\ndemonstration,--a demonstration which constitutes his glory. It is easy,\nwithout having even a smattering of philosophy, to understand quite well\nthat science is formed by thought. Now, if we did not possess the\nfaculty of thinking, it would not be given to us by experience. Thought\ndoes not enter by the eye or the ear. Imagine a living body not\npossessed of reason: its eye will reflect objects like a mirror, its\ntympanum will vibrate to the undulations of the air; but it will have no\nthoughts, and will know nothing.\n\nIs science formed by pure reason? No. No one can say what pure reason\nis, for the exercise of our thought is connected indissolubly with\nexperience. But, without pausing at this consideration, let us ask what\npure reason can do, if deprived of all objects of experience? One thing\nonly, namely, take cognizance of itself. Now the reason, in taking\ncognizance of itself, only creates logic, that is to say, the theory of\nthe laws of knowledge. Some philosophers, to be sure, have undertaken to\nprove that reason, by dint of self-contemplation, might arrive at the\nknowledge of all things. They have maintained that all the secrets of\nthe universe are contained in our thought, and that by just reasoning\none may form the science of astronomy without looking at the stars, and\nwrite the history of the human race without taking the trouble to search\nlaboriously into the annals of the past. But these attempts to\n_construct_ facts, instead of observing them, have succeeded too ill to\nmerit very serious attention.\n\nScience does not proceed therefore either from pure experience or from\npure reason; whence does it really come? From the encounter of\nexperience and of reason. Man observes, and he ascertains that facts are\ngoverned according to intelligent design. He creates mathematics, and\ndiscovers that the phenomena of the heavens and the earth are ruled\naccording to the laws of the calculus. His thought meets in the facts\nwith traces of a thought similar to his own. If any one of you doubts\nthis, I once more appeal to the almanac. Science, then, has birth only\nfrom a meeting of experience with reason; how is this meeting effected?\nThe whole question of the origin of science is here. This encounter is\nnot necessary; it does not result simply from perseverance in\nobservation. The encounter of mind and of facts constitutes a discovery.\nThe thought which has governed nature may remain long veiled from our\nmind. All at once perhaps the veil is lifted, and the thought of man\nmeets and recognizes itself in the phenomena which it is contemplating.\nWe encounter in this case the exercise of a special faculty, which is\nneither the faculty of observing nor the faculty of reasoning, but the\nfaculty of discovering. When a man possesses it to a certain degree, we\ncall him a man of genius. Genius, or the faculty of discovering, is the\ngenerating principle of science. Still, strange to say, this principle\nis scarcely pointed out by a great number of logicians. They develop at\nlength the rules of observation and the rules of reasoning; and it seems\nthat, in their idea, the conjunction of reason and experience is\neffected all alone and of necessity. I taught logic myself in this way\nfor twenty years, until one day, thinking better upon the subject, I was\nobliged to say to myself (forgive me this rather trivial quotation):\n\n\n     Tu n'avais oublie qu'un point:\n     C'etait d'eclairer ta lanterne.[163]\n\n\nThe meeting together of the understanding and of facts is a discovery;\nand discovery depends upon a faculty sung by poets, admired by mankind,\nand too little noticed by logicians--genius. Genius has for its\ncharacteristic a sudden illumination of the mind, a gratuitous gift and\none which cannot be purchased. But let us hasten to supply a necessary\nexplanation. Genius is a primitive fact, a gift; but the work of genius\nhas conditions, or rather a condition--labor. Labor does not replace\ngenius, but genius does not dispense with labor; nature only delivers up\nher secrets to those who observe her with long patience. Newton was\nasked one day how he had found out the system of the universe. He\nreplied with a sublime _naivete_: \"By thinking continually about it.\" He\nso pointed out the condition of every great discovery; but he forgot the\ncause--the peculiar nature of his own intellect. It was necessary to be\nalways pondering the motions of the stars; but it was necessary moreover\nto be Isaac Newton. So many had thought on the subject, as long perhaps\nas he, and had not made the discovery.\n\nLabor, the condition of discoveries, should have as its effect to\nrecognize the methods really appropriate to the nature of the inquiries,\nand to keep the mind well informed in existing science. In fact, every\nscientific discovery supposes a series of previous discoveries which\nhave brought the mind to the point at which it is possible to see\nsomething new. For this reason it is that a discovery often presents\nitself to two or three minds at once, when there are found, at the same\nepoch, two or three minds endowed with the same power. They see all\ntogether because the onward progress of science has brought them to the\nsame summit: this is the condition; and because they have the same power\nof vision: this is the cause. There is therefore a method for putting\nourselves on the road to discovery, but no method for making the\ndiscovery itself. The man of genius sees where others do not see; and\nwhen he has seen, everybody sees after him. If, furnished with Gyges'\nring, you could gain access to the studies of savants at the moment when\na great discovery has just been made, you would see more than one of\nthem striking his forehead and exclaiming: \"Fool that I was! how could I\nhelp seeing it? it was so simple.\" Truth appears simple when it has been\ndiscovered.\n\nDiscovery therefore, which has labor for its condition, is the principle\nof the progress of science. Under what form does a discovery present\nitself to the mind of its author? As a supposition, or, which is the\nsame thing, as an hypothesis. Hypothesis is the sole process by which\nprogress in science is effected. If we supposed nothing, we should know\nnothing. In vain should we look at the sky and the earth to all\neternity, our eye would never read the laws of astronomy in the stars of\nheaven, nor the laws of life upon the bark of trees or in the entrails\nof animals. This is true even of mathematics. The contemplation,\nprolonged indefinitely, of the series of numbers, or of the forms of\nspace, would produce neither arithmetic nor geometry, if the human mind\ndid not suppose relations between the numbers and the lines, which it\ncan only demonstrate after it has supposed them. The conditions are very\nclearly seen which have prepared and made possible a fruitful\nsupposition, but the hypothesis does not itself follow of any necessity.\nIt appears like a flash of light passing suddenly through the mind.\n\nThe carpenter's saw opens a plank from end to end on the sole conditions\nof labor and time; but the discovery of truth preserves always a sudden\nand unforeseen character. Archimedes leaps from a bath and rushes\nthrough the streets of Syracuse, crying out, \"I have found it!\" Why? The\nflash of genius has visited him unexpectedly. Pythagoras discovers a\ngeometrical theorem; and he offers, it is said, a sacrifice to the gods,\nin testimony of his gratitude. He thought therefore, according to the\nfine remark of Malebranche, that labor and attention are a silent prayer\nwhich we address to the Master of truth: the labor is a prayer, and the\ndiscovery is an answer granted to it.\n\nWhen this wholly spontaneous character of discovery is not recognized,\nand when it is thought that the observation of facts naturally produces\ntheir explanation, it must needs be granted that a discovery is\nconfirmed by the very fact that it is made. But this is by no means the\ncase. Hypothesis does not carry on its brow, at the moment of its birth,\nthe certain sign of its truth. A flash of light crosses the mind of the\nsavant; but he must enter on a course, often a long course, of study, in\norder to know whether it is a true light, or a momentary glare. Every\nsupposition suggested by observation must be confirmed by its agreement\nwith the data of experience. Let us listen to a great discoverer--\nKepler. He is giving an account of the discovery of one of the laws\nwhich have immortalized his name.\n\n\"After I had found the real dimensions of the orbits, thanks to the\nobservations of Brahe and the sustained effort of a long course of\nlabor, I at length discovered the proportion of the periodic times to\nthe extent of these orbits. And if you would like to know the precise\ndate of the discovery,--it was on the eighth day of March in this year\n1618 that,--first of all conceived in my mind, then awkwardly essayed by\ncalculations, rejected in consequence as false, then reproduced on the\nfifteenth of May with fresh energy,--it rose at last above the darkness\nof my understanding, so fully confirmed by my labor of seventeen years\nupon Brahe's observations, and by my own meditations perfectly agreeing\nwith them, that I thought at first I was dreaming, and making some\n_petitio principii_; but there is no more doubt about it: it is a very\ncertain and very exact proposition.\"[164]\n\nAll the logic of discoveries is laid down in these lines; and these\nlines are a testimony rendered by one of the most competent of\nwitnesses. You see in them the conditions of a good hypothesis: Kepler\nhas long studied the phenomena of which he wishes to find the law; he\nhas studied them by himself, and by means of the discoveries of his\npredecessor Brahe. The law has presented itself to his mind at a given\nmoment, on the eighth of March, 1618. But he does not yet know whether\nit is a true light, or a deceptive gleam. He seeks the confirmation of\nhis hypothesis; he does not find it, because he makes a mistake, and he\nrejects his idea as useless. The idea returns; a new course of labor\nconfirms it; and so the hypothesis becomes a law, a certain proposition.\n\nSuch is the regular march of thought. An hypothesis has no right to be\nbrought forward until it has passed into the condition of a law, by\nbeing duly confirmed. There are minds, however, endowed with a sort of\ndivination, which feel as by instinct the truth of a discovery, even\nbefore it has been confirmed. It is told of Copernicus, that having\ndiscovered, or re-discovered, the true system of planetary motion, he\nencountered an opponent who said to him: \"If your system were true,\nVenus would have phases like the moon; now she has none, and therefore\nyour system is false. What have you to reply?\"--\"I have no reply to\nmake,\" said Copernicus, (the objection was a serious one in fact); \"but\nGod will grant that the answer shall be found.\"[165] Galileo appeared,\nand by means of the telescope it was ascertained that Venus has phases\nlike the moon;--the confidence of Copernicus was justified. The\nscientific career of M. Ampere, the illustrious natural philosopher,\nsupplies an analogous fact. Trusting, like Copernicus, to a kind of\nintuition of truth, he read one day to the Academy of sciences the\ncomplete description of an experiment which he had never made. He made\nit subsequently, and the result answered completely to his\nanticipations. Genius is here raised to the second power, since it\npossesses at once the gift of discovery and the just presentiment of its\nconfirmation; but these are exceptional cases, and in general we must\nsay, with Mithridates, that--\n\n\n                         .... To be approved as true\n     Such projects must be proved, and carried through.[166]\n\n\nWe would encourage no one to attempt adventures so perilous, but would\ncall to mind in a great example what is the regular march of science.\nNewton, after he had discovered the law which regulates the motions of\nthe heavens, sought the confirmation of it in an immense series of\ncalculations. A true ascetic of science, he imposed on himself a regimen\nas severe as that of a Trappist monk, in order that his life might be\nwholly concentrated upon the operations of the understanding; and it was\nnot until after fifteen months of persistent labor that he exclaimed: \"I\nhave discovered it! My calculations have really encountered the march of\nthe stars. Glory to God! who has permitted us to catch a glimpse of the\nskirts of His ways!\" And astronomy, placed upon a wider and firmer\nbasis, went forward with new energy.\n\nIt is thus that the human mind acquires knowledge. How then does\nhypothesis come to be made light of? How can it be seriously said that\nwe have excluded hypothesis from the sphere of science, whereas the\nmoment the faculty of supposing should cease to be in exercise, the\nmarch of science would be arrested; since, except a small number of\nprinciples the evidence of which is immediate, all the truths we\npossess are only suppositions confirmed by experiment? The reason is\nhere: Our mind forms a thousand different suppositions at its own will\nand fancy; and it shrinks from that studious toil which alone puts it in\na position to make fruitful suppositions. We are for ever tempted to be\nguessing, instead of setting ourselves, by patient observations, on the\nroad to real discoveries. It is therefore with good reason that theories\nhastily built up have been condemned, and Lord Chancellor Bacon was\nright in thinking that the human mind requires lead to be attached to\nit, and not wings. Hence the inference has been drawn that the simplest\nplan would be to cut the wings of thought, without reflecting that\nthenceforward it would continue motionless. Because some had abused\nhypothesis, others must conclude that we could do without it altogether.\n\nTrivial and premature suppositions have therefore discredited\nhypothesis, by encumbering science with a crowd of vain imaginations;\nbut this encumbrance would have been of small importance but for the\nobstinacy with which false theories have too often been maintained\nagainst the evidence of facts. If Ampere had found his experiment fail,\nand had still continued to maintain his statements, he would not have\ngiven proof of a happy audacity, but of a ridiculous obstinacy. Genius\nitself makes mistakes, and experience alone distinguishes real laws from\nmere freaks of our thought. We have maintained the rights of reason in\nthe spontaneous exercise of the faculty of discovery; but let us beware\nhow we ignore the rights of experience. It alone prepares discoveries;\nit alone can confirm them. A system, however well put together, is\nconvicted of error by the least fact which really contradicts it. A\nGreek philosopher was demonstrating by specious arguments that motion is\nimpossible. Diogenes was one of his auditory, and he got up and began to\nwalk: the answer was conclusive. You remember, if you have read Walter\nScott, the learned demonstration of the antiquary who is settling the\ndate of a Roman or Celtic ruin, I forget which; and the intervention of\nthe beggar, who has no archaeological system, but who has seen the\nedifice in question both built and fall to decay. Reason as much as you\nlike; if your reasonings do not accord with facts, you will have woven\nspider's webs, of admirable fineness perhaps, but wanting in solidity.\n\nIt is time to sum up these lengthened considerations. Science does not\noriginate solely from experiment, nor does it proceed solely from\nreason; it results from the meeting together of experience and reason.\nExperience prepares the discovery, genius makes it, experience confirms\nit. What distinguishes the sciences is not the process of invention,\nwhich is everywhere the same; but the process of control over supposed\ntruths. A mathematical discovery is confirmed by pure reasoning. A\nphysical discovery is confirmed by sensible observation joined with\ncalculation. A discovery in the order of morals is confirmed by\nobservation of the facts of consciousness. Therefore it is that between\nthe physical and moral sciences there exists a broad line of\ndemarcation. Moral facts have not less certainty than physical\nphenomena; but moral facts falling under the influence of liberty, all\nmen cannot perceive them equally under all conditions. An optical\nexperiment presents itself to the eyes, and all the spectators see it\nalike, if at least they have one and the same visual organization; but a\ncase of moral experience has a personal character, and is only\ncommunicated to another person on condition that he puts faith in the\ntestimony of his fellow. In this order of things a man can observe\ndirectly only what he concurs in producing. With this reservation, we\nmay say that the control of moral truths is made by experience like that\nof physical truths. In all departments of knowledge, a thought may be\nheld as true when it accounts for facts.\n\nAnd so, Gentlemen, we conclude that every scientific truth is, in its\norigin, a supposition of the mind, the result of which is to produce the\nmeeting together of experience and reason, and so to permit the rational\nreconstruction of the facts.\n\nEvery system is shown to be at fault by facts, if facts contradict it.\n\nWhen a system explains the facts, we hold it as proved just to the\nextent to which it explains them. This accordance of our thought with\nthe nature of things is the mark of what we call truth.\n\nIf you grant me these premises, my demonstration is completed, and it\nonly remains for me to draw my conclusions.\n\nIt is said that the idea of God can have no place in a serious science,\nbecause this idea comes neither from experience nor from reason; that it\nis only an hypothesis, and that hypothesis has no place in science. I\nreply, grounding my answer on the preceding reasonings: No science is\nformed otherwise than by means of hypothesis. For the solution of the\nuniversal problem there exists in the world an hypothesis, proposed to\nall by tradition, and which bears in particular the names of Moses and\nof Jesus Christ. This hypothesis has the right to be examined. If it\nexplains the facts, it must be held for true. The idea of God comes\ntherefore within the regular compass of science; the attempt to exclude\nit is sophistical.\n\nLet us separate the idea of God from the whole body of Christian\ndoctrine of which it forms part, in order that we may give it particular\nconsideration. What is this hypothesis which bears the names of Moses\nand Jesus Christ? It is that the principle of the universe is the\nEternal and Infinite Being. His power is the cause of all that exists;\nthe consciousness of His infinite power constitutes His infinite\nintelligence. In Himself, He is _He who is_; in His relation with the\nworld, He is the absolute cause, the Creator. This explanation of the\nuniverse is not the privilege of a few savants; it is taught and\nproposed to all; and this is no reason why we should despise it. If we\nfurther observe that this thought has renovated the world, that it\nupholds all our civilization, that thousands of our fellow-creatures\nraise their voice to tell us that it is only from this source they have\ndrawn peace, light, and happiness, we shall understand perhaps that\ncontempt would be foolish, and that everything on the contrary invites\nus to examine with the most serious attention an hypothesis which offers\nitself to us under conditions so exceptional.\n\nThe hypothesis is stated. We must now submit it to the test of facts.\nWhere shall we find the elements of its confirmation? Everywhere, since\nit is the first cause of all things which is in question: we shall find\nthem in nature and in humanity; in the motions of the stars as they\nsweep through the depths of space, and in the rising of the sap which\nnourishes a blade of grass; in the revolutions of empires, and in the\nsimplest elements of the life of one individual. There is no science of\nGod; but every science, every study must terminate at that sacred Name.\nI shall not undertake, therefore, to enumerate all the confirmations of\nthe thought which makes of the Creator the principle of the universe: to\nrecount all the proofs of the infinite Being would require an eternal\ndiscourse. We have stammered forth a few of the words of this endless\ndiscourse, by showing that, without God, the understanding, the\nconscience, and the heart lose their support and fall: this formed the\nsubject of our second lecture. We saw further that reason makes\nfruitless attempts to find the universal principle in the objects of our\nexperience--nature and humanity. Let us follow up, although we shall not\nbe able to complete it, the study of this inexhaustible subject, by\nshowing that the idea of the Creator alone answers to the demands of the\nphilosophic reason.\n\nPhilosophy, in the highest acceptation of the term, is the search after\na solution for the universal problem the terms of which may be stated as\nfollows: Experience reveals to us that the world is composed of manifold\nand diverse beings; and, to come at once to the great division, there\nare in the world bodies which we are forced to suppose inert, and minds\nwhich we feel to be intelligent and free. The universe is made up of\nmanifold existences; this is quite evident, and a matter of experience.\nReason on the other hand forces us to seek for unity. To comprehend, is\nto reduce phenomena to their laws, to connect effects with their\ncauses, consequences with their principles; it is to be always\nintroducing unity into the diversity. All development of science would\nbe at once arrested, if the mind could content itself with merely taking\naccount of facts in the state of dispersion in which they are presented\nby experience. Each particular science gathers up a multitude of facts\ninto a small number of formulae; and, above and beyond particular\nsciences, reason searches for the connection of all things with one\nsingle cause. To determine the relation of all particular existences\nwith one existence which is their common cause; such is the universal\nproblem. This problem has been very well expressed by Pythagoras in a\ncelebrated formula, that of the _Uni-multiple_. In order to understand\nthe universe, we must rise to a unity which may account for the\nmultiplicity of things and for their harmony, which is unity itself\nmaintained in diversity.\n\nIf you well understand this thought, you will easily comprehend the\nsource of the great errors which flow from too strong a disposition to\nsystematize. Men of this mind attach themselves to inadequate\nconceptions, and look for unity where it does not exist. The barrier\nwhich we must oppose to this spirit of system is the careful\nenumeration of the facts which it forgets to notice. Materialism looks\nfor unity in inert and unintelligent bodies; it suffices to oppose to it\none fact--the reality of mind. Fatalism seeks unity in necessity. Point\nout to it that its destiny-god does not account for the fact of\nrepentance, for example, which implies liberty, and it is enough. The\nworship of humanity forces you to exclaim with Pascal--A queer God,\nthat! There is in the bitterness of this smile a sufficient condemnation\nof the doctrine. To seek for unity, is the foundation of all philosophy.\nTo seek for unity too hastily and too low, is the source of the errors\nof absolute minds. Absolute minds, however great they may be in other\nrespects, are weak minds, in that they do not succeed in preserving a\nclear view of the diversity of the facts to be explained. Take the\nproblem of Pythagoras; keep hold of the two extremities of the chain;\nnever allow yourselves to deny the diversity of things, for that\ndiversity is plainly evidenced by human experience; beware of denying\ntheir unity, because it is the foundation of reason; then search and\nlook through the histories of philosophy: you will find one hypothesis,\nand one only, which answers the requirements of the problem. It goes\nback, as I believe, to the origin of the world; it was glimpsed by\nSocrates, by Aristotle, and Plato; but, in its full light, it belongs\nonly to men who have received the God of Moses, and who have studied in\nthe school of Jesus Christ. If this hypothesis explains the facts, it is\nsound, for the property of truth is to explain, as the property of light\nis to enlighten.\n\nThe doctrine of the Creator can alone account to us for the universe, by\nbringing us back to its first cause. The first cause of unity cannot be\nmatter which could never produce mind; the first cause of unity cannot\nbe the human mind, which, from the moment that it desires to take itself\nfor the absolute being, is dissolved and annihilated. The unity which\nalone can have in itself the source of multiplicity, is neither matter\nnor idea, but power; power the essential characteristic of mind, and\ninfinite, that is to say, creative power. The Creator alone could\nproduce divers beings, because He is Almighty, and maintain harmony\nbetween those beings, because He is One. Thus is manifested an essential\nagreement between the requirements of philosophy and the religious\nsentiment; for religion, as we said at the beginning of these lectures,\nrests upon the idea of Divine power. Reason and faith meet together\nupon the lofty heights of truth. But let us not enter too far into the\ndifficulties of philosophy. Let us confine ourselves to considerations\nof a less abstruse order.\n\nThe Creator is the God of nature. All the visible universe is but the\nwork of His power, the manifestation of His wisdom. The poet of the\nHebrews invites to offer praise to the Most High, not only men of every\nage and of all nations, but the beasts of the field, the birds of the\nair, and the cedars of the forest, the rain and the wind, the hail and\nthe tempest.[167] In the language of a modern poet:\n\n\n     Thee, Lord, the wide world glorifies;\n     The bird upon its nest replies;\n     And for one little drop of rain\n     Beings Thine eye doth not disdain\n     Ten thousand more repeat the strain.[168]\n\n\nAnd such thoughts are not vain freaks of the imagination. Man, the\nconscious representative of nature, the high-priest of the universe,\nfeels himself urged by an impulse of his heart to translate the\nconfused murmur of the creation into a hymn of praise to the Infinite\nBeing, the absolute Source of life,--to Him who _is_, One, Eternal,--the\nfirst and absolute Cause of all existence.\n\nThe Creator is the God of spirits. He is not only the God of humankind;\n\"the immense city of God contains, no doubt, nobler citizens than man,\nin reasoning power so weak, and in affections so poor.\"[169] But let us\nspeak of what is known to us: He is the God of humankind. All nations\nshall one day render glory to Him. Mighty words have resounded through\nthe world: \"Henceforth there is no longer either Greek or barbarian or\nJew; but one and the same God for all.\" The idols have begun to fall;\nthe gods of the nations have been hurled from their pedestals; they have\nfallen, they are falling, they will fall, until the knowledge of the\nonly and sovereign Creator shall cover the earth as the waters cover the\nsea.\n\nThe Creator shall one day be known of all His creatures; and in each of\nHis creatures He will be the centre and the object of the whole soul;\nall the functions of the spiritual life lead on to Him. What is truth,\nbeauty, good? We have already replied to the question, but we will\nrepeat our answer.\n\nTo possess truth is to know God; it is to know Him in the work of His\nhands, and it is to know Him in His absolute power, as the eternal\nsource of all that is, of all that can ever be, of all actual or\npossible truth in the mind of His creatures. Truth binds us to Him, \"and\nall _science_ is a hymn to His glory.\"[170]\n\nHe is the eternal source of beauty. He it is who gives to the bird its\nsong, and to the brook its murmur. He it is who has established between\nnature and man those mysterious relations which give rise to noble joys.\nHe it is who opens, above and beyond nature, the prolific sources of\nart; the ideal is a distant reflection of His splendor.\n\nAnd goodness, again, is none other than He; it is His plan; it is His\nwill in regard of spirits; it is the word addressed to the free\ncreature, which says to it: Behold thy place in the universal harmony.\n\nThus a triple ray descends from the uncreated light, and before that\ninsufferable brightness I am dazzled and bewildered. There is no longer\nany distinction for me between profane and sacred; I no longer\nunderstand the difference of these terms. Wheresoever I meet with good,\ntruth, beauty, be the man who brings them to me who he may, and come he\nwhence he may, I feel that to despise in him that gleam, would be not\nonly to be wanting to humanity, it would be to be wanting to my faith.\nIf my prejudices or habits tend to shut up my heart or to narrow my\nmind, I hear a voice exclaiming to me: \"Enlarge thy tent; lengthen thy\ncords; enlarge thy tent without measure. Be ye lift up, eternal gates,\ngates of the conscience and the heart! Let in the King of glory!\" All\ntruth, all beauty, all good is He. Where my God is, nothing is profane\nfor me. To ignore any one of those rays would be to steal somewhat from\nHis glory.\n\nOh! the happy liberty of the heart, when it rests on the Author of all\ngood and of all truth. But if the heart is at liberty, how well is it\nguarded too! What is the most beautiful jewel (if we may venture to use\nsuch language) in the immortal crown of this King of glory? Powerful, He\ncreated power; free, He created liberty. And to the free creature, in\nthe hour of its creation, He said: \"Behold! thou art made in mine own\nimage! my will is written in thy conscience; become a worker together\nwith me, and realize the plans of my love.\" And that voice--I hear it\nwithin myself. Ah! I know that voice well, I know the secret attraction\nwhich, in spite of all my miseries, draws me towards that which is\nbeautiful, pure, holy, and says to me: This is the will of thy Father.\nBut I know other voices also which speak within me only too loudly: the\nvoice of rebellion and of cowardice, the voice of baseness and ignominy.\nThere is war in my soul. Enlightened by this inner spectacle, I cast my\neyes once more over that world in which I have seen shining everywhere\nsome divine rays; and I see that by a triple gate, lofty and wide, evil\nhas entered thither, accompanied by error and deformity. Then I\nunderstand that all may become profane; I understand that there is an\nerring science, a corrupting art, a moral system full of immorality. But\nthese words take for me a new meaning. There is no sacred evil, there is\nno profane good; there are no sacred errors and profane truths. Where\nGod is, all is holy; where there is rebellion against God, all is evil.\nAnd so the God who is my light is my fortress also; my heart is\nstrengthened while it is set at liberty, and I can join the ancient song\nof Israel:\n\n\n     Jehovah is our strength and tower.\n\n\nYes, Sirs, God is in all, because He is the universal principle of\nbeing; but He is not in all after the same manner. God is in the pure\nheart by the joy which He gives to it; He is in the frivolous heart by\nthe void and the vexation which urge it to seek a better destiny; He is\nin the corrupt heart by that merciful remorse which does not permit it\nto wander, without warning, from the springs of life. God makes use of\nall for the good of His creatures. He is everywhere by the direct\nmanifestation of His will, except in the acts of rebellious liberty, and\nin the shadow of pain which follows that evil light which leads astray\nfrom Him.\n\nHaving said that the idea of God the Creator alone satisfies the reason,\nand raises up, upon the basis of reason, man's conscience and heart, I\nshould wish to show you, in conclusion, that this idea renders an\naccount of the great systems of error which divide the human mind\nbetween them. Truth bears this lofty mark, that it never overthrows a\ndoctrine without causing any portion of truth which it may have\ncontained to pass into its own bosom.\n\nWhat then,--apart from declared atheism, from the dualism which has\nalmost disappeared, and from faith in God the Creator,--are the great\nsystems which share the human mind between them? There are two: deism\nand pantheism.\n\nWhat is deism? It is a doctrine which acknowledges that there is one\nGod, the cause of the universe; but a God who is in a manner withdrawn\nfrom His own work, and who leaves it to go on alone. God has regulated\nthings in the mass, but not in detail, or, to employ an expression of\nJean-Jacques Rousseau (who came at a later period to entertain better\nopinions), \"God is like a king who governs his kingdom, but who does not\ntrouble himself to ascertain whether all the taverns in it are good\nones.\" The idea of a general government of God which does not descend to\ndetails--such is the essence of deism.\n\nWhat is pantheism, in the ordinary meaning of the word? We have already\nsaid: it is a doctrine which absorbs God in the universe, which\nconfounds Him with nature, and makes of Him only the inert substance,\nthe unconscious principle of the universe. These are the two great\nconceptions which wrestle, in the history of human thought, against the\nidea of the Creator. These two systems triumph easily one over the\nother, because each of them contains a portion of truth which is wanting\nto its antagonist. They cannot support themselves because each of them\nhas in it a portion of error. This is what we must well understand.\n\nDeism contains a portion of truth; for it maintains a Creator\nessentially distinct from the Creation, or, according to an expression\nwhich I translate from an ancient Indian poem: \"One single act of His\ncreated the Universe, and He remained Himself whole and entire.\" This\nthought is true. What is the error of deism? It is that it makes a God\nlike to a man who works upon matter existing previously to his action,\nand who puts in operation forces independent of himself, and which he\ndoes nothing but employ. In this way a watchmaker makes a watch which\ngoes afterwards without him, because the watchmaker only sets to work\nforces which have an independent existence, and which continue to act\nwhen he has ceased his labor. We work upon matter foreign to us. The\nworkman did not make matter, but only disposes of it, and he can never\ndo more than modify the action of forces which do not proceed from his\nwill, and have not been regulated by his understanding. But the Being\nwho is the cause of all cannot dispose of foreign forces which act\nafterwards by themselves, since there exists in His work no principle of\naction other than those which He has Himself placed in it.\n\nDeism results therefore from a confusion between the work of a creature\nplaced in a preexisting world, and the work of the Supreme Will which is\nin itself the single and absolute cause of all. It contains an element\nof dualism: its God does not create; but organizes a world the being of\nwhich does not depend on him. Take what is true in deism--the existence\nof the only God; remember that the Creator is the absolute Cause of the\nuniverse; and the distinction between _ensemble_ and detail will vanish,\nand you will understand that God is too great that there should be\nanything small in His eyes:\n\n\n     God measures not our lot by line and square:\n       The grass-suspended drop of morning dew\n     Reflects a firmament as vast and fair\n       As Ocean from his boundless field of blue.[171]\n\n\nIn other words, take what is true in deism, and accept all the\nconsequences of it, and you will arrive at the full doctrine of the\ncreation.\n\nPantheism recognizes the omnipresence of God in the universe, or, if you\nlike the terms of the school, the immanence of God; this is its portion\nof truth. When I open the Hindoos' songs of adoration, and find therein\nthe unlimited enumeration of the manifestations of God in nature, I find\nnothing to complain of. But when, in those same hymns, I see liberty\ndenied, the origin of evil attributed to the Holy One, and man cowering\nbefore Destiny, instead of turning his eyes freely towards the Heavenly\nFather, then I stand only more erect and say: You forget that if your\nGod is the Cause of all, He is the Cause of liberty. If liberty exists,\nevil, the revolt of liberty, is not the work of the Creator. Your system\ncontradicts itself. You make of God the universal Principle, and you are\nright; make of Him then the Author of free wills, so that He will be no\nlonger the source of evil, and we shall be agreed.\n\nDeism and pantheism therefore, pushed to their legitimate consequences,\nare transformed and united in the truth. And you see plainly that I am\nnot making, for my part, an arbitrary selection in these systems. I am\nwalking by one sole light, the light which has been given to us, and\nwhich serves me everywhere as a guiding clue:--The Lord is God, and\nthere is no other God but He.\n\nSuch, Gentlemen, is the fundamental truth on which rests all religion,\nand all philosophy capable of accounting for facts. Such is the grand\ncause which claims all the efforts which we are wasting too often in\nbarren conflicts--the cause of God. But do I say the truth? Is it the\ncause of God which is at stake? When a surgeon, by a successful\noperation, has restored sight to a blind man, we are not wont to say\nthat he has rendered a service to the sun. This cause is our own; it is\nthat of society at large, it is that of families, that of individuals;\nit is the cause which concerns our dignity, our happiness; it is the\ncause of all, even of those who attack it in words of which they do not\ncalculate the import, and who, were they to succeed in banishing God\nfrom the public conscience, would, with us, recoil in terror at sight of\nthe frightful abysses into which we all should fall together.\n\nIt is time to sum up these considerations.\n\nInert and unintelligent matter is not the cause of life and\nintelligence.\n\nHuman consciences would be plunged in irremediable misery, if ever they\ncould be persuaded that there is nothing superior to man.\n\nThe universe is the work of wisdom and of power; it is the creation of\nthe Infinite Mind. What can still be wanting to our hearts? The thought\nthat God desires our good,--that He loves us. If it is so, we shall be\nable to understand that our cause is His, that He is not an impassible\nsun whose rays fall on us with indifference, but a Father who is moved\nat our sorrows, and who would have us find joy and peace in Him. This\nwill be the subject of our next and concluding lecture.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[160] Firmissimum hoc afferri videtur, cur deos esse credamus, quod\nnulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis, cujus mentem non\nimbuerit deorum opinio. Multi de diis prava sentiunt, id enim vitioso\nmore effici solet; omnes tamen esse vim et naturam divinam\narbitrantur.... Omni autem in re consentio omnium gentium, lex naturae\nputanda est.--_Tuscul._ i. 13.\n\n[161] _In presence of Heaven, we must believe or deny._ See Lecture III.\n\n[162] _Profession de foi du vicaire Savoyard._\n\n[163]\n\n     Thou hadst only forgotten one point,\n     And that was, to light thy lantern.\n\n[164] _Harmonices mundi libri quinque_.\n\n[165] The authenticity of this reply is disputed; M. Arago gives it in\ndifferent terms; but the question is of small consequence here as one of\nhistorical criticism, my object being not to establish a fact, but to\nput an idea in a strong light by means of an example.\n\n[166]\n\n                     .... Pour etre approuves\n     De semblables projets veulent etre acheves.\n\n[167] Ps. cxlviii.\n\n[168]\n\n     Le monde entier te glorifie,\n     L'oiseau te chante sur son nid;\n     Et pour une goutte de pluie\n     Des milliers d'etres t'ont beni.\n\n[169] Albert de Haller. _Lettres sur les verites les plus importantes de\nla revelation_. Lettre 2.\n\n[170] Et toute la _science_ est un hymne a sa gloire.\n\n[171]\n\n     Dieu ne mesure pas nos sorts a l'etendue.\n     La goutte de rosee a l'herbe suspendue\n     Y reflechit un ciel aussi vaste, aussi pur\n     Que l'immense Ocean dans ses plaines d'azur.\n                                          LAMARTINE.\n\n\n\n\nLECTURE VII.\n\n_THE FATHER._\n\n(At Geneva, 8th Dec. 1863.--At Lausanne, 1st Feb. 1864.)\n\n\nGENTLEMEN,\n\nWe have proposed for solution the problem which includes all others\nwhatsoever--the problem of the universe. What are the laws which govern\nthe universe? They are those which are the objects of science, taking\nthat word in its largest and most general meaning. What is the cause of\nthe universe? The eternal power of the Infinite Mind. These are the two\nanswers which we have hitherto obtained, but, as we have explained, a\nstudy is not complete if it confine itself to these two answers. When we\nknow the law and the cause of an object submitted to our study, we\nfurther look for the end designed. This is no freak of our fancy, but\nthe direct result of the constitution of our understanding. The universe\nis the creation of God. What is the design of the creation? I answer:\nthe design of the creation is the happiness of spirits. Nature is made\nfor the spiritual beings to which it offers the condition of their life\nand development; spiritual beings are made for felicity. The moving\nspring of infinite power is goodness: this is my thesis. If I succeed in\nestablishing it, it will follow that we shall in imagination see issuing\nfrom the supreme unity of the Infinite Being three rays: the power which\ncreates the being of things; the intelligence which orders them; and the\nlove which conducts them to their destination. It will also follow that\nI shall have justified the title under which these Lectures were\nannounced: Power and wisdom are attributes of the Creator; the Father\nreveals Himself in goodness.\n\nWhat shall be our method? Can we enter into the counsels of God? By what\nmeans? To place our understanding in the midst of the Divine\nconsciousness, there to behold the spring of the determinations of the\nInfinite Being, were an attempt so far exceeding our capacity, that it\nis impossible to point out any means whatever by which it could be made.\nThis would be to conceive of God in His eternal essence, independently\nof His relation to the universe, to nature, and to our reason. I do not\nsay merely that the attempt would be fruitless; I say that we have no\nmeans of attempting this metaphysical adventure. But might we not, in\nlooking at the work of God, discern in it the evidence of its design?\nThis is a process which we often follow in regard to our\nfellow-creatures. Do we wish to know the object which a man has in view\nin his labor? He may himself disclose that object to us directly in\nwords, or we may endeavor to discover it. We watch him at work, and by\nobserving the way in which he proceeds we sometimes come to know what\nhis thoughts are, because we find ourselves in presence of the work of a\nmind, and we ourselves are mind. Can we in the same way, by looking at\nthe universe, that grand work, succeed in discovering its end?\n\nThe way on which we are entering raises two objections, which proceed\nfrom the difficulties felt by two classes of men of opposite views; and\nour first business will be to rid ourselves of these preliminary\ndifficulties.\n\nYou will never succeed, it has been said to me, in proving the goodness\nof God, because evil is in the world. I am not inventing, Gentlemen. A\nletter containing this challenge has been addressed to me by one of\nyou. It is manifest, since we propose to ourselves to recognize in the\nwork the intention of the Worker, and since our thesis is the goodness\nof the First Cause of the universe, that evil, in all its forms, sin,\npain, imperfection, is the main objection which can be addressed to us.\nEvil is real; it is a sad and great reality; I am forward to acknowledge\nit. Any system which would prove that evil does not exist, or, which\ncomes to the same thing, that evil is necessary, that good and evil in\nshort are of the same nature, is an impossible, I had almost said a\nculpable, system. The strongest minds have worn themselves out in such\nattempts with no result whatever. The great Leibnitz attempted an\nenterprise of this nature. His system consisted in extenuating evil as\nfar as possible, and in pronouncing that amount of evil, of which he\ncould not dissemble the existence, to be necessary. He failed. The\nstrong intellectual armor of one of the greatest geniuses the world has\never seen was completely transpierced by the sharp and brilliant shaft\nof Voltaire.\n\n\n     Sad reckoners of the woes which men endure,\n     Sharpening the pangs ye make pretence to cure,\n     Poor comforters! in your attempts I see\n     Nought but the pride which feigns unreal glee!\n     O mortals, of such bliss how weak the spell!\n     Ye cry in doleful accents--\"All is well!\"--\n     And all things at the great deceit rebel.\n     Nay, if your minds to coin the flattery dare,\n     Your hearts as often lay the falsehood bare.\n     The gloomy truth admits of no disguise--\n     Evil is on the earth![172]\n\n\nFor once, Gentlemen, we will not contradict our old neighbor of Ferney.\nYes, evil is on the earth; and it constitutes, in the question which we\nare discussing, the greatest of problems, the most serious of\ndifficulties. Let us listen to a modern poet:\n\n\n     Why then so great, O Sovereign Lord,\n       Came evil from thy forming hand,\n       That Reason, yea, and Virtue stand\n     Aghast before the sight abhorred?\n\n     And how can deeds so hideous glare\n       Beneath the beams of holy light,\n       That on the lips of hapless wight\n     Dies at their view the trembling prayer?\n\n     Why do the many parts agree\n       So scantly in thy work sublime?\n       And what is pestilence, or crime,\n     Or death, O righteous God, to Thee?[173]\n\n\nWe have only to put this poetry into common prose to obtain this\nargument, namely,--The presence of evil in the world is not compatible\nwith the idea of the goodness of God. Here is the objection in all its\nforce. And what is the answer? Simply this, that God did not create\nevil. It was not He who brought crime into the world. He created\nliberty, which is a good, and evil is the produce of created liberty in\nrebellion against the law of its being. I borrow from Jean-Jacques\nRousseau the development of this thought. \"If man,\" says he, \"is a free\nagent, then he acts of himself; whatever he does freely enters not into\nthe ordained system of Providence, and cannot be imputed to it. The\nCreator does not will the evil which man does, in abusing the liberty\nwhich He gives him. He has made him free in order that he may do not\nevil but good by choice. To murmur because God does not hinder him from\ndoing evil, is to murmur because He made him of an excellent nature,\nattached to his actions the moral character which ennobles them, and\ngave him a right to virtue. What! in order to prevent man from being\nwicked, must he needs be confined to instinct and made a mere brute? No;\nGod of my soul, never will I reproach Thee with having made it in Thine\nimage, in order that I might be free, good, and happy, like Thyself.\n\n\"It is the abuse of our faculties which renders us unhappy and wicked.\nOur vexations and our cares come to us from ourselves.\"\n\nSuch is Rousseau's answer to the objection drawn from the existence of\nevil. It is a good one. It is so good that it is impossible to find a\nbetter. If we are determined not to outrage the human conscience by\ndenying the reality of evil; if God is the sovereign good, and if there\nis no other principle of things than He; evil cannot be accounted for\notherwise than by the rebellion of the creature. But now, Rousseau's\nanswer, excellent in itself and in the abstract, becomes profoundly\ninadequate, as the citizen of Geneva goes on to develop his theory. Evil\ncomes from the creature; but each individual is not the exclusive source\nof the evils which he does and suffers. To attribute to each individual,\nnot only the responsibility of his acts, but the origin of the evil\ngerms which exist in his soul, is the untenable proposition of a\ndesperate individualism. There is evidently among men a common property\nin evil; Rousseau sees it clearly enough, but he makes vain efforts to\nfind in the organization of society and in the condition of civilization\nthe causes of pain and of sin. When one has come to see clearly that the\nsource of evil is in the creature, the close mutual connection of\ncreated wills and their relations with nature present a field for long\nand difficult study; and Rousseau has no sooner discerned the road to\ntruth than he wanders away into byroads in which the solution of the\nproblem escapes him. This problem, Gentlemen, I have the intention and\ndesire of studying some day, if God permit, with those of you who may be\nwilling to undertake it with me. We shall then have to deal with an\nobjection, or rather with a difficulty. But this difficulty, which we\ncannot now dispose of, must not hinder us from stating our thesis. In\nevery well-conducted study, the propositions to be maintained must be\nlaid down and supported before dealing with objections. If it were\nmaintained that evil is the principle of things, it would be necessary\nfirst of all to endeavor to establish the thesis, in which the existence\nof good would be brought forward, and would constitute the objection.\nThe objection would have to be answered--Why has good appeared in the\nworld? And I would just say in passing, that our libraries are full of\ntreatises upon the origin of evil, and I have never met with one upon\nthe origin of good. It appears therefore that reason has always\nadmitted, by a sort of instinct, the identity of good, and of the\nprinciple of being. Our thesis is that the principle of the universe is\ngood. We are going to try to demonstrate it. Afterwards the difficulty,\nevil, will present itself, of which it will be necessary to seek the\nexplanation. This will be the natural sequel, and the necessary\ncomplement of the course of lectures which we are concluding to-day.\n\nI pass to another difficulty, another challenge which also has been\naddressed to me.\n\nYour object, Christians have said to me, is to establish that the\nprinciple and ground of all things is goodness. This you will not be\nable to do without departing from your prescribed plan, and entering\nupon the domain of Christian faith properly so called. In your\nexamination of the universe will you leave out of view Jesus Christ and\nHis work? Do you not know that it is by means of this work that the idea\nof the love of God has been implanted in the world, and that it is\nthence you have taken it? Do you think to climb to the loftiest heights\nof thought, and to make the ascent by some other road than over the\nmountain of Nazareth and the hill of Calvary?\n\nGentlemen, I declared my whole mind on this subject at first starting.\nThe complete idea of God demands, for its maintenance, the grand\ndoctrinal foundations of our faith. Christian in its origin, firm faith\nin the love of God the Creator requires for its defence the armor of the\nGospel. But before defending this belief, we must first establish it; we\nmust show that it has natural roots in human nature. Christianity\npurifies and strengthens it, but it does not in an absolute sense create\nit. The mark of truth is that it does not strike us as something\nabsolutely new, but that it finds an echo in the depths of our soul.\nWhen we meet with it, we seem to re-enter into the possession of our\npatrimony. The Cross of Jesus Christ is without all contradiction the\nmost transcendent proof of the mercy of the Creator; but the Cross of\nJesus Christ rather warrants the Christian in believing in the Divine\nlove than gives him the idea of it. We must distinguish in the Gospel\nbetween the universal religion which it has restored, and the act itself\nof that restoration, which constitutes the Gospel in the special sense\nof the word. Now what I am here maintaining is the fact of the existence\nin modern society of the elements of the universal religion. I am far\nfrom sharing in the illusions of my fellow-countryman Rousseau, when he\naffirms that even if he had lived in a desert isle, and had never known\na fellow-man, he would nevertheless have been able to write the\n_Profession de foi du Vicaire Savoyard_. I know very well that if I were\na Brahmin, born at the foot of the Himalayas, or a Chinese mandarin, I\nshould not be able to say all that I am saying respecting the goodness\nof God. The light which we have received--I know whence it radiates;\nbut, by the help of that light, I seek its kindred rays everywhere, and\neverywhere I find them in humanity.\n\nLet us endeavor, then, according to our plan, to recognize in the\nuniverse the marks of the Divine goodness. Let us first of all\ninterrogate the human soul, which is certainly one of the essential\nelements of the world; and let us interrogate it with regard to the\ngreat fact of religion.\n\nThe universal religion presents to observation two principal forms of\nmental experience: the sense of the necessity for appeasing the Divine\njustice, and the sense of the necessity for obtaining the help of God.\n\nThe sense of the necessity for appeasing justice reveals itself in\nsacrifices. There are sacrifices which are merely offerings of\ngratitude, and freewill gifts of love. But when you see the blood of\nanimals flowing in the temples, and not seldom human blood gushing forth\nupon the altars, you will be unable to escape the conviction that man,\nin presenting himself before the Deity, feels constrained to appease a\njustice which threatens him.\n\nThe sense of the need of help shows itself in prayer; and this must be\nthe especial object of our study, because it is in the fact of religious\ninvocation that we shall encounter the idea, obscure perhaps, but real,\nof the goodness of the First Cause of the universe.\n\nPrayer is a fact of the universal religion. Whence is it that we derive\na large part of what knowledge we have of the ancient civilizations of\nIndia and Egypt? From ruins: and the chief of these ruins are the ruins\nof temples, that is to say, of houses of prayer. Would we go further\nback than these monuments of stone? I interrogate those pioneers of\nscience who are searching for the traces of antiquity in old\nlanguages,--in the ruins of speech. I inquire, for example, of my\nlearned fellow-countryman, M. Adolphe Pictet: \"You who have studied,\nwith patient care, the first origins of our race--what have you\ndiscovered in the way of religion?\" He replies: \"When I have gone as far\nback as historical speculations can carry us by the aid of language, it\nappears to me that I no longer see temples built by the hand of man,\nbut, beneath the open vault of heaven, I see our earliest ancestors\nsending up together the chant of prayer and the flame of\nsacrifice.\"[174]\n\nAnd now, from this remote antiquity, I come down to the paganism, in\nwhich modern civilization had its beginning. Tertullian teaches us that\nthe pagans, seeming to forget their idols, and to offer a spontaneous\ntestimony to the truth, were often wont to exclaim--Great God! Good God!\nWhat in their mind was the order of these two thoughts, the thought of\ngreatness and that of goodness? The pediment of a temple at Rome bore\nthis famous inscription, _Deo optimo maximo_; and Cicero explains to us\nthat the God of the Capitol was by the Roman people named \"very good\" on\naccount of the benefits conferred by him, and \"very great\" on account of\nhis power.[175] It is the idea of goodness which here appears to be\nfirst. But let us go more directly to the root of the question: What do\nwe gather from the universality of prayer? What is it to pray? To pray\nis to ask. Prayer may be mingled with thanksgivings, and with\nexpressions of adoration, but in itself prayer is a petition. This\npetition rises to God: and when does it so rise? In distress, in\nanguish. It is misery, weakness, the heart cast down, the failing will,\nwhich unite to raise from earth to heaven that long cry which resounds\nacross all the pages of history: Help!--I analyze this fact, and inquire\nwhat it means. A request is made, and for what? For strength, for\ntranquillity, for peace; for happiness under all its forms. And of whom\nis happiness asked? Of goodness. Justice is appeased, power is dreaded,\nbut it is goodness which is invoked. It is so in human relations. The\nman who supplicates the fiercest tyrant only does so because he supposes\nthat a fibre of goodness may still vibrate in that savage heart. Take\nfrom him that thought; persuade him that the last gleam of pity is\nextinct in the heart to which he appeals, and you will arrest the prayer\non the lips of the suppliant. There will remain for him only the silence\nof despair, or the heroism of resignation.\n\nTo sum up:--Religion is a universal fact. \"There is no religion without\nprayer,\" said Voltaire, and he never said better. There is no prayer\nwithout a confused, perhaps, but real, conviction of the goodness of the\nFirst Cause of the universe. If you could stifle in man's heart the\nfeeling that the Principle of things is good, you would silence over the\nwhole globe that voice of prayer which is ever rising to God. Thus\nhumanity itself testifies to the truth for which I am contending.\nHumanity prays; it believes therefore in the goodness of God. This fact\nis an argument. The heart of man is organized to believe that God is\ngood: it is the mark set by the Worker Himself upon His work.\n\nLet us study now another of the elements of the universe. We have heard\nthe answer of man's heart; let us ask for the answer of reason. Has\nreason nothing to tell us respecting the intentions of the Creator? Let\nus place it in presence of the idea of God--of the Infinite Being, and\nsee what it will be able to teach us.\n\nTo attain my object, I must explain more particularly than as yet I have\ndone, a word rendered frivolous by the levity of our heart, a word\ndefiled by the disorder of our passions, and too often by the\nunworthiness, and worse, of poets and novelists, but which still, in its\nvirgin purity, is ever protesting against the outrages to which it has\nbeen subjected: that word is _love_.\n\nThis word has two principal meanings. In the Platonic sense of it, it is\nthe search after what is beautiful, great, noble, pure,--after what, as\nbeing of the very real nature of the soul, attracts, fills, and delights\nit. But there is another sort of love, which does not pursue greatness\nand beauty, but which gives itself; a love which seeks the wretched to\nenrich him, the poor to make him happy, the fallen to raise him up.\nThese two kinds of love seem to follow different and even contrary laws.\nHere, for instance, is a description of what often occurs in a large\ncity.[176] A man leaves his house in the evening in order to be present\nat performances in which I am willing to believe that everything bears\nthe stamp of nobleness and grandeur, or at least of a pure and wholesome\ntaste. He experiences keen enjoyment, and that of an elevated kind. The\nspectacle over, he returns to his dwelling, and at a still later hour he\nretires at length to his repose. He has not long extinguished his\nluxurious tapers, perhaps, when other men, who have slept while others\nwere seeking amusement, rise before daylight, and, lighting their small\nlanterns, go forth to succor the unfortunate, without witnesses and\nwithout ostentation.\n\nI have taken this example from Xavier de Maistre. Let me give you\nanother from scenes more familiar to ourselves. You know those pure\nsummer mornings, when one may truly say that the Alp smiles and that the\nmountain invites. A young man quits his dwelling at the first dawning of\nthe day, in his hand the tourist's staff, and his countenance beaming\nwith joy. He starts on a mountain excursion. All day long he quaffs the\npure air with delight, revels in the freedom of the pasture-grounds, in\nthe view of the lofty summits and of the distant horizons. He reposes in\nthe shade of the forest, drinks at the spring from the rock, and when he\nhas gazed on the Alpine chain resplendent in the radiance of the setting\nsun, he lingers still to see--\n\n\n     Twilight its farewell to the hills delaying.[177]\n\n\nNoble enjoyments! This young man enjoys because he loves. The spectacle\nof the creation speaks to his heart and elevates his thoughts. He loves\nthat enchanting nature, which blends in a marvellous union the\nimpressions which in human relations are produced by the strong man's\nmajesty and the maiden's sweetest smile.\n\nOn this same summer-day, another man has also risen before the sun. He\nis devoted to the assuaging of human miseries, and he has had much to\ndo. He has mounted gloomy staircases; he has entered dark chambers; he\nhas spent time in hospitals, in the midst of the pains of sickness; he\nhas come, in prisons, to the relief of pains which are sadder still.\nDay, as it dawned, gilded the summits of the Alps, but he saw not that\npure light of the morning. Day, as it advanced, penetrated into the\nvalleys, but he did not notice its progress. The sun set in his glory,\nbut he had no opportunity to admire either the bright reflection of the\nwaters, or the rosy tint of the mountains. And yet he too is joyful\nbecause he loves. He loves the fulfilment of stern duty, he loves\npoverty solaced, and suffering alleviated.\n\nHere are the two kinds of love. The disciple of Plato rises, far from\nthe vulgarities of life, into the lofty regions of the ideal, and feeds\non beauty. Vincent de Paul takes the place of a convict at the galleys\nthat he may restore a father to his children. These two kinds of love\nseem to us to be contrary one to the other: the one seeks itself, and\nthe other gives itself. Still they are both necessary to life, for in\norder to give we must receive. In the accomplishment of the works of\ngoodness, the soul would be impoverished and would end by drying up in\na purely mechanical exercise of beneficence, had it no spring from which\nto draw forth the living waters. Man must himself find joy in order to\ndiffuse it amongst his fellows. But mark the incomparable marvel of the\nspiritual order of things! The love which gives itself is able to find\nits worthiest object and its purest satisfaction in the very act of\nkindness. There is joy in self-devotion; there is happiness in\nself-sacrifice: the fountain furnishes its own supplies. Thus are\nharmonized the two contrary tendencies of the heart of man. \"It is more\nblessed to give than to receive;\" words these, of Jesus Christ, which,\nforgotten by the Evangelists, have been recorded by the Apostle St.\nPaul. And since the thought is a beautiful one, it has adorned the\nstrains of the poets: says Lamartine--\n\n\n     Dost thou happiness resign\n     To another? It is thine--\n     Larger for the largess--still![178]\n\n\nAnd Victor Hugo, personifying Charity, makes her speak as follows:\n\n\n     Dear to every man that lives,\n     Joy I bring to him who gives,\n     Joy I leave with him who takes.[179]\n\n\nAnd because this thought is profound as well as beautiful, it has been\ntaken up by the philosophers. \"To love,\" said Leibnitz, \"is to place\none's happiness in the happiness of another.\" Here is the connecting\nlink between Platonic love and the love which is charity. Hear how a\nChristian orator comments upon these words:--\"This sublime definition\nhas no need of explanations: it is either understood at once, or it is\nnot understood. The man who has loved understands it; and he who has not\nloved will never understand it. He who has loved knows that a shadow in\nthe heart of the beloved one would darken his own: he knows that he\nwould reckon no means too costly--watchings, labors, privations--by\nwhich to create a smile on the lips of the sorrowful; he knows that he\nwould die to redeem a forfeited life; he knows that he would be happy\nin another's welfare, happy in his graces, happy in his virtues, happy\nin his glory, happy in his happiness. The man who has loved knows all\nthis; he who has not loved knows nothing of it:--I pity him!\"[180]\n\nBut the great mistake, which seems peculiar to our nature, is that we\nare ever connecting happiness with the idea of receiving, and are always\nthinking of giving as of a loss to ourselves. We do not understand that\nselfishly to keep is to be impoverished, while freely to relinquish is\nto be enriched. Yet here is the grand discovery of the spiritual life;\nand once this discovery made, in order that the spiritual life may\nattain its object, it only remains to find the strength to put it into\npractice. Selfishness is wrong, no doubt, but it is not only wrong, it\nis ignorant, for it looks for happiness where it is not; and it is\nunhappy, for it wanders from the paths of peace.\n\nLet us now apply these considerations to the Infinite Being, and to the\nproblem of the end of the creation. Leaving ourselves to the guidance of\nthe laws of our reason, let us ask what object we shall be able to\nattribute to the Creator in His work? Will creation be the effect of a\nnecessity? No, Sirs, for in that case everything in the world would be a\nmatter of fate, and liberty would remain inexplicable. If a blind power\nwere directing the Almighty Will, we should return to the worship of\ndestiny. Will creation, then, be the carrying out of a design of which\nthe motive is interest? But what conceivable interest can influence Him\nwho is the plentitude of being? Or will creation be a duty? But whence\nshould come the obligation for the Being who is in Himself the absolute\nlaw? Creation can only be conceived of as a work of love. But of what\nlove? Of that which is the manifestation of absolute disinterestedness,\nof supreme liberty. Allow me to introduce into this discussion some\neloquent words, uttered in the year 1848, in the midst of the\nrevolutionary agitations of Paris. The problem which we are debating was\ntreated then, in the presence of an excited crowd, by Pere\nLacordaire.[181] He is entering upon this question: What can have been\nthe motive of the creation? And he distinguishes between love in the\nPlatonic sense of it, for which he retains the name of love, and the\nlove which gives itself, which he designates by the term--goodness.\n\"Was it then love,\" he asks, \"which impelled the Divine Will, and said\nto it unceasingly: Go and create? Is it love which we must thus regard\nas our first father? But, alas! love itself has a cause in the beauty of\nits object; and what beauty could that dead and icy shade possess before\nGod, which preceded the universe, and to which we cannot give a name\nwithout betraying the truth?... There remained something, Sirs, be very\nsure, more generous than self-interest, more elevated than duty, more\npowerful than love. Search your own hearts, and if you find it hard to\nunderstand me, if your own endowments are unknown to you, listen to\nBossuet speaking of you:--'When God,' says he, 'made the heart of man,\nthe first thing He planted there was goodness:' goodness; that is to\nsay, that virtue which does not consult self-interest, which does not\nwait for the commands of duty, which needs not to be solicited by the\nattraction of the beautiful, but which stoops towards its object all the\nmore, as it is poorer, more miserable, more abandoned, more worthy of\ncontempt! It is true, Sirs, it is true: man possesses that adorable\nfaculty. It is not genius, nor glory, nor love, which measures the\nelevation of his soul,--it is goodness. This it is which gives to the\nhuman countenance its principal and most powerful charm; this it is\nwhich draws us together; this it is which brings into communication the\ngood and the evil, and which is everywhere, from heaven to earth, the\ngreat mediating principle. See, at the foot of the Alps, yon miserable\n_cretin_, which, eyeless, smileless, tearless, is not even conscious of\nits own degradation, and which looks like an effort of nature to insult\nitself in the dishonor of the greatest of its own productions: but\nbeware how you imagine that that wretched object has not found the road\nto any heart, or that his debasement has deprived him of the love of all\nthe world. No: he is beloved; he has a mother, he has brothers and\nsisters; he has a place at the cottage-hearth; he has the best place and\nthe most sacred of all, just because of all he may seem to have the\nleast claim to any. The bosom which nursed him supports him still, and\nthe superstition of love never speaks of him but as of a blessing sent\nof God. Such is man!\n\n\"But can I say, Such is man, without saying also, Such is God! From whom\nwould man derive goodness, if God were not the primordial Ocean of\ngoodness, and if, when He formed our heart, He had not first of all\npoured into it a drop from His own? Yes, God is good; yes, goodness is\nthe attribute which includes in it all the rest; and it is not without\nreason that antiquity engraved on the pediment of its temples that\nfamous inscription, in which goodness preceded greatness.\"\n\nNow, to say nothing of the sparkling beauty of these words, let us pause\nat this definite idea: The Eternal, the first universal Cause of all\nthings, independently of which nothing exists, could only create under\nthe impelling motive of the goodness which gives, and not of the love\nwhich seeks requital. This proposition is as clear in the abstract as\nany theorem of geometry. But we have touched the threshold of the\ninfinite; and we never touch the threshold of the infinite without\nfalling into some degree of bewilderment. Clear as this thought is in\nthe abstract, if we wish to analyze it in its real substance, our view\nis confused. You understand well that goodness increases in the\nproportion in which its object is diminished. We are by so much more\ngood as we stoop to that which is poorer and more miserable. What then\nshall be the infinite goodness? In order to find it, we must infinitely\ndiminish its object: and here we encounter mystery. To diminish an\nobject infinitely is an operation impossible to our thought. This\nmystery is encountered even in the mathematical sciences. We take a\nquantity, halve it, and again halve this half, and so on without end,\nbut we shall never obtain the infinity of smallness; for the quantity\nindefinitely divided will always remain indefinitely divisible. At\nwhatever degree of division we may have arrived, between what remains\nand nothingness there extends always the abyss of the infinite. So I\nseek for the object of infinite goodness: that object must be infinitely\ndestitute. I diminish accordingly the existence of the universe: I\nextinguish all the rays of its beauty; I take from it order, life,\nmeasure, color, light; I reduce it until it is nothing but formless\nmatter, a something--I know not what--which has no longer a name. Vain\nattempt! This nameless something, so long as it is anything, will not be\n_nothing_. Between it and nothing there will always be the infinite. If\nthe goodness of God is applied to any object which was existing\nindependently of Him, however poor and abject that object be conceived\nto have been, then God is no longer the unique, the absolute Creator. If\nimagination will cross the abyss, we shall come of necessity to\nsay--what? that the object of infinite love must have been\nnon-existence. This is what the orator already quoted has done:--\"All\nperfection supposes an object to which to apply itself. The divine\ngoodness therefore requires an object as vast and profound as itself.\nGod discovered it. From the bosom of His own fulness He saw that being\nwithout beauty, without form, without life, without name, that being\nwithout being which we call non-existence: He heard the cry of worlds\nwhich were not, the cry of a measureless destitution calling to a\nmeasureless goodness. Eternity was troubled, she said to Time: Begin!\"\n\nThis, Gentlemen, is eloquence. The thought in itself does not bear a\nrigorous analysis; but do not think that the lustrous beauty of the\nlanguage is only a brilliant veil to what in itself is absurd. We have\narrived at darkness, but it is at darkness visible; the cloud is lighted\nup by the ray that issues from it. Our goodness, finite creatures as we\nare, is so much the greater as the object on which it is bestowed is\nless. Infinite goodness must create for itself an object. It does not\nlove nothingness, but a creature which is nothing in itself, a creature\nsimply possible, which, before owing to it the blessings of existence,\nshall owe to it that existence itself. The only being that we can\nrepresent to ourselves, by a sublime image, as stooping towards\nnothingness, is He whose look gives life. The creature is willed for\nitself, or,--to quote the words of Professor Secretan, addressed to you\nlast year,--the foundation of nature is grace.[182] We ask: What can\nhave been the object of creation? Our reason answers: The Infinite Being\ncan only act from goodness, He can have no other object than the\nhappiness of His creatures.\n\nAnd now I recapitulate. We ask what is the object of creation; and\nwhereas we cannot transport ourselves into the inaccessible light of the\nDivine consciousness, we question the work of God in order to discern\nthe intentions of the Creator. From the fact that humanity prays, we\ngather the reply that man has a spontaneous belief in the goodness of\nthe First Cause of the universe. We place reason in presence of the\nidea of the Infinite Being; reason declares to us that He who is the\nplenitude of Being could not have created except from the motive of\nlove. We understand that God has made all for His own glory, and that\nHis glory consists in the manifestation of His goodness. These thoughts,\nin their full light, belong to the Gospel revelation, but they appear,\nunder a veil, in the conceptions which lie at the basis of pagan\nreligions. Without entering the temple of idols, we may bow the knee\nbefore the pediment of the ancient sanctuary, and, beneath the open\nvault of heaven, adore, with the Roman people, that God whose goodness\ntakes precedence of His greatness.\n\nThe direct consequence of the principles which we have just laid down is\nthat happiness is the object of our existence. Created by goodness, we\ncan have no other end than blessedness.\n\nBut beware of supposing that we can take for our guide our desire of\nhappiness, and ourselves calculate its conditions. Happiness is our end;\nit is the will of our Father; but we must let ourselves be conducted\ninto it. If, shutting our ears to the voice which lays upon us commands\nand obligations, we would take our destinies into our own hands; if we\nmade the search after happiness our rule, understanding happiness in\nour own way, we should be taking for light fantastic gleams which would\nlead us into abysses of ruin. The unruly propensities of our heart would\nlead us to make ourselves the centre of the world. To \"live for self\" is\nthe motto of selfishness, and the watchword of unhappiness. To live for\nGod is the way to happiness. To live to God, that is to say, over the\nruins of our shattered selfishness, to enter into order, to take our\nplace in the spiritual edifice of charity, and to share in the joy which\nGod allots to all His children--this is the end of our creation. Once\nlifted to the height of this thought, we are able to understand the\ngreat struggle which rent the conscience of the ancients, because in\ntheir times the light of truth illumined only at intervals the clouds of\nerror which covered the world.\n\nThere are in man two voices; the one leading him to happiness, the other\ncalling him to holiness. The first impulse of his nature is to start in\neager pursuit of mere enjoyment; but ere long the second voice is heard,\nthe voice of conscience, striving to arrest him in his course. If man do\nnot obey her call, conscience becomes his chastiser. Hence arises a\npainful struggle of conflicting feelings, and the human mind is the\nsubject of a strong temptation to pacify itself by silencing one of the\ntwo voices. It is the history of antiquity. Socrates, the wise Socrates,\nhad indeed cried aloud: Woe! woe to the man who separates the just from\nthe useful; and had warned men that happiness may be found apart from\nwhat is right and good. Cicero put into beautiful Latin the lessons of\nthe Grecian sage; but the torn heart of man was not long in tearing the\nmantle of the philosopher. From the thought, full and complete as it is,\nof Socrates issued two celebrated sects, one of which wished to\nestablish man's life on the basis of duty without reference to\nhappiness; and the other on the basis of happiness without reference to\nduty.\n\nThe Stoics attached themselves to duty; but the need of happiness\nasserted itself in spite of them, and sought satisfaction in the gloomy\npleasure of isolation, and in the savage joy of pride. The sage of these\nphilosophers sets himself free, not only from all the cares of earth,\nbut from all the bonds of the heart, from all natural affection.\nFinally, by a consequence, at once sad and odd, of the same doctrine,\nthe highest point of self-possession is to prove that man is master of\nhimself, by the emancipation of suicide and in the liberty of death. The\nStoic philosopher declares himself insensible to the ills of life; he\ndenies that pain is an evil; and, on the other hand, he claims the right\nto kill himself in order to escape from the ills of existence! So ended\nthis famous school. At the same period, the herd of Epicurus' followers,\ngiving themselves over to weak and shameful indulgences, were thus in\nfact laboring with all their might (this is Montesquieu's opinion) to\nprepare that enormous corruption under which were to sink together the\nglory of Rome and the civilization of the ancient world.\n\nThis struggle which rent the ancient conscience, and which still rends\nthe modern conscience wherever the goodness of God continues\nveiled--this great conflict is appeased when we have come to understand\nthat goodness is the first principle of things, that happiness is our\nend, and that the stern voice of conscience is a friendly voice which\nwarns us to shun those paths of error in which we should encounter\nwretchedness. The conscience is the voice of the Master; and the same\nauthority which, speaking in the name of duty, bids us--\"Be good,\"\nadds, in the gentle accents of hope--\"and thou shalt be happy.\"\nHappiness, duty,--these are the two aspects of the Divine Will. Love is\nthe solution of the universal enigma. Therefore, surprising as the\nthought may be, it is our duty to be happy. Our profession of faith,\nwhen we look above, must be: \"I believe in goodness;\" and when we enter\nagain into ourselves, our profession of faith should be: \"I believe in\nhappiness.\" And we do not believe in it. Not to believe in happiness is\nthe root of our ills; it is the original misery which includes all our\nmiseries. Triflers that we are, we give ourselves up to pleasure because\nwe do not believe in joy: frivolous, we run after giddy excitement\nbecause we do not believe in peace: with hearts corrupt, we abandon\nourselves to the devouring flame of the passions, because we do not\nbelieve in the serene light of true felicity. But the more the thought\nof God's love enters our mind, the more will faith in happiness issue\nfrom our soul as a blessed flower. Happiness is the end of our being; it\nis the will of the Father. To each one of us are these words addressed:\nGod loves thee; be happy! If therefore (and I address myself more\nparticularly to the younger of my hearers), if in the depth of your\nsoul you are conscious of a sudden aspiration after true felicity, ah!\ndo not suffer the holy flame to be extinguished, do not talk of\nillusions; do not, I pray you, resign yourselves to the prose of life;\nto a dreary and gloomy contentedness with a destiny which has no ideal.\nYour nature does not deceive you; it is you who deceive yourselves, if\nyou seek your own welfare in the world of foolish or guilty chimeras.\nListen to all the voices which speak to you of comfort; be attentive to\nall the words of peace. Seek, labor, pray, till you are able to utter,\nin quiet confidence, those words of the Psalmist:\n\n\n     In peace I lay me down to rest;\n     No fears of evil haunt my breast:\n     In peace I sleep till dawn of day,\n     For God, my God, is near alway:\n     On Him in faith my cares I roll;\n     He never sleeps who guards my soul.[183]\n\n\nGod in the heart--this it is which adds zest to our enjoyments,\nsanctifies our affections, calms our griefs, and which, amidst the\nstruggles, the sorrows, and the harrowing afflictions of life, suffers\nto rise from the heart to the countenance that sublime smile which can\nshine brightly even through tears.\n\nFOOTNOTES:\n\n[172]\n\n     Tristes calculateurs des miseres humaines,\n     Ne me consolez point, vous aigrissez mes peines;\n     Et je ne vois en vous que l'effort impuissant\n     D'un fier infortune qui feint d'etre content.\n     Quel bonheur, O mortels, et faible et miserable.\n     Vous criez: \"Tout est bien\" d'une voix lamentable;\n     L'univers vous dement, et votre propre coeur\n     Cent fois de votre esprit a refute l'erreur.\n     Il le faut avouer, le mal est sur la terre.\n                                    DESASTRE DE LISBONNE.\n\n[173]\n\n     Pourquoi donc, O Maitre supreme,\n     As-tu cree le mal si grand\n     Que la raison, la vertu meme\n     S'epouvantent en le voyant?\n\n     Comment, sous la sainte lumiere,\n     Voit-on des actes si hideux,\n     Qu'ils font expirer la priere\n     Sur les levres du malheureux?\n\n     Pourquoi, dans ton oeuvre celeste,\n     Tant d'elements si peu d'accord?\n     A quoi bon le crime et la peste,\n     O Dieu juste! pourquoi la mort?\n            ALFRED DE MUSSET, _Espoir en Dieu_.\n\n[174] _Les origines indo-europeennes, ou les Aryas primitifs._--The\nabove is a _resume_, not a verbatim quotation.\n\n[175] Quocirca te, Capitoline, quem propter beneficia populus Romanus\nOPTIMUM, propter vim MAXIMUM nominavit. (_Pro domo sua_, LVII.)\n\n[176] See the _Voyage autour de ma chambre_ of Xavier de Maistre.\n\n[177] _Le crepuscule aux monts prolonger ses adieux._\n\n[178]\n\n     Tout le bonheur tu cedes\n     Accroit ta felicite.\n\n[179]\n\n     Chere a tout homme quel qu'il soit,\n     J'apporte la joie a qui donne\n     Et je la laisse a qui recoit.\n\nAnd Shakspeare--\n\n        \".... Mercy ... is twice bless'd,\n     It blesseth him that gives, and him that takes.\"\n                         _Merchant of Venice._--[TR.]\n\n[180] Lacordaire. _Conferences de 1848._\n\n[181] _Conferences de 1848_, p. 78.\n\n[182] _La raison et le Christianisme_: twelve lectures on the existence\nof God, one vol. 12mo. In the _Philosophie de la liberte_ (2 vols. 8vo.)\nM. Secretan has set forth, in a severely scientific form, the arguments\nof which the reader has just seen the oratorical expression from the pen\nof Pere Lacordaire. This agreement is worth notice, the dates showing\nthat no communication was possible.\n\n[183]\n\n     Je me couche sans peur,\n     Je m'endors sans frayeur,\n     Sans crainte je m'eveille.\n     Dieu qui soutient ma foi\n     Est toujours pres de moi,\n     Et jamais ne sommeille.\n\n\nTHE END.\n\n       *       *       *       *       *\n\nCambridge: Printed by John Wilson and Son.","title":"The Heavenly Father: Lectures on Modern Atheism","tradition":"philosophy-ethics","translated_text":null,"word_count":80461}