{"collection":"scripture-revelation","full_text_available":true,"graph_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/api/page/gutenberg_18438/graph","html_url":"https://unchartedknowledge.5gfusion.net/v2/page/gutenberg_18438","id":"gutenberg_18438","license":"Public Domain (US)","rights_basis":"gutenberg_metadata_copyright_false","source":"gutenberg","source_url":"https://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/18438","summary":null,"tags":["Category: Philosophy & Ethics","Category: Religion/Spirituality","Christian ethics -- Catholic authors"],"text":"E-text prepared by Michael Gray (Lost_Gamer@comcast.net)\n\n\n\nEXPLANATION OF CATHOLIC MORALS\n\nA Concise, Reasoned, and Popular Exposition of Catholic Morals\n\nby\n\nRev. JOHN H. STAPLETON\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nNew York, Cincinnati, Chicago:\nBenzinger Brothers\nPrinters to the Holy Apostolic See\nPublishers of Benzinger's Magazine\n1913\n\n\n\n\nNihil Obstat.\nREMY LAFORT,\n_Censor Librorum_.\n\n\n\n\nImprimatur\nJOHN M. FARLEY,\nArchbishop of New York\nNew York, March 25, 1904\nCopyright, 1904, by Benzinger Brothers.\n\n\n\n\nPREFACE\n\nTHE contents of this volume appeared originally in The Catholic\nTranscript, of Hartford, Connecticut, in weekly installments, from\nFebruary, 1901, to February, 1903. During the course of their\npublication, it became evident that the form of instruction adopted was\nappreciated by a large number of readers in varied conditions of life--\nthis appreciation being evinced, among other ways, by a frequent and\nwidespread demand for back-numbers of the publishing journal. The\nmanagement finding itself unable to meet this demand, suggested the\nbringing out of the entire series in book-form; and thus, with very few\ncorrections, we offer the \"Briefs\" to all desirous of a better\nacquaintance with Catholic Morals.\nTHE AUTHOR.\n\n\n\nCONTENTS\n\n          I. Believing and Doing\n         II. The Moral Agent\n        III. Conscience\n         IV. Laxity and Scruples\n          V. The Law of God and Its Breach\n         VI. Sin\n        VII. How to Count Sins\n       VIII. Capital Sins\n         IX. Pride\n          X. Covetousness\n         XI. Lust\n        XII. Anger\n       XIII. Gluttony\n        XIV. Drink\n         XV. Envy\n        XVI. Sloth\n       XVII. What We Believe\n      XVIII. Why We Believe\n        XIX. Whence Our Belief: Reason\n         XX. Whence Our Belief: Grace and Will\n        XXI. How We Believe\n       XXII. Faith and Error\n      XXIII. The Consistent Believer\n       XXIV. Unbelief\n        XXV. How Faith May Be Lost\n       XXVI. Hope\n      XXVII. Love of God\n     XXVIII. Love of Neighbor\n       XXIX. Prayer\n        XXX. Petition\n       XXXI. Religion\n      XXXII. Devotions\n     XXXIII. Idolatry and Superstition\n      XXXIV. Occultism\n       XXXV. Christian Science\n      XXXVI. Swearing\n     XXXVII. Oaths\n    XXXVIII. Vows\n      XXXIX. The Professional Vow\n         XL. The Profession\n        XLI. The Religious\n       XLII. The Vow of Poverty\n      XLIII. The Vow of Obedience\n       XLIV. The Vow of Chastity\n        XLV. Blasphemy\n       XLVI. Cursing\n      XLVII. Profanity\n     XLVIII. The Law of Rest\n       XLIX. The Day of Rest\n          L. Keeping the Lord's Day Holy\n         LI. Worship of Sacrifice\n        LII. Worship of Rest\n       LIII. Servile Works\n        LIV. Common Works\n         LV. Parental Dignity\n        LVI. Filial Respect\n       LVII. Filial Love\n      LVIII. Authority and Obedience\n        LIX. Should We Help Our Parents?\n         LX. Disinterested Love in Parents\n        LXI. Educate the Children\n       LXII. Educational Extravagance\n      LXIII. Godless Education\n       LXIV. Catholic Schools\n        LXV. Some Weak Points in the Catholic School System\n       LXVI. Correction\n      LXVII. Justice and Rights\n     LXVIII. Homicide\n       LXIX. Is Suicide a Sin?\n        LXX. Self-Defense\n       LXXI. Murder Often Sanctioned\n      LXXII. On the Ethics of War\n     LXXIII. The Massacre of the Innocents\n      LXXIV. Enmity\n       LXXV. Our Enemies\n      LXXVI. Immorality\n     LXXVII. The Sink of Iniquity\n    LXXVIII. Wherein Nature Is Opposed\n      LXXIX. Hearts\n       LXXX. Occasions\n      LXXXI. Scandal\n     LXXXII. Not Good to Be Alone\n    LXXXIII. A Helping Hand\n     LXXXIV. Thou Shalt Not Steal\n      LXXXV. Petty Thefts\n     LXXXVI. An Oft Exploited, But Specious Plea\n    LXXXVII. Contumely\n   LXXXVIII. Defamation\n     LXXXIX. Detraction\n         XC. Calumny\n        XCI. Rash Judgment\n       XCII. Mendacity\n      XCIII. Concealing the Truth\n       XCIV. Restitution\n        XCV. Undoing the Evil\n       XCVI. Paying Back\n      XCVII. Getting Rid of Ill-Gotten Goods\n     XCVIII. What Excuses From Restitution\n       XCIX. Debts\n\n\n\nMORAL BRIEFS.\n\nCHAPTER I.\nBELIEVING AND DOING.\n\nMORALS pertain to right living, to the things we do, in relation to God\nand His law, as opposed to right thinking, to what we believe, to\ndogma. Dogma directs our faith or belief, morals shape our lives. By\nfaith we know God, by moral living we serve Him; and this double\nhomage, of our mind and our works, is the worship we owe our Creator\nand Master and the necessary condition of our salvation.\n\nFaith alone will save no man. It may be convenient for the easy-going\nto deny this, and take an opposite view of the matter; but convenience\nis not always a safe counsellor. It may be that the just man liveth by\nfaith; but he lives not by faith alone. Or, if he does, it is faith of\na different sort from what we define here as faith, viz., a firm assent\nof the mind to truths revealed. We have the testimony of Holy Writ,\nagain and again reiterated, that faith, even were it capable of moving\nmountains, without good works is of no avail. The Catholic Church is\nconvinced that this doctrine is genuine and reliable enough to make it\nher own; and sensible enough, too. For faith does not make a man\nimpeccable; he may believe rightly, and live badly. His knowledge of\nwhat God expects of him will not prevent him from doing just the\ncontrary; sin is as easy to a believer as to an unbeliever. And he who\npretends to have found religion, holiness, the Holy Ghost, or whatever\nelse he may call it, and can therefore no longer prevaricate against\nthe law, is, to common-sense people, nothing but a sanctified humbug or\na pious idiot.\n\nNor are good works alone sufficient. Men of emancipated intelligence\nand becoming breadth of mind, are often heard to proclaim with a\ngreater flourish of verbosity than of reason and argument, that the\ngolden rule is religion enough for them, without the trappings of\ncreeds and dogmas; they respect themselves and respect their neighbors,\nat least they say they do, and this, according to them, is the\nfulfilment of the law. We submit that this sort of worship was in vogue\na good many centuries before the God-Man came down upon earth; and if\nit fills the bill now, as it did in those days, it is difficult to see\nthe utility of Christ's coming, of His giving of a law of belief and of\nHis founding of a Church. It is beyond human comprehension that He\nshould have come for naught, labored for naught and died for naught.\nAnd such must be the case, if the observance of the natural law is a\nsufficient worship of the Creator. What reasons Christ may have had for\nimposing this or that truth upon our belief, is beside the question; it\nis enough that He did reveal truths, the acceptance of which glorifies\nHim in the mind of the believer, in order that the mere keeping of the\ncommandments appear forthwith an insufficient mode of worship.\n\nBesides, morals are based on dogma, or they have no basis at all;\nknowledge of the manner of serving God can only proceed from knowledge\nof who and what He is; right living is the fruit of right thinking. Not\nthat all who believe rightly are righteous and walk in the path of\nsalvation: losing themselves, these are lost in spite of the truths\nthey know and profess; nor that they who cling to an erroneous belief\nand a false creed can perform no deed of true moral worth and are\ndoomed; they may be righteous in spite of the errors they profess,\nthanks alone to the truths in their creeds that are not wholly\ncorrupted. But the natural order of things demands that our works\npartake of the nature of our convictions, that truth or error in mind\nbeget truth or error correspondingly in deed and that no amount of\nself-confidence in a man can make a course right when it is wrong, can\nmake a man's actions good when they are materially bad. This is the\nprinciple of the tree and its fruit and it is too old-fashioned to be\neasily denied. True morals spring from true faith and true dogma; a\nfalse creed cannot teach correct morality, unless accidentally, as the\nresult of a sprinkling of truth through the mass of false teaching. The\nonly accredited moral instructor is the true Church. Where there is no\ndogma, there can logically be no morals, save such as human instinct\nand reason devise; but this is an absurd morality, since there is no\nrecognition of an authority, of a legislator, to make the moral law\nbinding and to give it a sanction. He who says he is a law unto himself\nchooses thus to veil his proclaiming freedom from all law. His golden\nrule is a thing too easily twistable to be of any assured benefit to\nothers than himself; his moral sense, that is, his sense of right and\nwrong, is very likely where his faith is--nowhere.\n\nIt goes without saying that the requirements of good morals are a heavy\nburden for the natural man, that is, for man left, in the midst of\nseductions and allurements, to the purely human resources of his own\nunaided wit and strength; so heavy a burden is this, in fact, that\naccording to Catholic doctrine, it cannot be borne without assistance\nfrom on high, the which assistance we call grace. This supernatural aid\nwe believe essential to the shaping of a good moral life; for man,\nbeing destined, in preference to all the rest of animal creation, to a\nsupernatural end, is thereby raised from the natural to a supernatural\norder. The requirements of this order are therefore above and beyond\nhis native powers and can only be met with the help of a force above\nhis own. It is labor lost for us to strive to climb the clouds on a\nladder of our own make; the ladder must be let down from above. Human\nair-ships are a futile invention and cannot be made to steer straight\nor to soar high in the atmosphere of the supernatural. One-half of\nthose who fail in moral matters are those who trust altogether, or too\nmuch, in their own strength, and reckon without the power that said\n\"Without Me you can do nothing.\"\n\nThe other half go to the other extreme. They imagine that the Almighty\nshould not only direct and aid them, but also that He should come down\nand drag them along in spite of themselves; and they complain when He\ndoes not, excuse and justify themselves on the ground that He does not,\nand blame Him for their failure to walk straight in the narrow path.\nThey expect Him to pull them from the clutches of temptation into which\nthey have deliberately walked. The drunkard expects Him to knock the\nglass out of his hand: the imprudent, the inquisitive and the vicious\nwould have it so that they might play with fire, yea, even put in their\nhand, and not be scorched or burnt. 'Tis a miracle they want, a miracle\nat every turn, a suspension of the laws of nature to save them from the\neffects of their voluntary perverseness. Too lazy to employ the means\nat their command, they thrust the whole burden on the Maker. God helps\nthose who help themselves. A supernatural state does not dispense us\nfrom the obligation of practising natural virtue. You can build a\nsupernatural life only on the foundations of a natural life. To do away\nwith the latter is to build in the air; the structure will not stay up,\nit will and must come down at the first blast of temptation.\n\nCatholic morals therefore require faith in revealed truths, of which\nthey are but deductions, logical conclusions; they presuppose, in their\nobservance, the grace of God; and call for a certain strenuosity of\nlife without which nothing meritorious can be effected. We must be\nconvinced of the right God has to trace a line of conduct for us; we\nmust be as earnest in enlisting His assistance as if all depended on\nHim; and then go to work as if it all depended on ourselves.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER II.\nTHE MORAL AGENT.\n\nMORALS are for man, not for the brute; they are concerned with his\nthoughts, desires, words and deeds; they suppose a moral agent.\n\nWhat is a moral agent?\n\nA moral agent is one who, in the conduct of his life, is capable of\ngood and evil, and who, in consequence of this faculty of choosing\nbetween right and wrong is responsible to God for the good and evil he\ndoes.\n\nIs it enough, in order to qualify as a moral and responsible agent, to\nbe in a position to respect or to violate the Law?\n\nIt is not enough; but it is necessary that the agent know what he is\ndoing; know that it is right or wrong; that he will to do it, as such;\nand that he be free to do it, or not to do it. Whenever any one of\nthese three elements--knowledge, consent and liberty--is wanting in the\ncommission or omission of any act, the deed is not a moral deed; and\nthe agent, under the circumstances, is not a moral agent.\n\nWhen God created man, He did not make him simply a being that walks and\ntalks, sleeps and eats, laughs and cries; He endowed him with the\nfaculties of intelligence and free will. More than this, He intended\nthat these faculties should be exercised in all the details of life;\nthat the intelligence should direct, and the free will approve, every\nstep taken, every act performed, every deed left undone. Human energy\nbeing thus controlled, all that man does is said to be voluntary and\nbears the peculiar stamp of morality, the quality of being good or evil\nin the sight of God and worthy of His praise or blame, according as it\nsquares or not with the Rule of Morality laid down by Him for the\nshaping of human life. Of all else He takes no cognizance, since all\nelse refers to Him not indifferently from the rest of animal creation,\nand offers no higher homage than that of instinct and necessity.\n\nWhen a man in his waking hours does something in which his intelligence\nhas no share, does it without being aware of what he is doing, he is\nsaid to be in a state of mental aberration, which is only another name\nfor insanity or folly, whether it be momentary or permanent of its\nnature. A human being, in such a condition, stands on the same plane\nwith the animal, with this difference, that the one is a freak and the\nother is not. Morals, good or bad, have no meaning for either.\n\nIf the will or consent has no part in what is done, we do nothing,\nanother acts through us; 'tis not ours, but the deed of another. An\ninstrument or tool used in the accomplishment of a purpose possesses\nthe same negative merit or demerit, whether it be a thing without a\nwill or an unwilling human being. If we are not free, have no choice in\nthe matter, must consent, we differ in nothing from all brutish and\ninanimate nature that follows necessarily, fatally, the bent of its\ninstinctive inclinations and obeys the laws of its being. Under these\nconditions, there can be no morality or responsibility before God; our\ndeeds are alike blameless and valueless in His sight.\n\nThus, the simple transgression of the Law does not constitute us in\nguilt; we must transgress deliberately, wilfully. Full inadvertence,\nperfect forgetfulness, total blindness is called invincible ignorance;\nthis destroys utterly the moral act and makes us involuntary agents.\nWhen knowledge is incomplete, the act is less voluntary; except it be\nthe case of ignorance brought on purposely, a wilful blinding of\noneself, in the vain hope of escaping the consequences of one's acts.\nThis betrays a stronger willingness to act, a more deliberately set\nwill.\n\nConcupiscence has a kindred effect on our reason. It is a consequence\nof our fallen nature by which we are prone to evil rather than to good,\nfind it more to our taste and easier to yield to wrong than to resist\nit. Call it passion, temperament, character, what you will,--it is an\ninclination to evil. We cannot always control its action. Everyone has\nfelt more or less the tyranny of concupiscence, and no child of Adam\nbut has it branded in his nature and flesh. Passion may rob us of our\nreason, and run into folly or insanity; in which event we are\nunconscious agents, and do nothing voluntary. It may so obscure the\nreason as to make us less ourselves, and consequently less willing. But\nthere is such a thing as, with studied and refined malice and\ndepravity, to purposely and artificially, as it were, excite\nconcupiscence, in order the more intensely and savagely to act. This is\nonly a proof of greater deliberation, and renders the deed all the more\nvoluntary.\n\nA person is therefore more or less responsible according as what he\ndoes, or the good or evil of what he does, is more or less clear to\nhim. Ignorance or the passions may affect his clear vision of right and\nwrong, and under the stress of this deception, wring a reluctant\nyielding of the will, a consent only half willingly given. Because\nthere is consent, there is guilt but the guilt is measured by the\ndegree of premeditation. God looks upon things solely in their relation\nto Him. An abomination before men may be something very different in\nHis sight who searches the heart and reins of man and measures evil by\nthe malice of the evil-doer. The only good or evil He sees in our deeds\nis the good or evil we ourselves see in them before or while we act.\n\nViolence and fear may oppress the will, and thereby prove destructive\nto the morality of an act and the responsibility of the agent. Certain\nit is, that we can be forced to act against our will, to perform that\nwhich we abhor, and do not consent to do. Such force may be brought to\nbear upon us as we cannot withstand. Fear may influence us in a like\nmanner. It may paralyze our faculties and rob us of our senses.\nEvidently, under these conditions, no voluntary act is possible, since\nthe will does not concur and no consent is given. The subject becomes a\nmere tool in the hands of another.\n\nCan violence and fear do more than this? Can it not only rob us of the\npower to will, not only force us to act without consent, but also force\nthe will, force us to consent? Never; and the simple reason is that we\ncannot do two contradictory things at the same time--consent and not\nconsent, for that is what it means to be forced to consent. Violence\nand fear may weaken the will so that it finally yield. The fault, if\nfault there be, may be less inexcusable by reason of the pressure under\nwhich it labored. But once we have willed, we have willed, and\nessentially, there is nothing unwilling about what is willingly done.\n\nThe will is an inviolable shrine. Men may circumvent, attack, seduce\nand weaken it. But it cannot be forced. The power of man and devil\ncannot go so far. Even God respects it to that point.\n\nIn all cases of pressure being brought to bear upon the moral agent for\nan evil purpose, when resistance is possible, resistance alone can save\nhim from the consequences. He must resist to his utmost, to the end,\nnever yield, if he would not incur the responsibility of a free agent.\nNon-resistance betokens perfect willingness to act. The greater the\nresistance, the less voluntary the act in the event of consent being\nfinally given; for resistance implies reluctance, and reluctance is the\nopposition of a will that battles against an oppressing influence. In\nmoral matters, defeat can never be condoned, no matter how great the\nstruggle, if there is a final yielding of the will; but the\ncircumstance of energetic defense stands to a man's credit and will\nprotect him from much of the blame and disgrace due to defeat.\n\nThus we see that the first quality of the acts of a moral agent is that\nhe think, desire, say and do with knowledge and free consent. Such\nacts, and only such, can be called good or bad. What makes them good\nand bad, is another question.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER III.\nCONSCIENCE.\n\nTHE will of God, announced to the world at large, is known as the Law\nof God; manifested to each individual soul, it is called conscience.\nThese are not two different rules of morality, but one and the same\nrule. The latter is a form or copy of the former. One is the will of\nGod, the other is its echo in our souls.\n\nWe might fancy God, at the beginning of all things, speaking His will\nconcerning right and wrong, in the presence of the myriads of souls\nthat lay in the state of possibility. And when, in the course of time,\nthese souls come into being, with unfailing regularity, at every act,\nconscience, like a spiritual phonograph, gives back His accents and\nreechoes: \"it is lawful,\" or \"it is not lawful.\" Or, to use another\nsimile, conscience is the compass by which we steer aright our moral\nlives towards the haven of our souls' destination in eternity. But just\nas behind the mariner's compass is the great unseen power, called\nattraction, under whose influence the needle points to the star; so\ndoes the will or Law of God control the action of the conscience, and\ndirect it faithfully towards what is good.\n\nWe have seen that, in order to prevaricate it is not sufficient to\ntransgress the Law of God: we must know; conscience makes us know. It\nis only when we go counter to its dictates that we are constituted\nevil-doers. And at the bar of God's justice, it is on the testimony of\nconscience that sentence will be passed. Her voice will be that of a\nwitness present at every deed, good or evil, of our lives.\n\nConscience should always tell the truth, and tell it with certainty.\nPractically, this is not always the case. We are sometimes certain that\na thing is right when it is really wrong. There are therefore two kinds\nof conscience: a true and a certain conscience, and they are far from\nbeing one and the same thing. A true conscience speaks the truth, that\nis, tells us what is truly right and truly wrong. It is a genuine echo\nof the voice of God. A certain conscience, whether it speaks the truth\nor not, speaks with assurance, without a suspicion of error, and its\nvoice carries conviction. When we act in accordance with the first, we\nare right; we may know it, doubt it or think it probable, but we are\nright in fact. When we obey the latter, we know, we are sure that we\nare right, but it is possible that we be in error. A true conscience,\ntherefore, may be certain or uncertain; a certain conscience may be\ntrue or erroneous.\n\nA true conscience is not the rule of morality. It must be certain. It\nis not necessary that it be true, although this is always to be\ndesired, and in the normal state of things should be the case. But true\nor false, it must be certain. The reason is obvious. God judges us\naccording as we do good or evil. Our merit or demerit is dependent upon\nour responsibility. We are responsible only for the good or evil we\nknow we do. Knowledge and certainty come from a certain conscience, and\nyet not from a true conscience which may be doubtful.\n\nNow, suppose we are in error, and think we are doing something good,\nwhereas it is in reality evil. We perceive no malice in the deed, and,\nin performing it, there is consequently no malice in us, we do not sin.\nThe act is said to be materially evil, but formally good; and for such\nevil God cannot hold us responsible. Suppose again that we err, and\nthat the evil we think we do is really good. In this instance, first,\nthe law of morality is violated,--a certain, though erroneous\nconscience: this is sinful. Secondly, a bad motive vitiates an act even\nif the deed in itself be good. Consequently, we incur guilt and God's\nwrath by the commission of such a deed, which is materially good, but\nformally bad.\n\nOne may wonder and say: \"how can guilt attach to doing good?\" Guilt\nattaches to formal evil, that is, evil that is shown to us by our\nconscience and committed by us as such. The wrong comes, not from the\nobject of our doing which is good, but from the intention which is bad.\nIt is true that nothing is good that is not thoroughly good, that a\nthing is bad only when there is something lacking in its goodness, that\nevil is a defect of goodness; but formal evil alone can be imputed to\nus and material cannot. The one is a conscious, the other an\nunconscious, defect. Here an erroneous conscience is obeyed; there the\nsame conscience is disregarded. And that kind of a conscience is the\nrule of morality; to go against it is to sin.\n\nThere are times when we have no certitude. The conscience may have\nnothing to say concerning the honesty of a cause to which we are about\nto commit ourselves. This state of uncertainty and perplexity is called\ndoubt. To doubt is to suspend judgment; a dubious conscience is one\nthat does not function.\n\nIn doubt the question may be: \"To do; is it right or wrong? May I\nperform this act, or must I abstain therefrom?\" In this case, we\ninquire whether it be lawful or unlawful to go on, but we are sure that\nit is lawful not to act. There is but one course to pursue. We must not\ncommit ourselves and must refrain from acting, until such a time, at\nleast, as, by inquiring and considering, we shall have obtained\nsufficient evidence to convince us that we may allow ourselves this\nliberty without incurring guilt. If, on the contrary, while still\ndoubting, we persist in committing the act, we sin, because in all\naffairs of right and wrong we must follow a certain conscience as the\nstandard of morality.\n\nBut the question may be: \"To do or not to do; which is right and which\nis wrong?\" Here we know not which way to turn, fearing evil in either\nalternative. We must do one thing or the other. There are reasons and\ndifficulties on both sides. We are unable to resolve the difficulties,\nlay the doubt, and form a sure conscience, what must we do?\n\nIf all action can be momentarily suspended, and we have the means of\nconsulting, we must abstain from action and consult. If the affair is\nurgent, and this cannot be done; if we must act on the spot and decide\nfor ourselves, then, we can make that dubious conscience prudently\ncertain by applying this principle to our conduct: \"Of two evils,\nchoose the lesser.\" We therefore judge which action involves the least\namount of evil. We may embrace the course thus chosen without a fear of\ndoing wrong. If we have inadvertently chosen the greater evil, it is an\nerror of judgment for which we are in nowise responsible before God.\nBut this means must be employed only where all other and surer means\nfail. The certainty we thereby acquire is a prudent certainty, and is\nsufficient to guarantee us against offending.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IV.\nLAXITY AND SCRUPLES.\n\nIN every question of conscience there are two opposing factors:\nLiberty, which is agreeable to our nature, which allows us to do as we\nlist; and Law which binds us unto the observance of what is unpleasant.\nLiberty and law are mutually antagonistic. A concession in favor of one\nis an infringement upon the claims of the other.\n\nConscience, in its normal state, gives to liberty and to law what to\neach is legitimately due, no more, no less.\n\nTruth lies between extremes. At the two opposite poles of conscientious\nrectitude are laxity and scruples, one judging all things lawful, the\nother all things forbidden. One inordinately favors liberty, the other\nthe law. And neither has sufficient grounds on which to form a sound\njudgment.\n\nThey are counterfeit consciences, the one dishonest, the other\nunreasonable. They do unlawful business; and because the verdict they\nrender is founded on nothing more solid than imaginations, they are in\nnowise standards of morality, and should not be considered as such.\n\nThe first is sometimes known as a \"rubber\" conscience, on account of\nits capacity for stretching itself to meet the exigencies of a like or\na dislike.\n\nLaxity may be the effect of a simple illusion. Men often do wrong\nunawares. They excuse themselves with the plea: \"I did not know any\nbetter.\" But we are not here examining the acts that can be traced back\nto self-illusion; rather the state of persons who labor under the\ndisability of seeing wrong anywhere, and who walk through the\ncommandments of God and the Church with apparent unconcern. What must\nwe think of such people in face of the fact that they not only could,\nbut should know better! They are supposed to know their catechism. Are\nthere not Catholic books and publications of various sorts? What about\nthe Sunday instructions and sermons? These are the means and\nopportunities, and they facilitate the fulfilment of what is in us a\nbounden duty to nourish our souls before they die of spiritual hunger.\n\nA delicate, effeminate life, spiritual sloth, and criminal neglect are\nresponsible for this kind of laxity.\n\nThis state of soul is also the inevitable consequence of long years\npassed in sin and neglect of prayer. Habit blunts the keen edge of\nperception. Evil is disquieting to a novice; but it does not look so\nbad after you have done it a while and get used to it. Crimes thus\nbecome ordinary sins, and ordinary sins peccadillos.\n\nThen again there are people who, like the Pharisees of old, strain out\na gnat and swallow a camel. They educate themselves up to a strict\nobservance of all things insignificant. They would not forget to say\ngrace before and after meals, but would knife the neighbor's character\nor soil their minds with all filthiness, without a scruple or a shadow\nof remorse.\n\nThese are they who walk in the broad way that leadeth to destruction.\nIn the first place, their conscience or the thing that does duty for a\nconscience, is false and they are responsible for it. Then, this sort\nof a conscience is not habitually certain, and laxity consists\nprecisely in contemning doubts and passing over lurking, lingering\nsuspicions as not worthy of notice. Lastly, it has not the quality of\ncommon prudence since the judgment it pronounces is not supported by\nplausible reasons. Its character is dishonesty.\n\nA scruple is a little sharp stone formerly used as a measure of weight.\nPharmacists always have scruples. There is nothing so torturing as to\nwalk with one or several of these pebbles in the shoe. Spiritual\nscruples serve the same purpose for the conscience. They torture and\ntorment; they make devotion and prayer impossible, and blind the\nconscience; they weaken the mind, exhaust the bodily forces, and cause\na disease that not infrequently comes to a climax in despair or\ninsanity.\n\nA scrupulous conscience is not to be followed as a standard of right\nand wrong, because it is unreasonable. In its final analysis it is not\ncertain, but doubtful and improbable, and is influenced by the most\nfutile reasons. It is lawful, it is even necessary, to refuse assent to\nthe dictates of such a conscience. To persons thus afflicted the\nauthoritative need of a prudent adviser must serve as a rule until the\nconscience is cured of its morbid and erratic tendencies.\n\nIt is not scruples to walk in the fear of God, and avoid sin and the\noccasions thereof: that is wisdom; nor to frequent the sacraments and\nbe assiduous in prayer through a deep concern for the welfare of one's\nsoul: that is piety.\n\nIt is not scruples to be at a loss to decide whether a thing is wrong\nor right; that is doubt; nor to suffer keenly after the commission of a\ngrievous sin; that is remorse.\n\nIt is not scruples to be greatly anxious and disturbed over past\nconfessions when there is a reasonable cause for it: that is natural.\n\nA scrupulous person is one who, outside these several contingencies, is\ncontinually racked with fears, and persists, against all evidence, in\nseeing sin where there is none, or magnifies it beyond all proportion\nwhere it really is.\n\nThe first feature--empty and perpetual fears--concerns confessions\nwhich are sufficient, according to all the rules of prudence; prayers,\nwhich are said with overwrought anxiety, lest a single distraction\ncreep in and mar them; and temptations, which are resisted with\ninordinate contention of mind, and perplexity lest consent be given.\n\nThe other and more desperate feature is pertinacity of judgment. The\nscrupulous person will ask advice and not believe a word he is told.\nThe more information he gets, the worse he becomes, and he adds to his\nmisery by consulting every adviser in sight. He refuses to be put under\nobedience and seems to have a morbid affection for his very condition.\n\nThere is only one remedy for this evil, and that remedy is absolute and\nblind obedience to a prudent director. Choose one, consult him as often\nas you desire, but do not leave him for another. Then submit\npunctiliously to his direction. His conscience must be yours, for the\ntime being. And if you should err in following him, God will hold him,\nand not you, responsible.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER V.\nTHE LAW OF GOD AND ITS BREACH.\n\nWITHOUT going into any superflous details, we shall call the Law of God\nan act of His will by which He ordains what things we may do or not do,\nand binds us unto observance under penalty of His divine displeasure.\n\nThe law thus defined pertains to reasonable beings alone, and supposes\non our part, as we have seen, knowledge and free will. The rest of\ncreation is blindly submissive under the hand of God, and yields a\nnecessary obedience. Man alone can obey or disobey; but in this latter\ncase he renders himself amenable to God's justice who, as his Creator,\nhas an equal right to command him, and be obeyed.\n\nThe Maker first exercised this right when He put into His creature's\nsoul a sense of right and wrong, which is nothing more than conscience,\nor as it is called here, natural law. To this law is subject every\nhuman being, pagan, Jew and Christian alike. No creature capable of a\nhuman act is exempt.\n\nThe provisions of this law consider the nature of our being, that is,\nthe law prescribes what the necessities of our being demand, and it\nprohibits what is destructive thereof. Our nature requires physically\nthat we eat, drink and sleep. Similarly, in a moral sense, it calls for\njustice, truthfulness, respect of God, of the neighbor, and of self.\nAll its precepts are summed up in this one: \"Do unto others as you\nwould have them do unto you\"--the golden rule. Thence flows a series of\ndeducted precepts calculated to protect the moral and inherent rights\nof our nature.\n\nBut we are more concerned here with what is known as the positive Law\nof God, given by Him to man by word of mouth or revelation.\n\nWe believe that God gave a verbal code to Moses who promulgated it in\nHis name before the Jewish people to the whole world. It was\nsubsequently inscribed on two stone tables, and is known as the\nDecalogue or Ten Commandments of God. Of these ten, the first three\npertain to God Himself, the latter seven to the neighbor; so that the\nwhole might be abridged in these two words, \"Love God, and love thy\nneighbor.\" This law is in reality only a specified form of the natural\nlaw, and its enactment was necessitated by the iniquity of men which\nhad in time obscured and partly effaced the letter of the law in their\nsouls.\n\nLatterly God again spoke, but this time in the person of Jesus Christ.\nThe Saviour, after confirming the Decalogue with His authority, gave\nother laws to men concerning the Church He had founded and the means of\napplying to themselves the fruits of the Redemption. We give the name\nof dogma to what He tells us to believe and of morals to what we must\ndo. These precepts of Jesus Christ are contained in the Gospel, and are\ncalled the Evangelical Law. It is made known to us by the infallible\nChurch through which God speaks.\n\nAkin to these divine laws is the purely ecclesiastical law or law of\nthe Church. Christ sent forth His Church clothed with His own and His\nFather's authority. \"As the Father sent me, so I send you.\" She was to\nendure, perfect herself and fulfil her mission on earth. To enable her\nto carry out this divine plan she makes laws, laws purely\necclesiastical, but laws that have the same binding force as the divine\nlaws themselves, since they bear the stamp of divine authority. God\nwilled the Church to be; He willed consequently all the necessary means\nwithout which she would cease to be. For Catholics, therefore, as far\nas obligations are concerned, there is no practical difference between\nGod's law and the law of His Church. Jesus Christ is God. The Church is\nHis spouse. To her the Saviour said: \"He that heareth you, heareth me,\nand he that despiseth you despiseth Me.\"\n\nA breach of the law is a sin. A sin is a deliberate transgression of\nthe Law of God. A sin may be committed in thought, in desire, in word,\nor in deed, and by omission as well as by commission.\n\nIt is well to bear in mind that a thought, as well as a deed, is an\nact, may be a human and a moral act, and consequently may be a sin.\nHuman laws may be violated only in deed; but God, who is a searcher of\nhearts, takes note of the workings of the will whence springs all\nmalice. To desire to break His commandments is to offend Him as\neffectually as to break them in deed; to relish in one's mind forbidden\nfruits, to meditate and deliberate on evil purposes, is only a degree\nremoved from actual commission of wrong. Evil is perpetrated in the\nwill, either by a longing to prevaricate or by affection for that which\nis prohibited. If the evil materializes exteriorly, it does not\nconstitute one in sin anew, but only completes the malice already\nexisting. Men judge their fellows by their works; God judges us by our\nthoughts, by the inner workings of the soul, and takes notice of our\nexterior doings only in so far as they are related to the will.\nTherefore it is that an offense against Him, to be an offense, need not\nnecessarily be perpetrated in word or in deed; it is sufficient that\nthe will place itself in Opposition to the Will of God, and adhere to\nwhat the Law forbids.\n\nSin is not the same as vice. One is an act, the other is a state or\ninclination to act. One is transitory, the other is permanent. One can\nexist without the other. A drunkard is not always drunk, nor is a man a\ndrunkard for having once or twice overindulged.\n\nIn only one case is vice less evil than sin, and that is when the\ninclination remains an unwilling inclination and does not pass to acts.\nA man who reforms after a protracted spree still retains an\ninclination, a desire for strong drink. He is nowise criminal so long\nas he resists that tendency.\n\nBut practically vice is worse than sin, for it supposes frequent wilful\nacts of sin of which it is the natural consequence, and leads to many\ngrievous offenses.\n\nA vice is without sin when one struggles successfully against it after\nthe habit has been retracted. It may never be radically destroyed.\nThere may be unconscious, involuntary lapses under the constant\npressure of a strong inclination, as in the vice of parsing, and it\nremains innocent as long as it is not wilfully yielded to and indulged.\nBut to yield to the ratification of an evil desire or propensity,\nwithout restraint, is to doom oneself to the most prolific of evils and\nto lie under the curse of God.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VI.\nSIN.\n\nIF the Almighty had never imposed upon His creatures a Law, there would\nbe no sin; we would be free to do as we please. But the presence of\nGod's Law restrains our liberty, and it is by using, or rather abusing,\nour freedom, that we come to violate the Law. It is for this reason\nthat Law is said to be opposed to Liberty. Liberty is a word of many\nmeanings. Men swear by it and men juggle with it. It is the slogan in\nboth camps of the world's warfare. It is in itself man's noblest\ninheritance, and yet there is no name under the sun in which more\ncrimes are committed.\n\nBy liberty as opposed to God's law we do not understand the power to do\nevil as well as good. That liberty is the glory of man, but the\nexercise of it, in the alternative of evil, is damnable, and debases\nthe creature in the same proportions as the free choice of good\nennobles him. That liberty the law leaves untouched. We never lose it;\nor rather, we may lose it partially when under physical restraint, but\ntotally, only when deprived of our senses. The law respects it. It\nrespects it in the highest degree when in an individual it curtails or\ndestroys it for the protection of society.\n\nLiberty may also be the equal right to do good and evil. There are\nthose who arrogate to themselves such liberty. No man ever possessed\nit, the law annihilated it forever. And although we have used the word\nin this sense, the fact is that no man has the right to do evil or ever\nwill have, so long as God is God. These people talk much and loudly\nabout freedom--the magic word!--assert with much pomp and verbosity the\nrights of man, proclaim his independence, and are given to much like\ninane vaunting and braggadocio.\n\nWe may be free in many things, but where God is concerned and He\ncommands, we are free only to obey. His will is supreme, and when it is\nasserted, we purely and simply have no choice to do as we list. This\nprivilege is called license, not liberty. We have certain rights as\nmen, but we have duties, too, as creatures, and it ill-becomes us to\nprate about our rights, or the duties of others towards us, while we\nignore the obligations we are under towards others and our first duty\nwhich is to God. Our boasted independence consists precisely in this:\nthat we owe to Him not only the origin of our nature, but even the very\nbreath we draw, and which preserves our being, for \"in Him we live,\nmove and have our being.\"\n\nThe first prerogative of God towards us is authority or the right to\ncommand. Our first obligation as well as our highest honor as creatures\nis to obey. And until we understand this sort of liberty, we live in a\nworld of enigmas and know not the first letter of the alphabet of\ncreation. We are not free to sin.\n\nLiberty rightly understood, true liberty of the children of God, is the\nright of choice within the law, the right to embrace what is good and\nto avoid what is evil. This policy no man can take from us; and far\nfrom infringing upon this right, the law aids it to a fuller\ndevelopment. A person reading by candlelight would not complain that\nhis vision was obscured if an arc light were substituted for the\ncandle. A traveler who takes notice of the signposts along his way\ntelling the direction and distance, and pointing out pitfalls and\ndangers, would not consider his rights contested or his liberty\nrestricted by these things. And the law, as it becomes more clearly\nknown to us, defines exactly the sphere of our action and shows plainly\nwhere dangers lurk and evil is to be apprehended. And we gladly avail\nourselves of this information that enables us to walk straight and\nsecure. The law becomes a godsend to our liberty, and obedience to it,\nour salvation.\n\nHe who goes beyond the bounds of true moral liberty, breaks the law of\nGod and sins. He thereby refuses to God the obedience which to Him is\ndue. Disobedience involves contempt of authority and of him who\ncommands. Sin is therefore an offense against God, and that offense is\nproportionate to the dignity of the person offended.\n\nThe sinner, by his act of disobedience, not only sets at naught the\nwill of his Maker, but by the same act, in a greater or lesser degree,\nturns away from his appointed destiny; and in this he is imitated by\nnothing else in creation. Every other created thing obeys. The heavens\nfollow their designated course. Beasts and birds and fish are intent\nupon one thing, and that is to work out the divine plan. Man alone sows\ndisorder and confusion therein. He shows irreverence for God's presence\nand contempt for His friendship; ingratitude for His goodness and\nsupreme indifference for the penalty that follows his sin as surely as\nthe shadow follows its object. So that, taken all in all, such a\ncreature might fitly be said to be one part criminal and two parts\nfool. Folly and sin are synonymous in Holy Writ. \"The fool saith in his\nheart there is no God.\"\n\nSin is essentially an offense. But there is a difference of degree\nbetween a slight and an outrage. There are direct offenses against God,\nsuch as the refusal to believe in Him or unbelief; to hope in Him, or\ndespair, etc. Indirect offenses attain Him through the neighbor or\nourselves.\n\nAll duties to neighbor or self are not equally imperious and to fail in\nthem all is not equally evil. Then again, not all sins are committed\nthrough pure malice, that is, with complete knowledge and full consent.\nIgnorance and weakness are factors to be considered in our guilt, and\ndetract from the malice of our sins. Hence two kinds of sin, mortal and\nvenial. These mark the extremes of offense. One severs all relation of\nfriendship, the other chills the existing friendship. By one, we incur\nGod's infinite hatred, by the other, His displeasure. The penalty for\none is eternal; the other can be atoned for by suffering.\n\nIt is not possible in all cases to tell exactly what is mortal and what\nvenial in our offenses. There is a clean-cut distinction between the\ntwo, but the line of demarcation is not always discernible. There are,\nhowever, certain characteristics which enable us in the majority of\ncases to distinguish one from the other.\n\nFirst, the matter must be grievous in fact or in intention; that is,\nthere must be a serious breach of the law of God or the law of\nconscience. Then, we must know perfectly well what we are doing and\ngive our full consent. It must therefore be a grave offense in all the\nplenitude of its malice. Of course, to act without sufficient reason,\nwith a well-founded doubt as to the malice of the act, would be to\nviolate the law of conscience and would constitute a mortal sin. There\nis no moral sin without the fulfilment of these conditions. All other\noffenses are venial.\n\nWe cannot, of course, read the soul of anybody. If, however, we suppose\nknowledge and consent, there are certain sins that are always mortal.\nSuch are blasphemy, luxury, heresy, etc. When these sins are\ndeliberate, they are always mortal offenses. Others are usually mortal,\nsuch as a sin against justice. To steal is a sin against justice. It is\nfrequently a mortal sin, but it may happen that the amount taken be\nslight, in which case the offense ceases to be mortal.\n\nLikewise, certain sins are usually venial, but in certain circumstances\na venial sin may take on such malice as to be constituted mortal.\n\nOur conscience, under God, is the best judge of our malevolence and\nconsequently of our guilt.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VII.\nHOW TO COUNT SINS.\n\nTHE number of sins a person may commit is well-nigh incalculable, which\nis only one way of saying that the malice of man has invented\ninnumerable means of offending the Almighty--a compliment to our\ningenuity and the refinement of our natural perversity. It is not\nalways pleasant to know, and few people try very hard to learn, of what\nkind and how many are their daily offenses. This knowledge reveals too\nnakedly our wickedness which we prefer to ignore. Catholics, however,\nwho believe in the necessity of confession of sins, take a different\nview of the matter. The requirements of a good confession are such as\ncan be met only by those who know in what things they have sinned and\nhow often.\n\nThere are many different kinds of sin. It is possible by a single act\nto commit more than one sin. And a given sin may be repeated any number\nof times.\n\nTo get the exact number of our misdeeds we must begin by counting as\nmany sins at least as there are kinds of sin. We might say there is an\noffense for every time a commandment or precept is violated, for sin is\na transgression of the law. But this would be insufficient inasmuch as\nthe law may command or forbid more than one thing.\n\nLet the first commandment serve as an example. It is broken by sins\nagainst faith, or unbelief, against hope, or despair, against charity,\nagainst religion, etc. All these offenses are specifically different,\nthat is, are different kinds of sin; yet but one precept is\ntransgressed. Since therefore each commandment prescribes the practice\nof certain virtues, the first rule is that there is a sin for every\nvirtue violated.\n\nBut this is far from exhausting our capacity for evil. Our virtue may\nimpose different obligations, so that against it alone we may offend in\nmany different ways. Among the virtues prescribed by the first\ncommandment is that of religion, which concerns the exterior homage due\nto God. I may worship false gods, thus offending against the virtue of\nreligion, and commit a sin of idolatry. If I offer false homage to the\ntrue God, I also violate the virtue of religion, but commit a sin\nspecifically different, a sin of superstition. Thus these different\noffenses are against but one of several virtues enjoined by one\ncommandment. The virtue of charity is also prolific of obligations; the\nvirtue of chastity even more so. One act against the latter may contain\na four-fold malice.\n\nIt would be out of place here to adduce more examples: a detailed\ntreatment of the virtues and commandments will make things clearer. For\nthe moment it is necessary and sufficient to know that a commandment\nmay prescribe many virtues, a virtue may impose many obligations, and\nthere is a specifically different sin for each obligation violated.\n\nBut we can go much farther than this in wrongdoing, and must count one\nsin every time the act is committed.\n\n\"Yes, but how are we to know when there is one act or more than one\nact! An act may be of long or short duration. How many sins do I commit\nif the act lasts, say, two hours? And how can I tell where one act ends\nand the other begins?\"\n\nIn an action which endures an hour or two hours, there may be one and\nthere may be a dozen acts. When the matter a sinner is working on is a\ncertain, specified evil, the extent to which he prevaricates\nnumerically depends upon the action of the will. A fellow who enters\nupon the task of slaying his neighbor can kill but once in fact; but he\ncan commit the sin of murder in his soul once or a dozen times. It\ndepends on the will. Sin is a deliberate transgression, that is, first\nof all an act of the will. If he resolves once to kill and never\nretracts till the deed of blood is done, he sins but once. If he\ndisavows his resolution and afterwards resolves anew, he repeats the\nsin of murder in his soul as often as he goes through this process of\nwill action. This sincere retraction of a deed is called moral\ninterruption and it has the mysterious power of multiplying sins.\n\nNot every interruption is a moral one. To put the matter aside for a\ncertain while in the hope of a better opportunity, for the procuring of\nnecessary facilities or for any other reason, with the unshaken purpose\nof pursuing the course entered upon, is to suspend action; but this\naction is wholly exterior, and does not affect the will. The act of the\nwill perseveres, never loses its force, so there is no moral, but only\na physical, interruption. There is no renewal of consent for it has\nnever been withdrawn. The one moral act goes on, and but one sin is\ncommitted.\n\nThus, of two wretches on the same errand of crime, one may sin but\nonce, while the other is guilty of the same sin a number of times. But\nthe several sins last no longer than the one. Which is the more guilty?\nThat is a question for God to decide; He does the judging, we do the\ncounting.\n\nThis possible multiplication of sin where a single act is apparent\nemphasizes the fact that evil and good proceed from the will. It is by\nthe will primarily and essentially that we serve or offend God, and,\nabsolutely speaking, no exterior deed is necessary for the\naccomplishment of this end.\n\nThe exterior deed of sin always supposes a natural preparation of sin--\nthought, desires, resolution,--which precede or accompany the deed, and\nwithout which there would be no sin. It is sinful only inasmuch as it\nis related to the will, and is the fruit thereof. The interior act\nconstitutes the sin in its being; the exterior act constitutes it in\nits completeness.\n\nAll of which leads up to the conclusion, of a nature perhaps to\nsurprise some, that to resolve to sin and to commit the sin in deed are\nnot two different sins, but one complete sin, in all the fulness of its\nmalice. True, the exterior act may give rise to scandal, and from it\nmay devolve upon us obligations of justice, the reparation of injury\ndone; true, with the exterior complement the sin may be more grievous.\nBut there cannot be several sins if there be one single uninterrupted\nact of the will.\n\nAn evil thing is proposed to your mind; you enjoy the thought of doing\nit, knowing it to be wrong; you desire to do it and resolve to do it;\nyou take the natural means of doing it; you succeed and consummate the\nevil--a long drawn out and well prepared deed, 'tis true, but only one\nsin. The injustices, the scandal, the sins you might commit\nincidentally, which do not pertain naturally to the deed, all these are\nanother matter, and are other kinds of sins; but the act itself stands\nalone, complete and one.\n\nBut these interior acts of sin, whether or not they have reference to\nexternal completion, must be sinful. The first stage is the suggestion\nof the imagination or simple seeing of the evil in the mind, which is\nnot sinful; the next is the moving of the sensibility or the purely\nanimal pleasure experienced, in which there is no evil, either; for we\nhave no sure mastery over these faculties. From the imagination and\nsensibility the temptation passes before the will for consent. If\nconsent is denied, there is no deadly malice or guilt, no matter how\nlong the previous effects may have been endured. No thought is a sin\nunless it be fully consented to.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER VIII.\nCAPITAL SINS.\n\nYOU can never cure a disease till you get at the seat or root of the\nevil. It will not do to attack the several manifestations that appear\non the surface, the aches and pains and attendant disorders. You must\nattack the affected organ, cut out the root of the evil growth, and\nkill the obnoxious germ. There is no other permanent remedy; until this\nis done, all relief is but temporary.\n\nAnd if we desire to remove the distemper of sin, similarly it is\nnecessary to seek out the root of all sin. We can lay our finger on it\nat once; it is inordinate self-love.\n\nAsk yourself why you broke this or that commandment. It is because it\nforbade you a satisfaction that you coveted, a satisfaction that your\nself-love imperiously demanded; or it is because it prescribed an act\nthat cost an effort, and you loved yourself too much to make that\neffort. Examine every failing, little or great, and you will trace them\nback to the same source. If we thought more of God and less of\nourselves we would never sin. The sinner lives for himself first, and\nfor God afterwards.\n\nStrange that such a sacred thing as love, the source of all good, may\nthus, by abuse, become the fountainhead of all evil! Perhaps, if it\nwere not so sacred and prolific of good, its excess would not be so\nunholy. But the higher you stand when you tumble, the greater the fall;\nso the better a thing is in itself, the more abominable is its abuse.\nLove directed aright, towards God first, is the fulfilment of the Law;\nlove misdirected is the very destruction of all law.\n\nYet it is not wrong to love oneself; that is the first law of nature.\nOne, and one only being, the Maker, are we bound to love more than\nourselves. The neighbor is to be loved as ourselves. And if our just\ninterests conflict with his, if our rights and his are opposed to each\nother, there is no legitimate means but we may employ to obtain or\nsecure what is rightly ours. The evil of self-love lies in its abuse\nand excess, in that it goes beyond the limits set by God and nature,\nthat it puts unjustly our interests before God's and the neighbor's,\nand that to self it sacrifices them and all that pertains to them.\nSelf, the \"ego,\" is the idol before which all must bow.\n\nSelf-love, on an evil day, in the garden of Eden, wedded sin, Satan\nhimself officiating under the disguise of a serpent; and she gave birth\nto seven daughters like unto herself, who in turn became fruitful\nmothers of iniquity. Haughty Pride, first-born and queen among her\nsisters, is inordinate love of one's worth and excellence, talents and\nbeauty; sordid Avarice or Covetousness is excessive love of riches;\nloathsome Lust is the third, and loves carnal pleasures without regard\nfor the law; fiery Anger, a counterpart of pride, is love rejected but\nseeking blindly to remedy the loss; bestial Gluttony worships the\nstomach; green-eyed Envy is hate for wealth and happiness denied;\nfinally Sloth loves bodily ease and comfort to excess. The infamous\nbrood! These parents of all iniquity are called the seven capital sins.\nThey assume the leadership of evil in the world and are the seven arms\nof Satan.\n\nAs it becomes their dignity, these vices never walk alone or go\nunattended, and that is the desperate feature of their malice. Each has\na cortege of passions, a whole train of inferior minions, that\naccompany or follow. Once entrance gained and a free hand given, there\nis no telling the result. Once seated and secure, the passion seeks to\nsatisfy itself; that is its business. Certain means are required to\nthis end, and these means can be procured only by sinning. Obstacles\noften stand in the way and new sins furnish steps to vault over, or\nimplements to batter them down. Intricate and difficult conditions\nfrequently arise as the result of self-indulgence, out of which there\nis no exit but by fresh sins. Hence the long train of crimes led by one\ncapital sin towards the goal of its satisfaction, and hence the havoc\nwrought by its untrammeled working in a human soul.\n\nThis may seem exaggerated to some; others it may mislead as to the true\nnature of the capital sins, unless it be dearly put forth in what their\nmalice consists. Capital sins are not, in the first place, in\nthemselves, sins; they are vices, passions, inclinations or tendencies\nto sin, and we know that a vice is not necessarily sinful. Our first\nparents bequeathed to us as an inheritance these germs of misery and\nsin. We are all in a greater or lesser degree prone to excess and to\ndesire unlawful pleasures. Yet, for all that, we do not of necessity\nsin. We sin when we yield to these tendencies and do what they suggest.\nThe simple proneness to evil, devoid of all wilful yielding is\ntherefore not wrong. Why? Because we cannot help it; that is a good and\nsufficient reason.\n\nThese passions may lie dormant in our nature without soliciting to\nevil; they may, at any moment, awake to action with or without\nprovocation. The sight of an enemy or the thought of a wrong may stir\nup anger; pride may be aroused by flattery, applause or even\ncompliments; the demon of lust may make its presence known and felt for\na good reason, for a slight reason, or for no reason at all; gluttony\nshows its head at the sight of food or drink, etc.\n\nHe who deliberately and without reason arouses a passion, and thus\nexposes himself imprudently to an assault of concupiscence, is\ngrievously guilty; for it is to trifle with a powerful and dangerous\nenemy and it betokens indifference to the soul's salvation.\n\nSuggestions, seductions, allurements follow upon the awakening of these\npassions. When the array of these forces comes in contact with the\nwill, the struggle is on; it is called temptation. Warfare is the\nnatural state of man on earth. Without it, the world here below would\nbe a paradise, but life would be without merit.\n\nIn this unprovoked and righteous battle with sin, the only evil to be\napprehended is the danger of yielding. But far from being sinful, the\ngreater the danger, the more meritorious the struggle. It matters not\nwhat we experience while fighting the enemy. Imagination and sensation\nthat solicit to yielding, anxiety of mind and discouragement, to all\nthis there is no wrong attached, but merit.\n\nRight or wrong depends on the outcome. Every struggle ends in victory\nor defeat for one party and in temptation there is sin only in defeat.\nA single act of the will decides. It matters not how long the struggle\nlasts; if the will does not capitulate, there is no sin.\n\nThis resistance demands plenty of energy, a soul inured to like combats\nand an ample provision of weapons of defense--faith, hatred of sin,\nlove of God. Prayer is essential. Flight is the safest means, but is\nnot always possible. Humility and self-denial are an excellent, even\nnecessary, preparation for assured victory.\n\nNo man need expect to make himself proof against temptation. It is not\na sign of weakness; or if so, it is a weakness common to all men. There\nis weakness only in defeat, and cowardice as well. The gallant and\nstrong are they who fight manfully. Manful resistance means victory,\nand victory makes one stronger and invincible, while defeat at every\nrepetition places victory farther and farther beyond our reach.\n\nSuccess requires more than strength, it requires wisdom, the wisdom to\nsingle out the particular passion that predominates in us, to study its\nartifices and by remote preparation to make ourselves secure against\nits assaults. The leader thus exposed and its power for evil reduced to\na minimum, it will be comparatively easy to hold in check all other\ndependent passions.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER IX.\nPRIDE.\n\nEXCELLENCE is a quality that raises a man above the common level and\ndistinguishes him among his fellow-beings. The term is relative. The\nquality may exist in any degree or measure. 'Tis only the few that\nexcel eminently; but anyone may be said to excel who is, ever so\nlittle, superior to others, be they few or many. Three kinds of\nadvantages go to make up one's excellence. Nature's gifts are talent,\nknowledge, health, strength, and beauty; fortune endows us with honor,\nwealth, authority; and virtue, piety, honesty are the blessings of\ngrace. To the possession of one or several of these advantages\nexcellence is attached.\n\nAll good is made to be loved. All gifts directly or indirectly from God\nare good, and if excellence is the fruit of these gifts, it is lawful,\nreasonable, human to love it and them. But measure is to be observed in\nall things. Virtue is righteously equidistant, while vice goes to\nextremes. It is not, therefore, attachment and affection for this\nexcellence, but inordinate, unreasonable love that is damnable, and\nconstitutes the vice of pride.\n\nGod alone is excellent and all greatness is from Him alone. And those\nwho are born great, who acquire greatness, or who have greatness thrust\nupon them, alike owe their superiority to Him. Nor are these advantages\nand this preeminence due to our merits and deserts. Everything that\ncomes to us from God is purely gratuitous on His part, and undeserved\non ours. Since our very existence is the effect of a free act of His\nwill, why should not, for a greater reason, all that is accidental to\nthat existence be dependent on His free choice? Finally, nothing of all\nthis is ours or ever can become ours. Our qualities are a pure loan\nconfided to our care for a good and useful purpose, and will be\nreclaimed with interest.\n\nSince the malice of our pride consists in the measure of affection we\nbestow upon our excellence, if we love it to the extent of adjudging it\nnot a gift of God, but the fruit of our own better selves; or if we\nlook upon it as the result of our worth, that is, due to our merits, we\nare guilty of nothing short of downright heresy, because we hold two\ndoctrines contrary to faith. \"What hast thou, that thou hast not\nreceived?\" If a gift is due to us, it is no longer a gift. This extreme\nof pride is happily rare. It is directly opposed to God. It is the sin\nof Lucifer.\n\nA lesser degree of pride is, while admitting ourselves beholden to God\nfor whatever we possess and confessing His bounties to be undeserved,\nto consider the latter as becoming ours by right of possession, with\nliberty to make the most of them for our own personal ends. This is a\nfalse and sinful appreciation of God's gifts, but it respects His and\nall subordinate authority. If it never, in practice, fails in this\nsubmission, there is sin, because the plan of God, by which all things\nmust be referred to Him, is thwarted; but its malice is not considered\ngrievous. Pride, however, only too often fails in this, its tendency\nbeing to satisfy itself, which it cannot do within the bounds of\nauthority. Therefore it is that from being a venial, this species of\npride becomes a mortal offense, because it leads almost infallibly to\ndisobedience and rebellion. There is a pride, improperly so called,\nwhich is in accordance with all the rules of order, reason and honor.\nIt is a sense of responsibility and dignity which every man owes to\nhimself, and which is compatible with the most sincere humility. It is\na regard, an esteem for oneself, too great to allow one to stoop to\nanything base or mean. It is submissive to authority, acknowledges\nshortcomings, respects others and expects to be respected in return. It\ncan preside with dignity, and obey with docility. Far from being a\nvice, it is a virtue and is only too rare in this world. It is nobility\nof soul which betrays itself in self-respect.\n\nHere is the origin, progress and development of the vice. We first\nconsider the good that is in us, and there is good in all of us, more\nor less. This consideration becomes first exaggerated; then one-sided\nby reason of our overlooking and ignoring imperfections and\nshortcomings. Out of these reflections arises an apprehension of\nexcellence or superiority greater than we really possess. From the mind\nthis estimate passes to the heart which embraces it fondly, rejoices\nand exults. The conjoint acceptation of this false appreciation by the\nmind and heart is the first complete stage of pride--an overwrought\nesteem of self. The next move is to become self-sufficient,\npresumptuous. A spirit of enterprise asserts itself, wholly out of\nkeeping with the means at hand. It is sometimes foolish, sometimes\ninsane, reason being blinded by error.\n\nThe vice then seeks to satisfy itself, craves for the esteem of others,\nadmiration, flattery, applause, and glory. This is vanity, different\nfrom conceit only in this, that the former is based on something that\nis, or has been done, while the latter is based on nothing.\n\nVanity manifested in word is called boasting; in deed that is true,\nvain-glory; in deed without foundation of truth, hypocrisy.\n\nBut this is not substantial enough for ambition, another form of pride.\nIt covets exterior marks of appreciation, rank, honor, dignity,\nauthority. It seeks to rise, by hook or crook, for the sole reason of\nshowing off and displaying self. Still growing apace, pride becomes\nindignant, irritated, angry if this due appreciation is not shown to\nits excellence; it despises others either for antipathy or inferiority.\nIt believes its own judgment infallible and, if in the wrong, will\nnever acknowledge a mistake or yield. Finally the proud man becomes so\nfull of self that obedience is beneath him, and he no longer respects\nauthority of man or of God. Here we have the sin of pride in all the\nplenitude of its malice.\n\nPride is often called an honorable vice, because its aspirations are\nlofty, because it supposes strength, and tends directly to elevate man,\nrather than to debase and degrade him, like the other vices. Yet pride\nis compatible with every meanness. It lodges in the heart of the pauper\nas well as in that of the prince. There is nothing contemptible that it\nwill not do to satisfy itself; and although its prime malice is to\noppose God it has every quality to make it as hideous as Satan himself.\nIt goeth before a fall, but it does not cease to exist after the fall;\nand no matter how deep down in the mire of iniquity you search, you\nwill find pride nethermost. Other vices excite one's pity; pride makes\nus shudder.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER X.\nCOVETOUSNESS.\n\n\"WHAT is a miser?\" asked the teacher of her pupils, and the bright boy\nspoke up and answered: one who has a greed for gold. But he and all the\nclass were embarrassed as to how this greed for gold should be\nqualified. The boy at the foot of the class came to the rescue, and\nshouted out: misery.\n\nLess wise answers are made every day in our schools. Misery is indeed\nthe lot, if not the vice, of the miser. 'Tis true that this is one of\nthe few vices that arrive at permanent advantages, the others offering\nsatisfaction that lasts but for a moment, and leaves nothing but\nbitterness behind. Yet, the more the miser possesses the more\ninsatiable his greed becomes, and the less his enjoyment, by reason of\nthe redoubled efforts he makes to have and to hold.\n\nBut the miser is not the only one infected with the sin of avarice. His\nis not an ordinary, but an extreme case. He is the incarnation of the\nevil. He believes in, hopes in, and loves gold above all things; he\nprays and sacrifices to it. Gold is his god, and gold will be his\nreward, a miserable one.\n\nThis degree of the vice is rare; or, at least, is rarely suffered to\nmanifest itself to this extent; and although scarcely a man can be\nfound to confess to this failing, because it is universally regarded as\nmost loathsome and repulsive, still few there are who are not more or\nless slaves to cupidity. Pride is the sin of the angels; lust is the\nsin of the brute, and avarice is the sin of man. Scripture calls it the\nuniversal evil. We are more prone to inveigh against it, and accuse\nothers of the vice than to admit it in ourselves.\n\nSometimes, it is \"the pot calling the kettle black;\" more often it is a\nclear case of \"sour grapes.\" Disdain for the dollars \"that speak,\" \"the\nmighty dollars,\" in abundance and in superabundance, is rarely genuine.\n\nThere are, concerning the passion of covetousness, two notions as\ncommon as they are false. It is thought that this vice is peculiar to\nthe rich, and is not to be met with among the poor. Now, avarice does\nnot necessarily suppose the possession of wealth, and does not consist\nin the possession, but in the inordinate desire, or greed for, or the\nlust of, riches. It may be, and is, difficult for one to possess much\nwealth without setting one's heart on it. But it is also true that this\ngreed may possess one who has little or nothing. It may be found in\nunrestrained excess under the rags of the pauper and beggar. They who\naspire to, or desire, riches with avidity are covetous whether they\nhave much, little, or nothing. Christ promised His kingdom to the poor\nin spirit, not to the poor in fact. Spiritual poverty can associate\nwith abundant wealth, just as the most depraved cupidity may exist in\npoverty.\n\nAnother prejudice, favorable to ourselves, is that only misers are\ncovetous, because they love money for itself and deprive themselves of\nthe necessaries of life to pile it up. But it is not necessary that the\ndiagnosis reveal these alarming symptoms to be sure of having a real\ncase of cupidity. They are covetous who strive after wealth with\npassion. Various motives may arouse this passion, and although they may\nincrease the malice, they do not alter the nature, of the vice. Some\ncovet wealth for the sake of possessing it; others, to procure\npleasures or to satisfy different passions. Avarice it continues to be,\nwhatever the motive. Not even prodigality, the lavish spending of\nriches, is a token of the absence of cupidity. Rapacity may stand\nbehind extravagance to keep the supply inexhausted.\n\nIt is covetousness to place one's greatest happiness in the possession\nof wealth, or to consider its loss or privation the greatest of\nmisfortunes; in other words, to over-rejoice in having and to\nover-grieve in not having.\n\nIt is covetousness to be so disposed as to acquire riches unjustly\nrather than suffer poverty.\n\nIt is covetousness to hold, or give begrudgingly, when charity presses\nher demands.\n\nThere is, in these cases, a degree of malice that is ordinarily mortal,\nbecause the law of God and of nature is not respected.\n\nIt is the nature of this vice to cause unhappiness which increases\nuntil it becomes positive wretchedness in the miser. Anxiety of mind is\nfollowed by hardening of the heart; then injustice in desire and in\nfact; blinding of the conscience, ending in a general stultification of\nman before the god Mammon.\n\nAll desires of riches and comfort are not, therefore, avarice. One may\naspire to, and seek wealth without avidity. This ambition is a laudable\none, for it does not exaggerate the value of the world's goods, would\nnot resort to injustice, and has not the characteristic tenacity of\ncovetousness. There is order in this desire for plenty. It is the great\nmover of activity in life; it is good because it is natural, and\nhonorable because of its motives.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XI.\nLUST.\n\nPRIDE resides principally in the mind, and thence sways over the entire\nman; avarice proceeds from the heart and affections; lust has its seat\nin the flesh. By pride man prevaricating imitates the angel of whose\nnature he partakes; avarice is proper to man as being a composite of\nangelic and animal natures; lust is characteristic of the brute pure\nand simple. This trinity of concupiscence is in direct opposition to\nthe Trinity of God--to the Father, whose authority pride would destroy;\nto the Son, whose voluntary stripping of the divinity and the poverty\nof whose life avarice scorns and contemns to the Holy Ghost, to whom\nlust is opposed as the flesh is opposed to the spirit. This is the\nmighty trio that takes possession of the whole being of man, controls\nhis superior and inferior appetites, and wars on the whole being on\nGod. And lust is the most ignoble of the three.\n\nStrictly speaking, it is not here question of the commandments. They\nprescribe or forbid acts of sin--thoughts, words or deeds; lust is a\npassion, a vice or inclination, a concupiscence. It is not an act. It\ndoes not become a sin while it remains in this state of pure\ninclination. It is inbred in our nature as children of Adam. Lust is an\nappetite like any other appetite, conformable to our human nature, and\ncan be satisfied lawfully within the order established by God and\nnature. But it is vitiated by the corruption of fallen flesh. This\nvitiated appetite craves for unlawful and forbidden satisfactions and\npleasures, such as are not in keeping with the plans of the Creator.\nThus the vitiated appetite becomes inordinate. At one and the same\ntime, it becomes inordinate and sinful, the passion being gratified\nunduly by a positive act of sin.\n\nThis depraved inclination, as everyone knows, may be in us, without\nbeing of us, that is, without any guilt being imputed to us. This\noccurs in the event of a violent assault of passion, in which our will\nhas no part, and which consequently does not materialize, exteriorly or\ninteriorly, in a human act forbidden by the laws of morality. Nor is\nthere a transgression, even when gratified, if reason and faith control\nthe inclination and direct it along the lines laid down by the divine\nand natural laws. Outside of this, all manners, shapes and forms of\nlust are grievous sins, for the law admits no levity of matter. No\nfurther investigation, at the present time, into the essence of this\nvice is necessary.\n\nThere is an abominable theory familiar to, and held by the dissolute,\nwho, not content with spreading the contagion of their souls, aim at\npoisoning the very wells of morality. They reason somewhat after this\nfashion: Human nature is everywhere the same. He knows others who best\nknows himself. A mere glance at themselves reveals the fact that they\nare chained fast to earth by their vile appetites, and that to break\nthese chains is a task too heavy for them to undertake. The fact is\noverlooked that these bonds are of their own creation, and that every\nend is beyond reach of him who refuses to take the means to that end.\nIncapable, too, of conceiving a sphere of morality superior to that in\nwhich they move, and without further investigation of facts to make\ntheir induction good, they conclude that all men are like themselves;\nthat open profession of morality is unadulterated hypocrisy, that a\npure man is a living lie. A more wholesale impeachment of human\nveracity and a more brutal indignity offered to human nature could\nscarcely be imagined. Reason never argued thus; the heart has reasons\nwhich the reason cannot comprehend. Truth to be loved needs only to be\nseen. Adversely, it is the case with falsehood.\n\nIt is habitual with this passion to hide its hideousness under the\ndisguise of love, and thus this most sacred and hallowed name is\nprostituted to signify that which is most vile and loathsome.\nDepravity? No. Goodness of heart, generosity of affections, the very\nquintessence of good nature! But God is love, and love that does not\nsee the image of the Creator in its object is not love, but the brutal\ninstinct.\n\nThere are some who do not go so far as to identify vice with virtue,\nbut content themselves with esteeming that, since passion is so strong,\nvirtue so difficult and God so merciful to His frail creatures, to\nyield a trifle is less a sin than a confession of native weakness. This\n\"weakness\" runs a whole gamut of euphemisms; imperfections, foibles,\nfrailties, mistakes, miseries, accidents, indiscretions--anything to\ngloss it over, anything but what it is. At this rate, you could efface\nthe whole Decalogue and at one fell stroke destroy all laws, human and\ndivine. What is yielding to any passion but weakness? Very few sins are\nsins of pure malice. If one is weak through one's own fault, and\nchooses to remain so rather than take the necessary means of acquiring\nstrength, that one is responsible in full for the weakness. The weak\nand naughty in this matter are plain, ordinary sinners of a very sable\ndye.\n\nTheirs is not the view that God took of things when He purged the earth\nwith water and destroyed the five cities with fire. From Genesis to the\nApocalypse you will not find a weakness against which He inveighs so\nstrongly, and chastises so severely. He forbids and condemns every\ndeliberate yielding, every voluntary step taken over the threshold of\nmoral cleanness in thought, word, desire or action.\n\nThe gravity and malice of sin is not to be measured by the fancies,\nopinions, theories or attitude of men. The first and only rule is the\nwill of God which is sufficiently clear to anyone who scans the sacred\npages whereon it is manifested. And the reason of His uncompromising\nhostility to voluptuousness can be found in the intrinsic malice of the\nevil. In man, as God created him, the soul is superior to the body, and\nof its nature should rule and govern. Lust inverts this order, and the\nflesh lords it over the spirit. The image of God is defiled, dragged in\nthe mire of filth and corruption, and robbed of its spiritual nature,\nas far as the thing is possible. It becomes corporal, carnal, animal.\nAnd thus the superior soul with its sublime faculties of intelligence\nand will is made to obey under the tyranny of emancipated flesh, and\nlike the brute seeks only for things carnal.\n\nIt is impossible to say to what this vice will not lead, or to\nenumerate the crimes that follow in its wake. The first and most\nnatural consequence is to create a distaste and aversion for prayer,\npiety, devotion, religion and God; and this is God's most terrible\ncurse on the vice, for it puts beyond reach of the unfortunate sinner\nthe only remedy that could save him.\n\nBut if God's justice is so rigorous toward the wanton, His mercy is\nnever so great as toward those who need it most, who desire it and ask\nit. The most touching episodes in the Gospels are those in which Christ\nopened wide the arms of His charity to sinful but repentant creatures,\nand lifted them out of their iniquity. That same charity and power to\nshrive, uplift and strengthen resides to-day, in all its plenitude, in\nthe Church which is the continuation of Christ. Where there is a will\nthere is a way. The will is the sinner's; the way is in prayer and the\nsacraments.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XII.\nANGER.\n\nNEVER say, when you are angry, that you are mad; it makes you appear\nmuch worse than you really are, for only dogs get mad. The rabies in a\nhuman being is a most unnatural and ignoble thing. Yet common parlance\nlikens anger to it.\n\nIt is safe to say that no one has yet been born that never yielded,\nmore or less, to the sway of this passion. Everybody gets angry. The\nchild sulks, the little girl calls names and makes faces, the boy\nfights and throws stones; the maiden waxes huffy, spiteful, and won't\nspeak, and the irascible male fumes, rages, and says and does things\nthat become him not in the least. Even pious folks have their tiffs and\ntilts. All flesh is frail, and anger has an easy time of it; not\nbecause this passion is so powerful, but because it is insidious and\npasses for a harmless little thing in its ordinary disguise. And yet\nall wrath does not manifest itself thus exteriorly. Still waters are\ndeepest. An imperturbable countenance may mask a very inferno of wrath\nand hatred.\n\nTo hear us talk, there is no fault in all this, the greater part of the\ntime. It is a soothing tonic to our conscience after a fit of rage, to\nlay all the blame on a defect of character or a naturally bad temper.\nIf fault there is, it is anybody's but our own. We recall the fact that\npatience is a virtue that has its limits, and mention things that we\nsolemnly aver would try the enduring powers of the beatified on their\nthrones in heaven. Some, at a loss otherwise to account for it, protest\nthat a particular devil got hold of them and made resistance\nimpossible.\n\nBut it was not a devil at all. It was a little volcano, or better, a\nlittle powder magazine hidden away somewhere in the heart. The imp\nPride had its head out looking for a caress, when it received a rebuff\ninstead. Hastily disappearing within, it spat fire right and left, and\nthe explosion followed, proportionate in energy and destructive power\nto the quantity of pent-up self-love that served as a charge. Once the\nmine is fired, in the confusion and disorder that follow, vengeance\nstalks forth in quest of the miscreant that did the wrong.\n\nAnger is the result of hurt pride, of injured self-love. It is a\nviolent and inordinate commotion of the soul that seeks to wreak\nvengeance for an injury done. The causes that arouse anger vary\ninfinitely in reasonableness, and there are all degrees of intensity.\n\nThe malice of anger consists wholly in the measure of our deliberate\nyielding to its promptings. Sin, here as elsewhere, supposes an act of\nthe will, A crazy man is not responsible for his deeds; nor is anyone,\nfor more than what he does knowingly.\n\nThe first movement or emotion of irascibility is usually exempt of all\nfault; by this is meant the play of the passion on the sensitive part\nof our nature, the sharp, sudden fit that is not foreseen and is not\nwithin our control, the first effects of the rising wrath, such as the\nrush of blood, the trouble and disorder of the affections,\nsurexcitation and solicitation to revenge. A person used to repelling\nthese assaults may be taken unawares and carried away to a certain\nextent in the first storm of passion, in this there is nothing sinful.\nBut the same faultlessness could not be ascribed to him who exercises\nno restraining power over his failing, and by yielding habitually\nfosters it and must shoulder the responsibility of every excess. We\nincur the burden of God's wrath when, through our fault, negligence or\na positive act of the will, we suffer this passion to steal away our\nreason, blind us to the value of our actions, and make us deaf to all\nconsiderations. No motive can justify such ignoble weakness that would\nlower us to the level of the madman. He dishonors his Maker who throws\nthe reins to his animal instincts and allows them to gallop ahead with\nhim, in a mad career of vengeance and destruction.\n\nMany do not go to this extent of fury, but give vent to their spleen in\na more cool and calculating manner. Their temper, for being less fiery,\nis more bitter. They are choleric rather than bellicose. They do not\nfly to acts but to desires and well-laid plans of revenge. If the\ndesire or deed lead to a violation of justice or charity, to scandal or\nany notable evil consequence, the sin is clearly mortal; the more so,\nif this inward brooding be of long duration, as it betrays a more\ndeep-seated malice.\n\nAre there any motives capable of justifying these outbursts of passion?\nNone at all, if our ire has these two features of unreasonableness and\nvindictiveness. This is evil. No motive, however good, can justify an\nevil end.\n\nIf any cause were plausible, it would be a grave injury, malicious and\nunjust. But not even this is sufficient, for we are forbidden to return\nevil for evil. It may cause us grief and pain, but should not incite us\nto anger, hatred and revenge. What poor excuses would therefore be\naccidental or slight injuries, just penalties for our wrongdoings and\nimaginary grievances! The less excusable is our wrath, the more serious\nis our delinquency. Our guilt is double-dyed when the deed and the\ncause of the deed are both alike unreasonable.\n\nYet there is a kind of anger that is righteous. We speak of the wrath\nof God, and in God there can be no sin. Christ himself was angry at the\nsight of the vendors in the temple. Holy Writ says: Be ye angry and sin\nnot. But this passion, which is the fruit of zeal, has three features\nwhich make it impossible to confound it with the other. It is always\nkept within the bounds of a wise moderation and under the empire of\nreason; it knows not the spirit of revenge; and it has behind it the\nbest of motives, namely, zeal for the glory of God. It is aroused at\nthe sight of excesses, injustices, scandals, frauds; it seeks to\ndestroy sin, and to correct the sinner. It is often not only a\nprivilege, but a duty. It supposes, naturally, judgment, prudence, and\ndiscretion, and excludes all selfish motives.\n\nZeal in an inferior and more common degree is called indignation, and\nis directed against all things unworthy, low and deserving of contempt.\nIt respects persons, but loathes whatever of sin or vice that is in, or\ncomes from, unworthy beings. It is a virtue, and is the effect of a\nhigh sense of respectability.\n\nImpatience is not anger, but a feeling somewhat akin to it, provoked by\nuntoward events and inevitable happenings, such as the weather,\naccidents, etc. It is void of all spirit of revenge. Peevishness is\nchronic impatience, due to a disordered nervous system and requires the\nservices of a competent physician, being a physical, not moral,\ndistemper.\n\nAnger is a weakness and betrays many other weaknesses; that is why\nsensible people never allow this passion to sway them. It is the last\nargument of a lost cause: \"You are angry, therefore you are wrong.\" The\ngreat misery of it is that hot-tempered people consider their mouths to\nbe safety-valves, while the truth is that the wagging tongue generates\nbile faster than the open mouth can give exit to it. St. Liguori\npresented an irate scold with a bottle, the contents to be taken by the\nmouthful and held for fifteen minutes, each time her lord and master\nreturned home in his cups. She used it with surprising results and went\nback for more. The saint told her to go to the well and draw\ninexhaustibly until cured.\n\nFor all others, the remedy is to be found in a meditation of these\nwords of the \"Our Father:\" \"forgive us our trespasses, as we forgive\nthose who trespass against us.\" The Almighty will take us at our word.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIII.\nGLUTTONY.\n\nSELF-PRESERVATION is nature's first law, and the first and essential\nmeans of preserving one's existence is the taking of food and drink\nsufficient to nourish the body, sustain its strength and repair the\nforces thereof weakened by labor, fatigue or illness. God, as well as\nnature, obliges us to care for our bodily health, in order that the\nspirit within may work out on earth the end of its being.\n\nBeing purely animal, this necessity is not the noblest and most\nelevating characteristic of our nature. Nor is it, in its imperious and\nunrelenting requirements, far removed from a species of tyranny. A kind\nProvidence, however, by lending taste, savor and delectability to our\naliments, makes us find pleasure in what otherwise would be repugnant\nand insufferably monotonous.\n\nAn appetite is a good and excellent thing. To eat and drink with relish\nand satisfaction is a sign of good health, one of the precious boons of\nnature. And the tendency to satisfy this appetite, far from being\nsinful, is wholly in keeping with the divine plan, and is necessary for\na fulsome benefiting of the nourishment we take.\n\nOn the other hand, the digestive organism of the body is such a\ndelicate and finely adjusted piece of mechanism that any excess is\nliable to clog its workings and put it out of order. It is made for\nsufficiency alone. Nature never intended man to be a glutton; and she\nseldom fails to retaliate and avenge excesses by pain, disease and\ndeath.\n\nThis fact coupled with the grossness of the vice of gluttony makes it\nhappily rare, at least in its most repulsive form; for, be it said, it\nis here question of the excessive use of ordinary food and drink, and\nnot of intoxicants to which latter form of gluttony we shall pay our\nrespects later.\n\nThe rich are more liable than the poor to sin by gluttony; but gluttony\nis fatal to longevity, and they who enjoy best life, desire to live\nlongest. 'Tis true, physicians claim that a large portion of diseases\nare due to over-eating and over-drinking; but it must be admitted that\nthis is through ignorance rather than malice. So that this passion can\nhardly be said to be commonly yielded to, at least to the extent of\ngrievous offending.\n\nNaturally, the degree of excess in eating and drinking is to be\nmeasured according to age, temperament, condition of life, etc. The\nterm gluttony is relative. What would be a sin for one person might be\npermitted as lawful to another. One man might starve on what would\nconstitute a sufficiency for more than one. Then again, not only the\nquantity, but the quality, time and manner, enter for something in\ndetermining just where excess begins. It is difficult therefore, and it\nis impossible, to lay down a general rule that will fit all cases.\n\nIt is evident, however, that he is mortally guilty who is so far buried\nin the flesh as to make eating and drinking the sole end of life, who\nmakes a god of his stomach. Nor is it necessary to mention certain\nunmentionable excesses such as were practiced by the degenerate Romans\ntowards the fall of the Empire. It would likewise be a grievous sin of\ngluttony to put the satisfaction of one's appetite before the law of\nthe Church and violate wantonly the precepts of fasting and abstinence.\n\nAnd are there no sins of gluttony besides these? Yes, and three rules\nmay be laid down, the application of which to each particular case will\nreveal the malice of the individual. Overwrought attachment to\nsatisfactions of the palate, betrayed by constant thinking of viands\nand pleasures of the table, and by avidity in taking nourishment,\nbetokens a dangerous, if not a positively sinful, degree of sensuality.\nThen, to continue eating or drinking after the appetite is appeased, is\nin itself an excess, and mortal sin may be committed even without going\nto the last extreme. Lastly, it is easy to yield inordinately to this\npassion by attaching undue importance to the quality of our victuals,\nseeking after delicacies that do not become our rank, and catering to\nan over-refined palate. The evil of all this consists in that we seem\nto eat and drink, if we do not in fact eat and drink, to satisfy our\nsensuality first, and to nourish our bodies afterwards; and this is\ncontrary to the law of nature.\n\nWe seemed to insist from the beginning that this is not a very\ndangerous or common practice. Yet there must be a hidden and especial\nmalice in it. Else why is fasting and abstinence--two correctives of\ngluttony--so much in honor and so universally recommended and commanded\nin the Church? Counting three weeks in Advent, seven in Lent and three\nEmber days four times a year, we have, without mentioning fifty-two\nFridays, thirteen weeks or one-fourth of the year by order devoted to a\npractical warfare on gluttony. No other vice receives the honor of such\nsystematic and uncompromising resistance. The enemy must be worthy.\n\nAs a matter of fact, there lies under all this a great moral principle\nof Christian philosophy. This philosophy sought out and found the cause\nand seat of all evil to be in the flesh. The forces of sin reside in\nthe flesh while the powers of righteousness--faith, reason and will--\nare in the spirit. The real issue of life is between these forces\ncontending for supremacy. The spirit should rule; that is the order of\nour being. But the flesh revolts, and by ensnaring the will endeavors\nto dominate over the spirit.\n\nNow it stands to reason that the only way for the superior part to\nsucceed is to weaken the inferior part. Just as prayer and the grace of\nthe sacraments fortify the soul, so do food and drink nourish the\nanimal; and if the latter is cared for to the detriment of the soul, it\nwaxes strong and formidable and becomes a menace.\n\nThe only resource for the soul is then to cut off the supply that\nbenefits the flesh, and strengthen herself thereby. She acts like a\nwise engineer who keeps the explosive and dangerous force of his\nlocomotive within the limit by reducing the quantity of food he throws\ninto its stomach. Thus the passions being weakened become docile, and\nare easily held under sway by the power that is destined to govern, and\nsin is thus rendered morally impossible.\n\nIt is gluttony that furnishes the passion of the flesh with fuel by\nfeeding the animal too well; and herein lies the great danger and\nmalice of this vice. The evil of a slight excess may not be great\nin itself; but that evil is great in its consequences. Little\nover-indulgences imperceptibly, but none the less surely, strengthen\nthe flesh against the spirit, and when the temptation comes the spirit\nwill be overcome. The ruse of the saints was to starve the enemy.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIV.\nDRINK.\n\nINTEMPERANCE is the immoderate use of anything, good or bad; here the\nword is used to imply an excessive use of alcoholic beverages, which\nexcess, when it reaches the dignity of a habit or vice, makes a man a\ndrunkard. A drunkard who indulges in \"highballs\" and other beverages of\nfancy price and name, is euphemistically styled a \"tippler;\" his\nbrother, a poor devil who swallows vile concoctions or red \"pizen\" is\ncalled a plain, ordinary \"soak.\" Whatever name we give to such\ngluttons, the evil in both is the same; 'tis the evil of gluttony.\n\nThis vice differs from gluttony proper in that its object is strong\ndrink, while the latter is an abuse of food and nourishment necessary,\nin regulated quantity, for the sustenance of the body. But alcohol is\nnot necessary to sustain life as an habitual beverage; it may\nstimulate, but it does not sustain at all. It has its legitimate uses,\nlike strychnine and other poison and drugs; but being a poison, it must\nbe detrimental to living tissues, when taken frequently, and cannot\nhave been intended by the Creator as a life-giving nourishment. Its\nhabitual use is therefore not a necessity. Its abuse has therefore a\nmore far-fetched malice.\n\nBut its use is not sinful, any more than the use of any drug, for\nalcohol, or liquor, is a creature of God and is made for good purposes.\nIts use is not evil, whether it does little good, or no good at all.\nThe fact of its being unnecessary does not make it a forbidden fruit.\nThe habit of stimulants, like the habit of tobacco, while it has no\ntitle to be called a good habit, cannot be qualified as an\nintrinsically bad habit; it may be tolerated as long as it is kept\nwithin the bounds of sane reason and does not give rise to evil\nconsequences in self or others. Apart, therefore, from the danger of\nabuse--a real and fatal danger for many, especially for the young--and\nfrom the evil effects that may follow even a moderate use, the habit is\nlike another; a temperate man is not, to any appreciable degree, less\nrighteous than a moderate smoker. The man who can use and not abuse is\njust as moral as his brother who does not use lest he abuse. He must,\nhowever, be said to be less virtuous than another who abstains rather\nthan run the risk of being even a remote occasion of sin unto the weak.\n\nThe intrinsic malice therefore of this habit consists in the disorder\nof excess, which is called intoxication. Intoxication may exist in\ndifferent degrees and stages; it is the state of a man who loses, to\nany extent, control over his reasoning faculties through the effects of\nalcohol. There is evil and sin the moment the brain is affected; when\nreason totters and falls from its throne in the soul, then the crime is\nconsummated. When a man says and does and thinks what in his sober\nsenses he would not say, do, or think, that man is drunk, and there is\nmortal sin on his soul. It is not an easy matter to define just when\nintoxication properly begins and sobriety ends; every man must do that\nfor himself. But he should consider himself well on the road to guilt\nwhen, being aware that the fumes of liquor were fast beclouding his\nmind, he took another glass that was certain to still further obscure\nhis reason and paralyze his will.\n\nMuch has been said and written about the grossness of this vice, its\nbaneful effects and consequences, to which it were useless here to\nrefer. Suffice it to say there is nothing that besots a man more\ncompletely and lowers him more ignobly to the level of the brute. He\nfalls below, for the most stupid of brutes, the ass, knows when it has\nenough; and the drunkard does not. It requires small wit indeed to\nunderstand that there is no sin in the catalogue of crime that a person\nin this state is not capable of committing. He will do things the very\nbrute would blush to do; and then he will say it was one of the devil's\njokes. The effects on individuals, families and generations, born and\nunborn, cannot be exaggerated; and the drunkard is a tempter of God and\nthe curse of society.\n\nTemperance is a moderate use of strong drink; teetotalism is absolute\nabstention therefrom. A man may be temperate without being a\nteetotaler; all teetotalers are temperate, at least as far as alcohol\nis concerned, although they are sometimes, some of them, accused of\nusing temperance as a cloak for much intemperance of speech. If this be\ntrue--and there are cranks in all causes--then temperance is itself the\ngreatest sufferer. Exaggeration is a mistake; it repels right-thinking\nmen and never served any purpose. We believe it has done the cause of\nteetotalism a world of harm. But it is poor logic that will identify\nwith so holy a cause the rabid rantings of a few irresponsible fools.\n\nThe cause of total abstinence is a holy and righteous cause. It takes\nits stand against one of the greatest evils, moral and social, of the\nday. It seeks to redeem the fallen, and to save the young and\ninexperienced. Its means are organization and the mighty weapon of good\nexample. It attracts those who need it and those who do not need it;\nthe former, to save them; the latter, to help save others. And there is\nno banner under which Catholic youth could more honorably be enrolled\nthan the banner of total abstinence. The man who condemns or decries\nsuch a cause either does not know what he is attacking or his mouthings\nare not worth the attention of those who esteem honesty and hate\nhypocrisy. It is not necessary to be able to practice virtue in order\nto esteem its worth. And it does not make a fellow appear any better\neven to himself to condemn a cause that condemns his faults.\n\nSaloon-keepers are engaged in an enterprise which in itself is lawful;\nthe same can be said of those who buy and sell poisons and dynamite and\nfire-arms. The nature of his merchandise differentiates his business\nfrom all other kinds of business, and his responsibilities are of the\nheaviest. It may, and often does, happen that this business is\ncriminal; and in this matter the civil law may be silent, but the moral\nlaw is not. For many a one such a place is an occasion of sin, often a\nnear occasion. It is not comforting to kneel in prayer to God with the\nthought in one's mind that one is helping many to damnation, and that\nthe curses of drunkards' wives and mothers and children are being piled\nupon one's head. How far the average liquor seller is guilty, God only\nknows; but a man with a deep concern for his soul's salvation, it seems\nwould not like to take the risk.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XV.\nENVY.\n\nWHEN envy catches a victim she places an evil eye in his mind, gives\nhim a cud to chew, and then sends him gadding.\n\nIf the mind's eye feeds upon one's own excellence for one's own\nsatisfaction, that is pride; if it feeds upon the neighbor's good for\none's own displeasure and unhappiness, that is envy. It is not alone\nthis displeasure that makes envy, but the reason of this displeasure,\nthat is, what the evil eye discerns in the neighbor's excellence,\nnamely, a detriment, an obstacle to one's own success. It is not\nnecessary that another's prosperity really work injury to our own; it\nis sufficient that the evil eye, through its discolored vision,\nperceive a prejudice therein. \"Ah!\" says envy, \"he is happy,\nprosperous, esteemed! My chances are spoiled. I am overshadowed. I am\nnothing, he is everything. I am nothing because he is everything.\"\n\nRemember that competition, emulation, rivalry are not necessarily envy.\nI dread to see my rival succeed. I am pained if he does succeed. But\nthe cause of this annoyance and vexation is less his superiority than\nmy inferiority. I regret my failure more than his success. There is no\nevil eye. 'Tis the sting of defeat that causes me pain. If I regret\nthis or that man's elevation because I fear he will abuse his power; if\nI become indignant at the success of an unworthy person; I am not\nenvious, because this superiority of another does not appear to me to\nbe a prejudice to my standing. Whatever sin there is, there is no sin\nof envy.\n\nWe may safely assume that a person who would be saddened by the success\nof another, would not fail to rejoice at that other's misfortune. This\nis a grievous offense against charity, but it is not, properly\nspeaking, envy, for envy is always sad; it is rather an effect of envy,\na natural product thereof and a form of hatred.\n\nThis unnatural view of things which we qualify as the evil eye, is not\na sin until it reaches the dignity of a sober judgment, for only then\ndoes it become a human act. Envy like pride, anger, and the other\nvicious inclinations, may and often does crop out in our nature,\nmomentarily, without our incurring guilt, if it is checked before it\nreceives the acquiescence of the will, it is void of wrong, and only\nserves to remind us that we have a rich fund of malice in our nature\ncapable of an abundant yield of iniquity.\n\nAfter being born in the mind, envy passes to the feelings where it\nmatures and furnishes that supply of misery which characterizes the\nvice. Another is happy at our expense; the sensation is a painful one,\nyet it has a diabolical fascination, and we fondle and caress it. We\nbrood over our affliction to the embittering and souring of our souls.\nWe swallow and regurgitate over and over again our dissatisfaction, and\nare aptly said to chew the cud of bitterness.\n\nOut of such soil as this naturally springs a rank growth of uncharity\nand injustice in thought and desire. The mind and heart of envy are\nuntrammeled by all bonds of moral law. It may think all evil of a rival\nand wish him all evil. He becomes an enemy, and finally he is hated.\nEnvy points directly to hatred.\n\nLastly, envy is \"a gadding passion, it walketh the street and does not\nkeep home.\" It were better to say that it \"talketh.\" There is nothing\nlike language to relieve one's feelings; it is quieting and soothing,\nand envy has strong feelings. Hence, evil insinuations, detraction,\nslander, etc. Justice becomes an empty word and the seamless robe of\ncharity is torn to shreds. As an agent of destruction envy easily holds\nthe palm, for it commands the two strong passions of pride and anger,\nand they do its bidding.\n\nPeople scarcely ever acknowledge themselves envious. It is such a base,\nunreasonable and unnatural vice. If we cannot rejoice with the\nneighbor, why be pained at his felicity? And what an insanity it is to\nimagine that in this wide world one cannot be happy without prejudicing\nthe happiness of another! What a severe shock it would be to the\ndiscontented, the morosely sour, the cynic, and other human owls, to be\ntold that they are victims of this green-eyed monster. They would\nconfess to calumny, and hatred; to envy, never!\n\nEnvy can only exist where there is abundant pride. It is a form of\npride, a shape which it frequently assumes, because under this disguise\nit can penetrate everywhere without being as much as noticed. And it is\nso seldom detected that wherever it gains entrance it can hope to\nremain indefinitely.\n\nJealousy and envy are often confounded; yet they differ in that the\nlatter looks on what is another's, while the former concerns itself\nwith what is in one's own possession. I envy what is not mine; I am\njealous of what is my own. Jealousy has a saddening influence upon us,\nby reason of a fear, more or less well grounded, that what we have will\nbe taken from us. We foresee an injustice and resent it.\n\nKept within the limits of sane reason, jealousy is not wrong, for it is\nfounded on the right we have to what is ours. It is in our nature to\ncling to what belongs to us, to regret being deprived of it, and to\nguard ourselves against injustice.\n\nBut when this fear is without cause, visionary, unreasonable, jealousy\npartakes of the nature and malice of envy. It is even more malignant a\npassion, and leads to greater disorders and crimes, for while envy is\nbased on nothing at all, there is here a true foundation in the right\nof possession, and a motive in right to repel injustice.\n\n\nCHAPTER XVI.\nSLOTH.\n\nNOT the least, if the last, of capital sins is sloth, and it is very\nproperly placed; for who ever saw the sluggard or victim of this\npassion anywhere but after all others, last!\n\nSloth, of course, is a horror of difficulty, an aversion for labor,\npain and effort, which must be traced to a great love of one's comfort\nand ease. Either the lazy fellow does nothing at all--and this is\nsloth; or he abstains from doing what he should do while otherwise\nbusily occupied--and this too, is sloth; or he does it poorly,\nnegligently, half-heartedly--and this again is sloth. Nature imposes\nupon us the law of labor. He who shirks in whole or in part is\nslothful.\n\nHere, in the moral realm, we refer properly to the difficulty we find\nin the service of God, in fulfiling our obligations as Christians and\nCatholics, in avoiding evil and doing good; in a word, to the discharge\nof our spiritual duties. But then all human obligations have a\nspiritual side, by the fact of their being obligations. Thus, labor is\nnot, like attendance at mass, a spiritual necessity; but to provide for\nthose who are dependent upon us is a moral obligation and to shirk it\nwould be a sin of sloth.\n\nNot that it is necessary, if we would avoid sin, to hate repose\nnaturally and experience no difficulty or repugnance in working out our\nsoul's salvation. Sloth is inbred in our nature. There is no one but\nwould rather avoid than meet difficulties. The service of God is\nlaborious and painful. The kingdom of God suffers violence. It has\nalways been true since the time of our ancestor Adam, that vice is\neasy, and virtue difficult; that the flesh is weak, and repugnance to\neffort, natural because of the burden of the flesh. So that, in this\ngeneral case, sloth is an obstacle to overcome rather than a fault of\nthe will. We may abhor exertion, feel the laziest of mortals; if we\neffect our purpose in spite of all that, we can do no sin.\n\nSometimes sloth takes on an acute form known as aridity or barrenness\nin all things that pertain to God. The most virtuous souls are not\nalways exempt from this. It is a dislike, a distaste that amounts\nalmost to a disgust for prayer especially, a repugnance that threatens\nto overwhelm the soul. That is simply an absence of sensible fervor, a\nstate of affliction and probation that is as pleasing to God as it is\npainful to us. After all where would the merit be in the service of\nGod, if there were no difficulty?\n\nThe type of the spiritually indolent is that fixture known as the\nhalf-baked Catholic--some people call him \"a poor stick\"--who is too\nlazy to meet his obligations with his Maker. He says no prayers,\nbecause he can't; he lies abed Sunday mornings and lets the others go\nto mass--he is too tired and needs rest; the effort necessary to prepare\nfor and to go to confession is quite beyond him. In fine, religion is\naltogether too exacting, requires too much of a man.\n\nAnd, as if to remove all doubt as to the purely spiritual character of\nthis inactivity, our friend can be seen, without a complaint,\nstruggling every day to earn the dollar. He will not grumble about\nrising at five to go fishing or cycling. He will, after his hard day's\nwork, sit till twelve at the theatre or dance till two in the morning.\nHe will spend his energy in any direction save in that which leads to\nGod.\n\nOthers expect virtue to be as easy as it is beautiful. Religion should\nconduce to one's comfort. They like incense, but not the smell of\nbrimstone. They would remain forever content on Tabor, but the dark\nfrown of Calvary is insupportable. Beautiful churches, artistic music,\neloquent preaching on interesting topics, that is their idea of\nreligion; that is what they intend religion--their religion--shall be,\nand they proceed to cut out whatever jars their finer feelings. This is\nfashionable, but it is not Christian: to do anything for God--if it is\neasy; and if it is hard,--well, God does not expect so much of us.\n\nYou will see at a glance that this sort of a thing is fatal to the\nsense of God in the soul; it has for its first, direct and immediate\neffect to weaken little by little the faith until it finally kills it\naltogether. Sloth is a microbe. It creeps into the soul, sucks in its\nsubstance and causes a spiritual consumption. This is neither an acute\nnor a violent malady, but it consumes the patient, dries him up, wears\nhim out, till life goes out like a lamp without oil.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVII.\nWHAT WE BELIEVE.\n\nOUR first duty to God, and the first obligation imposed upon us by the\nFirst Commandment is Faith, or belief in God--we must know Him.\n\nBelief is solely a manner of knowing. It is one way of apprehending, or\ngetting possession of, a truth. There are other ways of acquiring\nknowledge; by the senses, for instance, seeing, hearing, etc., and by\nour intelligence or reason. When truth comes to us through the senses,\nit is called experience; if the reason presents it, it is called\nscience; if we use the faculty of the soul known as faith, it is\nbelief.\n\nYou will observe that belief, experience and science have one and the\nsame object, namely, truth. These differ only in the manner of\napprehending truth. Belief relies on the testimony of others;\nexperience, on the testimony of the senses; science, on that of the\nreason. What I believe, I get from others; what I experience or\nunderstand, I owe to my individual self. I neither believe nor\nunderstand that Hartford exists--I see it. I neither understand nor see\nthat Rome exists--I believe it. I neither see nor believe that two\nparallel lines will never meet--I reason it out, I understand it.\n\nNow it is beside the question here to object that belief, or what we\nbelieve, may or may not be true. Neither is all that we see, nor all\nthat our reason produces, true. Human experience and human reason, like\nall things human, may err. Here we simply remark that truth is the\nobject of our belief, as it is the object of our experience and of\nunderstanding. We shall later see that if human belief may err, faith\nor divine belief cannot mislead us, cannot be false.\n\nNeither is it in order here to contend that belief, of its very nature,\nis something uncertain, that it is synonymous of opinion; or if it\nsupposes a judgment, that judgment is \"formidolose,\" liable at any\nmoment to be changed or contradicted. The testimony of the senses and\nof reason does not always carry certain conviction. We may or may not\nbe satisfied with the evidence of human belief. As for the divine, or\nfaith, it is certain, or it is not at all; and who would not be\nsatisfied with the guarantee offered by the Word of God!\n\nAnd the truths we believe are those revealed by God, received by us\nthrough a double agency, the written and the oral word, known as\nScripture and Tradition. Scripture is contained in the two Testaments;\nTradition is found in the bosom, the life of the Church of Christ, in\nthe constant and universal teachings of that Church.\n\nThe Scripture being a dead letter cannot explain or interpret itself.\nYet, since it is applied to the ever-varying lives of men, it needs an\nexplanation and an interpretation; it is practically of no value\nwithout it. And in order that the truth thus presented be accepted by\nmen, it is necessary, of prime necessity, that it have the guarantee of\ninfallibility. This infallibility the Church of Christ possesses, else\nHis mission were a failure.\n\nThis infallibility is to control the vagaries of Tradition, for\nTradition, of its very nature, tends to exaggeration, as we find in the\nlegends of ancient peoples. Exaggerated, they destroy themselves, but\nin the bosom of God's Church these truths forever retain their\ncharacter unchanged and unchangeable.\n\nIf you accept the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth as\nrevealed by God and delivered to man by the infallible Church from the\nBible and Tradition, you have what is called ecclesiastical, Catholic\nor true faith. There is no other true faith. It is even an open\nquestion whether there is any faith at all outside of this; for outside\nthe Church there is no reasonable foundation for faith, and our faith\nmust be reasonable.\n\nHowever, granting that such a thing can be, the faith of him who takes\nand leaves off the divine Word is called divine faith. He is supposed\nto ignore invincibly a portion of revealed truth, but he accepts what\nhe knows. If he knew something and refused to embrace it, he would have\nno faith at all. The same is true of one who having once believed,\nbelieves no longer. He impeaches the veracity of God, and therefore\ncannot further rely on His Word.\n\nLastly, it matters not at all what kind of truths we receive from God.\nTruth is truth always and ever. We may not be able to comprehend what\nis revealed to us, and little the wonder. Our intelligence is not\ninfinite, and God's is. Many things that men tell us we believe without\nunderstanding; God deserves our trust more than men. Our incapacity for\nunderstanding all that faith teaches us proves one thing: that there\nare limits to our powers, which may be surprising to some, but is\nnevertheless true.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XVIII.\nWHY WE BELIEVE.\n\nBELIEF, we have said, is the acceptance of a truth from another. We do\nnot always accept what others present to us as truth, for the good\nreason that we may have serious doubts as to whether they speak the\ntruth or not. It is for us to decide the question of our informant's\nintellectual and moral trustworthiness. If we do believe him, it is\nbecause we consider his veracity to be beyond question.\n\nThe foundation of our belief is therefore the veracity of him whose\nword we take. They tell me that Lincoln was assassinated. Personally, I\nknow nothing about it. But I do know that they who speak of it could\nknow, did know, and could not lead us all astray on this point. I\naccept their evidence; I believe on their word.\n\nIt is on the testimony of God's word that we believe in matters that\npertain to faith. The idea we have of God is that He is infinitely\nperfect, that He is all-wise and all-good. He cannot, therefore, under\npain of destroying His very existence, be deceived or deceive us. When,\ntherefore, He speaks, He speaks the truth and nothing but the truth. It\nwould be a very stultification of our reason to refuse to believe Him,\nonce we admit His existence.\n\nNow, it is not necessary for us to inquire into the things He reveals,\nor to endeavor to discover the why, whence and wherefore. It is truth,\nwe are certain of it; what more do we need! It may be a satisfaction to\nsee and understand these truths, just as it is to solve a problem two\nor three different ways. But it is not essential, for the result is\nalways the same--truth.\n\nBut suppose, with my senses and my reason, I come to a result at\nvariance with the first, suppose the testimony of God's word and that\nof my personal observations conflict, what then? There is an error\nsomewhere. Either God errs or my faculties play me false. Which should\nhave the preference of my assent? The question is answered as soon as\nit is put. I can conceive an erring man, but I cannot conceive a false\nGod. Nothing human is infallible; God alone is proof against all error.\nThis would not be my first offense against truth.\n\n\"Yes, all this is evident. I shall and do believe everything that God\ndeigns to reveal, because He says it, whether or not I see or\nunderstand it. But the difficulty with me is how to know that God did\nspeak, what He said, what He meant. My difficulty is practical, not\ntheoretical.\"\n\nAnd by the same token you have shifted the question from \"Why we\nbelieve\" to \"Whence we believe;\" you no longer seek the authority of\nyour faith, but its genesis. You believe what God says, because He says\nit; you believe He did say it because--the Church says it. You are no\nlonger dealing with the truth itself, but with the messenger that\nbrings the truth to be believed. The message of the Church is: these\nare God's words. As for what these words stand for, you are not to\ntrust her, but Him. The foundation of divine belief is one thing; the\nmotives of credibility are another.\n\nWe should not confound these two things, if we would have a clear\nnotion of what faith is, and discover the numerous counterfeits that\nare being palmed off nowadays on a world that desires a convenient,\nrather than a genuine article.\n\nThe received manner of belief is first to examine the truths proposed\nas coming from God, measure them with the rule of individual reason, of\nexpediency, feeling, fancy, and thus to decide upon their merits. If\nthis proposition suits, it is accepted. If that other is found wanting,\nit is forthwith rejected. And then it is in order to set out and prove\nthem to be or not to be the word of God, according to their suitability\nor non-suitability.\n\nOne would naturally imagine, as reason and common sense certainly\nsuggest, that one's first duty would be to convince oneself that God\ndid communicate these truths; and if so, then to accept them without\nfurther dally or comment. There is nothing to be done, once God\nreveals, but to receive His revelation.\n\nOutside the Church, this procedure is not always followed, because of\nthe rationalistic tendencies of latter-day Protestantism. It is a\nglaring fact that many do not accept all that God says because He says,\nbut because it meets the requirements of their condition, feelings or\nfancy. They lay down the principle that a truth, to be a truth, must be\nunderstood by the human intelligence. This is paramount to asserting\nthat God cannot know more than men--blasphemy on the face of it. Thus\nthe divine rock-bed of faith is torn away, and a human basis\nsubstituted. Faith itself is destroyed in the process.\n\nIt is, therefore, important, before examining whence comes our faith,\nto remember why we believe, and not to forget it. This much gained, and\nfor all time, we can go farther; without it, all advance is impossible.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XIX.\nWHENCE OUR BELIEF: REASON.\n\nMY faith is the most reasonable thing in the world, and it must needs\nbe such. The Almighty gave me intelligence to direct my life. When He\nspeaks He reveals Himself to me as to an intelligent being: and He\nexpects that I receive His word intelligently. Were I to abdicate my\nreason in the acceptance of His truths, I would do my Maker as great an\ninjury as myself. All the rest of creation offers Him an homage of pure\nlife, of instinct or feeling; man alone can, and must, offer a higher,\nnobler and more acceptable homage--that of reason.\n\nMy faith is reasonable, and this is the account my reason gives of my\nfaith: I can accept as true, without in the least comprehending, and\nfar from dishonoring my reason, with a positive and becoming dignity,--\nI can accept!--but I must accept--whatever is confided to me by an\ninfallible authority, an authority that can neither deceive nor be\ndeceived. There is nothing supernatural about this statement.\n\nThat which is perfect cannot be subject to error, for error is evil and\nperfection excludes evil. If God exists He is perfect. Allow one\nimperfection to enter into your notion of God, and you destroy that\nnotion. When, therefore, God speaks He is an infallible authority. This\nis the philosophy of common sense.\n\nNow I know that God has spoken. The existence of that historical\npersonage known as Jesus of Nazareth is more firmly established than\nthat of Alexander or Caesar. Four books relate a part of His sayings\nand doings; and I have infinitely less reason to question their\nauthenticity than I have to doubt the authenticity of Virgil or\nShakespeare. No book ever written has been subjected to such a\nsearching, probing test of malevolent criticism, at all times but\nespecially of late years in Germany and France. Great men, scholars,\ngeniuses have devoted their lives to the impossible task of explaining\nthe Gospels away, with the evident result that the position of the\nlatter remains a thousandfold stronger. Unless I reject all human\ntestimony, and reason forbids, I must accept them as genuine, at least\nin substance.\n\nThese four books relate how Jesus healed miraculously the sick, raised\nthe dead to life, led the life of the purest, most honest and sagest of\nmen, claimed to be God, and proved it by rising from the dead Himself.\nThat this man is divine, reason can admit without being unreasonable,\nand must admit to be reasonable; and revelation has nothing to do with\nthe matter.\n\nA glaring statement among all others, one that is reiterated and\ninsisted upon, is that all men should share in the fruit of His life;\nana for this purpose He founded a college of apostles which He called\nHis Church, to teach all that He said and did, to all men, for all\ntime. The success of His life and mission depends upon the continuance\nof His work.\n\nWhy did He act thus? I do not know. Are there reasons for this economy\nof salvation? There certainly are, else it would not have been\nestablished. But we are not seeking after reasons; we are gathering\nfacts upon which to build an argument, and these facts we take from the\nauthentic life of Christ.\n\nNow we give the Almighty credit for wisdom in all His plans, the wisdom\nof providing His agencies with the means to reach the end they are\ndestined to attain. To commission a church to teach all men without\nauthority, is to condemn it to utter nothingness from the very\nbeginning. To expect men to accept the truths He revealed, and such\ntruths! without a guarantee against error in the infallibility of the\nteacher, is to be ignorant of human nature. And since at no time must\nit cease to teach, it must be indefectible. Being true, it must be one;\nthe work of God, it must be holy; being provided for all creatures, it\nmust be Catholic or universal; and being the same as Christ founded\nupon His Apostles, it must be apostolic. If it is not all these things\ntogether, it is not the teacher sent by God to Instruct and direct men.\n\nNo one who seeks with intelligence, single-mindedness and a pure heart,\nwill fail to find these attributes and marks of the true Church of\nChrist. Whether, after finding them, one will make an act of faith, is\nanother question. But that he can give his assent with the full\napproval of his reason is absolutely certain. Once he does so, he has\nno further use for his reason. He enters the Church, an edifice\nillumined by the superior light of revelation and faith. He can leave\nreason, like a lantern, at the door.\n\nTherein he will learn many other truths that he never could have found\nout with reason alone, truths superior, but not contrary, to reason.\nThese truths he can never repudiate without sinning against reason,\nfirst, because reason brought him to this pass where he must believe\nwithout the immediate help of reason.\n\nOne of the first things we shall hear from the Church speaking on her\nown authority is that these writings, the four relations of Christ's\nlife, are inspired. However a person could discover and prove this\ntruth to himself is a mystery that will never be solved. We cannot\nassume it; it must be proven. Unless it be proven, the faith based on\nthis assumption is not reasonable; and proven it can never be, unless\nwe take it from an authority whose infallibility is proven. That is why\nwe say that it is doubtful if non-Catholic faith is faith at all,\nbecause faith must be reasonable; and faith that is based on an\nassumption is to say the least doubtfully reasonable.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XX.\nWHENCE OUR BELIEF: GRACE AND WILL.\n\nTO believe is to assent to a truth on the authority of God's word. We\nmust find that the truth proposed is really guaranteed by the authority\nof God. In this process of mental research, the mind must be satisfied,\nand the truth found to be in consonance with the dictates of right\nreason, or at least, not contrary thereto.\n\nBut the fact that we can securely give our assent to this truth does\nnot make us believe. Something more than reason enters into an act of\nfaith.\n\nFaith is not something natural, purely human, beginning and ending in\nthe brain, and a product thereof. This is human belief, not divine, and\nis consequently not faith.\n\nWe believe that faith is, of itself, as far beyond the native powers of\na human being as the sense of feeling is beyond the power of a stone,\nor intelligence, the faculty of comprehension, is beyond the power of\nan animal. In other words, it is supernatural, above the natural\nforces, and requires the power of God to give it existence. \"No man can\ncome to me, unless the Father who has sent Me, draw him.\"\n\nSome have faith, others have it not. Where did you get your faith? You\nwere not born with it, as you were with the natural, though dormant\nfaculties of speech, reason, and free will. You received it through\nBaptism. You are a product of nature; therefore nature should limit\nyour existence. But faith aspires to, and obtains, an end that is not\nnatural but supernatural. It consequently must itself be supernatural,\nand cannot be acquired without divine assistance.\n\nUnless God revealed, you could not know the truths of religion. Unless\nHe established a court of final appeal in His Church, you could not be\nsure what He did reveal or what He meant to say. Because of the\npeculiar character of these truths and the nature the certitude we\npossess, many would not believe all, if God's grace were not there to\nhelp them, even though one could and would believe, there no divine\nbelief or faith proper until the soul lives the faculty from Him who\nalone can give it.\n\nThe reason why many do not believe is not because God's grace is\nwanting nor because their minds cannot be satisfied, not because they\ncannot, but because they will not.\n\nFaith is a gift of God, but not that alone; it is a conviction, but not\nthat alone. It is a firm assent of the will. We are free to believe or\nnot to believe.\n\n\"As one may be convinced and not act according to his conviction, so\nmay one be convinced and not believe according to his conviction. The\narguments of religion do not compel anyone to believe, just as the\narguments for good conduct do not compel anyone to obey. Obedience is\nthe consequence of willing to obey, and faith is the consequence of\nwilling to believe.\"\n\nI am not obliged to receive as true any religious dogma, as I am forced\nto accept the proposition that two and two are four. I believe because\nI choose to believe. My faith is a submission of the will. The\nauthority of God is not binding on me physically, for men have refused\nand still do refuse to submit to His authority and the authority He\ncommunicated to His Church. And I know that I, too, can refuse and\nperhaps more than once have been tempted to refuse, my assent to truths\nthat interfered too painfully with my interests and passions.\n\nBesides, faith is meritorious, and in order to merit one must do\nsomething difficult and be free to act. The difficulty is to believe\nwhat we cannot understand, through pride of intelligence, and to bring\nthat stiff domineering faculty to recognize a superior. The difficulty\nis to bend the will to the acceptance of truths, and consequent\nobligations that gall our self-love and the flesh'. The believer must\nhave humility and self-denial. The grace of God follows these virtues\ninto a soul, and then your act of faith is complete.\n\nHerein we discover the great wisdom of God who sets the price of faith,\nand of salvation that depends on it, not on the mind, but on the will;\nnot on the intelligence alone, but on the heart. To no man is grace\ndenied. Every man has the will to grasp what is good. But though to all\nHe gives a will, all have not the same degree of intelligence; He does\nnot endow them equally in this respect. How then could He make\nintelligence the first principle of salvation and of faith? God\nsearches the heart, not the mind. A modicum of wit is guaranteed to all\nto know that they can safely believe. Be one ever so unlettered and\nignorant, and dull, faith and heaven are to him as accessible as to the\nsage, savant and the genius. For all, the way is the same.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXI.\nHOW WE BELIEVE.\n\nFAITH is the edifice of a Christian life. It is, of itself, a mere\nshell, so to speak, for unless good works sustain and adorn it, it will\ncrumble, and the Almighty in His day will reduce it to ashes; faith\nwithout works is of no avail. The corner stone of this edifice is the\nauthority of the word of God, while His gratuitous grace, our\nintelligence and will furnish the material for building. Now, there are\nthree features of that spiritual construction that deserve a moment's\nconsideration.\n\nFirst, the edifice is solid; our faith must be firm. No hesitation, no\nwavering, no deliberate doubting, no suspicion, no take-and-leave. What\nwe believe comes from God, and we have the infallible authority of the\nChurch for it, and of that we must be certain. That certainly must not\nfor a moment falter, and the moment it does falter, there is no telling\nbut that the whole edifice so laboriously raised will tumble down upon\nthe guilty shoulders of the imprudent doubter.\n\nAnd of reasons for hesitating and disbelieving there is absolutely\nnone, once we have made the venture of faith and believe sincerely and\nreasonably. No human power can in reason impugn revealed truths for\nthey are impervious to human intelligence. One book may not at the same\ntime be three books; but can one divine nature be at one and the same\ntime three divine persons? Until we learn what divinity and personality\nare we can affirm nothing on the authority of pure reason. If we cannot\nassert, how can we deny? And if we know nothing about it, how can we do\neither? The question is not how is it, but if it is. While it stands\nthus, and thus ever it must stand, no objection or doubt born of human\nmind can influence our belief. Nothing but pride of mind and corruption\nof heart can disturb it.\n\nIf you have a difficulty, well, it is a difficulty, and nothing more. A\ndifficulty does not destroy a thesis that is solidly founded. Once a\ntruth is clearly established, not all the difficulties in the world can\nmake it an untruth. A difficulty as to the truth revealed argues an\nimperfect intelligence; it is idle to complain that we are finite. A\ndifficulty regarding the infallible Church should not make her less\ninfallible in our mind, it simply demands a clearing away-Theological\ndifficulties should not surprise a novice in theological matters; they\nare only misunderstandings that militate less against the Church than\nagainst the erroneous notions we have of her. To allow such\ndifficulties to undermine faith is like overthrowing a solid wall with\na soap-bubble. Common sense demands that nothing but clearly\ndemonstrated falsity should make us change firm convictions, and such\ndemonstration can never be made against our faith.\n\nNot from difficulties, properly speaking, but from our incapacity for\nunderstanding what we accept as true, results a certain obscurity,\nwhich is another feature of faith. Believing is not seeing. Such\nstrange things we do believe! Who can unravel the mysteries of\nreligion? Moral certitude is sufficient to direct one's life, to make\nour acts human and moral and is all we can expect in this world where\nnothing is perfect. But because the consequences of faith are so\nfar-reaching, we would believe nothing short of absolute, metaphysical\ncertitude.\n\nBut this is impossible. Hence the mist, the vague dimness that\nsurrounds faith, baffling every effort to penetrate it; and within, a\nsense of rarefied perception that disquiets and torments unless\nhumility born of common sense be there to soothe and set us at rest.\nMoral truths are not geometric theorems and multiplication tables, and\nit is not necessary that they should be.\n\nOf course, if, as in science so in faith, reason were everything, our\nposition would hardly be tenable, for then there should be no vagueness\nbut clear vision. But the will enters for something in our act of\nfaith. If everything we believe were as luminous as \"two and two are\nfour,\" a special act of the will would be utterly uncalled for. We must\nbe able, free to dissent, and this is the reason of the obscurity of\nour faith.\n\nIt goes without saying that such belief is meritorious. Christ Himself\nsaid that to be saved it is necessary to believe, and no man is saved\nbut through his own merit. Faith is, therefore, gratuitous on His part\nand meritorious on ours. It is in reality a good work that proceeds\nfrom the will, under the dictates of right reason, with the assistance\nof divine grace.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXII.\nFAITH AND ERROR.\n\nINTOLERANCE is a harsh term. It is stern, rigid, brutal, almost. It\nmakes no compromise, combats a outrance and exacts blind and absolute\nobedience. Among individuals tolerance should prevail, man, should be\nliberal with man, the Law of Charity demands it. In regard to\nprinciples, there must and shall eternally be antagonism between truth\nand error, justice demands it. It is a case of self-preservation; one\ndestroys the other. Political truth can never tolerate treason preached\nor practised; neither can religious truth tolerate unbelief and heresy\npreached or practised.\n\nNow our faith is based on truth, the Church is the custodian of faith,\nand the Church, on the platform of religious truth, is absolutely\nuncompromising and intolerant, just as the State is in regard to\ntreason. She cannot admit error, she cannot approve error; to do so\nwould be suicidal. She cannot lend the approval of her presence, nay\neven of her silence, to error. She stands aloof from heresy, must\nalways see in it an enemy, condemns it and cannot help condemning it,\nfor she stands for truth, pure and unalloyed truth, which error\npollutes and outrages.\n\nCall this what you will, but it is the attitude of honesty first, and\nof necessity afterwards. \"He who is liberal with what belongs to him is\ngenerous, he who undertakes to be generous with what does not belong to\nhim is dishonest.\" Our faith is not founded on an act or agreement of\nmen, but on the revelation of God. No human agency can change or modify\nit. Neither Church nor Pope can be liberal with the faith of which they\nare the custodians. Their sole duty is to guard and protect it as a\nprecious deposit for the salvation of men.\n\nThis is the stand all governments take when there is question of\npolitical truth. And whatever lack of generosity or broadmindedness\nthere be, however contrary to the spirit of this free age it may seem,\nit is nevertheless the attitude of God Himself who hates error, for it\nis evil, who pursues it with His wrath through time and through\neternity. How can a custodian of divine truth act otherwise? Even in\nhuman affairs, can one admit that two and three are seven?\n\nWe sometimes hear it said that this intolerance takes from Catholics\nthe right to think. This is true in the same sense that penitentiaries,\nor the dread of them, deprive citizens of the right to act. Everybody,\noutside of sleeping hours and with his thinking machine in good order,\nthinks. Perhaps if there were a little more of it, there would be more\nsolid convictions and more practical faith. Holy Writ has it somewhere\nthat the whole world is given over to vice and sin because there is no\none who thinks.\n\nBut you have not and never had the right to think as you please, inside\nor outside the Church. This means the right to form false judgments, to\ndraw conclusions contrary to fact. This is not a right, it is a defect,\na disease. Thus to act is not the normal function of the brain. It is\nno more the nature of the mind to generate falsehoods than it is the\nnature of a sewing machine to cut hair. Both were made for different\nthings. He therefore who disobeys the law that governs his mind\nprostitutes that faculty to error.\n\nBut suppose, being a Catholic, I cannot see things in that true light,\nwhat then? In such a case, either you persist, in the matter of your\nfaith, in being guided by the smoky lamp of your reason alone, or you\nwill be guided by the authority of God's appointed Church. In the first\nalternative, your place is not in the Church, for you exclude yourself\nby not living up to the conditions of her membership. You cannot deny\nbut that she has the right to determine those conditions.\n\nIf you choose the latter, then correct yourself. It is human to err,\nbut it is stupidity to persist in error and refuse to be enlightened.\nIf you cannot see for yourself, common sense demands that you get\nanother to see for you. You are not supposed to know the alpha and\nomega of theological science, but you are bound to possess a\nsatisfactory knowledge in order that your faith be reasonable.\n\nHas no one a right to differ from the Church? Yes, those who err\nunconsciously, who can do so conscientiously, that is, those who have\nno suspicion of their being in error. These the heavenly Father will\nlook after and bring safe to Himself, for their error is material and\nnot formal. He loves them but He hates their errors. So does the Church\nabominate the false doctrines that prevail in the world outside her\nfold, yet at the same time she has naught but compassion and pity and\nprayers for those deluded ones who spread and receive those errors. To\nher the individual is sacred, but the heresy is damnable.\n\nThus we may mingle with our fellow citizens in business and in\npleasure, socially and politically, but religiously--never. Our charity\nwe can offer in its fullest measure, but charity that lends itself to\nerror, loses its sacred character and becomes the handmaid of evil, for\nerror is evil.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIII.\nTHE CONSISTENT BELIEVER.\n\nTHE intolerance of the Church towards error, the natural position of\nOne who is the custodian of truth, her only reasonable attitude, makes\nher forbid her children to read, or listen to, heretical controversy,\nor to endeavor to discover religious truth by examining both sides of\nthe question. This places the Catholic in a position whereby he must\nstand aloof from all manner of doctrinal teaching other than that\ndelivered by his Church through her accredited ministers. And whatever\noutsiders may think of the correctness of his belief and religious\nprinciples, they cannot have two opinions as to the logic and\nconsistency of this stand he takes. They may hurl at him all the choice\nepithets they choose for being a slave to superstition and erroneous\ncreeds; but they must give him credit for being consistent in his\nbelief; and consistency in religious matters is too rare a commodity\nthese days to be made light of.\n\nThe reason of this stand of his is that, for him, there can be no two\nsides to a question which for him is settled; for him, there is no\nseeking after the truth: he possesses it in its fulness, as far as God\nand religion are concerned. His Church gives him all there is to be\nhad; all else is counterfeit. And if he believes, as he should and does\nbelieve, that revealed truth comes, and can come, only by way of\nexternal authority, and not by way of private judgment and\ninvestigation, he must refuse to be liberal in the sense of reading all\nsorts of Protestant controversial literature and listening to all kinds\nof heretical sermons. If he does not this, he is false to his principles;\nhe contradicts himself by accepting and not accepting an infallible\nChurch; he knocks his religious props from under himself and stands--\nnowhere. The attitude of the Catholic, therefore, is logical and\nnecessary. Holding to Catholic principles how can he do otherwise? How\ncan he consistently seek after truth when he is convinced that he holds\nit? Who else can teach him religious truth when he believes that an\ninfallible Church gives him God's word and interprets it in the true\nand only sense?\n\nA Protestant may not assume this attitude or impose it upon those under\nhis charge. If he does so, he is out of harmony with his principles and\ndenies the basic rule of his belief. A Protestant believes in no\ninfallible authority; he is an authority unto himself, which authority\nhe does not claim to be infallible, if he is sober and sane. He is\nafter truth; and whatever he finds, and wherever he finds it, he\nsubjects it to his own private judgment. He is free to accept or\nreject, as he pleases. He is not, cannot be, absolutely certain that\nwhat he holds is true; he thinks it is. He may discover to-day that\nyesterday's truths are not truths at all. We are not here examining the\nsoundness of this doctrine; but it does follow therefrom, sound or\nunsound, that he may consistently go where he likes to hear religious\ndoctrine exposed and explained, he may listen to whomever has religious\ninformation to impart. He not only may do it, but he is consistent only\nwhen he does. It is his duty to seek after truth, to read and listen to\ncontroversial books and sermons.\n\nIf therefore a non-Catholic sincerely believes in private judgment, how\ncan he consistently act like a Catholic who stands on a platform\ndiametrically opposed to his, against which platform it is the very\nessence of his religion to protest? How can he refuse to hear Catholic\npreaching and teaching, any more than Baptist, Methodist and\nEpiscopalian doctrines? He has no right to do so, unless he knows all\nthe Catholic Church teaches, which case may be safely put down as one\nin ten million. He may become a Catholic, or lose all the faith he has.\nThat is one of the risks he has to take, being a Protestant.\n\nIf he is faithful to his own principles and understands the Catholic\npoint of view, he must not be surprised if his Catholic friends do not\nimitate his so-called liberality; they have motives which he has not.\nIf he is honest, he will not urge or even expect them to attend the\nservices of his particular belief. And a Catholic who thinks that\nbecause a Protestant friend can accompany him to Catholic services, he\ntoo should return the compliment and accompany his friend to Protestant\nworship, has a faith that needs immediate toning up to the standard of\nCatholicity; he is in ignorance of the first principles of his religion\nand belief.\n\nA Catholic philosopher resumes this whole matter briefly, and clearly\nin two syllogisms, as follows:\n\n(I.)\nMajor. He who believes in an infallible teacher of revelation cannot\nconsistently listen to any fallible teacher with a view of getting more\ncorrect information than his infallible teacher gives him. To do so\nwould be absurd, for it would be to believe and at the same time not\nbelieve in the infallible teacher.\n\nMinor. The Catholic believes in an infallible teacher of revelation.\n\nConclusion. Therefore, the Catholic cannot listen to any fallible\nteacher with a view of getting more correct information about revealed\ntruth than his Church gives him. To do so would be to stultify himself.\n\n(II.)\nMajor. He who believes in a fallible teacher--private judgment or\nfallible church--is free, nay bound, to listen to any teacher who comes\nalong professing to have information to impart, for at no time can he\nbe certain that the findings of his own fallible judgment or church are\ncorrect. Each newcomer may be able to give him further light that may\ncause him to change his mind.\n\nMinor. The Protestant believes in such fallible teacher--his private\njudgment or church.\n\nConclusion. Therefore, the Protestant is free to hear, and in perfect\nharmony with his principles, to accept the teaching of any one who\napproaches him for the purpose of instructing him. He is free to hear\nwith a clear conscience, and let his children hear, Catholic teaching,\nfor the Church claiming infallibility is at its worst as good as his\nprivate judgment is at best, namely, fallible.\n\nReligious variations are so numerous nowadays that most people care\nlittle what another thinks or believes. All they ask is that they may\nbe able to know at any time where he stands; and they insist, as right\nreason imperiously demands, that, in all things, he remain true to his\nprinciples, whatever they be. Honest men respect sincerity and\nconsistency everywhere; they have nothing but contempt for those who\nstand, now on one foot, now on the other, who have one code for theory\nand another for practice, who shift their grounds as often as\nconvenience suggests. The Catholic should bear this well in mind. There\ncan be no compromise with principles of truth; to sacrifice them for\nthe sake of convenience is as despicable before man as it is offensive\nto God.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIV.\nUNBELIEF.\n\nAN atheist in principle is one who denies the existence of God and\nconsequently of all revealed truth. How, in practice, a man endowed\nwith reason and a conscience can do this, is one of the unexplained\nmysteries of life. Christian philosophers refuse to admit that an\natheist can exist in the flesh. They claim that his denial is fathered\nby his desire and wish, that at most he only doubts, and while\nprofessing atheism, he is simply an agnostic.\n\nAn agnostic does not know whether God exists or not--and cares less. He\ndoes not affirm, neither does he deny. All arguments for and against\nare either insufficient or equally plausible, and they fail to lodge\nconviction in his mind of minds. Elevated upon this pedestal of wisdom,\nhe pretends to dismiss all further consideration of the First Cause.\nBut he does no such thing, for he lives as though God did not exist.\nWhy not live as though He did exist! From a rational point of view, he\nis a bigger fool than his atheistic brother, for if certainty is\nimpossible, prudence suggests that the surer course be taken. On one\nhand, there is all to gain; on the other, all to lose. The choice he\nmakes smacks of convenience rather than of logic or common sense.\n\nNo one may be accused of genuine, or as we call it--formal--heresy,\nunless he persistently refuses to believe all the truths by God\nrevealed. Heresy supposes error, culpable error, stubborn and\npertinacious error. A person may hold error in good faith, and be\ndisposed as to relinquish it on being convinced of the truth. To all\nexterior appearances, he may differ in nothing from a formal heretic,\nand he passes for a heretic. In fact, and before God, he belongs to the\nChurch, to the soul of the Church; he will be saved if in spite of his\nunconscious error he lives well. He is known as a material heretic.\n\nAn infidel is an unbaptized person, whose faith, even if he does\nbelieve in God, is not supernatural, but purely natural. He is an\ninfidel whether he is found in darkest Africa or in the midst of this\nChristian commonwealth, and in this latter place there are more\ninfidels than most people imagine. A decadent Protestantism rejects the\nnecessity of baptism, thereby ceasing to be Christian, and in its trail\ninfidelity thrives and spreads, disguised, 'tis true, but nevertheless\ngenuine infidelity. It is baptism that makes faith possible, for faith\nis a gift of God.\n\nAn apostate is one who, having once believed, ceases to believe. All\nheretics and infidels are not apostates, although they may be in\nthemselves or in their ancestors. One may apostatize to heresy by\nrejecting the Church, or to infidelity by rejecting all revelation; a\nProtestant may thus become an apostate from faith as well as a\nCatholic. This going back on the Almighty--for that is what apostasy\nis,--is, of all misfortunes the worst that can befall man. There may be\nexcuses, mitigating circumstances, for our greatest sins, but here it\nis useless to seek for any. God gives faith. It is lost only through\nour own fault. God abandons them that abandon Him. Apostasy is the most\npatent case of spiritual suicide, and the apostate carries branded on\nhis forehead the mark of reprobation. A miracle may save him, but\nnothing short of a miracle can do it, and who has a right to expect it?\nGod is good, but God is also just.\n\nIt is not necessary to pose as an apostate before the public. One may\nbe a renegade at heart without betraying himself, by refusing his inner\nassent to a dogma of faith, by wilfully doubting and allowing such\ndoubts to grow upon him and form convictions.\n\nPeople sometimes say things that would brand them as apostates if they\nmeant what they said. This or that one, in the midst of an orgy of sin,\nor after long practical irreligion, in order to strangle remorse that\narises at an inopportune moment, may seem to form a judgment of\napostasy. This is treading on exceedingly thin glass. But it is not\nalways properly defection from faith. Apostasy kills faith as surely as\na knife plunged into the heart kills life.\n\nA schismatic does not directly err in matters of faith, but rejects the\ndiscipline of the Church and refuses to submit to her authority. He\nbelieves all that is taught, but puts himself without the pale of the\nChurch by his insubordination. Schism is a grievous sin, but does not\nnecessarily destroy faith.\n\nThe source of all this unbelief is, of course, in the proud mind and\nsensual heart of man. It takes form exteriorly in an interminable\nseries of \"isms\" that have the merit of appealing to the weaknesses of\nman. They all mean the same thing in the end, and are only forms of\npaganism. Rationalism and Materialism are the most frequently used\nterms. One stands on reason alone, the other, on matter, and both have\ndeclared war to the knife on the Supernatural. They tell us that these\nare new brooms destined to sweep clean the universe, new lamps intended\nto dissipate the clouds of ignorance and superstition and to purify\nwith their light the atmosphere of the world. But, truth to tell, these\nbrooms have been stirring up dust from the gutters of passion and sin,\nand these lamps have been offending men's nostrils by their smoky\nstench ever since man knew himself. And they shall continue to do\nservice in the same cause as long as human nature remains what it is.\nBut Christ did not bring His faith on earth to be destroyed by the\nlilliputian efforts of man.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXV.\nHOW FAITH MAY BE LOST.\n\nIT is part of our belief that no man can lose his faith without mortal\nsin. The conscious rejection of all or any religious truth once\nembraced and forming a part of Christian belief, or the deliberate\nquestioning of a single article thereof, is a sin, a sin against God's\nlight and God's grace. It is a deliberate turning away from God. The\nmoral culpability of such an act is great in the extreme, while its\nconsequences cannot be weighed or measured by any human norm or rule.\n\nNo faith was ever wrecked in a day; it takes time to come to such a\npass; it is by easy stages of infidelity, by a slow process of\nhalf-denials, a constant fostering of habits of ignorance, that one\nundermines, little by little, one's spiritual constitution. Taking\nadvantage of this state of debility, the microbe of unbelief creeps in,\neats its way to the soul and finally sucks out the very vitals of\nfaith. Nor is this growth of evil an unconscious one; and there lies\nthe malice and guilt. Ignorant pride, neglect of prayer and religious\nworship, disorders, etc., these are evils the culprit knows of and\nwills. He cannot help feeling the ravages being wrought in his soul; he\ncannot help knowing that these are deadly perils to his treasure of\nfaith. He complacently allows them to run their course; and he wakes up\none fine morning to find his faith gone, lost, dead--and a chasm\nyawning between him and his God that only a miracle can bridge over.\n\nWe mentioned ignorance: this it is that attacks the underpinning of\nfaith, its rational basis, by which it is made intelligent and\nreasonable, without which there can be no faith.\n\nIgnorance is, of course, a relative term; there are different degrees\nand different kinds. An ignorant man is not an unlettered or uncultured\none, but one who does not know what his religion means, what he\nbelieves or is supposed to believe, and has no reason to give for his\nbelief. He may know a great many other things, may be chock full of\nworldly learning, but if he ignores these matters that pertain to the\nsoul, we shall label him an ignoramus for the elementary truths of\nhuman knowledge are, always have been, and always shall be, the\nsolution of the problems of the why, the whence and the whither of life\nhere below. Great learning frequently goes hand in hand with dense\nignorance. The Sunday-school child knows better than the atheist\nphilosopher the answer to these important questions. There is more\nwisdom in the first page of the Catechism than in all the learned books\nof sceptics and infidels.\n\nKnowledge, of course, a thorough knowledge of all theological science\nwill not make faith, any more than wheels will make a cart. But a\ncertain knowledge is essential, and its absence is fatal to faith.\nThere are the simple ignorant who have forgotten their Catechism and\nleave the church before the instruction, for fear they might learn\nsomething; who never read anything pertaining to religion, who would be\nashamed to be detected with a religious book or paper in their hands.\nThen, there are the learned ignorant, such as our public schools turn\nout in great numbers each year; who, either are above mere religious\nknowledge-seeking and disdain all that smacks of church and faith; or,\nknowing little or nothing at all, imagine they possess a world of\ntheological lore and know all that is knowable. These latter are the\nmore to be pitied, their ignorance doubling back upon itself, as it\nwere. When a man does not realize his own ignorance, his case is well\nnigh hopeless.\n\nIf learning cannot give faith, neither can it alone preserve it.\nLearned men, pillars of the Church have fallen away. Pride, you will\nsay. Yes, of course, pride is the cause of all evil. But we have all\nour share of it. If it works less havoc in some than in others, that is\nbecause pride is or is not kept within bounds. It is necessarily fatal\nto faith only when it is not controlled by prayer and the helps of\npractical religion. God alone can preserve our faith. He will do it\nonly at our solicitation.\n\nIf, therefore, some have not succeeded in keeping the demon of pride\nunder restraint, it is because they refused to consider their faith a\npure gift of God that cannot be safely guarded without God's grace; or\nthey forgot that God's grace is assured to no man who does not pray.\nThe man who thinks he is all-sufficient unto himself in matters of\nreligion, as in all other matters, is in danger of being brought to a\nsense of his own nothingness in a manner not calculated to be\nagreeable. No man who practised humble prayer ever lost hi& faith, or\never can; for to him grace is assured.\n\nAnd since faith is nothing if not practical, since it is a habit, it\nfollows that irreligion, neglect to practise what we believe will\ndestroy that habit. People who neglect their duty often complain that\nthey have no taste for religion, cannot get interested, find no\nconsolation therein. This justifies further neglect. They make a\npretence to seek the cause. The cause is lack of faith; the fires of\nGod's grace are burning low in their souls. They will soon go out\nunless they are furnished with fuel in the shape of good, solid,\npractical religion. That is their only salvation. Ignorance,\nsupplemented by lack of prayer and practice, goes a long way in the\ndestruction of faith in any soul, for two essentials are deficient.\n\nDisorder, too, is responsible for the loss of much faith. Luther and\nHenry might have retained their faith in spite of their pride, but they\nwere lewd, and avaricious; and there is small indulgence for such\nwithin the Church. Not but that we are all human, and sinners are the\nobjects of the Church's greatest solicitude; but within her pale no\nman, be he king or genius, can sit down and feast his passions and\nexpect her to wink at it and call it by another name than its own. The\nlaw of God and of the Church is a thorn in the flesh of the vicious\nman. The authority of the Church is a sword of Damocles held\nperpetually over his head--until it is removed. Many a one denies God\nin a moment of sin in order to take the sting of remorse out of it. One\ngets tired of the importunities of religion that tell us not to sin, to\nconfess if we do sin.\n\nWhen you meet a pervert who, with a glib tongue, protests that his\nconscience drove him from the Church, that his enslaved intelligence\nneeded deliverance, search him and you will find a skeleton in his\ncloset; and if you do not find it, it is there just the same. A\nrenegade priest some years ago, held forth before a gaping audience, at\ngreat length, on the reasons of his leaving the Church. A farmer\nsitting on the last bench listened patiently to his profound\nargumentation. When the lecturer was in the middle of his twelfthly,\nthe other arose and shouted to him across the hall: \"Cut it short, and\nsay you wanted a wife.\" The heart has reasons which the reason does not\nunderstand.\n\nNot always, but frequently, ignorance, neglect and vice come to this.\nThe young, the weak and the proud have to guard themselves against\nthese dangers, hey work slowly, imperceptibly, but surely. Two things\nincrease the peril and tend to precipitate matters; reading and\ncompanionship. The ignorant are often anxious to know the other side,\nwhen they do not know their own. The consequence is that they will not\nunderstand fully the question; and if they do, will not be able to\nresolve the difficulty. They are handicapped by their ignorance and can\nonly make a mess out of it. The result is that they are caught by\nsophistries like a fly in a web.\n\nThe company of those who believe differently, or not at all, is also\npernicious to unenlightened and weak faith. The example in itself is\npotent for evil. The Catholic is usually not a persona grata as a\nCatholic but for some quality he possesses. Consequently, he must hide\nhis religion under the bushel for fear of offending. Then a sneer, a\ngibe, a taunt are unpleasant things, and will be avoided even at the\nprice of what at other times would look like being ashamed of one's\nfaith. If ignorant, he will be silent; if he has not prayed, he will be\nweak; if vicious, he will be predisposed to fall.\n\nIf we would guard the precious deposit of faith secure against any\npossible emergency, we must enlighten it, we must strengthen it, we\nmust live up to it.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVI.\nHOPE.\n\nTHE First Commandment bids us hope as well as believe in God. Our trust\nand confidence in His mercy to give us eternal life and the means to\nobtain it,--this is our hope, founded on our belief that God is what He\nreveals Himself to us, able and willing to do by us as we would have\nHim do. Hope is the flower of our faith; faith is the substance of the\nthings we hope for.\n\nTo desire and to hope are not one and the same thing. We may long for\nwhat is impossible of obtaining, while hope always supposes this\npossibility, better, a probability, nay, even a moral certitude. This\nexpectation remains hope until it comes to the fruition of the things\nhoped for.\n\nThe desire of general happiness is anchored in the human heart, deep\ndown in the very essence of our being. We all desire to be happy, We\nmay be free in many things; in this we are not free. We must have\nhappiness, greater than the present, happiness of one kind or another,\nreal or apparent. We may have different notions of this happiness; we\ndesire it according to our notions. Life itself is one, long, painful,\nunsatisfied desire.\n\nWhen that desire is centered in God and the soul's salvation, it\nincontinently becomes hope, for then we have real beatitude before us,\nand all may obtain it. It can be true hope only when founded on faith.\n\nNot only is hope easy, natural, necessary, but it is essential to life.\nIt is the mainspring of all activity. It keeps all things moving, and\nwithout it life would not be worth living. If men did not think they\ncould get what they are striving after, they would sit down, fold their\narms, let the world move, but they wouldn't.\n\nEspecially is Christian hope absolutely necessary for the leading of a\nChristian life, and no man would take upon himself that burden, if he\ndid not confidently expect a crown of glory beyond, sufficient to repay\nhim for all the things endured here below for conscience's sake. Hope\nis a star that beckons us on to renewed effort, a vision of the goal\nthat animates and invigorates us; it is also a soothing balm to the\nwounds we receive in the struggle.\n\nTo be without this hope is the lowest level to which man may descend.\nSt. Paul uses the term \"men without hope\" as the most stinging reproach\nhe could inflict upon the dissolute pagans.\n\nTo have abandoned hope is a terrible misfortune--despair. This must not\nbe confounded with an involuntary perturbation, a mere instinctive\ndread, a phantasmagoric illusion that involves no part of the will. It\nis not even an excessive fear that goes by the name of pusillanimity.\nIt is a cool judgment like that of Cain: \"My sin is too great that I\nshould expect forgiveness.\"\n\nHe who despairs, loses sight of God's mercy and sees only His stern,\nrigorous justice. After hatred of God, this is perhaps the greatest\ninjury man can do to his Master, who is Love. There has always been\nmore of mercy than of justice in His dealings with men. We might say of\nHim that He is all mercy in this world, to be all justice in the next.\nTherefore while there is life, there is hope.\n\nThe next abomination is to hope, but to place our supreme happiness in\nthat which should not be the object of our hope. Men live for\npleasures, riches, and honors, as though these things were worthy of\nour highest aspirations, as though they could satisfy the unappeasable\nappetite of man for happiness. Greater folly than this can no man be\nguilty of. He takes the dross for the pure gold, the phantom for the\nreality. Few men theoretically belong to this class; practically it has\nthe vast majority.\n\nThe presumptuous are those who hope to obtain the prize and do nothing\nto deserve it. He who would hope to fly without wings, to walk without\nfeet, to live without air or food would be less a fool than he who\nhopes to save his soul without fulfiling the conditions laid down by\nHim who made us. There is no wages without service, no reward without\nmerit, no crown without a cross.\n\nThis fellow's mistake is to bank too much on God's mercy, leaving His\njustice out of the bargain altogether. Yet God is one as well as the\nother, and both equally. The offense to God consists in making Him a\nbeing without any backbone, so to speak, a soft, incapable judge, whose\npity degenerates into weakness. And certainly it is a serious offense.\n\nNo, hope should be sensible and reasonable. It must keep the middle\nbetween two extremes. The measure of our hope should reasonably be the\nmeasure of our efforts, for he who wishes the end wishes the means. Of\ncourse God will make due allowances for our frailties, but that is His\nbusiness, not ours; and we have no right to say just how far that mercy\nwill go. Even though we lead the lives of saints, we shall stand in\nneed of much mercy. Prudence tells us to do all things as though it all\ndepended upon us alone; then God will make up for the deficiencies.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVII.\nLOVE OF GOD.\n\nONCE upon a time, there lived people who pretended that nothing had\nexistence outside the mind, that objects were merely fictions of the\nbrain; thus, when they gave a name to those objects, it was like\nsticking a label in the air where they seemed to be. The world is not\nwithout folks who have similar ideas concerning charity, to whom it is\na name without substance. Scarcely a Christian but will pretend that he\nhas the virtue of charity, and of course one must take his word for it,\nand leave his actions and conduct out of all consideration. With him,\nto love God is to say you do, whether you really do or not. This is\ncharity of the \"sounding brass and tinkling cymbal\" assortment.\n\nTo be honest about it, charity or love of God is nothing more or less,\npractically, than freedom from, and avoidance of, mortal sin. \"If any\none say, 'I love God' and hates his brother, (or otherwise sins) he is\na liar.\" Strong language, but straight to the point! The state of grace\nis the first, fundamental, and essential condition to the existence of\ncharity. Charity and mortal sin are two things irreducibly opposed,\nuncompromisingly antagonistic, eternally inimical. There is no charity\nwhere there is sin; there is no sin where there is charity. That is why\ncharity is called the fulfilment of the law.\n\nOn the other hand, it sometimes happens that humble folks of the world,\nstriving against temptation and sin to serve the Master, imagine they\ncan hardly succeed. True, they rarely offend and to no great extent of\nmalice, but they envy the lot of others more advantageously situated,\nthey think, nearer by talent and state to perfection, basking in the\nsunshine of God's love. Talent, position, much exterior activity, much\nsupposed goodness, are, in their eyes, titles to the kingdom, and\ninfallible signs of charity. And then they foolishly deplore their own\nstate as far removed from that perfection, because forsooth their minds\nare uncultured, their faith simple, and their time taken up with the\ndrudgery of life.\n\nThey forget that not this gift or that work or anything else is\nnecessary. One thing alone is necessary, and that is practical love of\nGod. Nothing counts without it. And the sage over his books, the\nwonder-worker at his task, the apostle in his wanderings and labors,\nthe very martyr on the rack is no more sure of having charity than the\nmost humble man, woman or child in the lowest walks of life who loves\nGod too much to offend Him. It is not necessary to have the tongues of\nmen and angels, or faith that will move mountains, or the fortitude of\nmartyrs; charity expressed in our lives and deeds rates higher than\nthese.\n\nA thing is good in the eyes of its maker if it accomplishes that for\nwhich it was made. A watch that does not tell time, a knife that does\nnot cut, and a soul that does not love God are three utterly useless\nthings. And why? Because they are no good for what they were made. The\nwatch exists solely to tell the hour, the blade to cut and the soul to\nlove and serve its Maker. Failing in this, there is no more reason for\ntheir being. Their utility ceasing, they themselves cease to exist to a\ncertain extent, for a thing is really no longer what it was, when it\nfails to execute that for which it came into being.\n\nCharity, in a word, amounts to this, that we love God, but to the\nextent of not offending Him. Anything that falls short of such\naffection is something other than charity, no matter how many tags and\nlabels it may wear. If I beheld a brute strike down an aged parent, I\nwould not for a moment think that affection was behind that blow; and I\ncould not conceive how there could be a spark of filial love in that\nson's heart until he had atoned for his crime. Now love is not one\nthing when directed towards God, and another where man is concerned.\n\nThe great hypocrisy of life consists in this that people make an\noutward showing of loving God, because they know full well that it is\ntheir first duty; yet, for all that, they do not a whit mend their\nways, and to sin costs them nothing. They varnish it over with an\nappearance of honesty and decency, and fair-minded men take them for\nwhat they appear to be, and should be, and they pass for such. These\nwatches are pretty to look upon, beautiful, magnificent, but they are\nstopped, the interior is out of order, the main-spring is broken, the\nhands that run across the face lie. These blades are bright and\nhandsome, but they are dull, blunt, full of nicks, good enough for\ncoarse and vulgar work, but useless for the fine, delicate work for\nwhich they were made.\n\nThe master mechanic and artist of our souls who wants trustworthy\ntimepieces and keen blades, will not be deceived by these gaudy\ntrinkets, and will reject them. Others may esteem you for this or that\nquality, admire this or that qualification you possess, be taken with\ntheir superficial gloss and accidental usefulness. The quality required\nby Him who made you is that your soul be filled with charity, and\nproven by absence of sin.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXVIII.\nLOVE OF NEIGHBOR.\n\nTHE precept, written in our hearts, as well as in the law, to love God,\ncommands us, at the same time, to love the neighbor. When you go to\nconfession, you are told to be sorry for your sins and to make a firm\npurpose of amendment. These appear to be two different injunctions; yet\nin fact and reality, they are one and the same thing, for it is\nimpossible to abhor and detest sin, having at the same moment the\nintention of committing it. One therefore includes the other; one is\nnot sincere and true without the other; therefore one cannot be without\nthe other. So it is with love of God and of the neighbor; these two\nparts of one precept are coupled together because they complete each\nother, and they amount practically to the same thing.\n\nThe neighbor we are to love is not alone those for whom we naturally\nhave affection, such as parents, friends, benefactors, etc., whom it is\neasy to love. But our neighbor is all mankind, those far and those\nnear, those who have blessed us and those who have wronged us, the\nenemy as well as the friend; all who have within them, as we have, the\nimage and likeness of God. No human being can we put outside the pale\nof neighborly love.\n\nAs for the love we bear others, it is of course one in substance, but\nit may be different in degree and various in quality. It may be more or\nless tender, intense, emphatic. Some we love more, others, less; yet\nfor all that, we love them. It is impossible for us to have towards any\nother being the same feelings we entertain for a parent. The love a\ngood Christian bears towards a stranger is not the love he bears\ntowards a good friend. The love therefore that charity demands admits a\nvariety of shades without losing its character of love.\n\nWhen it comes to loving certain ones of our neighbors, the idea is not\nof the most welcome. What! Must I love, really love, that low rascal,\nthat cantankerous fellow, that repugnant, repulsive being? Or this\nother who has wronged me so maliciously? Or that proud, overbearing\ncreature who looks down on me and despises me?\n\nWe have said that love has its degrees, its ebb and flow tide, and\nstill remains love. The low water mark is this: that we refuse not to\npray for such neighbors, that we speak not ill of them, that we refuse\nnot to salute them, or to do them a good turn, or to return a favor. A\nbreach in one of these common civilities, due to every man from his\nfellow-man, may constitute a degree of hatred directly opposed to the\ncharity strictly required of us.\n\nIt is not however necessary to go on doing these things all during life\nand at all moments of life. These duties are exterior, and are required\nas often as a contrary bearing would betoken a lack of charity in the\nheart. Just as we are not called upon to embrace and hug an uninviting\nperson as a neighbor, neither are we obliged to continue our civilities\nwhen we find that they are offensive and calculated to cause trouble.\nBut naturally there must be charity in the heart.\n\nWe should not confound uncharity with a sort of natural repugnance and\nantipathy, instinctive to some natures, betraying a weakness of\ncharacter, if you will, but hardly what one could call a clearly\ndefined fault. There are people who can forgive more easily than forget\nand who succeed only after a long while in overcoming strong feelings.\nIn consequence of this state of mind, and in order to maintain peace\nand concord, they prefer the absence to the presence of the objects of\ntheir antipathy. Of course, to nourish this feeling is sinful to a\ndegree; but while striving against it, to remove prudently all\noccasions of opening afresh the wound, if we act honestly, this does\nnot seem to have any uncharitable malice.\n\nNow all this is not charity unless the idea of God enter therein. There\nis no charity outside the idea of God. Philanthropy, humanity is one\nthing, charity is another. The one is sentiment, the other is love--two\nvery different things. The one supposes natural motives, the other,\nsupernatural. Philanthropy looks at the exterior form and discovers a\nlikeness to self. Charity looks at the soul and therein discovers an\nimage of God, by which we are not only common children of Adam, but\nalso children of God and sharers of a common celestial inheritance.\nNeither a cup of water nor a fortune given in any other name than that\nof God is charity.\n\nThere are certain positive works of charity, such as almsgiving and\nbrotherly correction, etc., that may be obligatory upon us to a degree\nof Serious responsibility. We must use prudence and intelligence in\ndiscerning these obligations, but once they clearly stand forth they\nare as binding on us as obligations of justice. We are our brothers'\nkeepers, especially of those whom misfortune oppresses and whose lot is\ncast under a less lucky star.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXIX.\nPRAYER.\n\nNO word so common and familiar among Christians as prayer. Religion\nitself is nothing more than a vast, mighty, universal, never ceasing\nprayer. Our churches are monuments of prayer and houses of prayer. Our\nworship, our devotions, our ceremonies are expressions of prayer. Our\nsacred music is a prayer. The incense, rising in white clouds before\nthe altar, is symbolical of prayer. And the one accent that is dinned\ninto our ears from altar and pulpit is prayer.\n\nPrayer is the life of the Christian as work is the life of the man;\nwithout one and the other we would starve spiritually and physically.\nIf we live well, it is because we pray; if we lead sinful lives, it is\nbecause we neglect to pray. Where prayer is, there is virtue; where\nprayer is unknown, there is sin. The atmosphere of piety, sanctity, and\nhonesty is the atmosphere of prayer.\n\nStrange that the nature and necessity of prayer are so often\nmisunderstood! Yet the definition in our Catechism is clear and\nprecise. There are four kinds of prayer; adoration, thanksgiving,\npetition for pardon, and for our needs, spiritual and bodily.\n\nOne need be neither a Catholic nor a Christian to see how becoming it\nis in us to offer to God our homage of adoration and thanksgiving; it\nis necessary only to believe in a God who made us and who is infinitely\nperfect. Why, the very heathens made gods to adore, and erected temples\nto thank them, so deep was their sense of the devotion they owed the\nDeity. They put the early Christians to death because the latter\nrefused to adore their gods. Everywhere you go, under the sun, you will\nfind the creature offering to the Creator a homage of worship.\n\nHe, therefore, who makes so little of God as to forget to adore and\nthank Him becomes inferior to the very pagans who, sunk in the darkness\nof corruption and superstition as they were, did not, however, forget\ntheir first and natural duty to the Maker. Neglect of this obligation\nin a man betrays an absence, a loss of religious instinct, and an\nirreligious man is a pure animal, if he is a refined one. His\nrefinement and superiority come from his intelligence, and these\nqualities, far from attenuating his guilt, only serve to aggravate it.\n\nThe brute eats and drinks; when he is full and tired he throws himself\ndown to rest. When refreshed, he gets up, shakes himself and goes off\nagain in quest of food and amusement. In what does a man without prayer\ndiffer from such a being?\n\nBut prayer, strictly speaking, means a demand, a petition, an asking.\nWe ask for our needs and our principal needs are pardon and succor.\nThis is prayer as it is generally understood. It is necessary to\nsalvation. Without it no man can be saved. Our assurance of heaven\nshould be in exact proportion to our asking. \"Ask and you shall\nreceive.\" Ask nothing, and you obtain nothing; and that which you do\nnot obtain is just what you must have to save your soul.\n\nHere is the explanation of it in a nutshell. The doctrine of the Church\nis that when God created man, He raised him from a natural to a\nsupernatural state, and assigned to him a supernatural end.\nSupernatural means what is above the natural, beyond our natural powers\nof obtaining. Our destiny therefore cannot be fulfilled without the\nhelp of a superior power. We are utterly incapable by ourselves of\nrealizing the end to which we are called. The condition absolutely\nrequired is the grace of God and through that alone can we expect to\ncome to our appointed end.\n\nHere is a stone. That that stone should have feeling is not natural,\nbut supernatural. God, to give sensation to that stone, must break\nthrough the natural order of things, because to feel is beyond the\nnative powers of a stone. It is not natural for an animal to reason, it\nis impossible. God must work a miracle to make it understand. Well, the\nstone is just as capable of feeling, and the animal of reasoning, as is\nman capable of saving his soul by himself.\n\nTo persevere in the state of grace and the friendship of God, to\nrecover it when lost by sin, are supernatural works. Only by the grace\nof God can this be effected. Will God do this without being asked? Say\nrather will God save us in spite of ourselves, or unknown to ourselves.\nHe who does not ask gives no token of a desire to obtain.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXX.\nPETITIONS.\n\nFOR all spiritual needs, therefore, prayer is the one thing necessary.\nI am in the state of sin. I desire to be forgiven. To obtain pardon is\na supernatural act. Alone I can no more do it than fly. I pray then for\nthe grace of a good confession--I prudently think myself in the state\nof grace. Were I for a moment left to my depraved nature, to the mercy\nof my passions, I should fall into the lowest depths of iniquity. The\nholiest, saintliest of men are just as capable of the greatest\nabominations as the blackest sinner that ever lived. If he does not\nfall, and the other does, it is because he prays and the other does\nnot.\n\nSome people have certain spiritual maladies, that become second nature\nto them, called dominant passions. For one, it is cursing and swearing;\nfor another vanity and conceit. One is afflicted with sloth, another\nwith uncleanness of one kind or another. To discover the failing is the\nfirst duty, to pray against it is the next. You attack it with prayer\nas you attack a disease with remedies. And if we only used prayer with\nhalf the care, perseverance and confidence that we use medicines, our\nspiritual distemper would be short-lived.\n\nA person who passes a considerable time without prayer is usually in a\nbad state of soul. There is probably no one, who, upon reflection, will\nfail to discover that his best days were those which his prayers\nsanctified, and his worst, those which had to get along without any.\nAnd when a man starts out badly, the first thing he takes care to do is\nto neglect his prayers. For praying is an antidote and a reminder; it\nmakes him feel uneasy while in sin, and would make him break with his\nevil ways if he continued to pray. And since he does not wish to stop,\nhe takes no chances, and gives up his prayers. When he wants to stop,\nhe falls back on his prayers.\n\nThis brings us to the bodily favors we should ask for. You are sick.\nYou desire to get well, but you do not see the sense of praying for it;\nfor you say, \"Either I shall get well or I shall not.\" For an ordinary\nstatement that is as plain and convincing as one has a right to expect;\nit will stand against all argument. But the conclusion is not of a\npiece with the premises. In that case why do you call in the physician,\nwhy do you take nasty pills and swallow whole quarts of vile\nconcoctions that have the double merit of bringing distress to your\npalate and your purse? You take these precautions because your most\nelementary common sense tells you that such precautions as medicaments,\netc., enter for something of a condition in the decree of God which\nreads that you shall die or not die. Your return to health or your\nshuffling off of the mortal coil is subject to conditions of prudence,\nand according as they are fulfiled or not fulfiled the decree of God\nwill go into effect one way or the other.\n\nAnd why does not your sane common sense suggest to you that prayer\nenters as just such a condition in the decrees of God, that your\nrecovery is just as conditional on the using of prayer as to the taking\nof pills?\n\nThere are people who have no faith in drugs, either because they have\nnever used any or because having once used them, failed to get\nimmediate relief. Appreciation of the efficacy of prayer is frequently\nbased on similar experience.\n\nTo enumerate all the cures effected by prayer would be as bootless as\nto rehearse all the miracles of therapeutics and surgery. The doctor\nsays: \"Here, take this, it will do you good. I know its virtue.\" The\nChurch says likewise: \"Try prayer, I know its virtue.\" Your faith in it\nhas all to do with its successful working.\n\nAs in bodily sickness, so it is in all the other afflictions that flesh\nis heir to. Prayer is a panacea; it cures all ills. But it should be\ntaken with two tonics, as it were, before and after. Before: faith and\nconfidence in the power of God to cure us through prayer. After:\nresignation to the will of God, by which we accept what it may please\nHim to do in our case; for health is not the greatest boon of life, nor\nare sickness and death the greatest evils. Sin alone is bad; the grace\nof God alone is good. All other things God uses as means in view of\nthis supreme good and against this supreme evil. Faith prepares the\nsystem and puts it in order for the reception of the remedy.\nResignation helps it work out its good effects, and brings out all its\nvirtue.\n\nThus prayer is necessary to us all, whether we be Christians or pagans,\nwhether just or sinners, whether sick or well. It brings us near to\nGod, and God near to us, and thus is a foretaste and an image of our\nunion with Him hereafter.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXI.\nRELIGION.\n\nAS far back as the light of history extends, it shows man, of every\nrace and of every clime, occupied in giving expression, in one way or\nanother, to his religious impressions, sentiments, and convictions. He\nknew God; he was influenced by this knowledge unto devotion; and sought\nto exteriorize this devotion for the double purpose of proving its\ntruth and sincerity, and of still further nourishing, strengthening,\nsafeguarding it by means of an external worship and sensible things.\nAccordingly, he built temples, erected altars, offered sacrifices,\nburnt incense; he sang and wept, feasted and fasted; he knelt, stood\nand prostrated himself--all things in harmony with his hopes and fears.\nThis is worship or cult. We call it religion, distinct from interior\nworship or devotion, but supposing the latter essentially. It is\ncommanded by the first precept of God.\n\nHe who contents himself with a simple acknowledgment of the Divinity in\nthe heart, and confines his piety to the realm of the soul, does not\nfulfil the first commandment. The obligation to worship God was\nimposed, not upon angels--pure spirits, but upon men--creatures\ncomposed of a body as well as a soul. The homage that He had a right to\nexpect was therefore not a purely spiritual one, but one in which the\nbody had a part as well as the soul. A man is not a man without a body.\nNeither can God be satisfied with man's homage unless his physical\nbeing cooperate with his spiritual, unless his piety be translated into\nacts and become religion, in the sense in which we use the word.\n\nThere is no limit to the different forms religion may take on as\nmanifestations of intense fervor and strong belief. Sounds, attitudes,\npractices, etc., are so many vehicles of expression, and may be\nmultiplied indefinitely. They become letters and words and figures of a\nlanguage which, while being conventional in a way, is also natural and\nimitative, and speaks more clearly and eloquently and poetically than\nany other human language. This is what makes the Catholic religion so\nbeautiful as to compel the admiration of believers and unbelievers\nalike.\n\nOf course, there is nothing to prevent an individual from making\nreligion a mask of hypocrisy. If in using these practices, he does not\nmean what they imply, he lies as plainly as if he used words without\nregard for their signification. These practices, too, may become\nabsurd, ridiculous and even abominable. When this occurs, it is easily\nexplained by the fact that the mind and heart of man are never proof\nagainst imbecility and depravity. There are as many fools and cranks in\nthe world as there are villains and degenerates.\n\nThe Church of God regulates divine worship for us with the wisdom and\nexperience of centuries. Her sacrifice is the first great act of\nworship. Then there are her ceremonies, rites, and observances; the use\nof holy water, blessed candles, ashes, incense, vestments; her chants,\nand fasts and feasts, the symbolism of her sacraments. This is the\nlanguage in which, as a Church, and in union with her children, she\nspeaks to God her adoration, praise and thanksgiving. This is her\nreligion, and we practice it by availing ourselves of these things and\nby respecting them as pertaining to God.\n\nWe are sometimes branded as idolaters, that is, as people who adore\nanother or others than God. We offer our homage of adoration to God who\nis in heaven, and to that same God whom we believe to be on our altars.\nLooking through Protestant spectacles, we certainly are idolaters, for\nwe adore what they consider as simple bread. In this light we plead\nguilty; but is it simple bread? That is the question. The homage we\noffer to everything and everybody else is relative, that is, it refers\nto God, and therefore is not idolatry.\n\nAs to whether or not we are superstitious in our practices, that\ndepends on what is the proper homage to offer God and in what does\nexcess consist. It is not a little astonishing to see the no-creed,\ndogma-hating, private-judgment sycophants sitting in judgment against\nus and telling us what is and what is not correct in our religious\npractices. We thought that sort of a thing--dogmatism--was excluded\nfrom Protestant ethics; that every one should be allowed to choose his\nown mode of worship, that the right and proper way is the way one\nthinks right and proper. If the private-interpreter claims this freedom\nfor himself, why not allow it to us! We thought they objected to this\nkind of interference in us some few hundred years ago; is it too much\nif we object most strenuously to it in them in these days! It is\nstrange how easily some people forget first principles, and what a rare\narticle on the market is consistency.\n\nThe persons, places and things that pertain to the exterior worship of\nGod we are bound to respect, not for themselves, but by reason of the\nusage for which they are chosen and set aside, thereby becoming\nconsecrated, religious. We should respect them in a spiritual way as we\nrespect in a human way all that belongs to those whom we hold dear.\nIrreverence or disrespect is a profanation, a sacrilege.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXII.\nDEVOTIONS.\n\nTHERE is in the Church an abundance and a rich variety of what we call\ndevotions--practices that express our respect, affection and veneration\nfor the chosen friends of God. These devotions we should be careful not\nto confound with a thing very differently known as devotion--to God\nHimself. This latter is the soul, the very essence of religion; the\nformer are sometimes irreverently spoken of as \"frills.\"\n\nObjectively speaking, these devotions find their justification in the\ndogma of the Communion of Saints, according to which we believe that\nthe blessed in heaven are able and disposed to help the unfortunate\nhere below. Subjectively they are based on human nature itself. In our\nself-conscious weakness and unworthiness, we choose instinctively to\napproach the throne of God through His tried and faithful friends\nrather than to hazard ourselves alone and helpless in His presence.\n\nDevotion, as all know, is only another name for charity towards God,\npiety, holiness, that is, a condition of soul resulting from, and at\nthe same time, conducive to, fidelity to God's law and the dictates of\none's conscience. It consists in a proper understanding of our\nrelations to God--creatures of the Creator, paupers, sinners and\nchildren in the presence of a Benefactor, Judge and Father; and in\nsympathies and sentiments aroused in us by, and corresponding with,\nthese convictions. In other words, one is devoted to a friend when one\nknows him well, is true as steel to him, and basks in the sunshine of a\nlove that requites that fidelity. Towards God, this is devotion.\n\nDevotions differ in pertaining, not directly, but indirectly through\nthe creature to God. No one but sees at once that devotion, in a\ncertain degree is binding upon all men; a positive want of it is\nnothing short of impiety. But devotions have not the dignity of\nentering into the essence of God-worship. They are not constituent\nparts of that flower that grows in God's garden of the soul--charity;\nthey are rather the scent and fragrance that linger around its petals\nand betoken its genuine quality. They are of counsel, so to speak, as\nopposed to the precept of charity and devotion. They are outside all\ncommandment, and are taken up with a view of doing something more than\nescaping perdition \"quasi per ignem.\"\n\nFor human nature is rarely satisfied with what is rigorously\nsufficient. It does not relish living perpetually on the ragged edge of\na scant, uncertain meagerness. People want enough and plenty, abundance\nand variety. If there are many avenues that lead to God's throne, they\nwant to use them. If there are many outlets for their intense fervor\nand abundant generosity, they will have them. Devotions answer these\npurposes.\n\nImpossible to enumerate all the different practices that are in vogue\nin the Church and go under the name of devotions. Legion is the number\nof saints that have their following of devotees. Some are universal,\nare praised and invoked the world over; others have a local niche and\nare all unknown beyond the confines of a province or nation. Some are\ninvoked in all needs and distresses; St. Blase, on the other hand is\ncredited with a special power for curing throats, St. Anthony, for\nfinding lost things, etc. Honor is paid them on account of their\nproximity to God. To invoke them is as much an honor to them as an\nadvantage to us.\n\nIf certain individuals do not like this kind of a thing, they are under\nno sort of an obligation to practise it. If they can get to heaven\nwithout the assistance of the saints, then let them do so, by all\nmeans; only let them be sure to get there. No one finds devotions\nrepugnant but those who are ignorant of their real character and\nmeaning. If they are fortunate enough to make this discovery, they\nthen, like nearly all converts, become enthusiastic devotees, finding\nin their devotions new beauties, and new advantages every day.\n\nAnd it is a poor Catholic that leaves devotions entirely alone, and a\nrare one. He may not feel inclined to enlist the favor of this or that\nparticular saint, but he usually has a rosary hidden away somewhere in\nhis vest pocket and a scapular around his neck, or in his pocket, as a\nlast extreme. If he scorns even this, then the chances are that he is\nCatholic only in name, for the tree of faith is such a fertile one that\nit rarely fails to yield fruit and flowers of exquisite fragrance.\n\nOh! of course the lives of all the saints are not history in the\nstrictest sense of the word. But what has that to do with the Communion\nof Saints? If simplicity and naivete have woven around some names an\nunlikely tale, a fable or a myth, it requires some effort to see how\nthat could affect their standing with God, or their disposition to help\nus in our needs.\n\nDevotions are not based on historical facts, although in certain facts,\nevents or happenings, real or alleged, they may have been furnished\nwith occasions for coming into existence. The authenticity of these\nfacts is not guaranteed by the doctrinal authority of the Church, but\nshe may, and does, approve the devotions that spring therefrom.\nIndependently of the truth of private and individual revelations,\nvisions and miracles, which she investigates as to their probability,\nshe makes sure that there is nothing contrary to the deposit of faith\nand to morals, and then she gives these devotions the stamp of her\napproval as a security to the faithful who wish to practise them. A\nCatholic or non-Catholic may think what he likes concerning the\napparitions of the Virgin at Lourdes; if he is dense enough, he may\nrefuse to believe that miracles have been performed there. But he\ncannot deny that the homage offered to Our Lady at Lourdes, and known\nas devotion to Our Lady of Lourdes, is in keeping with religious\nworship as practised by the Church and in consonance with reason\nenlightened by faith, and so with all other devotions.\n\nA vase of flowers, a lamp, a. burning candle before the statue of a\nsaint is a prayer whose silence is more eloquent than all the sounds\nthat ever came from the lips of man. It is love that puts it there,\nlove that tells it to dispense its sweet perfume or shed its mellow\nrays, and love that speaks by this touching symbolism to God through a\nfavorite saint.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIII.\nIDOLATRY AND SUPERSTITION.\n\nTHE first and greatest sinner against religion is the idolater, who\noffers God-worship to others than God. There are certain attributes\nthat belong to God alone, certain titles that He alone has a right to\nbear, certain marks of veneration that are due to Him alone. To ascribe\nthese to any being under God is an abomination, and is called idolatry.\n\nThe idols of paganism have long since been thrown, their temples\ndestroyed; the folly itself has fallen into disuse, and its\nextravagances serve only in history \"to point a moral or adorn a tale.\"\nYet, in truth, idolatry is not so dead as all that, if one would take\nthe pains to peruse a few pages of the current erotic literature\nwherein people see heaven in a pair of blue eyes, catch inspired words\nfrom ruby lips and adore a well trimmed chin-whisker. I would sooner,\nwith the old-time Egyptians, adore a well-behaved cat or a toothsome\ncucumber than with certain modern feather-heads and gum-drop hearts,\nsing hymns to a shapely foot or dimpled cheek and offer incense to\n\"divinities,\" godlike forms, etc. The way hearts and souls are thrown\naround from one to another is suggestive of the national game; while\nthe love they bear one another is always infinite, supreme, without\nparallel on earth or in heaven.\n\nNo, perhaps they do not mean what they say; but that helps matters very\nlittle, for the fault lies precisely in saying what they do say; the\nlanguage used is idolatrous. And a queer thing about it is that they do\nmean more than half of what they say. When degenerate love runs riot,\nit dethrones the Almighty, makes gods of clay and besots itself before\nthem.\n\nWhat is superstition and what is a superstitious practice? It is\nsomething against the virtue of religion; it sins, not by default as\nunbelief, but by excess. Now, to be able to say what is excessive, one\nmust know what is right and just, one must have a measure. To attempt\nto qualify anything as excessive without the aid of a rule or measure\nis simply guesswork.\n\nThe Yankee passes for a mighty clever guesser, outpointing with ease\nhis transatlantic cousin. Over there the sovereign guesses officially\nthat devotion to the Mother of God is a superstitious practice. This\nreminds one of the overgrown farmer boy, who, when invited by his\nteacher to locate the center of a circle drawn on the blackboard, stood\noff and eyed the figure critically for a moment with a wise squint; and\nthen said, pointing his finger to the middle or thereabouts: \"I should\njedge it to be about thar'.\" He was candid enough to offer only an\nopinion. But how the royal guesser could be sure enough to swear it,\nand that officially, is what staggers plain people.\n\nNow right reason is a rule by which to judge what is and what is not\nsuperstitious. But individual reason or private judgment and right\nreason are not synonyms in the English or in any other language that is\nhuman. When reasoning men disagree, right reason, as far as the debated\nquestion is concerned, is properly said to be off on a vacation, a\nthing uncommonly frequent in human affairs. In order, therefore that\nmen should not be perpetually at war concerning matters that pertain to\nmen's salvation, God established a competent authority which even\nsimple folks with humble minds and pure hearts can find. In default of\nany adverse claimant the Catholic Church must be adjudged that\nauthority. The worship, therefore, that the Church approves as worthy\nof God is not, cannot be, superstition. And what is patently against\nreason, or, in case of doubt, what she reproves and condemns in\nreligion is superstitious.\n\nLeaving out of the question for the moment those species of\nsuperstition that rise to the dignity of science, to the accidental\nfame and wealth of humbugs and frauds, the evil embraces a host of\npractices that are usually the result of a too prevalent psychological\nmalady known as softening of the brain. These poor unfortunates imagine\nthat the Almighty who holds the universe in the hollow of His hand,\ndeals with His creatures in a manner that would make a full-grown man\npass as a fool if he did the same. Dreams, luck-pieces, certain\ncombinations of numbers or figures, ordinary or extraordinary events\nand happenings--these are the means whereby God is made to reveal to\nmen secrets and mysteries as absurd as the means, themselves. Surely\nGod must have descended from His throne of wisdom.\n\nStrange though it appear, too little religion--and not too much--leads\nto these unholy follies. There is a religious instinct in man. True\nreligion satisfies it fully. Quack religion, pious tomfoolery, and\ndoctrinal ineptitude foisted upon a God-hungry people end by driving\nsome from one folly to another in a pitiful attempt to get away from\nthe deceptions of man and near to God. Others are led on by a sinful\ncuriosity that outweighs their common-sense as well as their respect\nfor God. These are the guilty ones.\n\nIt has been said that there is more superstition--that is belief and\ndabbling in these inane practices--to-day in one of our large cities\nthan the Dark Ages ever was afflicted with. If true, it is one sign of\nthe world's spiritual unrest, the decay of unbelief; and irreligion\nthus assists at its own disintegration. The Church swept the pagan\nworld clean of superstition once; she may soon be called upon to do the\nwork over again.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIV.\nOCCULTISM.\n\nSPIRITISM as a theory, a science, a practice, a religion, or--I might\nadd--a profitable business venture, is considered an evil thing by the\nChurch, and by her is condemned as superstition, that is, as a false\nand unworthy homage to God, belittling His majesty and opposed to the\nDispensation of Christ, according to which alone God can be worthily\nhonored. This evil has many names; it includes all dabbling in the\nsupernatural against the sanction of Church authority, and runs a whole\ngamut of \"isms\" from fake trance-mediums to downright diabolical\npossession.\n\nThe craft found favor with the pagans and flourished many years before\nthe Christian era. Wondrous things were wrought by the so-called\npythonic spirit; evidently outside the natural order, still more\nevidently not by the agency of God, and of a certainty through the\nsecret workings of the \"Old Boy\" himself. It was called Necromancy, or\nthe Black Art. It had attractions for the Jews and they yielded to some\nextent to the temptation of consulting the Python. For this reason\nMoses condemned the evil as an abomination. These are his words, taken\nfrom Deuteronomy:\n\n\"Neither let there be found among you any one that consulteth\nsoothsayers, or observeth dreams and omens; neither let there be any\nwizard, nor charmer, nor any one that consulteth pythonic spirits or\nfortune tellers, or that seeketh the truth from the dead. For the Lord\nabhorreth all these things; and for these abominations He will destroy\nthem.\"\n\nThe Black Art had its votaries during the Middle Ages and kept the\nChurch busy warning the faithful against its dangers and its evils.\nEven so great a name as that of Albert the Great has been associated\nwith the dark doings of the wizard, because, no doubt, of the marvelous\nfruits of his genius and deep learning, which the ignorant believed\nimpossible to mere human agency. As witchcraft, it nourished during the\nsixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The excesses to which it gave rise\ncaused severe laws to be enacted against it and stringent measures were\ntaken to suppress it. Many were put to death, sometimes after the most\ncruel tortures. As is usually the case, the innocent suffered with the\nguilty. The history of the early New England settlers makes good\nreading on the subject.\n\nSome people claim that the spiritism of to-day is only a revival of\nold-time witchery and necromancy, that it is as prevalent now as it was\nthen, perhaps more prevalent. \"Only,\" as Father Lambert remarks, \"the\nwitch of to-day instead of going to the stake as formerly, goes about\nas Madam So-and-So, and is duly advertised in our enlightened press as\nthe great and renowned seeress or clairvoyant, late from the court of\nthe Akoorid of Swat, more recently from the Sublime Porte, where she\nwas in consultation with the Sultan of Turkey, and more recently still\nfrom the principal courts of Europe. As her stay in the city will be\nbrief, those who wish to know the past or future or wish to communicate\nwith deceased friends, are advised to call on her soon. Witchcraft is\nas prevalent as it ever was, and the witches are as real. They may not\nhave cats on their shoulders or pointed caps, or broomsticks for quick\ntransit, but they differ from the witches of the past only in being\nliberally paid, instead of liberally punished.\"\n\nThe Church does not deny the possibility of intercourse between the\nliving and the souls of the dead; she goes farther and admits the fact\nthat such intercourse has taken place, pointing, as well she may, to\nthe Scriptures themselves wherein such facts are recorded. The lives of\nher saints are not without proof that this world may communicate with\nthe unknown. And this belief forms the groundwork, furnishes the basic\nprinciples, of Spiritism.\n\nNevertheless, the Church condemns all attempts at establishing such\ncommunication between the living and the dead, or even claiming, though\nfalsely, such intercourse. If this is done in the name of religion, she\nconsiders it an insult to God, Who thereby is trifled with and tempted\nto a miraculous manifestation of Himself outside the ordinary channels\nof revelation. As an instrument of mere human curiosity, it is\ncriminal, since it seeks to subject Him to the beck and call of a\ncreature. In case such practices succeed, there is the grave danger of\nbeing mislead and deceived by the evil spirit, who is often permitted,\nas the instrument of God, to punish guilty men. When resorted to, as a\nmeans of relieving fools of their earnings, it is sacrilegious; and\nthose who support such impious humbugs can be excused from deadly sin\nonly on the grounds of lunacy.\n\nHypnotism and Mesmerism differ from Spiritism in this, that their\ndisciples account for the phenomena naturally and lay no claim to\nsupernatural intervention. They produce a sleep in the subject, either\nas they claim, by the emanation of a subtile fluid from the operator's\nbody, or by the influence of his mind over the mind of the subject They\nare agreed on this point, that natural laws could explain the\nphenomenon, if these laws were well understood.\n\nWith this sort of a thing, as belonging to the domain of science and\noutside her domain, the Church has nothing whatever to do. This is a\ntheory upon which it behooves men of science to work; they alone are\ncompetent in the premises. But without at all encroaching on their\ndomain, the Church claims the right to pronounce upon the morality of\nsuch practices and to condemn the evils that flow therefrom. So great\nare these evils and dangers, when unscrupulous and ignorant persons\ntake to experimenting, that able and reliable physicians and statesmen\nhave advocated the prohibition by law of all such indiscriminate\npractices. Crimes have been committed on hypnotized persons and crimes\nhave been committed by them. It is a dangerous power exercised by men\nof evil mind and a sure means to their evil ends. It is likewise\ndetrimental to physical and moral health. Finally, he who subjects\nhimself to such influence commits an immoral act by giving up his will,\nhis free agency, into the hands of another. He does this willingly, for\nno one can be hypnotized against his will; he does it without reason or\njust motive. This is an evil, and to it must be added the\nresponsibility of any evil he may be made to commit whilst under this\ninfluence. Therefore is the Church wise in condemning the\nindiscriminate practice of hypnotism or mesmerism; and therefore will\nher children be wise if they leave it alone. It is not superstition,\nbut it is a sin against man's individual liberty over which he is\nconstituted sole guardian, according to the use and abuse of which he\nwill one day be judged.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXV.\nCHRISTIAN SCIENCE.\n\nA RECENTLY discovered sin against the First Commandment is the worship\nof Mrs. Eddy, and it is commonly called Christian Science. This\nsacrilegious humbug was conceived in the brain of an old woman up in\nNew Hampshire and, like the little demon of error that it is, it leaped\nforth, after a long period of travail, full-fledged and panoplied, and\non its lips were these words: \"What fools these mortals be!\" Dame Eddy\ngets good returns from the sacrilegio-comic tour of her progeny around\nthe country. Intellectual Boston is at her feet, and Boston pays well\nfor its amusements.\n\nIt is remarkable for an utter lack of anything like Christianity or\nscience. It is as Christian as Buddhism and as scientific as the\nnotions of our early forefathers concerning the automobile. It is a\nparody on both and like the usual run of parodies, it is a success.\n\nThe average man should not attempt to delve down into the mysterious\ndepths of mind and matter which form the basis of this system. In the\nfirst place, it is an impossible task for an ordinary intelligence;\nthen, again, it were labor lost, for even if one did get down far\nenough one could get nothing satisfactory out of it. The force of\nEddyism lies in its being mysterious, incomprehensible and\ncontradictory. These qualities would kill an ordinary system, but this\nis no ordinary system. The only way to beat the Christian Scientist is\nto invite him to focus all the energy of his mind on a vulgar lamp-post\nand engrave thereon the name of the revered Eddy--this to show the\npower of mind. Then to prove the non-existence of matter, ask him to\nconsent to your endeavoring to make a material impression on his head\nwith an immaterial hammer.\n\nOf course this is not what he meant; but what he did mean will become\nby no means clearer after the wearisome, interminable lengths to which\nhe will go to elucidate. The fact is that he does not know it himself,\nand no one can give what he does not possess. True philosophy tells us\nto define terms and never to employ expressions of more than one\nmeaning without saying in what sense we use them. Contempt of this rule\nis the salvation of Christian Science, and that is where we lose.\n\nYet there is something in this fad after all. Total insanity is never\nmet with outside state institutions, and these people are at large. The\nravings of a delirious patient are often a monstrous mass of wild\nabsurdities; but, if you question the patient when convalescent, you\nwill sometimes be surprised to find they were all founded on facts\nwhich had become exaggerated and distorted. There is no such thing as\npure unadulterated error. All of which is meant to convey the idea that\nat the bottom of all fraud and falsehood there is some truth, and the\nmalice of error is always proportionate with the amount of truth it has\nperverted.\n\nThe first truth that has been exaggerated beyond recognition is this,\nthat a large proportion of human diseases are pure fiction of morbid\nimaginations, induced by the power of the mind. That such is the case,\nall medical men admit. Thus, the mind may often be used as a\ntherapeutic agent, and clever physicians never fail to employ this kind\nof Christian Science. Mrs. Eddy is therefore no more the discoverer of\nthe \"malade imaginaire\" than Moliere. When you' distort this truth and\nwrite books proclaiming the fact that all ills are of this sort, then\nyou have Eddyism up to date. Mrs. Eddy gathers her skirts in her hand\nand leaps over the abyss between \"some ills\" and \"all ills\" with the\nagility of a gazelle. Yes, the mind has a wonderful power for healing,\nbut it will make just as much impression on a broken leg as on a block\nof granite. So much for the scientific part of the theory.\n\nThe method of healing of Jesus Christ and that of the foundress of\nChristian Science are not one and the same method, although called by\nthe name of faith they appear at first sight to the unwary to be\nidentical. There is a preliminary act of the intelligence in both;\nthere is the exercise of the will power; and a mention of God in\nEddyism makes it look like a divine assistance. To the superficial\nthere is no difference between a miracle performed at Lourdes by God at\nthe intercession of the Blessed Virgin and a \"cure\" effected by the\nWidow of New Hampshire hills.\n\nYet there is a wide difference, as wide as the abyss between error and\ntruth. In faith healing, God interposes and alone does the healing. It\nis a miracle, a suspension of the ordinary laws of nature. Faith is not\na cause, but an essential condition. In Christian Science, it is the\nmind of the patient or of Mrs. Eddy that does the work. It is God only\nin the sense that God is one with the patient. Mind is the only thing\nthat exists, and the human mind is one with the Mind which is God. Then\nagain this cure instead of being in opposition to the normal state of\nthings like a miracle, itself establishes a normal state, for disease\nis abnormal and in contradiction with the natural state of man. Mental\nhealing, according to this system sets the machine going regularly;\nmiracles put it out of order for the moment. Christian Science\ntherefore, repudiates the healing method of Jesus by faith and sets up\none of its own, thereby forfeiting all title to be called Christian.\n\nBeing, therefore, neither Christian nor scientific, this new cult is\nnothing but pure nonsense, like all superstitions; the product of a\ndiseased mind swayed by the demon of pride, and should be treated\nprincipally as a mental disorder. The chief, and only, merit of the\nsystem consists in illustrating the truth, as old as the world, that\nwhen men wander from the House where they are fed with a celestial\nnourishment, they will be glad to eat any food offered them that has a\nsemblance of food, even though it be but husks and refuse. Man is a\nreligious animal; take away the true God, and he will adore anything or\neverything, even to a cucumber. However limited otherwise, there is no\nlimit to his religious folly.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVI.\nSWEARING.\n\n\"THOU shalt not take the name of the Lord, thy God in vain.\"\n\nA name is a sign, and respect for God Himself, as prescribed by the\nFirst Commandment through faith, hope, charity, prayer and religion,\nnaturally implies respect for the name that stands for and signifies\nGod. Your name may, of itself, be nothing more than mere sound; but\nused in relation to what it represents, it is as sacred, and means as\nmuch to you, as your very person, for whatever is addressed to your\nname, whether of praise or blame, is intended to reach, and does\neffectively reach, yourself, to your honor or dishonor. You exact\ntherefore of men, as a right, the same respect for your name as for\nyour person; and that is what God does in the Second Commandment.\n\nThe name of God represents all that He is. He who profanes that name\nprofanes a sacred thing, and is guilty of what is, in reality, a\nsacrilege. To use it with respect and piety is an act of religion which\nhonors God. Men use and abuse this holy name, and first of all, by\nswearing, that is, by taking oaths.\n\nIn the early history of mankind, we are told, swearing was unknown. Men\nwere honest, could trust each other and take each other's word. But\nwhen duplicity, fraud and deception rose out of the corrupt heart of\nman, when sincerity disappeared, then confidence disappeared also, no\nman's word was any longer good. Then it was that, in order to put an\nend to their differences, they called upon God by name to witness the\ntruth of what they affirmed. They substituted God's unquestioned\nveracity for their own questioned veracity, and incidentally paid\nhomage to His truth; God went security for man. Necessity therefore\nmade man swear; oaths became a substitute for honesty.\n\nA reverent use of the name of God, for a lawful purpose, cannot be\nwrong; on the contrary, it is good, being a public recognition of the\ngreatest of God's attributes--truth. But like all good things it is\nliable to be abused. A too frequent use of the oath will easily lead to\nirreverence, and thence to perjury. It is against this danger, rather\nthan against the fact itself of swearing, that Christ warns us in a\ntext that seems at first blush to condemn the oath as evil. The common\nsense of mankind has always given this interpretation to the words of\nChrist.\n\nAn oath, therefore, is a calling upon God to witness the truth of what\nwe say, and it means that we put our veracity on a par with His and\nmake Him shoulder the responsibility of truthfulness.\n\nTo take an oath we must swear by God. To swear by all the saints in the\ncalendar would not make an oath. Properly speaking, it is not even\nsufficient to simply say: \"I swear,\" we must use the name of God. In\nthis matter, we first consider the words. Do they signify a swearing,\nby God, either in their natural sense or in their general acceptation?\nOr is there an intention of giving them this signification? In\nconscience and before God, it is only when there is such an intention\nthat there is a formal oath and one is held to the conditions and\nresponsibilities thereof.\n\nBear in mind that we are here dealing for the moment solely with lawful\nswearing. There are such things as imprecation, blasphemy, and general\nprofanity, of which there will be question later, and which have this\nin common with the oath, that they call on the name of God; the\ndifference is the same that exists between bad and good, right and\nwrong. These must therefore be clearly distinguished from religious and\nlegal swearing.\n\nThere is also a difference between a religious and a legal oath. The\nreligious oath is content with searching the conscience in order to\nverify the sincerity or insincerity of the swearer. If one really\nintends to swear by God to a certain statement, and employs certain\nwords to express his intention, he is considered religiously to have\ntaken an oath. If he pronounces a formula that expresses an oath,\nwithout the intention of swearing, then he has sworn to nothing. He has\ncertainly committed a sin, but there is no oath. Again, if a man does\nnot believe in God, he cannot swear by Him; and in countries where God\nis repudiated, all attempts at administering oaths are vain and empty.\nYou cannot call, to attest the truth of your words, a being that does\nnot exist, and for him who does not believe in God, He does not exist.\n\nThe purely legal oath considers the fact and supposes the intention. If\nyou swear without deliberation, then, with you lies the burden of\nproving it; since the law will allow it only on evidence and will hold\nyou bound until such evidence is shown. When a person is engaged in a\nserious affair, he is charitably supposed to know what he is talking\nabout; if it happens that he does not, then so much the worse for him.\nIn the case of people who protest beforehand that they are infidels or\nagnostics, or who being sworn on the New Testament, disclaim all belief\nin Christ, there is nothing to be done, except it be to allow them to\nattest by the blood of a rooster or by the Great Horn Spoon. Then,\nwhatever way they swear, there is no harm done.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVII.\nOATHS.\n\nTHE first quality of an oath is that it be true. It is evident that\nevery statement we make, whether simple or sworn, must be true. If we\naffirm what we know to be false we lie, if we swear to what we know to\nbe false, we perjure ourselves. Perjury is a sacrilegious falsehood,\nand the first sin against the Second Commandment.\n\nIf, while firmly believing it to be true, what we swear to happens to\nbe false, we are not guilty of perjury, for the simple reason that our\nmoral certitude places us in good faith, and good faith guarantees us\nagainst offending. The truth we proclaim under oath is relative not\nabsolute, subjective rather than objective, that is to say, the\nstatement we make is true as far as we are in a position to know. All\nthis holds good before the bar of conscience, but it may be otherwise\nin the courts where something more than personal convictions, something\nmore akin to scientific knowledge, is required.\n\nHe who swears without sufficient certitude, without a prudent\nexamination of the facts of the question, through ignorance that must\nbe imputed to his guilt, that one takes a rash oath--a sin great or\nsmall according to the gravity of the circumstances. It is not\ninfrequently grievous.\n\nSome oaths, instead of being statements, are promises, sworn promises.\nThat of which we call God to witness the truth is not something that\nis, but something that will be. If one promises under oath, and has no\nintention of redeeming his pledge; or if he afterwards revokes such an\nintention without serious reasons, and fails to make good his sworn\npromise, he sins grievously, for he makes a fool and a liar of Almighty\nGod who acts as sponsor of a false pledge. Concerning temperance\npledges, it may here be said that they are simple promises made to God,\nbut not being sworn to, are not oaths in any sense of the word.\n\nThen, again, to be lawful, an oath must be necessary or useful,\ndemanded by the glory of God, our own or our neighbor's good; and it\nmust be possible to fulfil the promise within the given time.\nOtherwise, we trifle with a sacred thing, we are guilty of taking vain\nand unnecessary oaths. There can be no doubt but that this is highly\noffensive to God, who is thus made little of in His holy name.\n\nThis is the most frequent offense against the Second Commandment, the\nsin of profane swearing, the calling upon God to witness the truth of\nevery second word we utter. It betrays in a man a very weak sense of\nhis own honesty when he cannot let his words stand for themselves. It\nbetokens a blasphemous disrespect for God Himself, represented by that\nname which is made a convenient tool to further every vulgar end. It is\ntherefore criminal and degrading, and the guilt thereby incurred cannot\nbe palliated by the plea of habit. A sin is none the less a sin because\nit is one of a great many. Vice is criminal. The victim of a vice can\nbe considered less guilty only on condition of seriously combating that\nvice. Failing in this, he must bear the full burden of his guilt.\n\nAre we bound to keep our oaths? If valid, we certainly are. An oath is\nvalid when the matter thereof is not forbidden or illicit. The matter\nis illicit when the statement or promise we make is contrary to right.\nHe who binds himself under oath to do evil, not only does not sin in\nfulfiling his pledge, but would sin if he did redeem it. The sin he\nthus commits may be mortal or venial according to the gravity of the\nmatter of the oath. He sinned in taking the oath; he sins more\ngrievously in keeping it.\n\nThe binding force of an oath is also destroyed by fraud and deception.\nFear may have a kindred effect, if it renders one incapable of a human\nact. Likewise a former oath may annul a subsequent oath under certain\nconditions.\n\nAgain, no man in taking an oath intends to bind himself to anything\nphysically or morally impossible, or forbidden by his superiors; he\nexpects that his promise will be accepted by the other party, that all\nthings will remain unchanged, that the other party will keep faith, and\nthat there will be no grave reason for him to change his mind. In the\nevent of any of these conditions failing of fulfilment his intention is\nnot to be held by his sworn word, and his oath is considered\ninvalidated. He is to be favored in all doubts and is held only to the\nstrict words of his promise.\n\nThe least therefore we have to do with oaths, the better. They are\nthings too sacred to trifle with. When necessity demands it, let our\nswearing honor the Almighty by the respect we show His holy name.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXVIII.\nVOWS.\n\nVOWS are less common than oaths, and this is something to be thankful\nfor, since being even more sacred than oaths, their abuse incidental to\nfrequent usage would be more abominable. The fact that men so far\nrespect the vow as to entirely leave it alone when they feel unequal to\nthe task of keeping it inviolate, is a good sign--creditable to\nthemselves and honorable to God.\n\nPeople have become accustomed to looking upon vows as the exclusive\nmonopoly of the Catholic Church and her religious men and women. Such\nthings are rarely met with outside monasteries and convents, except in\nthe case of secular priests. 'Tis true, one hears tell occasionally of\na stray unfortunate who has broken away from a state voluntarily,\ndeliberately, chosen and entered upon, and who struggles through life\nwith a violated vow saddled upon him. But one does not associate the\nsacred and heroic character of the vow with such pitiable specimens of\nmoral worth.\n\nThe besom of Protestant reform thought to sweep all vows off the face\nof the earth, as immoral, unlawful, unnatural or, at least, useless\nthings. The first Coryphei broke theirs; and having learned from\nexperience what troublesome things they are, instiled into their\nfollowers a salutary distaste for these solemn engagements that one can\nget along so well without. From disliking them in themselves, they came\nto dislike them in others, and it has come to this that the Church has\nbeen obliged to defend against the change of immorality an institution\nthat alone makes perfection possible. Strange, this! More sad than\nstrange.\n\nFirst of all, what is a vow? It is a deliberate promise made to God by\nwhich we bind ourselves to do something good that is more pleasing to\nHim than its omission would be. It differs from a promissory oath in\nthis, that an oath makes God a witness of a promise made to a third\nparty, while in a vow there is no third party, the promise being made\ndirectly to God. In a violated oath, we break faith with man; in a\nbroken vow, we are faithless to God. The vow is more intimate than the\noath, and although sometimes the words are taken one for the other, in\nmeaning they are widely different.\n\nResolutions or purposes, such as we make in confession never to sin\nagain, or in moments of fervor to perform works of virtue, are not\nvows. A promise made to the Blessed Virgin or the saints is not a vow;\nit must be made directly to God Himself.\n\nA promise made to God to avoid mortal sin is not a vow, in the strict\nsense of the word; or rather such a promise is outside the ordinary\nprovince of the vow, which naturally embraces works of supererogation\nand counsel. It is unnecessary and highly imprudent to make such\npromises under vow. A promise to commit sin is a blasphemous outrage.\nIf what we promise to do is something indifferent, vain and useless,\nopposed to evangelical counsels or generally less agreeable to God than\nthe contrary, our promise is null and void as far as the having the\ncharacter of a vow is concerned.\n\nOf course, in taking a vow we must know what we are doing and be free\nto act or not to act. If then the object of the vow is matter on which\na vow may validly be taken, we are bound in conscience to keep our\nsolemn engagement. What we forbid ourselves to do may be perfectly\nlawful and innocent, but by that vow we forfeit the right we had to do\nit, and for us it has become sinful. The peculiar position in which a\nvow places a man in relation to his fellow-men concerning what is right\nand wrong, is the characteristic of the vow that makes it the object of\nmuch attention. But it requires something lacking in the outfit of an\nintelligent man to perceive therein anything that savors of the\nunnatural, the unlawful or the immoral.\n\nConcerning those whom a vow has constituted in a profession, we shall\nhave a word to say later. Right here the folly, to say nothing\nstronger, of those who contract vows without thinking, must be apparent\nto all. No one should dare take upon himself or herself such a burden\nof his or her own initiative. It is an affair that imperiously demands\nthe services of an outside, disinterested, experienced party, whose\nprudence will well weigh the conditions and the necessity of such a\nstep. Without this, there is no end to the possible misery and dangers\nthe taking of a vow may lead to.\n\nIf through an act of unthinking foolishness or rash presumption, you\nfind yourself weighed down with the incubus of a vow not made for your\nshoulders, the only way out is to make a clean breast of the matter to\nyour confessor, and follow his directions.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XXXIX.\nTHE PROFESSIONAL VOWS.\n\nTHE professional vow is a triple one, and embraces the three great\nevangelical counsels of perfect chastity, poverty and obedience. The\ncloister is necessary for the observance of such engagements as these,\nand it were easier for a lily to flourish on the banks of the Dead Sea,\nor amid the fiery blasts of the Sahara, than for these delicate flowers\nof spirituality to thrive in the midst of the temptations, seductions\nand passions of the every day world of this life. Necessity makes a\npractice of these virtues a profession.\n\nIt is good to be chaste, good to be obedient, good to be voluntarily\npoor. What folly, then, to say that it is unlawful to bind oneself by\npromises of this kind, since it is lawful to be good--the only thing\nthat is lawful! It is not unlawful, if you will, to possess riches, to\nenjoy one's independence, to wed; but there is virtue in foregoing\nthese pleasures, and virtue is better than its defect, and it is no\nmore unlawful to do better than to do good.\n\nIf it is lawful to contract a solemn engagement with man, why not with\nGod? If it is lawful for a short time, why not for a long time? If it\nis lawful for two years, why not for ten, and a lifetime! The\nengagement is no more unlawful itself than that to which we engage\nourselves.\n\nThe zealous guardians of the rights of man protest that, nevertheless,\nvows destroy man's liberty, and should therefore be forbidden, and the\nprofession suppressed. It is along this line that the governmental\nmachine is being run in France at present. If the vow destroys liberty,\nthese fanatics are doing what appears dangerously near being the same\nthing.\n\nThere is a decided advantage in being your own slave-master over having\nanother perform that service for you. If I do something which before\nGod and my conscience I have a perfect right to do, if I do it with\ndeliberate choice and affection, it is difficult to see wherein my\nliberty suffers. Again, if I decide not to marry--a right that every\nman certainly has--and in this situation engage myself by vow to\nobserve perfect chastity--which I must do to retain the friendship of\nGod--I do not see how I forfeit my liberty by swearing away a right I\nnever had.\n\nIn all cases, the more difficult an enterprise a man enters upon and\npursues to a final issue, the more fully he exercises his faculty of\nfree will. And since the triple vow supposes nothing short of heroism\nin those who take it, it follows that they must use the very plenitude\nof their liberty to make the thing possible.\n\nThe \"cui bono\" is the next formidable opponent the vow has to contend\nwith. What's the good of it? Where is the advantage in leading such an\nimpossible existence when a person can save his soul without it? All\nare not damned who refuse to take vows. Is it not sufficient to be\nhonest men and women?\n\nThat depends upon what you mean by an honest man. A great saint once\nsaid that an honest man would certainly not be hanged, but that it was\nby no means equally certain that he would not be damned. A man may do\nsundry wicked and crooked things and not forfeit his title to be called\nhonest. The majority of Satan's subjects were probably honest people in\ntheir day.\n\nThe quality of being an honest man, according to many people, consists\nin having the privilege of doing a certain amount of wickedness without\nprejudice to his eternal salvation. The philosophy of this class of\npeople is summed up in these words: \"Do little and get much; make a\nsuccess of life from the standpoint of your own selfishness, and then\nsneak into heaven almost by stealth and fraud.\" That is one way of\ndoing business with the Lord. But, there are greater things in heaven\nand on earth than are dreamt of in your philosophy, Horatio.\n\nHuman natures differ as much as pebbles on the sea shore. One man's\nmeat has often proven poison to another. In the religion of Jesus\nChrist there is something more than the Commandments given to Moses.\nLove of God has degrees of intensity and perfection. Such words as\nsacrifice, mortification, self-denial have a meaning as they have\nalways had. God gives more to some, less to others; He demands\ncorresponding returns. These are things Horatio ignores. Yet they are\nreal, real as his own empty and conceited wisdom.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XL.\nTHE PROFESSION.\n\nONE of the advantages of the monastic life, created by vows, is that it\nis wholly in keeping with human nature such as God created it. Men\ndiffer in their spiritual complexion more widely even than they do in\nmental caliber and physical make-up. All are not fitted by character\nand general condition for the same 'career; we are \"cut out\" for our\npeculiar tasks. It is the calling of one to be a soldier, of another to\nbe a statesman, because each is best fitted by nature for this\nparticular walk of life. The born poet, if set to put together a\nmachine, will, in the majority of cases, make a sorry mess of the job,\nand a bricklayer will usually prove to be an indifferent story-writer.\n\nSo also one is called to be a good Christian, while his brother may be\ndestined for a more perfect life. If there are vocations in the natural\nlife, why should there not be in the supernatural, which is just as\ntruly a life? If variety of aptitudes and likes determine difference of\ncalling, why should this not hold good for the soul as well as for the\nbody and mind? If one should always follow the bent of one's\nlegitimately natural inclinations, no fault can reasonably be found if\nanother hearkens to the voice of his soul's aspirations and elect a\ncareer in harmony with his nature.\n\nThere are two roads on which all men must travel to their destiny. One\nis called the way of Precept, the other the way of Counsel. In each the\nadvantages and inconveniences are about equally balanced. The former is\nwide and level with many joys and pleasures along the way; but there\nare many pitfalls and stumbling blocks, while on one side is a high,\nsteep precipice over which men fall to their eternal doom. Those\ndestined by Providence to go over this road are spiritually shod for\nthe travel; if they slip and tumble, it is through their own neglect.\n\nSome there are to whom it has been shown by experience--very little\nsometimes suffices--that they have, for reasons known alone to God,\nbeen denied the shoe that does not slip; and that if they do not wish\nto go over the brink, they must get off the highway and follow a path\nremoved from this danger, a path not less difficult but more secure for\nthem. Their salvation depends on it. This inside path, while it insures\nsafety for these, might lead the others astray. Each in his respective\nplace will be saved; if they exchange places, they are lost.\n\nThen again, if you will look at it from another standpoint, there\nremains still on earth such a thing as love of God, pure love of God.\nAnd this love can be translated into acts and life. Love, as all well\nknow, has its degrees of intensity and perfection. All well-born\nchildren love their parents, but they do not all love them in the same\ndegree. Some are by nature more affectionate, some appreciate favors\nbetter, some receive more and know that more is expected of them.\n\nIn like manner, we who are all children of the Great Father are not all\nequally loving and generous. What therefore is more natural than that\nsome should choose to give themselves up heart, soul and body to the\nexclusive service of God? What is there abnormal in the fact that they\nrenounce the world and all its joys and legitimate pleasures, fast,\npray and keep vigil, through pure love of God? There is only one thing\nthey fear, and that is to offend God. By their vows they put this\nmisfortune without the pale of possibility, as far as such a thing can\nbe done by a creature endowed with free will.\n\nOf course there are those for whom all this is unmitigated twaddle and\nbosh. To mention abnegation, sacrifice, etc., to such people is to\nspeak in a language no more intelligible than Sanskrit. Naturally one\nof these will expect his children to appreciate the sacrifices he makes\nfor their happiness, but with God they think it must be different.\n\nThere was once a young man who was rich. He had never broken the\nCommandments of God. Wondering if he had done enough to be saved, he\ncame to the Messiah and put the question to Him. The answer he received\nwas, that, if he were sinless, he had done well, but that there was a\nsanctity, not negative but positive, which if he would acquire, would\nbetoken in him a charity becoming a follower of a Crucified God. Christ\ncalled the young man to a life of perfection. \"If thou wilt be perfect,\ngo, sell what thou hast, give to the poor, then come, and follow me.\"\nIt is not known whether this invitation was accepted by the young man;\nbut ever since then it has been the joy of men and women in the\nCatholic Church to accept it, and to give up all in order to serve the\nMaker.\n\nScoffers and revilers of monasticism are a necessary evil. Being given\nthe course of nature that sometimes runs to freaks, they must exist.\nLiving, they must talk, and talking they must utter ineptitudes. People\nalways do when they discourse on things they do not comprehend. But let\nthis be our consolation: monks are immortal. They were, they are, they\never shall be. All else is grass.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLI.\nTHE RELIGIOUS.\n\nOWING to the disturbance over things religious in France, vows and\nthose who exemplify them in their lives are receiving of late a large\nshare of public attention. On this topic, it seems, every one is\nqualified to speak; all sorts of opinions have been ventilated in the\nreligious, the non-religious, and the irreligious press, for the\nbenefit of those who are interested in this pitiful spasm of Gallic\nmadness against the Almighty and His Church. The measure of\nunparalleled tyranny and injustice, in which antipathy to religious\norders has found expression, is being favorably and unfavorably\ncommented upon. But since monks, friars and nuns seldom find favor with\nthe non Catholic world, the general verdict is that the religious, like\nthe anarchist, must go; society is afraid of both and is safe from\nneither.\n\nTo Catholics who understand human nature and have read history, this\ncondition of things is not surprising; it is, we might venture to say,\nthe normal state of mind in relation to things so intensely Catholic is\nreligious vows. Antagonism against monasticism was born the day Luther\ndecided to take a wife; and as long as that same spirit lingers on\nearth we shall expect this antagonism to thrive and prosper. Not only\nthat, but we shall never expect the religious to get a fair hearing\nfor their cause. The hater, open or covert, of the habit and cowl is\nwhole-souled or nothing in his convictions. And he believes the devil\nshould be fought with his own weapons.\n\nWe do not expect all men to think as we do concerning the merits of the\nreligious profession. To approve it without restriction would be to\napprove the Church. To find no wrong in it would be indicative of a\ndangerous Romish tendency. And we are not prepared to assert that any\nsuch symptoms exist to an alarming extent in those who expatiate on\nreligious topics these latter days. There will be differences of\nopinion on this score, as on many others, and one fellow's opinion is\nas good, to himself, as another's.\n\nThere are even objections, to many an honest man, serious objections,\nthat may be brought up and become legitimate matter for discussion. We\ntake it for granted that intelligent men do not oppose an institution\nas venerable as monasticism without reasons. Contention between people\nwho respect intelligence is always based on what has at least a\nsemblance of truth, and has for its object to detect reality and label\nit as distinct from appearance.\n\nWe go farther, and admit that there have been abuses in this system of\nperfection, abuses that we were the first to detect, the first to\ndeplore and feel the shame of it. But before we believed it, we\ninvestigated and made sure it was so. We found out very often that the\naccusations were false. Scandalmongers and dishonest critics noted the\ncharges, but forgot to publish the verdict, and naturally with the\npublic these charges stand. No wonder then that such tales breed\nantipathy and hatred among those who are not in position to control\nfacts.\n\nA queer feature about this is that people do not give religious credit\nfor being human. That they are flesh and blood, all agree; that they\nshould err, is preposterous. A hue-and-cry goes up when it becomes\nknown that one of these children of Adam has paid the penalty of being\nhuman. One would think an angel had fallen from heaven. We notice in\nthis attitude an unconscious recognition of the sanctity of the\nreligious state; but we see behind it a Pharisaic spirit that\nexaggerates evil at the expense of justice.\n\nNow, if the principle that abuse destroys use is applied to all things,\nnothing will remain standing, and the best will go first. Corruptio\noptimi pessima. Everything human is liable to abuse; that which is\nnot, is divine. Religious and laymen, mortals all, the only time it\nis beyond our power to do wrong is when we are dead, buried, and\ntwenty-four hours underground. If in life we make mistakes, the fault\nlies, not in our being of this or that profession, but in being human.\nWhatever, therefore, the excesses that religious can be proven guilty\nof, the institution itself must not be held responsible, unless it can\nbe shown that there exists a relation of cause and effect. And whoever\nreasons otherwise, abuses the intelligence of his listeners.\n\nWe desire, in the name of honesty and fairness, to see less of that\nspirit that espies all manner of evil beneath the habit of a religious;\nthat discovers in convents and monasteries plotting against the State\nin favor of the Papacy, the accumulation of untold wealth by oppression\nand extortion for the satisfaction of laziness and lust, iniquity of\nthe deepest dye allied to general worthlessness. Common sense goes a\nlong way in this world. If it were only a less rare commodity, and if\nan effective tribunal could be erected for the suppression of\nmendacity, the religious would appear for the first time in history in\ntheir true colors before the world, and light would shine in darkness.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLII.\nTHE VOW OF POVERTY.\n\nONE objection to the vow of poverty that has a serious face on it, and\ncertainly looks wicked, is that it does not prevent the accumulation of\ngreat wealth, as may be seen in the cases of the Philippine Friars and\nthe French orders. This is one difficulty; here is another and quite\ndifferent: the wealth of the religious is excessive, detrimental to the\nwell-being of the people and a menace to the State. Taken separately,\nit is easy to dispose of these charges and to explain them away. But if\nyou put them together in one loose, vague, general imputation of\navarice, extortion and injustice, and hurl the same at a person unable\nto make distinctions, the shock is apt to disconcert him for a moment.\n\nThe first indictment seems to hint at a contradiction, or at least an\nincompatibility, between the profession of poverty and the fact of\npossessing wealth. We claim that the one does not affect the' other,\nthat a religious may belong to a rich order and still keep his vow\ninviolate. The vow in the religious is individual and personal; the\nriches collective. It is the physical person that is poor; the moral\nbeing has the wealth. Men may club together, put their means into a\ncommon fund, renounce all personal claim thereto, live on a meagre\nrevenue and employ the surplus for various purposes other than their\nneeds. The personal poverty of such as these is real.\n\nThis is the case of the religious. Personally they do not own the\nclothes on their backs. The necessaries of life are furnished them out\nof a common fund. What remains, goes through their hands for the glory\nof God and in charity to fellow-man. The employment to which these men\ndevote their lives, such as prayer, charity, the maintenance and\nconducting of schools and hospitals, is not lucrative to any great\nextent. And since very few Orders resort to begging, the revenue from\ncapital is the only means of assuring existence. It is therefore no\nmore repugnant for religious to depend on funded wealth than it was for\nthe Apostolic College to have a common purse. The secret reason for\nthis condition of things is that works of zeal rarely yield abundant\nreturns, and man cannot live on the air of heaven.\n\nAs to the extent of such wealth and its dangers, it would seem that if\nit be neither ill gotten nor employed for illegitimate purposes, in\njustice and equity, there cannot be two opinions on the subject. Every\nhuman being has a right to the fruit of his industry and activity. To\ndeny this is to advocate extreme socialism and anarchy and, he who puts\nthis doctrine into practice, destroys the principle on which society\nrests. The law that strikes at religious corporations whose wealth\naccrues from centuries of toil and labor, may to-morrow consistently\nconfiscate the goods and finances of every other corporation in the\nrealm. If you force the religious out of land and home, why not force\nMorgan, Rockefeller & Co., out of theirs! The justice in one case is as\ngood as in the other.\n\nIt is difficult to see how the people suffer from accumulated wealth,\nthe revenues from which are almost entirely devoted to the relief of\nmisery and the instruction of the ignorant. The people are the sole\nbeneficiaries. There is here none of the arrogance and selfishness that\nusually characterize the possession of wealth to the embitterment of\nmisery and misfortune. The religious, by their vow and their means, can\nshare the condition of the poor and relieve it. If there is any\ninstitution better calculated to promote the well-being of the common\npeople, it should be put to work. When the moneyed combinations whose\nrights are respected, show themselves as little prejudicial to the\nwelfare of the classes, the religious will be prepared to go out of\nexistence.\n\nEveryone is inclined to accept as true the statement, on record as\nofficial, that the wealth of the Religious Orders in France is at the\nbottom of the trouble. We are not therefore a little astonished to\nlearn from other sources that it is rather their poverty, which is\nburdensome to the people. The religious are not too rich, but too poor.\nThey cannot support themselves, and live on the enforced charity of the\nlaborer. French parents, not being equal to the task of maintaining\nmonasteries and supporting large families, limited the number of their\nchildren. The population fell off in consequence. The government came\nto the relief of the people and cast out the religious.\n\nAnd here we have the beautiful consistency of those who believe that\nany old reason is better than none at all. The religious are too poor,\ntheir poverty is a burden on the people; the religious are too rich,\ntheir riches are prejudicial to the welfare of the people. One reason\nis good; two are better. If they contradict, it is only a trifling\nmatter. As for us, we don't know quite where we stand. We can hear well\nenough, amid the din of denunciation, the conclusion that the religious\nmust go; but we cannot, for the life of us, catch the why and\nwherefore. Is it because they are too poor? or because they are too\nrich? or because they are both? We might be justified in thinking:\nbecause they are neither, but because they are what they are--\nreligious, devoted to the Church and champions of Her cause. This\nreason is at least as good as the two that contradict and destroy each\nother. In this sense, is monastic poverty a bad and evil thing?\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIII.\nTHE VOW OF OBEDIENCE.\n\nWHAT kind of obedience is that which makes religious \"unwilling to\nacknowledge any superior but the Pope?\" We have been confidently\ninformed this is the ground given in several instances for their\nremoval. And we confess that, if the words \"acknowledge\" and \"superior\"\nare used in certain of the meanings they undoubtedly have, there is\ngood and sufficient ground for such removal. At the same time we submit\nthat the foregoing phrase is open to different interpretations of\nmeaning, several of which would make out this measure of repression to\nbe one of rank injustice.\n\nThe studied misrule and abuse of language serves a detestable purpose\nthat is only too evident. A charge like the above is true and false,\nthat is to say, it is neither true nor false; it says nothing, unless\nexplained, or unless you make it say what you wish. It is a sure, safe,\nbut cowardly way of destroying an enemy without being obliged to admit\nthe guilt to oneself.\n\nNow the religious, and Catholic laity as well, never think of\nacknowledging, in the full acceptation of the word, any other spiritual\nsuperior than the Pope, and there can be nothing in this deserving\nrepression. Again, no Catholic may consistently with Catholic\nprinciples, refuse to accept as legitimate the legally constituted\nauthority of the country in which he resides. As to a man's views on\nthe different forms of government, that is nobody's business but his\nown. But whether he approves or disapproves in theory, his life and\nconduct must conform with the laws justly enacted under the form of\nGovernment that happens to be accepted. To depart from this rule is to\ngo counter to Catholic teaching, and no religious order does so without\nincurring strict censure.\n\nThe vow of obedience in a religious respects Caesar as well as God. It\ncannot validly bind one to violate the laws of State any more than to\nviolate the law of God. This vow does not even concern itself with\ncivil and political matters; by it the religious alone is affected, the\ncitizen looks out for himself. But the citizen is already bound by his\nconscience and the laws of the Church to respect and obey lawful\nauthority.\n\nA good religious is a good citizen, and he cannot be the former, if he\nis not the latter. As a mere Catholic, he is more liable to be always\nfound on the side of good citizenship, because in his religion he is\ntaught, first of all, to respect authority on which all his religious\nconvictions are based. There is a natural tendency in a Protestant, who\nwill have nothing to do with authority in spiritual matters, to bring\nthis state of mind over with him into temporary affairs; being\nself-willed in greater things, he is fore-inclined to be self-willed\nin lesser. The Catholic and, for a greater reason, the religious knows\nless of this temptation; and the better Catholic and religious he is,\nthe farther removed he is from possible revolt against, or even\ndisrespect of, authority.\n\nAgainst but one Order of all those repressed can the charge of\ninsubordination be brought with any show of truth. The Assumptionists\nmade the mistake of thinking that they could with impunity criticise\nthe doings of the Government, just as it is done in Paris every day by\nthe boulevard press. It is generally conceded that, considering the\nwell-known attitude of the Government towards the order, this was a\nhighly imprudent course for a religious paper to pursue. But their\nright to do so is founded on the privilege of free speech. It takes\nvery little to find abuse of free speech in the utterances of the\nclergy or religious in France. They are safe only when they are silent.\nIf there were less docility and more defiance in their attitude, if the\nFrench Catholics relied less on God and more on man for redress, they\nwould receive more justice than they have been receiving.\n\nThe punishment meted out to the religious for their insubordination has\nhad, we are told, a doleful effect on the temporal power of the Pope,\nan interesting patch of which has been broken up by the new French law.\nIt is a mystery to us how this law can affect the temporal power of the\nPope any more than the political status of Timbuctoo. It is passably\ndifficult to make an impression on what has ceased to exist these\nthirty years. We thought the temporal power was dead. This bit of news\nhas been dinned into our ears until we have come to believe. No\nconference, synod or council is considered by our dissenting friends\nwithout a good strong sermon on this topic. Strange that it should\nresurrect just in time to lose \"an interesting patch\" of itself! This\nis cruelty. Why not respect the grave? We recommend the perusal of the\nobituary of the temporal power written in Italian politics since the\nyear 1870. We believe the tomb is carefully guarded.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIV.\nTHE VOW OF CHASTITY.\n\nRELIGIOUS are sometimes called celibates. Now, a celibate, one of the\nbachelor persuasion, is a person who considers himself or herself good\nenough company in this life, and chooses single blessedness in\npreference to the not unmixed joys of wedlock. This alone is sufficient\nto make one a celibate, and nothing more is required. Religious do not\nwed; but, specifically, that is all there is in common between them.\nAll celibates are not chaste; celibacy is not necessarily chastity, by\na large majority. Unless something other than selfishness suggests this\nchoice of life, the word is apt to be a misnomer for profligacy. And\none who takes the vow of celibacy does not break it by sinning against\nthe Sixth Commandment; he is true to it until he weds. The religious\nvow is something more than this.\n\nAgain, chastity, by itself, does not properly designate the state of\nreligious men and women. Chastity is moral purity, but purity is a\nrelative term, and admits of many degrees. It is perfect or imperfect.\nThere is a conjugal chastity; while in single life, it may concern\nitself with the body, with or without reference to the mind and heart.\nChastity reaches its highest form when it excludes everything carnal,\nwhat is lawful as well as what is unlawful, thoughts and desires as\nwell as deeds.\n\nThis is the chastity that is proper to religious, and it is more\ncorrectly called virginity. This is the natural state of spirits who\nhave no bodies; cultivated in the frail flesh of children of Adam, it\nis the most delicate flower imaginable. Considering the incessant\nstruggle it supposes in those who take such a vow against the spirit\nwithin us that is so strong, the taking and keeping of it indicate a\ndegree of fortitude little short of heroism. Only the few, and that few\nrelying wholly on the grace of God, can aspire to this state.\n\nFrom a spiritual point of view, there can be no question as to the\nsuperiority of this state of life over all others. The teaching of St.\nPaul to the Corinthians is too plain to need any comment, not to\nmention the example of Christ, His Blessed Mother, His disciples and\nall those who in the course of time have loved God best and served Him\nmost generously.\n\nPrescinding from all spiritual considerations and looking at things\nthrough purely human eyes, vows of this sort must appear prejudicial to\nthe propagation of the species. In fact, they go against the law of\nnature which says: increase and multiply, so we are told.\n\nIf that law is natural as well as positive, it is certain that it\napplies to man collectively, and not individually. It is manifested\nonly in the instinct that makes this duty a pleasure. Where the\ninclination is lacking, the obligation is not obvious. That which is\nrepugnant is not natural, in any true sense of the word; whether this\nrepugnance be of the intellectual or spiritual order, it matters not,\nfor our nature is spiritual as truly as it is animal. The law of nature\nforces no man into a state that is not in harmony with his sympathies\nand affections.\n\nNevertheless, it must be admitted that to a certain extent the race\nsuffers numerically from an institution that fosters abstention from\nmarriage. To what extent, is an entirely different question. Not all\nlaymen marry. It is safe to say that the vast majority of religious\nmen, vow or no vow, would never wed; so that the vow is not really to\nblame for their state, and the consequences thereof. As for women,\nstatistics show it to be impossible for all to marry since their number\nexceeds that of men.\n\nNow, marriage with the fair sex, is very often a matter of competition.\nTalent, beauty, character, disposition and accomplishments play a very\nactive role in the acquisition of a husband. Considering that the\nchances of those who seek refuge under the veil are not of the poorest,\nsince they are the fairest and best endowed of our daughters, it would\nseem to follow that their act is a charity extended to their less\nfortunate sisters who are thereby aided to success, instead of being\ndoomed to failure by the insufficiency of their own qualifications.\n\nBe this as it may, what we most strenuously object to, is that vows be\nheld responsible for the sins of others. In some countries and sections\nof countries, the population is almost stationary in marked contrast to\nthat of others. Looking for the cause for this unnatural phenomenon,\nthere are who see it in the spread of monasticism, with its vow of\nchastity. They fail to remark that not numerous, but large families are\nthe best sign of vigor in a nation. Impurity, not chastity, is the\nenemy of the race. Instead of warring against those whose lives are\npure, why not destroy that monster that is gnawing at the very vitals\nof the race, sapping its strength at the very font of life, that modern\nMoloch, to whom fashionable society offers sacrifice more abominable\nthan the hecatombs of Carthage. This iniquity, rampant wherever the\nsense of God is absent, and none other, is the cause which some people\ndo not see because they have good reasons for not wanting to see. It is\nvery convenient to have someone handy to accuse of one's own faults. It\nis too bad that the now almost extinct race of Puritans did not have a\nfew monks around to blame for the phenomenon of their failure to keep\nabreast of the race.\n\nIf celibacy, therefore, means untrammeled vice, and marriage\ndegenerates into New Englandism, the world will get along better with\nless of both. Vows, if they have no other merit, respect at least the\nlaw of God, and this world is run according to that law.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLV.\nBLASPHEMY.\n\nTO blaspheme is to speak ill of God; blasphemy is an utterance\nderogatory to the respect and honor due to God. Primarily, it is a sin\nof the tongue; but, like all other sins, it draws its malice from the\nheart. Thus, a thought may be blasphemous, even though the blasphemy\nremain unexpressed; and a gesture, oftentimes more expressive than a\nword, may contain all the malice of blasphemy. This impiety therefore\nmay be committed in thought, in word and in deed.\n\nBlasphemy addresses itself directly to God, to His attributes and\nperfections which are denied, or ridiculed; to Jesus Christ and the\nBlessed Sacrament; indirectly, through His Mother and His saints,\nthrough Holy Scripture and religion, through the Church and her\nministers in their quality of ministers,--all of which, being\nintimately and inseparably connected with the idea of God, cannot be\nvilified without the honor of God being affected; and, consequently,\nall contempt and irreverence addressed to them, takes on the nature of\nblasphemy. An indirect sin of blasphemy is less enormous than a direct\noffense, but the difference is in degree, not in kind.\n\nAll error that affects God directly, or indirectly through sacred\nthings, is blasphemy whether the error consist in a denial of what is\ntrue, or an attribution of what is false. Contempt, ridicule, scoffing\nand sneering, where are concerned the Holy and things holy, are\nblasphemous. He also blasphemes who attributes to a creature what\nbelongs to God alone, or can be said only of holy things, who drags\ndown the sacred to the level of the profane.\n\nRevilings against God are happily rare; when met with, they are\ninvariably the mouthings of self-styled atheists or infidels whose\nsanity is not always a patent fact. Heretics are usually blasphemous\nwhen they treat of anything outside Jesus Christ and the Bible; and not\neven Christ and Scripture escape, for often their ideas and utterances\nconcerning both are as injurious to God as they are false and\nerroneous. Finally, despair and anger not infrequently find\nsatisfaction in abusing God and all that pertains to Him.\n\nNothing more abominable can be conceived than this evil, since it\nattacks, and is in opposition to, God Himself. And nothing shows up its\nmalice so much as the fact that blasphemy is the natural product and\noffspring of hate; it goes to the limit of human power in revolt\nagainst the Maker. It is, however, a consolation to know that, in the\nmajority of cases, blasphemy is found where faith is wanting or\nresponsibility absent, for it may charitably be taken for granted that\nif the blasphemer really knew what he was saying, he would rather cut\nout his tongue than repeat it. So true is it that the salvation of many\ndepends almost as much on their own ignorance as on the grace of God.\n\nThere is a species of blasphemy, not without its degree of malice,\nfound sometimes in people who are otherwise God-fearing and religious.\nWhen He visits them with affliction and adversity, their self-conscious\nrighteousness goes out and seeks Comparison with prosperous\nungodliness, and forthwith comments on strange fact of the deserving\nsuffering while the undeserving are spared. They remark to themselves\nthat the wicked always succeed, and entertain a strong suspicion that\nif they were as bad as others certain things would not happen.\n\nAll this smacks dangerously of revolt against the Providence of God.\nJob's problem is one that can be solved only by faith and a strong\nspiritual sense. He who has it not is liable to get on the wrong side\nin the discussion; and it is difficult to go very far on that side\nwithout finding Providence at fault and thus becoming guilty of\nblasphemy. For, to mention partiality in the same breath with God's\ncare of the universe, is to deny Him.\n\nThe daily papers, a few years ago, gave public notoriety to two\ninstances of blasphemy, and their very remarkable punishment, for it is\nimpossible not to see the hand of God in what followed so close upon\nthe offending. A desperate gambler called upon the Almighty to strike\nhim dumb, if in the next deal a certain card turned up. It did turn up,\nand at the last accounts the man had not yet spoken. Another cast from\nhis door a vendor of images and crucifixes with a curse and the remark\nthat he would rather have the devil in his house than a crucifix. The\nvery next day, he became the father of what came as near being the\ndevil as anything the doctors of that vicinity ever saw. These are not\nSunday-school stories invented to frighten children; the facts\noccurred, and were heralded broadcast throughout the land.\n\nDespair urged the first unfortunate to defy the Almighty. In the other\n'twas hatred for the Church that honors the image of Christ crucified\nas one honors the portrait of a mother. The blasphemy in the second\ncase reached God as effectively as in the first, and the outrage\ncontained in both is of an order that human language is incapable of\nqualifying.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVI.\nCURSING.\n\nTO bless one is not merely to wish that one well, but also to invoke\ngood fortune upon his head, to recommend him to the Giver of all goods.\nSo, too, cursing, damning, imprecation, malediction--synonymous terms--\nis stronger than evil wishing and desiring. He who acts thus invokes a\nspirit of evil, asks God to visit His wrath upon the object cursed, to\ninflict death, damnation, or other ills. There is consequently in such\nlanguage at least an implicit calling upon God, for the evil invoked is\ninvoked of God, either directly or indirectly. And that is why the\nSecond Commandment concerns itself with cursing.\n\nThus it will be seen that this abuse of language offends against\nreligion and charity as well. To the malice of calling down evil upon a\nbrother's head is added the impiety of calling upon God to do it, to\ncurse when He should be prayed to bless.\n\nOf course all depends on what is the object of our imprecations. One\nspecies of this vice contains blasphemy pure and simple, that is, a\ncurse which attains something that refers to God in an especial manner,\nand as such is cursed. The idea of God cannot be separated from that of\nthe soul, of faith, of the Church, etc. Malediction addressed to them\nreaches God, and contains all the malice of blasphemy.\n\nWhen the malediction falls on creatures, without any reference to their\nrelationship to God, we have cursing in its proper form with a special\nmalice of its own. Directly, charity alone is violated, but charity has\nobligations which are binding under pain of mortal sin. No man can sin\nagainst himself or against his neighbor without offending God.\n\nA curse may be, and frequently is, emphasized with a vow or an oath.\nOne may solemnly promise God in certain contingencies that he will damn\nanother to hell; or he may call upon God to witness his execrations.\nThe malice of two specific sins is here accumulated, the offense is\ndouble in this one abominable utterance; nothing can be conceived more\nhorrible, unless it be the indifferent frequency with which it is\nperpetrated.\n\nThe guilt incurred by those who thus curse and damn, leaving aside the\nscandal which is thereby nearly always given, is naturally measured by\nthe degree of advertence possessed by such persons. Supposing full\ndeliberation, to curse a fellow-man or self, if the evil invoked be of\na serious nature, is a mortal sin.\n\nPassion or habit may excuse, if the movement is what is called \"a first\nmovement,\" that is, a mechanical utterance without reflection or\nvolition; also, if the habit has been retracted and is in process of\nreform. If neither damnation nor death nor infamy nor any major evil is\ninvoked, the sin may be less grievous, but sin it always is. If the\nobject anathematized is an animal, a thing, a vice, etc., there may be\na slight sin or no sin at all. Some things deserved to be cursed. In\ndamning others, there may be disorder enough to constitute a venial\nsin, without any greater malice.\n\nConsidering the case of a man who, far removed from human hearing,\nshould discover too late, his forgetfulness to leave the way clear\nbetween a block and a fast-descending and ponderous ax, and, in a fit\nof acute discomfort and uncontrollable feeling consequential to such\nforgetfulness, should consign block, ax, and various objects in the\nimmediate vicinity to the nethermost depths of Stygian darkness: in\nsuch a case, we do not think there would be sin.\n\nOn the other hand, they in whose favor such attenuating circumstances\ndo not militate, do the office of the demons. These latter can do\nnothing but curse and heap maledictions upon all who do not share their\nlot. To damn is the office of the damned. It is therefore fitting that\nthose who cease not to damn while on earth be condemned to damn\neternally and be damned in the next life. And if it is true that \"the\nmouth speaks out of the abundance of the heart,\" to what but to hell\ncan be compared the inner soul of him whose delight consists in\nvomiting forth curses and imprecations upon his fellow-men?\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVII.\nPROFANITY.\n\nPROFANITY is not a specific sin. Under this general head come all\nblasphemy, false, rash, unjust and unnecessary oaths, rash and violated\nvows, and cursing:--called profanity, because in each case the name of\nGod is profaned, that is to say, is made less holy, by its application\nto unworthy objects and in unbecoming circumstances; profanity, because\nit has to do with the Holy Name, and not profanation, which looks to\nsacred things. Although language lends itself to many devices and is\nwell nigh inexhaustible in its resources, this category of sins of\nprofanity embraces about all modes of offending against the Holy Name,\nand consequently against the Second Commandment.\n\nWe have already examined the different species of profanity. But it is\nnot always easy to classify certain utterances and expressions that\nsavour of profanity, to determine the specific nature of their malice,\nespecially the guilt incurred by the speaker. First of all, the terms\nused are often distorted from their original signification, or require\nthat words left understood be supplied; as they stand, they are often\nas meaningless to the speaker as to the general uninitiated public. To\nget at the formal malice of such utterances is still more difficult,\nfor it becomes necessary to interpret the intentions of the speaker.\nThus, in one case, words that contain no evident insult to God may be\nused with all the vehemence of profanity, to which guilt is certainly\nattached; in another, the most unholy language may be employed in\nignorance of its meaning, with no evil intent, the only danger of\nmalice being from habit, passion or scandal.\n\nThis brings us to consider certain ejaculatory or exclamatory\nexpressions such as: God! good God! Lord! etc., employed by persons of\nvery different spiritual complexion. Evidently, these words may be\nemployed in good and in evil part; whether in one or the other, depends\non the circumstances of their using. They may proceed from piety and\ntrue devotion of the heart, out of the abundance of which the mouth\nspeaks. Far from being wrong, this is positively good and meritorious.\n\nIf this is done through force of habit, or is the result of levity,\nwithout the least interior devotion or affection, it is a mitigated\nform of profanity. To say the least, no honor accrues to God from such\nlanguage and such use of His name; and where He is concerned, not to\nhonor Him is dangerously near dishonoring Him. If contempt of God or\nscandal result from such language, the offense may easily be mortal.\n\nFinally, excited feelings of passion or wrath vent themselves in this\nmanner, and here it is still more easy to make it a grievous offending.\nAbout the only thing that can excuse from fault is absolute\nindeliberation.\n\nAgain, without implying any malediction, prescinding altogether from\nthe supernatural character of what they represent, as ejaculations\nonly, we come across the use of such words as hell, devil, damnation,\netc. Good ethics condemn such terms in conversation; hearing them used\npeople may be scandalized, especially the young; if one uses them with\nthe mistaken idea that they contain blasphemy, then that one is\nformally guilty of blasphemy; finally, it is vulgar, coarse and\nunmannerly to do so. But all this being admitted, we do not see any\nmore moral iniquity in the mention of these words than of their\nequivalents: eternal fire, Satan, perdition, etc. We do not advise or\nencourage the use of such terms, but it sometimes jars one's sense of\npropriety to see people hold up their hands in holy horror at the sound\nof these words, as if their mention were something unspeakably wicked,\nwhile they themselves would look fornication, for instance, straight in\nthe face without a shudder or a blush.\n\nProfanity is certainly a sin, sometimes a grievous sin; but in our\nhumble opinion, the fiat of self-righteous Pharisaism to the contrary\nnotwithstanding, it is a few hundred times oftener no sin at all, or a\nvery white sin, than the awful crime some people see in it. If a fellow\ncould quote classical \"Mehercule,\" and Shakespearean cuss-words, he\nwould not perhaps be so vulgar as to say \"hell.\" But not having such\nlanguage at his command, and being filled with strong feelings that\nclamor for a good substantial expression, if he looks around and finds\nthese the strongest and only available ones, and uses them,--it is\nnecessity and human nature, we wot, more than sacrilegious profanity.\nIt were better if his speech were aye, aye and nay, nay; but it does\nnot make it look any better to convict him of the blackest sin on the\ncalendar just because he mentioned a place that really exists, if it is\nhot, and which it is well to have ever before our eyes against the\ntemptations of life.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLVIII.\nTHIRD COMMANDMENT\nTHE LAW OF REST.\n\nTHE last of the three Commandments that refer directly to God,\nprescribes a rest from toil, and profane works; and in commemoration of\nthe mystical repose of the Lord after the six days' creation,\ndesignates the Sabbath or seventh day as a day that shall be set apart\nand made sacred to God. The peculiarity of the commandment is that it\ninterferes with the occupations of man, intrudes upon his individual\naffairs and claims a worship of works. The others do not go thus far,\nand are satisfied with a worship of the heart and tongue, of affections\nand language.\n\nLeaving aside for the moment the special designation of a day devoted\nto this worship, the law of rest itself deserves attention. Whether the\nSaturday or Sunday be observed, whether the rest be long or brief, a\nday or an hour, depends entirely on the positive will of God. More than\nthis must be said of the command of rest; that law grows out of our\nrelations with God, is founded in nature, is according to the natural\norder of things.\n\nThis repose means abstention from bodily activity.. The law does not go\nso far as to prescribe stagnation and sloth, but it is satisfied with\nsuch abstention as is compatible with the reasonable needs of man. Of\nits nature, it constitutes an exterior, public act of religion. The\nquestion is: Does the nature of our relations with God demand this sort\nof worship? Evidently, yes. Else God, who created the whole man, would\nnot receive a perfect worship. If God made man, man belongs to Him; if\nfrom that possession flows a natural obligation to worship with heart\nand tongue, why not also of the body? God has a Maker's right over us,\nand without some acknowledgment on the part of the body of this right,\nthere would be no evidence that such a right existed. There is no doubt\nbut that the law of our being requires of us an interior worship. Now,\nif that spirit of homage within us is sincere, it will naturally seek\nto exteriorize itself; if it is to be preserved, it must \"out.\" We are\nnot here speaking of certain peculiarly ordered individuals, but of the\nbulk of common humanity. Experience teaches that what does not come out\neither never existed or is not assured of a prolonged existence. Just\nas the mind must go out of itself for the substance of its thoughts, so\nmust the heart go out to get relief from the pressure of its feelings.\nGod commanded this external worship because it alone could preserve\ninternal affections.\n\nAgain, there are many things which the ordinary man ignores concerning\nGod, which it is necessary for him to know, and which do not come by\nintuition. In other words, he must be taught a host of truths that he\nis incapable of finding out by himself. Education and instruction in\nreligious matters are outside the sphere of his usual occupations.\nWhere will he ever get this necessary information, if he is not taught?\nAnd how can he be taught, if he does not lay aside occupations that are\nincompatible with the acquisition of intellectual truths? He is\ntherefore forced by the law of his being, and the obligation he owes\nhis Maker, to rest from his every-day labors, once in awhile, in order\nto learn his full duty, if for nothing else.\n\nPagans, who never knew the law of Moses, serve neither Saturday nor\nSunday; neither do they give an entire day, at fixed intervals to the\nexterior worship of the Deity, as we do. But a case will not be found\nwhere they did not on certain occasions rest from work in order to\noffer the homage of their fidelity to their gods, and to listen, to\ninstruction and exhortation from their holy men. These pagans follow\nthe natural law written in their souls, and it is there they discover\nthe obligation they are under to honor God by rest from labor and to\nmake holy unto Him a certain space of time.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XLIX.\nTHE DAY OF REST.\n\nTHE third article of the Mosaic Code not only enunciates the law of\nrest, but says just how much time shall be given to its observance; it\nprescribes neither a week nor a few hours, but one day in seven. If you\nhave a taste for such things and look well, you will find several\nreasons put forth as justifying this special designation of one day in\nseven. The number seven the Jews regarded as a sacred number; the\nRomans, as the symbol of perfection. Students of antiquity have\ndiscovered that among nearly all peoples this number in some way or\nother refers to the Deity. Science finds that nature prefers this\nnumber; light under analysis reveals seven colors, and all colors refer\nto the seven orders of the solar spectrum; the human voice has seven\ntones that constitute the scale of sound; the human body is renewed\nevery seven years. Authorities on hygiene and physiology teach that one\nday in six is too much, one day in eight is too little, but that one\nday in seven is sufficient and necessary for the physical needs of man.\n\nThese considerations may or may not carry conviction to the average\nmind. On the face of it, they confirm rather than prove. They do not\nreveal the necessity of a day of rest so much as show its\nreasonableness and how it harmonizes with nature in its periodicity,\nits symmetry and its exact proportion to the strength of man. As for\nreal substantial reasons, there is but one,--a good and sufficient,--\nand that is the positive will of God. He said: keep this day holy;\nsuch is His command; no man should need a better reason.\n\nThe God-given law of Moses says Saturday, Christians say Sunday.\nProtestants and Catholics alike say Sunday, and Sunday it is. But this\nis not a trifling change; it calls for an explanation. Why was it made?\nWhat is there to justify it? On what authority was it done? Can the\nwill of God, unmistakably manifested, be thus disregarded and put aside\nby His creatures? This is a serious question.\n\nOne of the most interesting things in the world would be to hear a\nProtestant Christian, on Protestant grounds, justify his observance of\nthe Sunday instead of the Sabbath, and give reasons for his conduct.\n\"Search the Scriptures.\" Aye, search from Genesis to Revelations, the\nMosaic prescriptions will hold good in spite of all your researches.\nInstead of justification you will find condemnation. \"The Bible, the\nBible alone\" theory hardly fits in here. Are Papists the only ones to\nadd to the holy writings, or to go counter to them? Suppose this change\ncannot be justified on Scriptural grounds, what then? And the fact is,\nit cannot.\n\nIt is hardly satisfactory to remark that this is a disciplinary\ninjunction, and Christ abrogated the Jewish ceremonial. But if it is\nnothing more than this, how came it to get on the table of the Law? Its\nembodiment in the Decalogue makes it somewhat different from all other\nceremonial prescriptions; as it stands, it is on a par with the veto to\nkill or to steal. Christ abolished the purely Jewish law, but he left\nthe Decalogue intact.\n\nChrist rose from the dead on Sunday, 'tis true; but nowhere in writing\ncan it be found that His resurrection on that day meant a change in the\nThird Commandment. In the nature of the event, there is absolutely no\nrelation between it and the observance of Sunday.\n\nWhere will our friend find a loop-hole to escape? Oh! as usual, for the\nSunday as for the Bible, he will have to fall back on the old Church.\nWhat in the world could he do without her? He will find there an\nauthority, and he is obliged to recognize it, even if he does on\nordinary occasions declaim against and condemn it. Incidentally, if his\neyes are open, he will discover that his individually interpreted Bible\nhas failed most woefully to do its work; it condemns the Protestant\nSunday.\n\nThis day was changed on the sole authority of the Holy Roman Catholic\nChurch, as the representative of God on earth, to whose keeping was\nconfided the interpretation of God's word, and in whose bosom is found\nthat other criterion of truth, called tradition. Tradition it is that\njustifies the change she made. Deny this, and there is no justification\npossible, and you must go back to the Mosaic Sabbath. Admit it, and if\nyou are a Protestant you will find yourself in somewhat of a mess.\n\nA logical Protestant must be a very uneasy being. If the Church is\nright in this, why should she not be right in defining the Immaculate\nConception? And if she errs here, what assurance is there that she does\nnot err there? How can he say she is right on one occasion, and wrong\non another? What kind of nonsense is it that makes her truthful or\nerring according to one's fancy and taste? Truly, the reformer\nblundered when he did not treat the Sunday as he treated the Pope and\nall Church authority, for it is papistical to a degree.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER L.\nKEEPING THE LORD'S DAY HOLY.\n\nTHE Third Commandment bids us sanctify the Lord's day; but in what that\nsanctification shall consist, it does not say. It is certain, however,\nthat it is only by worship, of one kind or another, that the day can be\nproperly kept holy to the Lord; and since interior worship is\nprescribed by the First Commandment, exterior and public worship must\nbe what is called for. Then, there are many modes of worship; there is\nno end to the means man may devise of offering homage to the Creator.\n\nThe first element of worship is abstention from profane labor; rest is\nthe first condition of keeping the Sabbath. The word Sabbath itself\nmeans cessation of work. You cannot do two things at the same time, you\ncannot serve God and Mammon. Our everyday occupations are not, of their\nnature, a public homage of fidelity to God. If any homage is to be\noffered, as a preliminary, work must cease. This interruption of the\nordinary business of life alone makes it possible to enter seriously\ninto the more important business of God's service, and in this sense it\nis a negative worship.\n\nYet, there is also something positive about it, for the simple fact of\ndesisting from toil contains an element of direct homage. Six days are\nours for ourselves. What accrues from our activity on those days is our\nprofit. To God we sacrifice one day and all it might bring to us, we\npay to Him a tithe of our time, labor and earnings. By directing aright\nour intentions, therefore, our rest assumes the higher dignity of\nexplicit, emphatic religion and reverence, and in a fuller manner\nsanctifies the day that is the Lord's.\n\nWe should, however, guard ourselves against the mistaken notion that\nsloth and idleness are synonymous of rest. It is not all activity, but\nthe ordinary activity of common life, that is forbidden. It were a\nsacrilegious mockery to make God the author of a law that fosters\nlaziness and favors the sluggard. Another extreme that common sense\ncondemns is that the physical man should suffer martyrdom while the\nsoul thus communes with God, that promenades and recreation should be\nabolished, and social amenities ignored, that dryness, gloom,\nmoroseness and severity are the proper conditions of Sabbatical\nobservance.\n\nIn this respect, our Puritan ancestors were the true children of\nPharisaism, and their Blue Laws more properly belong in the Talmud than\nin the Constitution of an American Commonwealth. God loves a cheerful\ngiver, and would you not judge from appearances that religion was\npainful to these pious witch-burners and everything for God most\ngrudgingly done? Sighs, grimaces, groans and wails, this is the homage\nthe devils in hell offer to the justice of God; there is no more place\nfor them in the religion of earth than in the religion of heaven.\n\nCorrelative with the obligation of rest is that of purely positive\nworship, and here is the difficulty of deciding just what is the\ncorrect thing in religious worship. The Jews had their institutions,\nbut Christ abolished them. The Pagans had their way--sacrifice;\nProtestants have their preaching and hymn-singing. Catholics offer a\nSacrifice, too, but an unbloody one. Later on, we shall hear the Church\nspeak out on the subject. She exercised the right to change the day\nitself; she claims naturally the right to say how it should be\nobserved, because the day belongs to her. And she will impose upon her\nchildren the obligation to attend mass. But here the precepts of the\nChurch are out of the question.\n\nThe obligation, however, to participate in some act of worship is\nplain. The First Commandment charges every man to offer an exterior\nhomage of one kind or another, at some time or another. The Third sets\naside a day for the worship of the Divinity. Thus the general command\nof the first precept is specified. This is the time, or there is no\ntime. With the Third Commandment before him, man cannot arbitrarily\nchoose for himself the time for his worship, he must do it on Sunday.\n\nPublic worship being established in all Christian communities, every\nChristian who cannot improve upon what is offered and who is convinced\nthat a certain mode of worship is the best and true, is bound by the\nlaw to participate therein. The obligation may be greater if he ignores\nthe principles of religion and cannot get information and instruction\noutside the temple of religion. For Catholics, there is only one true\nmode of public worship, and that is the Sacrifice of the Mass. No\nlayman is sufficient unto himself to provide such an act of religion.\nHe has, therefore, no choice, he must assist at that sacrifice if he\nwould fulfil the obligation he is under of Sunday worship.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LI.\nWORSHIP OF SACRIFICE.\n\nWE Catholics contend, and our contention is based on a law of nature\nthat we glean from the history of man, that sacrifice is the soul of\nreligion, that there never was a universally and permanently accepted\nreligion--and that there cannot be any such religion--without an altar,\na victim, a priest, and a sacrifice. We claim that reason and\nexperience would bear us out in this contention, even without the\nexample and teaching and express commands of Jesus Christ, who, in\nfounding a new and the only true religion, Himself offered sacrifice\nand left a sacrifice to be perpetually offered in His religion; and\nthat sacrifice constitutes the high worship we owe to the Creator.\n\nIt is our conviction that, when man came into the presence of the\nAlmighty, his first impulse was to speak to Him, and his first word was\nan act of adoration. But human language is a feeble medium of\ncommunication with the Almighty. Man talks to man. To talk with God, he\nsought out another language; and, as in the case of Adam's sons, he\ndiscovered in sacrifice a better and stronger mode of expressing his\nreligious feelings. He therefore offered sacrifice, and sacrifice\nbecame the language of man in his relations with the Deity.\n\nIn its simplest definition, sacrifice is the offering to God of a\nvictim, by one authorized for that task. It supposes essentially the\ndestruction of the victim; and the act is an eloquent acknowledgment,\nin language that is as plain as it possibly can be made, that God is\nthe supreme Lord of life and death, that all things that exist come\nfrom Him, and revert to Him as to their natural end.\n\nThe philosophy of sacrifice is that man, in some manner or other, had\nincurred the wrath of the Almighty. The pagan could not tell hi just\nwhat his offense consisted; but there is nothing plainer than the fact\nthat he considered himself under the ban of God's displeasure, and that\nsin had something to do with it; and he feared the Deity accordingly.\nWe know that original sin was the curse under which he labored.\n\nWhatever the offense was, it was in the flesh, the result of weakness\nrather than malice. There was something in his nature that inclined to\nevil and was responsible for sin. The better part tried to serve, but\nthe inferior man revolted. Flesh, therefore, was wicked and sinful; and\nsince all offense must be atoned for, the flesh should pay the penalty\nof evil. The wrath of God could be appeased, and sacrifice was the\nthing that could do it.\n\nAnother thing most remarkable among those who worshiped by sacrifice in\nthe early times, is that they believed firmly in the reversibility of\nmerit, that is, that the innocent could atone for the wicked. Somehow,\nthey acquired the notion that stainless victims were more agreeable to\nGod than others. God sanctioned this belief among the Jews, and most\nstrikingly on the hill of Calvary.\n\nThis being the case, man being guilty and not having the right to\ninflict the supreme penalty upon himself, the natural thing to do was\nto substitute a victim for himself, to put the flesh of another in the\nplace of his own and to visit upon it the punishment that was due to\nhimself. And he offered to God this vicarious atonement. His action\nspoke in this wise: \"My God, I am a sinner and deserve Thy wrath. But\nlook upon this victim as though it were myself. My sins and offenses I\nlay upon its shoulders, this knife shall be the bolt of Thy vengeance,\nand it shall make atonement in blood.\" This is the language of\nsacrifice. As we have said, it supposes the necessity of atonement and\nbelief in the reversibility of merit.\n\nNow, if we find in history, as we certainly do find,--that all peoples\noffered sacrifice of this kind, we do not think we would be far from\nthe truth if we deduced therefrom a law of nature; and if it is a law\nof nature, it is a law of God. If there is no religion of antiquity\nthat did not offer sacrifice, then it would seem that the Almighty had\ntraced a path along which man naturally trod and which his natural\ninstinct showed him.\n\nWe believe in the axiom of St. Augustine: \"securus judicet orbis\nterrarum, a universally accepted judgment can be safely followed.\"\nEspecially do we feel secure with the history of the chosen people of\nGod before us arid its sacrifice ordained by the law; with the sanction\nof Christ's sacrifice in our mind, and the practice of the divinely\ninspired Church which makes sacrifice the soul of her worship.\n\nThe victim we have is Jesus Christ Himself, and none other than He. He\ngave us His flesh and blood to consume, with the command to consume.\nOur sacrifice, therefore, consists in the offering up of this Victim to\nGod and the consuming of it. Upon the Victim of the altar, as upon the\nVictim of the Cross, we lay our sins and offenses, and, in one case as\nin the other, the sacred blood, in God's eyes, washes our iniquity\naway.\n\nOf course, it requires faith to believe, but religion is nothing if it\nis not whole and entire a matter of faith. The less faith you have, the\nmore you try to simplify matters. Waning faith began by eliminating\nauthority and sacrifice and the unwritten word. Now the written word is\ngoing the same way. Pretty soon we shall hear of the Decalogue's being\nsubjected to this same eliminating process. After all, when one gets\nstarted in that direction, what reason is there that he should ever\nstop!\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LII.\nWORSHIP OF REST.\n\nPARTICIPATION in public worship is the positive obligation flowing from\nthe Third Commandment; abstention from labor is what is negatively\nenjoined. Now, works differ as widely in their nature as differ in form\nand dimension the pebbles on the sea-shore. There are works of God and\nworks of the devil, and works which, as regards spirituality, are\ntotally indifferent, profane works, as distinguished from sacred and\nsinful works. And these latter may be corporal or intellectual or both.\nWork or labor or toil, in itself, is a spending of energy, an exercise\nof activity; it covers a deal of ground. And since the law simply says\nto abstain from work, it falls to us to determine just what works are\nmeant, for it is certain that all works, that is, all that come under\nthe general head of work, do not profane the Lord's day.\n\nThe legislation of the Church, which is the custodian of the Sunday, on\nthis head commends itself to all thoughtful men; while, for those who\nrecognize the Church as the true one, that legislation is authority.\nThe Church distinguishes three kinds of profane works, that is, works\nthat are neither sacred nor iniquitous of their nature. There is one\nkind which requires labor of the mind rather than of the body. These\nworks tend directly to the culture or exercise of the mind, and are\ncalled liberal works, because under the Romans, freemen or \"liberi\"\nalmost exclusively were engaged therein. Such are reading, writing,\nstudying, music, drawing--in general, mental occupations in whole, or\nmore mental than corporal. These works the Church does not consider the\nlaw includes in its prohibition, and they are consequently not\nforbidden.\n\nIt is impossible here to enumerate all that enters into this class of\nworks; custom has something to say in determining what is liberal in\nour works; and in investigating, we must apply to each case the general\nprinciple. The labor in question may be gratuitous or well paid; it may\ncause fatigue or afford recreation: all this is not to the point. The\nquestion is, outside the danger of omitting divine service, scandal or\ncircumstances that might lead to the annoyances and distraction of\nothers--the question is: does this work call for exercise of the mind\nmore than that of the body? If the answer is affirmative, then the work\nis liberal, and as such it is not forbidden on Sunday, it is not\nconsidered a profanation of the Lord's day.\n\nOn the other extreme are what go by the name of servile works, which\ncall forth principally bodily effort and tend directly to the advantage\nof the body. They are known also as works of manual labor. Before the\ndays of Christianity, slaves alone were thus employed, and from the\nword \"servi\" or slaves these are called servile works.\n\nHere again it is the nature of the work that makes it servile. It may\nbe remunerative or not, recreative or not, fatiguing or not; it may be\na regular occupation, or just taken up for the moment; it may be,\noutside cases of necessity, for the glory of God or for the good of the\nneighbor. If it is true that the body has more part therein than the\nmind, then it is a servile work and it is forbidden. Of course there\nare serious reasons that dispense us from our obligation to this law,\nbut we are not talking about that just at present.\n\nThe reason of the proscription is, not that such works are evil, but\nthat they interfere with the intention we should give to the worship we\nowe to God, and that, without this cessation of labor, our bodily\nhealth would be impaired: these are the two motives of the law. But\neven if it happened, in an individual case, that these inconveniences\nwere removed, that neither God's reverence nor one's own health\nsuffered from such occupations as the law condemns, the obligation\nwould still remain to abstain therefrom, for it is general and\nabsolute, and when there is question of obeying a law, the subject has\na right to examine the law, but not the motives of the law.\n\nWe shall later see that there are other works, called common, which\nrequire activity of the mind and of the body in about an equal measure\nor which enter into the common necessities of life. These are not\nforbidden in themselves, although in certain contingencies they may be\nadjudged unlawful; but, in the matter of servile works, nothing but\nnecessity, the greater glory of God, or the good of the neighbor, can\nallow us to consider the law non-binding. To break it is a sin, slight\nor grievous, according to the nature of the offense.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LIII.\nSERVILE WORKS.\n\nBUT, if servile works are prohibited on the Lord's day, it must be\nremembered that \"the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the\nSabbath,\" that, for certain good and sufficient reasons, the law ceases\nto oblige; and, in these circumstances, works of a purely servile\nnature are no longer unlawful. This is a truth Christ made very clear\nto the straight-laced Pharisees of the old dispensation who interpreted\ntoo rigorously the divine prohibition; and certain Pharisees of the new\ndispensation, who are supposed assiduously to read the Bible, should\njog their memories on the point in order to save themselves from the\nridicule that surrounds the memory of their ancestors of Blue-Law fame.\nThe Church enters into the spirit of her divine Founder and recognizes\ncases in which labor on Sunday may be, and is, more agreeable to God,\nand more meritorious to ourselves, than rest from labor.\n\nThe law certainly does not intend to forbid a kind of works,\nspecifically servile in themselves, connected with divine worship,\nrequired by the necessities of public religion, or needed to give to\nthat worship all the solemnity and pomp which it deserves; provided, of\ncourse, such things could not well be done on another day. All God's\nlaws are for His greater glory, and to assert that works necessary for\nthe honoring of God are forbidden by His law is to be guilty of a\ncontradiction in terms. All things therefore needed for the preparation\nand becoming celebration of the rites of religion, even though of a\nservile nature, are lawful and do not come under the head of this\nprohibition.\n\nThe law ceases likewise to bind when its observance would prevent an\nact of charity towards the neighbor in distress, necessity, or pressing\nneed. If the necessity is real and true charity demands it, in matters\nnot what work, not intrinsically evil, is to be done, on what day or\nfor how long a time it is to be done; charity overrides every law, for\nit is itself the first law of God. Thus, if the neighbor is in danger\nof suffering, or actually suffers, any injury, damage or ill, God\nrequires that we give our services to that neighbor rather than to\nHimself. As a matter of fact, in thus serving the neighbor, we serve\nGod in the best possible way.\n\nFinally, necessity, public as well as personal, dispenses from\nobligation to the law. In time of war, all things required for its\ncarrying on are licit. It is lawful to fight the elements when they\nthreaten destruction, to save crops in an interval of fine weather when\ndelay would mean a risk; to cater to public conveniences which custom\nadjudges necessary,--and by custom we mean that which has at least the\nimplicit sanction of authority,--such as public conveyances,\npharmacies, hotels, etc. Certain industries run by steam power require\nthat their fires should not be put out altogether, and the labor\nnecessary to keep them going is not considered illicit. In general, all\nservile work that is necessary to insure against serious loss is\nlawful.\n\nAs for the individual, it is easier to allow him to toil on Sunday,\nthat is, a less serious reason is required, if he assists at divine\nworship, than in the contrary event. One can be justified in omitting\nboth obligations only in the event of inability otherwise to provide\nfor self and family. He whose occupation demands Sunday labor need not\nconsider himself guilty so long as he is unable to secure a position\nwith something like the same emoluments; but it is his duty to regret\nthe necessity that prevents him from fulfiling the law, and to make\nefforts to better his condition from a spiritual point of view, even if\nthe change does not to any appreciable extent better it financially; a\npursuit equally available should be preferred. Neglect in seeking out\nsuch an amelioration of situation would cause the necessity of it to\ncease and make the delinquent responsible for habitual breach of the\nlaw.\n\nIf it is always a sin to engage without necessity in servile works on\nSunday, it is not equally sinful to labor little or labor much. Common\nsense tells us that all our failings are not in the same measure\noffensive to God, for they do not all contain the same amount of malice\nand contempt of authority. A person who resolves to break the law and\npersists in working all day long, is of a certainty more guilty than he\nwho after attending divine service fails so far as to labor an hour.\nThe question therefore is, how long must one work on Sunday to be\nguilty of a mortal sin.\n\nThe answer to this question is: a notable time; but that does not throw\na very great abundance of light on the subject. But surely a fourth of\nthe whole is a notable part. Now, considering that a day's work is, not\ntwenty-four hours, but ten hours, very rarely twelve, frequently only\neight, it will be seen to follow that two hours' work would be\nconsidered a notable breach of the law of rest. And this is the\ndecision of competent authority. Not but that less might make us\ngrievously guilty, but we may take it as certain that he who works\nduring two full hours, at a labor considered servile, without\nsufficient reason, commits a mortal sin.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LIV.\nCOMMON WORKS.\n\nTHERE is a third sort of works to be considered in relation to Sunday\nobservance, which, being of their nature neither liberal nor servile,\ngo by the specific name of common works. This class embraces works of\ntwo kinds, viz., those which enter into the common, daily, inevitable\nnecessities of life, and those in which the mind and body are exerted\nin an equal measure.\n\nThe former are not considered servile because they are necessary, not\nin certain circumstances, but at all times, for all persons, in all\nconditions of life. Activity of this kind, so universally and\nimperiously demanded, does not require dispensation from the law, as in\nthe case of necessary servile works properly so-called; but it stands\noutside all legislation and is a law unto itself.\n\nThese works are usually domestic occupations, as cooking and the\npreparation of victuals, the keeping of the house in becoming tidiness,\nthe proper care of children, of beasts of burden and domestic animals.\nPeople must eat, the body must be fed, life requires attention on\nSunday as well as on the other six days; and in no circumstances can\nthis labor be dispensed with. Sometimes eatables for Sunday consumption\nmay be prepared on the previous day; if this is not done, whether\nthrough forgetfulness, neglect or indifference, it is lawful on Sunday\nto prepare a good table, even one more sumptuous than on ordinary days.\nFor Sunday is a day of festival, and without enthusing over the fact,\nwe must concede that the words feast and festival are synonymous in\nhuman language, that the ordinary and favorite place for human\nrejoicing is the table, and in this man differs not from the other\nanimals of creation. This may not be aesthetic but it is true.\n\nIn walking, riding, games, etc., the physical and mental forces of man\nare called into play in about equal proportion, or at least, these\noccupations can be called neither liberal arts nor manual labor; all\nmanners of persons engage therein without respect to condition or\nprofession. These are also called common works; and to them may be\nadded hunting and fishing, when custom, rightly understood, does not\nforbid them, and in this region custom most uniformly does so forbid.\n\nThese occupations are looked upon as innocent pastime, affording relief\nto the body and mind, and in this respect should be likened to the\ntaking of food. For it is certain that sanitary conditions often as\nimperiously demand recreation as nourishment. Especially is this the\ncase with persons given to sedentary pursuits, confined during the week\nto shops, factories and stores, and whose only opportunity this is to\nshake off the dull monotony of work and to give the bodies and minds\nnecessary relaxation and distraction. It is not physical rest that such\npeople require so much as healthy movement of a pleasing kind, and\nactivity that will draw their attention from habitual channels and thus\nbreak the strain that fatigues them. Under these conditions, common\nworks are not only allowed, but they are to be encouraged.\n\nBut it must not be lost sight of that these pursuits are permitted as\nlong as they remain common works, that is, as long as they do not\naccidentally become servile works, or go contrary to the end for which\nthey are allowed. This may occur in three different manners, and when\nit does occur, the works known as common are forbidden as servile\nworks.\n\n1. They must not expose us to the danger of omitting divine service.\nThe obligation to positively sanctify the day remains intact. Sin may\nbe committed, slight or grievous, according as the danger to which we\nexpose ourselves, by indulging in these pursuits, of missing public\nworship, is more or less remote, more or less probable.\n\n2. These works become illicit when they are excessive, when too much\ntime is given to them, when the body receives too large a share of the\nexercise, when accompanied by overmuch application, show or fatigue. In\nthese cases, the purpose of the law is defeated, the works are\nconsidered no longer common and fall under the veto that affects\nservile works. An aggravating circumstance is that of working for the\nsole purpose of gain, as in the case of professional baseball, etc.\n\n3. Lastly, there are exterior circumstances that make these occupations\na desecration of the Lord's day, and as such evidently they cannot be\ntolerated. They must not be boisterous to the extent of disturbing the\nneighbor's rest and quiet, or detracting from the reverence due the\nSabbath; they must not entice others away from a respectful observance\nof the Lord's day or offer an opportunity or occasion for sin, cursing,\nblasphemy and foul language, contention and drunkenness; they must not\nbe a scandal for the community. Outside these contingencies of\ndisorder, the Sabbath rest is not broken by indulgence in works\nclassified as common works. Such activity, in all common sense and\nreason, is compatible with the reverence that God claims as His due on\nHis day.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LV.\nPARENTAL DIGNITY.\n\nWE have done with the three commandments that refer directly to God.\nThe second Table of the Law contains seven precepts that concern\nthemselves with our relations to God, indirectly, through the creature;\nthey treat of our duties and obligations toward the neighbor. As God\nmay be honored, so He may be dishonored, through the works of His hand;\none may offend as effectively by disregard for the law that binds us to\nGod's creatures as for that which binds us to the Creator Himself.\n\nSince parents are those of God's creatures that stand nearest to us,\nthe Fourth Commandment immediately orders us to honor them as the\nauthors of our being and the representatives of divine authority, and\nit prescribes the homage we owe them in their capacity of parents. But\nthat which applies to fathers and mothers, applies in a certain degree\nto all who have any right or authority to command; consequently, this\nlaw also regulates the duties of superiors and inferiors in general to\none another.\n\nThe honor we owe to our parents consists in four things: respect for\ntheir dignity, love for their beneficence, obedience to their authority\nand assistance in their needs. Whoever fails in one of these\nrequirements, breaks the law, offends God and sins. His sin may be\nmortal, if the quality of the offense and the malice of the offender be\nsuch as to constitute I serious breach of the law.\n\n'Tis the great fault of our age to underrate parental dignity. In the\neasy-going world, preference is given to profligate celibacy over\nhonorable wedlock; marriage itself is degraded to the level of a purely\nnatural contract, its bond has lost its character of indissolubility\nand its obligations are shirked to meet the demands of fashion and\nconvenience. When parents, unworthy ones, do not appreciate their own\ndignity, how will others, their children, appreciate it? And parenthood\nwill never be esteemed while its true nature and sanctity are ignored\nand contemned; there is no dignity where the idea of God is excluded.\n\nAfter God had created man, He left him to work out his destiny in a\nnatural way; and immediately man assumed towards his offspring the\nrelation that God first held towards himself--he assumed the\nprerogatives of paternity and of authority. All paternity belongs to\nGod, and to Him alone; yet man is delegated to that lofty, quasi-divine\nfunction. God alone can create; yet so near does the parental office\napproach to the power of creation that we call it pro-creation.\n\nTis true, this privilege man holds in common with the rest of animated\nnature, but with this difference: that the fruit of his loins is a\nchild of God, with an immortal soul, an heir to heaven where its\ndestiny is to glorify the Eternal during all eternity. And thus, man,\nin his function of parent, is as far differentiated from the rest of\nanimal nature as the act by which God created man is superior to all\nHis other creative acts.\n\nIf the tempter, when working out his plan for the fall of our first\nparents, had simply and unconditionally said: \"Ye shall be as gods,\"\nhis utterance would have in it more truth than he intended, for the\nmantle of parenthood that was soon to fall upon them made them like\nunto God. The children that romped around them, looked up to them even,\nalmost, as they were accustomed to look up to the Creator. And little\nthe wonder, since to their parents they owed their very existence.\n\nAs depositaries of authority, there is no human station, however\nexalted, comparable to theirs. Children are not merely subjects, they\nbelong to their parents. Church and State, under God, may see to it\nthat that authority is not abused; but within the bounds of right, they\nare held to respect it; and their acts that go contrary to the exercise\nof parental authority are, by the fact of such opposition, null and\nvoid. Before the State or Church, the family was; its natural rights\ntranscend theirs, and this bowing, as it were, of all constituted human\nauthority before the dominion of parents is evidence enough of their\ndignity.\n\n\"God could not be everywhere, therefore he made parents--fathers and\nmothers\"--that is how the pagans used to put it. However theologically\nunsound this proposition may appear, it is a beautiful attempt at a\ngreat truth, viz., that parents towards us stand in God's stead. In\nconsequence of this eminent dignity that is theirs, they deserve our\nrespect. They not only deserve it, but God so ordains it.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LVI.\nFILIAL RESPECT.\n\nWORTHY of honor are they whom the Lord sees fit to honor. In the\nexalted station to which they have been called and in the express\ncommand made by the Lord to honor them, we see evidence of the dignity\nof parents; and the honor we owe them for this dignity is the honor of\nrespect. By respect, we mean the recognition of their superiority, the\nreverence, veneration and awe all well-born men instinctively feel for\nnatural worth that transcends their own, the deference in tone, manner\nand deportment that naturally belongs to such worth.\n\nIt is much easier to say in what respect does not consist than to\ndefine the term itself. If it really exists in the heart--and there it\nmust exist, to be at all--it will find expression in a thousand\ndifferent ways, and will never be at a loss to express itself. Books\nwill give you the laws of etiquette and will tell you how to be polite;\nbut the laws that govern respect are graven on the heart, and he whose\nheart is in the right place never fails to read and interpret them\ncorrectly. Towards all, at all times and in all places, he will conform\nthe details of his life with the suggestions of his inner\nconsciousness--this is respect.\n\nRespect has no substitute; neither assistance nor obedience nor love\ncan supply it or take its place It may happen that children are no\nlonger obliged to help their parents; they may be justified in not\nobeying them; the circumstances may be such that they no longer have\nlove or affection for them; but respect can never be wanting without\nserious guilt. The reason is simple: because it is due in justice,\nbecause it is founded on natural rights that can never be forfeited,\neven when parents themselves lose the sense of their own dignity.\n\nSinful, wicked and scandalous parents there have been, are, and will\nbe. But just as they do not owe the excellence to any deed of their\nown, but to the free choice of the Almighty, so it depends not on\nthemselves to forfeit it. God made them parents without respect for\ntheir personal worth. He is the custodian of their dignity. Good or\nbad, they are parents and remain parents. Woe unto those who despise\nthe authors of their days!\n\nRespect overlooks an innocent joke at the expense of a parent, when\nabsolutely no malice is intended, when on both sides it is looked upon\nas a matter of good-natured pleasantry. It brooks humor. Not all\nfamiliarity breeds contempt.\n\nBut contempt, which is directly opposed to respect, is a sin that is\nnever anything but mortal. It refuses honor, belittles dignity and\nconsiders parents beneath esteem. It is contempt to laugh at, to mock,\nto gibe and insult parents; it is contempt to call them vile,\nopprobrious names, to tell of their faults; it is contempt, and the\nheight of contempt, to defy them, to curse them or to strike them. It\nis bad enough when this sort of thing is directed against an equal; but\nwhen parents are made the objects of contempt, it acquires a dignity\nthat is infernal.\n\nThe malediction of Heaven, the almighty wrath of God follows him or her\nwho despises a parent. We are repeatedly told in Holy Writ that such\noffenders \"shall die the death.\" Scorn of parents is looked upon as a\ncrime almost on a par with hatred of God. Pagans frequently punished it\nwith death. Among Christians it is left to the avenging wrath of God\nwho is pledged to defend the dignity of His delegated paternity.\n\nIt is not a rare occurrence to see just retribution visited upon\nparents who in their day were undutiful, unworthy and unnatural\nchildren. The justice of Heaven often permits it to be done unto us as\nwe do unto others. Our children will treat us as we shall have treated\nour parents; their hands will be raised against us and will smite us on\nthe cheek to avenge the grandsire's dishonor and tears, and to make us\natone in shame for our sins against our parents. If we respect others,\nthey will respect us; if we respect our parents, our children will\nrespect us.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LVII.\nFILIAL LOVE.\n\nHE who has a heart, and has it properly located, will not fail to love\nthat which is good; he will have no difficulty in so doing, it will\nrequire neither command nor persuasion to make him do so. If he proves\nrefractory to this law of nature, it is because he is not like the rest\nof mortals, because he is inhuman; and his abnormal condition is due,\nnot to nature's mistakes, but to his own. And no consideration under\nheaven will be equal to the task of instilling affection into a stone or\na chunk of putty.\n\nThat is good which is desirable, or which is the source of what is\ndesirable. God alone is absolutely good, that is to say, good in\nHimself and the cause of all good. Created things are good in the\nproportion of their furnishing us with things desirable, and are for\nthat reason called relatively good. They confer benefits on one and not\nperhaps on another. When I say: this or that is good, I mean that it is\nuseful to me, and is productive of comfort, happiness and other\ndesirable things. Because we are naturally selfish, our appreciation of\nwhat is good depends on what we get out of it.\n\nTherefore, it is that a child's first, best and strongest love should\nbe for its parents, for the greatest good it enjoys, the thing of all\nothers to be desired, the essential condition of all else, namely its\nexistence, it owes to its parents. Life is the boon we receive from\nthem; not only the giving, but the saving in more than one instance,\nthe fostering and preserving and sustaining during long years of\nhelplessness, and the adorning of it with all the advantages we\npossess. Nor does this take into account the intimate cost, the\nsufferings and labors, the cares and anxieties, the trouble and\nworriment that are the lot of devoted parenthood. It is life spent and\ngiven for life. Flesh and blood, substance, health and comfort,\nstrength of body and peace of soul, lavished with unstinted generosity\nout of the fulness of parental affection--these are things that can\nnever be repaid in kind, they are repaid with the coin of filial piety\nand love, or they remain dead debts.\n\nFailure to meet these obligations brands one a reprobate. There is not,\nin all creation, bird or beast, but feels and shows instinctive\naffection towards those to whom it owes its being. He, therefore, who\ncloses his heart to the promptings of filial love, has the consolation\nof knowing that, not only he does not belong to the order of human\nbeings, but he places himself outside the pale of animal nature itself,\nand exists in a world of his own creation, which no human language is\nable to properly qualify.\n\nThe love we owe to our parents is next in quality to that which we owe\nto God and to ourselves. Love has a way of identifying its object and\nits subject; the lover and the beloved become one, their interests are\ncommon, their purpose alike. The dutiful child, therefore, looks upon\nits parent as another self, and remains indifferent to nothing that for\nweal or for woe affects that parent. Love consists in this community of\nfeeling, concern and interest. When the demon of selfishness drives\ngratitude out of the heart and the ties of natural sympathy become\nstrained, and love begins to wane; when they are snapped asunder, love\nis dead.\n\nThe love of God, of course, primes all other love. \"He who loves father\nor mother more than me,\" says the Saviour, \"is not worthy of me.\"\nFilial love, therefore, must not conflict with that which we owe to\nGod; it must yield, for it draws its force from the latter and has no\nmeaning without it. In normal conditions, this conflict never occurs;\nit can occur only in the event of parents overriding the law that\ngoverns their station in life. To make divine love wait on the human is\ncriminal.\n\nIt may, and no doubt does, happen that parents become unlovable beings\nthrough disregard for the moral law. And because love is not a\ncommodity that is made to order, children may be found who justify on\nthese grounds their absence of affection or even their positive hatred\nfor such parents. A drunken parent, one who attacks the life, virtue or\nreputation of his offspring, a low brute who has neither honor nor\naffection, and whose office it is to make home a living hell, such a\none can hardly be loved.\n\nBut pity is a form of love; and just as we may never despise a fallen\nparent, just so do we owe him or her, even in the depths of his or her\ndegradation, a meed of pity and commiseration. There is no erring soul\nbut may be reclaimed; every soul is worth the price of its redemption,\nand there is no unfortunate, be he ever so low, but deserves, for the\nsake of his soul, a tribute of sympathy and a prayer for his\nbetterment. And the child that refuses this, however just the cause of\nhis aversion, offends against the law of nature, of charity and of God.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LVIII.\nAUTHORITY AND OBEDIENCE.\n\nAUTHORITY means the right to command; to command is to exact obedience,\nand obedience is submission of one's will to that of another, will is a\nfaculty that adores its own independence, is ambitious of rule and\ndominion, and can hardly bear to serve. It is made free, and may not\nbend; it is proud, and hates to bend; some will add, it is the dominant\nfaculty in man, and therefore should not bend.\n\nEvery man for himself; we are born free; all men are equal, and no one\nhas the right to impose his will upon another; we are directly\nresponsible to God, and \"go-betweens\" are repudiated by the common\nsense of mankind,--this is good Protestant theory and it is most\nconvenient and acceptable to the unregenerate heart of man. We\nnaturally like that kind of talk; it appeals to us instinctively. It is\na theory that possesses many merits besides that of being true in a\nsense in which only one takes it out of fifty who advocate it.\n\nBut these advocates are careful--and the reason of their solicitude is\nanything but clear--to keep within the religious lines, and they never\ndare to carry their theory into the domain of political society; their\nhard common sense forbids. And they are likewise careful to prevent\ntheir children from practicing the doctrine within the realm of\npaternal authority, that is, if they have any children. Society calls\nit anarchy, and parents call it \"unnatural cussedness;\" in religion it\nis \"freedom of the children of God!\"\n\nIf there is authority, there must be obedience; if one has the right to\ncommand, there arises in others the correlative duty and obligation to\nsubmit. There is no question of how this will suit us; it simply does\nnot, and will not, suit us; it is hard, painful and humiliating, but it\nis a fact, and that is sufficient.\n\nLikewise, it is a fact that if authority was ever given by God to man,\nit was given to the parent; all men, Protestants and anarchists alike,\nadmit this. The social being and the religious being may reject and\nrepudiate all law, but the child is subject to its parents, it must\nobey. Failing in this, it sins.\n\nDisobedience is always a sin, if it is disobedience, that is, a refusal\nto submit in things that are just, to the express command of paternal\nauthority. The sin may be slight or grievous, the quality of its malice\ndepending on the character of the refusal, of the things commanded and\nof the command itself. In order that the offense may be mortal, the\nrefusal must be deliberate, containing an element of contempt, as all\nmalicious disobedience does. The command must be express, peremptory,\nabsolute. And nothing must be commanded done that may not reasonably be\naccomplished or is not within the sphere of parental jurisdiction or is\ncontrary to the law of God.\n\nAn order that is unreasonable or unlawful is invalid. Not only it may,\nbut it should be, disregarded. It is not sufficient for a parent,\nwishing to oblige under pain of grievous sin, that he ask a thing done,\nthat he express his mind on the matter; he must order it and leave no\nroom to doubt that he means what he says. There may be disobedience\nwithout this peremptoriness of command, but it cannot be a serious\nfault. It is well also to make certain allowance for the levity and\nthoughtlessness of youth, especially in matters whose importance is\nbeyond their comprehension.\n\nIt is generally admitted that parental authority, exercised in things\nthat concern good morals and the salvation of the soul, can scarcely\never be ignored without mortal offending. This means that besides the\nsin committed--if the prohibition touches matters of sin--there is a\nsin specifically different and a grievous one, of disobedience; by\nreason of the parental prohibition, there are two sins, instead of one.\nThis should be remembered by those who, against the express command of\ntheir parents, frequent bad companions, remain on the street at night,\nneglect their religious duty, etc.\n\nParents have nothing to say in the choice their children make of a\nstate in life, that is, they may suggest, but must not coerce. This is\na matter that depends on personal tastes and the inner voicings of the\nspirit; having come to the age of manhood or womanhood, the party\ninterested knows best what walk of life will make him or her happy and\nsalvation easier. It is therefore for them to choose, and their choice\nmust be respected. In this they are not bound to obey the will of their\nparents, and if disinclined to do so, should not.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LIX.\nSHOULD WE HELP OUR PARENTS?\n\nTHERE are few things more evident to natural reason than the obligation\nchildren are under to assist their parents when necessity knocks at\ntheir door, and finding them unable to meet its harsh demands, presses\nthem with the goad of misery and want. Old age is weak and has to lean\non strength and youth for support; like childhood, it is helpless.\nAccidentally, misfortune may render a parent dependent and needy. In\nsuch contingencies, it is not for neighbors, friends or relatives to\ncome in and lend a helping hand; this duty devolves on the offspring,\non them first and on them alone.\n\nCharity is not alone to prescribe this office of piety. A stronger law\nthan charity has a claim in the matter, and that is the law of justice.\nJustice demands a \"quid pro quo,\" it exacts a just compensation for\nservices rendered. Even though there be no agreement between parents\nand offspring, and the former gave without a thought of return, nature\nrecords a contract, by the terms of which parents in want are entitled\nto the same support from their children as the latter received from\nthem in the days of their helplessness.\n\nThose who do not live up to the terms of this natural contract stand\namenable to the justice of Heaven. The obligation follows them during\nlife, wherever they go; and they can no more shirk it than they can\nefface the characters that declare it, graven on their hearts. Nothing\nbut sheer impossibility can dispense them.\n\nSo sacred and inviolable is this obligation that it passes before that\nof assisting wife and children, the necessity being equal; for filial\nobligations enjoy the distinction of priority. Not even engagements\ncontracted before God hold against the duty of relieving parental\ndistress and want, for vows are of counsel and must yield to the\ndictates of natural and divine law.\n\nOf course, the gravity of this obligation is proportionate to the\nstress of necessity under which parents labor. To constitute a mortal\nsin of neglect, it is not necessary that a parent be in the extreme of\nprivation and beggary. It is not easy to draw the line between slight\nand grievous offending in this matter, but if some young men and women\nexamined their conscience as carefully as they do their new spring\nsuits and hats, they would find material for confession the avowal of\nwhich might be necessary to confessional integrity.\n\nIt has become the fashion with certain of the rising generation, after\ndraining the family exchequer for some sixteen or eighteen years, to\nemancipate themselves as soon as their wages cover the cost of living,\nwith a little surplus. They pay their board, that is to say, they stand\ntowards their parents as a stranger would, and forgetting the debt\ntheir younger years have piled up against them, they hand over a\nmiserable pittance just enough to cover the expenses of bed and board.\nThis might, and possibly does, make them \"feel big,\" but that feeling\nis a false one, and the \"bigness\" experienced is certainly not in their\nmoral worth, in many cases such conduct is a prevarication against the\nlaw of God. This applies with equal force to young women whose vanity\noverrides the claims of charity and justice, and who are said to \"put\nall their earnings on their backs,\" while they eat the bread that\nanother earns.\n\nFrequently children leave home and leave all their obligations to their\nparents behind them at home. If their letters are rare, enclosed checks\nare still rarer. They like to keep the old folks informed of the fact\nthat it costs a good deal to live away from home. They sometimes come\nhome on a visit; but these are visits; and visitors, even if they do\nstay quite a while, do not pay board.\n\nBut pecuniary assistance is not all; it is occasionally care and\nattention an aged parent requires, the presence of a daughter who\nprefers the gaiety of the city to the quiet of the old homestead that\nis imperiously demanded. If the parent be feeble or sick, the undutiful\nchild is criminally negligent; the crime is still greater if there be\ndanger through that absence of the parent's dying without religious\nconsolation.\n\nI have said nothing of that unnatural specimen of humanity, sometimes\ncalled a \"loafer,\" and by still more ignoble names, who, to use a\nvulgar term, \"grubs\" on his parents, drinks what he earns and befouls\nthe home he robs, with his loathsome presence and scandalous living.\nThe least said of him the better. He exists: 'tis already too much\nsaid.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LX.\nDISINTERESTED LOVE IN PARENTS.\n\nLOVE seems to resume all the obligations of parents toward their\noffspring; certainly, it directs all their actions, and they fulfil\nthese obligations ill or well according to the quality of that love.\nBut love is not sufficient; love is of two kinds, the right and the\nwrong; nothing good comes of an affection that is not properly ordered.\nIn itself, parental love is natural, instinctive; therefore it is not\nmeritorious to any high degree. But there is much merit in the proper\nkind of parental affection, because it requires sacrifice.\n\nThere may be too little love, to the neglect and misfortune of\nchildren. There may be too much, to their spoiling and utter\nperversion. Again there may be affection that is partial, that singles\nout one for caresses and favors to the exclusion of the others; hence\ndiscord and dissensions in the family. The first two forms of\ninordinate affection are equally bad, while the last combines both and\ncontains the double evil thereof. It is hard to say which is the worse\noff, the child that receives too much or the one that receives too\nlittle of that love which to be correct should avoid extremes.\n\nParents are apt, under the sway of natural affection, to overlook the\nfact that God has rights over the children, and that the welfare and\ninterests of the children must not be left outside all consideration:\nherein lies the root of all the evil that befalls the family through\ndegenerate love. What is commonly, but improperly, called love is\neither pagan fondness or simon-pure egotism and self-love.\n\nWhen a vain person looks into a mirror, she (if it be a \"she\") will\nimmediately fall in love with the image, because it is an image of\nherself. And a selfish parent sees in his child, not another being, but\nhimself, and he loves it for himself. His affection is not an act of\ngenerosity, as it should be, but an act of self-indulgence. He does not\nseek to please another, he seeks to please himself. His love,\ntherefore, is nothing but concentrated vanity--and that is the wrong\nkind.\n\nSuch a parent will neglect a less favored child, and he will so far\ndote on the corporal and physical object of his devotion as to forget\nthere is a soul within. He will account all things good that flatter\nhis conceit, and all things evil that disturb the voluptuousness of his\nattachment. He owns that child, and he is going to make it the object\nof his eternal delights, God's rights and the child's own interests to\nthe contrary notwithstanding. This fellow is not a parent; he is a pure\nanimal, and the cub will, one day make good returns for services\nrendered.\n\nA parent with a growing-up family, carefully reared and expensively\neducated, will often lay clever plans and dream elaborate dreams of a\ngolden future from which it would almost be cruelty to awake him. He\nsees his pains and toils requited a thousand fold, his disbursements\nyielding a high rate of interest and the name his children bear--his\nname--respected and honored. In all this there is scarcely anything\nblameworthy; but the trouble comes when the views of the Almighty fail\nto square with the parental views.\n\nSymptoms of the malady then reveal themselves. Misfortunes are met with\ncomplaints and murmurings against Providence and the manner in which it\nruns the cosmic machine. Being usually self-righteous, such parents\nbring up the old discussion as to the justice of the divine plan by\nwhich the good suffer and the wicked prosper in this world. Sorrow in\nbereavement is legitimate and sacred, but when wounded love vents its\nwrath on the Almighty, the limit is passed, and then we say: \"Such love\nis love only in name, love must respect the rights of God; if it does\nnot, it is something else.\" The Almighty never intended children to be\na paying investment; it belongs to Him to call children to Himself as\nwell as parents themselves, when He feels like it. Parents who ignore\nthis do not give their children the love the latter have a right to\nexpect.\n\nIntelligent and Christian parents, therefore, need to understand the\ntrue status of the offspring, and should make careful allowance for\nchildren's own interests, both material and spiritual, and for the\nall-supreme rights of God in the premises. Since true love seeks to do\ngood, in parents it should first never lose sight of the child's soul\nand the means to help him save it. Without this all else is labor lost.\nGod frowns on such unchristian affection, and He usually sees to it\nthat even in this world the reaping be according to the sowing.\n\nThe rearing of a child is the making or unmaking of a man or woman.\nLove is the motive power behind this enterprise. That is why we insist\non the disinterestedness of parental love, before touching on the\nall-important question of education.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXI.\nEDUCATE THE CHILDREN.\n\nBEFORE reaching the age of reason, the child's needs are purely animal;\nit requires to be fed, clothed and provided with the general\nnecessities of life. Every child has a natural right that its young\nlife be fostered and protected; the giver must preserve his gift,\notherwise his gift is vain. To neglect this duty is a sin, not\nprecisely against the fourth, but rather against the fifth, commandment\nwhich treats of killing and kindred acts.\n\nWhen the mind begins to open and the reasoning faculties to develop,\nthe duty of educating the child becomes incumbent on the parent. As its\nphysical, so its intellectual, being must be trained and nourished. And\nby education is here meant the training of the young mind, the bringing\nout of its mental powers and the acquisition of useful knowledge,\nwithout reference to anything moral or religious. This latter feature--\nthe most important of all deserves especial attention.\n\nConcerning the culture of the mind, it is a fact, recognized by all,\nthat in this era of popular rights and liberties, no man can expect to\nmake anything but a meagre success of life, if he does that much,\nwithout at least a modicum of knowledge and intellectual training. This\nis an age in which brains are at a high premium; and although brains\nare by no means the monopoly of the cultured class, they must be\nconsidered as non-existent if they are not brought out by education.\nKnowledge is what counts nowadays. Even in the most common walks of\nlife advancement is impossible without it. This is one reason why\nparents, who have at heart the future success and well-being of their\nchildren, should strive to give them as good an education as their\nmeans allow.\n\nTheir happiness here is also concerned. If he be ignorant and untaught,\na man will be frowned at, laughed at, and be made in many ways, in\ncontact with his fellow-men, to feel the overwhelming inferiority of\nhis position. He will be made unhappy, unless he chooses to keep out of\nthe way of those who know something and associate with those who know\nnothing--in which case he is very liable to feel lonesome.\n\nHe is moreover deprived of the positive comforts and happiness that\neducation affords. Neither books nor public questions will interest\nhim; his leisure moments will be a time of idleness and unbearable\ntedium; a whole world--the world of the mind--will be closed to him,\nwith its joys, pleasures and comforts which are many.\n\nAdd to this the fact that the Maker never intended that the noble\nfaculty of the intelligence should remain an inert element in the life\nof His creature, that this precious talent should remain buried in the\nflesh of animal nature. Intelligence alone distinguishes us from the\nbrute; we are under obligation to perfect our humanity. And since\neducation is a means of doing this, we owe it to our nature that we\neducate ourselves and have educated those who are under our care.\n\nHow long should the child be kept at school? The law provides that\nevery child attend school until it reaches the age of fourteen. This\nlaw appears to be reasonable and just, and we think that in ordinary\ncircumstances it has the power to bind in conscience. The parent\ntherefore who neglects to keep children at school we account guilty of\nsin, and of grievous sin, if the neglect be notable.\n\nOutside this provision of the law, we think children should be kept at\nschool as long as it is possible and prudent to do so. This depends, of\ncourse, on the means and resources of the parents. They are under no\nobligation to give to their children an education above what their\nmeans allow. Then, the aptitudes, physical and mental, of the child are\na factor to be considered. Poor health or inherited weakness may forbid\na too close application to studies, while it may be a pure waste of\ntime and money to keep at school a child that will not profit by the\nadvantage offered. It is better to put such a child at work as soon as\npossible. As says the philosopher of Archey Road: \"You may lead a young\nman to the university, but you cannot make him learn.\"\n\nOutside these contingencies, we think every child has a right to a\ncommon school education, such as is given in our system under the high\nschool, whether it be fourteen years of age or over. Reading and\nwriting, grammar and arithmetic, history and geography, these are the\nfundamental and essential elements of a common school education; and in\nour time and country, a modicum of information on these subjects is\nnecessary for the future well-being, success and happiness of our\nchildren. And since parents are bound to care for the future of their\nchildren, we consider them likewise bound to give them such an\neducation as will insure these blessings.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXII.\nEDUCATIONAL EXTRAVAGANCE.\n\nOUR public educational system is made up of a grammar and a high school\ncourse, the latter consisting of a four years term of studies, devoted\nin part, to a more thorough grounding in the essentials of education;\nthe other part--by far the more considerable, according to the\nconsensus of opinion--is expended on educational frills and vanities.\nThese \"trimmings\" are given gratis, the public bearing the burden of\nexpense, which foots up to a very respectable total.\n\nFor a certain class of people--the people of means--this sort of a\nthing has not many disadvantages; it is in a line with the future\noccupation or profession of their offspring. But for the bulk of the\nchildren who attend our free schools and on whose parents educational\ntaxes are levied, it has serious inconveniences, is not in line with\ntheir future occupation or profession, is not only superfluous, but\ndetrimental. It is for them so much time lost--precious time, that were\nbetter spent learning a trade or otherwise fitting themselves for their\nlife work. Herein therefore we discover a double extravagance: that of\nparents who provide unwisely for their children's future and that of\nthe municipality which offers as popular an education that is anything\nbut popular, since only the few can enjoy it while all must bear the\nburden alike.\n\nThere is much in getting a start in life, in beginning early; a delay\nis often a handicap hard to overcome. With very few exceptions, our\nchildren gain their livelihood with their hands and eyes and ears, and\nnot solely with their brains; they therefore require title most\npractical education imaginable. They need intellectual tools to work\nwith, and not a smattering of science, botany, drawing and political\nphilosophy to forget as soon as possible. Pure culture studies are not\na practical gain for them, while the time consumed in pursuing these is\nso much taken away from a thorough training in the essentials. Lectures\non science, elementary experiments in chemistry, kindergarten\ninstructions in water color painting, these are as much in their place\nin the education of the average child as an ivory-handled gold pen in\nthe hand that wields the pick-ax.\n\nA boy is better off learning a trade than cramming his head full of\nculture fads; he is then doing something useful and profitable on which\nthe happiness and success of his life will depend. By the time his\ncompanions have done dabbling in science and have come to the\nconclusion that they are simply being shown how ignorant they are--not\na very consoling conclusion after all--he will have already laid the\nfoundation of his career and be earning enough to settle down in life.\nHe may not be able to talk on an infinity of subjects about which he\nknows nothing at all, but he will be able to earn his own living, which\nis something worth while.\n\nIf the free high school were more of a business school, people would\nget better returns for their money. True, some would then be obliged to\npay for the expensive fads that would be done away with; but since they\nalone enjoy these things, why should others be made to pay for them who\ncannot enjoy them? Why should the poor be taxed to educate the rich?\nWhy not give the poor full value for their share of the burden? Why not\nprovide them with intellectual tools that suit their condition, just as\nthe rich are being provided for in the present system? The parochial\nhigh school has, in several places we know of, been made to serve as a\nprotest against such evils and as an example that has already been\nfollowed in more than one instance by the public schools. Intelligent\nand energetic pastors, knowing full well the conditions and needs of\ntheir people, offer the children a course in business methods as being\nmore suitable, more profitable and less extravagant than four years\nspent in acquiring a smattering of what they will never possess\nthoroughly and never need in their callings in life. It is better to\nfill young minds with the useful than with the agreeable, when it is\nimpossible to furnish both. Results already bespeak the wisdom of this\nplan and reflect no small honor on its originators.\n\nParents therefore should see to it that their children get the kind of\neducation they need, the kind that will serve them best in after life.\nThey should not allow the precious time of youth to be whiled' away in\ntrifles and vanities. Children have a right: to be educated in a manner\nin keeping with their conditions in life, and it is criminal in parents\nto neglect the real needs of their children while trying: to fit them\nfor positions they will never occupy.\n\nIn the meantime, let them protest against the extravagance of\neducational enthusiasts and excessive State paternalism. Let them ask\nthat the burden of culture studies be put where it belongs, that is, on\nthe shoulders of those who are the sole beneficiaries; and that free\npopular education be made popular, that is, for all, and not for an\nelite of society. The public school system was called into existence to\ndo one work, namely, to educate the masses: it was never intended to\nfurnish a college education for the benefit of the rich men's sons at\nthe expense of the poor. As it stands to-day, it is an unadulterated\nextravagance.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXIII.\nGODLESS EDUCATION.\n\nTHE other defect, respecting education as found in the public schools\nof the land, is that it leaves the soul out of all consideration and\nrelegates the idea of God to a background of silent contempt. On this\nsubject we can do no better than quote wisdom from the Fathers of the\nThird Plenary Council of Baltimore.\n\n\"Few, if any, will deny that a sound civilization must depend upon\nsound popular education.\" But education, in order to be sound and to\nproduce \"beneficial results, must develop what is best in man, and make\nhim not only clever, but good. A one-sided education will develop a\none-sided life; and such a life will surely topple over, and so will\nevery social system that is built up of such lives. True civilization\nrequires that not only the physical and intellectual, but also the\nmoral and religious, well-being of the people should be improved, and\nat least with equal care.\n\n\"It cannot be desirable or advantageous that religion should be\nexcluded from the school. On the contrary, it ought to be there one of\nthe chief agencies for moulding the young life to all that is true and\nvirtuous, and holy. To shut religion out of the school, and keep it for\nhome and the Church, is, logically, to train up a generation that will\nconsider religion good for home and the Church, but not for the\npractical business of real life. A life is not dwarfed, but ennobled,\nby being lived in the presence of God.\n\n\"The avowed enemies of Christianity in some European countries are\nbanishing religion from the schools (they have done it since) in order\nto eliminate it gradually from among the people. In this they are\nlogical. Take away religion from the school, and you take it away from\nthe people. Take it away from the people, and morality will soon\nfollow; morality gone, even their physical condition will ere long\ndegenerate into corruption which breeds decrepitude, while their\nintellectual attainments would only serve as a light to guide them to\ndeeper depths of vice and ruin. A civilization without religion would\nbe a civilization of 'the struggle for existence, and the survival of\nthe fittest,' in which cunning and strength would become the\nsubstitutes for principle, virtue, conscience and duty.\"\n\nOne of the things the Catholic Church fears least in this country is\nProtestantism. She considers it harmless, moribund, in the throes of\ndisintegration. It never has, cannot and never will thrive long where\nit has to depend on something other than wealth and political power. It\nhas unchurched millions, is still unchurching at a tremendous rate, and\nwill end by unchurching itself. The godless school has done its work\nfor Protestantism, and done it well. Its dearest enemy could not wish\nfor better results.\n\nPopular education comes more and more to mean popularized irreligion.\nThe future struggles of the Church will be with Agnosticism and\nInfidelity--the product of the godless public school. And without\npretending to be prophets or sons of prophets, we Catholics can foresee\nthe day when godless education, after making bad Christians, will make\nbad citizens. And because no civilization worthy of the name has ever\nsubsisted, or can subsist, without religion, the maintenance of this\nsystem of popular and free government will devolve on the product of\nChristian education, and its perpetuity will depend upon the\ngenerations turned out of the religious school.\n\nThe most substantial protest the Catholic Church offers against godless\neducation is the system of her parochial schools; and this alone is\nsufficient to give an idea of the importance of this question. From\nheadquarters comes the order to erect Catholic schools in every parish\nin this land as soon as the thing can be done. This means a tremendous\namount of work, and a tremendous expense. It means a competition on\neducational grounds with the greatest, richest and most powerful nation\nin the world. The game must be worth the candle; there must be some\nproportion between the end and the means.\n\nThe Catholic Church has the wisdom of ages to learn from; and when she\nembarks on an enterprise of this kind, even her bitterest enemies can\nafford to take it for granted that there is something behind it. And\nthere is. There is her very life, which depends on the fidelity of her\nchildren. And her children are lost to her and to God unless she\nfosters religion in her young. Let parents share this solicitude of the\nChurch for the little ones, and beware of the dangers of the godless\nschool.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXIV.\nCATHOLIC SCHOOLS.\n\nTHE Catholic school system all over this land has been erected and\nstands dedicated to the principle that no child can be properly,\nthoroughly and profitably--for itself--educated, whose soul is not fed\nwith religion and morality while its intelligence is being stocked with\nlearning and knowledge. It is intended, and made, to avoid the two\ndefects under which our public school system labors--the one\naccidental, the other fundamental--namely, extravagance and\ngodlessness. The child is taught the things that are necessary for it\nto know; catechism and religion take the place of fads and costly\nfrills.\n\nThe Catholic school does not lay claim to superiority over another on\npurely secular lines, although in many cases its superiority is a very\npatent fact; it repudiates and denies charges to the effect that it is\ninferior, although this may be found in some cases to be true. It\ncontends that it is equal to, as good as, any other; and there is no\nevidence why this should not be so. But it does pretend to give a more\nthorough education in the true sense of the word, if education really\nmeans a bringing out of that which is best in our nature.\n\nNeither do we hold that such a training as our schools provide will\nassure the faith and salvation of the children confided to our care.\nNeither church, nor religion, nor prayer, nor grace, nor God Himself\nwill do this alone. The child's fidelity to God and its ultimate reward\ndepends on that child's efforts and will, which nothing can supply. But\nwhat we do guarantee is that the child will be furnished with what is\nnecessary to keep the faith and save its soul, that there will be no\none to blame but itself if it fails, and that such security it will not\nfind outside the Catholic school. It is for just such work that the\nschool is equipped, that is the only reason for its existence, and we\nare not by any means prepared to confess that our system is a failure\nin that feature which is its essential one.\n\nThat every Catholic child has an inherent right to such a training, it\nis not for one moment permitted to doubt; there is nothing outside the\nvery bread that keeps its body and soul together to which it has a\nbetter right. Intellectual training is a very secondary matter when the\nimmortal soul is concerned. And if the child has this right, there is a\ncorresponding duty in the parent to provide it with such; and since\nthat right is inalienable, that duty is of the gravest. Hence it\nfollows that parents who neglect the opportunity they enjoy of\nproviding their offspring with a sound religious and moral training in\nyouth, and expose them, unprepared, to the attacks, covert and open, of\nmodern indifferentism, while pursuing secular studies, display a woeful\nignorance of their obligations and responsibilities.\n\nThis natural right of the child to a religious education, and the\nauthority of the Church which speaks in no uncertain accents on the\nsubject go to make a general law that imposes a moral obligation upon\nparents to send their children to Catholic schools. Parents who fail in\nthis simply do wrong, and in many cases cannot be excused from mortal\noffending. And it requires, according to the general opinion, a very\nserious reason to justify non-compliance with this law.\n\nExaggeration, of course, never serves any purpose; but when we consider\nthe personal rights of children to have their spiritual life well\nnurtured, and the general evils against which this system of education\nhas been judged necessary to make the Church secure, it will be easily\nseen that there is little fear of over-estimating the importance of the\nquestion and the gravity of the obligations under which parents are\nplaced.\n\nMoreover, disregard for this general law on the part of parents\ninvolves contempt of authority, which contempt, by reason of its being\npublic, cannot escape the malice of scandal. Even when the early\nreligious education of the child is safeguarded by excellent home\ntraining and example and no evil effects of purely secular education\nare to be feared, the fact of open resistance to the direction of\nChurch authority is an evil in itself; and may be the cause of leading\nothers in the same path of revolt--others who have not like\ncircumstances in their favor.\n\nAbout the only person I know who might be justified in not sending his\nchildren to Catholic schools is the \"crank,\" that creature of mulish\npropensities, who balks and kicks and will not be persuaded to move by\nany method of reasoning so far discovered. He usually knows all that is\nto be learned on the school question--which is a lie; and having\ncompared the parochial and the public school systems in an intelligent\nand disinterested manner--which is another--he finds that the Catholic\nschool is not the place for his children. If his children are like\nhimself, his conclusion is wisely formed, albeit drawn from false\npremises. In him, three things are on a par; his conceit, his ignorance\nand his determination. From these three ingredients results a high\nquality of asininity which in moral theology is called invincible\nignorance and is said to render one immune in matters of sin. May his\ntribe decrease!\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXV.\nSOME WEAK POINTS IN THE CATHOLIC SCHOOL SYSTEM.\n\nSOME parents claim that their children do not learn anything in the\nCatholic school. It is good policy always to accept this statement as\ntrue in all its parts; it may be true, and it is never good to deny the\ntruth. All are not equally endowed with brains in this world. If a\nchild has it dinned into his ears that the school he attends is\ninferior, he will come to be convinced of the fact; and being\nconvinced, he will set to work verifying it, in his case, at least.\nHeredity may have something to do with it; children are sometimes\n\"chips of the old block,\"--a great misfortune in many cases,\nhandicapping them in the race of life. It is well, therefore, not to\nclaim too much for our schools. We concede the point.\n\nAnother parent thinks that because he went through the public schools\nand kept the faith in his day, his children may be trusted to do the\nsame. This objection has a serious front to it. It does seem strange\nthat children should not walk in the footsteps of their worthy parents;\nbut the fact is, and facts are stubborn things, the fact is that they\ndo not always act thus. And they might tell you, to justify their\nunseemly conduct, that the conditions that obtained in life in olden\ndays are not the same as at present; that there were no parochial\nschools then to offer a choice in matters of education and that kind\nProvidence might have taken this into consideration: that it was the\ncustom in those days for children to imitate the rugged virtues of\ntheir parents struggling against necessity on one hand and bigotry on\nthe other; but that through the powerful influence of money, the\nprogeny of the persecuted may now hobnob with the progeny of the bigot,\nand the association is not always the best thing in the world for the\nfaith and religious convictions of the former, unless these convictions\nare well grounded in youth. The parent therefore who kept the faith\nwith less had a very considerable advantage over his child who\napparently has more privileges, but also more temptations and dangers.\nThe objection does not look so serious now.\n\nOf course there is the question of social standing--a very important\nmatter with some parents of the \"nouveau riche\" type. A fop will gauge\na man's worth by the size of his purse or the style and cut of the coat\nhe wears. There are parents who would not mind their children's sitting\nbeside a little darkey, but who do object most strenuously to their\noccupying the same bench with a dirty little Irish child. A calico\ndress or a coat frayed at the edges are certainly not badges of high\nsocial standing, but they are not incompatible with honesty, purity,\nindustry and respect for God, which things create a wholesome\natmosphere to live in and make the world better in every sense of the\nword. There is no refinement in these little ones, to speak of, not\neven the refinement of vice. There is something in the air they breathe\nthat kills the germ of vice. The discipline considers sin a worse evil\nthan ignorance of social amenities, and virtue and goodness as far\nsuperior to etiquette and distinction of manners. If a different\nappreciation of things is entertained, we grant the inferiority of our\nschools.\n\n\"But then, it is so very un-American, you know, to maintain separate\nschools in opposition to an institution so intensely American as our\npublic school system. This state of affairs fosters creed prejudices\nthat it is the duty of every true American to help destroy. The age of\nreligious differences is past, and the parochial school is a perpetual\nreminder of things of the past that were best forgotten.\"\n\nWe deny that the system that stands for no religious or moral training\nis intensely American. This is a Christian land. If our denial cannot\nbe sustained, we consider such a system radically wrong and detrimental\nto the best interests of the country; and we protest against it, just\nas some of us protest against imperialism, high tariff and\nmonometalism. It is wrong, bad, therefore un-American.\n\nWe also claim that the Protestant propaganda that is being carried on\nunder the guise of non-sectarian education is unspeakably unjust and\noutrageous. Protestantism is not a State institution in this country. A\nstranger might think so by the way public shekels are made to serve the\npurposes of proselytism; but to make the claim, in theory, or in\npractise, is to go counter to the laws of this land, and is un-American\nto a degree. That is another un-Americanism we protest against.\n\nWe teach truth, not creed prejudices; we train our children to have and\nalways maintain a strong prejudice for religious truth, and that kind\nof prejudice is the rock-bed of all that is good and holy and worth\nliving for. We teach dogma. We do not believe in religion without\ndogma, any more than religion without truth. \"That kind of religion has\nnot been invented, but it will come in when we have good men without\nconvictions, parties without principles and geometry without theories.\"\n\nIf there is anything un-American in all this, it is because the term is\nmisunderstood and misapplied. We are sorry if others find us at odds on\nreligious grounds. The fact of our existence will always be a reminder\nof our differences with them in the past. But we are not willing to\ncease to exist on that account.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXVI.\nCORRECTION.\n\nAMONG the many things that are good for children and that parents are\nin duty bound to supply is--the rod! This may sound old-fashioned, and\nit unfortunately is; there is a new school of home discipline in vogue\nnowadays.\n\nSlippers have outgrown their usefulness as implements of persuasion,\nbeing now employed exclusively as foot-gear. The lissom birch thrives\nungarnered in the thicket, where grace and gentleness supply the whilom\nvigor of its sway. The unyielding barrel-stave, that formerly occupied\na place of honor and convenience in the household, is now relegated, a\nharmless thing, to a forgotten corner of the cellar, and no longer\npoints a moral but adorns a wood-pile. Disciplinary applications of the\nold type have fallen into innocuous desuetude; the penny now tempts,\nthe sugar candy soothes and sugar-coated promises entice when the rod\nshould quell and blister. Meanwhile the refractory urchin, with no fear\nto stimulate his sluggish conscience, chuckles, rejoices and is glad,\nand bethinks himself of some uninvented methods of devilment.\n\nYes, it is old-fashioned in these days to smite with the rattan as did\nthe mighty of yore. The custom certainly lived a long time. The author\nof the Proverbs spoke of the practise to the parents of his generation,\nand there is no mistaking the meaning of his words. He spoke with\nauthority, too; if we mistake not, it was the Holy Ghost that inspired\nhis utterances. Here are a few of his old-fashioned sayings: \"Spare the\nrod and spoil the child; he who loves his child spares not the rod;\ncorrection gives judgment to the child who ordinarily is incapable of\nreflection; if the child be not chastised, it will bring down shame and\ndisgrace upon the head of its parent.\" It is our opinion that authority\nof this sort should redeem the defect of antiquity under which the\nteaching itself labors. There are some things \"ever ancient, ever new;\"\nthis is one of them.\n\nThe philosophy of correction may be found in the doctrine of original\nsin. Every child of Adam has a nature that is corrupted; it is a soil\nin which pride in all its forms and with all its cortege of vices takes\nstrong and ready root. This growth crops out into stubbornness,\nselfishness, a horror of restraint, effort and self-denial; mischief,\nand a spirit of rebellion and destruction. In its native state,\nuntouched by the rod of discipline, the child is wild. Now, you must\nforce a crooked tree to grow straight; you must break a wild colt to\ndomesticate it, and you must whip a wild boy to make him fit for the\ncompany of civilized people. Being self-willed, he will seek to follow\nthe bent of his own inclinations; without intelligence or experience\nand by nature prone to evil, he will follow the wrong path; and the\nhabits acquired in youth, the faults developed he will carry through\nlife to his own and the misery of others. He therefore requires\ntraining and a substitute for judgment; and according to the Holy\nGhost, the rod furnishes both. In the majority of cases nothing can\nsupply it.\n\nThis theory has held good in all the ages of the world, and unless the\nspecies has \"evolved\" by extraordinary leaps and bounds within the last\nfifty years, it holds good to-day, modern nursery milk-and-honey\ndiscipline to the contrary notwithstanding. It may be hard on the\nyoungster--it was hard on us!--but the difficulty is only temporary;\nand difficulty, some genius has said, is the nurse of greatness, a\nharsh nurse, who roughly rocks her foster-children into strength and\nathletic proportions.\n\nThe great point is that this treatment be given in time, when it is\npossible to administer it with success and fruit. The ordinary child\ndoes not need Oft-repeated doses; a firm hand and a vigorous\napplication go a long way, in most cases. Half-hearted, milk-and-water\ncastigation, like physic, should be thrown to the dogs. Long\nthreatenings spoil the operation; they betray weakness which the child\nis the first to discover. And without being brutal, it is well that the\nchastisement be such as will linger somewhat longer in the memory than\nin the sensibility.\n\nThe defects that deserve this corrective especially are\ninsubordination, sulkiness and sullenness; it is good to stir up\nthe lazy; it is necessary to instil in the child's mind a saving\nsense of its own inferiority and to inculcate lessons of humility,\nself-effacement and self-denial. It should scourge dishonesty and lying.\nThe bear licks its cub into shape; let the parent go to the bear,\ninquire of its ways and be wise. His children will then have a moral\nshape and a form of character that will stand them in good stead in\nafter life; and they will give thanks in proportion to the pain\ninflicted during the process of formation.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXVII.\nJUSTICE AND RIGHTS.\n\nJUSTICE is a virtue by which we render unto every man that which to him\nis due. Among equals, it is called commutative justice, the which alone\nis here in question. It protects us in the enjoyment of our own rights,\nand imposes upon us the obligation of respecting the rights of our\nfellow-men. This, of course, supposes that we have certain rights and\nthat we know what a right is. But what is a right?\n\nThe word itself may be clearer in the minds of many than its\ndefinition; few ignore what a right is, and fewer still perhaps could\nsay clearly and correctly what they mean by the word. A right is not\nsomething that you can see and feel and smell: it is a moral faculty,\nthat is, a recognized, inviolable power or liberty to do something, to\nhold or obtain possession of something. Where the right of property is\nconcerned, it supposes a certain relation or connection between a\nperson and an object; this may be a relation of natural possession, as\nin the case of life or reputation, a relation of lawful acquisition, as\nthat of the goods of life, etc. Out of this relation springs a title,\njust and proper, by which I may call that object \"mine,\" or you,\n\"yours;\" ownership is thereby established of the object and conceded to\nthe party in question. This party is therefore said to have a right to\nthe object; and the right is good, whether he is in possession or not\nthereof. Justice respects this right, respects the just claims and\ntitles of the owner, and forbids every act injurious thereto.\n\nAll this pre-supposes the idea of God, and without that idea, there can\nbe no justice and no rights, properly so-called. Justice is based on\nthe conformity of all things with the will of God. The will of God is\nthat we attain to everlasting happiness in the next world through the\nmeans of an established order of things in this life. This world is so\nruled, and our nature is such, that certain means are either absolutely\nor relatively necessary for the attaining of that end; for example,\nlife, reputation, liberty, the pursuit of happiness in the measure of\nour lawful capacity. The obligation therefore to reach that end gives\nus the right to use these means; and God places in every soul the\nvirtue of justice so that this right may be respected.\n\nBut it must be understood that the rights of God towards us transcend\nall other rights that we may have towards our fellow-men; ours we enjoy\nunder the high dominion of Him who grants all rights. Consequently, in\nthe pursuit of justice for ourselves, our rights cease the moment they\ncome into antagonism with the superior rights of God as found in His\nLaw. No man has a right to do what is evil, not even to preserve that\nmost inalienable and sacred of all rights, his right to life. To deny\nthis is to destroy the very notion of justice; the restrictions of our\nrights are more sacred than those rights themselves.\n\nViolation of rights among equals is called injustice. This sin has a\ntriple malice; it attacks the liberty of fellow-men and destroys it; it\nattacks the order of the world and the basis of society; it attacks the\ndecree and mandate of the Almighty who wills that this world shall be\nrun on the plan of justice. Injustice is therefore directly a sin\nagainst man, and indirectly a crime against God.\n\nSo jealous is God of the rights of His creatures that He never remains\nsatisfied until full justice is done for every act of injustice.\nCharity may be wounded, and the fault condoned; but only reparation in\nkind will satisfy justice. Whatever is mine is mine, and mine it will\never remain, wherever in this world another may have betaken himself\nwith it. As long as it exists it will appeal to me as to its master and\nowner; if justice is not done in this world, then it will appeal to the\njustice of Heaven for vengeance.\n\nThe six last commandments treat of the rights of man and condemn\ninjustice. We are told to respect the life, the virtue, the goods and\nthe reputation of our fellow-men; we are commanded to do so not only in\nact, but also in thought and desire. Life is protected by the fifth,\nvirtue by the sixth and ninth, property by the seventh and tenth, and\nreputation by the eighth. To sin against any of these commandments is\nto sin against justice in one form or another.\n\nThe claims, however, of violated justice are not such as to exact the\nimpossible in order to repair an injury done. A dead man cannot be\nbrought back to life, a penniless thief cannot make restitution unless\nhe steals from somebody else, etc., etc. But he who finds himself thus\nphysically incapable of undoing the wrongs committed must have at least\nthe will and intention of so doing: to revoke such intention would be\nto commit a fresh sin of injustice. The alternative is to do penance,\neither willingly in this life, or forcibly in the purging flames of the\nsuffering Church in the next. In that way, some time or other, justice,\naccording to the plan of God, will be done; but He will never be\nsatisfied until it is done.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXVIII.\nHOMICIDE.\n\nTO kill is to take life, human or animal. It was once thought by a sect\nof crazy fanatics, that the Fifth Commandment applied to the killing of\nanimals as well as of men. When a man slays a man, he slays an equal;\nwhen he kills an animal, he kills a creature made to serve him and to\nbe his food; and raw meat is not always palatable, and to cook is to\nkill. \"Everything that moves and lives,\" says Holy Writ, \"shall be unto\nyou as food.\"\n\nThe killing therefore herein question is the taking of human life, or\nhomicide. There can be no doubt but that life is man's best and most\nprecious possession, and that he has an inborn right to live as long as\nnature's laws operate in his favor. But man is not master of that gift\nof life, either in himself or in others. God, who alone can give, alone\nmay take it away. Sole master of life, He deals it out to His creatures\nas it pleases Him; and whoever tampers with human life intrudes upon\nthe domain of the Divinity, violating at the some time the first right\nof his fellow-man.\n\nWe have an instinctive horror of blood, human blood. For the ordinary\nindividual the Mosaic enactment that forbids murder is almost\nsuperfluous, so deeply has nature graven on our hearts the letter of\nthat law. Murder is abominable, for the very reason that life is\nprecious; and no reasonable being, civilized or savage, dealing death\nunjustly unto a fellow-man, can have any other conviction in his soul\nthan that he is committing a crime and incurring the almighty wrath of\nthe Deity. If such killing is done by a responsible agent, and against\nthe right of the victim, the crime committed is murder or unjustifiable\nhomicide.\n\nWhich supposes that there is a kind of homicide that is justifiable, in\nseeming contradiction of the general law of God and nature, which\nspecifies no exception. But there is a question here less of exception\nthan of distinction. The law is a general one, of vast comprehension.\nIs all killing prohibited? Evidently no. It is limited to human beings,\nin the first place; to responsible agents, in the next; and thirdly, it\ninvolves a question of injustice. What is forbidden is the voluntary\nand unjust killing of a human being. Having thus specified according to\nthe rules of right reasoning, we find we have a considerable margin\nleft for the taking of life that is justifiable. And the records of\nDivine revelation will approve the findings of right reason.\n\nWe find God in the Old Law, while upholding His fifth precept,\ncommanding capital punishment and sanctioning the slaughter of war; He\nnot only approved the slaying of certain persons, but there are\ninstances of His giving authority to kill. By so doing He delegated His\nsupreme right over life to His creatures. \"Whoever sheds human blood,\nlet his blood be shed.\" In the New Testament the officer of the law is\ncalled the minister of God and is said not without cause to carry the\nsword; and the sword is the symbol of the power to inflict death.\n\nThe presence of such laws as that of capital punishment, of war and of\nself-defense, in all the written codes of civilized peoples, as well as\nin the unwritten codes of savage tribes, can be accounted for only by a\ndirect or indirect commission from the Deity. A legal tradition so\nuniversal and so constant is a natural law, and consequently a divine\nlaw. In a matter of such importance all mankind could not have erred;\nif it has, it is perfectly safe to be with it in its error.\n\nThese exceptions, if we may call them exceptions, suppose the victim to\nhave forfeited his right to live, to have placed himself in a position\nof unjust aggression, which aggression gives to the party attacked the\nright to repel it, to protect his own life even at the cost of the life\nof the unjust aggressor. This is an individual privilege in only one\ninstance, that of self-defence; in all others it is invested in the\nbody politic or society which alone can declare war and inflict death\non a capital offender.\n\nOf course it may be said that in moral matters, like does not cure\nlike, that to permit killing is a strange manner of discouraging the\nsame. But this measure acts as a deterrent; it is not a cure for the\noffender, or rather it is, and a radical one; it is intended to instil\na salutary dread into the hearts of those who may be inclined to play\ntoo freely with human life. This is the only argument assassins\nunderstand; it is therefore the only one we can use against them.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXIX.\nIS SUICIDE A SIN?\n\nMOST people no doubt remember how, a short time previous to his death,\nCol. Robert Ingersoli, the agnostic lecturer, gave out a thesis with\nthe above title, offering a negative conclusion. Some discussion ensued\nin public print; the question was debated hotly, and whole columns of\npros and cons were inflicted on the suffering public by the theologues\nwho had taken the matter seriously.\n\nWe recall, too, how, in the height of the discussion, a poor devil of\nan unfortunate was found in one of the parks of the Metropolis with an\nempty pistol in his clinched fist, a bullet in his head and in his\npocket a copy of the thesis: Is suicide a sin?\n\nTo a Christian, this theorizing and speculation was laughable enough;\nbut when one was brought face to face with the reality of the thing, a\ngrim humor was added to the situation. Comedy is dangerous that leads\nto tragedy.\n\nThe witty part of the matter was this: Ingersoli spoke of sin. Now,\nwhat kind of an intelligible thing could sin be in the mind of a\nblasphemous agnostic? What meaning could it have for any man who\nprofesses not to know, or to care, who or what God is?\n\nIf there is no Legislator, there is no Law; if no Law, then no\nviolation of the Law. If God does not exist, there can be no offending\nHim. Eliminate the notion of God, and there is no such thing as sin.\nSin, therefore, had no meaning for Ingersoli; his thesis had no\nmeaning, nothing he said had any meaning. Yet, people took him\nseriously! And at least one poor wretch was willing to test the truth\nof the assertion and run his chances.\n\nSome people, less speculative, contend that the fact of suicide is\nsufficient evidence of irresponsibility, as no man in his right senses\nwould take his own life. This position is both charitable and\nconsoling; unfortunately, certain facts of premeditation and clear\nmindedness militate so strongly against such a general theory that one\ncan easily afford to doubt its soundness. That this is true in many\ncases, perhaps in the majority of cases, all will admit; in all cases,\nfew will admit it. However, the question here is one of principle, and\nnot of fact.\n\nThe prime evil at the bottom of all killing is that of injustice; but\nin self-destruction where the culprit and the victim are one and the\nsame person, there can be no question of injustice. Akin to, and a\nsubstitute for, the law of justice is that of charity, by which we are\nbound to love ourselves and do ourselves no harm or injury. The saying\n\"charity begins at home\" means that we ourselves are the first objects\nof our charity. If therefore we must respect the life of our neighbor,\nthe obligation is still greater to respect our own.\n\nThen there is the supreme law of justice that reposes in God. We should\nremember that God is the supreme and sole Master of life. Man has a\nlease of life, but it does not belong to him to destroy at his own\nwill. He did not give it to himself; and he cannot take it away.\nDestruction supposes an authority and dominion that does not belong to\nany man where life is concerned. And he who assumes such a prerogative\ncommits an act of unquestionable injustice against Him whose authority\nis usurped.\n\nBy indirect killing we mean the placing of an act, good or at least\nmorally indifferent, from which may result a benefit that is intended,\nbut also an evil--death--which is not intended but simply suffered to\noccur. In this event there is no sin, provided there be sufficient\nreason for permitting said evil effect. The act may be an operation,\nthe benefit intended, a cure; the evil risked, death. The misery of ill\nhealth is a sufficient reason for risking the evil of death in the hope\nof regaining strength and health. To escape sure death, to escape from\ngrave danger or ills, to preserve one's virtue, to save another's life,\nto assure a great public benefit, etc., these are reasons proportionate\nto the evil of risking life; and in these and similar cases, if death\nresults, it is indirect suicide, and is in nowise criminal.\n\nThe same cannot be said of death that results from abuses or excesses\nof any kind, such as dissipation or debauchery; from risks that are\ntaken in a spirit of bravado or with a view to winning fame or lucre.\nFor a still better reason this cannot be said of those who undergo\ncriminal operations: it is never permitted to do what is intrinsically\nevil that good may come therefrom.\n\nAll this applies to self-mutilation as well as to self-destruction; as\nparts of the whole, one's limbs should be the objects of one's charity,\nand God's law demands that we preserve them as well as the body itself.\nIt is lawful to submit to the maiming process only when the utility of\nthe whole body demands it; otherwise it is criminal.\n\nOne word more. What about those who call upon, and desire death? To\ndesire evil is sinful. Yes, but death is a moral evil when its mode is\ncontrary to the laws of God and of nature. Thus, with perfect\nacquiescence to order of Divine Providence, if one desire death in\norder to be at rest with God, that one desires a good and meritorious\nthing and with perfect regularity; it is less meritorious to desire\ndeath with the sole view of escaping the ills and troubles of life; it\nwould even be difficult to convict one of mortal offending if he\ndesired death for a slight and futile reason, if there be due respect\nfor the will of God. The sin of such desires consists in rebellion\nagainst the divine Will and opposition to the providence of God; in\nsuch cases the sin is never anything but grievous.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXX.\nSELF-DEFENSE.\n\nTHE thought is a terrible one--and the act is desperate in itself--of a\nman, however justified his conduct may be, slaying with his own hand a\nfellow being and sending his soul, unprepared perhaps, before its\nMaker. But it is a still more desperate thing, because it strikes us\nnearer home, to yield up one's life into the hands of an agent of\ninjustice. There is here an alternative of two very great evils; it is\na question of two lives, his and mine; I must slay or I must die\nwithout having done anything to forfeit my life.\n\nBut the law of charity, founded in nature, makes my life more precious\nto me than his, for charity begins at home. Then, to save his life, I\nmust give mine; and he risks his to take mine! I do not desire to kill\nmy unjust aggressor, but I do intend, as I have a perfect right, to\nprotect my own life. If he, without cause, places his existence as an\nobstacle to my enjoyment of life, then I shall remove that obstacle,\nand to do it, I shall kill. Again, a desperate remedy, but the\nsituation is most terribly desperate. Being given law of my being, I\ncan not help the inevitable result of conditions of which I am nowise\nresponsible. The man who attacks my life places his own beyond the\npossibility of my saving it.\n\nThis, of course, supposes a man using the full measure of his rights.\nBut is he bound to do this, morally? Not if his charity for another be\ngreater than that which he bears towards himself, if he go beyond the\ndivine injunction to love his neighbor as himself and love him better\nthan himself; if he feel that he is better prepared to meet his God\nthan the other, if he have no one dependent on him for maintenance and\nsupport. Even did he happen to be in the state of mortal sin, there is\nevery reason to believe that such charity as will sacrifice life for\nanother, greater than which no man has, would wash away that sin and\nopen the way of mercy; while great indeed must be the necessity of the\ndependent ones to require absolutely the death of another.\n\nThe aggression that justifies killing must be unjust. This would not be\nthe case of a criminal being brought to justice or resisting arrest.\nJustice cannot conflict with itself and can do nothing unjust in\ncarrying out its own mandates. The culprit therefore has no grounds to\nstand upon for his defense.\n\nNeither is killing justifiable, if wounding or mutilation would effect\nthe purpose. But here the code of morals allows much latitude on\naccount of the difficulty of judging to a nicety the intentions of the\naggressor, that is, whether he means to kill or not; and of so\ndirecting the protecting blow as to inflict just enough, and no more\ndisability than the occasion requires.\n\nVirtue in woman is rightly considered a boon greater than life; and for\nthat matter, so is the state of God's friendship in the soul of any\ncreature. Then, here too applies the principle of self-defense. If I\nmay kill to save my life, 1 may for a better reason kill to save my\nsoul and to avoid mortal offense. True, the loss of bodily integrity\ndoes not necessarily imply a staining of the soul; but human nature is\nsuch as to make the one an almost fatal consequence of the other. The\nperson therefore who kills to escape unjust contamination acts within\nhis or her rights and before God is justified in the doing.\n\nWe would venture to say the same thing of a man who resorts to this\nextreme in order to protect his rightly gotten goods, on these two\nconditions, however: that there be some kind of proportion between the\nloss and the remedy he employs to protect himself against it; and that\nhe have well grounded hope that the remedy will be effective, that it\nwill prevent said loss, and not transform itself into revenge.\n\nAnd here a last remark is in order. The killing that is permitted to\nsave, is not permitted to avenge loss sustained; the law sanctions\nself-defense, but not vengeance. If a man, on the principle of\nself-defense, has the right to kill to save his brother, and fails to\ndo so, his further right to kill ceases; the object is past saving and\nvengeance is criminal. If a woman has been wronged, once the wrong\neffected, there can be no lawful recourse to slaying, for what is lost\nis beyond redemption, and no reason for such action exists except\nrevenge. In these cases killing is murder, pure and simple, and there\nis nothing under Heaven to justify it.\n\nRemembering the injunction to love our neighbor as ourself, we add that\nwe have the same right to defend our neighbor's life as we have to\ndefend our own, even to protect his or her innocence and virtue and\npossessions. A husband may defend the honor of his wife, which is his\nown, even though the wife be a party to the crime and consent to the\ndefilement; but the right is only to prevent, and ceases on the event\nof accomplishment, even at the incipient stage.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXI.\nMURDER OFTEN SANCTIONED.\n\nALL injury done to another in order to repair an insult is criminal,\nand if said injury result in death, it is murder.\n\nHere we consider an insult as an attack on one's reputation or\ncharacter, a charge or accusation, a slurring remark, etc., without\nreference to the truth or falsity thereof. It may be objected that\nwhereas reputation, like chastity and considerable possessions, is\noften valued as high as life itself, the same right exists to defend it\neven at the cost of another's life. But it must be remembered that the\nloss of character sustained in consequence of an insult of this kind is\nsomething very ephemeral and unsubstantial; and only to a mind\nabnormally sensitive can any proportion be perceived between the loss\nand the remedy. This is especially true when the attack is in words and\ngoes no farther than words: for \"sticks and stones will break your\nbones, but names will never hurt you,\" as we used to say when we were\nboys. Then, words are such fleeting things that the harm is done,\nwhatever harm there is, before any remedy can be brought to bear upon\nit; which fact leaves no room for self-defense.\n\nIn such a case, the only redress that can be had is from the courts of\njustice, established to undo wrongs as far as the thing can be done.\nThe power to do this belongs to the State alone, and is vested in no\nprivate individual. To assume the prerogative of privately doing\noneself justice, when recourse can be had to the tribunals of justice,\nis to sin, and every act committed in this pursuit of justice is\nunlawful and criminal.\n\nThis applies likewise to all the other cases of self-defense wherein\nlife, virtue and wealth are concerned, if the harm is already done, or\nif legal measures can prevent the evil, or undo it. It may be that the\njustice dealt out by the tribunal, in case of injury being done to u's,\nprove inferior to that which we might have obtained ourselves by\nprivate methods. But this is not a reason for one to take the law into\none's own hands. Such loss is accidental and must be ascribed to the\ninevitable course of human things.\n\nDuelling is a form of murder and suicide combined, for which there can\npossibly be no justification. The code of honor that requires the\nreparation of an insult at the point of the sword or the muzzle of a\npistol has no existence outside the befogged intelligence of godless\nmen. The duel repairs nothing and aggravates the evil it seeks to\nremedy. The justice it appeals to is a creature dependent on skill and\nluck; such justice is not only blind, but crazy as well.\n\nThat is why the Church anathematizes duelling. The duel she condemns is\na hand-to-hand combat prearranged as to weapons, time and place, and it\nis immaterial whether it be to the death or only to the letting of\nfirst blood. She fulminates her major excommunication against\nduellists, even in the event of their failing to keep their agreement.\nHer sentence affects seconds and all those who advise or favor or abet,\nand even those whose simple presence is an incentive and encouragement.\nShe refuses Christian burial to the one who falls, unless before dying\nhe shows certain dispositions of repentance.\n\nPrize fighting, however brutal and degrading, must not be put in the\ncategory of duelling. Its object is not to wipe out an insult, but to\nfurnish sport and to reap the incidental profits. In normal conditions\nthere is no danger to life or limb. Sharkey might stop with the point\nof his chin a blow that would send many another into kingdom come; but\nso long as Sharkey does the stopping the danger remains non-existent.\nIf, however, hate instead of lucre bring the men together, that motive\nwould be sufficient to make the game one of blood if not of death.\n\nLynching, is another kind of murder, and a cowardly, brutal kind, at\nthat. No crime, no abomination on the part of the victim, however\ngreat, can justify such an inhuman proceeding. It brands with the crime\nof wilful murder every man or woman who has a hand in it. To defend the\ntheory of lynching-is as bad as to carry it out in practice. And it is\ngreatly to be feared that the Almighty will one day call this land to\naccount for the outrageous performances of unbridled license and\nheartless cruelty that occur so frequently in our midst.\n\nThe only plea on which to ground an excuse for such exhibitions of\nbrutality and disrespect for order and justice would be the inability\nof established government to mete out justice to the guilty; but this\nis not even the case, for government is defied and lawful authority\ncapable and willing to punish is spurned; the culprit is taken from the\nhands of the law and delivered over to the vengeance of a mob. However\npopular the doctrine of Judge Lynch may be in certain sections of the\nland, it is nevertheless reprobated by the law of God and stands\ncondemned at the bar of His justice.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXII.\nON THE ETHICS OF WAR.\n\nIN these days, since we have evolved into a fighting nation, our young\nmen feel within them the instinct of battle, which, like Job's steed,\n\"when it heareth the trumpet, saith: 'ha, ha'; that smelleth the battle\nafar off, the encouraging of the captains, the shouting of the army.\"\nMilitary trappings are no longer looked upon as stage furniture, good\nonly for Fourth-of-July parades and sham manoeuvers. War with us has\nbecome a stern reality, and promises to continue such, for people do\nnot yield up willingly their independence, even to a world-power with a\nprovidential \"destiny\" to fulfil. And since war is slaughter, it might\nbe apropos to remark on the morality of such killing as is done on the\nfield of battle and of war in general.\n\nIn every war there is a right side and a wrong side; sometimes,\nperhaps, more frequently, there is right and wrong on both sides, due\nto bungling diplomacy and the blindness of prejudice. But in every case\njustice demands the triumph of one cause and the defeat of the other.\nTo determine in any particular case the side of right and justice is a\nvery difficult matter. And perhaps it is just as well that it is so;\nfor could this be done with truth and accuracy, frightful\nresponsibilities would have to be placed on the shoulders of somebody;\nand we shrink instinctively from the thought of any one individual or\nbody of individuals standing before God with the crime of war on his or\ntheir souls.\n\nTherefore it is that grave men are of the opinion that such a\ntremendous event as war is not wholly of man's making, but rather an\nact of God, like earthquakes, volcanic eruptions and the like; which\nthings He uses as flails to chastise His people, or to bring them to a\nsense of their own insignificance in His sight. Be this as it may, it\nis nevertheless true that a private individual is rarely, if ever,\ncompetent to judge rightly by himself of the morality of any given\ncause, until such time at least as history has probed the matter and\nbrought every evidence to light. In case, therefore, of doubt, every\npresumption should favor the cause of one's own country. If, in my\nprivate opinion, the cause of my country is doubtfully wrong, then that\ndoubt should yield to the weight of higher authoritative opinion.\nOfficial or popular judgment will be authority for me; on that\nauthority I may form a strong probable opinion, at least; and this will\nassure the morality of my taking up my country's cause, even though it\nbe doubtful from my personal point of view. If this cannot be done and\none's conscience positively reprove such a cause, then that one cannot,\nuntil a contrary conviction is acquired, take any part therein. But he\nis in no wise bound to defend with arms the other side, for his\nconvictions are subjective and general laws do not take these into\naccount.\n\nWho are bound to serve? That depends on the quality of danger to which\nthe commonwealth is exposed. First, the obligation is for those who can\ndo so easily; young men, strong, unmarried, with a taste for such\nadventure as war affords. The greater the general peril, the less\nprivate needs should be considered. The situation may be such as to\ncall forth every able-bodied man, irrespective of family necessities.\nTo shirk this duty when it is plainly a duty--a rare circumstance,\nindeed--is without doubt a sin.\n\nObedience to orders is the alpha and omega of army discipline; without\nit a cause is lost from the beginning. Numbers are nothing compared to\norder; a mob is not a fighting machine; it is only a fair target. The\nissue of a battle, or even of a whole war, may depend on obedience to\norders. Army men know this so well that death is not infrequently the\npenalty of disobedience. Consequently, a violation of discipline is\nusually a serious offense; it may easily be a mortal sin.\n\nWar being slaughter, the soldier's business is to kill or rather to\ndisable, as many of the enemy as possible on the field of battle. This\ndisabling process means, of course, and necessarily, the maiming unto\ndeath of many. Such killing is not only lawful, but obligatory. War,\nlike the surgeon's knife, must often lop off much in order to save the\nwhole. The best soldier is he who inflicts most damage on the enemy.\n\nBut the desire and intention of the soldier should not be primarily to\nkill, but only to put the enemy beyond the possibility of doing further\nharm. Death will be the result of his efforts in many cases, and this\nhe suffers to occur rather than desires and intends. He has no right to\nslay outside of battle or without the express command of a superior\nofficer; if he does so, he is guilty of murder. Neither must there be\nhate behind the aim that singles out a foe for destruction; the general\nhatred which he bestows on the opposing cause must respect the\nindividual enemy.\n\nIt is not lawful to wantonly torture or maim an enemy, whoever or\nwhatever he may be, however great his crime. Not even the express\ncommand of a superior officer can justify such doings, because it is\nbarbarity, pure and unmitigated. In war these things are morally just\nwhat they would be if they were perpetrated in the heart of peace and\ncivilization by a gang of thugs. These are abominations that, not only\ndisgrace the flag under which they are committed, but even cry to\nHeaven for vengeance.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXIII.\nTHE MASSACRE OF THE INNOCENTS.\n\nHEROD, the Bloody, slew all under two. A modern Moloch, a creature of\nlust and blood, disguised often under the cloak of respectability,\nstalks through a Christian land denying the babe the right to be born\nat all, demanding that it be crushed as soon as conceived. There is\nmurder and murder; but this is the most heartless, cowardly and brutal\non the catalogue of crime.\n\nIt is bad enough to cut down an enemy, to shoot him in the back; but\nwhen it comes to slaying a victim as helpless as a babe, incapable of\nentering a protest, innocent of all wrong save that of existing; when\neven baptism is denied it, and thereby the sight of God for all\neternity; when finally the victim is one's own flesh and blood, the\nlanguage of hell alone is capable of qualifying such deeds.\n\nDo not say there is no injustice. Every innocent human being, at every\nstage of its existence, from the first to the last, born or unborn, has\na natural and inalienable right to live, as long as nature's laws\noperate in its favor. Being innocent it cannot forfeit that right. God\nis no exceptor of persons; a soul is a soul, whether it be the soul of\na pontiff, a king or a sage, or the soul of the unborn babe of the last\nwoman of the people. In every case, the right to live is exactly the\nsame.\n\nThe circumstances, regular or irregular, of its coming into life, not\nbeing of its own making, do not affect the right in the least. It\nobeyed the law by which every man is created; it could not disobey, for\nthe law is fatal. Its presence therefore, cannot be morally obnoxious,\na crime on its part. Whether its presence is a joy or a shame, that\ndepends solely on the free act of others than itself; and it is for\nthem to enjoy the privilege or bear the disgrace and burden. That\npresence may occasion poverty, suffering, it may even endanger life;\nwhat if it does! Has a person in misfortune the right to strike down\nanother who has had no part in making that misfortune?\n\nLife does not begin at birth, but precedes it; prenatal life is truly\nlife. That which is conceived, is; being, it lives as essentially as a\nfull-grown man in the prime of life. Being the fruit of humanity it is\nhuman at every instant of its career; being human, it is a creature of\nGod, has an immortal soul with the image of the Maker stamped thereon.\nAnd the veto of God, \"Thou shalt not kill,\" protects that life, or it\nhas no meaning at all.\n\nThe psychological moment of incipient life, the instant marked by the\ninfusion of soul into body, may furnish a problem of speculation for\nthe savant; but even when certitude ends and doubt begins, the law of\nGod fails not to protect. No man who doubts seriously that the act he\nis about to perform is a crime, and is free to act or not to act, is\nanything but a criminal, if he goes ahead notwithstanding and does the\ndeed. If I send a bullet into a man's head doubting whether or not he\nbe dead, I commit murder by that act, and it matters not at all in\npoint of fact whether said person were really dead or not before I made\nsure. In the matter, therefore, which concerns us here, doubt will not\nmake killing justifiable. The law is: when in doubt, do not act.\n\nThen, again, as far as guilt is concerned, it makes not a particle of\ndifference whether results follow or not. Sin, you know, is an act of\nthe will; the exterior deed completes, but does not make, the crime. If\nI do all in my power to effect a wrong and fail in the attempt through\nno fault of my own, I am just as guilty before God as if I perpetrated\nthe crime in deed. It is more than a desire to commit sin, which is\nsinful; it is a specific sin in itself, and in this matter, it is\nmurder pure and simple.\n\nThis applies with equal force to the agent who does the deed, to the\nprincipal who has it done or consents to its being done, to those who\nadvise, encourage, urge or co-operate in any way therein, as well as to\nthose who having authority to prevent, neglect to use it. The stain of\nblood is on the soul of every person to whom any degree of\nresponsibility or complicity can be attached.\n\nIf every murderer in this enlightened Christian land of ours received\nthe rope which is his or her due, according to the letter of the law,\nbusiness would be brisk for quite a spell. It is a small town that has\nnot its professional babe-slaughterer, who succeeds in evading the law\neven when he contrives to kill two at one time. He does not like to do\nit, but there is money in it, you know; and he pockets his unholy blood\nmoney without a squirm. Don't prosecute him; if you do, he will make\nrevelations that will startle the town.\n\nAs for the unnatural mother, it is best to leave her to listen in the\ndead of night to the appealing voice of her murdered babes before the\ntribunal of God's infinite justice. Their blood calls for vengeance.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXIV.\nENMITY.\n\nKILLING is not the only thing forbidden by the Fifth Commandment:\nthereby are prescribed all forms of enmity, of which killing is one,\nthat attack either directly or indirectly, in thought or desire, as\nwell as in deed, the life, limbs or health of the neighbor. The fifth\nprecept protects the physical man; everything therefore that partakes\nof the nature of a design on the body of another is an offense against\nthis commandment. All such offenses are not equally grievous, but each\ncontains a malice of its own, which is prescribed under the head of\nkilling.\n\nEnmity that takes the form of fighting, assault and battery, is clearly\na breach of the law of God. It is lawful to wound, maim and otherwise\ndisable an assailant, on the principle of self-defense, when there is\nno other means of protecting oneself against attack. But outside this\ncontingency, such conduct is ruffianism before man, and sin before God.\nThe State alone has the right to inflict penalties and avenge wrongs;\nto turn this right over to every individual would be destructive of\nsociety. If this sort of a thing is unlawful and criminal when there\nmight be some kind of an excuse for it on the ground of injury\nreceived, the malice thereof is aggravated considerably by the fact of\nthere being no excuse at all, or only imaginary ones.\n\nThere is another form of enmity or hatred that runs not to blows but to\nwords. Herein is evil, not because of any bodily injury wrought, of\nwhich there is none, but because of the diabolical spirit that\nmanifests itself, a spirit reproved by God and which, in given\ncircumstances, is ready to resort to physical injury and even to the\nletting of blood. There can be no doubt that hatred in itself is\nforbidden by this commandment, for \"whosoever hateth his brother is a\nmurderer,\" according to St. John. It matters little, therefore, whether\nsuch hatred be in deeds or in words; the malice is there and the sin is\nconsummated. A person, too weak to do an enemy bodily harm, may often\nuse his or her tongue to better effect than another could his fists,\nand the verbal outrage thus committed may be worse than a physical one.\n\nIt is not even necessary that the spirit of enmity show itself at all\non the outside for the incurring of such guilt as attends the violation\nof this commandment. It is sufficient that it possess the soul and go\nno farther than a desire to do harm. This is the spirit of revenge, and\nit is none the less sinful in the eyes of God because it lacks the\ncomplement of exterior acts. It is immoral to nourish a grudge against\na fellow-man. Such a spirit only awaits an occasion to deal a blow,\nand, when that occasion shows itself, will be ready, willing and\nanxious to strike. The Lord refuses the gifts and offerings and prayers\nof such people as these; they are told to go and become reconciled with\ntheir brother and lay low the spirit that holds them; then, and only\nthen, will their offerings be acceptable.\n\nEven less than this suffices to constitute a breach of the Fifth\nCommandment. It is the quality of such passions as envy and jealousy to\nsometimes be content with the mere thought of injury done to their\nobject, without, even going so far as to desire to work the evil\nthemselves. These passions are often held in check for a time; but, in\nthe event of misfortune befalling the hated rival, there follows a\nsense of complacency and satisfaction which, if entertained, has all\nthe malice of mortal sin. If, on the contrary, the prosperity of\nanother inspire us with a feeling of regret and sadness, which is\ndeliberately countenanced and consented to, there can be no doubt as to\nthe grievous malice of such a failing.\n\nFinally recklessness may be the cause of our harming another. It is a\nsound principle of morals that one is responsible for his acts in the\nmeasure of his foreseeing, and consenting to, the results and\nconsequences. But there is still another sound principle according to\nwhich every man is accountable, at least indirectly, for the evil\nconsequences of his actions, even though they be unforeseen and\ninvoluntary, in the measure of the want of ordinary human prudence\nshown in his conduct. A man with a loaded revolver in his hand may not\nhave any design on the lives of his neighbors; but if he blazes away\nright and left, and happens to fill this or that one with lead, he is\nguilty, if he is in his right mind; and a sin, a mortal sin, is still a\nsin, even if it is committed indirectly. Negligence is often culpable,\nand ignorance frequently a sin.\n\nNaturally, just as the soul is superior to the body, so evil example,\nscandal, the killing of the soul of another is a crime of a far greater\nenormity than the working of injury unto the body. Scandal comes\nproperly under the head of murder; but it is less blood than lust that\nfurnishes it with working material. It will therefore be treated in its\nplace and time.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXV.\nOUR ENEMIES.\n\nWHAT is an enemy? A personal, an individual enemy is he who has done us\na personal injury. The enemy, in a general or collective sense, are\nthey--a people, a class or party--who are opposed to our interests,\nwhose presence, doings or sayings are obnoxious to us for many natural\nreasons. Concerning these latter, it might be said that it is natural,\noftentimes necessary and proper, to oppose them by all legitimate\nmeans. This opposition, however lawful, is scarcely ever compatible\nwith any high degree of charity or affection. But whatever of aversion,\nantipathy or even hatred is thereby engendered, it is not of a personal\nnature; it does not attain the individual, but embraces a category of\nbeings as a whole, who become identified with the cause they sustain\nand thereby fall under the common enmity. The law that binds us unto\nlove of our enemy operates only in favor of the units, and not of the\ngroup as a group.\n\nHatred, aversion, antipathy, such as divides peoples, races and\ncommunities, is one, though not the highest, characteristic of\npatriotism; it may be called the defect of a quality. When a man is\nwhole-souled in a cause, he will brook with difficulty any system of\nideas opposed to, and destructive of, his own. Anxious for the triumph\nof what he believes the cause of right and justice, he will rejoice\nover the discomfiture of his rivals and the defeat of their cause. Wars\nleave behind an inheritance of hatred; persecution makes wounds that\ntake a long time to heal. The descendants of the defeated, conquered or\npersecuted will-look upon the generations of their fathers' foes as\ntypifying oppression, tyranny and injustice, will wish them all manner\nof evil and gloat over their downfall. Such feelings die hard. They\nspring from convictions. The wounds made by injustice, fancied or real,\nwill smart; and just as naturally will men retain in their hearts\naversion for all that which, for them, stands for such injustice. This\nis criminal only when it fails to respect the individual and become\npersonal hate.\n\nHim who has done us a personal injury we must forgive. Pardon drives\nhatred out of the heart. Love of God is incompatible with personal\nenmity; therefore such enmity must be quelched. He who says he loves\nGod and hates his brother is a liar, according to divine testimony.\nWhat takes the place of this hate? Love, a love that is called common\nlove, to distinguish it from that special sort of affection that we\nhave for friends. This is a general kind of love that embraces all men,\nand excludes none individually. It forbids all uncharity towards a man\nas a unit, and it supposes a disposition of the soul that would not\nrefuse to give a full measure of love and assistance, if necessity\nrequired it. This sort of love leaves no room for hatred of a personal\nnature in the heart.\n\nIs it enough to forgive sincerely from the heart? It is not enough; we\nmust manifest our forgiveness, and this for three good reasons: first,\nin order to secure us against self-illusion and to test the sincerity\nof our dispositions; secondly, in order to put an end to discord by\nshowing the other party that we hold no grudge; lastly, in order to\nremove whatever scandal may have been given by our breach of\nfriendship. The disorder of enmity can be thoroughly cured and healed\nonly by an open renewal of the ties of friendship; and this is done by\nthe offering and acknowledgment of the signs of friendship.\n\nThe signs of friendship are of two sorts, the one common, the other\nspecial. Common tokens of friendship are those signs which are current\namong people of the same condition of life; such as saluting, answering\na question, dealing in business affairs, etc. These are commonly\nregarded as sufficient to take away any reasonable suspicion of hatred,\nalthough, in matter of fact, the inference may be false. But the\nrefusal to give such tokens of pardon usually argues the presence of an\nuncharitable feeling that is sinful; it is nearly always evidence of an\nunforgiving spirit. There are certain cases wherein the offense\nreceived being of a peculiar nature, justifies one in deferring such\nevidence of forgiveness; but these cases are rare.\n\nIf we are obliged to show by unmistakable signs that we forgive a wrong\nthat has been done, we are in nowise bound to make a particular friend\nof the person who has been guilty of the wrong. We need not go out of\nour way to meet him, receive or visit him or treat him as a long lost\nbrother. He would not expect it, and we fulfil our obligations toward\nhim by the ordinary civilities we show him in the business of life.\n\nIf we have offended, we must take the first step toward reconciliation\nand apologize; that is the only way we have of repairing the injury\ndone, and to this we are held in conscience. If there is equal blame on\nboth sides, then both are bound to the same duty of offering an\napology. To refuse such advances on the part of one who has wronged us\nis to commit an offense that might very easily be grievous.\n\nAll this, of course, is apart from the question of indemnification in\ncase of real damage being sustained. We may condone an offense and at\nthe same time require that the loss suffered be repaired. And in case\nthe delinquent refuse to settle amicably, we are justified in pursuing\nhim before the courts. Justice is not necessarily opposed to charity.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXVI.\nIMMORALITY.\n\nTHE natural order of things brings us to a consideration of the Sixth\nCommandment, and at the same time, of the Ninth, as treating of the\nsame matter--a matter so highly immoral as to deserve the specific\nappellation of immorality.\n\nPeople, as a rule, are tolerably well informed on this subject. It is a\nknowledge acquired by instinct, the depraved instinct of our fallen\nnature, and supplemented by the experiences weaned from the daily\nsayings and doings of common life. Finally, that sort of journalism\nknown as the \"yellow,\" and literature called pornographic, serve to\nround off this education and give it the finishing touches.\n\nBut, on the other hand, if one considers the innocent, the young and\ninexperienced, who are not a few; and likewise the morbidly curious of\nsensual tendencies, who are many, this matter must appear as a high\nexplosive, capable of doing any amount of damage, if not handled with\nthe utmost care and caution.\n\nMuch, therefore, must be left unsaid, or half-said; suggestion and\ninsinuation must be trusted to go far enough, in order that, while the\nknowing understand, the ignorant may be secure in the bliss of their\nignorance and be not prematurely informed.\n\nThey, for whom such language is insufficient, know where to go for\nfuller information. Parents are the natural teachers; the boy's father\nand the girl's mother know what to say, how and when to say it; or at\nleast should know. And if parents were only more careful, in their own\nway, to acquaint their children with certain facts when the time comes\nfor it, much evil would be avoided, both moral and physical.\n\nBut there are secrets too sacred even for parents' ears, that are\nconfided only to God, through His appointed minister. Catholics know\nthis man is the confessor, and the place for such information and\ncounsel, the holy tribunal of penance. These two channels of knowledge\nare safe; the same cannot be said of others.\n\nAs a preliminary, we would remark that sins, of the sort here in\nquestion as well as all kinds of sin, are not limited to deeds.\nExterior acts consummate the malice of evil, but they do not constitute\nsuch malice; evil is generated in the heart. One who desires to do\nwrong offends God as effectively as another who does the wrong in deed.\nNot only that, but he who makes evil the food of his mind and ponders\ncomplacently on the seductive beauty of vice is no less guilty than he\nwho goes beyond theory into practice. This is something we frequently\nforget, or would fain forget, the greed of passion blinding us more or\nless voluntarily to the real moral value of our acts.\n\nAs a consequence of this self-illusion many a one finds himself far\nbeyond his depth in the sea of immorality before he fully realizes his\nposition. It is small beginnings that lead to lasting results; it is by\nrepeated acts that habits are formed; and evil grows on us faster than\nmost of us are willing to acknowledge. All manner of good and evil\noriginates in thought; and that is where the little monster of\nuncleanness must be strangled before it is full-grown, if we would be\nfree from its unspeakable thralldom.\n\nAgain, this is a matter the malice and evil of which very, very rarely,\nif ever, escapes us. He who commits a sin of impurity and says he did\nnot know it was wrong, lies deliberately, or else he is not in his\nright frame of mind. The Maker has left in our souls enough of natural\nvirtue and grace to enable us to distinguish right and wrong, clean and\nunclean; even the child with no definite knowledge of the matter,\nmeeting it for the first time, instinctively blushes and recoils from\nthe moral hideousness of its aspect. Conscience here speaks in no\nuncertain accents; he alone does not hear who does not wish to hear.\n\nCatholic theologians are even more rigid concerning the matter itself,\nprescinding altogether from our perception of it. They say that here no\nlevity of matter is allowed, that is to say, every violation, however\nslight, of either of these two commandments, is a sin. You cannot even\ntouch this pitch of moral defilement without being yourself defiled. It\nis useless therefore to argue the matter and enter a plea of triviality\nand inconsequence; nothing is trivial that is of a nature to offend God\nand damn a soul.\n\nWeakness has the same value as an excuse as it has elsewhere in moral\nmatters. Few sins are of pure malice; weakness is responsible for the\ndamnation of all, or nearly all, the lost. That very weakness is the\nsin, for virtue is strength. To make this plea therefore is to make no\nplea at all, for we are all weak, desperately weak, especially against\nthe demon of the flesh, and we become weaker by yielding. And we are\nresponsible for the degree of moral debility under which we labor just\nas we are for the degree of guilt we have incurred.\n\nFinally, as God, is no exceptor of persons, He does not distinguish\nbetween souls, and sex makes no difference with Him. In this His\njudgment differs from that of the world which absolves the man and\ncondemns the woman. There is no evident reason why the violation of a\ndivine precept should be less criminal in one human creature than in\nanother. And if the reprobation of society does not follow both\nequally, the wrath of God does, and He will render unto every one\naccording to his and her works.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXVII.\nTHE SINK OF INIQUITY.\n\nTHE malice of lust consists in the abuse of a natural, a quasi-divine\nfaculty, which is prostituted to ignoble purposes foreign to the ends\nby the Creator established. The lines along which this faculty may be\nlegitimately exercised, are laid down by natural and divine laws,\ndestined to preserve God's rights, to maintain order in society and to\nprotect man against himself. The laws result in the foundation of a\nstate, called matrimony, within which the exercise of this human\nprerogative, delegated to man by the Creator, receives the sanction of\ndivine authority, and becomes invested with a sacred character, as\nsacred as its abuse is abominable and odious.\n\nTo disregard and ignore this condition of things and to seek\nsatisfaction for one's passions outside the domain of lawful wedlock,\nis to revolt against this order of creative wisdom and to violate the\nletter of the law. But the intrinsic malice of the evil appears in the\nnature of this violation. This abuse touches life; not life in its\nbeing, but in its source, in the principle that makes all vitality\npossible, which is still more serious. Immorality is therefore a moral\npoisoning of the wells of life. It profanes and desecrates a faculty\nand prerogative so sacred that it is likened to the almighty power of\nthe Creator.\n\nA manifold malice may attach to a single act in violation of the law of\nmoral purity. The burden of a vow in either party incurring guilt,\nwhether that vow be matrimonial or religious, is a circumstance that\nadds injustice or sacrilege to the crime, according to the nature of\nthat vow; and the double guilt is on both parties. If the vow exists in\none and the other delinquent, then the offense is still further\nmultiplied and the guilt aggravated. Blood-relationship adds a specific\nmalice of its own, slight or grievous according to the intimacy of said\nrelationship. Fornication, adultery, sacrilege and incest--these, to\ngive to things their proper names, are terms that specify various\ndegrees of malice and guilt in this matter; and although they do not\nsound well or look well in print, they have a meaning which sensible\nfolks should not ignore.\n\nA lapse from virtue is bad; the habit or vice, voluntarily entertained,\nis infinitely worse. If the one argues weakness, even culpable, the\nother betrays a studied contempt for God and the law, an utter\nperversion of the moral sense that does not even esteem virtue in\nitself; an appalling thralldom of the spirit to the flesh, an appetite\nthat is all ungodly, a gluttony that is bestial. Very often it supposes\na victim held fast in the clutches of unfeeling hoggishness, fascinated\nor subjugated, made to serve, while serviceable; and then cast off\nwithout a shred of respectability for another. It is an ordinary\noccurrence for one of these victims to swallow a deadly potion on being\nshown her folly and left to its consequences; and the human ogre rides\ntriumphantly home in his red automobile.\n\nBut the positions may be reversed; the victim may play the role of\nseductress, and displaying charms that excite the passions, ensnare the\nyouth whose feet are not guided by the lamp of experience, wisdom and\nreligion. This is the human spider, soulless and shameless, using\nsplendid gifts of God to form a web with which to inveigle and entrap a\ntoo willing prey. And the dead flies, who will count them!\n\nThe climax of infamy is reached when this sort of a thing is made, not\na pastime, but a business, when virtue is put on the market with its\nfixed value attached and bartered for a price. There is no outrage on\nhuman feeling greater than this. We are all born of woman; and the\nsight of womanhood thus degraded and profaned would give us more of a\nshock if it were less common. The curse of God is on such wretches as\nply this unnatural trade and live by infamy; not only on them, but on\nthose also who make such traffic possible and lucrative. Considering\nall things, more guilty the latter than the former, perhaps. Active\nco-operation in evil makes one a joint partner in guilt; to encourage\ninfamy is not only to sin, but also to share all the odium thereof;\nwhile he who contributes to the perpetuation of an iniquity of this\nnature is, in a sense, worse than the unfortunates themselves.\n\nThe civil law which seeks to eliminate the social evil of prostitution\nby enactment and process, gives rise, by enactment and process, to\nanother evil almost as widespread. Divorce is a creature of the law,\nand divorce opens the door to concubinage, legalized if you will, but\nconcubinage just the same. The marriage tie is intact after as well as\nbefore the decree of divorce; no human power can break that bond. The\npermission therefore to re-marry is permission to live in adultery, and\nthat permission is, of its very nature, null and void. They who avail\nthemselves of such a permission and live in sin, may count on the\nprotection of the law, but the law will not protect them against the\nwrath of the Almighty who condemns their immoral living.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXVIII.\nWHEREIN NATURE IS OPPOSED.\n\nCERTAIN excesses, such as we have already alluded to, however base and\nabominable in themselves and their effects, have nevertheless this to\ntheir credit that, while violating the positive law of God, they\nrespect at least the fundamental laws of nature, according to which the\nuniverse is constructed and ordered. To satisfy one's depraved\nappetites along forbidden but natural lines, is certainly criminal; but\nan unnatural and beastly instinct is sometimes not-satisfied with such\nabuse and excess; the passion becomes so blinded as to ignore the\ndifference of sex, runs even lower, to the inferior order of brutes.\nThis is the very acme of ungodliness.\n\nThere are laws on the statute books against abominations of this sort;\nand be it said to the shame of a Christian community, said laws find an\nonly too frequent application. Severe as are the penalties, they are\nless an adequate punishment than a public expression of the common\nhorror inspired by the very mention of crimes they are destined to\nchastise. To attain this depth of infamy is at one and the same time to\nsin and to receive the penalty of sin. Here culminates repeated\nviolence to the moral law. When one is sated with ordinary lusts and is\nbent on sweeping the whole gamut of mundane experiences and\nexcitations, that one invariably descends to the unnatural and\nextraordinary, and lives a life of protest against nature.\n\nSt. Paul confirms this. According to him, God, in punishment for sin\ndelivers over people to shameful affections, to a reprobate sense; he\nsuffers them to be a hell unto themselves. And nature seldom fails to\navenge herself for the outrages suffered. She uses the flail of disease\nand remorse, of misery and disgust, and she scourges the culprit to the\nverge of the grave, often to the yawning pit of hell.\n\nPeople shudder at the very thought of such unmentionable things: but\nthere are circles in society in which such sanctimonious shuddering is\na mighty thin veil of hypocrisy. Infinitely more common, and little, if\nany, less unnatural and abominable are the crimes that are killing off\nthe old stock that once possessed the land and making the country\ndependent for increase of population on the floods of immigration. The\nold Puritan families are almost extinct; Boston is more Irish than\nDublin. The phenomenon is so striking here that it is called New\nEnglandism. Why are there so few large families outside the Irish and\nCanadian elements? Why are there seen so few children in the\nfashionable districts of our large cities? Why this blast of sterility\nwith which the land is cursed? Look behind the phenomenon, and you will\nfind the cause; and the finding will make you shudder. And if only\nthose shudder who are free from stain, the shuddering will be scarcely\naudible. Onan and Malthus as household gods are worse than the gods of\nRome.\n\nMeanwhile, the unit deteriorates alongside the family, being given over\nto a reprobate sense that is centered in self, that furnishes, against\nall law, its own satisfactions, and reaps, in all justice, its\ninevitable harvest of woe. To what extent this vice is common it would\nserve no purpose to examine; students of criminology have more than\nonce made known their views on the matter. The character of its malice,\nboth moral and physical, needs no comment; nature is outraged. But it\nhas this among its several features; the thralldom to which it subjects\nits victim has nothing outside itself to which it may be compared.\nMan's self is his own greatest tyrant; there are no tortures so\nexquisite as those we provide for ourselves. While therefore we reprove\nthe culprit, we commiserate with the unfortunate victim, and esteem\nthat there is none more worthy of sympathy, conditioned, of course, on\na state of mind and soul on his part that seeks relief and freedom;\notherwise, it were pity wasted.\n\nWe have done with this infernal category of sin and filth. Yet we would\nremark right here that for the most part, as far as they are general\nand common, these excesses are the result of one cause; and that cause\nis everyday systematic Godlessness such as our public schools are\nlargely responsible for. This system is responsible for a want of vital\nChristianity, of a lack of faith and religion that penetrates the human\nfibre and makes God and morality a factor in every deed. Deprived of\nthis, youth has nothing to fall back on when the hour of temptation\ncomes; and when he falls, nothing to keep him from the bottom of the\npit.\n\nIt is impossible to put this argument in detail before the Christian\nand Catholic parent. If the parent docs not see it, it is because that\nparent is deficient in the most essential quality of a parent. Nothing\nbut the atmosphere of a religious school can save our youth from being\nvictims of that maelstrom of impurity that sweeps the land. And that\nalone, with the rigid principles of morality there inculcated, can save\nthe parents of to-morrow from the blight and curse of New Englandism.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXIX.\nHEARTS.\n\nTHE heart, the seat of the affections, is, after the mind whose\nauthority and direction it is made to obey, man's noblest faculty; but\nit may, in the event of its contemning reason's dictates, become the\nsource and fountain-head of inordinate lust and an instrument of much\nmoral disaster and ruin. When the intelligence becomes powerless to\ncommand and to say what and when and how the affections shall disport\nthemselves, then man becomes a slave to his heart and is led like an\nass by the nose hither and thither; and when nature thus runs\nunrestrained and wild, it makes for the mudholes of lust wherein to\nwallow and besot itself.\n\nThe heart is made to love what is good; now, good is real or apparent.\nLove is blind, and needs reason to discern for it what is good and what\nis not, reason to direct its affections into their legitimate channels.\nBut the heart may refuse to be thus controlled, swayed by the\nwhisperings of ignorant pride and conceit; or it may be unable to\nreceive the impulse of the reason on account of the unhealthy fumes\nthat arise from a too exuberant animal nature unchastened by\nself-denial. Then it is that, free to act as it lists, it accepts\nindiscriminately everything with an appearance of good, in which gets\nmixed up much of that which appeals to the inferior appetites. And in\nthe end it gets lost.\n\nAgain, the heart is a power for good or evil; it may be likened to a\nmagazine, holding within its throbbing sides an explosive deposit of\nuntold energy and puissance, capable of all things within the range of\nthe human. While it may lift man to the very pinnacle of goodness, it\nmay also sink him to the lowest level of infamy. Only, in one case, it\nis spiritualized love, in the other, it is carnal; in one case it obeys\nthe spirit, in the other, the flesh; in one case its true name is\ncharity, in the other, it is animal, sexual instinct, and it is only\nimproperly called love. For God is love. Love therefore is pure. That\nwhich is not pure is not love.\n\nPeople who trifle with the affections usually come to woe sooner or\nlater, sooner rather than later; affairs of the heart are always\nmorally malodorous affairs. Frequently there is evil on one side at\nleast, in intention, from the start. The devil's game is to play on the\nchaste attachment, and in an unguarded moment, to swing it around to\nhis point. If the victim does not balk at the first shock and surprise,\nthe game is won; for long experience has made him confident of being\nable to make the counterfeit look like the real; and it requires, as a\ngeneral rule, little argument to make us look at our faults in their\nbest light.\n\nMany a pure love has degenerated and many a virtue fallen, why? because\npeople forget who and what they are, forget they are human, forget they\nare creatures of flesh and blood, predisposed to sin, saturated with\nconcupiscence and naturally frail as a reed against the seductions of\nthe wily one. They forget this, and act as though theirs were art\nangelic, instead of a human, nature. They imagine themselves proof\nagainst that which counts such victims as David and Solomon, which\nwould cause the fall of a Father of the desert, or even of an angel\nfrom heaven encumbered with the burden we carry, if he despised the\nclaims of ordinary common sense.\n\nAnd this forgetfulness on their part, let it be remembered, is wholly\nvoluntary and culpable, at least in its cause. They may not have been\nattentive at the precise moment that the flames of passion reached the\nmine of their affections; but they were well aware that things would\ncome inevitably to such a pass. And when the mine went up, as it was\nnatural, what wonder if disaster followed! Who is to blame but\nthemselves? People do not play with matches around a powder magazine;\nand if they do, very little consolation comes with the knowledge of\ntheir folly when they are being picked up in sections from out of the\nruins.\n\nOf course there are easier victims than these, such as would not\nrecognize true inter-sexual love if they saw it through a magnifying\nglass; everything of the nature of a fancy or whim, of a sensation or\nemotion with them is love. Love-sick maidens are usually soft-brained,\nand their languorous swains, lascivious. The latter pose as \"killers;\"\nthe former wear their heart on their sleeve, and are convinced that\nevery second man they meet who treats them gallantly is smitten with\ntheir charms and is passionately in love with them.\n\nSome go in for excitement and novelty, to break the monotony of\nvirtuous restraint. They are anxious for a little adventure and\nromance. A good thing, too, to have these exploits to narrate to their\nfriends. But they do not tell all to their friends; they would be\nashamed to. If said friends are wise they can supply the deficiencies.\nAnd when it is all over, it is the same old story of the man that did\nnot know the gun was loaded.\n\nThey therefore who would remain pure must of all necessity keep custody\nover their heart's affections, make right reason and faith their guide\nand make the will force obedience thereto. If wrong attachments are\nformed, then there is nothing to do but to eradicate them, to cut, tear\nand crush; they must be destroyed at any cost. A pennyweight of\nprudence might have prevented the evil; it will now take mortification\nin large and repeated doses to undo it. In this alone is there\nsalvation.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXX.\nOCCASIONS.\n\nOCCASIONS of sin are persons, places or things that may easily lead us\ninto sin: this definition of the little catechism is simple and clear\nand requires no comment. It is not necessary that said places or\nthings, or even said persons, be evil in themselves; it is sufficient\nthat contact with, or proximity to, them induce one to commit an evil.\nIt may happen, and sometimes does, that a person without any evil\ndesign whatever become an occasion of sin for another. The blame\ntherefore does not necessarily lie with objects, but rather with the\nsubject.\n\nOccasions are of two kinds: the remote or far and the proximate or\nnear; they differ in the degree of facility with which they furnish\ntemptation, and in the quality and nature of such temptation. In the\nformer, the danger of falling is less, in the latter it is more,\nprobable. In theory, it is impossible to draw the line and say just\nwhen an occasion ceases to be proximate and becomes remote; but in the\nconcrete the thing is easy enough. If I have a well-grounded fear, a\nfear made prudent by experience, that in this or that conjuncture I\nshall sin, then it is a near occasion for me. If, however, I can feel\nwith knowledge and conviction that I am strong enough to overcome the\ninevitable temptation arising from this other conjunction of\ncircumstances, the occasion is only remote.\n\nThus, since danger in moral matters is nearly always relative; what is\na remote occasion for one may be a proximate occasion for another.\nProneness to evil is not the same in us all, for we have not all the\nsame temperament and the same virtue. Two individuals may assist at a\nball or a dance or a play, the one secure from sin, immune against\ntemptation, the other a manifold victim of his or her folly. The dance\nor spectacle may not be bad in itself, it is not bad in fact for one,\nit is positively evil for the other and a near occasion of sin.\n\nRemote occasions cannot always be avoided, they are so numerous and\nfrequent; besides the evil they contain is a purely imaginative, and\ntherefore negligible, quantity. There may be guilt however, in seeking\nsuch occasions and without reason exposing ourselves to their possible\ndangers; temerity is culpable; he that loves danger shall perish.\n\nWith the other kind, it is different. The simple fact of embracing a\nproximate occasion of sin is a grievous fault, even in the event of our\naccidentally not succumbing to the temptation to which we are exposed.\nThere is an evil in such rashness independent of its consequences. He\ntherefore who persists in visiting a place where there is every\nfacility for sinning and where he has frequently sinned, does a deed of\ncrime by going there; and whatever afterwards occurs, or does not\noccur, affects that crime not in the least. The same is true of reading\ncertain books, novels and love-stories, for people of a certain\nspiritual complexion. The same is true of company-keeping,\nstreet-walking, familiarity and loose conversation. Nor can anything\ndifferent be said of such liberties, consented to or merely tolerated,\nas embracing and kissing, amorous effusions and all perilous amusements\nof this nature. When experience shows these things to be fraught with\ndanger, then they become sinful in themselves, and can be indulged in\nonly in contempt of the law of God and to our own serious spiritual\ndetriment.\n\nBut suppose I cannot avoid the occasion of sin, cannot remove it. What\nthen?\n\nIf it is a clear case of proximate occasion of sin, and all means fail\nto change it, then the supposition of impossibility is a ridiculous\none. It is paramount to asserting that sin and offense of God is\nsometimes necessary; and to talk thus is to talk nonsense. Sin is a\ndeliberate act of a free will; mention necessity in the same breath,\nand you destroy the notion of sin. There can never be an impossibility\nof avoiding sin; consequently, there can never be an impossibility of\navoiding a near occasion of sin.\n\nIt may be hard, very difficult; but that is another thing. But, as we\nhave already said, the difficulty is rather within than without us, it\narises from a lack of will power. But hard or easy, these occasions\nmust nevertheless be removed. Let the suffering entailed be what it\nmay, the eye must be plucked out, the arm must be lopped off, to use\nthe Saviour's figurative language, if in no other way the soul can be\nsaved from sin. Better to leave your father's house, better to give up\nyour very life, than to damn your soul for all eternity. But extremes\nare rarely called for; small sacrifices often cost more than great\nones. A good dose of ordinary, everyday mortification and penance\ngoes a long way toward producing the necessary effect. An ounce of\nself-denial will work miracles in a sluggard, cowardly soul.\n\nIt would be well on occasion to remember this, especially when one in\nsuch a state is thinking seriously of going to confession: if he is not\nprepared to make the required effort, then he had better stay away\nuntil such a time as he is willing. For if he states his case\ncorrectly, he will not receive absolution; if his avowal is not\naccording to fact, his confession is void, perhaps sacrilegious. Have\ndone with sin before you can expect to have your sins forgiven.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXXI.\nSCANDAL.\n\nON only rare occasions do people who follow the bent of their unbridled\npassions bethink themselves of the double guilt that frequently\nattaches to their sins. Seemingly satisfied with the evil they have\nwrought unto their own souls, they choose to ignore the wrong they may\nhave done unto others as a consequence of their sinful doings. They\nbelieve in the principle that every soul is personally responsible for\nits own damnation: which is true; but they forget that many elements\nmay enter as causes into such a calamity. We are in nowise isolated\nbeings in this world; our lives may, and do, affect the lives of\nothers, and influence them sometimes to an extraordinary extent. We\nshall have, each of us, to answer one day for results of such\ninfluence; there is no man but is, in this sense, his brother's\nguardian.\n\nThere are, who deny this, like Cain. Yet we Icnow that Jesus Christ\nspoke clearly His mind in regard to scandal, and the emphasis He lays\non His anathemas leaves no room to doubt of His judgment on the\nsubject. Scandal, in fact, is murder; not corporal murder, which is a\nvengeance-crying abomination, but spiritual murder, heinous over the\nother in the same measure as the soul's value transcends that of the\nbody. Kill the body, and the soul may live and be saved; kill the soul\nand it is lost eternally.\n\nProperly speaking, scandal is any word or deed, evil or even with an\nappearance of evil, of a nature to furnish an occasion of spiritual\ndownfall, to lead another info sin. It does not even matter whether the\nresults be intended or merely suffered to occur; it does not even\nmatter if no results follow at all. It is sufficient that the\nstumbling-block of scandal be placed in the way of another to his\nspiritual peril, and designed by nature to make him fall; on him who\nplaced it, is the guilt of scandal.\n\nThe act of scandal consists in making sin easier to commit--as though\nit were not already easy enough to sin--for another. Natural grace, of\nwhich we are not totally bereft, raises certain barriers to protect and\ndefend the weak and feeble. Conspicuous among these are ignorance and\nshame; evil sometimes offers difficulties, the ones physical, the\nothers spiritual, such as innate delicacy, sense of dignity, timidity,\ninstinctive repugnance for filth, human respect, dread of consequences,\netc. These stand on guard before the soul to repel the first advances\nof the tempter which are the most dangerous; the Devil seldom unmasks\nhis heavy batteries until the advance-posts of the soul are taken. It\nis the business of scandal to break down these barriers, and for\nscandal this work is as easy as it is nefarious. For curiosity is a\nhungering appetite, virtue is often protected with a very thin veil,\nand vice can be made to lose its hideousness and assume charms, to\nuntried virtue, irresistible. There is nothing doing for His Satanic\nMajesty while scandal is in the field; he looks on and smiles.\n\nThere may be some truth in the Darwinian theory after all, if we judge\nfrom the imitative propensities of the species, probably an inherited\ntrait of our common ancestor, the monkey. At any rate, we are often\nmore easily led by example than by conviction; example leads us against\nour convictions. Asked why we did this or that, knowing we should not\nhave done it, we answer with simian honesty, \"because such a one did\nit, or invited us to do it.\" We get over a good many old-fashioned\nnotions concerning modesty and purity, after listening to the\nexperiences of others; we forget to be ashamed in the presence of the\nbrazen, the unabashed and the impudent. We feel partially justified in\ndoing what we see done by One to whom we are accustomed to look up. \"If\nhe acts thus,\" we say, \"how can it be so very wrong in me; and if\neverybody--and everybody sometimes means a very few--if everybody does\nso, it cannot be so bad as I first imagined.\" Thus may be seen the\nworkings of scandal in the mind and soul of its victim. Remembering our\nnatural proneness to carnal indulgence, it is not surprising that the\nvictims of scandal are so many. But this cannot be taken as an apology\nfor the scandal-giver; rather the contrary, since the malice of his sin\nhas possibilities so unbounded.\n\nScandal supposes an inducement to commit sin, which is not the case\nwhen the receiver is already all disposed to sin and is as bad as the\ngiver. Nor can scandal be said properly to be given when those who\nreceive it are in all probability immune against the evil. Some people\nsay they are scandalized when they are only shocked; if what shocked\nthem has nothing in it to induce them into sinning, then their received\nscandal is only imaginative, nor has any been given. Then, the number\nof persons scandalized must be considered as an aggravating\ncircumstance. Finally, the guilt of scandal is greater or less\naccording to the helplessness of the victim or intended victim, and to\nthe sacredness of his or her right to immunity from temptation,\nchildren being most sacred in this respect.\n\nOf course God is merciful and forgives us our offenses however great\n'they may be. We may undo a deal of wrong committed by us in this life,\nand die in the state of grace, even after the most abominable crimes.\nTheologically, therefore, the idea has little to commend itself, but it\nmust have occurred to more than one: how does one feel in heaven,\nknowing that there is in hell, at that moment, one or many through his\nor her agency! How mysterious is the justice of God to suffer such a\nstate of affairs! And although theoretically possible, how can anyone\ncount on such a contingency in his or her particular case! If the\nscandalous would reflect seriously on this, they would be less willing\nto take the chances offered by a possibility of this nature.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXXII.\nNOT GOOD TO BE ALONE.\n\nA MAN may come to discover that the state in which he finds himself\nplaced, is not the one for which he was evidently intended by the\nMaker. We do not all receive the same gifts because our callings are\ndifferent; each of us is endowed in accordance and in harmony with the\nends of the Creator in making us. Some men should marry, others may\nnot; but the state of celibacy is for the few, and not for the many,\nthese few depending solely on an abundant grace of God.\n\nAgain, one may become alive to the fact that to remain in an abnormal\nposition means to seriously jeopardize his soul's salvation; celibacy\nmay, as for many it does, spell out for him, clearly and plainly,\neternal damnation. It is to no purpose here to examine the causes of,\nand reasons for, such a condition of affairs. We take the fact as it\nstands, plain and evident, a stern, hard fact that will not be downed,\nbecause it is supported by the living proof of habit and conduct;\nliving and continuing to live a celibate, taking him as he is and as\nthere is every token of his remaining without any reasonable ground for\nexpecting a change, this man is doomed to perdition. His passions have\nmade him their slave; he cannot, it is morally impossible for him to do\nso, remain continent.\n\nSuppose again that the Almighty has created the state of wedlock for\njust such emergencies, whereby a man may find a remedy for his\nweaknesses, an outlet for his passions, a regulator of his life here\nbelow and a security against damnation hereafter; and this is precisely\nthe case, for the ends of marriage are not only to perpetuate the\nspecies, but also to furnish a remedy for natural concupiscence and to\nraise a barrier against the flood of impurity.\n\nNow, the case being as stated, need a Catholic, young or--a no longer\nyoung--man look long or strive hard to find his path of duty already\nclearly traced? And in making this application we refer to man, not to\nwoman, for reasons that are obvious; we refer, again, to those among\nmen whose spiritual sense is not yet wholly dead, who have not entirely\nlost all respect for virtue in itself: who still claim to have an\nimmortal soul and hope to save it; but who have been caught in the\nmaelstrom of vice and whose passions and lusts have outgrown in\nstrength the ordinary resisting powers of natural virtue and religion\nincomplete and half-hearted. These can appreciate their position; it\nwould be well for them to do so; the faculty for so doing may not\nalways be left with them.\n\nThe obligation to marry, to increase and multiply, was given to mankind\nin general, and applies to man as a whole, and not to the individual;\nthat is, in the common and ordinary run of human things. But the\ncircumstances with which we are dealing are outside the normal, sphere;\nthey are extraordinary, that is say, they do not exist in accordance\nwith the plan and order established by God; they constitute a disorder\nresulting from unlawful indulgence and wild impiety. It may therefore\nbe, and it frequently is the case, that the general obligation to marry\nparticularize itself and fall with its full weight on the individual,\nthis one or that one, according to the circumstances of his life. Then\nit is that the voice of God's authority reaches the ear of the unit and\nsays to him in no uncertain accents: thou shalt marry. And behind that\ndecree of God stands divine justice to vindicate the divine right.\n\nWe do not deny but that, absolutely speaking, recourse to this remedy\nmay not be imperiously demanded; but we do claim that the absolute has\nnothing whatever to do with the question which is one of relative\nfacts. What a supposed man may do in this or that given circumstance\ndoes not in the least alter the position of another real, live man who\nwill not do this or that thing in a given circumstance; he will not,\nbecause, morally speaking, he cannot; and he cannot, simply because\nthrough excesses he has forgotten how. And of other reasons to justify\nnon-compliance with the law, there can be none; it is here a. question\nof saving one's soul; inconveniences and difficulties and obstacles\nhave no meaning in such a contingency.\n\nAnd, mind you, the effects of profligate celibacy are farther-reaching\nthan many of us would suppose at first blush. The culprit bears the\nodium of it in his soul. But what about the state of those--or rather\nof her, whoever she may be, known or unknown--whom he, in the order of\nProvidence, is destined to save from the precariousness of single life?\nIf it is his duty to take a wife, whose salvation as well as his own,\nperhaps depends on the fulfilment of that duty, and if he shirks his\nduty, shall he not be held responsible for the results in her as well\nas in himself, since he could, and she could not, ward off the evil?\n\nIt has come to such a pass nowadays that celibacy, as a general thing,\nis a misnomer for profligacy. Making all due allowance for honorable\nexceptions, the unmarried male who is not well saturated with\nspirituality and faith is notoriously gallinaceous in his morals. In\ncertain classes, he is expected to sow his wild oats before he is out\nof his teens; and by this is meant that he will begin young to tear\ninto shreds the Sixth Commandment so as not to be bothered with it\nlater in life. If he married he would be safe.\n\nFinally what kind of an existence is it for any human being, with power\nto do otherwise, to pass through life a worthless, good-for-nothing\nnonentity, living for self, shirking the sacred duties of paternity,\ndefrauding nature and God and sowing corruption where he might be\nlaying the foundation of a race that may never die? There is no one to\nwhom he has done good and no one owes him a tear when his barren\ncarcass is being given over as food to the worms. He is a rotten link\non the chain of life and the curse of oblivion will vindicate the\nclaims of his unborn generations. Young man, marry, marry now, and be\nsomething in the world besides an eyesore of unproductiveness and\nworthlessness; do something that will make somebody happy besides\nyourself; show that you passed, and leave something behind that will\nremember you and bless your name.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXXIII.\nA HELPING HAND.\n\nTHE moralist is usually severe, and the quality of his censure is\nmerciless, when he attempts to treat the unwholesome theme of moral\ndeformity; and all his efforts are mere attempts, for no human language\ncan do full justice to such a theme, or fully express the contempt such\nexcesses deserve. It is just, then, that, when he stands in the\npresence of the moral leper who blushes not for his degradation, he\nflay with the whip of scorn and contempt, scourge with anathema and\nbrand him with every stigma of infamy, in order that the load of\nopprobrium thus heaped upon his guilty head may at least deter the\nclean from such defilement.\n\nBut, if guilt is always guilt, the quality of guilt is varied. Just as\nall virtue is not equally meritorious, so to other sources than\npersonal unworthiness may often be traced moral debility that strives\nagainst natural causes, necessary conditions of environment and an\never-present and ever-active influence for evil. A fall does not always\nbetoken profound degradation nor a stain, acute perversity of the will.\nThose therefore who wrestle manfully with the effects of regretted\nlapses or weaknesses, who fight down, sometimes perhaps unsuccessfully,\nthe strong tendencies of a too exuberant animal nature, who strive to\nneutralize an influence that unduly oppresses them,--against these,\nguilty though they may have been, is not directed the moralist's\nunmeasured censure. His reproaches in such cases tend less to condemn\nthan to awake to a sense of moral responsibility; earnestness in\npointing out remedy and safeguards takes the place of severity against\nwilfulness. For he knows that not a few sentences of condemnation\nChrist writes on the sands, as He did in a celebrated case, and many an\nover-zealous accuser he has confounded, like the villainous Pharisees\nwhom He challenged to show a hand white enough to be worthy to cast the\nfirst stone.\n\nEvidently such pity and commiseration should not serve to make vice\nless unlovely and thus undo the very work it is intended to perform. It\nshould not have the characteristics of certain books and plays that\npretend to teach morality by exposing vice in all its seductiveness.\nOver-sensitive and maudlin sympathy is as ridiculous as it is\nunhealthy; its tendency is principally to encourage and spoil. But a\njudicious, discreet and measured sympathy will lift up the fallen,\nstrengthen the weak and help the timorous over many a difficulty. It\nwill suggest, too, the means best calculated to insure freedom from\nslavery of the passions.\n\nThe first of these is self-denial, which is the inseparable companion\nof chastity; when they are not found together, seldom does either\nexist. And by self-denial is here meant the destruction of that eternal\nr reference for self, that is at the bottom of all uncleanness, that\nmakes all things, however sacred, subservient to one's own pleasures,\nthat considers nothing unlawful but what goes against the grain of\nnatural impulse and natural appetites. There may be other causes, but\nthis self-love is a primary one. Say what you will, but one does not\nfall from his own level; the moral world is like the physical; if you\nare raised aloft in disregard for the laws of truth, you are going to\ncome down with a thud. If you imagine all the pleasures of life made\nfor you, and become lawful because your nature craves for them, you are\ntaking a too high estimate of yourself; you are going before a fall He\nwho takes a correct measure of himself, gets his bearings in relation\nto God, comes to realize his own weak points and several deficiencies,\nand acknowledges the obligations such a state of affairs places upon\nhim, that one may sin, but he will not go far.\n\nHe may fall, because he is human, because strength sufficient to guard\nus against the assaults of impurity is not from us, but from God. The\nspirit of humility, therefore, which makes known to him his own\ninsufficiency, must be fortified with the spirit of faith which makes\nhim ask for support through prayer. It is faith that makes prayer\npossible, and living faith, the spirit of faith, that makes us pray\naright. This kind of prayer need not express itself in words; it may be\na habit, a long drawn out desire, an habitual longing for help coupled\nwith firm confidence in God's mercy to grant our request. No state of\nsoul however disordered can long resist such a power, and no habit of\nevil but in time will be annihilated by it.\n\nThe man or woman who undertakes to keep himself or herself pure, or to\nrise out of a habit of sin without the liberal use of divine\nsupplication has in hand a very ungrateful task, and he or she will\nrealize it before going far. And unless that prayer is sincere and\nheartfelt, a prayer full of faith that will not entertain the thought\nof failure, every effort will be barren of results. You must speak to\nGod as to one near you, and remember that He is near you all the time.\n\nThen there are the sacraments to repair every breach and to heal every\nwound. Penance will cleanse you, communion will adorn and equip you\nanew. Confession will give you a better knowledge of yourself every\ntime you go; the Food of God will strengthen every fibre of your soul\nand steel you against the seductions that otherwise would make you a\nready victim. Don't go once a year, go ten, twenty times and more, if\nnecessary, go until you feel that you own yourself, that you can\ncommand and be obeyed. Then you will not have to be told to stop; you\nwill be safe.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXXIV.\nTHOU SHALT NOT STEAL.\n\nTHE Seventh Commandment is protective of the right of property which is\nvested in every human being enjoying the use of reason. Property means\nthat which belongs to one, that which is one's own, to have and to\nhold, or to dispose of, at one's pleasure, or to reclaim in the event\nof actual dispossession. The right of property embraces all things to\nwhich may be affixed the seal of ownership; and it holds good until the\nowner relinquishes his claim, or forfeits or loses his title without\noffense to justice. This natural faculty to possess excludes every\nalien right, and supposes in all others the duty and obligation to\nrespect it. The respect that goes as far as not relieving the owner of\nhis goods is not enough; it must safeguard him against all damage and\ninjury to said goods; otherwise his right is non-existent.\n\nAll violations of this right come under the general head of stealing.\nPeople call it theft, when it is effected with secrecy and slyness;\nrobbery, when there is a suggestion of force or violence. The swindler\nis he who appropriates another's goods by methods of gross deception or\nfalse pretenses while the embezzler transfers to himself the funds\nentrusted to his care. Petty thieving is called pilfering or filching;\nstealing on a large scale usually has less dishonorable qualificatives.\nBoodling and lobbying are called politics; watering stock, squeezing\nout legitimate competition, is called financiering; wholesale\nconfiscation and unjust conquest is called statesmanship. Give it\nwhatever name you like, it is all stealing; whether the culprit be\nliberally rewarded or liberally punished, he nevertheless stands\namenable to God's justice which is outraged wherever human justice\nsuffers.\n\nOf course the sin of theft has its degrees of gravity, malice and\nguilt, to determine which, that is, to fix exactly the value of stolen\ngoods sufficient to constitute a grievous fault, is not the simplest\nand easiest of moral problems. The extent of delinquency may be\ndependent upon various causes and complex conditions. On the one hand,\nthe victim must be considered in himself, and the amount of injury\nsustained by him; on the other, justice is offended generally in all\ncases of theft, and because justice is the corner stone of society, it\nmust be protected at all hazards. It is only by weighing judiciously\nall these different circumstances that we can come to enunciate an\napproximate general rule that will serve as a guide in the ordinary\ncontingencies of life.\n\nThus, of two individuals deprived by theft of a same amount of worldly\ngoods, the one may suffer thereby to a much greater extent than the\nother; he who suffers more is naturally more reluctant to part with his\ngoods, and a greater injustice is done to him than to the other. The\nsin committed against him is therefore greater than that committed\nagainst the other. A rich man may not feel the loss of a dollar,\nwhereas for another less prosperous the loss of less than that sum\nmight be of the nature of a calamity. To take therefore unjustly from a\nperson what to that person is a notable amount is a grievous sin. It is\nuniformly agreed that it is a notable loss for a man to be unduly\ndeprived of what constitutes a day's sustenance. This is the minimum of\ngrievous matter concerning theft.\n\nBut this rule will evidently not hold good applied on a rising scale to\nmore and more extensive fortunes; for a time would come when it would\nbe possible without serious guilt to appropriate good round sums from\nthose abundantly blessed with this world's goods.\n\nThe disorders necessarily attendant on such a moral rule are only too\nevident; and it is plain that the law of God cannot countenance abuses\nof this nature. Justice therefore demands that there be a certain fixed\nsum beyond which one may not go without incurring serious guilt; and\nthis, independent of the fortune of the person who suffers. Theologians\nhave fixed that amount approximately, in this country, at five dollars.\nThis means that when such a sum is taken, in all cases, the sin is\nmortal. It is not always necessary, it is seldom necessary, that one\nshould steal this much in order to offend grievously; but when the\nthief reaches this amount, be his victim ever so wealthy, he is guilty\nof grave injustice.\n\nThis rule applies to all cases in which the neighbor is made to suffer\nunjustly in his lawful possessions; and it effects all wrongdoers\nwhether they steal or destroy another's goods or co-operate\nefficaciously in such deeds of sin. It matters not whether the harm be\nwrought directly or indirectly, since in either case there may be moral\nfault; and it must be remembered that gross negligence may make one\nresponsible as well as malice aforethought.\n\nThe following are said to co-operate in crime to the extent of becoming\njoint-partners with the principal agent in guilt: those in whose name\nthe wrong is done, in obedience to their orders or as a result of any\nother means employed; those who influence the culprit by suggesting\nmotives and reasons for his crime or by pointing out efficient means of\narriving thereat; those who induce others to commit evil by playing on\ntheir weaknesses thereby subjecting them to what is known as moral\nforce; those who harbor the thief and conceal his stolen property\nagainst their recovery; those whose silence is equivalent to\napprobation, permission or official consent; those finally who before,\nduring or after the deed, abstain from performing a plain duty in\npreventing, deterring or bringing to justice the guilty party. Such\npersons as the foregoing participate as abettors in crime and share all\nthe guilt of the actual criminals; sometimes the former are even more\nguilty than the latter.\n\nThe Tenth Commandment which forbids us to covet our neighbor's goods,\nbears the same relation to the Seventh as the Ninth does to the Sixth.\nIt must, however, be borne in mind that all such coveting supposes\ninjustice in desire, that is, in the means by which we desire to obtain\nwhat is not ours. To wish for, to long ardently for something that\nappeals to one's like and fancy is not sinful; the wrong consists in\nthe desire to acquire it unjustly, to steal it, and thereby work damage\nunto the neighbor. It is a natural weakness in man to be dissatisfied\nwith what he has and to sigh after what he has not; very few of us are\nfree from this failing. But so long as our cravings and hankerings are\nnot tainted with injustice, we are innocent of evil.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXXV.\nPETTY THEFTS.\n\nA QUESTION may arise as to petty thefts, venial in themselves, but oft\nrepeated and aggregating in the long run a sum of considerable value:\nhow are we to deal with such cases? Should peculations of this sort be\ntaken singly, and their individual malice determined, without reference\nto the sum total of injustice caused; or should no severe judgment be\npassed until such a time as sufficient matter be accumulated to make\nthe fault grievous? In other words, is there nothing but venial sin in\nthefts of little values, or is there only one big sin at the end? The\ndifficulty is a practical one.\n\nIf petty thefts are committed with a view to amass a notable sum, the\nsimple fact of such an intention makes the offense a mortal one. For,\nas we have already remarked in treating of the human act, our deeds may\nbe, and frequently are, vitiated by the intention we have in performing\nthem. If we do something with evil intent and purpose, our action is\nevil whether the deed in itself be indifferent or even good. Here the\nintention is to cause a grave injustice; the deed is only a petty\ntheft, but it serves as a means to a more serious offense. The act\ntherefore takes its malice from the purpose of the agent and becomes\nsinful in a high degree.\n\nAs to each repeated theft, that depends again on the intention of the\nculprit. If in the course of his pilferings he no longer adverts to his\nfirst purpose and has no intention in stealing beyond that of helping\nhimself to a little of his neighbor's goods, he is guilty of nothing\nmore than a venial sin. If, however, the initial purpose is present at\nevery act, if at every fresh peculation the intention to accumulate is\nrenewed explicitly or implicitly, then every theft is identical with\nthe first in malice, and the offender commits mortal sin as often as he\nsteals. Thus the state of soul of one who filches after this fashion is\nnot sensibly affected by his arriving at a notable sum of injustice in\nthe aggregate. The malice of his conduct has already been established;\nit is now completed in deed.\n\nA person who thievishly appropriates small sums, but whose pilferings\nhave no moral reference to each other, will find himself a mortal\noffender the moment his accumulated injustices reach the amount we have\nqualified as notable, provided he be at that moment aware of the fact,\nor even if he only have a doubt about the matter. And this is true\nwhether the stolen sums be taken from one or from several persons. Even\nin the latter case, although no one person suffers serious damage or\nprejudice, justice however is seriously violated and the intention of\nthe guilty party is really to perpetrate grave injustice.\n\nHowever, such thefts as these which in the end become accumulative,\nmust of their nature be successive and joined together by some bond of\nmoral union, otherwise they could never be considered a. whole. By this\nis meant that there must not exist between the different single thefts\nan interruption or space of time such as to make it impossible to\nconsider reasonably the several deeds as forming one general action.\nThe time generally looked upon as sufficient to prevent a moral union\nof this kind is two months. In the absence therefore of a specific\nintention to arrive at a large amount by successive thefts, it must be\nsaid that such thefts as are separated by an intervening space of two\nmonths can never be accounted as parts of one grave injustice, and a\nmortal sin can never be committed by one whose venial offenses are of\nthis nature. Of course if there be an evil purpose, that alone is\nsufficient to establish a moral union between single acts of theft\nhowever considerable the interval that separates them.\n\nSeveral persons may conspire to purloin each a limited amount. The\ncircumstance of conspiracy, connivance or collusion makes each\nco-operator in the deed responsible for the whole damage done; and if\nthe amount thus defrauded be notable, each is guilty of mortal sin.\n\nWe might here add in favor of children who take small things from their\nparents and of wives who sometimes relieve their husbands of small\nchange, that it is natural that a man be less reluctant to being\ndefrauded in small matters by his own than by total Strangers. It is\nonly reasonable therefore that more latitude be allowed such\ndelinquents when there is question of computing the amount to be\nconsidered notable; perhaps the amount might be doubled in their favor.\nThe same might be said in favor of those whose petty thefts are\ndirected against several victims instead of one, since the injury\nsustained individually is less.\n\nThe best plan is to leave what does not belong to one severely alone.\nIn other sins there may be something gained in the long run, but here\nno such illusion can be entertained, for the spectre of restitution, as\nwe shall see, follows every injustice as a shadow follows its object,\nand its business is to see that no man profit by his ill-gotten goods.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXXVI.\nAN OFT EXPLOITED, BUT SPECIOUS PLEA.\n\nIT is not an infrequent occurrence for persons given to the habit of\npetty thefts and fraud, to seek to justify their irregular conduct by a\npretense of justice which they call secret compensation. They stand\narraigned before the bar of their conscience on the charge of niching\nsmall sums, usually from their employers; they have no will to desist;\nthey therefore plead not guilty, and have nothing so much at heart as\nto convince themselves that they act within their rights. They\nelaborate a theory of justice after their ideas, or rather, according\nto their own desires; they bolster it up with facts that limp all the\nway from half-truths to downright falsities; and thus acquit themselves\nof sin, and go their way in peace. A judge is always lenient when he\ntries his own case.\n\nSecret compensation is the taking surreptitiously from another of the\nequivalent of what is due to one, of what has been taken and is kept\nagainst all justice, in order to indemnify oneself for losses\nsustained. This sort of a thing, in theory at least, has a perfectly\nplausible look, nor, in fact, is it contrary to justice, when all the\nnecessary conditions are fulfilled to the letter. But the cases in\nwhich these conditions are fulfilled are so few and rare that they may\nhardly be said to exist at all. It is extremely difficult to find such\nA case, and nearly always when this practice is resorted to, the order\nof justice is violated.\n\nAnd if common sense in the case of any given individual fail to show\nhim this truth, we here quote for his benefit an authority capable of\nputting all his doubts at rest. The following proposition was advanced:\n\"Domestic servants who adjudge themselves underpaid for services\nrendered, may appropriate to themselves by stealth a compensation.\"\nThis proposition has received the full weight of papal condemnation. It\ncannot be denied that it applies to all who engage their services for\nhire. To maintain the contrary is to revolt against the highest\nauthority in the Church; to practise it is purely and simply to Sin.\n\nA case is often made out on the grounds that wages are small, work very\nhard and the laborer therefore insufficiently remunerated. But to\nconclude therefrom the right to help oneself to the employer's goods,\nis a strange manner of reasoning, while it opens the door to all manner\nof injustice. Where is there a man, whatever his labor and pay, who\ncould not come to the same conclusion? Who may not consider himself\nill-paid? And who is there that really thinks he is not worth more than\nhe gets? There is no limit to the value one may put on one's own\nservices; and he who is justified to-day in taking a quarter of a\ndollar, would be equally justified to-morrow in appropriating the whole\nconcern. And then what becomes of honesty, and the right of property?\nAnd what security can anyone have against the private judgment of his\nneighbor?\n\nAnd what about the contract according to the terms of which you are to\ngive your services and to receive in return a stipulated amount? Was\nthere any clause therein by which you are entitled to change the terms\nof said contract without consulting the other party interested? You\ndon't think he would mind it. You don't think anything of the kind; you\nknow he will and does mind it. He may be generous, but he is not a\nfool.\n\n\"But I make up for it. I work overtime, work harder, am more attentive\nto my work; and thereby save more for my employer than I take.\" Here\nyou contradict yourself. You are therefore not underpaid. And if you\nfurnish a greater amount of labor than is expected of you, that is your\nbusiness and your free choice. And the right you have to a compensation\nfor such extra labor is entirely dependent on the free will of your\nemployer. People usually pay for what they call for; services uncalled\nfor are gratuitous services. To think otherwise betokens a befuddled\nstate of mind.\n\n\"But I am forced to work harder and longer than we agreed.\" Then it is\nup to you to remonstrate with your employer, to state the case as it is\nand to ask for a raise. If he refuses, then his refusal is your cue to\nquit and go elsewhere. It means that your services are no longer\nrequired. It means, at any rate, that you have to stand the cut or seek\nto better your condition under other employers. It is hard! Of course\nit is hard, but no harder than a great many other things we have to put\nup with.\n\nIf my neighbor holds unjustly what belongs to me, or if he has failed\nto repair damages caused, to recover my losses by secret compensation\nhas the same degree of malice and disorder. The law is instituted for\njust such purposes; you have recourse thereto. You may prosecute and\nget damages. If the courts fail to give you justice, then perhaps there\nmay be occasion to discuss the merits of the secret compensation\ntheory. But you had better get the advice of some competent person\nbefore you attempt to put it in practice; otherwise you are liable to\nget into a bigger hole than the one you are trying to get out of.\n\nSometimes the bold assertion is advanced that the employer knows\nperfectly that he is being systematically robbed and tolerates it. It\nis incumbent on this party to prove his assertion in a very simple way.\nLet him denounce himself to his employer and allow the truth or falsity\nthereof hang on the result. If he does not lose his job inside of\ntwenty-four hours after the interview, he may continue his peculations\nin perfect tranquillity of conscience. If he escapes prosecution\nthrough the consideration of his former employer, he must take it for\ngranted that the toleration he spoke of was of a very general nature,\nthe natural stand for a man to take who is being robbed and cannot help\nit. To justify oneself on such a principle is to put a premium on\nshrewd dishonesty.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXXVII.\nCONTUMELY.\n\nTHE Eighth Commandment concerns itself with the good name of the\nneighbor; in a general way, it reproves all sins of the tongue, apart\nfrom those already condemned by the Second and Sixth commandments, that\nis to say, blasphemous and impure speech. It is as a weapon against the\nneighbor and an instrument of untruth that the tongue is here\nconsidered.\n\nBy a good name is here intended the esteem in which a person is held by\nhis fellow-men. Call it reputation, character, fame, renown, etc., a\ngood name means that the bearer is generally considered above reproach\nin all matters of honesty, moral integrity and worth. It does not\nnecessarily imply that such esteem is manifested exteriorly by what is\ntechnically known as honor, the natural concomitant of a good name; it\nsimply stands for the knowledge entertained by others of our\nrespectability and our title to honor. A good name is therefore one\nthing; honor is another. And honor consists precisely in that\nmanifestation on the part of our fellows of the esteem and respect in\nwhich they hold us, the fruit of our good name, the homage rendered to\nvirtue, dignity and merit. As it may therefore be easily seen, these\ntwo things--a good name and honor--differ as much as a sign differs\nfrom the thing signified.\n\nThe Eighth Commandment protects every man's honor; it condemns\ncontumely which is an attack upon that honor. Contumely is a sign of\ncontempt which shows itself by attempting to impair the honor one duly\nreceives; it either strives to prevent that honor being paid to the\ngood name that naturally deserves it, or it tries to nullify it by\noffering just the contrary, which is contumely, more commonly called\naffront, outrage, insult.\n\nNow, contumely, as you will remark, does not seek primarily to deprive\none of a good name; which it nearly always succeeds in doing, and this\nis called detraction; but its object is to prevent your good name from\ngetting its desert of respect, your character supposedly remaining\nintact. The insult offered is intended to effect this purpose. Again,\nall contumely presupposes the presence of the party affronted; the\naffront is thrown in one's face, and therein consists the shocking\nindecency of the thing and its specific malice.\n\nIt must be remembered that anger, hatred, the spirit of vengeance or\nany other passion does not excuse one from the guilt of contumely. On\nthe other hand, one's culpability is not lessened by the accidental\nfact of one's intended insults going wide of the mark and bearing no\nfruit of dishonor to the person assailed. To the malice of contumely\nmay, and is often, added that of defamation, if apart from the dishonor\nreceived one's character is besmirched in the bargain. Contumely\nagainst parents offends at the same time filial piety; against God and\nHis saints, it is sacrilegious; if provoked by the practice of religion\nand virtue, it is impious. If perpetrated in deed, it may offend\njustice properly so called; if it occasion sin in others, it is\nscandalous; if it drive the victim to excesses of any kind, the guilt\nthereof is shared by the contumelious agent.\n\nSometimes insult is offered gratuitously, as in the case of the weak,\nthe old, the cripple and other unfortunates who deserve pity rather\nthan mockery; the quality of contumely of this sort is brutal and\nfiendish. Others will say for justification: \"But he said the same, he\ndid the same to me. Can I not defend myself?\" That depends on the sort\nof defense you resort to. All weapons of defense are not lawful. If a\nman uses evil means to wrong you, there is no justification, in\nChristian ethics, for you to employ the same means in order to get\nsquare, or even to shelter yourself from his abuse. The \"eye-for-eye\"\nprinciple is not recognized among civilized and Christian peoples.\n\nThis gross violation of personal respect may be perpetrated in many\nways; any expression of contempt, offered to your face, or directed\nagainst you through a representative, is contumely. The usual way to do\nthis is to fling vile epithets, to call opprobrious names, to make\nshameful charges. It is not always necessary that such names and\nepithets be inapplicable or such charges false, if, notwithstanding,\nthe person in question has not thereby forfeited his right to respect.\nIn certain circumstances, the epithet \"fool\" may hold all the\nopprobriousness of contumely: \"thief\" and \"drunkard\" and others of a\nfouler nature may be thus malicious for a better reason. An accusation\nof immorality in oneself or in one's parents is contumelious in a high\ndegree. Our mothers are a favorite target for the shafts of contumely\nthat through them reach us. Abuse is not the only vehicle of contumely;\nscorn, wanton ridicule, indecent mockery and caricature that cover the\nunfortunate victim with shame and confusion serve the purpose as well.\nTo strike one, to spit on one and other ignoble attacks and assaults\nbelong to the same category of crime.\n\nThe malice of contumely is not, of course, equal in all cases;\ncircumstances have a great deal to do in determining the gravity of\neach offense. The more conspicuous a person is in dignity and the more\nworthy of respect, the more serious the affront offered him; and still\nmore grave the offense, if through him many others are attainted. If\nagain no dishonor is intended and no offense taken, or could reasonably\nbe taken, there is no sin at all. There may be people very low on the\nscale of respectability as the world judges respectability; but it can\nnever be said of a man or woman that he or she cannot be dishonored,\nthat he or she is beneath contempt. Human nature never forfeits all\nrespect; it always has some redeeming feature to commend it.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXXVIII.\nDEFAMATION.\n\nDEFAMATION differs from contumely in that the one supposes the absence,\nthe other, the presence, of the person vilified; and again, in that the\nformer asperses the reputation of the victim while the latter attacks\nthe honor due or paid to said reputation. A good name is, after the\ngrace of God, mans most precious possession; wealth is mere trash\ncompared with it. You may find people who think otherwise, but the\nuniversal sentiment of mankind stigmatizes such baseness and buries it\nunder the weight of its opprobrium. Nor is it impossible that honor be\npaid where a good character no longer exists; but this is accidental.\nIn the nature of things, reputation is the basis of all honor; if you\ndestroy character, you destroy at the same time its fruit, which is\nhonor. Thus will be seen the double malice of defamation.\n\nTo defame therefore is to lessen or to annul the estimation in which a\nperson is held by his fellow-men. This crime may be perpetrated in two\ndifferent manners: by making known his secret faults, and this is\nsimple detraction; and by ascribing to him faults of which he is\ninnocent, and this is calumny or slander. Thus it appears that a man's\ncharacter may suffer from truth as well as from falsehood. Truth is an\nadorable thing, but it has its time and place; the fact of its being\ntruth does not prevent it from being harmful. On the other hand, a lie,\nwhich is evil in itself, becomes abominable when used to malign a\nfellow-man.\n\nThere is one mitigating and two aggravating forms of defamation. Gossip\nis small talk, idle and sufficiently discolored to make its subject\nappear in an unfavorable light. It takes a morbid pleasure in speaking\nof the known and public faults of another. It picks at little things,\nand furnishes a steady occupation for people who have more time to mind\nother people's business than their own. It bespeaks small-ness in\nintellectual make-up and general pusillanimity. That is about all the\nharm there is in it, and that is enough.\n\nLibel supposes a wide diffusion of defamatory matter, written or\nspoken. Its malice is great because of its power for evil and harm.\nTale-bearing or backbiting is what the name implies. Its object is\nprincipally to spread discord, to cause enmity, to break up\nfriendships; it may have an ulterior purpose, and these are the means\nit employs. No limit can be set to its capacity for evil, its malice is\nespecially infernal.\n\nIt is not necessary that what we do or say of a defamatory nature\nresult, as a matter of fact, in bringing one's name into disfavor or\ndisrepute; it is sufficient that it be of such a nature and have such a\ntendency. If by accident the venomous shaft spend itself before\nattaining the intended mark, no credit is due therefore to him who shot\nit; his guilt remains what it was when he sped it on its way. Nor is\nthere justification in the plea that no harm was meant, that the deed\nwas done in a moment of anger, jealousy, etc., that it was the result\nof loquacity, indulged in for the simple pleasure of talking. These are\nexcuses that excuse not.\n\nThere are those who, speaking in disparagement of the neighbor, speak\nto the point, directly and plainly; others, no less guilty, do it in a\ncovert manner, have recourse to subterfuge and insinuation. They\nexaggerate faults and make them appear more odious, they put an evil\ninterpretation on the deed or intention; they keep back facts that\nwould improve the situation; they remain silent when silence is\ncondemnatory; they praise with a malignant praise. A mean, sarcastic\nsmile or a significant reticence often does the work better than many\nwords and phrases. And all this, as we have said, independently of the\ntruth or falsehood of the impression conveyed.\n\nListeners share the guilt of the defamers on the principle that the\nreceiver is as bad as the thief. This supposes of course that you\nlisten, not merely hear; that you enjoy this sort of a thing and are\nwilling and ready to receive the impression derogatory to the\nneighbor's esteem and good name. Of course, if mere curiosity makes us\nlisten and our pleasure and amusement are less at the expense of the\nneighbor's good name than excited by the style of the narrator or the\nsingularity of the facts alleged, the fault is less; but fault there\nnevertheless is, since such an attitude serves to encourage the\ntraducer and helps him drive his points home. Many sin who could and\nshould prevent excesses of this kind, but refrain from doing so; their\nsin is greater if, by reason of their position, they are under greater\nobligations of correction.\n\nAlthough reputation is a priceless boon to all men, there are cases\nwherein it has an especial value on account of the peculiar\ncircumstances of a man's position. It not infrequently happens that the\nwhole success of a man's life depends on his good name. Men in public\nlife, in the professions, religious and others similarly placed,\nsuffer from defamation far more than those in the ordinary walks of\nlife; and naturally those who injure them are guilty of more grievous\nwrong. And it goes without saying that a man can stand an immoral\naspersion better than a woman. In all cases the malice is measured by\nthe injury done or intended.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER LXXXIX.\nDETRACTION.\n\nTO absolve oneself of the sin of detraction on the ground that nothing\nbut the truth was spoken is, as we have seen, one way of getting around\na difficulty that is no way at all. Some excuses are better than none,\nothers are not. It is precisely the truth of such talk that makes it\ndetraction; if it were not true, it would not be detraction but\ncalumny--another and a very different fault. It would be well for such\npeople to reflect for a moment, and ask themselves if their own\ncharacter would stand the strain of having their secret sins and\nfailings subjected to public criticism and censure, their private\nshortcomings heralded from every housetop. Would they, or would they\nnot, consider themselves injured by such revelations? Then it would be\nin order for them to use the same rule and measure in dealing with\nothers.\n\nHe who does moral evil offends in the sight of God and forfeits God's\nesteem and friendship. But it does not follow that he should also\nforfeit the esteem of his fellow-men. The latter evil is nothing\ncompared with the first; but it is a great misfortune nevertheless. If\na man's private iniquity is something that concerns himself and his\nGod, to the exclusion of all others, then whosoever presumes to judge\nand condemn him trespasses on forbidden ground, and is open to judgment\nand condemnation himself before his Maker.\n\nAll do not live in stone mansions who throw stones. If there is a mote\nin the neighbor's eye, perhaps there is a very large piece of timber in\nyour own. Great zeal in belaboring the neighbor for his faults will not\nlessen your own, nor make you appear an angel of light before God when\nyou are something very different. If you employed this same zeal\ntowards yourself, you would obtain more consoling results, for charity\nbegins at home. One learns more examining one's own conscience than\ndissecting and flaying others alive.\n\nIt may be objected that since detraction deals with secret sins, if the\nfacts related are of public notoriety, there is no wrong in speaking of\nthem, for you cannot vilify one who is already vilified. This is true;\nand then, again, it depends. First, these faults must be of public\nnotoriety. A judicial sentence may make them such, but the fact that\nsome, many, or a great many know and speak of them will not do it. The\npublic is everybody, or nearly everybody. Do not take your friends for\nthe public, when they are only a fraction thereof. If you do you will\nfind out oftener than it is pleasant that your sins of detraction are\nsins of slander; for rumors are very frequently based on nothing more\nsubstantial than lies or distorted and exaggerated facts set afloat by\na calumniator.\n\nEven when a person has justly forfeited, and publicly, the\nconsideration of his fellowmen, and it is not, therefore, injurious to\nhis character to speak of his evil ways, justice may not be offended,\nbut charity may be, and grievously. It is a sin, an uncharity, to harp\non one's faults in a spirit of spite, or with the cruel desire to\nmaintain his dishonor; to leave no stone unturned in order to\nthoroughly blacken his name. In doing this you sin against charity,\nbecause you do something you would not wish to have done unto you.\nJustice itself would be violated if, even in the event of the facts\nrelated being notorious, you speak of them to people who ignore them\nand are not likely ever to come to a knowledge of them.\n\nIf you add, after telling all you know about a poor devil, that he did\npenance and repaired his sin, you must not imagine that such atonement\nwill rehabilitate him in the minds of all. Men are more severe and\nunforgiving than God. Grace may be recovered, but reputation is a thing\nwhich, once lost, is usually lost for good. Something of the infamy\nsticks; tears and good works will not, cannot wash it away. He,\ntherefore, who banks too much on human magnanimity is apt to err; and\nhis erring constitutes a fault.\n\n\"But I confided the secret to but one person; and that one a dear\nfriend, who promised to keep it.\" Yes, but the injured party has a\nright to the estimation of that one person, and his injury consists\nprecisely in being deprived of it. Besides, you accuse yourself openly.\nEither what you said was void of all harm, or it was not. In the one\ncase, why impose silence! In the other, why not begin yourself by\nobserving the silence you impose upon others! Your friend will do what\nyou did, and the ball you set rolling will not stop until there is\nnothing left of your victim's character.\n\nOf course there are times when to speak of another's faults is\nderogatory neither to justice nor to charity; both may demand that the\nevil be revealed. A man to defend himself may expose his accuser's\ncrookedness; in court his lawyer may do it for him, for here again\ncharity begins at home. In the interests of the delinquent, to effect\nhis correction, one may reveal his shortcomings to those who have\nauthority to correct. And it is even admitted that a person in trouble\nof any kind may without sin, for the purpose of obtaining advice or\nconsolation, speak to a judicious friend of another's evil ways.\n\nZeal for the public good may not only excuse, but even require that the\ntrue character of a bad man be shown up and publicly censured. Its\nobject is to prevent or undo evil, to protect the innocent; it is\nintended to destroy an evil influence and to make hypocrisy fly under\nhis own colors. Immoral writers, living or dead, corrupt politicians\nand demagogues, unconscionable wretches who prey on public ignorance,\nmay and should be, made known to the people, to shield them is to share\ntheir guilt. This should not be done in a spirit of vengeance, but for\nthe sole purpose of guarding the unwary against vultures who know no\nlaw, and who thrive on the simplicity of their hearers.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XC.\nCALUMNY.\n\nTO the malice of detraction calumny adds that of falsehood. It is a\nlie, which is bad; it is a report prejudicial to the character of\nanother, which is worse; it is both combined, out of which combination\nsprings a third malice, which is abominable. All the more so, since\nthere can exist no excuse or reason in the light of which this sin may\nappear as a human weakness. Because slander is the fruit of deliberate\ncriminal spite, jealousy and revenge, it has a character of diabolism.\nThe calumniator is not only a moral assassin, but he is the most\naccomplished type of the coward known to man. If the devil loves a\ncheerful liar, he has one here to satisfy his affections.\n\nThis crime is one that can never be tolerated, no matter what the\ncircumstances; it can never be justified on any grounds whatsoever; it\nis intrinsically evil, a sin of injustice that admits no mitigation.\nWhen slander is sworn to before the courts, it acquires a fourth\nmalice, that of irreligion, and is called false testimony. It is not\nalone perjury, for perjury does not necessarily attack the neighbor's\ngood name; it is perjured calumny, a crime that deserves all the\nreprobation it receives in this world--and in the next.\n\nTo lie outright, deliberately and with malice aforethought, in\ntraducing a fellow-man, is slander in its direct form; but such\nconditions are not required to constitute a real fault of calumny. It\nis not necessary to be certain that what you allege against your\nneighbor be false; it is sufficient that you be uncertain if it be\ntrue. An unsubstantiated charge or accusation, a mere rumor given out\nas worthy of belief, a suspicion or doubt clothed so as to appear a\ncertainty, these contain all the malice and all the elements of slander\nclearly characterized. Charity, justice and truth alike are violated,\nguilt is there in unquestioned evidence. Whatever subterfuge,\nequivocation or other crooked proceeding be resorted to, if mendacity\nin any form is a feature of the aspersions we cast upon the neighbor,\nwe sin by calumny, purely and simply.\n\nSome excuse themselves on the plea that what they say, they give out\nfor what it is worth; they heard it from others, and take no\nresponsibility as to its truth or falsehood. But here we must consider\nthe credulity of the hearers. Will they believe it, whether you do or\nnot? Are they likely to receive it as truth, either because they are\nlooking for just such reports, or because they know no better? And\nwhether they believe it or not, will they, on your authority, have\nsufficient reason for giving credence to your words? May it not happen\nthat the very fact of your mentioning what you did is a sufficient mark\nof credibility for others? And by so doing, you contribute to their\nknowledge of what is false, or what is not proven true, concerning the\nreputation of a neighbor.\n\nFor it must be remembered that all imprudence is not guiltless, all\nthoughtlessness is not innocent of wrong. It is easy to calumniate a\nperson by qualifying him in an off-hand way as a thief, a blackleg, a\nfast-liver, etc. It is easy, by adding an invented detail to a\nstatement, to give it an altogether different color and turn truth into\nfalsehood. But the easiest way is to interpret a man's intentions\naccording to a dislike, and, by stringing in such fancies with a lot of\nfacts, pass them on unsuspecting credulity that takes all or none. If\nyou do not think well of another, and the occasion demand it, speak it\nout; but make it known that it is your individual judgment and give\nyour reasons for thus opining.\n\nThe desperate character of calumny is that, while it must be repaired,\nas we shall see later, the thing is difficult, often impossible;\nfrequently the reparation increases the evil instead of diminishing it.\nThe slogan of unrighteousness is: \"Calumniate, calumniate, some of it\nwill stick!\" He who slanders, lies; he who lies once may lie again, a\nliar is never worthy of belief, whether he tells the truth or not, for\nthere is no knowing when he is telling the truth. One has the right to\ndisbelieve the calumniator when he does wrong or when he tries to undo\nit. And human nature is so constructed that it prefers to believe in\nthe first instance and to disbelieve in the second.\n\nYou may slander a community, a class as well as an individual. It is\nnot necessary to charge all with crime; it is sufficient so to\nmanipulate your words that suspicion may fall on any one of said class\nor community. If the charge be particularly heinous, or if the body of\nmen be such that all its usefulness depends on its reputation, as is\nthe case especially with religious bodies, the malice of such slander\nacquires a dignity far above the ordinary.\n\nThe Church of God has suffered more in the long centuries of her\nexistence from the tongue of slander than from sword and flame and\nchains combined. In the mind of her enemies, any weapon is lawful with\nwhich to smite her, and the climax of infamy is reached when they\naffirm, to justify their dishonesty, that they turn Rome's weapons\nagainst her. There is only one answer to this, and that is the silence\nof contempt. Slander and dollars are the wheels on which moves the\npropaganda that would substitute Gospel Christianity for the\nsuperstitions of Rome. It is slander that vilifies in convention and\nsynod the friars who did more for pure Christianity in the Philippines\nin a hundred years than the whole nest of their revilers will do in ten\nthousand. It is slander that holds up to public ridicule the\ncongregations that suffer persecution and exile in France in the name\nof liberty, fraternity, etc. It is slander that the long-tailed\nmissionary with the sanctimonious face brings back from the countries\nof the South with which to regale the minds of those who furnish the\nBibles and shekels. And who will measure the slander that grows out of\nthe dunghill of Protestant ignorance of what Catholics really believe!\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XCI.\nRASH JUDGMENT.\n\nTHE Eighth Commandment is based on the natural right every fellow-man\nhas to our good opinion, unless he forfeits it justly and publicly. It\nforbids all injury to his reputation, first, in the estimation of\nothers, which is done by calumny and detraction; secondly, in our own\nestimation, and this is done by rash judgment, by hastily and without\nsufficient grounds thinking evil of him, forming a bad opinion of him.\nHe may be, as he has a right to be, anxious to stand well in our esteem\nas well as in the esteem of others.\n\nA judgment, rash or otherwise, is not a. doubt, neither is it a\nsuspicion. Everybody knows what a doubt is. When I doubt if another is\ndoing or has done wrong, the idea of his or her guilt simply enters my\nmind, occurs to me and I turn it over and around, from one side to\nanother, without being satisfied to accept or reject it. I do not say:\nyes, it is true; neither do I say: no, it is not true. I say nothing, I\npass no judgment; I suspend for the moment all judgment, I doubt.\n\nA doubt is not evil unless there be absolutely no reason for doubting,\nand then the doubt is born of passion and malice. And the evil,\nwhatever there is of it, is not in the doubt's entering our mind--\nsomething beyond our control; but in our entertaining the doubt, in our\nmaking the doubt personal, which supposes an act of the will.\n\nStronger than doubt is suspicion. When I suspect one, I do not keep the\nbalance perfectly even between yes and no, as in the case of doubt; I\nlean mentally to one side, but do not go so far as to assent one way or\nthe other. Having before me a person who excites my suspicion, I am\ninclined to think him guilty on certain evidence, but I fear to judge\nlest I should be in error, because there is evidence also of innocence.\nIf my suspicion is based on good grounds, it is natural and lawful;\notherwise it is rash and sinful; it is uncharitable and unjust to the\nperson suspected. A suspicion often hurts more than an accusation.\n\nDoubt and suspicion, when rash, are sinful; but the malice thereof\nis not grave unless they are so utterly unfounded as to betoken\ndeep-seated antipathy and aversion and a perverse will; or unless in\npeculiar circumstances the position of the person is such as to make\nthe suspicion gravely injurious and not easily condoned. There is guilt\nin keeping that suspicion to oneself; to give it out in words is\ncalumny, whether it be true or not, simply because it is unfounded.\n\nIn a judgment there is neither doubt nor suspicion; I make my own the\nidea presented to my mind. The balance of assent, in which is weighed,\nthe evidence for and against, is not kept even, nor is it partially\ninclined; It goes down with its full weight, and the party under\nconsideration stands convicted before the tribunal of my judgment. I do\nnot say, I wonder if he is guilty; nor he most likely is guilty; but:\nhe is guilty--here is a deliberate judgment. Henceforth my esteem\nceases for such a person. Translated in words such a judgment is not\ncalumny because it is supposedly founded in reason; but it is\ndetraction, because it is injurious.\n\nSuch a judgment, without any exterior expression, is sinful if it is\nrash. And what makes it rash? The insufficiency of motive on which it\nis based. And whence comes the knowledge of such sufficiency or\ninsufficiency of motive? From the intelligence, but mostly from the\nconscience. That is why many unintelligent people judge rashly and sin\nnot, because they know no better. But conscience nearly always supplies\nintelligence in such matters and ignorance does not always save us from\nguilt. An instinct, the wee voice of God in the soul, tells us to\nwithhold our judgment even when the intelligence fails to weigh the\nmotives aright. To contemn this voice is to sin and be guilty of rash\njudgment.\n\nIn the language of ordinary folks, not always precise and exact in\ntheir terms, an opinion is frequently a judgment, to think this or that\nof another is often to judge him accordingly. The suspicions of\nsuspicious people are at times more than suspicions and are clearly\ncharacterized judgments. To render a verdict on the neighbor's\ncharacter is a judgment, by whatever other name it is called; all that\nis necessary is to come to a definite conclusion and to give the assent\nof the will to that conclusion.\n\nWhen the conduct of the neighbor is plainly open to interpretation, if\nwe may not judge immediately against him, neither are we bound to give\nhim the benefit of the doubt; we may simply suspend all judgment and\nawait further evidence. In our exterior dealings this suspicion should\nnot affect our conduct, for every man has a right to be treated as an\nhonest man and does not forfeit that right on the ground of a mere\nprobability. This, however, does not prevent us from taking a cue from\nour suspicion and acting guardedly towards him. This does not mean that\nwe adjudge him dishonest, but that we deem him capable of being\ndishonest, which is true and in accordance with the laws of prudence.\n\nNeither are we bound to overlook all evidence that points to a man's\nguilt through fear of judging him unfavorably. It is not wrong to judge\na man according to his merits, to have a right opinion of him, even\nwhen that opinion is not to his credit. All that is necessary is that\nwe have good reason on Which to base that opinion. If a neighbor does\nevil in our presence or to our knowledge he forfeits, and justly, our\ngood opinion; he is to blame, and not we. We are not obliged to close\nour eyes to the truth of facts, and it is on facts that our judgments\nare formed.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XCII.\nMENDACITY.\n\nTO lie is to utter an untruth, with full knowledge that it is an\nuntruth. The untruth may be expressed by any conventional sign, by\nword, deed, gesture, or even by silence. Its malice and disorder\nconsists in the opposition that exists between our idea and the\nexpression we give to it; our words convey a meaning contrary to what\nis in our mind; we say one thing and mean another. If we unwittingly\nutter what is contrary to fact, that is error; if we so clumsily\ntranslate our thoughts as to give a false impression of what we mean,\nand we do the best we can, that is a blunder; if in a moment of\nlistlessness and inattention we speak in a manner that conflicts with\nour state of mind, that is temporary mental aberration. But if we\nknowingly give out as truth what we know is not the truth, we lie\npurely and simply.\n\nIn misrepresentations of this kind it is not required that there be a\nplainly formulated purpose of deceiving another; an implicit intention,\na disposition to allow our words to run their natural course, is\nsufficient to give such utterances a character of mendacity. For,\nindependently of our mental attitude, it is in the nature of a lie to\ndeceive; an intention, or rather a pretense to the contrary, does not\naffect that nature. The fact of lying presupposes that we intend in\nsome manner to practise deception; if we did not have such a purpose we\nwould not resort to lying. If you stick a knife into a man, you may\npretend what you like, but you did certainly intend to hurt him and\nmake him feel badly.\n\nNor has any ulterior motive we may have in telling an untruth the power\nto change its nature; a lie is a lie, no matter what prompted it.\nWhether it serves the purpose of amusement, as a jocose lie; or helps\nto gain us an advantage or get us out of trouble, as an officious lie;\nor injures another in any way, as a pernicious lie: mendacity is the\ncharacter of our utterances, the guilt of willful falsehood is on our\nsoul. A restriction should, however, be made in favor of the jocose\nlie; it ceases to be a lie when the mind of the speaker is open to all\nwho listen and his narration or statement may be likened to those\nfables and myths and fairy tales in which is exemplified the charm of\nfigurative language. When a person says what is false and is convinced\nthat all who hear him know it is false, the contradiction between his\nmind and its expression is said to be material, and not formal; and in\nthis the essence of a lie does not consist.\n\nA lie is always a sin; it is what is called an intrinsic evil and is\ntherefore always wrong. And why is this? Because speech was given us to\nexpress our thoughts; to use this faculty therefore for a contrary\npurpose is against its nature, against a law of our being, and this is\nevil. The obnoxious consequences of falsehood, as it is patent to all,\nconstitute an evil for which falsehood is responsible. But deception,\none of those consequences, is not in itself and essentially, a moral\nfault. Deception, if not practised by lying and therefore not intended\nbut simply suffered to occur, and if there be grave reason for\nresorting to this means of defense, cannot be put down as a thing\noffensive to God or unjustly prejudicial to the neighbor. But when\ndeception is the effect of mendacity, it assumes a character of malice\nthat deserves the reprobation of man as it is condemned by God. And\nthis is another reason why lying is essentially an evil thing, and can\nnever, under any circumstances be allowed or justified.\n\nThis does not mean that lying is always a mortal sin. In fact, it is\noftener venial than mortal. It becomes a serious fault only in the\nevent of another malice being added to it. Thus, if I lie to one who\nhas a right to know the truth and for grave reasons; if the mendacious\ninformation I impart is of a nature to mislead one into injury or loss,\nand this thing I do maliciously; or if my lying is directly disparaging\nto another; in these cases there is grave malice and serious guilt. But\nif there is no injustice resulting from a lie, I prevaricate against\nright in lying, but my sin is not a serious offense.\n\nThis is a vice that certainly deserves to be fought against and\npunished always and in all places, especially in the young who are so\nprone thereto, first because it is a sin; and again, because of the\nsocial evils that it gives rise to. There is no gainsaying the fact\nthat in the code of purely human morals, lying is considered a very\nheinous offense that ostracizes a man when robbery on a large scale,\nadultery and other first-degree misdemeanors leave him perfectly\nhonorable. This recalls an instance of a recent courtroom. A young\nmiscreant thoroughly imbued with pharisaic morals met with a bold face,\nwithout a blush or a flinch, accusations of misconduct, robbery and\nmurder; but when charged with being a liar, he sprang at his accuser in\nopen court and tried to throttle him. His fine indignation got the best\nof him; he could not stand that.\n\nAmong pious-minded people two extreme errors are not infrequently met\nwith. The one is that a lie is not wrong unless the neighbor suffers\nthereby; the falsity of this we have already shown. According to the\nother, a lie is such an evil that it should not be tolerated, not one\nlie, even if all the souls in hell were thereby to be liberated. To\nthis we answer that we would like to get such a chance once; we fear we\nwould tell a whopper. It would be wicked, of course; but we might\nexpect leniency from the just Judge under the circumstances.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XCIII.\nCONCEALING THE TRUTH.\n\nTHE duty always to tell the truth does not imply the obligation always\nto tell all you know; and falsehood does not always follow as a result\nof not revealing your mind to the first inquisitive person that chooses\nto put embarrassing questions. Alongside, but not contrary to, the duty\nof veracity is the right every man has to personal and professional\nsecrets. For a man's mind is not public property; there may arise at\ntimes circumstances in which he not only may, but is in duty bound to\nwithhold information that concerns himself intimately or touches a third\nperson; and there must be a means to protect the sacredness of such\nsecrets against undue curiosity and inquisitiveness, without recourse\nto the unlawful method of lying. Silence is not an effective resource,\nfor it not infrequently gives consent one or the other way; the\nquestion may be put in such a manner that affirmation or negation will\nbetray the truth. To what then shall one have recourse?\n\nLet us remark in the first place that God has endowed human\nintelligence with a native wit, sharpness and cunning that has its\nlegitimate uses, the exercise of this faculty is evil only when its\nmethods and ends are evil. Used along the lines of moral rectitude\nstrategy and tact for profiting by circumstances are perfectly in\norder, especially when one acts in the defense of his natural rights.\nAnd if this talent is employed without injustice to the neighbor or\nviolence to the law of God, it is no more immoral than the plain\ntelling of truth; in fact it is sometimes better than telling the\ntruth.\n\nBut it must be understood that such practices must be justified by the\ncircumstances. They suppose in him who resorts thereto a right to\nwithhold information that overrides the right of his interrogator. If\nthe right of the latter to know is superior, then the hiding of truth\nwould constitute an injustice, which is sinful, and this is considered\ntantamount to lying. And if the means to which we resort is not lying,\nas we have defined it, that is, does not show a contradiction between\nwhat we say and what we mean, then there can be no fear of evil on any\nside.\n\nNow, suppose that instead of using a term whose signification is\ncontrary to what my mind conceives, which would be falsehood, I employ\na word that has a natural double meaning, one of which is conform to my\nmind, the other at variance. In the first place, I do not speak against\nmy mind; I say what I think; the word I use means what I mean. But the\nother fellow! that is another matter. He may take his choice of the two\nmeanings. If he guesses aright, my artifice has failed; if he is\ndeceived, that is his loss. I do him no injustice, for he had no right\nto question me. If my answer embarrasses him, that is just what I\nintended, and I am guilty of no evil for that; if it deceives him, that\nI did not intend but willingly suffer; I am not obliged to enter into\nexplanations when I am not even bound to answer him. Of the deception,\nhe alone is the cause; I am the occasion, if you will, but the\ncircumstances of his inquisitiveness made that occasion necessary, and\nI am not responsible.\n\nThis artifice is called equivocation or amphibology; it consists in the\nuse of words that have a natural double meaning; it supposes in him who\nresorts to it the right to conceal the truth, a right superior to that\nof the tormentor who questions him. When these conditions are\nfulfilled, recourse to this method is perfectly legitimate, but the\nconditions must be fulfilled. This is not a weapon for convenience, but\nfor necessity. It is easy to deceive oneself when it is painful to tell\nthe truth. Therefore it should be used sparingly: it is not for\nevery-day use, only emergencies of a serious nature can justify its\nemploy. Another artifice, still more delicate and dangerous, but just as\nlegitimate when certain conditions are fulfilled, is what is known as\nmental restriction. This too consists in the employ of words of double\nmeaning; but whereas in the former case, both meanings are naturally\ncontained in the word, here the term employed has but one natural\nsignification, the other being furnished by circumstances. Its\nlegitimate use supposes that he to whom the term is directed should\neither in fact know the circumstances of the case that have this\npeculiar significance, or that he could and should know them. If the\ninformation drawn from the answer received is insufficient, so much the\nbetter; if he is misinformed, the fault is his own, since neither\ngenuine falsehood nor evident injustice can be attributed to the other.\n\nAn example will illustrate this better than anything else. Take a\nphysician or lawyer, the custodian of a professional secret, or a\npriest with knowledge safeguarded by the seal of the confessional.\nThese men either may not or should not reveal to others unconcerned in\nthe matter the knowledge they, possess. There is no one but should be\naware of this, but should know that when they are questioned, they will\nanswer as laymen, and not as professionals. They will answer according\nto outside information, yes or no, whether on not such conclusion agree\nwith the facts they obtained under promise of secrecy. They simply put\nout of their mind as unserviceable all professional knowledge, and\nrespond as a man to a man. Their standing as professional men puts\nevery questioner on his guard and admonishes him that no private\ninformation need be expected, that he must take the answer given as the\nconclusion of outside evidence, then if he is deceived he has no one to\nblame but himself, since he was warned and took no heed of the warning.\n\nAgain we repeat, the margin between mental restriction and falsehood is\na safe, but narrow one, the least bungling may merge one into the\nother. It requires tact and judgment to know when it is permissible to\nhave recourse to this artifice and how to practise it safely. It is not\na thing to be trifled with. In only rare circumstances can it be\nemployed, and only few persons have the right to employ it.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XCIV.\nRESTITUTION.\n\nA PECULIAR feature attaches to the sins we have recently treated,\nagainst the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth commandments. These\noffenses differ from others in that they involve an injury, an\ninjustice to our fellow-man. Now, the condition of pardon for sin is\ncontrition; this contrition contains essentially a firm purpose that\nlooks to the future, and removes in a measure, the liability to fall\nagain. But with the sins here in question that firm purpose not only\nlooks forward, but backward as well, not only guarantees against future\nill-doing, but also repairs the wrong criminally effected in the past.\nThis is called restitution, the undoing of wrong suffered by our\nneighbor through our own fault. The firm purpose to make restitution is\njust as essential to contrition as the firm purpose to sin no more; in\nfact, the former is only a form of the latter. It means that we will\nnot sin any more by prolonging a culpable injustice. And the person who\noverlooks this feature when he seeks pardon has a moral constitution\nand make-up that is sadly in need of repairs; and of such persons there\nare not a few.\n\nJustice that has failed to protect a man's right becomes restitution\nwhen the deed of wrong is done. Restitution therefore that is based on\nthe natural right every man has to have and to hold what is his, to\nrecover it, its value or equivalent, when unduly dispossessed, supposes\nan act of injustice, that is, the violation of a strict right. This\ninjustice, in turn, implies a moral fault, a moral responsibility,\ndirect or indirect; and the fault must be grievous in order to induce a\ngrave obligation. Now, it matters not in the least what we do, or how\nwe do it, if the neighbor suffer through a fault of ours. If any human\ncreature sustains a loss to life or limb, damage to his or her social\nor financial standing, and such injury can be traced to a moral\ndelinquency on our part, we are in conscience bound to make good the\nloss and repair the damage done. To do evil is bad; to perpetuate it is\nimmeasurably worse. To refuse to remove the evil is to refuse to remove\none's guilt; and as long as one persists in such a refusal, that one\nremains under the wrath of God.\n\nRestitution concerns itself with things done or left undone, things\nsaid or left unsaid; it does not enter the domain of thought.\nConsequently, just as an accident does not entail the necessity of\nrepairing the injury that another sustains, neither does the deliberate\nthought or desire to perpetrate an injustice entail such a consequence.\nEven if a person does all in his power to effect an evil purpose, and\nfails, he is not held to reparation, for there is nothing to repair. As\nwe have said more than once, the will is the source of all malice in\nthe sight of God; but injustice to man requires material as well as\nformal malice; sin must have its complement of exterior deed before it\ncan be called human injustice.\n\nWe deem it unnecessary to dwell upon the gravity of the obligation to\nmake restitution. The balance of justice must be maintained exact and\nimpartial in this world, or the Almighty will see that it is done in\nthe next. The idea that God does not stand for justice destroys the\nidea that God exists. And if the precept not to commit injustice leaves\nthe guilty one free to repair or not to repair, that precept is\nself-contradictory and has no meaning at all. If a right is a right, it\nis not extinguished by being violated and if justice, is something more\nthan a mere sound, it must protect all rights whether sinned against or\nnot.\n\nIt might be convenient for some people to force upon their conscience\nthe lie that restitution is of counsel rather than of precept, under\nthe plea that it is enough to shoulder the responsibility of sin\nwithout being burdened with the obligation of repairing it, but it is\nonly a soul well steeped in malice that will take seriously such a\ncontention. Neither is restitution a penance imposed upon us in order\nto atone for our faults; it is no more penitential in its nature than\nare the efforts we make to avoid the faults we have fallen into in the\npast. It atones for nothing; it is simply a desisting from evil. When\nthis is done and forgiveness obtained, then, and not till then, is it\ntime to think of satisfying for the temporal punishment due to sin.\n\nNaturally it is much more easy to abstain from committing injustice\nthan to repair it after it is done. It is often very difficult and very\npainful to face the consequences of our evil ways, especially when all\nsatisfaction is gone and nothing remains but the hard exigencies of\nduty. And duty is a thing that it costs very little to shirk when one\nis already hardened by a habit of injustice. That is why restitution is\nso little heard of in the world. It is a fact to be noted that the\nCatholic Church is the only religious body that dares to enforce\nstrictly the law of reparation. Others vaguely hold it, but rarely\nteach it, and then only in flagrant cases of fraud. But she allows none\nof her children to approach the sacraments who has not already\nrepaired, or who does not promise in all sincerity to repair, whatever\nwrong he may have done to the neighbor. Employers of Catholic help\nsometimes feel the effects of this uncompromising attitude of the\nChurch; they are astonished, edified and grateful.\n\nWe recall with pleasure an incident of an apostate going about warning\npeople against the turpitudes of Rome and especially against the\nextortions of her priests through the confessional. He explained how\nthe benighted papist was obliged under pain of eternal damnation to\nconfess his sins to the priest, and then was charged so much for each\nfault he had been guilty of. An incredulous listener wanted to know if\nhe, the speaker, while in the toils of Rome had ever been obliged thus\nto disgorge in the confessional, and was answered with a triumphant\naffirmation. At which the wag hinted that it would be a good thing not\nto be too outspoken in announcing the fact as his reputation for\nhonesty would be likely to suffer thereby, for he knew, and all\nCatholics knew, who were those whose purse the confessor pries open.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XCV.\nUNDOING THE EVIL.\n\nWHENEVER a person, through a spirit of Police or grossly culpable\nnegligence, becomes responsible for serious bodily injury sustained by\nanother, he is bound, as far as in him lies, to undo the wrong and\nrepair the injustice committed. The law of personal rights that forbade\nhim to lay violent hands on another, now commands that the evil be\nremoved by him who placed it. True, physical pain and tortures cannot\nbe repaired in kind; physical injury and disability are not always\nsusceptible of adequate reparation. But there is the loss incurred as a\nresult of such disability, and this loss may affect, not one alone, but\nmany.\n\nDeath, too, is of course absolutely irreparable. But the killing of the\nvictim in nowise extinguishes the obligation of reparation. The\nprincipal object is removed; but there remain the loss of wages, the\nexpenses necessitated by illness and death; there may be a family\ndependent on the daily toil of the unfortunate and made destitute by\nhis removal. One must be blind indeed not to see that all these losses\nare laid at the door of the criminal, a direct result of his crime,\nforeseen, too, at least confusedly, since there is a moral fault; and\nthese must be made good, as far as the thing is possible, otherwise the\nsin will not be forgiven.\n\nSlander must be retracted. If you have lied about another and thereby\ndone him an injury, you are bound in conscience to correct your false\nstatement, to correct it in such a manner as to undeceive all whom you\nmay have misled. This retraction must really retract, and not do just\nthe contrary, make the last state of things worse than the first, which\nis sometimes the case. Prudence and tact should suggest means to do\nthis effectively: when, how and to what extent it should be done, in\norder that the best results of reparation may be obtained. But in one\nway or another, justice demands that the slanderer contradict his lying\nimputations and remove by so doing the stain that besmirches the\ncharacter of his victim.\n\nOf course, if it was by truth and not falsehood, by detraction and not\ncalumny, that you assailed and injured the reputation of another, there\nis no gainsaying the truth; you are not justified in lying in order to\nmake truth less damaging. The harm done here is well nigh irreparable.\nBut there is such a thing as trying to counteract the influence of evil\nspeech by good words, by mentioning qualities that offset defects, by\nsetting merit against demerit; by attenuating as far as truth will\nallow the circumstances of the case, etc. This will place your victim\nin the least unfavorable light, and will, in some measure, repair the\nevil of detraction.\n\nScandal must be repaired, a mightily difficult task; to reclaim a soul\nlost to evil through fatal inducements to sin is paramount, almost, to\nraising from the dead. It is hard, desperately hard, to have yourself\naccepted as an angel of light by those for whom you have long been a\ndemon of iniquity. Good example! Yes, that is about the only argument\nyou have. You are handicapped, but if you wield that argument for good\nwith as much strength and intensity as you did for evil, you will have\ndone all that can be expected of you, and something may come of it.\n\nThe wrong of bodily contamination is a deep one. It is a wrong, and\ntherefore unjust, when it is effected through undue influence that\neither annuls consent, or wrings it from the victim by cajolery,\nthreat, or false promise. It becomes immeasurably aggravated when the\nvictim is abandoned to bear alone the shame and burdensome consequences\nof such injustice.\n\nMatrimony is the ordinary remedy; the civil law will force it;\nconscience may make it an obligation, and does make it, unless, in rare\ncases, there be such absolute incompatibility as to make such a\ncontract an ineffective and ridiculous one, an inefficient remedy, or\nnone at all. When such is the case, a pecuniary compensation is the\nonly alternative. A career has been blasted, a future black with\ndespair stares the victim in the face, if she must face it unaided; a\nburden forced upon her that must be borne for years, entailing\nconsiderable expense. The man responsible for such a state of affairs,\nif he expects pardon for his crime, must shoulder the responsibility in\na manner that will repair at least in part the grave injustice under\nwhich his victim labors.\n\nIf both share the guilt, then both must share the burden. If one\nshirks, the other must assume the whole. The great victim is the child.\nThat child must get a Christian bringing-up, or some one will suffer\nfor it; its faith must be safeguarded. If this cannot be done at home,\nthen it must be placed where this can be done. If it is advantageous\nfor the parent or parents that their offspring be raised in ignorance\nof its origin, it is far more advantageous for the child itself. Let it\nbe confided to good hands, but let the money necessary for its support\nbe forthcoming, since this is the only way to make reparation for the\nevil of its birth.\n\nI would add a word in regard to the injustice, frequent enough, of too\nlong deferring the fulfilment of marriage promises. For one party,\nespecially, this period of waiting is precarious, fraught with danger\nand dangerous possibilities. Her fidelity makes her sacrifice all other\nopportunities, and makes her future happiness depend on the fulfilment\nof the promise given. Charms do not last forever; attractions fade with\nthe years. If affection cools, she is helpless to stir up the embers\nwithout unmentionable sacrifice. There is the peril. The man who is\nresponsible for it, is responsible for a good deal. He is committing an\ninjustice; there is danger of his not being willing to repair it,\ndanger that he may not be able to repair it. His line of duty is clear.\nUnless for reasons of the gravest importance, he cannot in surety of\nconscience continue in a line of conduct that is repugnant alike to\nnatural reason and common decency, and that smacks of moral make-up\nthat would not bear the scrutiny of close investigation.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XCVI.\nPAYING BACK.\n\nA MAN who has stolen, has nothing more urgent and imperative to\nperform, on this side of eternity, than the duty of refunding the money\nor goods unjustly acquired, or the value thereof. He may possibly\nconsider something else more important; but if he does, that man has\nsomehow unlearned the first principles of natural honesty, ignores the\nfundamental law that governs the universe, and he will have a difficult\ntime convincing the Almighty that this ignorance of his is not wholly\nculpable. The best and only thing for him to do is to make up his mind\nto pay up, to disgorge his ill-gotten goods, to make good the losses\nsustained by his neighbor through his fault.\n\nHe may, or may not, have profited to any great extent by his criminal\nproceedings; but there is no doubt that his victim suffered injustice;\nand that precisely is the root of his obligation. The stolen goods may\nhave perished in his hands and he have nothing to show; the same must\nbe said of the victim the moment his possessions disappeared; with this\ndifference, however, that justice was not violated in one case, and in\nthe other, it was. The lawful owner may be dead, or unfindable among\nthe living; but wherever he may be, he never intended that the thief\nshould enjoy the fruit of his crime. The latter's title, vitiated in\nits source, cannot be improved by any circumstance of the owner's\nwhereabouts. No one may thrive on one's own dishonesty.\n\nYou say this is hard; and in so saying, you lend testimony to the truth\nof the axiom that honesty is the best policy. There is no one but will\nagree with you; but such a statement, true though it be, helps matters\nvery little. It is always hard to do right; blame Adam and Eve for it,\nand think of something more practicable. But must I impoverish myself?\nNot to the extent of depriving yourself of the necessaries of life. But\nyou must deprive yourself to the extent of settling your little\naccount, even if you suffer something thereby. But how shall I be able\nto refund it all! You may never be able to refund it all; but you may\nstart in immediately and do the best you can; resolve to keep at it;\nnever revoke your purpose to cancel the debt. In case your lease of\nlife expires before full justice is done, the Almighty may take into\nconsideration your motives and opportunities. They do say that hell is\npaved with good intentions; but these intentions are of the sort that\nare satisfied with never coming to a state of realization.\n\nBut I shall lose my position, be disgraced, prosecuted and imprisoned.\nThis might happen if you were to write out a brief of your crime and\nsend the same, signed and sworn to, to your employer. But this is\nsuperfluous. You might omit the details and signature, enclose the sum\nand trust luck for the rest. Or you might consult your spiritual\nadviser; he might have had some experience in this line of business.\nThe essential is not that you be found out, but that you refund.\n\nIt may happen that several are concerned in a theft. In this case, each\nand every participant, in the measure of his guilt, is bound to make\nrestitution. Guilt is the object, restitution is the shadow; the\nfollowing is fatal. To order or advise the thing done; to influence\nefficaciously its doing; to assist in the deed or to profit knowingly\nthereby, to shield criminally the culprit, etc., this sort of\nco-operation adds to the guilt of sin the burden of restitution. Silence\nor inaction, when plain duty would call for words and deeds to prevent\ncrime, incriminates as well as active participation, and creates an\nobligation to repair.\n\nThere is more. Conspiracy in committing an injustice adds an especial\nfeature to the burden of restitution. If the parties to the crime had\nformed a preconcerted plan and worked together as a whole in its\naccomplishment, every individual that furnished efficient energy to the\nsuccess of the undertaking is liable, in conscience, not for a share of\nthe loss, but for the sum total. This is what is called solidarity;\nsolidarity in crime begets solidarity in reparation. It means that the\ninjured party has a just claim for damages, for all damages sustained,\nagainst any one of the culprits, each one of whom, in the event of his\nmaking good the whole loss, has recourse against the others for their\nshare of the obligation. It may happen, and does, that one or several\nabscond, and thus shirk their part of the obligation; the burden of\nrestitution may thus be unevenly distributed. But this is one of the\nrisks that conspirators in sin must take; the injured party must be\nprotected first and in preference to all others.\n\nNo Catholic can validly receive the sacrament of penance who refuses to\nassume the responsibility of restitution for injustices committed, and\nwho does not at least promise sincerely to acquit himself at the first\nfavorable opportunity and to the extent of his capacity. This means\nthat only on these conditions can the sin be forgiven by God. That man\nis not disposed sufficiently to receive absolution who continually\nneglects opportunities to keep his promise; who refuses to pay any,\nbecause he cannot pay all; who decides to leave the burden of\nrestitution to his heirs, even with the wherewith to do so. It is\nbetter not to go to confession at all than to go with these\ndispositions; it is better to wait until you can make up your mind.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XCVII.\nGETTING RID OF ILL-GOTTEN GOODS.\n\nIT may happen that a person discover among his legitimately acquired\npossessions something that does not in reality belong to him. He may\nhave come by it through purchase, donation, etc.; he kept it in good\nfaith, thinking that he had a clear title to it. He now finds that\nthere was an error somewhere, and that it is the property of some one\nelse. Of course, he is not the lawful owner, and does not become such\nby virtue of his good faith; although, in certain given circumstances,\nif the good faith, or ignorance of error, last long enough, a title may\nbe acquired by prescription, and the possessor become the lawful owner.\nBut we are not considering the question of prescription.\n\nIt is evident, then, that our friend must dispossess himself in favor\nof the real owner, as soon as the latter comes upon the scene and\nproves his claim. But the possessor may in all innocence have alienated\nthe goods, destroyed or consumed them; or they may have perished\nthrough accident or fatality. In the latter case, nothing remains to\nrefund, no one is to blame, and the owner must bear the loss. Even in\nthe former case, if the holder can say in conscience that he in nowise\nbecame richer by the possession and use of the goods in question, he is\nnot bound to make restitution. If, however, there be considerable\nprofits, they rightly belong to the owner, and the possessor must\nrefund the same.\n\nBut the question arises as to how the holder is to be compensated for\nthe expenditure made in the beginning and in good faith when he\npurchased the goods which he is now obliged to hand over to another.\nImpartial justice demands that when the rightful owner claims his\ngoods, the holder relinquish them, and he may take what he gets, even\nif it be nothing. He might claim a compensation if he purchased what he\nknew to be another's property, acting in the interests of that other\nand with the intention of returning the same to its owner. Otherwise,\nhis claim is against the one from whom he obtained the article, and not\nagainst him to whom he is obliged to turn it over.\n\nHe may, if he be shrewd enough, anticipate the serving of the owner's\nclaim and secure himself against a possible loss by selling back for a\nconsideration the goods in question to the one from whom he bought\nthem. But this cannot be done after the claim is presented; besides,\nthis proceeding must not render it impossible for the owner to recover\nhis property; and he must be notified as to the whereabouts of said\nproperty. This manoeuvre works injustice unto no one. The owner stands\nin the same relation to his property as formerly; the subsequent holder\nassumes an obligation that was always his, to refund the goods or their\nvalue, with recourse against the antecedent seller.\n\nThe moment a person shirks the responsibility of refunding the\npossessions, by him legitimately acquired, but belonging rightfully to\nanother, that person becomes a possessor in bad faith and stands\ntowards the rightful owner in the position of a thief. Not in a\nthousand years will he be able to prescribe a just title to the goods.\nThe burden of restitution will forever remain on him; if the goods\nperish, no matter how, he must make good the loss to the owner. He must\nalso disburse the sum total of profits gathered from the illegal use of\nsaid goods. If values fluctuate during the interval of criminal\npossession, he must compute the amount of his debt according to the\nvalues that prevailed at the time the lawful owner would have disposed\nof his goods, had he retained possession.\n\nFinally, there may be a doubt as to whether the object I possess is\nrightfully mine or not. I must do my best to solve that doubt and dear\nthe title to ownership. If I fail, I may consider the object mine and\nmay use it as such. If the owner turn up after the prescribed time, so\nmuch the worse for the owner. An uncertainty may exist, not as to my\nproprietorship, but as to whom the thing does belong. If my possession\nbegan in good faith and I am unable to determine the ownership, I may\nconsider myself the owner until further developments shed more light on\nthe matter.\n\nIt is different when the object was originally acquired in bad faith.\nIn such a case, first, the ill-gotten goods can never be mine; then,\nthere is no sanction in reason, conscience or law for the conduct of\nthose who run immediately to the first charitable institution and leave\nthere their conscience money; or who have masses said for the repose of\nthe souls of those who have been defrauded, before they are dead at all\nperhaps. My first care must be to locate the victim; or, if he be\ncertainly deceased or evidently beyond reach, the heirs of the victim\nof my fraud. When all means fail and I am unable to find either the\nowner or his heirs, then, and not till then, may I dispose of the goods\nin question. I must assume in such a contingency as this, that the will\nof the owner would be to expend the sum on the most worthy cause; and\nthat is charity. The only choice then that remains with me is, what\nhospital, asylum or other enterprise of charity is to profit by my\nsins, since I myself cannot be a gainer in the premises.\n\nIt might be well to remark here that one is not obliged to make\nrestitution for more than the damages call for. Earnestness is a good\nsign, but it should not blind us or drive us to an excess of zeal\ndetrimental to our own lawful interests. When there is a reasonable and\ninsolvable doubt as to the amount of reparation to be made, it is just\nthat such a doubt favor us. If we are not sure if it be a little more\nor a little less, the value we are to refund, we may benefit by the\nuncertainty and make the burden we assume as light as in all reason it\ncan be made. And even if we should happen to err on the side of mercy\nto ourselves, without our fault, justice is satisfied, being fallible\nlike all things human.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XCVIII.\nWHAT EXCUSES FROM RESTITUTION.\n\nTHOSE who do not obtain full justice from man in this world will obtain\nit in the next from God. If we do not meet our obligations this side of\nthe tribunal of the just Judge, He will see to it that our accounts are\nequitably balanced when the time for the final reckoning comes. This\nsupposes, naturally, that non-fulfilment of obligations is due on our\npart to unwillingness--a positive refusal, or its equivalent, wilful\nneglect, to undo the wrongs committed. For right reason and God's mercy\nmust recognize the existence of a state of unfeigned and hopeless\ndisability, when it is impossible for the delinquent to furnish the\nwherewithal to repair the evils of which he has been guilty. When this\ncondition is permanent, and is beyond all remedy, all claims are\nextinguished against the culprit, and all losses incurred must be\nascribed to \"an act of God,\" as the coroner says. For no mart can be\nheld to what is impossible.\n\nChief among these moral, as well as legal, bankrupts is the\ngood-for-nothing fellow who is sorry too late, who has nothing, has no\nhopes of ever having anything, and who therefore can give nothing. You\ncannot extract blood from a beet, nor shekels from an empty purse. Then\na man may lose all his belongings in a catastrophe, and after striving\nby labor and economy to pay off his debts, may see himself obliged to\ngive up the task through sickness, misfortune or other good causes. He\nhas given all he has, he cannot give more. Even though liabilities\nwere stacked up mountain-high against him, he cannot be held morally\nresponsible, and his creditors must attribute their losses to the\nmisfortune of life--a rather unsubstantial consolation, but as good a\none as the poor debtor has.\n\nThere are other cases where the obligations of restitution are not\nannulled, but only cancelled for the time being, until such a time as\ncircumstances permit their being met without grave disaster to the\ndebtor. The latter may be in such a position that extreme, or great,\nwant would stare him in the face, if he parted with what he possesses\nto make restitution. The difficulty here is out of all proportion with\nthe injustice committed for, after all, one must live, and charity\nbegins at home, our first duty is toward ourselves. The creditors of\nthis man have no just claim against him until he improves his\ncircumstances; in the meantime, the burden of responsibility is lifted\nfrom his shoulders.\n\nThe same must be said when the paying off of a debt at any particular\ntime, be it long or short, would cripple a man's finances, wipe out his\nearnings to such an extent as to make him fall considerably below his\npresent position in life. We might take a case during the late coal\nfamine, of a man who, in order to fill his contracts of coal at six\ndollars a ton, would be obliged to buy it at fifteen and twenty dollars\na ton; and thereby sacrifice his fortune. The thing could not be\nexpected, it is preposterous. His obligee must wait and hope for better\ntimes.\n\nA man's family is a part of himself. Therefore the payment of a just\ndebt may be deferred In order to shield from want parents, wife,\nchildren, brothers or sisters. Life, limb and reputation are greater\npossessions than riches; consequently, rather than jeopardize these,\none may, for the time, put aside his obligations to make restitution.\n\nAll this supposes, of course, that during the interval of delay the\ncreditor does not suffer inconveniences greater than, or as great as,\nthose the debtor seeks to avoid. The latter's right to defer payment\nceases to exist the moment it comes into conflict with an equal right\nof the former to said payment. It is against reason to expect that,\nafter suffering a first injustice, the victim should suffer a second in\norder to spare the guilty party a lesser or an equal injury. Preference\ntherefore must be given to the creditor over the debtor when the\nnecessity for sacrifice is equal, and leniency must be refused when it\nbecomes cruelty to the former.\n\nOutside these circumstances, which are rare indeed, it will be seen at\nonce that the creditor may act an unjust part in pressing claims that\naccidentally and temporarily become invalid. He has a right to his own,\nbut he is not justified in vindicating that right, if in so doing, he\ninflicts more damage than equity calls for. The culprit has a right not\nto suffer more than he deserves, and it is mock justice that does not\nrespect that right. If the creditor does suffer some loss by the delay,\nthis might be a circumstance to remember at the final settlement but\nfor the present, there is an impediment to the working of justice,\nplaced by the fatal order of things and it is beyond power to remove\nit.\n\n\n\nCHAPTER XCIX.\nDEBTS.\n\nBEFORE closing our remarks, necessarily brief and incomplete, on this\nsubject, so vast and comprehensive, we desire in a few words to pay our\nrespects to that particular form of injustice, more common perhaps than\nall others combined, which is known as criminal debt, likewise, to its\nagent, the most brazen impostor and unconscionable fraud that afflicts\nsociety, the man who owes and will not pay. More people suffer from bad\ndebts than from stealing and destruction of property. It is easier to\ncontract a debt, or to borrow a trifle, than to steal it outright; it\nis safer, too. Imprudence is one of the chief characteristics of this\ngenus of iniquity. \"I would sooner owe you this than cheat you out of\nit:\" this, in word or deed, is the highly spiritual consolation they\noffer those whom they fleece and then laugh at.\n\nThe wilful debtor is, first of all, a thief and a robber, because he\nretains unjustly the lawful possessions of another. There is no\ndifference between taking and keeping what belongs to the neighbor. The\nloss is the same to a man whether he is robbed of a certain amount or\nsells goods for which he gets nothing in return. The injustice is the\nsame in both cases, the malice identical. He therefore who can pay his\ndebts, and will not, must be branded as a thief and an enemy to the\nrights of property.\n\nThe debtor is guilty of a second crime, of dishonesty and fraud against\nhis fellow-man, by reason of his breaking a contract, entered upon with\na party in good faith, and binding in conscience until cancelled by\nfulfilment. When a man borrows or buys or runs an account on credit, he\nagrees to return a quid pro quo, an equivalent for value received. When\nhe fails to do so, he violates his contract, breaks his pledge of\nhonor, obtains goods under false pretense. Even if he is sincere at the\ntime of the making of the contract, the crime is perpetrated the moment\nhe becomes a guilty debtor by repudiating, in one way or another, his\njust debts. Now, to injure a person is wrong; to break faith with him\nat one and the same time is to incur guilt of a double dye.\n\nThere is likewise an element of contumely and outrage in such dishonest\noperations; the affront offered the victim is contemptible. Men have\noften been heard to say, after being victimized by imposture of this\nsort: \"I do not mind the loss so much, but I do object to being treated\nlike a fool and a monkey.\" One's feelings suffer more than one's purse.\nEspecially is this the case when the credit is given or a loan made as\na favor or service, intended or requested, only to be requited by the\nblackest kind of ingratitude.\n\nAnd let us not forget the extent of damage wrought unto worthy people\nin hard circumstances who are shut out from the advantages of borrowing\nand buying on credit by the nefarious practices of dishonest borrowers\nand buyers. A burnt child keeps away from the fire. A man, after being\ndefrauded palpably a few times, acquires the habit of refusing all\ncredit; and he turns down many who deserve better, because of the\npersecution to which he is subjected by rogues and scoundrels. Every\ncriminal debtor contributes to that state of affairs and shares the\nresponsibility of causing honest people to suffer want through\ninability to get credit.\n\nAnd who are the persons thus guilty of a manifold guilt? They are those\nwho borrow and buy knowing full well they will not pay, pile debt upon\ndebt knowing full well they cannot pay. Others, who do not repudiate\nopenly their obligations, put off paying indefinitely for futile\nreasons: hard times, that last forever; ships coming in, whose fate is\nyet unlearned; windfalls from rich relatives that are not yet born,\netc.; and from delay to delay they become not only less able, but less\nwilling, to settle their accounts. Sometimes you meet a fellow anxious\nto square himself for the total amount; half his assets is negotiable,\nthe other half is gall. He threatens you with the alternative of half\nor none; he wants you to accept his impudence at the same figures at\nwhich he himself values it. And this schemer usually succeeds in his\nendeavor.\n\nOthers there are who protest their determination to pay up, even to the\nlast cent; their dun-bills are always kept in sight, lest they forget\ntheir obligations; they treasure these bills, as one treasures a thing\nof immense value. But they live beyond their means and income, purchase\npleasure and luxury, refuse to curtail frivolous expenses and\nextravagant outlay. And in the meantime their debts remain in status\nquo, unredeemed and less and less redeemable, their determination holds\ngood, apparently; and the creditor breaks commandments looking on and\nhoping.\n\nSome do violence to their thinking faculty by trying to find\njustification, somehow, for not paying their debts. The creditor is\ndead, they say; or he has plenty and can well afford to be generous. An\nattempt is often made at establishing a case of occult compensation,\nits only merit being its ingenuity, worthy of a better cause. All such\nlame excuses argue a deeper perversity of will, a malice well-nigh\nincurable; but they do not satisfy justice, because they are not\nfounded on truth.\n\nA debt has a character of sacredness, like all moral obligations; more\nsacred than many other moral obligations, because this quality is taken\ndirectly from the eternal prototype of justice, which is God. You\ncannot wilfully repudiate it therefore without repudiating God. You\nmust respect it as you respect Him. Your sins and your debts will\nfollow you before the throne of God. God alone is concerned with your\nsins; but with your debts a third party is concerned. And if God may\neasily waive His claims against you as a sinner, a sterner necessity\nmay influence His judgment of you as a debtor, through respect for the\ninviolable rights of that third party who does not forgive so readily.\n\n\n\nTHE END.\n\n\n\n\nSTANDARD CATHOLIC BOOKS\nPUBLISHED BY\nBENZIGER BROTHERS\n\nCINCINNATI: 343 MAIN ST.\nNEW YORK: 36-38 BARCLAY ST.\nCHICAGO: 214-216 W. MONROE ST.\n\nBooks marked net are such where ten per cent, must be added for\npostage. Thus a book advertised as _net_, $1.00, will be sent postpaid\non receipt of $1.10. Books not marked _net_ will be sent postpaid on\nreceipt of advertised price.\n\nMISCELLANEOUS BOOKS\n\nABANDONMENT TO DIVINE PROVIDENCE. CAUSSADE. _net_, 0 50\nADORATION OF THE BLESSED SACRAMENT. TESNIERE. _net_, 1 25\nANECDOTES AND EXAMPLES ILLUSTRATING THE CATHOLIC CATECHISM. SPIRAGO.\n_net_, 1 50\nANGELS OF THE SANCTUARY. MUSSER. 0 20\nANNOUNCEMENT BOOK FOR SUNDAY MASSES. _net_, 1 25\nART OF PROFITING BY OUR FAULTS. 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TAGGART. 0 85\nJACK O'LANTERN. WAGGAMAN. 0 45\nJUNIORS OF ST. BEDE'S. BRYSON. 0 85\nJUVENILE ROUND TABLE. First Series. 1 00\nJUVENILE ROUND TABLE. Second Series. 1 00\nJUVENILE ROUND TABLE. Third Series. 1 00\nKLONDIKE PICNIC, A. DONNELLY. 0 85\nLAMP OF THE SANCTUARY. WISEMAN. 0 25\nLEGENDS AND STORIES OF THE CHILD JESUS FROM MANY LANDS. LUTZ. 0 75\nLITTLE APOSTLE ON CRUTCHES. DELAMARE. 0 45\nLITTLE GIRL FROM BACK EAST. ROBERTS. 0 45\nLITTLE MISSY. WAGGAMAN. 0 45\nLOYAL BLUE AND ROYAL SCARLET. TAGGART. 0 85\nMADCAP SET AT ST. ANNE'S. BRUNOWE. 0 45\nMAKING OF MORTLAKE. COPUS. 0 85\nMARKS OF THE BEAR CLAWS. SPALDING. 0 85\nMARY TRACY'S FORTUNE. SADLIER. 0 45\nMASTER FRIDOLIN. GIEHRL. 0 25\nMELOR OF THE SILVER HAND. BEARNE. 0 85\nMILLY AVELING. S. T. SMITH. 0 85\nMORE FIVE O'CLOCK STORIES. 0 75\nMOSTLY BOYS. FINN. 0 85\nMY STRANGE FRIEND. FINN. 0 25\nMYSTERY OF CLEVERLY. BARTON. 0 85\nMYSTERIOUS DOORWAY. SADLIER. 0 45\nMYSTERY OF HORNBY HALL. SADLIER. 0 85\nNAN NOBODY. WAGGAMAN. 0 45\nNED RIEDER. WEHS. 0 85\nNEW BOYS AT RIDINGDALE. BEARNE. 0 85\nNEW SCHOLAR AT ST. ANNE'S. BRUNOWE. 0 85\nOLD CHARLMONT'S SEED BED. S. T. SMITH. 0 45\nOLD MILL ON THE WITHROSE. SPALDING. 0 85\nOLD ROBBER'S CASTLE. SCHMID. 0 25\nOUR LADY'S LUTENIST. BEARNE. 0 85\nOVERSEER OF MAHLBOURG. SCHMID. 0 25\nPANCHO AND PANCHITA. MANNIX. 0 45\nPAULINE ARCHER. SADLIER. 0 45\nPERIL OF DIONYSIO. MANNIX. 0 45\nPERCY WYNN. FINN. 0 85\nPETRONILLA. DONNELLY. 0 85\nPICKLE AND PEPPER. DORSEY. 0 85\nPILGRIM FROM IRELAND. CARNOT. 0 45\nPLAYWATER PLOT. WAGGAMAN. 0 60\nPOVERINA. BUCKENHAM. 0 85\nQUEEN'S PAGE. HINKSON. 0 45\nQUEEN'S PROMISE. WAGGAMAN. 0 60\nRACE FOR COPPER ISLAND. SPALDING. 0 85\nRECRUIT TOMMY COLLINS. BONESTEEL. 0 45\nRIDINGDALE FLOWER SHOW. BEARNE. 0 85\nROMANCE OF THE SILVER SHOON. BEARNE. 0 85\nROSE BUSH, THE. SCHMID. 0 25\nSEA-GULLS ROCK. SANDEAU. 0 45","title":"Explanation of Catholic morals : $b a concise, reasoned, and popular exposition of Catholic morals","tradition":"scripture-revelation","translated_text":null,"word_count":100010}